REDEVELOPMENT IN BOSTON: A STUDY OF THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

by

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ABSTRACT

Redevelopment in Boston: A Study of the Politics and Administration of Social Change

By Nancy Rita Arnone
Submitted to the Department of Political Science on January 11, 1965, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The social and political characteristics of the system in which redevelopment programs are implemented affects the successful operations and style of the organization. The Boston Redevelopment Authority attempts to implement redevelopment programs in the midst of a social and political system generally inimicable to its goals and values. However, the BRA possesses resources of federal funds, technical expertise, and political leadership and skill which are superior to those of the larger system. In addition, it is able to form coalitions with other elements of the socio-political system which are more likely to be favorable to its objectives. By building such coalitions, it is possible to achieve the organization's objectives.

The necessity of forming coalitions and of existing as the strongest single entity in a largely inefficient system requires that the organization's upper and middle level personnel adopt politicized behavior pattern, characterized by role flexibility, a variety of decision criteria, long range time perspective, and a propensity to compromise, besides professional and organizational roles. The demands of these multiple roles may be in conflict resulting in dysfunctional situations for the individuals and for the redevelopment program's progress. A number of mechanisms for adjustment exist including physical withdrawal from the organization or psychic withdrawal. The strategy for adjustment which one selects depends upon his position in the organization, his professional training, his age and experience and reputation, the intensity of the conflict, and the needs of his personality system. There are a number of positive steps which the BRA can take to alleviate the pressures on its middle level personnel.

The redevelopment bureaucracy in Boston has in turn affected the social and political system in which it operates. It has acted as the catalytic agent for basic changes in the system. It particularly has affected the composition of the political power structure, through the institutionalization of its coalition with the city's business and economic interests. The perpetuation of this coalition can overcome the city's hostility to the redevelopment bureaucracy's goals. There is evidence that the BRA's early accomplishments will also diminish the city's opposition.

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CHAPTER I

REDEVELOPMENT AND BOSTON

This study is a description and an analysis of a conflict. The setting is the city of Boston, and the principal parties to the conflict are the Boston Redevelopment Authority, a municipal agency, and the political system of the city itself. The conflict has arisen since the Redevelopment Authority is characterized by goals, values, and a mode of operation which is different from those of many segments of its social and political environment. It might be said that conflict is inherent in the redevelopment process itself, because it tends to affect so many aspects of a community. But the nature of the conflict depicted in the present study is exacerbated and its scope extended by a disparity in political cultures between system and sub-system.

The central questions of the study are: what kinds of constraints does this disparity place upon the range of policy alternatives and what demands upon the behavior of active participants in the systems? How must the BRA adjust its structure and its policies in order to function within the framework of Boston? What impact has this had upon the redevelopment program and upon the internal operations of the BRA? Finally, what effect has the BRA and the redevelopment program had upon its environment?

Viewed in another way, this study concerns a conflict between a low capacity political system confronted by a program necessitating
rational planning and a high capacity for action. On still another level, it may be portrayed as a conflict among traditional, transitional, and technically oriented political elites and the general political ethos which accompanies each. On a more abstract plane, it is a conflict between a loosely integrated system with minimal resources which tends to perform basic systemic functions inefficiently, and a highly integrated, relatively efficient sub-system, possessing superior resources and some skill in their use, which the larger system has been unable to assimilate.

While our study touches upon the conflict at all of these levels, the basic model which is employed throughout is a systems model. In the decade or so since this type of model has become a tool for political analysis, its utility has been proven many times and the range of its application has widened considerably. The systems model is both comprehensive and dynamic; and, thus, it presents a scheme for the analysis of social and political phenomena which can encompass all their aspects.

This chapter introduces the major components of the study, the re- development process, the Boston social and political system, and the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The next three chapters examine, respectively, the operations of the BRA; other elements in the Boston political system which bear some relationship to redevelopment activities; and their interaction with the BRA; in other words the politics of implementing redevelopment in Boston. In the following chapters, the concept of "politicization" of a municipal bureaucracy is treated, along with its applicability to the BRA and its results for the organization and individuals within it. A final section explores the implications of redevelopment for the Boston political system.

Notes on the systems model and on the methodology of the study may be found in Appendix A.
Redevelopment

The term redevelopment as used in this study includes both short and long range development planning and urban renewal in all its phases.

Urban renewal programs are quite familiar to most Americans, although the program is only fifteen years old. In early 1964 nearly 800 communities were engaged in approximately 1600 federally assisted urban renewal projects. Essentially, the federal urban renewal program provides loans and grants to local communities to finance the costs of land acquisition and site improvements. After this, the parcels of land are sold by the local community to private developers. The federal government also provides funds for preliminary planning and survey work.

Renewal, then, is a public-private program, with the federal and local governmental units sharing the pre-development project costs on a two-thirds, one-third basis. In Massachusetts and a few other states, the state government has assumed the burden of one-half of the local community's share.

Renewal was originally intended as a housing or slum clearance program; and its administration on the federal level is supervised by the Urban Renewal Administration, a division of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Although the enabling statutes for renewal are considered housing legislation, subsequent revisions of the original act which was passed in 1949, notably those of 1954, 1961, and 1964, have expanded its scope to include blighted areas in general, no matter whether the proposed re-use be commercial, industrial, or residential. In many cities,

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in fact, the major redevelopment efforts to date have been commercial rather than residential.

In return for federal funds, the URA requires that each community prepare a "Workable Program" for the entire community's development. This document must include detailed descriptions of the community's activities and programs in seven areas, such as code enforcement, relocation, and the preparation of a comprehensive city plan.

After relatively timid beginnings, followed by several spectacular successes, renewal programs spread rapidly to all sections of the country. Indeed, having a renewal project has become a kind of status symbol for a community; and there is competition between cities to outdo each other in per capita expenditures for redevelopment or in total federal grants received. Furthermore, in some instances, renewal has proved to be politically profitable for its proponents. Mayor Richard C. Lee of New Haven, for example, has built his reputation largely upon the successful implementation of renewal projects during his administration.\(^3\) Mayors in other cities as well regard redevelopment projects as their most notable accomplishments.

In addition to its obvious effects, such as transforming skylines, altering land use patterns, and rejuvenating central business districts, redevelopment has had implications, perhaps less direct and less dramatic, for other segments of the community besides those involved in relocation or planning.

Execution of redevelopment projects has sparked an increase in activity in construction and building industries and in large-scale

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real estate promotion. The financial community has been affected by the appearance of renewal and redevelopment bonds of many types and of many differing degrees of "soundness" on the investment market. New corporations have been formed to finance redevelopment projects; and many older, established corporations such as Aluminum Corporation of America, whose primary activity is in other fields, have found in redevelopment a fruitful area for allocation of their surplus capital resources.

A whole new field of law has arisen around decisions stemming from litigation involving renewal projects. Requirements for comprehensive and long-range planning in conjunction with projects have expanded the need for as well as the role of city planners. Experimentation with new construction materials and new design concepts has been encouraged by far-sighted redevelopment officials. A new type of expert, the redevelopment coordinator, has come to play an important part in municipal policy formulation and decision-making.

Furthermore, the administrative tasks connected with implementation of a redevelopment project have spawned a host of new agencies at all levels of government, which by their frequent interaction have contributed to strengthening inter-governmental cooperation, especially between federal and local units.

Benefits both direct and indirect have accrued to a number of groups in the communities affected; Chambers of Commerce and other organizations with community wide interests have sought active participation in renewal planning, as in Boston, or sponsorship of low-income housing in renewal areas, as in Hartford. Thus they have not only aided redevelopment but also enhanced their community service image. A considerable number of citizens, not ordinarily involved in civic
affairs, have begun to play an active role through civic organizations and neighborhood associations supporting or obstructing redevelopment projects.

No program so broad in scope and so far reaching in its effects could help but arouse tremendous opposition. Displacement and relocation, which usually have involved lower income and/or minority group members, tend to be the issues which generate most hostility to re- development. Those, thus directly affected, are often joined in opposition by liberal intellectuals who decry the abuses of redevelopment. The official requirement for designation of the entire project area as sub-standard may antagonize middle class project area residents. For the area under treatment may be sub-standard only in scattered spots, while a much larger area is taken for planning purposes. The implication that one lives in a slum tends to impede the search for new housing.

Resentment is also stirred by what its opponents view as the seemingly offhand disregard of traditional democratic processes by redevelopment officials and by seemingly dehumanized planning criteria.

Finally, no phenomenon of such magnitude, with such potential impact in so many spheres of human activity could long escape the analytical eyes of social scientists. However, neither in the proliferating literature on the subject nor, for that matter, in popular discussions of redevelopment is there much emphasis upon the concept of redevelopment as a political process occurring within a particular social and political environment which influences its progress and character. Nor is redevelopment viewed as a mechanism for broadly

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¹ A discussion of the extant literature on urban redevelopment will be found in Appendix B.
based social change.

The mere existence of enabling legislation and a program to channel federal monies to cities and, thus, make economically feasible their attempts to combat physical deterioration and its concomitant social problems is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for redevelopment. The major responsibility for redevelopment still rests with the local community. This fact introduces a considerable number of new variables into the redevelopment process; for cities differ greatly in their ability to initiate policies, mobilize support for them, and secure the requisite leadership and technical skill for their implementation.

Boston

Boston's socio-political conditions, appear to present a less than hospitable environment for successful redevelopment. It seems somewhat paradoxical that while Boston's native son, John F. Kennedy, and other members of his family were undertaking positions of national and state leadership, the city was enduring nearly a dozen years of leadership vacuum. It is also paradoxical that Boston area educational institutions produce experts of the highest order for every field of endeavor, and that the level of skill of those involved in the city's public affairs, prior to the establishment of the BRA, was abysmally low. Furthermore, Boston-based financial enterprises were investing substantially in development activities in other cities, while Boston was declining physically and economically at an alarming rate.

In mid-1960 it seemed clear that some sort of external stimulus would be necessary to alter the disastrous dynamics of Boston's economy; for the city by itself could not generate the type of large scale,
coordinated, and expertly guided reforms the city needed.

The physical and economic problems which beset Boston are similar to those encountered by many other urban areas. Deterioration, blight, and archaic street patterns are products of extreme age and are common to nearly every city founded early in American history.\(^5\) Boston's deleterious physical situation, however, is intensified by many years of public and private neglect.

Its economic difficulties are somewhat more particular, localized in origin, and peculiar to Boston's place in the Massachusetts political structure. Indeed, many of their aspects are beyond the city's control.

Saddled by lack of room for development and by the fact that colleges, medical institutions, religious institutions, and other institutions which enjoy tax exempt status occupy approximately 40% of its land area, the tax base was not only stagnant but actually decreasing in size in the fifties. Consequently, the tax rate spiraled; by 1959 it exceeded $1.01 on a thousand dollars of assessed valuation, the highest rate in the country. This tended to accelerate the population outflow, which in turn resulted in a further revenue decline, and so on.\(^6\) The election of John Collins as Mayor in 1959 was a significant turning point. During his first four-year term Collins reduced the tax rate each year, by enforcing stringent economy measures.

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\(^5\) According to the 1960 census, over 85% of the dwelling units in the city of Boston were in structures built prior to 1939. 1960 Census of Population, Vol. I, Part 1, Table 22 and Vol. I, Part 23, Table 5.

Locally based business concerns, with a stake in Boston's economy, had long before lost confidence in the social and political system which dominated the city and were reluctant to invest in any sort of private revitalization effort. The costs and risks involved seemed to outweigh any gain to be obtained by such piecemeal measures. And if local concerns with home offices and long traditions in Boston were deterred from assisting the city, it seemed apparent that their timidity would be multiplied in the case of out-of-town concerns. Prudential Insurance Company had planned to build a regional office in the city, but immediately became involved in a complicated legal battle which threatened to squelch its operations, too.7

Not all of Boston's financial problems can be attributed solely to physical deterioration, corruption, poor management, or the dwindling tax base, exacerbated by the migration to the suburbs. Indeed, some of the economic burden Boston was required to bear has been thrust upon the city by other agencies. In the first place, Boston city alone must pay the total costs of the administrative apparatus of Suffolk County (which includes a number of other cities as well). The County Court system has been estimated to cost over four million dollars annually. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, which links over twenty communities in Greater Boston, regularly accumulates a deficit in excess of twenty million dollars per year; and a major portion of this deficit is assigned to Boston. It has also been charged that the proportion of the deficit of the Metropolitan District Commission, which maintains roads, recreational facilities, and the water supply in the metropolitan area, which Boston

must pay, is inequitable. Attempts in the state legislature to change the formulae by which these deficits are allocated have met with almost no success, for the usually disorganized suburban block is strongly united, at least in opposition to Boston.

Attempts at the solution of these physical and economic problems occur within a social and political framework. Descriptions of Boston's social and political systems and their structure, functions, and predominant characteristics often appear to be couched in cliches and to perpetuate stereotypes. Nevertheless, there are substantial elements of reality in the Cleveland Amory, Back Bay-Beacon Hill, Brahmin image of Boston; the William F. Whyte, working class, Italian image of Boston; as well as the Edwin O'Connor, Irish politico image. And the fact seems to be that all these groups do exist, side by side, semi-autonomously, within the same geographical and political unit.

In other words, the Boston social system is marked by extreme cultural fragmentation and strongly rooted group identifications. As a result social integration is at a low level in Boston. The divisions are along both class and ethnic lines. The middle class in the city, never numerically very large, abandoned it physically for the surrounding suburbs; and the upper classes have abjured socially and politically, taking little interest in city-wide activities. Talent has been drained

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off to other levels of governmental activity and skilled individuals become involved in pursuits other than municipal affairs. 10

The Yankees have, by tacit consent, allowed the sociocultural ethos of the numerically superior and largely unassimilated immigrant groups to permeate the system. They have, however, continued to exercise the social welfare function, through philanthropic and extra-political activities and still control what wealth is left in the city. They have also perpetuated, for the benefit of a relatively small group, certain "cultural" activities which have long been associated with Boston.

The dominant social and cultural pattern of Boston, then, is that of the working-class Irish. Not only do the Irish have numerical, and, hence, political control of the city, but their cultural norms also dictate the manners and morals and modus operandi of the city system.

As for political structure, under the governmental system adopted in 1951, Boston has a nine-man council elected every two years, at large, on a non-partisan basis, and a "strong" mayor elected for a four-year term who has, on paper, at least, considerable powers. The scope of real activity of the council is severely circumscribed. Boston does not have home rule, and there are many policy matters with profound implications for the city that are beyond its decision-making purview. The powers of the council then, except to obstruct

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10 A study undertaken by the author showed that the social and economic characteristics of Democratic office holders in thirteen greater Boston communities (including the city itself) were significantly different from those of individuals from the same communities who held state and national level offices.
the Mayor's budget by withholding its consent, are not great. Ironi-
cally, the only area in which the council is granted formal powers of
any substance is in the field of urban redevelopment; and then, it is
by virtue of a provision of the federal renewal law, which the state
legislature cannot override.

All the elected politicians in Boston are "locals" in Merton's
terms.\footnote{Robert Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan
Influentials," in Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe: The Free
Press of Glencoe, revised edition, 1957), p. 393.} The fact that they represent the dominant political ethos,
a political culture based on an ethnocentric, working class society,
militates against their advocacy and embodiment of public regarding,
social responsibility concepts in the political system, though such
principles are given much "lip service" at election time. The paro-
chialism of the Councilmen is attributable to the social structure
insofar as it allows only the numerical majority, the working class
Irish and Italians in this case, to be elected, to the exclusion of
other groups. As a BRA official remarked in preparing one of his sub-
ordinates for an appearance before the City Council's redevelopment
committee, "Don't give a presentation for Beacon Hill, because Beacon
Hill isn't represented on the City Council."

It has been suggested, however, that the unrepresented groups,
particularly the Yankees, might very well be content to leave the
electoral system inequitable than to be a minority on a relatively
powerless Council.\footnote{Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Harvard University Press and the MIT
Press, 1963), p. 96.}
The political culture, or orientation toward political activity, of a complex system such as Boston is certainly not monolithic. Yet there are dominant strains which may be defined. These attitudes tend to permeate much of the system, affecting its style and its operations. The cluster of attitudes which characterizes the predominant political culture of Boston has been referred to as "working class authoritarianism". This indicates that persons belonging to the lower classes are likely to display authoritarian predispositions in political and social situations; to prefer simple solutions and immediate gains, and to think in gross stereotypes. Among the elements contributing to the formation of such predispositions are: lack of education, infrequent participation in political or voluntary organizations of any kind, little reading, ethnic isolation, economic insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns. In addition, the presence of a strong strain of anti-intellectualism has also been found in persons manifesting other working class authoritarian attitudinal patterns.

There are behavior and policy oriented implications of working class authoritarian attitudes. Suspicion and hostility toward "out-groups," already pronounced in a cultural framework such as this, becomes more intense when cohesive, working class groups must come in contact with non-elected public officials such as members of a municipal bureaucracy, who are not members of their group.

Furthermore, the government is likely to be perceived as individual actors rather than as "impersonal" agencies. All government action is

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likely to be taken as the actions of individuals, either wrongly or rightly motivated, according to the degree that these actions correspond to the immediate needs of the individual and his group.\(^1\)

Thus, it would follow, that the prevailing political culture in Boston would be opposed to redevelopment programs. Persons with its attitudes tend to perceive redevelopment as just another attempt of corrupt politicians seeking personal gain at the expense of the "little people." In addition, the goals of redevelopment are too long-range and complex to be meaningful. All that can be seen immediately is the displacement of working class families, the razing of structures, and governmental interference in their activities. As a program requiring technical skill to achieve results, redevelopment is also likely to bring "experts" with superior education and knowledge into the purview of the working class authoritarian and add the anti-intellectual aspects of his attitude structure to those already allied against redevelopment.

Working class authoritarianism is similar to what is often called the immigrant political culture. In terms of the American political experience, immigrant political culture constitutes the traditional political culture, (i.e. the tribalism of some other societies). Recent investigations of cities with strong immigrant political cultures, contend that there is an overall tendency to move toward acceptance and implementation of the Anglo-Saxon or "public regarding" model for political behavior as opposed to the immigrant, private (or group)
regarding model. While in Boston the private regarding, immigrant political culture still appears to be in control, its grip is becoming less firm. The election of John Collins in 1959 was in many ways indicative of the beginning of the rise of the new political culture in Boston.

During the first part of his administration, he served as a transitional political figure, bridging the gap between the "new" political style he represented and the dominant political culture of which he was, after all, a product. Toward the end of his term in 1962 and 1963 it became increasingly evident that a new alignment was taking place between Collins and important business and financial interests, which heretofore had abdicated from political activity. His opponent in the 1963 election, which Collins won easily, an Italian Councilman who identified himself with "the little man," referred to Collins as a tool of the insurance, financial and real estate interests in the city. To the working class authoritarian with strong ethnic group ties, this sort of argument might be appealing. However, Collins had made few enemies during his term; and, since he belonged to the dominant ethnic group, his support by middle and upper class elements was not the hindrance it might have been. His opponent carried only the three wards in the city in which Italians are in the majority. Given the Collins election and re-election it appears that a real transformation of the Boston political ethos might be in progress.

Looking at the Boston system in terms of the basic political functions to be performed, it becomes evident to what extent social

\[15\text{Manfield and Wilson, passim.}\]
patterns dominated by the ethnically centered group, and by an immigrant political ethos, affect the city's political style. For example, both political socialization and political recruitment are performed largely by the peer group; and the ethnically and class defined group's attitude toward political activity will be reflected in those of its members who hold political offices. The extent of the peer group's long-range influence upon its members varies according to the group's power position in the system, its degree of assimilation, and its cohesiveness. Thus, Italian politicians in Boston are more closely tied to the interests and attitudes of their group than are the Irish.

Interest articulation in Boston, as might be expected from the characteristics of the social structure, is relatively low. The needs and desires of the dominant groups tend to express themselves "naturally" in the political system, since the two major groups have a monopoly on formal political power. There are no parties, merely ad hoc personal factions at election time. Labor unions are remarkably weak for a working class city. Business groups and other institutions, prior to the advent of the BRA's program, tended to have very specialized interests, or to direct their attention to other levels of government. The mayor, city council, and city bureaucracy, which might serve as interest aggregation centers in the system perform these functions imperfectly, if at all. Mayors have tended to eschew conflict to avoid alienating major groups, the city council tends to be tightly controlled by one group, and the city bureaucracy with the exception of the BRA, is narrowly oriented toward day to day operations.
Finally, the communication function is performed primarily by and for the group. Hence, through the mediation of the group, communication, like recruitment and socialization tend not only to reflect but also to reinforce existing attitudes, value orientations, and a generally traditional political culture.  

The Urban Political System: Specialized Functions

These aspects of the Boston political system which have been discussed thus far are those common to all political systems. There are, in addition, particular policy-oriented functions which urban political systems have in common. A number of typologies of such functions are in current usage. Oliver Williams, for example, lists four basic functions for the urban political system: (1) instrument of community growth; (2) provider of life’s amenities; (3) arbiter of conflicting interests; (4) caretaker. Banfield and Wilson collapse all functions to two categories: (1) service and (2) conflict management. The present author prefers a trichotomous division: (1) development, (2) service, and (3) conflict management.


18 Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, Chapter 2.
By almost any yardstick the city of Boston's performance of the service function deserves a low rating. The streets are in a horrible state if disrepair, broken street lighting goes for weeks without replacement; of the parks and squares of which Boston is so proud, only the centrally located Common and Public Garden are well cared for; school buildings are old and teachers not paid competitively with the suburbs or with many other cities; the police department is seriously understaffed; the fire department needs new equipment; the welfare department's administration is cumbersome and inefficient, to cite only a few examples of areas in which performance of the service function could use improvement.

Prior to the advent of the Redevelopment Authority bureaucracy under the reorganization plan of 1961, there was a skeleton planning department and a 16-member staff for the redevelopment authority board, which lacked the skill and imagination to launch and carry out a meaningful development program.

As for conflict management, the dominant class and ethnic groups and their socio-political ethos control the political system to the extent that intra-group conflict is minimized or resolved within the group and not interjected into the political "arena," and inter-group conflict in the political system tends to have the solution dictated by the numerically superior group.

Conflict in the Boston political arena, then, has usually taken the form of conflict between political personalities, from the same group or from different groups. This pattern would fit, with a political culture which is inclined to see all social action in terms of personal relations. Such personality conflicts either have been
resolved at the polls and marked the ascendancy of one and the political demise of the other or have lingered on from issue to issue from year to year, simmering, without much possibility of either person making concessions.

Thus, whether the specific functions of urban government or the more generalized functions of political systems are used as criteria, Boston's political system appears to have deficiencies in performance.

To summarize: The Boston social system, as a whole, performs the basic functions of integration and resource allocation in a manner contrary to the dictates of the highly technical, achievement-oriented society of which it is a part. The system, in addition, gives the appearance of being unable to incorporate new elements into itself if their essential nature is at all divergent from the predominant social ethos and the pattern of accepted norms and beliefs. Tensions are poorly resolved within such a system.

Furthermore, the political sub-system of this social and cultural system in Boston shares the value orientation of its environment. Working class authoritarianism and a private regarding political ethos have produced an inefficient political system in terms of either general or specific functional criteria. Politics is highly personalized. Yet there is cynicism, expressed with regard to politics in the abstract; and the citizenry are apathetic unless confronted by direct contact with a political agency. Their view in this case is one of hostility, suspicion and fear of exploitation.

The political system, too, is unable to meet the demands of a complex technological society, as its recruitment and political socialization mechanisms and "styles" are not such as to obtain the requisite skills to cope with its problems.
Redevelopment for example is a complex process requiring expertise and technical skill in its administration. It is a program with long-range goals which is not likely to provide immediate tangible benefits to the working class or to the working class orientated. Its economic and aesthetic implications are rarely perceived until after completion of the process. Its practitioners are more likely to be "cosmopolitan" in perspective than local. It would appear that Boston, a city which could most benefit by redevelopment treatment would be least likely to be able to generate the resources necessary to achieve it.

This negative appraisal of its action capacity does not mean that the system is completely static. It merely implies that the normal social processes which in turn transform the political culture have been operating more slowly in Boston than in many other American cities. This is due in part to the absence of a policy orientation in the political system and in part to the scarcity of technical skill in municipal enterprises, and to the lack of political leadership and economic resources.

The Boston Redevelopment Authority

By 1960 Boston's deteriorating physical conditions and the depressing economic cycle clearly seem to demand a remedy. Since it seemed improbable that a remedy of the magnitude necessary to deal with these problems could come from the private sphere or from the local government alone, a federally sponsored remedy appeared to be dictated. The proposed "answer" has been Boston's redevelopment program.
The Boston Redevelopment Authority is the body which initiates, formulates, and implements redevelopment projects in Boston. Actually this title, Boston Redevelopment Authority, belongs to two distinct entities. One is a five-man appointed board of "laymen," legally, the policy-making part of the BRA. The other is the administrative apparatus it is supposed to supervise. The administrative head of the BRA bureaucracy has the title redevelopment administrator, and is technically responsible to the five-man board.

The BRA board antedates the present bureaucratic structure of the BRA; and prior to the establishment of the present system, the BRA administrative apparatus was, in fact, the policy-implementing arm of the BRA board. Since the 1960 transition, however, the BRA board and the BRA bureaucracy have tended to grow further apart. In addition, the BRA bureaucracy itself now has two divisions, separate both physically and intellectually as well as functionally. One of these is the "old" BRA bureaucracy which existed before 1960 and which has been and continues to be subject to the five-man board. The other is the administrative apparatus created and ruled by Edward J. Logue, following the election of Mayor Collins. Besides redevelopment administrator of the BRA, Logue also occupies the position of development adviser in the office of the Mayor.

At the end of 1963, the BRA employed 440 persons, loosely divided into six departments. The Planning department included all the project teams, plus the comprehensive planning division and was by far the largest and most active department; Development was the second largest in terms of individuals involved but its activities were less obvious and dramatic than those of other departments; since it
concentrated on long range objectives. The legal staff also operates under the rubric of the development department. The operations department was located in the office of the "old" BRA and consisted of its staff with functions such as auditing, general purchasing, engineering and the residue of two pre-1960 projects under its control. Transportation planning, family relocation and administrative management were formally listed as separate departments. The last of these theoretically included such functions as recruitment, assignment and management of personnel, space allocation and supply as well as public relations activities. In practice, however, these functions were performed either by the project teams or by the redevelopment administrator's office staff. In addition there were seven professional and neighborhood advisory committees of non-BRA personnel cooperating with the BRA. Of the BRA staff members 77 were listed as professional planners. 19 84% of this number were assigned to project teams in some capacity or other.

In fiscal 1963, the BRA's operating budget was $3,850,842. $2,182,387 of this was the federal government's share; and $282,655 was the city's share. Nearly $1,000,000 more was expended from survey and planning contracts, also financed by the federal government, but from a fund separate from that for renewal.

The BRA: Structure

Since the functions to be performed by any agency implementing renewal were specified by law and since the new development administrator

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19 The definition of planner used here means a person holding a graduate degree in planning or otherwise qualifying for membership in the American Institute of Planners.
was familiar with the organizational necessities of planning and comprehensive development, and since he was able to begin almost totally anew to fashion the most efficient and effective administrative apparatus to implement these functions, it would be supposed that the BRA's organization might serve as a model arrangement. Such is not the case, for the BRA has been designed to reflect a peculiar combination of Logue's extremely unorthodox organizational theory, his personal decision making style, and his orientation toward redevelopment.

There is, however, as George Duggar has pointed out no accepted mode of organization for optimal performance of redevelopment.

Enthusiasts for a municipal activity which demands wide cooperation from all corners of the local government are often likely to favor a clear hierarchy of authority, in which the policy is formulated at the top level of local government—whether it be mayor, council, or city manager—and then is put into effect from above. On the other hand, enthusiasts for a narrowly limited and self-contained activity are likely to favor granting to the organization responsible for the activity a substantial independence from the usual city hall chain of command. Since urban renewal requires both the widespread cooperation of many existing local government departments and agencies and the pursuit of some relatively limited and self-contained new activities, it is understandable that there has been no generally accepted doctrine as to which local government structure is the best for accomplishing urban renewal.  

The basic feature of the BRA is project team organization. Since, Logue conceives of the BRA as action oriented, each project "team" has attached to it one or more planners, one or more architects, economists, social workers and a number of secretaries, clerks, and research assistants, depending upon the magnitude of the survey and planning effort to be done by the BRA staff. Often the most difficult of this type of activity is "farmed out" to consultants. The project teams and

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project director operate as totally separate units. If there is a field staff for relocation, rehabilitation or both, there is a field director for the project, too. Each project team operates entirely separately, in a parochial fashion, with its own norms and socialization process; each project director has evolved his own style. The project team offices are physically separate from each other, too; and there are barriers both physical and psychological between the project teams. The members of one project team, for example, are not likely to know the names of any members of another project team. The exception to this occurs among the planners and architects who are the most professionally conscious of the BRA employees. Because of their "cosmopolitan" professional orientation, they are more likely to follow the activities of their functional opposites on other project teams.

Project team loyalty varies from project group to project group, as does group cohesion and authority structure. In the BRA as a whole though, there is no question that the lines of authority all lead to Logue and from Logue to the project directors. It is not an uncommon finding to encounter BRA employees who have never seen Logue in person, since he is prone to remain aloof from the organization's lower echelons. However when it is necessary, Logue will intercede in individual cases to secure raises or changes in status for individual employees of no matter what rank.

In addition to the project teams, there are a number of central office, "back-up" divisions of the organization. These include relocation and rehabilitation, purchasing, personnel and community
relations, and planning and architecture coordination. Each of these is headed by a director who may or may not have a staff under him. The principal function of these offices is to coordinate the activities of those who perform the various functions they are designed to oversee on each project staff. They also are responsible for preparing the voluminous reports required by federal officials.

There is considerable tension between these "horizontal" organizational units in the BRA and the "vertical" units which are the project teams. Both forms of organization contain many of the same professional roles, but perform different functions in and for the organization, as will be seen in Figure I.

The extreme parochialism of the project staffs and their internal orientation has made it difficult for the central office staffs to perform what they consider to be their oversight function. Particular tension existed between the relocation workers in Washington Park and the central staff over to whom they owed primary responsibility, their field director or central office relocation. At the end of our observation period, it was learned that the conflict had reached such proportions that central office relocation was on the point of being disbanded, except for its director; and its workers transferred to project staffs. The same fate was to befall the experiment in central office rehabilitation.

Architecture and planning central offices already consist only of one man. Here, there are fundamental professional links which prevent conflict from arising. Personnel central office is a new creation; for until the late spring of 1964 either Logue, himself, or, in the case of lower level personnel, a project director (depending
Figure 1
Horizontal and Vertical Organization in the BRA

A. Horizontal Organization: Functionally Organized Central Office Divisions

Project Teams

- Central Office
- Relocation
- Rehabilitation
- Central Office Planning Coordinator
- Central Office Architecture Coordinator
- Supplies
- Central Office Community Relations

B. Vertical Organization: Project Teams

Project Director

- Administrative Asst.
- Chief Planner
- Planners
- Chief Architect
- Architects
- Relocation Staff
- Economist
- Research Staff
- Clerical Staff
- Legal Officer
- Community Relations
of course upon how much confidence Logue had in the judgement of the project director, i.e. how much his style and orientation corresponded to Logue's own) processed job applications and made the final employment decision. Upon the request of a number of young men of various occupations and roles within the BRA, a "personnel services unit" was established, not for recruitment purposes, for Logue wishes to keep that as close to himself as possible, but to aid in counteracting the narrow perspective these individuals felt they had acquired regarding the redevelopment process.

Figure 2 presents a diagrammatic representation of the official structure of the BRA and Figure 3 represents the structure of the BRA according to our observations.

Situational Constraints: Prior Experience with Redevelopment

In addition to the characteristics of the city, its political system and political culture, which have been noted, there are two other features of the environment in which the Boston Redevelopment Authority must operate that may place constraints upon various aspects of its performance. One of these is Boston's previous experience with redevelopment, before the establishment of the "new" BRA bureaucracy in 1960.

Redevelopment in Boston until that time had been small-scale, uncoordinated, ad hoc and scattered. The most notable project to date had been the West End Project. Tactics of the developer and the city administration in the case of the West End, in which over a thousand people of lower income were displaced and upper income, high rise apartments built on one-third of the land and the remainder converted
Figure 2
The Official Structure of the BRA

BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Administrative Management
Office Staff

Development Administrator

Legal Staff
Special Counsel

Planning Division
- Transportation Planning
- General Planning
  - Comprehensive Planning
  - Capital Improvement Programming
  - Community Planning
  - Referrals

Project Development Division
- Renewal Planning
  - Redevelopment & Renewal Plans
- Federal Processing
- Rehabilitation in Renewal Areas
- Relocation
  - Family
  - Business
- (121 & 121A)

Land Division
- Land Acquisition
- Land Disposition

Operations Division
- Legal Title Search Closing
- Demolition
- Controller

- West End
- Whitney Street

Property Management
Project Engineering
Figure 3

The Operating Structure of the USA
into parking lots, has given redevelopment a "bad" reputation in Boston. The activities of the agencies involved had corroborated the views of many Boston residents with regard to the pernicious, exploitative nature of government, and made redevelopment appear to be a totally despised concept.

The West End project, considered in retrospect, was more of an exercise in real estate speculation than in urban redevelopment. Originally, the project was conceived to make more "rational," i.e., more tax-producing, use of a large piece of land bounded on the south by Beacon Hill, on the North and West by the Charles River Basin, and on the East by the fringes of the business district. The frontage overlooking the river was thought to be most attractive site for high-rise, upper-income housing; a shopping center was to be included as well as garden apartment units.2 In the original plan, a hundred or so units of middle income housing were also included largely as a palliative to satisfy local political representatives that some relocation housing would be available. The West End project was specifically designed according to its developers to lure to the city older suburbanites whose families had grown up and who no longer needed a large house. Those who were no longer interested in maintaining the responsibilities of home-owning, and young professional people whose occupations were

2Boston Housing Authority, Urban Redevelopment Division, Facts and Figures on the West End Project, April, 1953.
likely to be "central-city" oriented. Another unfortunate feature of
the Charles River Park project, for the future of renewal in Boston,
was that the development capital came mostly from outside Boston.
This enhanced the working class authoritarian Bostonian's image of
the "outsiders" as exploiter and the government personnel as his
willing accomplice.

However, the most salient aspect of the West End project's
failure in the eyes of most Boston residents was in its relocation
policies. So marked was the social disruption caused by the West
End relocation, that it has become practically the "classic" case
of how relocation should not be done and has provided much ammunition
for urban renewal opponents.

What West End left in the city was a hostile and cynical attitude
toward redevelopment in general and toward its practitioners in
particular. The present BRA bureaucracy tries to avoid all discussion
of what is an acutely painful topic. When questioned about West End
directly, BRA officials explicitly disassociate themselves and the

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22 A study carried out by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Urban Studies Program showed that this objective was not attained, at
least not in the first of the tower buildings to be rented. It showed
that those who actually occupied most of the apartments were upper
income persons who had moved from other upper income areas within the
city or from residential hotels. See Eugene R. Zeha, "The Pull of a

23 Gans, The Urban Villagers, and Peter Marris, "A Report on Urban
Edward J. Ryan, "Personal Identity in an Urban Slum," and Herbert Gans,
"Effects of the Move from City to Suburb," all in Leonard Duhl (ed.),
The Urban Condition (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963). All deal
with Boston's West End Project.
present BRA from any connection with it. Responsibility for overseeing the remaining development of the project still rests primarily with the remnants of the "old" BRA bureaucracy, which is separate from the new both physically, functionally, and ideologically.

Situational Constraints: The Federal, Legal Framework

The federal legal framework for redevelopment may also act as a constraint upon redevelopment activities. Indeed, it may be argued that one of the partial explanations for the relocation failings of the West End project was that the project was undertaken in accordance with the 1954 version of the federal redevelopment law which did not require more than token relocation assistance on the part of the local project agency.\textsuperscript{24}

Although it has now been fifteen years since redevelopment programs were inaugurated on a large scale, and there have been three major revisions of portions of the redevelopment laws, the program is still conceptually in a rather primitive stage. Fifteen years is a relatively short time for the evolution of a complex program involving the participation of several levels of government which touches upon so many aspects of urban life. In view of the time span and in view of the nature of the housing laws of which redevelopment is a part, the conceptual development and clarification of this program seems to have progressed at an amazingly rapid rate.

In the period of the West End Project, though, the program itself required only the most minimal efforts on the part of the

local project agency to assist relocatees and hence made provisions for only minimal financial aid. Subsequent revisions have continually increased the stringency of relocation requirements on the local project agency and also liberalized the cash payments to relocatees.25

During the early years of redevelopment, there was no experience in administration of project implementation upon which to draw, professional staff people with the necessary backgrounds in planning the community relations were scarce. The local project agencies charged with tasks under the law which they could not possibly fulfill, looked to the federal legislation for guidance. Since it was couched in the most general terms, it proved inadequate. Many different patterns of redevelopment implementation and of local project agency organization resulted. Misuse of the program and the replacement of lower income housing with upper income housing, and the spread of slum areas rather than their removal were common phenomena.

Another potential constraint on redevelopment may be the amount of federal funds available. Despite its widespread use, redevelopment is not a "popular" program in Congress and in many areas of the country. The actual allocations by Congress are usually well below the budget requests. The fact that there is a time lag in redevelopment and that it has become common practice for cities to reserve federal monies well in advance of the time they expect to be using them, results in unexpended (but already allocated) sums in URA's treasury. This, too, prompts economy-minded Congressmen to oppose

further appropriations.

There is no real formula for allocation of scarce redevelopment funds among cities. So, to a considerable extent, "earmarking" of federal funds depends upon the network of personal relationships between federal and local redevelopment officials. Past performance and political considerations are other criteria for determining allocation. The federal officials realize that the political climate of a city or a project area directly affects redevelopment and the willingness of developers to invest in a city.

The requirements for federal review of redevelopment projects may act as an impediment to a local project agency's activities. In the case of Boston, there seems to be little likelihood that the federal agency will veto a project. Yet federal review by both regional and national offices of the URA is a time consuming process, often delaying a project for years.

Local projects are under the supervision of six regional offices in different sections of the country, who are charged with overseeing and reviewing plans for conformity with the requirements of the seven tenets of the Workable Program. They then make recommendations to the national Urban Renewal Administration, and oversee the implementation of the project.

The Upper North East Regional Office is seriously understaffed considering the sheer scope and number of projects being planned and the number of cities carrying them out. Regional office supervision seems most significant in the case of smaller cities and towns implementing one small-scale project at a time. 26 Boston, New York, New York.

and even Hartford, New Haven, and Worcester, pay only pro forma obeissance to the regional office. The close personal ties between redevelopment directors in these larger cities and the upper echelon personnel of the federal agency usually means that the regional office is superseded by decision-making.

Regional office personnel also seem to be the weakest link in the redevelopment policy system. Often regional experience is used as a training ground for federal or local project agency work. Nonetheless there is the requirement that project plans and reports be submitted to regional.

Environmental Constraints on Redevelopment

Given a situation in which the urban redevelopment policy producing sub-system is hypothesized to have a value orientation and mode of operation incompatible with that of the socio-political environment, what are the results for redevelopment decision-making?

This disparity in political cultures, it is hypothesized, would create disparate goals and strategies in redevelopment. The redevelopment authority, for example, would wish to keep the arena of its decision-making activity limited, to keep as many aspects of policy as possible out of the "political" sphere. In other words the bureaucracy wishes to keep the scope of conflict limited. 27 On the other hand, political activists in Boston, representatives of the socio-cultural "least common denominator," are interested in making as much of redevelopment activity as possible public; in enlarging the scope of the conflict.

In fact, redevelopment has proved to be functional in a positive way for councilmen as well as the mayor. Programs which Collins supported in redevelopment could indirectly account for his re-election (i.e., federal monies coming into the city aided in reduction of the tax rate, his most "popular" issue). A number of councilmen too have built their reputations and large personal followings in the city upon intransigent opposition to urban renewal in principle and especially in practice. The redevelopment administrator is chosen as their special target, and this "fits" perfectly with their constituency's conceptions of government officials as their enemies.

