AMERICA'S RELUCTANT ALLIES:

The Genesis of the Political-Military Cultures
Of Japan and West Germany

by

Thomas U. Berger

Submitted to the Department of
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ABSTRACT

This study supplements conventional rational-choice models for explaining foreign policy behavior by developing alternative analytical frameworks incorporating historical and political cultural variables. To this end it introduces the concept of political-military culture. Political-military culture refers to the attitudes of a particular society towards the military, national security and the use of force, and their linkage to other political issues, such as democracy, history and national identity. These linkages are the product of historical forces, such as experiences of war, occupation and modernization, which interact with pre-existing attitudes and understandings to create new political-military cultures. The utility of this approach for achieving a better understanding of the parameters and dynamics of defense policy formation is explored through a comparison of the historical development of post-war Japanese and West German defense and security policies. Special attention is paid issues of cultural change and the role of political debates where the concrete interests and cultural predispositions of different sub-groups compete in trying to determine both defense policy outcomes and to influence the development of the political-military culture of the overall society.

It was found that the experiences of defeat and the delegitimation of the old, militaristic pre-war political orders of Japan and Germany have become institutionalized and are now central features of their new political-military cultures. An essentially anti-militaristic, if not down-right pacifist attitude towards the military and the use of force has been steadily reinforced over the course of the post-war period, nurtured by a relatively benign international economic and security environment. This new political-military culture now transcends generational boundaries and is even more strongly held by the new generations of German and Japanese who did not directly experience the traumas of defeat and occupation. This new political-military culture is now firmly rooted in the new German and Japanese political systems, are closely linked to both
democracy and their enormous economic successes, and is thus unlikely to change quickly barring a major new shock on an order of magnitude comparable to WW II.

Despite these broad similarities it is also important not to overlook the very important differences in the specific contents of the two political-military cultures, differences that are both the product of their differing historical circumstances and of different cultural attitudes. In the case of Germany, it is indelibly marked by the profound feeling of guilt left behind by the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities. This has to a large degree delegitimized nationalism in the German context, and with it the foundations for the classical Realpolitik approach to international relations. In Japan, on the other hand, the sense of guilt and remorse has played a decidedly secondary role. On the other hand, the Japanese have been intensely aware of the suffering inflicted on their own nation during WW II, for which it holds their own military responsible for as well as the Americans who bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has left behind a legacy of profound antipathy and distrust towards the military as an institution, which as had a similar inhibiting function in the Japanese context that guilt has had in the German. Paradoxically, the German sense of guilt has made it easier for the Germans to deal with defense problems, providing it is in a multilateral setting, such as NATO, because it fits in with the post-war German emphasis on integration as a means of overcoming the threat of nationalism. In contrast, the Japanese attachment to the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S. is far more tenuous.

The dissertation is based on three years of intensive field research in Japan and West Germany and makes extensive use of both interviews and primary documentary sources.

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The author was born January 9, 1962 in Hartford, Connecticut. He attended the Facker Collegiate Institute high school in Brookline, New York before obtaining a B.A. in Political Science at Columbia University in Spring, 1982. After working for The Washington Quarterly as an editorial assistant, he entered the Ph.D. program at M.I.T. in the Fall of 1983. Over the course of his studies he has been fortunate to receive support from a variety of sources. Research in Japan was supported by first a 2 year Fulbright Graduate Research Fellowship and then a 1 year Japan Foundation Graduate Fellowship. During this period the author was affiliated with the University of Tokyo at Komaba after completing language training at the Interuniversity Center for Japanese Language Studies (Stanford Center). Research in West Germany was made possible by a 1 year German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Graduate Research Fellowship while affiliated with the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität in Bonn. Additional financial assistance was received during the write-up phase of the dissertation process in the form of a MacArthur Scholar dissertation support grant. During the 1991-1992 academic year he will be a Olin Post-doctoral Fellow in National Security Studies at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Perhaps the greatest source of support, however, has been the author’s wife, Sucharita, and daughter, Diya.
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Introduction

The purpose of this study is two fold. First, on the empirical level, it seeks to understand the peculiar puzzle of recent German and Japanese defense policy behavior - to wit, why these two emerging powers remain peculiarly reluctant to play a military role commensurate with their economic and technological potential. Second, this study on a more theoretical level also seeks to use this particular question to develop an approach for the analysis of defense and security policy formation that takes into account cultural and ideational factors, factors which are usually overlooked in conventional analyses but which in the case of Japan and Germany play an unusually prominent role.

The recent events of the Gulf War have brought the empirical puzzle into particularly sharp relief. Other major U.S. allies were ready to lend not only financial and political support, but also to send military forces to fight alongside U.S. troops in Kuwait. In contrast Japan and Germany, who have been widely expected to increasingly take over the mantle of global leadership from a faltering American hegemon, were surprisingly ineffectual during the crisis. For domestic political reasons they were apparently unable to dispatch even token, non-combat forces until well after hostilities had ended. Even the provision of non-military support proved surprisingly difficult and was marked by sharp domestic political acrimony.

German and Japanese behavior seemed consistent with the
charge that they are free riders on the international security order underwritten by the United States. The criticism that has been made time and again in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere that as long as there are others to do the dangerous and costly work of preserving the international order for them, Japan and Germany have no incentive to make any efforts on their own. In the Gulf War, however, foreign policy experts and decision makers in both countries began to worry that failure to take greater risks could jeopardize their security relationship with the U.S., thus endangering their free ride.\(^1\) They argued that sending at least some forces, if not on the same scale as Britain and France, then at least comparable to the contributions of Italy or even Belgium, would have sufficed to forestall much of the criticism from abroad that they have been subjected to since the crisis.\(^2\) In the view of these critics, if Japan and Germany were perfectly rational free riders who wished to preserve the arrangements which have been so beneficial to them at a minimum cost, they should have taken some modest steps toward military participation. Had the U.S. suffered significant casualties in the military confrontation with Iraq (as most experts had predicted), German and Japanese inaction ran the risk of triggering an enormous, isolationist backlash in the U.S. which could undermine the alliances. In the end the enormous U.S. military success in the Gulf War prevented such a backlash from emerging, but in the view of at least some German and Japanese experts it had been a close call.\(^3\)
What makes German and Japanese actions, or inaction, all the more puzzling is the stark contrast with the pre-war period. If there ever have been advanced industrial nations which could be called militaristic, because of the great social prestige they accorded their armed forces and the value they placed on military might as a means of achieving national objectives, than surely they were pre-war Japan and Germany. Yet, as the Gulf war once again demonstrated, if there are any major nations in the world today which could be called anti-militaristic, if not actually pacifistic, for the low esteem accorded to their military establishments and their unwillingness to contemplate the use of force, then once again they are Japan and Germany.

This aspect of German and Japanese state behavior is perplexing to many outside observers. Many analysts who share a realist outlook on international relations, such as John Mearsheimer writing on Germany or John Friedman and Meredith Lebard on Japan, have felt that such a military buildup is inevitable given the demise of the post-World War II system of superpower competition and the inherently competitive nature of the anarchic state system.\(^4\) Other commentators, such as A.L. Rosenthal and William Safire of the *New York Times*, have been even more pessimistic in their forecasts, warning of the likelihood of a reemergence of the old, militaristic patterns of behavior which are presumably rooted deep in the cultures of these two societies. \(^5\)

To date, however, there is little evidence of such
predictions coming true. Whereas in the past Japan and Germany were societies obsessed with military might, today they seem to be instead consumed with a passion for economic expansion. Many of the same qualities – loyalty, discipline, hard work and obedience – which helped make them so successful in their martial endeavors are similarly useful in their economic ones. However, instead of showing any interest in translating their new economic and technological prowess into military might, they seem to continue to prefer diplomatic and economic instruments in their foreign policies. Japan has outstripped the U.S. in the amount of foreign aid it disburses each year, and Germany has become the leading advocate among industrialized nations for extending economic assistance to the Soviet Union.

This aversion to the military and the use of force seems to be deeply rooted in the two nations' experiences of defeat and occupation, and has been positively reinforced by their economic successes and the relatively benign security environment created for them by the United States. Even now, as the generation which underwent these formative experiences slowly leaves the political stage, and the international environment which gave birth to the post-war German and Japanese approaches to security is being transformed, these attitudes evidently continue to survive and to shape their policies in the new, multi-polar world.

This study examines the process by which these attitudes have become embedded in German and Japanese society and how these attitudes have evolved over the course of the post-war period.
These attitudes are treated as part of each nation's own, unique political-military culture, which can be defined as being the constellation of attitudes, perceptions and patterns of behavior regarding national defense, the armed forces and the use of force that exists in a particular political system.

Political military cultures do not come into being in a single leap, as a result of some primal experience lost in the mists of time. Nor do all segments of the population of a particular society relate to it in the same manner. Rather political-military cultures emerge out of an ongoing process whereby historical events (war, economic disasters, social and technological trends and so on) interact with the already existing political-military culture to form a new set of attitudes and perceptions. At the same time, the process of change involves different groups in the political system, guided by their own peculiar set of experiences, perceptions and interests, constantly interacting, bargaining and struggling with other groups in order to not only to form policy, but also to win acceptance of their particular interpretations of historical events and their own preferred political-military culture.

In this sense one can see political-military culture as a form of negotiated reality. It is born out of the interaction of three elements: the existing political-military culture, historical forces and rational considerations. At different points in a nation's history one or another element may play a more dominant role, but it is always a combination of all three
causal elements which contributes to the ongoing and dynamic
development of the whole.

As the term "negotiate" suggests, there is nothing automatic
or inevitable about the kind of policies or supporting culture
which may emerge out of a particular conjunction of structural
forces. So for example, as will be shown later, under different
circumstances the military defeat and occupation of Japan and
West Germany might have produced a very different kind of
political-military culture than the one which ultimately did
emerge had the internal political struggles between different
ideological camps been resolved differently. Nonetheless, over
the course of the 1950s and 60s a consensus favoring a low-key,
non-military approach to national security began to emerge among
enough of the major German and Japanese political actors. This
consensus became linked with the enormous success of the post-war
German and Japanese systems and were legitimated through new,
national self understandings. This non-military, even anti-
military approach to national security by the early to mid-1970s
was institutionalised and became increasingly difficult to alter.

This dissertation is an account of the negotiations on
defense and security in Japan and West Germany, of the different
groups who became involved in the domestic political debate on
these issues, and of how those debates in turn influenced the
policy making process. It analyzes how various historical events,
most notably the war and occupation, but also the experiences of
the Cold War and detente, and deeper cultural forces (such as
notions of guilt) interacted to shape the political debate out of which emerged new attitudes towards the military and the use of force emerge. In doing so it does not deny the validity of other approaches, such as the realist or culturalist approaches which focus on deeply embedded structures. Rather the study seeks to examine how these forces are mediated by public debates so as to form new orientations which eventually begin to take on a dynamic of their own. In this sense historical-political culture can be understood as an effort to link the realist and cultural approaches together by looking at how they interact to produce new stable patterns of behavior.

The concept of political-military culture raises a number of larger questions about the issue of political culture in general. Theoretically it is possible to distinguish between two different, complementary approaches of political culture. One, which can be called the "anthropological political cultural" approach, examines the influence of deeply rooted, unreflected social structures, such as the family or fundamental beliefs about authority and power, have on political behavior. The other, "historical-political cultural" approach, focuses instead on how society reflects upon its political beliefs and traditions and how this process in turn influences politics.

Political-military culture clearly is one subset of a larger, historical-political culture of a nation. Defense policy formation is particularly well suited to the study of this kind of political culture because it automatically raises the question
of national identity and values, and thus questions about what the nation should be prepared to defend, and at what cost. Since similar dynamics are theoretically involved in almost all aspects of state policy, a better understanding of the evolution of political-military culture may provide insights on the development of national policy in other areas.

Japan and Germany are good cases to study in this context because they represent extreme (and important) examples of nations whose behavior in certain significant respects have departed from what other models would lead us to expect. They are unusual in that they have redefined their approach to security in such a way as to downplay the military far more than other nations, including not only middle powers such as France and Britain but also neutralist countries such as Sweden and Switzerland. They also represent extreme cases of apparent cultural change, which has been traditionally one of the more problematic areas in the study of culture in general. If political-military culture, and by extension historical political culture, is an analytically useful concept at all, it should help explain cultural change in these two cases.

Moreover, by studying two cases which differ significantly on a number of crucial levels (for example geo-strategic location or traditional notions of guilt) it may be possible to identify patterns of behavior which transcend the particulars of each case and which may in fact be common features of how all societies and their associated political cultures evolve.
Chapter 1 - Theoretical Issues and Methodology

In political science, and in the social sciences in general, there are two main approaches for explaining human behavior. There is the cultural approach, which stresses the motivational force of the ingrained values and norms of a society. And there is the rationalist approach, which focuses instead on the role of reasoning. Traditionally, theories trying to explain defense and security policy formation have been based almost entirely on the rational-choice model for explaining political behavior. They have tended to avoid using culture as a variable, except in the restricted sense, as ideology or as a cognitive limitation on rationality. (6)

There are many different varieties of such analyses. For example in international relations there is the realist or neorealist school, which focus on systemic variables such as the balance of power or the creation of international regimes that coordinate expectations and make possible cooperation between national actors. (7) Other approaches have concentrate on domestic political factors influencing foreign policy, such as bureaucratic procedures, competition between governmental actors, the relationships between military, political and business interest groups, or inter-party competition. (8)

Common to these approaches is the belief that security and defense policy making is guided by rational calculation aimed at maximizing objective utility, be it utility formulated in terms
of "national interest defined as power" (realism and neorealism), gaining influence in the policy process (bureaucratic and governmental actor models), or achieving electoral success (political parties). The fundamental premise is that any actor—be it an individual, a firm or the nation state—put in the same situation and operating with the same information, is likely to behave in the same way, regardless of his or her cultural-normative background.

Paradoxically, many scholars who study the domestic political processes of specific countries recognize that foreign policies are just as often legitimated through reference to ideals and values as through calculations of national interest. (9) The true rational choice theorist would be inclined to dismiss such legitimizations as being mere rhetoric, designed to bolster support while obscuring the real interests driving policy.(10) But many experts on the foreign policies of particular countries accept the notion that normative and ideological factors do play an important role in shaping foreign policy. Nonetheless because of the constraints imposed by their rational-choice theoretical frameworks, defense and foreign policy analysts have tended to avoid incorporating such variables as culture in their analysis. If such factors are considered at all, it is usually in the sense of ideology, which has a strong pejorative connotation and tends to limit analysis to consciously held systems of ideas and to exclude the influence of unarticulated beliefs and values.(11)
This study seeks to supplement conventional rational-choice approaches for explaining defense and security policy by developing a model of policy formation that brings in social and political cultural variables. It uses this model, based on the concept of political-military culture, to augment rational-choice and deep cultural models to achieve a better understanding of the German and Japanese cases. This cultural model is also designed to address one of the primary problem areas of the political-cultural approach, namely how to account for political change. This issue is a particularly salient one in the context of German and Japanese defense because of their apparent transformation from societies with strong martial traditions into ones which seem almost pacifistic in outlook.

Indeed, it is the central thesis of this study that precisely because of their martial pasts, rather than merely guilt over World War II, defense has become a controversial and difficult issue in both societies. In both Japan and West Germany the military has become associated with the old, pre-war anti-democratic orders and, of course, with the enormous suffering that had been inflicted on their own populations as well as on the peoples of other countries. This aspect of both nations' history has played an important role in guiding early defense policy making, and over the course of post-war debates on defense and security, the importance of restraining the military and associated nationalist forces has been stressed again and again. Distrust of a strong military has been so integrated into the
German and Japanese approaches to defense and security policy that it has become internalized and tends no longer to be the subject of serious debate. The weakness of the military has become one of the most important points of demarcation between the old and the new political orders and is closely associated with post-war democracy.

In the process, new interpretations of their history and of the legitimate roles of their nations in international politics have also become institutionalized. These approaches and their legitimations are now accepted by a substantial majority of their respective publics and by the different groups (political parties, intellectuals, media, etc.) which make up the two political systems. Consequently attempts to link military or defense policies with national or patriotic themes are likely to be perceived as threats to democracy and trigger massive domestic resistance. In short, this pronounced aversion to the military and to the use of force has become a central feature of Japan's and Germany's new political cultures. Even if there is a revival of national pride in either country, it is unlikely to revive the old, pre-war nexus between the state, the nation and the armed forces.\(^{13}\)

Approaches to analyzing foreign policy which tend to overlook or discount this cultural element have difficulty explaining the extraordinary German and Japanese reluctance to do more for their own as well as for international security. This reluctance is clearly reflected by the two nations' vacillation
in response to the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and their inability to send even token forces in support of the Allied effort, in spite of the fact that arguably they had the most at stake in assuring a stable supply of oil and attracted international criticism for their inactivity. This reluctance can also be seen in a number of other aspects of their behavior over the last 20 years. For example, it is becoming increasingly difficult purely in terms of optimizing their national interest to account for their singular unwillingness to increase their military contribution to international security. While until the 1970s both nations had relatively little latitude for independent action, arguably by the middle of the decade they had both the economic means and, with the increase in Soviet power relative to that of the U.S., the international security motive to considerably increase their non-nuclear military capabilities. In addition, after Afghanistan they came under increasing pressure from their chief ally, the U.S., to contribute more to their own security. These pressures increased again during the Gulf crises of 1987 and 1990-1991.

Operating under the narrow assumptions of the classical balance-of-power realist approach to international relations it would be difficult to explain why Japan and West Germany have acted the way they have to date, or to avoid predicting that they will soon greatly increase their military capabilities. Indeed, John Mearsheimer in a widely read article predicted precisely this with regard to Germany.\(^{14}\) John Friedman and Meredith Lebard have made similar forecasts for Japan. \(^{15}\) While these
are minority views among experts, they have been able to make a persuasive cases by remaining truer than most analysts to the tenets of the realist model. The alternative rationalist view, which stresses growing global interdependence and the declining utility of force relative to economic means of achieving national interest, provides a perhaps better explanation for German and Japanese behavior. Nonetheless it still has difficulty accounting for the apparent emotional depth of Japanese and German aversion to military measures, which is not shared by other countries, such as France and Britain, which can be classified as middle powers in the international system.\(^{16}\)

Political Culture

The concept of culture, along with rationality, is one of the metaconcepts of the social sciences, spanning many disciplines and employed in many different ways. The original use of the term can be traced back to Durkheim, who saw culture as an expression of the larger, non-material structures which unite society made up of individuals but which is larger than the sum total of its members.\(^{17}\) While considerable differences exist among social scientists regarding the definition of culture, at the very least they agree that culture embraces patterns of behavior which are not biologically determined and yet have been institutionalized, and are passed on from generation to generation. Culture helps simplify the problems of everyday
existence by providing principles which guide behavior and make sense of events. Without culture, the individual is forced to discover these principles on the basis of his own, necessarily limited experience. (18)

In political science it is possible to distinguish two major approaches to political culture that are based on different views about the origins of political culture. The first approach can be termed the anthropological approach. It sees political culture as rooted in the deeper structures of society, such as the personality structure, religion, language and primary socialization processes. The second approach, the historical approach, prefers to see political culture as being born of historically created structures and experiences and debates about how to interpret those experiences.

These two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A-juably they both look at different levels of the larger phenomenon of culture. Anthropological political culture is perhaps best suited for explaining political behavior on the interpersonal and small group level. For example, it is well-suited for explaining patterns of political communication, relations among political leaders, and between leaders and followers. Models relying on historical political culture are better at explaining behavior at the institutional and more remote, collective level. For example attitudes towards legislative procedure, the construction of national identities, and, of greatest relevance to the present study, defense and
security policies.(19) One of the factors hindering the further development of the concept of political culture has been the tendency to confound the two types of culture, both by its adherents and by its critics.

In practice, however, most studies of political culture have tended towards one or the other of the two approaches to political culture without distinguishing between the types of political behavior that they may be best suited to explaining. This has important implications for how one views the possibility of a fundamental change in patterns of political behavior.(20) Table 1 below summarizes the most important points of contrast between these two approaches.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units of analysis</th>
<th>Anthropological</th>
<th>Historical</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deep structures, i.e. family, personality, patterns of interaction religious-mythic world views</td>
<td>Historic events and the collective memory - state formation, social and political movements, key events, e.g. catastrophes, colonization, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents of change</td>
<td>Little real change, if any. Result of changes in primary socialization Inherent tensions causing cyclical variation</td>
<td>Interpretation and re-interpretation of historical events through public debates and secondary socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility for change</td>
<td>Little or none, cycles</td>
<td>Relatively large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The anthropological school, inspired by the works of Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and Geoffrey Gorer,(21) began
studying what was called national character before the term political culture was developed. For followers of this school culture was the generalized personality of a people. Through the analysis of a people's modal personality, and through the use of the methods and concepts of modern anthropology and psychology, they believed a better understanding could be obtained of the dynamics that drive politics. The term national character was subsequently abandoned, in part because it came too close to being a form of cultural determinism. Yet later scholars, such as Clifford Geertz, Morris Carstairs and Lucian Pye, continued studying the influence of deep social structures, adopting more sophisticated and nuanced views of culture.

Inasmuch as this approach links political behavior to deeply embedded cultural institutions it tends to see the possibility for political cultural change as being relatively limited. When it does occur, adherents of this view would expect it to take place very gradually. Since, however, political systems obviously do change, and sometimes quite rapidly, proponents of this school have tended to make use of one of two possible types of explanations. The first sees political cultures as going through cycles in which different elements of the political culture predominate at different points in time and under different conditions. For example, Samuel Huntington proposed that there is a basic cycle in American politics of alternating periods of creedal passion and of creedal passivity. Likewise Lucian Pye focuses on contradictions and paradoxes
that are built into every culture, similar to the psychological tensions which exist in individuals. At different times these internal tensions in the society (and by extension in its individual members) are resolved in different ways. In the case of China, for instance, the fundamental clash is between Confucian pragmatism (as exemplified by pre-Tiananmen Dengism) and Taoist-Buddhist mysticism (as personified by Mao Zedong during the cultural revolution and perhaps post-1989 Dengism).\(^{(25)}\)

A second solution to the problem of explaining change while retaining a view of culture as emerging out of deep social structures focuses on how political cultures reproduce themselves through socialization. Changes in socialization can translate into very different attitudes towards authority, the nation, and other politically significant issues.\(^{(26)}\) A number of scholars have focused on the impact of modernization on socialization and how this can alter political and economic behavior.\(^{(27)}\) Beyond the primary socialization phase, changes in secondary socialization at the school and even the political-institutional level (i.e. parties, bureaucracies, etc.) can be expected to have consequences for the formation of personality as well as the types of personalities which come into positions of political authority. Since secondary socialization does not necessarily belong to the deeper structures of society explanations stressing secondary socialization may be more properly categorized as being on the historical view of political culture. Adherents
of the anthropological view, in contrast, are likely to stress the cumulative nature of socialization, with initial socialization acting as a filter conditioning later learning.\(^{(28)}\)

The **historical approach** sees political culture as the product of the history of the collectivity. In keeping with the Durkheimian tradition, it rejects the need to look at the individual persona in order to understand group behavior. In the American academic tradition this school has often, but not exclusively, been quantitatively oriented in its methodology. Representative of this approach are such studies as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba *The Civic Culture*, Daniel Lerner *The Passing of Traditional Society* and, more recently, Ronald Inglehart *The Silent Revolution* \(^{(29)}\).

Political culture from this perspective is seen as the product of historical forces, such as modernization, democratization, wars, natural catastrophes, and intellectual movements, which become anchored in the collective memory of the society and support particular orientations towards politics. Each new experience is interpreted through the lenses of the pre-existing political culture, though some experiences obviously carry a greater weight than others and may force a reinterpretation of the older patterns of thinking.

Various groups participate in this process of interpretation and reinterpretation, each of which may be guided by different sets of interests and by their own sub-cultural perspectives, which may differ from those of the rest of society. Thus
historical forces, rational calculations of interest and differing cultural responses come together in debates out of which emerge both the nation's response to events, in the form of policy, and possibly a modified set of cultural understandings. In this sense, historical political culture can be understood as a form of negotiated reality. Different political groups through their participation in the policy debate are confronted with the reality of what the overall constellation of political forces will accept. While they may reject that political reality for a time, ultimately they are forced to either make compromises or run the risk of becoming politically marginalized. Even groups who see their immediate objectives achieved in the policy-making process have a strong incentive to make compromises in order to shore up political support for their initiatives. Such compromises need to be legitimated, both internally, within the group, and externally, to the larger public. While the group may choose to do so purely on the basis of tactical interest, saying in effect that they bowed to the superior will of the other side, in the long-run such legitimations are inherently unstable and reduce the likelihood that other, opposing groups will accept the concessions being offered. There are thus strong pressures, once compromises begin to be made, to justify them through reference to higher principles or by amending one's world view. Alterations legitimated in this way become difficult to alter.

Once enough of the main groups in a political system have made such compromises, the policy patterns born out of this
political bargaining process become increasingly difficult to change, especially if there remain fundamental philosophical differences between the different political actors. Over time these policies become even more stable, especially once a new generation of political leaders come to the fore who did not take part in the original policy making process and hence are less aware of the policies' arbitrary nature. For the new generation these policy outcomes are taken for granted.

Over time such experiences and interpretations of reality accumulate and sediment in overlapping layers to form a political culture, reinforced by such agents of secondary socialization as schools and literature. This process can be depicted diagrammatically as follows:

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T1  Historical-Political Culture/Associated Policies and Behavior

    Historical events

    Debates - Changes in secondary socialization

T2  Historical-political Culture' / Associated Policies and Behavior
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Following Parsons' approach to the cultural system \(^{30}\), historiographers tend to see the core of a particular political culture as being comprised of its interpretative codes (the most
basic of which is the language itself). These codes determine how reality is perceived and interpreted and give meaning to political action. Culture constantly interacts in a dynamic fashion with other, non-cultural forces (economic, political, etc.) simultaneously influencing and being influenced by them. This cultural core provides political culture with a measure of continuity and prevents it from being merely an ephemeral dependant variable without any explanatory power of its own. (31)

This view of political culture bears a remarkable similarity to Imre Lakatos' view of the process of theoretical development in the sciences. Lakatos contends that there are theoretical Research Programs with a core set of beliefs composed of positive and negative heuristics regarding the fundamental nature of reality. This core generates a "belt" of hypotheses which use these heuristics to explain empirical reality. Individual hypotheses may be disproved, but as long as the core remains vital it will generate new hypotheses to account for new data while leaving the core beliefs intact. (32)

In a similar way the core of a culture includes a central set of beliefs about the nature of reality which in turn produce various auxiliary hypotheses to explain empirical reality and guide behavior. Harry Eckstein refers to these core beliefs as orientations, which produce attitudes towards specific objects. (33) By way of illustration, one may posit that Russian culture has a core belief, or orientation, that political authority should be both centralized and absolute. The core
orientation towards authority shaped the Russian peoples' attitudes towards both the Tsar and the Communist Party, producing very similar patterns of total obedience both before and after the revolution.

This analogy between the development of scientific theories and cultural evolution also suggests why and under what circumstances cultural change is likely to take place. Eventually, Lakatos argues even core beliefs will change if they are unable to generate hypotheses with sufficient explanatory power to cope with new phenomena or the discovery of new evidence concerning old ones. They then enter a period of "degenerative decay" leading to their ultimate replacement by a new Research Program. In the same way, as Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky have recently noted, cultures remain vital only if their core principles continue to generate solutions which satisfy human needs.\(^{34}\) When cultures cease to provide such solutions, their members begin to doubt them, and ultimately defect if viable alternatives are available.\(^ {35}\)

Cultures, however, are even more resistant to change than Research Programs, because in addition to core beliefs about the nature of reality, which tell us how the world is, there are also normative ones, which tell us how the world should be. Thus, in contrast to Research Programs, cultures have a powerful emotional hold on their members and supply, at least in part, the criteria for measuring their own success. The historical approach assumes that over time the cultural core will respond to historical
pressures. In contrast, the anthropological view, given the deeply-rooted level of culture it focuses upon, is profoundly pessimistic. New institutions may arise in response to pressures, but in their essence they will be patterned after the old ones. (36)

Political-Military Culture

To explore the link between political culture and defense and security policy formation it is useful to introduce a new analytical concept, that of political-military culture. Political-military culture can be defined as a subset of the larger historical political culture encompassing those social orientations relating to defense, security, the military institution, and the use of force against other nations. (37)

The political-military culture of a nation influences defense and security policy formation in a number of ways: 1) it supplies fundamental goals and norms to the political actors; 2) it shapes the political actors' perceptions of the objective conditions within the society; 3) it influences their perception of the international situation; 4) it largely determines their ability to mobilize the resources of their society for military action.

Using the concept of political-military culture we can construct a model of how culture interacts with other variables to produce security policy. We can call this the "culturally-
bound actor model" to distinguish it from the rational actor model. In order to illustrate the role culture plays in influencing the making of policy and compare it with the conventional rational actor approach we can depict these two models diagrammatically. By necessity these diagrams are given here in highly simplified form. They are heuristic depictions (what Weber would call "ideal type" models) of two very different approaches to explaining human cognition and behavior, the rational and the cultural.

I. Rational Actor Model

```
National Interest ----> Political Actors
                      Policy Process
                         \
                      Security Policy
                         \
          Objective Domestic Conditions and Capabilities
                          \
                      Outcomes
```

II. Culturally-Bound Actor Model

```
strong/weak(1) ----> Socio-culturally defined Norms and Perceptions (cultural system)
                         \
                         \
                         Political Actors
                         Policy process
                         \
          Objective National Conditions and Capabilities
                          \
                      Security Policy
                         \
                      Outcomes
```

(1) the causal relationship in the case of the historical school is relatively strong, in the case of the anthropological school it is relatively weak
causes changes in (direct causal relationship)
shapes perceptions, provides goals

In the rational choice model the security pressures of the international system both influence the formulation of national interest by placing constraints on it and interact with national security policy to produce outcomes. The outcomes (the level of security in fact enjoyed by the society) impact upon objective national conditions and capabilities, affecting the kinds of policies that can be realized and generating demands which are incorporated in the national interest. The national interest is the optimal utility function of the overall society, constrained by its domestic capabilities and the security pressures exerted by the international environment.\(^{(38)}\) Cognition plays a role at this stage as the political actors can be assumed to be operating with limited information, possibly leading to misperception of the true international or domestic situations. The political actors then determine security policy, ideally on the basis of the national interest. They include in addition to the governmental branches directly involved in policy making also unofficial political forces such as interest groups, the media, public opinion and so forth. Internal governmental variables—bureaucratic interests, party and intragovernmental rivalries, and so forth—are all part of the policy process and may distort the overall national interest by giving greater weight to
particularistic concerns. Yet if policy diverges too far from the dictates of the overall national interest either the deteriorating condition of the objective national security situation will force reform or replacement of the political actors, or else the system will fail.

Change in security policy can be brought about by a number of different causes. Changes in the international system, such as shifts in the balance of power or the establishment of new economic regimes, can force political actors to recalculate the national interest and adjust policy accordingly. Changes in domestic capabilities may take place, perhaps as a result of poor security policy producing negative outcomes or because of endogenous factors (e.g. demographic growth, technological advances, etc.). Finally changes may occur in the policy-making process altering the way in which the national interest is calculated (the formation of new interest groups or change in government).

The cultural model is similar in most respects to the rational actor model described above. One key difference lies in what is seen as being the basis of political actors' actions. Instead of calculating the national interest based on the actors preferences, the culturally-bound political actor responds to security outcomes guided by the norms and schemes of interpretation supplied by the cultural system. Whereas the rational actor evaluates each event in the international system in terms of its impact on what can be done to maximize his
utility, the culturally-bound actor interprets such developments using the concepts and categories supplied by his cultural background and reacts according to norms and values. The mode of his responses are influenced by his cultural norms and values as well.

Of course, in real life it is impossible to find either a pure rational actor or culturally bound actor; both modes of cognition exist side by side in every individual. Indeed, arguably the two complement one another, for rationality by itself cannot define the goals which it methodically seeks to achieve, while culture without rationality would be static and prone to paralysis in the face of conflicting goals. The goals which rationality seeks to fulfill can only be provided by genetically determined instinct or by some outside agency, such as culture. Even the most cold-blooded practitioner of Realpolitik, the epitome of the rational actor in international relations, operates implicitly on the basis of an ethical code which places the interest of the nation-state above all other goals.

