THE TERMINATION OF GENERAL WAR

by

CLARK CLAUS ABT

B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1951)

M.A., Johns Hopkins University
(1952)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

January 1965

Signature of Author ...........................................
Department of Political Science, December 10, 1964

Certified by ..................................................,
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by ..................................................
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
Abstract

THE TERMINATION OF GENERAL WAR
(unpublished manuscript, 324 pages)

by

Clark C. Abt

December 1964

The termination of general war is considered in terms of four historical case studies, and an extrapolation of the historical findings to a future general nuclear war. The four case studies are the termination of the wars between Bolshevik Russia and Imperial Germany in 1917-1918, between Imperial Germany and the Allies in 1918, between Nazi Germany and the United Nations in 1945, and between Japan and the United States in 1945. Considerable use is made of statements and evaluations by prominent persons on the losing side. The major variables common to the four historical cases are identified, and a theoretical model of the termination process and its phases is developed. These are generally and successively a contest of military strength among the belligerents; a domestic political conflict among realist, diehard, and revolutionary factions in the militarily defeated nation; negotiations, further fighting to exhaustion, or revolution and negotiation, depending on which domestic faction is dominant; and the actual termination of the war by negotiated surrender before or after the physical occupation of the defeated nation by the winners. The model is then applied to a hypothetical future nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and possible correspondences and differences in termination between such a war and the case histories of the past are identified.
THE TERMINATION OF GENERAL WAR

Clark C. Abt
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
The Termination of General Nuclear War 1

CHAPTER II
The Termination of the War Between Russia and Germany in 1917-1918 10

CHAPTER III
The Termination of World War I by Germany 47

CHAPTER IV
The Termination of World War II in Europe in 1945 118

CHAPTER V
The Termination of World War II in the Pacific in 1945 183

CHAPTER VI
Summary and Conclusions 232

CHAPTER VII
General War Termination Implications for the Future 272
CHAPTER I

THE TERMINATION OF GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

INTRODUCTION

This study of the termination of general war is intended to be an introductory treatment of a subject at once crucial, bizarre, and unpleasant. Yet it must be treated, so that if general nuclear war is ever initiated, it can be stopped short of the worst possibilities.

In World War II, according to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, the Japanese made the political decision to end the war some six months before the war was actually terminated. Perhaps if this decision had been implemented promptly, hundreds of thousands of lives might have been saved. In a third world war, in which the rate of fatalities may be tens of millions rather than tens of thousands, the reduction of the termination delay by even a few days may save hundreds of millions of lives. It is possible to imagine alternative general nuclear wars in which the losses range from the ten million fatalities of World War I, through the fifty million dead of World War II, up to the annihilation of Western civilization with the death of over 500 millions. Surely if we value a single life, distinctions in the hundreds of millions are supremely important.

Insight into the strategic war termination process is important for the deterrence of war as well as for war damage limitation. If the damage from a war can be limited by effective termination, the credibility of a U.S. military response to major aggression may be enhanced. Many wars may never have begun if the aggressor had possessed a reasonably clear view of the most likely outcome.

Examination of the termination process focuses attention on the relationships between the war aims and the actual intra-war operations. Several studies have called into question whether in World Wars I and II, for example, the surrender terms offered the defeated belligerents were the most effective possible for achieving prompt termination and the original war aims.∗

Understanding of termination may inhibit an otherwise desirable attack if there is uncertainty concerning the defender's understanding of his part in the termination process. It may also reduce inhibition to attack if both the understanding of the defender and his decisive military weakness is assured. But to know whether anyone else understands termination, we must at least first understand it ourselves.

War aims change in the course of a war, because of changing capabilities, or because problems become perceived more (or less) realistically with war experience. It would seem desirable that war-fighting strategies should be able to change with them. Because of time compression in a future war, the lesson of experience in that war must somehow be anticipated. On the widely held but not necessarily valid assumption that a general strategic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would be very short, little attention has been given to the possible need for changing strategic options, and indeed changing entire strategies for force structures in the course of such a war. While the initial nuclear exchange of a general strategic war between the United States and the Soviet Union may be decisive in many ways, the particular ways in which it may be decisive may not be known to the belligerents for some time, and continued operations may be both possible and necessary in the coming age of highly survivable strategic forces. How to terminate such a war promptly, and how to avoid a ragged but massively lethal continuation of hostilities, is therefore essential to the general understanding of how to fight such a war most effectively. The risks and limitations on being able to terminate a general nuclear war before the most grievous destruction of cities occurs on both sides may also give pause to spurious optimism about "winning" strategies.

In very general terms, wars are terminated when one of the belligerent nations or coalitions wishes to stop fighting, because it has lost the means or the will, or both, and realizes what minimum national goals can still be met by termination. On this basis, then, one might say that the military defeat (denial of means) of one side will result in termination of the war. This is obvious. But this would not be saying anything very useful, because military defeat is a matter of many degrees (which becomes increasingly
costly), and because it is still unclear exactly when, why, and how the termination of war occurs. In most every major war it is possible to see how it could have been terminated before it actually was, and how it might have been terminated even later than it was. What is interesting, and extremely important for both the total and relative costs of the war, is what makes a war end precisely when it does under certain specific conditions.

At the beginning of a war the predominant question is that of which side will win. In most general wars this question is decided, and the answer perceived by both victors and vanquished, long before the end of the war. Thus we must look to other aspects of war, in addition to the relative balance of power and the probable war outcome, for an answer to the question of just when a war ends. It does not usually end when its military outcome is decided, or even when that outcome is apparent to both sides. Why not? One may ask. How wasteful to continue fighting when the outcome is apparent! True enough, but it will be shown that the loser can go on fighting for many seemingly and actually important objectives other than victory.

The problems likely to be encountered in war termination may identify important requirements that must be satisfied in the pre-war development of military systems. For example, the desired degree of devolution of fire control capability of ICBM's may appear quite different from the pre-war and the war termination aspects. From the pre-war, deterrent-maximizing aspect, it may be argued that firing control should devolve to the lowest level of authority above which communications are destroyed, to deny an enemy the hope of a successful "decapitating attack." From the termination aspect, however such an approach might make it extremely difficult for whatever central authority remained in command to effect a coordinated cease-fire. This is only one example.

The study examined the general war termination problem in two ways: The first part is concerned with the termination of past wars, and is intended to identify such historical lessons as they may offer. The second part attempts to explore in a very preliminary way—and quite on the basis of unclassified information—current U.S. and Soviet capabilities and characteristics for terminating a general nuclear war, and attempts to draw conclusions from the lessons of the past and current capabilities. Some recommendations for U.S. policy are then offered.
For the first part concerned with the lessons of the past, attention is concentrated on the terminations of conflicts in the first and second World Wars. The first World War contains a termination by a Soviet regime, which is important because it is the only example of a Soviet Russian strategic surrender. The second World War seems most important to consider not only because it has a diversity of very different terminations (the Belgian, French, Italian, German, and Japanese strategic surrenders; the Finno-Russian limited surrender; and the Polish, Norwegian, and Dutch "informal" terminations), but also because the terminations of the second World War occur in a technological context which, although superseded by ballistic missiles and thermonuclear warheads, is closer to the present than that of any other world wars.

The approach used to treat the historical examples was as follows. First, criteria of current relevance were used to select four important cases of war termination in this century. Then in each case an attempt was made to identify the presence of an overall pattern or process of war termination. The most significant dimensions and the key military, political, and economic variables were then identified, and their relations considered. Certain conclusions were then drawn concerning what was peripheral and what was decisive in each case of war termination. Finally, consideration was given to how the belligerents involved manipulated the key variables, and how else they might have done so.

Some of the specific questions which the historical first part attempts to answer in terms of these two World Wars are:

Why are wars terminated?
What is the division of responsibilities and functions between winner and loser?
What reasons do the losers give for surrender? The winners for victory?
What is the effect of the intelligence of each side on the termination decision?
What are the major factors influencing a government to surrender? What indicators exist for these factors?
What is decisive in persuading one side to attempt termination? (No hope of victory? Fear of internal revolution if further sacrifices are demanded of the population? Military pressures?)
What is the role of invasion, or the threat of it, in strategic surrender?
For every way in which a general nuclear war can start, there are many alternative terminations. Although there is likely to be much repetition among types of terminations, the number of possibilities is obviously large. This study has elected to deal with a few of the possibilities in some depth, necessarily ignoring others. Hopefully other students will become interested in the problem, and explore other possibilities for termination.
Selection of Wars for the
Study of Strategic Termination

The general objective of this study was to understand those aspects of strategic war termination that may be of most significance for the future. According to this general objective, the selection of past wars for study was made on the basis of the direct involvement of the United States, the Soviet Union, or a major European power. Since World Wars I and II offered the richest sources of information and the intercontinental scale of events probable in any future general war, they promised to offer some of the most interesting examples of strategic war termination. It seemed appropriate to select the most different kinds of termination "plots" within World Wars I and II, to encompass the maximum of recent historical variation in the termination process and thus explore its uncertainties. To examine the significance of domestic revolution, physical exhaustion, invasion, conditional and unconditional surrender, and the shock effects of city destruction for termination, the four cases chosen each are examples of either the presence or the absence of these factors.

In Bolshevik Russia and Imperial Germany in World War I, termination followed domestic revolutions, while in World War II Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan it did not. In Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, surrender followed physical exhaustion, while Bolshevik Russia and Imperial Germany retained considerable physical resources until termination. Imperial Germany and Japan were not invaded, but Nazi Germany was invaded before termination. Bolshevik Russia and Imperial Germany surrendered conditionally, while Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally and Imperial Japan surrendered her military forces unconditionally. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan both suffered the shock effects of city destruction before the wars were terminated, while Bolshevik Russia and Imperial Germany did not.

Because of this great variety in the political, economic, and military conditions leading up to the defeat of Bolshevik Russia, Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan, these four examples of general war termination were selected for detailed examination of what underlying patterns they shared (if any), and how they differed.
Each of these four case studies of general strategic war termination is a unique drama with its own setting, plot, and characters, and its own lessons for the strategic choices open to both victorious and vanquished nations. Fortunately we can only speculate on the setting, plot, and characters in a possible future general strategic war. Because of the great technological and political changes since 1945, a future general strategic war could be very different from World Wars I and II. The termination of such a future war could also be very different—and very much worse for the victor as well as the vanquished. Precisely because the future is so uncertain, it seems important to explore the variety and the underlying similarity of these major war terminations of the recent past. If their very considerable variety discloses, on detailed examination, some similarities of underlying processes, then perhaps an awareness of these underlying processes will aid in anticipating the future.

It seems axiomatic that a study of the termination process should focus on the details of decision-making and the factors influencing it in the defeated nation. As has been pointed out by Calahan, ¹ Coser, ² Kecskemeti, ³ and Simmel, ⁴ wars are won by the victors but peace is decided on by the vanquished (in wars ending short of total destruction of

---

¹ "War is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished. Therefore, to determine the causes of peace, it is always necessary to take the vanquished point of view. Until the vanquished quits, the war goes on."


² "If both victor and vanquished are to make a contribution to the termination of their conflict they must arrive at some agreement... In order to end a conflict the parties must agree upon rules and norms allowing them to assess their respective power position in the struggle... Agreements as to goals and termination of outcome shorten the conflict. Once a goal has been reached by one of the parties and is accepted as a clue to the acceptance of defeat, the conflict is ended. The more restrictive the object of contention and the more visible for both parties the clues to victory, the higher the chances that the conflict be limited in time and extension. Emile Durkheim's dictum concerning human needs, 'The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfaction received only stimulates instead of filling needs,' is applicable in this connection. Agreed-upon limits upon the 'appetites' of the contenders place normative restrictions upon a process which does not inherently contain self-limiting properties."

Footnote continued on next page.
one side). For this reason, research into the termination process has concentrated on the forces and motivations operating in the defeated rather than in the victorious nations.


4. The vanquished "actually makes a gift to the victor."

to bring the Allies to terms before further reinforcement by Americans made it impossible, and thus sought to exploit the Bolshevik need for external peace as a means to the internal consolidation of Communist rule.

In the winter of 1917-1918 the Germans were in a sense running a race with the Americans to see which nation could first deploy enough forces to France to achieve a decisive victory there—decisive for the Germans not in the sense of a victorious end to the war, but for the securing of at least a stalemate peace. At the same time the Germans were in a sense running another race with the Bolshevik negotiators at Brest-Litovsk: If they acceded to Russian demands for a peace of "no annexations and no indemnities", they could achieve a prompt release of their troops for redeployment to the western front, but would have to sacrifice the sorely needed grain supplies of the Ukraine. If they refused to meet the Russian terms and insisted on their own, the Russians might make enough trouble to require German troops to control the Ukraine and protect against Communist infiltration of the German eastern provinces—all draining off forces from commitments to the front in France. Apparently the Germans lost patience with Trotsky's stalling tactics in February of 1918, because they broke negotiations and marched to within 100 miles of Petrograd before Lenin was induced to give up the Ukraine and accept the German terms on March 3.

The Bolshevik regime was also in a contest with the Germans under pressure of time and military threats. Since one of the principal bases of their extremely fragile and limited popular appeal in Russia* was the ending of the war, and since the Russian military forces were in any case utterly disorganized and ineffective at this time, the Bolsheviks could not credibly threaten to resume war against Germany as a counter to German demands. Furthermore, if these demands were not met and German forces invaded Russia, the survival of the Bolshevik regime would have been thrown in doubt.

* In the November 25, 1917, elections of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks polled only 9,800,000 out of 41,700,000 votes, provoking Lenin to dissolve this last vestige of popular government the following January.
Chronology of Key Events

Termination of the War Between Russia and Germany in 1917-1918

June 28, 1914  Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo
July 23, 1914  Austrian 48-hour ultimatum to Serbia
July 24, 1914  First formulation of Russian policy that Serbia must not be successfully attacked by Austria
July 25, 1914  Austrian assurances to Russia that no Serbian territory would be annexed. Russian war preparations.
July 28, 1914  Austria declares war on Serbia. Rupture of Austro-Russian relations.
July 29, 1914  Russian General Mobilization, recalled after German protest and limited to mobilization against Austria.
July 30, 1914  Revelation of technical difficulty of partial mobilization leads to renewed Russian general mobilization.
July 31, 1914  German 12-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding cessation of mobilization.
August 1, 1914  German declaration of war on Russia, no reply having been received to the ultimatum.
August 6, 1914  Austrian declaration of war on Russia.
November 2, 1914  Russian declaration of war on Turkey.
March 1915  German Supreme Command first contacts Lenin in Zurich, but abandons connection.
June 26, 1915  Russian war minister, General Sukhomlikov, removed, later tried for malfeasance.
October 19, 1915  Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria.
February 1, 1916  Russian minister-president Goremykin resigns, succeeded by M. Stürmer.
June-September 1916  Offensive by Brusilov, commander of Russian southern front against Kovel. Russians took Lutsk (June 8) and Czernowitz (June 18). Heavy fighting about Baranovici and Kovel. Russians advanced 25 to 125 km from Pinsk south to Czernowitz and captured half a million Austrian prisoners. Advance stopped by arrival of 15 German divisions from the western front. Russian losses of about a million men and failure to make decisive gains left the army demoralized.
July 22, 1916  Russian foreign minister M. Sazonov resigns; functions taken over by M. Stürmer.
November 24, 1916  M. Stürmer resigns, is followed by M. Trepov.
December 1916  Rasputin murdered by Russian noblemen.
March 8, 1917  Riots in Petrograd.
March 11, 1917  Mutiny of the Imperial Guard in Petrograd.
March 12, 1917  Revolution in Petrograd.
March 15, 1917  Abdication of Czar Nicholas II.
March 22, 1917  Provisional Coalition Government formed under Prince Lvov.
March 27, 1917  Proclamation of the Petrograd Soviet calling for immediate cessation of hostilities.

April 16, 1917  Lenin arrives in Petrograd, having been provided transport via Germany and Sweden by the German High Command, because the latter was aware of Provisional Government's intention to continue the war.

April 17, 1917  Lenin addresses All-Russian Conference of Soviets, demands propaganda in the army, overthrow of the Provisional Government, an end to the war.

July 1, 1917  Provisional government resumes offensive against Germany.
July 19, 1917  Successful German counter-attack, major Russian defeat as regiments mutinied in response to Bolshevik agitation.
July 22, 1917  Fall of Lvov Administration, Kerensky becomes Prime Minister, Bolsheviks suppressed.

July 18-28, 1917  Germans and Austrians drive Russians back and retake Halicz, Tarnopol, Czernowitz.

August 1, 1917  Brusilov succeeded by General Kornilov in Russian Command.
August 1917  Failure of summer offensive, paralysis of Provisional Government, increasing number of Bolshevik deputies in All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

September 3, 1917  Germans attack Kornilov, surround and capture Riga.
September 8-14, 1917  Kornilov marches on Petrograd in counter-revolution against Kerensky, fails as Kerensky arms Bolsheviks.

September 12, 1917  Petrograd Soviet passes Bolshevik resolution demanding immediate cessation of war by vote of 279 to 115. Trotsky and other Bolsheviks released from prison.

October 23, 1917  Lenin secretly returns to Petrograd.
October 25, 1917  Petrograd Soviet creates Military Revolutionary Committee under Trotsky.

October 26, 1917  Trotsky wins over garrison of fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, gains possession of 10,000 rifles and distributes them among Red Guards organized since June.

November 5, 1917  Kerensky proclaims state of emergency, outlaws Military Revolutionary Committee, orders arrest of Trotsky - but orders are not enforced due to lack of military power.

November 7, 1917  Lenin and Trotsky and Red Guards seize control of Petrograd. Lenin calls for an immediate armistice on all fronts.

November 9, 1917  Trotsky (Foreign Minister) invites Allies and Central Powers to conclude immediate armistice - "No annexations, no indemnities" as basis of peace.

November 20, 1917  Ukrainians proclaim Ukrainian Peoples' Republic.
November 21, 1917  Bolshevik government, having received no reply to November 8/9 invitation to all belligerents to make peace on basis of no annexations and no indemnities, opens separate discussions with Central Powers.

November 25, 1917  Elections of Constituent Assembly--Out of 41,700,000 votes only 9,800,000 polled by Bolsheviks--Lenin wrecks Assembly on 18 January 1918.
In considering the reasons for the termination of a war at a particular time, it seems reasonable to ask the question: When were military capabilities reduced to the point where it was no longer possible to "win" the war? When this point is reached and widely believed to have been reached, is presumably the time when people begin seriously to consider how to terminate the war. The role of military pressures in dramatizing the improbability of victory, and thus in persuading a people to consider alternatives to further fighting such as revolution and surrender, can be seen operating in the Russia of 1916-1917. Yet the interaction of military factors with domestic political conflicts in finally forcing Russia to accept German surrender terms was much complicated by the two successful Russian revolutions in 1917, and the greater preoccupation of both Germany and the Allies with the western front in France.

It is difficult to identify a specific situation when the Russians believed they could no longer "win", for several reasons. First, almost independently of whatever happened on the eastern front, it seemed likely that the contest on the western front would be more decisive—perhaps even as seen by Russian leaders (although there is no clear evidence on this point). Russia, in the military-political sense, was very much the junior ally to England and France, much as Austria-Hungary was the larger but junior ally to Germany. Thus whether Russia "won" or "lost", especially the latter, might not necessarily mean victory or defeat in the war as a whole.

Second, the enormous distances, primitive transport conditions, and correspondingly slow percentage changes of territory on the eastern front tended to make military victory—the usual sine qua non for political victory—relatively less decisive. This characteristic of the
eastern front, together with the uncertain allegiances of some of the Balkan powers such as Bulgaria, tended to render very technically complex and uncertain any assessment over whether it was possible for Russia to "win" the war.

Third, there is the problem of just how salient this question was for most of the people involved in the Russian war effort. Although it is clear that dedicated professionals such as Generals Gourko and Golovin were committed to achieving victory over Germany, many other high level commanders apparently used the war as an occasion for personal enrichment. General Sukhomlikov, for instance, the Russian war minister, was so flagrant in this respect that he was removed from his post and later tried for malfeasance. The profiteering and corruption in war industries and the petty pilferage of supplies for the front was notorious, strongly indicating an absence of popular commitment to the war. The Russian army consisted mostly of ignorant and illiterate peasants who fought (sometimes very bravely) out of a habitual allegiance to the Czar that had strong mystic elements, and was equally unpredictable. But few peasants felt they had a strong personal stake in the war, because the farms of most of them were hundreds of miles from the front. As General Knox observed, "To the average Russian peasant, his country was the hovel on the Volga, or perhaps in the Urals, where he happened to have been born, and to which he thought the Germans would never penetrate." 

Because of all these reasons, it would seem that for most Russians—even many on a high level—the question of who would "win" the war was perhaps less salient than when it would end, and how domestic conditions would

---

5 Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1921, p. 598. See also George F. Kennan; "It is difficult...to see what stake the common people of Russia ever did have in the outcome of the war. A Russian victory would presumably have meant the establishment of Russia on the Dardanelles. For this, the Russian peasant could not have cared less. A German victory would obviously have affected the prestige of the Tsar's Government. It might have led to limited territorial changes, and to some German commercial penetration. That any of this would have affected adversely the situation of the Russian peasant is not at all clear; in any case, he was not convinced that it would." p. 5. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, Boston, Little Brown, 1960.
be changed. It may not be an exaggeration to say that, for most Russians in World War I, popular, as opposed to official, war aims pertained more to the domestic order than to international rivalries. In this sense, the question of whether it was no longer possible to "win" the war must have had a limited appeal in Russia, principally to the officer corps and the politicians. But because it did matter to them, it is necessary to consider how this question might have been answered by them. It seems clear that the answer would have been that Russia with her own army had little hope of achieving a decisive impact on the German army after the failure of Brusilov's summer 1916 offensive.

In the Brusilov offensive on the southern front, the Russians had at first made fair progress against the Austrians, capturing half a million Austrian prisoners and advancing as much as 100 kilometers. But when they were fully extended, German reinforcements arrived from the western front and rapidly turned the tide. In the German counter-attack the Russians lost most of their previous gains. The offensive cost the Russian army the loss of about one million men, and left it thoroughly demoralized. The 1,200,000 casualties at an average of over 200,000 per month had been surpassed only by the bloody retreat from Galicia in the previous summer of 1915 when ammunition supplies had failed. The cumulative losses suffered by the Russian army by November 1916 were 4,670,000 casualties, with about 1,000,000 dead, out of a total of 15,500,000 mobilized. This does not include missing men and prisoners. According to General Knox, however, "Probably many of the two million men who at the end of 1916 were classed as 'missing and prisoners' were really 'killed'." While the losses in officers and men had steadily decreased in France, they had as steadily increased in Russia, and the rate was not significantly reduced even when the ammunition crisis of 1915 has been passed.

Although the masses of soldiers and peasants may not have shared the Czarist government's war aims enthusiastically, this should not be understood as an absence of patriotic feeling. On the contrary, there was great popular discontent aroused by rumors of the Czarina's relations with German sympathizers. However, the patriotism of the Russian masses was generally directed primarily toward the defense of the homeland rather.
In retrospect, it is easy to say that the Russian Army never recovered its strength after the fall of 1916, but is far from clear that this was apparent at the time, nor was this so much a cause as an effect of the March Revolution. The ammunition crisis and appalling losses of the summer of 1915 in Galicia could have seemed just as much of a "turning point". In the winter of 1916-1917 some Russian leaders were quite ready to promise major new offensives, particularly during the Allied conference in Petrograd in January 1917. Even after the March Revolution, in the late spring of 1917 the then Minister of War, Kerensky, was urging another offensive. Although the motives for such offensives undoubtedly included a desire to impress the western Allies with the Russian was effort in order to assure continued shipments of aid, it is difficult to believe that all these leaders, including Kerensky, considered the outcomes of further offensives completely hopeless.

6 "England and France were opposed on July 1st (1916), the date of the commencement of the Somme offensive, by 1,300 battalions. Russia was opposed in the eastern theatre on June 4th, the date of the commencement of Brusilov's offensive, by 509 German and 534 Austrian battalions... On January 1st, 1917, she was occupying 854 German battalions, 708 Austrian battalions and 24 Turkish battalions--an enemy increase in the eastern theatre of 345 German, 174 Austrian, and 24 Turkish battalions, as compared with an increase of only 27 German battalions in the western theatre. This contribution to the allied cause was attained with equipment that would have been laughed at in the western theatre, and Russia paid the price in blood. Brusilov's armies lost 375,000 men in 27 days in June, and their losses up till the end of October exceeded a million." Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, p. 551.


8 Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, p. 544.

9 Ibid., p. 543.

10 "On the eve of the Revolution the prospects for the 1917 campaign were brighter than they had been in March 1916 for the campaign of that year... The Russian infantry was tired, but less tired than it had been twelve months earlier... The stocks of arms, ammunition and technical equipment were, almost under every heading,... much larger than they were in the spring of 1915 or of 1916, and for the first time supplies from overseas were arriving in appreciable quantities... The leading was improving... the army was sound at heart. The men in the rest of the winter would have forgotten the trials of the past, and would have attacked again with the élan of 1916. There can be no doubt that if the national fabric in the rear had held together... the Russian army would have gained fresh laurels in the campaign of 1917..." Ibid., pp. 551-552.
In spite of the manpower and morale losses of Brusilov's summer 1916 campaign, in many ways the Russian army was technically superior to its state at any previous period of the war. Although army needs for such technical equipment as telephones, telegraph wire, and signaling stations were never met, they were closer to being met in 1916 than at any other time. For example, the number of artillery shells delivered during the war, both from Russian production and from production abroad, was highest in 1916. Nevertheless, while Russian artillery and ammunition had improved on an absolute scale, "inasmuch as the standards of armament in 1917 were higher,...in comparison with enemy armies and those of Russia's Allies, she was, in 1917, more poorly armed than in 1914."

"On January 1, 1916, there were in the army in the field 4,000 telephone outfits, 27,000 versts of telephone and telegraph wire, and 240 signaling stations. The need for the next eighteen months was estimated as follows: 298,000 telephone and telegraph outfits, 680,000 versts of wire and 2000 signaling stations. In the course of 1916 there were delivered 105,000 telephones, 3000 telegraph instruments, 236,000 versts of wire, and 802 wireless stations. Thus the need was not met." Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, p. 148.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shell Deliveries, 1914-1917</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Available at beginning of</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>war</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total produced by Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total supplied by Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid., p. 142.

13 Ibid., p. 142.
At the outbreak of the war the Russian army had 70 divisions and 19 brigades. Another 35 divisions were mobilized, for a total in 1914 of 114-1/2 infantry divisions and some 15,000,000 men. Of these, 94-1/2 divisions were allocated to the German and Austrian fronts. Against these Russian forces of 94-1/2 divisions, the Germans initially deployed some 20 infantry divisions, and the Austrians deployed 46 infantry divisions, for a total of 94-1/2 to 66, or roughly a division force ratio of 3 to 2. 14

These numbers by themselves are extremely misleading, however. The Germans had available an average of 14 batteries of heavy field artillery for every first line division, while the Russians had an average of only seven batteries per division. Thus "a Russian infantry division of the first line, so far as its artillery fire was concerned, possessed just one-half the strength of a German infantry division of the first line... This, in its turn, leads to the conclusion that in 1914 the fighting strength of the Russian army, estimated at 114-1/2 divisions, in point of fact amounted only to 60 units. This, too, also tallies exactly with an authoritative statement of General Manikovsky to the effect that the War called for artillery twice as strong as what had been scheduled for the Army." 15 This estimate brings the division force ratio down to a nearly equal and usually indecisive (other factors being equal) one-to-one.

In addition, the Germans understood the effective use of concentrated firepower better than the Russians. Golovine lists 14 battles between Russian and German forces in East Prussia and Poland in 1914, of which in the four that resulted in "swift and decisive success for the Germans" the German superiority in artillery batteries was an average of 4.5 to 1. The eight indecisive battles had an average artillery force ratio of 1 to 1. The two battles won by the Russians had rough parity in artillery, and apparently the outcomes were the result of other factors. 16 This would seem to indicate the decisive

15 Ibid., p. 209.
16 Ibid., Table 13.
effect of artillery firepower superiority. By October 1917, this German firepower superiority had increased, despite absolute level increases in Russian artillery. On the Northern front, the Germans had 1.4 howitzers per verst of front, to 0.7 Russian, and 2.4 heavy guns per verst of front to 1.1 Russian. On the Western front the Germans had 0.6 howitzers per verst versus 0.4 Russian, and 1.5 heavy guns for only 0.5 Russian. On the Southwestern front the Germans also enjoyed better than 2 to 1 firepower superiority. 17 The artillery situation was better for the Russians in 1917 than in 1915 when they had run out of ammunition, but it was still very bad, and much worse than in 1914.

Perhaps such questions as "When did a decisive fraction of the leadership and population believe that defeat was inevitable" are not so relevant to the Russian termination, as are questions of what caused the March Revolution, and then the October Revolution, in which the Bolsheviks came to power, and what then caused the Bolsheviks to favor an immediate termination of the war with Germany. If there had been no revolution in Russia, it seems likely that the war with Germany would have continued until the November 11, 1918 Armistice without either a decisive Russian or a German defeat on the eastern front.

If there had been no revolution, the Russian weaknesses of artillery, communications, supply, and morale might have been balanced by the German weaknesses of relatively scarce manpower, and the need to concentrate most forces against the western allies, particularly as these were reinforced by 2,000,000 fresh troops from America in 1917-1918. There might have been sporadic tactical victories by the Germans, but the extent of the front, the primitiveness of conditions, and the relatively modest German commitment of troops and transport very likely would have prevented exploitation of such victories to the point of decisive defeat of the still vast Russian army.

The Russian army had suffered many tactical defeats by the Germans from 1914 to 1917, although it had also won a few tactical victories, particularly against the Austrians. What finally destroyed it, however, was

17 Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, I. 141.
neither a decisive and massive military defeat nor the attrition effects of
the many lost campaigns—even though Tannenberg in 1914, Galicia in 1915,
and the Brusilov offensive on the southern front in 1916 were major disasters.
What destroyed the Russian army in 1917 was the internal disruption of two
revolutions, not attrition or defeat by the Germans. Nevertheless, the many
defeats contributed importantly to the pressures causing these revolutions.

These conclusions would not seem to be altered by the possibility of
a successful German advance on Moscow at almost any time in the war. The
German army probably could have achieved a complete and decisive defeat of
the Russian army at almost any point in the war, provided Germany was willing
at the same time to risk defeat on the western front by transferring a major por-
tion of its forces there to the eastern front. This Germany was unwilling to
do, for very sensible reasons. When faced by two major threats in a situation
where one's relative power is ever diminishing, the logical strategy is to stale-
mate the minor threat and to allocate all remaining resources to the earliest pos-
sible defeat of the major threat. Germany had less to fear from a Russian of-
fensive than from an Anglo-French-American offensive, because the Russian
army was known to be more easily "handled", because disruptive political
factors were known to be at work behind Russian lines, and because the dis-
stances and conditions on the eastern front made a Russian occupation of war
material-producing areas in Silesia a more remote possibility than an allied
occupation of the Ruhr. Thus the German army did not make the necessary
force commitment to defeat decisively the Russian army, not because it could
not do so, but because it was forced by the circumstances of its relatively
decreasing power on the western front to devote most of its resources to that
western front. All this was also known to the Russians, hence they remained
hopeful of victory at least until after the first (March) revolution.

If the March Revolution made possible the November Revolution,
and the November Revolution made possible the termination of the war by
the Bolsheviks, the principal causes of these two revolutions are important
contributing factors to the termination of the war. The March Revolution,
ironically, seems at once more "justified" and more difficult to explain than
the November Bolshevik coup d'etat. It seemed to be an almost spontaneous
disruption in the capitol (Petrograd) that was not plotted, directed by, or
even anticipated by the Bolsheviks scattered in Switzerland, Sweden, and
Siberia. Both its occurrence and its timing were decisive. Its occurrence
decided the termination of the war between Russia and Germany. Its timing
may have decided the defeat of Germany.

What were the events that led to the so-called "February Revolution" (March in the Western calendar) that caused the abdication of the Czar
(March 15) and initiated eight months of rule by the relatively moderate
Provisional Government? This question is important because, without
the social and political ferment following the deposition of Czarist rule,
it is unlikely that the "October Revolution" (November 7 in the Western
calendar) could have taken place. (Indeed, the February Revolution had
caught the Communists by surprise, with Lenin in Switzerland and other
leaders also dispersed.) It was only after the "October Revolution" that
the Communists seized power, supressed the Provisional Government,
denounced the French and British alliances, and initiated peace negoti-
ations with Germany.

One theory concerning the March Revolution is that it was caused
by German subversion and intrigue at the Czar's court. Kennan\textsuperscript{19}
attributes this view to an unbalanced Allied preoccupation with the war, in which
"The Germans, as they saw it, had to be the source of all evil; nothing bad
could happen that was not attributable to the German hand. From this
fixation flowed the stubborn conviction in Paris and London that the troubles
in Petrograd in late 1916 were merely the result of German influence and

\textsuperscript{18} "It was the unexpected Revolution in Russia on March 12, 1917, which
crystallized the American decision for war.... If the Russian revolution had
occurred three or even two months earlier, Germany, with the promise of
victory and relief on the eastern front, would not have played the 'last card'
of unrestricted submarine warfare, the United States would not have entered
the war, and Germany would have won, or there would have been a compromise
peace..." (Italics added) Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the
See also Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (London, 1927), Vol. III,
p. 212-215: "The beginning of 1917 was marked by three stupendous events:
the German declaration of unlimited U-boat warfare, the intervention of the
United States, and the Russian Revolution. Taken together these events con-
stitute the second great climax of the war. The order in which they were placed
was decisive. If the Russian Revolution had occurred in January instead of
March, or if, alternatively, the Germans had waited to declare unlimited
U-boat war until the summer, there would have been no unlimited U-boat war

intrigue at the Czar's court." Kennan believes that the revolution was precipitated by the strain of the war against Germany, and states that recently captured German documents "reveal that there was very little substance for such suspicions". His view is substantiated by other German sources.

On the other hand, the impact on public opinion of the suspicion of German influence at the Court, particularly in the case of the Czarina (known to have been already so malleable to the influence of Rasputin), and of Prime Minister Boris Stürmer merely because of his German name, must have been at least a contributing factor in reducing public confidence in the Government. After all, it was not the Communists who overthrew the Czarist regime, but liberal social democrats who wanted to prosecute the war against Germany more effectively following basic domestic reforms.

The other major theory concerning the causes of the March Revolution is that German subversion of the Court was inconsequential, and that the important factors were the political and administrative disintegration of the Czarist regime—never very sound since the Russo-Japanese War—under the great military, economic, and political pressures of the war. The murder of Rasputin in December of 1916 by a group of noblemen including one of the Grand Dukes was one indication of the degree of this disintegration at the highest levels.

until the summer, there would have been no unlimited U-boat war and consequently no intervention of the United States. If the Allies had been left to face the collapse of Russia without being sustained by the intervention of the United States, it seems certain that France could not have survived the year, and the war would have ended in a Peace by negotiation or, in other words, a German victory."


20 Ibid., p. 13.

21 See, for example, Walter Görllitz (Ed.), The Kaiser and his Court, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964. Admiral von Müller, Chief of the German Naval Cabinet, wondered if the English were behind the March Revolution, and asked: "Does it mean peace or a more vigorous prosecution of the war?" Also, "His Majesty (the Kaiser) is convinced that this will prolong the war because it has been engineered by the Entente and by England in particular." p 248.
According to General Denikin, then commanding the Russian Seventh Corps, "Two things tended to restrain resistance (to the March Revolution): first, the apparent legality of the two acts of abdication, the latter of which, by calling for submission to the Provisional Government, 'vested with full power', struck every weapon out of monarchical hands; and, second, the fear that a civil war would open the front to the enemy." The second reason shows how even at this early date, the external military pressures directly contributed to the success of the revolution, which eventually led to the domestic dominance of the faction wanting to terminate the war. Without so strong a German threat, front-line units might have been used to suppress the rebels. But what initiated the March Revolution in the first place? And what induced the Czar to abdicate?

Here is a sampling of views on the immediate development of the March Revolution (the "February Revolution" in the old Russian calendar), by two American scholars (Curtis and Kennan), two British Generals (Fuller and Knox), and two Russian generals (Golovine and Gourko):

"The February Revolution...was a spontaneous, moderate affair, which sought chiefly to replace the incompetent government of the Tsar with a more effective one of progressive political leaders. Because its program was to leave the existing social and economic system intact and to pursue policies espoused by the middle class, the socialists dubbed it...a 'bourgeois' rather than a 'proletarian' revolution...In the first two months of 1917...inflation advanced...with severe effects on the working population, which showed its exasperation by an increasing number of strikes...Early in March...strike of workers of Petrograd's great Putilov Works turned thousands of men onto the streets, to demonstrate against the government...By the 9th there were nearly 200,000 strikers in the streets. Cossacks called out to disperse the crowds refused to charge them...On March 10 the movement grew in intensity, and the Tsar wired...the garrison to disperse the crowds with rifle fire...the...next day...the garrison fired with considerable effect on crowds...that night the troops in their barracks decided not to shoot down crowds in the future. When ordered to march on the morning of the 12th, one of the regiments refused, shot the commander, and poured into the streets to join the crowds. Other regiments were quickly won over to the revolution...the Tsar...had consistently underestimated the seriousness of the uprising, so that measures to suppress it were taken too late...""
"...it was in the latter part of 1916... that the signs of the political disintegration of the old Tsarist regime first became marked... in the most sinister sort of court intrigue, in an increasing political isolation of the royal family, in a growing restlessness and despair throughout all moderate Russian political circles, and in a creeping paralysis of the Russian war effort... the French and British governments... did not realize how far the disintegration had gone and how deeply the Russian capacity to wage war was already undermined. The internal crisis was of such gravity that there was no chance for a healthy and constructive solution to it unless the war effort could be terminated at once and the attention and resources of the country concentrated on domestic issues. The army was tired. The country was tired. People had no further stomach for war. To try to drive them to it was to provide grist for the mill of the agitator and the fanatic... from 1916 on, the demands of the political situation in Russia were in conflict with the demands of the Allied war effort... The premise... that Russia could and should be kept in the war—was an impossible premise... by the spring of 1917 nothing the Allies might have done could have made Russia once more a serious factor in the war. The entire Russian economic and political system had been overstrained by the military effort... The only point at which Allied statesmanship might, with different policies, have produced a different result was in the political field. It was inevitable that Russia should leave the war in 1917. It was not inevitable that this should have occurred under the chairmanship of the Bolsheviks. This, surely, was at least in part the effect of the blunders of Western statesmanship." 25 (in trying to keep Russia in the war)

"The Petrograd revolution of March 1917, was a popular and not a revolutionary rising, brought about by war weariness and universal discontent." 26

"The bureaucracy was at once weak and inefficient, and while shirking strong government, was suspicious of popular cooperation for the national defense. It had totally failed to enlist the sympathies of the masses... my soldier friend breathed into my ear that the Emperor was a good man, and fond of his people, but surrounded by traitors. Now these traitors would be removed and all would be well... The mutiny of the 12th would never have developed into a revolution... the Government, by its gross stupidity, had not previously succeeded in alienating every class of the population. If the movement had been at the outset a naked class revolt, it might

25 Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, pp. 12-32. Italics added. Note how the pressure of German military successes helped provoke the revolution that soon increased the relative effect of these military pressures.

have been nipped in the bud... everyone... recognized that matters had come to such a pass that some change was essential. What was wanted in the interests of Russia and of her allies was an orderly transition to constitutional government. The tragedy of the position lay in the fact that the educated patriots of the country, upon whose initiative only such a transition might have been possible, had in sheer patriotism and loyalty to their allies tried to defer revolution till the end of the war... lest in the probable disorder of a change of government Russia's pressure on the enemy might be weakened.27

"Confidence in the Imperial Government had been completely undermined, and an end had been made of the linked unity expressed by the traditional formula, 'for faith, and Tsar and country.' 'Tsar' and 'country' became two conceptions having contrary meanings. Rumors that spoke of high treason on the part of the Empress, and of the unclean role of Rasputin, though without foundation, had an especially demoralizing effect. The very fact that Rasputin had been murdered by members of the Imperial family was interpreted by the soldiers as proof of the truth of such rumors. Disorders in the country, lack of supplies, disorganization of transport, malicious criticisms of the Government by the intelligentsia—in the case of our common soldiers, all this had gone deep, and had extirpated every feeling of confidence and respect for the former Government. The mystic prestige of the Imperial crown was destroyed. And there was therefore no reason to expect that in the first days of the Revolution any element of the rank and file would take up arms in the defense of that Government, now in its fall."28

"The Petrograd garrison, consisting of depot units, turned out to be the Revolution's driving force. Indeed it was its revolt that gave the Revolution its instant victory. The Baltic fleet and the fortress troops of Kronstadt, which were nearest to Petrograd, proved to be no less demoralized."29

"... persistent rumours were circulated that the Empress had German sympathies, and proofs were given of this..."30

27 Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, pp. 545-564. Italics added. Note again how the external military demands made by the enemy and the allies led the moderates to try to defer the revolution, rather than 'capturing' it.


29 Ibid., p. 250.

"...the public in the capital was both troubled and dissatisfied with the Government work in the interior. This in turn had affected the proper supplying of the Army, and threatened that this supply would not fully satisfy the needs of the Army and the population...Many foresaw a Revolution when the war was finished if the Government continued as it was...nobody had any idea that the Revolution would turn out as it actually did. The fear was that when demobilization took place there would be riots in agricultural centers, and in towns, when the return of workmen would upset the equilibrium between the demand and supply of labour...To those people with whom I held any discussion, possibly nothing was known of what was happening in the industrial centers, and what kind of propaganda was circulating in workmen's circles. Neither was I aware of what took place there, but it may be supposed that everything was not quiet, because it was at this time...the Petrograd police...were being trained in the use of machine guns. Clearly the Government could not reckon on the Petrograd garrison's loyalty, though this garrison had reached the unusual number of 160,000. In peace time the garrison in the capital never even reached 40,000...the Emperor once instructed me to send to Petrograd, for a rest, two cavalry divisions...I ascertained that there was no place in which a regiment could be quartered, much less a division. Then the Emperor confined himself to sending for a Naval Marine Guards detachment..." 31

All these sources agree on the incompetence of the Czarist government, war weariness resulting from German military successes, popular discontent, loss of confidence in the Czar's leadership and suspicion of the Czarina's allegedly German sympathies, and court corruption, and that this was not a "horizontal" (class) split but a vertical split between monarchists, republicans, conservatives, socialists, democrats and non-politicals who were at the end of their patience with the government, and members of exactly the same parties (with the exception of some socialists) who were not at the end of their patience. 32 Nevertheless one may question Kennan's assertion that there was no chance for a solution to the internal crisis without ending the war, especially in view of the statement by General Knox, the British military attaché on the scene in Petrograd,

31 Gourko, Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia 1914-1917, pp. 2630264.

32 I am grateful to Paul Kecskemeti for having pointed out to me that this vertical split, from elite through middle class to proletariat, is generally much more common in revolutions than a division along class lines. Other examples are China (1949), Hungary (1956), and Cuba (1959).
that "...even granted the revolution, if a man had been forthcoming who was man enough to protect the troops from pacifist propaganda, the Russian army would have gained fresh laurels in the campaign of 1917, and in all human probability would have exercised a pressure which would have made possible an allied victory by the end of the year."\textsuperscript{33} It is difficult to agree with Kennan's unqualified assertion that there was nothing the Allies could have done to keep Russia in the war. They might have called for reforms earlier, and enforced them by threat of withholding supplies, and the British navy might have intervened at Petrograd—but these are speculations. Knox does appear indirectly to confirm Kennan's view that it was the effort to suppress all internal reform in order to carry on the war that eventually caused the revolution that soon undermined all further war effort.

It would seem that the truth of the causes of the March Revolution, as so often is the case, lies somewhere among these views. With the failure of the Brusilov offensive in September of 1916 and the loss of about one million men, the army was indeed demoralized. How decisive or permanent this was will never be known. The increasing isolation of the royal family was the despair of moderate opinion. Rasputin's murder in December 1916 represented a kind of indirect attack on and warning of the royal family by the conservative and moderate elite, since the royal family had given Rasputin its confidence and protection.

In January 1917, only weeks before the first revolution, the Allies held a diplomatic conference in Petrograd to stimulate renewed Russian military offensives on the eastern front against the Germans. The results only hastened the onset of revolution and Russia's leaving the war. The Russian bureaucracy, embarrased by their own disorganization and corruption, and fearful of losing Allied aid, concealed Russia's exhaustion and instead made

\textsuperscript{33} Knox, \textit{With the Russian Army 1914-1917}, p. 552.
extravagant promises. This of course further alienated the military command from the bureaucracy, as it did moderate liberal and socialist leaders not in the Government. Allied representatives refused to take very seriously the warnings given by Russian moderates, forcing the latter to consider sterner measures. Lord Milner returned from this conference to report to the War Cabinet that there was "a great deal of exaggeration in the talk about revolution." This was only weeks before the revolution broke out.

We will not trouble the reader with a retelling of the famous days from the March to the November Revolution in Petrograd. Suffice it to say that with the publication of the well-known Order No. 1 on March 1 by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies effectively depriving officers of disciplinary power over their troops and sanctioning insubordination, the unstable division of power between the Provisional Government and the ad hoc body of workers and soldiers and agitators of the Petrograd Soviet, the honorable but possibly disastrous decision of Foreign Minister Paul Milyukov to adhere to treaty obligations and press on with the war, the spreading administrative paralysis and civil disorder, and the free rein given to Bolshevik agitators in the army, it was probably inevitable that the "Kerensky" offensive on the Galician front in June would end in failure and complete the utter disruption of the army. This attempt to renew hostilities exacerbated the mutual distrust that had grown between officers and soldiers as a result of Order No. 1 and Bolshevik agitation, because it required a discipline the officers found it impossible to restore. Many officers were humiliated by this situation and blamed Kerensky (by then Premier) for not reversing Order No. 1 (which he dared not do lest he lose Socialist support). As a result General Kornilov, former commander on the Galician front, made an unsuccessful attempt at a

---

34 According to Kennan"...the Russian commander in chief at the front, in a private letter to the Russian Cabinet, complained that he had not the faintest ability to live up to what had been promised to the Allies in the way of Russian military performance during the forthcoming campaign of 1917." Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, p. 15.

coup d'état with a march on Petrograd in August 1917. He never even reached the city, but Kerensky panicked and armed the Bolsheviks in the belief that their armed support was essential for the suppression of the Kornilov coup. The Bolsheviks now held the predominant physical power in Petrograd. After a few weeks of preparations in the provinces and the army they seized power in Petrograd on November 7, 1917. Within a few weeks the Bolsheviks also controlled Moscow and most of Russia.

It is interesting at this point to note once again the frequent choice that seems to appear between continued war and revolution on the one hand, too early termination and military coup d'état on the other, with a narrow margin of well-timed termination between them that avoids both revolution and military coup d'état. If Kerensky had attempted to terminate the war even before the summer offensive of 1917, the army might have still been organized enough to have succeeded in a military coup, particularly since the Bolsheviks were then still substantially unarmed. As it was, he appears to have waited too long (and had insufficient Allied support and perhaps bad luck with an already too far deteriorated administration), so that the choice to continue the war brought revolution with it. Perhaps if he had not launched the inevitably unsuccessful summer offensive, and had instead partially and selectively demobilized some of the army, he might at once have been able to compete successfully with the Bolsheviks for popular loyalties without risking a military coup. But for this to have been possible, the Germans would have had to have refrained from serious attacks, and Kerensky would have had to have been free from Allied pressures to launch another offensive under the threat of their stopping the flow of supplies. In addition, the physical insecurity Kerensky had reason to feel in Petrograd probably made it psychologically unlikely for the Premier to demobilize forces at such a time. The margin for timely termination with neither revolution nor coup d'état was just too narrow in this case.

36 In some ways, Japan in 1945 was more fortunate in achieving the "middle way" of timely termination, but only insofar as avoiding revolution and coup d'état are concerned.
We now come to the question of why the Bolsheviks, now in control of Russia, immediately made efforts to terminate the war with Germany. Did they too have to deal with a threat of revolution if they continued the conflict? Perhaps, if a counter-revolution can be considered in the same way as a revolution in this context.

The Bolshevik decision to call for an end to the war when they were still out of power at once represented both an ideological judgment that the international conflict was the result of "contradictions" in the capitalist world that would be corrected by social changes in the class structure, and a strategic judgment that the people's energies must be turned from the international conflict—which could never be "won" by the international proletariat—to the class conflict, which could be won by the international proletariat under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. It was also a tactical judgment of the Bolsheviks that their anti-war slogans, generated for the above ideological and strategic reasons, would gain them support from the demoralized and war-weary masses of Russian soldiers, workers, and peasants. As has been true so often of Communist assessments of political crises, they were largely correct in their tactical judgment, partially correct in the strategic evaluation, and very distorted in their ideological judgment in a way that was to bear bitter fruit years later.  

After the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in the November 7 coup d'etat, their decision to terminate the war probably represented a military-political judgment that their fragile hold on Russia would not permit simultaneous military consolidation of Communist power and continued military combat against Germany. They had succeeded in demoralizing the army and in breaking down discipline by destroying trust between officers and men, in order to bring down the Provisional Government and end the war. They could not now reverse the chaotic flood of disorganized soldiers returning home. Lenin had said that the army had voted against the war with its feet. According

37 The Russian social revolution did not, as they had hoped, spark a worldwide Communist revolution by way of Germany, but instead consolidated the west against Russia.
to Golovine, more than 2,000,000 men left the army in 1917 willfully under various pretexts. Nor were there so many Red Guards, and certainly not many highly disciplined and effective combat leaders in the Red Guards, that Lenin could hold any realistic hopes in being able successfully to fight a "two-front" war with them against both Germany and anti-Bolshevik Russians. To the Bolsheviks, international defeat against Germany was the price of domestic class victory of Communism in Russia, and since in any case they could not gain victory over Germany by sacrificing the domestic class victory, it was a price they willingly paid.

The military pressures exerted on all three Russian regimes—Czarist, social-democrat, and Bolshevik—by the German army played a major if not so dramatic a role in the termination of the war. By the fall of 1916, after the disaster of the Brusilov offensive, the Russian army had clearly lost the major tests of strength with Germany, particularly since Germany had not even engaged most of her forces on the eastern front. Most of the battles of three years had been won by the Germans, and most of the casualties had been Russian.* The continued German military pressure, exacerbated by its attrition effects by Anglo-French demands for Russian offensives that were not warranted by Russian capabilities, so overstrained the Russian

* Numbers in Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Prisoner</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Dead &amp; Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>71.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>9.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>4,247</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Possible measure of combat daring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Possible measure of morale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

economic and political system that war weariness and popular discontent erupted into revolution. Continued German military pressures, and the threat they posed of exploiting a civil war, then inhibited the control of the revolution by Russian moderates, so that the Bolsheviks were able to take over in their November 1917 coup. Further military pressures by the German army then forced the still fragile Bolshevik regime to choose between conditional surrender to Germany and probable defeat of the revolution in Russia. If the external military pressures of the German army or the internal counter-revolutionary pressures had been less, the Bolsheviks might have refused to terminate the war. As it happened, the combined military pressures were sufficient to force a termination of the war.
Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk

In its first official act on its first day in power, on November 8, 1917, the new Soviet government issued the Decree on Peace. It called on all belligerents to accept "an immediate peace without annexations (i.e., the seizure of foreign lands, or the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities." It announced its readiness "to conduct these negotiations in writing, by telegraph, and by negotiations between representatives," and proposed an immediate armistice "of not less than three months." The proposal was essentially for a status quo ante, compromise peace.

Having good reason to doubt the legitimacy and the stability of the Soviet regime, none of the belligerents responded. This did not discourage the Soviets, who then directly contacted Allied representatives in Petrograd and sent parliamentarians (Joffe) across the German lines to contact the German high command. The Soviets would have much preferred a multilateral, general peace, since they had little military power left with which to parry German terms. However, since an end to the war with Germany was essential for the consolidation of the Soviet regime, the Communists were prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany if necessary. Although the Bolshevik ascendancy and the peace offer came as a surprise to the Germans, they lost no time in seeing its possibilities for releasing as many as a million men from the eastern front for transfer to the western front for the forthcoming spring 1918 offensive.

The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the German army's eastern front headquarters, began on December 3, 1917, and were not concluded until March 3, 1918—just three months later. This delay was not the result of any lack of eagerness on either side to conclude peace for its own good reasons, but rather the result of very different "styles" of negotiation and Soviet exploitation of the conference for propaganda intended to stir the German masses to revolution. The initial German terms became stiffer in the course of protracted Soviet exploitation of the conference as a sounding box and intentional Soviet bad manners.
The German-Soviet armistice was signed on December 15. The peace treaty negotiations were initiated on December 22. Late in December the Soviets broke off the talks and tried to shift the scene of negotiations to Stockholm in the hope of gaining a better audience for their political hectoring and thus influence Socialist opinion in the western democracies. They had been shocked into this desperate attempt to gain support when learning the Germans intended to keep the Baltic States and Poland under their control. That was hardly self-determination. The Germans refused to move, however, only going so far as to renounce annexations if the Allied powers would also do so. Negotiations were resumed in January at Brest-Litovsk by Trotsky in person.

The Germans permitted Trotsky a month of propagandistic speechmaking because they were simultaneously negotiating with non-Communist Ukrainian separatists (the Rada) for a separate treaty. Germany wanted and needed the Ukraine's grain, on February 1, 1918, formally recognized the independence of the Ukraine, and on February 9 signed a separate peace treaty with the Ukraine. This was a great setback to the Soviets because it weakened their prestige, removed a major source of food from their control, and also removed from them what they had hoped would be a major bargaining prize with the Germans—Soviet control of Ukrainian grain. Meanwhile the Germans, having gotten what they most wanted from the treaty with the Ukraine, prepared an ultimatum on the acceptance of terms to the Soviets.

The Germans had probably hesitated to make the ultimatum because of Austrian Foreign Minister Count Czernin's urging for the quickest possible termination because of Austria's urgent need for peace and bread. The ultimatum risked a complete breakdown of negotiations, with an attendant protraction of the war. Kühlmann, the German Foreign Minister heading the negotiations, may also have held some hopes that moderation, rather than an ultimatum, could stimulate Allied interests in an armistice. Also, the German socialists were becoming dissatisfied with the Government, and brutal terms would stir them up. At the same time, Trotsky might have been willing to delay a little for further propaganda exploitation, and in the hope of revolutionary risings in Austria and Germany.
But on January 18 General von Hoffmann put on the table a map marking the proposed German territorial terms. The line ran north from Brest-Litovsk to the Baltic, leaving Poland, Lithuania, and western Latvia including Riga in German control. The line roughly coincided with the German army forward positions, and on that basis could easily have been moved even further eastward had the Germans wished it. The line south of Brest-Litovsk was to be worked out between Germany and the Ukranian Rada. The Bolshevik delegation was appalled at the terms.

Trotsky, on February 10th, broke off the negotiations a second time with the famous phrase: "no war, no peace." He essentially declared Soviet participation in the war terminated unilaterally, while refusing to sign the German terms. This was a compromise position among two Soviet positions. Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin—the "realists"—believed it essential to accept the terms. Bukharin and other Left "deviationist" extremists wanted to reject the German offer and proclaim a "revolutionary war" of mass uprisings that they hoped would spread to Germany and Austria.

If the Soviets thought this unilateral termination would confuse the Germans, they were mistaken. The German forces began to advance into Russia a week later on February 18, prepared to occupy Petrograd if necessary. This was too much for Lenin, who reportedly went as far as threatening to resign in arguing for immediate acceptance of the German terms. Trotsky joined Lenin on the issue, and a radio message was sent to Berlin signed by both accepting the terms. There was no reply for three days, until on February 22 the new and stiffer German terms arrived.

These final German terms called for Soviet evacuation of all Latvia and Estonia, a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and the Ukranian Rada, and withdrawal of all Soviet forces from the Ukraine and Finland. The Soviets were given two days to decide, three more days to get to Brest-Litovsk to sign. The treaty also called for an end to all agitation and propaganda (Article 2), the surrender of Ardakhan, Kars, Batum, and eastern Anatolia to Turkey (Article 4), demobilization of the Russian army and navy (Article 5), return of prisoners of war (Article 8), renunciation of indemnities (Article 9), and ratification within two weeks (Article 14).
On March 3, the Soviet delegation, now led by Sokolnikov, signed the Treaty at Brest-Litovsk after refusing to read or discuss it, by way of indicating that it was a dictated rather than a negotiated peace. The Treaty was unpopular in Russia, creating new factions opposing the Communists. The Left deviationists continued to oppose this "obscene" policy of Lenin's. The Soviets waited until the last day to ratify the Treaty, in the hope of American and other Allied military aid for a renewed war against Germany. When no aid was forthcoming, Lenin in the Fourth Congress of Soviets on March 14th argued in a speech that since further war with Germany was out of the question, the Treaty was the only way out. He called it a Tilsit peace, implying that sometime in the future the settlement would be undone as had been the case with the earlier treaty with Napoleon.  The Congress voted 784 to 261 for ratification, with 115 abstentions.

The terms of the Treaty, although they might have been worse had Germany not been so occupied on the western front, were severe. "Severe" does not mean just or unjust, but only "difficult" for the Russians. There were no reparations (not that they could have or would have been paid). The lost territories were more in the category of previous Russian conquests, than they were ones in which the people felt themselves Russian and desired Russian rule.

Russia lost some 1,300,000 square miles of her most important territories, with an estimated population of 60,000,000 (This might roughly be equated with about half of the United States at that time.) The territories lost included Russian Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, and parts of the Transcaucasaus. The economic loss was particularly devastating; most of Russia's coal and iron production were in the Ukraine. Russia lost approximately half her industrial equipment in the ceded territories.

But the Communist government survived, and eventually took back most of this territory and more.

* It was undone by the Versailles Treaty only a year later.
SOME LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-GERMAN TERMINATION OF 1917-1918

The Soviet Russian termination of war with Germany in 1917-1918 is more interesting from the pre-termination domestic policy conflict aspect, than it is from the aspects of termination indicators or mechanics.

As far as indicators of impending termination are concerned in this case, they must be considered as indicators of the March Revolution, and then subsequent indicators of the accession of the avowed "peace party", the Bolsheviks, in the November revolution. Since Russian absolute physical-military strength in 1916-1917 was superior to what it had been at any previous time in the war, and since munitions deliveries at this time were also the best yet achieved, we cannot look to either the physical state of the armed forces or munitions for indicators. Nor is the fact that the Russian army's relative strength in artillery firepower vis-a-vis the German army was worse in 1916-1917 than ever before a useful indicator, since it had been getting steadily worse throughout the war, and there is no clear way of knowing how bad was bad enough to be decisive. (The Germans defeated the Russians decisively whenever they had better than 4 to 1 local artillery superiority. The Germans by 1917 only had a little better than 2 to 1 overall artillery superiority, but continued to beat the Russians in piecemeal battles as they had since 1914, when they had only rough firepower parity.)