The redevelopment authority then would attempt to greet the public with a fait accompli whenever possible and present their propositions to the politicians, in as general a form as possible under terms of the federal law, in order to deny the political activists a role in the actual planning of specific projects.

After Boston's experience with the West End project, another constraint upon the Redevelopment Authority's activities relates to the kind of project which can feasibly be undertaken. Projects in densely populated residential areas in which there is likely to be the most sub-standard housing are, since the memory of the West End dies hard, going to be less easily implemented than projects which do not require large amounts of family relocation such as commercial projects in areas already occupied by businesses.

Commercial redevelopment of the area is more likely to draw the interest of potential developers than new low or moderate income housing which the city badly needs. Thus far it has been extremely difficult in Boston to find organizations strong enough or willing to
form a development corporation to sponsor housing projects. Thus, commercial redevelopment is easier to attain, and more directly economically beneficial. The political ethos also would seem to dictate that the most desirable type of redevelopment is low-income housing on vacant land or land owned by large out-of-town corporations. Land is very scarce in Boston and the corporations are among the few large taxpayers left. In sum, the areas most needing redevelopment in Boston are those least likely to get it. In addition, there are some areas of Boston that have been declared "off limits" for political reasons to planning and redevelopment. There is, for example, an informal agreement that the North End will not be "touched."

The exact nature of the plans, of course, is dictated by the needs and socio-economic composition of the area. This is an environmental constraint.

The working class authoritarian, tradition-bound, world view seems to include an antipathy toward modern architecture. Although architects working on Boston redevelopment projects have not allowed this to hinder them thus far, anti-renewal spokesmen use this as another mobilization point, as well.

The timing of announcements connected with redevelopment and their contents must be handled with extreme care to prevent opponents from having material to interpret in their own way and use as anti-renewal ammunition. This was particularly true during the 1963 mayoralty campaign. A moratorium on redevelopment publicity was declared from September until after the election. As will be seen in a later chapter, the redevelopment bureaucracy deals selectively with the media.
One of the most important constraints upon the redevelopment bureaucracy stemming from the socio-political environment is the limit it places upon the potential bases of support for redevelopment projects. The intense xenophobia of some segments of the population makes the redevelopment authority's task difficult. On public display, the Authority is careful to try to place as many native Bostonians as possible on view. The development Administrator has tried to recruit local talent, but Boston-born Irish city planners with the requisite skills are hard to find. Thus, the environment to a certain extent conditions who can speak for the Authority. The mayor rarely does directly.

In addition the hostility of the most working class authoritarian of the councilmen makes many professional people and representatives of business, financial and real estate groups, who tend to support redevelopment projects, loath to appear in public to express their support. They are likely to be subjected to personal indignities, if they dare to appear before the headline-hunting councilors who hope to enhance their image with the constituents not only by opposing renewal but by embarrassing a Yankee, Harvard graduate in public. Not all councilors conform to this pattern, but until the 1963 election they were in the majority and managed to impede the redevelopment process fairly successfully.

The environment and past experience with redevelopment in Boston conditions the rhetoric of redevelopment as well. Care is taken by the BRA to use few planning terms in public, before audiences who are likely to resent expertise.

The groups in the community with whom the BRA believes it can work
are limited. Having a given amount of time, personnel, and energies for dealing with the local community, the BRA will concentrate its efforts on the more educated, marginal middle class elements in the project areas, attempting to win over extant organizational bases and community leadership before opposition can crystallize.

Federal "red tape" is apt to be less of a constraint on redevelopment activities in Boston than in any other cities. The Boston redevelopment administrator is a close friend of heads of both regional offices, and has been able to obtain a number of concessions. For example, when the City Council rejected the government center plan for the second time, the URA granted approval for construction to begin on one site at a time. 28 The necessity of each office's processing the plans and applications for funds contributes to the overall redevelopment time lag. But this is not a serious impediment.

The most significant constraint upon redevelopment in Boston, however, is the Redevelopment Authority's perception of potential constraint. It might even be argued that there have been instances in which the BRA has been over-cautious in anticipating the presence of constraints which did not materialize. Given the socio-political system in Boston, as it has been described, in any direct confrontation, the bureaucracy sub-system, which is better integrated, more efficient in performance of its systemic functions than the larger system of which it is a part, and which possesses a greater stock of power resources, can if it uses them judiciously overcome most serious environmental constraint.

In addition to constraints, the environment, particularly its inadequacy in the performance of the political functions, places demands on the Redevelopment Authority, which are more or less outside the scope of her goal implementation functions. The next chapter will examine the Boston Redevelopment Authority, its activities, and its orientation.
CHAPTER II

THE REDEVELOPMENT SYSTEM: (1) THE BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

The present chapter has as its focal point the "new" BRA bureaucracy. This is the real locus of redevelopment decision-making for Boston. This is the agency which has in four years produced more fundamental innovations in Boston's political and governmental systems than had been achieved in the previous forty years. This is the agency of the municipal bureaucracy which initiated and developed the comprehensive redevelopment program for the city, which has been credited with drastically impeding, if not entirely halting, Boston's demise as a regional urban center.

This is the agency, too, which has, for the first time in many decades, engineered the coordination and cooperation of other elements of the Boston socio-political system in pursuit of long-range, mutually beneficial goals. It has been able to accomplish these things in the midst of a generally hostile environment, largely because it possesses superior resources to those of the environment and because it functions more effectively and efficiently as a system.

The phenomenon of a municipal bureaucracy serving as the decision-making and conflict resolving center and policy coordinator for a municipal political system along a wide range of issues, is
the rule rather than the exception in Western Europe.\(^1\) Yet, until
recently this phenomenon was virtually unknown in the United States.
In the first place it would create a situation which would be dis-
tinctly at odds with the American myths of local democracy.\(^2\) In
the second place, and, perhaps more important, local bureaucracies
lacked the necessary resources of technical skill, leadership, and
funds. Several federal programs of the past twenty years, especially
urban renewal and housing programs, and transportation programs, have
permitted, if not required, the establishment of local, or area wide,
bureaucracies to deal with implementation of these programs. Whether
these bureaucracies have extended the range and scope of their
influence has been largely determined by the quality of their leader-
ship and technical skill and by environmental variables.

In Boston, the Redevelopment Authority's functions in the
political system appear to be very great. It may even be argued
that its activities have precipitated and accelerated fundamental
social changes in the system.

The BRA: Beginnings

In the early months of 1960, even the most astute observer of
Boston politics would not have predicted that the city would ever

\(^1\) See, for example, William A. Robson, The World's Greatest
Metropolis: Planning and Government in Greater London (Pittsburgh:
Institute of Local Government of the University of Pittsburgh, 1963).

\(^2\) Re-examinations of the myths of local government may be found
in E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People; Robert C. Wood;
Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1958); and Leonard Fein (ed.), American Democracy: Essays on
have an ambitious and dynamic redevelopment program, actually producing visible results in 1964.

Given all the socio-political systems' characteristics, plus the additional constraints of federal requirements and the city's previous experience with redevelopment, which resulted in discrediting the program in the minds of Bostonians, it did indeed seem unlikely that Boston would use this mechanism to solve its physical and economic dilemma.

The election of John Collins in 1959, served as the trigger for the transition, which has proven disruptive to the deeply rooted political power patterns in the city. The most notable, most dramatic departure from past patterns was the establishment of the Boston Redevelopment Authority.

Shortly after his election as Mayor of Boston, Collins, not oblivious to the fiscal and physical plight of the city and seeking a policy tool to halt or retard even temporarily the city's near bankruptcy, paid a visit to New Haven. This city was already achieving a national wide reputation for its imaginative and highly successful redevelopment program. It was there that Collins met Edward Logue, Mayor Lee's development coordinator and one of the principal factors accounting for New Haven's redevelopment success. Collins persuaded Logue to serve as a consultant on Boston's redevelopment problems and work on a per diem basis, paying him out of a Mayor's office special fund. Logue was affiliated with Boston in that capacity for nearly a

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3It has been brought to my attention by one of the participants that Logue and Collins had actually met in Boston through John Saltenstall, then after both Logue and Collins conferred with a Cambridge urban affairs expert a formal meeting was arranged in New Haven.
year. However, he explains, he became increasingly intrigued with Boston's possibilities and with its challenge; for the obstacles to implementation of a successful renewal program appeared to be so formidable.

Mayor Collins, meanwhile, appeared to become increasingly aware of the indirect as well as the direct repercussions of redevelopment, and more anxious to secure the services of Logue for Boston. On the other hand, Logue's conditions prerequisite to undertaking the leadership role for the Boston operation were relatively iemanding, particularly in view of the Boston political system, which tended to resist changes in the municipal bureaucracy more tenaciously than changes in the structure of the other parts of the city government.

What Logue wanted was an unprecedented administrative structure, which would, in effect, centralize redevelopment decision-making in one office. The City Planning Commission as well as the previously existing redevelopment agency would be absorbed by a new Redevelopment Authority. The advantages of coordinating the planning and redevelopment functions for the city, by combining them into one agency were considerable. Indeed, as Kaplan points out in his study of Newark, one of the major sources of potential conflict in a redevelopment policy producing system is that which can occur between competing planning and redevelopment agencies whose spheres of activity, of necessity must, overlap. In other cities too, a separate planning

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1) Supervise and develop the Boston Redevelopment Authority Staff

2) Create new positions and determine the compensation thereof

3) Establish the Authority's internal organization, including staff assignments

4) Power to recruit new personnel

5) Appointment of these personnel would be subject to approval of the Authority

6) Power to appoint counsel and hire consultants

7) Authority to prepare plans and applications for urban renewal projects subject to approval of the authority

8) Right to conduct negotiations with federal and state authorities

9) Responsibility for coordinating policies, plans, and programs with the cooperation of the Mayor.

10) The duty of preparing the agenda for redevelopment authority meetings

The Authority Board which here-to-fore, had, in reality, run the redevelopment program, immediately rejected this plan though it had the backing of the Mayor. 7 In addition, through a special tenure provision, the administrative director of the BRA at that time could not be dismissed from his position since he had served in it longer than six months. Thus, the BRA Board contended that Logue's appointment would be illegal, in addition to jeopardizing their control of existing redevelopment programs. They also resented the fact that Logue was recruited from outside Boston, 8 without their prior knowledge

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7 A complete chronology of the controversy surrounding Logue's appointment may be found in Dennis E. Cook, "A Renewal Decision Viewed Through A Game Model of Politics" (unpublished Bachelor's thesis, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1962).

agency has been shown to present nearly insuperable obstacles to a redevelopment agency. 6

In addition to unrestricted leadership of this new agency, Logue would also hold a position of development assistant in the office of the mayor, partly to emphasize the mayor's close identification with redevelopment and also to provide for two sources from which Logue's salary could be drawn.

Such unusual preconditions set by a possible appointee of the Mayor's, and a potential civil servant, were unknown in Boston and precipitated a lengthy battle, terminated only by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth, and left behind it bitter personal animosities which still exist between Logue and some members of the five-man Redevelopment Authority Board.

Logue set forth what he considered the ten necessary conditions to his employ in a memorandum, submitted to the five-member authority in April of 1960. Powers he considered essential to implementation of a successful program were:

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or consent.

Logue had, however, the support of the Mayor, of an incipient coalition of business, financial, and real estate men, and of the largest and most powerful union in the Boston area, the building trades unions, as well as the editorial pages of three major newspapers, all of whom perceived benefits from a large scale redevelopment effort, centrally directed by specialists. Furthermore, Logue had, with the Mayor's approval, taken the initiative and prepared a comprehensive redevelopment plan for Boston which was artfully presented to the public. The Federal Urban Renewal Administration, with whom Logue had had a close working relationship since his earliest days in New Haven redevelopment, had approved the program and allocated money for the first two projects, when it seemed likely that Logue would be hired for the Boston post.

Ultimately Logue was accepted, by a 3-2 vote of the Authority Board after bitter words and after the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth, asserted that since under the terms of a compromise plan, the previous administrative head of the Redevelopment Authority was not being fired and his salary not being decreased, only his duties changed; Logue's appointment was not illegal.9

To understand the background of the controversy over Logue's appointment, which has had some repercussions for the operating style of the Redevelopment Authority bureaucracy since that time, it is perhaps useful to examine briefly the nature and composition of the

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Redevelopment Authority Board as well as the pre-Logue organizational structure and personnel policies of the administrative apparatus of the BRA.

The five members of the BRA Board in 1960 and 1961 had been appointed by Collins predecessor and reflected the "old guard," patronage, parochial, quasi-machine, political traditions of the city.

Msgr. Lally, editor of the Pilot; James Colbert, former political columnist for a group of local community newspapers; James McCloskey, an official of the Trade Unions Council; Melvin Mascusso, another newspaper man, and the appointee of the State Housing Board; and John Lund, a real estate man, comprised the BRA Board at that time. In 1961 Lund was succeeded by John Ryan, another real estate representative; and in 1964 he was succeeded by George Condakes a wholesale produce dealer. The terms run for five years. When Logue's appointment was at issue, Lally and Lund, both pro-redevelopment and interested in technical competence voted in favor of him on all occasions, McCloskey and Colbert were staunchly and vigorously opposed, and Mascusso held the controlling vote. Note that no one of the Board members had any knowledge of planning design, or redevelopment; yet in the pre-Logue organization they made the decisions on where projects were to be, what form they would take, who would be the developers, etc. Note that three were news media affiliated. Logue knew immediately that this was not a framework in which he could hope to implement a program of the nature that was required for Boston. He perceived further, that he personally could not have his "hands" so "tied" by the

10 Personal communication, May 1964.
by the Authority Board, particularly when a majority of its members embodied attitudes toward redevelopment so antithetical to those Logue deemed most suitable for Boston's needs.

The BRA administrative apparatus, prior to Logue, consisted of sixteen employees, over half of whom were secretaries or clerical workers and the remainder mostly lawyers. There were no planners nor architects nor social workers on the staff. The planning Council was a separate agency, which had little City Hall support before the Collins administration. Thus it had a small budget, and relatively little tangible was done.

Small wonder that the West End project was ineptly handled, for the pre-1960 BRA apparatus was unable to cope with it. Indeed the entire Boston socio-political system, was unable to adjust to the complex systemic requirements of the redevelopment program without an external stimulus.

The BRA's Program

With this background let us proceed to summarize the BRA's record since its inception and to examine the dimensions and character of its present redevelopment program.

Mayor Collins released the details of the development program, which Logue had prepared, in September of 1960. At that time ten areas were designated as of top priority for renewal treatment. The estimated costs of the projects, phased over the following six years,

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12 City of Boston, City Record, September 24, 1960, text of mayor's development program.
was $90,000,000; to be divided on a two-thirds, one-third basis between
the federal government and the city. The city itself was partitioned
into eight General Neighborhood Renewal Plan areas in which particular
renewal projects were included. 13 Two projects, West End and New
York Streets, were already in progress and two others, Washington
Park and Government Center, were pending. Otherwise, the BRA was
starting afresh with a comprehensive redevelopment plan for Boston.

Logue's 1960 projections for the ten renewal areas, envisaged
that all of them would be in the "execution" stage by the beginning
of 1964; that five would have been completed by the end of 1964; and
that only one, the South End Project would extend into 1967, the last
year for which these initial projections were made. However, in the
latter part of 1964, we find six of those projects including the
non-governmental Prudential project, in the execution stage and no
project totally completed. Does this mean that the BRA has failed as
a goal oriented agency in effectively implementing a redevelopment
program in Boston?

If success is to be measured simply by the number of projects
in execution, as many critics of Boston renewal maintain, then certainly
the BRA has not achieved the objectives set for it nor matched the
accomplishments of many other cities. But there have been extenuating
circumstances, and a case may be made for the proposition that the
obstacles in the way of reaching the execution stage for several of
the top priority projects, can not be attributed to any action or

13 The boundaries of renewal project areas may coincide with
those of the GNRP area. Usually the area of the renewal project is
much smaller than that of the GNRP.
inaction on the part of the BRA; but rather to external variables and those primarily of a non-technical nature. Furthermore, Logue's projections erred in underestimating the time required for two crucial phases of the projects: securing local approval and federal review.

Judged on the basis of criteria other than mere numbers of projects in execution, however, the redevelopment program has been extremely successful. For example, between 1959 and 1963, Boston moved from seventeenth place to fourth place in a ranking of the total amount of money reserved by the federal government for renewal projects in major cities.\textsuperscript{14} In terms of per capita expenditures, of the dispersion of projects throughout the city, of the total area being treated and of the proportion of the city receiving redevelopment assistance, Boston also ranks high. In terms of the quality of design of the buildings erected under the auspices of the redevelopment program, Boston's program is very highly rated. In terms of technical competence and of imagination and experimentation with redevelopment methods and concepts, the BRA generally has an admirable record. Its relocation programs and policies, while not the most outstanding feature of its work thus far, have been, from the statistics that are available, much better than the national average. However the BRA's most notable accomplishments to date involve its total impact upon the economic and political activities of the city. The Boston Chamber of Commerce, early in 1964 estimated that the redevelopment program would stimulate over $400,000,000 in private investment (along with $309,000,000 in

local public investment and $193,000,000 in institutional investment)\textsuperscript{15} in the city. In addition the establishment of the BRA and its program have had unintended consequences for the city's political system.

On the basis of his redevelopment experiences in New Haven, Logue could not have foreseen the impediments to his program which were inherent in the social and political systems of Boston. Thus, in the original staging of projects, he might have assumed that City Council approval was merely a formality and that the strategies for dealing with neighborhood elites in order to win their consent would be similar to those successfully utilized in New Haven. It was soon apparent to him that the political atmosphere in Boston was much different from that to which he and his lieutenants were accustomed and that many adjustments in operating style would have to be made. The process of adjustment, which is continuing and still incomplete has slowed Boston's redevelopment process considerably.

Aside from the factors of hostility toward redevelopment by members of Boston's majority ethnic groups and their political spokesmen on the one hand and the liberal intellectual community on the other the conflict between Boston and the BRA was exacerbated by the range of BRA's activities, which made almost every area in the city a target for some form of redevelopment treatment, and the relative visibility of its actions, particularly during its early days. In cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and San Francisco, for example, all of which have had large scale redevelopment programs, redevelopment controversies have rarely been the primary source of

\textsuperscript{15} The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, \textit{Boston Renewal}, January, 1964, pp. 33-34.
community conflict. These cities, it may be argued, have governmental administrations which have been, at least in recent years, policy oriented to a greater extent than has Boston's. Hence, the political environment appears more diversified and more complex. As a result, of the number and variety of political conflicts occurring at any one time, redevelopment activities are but one category competing for public attention. In Boston, on the other hand, redevelopment, and, indeed, a policy oriented municipal bureaucracy, was somewhat of a novelty. Since redevelopment had subsumed so many other areas of potential controversy and since the redevelopment authority soon became the major agency of local governmental action, its activities were watched closely and "played up" in the local press. In particular, every false step was noted and every attempt made to link the BRA with the social abuses of the West End project. Furthermore, the BRA was beginning essentially from scratch as far as planning and rationalized governmental activities in Boston were concerned. Boston had not been accustomed to such methods for over a half century.

Engineering local consent is the major impediment to redevelopment in Boston; but the increasing length of time for federal review of plans and projects also acts to extend the period prior to the execution stage. The volume of projects to be reviewed and the lack of competent personnel are the major reasons for this. As the range of redevelopment tools becomes wider a larger number of communities have begun to take advantage of the program. Each project must undergo federal regional office and then national office scrutiny before the survey and planning grant is authorized and again before the loan and
grant for actual project costs is awarded.

At present the BRA has ten projects underway. The facts and figures with regard to these projects are highly variable from day to day and week to week. The data presented here represents the information available in the spring of 1964. A brief description of the characteristics of each follows, and the information is summarized in Table 1.

**New York Streets**, initiated in 1952 was Boston's first redevelopment endeavor. It encompasses 24 acres and is intended exclusively for industrial development. All twelve of its parcels have been either leased or sold to developers. It is located in the South End GNP and is adjacent to the Castle Square Project Area. Tax revenues from the area have nearly doubled with redevelopment as yet incomplete.

**Whitney Street** (Charlesbank Apartments) in the Parker-Hill Fenway area is the smallest BRA sponsored project comprising only seven acres. This is a project financed only by the city, thus not strictly speaking a UR project but included in our tabulation since it is officially under the aegis of the BRA. Its reuse is as a diversified residential development. It contains a high rise upper middle income apartment building and several low rise complexes of moderate income housing, envisaged as relocation housing by the BRA.

**West End**, which has already been noted, is 41 acres in size. It was the city's first large scale renewal effort. Located along the Charles River its reuse plan calls for 2,400 dwelling units, a shopping center, library, research center, hospital, home for aged Roman Catholic priests, and parking facilities. One border of the project is partially adjacent to Government Center and another faces the
north side of Beacon Hill. Development is proceeding slowly, only about half of the dwelling units are completed and ground has only just been broken on other parcels.

Government Center, thus far the most controversial, and after West End, the most publicized of Boston's projects outside the city, is 60 acres in size. It will occupy the former Scollay Square area, long reputed to be a favorite spot for seamen from around the world. Besides the new City Hall, there will be a new federal office building and a state service center on the site. Seven private office buildings are anticipated along with a 2,000 car parking garage, a motel, and a pedestrian plaza. The entire street pattern of the area as well as the mass transit facilities are undergoing alterations. Older buildings bordering the site are also slated for rehabilitation. Construction is under way on the three governmental buildings and two of the private office buildings. This project is located near the West End and Downtown projects and between Beacon Hill and the Waterfront Project.

Washington Park in Roxbury is located in the area of Boston which has the largest concentration of Negroes. The project area of 502 acres will receive a mixture of renewal, rehabilitation and conservation treatments. This is thus far Boston's most successful residential project. Its reuse plan lists 1,500 units of moderate income housing in addition to the 6,500 units to be rehabilitated, three new elementary schools, new recreational facilities and civic center, a library, commercial and shopping centers, and parking facilities. The new housing and the shopping center are underway. Rehabilitation is moving very slowly.
South End is the largest area to be undertaken for renewal treatment, 564 acres. The Castle Square Project Area is included within it. Like Washington Park, this too is to be primarily a residential renewal and neighborhood rehabilitation project. The problem here is that so many of the structures are beyond the stage of feasible rehabilitation. The difficulties are intensified by the high incidence of social problems in the area, which will make relocation for many of the inhabitants impossible in the existing housing supply. With these impressive obstacles at the outset, small wonder that South End has been in the survey and planning stages for nearly four years and has changed project directors frequently. The reuse plans at present include four new schools and playgrounds, a medical center, an industrial development site, approximately 2,500 new housing units, rehabilitation for 3,000 structures, a community center, skating rink and swimming pool, and substantial alterations in the street pattern. There has been some voluntary rehabilitation.

Charlestown across the Charles River and isolated from the rest of Boston is also still in the planning stage. It is an area of 500 acres intended primarily for rehabilitation treatment. 1,000 new residential units are anticipated, however. In addition a housing project for the elderly is projected along with three new schools, a new shopping center and an industrial development site. The M.T.A. elevated tracks in the area would also be torn down under the redevelopment plan. Community resistance even to rehabilitation has been intense, and the internal conflicts and high level personnel
changes within the project team have further impeded the project's progress.

Waterfront; the full title of this project is Downtown-Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project. Although only 100 acres in size, its reuse is the most diverse. Where it borders on the North End, the reuse plan calls for moderate income housing. Overlooking the Waterfront will be several luxury apartment towers. Also on the Waterfront will be a new municipal recreational area with aquarium and marina. On the inland portions of the project there are to be provisions for the expansion of the city's financial district. Several new office buildings are projected; the historic buildings in the area will be renovated. Execution should begin in 1965, local approval having been accorded in June of 1964.

Central Business District. This is envisaged as being the most expensive of Boston's redevelopment projects and the one requiring the most investment from the private sector in order to reach fruition. It is still in the survey and planning stages, however. Reuse of its 159 acres is to be totally commercial. Additional parking facilities are to be constructed and the inefficient street pattern of the area considerably revised. This project is being actively sponsored by a Committee for the Central Business District composed of businessmen from the project area.

South Cove is one of the newest BRA projects, although institutions in the project area have been planning its reuse for many years. Near the South End, it is the location of many medical and educational institutions, the chief among them Tufts-New England Medical Center. The Chinese Community also resides there. Reuse of the 88 acres calls for rehabilitation of the Chinese commercial district, 500 new housing
units, improved parking and traffic conditions, and expansion of the medical center.

In addition to these projects, listed as "active" by the BRA at the time of our factual survey, there is also the Castle Square Project in the South End project area which has gone into the execution stage recently, but for which the BRA no longer has an office project team. Its responsibilities for the area are substantially completed; relocation activities have been concluded; and the parcels have been conveyed to the developers.

A new project planning team has been established for the Parker-Hill Fenway area. Planning is in its initial stages, but it seems apparent that because of the large number of institutions in the area, the overall redevelopment treatment might be similar to that of the South Cove area.

Finally, the general development section of the BRA has undertaken a project known as "operation grand slam," designed to spread the municipal facilities improvements of redevelopment out among those areas of the city not undergoing renewal. The expectation is that by using vacant and tax title property, about fifty projects of from two to fifteen acres can be developed for single-purpose public facilities such as schools and playgrounds, parks, relocation housing, etc. The projects are to be located in the "low priority" redevelopment neighborhoods.

Such are the dimensions of the BRA's redevelopment activities. In addition it also has the responsibility for the city's overall planning and development.
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The BRA: Functions

The basic functions of implementing urban renewal projects, include preliminary planning, preparation of survey and planning application for federal funds for the first stage. This is followed by physical, economic and sociological surveys of the area as preparation for planning for the future of the area in conformance with the general land-use plan for the entire city. Social and economic projections of the future of the area, given certain mixes of prospective land-use are also often prepared. When these kinds of surveys have been completed (theoretically) actual planning begins. However, in practice survey and planning functions are carried out by two different groups simultaneously. Or the planning may precede the survey work and the surveys may be used only to justify the features of the plans which have been produced. The BRA has, during the period of study employed all three patterns. In the case of Parker Hill-Fenway, an area near a number of medical and educational institutions, the survey work was definitely an antecedent of any planning activity. In the case of the Central Business District plan, the planning was being done by a consulting firm, Victor Gruen and Associates, while the BRA staff members assigned to this project were carrying on the surveys and projections for the area. In the Charlestown project, on the other hand, the planning for the area had already been nearly completed while only beginnings had been made on the survey work.

The results of the survey and planning activity are forwarded to regional and national offices along with an application for loan and grant and documents attesting that the plans conform to the
requirements of the so-called Workable Program. There is a lengthy process of review by regional and federal urban renewal agencies. Meanwhile, the Local Project Agency is expected to secure the sanction of those directly involved in the local project area, through public hearings and estimate of consensus; of the mayor; and of the city governing body. In Boston this means the city council.

Indeed, securing public acceptance of its plans and decisions soon became one of the most time consuming aspects of the redevelopment process in Boston for the BRA. Public hearings had to be held, not only in the community immediately affected, but also before the city council. These often dragged on for weeks and months as the councilmen opposed to renewal tried to get as much publicity as possible from them, and to embarrass Logue and his staff as much as possible. Preparation of models and displays for exposition to the community and segments thereof as well as to the council, also required a considerable amount of the staff's time and energies. It was estimated that approximately one third of the BRA's 480 employees spent over half their time solely in activities preparatory to achieving public consent for its projects.17

When the loan and grant approval has been secured, land taking and relocation begin. Usually, the agency takes the land and then solicits bids for developers who promise to develop the area in accordance with the plans that have been prepared. In the case of

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16 U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Laws contains the legal requirements for the Workable Program. Critiques of the Workable Program may be found in Fiser, Mastery of the Metropolis, Chapter 5.

Boston, all but one of the major projects now in process are to some extent rehabilitation projects, not total clearance projects. Thus, at this phase rehabilitation work, either under the auspices of the BRA, or by private individuals, is begun. If there is a gap between BRA acquisition of properties and disposition to a developer, the BRA is landlord to all tenants. It is during this phase that the most intensive relocation and social service work is done in the project areas. A field office is customarily set up with facilities for relocation and rehabilitation assistance. For rehabilitation, the BRA architects will prepare designs for individual household rehabilitation and refer the individuals to BRA approved contractors. In the relocation process the BRA works extremely closely with Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), a joint federal and foundation sponsored organization to coordinate social services. Relocation in the Castle Square project, for example, brought to the notice of social workers a number of cases of which they would not ordinarily have known. A number of elderly, reclusive, infirm persons not cognizant of social welfare assistance available to them, were discovered. Many families, fearful and suspicious of welfare services, may be aided when relocation workers can refer them to the proper social agency or the social agency to them. Students at the Simmons School for Social Work at the Boston University Social Work School, augment the relocation staff of the BRA.

While rehabilitation of those structures which will be retained, according to the project plan, and relocation of families and business firms from those structures which will be demolished proceeds, the BRA

reviews the proposals of those developers who have bid for certain parcels of land within the project. The developer is usually chosen on the basis of either economy or aesthetic considerations or both. In the case of the shopping center in the Washington Park renewal project, there was the additional criterion of "an established reputation" in the community to be served. The parcels of land are then conveyed to the developer; and the remainder of the municipal bureaucracy's task is to see that the terms of the developers contract are carried out in conformance to the project plan, and to supervise any city's sponsored improvements which may be part of the project. These may include street widening, installation of new "street furniture," construction of public buildings, such as police or fire or school or library facilities. BRA architects are generally charged with design of these facilities and also exercise "design review" for the entire project. In addition, as was the case in the Washington Park project, the development corporation chosen may contract with the BRA staff to prepare designs for housing projects and other buildings.

To summarize, the BRA's principal goal implementation functions are socio-economic surveying, planning, design and design review on the technical side and engineering local public and political acceptance and procuring developers, on the non-technical side.

Long range development planning is included within the purview of the BRA's activities. This allows the BRA staff to undertake the city's capital budgeting formulation over time. In 1963 the Development staff prepared, under Logue's direction as the Mayor's special assistant for development (not as redevelopment administrator), a 300-
page, illustrated, detailed program for capital improvements for Boston's municipal facilities to cover the years through 1975.  

The BRA: Substantive Orientation

Because of the diverse functional requirements of implementing redevelopment a number of different professions become involved in the process at different stages. Each of these brings to redevelopment its own approach, its own orientation toward redevelopment, its own set of expectations regarding the goals toward which redevelopment should aim and the methods by which they should be achieved. Three major categories of orientations have been identified in this study.

(a) The Sociologist-Social Worker Orientation. The sociologist-social worker orientation towards redevelopment regards it principally as a housing program. Its objectives, according to this view, should be to increase the standard housing inventory and at the same time upgrade the life style and widen the range of housing alternatives available to lower income persons; in sum to "get rid of slums." It is also regarded as a convenient means of achieving dispersal of minority groups.  

Redevelopment programs implementing these objectives should also carry with them a comprehensive and coordinated social service program. They should emphasize relocation of families.

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and should result in as little relocation as possible. There are some inherent contradictions in this orientation. For it is not clear from the objectives whether total clearance and maximum relocation to attain dispersal or minimum clearance to lessen disruptions of the community's social fabric is paramount. Indeed, this confusion among the ranks of the practitioners of redevelopment who hold these views has diminished their influence in recent years. As these significant social goals appear to be mutually exclusive in practice, fewer redevelopment agencies, particularly among the upper echelon personnel believe that they can be successfully achieved.

(b) The Planner-Architect Orientation. The professional orientation of those practitioners of urban renewal who espouse the planner-architect approach, is, despite twenty years engaged in the real world of urban political battles, still likely to be somewhat idealistic. The notion of "city beautiful" dies hard. The objectives of those who hold this view of the nature of redevelopment programs, are to conserve what is "good" from the past, demolish what is neither good nor useful, and reconstruct the city according to their specific visions or, if they are less imaginative, according to the currently acceptable ratio of buildings to open space. They wish to halt the city's physical decay. They too, are ambivalent toward the techniques to achieve their goals. They too, have not been able to decide whether they prefer total clearance, rehabilitation, conservation or some mix of the three as the means of redeveloping the city. In early years of redevelopment, however, they like the sociologist-social workers had extravagant hopes for total clearance and complete redevelopment which have not materialized in
practice. Planners and architects, or those with this orientation toward redevelopment, are most likely to be in control of redevelopment efforts in towns and smaller cities. Thus, in terms of sheer numbers, it can be said that those with this orientation toward redevelopment dominate the majority of redevelopment programs in the country today.

(c) The Political-Economic Orientation. As might be expected, because of the complex socio-economic context in which they must operate, many large cities' redevelopment programs are headed by those who have a political-economic orientation toward the subject. Those who hold this view are more likely to see redevelopment in terms of its potential advantages to tax rates, real estate values, and overall financial health of a city. In addition, they may be concerned with its political benefits if the program is successful, or more cognizant of the permissible limits to which redevelopment can be carried in a particular urban environment. Their recognition of economic and political feasibility, dictate a strategy of choosing to attempt projects which are nearly certain to come to fruition, and to select tactics of implementation which have been calculated as least likely to generate conflict. Hence, when this orientation is dominant, commercial rather than residential projects are apt to be undertaken. Proponents of this orientation too are more likely to agree on a "mix"

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22 In 1963, 67% of the cities participating in the federal urban renewal program had populations of less than 50,000 and thirty per cent had populations of less than 25,000. It is in these cities that the planner's orientation toward redevelopment is most likely to prevail.
of clearance, rehabilitation, and conservation in proportions of approximately 20%, 40%, and 60% respectively.

The Boston Redevelopment Authority provides an excellent example of an agency whose chief executive possesses the political-economic orientation toward redevelopment. He seems to be acutely aware of the political and economic feasibility of projects in their particular environment. Further, as will be seen, the BRA and the Mayor, its major political supporter, are more likely to be ideologically attuned to the business, financial and real estate interests in the community. Thus, an alliance between them is entirely plausible in implementing redevelopment projects.

The BRA, and particularly its administrator, is opposed to total clearance projects. Logue's anti-clearance attitudes, are not directly related to his Boston experience. In fact they antedate the refinements of the federal program that allowed redevelopment administrators a wider range of tactical and conceptual alternatives for implementing redevelopment. The New Haven, Wooster Square Project, which was undertaken while Logue was serving as development administrator there, was in 1955 a pioneer in making viable the concept of rehabilitation in redevelopment projects. None of the existing redevelopment projects in Boston, with the exception of the West End project which was initiated prior to Logue's administration, is a total clearance project. There is a strong emphasis on rehabilitation and conservation even in commercial redevelopment projects in Boston. However, its effectiveness has yet to be tested on a large scale, as few projects are now in execution. Prospects for its success, particularly in the Boston socio-political system are not favorable.
Conditions surrounding the BRA's establishment and the orientation of its upper echelon toward redevelopment have affected not only the organization's structure but also its style.

The BRA Style

The most distinctive aspect of the Redevelopment Authority bureaucracy in Boston is its "style." This is evident the moment one enters its offices which occupy all of the tenth and eleventh floors of City Hall Annex. One of the first actions taken by Logue, following his appointment was to refurbish completely this space. This incidentally, is not the location of the former development authority offices. The former staff still under its old direction maintains its offices two blocks away. Indirect lighting, pale walls, and brightly colored leather chairs in the reception rooms on each floor, indicate immediately that this agency is totally different from the other municipal bureaucracies in Boston. The first nine floors of the city hall annex are marked by sickly green or yellow walls and room size, open offices staffed by elderly paper shufflers, for the most part. The immediate impression one gets of the BRA staff is of youth and vitality.

The BRA is a highly professional organization, the manners, modes of dress and speech of the BRA employees differ sharply from those of the other city agencies in Boston. A check of the personnel files of the BRA shows that over three quarters of the employees have some education beyond high school; over half of them are professionals. A large number of the secretarial staff have had some college training.23

23Boston Redevelopment Authority, personnel records.
The offices of project directors and other officials are located along corridors. The doors are painted bright colors, no names or titles appear on them. Logue's office, indicative of his isolation from the rest of the staff, is in a far corner of the eleventh floor, directly overlooking the Government Center project.

Not only the physical features of the BRA distinguish it from other parts of the Boston municipal bureaucracy. The attitudes of the staff vary too. Their training and hence their orientation toward problems of goal implementation is highly professional. They constitute an "action" agency in the midst of a city administration which would rather not act. The BRA is composed mainly of non-Bostonians. In fact there are only two native Bostonians in upper echelon positions and only one Boston area born project director.\(^{24}\) The addresses of most of the personnel are outside Boston or on Beacon Hill, where Logue and two of his closest associates live. Many have been drawn to the BRA through Harvard and MIT Schools of urban design, architecture, and planning. For these people it is perhaps their first job, and provides invaluable experience. There is considerable turnover; for not all can adjust to the requirements of a municipal bureaucracy in which the work is not always as creative and professionally satisfying as they may prefer. However, a number of planners and architects almost directly out of graduate schools have assumed posts of some responsibility, due to the change-over of personnel and the inability of the BRA to fill all the necessary positions with "top" talent. Recruitment tends to be nationwide, however.

\(^{24}\) Boston Redevelopment Authority, personnel records.
The BRA also makes considerable use of consultants. It is felt that not only can they provide expertise in particular areas where the project staffs may be a bit weak, economics analyses for example; but the prestige of their names often aids the BRA in gaining support for their proposals among the business and financial interest and the media. Thus, the BRA differs from the rest of the municipal bureaucracy in median age, education level, and professionalism. (Logue will not hire a planner who has not a planning degree from a recognized institution.25

Lacking long-time residence in the community, and having a "cosmopolitan" orientation toward Boston and its redevelopment problems, BRA employees do not tend to share the prevailing political culture of the city. Indeed, one of the most frequent epithets thrown at Logue by his opponents is that he is an "ivy-League out-of-towner," the antithesis of a representative of the Boston political culture and the dominant political culture in other parts of the city bureaucracy. In addition the BRA personnel and decisions are likely to be professionally oriented; its personnel policies based on achievement criteria rather than political connections; its employees not bound by the peculiar city tenure provisions.26

The BRA is oriented toward producing tangible results of Boston's "redevelopment." As a consequence, there has been less emphasis on

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25Personal communication, May 1963, corroborated by other members of the BRA staff.

26Christian Science Monitor (Boston edition), February 7, 1964, page 1 carries an article detailing Logue's running battle to exempt his professional employees from the city's automatic tenure system.
general planning than perhaps would have occurred if the planning unit had been left under a separate agency. However, Logue has been explicit on the point both in public and in private that planning is essentially meaningless unless directly tied to an implementing agency. Thus, the project planners in and through the BRA have greater probability of seeing their plans become reality.\textsuperscript{27}

In its strategies of internal decision making, and external goal implementation, it may be argued that the BRA officials, and particularly Logue, operate in a manner quite different from the rest of the Boston political system. There are variations in the particular pattern of decision making from one division to another in the BRA; but the general style is essentially the same. All project directors are likely to have a policy orientation somewhat akin to Logue's. The amount of project team cohesion and the method by which it is achieved also varies from section to section. Given the independence of project teams, there are two major mechanisms for cohesion within the whole organization, (1) Mr. Logue, (2) shared professional norms and principles. The degree to which each section of the BRA or particular sets of decisions need to be coordinated by each, or a particular combination of these, also varies.

In the context of the Boston political system, the BRA is an innovative, issue generating agency. It places an extremely high emphasis on the quality of its work and the quality of its personnel; it

would not be an exaggeration to state that many of the outstanding re-
development professionals in the nation have at one time or another
during the past three and one half years served the BRA. The Rehabili-
tation director was formerly assistant director of St. Louis redevelop-
ment; there are relocation officials who are veterans of Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Syracuse renewal experiences, for there is considerable
trading among cities of the limited number of competent, experienced
redevelopment professionals.

The BRA can obtain the quality it desires by maintaining a salary
scale for its professional and clerical staff, of a totally different
caliber from any other parts of the Boston municipal bureaucracy. This
is possible only because of the BRA's particular access to federal funds.
Finally, the emphasis on quality of all kinds is exemplified by the
Architects Review Board, one of several professional consulting panels
which Logue had appointed, to make suggestions regarding the merits of
various design proposals before the BRA.