In other words, Realpolitik is itself based on a cultural system whose guiding principles are stripped down to a minimum. In modern times that minimum is the survival of the nation state and by extension the expansion of its power in order to ensure survival. In more ancient times it may have been loyalty to the ruler or the tribe, as in Kautilya’s Arthashastra or Machiavelli’s The Prince (though already in Machiavelli one can
observe the tension between loyalty to the nation and to the ruler). Even if one maintained that men are born with an instinct for survival, and perhaps a lust for power as well, and that all other norms and values are fundamentally subordinate to these instincts, empirically they also seem born with a need for community. How that community (family, region, religion or nation) and the individual's relationship to that community are defined is determined by culture.

It is also important in this context to avoid the false dichotomy of rational versus nonrational when comparing these two approaches to explaining human behavior. As Max Weber pointed out there is both value rationality, the maximizing of particular values, and instrumental rationality, the weighing of the costs and benefits of actions. As long as an individual combines value rationality with instrumental rationality he remains rational. It is when an actor ceases to weigh the costs and benefits of his actions, and fails to consider whether his goals are achievable, that his behavior ceases to be rational.

Perhaps the most important difference between the two approaches is what they believe the origins of values and preferences to be. The rational-actor school sees values and preferences as being inherent in human nature and common to all men. Be they French, German, American, Japanese or Eskimo, all human beings share common needs and aspirations, which they seek to maximize. These values and preferences are more or less set, and do not change. The culturalist, on the other hand, would
argue that while some goals are common to all people, the most basic of which is the instinct for self-preservation, man, in contrast to other creatures, is instinct-deficient.\(^{39}\) Certain of his needs and wants, as well as ways of trying to cope with his environment, have to be provided by his society. Hence these goals can change and there may be considerable variation in the values of members of different societies.

Changes in the objective condition of the country may trigger changes in the cultural system, leading in turn to shifts in the norms and interpretative schemes of the actors. But alteration of the cultural system can be expected to be neither rapid nor easy. The historical view of culture believes that the causal link between the objective conditions of a society and its cultural system are fairly strong. The anthropological approach, in contrast, would see it as being weak; even if the objective conditions deteriorate so much that new political institutions come into being and most of the old political actors are overthrown, the basic cultural patterns informing policy remains much the same.

**Selection of the Cases**

Japan and Germany are particularly interesting cases for the study of political-military culture for a variety of reasons. First, one need only think of the impact of the German peace movement or the strict Japanese adherence to "peace diplomacy"
and the three non-nuclear principles to see that the issues of security and defense have been as highly ideologized in these two countries as anywhere in the world. Indeed, the extremely emotional and complex debates over defense in these two countries are baffling to outsiders and have caused more than one foreign observer to prefer likening them to ideological disputes as opposed to rational deliberations on national interest and military strategy. Germany and Japan can therefore be said to represent extreme cases of defense debates where disagreements over values and norms seem to play at least prima facie an unusually large role. If the theory of political culture, and by extension the notion of political-military culture, has any validity at all, it should apply to these two cases. If, in fact it turns out that such factors do play an important role in Japan and West Germany, it would be necessary to examine other cases where the cultural factor is not as obviously important in order to further determine the usefulness of the approach. (40)

Second, because they represent such dramatic instances of change, they raise the question of the mutability of political culture in an especially clear fashion. Moreover it is useful to select both an Asian and a Western society as case studies because if there are differences in behavior due to deep cultural factors they may be expected to stand out in sharper relief, and secondly in order to underline the universality of this perspective and to avoid the charge of ethnocentrism.

Two cases have been chosen for study instead of one for the
simple reason that doing so strengthens the findings and imposes the discipline of comparison upon the analysis. If, for example, the political-military cultural approach proves applicable in one case, but not the other, the researcher is forced to try to explain the discrepancy. If, on the other hand, the findings in both cases prove consistent with one another, this would greatly support one or the other view of the role of culture in influencing political actions.

In addition Germany and Japan are similar enough to make a comparison in terms of political culture possible. At the same time they are sufficiently dissimilar to allow for some control of the variables. First of all, they are similar in the crucial category of having been previously militaristic societies with feudal pasts who have undergone transformations in their attitudes towards the military. They were also remarkably similar in a number of other respects in the pre-war era. Both were relatively late industrializers and despite pressures from a burgeoning middle class had a less than happy history with democratization. As rising new powers on the world scene they were dissatisfied with the existing world order and were determined to carve out a larger sphere of influence at the expense of the already established imperial powers. Finally, they were allies in the Second World War, were defeated and subjected to foreign occupation. In the immediate post-war period both were then forced to rebuild their political institutions along democratic, American lines. The old order was more or less
delegitimated (more in West Germany, less in Japan;), making theirs not only a military defeat but a moral one as well. In the post-war period both nations have been close allies of the U.S., preferring to follow the U.S. lead in foreign policy and defense matters while concentrating on economic development to the point of becoming the objects of international criticism. Finally they are politically speaking non-nuclear middle powers, while economically, and increasingly technologically, they are great powers if not superpowers. (41) Without these basic similarities the two nations would be difficult to compare.

On the other hand the differences between the two are equally obvious. Geography, it has been said, is destiny. In this regard it is hard to imagine two nations more dissimilar than Japan and Germany. Japan is an island nation which, while strategically located, has been relatively insulated from the pressures of the Cold War. West Germany, on the other hand, is a continental power, directly confronted by the armed might of the Soviet Union on its borders. Moreover Germany was until quite recently a divided nation (the problem of the Japanese Northern Territories, though important, obviously cannot compare in magnitude), a fact which has exerted a profound influence on all levels of German politics. Through NATO and the European Community (EC) West Germany is embedded in a dense network of economic and military ties with its neighbors, while Japan is relatively isolated except for its far more tenuous military relationship with the U.S.. And, of course, culturally speaking
Japan is an Asian nation, with a syncretistic blend of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism, and is strongly influenced by ideas and philosophies coming from the East Asian mainland. Germany, in contrast, shares in the Christian and Greco-Roman tradition of Western civilization. Finally, Germany and Japan differ on a whole range of lesser items, such as the existence of a divided political Left in Japan and its consequent failure to form an effective opposition able to take power from the conservatives. Likewise there exists a far stronger sense of war guilt in West Germany as compared to Japan. These differences allow for some control of the variables. So, for example, it has been argued that idealistic pacifism is kept alive in Japan because the Left has never borne the responsibility of governing. Yet in Germany such idealism is just as strong or even stronger than in Japan, despite the fact that all the main parties have taken turns at governing and have the very real possibility of doing so again in the future.

Methodology

Using the concept of political-military culture as outlined above, we can now present the object of this study as being the exploration of the evolution of the German and Japanese political-military cultures in the post-war era. Our approach will be to examine the history of the post-war debates on defense, the events which stimulated them, the roles in those
debates played by different groups comprising the political system, and the policies which emerged out of those debates. In this way it is hoped that an interpretation of defense policy formation will be developed which will shed light on the central puzzle of how these cultures made the transition from being martial to anti-military and why these patterns persist even some 45 years after the end of World War II.

For the purpose of this study the examination of West German and Japanese political-military culture will be restricted to looking at the debates about defense and security as they have developed over the 45 years of the post-war era (1945 to 1990). The type of debates include interpolations in the national assemblies, speeches and memoirs of political leaders, newspaper editorials and journal articles, party platforms and available government documents. Public opinion polls as well were used as important sources of information on attitudes outside of the elites. In short, this study will look wherever thinking about the subjects of the military, defense, security and the political factors shaping them can be found. To augment these types of documentary sources extensive interviews have been conducted with representative members of the different political sectors participating in the defense debate and defense policy making process. In some instances the interviews provided new data, in others they have helped provide a better understanding of the general political and psychological background in which the defense debates took place.
These debates cannot be considered uncritically. It was necessary to look at the political context in which they took place, and to give attention to such important background factors as the extent of the military buildup, the external military threat, alliance pressures, economic conditions, social development and ideological movements, as well as electoral factors. Particular attention has to be given to the connections made in these debates between security issues and other political issues, especially those concerning national identity and traditions. In tracing the development of German and Japanese political-military cultures, shifts in the complex of issues (i.e., in what issues are raised, when, and in what context) are of fundamental significance.

Focusing on the evolution of defense debates is a useful approach which sheds light on the formation of political-military culture. It does not, however, cover all the aspects of Germany's and Japan's historical political cultures with relevance for attitudes towards the military and defense. A more complete survey would require looking at other avenues of secondary socialization, including the treatment of the military in novels, movies and television as well as examining how security issues are presented in the classroom and textbooks.

Also it would be useful if greater attention could be given to anthropological political culture factors, such as the possible connections between specific culturally determined personality features and attitudes towards security and how these features
may change as a result of shifts in the family structure, child rearing practices, and so forth. A strong prima facie argument, which would not necessarily contradict the approach adopted here, could be made that Japan and Germany have in effect sublimated their deeply ingrained aggressive impulses into economic pursuits. Instead of seeking victory on the battle field, today they strive for dominance in the corporate boardroom and the shop floor; instead of invading Eastern Europe or South East Asia, they are preparing to buy them. Anthropological political cultural factors, however, are only looked at insofar as they directly relate to the defense debate, for example how they may help shape how these two societies dealt with the question of war guilt, and unfortunately it is not possible to systematically explore this provocative thesis. It may be pointed out in passing, however, that even if one accepts that Japan and Germany's focus on economics has diminished their interest in military matters, this by itself is not a sufficient explanation for their profound aversion to contemplating military solutions to national security problems. After all history is full of examples of commercial powers - from ancient Athens to 19th century Britian - which had no qualms about using force when it suited their national interest.

For analytical purposes the history of the post-war Japanese and West German debates on security policy have been broken down into three periods. At the end of each period a major policy decision, each representing a watershed in the development of
security policy in the respective countries, has been selected as a point of demarcation. For Japan the first period stretches from 1945 to 1960 and the revision of the Security Treaty with the U.S., the second period covers the years from 1960 to 1976 and the formulation of the Basic National Defense Policy Outline, and the last period looks at developments thereafter till the end of the Cold War in 1990. In Germany the first period lasts from 1945 to 1955 when West Germany formally joined NATO, the second period spans the years between 1955 and the dual track decision in 1979, while the third period looks at events up to Autumn 1990 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which represents not only the beginning of a new epoch in German politics but has profound implications for the German security debate as well. While in both cases the scheme of periodization seeks to respect the circumstances peculiar to each country, the time spanned by the different periods have been kept roughly similar in order to control for changes in the international environment.

Obviously German and Japanese defense policy has not come to an end in 1990, and while the Fall of the Berlin wall marked the end of an era of superpower confrontation, thereafter both nations continued to grapple with the problem of how to adjust to the changes in the international environment wrought by the events of 1990-1991. In 1991 West Germany began major reductions in the Bundeswehr, and for the first time there was serious discussion of the use of German forces outside of the NATO area. Likewise in Japan the Diet debated Japanese participation in
peace keeping operations.

The subsequent study is organized into three sections, each covering the development of the political military cultures in both Japan and West Germany. Chapters two through seven describe the evolution of West German and Japanese political military cultures in the first period immediately after the war. Particular attention has been paid to this period because the fundamental trends established during this time proved crucial for subsequent developments. Chapters eight and nine describe the changes which occurred in the middle period, while chapters ten and eleven cover developments in the last period.

At the end of each section there will be a brief subsection comparing the development of the two political-military cultures. In these subsections consideration is given to what the addition of the political-military culture approach brings to understanding of defense policy formation and how it explains any apparent deviations from what rational actor models might lead one to expect. It also examines the extent to which there are signs of a reemergence of more traditional, militaristic patterns of behavior, as might be expected if one subscribes to the belief that cultures never change.

Since attitudes and views on any subject are never evenly distributed across a society, it is necessary to take into account differences between the major ideological camps in each country as well as between the different major sectors of their overall political cultures. The term sector as used here (42)
refers to five major groupings in the society: public opinion, the media, intellectual opinion, business interests and the political parties. This does not pretend to be a definitive system of classification. It may be possible to add other groups (such as the government bureaucracy) or to break down any particular group even further (for example Left versus Right political parties). This particular schema has been chosen because it seems fairly comprehensive without being overly complex.

At the end of each of the major empirical chapters (chapters three to eight) there will be a description of the political-military culture at the end of the period examined. First the ideological dividing lines will be described, taking care to define what Right, Left and Center means in the context of the political-culture of each country. As will be shown later, there are substantial differences between the meanings given to the terms Left and Right in Germany and Japan, and in how the ideological boundaries are drawn. In Japan one can identify a clear Left-Right spectrum, in West Germany the situation has been more complicated. The next step in the analysis explores which ideological positions dominated in the different sections and why. By tracking changes in the positions taken by the different ideological camps and ideological shifts in the different sectors it is hoped that a larger portrait of the political-military culture of the time can be achieved. Shifts can be identified by comparing the positions taken in the defense debate by the
different sectors of the political military culture during one period and comparing it to their positions in the latter periods. Finally by looking at the changes in the debate, in the issues raised, by whom and how they are interconnected, between the different periods an overview can be obtained of how the political-military culture over the course of the post-war period has evolved and we can begin to judge the utility of the political-military cultural, and by extension the historical-political cultural approach.
Chapter 2 - Defeat and Occupation

At 12:00 Noon, August 15, 1945, NHK radio broadcasting system in Tokyo sent out to the embattled Japanese Empire a message from the Emperor to his subjects. It was a remarkable statement, both for its historical significance in bringing an end to the war of Asia, and as a reflection of the Japanese mood at the time of defeat.

To Our Good and Loyal Subjects - After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation...

... We declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe on the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best done by everyone ... the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.

... Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation ,ever firm in its faith in the imperishableness in this divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction of the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so ye may enhance the innate glory of the state and keep pace with the progress of the world.(43)

Nowhere was there any direct mention of the word surrender, or an explanation of what provisions of the Potsdam declaration meant. Yet most Japanese immediately understood the broadcast’s
basic significance: the War in Asia, which had been waged by the whole Japanese nation with unparalleled ferocity and determination, and in which as many as three million Japanese had lost their lives, had ended in defeat and ignominy. The war had been a devastating one. A total of 8,045,094 Japanese had been killed or wounded in the war. 7.5 million dwellings had been destroyed. In Tokyo, which had been ravaged by fire bombings, the pre war population of 6,700,000 (1940) had been reduced to 2,800,000. In one air raid on Tokyo that year over 140,000 had perished in a single evening. In Northern China Soviet forces were overrunning Japanese held territories, triggering a massive exodus of the 2.5 million Japanese settled in those territories. An estimated 594,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were captured by Soviet forces, many of whom were to die in captivity (44).

In addition to human losses the economic damage of the war had been immense. An island nation heavily dependent on imports for its food and industry, Japan had been nearly strangled by the Allied blockade. Industrial production was down to a mere fraction of what it had been before, and much of the country was facing famine.

In addition Japan was the only nation to suffer the horrors of atomic war. Perhaps 100,000 Japanese died almost immediately at Hiroshima, and 75,000 more at Nagasaki. Many more were to die in the years to come from radioactive fallout and related illnesses. Tens of thousands more were maimed and crippled by the
atomic blasts. The memory of atomic bombing was to leave a deep scar on the national psyche and would play a special role in the subsequent development of the Japanese sense of victimization in the War.

Yet despite the enormity of its losses and despite its obviously hopeless military situation, the decision to surrender had not been an easy one. Some, including the circle around Prince Konoye Fumimaro\(^4\) had foreseen defeat and had begun looking for ways to end the war well before August 1945. Konoye's group represented the old Japanese establishment and included future Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichiro. While the majority of its members had supported Japan's territorial expansion in Asia, they recognized that the war was going against them and were eager to negotiate a settlement with the US in order to minimize Japanese losses, preserve the institution of the Emperor, and stave off the threat of a communist uprising. But many military men, were determined to resist defeat at all costs. Even after atomic bombs had been dropped the hard-liners wanted to go through with plans for Hondo Kessen, the final battle for the defense of the Japanese homeland, even at a probable cost of millions of Japanese lives. In the end only skillful maneuvering on the part of Prince Konoye's group and Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, assisted by the Emperor's personal intervention, managed to force the military to accept defeat in a dramatic cabinet meeting on August 14.\(^6\)

Thus at the end of the war the political situation in Japan
differed greatly from that of its war-time ally, Germany. First, unlike the Nazis, Japan surrendered and did not fight to the bitter end. Consequently much of the Japanese war-time leadership survived and was in control at the start of the post-war period. Secondly, like other Japanese "modernizations" the militarist movement in Japan had been imposed from above, supported by many of the old power elite and working through established political institutions. In contrast, the Nazis created a new social movement, organized into a mass party (there was no "fascist party" in Japan as there was in Italy and Germany) which seized political control and set about to create a "new order".\(^{(47)}\) Whereas in Germany there had been a considerable, though ultimately ineffective opposition, to the Nazis(for example the 20th of July officers' plot to assassinate Hitler) in Japan, virtually every political and social grouping had supported the war effort. Thus, to a far greater extent than in Germany, the groups and forces which had been involved in starting the war were to remain in power even after the war had ended, making it even more difficult than in Germany to find centrist leaders who had been untainted by their support for the war. This tendency was reinforced by the Occupation's decision to rule indirectly, largely acting via the existing administrative system rather than trying to govern directly, as in Germany.\(^{(48)}\)

Given the nature of the Japanese defeat and the comparatively greater continuity between the post and pre-war political systems, and in light of the extraordinary fanatical resistance
Japanese troops had displayed in the course of the Pacific campaign, it is remarkable how smoothly the Occupation went. Arguably never before in the history of mankind has so swiftly and so completely a peaceful and cooperative relationship been established between the victors and the vanquished of such a savage war. While there were many elements making for this peaceful transition from bitter enemy into docile and even enthusiastic subjects, certainly one of the most important contributing factors was precisely the continued functioning and cooperation of the Japanese elite. (49) The Japanese leadership, no doubt largely motivated by a simple instinct for self-preservation, went out of their way to cooperate with (and where possible, to manipulate) the Occupation authorities.

At the same time, while this continuity may have served to ease the administration of Japan, it also held the potential of facilitating a return to the pre-war system. It may be argued that Japan in 1945 resembled Germany after WW I more than after WW II. Japan, like Germany in 1918, had lost an Empire and was facing grave social and economic unrest, including the at least perceived threat of a Marxist take over. The leadership which had started and prosecuted the War was more or less the same leadership which had created the Empire. The Japanese felt far more than the Germans that they had fought a good fight and had simply been beaten on military terms, rather than on moral grounds. It was therefore not at all inconceivable in 1945 to imagine that 20 years down the line Japan could progress in much
the same fashion as Germany did in the 1920s and 30s. That a reactionary backlash failed to materialize was due to a number of factors, including the new lessons which were drawn from the war, the demilitarization of Japan under the American occupation, and the establishment of a new national mission. The following three sections will examine these factors in some detail.

Lessons of the War

The war had left profound spiritual scars on the national psyche. For the first time in its recorded history Japan, which had held an unshakable faith in the invincibility of its armed forces, had been conquered. After the defeat a period of bitter self-questioning began, an asking after the purpose and the causes of the great calamity which had befallen Japan. This process was vigorously promoted by the Allied occupation, which as in Nazi Germany, was determined to punish the perpetrators of war-time atrocities and, as part of the demilitarization program, to demonstrate to the Japanese people the error of their ways. Yet, though some elements of Japanese society, notably journalists and intellectuals, did indeed engage in a serious process of painful self-examination and recrimination, the overall response of the society was ultimately far weaker than the mood of self-critique and repentance that came to permeate post-war West Germany.
From the start, however, bringing war criminals to justice was to prove a difficult affair. Though by the end of the war long lists of Japanese war criminals had been drawn up by the allies, large numbers of war criminals managed to escape prosecution in the confusion of the immediate post-war.\(^{(50)}\) Nonetheless between 1945 and 1951 a total of 5,700 so-called class B and C war criminals were tried in courts throughout Asia. Of these, 920 were executed. These trials, while they received considerable attention in Japan, were primarily aimed at simply dispensing justice to perpetrators of various misdeeds.

The Tokyo war crime trials of class A war criminals, like the Nürnberg trials in Germany, had a far more ambitious purpose and were intended as a showcase in which the leaders of war-time Japan were to punished for their crimes against peace and against humanity. By exposing the misdeeds of their leaders it was hoped that the basic justice of the Allied cause could be demonstrated to the Japanese people and help create a national sense of war guilt which would prevent Japan from ever again going down the path of military expansion. While this goal ultimately may have been achieved thanks to a variety of other factors, the trials themselves were to prove a singularly ill-fated enterprise.\(^{(51)}\)

Ultimately 7 of the defendants, including Prime Minister Tojo Hideaki, were executed and 16 others were sentenced to life imprisonment. But from start to finish the proceedings were so riddled with difficulty that in the end even many Americans were forced to conclude that the trial had become a mere display of
vengeance on the part of the victors.

Right in the beginning SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers - the official name of the military government in Japan), fearing domestic unrest,\(^{52}\) crippled the investigations by not only excluding the Emperor from prosecution, but by even refusing to allow him to be called to testify at the proceedings in order to prevent possible domestic unrest. Since technically the Emperor was the all powerful head of state in whose name the war had been carried out, and since he had been present at most of the important meetings of the cabinet both before and during the War, where his approval had been necessary for all official decisions, his exclusion from the proceedings was a considerable obstacle to establishing the true course of events. By doing so SCAP robbed both the prosecution and the defense of its most valuable witness and demonstrated the artificial and political character of the trials before they had even begun. \(^{53}\)

There were many other difficulties as well. First of all was the nature of the charges, "waging aggressive war" and "crimes against humanity" were unprecedented crimes in the history of international law and difficult to attribute to a small group of individuals alone. Furthermore the defendants themselves, out of religious devotion for the Emperor, refused to give evidence or became evasive whenever matters which might implicate the Emperor arose, even when doing so hurt their own positions in the trial.\(^{54}\) This self-sacrificial display helped to reinforce the defendants' popular image as martyrs. And if problems with the
legal basis of the trials and the uncooperativeness of the
witnesses were not enough, the odds were obviously overwhelmingly
stacked in the favor of the prosecution. The Allies determined
the law and the proceedings, they drew up the charges and chose
the defendants. Increasingly Japanese popular anger against the
defendants turned to pity as the trials proceeded.

But perhaps even without all of these problems, it is still
likely that the trials would not have had the effect sought after
by the Occupation authorities. For, to put it quite simply, it
appears that the Japanese people on the whole did not feel much
guilt over the war. On the contrary, they felt that it was they
who had been the victims, not the aggressors in the war. A
variety of both historical and cultural factors were responsible
for this attitude. There was the widely held view, expressed most
eloquently by some of the defendants in the war crime trials,
that in fact it was the West that had forced the war on Japan.
General Tojo, the chief defendant in the trials, produced a long
testimonial in which he skillfully argued that Japan had been
forced into war by the Western Allies, who were encircling it
militarily and waging economic warfare by cutting its vital oil
supplies. While Tojo would accept no blame for starting the war,
he took full responsibility for losing it, thus demonstrating his
spirit of self-sacrifice while underlining the basic justness of
his cause. With help from an inept Allied prosecution, Tojo
managed to transform himself from a disgraced military leader
into a hero.(55) Tojo’s arguments were further expanded upon by
another war crimes trial defendant, Ishiwara Kanji, who traced
the origins of the war back to Commodore Perry forcing a happily
isolated Japan to enter an international society of rapacious
Imperial powers. Japan, in order to defend itself, became a
disciple to the Western powers who had carved up Asia and Africa
among themselves, and in learning their lessons
too well, won their enmity. He angrily summed up his case saying
"... it is not me you should sub poena, but Commodore
Perry!".\(^{56}\)

These arguments well express the view of World War II that
many Japanese after the war and since have held on the issue of
War Guilt. Even much of the political Left, which is highly
critical of the pre-war establishment, partly accepts this view.
While they ferociously attack the role played by the Japanese
military-political and economic leadership in causing the war,
they implicitly agree with conservative defenders of the war and
are equally critical of the capitalist West for its racist and
colonial policies, and for dropping the atomic bombs of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.

An additional factor may have been the differing nature of
the Japanese atrocities compared to the German ones: the Japanese
involved average soldiers acting in the thick of action,
while the Germans involved special units using the latest
scientific methods to systematically and efficiently kill
millions. Finally, whereas in Germany large numbers were killed
on German soil, and the Allied forces could force thousands of
Germans to tour the concentration camps, no such demonstration was possible in Japan.

There may have been a further, deeper cultural dimension involved as well. The Japanese conception of the individual's relationship to his environment, including his social environment, differs greatly from that of the West. The conceptualization of morality peculiar to the West is deeply rooted in the Christian view of the individual whose actions are ultimately judged by the standards of a higher, non-socially constructed morality. In contrast in the Japanese tradition the individual is a single unit within a larger group, and it is through the group that values and moral standards are set. The individual's conscience is held responsible not to some divine higher standard of justice which exists beyond the group, but rather to the standards of the divine as expressed through the group. In the case of the Japanese, the relevant group is of course the Japanese nation. In the pre-war period the Japanese nation was conceived as a single family, ordered along the principles of Confucian hierarchy and headed by the Emperor. The Emperor, it was taught and fervently believed, was the direct descendant of an unbroken line of rulers reaching back into the primordial past to the sun goddess Amaterasu. The Emperor was thus the direct link of the Japanese people to the divine, giving Japan its unique place in the hierarchy of nations, and the fount of all values. (57) The individual felt bound to obey the will of the Emperor in the same way as a fervent Christian might feel
obliged to obey the Pope or the precepts found in the Bible. (58)

Given this deep and profound difference in the Japanese and Western conceptions of man, god, nature and morality, no wonder it proved difficult to apply Western standards of justice and morality to Japan.

This clash of cultural views was reflected in the proceedings of the trials where to the bafflement of the American prosecutors the defendants, who were the top leaders of the nation, claimed again and again that they had in fact been powerless and had only followed the already established consensus. While German war criminals often made similar claims, the infamous "I was only following orders", they nonetheless recognized their actions were intrinsically evil. But they, frequently using a debased version of Nietzschean nihilist philosophy to legitimate their actions, rejected conventional morality in their worship of a "will to power". Where Okuda cringed before his prosecutors Goering roared with laughter. For the Japanese leadership such reasoning was quite unthinkable. (59)

To the last they saw themselves as faithful servants of the Emperor obeying a code of situational ethics.

Most Japanese, despite the government's declared Ichiooku zange, the repentance of a 100 million, (60) refused to confront the accusation that any misdeeds had occurred. Instead there was a massive, almost instinctive effort to forget, or ignore what had happened. In later years this silence on the atrocities of the war was to allow for these memories to become diluted and
washed away to the point where in the 1980s it became possible to claim that they had never occurred at all.

Thus in the 1950s, after the Occupation had ended, there existed but little sense of guilt which might prevent a resurgence of militarism. On the contrary, while memories of Japanese wrong doings were conveniently ignored, memories of Japanese losses, especially those due to the atomic bombings, were greatly emphasized, contributing to the popular image of Japan as a victim and creating at least the potential for a thirst for revenge. These conditions combined to allow Japan to draw its own lessons from World War II, ones which differed from the lessons the Americans had intended them to learn, but which were not opposed to following the course the Allies had plotted for post-War Japan and would help ensure that Japan would not go down the path to militarization again.

The most important of these lessons was a profound antipathy and mistrust for the military. While the Emperor and the nation as a whole was not blamed for the war, the military was. The militarist leaders of the 1930s and 40s came to be seen as having dragged the nation into a futile struggle against obviously overwhelmingly superior opponents, needlessly sacrificing millions of lives. The military was reviled and ridiculed in the press and military men were ostracized in their daily lives. Whereas in the pre-war period the military had been revered as the highest form of service to the nation, the war dealt a blow to its prestige from which it never was to recover.
A second consequence of the war experience was a reaffirmation of Japan's sense of vulnerability while changing attitudes on how to try to cope with it. In the pre-war Japan had been acutely aware of its weakness. Geographically, though an island, it was surrounded by powerful neighbors, the Soviet Union, China and the U.S. and was largely dependent on the outside world for food, markets and the raw materials needed by its industries. This sense of vulnerability had been one of the driving forces behind Japan's pre-war military expansionism.\(^{62}\)

To compensate for its weakness, Japan had tried to project a powerful front toward the outside world, and developed an extremely aggressive approach to foreign relations.

But in the post-war period while the sense of vulnerability remained, the Japanese response to it went in the opposite extreme. Instead of its earlier exaggerated belligerency, the new Japanese approach to foreign relations stressed developing friendly ties with all nations based on a philosophy of "omni-directional diplomacy" (\textit{zenko gaiko}). While Japan's leaders appear to have been aware of the need of some kind of armed forces in the future, the popular attitude seemed to be that military power was less than useless.

Finally as a result of the war there emerged a tremendous belief in the overwhelming military, economic and cultural superiority of the West in general, and of the United States in particular. In the popular culture of the immediate post-WW II period there was a reemergence of the worship of things Western
and young Japanese strove to copy everything that the U.S. had to offer, from big-band music to the American style of management.

These lessons of World War II were to have a decisive impact on the formation of a new Japanese military establishment, as well as on Japanese attitudes towards problems of defense in the 1940s and 50s, and beyond.

Swords into Plowshares

Unlike most historical occupying armies, the U.S. forces during the first years of the Occupation of Japan set out to do far more than to merely disarm their former opponents; they also sought to demilitarize and democratize the Japanese nation. While it has been argued that the American Occupation stressed the demilitarization aspect of its program more than democratization (63), in fact the two were probably inextricably linked in the minds of its leaders. They believed that if they got rid of the anti-democratic remnants of the authoritarian past, removed the evil individuals who had led Japan into war and destruction and gave the common Japanese man a taste of freedom and democracy, Japan would never again become a threat to the U.S. or the rest of the free world.

The first task which had to be faced was the enormous chore of physically dismantling the gigantic Japanese military establishment. There were perhaps close to 7 million men still in uniform, and there were over three and a half million Japanese
soldiers and a similar number of civilians overseas who had to be brought back to their homeland. Then there was the enormous stockpile of military equipment left over from the war which had to be disposed of.

Of course the destruction of existing stores of weapons made little sense if the means to produce them were not also removed. Accordingly various controls were placed on Japanese industry and all weapon production was immediately banned, though the plants would lie idle for many years before being converted to new purposes. The Japanese aircraft industry as well was largely dismantled and all production of planes was halted. Military airfields were turned over for agricultural use and no Japanese national was permitted to learn how to fly, since a pool of trained pilots was considered an important military resource.\(^6\)

There was also the heavy burden of war reparations which could have delayed Japanese economic recovery for many years.

But the Occupation was not content with simply physically dismantling the military establishment. While they had rejected proposals to permanently disable Japanese heavy industry, U.S. policy makers in the State and War Departments were convinced, rightly or wrongly \(^6\), that the great Japanese industrial concerns, the Zaibatsu, had been one the main forces behind half a century of Japanese Imperial expansion. According to a report prepared by a commission sent by the State and War Departments in March 1946, the Zaibatsu represented "excessive concentrations of economic power" which hindered the development of truly
competitive capitalism and the emergence of a large middle class, believed to be an important prerequisite for stable democracy. Accordingly anti-monopoly "bust-the-Zaibatsu" laws were decreed, along with a Fair Trade Commission, to prevent unreasonable restraints on trade and unfair methods of competition. Not only the great corporations themselves, but also Japan's old economic leadership was to be driven out, and all the directors, managers and major stockholders of companies targeted for dissolution were to be divested of their assets.

The rest of Japan's military, political and intellectual leadership as well was to be purged of harmful elements. Article 6 of the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945 stated that "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest".\(^{66}\) The basic assumption behind this policy was, as with the war crimes trials, that the blame for the war and Japan's aggressiveness could be assigned to particular individuals motivated by selfish purposes, as opposed to rising from systemic factors. Once the corrupt leadership was safely disposed of the country could be turned towards peace and democracy.

There followed a massive purge of individuals considered to be untrustworthy in the political, bureaucratic, business and media worlds. Unlike the war crime trials, the purges were carried out on the basis of category rather than evidence of individual wrong doing. The categories to be purged included not
only the senior military leadership, the thought police (Shisokeisatsu), and the dreaded Japanese field gendarmerie (Kempeitai), but also a broad segment of the Japanese elite. Purged individuals were removed from position of authority and banned from holding political office. In addition, for 10 years after an individual had been purged no person related to him by blood, marriage or adoption was allowed to succeed to his post.