In the absence of clear physical indicators, what then were some indicators of the impending loss of confidence in the government and revolution? After all, there were warnings, the most dramatic of which probably was Rasputin's murder in December 1916. This should have alerted Allied agents that something was up, since members of the royal family had participated. If observers had then sampled popular opinion in Petrograd and in the Russian army, it seems probable that they would have noted the somewhat surprising fact that far from feeling relief that this "evil influence" had been removed from the court, most people apparently believed the murder confirmed the worst accusations about court subversion, intrigue, and possible German sympathies.
There were also an increasing number of increasingly large strikes - for bread, against inflation - in Petrograd and other major cities in 1916 and early 1917. While it has not been possible to collect quantitative data on this, one suspects that a curve plotting strike frequency and magnitude would have risen steeply in the winter of 1916-1917, and this could have been another indicator.

Since the Russian army had an over-all numerical superiority over the German and Austrian forces facing them of over 2 to 1, and since availability of artillery and artillery ammunition was unprecedented (the dangerous shortages of 1916 having been more than made up), the idea that a single and decisive major military defeat caused the surrender in December 1917 is completely untenable. Although a military offensive initiated by the Kerensky Provisional Government in the summer of 1917 failed and resulted in a successful German counterattack, this merely hastened the internal disintegration which was the real cause of the surrender.

It is not enough of an explanation of the surrender to say that it was the result of either the March social democrat revolution or the subsequent November Bolshevik Revolution. After the March revolution and the abdication of the Czar, the provisional government of Kerensky and the competing Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers both expressed the intention of continuing the war, although all were looking for a "permanent peace" to their British and French allies (something the British and the French would not tolerate).

The March Revolution was a possibly decisive contributing factor to the eventual surrender and termination of that part of the war for three primary reasons: First, it made it possible for the small Bolshevik faction to carry out its subversive and undermining activities freely in preparation for its November revolution; Second, the "democratization"* of the army by the Social Democratic Provisional Government (a coalition including the Bolsheviks) resulting in a complete breakdown of military discipline and combat effective-

---

* "Democratization" included institution of election of officers and even voting on whether or not to obey orders.
ness; and third, the economic and industrial chaos occasioned by the interruptions of factory output and railroad service partly as a result of revolutionary anarchy among workers and partly because of the confusion of administrative services. What was probably decisive about the March Revolution in causing an early termination in December of 1917, was the opportunity created for the Bolshevik take-over in November. After all, both the disruption of the army by the utter loss of morale occasioned by the distrust between officers and men, and the economic and logistic chaos would not have been decisive in the termination, unless the German forces had chosen to exploit these weaknesses with a massive attack, which they did not. As a matter of fact the German forces on the eastern front were being shifted to the west well before the termination, in preparation for a massive offensive against the British and French forces before these could be decisively stiffened by the arrival of Americans. Furthermore, at this point in the war there is a serious question of whether the material resources of the Central Powers were sufficient logistically to support a decisive invasion of Russia, even though their military discipline and organization were so clearly superior that with numerical inferiorities of 1 to 2 and worse they could defeat the Russian forces opposing them in local engagements. The reason why the war on the eastern front was terminated in December of 1917 rather than perhaps a year later was probably because the Bolsheviks achieved a precarious control in their November revolution against the Kerensky Provisional Government, after that government had been disrupted by the conflict between Kerensky and Kornilov.

The Bolsheviks needed to make peace immediately in order to consolidate their extremely precarious position in Russia. This position rested on the control of a few tens of thousands of workers and soldiers led by several hundred Bolshevik organizers. The danger of counter-revolution was not only imminent, but active in the form of counter-revolutionary military groups operating in Siberia, the north, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. The obvious route for at once gaining the most massive popular support and gaining the time needed for the consolidation of the Bolshevik putsch was to terminate the war. This Trotsky did at Brest-Litovsk.
There are several significant questions that may be asked about the termination of the Russo-German war in 1917. Why did the general weariness of the Russian people take so long to translate itself into decisive action for termination? How was this war weariness induced? Why did not the Germans, who undoubtedly were aware of the political developments in Russia through their many agents and sympathizers, exploit the situation more promptly for an earlier termination?

There are several probable reasons for the wide-spread and intense war weariness of most of the Russian population. They mostly reduce to a matter of relatively limited and not widely shared war aims, combined with rather widely felt and disproportionate war cost. The geo-political war aims of the Russian government, to the extent that these were even explicitly understood by that government, were not widely shared by the mass of the population. The population was undoubtedly willing to defend its own land, but not particularly interested in the conquest of foreign land, as indicated by the repeated willingness of the Russian forces after the March revolution to defend their positions, but their repeated unwillingness to attack, and the several instances of attempted truce terms on the basis of mutual relinquishment of all foreign territories. On the other hand, these limited and narrowly based war aims were unable to generate sufficient resolve to make the heavy war losses appear worthwhile.

Why were the war losses as heavy as they were? The heavy losses were probably a result of a combination of very uneven standards of military command leadership and tactical force effectiveness, a readiness to trade space and lives for time, (much as against the German invasion of 1941), serious shortages of ammunition, artillery, and transport, and generally poor organization of logistics and communication support.

Why did not the Germans exploit the situation more promptly? Prompt they were, having initiated financial support of Bolshevik and other subversive Russian factions in 1915. Also, the Germans exploited the March Revolution by helping Lenin and several co-conspirators get back to Petrograd. What the Germans perhaps failed to do was sufficiently to follow up their investment in revolution by a detailed and continuous inspection of its results, so that
they would know when to expect the Bolshevik coup and how to respond to the Bolshevik peace offers. It seems amazing that the German High Command was actually surprised by both crucial events, but this was the case. Perhaps this neglect can be explained by the fact that the German investment in the Bolsheviks was only one of many similar German investments in subversion and anti-war propaganda among the Allies, and was thus not tracked in detail. It might also be partly explained by the probable ambivalence felt by many conservative German military and diplomatic personnel at being involved in the clandestine support of such dubious conspirators—a feeling of "class treason", perhaps, that inhibited much open attention to the matter.

It might be concluded that the Germans lost valuable time by not more actively aiding the Bolsheviks in coming to power, although there is some question as to how effectively they could have done so without degrading the already very limited popularity of the Bolsheviks. Certainly the Germans paid what later turned out to be a very high price for the delay in termination, if Bemis and Churchill are correct in suggesting that a revolution in January 1917 would have avoided the German decision for unrestricted U-boat warfare that brought the United States into the war on the Allied side in April of 1917.

On the Allied side, there was better luck but little better sense. The Brest-Litovsk negotiations, partly because they were protracted by both the Germans and the Soviets, failed to release German forces fast enough to beat the Americans to a victory in France, but not because of anything that the Allies did to protract them. The Bolsheviks, neither knowing or caring for what was at stake on the western front, gave the Allies many openings for diplomatic delay—openings that were never exploited. They asked for Allied participation in the negotiations, and they asked for Allied aid so that they could resist German demands. If the Allies had responded, they very probably would have protracted the negotiations still further, and perhaps would have prevented the transfer of at least some German divisions from the eastern to the western front in March 1918.
If it had not been for the delays caused by the Germans and the Soviets themselves, the negotiations might well have been completed in January. But the British and French apparently did not understand the risk they were taking at the time, and completely ignored Russian openings for delaying the Russian-German peace. Perhaps they were blinded into an emotional rejection of any Bolshevik proposals by their disgust with the Bolshevik renunciation of the Alliance, the Bolshevik publication of the secret Anglo-French-Russian agreements on post-war European partition, and Bolshevik propaganda calling for international revolution. They were very lucky, but not wise, in the rejection of opportunity.

A lesson to be drawn from the Russian-German termination is that at least this part of World War I is well described by German General Max Hoffmann's title for his book, "The War of Lost Opportunities". Why were these opportunities lost? Neither the Allies nor the Germans really understood the game that was being played in Russia, its rules or its stakes, or all its significance for them. It seems primarily to have been the old story of surprise because of lack of anticipation of important contingencies, lack of anticipation because of lack of systematic political-military forecasting, and lack of systematic political-military forecasting because of the strong, implicit and incorrect assumption that domestic politics is only a secondary factor in war. In the Russo-German war of 1914-1917, Russian domestic politics were decisive.

Another lesson to be learned from this termination is that it is entirely consistent with Bolshevik Marxist-Leninist doctrine to accept the most bitter kind of politico-military defeat, if this is necessary to preserve the Communist Party and its control over Russia. (Whether this is likely to hold true for the responses of other Communist regimes is unknown.) Even if there has been much "Stalinist deviationism" and Krushchevian revisionism" since Lenin's control of the Communist Party, it may at least be useful to know that the Soviet Union now and in the future has a most highly honored precedent for accepting a strategic surrender as the alternative to political, let alone physical destruction.
A final important lesson of the Russian termination is the potent role external military pressures can play in exacerbating the conditions provoking a revolution, in preventing the internal control of such a revolution, and finally in forcing the barely successful revolutionary regime to choose between terminating the external war by some form of surrender, or terminating the internal civil conflict by the abandonment of the revolution. Both the German military pressures on the eastern front, and Anglo-French military-diplomatic pressures for further costly offensives against the Germans played this possibly decisive role in the termination of the war between Russia and Germany in 1917-1918.
CHAPTER III

THE TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR I
BY GERMANY

"But what a game! Each group of players in persistent disunity, everyone new to the game, fresh pieces continually introduced, and fresh rules extemporized..."  

The German termination of World War I in 1918 shares with the Russian termination of 1917-1918 the greatest importance for subsequent historical developments. It was with this termination that the modern states of Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were formed. It was here that the seeds of a bitter nationalism and political violence were generated by the "Dolchenstoss" (stab-in-the-back) legend, German non-acceptance of the stiff peace terms of Versailles, and defense of the German eastern territories against Polish incursions by the violence of the Freikorps. It was here that the economic bases for inflation and the appeals of the revolutionary solutions of socialism were accelerated. And these trends of bitter nationalism and socialism were soon to combine and grow into total Nazi political control of Germany. And it was here too that the inner lack of pacification of the leadership of the German army, combined with the constraints of the Versailles Treaty, generated secret support of von Seeckt's creation of a great army in miniature cadres—an army that was forced to emphasize mechanized mobility to compensate for the numerical weakness decreed for it by the victors, and that thus developed the doctrinal foundations for the very blitzkrieg tactics that were to execute and further to encourage Hitler's aggressions against those same victors a generation later.

For these reasons it may seem that the German war termination of World War I is of less import than the peace terms imposed by the victorious Allies. The termination process itself—as shall be seen below—was more of


39 "...The Versailles Treaty, based on the charge of Germany's exclusive war guilt...largely determined the political developments of the nineteen-twenties, and coloured every thought and action in German internal affairs. As parliamentarian, Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, it was the main psychological problem with which I had to deal..." Franz von Papen, Memoirs, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1953, p. 22.
a chain of missed opportunities than it was an orderly progression of reasonable steps taken to end the war at the most mutually—or even unilaterally—satisfactory time. Yet if the peace terms were so far-reaching in their effects, their origins must be of importance. And the origins of the peace terms are to be found, in large measure, in the circumstances of the particular termination process that preceded them.

The termination of World War I by Germany thus seems most important, not only because it was the end of an unprecedentedly costly war that had been practically stalemated for four years, not only because it offers a tragic spectacle of one missed opportunity after another to end the monstrous attrition, but because its end came so late, and in such a way, that the principal forces that culminated in the second and even more destructive world war were thus conceived and given fertile ground in which to fester.

The German termination in 1918 was in some ways remarkably similar to the Russian termination in 1917-1918 in that it immediately followed a revolution; the navy played a prominent part in the revolution while most of the soldiers on the battlefront continued to do their duty; a previously much-revered emperor abdicated and the monarchy was completely overthrown; a military coup was threatened; a moderate liberal government first replaced the monarchy to be replaced by a more leftist government later; the war was ended without substantial invasion of the loser's home territory; foreign territory occupied by the defeated nation was to be evacuated; and substantial military physical resources for continuing the war were still available to the defeated party at the war's end.

However, the German termination differed significantly from the Russian termination in that it ended a world war rather than merely ending (or damping) hostilities in a theater of that war; it was terminated by a treaty calling for extensive disarmament of the defeated nation and heavy reparations (rather than principally loss of economically valuable territory in the Russian case); the termination settlement was upset only several years later and at first very secretly and gradually (rather than within the year in the Russian case); and the most onerous aspects of the termination settlement were enforced to a degree sufficient to cause great bitterness.

40 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918, and annulled by Soviet decree on November 13, 1918, and by Article 116 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.
and thirst for revenge among many nationalists in the defeated nation. The German army in November 1918 was still a very respectable fighting force of 2,000,000 men that, for the most part, marched back to Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Poland, and the Balkans in good order, and sometimes even singing, with officers in command. The Russian army in November 1917, on the other hand, was in large part totally disorganized, had degraded and sometimes murdered its officers, and constituted a dangerous but militarily ineffective mob. Despite the Kiel mutiny, much of the German navy, and all of the U-boat service, remained devoted to the end.\footnote{The Russian navy presented a much more extensive breakdown of discipline and command.}

The peace terms imposed on Germany at Versailles had their origins in the war aims of the victorious Allied nations. Some of these war aims were held in common by all the Allies, such as the drastic reduction of German power to wage war for the foreseeable future. Other war aims of the victor nations were at least partly mutually conflicting and competitive, such as the distribution of reparations and ceded territory.\footnote{In this discussion we are concerned chiefly with those of the Allied war aims that they} The failure of France and England to persuade Italy to give up her claim to certain Austrian border territory in the Dolomites, and Italy's failure to be thus persuaded, stopped the Austrian-Allied negotiations which otherwise probably would have led to Austria's leaving the war, and probably also a consequently earlier German termination. This was a clear case of conflict of Allied national interests. If the war had thus been ended in 1917, England and France would have saved themselves about a million men, and the leadership of the Alliance might not have been taken by Wilson because of the lesser importance of the American contribution to the war effort in 1917, but Italy would have failed to gain some Austrian territory. Italy's refusal to relinquish some of her territorial claims cost her allies heavily, and also cost Italy herself tens of thousands of lives, but it did succeed in gaining for her the desired territory.

\footnote{Apprently morale and discipline were strong in the submarines, destroyers, and cruisers—all of which came in contact with the enemy. Morale was lowest in the large battleships, which had the monotonous mission of coastal defense most of the time, and had poor food and oppressive conditions. See Ralph Haswell Lutz, The German Revolution, Stanford, 1922, pp. 28-34.}
held in common, because these would seem to offer the most significant motives and means for the termination process, and because we wish to avoid here the complexities of inter-allied negotiations.

The commonly held Allied war aims were logically the result of what actions were perceived to be necessary for Allied security, and what actions seemed to be possible, within military, political, and economic constraints, to achieve that security. Aims among the Allies on both sides tended to be initially somewhat divergent, then became more consonant, and at the end of the war they again diverged. Means also tended to diverge toward the end of the war among the Allies within each of the great coalitions. The perception of what was necessary for Allied security was strongly influenced by the Allied perception of German military capabilities and geopolitical intentions. The perception of what was possible for achieving Allied security was also strongly influenced by Allied perception of German capabilities and intentions, as well as by Allied capabilities, since military coercive power is a function of the relative capabilities of the adversaries.

The war aims of both the victorius Allies and the defeated Central Powers show an initial expansion from relatively modest beginnings at the start of the war in 1914, with a more rapid expansion in Germany from overconfidence resulting from initial successes. As the unanticipated duration, cost in lives, and material requirements became known, war aims of wider and more intense appeal were required for the domestic political justification of such costs and the political ratification of their continued expenditure.* Thus popular slogans were developed, such as "The war to save democracy," "The war to end wars," etc. which had very little to do with the original specific and limited war aims of modest military victory for the sake of maintaining a military balance of power, honoring alliance commitments, and a modest increase in prestige and territory. It seems most unlikely, for example, that any of the belligerents in 1914 had the slightest intention of changing the form of government of their adversaries. By 1916, however, both sides were hoping for and actively aiding revolutionary changes in the form of government of their adversaries.

* Expansion of War Means in World War I included expansion in the number of Allies, the operating (targeting) doctrine of the U-Boats, the increased conscription following increased scale of operations and casualties, and the increased economic sacrifices caused by labor and material shortages.
(The Germans began aiding the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties in Russia in 1915.) By 1918 Wilson was practically insisting on the overthrow of the monarchy in Germany as a condition even for serious armistice negotiations. To a government being threatened thus with political extinction, this constitutes political total war, and is likely to provoke the most diehard resistance.

The expansion of war aims and war means was probably the principal cause of the protraction of the war, to the point where it was terminated by the supportively physical but decisively psychological/political exhaustion of the Central Powers. When the war was terminated, Allied war aims had surpassed those of the Central Powers, as Allied means of war had also.

What is probably more significant, the proportionality between means and aims was increasing much more rapidly for the Allies than for the Central Powers. These relationships are illustrated graphically in qualitative form in the sketches below.
As shown in the diagram, German war aims initially were possibly
defensive as were those of England, while Austria and France appear now to
have been the aggressors or would-be aggressors. Both Austria and Russia
had been contesting the domination of the Balkans as the Turks lost their con-
trol over the area. Many influential Austrians believed war inevitable with
Russia, and were glad to use the pretext of the Archduke Ferdinand's assas-
sination for humbling Russia's Serbian ally and incidentally gaining hegemony
over that area. Russia, her prestige committed to the support of Serbia and
aiming to preserve her share of influence in the Balkans, took up the challenge.
The Russian mobilization was a direct military threat to Germany. The Franco-
Russian alliance and France's hopes of recovering Alsace-Lorraine would bring
France into a Russo-German war, and the German General Staff believed that a
protracted two-front war would be disastrous.

"From the purely technical viewpoint of the General Staff, a
war on two fronts could only be fought if an immediate result was ob-
tained on one of them. The immense distances to the east made any
(quick) result in this direction out of the question, and this obliged us
to concentrate on the French front. The schlieffen plan...could only
be conducted through Belgium...The fault of the country's political
leaders lay in not instructing the General Staff to prepare alternative
plans for a campaign against France...when the German Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, expressed a desire to respect Belgium's neutrality,
Moltke was obliged to reply that the plan...could not be altered without
running the risk of losing the war on the first day."

In today's terms, Germany "pre-empted" in declaring war on Russia,
after her 12-hour ultimatum to Russia to discontinue preparations for war on
the German frontier went unanswered. If Germany had permitted a Russian

42 "...General Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff,...con-
tended that time was on the side of the Russians, and that as a conflict between
Austria and Russia was inevitable, the sooner it started the better...Moltke,
the German Chief of Staff, being strongly against any preventive measures,
did everything in his power to restrain his Austrian colleague." Franz von Papen, Memoirs, p. 13.

43 Ibid., p. 28. The decisions to expand a war on each side are usually based
on current successes or their absence, and the prospects for improvement by
expansion. In an indecisive stalemate such as during most of WWI, both sides
will seek expansion, by such means as accumulating allies, to gain enough rela-
tive power for a decisive victory. In WWII, Britain tried to expand and Nazi
Germany tried to limit the war in the early phases of almost total Nazi success.
As shown in the diagram, German war aims initially were probably defensive, as were those of England, while Austria and France appear now to have been the aggressors or would-be aggressors. Both Austria and Russia had been contesting the domination of the Balkans as the Turks lost their control over the area. Many influential Austrians believed war inevitable with Russia, and were glad to use the pretext of the Archduke Ferdinand's assassination for humbling Russia's Serbian ally and incidentally gaining hegemony over that area. Russia, her prestige committed to the support of Serbia and aiming to preserve her share of influence in the Balkans, took up the challenge. The Russian mobilization was a direct military threat to Germany, particularly since Germany knew of France's revanchist intentions toward Alsace-Lorraine, the Franco-Russian alliance would bring France into a Russo-German war, and the belief of the German General Staff that a protracted two-front war would be disastrous.

"From the purely technical viewpoint of the General Staff, a war on two fronts could only be fought if an immediate result was obtained on one of them. The immense distances to the east made any (quick) result in this direction out of the question, and this obliged us to concentrate on the French front. The Schlieffen plan... could only be conducted through Belgium... The fault of the country's political leaders lay in not instructing the General Staff to prepare alternative plans for a campaign against France... when the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, expressed a desire to respect Belgium's neutrality, Moltke was obliged to reply that the plan... could not be altered without running the risk of losing the war on the first day." 43

In today's terms, Germany "pre-empted" in declaring war on Russia, after her 12-hour ultimatum to Russia to discontinue preparations for war on the German frontier went unanswered. If Germany had permitted a Russian

42 "...General Conrad von Hützendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff,.... contended that time was on the side of the Russians, and that as a conflict between Austria and Russia was inevitable, the sooner it started the better... Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, being strongly against any preventive measures, did everything in his power to restrain his Austrian colleague." Franz von Papen, Memoirs, p. 13.

43 Ibid., p. 28. The decisions to expand a war on each side are usually based on current successes or their absence, and the prospects for improvement by expansion. In an indecisive stalemate such as during most of WWI, both sides will seek expansion, by such means as accumulating allies, to gain enough relative power for a decisive victory. In WWII, Britain tried to expand and Nazi Germany tried to limit the war in the early phases of almost total Nazi success.
general mobilization without such a response, she would have lost the critical defensive advantage of being able to mobilize faster than the numerically superior Russian forces. Since France had answered a German query concerning what she would do in the event of a Russo-German war with the cryptic "France will act according to her own interests," and since France had mobilized her (also numerically superior) border forces, Germany had to assume that a Russo-German war would entail a French attack. The German attack on France through Belgium following the German declaration of war on Russia was thus intended to pre-empt the attack anticipated from France and Russia on Germany.

The vaunted German military planning can certainly be blamed for the narrowness and inflexibility of the single alternative of the Schlieffen plan for attacking France only through Belgium. The German political leadership can certainly be blamed for not anticipating that the execution of such a plan would outrage world opinion and bring England into the war to honor her commitment to defend Belgium's neutrality. The political leadership should have insisted that other alternatives be considered in advance. But in spite of these fatal blunders, and in spite of many foolish boasts by the Kaiser before and after, objective examination suggests that German war aims in July 1914 were wholly defensive.44

Unfortunately for both the Central Powers and the Allies, German war aims appear to have escalated rapidly from their predominantly defensive motives in July 1914. By September 4th the Kaiser was asking how to "achieve an honourable peace with England proportionate to the great sacrifice."45 By September 16th the Kaiser said of the English in his exasperation at the failure of the Schlieffen plan that "The fellows must be brought to their knees."46

44 This judgment is in part also based on statements by Admiral Georg von Müller, Chief of the German Naval Cabinet and aide to the Kaiser from 1914 to 1918, in his book, The Kaiser and His Court, Chapter I; and Walter Goerlitz in The German General Staff, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, Chapter VII.
45 Müller, The Kaiser, and His Court, p. 28.
46 Ibid., p. 33.
In February of 1915 the Kaiser declared that although he had no intention of annexing Belgium, he "would lay claim to rights over the fortresses, the coast and Antwerp."47 By October of 1915 he talked of vast annexations in the East. "The whole of Poland must remain German."48 He also now intended to keep Belgium.

By August 1916 the heavy losses at the Somme and elsewhere inspired a somewhat more realistic hope from the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg: "Our situation is such that we must make peace soon while we are still in the position of victors. A general status quo with an attempt to preserve our possibilities for expansion, yes—don't be alarmed—even a frontier adjustment with France in the sense of ceding French Lorraine and Upper Alsace in exchange for a part of the Briey zone."49 In November of 1916 Germany's proposed peace terms included recognition of a puppet Kingdom of Poland, annexation of Courland, part of Lithuania, Briey, Longwy, strategic areas in Alsace-Lorraine, and reparations.50 Evacuation of France and Belgium had by now been deemed unavoidable by the German government.

By April of 1917, the territorial war aims agreed to by the High Command and the Chancellor, and sanctioned by the Kaiser, had expanded again to incorporation of Courland and Lithuania, the puppet Poland with frontier concessions to Germany on the Narev line, parts of Serbia and Rumania for Austria, a completely German-controlled Belgium, cession of Liege, the Flanders coast and Briey.51 On July 19, 1917, the Reichstag passed a Peace Resolution52 calling for a negotiated peace renouncing all enforced frontier adjustments and political/economic "rapes" and calling for Freedom of the

47 Müller, The Kaiser and His Court, p. 66.
48 Ibid., p. 114.
49 Ibid., p. 197.
50 Ibid., p. 217.
51 Ibid., p. 261. These terms were supported by most of the political parties, including the Social Democrats. According to Lutz, "Scheidemann had informed Ludendorff that he was not opposed to the necessary annexations of territory nor to the proposed war indemnities." Lutz, The German Revolution, p. 17.
52 Müller, The Kaiser and His Court, p. 289.
Seas. Yet the Kaiser a few weeks later vaingloriously insisted: "Where my bayonets are on guard the land will under no circumstances be returned."53 But already at this time there were indications of revolt in the desertions, hunger strikes, sabotage, and minor mutinies in several battleships. By September 1917 the Crown Council was again arguing the pros and cons of retaining the Flanders coast. Kühlmann, the new Foreign Secretary, already believed that giving up Belgium was essential to a chance for an early peace. In a speech to the Reichstag on "peace" aims (or war aims) on October 10, 1917, he stressed the German intent of retaining Alsace-Lorraine but did not commit himself on Belgium. Finally by then the Kaiser had privately agreed to renounce Belgium it hastened peace to do so.

Most of these territorial war aims were communicated directly or indirectly to the Allies. From late in 1915 until 1917, when they no longer included annexations in the West and the Russian war effort was already crumbling, the German war aims probably contributed to Allied motivations for fighting the war through to a decisive military defeat of Germany.54 In this respect their unrealistic extent may have served to protract the war unnecessarily. Allied war aims, on the other hand, were equally unrealistic as perceived from the aspect of the "victorious" German High Command.

The following sections discuss war means as they declined in Germany and eventually induced termination. Alliances are the principal political device through which nations organize overall war-making means, and are discussed first. The relative decline in Germany of such other war-making means as military manpower, labor, morale, and leadership is then described.

53 Muller, The Kaiser and His Court, p. 292.
54 "...the nation had entered upon the war with universal enthusiasm because of its belief that it had been attacked."
"The empire was hurled to destruction primarily by the Pan-Germans, the politicians of the Fatherland party, and groups of annexationists who developed the war aims of the empire toward the goal of world conquest." Lutz, The German Revolution, pp. 15-17.
Significance of Alliances

Alliances are of usually great and often decisive importance in general wars. In World War I the changes of alliances in both warring coalitions became decisive late in 1917 with United States entry into and Russian exit from the war. The physical and psychological war-making power of the Anglo-French - Italian - Serbian Allies perhaps doubled with U. S. entry on their side, much more than merely compensating the loss of Russia.

By 1918 two important trends can be discerned within the warring coalitions. In the Allies, there is an exponential growth in the number of nations participating, providing a somewhat slower but still very impressive growth of war-making resources. Among the Central Powers, on the other hand, the weaker partners begin to break down late in the summer of 1918, and soon negotiate separate armistices (Bulgaria on September 30, Turkey on October 30, Austria on November 3, 1918). Within the six weeks between September 30 and the termination of November 11, Germany lost all three of her major allies. Ludendorff and other German leaders, by their own statements, became convinced of the hopelessness of a victory by the Central Powers as this disintegration became apparent in late September 1918.

Although unprecedented losses occurred on the Western front at the same time, by themselves these may not have seemed so decisive had Germany's allies been able to maintain or even to extend their strength at the same time.

By September of 1918 it must have become apparent to the German leaders that their allies had represented drains on rather than contributions to their power. Thus the impending loss of these allies on the one hand suggested the liquidation of unsuccessful German "investments", but on the other hand could result in additional losses from attempts to "throw good money after bad". Several far-sighted German statesmen saw clearly by the summer of 1918 that Germany would do best to liquidate these alliance investments, and bring back to the western front the divisions scattered in the Ukraine, the Balkans, and Italy. However, perhaps because this might have been perceived as a sign of weakness by the Allies at precisely the time when Ludendorff was making his last bid for a stronger negotiating position with the March - July offensives, the German High Command rejected such a course. Also, the unrealistic inflexibility of the Kaiser concerning
the relinquishing of territory added subjective weight to the decision to maintain these costly commitments.

The decisive factor in the termination of the war was the entry of the United States on the Allied side. This broke the see-saw stalemate that would otherwise probably have resulted in a compromise peace following mutual exhaustion of resources and morale. The entry of the United States, at a time when America was bound to be the principal ally in terms of military resources, also gave a decisive voice to Wilson as the Allied spokesman formulating peace terms. Since Wilson's "14 points" were more generous than those England and France had previously offered to Germany, this intervention of a combination of American power and American idealism made the German acceptance of at least a limited defeat both more unavoidable and more acceptable.

If the growth and decline of the two warring coalitions, expressed simply in numbers of nations *, is plotted as a function of time, it can be seen that the most decisive changes in numbers of allies took place in mid-1917 with the entry of the United States, Greece, China, and Brazil on the allied side; and in the fatal six weeks of September 30 - November 3, 1918, when Germany lost her allies. In retrospect and on a macroscopic scale, this may be interpreted as a decisive shift in the world balance of power having taken place in mid-1917, and taking about one year to make its impact on the Central Powers in defeating them.

The significance of the mid-1917 shift and the late-1918 sudden disintegration for war termination is that: (1) The Central Powers were probably at the peak of their relative power in March of 1917 just after the Russian "February" revolution, and (2) With indications (and there were many) of the collapse of her allies in the summer of 1918, Germany had her last opportunity to bargain for peace terms from a position of at least plausible further resistance on a continental scale. Both of the above conclusions

*A plot of relative increases in available war resources would, by chance, be quite similar.
could have been discerned at the time, as indeed the first was by Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg and the second was by Prince Max of Baden. Unfortunately for the Central Powers, neither of these far-sighted statesmen was persuasive enough, soon enough, to enable Germany to exploit these pre-turning point positions diplomatically.
After examining the state of munitions, transport, fuel, food, and personnel on the western front from 1914 to 1918, one must arrive at the melancholy conclusion that the most critical material of war was human life. No army has ever had all it thought it needed of munitions, transport, fuel, and food, but—given an inexhaustible supply of manpower—the armies struggling on the western front probably could have continued fighting for years. This was before the time of strategic bombardment of homeland industries, and the principal constraint on the war production of nations was the supply of manpower. This was true even of blockaded Germany, for she could still manage to obtain enough iron ore from occupied France and Belgium to fill out her own goodly supply, the synthetic nitrogen fixation process had obviated the need to import nitrates for explosives, and the domestic coal supply was adequate. Even the German food supply could probably have provided subsistence standards for several more years, particularly when augmented by easily defensible Ukrainian grain production.

Manpower had become the critical materiel of war in 1918, and this is probably why the influx of over two million Americans, with three million more to come by 1919, decisively changed the balance of power in favor of the Allies. In the First World War it was not America's material support that was decisive, since many American soldiers actually had to be equipped with British and French weapons. By the summer of 1918 the French had sustained over three million casualties, out of a population of only some 40,000,000. The British, with a similar size population, had suffered almost two million casualties. Churchill understates the problem:

"The state of our Man Power, with men of fifty already summoned to the colours, and the standards of physical fitness lowered to a harsh point, made the maintenance of the armies in 1919...a problem of extreme difficulty. Another three or four hundred thousand men shorn away would compel a melancholy contraction in the number of British Divisions available for 1919...The Cabinet therefore at the end of August sent their Commander-in-Chief a message warning him of the grave consequences which would result from a further heavy blood drain."

55 In 1913 Germany and Austria-Hungary produced about 365 million tons of coal, versus about 367 million tons for Great Britain and France. (The U.S. produced some 570 million tons). In 1913 Germany was second only to the U.S. in steel production producing 19 million tons versus 12 million for England and France and 32 million for the U.S. Readings in the Economics of War, ed. by J. M. Clark, W. H. Hamilton, and H. G. Moulton, Chicago, 1918, p. 135-138. (Footnote continued on following page.)
For the French, with their even greater losses, the situation was worse. After the Nivelle offensive and the subsequent mutinies its enormous and fruitless losses had provoked, the French high command had resolved on a defensive posture until the Americans arrived in force. It was American manpower that turned the tide in World War I.

The Germans knew of and feared this potentially decisive effect of the arrival of two million fresh American troops on the western front. However, despite early warnings by the German military attaché in Washington, von Papen, the German General Staff appears to have believed that even with a United States entry into the war on the Allied side, a decisive victory could be won in France before sufficient American troops could be deployed there to affect the outcome. This belief may have rested, at least in part, on the mistaken assumption that an unrestricted submarine campaign could, if necessary,interdict the continental battlefield. This untried assumption must have developed before the German decision to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917, and the Allied response to it late in the spring of the convoy system. As it turned out, the convoy system and other improved Allied anti-submarine techniques enabled some two million American troops to be shipped to France in 1917 and 1918 without a single sinking by submarine attack.

It is also persuasively argued in the same book (pp. 160-162) that the blockade was ineffective in denying Germany the material needs for war, including food. See also General Gröner's statement of December 14, 1916, quoted in the same book on pp. 199-201: "The Danube means everything to us. Last year we had to beg Roumania for her oil and grain...now we don't need to beg." (Roumania having been occupied by the German Army.)


"...the United States was a sea power...and shared the British conception of the freedom of the seas. It was my absolute conviction that our manner of conducting the U-boat campaign would in the end lead to open conflict...in that event, the war would be lost..." p. 61-62.

"All your Majesty's representatives in America are convinced that war will come (between Germany and the U.S.) if no solution is found to the U-boat dispute.' 'No, no!' the Emperor answered, with an imperious gesture, 'my friend Ballin knows the Americans better. He tells me that Wilson is an obstinate fellow, but that he will never get Congress to agree to a declaration of war.'" p. 64.

"...in 1917, I received a request from the General Staff to submit a memorandum on the possibility of the United States organizing an expeditionary force if the U-boat campaign led to a declaration of war. The general impression was that the peacetime strength of the American Army would permit no such development within a short space of time. I presented in the strongest possible terms the opposite opinion, but I doubt whether my report had much effect." p. 65. Papen, Memoirs. (Italics added.)
Situation on the Western Front on September 25, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allied Divisions</th>
<th>German Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American (= to 2-1/2 British or French divisions): 27</td>
<td>Assault: 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinary: 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Infantry: 59</td>
<td>Landwehr: 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Cavalry: 3</td>
<td>Cavalry: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Infantry: 99</td>
<td>Austro-Hungarian: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Cavalry: 6</td>
<td>Fresh Reserve: 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Infantry: 13</td>
<td>Tired Reserve: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Infantry: 2</td>
<td>Total Divisions: 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese Infantry: 2</td>
<td>Total Division Equivalents: 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Divisions:</strong> 211</td>
<td><strong>Total Division Equivalents:</strong> 252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated Effective Force Ratios

*British Army (Haig) vs. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and von Boehn, (Northern front) 87:77 German (about 2:1 in effectiveness)*

*French (Fayolle and Maistre) and American Army (Pershing) vs. Crown Prince and von Gallwitz (Central front) 111:93 German (about 4:1 in effectiveness)*

*French Army (de Castelnau) vs. Duke Albrecht of Württemberg (Southern front) 19:22 (about 3:1 in effectiveness)*

---


*"Effectiveness" is based on relative numbers of fighting troops, rather than the numbers of units.
A Domestic Indicator:

Strikes

Another critical war resource that was being exhausted, or at least disrupted, was labor. In April of 1917 there occurred the first of a series of major strikes of munitions workers. One hundred twenty-five thousand men and women took part in the strike, instigated by the Independent Social-Democrats formed at Gotha on April 9.

"The will to victory which in January 1918 inspired the veteran German armies on the western front was by that time lacking in the war workers in the great industrial centers of the Empire... the workingmen in the essential war industries were not organized so that their lowered morale could be strengthened... strikes, although partly of revolutionary origin, were caused primarily by the nervous exhaustion of the working class."  39

"...a comprehensive strike movement has been planned for April 16 (1917) in Greater Berlin. The choice of the date and the fact that the movement had grown out of the masses themselves show clearly where the chief reasons for it are to be sought. April 16 is the day when the new regulation of food supply, together with a reduction of the bread ration, is to take effect.

"But these are not the only motives which led to the movement. Undoubtedly the great world events of the last weeks 60 have made a very strong impression upon the people... the great majority of the people are as one in believing that there should not be any postponement of the announced reforms of internal policy."

"As a third factor, undoubtedly, the deep desire for peace plays a decisive role. The recurrences of yesterday (strikes) should be considered as a note of warning..." 61

"...It is asserted that the strike was a suitable means for bringing about a speedier conclusion of peace. But that would be taking for granted that the corresponding radical parties in other countries would also give their adhesion to it and would renounce


60 The Russian March Revolution and Tsar's abdication, and U.S. entry into the war on April 6.

61 Vorwärts, No. 104, April 17, 1917, pp. 1-2, quoted in The Fall of the German Empire. (Italics added.)
their desire for war and destruction, and even then they would have to be strong enough to impose their will in their own countries. Nowhere has this desire or this power been shown. On the contrary... the more firmly the enemy believes that there are deep-rooted internal conflicts in Germany the further does the possibility of peace recede.\textsuperscript{62}

These strikes were at least partly the result of a reduced food supply and increased working hours. The Allied blockade was directly responsible for the reduced food supply, and indirectly contributed to the need for longer working hours. Thus Allied military pressures contributed significantly to the domestic disunity leading to revolution and termination.

\textsuperscript{62} Von Payer in the Reichstag on Internal Reforms, February 25, 1918, quoted in The Fall of the German Empire, pp. 335-6. (Italics added.)
April 16-20, 1917: 125,000 strike in protest of reduced bread ration, instigated by Independent Social Democrats and encouraged by Russian March Revolution.
June, 1917: Sabotage reported in Bavarian factories.
July 7, 1917: Labor disorders at Düsseldorf in connection with food shortages—munitions works temporarily closed.
January 15, 1918: Strikes in Vienna
January 29, 1918: Strikes of 250,000 in Berlin, Magdeburg, Halle, Hamburg, Kiel, Nuremberg, Danzig, the Ruhr and Saxony. Strikers demanded: (1) The speedy bringing about of peace without annexations or indemnities, on the basis of the self-determination of peoples in accordance with the principles formulated by the Russian People's Commissioners in Brest-Litovsk; (2) Delegates of the workers of all countries to be invited to participate in the peace negotiations. As regards Germany in particular: (3) More liberal food supply...an even distribution among all classes of the people; (4)...restoration of the right of assembly as well as that of free discussion...(5) the abolition of the military control of industrial undertakings; (6) The immediate release of all persons convicted or arrested for political action; (7) The drastic democratization of the entire state organism in Germany, beginning with the introduction of the general, equal, direct, and secret vote for all men and women over 20 years for the Prussian Diet." 64
January 30, 1918: Strike of 18,000 Hamburg shipyard workers for more food.
February 1, 1918: Strike of Bremen shipyard workers.
February 1, 1918: Martial law declared in greater Berlin. Strikes in Leipzig, Essen, and Munich. Leaders in Munich arrested.
February 8, 1918: Workmen's Committees in Munich munitions factories demand peace without annexations or indemnities, domestic democratization, more equal food distribution.

63 Source: R.H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire.
64 Ibid., p. 233.
Morale of the Army

The question of German morale seems most important for the understanding of the German termination in 1918, because such substantial physical and organization resources remained for continuing the conflict. In general, morale seems to have been correlated with the military position (military means), as shown on the War Means Curves in the previous diagram. This raises the question of whether morale is the cause, the effect, or both, of the military situation, or whether they both have a common cause. We must also see if there were significant distinctions in the morale of the fighting troops, the military commanders, the troops in the rear, the home population, and the political leadership.

Evidence is consistent that morale among the German fighting troops declined to a new low after the summer of 1918, but not so low that they could not still fight. General Hoffmann said on October 8, 1918, that "Our troops are just as good as they ever were... but they have lost all their nerve." According to one former German non-commissioned officer on the western front in 1918, many soldiers thought the war had been lost after the failure of the March 1918 offensive. On the other hand, the more the troops were in the front lines, the more oblivious they were of the larger factors concerning the course of the war. Ludendorff's failure of nerve on August 8 was apparently not communicated to the company level fighting troops, and despite General Hoffmann's statement the troop fought intensely up to the last day of the war. They fought without enthusiasm (that ended in 1914!), with low morale, but they did go on fighting.

From July to September the rate of withdrawal of German forces was unprecedented on the western front, particularly since until the March offensive most of the front line had changed position less than ten miles since 1914. This must have indicated to even the benumbed front-line troops by October that the German army was being consistently defeated, even if it was not yet destroyed. Nevertheless, the German soldiers continued stubbornly to resist the Allied advances, even when these were carried out with great numerical superiority and hundreds of new tanks. Only on rare occasions, as when Allied tanks suddenly and unexpectedly broke through the line, did German units retreat in disorder. It must be concluded that

67 Former Feldwebel George Rosenberg, personal communication.
the morale of the German army, while undoubtedly decreasing with the declining fortunes of war, did not sink so low as to disrupt decisively the army's combat effectiveness.68

The German army in the summer and fall of 1918 was forced back by the overwhelming brute force of superior Allied numbers and equipment. In the sense of having to give up territory and key defensive positions,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Prisoners Captured</th>
<th>Guns Captured</th>
<th>Allied Advance</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>miles</td>
<td>approx. area, sq. miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amiens</td>
<td>8-12 August</td>
<td>21,850</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapaume</td>
<td>21-31 August</td>
<td>34,250</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arras</td>
<td>26 Aug. - 3 Sep.</td>
<td>18,850</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Basse</td>
<td>15 Aug. - 20 Sep.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epeny</td>
<td>18-19 Sept.</td>
<td>11,750</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ypres</td>
<td>28-29 Sept.</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Quentin</td>
<td>27-30 Sept.</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambrai</td>
<td>8-10 October</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selle</td>
<td>17-25 October</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>14-31 October</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courai</td>
<td>14-31 October</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maubeuge</td>
<td>1-11 November</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mons</td>
<td>8-11 November</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>186,000 (+202,000 by French, Americans, and Belgians)</td>
<td>2,810 (+3770 by other Allies)</td>
<td>2,785 sq. miles (in British Sector alone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British Gains, 8 August to 11 November 1918

"Six battle-worthy divisions" were lost at Amiens on August 8, according to Ludendorff. From July 18th to November 11th, 1918, the Allies captured 391,000 German prisoners and 6618 guns! "From March 21 to November 11, 1918, the Allies inflicted 1,471,000 German casualties in killed, wounded, and prisoners. at a cost of some 1,800,000 Allied casualties.

the German army was defeated on the western front, and its stubborn resistance reduced further its waning strength, but it was never destroyed. When the Bolshevik regime terminated hostilities on the eastern front in November 1917 it no longer possessed an effective fighting force, but when the German government terminated hostilities in November 1918 it still commanded a battered but still operational army. The immediate cause of the German termination of World War I thus cannot be attributed to an absence of the power of further military resistance. It therefore seems apparent that the low and declining morale of the German army in 1918 was not a decisive factor in the termination of hostilities.

The morale of some key military commanders appears not to have been as steady, if depressed, as that of their troops. In the final phase of the war on the western front against the Allies, Ludendorff was in effect the supreme war lord of Germany, although the Kaiser and Hindenburg both were his titular superiors. Certainly Ludendorff was the supreme director of all German military operations from August 29, 1916, to his resignation in early November 1918 a few days before the armistice, even though his official position was First Quartermaster-General under Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff. Most sources agree that Ludendorff "lost his nerve", "had a nervous breakdown", "suffered a complete collapse", etc.

68 "... the old battle-hardened divisions still compelled the respect of British Generals, many of whom thought that it would take a year, or possibly two, before final victory was achieved." Walter Goerlitz, The German General Staff, p. 195. See also Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. IV, p. 232; speaking of Foch, supreme Allied commander: "All his plans aimed at the summer of 1919. In August, when asked when the war would end, his official answer was 'about next autumn in twelve months'; and as late as the middle of October his staff made the answer 'in the spring'."

69 Some impression may be gained of the German soldier's attitude from the following anecdote related by General Knox, concerning a Bolshevik Russian soldier's attempt to subvert a German soldier at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations in December 1917: "The soldier tried propaganda on his own, and got a rebuff. He tried to reason with a German soldier: 'We have kicked out our Nikolai. Why don't you do the same with your Wilhelm?' The German said: 'Why should I pull a sound tooth out of my head because you had a toothache a year ago?'" Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, p. 741.
Ludendorff's Failure of Nerve

According to some commentators, the first "collapse" of Ludendorff's morale in August initiated the national collapse. Whether Ludendorff's first nervous crisis was a significant cause or effect of the impending breakdown is difficult to determine, but we may be assured that it was at least a contributing factor. It appeared significant indirectly—not by initiating the collapse of military resistance, which did not occur, but rather by at first frightening and then disrupting the political leadership.

On October 26, 1918 the Kaiser proclaimed: "This afternoon I had a disagreement with Ludendorff resulting in his resignation, which I was glad to accept. He is a man broken by his nerves and denies that he added to the difficulties of the armistice bid." The Kaiser's judgment of a man and events, so often out of balance, seems just in this case, and was corroborated by Chancellor Prince Max of Baden and Secretary of State Solf.

Ludendorff suffered a second "collapse" at the end of October 1918, when he suddenly clamoured for an immediate armistice after having been one of the principal obstacles to its conclusion, and then again reversed himself and resigned.

"In four weeks Germany had accepted the decision of four years of conflict, the rest of the chronicle of progressive national collapse taking place at an equal speed in the armed forces and at home. Yet the collapse had begun at OHL with the breaking of Ludendorff by the events of July 13 and August 8."


Müller, The Kaiser and His Court, p. 412.

"At the beginning of the month (October) the political government of the Empire was coerced by the Supreme Command into requesting an armistice and proposing peace to the enemy." Solf, Secretary of State for the Foreign Office.

Let us examine some of the circumstances surrounding Ludendorff's first "collapse", as they probably shed light on the reasons for his subsequent behavior.

"Mertz's diary entries give a vivid—perhaps too vivid—picture of an extraordinary fortnight:

'July 23, evening: Wetzell and I feel we are dying of half measures. Ludendorff will spend himself completely without finding the strength to decide on anything dynamically effective.

July 24th: There is question of his Excellancy Ludendorff's nervousness and of disjointedness in the work he produced... His Excellency is working himself to death, worrying too much about details. This situation is really grave.

July 25th: Von Schwerin (Chief of the General Staff of the Balkan Army group, temporarily in Avesnes) very much disturbed by the appearance of his Excellency. It really does give the impressing that his Excellency has lost all confidence. The Army chiefs are suffering terribly as a result of it.'

On August 7 Ludendorff had to issue a secret order to the OHL staff to repair the damage done by his own fortnight of disintegration:

'To my regret the existence of despondent outlooks has been established and their source has been traced to Supreme Headquarters. At home and in the Army, all eyes are turned upon the OHL. Whether rightly or wrongly, each member of the Supreme Headquarters is looked upon as being well informed and corresponding values put upon all he says. For this reason every member of the Supreme Headquarters must, even outside the OHL, remain conscious of his responsibility... the OHL is free from despondency. Sustained by what has previously been achieved on the front and at home, prepare stoutheartedly to meet the challenges that are to come. No member of OHL may think and act in a manner other than this.'


68
"The themes of panic, dissolution, and insubordination were really more imminent under the conduct of Nivelle's troops after the failure of the April 1917 offensive, and on the eve of the mutinies. By the end of the day Rawlinson had advanced up to four miles, and according to German accounts had virtually annihilated the line divisions opposite him. There were neither defensive nor strong field forces to bar fast British penetration and pursuit. 'August 8,' wrote Ludendorff, 'was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war. This was the worst experience that I had to go through, except for the events that, from September 15 onward, took place on the Bulgarian front and sealed the fate of the quadruple alliance.'"

From other descriptions given by Prince Max of Baden, the chancellor of the government conducting the peace negotiations, it seems clear that Germany may have been precipitously forced into peace negotiations by the panic of General Ludendorff and the Army high command on 29 September 1918. As Solf, Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, put it, "At the beginning of the month (October) the political government of the Empire was coerced by the Supreme Command into requesting an Armistice and proposing peace to the enemy." Then, at the meeting of the German War Cabinet on 17 October, Ludendorff shifted his position—apparently having recovered his nerve—and stated that "We ought to tell the enemy that he will have to fight for such conditions." (Wilson's 14 points) Prince Max himself suggests that a more honest statement by Ludendorff would have been to say:

"I have today regained my nerve and my confidence. From 29 of September to 3 October I had lost both. I had an unexampled responsibility. The degree of tension in which I have lived for four years went beyond human power. And neither was there then nor is there today any necessity for precipitate action. It is true that in any case we must inevitably collapse by the spring of next year at the latest. I regret having let loose the panic in Army and people. Help me to repair the catastrophe of the Armistice offer. I see a new and hopeful factor, the army's power of attack is slackening."

75 Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Memoirs, Harper & Bros, Publishers, New York and London, 1919, p. 679. See also Ludendorff's retrospective rationalization: "I had no hope of finding a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to our advantage. On the contrary, I became convinced that we were now without the safe foundations for the plans of OHL on which I had hitherto been able to build...Leadership now assumed...the character of an irresponsible game of chance, a thing I have always considered fatal. The fate of the German people was for me too high a stake. The war must be ended." (Memoirs, p. 684.)
If we show ourselves capable of a war of desperation, perhaps then the enemy will not muster up the necessary energies for a war of annihilation, and will give us a peace which allows us to live.

Instead of that General Ludendorff replied: I have always treated the shortage of men as the most important factor. Today I hear that within a reasonable space of time I can have 600,000 men. 76

Thus Prince Max of Baden, giving his reasons why "in the course of this meeting I have lost confidence in Ludendorff as a man." 77

"Houssmann, as was his custom, summed up pointedly the change in the high command's attitude: 'Their former idea was: diplomacy to the rescue to avoid a military catastrophe; their present idea: rather a military catastrophe than accept dishonorable conditions. This is a big change.' And yet the Supreme Command did not desire any rupture of the Armistice negotiations." 77

The way Chancellor Max summed it up was:

"The military situation has not improved since the fifth of October. But even today it was not as black as General Ludendorff had painted it on 29 September. We had no right to fly the white flag on 5th October; we had no reason to do so even today. But anyhow in a few months more the situation must be desperate. The conclusion to be drawn was clear: The negotiations with Wilson must go on. Once we had turned to him, we must give him every chance to show his good will, whether we really believed in it or not; our conditions forced us to make the greatest sacrifices to obtain peace, but if dishonorable conditions were made for the Armistice, then the people must be called out to make a last stand." 78

The general sequence of key events leading to the surrender of Germany thus seem to have been as follows:

1. Major military defeat and panic on the part of Ludendorff on 8 August, and more panicky demands by him on 29 September, and late October 1918.

76 The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, p. 138. (Italics added)

77 Ibid., p. 139.

78 Ibid., p. 135-136.
2. Ludendorff's and the Army High Command's insistence to the government that "The Army needs rest" and of the "need for an immediate Armistice to save the Army" and to prevent a complete collapse.

3. On the Army High Command's insistence, the government's request for an Armistice on 5 October, to be based on Wilson's 14 points.

4. An immediate drop in morale in both the Army Command and, probably more decisive, on the home front as a result of both the Armistice offer of 5 October and Wilson's relatively cool replies. ("Our request for an Armistice had been a deadly blow to the sense of honor of millions of Germans.")

5. Feedback of reduced public confidence in the war effort on both the government and the military command, further reducing the effectiveness of military leadership and the governments' hope of maintaining sufficiently stiff resistance to obtain better peace terms.

It thus seems that the morale breakdown in the Army High Command, together with the military failure and breakdown, had critical effects on the political situation in Berlin. Possibly even the naval mutiny at Kiel was precipitated by panicky plans for a "last great sea battle" by such "diehard" Ludendorff supporters as Admiral Souchon (of Goeben fame), Commandant at Kiel in 1918. In the nearly exhausted Germany of 1918, a major breakdown in any vital element of the national power structure—soldiers, sailors, commanders, workers, political leaders—would probably have led to the collapse of other elements of the system. The facts indicate that the Army High Command was the first vital element to break down. Although it temporarily recovered, the decay had by then already spread (or been produced in parallel) in the Berlin political circles, the non-fighting mutinous sailors in Kiel, and finally the general population in northern Germany, where it resulted in a revolution forcing the immediate end of the war. The following chart shows the increasing rate of government ministerial turnover as the end approached.


80 "When the great organizations of this world are strained beyond breaking point, their structure often collapses at all points simultaneously...All her (Germany's) Allies whom we had so long sustained, fell down broken and ruined, begging separately for peace. The faithful armies were beaten at the front and demoralized from the rear. The proud, efficient Navy mutinied. Revolution exploded in the most disciplined and docile of states. The Supreme War Lord fled."
### Ministerial Changes in Imperial Germany, 1914-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chief of Staff</th>
<th>Chancellor</th>
<th>Foreign Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>von Moltke (since 1905)</td>
<td>Bethmann-Hollweg</td>
<td>Zimmermann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September: von Falkenhayn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>August: Hindenburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>July: Michaelis</td>
<td>5 August von Kühlmann</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October: von Hertling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>October: Gröner</td>
<td>3 October: Prince Max of Baden</td>
<td>20 July: Admiral von Hintze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 November: Ebert</td>
<td>3 October: Solf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(February 1919)</td>
<td>9 November: Scheidemann</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pressures for the Kaiser's Abdication

In October and November of 1918, the German constitutional government was beset by the problem of satisfying Wilson's strongly implied demands for the abdication of the Kaiser as the precondition for Armistice negotiations. The Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, and other leaders of the government, although much grieved in their sincerely loyal feelings for the Kaiser, were convinced that the mobilization of the German population for one final effort of a war of "national defense" should not be fought by the German people merely to save the Kaiser, but only if all of Wilson's demands concerning the Kaiser had been met and the allies insisted on what in Germany was considered a "dishonorable peace"—that is, unconditional surrender. The German leaders believed, correctly, that Wilson was engaged in an internal struggle both in the United States and within the Alliance against "Chauvinists" such as Foch, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who were in favor of imposing relatively harsh peace terms on Germany.

The German leaders felt that in order to give Wilson all possible ammunition for winning his internal political fight for moderate peace terms, any possibility at all for meeting his implied demands for the resignation of the Kaiser and the "democratization" of Germany could not afford to be neglected.

The problem was to get the Kaiser to resign voluntarily, before the pressure of domestic public opinion made his resignation an ignominious and undignified response to pressure by the enemy and home opinion. General Ludendorff did not help matters by issuing an Army proclamation insisting that the country would fight on and that negotiations with Wilson must be broken off, in order to achieve a "peace with honor". This led to Ludendorff's dismissal by the Kaiser at the insistence of Prince Max of Baden, who threatened his own resignation otherwise. At the same time, although telegrams from German advisors abroad were laid before the Kaiser by Prince Max, indicating that the Kaiser's resignation was necessary for a continuation of peace negotiations, the Kaiser simply refused to get the point. Prince Max was convinced that the only basis of achieving
either moderate peace terms, or the broadened base of public opinion support for a desperate war of national defense, was the voluntary abdication of the Kaiser. But this had not been achieved even by early November, when Austria had surrendered, the Rumanian oil supplies were cut off, and according to Crown Prince Rupprecht, as a result of losses the average division strength on the Western front had fallen to less than 1,000 rifles per division, as compared to 12,000 at the beginning of the war.1

What is instructive about this termination crisis is that sometimes a scapegoat figure on which the feelings of both internal national and external hatred converge, can and sometimes must be sacrificed dramatically as the precondition for termination. In the case of the Kaiser in World War I, the necessity for this seemed less an internal German matter, than a point that Wilson believed he needed to make, to gain support for more moderate peace terms among his French and British allies and even the Jingoists in Congress. It is doubtful that Wilson understood the devastating effect his insistence on the abdication of the Kaiser had in Germany, on political unity, government, Army, and civilian morale—nor the far-reaching postwar effects on German political stability of the overthrow of the traditional monarchical form of government. Wilson's conditions concerning the Kaiser split the government, forced the dismissal of General Ludendorff, and undermined further the confidence of the Army command.

The Kiel Rebellion

At least according to Prince Max, the Naval mutiny at Kiel that spread to other North German ports spelled the end of any hope of a "national rising" in response to an allied demand for German disarmament as the precondition for an armistice. The sailors in Kiel found it an opportune time to mutiny on the 4th and 5th of November 1918. This was

1 The German Army High Command resisted the consolidation of decimated units into more fully manned units, for fear of showing weakness both at home and to the enemy by the consequently reduced number of units. See the letter from Rupprecht to Max of Baden in the latter's Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 158: "...the divisions can only go into battle with an average strength of a thousand rifles, against 12,000 at the beginning of the war."
partly because they had heard possibly correct although distorted rumors of a Naval high command plan to seek one last major Naval engagement with the British fleet (in the hope of imposing sufficient losses on it to improve allied armistice terms), and because of the suspected opposition of the German Admirals to the abdication of the Kaiser, and possibly also because of some Bolshevik or anarchist infiltration of the fleet and the North German ports.

Some 40,000 healthy, well-fed, and apparently determined sailors mutinied in the Kiel area, and no loyal Army units available in Germany could stop them. Those few reserve forces sent against them either surrendered their arms to the mutineers or joined them. The mutineers, encouraged by their success, took over the ships and landed in Lübeck, Hamburg, Bremen, and other North German ports and took control. They demanded the immediate release of any previous mutineers and agitators that had been imprisoned by the authorities, a cancellation of the anticipated "suicide mission" to engage the British fleet, and the abdication of the Kaiser.