BRA Resources

The BRA, in addition to possessing a style, quite clearly distinct
from the prevailing political culture's ideal of a municipal bureau-
cracy, also has associated with it certain resources which the system
as a whole seems to lack. This fact alters the power balance between
system and sub-system. It tends to favor the latter, depending upon
the latter's effective utilization of its resources to achieve its
goals. In addition, the sub-system, the BRA, because of its superior
resources, may be called upon to perform for the system basic functions
which it cannot perform for itself. The BRA possesses resources of
(1) technical expertise, (2) federal support, (3) federal money,
(4) Logue's leadership, his personnel and professional connections network, and (5) the support of heretofore dormant, but potentially influential, elements in the political and social system, which are closer to its operating style than to the political culture of the socio-political system which is Boston. The BRA also has (6) the tacit support of the Mayor and a rising transitional elite which tries to satisfy both those who form the basis of the Mayor's electoral support and the demands of the BRA's professional, action oriented, ethos.

The BRA has amassed power through its virtual monopoly of skills in the city administration. It has, in effect, assumed the policy making functions for a number of other agencies. The capital budget projections for the next decade, for instance, as they apply to the library facilities and number and location of police and fire houses are actually making policy for these agencies, influencing their staff needs, etc.

Hence, beginning with federal funds, a dynamic director with a large network of professional connections, and absorption of the general planning function, the BRA has built a skill reservoir in the municipal bureaucracy which has allowed it to become the central policy producing unit for the city. Its functions are, in reality, not solely those connected with redevelopment implementation. Redevelopment itself affects the social and political fabric of the entire city, but in addition the scope of the BRA's operations have been enlarged, perhaps somewhat against its will. Since, for example, there was no effective zoning code for the city, the BRA had to write one and supervise its implementation; and transportation planning has brought it into contact and a working relationship with state and metropolitan wide bureaucracies as the
city's spokesman. Logue, more often than not, is personified as the center of political conflict over redevelopment, leaving the mayor only to make formal announcements and remain freer with respect to his operation within the total system.

BRA is not entirely isolated in its position vis-à-vis the predominant political culture. If BRA's leaders use the organization's resources "intelligently," they can build coalitions with other elements in the socio-political system which are closer to its orientation. The next chapter will consider the other elements in the socio-political system of Boston which are relevant to the redevelopment process.
CHAPTER III

THE REDEVELOPMENT SYSTEM: (2) OTHER ELEMENTS

In order to implement a redevelopment project, more than merely a skillful, efficient, and effective administrative agency with a direct line to federal coffers is necessary. There must exist in the larger system either a permissive political environment or the possibilities of building a coalition of elements in the system which can overcome the obstacles of a hostile socio-political environment. In Boston, the socio-political system and the political culture associated with it is in many respects antithetical to redevelopment. However, there are in the community, a number of other potential power centers which it is possible for the leaders of the redevelopment authority to mobilize in support of their goals. This chapter will consider the other major units in the Boston socio-political system with which the BRA comes into contact as it seeks to bring its plans to fruition.

Each group or set of groups is analyzed in terms of its general political style and the functions it can perform for the redevelopment program. A group's functions in the renewal process conditions at which phase of the process it tends to become involved. Further, by examining and comparing the "political culture" of the various types of groups and their likely orientations toward redevelopment, it may be possible to predict the probable nature and intensity of their participation in
the redevelopment process, to gauge their relative propensity to be functional or dysfunctional to the attainment of the BRA's objectives.

**Business Interests**

Under the rubric of business interests may be included banking and legal firms, as well as retail and manufacturing and service enterprises in the city of Boston. Owners and operators of these institutions were among the first to leave Boston for the suburbs as a place of residence, though there are a few notable exceptions.¹ Boston still has a surprisingly large number of local area-controlled major business establishments. Individuals heading them have provided most of Boston's leadership in cultural and philanthropic endeavors; they have been unwelcome at City Hall in the reign of the Irish-political ethos, and they knew it well. They tended, prior to the election of Collins and the advent of the new BRA bureaucracy, to channel their monies, activities, and energies into other areas in which their efforts would be appreciated.

A committee of sixteen, under the direction of Charles Coolidge of the law firm of Ropes and Gray, had been formed during the administration of Collins' predecessor and tentative overtures were made by the business community for some sort of cooperation. When Collins was elected, however, he called in the business leaders and asked for their assistance in streamlining the governmental operations of the city in an effort to cut operating costs and break the city's economic decline.

In the redevelopment process, the overt participation of the local business community can be extremely useful. Lack of at least its tacit consent to implementation of renewal can be a powerful impediment.

Indeed, in no case could commercial redevelopment have succeeded on a large scale in a situation in which a substantial segment of the local business community opposed it.

The functions which the business community can perform in redevelopment vary according to the socio-political system of an individual community and the resources of the business community. They may be as great as performing the actual planning function or hiring consultants when the city bureaucracy lacks the necessary skills or as small as merely issuing statement in support of a project. In Boston the business community was able to provide an important element of support for redevelopment.

Banks and manufacturing companies can form development corporations to undertake the actual construction phase or redevelopment. Businessmen's organizations, too, may, depending upon the enabling legislation in particular states, form development corporations for redevelopment projects, as was done, for example, in Hartford.\(^2\) Massachusetts legislation concerned with redevelopment corporations is among the most lenient in allowing groups to become development corporations.\(^3\) The leading corporate developer at present in the city is the Prudential Insurance Company, incidentally, not a locally based company. But this is a departure from


\(^3\)Massachusetts, General Laws, Chapter 121, Sections 22B to 26HHH, as amended through 1961.
the usual pattern for Boston. The major function of the business community, however, is that of support for redevelopment proposals initiated in other ways. The business community has amazing amounts of reserve potential for socio-political activity in Boston. Years of Irish, working class rule, municipal corruption, and their distaste for city politics in the machine style led to abandonment of the leadership role they had had in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This aloofness from the problems of the city became habitual within three generations. It would in short, require some sort of impetus from outside of the business community to overcome its timidity regarding participation in political Boston's affairs. Although absentee ownership does not characterize most of Boston's business enterprises, the business community seemed unwilling to take part and acquiesced in the ascendency of a political regime which was leading the city as a whole, though not their individual companies, to financial ruin.  

The most likely potential support group for redevelopment is the Chamber of Commerce. The political culture prevalent among its members, a good many of them products of schools and colleges held to be in the "aristocratic" image of Boston, is more closely attuned to that of the BRA bureaucracy than that of the dominant political ethos in the city.

The problem, however, is to translate these attitudes and general orientation toward social behavior from the confines of their respective businesses and their cultural and philanthropic activities and channel

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some of them into city-wide action. The potential for redevelopment leadership is present; the business community has resources in money and administrative and organizational skill. The BRA leadership, in conjunction with the transitional political leadership characteristics of the Collins administration,\textsuperscript{5} has the task of convincing the business leadership that it has a stake in the future of Boston.

**Real Estate Interests**

Real estate firms, like business enterprises which are locally based, have a definite interest in the city's economic welfare. These two groups may be described as "cosmopolitan locals." They have a business or professional orientation which transcends the boundaries of the specific political system in which they are located, while at the same time, their activities within the system itself give them roots in the local community and a vested interest in its development.

The Boston real estate community, though it might well be considered only a sub-category of the business community, is given special separate treatment because of its peculiar relationship to the redevelopment process. Real estate firms, too, may and often do act as development corporations for redevelopment areas. They may, on occasion, hire their own planners and "counterplan" an area or undertake moderate-scale development outside the framework of federal renewal programs. This would alleviate some red tape and allow them to exercise greater latitude in

planning and building. Though in Boston the size of plots of land is so small, ownership is so fragmented and, thus, land acquisition of parcels sufficiently large to warrant development is well-nigh impossible without the redevelopment authority's *eminent domain* power.

As in the case of business interests, a real estate organization, such as the Greater Boston Real Estate Board, may be a supporting force for redevelopment, in general. In Boston, this tends to be true, although some reservations have been expressed by the local board concerning specific aspects of some projects to be undertaken.

Redevelopment serves primarily the needs of larger real estate operations. Indeed, it may even be temporarily dysfunctional from the point of view of smaller real estate organizations or those whose operations are confined to a small, ethnically cohesive, homogenous community, if that area should become part of a redevelopment project. Inclusion in a project area tends to depress rents and then to "freeze" the real estate market in the area. Thus, Boston's Washington Park and Government Center projects were the cause of some dissention and division in the real estate community. Large real estate concerns may be alienated from a particular redevelopment project when a competitor wins a development contract. Much of the delay in Boston's Government Center Operations occurred over a charge of ostensible favoritism to one real-estate-turned-development company, by the real estate company managing another building located on the potential site of a new building. The City Council was unwilling to give its consent to a project thus "tainted."

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Large real estate companies turned developers can easily "empire-build" and substantially increase their holdings in an area by use of redevelopment. Boston's First Realty Company is a case in point. It is substantially involved in several of Boston's major projects, in a variety of capacities.

It is difficult to define an identifiable political culture for the real estate sub-system of the Boston socio-political system. The major distinction in the way real estate operators view the political process and the redevelopment process is, to a great extent, a function of their size and their relative ability to take advantage of the development opportunities afforded by the redevelopment program. Larger real estate firms, those that are potential developers instead of merely sideline supporters, are more likely to appreciate and share the Redevelopment Authority Bureaucracy's orientation toward achievement, collectivity rather than individual interest, universal, diffuse, and neutral political styles. The members of the real estate community, too, are in some cases of the same socio-economic background as the most significant elements of the business community, and thus can ally with them in support of redevelopment. Codmans as real estate brokers have been leading lights on Beacon Hill since the second decade of Boston's history.7

On the other hand, many of Boston's real estate operators, including First Realty's president, are not products of Harvard and Groton and are not oriented toward the cultural-historical traditions of the city. Their roots in Boston and ties to its traditions are

7Amory, The Proper Bostonians, pp. 69 and 199.
much more tenuous. This has led unfortunately to a disregard for a number of fine specimens of old Boston architecture. A number of them have been victims of pure speculation on the part of the real estate adventurers. 8

Real estate interests in general tend to benefit from redevelopment, as property values are enhanced in the long run. Those larger real estate firms which can become developers stand to gain most and are likely to be among renewal's most ardent supporters.

Mass Media

Boston's mass media are the most important means of conveying information about the renewal activities. Hence, they can aid renewal or seek to impede it by granting or withholding editorial support. They can also serve as one of the important mechanisms for engineering a public consensus either for or against redevelopment, in general, or with reference to a specific project.

In Boston, newspapers are the only really significant element of the media. The television channels, with the exception of the educational channel, which is distinctly Cambridge-academic in tone, are network-connected and pay but fleeting attention to local news. Radio stations have a few local "public affairs" programs on which Logue, as one of Boston's most controversial public servants, is frequently heard. But the majority of their programming consists of popular or classical music.

There are four major newspaper operations, producing five dailies and three Sunday papers. This is supplemented by an indeterminate

number of ethnic and community weeklies, particularly in South Boston and Dorchester. The small community papers were, with the exception of the Roxbury (the primarily Negro district) paper, unalterably opposed to redevelopment in both theory and practice. The Roxbury paper tended to favor redevelopment editorially but to be critical of some practices and of the pace of the program in Washington Park in its news stories. The positions of these types of papers is understandable in view of their clientele and their editors and publishers. As has been noted, James Colbert, a member of the BRA Board, unfriendly to Logue and the "new" BRA bureaucracy, was the political editor for a chain of newspapers serving the South Boston area. The typical working class authoritarian distrust of government in any shape or form is blatantly manifest in the neighborhood oriented papers.9

As for the major papers, three of the five could be considered transitional in the sense that Collins and four members of the newly elected city council are. The other two papers, the Christian Science Monitor and The Globe (morning, evening, and Sunday), are not marked by the split between the orientation of editorials and news reporting which characterizes the Herald, the Traveler and The Record American. The latter three papers, in attempts to gain and keep circulation high, tend to sensationalize the more negative aspects of redevelopment implementation and to quote Logue in ways potentially damaging to the image of redevelopment the BRA wishes to project. This, it seems to be assumed, will sell more newspapers to the Boston "masses" with

9Charlestown Patriot is an example. Published weekly, its editorials and news stories alike have been harshly critical of renewal.
their built-in, anti-redevelopment predilections. On the editorial pages, however, and, occasionally, in special BRA "managed" pre-drafted, series of articles, these three papers tend to support redevelopment programs as the only realistic solution to Boston's problems.

The Globe and the Monitor are not characterized by this dichotomy, and both their reporting and editorials are slanted in the direction of redevelopment. The Monitor's audience, of course, is not drawn from the Boston Irish primarily, and The Globe enjoys a greater circulation in the suburbs than the city.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, their orientation is less likely to correspond to the working class authoritarian political culture and to be more attuned to that of BRA.

Note must be taken too of the archdiocesan newspaper The Pilot, which is edited by none other than the chairman of the BRA Board, and is usually strongly in favor of redevelopment in principle. But, since it is also the voice of Richard Cardinal Cushing, and archtypical Boston Irishman, there is some ambivalence when specific projects such as Charlestown are at issue.

The political culture of the chief structures performing the communications function with regard to redevelopment varies. If only the news coverage were concerned, it appears to be rather closer to the dominant working class political culture. On the other hand, when the editors only are concerned, they are locally based businessmen with the orientation described as characteristic of this group. In all, then, there is a mixed picture, one which can serve to corroborate and buttress the pre-existing attitudes of the masses, the transi- tionals, or the BRA.

Thus, the prudent politician on the Council waits until "time has almost run out," then promises his Council vote for the project in return for a concession from either Logue or the Mayor.

The federal URA is aware of Logue's political situation in Boston. Thus, in the Government Center Project, which the Council rejected twice prior to Collins' campaign for re-election in 1963, URA, in an unprecedented move, granted the BRA the authority to convey individual parcels of the project to the chosen developers before consent for the project plan had been secured from the City Council.13

The Council's political culture has been described in detail. But it is important to note that in the campaign of 1963, for the first time in many many years, a businessmen's group, spurred on by Logue and Mayor Collins, supported a slate of candidates more in line with their political ethos. Four of these were elected, two as freshman Councilmen. This group may be termed the transitional figures on the Council. They are younger, and better educated than other members of the Council, and can be counted on to support the Mayor's program, especially redevelopment. They are less fully a part of the tightly integrated ethnic communities, though three are Irish and one Italian. One is the son of Collins' predecessor. However, four is not a majority of the nine-man Council and another pivotal vote must be wooed and won for redevelopment projects, if the Council is not to block them completely.

The Mayor

Mayor Collins can be given credit for bringing Logue and the redevelopment program as it presently exists to Boston. His function as

The City Council

The Council has already been considered in the context of the political system in which redevelopment must operate. It is also, by law, a part of the redevelopment policy-producing sub-system of the socio-political system. Its functions are legally prescribed with regard to redevelopment. It must approve all plans. Its power is proscribed by a variety of factors to which allusion has already been made. Thus, as has been seen, the Council members desire to get as much political mileage and as many headlines as they can out of the redevelopment, the one area in which they have any influence at all. Personal animosity between Logue and certain members of the Council, particularly William Foley, whom Architectural Forum termed a "young, old pol," is high and City Council Sessions are often marked by heated exchanges between the two.¹¹ Foley particularly cites Logue's salary, non-Boston birthplace, and Yale education in derisive fashion. Hearings on crucial projects have continued for days, when they could easily have been concluded in a few hours, as Councilmen procrastinate and attempt to embarrass the BRA representatives by making allusions and unwarranted insinuations of corruption and mismanagement within the BRA, and challenging its technical competence.¹²

Members of the Council know well that withholding their consent can jeopardize a project. Lack of Council approval over a period of time can mean loss of the federal funds earmarked for that project.

¹¹Architectural Forum, June 1964, p. 86.

chief advocate of the program is crucial to the success of the entire effort. He, if he is Boston's prototype of a new political leadership, more middle class and public-regarding in its orientation, must vigorously espouse new programs and help engineer initial support for them. Collins, finding that redevelopment has proven to be more controversial and less popular a program for Boston than he had envisioned, has supported Logue only in principle. In general he has been somewhat cool toward specific aspects of the program, after providing it with its original impetus and its leadership. The task of mobilizing support from other elements of the system and of facing the attack of opponents has been left to Logue. In other words, Logue has taken the blame for mistakes and the Mayor has the privilege of triumphantly announcing a new plan. Logue does not disagree with this division of labors. In many ways he appears to be a better "politician," if the term is used as implying mediator among conflicting interests, than the Mayor.

There is no doubt that the Mayor's political style is closer to that of Logue and the BRA officials than to the working class political ethos of his predecessors and many of the other members of the political "elite." But he cannot afford to forget the source of his votes; and he is politically ambitious. Indeed after his 1963 victory he was

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14 Niccolo Machiavelli listed a basic rule of practical politics "that rulers should let the carrying out of unpopular duties devolve on others, and bestow the favours themselves". The Prince, Chapter XIX (New York: Modern Library Editions, 1950), p. 70.
mentioned as a likely possibility for statewide office when his term expires. He is truly the transitional figure in Boston politics with roots in the past and a future orientation.\(^\text{15}\)

The BRA Board

A description of this group of five men is given in the preceding chapter. Officially, they have considerable power over redevelopment policy and are publicly responsible "to the people" for the redevelopment program. Among some members of the Board there is an exaggerated sense of what their responsibility "to the people" entails. However, since the BRA staff reorganization which occurred when Logue assumed the post of development administrator, the actual functions of the Board have become literally what Logue will let them be. It apparently was not realized at the time how significant was the seemingly innocuous request that Logue be allowed to set the agenda for BRA meetings. However, this has had the effect of reducing the scope of the power of the BRA Board considerably. Logue, clearly recognizing the orientation of the Board, tends to greet the Board with a set of faits accomplis when major decisions are involved such as choice of developer. Otherwise the Board deals only with trivia, such as dates of eviction for site residents.\(^\text{16}\)

The General Public

Mobilization of public opinion on behalf of redevelopment can be an important tool in project implementation. If a substantial number

\(^{15}\)See Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, p. 22.

\(^{16}\)Boston Redevelopment Authority Board meetings during May 1964 were attended by the author.
of "civic" leaders can be persuaded to unite behind such an effort its success may be enhanced. In Boston, however, it is difficult to say that there are any civic leaders. Those who are mobilized in support of redevelopment tend to be those who would more likely be interested and favorable toward projects of this sort in any case.17

The functions of the general public, which includes all those in the city outside the area directly affected by a project, could influence the members of the BRA Board and the City Council who must "legitimatize" the decisions of the BRA. Rarely, despite the excellent media coverage of the BRA, which is considered the most newsworthy agency of the city government, does the general public become interested in specific details concerning redevelopment. The one exception might be the Waterfront Project.

Since redevelopment in Boston has a "bad reputation," the BRA can overcome it by showing distinct results in a project with none of the problems which beset the West End. In addition the structural "end product" should be pleasing and the entire city should benefit economically and aesthetically. The Waterfront Project fulfills these criteria.18 According to the plan, there is to be no family re-location. This is a project that can capture the imagination of a public. Not in Boston. At least not thus far. A massive campaign


18 Architectural Forum, June 1964, p. 95.
on behalf of the Waterfront Project by the Chamber of Commerce, which undertook the initial planning for the project, was largely unsuccessful in overcoming the Bostonians' antipathy to feasible redevelopment. The memories of the bulldozers and parking lots in the West End are still fresh.

The function of the general public is not one that is fundamental or essential to the implementation of a redevelopment project, however. Public support merely provides a favorable environment in which redevelopment is rendered relatively more simple. It alleviates a potential obstacle.

The Public in the Project Area

Unlike the general public which forms a backdrop against which the drama of redeveloping a city is played out, the public in the project area does have a specific and integral part in redevelopment. One of the requirements for a local projects area's securing funds under the terms of the federal urban renewal program is that a public hearing be held in the project area and that it be the "consensus of the redevelopment officials based upon that hearing that there is substantial neighborhood support for the project plan." In other words the "interested publics" within a project must ratify the plan before the "feds" will authorize loan and grant funds.

The publics in the project areas differ considerably. Charlestown is unalterably opposed to redevelopment of any sort, including

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rehabilitation, as long as a government agency is involved. Long the most isolated and homogeneous of the Irish communities in Boston, it is representative of the working class authoritarian mentality in its purest form. In fact it is dangerous for one to admit BRA affiliation in Charlestown. It is the home of some of redevelopment's staunchest opponents and also the place in which Msgr. Lally, Chairman of the Redevelopment Authority, has his home.

Washington Park in Roxbury is another primarily residential area in which the local publics might be a significant factor in redevelopment. In this area, attitudes toward redevelopment vary quite sharply according to socio-economic class. Since this is the predominantly Negro area of the city, and since opportunities for residential mobility are somewhat limited for Negroes in greater Boston, there is a substantial sub-community of middle class Negroes included in the project area. It was found that the middle class Negroes had orientation toward redevelopment more closely akin to those of the professional and business interests and the BRA. This may be because most of them would not be disadvantaged under the terms of the project plan. They were in parts of the project area slated for rehabilitation or conservation. These redevelopment tactics necessitate individual initiative and present little financial hardship to middle class Negroes. On the other hand, the most directly affected are lower class Negroes. They tend to share the working class authoritarian's view of redevelopment (though not necessarily all the other attitudes that this sort of political ethos implies).
Other residential areas to be affected by redevelopment include South Cove, the Chinese community, and South End, which is hardly a community at all, being known now principally as the "worst slum" and location of most "socially disorganized" in the city. A good many of the displaced businesses from Scollay Square relocated there when that latter area was cleared for Government Center. The prevalence of social problems of this area almost precludes any community-wide orientation toward redevelopment.

Parker-Hill Fenway, Whitney Street, and North Harvard are all smaller project areas with a smaller public with which to be concerned. Only in the cast of the last of these does there seem to be a definable attitude toward redevelopment. It is again representative of the prevailing political culture of the area. North Harvard is a marginal lower middle class deteriorated area but many Harvard students also live there. They too oppose the redevelopment plan but for different reasons from those of their landlords.

The Elite in the Project Area

While the publics in specific project areas must merely appear to be not completely opposed to redevelopment, neutral or apathetic, there is a more active role for the "elite" in any project area. The publics in a project area may be considered an unorganized, nearly amorphous mass, and their attitudes and orientations either extrapolated from socio-political data or perceived through their verbal manifestations and behavior at public hearings.

The project area's so-called elite consists of those elements of a community which may have some sort of organizational base. They are
those with whom the BRA bureaucracy deals in an attempt to generate support and forestall open opposition to its plans. The objective is to impress these groups favorably and encourage them to speak at the local hearing and at the City Council's public hearing as neighborhood proponents of the plan.

If the community in question lacks an organizational base which can be utilized in this way, the BRA community relations member of the relevant project team will try to create one. As will be seen, in the case of Charlestown, experiments of this kind may prove disastrous if the elite in the community with which the BRA deal exclusively are not in communication with the people or if the people are not apathetic enough to allow the interested few to represent them.

In Washington Park those not in the elite are unable to organize as effectively in opposition to the project, since they are not accustomed to concerted community action. In South Cove, on the other hand, the Chinese Merchants Association and the Council of Chinese Organizations did actually speak for those in the community who were interested while the Federation of Charlestown Organizations group did not represent all interested parties in that project area.

The elite in a project area, then, are those who are familiar with some measure of community participation. Hence they are more likely to be transitionals, who are slowly moving away from the tightly

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knit, ethnic, working class, political and social ethos. This phenomenon, again as in the case of the project area public, will vary according to the neighborhood. As the figure below shows, patterns of neighborhoods attitudes may be such that the elite in the project area are favorable toward the BRA plan, and the public opposed as in Charlestown; (2) the elite and the public both favorable (Castle Square); (3) the elite opposed and the public in favor (there is no example of this pattern in Boston); (4) and the elite and the public both opposed (South Cove).

Patterns of Project Area Attitudes Toward Redevelopment in Boston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
<th>In Favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Cove</td>
<td>before BRA agreement</td>
<td>Charleston, Washington Park, South End, Aster-Hill-Fenway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Harvard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Favor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>none of this pattern in Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td>Castle Square Waterfront</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The style of the various project area elites varies, too, according to their class and the degree of cohesion in the community. In Washington Park the elite is principally middle class, and there is, as in many Negro communities, a split between the middle and lower class members of the community. Further, since many of the lower class members of the community are transient and are beset with a variety of social problems, there is little likelihood that they can or will organize into an effective "counter elite" which can compel the BRA to bargain with them, as well as with the established elite.

In Charlestown, on the other hand, there was no real community elite. Although there was a fairly high level of organization, almost none of it was oriented toward civic action. Thus, the FOCO was an artificial elite. Its role as principal bargaining agent for the community with the BRA, enhanced the personal prestige of many in the groups. This further alienated them from the community. In addition, a counter elite, originating from the same organizational bases as FOCO's members, was able to organize effectively enough to dominate the local project hearing.

Developers and Potential Developers

There is substantial overlap in Boston between developers and potential developers for urban renewal projects and real estate and business interests.

Developers are the key to successful implementation of redevelop-
ment projects. Indeed, what has obstructed many smaller cities in need
of redevelopment, who have formulated well conceived plans, has been
the dearth of local investment capital and the reluctance of outside
developers to risk substantial sums in the area. Critics of redevelop-
ment use this argument to illustrate the limited applicability of the
federal redevelopment programs. 23

Without a developer urban renewal means slum clearance only, the
creation of parking lots, in rare cases public parks, or public housing
projects. In other words, if redevelopment is to be viewed as either
a non-governmental housing program, to increase the standard housing
inventory, or as a commercial revitalization program, private de-
velopers are essential. Redevelopment is a "public-private" cooperative
venture, though this study has emphasized the public, governmental
aspects of the process. These phases of redevelopment entail "tearing
down" and re-use planning. The program was specifically designed to
allow private enterprise to perform most of the "building up." Without
a developer or the firm possibility of securing one, no prudent local
project agency will undertake a project.

As Harold Kaplan has noted in his study of Newark, finding suitable
developers in the initial stages of redevelopment experience in that
city was one of the most difficult tasks of the Newark Housing Authori-
ty. 24

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23 Charles Abrams, class session of MIT Department of City Planning
seminar in Housing and Urban Renewal, April 5, 1963.

24 Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics, Chapter 2.
In Boston, however, investment capital for redevelopment is plentiful. There is actually a surplus of potential local developers for every project site presently programmed. In view of this and in view of the lesson taught by the West End project, the BRA has an un-official policy of seeking only local developers for its projects. This is very different from other cities in which local capital for development might not be so readily available.

The question might be asked, Why, if development capital was so plentiful in Boston, was there virtually no redevelopment until 1960, why was Boston such a "late starter" in the redevelopment program? From what has been said above, however, it must be fairly obvious that the chaotic and uninviting political and economic atmosphere of Boston was not conducive to increased confidence in the system. It was necessary therefore to have a Collins, who shared some of the business and financial community's political culture, and a Logue, who inspired confidence and restored respect in the city's future, before local business and financial interests would consider investing in development ventures in Boston.

There is the special case of Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes, Boston's most vigorous development corporation. During the fifties it was engaged in a series of dramatic projects located along Route 128, Boston's circumferential highway. These developments took the form of industrial parks specializing in electronics and research and development enterprises. In addition, CC&F began, in the early sixties, a large research and office complex adjacent to Massachusetts Institute of Technology and co-sponsored by that institution. In other words,
the activities of CC&F were beneficial to the Boston metropolitan area as a whole; but by moving jobs further into the suburbs actually contributed to the decline of the central city.

Within the past two years, however, Gerald Blakely, head of CC&F, has become interested in Boston's program. His renewed interest in aiding Boston precipitated t'e Government Center Parcel 8 controversy.

The political culture and style of developers is essentially similar to that of large real estate firms. Their interests are specific and self-oriented regarding the possibilities of profit for their company. But working of their own volition, closely with the BRA bureaucracy, they tend to value achievement, neutrality, and a contribution to universal systemic goals, too.

State Agencies and the State Legislature

Besides non-governmental groups, implementation of redevelopment projects involves a complex set of relationships with agencies of several levels of government. The Boston Redevelopment Authority is actually a creation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, established in 1954 to carry out redevelopment in Boston. One member of the five-man BRA Board is appointed by the State Housing Board. Thus, the state still maintains a tangential interest in the activities of the BRA. Their oversight function is limited by the nature of the BRA's operations under the federal statute which brings it into closest contact with local and federal agencies.

Since Boston does not have "home rule;" the BRA is frequently in the position of requiring state legislative consent for aspects of its plans. The state legislature is the only body to which a variety of
Boston metropolitan area agencies are responsible. Although Massachusetts has one of the most equitably apportioned legislatures in the United States, the suburbs surrounding Boston can easily override most proposals favorable to the city which might not be directly beneficial to them. Much possible remedial action for Boston, both economic and social, has been obstructed in the state legislature.

The BRA maintains the services of a "lobbyist" at the state capital. He is a political "character" of the type usually found hanging around the corridors of state and local legislative bodies, but one who knows the legislators by name and can sound them out on positions on matters of interest to the BRA.

A most recent and significant instance in which the BRA was brought into direct confrontation with the state legislature involved the Waterfront Project. The tidelands portions of the project area are under the control of the state. In the past, large corporations such as the Gillette Safety Razor Company, which intended to build on redeemed tidelands or to extend their holdings into the tidelands area, were granted irrevocable leases to the property by the state. According to the plans for the Waterfront Project, substantial portions of the tidelands areas must be leased to developers of various sections of the project. Without irrevocable leases no developer would invest in the project, for there would be the possibility that the state could lay claim to the properties and all structures built upon them at any time.

The BRA thought it desirable to have "blanket" authority to grant such irrevocable leases to the chosen developers given to it, so that

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each would not have to negotiate with the state separately. The state Waterways Commission, which held the lease granting power, wished to retain it. The BRA-sponsored bill was defeated in two previous sessions of the legislature. In 1964, both federal and local approval of the project were given and concentrated effort was made to reach a compromise. The measure finally agreed upon allows the state agency to retain its prerogative of granting irrevocable leases, but promises to grant such leases to developers whom the BRA chooses, when the BRA requests it.²⁶ Hence the BRA will substantively control the process.

The political culture of Boston's representatives in the state legislature is very like that of many of the City Councilmen. Elected by working class authoritarian constituencies, they are likely to reflect that orientation toward socio-political phenomena. There are exceptions, however, such as the representatives of Beacon Hill and Back Bay, the only Republican stronghold in the city. In the case of the tidelands bill, it was a coalition of Boston suburban and a few Boston city representatives plus other delegates from large cities in other parts of the state (who might need redevelopment-enabling legislation), who were able to prevail over the other suburban and rural interests in securing its passage.

In the summer of 1963, the state auditor's office, whose late chief executive was a political foe of Collins, sought to embarrass the latter during the election campaign by undertaking a "routine audit" of the BRA's books. An audit had not been done since Logue had come to Boston. This produced a short siege of panic in BRA headquarters, as it was a

foregone conclusion that the state auditor's report would be highly critical in a negative sense. The BRA, further, operated like no other governmental bureaucracy in the state. Most of its money came from the federal government, though its employees were considered city employees. Logue frequently shifted money from one project to another as the exigencies of situation required. The financing of redevelopment in Boston, is highly unorthodox, and Logue has built a reputation on his ability to use the federal legal framework for redevelopment in a most creative and imaginative manner.\(^{27}\)

The State Auditor's report, of course, made sensational headlines in the Boston press. Logue, however, invited the Federal Urban Renewal Administration to conduct an audit of its books. This was done, and URA promptly issued a report completely exonerating the BRA from charges of extravagance and mismanagement and expressing confidence in Logue's methods.\(^{28}\)

The political style of the state bureaucracies is, in most respects, antithetical, to that of the BRA. They do not possess skill, a high salary scale, or a middle class public-regarding political ethos, though they do get large sums of federal money. Cooperation with the BRA is not likely, and the BRA seeks to circumvent them whenever it is feasible.

City Agencies

The city agencies which share office facilities in city hall annex with the BRA have little in common with it. Their cooperation is sometimes necessary in preparation of the technical aspects of redevelopment projects. The Assessors Office, the police, fire, school, building

\(^{27}\) *Fortune*, June 1964, p. 137.

departments all come into contact with the BRA at some time or another. The BRA is particularly interested in building and zoning code enforcements and violations.

There is one exception to the generally poor working relationships the BRA has with other city agencies. That is the Boston Public Housing Authority. Until the recent appointment of Logue's former deputy, Ellis Ashe, to the post of director of the PHA in Boston, there was difficulty in gaining the cooperation of the PHA in the BRA's relocation plans. PHA placement, like almost everything else in Boston, was interjected into the political arena and political sponsorship was required for admittance to preferred projects and to large apartment units which are in short supply. Since Ashe's appointment, PHA and BRA have worked together with greater facility.

While many of the functions which the other city agencies perform for redevelopment implementation are only tertiary in importance, they could greatly facilitate the research and survey activities of the BRA. The differences in style and political culture, however, make such cooperation unlikely. Employees in other city offices resent strongly the BRA's frequent forays into their offices in search of background information.

Since the publication of the capital budgeting report for the next decade, the line agencies have also begun to realize that the BRA staff, acting in the role of Mayor's consultants on development rather than a renewal project-implementation agency, have actually shaped their department's policy for the years to come.
City Institutions

Major non-governmental institutions in the city can be another source of planning and political support for the redevelopment bureaucracy. If their individual development programs can be tied to renewal projects through Section 112 of the 1961 housing act, they can be of direct service to the BRA in financing redevelopment.

Since a great deal of property in Boston is tax-exempt and a large percentage of it belongs to educational and medical institutions of high national prestige, securing the support of these institutions is important. Most of them of any consequence share the BRA, professional, political ethos, stressing public-regarding action. Tufts Medical Center, for example, located adjacent to the South Cove redevelopment project, has aided the BRA in planning for that area; and the 112 funds due to it will help defray the costs of the project.

ABCD is another institution existing in Boston, but is not strictly speaking a city agency. It originally was established by Logue to coordinate social renewal with physical renewal, as had been done in New Haven. 29 But it has expanded its operations to other areas of the city besides those directly affected by redevelopment. Its orientation is highly professional and middle class with regard to political action. However, it can possibly conflict with the BRA, since what is its sole objective is only a part and not always the dominant part of the BRA's objectives.

Federal and Regional Offices

Approval of regional and federal offices is a sine qua non of re-development projects. In Boston's case, as has been noted, the close personal relationships between the federal and local leadership and Logue's skill as a redevelopment professional as well as a "politician" practically assure that federal approval will be forthcoming. The regional office is more skeptical regarding the scope of Boston's redevelopment program, and worries about Logue's over-extending the 440-person staff's efforts. The federal office also, though mindful of the hostile political and social environment with which the BRA must cope, would like to see the process in Boston proceed more speedily.

Power Resources

The power resources which the BRA possesses to aid it in the accomplishment of its objectives have already been described. Each of the other elements in the redevelopment policy producing system also has certain resources\(^30\) which can be utilized to enhance or to impede the progress of redevelopment, depending upon whether the group in question supports or opposes the BRA's program.

Money and authority emerge as the most significant resources which the other elements in the redevelopment system possess. The business interests, real estate community, developers, and city institutions, for example, have the needed investment capital without which the private phase of the development activity is impossible. In addition, the business and financial communities and the city institutions also possess the resources of "prestige" and respect to some extent.

Authority is the primary resource of the Mayor, City Council, BRA Board and State Legislature. Utilization of that authority to withhold consent from the BRA's plans at any point can seriously retard the progress of the redevelopment effort.

The major resource of the state and city bureaucracies with reference to redevelopment is information and knowledge. All of the elements with the exception of the governmental bureaucracies have the potential to provide leadership either for or against redevelopment. This leadership potential is particularly the chief resource of the local project area elite. The media, the public in the project area, and the general public are more difficult to classify.

The general public has the resource of the vote which can be exercised only infrequently and which only indirectly affects the redevelopment process. In Boston, however, if Collins were to have been defeated for re-election in November of 1963, it seems likely that Logue would have been the first to be relieved of his duties and the character of redevelopment in Boston would have been drastically changed. Thus, this is a potentially significant resource; yet its impact is diminished by the intermittency of its use and by the mediating factors of electoral politics which structures their choices and determines the salient issues.

The project area public theoretically share the resource of authority with respect to redevelopment, for their consent is officially required. Their lack of organization and leadership, however, mitigates the impact of this resource. The mass media possess knowledge, information and skill but none of these to any great extent. To some the Christian Science Monitor and the Globe or the Traveler may possess prestige.
None of the other elements in the Boston redevelopment system can rival the BRA in terms of technical skill and only the Mayor has the potential to rival it with regard to leadership. Its access to federal funds gives it considerably more of the resource of wealth, than any other element. Furthermore, the authority of none of the elements which have this as their major resource is absolute.

This inventory of the resources of the other elements in the redevelopment system allows the elements to be ranked in order of potential influence on the redevelopment process. Such a ranking appears in Table 2.

### Table 2

**Ranking of Systemic Elements in Terms of Resources for Redevelopment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>money, prestige, leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>money, prestige, leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mayor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>authority, leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Interests</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>money, leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA Board</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite in Project Area</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>leadership, authority, prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislature and Agencies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>authority, information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public in Project Area</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>information, leadership, prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Public</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>the franchise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Agencies</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that although some of the groups appear to possess the same categories of resources, they are ranked differently. This, of course is due to the fact that the relative amounts of the resource which they have been perceived to possess differ. In some cases, as for example, the developers, possession of large quantities of one resource, money, is
held to be more significant for the redevelopment process than a combination of other resources possessed by another element such as the State Legislature.

It is also interesting to compare this ranking with the continuum in the next section which shows the propensity of elements to support or oppose the BRA's plans.

Support and Opposition: Conditioning Variables

The orientation and power resources of the other elements, in addition to the BRA, which have a role to play in redevelopment in Boston have been described. The task of the BRA, given the overt hostility of some groups and the latent propensity to support it of others, is to form the strongest possible coalition of elements favorable to its plans for any project.

If, as has been argued, the concept of political culture or rather the degree of correspondence between the political culture of a group and that of the BRA leaders is useful to gauge the propensity of any of the other elements to form an alliance with the BRA to implement a project, then other units of the redevelopment policy-producing sub-system of the Boston socio-political system may be ranked according to this index.

They are ranked, thus, on the continuum in Figure 5. The continuum in turn is divided into most possible proponents and most possible opponents. However, the support and cooperation of no group is purely automatic, and the BRA must employ strategies to convince its potential

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31 Note that the elements of the system which were ranked first and second in terms of power resources for redevelopment are also those which tend to have the greatest propensity for continuous support of the BRA.
friends that supporting them is in its interest and must seek to use its superior resources of wealth and skill to circumvent its opponents.

As Figure 5 shows, the business and financial groups in the city are most likely to favor redevelopment, closely followed by the "institutions" in the city and the real estate interests and developers. The federal and regional redevelopment bureaucracies are not included on the continuum, since their views are obvious and they actually are not part of the Boston system for purposes of the present analysis. The general public, the project area publics, and the City Council are least favorable. The Mayor occupies a position on the spectrum which is definitely favorable. But the project area elites, the mass media, the BRA Board of Directors, and the state and city agencies are in intermediate positions. The state agencies and the media perhaps feel the least involvement in redevelopment.

The proponents of redevelopment in Boston share significant attributes of the political culture which are also those of the BRA. These may be defined in terms of the Parsonian pattern variables as being

Figure 5
Sources of Potential Support and Opposition to Redevelopment in Boston
relatively more universalistic, diffuse, collectivity oriented, achievement oriented, and affectively neutral than their opposites. Opponents to redevelopment tend to have internalized a political culture whose characteristics are more particularistic, specific, self-oriented, ascription oriented and emotional.

Probable orientation of the other elements in the redevelopment policy producing system in Boston toward redevelopment varies not only with political culture, but with the perceived rewards or deprivations which will accrue to the group in question. Large realtors, for example, will tend to gain direct financial benefits from redevelopment; the publics in project areas assume that they will be compelled to move. The former tend to favor redevelopment, the latter to oppose it. When the group in question derives only indirect advantages from redevelopment, as do the media and those portions of the business community who play a less active role in the process, support or opposition by the group will not be immediately evident.