At first the purge was relatively mild, based on a system of questionnaires to be filled out by everyone in critical categories. But in 1947, a few months before the first post-war elections in which SCAP feared there would be a major comeback of old pre-war politicians and their cohorts, the purge was extended dramatically. Questionnaires were dispensed with and anyone in the specified categories could be purged by the committees on the basis of "reasonable evidence". Altogether over 200,000 person were purged under the Occupation, including no fewer than three of its future prime ministers (Kishi, Hatoyama and Ishibashi).

Inevitably many of those who were purged were in fact innocent of wrong doing, and there were many others who fully deserved to be removed but were not. In addition the purge was carried out unevenly, with the brunt of its effects felt by the ex-military men upon whom the Japanese officials in charge of the purge were all too glad to pin the blame upon. In contrast only 2% of those bureaucrats who were screened were purged. The business world as well was relatively unscathed by the purge, with only 2,000 business leaders affected. When the Occupation
ended, all of those who had been purged were absolved, despite
the firm insistence of some of the Occupation leaders that it
should remain in effect (68). Many purgee then returned to the
positions of power they had held before.

The U.S. was also determined to root out the ideological
underpinnings of the pre-war system. It did so in two ways. First
it established the principle of the separation of church and
state, depriving the Emperor of his official position as a Shinto
deity. Thus with one blow it smashed the chief ideological
underpinning of the pre-war Japanese state and eliminated the
central ideological core of Japanese militarism. Secondly it
undertook a far-reaching reform of the structure and content of
the Japanese educational system.

Even before the American forces arrived the Ministry of
Education had begun to rid itself of militarist influences,
issuing instructions for editing those sections of the existing
textbooks pertaining to national defense and absolute obedience
to Imperial decrees. Interestingly enough, the decree stressed
retaining the concept of the Emperor as the kokutai, national
essence, and the teaching of Japanese culture and ethics,
suggesting the Ministry wished to separate the ideology of
Emperor worship from that of the Imperial army.(69) The
Occupation went much further, suspending all teaching of
geography (which was heavily impregnated by Imperial and
nationalist ideology) history and ethics (shushin) classes
designed to impress ideals of obedience and self-sacrifice. The
teaching of history and geography were resumed once a suitable
textbook had been produced which dismissed the concept of the
Emperor's divinity and down played the importance of the military
in Japan's history. The old ethics course was abolished
altogether and replaced instead by civic studies which stressed
individual responsibility and initiative. Crucial to making these
reforms lasting ones was the weakening of the previously all
powerful Ministry of Education, which in the past had used
education as a tool for the indoctrination of new generations of
loyal subjects. (70)

The Occupation's determined efforts to transplant ideas and
institutions from their American origins to the very different
historical-cultural environment of Japan were perhaps predestined
to go awry. The Japanese were often puzzled by the new concepts
the Americans were trying to introduce, and became adept at
fending them off when not desired. An amusing anecdote which
illustrates this point of a local mayor in who, to demonstrate
to the Americans how quickly democracy was taking root in his
area, posted a look out for jeeps heading for the town. If any
were spotted the mayor quickly arranged for the astounded GIs to
come upon a "spontaneous" American style square dance.(71)
Critical to the Japanese ability to influence the reforms was
MacArthur's decision to rely on an indirect method of control for
the Occupation. This meant that the U.S. was forced to act
through their Japanese bureaucratic counterparts, and were to a
large extent dependent on them for information and for carrying
out their decrees. In principle the U.S. authorities had total control, and often succeeded in having their decrees carried out. But equally often they were outmaneuvered or stalled until they lost interest. In particular the Japanese were successful in sabotaging efforts at economic decentralization, helped in no small measure by U.S. strategists concerned with containing Communist expansion in Asia and U.S. business interests who were in principle opposed to the thinking which lay behind the reforms. (72)

In general it can be observed that those reforms with roots in the pre-war period took hold in the post-war era. For example the expansion of the powers of the Japanese Parliament, known for rather arcane reasons as the Diet, as well as the growth of political party activity all had precedents in the pre-war period, especially during the era of Taisho democracy in the 1920s. Likewise the labor movement, long suppressed by the police forces of the now-dissolved Internal Ministry (the Naimusho), were able to make remarkable gains under the more tolerant atmosphere of the Occupation. On the other hand, those reforms without pre-war precedent to support them tended to not succeed. So, for example, the Occupation's efforts at curbing the great cartels proved to be virtually a complete and utter failure. Within a few years after the Occupation ended virtually all the great Zaibatsu had reformed and the monopolistic practices believed to be harmful to the development of "truly competitive capitalism" remained. Indeed, writing from the perspective of
today, it seems ironic that it is precisely these practices which may have even enabled Japan to beat the United States as a competitive economic superpower and which U.S. leaders and experts today are scrambling to copy.

Much of the contemporary scholarship on Japanese politics has revealed a remarkable degree of continuity between pre-war and post-war Japan. The one area which was to prove an exception to this rule (along with perhaps the separation of state and religion) was the military. As described earlier the military had been thoroughly discredited and delegitimated by the defeat in the war. It was blamed for all the ills which had befallen the nation. It became permanently identified as an anti-democratic force among intellectuals, and ceased to function as a focus of patriotic sentiment for the mass of common citizens. This lack of appeal was supported by the tremendous growth of democracy and the diversion of national energies into other, largely economic, pursuits. While the disarmament part of the Occupations' policies may have turned Japan's swords into plowshares, it was these other reforms that helped make sure that after the Americans had left the plowshares would not willingly be turned back into swords.

The Constitution

Foremost among the Occupation's reforms, and arguably its most lasting legacy, was the new constitution. (73) Constitutional
reform was identified early on as one of the Occupation's chief goals. The constitution, and in particular its anti-war Article 9, was to have a profound effect on the future development of the Japanese defense debate.

At first SCAP wished to leave the task of drafting the new constitution to the Japanese government, believing that such fundamental reforms had best come from the Japanese themselves. However, MacArthur and other Occupation leaders made clear to the Japanese in what direction they were expected to go.

Many Japanese, however, both within the government and outside wished to keep changes to the old Meiji constitution to a minimum. Even the most radical proposals, made by Takano Iwasaburo's group, which was closely associated with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), suggested the Emperor could be retained if the people so desired. Prime Minister Shidehara, though quite liberal in the context of the Japanese establishment, himself expressed the opinion to MacArthur that it was unnecessary to change the text of the old constitution at all in order to introduce democracy to Japan.

The moderate conservatives who came into power at the end of the war were concerned above all with preserving the institution of the Emperor, which they saw as integral to the Japanese political, social and cultural order. Without it they feared a national collapse and takeover by revolutionary communist forces. With regard to the military they felt that it should be stripped of its privileges and its political
influence minimized, but with the exception of only one member, none thought it should be completely abolished. In short they wished to effect a return to Taishō democracy of the 1930s.

The Japanese government began working on a draft constitution that kept changes to a minimum. Among other things it retained the Emperor as the head of the armed forces and gave him the right to declare war and peace, with approval of the Diet. (75) This was of course entirely unacceptable to SCAP, and as soon as the draft's contents became publicly known MacArthur instructed his staff to prepare their own alternative proposal. Working under tremendous pressure, the young lawyers of the Government section slapped together an entirely new draft constitution in the period between February 4 to February 10, 1947.(76) The final product was then hastily translated into Japanese and presented to the Japanese government, who were told that if they did not accept the SCAP draft the Emperor might be tried as a war criminal and SCAP would put its proposals directly to the Japanese people, a move which would almost certainly have brought down the government. (77) Faced with this kind of pressure the Japanese had no choice but to accede to the Occupation's demands. After much further negotiation the Japanese cabinet made public a final proposal for the new constitution virtually identical to the SCAP draft. Even the wording and phraseology, in awkward Japanese betraying its foreign origins, had been left largely unaltered.

The most distinctive feature of the new constitution was
Article 9, which declared that the Japanese people forever renounced the sovereign right as a nation to settle international disputes through force. It further proclaimed that to this end Japan would never maintain military forces or war materials. The origins of Article 9 are the subject of a great deal of controversy, and to this day it is not entirely clear who originally proposed it. The official story as told by both MacArthur and Shidehara is that it had been first suggested by the Prime Minister during a private meeting with MacArthur on January 24, 1946. (78) A number of inconsistencies in this account have led historians to believe that at the very least MacArthur's involvement in the creation of Article 9 was greater than he wished it to appear, and that measures were taken to make it seem that the Japanese side alone had produced it. (79)

Regardless of who actually first proposed the idea, it is clear that Shidehara both agreed to the provision and worked to make it appear that the initiative had come from the Japanese side. In his March 20 speech to the Privy Council, Shidehara strongly praised Article 9, saying

"I think Article 9 of the outline is unexampled. I am not sure whether any other countries will follow the Japanese example by officially renouncing war. But the renunciation of war is undoubtedly desirable and the right way based on Justice. We decided to go to the waste land of international society, raising the grand flag. We need not consider whether other countries follow in our footsteps. In reality the invention of the atomic bomb requires universal appraisal of military thinking. In the future destructive arms which may have ten or twenty times the strength of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be invented. I am very sorry that today the countries of the world still follow armed policies, since with the future invention of more powerful weapons, big and small cities will be reduced to ashes in an instant and millions of people will perish. Then
maybe nations will wake up and seriously consider renouncing war." (80)

This speech was to set the tone for much of the future debate on both Article 9 and Japanese defense. It fully acknowledged the extreme idealism of the constitution, while at the same time implicitly arguing that the kind of Realpolitik thinking which in the past had dominated international relations was no longer applicable in the new atomic age. In Japan this kind of argument had especially strong resonance given the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, in a peculiar fashion it allowed Japan to seize the moral high ground, for it alone had suffered the horrors of atomic attack, and could thus serve as an example of the futility of war and play a leading role guiding the world to peace.

Despite various objections raised in the Privy Council to Article 9 in its present form it was accepted and presented to the Diet for deliberation. There again the anti-war provision sparked fierce debate. Ironically it was the Left which proved to be the provision's fiercest critics while the conservatives supported the pacifist position, roles which were soon to be reversed. In response to the Left's criticisms Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (whose Liberal Party had replaced Shidehara's Progressives as the leading party), argued - despite the fact that originally he had been one of the most outspoken supporters of the Japanese government's original, minimalist draft - that it was difficult to distinguish between aggressive and defensive wars and that in the past all too often blatant aggression had
been carried out in the name of peace. Thus it was best not to recognize the right to self defense because it might inadvertently lead to war. (81) Yoshida responded in similar fashion to attacks from the Right as well, (82) though he was forced to back down from somewhat from the extreme position that even the right to self defense was abandoned under the new constitution. (83)

After the draft constitution passed through the main assembly it was referred to a special subcommittee on the constitution under the chairmanship of Ashida Hitoshi of the Progressive party. In the fourth meeting of the subcommittee, held on June 29, 1947, Ashida proposed the changes in the wording of Article 9 which were to have far-reaching consequences, though they largely escaped public notice at the time. To the beginning of the first paragraph, which read "The Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" the words "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order ..." were added. And to the beginning of the second paragraph, which read "Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." the words "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph ..." was tacked on.

At first glance these modifications in no way altered the meaning of Article 9, and in fact even served to underline its
idealistic aspirations. However, as Ashida himself was to later claim, these modifications served to make the provisions of Article 9 conditional. That is, with these additions one could interpret the articles as saying the Japanese people renounce war only if international peace based on justice and order were achieved. Thus, surreptitiously the way for rearmament within the limits of the new constitution was opened.

The initial public reaction to the new constitution was favorable. Newspapers and intellectuals were overwhelmingly supportive of the new constitution, including its pacifist elements. Typical of their views was Mori Nobutatsu's "Heiwa Kokka no Kensetsu", or "the construction of a Peace Nation". Mori argued that Japan must not be satisfied with being merely a disarmed nation, but that she had to go on and become a true peace nation, a nation which has no desire to wage war. This could only be done by weeding out of all the deeper roots of warfare in Japanese society, namely the remnants of its feudal, capitalist past. In its place a democratic, socialist political and economic order should be established, supported by a cultural revolution which would wipe out inequality and the old belief system. (84)

The thinking of the Japanese intellectuals was a radical version of the idealism of the more liberal members of the Occupation. The creation of a truly peaceful Japan required the establishment of a new domestic order. In this way Japan could be seen as having a special mission in the international system.
Through Hiroshima and Nagasaki it had become the only nation in the world which truly understood the futility of war in the modern age. By eradicating and renouncing war it could become a shining beacon for the rest of mankind to follow.

The intellectuals, followed by the left-leaning socialist party, tied the constitution to a whole set of other political issues. Article 9 became associated with a new domestic political agenda for creating a more just and modern Japanese society. They also stood the war issue on its head. While war guilt continued to be acknowledged, it was alleviated by first stressing Japan's own terrible losses, and second by turning national energies to the task of eliminating war for all time. In a sense Article 9 can be seen as a form of atonement for WW II. It also let the Japanese recapture the moral high ground and became a source of national pride. Nationalism, pacifism, war guilt, commitment to reconstructing the nation into a modern state and a radical domestic political agenda were all mixed together into a potent ideological brew which was to dominate public discourse on the defense issue for at least the next 20 years.

...and back into Swords

Efforts to pave the way for rearmament began almost as soon as the war ended, though for the first 2 years of the Occupation little progress was made. With the development of the Cold War there ensued a reassessment of the Occupation's goals, including
serious consideration of creating at least a Japanese constabulary force to keep domestic order. With the outbreak of the Korean war this changed into a wish, at least on the U.S. side, that Japan develop a full-fledged military capable of helping with the job of containing the expansion of Communism in Asia. The plowshares were thus beaten back into swords, ironically under the direction of the Americans who had disarmed Japan to begin with. The road to rearmament was a long and twisted one, involving a variety of actors both on the U.S. and the Japanese side, with very different objectives and world views.

The first plans for rearmament were drawn up by the Japanese military even before the Occupation had begun. Two weeks after the Emperor had declared his acceptance of the Potsdam declaration, the Army produced a proposal to create a small elite guard backed by expanded police forces. Apparently these proposals were inspired by the nucleus German army (die Reichswehr) created after WWI, which allowed for rapid buildup after 1935. The Imperial Navy as well drew up its own, separate, plans for a new coastal police force. Like the Army, the Navy apparently hoped for a chance to rearm on a somewhat grander scale in future. On the day of surrender, while trying to pacify naval officers pushing for continued resistance, Rear-admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi argued "With the end of World War II there is sure to be a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the rift between them Japan can find a chance to regain her
feet."\(^{(86)}\) Despite the amazing prescience of the Admiral's forecast, at least initially the U.S. was to prove more severe than the Japanese had hoped, and both the Army and the Navy plans were rejected.\(^{(87)}\)

Some Americans as well were opposed to total disarmament. General Willoughby, head of the G2 intelligence section in SCAP, supported by the Pentagon and conservatives in the U.S., believed that eventually the U.S. would need Japan to help militarily contain communism in Asia. With the help of the former head of intelligence in the Imperial Army, Arisue Keizo, Willoughby gathered together a group of former military officers who were officially engaged in historical research but who could also serve as the nucleus around which a new military staff could be built. Head of this group was colonel Hattori Tokushiro, a top level intelligence officer and former private secretary to General Tojo.\(^{(88)}\)

In addition to the Hattori group a far larger number of ex-military men, including 190 former generals and admirals given special immunity from the purge, were employed by the Occupation to help with the demobilization effort. Altogether 80,000 ex-officers were working in the Local Assistance Bureaus set up to help deal with an estimated 10 million veterans and their dependents, though the job could easily have been done by civilians as well. These bureaus undoubtedly helped to dismantle the old military machine and to meet the genuine humanitarian needs of the millions of former service men and their families.
who had been uprooted by the war. But they also incidentally helped collect detailed information on the whereabouts of all of the former members of the Japanese military for the Hattori group, thus enabling them to draw up plans for their remobilization. (89)

In this way, even while the Americans were working to eliminate all vestiges of militarism in Japan, essential parts of it were preserved, encouraged by elements within the Occupation itself. Moreover vast military production facilities remained, even though they had been idled by the Occupation’s ban on military production, and latter, there were many in the Japanese industrial world who were at least potentially interested in going back to military production. However, though the elements necessary for a rearmament, and perhaps even a remilitarization of Japanese society were in place from early on in the Occupation, for at least two years there was little pressure to set these elements into motion.

In the United States as well there were influential people, both in the State Department and in the military Departments who were opposed to the direction which the Occupation was taking. With the intensification of the Cold War and the resulting shift in U.S. foreign policy, they were given a chance to initiate an at least partial reversal of some of the more liberal reforms undertaken by SCAP in Japan.

As the Soviet Union steadily increased its control of Eastern Europe, cutting it off from the West, and the Communist
Chinese forces under Mao Zedong swept the Nationalists from the mainland, American policy makers became increasingly aware that the U.S. would have to deal with a hostile Soviet Union and bear the burden of containing the threat of Communist expansion. To do this would require the economic revitalization of non-Communist Europe and Asia, which could not be realized quickly without the economic reconstruction of Japan and Germany.\(^{(90)}\) Official pronouncement of this new policy line came in May 1947, with Under-secretary of State Dean Acheson's speech in Mississippi calling for 'reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia - Germany and Japan - upon which the ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends'.\(^{(91)}\)

At the same time, important institutional changes were made with the passage of the National Security Law in April 1947 which, among other things, created the National Security Council (NSC). The purpose of the NSC was to both globalize and centralize U.S. foreign policy, and Japan policy now came to be seen on more than just its own terms, or as merely a part of U.S. regional policy in East Asia. At the same time, the State department was wary lest Japan and Germany emerge again as dangerous powers. George Kennan, the chief intellectual architect of the new policy of containment, wrote "they (Japan and West Germany) should be reconstructed to the point where they could play their part in the Eurasian balance of power, but not so far advanced as to permit them again to threaten the interests of the maritime world of the West."\(^{(92)}\)
The U.S. military more than the State Department was interested in rearmament, being greatly concerned with the increase in civil and labor unrest that accompanied the explosive growth of the largely Socialist and Communist labor movement in Japan and its potential for turning into a Communist insurgency. While the build up of a regular Japanese military for external security purposes does not seem to have been on the immediate agenda at this point, U.S. military planners felt that in the long run the creation of a Japanese military presence would help to contain the Soviets in the East while the U.S. launched an offensive in the West (93). Nonetheless, they wanted to keep rearmament limited in order to avoid creating tensions in East Asia. (94) This thinking was incorporated in NSC 13/2 which, while opposing outright rearmament as premature, called for the establishment of a 150,000 man national police force. During the same period some military men in Japan proposed the creation of perhaps three to five lightly armed Japanese divisions for internal security purposes.(95)

These proposals were opposed by both MacArthur and by Prime Minister Yoshida, who feared that rearmament would undo all that the Occupation had achieved so far and would create an explosive international situation in the Far East, where memories of Japan's war-time behavior were still strong.(96) Instead MacArthur proposed in a much publicized interview on March 1, 1949, that Japan should become the "Switzerland of the Pacific"(97), though he backed away somewhat from his advocacy of
unarmed neutrality in the months prior to the outbreak of the Korean war.\(^{(98)}\)

Given the strong popular anti-war sentiment and the official demilitarization policies of the Occupation official discussion of rearmament was impossible. Indeed at the time it was widely believed in the Japanese government that under the new constitution Japan did not even possess the right to maintain armed forces. Moreover, the average Japanese perceived no immediate military threat, and in any case held an invincible faith in the power of the U.S. to defend them. Yet at least some Japanese, such as General Arisue and Ashida Hitoshi, were already raising the subject on a non-official level with the U.S..\(^{(99)}\)

During the brief tenure in office of the socialist Katayama government, Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi, secretly proposed to the U.S. that Japanese should align itself with the West against the Soviet Union, allow the U.S. to maintain bases in Japan for use in case of emergency by U.S. forces stationed outside of Japan, and create a large, centralized paramilitary force to deal with the threat of internal subversion. But at the time the U.S. was not yet ready to respond to these proposals, and Prime Minister Yoshida, who took over from the Katayama government, was far more reluctant to pursue the rearmament issue than his conservative rival Ashida.\(^{(100)}\)

During this period while the rearmament issue did not surface in the public debate, there was open discussion of two issues of great significance to the problem of preserving
Japanese security; how to cope with increasing domestic unrest; and the controversy over the kind of peace treaty Japan should eventually sign. This second problem in particular had broad implications, for it would determine the terms on which Japan would reenter the society of nations as a sovereign entity and how its external security was guaranteed.

The domestic security concerns arose from the tumult caused by the sudden rise of Leftist parties and the Left-oriented labor movement which rushed in to fill the ideological gap created by the delegitimation of the old political order. They were supported by most Japanese intellectuals, who already before the war had been largely oriented towards Marxism. Their views received sudden legitimation by the spectacular world-wide growth of Communism, as well as the fact that in the pre-war they alone had faced up to the militarists, suffering severe persecution as a consequence. While generally supportive of such Occupation measures as land reform, universal suffrage, disarmament and so on, they looked to the Soviet Union and Marxism rather than the U.S. for models. They laid the blame for the rise in international tensions on the U.S. and depicted the Communist bloc as being peace-loving, and increasingly turned against the U.S. as the Cold War developed and the Occupation pulled back from its more liberal positions.

This change in the U.S. Occupation policy was referred to as the "reverse course" by Japanese intellectuals, and led to increasingly bitter criticism of the U.S. despite (perhaps even
because of) strict censorship by the Occupation authorities. The conservative government felt directly threatened, and industry was reeling from the effects of waves of strikes by the newly organized and often militant workers. To cope with this threat Yoshida and other conservative leaders repeatedly requested SCAP to allow Japan to recreate and strengthen a central police force with para-military abilities. While falling short of calling for a new military, the Japanese government wanted to have some kind of force capable of maintaining internal security. They believed that external security would be secured either through the creation of a multilateral pact guaranteeing a neutral, unarmed Japan, or through reliance on the U.S..

In short, until the outbreak of the Korean war there was little surface movement to rearm Japan. Though among both Japanese and Americans there were groups clandestinely planning rearmament, they remained powerless to move beyond the planning stage. They were opposed on the American side by MacArthur and his circle in SCAP, and on the Japanese side by Yoshida and the strength of the public antipathy towards the military. In addition, the immediate security threat was seen to be internal rather than external in nature, weakening arguments in favor of a massive buildup of conventional forces. Even the U.S. military at this time was more interested in keeping its bases in Japan and in ensuring their security than in building up a powerful Japanese surrogate to the U.S. military presence in East Asia, though it envisaged doing so if open hostilities opened up
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..\(^{101}\)

The unexpected invasion on June 25, 1950 of the Republic of South Korea by the Communist North with one stroke caused the intensity level of the Cold War to take a quantum leap. The closest U.S. forces to the area of hostilities were those stationed in Japan, and units were immediately sent to stiffen the collapsing front in Korea. This raised the problem of how to replace the forces who had been withdrawn from Japan and keep order within the country. These fears were substantiated by the activities of the Communist party within Japan, who, following instructions from Moscow, had taken up more violent measures, apparently in the hope that this could precipitate a Communist revolution. It was widely believed that the Soviet Union might be drawn into the hostilities, and that the Korean invasion was just a diversionary maneuver to draw away U.S. military resources from the strategically more important European theater. To replace the U.S. ground forces sent to Korea without stripping the defenses of other vital areas the only feasible alternative was to arm the Japanese. Two weeks after the Korean war had begun, and less than five years since the War in the Pacific had ended, MacArthur issued a memorandum instructing the Japanese government to raise a 75,000 man police reserve force (Keisatsu Yobitai) to replace roughly the same number of Americans (4 divisions) being sent to Korea from Japan. Both MacArthur and the Japanese government insisted that these were not armed forces, but merely a special branch of the police \(^{102}\) and both SCAP and the Japanese
government tried to avoid taking responsibility for the move.\(^{103}\) SCAP insisted that it was only responding to long-standing Japanese requests to be allowed to strengthen the police forces while Justice Minister Ohashi Takeo claimed in a Diet interpellation that the decision to create the Yobitai had been forced on the government.\(^{104}\) Yet clearly the first step toward creating a new Japanese military had been taken.

The initial public reaction was not as sharply critical as might have been expected, undoubtedly because of the apprehension the war in nearby Korea had caused. The influential Asahi newspaper, while warning against the danger of recreating a police state, did not see the creation of the Police Reserve force as rearmament \(^{105}\), and the Mainichi even positively appraised the move as being useful in allaying popular fears in the face of the tense domestic and international climate.\(^{106}\) The first domestic survey on the rearmament issue revealed that 53.8% of the respondents favored rearmament, while 27.6% opposed it. At the same time, domestic attitudes towards the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Japan was far more ambivalent, with 29.9% for and 37.5% against.\(^{107}\)

Nonetheless, with the new tenser international situation and the appearance of various signs that opinion in the U.S. was moving towards pushing Japan to rearm \(^{108}\), a storm of debate on the problem of rearmament and Japanese security was unleashed in the nation's journals. Up to that time most of what had been written assumed that under the new constitution Japan was to be
totally disarmed, and the only question was whether it even had a theoretical right to defend itself if attacked.\(^{109}\) Now there suddenly appeared a wave of articles in such influential journals as Bungeishunju and Toyo Keizai Shinpo supporting not only Japan’s right to self defense, but advocating that Japan maintain military forces. Leading the charge for rearmament was Ashida Hitoshi, who argued that Japan had at least the right to maintain forces for the purpose of self defense.\(^{110}\)

At the same time a chorus of opposing voices arose in such widely respected journals as Sekai and Chuokoron, as well as magazines associated with Left-wing unions and parties such as Kaiso. Representative of this group was Abe Yoshishige, who argued that while Japan would suffer in many ways if it relied on other nations for its security, this was morally a far nobler path to follow than to inflict harm upon other countries. Japan should pursue peaceful relations with all nations, including both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and promote peace throughout the world.\(^{111}\) The battle lines between the idealists and the pragmatists were being drawn, and the struggle was to intensify as the issue of how to guarantee Japan’s security after the Occupation loomed large.
Chapter 3 - Turning the Conservative Tide

Yoshida’s Dilemma - the Road to San Francisco

Conservative Japanese leaders broadly viewed the Korean War a gift from heaven, (112) helping both the nation’s sagging economic fortunes and vastly improving Japan’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S. in negotiating a peace treaty. At the same time, though Yoshida evaluated the direct military threat to Japan as being far lower than his American counterparts did (113), the problem of rearmament, or to be more precise, how to cope with U.S. pressures on Japan to rearm, posed a very real dilemma for him. How Yoshida was to deal with this problem was to have a decisive impact not only on Japanese rearmament but also on the development of post-war Japanese politics and society.

Once the issue of the Emperor had been settled (114), Yoshida’s main goal was to restore Japan’s status as a free and independent nation as quickly as possible. At the same time, Yoshida was also determined not to give in to U.S. pressures for building up too large a military force all at once. His resistance, at least for the time being, was based on four lines of reasoning.

First, Yoshida gave clear priority to Japan’s economic reconstruction and to economic matters in general over virtually all other policy goals, arguing that politics should be seen as the extension of economics. He felt that Japan’s economy around
1950 did not have the resources to spare for a large-scale rearmament program. Linked to this was Yoshida's concern that if Japan was to recover economically it needed to restore its economic ties to mainland China and the nations of South East Asia and that rearmament could rekindle fears in these countries and damage trade.\(^{115}\)

Moreover Yoshida had every reason to be profoundly suspicious of the old military. Before the war he had often found himself at odds with the military on policy matters and he had been briefly imprisoned by the secret police for his efforts to end the war in 1945. Along with other members of the circle around Prince Konoye Yoshida had sought a speedy end to the war, believing that the militarists were at least partially inspired by the Communists and that both the extreme Left and the extreme Right were in fact not all so far apart. He regarded both communism and fascism as revolutionary, anti-capitalist movements seeking to destroy and transform the old social, economic and political order.\(^{116}\) To rebuild the military so soon after defeat, while many military men were still lurking in the wings waiting for an opportunity to regain their position of power, was to virtually invite these subversive political elements to make a comeback.

Third, Yoshida feared the strength of popular opposition to rearmament. He felt that devoting resources to building an army at a time when many Japanese still did not have enough to eat would strengthen growing revolutionary forces in Japan and could possibly lead to an overthrow of the conservative, pro-capitalist
government. In the peace treaty negotiations with the U.S. he even warned special envoy John Foster Dulles that any Japanese leader who sought to press a new military on Japan would be killed as a traitor by the people.

Finally, Yoshida, while in favor of alignment with the U.S., wished to avoid Japan becoming overly integrated in U.S. strategy. In the pre-war period he had looked back with nostalgia on the old British-Japanese alliance which had won the Russo-Japanese war and hoped for a similar arrangement with the U.S. in the post-war period, this time to cope with the new Communist Russian threat. He felt U.S. and Japanese interests were not always congruent, especially with regard to policy in Asia, and wished to avoid a situation in which Japan might be drawn into doing things she did not want to do. The Korean war gave Yoshida additional grounds to worry on this account, for he feared, as did his opponents on the Left, that if he were to give in to U.S. demands for rearmament the U.S. would then place him under enormous pressure to send these forces to help out in Korea. These fears were not insubstantiated, for despite Yoshida's efforts to keep Japan from becoming involved in the war, in fact Japanese crews were used to man 46 U.S.-supplied minesweepers which were dispatched, with the utmost secrecy, to patrol the coast of South Korea.

This is not to say that Yoshida was a pacifist. While before the war he had opposed the military's policies, he did so because he thought they would lead to a profitless war against the U.S.
and Britain, and not because he opposed the use of force as a matter of principle. Immediately after the war he had not expected Japan to eternally forego having a military, for in the Shidehara cabinet it was he who had been one of the strongest supporters of the Matsumoto draft-plan for the constitution, which contained no anti-military provisions and made the Emperor the sovereign head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and in the early 1960s Yoshida became an ardent advocate of Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. Where Yoshida differed from both the Americans and his conservative rivals was the pace at which he believed Japan should rearm. Whereas such right-wing leaders were pushing for immediate and large scale rearmament, Yoshida wished to proceed as slowly as possible, and would perhaps even have preferred putting it off all together. He felt that Japan had to be fully rehabilitated, economically, politically and spiritually, before she embarked on rebuilding her military power. In particular he was concerned with the spiritual side of the nation's revival, and during his Prime Ministership he tried vigorously, though with only partial success, to restore the old pre-war system of patriotic education, including reverence for the Emperor.\(^{(119)}\)

In short, the kind of agreement that Yoshida was looking for was one that would achieve Japan's independence through an alliance with the U.S., which on the one hand would give Japan an unconditional American guarantee against outside attack, and on the other hand would not require her to engage in large-scale
rearmament nor provide bases to be used to support broader U.S. policies in East Asia. Even if such an arrangement implied that Japan would be dependent on the U.S. for the foreseeable future, in the long run Japan would emerge the stronger for it. (120)

Yoshida was challenged by at least three different groups; most visibly by the Left, in particular the Socialist party and its supporters; by fellow conservatives, who had ties both with the U.S. and with ex-military men; and finally the United States.

The political Left in Japan, though far from being a unified group and embracing many diverse and competing elements, was united in its opposition to both rearmament and to entering an alliance with the U.S.. Yoshida was widely viewed by these groups as a reactionary seeking to protect the vested interests of the large corporations and the ruling elite from the forces of change and progress. They suspected that Yoshida and the other conservatives were hoping to achieve a return to the old Imperial Japanese system. The opposition's main arguments can be divided into the following four general groups. First, they argued that entering into a security alliance would violate the spirit of the constitution. Instead of military might, Japan should rely solely on the force of international opinion and the United Nations to protect it from external aggression. (121) Secondly there was the belief that Japan should remain neutral in the conflict between the two global Superpowers. (122) An alliance with the U.S., it was feared, could lead to Makikomare, being dragged into war against Japan's will. (123) Third, they felt that the
continued presence of U.S. bases in Japan would be a violation of Japanese sovereignty.\(^{124}\) Finally, they opposed rearmament because they feared that a new military would have the same corrosive effect on the new democracy that the old Imperial military had in the 1920s and 30s, leading to the reemergence of militarism, rising like some monstrous phoenix from the ashes of Japan's. While these views had little direct impact on policy, the left strongly influenced public opinion, placing the government on the defensive in Diet debates and greatly complicating Yoshida's position.