At the same time, the Army, now under the nominal command of General Groener after Ludendorff's dismissal, had become more rigid in its rejection of the Kaiser's abdication. The Kaiser had insisted on making a tour of the Western front in the hope of stiffening the morale of the forces there, who were alleged to have felt themselves abandoned by the Kaiser. It may be surmised that the Kaiser also had no wish to face the blandishments of Prince Max in Berlin concerning the patriotic necessity of his voluntary abdication. At any rate, as the situation on the home front grew continually worse, the rigidity of the Army High Command increased in its attitude towards terms of negotiation and acceptance of preconditions such as the abdication of the Kaiser. Thus the situation was becoming increasingly "brittle" and unstable—the flexibility of Prince Max and his government being continually narrowed, while the demands made on it by domestic faction at home and allied terms grew increasingly difficult to meet.
According to Wheeler-Bennett, the Kaiser's abdication and the German revolution of November 9-11, 1918, "were almost entirely the results of outside interference." The war-weariness of the outnumbered, outworn, and unsuccessful German armies in the West, together with the increasing privations, awareness of heavy casualties, and hopelessness of victory on the home front, had created a pervasive degree of dissatisfaction with the Kaiser and the High Command. What mobilized this latent dissatisfaction, by giving it a clear and immediate practical aim, was President Wilson's announcement on October 23 that if the allies had to deal with the military authorities and the monarchical autocrats of Germany... they must demand not negotiations for peace but surrender.

"From that moment the Spartakists of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and Haase's Independent Socialists did not cease to reiterate that the Kaiser and the Generals alone stood between Germany and a just peace. More sober and responsible minds sought desperately to preserve the Monarchy but could find no other means of so doing than to effect the abdication of the Kaiser and the Crown Prince in order to clear the way for a regency. The Social Democrats, viewing with the gravest apprehension the ever more rapid approach of the day when they... would themselves have to shoulder the burden of office and responsibility, now made frantic efforts to shore up that very imperial structure which they had hitherto so persistently undermined. Wrote Theodor Wolff of Fritz Ebert (leader of the Social Democrats): '...it was less pleasant to find oneself in the morning the Supreme Commander of the Revolution after going to bed as a member of the respectable middle class.'

"This critical situation, of which the seeds had long been sown, was precipitated by Mr. Wilson's declaration. The efforts to preserve the Monarchy at the expense of the monarch were frustrated by the obstinate refusal of Wilhelm II to abandon his throne.


83 Ibid., p. 17.

84 Theodor Wolff, Through Two Decades, London, 1936, pp. 118 et seq.
Had he abdicated in the last week of October 1918 he would almost certainly have preserved the monarchical form of government in Germany, for all conservative, liberal, and bourgeois forces within the Reich were united in the belief that herein lay the best way of combating the threat of Communism.

"... Prince Max, faced with a mounting wave of revolution, announced the abdication on the afternoon of November 9 in a last effort to save the throne. This gesture came too late. Already Karl Liebknecht was announcing the establishment of a Soviet régime from the steps of the Imperial Palace.

"The Social Democrats... were forced into making a revolutionary gesture in order to forestall a revolution, and, in a moment of mingled exultation and panic, Philip Scheidemann proclaimed the German Republic from the window of the Reichstag... The change of régime did not come as a result of any long-planned revolutionary movement. It occurred, in very great measure, because those in power believed that by this means alone could Germany comply with President Wilson's preliminary pre-requisite for peace, and partly because of the fear of Bolshevism; both courses being the result of pressure from outside rather than from within Germany."85

If Wheeler-Bennett is right about Wilson's declaration being the principal factor in crystallizing German discontent into a revolution by long latent but previously unfocused forces, there is a possible lesson to be learned here about war termination. If the latent discontent within a nation can be mobilized against a "war to the bitter end" régime, by destroying all hope of such a régime gaining any terms better than unconditional surrender, realistic elements are faced with a choice between pinning their hopes on the "diehard" régime with an outcome of either unconditional surrender or victory, and overthrowing that régime for one that promises no victory but has at least some hope of attaining a negotiated peace, simply because the victorious enemy has not foreclosed that possibility with the new, non-"diehard" régime. Realistic men will usually choose the latter, provided there is no reasonable hope of

victory. The operational result within the defeated nation is, at best, a takeover by the "realists" and a promptly negotiated termination (as in Germany in November 1918), or a further deterioration of internal unity accelerating such a takeover, or, if the more moderate "realists" are barred from power, such a deterioration of internal unity that violently revolutionary forces gain control and terminate the war on the most abject terms to consolidate their own dominance (as in Russia in November 1917).

From the point of view of the victor who wishes to terminate the war as promptly and thoroughly as possible, the second two possibilities (early negotiated peace with moderate "realist" faction, later unconditional peace imposed on a nation totally disrupted by revolution resulting from postponement of peace) are preferable to the first (continued maximum resistance by the "dissidents" holding out for unrealistic peace terms). In fact it may constitute an implicit war aim to impose sufficient military, economic, and political pressures on a nation to coerce it into one of these two postures for termination.

There are important distinctions of value, however, both for victor and vanquished, in these two alternative termination postures of a negotiated peace by a moderate "realist" government and a peace dictated to a radical revolutionary government attempting to control internal anarchy. Obviously the former is preferable to the latter for most of the defeated nation (all except the revolutionary minority thus losing its chance to take over), because there are likely to be more generous peace terms, the costly war will be terminated sooner, and the immediate post-war government will provide an orderly transition in consonance with the sympathies and traditions of the majority. If termination is delayed until the most violent type of revolution brings it about as the only alternative to complete chaos and anarchy, the victor can impose more unfavorable terms (as Germany did at Brest-Litovsk) on a now helplessly disrupted nation that has had to suffer the costs of war for an additional period of time (March to November 1917 in Russia). In the anarchic situation, the political form most likely to survive may also be more totalitarian and less respectful of majority views and traditional rights than the moderate realist regime it supplanted as a result of the protraction of an unsuccessful war.
What has not been much emphasized by American, English, and French scholars—perhaps because it is unpleasant to become aware of one's own nation's tragic mistakes—is that the termination negotiated with moderate, realistic elements of the defeated nation may also be in the long-range interests of the victors. Forcing a revolutionary regime on a defeated nation may disrupt its powers of military resistance more rapidly, but it may also initiate long-term political instabilities that may eventually result in further wars as the military-economic power of the defeated nation recovers. This is what happened in Germany.

It would probably be imputing too much foresight to Wilson to suggest that he considered these factors in this way when he decided to declare his refusal to negotiate even an armistice with the Kaiser or the General Staff. The announcement possibly was decisive in terminating the war in November 1918 rather than in the summer of 1919, but the Kaiser may not have lasted much longer even without Wilson's ultimatum. In any case, who can say that the history of the West was the better for it, and the concomitant termination of the monarchy in Germany? One would have to balance the costs (to all the belligerents) of additional months of war against the expected costs of the increased chances of future wars.

What is instructive tactically and operationally is that a declaration such as Wilson's could have such a decisive effect on the timing and form of termination. What is instructive and disturbing historically is that the provocation of internal disunity as a means of hastening termination, as practiced both advertently by the Germans against Imperial Russia and perhaps inadvertently by Wilson against Imperial Germany, could increase the ultimate costs of war by being another source of new wars resulting from the internal political instabilities. *

* In opposition to this speculation, it may be observed that had the Prussian monarchy been preserved after WWI, Hitler might have taken over power from an aged and inadequate Kaiser in 1933, as probably as he did take it over from the aged and inadequate President Hindenburg of the Weimar Republic. Also, by direct intervention, the Allies could have barred a Hitler from power had they had the necessary political resolve.
A problem posed for the future is that in all but the most limited wars, the enormous rate at which losses can occur in nuclear wars places a premium on the earliest possible termination, and this early termination may best be achieved by destroying the internal unity of a nation to a degree that by itself may be a breeding ground of future conflicts. Royalists such as Churchill might still wonder whether the many thousands of lives saved by termination in November 1918 rather than some time in 1919, by forcing a major internal change on Germany, were too dearly bought by the greater costs of having later to defeat the Nazi regime that otherwise might never have arisen. In the case of a future World War III fought with nuclear weapons, however, there can be little doubt that historical speculations on subsequent political developments must be displaced by the immediate and overriding concern of terminating the unprecedented destruction at the earliest possible moment.

The Armistice Negotiations

The armistice negotiations illustrate the role of the victor's military pressures in "nailing down" the termination of a great war. Without Marshal Foch's hardheaded understanding of this requirement, other policies might have prevailed and conceivably tempted Germany into a few months more armed resistance. This would not have changed the military outcome of the war, but might have resulted in a Bolshevik Germany. The implementation of the German decision for an armistice took about a week before it actually went into effect on November 11 at 11 a.m. As early as October 6, the German government had addressed a note to Wilson through the German Minister at Bern and the Swiss Government, asking him "to take into his hands the cause of peace... and... to open negotiations" on the basis of Wilson's January 8 and September 27, 1918 speeches.
Wilson replied on October 8, stipulating as a condition for an armistice that German forces be withdrawn from all invaded territory. On October 12 Chancellor Prince Max of Baden had informed Washington that he was ready "to conclude an armistice in conformity with the evacuation proposals presented by the President." This reflected a readiness to accept the American, but not the French terms of armistice. 86

There had been differences of opinion among the Allies on armistice terms. Foch (Commander of the Allied Armies) had insisted on three principles for an armistice: Evacuation of invaded countries; Assurance of a suitable military base of departure "permitting us to pursue the war until the enemy forces are destroyed in case peace negotiations fail" 87; and securities for reparations enforced by occupation of the German territory on the left (western) bank of the Rhine. This was demanding considerably more than the sole condition of evacuation announced up to that time (and unilaterally without Allied consultation) by Wilson. Lloyd George on October 9 sent Wilson a message calling his attention to the insufficiency of his conditions in order to avoid subsequent misunderstanding. The British Prime Minister said that Wilson's sole condition of evacuation would not prevent the Germans

"from drawing such advantages from a suspension of the fighting as to be in a better military situation at the expiration of an armistice not followed by peace than they were at the moment when hostilities had been interrupted. The chance would be given them to extricate themselves from a critical situation, save their war material, re-form their units, shorten their front and retreat without loss of men to new positions which they would have time to select and fortify... The conditions of an armistice cannot be fixed until consultation has been had among the military experts and after consideration of the military situation at the moment when negotiations are begun." 88

87 Ibid., p. 452. This condition was to be implemented by semicircular bridgeheads on the right bank of the Rhine of 25 kilometers radius each, at Rastadt, Strasbourg, and Neu-Brisach, within 15 days of the declaration of the armistice.
88 Ibid., pp. 453-4. (Italics added.)
Thus the French and British viewed Prince Max's message of October 12 to Washington, accepting an armistice "in conformity with the evacuation proposals presented by the President", as a German exploitation of an opportunity to extricate their forces for stiffer bargaining later. (Apparently the Allies were not well informed on how close Germany was to revolution and total internal collapse.) Wilson responded to the Anglo-French warnings by telegraphing to Max of Baden on October 14:

"...the conditions of the armistice...must be left to the judgment and advice of the military counsellors of the United States and the Allied governments,...no arrangements could be accepted...which did not secure...the maintenance of the present superiority of the armies of the United States and of the Allies on the battlefield." 89

To this Prince Max replied on October 20 in general but non-committal terms, leaving it up to the President to draw up the specific conditions. The Supreme War Council had been called upon on October 8 to draw up "a project for an armistice." 90

Wilson now suspended his correspondence with Berlin and referred the German Government to this tribunal. Clémentceau asked Foch to prepare a detailed proposal. To get their opinions, Foch convened a meeting of the Allied commanders at his headquarters at Senlis on 25 October. The views ranged from a "soft" British position through a fairly tough American position to a "tough" French position. It was the French position that was substantially adopted.

Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander, emphasized the residual power of resistance of the German Army and the shortages of men in the British Army, the exhaustion of the French Army, and the incomplete organization of the American Army. In view of these factors, he proposed the very moderate terms of:

89 The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 454. (Italics added.)
90 Ibid., p. 455.
"(1) Evacuation of Belgium and the occupied portions of France.
(2) Evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine, Metz and Strasbourg being delivered to the Allies.
(3) Return of rolling stock taken from France and Belgium and the repatriation of their citizens." 91

This was essentially an armistice "without annexations or reparations" implied, and could have left the Germany Army in a strong position (if there had been no revolution, which was not then anticipated). Foch disagreed with these conditions, stating that "it did not seem that the reasons supporting them were well founded." 92 Although he recognized that "victorious armies are never fresh", he believed the German Army to be thoroughly disorganized (which it was not) and hence incapable of further serious resistance. Foch was probably correct in seeking more extensive armistice guarantees of German acquiescence to Allied peace terms, but for the incorrect reason of underestimating residual German military capabilities.

General Pershing, the American commander, agreed with Foch's (probably incorrect) estimate of German military weakness, and argued that this justified imposing severe conditions—a conclusion based on substantially incorrect information and doubtful reasoning. He proposed that, in addition to the terms suggested by Haig, the Germans vacate all occupied territory (including that on the eastern front), that the Allies would occupy Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine bridgeheads on the right bank, and that all submarines and submarine bases be turned over to the Allies or some neutral.

General Pétain, speaking for Foch, declared that to make it impossible for the Germans to resume hostilities, Allied occupation of the entire left bank and of the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Rhine was

91 The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 459.
92 Ibid.

83
necessary, as well as the surrender of 5000 German locomotives and 100,000 railway cars. Somehow the armistice terms finally submitted to the Allied governments as a result of this meeting contained all of the above conditions and additions. The added terms called for surrender of 5000 cannon, 30,000 machine guns, and 3000 minenwerfer; creation of a 25-mile wide neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine; delivery of 150,000 railway cars and 150 submarines; withdrawal of the surface fleet to the Baltic ports and Allied occupation of Cuxhaven and Heligoland; and maintenance of the blockade during the fulfillment of these armistice conditions. ³³

On October 31 the Allied leaders met again in Paris at the residence of Colonel House, who represented President Wilson. It had just been learned that Turkey had signed an armistice at Mudros and that Austria had collapsed. Colonel House asked Foch if he considered it preferable to continue the war rather than to conclude an armistice with Germany, apparently impressed by the toughness of Foch's proposed terms. Foch answered: "If I obtain through the Armistice the conditions that we wish to impose upon Germany, I am satisfied. Once this object is attained, nobody has the right to shed one drop more of blood." ³⁴

On November 1 a detailed examination of the armistice terms to be imposed began in Paris. Foch and Haig (apparently also expressing Lloyd George's views) reiterated their different views. Finally, on November 4, the definitive text incorporating all of Foch's demands was agreed to by the heads of the Allied governments and cabled to Wilson. The President cabled Berlin on November 5, referring the Germans to Allied headquarters.

³³ The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 461.
³⁴ Ibid., p. 463.
At 00:30 a.m. on November 7 Foch received the first wireless message from the German Supreme Command, giving the names of the designated plenipotentiaries and asking Foch to fix a place of meeting. It also requested a provisional suspension of hostilities during the armistice negotiations, which Foch rejected. Later on the same morning arrangements were made to stop firing on both sides in the area and at the approximate time where the German delegation was to pass through the lines. The German delegation arrived about four hours late due to blocked road conditions, but still made it safely across, arriving at the designated meeting place near Rethondes twelve hours late. The negotiations thus were not begun until 0900 on the morning of 8 November.

The German delegates, Secretary of State Erzberger, Count Oberndorff, Major General von Winterfeldt, and Captain Vanselow of the Navy presented their credentials to the Allied delegation. Erzberger asked for the Allied armistice proposals. Foch replied that he had none to make, unless the German delegates asked for an armistice. They did so, and General Weygand then read the terms. Erzberger once more requested a suspension of military operations, pleading fear of revolution in Germany, and describing how the order to cease firing to permit their crossing the line

"was executed only after considerable trouble. All these circumstances led him to fear that Germany might soon fall into the grip of Bolshevism, and once Central Europe was invaded by this scourge, Western Europe, he said, would find the greatest difficulty in escaping it. Nothing but the cessation of Allied attacks would make possible the recovery of discipline in the German Army and through the restoration of order save the country." 

95 Marshall Foch, General Weygand, Admiral Wemyss, Admiral Hope, Naval Captain Mariott, and interpreters Commander Bagot and Officer Laperche.

96 The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 470.
Foch once again refused to stop military operations until the German delegation had accepted and signed the armistice. General von Winterfeldt then read a prepared text asking a third time for immediate suspension of hostilities, which was refused once again by Foch. The Germans then requested a 24-hour extension of the ultimatum that the Allied terms be accepted or rejected within 72 hours, which was also refused by Foch. The German delegation then sent a German courier to German General Headquarters at Spa with the terms. Various detailed discussions were then held, in which the Germans protested some of the Allied conditions.

The delivery of 30,000 machine guns was protested because "If this were done there would not be enough left to fire on the German people, should this become necessary." For the German Army to march back to Germany in an orderly fashion, it was requested that the time limit fixed for evacuation be extended several weeks. The clauses concerning railway material and the blockade were protested as being inhumane, because they would paralyze the distribution of food. Foch rather cynically comments:

"To sum up, Germany must be left with an army in good order, so that she may suppress revolts; and she must be provided with food." 

The approval of the Chancellor (Prince Max of Baden) was necessary for conclusion of the armistice, the delegates not having this power. This limitation delayed the signing for a day or two, until on the evening of 10 November a wireless message was received from the Chancellor stating the German Government's acceptance of the Allied armistice conditions, authorizing Erzberger to sign, and again requesting Allied modification of terms to permit transportation sufficient for food distribution. A number—

97 The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 473.
98 Ibid., p. 474.
3,084—was added to the Chancellor's signature. This had been previously agreed upon between him and Erzberger for authentication. The Armistice was signed at 5 a.m. on November 11, and radio and telephone messages were sent out to terminate hostilities at 11 a.m. on the same day.

The final terms called for the surrender of only 25,000 machine guns, changed from the previous demand for 50,000. The terms relating to the surrender of railroad equipment and rate of evacuation were not modified. Erzberger read a declaration to Foch stating that the German Government would attempt to comply with the terms,

"But... the shortness of the delays allowed for evacuation and the surrender of indispensable transportation equipment, threaten to create a situation such as may render it impossible for them to continue fulfillment of the terms, through no fault of the German government and people... this agreement may plunge the German people into anarchy and famine... we might have expected terms which, while assuring our adversary complete and entire military security, would have terminated the sufferings of noncombatants... The German nation, which for fifty months has defied a world of enemies, will preserve, in spite of every kind of violence, its liberty and unity. A nation of seventy millions suffers but does not die." 99

Whatever the justice of this recrimination, Foch clearly understood the role of military pressures in assuring German compliance with Allied Armistice terms. His insistence on German acceptance of conditions assuring him the continued and even increased capacity to exert these military pressures was an effective way of "nailing down" the termination of World War I.

99 The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 487.
False Myths about German
Defeat in 1918

1. Communist propaganda by troops shifted from the eastern to the western front dissolved the discipline of the German army.

2. Germany was starved into defeat, starvation having reduced the will to resist of the army.

3. The enormous casualties on the western front reduced German army morale to the point where combat effectiveness broke down.

4. Germany needed to be made to suffer total defeat because the war guilt was all hers, and a strong Germany would threaten renewed aggression.

5. The Kaiser and the General Staff were deliberate sources of German war guilt, because they had planned aggression.
Some Lessons About Termination

The history of Allied and Central Powers attempts to terminate the First World War indicates several broad conclusions that may or may not be applicable to the termination of other general wars. These conclusions can be classified according to war aims, peace terms, means of military resistance, will to resist, the perceived costs, gains, risks, and expectations regarding various types of terminations, tacit negotiations, and the implementation of armistices.

In this writer’s judgment, Imperial Germany’s war aims at the beginning of the war in August 1914 were primarily defensive and non-annexationist. Germany was one of the last powers to mobilize, and, because of the great military advantages attained by a "first (mobilization) strike," considered herself to be reacting defensively in responding with a "pre-emptive" attack on France through Belgium. Von Moltke and Bethmann had warned Russia that "Mobilization means war!", and they were right.

If Germany's war aims had remained manifestly defensive, as the Socialists and some liberals had all along advocated, the war might have been terminated after the failure of the German offensive in France and the Russian Offensive in East Prussia. It is impossible to know whether a German declaration for a peace without annexations or reparations in late 1914 would have been acceptable to the Allies, but it seems at least possible. Only a few German military leaders had the foresight to see this, unfortunately (Colonel—later General—Max Hoffmann was one of the few). The unexpected costs of the conflict, when the mobile attacks bogged down into the protracted and indecisive war of positions, incited demands for compensatory annexations, reparations, and colonies among a very broad German public. The initial German military successes also made such expanded war aims appear achievable without undue sacrifices. Expansionist and militarist factions exploited this considerable public support of the now more aggressive national policy, narrowing the diplomatic scope for maneuver of the basically defensively inclined Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. Thus was lost one great period of opportunity for termination before the worst had to be endured by the belligerents.
The difference of war aims among the Central Powers also made difficult a more reasonable policy. Austria-Hungary, exploiting German military power, was probably the principal initiator of the conflict, with the aggressive aim of expanded domination over the Balkans. Germany was put into the position of more or less acceding to her more aggressive (but weaker) Austrian ally's expansionist war aims, or risking the loss of that seemingly powerful "Kulturgenosse." Similar considerations applied to Turkey.

In both of the opposed coalitions the principal allies (Germany and Great Britain) found themselves forced to expand their war aims in order to feed the postwar expectations of nations they were committed to by treaty, or desired to recruit for their own side. Another major opportunity for a negotiated termination was missed in 1917 when Italian revisionist-annexationist war aims made it impossible for England and France to achieve a unified Entente Alliance position on non-annexationist terms that probably would have been acceptable to the Central Powers. It must be concluded that the system of alliances was a major factor in expanding the war aims of both sides, thus rendering them mutually incompatible. Because there had to be "something in it for everyone", everyone lost more in the end.

With the entry of the United States into the war in April of 1917, an increasingly ideological complexion was given to the Allied war aims, particularly as the overthrow of the feudal Czarist regime by bourgeois and liberal elements in the Russian March 1917 revolution removed an embarrassing contradiction in the Entente. The war "to save democracy" finally expanded the war aims to political total war, when Wilson insisted on the removal of the Kaiser and the German Supreme War Lords as the preconditions for armistice negotiations, with the alternative of unconditional surrender. It is difficult to say whether this escalation protracted or shortened the war, but probably helped to provoke the German revolution and much of the subsequent political instability that ended in Nazi aggression. The revolution itself accelerated the internal disruption of Germany's power to continue the war, but also disrupted any possible internal agreement on terms of a negotiated peace. Whether such a negotiated peace would have been more or less in allied (and German) long-run interests is beyond the scope of the present study.
The means of military resistance proved both better balanced and more difficult to evaluate than had been anticipated in the calculations of the belligerents. The Schlieffen plan failed to terminate the war with a great military victory, and the March 1918 Ludendorff offensive also failed. The allied blockade failed decisively to deny to the Central Powers the essential resources for carrying on the war. The German intensified submarine campaign first failed to disrupt the allied blockade or crush British resolve, and then completely failed to interrupt or delay the transport of two million American troops to France. The Russo-German termination at Brest-Litovsk in the winter of 1917-1918 failed to free sufficient German and Austrian forces to make their redeployment to the western front decisive in the Ludendorff spring 1918 offensive. The mutual attrition process proved more subtle and less predictable (and less controllable) than both sides had hoped. For almost every major strategic measure introduced by one side, the other found a countermeasure tending to render it, by itself, indecisive.

The significance of this protracted mutual failure to anticipate the individually largely indecisive effects of so many major operations for termination, is that they usually raised false hopes of quick military successes that diluted the motivations for serious consideration of how to terminate the war on the basis of the then current military balance. Each side always had to try just one more campaign to alter the balance in its favor, so that it could negotiate a termination from a stronger bargaining position. This process contributed to the protraction of the war to the point where the Central Powers were finally so exhausted that no further hopes for one "last great battle" to reverse the tide could be realistically entertained.

100 "...Haig...shared the military doctrines of Foch. Both these illustrious soldiers had year after year conducted with obstinacy and serene confidence offensives which we now know to have been as hopeless as they were disastrous. But the conditions had now changed. Both were now provided with offensive weapons, which the military science of neither would have conceived. The German losses in Ludendorff's attacks had affected alike the number and quality of the enemy. The swift and ceaseless inflow of the Americans turned the balance of Man Power heavily in favour of the Allies; there was at last enough artillery for formidable attacks to be delivered against almost any part of the hostile line. The Goddess of Surprise had at least returned to the Western Front. Thus both Haig and Foch were vindicated in the end. They were throughout consistently true to their professional theories, and when in the fifth campaign of the war the facts began for the first time to fit the theories, they reaped their just reward." Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. IV, p. 247.
The reasons why the Central Powers could no longer hope for a reversal of fortune in October 1918 were also probably not anticipated by the Allies, who had planned on having to carry on the war for at least another year. The military-economic attrition had undoubtedly helped to create the conditions for internal failure of nerve in the military command, fatal vacillation in the political leadership, and revolutionary unrest among sailors and workers. But the exacerbation of these internal problems to the point of revolution at the particular time it occurred was probably more directly related to the personal characteristics and failings of Ludendorff and the Kaiser. Very generally, the German collapse may be described as a series of by themselves non-decisive but important military defeats, followed by a panicky breakdown of judgment in the military high command, resulting in German peace feelers provoking stiffened Allied terms (demands for the Kaiser's abdication), accelerating the development of an internal schism between "diehards," moderate "realists," and revolutionaries that ended in revolution and the need to make peace almost unconditionally.

The German will to resist was weakened by the reduction of military power to merely defense capabilities, but its collapse preceded the collapse of military defensive power. Ludendorff's panics of August and September, and his regression to a "diehard" position in October, together with the Kaiser's refusal to abdicate, probably provoked the revolution that constituted the collapse of a unified national will to resist. Then the military capacity for national defense, previously weakened, was completely disrupted. Under further Allied military pressures, it would have collapsed had not the war ended.

101 "For...two years Germany, and indeed the quadruple Alliance, was ruled by...the Supreme Command and the world was treated to an experiment in government by the Great General Staff...In the course of their rule, Hindenburg and Ludendorff dragooned into submission the Kaiser, the Imperial Chancellor, the Cabinet and the Reichstag, the party chieftains, the captains of industry, and the leaders of the trade unions. They caused two Chancellors and a Foreign Minister to be dismissed...In the field of foreign affairs the Supreme Command insisted upon...unrestricted U-boat warfare and thereby made inevitable the entry of America into the war on the side of the Allies. They demanded the establishment of a Kingdom of Poland and thereby destroyed all hopes of a separate peace with Tsarist Russia. The predatory nature of their demands..." (Footnote continued on next page.)
The lesson here is that once objective military capabilities have been weakened by a series of defeats in themselves not decisive, the most vulnerable point of continued national resistance may be in the military and political leadership. The régime itself now may become a more lucrative target for political action (such as Wilson's declaration concerning the Kaiser), than the military forces are for military action.

The perceived costs, gains, risks, and expectations of alternative terminations are constantly considered by belligerents, consciously or unconsciously. By risk we mean the subjective probability of a cost, and by expectation (or hope) the subjective probability of a gain. In even the simplest terms discussed above, it is apparent that both domestic and foreign military,

on France and Belgium ruined what chance of success may have attended the Papal peace proposals of 1917... the Supreme Command did not win the war for Germany... the German armies in the West... were well and truly beaten in the field and they knew it. The breakdown of October and November was in a sense a general strike of a hopelessly defeated army against the madness of its leaders...

"Once they had realized, late in September 1918, that the tide of war had turned irrevocably against them, they (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) sought to take such measures as they deemed necessary to safeguard the Reich from invasion, and to preserve the Monarchy. But the measures... were both too little and too late.

"To meet the growing clamour of the masses the Condominium demanded the immediate opening of negotiations for an armistice, and a 'Revolution from above'... both these proposals were designed to mitigate the severity of the terms of peace... constitutional reforms were advocated for the dual purpose of consolidating the morale of the country behind the Emperor and the Army and of impressing the Allies with the 'progressive' character of the 'New Germany'. In both cases the Army would appear in the rôle of savior. It was never dreamed by the Condominium that the action which they now urged so imperatively would terminate in a military capitulation, which would reduce the German Army to impotence, and in a political revolution, which would sweep the Kaiser from his throne."

"... no armistice could be concluded until military dictatorship and imperial authority alike had been replaced... within the Reich... once the flood gates had been opened to reforms long overdue, there was no stemming the torrent... In their efforts to safeguard the imperial throne and the position of the military cost, the Supreme Command had ensured the downfall of both."


Paul Kecskeméti makes a similar point concerning the more recent Hungarian revolution in The Unexpected Revolution.
political, and economic considerations are involved in this kind of balancing of alternatives. The extremes of German World War I expectations or hopes were foreign military victory and conquest, economic relief through imports and gain through colonies, and diplomatic support from new allies or peace-making factions among the enemy nations; domestic peace, prosperity, and unity. The extremes of risk were foreign total military defeat, leakproof blockade and economic isolation, and united and complete world opposition; at home civil war, famine and plague, and political anarchy. The greatest risks were taken—Ludendorff had said "I regard myself as a gambler" and the realization of these risks imposed very great costs on Germany (and on the Allies) without achieving any of the expectations.

What seems at once technically admirable because of such an economy of means, and politically irresponsible because tens of millions of people were used as willing or unwilling pawns, was the criticality of German politico-military judgments in matters of grand strategy. Almost every one of the fatefuly wrong decisions—the Schlieffen plan execution, submarine warfare, the failure to withdraw to the German frontier in 1918—chose possible but low confidence operations. They all had a chance of being effective if most of the planning assumptions were fairly accurate—but these rarely are (there is "the fog of war"). Given the choice between a high confidence of only relatively modest losses (such as might have resulted from a termination following withdrawal of all German forces to within Germany in 1918), or a very low


103 "Certainly the highest interests of Germany, once all hope of victory was closed, required the orderly retreat of the greater part of her armies to the Antwerp-Meuse line, and thence to the German frontier. To secure this at all costs became, after the battle of August 8... the paramount duty of soldiers and statesmen, and of all parties and classes. Moreover, such a retreat could assuredly have been accomplished, provided the decision was immediate... It would... have been possible for the retreating invaders to have sown the roads and railways behind them with mines so that they would be continually destroyed day after day by a fresh... series of explosions at points and moments which their pursuers could never foresee... It would therefore not have been possible for the Allied armies to advance to the German frontiers until they had reconstructed the whole intervening railroad system... The e...
confidence of somehow reversing the trend of defeat by a major military victory, the German leadership nearly always chose the latter (except for Prince Max, and by then it was too late.)

Was this predilection for the "long shot" choice among cost-gain alternatives really always a conscious one by the "gambler" Ludendorff and his colleagues? That is, was this a characteristic unique to those leaders of Germany at that time only, or is this a more general characteristic of the decisions of the losing side in a war? Although more cases will have to be studied before definite conclusions can be drawn, it may already be

might therefore have been gained for Germany... perhaps six months... before she was exposed to actual invasion. The time was sufficient... for the whole remaining resources of the nation to be marshalled in defense of its territory. But far more important than any military advantage was the effect which Germany, by admitting defeat and withdrawing completely from France and Belgium, would have produced on the cohesion and driving power of the Allies. The liberation of the soil of France was the dominating impulse which held the French people to the war. The rescue of Belgium was still the main rallying point of the British war resolve. Had Germany therefore removed both these motives, had she stood with arms in her hands on the threshold of her own land ready to make a defeated peace, to cede territory, to make reparation; ready also if all negotiations were refused to defend herself to the utmost, and capable of inflicting two million casualties on the invader, it seemed, and seems, almost certain that she would not have been put to the test... The German Headquarters could not make up its mind to face the consequences of a swift and immediate retreat. Foch is reported to have said at the end of August, pointing to the war map: 'This man (the German) could still escape if he did not mind leaving his luggage behind him.' The immense masses of munitions and war stores of all kinds which the Germans had in four years accumulated in France and Belgium became a fatal encumbrance. The German Staff could not bear to sacrifice them."

"...Without counting the destruction which the enemy could operate along our obligatory lines of communication and the resulting delays to our march, if he continued the struggle, a serious obstacle would soon confront our advance in this direction—the Rhine. Here the German would be in a position to stop our progress for a long time, and, under the protection of the river, they could reconstitute their army." The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, pp. 450-451.
suggested that the paralysis of desperation, the narrowing of perceived alternatives under crisis pressures, and the natural human tendencies toward habitual behavior (i.e., to fight on) under uncertainty and stress make this a more general phenomenon of war termination.

The most dynamic and significant part of the negotiations over terms of termination were executed tacitly in World War I. Although Cardinal Pacelli, the Papal Nuncio in Munich, did transmit some confidential messages, and although the usual neutral diplomatic channels of Switzerland, Holland, and Sweden were also used, the most significant offers and counter-offers were expressed in the form of public statements in 1917 and 1918. Wilson and the Kaiser used the vehicle of public speeches, lesser lights or agencies issued printed statements. This appears to have operated satisfactorily for the most part in the relatively slow-moving days of the first World War when international communications were not themselves significantly vulnerable to electronic jamming or bombardment. Perhaps almost surprisingly in a war of so many other blunders, one gathers the impression that communications between adversary nations were usually as clear and complete as their originators intended them to be.

There were some important cases of ambiguity of meaning and intent, but this was not the result of technical but of political difficulties. Russia apparently was not completely clear on the fact that her general mobilization meant war with Germany, despite the latter having warned precisely that. Wilson's statements in the summer of 1918 were still somewhat ambiguous concerning the position of the Kaiser, but probably so were Wilson's own views at the time.

The final discussions of armistice terms between Secretary of State Erzberger and Marshal Foch were not so much negotiations as the personal communication of dictated terms, followed by protests against them, and their final acceptance. Radio wireless communications with the German Chancellor in Berlin, Prince Max, confirmed the acceptance. These discussions are instructive in showing what measures Foch insisted on to assure
German defenselessness in the face of subsequent peace terms, and the entirely different additional threats they imposed on the German Government (famine, powerlessness to combat revolution). These additional threats might have provoked German non-acceptance, had not the German revolution rendered acceptance urgently essential. Despite German warnings that the conditions might be rendered unfulfillable by the anarchy and famine they might produce, however, they were almost wholly fulfilled. They were also very probably instrumental in forcing Germany to accept—under protest—the dictated Versailles peace terms in 1919.

In sum, by a combination of crippling internal disorders and Foch's relentless foresight, the German Armed forces had been tricked into what amounted to unconditional surrender. An expensive violent invasion was avoided, replaced by a peaceful partial occupation agreed to by the defeated nation. If it had been perceived as such in November of 1918, the war might very possibly have continued, and civil war would possibly have broken out in Germany resulting in an explicitly unconditional surrender later. Perhaps this trick saved many Allied and German lives by making possible a termination of hostilities when it did, while at the same time assuring against their resumption in protest against Allied peace terms.

Finally, the termination of World War I, and the missed opportunities for earlier terminations, indicates the melancholy cost of the failure of a great nation clearly to define and limit its war aims to those made feasible by a realistic appraisal of its own and its enemies' capabilities. General Gröner, actually one of the more moderate military men, dramatically expressed the eclipse of German political sensitivity under the military dictatorship when he said in December 1916:

"Lloyd George does not scare us. We have, however, not time for busying ourselves with politics; we have more important things to do—supplying Hindenburg with the means of victory."

Those governments, like that of Germany in World War I, that do not take time for politics during a war, will miss the best opportunities for terminating war on terms most favorable to themselves.

104 The Economics of War, 1. 201.
A Descriptive Model of Domestic Politics in Termination

One way of describing termination analytically, and in a way that can be checked for similarity in other war termination situations, is to consider it thusly: Three factions appear to develop with increasing clarity and increasing conflict amongst them as the termination process approaches its critical and decisive phase. These are really three approaches to the minimization of the cost of defeat. The differences of approach seem to be dependent principally on the probability they attribute to a decisive defeat, and the relative painfulness of hard or soft truce terms in terms of national power.

One group's values are principally directed at the preservation of maximum national power—that is, the minimization of the reduction of national power by the terms of the armistice. This faction looks for "long shot", low confidence high payoff measures, to raise the perceived costs of imposing unconditional surrender to a point where it will not be demanded. Low confidence, high payoff solutions of this kind included a last great naval battle in which the British Fleet would be grievously wounded, a last land offensive on the Western front such as that of March 1918, Hitler's secret weapons (the V Bombs), the Kamikaze and Kaiten weapons employed by the Japanese in 1945 (or possibly in a third world war, resort to nuclear bombing of cities). This is the approach sometimes taken by the most nationalistic military elements.* They are often called the "diehard" faction.

Somewhat the opposite approach is taken by the faction that has absolutely no hope of reversing the military defeat, but also has local social, political, and economic objectives that it can gain: the expense of a disorganization, and hence reduction, of over-all national power at the hands of the victors. Thus while some latent feelings of patriotism and nationalism may still exist in this faction, they are at least in part counteracted by expectations of an improved social order as a result of the defeat of the nation. This faction absolutely abhors such desperate low confidence, high payoff measures as a last naval attack or land offensive to reverse the situation, first of all because it does not really want to reverse it, and also because

* But not in Nazi Germany in World War II, as will be shown in the following chapter.
a reversal usually has to be accomplished at great cost to the members of that faction (or their constituents) in blood. Thus the Russian soldiers on the Central front in the summer of 1917 had no wish to sacrifice themselves for an at best transient military success for the Kerensky govern-
ment, so that that government could obtain slightly better peace terms and indeed stay in power. Nor did the sailors in Kiel in November 1918 wish to risk death in what they were sure were the last days of an unsuccessful war, in order that what they believed to be a military dictatorship could maintain itself and the Kaiser in power at the cost of their blood. This faction, generally consisting of domestic revolutionaries, insurgents, progressives striving for reform, and many relatively apolitical soldiers and proletarians weary of an unsuccessful war, might be characterized as accepting defeat "with a vengeance", and ready to revolt rather than tolerating any interference with the apparent course of war termination.

The third faction, usually consisting of patriotic but realistic conserva-
tives and liberals, attempts to steer a middle course, by instituting sufficient domestic social reforms to achieve enough loyalty by the population to con-
tinue resistance against the enemy. This resistance is intended to minimize incipient losses of national power by persuading the victors to adopt moderate peace terms. Thus Kerensky and Kornilov and Gurko attempted simultaneously to democratize the Russian Army and government and thus to maintain resistance against the Germans. Thus the government of Prince Max of Baden attempted to accede to Wilson's demands for a "democratization" of the German government, by empowering the Reichstag with the decision over war and peace, and exerting pressure for the voluntary abdication of the Kaiser, in order to maintain sufficient unity on the home front to prepare for a "national rising" as the final bargaining counter against armistice terms that demanded German disarmament. These are the moderates, or "realists".

Consider the conflicting and cooperative aims of these three factions, which correspond only very roughly to Right Wing leadership of diehard traditionalist sympathies, disaffected and radical revolutionary elements of the
proletariat and the soldiery, and moderate pragmatic realist leadership wishing to maximize national power. All factions at some critical stage wish to terminate the war. The diehards want to terminate it in order to prevent further deterioration of the military forces, the discipline in them, and the maintenance of traditional authority in the country. The revolutionary workers and soldiery and peasants want to terminate because they are simply weary of the wartime dangers and conditions. And the pragmatic moderate realist leaders want to terminate in order to maintain some semblance of national unity and authority and international power. The domestic conflict over termination arises because these three predominant factions usually differ on when to terminate the war.

The diehard Right fears revolution, the revolutionary Left fears postponement of social progress and suppression, and the realist Center fears the national disunity and weakness to foreign enemies caused by their polarization. These fears are likely to become salient at different times, depending on the presence of immediate warning signs of: Rightist takeover and continued war (declaration of martial law, threatened breakdown of peace negotiations, removal of moderate leaders attempting to negotiate termination); revolution (strikes, mutinies); and enemy exploitation of the internal schism (stiffening of peace terms, renewed offensives, propaganda exacerbating the internal schism on termination). (See the chart on the following page.)

Termination is a cooperative goal carried out for conflicting sub-goals. The relatively Right Wing and diehard military leadership wants maintenance of traditional authority. The revolutionary Left Wing proletariat of workers, soldiers and peasants wants the breakdown of traditional authority and social hierarchy that disfavored them as a class, in the hope of the establishment of social, economic, and political reforms increasing their relative power, status, and wealth in the post-war society. The pragmatic and moderate realists want maintenance of national unity and power by a compromise of traditionalist authority with demands for relief from war and for socio-political reform from below.

105 Subsequent discussions on termination in World War II Germany and Japan will examine the existence of such groupings in the totalitarian regimes.
In a sense, both the Left- and the Right-Wing factions propose radical solutions in conflict with the compromise solution of the pragmatic and moderate realist leaders. The radical solution of the Right is the long-shot hope for sufficient military success to obtain relatively favorable peace terms. The radical solution of the Left is so completely to undermine further national resistance—either by revolution, acceptance of unconditional surrender, sabotage of continued military and civil resistance, or combinations of these—that the termination of the war will coincide with the disruption of traditional authority in the government structure, creating a turbulent situation which may be exploited for the formation of new social, economic, and political institutions more favorable to them as a class. The moderate realist circles have the most difficult task of at once maintaining enough domestic unity and military morale to make it clear to the military victors that their armistice terms must be fairly generous, or armed resistance will continue at an effective level, and at the same time of accomplishing sufficient domestic political and economic reforms to obtain the support of the populace, while at the same time reconciling the conservative military circles to the necessity for such reforms.

Both in Russia in the summer and fall of 1917, and in Germany in the summer and fall of 1918, we may trace a process of change in the distribution of political loyalties and power. The initial distribution is one of primarily traditionalist, Right Wing sympathies with a strong secondary loyalty to realist pragmatic moderate opinions, and only a minor radical Leftist wing. Next there is an interim stage (March - November 1917 in Russia, October - November 1918 in Germany), in which the Center has maximum growth at the expense of the Right, with only a moderate Leftist growth. There then occurs a third stage (November 1917 in Russia, November 1918 in Germany), in which the Left grows rapidly, but now more at the expense of the center and then the Right which is now hardening in its resistance to termination. This merges with a fourth stage, in which the Left continues to grow rapidly, as it finally becomes the comminant force for termination.*

*Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool has pointed out that there are also flaws in participation—non-participation. The growth of the Left is thus not merely (or necessarily) the result of shifts from the center and the Right, but also (or even substantially) the result of the mobilization of newly participating opinion.
Thus in Russia in 1917, there was a major growth of the bourgeois moderate pragmatists of Kerensky’s provisional government from the March revolution through the summer campaign, accomplished at the expense of Right Wing Czarist and traditionalist power, while there was also at the same time a modest growth and consolidation of Left Wing power. Then in October and November of 1917, there was a major growth of Left Wing (Bolshevik) power at the cost of the Kerensky provisional government, and this was decisive both in terminating the war and in Bolshevik Leningrad and Moscow arrogating to themselves the voice for the Russian government. In Germany in 1918 a similar pattern may be discerned with the growth of moderate liberal and "realist" power in the formation of the government of Prince Max of Baden on 5 October, and its acceptance of Wilson’s 14 points as a basis for an armistice agreement, principally at the expense of the diehard Right Wing military clique represented by Ludendorff. Then once again, with the November 4 and 5 Kiel mutiny and the growth of Left Wing revolution in the North German ports and in Berlin, accomplished at the expense of the power of Prince Max of Baden’s Moderate realist government, war termination and a temporarily socialist government were forced in a similar manner. These patterns were not unique to World War I, being in part repeated in Japan, Germany and Italy in World War II. However, the sequence in World War I seems clear: First, the growth of moderate, peace-making realist power at the expense of the increasingly unpopular and rigid diehard traditionalists; second the splitting off and growth of a revolutionary Left Wing faction insistent on immediate peace at any cost, at the expense of the realist central party; and finally a termination of the war as internal disruption becomes more complete and a fragile coalition of realist and Left Wing revolutionary forces enjoy a precarious domination.

* In World War II Germany, it was the government (Nazi Party) that was the diehard faction, while the moderate realists and to a lesser degree the revolutionary factions were represented by senior Army officers. (See Chapter IV) In World War II Japan, it was the Japanese Army that was the diehard faction, while the moderate realists comprised court officials, members of the Foreign Office, and senior Navy officers. (See Chapter V)
1. Right wing (R) nationalism, military expansionism (Stürmer, Ludendorff)

2. Military failure and economic hardships upset war-initiating government, lead to more broadly based, moderate realist central (C) government (Kerensky, Max of Baden).

3. Moderate (Bourgeois) government fails to win popular support because of impossibility of reversing tide of military failures and economic hardships, loses support to left-wing (radicals, socialist) faction (L) with war-terminating objectives. (Lenin, Ebert).

4. Left-wing (radicals, socialists) government achieves and consolidates power by terminating war (sometimes the diehard Right tries or threatens counter-revolution by military coup).

The alternatives to prompt termination seem to be violent revolution, or reduction by exhaustion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Faction</th>
<th>Principal Fear</th>
<th>Typical Increasing Fear Warning Signs</th>
<th>Fear-Increasing Events</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diehard Right-wing Nationalists, Traditionalists, Pan-Germans Fatherland Party in Germany, Some Conservatives and Monarchists (Zimmermann, von Tirpitz, Ludendorff)</td>
<td>Revolution, Surrender, loss of military power</td>
<td>Political Concessions to the Left</td>
<td>March 15, 1917: Tsar abdicates, liberal coalition government formed</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>July 1917: Equal and direct suffrage introduced under pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutinies</td>
<td>March 11, 1917: Mutiny of Imperial Guard at Petrograd, July 1917: Mutinies following defeat in Brusilov offensive</td>
<td></td>
<td>August 8-17, 1918: Few units mutiny at Amiens, November 3, 1918: Mutiny of navy at Kiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>March 8-10, 1917: Strike of 200,000 munitions workers at Petrograd</td>
<td></td>
<td>April 1917: 125,000 strike in Berlin, January-February 1918: 250,000 strike in Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel, Bremen, Danzig, Munich, Nuremberg, Ruhr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Realist&quot; Moderate Center German Liberals, Conservatives, some Monarchists Socialists, Democrats, Catholics, Social Democrats (Prince Max of Baden, Elbert)</td>
<td>Total defeat and internal chaos resulting from enemy exploitation of &quot;Right-Left&quot; schism, Revolution and Coup, Unconditional surrender and continuation of war</td>
<td>Stiffening of enemy peace terms</td>
<td>February 1918: German peace terms stiffen at Brest-Litovsk</td>
<td></td>
<td>November 1918: Allied armistice terms stiffened beyond Wilson's original proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Renewed enemy offensives</td>
<td>July 1917: German counter-attack to Brusilov offensive, January 1918: German advance following breakdown at Brest</td>
<td></td>
<td>September-October 1918: Allied offensive or western front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy statements and propaganda exacerbating domestic schism</td>
<td>July 1917: German Reichstag calls for &quot;peace of understanding&quot; without annexations</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1918: Wilson states refusal to negotiate with Kaiser, Ludendorff except for unconditional surrender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Left-Wing Reformers, Independent Socialist Party in Germany (Seceded from Social Democrats in 1917, became Radical Socialist Party) Spartacists (Haase, Barth, Liebknecht)</td>
<td>Right-Wing Coup, Postponement of socioeconomic progress (including peace), Continued War and Privations</td>
<td>Suppression of political liberties (rights of dissent)</td>
<td>September 1917: Kornilov coup attempt</td>
<td></td>
<td>February 1918: Martial law declared in Berlin, strike leaders arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of &quot;moderate&quot; officials attempting to negotiate peace</td>
<td>July 1917: Kerensky jails Trotsky and other Bolsheviks</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 1917: Removal of Foreign Minister von Kuhlmann for similar reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breaking off of termination negotiations, resumed offensives</td>
<td>July 1917: Brusilov offensive</td>
<td></td>
<td>March-July 1918: offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 17, 1918: Ludendorff insists on fighting on against Wilson's (14 points) terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IIIA

**PRINCIPAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1914</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28</td>
<td>Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td>Mission of Austrian Count Hoyos to Berlin, where Kaiser and Bethmann (German Chancellor) promised support (the &quot;Blank Check&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23</td>
<td>Austrian 48-hour ultimatum to Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24</td>
<td>Russia formulates policy of defense of Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25</td>
<td>French assurances of support given to Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26</td>
<td>Sir Edward Grey proposed conference on Austro-Serb issue, France accepts, Austria refuses, Germany refuses but is willing to attend conference on Austro-Russian tensions, Russia accepts in principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td>First French preparatory measures. British fleet ordered not to disperse. Grey promises Russia diplomatic support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td>Austria declares war on Serbia. Rupture of Austro-Russian negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29</td>
<td>Bethmann urges resumption of Austro-Russian negotiations, despite contrary pressure by General von Moltke, German chief of staff. Bethmann willing to promise not to take French or Belgian territory if England promises neutrality. England rejects bid. Russian general mobilization changed to mobilization against Austria only on German protest that she is trying to restrain Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30</td>
<td>Technical problems of partial mobilization result in Russian general mobilization, despite German warning that &quot;mobilization means war!&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31</td>
<td>Germany proclaims &quot;state of threatening danger of war,&quot; sends 12-hour ultimatum to Russia to cease warlike preparations on frontier. Germany asks France what response she would make to a Russo-German war—Paris replies that &quot;France would be guided by her own interests.&quot; Germany refuses British request that Belgian neutrality be respected. Austria decrees general mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1</td>
<td>French mobilization (15:55), German mobilization (16:00). Germany offers England promise not to attack France if England guarantees French neutrality. German declaration of war on Russia (19:00), no reply being received to ultimatum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1914 (Cont'd)

August 2  British cabinet votes to give France assurances of coastal protection. Germany begins invasion of Luxembourg, demands Belgian permission to cross territory (rejected).

August 3  Germany declares war on France, invades Belgium. Italy declares her neutrality.

August 4  England declares war on Germany, on basis of German attack on Belgium.

August 6  Austria declares war on Russia, Serbia declares war on Germany.

August 8  Montenegro declares war on Germany.

August 12  France and England declare war on Austria.

August 23  Japan declares war on Germany, on Austria two days later.

August 28  Austria declares war on Belgium.

August 30  Germans defeat Russians at Tannenberg, take over 100,000 prisoners.

September 12  First battle of the Marne—German advance stopped.

September 15  Germans defeat Russians at Masurian Lakes, take 125,000 prisoners.

November 2  Russia and Serbia declare war on Turkey.

November 5  England and France declare war on Turkey.

December  Line on western front becomes relatively fixed, not varying more than 10 miles in 3 years. War becomes "war of positions." Almost all Belgium, 10% of France occupied by Germans.

December 20  Prince Bûlow, former German chancellor, in Rome on special mission, admits Italian claim to Trentino, later attempt to persuade Austria to give it up.
1915

January 13  Count Burian replaces Berchtold as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister.

January 19  First German Zeppelin raid on England.

April 26  England, France, Russia, and Italy conclude secret treaty of London. In return for declaring war on Austria within a month, Allies promised Italy South Tyrol, Trentino, Trieste, Southern Dalmatia, Libya, Eritrea, Somaliland.

May 2  Start of great Austro-German offensive in Galicia. Russians, suffering from lack of ammunition and supplies, severely beaten. Germans advanced 100 miles by June, liberated Galicia and Bukovina, took hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners.

May 3  Italian government denounces Triple Alliance.

May 7  Lusitania sunk off Iceland with loss of 1198 lives, 139 American, German embassy had put warning ads in New York newspapers before her sailing.

May 9  Wilson protests sinking in strong terms.

May 13  U.S. protest note to Berlin demands reparation, cessation of sinkings.

May 23  Italy declares war on Austria. Germany severs diplomatic relations with Italy.

June 9  U.S. Secretary of State Lansing sends note of protest on sinking to Berlin, fails to elicit German assurances for the future. Third note sent July 21.


August 21  Italy declares war on Turkey.

August 25  Germans take Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, Grodno, Vilna.

September 1  German government assures that no liners sunk in future without warning and some provision for safety of non-combatants, provided ship does not attempt to resist or escape. German submarines observe assurances during 1915.

September 6  Bulgaria concludes mutual defense alliance with Germany and Austria.
1915 (Cont’d)

October 13 Dekasse resigns as French foreign minister, succeeded by Prime Minister Viviani.

October 14 Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.

October 15 England and Montenegro declare war on Bulgaria, one day later.

October 19 Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.

October 29 Viviani cabinet resigns in Paris, Briand takes over as premier.

December 4 Asquith cabinet resigns, Lloyd George forms war cabinet, Arthur Balfour replaces Sir Edward Grey in Foreign Office.

1916

February 22 Wilson’s representative, Col. House, conferred with Sir Edward Grey, producing the House Memorandum, stating readiness of Wilson to propose a peace conference whenever England and France thought opportune. U.S. terms for mediation were restoration of Belgium and Serbia, reversion of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Constantinople to Russia, independent Poland, Germany to retain and perhaps increase her colonies. U.S. opinion still divided.

February Beginning of Verdun battle, extending to June. No major gains by Germans, at cost of about 300,000 men. French lost 350,000.

March 1 Germany begins “extended” submarine campaign. Germany informs U.S. that henceforth armed merchantmen would be treated as cruisers.

March 9 Germany declares war on Portugal.

March 15 Austria declares war on Portugal.


May 31 Battle of Jutland—meeting of German and British fleets—both lost six ships, but British lost twice the tonnage of the German losses.
1916 (Cont'd)

June
Great Russian Brusilov offensive in South. Russians fail to take Kovel or Lemberg, lose 1,000,000, leaving their army demoralized.

July 1
Opening of the Somme battle. Germans, outnumbered 6 to 1 at first, give little ground. British losses on one day were 60,000—higher than any other day in war.

August 19
Military alliance concluded between Russia and Rumania.

August 27
Rumania declares war on Austria, tempted by Russian and Allied acceptance of her claims on Bukovina and Transylvania.

August 28
Italy declares war on Germany, Germany declares war on Rumania.

August 29
Hindenburg succeeds von Falkenhayn as German chief of staff, now shares latter's opinion that French front is decisive one, as opposed to Hindenburg's earlier belief that eastern front is decisive.

August 30
Turkey declares war on Rumania.

September 1
Bulgaria declares war on Rumania.

September 2
London raided by 14 Zeppelins at once.

September 15
First use of tanks by British, but too few (18) to be decisive.

November 5
Germans, in occupation of Poland, announce independent Polish state.

November 7
Wilson re-elected primarily on peace platform.

November 18
End of Somme campaign—Allies gained 125 square miles, maximum of 7 miles advance, at cost of 400,000 British and 200,000 French. Germans lost 400,000-500,000.

November 20
German foreign minister von Jagow resigns, replaced by Zimmermann.

November
Death of Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria. Accession of Emperor Karl.

November 28
First German airplane raid on London.

December
Germans successfully invade Rumania, Wallachia, take Bucharest (December 6). By January 1917 most of Rumania, with important wheat and oil areas in German hands.

December 12
Germany appeals to U.S. to inform Entente that Central Powers are prepared to negotiate peace—possibly as result of favorable bargaining position achieved after conquest of Rumania.
1916 (Cont'd)

December 18  Wilson suggests all belligerents state their terms for peace. Germany, Austria, and Turkey replied on December 26 in appreciative way without specific terms, suggesting a conference.

December 30  Allies reject German peace approach of 12 December on basis of German failure to mention any specific terms.

1917

January 8  German leadership decides in meeting at Pless that unrestricted submarine warfare is only way to bring England to agree to terminate war on terms acceptable to Germany. War with America anticipated, but felt that England would give in before major U.S. reinforcements could arrive.

January 10  Allies reply to Wilson's suggestion for statement of peace terms: Restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro; evacuation of French, Russian, and Rumanian territory with reparations; reorganization of Europe on basis of nationalities (meaning the breakup of Austria-Hungary); restoration of territories previously taken from Allies; liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czechs from foreign rule; freeing of subject nationalities under Turkish rule and expulsion of Turks from Europe. Far-reaching nature of Allied terms estranged Wilson, who favored "Peace without victory" (speech to the Senate, January 22, 1917).

January 29  German peace terms communicated confidentially to Wilson: Restitution of the German-occupied part of Alsace; creation of a "strategic and economic zone" between Germany and Poland; return of colonies and granting to Germany colonies according to her economic and population needs; restoration of occupied France; renunciation of economic obstacles to international trade; compensation for German damages suffered by the war; freedom of the seas.

January 31  U.S. notified by Germany that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin on February 1.

February 3  U.S. severs diplomatic relations with Germany. Latin-American states follow suit in response to appeal from Wilson.

February  British intercept and decipher Zimmermann note, revealing German intrigue to gain anti-U.S. military alliance with Mexico and Japan.
1917 (Cont'd)

March 15  Russian revolution—Czar abdicates—Prince Llov heads provisional government.
March 17  Briand cabinet forced to resign, replaced by Ribot.
March-June Secret negotiations between Austrian leadership and Allies. Emperor Karl determined to make peace, even without Germany. Negotiations by his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, serving in Belgian army. Success of negotiations blocked by failure to satisfy Italy.
April 6   United States declares war on Germany, followed by Panama and Cuba the next day.
April 13  Bolivia severs relations with Germany.
April 28  Turkey severs relations with the United States.
April     High point of submarine warfare—875,000 Allied tons lost, exceeding German estimate of 600,000. Admiralty resorts to convoy system.
May-June  Nivelle offensive on Aisne fails. French take only Chemin des Dames at very heavy losses. 16 French corps mutiny in protest against the slaughter. Nivelle dismissed, replaced by Pétain who decides to go on defensive until arrival of Americans.
June 27   Greece declares war on Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, and Turkey.
July 11   Equal, direct, and secret suffrage introduced under pressure in Germany.
July 14   Bethmann, having lost support of Conservatives, National Liberals, and Center, and military, retires and is replaced by Michaelis.
July 16   Kerensky becomes prime minister of Russian Provisional Government.
July 19   Reichstag passes resolution favoring "peace of understanding" without annexations.
July 22   Siam declares war on Germany and Austria.
July      Great Brusilov offensive by Russians in Galicia, fails after heavy losses as army discipline dissolves.
August 1  Peace proposals by Pope Benedict.
August 4  Liberia declares war on Germany.
1917 (Cont'd)

August 5  Von Kühlmann replaces Zimmerman as German foreign minister.

August 14  China declares war on Germany and Austria.

August - November  British lose 400,000 men in vain attacks at Ypres, troops are demoralized.

September 12  Painlevé forms new cabinet, France war weary.

September 14  Kornilov attempts rightist coup in Petrograd, fails.

October  German submarines had by now destroyed 8,000,000 tons of allied shipping, but lost 50 submarines and were becoming less effective due to Allied convoys and anti-submarine warfare.

October 6  Peru severs relations with Germany.

October 7  Uruguay severs relations with Germany.

October  Italians defeated at Caporetto, retreat to Piave. Italians lose 300,000 prisoners.

October 26  Brazil declares war on Germany.