Another variable, influencing whether a group will adopt a position of a group in support, opposition at all, or remain neutral, is the degree of involvement, or the intensity of the involvement in redevelopment. This applies most generally, but not exclusively, to groups which will be directly affected by the plans and projects of the BRA. Publics in the project area will have more intense feelings regarding a project than will the general public, for instance. Whether the position taken by an "involved" group is favorable or unfavorable, the more intensely held the attitude, the less likely it is to be amenable to change, or influenced by BRA activities.

The following chapter will consider which groups become "involved"
in redevelopment and at which phases of the process. It will also dis-
cuss the strategies which the BRA has used to form coalitions among
various elements to aid it in achieving its goals.
CHAPTER IV

THE URBAN REDEVELOPMENT SYSTEM: (3) FORMING COALITIONS

The Boston Reievelopment Authority requires the assistance and cooperation of other units of the city's socio-political system in order to achieve its goals. For although the BRA possesses resources which render its mode of operations more effective than that of the environmental system, the legal requirements of multi-level approval and the perceived constraints of the socio-political system define what is feasible. The full range of alternative strategies which would seem to be available, judging from the skill, money, and leadership resources of the BRA, is in practice severely circumscribed.

The BRA must attempt to create an environment in Boston less in conflict with its orientation. Since the BRA operates as a quasi-rational organizational system, it would wish to expend as little as possible of its reservoir of power resources in a given situation in order to achieve the desired result.¹ By mobilizing a combination of "friendly" or neutral potential power centers, the BRA can usually overcome most of the obstacles presented by the socio-political system, at relatively little political

"cost."

The previous chapter described the other relevant units of the Boston socio-political system and their various political styles and orientations. It concluded by hypothesizing that the probability of any units forming a "positively charged link" to the BRA was directly related to (1) the extent to which its "political culture" corresponded to that of the BRA and differed from the dominant political culture of the city; (2) the perceived benefits to accrue to it from allying with the BRA; (3) the intensity of its involvement in the BRA's program.

This chapter discusses the question of which elements are necessary and sufficient to a coalition at various stages of the redevelopment process. The problem is analyzed from a functional rather than a sequential point of view. Referring back to the description of the redevelopment process, it can be seen that the functional categories presented here conform to a great extent to the various time phases of the process. In other words, most technical functions are performed during the initial phases of project implementation, most political functions during the intermediate stages, and so on.

This chapter also describes the general strategies of the BRA in dealing with sets of groups, having different orientations towards it. Specific strategies for forming alliances with "essential" groups are examined; and the overall patterning of coalitions is illustrated by example from a number of Boston redevelopment projects.

Essential Elements for Coalitions

The coalitions and linkages established between the BRA and other elements in the Boston socio-political system tend to be temporary and ad hoc. New sets of links must be "forged" for each project and for
different phases of the same project. Though as the BRA's experience and contact networks grow, the same individuals find themselves involved in redevelopment conflicts with increasing regularity.

It may be argued that all the relevant units of the system which were enumerated in the previous chapter are indispensable to the successful implementation of redevelopment. Nevertheless, some elements are more essential than others. And the actual support or at least the acquiescence of four major elements may be viewed as absolutely essential.

For the present discussion, the functions and stages of the redevelopment process have been consolidated into three categories: (1) Technical Functions, (2) Socio-Political Functions, (3) Economic Functions.

(1) Technical Functions. In the first category are included such activities as survey and planning for the project area, design work, planning, supervision of the developer, construction of models and illustrative materials, preparation of reports, and compliance with formal federal requirements. These types of functions are performed almost entirely by the BRA bureaucracy. Business and financial groups and neighborhood organizations may assist with the planning. The former groups particularly may lend monetary support to the hiring of consultants for phases of the technical work for projects in which they are interested. Non-BRA planners and architects may be selected as technical advisers. Other city agencies may (but in Boston are unlikely to) lend personnel or give ready access to needed information in their files.

However, given the high level of professional skill to be found on the BRA staff, such outside assistance is in no sense to be considered
essential. If necessary, the BRA can perform all the tasks connected with the technical aspects of project implementation.

(2) Socio-Political Functions. Under the rubric of socio-political functions of redevelopment are such activities as publicizing the project plans; conveying information to the general public and to publics in the specific project areas; attaining the support of local elites in the project area, and, if feasible, the publics in the project area; engineering consent from the relevant political agencies, the Mayor, a majority of the City Council, the state legislature, if legislative action is required at any phase of the project, the regional and federal offices of the Urban Renewal Administration; and mobilizing as broad as possible a base of support from groups and institutions within the community.

Obviously, many of these functions can not be performed by the BRA alone, particularly in Boston. The BRA needs the assistance of the media for publicizing and communicating with the community. Although the BRA staff spends a considerable amount of time and energy preparing pamphlets, "fact sheets" and graphic materials for public display, they reach only the already interested, largely pro-redevelopment segments of the community. Recently the BRA opened a public relations office in the business district of town. In addition, the BRA has maintained a display booth at the Boston Arts Festival for

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the past three years complete with elaborate colored displays and telephones on which one can hear a tape-recorded message from the Mayor boosting redevelopment. The BRA site offices for relocation and rehabilitation in specific project areas serve as another means of communication. However, the BRA needs the media to reach a large audience with both general and specific information. But the media's information-giving function is not fundamental to redevelopment. Nor is editorial support a prerequisite for a project's success, though it can certainly help. During the period in which Logue directed redevelopment in New Haven, the city's two major newspapers opposed redevelopment consistently and viciously.³

The BRA also needs a pro-redevelopment organizational base in each project area, composed of local residents and/or business interests. If, as in the case of Charlestown or now in the South End, no community-wide civic action groups, with which the BRA can conveniently deal exist prior to project initiation, there is a considerable probability that the BRA will attempt to create one.

What the BRA feels it needs most in the socio-political sphere, considering the inimicable Boston environment, is as broad a range of support from groups either already sharing its political ethos, or from groups which can be convinced that supporting redevelopment will somehow enhance their image or serve their own goals. An example of the latter is the local carpenters union, whose membership is predisposed to be hostile to redevelopment in general, yet whose leadership can be persuaded to sponsor projects in public hearings, having

been persuaded that more construction jobs for its members will result.

The BRA welcomes the mediation efforts of any group which can help it to generate support in the entire community. The support of business and financial interests in the city is most crucial. If these groups, plus the real estate community, favor a project, this fact may exert an influence on normally recalcitrant elements of the political structure whose consent is required by law. BRA Board consent is needed, too, and here again the amount and kind of outside support which the BRA can muster for its plans is important. When dealing with the federal redevelopment agencies as well, the BRA must prove that substantial elements of the community back the project. This does not necessarily mean the local project elite or publics, though the BRA leadership itself feels that it must have at least tacit consent in order to prevent another West End debacle.

In sum, the most essential units in a coalition for performance of socio-political functions of redevelopment are the business, financial, and real estate interests and the elite in the project area. As will be seen, redevelopment in Boston is not politically feasible without the support or acquiescence of these two kinds of groups.

(3). Economic Functions. The economic functions of redevelopment consist of the method of primary financing, the securing of developers, and the actual development activities. Boston has been frequently cited as an example of a city which has been especially skillful in redevelopment financing. Of the 180 million dollars which is the projected cost of the redevelopment program in its present state, the federal government will pay $120 million. At least it has currently earmarked that amount for Boston. Under Massachusetts law, the state
will assume one-half of the city's share of $30 million. Thus, Boston need pay only $30 million and much of this can be paid for by site improvements, i.e., street widening in the project areas; new lighting facilities; building municipal garages, schools, fire and police installations and the like in the project area. Furthermore, as has been noted, the great number of educational and medical facilities in the city which are planning expansions programs within or adjacent to redevelopment projects gives the city a greater share of Section 112 cash credits for redevelopment than any other city in the country. 

The city has not yet been compelled to issue any bonds explicitly for redevelopment. This is politically fortunate as well as fiscally sound, for there is little doubt that any referendum on bond issues for redevelopment would be soundly defeated in Boston.

During the primary financing stages of redevelopment, which pay for land assembly, acquisition, and demolition in addition to survey, research, and planning activities of the BRA staff, the BRA must gain the cooperation of the city agencies which will undertake the improvements which serve as the city's contribution to the redevelopment costs. When it wishes to make use of the credits due the city under the provisions of Section 112, the active cooperation of the institutions involved is needed.

When the stage is reached that the BRA solicits bids from potential developers another crucial element for redevelopment implementation must be present—the developer. For commercial projects and commercial sites

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4 Massachusetts, General Laws, Chapter 121, section 26NN.
5 Fortune, June 1964, p. 137.
in residential projects this presents no problem. In Boston there have thus far been more developers than can be accommodated. The difficulty, as in many cities, has been to obtain developers for low-income and middle-income housing in residential projects, which will replace substandard dwellings. Such housing is not a profitable investment. The average net return which a developer can expect from this type of housing when built under the provisions of Section 221(d) 3 of the federal housing act is in the 6-7% range. In upper income housing the return on investment is at least twice that; and real estate economists caution aspiring real estate speculators never to invest in ventures promising less than 12% return. 6

Boston, thus far, has been less successful than many other cities in influencing church groups, civic associations, unions, banks and other organizations to form development corporations to build low and middle income housing in its residential redevelopment projects. Public housing is not entirely an answer. Boston already has reached what might be termed the saturation point in public housing. It is an "unpopular" program, as Meyerson and Banfield have shown in the case of Chicago. 7 A relatively small number of housing for the elderly units are programmed for three of the BRA's forthcoming projects, though.

Rehabilitation on a large, project area scale as a substitute for new low income and middle income housing has not been as successful as Logue and his colleagues had hoped. There have been some sporadic

6 Eli Goldston, speech to MIT Department of City Planning class in Real Estate Economics, November 1962.

7 Meyerson and Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, especially Chapter 4.
efforts, but the "contagion effect" which was expected to carry the program along has not "worked" in Boston. When one person has been persuaded by the BRA to paint, mend the front porch, or renovate the kitchen, this has generally not convinced his neighbors to do likewise. Even though the financing terms of rehabilitation under the FHA have been considerably liberalized in 1961 and again in the 1964 housing act, the motivation to rehabilitate is lacking. Those whose overt cooperation is needed feel no affinity for the objectives of the "new Boston," indeed prefer the old one. They see no personal gain in undertaking an expensive rehabilitation project, or in adding a twenty-year low interest loan to their debts. 8

Boston's most nearly complete project, which bears the stamp of the Logue organization and orientation is Government Center. In this instance a large percentage of the development activity took the form of government building, a new city hall, a state office building complex, and a federal office building. All of these had formerly been planned for the city, and their clustering in one specific area is a first step in achieving some rationality in Boston's non-residential land-use pattern. Developers here were the various levels of government, and developers for two other office buildings in the project were not difficult to obtain.

The real development of redevelopment, then, is a function that cannot be performed by government agencies alone. There must be developers to rebuild on cleared parcels or individuals willing to rehabilitate their homes in accordance with the BRA plans, to supplement government-sponsored building.

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8Conversation with assistant director of Charlestown rehabilitation field office, December 1963.
Coalition Building: General Strategies

Of the four elements essential to coalitions for successful redevelopment in Boston, three perform socio-political functions and one, the developers, perform economic functions. The BRA has the necessary resources to perform the technical functions unaided. It can not, however, perform the socio-political function of generating a positive consensus in the community regarding its plans and securing the approval of the political structures. Since the political structure in Boston whose consent is essential tends to operate within the framework of a political orientation antithetical to the BRA's, two extrapoli
tical sources of support are essential ones. These are (1) the business and financial community and (2) the elite in the specific project areas.

The BRA's general strategy for building coalitions to permit implementation of redevelopment projects consists of four parts.

I. To avoid direct, public conflict with its enemies; keep the arena of conflict circumscribed and manageable; make its bargains in private; avoid negative publicity.

II. To gain the support of the four essential elements of the coalition and as many of the subsidiary elements as possible in any given instance with as little "cost" as possible; to conserve its power resources.

III. To gain key supporters, persons or groups to act as spokesmen for redevelopment to mobilize support; to allow the BRA to use its resources for tasks it alone must perform; to use community-based and community-identified intermediaries for mobilizing support.

IV. To attempt to counter opposition by preventing its effective mobilization; to co-opt community leadership; to create a coalition strong enough in support of redevelopment that the opposition is rendered ineffective; to negate opposition before it arises.
These "strategic principles" dictate that the major expenditure of the BRA's power resources be directed toward gaining the support of potential developers, the City Council, the business and financial interests in Boston and the elite in project areas. Since direct approval from the City Council is almost impossible for the BRA to attain, it tends to concentrate its efforts on the other three groups. Then, the BRA expects that the support of the business and financial community and especially that of the elite in project areas can be used as leverage with the City Council.

Coalition Building: Specific Tactics, (1) The Essential Elements

What are the specific tactics which the BRA employs in order to obtain the support of the four essential elements to redevelopment coalitions in Boston? The answers vary considerably depending upon which group is involved. The business and financial interests and the potential developers are more likely to share the BRA's political orientation both toward redevelopment itself and toward action in the political system, thus appeals for their support can be couched in terms of long-range, city-wide economic benefits as well as the enhancement of their "civic service" image and direct financial gain.

In Boston, the BRA has a "natural ally" in business, financial and development circles. These groups are likely to support the BRA most intensely and most continuously. They immediately espoused the cause of redevelopment, for they tended to see in it a means of "salvation" for the city. They had somewhat reluctantly watched the city's demise, yet could not concert action on a large enough scale among themselves to halt it. They needed some other agency in whom they had confidence to
"take the initial risk," before they could be persuaded to participate.
The BRA and Logue served this function, and business and financial
groups were quick to respond. They are credited with the initiation of
two major projects, Downtown and Waterfront. They have also strongly
supported Government Center. All three of these are primarily commercial
redevelopment projects.

In the cases of Downtown, known as CBD (central business district)
and Waterfront, these groups took an active part in the planning process.
For Waterfront, the Chamber of Commerce's Redevelopment Division under-
took and underwrote the entire preliminary survey and research work,
hired consultants, and with staff, borrowed in part from the BRA and
in part from planning and architectural firms outside of Boston, did
the actual project planning. A Vice President of the New England
Merchants National Bank was given a leave in order to direct the
operations of the Waterfront Project Group.

The business community's overt part in the CBD project has been
no less important. The Committee for the Central Business District
was incorporated in May of 1963. This Committee jointly with the BRA
has undertaken the planning and shares the cost of consultants for the
preliminary stages of the project. CCBD, for example, pays one-half
of the fees to the Gruen firm which has been engaged to do the general
project planning.

There is a possibility that the present CCBD corporation, whose
duties now include only planning and mobilizing support within the
affected area of the project, may at a later stage in the project be
transformed into an actual development corporation for some sites for
which other developers might not bid. Furthermore, since a great deal
of the CBD project area is slated for rehabilitation treatment, the
fact that a committee of nearly fifty of the major business and financial establishments has been involved in the program from the very beginning may not only persuade others to participate but assure smaller firms in the area that mortgage money for the building improvements will be forthcoming.

The BRA is required to spend relatively little in the way of its power resources to gain the support of business and financial interests, for their inherent propensity to support redevelopment, particularly commercial development, is strong. BRA realizes that these groups are their staunchest allies in the "hostile environment" and exert considerable effort to keep open channels of communication on all relevant matters and to maintain a generally close working relationship with them. During the period of direct observation of Logue's activities more communication occurred between the BRA offices and business and financial interests than any other groups.

There have been occasions on which the BRA has been compelled to check the enthusiasm of these groups for redevelopment.

It may be argued that the business interests are almost too eager to expand the redevelopment program. Logue is extremely sensitive to charges of "empire building," frequently leveled at him by opponents and thus is not anxious to extend the redevelopment program much beyond the presently projected number of projects. He also recognizes that the utility of redevelopment "pump priming" in any one city has limits. This creates a situation of potential conflict between the BRA and its principal advocates. With reference to the CBD, the BRA has had to exercise the utmost tact in attempting to curb the enthusiasm of the CCBD for the most grandiose schemes.
Another potential source of conflict exists between the BRA and local developers. Like the relationships the BRA maintains with the city's business and financial interests, forging positively charged links between them and perpetuating amicable contacts necessitates the expenditure of very few of the BRA's resources. BRA expertise is recognized and appreciated by developers. In fact many of them are anxious to be associated with the redevelopment program for reasons of prestige as well as lucre. However, they too are interested in an expansion of the BRA's plans to include more commercial projects. While BRA's basic orientation might lead Logue to concur, the political constraints of Boston as well as the redevelopment needs of the city at present act to preclude this.

There are plenty of opportunities for developers in residential and mixed residential and commercial projects which have not yet reached the implementation stage yet. But the experience of the one major Boston real estate firm that has elected to become a co-developer of moderate-income housing in Boston has not been a happy one and has made potential developers somewhat reluctant to invest in this type of venture.

In Academy Homes in Washington Park renewal area, it was decided by co-developers, The First Realty Company and Building Services Employees Union, Local 254, that there be experimentation with pre-cast concrete slabs, a building material usually used only in large commercial buildings, in order to build a more durable and attractive structure at less cost. Sub-soil problems were encountered at the outset when it was discovered that the area was the site of a dump over a century ago;
there were also problems connected with electrical and heating plans for the structures, and personal difficulties in the relationships between officials of the union and the real estate concern. The union admitted that it had sponsored the project in order to enhance its public image and had little enthusiasm for construction experiments which ERA and First Realty had backed.  

ERA was at this point concerned about the project's being nearly a year behind its construction schedule; for this was to be relocation housing, and its delay prevented demolition and construction in other areas of Washington Park. Also, Academy Homes was a pilot project in many ways, ERA was anxious to have it completed and inhabited by re-located low-income families in order to prove that this type of operation was feasible in Boston.

First Realty, on the other hand, felt no such time pressure. It was interested in the use of the new building techniques. Furthermore, since it was to be the management company when the project was finished it was also interested in seeing that the buildings were not completed in such haste that a product of inferior quality resulted; for they would have to bear the brunt of residents' complaints afterwards. At length, the ERA could not resolve the differences between the co-developers and was impatient with the stalemate. The ERA Board awarded the remainder of the development contract to the union alone, who in turn hired its own contractor.

Cabot, Cabot & Forbes, the Boston area's major development corporation, also enjoys a symbiotic relationship with the ERA. Its

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9Boston Globe, February 1, 1964, p.4.
10Conversations with representative of First Realty Company, Boston, March 1964.
interests in development have been principally outside of the city and it has largely been Logue's personal friendship with the firm's president which has resulted in the latter's strong support. However, this firm too has yet to erect a building on a renewal site.

Tactics which the BRA uses to gain the support of the elite in project areas tend to vary from project to project.

If the composition of the local elite is not apparent, it must be discovered. If no recognizable community leadership exists the BRA may attempt to create a synthetic one with which to deal. Then the specific nature of the BRA's appeals will depend upon the degree of correspondence between its political culture and that of the project elite. For this factor conditions the latter group's propensity to support the BRA.

The more middle class the local community elite tends to be, the more the BRA can employ substantive appeals. The more it tends to be working class authoritarian in its orientation, the more the BRA must resort to tactics designed to cater to the needs of the individual elite member's personality system. Content of BRA material disseminated in Washington Park and Charlestown illustrates the differences. That for Washington Park dealt almost exclusively with the plans for the area with specific suggestions as to how persons in the community would be affected and how they could aid the program or secure BRA services. The material for Charlestown contained almost no details about the project plan. Most of the content dealt with individuals involved in the Federation of Charlestown Organizations (the organization created to work with the BRA) and gave detailed accounts of its meetings. Yet both tended to reinforce the support of the
respective elites for the program.

Winning community elites to the BRA cause is resource-consuming for the BRA. Since it cannot hope to gain the approval of the City Council as a whole, the BRA expects that the local elite members will attempt to exert pressure on individual councilmen to support the redevelopment project in question. The local elite is, then, the focal point of much of the BRA's socio-political support-mobilizing activity.

The basic objectives, as has been noted in the discussion of general strategy, are twofold. In the first place the BRA leadership is intellectually committed to the notion of "planning with people." Again as in the case of Logue's predisposition to favor certain redevelopment concepts, the planning with people orientation antedated his arrival in Boston. Certain concessions to the new, more complex, more hostile environment have had to be made in transferring implementation of the "planning with people" concept into the Boston socio-political context. The BRA genuinely needs and wants the support of local community leadership, for without it securing political approval for projects is virtually impossible.

Secondly, by gaining the positive support of community leadership the BRA may effectively "co-opt" individuals who might provide leadership for anti-redevelopment forces. The BRA invests community leaders with a sense of efficacy in the redevelopment process, and they tend to become identified with the project and emotionally committed to it.

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12 The concept of "Co-optation" is from Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1949).
When this occurs, the anti-renewal forces may find themselves without an organizational base or a public spokesman, save for the anti-redevelopment "diehards" on the City Council.

Several examples of actual relationships between the BRA and local community elites in project areas will serve to illustrate these points.

Washington Park is a case in which the BRA has enjoyed amicable community relations with the project area elite. Charlestown, on the other hand, presented the facade of success but was a colossal failure; South Cove is a project area in which the original hostility by both elite and public in the project area was mollified by BRA compromises. South End has the appearances of becoming a project in which the BRA and the community leaders will cooperate peacefully.

Washington Park project is interesting in that it was the only project in Boston in which the project area elite spontaneously requested redevelopment. Indeed, as has been said, Roxbury, the Negro community, also has within it a substantial number of middle-class Negroes who continue to live there even though their income levels might dictate a move to another community. These comprise the Washington Park Project area elite, and as has also been said, their political orientation is one with which the BRA can "do business." They exerted pressure upon the BRA to hasten work in Roxbury; and the BRA, encouraged by the existence of a middle-class elite in the community, was less reluctant to make Washington Park its residential redevelopment "test case." Originally the project boundaries were much smaller than at present and nearly 80% of the area was scheduled for demolition. By nearly tripling the project area and including some middle class neighborhoods slated only for rehabilitation, the percentage to be demolished was brought closer to the unofficial federal limit of 35%
of the total project area. The Washington Park elite consists of clergymen and leaders of fraternal and civil rights groups in Roxbury. They are, however, not so concerned with altering residential racial patterns as with improving the quality of housing available in Roxbury. But there are indications at public hearings and from a few isolated incidents that redevelopment is not as popular with the many Roxbury residents as it is with their leaders.

Charlestown is an illustration of breakdown in communication between an elite with whom the BRA thought it could deal and the public in the area. It also is an example of a failure of the BRA staff to allocate its personnel resources in the most rational manner. The Federation of Charlestown Organizations was in the first place a group created at the instigation of the BRA community relations staff. Instead of facilitating communication, the FOCO members kept secret the BRA plan rather than explaining it to the members of the groups they represented, as they felt privileged to have the plan details revealed to them. When BRA letters and copies of the plan were mailed to every local family, they were in no way prepared to understand the redevelopment program and saw only short-range, negative consequences. The public hearing was chaos; several BRA officials were very nearly assaulted.\(^13\) Of course the timing and location of the hearing by the BRA were a mistake; it took place in a school auditorium in the area in which there was to be total demolition, where negative passions were the highest, and shortly after the letters were sent informing residents, in a most impersonal fashion, of the planned disposition of the property in which they lived. But it occurred long enough after the

\(^{13}\textit{Christian Science Monitor} \text{ (Boston edition), February 18, 1963, p.1}.
arrival of the letters to allow the opposition to organize and have leaders and spokesmen.

After the disastrous public hearing in January of 1963, the BRA decided to revise its plans, and give Charlestown a chance to "cool off" and try again in a year or so. However, the Charlestown project team is probably the weakest link in the BRA organization and the environment is most hostile to redevelopment. The prospects for redevelopment there do not seem bright. The community relations workers of the BRA staff assigned to Charlestown are inexperienced and too militantly upper middle class either to understand or communicate meaningfully with the inhabitants of the area.

As will be seen in later chapters, the BRA staff tends to concentrate its most competent personnel resources in project teams for areas in which it "knows" it has a chance for success. Just as it expends most of its energies and resources in areas in which it is fairly sure it can win some support, the BRA does not allocate too much time to known hopeless causes, such as the City Council.

South Cove is another project whose eventual implementation in its present form is somewhat problematical. The public hearings on this project were characterized by both the sublime and the ridiculous.14

14 During their negotiations with the Chinese community "leadership," the BRA project team secured the support of one Mr. Lee who was president of the largest organization in the community. However, the organization had an election during this time and another Mr. Lee was chosen as head of the organization. At the hearings in December 1962, the BRA presented testimony from its Mr. Lee in support of the project. The second Mr. Lee, who maintained that he was the real spokesman of the Chinese community also appeared and expressed views in opposition to the project. To add to the confusion, a third Mr. Lee, the Chief BRA architect in charge of the South Cove project and a member of the Chinese community as well, also offered testimony. Transcript of Hearings before the City Council Committee on Urban Redevelopment, Vol. 1, December 19, 1962, p. 112 and ff.
The major residential group in the area is the Boston Chinese Community who have assumed political power far greater than their size, 3,000 persons, warrants. They are tightly organized; however, and after having lost land to the Turnpike Authority, which does not hold public hearings on land takings and is responsible directly to no political body, the Chinese Community apparently seemed determined to play the underdog role to the hilt. This could not have pleased the City Councilmen more, and they nearly fell over each other in their haste to champion the Chinese Community's cause against the "evil" BRA and Tufts Medical Center. By signing an agreement with Chinese leaders, to the effect that the Chinese Community could substantially veto the part of the plan which covered their area, the BRA was able to attain the conditional support of the project elite.

In the South End, BRA has been working through an established community organization, United South End Settlements, a social work organization, and ABCD. The BRA has followed its usual pattern of dealing with project area elites. This consists of: (1) calling in neighborhood leaders or sending the project director to a neighborhood-wide meeting after planning has been substantially completed and explaining the features of the plan and its benefits to the community; (2) requesting suggestions for improvements and changes from the community elite; (3) estimating the general attitude of the area elite in order to judge the extent of the opposition to be anticipated; (4) following up the initial meeting by sending staff members to meetings of church and community organizations in the

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15 Ibid., passim, also Vol. 2 and Vol. 3 of these hearings, dated April 4, 1963 and May 1, 1963 respectively.
project area when requested by members of the project area elite, and
(5) opening a project area BRA site office to disseminate information
on the project in general and specifically technical assistance on
relocation and rehabilitation services.

Thus far in the South End this has been working smoothly. There
is evidence that as the BRA acquires experience in dealing with
project area elites in a number of different types of communities
that more amicable relations can be more readily attained. In addition,
as BRA projects begin to show tangible results in other areas, some
of the community resistance to redevelopment may be alleviated.

The cardinal operating principle of the BRA in mobilizing
support for its projects from other elements in the socio-political
environment is to conserve power resources and allocate few of them
to attempting to convert its most intransigent opponents. The de-
finable pattern of tactics for relating to the city council, the
fourth essential element for a redevelopment coalition in Boston,
is marked by this pattern. Except for the newly-elected Council
minority who are generally favorable to redevelopment, contact
between the Council and the BRA offices is non-existent. The BRA
will make substantial concessions to its "friends" on the council when
it is absolutely necessary, as the following incident will illustrate:

In the most recent series of Government Center hearings, after
which the project plan was finally approved, one of the expected pro-
ponents, a North End resident, voiced unanticipated opposition to
one portion of the traffic solution which would possibly have brought
increased traffic flow into the area from which derived most of his
votes. The BRA staff and Logue worked well into the night and the weekend in an effort to reach an alternative solution which would be acceptable to him. His was ultimately the pivotal vote providing the bare majority in favor of the plan. Since he was a councilman who has not unalterably opposed redevelopment and who can be counted on to back future plans which do not directly affect the Italian communities in Boston, every effort was made to mollify him and to accommodate him. ¹⁶

Logue depends largely upon mediators to attempt to persuade the two "moveable" members of the Council majority (the other three are unalterably opposed to redevelopment). The Mayor, influentials among the project area elite, key individuals from the business, financial, and development communities have performed this function at one time or another. A combination of many of these elements who can exert pressure on the councilmen is, of course, the desideratum, and one of the major purposes for the BRA's seeking to widen the redevelopment coalition beyond those elements essential to implementation.

**Coalition Building: Special Tactics (2), Subsidiary Elements**

The same strategic principles which appear to guide the BRA in its attempts to gain the support of the essential elements for redevelopment coalitions may be applied to its relationships to the subsidiary elements in the redevelopment policy-producing system. Again the BRA wishes to avoid outright conflict whenever possible,

¹⁶ Including having the new traffic solution presented to the Italian Councilman by a Sicilian born planner on the BRA staff. This all occurred in May 1964, during the period in which I observed the Redevelopment Administrator's activities directly.
consolidate the support of its friends, conserve its resources, use
its natural allies to mobilize other elements, and thwart the organ-
ization of an effective opposition.

To simplify the discussion of subsidiary elements, they will
be categorized as "natural allies," persuasibles, neutrals, and
natural enemies with reference to redevelopment.

The real estate community and the educational and medical
institutions in the city are the two natural allies of the BRA and
its projects which are not classified as essential to coalitions.
Nonetheless, their political orientation for the most part predisposes
them to support the BRA. In fact, their public support has been
evident for every one of the BRA projects included in the scope of
the present study. The BRA will, as in the case of business and
financial communities, attempt to keep relevant groups informed on
all stages of a project's progress, and make compromises when necessary
to secure more than token support. Generally this requires the
expenditure of a minimum amount of the BRA's resources.

Educational and medical institutions in the city should also
have a natural affinity for the redevelopment program, according to
the political culture rankings. This is in fact the case, though
the projects in which they are most interested have not yet reached
the stage of the redevelopment process that there is tangible evidence
that their expansion programs and redevelopment's aims are as com-
patible as it would appear. The Tufts Medical Center on South Cove
and the Harvard and Boston University medical complexes near the
Parker Hill-Fenway Project badly need middle-income housing facilities
to allow them to attract the new qualified staff members commensurate with the scope of the expansions they have projected. The institutions are generally interested in the overall "upgrading" of the area in which they are situated; and redevelopment seems to be a likely solution. All institutions in both areas have been invited to participate in the planning for the area to the extent that they are able and at least to inform the BRA of their spatial needs and number and type of dwelling units they prefer for the area. In the case of South Cove, Tufts has hired its own planning firm, and it has yet to be seen whether its blueprints for the area will be substantially in conflict with those of the BRA project planners.

The Mayor could almost belong in a residual category. His support, strangely enough, is not legally required for redevelopment implementation. He is generally to be considered as a natural ally of the BRA, since he is responsible for its existence. However, the Mayor appears to have lost some of his initial enthusiasm for the program. Logue has made himself and the redevelopment program more controversial and more of a political liability to the Mayor than the latter either would prefer or probably could have foreseen. The Mayor saw redevelopment and Logue's expertise as a means of getting badly needed federal financial assistance for the city. He also originally thought of redevelopment as a program which could build a reputation for him.

But Logue and the Mayor do not, according to informants, have the same sort of personal and working relationship as Logue did with Lee in New Haven. The Boston political situation as well as the
Mayor's personal goals preclude this. The Mayor has been conspicuously absent from a supportive role when the BRA was embroiled in the "Parcel 8" controversy or the Charlestown fight. His office has not served as mediator in a number of instances in which it could have, and has allowed or compelled Logue to form whatever alliances he could largely on his own.

The inner circles at the BRA, however, are quick to emphasize the Mayor's role, particularly to an outsider. In weeks of actual observation, only one brief phone call was placed from Logue's office to that of the Mayor's secretary and one was returned. Further, it is a well known fact in Boston political circles that the Mayor transacts city business only in his city hall office during working hours, so a great deal of informal political activity related to redevelopment is precluded. The Mayor sends the usual bland letter of transmittal to all the City Council hearings dealing with approval of redevelopment plans, urging favorable action. He will never "demean himself" by appearing in the Council chamber when the Council is in session. He seems to be attempting to create the image of a "statesman-reformer" in a highly politicized environment. This leaves Logue as the true focal point for redevelopment and development policies in the city.

Major persuasible elements of the redevelopment policy-producing system are the media, some city agencies. In these cases the BRA will spend some resources to attain their consent for it will simplify the redevelopment process considerably.

Editorially the newspaper might be considered a natural ally of redevelopment in Boston, judging from their contents. However, their
peculiar situation with regard to redevelopment has already been noted. In sum the BRA has been able to maintain excellent relations with some segments of the press. The BRA makes "good copy" and provocative headlines; and tends to "sell newspapers." On the other hand, the BRA wants publicity, but publicity that it can "manage."

Usually about a week prior to a hearing on a project, the BRA calls in either editors or favored reporters, who can be counted on to make a case for the BRA, and holds special briefings on the project in question. It has even been said that one of the major papers lets the BRA write its editorials. Special redevelopment "problem series" are encouraged. Logue willingly grants candid interviews to reporters who will present the more positive aspects of the redevelopment program. These often are given prime space in the paper, and a number of Boston reporters have enhanced their professional reputations considerably by their redevelopment articles. Lines of communication to papers are kept open, and Logue is personally friendly with several members of the editorial staff of the major papers.

The papers have an indirect pay-off particularly from boosting commercial redevelopment projects, for espousal of projects with which major retail enterprises are intimately identified may have the effect of increasing advertising revenue.

Among the neutral elements of the system are the state agencies, state legislature, and city staff agencies. These are groups which are themselves least directly affected by redevelopment activities in the city of Boston. When their participation is required, as the state legislature's was in the Waterfront project, the power dynamics of the specific situation will largely determine the tactics and amount
and kinds of resources the BRA must expend to attain their consent or acquiescence to its plans.

The majority of the Boston City council, the general public, and the public in specific project areas may be termed the "natural enemies" of the BRA. This may at first glance appear to be a formidable array. However, it is fragmented, leaderless, and unable to coordinate its antipathy to redevelopment into any form of efficacious organization. The strategic principle the BRA follows in dealing with these groups is to circumvent them whenever possible, avoid open confrontation, and co-opt potential sources of leadership. As was pointed out in the discussion of project area elites, these are the socio-political functions of the BRA which are the most resource consuming.

Yet, the socio-political system from which the innate hostility to redevelopment is derived, itself acts as a factor in preventing the most hostile groups from effectiveness. They are impeded in their goal of obstructing redevelopment by their lack of resources, organization, and access to the decision making. The city council, for example, cannot hire "counterplanners" to dispute publically with BRA plans for an area. Without technical knowledge these groups are more or less at the mercy of the BRA.

The low level of organization for civic action in the city as a whole and the fact that what major organizations do exist have been co-opted by redevelopment makes effective opposition virtually impossible. Opposition was successful in the case of Charlestown, when the BRA was not able to form the necessary linkages in the community and when the other elements of the coalition remained neutral.
Besides lacking the skill and financial resources and the organizational base for effective opposition, the hostile elements lack a means of access to the decision centers. The BRA, it will be remembered, deals solely with the project area elite, who are more likely to share its value orientation. They then act as co-opted intermediaries, when the process functions properly, as in Washington Park.

The Patterning of Linkages

The BRA exists in an environment not generally conducive to the implementation of redevelopment projects. Since, as an organizational system which is in its early stages of evolution, its goal implementation functions are still considered to be paramount, it operates in the environment by forming coalitions with its natural allies and obtaining intermittent assistance from persuadable elements in order to overcome its natural enemies and achieve its objectives.

After four years of existence, and experience with at least a dozen specific redevelopment projects, some generalizations may be made concerning the patterning of linkages that has emerged from the BRA's use of the strategies and tactics which have been discussed above.

There are at least three different ways of viewing the patterning of linkages between elements in the system for the implementation of redevelopment projects; (1) according to which groups have performed the essential functions listed in the first portion of this chapter, (2) according to the total of elements which were involved in each of the projects, (3) according to the perceived relationships of
particular groups to the BRA. All three aspects of the "BRA-other element" relationships have been touched upon in the foregoing discussion but can be clarified and systematized in the diagrams on the following pages.

It is evident that there are recurring patterns of linkages between the BRA and certain elements. If these relationships persist, the coalitions resulting from these patterns of linkages could well become institutionalized. The elements with which the BRA has the most frequent positively charged links are, as would be expected, the two essential elements of any coalition for achieving redevelopment which share its political culture most thoroughly—the business and financial interests and the developers. The local project elite, the other essential element of any coalition for successful redevelopment in Boston, the media, real estate interests are the next most frequent supporters of the BRA.

On the basis of the data presented, it would appear that the hypotheses which closed the previous chapter relating to the propensity of certain groups to support the BRA has been substantiated. The BRA's strategy and tactics in dealing with these elements appears to have some impact, even if it is not definitely quantifiable. This is shown most clearly in the case of the media which has been categorized as a "persuasible," and has been successfully persuaded.

In the case of the elite in project areas, the variety of outcomes, however, is as much attributable to the socio-cultural characteristics of the neighborhood as to the BRA's strategy and tactics.
From the point of view of political science, it would appear that the overall strategy which the BRA has adopted to cope with the environmental system is a reasonable one, which takes into account the political realities and power dynamics of the system and most successfully exploits the organization's own strengths and the opposition elements' weaknesses.
### Table 3

#### Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Essential Functions

##### A. Political Support

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##### B. Economic Functions

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Figure 6
Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Project

Project: West End
Principal reuse: residential
Age of redevelopment: June, 1964: Execution

Project: Castle Square
Principal reuse: industrial/residential
Age of redevelopment: June, 1964: Execution

Project: Washington Park
Principal reuse: residential
Age of redevelopment: June, 1964: Execution
Figure 6-A
Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Project

**Charlestown**
- Principal reuse: residential
- of redevelopment
- June, 1964: Planning

**South End**
- Principal reuse: residential
- June, 1964: Survey
- Planning

**Government Center**
- Principal reuse: commercial
- June, 1964: Execution

**BRA**
- Developers
- Public Housing Authority
- Project Area Elite
- Real Estate Int.
- Project Area Elite
- Developers
- Public Housing Authority
- Business/Financial
- Real Estate Int.
- Mayor
- Media
- City Government
- State Government
- Fed. Government
- Media
Figure 6-B
Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Project

Project: Waterfront
Initial reuse: Commercial
Phase of redevelopment
June, 1964: Planning

Project: Central Business District
Initial reuse: Commercial
Phase of redevelopment
June, 1964: Survey + Planning

Project: South Cove
Initial reuse: Residential Institutional
Phase of redevelopment
June, 1964: Planning
Project: Parker-Hill Fenway
Principal reuse: residential
Stage of redevelopment: June, 1964: survey and planning

Project: Whitney Street
Principal reuse: residential
Stage of redevelopment: June, 1964: execution

Project: North Harvard
Principal reuse: residential
Stage of redevelopment: June, 1964: dormant

Figure 6-C
Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Project

Developers
Real Estate Int.

BRA

Project Area
Elite

City Institutions

Public Housing Authority

Business & Financial

City Council

Real Estate

Developers

Mayor

Institutions

Real Estate
### Table 4
Patterning of Redevelopment Coalitions by Perceived Relationships

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* + indicates positive relationship
  - - indicates negative relationship
CHAPTER V

POLITICIZATION OF A MUNICIPAL BUREAUCRACY

The requirements for goal implementation and the maintenance of the BRA's systemic integrity imply, almost by definition, the politicization of this municipal bureaucracy. By compelling the BRA to form coalitions with other potential power centers in the system, in order to attain its aims, the environment dictates that the BRA confront and compromise with a number of different units with different interests, objectives, and styles. This in turn requires that the BRA possess a flexible posture, that it be able to alter its orientation and substantive emphasis when dealing with the various elements. Further, it necessitates the adoption of a long-range time perspective by the organization, to reconcile the forfeiture of immediate goals to future benefits. As a precondition for systemic maintenance and achievement, the BRA is practically precluded from rigid, strictly goal oriented behavior. It must consider a variety of factors in its decisions, many not directly related to the technical aspects of the redevelopment process.