On the Right Yoshida faced criticism from his conservative political opponents, led by Hatoyama Ichiro, Ashida Hitoshi and Ishibashi Tanzan. More than ideological differences it was their personal rivalry with Yoshida which motivated their attacks. In fact, both Ashida and Ishibashi were overall far more liberal in their outlook than Yoshida, and Hatoyama, while sharing Yoshida's deep reverence for the Emperor, like Ashida and Ishibashi had the courage to stand up to militarist policies during the 1930s.\(^{125}\) While their basic interests and world views were far closer to Yoshida's than that of the Left (all were strong supporters of capitalism and favored alliance with the U.S. over neutrality), they tended to rate the Communist threat far more highly than Yoshida did, and felt that Japan should pursue rearmament with greater vigour. \(^{126}\). They were highly critical of what they called Yoshida's deceptive approach to rearmament (gomakashi saigunbi) and were strongly in favor of revising the Constitution
to make this possible.\(^{127}\) Though during the Occupation they had relatively little opportunity to influence policy, they made their influence felt from behind the scenes, criticizing Yoshida in private. With the help of conservatives in the U.S., Hatoyama and Ishibashi were able to meet in secret with John Foster Dulles during his second visit to Japan in December 1950. At this meeting they presented Dulles with a memorandum calling for the speedy end of the occupation, an anti-communist alliance with the U.S., and an independent, Japanese-led military force to help cope with both internal and external threats. The document also referred to a "People’s Movement" (Kokumin Undo) which they and their friends had organized which could serve as the basis for the new armed forces. This movement’s purpose was to preach anti-communism and the importance of increasing economic production (Seisan Kakudai). The movement, they said, was also organizing patriotic young men into Self-Policing Units (Jikeidan) and giving them spiritual and political training.\(^{128}\). In an apparently separate document entitled "Outline for a Peace Treaty", which included ideas from the Hattori group working under General Willoughby, Hatoyama went on to propose the eventual creation of a huge military, with 20 divisions, 2,500 planes and a 150,000 ton fleet, to be built with the assistance of the U.S..\(^{129}\) In the meeting with Dulles Hatoyama stressed that Japanese forces should only be used for the defense of Japan and that he opposed sending forces to Korea. \(^{130}\) Ashida, on the other hand, proposed sending Japanese volunteers to the war
front. The basic details of the meeting were soon published, beginning with an Article in the *Ekonomistu* in August, 1950.\(^{131}\)

But more than his domestic critics on both the Left and the Right the most serious challenge Yoshida had to deal with was U.S. pressures to rearm. In June, 1950, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, Dulles visited Japan to discuss treaty and security issues. In the meetings Dulles pushed for a more active Japanese contribution to the defense of the Far East. But Yoshida, to the surprise of many of his advisors\(^{132}\), was evasive and opposed the idea of rearmament, arguing that the defense of Japan could be achieved without resorting to arms. To support his position Yoshida pointed out that Japan operated under various constraints imposed by its Constitution, public opinion and the weakness of the Japanese economy.\(^{133}\) Three days later the Korean war broke out and pressures on Yoshida escalated. The only question left was the pace at which it would proceed.

In December, 1950 a second round of meeting between Dulles and Yoshida began. Dulles pressed vigorously for active Japanese participation in a collective NATO-like defense pact which would have covered much of the Pacific, including Australia, New Zealand, the Phillipines and perhaps Indonesia, but leaving out Korea and Taiwan, where the fighting was going on. He also demanded that Japan raise a 350,000 man army and warned that under the Vandenberg Act of 1948 the U.S. could not commit itself to defending countries which did not contribute to their own
defense. Yoshida violently resisted these demands, and with the help of MacArthur managed to stave off Dulles with the suggestion that a reactivation of the Japanese arms industry might be of greater use than raising Japanese forces. (134). Nonetheless, though Yoshida later portrayed himself as valiantly resisting U.S. pressures, he was forced to pledge that Japan would make every effort to build up its forces within the limits of what its Constitution and what its economy could bear. It is widely believed that he secretly promised that this would mean increasing the PRF by 50,000 men, officially acknowledging it to be a military and creating a National Security Ministry with an attached Joint Chief of Staff-like body. (135)

On September 10, 1951 the Peace Treaty was concluded in San Francisco, officially ending the war between Japan and 48 Allied nations, excluding the Soviet Union and China. That same day two more, separate agreements were sealed, the Administrative Agreement covering the provision of bases to the U.S. and the Mutual Security Treaty defining the military relationship between the two countries (Yoshida had deliberately opted to make them separate so as to leave open the option of getting rid of one without the other).

The new treaty was flawed in many respects from both the U.S. and the Japanese points of view. The Japanese were given no firm commitment that the U.S. would come to their defense in case of attack. Moreover, the Treaty contained a clause giving the U.S. the right to intervene militarily in case of civil
unrest in Japan, while the Japanese were given absolutely no control over how the U.S. bases in Japan were to be used. Both of these aspects of the Treaty could easily be interpreted as violating Japanese sovereignty. In addition, Yoshida was forced, against his will, to sever ties with the PRC, underlining the complete subservience of Japanese foreign policy to that of the U.S. (136) Naturally the U.S., by virtue of its vastly superior bargaining position, had less cause to be dissatisfied. Nonetheless, despite Dulles' best efforts, the U.S. had to settle for a definition of mutual security which did not commit the Japanese to a broader defense of East Asia. But despite these faults, the Treaty was to serve as the basis of U.S.-Japanese security relations for the next 9 years, and correcting its deficiencies was to become a primary goal of Japanese diplomacy until 1960.

While the treaty provoked a storm of protest from the Left-wing opposition parties, the overall public reaction was positive. Despite strong neutralist sentiment before the Treaty was signed (in 1949 48.4% favored neutrality over 20.5% for alignment with the U.S., and in 1950 the figures came to 43% versus 43%) (137) and despite the treaty's many faults, public opinion polls after the Treaty was signed revealed a solid majority of Japanese approved of it, seeing it as the best that could be achieved under the circumstances. A September Mainichi poll showed 79.9% of those polled supported the Treaty, while only 6.8% opposed it and 10.4% responded they didn't know. A
Yomiuri poll that same month showed that in response to the question "Will the treaty increase Japanese Security", 31.1% said yes, 16.4% said no and 52.5% said they didn’t know. Another poll shortly thereafter revealed that 18.3% felt positive about the presence of U.S. bases in Japan, 33.6% felt there was nothing that could be done about it, 29.0% were opposed and 19.1% didn’t know. These polls reveal that though the Japanese were not sure about the need for such a Treaty in terms of Japanese security, the vast majority were ambivalent at best about the continued U.S. military presence in their country, the general feeling was any treaty which brought the foreign occupation to an end was better than none. The major newspapers as well registered their basic approval, though Yoshida was much criticized for his arrogant attitude in Diet questioning. Only the Asahi expressed any serious criticism, saying that Japan should have held out for more aid, made sure that the bases would be used for purely defensive purposes and that the clause permitting U.S. intervention should not have been permitted.

Though few fully appreciated the full significance at the time, the basic elements of what was to be later called the "Yoshida Doctrine" had thus been set in place: alignment with the U.S. at the expense of relations with the Communist bloc; a general emphasis on economic over other political goals; a preference for Japan’s making economic rather than political-military contributions to the world; and foregoing a major military buildup in favor of relying on the U.S. for Japan’s
security. In this context Japan's own military came to be seen primarily as a bargaining chip, appreciated more for its value as a means of placating the U.S. than for its ability to fulfill any military function. It was this "Yoshida Doctrine" which was to set the basic guidelines for Japan's foreign policy for the rest of the post-war era. Yet it is probable that even Yoshida himself never saw this strategy as something more than a temporary solution to the immediate problems at hand at the time, and his later advocacy of nuclear weapons suggest that by the 1960s he thought it was time to take a more independent stance. In the early 1950s this doctrine enjoyed only tenuous domestic support, facing conflicting pressures from both the political Left and the Right. Were it not for the luxury the Occupation provided of being able to ignore domestic political pressures (leading Yoshida's reign being characterized as "one-man" rule in the press), and were it not for the fact that the pressures from the Left and the Right effectively canceled one another out, it is doubtful that Yoshida could have succeeded in seeing his defense policies through.

The Backdoor to Rearmament - The New Military 1953-1954

The new military created on MacArthur's order in July 1950 was in many ways typical of Occupation reforms in the abrupt manner it was implemented and the confusion accompanying its birth. Over the following four years the Police Reserve Force
evolved rapidly, and by 1954 the basic institutional arrangements of the Self Defense Forces of today had been established. Unlike many of the other projects begun by the Occupation, however, the new military represented to a remarkable degree a major departure from its pre-war predecessor. Yoshida, supported by MacArthur and the strength of popular anti-military sentiments was able to keep out potentially reactionary influences in the new military and succeeded in creating a system of civilian control without antecedent in modern Japanese history. In doing so a price may have been paid in that the new institution was far weaker both politically and militarily than the old. Moreover, the confused, obfuscatory way in which Yoshida and the government tried to explain and justify the new institution’s development fostered public suspicion about its real purpose and helped poison the development of a rational defense debate.

The original Police Reserve Force numbered 75,000 men, hastily gathered together and equipped with light weapons supplied by the U.S.. There was no shortage of volunteers in the depressed economy of 1950, and over 382,000 applied for 75,000 positions, attracted in part by the attractive enlistment bonus and high wages. The primary motive to enlist seems to have been more economic than patriotic. A few recruits appeared with letters of recommendation, written in blood, from their veteran fathers. But later, when the economy improved, it became increasingly difficult to recruit, and 280,000 men was widely believed to be the maximum that could be raised.
With the Korean war in full swing there was tremendous pressure to arm quickly, resulting in great political and organizational confusion. Most accounts suggest that Yoshida and his advisors, at least initially, viewed the PRF as merely an auxiliary force which could be mobilized to reinforce the police in case of major civil unrest.\(^{(141)}\) Officially both SCAP and the Japanese government presented them to the public as an extension of the police.\(^{(142)}\) At the same time, the Americans viewed the PRF as being a constabulary or national guard-type force.\(^{(143)}\) Since Japan never had a national guard, and the type of riot control missions that SCAP envisioned for the new force had traditionally been done by the armed forces, many inside and outside the government came increasingly to the conclusion that this was an embryonic military in disguise.\(^{(144)}\) They were probably not all too wrong, for though opinion on the issue was divided in SCAP, this was precisely the point of view held by the American military advisors overseeing the buildup.\(^{(145)}\)

Yoshida probably did not see the PRF as being the basis for the future military he ultimately envisaged for Japan. Until 1952 he apparently hoped to create a small, high quality military independent of the Police Reserve Force. But under tremendous pressure from the U.S., he was forced to quickly build on the forces which were already in place.\(^{(146)}\)

Willoughby took advantage of the situation and tried to place Colonel Hattori and 6 other ex-officers from his shadow staff in charge of selecting the new military leadership.
Yoshida, no doubt alarmed at the prospect of having Tojo's former private secretary making the personnel decisions for the new military, swiftly intervened, and persuaded MacArthur to block Willoughby's efforts. Thus with a single stroke close to five years of secret planning was stymied, and a major step was taken towards removing the influence of the old army.\(^{147}\) However, despite this rebuff, Battori's group continued to be active outside of the PRF, establishing contacts with conservative leaders like Hatoyama and waging a campaign of harassment against the new PRF leadership selected by Yoshida. Eventually, many of the Battori group were permitted to enter the military, but after the initial phase of creation was over and they could no longer influence its further development.\(^{148}\)

The men Yoshida selected to fill the top posts in the new PRF had as little connection with the old military as possible. Masuhara Keikichi, the new Director General, was a former provincial mayor who had only served a brief time as a lieutenant in the Imperial army.\(^{149}\) Midori Eiguchi, the Vice-Minister, was formerly a representative of the Labor Minister, \(^{150}\) and Hayashi Keizo, who was given the highest post among the uniformed personnel, had been a member of the Imperial Household Agency with but little real military experience.\(^{151}\) Profoundly suspicious of the military, these men saw it as their mission to make a fresh start.\(^{152}\)

All three were former members of the defunct Internal Ministry (Naimusho) and were extremely conservative in their
political outlook. Most of the personnel they brought in were ex-Internal Ministry men like themselves, men who, much like the old military men they were to watch over, had been suddenly dispossessed in the wake of the Occupation reforms and had no place else they could go to.\(^{153}\)

While not militarists, Hayashi and Matsuhara shared Yoshida's concern with instilling patriotism and spiritual vigour. They were deeply disturbed by the negative image of the PRF as mercenaries serving the U.S., an image encouraged in no small measure by the Hattori group. The new leaders of the PRF desperately sought to counter this impression by raising morale through spiritual education.\(^{154}\)

To further reduce the influence of the old military it was decided that at first that no ex-career officers would be recruited as officers, though eventually many did find their way in because of the growing need for their military expertise.\(^{155}\)

The U.S. advisors sought to introduce American ideas on civilian control of the military. Initially the Japanese did not seem to understand the new concept (Matsuhara after his first briefing apparently had the impression it had something to do with the kind of hats the PRF should adopt) and generally resisted the U.S. advisors' suggestions.\(^{156}\) However, the concept of "Shiberian Kontroru" did eventually take hold, partly to allay rising public fears concerning the new military, and partly because it was in the institutional interests of the bureaucrats
themselves. The Director General was given near complete executive authority, including the right to decide all personnel matters and was supported by 5 Internal Bureaus (Naïkyoku) which oversee all aspects of the new military. A National Council (Kokubokaiqi) was also established to review major defense decisions before sending them to the cabinet for final approval. While this control system has been subject to a variety of different interpretations and criticisms, it was to survive and become one of the critical differences between the pre- and post-war systems. (157)

Initially the PRF was organized into 30 lightly armed units concentrated around major urban centers where the Communists were strongest. (158) Following the ratification of the Peace Treaty the Police Reserve Forces took on a more clearly military character following their reorganization into the National Security Forces (Hoantai) in August 1952. Authorized manpower was increased to 110,000 and heavy weapons were obtained from the U.S.. At the same time a modest navy was added on. (159) The government continued to claim that the National Security Forces were not yet a military, though Yoshida now admitted that it could be the foundation of a future army. (160)

U.S. pressures on Japan to further expand its forces continued unabated even after the National Safety Agency was established, increasingly using the leverage afforded by the proposed U.S. Mutual Security Assistance aid program to Japan. (161) In negotiations between Dulles and Yoshida's star protege,
Ikeda Hayato, the U.S. pressed for a buildup of 325,000 ground troops, an 800 plane Air Force and a doubling of Japan's defense spending, which at the time was approximately 2.5% of its GNP. The U.S. warned that at least this level of forces was needed to defend Japan in case of a lightening attack of 500,000 combined Soviet and Chinese troops. In response Ikeda promised Japan would raise a mush more modest force, synchronized with a gradual withdrawal of all but a few U.S. air and naval units from Japan. Ikeda, following in Yoshida's footsteps, emphasized the various limitations Japan was laboring under, in particular the weakness of its "shallow economy". He stressed that anti-military feelings would be greatly inflamed were the military to be perceived as an economic burden on an already impoverished Japan. Ikeda added that the U.S. had only itself to blame for the situation since it was its misguided Occupation policies which had created these anti-military feelings. The U.S. would have to wait until the Japanese people could be reeducated, which would take considerable time to accomplish. In the meantime the U.S. should assist in ensuring the economic prosperity of Japan, which was crucial to such a reeducation program and to the stability of Asia. Ultimately the U.S. grudgingly accepted Ikeda's proposal and the final agreement was signed in March, 1954.(162)

While Yoshida was later to use the MSA to claim that Japan had been forced to change the character of the National Security Forces in order to receive U.S. aid (163), in fact, as least as important a factor was the intense pressure from Shigemistu and
Ashida’s Progressive party, whose support Yoshida desperately needed to sustain his weakening government. On July 1, the two Defense Laws were passed, transforming the National Security Agency and the National Security Forces into the Self Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces (SDF). The mission of the new forces was redefined to include defense versus external attack or threat of attack, and a new branch, the Air Force, was created. Though the House of Councillors passed a resolution forbidding external dispatch, the military character of the SDF was now unmistakable.

As this evolution from Police Reserve Force to Self Defense Forces took place, the Yoshida government was hard put justifying these developments constitutionally. On the one hand Yoshida was pressed to try to allay public fears that the new institution was a threat to democracy or might drag Japan into a tight net of regional defense obligations. On the other hand, he needed to placate the U.S., which was by far Japan’s single most important economic and political partner.

As the preparations for turning the PRF into the National Security Forces began in 1952, the debate then shifted to the Constitution, focusing on the second paragraph which forbids the maintenance of war potential. That January Kimura Tokutaro, then attorney general, announced that the planned military buildup was not war potential and would therefore not require constitutional revision. In March Yoshida, in an apparent reversal, announced that war material for the purpose of self defense was not
unconstitutional. If it were, the government would have to take the issue to the people to determine whether they were prepared to revise the Constitution. This created an uproar and the Left-wing opposition parties boycotted deliberations, bringing the Diet to a complete standstill. Yoshida was forced to withdraw his statement, saying that maintaining war potential even for self defense was unconstitutional and that the government had no intention of asking the people to revise the Constitution at the present time. (164)

To sum up, this tug of war between various political forces forced the government to shelve both the idea of raising constitutional revision and the argument that war potential for the sake of self defense was permissible. Instead the government adopted a new line of interpretation, namely that war potential meant the ability to fight a modern war effectively, but anything short of this was acceptable. (165) This became known as the concept of what some cynically referred to as "a military without war potential" (senryoku naki guntai).

But perhaps more important than the final outcome of these semantic battles was their impact on the minds of the public and the opposition. The steady buildup of military strength, seemingly undisturbed by ordinary democratic processes and the governments’ fluctuating interpretation of the Constitution and the purpose of the new forces, created the appearance of an unstoppable march towards militarization. Reinforcing this impression was the Yoshida government’s campaign to rectify
the police system, efforts to strengthen the power of the Ministry of Education and reintroduce pre-war moral training into the curriculum (including reverence for tradition and the emperor), along with various measures to increase internal security. In this context, many Japanese, including many who otherwise had no particular sympathy with the Left, were convinced that the government was secretly planning to revive the old military as well.

The defense debate thus became characterized by violent ideological cleavages between Left and Right, and focused on abstract legalistic wrangling far removed from a concrete discussion of Japan's security problems. The intense emotional nature of this debate presented a major obstacle to the development of Japanese defense policy for over two decades to come. Desperate to avoid public controversy, the Self Defense Forces continued to grow without any public debate about its real needs and goals in a process its critics were to call "an accumulation of fait accomplis" (Kiseijijitsu no tsumoriagari). In later years, after he left power, Yoshida admitted his failure to take the defense issue to the public to have been his greatest mistake as a politician, and subsequent generations of conservative politicians were to vainly try to reverse the process.
The Elections of 1952-1953 and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Japanese People

Public debate on rearmament was initially dampened by Occupation censorship. Once the Occupation was over, however, this restriction disappeared, and rearmament became the central issue of the first post-Occupation elections in 1952 and 1953. An Asahi poll taken in May, 1952 showed that rearmament was selected as the top issue in the coming elections by most respondents (20%), followed by stabilization of the people's livelihood (12%), and economic problems (6%), while 33% indicated Don't know. The same survey revealed a sharp cleavage over the National Security Forces, with 38% indicating they supported it, 33% opposing and 29% not sure.\(^{(166)}\)

From early on both major parties, Yoshida's Liberals and the Socialist party under Suzuki Mosaburo, showed signs of internal division over the defense issue. The main-stream faction supporting Yoshida generally avoided defense and preferred concentrating on economic questions. They stressed that Japan was not rearming, only gradually increasing its self-defense abilities (Jieiryoku). Japan should concentrate on increasing its basic economic and spiritual strength. The anti-Yoshida Hatoyama faction, on the other hand, went into an open state of rebellion, setting up their own, separate campaign headquarters and calling for an end to the Yoshida government. They campaigned under the slogan of constitutional revision and rearmament. Their main argument was essentially a nationalistic one; that as an
independent nation Japan should and must have a military of its own. Moreover, on the constitutional issue, Ashiūa and others stressed the need for constitutional reform to permit rearmament. They maintained that it was a disgrace for Japan to have a Constitution that had been forced upon her by foreign powers.

In the meantime, the Socialist party had split over the Mutual Security Treaty issue into right and left-wing factions. The larger right wing stressed improving standards of living over rearmament and called for joining the U.N. and ensuring security through collective security. The left wing campaigned on opposition to rearmament, the Mutual Security Treaty, and constitutional revision. Some left Socialist leaders, such as Party Chairman Suzuki Mosasaburo, campaigned on this one issue alone, leaving out any reference to socialist economic plans, etc.. Large rallies were staged throughout the country where Socialist and Union leaders poured out anti-military rhetoric such as "Fathers don’t send your sons to the battle front again!", and warned that the nation was once again heading towards militarism and authoritarianism.

Besides the two major parties, there was the Progressive Party under Ashida, which vigorously supported constitutional revision and rearmament, and the Communist Party, which was bitterly opposed to the alliance with the U.S.. (167)

As the campaign progressed the proponents of rearmament were surprised by the strength of popular opposition to any kind of military. Soon Hatoyama toned down his pro-rearmament rhetoric
and Shigemitsu, president and number two man of the Progressive party after Ashida, told reporters that the party absolutely opposed rearmament and only supported increasing self-defense ability. This was essentially the same position as that of Yoshida’s Liberals. Thereafter all the conservative parties avoided addressing the defense issue, ironically leaving the right wing of the Socialist party taking the most pro-defense (but not pro-rearmament) stance.\textsuperscript{168}

The results of the voting were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats before</th>
<th>Seats After</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(111)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: \textit{Asahi} October 3, 1952

Though Yoshida’s Liberals succeeded in maintaining their majority, it was widely believed that the establishment of the National Reserve Force had been politically costly. And while the Progressive party had gained considerably, they had been expected to do even better. Moreover, the party’s support of rearmament was generally held accountable for its failure. One of Ashida’s rivals in the party, Kawasaki Hideji, placed the blame squarely on his doorstep, claiming that if it hadn’t been for Ashida’s pushing for rearmament the party might have gained a further 10
The Left, excepting the Communist Party, which had alienated the electorate with its violent tactics, had clearly been the big winner in the elections, growing even faster than the Right. The anti-military issue had plainly struck a chord with the electorate.

A few months later, in April 1953, as the Yoshida government increasingly showed signs of atrophy, a second election was held. Once again rearmament became the key issue, and was vigorously pursued by the Left, even though Yoshida did his best to avoid it. This time around the parties took much the same positions that they had before, with a few minor modifications.

The results of the election were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats Before</th>
<th>Seats After</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals (Yoshida)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals (Hatoyama)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer-Workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Asahi 4/20/53

Even more clearly than the time before these results revealed the depth of public antipathy to rearmament and
constitutional revision. Yoshida's Liberals had taken a beating, as had Hatoyama's group, both losing about 10% of their strength. Even more shocking was the damage done to the Progressives, who had been expected to make great gains. Some of the Progressives' leading figures, including Director General of the NSF Kimura Tokutaro, lost their seats. The final blow had been dealt to Ashida, and the more conservative, but also more pragmatic, Shigemitsu took control.

The Left in general had been greatly strengthened both in the Lower House elections, and in the subsequent Upper House race. However, the more left-leaning, anti-military left-wing Socialist party had gained the most, for the first time outnumbering the right-wing faction.

These developments were to have a number of long-term consequences. First, the Liberals became a minority government and were forced to turn to the Progressives for support. This led to the Yoshida-Shigemitsu talks on the establishment of the Self Defense Forces, where a consensus on defense, albeit a fragile one, was reached, permitting the consolidation of the conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The rapid growth of the Left, which alarmed conservative voters, the business world, and conservative voters alike, gave further encouragement to this development.

These elections were significant on a deeper level as well. Unlike most other countries, defense and military issues had lost their nationalistic appeal in Japan. While Ashida and Hatoyama
certainly did find support for their nationalistic message, especially in the rural areas, it also gave the Left an issue around which it could rally support. While conservatively inclined voters outnumbered liberal and radical ones, they were likely to vote for the conservatives regardless of their position on the defense issue. On the other hand, there was a large body of floating voters, especially among the young and housewives, who were otherwise politically disengaged, but who could be mobilized by the Left on the military issue. Thus the numbers of additional conservative voters that could be won through such appeals was outweighed by the number of negative votes they generated. In essence, on the military issue the conservatives' battle for the hearts and minds of the Japanese people had already been lost by 1952-1953. But it would take a number of more years, and the immense shock of the Security Treaty battle of 1960, before this lesson would finally sink in.

Strangling the Infant Military-Industrial Complex

The Japanese economy in 1950 was still suffering from the aftermath of the war and was in a state of prolonged depression. With the Korean war, however, Japan enjoyed an economic boom based on supplying the suddenly vastly expanding needs of the U.S. forces in East Asia.(172) This economic expansion, called the "special demand" (tokuju) boom", was a major factor in reviving the Japanese economy and was particularly important in
earning the hard currency needed to obtain technology and raw materials.\(^{(173)}\)

This spawned great interest in the industrial world, and when Dulles visited Japan in 1951 he met with Keidanren's Special Advisor Nagasaki Eizo, who presented him with a proposal for a peace treaty. The proposal called for stationing of U.S. troops in Japan after a peace treaty had been signed and went on to say that while for a fixed time period Japan would have to look to the U.S. for military equipment, eventually Japanese industry was ready and able to support its own self-defense capability.\(^{(174)}\) This was no doubt very encouraging to Dulles and other U.S. planners who hoped to make Japan a bulwark against Communism and turn it into the "weapons shop of East Asia".

In the Spring of 1952, the restrictions on Japanese weapons and aeronautical production were relaxed, and the Japanese munitions factories, which had lain idle for nearly seven years, sprang back to life.\(^{(175)}\) Soon weapons production became the leading category of tokuju goods and many companies soon became highly dependent on weapons shipments.\(^{(176)}\)

Three special sub-committees were set up within Keidanren, including the Defense Production Committee (Boei Seisan Tinkai) under Gyoko Kiyo It included many top business leaders, as well as 10 former admirals and generals, some of whom had contacts to the groups of ex-military men planning the restoration of the Army and the Navy. \(^{(177)}\)

At the same time the business world experienced an explosion
of interest in the weapons industry, as reflected by the precipitous increase in the number of articles devoted to the subject; from 6 in 1951 to 33 in 1952, and 134 in 1953.\(^{178}\) The vast majority of these articles appeared in journals specializing in economic matters, and many of the business world's (called Zaikai) top leaders were among the contributors. Accompanying this surge of interest was a sudden proliferation of various plans for rearmament presented to the public, such as the 3-3-3 plan (300,000 man army, 300,000 ton navy and 3,000 plane airforce) produced by a group receiving Zaikai support.\(^{179}\) However, business leaders, including even the members of the Defense Production Committee, were not necessarily fully committed to increasing arms production. Reservations were expressed about the extreme sensitivity of the industry to political factors and changes in the international climate. Even Gyoko expressed the view that regular exports were preferable to military ones, but for the time being they were needed to turn around Japan's negative balance of payments.\(^{180}\)

In February 1953, pushed by the military men on its staff, the Defense Production Committee publicly announced a proposal for the creation within 6 years of a 300,000 man army, a 290,000 ton navy and a 2,750 plane air force, over twice what Kimura Tokutaro's National Security Agency was requesting,\(^{181}\) but very close to what U.S. military planners thought Japan needed. The drafters of the plan were concerned with creating an independent Japanese military establishment which would be large enough to
sustain a Japanese arms industry without relying on sales to the U.S., thus assuring a stable source of demand. The report sparked a massive controversy within the Japanese business world as leaders from finance and light industry protested vigorously that Keidanren was overemphasizing arms production and that the nation simply did not have the wherewithal to support a giant arms industry. Some even called for the eviction of the Defense Production Committee from Keidanren. Even the Chairman of Keidanren, Ishikawa Ichiro, who was generally for encouraging arms production, was against the economy's becoming overdependant on the weapons sector and wanted to increase normal trade with the U.S. instead.\(^\text{182}\)

Both the banking industry and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) simultaneously moved against letting the defense industry get too big. Arguing that overreliance on defense production was risky, the banks began refusing credit to companies over 20-30% dependent on weapons production. As a result, under the credit-tight conditions of the Japanese economy in the 1950s, the big conglomerates were forced to shy away from defense contracting. \(^\text{183}\) At approximately the same time MOF opposed MITI's efforts to establish subsidies and special tax and financing benefits for the defense and aeronautics industries. Finally, in December 1952 MITI was forced to give up its efforts to get special "infant industry" treatment for the weapons industry in the battle over the 1954 budget. During the debates MOF came out with a series of arguments against an arms industry build up. It argued that
there was no point in trying to get special treatment when the government's defense policy was still unclear. It also pointed to the fluidity of the weapons market, and its enormous costs, and suggested that the National Security Forces should continue to rely on weapons from the U.S.. Finally, it opposed special tax treatment because of the general confusion and sense of unfairness it might create. (184)

As the war in Korea began to show signs of winding down, orders from the U.S. military, Tokuju, began to drop precipitously. (185) At the same time, in 1953 non-military exports began to slowly pick up, making the Japanese economy less dependent on the military sector. The great hope for the future of the defense industry came to focus on the proposed U.S. Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) aid. (186) However Yoshida, supported by the Foreign Affairs (187) and Finance Ministries, decided to deflect the military nature of the MSA. Though technically the aid was to support defense and the defense industry, as described earlier, from the start Ikeda fended off U.S. demands for large-scale rearmament and presented only relatively modest proposals for a military buildup. To the annoyance of the U.S., the Japanese delegation sought to divert as much as possible the planned aid from purely military projects to civilian sectors of the economy. After an agreement was finally reached, the technical negotiations dragged on until March 1954.

Even after the final agreement was initialed there emerged a ferocious struggle between the different ministries,
especially MOF and MITI, over the allocation of the funds. MOF was particularly vigorous in its efforts to divert the aid to other industries, such as machine tools. It now argued that given the unstable nature of the arms market, the defense industry would inevitably try to influence politics, and to legitimate its continued growth might even try to create dangers abroad. In other words, though MOF did not use the term, they were warning of the dangers of what American social scientists would later call a "military-industrial complex".\textsuperscript{188}

With MSA held in abeyance by the stalemate between the two ministries, and Tokuju falling off as the Korean war wound down, the defense contractors began to switch production to the civilian sector. And with civilian exports unexpectedly taking off, MITI lost interest in the defense industry and redirected its energies elsewhere. The only market for the Japanese weapons manufacturers were the Self Defense forces, which soon reached a plateau in terms of absolute size and whose share of both the budget and GNP began to decrease.\textsuperscript{189}

In the process of this protracted political struggle the larger patterns of bureaucratic and special interest politics with regard to defense were given a more or less stable form. The Ministry of Finance emerged as the major bureaucratic actor playing a constraining role with regard to the defense buildup. MITI, which might have been a centripetal counterbalance to MOF's centrifugal one, dropped out of the constellation. The Defense Production Committee was to continue its lobbying efforts, but
its role within Keidanren was relegated to a minor one proportionate to defense's overall importance to the economy. Increasingly the industry became dependent on production licensing agreements with the U.S. .

Thus the Ministry of Finance and Yoshida, assisted to a lesser extent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in staving off powerful pressures which built up within the industry and bureaucracy to form what might have been a Japanese equivalent to a military industrial complex. Though it is not clear to what extent they did so because they feared the dangers such a complex might pose or rather because they were more concerned with short-term economic growth, clearly their actions had held off aid and funds to the arms industry long enough for it to die out on its own. If they had permitted the industry to grow further, conceivably the Japanese military as well might have been expanded far beyond the form it ultimately took. (190) Instead, by refusing to nurture the arms industry, and by delaying MSA as long as possible, Yoshida and his bureaucratic allies successfully strangled the infant military-industrial complex in its cradle.