October 30  Count Hertling replaces Michaelis as chancellor.

November 7  Bolshevik coup d'état in Petrograd succeeds.

November 16  Fall of Painlevé cabinet, replaced by Clemenceau.

November 20  First great tank attack (380) by British, breakthrough not exploited.

November 28  Bolsheviks request armistice.

December 7  United States declares war on Austria.

December 8  Ecuador severs relations with Germany.

December 10  Panama declares war on Austria.

December 15  Armistice concluded with Russia on eastern front.

December 16  Cuba declares war on Austria.
1918

January

Allies now building increasingly more shipping tonnage than is being destroyed by German submarines.

January 5

Lloyd George formulates British war aims: Restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. Also "reconsideration" of the Franco-Prussian settlement of 1871, an independent Poland, self-determination of nationalities in Austria-Hungary, satisfaction of Italian and Rumanian claims. Also some future organization to limit arms.

January 8

Wilson outlines a peace program of fourteen points in speech to Congress. These are: (1) open covenants, (2) freedom of the seas in peace and war, (3) removal of trade barriers, (4) reduction of armaments to domestic police only, (5) self-determination of colonies, (6) evacuation of Russia, Belgium, (7) France, (8) including Alsace Lorraine, (9) adjustment of Italian frontier along lines of nationality, (10) self-determination among peoples of Austria Hungary, (11) restoration of Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, (12) permanent opening of Dardanelles, (13) independent Poland with access to the Sea, (14) formation of a league of nations.

March 21 - April 5

Great March "Ludendorff Offensive" pushes in Allied lines some 40 miles; then is stopped.

April 10

Meeting of Congress of Oppressed Austrian Nationalities in Rome—Czech, Yugoslav, Polish, and Rumanian representatives proclaim right of national self-determination, vow to fight Hapsburg government.

April 23

Guatemala declares war on Germany.

May 8

Nicaragua declares war on Germany and Austria.

May 23

Costa Rica declares war on Germany.

May 24

BEF under General Poole lands at Murmansk—practical state of war between Allies and Soviet Russians.

May 26

Czech legion of 100,000 begins fighting Bolsheviks, seizing Kazan, Omsk, Irkutsk in Siberia. They declared war on Germany on August 13 and were recognized as a nation by British and U.S.

Summer

Many disorders in cities of Austria Hungary—end of parliamentary government—desertions—Czech, Polish, Yugoslav legions fight for Allies.
1918

January
Allies now building increasingly more shipping tonnage than is being destroyed by German submarines.

January 5
Lloyd George formulates British war aims: Restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. Also "reconsideration" of the Franco-Prussian settlement of 1871, an independent Poland, self-determination of nationalities in Austria-Hungary, satisfaction of Italian and Rumanian claims. Also some future organization to limit arms.

January 8
Wilson outlines a peace program of fourteen points in speech to Congress. These are: (1) open covenants, (2) freedom of the seas in peace and war, (3) removal of trade barriers, (4) reduction of armaments to domestic police only, (5) self-determination of colonies, (6) evacuation of Russia, Belgium, (7) France, (8) including Alsace Lorraine, (9) adjustment of Italian frontier along lines of nationality, (10) self-determination among peoples of Austria Hungary, (11) restoration of Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, (12) permanent opening of Dardanelles, (13) independent Poland with access to the Sea, (14) formation of a league of nations.

March 21 - April 5
Great March "Ludendorff Offensive" pushes in Allied lines some 40 miles, then is stopped.

April 10
Meeting of Congress of Oppressed Austrian Nationalities in Rome--Czech, Yugoslav, Polish, and Rumanian representatives proclaim right of national self-determination, vow to fight Hapsburg government.

April 23
Guatemala declares war on Germany.

May 8
Nicaragua declares war on Germany and Austria.

May 23
Costa Rica declares war on Germany.

May 24
BEF under General Poole lands at Murmansk--practical state of war between Allies and Soviet Russians.

May 26
Czech legion of 100,000 begins fighting Bolsheviks, seizing Kazan, Omsk, Irkutsk in Siberia. They declared war on Germany on August 13 and were recognized as a nation by British and U.S.

Summer
Many disorders in cities of Austria Hungary--end of parliamentary government--desertions--Czech, Polish, Yugoslav legions fight for Allies.
1918 (Cont'd)

June 15-24  Battle of the Piave—Austrians make last bid for military victory in Italy, fail, lose 100,000 men, leaving army demoralized.

July 12  Haiti declares war on Germany.

July 15 - August 7  Second Battle of the Marne—Ludendorff's attempt to advance west and east of Rheims largely frustrated—turn of the tide as Allies counterattack.

July 19  Honduras declares war on Germany.

August 8-11  British make unusual gains at Amiens, driving through German lines with 450 tanks. German forces in local area demoralized, Ludendorff loses his nerve.

September 15  Austria appeals to Wilson to call an informal peace conference—plea rejected by Wilson.

September 15-24  Allies (Italians, Serbs, French, English, Greeks) begin great offensive from Albania to Struma River, threaten to split German-Bulgarian forces. Bulgaria appeals for armistice.

September 29  Ludendorff demands government initiate peace negotiations while army can still hold out.

September 30  Armistice concluded with Bulgaria at Saloniki: Bulgarian army to be demobilized, occupied Greek and Serb territory evacuated, all means of transport to be at Allied disposal.

October 4  Prince Max of Baden replaces Hertling as chancellor and foreign minister, appeals with Austria to Wilson for an armistice.

October 14  Turks appeal to Wilson for armistice.

October 16  Emperor Karl proclaims belatedly the Austrian federal state with self-government of subject nationalities.

October 27  Ludendorff resigns, replaced by General von Gröner.

October 30  Armistice between Allies and Turkey concluded at Mudros. Allies now control Dardanelles, Turkey severs relations with Germany. Italians win battle of Vittorio Veneto, Austrians collapse. Several hundred thousand Austrians captured, rest in full retreat. Austrian foreign minister Andrassy, replacing Burian on October 25, notifies Wilson Austria is willing to make separate peace. Austrians offer to surrender unconditionally to Italians, disorders in Vienna and Budapest.

November 1  Establishment of independent Hungarian government.
1918 (Cont'd)

November 3 Conclusion of an armistice between Allies and Austria-Hungary: Complete demobilization of armies, withdrawal of troops fighting with Germans, surrender of half the equipment, evacuation of occupied territories, Allied occupation of strategic points. Mutiny in German navy at Kiel, spreads rapidly through northwest Germany.

November 7 Revolution in Munich, king abdicates. Prince Max suggests Kaiser abdicate, but he resists.

November 8 German armistice commission under Erzberger, leader of Center Party, received by Foch in Compiegne.

November 9 Prince Max, unable to wait longer due to impending revolution, announces Kaiser's abdication in Berlin. Socialist leader Scheidemann proclaims German Republic.

November 10 Kaiser abdicates and flees to Holland, having been told by Hindenburg and Grünher that there were unable to guarantee loyalty of the army. Chancellor Prince Max wires Erzberger German Government's acceptance of Allied armistice terms received on the 8th.

November 10 Allies enter Rumania, who re-enters war on Allied side.

November 11 Armistice signed by Erzberger and Foch at 5 a.m. Hostilities cease on western front at 11 a.m.

Allies reoccupy France and western Germany. Last German troops cross French frontier November 18 and Belgian frontier November 26. British and American troops begin occupation of Germany December 1.
Allied Armistice Terms to Germany

Goals:
Designed to render Germany militarily helpless to resist the acceptance of subsequent peace terms still left to be worked out.

Means:
Immediate German evacuation of all occupied territory and German territory west of the Rhine, which was to be occupied by Allied forces.

Renunciation of the German-dictated treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and withdrawal of German forces from Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, and Russia.

Germany to surrender to the Allies 5000 locomotives, 5000 trucks, 150,000 freight cars, 160 submarines, all major warships.

Schedule:
The Armistice was concluded for a period of 30 days, beginning 11 a.m. on 11 November 1918. It was renewed periodically until peace was signed on June 28, 1919 at Versailles. Occupation of Germany west of the Rhine began December 1, 1918.

Allied Peace Terms to Germany

Goals:
That Germany should pay the costs of the war (rejected by Wilson) and be denied the means to make war in the future; self-determination of nationalities.

Territorial
Means:
Germany to cede the following territories:

Alsace-Lorraine to France
Moresnet, Eupen, and MalMidy to Belgium
The Saar to international administration for 15 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held. French rights to coal mines in the first 15 years.
Schleswig to decide allegiance by plebiscite
Most of Posen and West Prussia to Poland
Upper Silesia to decide allegiance by plebiscite
Danzig to be a free state within the Polish customs union
Parts of East Prussia to decide by plebiscite whether to go to Poland or Germany
Memel to the Allies
German Baltic Colonies to the Allies

Military
Means:
Germany to accept full responsibility for causing the war (Article 321)
Army limited to 100,000, with no large guns and only limited small ones

116
Navy limited to six warships and six other craft
Ban of submarines and military aircraft
Dismantling of Heligoland fortifications
Allied occupation of the Rhineland for 15 years, and longer if necessary
Demilitarization of the east bank of the Rhine in a belt of 30 miles depth
Kiel Canal and German rivers opened to shipping of all nations

Economic Means:

Germany required to pay all civil damage caused during the war, the final bill for which was to be presented by May 1, 1921. In the meantime Germany was to pay $5 billion, the remainder to be paid in 30 years.

Germany was to turn over to the Allies all merchant ships of over 1600 tons, half of those between 800 and 1600 tons, and a quarter of her fishing fleet. Germany was to build 200,000 tons of shipping annually for the Allies for five years. Large amounts of coal were to be delivered to France, Belgium, and Italy annually for ten years.

Germany was to bear the cost of the allied occupation armies, and to agree to the sale of German property in Allied countries.

Schedule:

May 7, 1919  Treaty submitted to German delegation, which protests vigorously that terms not consistent with conditions under which Germany surrendered, and that many terms were impossible of fulfillment.

May-June 1919  Slight modifications only made by Allies in treaty. Germans decide they cannot resist and must sign, after acute domestic crisis.

June 28, 1919  Signature at Versailles

July 7, 1919  Ratification by German government. France ratified on October 13, Great Britain and Italy on October 15, Japan on October 30. The United States never ratified the treaty.
CHAPTER IV

THE TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE IN 1945

When the termination of World War II in Europe is considered from the perspective of World War I, there appears to be an expansion in every physical military means and every political aim. Where in World War I the Imperial German army's high tide was reached at the Marne on the West, the Piave on the South, Brest Litovsk in the East, and Helsinki in the North, in the second world war the Nazi German armies reached the Bay of Biscay in the West, the Egyptian Desert at El Alamein in the South, the gates of Moscow and the Caucasus in the East, and North Cape in the North. Where Imperial Germany's war aims were at first defensive and then aggressive only to the point of retaining her conquests and some colonies, Nazi Germany's very ideology was devoted to world conquest. The second world war in Europe was physically bigger, much more destructive,* and fought in a much more bitter spirit than was World War I.

The termination of World War II in Europe was also quite different from what occurred in World War I, and much more destructive physically and perhaps politically. In World War I internal disruption through revolution played a major role in both the Russian and German cases, while in World War II both principal Axis powers (Nazi Germany and Japan) were totalitarian powers that rendered internal rebellion ineffective contributions to terminating the conflict. In Germany in particular, the Nazi regime had achieved unprecedented popularity immediately prior to the war by having raised the standard of living to the highest level it had ever attained, and by more than restoring German national pride. The failure of the German anti-Nazi opposition to depose the Hitler regime was probably the single most decisive factor preventing an early termination of the war in Europe, once it was militarily clear that Germany would eventually be defeated.

If the terminations of World War I are compared with those of World War II, it may be possible to draw a general conclusion that the disruption of a nation's fighting power by internal revolution, while politically destructive

* Although precise figures are not available, most estimates agree that the total cost in lives—soldiers and civilians—of World War I was some 15–20 millions, while for World War II (all theaters) it was between 40 and 50 millions.
in the long run, in the short run provides one of the earliest possible opportunities
valves" for termination when a war can no longer be won. On the other hand,
in World War II the essentially complete destruction of the principal*Axis
powers' military capabilities (and many of their economic capabilities also)
was rendered necessary primarily because the regimes were so effectively
totalitarian that no revolutionary opposition had any hope of success in
gaining power and terminating the war.

The over-riding difference between the termination of World War I
and World War II was that, in World War I, the military and economic cost
of the war, the hopelessness of victory, and the incapacity of the leadership
in the defeated nations induced revolutions which then greatly accelerated
the termination process, which resulted in armistices before the defeated
nations were invaded to any degree and before their armed forces and economic
resources were destroyed substantially by the victors. In World War II, on
the other hand, the totalitarian regimes of the Axis powers prevented internal
revolution, while the ideological bitterness and much greater incompatibility
of war aims and peace aims resulted in termination of these wars by the
thorough destruction of the defeated nation's military and economic capacity
to resist. In the case of Germany, the war did not end until the country itself
had been invaded and occupied by force, and its war economy and military
forces had been almost completely reduced.

Fundamental to the problem of termination of World War II in Europe
is the question of, first, why the Axis powers were defeated militarily, and,
second, what prevented an internal revolution that could have resulted in a
more reasonable regime capable of achieving an earlier termination short of
total destruction of Germany's war-making resources.* To find out why the
Second World War in Europe was terminated when it was, and in the way that
it was, it is necessary to determine first of all why it should have been ter-
minated earlier (from the aspect of maximizing the German and United
Nations objectives), why it was not terminated at an earlier time when it
could have been terminated more economically, and why it was finally ter-
minated when and in the way that it was.

* Italy is here not considered as a "principal" Axis power.

** Alternative routes to general war termination, while possible, do not
offer recent illustrative historical examples discussed here.

119
The first question of determining the most sensible point at which the war should have been terminated, both from the Allied and Axis mutual points of view, is one that can be dealt with straightforwardly through the advantages of military and political hindsight, but understandably may have been quite unclear to the participants at the time. The second question of why the utility of an earlier termination was neither recognized nor carried out must be answered in terms of the forces in Germany that prevented the anti-Nazi opposition from gaining control of the government. The third question of what finally did terminate the war is primarily a military-economic question of how the war-making capabilities of Nazi Germany were systematically reduced to the point of exhaustion and collapse.

To summarize, to explain the German termination of World War II in Europe, we must answer three questions:

1. What would have been the most sensible point (or points) in the war at which a negotiated peace best satisfying the war and peace aims of both belligerent coalitions might have been achieved? (A political-military strategic problem.)

2. What prevented the overthrow of the intransigent Nazi regime by the moderate German anti-Nazi opposition that might (but not necessarily would) have achieved an earlier and less destructive termination of the war (by internal disruption rather than by internal exhaustion)? (Primarily a problem of German domestic politics, particularly in the army, the Nazi party, the bureaucracy, and the urban populations.)

3. How was the exhaustion of Nazi German war-making capacity attained by the Anglo-American-Russian allies? (Primarily a military-economic problem.)
When Could the War Have Been Terminated Most Favorably for Germany?

In the broadest terms, World War II in Europe began with Nazi German military victories that were never thoroughly consolidated or exploited economically or politically. The Nazi-occupied areas of western and eastern Europe were never effectively organized for a maximum economic contribution to the German war effort, nor were the captive populations effectively mobilized politically to a point even approaching voluntary contribution of trustworthy troops. This was to have important effect on termination, because World War II in Europe was terminated principally by United Nations military destruction of Germany’s war-making economy. This was not a necessary condition, but it was sufficient. Although the Allies won many military victories, they never succeeded in destroying German military power by direct military action. Still less did they succeed in destroying German political power to resist, in the sense of provoking disruptive revolution or refusal of the population to support the war effort. The United Nations terminated the war by the violent exhaustion of the German war economy by military means—specifically, invasion. Whereas in World War I German and Russian domestic political unity were the first targets to collapse, in World War II the decisive defeat directly resulting in termination in Germany was the collapse of the war-making economy. Military collapse followed immediately, as did political collapse soon after, but the war-making economy was the first to go. Nazi Germany had won her victories politically and militarily, but was defeated principally through economic exhaustion.*

According to Kecskemeti, divergent attrition of war-making resources is the critical determinant of the most favorable point to terminate a war. This seems logical enough as far as it goes, but for this factor actually to operate on the decisions of a defeated (or about-to-be defeated) nation, it is necessary for the leadership of that nation to have:

* The "war-making economy" is taken to include the industrial basis of Nazi German combat effectiveness. This does not necessarily mean that strategic bombing won the war, since it was not until the Allied invasion of Germany that the industrial base of the war economy was thoroughly destroyed. Strategic bombing undoubtedly played a major role in reducing the industrial basis of German military power, but whether or not it would have been decisive by itself without invasion is difficult to say. On balance, it would seem not to have been.
1. An awareness of the meaning of divergent attrition (e.g., absence of a belief that spiritual superiority can somehow overcome material inferiority).

2. An awareness of the fact of divergent attrition.

3. A judgment that the current fact of divergent attrition is a stable or even an increasing factor, rather than a transient anomaly that may be reversed or compensated by special measures (such as "secret weapons").

4. A judgment that divergent attrition exists in decisive areas, and to a degree that is decisive and irreversible.

The awareness of the significance of divergent attrition certainly existed among the senior Army officers, as well as with Speer and other top economic administrators in Nazi Germany. On the other hand, many of Hitler's utterances in his more hysterical moods after 1943 suggest a desperate belief that "superior German will" could somehow compensate for material inferiority. Since Hitler had direct and personal control of national policy, this increasingly unrealistic attitude of his would seem to discount the significance of a perceived divergence of attrition rates in Nazi German policy. Furthermore, Hitler's penchant for the trend-reversing effect (it was hoped) of advanced "secret weapons" that, by means of terror and superior combat effectiveness, would compensate otherwise substantial material shortages, suggests that at the highest level German policy was not very attentive to the significance of divergent attrition.

Appendix IVA shows how in particular the economic sources of military power Nazi Germany began to suffer from very marked "divergent attrition" in the last years of the war. These economic limitations soon had a decisive impact on military offensive and defensive capabilities, particularly in logistic support of tactical weapons. In the last major Nazi offensive, the Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944-1945, even the tanks ran out of fuel. As basic capital equipment and industries were destroyed, the attrition became clearly irreversible and decisive. But Hitler refused to draw the necessary conclusions from this, and the Army generals who did were not capable of taking over control of German policy.
Theoretically, the best time for a nation to terminate a war is when it perceives it no longer has any chance of winning it, but retains the maximum amount of military power for exacting favorable termination conditions. This position seems to have been reached in the European theater of World War II by Germany sometime in the Autumn of 1941, at the peak of Nazi successes. It might also be argued that the peak of Nazi successes was reached in the Summer of 1942, with the extension eastward of the maximum line of German advance in Russia from Rostov to Stalingrad, but by then the United States had come into the war and the process of divergent attrition ultimately so disastrous to Germany was already under way. It might also be argued that even though the advance into Russia in the fall of 1941 was a great military success, Germany's best opportunity for an early termination of the war was in the Summer of 1940, after Dunkirk—had Britain been willing.

This judgment is not dependent on historical hindsight. Sober and realistic observers in Germany, and not only those senior members of the military having access to special information, seem to have recognized the turning point of the war. For example, in November 1942 the German air ministry drew up an order concerning the calling up of 15- and 16-year old boys for service with anti-aircraft units, and this provoked a rather significant letter of protest from then Minister without Portfolio Hjalmar Schacht.

106 Divergent attrition itself was not yet so much in evidence, but with U.S. entry into the war the basis of divergent attrition—Allied war production surpassed the losses to U-boats at an increasing rate, this example of divergent attrition was very probably not clearly apparent to the German leadership for some time. As one German general put it, "...the military defeat was already implicit in the antecedent political defeat. which had provoked a coalition of all the great powers against Hitler's Germany."


107 Hitler seems to have had some thoughts along these lines, it having been said that he delayed his speech announcing the armistice with France in the hope of coupling it with an announcement of peace negotiations with England. Feelers had been put out, but Churchill's War Cabinet was most uncooperative. For one account of stillborn attempts at secret negotiations between Britain and the German anti-Nazis, see Bryans, *Blind Victory*.
Schacht stated in his letter that because "For some months now I have been expressly forbidden to listen in to foreign broadcasts, all my current knowledge of the military, economic and political situation is based on the same sources as are available to any other thinking German." Thus his statement appears to have a broader significance than would the perhaps special insight of only one man. Schacht made the following comment:

"The facts as the German people can see them are as follows:

(1) The original prospect of a short war has proved to be vain.

(2) The prospect of a speedy reduction of England by the Luftwaffe has proved equally vain.

(3) The statement that Germany would be immune from hostile air attack has proved inaccurate.

(4) The repeated assurance that Russian resistance had been broken has turned out to be wrong.

(5) On the contrary, the supply of war materials to Russia by her Allies, and her own manpower reserves, have led to constant heavy counter-attacks against our eastern front.

(6) The first victorious advance against Egypt has broken down after a series of further attempts.

(7) The landing of Allied forces in North and West Africa, which was said to be impossible, has taken place.

(8) The extraordinarily large amount of shipping space which was necessary for this landing indicates that in spite of the great successes our submarine arm was not sufficiently powerful to prevent the passage of these transports.

In addition, every German citizen can observe the cuts in civilian supplies, transport, armaments, and manpower. The calling up of 15-year old boys will increase the doubts of the civilian population about how this war can be brought to an end."

109 Ibid., p. 143. (Italics added)
Schacht was finally dismissed from his formal post as Minister without Portfolio for writing this letter, which sums up with admirable clarity the reasons why the fall of 1942 was an excellent time to initiate steps for the termination of the war from the German point of view, even on the basis of information commonly available in Germany at the time.

There can be no single or simple answer to the question of why Hitler apparently did not appreciate the fact that this was the best time at least to attempt termination (even if such attempts would probably have been unsuccessful). Some of the major reasons may have been the British rejection of previous "feelers" in 1940, the still increasing successes of the U-boat blockade of England, still growing German war production, underestimation of the relatively greater growth of U.S. war production, underestimation of the Allied will to total victory, and overestimation of the promise of new weapons (long-range schnorkel submarines, V-1's and V-2's, jet aircraft).

At the peak of German successes in 1941, Hitler had actually ordered a cutback in war production in order to increase economic output for civilian consumption. In the Fall of 1942 this decision had been reversed, but it might be said that the initial optimism had only just given way to a more realistic view of the need for further strong effort, but not to the point where there was any substantial lack of hope about the success of such a readily available expansion of economic and industrial effort. Furthermore, the enormous occupied areas and now German-controlled industries in France and Russia had not yet been mobilized to support the German war effort to any substantial degree, so that it was possible for Hitler to believe that his lack of a decisive success by the Fall of 1942 might well have been the result of simply not having fully exploited the available resources. It seems understandable today that a totalitarian with Hitler's fanatical beliefs in the total mobilization of material resources, and the ability of great will to overcome any material deficiencies, would be unlikely to have a strong perception of eventual defeat when not even the available material resources needed to gain victory had yet been fully exploited.
The German total available economic product (gross national product plus foreign contributions from occupied areas) had its greatest percentage growth (12.6%) in 1941, and was still growing at the very substantial rate of over 5% in 1942, so that although government expenditure had risen from 53% to 60% from 1941 to 1942, consumer expenditure had only dropped to 43% and there was considerable "belt-tightening" still possible.\footnote{\textit{Total available economic product in Germany in terms of 1939 Reichmarks prices, was 140 billion in 1939, 150 billion in 1940, 169 billion in 1941, 178 billion in 1942, 184 billion in 1943, and 180 billion in 1944. Total government expenditure in billions in 1939 level Reichmarks increased from 45 billion in 1939, to 65 billion in 1940, 89 billion in 1941, 106 billion in 1942, 114 billion in 1943 to 118 billion in 1944. (65% of GNP). United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Economics Effects Division Report, 1946.}}

If the fall of France in 1940, the peak of German military success in Russia in the Fall of 1941, and the peak of territorial expansion in the Fall of 1942 may be considered three major turning points of the war at which it might have been opportune for Germany to have initiated termination negotiations; the Summer of 1944 was clearly another and probably the fourth most important opportunity. Gördeler, Beck, Rommel, and other involved in the anti-Hitler July 20, 1944, conspiracy realized this, only they had hoped to be able to overthrow the Nazi regime before the Allied landing on June 6. It was in the Spring and Summer of 1944 that the Allies for the first time began effectively to use their air forces to disrupt the German economy and transportation system. The interdiction bombardments in Northwestern France had made the success of the June landings in Normandy possible. The attacks on the petroleum industry beginning mainly in May 1944 had reduced production of the 13 major synthetic plants from 316,000 tons in May to 17,000 in September, and the production of aviation gasoline from 175,000 tons in April to a mere 5,000 tons in September of 1944. The air attack on the steel industry, particularly the RAF attacks on the Ruhr from July to December 1944, had also proven effective. The attacks on the transport system, spreading out to targets in Eastern France, Belgium, and throughout Germany as the June landings
became successful and Allied forces broke out from their beachheads, reduced freight car loading from 900,000 in August of 1944 to 700,000 in October of 1944 and to 550,000 in December of 1944.\textsuperscript{111}

It is not surprising that in 1944, for the first time since long before the war, total available German economic products declined—from 184 to 180 billion 1939-level Reichmarks. This may well have been the fourth most obvious significant turning point of the war at which it would have been opportune for Germany to initiate termination negotiations.

A fifth important turning point anticipated what is probably the above fourth most important turning point by some two years—the crisis in the U-boat war. At the end of 1942, Allied and neutral shipping losses had reached a peak of (for that year) 1,570 ships totalling 7,697,905 tons. The number of U-boats operational in the Atlantic had risen from 90 in 1941 to some 200 in 1942. In May of 1942 the U.S. production of ships had begun to balance and exceed the losses from U-boats although the fact was probably not clearly known to the Germans. Thus the Spring and Summer of 1942 presented a good example of "divergent attrition" in the shipping war. By late 1942, with increased U.S. production of ships and small anti-submarine vessels, and much-improved anti-submarine techniques, U-boat sinkings began to fall off in spite of a greater number of U-boats. This was another significant turning point that might have been the basis for the initiation of termination negotiations early in 1943. By 1943, the total annual Allied shipping losses had significantly declined to 597 ships totalling some 3,220,137 tons or less than half what they had been in 1942.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), September 30, 1945.

In summary, at least five major turning points of the Second World War in Europe offered Hitler what in retrospect may be seen as objectively desirable points to initiate termination negotiations. These were, in probably descending order of desirability from the German point of view:

1. Immediately after the fall of France and the evacuation of the British expeditionary force at Dunkirk in June of 1940, and before the expansion of the war to include two additional major world powers as enemies of Germany (Russia and the United States).

2. The peak of military success in the Autumn of 1941.

3. The peak of military territorial expansion in the Autumn of 1942.

4. The peak of military economic production in Spring 1944, and before the Allied landings in Normandy in June of 1944.

5. The peak of U-boat sinkings of Allied shipping, just before American ship production began to outweigh U-boat sinkings in mid-1942, and before the absolute number of sinkings by U-boats began substantially to decline in the Winter of 1942-1943.

* This "desirability from the German point of view" is of course in the light of subsequent developments. Since German expectations of military success declined progressively from (1) to (4) above, the perceived desirability must have increased correspondingly as the war continued. Why termination was not successfully initiated by Germany despite the increasingly apparent need for it is discussed below. The principal internal force for termination short of Germany's physical destruction was the anti-Nazi resistance. The pressure of Allied military successes resulted in increasingly desperate attempts to change the government, culminating in the July 20, 1944 bomb plot. The reasons for the failure of the anti-Nazi resistance to overthrow Hitler may have been decisive for the inability of Germany to terminate the war before being completely occupied by invading armies.
The Failure of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany

From 1938 through 1944, there are known at least ten planned attempts to dispose of Hitler as the leader of Germany. (See Appendix IVB) These were probably the single most dramatic and concrete expressions of the German anti-Nazi opposition's attempts to change the regime. The motives of the thousands of anti-Nazis were as diverse as their political backgrounds, which included Catholics and Protestants, conservatives and socialists, liberals and monarchists. All were united on two major objectives, however: the restoration of a "decent" domestic government for Germany (Dr. Gördeker stated that the distinction between pro- and anti-Nazi finally came down to a question of decent and non-decent), and the need to terminate a war that was bound to end in defeat and destruction for Germany.

Although the German anti-Nazi opposition knew that they may have had much potential but passive support from large elements of the population that were either nominal Nazis, or non-Nazis and potential anti-Nazis, the fact remains that the active resistance movements—although fairly large—consisted mostly of upper middle class or aristocratic members of the civil service, the Foreign Office, and the Army. Although the opposition was sparked mostly by Dr. Gördeker, a former Mayor of Leipzig and economic administrator, most of the leading personalities and activists in it were field grade and general officers of the German army. Colonel General Beck, former Chief of Staff, was designated to be the provisional president in the shadow cabinet formed in the event that the July 20, 1944, plot was successful. (See table of organization of Anti-Nazi Shadow Government on p. 132.)


* See Appendix IVC for a chart of the leading participants in the Anti-Nazi opposition and their relationships.

** At least several thousand Germans actively participated in the Anti-Nazi resistance, and there probably were many thousands more that lent passive support. Nevertheless, the Anti-Nazi resistance certainly never approached the proportions of a popular mass movement.
The German resistance to Hitler crystalized around senior officers of the Army for chiefly two reasons: First, the Army was the only organization that was at once sufficiently "Nazi-proof" and had sufficient physical power to overcome the security forces of the Nazi regime (which even in 1939 included some 50,000 SS troops in addition to the Gestapo and the Security Service). Second, most of the senior officers of the Army, and in particular the members of the Great General Staff, had been raised in an aristocratic and moderate conservative tradition of orderly and decent devotion to the achievement of realistic national objectives of military security and social progress. On the strategic level, they were trained more for national defense than for wars of conquest, although the tactics of defense necessarily included offensive operations (as they do in any army). The more sober and realistic generals were completely estranged by Hitler's adventurism, and many predicted failure at each new aggression. Hitler's initial series of successes—achieved with the very substantial if unwitting support of England and France—increased Hitler's confidence in himself and his ability to dispense with the advice of the generals, while weakening their own confidence. Nevertheless, the stronger characters among the generals, such as Beck, were consistently convinced that Hitler's policy—regardless of transient successes—could only lead to an expanded war and ultimate disaster for Germany. Thus the second basic reason for the German opposition to Hitler crystalizing around senior generals of the army was that these men, trained as they were for a careful weighing of national military resources, saw clearly and consistently through Hitler's initial successes that a European war was unlikely to remain limited, and that a world war for Germany would spell ultimate defeat.\footnote{114 It would be misleading to leave the impression that most of Hitler's generals belonged to the anti-Nazi Opposition. General Guderian has written of his attempt to dissuade Goerdeler from the planned anti-Hitler coup: "I came to the conclusion that Dr. Goerdeler's plan would be harmful to our general interest and was furthermore incapable of being put into practice...I met Dr. Goerdeler again in April (1943) and was able to assure him that I had not found a single general who was prepared to join in his plan. The individuals I had sounded had all refused to take any part in the proposed action, not only on (Footnote continued on next page.)}
They and a few members of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service were apparently among an educated minority that were not swept up by the Nazi propaganda and could see clearly that Germany simply did not have the military, economic, and political resources to win a long war against a combination of England and Russia, let alone both of them combined with the United States. They did not have much confidence in Hitler and Ribbentrop's ability to keep the war limited to a series of piece-meal aggressions that would not strain Germany's military or economic resources, and they were correct.

Why did the anti-Nazi opposition to Hitler led by senior officers of the army fail to depose him? A part of this problem will never be explicable, because Hitler survived so many attempts on his life by what was apparently sheer luck. It is possible to explain, however, why the death of Hitler was perceived to be such an essential condition for a military coup d'état and revolution from above. Immediately after the death of President von Hindenberg in 1934, Hitler had made the senior officers of the Army swear their personal loyalty to him as their commander and chief. This oath, although extracted under indirect although potent duress, was either taken seriously or believed to be taken seriously by most of the senior general officers of the Army. Beck and finally Gördeler came to believe that the only way they could assure the support or at least the neutrality of the senior Army commanders in a coup d'état would be to release them from their oath of loyalty to Hitler by the latter's demise.

account of their oath of allegiance, but also because of the grave situation at the front." Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, New York, Ballantine Books, 1961, p. 240. Italics added. Apparently some of the generals still hoped for a reversal of military fortunes at the front to provide a better opportunity for negotiating an end of the war. Guderian, speaking of the December 1944 Ardennes offensive, states that Hitler "thus expected to gain time, to shatter the enemy's hopes of total victory, so that he would drop his insistence on unconditional surrender, and to make him willing to accept a negotiated peace." Panzer Leader, p. 307.

115 "Like the rest of the Army, I also felt myself bound by the oath of allegiance I had taken. I therefore asked Dr. Goerdeler to give up his proposed plan." Ibid., p. 240.
Anti-Nazi Shadow Government

Col. Gen. Beck (Retired Army)
Provisional Chief of State

Göerdeler (Retired Civil Service)
Chancellor

Leuschner (Labor Leader)
Vice-Chancellor

Kaiser (Labor Leader)
Deputy Vice-Chancellor

Von Hassell (Retired)
Foreign Office
Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Von der Schulenberg Alternate)

Gen. Olbricht or Gen. Hoeprner (Active Army)
War Minister

Leber (Social-Democrat)
Journalist
Minister of the Interior (including Police)

Haubach (Socialist Leader)
Propaganda Minister

Col. von Stauffenberg (Active Army)
Under-Secretary of State

Letterhaus (Catholic Labor Leader)
Minister of Reconstruction

Lejeune-Jung (Former Reichstag)
Deputy, Liberal
Minister of Economics

Bolz (Retired State President of Wurttemberg)
Minister of Culture

Loesser (Former Mayor of Leipzig)
Minister of Finance

Dr. Wirmer (Catholic Lawyer)
Minister of Justice
It was also felt in less specific form that in the next tier of the Nazi party hierarchy below Hitler, there was no single sufficiently powerful and charismatic personality to mobilize effective resistance against an Army coup d'état. (Hitler had always taken care to maintain a relative balance of power among his principal subordinates so that no one of them could independently threaten his own leadership.)

A third reason why particularly the civilian and foreign office members of the anti-Nazi opposition, who were more aware of international political considerations, felt that the death of Hitler was essential for the success of a coup d'état and the termination of the war was that it was believed that much of the responsibility for Nazi aggression could be placed with Hitler personally, and that the Allied governments would be unlikely to tolerate negotiations with Hitler for termination of the war on any terms except unconditional surrender. In this respect, the perceptions of the anti-Nazi opposition may have been conditioned by Wilson's attitude toward negotiations with the Kaiser in World War I. In any case, it was clear that Hitler would have to be removed from power before the war could be terminated, and it was simply too dangerous to remove him without killing him lest he mobilize a counter-revolution.

Given these reasons for the importance of doing away with Hitler, at least as perceived by the senior officers of the Army involved in an anti-Nazi coup, it is clear why the failure to kill Hitler in at least ten attempts from 1938 to 1944 (see the table on page 166) could be used as an excuse by many army field commanders for not committing themselves. The anti-Nazi Army leaders may thus have trapped themselves by insisting upon the need to destroy Hitler as an essential preliminary to any successful coup, and then being unable to carry out the execution.

116 Apparently a similar situation existed in Stalinist Russia, and might persist in Soviet Russia and Communist China to some degree. See, for example, the discussions in Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948, particularly Chapter XV. Hopkins seems to have gained the definite impression that no one below Stalin was willing to take responsibility for any major decision.
Two interesting questions are provoked by this situation: Were the anti-Nazi generals correct in their assumption that the death of Hitler was essential to the success of an anti-Nazi coup? And, why was it not possible to kill Hitler? There is much to be said for the generals' judgment on the first question. One detects yet another and not usually voiced reason why they felt it was essential to kill Hitler, rather than merely to arrest and imprison him. Hitler apparently possessed an extraordinary personal persuasiveness that even his opponents respected and feared. If he were arrested but permitted to remain alive, there was a justifiable fear that some of the anti-Nazi confederates or neutral parties might be persuaded by Hitler to defect and support a counter-revolution—possibly as a result of promises of great rewards by Hitler, internal conflict among the anti-Nazi factions, etc. Furthermore, there seems little doubt that the United Nations would have been more ready to negotiate with a German provisional government that had completely eliminated Hitler, than with one that had merely imprisoned him and was thus itself in a less stable position. 117 Finally, the fact remains that large, if not necessarily majority, proportions of the German population were blindly devoted to Hitler, and his imprisonment rather than execution might have provoked a civil war.

117 Possibly Roosevelt and Stalin had different views on this point. For example, Stalin "did not share the view of the President that Hitler was mentally unbalanced and emphasized that only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people whatever are thought of the methods." Harry Hopkins in Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 782.

Churchill's view was similar to Roosevelt's, at least as he expressed it in a letter to Sherwood: "It is false to suggest that it" (the unconditional surrender formula) "prolonged the war. Negotiation with Hitler was impossible. He was a maniac with supreme power to play out his hand to the end, which he did; and so did we." Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696. (Italics added)

See also the secret Halifax—von Hassell communications in 1939 - 1940, in which it was made clear "that Great Britain would never be able to accept any government which included Herr Hitler or any of his friends...". Bryans, Blind Victory, p. 170.
The answer to the second question—why the army was unable to kill Hitler—can be answered only partially because of Hitler’s uncanny good luck in escaping at least ten serious attempts on his life. One cannot explain why all these attempts were unsuccessful, but it may be possible to give some reasons why an even much greater number of attempts were not made and why individual attempts were not made with greater force. Almost all the attempts that were recorded had an important common characteristic: The means of killing Hitler were planted bombs with time delays that permitted the escape of the assassin. There was not a single case of a senior Army officer intending personally to shoot Hitler and take the probably inevitable immediate consequences of being himself killed by Hitler’s body guards.

A superficial judgment of this curious fact might be that the anti-Nazi officers were either afraid to die, or did not think the death of Hitler was sufficiently important directly to risk their own lives. This hardly seems to be the case, however, in view of the great risks and courage shown by the anti-Nazi conspirators, the voluntary suicide of General Beck and other following the failure of the July 20, 1944, attempts, and the proven combat courage of many of the conspirators (Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg, the carrier of the bomb in the 20 July attempts, had lost a hand, an eye, and several fingers from his remaining hand in combat only months before the attempt). No, there seems rather to have been an unstated but apparently very potent fear of facing Hitler directly with a threat to his life. Call it magical thinking, unreasoning fear of a charismatic leader, inability directly to do something that violated

---

118 Some insight into a possible lack of the dynamism necessary for a successful coup can be gained from General Guderian’s opinion of General Beck: “I was very surprised that a man like Beck, the hesitancy of whose character was well known to me, should be involved in such a business. A man of his type was the very last person suited to take part in a coup d’etat, since he was incapable of taking a decision, and also had no popularity with the troops, to whom he was indeed more or less unknown; he was a philosopher, but no revolutionary.” Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 240. Guderian’s opinion of Beck had been soured before the war, in a conflict over the importance of armored forces in which Beck in his conservative way had frustrated some of the enthusiastic Guderian’s plans. Nevertheless, it is indicative of some of the lack of broad appeal among even Army officers that limited the anti-Nazi opposition’s hopes.
one's oath of loyalty as an officer (the placing of a bomb was after all a somewhat indirect method of killing)—Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that not one of these courageous and determined conspirators was able to kill Hitler by the simplest, surest, and most obvious means—the use of one's own personal side arm.

An explanation of why the attempts on Hitler's life were not more frequent and massive is suggested by the state of the all-pervasive Gestapo terror that existed in Germany from the late 1930's until the end of the war. To assure the security of their mission, the anti-Nazi conspirators had to limit their number to those of whose loyalty they were assured, and this was not likely to be a large number among Hitler's direct entourage. Nor was it likely that a significant force of men, all of whom were loyal to the anti-Nazi cause, could be introduced into the immediate vicinity of Hitler's headquarters for direct action. To some extent many of the anti-Nazi conspirators in the Army were under various degrees of suspicion, or believed themselves to be under such suspicion, by the Gestapo. The congregation of large numbers of them in immediate proximity to the Führer would raise obvious suspicions resulting in the escape of the target and purges that would weaken the chances for another attempt. The "gewitter reaktion" (storm reaction) to the July 20, 1944, attempt illustrates very dramatically the lengths to which a retaliatory purge could go in response to an unsuccessful attempt. It went so far, so ruthlessly, that completely innocent friends and distant relatives, including women and children, of known or even suspected conspirators were tortured and executed. The numbers ran into the thousands. The purge completely paralyzed further attempts on Hitler's life, and we know of no other major planned conspiracy to kill Hitler after than of July 20, 1944.

In summary then, the German anti-Nazi opposition to Hitler failed because it believed, probably correctly, that it was necessary to kill Hitler before a coup d'état could successfully be effected, and because it was unable to kill Hitler in many attempts. The inability to kill Hitler
was the result of a combination of Nazi police terror stringently limiting the number and activities of the anti-Nazi conspirators, together with the inexplicable good luck of the Führer in escaping the numerous but low-powered attempts that were made on his life, and possibly also a kind of personal mystique exercised by the dictator that somehow prevented intimate personal and direct attacks on his life by the senior Army officers. 119

119 B.H. Liddell Hart gives four factors that checked subsequent attempts to end the war by the German generals: The oath of loyalty to the Führer; the probable lack of understanding of the German people of the situation and the need to end the war; the troops on the Eastern Front would reproach the generals for letting them down; and fear of going down in history as traitors. The German Generals Talk, New York, Berkeley, 1958, p. 226.
The German Anti-Nazi Opposition Movement's Relations

With the Allies

Several German commentators have argued that the German opposition movement was hampered in its effectiveness by the unresponsiveness of British and American contacts to requests for a clear statement of Allied peace terms. Von Moltke, Gördeker, several Protestant clergymen in contact with the Bishop of Chichester, and von Hassell in contact with the English representative to the Pope in Rome, all made attempts to gain this information from the Allies in the early part of the war. Then, according to Professor Rothfels at least, in early 1943 President Roosevelt's declaration of the objective of unconditional surrender at the Casablanca Conference completely cut the ground from under the German opposition. Rothfels argues that with unconditional surrender terms, many anti-Nazi Germans previously willing to engage in a coup d'état now felt undecided about it because it would be impossible to protect the German frontiers against Allied invasion during the probable internal disturbances immediately after the coup attempt.

It seems somewhat unrealistic of Rothfels to have expected the Allies to jeopardize alliance unity and risk a major propaganda setback by offering a conditional peace, at a time when they had just begun to win the war, and at a time when the alliance with Russia was still fairly fragile and being developed. Undoubtedly some German anti-Nazis used first the Allied silence, and then the severity of Allied peace terms to rationalize their indecisiveness toward the coup. Others may have sincerely believed that there was no point in taking the supreme risk without first gaining some evidence of specific support for at least mitigation of peace terms from the Allies, because this would have to be used as an argument to gain additional support from undecided members of the Army. In any case, this policy of attempting to persuade the Allies to accept more moderate peace terms (than unconditional

120 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler.
surrender) in exchange for attempted replacement of a Nazi regime in Germany by coup d'etat failed. That it would continue to fail was unfortunately not made convincingly clear to the anti-Nazi Germans in contact with the British and the Americans through the Dulles organization in Zurich (although it was explicitly stated thus).

It would seem that the most unfortunate part of Allied policy with respect to the anti-Nazi opposition in Germany was not so much its refusal to offer improved peace terms as a consequence of internal revolt against Hitler—against which there were many political and military reasons*—but the failure to convince the anti-Nazi German representatives that such modifications of peace terms would not be forthcoming, and therefore, that there was no point in their delaying attempts to overthrow Hitler in the hope of gaining such Allied concession. An early disabusement of this sort might have persuaded Gördeler, Stauffenberg, and other activists in the anti-Nazi movement to make more substantial and earlier attempts on Hitler's life than were carried out. Even if an attempt such as that of July 20, 1944, had only succeeded to the extent that it did in wounding and frightening Hitler, but had been made in 1942, it probably would have shortened the war in disturbing his judgment and inducing him to impose inefficient super-centralized military control earlier in the war.

Another lesson that may be learned from this series of pathetic attempts to persuade the Allies to be moderate in their terms, so as to permit the anti-Nazi opposition to gather enough Army support in Germany for a revolt, is that in a major war, with major alliance arrangements and propaganda commitments at stake, belligerents are not likely to find it worthwhile to adjust their over-all policy and war aims as a result of contacts with minor and unofficial dissident representatives from the enemy regime. Neither Prince Hohenloue's attempts from Switzerland in World War I, nor Gördeler's attempts in Europe in World War II, nor Kase's attempts for Japan in Switzerland in World War II, were effective in this respect, and probably all were ineffective for these similar reasons.

* Since the Anglo-American opening of a major 'second front' in France to relieve German pressure on Russia had had to be postponed from 1942 to 1943, and then again to June 1944, Stalin had grown increasingly suspicious of Anglo-American intentions regarding the defeat of Germany. It seems likely that discussion of terms less than unconditional surrender by the U.S. and Great Britain would have seriously strained the alliance with Russia, on which the Western nations depended almost as much as did the Russians.
The anti-Nazi opposition's attempts to obtain Allied recognition of a decisive difference between the Nazi German government, and the German people and anti-Nazi opposition, may have been bound to fail during a war involving such massive ideological and emotional commitments on both sides. With the mobilization of civilian energies being achieved to no minor degree among the Allies by propaganda suggesting that "a good German is a dead German", it seems at least understandable from a psychological warfare aspect why the Allies were unwilling to promulgate a change of war aims based on an openly declared distinction between "good" Germans and "bad" Germans. Given such a statement of moral distinction, it would have been more difficult for the Anglo-American allies to justify the massive air bombardment of German cities that was believed to be essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

Rothfels states that in the planning for the anti-Nazi uprising between the Polish and French campaign (late 1939 - Spring 1940), "The aim of the foreign contacts at this time was to obtain assurance of a reasonable peace and then of a suspension of military operations so German weakness following on a military putch should not be exploited by the opponents in the West." \[121\] It may not have occurred to Professor Rothfels that even in this early period of "phony war" the ideological commitments among the Western Allies had

---

\[121\] Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, 1. 127.

See also Bryans, Blind Victory, for a first-hand account of the secret communications between Lord Halifax and Ulrich von Hassell. Von Hassell's Italian son-in-law, Pirzio-Biroli, wrote to Halifax on December 28, 1939, that "The Germans to whom I have talked have not concealed the fear which they have of the attitude of Great Britain in the event of a changement of Government taking place in Germany. They fear in fact that England might take a military advantage of it. And this is one of the things that contributes to making any scheme for a coup d'etat more difficult." p. 168.

J. Lonsdale Bryans also argues that the failure of the British activity to support the German anti-Nazi opposition, by an assurance that no military advantage would be taken of an internal overthrow of the Hitler regime, contributed to the failure of the German opposition. In view of the manifest physical incapacity of British and French forces to execute a serious threat of invasion against Germany in 1939-1940, because of both airpower and ground forces inferiority, the claim that the anti-Nazi generals desisted from an anti-Hitler coup for fear of Allied exploitation seem hardly credible.
very probably already escalated to total war, at least in a very powerful
tuition soon to take control of the war cabinet in Britain (Churchill). The
German aggressions against Czechoslovakia and Poland had finally suc-
cceeded in mobilizing many latent British, French, Russian, and even Am-
erican fears about a massive and ominous shift in the European balance of
power. Thus at least with the benefit of hindsight, it seems unrealistic
indeed to have expected the Allies to permit what to them would have seemed
a consolidation of Germany's aggression-gotten gains, while a modification
of the internal regime was carried out—a modification, incidently, which
would not at all necessarily be perceived by the Allies as a significant im-
provement. The German General Staff and Army mobilized many of the
latent fears that had been generated by them in World War I, and were not
seen as a particularly benign influence strongly contrasting with the Nazi
party, although a detailed examination of domestic policy would have revealed
such a difference. 122

It must also be remembered that at the very time that Kordt and von
Hassell were making their peace feelers to the British through diplomatic
channels in Switzerland, and Görderler was making soundings through Stockholm
and the King of the Belgians, and the Munich lawyer Dr. Joseph Müller was
making contacts for the Armh Intelligence and Cardinal Faulhaber (the
Archbishop of Munich) at the Vatican, the British were themselves attempting
a massive mobilization of public opinion to generate the commitment and
resources necessary for a successful war against Germany. After all the
trials of the 1930's experienced by men like Churchill in warning their
countrymen and attempting to exhort them to the point where they would

122 Because of the potential war-preventing and war-terminating importance
of such domestic political-military schisms, the United States should monitor
the domestic politics of its potential enemies most carefully and continu-
ously. It was precisely here that Germany failed most conspicuously in both World
Wars. "On both occasions she miscalculated her own strength and waged war
against an almost world-wide coalition... Hitler... mistook the calm of the
Anglo-Saxons, their readiness to negotiate, their riches and their democracy
for signs of weakness. He completely failed to understand the sources of
strength of a free democracy... the military defeat was already implicit in
the antecedent political defeat, which had provoked a coalition of all the great
powers against Hitler's Germany." General Frido von Senger und Etterlin,
Neither Fear nor Hope, pp. 336-338.
make a determined effort to resist Nazi aggression, they were not about to risk a major reversal in what finally looked to be a trend in the proper direction in public opinion by letting it be revealed that they were busy at work on a negotiated peace. 123

Another barrier to a positive British response to the anti-Nazi opposition's request for promise of a moderate peace following a German anti-Nazi revolt were the suspicions that must have been generated by transmission of specific requests to avoid the bombing of certain cities. According to Rothfels, Görderler "As he was expecting the internal revolt in Germany in September 1943,... asked... again through J. Wallenberg, that the RAF should spare Berlin, Leipzig, and Stuttgart until the middle of October as the oppositional movement has its centers there and the interruption of communications would make the putch more difficult. All this was passed to the British, but provoked no response.″ 124

Now while this request may have seemed eminently reasonable to the logical and idealistic and somewhat naive Görderler, it should not be surprising that the British failed to respond to such a request after they had suffered much of the worst of the blitz themselves, and it should not be surprising that suspicion of Nazi attempts to divert or dilute their bombardment of Germany would lead to rejection of such requests. While it is undoubtedly true that the bombing of the German cities was objectively an inconvenience to the anti-Nazi opposition, it very possibly was an even greater disrupting factor in the attempts of the Gestapo to track and trace and control this opposition. The historical evidence shows both gains and losses for the anti-Nazi opposition through the Allied bombardment, so that even in retrospect it is by no means clear that the war would have been shortened by the British having honored Görderler's request.

123 J. Wallenberg, the Swedish Banker that Görderler used as a frequent contact, probably had a more sound perception of Allied political problems with the German request for moderated peace terms. This may have prompted him in November of 1942 to advise Görderler that the coup d'etat "should be risked even without the British promise of a moderate peace." Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, p. 129. Referring to the dark days of the summer of 1940 when France fell, Churchill states that "the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter of course by...all parties in the State." Winston S. Churchill, Their First Hour, New York, Bantam Books, 1962, p. 153.

124 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, 1, 129.
The old argument against stiff Allied terms brought up in World War I by Ertzberger and Max of Baden was raised again, unsuccessfully as before. Von Trott zu Solz of the German Foreign Office spoke to U.S. State Department officials in later 1939 and early 1940, expressing fears that an Allied war of destruction would compel anti-Nazi elements in Germany who had begun to cooperate for the overthrow of Hitler to revert to a patriotic war of defense. According to Rothfels, "The German people, he said, face the inescapable dilemma of having to support the regime in war as long as it seemed to be the Allies' intention to destroy Germany...If...the Western power failed to take up a constructive line there was, in Trott's opinion the urgent danger of a national Bolshevism that would not halt at the German frontiers."  

This seems very unlikely to have been a very influential threat in the U.S. State Department of 1939 and 1940, which was not at that time particularly frightened by the Russian Communist menace, and whose consultations with the British had undoubtedly rendered it rather suspicious of German diplomatic efforts to mitigate Allied war aims in return for some nebulous promise of internal reform in Germany. According to Rothfels, "President Roosevelt at first showed interest in the appeal to support the German underground, but soon, apparently on the advice of men close to him, discouraged further contacts. Von Trott was even denounced as a Nazi agent, which is bitterly ironical in view of the sequel."

The sequel was that when von Trott returned to Germany via Japan to continue his underground activity, he was involved in the July 20, 1944, plot, after which he was caught by the Gestapo and hanged in August of 1944.

In view of these factors British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's cool response to the Bishop of Chichester's transmission of anti-Nazi Dr. Hans Schönfeld's request for some expression of an Allied difference of attitude to


126 The German Opposition to Hitler, p. 132. There is no evidence in Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins—generally believed to be the best overall source on Roosevelt's wartime policy—of his having "first showed interest."
a Germany that had freed itself from Hitler is not surprising. "Eden did not doubt the honest conviction... But he thought that the resistance movement in Germany had so far given little proof that it existed. It must first follow the example of the other oppressed people in Europe and take active steps. In vain the Bishop objected that the other peoples had been promised liberation by the Allies, but the Germans had not. The matter rested with Anthony Eden's statement on July 17 that a reply would not be 'in the national' interest." 127

Another criticism, particularly of American policy, leveled by Rothfels is that the Dulles organization in Switzerland was robbed of effective means of psychological warfare, and Goebbels was provided excellent propaganda ammunition (as apparently noted in his diary) by Roosevelt's unconditional surrender declaration at the Casablanca Conference. According to Rothfels, "The policy of unconditional surrender certainly made it harder for the German Opposition to win over recalcitrant generals." 128 That may have been a valid criticism, even more so in the cases of the Italian and Japanese surrenders. However, it must be asked whether the unity and the morale of the Allies was strengthened by the unconditional surrender declaration more or less than the probably in any case ineffective

127 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, p. 135.
128 Ibid., p. 143. According to General Guderian, "The effect of this brutal formula (of Unconditional Surrender) on the German nation and above all, on the Army was great. The soldiers, at least, were convinced from now on that our enemies had decided on the utter destruction of Germany, that they were no longer fighting—as Allied propaganda at the time alleged—against Hitler and so-called Nazism, but against their efficient, and therefore dangerous, rivals for the trade of the world." Panzer Leader, p. 223. One wonders just how many German soldiers shared this rather Leninist interpretation of Allied war aims. But for the American side of the story, see in particular Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 360, 697, 756-7. "The President and the Prime Minister... are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor

(Footnote continued on next page.)
German opposition to Hitler was further weakened by it. After all, the American landings in Africa had hardly satisfied Russian pleas for the opening of the Western front. Also, it is possible that Robert Sherwood is correct in suggesting that Roosevelt was concerned lest he repeat the (apparent) "mistake" of Woodrow Wilson of making definite promises to the enemy that might one day be invoked as protests against peace terms.

Another factor in the refusal of the Allies to recognize a German negotiator for the anti-Nazi movement was that there was no single negotiator, nor could one be identified sufficiently strongly and consistently without risking that very negotiator's life or at least effectiveness within Germany. It might have been possible to establish an anti-Nazi "government in exile" in London or elsewhere, but it apparently was not possible to establish an anti-Nazi "shadow government" which could have achieved sufficient Allied recognition for effective negotiations within Germany.

According to Rothfels, "It is clear that Casablanca destroyed any hope of a tolerable peace which might still have been entertained by the German resistance movement, and that therefore any contacts with the West undertaken with this aim could only have questionable value. Before this time and up to the year 1944 there is simply no evidence that the conspirators sought to split the Allied front, as was suspected in London and Washington. But now it seemed as though their own ranks were split into a Western and an Eastern group... Trott had said: 'Constructive thoughts and plans for the post-war reconstruction of Germany are coming steadily from the Russians, while the democratic countries made no proposals whatever'..."129

of the Italian or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany, Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples. "Roosevelt's notes (prepared in advance) for the press conference at Casablanca, in January 1943, at which he announced the unconditional surrender policy. Quoted in Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696-7. Sherwood goes on to comment: "What Roosevelt was saying was that there would be no negotiated peace, no compromise with Nazism and Fascism, no 'escape clauses' provided by another Fourteen Points which could lead to another Hitler. (The Ghost of Woodrow Wilson was again at his shoulder.) Roosevelt wanted this uncompromising purpose to be brought home to the American people and the Russians and the Chinese, and to the people of France and other occupied nations, and he wanted it brought home to the Germans—that neither by continuance of force nor by contrivance of a new spirit of sweet reasonableness could their present leaders gain for them a soft peace. He wanted to ensure that when the war was won it would stay won." Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 697.
Rothfels claims that this sounded a warning prophecy of the post-war Communization of the German Democratic Republic, but this seems doubtful indeed in view of the fact that this is an imposed rather than a popular and voluntary regime. The "turning to the East" that may indeed have been provoked by the failure of peace feelers to the Western Allies probably had as its principal consequence the further oscillation, delay, and indecisiveness of action of the anti-Nazi opposition. Furthermore, it is clear the Nazis and anti-Nazis were united in a common goal towards the end of the war of attaining for Germany as much Allied and as little Russian occupation as possible. 130

This is attested to by Stauffenberg's contacts with the British in the Spring of 1944, in which he hoped that the invasion in the West still could be avoided if an agreement was reached on the Germans turning all their forces against the Russians. Beck and Gördel also harbored fantastic hopes of an armistice in the West and a continuing battle against Russian forces in the East, that would even include landings of Allied paratroops at key German positions for military cooperation. Gisevius apparently transmitted a proposal to Dulles in May 1944 that even suggested Allied landings near Bremen and Hamburg, and the occupation of Berlin by three Allied airborne divisions while the battle against the Russians was continued. None of these ideas had any relation to official or even unofficial Anglo-American military planning, although in retrospect they may seem less fantastic than they did to the Allies in 1944 and 1945.

At the same time there seems to be some suggestion of the Soviets having fished in troubled waters, with attempts to attain a German slackening of the efforts of resistance against Russian penetration, with increased fighting against the Allies—presumably so that the Soviets could advance further West in their occupation with fewer losses.

129 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, p. 146.
Apparently the Russians took the initiative in contacting in Stockholm Peter Kleist, Ribbentrop's representative, through a diplomatic intermediary, Clauss. Kleist and Clauss met in December 1942 and in June and December of 1943, and these meetings were also known to the anti-Nazi conspirators Schulenberg, Trott, and von Hassell. Hitler did not exploit the meetings, but some of the anti-Nazi opposition would have liked to. According to the Russian intermediary Clauss, American offers to Russia had been so generous at Teheran that Germany could no longer compete. He is said to have added "The Trojan Horse with which Stalin stormed the American Citadel was the threat with the 'National Committee of Free Germany.'" 131 Thus Stalin may have threatened, at least by implication, a separate peace, or at least an induced reallocation of German war effort towards the Allies, as a means of obtaining better post-war arrangements for Russia. * In this light, at least, President Roosevelt's otherwise perhaps premature declaration of unconditional surrender at Casablanca may have been a wise move from the aspect of intra-Allied negotiations with the Russians. After Teheran, the idea of a German National Committee was no longer mentioned in the Soviet press until after the war.