In more general terms, the first section of this study dealt with the BRA's external relationships, this chapter and the two which follow it will treat the implications of the demands placed upon the organization by the environment for its internal dynamics.
The exigencies of politicization permeate this structure and affect the behavior of role incumbents at all levels of the organization. The requisites of political action may, and often do, come into conflict with an individual's professional and organizational roles in the BRA structure. Before consideration of these propositions in greater detail, the BRA will be examined as both an organizational system and as a political system in its own right.

The first task for the present chapter will be to show that the BRA is politicized. This can be accomplished by comparing the BRA and its behavior to existing models of organizations and organizational role behavior. If these are found to be inadequate, a supplementary explanatory model, that of political behavior will be offered. Politicization will be examined on two levels, (1) that of the BRA as a politicized system, performing political functions itself and with reference to the environment and manifesting political behavior patterns in this chapter, and (2) that of the politicization of individual roles, in the chapter following.

**Municipal Bureaucracy: The Typical System**

Whether its study be the "public administration" of political scientists or the "organization theory" of sociologists, there is a broad area of commonality with regard to the essential characteristics of complex organizational systems. Major theoretical constructs of complex formal organizations all tend to include, at least implicitly, the characteristics originally enumerated by Max Weber as differentiating a bureaucracy from another type of social "formation." Hierarchy, formalized rules of procedure, clear-cut division of duties, impersonal
orientations toward both "clients" and other officials, and employment secured on the basis of merit with promotions also based on technical criteria, and some form of "tenure" are the fundamental attributes of a bureaucracy according to Weber's scheme.¹ The combination of these factors produced the most efficient form of administrative organization, "because experts with much experience are best qualified to make technically correct decisions, and because disciplined performance governed by abstract rules and coordinated by the authority hierarchy fosters a rational and consistent pursuit of organizational objectives."²

Empirical evidence has yielded a number of refinements of Weber's "ideal type." His scheme contains the assumptions that the elements or attributes of a bureaucratic organization are related in certain ways and that their interactions are functional in a positive manner for the organization. Thus, one major criticism of Weber's concept of bureaucracy has been that it fails to "examine the conflicts that arise between and among the elements comprising the system."³ A further refinement of the Weberian hypotheses concerning bureaucracy has been the addition of the systematic analysis of informal aspects of organizations.⁴ Numerous studies have demonstrated that friendship patterns, non-hierarchical communications networks, and personality characteristics of role incumbents which affect the leadership structure

³Ibid., p. 34.
⁴Ibid., p. 35.
tend to modify the formal arrangements of a bureaucracy. From the point of view of the present study, one of the most significant elaborations of Weber's theory is that which has exposed the inherent contradiction between two bases of authority: administrative, hierarchical discipline, and technical expertise.

Bureaucracies which operate as part of the governmental apparatus in what is generally considered to be a "democratic" political system have a further aspect; that is, they must be assumed to be responsible to the electorate, either directly as public officials, whose activities are theoretically open to popular scrutiny, or indirectly through elected officials who appoint or supervise them and to whom they are accountable.

Municipal Bureaucracy: The BRA

From the information regarding the BRA which has been presented in the foregoing chapters, it may be seen that in a general sense it conforms to the traditional model of a municipal bureaucracy. Admittedly, the hierarchy is only well defined in the upper echelons. Below the rank of project director or section head, for the non-project divisions of the agency, there is a wide range of variation within the organization as to the structuring of roles. On one project team, for example, all professionals were treated as of equal status and authority by the project

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director, while in another planners were definitely considered to be more authoritative and prestigious than other professionals. In still another, community relations and relocation professionals occupied the decision-position immediately below the rank of project director, with reference to the project as a whole. The socio-political exigencies of the particular project or function as well as the personalities of the role incumbents involved, influenced the hierarchical structure of each section of the BRA.

Formalized rules of procedure, with the exception of the federal urban renewal manual requirements for project implementation, are of the most general sort. Again as in the case of hierarchical structure there were variations from division to division within the BRA. For most project teams there were no formal rules but fairly rigid group norms.

Division of duties is for the most part according to an individual's technical competence. There were several notable cases, however, in which this was not so in the BRA. When, for example, a graduate planner was used to fill a community relations worker's job, the results were not only dysfunctional for the individual involved but for the entire project. More pressing, though, is the generalized lack of persons with combinations of skills to fill the multi-functional roles that redevelopment implementation in Boston requires. This is likely to remain a serious problem for the BRA and other redevelopment bureaucracies, unless some sort of special training program for redevelopment professionals drawn from many professional orientations is established.

Employment in all parts of the BRA, including clerical positions, is on the basis of technical criteria and experience. Despite the preference for experience, the BRA serves as the "first" job for a large number of professional planners, architects, and community relations workers. The close relationships between the Harvard and MIT planning and architecture schools and the BRA has been noted. Simmons and Boston University Schools of Social Work often urged their students to work with BRA site offices in specific projects as part of their "field" training. Promotions are frequent, as are remunerative increments. These are along a finely graded scale, which, for example, contains seven different levels for planners and three for planning assistants.

Impersonality is the dimension on which the BRA departs most markedly from the traditional bureaucratic model. The necessity of forming coalitions, dictates that the BRA treat other elements in the system differently depending upon the correspondence of their political cultures to that of the BRA and their propensity to support the BRA. In addition, relationships between and among staff members were not usually marked by "affectively neutral" behavior, especially not on the better integrated, more cohesive project teams.

Because of the BRA's official position as an agency of government, it is supposed to be publicly accountable for its actions as well as responsive to demands from its "public" clientele. As has been noted, in Boston, it appears more "prudent," from the point of view of the BRA's goal implementation objectives, for the organization to keep as many details as possible from public cognizance. In addition, the BRA bureaucracy's responsiveness to the demands of any portion of the community is directly proportionate to its perception of (a) the amount of
support a group will give the BRA in its public and private battles with the hostile environment, if the group is predisposed to favor the BRA's program, or (b) the probability that the group can form a coalition with other hostile elements in the environment, such as the City Council majority, if the group in question is predisposed to be hostile to the BRA program.

The BRA as an Organizational System

The BRA appears to conform to the traditional model of a municipal bureaucracy in certain crucial ways. Yet there are aspects of its behavior which are sharply divergent from the ideal. Thus the BRA will next be analyzed in terms of a functioning organizational system. All systems, in order to survive must perform the basic functions of resource allocation and integration to some degree. They must be able to assimilate new elements. Organizational systems have specific indigenous functions as well as these fundamental systemic functions. Organizational systems have defined goals whose achievement, partial achievement or creation is a precondition for the perpetuation of the organization. Sub-functional requisites of the organizational system's goal achievement functions are cohesion, which is conceptually distinct from integration, and the coordination of roles. Organizational systems, too, perform the function of adaptation to the environment in which they must operate, and in turn affect and alter the environment.

The functional analysis of organizational systems, plus the traditional, structurally descriptive analysis, adds somewhat to the
explanation of the behavior of the BRA and serves as a model for predicting its future modes of action.7

Integration and allocation functions within the BRA are performed at every level of the organization, although in their formal sense they only occur in the office and in the person of the redevelopment administrator himself. Because of the fragmented organizational arrangement, by project teams for redevelopment projects and by specific functions for central office division and general development sections, and because communication between project teams below the level of project director has been rare, the redevelopment administrator is particularly, by definition, the only role incumbent with sufficient knowledge of the overall activities to serve as an integrating force for the organization. Furthermore, he alone has adequate knowledge of the scope and nature of the agency's skill, financial and political resources to allocate them within the organization in an intelligent manner. Attempts have been made through the mechanism of horizontal, central office divisions which are functionally rather than project-oriented, to resolve allocation and functional integration problems of the organization on the level below the development administrator. Conflicting role demands of those involved have impeded the success of some of these efforts.

Integration and allocation functions for the project teams are chiefly performed by the project director. The elements and the resources base with which he is dealing are fewer in number and smaller in magnitude than those with which the redevelopment administrator must deal;

but the resolution of personal conflicts and resource requirements must be accomplished on a more specific, particularistic, and individually oriented basis. In many ways this makes the role demands of the project director with reference to the internal dynamics of the organization a much more complicated and delicate one than the role of redevelopment administrator even though the scope of the redevelopment administrator's role with reference to these functions of the system is greater. The redevelopment administrator is less intimately concerned with the individuals and the particular resource base of a project team on a day-to-day basis. However, in making decisions for the organization as a whole and for the organization in its relationships with elements in the environment which affect integration and resource allocation, the redevelopment administrator is subject to more diverse, and ultimately more disruptive forces from outside the BRA, than those which confront the project director from inside the BRA.

Project directors in the BRA, by virtue of their different training, professional orientation, and personalities have evolved different methods of dealing with these forces. In general three styles may be distinguished. Each type affects the integration and possibilities for resource allocation within the project team. One pattern of project director, represented by V, a young lawyer, relates almost entirely to his project team and appears to be only minimally concerned with environmental elements of his project area or with the overall program of the redevelopment administrator. As might be expected, V's project team is an extremely cohesive unit with high morale and an extra-office social life. Almost paradoxically, the high level of integration has adversely affected resource allocation decisions made by the project director.
For he seems to have become too close to his team and too much "like one of the boys" to have any real authority.

R, on the other hand, is a project director who relates almost exclusively to the environmental elements of the project area and to the redevelopment administrator's office. His project team members tend to consider him too aloof and insensitive to their interests. The project team is characterized by a number of functional cliques which tend not to work well together: the research section, the planning section, and the design section. Despite the loose integration of the project team, R, who has had training in public administration, has perhaps the most efficient project team in the BRA. Having remained relatively uninvolved with the internal politics of the team, he is in a more advantageous position to possess and utilize his authority. Thus, R can make decisions and with the expectation that they will be carried out.

D presents an example of a third type of project director. He attempts to relate and mediate between his project team members, the redevelopment administrator's office and the external elements of his project area. Although there is a moderate amount of cohesion within his project and although there appears to be a relatively satisfactory modus operandi with the project area elite, his inability to relate successfully to either the redevelopment administrator's office or to the other institutions and agencies involved in the project, tend to lessen the efficiency and effectiveness of his project team.

This cursory, functional analysis of the BRA organizational system has served to supplement the traditional model of a municipal bureaucracy. Yet it has compelled generalizations that are only partially explanatory. Further, the structural-system framework fails to give the emphasis to external relationships between the bureaucracy and other parts of the system which appears to dominate its activities. Before arguing that still another model for a municipal
bureaucracy ought to be added to the traditional and systemic ones, there follows a brief survey of the role requirements associated with organizational behavior in terms of the traditional model of a municipal bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic Behavior: The Traditional Model

The traditional model of bureaucratic or administrative behavior is derived directly from the model of the organization itself. If complex organizations are characterized as Robert Presthus summarizes, by size, specialization, hierarchy, status, authority, oligarchy, co-optation, rationality, and efficiency, they provide a distinctive work environment for their members.

Behavioral expectations are clearly prescribed and interpersonal relations are structured by nice distinctions among the authority, status and rank of those concerned. At the same time conflict is always present. This reflects the tensions between those in hierarchical positions who monopolize organizational power and rewards, and those in specialist roles.

Models of organizational behavior, ever since they have accepted the findings of modern psychology and abandoned the non-personal rigidity of the Weberian scheme, have given particular attention to the inherent conditions for conflict between (1) the authority and status position in the administrative hierarchy and technical expertise and (2) between socialization into the organizational role and its group norms and the professional training one has received and its more "cosmopolitan" professional socialization accompanying norms of behavior. For example, training as a professional architect with emphasis upon the criteria

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9 Presthus, *The Organizational Society*, p. 58.
of aesthetics and functionalism is likely to be in conflict with one's status position as third assistant designer for a particular project whose immediate supervisors may value planning criteria or neighborhood height restrictions more than architectural creativity. In the case of the BRA, too, there might be an added dimension of the feasibility of erecting a building at variance with the existing style of buildings in the area.

Robert Merton has argued that the restrictions of bureaucratic structures tend to transform experts and creative innovators of the professions into mere technicians. Neither this proposition nor its converse, that the bureaucratic situation which produces role conflict between one's professional norms and the organizational norms, may make experts of technicians, is completely valid to describe the BRA. Indeed, one of the original findings of the present study was that there existed in the BRA bureaucracy, role demands of a different sort, an entirely distinct facet which demanded of the BRA's technical experts behavior patterns even more discrepant and more conflicting than those arising from the clash of professional and administrative role requirements. This stems from the "politicization" of the municipal bureaucracy and the requirement of its professional and administrative personnel that they fulfill roles and perform functions which are usually associated with the political system.

The Politicization of the BRA

The BRA has been considered as an organization according to the traditional structural-rational model of bureaucracy, and is an organizational system performing general and specific functions. Neither of these appears to provide a sufficient explanation of its activities in the Boston socio-political system. Nor has a combination of these two modes of analysis provided a satisfactory explanation. Thus, an additional concept may be introduced, that of politicization. The phenomenon of politicization, the performance of political functions and the adoption of political behavior patterns by bureaucratic structures, has occurred and been systematically analyzed with respect to other levels of government. Selznick, Maass, Blau, and Scott have all observed these tendencies in federal and state agencies.11 Robert Wood has referred to their increasing ubiquity.12

As was noted in the introductory section of this chapter, the BRA is "politicized" almost by definition. The nature of the relationships with its environment and with specific elements in the socio-political system are many and diverse. It can not utilize the same sorts of behavior patterns, or the same types of arguments, with the business and financial community in Boston and with the elite in the local project areas. These groups have different orientation to redevelopment; and the BRA, in attempting to secure their support, must recognize this and adjust its strategies and tactics to suit each group appropriately.


12 Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments, Chapter 4.
In addition to politicization defined in this way, the politicization of the BRA may be considered with reference to its performance of functions for the entire Boston socio-political system.

The discussion of Boston's political system detected some shortcomings in performance of the basic social functions by elements of the system most commonly charged with the performance of these functions. The mode of performance of these functions was shown to be less than satisfactory for a complex urban political system in a society requiring technical skill and financial resources for solving its problems. Interjected into this system, in 1960, was a new administrative apparatus of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and a redevelopment administrator of extraordinary talent and energy. The new bureaucracy, as has been seen, embodied a value orientation and a socio-political style very different from that dominating the city's socio-political system. In addition, because of the very nature of its substantive objectives, redevelopment and city-wide development planning, the BRA rapidly extended the scope of its influence. Through performance of the planning and capital budgeting functions for the city administration, the BRA was, in actuality, making policy for the city "line" departments and making basic decisions regarding the level of services for the city for years to come. Stresses and strains between the BRA and its environment were inevitable.

Politicization of the BRA was not a gradual process. Rather, the essentially political nature of its functions was almost immediately obvious. Since it was a significantly more effective and efficient system than the political system into which it was injected, and since it could not function separately from the contextual system, it was
compelled to assume partial performance on the major system's functions in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to achievement of its own aims.

Successful redevelopment requires a smoothly operating or entirely permissive socio-political system. Many cities may be shown to have political systems in which the power structure performing the basic systemic functions is so well integrated or so fragmented that the environment for any policy program the system wishes to undertake is entirely permissive and the tacit consent of all groups concerned can be easily attained. New Haven, Newark, and Hartford illustrate this type. Still other urban political systems function so efficiently that new elements, though they generate conflict within the city, can be fairly easily assimilated and the conflicts resolved through the established systemic mechanisms. New York City, with reference to redevelopment, may be taken as an example of this pattern. 13

The BRA found the socio-political prerequisites for goal implementation in Boston to be lacking. Hence it was compelled from the first to create them in order to make redevelopment "work." The conflict generated by Logue's appointment provided an indication of the alignment of forces and their relative strengths and weaknesses in redevelopment controversies, even before Logue had established the BRA organization.

It soon became apparent that the scope and nature of the redevelopment program made the BRA rather than any other of the traditional

13 Wood, 1400 Governments, Chapter 4; also Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), Chapter IX; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, Chapter 10; and Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics, passim.
offices of the city bureaucracy, or even the Mayor's office, the place to which an individual or group should turn in order to exert pressure on the city government. It became apparent that this was the true locus of decision-making for the city. To the BRA executive offices the fragmented special interests of the city's ethnic and neighborhood groups were pleaded by their representatives. Here, too, the various interests were aggregated into policy proposals. Through the BRA organization as well, a new style of municipal employee, at least for Boston, was recruited into the system. Furthermore, precisely because it was fundamentally different from all previous municipal bureaucracies in the city, because its very existence generated a great deal of friction within the political system, and because the redevelopment administrator was himself a "colorful" personality who did not often shirk from overt verbal battle with his opponents, the media in the city directed considerable attention to its activities.

To augment the communications activity of which it was the prime stimulus, the BRA, too, published a considerable number of documents which it distributed throughout the project areas and at special exhibits. Further, the existence of BRA field offices in the project areas buttressed the interpersonal communications process. In sum, the politics that mattered in Boston became the politics of redevelopment, and its focus the BRA.

Providing interest articulation mechanisms for the highly fragmented socio-cultural system through the BRA is somewhat more complicated. Boston, as has been noted, is particularly weak as a functioning political system in that the number and influence of organizations which make demands upon the political system are small. This phenomenon has roots
in the socio-cultural patterning of the city. Thus, until the BRA project teams "invaded" certain areas of the city such as Scollay Square and the South End, the residents there, both the "socially disorganized" and deviant and the "respectable but poor," had had no means of having their interests articulated in the political arena. The BRA project teams, then, are through the process of many of its members becoming "identified in and with" the community of the project area, serving as means of articulation in the system as a whole.

The BRA is much more successful in performing the function of communication about political matters for the city system than it is in terms of performing this function for itself as an organizational-political system. Communication regarding intra-organizational political activities is by word of mouth, rumor, or an occasional memo. The communication patterns are well defined from the top, down through the organization and less well organized from the bottom up. As has been pointed out, much of the intra-organizational communication occurs within the project team.

Figure 7 presents a summary of the stages and modes of analysis which have been applied to the BRA bureaucracy thus far, in our discussion.

A complete description of the BRA as a system and as a dynamic part of its environment necessitates recognition of the "politicized" dimension of the BRA system on two levels: as a discreet entity, a politicized municipal bureaucracy, and as a municipal bureaucracy performing essential political functions for the system as a whole. However, no matter of which level the discussion takes place, completion of the argument
Figure 7

Stages of Analysis of A Municipal Bureaucracy

Unit of Analysis = The Organization

Stage 1
Municipal Bureaucracy
(traditional model)

Stage 2
Organizational System
(systems model)

Stage 3
Inefficient Political System
as environment

Stage 4
Politicized
Municipal Bureaucracy
(model of politicization
process and behavior)

Organization as a political system
requires delineation of an explicit model of a "politicized behavior," to be contrasted with that of traditional administrative behavior.

A Model of Political Behavior

In introducing the topic of political behavior in an administrative framework, it must be made clear that the subject of discussion is not the old policy-administration dichotomy, which it is assumed has been synthesized once and for all. Indeed, the definition of "political" which is to be employed is much broader and refers to more generalized aspects of human behavior. Policy making, in terms of the systemic analysis of political phenomena, is one of the output, or governmental, functions of the system. Here the concern is with behavior characterizing the input or political functions of the system.¹⁴

The model of political behavior used here was derived prior to observation of the organization under discussion. It has four major aspects: (1) role flexibility; (2) sources of decision criteria; (3) time perspective; (4) propensity to compromise.

Role Flexibility: This aspect of political behavior refers to the ability of an individual who occupies several distinct and often disparate roles to change among them with relative ease as the exigencies of particular situations dictate. This does not imply that he must perform all of the roles equally well, but only that he must have sufficient personal resources to be able to play them convincingly for the particular

audience. His "backstage preparations," to use a term borrowed from Erving Goffman's dramaturgical analogy, should not be visible.\textsuperscript{15} Individuals purportedly playing political roles can be ranked according to their observed role flexibility within the political arena. Although evidence is still fragmentary and the model has not yet been widely tested, it can be hypothesized that "success" in political activity can be correlated positively with skill and degree of role flexibility. There are two subsidiary dimensions to role flexibility. These are (a) sensitivity to role change, that is, how aware is the individual that he is changing roles and how completely does he appreciate the behavior requirements of the different roles; and (b) psychic comfort in role changes, that is to say, how much tension exists in the individual personality system as a result of the change of roles.

To use an example from national level political activity, which may clarify this concept of role flexibility: a number of prominent political figures have been ranked according to a gross evaluation of their relative ability to play a variety of political roles and alternate among them with ease and rapidity.

**Ranking of National Politicians on Role Flexibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Flexible</th>
<th>Least Flexible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franklin D. Roosevelt (until 1937)</td>
<td>Dwight Eisenhower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Humphrey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon Johnson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Kennedy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Kennedy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John Kennedy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry S. Truman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adlai Stevenson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Goldwater</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Role flexibility does not mean to imply either lack of fundamental principles or the ability to be all things to all people. What it does imply, in very simple terms, is the ability to be what some people want at a particular time and what others want at another time. To apply it to this particular study, Edward J. Logue, for example, has been observed to have at least twelve distinct roles to play as redevelopment administrator. These roughly correspond to the different audiences to which he must direct himself in his capacity as redevelopment administrator.

**Sources of Decision Criteria:** The second aspect of the model of political behavior refers to the bases upon which decisions are made. What factors are considered, and with which priorities, and to what extent is there a predictable pattern of the dominance of any one factor or set of factors in the decision-making of an individual role incumbent? Number and variety of decision criteria sources distinguish between administrative and political behavior patterns. Political behavior would be least likely to show a pattern of dominance of one or one set of decision criteria derived from a single source. It would be more likely to consider the widest range of factors and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of their possible outcomes. The pure type model of administrative behavior, on the other hand, would suggest that formal rules would provide the basis for decisions. A professional orientation, which is the usual one placed in opposition to administrative role requirements, would suggest that decisions be based upon a set of principles and norms of that profession.

**Time Perspective:** This aspect of the model of political behavior refers to a political actor's longer time perspective and willingness
to sacrifice immediate gains for long-term benefits. Administrative behavior and technical-professional behavior patterns on the other hand imply the primacy of direct, perceivable payoffs.

**Propensity to Compromise:** Role flexibility, a wider source of decision criteria and long-range time perspective almost naturally result in a high propensity to compromise, and, thus, this is a basic element of the model of political behavior. The broader the sources of decision criteria and the more varied the pattern of criteria dominance the more likely is an actor, for instance, to see the absolute necessity to "sub-optimize."\(^{16}\) Administrative and technical-professional behavior models, seen not to posit so "open" a mental set which allows for a relatively high propensity to compromise on a given issue.

The four aspects of the model of political behavior are intimately related and it seems rare if not impossible for an individual to rank highly in the direction of political behavior on one of them and not on the others, though there is the possibility of considerable variation.

Does the BRA as an organizational entity manifest political behavior patterns in terms of this model? The evidence seems to indicate a positive response. The organization and its representatives must alter their postures with respect to different groups with considerable frequency. It must take into consideration the objectives and demands of its supporters and of those elements absolutely essential to a coalition for successful project implementation. There are several different patterns of decision criteria dominance; most notably, one for residential projects and one for commercial projects. The BRA has shown

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\(^{16}\) For further elucidation of this concept see Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 396-402.
itself willing to compromise with its natural allies and with those elements of the system which have been termed "persuasible"; in so doing it has had to concede short-term objectives in order, hopefully, to facilitate the attainment of more basic, long-term advantages. An example of this is the South Cove agreement with the Chinese Community.\textsuperscript{17}

It may be concluded that the BRA is truly politicized municipal bureaucracy since it may be regarded as a political system itself, since it may be shown to perform basic political functions for the system as a whole, and since its activities tend to conform to the model of political behavior which has been presented.

\textbf{Tripartite Role Conflict in a Politicized Municipal Bureaucracy}

The model which has been introduced to measure the degree of politicized behavior in the BRA, is predicated on the proposition that the BRA can not be satisfactorily described as merely an organizational system or in the manner of a traditional municipal bureaucracy. The model when applied to the behavior of individuals in the bureaucratic structure adds still another dimension to the study of complex organizations.

Those who have considered complex organizations from the point of view of "public administration" appear to have been concerned primarily with the organizations' goal-implementation functions. They have discussed methods of securing teamwork to achieve their objectives, of coping with the environment, of surviving in a changing society, of competing with other bureaucracies, especially other governmental bureaucracies for resources and prestige. They have examined the relationships

\textsuperscript{17}Hearings Before the Executive Committee of the Boston City Council, South Cove Urban Renewal Project, Vol. 4, May 24, 1963.
of bureaucratic structures to each other and to other elements of the formal governmental system. And they have tried to assess the implications of the proliferation of bureaucratic structures in government for "democratic institutions" and myths. While they have, since Goodnow's writings at the beginning of this century, recognized the inseparability of policy and administration, they have not, by and large, carried this to its logical conclusion and investigated the political functions of governmental bureaucracies. Two notable exceptions are studies by Maass and Selznick of the Army Corps of Engineers and TVA respectively.\textsuperscript{18} Public administration theorists have not been concerned with the impact of their own political activities upon municipal bureaucracies, and have tended completely to neglect the impact on individual actors.

Those who have studied organizations from the point of view of industrial dynamics have tended to view them in terms of engineering intra- and inter-group harmony.\textsuperscript{19} This orientation has frequently been more manipulative than analytical and more concerned with creating an atmosphere conducive only to increased productivity. This is the business school industrial management approach to the study of organizational behavior; thus it has tended to stress the balancing of management and workers' satisfaction, with more attention to the former. With this perspective it is understandable that these types of studies have ignored the politicization of roles and the infiltration of political behavior patterns into complex organizations.

\textsuperscript{18} Maass, Middy Waters and Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots.

\textsuperscript{19} See Blau and Scott, Formal Organizations, Chapter 1.
Still another group, sociologists, involved in the study of complex organizations, might be expected to be the logical ones to explore the relationship of bureaucratic functions to societal functions. They have not yet gone far enough either. In the past two decades, however, many provocative studies have noted the increasingly dysfunctional conflict between technical experts and bureaucratic roles. Hence, Presthus notes that scientific personnel are more likely to conform to the ambivalent pattern of accommodation to organizational demands, the pattern which produces the most psychic strain for the individuals but not necessarily the least efficient and effective organization. 20 And Victor Thompson in another recent treatment of this dilemma cites the existence of the bureuopathic personality. 21

These, however, take into consideration only two dimensions of possible role conflict. On the basis of the observations of the present study, it is hypothesized that in municipal bureaucracies operating in an ineffective political system, the role conflict which may exist for individuals in the system has three dimensions; is tripartite in nature.

In other words, while existing literature treats the conflicts which may occur between technical expertise and bureaucratic or hierarchical authority structures; in the situation that has been described in the EDA, maybe there is a conflict not only between these two elements but between these two, separately or together, and the political demands of the organizational system.

20 Presthus, The Organizational Society, Chapter 8.

Figure 8
stages of Analysis of Bureaucratic Role Behavior

unit of Analysis = The Individual

stage 1
Bureaucratic Behavior (traditional model)

stage 2
Dualistic Role Conflict

Professional Role

Organizational Role

stage 3
Tripartite Role Conflict in a Politicized Municipal Bureaucracy

Professional Role

180
To use an example from the BRA, a planner, may have potential conflict between the role he is required to play to "get along" with the project director whose training has been in law and to "get along" with the elite in the project area with which he is dealing and their spokesman on the city council. If this sort of three way conflict exists for an individual he must choose between several major alternatives for adjustment, for such a situation is clearly untenable for very long. He may (a) withdraw physically, resign from the organization; (b) withdraw psychologically, lessen his investment in deriving satisfactions from his occupation and seek other outlets; (c) seek an adjustment between two of the conflicting roles to override the third; (d) adjustment between the three roles. In the case mentioned, the most usual mode of accommodation might be to sublimate temporarily the conflict between planner and project director in order, more effectively, to carry out the demands of the planner's political role.

It requires a highly politically sensitized individual to accomplish this tripartite role reconciliation, particularly in the context of Boston. Unfortunately the vast majority of those in the service of municipal bureaucracies do not possess the requisite skill for resolution of three dimensional role conflicts.

It is likely though, that all three discrepant roles will not be in simultaneous conflict. The more probable condition is that two will conflict with a third. Hence the mode of resolution is readily apparent. Accomplishing it, however, is more difficult than mere recognition of the elements to be reconciled in a particular situation. Individual personality systems and professional orientation are crucial variables.
Figure 9

Patterns of Tripartite Role Conflict in the BRA

A. Pol. Role
   \[\text{Prof. Role}\]
   \[\text{Bur. Role}\]

B. Pol. Role
   \[\text{Bur. Role}\]
   \[\text{Prof. Role}\]

C. Pol. Role
   \[\text{Prof. Role}\]
   \[\text{Bur. Role}\]

D. Bur. Role
   \[\text{Prof. Role}\]
   \[\text{Pol. Role}\]

\[\text{MM = no conflict}\]
\[\leftrightarrow = conflict\]
The personality of the role of incumbent concerned will determine, in the first place, whether or not he will even attempt to reconcile the disparate roles and their behavioral demands. Then the structure and functions of his personality system will influence his relative success in resolving the role conflict.

Before examining the methods of possible resolution of these role conflicts in greater detail, the model of political behavior introduced here, must be shown to be applicable to specific roles in the municipal bureaucracy.
CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL ROLES

The Boston Redevelopment Authority has been described as a politicized organizational system. The proposition has been offered that the phenomenon of politicization not only characterizes the BRA as an entity but individual roles within it as well. This chapter considers in detail application of the model to the BRA Organization and to particular roles within it.

Special attention is given to the role of the professional planner in the BRA. Planners are, in the first place, the professionals who comprise the majority of the BRA's professional staff. Theirs is the profession most usually cited as representing the dominant orientation of redevelopment. But, in the politicized BRA, planners are those who are likely to experience the most intense role conflict. And as subsequent sections will demonstrate, they are least able to resolve it successfully.

Reprise: The BRA and the Political Behavior Model

The first task of this section of the study will be to review and elaborate upon evidence to the effect that the BRA is indeed a politicized system, according to the criteria of our model of political behavior. The model consists of four dimensions: role flexibility, sources of decision criteria, time perspective, and propensity to
compromise. If the BRA corresponded to the traditional, structural-rational model of a municipal bureaucracy, it would likely perform one, or at most two, clearly defined roles with reference to its environment. It would use as decision criteria those principles which underlay the legislation, administrative order, or program which it was charged to administer. In other words, the sources of decision criteria for the organization and for every role incumbent within it would be relatively fixed. The number of sources of decision criteria would be few at most and their orientation and substantive interest likely to be similar. The scope of the time perspective for traditional organizations is apt to be limited to the immediate. Long-range goals and delayed solutions would not properly be within its purview unless it was specifically designed as a long-range planning organization. Further, since the decision criteria are likely to be explicit and the role of the organization distinctly defined, compromise by the organization is largely precluded. If the organization and its goals are in conflict with another organization, the conflict must be resolved through the mediation of an outside agency or dictated by a higher authority.

The BRA, as has been noted, is politicized almost by definition. The very scope of its program necessitates contact with a multiplicity of other groups, not all of whom have compatible orientations. Thus, it must alter its strategy and tactics when dealing with different groups. This often entails role flexibility in the extreme. The posture of the BRA when dealing with publics in project areas, for instance, and with real estate firms who may be potential developers will be quite different. These two groups have different reasons for being interested
in redevelopment. To avoid conflict and to secure their respective support the BRA must emphasize those aspects of redevelopment which are most likely to reinforce the positive factors in their orientations toward the subject. Further, the groups differ in the degree to which they share the BRA's orientation. To the extent that they tend to have a socio-political ethos in common with it, the BRA can stress substantive factors. The BRA must pick and choose among the substantive factors, too. Quite obviously relocation plans will not be of the same crucial importance to potential developers that they will be to the community leaders in the area to be directly affected by the project. Role flexibility then, is an attribute of the BRA's behavior pattern. Role flexibility and the other aspects of political behavior have been forced upon the BRA from its inception.

The nature of redevelopment brings it into contact and potential conflict with so many elements in the system, and there is an imperfectly developed political system to mediate between this agency of the municipal bureaucracy and its environment in Boston. Thus, the BRA must fulfill this latter function, which is essential to the implementation of its goals, by itself. This requires the ability to alter its emphasis and its own perception of its role and relationships with the other elements. It is difficult to discuss sensitivity to its own role changes and psychic comfort or discomfort with regard to an entire organization. Though when individual or group roles are considered, these sorts of factors are naturally more amenable to systematic analysis.

Because of the number and variety of groups with which it is connected in the environment and because of the differences among the
substantive and attitudinal orientations of the four essential elements to redevelopment coalitions, which the BRA must mobilize in support of its projects, the number of sources and the variety of sources for criteria upon which the BRA can draw in decision making are great. It has been hypothesized that the number and variety of sources of decision criteria are positively correlated with "degree of politicization." The more politicized the individuals or organization, the greater the number and variety of sources for decision criteria.

The intrinsic nature of redevelopment implementation as well as the environmental constraints which the BRA encounters in Boston, dictate that immediate tangible results cannot be expected much of the time. The time lag from the initiation of a redevelopment project until the time at which buildings are ready for occupancy averages from three to five years depending upon (1) the city's political system, (2) its experience with redevelopment, (3) the skill of its bureaucracy, and (4) the whims of developers. Hence, it is not surprising that the BRA as a unit is oriented toward future benefits rather than day to day results. Allocation of tasks within project teams is usually done on a quarterly basis, not day to day.

Since all aspects of the political behavior model are interrelated and since the BRA has been found to possess a large and diverse number of decision criteria sources, it may be seen that it ranks high on propensity to compromise. This, too, has been forced upon it by the exigencies of the situation in which it must operate. Ideally, the BRA may not wish to compromise among demands of competing decision criteria, postpone decisions or establish priorities among them. Politicization
and the "new" demands this places upon the organization make this type of behavior as common to its role incumbents: drawing plans or designing buildings. The argument has been made that the most important characteristics of the municipal bureaucracy presently under discussion is the fact of its " politicization" and of its perception of its politicization.

Turning now to a discussion of the relative politicization of different roles within the BRA, the roles have been placed in the familiar categories of organizational roles and professional roles. Organizational roles are those which define a status or hierarchical position in the organization. Three of these will be considered; redevelopment administrator, project director, and central office division head.

The Politicization of Organizational Roles

The archetypical political role to be found within the BRA is, of course, that of redevelopment administrator. The demands of the role in the Boston political system are such that only a highly politicized role incumbent could achieve any results at all. Leaving aside for the moment, the personality of the particular role incumbent, the role itself within the bureaucracy is politicized to a greater degree than any other role within the entire governmental apparatus of the city, formal or informal. The redevelopment administrator, as chief executive and the major means of integration within the organization and the locus of all decision making, actually sets the tone for the organization. His personal orientation toward the substantive aspects of redevelopment project implementation is the dominant and prevailing one. Indeed, accommodation to the style of the organization
is determined to a large extent on the degree to which a particular role and a particular role incumbent shares the director's orientation toward redevelopment, toward his own role, and toward the political demands superimposed upon that role by the environment and the nature of the organization's role in the community.

(i) The Redevelopment Administrator

Since it is usually the redevelopment administrator himself who acts as spokesman for the BRA and as ultimate decision maker in relationships between the BRA and the other elements of the system, the success or failure of the organization's role flexibility rests upon him; for he must confront representatives of the diverse interests in the city. In terms of the present data, twelve different roles have been defined for the redevelopment director in Boston, related to his occupation. They are shown in Figure 10.

These twelve "faces" correspond to the twelve major different elements in the system with which he must deal. Each has a particular political style, more or less in conformance with that of the BRA's and each has a particular interest and objective in relation to redevelopment. These must be carefully considered in the posture which Logue adopts in relationships with any one of the groups.

As Goffman has pointed out, in the expression one "gives off" as well as the expression one gives, obtaining the desired reaction of the audience must be a principal factor in verbal and non-verbal communication.²

Because of the sometimes drastically discrepant postures he must adopt, it is necessary to keep the areas in which he interacts with

Figure 10 -
Role Repertory of BRA's Politicized Redevelopment Administrator

Logue

- Adviser to Mayor
- Mediator with federal government
- Mediator with legislative bodies
- Friend of editors
- Lobbyist before state legislature and agencies
- Planner for City Departments
- Spokesman for Redevelopment Board
- Spokesman for Redevelopment Council

- Public Spokesman
- Organizational Executive
- Persuader of Project Elite
- Mobilizer of Support
- Salesman to Project Publics
- Mediator with Potential Developers
various groups as separate as possible. This also allows a period in which to alter his "mental set" to the new roles which he must adopt. Thus, Logue, a political actor who is most highly sensitized to role changes usually tries to leave some time between appointments with persons or groups requiring different styles of roles in order to adjust from one to the other with minimal internal conflict. There are some instances in which not only the role behavior but the physical setting of the encounter between the redevelopment administrator and the other group or individuals involved must be altered to conform to the role behavior the redevelopment administrator intends to adopt. For instance, whenever possible, Logue tries to meet members of the local project elite and the particular project "publics" on their own home territory, in a public place within the project area. Thus, most encounters between Logue and the project elite in Roxbury have occurred at Roxbury churches. This is designed, from Logue's point of view, so that the local project area elite will not feel at too great a psychological disadvantage as they might tend to in the bureaucratic atmosphere of his office.

Since the redevelopment administrator's role requires such sudden and drastic role changes and a wide repertory of roles, it also requires sensitivity to the role changes and the audience concerned and a personality system and substantive orientation which can tolerate the variety of role changes. A political-economic orientation toward redevelopment is the most satisfactory for the role which requires most role flexibility. It is the broadest, most practically oriented attitude and,

\footnote{Goffman, \textit{The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life}, Chapter 3.}
hence, can encompass all the required roles.

Contact with the large numbers or organizations and units connected with the development administrator's job also may lead to a reinforcement of the politicization of the role through internalization and recognition of a large number and wide variety of sources for decision criteria. This need not necessarily be the case, however. It is entirely conceivable that there may be instances in which the role incumbent comes in contact with a great number of groups but does not take their interests and objectives into account as sources of decision criteria. The more frequent and intense the contact and the more power resources the other group possesses, the more likely that the development administrator will take the group's interests and objectives in redevelopment into consideration in decision making. The Boston business and financial interests which have been noted as being most closely attuned to the BRA in style and orientation toward redevelopment, are usually taken into account in all project decisions which will affect them in any way. Hostile city council members, though they have the power to block temporarily the implementation of project plans, are not usually taken into account; for they are treated as intransigent foes of the program.

In sum, all of the other elements with which the redevelopment director comes into contact and toward whom he must exhibit a particular type of role behavior in order to evoke the desired reaction, are potential sources of decision criteria. The degree to which each actually acts as a source of decision criteria is dependent upon the factors to which we have alluded: (1) their power position in the system; (2) their orientation vis à vis the BRA and its style, and substantive
objectives, and (3) the decision maker's perceptions of these factors.

With regard to time perspective, the role of the development administrator, since it is most politicized in terms or role flexibility requirements and exposure to sources of decision criteria, is also most conscious of long range results and less concerned with immediate tangible results. This is slightly modified in Boston, by Logue's strong desire to assist in changing the prevailing public image of redevelopment by erecting low income housing. Logue wants as much low income housing as possible erected rapidly; and, as was the case in Washington Park, when undue delays or disputes between co-developers threaten the project's completion schedule, he will recommend strong measures to the BRA Board to alleviate those conditions. However, for the most part Logue's time perspective is sufficiently expansive for him to keep a realistic appraisal of the speed with which redevelopment can actually be accomplished in Boston. He understands, for example, that there is no probability for any building in the South End for approximately three years. Thus, without extravagant expectations, since his initial projections, he is less likely to be exceedingly frustrated when project deadlines are not met.

In the case of propensity to compromise, the politicized redevelopment administrator must strike a balance between an over-willingness to accommodate other interests and the demands of (1) interests of those on his staff who tend to be less politicized and (2) those other elements of the system which tend to lack the willingness to compromise.