The Final Catalyst - Treaty Revision Struggle of 1960

In the years following the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco the defense issue receded from the public eye, though it periodically reemerged, usually accompanied by raucous
controversy. Throughout this period there was simmering discontent with the new security arrangements, both on the Left, who wanted to see the Security Treaty replaced by a "regional approach" to Asian security, and the Right, who felt Japan should pursue a more independent course. Ultimately these two forces were to clash over the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, triggering the most violent and large-scale political battle in post-war Japanese history. The course of this struggle was to finally reveal to the LDP the limits of what it could do in the face of the new, emerging anti-military culture. While the Treaty ultimately was revised, further efforts to radically change the system were abandoned. (191)

In 1954 Yoshida was ousted from the Prime Ministership in a coup engineered by his conservative enemies and by members of his own party. Soon thereafter the conservative parties unified to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), spurred on by vigorous pressure from the business world. The new party was led by none other than Yoshida's erstwhile political arch-enemy, Hatoyama Ichiro. Hatoyama and his allies were dedicated to reversing what they saw to be the excesses of the Occupation-period reforms and to achieving full national independence (dokuritsu no kansei). Their three primary goals were to: revise the Constitution; create a self defense army (Jieigun); and pursue an independent foreign policy. (192)

Hatoyama was soon thwarted in his first objective when in the following general election the opposition parties continued
to grow rapidly, gaining over a third of the seats in the Diet. Since constitutional revision requires two thirds approval of both houses of the Diet, it became next to impossible for Hatoyama to achieve this goal. Soon thereafter the two socialist parties reunited, further hampering the LDP. Instead Hatoyama’s primary goal shifted to reestablishing diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.

Outside the LDP as well there was considerable discontent with the current security arrangements. Already 1951, soon after the signing the San Francisco treaty, the JSP and JCP attacked those aspects which they felt reflected an essentially unequal relationship between Japan and the U.S.. In particular they pointed out that the Treaty did not specifically commit the U.S. to Japan’s defense in case of attack, contained a clause giving the U.S. the right to intervene militarily to maintain internal order in Japan, and had no provisions for itsa termination. The Foreign Ministry as well shared these concerns.

Adding to the pressures on the government were the U.S. bases in Japan, which were a constant source of sometimes violent friction. The bases symbolized to many Japanese the continued dominance of U.S. interests, and there was a wide spread fear that through their presence Japan could be dragged into a war against its will (makikomare).

In 1955 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru visited the U.S. and tried to convince John Foster Dulles that the treaty in its present form was provoking anti-American feelings in the Japanese
populace that could endanger its relationship with the U.S.. Dulles, however, rejected Shigemitsu's arguments, maintaining that Japan needed to increase its forces and contribute to regional security. (197) In the joint communique it was agreed that conditions should be established for Japan to take primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland and to contribute to the preservation of international security in the West Pacific. Only once such conditions had been met would it be appropriate to replace the current Security Treaty with a more equitable one. (198)

Even this relatively mild statement of intent provoked a storm of controversy back in Japan, as the opposition forces charged the Hatoyama government with violating the law and the Peace Constitution. (199) Shigemitsu was compelled to plead that the communique had been misinterpreted and that Japan had not taken on any military obligations. Hatoyama was forced to shelve any plans he may have had for revising the Security Treaty. (200)

Hatoyama's successor (after the short-lived Ishibashi government) was Kishi Nobosuke, a powerful conservative faction leader who had been member of the Tojo cabinet during the war and had been imprisoned as a class A war criminal during the Occupation. Kishi was determined to renegotiate a more equitable Mutual Security Treaty, and from the start of his Prime Ministership dedicated enormous energies to this project. In addition Kishi hoped to increase defense consciousness in Japan and to use the treaty to change the Japanese Constitution to
permit the maintenance of war material (senryoku) and the overseas dispatch of the SDF. Moreover Kishi wanted to open Japan to the idea of collective defense by using the issue of contributing to security in the Far East and taking responsibility for the defense of Okinawa and the Ryukyu islands. This would have represented a fundamental transformation of the policies established by Yoshida, and he was opposed in this goal by a sizable fraction of the LDP and the Foreign Ministry, which preferred a low-key technical approach to dealing with the current treaty's shortcomings.\(^{201}\)

One of Kishi's first steps was to establish the Basic Principles of National Defense (Kokubo no kihonhoshin) in May, 1957. There were four principles altogether; one, support the U.N. and strive for international cooperation in the hope that one day world peace will be realized; two, secure the basis for national security by stabilizing the national standard of living (Minsei) and furthering patriotism; three, gradually increase defense strength proportionate to national (economic) capabilities and in accordance with domestic (political) conditions; and four, deal with external aggression in cooperation with the U.S. until the U.N. can effectively prevent such international conflict.\(^{202}\) These principles have remained the foundation of Japanese defense policy to this day. They represent a peculiar mixture of political principles, with on the one hand a moderate emphasis on the U.N. and economic factors, while on the other hand maintaining the conservative's emphasis
on domestic stability and fostering patriotic values as key elements in national security.

Soon thereafter, in June of 1957, Kishi visited the U.S. and obtained Dulles’ and President Eisenhower’s consent to begin preparatory talks for a new treaty. The joint communiqué announced a "new era in U.S.-Japanese relations", (203) and in August a joint committee was set up to consult on treaty issues.(204)

In July, 1958 the Government decided to make official announcement of its intention to press for Treaty revision. As soon as the government announced its intentions it once again came under a hail of criticism, both from the opposition forces and, perhaps more importantly, from within the LDP itself. Crucial to the course the political struggle was to take was the nature of factional politics within the LDP. Though nominally united under a common roof, the party in fact was rent by rivalries between factions led by individual power brokers dispensing political favors in return for support in their pursuit of the Prime Ministership. In the late 50s there were no fewer than 8 such factions within the LDP. Kishi could count on the support of his brother Sato, but together they controlled less than half of the party’s membership and needed to court the other leaders to maintain control. At the time the chief rivalry was between Ikeda Hayato and Kono Ichiro, each of whom hoped to succeed Kishi and become Prime Minister. Kishi attempted to play these two off against each other in order to stabilize his power
base, but whichever one of the two seemed to be less favored by Kishi could be counted on to oppose him on controversial issues.

It was therefore not surprising that those factions that at the time had been left out of the distribution of favors quickly organized to protest the new negotiations. Some of these groups were also ideologically less committed to improving defense and were more concerned with improving relations with mainland China. Particularly controversial was the question of whether treaty revision might open the way for sending of SDF units abroad. Suspicions on this score were increased by Fujiyama’s evasive answers to questions regarding overseas dispatch. Members of the Foreign Ministry as well expressed reservations on this account as well, and in general would have preferred avoiding the treaty issue altogether. (206)

In June, 1959, in a major shakeup of the cabinet, Kishi elevated Ikeda and Ishii, who until then had been openly critical of Kishi’s plans to revise the Treaty, to more important positions. At the same time Ikeda’s chief rival, Kono Ichirō, who was generally more Right Idealist in his views on defense, was forced out. At the time there were considerable rumors that Kishi had struck a deal with Ikeda’s old mentor, Y. Ōhida, promising to make Ikeda the next Prime Minister in return for his support on the treaty revision issue. (207) With a majority within the party supporting Treaty Revision, Kishi then felt he could proceed with his project, and on October 6, 1959 the draft treaty was published. It was hoped that the treaty
could be pushed through along with the budget by early next Spring, followed by a triumphal visit by U.S. President Eisenhower in June. (208)

Meanwhile, outside of the LDP, the opposition forces began preparing themselves for the coming confrontation. The left wing of the JSP was in favor of cooperating with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and making use of mass demonstrations to rally support and gain political control. The right wing, under Nishio Matsuhito, was adamantly opposed to working with the JCP and wanted the JSP to become a multi-class party seeking to secure power through peaceful, parliamentary means. Since the mid-50s, however, the largest labor union organization, Sohyo, which was also the most important supporter of the JSP, had come out increasingly in favor of the left-wing position. The labor unions were angered by several of Kishi’s policies, especially his tough stance on a National Railways strike and his efforts to introduce a teacher ratings system. It was broadly felt that these policies, along with the Police Revision bill, were designed to prepare the domestic foundations for revising the treaty and eventually for the remilitarization of Japan. (209)

The JSP created a People’s Conference to Defend Peace and Democracy (Minshushugi to Heiwa o Mamoru Kokuminkaiqi), soon joined by the JCP. In response the right wing of the JSP split off from the party to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), further strengthening the hand of the radicals in the Socialist party. (210)
Outside of the political parties also many private groups organized to protest the upcoming Security Treaty revision, including many prominent writers, intellectuals, lawyers and journalists. These groups joined in demonstrations and produced a stream of announcements, pamphlets, books and articles denouncing the Treaty and rallying popular opinion against the government.

Public opinion polls in 1959 showed the public was generally ambivalent regarding the Treaty. The issue of military threat did not play a large role in the mind of the public, and according to a poll taken by the Yomiuri newspaper in September, 1959, only 28% of all respondents said that they would worry about the threat of Communist aggression if the Security Treaty were abolished altogether and all military ties with the U.S. broken, while 27% said they would not and 42% responded that they didn't know.\(^{(211)}\) At the same time, more people believed Japan should side with the West than adopt neutrality, and only a minuscule fraction favored joining the Communist bloc. According to a July 1959 Tokyo Shimbun poll, 45.3% were for siding with the Free World, 1.6% for the Communist bloc, 36.0% for adopting Indian-style neutralism, and 15.3% gave "don't know" responses.\(^{(212)}\) However according to the Yomiuri poll \(^{(213)}\) taken a mere three months later only 26% were for siding with the U.S. and the free world, 1% for siding with the the Soviet Union and the PRC, and 50% for neutrality (the other 23% answering DK). Since no significant political events occurred between the time the two polls were taken, this suggests that including the U.S. along
with the free world in the question caused a considerable number of respondents to prefer the neutrality. When asked about the need to revise the Treaty, only 7.2% felt it had to be changed right away, while 20.6% felt it should be abolished eventually. A further 6.4% felt it should be abolished right away, 13.0% felt it should be abolished eventually and 12.5% said the Treaty was fine as it was. The remaining 40.03% didn't know or said the issue did not interest them.\(^{(214)}\) In short the majority of the public preferred working together with the free nations of the world, but a considerable minority leaned towards neutralism, especially if the alternative was becoming involved in U.S. strategy and possibly military operations in the Far East. Opinion on the Security Treaty issue itself remained mixed and uncertain.

On January 20, 1960 negotiations with the U.S. were completed and the new Security Treaty documents signed in an official ceremony. In February 1960, after the Spring session of the Diet began, the debate on ratifying the new Mutual Security Treaty started again with new vigor. The Socialists energetically attacked the proposed Treaty on all fronts, questioning the strength of the U.S.'s promise to consult with the Japanese government prior to using U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the extent to which the new treaty committed Japan to supporting U.S. strategy in the Far East. Though the government protested that the U.S. could be counted on to act in good faith, the Socialists were able to punch holes in the official arguments and succeeded
in making it appear that Japan was being bullied into revising the treaty against its interests. (215)

At the same time public opinion, the intelligentsia and the media turned increasingly against the government. All three major newspapers had been pushing for adhering to the Peace constitution and getting an explicit U.S. guarantee of Japanese security while minimizing Japanese military obligations. (216) The Yomiuri and even more so the Asahi had been critical of the treaty for some time. The Asahi even demanded that Japan keep a recognition of its security interests in East Asia out of the new Treaty altogether. (217) The Mainichi as well was generally more supportive of Treaty revision, but after a poll in August in 1959 showed apparently growing popular disquiet on the Treaty, the Mainichi became more critical, demanding that the government first win the people's support. (218)

Prominent journals such as Sekai, Bungeo and Chuokoron published pieces highly critical of the government. (219) One commentator called it "the most humiliating treaty in history" (220) In the February and April issues of Chuokoron Nishi Haruhiko, former Japanese ambassador to Britain, wrote articles arguing that there was no need for revising the Treaty since the U.S. would defend Japan in any case, and revising it would needlessly provoke the U.S.S.R.. Nishi added that he was not alone in his opinion and that many others in the Foreign Ministry agreed with him. (221)

Public opinion polls also showed increased dissatisfaction
with the Treaty. An April Mainichi poll showed only 21.6% felt satisfied with the new Treaty over against 36.0% who were dissatisfied. And a Yomiuri survey taken at the same time showed that only 21% hoped the Diet would ratify the Treaty while 28.0% hoped it would not.\(^{(222)}\)

In November the demonstrations against the government and its policies began to grow both in scale and violence. Leading the fray were the young firebrands of Zengakuren, young radical students who rejected the control of the older and more cautious JSP and JCP leaderships and hoped to provoke a violent Communist overthrow of the government.\(^{(223)}\) Campuses throughout Japan were paralyzed as student radicals arranged sit ins and demonstrations, and special police forces were daily locked in often violent confrontation with youthful protestors outside the Diet building.

In the Spring the conflict intensified after Kishi contradicted himself in Diet debates over definition of the Far East by the Treaty. \(^{(224)}\) Kishi had hoped to secure ratification of the Treaty by April 26 in the Lower House, but was thwarted by the Socialists’ boycott of the proceedings. Though the LDP had a majority and could force the bill through, they needed to ensure a semblance of democratic procedures by having the other parties, or at least the DSP, in attendance. The DSP, however, worried about winning votes in the upcoming Fall elections, increasingly showed signs it might join the JSP boycott of the Treaty. \(^{(225)}\) On May 15, with the survival of his Prime Ministership at stake,
Kishi placed the Treaty on the Diet agenda to be voted on (Jyotei suru). Under the provisions of the Diet law, this meant that even without actually voting on the Treaty it would be automatically ratified after 30 days under provisions, just in time for President Eisenhower's scheduled visit on June 19. (226)

The popular and opposition response was overwhelmingly critical. On May 16 JSP Chairman Asanuma Inejiro put out an emergency declaration warning that Kishi's methods posed a threat to democracy and declared that his party was ready to resort to force to stop the Treaty revision. Both the speaker of the House, Kiyose Ichiro (a member of the moderate LDP Miki faction) and Nakamura Takaichi of the JSP resigned to protest Kishi's methods. (227) Violence increased inside as well as outside the Diet building. BUSKY young aides to Socialist Diet members resorted to physical violence in order to disrupt the proceedings in the lower house. The Japanese public was treated to the undignified spectacle of their elected representatives engaging in a form of parliamentarian rugby as rival LDP and JSP-JCP dietmen and their aides formed teams to gain control of the Diet floor. On May 19 police forces were for the first time called in to carry out opposition members who were staging a sit in in the main Diet hall. Thereafter all the opposition parties boycotted the Diet sessions, demanding Kishi's immediate resignation and postponement of the Eisenhower visit. (228)

Former Prime Ministers Bigashikuni, Katayama and Ishibashi joined together to urge that Kishi resign. All the newspapers
joined together in their editorials to condemn Kishi on May 20 and 21. Even the usually conservative *Nikkei* published an editorial sharply critical of the LDP. (229) In response to his critics Kishi snapped to reporters that he was listening to the "voiceless voice" of the nation (*Koe naki Koe*), a sort of silent majority which they, the media and the opposition, were presumably ignoring. (230) This remark seemed to symbolize the arrogance and high handedness of Kishi, and it provoked a wave of condemnation from the media and the intellectuals. (231) The struggle increasingly began to focus on Kishi himself, rather than on the Security Treaty and defense issues.

In May, as mobs gathered outside his home threatening to break in to force him to resign, Kishi became increasingly desperate. Within his party there were rumors that the moderate Socialists and the anti-mainstream of the LDP might break off to form a new party. (232) Kishi’s backers in the business world, who originally had supported the revision of the Treaty as being good for relations with the U.S., also reportedly became concerned that the disturbances might undermine the constitutional order. (233) Kishi and Ikeda in desperation repeatedly appealed to Akagi Munenori, then director of the SDA, that he turn out the Self Defense Forces to bring the demonstrators under control. (234) Munenori, however, was convinced that this could lead to a blood bath and steadfastly turned down their requests. (235)

With the mounting violence moderate opinion began to turn increasingly against Kishi. On June 3 the Mikkakai, a major
business group, called for the treaty to be postponed, as did Adachi Tadashi, President to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry five days latter (236). Keidanren began putting heavy pressure on the LDP to stabilize the situation and restore the image of government in Japan. (237) All the major newspapers, who, while condemning the violence, had previously been more critical of the government, put out a joint declaration which criticized both sides and called for restoration of order.(238) That same day Kishi gave in and postponed President Eisenhower’s trip. On the 18th a large but peaceful vigil was held by demonstrators as the Treaty was automatically ratified at midnight. On the 23rd the instruments of ratification were exchanged and Kishi resigned as Prime Minister.(239) He was succeeded by Ikeda Hayato.

A few months latter, in November, general elections were held, and the LDP returned to power with a healthy majority, and even picked up 13 seats over 1958. The DSP lost almost half its strength, and while the JSP and JCP both made substantive gains, they were far fewer than they had hoped in light of the recent crisis.(240) The turbulence of May and June had passed without leaving a visible trace on the political landscape, other than Kishi’s removal.

Nonetheless, the battle over the Treaty was to prove a watershed in the history of Japanese security policy. Though the Treaty had been revised and many of the goals which had been left unfulfilled by the first treaty were now achieved, the change was
largely incremental rather than a quantum leap, as Kishi had hoped it would be. Rather than a departure, the new Treaty represented a consolidation of the post-war security system established by Yoshida. While the opposition forces were to continue their campaign against the Ampo (mutual security treaty) system, they were really successful for two reasons. The first was the savage factional rivalries within the LDP which erode any Prime Minister's internal support when confronting controversial issues, reinforcing a general tendency towards immobilism in the Japanese political system. And secondly, moderate forces outside the opposition parties, in the media, big business and the LDP, were uneasy about Kishi's hidden political agenda, which threatened the Ampo system as it had been defined under Yoshida, and preferred gradual reforms to violent controversies. Even the Asahi, which had been the most active of the big newspapers in supporting the protestors, joined the other newspapers in condemning both sides once the violence got out of hand. And the majority of the intellectuals who had supported the demonstrations agreed with Maruyama Masao that the chief threat had been not the Ampo treaty itself, but rather the Kishi government.

With Kishi out of the way the situation quickly returned to normal, and LDP leaders, traumatized by the events of May and June, were in the future to try to avoid the defense issue as much as possible. In an interview with American researcher George Packard, Kishi said "after the rains fall the earth hardens".
What Kishi meant was that he did not think the riots would reoccur, but his remarks could equally well be applied to describe the effect the struggle would have on Japanese political-military culture; after the Spring storms the new culture was to harden and take root.
Chapter 4 - The Political Military Culture of Japan - Circa 1960

By the end of 1960 the general parameters of post-war Japanese defense had been largely determined. Japan’s basic security policies were in place, and except for increased cooperation with the U.S. beginning in the late 70s little has changed since. The nation, wearied by the divisive battle over the Security Treaty, overwhelmingly opted to devote itself to other matters.

In policy terms this meant that the security of Japan was entrusted to the so-called twin pillars of defense policy; the Mutual Security Treaty and the Self Defense Forces. In reality the Security Treaty pillar dwarfed the SDF one. Japanese government leaders preferred to rely on the awesome might of the U.S., both because they felt that Japan by itself was too weak economically to provide for its own security and because they preferred not to pay the considerable political and economic costs of a major military buildup. Instead the Self Defense Forces were limited to being a minimal military establishment kept at a low state of readiness. It was even inadequate to the task of maintaining internal security, as the recent riots had shown. Arguably the SDF’s only real utility was as a palliative to U.S. demands that Japan do more for its own security. While Japan relied almost exclusively on the U.S. to protect it with its military and nuclear "umbrella", Japan was a most reluctant ally, uncomfortable even with using the term "alliance" to
describe her relationship to the U.S.. There was a widespread feeling, vocalized most clearly by the Left, but tacitly acknowledged by many on both the Right and in the Center as well, that U.S. and Japanese interests did not and could not always coincide and that Japan should avoid becoming overly involved in U.S. strategic designs. Japan therefore tried to avoid making any contribution to overall Western security beyond the minimum needed for her own territorial defense and generally following the U.S. lead on foreign policy.

On a deeper level, by 1960 the broad contours of Japan's new political-military culture had become clear as well. One of the distinguishing features of the defense debate in Japan was the unusually intimate linkage between issues pertaining to the problems of defense and security and a large number of other issues which, at least superficially, seemed wholly unrelated. Of course such linkages exist in every country, if for no other reason than that the military competes with other governmental programs for the allocation of limited resources. But nowhere else (with the exception of West Germany) has defense been linked to such a wide array of other issues, and has evoked such emotional intensity. The Security Treaty issue raised not only the problem of Japan's alignment in the East-West conflict, but also posed the question of whether Japan would follow the capitalist or the socialist path to development. More subtly it brought up the question of Japan's relationship to East Asia, especially mainland China, and more distantly the question of
whether it saw itself as belonging culturally to the East or the West. In the eyes of some, especially intellectuals, the defense issue also raised the question of what sort of moral obligation Japan should bear as a result of its past misdeeds in the region. Rearmament brought with it the specter of revived militarism, and many who had experienced the militarist frenzy of the 1930s and 40s worried that there might lurk innate propensities in Japanese society towards militarism. Legislation intended to cover mobilization in times of emergency and the protection of military secrets \(^{(242)}\) raised the dilemma of how to reconcile democratic civil liberties with national security needs, and how to prevent such laws from being abused to create a police state.\(^{(243)}\) And, of course, the problem of how to present Japan's military past in the school curriculum provoked fierce and even violent conflicts between those who felt Japan must forever renounce its martial heritage and those who believed it must be vigorously affirmed if Japan was to be a proud and independent nation true to its traditions and past.

At the heart of the controversy, and at the forefront of the defense debate during the 1952-1960 period, was the Constitution, in particular its preamble and Article 9. Nothing was more symbolic of the new democratic order's break with the pre-1945 era than its apparently total renunciation of not only military forces, but even of Japan's right as a sovereign nation to use force as a means of settling international disputes. The Constitution offered Japan a new pacifist identity, and that
identity was associated with all the other reforms brought about under the American Occupation, including the new egalitarianism, democracy, and civil liberties. The creation of the SDF and Japan's entry into a de facto, albeit limited, military alliance with the U.S. posed a challenge to that identity, ironically so since those measures were urged onto Japan by the very nation which had given her the new Constitution. The often idealistic supporters of the Constitution saw in the government's defense policy proposals a sinister plot to subvert the newly established liberal democratic order, and feared that if Article 9 were allowed to be abolished or revised it would open the way for altering other parts of the Constitution, including those pertaining to the status of the Emperor and the rights of the individual. These fears seemed substantiated by the nationalist rhetoric of many powerful conservative politicians as well as by the government's evident duplicity in the area of defense. The government was seen to be constantly reneging on past promises and leaving loopholes in defense policies that would allow their later reinterpretation. For example, in both 1957 and 1959 Kishi firmly declared that it was not the government's policy to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but added that the Constitution did not directly prohibit such weapons providing they were used for purely defensive purposes.\(^{244}\) Such behavior succeeded in alarming not only the more idealistic defenders of the Constitution on the socialist Left, but also many with a more centrist position, who, while perhaps dubious of the lofty
pacifist ideals of the Constitution, had a generally positive evaluation of the course post-war Japan had embarked upon.

These diverse issues of defense, the Constitution, democracy, nationalism, independence, capitalism versus socialism, memories of the war and so forth, came to be linked together to form an entire complex of issues which emerged again and again whenever defense as an issue was discussed. Their interlinkage was reflective of the fact that defense was not simply a mundane policy problem, but was closely connected to the fundamental problem of national identity. The basic question of what the nation is and what it should be was at stake in these debates, leading many outside observers to comment on their irrational if not "theological" character. This complex of issues can be called, to coin a phrase, a "political-military complex". It is this complex of issues which was one of the post-war era's chief distinguishing features, and may prove to be one of its most lasting legacies.

Of course there exists considerable diversity of opinion on the defense issue, but the very fact that defense was universally viewed within this extremely broad context was itself part of the larger Japanese political culture. In the meantime, while the number of positions which were taken in the defense debate was matched only by the number of its participants, there emerged three distinct, and clearly identifiable groups of positions on defense: the Right Idealists, the Left Idealists and the Centrists. Each of these represented a subculture within the
larger Japanese political military culture.

What distinguishes these groups from one another is not only their views on how national security should be maintained, but also on the kind of nation Japan both was and should aspire to be. Since for the most part a direct military threat did not seem immediate to most Japanese, national defense was not what was really at issue in the defense debate. Rather the positions the different groups took on defense can be better understood as flowing from their positions on other issues. The traumatic experience of defeat and Occupation had fragmented Japanese political culture into three parts, breaking it along lines which already existed before the war (246), but greatly deepening and emotionalizing these cleavages. It is for this reason that many prominent Japanese political scientists, like Professor Watanuki Joji of Tokyo University, argued that political cleavages in Japan were rooted more in cultural differences within the Japanese population rather than regional, class, or ethnic differences as in the West.(247)

The Right Idealists were distinguished from the other two groups by their reverence for Japan's historical and cultural traditions as well as by their generally critical view of the political and social reforms instituted under the American Occupation. Of the three groups they were closest to the old political-military culture, and they unabashedly espoused both martial values and the military as being essential to the nation's pride and independence. Their brand of old style
nationalism saw the maintenance of a strong military as vital to the fostering of a sense of national pride and independence, and they hoped to use the defense issue to spark a debate on the subject of national identity. During the 1945 to 1960 period it was difficult for this group to publicly express its views, at first because of the tight censorship the Occupation authorities placed upon all forms of nationalist rhetoric, and later because of the near universal opposition of the media and the intellectual elites. Moreover such views had been discredited by the defeat in the war, and judging by survey data from both that period and since, those holding such views have remained in the minority. Nonetheless, the Right Idealists were influential, especially within the conservative parties, and many powerful political and economic leaders held similar views. There is also reason to believe that these views enjoyed considerable support among the still substantial rural population of the time, which constituted an important base of conservative party support.\(^{(248)}\)

It is possible to trace the origins of the views of the Right Idealists back to the old Meiji debate over the problem of how to preserve the essence of Japanese culture while adapting to meet the challenge posed by modern, Western technology.\(^{(249)}\) Like their Meiji counterparts, the Right Idealists were concerned with modernizing while at the same time controlling that modernization process and prevent it from eroding the core values of Japanese society. How to define that core, however, is no easy task. Already back in the 1890s one major newspaper bemoaned the
collapse of Japanese civilization when Mitsukoshi department store began allowing its customers to enter with their shoes on. But in general the Right Idealists agreed that the core of Japanese society includes its sense of unity as a nation, the maintenance of a spirit of self sacrifice, and the fostering of a deep respect for the established social order. The key component was the old Imperial ideology, (Tennosei) of reverence towards the Emperor as the link between the Japanese people and the divine; an ideology with refused to completely die out despite the Emperor's own denial of his old pre-war status. It would be a mistake, however, to classify all the Right Idealists as being necessarily right-wing reactionaries. Even the most fervent right-wing ideologue was quite well aware of the enormity of Japan's defeat in the war and recognized that the old system had to change. What they opposed, however, were the more liberal aspects of the Occupation's reforms which they saw as being more or less deliberately aimed at permanently weakening the Japanese state. The Americans, according to this interpretation of history, had sought the spiritual as well as the military disarmament of the nation. Foremost among these restrictions were naturally the new Constitution, the destruction of the military and the emasculation of the Emperor, but they further included a whole array of other measures, such as unfettered trade unionism, a decentralized police force, liberalized education and so forth. Beyond these concrete policies the Right Idealists also tended to be sharply critical of the new, often crass materialist spirit of
the times, with its rejection of old ways, its adulation of the rights of the individual over that of the collectivity, and the growing disregard for the old patterns of hierarchy and authority.

One of the key ideological dilemmas which hobbled the Right Idealists was that while on the one hand they opposed the corrupting influence of American-style modernization, on the other hand they saw Communism and Socialism as even greater threats to their core values than American-style liberalism. Therefore they paradoxically became, at least publicly, fervently pro-American, vigorously supporting the military alliance with the U.S. and cheering on the hardest of the U.S. hard-line cold war policies. This fundamental contradiction helped limit their nationalist appeal and opened them up to the charge of being U.S. stooges as well as reactionaries.

Militarily the Right Idealists viewed a strong military as one of the necessary attributes of a truly sovereign nation. As long as Japan was dependent on another nation she would never display any real national pride or independence. Essential to the creation of such a strong military was the abolition of Article 9 and the rewriting of the preamble to rid it of its pacifist overtones. Indeed the Constitution as a whole should be rewritten on the principle that a nation’s constitution should be written by its own people and tailored to suit that nation’s own, peculiar conditions. Other restrictions on the military, such as the prohibition against overseas dispatch, the acquisition of
nuclear weapons, and arms exports, should be removed as well. Of equal importance to these concrete military policies was the strengthening of the spiritual foundations of the armed forces through a greater emphasis on morale and spiritual training and rallying the rest of society to support them in their mission. This latter goal could only be achieved through the development of a nationalist school curriculum, the free use of national symbols (including the Emperor) and the suppression of subversive groups such as the teacher's union. At the same time, many Right Idealists felt that the military of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s had been out of control and even such ultra-hawkish dietmen as Funada Naka, felt that stringent civilian controls were necessary if the military was to be prevented from becoming once again a threat to the nation.\(^{250}\) In this context it is worth noting once more that in 1945 the conservative anti-war group around Prince Konoye had identified the military as the most dangerous potential source of a Communist insurrection in 1945. Likewise some of the Right Idealists were quite pragmatic in their outlook, giving at least temporarily priority to political and economic objectives over military ones. Arguably the prime example of this kind of pragmatism was Yoshida himself, who though later associated with a moderate, non-military course, was very much a Right Idealist in his domestic views (including on the subject of the Emperor) and who in his waning years came out strongly in favor of a militarily powerful and nuclear-armed Japan.\(^{251}\)
Many of the Right-Idealist politicians, for example Kishi and Hatoyama, wanted to use the defense debate to spark a broader debate on issues of Japanese nationalism and national identity. In this regard they were sharply critical of the centrist political leadership, including more pragmatic Right Idealists like Yoshida, who they felt failed to live up to their moral responsibility and to squarely confront these problems.

Whereas the Right Idealists were the most positive about Japan's past and the most critical of the Occupation's reforms, the Left Idealists were the most negative about old Japan and became zealous guardians of the new liberal order. The Left Idealists were determined to achieve a complete break with the old political, social and economic order, whose pernicious influence they thought still lingered on, stifling the creation of a new, truly democratic and egalitarian Japan. Unlike the Right Idealists the Left Idealists were deeply hostile to the old social order, which they saw as feudalistic and exploitative, and to traditional culture, which for them was backward and superstitious. While they whole-heartedly embraced modernization as a liberating ideal, unlike the Centrists they found their models in the communist East and not the capitalist West. It was this point of view which enjoyed perhaps the greatest prominence in the immediate post-war years, obtaining powerful support from the left-wing opposition parties, the labor unions, the intellectuals and large sections of the media. Most of the public debate on defense during the 50s and 60s was conducted between
the members of the Left Idealist and the Centrist groups, while the discredited Right Idealist view lurked ominously in the wings.

It is important to emphasize that not all the Left Idealists were pro-Soviet Marxist ideologues. As in the other two groups there existed considerable diversity within this group as well. It is doubtful that the majority or even the plurality of the rank and file members of the opposition parties or the participants in the anti-treaty and anti-base demonstrations were committed Marxists. On the mass level the appeal of the Left Idealists lay in their attack on the status quo, a status quo under which a very large segment of society, which had borne the brunt of rapid industrialization, urbanization and the havoc of war, felt often violently dissatisfied. The groups which organized these discontented sectors of society happened to be Marxist, drawing on the pre-war Marxist tradition of dissident intellectuals and labor unions, and they provided this expression of mass discontent with a leftist voice. They could just as easily have been organized under an entirely different ideological banner, as many later were with the rise of the Buddhist Sokka Gakkai and its political arm, Komeito, in the 1960s.

In addition to Socialism there was a strong strain of pan-Asian idealism among the Left Idealists, a widely shared feeling that Japan had a special role to play in the development of Asia, a role which was being frustrated by U.S. cold war policies and,
according to some, Western anti-Asian racism. Japan should develop close ties with other Asian and developing nations in order to forge a third-force alternative to the East-West confrontation, and the Left Idealists were generally excited by the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement emerging among the former colonies of the great powers in the Third World.\(^252\) One interesting and perhaps paradoxical aspect of this Asianist sentiment was that despite the fact that the Left Idealists' progressive liberalism generally led them to be critical of Japan's past and traditions, part of their emotional appeal was based on the feeling that Japan was fundamentally an Asian country with closer ethnic and cultural ties to the Asian mainland (by which was usually meant mainland China) than with the West. These views appealed as much to Right Idealists as to Left Idealists, given the right wing's own pre-war pan-Asian tendencies.