* There is no direct evidence to this effect in Hopkins' papers, but the great concern Roosevelt and Churchill felt at the time concerning the possibility of Russia leaving the war may have been induced by more than strategic analysis.
The Effect of the Allied Demand for Unconditional Surrender

It has been argued by some American scholars, with considerable support from German sources, that President Roosevelt's announcement of the policy of unconditional surrender at the Casablanca Conference, and the Allied adherence to it in Europe in World War II, unnecessarily prolonged the war and interfered with its prompt termination. German scholars such as Hans Rothfels have stated that the announcement of the unconditional surrender policy cut the ground from under the anti-Nazi opposition in Germany, by denying it one of its strongest arguments for recruiting the military commanders--to wit, that better terms might be achieved by an anti-Nazi government following Hitler's assassination than could possibly be achieved by any Hitler regime.

Although Roosevelt's announcement of the unconditional surrender policy at Casablanca may not have been the result of profound study and analysis, and may even have been directed more toward our Allies--particularly Russia--than toward Germany, it is by no means clear that this announcement and subsequent adherence to the policy of unconditional surrender delayed the termination of World War II. To assert that it did so requires proof that it was this announcement that rendered the anti-Hitler plot infeasible, and made an earlier surrender by German forces unlikely. Yet the fact is that the anti-Nazi opposition in Germany continued to make attempts on the life of Hitler after the Casablanca declaration, and that it seems to have been unsuccessful.

133 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler.

Footnote continued on next page.
primarily for reasons of internal terror, Hitler's extraordinary good luck, and certain psychological inhibitions that the would-be assassin suffered with respect to Hitler's person.

There were essentially four armed forces in Nazi Germany in World War II: The Wehrmacht (Army), the Navy, and the semi-private armies of the Luftwaffe (Air Force) and the Himler organization's Schutzstaffel (SS). By 1944 the Waffen-SS (weapons-SS) consisted of well over 20 divisions. In the event of an attempted anti-Nazi coup, the Navy, the Luftwaffe, and the SS would all probably have been loyal to Hitler, and the Wehrmacht probably would have been split. Since most of the Army units would have been tied up fighting on the Russian and French and Italian fronts, the very modest numbers of Wehrmacht forces in Germany proper would by no means necessarily have been sufficient for an effective coup d'état, even had the promise of a negotiated peace made possible more widespread Wehrmacht support for the anti-Nazi conspiracy than was actually the case.

It seems a little naive to take the unconditional surrender policy of the Allies in World War II quite literally, or to assume that the various anti-Nazi opposition groups and Army commanders in Germany took it literally, in the sense that unconditional surrender meant the total destruction of Germany. It should be remembered that unconditional surrender simply meant that the Allies could impose whatever peace they wished on a defeated Germany—a condition not likely to differ radically from that of a negotiated peace with a substantially defeated and disarmed Germany. Historical experience with the United States, announcements about the post-war world made in

According to Sherwood, "this announcement of unconditional surrender was very deeply deliberated". Sherwood gives as evidence to support this view a footnote in Dwight D. Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe, in which General Eisenhower states that the President's unconditional surrender formula is mentioned in the Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with the President on January 7, 1943: this meeting was in preparation for the impending conference at Casablanca. "Sherwood remains convinced that the formula "did not prolong the war for as long as five minutes and may have shortened it." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, op. cit. p. 972, 974.

135 Perhaps it was unfortunate that Roosevelt, when announcing the policy at Casablanca, refrained from making the explicit statement present in his formal notes that "unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace...". Roosevelt and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 696.
the Atlantic Charter (including self-determination and personal and economic freedoms) and other knowledge about the character and aims of the principal Western Allies must have made it seem at least likely to thoughtful and educated Germans that unconditional surrender was unlikely to mean the total destruction of the German state, or even necessarily a political-economic disaster for Germany. That this was probably true was attested to indirectly by the fact that anti-Nazis all did their best toward the end of the war to surrender selectively to the Western Allies while continuing to fight against the Soviet Russian Army. The policy of unconditional surrender was uniform for all the Allies, but apparently most Germans perceived quite palpably the probable post-war difference between a peace imposed and enforced by the Western Allies, and one imposed and enforced by the Russians.

The policy of unconditional surrender could have aided the termination of the war by making it quite clear to the anti-Nazi opposition in Germany that German opposition to Hitler was the absolute minimum for any termination of war in the West. The policy of unconditional surrender certainly had the virtue of simplicity. It probably was more susceptible to agreement by both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union than any particular conditional peace terms were likely to have been. Particularly since the terms desired by the Germans envisaged a peace in the West with continued fighting against Soviet Armies, such a conditional negotiated termination would have been extremely divisive of the United Nations Alliance. This seems to have been well understood by the Allied staffs toward the end of the war, when desperate last-minute attempts were made by the Doenitz Regime to surrender selectively to the Anglo-American forces in the West while continuing to fight against the Soviet Armies in the East.

Whether the German at first anti-Nazi, and then Nazi attempts, to achieve a negotiated peace were motivated primarily by an attempt to split the United Nations Alliance, or by the very understandable preference for being under the control of the Western powers rather than of the Soviet Union, it is not necessary to decide here. Whatever the German motivations, the serious consideration of negotiated peace terms on the basis indicated and
and strongly preferred by the Germans would have been extremely divisive of the United Nations Alliance, would probably have disrupted that Alliance, and might therefore have prolonged the war by reducing the inter-allied cooperation essential for termination by military victory. Lack of American aid to Russia might have seriously delayed the Russian counter-attack that drew most German forces from the Western front.

It may also be argued that however desirable an announcement of terms other than unconditional surrender may have been from the aspect of inducing an early German collapse through internal revolution, it apparently was not possible to offer other terms during the war. Hammond has pointed out that Roosevelt's "general view (he wanted to be stern) was too general to be policy, and his only specific program, if dismemberment could be called that (and on that he was not absolutely sure), was opposed by the State Department... What Roosevelt wanted (was)... that policy commitments for the treatment of Germany were not greatly urgent and should be postponed wherever possible." 136 Because of the confusions and disagreements among the United States executive, diplomatic, military, and public opinion leaderships, as well as those between the Grand Allies with their partly divergent national interests, the policy of unconditional surrender may have been the only practical alternative to disruptive and inconclusive arguments about what policy to announce instead. In a sense, the unconditional surrender policy offered the administrative convenience (at some moot political-strategic price) of postponing the most difficult decisions concerning post-war Germany until the end of the war. This was entirely consistent with the firmly rooted (although perhaps unfortunate) tendency of the United States to de-emphasize political issues during the war. In short, the unconditional surrender policy of World War II, given the nature of administrative organization and the diversity of intra- and inter-allied opinion, may have been the only policy on which it was possible to achieve a workable minimum of agreement--particularly since it seems to have been Roosevelt's firmly held personal policy.

Lessons of the Termination
of the War in Europe in 1945

The termination of the war with Nazi Germany in Europe in 1945 illustrates the very high cost---both to victor and vanquished---of operating on the assumption that military defeat is not only the necessary, but also the sufficient condition for the termination of a war. Military defeat is a necessary condition for the termination of a war, even if this defeat be only anticipated, but it is almost never a sufficient condition for termination.

The termination of World War II in Europe also indicates the escalating effect of a militant ideology on the war aims and means of both sides---an escalation that was also shown to make unfortunately irrelevant the attempts of minority anti-Nazi opposition parties of more realistic views to arrange negotiations for a conditional termination.

The termination of the war with Nazi Germany was achieved by an attrition process culminating in complete exhaustion of Germany's military-economic resources by the taking of physical control of her war-making economy by occupation. The eventually highly visible process of divergent attrition of war-making resources failed to convince the leadership of Nazi Germany of the necessity of making peace, for both rational and irrational reasons. The rational reasons might have included the fact that the enormous growth of Anglo-American war-making power may have been somewhat masked from German awareness by the very substantial continued growth of Nazi German war-making power well into 1944, the development of qualitatively superior weapon systems by the Nazis that may have been expected to compensate for their numerical inferiority (one need only imagine what might have

---

Military defeat may be defined as a loss of strategic initiative without the hope of recovering it. A less abstract definition has been, in practice, the loss of most of a nation's relative military power to resist a victorious enemy. Surrender, in this context, does not create but rather confirms formally the defeat. (Other types of surrender, such as by subversion, are of course possible without having been preceded by military defeat.)
happened if the Germans had been successful in the development of an atomic bomb even as late as 1944), and the not completely unrealistic but premature perception of an impending split between the Western and Soviet Russian Allies.

The more irrational reasons for Hitler’s possibly having an adequate perception of the necessity for Germany to terminate the war may have included the nebulous personal and Nazi myths of racial superiority, superiority of German will and skill, and a favorable or at least an "all or nothing" historical fate. For these and other reasons, the process of divergent attrition of war-making materiel, which might have been strongly apparent in early 1942 after Germany was at war with both the United States and Soviet Russia, simply was not a decisive factor in the calculations of the German leadership concerning war termination, however much it was a major consideration for the sober and rational German Army generals of the General Staff tradition that calculated such factors.

In this respect it is interesting to note a problem in the means of developing a sufficiently strong realization of impending defeat in the defeated nation, to persuade them to agree to terminating the war before the utter exhaustion of military-economic resources. Against a national leader such as Hitler, the most dramatic portents of impending defeat apparently avail nothing. To such a romantic ego-centric psychopathic personality, the destruction of the nation only adds a certain dramatic ennoblement to what would otherwise be a tawdry practical defeat. To an Adolf Hitler who could say that the German people did not deserve to survive the military defeat of Nazi Germany because they were thus proven unworthy, no demonstration of the certainty and degree of military defeat could be powerful enough, because it was already an accepted fact and not considered as a logical basis for initiating termination attempts.

If an irrational leader such as Hitler cannot be convinced, is it of any use to take strong measures for increasing the intensity of the perception, and possibly the number of perceivers, of impending military defeat? In a nation whose leadership is impervious to such considerations, is it possible to render more likely the removal of the diehard leadership by more realistic elements? For example, would more dramatic demonstrations of Germany's
impending defeat have been effective in increasing the numbers or activities of the anti-Nazi opposition, so as to increase their probability of removing Hitler from power? Would the Waffen SS, Luftwaffe, Gestapo, and Navy, for example, have been more likely to support a coup by senior members of the Army, if the portents of defeat had been more dramatically and impressively imposed on Nazi Germany in 1944? The evidence on both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan suggests that the physical portents of defeat were tremendously impressive, and yet ineffective by themselves in provoking a coup by the realists. In Japan even the two atomic bombings failed to convince many diehards. Thus the marginal utility of additional undiscriminating destruction appears low in terminating a war, once defeat is certain. If the realists cannot be brought to effective political action against the diehards by added general destruction, perhaps the discriminating destruction of diehards such as Hitler and their immediate underlings offers the earliest hope of terminating an already decided war.

The "piecemeal" surrenders of German forces during the final collapse of April - May 1945 illustrates what may happen when a defeated nation is being invaded from two directions at once by enemies that are allied in a common surrender policy, but are believed to have very different motives and means of execution. It also suggests that it was necessary to invade and physically to occupy German territory to induce surrender, despite the collapse of the war economy. Although several years of additional air bombardment might have reduced Germany to a hostile area controlled by forces equipped little better than guerrillas, recent experience with guerrillas indicates that this would not necessarily have reduced overall war costs for either side. Furthermore, the possibility of a Nazi atomic weapons development and the sufferings of the captive populations made termination urgent. In the final analysis, although air power made the land invasion possible and successful, it was the invasion by ground forces that terminated the war.

The development of Allied policy toward occupation of post-war Germany and, necessarily, the terms of war termination, illustrates the difficulty of achieving agreement among allies of adverse interests on any terms short of unconditional surrender. Terms of unconditional surrender
are essentially a means by which allies of diverging interests and plagued by internal conflicts) postpone their disagreements to after the end of the war, in order to retain the military-political unity needed to win it promptly. Although coalition warfare may therefore require unconditional surrender terms, these need not necessarily be assumed to be understood by the defeated nation as a portent of inordinately severe post-war conditions. If the Germans had been unable to distinguish between the expected postwar conditions in the Anglo-American and Soviet occupation zones, despite the United Nations terms of unconditional surrender common to both, they would hardly have made the efforts they did to surrender selectively to Anglo-American forces while attempting to continue holding off the Red Army. **

As a part of the final termination bargaining, the Nazi German government attempted to split the alliance between the Americans and British on the one hand, and the Russians on the other. Although Admiral Doenitz in his memoirs gives as his principal reasons for attempting a separate surrender to the Anglo-American forces in the West, while fighting on against the Russians in the East, the hope of saving as many German soldiers and civilians from enslavement in Russia as possible, the possibility of splitting the alliance was probably not unimportant. The Soviets were very much afraid that the West would agree to a separate surrender, since their own ideology portrayed the Western nations as capable of any selfish act, and their own behavior in signing a German-Russian non-aggression pact in 1939 provided both a model and a kind of justification for such treachery.

---

** This may be the case only where the power of the allies is well balanced, or where the strongest ally insists on unconditional surrender (as the United States did in World War II). In World War I, the decisively dominant ally, also the United States, did not insist on such a formula.

*** See the table on the following page describing this effort.
German Piecemeal Surrenders to the Western Allies

in 1945

April 17
"Dissolution" of Army Group B (Commanded by Field Marshal Model)
- 300,000 men in the Ruhr, surrounded by U. S. Ninth Army, told to return home or surrender or break through to another front.

April 28 - May 2
German forces in Italy and Austria (about 1,000,000 men) under Field Marshal Kesselring.

May 2 - 4
Doenitz initiates surrender of German forces facing British (Montgomery) in northwestern Germany and units then fighting Russians east of the Elbe. Montgomery refused offer, insisting on unconditional surrender.

May 4
General Wenck on eastern front surrenders with 100,000 troops to U. S. Ninth Army.

May 5
Army Group G (under General Schulz) surrendered to Generals Devers and Patch in Munich.

Nineteenth Army (under General Brandenberger) surrenders at Innsbruck.

Doenitz offers selective surrender of all German forces facing Western Allies, through emissary Admiral von Friedeburg at Rheims. Eisenhower refused, insisting on unconditional surrender on all fronts simultaneously.

May 6
Unconditional surrender on all fronts signed, with cease-fire fixed for midnight - May 8.

May 12
Field Marshal Schörner surrenders German forces in Czechoslovakia, after continuing to fight Soviet forces after the rest of the German army had observed the cease fire.
In April Stalin had actually accused the Western allies of parfidy in secretly negotiating with the Germans in Switzerland for a separate surrender. It was partly for this reason that Eisenhower took such scrupulous care to refuse the offer of Admiral Doenitz's envoy, Admiral Friedenburg, of the surrender of three German armies to the Americans that were then facing the Russians between Berlin and Rostock on the Baltic, northwest of Berlin. "Montgomery told them that this offer should be made to the Russian commanders in the East--adding however that of course any individual soldiers or small groups from these three armies that came toward the Western front would be accepted as prisoners. He also rebuffed pleas made by the scheming envoys for helping him save the many German civilians who were fleeing from the Russians. What the German envoys had in mind was a secret arrangement under which the German forces would take refuge in designated areas which still resistant German troops would give up to Western armies if these went forward." 137

"History hints that what is done during the first few months after a great war ends is likely to determine the fate of the next generation, perhaps of many generations." 138 This was certainly the case with what was done during and immediately after the end of the war in Germany in May 1945. The division of Germany and the geographic isolation and military vulnerability of West Berlin persist twenty years after the end of the war, and continue to be a major source of international tensions that could lead to another great war.

137 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference, Princeton University Press, 1960. p 11
138 Ibid., p 25

157
APPENDIX IVA

ATTRITION OF NAZI GERMAN WAR RESOURCES, 1939-1945
Allied Air Target Priority Trends in World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1942 - June 1943</td>
<td>Submarine bases, pens, construction yards</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1943 - April 1944</td>
<td>Airframe industry and ball-bearing industry</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1944 - July 1944</td>
<td>Interdiction of the Normandy landing area</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1944 - November 1944</td>
<td>Petroleum Industry</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Production in 13 synthetic plants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aviation Gas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 1944 - December 1944:
Steel Industry (Ruhr) (RAF) Effective

August 1944 - May 1945:
German Railroad and Waterway Transport Effective

Freight Car Loadings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>214,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attacks on petroleum industry and transportation were decisive.

137 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) September 30, 1945.
Economic Summary
### Gross National Product and Total Available Product of Germany, 1936-1944, at 1939 Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GNP (Reichmarks)</strong></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Growth of GNP</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Contributions (Occupied Areas)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Available Product</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Growth Total Available Product</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Government Expenditure</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage GNP Government Expenditure</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage GNP Consumer Expenditure (small overlap with Government Expenditure)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Decrease of Production Through Loss of Territory in January 1945

(In % Average Monthly Production 2nd Quarter 1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raw Materials</th>
<th>Metals</th>
<th>Foods</th>
<th>Total/ Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhine-Ruhr</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Area</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesia and Sudetes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Decrease of Production for Reasons Other than Loss of Territory

(same basis as above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rhine Ruhr</th>
<th>South-West</th>
<th>Berlin Area</th>
<th>Silesia and Sudetes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foods</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Economic Effects Division Report.*

*Transportation difficulties, lack of coal, power, and raw materials; direct enemy action.*
Changes in Principal Food Rations for Normal Consumers in Germany, 1939-1945
(Weekly Ration in Grams)
### Weekly Ration of Flour, Meat, and Fat in Germany

(In Grams)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>World War II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1915 1916 1917 1918</td>
<td>1939 1940 1941 1942 1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flour:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Consumers</td>
<td>1575 1400 1540 1400</td>
<td>1800 1688 1688 1688 1688</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Workers</td>
<td>2275 3500 3115 2450</td>
<td>3600 3488 3488 3488 3618</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meat:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Consumers</td>
<td>250 250 250</td>
<td>500 500 400 350 250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Workers</td>
<td>350 350 325</td>
<td>1200 1200 1000 950 850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fat:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Consumers</td>
<td>100 100 70</td>
<td>270 270 270 206 216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Workers</td>
<td>100 150 210</td>
<td>740 740 740 575 488</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### RAF & GAF Strength as of December 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C received in 15 mos.</th>
<th>April-Nov. 1940</th>
<th>Monthly Average</th>
<th>Fighting Strength</th>
<th>Monthly Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from US</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 6 March 1941: British Division "Slice" = 42,000 men for 15,000 fighting troops. 57 Divisions approved (36 British, 21 Overseas). 1,800,000 British soldiers.

#### Naval Construction Program, 1943

100 frigates for convoy escort delivered by middle of 1944.
74 destroyers on order, being completed at rate of 8 - 15 per annum.

#### U-Boat Sinkings, 1941

September 2, October 2, November 5, December 9 (British sub losses at same time were 3).

#### British Forces, September 1941

- **Army**: 2,000,000 (900,000 in field forces)
- **Home Guard**: 1,500,000
- **RAF**: 1,000,000 out of 44,000,000 total population
- **Navy**: 500,000

#### Shipping Losses (Allied and Neutral)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U-boat</strong></td>
<td>423,769 (116)</td>
<td>2,186,158 (471)</td>
<td>2,162,168 (429)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine</strong></td>
<td>262,697 (79)</td>
<td>509,889 (201)</td>
<td>229,838 (108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface craft</strong></td>
<td>1,337 (15)</td>
<td>511,615 (94)</td>
<td>495,077 (113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>2,949 (10)</td>
<td>580,074 (192)</td>
<td>970,481 (324)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other causes</strong></td>
<td>7,253 (4)</td>
<td>202,806 (100)</td>
<td>332,717 (167)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>758,005 (224)</td>
<td>3,990,542 (1058)</td>
<td>4,190,281 (1141)</td>
<td>9,697,905 (1570)</td>
<td>5,220,157 (597)</td>
<td>1,045,624 (205)</td>
<td>438,821 (105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>57</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>758,005 (224)</td>
<td>3,990,542 (1058)</td>
<td>4,190,281 (1141)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number U-boats (1170 total, 863 operational, May 42 US 12 million US faith 753 lost (123 in port) - sank 2,759 allied ships totalling 14,110,413 tons. US balances ton program losses with building.

144 Ibid., p. 613.
145 Ibid., p. 713.
146 Ibid., p. 716.
147 Ibid., p. 732.
**APPENDIX IVB**

**GERMAN RESISTANCE TO HITLER: TEN ATTEMPTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 1938</td>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>Colonel-General Beck, Chief of the General Staff, wrote in a memorandum that the Army must not only prepare for a possible war, but also &quot;for an internal conflict which need only take place in Berlin.&quot;[150](Starting point for plans for a military coup d'etat.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1939</td>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>Von Hammerstein, commander of Army Group A on the Rhine, was determined to arrest Hitler as soon as he appeared on a scheduled inspection, but Hitler had one of his &quot;premonitions&quot; and canceled the visit.[151]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8, 1939</td>
<td>Civilian:</td>
<td>Unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life by cabinet-maker G. Elser in Bürgerbräu cellar, Munich, by means of a time bomb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1940</td>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>This plot pre-empted the opportunity for another, unconnected plot by the Army (Grosscurth, von Etzdorf, Oster) planned for November 11. The security restrictions resulting from the November 8 attempt made the November 11 attempt impossible.[151]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1942</td>
<td>Luftwaffe:</td>
<td>&quot;Red Chapel&quot; resistance group uncovered in Luftwaffe Air Ministry (Schulze-Boysen, Harnack, Kuckhof)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 18, 1943</td>
<td>Civilian:</td>
<td>Munich students' revolt (Hans &amp; Sophie Scholl, Professor Kurt Huber, and friends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 1943</td>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>Tresckow and Schlabrendorff successfully smuggled a time bomb into Hitler's aircraft, but the mechanism proved defective. A few days later another attempt was made in Berlin at the opening of an exhibition by von Gersdorff, but Hitler suddenly left early.[151]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1943</td>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>Schlabrendorff smuggles another bomb into Hitler's headquarters, but he had already left. [152]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 1944

Army: Plan by General Stieff failed as a result of air raid preventing Hitler's appearance. 152

July 20, 1944

Army, Civil Service

Bomb plot executed against Hitler, by Stauffenberg et al. Hitler is wounded but survives. General Stulpnagel, Commander in Chief in France, ordered arrest of Paris heads of Gestapo and SS.

151 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
152 Ibid., p. 78
153 Ibid., p. 79
APPENDIX IV-D

EVOLUTION OF ALLIED POLICY FOR THE POST-SURRENDER TREATMENT OF GERMANY

August 1941

Atlantic Charter - Roosevelt and Churchill proclaim post-war aims of non-aggrandizement, national self-determination, freedom of the seas, personal freedoms, economic collaboration, a secure peace.

December 25, 1941

Declaration of the United Nations - Reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter, pledge of destruction of Hitler and his allies.

January 1942

Allied Declaration of German War Crimes - Announced intent of exacting retribution for war crimes.

January 1943

Casablanca Conference - Roosevelt announced policy of unconditional surrender.

March 15 & 22, 1943

Eden-Roosevelt Conversations - Informal agreement that Germany should be dismembered. 154

August 20, 1943

Quebec Conference - Eden-Hull conversations: "Each revealed that there was some support for 'imposed dismemberment' within his government, and each indicated his own disagreement with the proposal." 155

October 1943

Moscow Meeting - Soviet Union and China subscribe to unconditional surrender policy.

October 4, 5, 1943

Roosevelt-Hull-Stettinius-Leahy Conversations: "The President said he favored the partition of Germany into three completely sovereign states. Hull and his assistants were well briefed in their objections to this proposal." 156

October 1943

Moscow Conference: U.S., U.K., Soviet foreign ministers agree that Germany would be returned to her pre-1938 borders, prepare "Declaration on German Atrocities." No agreement reach on occupation policy. Proposals for 'denazification', prohibiting of standing army, dissolution of German General Staff, dismantling of arms industry, prohibition of aircraft manufacture. Three chiefs of state favored dismemberment, while at least the U.S. and British ministers opposed it. 157

169
November 1943

Teheran Conference - Stalin questions wisdom of undefined 'unconditional surrender' doctrine, disagrees with Roosevelt's partition plan for five autonomous German states and three international zones, and with Churchill's for the detachment of Prussia and the inclusion of the southern states in a Danubian federation. Dismemberment problem referred to European Advisory Commission.

December 15, 1943

First meeting of the European Advisory Commission - British anxious to settle issues while war still on, U.S. attempts to limit discussion to problems directly involved with German surrender. Three major problems identified: occupation zones, the instrument of surrender, and tripartite controls. Resolution of these issues was postponed until after the German surrender.


156 Ibid.

157 Ibid., p. 316.
**APPENDIX IV**

**GERMAN PEACE "FEELERS",**

**PLANNED AND EXECUTED, 1939-1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Individuals/Proposals</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Von Hassel, et al.</td>
<td>Retention of &quot;peaceful&quot; conquests (Austria, Sudetenland) + Polish Corridor. 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 1941</td>
<td>Gördeler (through Swiss channels to London and later through Swedish banker Wallenberg)</td>
<td>Germany to keep Alsace-Lorraine, Polish Corridor, Danzig, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel; evacuation of France and Belgium and other occupied territories, Germany to be given colonies. 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1943</td>
<td>Gördeler (not transmitted to Allies)</td>
<td>Same as 1941, except colonial demands dropped, and Alsace-Lorraine to be divided on linguistic basis or made independent. 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 1943</td>
<td>Gördeler, Hassell, Schulenberg (and separately, Peter Kleist for Ribbentrop)</td>
<td>Possible peace with Russia and continuation of war against Western Allies. 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1944</td>
<td>Rommel, von Stulpnagel, von Falkenhausen</td>
<td>German evacuation of occupied western territories, withdrawal behind Westwall. Suspension of Allied bombing of Germany. Armistice and peace negotiations with Allies. Arrest and trial of Hitler by the Army. Continuation of the war in the East, holding a shortened line along the Vistula. 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1944</td>
<td>Gisevius, Beck, Gördeler</td>
<td>Offer of unconditional &quot;selective surrender&quot; to Western Allies only, with Allied occupation of Germany while German army would continue to hold off Red Armies in Poland. 162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 1944</td>
<td>Kesselring (through SS General Wolff and American representatives</td>
<td>Unconditional but partial surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Switzerland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2, 1945</td>
<td>SS General Schellenberg, through Swedish Red Cross (Count Bernadotte)</td>
<td>Alliance with U.S. and British forces against Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23, 1945</td>
<td>Himmler, through Bernadotte</td>
<td>Surrender on Western front only.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


160 Ibid., pp. 570-576.

161 Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944, Chicago, 1950, pp. 72 ff.

162 Ritter, p. 387. See also Hans Bernd Giservius, Bis Zum bitteren Ende, Zurich, 1946, II, pp. 299, 322.


164 Albert Kessilring, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag, Bonn, 1953, pp. 409-423.
APPENDIX IVF

PRINCIPAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR II

1939

September 1  Poland invaded by Nazi Germany.
September 2  Italy proclaims its neutrality.
September 3  Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.
             Britain proclaims naval blockade of Germany.
September 17 Russia invades Poland, Red Army meeting Germans at
              Brest Litovsk on September 20.
September 28 Germany and Russia divide Poland.
November 3  U.S. Neutrality Act of May 1937 amended to repeal arms
            embargo, placing exports to belligerents on cash-and-
            carry basis.
December 8  U.S. protests British seizure of German goods aboard
            neutral ships.
December 13 German battlecruiser Graf Spee scuttled in Montevideo
            harbor after being trapped by British cruisers.

1940

January 14  Admiral Yonai forms new Japanese cabinet.
February 16 Norway protests British destroyer invading coastal waters
            to attack German ship Altmark.
March 20   Daladier resigns, Reynaud forms new French cabinet.
March 30   Chinese puppet government under Wang Ching-wei created
            by Japanese at Nanking.
April 9    Germany invades Denmark and Norway.
May 10     Germany invades Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg.
            Chamberlain resigns, Churchill leads coalition cabinet.
May 28     Belgian surrender ordered by Leopold III.
June 4     215,000 British and 120,000 French troops evacuated
            from Dunkirk, but lose most of their equipment.
June 10    Italy declares war on Great Britain and France.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>Germans occupy Paris. French government moves to Tours, then Bordeaux.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>Marshal Pétain replaces Reynaud, sues for peace with Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>France and Germany conclude armistice, providing for disarmament of French forces and German occupation of 3/5 of France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>British attack French fleet at Oran, sink 3 battleships and a carrier when French refuse to surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td>French Vichy government severs relations with Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16</td>
<td>Prince Konoye named Japanese Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>President Roosevelt signs bill providing two-ocean navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8</td>
<td>Luftwaffe opens counter-air offensive against RAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 17</td>
<td>Germany declares waters around Great Britain subject to total blockade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2</td>
<td>50 U.S. destroyers transferred to Britain in exchange for 99-year leases on bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, West Indies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 7</td>
<td>Intensified German bombing of civilian targets (London)--300-600 civilians killed/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11</td>
<td>RAF bombs north sea ports to disrupt German invasion preparations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>U.S. Selective service act, providing for training of 1,200,000 troops and 800,000 reserves. Improved British air defense imposes loss of 185 on Luftwaffe, which abandons counter-air campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 22</td>
<td>Japanese begin occupation of French Indo-China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 26</td>
<td>U.S. embargo on export of scrap metal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27</td>
<td>Germany, Italy, and Japan conclude three-power pact at Berlin pledging mutual aid for ten years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 11</td>
<td>German forces occupy Rumania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28</td>
<td>Italian forces attack Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31</td>
<td>Germans have lost some 2400 aircraft compared to 800 RAF since August 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 5</td>
<td>Roosevelt elected President for a third term.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1940 (Cont'd)


November 23  Rumania joins German-Italian-Japanese Alliance.

December 6  Marshal Badoglio resigns following Italian reverses in Greek campaign.

December 20  Roosevelt names defense board under Knudsen to hasten aid to Britain and prepare U.S. defenses.

December 21  Germany denounces U.S. defense measures as "moral aggression".

December 23  Eden becomes British foreign secretary, Halifax British ambassador to U.S.

1941

January 22  British take Tobruk in Libya, Benghazi on February 7, capture 114,000 Italians at cost of 3,000 casualties.

March 11  U.S. Congress Lend-Lease Act, empowering President to send goods to nations whose defense is vital to defense of U.S.

April 3  Italians, reinforced by Germans under Rommel, drive British back in Libya.

April 6  Germans invade Yugoslavia, occupy Belgrade April 10.

April 13  Russia and Japan conclude neutrality pact.

April 27  Germans occupy Athens, force evacuation of 50,000 British troops.

May 20  German parachute troops successfully invade Crete.

May 24  German battlecruiser Bismark sinks British battlecruiser Hood, but is destroyed on May 27.

June 16  U.S. orders German consulates to be closed throughout U.S. —Germany and Italy retaliate June 10.

June 22  German armies of 3,000,000 (including Italian, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Finnish allies) invade Russia on 2000-mile front.
1941 (Cont'd)

July 1  Germans occupy Riga, Russians continue retreat with heavy losses.

July 13 Great Britain and Russia conclude mutual-aid treaty.

July 16 Germans capture Smolensk. British, Allied, and neutral shipping losses in 2 years of war placed at over 7,000,000 tons.

August 14 Roosevelt and Churchill declare joint peace aims in Atlantic Charter; No territorial aggrandizement, national self-determination and self-government, equality of economic opportunity, freedom from fear and want, free seas, abandonment of force, disarmament of aggressors.

August 19 Germans claim all of Ukraine west of Dnieper except Odessa.

August 24 Churchill pledges British aid to U.S. against Japan.

August 24-9 British and Russian forces occupy Iran.

September 4 Germans begin siege of Leningrad (relived in January 1943).

September 19 Kiev and Poltava captured by German forces.

October 17 Prince Konoye forced to resign—Tojo becomes Japanese premier and war minister. U.S. destroyed Kearny; torpedoed off Iceland.

October 24 Kharkov captured by Germans who begin siege of Moscow. Soviet government transfers to Kuibyshev.

October 31 U.S. destroyer Reuben James torpedoed in Atlantic.

November 6 U.S. extends one billion lend-lease credit to U.S.S.R.

November 25 Bulgaria joins Axis.

November 29 Tojo declares U.S. and British influence must be eliminated from Far East.

December 2 Roosevelt asks Japanese aims in Indo-China.

December 7 Japanese surprise attack on U.S. forces at Hawaii, Philippines, Guam, Midway, Hong Kong, and Malaya.

December 8 U.S. declares war on Japan.

December 11 Germany and Italy declare war on U.S.

December 21 Thailand and Japan sign ten-year alliance.

December 25 Hong Kong captured by Japanese.
1942

January 15 Rio Conference opens to unite American republics against Axis.

March 8 Japanese occupy Rangoon.

April 11 Revolutionary disturbances in India—Ghandi and Nehru jailed.

April 18 Sixteen B-25's led by Col. Doolittle bomb Tokyo.

May 26 Churchill and Molotov negotiate 20-year mutual aid treaty.

May 27 Second Axis drive on Egypt, finally stopped at El Alamein 70 miles from Alexandria.

June 9 U.S. and Britain agree to pool all resources for victory.


June 30 Congress votes record $42 billion defense appropriation.

July 6 Argentina announces policy of neutrality.

August 12 Anglo-Russian conference in Moscow—Churchill discusses second front in Europe with Stalin.

October 23 Montgomery opens third British offensive in North Africa at El Alamein.

November 8 U.S. forces land in French Morocco and Algeria with 850 ships. Local Vichy forces overcome.

November 11 German forces occupy Vichy France—Most of French fleet scuttled at Toulon to prevent German capture.

November 12 German forces driven from Egypt.

1943


February 2 Twenty-two German divisions reduced to 80,000 men at Stalingrad surrender to Russians. Germans lose 500,000 men killed and captured in 3 months of winter fighting—Possible turning point of war.
1943 (Cont'd)

February 6    Mussolini dismisses Ciand as foreign minister, himself assumes that portfolio.

February 7    Eisenhower appointed commander of Allied North African theater.

April 27      Soviet Union suspends relations with Polish (London) government-in-exile.


May 8-12      End of Axis resistance in North Africa with U.S. capture of Tunis.

May 23        Communist Third International dissolved.

June 4        French Committee of National Liberation formed under de Gaulle.

July          Russian summer campaign with 275 divisions vs. 260 German-Materiel advantage passes to Russians.

July 26       Mussolini forced to resign and arrested, replaced by Marshal Badoglio. Mussolini later rescued by German paratroops on September 15, and formed Italian rump fascist state.


September 3   Allies land in Italy.

September 9   Badoglio accepts Allied surrender terms. American troops landed near Salerno. Iran declares war on Germany.

September 11  German forces in Italy seize leading cities as far south as Rome. Most of Italian fleet escapes to Allies.

September 13  Gen. Chiang K'ai-shek elected president of Chinese Republic by Central Executive Committee.

October 1     American forces enter Naples.

October 9     Yugoslav guerrillas under Tito take offensive against Axis troops near Trieste. Russian reach Dnieper at several points.
1943 (Cont'd)

November 6    Russians recapture Kiev.
November 9    United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) organized in Washington.
November 28-January 12, 1944  Teheran Conference. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin announce complete agreement on war plans. Allies have now achieved naval supremacy. 500 U-Boats destroyed, shipping losses sharply reduced.
December 1    Cairo Declaration. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang announce joint determination to reduce Japan to surrender. Japan still had 17 capital ships, but under 10 carriers against 40 British and over 100 U.S. carriers.

1944

January 22    Costly Allied landings at Anzio.
January 27    Argentina severs relations with Axis following discovery of espionage plot.
March 22    German forces occupy Hungary, set up puppet government.
March 27    Argentina declares war on Germany and Japan.
May 9    Russians recapture Sevastopol, clear Crimea and Ukraine of German forces.
June 4    U.S. Fifth Army captures Rome.
June 6    Allied Expeditionary Force invades Normandy.
June 17    Germany begins V-1 bombing of British cities.
June 27    Allies capture first major port of Cherbourg—during first 100 days after D-Day, 2,200,000 men, 450,000 vehicles, and 4 million tons of stores were landed.
July 18    Tojo cabinet resigns, replaced by Koiso.
July 24    Russian forces drive Germans from last major Russian city.
July 27    Soviets recognize Polish Committee of National Liberation (at Moscow).
August 12    Allies capture Florence.
August 15    Allies land between Nice and Marseille.
1943 (Cont'd)

November 6      Russians recapture Kiev.
November 9      United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
                (UNRRA) organized in Washington.
November 28-
January 12, 1944  Teheran Conference. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin
announce complete agreement on war plans. Allies have
now achieved naval supremacy. 500 U-boats destroyed,
shipping losses sharply reduced.

December 1      Cairo Declaration. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang
announce joint determination to reduce Japan to surrender.
Japan still had 17 capital ships, but under 10 carriers
against 40 British and over 100 U.S. carriers.

1944

January 22      Costly Allied landings at Anzio.
January 27      Argentina severs relations with Axis following discovery
                of espionage plot.
March 22        German forces occupy Hungary, set up puppet government.
March 27        Argentina declares war on Germany and Japan.
May 9           Russians recapture Sevastopol, clear Crimea and Ukraine
                of German forces.
June 4          U.S. Fifth Army captures Rome.
June 6          Allied Expeditionary Force invades Normandy.
June 17         Germany begins V-1 bombing of British cities.
June 27         Allies capture first major port of Cherbourg—during
                first 100 days after D-Day, 2,200,000 men, 450,000
                vehicles, and 4 million tons of stores were landed.
July 18         Tojo cabinet resigns, replaced by Koiso.
July 24         Russian forces drive Germans from last major Russian city.
July 27         Soviets recognize Polish Committee of National Liberation
                (at Moscow).
August 12       Allies capture Florence.
August 15       Allies land between Nice and Marseille.
1944 (Cont'd)

August 24  Rumania accepts United Nations armistice terms.
September 4  Brussels liberated by British.
September 5  U.S.S.R. declares war on Bulgaria.
September 8  Bulgaria accepts Russian armistice conditions.
September 12  U.S. First Army crosses German frontier near Eupen, and U.S. armor enters Germany north of Trier.
September 15  U.S. Seventh and French First Army sweep up Rhone valley, meet U.S. Third Army at Dijon.
October 2  Free Polish forces in Warsaw capitulate to Germans as Russian aid fails to arrive.
October 13  Athens occupied by British forces.
October 20  Belgrade occupied by Russian and Yugoslav forces.
October 23  Italy recognized by Allies.
November 7  Roosevelt elected for fourth term as President.
November 27  Stettinius replaces Hull as U.S. Secretary of State.
December 10  Franco-Soviet twenty-year alliance negotiated in Moscow by de Gaulle.
December 25  Churchill and Eden in Athens to settle Greek civil war—Archbishop Damaskinos sworn in as regent.

1945

January 6  Turkey breaks diplomatic relations with Japan.
January 17  Russians capture Warsaw, Cracow and Lodz (January 19), force Germans to abandon Vistula line.
February 7-12  Yalta Conference: Last meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Declaration that concerted plans for the final defeat, occupation, and control of Germany had been completed. Polish (London) government in exile unsuccessfully appealed for Anglo-American help against Soviet deportations of Polish populations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 20</td>
<td>Russian mechanized units, spearheading attack by 215 divisions, within 30 miles of Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26</td>
<td>Syria joins United Nations. SHAPE announces total of 954,377 German prisoners taken since D-Day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3</td>
<td>Finland declares war on Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>American Third Army captures Cologne. U.S. First Army crosses Rhine at Remagen on March 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5</td>
<td>Soviets denounce 5-year non-aggression pact with Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11</td>
<td>U.S. Ninth Army reaches Elbe River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>Roosevelt dies, Truman becomes President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>Russians in Berlin, meet American forces on Elbe at Torgau April 25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28</td>
<td>Mussolini captured and executed by Italian partisans. German armies in Italy surrender unconditionally April 29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>Hitler reported dead as Russians fight their way into Berlin. Admiral Dönitz heads provisional government opening surrender negotiations with Allies. One million German and Italian soldiers surrender in Italy and Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4</td>
<td>Dissolution of Nazi Germany—many local military commanders make separate offers of surrender. German forces in northwestern Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark surrender to Anglo-American forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>German provisional government under Dönitz surrenders unconditionally at Reims. V-E Day proclaimed May 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9</td>
<td>German army chiefs complete formal surrender in Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9-23</td>
<td>Dönitz provisional government transmits Allied orders while German armed forces are disarmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>Allied Control Commission (Eisenhower, Montgomery, Zhukov) assume full control of Germany. German territory as of December 31, 1937, is divided into U.S., British, Russian, and French zones of military administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>Three-way division of responsibility among Russian, American, and British forces of occupation in Berlin replaces single control exercised two months by Russians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10-20</td>
<td>Japanese home islands attacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>U.S. drops Atomic bomb on Hiroshima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan, invades Manchuria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 9</td>
<td>U.S. drops second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>Japanese government offers to surrender if Emperor is permitted to retain throne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14</td>
<td>Japanese accept U.S. surrender terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28</td>
<td>American forces land in Japan and begin occupation of key centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2</td>
<td>Formal surrender signed by Japanese on board U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Merchant Tonnage, 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Nations</th>
<th>Axix Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,001,925</td>
<td>5,629,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,470,177</td>
<td>4,482,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,833,813</td>
<td>3,424,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,969,578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,933,933</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408,418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,537,311</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Tonnage (over 100 tons) in 1939: 68,509,432
--more than half of this was destroyed by 1945 by submarine and air attack.

By May 1945, Britain and the United States had over 4,000 ships of over 43,000,000 total tonnage, while Axis naval and merchant ships had been almost completely eliminated.

---

CHAPTER V

THE TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR II
IN THE PACIFIC IN 1945

The termination of the war in the Pacific between Japan and the United Nations was the last termination of a general war in our experience. It also initiated a new era in warfare with the employment—not decisive but impressive—of nuclear weapons. Perhaps it was also prophetic in involving considerations of a last ditch defense against invasion that could in no way have changed the war's outcome, but might have been enormously destructive to both vanquished and victor had it been resorted to. The termination of this war is notable in that the invasion and its costs was successfully replaced by a largely peaceful occupation and disarmament of defeated Japan. Estimates of the saving in lives on both sides thus realized run into the millions. 166

Although the avoidance of an invasion by force was a mutually constructive aspect of this general war termination, there was also a negative lesson. The war might also have been terminated much earlier without a significantly different outcome. Authorities such as Butow 167 and the USSBS 168 believe that the turning point of the war occurred as early as 1942 in the Midway and Guadalcanal campaigns, and that the outcome of the war could not have been reversed after the fall of Saipan in July 1944. Yet the highly-placed Japanese who at that time recognized that Japan would inevitably lose the war and must make peace were unable to do more than force the Tojo Cabinet to resign. The war dragged on for fully another year and cost another half million fatalities before it could be terminated. This costly delay constitutes the negative lesson of the termination of World War II in the Pacific.

166 "To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British..." Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 545.
168 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "Japan's Struggle to End the War", 1 July 1946.
The most important problems of the Japanese termination are thus the following questions, to put them in chronological order:

1. Why was the war not terminated when Japan's defeat became clearly inevitable, even to many Japanese leaders?
2. How was the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, and the costly resistance to it, avoided?

Even to ask the first question, it must first be demonstrated that Japan's defeat actually did become inevitable, and was recognized as such, well before the war was terminated. This requires the subordinate examination of the military, economic, and political factors that made defeat inevitable, and how this fate was perceived in Japan. Then the forces affecting termination of the war by Japan can be presented in the proper contrast, and their potency shown.

The obvious answer to the question of why the invasion was avoided is that it became unnecessary when Japan surrendered almost unconditionally in August 1945. Yet Japan might well not have surrendered until a costly invasion had succeeded. Thus the significant factor in the avoidance of invasion was the timing of the Japanese surrender in August, three months before the planned U.S. assault on the south-westerly island of Japan, Kyushu.169 Why did the Japanese surrender in August 1945, rather than in November or December? That is the crucial question relevant to the avoidance of the scheduled U.S. invasion.

---

169 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 537.
When and Why Did Defeat become Inevitable for the Japanese?

The war aims of the Japanese were limited. Japan's original strategic plan called for the military occupation "within three or four months of the entire area enclosed within a perimeter consisting of Burma, Sumatra, Java, northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Wake, and from there north to the Kuriles." This was based on the assumptions that the Russian threat to Japan had been neutralized by German victories in Europe, that Great Britain was fully occupied defending her home islands, that the United States could not immediately deploy sufficient air and naval forces to stop the scheduled conquests, that the U.S. would be unable to mobilize enough power for offensive action for nearly two years, and that the U.S. would therefore be likely to acquiesce in a compromise peace permitting Japan to retain most of her oil-rich conquests.

The first three assumptions concerning Russian, British, and immediate U.S. counterthreats were correct. The last two were not. Within two months of the start of the war on December 7, 1941, U.S. carrier forces were on the offensive, attacking the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on February 1, 1942. Within weeks Marcus and Wake Islands were attacked. In May 1942 U.S. carriers attacked Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, and early in August U.S. Marines seized a beachhead and airhead on Guadalcanal. Japanese forces had reached their maximum conquests in July 1942, and by August—within 9 months of the start of the war—the U.S. advance back across the Pacific had been initiated. The Japanese had underestimated the earliest time for an effective U.S. offensive by some 15 months. They had also completely underestimated the resolve of an aroused America to prosecute the war to a total victory, brooking no compromise peace.

The Japanese also had a "backup" plan, in the event that the U.S. proved more defiant than expected. With the naval supremacy gained by the surprise attack of December 7, 1941, and the "blitzkrieg" occupation of strategic Pacific islands, they planned to fortify a "Pacific wall" believed to be indefinitely defensible against U.S. attacks. This "Pacific wall" was believed to assure Japanese retention and exploitation of the oil and raw materials of the conquered territories to a degree sufficient to support the war economy indefinitely. After some unsuccessful attempts to force a military decision, the U.S. would be willing to consider a compromise agreement. In return for an unconditional recognition of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' and the American acquiescence to some territorial annexations, Japan would be prepared to restore some of its initial conquests. In this the Japanese again made a major miscalculation, greatly under-rating both the capabilities of individual submarines and aircraft to interdict Japanese inter-island surface transport, and the number of such submarines, aircraft, and supporting surface forces the U.S. could produce and operate promptly. (By the end of 1942, the U.S. Navy had about 100 aircraft carriers, compared to 10 in 1941!)

A fascinating question that can only be touched on here is why the Japanese so underestimated the United States' military-economic power and political resolve. Possibly it was due to a combination of a tradition of success with "limited" strategic wars (the Russo-Japanese War of 1905), the apparent imminence of a German victory over Russia and England in Europe, and some ideological self-delusions about the "softness" of democracies.

172 Ibid.
Japan's overall economic potential (measured in gross national product) was less than 10 percent of that of the U.S., and Japanese peak arms production only reached about 10 percent of the U.S. output. Thus once the U.S. became committed to a total war of attrition with Japan, barring extraordinary blunders by the U.S., the defeat of Japan was highly likely. This was the case even with only about one-third of American mobilized military power deployed in the Pacific, which still provided a numerical superiority of over 3:1. In addition, Japan suffered the decisive disadvantage of vulnerability of both raw materials supply lines and Home Island industries to U.S. bombardment, while U.S. industries and raw materials were safe from Japanese attack.

"The economic potential could support a short war of limited liability. The accumulated stocks of munitions, oil, and ships could be thrown into action and produce a devastating effect on an unmobilized enemy. It could be done only once. When this unique blow failed to result in peace, Japan was doomed. Its economy could not support a protracted campaign against an enemy even half as strong as the United States."  

There are indications that at least some highly-placed Japanese were aware of these facts. The following tables show the growth and decline of Japan's wartime economy, in terms of gross national product, armaments production, oil production, railway transport capacity, and relative air strength—all important indicators of military capability. Note that while gross national product and defense expenditure continued to increase until well into 1944, oil stocks, steel production, and aluminum production began to show major declines in 1943. Air and naval superiority was attained even earlier by the United States in the winter of 1942-1943. The Japanese at no time during the war produced airplanes at a rate even approaching that of the United States, falling ever more behind (4000 vs. 18,000 U.S. planes in 1941, 23,000 vs. 100,000 U.S. in 1944.)


* In terms of overall military manpower. In terms of such equipment as ships and aircraft, the numbers were initially slightly in favor of Japan after December 7, 1941, but by the end of 1942 began to favor the U.S., and by early 1945 had reached an overwhelming superiority of over 5:1.
Comparison of U.S. and Japanese GNP
1940--1944

In comparison, in 1940 U.S. GNP was well over 200 in billions of 1940 dollars, then worth somewhat more than yen. By 1944 it was over 200 billion dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (billions of 1940 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEFENSE AND CONSUMER EXPENDITURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Consumers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% GNP WAR EXPENDITURE, JAPAN AND U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JAPAN'S MERCHANT FLEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(millions of tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARMAMENT PRODUCTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(millions of 1945 yens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>10,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>15,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>6,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>10,842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>6,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>10,842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, December 1946."
Japan's Economy, 1940-1945

CRUDE OIL
PRODUCTION
AND STOCKS
(thousands of barrels)
p. 30 (179)

Produced in
Netherlands
East Indies
Consumed in South

Inner zone production = Imports

RELATIVE
JAPANESE AND U.S.
OPERATIONAL
AIR STRENGTH
(Aircraft)
p. 33 (179)

U.S.

1942 1943 1944 1945

ANNUAL
AIRCRAFT
PRODUCTION
(p. 180)

U.S. 261,826
total
4 years

Nazi Germany 92,656
total

Japan 58,822
total

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's Economy".

JAPANESE SHIPPING, GROSS TONS

JAPANESE RAILWAY TRANSPORT CAPACITY, TONS

JAPANESE BASIC METALS PRODUCTION, TONS

Crude oil production (x1000Kt)
Oil

Most of Japan's oil (90% of wartime requirements) was imported from the conquered Netherlands East Indies. U.S. strategy aimed at interdicting this import traffic and destroying the reserves in the home islands. The U.S. submarine, surface craft, and aircraft blockade cut the flow of oil imported to Japan from 15 million barrels in 1943 to 5 million barrels in 1944, and practically stopped it entirely in 1945.

The Japanese had stockpiled some 43 million barrels of oil at the start of the war in 1941, more than 80% of it imported previously from the U.S. They expected this would meet wartime needs for two years, during which time they expected to capture additional sources in the Netherlands East Indies. They were successful beyond their expectations in capturing the oil-rich East Indies in just over two months after the start of the war. They produced 26 million barrels of oil in their first year of occupation.

But the Japanese had failed to anticipate the effectiveness of the U.S. blockade. U.S. planners correctly gave oil tankers very high priority as submarine targets. By the end of 1943, despite the Japanese having increased their tanker tonnage from a prewar 575,000 tons to 834,000 tons, sinkings by U.S. submarines and aircraft began to exceed tanker construction. By 1944, out of 37 million barrels produced in the East Indies, only some 5 million barrels arrived in the home islands of Japan. Tanker sinkings had increased from 388,000 tons in 1943 to 754,000 tons in 1944, completely outdistancing new construction. When the U.S. forces occupied the Philippines in late 1944 and Okinawa in April 1945, they cut completely Japan's vital oil transport life line.

The fuel shortage crippled Japan's military operations after the fall of 1944. Battleships and aircraft carriers that might have tipped the balance in the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, in which the Japanese attempted to destroy the U.S. invasion fleet, had been tied up in port as anti-aircraft vessels for lack of fuel. Air defense of the home islands was drastically reduced by the fuel shortage, which caused a combination of reducec pilot
training, elimination of testing of new aircraft, and reduction of aviation fuel quality to 87 octane and less. The combined effect is indicated by the non-combat ferrying losses of 30% of operational aircraft sustained by the Japanese after fall 1944. The fuel shortage soon had pervasive effects, in that it crippling Japanese air defenses it rendered all Japanese forces and war industry open targets for U.S. air attack. The bombing of Japanese refineries and storage tanks was largely redundant—most of the refineries were already inactive and the tanks empty as a result of the blockade. If there is one lesson to be learned about strategic targeting in a sustained general war from World War II, it is that fuel is one of the most critical targets.
### OIL STOCKS AND CONSUMPTION
(millions of barrels)

**p. 3 (181)**

![Graph showing OIL STOCKS AND CONSUMPTION](image)

### NUMBER OF MONTHS' SUPPLY BASED ON 1941 REQUIREMENTS

![Graph showing NUMBER OF MONTHS' SUPPLY](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indigenous Crude Oil Production</strong></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1400.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Synthetic Oil Production</strong></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crude Oil Refining Capacity</strong></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1700.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stocks of Liquid Fuels</strong></td>
<td>43.</td>
<td>535.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil refined daily per refinery worker</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>53.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--

1. USGS, "Oil in Japan's War", February 1946.
TANKER TONNAGE
(thousands of tons)
p. 53 (182)

FLOW OF OIL
(thousands of barrels per month)

REFINERY CAPACITY AND CRUDE OIL PROCESSED
(barrels per day)
p. 65 (182)

Note how refinery capacity far exceeded oil supplied for processing despite refining capacity losses from bomb damage.

182 USSBS, "Oil in Japan's War", February 1946.
When was Defeat Perceived to be Inevitable
by the Japanese?

The overwhelming industrial-economic superiority of the United States, together with the national resolve to use it aroused by the Pearl Harbor attack, made Japanese defeat inevitable at the very beginning. However, this could only have been the objective (and now retrospective) basis of a Japanese decision to seek war termination. The questions are when was the inevitability of defeat apparent to the Japanese, and to which Japanese, and why it became apparent when it did rather than sooner or later.

The serious possibility of Japan's defeat was probably apparent to some influential Japanese even before the war began. Other fanatical and ill-informed Japanese were surprised by the surrender, and never believed in the inevitability of defeat. The question is, which Japanese groups and prominent persons were the ones whose perception of probable defeat was instrumental in delaying the decision to surrender, or in accelerating it. Obviously, the members of the cabinet were important—particularly the premier, foreign minister, and war and navy ministers. But the cabinet members were not the only ones of importance. There was the Emperor to be considered, his court officials and other aristocrats, the Jushin (retired premiers*), the Zaibatsu (industrialists), senior officers, diplomats, bureaucrats, and professional politicians,—and, one would expect, the public.

Curiously enough, the process of political decision in World War II Japan was almost completely independent of public opinion, at least until near the very end of the war. Thus according to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, (USSBS), the basis for opposition to a continuation of the war in 1944, "was not popular feeling, but the conviction of a few, many of whom who had

184 "...there were a few, a mere handful among this ruling elite, who were still troubled...Even the news of the tremendous damage inflicted at Pearl Harbor could not quite dispel their fears or soothe their exasperation at having now to participate in what they felt was the supreme folly for Japan." Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 8.

* Baron Wakatsuki, Admiral Okada, Hidota, Prince Koro, Baron Hiranuma, Abe, Admiral Yonai, and after their wartime cabinets collapsed in 1944 and 1945, Generals Tojo and Koiso.
not been confident of the war's success from the beginning, that the war could not be won and a settlement should be made before disaster." 186

185 Note in the following data from a USSBS post-war survey (3,135 interviews* at 60 widely distributed sample points between 10 November and 29 December 1945) that 1% initially opposed the war, and that 28% never reached the point of unwillingness to continue the war. This latter number corresponds closely with the "26% who still felt that Japan might not lose the war."**

GROWTH OF CERTAINTY THAT JAPAN COULDN'T WIN, AND GROWTH OF UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THE WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Never Unwilling</th>
<th>Surrender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-level Air Raids on Provincial Cities</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-level Air Raids on Major Cities</th>
<th>Leyte-Saipan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level Air Raids on Factories</th>
<th>Iwo Jima</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec. '41</th>
<th>Dec. '42</th>
<th>Dec. '43</th>
<th>Jun '44</th>
<th>Jun '45</th>
<th>Sept. '45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

REASONS FOR HAVING REACHED A POINT OF UNWILLINGNESS TO GO ON WITH THE WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Attack</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. air activity over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan generally</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal suffering</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that Japanese war potential was impaired</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic bomb raids</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer deprivation and shortages</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of shortages of war materials</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military losses and reverses</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial opposition to the war</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never reached such a point</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous and unspecified reasons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages add to more than 100 because some people gave more than one reason.


** Ibid., p. 21.
The state of public opinion apparently was not readily discernible by the government. "The traditional policy of repression of dissident opinion, the almost complete absence of skilled personnel to analyze morale trends, and the risks involved, even for officials, in collecting or using such information, all combined to assign such functions a minor role. Such information as was available was little used, although there was an increase of interest with successive war cabinets." 187

This elite ignorance of public opinion had important consequences for the manner and timing of the termination of the war. Not only was the increasing public anti-war sentiment not effectively communicated to the government and to the elite, but the high-level ignorance of public attitudes also led to the most conflicting interpretations based more on the interpreters' wishes and fears than on fact. "When cases of strikes or subversion came to the attention of the government or when the newspapers cautiously criticized the government, it was impossible to know the extent or intensity of the attitudes they represented... Thus it was possible for Baron Hiranuma to feel that 'the general population was not aware of the war situation' until after surrender; and for Prince Konoye to fear the possibility of a Communist revolution." 188

Another consequence of the lack of communication between government elite and population was the belief that it would require the Emperor to make the people accept surrender. 189 This was to have decisive significance for the success of efforts to terminate the war, probably not because the Emperor's intervention was needed to make the people accept surrender, but because it was need to make all of the cabinet accept it.

185 "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale", Morale Division, p. 142.
187 Ibid. Italics added.
188 Ibid, p. 141.
189 "It was my conclusion that the only way to reach the opinions of the people would be through the Emperor. On this point Japan is much different from America, where it might be possible to prepare public opinion." This was probably true, as the events at termination showed. Admiral Takagi, Ibid., p. 141.
If the process of political decision-making was almost completely independent of public opinion during most of the war, then what did it depend upon? According to USSBS, "political policy was set through a curious process of bargaining, which involved an almost perpetual forming and reforming of coalitions within the oligarchy. The process required a careful consultation of all factions and unanimity among leaders before the government could take a major policy step... When unanimity could not be achieved... the coalition had to be reshuffled." 190 The principal factions involved were the Army, the Navy, the Government (including the Cabinet, foreign office, and bureaucracy), the Imperial Household, and the Zaibatsu.