As in the case of sources of decision criteria, the supposition

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3 Personal conversation, May 1964.
is that groups with whom the BRA director has the most propensity to compromise are (1) those who share its orientation and thus have a relatively high propensity to compromise, (2) those whose support is essential to project implementation, and (3) those who have more power resources in the environment vis a vis redevelopment but who are not intrinsically opposed to redevelopment. Logue, for example, concluded an unprecedented agreement with the Chinese Community. This has been one of the most notable BRA compromises to date with one other specific group within the system. Such an agreement could not have been reached, in all likelihood, with the Charlestown leaders. One point on which the Mayor and Logue refuse to be moved is the call of redevelopment foes for a referendum on renewal projects. In other words, the propensity to compromise is limited and prudently exercised in practice by the BRA director. Logue will not waste the organization's power resources in futile one-way concessions.

(ii) The Project Director

The next most politicized role is that of project director. As has been pointed out, the scope of the project director's purview is different. He is more closely connected with the internal dynamics of the organization, of running his project team than with the BRA's relationship with the environment or elements in the environment. Thus, the number of roles in his repertory is smaller than that of the redevelopment administrator. (See Figure 11.) His successful role flexibility is essential to maintenance of coordination of roles within the project team. It is interesting to note that the most successful project directors in the BRA, from the point of view of role flexibility and sensitivity to role changes, were those without a professional orientation which could be
considered a part of the "technical" functions of redevelopment. As will be seen in the next section of this chapter those trained as planners or architects were less likely to be successful in fulfilling the political role requirements of the project director.

The project director's role changes occur mainly within the organization, specifically within the project team. Thus, the details of the role requirements will tend to vary with the individuals with whom the project director must relate, the secretaries, professional planners, professional architects, community relations workers, central office division directors, or their underlings. Here the personality of the
individuals, and their status positions within the organization along with their professional role are likely to be significant variables in determining the specific content of any role behavior.

Because his range of contacts and role requirements are more restricted than the redevelopment administrator's, the project director's sources of decision criteria might also be expected to be more restricted. This need not necessarily be so. The actual range of the sources of decision criteria available to and used by any project director usually depends upon the style in which he administers the project team. This varies considerably among projects. One project director, that for the Downtown project, tends to consider the business and financial interests, his external clientele, and outside consultants as major sources of decision criteria, largely bypassing his project team. The Charlestown project director, on the other hand, considers every professional on his staff as a source of decision making criteria, and tends to neglect completely factors external to the project team. These represent the two extremes within the BRA. Other project directors fall somewhere in between these two. The styles of the project directors and their consideration of the available sources of decision criteria, vary according to their personalities and professional training.

The nature of their project (commercial or residential) and the project area with which they deal, however, does influence the range of sources of decision criteria. The business and financial interests who are concerned with the Downtown project have an orientation toward redevelopment close to the BRA's, and Charlestown's is perhaps the furthest from the BRA's of any project area elite or public. Hence, it is not surprising, in view of this, that the project director in the first
instance mentioned above uses the external related elements of the system as sources of decision criteria and the latter does not.

Regarding time perspective, project directors are apt to be more interested in short run results, the completion of specific tasks, than the development administrator who must consider the entire program. The scope of the project director's interests is smaller, yet he is much more likely to have a long-range view of his project than merely concern for day to day duties. He can usually envisage them as but parts of a whole.

The arena for the project director's propensity to compromise is confined to the project team for these are the limits of his decision making authority. The types of compromises he must make are usually those involving allocation of tasks and functions within the project team and those which deal with individual personnel problems. The degree to which a project director is likely to compromise varies from team to team with the individuals, of course. Nevertheless, given the relatively high degree of politicization of this role and the overriding objective of maintaining a smoothly functioning project team, his propensity to compromise, would appear, on the surface, to be relatively high on small matters.

(iii) The BRA Central Office Division Head

The third organizational role, whose observed behavior will be measured alongside the model of politicized administrative behavior, is the central office division head.

The role flexibility requirement for this role falls somewhere between those of project director and development administrator. While this role does not so often come in contact with elements in the environment connected with redevelopment project implementation, it must be remembered that
this type of executive in the BRA is at the top of the functional or horizontal form of organization. Hence, he tends to come in contact with a whole set of other groups, the non-BRA professionals who share a functional speciality. Rehabilitation and relocation central office staff directors, for example, must have role relationships with housing officials, social workers, banks to obtain special mortgage concessions for relocatees etc., in addition to field office staffs and workers, his own subsidiaries and the redevelopment administrator. The planning coordinator also maintains constant contact with a number of special BRA planning consultants and a large group of non-BRA planners in Boston and throughout the country. Figure 12 contains the role repertory needed for this politicized role.

Figure 12
Role Repertory of BRA's Politicized Central Office Division Heads

peer of non-BRA professionals
Supervisor of office staff
Subordinate to redev. admin.
Spokesman for functional interests of people
Spokesman for BRA and city council
overseer of site office professionals
Chief of project director
C. O. D. H.
Whether the external or internal role relationships are more salient to the role incumbent is a function of (1) the substantive concerns of his office, (2) the size and composition of his office staff, and (3) whether or not field offices of project staffs are involved, as they are in relocation and rehabilitation. His roles are likely to overlap when dealing with professionals within and outside the organization. There is apt to be less discrepancy between the role requirements of his roles since his unit is functionally organized and the persons with whom he will have most dealings are very likely to share portions of his orientation. Thus, less sensitivity to role change is required and less psychic discomfort is apt to be inherent in the changing role situations. The central office head is the least politicized of the three categories of decision makers in the BRA.

The relatively less politicized position of the central office division head with respect to role flexibility, means that there are likely to be fewer sources of decision criteria and that they will be more similar than those confronting either the project director or the redevelopment administrator.

His time perspective is more present oriented. Phasing is one aspect of all these officials' work, but they tend to be more oriented to disposition of individual cases or plans and less likely to perceive any one of them as part of a process over time.

Since he supervises a functionally organized division, he is likely himself to have professional training in the specialized field. The internalization of professional training is, as was inferred in the case of project directors, less likely to allow a role incumbent to have a
high propensity to compromise. The professional orientation implies a set of principles for decisions which are not lightly put aside. The BRA central office heads were least likely to compromise even on small matters and enjoyed the least harmonious relationships with their underlings and with the more politicized members of their profession.

Comparing the three politicized organizational roles of the BRA which have been discussed, it may be seen that the role of redevelopment administrator is by far the most politicized according to the first three dimensions of the model; that the role of project director is second on all dimensions except that of propensity to compromise, on which it ranks higher than that of redevelopment administrator; and that the central office division head is considered the least politicized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Role Flexibility</th>
<th>Source of Propensity</th>
<th>Time Respect</th>
<th>Prop. To Comp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Redevelopment Admin.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Director</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. Office Division</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having seen how organizational decision making roles in the BRA conform to the model of political behavior, we next turn to a discussion of the politicization of professional roles within the organization.
The Politicization of Professional Roles

Four professional roles will be considered, the planner, the architect, the lawyer, and the community relations worker. These four were chosen since they are, numerically, and with reference to the functions to be performed by the BRA in project implementation, the most significant for the organization.

Each of these professional roles carries with it a particular set of technical standards, of role expectations, of norms of behavior, a particular orientation toward the redevelopment process, and a complete set of guidelines for day to day decision making. These stem from role socialization resulting from professional training. In addition, each of the four professions to be considered may be viewed as being at a different stage of professionalism. This distinction also affects role behavior.

Other attributes of professional role incumbents which are relevant to a discussion of their role conflicts are (1) the age of the individual and (2) the amount of professional work experience they have had. For reference to all four of the professions included here, it is suggested that greater age and professional experience and hence, the opportunity to have "reality tested" one's professional principles and "world view" is more conducive to successful politicization of the role, and likely to make political role behavior as in the BRA context less psychically oppressive.

(1) Planners

The role of the professional planner in the redevelopment bureaucracy will be considered first. Planners are the most numerous professional group in the BRA. They do not however, have organizational
decision making roles commensurate with their numbers. Of the ten project directors, only two were professional planners. The redevelopment administrator is not a planner by training; and the only central office division heads who are planners are those in charge of coordinating planning functions among the projects, the director of general planning, and the heads of zoning and transportation planning. This does not mean that the organizational role of planner as it exists in the BRA is not highly politicized, for the second in authority behind almost every other BRA executive officer is a professional planner. Thus, the required repertory of roles and the necessity for role flexibility is second only to those of the project directors and central office division heads.

Figure 13
Role Repertory of BRA's Politicized Planners

- Supervisor
- Spokesman to project public
- Subordinate planner
- Spokesman to project elite
- Peer to non-BRA planners
- Peer to BRA planners
The necessity for role flexibility on the part of planners revolves around the relationships which the planner enjoys with his professional colleagues and those relationships he needs to maintain with other members of the project team who are not planners. Planners not formally occupying section head roles frequently have to perform them when the role requirements of superiors are so conflicting in time and space that the real role incumbent can not feasibly perform them. If, for instance, the project director was asked to go to Washington with Logue, with reference to his project plans, the second in command planner would be called upon to fill the project director's role temporarily, and perform all functions of that office.

Planners are not immune from contact with project area elite members or members of the project area public. This is especially true when the planner is assigned to the project site office. Again, role flexibility is required of planners in many instances, since they are often in organizational roles which are not those for which they were professionally trained. The case of the professional planner acting as community relations coordinator for one project team has already been mentioned. In addition, the most significant case of unresolved role conflict among the upper echelons of the BRA personnel involved the case of a planner acting in the organizational role of assistant to a central office division head. Because of the age and orientation of the central office division head, the planner's role assumed the tasks of mediation between the site office staffs, project staffs, and the central office; a highly political situation in which individuals of many orientations were concerned. The relative rigidity of the role incumbent, his inability to meet the requirements of role flexibility
seriously hampered the efforts of the entire functional group.

This is all leading to the conclusion that the organizational roles planners occupy in the ERA, and the highly politicized nature of the ERA apparatus and its activities demands a large measure of role flexibility on the part of planners. And as a recent study has pointed out, planners are not equipped for politicized roles by their training.\(^4\)

The professionalism of planning has been defined as "incomplete" because there is still considerable heterogeneity in career patterns and variety in planning education, and recruitment channels are not well defined.\(^5\) This stage of professionalism in which the planning professions finds itself at present, "in quest of identity," has resulted in over-self-consciousness and hyper-professionalism marked by an excess of emphasis on professional distinctiveness and particular behavior patterns, and the assertion of professional principles as decision criteria. In addition, since planning as a profession is relatively young, so are its role incumbents. This implies that few of them have had sufficient opportunity to have their hyperprofessionalism ameliorated by time and experience in the real world of political planning.

Planners' attitudes regarding politics have been shown to be definitely negative. Several explanations for this have been offered. One is that political activity in the United States still carries with it the stigma of the early twentieth century stereotype of corruption and bossism.\(^6\)


\(^6\) Ibid., p. 205.
Another reason that political roles are negatively perceived by planners might be that political roles usually conflict with the technically oriented criteria of planning.

Thus, planners to be effective in a highly politicized organization such as the BRA, must adopt political roles. To the extent they recognize the various roles they are called upon to play as political, or as discrepant with the technically oriented norms of their profession, they tend implicitly to refuse to perform them or to adopt the requisite amount of role flexibility needed to satisfy the demands of the system.

Aside from role flexibility, planners have not been notably successful within the BRA in adjusting to the other dimensions of political activity. While the diverse groups they must deal with might dictate a variety of sources of decision criteria, their professional self-consciousness has tended to make professional norms and technical standards for behavior take precedence. In other words, their strong professional identity acts as a filter for selecting sources of decision criteria inimical with it. Thus, the professional planner will tend to take refuge in professional sources of decision criteria, to lessen the necessity for political behavior.

The planners' time perspective, partially instilled in him by his training, is a long-term perspective, which it has been suggested, is associated with political behavior. However, no one dimension alone is sufficient for successful role politicization. The fourth aspect of the model of political behavior is that of propensity to compromise. Here again, the hyper-professionalism of the planners and the tendency to take refuge in familiar, technically defined standards rather than adopt dissident and negatively perceived role behaviors, mitigates
against a high propensity to compromise.

It must be concluded that the planners' professional role is unsatisfactorily politicized in terms of our model.

(ii) Architects

Architects are the next professional group whose politicization in the BRA will be discussed. In the first place, it must be pointed out that professionally the architects' situation is somewhat different from the planners'. The architectural profession is better recognized and more prestigious. Hence, architects tend to be less professionally self-conscious. Having internalized their professional identity more successfully, they tend not to feel the necessity to assert their professional norms in political and bureaucratic role situations.

The requirements for role flexibility on the part of the architects in the BRA were less demanding than those of planners. Their politicized role repertory has fewer facets.
Even though demands for role flexibility are fewer, the architects seem more conscious of role change. Perhaps, this is because their technical-professional roles' norms are so distinctly different from those that the politicized roles force upon them.

Unlike planners, architects have had a longer association with political actors and roles. These "professions" have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship since the earliest days of urban civilizations. Therefore, architects' perceptions of political roles might be expected to be significantly less negative than those of planners. Architects have been able to see the necessity for allying with traditional political role incumbents in order to accomplish objectives. They have a greater appreciation of political exigencies and tend to realize to a greater extent than planners that political roles are essential elements of action systems in socio-political environments. It might be hypothesized that this is a by-product of architecture's professional maturity.

If architects are more successful at adopting the range of political roles prescribed for them within the BRA system, they might be expected to take into consideration a wider range of decision criteria. However, as Figure 14 shows, although the number of roles which the architect must confront is not small, the variety of orientations represented by those roles is small. In other words, architects in the BRA are more likely to confront other architects either in or outside the BRA in their politicized role behavior. Thus, the sources of their decision criteria are more narrow than might be expected.

Architects' time perspectives tend to be very long range and their propensity to compromise of moderate intensity. The more professionally oriented the architect tends to be, the less likely he would be to make
compromises in the area of his technical competence. In the BRA, hyper-professionalized planners and architects often collide regarding project planning and design. Resolutions of these kinds of conflicts are usually dictated from above, by either the project director or the redevelopment administrator.

(iii) Community Relations Professionals

Community relations professionals, most of whom have had social work or sociological training of some sort, are the next group of professionals whose role politicization is to be examined in terms of the BRA data. Their role repertory for politicization is larger and more diversified than that of architects.

![Figure 15: Role Repertory of BRA's Politicized Community Relations Professionals](image)

Nevertheless, in professional orientation they are likely to be more closely akin to planners. The social work professions are older than planning but of more recent institutionalization than architecture. Thus, a crucial variable here is the amount of work experience the
particular individual has. For professionalism appears to decrease with exposure to greater amounts of work experience over time. The principles learned in professional training school are seen as having to be modified in view of the "real world" role demands. As we have said, the more established, socially secure, professions can accomplish this most easily.

The amount of sensitivity to role change and the psychic discomfort felt by individuals as a result of role changes varies greatly with respect to community relations professionals. In general, however, it might be said from the observations of the BRA staff, that younger workers were more aware of role change and seemed to experience more tension. They were also more likely to become more "ego involved" in their case work.

Sources of decision criteria for community relations professionals appeared to be relatively few though of some variety. This differs from the architects who had many sources of decision criteria, but many of essentially similar orientation. Other community relations professionals outside the BRA were less likely to be a significant reference group for community relations workers in the way that non-BRA planning professionals were for BRA planners.

For community relations workers, however, their project area clientele was often the most significant source of decision criteria. This was particularly true for community relations professionals in the site offices. The early abuses of redevelopment have made relocation and community services connected with redevelopment the aspect of the redevelopment programs extremely delicate. Furthermore they are most closely supervised by federal officials. Thus, federal requirements
were important sources of decision criteria for community relations workers.

The time perspectives of community relations professionals are more likely to be short range than either those of planners or architects. They are more likely to consider individual cases and their disposition than the total redevelopment process. Their propensity to compromise is more likely to be in the range of that of the planners than of the architects. Here again, the predominance of professional norms as principle sources of decision criteria and the clientele orientation of community relations workers may be cited as explanatory factors.

(iv) Lawyers

Lawyers are another numerically and functionally significant group of professionals within the BRA. Their politicization appears to be the most complete and least psychically oppressive of the four professional groups that have been considered. Few of the BRA lawyers act in their professional capacity, although there is a growing legal staff and most project teams now have a legal officer.

The principal politicized actor in the BRA, Logue, is a lawyer by training, but a politician in both the old and newer sense by inclination. In addition, two of the major project directors are lawyers.

The political role repertory of the BRA lawyers as lawyers is small, and to a greater extent than in the case of any other of the professional groups, it is conditioned by the lawyers' organizational role. For lawyers as for social workers, rarely are members of the same professional group from outside the BRA a significant reference group.

Law is, like architecture, an ancient profession and one which has been closely aligned with traditional political actors, as planning
and social work have not. Lawyers, then, are most likely to appreciate the demands of politicized role behavior, particularly role flexibility.

Figure 16
Role Repertory of BRA's Politicized Lawyers
peer to non-BRA lawyer
subordinate
Supervisor
legal adviser
peer to BRA lawyers

The BRA lawyers observed exhibited traits more like those defined as peculiar to organizational roles in that they were more likely to be sensitized to role flexibility as they were more proficient in successfully changing roles. In addition, they experienced little obvious psychic discomfort from role flexibility. Indeed, role flexibility might be considered among the principal professional norms of the advocate.

Lawyers also consider a variety of decision criteria, though the number of sources is likely to be circumscribed from instance to instance by organizational role. Professional norms are not usually very significant factors. As has been said, most of the BRA lawyers are occupying positions
in the organization in which traditional legal criteria are largely irrelevant for decision making. Further, lawyers are not so professionally self-conscious on a day to day basis that they feel they must assert and utilize legal principles and modes of analysis, as planners, for example, seem to feel they must use theirs.\footnote{See Everett Cherrington Hughes, "The Study of Occupations," in Sociology Today. In the same volume also see Philip Selznick's essay on "The Sociology of Law."}

Regarding time perspective, the lawyers fall between social workers and architects at the BRA. They have a moderately "political" time perspective, according to the model. They are most likely, however, to have a high propensity to compromise. Since professional norms are not likely to be an issue and since their role changes tend to be accomplished with relative facility, they tend to compromise quite readily.

This concludes the discussion of the politicization of professional roles in the BRA context. Rankings of the four professional roles along four dimensions of the political behavior model are presented in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Dimension of Political Behavior</th>
<th>Source of Power</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Prof. Comp</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planners</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Rel. Prof.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
Politicization and Role Conflict in the BRA

This chapter has sought to show how and to what extent professional roles and organizational roles, two aspects of role behavior in complex, technically oriented, goal implementing organizations are politicized. It has been argued that they are, in fact, politicized because political role demands permeate the BRA organization. The organization as an entity performs political functions and has been compelled to do so in order to maintain its systemic integrity and implement its substantive objectives in the socio-political environment. In addition, a model of political behavior has been presented and it has been shown that the BRA as an entity substantially conforms to this model in its activities.

Organizational roles have been shown to be relatively more successfully politicized than professional roles, in terms of the model. This follows, since organizational roles are peculiar to the particular bureaucratic structure and its hierarchy and authority patterns. They are peculiar to the BRA, which has been described as a highly politicized entity. And, hence, are less likely to conflict with it. Professional roles, on the other hand, are not peculiar to the organization and exist separately from it. This fact of their separate identity tends to bring them into conflict with bureaucratic and political role demands with great frequency.

Within the category of professional roles, the degree of politicization varies with (1) relative age and hence relative degree of professional self-consciousness inherent in the profession; (2) the amount of experience of the role incumbent, that is, the degree to which he may have become de-professionalized by competing role requirements in the real world;
(3) the profession's perception of political roles and behavior patterns;
(4) the degree to which the profession's general orientation toward the
substantive aspects of the BRA's goal implementation functions, (i.e.,
redevelopment), is in agreement with the dominant one of the organization,
(i.e., Logue's); (5) the role demands of the professional's organization
position. Table 7 ranks the four professions which have been discussed
according to these variables. The results corroborate the conclusions of
the foregoing sections in which lawyers, architects, social workers, and
planners were found to be politicized, in that order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least Politicized</th>
<th>Most Politicized</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>Planner</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contractor</td>
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<td>Architect</td>
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Table 7

On the basis of the material which has been presented, it may be
that there is considerably more overlap between political role demands
and organizational role demands. Thus, role conflict, is more likely
between (1) professional role demands and political role demands;
(2) professional role demands and organizational role demands;
(3) professional role demands and both political and organizational role
demands. As has been suggested a number of times, resolution of such
conflicts depends not only upon the intensity of conflicting role
requirements, but on the individual's style of performance of his various
roles.
CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL STYLES

If the BRA is to continue to function as a policy-producing organizational system, a majority of its personnel at all levels of the organizational hierarchy must find ways to resolve or alleviate the role conflicts and tensions resulting from politicization. The nature of the role conflicts has been described as essentially tripartite, with variations both in the combination of role demands which may be in opposition and in the intensity or perceived intensity of the conflict.

There is a multiplicity of techniques which can be employed to resolve or attempt to resolve conflicts between the demands of professional, bureaucratic, and political roles in the context of the BRA. And the question of which individuals choose which methods for which reasons is as complicated to answer as it is intriguing. However, on the basis of some case examples, tentative generalizations may be made. Moreover, the method of adjustment selected by an individual may have significant implications for the organization, depending upon not only the specific method of resolution selected but also upon (a) his relative success or failure in its utilization and (b) his position and role in the organizational structure.

Techniques of Adjustment

Actually there are as many techniques of adjustment as there are
individuals experiencing the pressures of role conflict in the BRA. However, for purposes of analysis a number of categories of the most commonly used techniques may be defined.

First of all, the various methods may be classified as techniques characterized either by withdrawal from conflict or by intensification of the conflict and then adjustment. There are two major types of withdrawal, physical and psychic. **Physical withdrawal** from the BRA is the most extreme form of adjustment. (Indeed, it might be argued that it is hardly a technique of accommodation, since it involves physical removal from the arena of conflict.) By adopting this method the individual in fact relinquishes the discrepant roles and adopts others outside the BRA framework. This is often employed as a "last resort" by individuals who attempt adjustment by other means and are not successful or by individuals for whom the pressures are too intense for any other type of adjustment. However, it must be noted that physical withdrawal is not a viable alternative for all groups of BRA employees.

A second type of adjustment is **psychic withdrawal**. With this method the individual remains an employee of the BRA, but escapes from the pressures of role conflict in the environment by retreating to outside interests. In other words his energies are removed from the work situation and re-channeled to other areas. There are many forms and many directions which the reallocation of energies may take. Those most frequently observed at the BRA were withdrawal into familial concerns and withdrawal into non-BRA oriented professional activities. This technique has aspects of both denial and overcompensation; denial of the fact that pressures exist and at the same time overcompensation in other
spheres of endeavor.

M, an architect, illustrates one pattern of psychic withdrawal. Highly talented in his field and generally intelligent, he seemed to recognize the necessity for politicized behavior and to regard it as a part of the functions of the redevelopment administrator in order to achieve the organization's goals. However, he also appeared to believe that political behavior should end outside Logue's office and that project teams were merely groups of professions brought together temporarily to solve specific technical problems in a professional manner. Thus, he made no attempt to integrate political or bureaucratic role demands into his perception of his functions at the BRA. He remained aloof from the project team of which he was a member, rarely conversing with its members or participating in project team meetings. His psychic withdrawal took the form of an intense emphasis on professional norms and standards and identification with the cosmopolitan architectural community in Cambridge, in which he was a significant figure. His technical work was competently performed, but he reserved his real creativity and personal energies for outside professional activities.

In the category of techniques marked by initial intensification of the conflict and then by adjustment, the attempts at adjustment may be divided into those that are relatively successful and those that are not. An individual may sincerely try to adapt to the multiple role requirements but be impeded by the basic structure of his personality system, and the significantly greater congeniality of one role. Adjustment may be retarded because he disagrees with or strongly dislikes the nature of one or two of the roles he is called upon to play. But no matter what the source of the impediment to successful adjustment,
lack of success tends to result in ambivalence toward one or more of his roles and ultimately toward the organization itself. Unsuccessful accommodation also often implies a residue or guilt or uneasiness about playing a variety of roles. Less than satisfactory adjustment resulting in ambivalence is a very common phenomenon at the BRA, especially among the middle level professionals. However, the strains of such a situation seem to indicate that an individual cannot persist in this state for an indefinite period and that a more clearly defined, often more extreme technique (i.e. physical or psychic withdrawal) must ultimately be employed.

Some examples of incomplete adjustment to conflicting role demands may help to clarify this pattern; the case of P for instance. P, an economist by training, did not seem to possess a strong professional orientation. He tended to identify with the BRA organization and his organizational role. As a middle level professional, however, he both had authority over research teams and was officially subordinate to two levels of planners on the project team to which he was attached. In addition, he had extensive contact with outside consultants on several BRA projects; this variety of contacts all necessitated a certain degree of politicized behavior on the part of P. Intent on performing all of his functions in the BRA satisfactorily, P did appear to try to reconcile all the role demands. However, his personal, social needs from the organizational setting and his personality system's perceived requirements for structured situations, prevented him from having sufficient role flexibility for the various roles. He tended to release his frustrations in negative expressions directed toward the BRA and its upper echelons,
as well as other groups in the redevelopment system with which he came in contact. His criticisms of the organization tended to be procedural rather than substantive.

Another, young, middle range professional, J, found himself in a position in the BRA in which his professional role and the substantive orientation toward redevelopment that accompanied it were in conflict with both his organizational role and its politicized requirements. He, too, appeared sincerely to desire to adjust to the BRA situation for he was satisfied with the professional opportunities which it offered him. But his deep seated attitudes toward the goals and strategies of the BRA seemed nearly antithetical to those of the BRA leadership. This not only prevented his immediate adaptation to the multiple role situation but also would prevent his rise to the upper echelons of the organization. Thus, J was extremely ambivalent towards the continuance of his job at the BRA. His ambivalence was further expressed in alternative praise for Logue's political skills in balancing competing interests within the BRA (as J himself was unable to do) and sharp denunciation of the organization for what he believed to be a mistaken emphasis on commercial and industrial redevelopment. Both J and P talk frequently about leaving the BRA.

Despite the sometimes discrepant role demands, a large number of BRA employees do manage to adjust satisfactorily to the complex employment situation of the BRA. There seem to be two major attributes of successful adjustment. These are the separation of roles and the structuring of roles by the individual. This implies the ability to (1) sort out the behavior patterns appropriate to each role and (2) rank order them
according to the exigencies of a particular situation. This in turn implies either a flexible personality structure, the presence of less intense role conflict or both. Thus, in most cases, those BRA employees who have resolved or ameliorated the effects of multiple role demands are those in the lower echelons of the organization such as secretaries or research workers, for whom the conflicts are less intense, because their roles are less politicized and they lack a distinct professional orientation; or those at the top of the organizational hierarchy such as project directors, who are more likely to be highly politicized and flexible personalities capable of structuring and separating their various roles. This leaves a large segment of middle level professionals still confronted with the role conflicts which have been described.

Personality characteristics and place in the organizational hierarchy are important in determining the relative success of one’s adjustment within the BRA. But there are also other variables conditioning which individuals are likely to adopt which of the strategies we have defined.

Who Chooses Which Strategy, Why

During the second month of observations there were three resignations from the BRA, all of upper echelon personnel: the chief legal officer, a project director, and the assistant central office relocation head. Shortly before the period of observation began another project director had resigned. All ultimately accepted new jobs in which they were likely to encounter fewer "political" pressures and less complicated role demands. In terms of the present analysis they chose the strategy of physical withdrawal to overcome the role conflicts of the BRA. The only other individuals to adopt this strategy during the period under discussion
were several clerical workers who left to marry or have children and one junior architect who accepted a traveling fellowship.

The upper echelon personnel who resigned all had a variety of characteristics in common. In the first place they were all well above the median age for BRA professionals. They all had had considerable experience in redevelopment, and all but the lawyer ultimately continued to work in redevelopment. One project director, for example, had formerly been affiliated with the federal URA and returned to a position there; the other project director became chief project planner in another smaller city; the central office relocation director joined the redevelopment division of a reality company. All had been involved in intensely politicized situations within the BRA. Both project directors had headed the two projects subjected to most publicity and hostility up till that time, Charlestown and Government Center. Furthermore, all were highly regarded in their particular professions; and, despite the pressure upon them, seem to have performed their functions extremely competently during their tenure at the BRA. Finally, all seemed to have perceived the conflicts inherent in their positions at the BRA.

Even though three of the four were engaged in professions closely tied to redevelopment activities, because of their reputations and experience, they had no difficulty at all in finding other positions outside the BRA which seem to be economically comparable, less psychically demanding, and more personally satisfactory to these individuals.

For most middle level professionals in the BRA, however, physical withdrawal does not appear to be a feasible strategy of adjustment. For a majority of them, the BRA represents their first professional job experience. They have not, in most cases achieved professional reputations
outside the BRA. Furthermore, many of them have growing families and
the BRA wage scales and promotion rates are extremely appealing. In
addition, most all of them are in professions which are intimately
related to redevelopment activities. There are limited alternatives for
young planners, for example, outside of governmental agencies, in many
cities. It seems somewhat easier for architects in the BRA to break
away from redevelopment, however, since not only do they appear to have
greater opportunities for building professional reputations either inside
or outside of a governmental bureaucracy, but their work is not so
exclusively tied to governmental programs as is that of planners.
Lawyers in the BRA, too, since they are not professionally confined to
redevelopment, find it easier to leave. Thus, it is that very group in the
BRA which has been depicted as being least likely to be able to accept and
adjust to the divergent demands of politicized organizational roles which
is the one least likely to be able to leave the BRA with impunity.

As in the case of M, they may withdraw their personal energies
from their BRA work or like J and P try to adjust to their situation.
If like J and P, their attempts are relatively unsuccessful, they are
apt to speak seriously and frequently about leaving, but rarely actually
do so.

G represents another example of the dilemma of the middle range
professional in the BRA. Though trained as a planner he has been acting
as a community relations professional, which precluded achievement of a
professional orientation or reputation. In addition to that, his conception
of his place in the BRA hierarchy is bureaucratic in the traditional
manner. Furthermore, his organizational position on the central office
relocation staff has given him a highly political role to play as well.
Indeed, his situation is one of the most serious in terms of role conflicts which was observed at the BRA. The mode of accommodation which he selected, psychic withdrawal into familial concerns, does not seem to be the optimal strategy for him either. He has said that he wishes to leave the BRA and redevelopment work in general. But his technical work at the BRA has been less than satisfactory because of his inability to adjust to its pressures and his lack of political skills have labeled him as a troublemaker. Thus the prospects of his obtaining a suitable planning job with similar economic benefits outside the BRA are bleak, and he appears to be "frozen" into a most unhappy position.

The examples presented thus far seem to indicate that few middle level professionals at the BRA were able to adjust to the conflicting pressures of their roles and perform their functions adequately. There were, however, some exceptions to this generalization. The exceptions, those who were able successfully to adjust to the BRA multiple role demands, appeared to exhibit the following similar characteristics. First of all, they tended to be either lawyers, or persons not trained in technical redevelopment professions such as planning, architecture, or community relations work. As has been pointed out, persons with a strong planning or community relations professional orientation are likely to have negative attitudes toward political role playing, coupled with a personal inability to carry out such roles.

Secondly, age and experience often acted as a mediating factor in adjustment. R for example, had had a strong community relations orientation in her previous position, but the BRA was her third redevelopment position, and her strong professionalism (though not her professional competence) had diminished considerably. This allowed her to adjust
relatively successfully to the demands of her role in the BRA.

The personality system of the individual concerned is the third major mediating factor which may facilitate adjustment for middle level professionals. A more flexible personality, one less self-oriented, less needful of defined and structured situations and prescribed rules of procedure is more likely to be able to adjust to the BRA. The finding, for example that both one's role and status within the organization were likely to fluctuate with intra-organizational or intra-project team shifts, proved to be extremely disconcerting to many individuals. A person may be chief planner for one project and then find himself transferred to another project team on which he may play a subordinate role to other planners, as happened in the case of S. S found it extremely difficult to adjust to such a change in status and her performance of professional and political roles suffered.

In sum, variations in professional training, personality, and experience were likely to result in very different patterns of adjustment for middle range professionals.

In addition, whether one selected the strategy of psychic withdrawal like M and G or attempted adjustment like P and J is dependent upon the individual's potential for identification with other groups. M had the Cambridge architectural community and G had his family. P and J were both unmarried; and P had no professional community with which to relate, while J was a newcomer to the Boston area. As a result both P and J identified with the BRA organization and were highly motivated to try to adjust to its requirements.

To summarize, the upper echelon BRA employees, whose roles are most politicized and who are most likely to experience the serious role
conflicts, have been shown to be either inherently sufficiently "politicized" themselves to play their various roles, or to be able select the option of physical withdrawal from the BRA as a method of resolution. Middle level professionals are also in highly politicized roles in the BRA. But, leaving the BRA is frequently not a feasible alternative for them; and they tend either to withdrawal psychically or if other strong non-BRA identifications are lacking, to attempt accommodation. Variations in professional training, personality structure, and working experience result in different patterns of adjustment for these groups. Finally, the lower level, non-professional personnel at the BRA present little problem for their roles tend to involve few competing pressures, since politicization and professional orientation are rarely factors which place demands upon them.

Implications of Adjustment Strategies for the BRA

The relative success or failure of adjustment and the specific strategy chosen by different BRA employees has a differential impact upon the organization and its functions.

The resignation of an upper echelon official, such as a project director or a central office staff director most certainly has a significant impact not only upon members of the staff immediately concerned, those in capacities below the departing officials, but also upon other upper echelon personnel, who are consciously or not compelled to re-evaluate their positions within the BRA and the alternative positions open to them. Departure of upper echelon officials causes extreme disruption in the operations of the project teams. This is particularly true if that team has been director oriented and its operating style
built around the personality of the director. The project team must accustom itself to a different style in most instances. The departure is especially disturbing if the project is in the middle stages of its progress. In other words, when a project is still in the initial stages of preliminary planning and the project team is not yet a cohesive group with its own norms and styles of behavior, the departure of its leader may not be so significant. If however, as happened in the case of the Charlestown project, in the Spring of 1963, the project director leaves abruptly while the team is as yet not completely recovered from a disastrous set back, such as the Charlestown public hearing in January of that year, and the temporary replacement for the project director lacks the requisite personal skills to weld the project team together again, unless a strong project director is found, it is unlikely that the project team will be viable enough to get its project into the execution stage.

Physical withdrawal of an upper echelon official also places additional pressures upon the already overburdened redevelopment administrator. He must choose from among the staff an interim or temporary project director and then begin the search for another to fill the position. Thus, physical withdrawal of upper echelon officials is likely to have the most seriously dysfunctional effects for the widest number in the BRA and for the longest duration of time.

The effects of the technique of psychic withdrawal as a method for ameliorating the pressures of role conflict within the organization vary according to the person employing it and their position within the organization. As has been noted, this is not a technique that can be employed by project directors or central office heads as it would seriously
impair their ability to act at all. It is taken as a given fact that if one has been entrusted by Logue with a position of this nature that the degree of commitment to the job and the task are sufficient to rule out psychic withdrawal as a feasible alternative. Thus, those most likely to withdraw from the job situation and its role conflicts into professional, social, or familial concerns are those in highly politicized roles below the rank of project director (i.e. middle level professionals). The most noticeable effects are in terms of the individual's ability to perform the functions of his job. Here the most significant variable is the direction in which the individual has decided to redirect his energies. For example in the case of M, his psychic withdrawal was into professional activities outside the BRA. However, to maintain his professional reputation he felt consistently compelled to produce designs of the highest quality and imagination within the framework of his BRA occupation as well. Hence, his withdrawal from the BRA roles and its conflicting pressures into professional concerns actually proved to be beneficial to the organization's activities.

Since, too, architects of high status within the organization but without administrative responsibilities tend to be those in the organization who can work most autonomously and in almost complete isolation, M's psychic withdrawal affected few save some of the members of his project team. A number of them felt that the team's morale suffered by M's apparent lack of interest and enthusiasm for the team's entire task, particularly in view of the fact that M was among the most productive and respected members of the team. A number of the more sensitive persons of the team actually felt M was being snobbish; and they felt insulted by his behavior, or complete lack of behavior, with
reference to the group. Thus, X's psychic withdrawal was ultimately beneficial to the overall BRA objectives in terms of design but moderately dysfunctional for some of his associates on the project team.

On the other hand directed the psychic energies freed by his withdrawal from the identification and demands of his job, inward toward his family rather than toward professional activities. He remained involved enough with the organization to criticize it and its director. But this seemed to represent resentment that he had not been able to be successful at resolving the conflicting demands of his job. Thus, he tended to speak derogatorily of those who had been. In any event G's withdrawal to familial concerns adversely affected his work. He rarely accomplished anything concrete for the organization; and, indeed, spent a great deal of his time undertaking fruitless inspection tours of field offices. Furthermore, since he had rendered himself ineffectual in terms of the organization and its goals, this fact affected those who were officially his subordinates. Their morale and enthusiasm for the organization seemed to be somewhat lessened by frequent contact with G. Those among his subordinates however, who had a wider range of contacts within the organization were able to counteract J's negative influence. This of course only tended to diminish G's authority over those to whom he was supposed to be a superior, and further reinforced his feelings of impotence, insecurity, and hostility to the organization. Ultimately, J's interference in the activities of the central office relocation staff became so acute that the section was disbanded, following its leader's resignation; and J was transferred to a project team with a strong personality as project director.
As has been noted, attempted but unsuccessful adjustment among the role demands in the BRA situation tends to lead to ambivalence. These uncertainties regarding one's attitude toward the organization and the performance of the various roles created a rather fluid situation in some sections of the BRA. The major variables in determining the impact such a mode of accommodation would have upon the organization and the performance of functions connected with implementation of its goals are (1) the position of the individual in the organizational hierarchy, (2) his perception of the severity or discontinuity of the role demands, and (3) the amount of pressure generated by the exigencies of the situation for a quick and relatively permanent resolution of the conflict. This last can be seen to be highly correlated with position in the administrative hierarchy. Continuation in the position requires that one fulfill certain tasks; when role conflict is perceived by a project director or his deputy, his ability to carry out the functions will be impaired. Thus, there can be said to be considerable pressure on the individual for an immediate and relatively stable accommodation, if he wishes to remain in his organizational role.

Ambivalence in attitude and behavior with regard to the organization is quite common among middle level personnel in the BRA. Indeed, when there are a number of individuals on the same project team or in the same functional section of the BRA who share this orientation, as the result of incomplete adjustment to the organization's multiple role demands, they are likely to reinforce each other and compound its effects. During periods in which they are dissatisfied with the organization (when their own personal role conflicts are most evident and oppressive), they are likely to be relatively unproductive in terms of their day to day tasks.
Conversely, at times at which they are required to act in such a way that role conflict is less oppressive or less perceptible, both their attitudes toward the organization and their contribution to its activities is more positive. Peers and co-workers may reinforce each other's positive attitudes, too. Indeed, one can observe periods of several days or weeks in which middle level personnel of a project team or of several project teams may be especially active and productive and other periods in which large numbers of middle range professionals are practically incapacitated and little is accomplished. It is during these latter periods that most threats to leave the organization are heard. But, as has been pointed out, they are not likely to be acted upon.

Fortunately for the continued existence of the BRA, the majority of the members of the organization have made successful adjustments, either because they are in positions which are not highly politicized or because they tend to be personalities who better understand the implications of their various roles. Thus, it is both ends of the organizational hierarchical structure, the lower level personnel, on the one hand and the redevelopment administrator and his chief lieutenants on the other, who manage to keep the organization functioning and to maintain a sufficient level of integration within the organization for its perpetuation.

Postscript: Policy Proposals for the BRA

Presumably the BRA leadership wishes the redevelopment policy-producing system and the BRA bureaucracy to function as efficiently and as effectively as possible. What kinds of modifications in policy
could the BRA undertake in order to accomplish this?

With reference to the BRA organization itself, the major problem has been defined as the inability of middle level professionals to resolve the conflicting demands of multiple roles forced upon them by the BRA's politicization. A second area of difficulty involves the extreme centralization of decision making and organizational integration in the person of the redevelopment administrator. This latter may necessitate some structural changes as a possible remedy, and the first, a revision of personnel recruitment policies.