Whereas the Right Idealists were the heirs of the old pre-war political-military culture, the Left Idealists drew their inspiration from the new pacifist ideals created by MacArthur and Shidehara and enshrined in the Constitution. Japan would become a "Peace Nation", the harbinger of a new international morality offering a war-weary world an alternative to violence. In this way Japan, by virtue of having learned a bitter lesson on the folly of war, and as the only country to ever have experienced the horrors of modern nuclear warfare, would become a shining example to the rest of the world. Ironically, while the Left
Idealists were the prime beneficiaries of the political changes ushered in under the U.S. occupation, and although they were the most stalwart and undeviating guardians of the new American-created institutions, they were also virulently anti-American, especially after the "reverse course" of 1947-48 which turned back many of the more liberal aspects of the Occupation. The Left Idealists tended to see the Cold War as having been the fault of the U.S., while the Soviet Union and the PRC were viewed as essentially peace-loving nations forced to defend themselves from the aggressive blandishments of the aggressive capitalist nations. The pro-U.S. stance of their domestic political opponents, whom they viewed as dangerous reactionaries, tended to simply reinforce this image. U.S. policy in East Asia was viewed as destructive and dangerous, giving rise to tensions which could ultimately endanger Japan as well as its neighbors. Implacable U.S. hostility towards mainland China in particular posed dilemmas for those with strong Asianist sentiments. But despite anti-Americanism, the Left Idealists strongly felt that Japan should avoid becoming involved with any alliance and adopt a policy of strict neutrality. Even the Japanese Communist Party, which had intimate ties to the Communist bloc, and whatever long-range plans it may have harbored privately, in its official policy statements it supported adopting a neutral stance between East and West.

The Left Idealists pushed for nothing less than the immediate abolition of the Mutual Security Treaty and the
dismantling of the Self Defense Forces, in short the complete reversal of the government’s policies on defense and security. Instead Japan should adhere to the principle of unarmed neutrality (Hibuso Churitsu) and rely on "peace diplomacy" (Heiwa Gaiko) to avert military threats. The Left Idealists evaluated the chances of Japan actually being invaded as being very low, but in the unlikely event that Japan were actually invaded she would rely on the force of world opinion, as expressed through the UN, and passive resistance to convince an occupier to desist. Short of these ultimate objectives, which, to use the parlance of latter-day American radicalism, were "non-negotiable", the Left Idealists were determined to hamper the present government’s defense policies as much as possible, resisting every new policy initiative and going on the offensive by trying to force the government to place concrete limits on the Self Defense Forces and the activities of the U.S. forces in Japan. Behind these often frantic maneuvers, as was pointed out earlier, was the conviction that the government was actively seeking a return to the pre-war system. These fears were fed by both the government’s failure to find a consistent and broadly acceptable explanation for its policies as well as by the very real influence of the Right Idealists, especially within the conservative parties. These suspicions lent a desperate edge to the Left Idealists’ efforts to stave off every new conservative policy proposal and made it impossible to achieve any kind of consensus on defense between the Left Idealists and the Right.
The Centrists, like the Left Idealists, were strongly committed to modernizing and reforming Japan, but unlike the Left they sought their models more in the capitalist West, and in particular the victorious United States, than in the Communist East. While not as implacably hostile to Japan's past as the Left Idealists, their confidence in the nation and its institutions had been shaken to the core by the defeat and by the evident overwhelming superiority of the conquering Americans. In a way, their idealization of the U.S was as complete as the Left Idealists' idealization of the Communist nations or the Right Idealists' glorification of the past. Clearly the old system had failed and the only chance for national survival lay in its complete overhaul and the adoption of the new modernity as embodied by the U.S. Their view of Japan's traditions was not so much colored by hostility as by a sense of hopelessness, as if everything which was Japanese could not hope to compete with the brash, vigorous energy of the West.

The Centrists enjoyed a broad range of support, especially in the bureaucracy, in business circles and among large sections of the conservative political parties. Their views were also probably shared by much of the general population, but at the same time they did not have the energy and motivation that members of the other two groups had. By their very nature they tended to be pragmatic and low-key. And though in the end it was they who won out in policy terms and went on to determine the overall tone of the new Japanese political-military culture, it
should not be forgotten that at the time their support appeared weak, and it was not until the debacle of the Security Treaty revision shocked the LDP out of any further tinkering with the Security arrangements established under the Yoshida government that the entire system achieved some measure of stability.

Two central beliefs underlay the Centrist position on defense. The first was that Japan was far too vulnerable both geographically and economically to defend herself militarily. The Centrists were just as aware as the pre-war imperialists had been of Japan's tremendous dependence on imported food and natural resources, even more so after having experienced the deprivations inflicted by the U.S. submarine campaign against Japanese shipping. But the defeat had convinced the Centrists of the futility of the old solution to this threat; military force and imperial expansion. Instead they were convinced that the flow of necessary raw materials would have to be ensured by the cultivation of peaceful ties with foreign nations, an endeavour which would be frustrated if Japan were perceived as a military danger. Thus in the post-war era Japan was to as assiduously cultivate an image of weakness and deference as in the pre-war period she strove to appear strong and aggressive. In both cases the response can be seen as having derived from the same sense of vulnerability, only this time around the new policies were couched in the language of universal moralism. The second belief, which was linked to the first, was that Japan's energies, at least for the time being, should be devoted to the enterprise of
economic expansion. Modernization was conceived of by the Centrists in terms of economic modernization first, and social and political modernization second. Indeed, the other forms of modernization were often seen as being needed only insofar as they helped with the task of economic reorganization, equating social reform with the disposal of old, burdensome traditional practices and ways of thinking. In this way, the Centrists were the agents of a society wide sublimation of national energies from martial pursuits to economic ones, and it could be legitimated both in terms of individual self interest or in terms of patriotic service to the nation.

Given these two basic premises, the Centrists, like the Left Idealists, would ideally have preferred achieving some form of neutrality between the U.S. and the Communist bloc. But unlike the Left Idealists, the basis of their preference was more pragmatic than ideological. The danger of being dragged into a war by the U.S. could not be discounted, and the costs of maintaining the SDF were not inconsiderable. Until the mid-1950s many business leaders and bureaucrats were doubtful that Japan could be economically viable if cut off from her traditional markets and sources of raw materials on the Asian mainland. It was for these reasons that Yoshida and the Foreign Ministry hoped until only a few months before the Treaty of San Francisco that some sort of four-power treaty for the demilitarization of Japan could be worked out. But it soon became apparent that neither the U.S. nor, in the final analysis, the Soviet Union was ready to
support such an arrangement. Given the stark choice between the Communist U.S.S.R. and the West there never was any doubt which side the Centrists would prefer. The U.S. offered the far more attractive system to live under, and measured in terms of either military or economic power was far superior to the Soviet Union. By the mid 1950s, as Japan's economy entered a phase of economic growth which would last till the early 1970s, fears of being cut off from the traditional markets and resources of mainland Asia abated, and nearly complete dependence on the West came to be widely seen as an acceptable, even preferable alternative. Economic relations with the U.S. and Europe would be endangered by close ties to the PRC and North Korea, and it became increasingly obvious where the economic advantage lay, at least to those who did not view matters through ideological lenses.

While the Centrists tended to evaluate the military threat to Japan as being rather low, they did recognize its existence. Japan alone could not possibly cope with the threat posed by the Soviet Union, if for no other reason than that it possessed no nuclear weapons of its own and acquiring them would provoke political chaos at home and hostility abroad, including on the part of the U.S.. In addition, it was also clear that the economic costs of creating a substantial military would place a heavy burden on the rest of the economy. The only solution was to rely, as much as possible, upon the U.S. to provide military security. The price tag for such dependence was a large one; Japan would have to follow the U.S. lead on foreign policy.
in East Asia and elsewhere; she would have to provide the U.S. with military bases, which were inevitably the source of considerable domestic political criticism; and she would have to maintain some military forces of her own to satisfy the U.S. that she was doing something on her own. Above all else, this dependence on the U.S. rankled national pride, for unlike in Germany, there was no sense that there was anything Japan should alone for, or the perception of an immediate security threat requiring a U.S. presence. The image created was one of capitulation to superior force and economic need, rather than joining a noble league to defend Democracy and restore rational honor, an image which did not play well at home. But from the Centrist point of view these costs were preferable to the costs of any of the conceivable alternatives. At the same time the costs could be minimized, limitations could be placed on the use of the U.S. bases (though how effective those limitations actually were is another matter), and the treaty relationship was made subject to mutual consent. In foreign policy, Japan would be acquiescent to U.S. demands, but not necessarily enthusiastic in its support, preferring in all things the maintenance of a low profile. The Self Defense Forces were limited to the level needed to achieve the withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. ground forces, and placed under severe restrictions to prevent either their being drawn into U.S. operations overseas or their becoming a threat to civilian control. Beyond these minimal goals the Centrists had no interest in the defense issue, and preferred to ignore it as much
as the U.S. and the opposition would allow.

The following chart summarizes the views of these three groups on specific issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Right Idealist</th>
<th>Left Idealist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition Vs. Modernity:</td>
<td>Pro-Tradition</td>
<td>Anti-tradition</td>
<td>Weakly anti-traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist vs. Socialist models:</td>
<td>Weakly pro-capitalist</td>
<td>Pro-socialist</td>
<td>pro-capitalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War guilt:</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>some (towards Asia)</td>
<td>Little or none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Reforms:</td>
<td>largely negative</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional revision:</td>
<td>in favor</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asianism:</td>
<td>latent</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism in Education:</td>
<td>foster</td>
<td>opposed</td>
<td>more opposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Treaty:</td>
<td>tactical support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF:</td>
<td>support and greatly expand</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support in its current form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas dispatch:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons/option:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms exports:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict civilian control of the SDF: mixed</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three sub-cultures were unevenly distributed among the different institutions and groups which make up the Japanese
political system. In some groups there was a clear predominance of one political-military sub-culture over the others, while in others the story was less clear. But in every important sector of the Japanese political system one always finds some mixture of these different sub-cultures. There were Left Idealists even within the LDP, and certainly there were many Centrists within the opposition parties and among the intellectuals. Some of the leading pre-war Right Idealists, like Ishiwara Kanji, were to become Left Idealists in the immediate post-war period, and leading leftists, like Shimizu Ikutaro, were eventually to switch over to being right-wing reactionaries. In the following a thumbnail sketch will be given of the major sectors which make up the Japanese political environment: public opinion, intellectual opinion, media, business, the opposition parties, bureaucratic actors and the LDP. With each sketch an effort will be made to identify roughly what the mix of the different political-military sub-cultures in that particular group was.

To understand Japan's overall political-military culture it is necessary to look at each of these elements of the Japanese political-military culture both separately and together. If an analogy may be permitted, each of these sectors can be likened to a tile in a mosaic. Each piece has its own combination of form and color, but only when all the tiles are viewed together can the larger picture of Japanese political-military culture be discerned. Based on these analyses of each of the different sectors an impressionistic chart is given which identifies,
admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, the overall range of positions within each group. It's hoped that each chart will give the reader some insight into what the overall "balance of forces" in 1960 was. And by comparing this chart with charts drawn up for the subsequent two eras (1976 and 1989) singled out as break points in the analysis we can diagrammatically illustrate the shifts over time in the positions of these different constituent elements of the Japanese political system and then identify broader trends.

I. Public Opinion

Japanese public opinion during the 1945 to 1960 period reflected a profound ambivalence regarding defense and security issues. Though there existed a large Centrist plurality (perhaps 40%) for relying on the U.S. and building up Self Defense Forces, the Japanese public was not enthusiastic about the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, and an almost as large segment (about a third) was attracted by the idea of neutrality. Only a relatively small, but not insignificant group favored independent Japanese rearmament (at most 10%), and very few were in favor of alignment with the Communist Bloc over the U.S..

The basic trend could already be seen in the first survey on defense issues conducted in August 1950 by the Mainichi newspaper, which asked how Japan should defend itself in the future. 11% responded Japan should rely completely on the U.S., 33% rely on the U.S. and increase the Self Defense Forces, 10%
rely completely on the U.N., 26% rely on the U.N. and increase self defense forces, 7% defend itself without any other nation's support and 13% responded other or gave no answer.\(^{(254)}\) Thus total support for SDF was 66%, of whom half were also for siding with the U.S., 11% for an independent Japanese stance, and the other 40% for some form of armed neutrality relying on the UN. Altogether 44% were for for some degree of reliance on the U.S.. At the same time, as later surveys showed, there was only very limited support for the stationing of U.S. troops on Japanese soil, and while a majority of Japanese recognized the necessity of the U.S. military presence in Japan, the majority hoped that this would prove only a temporary arrangement.\(^{(255)}\)

Many Japanese in 1959 would have preferred a non-aggression pact as suggested by the JSP in its election campaign the previous Spring, (perhaps as many as 50%), but even among those in favor of such a pact the majority recognized that it had little prospect of being realized.\(^{(256)}\) Many clearly agreed with the arguments that the JSP was making against the Treaty regarding the ineffectiveness of the U.S. promise to consult with Japan before it use its forces stationed there.\(^{(257)}\) Far more people seemed opposed to the _quid pro quo_ of U.S. defense of Japan in return of Japanese defense of the U.S. bases than were for it.\(^{(258)}\) Only a minority were actively for revising the Security Treaty, though many thought it inevitable.\(^{(259)}\) Certainly the vast majority were against revising it in light of the resistance it provoked, even though the methods of the
demonstrators were condemned equally as much as the high-handed approach of the Kishi government.\textsuperscript{(260)} Moreover, throughout the 50s, while between a quarter and a third of the population was in favor of constitutional revision, an equal percentage was strongly against it and the rest thought that it would be inadvisable at the present time.\textsuperscript{(261)}

In addition to what can be gleaned from public opinion polls, Japanese electoral behavior at the time also conveyed one clear message; the majority of the public did not vote on the basis of their views of defense. Attempts by conservatives in the elections of 1951-1952 clearly revealed that defense could not effectively be used to rally electoral support for increased rearmament. And the elections of 1958 and even more so those of November 1960 should have shown the JSP that running against the security issue was not going to give them the electoral advantage they needed to come into power. That the Socialists chose to ignore this message was another matter, but by the Summer of 1960 the LDP had clearly come to understand that raising the defense issue did not pay electorally. It has since become axiomatic in the party that "defense does not get the vote" \textit{(Boei wa hyo ni tsunagaranai)}.\textsuperscript{(262)}

II. Intellectual Opinion

Following the Second World War intellectuals in Japan belonged overwhelmingly to the Left Idealist camp. Already in the
pre-war period Japanese intellectuals for a variety of reasons had strongly tended towards Marxism. First, at least in the 1920s and 1930s, intellectuals everywhere, not only in Japan, tended towards socialist utopianism. After the Russian revolution of 1917, and with socialist movements all over Europe on the move, it was easy to see socialism as the wave of the future. In addition, there was the matter of historical timing. When the social sciences came to Japan, Marxism was very much in vogue in the West, and to the Japanese Marxism became indistinguishable from social scientific thinking. Finally Marxism was in a way very convenient for Japanese intellectuals, insecure about venturing out for the first time into intellectual waters which had already been navigated by the scholars of the West for centuries. Marxism seemed to offer a comprehensive system which allows those who master it to express opinions on all subjects, from economics and history to art and literature. Everything could be made to reveal its true nature through the application of the razor-sharp scalpel of identifying class interest and then given a higher meaning by analyzing its place in the grand march of the mode of production and the dialectics of history. By carefully studying the Marxist paradigm as the highest product of European intellectual accomplishment, the Japanese intellectual could feel he had found the short cut to the mastery of the vast body of Western learning.

In the post-war period this general leaning towards Marxism was reinforced by a number of factors. Marxism was given new
legitimacy as the dire pre-war predictions of economic doom seemed borne out by the terrible state of material deprivation in which the nation found itself, made all the more poignantly by the painful contrast with the great prosperity of the U.S., whose soldiers lived in relative luxury in Japan's ruined cities and whose images bombarded the impoverished Japanese in the form of movies, radio programs, books, magazines and even school texts. Inevitably, along with the desire to emulate the Americans, there also came the contrary impulse to reject them, especially since the achievement of such riches appeared a futile dream. It was precisely this nationalistic impulse which worked in favor of the Communists. Many Japanese thinkers were aware of the dangers of this type of emotional left-wing nationalism, but as Maruyama Masao argued, these dangers were preferable to those of nationalism on the Right.\(^{(263)}\)

At the same time, Communism as a movement both at home and abroad had been given fresh impetus by the war. Communism swept Eastern Europe and much of Asia and socialist movements elsewhere greatly grew in strength. In Japan the Communist leaders were freed by the Occupation and encouraged to become active in politics. During the pre-war period Marxism had been ruthlessly and often brutally suppressed by the authorities, and while the Japanese militarists had at least domestically been less enthusiastic about physically annihilating their opponents than the Nazis or even the Italian Fascists had been, they were brutally efficient in suppressing enemies of the state, with
Communists heading the lists. Whereas most of the opposition had been co-opted by the militarists, only the Communists had steadfastly refused to compromise, and many of the post-war Communist leaders were imprisoned and tortured for decades before reemerging from their cells in 1945. The Communists had been vindicated by history, and the many Japanese intellectuals who had bought their peace with silence during the war, or had even actively propagated in support of the militarists and the war (Kyoto University in particular had become notorious for legitimizing the militarist program) were now wracked with guilt about their past failure to speak out. Even if they viewed things differently from their Communist colleagues and students they were unable to speak out against them. Indeed, in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the late 1940s and 50s, to do so was even physically dangerous, and those who spoke critically of the Soviet Union or the PRC ran the risk of physical assault.\(^{264}\)

Contributing to this was the sense on the part of many intellectuals that Japan bore a moral debt to the peoples of Asia, and above all to the people of mainland China, for the atrocities committed by the Japanese forces stationed there during WW II; a debt which could not be repaid if Japan followed the U.S. line of isolating the PRC.

These psychological pressures made it almost impossible for the majority of Japanese intellectuals to admit that the Soviet Union and the PRC, as the two leading socialist nations, were capable of any wrong, and for the most part they swallowed whole
the Soviet interpretation of international events. Evidence which contradicted this world view was ignored or dismissed out of hand, as could be seen by the near-universal condemnation of the 1956 uprising in Hungary as being an attempted reactionary coup d'état. (265)

This is not to say, however, that views among the intellectuals were monolithic. Among the Marxists there were two main schools of thought; the ronoha (worker-laborers faction) and the kozoha (structure faction). The two had originated during the 1920s. The ronoha theorists produced the ideology of the left wing of the JSP while the kozoha was linked to the JCP. The kozoha school saw Japan as being a "half feudal capitalist system" (hankokushugiikeizai seido), in which, unlike the British form of capitalism Marx was writing about, feudalistic practices, (for example the land owner system) were built into the organic reproduction of capital and thus constituted an essential element of the Japanese capitalist system. As a result the Japanese bourgeoisie had a class interest in preserving feudalistic elements in the Japanese economy and thus could not play the positive role that Marx acknowledged they could play in other nations. Hence in Japan the revolution would have to be wholly carried out by the proletariat. The Americans had played a helpful role with the earlier Occupation reforms, but with the Korean war the U.S. influence became wholly negative. Not only did the U.S. become the arch-enemy of global Communism, but with the red purges it became the chief enemy of socialist forces
within Japan as well. In short, the U.S. was the patron of the class enemy. The ronoha theorists, in contrast, saw Japan as an advanced capitalist society. The bourgeoisie could play a helpful role, and the main enemy was the repressive capitalist state.

What this meant in practical terms was that whereas the kozoha theorists and the JCP saw the U.S. as the prime enemy, the ronoha members and the JSP focused their attacks on the Japanese government. These differences led to very different evaluations of the outcome of the Security Treaty riots. Within the Minshushugi to Heiwa o mamoru Kokuminkaigi, the umbrella organization set up to coordinate the anti-Security Treaty movement, there were two main factions. There was the Shiminha (citizens faction), which was generally identified with the JSP and the ronoha point of view, and the Zengakurenha, the faction of the radical students, sometimes associated with the JCP and the kozoha school, though the older Communists disapproved of the young radicals' methods and lack of discipline. Maruyama Masao, the leader of the Shiminha, called a meeting at Tokyo University shortly after the Treaty was automatically extended and told his followers that while it was regrettable that they had failed to block the Treaty, their main goal of bringing down the Kishi government had been accomplished. In stark contrast, Shimizu Ikutaro, the main intellectual spokesman for the Zengakurenha, later wrote of the devastating shock, the sense of defeat and desolation, he suffered as he waited outside the Diet building on the night the Treaty was automatically extended. Kishi's
resignation was some small consolation, but the main target, the Security Treaty and Japan's tie to the imperialist U.S., had escaped unscathed.

During the 1950s intellectuals of all stripes played an important role in laying down a barrage of criticism upon the government's defense policies. The most important among the myriad of organizations set up by the so-called progressive or reform intellectuals (kakushin interii)(266) was the Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai (the Peace Problem Study Group) formed in July 1949 to discuss the UNESCO Declaration on the Causes of War and the Foundations of Peace. Its founders were Abe Yoshige, president of Gakushuin University, Ouchi Byoe, a prominent economist at Tokyo University, and Nishina Yoshino, Director of the Science Research Institute.(267) Other important members included Maruyama Masao, Ukai Nobushige, Royama Masamichi and, joining the group later on, Shimizu Ikutaro. Over the next decade the Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai issued a series of influential statements published in the prominent journal Sekai which affirmed its belief in the progress of man and the achievability of a just social order under which the exploitation of man by his fellow man would be ended. The Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai was joined by a chorus of lesser assemblies of academics throughout Japan.

This hodgepodge of organizations and committees played no small role in legitimating the efforts of the opposition parties to sabotage the government's defense program. Equally important, but not as commonly recognized, they made it virtually impossible
for the government to legitimate its policies. The few intellectuals who dared to openly support the government were generally drowned out by the deluge of critical opinion emanating from the Japanese academic and journalistic worlds. (268) Intellectuals everywhere play a crucial role in the formation of culture, and as long as the Japanese intellectual mainstream so solidly held to the left-idealistic world view it was impossible to win support for more pragmatic policies. At the same time the intellectuals were relatively isolated, and their policy goals were at times so clearly at odds with reality that they failed to make the Left-Idealist political culture, at least in its unadulterated form, the dominant one. But with time the ideological divisions among the intellectuals, a fractious lot by nature anyway, would lead to a gradual acceptance of compromise with the Centrist political-military culture.

III. The Media

The two dominant forms of opinion-making media during this period were newspapers and journals. Like the U.S. or any other nation with a large literate population Japan has a myriad of regional and specialized newspapers. But in addition it also has several giant national papers with circulations running into the millions. The largest at the time was the Asahi, which had the reputation of being the newspaper for the educated man, followed by the Mainichi and the Yomiuri. Trailing considerably in the
circulation enjoyed by these three giants was the highly influential Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Japan's equivalent to the Wall Street Journal, and the Sankei Shimbun, which also specializes in economic matters. While not a national paper, the Tokyo Shimbun as well was an influential paper with millions of readers. There was an even greater diversity of dailies, but there was no equivalent to the mega-newspapers with their millions of subscribers. There was however a sudden explosion of the so-called Sogo Zasshi, or universal journals, which carried articles and columns spanning the whole spectrum of genres, from literature and poetry to politics, economics, sports and social criticism. The most important of these was Sekai, which rapidly established itself as the leading journal among intellectuals, and Chuokoron, followed by Bungeishunju, though during the period under consideration here Bungeishunju did not have the kind of prominence enjoyed by the other two. Between the newspapers and the journals were of course the weeklies, the Shukanshi, which were generally associated with one of the larger newspapers (for example Asahi Jyaanaru is connected to the Asahi newspaper, and the Ekonomisuto to the Mainichi), but these tended to follow their parent newspapers in their general editorial outlook. Many of these were notorious for their sensationalistic and even scurrilous brand of journalism.

During the pre-war period the newspapers had generally been both pro-democratic and pro-expansionist, fitting in with the press's generally critical attitude towards the government. On
the one hand, the press campaigned for the expansion of the right to vote and, naturally enough, championed freedom of speech. On the other hand, the press took a jingoistic position in castigating the government for being too cautious in expanding the Empire's boundaries and was supportive of the young radical officers in the Kwantung army who were engineering incidents to draw the Army deeper and deeper into China. Though the press, especially the Asahi, criticized the extremist officers who participated in the May 15, 1932 affair (for which they were later attacked by the rebel troops in the February 16, 1936 revolt) they wholeheartedly supported the radicals' foreign policy agenda and did not dare question the Army's version of events for fear of being labeled unpatriotic. During the war the newspapers were placed under the control of the Intelligence Committee (later Bureau) of the cabinet, and became purely an instrument of militarist propaganda.

Consequently, after the war there came a violent reaction as many newspapermen, guilty over their war-time and pre-war roles, shifted to the opposite pacifist anti-military extreme. Almost as soon as the war ended senior newspapermen at all the major newspapers formed unions and presented the owners and their appointed editors with a series of demands for democratization of the internal organization of the newspapers, for union control of editorial policy and for the resignation of the senior editorial and managerial staff, as well as the board of directors and other top managers of the newspapers for their war-time roles.(269) The
large families which owned and had until then largely run the papers were forced to give up much of their control and retreat into mainly proprietary roles.

SCAP, however, came out against union control of editorial policy, and supported management against the union radicals in the especially acrimonious disputes at the Yomiuri. SCAP also encouraged the publishers and editors to form the Japan Newspaper Association (Nihon Shimbun Kyokai) to help establish and apply standards of journalism. Thereafter the unions managed to only rarely influence editorial policy and control remained in the hands of the editorial staffs and the presidents. Though the sympathies of many journalists and their unions may have disposed them to be more critical of the government, management was thus able to reign in the radicals and pursue a more independent editorial policy. Intense competition between the newspapers for both readers and advertisers exerted a major moderating influence on the newspapers, forcing them to not diverge too far from views acceptable to both their readerships and their advertisers. In addition, the structure of news gathering and the press club system discouraged investigative reporting and forced the press to develop long-term links with the government and the different agencies if they wished to get information. Of the major papers during this period the Asahi was the most consistently critical of the government’s defense policies, followed by the Mainichi and Yomiuri. The Nikkei tended to be neutral on defense matters, while Sankei and some other media organizations, such as
Jiji Press, supported the government.\(^{271}\)

Initially the major newspapers were all relatively supportive of the Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1941, with the exception of the *Asahi*. However they all were strongly critical of proponents of large-scale rearmament, and came out against Hatoyama's drive constitutional revision in 1955, when it appeared that conservative leaders might change parts of the Constitution to stress the duties of individuals towards the state over against their rights.\(^{272}\) During the late 50s and 1960 the *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* were strongly critical of the move to revise the Security Treaty. Though the *Mainichi* was initially more supportive, it shifted to an anti-government position as the popular mood seemed to turn increasingly against treaty revision. By May, 1960 all of the major newspapers, including even the *Nikkei* and *Sankei* were calling for Kishi's resignation. At the same time the newspapers were critical of the opposition's tactics, and as the violence increased even the *Asahi* switched its position and called for the government to welcome President Eisenhower and restrain the demonstrators.\(^{273}\) Consequently the press came very much under criticism from both the political Left, for not more resolutely supporting the anti-government movement, and the Right, for its sharp criticism of defense policies.

IV. The Business World
Despite various internal rivalries (274) the business world of Japan joined together early on in the post-war era to realize its own political agenda. Japan's business leaders were primarily concerned with stabilizing the domestic situation and ensuring the creation of a political environment favorable to capitalism. Beyond this many business leaders had a world view similar to that of the Right Idealists described above, but their concern with political stability (as evidenced by their growing dissatisfaction with Kishi as the Security Treaty crisis intensified) forced them to compromise on these ideals in the face of popular opposition.

While in the early 50s there was tremendous interest in using defense production to stimulate the economy, many business leaders, especially in the financial sector of the economy, questioned the long-range wisdom of this strategy. Moreover, during the 1930s the business establishment had been one of the prime targets of the militarists, and many business leaders shared Prince Konoye's Group's fear that the military itself could become a hotbed of sedition. In any case, by the mid-1950s the Japanese economy had sufficiently recovered to make pump priming through military spending completely unnecessary, and growth in trade with the U.S. disposed of any latent interest in Communist markets.

Interest in defense would survive in the business community. But, with the exception of the aeronautics industry which was largely dependent on the Self Defense Forces for
contracts, interest survived largely in a residual form. In the coming decades business leaders would occasionally speak out on defense-related topics (most notably around 1970), but largely had little motivation to pay much attention to questions of military security.

V. The Conservative Parties

Far from being a unified group, the conservatives were a complicated agglomeration of groups brought together by their and their backers' (especially the Japanese business world's) common fear of Communism, and kept barely united by the benefits of incumbency. Within the same party there were such ardent liberals as Ishibashi Tanzan and Miki Takeo, and staunch conservatives as Kishi Nobosuke and Kono Ichiro. In general one can speak of two major streams with regard to defense.

The first group centered on Yoshida Shigeru and the men he brought into politics with him, such as Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi. Their position on defense fit into the Centrist world view described above, and they preferred to keep a low profile on defense in favor of economic expansion and reliance on the U.S.. However, as has been shown earlier, even Yoshida was quite conservative in his world view and wished to prepare the way for eventual larger-scale rearmament by first establishing the social and spiritual foundations needed for rearmament.

The second group included many of the old liberal
politicians such as Hatoyama Ichiro, Ashida Hitoshi and Kono Ichiro, whose view of reality more closely corresponded to that of the Right Idealists. It should be stressed, however, that men like Hatoyama and Ashida, while ardently pro-rearmament, were not died-in-the-wool reactionaries. Hatoyama had been prominent for his opposition to the militarists in the 1930s and 40s and was a firm believer in parliamentary democracy, while Ashida had ties with labor leaders like Nishio Suehiro and socialist Katayama Tetsuo and could boast of near impeccable pre-war liberal credentials. Indeed, they were arguably rather more liberal than Yoshida himself. Unlike Yoshida, however, Hatoyama and Ashida were more openly pro-rearmament, and were eager to take the issue to the Japanese people and win their support. They also were more ready to accept the American Cold War view of the Soviet threat, making them more willing to condone a massive arms buildup. In part at least some of their differences with Yoshida can be better explained in terms of personal rivalries with Yoshida than in terms of deep-rooted ideological differences. Kishi Nobosuke and Shigemitsu Mamoru, on the other hand, though allied with Hatoyama and Ashida, had been active supporters of the militarists’ policies in the 30s and 40s, and their commitment to democratic principles was probably tenuous at best. At the same time, even they remained deeply distrustful of the old military, though they supported Admiral Nomura and Colonel Hattori in their efforts to rebuild the old military and in their attacks on the SDF as created by their arch-rival Yoshida.
In addition to these two major ideological streams one might arguably identify a third current represented by Ishibashi Tanzan and Miki Takeo and their followers. Ishibashi had been perhaps the most prominent pre-war conservative critic of the militarist policy in China and had developed ties with the Communists and Socialists in the immediate post-war period, while Miki became known as an advocate of the peace diplomacy of former Prime Minister Shidehara. Both Ishibashi and Miki were less interested in defense and security matters than the others, and placed greater value on maintaining ties with Communist China. Overall their views were not too far removed from those of the Left Idealists. Nonetheless, in terms of absolute numbers they represented a distinct minority within the party.

There were also many important members of the LDP, such as Ono Bamboku, who did not hold particularly strong opinions on defense and security issues. Future Prime Minister Sato Eisaku can probably be categorised as belonging to this group, though he had ties to both of the major ideological currents (Yoshida had been his political patron and mentor, while Kishi was his brother).