These different factions, and sometimes more rarely the different persons in them, apparently perceived the probability of Japanese defeat, the type of defeat, and its timing quite differently. Precisely because "the Japanese had a fine penchant for diffusing political responsibility," 191 and because there had to be unanimity among the different factions represented in the Cabinet, the differences in their perception of defeat resulted in the protraction of the war.

At the start of the war, because of the political domination of the ardent militarists (gumbatsu) of chiefly the Army and somewhat less so the Navy, a superficial unity apparently existed concerning the decision to engage the United States and Great Britain in war. However, "hostilities were actually only six months old when Admiral Takagi began feeling concerned about the situation in the field. He recognized that the battle of Midway was a turning point..." 192 By the beginning of 1943, Prince Konoye began to meet regularly with other senior statesmen and Jushin, in order "to get someone into the Tojo cabinet who was opposed to the war... The issue, in Konoye's mind, was clear-cut: and the war now or be prepared to see communism emerge as the ultimate victor." 193 In May 1943, Marquis Kido, Keeper of the Privy Seal and the

190 "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale", p. 140.
191 USSBS, "Japan's Struggle to End the War", 1 July 1946, p. 2.
192 Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 20.
193 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
Emperor's confidant, told his friend Foreign Minister Shigemitsu "that hostilities could not be ended until the military had been brought under control and that the only way this could be accomplished was through the imperial family."  

The next day Kido told the Emperor's younger brother, Prince Takamatsu, that it would be necessary to request the Emperor's aid, or the issue would remain unresolved in an intra-government contest between the military and those seeking war termination.  

Several of the most senior members of the imperial household, the court, the foreign office, and in some cases the Navy, had apparently concluded that defeat was inevitable by late 1942 or early 1943, and proceeded to prepare the way for termination. This preparation consisted principally of carefully inserting into the Cabinet and other key positions men who would oppose the gumbatsu and support termination attempts. They had to proceed slowly and cautiously, because of the police power of the military.  

The Army, on the other hand, for the most part hoped for Japanese victory to the end. Since 1930 the Army had been the principal exponent of Japanese territorial expansion, under the influence of fanatical young majors and colonels who resorted to intrigue and assassination. The Army could and did use its "constitutional position of being responsible only to the Emperor to dissolve cabinets, to control their composition and policies by the withdrawal or threat to withdraw War or Navy ministers from the Cabinet, and to carry out programs independent of or even inconsistent with those of civilian leaders, for example, the foreign minister... to the extent... that Japan had an institution corresponding to the Nazi fanatics in Germany, the Army may well be described as that body."  

194Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 18.  
195Ibid., p. 19.  
196"Even such notables as Kido, Konoye, Shigemitsu, and Okada scarcely dared do anything more than clandestinely exchange opinions behind locked doors." Ibid., p. 26.  
197USSTBS, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale", pp. 139-140.
The Navy was more conservative than the expansionist Army, having drawn most of its senior officers from the aristocracy in contrast to the senior Army leaders' chiefly lower-middle class origin. In this the Japanese Navy tended to resemble the German Army in World War II. After 1930 the Navy's influence was overshadowed by that of the Army, and its younger officers apparently were infected by the Army's expansionist ideas. "...the Navy was in effect led by the Army. Thus, Admiral Takagi of the naval general staff told interviewers that while Navy leadership opposed the war," (much as the German Army General Staff had done) "they were not strong enough to overcome the Army's insistence. (This was, of course, helped by the desperate position of the international oil embargo of 1941 forced on the Navy.)"\textsuperscript{198} It is significant that many of the Jushin who worked for an early termination of the war because they considered defeat probable were Navy admirals, such as Okada, Sakonji, Suzuki, Toyoda, and Yonai. Many parallels could be drawn between these senior Japanese admirals and the German anti-Nazi generals Beck, von Falkenhausen, Obricht, Oster, von Stulpnagel, von Tresckow, and von Witzleben.

Parallels also appear between the end-the-war foreign office factions of World War II Japan and Germany. Shigemitsu, who became Japanese Foreign Minister in 1943, worked for a peaceful settlement with China, having recommended giving China back to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{139} He was also a close friend of Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and a leader of Japanese efforts to terminate the war. Japanese diplomats in Moscow (Sato), Stockholm (Okamoto), and Berne (Kase) worked to bring about termination, as did the Foreign Minister at the end of the war (Togo).

\textit{"The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale"}, p. 140. 
Butow, \textit{Japan's Decision to Surrender}, p. 18.
The court and imperial family were apparently unenthusiastic about the war. As early as "July 1942, the Emperor mentioned his desire for an early termination of the war to Foreign Minister Togo and revealed to him that he had expressed the same sentiments to the Premier" (Tojo) "the previous February." It was the duty of Marquis Kido to be a general clearinghouse of information for the Emperor. It was customary for Kiço to see the Emperor at least daily, and sometimes several times a day. "Kido became convinced that Japan could not win after all, and he therefore lent his support to the argument that Japan must salvage through negotiation what she could no longer hope to save by prolonging hostilities... As early as the first week in February 1942... the realistic and well-informed Privy Seal was already thinking in terms of the day when the difference in strength between the United States and Japan would be a telling factor." Kido apparently expressed these views to the Emperor in February 1942.

The answer to the question, "When was defeat perceived to be inevitable, and by whom?" may now be summarized for the most important Japanese factions. By "defeat" is meant the loss of the war by Japan, not necessarily unconditional surrender. "Defeat" is another way of describing the long-term inability of a nation to achieve an important part of its war aims. The specific conditions of defeat—war losses, armistice terms, disarmament, occupation, peace terms, reparations, territorial settlements, political changes—these could not be predicted by those Japanese who perceived the inevitability of defeat. Most of them only knew that whatever the terms were, they were likely to be costlier for Japan the longer the war continued.

200 Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 14.
201 Ibid., 1. 13.

* The war aims may or may not include the limitation of losses of life, material, and territory to some explicit level. However, the "winner" usually tends to minimize the impact of the losses suffered, and the loser tends to express greatest concern over the political and economic costs of the defeat.
The most pessimistic faction consisted of members of the court, such as Marquis Kido, Prince Konoye, and Prince Higashikuni, and members of the Foreign Office, such as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Minister Kase.

These personages probably never believed in chances for a successful war, even before it was launched. Their problem was not so much that of obtaining sufficient negative information to convince themselves of the hopelessness of the task Japan had set for herself, as it was to find ways by which they could advance the termination of what they believed to be an increasingly ruinous war. In the context of ruthless Army and police suppression of all open opposition to the war effort, their approach was to seek quietly to increase the power of the anti-war faction, by introducing members of their faction into the Cabinet, and by attempting to win over relatively more neutral personages of influence to the cause of termination.

The principal target of this attempt to build a sufficiently powerful end-the-war coalition was the Emperor himself in the end, because it became apparent that the Army could only be convinced to accept a feasible termination by the Emperor. If the Army or Navy disagreed with a major peace move, they could block it indefinitely by the Army or Navy Minister resigning from the Cabinet, forcing its fall. Although the Emperor apparently never strongly favored the war, to persuade him to intervene in the Cabinet was to require his coming to disfavor the war with unprecedented intensity. The Emperor was not expected to determine policy so much as to ratify and bless it. His entire training and tradition bound him to lend authority but not to determine its direction. Thus Marquis Kido successfully prepared the Emperor eventually to lend his personal prestige to the end-the-war faction, directly and through the help of the Emperor's younger brother, Prince Takamatsu.

202 "Mr. Shigemitsu 'emphasized...that Britain would never be defeated in the war with Germany...that Japan should in no case be involved in any war, and that the negotiations...with the United States should by all means be brought to a successful end." Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 14. Shigemitsu had been in England as Japanese Ambassador until 1941, and based his realistic opinion on personal experience, as did many like-minded Japanese diplomats.

204
The second major target of the realists' attempts to circulate a true picture of Japan's fate in order to unseat the Tojo government, and form a coalition to end the war, was the Navy. Partly to this end, Admiral Takagi's study of the "war's lessons" to date was circulated in the Naval high command. Takagi apparently believed that the battle of Midway in Summer 1942 was a turning point of the war, and that the Allied penetration of the Solomon Islands in Summer 1943, if successful, would decide the war. On orders from the Navy Minister, Takagi made his study between September 1943 and February 1944. Takagi concluded that Japan could not possibly win, due principally to fleet, air, and merchant ship losses; the difficulties of importing essential raw materials in the face of the shipping losses; the stagnation of industry; the domestic confusion and slackening morale; and the threat of direct air attack on Japanese industry. These conclusions supported, and were used to support the concern over continuation of the war felt by Admirals Yonai and Inouye. Admiral Yonai communicated the results to at least some of his fellow Jushin, increasing the opposition to the Tojo government.

By the summer of 1944 most of the Jushin and many of the Navy high command wanted to oust Tojo. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Minister Kishi threatened to resign in June, just before Saipan was taken. Then Admiral Yonai, supported by the Jushin, refused Tojo's request to join the cabinet after the loss of Saipan. Finally, Navy Minister Shimada's resignation in July forced the end of the Tojo Government.

Thus by the fall of 1944 influential members of the court, the Foreign Office, the Naval High Command, the Jushin, and increasingly, the public perceived defeat as inevitable. They were followed by increasing numbers of diplomats, aristocrats, and senior Navy officers. The next to the last faction to perceive the inevitability of defeat was the ill-informed and police-regimented public, which began to have serious doubts after the relatively lightly opposed low-level B-29 raids on major cities in early 1945. The last faction to perceive

203 Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 20-21.
the inevitability of defeat was the leadership of the Army and the more mili-
taristic younger officers, primarily in the Army but also in the Navy. It
seems safe to say that Marquis Kido was correct in his estimate that only
the personal intervention of the Emperor would suffice to overcome the Army's
power to paralyze realistic termination efforts, because when Japan surrendered,
most of the Army wanted to continue the war. There was no physical force in
Japan capable of stopping it from doing so.

The attitude of the Japanese Army leaders may be explained by their
images of war, victory, and defeat. Only a modest fraction of the Army had
been engaged by the American forces in their island-hopping campaign. (The
Japanese Navy had sustained the brunt of American offensives, and had been
shattered in the process.) Most of the Japanese Army had experienced little
else than a series of successes in China, or nurtured a still untried thirst
for glorious battle while on training duty in Japan. Thus the most common
image of war held by Army officers was likely to reflect their most common
experience of it in China—perhaps not quite a series of glorious offensives,
but hardly much risk of shattering defeats. Victory would consolidate the
mainland territorial conquests, and enhance the relative social position of
those that had won this territory for Japan. Defeat—for an Army still largely
unengaged against the principal adversary and therefore still untested against
it—must have seemed as dishonorable as a surrender without even a fight is
in the army.
What Forces Opposed Termination
When Defeat Was Likely, and Why?

The forces opposing war termination may be classified according to whether they take form within key persons, within key factions, or within key classes. Within persons, there were such motivations as patriotism, fear of loss of honor, fear of loss of life, fear of loss of power, fear of post-war conditions. Most of these motivations may act for or against termination, as for example patriotism and fear of loss of life. The direction they will take will depend on the person's intellectual evaluation of the war situation. A patriot who is well informed and realistic may decide that it is in the interest of his country to avoid further useless bloodshed by terminating an unsuccessful war. The same patriot, basing his evaluation on information (wishful thinking) indicating that his country may yet reverse the trend from losing to winning, may just as patriotically oppose termination.

It is apparent that differences of individual personality are not a significant or direct source of attitudes on war termination. In both the end-the-war and in the fight-to-the-bitter-end factions, there were optimists (Goerdeler, Fujimura) and pessimists (Olbricht, Takagi), impatient men of action (Stauffenberg, Kase) and sober reflective ones (Beck, Suzuki). The decisive difference between those promoting and those opposing war termination was also not one of personal courage. Most often, the decisive differences were those of value weightings, expectations, and information.

The Japanese Army was the faction most consistently and bitterly opposed to termination of the war, before and after the time when defeat became probable. The Army had somewhat different information available to it than did the Navy and the Foreign Office. There are also indications that the Army weighted information available to all the elite differently from the Navy and the Foreign Office. The Army had suffered comparatively fewer defeats in the war than had the Navy, perhaps because it had not been so
extensively engaged with U.S. forces, and had not been thoroughly informed as to the extent of naval losses (particularly at Midway)\textsuperscript{204} perhaps because of the political contest for prestige between the Army and the Navy. The Army had also enjoyed both more military success and political success than the Navy, having dominated Japanese policy from 1930 onward. In a sense, the war with the United States had been promoted chiefly by the expansionist militarist Army faction, although the Navy had to fight most of it. The Army was indeed still largely undefeated at the end of the war, having been engaged principally in Burma and China. The Army losses in Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa were critical strategically, but not so great numerically (well under 1,000,000 men). Less than half of the Army had been engaged by U.S. forces. Although the naval protection of supply routes and forward island positions essential to the Army was no longer possible in 1945, the Army apparently believed wholeheartedly in a last great battle of defense of the home islands, in which it was hoped such great casualties could be imposed on the Allies as to induce them to accept a compromise peace.

The expectations of many Japanese concerning the future of Japan following surrender were also major obstacles to the termination of the war after defeat had become inevitable. To those who believe that they will be killed (or left to die from starvation) by the victors, every day of continued resistance prolongs life, rather than reducing it. The feeling is expressed by a Japanese woman munitions worker, asked the question: "During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family if Japan lost the war?"

\textsuperscript{204}"Interrogations of key personnel in the Japanese navy have revealed that they variously consider either Midway or Guadalcanal as the turning point" (of the war). "See USSBS, Interrogations, II...also USAAF, Mission Accomplished, 47-53. The loss of Saipan...is generally considered to be beyond the turning point stage. Those who continued to hope, after Midway, for a favorable change in fortune knew after Saipan, that their hopes had lost all meaning." Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 11.
"I thought that all the people of Japan would become slaves. At one time we thought that if we lost we were going to die in a mass. Even in schools we were taught that the Americans were rough people. In school we were told that the Americans were going to squeeze our throats and kill us and make a hole in our ears and string a wire through it—and that they were going to torture us. They told us that before the war started. I thought that it was better to be dead than to be captured. I hated to die suffering. I thought that it would be better if we died together happily."

This attitude was not an isolated one. The USSBS indicated that over two thirds of the Japanese population shared the views of this terrified woman:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectations if Defeated</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brutalities, starvation, enslavement, annihilation</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't know; wondered what would happen</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't expect defeat</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good treatment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given such expectations, based on the propagandistic information given to the Japanese people by a totally controlled press and radio, it seems understandable that many people would be willing to fight to the end despite the certainty of defeat. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Japanese having the most hatred for Americans during the war had the highest war-supporting morale, while conversely those with low morale also tended not to think so badly of Americans.

---


206 Ibid.

207 "Of people with the highest morale—27 percent said they didn't think badly of Americans. 43 percent said they thought badly of Americans.

Of people with the lowest morale—36 percent said they didn't think badly of Americans. 31 percent said they thought badly of Americans." Ibid., p. 24.
The above factors also help to explain some of the differences in attitude between the Japanese Army, Navy, and Foreign Office toward war termination. The Army had most to fear from the victorious Americans. Its rank and file and officers had been drawn mostly from Japanese farming communities, and their lack of worldly knowledge made propagandistic indoctrination with pejorative images of America and Americans relatively thorough. Its leadership had been the principal exponent of Japanese territorial expansion by conquest, and more than any other single faction had been responsible for the war. Its occupying forces overseas had committed brutalities that the Americans announced they intended to punish as war crimes. And its prestige was committed utterly to the war, so that even if the victorious Americans practiced no recriminations whatever, the political influence of the Army in a defeated Japan would have been destroyed. Defeat and surrender meant assured political death for the Japanese Army even more than to the Navy, while even a doomed and desperate last-ditch resistance prolonged the Army's political life by sustaining its near-absolute control of the nation. Given such a choice between assured death and a precariously prolonged life, an organization and the men devoted to it tend to go on fighting so long as they are physically capable of doing so.

The more realistic and moderate attitude of the Japanese Navy can be explained in similar terms. Navy enlisted and younger officer personnel were drawn mostly from Japan's great urban seaports. Western influence in these seaports, in the form of pre-war commercial maritime contacts, together with the greater knowledge of American and other Western peoples gained during pre-war training cruises, probably left the Japanese sailor less susceptible to anti-American propaganda picturing Americans as wild beasts. Thus defeat was not necessarily a fate worse than death. The Navy leadership and senior officers, much like the German Army General Staff, drew its people chiefly from the Japanese aristocracy. Although just as devotedly patriotic

---

\* To some extent defeat and surrender meant a lesser degree of political loss for the Navy than for the Army. The Navy officers were better connected with industrialists (Zaibatsu) through family ties, and could look forward to useful seagoing careers in a peacetime merchant marine.
as the rural middle class and peasantry constituting the recruitment basis of the Army, the Japanese aristocracy was better educated, had more knowledge of American ways (many had traveled and been educated in the United States), and thus had more realistic expectations of the nature of American treatment following Japanese defeat.

The Navy was also necessarily more technologically and economically oriented than the Army, having to deal with the realities of ship fuel, long-range firepower, more complex and mobile communications and logistics. Thus the hope that Japan would prevail despite material inferiority because of her superior spiritual strength was less likely to impress men dealing with naval hardware than it would impress men dealing with personal combat.

There is reason to believe that many senior navy officers had opposed the war from the beginning, but that they were unable to maintain their position against Army pressure even in the Navy when the Allied oil embargo threatened Japan with economic strangulation.

The Navy was relatively innocent of having committed atrocities, so that its leaders had less to fear from post-war crimes trials on the basis of personal guilt as well as on the basis of more realistic expectations concerning American justice.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the aristocracy to which many Navy officers belonged wanted to preserve itself as a class through any defeat.

208 In the USSBS, the Japanese were asked the question: "During the war what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan's Greatest Strength</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual things (Yamato Damashii, Spirit of sacrifice, fighting spirit, etc.)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamikaze corps</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material things—natural resources, industry, scientific knowledge, military power</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in military and political leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submissiveness to higher-ups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan had no strong points</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan might suffer. If the Army policy of resistance to the bitter end on the Japanese home islands had been followed, there was the fear that the social disruption of a violent invasion would result in anarchy, or Communist revolution, and the ruin of the aristocracy in any case. The Army, in its own view, had little to lose by fighting to the bitter end, and everything to lose by agreeing to surrender. The Navy, on the other hand, had the class basis of its officers to lose by such a last-ditch resistance, and could hope for the survival of the aristocracy and the eventual restoration of its commercial basis if the Japanese homeland could be saved from further destruction and social upheaval.

The Japanese Foreign Office was probably the most realistic faction in its attitude toward termination, particularly once it was clear that the war was lost, but in many cases even before that time. Having manifold intimate contact with and knowledge of the Allied nations, the diplomats were the first to doubt Japanese hopes that the United States and Britain would have insufficient resolve to prosecute an expensive war to a victorious conclusion.\(^{209}\) They were the least susceptible to Japanese propaganda, and had the most information about Allied capabilities and intentions. Many Japanese diplomats made persistent individual and collective attempts to accelerate the termination of the war.

The very difference among these factions, in their values, their information, and their expectations, combined with an organizational characteristic of the Japanese government to delay termination of the war well beyond the point when a majority of both people and leaders wanted it. This characteristic was the requirement for unanimity within the cabinet. It could not be met so long as the Army Minister, General Anami, refused to accept Allied surrender terms, even when the rest of the cabinet including the Premier, Admiral Suzuki, had already accepted the need to surrender. It required the unprecedented direct intervention of Emperor Hirohito to break the tradition of unanimity as the precondition for government policy.

\(^{209}\) See footnote 200, Shigemitsu quoted by Butow.
Significance of the Termination of the War with Japan being Delayed to August 1945

In addition to the importance of the war with Japan having ended in August 1945—before the planned Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in November and December, there is also great historical significance in Japan not having surrendered until August 1945. There is good reason to believe that if Japan had surrendered in May of 1945, immediately after the German surrender and when Japan had already been defeated militarily and economically, major political changes not only in the Far East but also in Eastern Europe would have occurred differently than in the way that they did.

In the first months of 1945, Britain and the United States were in serious but private conflict with Russia over the selection and constitution of the Polish government. At that time it was felt by the Anglo-American allies that it would be too dangerous to jeopardize the Russian military contribution against the Japanese to risk an open break with Russia over Poland. It was believed that it would be necessary to invade the Japanese home islands in order to win the war, and that well over a million fatalities might be suffered, so that Russian aid in tying down much of the Japanese army in Manchuria and perhaps even in supplying troops for the invasion was very much desired. This belief in the need for Russian aid, based on an expectation of a much longer war, an underestimation of the effects of U.S. attacks on Japanese shipping and industry, and uncertainty over the effectiveness of the atomic bombs, all caused Anglo-American policy to accept, however grudgingly, the Soviet position on Poland.

The Russians did not wish to risk war with Japan before they could transfer enough forces to the Far East to defend against any possible Japanese advance from Manchuria. Had the Japanese surrendered in May of 1945, before the Russians could have transferred their victorious armies from Germany and declared war, much of the basis for the Allies' "swallowing" Russian intransigence over Poland might have disappeared. The probable result would then
have been either a successful facing down of Russia's insistence on a puppet or Communist government of Poland, or an early clarification of the cold war conflict in time for the Western allies to avoid relinquishing much of the areas in East Germany and Czechoslovakia that they had already occupied but later gave up to Russian occupation. In summary then, the mere 3-month delay in Japan's surrender possibly cost the West a free Poland, and possibly also a free East Germany and an at least partly free Czechoslovakia.

We must also take issue with the statement by Tashikazu Kase²¹⁰ that the war ended at exactly the right moment for Japan—that is, that she could not have ended it earlier to her advantage. On the contrary, if the war had ended earlier, Russia might not have been at war with Japan, and might not have been in a position strongly to influence the outcome of the civil war that was even then being waged in China between the Chinese nationalists and Chinese Communists.²" Today Japan is faced with an extremely serious potential threat from Communist China and this threat might never have developed had the war ended sufficiently early for Communist influence in the Far East not to have been permitted to grow. In this respect the comments of W. Averell Harriman, even as early as in May of 1945, are remarkably prophetic. According to Forrestal's diary, Harriman "said the Russians...much more greatly feared a separate peace by ourselves with Japan than any fear of ourselves about their concluding such an arrangement. He said he thought it was important that we determine our policy as to a strong or weak China, that if China continued weak, Russian influence would move in quickly and toward ultimate domination. He said there could be no illusion about anything such as a 'free China' once the Russians got in."²¹¹

²¹⁰ Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, New Haven, 1950.
²" Japan may also have avoided the loss of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to Russia.
In a conference on 23 April 1945 called by President Truman in the White House, the issue of Russian intransigence over the Polish government and the question of Russian participation in the anticipated invasion of Japan were discussed.

"Mr. Forrestal said... he had felt that for some time the Russians had considered that we would not object if they took over all of eastern Europe into their power. He said it was his profound conviction that if the Russians were to be rigid in this attitude we had better have a showdown with them now than later... Mr. Stimson observed that we would like to know how far the Russian reaction to a strong position on Poland would go.

"Admiral Leahy said that he had left Yalta with the impression that the Soviet government had no intention of permitting a free government to operate in Poland, and that he would have been surprised had the Soviet government behaved any differently than it had.

"General Marshall was even more cautious and brought up what undoubtedly was on all their minds. He said he 'hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work,' and he was inclined to agree that it would be a serious matter to risk a break."

Although the Russians undoubtedly hoped to participate in the war against Japan to increase their influence in the Far East, it is by no means necessarily true that they decided to declare war only after the United States dropped the atomic bombs and made the near future end of the war a certainty. Apparently Stalin told Harry Hopkins on his last mission to Moscow in early June of 1945 that "The Soviet armies would be deployed on the Manchurian frontier on August 8." There thus must exist considerable doubt that the Russian declaration of war on Japan on August 8 was prompted purely by the United States' use of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6.

212 The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 50-51. Note here how consideration of the expected need of Russian support of the final phase of the war against Japan inhibited United States countermeasures to Russian rejection of free election in Poland.

213 Ibid., p. 67. See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 912.
How Was Invasion of the Japanese Home Islands Avoided?

This question presupposes that an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands was actually planned, and also implies that the execution of such a plan was most happily avoided. That the invasion was planned—for Kyushu in November, Honshu by March of 1946—is a fact verifiable by examination of U.S. military records. Why it was planned is more difficult to explain accurately.

The U.S. military experience of fighting the Japanese on island bases indicated a most tenacious resistance. (In the invasion of Okinawa, nearly half the Japanese garrison is believed to have been killed before the Japanese forces surrendered. In defending other islands, many units never surrendered.) This and the experience with diehard Hitlerite Germany, coupled with continued Japanese assertions of intent to win at all costs, apparently persuaded American leaders that the Japanese might well never surrender unless the home islands were occupied by force.


215 "Though defeated in a military sense, Japan showed no disposition to surrender unconditionally. And Japanese troops had demonstrated time and again that they could fight and inflict heavy casualties even when the outlook was hopeless. Allied plans in the spring of 1945 took these facts into account and proceeded on the assumption that an invasion of the home islands would be required to achieve at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan—the announced objective of the war."


"...defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland was considered a prerequisite to Japan's surrender..."

Ibid., p. 396.
Alternatives to invasion were seriously considered. They included a more intensive air bombardment following the occupation of bases around Japan, intensified naval blockade, and political inducements to surrender such a guaranteed preservation of the Emperor's status. A strategic debate on the subject occupied the attention of many senior U.S. commanders in the spring of 1945. In general, the senior Navy officers, including Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, agreed with Admiral Leahy's view: "I was unable to see any justification for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan. I feared the cost would be enormous in both lives and treasure." The senior U.S. Army leaders opposed the Navy view, and Marshall and MacArthur successfully persuaded President Truman to decide to invade Kyushu in November on June 18, 1945, at a meeting with the Joint Chiefs at the White House. General MacArthur believed that invasion was the only course "that would permit application of the full power of our combined resources—ground, naval, and air—on the decisive objective. Japan, he believed, would probably be more difficult to invade the following year...Reliance upon bombing alone, MacArthur asserted, was still an unproved formula for success, as was evidenced by the bomber offensive against Germany."

216 Alternatives to invasion were outlined by General Marshall in his message of April 12, 1945, to MacArthur. See The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan, pp. 54-55.


218 This meeting is summarized in The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan, pp. 77-85. See also The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 70-71; and Leahy, I Was There, pp. 383-5. The Joint Chiefs had accepted the invasion concept earlier, and had issued a directive for the Kyushu assault planning on May 25; see Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.", p. 395.

219 Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb", pp. 394-5. By "success", MacArthur probably meant termination on the basis of United Nations terms of unconditional surrender. It was feared that Japan would be more difficult to invade the following year because of the time thus gained by the Japanese to excavate and consolidate a formidable network of home defenses.
There is at least some possibility of inter-service rivalry having played a role in this decision, although it is impossible now to know how important a consideration this was. The combination of an intensified blockade and air bombardment favored by the Navy (and the semi-autonomous Army Air Force), had it been adopted to the exclusion of the invasion, might have "deprived" MacArthur's Army ground forces of a major role in the final phase of the war. This would seem to have been only a secondary consideration for at least President Truman and General Marshall, however, in view of the fact that "In the opinion of the (Army?) intelligence experts, neither blockade nor bombing alone would produce unconditional surrender before the date set for invasion." 220

According to these intelligence reports, "Japan was portrayed as a defeated nation whose military leaders were blind to defeat...Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity, or some miracle, they hoped, would offer them a way out." 221

Given these Allied intelligence estimates of the situation in Japan, which turned out to have been substantially correct (although incomplete in their awareness of how quickly the situation might change), the conclusion to be drawn is indeed that invasion would achieve at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. But why should "the earliest possible date" be so important? To save lives? But would not an invasion resisted by over 2,000,000 Japanese troops and many more armed civilians take more lives than would be saved by achieving victory at the earliest possible date? It seems unlikely that the pressure for the earliest possible victory was motivated primarily, or even significantly by a desire to save lives. There is ample evidence to support the


221 Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb".
In summary, the timing of events in the final months of the war was critical. If Japan had not surrendered in August, or indeed before November, the scheduled invasion of Kyushu at least would probably have been executed, at great cost to both sides. In addition to the great additional cost in lives, the invasion would very likely have resulted in a much more bitter peace in Japan, additional political and probably territorial concessions to Russia to gain her aid in the invasion, and possibly Soviet participation in the Japanese occupation with all the attendant difficulties extant in the division of Germany. All this was avoided because the invasion was scheduled for November, and because Japan surrendered in August. Because this sequence was so critical, it is important to know why Japan surrendered before November, and why the invasion was scheduled for November and after.

To answer the easier question first, the invasion was scheduled for November for at least the following reasons:

1. The earliest feasible date was desired, consistent with a reasonable chance of success, to minimize Soviet political intervention in the Far East.

2. Okinawa, within easy fighter aircraft range of Japan's southern home island of Kyushu, was not fully in U.S. control until its Japanese garrison surrendered on June 22.

3. The massive U.S. air offensive against the Japanese home islands was not fully under way until May 1945, and was scheduled for intense operations through October.

4. At least three months were required for the massive logistic preparations for Allied landings on Kyushu, following the victory over Japanese forces on Okinawa late in June.

It may be concluded that the invasion of Kyushu was scheduled for the earliest time consistent with thorough military preparations, and that these required some three months following the close of the Okinawa campaign. The more difficult question of timing is that concerning Japan's surrender
some ten weeks before the invasion was scheduled to begin. This surrender was ultimately the result of Japan's military-economic defeat, but its immediate timing seems to have been only very loosely dependent on that defeat. As stated above, "Japan was...a defeated nation whose military leaders were blind to defeat." What caused them to give up this blindness, and what caused the objections of those who continued to be blind, was not only additional military defeat, but a fundamental change in Japan's political expectations.

Japan's military diehards intended to continue the war to a great battle of home defense against the invasion, if necessary, in order to avoid unconditional surrender. They hoped that Allied war-weariness and disunity, together with the awesome prospect of millions of casualties resulting from an invasion, would offer an alternative to the unconditional surrender they equated with at least political extinction. If this is seen as an unrealistic estimate with the benefit of hindsight, it is at least possible to understand how Japanese Army leaders, such as War Minister Anami, not being aware of the atomic bomb and still having hopes of Soviet mediation, could believe in such an estimate. The final terms offered to Japan in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26 made no reference to the atomic bomb, nor did it offer any hope that the Emperor or the imperial system could be retained after Japan's surrender. It is understandable that Premier Suzuki, under pressure from the Army, declared to the press on July 28 that Japan would ignore the Potsdam Declaration. Suzuki's statement was interpreted by the Allies as a rejection of the Potsdam Declaration, and President Truman made the final decision to use the atomic bomb, which was first dropped on Hiroshima on August 6.

* The fact that additional military defeat was not decisive in persuading the Japanese diehards to surrender is not an argument for reducing military pressure once the outcome of the war is decided. On the contrary, the change in political expectations which finally caused most of the diehard faction to accept surrender required continued and even intensified military pressure to be effective. Military defeat, while being by itself not sufficient to induce a timely surrender, was and continued to be most necessary to make the political effects decisive in the four general war terminations considered.
On August 8 in Moscow Molotov handed Japanese Ambassador Sato Russia's declaration of war. (Three months to the day after Germany's surrender, as Stalin had promised at Yalta.) On August 9 the second (and last then available) atomic bomb destroyed Nagasaki. On August 10 Japan sued for peace, accepting the Potsdam terms. Did the atomic bombings, or the Soviet declaration of war, or the combination of the two, result in the Japanese surrender on August 10?

According to one persuasive historian, it may have been Russia's entry of the war that was decisive, rather than the use of the atomic bomb. (Of course the two events were not unrelated.)  

"The first bomb had produced consternation and confusion among the leaders of Japan, but no disposition to surrender. The Soviet declaration of war, though not entirely unexpected, was a devastating blow and, by removing all hope of Soviet mediation, gave the advocates of peace their first opportunity to come boldly out into the open. When Premier Suzuki arrived at the Palace on the morning of the 9th, he was told that the Emperor believed Japan's only course now was to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The militarists could and did minimize the effects of the bomb, but they could not evade the obvious consequences of Soviet intervention, which ended all hope of dividing their enemies and securing softer peace terms."

However, the same historian concedes that "all that can be said on the available evidence is that Japan was defeated in the military sense by August 1945 and that the bombing of Hiroshima, followed by the Soviet Union's declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki and the threat of still further bombing, acted as catalytic agents to produce the Japanese decision to surrender. Together they created so extreme a crisis that the Emperor himself, in an unprecedented move, took matters into his own hands and ordered his ministers to surrender. Whether any other set of circumstances would have resolved the crisis and produced the final decision to surrender is a question history cannot yet answer."  

224 Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb", p. 408. Italics added.
225 Ibid., pp. 409-410.

* Although some realist members of the Japanese Foreign Office believed that Germany's surrender in May 1945 offered an opportunity to surrender, their views made little headway among the few diehards they dared approach. There was remarkably little operational coordination between Japan and Nazi Germany in any case, and practically no exchange of military or economic aid. It is also known that the German attack on Russia was an embarrassment to the Japanese, as the Japanese attack on the United States was to be for the Germans.
Russia's declaration of war may have been precipitated by the use of the atomic bomb, since it made the early end of the war much more likely, and left less time for Russian political participation, while also reducing Russian estimates of the military cost of such participation. On the other hand, there is more concrete evidence suggesting that the use of the atomic bomb was motivated by a desire to forestall Russian participation in the war and its political spoils. Since the two events seem to be so closely linked, there is a little point in arguing that one or the other was the principal factor causing Japan to surrender in the second week of August. It seems sufficient to conclude that a combination of the two events—the increased assurance of physical destruction resulting from use of the atomic bombs, and the dashing of hopes of negotiation of softer terms occasioned by the Russian declaration of war—were the immediate causes of Japan surrendering when she did and the avoidance of invasion. It must also be emphasized that these immediate causes of surrender would very probably have been indecisive had not Japan already been militarily and economically defeated by a (possibly redundant) combination of U.S. naval blockade and air bombardment.

The termination of the war with Japan illustrates most strikingly the critical importance of the timing of surrender, and how such timing, while very dependent on continued military pressures, is not entirely dependent on the achievement of military victory.** In the war in the Pacific as in the war in Europe, military victory was necessary for the termination of the war, but it was not by itself sufficient. A domestic political conflict in Japan had to play out its drama, influenced but not entirely controlled by the actions of the victors, before the decision to surrender could be made.

* It was critical for avoiding a costly (to both sides) invasion, for avoiding greater Soviet participation in the final war effort, and for keeping the Soviet Union out of Japan. Only the first of these reasons can be considered typical in general war termination.

** It is important to distinguish military "victory", in the sense of the eventual war outcome being decided by it, and continued military pressures after military victory is assured. Both are pre-conditions for a nation accepting surrender—the former to bring the domestic political pressures for termination into play, and the latter to maintain and increasingly to intensify their appeal.
Lessons of the Termination
of the War in the Pacific in 1945

The termination of the war with Japan in 1945 shows the critical importance of the timing of surrender for both the manner and costs of termination, and for post-war political developments. Had Japan surrendered three months earlier than in August 1945, the map of Eastern Europe might be different today. Had Japan delayed her surrender by another three months beyond August, Kyushu would have been invaded by U.S. forces, a costly and bitter fight to the finish might have gone on another six months, and the subsequent occupation of Japan might have included Soviet participation with all its attendant consequences. American policymakers apparently failed to recognize sufficiently early the advantages to them in Europe vis-a-vis the Russians of an early Japanese surrender.

The question of whether blockade and air bombardment is sufficient to attain surrender was raised more explicitly than in the case of the Nazi German termination, because of Japan's greater vulnerability to these measures and her potentially fanatical fanatical resistance to invasion. The question was not fully resolved by events, because domestic political events in Japan ended the war by surrender before blockade and bombardment had done the maximum possible damage. Nevertheless, there is much reason to believe that the military pressures of blockade and bombardment in fact helped to precipitate these political changes, while an invasion itself might have tended to prevent them from occurring. (In the event of an invasion, the Army probably could have mobilized the nation for a fanatical last-ditch defense.) On the other hand, had Japan resisted the effects of blockade and bombardment, and simply suffered the attendant starvation and attrition without surrender, an early termination of the war would have required an invasion. This suggests that before land invasion is resorted to, attempts to terminate a war on the basis of the obvious outcome of such an invasion may save many lives. Once an invasion is under way, a realistic peace party may be overwhelmed by the diehards' mobilization of desperate patriotic sentiment. Thus the kinds of military pressures exercised by the winning powers may either aid or retard the efforts of the peacemakers in the defeated nation.
One of the lessons of the terminal phase of the war with Japan, was the extreme cost that can be imposed by a desperate and determined enemy, however near utter defeat he may be, provided the necessary moral resources exist. In the case of Japan, this desperate exploitation of moral resources in an attempt to compensate for physical weakness took the form of the Kamikaze and Kaiten forces and attacks.

As stated by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "By the summer of 1944, it had become evident to the Japanese air commanders that there was no way in which they could equal the United States air arm at any point... The one and only asset which they still possessed was the willingness of their pilots to meet certain death... From October, 1944, to the end of the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese flew 2,550 Kamikaze missions, of which 475, or 18.6% were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses... No ship larger than an escort carrier was sunk. Approximately 45 vessels were sunk, the bulk of which were destroyers... A heavier explosive head was required to sink larger ships... The losses actually sustained were serious, and caused great concern. Two thousand B-29 sorties were diverted from direct attacks on Japanese cities and industries to strike Kamikaze airfields in Kyushu. Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration they might have been able to cause us to withdraw... At the time of surrender, the Japanese had more than 9,000 planes on the home island available for Kamikaze attack, and more than 5,000 had already been specially fitted for suicide attack to resist our planned invasion." (Note how 5,000 remaining aircraft for suicide attack compares with the 2,550 missions that were actually flown between October 1944 and the end of the Okinawa campaign, and cost the loss of 45 ships.) 226

If the previous 2,550 Kamikaze missions succeeded in destroying 45 ships, it seems not unreasonable to believe that the 5,000 aircraft specially fitted for suicide attack to resist our planned invasion might have destroyed on the order of 100 ships in our invasion fleet. If the additional 4,000

aircraft remaining had been modified for improvised Kamikaze missions, perhaps as many as another 100 ships might have been lost to this type of attack.* Although the losses would probably have been limited principally to troop transports, destroyers, light cruisers, and escort carriers, because of the inadequate explosive warhead employed, even such losses might have been fatal to the early success of an invasion of the Japanese home islands. One need only imagine the result of a convoy of 10,000-ton troop transports being hit by such attacks—50% losses among troop transports before they could disembark their troops into landing craft would probably have sufficiently shaken and demoralized the attacking forces so that even if they had persisted in a landing attempt, they might have been much easier to repulse on the beaches.

The domestic political conflict in Japan, between the realists attempting to terminate the war and the diehards holding out for a great final battle against invasion, might possibly have been resolved earlier than it was in favor of termination if the Japanese had better understood American post-war intentions. The unconditional surrender demand, repeated in July at the Potsdam Conference (code named TERMINAL), made it politically too dangerous for the realist Premier, Admiral Suzuki, to do other than to reject the Allied ultimatum. The atomic bombings and Russian entry into the war which followed within weeks thereafter might both have been avoided, had the final Allied demands given some direct assurance of the United States' actual post-war intentions toward Japan. (On the other hand, there were probably pressures for the use of the atomic bomb not directly related to terminating the war, such as the desire to impress the Soviets and hopefully thus attain better cooperation in Europe.)

In this respect American declaratory policy gave little or no support to the Japanese peace faction, although it might readily have done so without relinquishing any of the victor's rights actually exploited.

---

* This linear extrapolation may even be conservative, considering the reduced range to more densely massed invasion fleet targets that the Kamikaze pilots would have been able to exploit.
As Paul Kecskemeti has pointed out, "The Japanese surrender illustrates the use of a defeated power's residual strength, combined with an insular position and an extreme will to resist, for the purpose of obtaining political concessions in return for surrender." However, one may disagree with Kecskemeti's further conclusion that "American interest in cutting losses was the chief factor in Japan's bargaining strength." The U.S. cabinet and the President were prepared to accept the anticipated heavy casualties involved in an invasion, if that was the best way to shorten the war. What U.S. decision-makers were finally unwilling to neglect was the opportunity of ending the war quickly, before further Soviet intervention. It seems at least equally likely that American desire to end the war quickly and thus avoid further indebtedness to and intervention by the Soviets was the chief factor in Japan's bargaining strength. This illustrates how inter-allied competition for post-war power may affect war aims and perceived costs in the terminal phase of a war—albeit rather belatedly in this case.

The termination of the war in the Pacific indicated the great risks and possible costs of inadequate communication between victor and vanquished. Communication was inadequate not for lack of transmitters or channels, but because of blocked and excessively narrow reception of signals. Many Japanese diplomats have ample indication that Japan would surrender if the Emperor could be retained, but this seemed significant to only a small proportion of policy-making Americans. American statements and broadcasts also had occasionally stated that unconditional surrender did not mean Japanese enslavement or destitution or even necessarily the loss of the Emperor, but this information was suppressed, ignored, or distorted by the Japanese diehards.* If a desperate kind of mutual understanding of "unconditional surrender"


228 See Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb",

* It may well have been simply misunderstood, since it was stated somewhat ambiguously.
that was in fact quite conditional had not been achieved at the last opportunity, so to speak, under the pressure of atomic bombing (on the Japanese) and Soviet intervention (on both the Japanese and the U.S.), the war might well have included a bloody invasion and ground on for another year. This further tragedy for both Japan and the United States was narrowly avoided principally by the unprecedented and courageous intervention of Emperor Hirohito in issuing the Imperial Rescript to the Japanese people to surrender. The Emperor now appears to be the principal hero of this drama. Such "divine" intervention might not always be available, and in some future war might have to be simulated somehow if the bitter costs of fanatic residual resistance are to be avoided.

Finally, the termination of World War II by the Japanese surrender indicates the importance of discriminating between the termination propensities of losing enemies. It was American policy to finish Hitler first, possibly because of the relative urgency of liberating the oppressed people of Nazi-occupied Europe so that Nazi defenses and resource exploitation could not be consolidated. The pressure of the Russian and British allies may have been even more decisive. Yet had American policymakers anticipated the postwar confrontation with an expansionist Russia in Europe, they might have found it wiser to attempt to end the war with Japan first. This might have given them maximum physical and bargaining power for the defeat of Nazi Germany and the subsequent rehabilitation of Europe on Western terms. This intent might have also led them to perceive that a diehard stand was likely in Nazi Germany, forcing a termination protracted by the need for invasion, while a latent realism existed among important Japanese factions that only awaited mobilization through a combination of military pressures and conditional surrender terms for an early termination of the war in the Pacific.
TURNING POINTS OF THE WAR

1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945

- Mandalay
- Burma
- Singapore
- Philippines
- Guadalcanal
- Midway
- Loss of Japanese offensive power
- Kiska
- Height of Japanese conquests
- Guadalcanal
- Pearl Harbor
- Battle of Solomons
- Gilberts
- Marshalls
- Saipan
- B-29 raids
- Guam
- Leyte
- Iwo Jima
- Okinawa
- Hiroshima
- Nagasaki
- Russia attacks

Favors + Japan

Favors U.S.
APPENDIX VB

ENEMY FIGHTER REACTION
(number of attacks per B-29 over target).
p. 19 (229)

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT LOSSES
p. 20 (229)

Note the increasing proportion of losses due to fighters, as U.S. bases at Iwo and Okinawa and air superiority make possible fighter sweeps.

(Losses on the ground are included)

229 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War against Japan (Twentieth Air Force)", 1 September 1946.
Japanese War Termination Functions

CABINET

NAVY
Admiral Suzuki (Premier)
Admiral Okada
Admiral Yonai (Navy Minister Premier)
Admiral Tokagi ("War's Lessons" study)
Commander Fujimura, Naval Attaché to Switzerland

FOREIGN OFFICE
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
Foreign Minister Togo
Okamoto, Minister to Sweden
Shunichi Kase, Minister to Switzerland
Toshikazu Kase
Sato, Ambassador to Russia
Matsumoto, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs

ARMY
General Okamoto, Military Attaché to Switzerland

JUSHIN
Admiral Okada
Admiral Yonai
Prince Konoye
Baron Wakatsuki
Hirotō

ZAIBATSU
Yoshimura
Kitamura

COURT
Marquis Kido
Prince Takamatsu (Emperor's younger brother)
Marquis Takugawa
Prince Higashikuni

GOUEN
Bankers in Switzerland
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Possible Wars and War Terminations

This study has concentrated on terminations in the two world wars of this century, rather than on terminations of limited or internal revolutionary wars. The choice was based on the greater risk involved in a lack of understanding of general war termination, and the greater clarity (at least to this student) of general war termination compared to other terminations. Greater scholarly attention is given to major than to minor wars, providing richer and more balanced sources. General war terminations are processes that elicit the fullest attentions of the belligerent governments, and are therefore less sensitive to the multitude of secondary and not directly relevant domestic and foreign activities of nations that otherwise tend to mask the essential issues. The termination process is also simpler in general than in lesser wars because many of the escalatory options have been foreclosed.

Yet the termination process is just as essential an element in internal revolutionary and limited local international wars. These have not been treated here because they seemed too complex for such an introductory research, but they should not be neglected. On the contrary, the prompt termination of internal revolutionary wars may be the most effective means of avoiding their escalation to limited local international wars. The prompt termination of limited local international wars may be the most effective means of avoiding escalation to general strategic nuclear war.

In each type of war there are a number of possible types of terminations. In the cases of general war discussed here, terminations involved domestic revolutions and attempted coups d'etat; strategic bombardments of military, economic, and population targets to the point of exhausting physical capacities for further resistance; invasion, occupation, and pacification by force; tacit and explicit negotiations between belligerents; and various combinations of these. In the cases considered, each of these elements played an important part in the termination process.
A Model of General War Termination, 
and its Key Variables

The major forces facilitating war termination are externally applied military pressures and political-military inducements to surrender, and internally active fragmentation of a unified national resolve to continue the war. The external military pressures indicate the ultimate futility of further resistance to the losing nation, as well as threatening yet greater war costs. The external political-military inducements to surrender, chiefly in the form of armistice terms and expressions of postwar intentions, are intended to persuade the losing nation that the national interest is served better by surrender than by continued resistance. The internal fragmentation of unified national resolve faces the losing nation's leadership with a choice between continuing the war at the risk of revolution from within and bombardment and invasion by the enemy, and ending the war at the risk of military coup d'état from within and unacceptable peace terms from the enemy.

If the leadership attempts to terminate the war too soon, it is threatened with a military coup by diehards internally, or possibly harsher peace terms than might have been obtainable from the victorious enemy by a last-minute military success. If the leadership delays termination too long, it is threatened by revolution internally, and externally by physical devastation from the victorious enemy. Military coups may be provoked by the leadership threatening to accept peace terms considered too harsh and unacceptable to the military. Revolution may be threatened by the populace and soldiery if the leadership threatens not to terminate the war, if the population is war weary and wishes to avoid further physical devastation. Domestically, the poles of conflict are military coup from the right and revolution from the left—both constituting a violent overthrow of government, versus the official and legitimate government attempting to balance these two forces.* In terms of foreign relations, the opposing poles are the threats of unconditional surrender and possibly unacceptable peace terms, versus further destruction and devastation if they are not accepted.

* If the government is of the far right, or "diehard", it will be threatened by the moderate realists as well as by the left. This was the case in Nazi Germany.
The process of war termination tends to go through four stages, which usually occur in approximate sequence as follows:

First, a military-economic-political test of strength, usually to where the eventual outcome is obvious to most observers;

Second, a domestic leadership conflict in the losing nation among Diehards, Realists, and Revolutionaries over the significance of and response to the outcome of the military test of strength;

Third, the resolution of the domestic conflict either by the victory of the diehards (possibly by military coup d'etat), or by the victory of the realists or by the victory of the revolution.

Fourth, termination of the war by physical exhaustion* (if the diehards are in control), or by negotiation (if realists are in control), or internal disruption* with or without negotiation* (if revolutionaries have taken over). Termination is followed by partial or complete occupation, disarmament, and annexation.

The generally successive phases of the process of war termination are illustrated by the four case studies in World Wars I and II in the following table and flow chart.

The main variables affecting the outcome of the termination process, the duration of each of the four phases, and the sequence of critical decisions, appear to be the following:

1. Relative and absolute residual military power of each belligerent;
2. Standard of living and physical security of the belligerent populations;
3. Unity of purpose in the winning and losing coalitions;
4. Ideological intensity of the conflict, and relative and absolute resolve of the belligerents;
5. Post-surrender expectations of the losing nation's leadership and publics;
6. Coercive powers of the losing regime over its population, including control of domestic communications;
7. Speed, reliability, and credibility of communications between belligerents.

The qualitative states of these variables tending to support "Realist", "Revolutionary", or "Diehard" control of a defeated nation's government are shown on the chart on p. 238.

---

* Some exhaustion and disruption are likely to be present even where wars are terminated by negotiations, and some negotiations usually occur even when a war is terminated principally by disruption or exhaustion. "Negotiation" is used here to indicate terminations in which the loser was not so exhausted or disrupted that he could not have continued the war at a potent level for at least several months longer.
### Four Examples of War Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>WWI</th>
<th></th>
<th>WWII</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bolshevik Russia</td>
<td>Imperial Germany</td>
<td>Nazi Germany</td>
<td>Imperial Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1914 - 1916</td>
<td>1914 - 1917</td>
<td>1939 - 1942</td>
<td>1941 - 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1938 - 1944</td>
<td>1944 - 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Kornilov vs Ludendorff vs Nazis vs Army</td>
<td>Kerenisky vs Prince Max vs Anti-Nazi Opposition (Army) vs Count, Foreign Office, and Navy vs ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Social Democrats vs Communists vs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>October 1917</td>
<td>October 1918</td>
<td>1938 - 1945</td>
<td>&quot;Realist&quot; Koiso replaces Diehard Tojo, is replaced by more realistic Suzuki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Bolshevik Revolutionaries, win</td>
<td>Realist Prince Max wins (too late) ... November 1918 Social Democrats and Communist Revolutionaries take over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Disruption</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Physical Exhaustion</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftermath of partial or complete occupation, disarmament and annexation</td>
<td>No disarmament</td>
<td>Near-total disarmament, Partial occupation Complete chiefly west of Rhine, Partial annexations (Poland, Ukraine)</td>
<td>Complete disarmament</td>
<td>Complete occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate annexations (Alsace, Sudetenland, etc., Silesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

235
World War I

- Failure of summer offensive on central front, capture of Riga
- Russia 10-11/17
- Revolution & Surrender
  or
- Defeat and total social disruption, anarchy

- Failure of spring offensive, August defeats, Defections of Austria & Rumania
- Germany 7-11/18
- Revolution Occupation
  or
- Abdication of Kaiser, disarmament, surrender

Time

World War II

- Total defeat of the Japanese Navy
- Hiroshima
- Nagasaki
- U.S. invasion of home islands after devastation of cities
  or
- Unconditional surrender

- Russian entry into war

- Defeat of German armies in West, Italy and Russia
- Germany 3-5/45
- Soviet occupation of Germany
  or
- Continued fighting on Western & Eastern fronts, devastation

Time
Relations Among Four Phases of War Termination in the Defeated Nation

Phase I: Military-Economic-Political Test of Strength

Phase II: Realistic Perception of outcome of test of strength

Unrealistic perception of outcome of test of strength

Conflicts among "Realists", "Revolutionaries", and "Diehards" in Loser Regime

Phase III: Realists Win

Revolutionaries Win

Phase IV: Negotiated Termination

Least cost to both belligerents

Disrupted Termination

Most cost to both belligerents

Crucial Decisions:
1. Outcome of Military-Economic-Political Test of Strength.
2. Realistic or Unrealistic Perception of outcome of test of strength.
3. Realist, Revolutionary, or Diehard Control of Termination.

Crucial Variables:
1. Relative and absolute residual military power.
2. Standard of living and physical security of the population.
3. Unity of national purpose (or disunity).
4. Ideological intensity, and relative and absolute resolve.
5. Post-surrender expectations by leaders and publics.
6. Coercive power over own population, including control of domestic communications.
7. Speed, reliability, and credibility of communications with adversaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defeated Nation Crucial Variables</th>
<th>Outcome of Domestic Contest in</th>
<th>Defeated Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realists Win</td>
<td>Diehards Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Relative and absolute residual</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military power</td>
<td>very low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Standard of living and physical</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security of population</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unity of national purpose</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ideological intensity of conflict,</td>
<td>optimistic or mixed</td>
<td>pessimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative and absolute national</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resolve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Post-surrender expectations by</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leaders and publics</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coercive power over own population,</td>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including control of domestic</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Speed, reliability, and credibility</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of communication with adversaries</td>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Russian and German terminations of World War I both present dramas of realists attempting to moderate between domestic threats of diehard military coup d'etat from the Right, and subversive revolution from the Left. These domestic conflicts occurred in contexts of great military and economic pressures imposed by the Germans against Russia from 1914 to 1917, and imposed by the Allies against Germany from 1914 to 1918. The national leaderships had to preserve sufficient national unity for a strong bargaining position toward the winning enemy, while at the same time negotiating terminations to avoid further useless losses.

In the second World War, the principal termination dramas were different from those in World War I. Here the problems were not so much those of realistic national leaderships attempting to terminate the wars on the best possible terms, as it was that of realistic but out-of-power factions installing realistic leaderships that recognized the inevitable defeats and were willing to try for termination. In Nazi Germany the realists never succeeded in deposing the diehard Hitler, and in Japan the realists only barely and tardily overcame Army resistance to surrender.

Because at least two of these four major powers (Germany in 1918 and Japan in 1945) had substantial reserves of strength with which they could have continued to resist their ultimately victorious adversaries much longer than they did, the decisive dimensions of war termination are not only the military contest between belligerents, but also the domestic political contest in the losing nation between diehard, realist, and revolutionary factions determining when and under what conditions to surrender.

Ludendorff had blocked a realist German policy toward termination, until Prince Max of Baden's government was installed only a month before the Armistice. Max's problem thereafter was to avoid both military coup and revolution while negotiating.
Generalizations from the Case Studies

Military victory is the necessary, but not the sufficient condition for winning a war. The loser must also be induced to surrender, or, if he will not, he must be physically overwhelmed. That involves much more than military victory. Political action in the defeated nation, induced by military and political action by the victorious nation, seems essential for prompt termination after the military contest has been decided.

The military contest is usually decided when the ultimate loser loses the power of major offensive action and the winner still has it. Major offensive actions are defined as those striking directly at the military and economic centers of the adversary's power by strategic or tactical forces or both. This is not to say that a nation lacking major offensive power is therefore powerless to exact major costs from the winning enemy. Such a losing nation can always resort to suicide weapons and terror warfare, including bacteriological weapons and, today, nuclear attacks on population centers. However, the losing nation cannot change the military outcome of the war by such destructive acts. It can only greatly increase the costs to the winning nation (and probably to itself through counter-retaliation).

In terms of contemporary strategic nuclear power, a nation may be considered to have lost the military contest when only its adversary retains strategic and tactical counterforce capabilities, even if it retains a murderous antipopulation capability. In previous wars, the worst losses the loser could inflict on his victorious enemy was a small percentage of the total population. Today, because the lethality of nuclear weapons is so great when used against city targets, the loss of the military contest might not necessarily presage the complete military-political loss of the war. Whether the loss of the military contest—that is, the loss of counterforce capability while the enemy still retains it—also results in the political loss of the war, would seem to depend on the relative and absolute amounts of residual killing power available to both sides, and the relative and absolute resolve and capacity for sacrifice.
of the two sides. If this is the case, the domestic conflict over when to stop the war and under what terms among diehard, realist, and revolutionary factions that has previously been decisive chiefly on the losing side, may under conditions of nuclear war occur importantly on both sides. (This problem is discussed more fully in the following chapter.)

The domestic political conflict in the loser nation over when to stop the war, and under what conditions, is usually decided on the basis of perceived war aims and post-war expectations and the relations between the national leadership, military forces, and population. The degrees and directions of domestic disunity concerning war aims on one each side, and how this is perceived by the adversaries may also be a major influence on the outcome of the domestic conflicts in both adversaries. The international contest of military and political resolve is fed and deflected by the internal domestic political contests of resolve. In the likely-to-lose nation, as the foreign war outcome becomes clear, latent domestic class war becomes a greater fear for many.

The diehard faction in the domestic conflict is not necessarily composed mostly of military men—its "diehard" nature is not primarily the result of military values, but rather the result of certain expectations concerning the meaning of defeat are probably more important than the unreal and desperate hopes of a sudden reversal of military fortune through "secret weapons", suicidal valor, or dissent in the victorious alliance. The meaning of defeat for the diehards is a drastic loss of power and wealth as a class, if not total liquidation as a class or party. Atrocious behavior by a belligerent's leadership is a twofold tragedy. First, for its direct victims; Second, possibly amplified manyfold, because of the inhibition of realistic termination by guilty fears of post-war recriminations protracts the killing long beyond a realistic end. It was this diehard faction that denied Germany a less destructive termination in World War II, and very nearly cost Japan (and the United States) a murderous invasion struggle.
The opposite faction to the diehards is the revolutionary faction, who wishes to exploit the war situation for domestic factional and class objectives. The revolutionaries believe that their social, political, and economic objectives can best be gained by the internal disruption of traditional power and authority with national defeat. Thus their post-war expectations are in the net positive, despite latent feelings of patriotism. Because the revolutionary faction does not unreservedly want to reverse the trend to the national defeat it needs to change the internal order, it violently resists any desperate eleventh-hour military offensives. Also, it is usually recruited from the masses that pay much of the cost in blood of such desperate and futile last attempts. It was the Russian and German revolutionaries that were the most direct agents of termination in World War I. In World War II the revolutionary faction only made a doomed appearance among the "counter-revolutionary" Anti-Soviet Russians in the Ukraine that fought for the Germans under General Vlasov. In Nazi Germany and Militarist Japan, the police state ruthlessly suppressed what little mass opposition had not already been dissipated by fanatically nationalistic indoctrination.