Structural changes could be accomplished with facility, because of the centralization of authority in the BRA organization. Basically, however, the organizational structure is soundly conceived. The project team arrangement, with this as the principal unit of the organization, appears to be a method or organization well adapted to the exigencies of the Boston environment. By building a series of cohesive and autonomous sub-organizations within the BRA, Logue and his lieutenants have managed to institutionalize their "action" orientation. Of course, as has been noted in the previous discussion, there is considerable variation in the operating style and effectiveness of the project teams. This reflects the variations in personality of the role incumbents rather than the organizational structure.

As for central office staffs, the idea of functionally, or horizontally designed units to coordinate the work of project team planners, architects, and relocation workers is also basically sound, but requires somewhat more care and delicacy in choice of personnel in order to achieve its objectives without increasing the level of tension in the organization. The dissolution of the central office relocation section, following undue
harassment of project team field workers by one of its officials, is an example of the results of misplaced and misused talents in the organization and of the problems involved in the tasks of functional coordination of professionals.

Actually, the central office staffs have a good deal more power potential than do their functional opposites on various project teams. The operations of the central office staffs for the particular functional areas can, if not deftly handled, and if, in the case of professionals, not entrusted to a member of the profession who is respected outside the ERA organization for his professional competence, disrupt the smooth functioning of several project teams. Conflicts between personnel on one project team tend to affect only the operations of that team. Whereas it is likely that friction and discrepancies in orientation between central office staff personnel and their functional counterparts on project teams will probably not remain limited only to one project team. One point which deserves greater emphasis: this refers to the extra-organizational professional reputation of the central office division heads and their deputies. Thus, far in the ERA the most satisfactory central office staff, and in terms of the objectives of maintaining a high quality of design while also blending the new designs harmoniously with the existing Boston architecture, has been the central office design coordinator. He is both liked and respected by the project staff architects. This is sufficient for accomplishment of his tasks, and sufficient to compensate for deficiencies in his ability to politicize his role. His role is somewhat more restricted than originally intended, for the redevelopment administrator performs some of its functions.
Similarly, the central office planning coordinator is also widely respected in the planning field on a national level. He, however, does appear to be more of a political actor than the design coordinator. In fact, he proved to be the most highly politicized planner observed in the BRA. The significant factor in the situations of both design and planning coordinators, which contributes considerably to their ability to perform their tasks, is their extra-BRA reputation. This serves to compensate for any lack of political finesse in their "handling" of project team architects and planners.

With respect to the redevelopment administrator's office, one of the major deficiencies noted at the beginning of the observation period was in the process of being remedied as the observations were nearing their termination. That involved the establishment of a central personnel office. Prior to that time Logue personally oversaw all upper echelon and professional employment and the project directors had control of employment of lower echelon personnel to augment their teams' staff. The institution of a central personnel office does not alter or diminish Logue's absolute discretion to hire and fire and transfer professional personnel. It does, however, provide a clearing house for job applications for lower level staff. Thus, it relieves project directors of preliminary screening tasks which can become time consuming. More important than this, though, it is intended to serve as a safety valve for the organization, a point at which middle and lower level personnel can air their grievances. The provision of such an office is significant for reducing the level of tension in the organization. This is especially true since in the BRA some project directors or central office heads are primarily concerned with the external relationships
of their divisions and appear unsympathetic, insensitive, or merely apathetic to the problems of their personnel; and direct recourse to the redevelopment administrator is usually not feasible. In addition, the selection of the personnel director seems to be a particularly felicitous one.

A concrete suggestion for change in the structure of the BRA organization involves the office of the redevelopment administrator. Clearly the scope of the office as it has evolved in Boston is too great, and has too many conflicting demands for one individual to perform all of its functions unassisted for a long period of time. The objective of centralized and thus thoroughly coordinated (through one person) decision making is certainly a worthy one. Furthermore, Logue's own personal style of administration mitigates against delegation of any but technical and information gathering tasks. Nevertheless, there is a fantastic amount of trivia which consumes his time and attention. He works an average of nine hours a day in the office, without a break for lunch, save for a sandwich and coffee at his desk, and an incalculable amount of time at home in the evenings and on weekends. Provision was made in the act establishing the BRA for several deputies for the redevelopment administrator.

During the period of observation there was one officially designated assistant administrator, who was charged with oversight of the development sections. However, there did not appear to be a sense of rapport or even much communication between Logue and his official chief assistant. Rather, two or three individuals who occupied other offices in the BRA were Logue's closest associates. These tend to be individuals whom Logue has known and worked with for a considerable amount of time. Two
of them were his assistants in New Haven. Logue's present official
deputy seems to share neither Logue's operating style nor his orientation
toward redevelopment politics. On the other hand, the person closest
to Logue along these dimensions is serving as project director of an
extremely sensitive and crucial project. Thus, while his and Logue's
natural affinity might make it appear that his transfer into an official
position closer to the redevelopment administrator would be desirable,
his innate political abilities make his continuance as project director
equally desirable. If a suitable substitute for him in the role of
project director could be found (though individuals with the optimum
mixture of qualities and talents for such positions are extremely rare),
X could be most effective as Logue's second in command, since they work
so effectively together and their operating styles are similar. In
any event, there is an increasing need to relieve the redevelopment
administrator of some of the burdens of his office. While there is
evidence that the external political demands of his office might become
less pressing as Boston's redevelopment coalitions become semi-institu-
tionalized, in the meantime delegation of some sensitive tasks to a
trusted subordinate would seem imperative.

Other changes within the BRA which could improve its operations,
as a goal oriented organization, are more strictly physical. The office
space which the BRA occupies was intended to accommodate only half the
number presently crammed into it. Though the offices have been completely
refurbished since Logue's administration began, desk space and even
chairs are a premium and some of the physical working conditions are
clearly impossible for optimum production. The lack of adequate storage
space and a central filing system also complicates matters by resulting
often times in needless duplication of research. The possibility of securing additional space is good. For as soon as the Government Center Buildings are ready for occupancy, a number of other city hall offices are to move to the "new" buildings thus freeing more space in the building which houses the BRA. However, caution should be taken against further dispersion of project teams. In view of their autonomous nature any greater degree of physical dispersion would tend to exacerbate the relative lack of communication and the difficulty of coordination between them.

Securing and keeping a highly skilled professional staff for the BRA emerges as the organization's gravest problem. Its magnitude is compounded by the fact that in order to adjust to the BRA work-situation, individuals should possess not only technical expertise but political skills and flexible personality systems as well. Persons with such combinations of talents are extremely rare. Furthermore, many who possess them chafe at the thought of employment in a municipal bureaucracy.

The dominant aspect of employment policy in the BRA at present is the emphasis upon technical expertise. The belief seems to be generally held among upper echelon personnel in the organization that technical experts in the redevelopment professions (i.e. planning, architecture, social work) can absorb whatever elements of a non-technical approach their roles require while on the job. Our observations on the other hand tend to lead to the conclusion that this occurs infrequently. In other words, rather than widen the perspectives of young professionals, the multiple role demands of the BRA environment often result in their taking refuge in their specialized professional norms and decision criteria. On the other hand, it has been observed that both upper
echelon and middle range professionals trained in law or political science or public administration fields, other than those directly related to redevelopment, have tended to be somewhat better able to adjust to the demands of their roles.

During the initial "action oriented" period of the BRA's existence a hiring policy which stressed technical expertise clearly seems dictated. However, in view of the politicized nature of this municipal bureaucracy, it would seem that this hiring policy should be augmented in the future by the employment of more "talented generalists." The ideal professional employee for the BRA, given the complexities of its relationship to its environment, would have a combination of skills including a humanistic, liberal education and some understanding of the specialized skills necessary for redevelopment implementation. Such individuals are in short supply. Thus, it would appear that the BRA organization, instead of searching in vain for experienced redevelopment professionals with a generalist's orientation as well, might try recruiting educable young non-professionals. In other words, a "mix" of hiring strategies at this stage of the organization's development might tend to alleviate some of the stresses and strains which exist in the organization as a result of unresolved professional, bureaucratic and politicized role conflicts on the part of many middle range professionals.

The entire problem of staffing in a city's redevelopment bureaucracy of course is exacerbated by the overall problem of recruiting for posts.

1 Arguments against this position based on the British experience may be found in Robert Presthus, "Decline of the Generalist Myth," in Public Administration Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (December, 1964), pp. 211-17.
in municipal government. On the whole the pay scales are certainly not competitive with business, industry, academia, or even another level of government. In addition municipal administration has not yet rid itself of many years of a bad image, resulting from the machine age and the city spoils systems.

The BRA has managed to a certain degree to overcome these inherent handicaps. With federal funds as the basis, the BRA pay scale is more than competitive with other employment opportunities especially for first-job architects, planners, and social workers. The upper echelon personnel are also well paid. Logue recognizes that this is the only way to obtain and maintain a first rate organization.

The second problem, that of interesting talented and intelligent young people to work for city government, is not so easily solved. The BRA is exceptional in circumventing the problem. Logue made certain preconditions to his undertaking of the Boston redevelopment post; among them was that the BRA employees not be under the regular city civil service; and it is essentially fair to say that there is no patronage involved in BRA employment.

Furthermore, the BRA separates itself from the city government as much as is possible. Since it is not totally dependent upon the city budget nor personnel system, this is feasible. Thus, there is literally no identification of the employees with the city administration, but only with the BRA; and there is no loyalty to the mayor, only to Logue or to the project team and task.

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There is one further factor which aids the BRA and puts it in a special position with regard to recruitment, and that is the proximity and close working relationship with two of the leading planning and design graduate schools in the country. The BRA offers part time jobs with the prospect of future full time employment to many graduate students of these institutions, with the results of a "built-in" recruiting pool promising high technical quality.

However, in order to implement the personnel policies outlined above, it seems likely that the BRA will have to recruit from a somewhat larger area, both educationally or geographically. Thus far the BRA has been extremely lucky. Located in the midst of a metropolitan area that is not only an educational center itself, but which also because of the proximity of graduate and professional schools also tends to attract graduates of "Ivy-League" girls' schools as well, it has heretofore had an adequate pool of talent. The BRA policies thus far, hiring technical professionals for middle range managerial jobs, has placed many of these potentially useful generalists in secretarial or menial research jobs, where their talents are less likely to be utilized, their frustrations with the tasks more likely to be high, and their tenure at the BRA short. There have been indications that the rigid policy of hiring only those with planning degrees to perform any task even tangentially related to planning is softening. Toward the end of the period of our observations, some of these generalists were being groomed for supervisory assistant positions.

For the redevelopment policy-producing system to function as smoothly as possible, each project team, as well as the BRA organization as a whole, should, in its external relationships with other elements in
the system, utilize the optimum strategy for achieving its objectives.

What this strategy entails in each individual case depends primarily upon the type of project being undertaken, that is, whether its major re-use is to be commercial or residential. This factor, as we have seen, influences which elements of the redevelopment policy producing system are essential to the ERA-centered coalition supporting the project. The major business and financial interests in the city, for example, are not a crucial element in the Washington Park Project coalition; and the Central Business District Project team does not have to concern itself with wooing a project area elite. It would seem, then, that, if the project team itself is held as a constant, the most reasonable strategy for each project team would be similar to those outlined above, which Logue employs with respect to the entire ERA organization and its external relationships.

However, the project teams, as has been pointed out, are not "constants"; they vary considerably in style and in the ability to perform their organizational and systemic functions. Thus, the most significant set of variables in determining the optimum feasible strategy is the resources of the project team. These resources include skilled personnel both in terms of numbers and allocation of talents according to the needs of the project team. For example, it seems likely that project teams with commercial orientations would not need to have many community relations workers on their staffs. Rather the emphasis in allocation of personnel with regard to commercial projects would place a greater number of economists and planners on these teams. Another point concerning best use of professional talents is that, when there is a shortage of professionals in a particular
category, it would seem more prudent to fill the position temporarily with a "generalist" than with a professional of another category who tends to superimpose his own professional norms and standards, often those antithetical to what the situation requires, upon the role. Generalists in the BRA environment, having no strong professional identification, appear to be more likely to respond to the exigencies of the particular role in a flexible way. It has been noted that in cases at the BRA in which trained planners have occupied the positions of community relations workers the results have been generally dysfunctional for the organization's objectives.

Another resource of the project team which can influence its choice of strategy and its effectiveness in carrying it out, involves the level of integration and cohesion in the project team. However, a high level of team integration, as in the case of the Charlestown project team, does not necessarily mean that productivity will be correspondingly high. Functional cliques with fairly high cohesiveness, comprising a generally loosely integrated project team, proved to be the most effective mode of team organization observed in the BRA, when dominated and coordinated by an affectively neutral and respected project director.

The number and placement of persons on the project team with overtly unresolved or unsuccessfully resolved role conflicts also affects the team's ability to carry out any strategy which it chooses. If the second level personnel manifest extreme ambivalence toward the organization or the project team and their leadership or toward both, it seems likely that the team or functional sub-group will not tend to perform satisfactorily.
The political and organizational skill of the project director and his ability as leader of his project team also are factors which delimits the choice and effectiveness of the project team's optimum feasible strategy. Thus, teams with relatively weak project directors ought not to attempt to implement strategies and tactics which require a high degree of centralized leadership. Conversely, if project teams headed by a strong and politically skilled personality opt for strategies which permit sub-group autonomy of action there is likely to be conflict between the project director and the sub-group's evolved leadership.

These, then, are the most significant variables determining the selection and relative success of strategies for project teams. There are also variables peculiar to the particular project area with which the team is dealing, especially residential project areas. The repertory of strategies and possible combinations of strategies is extensive, even given the environmental constraints in Boston. Therefore, a fairly objective appraisal of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each project team might precede any strategic decisions. A detailed prescription of the optimum feasible strategy for each team is difficult, since major variations in the most significant factors occur frequently.

In sum, while the BRA organization as a whole, under Logue's skilled political leadership, has both chosen rational strategies, given its goals and the nature of its environment, and been thus far, relatively successful in employing them, many of the constituent parts of the organization, that is the project teams, have not been able to do so. Thus, the amazing aspect of the BRA is that despite its internal tension level, which is high due to role politicization, despite
the inefficient allocation of resources both within and among project teams, the organization has been able to cope with its environment, overcome formidable obstacles, and accomplish many of its objectives.
CHAPTER VIII

REDEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

While the previous chapters have been concerned with the impact of the Boston environment upon the organization and political behavior of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, this chapter will consider the reciprocal of that relationship and discuss the proposition that the BRA has served as a catalytic agent for the process of social change in the Boston political system.

It has already been noted that Boston is essentially a low capacity system in terms of conflict resolution and the ability to adopt and implement rational, planning-oriented programs. The argument has also been made that the BRA has become a major coordinating, integrating and resource allocating mechanism in the Boston system. According to the theoretical formulation of the systems model, an efficiently functioning social and political system in Boston should have been able to assimilate a new element, the BRA. However, given the relatively inefficient system, which has been described, and the more highly integrated, more effective BRA organizational system, with its superiority of resources, skill in their utilization, and markedly different political orientation, normal system-sub-system relationships
have been set awry. Conflict between the dominant orientation of the larger system and that of the sub-system over development policies were seen to be resolved in favor of the latter, in the vast majority of cases, despite some diminution in the efficiency of the organization, attributable largely to the pressures generated from multiple role requirements imposed upon BRA professionals by the political environment.

Thus the BRA has adjusted its policies and its internal organization to the exigencies of the environment. It does not appear to have had its activities critically or permanently disrupted by external pressures. It does seem to have been able to make a beginning in the achievement of its primary objective, implementation of a comprehensive redevelopment program for the city. In the process, however, it has tended to affect the Boston political system in important, if not immediately apparent, ways. While the implications of the BRA's activities for its environment may be less dramatic and more subtle than those of the larger system for the BRA, it may be argued that ultimately the effects which the BRA has upon Boston will prove to be more significant and more enduring. For the BRA may be said to have both accelerated the rate and directed the nature of social change in the Boston political system.

Social Change in Boston

All social action is not social change; although social change does involve social action. The consensus among social theorists seems to be that social change occurs when there is
a definite shift in the patterning of elements within a social or political system. New relationships seem to emerge and new standards and goals are shared and endure long enough to be recognizable as a new structure. The hierarchical ranking of elements in the system is altered; those which may have performed peripheral functions, played peripheral roles, or which may not have existed previously, are interjected into positions of influence and power. Elements of low "political yield" are translated into elements of higher political yield.

Stimuli for social change may be indigenous to the system, in the form of unanticipated consequences of purposive social action or creative or deviant behavior of individuals or groups. There may also be external stimuli for change, such as changes in the physical environment, uncontrollable natural forces, changes in technology, and the external relationships of the system.

In fact, of course, most social changes stem from a combination of causes.

In the past twenty years, models of social change have been developed based on the experience of societies, such as those in many parts of Asia and Africa and Latin America, which are undergoing rapid economic and political development. However, the application of these models to mature, stable systems such as Boston appears to be both feasible and desirable. Taking, for example, the familiar three-fold typology of traditional, transitional, and modern societies and using it apart from its economic and technological

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bases and only with reference to its implications for political styles, it would seem that Boston could be characterized as in the transitional phase, politically. In fact, the term transitional has been employed throughout the analysis to refer to Collins and the recently elected minority on the City Council. They are Boston's transitional political figures. The analogy might also be expanded, to view Boston's ethnically oriented political and social structure and the low level of integration in the system as an industrial society's variant on tribalism.

The process of social change also tends to precipitate a situation of conflict within the system as conservative forces and entrenched institutions join with those elements of the system with a political culture marked by psychic immobility, in order to resist change.

In this respect the application of these models to Boston and the BRA is quite clear. The City Council majority, other city bureaucracies, and most especially the older, ethnically oriented neighborhoods, feel most threatened by the nature of the changes occurring in the Boston system and, hence, to form

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2 Direct application of a model of a transitional society to Boston is found in Appendix A.

the nucleus of resistance to the BRA. The first two groups
tend to resent the accumulation of power resources by the Mayor
and the BRA. The neighborhoods fear that their personal and
economic security will be undermined through the disruption of
their sub-system by the actions of the BRA.

But, this is running ahead of our argument; what evidence is
there that a process of accelerated social change is underway in
Boston? Can we demonstrate that a realignment of the power
positions of elements in the system is in fact taking place?
Further, can a case be made that much of this is attributable
to the existence, orientation, and policies of the BRA?

The following are five major phenomena which have occurred
in Boston recently which may be taken as indices of social change.

(1) The election in 1959 of a relative political unknown,
without traditional political ties; and his subsequent re-election
in 1963, this time openly as a "reform" mayor, and an ally of
economic interests.

(2) Active participation of Yankee business and financial
interests in both the mayoralty and city council election campaigns
in 1963; and the election of four members of the city council
acceptable to and supported by these groups.

(3) A wide scale reawakening of interest by business and
financial groups in municipal government and its activities coupled
with a dramatic increase in capital investment by these groups in
the city of Boston.

(4) A municipal administration with a distinct policy
orientation, characterized by the institution of programs, like
redevelopment and expanded social services which entail long range planning and commitments.

(5) The introduction of a large number of cosmopolitan, technically skilled persons into policy-making positions in the municipal bureaucracy.

Thus, there can be seen to be alterations in the content and objectives of public policy as well as in the composition of the policy making elite. In addition this is coupled with economic expansion within the system. Changes in these critical areas also appear to be the key elements in models of social change.

Redevelopment (and the BRA) as Catalytic Agent

With the exception of the initial election of the Mayor in 1959, all of these indices of social change may be considered related to and further stimulated by the BRA. And, all of these indicators of social change are also intimately related to each other.

Two seemingly contradictory trends, dissatisfaction with the traditional style of political actors and a desire for maintenance of the status quo coalesced to bring Collins victory in his first attempt for major office. The sequence of events surrounding the establishment of the BRA which closely followed Collins’ election has already been related. Thus, by originally bringing Logue to Boston, Collins might be seen as a primary

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force in fostering changes in the system. Yet, the nature of
the programs which Logue was to attempt to implement, plus his
personal reputation for technical competence and political skill
are, it may be argued, the principal forces to which the rate and
direction of these changes may be attributed.

After nearly half a century of ostensible withdrawal from
Boston's political affairs, the "Old" Boston, predominantly
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant economic elite has been re-introduced
as an active participant in the city's decision making process.
They have been joined by newer upper middle class elements who
also have an interest in Boston's economic and social conditions.
While these groups certainly do not have the same degree of
influence which they exerted in municipal affairs during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they have re-emerged as
forces with which to be reckoned by policy makers. It may be
suggested that while the city government acted merely as a care-
taker, providing minimal urban services and serving as dispenser
of jobs and favors, the economic interests were content to let the
Irish and later the Irish and Italians have a monopoly on official
political power, since its activities would not affect them.

However, the introduction of the BRA, a policy oriented
municipal bureaucracy, headed by a person whose attitudes toward
social and political behavior they shared, charged with implementa-
tion of a federally sponsored program, and possessing a high level
of professional skill, inspired their confidence and respect and
secured their interest and enthusiastic support. Furthermore,
if policies with economic and social ramifications for the city
were to be made and actually carried out, they definitely wished to have a part in the policy producing process.

Finding that redevelopment programs worked to their benefit and that the BRA's leadership was congenial and sympathetic to their interests, they wished to see its policies continued and expanded. Hence, part of the reason for their concern that Collins be re-elected and that there be an increased number of City Councilmen favorable to his and Logue's policies.

This re-emergence of the former economic elite has not been confined only to the realm of political action. The business and financial groups have instituted planning and development programs of their own both independently and in conjunction with the BRA's projects. The extensive assistance given the BRA staff by the redevelopment division of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and the creation and planning activities of the Committee for the Central Business District attest to the genuine commitment of these groups to redevelopment and development programs.

As has been pointed out, redevelopment requires long-range planning of a comprehensive nature as well as rational allocation of resources and a certain level of technical skill. The inception of such programs in Boston, under the aegis of the BRA, has been cited as an important aspect of social change.

The BRA can be seen as directly responsible for bringing a new type of municipal employee to the Boston political system. With federally subsidized budget, the BRA is able to attract top level planning and architectural talent with a cosmopolitan orientation toward the city's problems.
Although there is not yet empirical evidence to corroborate these suppositions, it may be assumed that there will be other social and political repercussions of redevelopment which will ultimately have effects for the Boston system.

The physical alterations redevelopment will make, particularly in the non-residential areas of the city, and the necessity of bringing larger numbers of people into direct contact with governmental programs may have long range social implications. Redevelopment in the former Scollay Square area, now Government Center, has increased real estate value in that area markedly and reinforced business, financial, and real estate support for redevelopment efforts. While the projected return to the central city from the outlying suburbs has thus far failed to materialize, 221 D(3) middle income projects may serve to keep many middle class families in the city and widen the range of housing alternatives.

There are many other possible social implications stemming from Boston's redevelopment program which have yet to be explored. Perhaps, redevelopment may affect the level of integration in the system as a whole; it may be that relocation of families from one part of the city into another will gradually lessen neighborhood homogeneity and ethnocentrism; it may be that with redevelopment will come a sense of pride in the city's accomplishments and a sense of identity with the city as a whole rather than with a sub-unit. It may be that the presence of a geographical focal point such as the plaza at Government Center will appear to lessen the physical diffusion of the city. And there are many other potential social ramifications. Concrete results from redevelopment
might gradually alter the attitudes of many Bostonians regarding the BRA and coordinated, government directed social action.

Arguing that the BRA and Boston's urban development program have served as the primary stimulus and catalyst to fundamental social change in the system, is not meant to imply that portents of change were not already apparent prior to the organization's establishment. However, the redevelopment program and the personalities and political styles of those implementing it have served to accelerate what changes were already in progress, sparked others, and most important, influenced the direction of new policies and the composition of the new policy-making group.

Social Change in Stable, Mature Systems

Since many extant models of political and social change tend to have evolved from the experiences of areas undergoing most rapid political and economic dislocations, their structure and dynamics tend to reflect their origins. In addition, they tend to have been formulated in the context of national level political systems and, thus, presuppose (1) considerable socio-cultural diversity and (2) a variety of institutionalized and bureaucratized elements which are potential power centers.

The urban political system with which we are concerned differs from these types of systems along two dimensions. In the first place, it may be characterized as a mature, stable political system (although the style of its politics has been denoted as transitional). Stability may be defined as lack of an inherent propensity to alter the political power pattern or to
undertake major policy revisions or experiment with the ends and means of social action. Maturity refers to the existence of an economic and technological base commensurate with modern, industrialized society, plus social and political institutions which have evolved beyond the stage at which goal implementation is their primary concern. Furthermore, a stable, mature system implies a low level of tension; there are no basic conflicts which are interjected into the political sphere, either because they tend to be resolved in other areas or at other levels of social action or because a modus vivendi has been reached between major elements in the system. These characteristics of stable, mature systems by no means preclude social change but seem to dictate that the methods by which change is stimulated and directed and the rate at which it occurs might well be somewhat different from those which pertain in "younger," more mobile systems.

A second difference between the urban political system under discussion and the political systems from which social change models tend to have evolved is that the city is a sub-national system. This prevents it from possessing a number of elements which have figured significantly in models of social change, such as the military. Also, in Boston, the element of organized political parties is lacking. There is, however, class and ethnic diversity. There is also some range of policy choices open to the city, but as a local unit in a federal system there are many areas of decision making affecting its economic and political components in which it has essentially no voice. As for multiple potential power centers, in stable, mature systems their number and strength
vary with the complexity of the social structure, the perceived rewards from social action, and the available power resources.

The manner in which a realignment of elements in the Boston political system was precipitated, accelerated, and directed may provide a basis for generalizations regarding social change in mature, stable systems. The dynamics of the system itself are in some sense responsible for the initial action, the election of Collins and the introduction of redevelopment. Since existing organizational structures were inadequate and unacceptable a new one was established. Theoretically, the new organizational element could have been assimilated by the system into its operations with little tension or conflict. Indeed, the amount of tension which occurs in the process of assimilation of new elements may be seen as a direct function of the degree to which the orientation of the new sub-system is at variance with that of the larger system.

The context in which the new sub-system was to function had had few demands placed upon it; and these had tended to be poorly and ineffectively articulated. They also were largely unmet; for the system had become habituated to low performance. Thus, when the demands for redevelopment program implementation were placed upon it, it was unable to perform them without the introduction of outside forces.

The new redevelopment bureaucracy not only fulfilled its own functions but also filled in the gaps in the performance of the larger system. This gave it a basis for policy formulation which was unrivaled in the context of this system.
Indeed, it may be hypothesized that a new element which not only introduces a new program but also assumes functions and fills structural gaps in the basic functions of the political system is more likely to promote social change of a far reaching order.

As has been mentioned changes in structure alone are not sufficient to stimulate and direct social change in a mature stable system. Indeed, the recruitment function of the system becomes the principal variable here, as for any behavioral theory of political action. For the fundamental distinction is not the organizational structure but rather the orientation of those who operate it and their styles of performance of basic functions. These vary and differ with the professional socialization and political culture of those recruited as role incumbents for the organizations.

One should not overestimate either the rate or intensity of the effects of the changes introduced through the redevelopment program in Boston. It must be remembered that all elements in the system are not interacting at all times and with the same degree of intensity. Retail trade in Boston or education, for example, may not feel the effects of an altered economic climate or new residence patterns which redevelopment is helping to bring about, for a long time.

The system upon which the BRA was superimposed was loosely integrated. Level of integration in the system has been used as an index of the possibility of the system's effectively carrying out community-wide action programs. But if a substitute for integration can be achieved through the accumulation of power resources
by a municipal bureaucracy the possibilities are considerably enhanced, that the action program will succeed.

There is still another aspect of this process of introducing social change in a stable mature society. If, as would be likely from the definitions given of stable, mature social systems, the system is "overdeveloped" in the economic sense yet still retains traditional elements in its social and political spheres, a principal method of overcoming resistance on the part of conservative elements, may be through the effective intermingling of the newer orientation with familiar patterns of action. This is the area in which the BRA has not been spectacularly successful. While it has been able to form coalitions with those sharing its orientation or those who stand to benefit from the successful implementation of redevelopment projects; the rate of redevelopments progress in Boston has been less rapid than was anticipated, partially because of the initial inability of the BRA professionals to utilize elements of the traditional orientation. There are signs that this is changing as the BRA professionals tend to become more sensitive to the exigencies of the political situation in which they are acting.

That social change of some sort is an inevitable product of the results of conflict situations and tensions between systems and sub-systems, has never been established. Stalemate or retrogression are also possible outcomes. Specification of the exact situations in which social change of a functional nature is the outcome from intra-systemic conflict between system and sub-system is beyond the scope of the present study.
Nevertheless, we can tentatively hypothesize on the basis of our Boston data that social change can occur in a stable, mature system as the result of the tensions generated by the introduction of a new element which the system cannot assimilate, if the element has sources of strength from outside the system, in short, if the system cannot destroy it. And the unit with superior resources will dictate the direction of the realignment of elements in the system.

The Emergent Power Pattern

Boston's political power pattern prior to the advent of the BRA has been described as fragmented and leaderless. With the introduction of a policy oriented municipal bureaucracy, whose leadership shared the social and political ethos of the business and financial interests in the city, a new convergence of power centers\(^5\) appears to have become the core of a definable power structure.

There are three elements in the core of the emergent power structure in Boston. First of all there is the BRA, a new style municipal bureaucracy, possessing federal funds, technical skill as well as political skill in the utilization of the organization's resources. Secondly, there is the mayor, who has been seen to behave similarly to the Banfield model of an urban mayor, eschewing direct alignment with parties to a conflict but

legitimizing decisions after the competing interests have arrived at a compromise. Yet, Collins' election has acted as a trigger for social change, and does have a specific policy orientation. The third element in the coalition is the business and financial elite.

Patterns of interaction between these three sets of political actors are becoming institutionalized, and the range of matters on which they are making decisions is increasing. The power core interacts with other groups and interests in the community, which may influence their decisions and provide decision criteria. Although the other groups who participate in the decision process on specific issues may vary from topic to topic, there appears to be a constant in the form of the three-element core, which has been described.

The power pattern which seems to be emerging in Boston may be viewed as a form of synthesis of two more common models of community power. One is the "power elite" model, popularized by C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter. This model posits a pyramidal structure for community power with a semi-permanent group at the top which must participate in making or at least, ratify or accede to all major public decisions. From the political scientists' critiques of this model has emerged the "pluralistic or multiple elite model of


Dahl, Polsby, and others. There are many variants upon this but essentially all agree on a mobile power pattern.

The model which has been introduced as representing the new power pattern in Boston incorporates some elements of both approaches. Similar in many ways to Dahl's executive centered coalition, in Boston it seems to be more correctly a municipal bureaucracy centered coalition, for the BRA serves as the principal policy initiator and the chief mechanism of power concentration.

The power elite model is somewhat static, positing as it does a fairly stable, constant force in the urban decision process over a long period of time and over a wide range of issues. The pluralistic or multiple power center model is much more flexible; it implies a continuous shifting of the elements of decision coalitions whose composition is based on the issues involved. The synthesis or variant or modification of the two which is posited as representative of the Boston experience, has both relatively stable and mobile elements. There is a fairly constant coalition (or power elite) active on a wide range of issues composed of the municipal bureaucracy, the BRA, a moderately active mayor, and locally-oriented business interests. In addition, operating on the periphery, and in a variety of patterns in conjunction with this core, depending upon the specific issue, are a variety of other groups.

Figure 17
Three Models of Urban Power Structure

A. Power Elite Model

B. Multiple Elite Model

C. Composite Model

In models B and C, the pattern of linkages between groups varies with issue.
Prognostication

The prospects for achievement of the goals of the redevelopment program in Boston are becoming increasingly brighter. As the power core which is beginning to emerge assumes a semi-permanent character and is no longer merely an ad hoc coalition for a specific project, and as contacts between the elements of the "power core" improve mutual understanding and confidence, this coalition will increase the scope of its power and be able to dictate the outcomes of community conflict with greater facility.

The formation of rival coalitions with sufficient resources to challenge the newly emergent power core, is possible but not probable in the near future. For the power core has within itself the major sources of leadership as well as a virtual monopoly of the technical skills and economic resources required for policy implementation. In addition, other potential sources of leadership have been co-opted by the power core. The residual groups tend to be both fragmented and inarticulate. From time to time spokesmen for these groups do arise, but they usually tend to be either demagogic in style, which precludes them from concerted social action, or, as in the case of intellectual spokesmen for the plight of those displaced by redevelopment, completely removed from those for whom they purport to speak. Thus, if there are no serious conflicts among the members of the power core, its position will probably not be significantly threatened.

With regard to development programs themselves, it seems likely that as tangible results appear there should be progressively less tension between the BRA and other groups in the system, as the image
of the city's previous experience with redevelopment is gradually removed. As the federal-legal framework and tools with which the BRA has available to implement its objectives become more diversified and more sensitive to political, economic and social problems which must be resolved in the redevelopment process, and as there is a corresponding increase in the imaginative use and adaptation of these tools to suit local needs, the abuses for which critics of the program have so often indicted it may become less prevalent. It may be argued that every successive revision of the redevelopment program bills has sought to include measures to attempt to ameliorate the social disruptions which redevelopment causes; and the 1964 housing act is no exception.

Concerning the BRA, the policy suggestions in a previous section indicate its areas of strength and weakness, according to this analysis. It must, if it is to continue and to increase its effectiveness, attempt to reduce the level of tension within the organization. It should also seek to relieve the instability in leadership and employment at the upper and middle echelons by recruiting generalists rather than only professionals to fill non-technical, politicized positions. As the number of projects in implementation increases also the general long-range development activities of the organization seem likely to assume a greater amount of importance in the organization with a corresponding reallocation of the BRA's resources.

As for the BRA's relationships with the other elements in the socio-political system, save for the most intransigent elements of the system, those most likely to oppose any change in the status quo, the BRA by itself or in combination with the business
and financial elites in the city is likely to be more successful in gaining support in the future, as redevelopment benefits to the city become evident. In other words, as Boston begins to move more rapidly through its period of transition, toward a political system dominated by the Anglo-Saxon political ethic, the environment will probably tend to become more conducive to successful redevelopment efforts.

At the root of the BRA's influence in stimulating and directing social change in the Boston social and political system is, of course, the underlying factor of technological change. Technology has drastically altered the criteria for evaluating the capabilities and performance of political systems. It has brought into the Boston system individuals with a divergent political orientation who view the city's problems from professional and cosmopolitan perspectives.

It has placed great emphasis, perhaps undue emphasis, upon narrow specialization and expertise. This, as we have seen, is not without its negative aspects when experts are operating in a highly politicized environment.

An important thing to remember is that redevelopment programs no matter how successfully implemented, no matter how significant in terms of altering the operations and attitudes of the political system are not a panacea for any city. Indeed, no one federal or local program can be. Ultimately, the resolution of urban social and economic problems requires the most intensive efforts and the broadest combination of programs from all political levels. The
mass transit bill, the economic opportunities act, housing and redevelopment programs are just three of the large scale programs now available to cities. But again a plethora of federal-local programs are not sufficient in and of themselves no matter how expertly staffed and no matter how imaginatively drafted. Although the problems which beset cities are not necessarily or totally of political origins, they exist in a political context and it is in and through political agencies that they must be solved, since their scope and magnitude is beyond the capacities of private efforts. Any organization or municipal bureaucracy, charged with implementation of such programs, which ignores this essential fact of life, and which fails to equip itself for its political role is not likely to be successful in the accomplishment of its goals. Planners, architects, and social workers, the most numerous of the "new" urban government professionals, as much as they may find this facet of their roles uncongenial, tend to defeat themselves and the projects in which they are involved by denial of political realities, and failure to adjust to them.

The present study as it has explored the reciprocal relationships between a technically expert, goal oriented, municipal bureaucracy and the social and political system of Boston has demonstrated how one organization has met the challenges to its objectives. While the BRA has been relatively successful in overcoming obstacles to its program, in the environment, its record is not yet one of spectacular achievements. On the other hand, considering both the internal and external pressures with which it is confronted, its long run impact on the political system as an accelerating
factor in basic social change, and its program as a partial remedy for the economic and physical problems of the city, it has managed to precipitate dramatic changes in Boston; and, during the present administration, at least, its prospects for future accomplishments appear favorable.
APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
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METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present study is concerned with urban redevelopment, but in a somewhat different manner from the existing literature. The focus is hardly substantive, for no projects are described per se, no sequence of decisions reconstructed, no critiques of plans offered, no normative arguments regarding the desirability of any project or its feasibility presented. Rather, the focus is upon redevelopment as a political and organizational phenomenon, as a policy producing sub-system of a particular political and social system.

Originally, the research interest was considerably more substantive, growing out of work in housing policy, urban politics, and public administration.\(^1\) The initial objective of the study was to investigate the coalescence of forces to implement redevelopment programs in Boston, Massachusetts. However, the further the research progressed, the greater the compulsion, indeed, the necessity, to

conceptualize at ever higher levels of abstraction in order to follow the analysis to its logical conclusions.

In exploring the relationship of the redevelopment process to its political and social environment it was found that redevelopment in Boston seemed to perform latent functions\(^2\) not directly related to renewal process for the more inclusive units of the socio-political system. In examining the behavioral prerequisites for administration of Boston's redevelopment program, much of the most current organizational theorists' most perceptive work was of questionable utility. The choice gradually became (1) to narrow the scope of the study to one or several redevelopment decisions in the Boston socio-political context or (2) to expand the theoretical implications of the research findings beyond their original bounds. The latter alternative was selected. This could be, perhaps, an example of what Robert Merton has referred to as the *serendipity pattern* in social research, that is, "the unanticipated, anomalous and strategic datum exerts pressure for initiating theory."\(^3\)

Data Gathering: Participant-Observation as a Research Method

The data for this analysis was obtained through direct observation coupled with some interviewing and analysis of relevant documents. For a period of approximately five months, under the auspices of a


research grant from the National Center for Education in Politics, the author served as a staff member of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. During that time it was possible to view at close hand the activities of the Authority, (and the behavior patterns of key decision-makers) and its interaction with other elements of the redevelopment policy producing system as well as political and social units outside that system, the daily demands and pressures upon the BRA and its employees, various strategies and tactics of adjustment to the BRA work situation and their success or failure.

Manuals on field research techniques in studying complex organizations, cite as a principal problem in this type of research the disturbance created by the presence of the observer. In order to alleviate this, a variant on simple observation, participant-observation, was employed.

Participant-observation as a research technique has both advantages and disadvantages. There are three major positive features of this method. In the first place actual experience in a role allows one to assess the utility of relevant literature, and its lacunae; and to postulate questions for future study. Secondly, it helps one to interpret data from other sources; and finally, it gives the researcher access to areas and information which otherwise would be closed to him merely as a researcher.

On the other hand, the very advantages of closeness and access to privileged material may also be detrimental to the overall research effort. Participation in one area of a complex socio-political environment may deny the observer access to information from other areas of the environment. And there is the very real danger of over-participation, of becoming so immersed in one's role that one leaves no time for observation. The reliability of data gained through participant-observation is also open to question; although, it has been pointed out\(^5\) that a number of empirical studies "indicate that it compares favorably with other methods." To this list of possible drawbacks can be added the factor of "observer-bias," the researcher's own predetermined orientation toward his subject which conditions him to perceive, interpret, and retain information selectively. Further, if the other members of the social unit under observation are aware not only of the participant-observer's dual role but of the specific nature of his research, it cannot be known exactly how and to what extent their behavior has consciously or unconsciously been altered.

The three mechanisms which Blau and Scott, both veterans on direct observation of bureaucratic organizations list as "role attributes" through which the observer can lessen the disturbance of his presence and generally increase the reliability of his records are (1) impartiality, that is, allowing all members of the group observed, approximately equal access to the observer, (2) neutrality, on intra-organizational and inter-group issues, (3) maintenance of a

favorable balance of obligations between observer and observed.\textsuperscript{6}

In the case of the present study, striving for impartiality meant establishing "social relations" with middle and lower echelon personnel, most of whom were contemporaries of the researcher and had had similar educational experiences prior to their professional training and with whom there need be no contrivance in order to have a great deal "in common." Hence, there was little difficulty in sitting in a project director's office in the morning and going to lunch with junior members of the same project team in the afternoon. It was also quite simple to glean a variety of opinions on the same issue in this way. Lunch and coffee break socializing proved to be an effective substitute for a formal interview in many instances, and the relaxed atmosphere tended to lead to more revealing disclosures of actual orientations.