Only a few former military men began, hesitantly, to enter political life, and in 1956 a total of 12 were elected to the upper house. Naturally they all joined the LDP, but were largely concerned with issues such as the care of wounded veterans and the families of fallen soldiers, the erection of war memorials and so forth. On defense issues they were by and large
dissatisfied with the SDF and current rearmament and advocated constitutional revision, spiritual education and armed neutrality along the lines of Switzerland or Sweden. While their numbers were quite limited, they had the all out support of veterans and war widows groups and gathered more votes than the entire JCP. Also, while the number of former military officers who became professional politicians remained small, the veterans organizations (the most important of which was the Senyukai), along with religious organizations, became an important grass-roots organizational basis for many LDP candidates. *(275)*

Yet, despite ideological differences within the LDP, the fierce competition for power between the different factions made it nearly impossible to adhere to a consistent ideological position on defense, or for that matter, on any other issue. One simple reflection of the intensity of the political infighting in the LDP is that in the 10 year period stretching from 1950 to 1960 Japan had no fewer than 4 prime ministers, whereas the U.S. had only two presidents and West Germany but a single chancellor. Over the entire period from 1950 to 1990 Japan has had fifteen prime ministers over against 9 U.S. presidents and 6 West German chancellors. The LDP is made up of a complex constellation of competing factions supporting an individual leader in his bid to become Prime Minister. In return for their support the members of a faction receive money, nomination as an LDP candidate *(276)*, and powerful political posts within the government and the party. Failure to compete means the demise of the faction, and over the
course of the post-war period the factional map within the LDP has changed many times. No single faction can hope to gain control of the Prime Ministership on its own. Instead the faction leader must constantly seek alliances with the other factions, forcing the LDP politician to be uncommonly flexible in whom he teams up with. The old saw that politics makes strange bed fellows is a truism the world over, but in the LDP there is a veritable orgy of political maneuvering, as factional leaders are forced to hop from one alliance after another involving not one but multiple partners. Even Kishi, who with nearly a third of the party under his control was unusually powerful, was forced to seek partners to hold power. In this manner ideological preferences are forced to give way to pragmatic necessities. (277)

Thus despite his very different ideological position, Ikeda, previously the most important critic of the new treaty, ultimately sided with Kishi to help push through the Treaty’s ratification in the Diet in order to become Prime Minister. Significantly, however, as part of the deal Ikeda and his mentor Yoshida reportedly reserved the right to criticize Kishi’s methods afterwards. In addition they wished to make the Treaty Revision Kishi’s Banamichi (literally the flower path, or grand exit in Kabuki), allowing Kishi to make a graceful exit from the Prime Ministership. Likewise Kono Ichiro, who in 1954 had campaigned hard to increase the defense budget and whose ideological views were probably closer to Kishi’s than Ikeda’s were, cynically became the Treaty’s most zealous conservative
opponent once pushed out of government in favor of his chief rival, Ikeda. The 1960 struggle over the Security Treaty set a pattern where the Prime Minister was always undermined on controversial issues by their rivals motivated more by considerations of power than their own objective views on the policy question itself. This pattern contributed greatly to not only the Japanese government's immobility on defense, but on many other major policy issues as well.

VI> The Opposition Parties

Like the Conservatives, the leftist opposition parties were composed of a diverse mixture of ideological currents and concrete interests, overlaid with a complex web of personal alliances and rivalries. Unlike the Conservatives, however, the leftist parties were unable to pull themselves together to create a united and effective opposition capable of taking power from the Conservatives. While there were several attempts at creating a powerful Socialist party able to challenge the LDP, these efforts time and time again were frustrated by the inability of the Socialist leaders to arrive at a consensus on defense and rearmament issues. It is possible to identify three main currents on the defense issue among the left-wing opposition parties during the 1950s: pro-defense pragmatists, pacifists, and hard-line Marxists.

The first group was that of the right-wing Socialists led
by Nishio Matsuhiro, Mizutani Chosaburo and Sone Eki. Nishio was an important pre-war labor leader with close ties to Ashida Hitoshi of the Conservatives. He and Ashida represented the core axis around which the brief-lived centrist 1947 government of Katayama Tetsu was built and initially he controlled the strongest faction in the Socialist party. Before the war Nishio and others of the Shaminminshuto had been outspoken in their opposition to the militarists, even while Nishio latter confessed that he had sympathized with the young officers who staged the Manchurian incident. Nishio's support derived primarily from the Zenro (later simply Domei) unions, especially the Textile and Seaman's Unions, as well as industrial firms often belonging to companies engaged in defense-related production. Nishio fought long and hard against the leftward drift of the Socialist party. He opposed the Socialists' attacks on the rearmament and Security Treaty policies of the government and argued that as an independent nation Japan needed the ability to defend herself. For this purpose he advocated the creation of an 150,000 to 200,000 man military under tight civilian control and without the ability to conduct offensive operations.\(^{278}\) Nishio also contended that constitutional revision enabling a military buildup was needed and said that Japan needed to enter into collective security agreements in East Asia and with the U.S..\(^{279}\) Sone Eki, Nishio's protege and former high official in the Foreign Ministry, contended that a gradual rearmament was needed to counter both the internal and external Communist
threat. He also advocated Japanese participation in the UN peace keeping force and the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty, though he warned against replacing it since this could open the way for the overseas dispatch of Japanese troops.\(^{280}\) Despite their support for constitutional revision, the Security Treaty and rearmament, they remained very much centrist in their general orientation, stressing the importance of economic development and the raising of the standard of living over the pursuit of military means of achieving security.

In contrast the left-wing Socialists, including the Kawakami Shotaro faction which sometimes sided with Nishio, were strongly opposed to the government's defense and security policies. Other important leaders included Asanuma Inejiro, Wada Hiro and Suzuki Mosaburo. They were strict adherents to the party's three peace principles, adopted at the first post-war meeting of the Socialist party in December, 1945: democracy, socialism, and opposition to all militaristic thought and action along with the realization of perpetual peace through the cooperation of the peoples of the world.\(^{281}\) In 1951 opposition to rearmament was added as a fourth principle. In addition, many of the Socialist leaders on the Left had cooperated with the militarist government and may consequently have felt added psychological pressure to avoid committing the same error again. There was also a genuine fear that the conservatives were attempting to undermine democracy.\(^{282}\) The left-wing Socialist party received most of its organizational support from the General Council of Japanese
Labor Unions, Sohyo, which after 1954 was dominantly composed of public sector unions. In addition the JSP was backed by the large majority of Japanese intellectuals, and its pacifist and social welfare messages had considerable resonance among urban youth and housewives. The left-wing socialists were strongly opposed to rearmament and the security arrangement with the U.S., preferring instead the establishment of a neutral Japan whose security would be guaranteed by the great powers including the Soviet Union and the PRC. Trips by Socialist leaders to the Soviet Union and the PRC were a major source of publicity and helped buttress the Socialists' neutralist image. At the same time it opened them up to manipulation by the Chinese (as during Asanuma's trip to Beijing in 1959), and increased the Conservatives' and right-wing Socialists' mistrust. Theirs was the dominant voice of the Socialist party during the major defense debates of the era.

The hard-line Marxist wing of the party embraced the left wing of the Socialist party, led by Sakisaka Itsuro, and the Japanese Communist Party, by 1960 under the iron hand of Miyamoto Kenji. Believers in the kozaha thesis and with close ties to Moscow and Beijing, the hard-line Marxists favored violent confrontation with the government as prelude to a revolutionary takeover and the reform of the nation. (283) The hard-line Marxists within the JSP were more circumspect with their revolutionary ideology while working to expand their party's ties to the JCP. The hard-line Marxists were backed by the radical wing of the labor movement (including notably the teacher's
union) and the more militant intellectuals and students, such as Shimizu Ikutaro and the young firebrands of Zengakuren. Electorally they derived additional support from disaffected portions of society, who voted Communist knowing that this was perhaps the most effective way of registering protest with the ruling conservative party. The JCP supported the adoption of a policy of strict neutrality, breaking all ties with the West while creating a socialist people’s army completely free of residues from the old militarist past.

After the Security Treaty riots of 1960 the Japanese Socialists believed that they had scored a great success in toppling the Kishi government, though there was concern that they had been unable to convert that success into electoral gains. In the following years there was an ongoing debate between those in the party who hoped to repeat the success of 1960 on a larger scale in 1970, and those who felt that the elections of November 1960 had demonstrated the sterility of the party’s approach and the need for reform.

Despite their inability to unite, the left-wing opposition parties sporadically worked together to frustrate the LDP on defense issues. In this they acted more as a stabilizing (critics would contend immobilizing) force in the development of defense policy. Indeed, many in the party today believe that this has been the party’s greatest achievement in a history otherwise marked by a long succession of failures.
VI. The Bureaucracy

Finally, though they cannot be classified as constituting one of the five sectors identified earlier, it is worthwhile to look briefly at the positions of the different government ministries on defense. There were four bureaucratic institutions which were primarily involved in the making of security policy: the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) itself; the Ministry of Finance (MOF); the Foreign Ministry (MOFA); and the Ministry of International Trade and Finance (MITI). The JDA, despite in principle bearing prime responsibility for military security, was in fact a very weak political actor. Internally it was divided between the military and non-military personnel, who did not trust each other. Externally it was penetrated by MOF, which traditionally appointed the head of the financial division, and by MITI, which controlled the procurements division. There was also a built-in conflict between the JDA and the Foreign Ministry over the issue of who would handle relations with the U.S.. In part these dependencies were forced upon it by lack of technical knowledge, but it also made it easier for the other ministries to use the JDA and the SDF for their own purposes. Moreover, they presented an obstacle to the emergence of an independent esprit de corps among JDA till the early 80s.

The Finance Ministry represented the flower of the Japanese bureaucratic elite and was probably the single most powerful political force in Japan during the 1950s. It’s primary objective
was to check government spending, and in this role it naturally acted to limit defense expenditures. In addition, in the pre-war period it had been targeted by the radical militarists who objected to its efforts to restrain Japan’s military buildup. Many MOF officials therefore shared the general distrust of the new Self Defense Forces and took pride in their close supervision of it. Still in the 1980s it is not an uncommon view among MOF officials that it is they, and not the Diet, which is the real guarantor of civilian control of the military.\(^{284}\)

MITI, with its origins in the old pre-war Munitions Ministry, had an inherent interest in defense production. When the old military production lines roared back into action with the start of the Korean war, naturally MITI became involved, successfully seizing control of licensing and trying to loosen export controls. However, as the economy turned increasingly away from defense, MITI as well shifted its focus elsewhere, and defense became largely a residual concern.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was politically speaking one of the weakest ministries in the world of Japanese bureaucracies. With no domestic constituency (in contrast to, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture) and no control of licensing, taxation or other such bureaucratic sources of power, the post of Foreign Minister was of only limited interest to aspiring young LDP politicians. On the defense question the Foreign Ministry became the prime bearer of the Yoshida doctrine, and though it had little influence on internal military matters, it played an
important role in terms of coordinating activities with the U.S. In this capacity it was a major factor in the military buildup of the late 70s. At the same time, it was basically highly cautious and, during the 1950s, tried to oppose any effort to tamper with the security system. The lack of result of its efforts reflects its general powerlessness externally.

In terms of the three ideological categories described at the beginning of this section, the Left Idealist, Right Idealists and Centrists, all four ministries pretty clearly fall into the Centrist camp. Within the military itself it is impossible to judge how many old military men shared a Right Idealist worldview, though it seems likely that they were not few in number. Nonetheless, they were kept tightly under control by the Defense Ministry bureaucrats, and perhaps more importantly by the knowledge that unlike during the 1920s and 30s any efforts on their part to influence politics would excite near-universal condemnation. The other ministries tended to either support or cooperate with the JDA depending on their own institutional interests, though they shared the general Centrist aversion to the military and military means of resolving Japan's security dilemma.

Conclusion

It is interesting to speculate whether it would have been possible for Japanese security policy to have developed in a
different direction. In light of the enormous success that Japan enjoyed pursuing the course that it did, it is difficult to imagine that they could have done it any other way. Yet from the perspective of the 1950s the establishment of the Yoshida doctrine as a permanent solution to the problems of Japanese security seemed to be far from an assured outcome. The conservative groups who dominated the LDP in the second half of the 50s certainly envisioned a very different future for Japan, and it was undoubtedly within the Japan’s economic ability to give in to U.S. prodding and create a far larger military than it actually did. Furthermore, given the example of West Germany, there is no reason to believe that Japan could not have entered into mutual security arrangements with other nations in the region, creating a NEATO (North East Asian Treaty Organization) similar to NATO in Europe. This might have fostered greater regional economic integration and enhanced military security. Indeed, from the standpoint of the 1990s, this might have alleviated many of Japan’s (and the U.S.‘s) long-term political problems. Japan could also have pursued a policy of greater distance from the U.S., as was being urged by the opposition parties, the intellectuals and a large segment of the population. While the costs of such a policy would have been high, history is strewn with examples of nations who adopted unwise policies and it is doubtful whether the U.S. after the mid-1950s could have intervened to overturn a policy set by a democratically elected Japanese government.
The domestic basis of support for the Centrist position can thus be seen as having been relatively narrow. Nonetheless, the other two sides managed to cancel one another out, as they did most spectacularly during the Security Treaty riots of 1960, leaving the political field to the centrists. Over time support for the centrist position would solidify and spread and come to spread Japan’s political-military culture.

But in 1960, the fractured state of the Japanese political-military culture promoted extreme avoidance of the defense issue. Defense and security questions became dominated by a whole host of taboos (the Japanese themselves used the English term in this context), such as the three non-nuclear principles and the taboo concerning nuclear weapons, the taboo of constitutional revision, of overseas dispatch, and even of the use of the term alliance in reference to the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements. Instead the government was forced to make security policies through a process called kiseijijitsun tsumoriagari, or the accumulation of fait accomplis. This in turn increased the opposition’s and popular distrust of the military and of the conservative government in general and probably had a corrosive effect on the development of Japanese democracy. (288) This extreme distrust of the government helped deepen the rifts within the Left and prevented them from uniting or adopting a more pragmatic position on questions of defense and security.
Analytic Overview - Japan I (Chapters 3-5)

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prevented them from uniting or adopting a more pragmatic position on questions of defense and security.

What has been shown in the previous chapters is the emergence of the new political-military culture out of the interaction of specific historical events (primarily the defeat in WW II, the beginning of the Cold War) and culturally-bound perception of those events. In terms of the earlier theoretical discussion this is obviously a process through which a historical political culture came into being (the emphasis here of course being its defense aspect).

Let it be stipulated that all along there remain what was previously called an anthropological basis for this political culture. For example, many aspects of the Japanese character remained the same from the pre-war period, including the near universal respect for hierarchy, a tradition of obedience and a strong "work ethic", a preference for the informal exercise of power, and so forth. These characteristics could be found throughout the society, regardless of the ideological views of different segments. These traits were as common among the most radical Socialists as among the most conservative elements in the LDP. Having said this, these stipulated "deep structures" do not explain the specifics of the political military culture which in fact emerged. Rather, to provide such an explanation it is precisely necessary to look at the detailed political and ideological processes which were examined in the forgoing.

In other words, what we see here is a web of causal factors
consisting of different political sector; in Japanese society interacting with each other and with forces outside of Japanese society impinging on all of them. The different sectors enumerated earlier (political parties, media, intellectuals, business interests, public opinion and bureaucratic actors) each pursued their own agenda, yet each contributed to the overall process of culture formation. Some of these contributions were highly intentional, other quite unintentional. (examples - the most clearly intentional being the LDP, even the Left, who even refused to even acknowledge the military lest they lend it legitimacy, in a negative sense contributed to the evolution of the new political-military culture by imposing all sorts of restraints on its further development). One could say that both the Left Idealists and the Right Idealists failed in their agendas. The left was unable to push Japan in the direction of unarmed neutrality, 'the right in reestablishing the old pre-war linkage between the army, the state and the nation. If anybody "won", it was the pragmatic Center, which steered a course between these two extremes by insisting on a policy of limited rearmament and military dependance on the U.S.. It is important to point out, however, that this Centrist course was not clearly planned and deliberately executed. Rather, it emerged out of the course of events. Indeed, its primary architect, Prime Minister Yoshida, had in the long-run a very different course in mind for Japan. Likewise, the Japanese business elite was divided among themselves on the benefits of large-scale arms production in the
early 50s. The Yoshida doctrine was not a global, strategic vision, but rather an ad hoc response to a particular situation. But because of the intense political and ideological controversy surrounding defense, it became very difficult to change a policy once it had been adopted. They were the product of a social and political consensus on defense to which both the Left and Right Idealists contributed to in a negative way. They were influenced from outside the Japanese political system, especially by the overwhelming presence of the United States, and more distantly by the security threat posed by Communism, especially after the outbreak of the Korean war.

The chaotic manner in which Japanese defense policy developed puts a different light on the phrase accumulation of faits accompli. As used by the critics of the government at the time, it implied that the government was deliberately creating facts that could no longer be undone as part of a long range strategy for the transformation of Japanese defense, and perhaps of the Japanese polity as well. Up to a point this was a legitimate observation. At the same time there is also a more interesting meaning which could be given to this phrase, namely that there was an accumulation of faits accompli unintended by anyone. Because of the political cross pressures, for every new defense initiative there tended to emerge counter initiatives designed to place limits on the further expansion of the military establishment., for example the three non-nuclear principles, the restrictions on the export of arms, etc.. These counter
initiatives created **faits accomplis** of their own.

There are two ironies involved here as well. The first concerns the lessons which were drawn from the war. On the one hand, the U.S. initially wanted to impress upon the Japanese a version of history which totally delegitimated the Japanese actions prior and during WWII. The Japanese by and large failed to learn this "lesson", and refused to acknowledge that they had been the aggressors in WWII. Nonetheless, they drew their own set of lessons from the war, among which was the profound distrust of the military. Ironically, this institutionalized a strongly anti-military in post-war Japanese political culture which was what the Americans wanted in the first place. Further deepening the irony is that it was precisely this anti-military animus which later frustrated and irritated U.S. leaders who in the 1950s were trying to draw on Japanese resources to contain communism in East Asia.

A second irony is that each of the three major ideological camps discussed had distinctive illusions. The Right Idealists had illusions about the Japanese past. The Left Idealists about the Communist World. And the Centrists had illusions about the overwhelming superiority of the West. The interaction of these different illusions created a new reality, namely the new political military culture which emerged.

This second irony is related to the dynamic interaction between what was previously called the political-military subcultures, the different ideological groupings of Left
Idealists, Right Idealists and Centrists. As the term sub-culture implies, each of these groups had a history going back into the pre-war period, a history which was to influence their attitudes and preferences in the post-war.

The Left Idealists had been the chief domestic victims of pre-war Japanese authoritarianism and had been profoundly alienated as a result from virtually every aspect of Japanese society, and were furthermore intensely antagonistic to the old power-elite, many of whom reemerged to play an important role in the post-war. In addition, they were influenced by a strong Marxist intellectual tradition, and by a greater willingness to recognize the extent of Japanese atrocities committed in other parts of Asia. Both of these tended to make the Japanese Left distrustful, if not hostile towards the U.S..

The Centrists, many of whom were in the business and bureaucratic worlds, for their part were motivated by a combination of pragmatic interests and their own particular experiences of the past. The most important of these interests, of course, was an economic one, which favored the retention of Japan’s basically capitalists system and therefore increasingly its ties to the U.S. (once it became clear Japan could prosper without its traditional East Asian markets). At the same time, the Centrists subscribed to capitalism as an ideology, and moreover were impressed by the need for reform of Japan’s political, economic and even social institutions in the wake of defeat.
The Right Idealists were the most obviously linked to the past, and tended to be those with the closest personal linkage to the pre-war Japanese system. Even those who rejected aspects of the old regime, most importantly the lack of civilian control over the pre-war military, tended on the balance to feel that the basic objectives and values of pre-war society were worth retaining.

The existence of these sub-cultures are sufficient to indicate that the political-military culture which emerged is neither monolithic nor unchanging. The sub-cultures continue to interact and thus to influence the overall political-military culture. The context within which these different sub-cultures interacted was, of course, the ongoing debate on defense security policy. The Japanese government was under constant pressure from various internal and external forces to adjust its policies to meet changing realities. Every time such new policies were proposed, they triggered intense public debate between these different groups, and set the broad parameters for the kind of policies which could be adopted.

Central to all of these debates on defense policy was the larger issue of national identity. Each of these different sub-cultures had its own normative vision of what Japan as a nation should be. One consequence of this is that positions on defense policy tended to correlate with a wide range of positions on other policies, such as education, labor relations and social policy. Because of the peculiar historical circumstances of
Japan, because of its unsuccessful pre-war experiment with democracy and because of the defeat in WW II, every defense debate almost immediately went to the heart of the question of what Japan is all about. Therefore compared with other countries, the shaping of political-military culture has impinged in a very important way on the shaping of the political culture in general.
The Formative Period in West Germany, 1945 to 1955

Chapter 5 - Defeat and Occupation

The Zero Hour - End of the War in Europe

On May 8, 1945 the final hour, die Stunde Null, had struck for the Third Reich. The victorious armies of the Allied Powers had swept away the final remnants of Hitler's armies, Adolf Hitler, abandoned by most of his confederates, had committed suicide in the increasingly surreal atmosphere of his underground bunker in Berlin, and the day before, General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmacht Staff, signed the unconditional surrender of Germany at General Eisenhower's Headquarters in Reims.(292)

Order, which had held up remarkably despite massive aerial bombardment and encroaching armies, now crumbled, and the country was plunged into chaos. As the economy collapsed, the search for food and shelter became the most urgent task confronting the average German citizen. Particularly piteous was the plight of the millions of refugees who choked the roads from the East, seeking to escape the advancing Red Army.

In the parts of the country occupied by Soviet forces conditions were particularly appalling as Soviet troops, most of whom had friends and relatives who had died at German hands, exacted a bloody revenge upon a defeated German population. Though the mass violence soon abated, thousands more were to die
of malnourishment or maltreatment in Soviet internment centers, often erected at the sites of former German concentration camps.\(^{293}\) Conditions in the West were much better, though many incidents occurred (especially in the zone occupied by the French) and many Allied officers were not above exploiting opportunities for self-enrichment when such presented themselves.

Unlike Japan, Germany had chosen to fight to the bitter end. Consequently the material damage was immense. Over six and a half million Germans had died, approximately half of whom were soldiers. A further 2 million were crippled.\(^{294}\) Virtually all military personnel were imprisoned by the Allied forces, and many were transported as slave laborers to the Soviet Union where they were to remain, in some cases, for nearly a decade.\(^{295}\) The intense aerial bombardment of the last months of the war (as far East as Berlin no town with a population of over 50,000 was left unscathed) had leveled most buildings in the major cities, and there was a terrible shortage of food, clothing and other basic necessities. In August the average West German daily ration was estimated at 1,100 calories.\(^{296}\) Only generous doses of assistance from the U.S. managed to stave off wide-spread starvation in the West Zone. Those in the East frequently were not so fortunate.

With the total collapse of civil authority in Germany, the fate of the nation rested almost entirely in the hands of the Allied powers. Since there were no fewer than four Allied nations, France, England, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the
future development of Germany was inextricably linked to the evolution of relations between the four powers. The immediate course of events in post-war Germany was determined by a series of meetings between the Allied leaders culminating in the conference at Potsdam between July 17 and August 2, 1945. The Allies agreed to divide Germany into four occupation zones under French, British, American and Soviet military governments, with Berlin coming under joint administration. They were also able to agree, at least verbally, on the "4 d's", denazification, demilitarization, decartelization and democratization, as the principles which were to guide their occupation policies. They failed, however, to agree on reparations policy. Equally controversial was the adjustment of Germany's borders, with the Soviet Union demanding the annexation of approximately a quarter (108,000 square kilometers) of Germany's pre-1938 territory by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In part this was to compensate Poland for the annexation of an equally large portion of its eastern territories by the Soviet Union.\(^{(297)}\)

One consequence of this was that it further taxed Germany's already overstrained resources by creating a further enormous influx of refugees. Altogether sixteen and a half million people were, often violently, expelled from their homes. Of these, 2 million died during the flight, a further 3.5 million settled in East Germany and over 10 million in the West.\(^{(298)}\)

Germany in the Summer of 1945 was thus a nation defeated and divided. The great national dream which had propelled German
history since the beginning of the 19th century seemed finally bankrupt. Instead of creating Lebensraum for future German generations, the end of the war left Germany greatly reduced territorially, and partitioned the country for over a generation. The large numbers of refugees in the West and the historical German commitment to national unity created at least theoretically a considerable potential for irredentism. In addition, Western acquiescence in the division of Germany and the annexation of the Eastern territories made it possible that such irredentism, when it emerged, could take an anti-Western as well as anti-Soviet character. Indeed, that it did not emerge must be considered, in the light of human history, an extraordinary anomaly. \(^{(299)}\)

Beyond the partition of the country, a number of other factors distinguished the fate of Germany from that of its wartime ally Japan. First, the Nazi movement had been a broad-based party that, if not already in 1933, than at the latest by the mid-1930s enjoyed the solid support of the majority of the population. \(^{(300)}\) At the same time, the relationship between the old political elite and the new elite was tenuous at best, and though the Prussian aristocracy and big business leaders may have initially supported Hitler as a counter to the Socialists and Communists, they soon became powerless subjects of his regime as well. \(^{(301)}\) Unlike Japan, there existed a relatively large resistance movement against Hitler's totalitarian regime. Thousands of Social Democrats and Communists had been imprisoned,
and in many cases killed for their opposition. Many priests and conscientious objectors as well had suffered at the hands of the SS and the Gestapo. In the end even the German officer corps began to turn against Hitler, culminating in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt. Thus paradoxically, while a sense of responsibility and guilt over what had occurred was much more widely spread among the general population of West Germany than of Japan, there were many more Germans than Japanese who could legitimately claim that they had nothing to do with the corrupt Nazi government. Many historians seeking to analyze the causes of the catastrophe of Nazism, could convincingly claim that instead of being the natural product of German history or the capitalist system Hitler and the Nazis actually were an aberration, a hideous perversion, of German culture and civilization.

In the popular iconography which took hold in the German cultural environment after 1945, May 8th was referred to as the Stunde Null, the hour zero, of German history. This term referred not only to the end of the Second World War, but, more broadly, it suggested that the slate had been wiped clean by the final Armageddon of the Third Reich. All that occurred before that magic hour was no longer relevant for what followed. This, of course, was a myth. Many prominent Nazis survived to pursue important careers in business and government. What is true, however, is that a political elite emerged in the post-war period which could claim to be relatively untainted by the Nazi past and could steer the country in a new direction. While May 7, 1945 may
not have represented a Novum in German history, it did create the opportunity for the nation to cleanse itself of some of the more undesirable elements of its past.

Lessons of the War - Nürnberg and Beyond

The defeat in World War II and the Nazi atrocities seared a scar into the soul of the nation which would remain long after the material damage inflicted by the war had been repaired. The evidence of the Nazi crimes against humanity, and in particular against the Jews, was clear and irrefutable. Despite frantic last minute German efforts to destroy incriminating evidence, the Allies had no trouble collecting overwhelming amounts of papers, photographs and gruesome forensic evidence documenting the extent of the outrages. Using this evidence the occupying forces set out to impress upon the German populace the magnitude of their transgressions. They were assisted by many German survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, some of whom, like the leader of the Socialist party (SPD) Kurt Schumacher, were to become leading figures in the post-war era.

The post-war debate in Germany thus took a on wholly different tenor from the one in Japan. What was at issue in Germany was not merely who bore responsibility for initiating the conflict and the terrible losses incurred, but also the manner in which the war had been conducted and the crimes which had been committed by the Nazi regime. Auschwitz had shaken the German's
confidence in their own civilization to the core, and a great debate ensued among intellectuals about the place of the Third Reich in German history. At the heart of this controversy was the question of how the same nation which produced Goethe, Kant and Beethoven could be responsible for the most barbarous atrocities in modern Western history. There were many different ideological positions in this debate, including a general division between those who, like Gerhard Ritter, tried to portray the Nazi phenomenon as the product of alien forces and an aberration in German history, and others, like Friedrich Meinecke, who saw it as having deeper roots in German culture and history. (302) Regardless of their political preferences, there was no serious intellectual or public figure who sought to defend the former regime and there was universal, moral condemnation of its acts. Far more than in Japan, the end of WW II had been a moral as well as military defeat.

The prime instrument to this end was to be the trial at Nürnberg of the Nazi leaders for war crimes. Like the Tokyo trials of the Japanese war-time leadership, the Nürnberg trials were not merely to be instruments of just revenge, but were imbued with a higher moral and didactic purpose; to demonstrate to the German people and the world the evil of the Nazi leadership and to establish a set of universal laws and principles as the basis for a new, more humane international order.

Altogether there were four categories of war crimes trials.
The first dealt with the top Nazi leadership, altogether 22 individuals representing six organizations identified as being criminal in nature; the SS, the SA, the Reich Cabinet, the Gestapo-SD, the Nazi "leadership" Corps and the General Staff and High Command (treated as one unit) of the Wehrmacht. Of these, 12 were sentenced to death, 3 to life imprisonment, 4 to lengthy prison terms, and 3 were acquitted. In addition to the individual sentencing, 3 of the six organizations on trial were declared criminal - the Nazi leadership Corps, the Gestapo-SD and the SS. In the case of the High Command and General Staff and the Wehrmacht the judges ruled that they should not be held accountable because they did not constitute real groups and the 118 surviving officials involved could be tried on an individual basis. Of the four military men on trial, Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel and General Alfred Jodl were both executed, while Admiral Erich Räder was sentenced to life imprisonment and Admiral Karl Dönitz escaped with a relatively mild ten year prison sentence.

The second group of trials involved 5,006 individuals tried in Allied courts in Germany for various war time violations. Of these 794 were condemned to death and 486 eventually executed. The third category involved those tried in German courts by German judges. By 1950 5,228 had been convicted in these courts, mostly for minor offenses. Only 100 of the convictions were for murder. The fourth category was the 13,532 trials of war criminals conducted outside of Germany in the countries where the crimes had been committed.
Of the three categories of trials the Nürnberg trials were by far of the greatest symbolic importance. Yet, however justified they may have been on a higher, moral level, they suffered from the same legal deficiencies that the Tokyo trials did. First, the charges upon which the defendants were arraigned—conspiracy against peace, crimes against peace, violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity—had for the most part not existed at the time they had been committed. Second, it was often difficult, as in any attempt to show conspiracy, to prove that individual leaders were directly responsible for crimes actually carried out by their subordinates. Third, the concept of collective guilt, whereby the defendants were tried not only as individuals but as representatives of criminal organizations, was a dubious one from a jurisprudential point of view.\(^{305}\) Finally, only German documents were made available for the trial, while important non-German diplomatic records which might have been relevant to the "conspiracy against peace" charges were kept locked in the vaults of the Allied foreign ministries.\(^{306}\)

Finally WWII had been a total war, waged with unparalleled ferocity and inflicting horrific casualties on both sides. The Allies as well had not escaped the war with perfectly clean consciences; the Americans and the British bore responsibility for the fire bombings of Hamburg and Dresden (and for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and the Soviets had to answer for their ruthless policy of territorial annexation which
dispossessed not only millions of Germans, but also great numbers of their supposed Allies, the Poles, as well. (307) Even in the warm afterglow of the war-time alliance with the Soviet Union, many in the West wondered at the appropriateness of having representatives of the murderous Stalin regime sitting in judgement upon crimes which the Soviets had committed on an almost equal scale.

Despite these shortcomings, the German response to the Nürnberg trials was far more positive than the Japanese response to the Tokyo trials. Even the German attorneys for the defense, while aware of the dubious legal basis for the prosecutions, agreed that the trial had been fair.(308) Most Germans, while perhaps not wholly convinced by the prosecution’s case concerning the German responsibility for initiating the conflict, were genuinely appalled by the truth about the Nazi concentration camps which the trial had helped publicize. Many felt that the trials had not gone far enough, and angry crowds gathered on the day the verdicts were given to protest the three acquittals. Wilhelm Högner, chief minister of Bavaria, was one of those most outraged and ordered the immediate taking into custody of the three men who had been acquitted for their trial in denazification courts.(309)

In retrospect the trials did not have quite the impact the Allies had hoped they would. Even the U.S. military governor of the time, General Lucius Clay, was reported to have said that he felt the trials had been a disaster. As a means of bringing to
justice the perpetrators of the immense and numerous atrocities which had been carried out under the Third Reich the trials had been clearly inadequate. Nor did they fully accomplish their educational mission. According to a 1951 survey, 40% of those surveyed felt that things were best in Germany in this century during the years 1933 to 1938. Still in 1971 many felt that Nazism had merely been a good idea that had been poorly executed.\(^{(310)}\) Some even argued that rather than expediting coming to terms with the Nazi past, the collective guilt concept underlying the trials may have hindered the task.\(^{(311)}\)

From 1951 to 1955 a further 628 trials were held in Germany, but by the mid-50s a number of prominent figures were calling for an end to the trials. In 1955 the Occupation ended and at the same time the statute of limitations for crimes short of murder was exceeded. However, a Central Office of Länder Justice Departments was set up which continued to prosecute cases, such as the Ulm case in 1956 which brought a former SS officer who had murdered hundreds of Jews in Lithuania to justice. What made the case especially sensational was that the accused was applying to become the city of Ulm's chief of police, demonstrating in graphic form what the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the critical press had been maintaining all along; the old Nazis were coming back and threatening to take over the society. Cases like this helped keep the war guilt issue alive long after the end of the Occupation, in contrast to Japan where it came to an end after the Americans withdrew.\(^{(312)}\)
Far more important than the trials themselves was the process of self-examination which the Germans undertook themselves. Particularly important in this process was the role of the German churches. In August 1945 at a conference in Treya the Protestant churches announced that all Germans bore guilt for the Nazi regime. It directly addressed the issue of all those who while not of their own volition supporters of the Nazi regime, went along with its immoral policies (the so-called Mitläufer). The obedience of the German army and the bureaucracy to the Nazi regime based on their oath of loyalty to the state was singled out as an immoral action and attributed to a false interpretation of Lutheranism.\(^{313}\)

The Catholic church as well recognized Germany’s guilt at its Bishops’ Conference held in Fulda. Unlike the Protestants, however, it was more reserved in its self-criticism. While recognizing that many Germans, including Catholics, were guilty of committing crimes or of tolerating crimes against human freedom and dignity, the Bishops’ message also maintained that during the Nazi period the Church had stood up for the rights of the individual.\(^{314}\)

The German universities and mass media paid a great deal of attention to the Holocaust, and a mood of bitter self recrimination swept the country. In the ensuing years, even after the Occupation came to an end in 1955, an anti-Nazi past became a key asset in making a political career in the Federal Republic. Most of the top leadership of the era, including Konrad Adenauer,
Kurt Schumacher, Ezard Reuter, Jakob Kaiser and Gerhard Müller could all claim to having been persecuted under the Third Reich. Conversely having a Nazi record was an indelible stigma which as late as the 1970s could bring down high officials. The German equivalent of Kishi's becoming Prime Minister or Mamoru Shigemitsu's becoming the head of a major conservative part would have been Albert Speer becoming Chancellor or Joachim von Ribbentrop (had he not been hanged) becoming the head of the CSU; in other words, unthinkable in the German context.