The third faction in the internal political conflict over war termination are the patriotic but realistic liberals and conservatives, who might be called "realists". They have less to fear from defeat than do the diehards, because they have not used the war as a springboard to power nor been guilty of atrocities, but they have more to fear from defeat than do the revolutionaries, because they wish to preserve the traditional national order and conserve national power and wealth. They are the people in the middle, threatened by military coup d'état by the diehards if they attempt to make a realistic end of the lost war, or revolution by the revolutionaries if they do not. They must try to maintain national unity in order to attain the best possible combination of peace terms and minimum further losses from war. If they lose to the diehards, it may mean war to the bitter end of physical destruction and invasion (as in Germany in 1945). If they lose to the revolutionaries, it may mean an internal weakening of the nation sufficient to force it to accept drastic peace terms (as the Russians and Germans were each forced to accept in 1918).
Four principal threats are consistently perceived by the loser nation's decision makers toward the end of a war, and constitute forces they feel obliged to balance against one another:

a. The threat of a military coup and military dictatorship from the right.

b. The threat of a revolution from the left.

c. The threat of the imposition of excessively harsh peace terms by the victorious enemy.

d. The threat of physical devastation by the victorious enemy.

From a non-partisan view of wars, the minimum cost of war is usually attained if the realist faction controls the government of the defeated nation. If the diehards are in control, as in Nazi Germany, the maximum of destruction will ensue for both victors and vanquished in the unnecessary terminal agony. If the revolutionaries are in control, the victors may achieve the greatest reduction in their losses, but the internal costs to the defeated nation may be great, including civil war, as in Russia after World War I. In the four greatest war terminations of this century, only one (Japan) ended with the realists in control of the defeated nation, and that just barely. *

A future nuclear war may urgently require a "realist" government in both victor and vanquished nations, rather than only in the defeated nation. Thus the low incidence of realist regimes in termination is frightening. Nor does it appear to be accidental. The margin of time between continued war and revolution (or destruction) on the one hand, and too early termination and military coup d'etat on the other, is usually very narrow and sometimes even non-existent when the extremes overlap. Thus, realists have a difficult time surviving.

* In Imperial Germany in November 1918, the 'realist' chancellor Prince Max of Baden was unable to retain full control in the final days of the war, as revolution swept northern Germany, Berlin, and Munich. Thus although the realist government of Prince Max negotiated the armistice through its delegate Erzberger, it was not any longer in control when the war ended on November 11, 1918, and Prince Max had already resigned.
## Objectives and Acceptable and Unacceptable Risks

of Three Factions in War Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Faction in Losing Nation</th>
<th>Maximum Objective</th>
<th>Minimum Objective</th>
<th>Cannot Accept</th>
<th>Will Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Right-Wing&quot; Traditionalist Militarist Elites (Diehards)</td>
<td>Victory, Authoritarian Regime</td>
<td>Conditional surrender, no disarmament</td>
<td>Unconditional surrender and disarmament</td>
<td>Revolution and/or total devastation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Center&quot; Moderate Liberal–Conservative Political, Aristocrats &amp; Bourgeois (Realists)</td>
<td>Stalemate, Constitutional Stable Government</td>
<td>War Termination, Orderly government and national survival</td>
<td>Revolution and/or Total Devastation, Militarist Coup</td>
<td>Unconditional Surrender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Left-Wing&quot; Reform, Radicals, and Revolutionary Proletariat and Bourgeois (Revolutionaries)</td>
<td>War Termination, Socio-economic reforms, Increased Power</td>
<td>War Termination, Economic Relief</td>
<td>Continuation of war, Militarist Coup</td>
<td>Unconditional Surrender, Revolution, Anarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interactions and Communications

The interactions between winner and loser in general war termination include the channels of communication between the two, the messages and information communicated, and the impact of the communicated information on the subsequent actions of the belligerents.

In World Wars I and II, the most common means of formal and explicit communication between the belligerents were public statements by political and military leaders or their spokesmen. These statements were broadcast in the press and on the radio. Although the intended recipients were rarely specifically identified, these recipients—usually the adversary leaders—almost always "got the message". The speed of these open, formal radio communications has not changed significantly since 1918, but has first increased and recently has decreased in reliability (due to improved radio equipment and radio disruption or "jamming" techniques, respectively).

The most common informal and tacit means of communications between the belligerents have been their observed military operations. If one side deploys a large invasion fleet, or gradually steps up a strategic bombing campaign, or selectively strengthens one front, the message is usually understood (although the meaning may be intentionally deceptive). 230

The normal diplomatic channels of international communications through neutral nations have been only a secondary means for belligerents negotiating the termination of a general war. The meetings of both official and clandestine emissaries in Sweden and Switzerland served an important mutual information—gathering function, and in some cases provided a means of arranging regional surrenders. * The diplomatic and other channels through neutral nations were not used for the major exchanges of surrender terms and offers, however, in either World War I or II.


* For example, S. S. General Wolff's negotiations in Switzerland with allied representatives in April 1945 concerning the surrender of German forces in Italy.
The private and clandestine connections between intelligence groups and subversive agents operating in neutral nations were also not an important channel of communications for termination bargaining, although they did serve as 'sounding boards'. In both World Wars, German anti-government advocates of an early termination operating in Switzerland and Sweden and Portugal were unsuccessful in opening even serious official discussions with allied representatives. The Japanese diplomats seeking private discussions of termination in Switzerland in the spring of 1945 were equally unsuccessful. It seems that in a major war, with decisive alliance arrangements and public support at stake, leaderships of belligerents are unlikely to find it worthwhile to adjust their over-all policy and war aims as a result of contacts with minor and unofficial dissident representatives from an enemy regime. Such at least was the experience of German anti-war dissidents in World Wars I and II, and Japanese diplomats working for peace in World War II. On the other hand, the widely publicized open statement of general peace terms by at least one belligerent tends to facilitate the termination of war by providing a focus of debate for conditions for termination in the about-to-be-defeated nation.

The messages and information communicated between belligerents in the termination process tend to differ, according to whether they are transmitted by the principal explicit means of radio-broadcast public statements, or the principal tacit means of indicative military operations. Explicit communications can express both positive intentions of what will be done and negative intentions of what will not be done. Tacit communications by means of symbolic or indicative military and political operations express positive intentions more effectively than negative ones, and therefore tend to be used more often to threaten than to promise (since in war termination promises are usually of the negative type, promising not to do some fearful thing). 

* This is not to say that military operations cannot be used tacitly to communicate intentions not to do something. It just involves a more complicated effort to achieve this type communication tacitly. For example, to communicate to an adversary that one intends not to bomb his cities, one must first achieve and then communicate (i.e., demonstrate) a capacity to do so, and then dramatically refrain from exploiting that capacity. In practice this Footnote continued on next page.
The broadcast open statements constituting the principal explicit communications in war termination usually express demands, threats and promises. The winner demands that the loser surrender, threatens further destruction if the loser refuses, and promises not to destroy the remaining non-military values (and sometimes some of the military values) of the loser. The loser usually demands better terms—that is, reduced threats and more generous promises from the winner—and threatens continued resistance if demands for improved terms are not met. All the loser has to offer or promise to the winner is surrender, but that is usually not explicitly communicated.

The military operations constituting the principal tacit communications in war termination have usually expressed only threats, as a way of increasing the credibility of the explicit threats made in the form of open declarations. For example, the Imperial German demand for Bolshevik Russian surrender in early 1918 was backed by a threat to resume the offensive, invade Russia and occupy at least Petrograd. This threat proved insufficient to move the Bolshevik leaders. The German Army then rendered the threat completely credible by proceeding successfully to invade in the direction of Petrograd, and the Bolsheviks found it necessary to come to terms. In the future, where promises made by explicit declaratory communications may not be sufficiently credible, military operations may also be required tacitly to communicate promises as well as threats. In World Wars I and II, however, military operations in the terminal phases were used principally to signal threats of further costs from continued resistance.

The loser can also increase the credibility of his threats of continued resistance and increased war costs, by the tacit communication of both his resolve and his physical capacity to do so through military and political actions. The Nazi German organization of "Werewolf" guerrilla units and the Japanese

might be accomplished by destroying the air defenses of cities, overflying them in the process. Gregory Bateson has experimented with octopus to determine if a similar type of negative tacit communication exists among animals. Apparently it does. (Personal Communication, Gregory Bateson, 1963)

* To surrender may be defined as placing oneself in the adversary's physical power, by disarming one's residual military power by a decision not to use it.
organization of the Kamikaze Corps tacitly communicated the resolve and the capacity for continued violent resistance. In World War I, Prince Max of Baden's threat of a "national rising of the German people" if better peace terms were not offered Germany, was not made credible by the actual state of German public opinion or military organization.

What happens when both winner and loser communicate explicitly and tacitly and credibly the resolve to continue the war unless their respective (and incompatible) demands are met? If these communications are not bluff, the war will continue until one or both sides find conditions changed sufficiently to modify their terms. Whether the terms of the winner should be unconditional or conditional surrender will depend on the relative and absolute power of the belligerents, the ideological intensity of the war, and the degree of unanimity of purpose in the winning coalition.

If the loser has substantial residual power, either in relative military terms or in the sense of being able to impose major civil losses on the winner, the winner may find it expedient to demand only a conditional surrender (as the Germans did versus Bolshevik Russia in 1918). If the ideological intensity of the war is as strong as it was between the United Nations and Nazi Germany, a conditional termination seems unlikely. If there is a diversity of actual and suspected post-war aims in a winning coalition, as there was between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia in World War II, a conditional termination is also unlikely. It is most difficult (and therefore unlikely) for allies of diverse post-war interests to agree to any terms but unconditional surrender, in effect thereby postponing the political settlement until after war termination. To do otherwise would be to jeopardize alliance unity, coordination, and the earliest possible termination. It may be that coalition war requires unconditional surrender, the more so to the degree that the allies' post-war objectives are diversified.
Termination Strategy for the Winner

To persuade the defeated nation to recognize the futility of further fighting and accept terms of surrender, the winning nation to a limited degree can increase the expectation in the defeated nation of a decent rehabilitation without vengeful indignities and with economic aid, thus increasing the acceptability of surrender for most of the population. The winner can do this by sparing civilians as much as possible. He can demonstrate his increasingly superior military power by stepping up the pace of military actions, reducing the hope and number of the diehards opposed to termination. This increased military pressure can destroy the residual defensive weapons of the losing nation, and its defenselessness may then be demonstrated by aggressive reconnaissances that portend more destruction if the war is not terminated.

All these measures by the winner to terminate the war fall under the two headings of demonstrably increasing the absolute and relative military threat, while simultaneously reducing the fears of the defeated nation concerning its status and survival after surrender. The object of the victor is to make surrender appear a much more attractive way of achieving survival than does continued resistance, and to give the defeated nation an awareness of having something more to lose by offering hope of something to gain from prompt termination.

Let us consider some specific military, economic, political, and psychological examples. By his military actions, the winner can to some degree disarm the loser, reducing the loser's capacity to threaten high costs for continuation of the war to the point where the loser is at an even greater disadvantage. The winner can protect himself against high additional costs by defending his own value as well as by disarming enemy offensive power. The winner can to some degree exert direct control (or threaten it) in the loser's homeland, by invasion, bombardment, and various combinations of these two types of denial. The loser's economy can to some extent be controlled by the winner in both the quantity and quality of its output by selective occupation and/or bombardment. The loser's central government can be denied communications
with its forces, for example, and some of these may be subverted or captured. The winner may disrupt the loser's air defenses, and demonstrate an irresistible capacity to destroy the society in the event the loser persists in the war.

By his military actions against specifically economic targets, the winner can so cripple the loser's war-making capacity, that physical occupation becomes feasible without unacceptable losses for the winner. The winner can impose great internal socio-economic pressures on the loser by reducing the latter's living standards through bombardment of food distribution elements. These two major economic targets overlap only to some extent, and the choice of which to concentrate on is made by the winner on the basis of relative vulnerabilities, response rate estimates, and political considerations. If war production industry is concentrated and vulnerable and agriculture and distribution systems are dispersed, for example, the former is likely to be concentrated on.

Both the winner's military and political actions can be directed against the loser's political targets. By first achieving and then demonstrating the defenselessness of the loser's population by military actions, the winner can cause the loser's population to lose confidence in the loser's government. The political disunity thus generated may bring on a shift from diehard to realist control, or even result in revolution and collapse. The implied threat exercised by the winner in demonstrating but not yet exploiting the loser's defenselessness will tend to make surrender more palatable to the population, both by reducing the credibility of alternatives to surrender and by demonstrating the humane restraint of the winner.

The military strength of the loser, by itself, is not a good indicator of an impending revolution. Both Russian and German armed forces were near their over-all peak strengths when the revolutions broke out in 1917 and 1918 respectively. An increasing incidence and intensity of strikes, together with a sharp rise in open criticism of the regime showing loss of public

---

250
confidence, were the most important macroscopic changes presaging the revolts in Russia and Germany. In World War I, it was the political-economic national structure that broke down in defeated Russia and Germany, not the military forces. Although these breakdowns were encouraged by military losses, the decisive breakdowns were still the domestic political-economic ones. By way of contrast, in World War II the home fronts in Nazi Germany and Japan never collapsed politically, and retained significant economic war-making potential to nearly the end, when they were denied either by bombing or occupation.

When a revolution appears imminent in a military weakening belligerent, the revolution may be hastened by an increase in external military pressure. This seems to have the effect of saturating and paralyzing the decision-making capacities of the leaderships for pre-empting their domestic adversaries. Furthermore, it tends to confirm the revolutionaries in their belief in the futility of further external conflict. From the viewpoint of the winning nation, a revolution in the losing nation is desirable not only because of the direct weakening of discipline, administration, economy, and morale, but also because it exerts a great pressure on the legitimate regime to accept a truce in order to permit it to stabilize the domestic situation.

One of the risks of provoking an internal revolt in a losing adversary is the protraction of the internal process of agreeing on termination. Although internal revolution accelerates disruption and decline of a nation's war-making power, it may actually delay the necessary degree of internal agreement of termination. Provoking a revolution in a defeated (but still fighting) nation seems justified when the pre-revolutionary decision structure is so much in the control of diehards that even the confusion of revolutionary changes is likely to result in an earlier surrender decision than would otherwise be possible.

Where World War I ended in revolutions (at least some of which may have been merely precipitated rather than caused by the war), World War II ended in the physical destruction of the war-making powers of the defeated nations. The change in expressed public opinion was decisive in World War II.

* As the perceived situation of the loser worsens, his desperation is also sometimes indicated by a rapid increase in the rate of changes of military command. At the same time there may be increased direct consultation between military leaders and diplomats, the former in desperation seeking for means to terminate.
in both Russia and Germany (and very nearly, in France and England). It was decisive in its relative stability under the greatest physical duress in World War II Germany and Japan. This was probably the result of a combination of more intense and prolonged ideological indoctrination and a much more ruthless police suppression of all expressed dissidence in World War II.

There may be a critical range of relative power that must be satisfied by a revolution in a nation at war, for it to result in termination. If the Bolsheviks had been much weaker than they were, they would have been unable to gain the power to execute their peace policy. Had they been much stronger, they would not have needed to terminate the war to consolidate their domestic power. It was Bolshevik relative strength that enabled them to overthrow the Kerensky Government, and it was Bolshevik weakness that forced them to accept the otherwise unacceptable German terms. Both the Russian and the Japanese acceptance of the peace terms was very sensitive to the balance of power among the domestic factions.

Military coups d'état have not been successful in the major powers in preventing terminations in World Wars I and II, even though they were attempted or threatened in each case of termination. The Kornilov Coup against the Kerensky government failed. The Ludendorff putsch against Max of Baden never came off. The anti-Hitler July 20, 1944 coup by conservative Wehrmacht elements fizzled. And the Japanese Army coup against the Emperor and the surrender came too late (after the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript announcing surrender) and was quickly put down. Where the military are diehards, as the Army (but not the Navy) leadership was in Japan, the failure of military coup may be fortunate for prompt termination. Where the military are conservative realistic elements hoping to terminate the war by overthrowing the diehard party, as they partly were in Nazi Germany, the failure of such coups was unfortunate for prompt termination.

The major differences between individuals favoring and opposing war termination—between realists and diehards—are usually not their optimistic versus pessimistic or acquiescent versus stubborn personalities, but rather their differences of class, values, expectations, and information. Usually
the realists are of upper or upper middle class origins, have rationalistic values, expectations of some humanity on the part of the victors, and worldly information about the human qualities of the victors that make these expectations possible despite propaganda and indoctrination. In contrast the diehards are usually of middle or petit bourgeois origins, have romantic values, expectations of the worst brutality from the victors, and lack the worldly information to keep from believing their own propaganda and ideological indoctrination.

A diehard leadership is not decisively attentive to the significance of divergent attrition of war-making power. Only the realists base their calculations on it. Thus if a realist regime is not in power, divergent attrition (victory in the military test of strength) will be necessary but not sufficient for war termination. A diehard leadership may be centered upon a charismatic leader such as Hitler. The only way for the winner or the domestic realists to remove a diehard charismatic leader from power appears to be to kill him. Lesser measures are usually too reversible, and are perceived as such.

The winner can terminate the war with or without invasion of the defeated nation's homeland, depending on domestic political developments in the defeated nation and the range of the winning nation's firepower. Whether invasion is required or not appears to be directly related to whether the diehards or the realists or revolutionaries control the defeated nation's government, and the range of strategic firepower. In World War I, both the Russian and German terminations resulted from revolutionary forces having taken control, and no significant invasion was necessary. If neither revolutionary or other termination-favoring factions had taken over control of the defeated nations, invasion would have been required, because of the technological incapacity of the winners significantly to destroy the war-making potential of the losers at a range beyond artillery range.
In World War II, invasion was necessary to quell quickly the diehard Hitlerite power by force majeur, and would have been required to subdue Japan quickly, if that nation's diehard resistance to surrender had not been overcome internally at the eleventh hour by its own realists. If the developing political conflict between Russia and the West had permitted a more protracted termination, air bombardment alone might have eventually terminated the war.
The Importance of National Morality for General War Termination

The intervention of the United States was decisive in bringing the two greatest wars of this century to an end. In World War I, Germany might have won at least a stalemate peace and retained substantial conquered territories had not the United States entered the war on the Allied side. In World War II, it is difficult to know whether Russia and England by themselves could have held out indefinitely against a Nazi-dominated Europe, but without American aid the war might have dragged on for a decade longer. If the intervention of the United States was decisive in terminating both wars in Europe, the greatest importance must attach to the factors that induced the United States to intervene.

The moral factor is important among the causes of United States intervention in both wars. German callousness toward loss of life among Belgian civilians, and toward Belgian civil and political rights, precipitated England into the war against Germany in 1914. Then German callousness towards the loss of American civilians in the expanded submarine war of 1916 and 1917 sufficiently outraged American public opinion to bring the United States into the war, and decisively swung the balance of power against Germany.

In World War II, Nazi atrocities against first the Jews in Germany and then captive peoples all over Europe helped to mobilize public opinion against Germany. However, as late as September 1939, a Roper opinion poll (on the following page) showed that over two thirds of the American public wanted to remain neutral in the Allied-Axis conflict in Europe (although of the one-third that wanted to intervene by economic or military means, almost all favored the Allies). But by the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the majority of American public opinion had swung to the support of all active aid to Great Britain short of war. Even without the Pearl Harbor attack and the war in the Pacific, the United States would probably have entered the war on England's side.

255
Roper Poll of September 1939*

"Which of these comes closest to describing what you think America should do about the present European war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
<th>Under 40 %</th>
<th>Over 40 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enter the war at once on the side of England, France, and Poland.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find some way of supporting Germany.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take no sides and stay out of the war entirely, but offer to sell to anyone on a cash-and-carry basis.</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not enter the war but supply England, France and Poland with materials and food, and refuse to ship anything to Germany.</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay out for now and for as long as we can, but go into war on the side of England and France if they are in real danger of losing, and in the meantime help that side with food and materials.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have nothing to do with any warring country—don't even trade with them on a cash-and-carry basis.</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other—Pro-Allies</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other—Pro-Germany</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other—Favoring neither side</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

eventually. Once again, German moral callousness and insensitivity to the effects of national morality on public opinion in powerful neutral nations was probably decisive in bringing the United States into the war against Germany.

The morality of a nation's actions in the world has often been exaggerated in significance, for what may be the wrong reasons of the immediate impact on world opinion, but it has often been underrated by otherwise realistic people in its political consequences on the alignment of nations in war. In any future general war, allies will be more important than ever for the principal adversaries, not primarily because they contribute a significant percentage of the alliance's technological and industrial power, but rather because they contribute land and deployment areas that may be all the more important in a future global conflict. Thus it seems most important for the United States to continue to conduct itself internationally in such a way as to attract the maximum number of allies, consistent with its traditions. Morality in international relations is not a luxury to be enjoyed only by neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland. They are in the central component of the foreign policy, and the military policy, of any great power that hopes to attract allies to itself, or at least to avoid rebuffing potential allies so that they drift to the adversary power.

The expectations concerning the post-war morality of a victorious nation are usually based on the apparent morality of that nation's pre-war (and wartime) behavior. For example, Nazi German readiness for aggression and unprovoked threats of military action before World War II were an omen of Nazi brutality and atrocities in the occupation of defeated nations. Because it is important to maintain a belief in potential military adversaries of the United States that a surrender to the United States is not a fate worse than death, but rather a potential opportunity not only for national survival but even for national growth (as has been evidenced in post World War II Germany and Japan through American liberality and aid), and because post-war expectations are connected with pre-war behavior, it is important to the United States to conduct itself in international affairs that it gives an impression of acting
with a universal concern for other people's liberties and welfare. This means a resort to military action only with the greatest reluctance and after other measures have failed, and only in response to fairly unambiguous cases of aggression. It means limiting military actions to military objectives to the maximum degree feasible, and avoidance of the sacrifice of innocent civilians in even enemy nations.

In the New York Times of 14 October 1964, Mr. Robert Kennedy was quoted as stating that his brother, President John F. Kennedy, in the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, desisted from the choice of bombing those missile sites and chose blockade instead, because it had been estimated that some 25,000 Cuban civilians would be killed in the course of such a bombing. Mr. Robert Kennedy stressed the moral stature of his brother in making this decision. We would add that this moral stature was also the better part of political wisdom, in that had such strikes been carried out, the peaceful and non-aggressive image of the United States would have been tarnished. This would have been a setback in the war-winning and war-terminating power of the United States.

The magnanimity of the victor may speed the surrender of the loser, due to the latter's expectation of fair treatment: e.g., Nazi attempts to surrender separately to Western allies rather than Soviets. Cruel behavior by the winner, on the other hand, deters surrender even when under circumstances of a less vicious foe it might be induced by military defeats. The British in 1940 fought on against the Nazis, as did the Soviets in 1942, whereas against a more humane foe they might have attempted a negotiated peace. The behavior of a major power with consistent generosity, fairness, respect for life and humanity may greatly enhance its chances of achieving victory in war, because the defeated has less to fear from surrender. Perhaps this is also why guerrilla wars are often won against absentee rulers, since the latter have little to fear from their surrender to the guerrillas.

Wars may start as contests of nerve, continue as contests of power and resolve, but they may end as contests of trust in the generosity of the victor. The victor whose peace terms seem harsh and unjust to the vanquished
may cause his defeated enemy, when and if there is another war between the
two, to fight all the harder lest the unjustly great costs of defeat be re-
rowned. Perhaps this explains partly why the French fought harder in 1914
than in 1940, and why the Germans resisted to a more bitter end in 1945 than
they did in 1918. One would like to know why some nations at certain times
in their history have tended to impose unusually harsh peace terms on their
defeated foes. Perhaps more frustrated power projects more hostility, and
therefore, can be more cruel in victory. France was long frustrated before
1914, and Germany was even more frustrated before the second World War.

It may be useful for the U.S. deliberately to project the image of its
magnanimity in victory, even beyond what is already widely believed. It
might be worthwhile, for example, for the U.S. to declare that in any stra-
tegic nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the U.S. would provide food and
shelter for the surviving Russians to the best of its own surviving industrial,
agricultural, and transport capability. Even if this were openly scoffed at
by the Soviet leadership, as it would probably be, such a declaration if often
repeated might exercise a wholesome influence on Soviet strategic doctrine.
A Soviet military planner might feel more inhibited about targeting Detroit,
Chicago, and East Coast seaports under these circumstances, knowing that
in the event of war the survival of millions of Russians might depend on the
survival of these American production and transport centers.
War Termination Strategy for the Loser

The objective of the winner of a general war is to end it as soon as possible, consistent with retaining the surrender and disarmament of the loser. Basically, the winner wants to minimize his costs of consolidating his victory. The loser must choose among more complex objectives, since up to a point it is in his interest to prolong the war, but beyond that somewhat hazy point it is in his interest to terminate. The loser wants to minimize the cost of defeat, just as the winner wants to minimize the cost of victory. Before the belligerents can agree on a "price" for the victory of one and the defeat of the other, however, they must agree on who is the victor and who is the vanquished.

As the end of a war approaches, there may be much or little doubt concerning who is the victor and who is the vanquished. In 1917 the outcome of the war was still very uncertain, but in 1944 it was already clear that it was only a matter of time before Germany and Japan would be defeated. Whichever is the case, it has generally been believed to be in the loser's interest to put on a brave front and behave as if he were still hopeful of winning. This self-delusion is a natural emotional response to fear of failure—it is even known in the vernacular as "whistling in the dark." However, careful examination of World Wars I and II suggests that this brave but false front of confidence is not necessarily in the best interests of the loser.

Strategic objectives and negotiating tactics have often been confused in the evaluation of the utility of the false front of confidence for the loser. The pretense of possessing greater residual war-making power than actually exists is an obvious negotiating tactic. However, it is dangerous for the loser to confuse this tactic with his strategic objective, which should be termination precisely because he has lost. If the loser believes his own propaganda—as desperate nations often tend to do—he will find it difficult even seriously to investigate means by which the war can be terminated. (This if of course putting the matter in a simplified way, since nations—particularly losing ones—are
not monolithic unities.) It is most difficult for a loser regime simultaneously to iterate its determination to persist until victory, while it is carefully planning to cut the costs of its defeat, yet that is just what it must do to minimize the costs of defeat. In the cases of World Wars I and II, the losers were apparently unable to maintain the distinction between bargaining tactic and strategic aim. In World War I when the tactic collapsed, the aim collapsed. In World War II when the bluffing tactic was maintained, the strategic aim of termination at minimum cost was foreclosed.

Given the apparently nearly insurmountable difficulty for the loser of maintaining the distinction between negotiating tactic and strategic aim, it would appear to be in the loser's interest to sacrifice the possible gains of the bluffing tactic for the sake of attaining the strategic aim of termination at minimum cost. The loser is likely to lose less by agreeing to an earlier termination as soon as it appears certain that he has lost, than he is likely to lose by holding out for better terms. This is because his relative bargaining power will continue to decline with divergent attrition, so that not only will his bluff be progressively less credible, but also the costs of maintaining it will continue to mount.

The loser still has the problem of determining most reliably that he is losing, will continue to lose, and therefore in the sense of expectations has already lost. It seems one of the major but neglected ironies of warfare that the loser enjoys a significant information advantage over the winner in determining that he has lost. Only the loser really knows that he has little or nothing left with which to reverse the victorious tide of enemy forces, which by their very winning actions are everywhere apparent to him. Only the loser knows that his vaunted reserves are phantoms or boys, his secret weapon is a figment or a fragmentary success, his suicidal popular resolve is a slogan of an increasingly isolated faction. Most succinctly, the loser knows he has lost when he can see that he will run out of war-making power before the winner will, and there is nothing he can do to change the trend.
Theoretically, because the loser is likely to know he will lose before the winner knows he will win, the loser should be in the best position to initiate termination on the last damaging terms to himself. Yet this was not the case in World Wars I and II, perhaps because the loser's dominant factions did not seem convinced of their impending defeat until well after the winners were convinced of their own ultimate victory. Perhaps no nation committed to the daily costs of a great war can permit itself to believe it will lose until the omens are overwhelming. By then, the loser has lost his information advantage, however. Both winner and loser have then learned their identities well, and the only remaining questions are "when" and "what terms".

The loser wants to obtain the most favorable possible terms of termination from the winner. What is "most favorable" is itself a complex problem, since not all the political and economic aims of the belligerents are likely to be in pure competition (Although the military aims tend to be.). The loser wants to cut his losses—military, political, economic, and territorial. To do this, he must be able to raise the costs for the winner of imposing unacceptable losses to a level unacceptable to the winner. In short, the loser cuts his losses to the extent he can deter their imposition by threatening the winner with unacceptable costs.

What are some ways the loser can threaten the winner with unacceptable costs, and thus deter unacceptable losses to himself? Militarily, he can threaten to employ his inferior and dwindling forces against the winner's vulnerable population rather than his superior forces. While nuclear weapons have given unprecedented potency to this terror threat, it is not a new one. After the battle of Agincourt the French murdered the boys serving the English knights "expressly against the law of arms,"231 (although apparently not for termination bargaining). The loser's prisoners and civilian hostages have often been at jeopardy lest the victor attempt to impose too harsh terms. In World War I, defeated Germany could have poisoned the French countryside,

231 William Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act IV, Scene VII.
and possibly used her remaining U-boats to land poison-laden saboteurs in England and the United States. In World War II, Hitler's ballistic rocket weapons may have been intended to produce enough terror in the London population to induce Britain to moderate her will to achieve complete victory over Germany. (If so, the Nazi's completely misunderstood the British mentality, as they had throughout the war.)

The loser can also threaten to or actually employ his military forces against the winner's military targets in a way that greatly increases the winner's cost of winning. This is usually achieved at the cost of greater military losses to the loser also, as in the Japanese Kamikaze attacks, and is essentially an intensification of the fighting. The loser in effect threatens to exhaust all his remaining forces simply to punish the winner. Once such a threat is executed it usually loses much of its utility for achieving more lenient peace terms, so that its credibility is at a premium for the loser.

The credibility of this threat of suicidal terminal engagements can be increased by physical measures constraining the loser's forces to such costly fights, such as "burning their bridges behind them". Psychological bridges may also be burned by forcing the "suicide" forces to commit atrocities so that they can have no hope of mercy from the victors. Demonstrations of ferocious resolve to die fighting may be used to provide evidence of a more widespread commitment to fanaticism.

Ruthless police suppression of all peace factions may also be used by the loser to indicate (and achieve) unity of resolve to hold out for some minimum terms, but it can have a "boomerang" effect. If the deterrent threats against the winner's too severe terms are successful, the loser regime may then still be unable to end the war, precisely because it has destroyed the pro-termination factions it needs to gain broad support for termination.

The threat of increased war costs for the winner is the loser's "stick" against unacceptable terms, but there is also a "carrot" to tempt the winner to moderate his demands. This can assume the form of tacitly communicated
indications of a willingness to abide peacefully by more moderate terms, as well as tacti promises to cooperate in the verification and enforcement of the more moderate terms. To make such promises of cooperation credible, the loser regime must appear to have a broad base of popular support, and it must appear able to control its own military and other diehards.

Another means sometimes resorted to by the loser tacitly to communicate a desire for reconciliation is the appeal to superordinate goals. Examples of this were Emperor Hirohito's appeals for world peace in 1945, and Imperial and Nazi German appeals for a common Western struggle against Bolshevism in 1918 and 1945. While this approach was unsuccessful in persuading the winners in World Wars I and II to abate their drive to victory, it did provide an indicator of the loser's desire for reconciliation—albeit on somewhat unrealistic terms under the circumstances. This tactic would appear to be most useful to a not entirely freely acting peace faction in a loser nation still controlled by diehards, since it is more a way of signalling a desire to terminate than it is an effective inducement to the winner to moderate his terms.

The more cynically motivated appeal for a common fight against Communist Russia by such Nazi leaders as Admiral Doenitz were probably intended to split the victorious United Nations coalition. A loser government may also try to split the winning coalition by promulgating peace offers designed to be attractive to some and disturbing to others in that coalition. Such attempts are costly in terms of the loser's own morale, however, while having a record of failure in both World Wars.

232 "...Inouye said in conclusion: 'We should like mutually to join hands in constructing an international machinery which strives toward world peace and the good of humanity.' This line we interpreted as the message of the whole broadcast, coming as it did, at the end of a long talk, after much verbal shadowboxing..." (p. 358)

"What made this answer particularly significant were the thirteen concluding words. Inouye expected an answer since he stated: 'I should like to know what Zacharias thinks of these words from Japan.' (p. 358)

"The Japanese text of the Inouye broadcast revealed a significant and interesting side light which was lost in the English translation. In the last paragraph he addressed me as Zacharias-Kun. Previous references were to Zacharias-Taisa (Footnote continued on following page.)
A still unanswered fundamental question is: What is a "good" loser in war? If a nation negotiates an end to a war as soon as its leadership suspects it may lose, it may thereby throw away the chance for a victory it could have attained by persisting longer, and may lose many of its national values as a consequence. On the other hand, if a nation refuses to concede its defeat even when it is clearly imminent and irreversible and humane terms are offered, it will impose unnecessary loss of life and hardship on both itself and its adversary, and thus also lose many national values.

Is a "good" loser from a national point of view the same thing as a "good" loser from an international aspect, viewing all the belligerents as one interacting system that must resolve its internal conflicts for the sake of healthy growth? From the defeated nation's point of view, a "good" loser is one that minimizes the costs of losing after all "reasonable" hope of victory has been exhausted. From the winning nation's point of view, a "good" loser is one that surrenders at the first indication of impending defeat. (Whenever all important factions can agree that has occurred!) From the aspect of minimizing the total loss of life and materiel of the war, regardless of on what side they occur, the good loser is the one that gives up easily without much of a fight. Yet this is a most unsatisfactory criterion, because its adoption would only encourage aggression by the promise of easy victims. Ideological values such as national independence, self-determination, civil liberties, and social justice are for many of us worth fighting for to a point well beyond even a substantial expectation of defeat. In this case—that is, if one is the loser and one believes in one's cause—a "good" loser may be a very stubborn "bad" loser indeed. It can only be concluded that the "goodness" of a loser in accepting his loss depends on how we value his cause relative to that of the winner. "Evil" losers should give up quickly, and "virtuous" losers should fight to a martyr's end!

(captain), and ordinarily, when referring to 'Mr.,' the word San is used. The word Kun is one used only between close friends or intimates. Therefore its injection here was a significant gesture and appeal which carried the fullest of hidden meanings. Literally translated the implication was 'my good friend' Zacharias." (p. 359).

Since each nation is likely to believe its own cause virtuous and that of the adversary evil, stubbornness about losing is assured. What is needed is some superordinate international understanding of the limits to which national values, whatever they are, can go in forcing the belligerents in a war to continue fighting beyond the point where the outcome of the test of strength is clear. This allegedly existed in the age of chivalry. Such limits on violence or threatened violence certainly exist today in the domestic political contests in the democracies. Unfortunately there have been no such effective agreements on a global basis. Until such limits are accepted by potential belligerents, wars are likely to continue to be more destructive than their political utility requires.
### Alternative Strategies for the Winner

| Military            | Defeat (disarm) enemy forces (Deny enemy CF)*  
|                     | Defend friendly economy and population (Deny enemy CV)**  
|                     | Control (or threaten to control) enemy homeland (invade and occupy, or destroy)  
|                     | Threaten further costs of war (Threaten CV)  
| Economic            | Destroy enemy war-making capacity  
|                     | Impose internal pressures by reducing living standard  
| Political           | Threaten further costs to enemy if he does not surrender, offer attractive (high survival) terms if he does. Support indirectly the enemy domestic realists, destroy (indirectly) the enemy diehards.  
| Psychological       | Demonstrate to enemy overwhelming irreversible military superiority and resolve to use it if necessary, as well as generosity toward enemy if he surrenders.  

### Alternative Strategies for the Loser

| Military            | Retain forces for bargaining  
|                     | Threaten high costs for further enemy operations  
|                     | Threaten enemy value  
|                     | Demonstrate capacity to resist enemy military pressure  
| Economic            | Retain war-making capacity as long as possible  
|                     | Retain minimum living standards  
| Political           | Present picture of national unity and resolve demands for surrender  
|                     | Suppress both revolutionaries and diehards  
|                     | Communicate and support enemy revolutionaries  
|                     | Tactily communicate willingness to consider stalemate peace  
| Psychological       | Display unity, resolve, and confidence  
|                     | --will to exact heavy costs for victor's attempt to impose odious terms  
|                     | --willingness to join victor in post-war "reforms"  

* CF = Counterforce strikes, typically at military targets such as airfields, missile silos, and naval forces.

** CV = Countervalue strikes, typically at urban-industrial population targets.
APPENDIX VIA

THE DIFFICULTY OF LIMITING WAR AIMS
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WAR MEANS

In various speeches in the course of World War II, both Roosevelt and Churchill implied that German and especially Prussian society was war-like and militantly aggressive by nature, that Prussian-dominated Germany had been morally responsible for the first as well as the second World War, and that therefore, the necessary aim of World War II was to destroy this Prussian-German spirit by means of a moral crusade requiring total defeat of the enemy. 233

While it is understandable that Churchill and Roosevelt found it necessary (whether it really was necessary or not) to distort history for the propagandistic purpose of mobilizing a broad base of public support for the war, they may have come to believe their own propaganda and make policy on the basis of these beliefs. It apparently was no longer possible to distinguish the Nazi ends, and the means of the military professionalism and tradition of Prussia and the German Army. Allied policy had to be directed toward the total defeat and punishment and reconstruction of Germany, rather than toward the removal of the Nazi government. The threatening capability as well as the threatening intent had to be removed. Lest it be thought that this was a situation unique to World War II, resulting from the unprecedented bestiality of the Nazi regime, it should be remembered that much the same phenomena occurred in World War I, and indeed in other previous wars.

233 "The core of Germany is Prussia. There is the source of the pestilence... Nazi Germany and Prussian militarism are the two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed. They must be rooted out if Europe and the world are to be spared a third and still more frightful conflict."

268
There may thus be a fundamental obstacle to the limitation of a general war, including the limitation of its aims, means, and duration. (The prompt termination of a war is after all one very substantial means of limiting its costs.) In wars that cannot be decided quickly because of the relatively balanced capabilities of the contenders (and capabilities are measured by resolution and organization and skill as well as by physical power), there is apparent from historical examples a very strong tendency on the part of the belligerents to vilify their adversaries in order to mobilize the mass public commitment of a morale crusade for the war effort. This vilification of the adversary, in its simplest form, is usually the elimination of the distinction between the nationals of the adversary nation that favor its hostile policy, and the more moderate and peace-loving nationals of the adversary nation. "The only good German (or Japanese)—so the slogans went—"is a dead one".

The mobilization of public opinion support for the war effort by means of propagandistic distortions and simplifications concerning the enemy is a kind of race carried on by adversaries that has very similar characteristics to a prewar arms race, or the initiating mobilization or pre-emptive strike races. In all these cases there is a significant advantage achieved by mobilizing the forces involved first, faster, and to a further degree. It is the "He wins who gets there firstest with the mostest" phenomenon. It has a common escalatory or expansive dynamic, in the sense that an increased mobilization on one side immediately provokes yet greater efforts in the adversary, and so forth. This phenomenon has been rather exhaustively examined in the case of prewar arms races, the mobilization races initiating a war (particularly in the case of World War I), and the mutual pre-emption races that might occur at the beginning of a contemporary nuclear war. What has been rarely considered is the mutual escalation of political mobilization, in the form of increasing mutual vilification, proclamation of moral crusades, and expansion of war aims.
The fundamentally **political escalation** is no less important than the purely military escalation of a war, for the problems of limiting war scope, intensity, duration, and costs. As the enemy is vilified, as his attributed war aims are expanded to outrageous proportions, and as massive public opinion support for the sacrifices necessary to mount an enormous national war effort is developed, a partly irreversible process having great political momentum is created. The public is not foolish. It cannot be mobilized en masse to make sacrifice of life, treasure, and political freedom in support of a major war effort without being given substantial evidence of the necessity for it—evidence consisting of the profoundly threatening aims and capabilities of the enemy. This is not a state of mind that is readily reversible, even following decisive victories that would, under ideally rational circumstances, make a negotiated peace most possible then and there.

It should not be surprising that a peace "without victors"—in Wilson's phrase—is unlikely to be acceptable to the public of a nation and its representatives that have been worked up, and that have worked themselves up to the point of a moralistic crusade for the extermination of a basic evil threat. A return to a more discriminating view capable of distinguishing destructive and benevolent elements in the adversary nation takes much time, reduction of the threatening pressures of war, and access to and interest in examining the other side of the story.

Perhaps it would have been asking too much of Roosevelt and Churchill, after they had striven so many years to mobilize the necessary public support for the war effort they correctly believed necessary, for them to have clearly perceived that their own political commitment had escalated beyond what might be objectively called for, and that some of the mass political commitment they had helped to mobilize could be partially demobilized before the termination of the conflict. That would be a little like demobilizing a large part of one's armed forces while the war was still being pursued. Although it might be argued that after the termination of the war in Europe there actually was some cutback in war production in the United States, this possibility cannot
be readily extrapolated to the political sphere, where commitment is a much more unstable, "binary" phenomenon. A nation's population tends to be either committed to a war effort wholeheartedly, or not at all—it can rarely be carefully regulated by degrees. Given the choice between a possibly somewhat extension of the war as a possible result of disproportionate political mobilization in the form of excessive war aims and political commitments, versus the risk of pervasive relaxation of the political commitment to the war effort needed to generate the physical and moral forces for carrying it through to a successful conclusion, it is understandable that Roosevelt and Churchill—and indeed, almost all great historical leaders—chose to risk what may in a sense be called an excess of victory, rather than risk a potentially premature relaxation of effort.
CHAPTER VII

GENERAL WAR TERMINATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The most practical reason for studying the past is to gain some insight into the future. No part of the future is more decisive for civilization than the future of war. A general nuclear war could undo civilization, or radically change its focus and direction. At least the first and possibly decisive campaigns of such a war are likely to be fought with weapons and plans prepared in advance according to some preconceptions of the future. What does a study of major war terminations in 1918 and 1945 tell us about how a general nuclear war might be fought and terminated in the future?

To answer this question, it is necessary to distinguish which characteristics of past general wars and a possible future general nuclear war are likely to remain largely unchanged, which characteristics are likely to be quite different, and which characteristics are still very uncertain. Then perhaps some of the more consistent lessons of the past terminations can provide an indication of some aspects of future general nuclear war termination.

Similarities and Differences between Past and Possible Future General War Terminations

The terminations of World Wars I and II have a limited application to planning for the termination of a possible nuclear World War III, in spite of the usefulness of the study of these previous wars in sensitizing one to the problems of termination, because:

1. In a general thermonuclear war there is not likely to be sufficient time for the political-military organizational conflict and psychological disintegration in the losing nation that has typically presaged termination.

2. In a general thermonuclear war there is not likely to be sufficient time for public opinion to form a politically effective opposition to a continuation of the war with sufficient strength to have a significant impact on decision makers (unless there is a "broken backed" protracted nuclear war).
3. The military outcome of a thermonuclear general war may be indecisive, because of the extremely high absolute levels of damage, possibly making it impossible to determine which side has been the victor and which side has been vanquished.

4. It is possible that in a future thermonuclear war, the probable military victor (the U.S.) will be the most seriously damaged in his urban/industrial base, while the probable militarily defeated party (the Soviet Union) may have the strongest surviving residual urban/industrial base (if the superior U.S. forces desist from destroying it). This is because U.S. force superiority encourages a selective counterforce, damage limiting targeting doctrine, while Soviet firepower inferiority and the survivability of U.S. forces tends to make U.S. cities more lucrative for the Soviets than their cities are for targets. If this is the case, particularly concerning post-war recovery, termination bargaining is likely to be completely different from that in World Wars I and II, in which the defeated nations were also correspondingly economically exhausted in comparison with the victorious coalitions.

The Nazi German and Japanese terminations of World War II may be the ones most similar to what might occur in a third and nuclear general war, because most of the anti-war and anti-government groups felt that it was hopeless to appeal to the population. In Nazi Germany and WWII Japan, the population was largely apathetic as a result of war weariness, and cowed by military and police terror into subservience. In a nuclear war, appeals to the population may not be reachable in their shelters with the probable disruption of communications. The World War II German and Japanese terminations may also provide

---

It may be to the United States' advantage to permit Soviet industry to survive in such a contingency. Superior U.S. military power might then coerce the application of Soviet industry to the recovery of American and Western European industry. For the most immediate reason of giving the Soviets the greatest incentive to desist from striking U.S. cities, official U.S. strategic doctrine has since 1961 expressed the intention of avoiding the destruction of Soviet urban-industrial areas. The Soviets have not reciprocated this declared doctrine.
the closest parallel to termination of a possible third world war, because in both these bases it was already too late to avoid most of the physically destructive effects of the war, the termination issue being not so much the preservation of urban/industrial value as chiefly one of whom to surrender to, and whom to accept as an occupying government, and on what terms.

The termination problem in a general nuclear war is likely to be even more complex and even more difficult, because there is likely to be more paralysis of decision making at high levels, less time available for making those decisions, more uncertainty about the information required to make the decisions, and less opportunity for test proposals and "peace feelers".

In a future nuclear war, historic war termination characteristics have a much more ominous and deadly significance than they have had in the past. Where suicidal last-ditch offensives cost hundreds of thousands of lives in World Wars I and II, the same type of terminal desperation may cost hundreds of millions of lives in a third and nuclear world war.

In the terms of current strategic thought, the above tendency is expressed by the change from counterforce to countervalue nuclear targets in the course of a general nuclear war. The likelihood, initiation, timing, and degree of a change from counterforce to countervalue targets is critical for the termination of a nuclear war, and vice versa. A weak nuclear power, such as France and possibly China, may elect to initiate its strategic attack against countervalue targets, committing revenge and suicide at once against any stronger nuclear power. A strong nuclear power, such as the United States or possibly the Soviet Union, seems more likely to begin a nuclear war with counterforce strikes, but at some point of damage-disrupted political control may be driven to countervalue strikes.

* The United Nations might be designated in advance to accept termination agreements from both sides, as one way of cutting short any time-consuming controversy over who had "won" and by how much.
The resort to countervalue strikes seems most likely to occur in a nuclear power that has been bested in a counterforce exchange, and sees its only hope of survival as blackmail by the selective killing of hostages. If that fails also, a resort to indiscriminate countervalue strikes may express an overwhelming emotional need forever to "spoil" what would otherwise be the victory of the adversary. It is threatening the winner, in effect, that although he may have "won" the war he will not live to enjoy the peace.

Because the matter may be decided emotionally at almost any point in a nuclear war, if not even before it begins, it is most difficult to estimate when a nuclear belligerent will switch from counterforce to countervalue targets. Theoretically, he would "rationally" do so when the marginal utility of imposing countervalue damage surpassed the marginal utility of imposing counterforce damage.* This point might be reached by the U.S., for example, when the only weapons surviving were a few Polaris missiles incapable of reducing substantially the surviving Soviet submarine and hardened missile forces, and a number of Soviet cities with adjacent military bases had remained unscathed because of U.S. reluctance to risk Soviet collateral value damage from counterforce strikes. The crisis would probably be reached much earlier by the Soviets (if not before the war began), because of their numerical inferiority. In both cases, the belligerents begin with countervalue "overkill" capacity. When counterforce capability is reduced to the extent that its hostage threat is imperiled, a nation may consider raising the marginal utility of enemy countervalue targets to the enemy by reducing their number. This would initiate the desperate, "contest of suicides" phase of a nuclear war.**

* It is most difficult to obtain agreement among even military planners about degrees of military utility.

** In a future war, populated cities may become suicide "weapons", in the sense that each one of them will destroy an enemy force unit (by absorbing it) at a given cost in lives. This situation becomes slightly less horrible to contemplate if cities are actively defended, hardened, and dispersed, thereby making them more effective suicide weapons in the sense that the number of enemy weapons expended per cost of life will increase.
"Short" or "Long" Test of Military Strength?

The characteristic most widely assumed to be completely changed in a future nuclear general war is its pace, or the rate at which destruction occurs. Since this rate is orders of magnitude greater than ever before, it is widely believed in the West that a general nuclear war will be much shorter than general wars of the past have been, on the implicit assumption that some maximum level of damage is reached much more rapidly. But where is this "maximum level", and does it in fact even exist?

The "short war" conception attained its purest and most devastating form in the massive retaliation concept, also known as the "spasm response". Since the level of damage imposed by an "all-out" nuclear spasm response is so great that not much is left to fight with or for, it was (and often still is) assumed that a general nuclear war would consist of a massive exchange of destruction lasting the few hours it would take to deliver the weapons by various aircraft and missiles.

In the current U.S. strategic doctrine of attacking enemy forces rather than value (population and industry) unless driven to the latter by lack of a corresponding enemy restraint, the reduced pace at which massive destruction is imposed (being at least initially limited to military targets) suggests the possibility of a war much longer than hours. Unfortunately many military planners on even the highest level have failed to draw the necessary conclusion that controlled war may mean protracted war, or if they have drawn this conclusion, they have failed to implement it with the doctrines, plans, and capabilities required in a protracted general nuclear war.

Some of the military theorists of the most likely adversary to the United States in a general nuclear war, the Soviet Union, have given more explicit recognition to the possibility of a protracted general nuclear war. While agreeing with American military doctrine that "the initial period of the future war will be of critical importance", they believe that, "At the same time, each
state must obviously take into account the possibility of a protracted war, for which it is necessary to prepare potential forces." 234

The Soviet concept of operations in the protracted phase of a general nuclear war envisages participation by "great masses of troops" in "military operations in ground theaters". 235 According to Lt. General of the Air Force N. Sbytov, "The results of strategic rocket-nuclear blows must be fully utilized by land forces. They will finish by smashing the remaining groups of enemy troops, occupy enemy territory, and defend their own country against penetration by the enemy troops... As great as the role of strategic rocket troops would be in a war, a complete victory over the aggressor could be achieved only as a result of combined operations by all types of armed forces." 236

This Soviet expectation of a relatively long war with an initial period of "nuclear and missile strikes for the simultaneous destruction of enemy military and economic potential, the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons, and the disorganization of military and governmental control" 237 suggests the presence of a Soviet strategic doctrine with some important differences having major consequences for termination. The U.S. declared policy is to limit strategic strikes to military targets, at least initially, while the Soviet targeting doctrine apparently envisages strategic strikes against U.S. forces, command and control centers, and economic targets. The U.S. general war doctrine emphasis on strategic aerospace nuclear forces has left the role of Western ground forces uncertain in a general nuclear war, while the Soviets indicate that they will use such forces to "occupy enemy territory"—presumably, Western Europe and possibly the Mid-East.


236 Sbytov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Results", Italicics added.

If the U.S. prepares only for a "short" war, and the Soviets prepare for a "long" war, in the event of a general nuclear war the U.S. motivations for an early termination would be very strong for even the purely military reasons of not having prepared for anything else. If the U.S. believes that cities are destroyed only in an all-out uncontrolled war calling for all-out counter-city retaliation, and the Soviets believe that economic centers such as great ports and command centers such as Washington, Omaha, Denver, and London constitute legitimate "military" targets, then the war is likely to become a ferocious city exchange very quickly—postponing termination to a point where it is enormously less worthwhile than it would have been before the cities and populations were destroyed. If the U.S. believes Western Europe to be the other vital half of the Western Alliance (as it indeed is in productivity and population), and the Soviets occupy all of Europe as a natural follow-up to a nuclear exchange in which much of their own industry is destroyed, it may be impossible to achieve early terms of termination satisfactory to both even if the U.S. has increased its superiority over Soviet strategic forces. In such a stalemate, the Soviets could hold Europe but be powerless to invade North America, and (for years at least) vice versa. Presumably the U.S. would not be willing to destroy Western Europe's peoples to save them from the Russians.

Such a stalemate might be resolved by an American invasion of the Continent with tactical nuclear armies, but that would take years, and be contingent upon the substantial survival of American population and industry, as well as strategic power. If American population and industry suffered collateral damage from a military exchange, it seems unlikely that the necessary invasion forces could be organized for years. In the interval, selective strategic bombardment exchanges between surviving Soviet forces in Europe and Asia and the probably superior U.S. forces on the seas and in North America might continue, threatening at any time to escalate to the total mutual destruction of populations. In this grim prognosis the importance of prompt termination is unprecedented, and so is its difficulty.

Let us return now to the question of what characteristics of past wars are still sufficiently present to offer some insight into the problem of termination in a general nuclear war. Both the U.S. and Soviet doctrines recognize the need to win the initial strategic nuclear campaign, corresponding to the winning of the military test of strength in past wars, as the precondition to a "victorious"
conclusion. While this seems to be assumed as being sufficient for victory in U.S. doctrine, at least one Soviet military theorist has stated that "Superiority in strength over the enemy does not mean automatic victory. It provides a possibility of victory...". Never was this so true before as in general nuclear war, in which even the greatest conceivable force superiority (ever 100 to 1) might be unable to prevent the loss of much of the superior side's population and industry to the desperate ferocity of the defeated nation's surviving nuclear and biological firepower. One has only to imagine the situation of World War II Germany or Japan, given their retention of sufficient survivable nuclear firepower to destroy the ten largest American cities and London and Paris and Moscow and Leningrad. The United Nations might have been willing to negotiate much less than unconditional surrender under such circumstances. Thus the residual bargaining power of even a decisively defeated nuclear power is likely to be greater than that of decisively defeated Japan in World War II, requiring careful exploration of mutually acceptable terms to achieve prompt termination. The alternative to negotiated peace in the future may be destruction as an organized nation of both vanquished and victor.

**Domestic Conflict in Nuclear War Termination**

The second phase of general war termination, usually following the major part of the military test of strength because the perception of its outcome tends to precipitate it, is the domestic political conflict over war termination among diehards, realists, and revolutionaries in and near the government. Whether such a phase develops in a future nuclear war much as it has in the past would seem to depend principally on the endurance of an organized national central government in the belligerents. There is much uncertainty over

---


[* It seems perfectly feasible for the Soviet Union to maintain enough missile-launching submarines and hardened ICBM bases to assure an extremely survivable capacity to destroy completely the ten largest U.S. urban industrial areas, or approaching 50 million lives. *]
this, both in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union. Sokolovskii, for example, states that "leadership of the country and the armed forces... changes continuously under the influence and impact of external and internal conditions of state. It is difficult to say now exactly how this system will be organized in a future war." Kahn worries that "There are some very knotty questions that come up here about executive responsibility and civil-military relations," and goes on to suggest the need for multiple "assistant presidents" in protected places to assess damage, make decisions, communicate decisions, and monitor ensuing actions.

There are several distinguishable uncertainties in the second, or conflict of domestic leadership phase of general war termination. The first problem is the perception of the outcome of the first phase, or test of military strength. This outcome may be far from clear in a general nuclear war due to disruption of communications, and even if its general outlines are known, its meaning for termination may be unclear. It is not difficult to envisage a situation wherein the U.S. president (or other surviving leader) believes he retains from 20 to 40 percent of his forces, while believing the Soviets to have a residual capability from 10 to 50 percent of their initial inventory. If the U.S. had a 2 to 1 superiority at the start of the war, it might now have anything ranging from a slight inferiority to a massive 8 to 1 superiority. The uncertainty over the outcome of the first major test of strength is compounded by the uncertainty of its significance in termination bargaining, because even less may be known about such quantities as relative national unity, resolve, and capacity for further sacrifice that amplify or diminish the impact of the military actions.

Assuming that there is comprehensive post-attack intelligence and damage assessment data available to both sides, and the communications needed to disseminate this information to the surviving leaders (a very optimistic assumption), there is still the problem of when and how to terminate

240 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 188-189.
the war. In World Wars I and II these questions were decided by the outcome of domestic political conflicts in the defeated nations among diehard, realist, and revolutionary factions, under the impact of continued external military pressures. In a general nuclear war, the situation may be more symmetrical in that the potential for such a domestic conflict may be almost as potent in the victor of the military test of strength as in the vanquished, but the domestic conflict over termination may also remain latent in both belligerents due to a lack of time for it to develop. In World War I these conflicts took over two years to develop in Russia and Germany. In World War II they were latent throughout and from even before the war in Nazi Germany and Japan, but did not emerge into palpable action until the last year of the war. It seems most doubtful that these conflicts will emerge in time to contribute to termination if they are not already present at the start of the war. (These conflicts are likely to be present and active, however, if a nuclear war results from an escalation of a limited conflict.)

The leadership of a nation substantially defeated in the military test of strength in a general nuclear war, if diehard, is relatively less likely to be influenced or overthrown by realist or revolutionary factions in time to prevent the most destructive exchanges in the war (since these are likely to occur in the first days and weeks). In the case of a Soviet diehard leadership, the problem may be reversed or compounded by the suppressive power of a police state, which has more readily available dual powers in it than does a free one. Soviet leaders might also not consider the outcome of an exchange of intercontinental strategic blows as decisive, reserving that judgment for the outcome of the continental Eurasian campaigns. It seems all too possible for a situation to arise in which the U.S. has greatly increased its superiority over Soviet intercontinental forces in the course of an inter-continental exchange of weapons, while the Soviets had achieved corresponding military successes—or at least suffered no decisive losses—in Europe. The U.S. leaders might then believe they had won the military test of strength and attempt to negotiate a termination, while the Soviets in turn believed the decisive test (in Europe) was still ahead. A diehard Soviet regime, and quite possibly even a realist one, might then either refuse negotiations, or exploit them as a screen for preparations for a decisive
strike in Europe or North America or both. (Since the instantaneous balance of military forces depends on available forces, and since forces may be becoming available for one side even as they are being lost to operational status on the other, the respite of a few days or even hours could change the balance of power in certain circumstances.)

Given a diehard Soviet leadership, and a decisive U.S. strategic dominance that the Soviets refuse to acknowledge by agreeing to terminate the war, the alternatives open to the U.S. are different from what they were in past wars. The alternatives are narrowed, in that there may not be enough time for realist and revolutionary factions to oust the diehards. Propaganda broadcasts and/or tempting peace terms may fail to cause the downfall of the diehards. The alternatives are also broadened, in that on the basis of the assumption of U.S. strategic dominance the possibility of physically destroying the diehard regime exists for the first time. This would seem to be the most hopeful approach to installation of a more realistic regime—that is, to destroy physically the diehard regime in the hope that its replacement would be more realistic about negotiating termination.

(The problem may be complicated if the diehards and realists are co-located, as they are likely to be. If they are, they must be driven to separate physically by selective threats. If this cannot be done, the most discriminating type of force is required—that is, force wielded by individual agents. Thus selective invasion or commando raids might be needed.)