Neutrality was the most difficult posture to maintain. It frequently meant denying knowledge of the particulars of a situation in order to avoid expressing an opinion. However, this feigned ignorance, on occasion led to a re-explanation of the facts from a different source, which in itself served an important function in the research.

Mobility within the organization as well as technical skill in research work enabled a favorable balance of obligations to be maintained between the researcher and the middle and lower echelon BRA personnel. Since communication in the BRA between project teams below the level of project director, is practically non-existent, knowledge of what was transpiring in other projects at a particular

moment was seized upon with interest. By working with a number of divisions and by keeping contacts within all of them during the research period, it was possible to trade information to obtain needed data within the organization. Research skill permitted actual participation in redevelopment tasks, and a number of papers and research chores for the various project teams were completed during the research period.

In addition to the potential problems noted, there may also be some ethical questions involved in participant-observation, particularly if those observed are not aware to what extent or what aspects of their behavior are subject to scrutiny by the researcher.

Edward Shils has written a reflective essay treating the moral and ethical aspects of participant-observation and concludes that it is a technique to be used with care for it seems "susceptible to considerable ethical abuse."7 However, it is conceded that observation of phenomena in the public sphere is not subject to the same research restrictions; since, Shils continues, "the person who takes on himself the responsibilities of public life has to some extent made a large part of his action public property."8 Presumably this would also apply to employees of a municipal bureaucracy.

Another major problem might have been over-identification

with the organization studied. However, aside from the initial bias in favor of the overall objectives of the organization, (which, of course, was a necessary prerequisite of gaining access to the organization at all), a conscious effort was made to counteract over-identification by continuing to maintain the MIT graduate school affiliation and not immersing oneself in the activities and problems of the redevelopment bureaucracy after working hours. It may be argued that the after hours informal contacts of the ERA members might provide a significant data source. Yet it was impossible to investigate every facet of the organization and its personnel, and it seemed more important to retain some measure of perspective by having a number of interests and identifications during the research period.

Furthermore, the pitfalls of participant-observation, especially the problem of over-identification with one's data or a particular portion of it, were well known to the researcher from previous experience; and certain other precautionary measures were taken in connection with this research to counteract the negative aspects of participant-observation as a research technique.

First of all, during the period of observation, arrangements were made so that the observer could move from one sub-unit of the organization to another when it was deemed appropriate. In all, significant amounts of time were spent in six separate parts of the organization besides the office of the redevelopment administrator. These included 3 project staffs, the central planning department and the family relocation section. Members of the sub-units, had only
a vague notion of the exact nature of the research, this both enhanced
and impeded acceptance of the observer and the establishment of
rapport with key individuals in each section.

There was, of course, great variation according to the person-
alities involved. It was generally felt that one should be somewhat
wary of individuals who would too readily accept the participant-
observer and begin at once to pour out their opinions on all
aspects of the organization's functions. It was usually found
that such individuals were ideologically or sociologically at
odds with the organization, or its sub-unit. In other words they
had an "ax to grind" and were just waiting for the sympathetic
ear of a researcher. However, it was discovered that many times
such loquacious personnel did unintentionally provide leads to
the location of more fruitful data. Because of the frequent changes
of personnel between and among project teams and other sub-divisions
in the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the presence of another
semi-skilled young woman was not novel. When pressed for an
explanation of the research focus, the most general statements
appeared to be satisfactory for most persons, including the
development coordinator.

In general there appeared to be little discomfort on the part
of employees, due to the presence of the researcher, since they
were accustomed to having Harvard and M.I.T. graduate students of
planning and architecture as visitors and part-time staff members
and hence, assumed that the substance of their work and not their
behavior was our research interest.
Regarding other potential difficulties, affiliation with the BRA bureaucracy did not appear to close off many other data sources. It proved a distinct advantage when dealing with business and financial interests and other pro-BRA groups and with the media. When interviewing other groups and actors in the redevelopment system, thought to be opposed to the BRA or its personnel, or individuals not directly involved in redevelopment, it was preferable to use the academic affiliation, since Bostonians would more likely speak candidly about redevelopment to an M.I.T. graduate student than to a BRA representative.

There was only one occasion during the entire research period when it was considered necessary to change observation "posts" within the organization because the participant-observation role was in jeopardy. Paradoxically, this occurred in the sub-unit into which it proved to be most difficult to gain acceptance and access to information. This was the case in which the unit's director and his two immediate subordinates were unexpectedly hostile and suspicious, believing the researcher was a "spy" for one of the anti-redevelopment newspaper reporters. However, after approximately three weeks they and other members of the unit indicated that their fears had been sufficiently allayed, but in return they expected complete dedication to the unit, wholehearted acceptance of its norms, in other words, "over-participation." Since this type of situation seemed incompatible with the participant-observer's dual role and with maintenance of the delicate balance between aloofness and rapport, it seemed
desirable to change units. A satisfactory amount of material had been obtained from that unit, in any event.

The culmination of the research effort was a week of observation, in the office of the redevelopment administrator. No pretense of participation was either feasible or necessary in these circumstances; and almost unlimited access was granted.

In sum, participant observation proved to be the most valuable method possible for research on the subject at hand. Intermittent interviewing could not have netted the same quantity and quality of material. However, extreme caution should be taken that the researcher has a predetermined focal point, a framework to assist him in selecting which of the myriad of phenomena are essential to the study; otherwise there is a real danger of the research period resulting in a mass of random observations upon which it is difficult to superimpose a coherent structure.

Techniques of Analysis

There are a number of ways in which one might approach a piece of research. Often, the researcher will decide to use or

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9This would have been particularly true with reference to the upper echelons of the BRA; for during my observations I found that, while the organization is perfectly willing to have Harvard and M.I.T. planners and architects and Simmons Social Work graduate students work for them on a part-time basis, they have been so deluged with requests for interviews from Boston area students preparing theses and term papers that interviews with these students are regarded as disagreeable chores. The usual procedure is to relegate this task to a very junior staff member. Indeed, after only two weeks at the BRA, I found myself charged with informing a Boston College undergraduate about the BRA structure and functions. I shudder to think how partial and distorted my perceptions of the BRA might have been had I employed only interviewing and analysis of documents as research techniques in this study.
to test a particular theoretical model then set out to gather
data to fit his needs. The danger in this, however, is that the
model so structures the research, that only data fitting the model
and supporting the hypotheses is collected or utilized and the
model becomes little more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. A
frequently cited example of this type of approach is the community
power studies of Floyd Hunter and associates.\(^{10}\) By positing a
"power elite" model, of community decision making, they tended to
ask questions in such a way that the conclusion of the existence
of a power elite was practically inescapable.

Or a researcher with general and specific substantive questions
in mind may gather data bearing on them and afterwards attempt to
decide which of the available analytical models will best suit the
data and the level of analysis to which he wishes to carry his
study. This appears to be the case with Robert Wood's study,
\(^{11}\) After amassing a vast quantity of information
about the political economy of the New York Metropolitan region
and specific towns in the area, a type of modified systems model
was adopted in order to integrate the seemingly diffuse data.

A third common approach is to collect and present all the data,
often in the form of case studies, without an explicit theoretical
model, then use the data to generate such a model. Banfield's
study of Chicago, and Martin and Munger's study of Syracuse\(^{12}\) seem

\(^{10}\) Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University

\(^{11}\) Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments*.

\(^{12}\) Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961); and Roscoe Martin and Frank Munger et. al.
to follow this pattern. The principal difficulty with this approach to analysis is that, in the process of exposition of data and model, the latter may assume the appearance of having been "tacked on" at the end; and the relationship between the case material and the theoretical hypotheses resulting from them may not be so clearly drawn. The integration of social theory and empirical research seems to be somewhat less complete when the data and the model are presented separately than when the analytical model is directly applied.

In the present study, the second approach referred to above was employed. Following collection of the data, it was necessary to select the model most likely to lend coherence and cohesion to presentation of the subject and to result in the most penetrating analysis of the data. Modern social science has, in the past decades, particularly, provided its students with no dearth of models for analyzing socio-political phenomena. Indeed, the process of choosing the conceptual framework to be used for the study as a whole as well as for its component parts proved to be a most challenging intellectual exercise. During the early stages of data gathering, a wide range of alternative models seemed to be appropriate for analyzing the data in terms of the central questions which had been formulated. However, as collection of the material progressed, an increasingly comprehensive orientation seemed to evolve and the range of choice became considerably limited. Ultimately, characteristics inherent in the nature of the data itself dictated the choice of a systems model.
The major alternative models which were considered and rejected for this study were: (1) the "game" model and its principal variation, the multiple-game model; (2) power structure models, including the elite model and the pluralistic model; (3) group conflict models; (4) structural-functional models.\(^{13}\) Rejection is not intended as a broad indictment of the validity of these models but merely a result of an evaluation of their applicability to the present study's scope, purpose, and data base.

To reconstruct the "process of elimination" briefly, the five possible models with which the researcher was familiar were evaluated in two different ways (1) according to basic characteristics and concepts, a listing of the sort of data base to which each seemed suitable, and a general assessment of utility for the present study, and (2) according to two broad categories of criteria which permitted measuring the models against each other by rank ordering them.

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The latter will be discussed first.

The analytical models appear to vary along the dimensions of scope and dynamism. Scope has two sub-categories (1) degree of inclusiveness and (2) level of abstraction. Dynamism also has two: (1) flexibility and (2) social change potential. Some clarification of these concepts as they are used in the discussion follows:

**Scope:**

*Degree of Inclusiveness* refers to the extent to which one model subsumes the concepts and mode of analysis of the others.

*Level of Abstraction* refers to the relative ability of a model to encompass a wide variety of data, to relate diffuse data under a comprehensive scheme; and of the model's application to result in general propositions related to social action.

**Dynamism:**

*Flexibility* refers to short range capability of model to respond to change, to show movement, and interaction among components.

*Social Change Potential* refers to long range capability of model to absorb basic alterations in pattern of elements and their interaction.

Table A-1 presents the rank ordering of the five types of models along the dimensions and according to the aspects of those dimensions outlined here. It must be noted that this rank ordering is based solely upon the authors' understanding of the models and their properties in terms of the present study. Those ranked Number 1, are considered to have more of any given property.
Table A-1

Ranking of Analytical Models According to Scope and Dynamism

**Scope**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusiveness</th>
<th>Level of Abstraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Systems</td>
<td>1. Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Structural-Functional</td>
<td>2. Structural-Functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Game</td>
<td>4. Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Power</td>
<td>5. Game</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dynamism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexibility</th>
<th>Social Change Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Systems</td>
<td>1. Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Group Conflict</td>
<td>2. Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Game</td>
<td>3. Group Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Power</td>
<td>4. Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Structural-Functional</td>
<td>5. Structural-Functional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judged solely on these criteria of scope and dynamism, the systems model is a clear first choice. It maximizes both inclusiveness, since it subsumes all other models and their concepts, and level of abstraction as well as dynamism for it provides for continuous flexibility and change. A cross check on the evaluation of the models, one which referred specifically to the nature of the data base and the general questions posed by the study is found in Table A-2.
Table A-2

Ranking of Analytical Models According to Applicability to Data Base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>&quot;Best&quot; Data Base</th>
<th>Provision for Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Game</td>
<td>actors, goals, strategies, resources, tactics, outcomes</td>
<td>single case study, definable bounds</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>who has power or influence, what kind, how much, over whom, on what matters</td>
<td>several decision case study</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Conflict</td>
<td>group interests, cohesion, resources, coalitions</td>
<td>single or many cases</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural-Functional</td>
<td>basic functions, structures to perform, latent functions</td>
<td>single or many case studies</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems</td>
<td>role, adjustments, inputs, outputs, functions demands</td>
<td>many elements</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A-2 shows that the game model, though conceptually coherent, seems best applied to single cases, with easily definable bounds; this immediately eliminated it as far as the present study was concerned. The nature of the data was too diffuse. There were two major drawbacks to the power, group conflict, and structural-functional models. In the first place in none of them did there seem to be adequate provision for consideration of the socio-cultural environment within the framework of the analysis. Furthermore, power and group conflict models are only concerned with overt participants. The major reason for elimination of the Structural-Functional model was that it is, in effect, a sub-model of the systems model.

Having arrived at the conclusion that a systems model seems best suited to the present study's data base, since it is sufficiently
universal in scope to apply both to the material relating the urban
renewal policy producing sub-system in Boston and to its social,
political, economic, and cultural environment, as well as to the
data concerned with behavior within the redevelopment bureaucracy,
a more detailed consideration of the systems model seems required.

The Systems Model and Its Application

The essential elements of the systems concept have their origins
in the natural sciences. About fifteen years ago, however, a group
of sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and social psychologists
led by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, began an extensive project
of conceptual translation and elucidation which had as its basis
the adaptation of systems model to analysis in the social sciences. ¹⁴
Culture, society, and the individual were perceived as systems,
possessing the three fundamental properties of systems; comprehensiveness, interdependence, and boundaries. ¹⁵

Political scientists and political sociologists were not
long in acknowledging the possibilities of systems models for
analysis of phenomena in their disciplines. One of its major
appeals was the very breadth of its scope, its ability to encompass

¹⁴ Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (ed.) Toward a General

¹⁵ Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to
Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.),
The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University
more fragmentary modes of analysis. David Easton and Gabriel Almond are but two of the most notable political scientists who have contributed to the growing body of theory treating the use of systems models in political science. Alvin Gouldner and Robert Merton have respectively examined the model's utility in analysis of complex organizations, and applied it to bureaucratic formations.

In sum, so successfully and so completely has the systems model been assimilated into the vocabularies and technical repertoires of social scientists that there is even a tendency to use the model indiscriminately and carelessly and to forget that there still remains much that can be done to elaborate upon the systems model, to sharpen conceptually many of its details and to expand the range of its rigorous and explicit application.

As has been pointed out there are numerous formulations of the systems model, and in preparation of the present study, it seemed advisable to examine as many of them as possible according to the criteria of conceptual clarity and ease of application to the data base.

The systems model has been specifically designated as a technique to be used in analyzing material in comparative national politics. However, there appeared to be no logical reason why it could not in the same form be applied to a particular urban area and its socio-political phenomena. Indeed, such application might provide a test of the universality of the model.

Analysis of the Boston political system and its socio-cultural environment, and the Boston Redevelopment Authority as a sub-system operating within it to implement certain policy goals; analysis of the Redevelopment Authority itself as a separate system with professional staff members as individual sub-systems; and analysis of key individual role incumbents in the Redevelopment Authority as personality systems, with the organization this time serving as the environment, necessitates application of the systems model on three levels (the political system, the organizational system, and the personality system). System-sub-system relationships may be analyzed (1) between the Urban redevelopment policy-producing sub-system and the larger social and political system and (2) between the personality sub-systems and the organizational system of the Redevelopment Authority.

Returning now to more extensive explanation of the characteristics and concepts involved in the systems model and its use, Almond describes the three basic properties systems as follows:

**Comprehensiveness** means that we speak of the political system, we include all interactions--inputs and outputs .... we mean to include not just structures based on law ..... or just associational or formally organized units ..... but all of the structures in their political aspects, including undifferentiated structures like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups, as well as anomic phenomena like riots, street demonstrations and the like.

By **Interdependence** we mean that a change in one subset of interactions produces changes in all other subsets. (This does not imply, however, that all other subsets are uniformly affected) (Parenthetical observation mine. NRA).

By the existence of a **Boundary** in a political system we mean that there are points where other systems end and the political system begins ..... The boundaries between the society and policy differ from political system to political system.17

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In other words, the system concept "implies a totality of relevant units, relationships between the interaction of units, and a certain measure of stability in the pattern of interaction of the units."

**Role**, is the basic unit of the system. Thus a political system may be defined as a set of interacting roles or as a structure of roles, if by structure there is meant a patterning of action. The definition of the term role itself comes from Parsons and Shils.

The role is that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process. It involves a set of complementary expectations concerning his own actions and those with whom he interacts. Both the actor and those with whom he interacts possess these expectations. Roles are institutionalized when they are fully congruous with the prevailing culture patterns and are organized around expectations of conformity with morally sanctioned patterns of value orientation shared by the members of the collectivity in which the role functions.18

For example in terms of the present study, the role of city councilman in the Boston political system carries with it the expectation that redevelopment projects which will displace significant numbers of people will be opposed no matter what the merits of the plan; the role of project director in the Boston Redevelopment Authority requires of its incumbents certain patterns of behavior which may or may not be in conflict with their other roles such as professional planner, or economist, lawyer or architect. There may be, as in the Boston Redevelopment Authority, not only conflict between an individual's various role requirements, but also "role-incongruence" or disagreement among incumbents of the same role as to what patterns of behavior are (or should be) associated with that role.

**Political Culture.** This concept is Almond's contribution to the systems model and is an outgrowth of the application of the systems model to political phenomena. It refers to a particular "pattern of

orientation" toward political action. Almond points out that political culture does not coincide with a given political system or society.

Patterns of orientation to politics may, and usually do, extend beyond the boundaries of a political system. The political culture of Boston's lower middle class, for instance, is practically identical to the political culture of the lower middle class in Cambridge political system.

A second pertinent note regarding political culture is that political culture is not the same thing as "general culture,"

..... although it is related to it. Because political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as standards and values of the general culture it is a differentiated part of culture and has a certain autonomy.19

Although, for example, the general cultural norms of the majority of people in Boston should make them favorably disposed toward organized social action, their political culture tends to militate against such organized group action in the political system.

Briefly to summarize the remaining aspects of the political system model: (1) all systems have structure which vary "according to the degree and form of structural specialization"; (2) there is a universality of functions in political systems; these include the input (or political functions) of socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and communication. (In Easton's formulation of the political system these input functions are termed demands and supports)20


and the output (or governmental functions) of rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication; (3) all political structure is multifunctional; (4) all political systems are "mixed" in the cultural sense with some "traditional" and some "modern" elements. The present study focuses upon the political or input functions in the Boston political system, and the role of a particular structure the Redevelopment Authority in that system. The BRA, while a sub-system of the Boston social and political systems, is also a system in its own right with functions and sub-units. The BRA, considered as a political system, will have performed within it (or in coalition elements within and outside of it) the same functions as the Boston political system; in addition, because of its special nature as a bureaucracy it will also have particular functions of organizational maintenance and goal implementation or achievement in addition to the two general system functions. The personality system model will be discussed in a later Chapter.

In analyzing the Boston political system, following the pattern of studies of national and area wide political systems, the procedure will be to ask by what structures and in what "style" the basic functions of the system are performed. Style refers to the mode of performance of function which is highly correlated with the prevailing political culture, as this latter seeks to act itself out in the political system. The Parsonian "pattern variables," mainly because they are widely used, are convenient shorthand for describing characteristics of the style of functional execution in the system. Again, following the suggestion of Almond, the pattern variables are more useful analytical tools when they are viewed as continual rather than as pure dichotomies.

21 Almond, in Introduction to Politics of Developing Areas, p. 11.

22 Parsons and Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, pp. 76-105.
The general systems model is organic in nature and hence in continuous flux. Inherent in a system are tendencies toward equilibrium, but, since the process is continuous, and there are always new inputs to be assimilated or tensions within the system to be resolved; true homeostasis is never achieved. Yet systems tend toward that state; and systems can be compared according to their relative success in attaining stability.

The two basic functions of general systems are integration (organizing relations among member units to coordinate them and unify them into a single entity) and adaptation (the accommodation of the system to demands of the environment and to pressures generated within the system from the specialized functions of the system as well as active transformation of external environment).

Every system, except simple unitary systems, have by definition, subsystems. These may be of several sorts; (1) they may be independent of each other, in the sense of having no overlapping parts, or of having no contact with each other, or of having contact only as whole systems; (2) they may overlap in that they share some parts but not all; (3) they may be inclusive in that one is smaller and one larger and all the members of the smaller are in the latter. To illustrate; (1) The Boston Redevelopment Authority and The Boston Globe (a newspaper) are both part of the Boston political system, they have no overlapping parts; (2) The Boston Chamber of Commerce Planning and Redevelopment Committee shares planners with the BRA, they are both part of the redevelopment policy producing system in Boston; (3) all the members of the Mayor's Committee for the Central Business District (sub-system of the redevelopment policy producing system) are also included in the businessmen's Committee for the Central Business District.

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In the foregoing discussion, some confusion might have resulted from the introduction of the political system model as well as the conceptualization of the general system model. Political functions which have been enumerated are not universal to all systems but only to all political systems. The political system model will be used in the analysis of the Boston political system. The general system model as well as portions of the political system model will be used in the analysis of the Redevelopment Authority as a policy producing sub-system of the political system.

At that point in the present study at which the personality systems of key individuals in the redevelopment bureaucracy are introduced still another variation on the general systems model is employed. As Parsons and Shils note, though the three essential characteristics of the systems model remain constant "The structure of a social system and the functional imperatives for its operation and survival or orderly change as a system are, moreover, different from those of personality."

Personality System

For a social scientist whose research focus has been primarily confined to sociological and political phenomena, the profusion of personality theories might have been a source of some perplexity. However, since the systems model was chosen as the basic conceptual scheme for the present analysis, the Parsons-Shils systems approach to personality as a discreet unit of social action appeared to be a logical choice for an analytical model. The next methodological problem concerned the level of detail to which the examination of personality systems should be extended in the context of the present study. It was decided that the major characteristics of personality systems could be introduced as a significant variable

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in the process of adjustment to multiple role demands within the BRA without including an extensive examination of personality theory or of individual personality characteristics in the body of the paper.

The personality system has been defined as:

an organized set of primary and complex need-dispositions which are related to one another in a hierarchical way .... the structure of personality is the result of a cumulative process of commitments between alternatives of orientation and their consequences for defense or resolution within the system and adjustment to the external situation. 25

As a system, personality performs the essential systemic functions of integration and allocation and adjustment to its environment. In addition, the specialized functions of the personality system are those of "boundary maintenance" and the "optimization of gratification."

Both allocative and integrative functions of the personality system are performed on both internal and external levels. Internal allocation is a functional necessity, since the possibility of gratification of all need-dispositions either sequentially or simultaneously is limited "by the structure of the object system and by the intra-systemic incompatibility of the consequences of gratifying them all." 26

External allocation distributes the energies of the system among various objects which are related to gratification of certain need-dispositions.

... once the distribution of functions has been made, each of the need-dispositions constitutes a sub-system with its own systemic requirements. This introduces the possibility ... 27

Integrative mechanisms alleviate or attempt to prevent conflicts among need-disposition sub-systems. Internal integrative mechanisms, according to the personality system schema, are also known as mechanisms of defense.

27 Ibid., p. 132.
Seven of them are commonly listed, and they act to introduce modifications into the structuring of need-dispositions.

External integrative mechanisms are also called mechanisms of adjustment. As their name implies they operate in the personality system to resolve or alleviate conflicts between external cognitions or cognitions and need-dispositions.

There are four basic need-dispositions in the system which it strives to gratify: (1) the immediate need-disposition for a specific object, (2) love or affection, (3) approval (short range), and (4) esteem (long range). The threat of deprivation of gratifications for these need-dispositions may induce anxiety. Coping with anxiety or threats to gratification of the basic need-dispositions may be done either passively or actively.

Personality systems do not exist in a vacuum, however. Their functions and the demands placed upon the system are related to the patterning of an individual's social roles.

**Personality and Role**

The interdependence of personality systems and role behavior is very nearly total. It is the need-disposition structure (i.e. the personality) which conditions an individual's response to the requirements and expectations of his social roles. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated the association of defined personality traits with attitudes and role behavior within organizational settings. While none of the studies deals specifically with the roles which are being considered in the BRA, they provide useful clues regarding "key" attitudes which are common to

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organizational role requirements. A general finding of these seems to be that attitudes toward authority and toward the acceptance of responsibility may be taken as indicators of a wide range of personality tendencies with which they have been shown to correlate. 29

Role behavior in organizational situations has been shown to be related to the degree to which the personality system has internalized the goals of the "collectivity."

In the case of the present study, role behavior of individual role incumbents is associated not only with the degree to which the goals of the organization have been internalized by the personality system, but also with the degree to which the orientation and style of the organization have been found compatible with the personality system and to its other non-organizational roles.

Rarely, if ever, is the integration of the personality system into its social roles completely perfected. Since both systems are constantly in flux, there is always some time lag in accomplishing the adjustment. Nevertheless, there are wide variations in the degree to which personality and role expectations coincide. For example, if the individual's "self-image" or "identification of himself with certain qualities or performance capacities on which he places a high evaluation" is markedly different from that required by his role and that held by others around him in the social setting, it is likely that the actions of others with regard to him will not fulfill his expectations. In other words his personality system will not be integrated with the social system. The essential element in

this process then can be seen to be the complementarity of role expectations.

If personality and role behavior requirements are discrepant and if personality system requirements are given precedence in performance of role functions, the failure of other roles with which he interacts to perform according to his expectations may be considered a form of "sanction." The severity of the sanction with regard to the individual's need-disposition structure, will determine whether he will adjust his role behavior or his role expectations of others in a particular situation. The ease of alteration of role behavior to external objects, then, depends upon whether an individual is motivated by a predominantly conformative or alienative set of need-dispositions with respect to the role. Again, the degree to which the personality system has internalized the value patterns of the role structure, in which he must operate, is crucial.

One final point regarding the relationship of personality systems and role behavior; there are two dichotomies whose inter-relationships serve as useful tools for the present analysis. These are (1) the dichotomy between a role incumbent's orientation toward his own role in the organization or toward others (this has been formalized in terms of "introvert-extrovert" by Jung and as "inner-directed--other-directed" personality types by Reisman or as "tough minded"--"tender minded" by James) and the dichotomy between rigid, ritualistic personality types and more flexible personality types.

**Personality and Profession**

When profession and social role are identical, many of the generalizations in the foregoing section, which dealt with the relationship of personality system and role, apply. However, when, as in the case of
many individuals at the BRA, professional and organizational role do not coincide, in order to understand the mediating effect of personality in situations of role conflict, the association of personality with profession must be investigated separately.

In recent years many studies of the personalities of different categories professionals have appeared. They have been conducted with varying degrees of rigor and methodological sophistication. But they appear to have been predicated on the assumption that there is a strong relationship between personality traits and one's profession. Some studies, notably those of scientists undertaken by Anne Roe and Bernice Eiduson, carry their personality explorations back into their subjects' childhood, seeking to isolate factors which would predispose individuals to select a particular career. Others have merely noted the common attitudes and orientations of practitioners in different professions and concluded that they were based upon common professional socialization and group norms working upon common personality syndromes.

Specific findings of these studies tend to confirm the somewhat stereotyped suppositions regarding the personality patterns of those in various professions. Social workers, for the most part, have been found to be more "tenderminded"; military professionals are usually found to be role oriented and relatively rigid on personality dimension scales; etc.

The question of the relative influence of basic personality patterns and professional socialization and the imposition of professional group norms is a provocative one. Its consideration is outside the scope of the present study, however.

With reference to the present study, the personality of the professional is being considered a principal factor in his ability and inclination
to resolve role conflicts in the BRA organizational framework. Particularly in cases in which organizational role is less salient to the conflict situation than professional role, the interaction of personality and profession will be significant.

The Assessment of Personality in the BRA

Many schools of personality theory tend to hold that personality is only manifest in "social interaction." Unless "social interaction" is interpreted as meaning all behavior which occurs within a socio-cultural system and not merely direct interaction with other persons it is a difficult proposition to accept. Once having adopted the systems model of personality for analysis, manifestations of personality are not viewed as confined to external behavior involving other social actors. Indeed, the interdependence of internal and external functional prerequisites of the system is emphasized.

Thus, in making judgments regarding the personality characteristics of individuals observed at the BRA, what has been considered is not only their overt behavior in interaction with superiors and peers and subordinates in the BRA system, but less obvious indexes of personality patterns as well. In the case of project directors, overall communications behavior with reference to their staff was a factor as was mode of dress, posture, arrangement of office, and visible patterns of taste and material consumption.

No direct personality tests were given to any members of the staff nor were direct questions related to personality included in the focused interviews. By and large, however, direct methods of eliciting personality data were not necessary. Strict methodologists might question the validity or reliability of the perceptions and evaluations since the
observations have not been quantified and no control group was used. But, for the purposes of the present study, participant-observation and careful recording of daily observations and perceptions have appeared to be adequate. Indeed, the participant aspect of participant-observation afforded an opportunity to observe personal working habits and self-oriented behavior to a greater extent than would have been possible in a structured, observer-observed situation.

Boston as A Transitional Political System

Another set of methodological considerations in this study involved the characterization of present day Boston's political system and its leaders as "transitional." Again, this is an example of our utilization of models and concepts originally applied to political behavior in the area of comparative analysis of developing political systems. The looseness of integration in Boston's system plus the political culture of working class authoritarianism plus the evidence of changing leadership cliques and a more rapid rate of social and cultural evolution, since the inception of the ERA, suggested this characterization of the Boston system early in the observation period.

The fact, too, that Boston appeared to be experiencing an economic resurgence, as well as political and social change, made application of the transitional model seem to be warranted; for economic growth is a central element of most models of transitional systems.

Table A-3 presents a direct comparison of the observed traits of Boston's political system and the model of a transitional political system used in Lucian Pye's study of Burma. This model was selected since

it seems to have incorporated the common elements of other models of transitional systems.

Because this model was evolved from observations of a national political system, there are elements of it which can not apply to the Boston situation, such as those involving the army. In addition, Boston does not have organized political parties operating with reference to urban issues and power patterns. This renders other elements of the model inapplicable.

Table A-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait of Transitional System</th>
<th>Comment on Boston's System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political sphere is not sharply differentiated from social and personal relations.</td>
<td>If this means that personalities, rather than policy alternatives define political conflict, this generally applies to Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties tend to take on a world view</td>
<td>No parties in Boston, but ethnic groups define world view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a prevalence of cliques</td>
<td>There are class and group defined cliques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The character of party loyalty gives political leaders a high degree of freedom in determining policies</td>
<td>The predominance of ethnic group loyalty for the lower class gives officials considerable freedom in determining policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties and aspiring elites tend to appear as revolutionary movements.</td>
<td>Not true of Boston. Aspiring elites appear threatening but hardly revolutionary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is little or no integration among participants due to lack of unified communications system.</td>
<td>There is little integration but not due to lack of communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New elements are recruited to political roles at a high rate</td>
<td>New elements enter the political system slowly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are sharp differences in political orientation of the generations</td>
<td>There are some differences in political orientation between generations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait of Transitional System</th>
<th>Comment on Boston's System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little consensus exists as to the legitimate ends and means of political action.</td>
<td>There is generally broad consensus on ends and less consensus on means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The intensity and prevalence of political discussion bear little relationship to political decision making.</td>
<td>Generally true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles are highly interchangeable</td>
<td>The role of the BBA in the political system is interchangeable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are relatively few explicitly organized interest groups with functionally specific roles.</td>
<td>For a city of its size in the U. S., there is little interest group activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership must appeal to an undifferentiated public.</td>
<td>Not so. The leadership must appeal to the dominant ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders are encouraged to adopt more clearly defined positions on international issues than on domestic issues</td>
<td>Leaders feel they can adopt more clearly defined positions on state and national issues than purely local ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The affective or expressive aspect of politics tends to override the problem solving or public policy aspect.</td>
<td>Generally true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charismatic leaders tend to prevail</td>
<td>None since Curley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political process operates largely without benefit of political brokers</td>
<td>Boston has an abundance of political brokers, self-styled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this illustration it is clear that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the model and the observed characteristics of the Boston political system. Yet on several critical points there seems to be substantial similarity. However, even if Boston does not "fit" the model of a transitional society in the comparative international sense, in terms of the American political system as a whole Boston is still just beginning its transitional phase. This direct application of the model, in Table A-3 has also shown that while there is not
necessarily complete transferability of models and concepts among areas of study in the social sciences, application of models from other areas has a definite heuristic value.

On final note; some readers may wish that the more orthodox case method which might have presented more substantive detail had been employed or that more specific day to day observations had been included. However, our fundamental orientation toward this project coupled with the research method and the time span involved tended to militate against such procedures.

During the observation period at the BRA, such a vast amount of data bearing upon the central questions of the study was available, that the major task of the researcher was not only to select out those that were most relevant but also to abstract, to classify, and to generalize on the basis of an enormous quantity of data. In addition, a considerable amount of the material to which we had access within the BRA through the participant-observer method, was "privileged." In other cases, only assurances of anonymity secured cooperation of individuals in expressing their views candidly. Thus, we were precluded from presenting here many items of data upon which our conclusions are based.

Furthermore, our conception of social science research tends to view the functions of abstraction, classification, and generalization, rather than those of chronicling, recording, or describing, social phenomena as our "proper" role. Hence, the strongly analytic emphasis which is found in the preceding pages.
APPENDIX B

LITERATURE ON REDEVELOPMENT
Literature on Redevelopment

The appeal of redevelopment and its various aspects and ramifications as subjects for investigation by planners, architects, economists, social psychologists, and sociologists, is quite understandable. In the first place, as the number of redevelopment projects increased so did the opportunities for research. Each project could be seen as a discrete case example and the researcher's problem was mainly to decide whether to choose to do a detailed study of one project or a less detailed comparative study of a set of cases.

Ostensibly, redevelopment decision making took place within the public domain; so, theoretically, at least, a researcher should have relatively easy access to persons and papers involved.\(^1\) Redevelopment was a new field and each study could be taken as a definitive work with regard to its own subdivision of any aspect of the process. Since redevelopment has proven to be such a multi-faceted process, with a bit of imagination, it was possible to structure one's research so that there would be very little overlap with any other studies in the field.

The result of all this has been the creation of an already vast and steadily growing body of literature. This extant literature on redevelopment, consists of books, articles, and essays; a majority of them dealing with the technical or procedural aspects of redevelopment. The

\(^1\)In fact, however, the Boston Redevelopment Authority proved to be highly "security conscious." Given the nature of the environment in which it operated, the antipathy of Boston politicians and some newspaper reporters and the somewhat unorthodox administrative methods of the redevelopment administrator, it is understandable that many in the organization attempted to keep detailed knowledge of its activities from becoming public. At first, however, until my "loyalty" had been proven, this attitude tended to impede my examination of basic data regarding the organization's functions.
effects of displacement upon individuals and ethnic groups, the phenomenon of citizen participation, the capital resources necessary for renewal, the requirements of planning projects from one to one hundred acres, the merits of architectural innovation versus continuity, types of background studies prior to project planning all have received detailed treatment. The most prominent characteristic of the literature, however, is its extreme fragmentation in treatment of the redevelopment process. Each researcher is equipped with his own training in a specific discipline and/or a professional orientation to guide his research. Each approach or orientation to redevelopment studies has its equally specialized audience. Hence, each new study may add to the understanding of a specific phase of the renewal process and at the same time tend to increase the fragmentation and particularization of the literature. There are many knowledgable and expert redevelopment planners, planning lawyers, and community relations workers, but few individuals with a sufficiently broad perspective of the entire process.

The following summary of the existing literature has divided it into eight general categories, defined according to disciplinary or professional approach to redevelopment.

(i) **Sociological Studies.** Sociologists, who long have regarded study of the urban environment as their particular prerogative, have been among the first and most prolific writers on redevelopment. Their principal concern has been the social implications of redevelopment for relocated groups, for the city's entire social structure, and for particular "life styles." In general their evaluations or redevelopment tend to be negative, stressing the disruptive nature of redevelopment for the social fabric of neighborhood communities; a notable exception
is the Rossi and Dentler study of Chicago renewal activities in which community cohesion was found to have been fostered by a renewal project.²

These writers' criticism is usually aimed directly at the relocation aspects of redevelopment, focusing on the careless, haphazard, ineffective, or nonexistent relocation programs in various communities. While redevelopment is assumed to have beneficial effects in the long run, and is theoretically sound, in practice and in its short run impact, these writers find that there are serious flaws in the program, from their point of view.³ The prognosis for the future is no more hopeful than past experience, according to the most pessimistic among them, such as Scott Greer. In a recent manuscript Greer appeared to advocate a complete revision of the entire program or its abandonment as a useless effort in contradiction with prevailing social trends.⁴

(ii) Social Psychological Studies. These studies are closely related to the sociological studies, only instead of focusing upon the disruptive effect redevelopment has upon social groupings, they tend to center their attention upon its impact on individuals. A number of articles in the anthology The Urban Condition⁵ typify this approach.


(iii) **Planners' Studies.** At almost the opposite extreme from the approach of the sociologists and social psychologists, are planners who, in terms of employment opportunities stemming from the projects, have been direct beneficiaries of redevelopment and many of whom are among its chief proponents and apologists. Much of the planning literature on renewal deals on the one hand with formulation of specific project plans and critiques of these plans based on "accepted planning principles" of the moment and on the other with "ideal type" plans for different categories of projects.

(iv) **Architectural Studies.** Architects' writing on renewal has taken the form of evaluation of the aesthetic qualities of project design and of particular structures within the projects on one hand and on the other has been in the nature of a vigorous debate which has tended to argue for less conservatism in design while at the same time preserving the architectural flavor and scale of individual cities. Periodicals such as *Architectural Forum*, during its lifetime a prime vehicle for presenting views on redevelopment, have been critical of redevelopment for its propensity to visual homogenization of American cities.

(v) **Economic Studies.** These studies have been primarily of the nature of economic feasibility studies prepared as background material for planning, often featuring elaborate projections of economic activities of different kinds for specific areas. There also have been detailed studies of the actual economic effects of renewal projects. In addition, there are several general economic studies which stress the economic base prerequisites for a feasible renewal program, as well as a number of
articles by professional developers stressing the economic opportunities in renewal.

(vi) Legal Studies. Redevelopment and planning law is a rapidly growing field, though few law schools as yet have given it a place in their curricula. In the past five years, a number of the major law quarterlies have devoted special issues to it. The two-part treatment of the subject by Law and Contemporary Problems, in 1960, touched not only upon legal aspects but also contains several of the useful and penetrating articles on the political aspects of renewal. The Federal Bar Journal, too, in its issues on redevelopment departed from a strictly legal approach. On the whole, however, the literature here has tended to be concerned with explicating the expanding body of judicial decisions connected with use of eminent domain and with redevelopment tax concessions.

(vii) Political Studies. What few political studies of renewal have appeared thus far seem to be traditionally oriented. That is to say, they have examined the structural correlates of redevelopment or its implications for democratic political processes. Three major exceptions have been Dahl's treatment of New Haven, Wood's of New York, and Kaplan's recent study of Newark. Wood and Dahl, however, both presented somewhat cursory discussions of redevelopment as part of a larger work and in the context of a more inclusive problem. Kaplan's study, though

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6See, for example, two articles in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXVI (Winter, 1961), pp. 105-117 and pp. 118-117.

it is a much needed contribution, is loosely constructed, and its impact is weakened by lack of an explicit analytical model.

(viii) Comprehensive or Integrative Studies. The major example of this type of study which purports to integrate the perspectives of a number of different disciplines is a two-volume set undertaken nearly fifteen years ago by Coleman Woodbury and associates. It is now somewhat out of date, since redevelopment concepts and practices have evolved much further and in directions that could not have been anticipated in the early years of the federal redevelopment program. There appears to be a need for a similar project, foundation sponsored, perhaps, after fifteen years of experience with renewal. There are several other collections of essays which purport to be comprehensive or integrative studies, utilizing the approaches and orientations of many disciplines; but most of them seem to fall short of accomplishing their expressed purpose, for there is relatively little in the way of a cohesive framework to show relationships between their component parts.

In addition to the eight categories outlined above, there is a plethora of Housing and Home Finance Agency and Urban Renewal Administration (one of HHFA's branches) pamphlets and manuals for the public as well as more technical material for redevelopment administrators. Local redevelopment agencies also publish reports and documents to add to the quantity of literature.

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A member of Phi Beta Kappa, as well as numerous professional organizations, Miss Arnone has served as a research assistant at the Democratic National Committee in Washington, D.C. (1960) and as a junior consultant and research associate in the Strategic Studies Department of Raytheon Company (summers, 1962 and 1963).

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