A capability for executing such "decapitating" attacks requires much pre-war preparation. The initial command, control, and communications structure of the defeated nation must be known in some detail, and armed reconnaissance means must be available to detect shifts and changes during the war. Ideally, the physical whereabouts, command status, communicating capability and loyalties of all senior political and military leaders would be known, as well as which of them were diehards requiring elimination and which were potential realists to be protected in the hope of their taking over and negotiating termination.*

* See Appendix VIIA.
If a "realist" leadership is in power initially in the militarily defeated nation, or if it has been "installed" indirectly by decapitating attacks eliminating a previous diehard regime, the problems of the victor are greatly simplified but far from solved. The word "realist" has a connotation of the rational, of an awareness of what is possible, and a balancing of what is possible against what is desirable (but the pursuit of which may jeopardize even the possible). In this context, "realist" leaders are those that refuse to take "long shots", or low probability, high risk and high payoff decisions. Instead they prefer high confidence, low risk decisions and modest payoffs. The problem is that victor and vanquished, even if both are "realists", may have quite different information, values, and estimates on which they base their beliefs on what is negotiable. If these differences cannot be resolved quite rapidly, the pressure of military operations and ebbing military capabilities may force the belligerents to pass by the opportunity for a termination agreement.

Much can be done before a general nuclear war begins to insure against differences of information and lack of appreciation of different values preventing a negotiated termination. An active and continuing exchange of military concepts (without of course any military secrets) and a realistic mutual appreciation of forces and capabilities would reduce the dangers of mutual underestimation, overestimation, or miscalculation of intent. An intensive and continuing exchange of political-operational interests and antipathies, candid but not necessarily public, would reduce the dangers of mutual neglect of vital political interests. (Ironically, these information exchanges tend to vary directly with the friendship felt by two nations for each other, when it is precisely when they are about to engage in war against each other that they are most in need of this information.) Some possible peacetime measures are suggested below.

* The greater the external military pressures, the more the difference in the estimates of these factions may be reduced.

** This exchange need not be formal or explicit. Mutual reading and study of the strategic literature can do much.
Prewar Preparation

It may be argued that the domestic political dispute among diehards, realists, and subversives concerning the timing of war termination that has been identified in the historical studies of World War I and II have little if any relevance for the termination of a general nuclear war in the future, because there will be insufficient time for such factions to form and for the contest among them to be resolved. This would be a valid criticism of the relevance of the internal factional dispute to future general war termination, in these cases where such a war was initiated by a "bolt out of the blue" surprise attack. However, it seems more likely that any future general war will be initiated following a period of extreme tension concerned with one or more relatively local crises, such as those that have occurred in Berlin, Korea, the Middle East, Cuba, and in Southeast Asia. If it is assumed that one of the most likely ways in which a general nuclear war of the future will be initiated will be with escalation from a more limited local conflict, then it also seems reasonable to assume that diehard, realist, and subversive factions may have had time to form in the belligerent governments, at least with respect to that antecedent local crisis.

Although the domestic factional dispute may have formed prior to the initiation of a general nuclear war as a result of a more limited local conflict that led to the general war, the alignment of the factions may not necessarily be the same after the situation changes from one of limited to general war. In the case of Japan in 1941, for example, the Navy faction tended to favor an aggressive policy for capturing sources of oil in the Netherlands East Indies, while toward the end of the war it was also the Navy faction that was on the whole among the realists favoring prompt termination of the war. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev himself may have been in the faction that favored aggressive exploitation of local advantage, but a most cautious response to U.S. strategic threats. Nevertheless, in spite of the
possible changed alignment of the domestic factions disputing the issues of war and peace, the fact remains that prior to the initiation of a future general war, such factions are in fact likely to have been formed by the antecedent crisis, even if they change sides when the crisis escalates.

It might conceivably be in the best interests of potential belligerents for the domestic conflict between "hard" and "soft", or at least diehard and realist factions, to be kept alive by intellectual debate. This would tend to reduce the time required for the activation of the diehard, realist, and possibly subversive factions during a limited crisis, thereby reducing the danger of the limited crisis developing so quickly that it precludes formation of these factions before a general war is initiated. If such factions had not had time to form, the domestic conflict over war termination might not be resolved promptly and effectively. One way of maintaining this factional contest even during times relatively free of crises in the East-West conflict, would be to maintain a fairly active level of intellectual debate both internally and internationally concerning potential international military conflicts and the strategic options that might be exercised in their resolution.

It might also be important for a nuclear power to declare peace terms in advance of a nuclear war or even a crisis, specifying different terms for the most likely military outcomes. This could avoid delays in communication, authentication, and adversary understanding, thereby facilitating prompt termination. (Herman Kahn has proposed both the U.S. and S.U. accepting Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn's World Peace through World Law for purposes of prompt termination when there is no time to negotiate. Unfortunately this book is more fitting for a peace settlement than for an armistice.) Some other possible peace terms are given in the following chart.
# Alternative Peace Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Too Soft (To be believed and respected)</th>
<th>Too Hard (To be tolerated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retain arms</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of alliance, full sovereignty retained</td>
<td>National identity retained, but under victor's hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massive aid, no reparations</td>
<td>Limited reparations following restoration of economy by aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention of war-making regime</td>
<td>Change of government to peaceful, more democratic, pro-Western factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation or inspection</td>
<td>Partial occupation of key government, military, and industrial centers, with inspection of unoccupied areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention of all status quo ante borders, including previous conquests against local inhabitants wills</td>
<td>Withdrawal to historic ethnic cultural borders, with regional self-determination guaranteed by free plebiscites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To Induce Enemy Surrender (Following friendly victory in the military test of strength)

1. Explain to the defeated belligerent how to do it safely
   (safe from "bitter-enders", safe from opponent misunderstanding)

2. Demonstrate the futility of resistance
   (defeated anyway, might as well survive—hopelessness of resistance)

3. Provide credible assurance of good treatment

4. Provide rationalization in enemy terms of the honorableness of surrender—e.g., in terms of enemy patriotism

Surrender Terms:

Obligations Imposed on Defeated

1. Cessation of all belligerent activities

2. Deposition of all weapons at designated points

3. Revelation of all weapons and supply dumps

4. Revelation of all hidden sites, demolitions, mine fields, etc.

5. Orderly assembly of military personnel at designated points

6. Communication to subordinate units of the surrender decision

Conditions to be observed by victor

1. Cessation of all belligerent activities

2. Supply of food and shelter to surrendered personnel

3. Gradual restoration of civil and economic liberties
Minimum Requirements for General Nuclear War Termination

The above measures for achieving a more broadly shared "strategic logic" that is intended to lead very different and opposed belligerents to the identical conclusion from a shared set of military circumstances are unlikely to prove adequate by themselves. Even perfect information available to adversaries will not assure their availing themselves of the most "rational", stable, "saddle-point" or "mini-max" solutions. The impediments to ideal decisions by adversaries with even perfect information include emotional distortions of values, logic, and timing (impatience and anxiety). Trust is at a minimum, and even trust in an adversary's rational choice is eroded by awareness that he may wish to obscure his intent by making intentionally non-rational (randomized) decisions.

Given even the most clear-sighted and humane national leaders, it may be optimistic to believe that they will somehow see through an immense and appalling chaos of mutual destruction to a mutually satisfactory termination in a few hours under the pressures of general nuclear war, when they are unable to resolve their lesser conflicts in the years of peace. It seems likely that only the more "obvious" conditions for termination will have any hope of being realized.

"Obvious" conditions for termination must be explored for general nuclear war, precisely because they are not yet obvious. If the past is any model—and it seems to be in this case—the following minimum conditions probably must exist in even a general nuclear war for a termination to be negotiated well short of weapons exhaustion.

A. The losing nation must have lost, or appear inevitably to lose in current operations, most of its significant military power against the winning nation to a degree recognized by both as practically irreversible. In terms of general nuclear war, this would mean the loss of strategic and tactical counterforce capabilities in the defeated nation, or their imminent loss in the course of ongoing operations, while the winning nation retained such capabilities. In short, the test of military power has been decided irreversibly.*

* This condition may exist before a war has even started, as it does now. The point is that approximately equal adversaries are less likely to end the war than those which have resolved their relative power.
B. Substantial residual military capabilities in the control of the losing nation that could make the unilateral imposition of the victor's will unacceptably costly. In a general nuclear war, this might consist of a few missile-firing submarines or a few survivable ballistic missiles capable of destroying perhaps ten or twenty major cities. (The total population of the ten largest metropolitan areas in the United States is about 50 million, or about one quarter of the nation.)

C. A belief in both the winning and the losing leaderships that the costs of further military action outweigh the probable gains, provided the adversary will agree to termination terms commensurate with the balance of military forces and destruction potential.

D. An operational capacity temporarily to withhold further military action while termination possibilities are being explored, without this resulting in a disproportionate loss of relative residual military capabilities.

E. An operational capacity to communicate, and receive communications of, termination offers. This presupposes not only the existence of technical means of communication, but also the existence of central governments willing and able to make and receive such offers and to execute possible agreements. In the disruption caused by a nuclear war, the latter condition may be attainable only for transient periods of time.

F. Post-war aims and expectations among the belligerents that offer some common ground for agreement. For example, if following a victory of U.S. strategic intercontinental forces and a stalemate of Soviet and NATO forces in Europe, the Soviets insist on occupying Germany and the U.S. insists on Soviet withdrawal to her prewar borders, there will probably not be sufficient common ground for agreement. More radical and pervasive termination agreements are not necessarily less likely to be mutually acceptable—for example, policed general disarmament. However, such fundamental and pervasive measures may require an unprecedented degree of desperation to overcome the understandable mutual distrust and difficulties of enforcement.
In any case, it seems very likely that the belligerents will not be able to negotiate termination unless both sides have "realist" leaders rather than diehards or revolutionaries. The latter faction may do more to disrupt negotiations than it would contribute to prompt willingness to terminate the war.

G. The physical capability of the winner to invade the loser's territory, or execute an equivalent disarming "pacifying", and controlling destruction by bombardment.

H. The loyalty of most of the military leaders on each side to the realist political leaderships, and the mutual assurance that this is actually the case. The enormous firepower under the physical control of even low-level commanders in a general nuclear war makes it essential that any termination agreement be thoroughly enforceable throughout each side's military forces.

I. In the event that a diehard faction obtains and retains control of the substantially defeated nation's forces, it will be necessary physically to destroy it by bombardment or selective occupation or both, or temporarily to agree to its demands while seeking means to unseat it internally.

It seems unhelpful to predict "Full-scale nuclear warfare threatens its target with a level of destruction so high that coordinated activities must largely come to a stop. In such a situation, the loser cannot offer "surrender" in the shape of handing to the winner control over cohesive residual capabilities and over a society that is still a going concern."\(^{241}\) If coordinated activities do come to a stop, then obviously there is no way to coordinate them for a prompt termination. The problem is to plan military forces, command and control systems, and strategies that will make it possible for coordinated activities to survive on our side at least, and in a selective way also on the enemy side. Our military planning should direct itself precisely to the objective of permitting the enemy to hand over to us control over his cohesive residual capabilities and

a society that still functions. If he is not permitted to have that degree of self-control, then he will most probably do us the most grievous automatic damage despite the comparable costs to him. If he is not permitted to retain a society that is still a "going concern", what possible motive can he have for terminating the war without taking his revenge on our cities?

Because the first, more reasonable response to the disaster of nuclear war may fail in part or entirely, and tend toward the second, even greater disaster of a nuclear war to exhaustion, is no reason not to do all that is possible in preparing a capability for the first and lesser disaster. The difference in magnitude in the two disasters is great, although in absolute terms both are disasters. It may also be the difference between a decisive shift in relative power, and a continuation of the same relative power at lower absolute levels. It may be the difference between 20 to 50 million deaths,* and 300 to 500 million deaths. The former would mean a decade of recovery; the latter, the end of Western Civilization as we know it.

There is also an important pre-war, war-preventing advantage of serious efforts made toward terminating a general nuclear war before it escalates from a counterforce exchange to the mutual destruction of populations: "If one country designs its military establishment to terminate war rather than deter war (by punishing the enemy with a retaliatory strike), it is much less likely to indulge in wishful thinking. . . . An official goal that calls for an objective capability to terminate a war in a fashion other than envisaged in the Homicide Pact concept might have a most salutary effect in restraining fanciful notions." 242

As Paul Kecskemeti has pointed out, and as seems confirmed by our own researches, "in nontotal nuclear war, the final political payoffs must be moderate..." 243 Since even the most ideally limited nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to exact a cost comparable to that of World War II, it seems obvious that there is no point to such a war.

242 Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 255.
243 Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender, p. 252.
* Approximately 50 million people were killed in World War II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Termination Characteristic</th>
<th>Past General Wars</th>
<th>Future General Nuclear War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>WWII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent Attrition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Popular Revolt in Loser</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Italy only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of Public Opinion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Coup in Loser</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Leadership</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes and No (Hitler)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated Termination</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Surrender?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Invasion of Homeland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Germany) Yes (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Homeland</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Crimes Trials</td>
<td>No (only low-level)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military acceptance of political leaders' surrender</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mostly yes (some resistance in Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time delay between outcome of military test of strength and political decision to terminate war</td>
<td>Months</td>
<td>1 - 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost in lives lost of time delay between decisive military outcome and political decision to terminate</td>
<td>1 - 2 million</td>
<td>2 - 3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How could a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union be terminated? We have seen how in past wars the decisive outcome of the military test of strength was necessary but not sufficient for termination. It usually led to a domestic conflict in the practically defeated nation's leadership among diehard, realist, and revolutionary factions over when and under what conditions to surrender. If the diehards won this internal conflict, as Hitler did in Nazi Germany, the victors had to invade the defeated nation to destroy, capture, and disarm its residual forces to end the war. If the "realists" won this internal conflict, as they did in Germany in 1918 and at the last moment in Japan in 1945, both victors and vanquished were spared the costs of invasion and the war ended in a negotiated surrender of the defeated nation. If the revolutionaries won the internal conflict, as they did in Russia in 1917, the war also ended in a negotiated surrender of the defeated nation, which however had less bargaining power because of the disruptive effects of revolution on its residual military power. In World Wars I and II, these three termination phases spanned one to two years. In a general nuclear war, these three termination phases are likely to be compressed into a period of days, weeks, or months.

Given the compressed pace of a general nuclear war, the three termination phases are likely to occur almost simultaneously. That is, even while the outcome of the military test of strength is still being decided by an exchange of ballistic missile and bomber strikes, there is likely to be an internal conflict in the belligerent governments* over when and under what terms and how to stop the war, and an exchange of demands and offers between belligerents directed toward negotiating termination. Because of this degree of time compression, and the civilian population's probable lack of communication with and

---

* This domestic conflict over termination will be much more important in the winning nation in a general nuclear war than it has been in past general wars, because of the much greater residual destructive power of the defeated nation.
physical access to the strategic military forces and their commanders, the possibility of revolution in these few days or weeks seems remote compared to what it was in World Wars I and II. If a general nuclear war is not terminated within days or weeks, however, and many cities still survive, the possibility of revolution seems stronger than it did in the past because of the absolute threat to people's lives from a protraction of the war.

We concern ourselves chiefly with the first days or weeks of a general nuclear war, because avoiding the worst kind of counter-city exchanges seems most doubtful for a war protracted beyond that time period. Given the assumption that popular revolutions (but not military or civil coups) can be ruled out in the first weeks of a general nuclear war, it follows that the government and the military are the principal targets for any efforts to persuade the adversary to agree to terminate the war. What can be done by the militarily superior power to convince these decisive groups that they are losing or will soon lose the test of military strength, and that worse things will follow if an end is not made to the war? What can be done to persuade them to terminate the war on the basis of residual power relations rather than on the basis of residual population kill potential (which may be near total for both sides)? What can be done to remove a diehard leadership in the militarily defeated nation that refuses to negotiate termination, and what can be done to replace it with a more realistic leadership?

To convince the Soviet leadership that it was losing or had lost the military test of strength, at a minimum it would be necessary to increase the ratio of U.S. strategic force superiority. This would be most convincing if superiority were increased in each major strategic force type, such as ICBM's, strategic bombers, and missile-launching submarines. An increase in the ratio of total delivery vehicles or total deliverable explosive yield composed of great increases in some types of superiority mixed with small decreases or even the loss of other types of superiority would present a less immediately lucid, more ambiguous outcome to Soviet leaders.

* The effects of radioactive fallout from the counterforce strikes on incompletely sheltered urban and rural populations within several weeks of the start of the war may render distinctions between counterforce and countervalue academic. Fallout shelters help to preserve a useful distinction.

294
The counterforce campaign attaining increased strategic force superiority should probably be carried at least to the point of diminishing returns in force ratio improvement, consistent with the observation of pre-set (undesired) collateral damage limits. An argument can also be made for carrying the counterforce campaign to the point of minimum enemy residual firepower, rather than to diminishing or zero force ratio improvement, even at the cost of reducing the final U.S. force superiority ratio. This would be most desirable if there were any hope of reducing the enemy residual counter-population kill potential against the U.S. to a relatively small value compared to the collateral kills from the counterforce exchange, such as perhaps in the range of one to ten million. However, if the Soviet force inventory absolute levels are as high as they are now or higher, and if the U.S. continues to leave its cities undefended, it seems most unlikely that even a very successful U.S. strike could immediately reduce the Soviet residual counter-population potential to less than the ten reliable ICBM’s or sub-launched ballistic missiles or defense-penetrating strategic bombers needed to kill 50,000,000 Americans. (Our European allies’ populations are obviously very much more vulnerable to the much more numerous and survivable—because—mobile Soviet continental air and missile forces.)

If, then, there is no reasonable hope of reducing the Soviet residual kill potential to less than 50,000,000 without massive sheltering and anti-missile defenses, it does not seem worth sacrificing much of the U.S. superiority ratio to reduce it from, say, 55,000,000 to 50,000,000. An overwhelming U.S. superiority of five-to-one with a 55,000,000 Soviet countervalue residual might better impress the Soviets with the futility of further action than a modest U.S. superiority of two-to-one with a 50,000,000 Soviet countervalue residual (provided that the superiority can be made meaningful).

The above conclusion might be valid even if the Soviet leader is a fanatic diehard like Hitler. At first examination one would tend to think that, under such circumstances, the U.S. counterforce effort should be carried to the point of minimum Soviet residual countervalue power, since with a Hitler, restraint cannot be hoped for. This might not be the case, however, since the large U.S.
counterforce superiority might better be used to "decapitate" such a ferocious regime and thereby end the immediate countervalue threat to the U.S., than to leave that regime intact and merely reduce its countervalue threat by some small percentage.

U.S. Counterforce Superiority Ratio

1. Point of diminishing returns in U.S. Counterforce Superiority Ratio improvement.

2. Point of diminishing U.S. Counterforce Superiority Ratio.

Soviet Countervalue Residual against U.S. population (millions)

3. Point of no further reduction in Soviet Countervalue Residual (Counterforce "saturation").

Three Alternative Degrees of U.S. Counterforce Effort
The above considerations may all be rather academic if post-strike bomb damage assessment (BDA) and own forces status information is not available to both the U.S. and Soviet leaderships. Without BDA and status of forces information, the U.S. would be unable to detect the point of diminishing improvement in superiority, or the subsequent point of diminishing superiority, or the subsequent point of no further reduction in Soviet countervalue residual. Without such survivable information inputs, the Soviets would be unable to detect the trend of increasing U.S. superiority, or the subsequent trend of decreasing Soviet countervalue residual against the U.S. population, or the subsequent trend of decreasing U.S. superiority as vulnerable Soviet force targets are exhausted (counterforce "saturation").

An alternate criterion for halting or pausing in the counterforce campaign might be either the point of U.S. counterforce "saturation" (no more vulnerable Soviet force targets), or some minimum U.S. residual countervalue superiority ratio or absolute value, whichever was attained first.
In the absence of an expected U.S. and Soviet capability to supply such information to respective leaderships, the U.S. might have to compromise between the objective of retaining maximum force superiority, and that of reducing Soviet countervalue potential to a minimum. For example, the U.S. might plan to persist in its counterforce attacks until either its estimated force superiority diminished to, say, two-to-one, or until there remained no further Soviet force targets offering a high probability of kill. Another possibility in this context would be for the U.S. to make a maximum counterforce effort, while retaining only enough countervalue residual believed to be sufficient to deter or punish any major Soviet countervalue attacks. This might consist of perhaps twenty Polaris missiles deployed in four or five individual submarines. In this case the U.S. would in effect trade its strategic force superiority for maximum U.S. population survival. If post-attack BDA and status information are available to only one of the belligerents, he will have a significant advantage in terminating the war on his terms. This is not only because he will be able to allocate his forces much more efficiently (by using the shoot-look-shoot firing doctrine and reducing multiple targeting to compensate for unreliability), but also because he will be able to pause for negotiations after the "best" degree of counterforce effort (depending on the criterion chosen). For example, if the U.S. alone had post-attack BDA and status information, it would know when to withhold further firing, while the enemy might continue to degrade his situation further by continued efforts of diminishing utility.

If BDA and status information were available only to the Soviets, it would raise the possibility of Soviet bluffing concerning the actual amount of counterforce damage imposed by the U.S. strikes. The Soviets might claim to have retained most of their missile force, while much of the U.S. missile force was attrited by having been launched. This bluff could be used to back up a Soviet surrender demand, or to stall the response to a U.S. surrender demand. It would be many hours before the Soviet claim to superiority (or non-inferiority) could be substantiated, even if they cooperated by permitting unarmed overflight inspection.
In addition to carrying the campaign to the point of maximizing one or more of the above criteria, certain targeting selections may enhance the visible impressiveness of the U.S. force superiority and emphasize the futility of continued Soviet resistance. Such targets might include aircraft fuels, electric power, railroad transport, and some communications. The denial of these domestic resources would frustrate dramatically and immediately the re-allocation of forces for continued war, as well as resulting in directly frustrating experiences for many civil and military commanders attempting to communicate with or travel among various key areas and/or units. The writings of Nazi German and Japanese officers are eloquent in their expressions of the demoralizing impact of such operational frustrations.

The historical studies have shown that achievement of over-all military dominance, by itself, usually fails to convince the losing nation to surrender. The internal political conflict among the losing nation's leaders could be accelerated and influenced in past wars by propaganda, diplomatic feelers, subversive operations, support of dissident factions, and selective military pressures. In a general nuclear war, only the military pressures are likely to be available to the winning nation. If the winning nation fails to use the military superiority it has gained in the initial test of national power to motivate the losing nation's surrender, it may lose a most transient opportunity to terminate the war on relatively favorable terms.

The problem is, how can the winning nation in a general nuclear war—presumably the United States for the foreseeable future—use its military superiority to persuade the losing nation—presumably the Soviet Union—to surrender?

In World War I it was the military threat of invasion and occupation, rendered completely credible by the military superiority of the victorious enemy, that motivated first Bolshevik Russia and then Imperial Germany to accept German and then Allied surrender terms, respectively. This was clearly shown when Trotsky at first refused to accept German surrender terms at Brest-Litovsk, whereupon the German Army began to invade Russia and forced the Bolsheviks to accept the terms.
In World War II, the threat of Anglo-American and Russian invasion of Nazi Germany failed to induce the diehard Nazi regime to surrender. The German anti-Nazi opposition, however, unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Hitler, hoping to prevent invasion by a selective partial surrender to the Anglo-Americans and thus strengthened one-front resistance to Russian attack. The Japanese moderates and realists barely managed to prevent the carnage of an American invasion of the home islands by overcoming the political resistance of their Army diehards to surrender.

In World War I it was clearly the credible and imminent threat of invasion and occupation that convinced the Bolshevik Russian and Imperial German leaders that the conditional surrenders demanded offered the lesser evil. In World War II the situations were less clear. Nazi Germany did not surrender until Germany itself had been invaded and occupied by force, the German Army battered and cut up into isolated pockets, and the German war economy mostly destroyed or occupied. In a sense the Dönitz provisional regime's surrender in May of 1945 did little more than to formalize the successful armed occupation of most of Germany by United Nations forces. Nevertheless, conservative and realistic German military leaders had attempted to overthrow Hitler and make peace, hoping thereby to avoid further air bombardment and at least Soviet occupation. In the case of Japan, it was probably the loss of life threatened by further bombardment and by invasion, rather than the threat of hostile occupation, that persuaded the moderates and the Emperor that American surrender terms must be accepted. Thus while in World War I the limited range and lethality of bombardment made enemy invasion and physical occupation the principal disaster to be avoided by surrender, in World War II the great destructiveness of further air bombardment posed a possibly even greater national disaster than surrender. Clearly it was the effect of these continued military threats that resolved the domestic political conflict over when and under what conditions to surrender (except in the case of diehard Nazi Germany).
In a general nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the military threats the U.S. might exercise to induce Soviet surrender following a successful U.S. counterforce campaign are still destruction by bombardment and occupation by force. What has changed radically is that a U.S. threat of nuclear city bombardment would be very likely to be deterred by a corresponding Soviet counter-threat which probably cannot be eliminated by a counterforce campaign. It is as if Hitler or WWII Japan had had control of ten or twenty large nuclear bombs planted in the largest Allied cities. Conceivably a strategically superior U.S. could threaten to destroy two Soviet cities for every one U.S. or allied city destroyed, but a bitterly determined Soviet leader cannot be counted on to surrender under this threat when he knows that the U.S. would (or should!) shrink at the cost of 50,000,000 Americans. The Soviet leader might also have been rendered somewhat insensitive to a further loss of Russian life if many millions had already succumbed to radioactive fallout as a result of massive U.S. counterforce strikes.*

The other historic form of military pressure, the threat of occupation by force (invasion), completely lacks credibility under current U.S. military capabilities. A massive U.S. invasion army of 10,000,000, the survivable bases to house it, the survivable air and sea lift to transport it to Eurasia, and the survivable logistics to support it are probably technically feasible. However, such a force could not be assembled in a few weeks in a United States at least partly devastated by Soviet nuclear bombardment unless massive preparations had been made in peacetime. The cost of such preparations, together with the conscription of manpower required, would probably not be politically feasible without a truly draconian Soviet threat of several years unremitting duration.

* The likelihood of a Soviet leadership being somewhat more responsive to U.S. counter-city threats if most Soviet cities have survived does not by any means assure such responsiveness if the U.S. executes a city-avoidance targeting policy.
The two historic forms of military pressure—invasion and bombardment—used to induce surrender thus appear impractical for the early termination of a general nuclear war between the United States and Russia.* Are there then no feasible alternatives to termination by persuasion and, that failing, mutual population destruction, or an eventual massive invasion after at least months of limited strategic nuclear warfare that continually threatens to expand to mutual population destruction?

Perhaps. If, by great self-restraint and command and control systems more survivable and positively controlling than any now operational, both sides have settled down to an excruciatingly tense stalemate in which the U.S. counterforce campaign has attained great strategic force superiority, and Soviet armies have occupied Western Europe, and both sides refrain from city bombardment—then there is still something the United States can do with its strategic superiority to win back the prize of Europe without a decade's effort of invasion.

U.S. strategic forces, with their strategic superiority presumably capable of overcoming Soviet air and missile defenses, could systematically destroy the war-making economy of Russia, Eastern Europe, and even a Russian-occupied Western Europe; without the worst degree of countervalue destruction of densely populated urban areas. They could do this by multiple interdiction bombardment, using strategic aircraft and missiles to deliver accurately low and intermediate yield nuclear warheads to transportation, fuel refinery and storage, and electric power generating targets. Air burst could be used to limit fallout. Manufacturing plants located in or near heavily populated areas would be spared to avoid collateral damage to populations, but their raw material and power inputs and production outputs would be interdicted by the disruption of railroads, bridges, canals, airfields, fuel, and power. The strategic interdiction campaign could be carried out in such a way as to break up the Soviet and satellite economies into relatively inefficient, individually non-self-supporting regions that would have to concentrate largely on food production for survival. Such a systematic and sustained disruption of national economies and administrations would probably threaten the Soviet leaders with loss of political control before many months had passed.

* A third historic form of military pressure—blockade—does not apply to nearly transcontinental powers such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union, because their great areas encompass practically all resources required for war.
The above strategy of sustained strategic interdiction is less potentially suicidal than the attempt to coerce surrender by city bombardment, and more practical than massive ground force invasion and occupation. However, it would probably cause substantial indirect collateral damage to populations through hardship and hunger, although these hardships are a lesser evil for the population than nuclear bombardment. Also, it would require either a very substantial number of strategic air and missile delivery vehicles at the start of the war, or a survivable vehicle production capability. Thousands of low and intermediate yield nuclear warheads would have to be survivably stockpiled before the war began, as well as survivable aircraft fuel storage and production facilities.*

Given the above capability to terminate a general nuclear war on terms favorable to the U.S., and the U.S. strategic superiority needed to win the strategic test of strength so that it can be brought into play, and a U.S. strategic doctrine clearly presenting the above choice as the safest of several alternatives, deterrence of a direct Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or Western Europe would probably be enhanced. Further, the credibility of U.S. intervention against limited aggression elsewhere would also be strengthened. Nevertheless, even the above lesser evil depends for its quality of lesser evil on a fragile concatenation of mutual restraint, control, and predictability that fails to justify any optimism about the outcome of a general nuclear war.

Instead of hundreds of millions of dead, there might thereby result tens of millions of dead. That is still a catastrophe. Perhaps the most worthwhile result of nuclear powers preparing such general war termination capabilities will be a more widespread thinking through of such a war. That thinking through will show how indecisive the political outcome of such a war (in the sense of initial political objectives) is likely to be. Tens of millions of deaths, with an irreducibly great risk of hundreds of millions of deaths, is too high a price for stalemate, if a stalemate can be had without such a war.

* Nuclear-powered aircraft look particularly attractive for this contingency of probably disrupted organic fuel production.
The above strategy of sustained strategic interdiction is less potentially suicidal than the attempt to coerce surrender by city bombardment, and more practical than massive ground force invasion and occupation. However, it would probably cause substantial indirect collateral damage to populations through hardship and hunger, although these hardships are a lesser evil for the population than nuclear bombardment. Also, it would require either a very substantial number of strategic air and missile delivery vehicles at the start of the war, or a survivable vehicle production capability. Thousands of low and intermediate yield nuclear warheads would have to be survivably stockpiled before the war began, as well as survivable aircraft fuel storage and production facilities.*

Given the above capability to terminate a general nuclear war on terms favorable to the U.S., and the U.S. strategic superiority needed to win the strategic test of strength so that it can be brought into play, and a U.S. strategic doctrine clearly presenting the above choice as the safest of several alternatives, deterrence of a direct Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or Western Europe would probably be enhanced. Further, the credibility of U.S. intervention against limited aggression elsewhere would also be strengthened. Nevertheless, even the above lesser evil depends for its quality of lesser evil on a fragile concatenation of mutual restraint, control, and predictability that fails to justify any optimism about the outcome of a general nuclear war.

Instead of hundreds of millions of dead, there might thereby result tens of millions of dead. That is still a catastrophe. Perhaps the most worthwhile result of nuclear powers preparing such general war termination capabilities will be a more widespread thinking through of such a war. That thinking through will show how indecisive the political outcome of such a war (in the sense of initial political objectives) is likely to be. Tens of millions of deaths, with an irreducibly great risk of hundreds of millions of deaths, is too high a price for stalemate, if a stalemate can be had without such a war.

* Nuclear-powered aircraft look particularly attractive for this contingency of probably disrupted organic fuel production.
1. Strategic force superiority (control of aerospace).

2. Command and Control survivable throughout the war, capable of digesting intelligence and retargeting weapons, and communicating with several echelons of the enemy command structure when needed.

3. Target intelligence survivable throughout the war.

4. Political intelligence concerning the factions and their relative power in the enemy government and military command.

5. A. Strategic Interdiction Capability vs. Eurasia

   (capacity to detect and destroy thousands of small-area semi-hard targets (bridges, RR, power plants, refineries with minimum collateral damage)—also permits decapitation attack if needed)

   OR

   B. Survivable Strategic Invasion and Occupation Capability vs. Eurasia

   (Ground, sealift, airlift, and tactical air forces, and their logistic support, sufficient to invade Eurasia, overcome all resistance (including nuclear), and occupy most urban centers of power—at least several million men.

   OR

   C. TOTAL Counterforce, requiring:

   (for offense: Large superiority, much recce-strike, effective ASW

   (for defense: Working blast shelters for population and economy, plus massive active defenses

   OR

   Mixes of A B and C

504
Some Caveats for General War Termination Efforts

Decapitation attack might defeat its own objective of preventing enemy countervalue retaliation, by removing all restraint from subordinate military commands. Decapitation should be used only in cases where a "Hitler" type diehard forces the military to continue a war against their better judgment. Where it is the military that are restrained from diehard desperation attacks by the government, as in World War II Japan, it would be most dangerous to remove that government suddenly and violently.

It may not be possible to determine whether the enemy government has a diehard or realistic attitude toward termination. If a mistake is made in this determination, in an incorrect assessment leading either to decapitation of a restraining government or non-action against a fanatic diehard regime, the result could be a spasm countervalue response.

The enemy may not be willing to suffer a strategic interdiction campaign without resorting to countervalue retaliation in the form of population attacks. It might be impossible to limit the collateral damage from the strategic interdiction campaign sufficiently to render it clearly distinguishable from a counter-population campaign. Also, the indirect effects of even a very precise counter-economy interdiction campaign, such as interruption of food and fuel distribution, may cause such starvation as to be in effect merely a protracted form of counter-population attack.
APPENDIX VIIA

TERMINATION CONSIDERATIONS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC BREAKDOWN

There is considerable direct and indirect evidence that may be gathered both from written reports and from personnel interviews, to the effect that both in Germany and Japan at the end of World War II the population would probably have continued to resist indefinitely without either invasion or top-level termination of the war. It seems that under the massive disruptive impact of bombardment, people turned to the accustomed sources of authority and administration for support. In Germany, for example, according to the U.S.S.R.S., the propensity to accept surrender was somewhat less in the most heavily bombed cities than in the more moderately bombed cities (although this may have been attributable to the less resistant persons having been evacuated). A possible conclusion would be that there is little likelihood of a revolt against a war-making regime from below because of the impact of civil destruction, at least in such totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany, World War II Japan, Soviet Russia, and Communist China. A major implication for the termination situation of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is that it would seem relatively unlikely that the Soviet population, potentially terrorized by the Communist secret police and possibly driven to even greater loyalty to their accustomed administrative and political machinery, would rebel against their government under the impact of widespread destruction. Moreover, a nuclear environment would pose especially severe problems for any rebellion.

The immediate post-World War II experience in Germany and Japan also suggests the need for discrimination in the changing of the old for a new administration by the occupying forces. In Germany, the allies ejected all Nazi party members from positions of administrative responsibility, thereby causing considerable administrative chaos and a major delay in the resumption of normal civil functions. This policy was executed on the basis of a misguided notion that all Nazi party members were ideologically dedicated Nazis. In fact, many professional German civil officials and
administrators had been forced to become Nazi party members, and were largely a-political. Their undiscriminating ejection from administrative posts, together with the ejection of ideologically committed Nazis, substantially disrupted the resumption of normal civil operations in post-war Germany.

In Japan, on the other hand, the American occupation made full use of the indigenous Japanese administration, satisfying itself with the ejection of only a small number of the top leaders. Possibly this more discriminating and effective policy was carried out because of a lesser cultural familiarity with the Japanese than with the Germans, and the absence of such a clear-cut, crude but simple distinction between "party" and "non-party" people as existed in Nazi Germany.

If it were considered necessary to occupy parts of the Soviet Union in the course of a war, it would thus appear to be unwise indiscriminately to remove all Communist party members from administrative office. Since some 5% of the population are party members, and much like in Germany the senior administrative posts require party membership, there may be many competent and relatively non-political administrators who are only nominal Communist party members.* To enforce a blanket exclusion of Communist party members from administrative office in occupied areas might simply disrupt administration, much as it did in Germany after World War II, with such a disruption reducing the acceptability of the occupation to the population.

In any attempt to persuade a great power such as the Soviet Union to terminate a war, if the top leadership of the government cannot be thus persuaded, the administrative machinery of that government may have to be destroyed or pre-empted. To destroy it means to disrupt all centralized control of Soviet weapons. This might have disastrous consequences for population targets in the West. To control it, however, may require destroying parts of it—possibly only some particular channels of communication connecting the top leadership with the rest of the network and thereby isolating the leadership. Another and possibly more favorable action

* How nominal party members can be discriminated from dedicated ones is itself a subject requiring considerable research.
would be to attempt to obtain control of various dispersed parts of the administrative network, thereby only selectively disrupting it. These points of control may act as filters that permitted the transit of messages that facilitate termination, but deny the transfer of messages directed toward continuing the struggle.

When considering how best to attempt to achieve control of the administrative network of a country to induce its surrender against the will of a recalcitrant leadership, it is of obvious interest to determine which functional or political factions might be most accessible to control and/or take over as a means of carrying out such a strategy. There have been many years of repeated indications of both administrative and political conflicts between the Soviet Communist party and the Red Army organization. To a surprising degree, this conflict includes elements reminiscent of the conflict between the German Wehrmacht and the Nazi party in the 1930's and early 1940's, and also between the Japanese diplomatic service, and to a lesser extent, the Japanese Navy on the one hand, and the more militaristic and expansionist Japanese Army.

If for the moment it is assumed that the Red Army presents a logical alternative administrative structure to seize for denying and counter-acting the Communist party and government administrative structure in an attempt to achieve termination, it is of interest to determine what part of the vast military administrative organization would be most susceptible to outside influence. In this respect also, at least the history of World War I indicates that it is the non-fighting military forces that are most susceptible to revolutionary appeals. The Petrograd Garrison, and the German sailors at Kiel had experienced the least amount of fighting among the armed forces in their respective wars. The soldiers that were involved in the greatest amount of action, such as the Russian front line infantry and the German infantry and U-boat sailors, in most cases remained possibly hopelessly but still loyally devoted to their duties until they were ordered to lay down their arms. Thus there is at least the suggestion that the most lucrative target in the military administrative machinery for appeals for rebellion against the legitimate
political authority, would be those units least involved in any military action. In the Soviet Union, this group might well be the police armies developed to maintain internal order, or possibly once again the Soviet (surface) Navy. Red Army units stationed well within the Soviet Union might also be considered.

To control these potentially dissident groups, or even to strongly influence them, command of the air over Eurasia would be desirable. It would permit the selective isolation of diehard elements by interdiction of their communications, and the selective netting together of friendly elements by dropping in agents and other means. With control of the air, communications between diehard elements and surviving nuclear forces could be cut, reducing the danger of desperate uses of it. Ballistic missiles are probably essential for suppressing enemy air defenses to the point where friendly aircraft penetrations do not suffer heavy losses (among other things), but they alone cannot achieve these highly discriminating termination tasks. Without aircraft, a blind duel to stalemate or destruction seems unavoidable once a general nuclear war is initiated. With strategic aircraft, there appears to be a slim possibility of a termination on terms favorable to the United States.
APPENDIX VIIIB

BASIC REPLANNING AND RETARGETING LOGICS
IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

Changes of strategic option must be simulated in any complete model of general nuclear war, since such changes are both possible and potentially decisive for the outcome of a war. Furthermore, in such a model the playing out of a war through several successive weapons exchanges is likely to reveal important survivability, command control, and retargeting requirements not apparent in the simulation of a single, initial exchange.

Changes of strategic option may result from various outcomes (own and enemy force losses, operabilities, collateral damage, enemy operations such as European invasion, etc.) of the initial exchange. Because the option change occurs after both sides' forces and targets have been affected by the initial strike, the weapons-to-targets matching planned for a particular option when used as an initial strike will have to be modified by the new conditions. Even the choice of continuing the war with the same option as was used initially will therefore require retargeting. Retargeting should occur in every cycle. Replanning (option change) may or may not occur, but when it does it also requires additional retargeting. These relations are shown schematically in the following diagram.
There are four decision sets to be considered, each requiring its own logic and criteria for choice. These are:

- Initial option
- Replanned option
- Retargeted weapons-to-targets matchings
- Termination

The initial and replanned strategic options available for choice, both initially and for replanning, are assumed to be the five of:

- Counterforce, value avoidance (CFVA)
- Counterforce (CF)
- Counterforce plus countervalue ("bonus") (CFCV)
- Counter-population (CP)
- Counter-economy (CE)
Each of these strategic options is directed toward the destruction of a particular class of targets, sometimes with the explicit intention of not destroying another class of targets (as in counterforce-value avoidance), sometimes with the explicit intention of achieving bonus effects against another class of targets, and sometimes simply disregarding side effects (as in straight counterforce).

The criteria for choice of the initial and subsequent (replanned) strategic targeting options may be either descriptive or normative in a model. In the case of initial option choice, it seems most direct simply to assume that American and Soviet expressions of strategic doctrine are descriptive, and should be considered first. They may not be normative doctrines, but that might be revealed most promptly by their simulation. At this time, the preferred American and Soviet doctrinal choices of initial options appear to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed Initial Option Choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. initial option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. U. initial option</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note the invariance of Soviet initial option choice with differing initial conditions, reflecting a lack of discrimination in Soviet strategic literature between their initiating or responding to a nuclear attack—they do not admit the possibility of their preempting. Note also the uncertainty in the U.S. choice of option in the event of a mutual or Soviet preemption, reflecting a schism in U.S. doctrine concerning our retaliatory response between counter-
force and finite deterrence advocates. This schism may be bridged in a simulation by assuming, as Herman Kahn does, that U.S. response should depend on the counterforce and value losses imposed by the initial enemy attack. This of course assumes that U.S. decision makers know the capability of their surviving forces and the value damage sustained quickly enough to base their response decision on this information—possibly a rather doubtful assumption. For purposes of simplicity, however, we will base our assumptions on Kahn as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surviving U.S. Force Capability</th>
<th>Surviving Population and Economy</th>
<th>U.S. initial RETalilatory option</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 90% of original capability</td>
<td>Over 90%</td>
<td>CFVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 70% of original capability</td>
<td>Over 70%</td>
<td>CF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50% of original capability</td>
<td>Over 50%</td>
<td>CFCV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20% of original capability</td>
<td>Over 20%</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 20% of original capability</td>
<td>Under 20%</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FLEXIBLE WAR PLANS FOR DEFENDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability of Surviving Force</th>
<th>Assumed Level of Damage</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negligible Counterforce</td>
<td>80-100%</td>
<td>All-out countervalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Countervalue</td>
<td>40-80%</td>
<td>All-out counterforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Counterforce High</td>
<td>40-80%</td>
<td>Some withholding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countervalue</td>
<td>10-40%</td>
<td>Careful counterforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Counterforce High</td>
<td>10-40%</td>
<td>Much withholding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countervalue</td>
<td>0-10%</td>
<td>Temorizing Measure or very discriminating counterforce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

313
We have modified Kahn's proposal in the direction of what we believe to be greater realism, although not necessarily greater sense. Thus where Kahn calls for CFVA at levels of population and economy damage up to 40%, we assume that when 30% damage is reached the response will shift to all-out counterforce (CF). Where Kahn shifts to countervalue abruptly at the extreme value damage level of 80%, we assume a shift by degrees (CE, than CP), but at less extreme levels (CE at over 50% damage, CP at over 80% damage).

The choice of replanned options following the above initial choices is even less clear, but we must make some plausible assumptions to get on with our model. For the U.S., it seems reasonable to assume that the above criteria determining the initial response will persist for subsequent replanned responses, provided command and control survive. The survival of command and control depends partly on the option choices made by the Soviets. The anticipated Soviet "mixed" attack on U.S. forces, government and military command centers, and important urban-industrial areas would place a severe strain on the survival of U.S. command and control. In the event of failure of U.S. command and control, it seems reasonable to assume that the option progression (or "escalation") from counterforce to countervalue targeting would be accelerated. For modeling purposes, therefore, it may be assumed that the loss and damage criteria determining the initial U.S. response will persist unless the Soviets, by persisting in countervalue attacks, disrupt U.S. command and control. At this point the U.S. response will be one step further in the direction of all-out countervalue response, than it would have been based on U.S. losses and damage alone. It will be assumed that U.S. political command and control becomes disrupted at the point of 30% population loss. The same assumption seems plausible for the Soviet side.

The retargeting that occurs in successive cycles of option choice will also be assumed to revert to preplanned targets if command and control becomes disrupted. If these preplanned targets are forces, the absence of bomb damage assessment inputs from the now disrupted command and control system
will result in many wasteful launchings of weapons at targets no longer active. If the preplanned targets are population or economy, they will be destroyed with undiminished efficiency when command and control fails.

Provided command and control survives, retargeting will be assumed to be on a rational, efficient basis. The following rules for weapons-to-targets matching changes will be assumed:

**Basic Retargeting Rules**

1. When known enemy single unit (e.g., ICBM silo) force targets exceed own counterforce-capable ($P_k > .2$) unit inventory, cease all counterforce action, except where enemy non-dispersed targets (e.g., full airfield, carrier) offers opportunity for improving relative force ratio by destroying several enemy weapons with only one of own.

2. If still owning superior force inventory but having struck all known force targets with at least one weapon, and if still owning strategic aircraft for recon, send in 20 B52's for BDA and launch "best" (see below) residual missiles at 80% of surviving enemy ICBM holes (B52 cannot tell if launched) after 15-hour delay for BDA mission.

3. Launch vulnerable weapons first.

4. Launch vulnerable weapons at enemy time-urgent vulnerable targets first, non-time urgent targets last.

5. If $P_k \geq .8$ on single weapon target, launch only one weapon at it. On multiple weapon target (airfield, carrier), launch no more weapons at it than can achieve $P_k \geq .95$.

6. Among weapons of equal vulnerability, launch shorter-range or overseas (land-based) weapons first.

7. Where weapons in a force category go out of commission after a certain time for lack of maintenance, launch the remaining available weapons at the best remaining targets when half the surviving force category is disabled due to lack of intra-war maintenance.
The termination criteria are most uncertain. Some candidate criteria are listed below merely to indicate the complexity of the problem:

1. Minimum probability of general war (\(? = function of maximum punishment, maximum credibility of punishment, or both\))

2. Minimum U.S. and allied civilian population loss (best achieved by what mix of active defense, passive defense, and enemy offensive suppression?)

3. Combination of (1) and (2) above.

4. Maximization of relative military power (what mix of strategic and tactical?)

5. Maximization of relative economic power (including denial of Soviet occupation of Western Europe).

6. Combination of (4) and (5) above.

7. Maximization of relative population level in Western and Communist alliances.

8. Maximization of total (all belligerents and neutrals) population survival.


10. Combinations of the above.

There are difficult questions of feasibility, national interest, morality, and historical purpose to be resolved before any one or combination of the above criteria can be chosen for termination. (The exhaustion of firepower is not listed, since it is not a chosen criterion but rather an abdication from all rational choice.)
Historical research on the terminations of World Wars I and II indicates that the losing nation is the one that makes the final termination decision, and that this decision is sensitive to the political objectives of the government and its principal opposition. For a Hitler-type diehard regime, the termination criterion is close to (the losing side's) weapons exhaustion. For a realist government such as that of Prince Max of Baden in the Imperial Germany of 1918, the termination criterion is a balancing of the costs of further resistance against the costs imposed by the surrender terms, and is therefore very sensitive to those surrender terms.* For a revolutionary government such as that of Lenin and Trotsky in World War I Bolshevik Russia, the termination criterion is that of the earliest possible end to the war that leaves most of the nation intact, so that the domestic crisis of counter-revolution can be dealt with.

In terms of a quasi-quantitative model of general war, the above termination criteria must be expressed in quantitative form to be useful. The diehard termination criterion would be the exhaustion of all strategic weapons, by reason of expenditure, direct enemy action, side effects, or total loss of control. In a simple model, it may be assumed that a diehard termination simply means weapons exhaustion from expenditure and losses to enemy bombardment.

A "realist" termination criterion in quantitative terms is more difficult to define, since it depends on the winner's terms of surrender and the loser's evaluation of these terms. The severity of the winner's terms are likely to be directly related to the severity of the value damage he has sustained at the hands of the loser. The costs of continued war that the loser

* The Japanese surrender in 1945 is another case of war termination by a "realist" regime, albeit almost belatedly. It lies somewhere on a spectrum between the "prompt" realist termination of Imperial Germany in 1918, and the diehard termination of physical exhaustion by bombardment and invasion of Nazi Germany.
must balance against the costs of the surrender terms will depend on what value he has left to lose (residual value), the winner's capacity to destroy that residual value, and the loser's capacity to deter or deny the winner's destruction of that residual value.

The denial of the winner's capacity to destroy loser value, by the counterforce activities of the loser, may be temporarily dismissed as an unlikely case since presumably the winner is the winner precisely because he has an irreversible counterforce superiority. The loser's capacity to deter the winner's threat of value destruction cannot be dismissed, when a residual of only a few dozen survivable strategic nuclear missiles on the losing side could impose a penalty of tens of millions of deaths on the winner if he executes his threat (unless he has an effective ABM system).

The loser's ability to deter the winner's countervalue threat by his own residual countervalue capability will depend on the winner's residual value, as well as on the loser's residual countervalue capability. If the winner has little left to lose, he may be ferocious and undeterred by any residual threat the loser can express. If the winner is lucky enough to have escaped major losses, and the loser has suffered very heavily, the loser's threat is of greater credibility.

In quantitative terms, the loser must balance the following costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs of Surrender</th>
<th>vs.</th>
<th>Costs of Continued War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy losses in winner,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Winner's countervalue residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard terms.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(capacity for imposing costs of continued war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate losses in winner,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loser's value residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate terms.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(maximum costs of continued war subject to winner's countervalue capacity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight losses in winner,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loser's countervalue residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Easy&quot; terms.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(to deter winner's threat of imposing countervalue costs for continued war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winner's value residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(maximum costs of continued war subject to loser's countervalue capacity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Presumably the winner will have tried to deter heavy losses to himself by the threat of hard terms. He is also likely to be less tender in his mercies after having suffered heavily. He may also believe it essential to his political survival to impose hard terms if his physical losses have threatened that survival.
The costs of surrender must be made commensurate with the costs of continued war in order to reach a conclusion in a quantitative model. This may be done by expressing both surrender costs and continued war costs in the common terms of population and economy value losses. Total loss of political control for a diehard government may be perceived as comparable to total loss of the population, the fanatic political beliefs of the dishards not distinguishing between loss of loyalty and loss of life. Moderate loss of political control may look like moderate loss of life to a diehard regime, or look like the equivalent of a slight loss of life to a realist regime with a longer view.

In view of the above, let us assume for this model that over 30% fatalities will constitute "heavy losses" in the winner, between 5% and 30% will constitute "moderate" losses, and under 5% will constitute "slight" losses. Terms will then be hard, moderate, or "easy" corresponding to these losses in the winner. Let us assume further that terms can be expressed as a combination of population costs and economic costs (by territorial losses and reparations). Hard terms are arbitrarily defined as 30% population loss (all of Eastern Europe and some of European Russia, for example) and 50% economy loss. Moderate terms may be defined as 20% population loss and 20% economy loss. "Easy" terms may be defined as no further losses of population or economy, but enforced disarmament (with the opportunity cost of no foreseeable returns from future aggression).

The loser must balance these now somewhat arbitrarily quantitatively defined expected losses* from surrender against expected losses from continued war. The loser's deterrence of the winner's threat of value destruction depends on the percentage of the winner's residual value he can destroy. If the loser can still destroy all of the winner's value, the winner's threat against the loser's residual value is no more credible than the loser's counter-threat

* Note that the losses from the surrender terms are expected—that is, in this model we assume that the loser trusts the winner not to exceed his own terms after termination. This is by no means an assured conclusion, but it simplifies our model for the time being.
The costs of surrender must be made commensurate with the costs of continued war in order to reach a conclusion in a quantitative model. This may be done by expressing both surrender costs and continued war costs in the common terms of population and economy value losses. Total loss of political control for a diehard government may be perceived as comparable to total loss of the population, the fanatic political beliefs of the diehards not distinguishing between loss of loyalty and loss of life. Moderate loss of political control may look like moderate loss of life to a diehard regime, or look like the equivalent of a slight loss of life to a realist regime with a longer view.

In view of the above, let us assume for this model that over 30% fatalities will constitute "heavy losses" in the winner, between 5% and 30% will constitute "moderate" losses, and under 5% will constitute "slight" losses. Terms will then be hard, moderate, or "easy" corresponding to these losses in the winner. Let us assume further that terms can be expressed as a combination of population costs and economic costs (by territorial losses and reparations). Hard terms are arbitrarily defined as 30% population loss (all of Eastern Europe and some of European Russia, for example) and 50% economy loss. Moderate terms may be defined as 20% population loss and 20% economy loss. Easy terms may be defined as no further losses of population or economy, but enforced disarmament (with the opportunity cost of no foreseeable returns from future aggression).

The loser must balance these now somewhat arbitrarily quantitatively defined expected losses* from surrender against expected losses from continued war. The loser's deterrence of the winner's threat of value destruction depends on the percentage of the winner's residual value he can destroy. If the loser can still destroy all of the winner's value, the winner's threat against the loser's residual value is no more credible than the loser's counter-threat.

* Note that the losses from the surrender terms are expected—that is, in this model we assume that the loser trusts the winner not to exceed his own terms after termination. This is by no means an assured conclusion, but it simplifies our model for the time being.
against the winner's residual value. Being able to destroy value several times over adds some confidence, but does not fundamentally alter a saturation situation. Since mutual countervalue threat saturation appears most probable, the loser will have to balance the cost of total residual value destruction against the available surrender terms. This would seem to imply the paradoxical result that the loser would do well to accept any terms of surrender short of annihilation.

By all rational standards this would seem to be the case, but the problem is that exactly the same holds true for the winner. He, too, would do well to accept any terms from the "loser", so long as the loser can destroy most of the winner's residual value. Here we have a stalemate, more likely to be settled by superior resolve and callousness to life than by rational analysis.

Given the expectation of such a stalemate by both sides, it would appear to be in the winner's interests to offer the easiest possible surrender terms that guarantee his military dominance. Given easy terms, it would also be in the loser's interest to accept them and "trust" the winner—a possible risk—rather than continue the war and assure further destruction, with a greater risk of total loss.

In model terms, therefore, it may be assumed that so long as both winner and loser countervalue capacity saturates the adversary's residual value, a stalemated termination occurs with—presumably—a very conditional surrender.

To the extent that the loser does not have saturation countervalue capacity, but can still exert a significant threat against the winner's residual value, to that extent will the winner have superior bargaining power. In representative quantitative terms, the winner's expected cost of continued war is simply that of the loser's residual countervalue potential. The winner will thus have to balance this cost against the future costs of a compromise peace. If the winner has had light losses, a compromise peace may be more likely than if he has suffered heavy losses. The costs of continued war to the
loser are still total, but now the credibility of those costs being imposed by the winner have increased to the extent that he can preserve his own residual value. The loser will therefore do well to accept any terms permitting his substantial survival.

The loser may try for a victory by a contest of resolve, however. He may continue the war, trading city for city with the winner in the hope that the winner will accept a compromise peace rather than lose all those cities at risk to the loser's countervalue residual. In this case, the worst cost to the loser would be total destruction, but perhaps the most likely cost would be the equivalent retaliation to whatever cost he can impose on the winner. The cost of continued war to a loser with less than saturation residual countervalue capability is therefore assumed to be equal to his countervalue kill potential against the winner.

For example, if at some point in a nuclear war the U.S. has 150 million people left, of which the Soviet countervalue residual can kill 50 million, and the U.S. can kill all of the residual Soviet population (assuming it is over 50 million), then the assumed cost to the Soviets of continued war is 50 million.

A revolutionary termination criterion is the earliest possible end of the war, consistent with retention of most of the loser's country. Termination would occur whenever the revolutionary faction acquired control of the government, provided command and control communications had not been largely disrupted. In model terms this could occur at any time, practically independently of force ratios and residual value ratios. It is more of an extremely lucky "break" for the winner than a contingency determined by force interactions in a simple model.
Although the revolutionary termination criterion of earliest possible end of the war can occur at any time in the loser nation, it is most important to remember that it tends most to occur in the loser nation. In quantitative and classical model terms, the loser nation is the one that has a significantly inferior strategic force which has no hope of attaining superiority through any further military actions. In another and now very important sense, the loser nation is one that cannot protect its own population and economy from enemy action, and in this sense all belligerents in a general nuclear war may be losers and correspondingly subject to internal revolt.

For the purposes of a simplified model, we will assume that only the Soviet Union is subject to internal revolt in a general nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. This appears to be a reasonable assumption for two reasons: First, the U.S. will be much superior in its residual forces (the 'winner' in the classical sense). Second, the U.S. is more stable in its internal political structure than is the Soviet Union.
The conclusion appears inescapable: For the foreseeable future, the survivable absolute level of Soviet strategic nuclear forces is probably high enough to force an at best near-stalemate outcome to a nuclear war with the United States, despite our current and even increasing relative strategic superiority.

Does this mean that the U.S. should abandon its costly and difficult efforts to maintain strategic superiority or the strategy of counterforce? Not at all. Strategic superiority offers some degree of "insurance" against U.S. intelligence failures, Soviet technological breakthroughs, and unanticipated shifts in political alliance (to the Communist side), by providing enough of a margin of superiority to permit time for U.S. countermeasures to take effect, before the Soviets could attain a military superiority that might encourage them in aggressions. It also provides a degree of insurance against "Hitlers", both by deterring their rise to supreme power (because of the obvious risks of national extinction they engender), and by somewhat reducing the costs of a general war to the U.S. if a "Hitler" takes over Russia and cannot be deterred.

The above conclusion suggests that there may be more fruitful applications of U.S. wealth and technological ingenuity than a futile quest for a "true" strategic counterforce capability against the Soviet Union. (A "true" counterforce capability can be defined as one that can disarm an enemy nation without incurring significant losses from the disarmed nations' retaliatory forces.) The problem is to provide usable defense power with which the U.S. can protect allies and homeland.

Counterforce strategy, while not offering any attractive hope of disarming the Soviet Union in a nuclear war without unacceptably high American and European fatalities, is still the most reasonable option if we are forced into nuclear war.
What are some possible kinds of usable defense power? General purpose forces and their rapid transport and support are one relatively attractive possibility. Another is active defense against missiles and aircraft—not because it can be very effective against a massed Soviet attack, but rather because of its potentially substantial effectiveness against the growing number of lesser threats. Probably the safest all-around investment for the nation is scientific research and development, including space exploration and the now less supported areas of medical and social science. It is difficult to convert military hardware into overall national development, but—given the necessary intelligence systems, vigilance, and maintenance of flexible "across-the-board" military power—there may be time to convert a high-paced science and technology to defense purposes—particularly if efforts are made constantly to "peel-off" the applicable developments.
defense power? General support are one relatively ease against missiles and air- against a massed Soviet attack, of effectiveness against the the safest all-around investment development, including space of medical and social science. To overall national development, vigilance, and maintenance —there may be time to convert the purposes—particularly if applicable developments.