Beyond blocking the return of the old elite the German sense of guilt had two further consequences which were to have a profound impact on the formation of latter German attitudes towards the military and defense. The first was a far-going delegitimation of nationalism, which was came to be associated with the National Socialism. While nationalist ideas continued to motivate political decision making (as most clearly reflected in the continued effort to find some way of reunifying the nation), it became increasingly difficult to use nationalist rhetoric in political discourse on the national (though not local) level. At a later stage this was to make acute the problem of motivating the new armed forces (Wehrmotiv). Second, the Nazi experience had undermined the traditional ethos of obedience to the state. No longer could blind service to the state regardless of the moral implications be considered ethically acceptable. Consequently, unlike France, where the creation of new institutions could be regarded as a largely a technical
exercise in the art of government, in Germany all new institutions had to be somehow morally justified. (318) This was to make the creation of a hierarchial order inside any future military organization especially problematical. In Japan, in contrast, the old institutions' mere existence was legitimation enough in most cases, and did not require any new philosophies to justify them, and nationalism per se (as opposed to nationalism in its militarist or Tennosei forms) was never really rejected.

As a result of its wartime experiences and its dark past, West Germany was like "an ingot cast out of the slag of war, West Germany is fated to be a country of contrasts - and of souls which, if they are not always tortured, are at least perennially being searched" (319) After the initial shock of defeat and rejection of the past, however, the German population was simply too preoccupied with the task of reconstruction to indulge in endless recriminations, and by the early 1950s most Germans wished to forget the past as much as possible. Though a new, strict morality had been established, in actuality many compromises were made, for example with bringing all those guilty of wrong doing to justice. This was called Vergangenheits-Bewältigung, or subduing the past. In time, however, the past was to prove itself unsubduable, and the compromises made in the immediate post-war were to come partially undone in latter decades.
Disarmament and the New Political Order

Even after the hostilities in Europe came to an end, there was widespread fear that though German nationalism and militarism had been defeated it was bound, as it did after WW I, to rise once again out of the ashes and rubble of central Europe to threaten world peace once again. According to opinion polls in the U.S. in August 1945, only 19.6% of those questioned thought Germany had learned its lesson from the war, and 60% expected that it was only "waiting for an opportunity to try again".\(^{320}\) This apprehension about the dangers of a nationalist German revival was shared by many in the U.S. government as well, in particular by President Roosevelt, who had a strongly negative image of Germany. Such fears were even stronger among the French and the Russians, who had already twice this century suffered the consequences of German aggression. All agreed that the primary objective of Allied Occupation policy should be preventing Germany from becoming a threat again. But there existed differences of opinion over how to go about this task, both within the U.S. government, and between its allies. This disagreement over how to proceed was to create muddled policy and vastly disparate conditions within the separate zones occupied by the different Allied armies.

Within the U.S. the two chief rival approaches were those of Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, who wished to pursue a
hard-line policy of permanently reducing German industry, and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, who advocated a more moderate course. Initially Morgenthau's views dominated U.S. policy making. After the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 the role of Morgenthau and Treasury Department began to wane, while Stimson and the State Department's influence increased. Initially, however, Occupation policy of the Western Allies was a strained compromise between a desire to punish Germany and to educate it. Over time Stimmson's views, which were also shared by the Military Governor of the American Zone in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, came to increasingly take over Occupation policy making and in some cases reversed earlier policies in a manner reminiscent of the "reverse course" in Japan. Helping them in this was the gradual development of the Cold War, which forced the Western governments to think of Germany increasingly as an important ally against Communism, rather than as a conquered foe.

The main core of the Allied Occupation policy were the "4' ds" - denazification, demilitarization decartelization and democratization - which had at least verbally been agreed to by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin at their meeting at Potsdam in July 1945. Unfortunately the precise meaning of these "4 ds" remained vague, contributing to the general worsening of relations with the U.S.S.R. The simplest of these to accomplish was demilitarization. Far less of the German military had survived the war than in
Japan, and those who survived were largely prisoners of war in Allied internment camps or labor colonies in Siberia. There remained enormous stockpiles of war material to be disposed of, The civilian population was disarmed, and even the police were forbidden firearms. All manner of military and paramilitary organization, including many institutions whose sole function was to care for sick and wounded veterans, were outlawed (323), and veterans benefits as well were cut off at a time when the country was awash with broken soldiers returning from the war. All manner of nationalistic ceremonies and paraphernalia, such as uniforms (324), parades, singing the national anthem, and even militaristic toys, were forbidden.

The second of the 4 d's, denazification, intended to accomplish a sort of spiritual demilitarization of the German people, proved considerably more problematic. Denazification began almost as soon as the Allied armies moved in with the wholesale incarceration or firing of party officials at all levels of government and industry, along with all members of the SS and officers of the General Staff. Under the provisions of Law No.8, which went into effect September 26, 1945, all former members of the Nazi party were forbidden employment except in menial positions. Since most local officials down to the postmaster level had joined the party the result was total administrative chaos (29% of the total population was in the party(325)). The Allies, often very arbitrarily, arrested 10s of thousands of Nazis; over a 100,000 in the American zone, 64,000
in the British, 67,000 in the Soviet and 19,000 in the French zone. The great majority of these were later proven to have been relatively innocent of any serious wrongdoing.\(^{327}\)

By the end of 1945 the Occupation began to shift its policy, and thereafter denazification proceeded on an individual case-by-case basis rather than through the summary dismissals of entire categories of people. The main instrument of identifying those to be purged was a massive questionnaire (known as the Fragebogen in Germany). Those cases which were deemed worthy of further investigation were then singled out for trial at special denazification courts. At first these were reviewed by Allied personnel, but increasingly the Americans were forced to rely on Germans to handle the deluge of paper that this measure triggered. Altogether 13 million questionnaires were filled out, a staggering number, 3 million, of which were deemed worthy of trial.

While initially many Germans had approved of denazification, gross abuses in the handling of the trials increasingly alienated the population. In 1946 57\% of the Germans surveyed in the American zone were satisfied with the denazification process, but by 1948 only 32\% felt it had fulfilled its purpose, dropping further to 17\% in 1949.\(^{328}\)

Many in the Occupation as well became concerned with the evident injustice of the system. And increasingly there was domestic criticism from the U.S. as well, especially from a Congress increasingly preoccupied with meeting the new Soviet
menace.\textsuperscript{329} Even the Military Governor, General Clay, came to the conclusion that full denazification was impossible and perhaps unnecessary as well.\textsuperscript{330} Denazification continued, but by 1948 the number of cases declined drastically, and on December 15, 1951, the new German government ordered the termination of the program.

Altogether 947,000 cases were tried in the American zone between July 1946 and June 1949, of whom 129,739 (13\%) were found guilty.\textsuperscript{331} In the French zone, in contrast, after an initial rush, only relatively few former high-ranking Nazi officials were brought to trial. In the British zone the situation resembled the American zone in terms of the principles guiding denazification, but it was far less vigorously pursued.\textsuperscript{332} While many innocent people had suffered, many also escaped the punishment that they most richly deserved. The most famous case was that of Hans Globke, who had written the commentary on the Nazi Nürnberg laws regulating race relations and who later became personnel assistant to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Parallel to the denazification trials was denazification of the school system. Initially all the schools were closed down so that the teachers and the textbooks could be reviewed by Allied authorities. Many teachers were subsequently dismissed and new textbooks free of Nazi ideology were made available within a remarkably short period of time so that the schools could be reopened by the Fall of 1945. The French in particular were very thorough in this area, and it is estimated that close to 50\% of
the teachers in their zone were discharged. (333) University professors were also reeducated in brief 2 week seminars organized by the Occupation and its German staff. In addition ongoing efforts were made to introduce American democratic values into the curriculum.

The third item on the Occupation's agenda was the destruction of the German capacity to create armed forces. The first step in this direction was the ban or imposition of controls on all sorts of production with military significance, including explosives, steel, and above all else, airplanes. Closely linked to this was the question of reparations, with the Soviets and the French eager to adopt an as wide as possible definition of military industry so as to speed their dismantling and shipment to their respective homelands. (334) And in both East and West Germany scientists, especially rocket scientists, were transported to continue their work for the victorious allies.

In addition many American scholars, together with the Soviets and German leftists, were convinced that Nazism was a product of Germany's cartelized industrial system. Consequently it was agreed at Potsdam to decartelize German industry in order to wipe out the roots of Nazism. Yet, as in Japan, the American policies in this effort soon fell victim to internal ideological disagreement between liberals and conservatives within the U.S. military government. And unlike Japan, almost from the beginning the conservative viewpoint enjoyed the upper hand. Ultimately only four large firms were investigated, and only one, I.G.
Farben, which was not investigated but had been under direct American control since the start of the Occupation, was split up. (335)

Ironically the Germans themselves were far more favorable to the idea of decartelization, and initially not only the SPD but even the German Right was for some form of Socialism. Some of the chief figures in the newly emerging Christian Democratic Union (CDU), like Jakob Kaiser and Karl Arnold, felt that big industry and the concentration of economic wealth were antithetical to democracy. The CDU's Ahlen Program, adopted in 1947, boldly declared that "The capitalist economic system is incompatible with the governmental and social existence of the German people." (336) Unlike the Socialists however, the CDU supported retaining the concept of private property as a necessary precondition for personal freedom. They were opposed, however, to the over concentration of wealth and proposed massive nationalization and central control of large enterprises. The CDU's sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), adopted a similar program at its founding in Munich.

Arguably the most successful of the Allied reforms, and the one which owed the least to its interventions, was the democratization of Germany. The first step was the restoration of local government and the first post-war elections were already held in Fall, 1945. Encouraged by early high voter turn outs and the low levels of support for the more extremist parties, the Americans increased the power of the local Länder, or provinces,
who adopted state constitutions based largely on the old Weimar models. Regional administration was increasingly taken over by local German authorities from the Allies, who, unlike in Japan where the war had left the old bureaucracy largely intact, had been forced to administer the country directly themselves. New political parties, forming along the lines of the old pre-1933 parties established themselves, the most important of which were the relatively conservative CDU/CSU, the social-democratic SPD and the Free Democratic party (FDP). The new leadership, as was noted earlier, was by and large free of any association with the Nazi regime. At the same time the largest conservative groupings, which had strong regional loyalties (Rhineland Catholicism in the case of the CDU, Bavarian Catholicism in the case of the CSU), were amenable to the Allied policy of pushing for a decentralization of government. Ironically the division of Germany and the effective loss of the traditional centralizing influence of Prussia and Berlin greatly helped make this decentralization of power possible. The new capital was the sleepy little town of Bonn, a provincial city on the banks of the Rhine which could not possibly become the sort of center of national power that Berlin had been.

The situation was thus very much unlike the one in Japan, where the American Occupation were forced to intervene to prevent the reemergence of the old 1930s party elite. Another reflection of the relative ease of the German democratization process can be seen in the genesis of the new constitution. Once it became clear
that there would be no immediate reunification of Germany the Allies agreed at the London Conference of 1948 that a new West German government should be formed on the basis of democratic federalism. In a series of meetings the chief ministers of the German states themselves worked out the details of a new "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz) to serve as the constitutional basis of the new West German state. To underline the provisional nature of the new German state the very first sentence of the preamble declared that the new Basic Law would only be valid till the day the two German states were reunited.\(^{(337)}\)

The issue of national defense also played an important role in the deliberations on the Basic Law, though it did not receive as much attention as the national and federal questions did. The SPD, and especially Carlo Schmid, pushed for the inclusion of a clause which would transfer Germany's right to self defense to a supranational body, like the U.N., responsible for security matters. They admitted, however, that such a body did not currently exist. In his speech before the Council on the 8th of September Schmid made use of arguments which, while rejecting neutrality, were remarkably reminiscent to Japanese proponents of the idea of a "peace nation":

Further a provision should be made which allows the legal transfer of Sovereign powers to international organizations. I believe that through such a provision this Basic Law would clearly demonstrate that the German people at least are determined to leave the nation-state phase of their history and enter the supranational phase... And then there is the further question of security. We will have no more Wehrmacht! I for my part welcome that it appears the age of national armed forces is coming to an end and that the right to self defense is ever more being given over to
international authorities... I therefore believe that the constitution should contain a provision which would allow joining such a system of collective security on a mutual basis. (338)

The CDU on the other hand, including then head of the CDU in the British zone, Konrad Adenauer, wished to include an article which would make external security one of the responsibilities of the federal government. They were careful, however, to avoid linking this in any way to proposals for taking over the military aspects of national security (Landesverteidigung). (339) In the end Thomas Dehler of the FDP cast the deciding vote against a constitutional restriction on the use of force for national defense. The new Basic Law contained only a clause forbidding aggressive wars, leaving the question of self defense open for the time being. At the behest of Carlo Schmid an article was added establishing the right to refuse military service on grounds of conscience (Kriegsdienst-verweigerung). (340) Ironically, much like article 66 of the Japanese constitution which forbade military men becoming cabinet members, this article was later used to giver a rearmament a legal basis. It was argued that at the time of the framing of the Basic Law a future military was implicitly recognized, otherwise there would have been no need to establish the right to conscientious objection. Yet Carlo Schmid and the other SPD delegates probably saw the new Basic Law simply as a provisional mechanism. Their primary motive in proposing the conscientious objector clause was to prevent the Western Allies from drafting German youth for military service in their own armed forces.
As in Japan, ultimately it was the successful democratization of West Germany which was to help ensure, despite the not fully successful denazification and decartelization programs, that the demilitarization of German society would survive the end of the Occupation. There were three fateful differences, however, between the German and Japanese processes of democratization which were to have significant consequences for the subsequent development of their political-military cultures. First, there was a much more total break with the political forces who had led Germany into the war than there had been in Japan, and the new leaders of the Federal Republic, including the conservatives, could all claim with varying degrees of validity that they had been opponents and even victims of the Hitler regime. Though there were fears that Bonn might suffer the fate of Weimar, few of the mainstream political leaders, including the Social Democrats, had reasons to believe that there was any desire to return to the prewar situation. Second, democratization had been, much more clearly than in Japan, the work of the Germans themselves. This increased the German peoples' confidence in the new democratic institutions and gave German leaders sufficient self assurance to tamper with the system as the need arose (as it later did with rearmament). Third, there was no Article 9, which was to give idealistic pacifism in Japan an institutionalized source of legitimacy that it did not enjoy in West Germany. Thus, when rearmament became an issue in Germany, it did not pose in the minds of most Germans the kind of threat to democracy that
it did in Japan.

The Defense Debate Prior June 25, 1950

Already before the end of World War II in Europe there were signs that the hoped for international order based on peaceful U.S.-Soviet cooperation might not be as easily achieved as President Roosevelt and many others had fervently hoped. Winston Churchill in particular was alarmed by the evident Soviet efforts to consolidate their control over Eastern Europe. While unsuccessfully trying to alert Roosevelt to the possibility of a post-war competition between the two superpowers, (342) Churchill ordered the British Staff do a study on the Red Army. The report which was prepared was extremely pessimistic regarding the probable outcome of a military clash. (343) The existing military forces of the Western Allies were believed inadequate for a conventional defense of Europe. The only realistic source of the needed military manpower for such a defense was West Germany. Yet, after having just concluded a titanic struggle to beat back German aggression, the U.S. and its Western Allies were understandably reluctant to resort to such measures. It would take five years of tentative groping before the U.S. were prepared to make the final decision in favor of rearmament, and it would be 10 years before German troops once again took up arms. In view of recent history, it was a reversal of policy which took place with remarkable speed. Yet, in light of the dangers the Allied military men believed they were facing, it was
a necessary step which came remarkably slowly.

The first, embryonic steps can be seen already as of April 1945, when German units surrendering to the British were left intact under the command of their officers and whose weapons were stockpiled in British depots. In this way Churchill sent a subtle signal to the Soviet Union that in case of attack, these German units could be reactivated. Altogether there were 2.5 million former soldiers in the Western Occupation zones who, theoretically at least, could have been mobilized. In June that year these groups were disbanded and reformed as special services groups engaged in mine removal, etc. Though unarmed, they retained military codes of discipline and military ranks. These special service formations were employed by the Western Allies throughout the Occupation period. While at first unarmed, in Spring 1950 they were issues carbines and charged with assisting with the maintenance of security around Western military installations. By Summer 1950, there were altogether about 80,000 Germans belonging to such units, about the size of the Police Reserve Force in Japan.

No further steps were taken, however, to maintain a usable core military force, as was attempted by Willoughby and Arisue in Japan. Likewise, as far as it is known, there is no indication that till 1948 former German military men were thinking along such lines. But as the Cold War gradually intensified it became increasingly clear that the U.S. and its allies would have to prepare themselves to meet the threat of a possible Soviet
invasion of Western Europe. The 1947 Marshall Plan was in part designed to provide the economic part of the equation for containing Communism. And in 1948 the first step towards creating a new alliance aimed against the Soviet Union was taken when Britain, France and the Benelux nations joined together to form the Brussels Pact, the precursor of NATO.

These developments inevitably shaped Western policy towards occupied West Germany. In May 1948 Carl Friedrich, Military Governor General Clay's expert on governmental questions, publicly expressed his opinion that in the long run Germany would need some sort of armed forces, perhaps along the lines of Switzerland's citizen army, but that they should be established only much later in order to allow democratic forces to take root first. Others in the U.S. as well began to increasingly accept the notion that at some point Europe might need German troops. A few months later, in France, where resistance to German rearmament was to prove the strongest, the noted political scientist Maurice Duverger was the first prominent figure to propose that regional integration, not only on an economic basis, but political and military as well, represented the best possible solution to solving the German problem.

Around this time the rearmament question also began to be publicly discussed in West Germany. Political scientist and publicist Eugen Kogon caused a great stir in Germany when he revealed in January 1949 that many of the Western Allies were at least considering the possibility of rearming West Germany.
A serious debate was kindled on the subject, but with the exception of the Rheinischer Merkur, which proposed the creation of defense forces (Wehrverbände), most major newspapers were solidly opposed to the idea. (349)

West German politicians as well began to consider, at least privately, the possibility of German rearmament. Adenauer, who after ousting his rival, Jakob Kaiser, was the most powerful man in the CDU, first mentioned the possibility of rearmament in Spring 1948 after the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia. At the time he thought of 80 divisions, a figure he soon reduced to 30 divisions in a discussion in the Fall. (350) The most important forum for this sort of debates was the so-called Laupheimer circle, a non-partisan political study group, which began to draw upon Germany’s abundant military talent to provide these discussions with some expertise. Already in June 1948 former General Hans Speidel, who had been one of the coconspirators in the 20th of July plot to assassinate Hitler, delivered a lecture on the military situation in Western Europe. (351)

In November 1945 Speidel sent Adenauer a memorandum entitled "The Security of Western Europe". It depicted West Germany as a bastion versus the Soviet Union and stressed that Europe’s security interests were the same as Germany’s. Speidel added that for the foreseeable future Europe must rely on the U.S. to guard against the Soviet menace. While Speidel did not touch on rearmament in his first memorandum, he did so in a follow up memo sent to Adenauer in December in which he expressed his personal
fear that the U.S. might abandon Germany in case of war. He argued that the U.S. would need a further 20 divisions to shore up its defenses and suggested that German units best be raised as part of a united European army. In 1949 memoranda he spelled out more concretely the nature of the threat facing West Germany and the size of the forces that would be needed to defend against it. Altogether, Speidel believed that at least 15 German divisions equipped with U.S. weapons would be needed.\(^{(352)}\)

Adenauer was profoundly disturbed by the military situation as described to him both by Speidel and by his intelligence chief, Arnold Gehlen. American military planning at the time was based on the premise that the Western forces would at least temporarily be forced off the continent and would have to reconquer Europe through a drawn out process of amphibious invasions launched from Britain and North Africa. In the meantime West Germany would be under Soviet occupation and would face the prospect of armies fighting across its already ravaged territory at least two more times. In addition Adenauer feared the Soviets might be tempted to wage a proxy war using the 70,000 East Germans who had been organized into special paramilitary forces.\(^{(353)}\) Yet, when he began to raise the issue, however cautiously, with American military officials, he encountered strong resistance.\(^{(354)}\)

The German political parties as well remained officially opposed to any notion of rearmament. Some in the CDU did not explicitly reject an eventual rearmament, but none were actively
in favor of it.\(^{(355)}\) Others worried that the Allies wished to use German troops as cannon fodder.\(^{(356)}\)

Of the major political parties the Free Democrats (FDP) had the closest ties to the old military, and a number of leading FDP politicians, most notably Hasso von Manteuffel, former commander of the crack "Großdeutschland" division, and Kurt Bennecke, were both ex-generals with very conservative political ideas. In late 1949 Manteuffel sent his own memorandum to Adenauer in which he argued that while Germany must be drawn into a West European Security system, it should create its own, independent armed forces of about 30 divisions, composed of "racially pure" (reinrassige) German troops under German strategic and operational command.\(^{(357)}\)

Carlo Schmid and the SPD was adamantly opposed to any form of rearmament and insisted that military security remained first and foremost the duty of the Occupation powers. They felt that the danger of a Soviet attack could be best defused by the implementation of an effective policy of social reform. Any future German involvement in security matters was conceivable only within the framework of an international collective security system. \(^{(358)}\) Ernst Reuter, the charismatic governor of Berlin, warned in January 1949 that West Germany was being "remilitarized", endangering its fledgling democracy.\(^{(359)}\)

As 1949 progressed, however, the threat of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union continued to increase. In April 1949 NATO accepted plans for setting the initial line of
defense at the Rhine. Yet, to hold even this front new sources of strength were urgently needed. (360) Beginning in the Spring of U.S. policy makers began to send signals that they at least were willing to contemplate German rearmament. (361) But politically the topic was still too controversial at home. (362)

On November 22, 1949 the Petersberg agreement was concluded, restoring to the West German government a large measure of sovereignty in domestic and international matters and incorporating it as a member of the European Community. The question of German rearmament was left untouched. Kurt Schumacher was infuriated by the new agreement, especially by its provision for German participation in the Ruhr Authority, which oversaw coal and steel production. Schumacher saw this as part of an international capitalist plot to wrest control of German industry from the nation. In a fiery session of the Bundestag Schumacher denounced Adenauer as the "Chancellor of the Allies", a charge which was to made repeatedly in the coming years.

Adenauer as well continued to try to pursue the issue. In response to the creation of the Atlantic Pact, in May 1949 he took the position that Germany should join this new system of collective security as an equal partner so that it could participate in Western defense planning and avoid being abandoned in case of war. (363) In November and December that year Adenauer gave interviews with French and U.S. newspapers in which he reiterated that West Germany might consider raising troops in the context of a European army. (364) Yet even this cautious
formulation provoked a popular backlash. Adenauer was severely criticized in the press both by the political Left and the Right. (365)

Public opinion was also against him, and studies done in June 1949 showed that 60% of all Germans surveyed said they would reject their or members of their family's becoming soldiers (Soldatenwerden). According to a further survey conducted in April, 1950, only 33% of Germans at the time supported the idea of a European army with a German contribution. (366) The SPD reaction was also very negative, maintaining that external security was strictly the Allies responsibility and that what was needed was not rearmament but the search for a peaceful solution to the issue of national division. (367)

Consequently Adenauer was forced to rephrase his position even more carefully in the Bundestag on the 16th of December. He made clear once again that he was against the creation of a national army, even if pushed to do so by the Allies. Only in the most extreme case would a German contribution to an army of the European federation be considered. Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano stressed that while the idea of rearmament remains far off, Germany is historically and geographically part of Western culture and should serve World Peace and defend its freedom as an equal member of a United Europe. The SPD repeated its opposition to rearmament and stressed that the best defense against Communist attack or subversion was the creation of a just (socialist) domestic order, while more conservative members of
the nationalist wing of the FDP maintained that it was a mockery to talk of creating German armed forces when honorable military men were being prosecuted for war crimes. (368)

Thereafter Adenauer became more circumspect in his public pronouncements concerning defense and security policy, but in private meetings with the Allies he continued to express his concern about the Soviet military potential and press for some form of security guarantee for West Germany. (369) In the meantime he actively pursued a policy of economic and political integration with Western Europe, which he hoped would alleviate French concerns about a German rearmament. The most important breakthrough in this direction came in May, 1950 with the Schuman Plan, which would place German and French steel and coal production under a joint High Authority open to participation by other European nations. Behind this bold initiative was the broader hope that this measure would lead to a series of economic and political fusions which would end with the creation of a common European military.

In the Spring of 1950 Adenauer appointed retired general Graf Gerhard von Schwerin as his personal advisor on security matters and requested an analysis of the military situation. Schwerin's scenario, which depicted an unstoppable Soviet offensive from the East and the utter devastation of West Germany, so disturbed Adenauer that he arranged for special private meetings with the Western Allied High Commissioners in early June. In those discussions, two weeks before the outbreak
of the Korean War, Adenauer broached the idea that though the time was not yet ripe for German rearmament, an "International Legion" of German volunteers might be created and trained in France. While none of the High Commissioners were ready to take Adenauer up on his suggestion, neither did any of them reject the idea of German rearmament out of hand. They tried to reassure Adenauer that a Soviet threat was not yet imminent, and they remained skeptical about the political problems which German rearmament would involve.\(^{370}\)

Thus even before the Korean War brought East-West tensions to their highest level, the general drift of Allied policy towards an eventual rearmament of West Germany is unmistakable. At the same time the political difficulties resistance to such a move was even greater than in the case of Japan because of the complicating factor of British and above all French interests. Also, unlike Japan there was less planning for an eventual German rearmament, first because of the absence of a figure like Willoughby, and secondly because there remained no organized cadres of military men like Japan's Colonel Hattori determined to preserve the old military traditions.

Another important difference with Japan with important implications for the subsequent development of West Germany's political-military culture was the linkage between the establishment of West German forces and the creation of a united Europe. Unlike Yoshida, Adenauer firmly rejected the idea of recreating a national military and preferred to link German
security interests with European ones. Thus, while in Japan the security arrangements with the U.S. had largely an instrumental function, in the German case the entry into a defensive pact including the rest of Western Europe was in and of itself part of a higher goal of achieving European unity. This also gave it a moral character quite unlike that of security arrangements in Japan. Contributions to defense were part of a German duty owed to Western and European civilization, and as such could be seen as an act of atonement for Germany's sins of the recent past; this time Germany would join the struggle against totalitarian dictatorships on the side of the democracies. This also offered a solution to the problem of how to legitimate rearmament in a domestic political environment of intense anti-militarism and deep suspicion of nationalism.

This solution was not acceptable to everyone, and already in these early debates in 1948-1950 the future battle lines over rearmament began to draw into view. The SPD and many in the media and the intellectual world preferred a non-military approach to security, in part because they felt that reunification would only be possible through the adoption of a policy of military neutrality, and in part because they feared that integration into the Western alliance would solidify a capitalist economic and social system to which they were deeply opposed. In subsequent years they would make use of the anti-military mood in the general populace to oppose rearmament.
Chapter 6 - The Slow Rearmament

Reaction to the Korean War

On June 25th, 1950 North Korea crossed the 38th parallel and attacked the South. Soon thereafter Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the East German Communist regime, sent shivers down the spines of many West Germans when he declared that Korea was an example of how the Revolution will sweep away the corrupt puppet governments of the capitalist world.\(^{371}\) There were many, both in Germany and abroad, who feared that Korea was but a prelude to a much greater invasion of West Europe, and that the Communist actions in Asia were only a diversion meant to lure scarce resources away from the much more important European theater. Especially great was the fear that the Soviets, as in Korea, might wage a proxy war using the East German KVP (Kassernierte Volkspolizei). The KVP had 70,000 well trained and equipped soldiers, and it was believed that through mobilization these forces could easily be increased to from 200,000 to 300,000 men.\(^{372}\) At the time there were only 4 and 1/2 U.S. and British divisions in West Germany. Adding to the sense of threat, since September, 1949 it was known that the Soviet Union had developed its own atomic bomb, weakening the deterrent effect of the U.S.‘s own, still limited strategic arsenal.\(^{373}\)

The initial reaction in West Germany was one of panic, and all the major newspapers and journals, regardless of their
ideological leanings, were full of alarm over the implications of the Korean invasion for Western Europe. Nonetheless, no major paper called for the creation of German military forces to meet the threat. According to a poll conducted in West Germany that Summer, when asked "Do you worry that a new world war might break out in this year?" the majority, 53%, answered yes, while 47% responded negatively.

Yet despite the general alarm, Allied reservations about German rearmament remained strong. Adenauer and his circle of advisors, on the other hand, felt that their worst fears being realized and requested an increase in U.S. troops in West Germany. Later that same day Adenauer held meetings both with leading members of his Christian Democratic party and with the opposition leader, Kurt Schumacher. All agreed on the existence of a great danger and the need for a continued strong U.S. presence in Germany as well as for the creation of a German paramilitary numbering about 100,000 men.

In the U.S. the long-simmering and complicated debate over the issue of German rearmament was now brought to a boil. The State Department remained reluctant to contemplate rearming West Germany, as did many intellectuals and foreign policy experts, including conservative ones such as Carl Friedrich and John Foster Dulles. On the other hand, there were many in Congress who, worried over the costs of the U.S. military buildup, were more positively disposed to the idea of getting all the Western Allies, including the Germans, to make greater military
contribution. The Pentagon as well was convinced that West German participation would be indispensable to an effective conventional defense of the European continent.\(^{378}\) The other Western Allies, remained resistant, and in the end the only immediate measure taken was on July 28 when the High Commissioners, in response to earlier requests by the German Federal Government, authorized the establishment of a gendarmerie organized on a Länder, not federal level; and not exceeding 10,000 men. \(^{379}\). Adenauer was bitterly disappointed.

Encouraged by a European Council’s resolution stating that German participation in an European army would be desirable, in late August Adenauer once again took up the issue with the High Commissioners. Adenauer called for a Federal police force to deal with internal security matters and offered German troop contingents as part of a European army, specifically rejecting the remilitarization of Germany through the creation of a purely national German army. Adenauer also made increased German sovereignty a precondition for German military measures, and requested the end of the Occupation and a return to full German sovereignty in domestic and foreign policy except for defense. He argued that West Germany must be free if it was to be psychologically capable of making a military contribution. \(^{380}\) Adenauer’s sudden initiative caused trouble within his own faction, especially with Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann (CDU), who wished to strictly limit any German military efforts to providing only internal security, not including the threat of
East German invasion. But the other cabinet members chose to support Adenauer. (381)

In the U.S. the Pentagon's point of view began to increasingly win out, and even Secretary of State Dean Acheson came to the conclusion that Germany would be lost to the West if the U.S. did not provide for its defense.(382) Truman as well, though initially uneasy about the idea, ultimately came down on the side of the Pentagon and authorized planning for the creation of a new German army as part of NATO. (383)

Meanwhile Adenauer's military advisors continued to develop their own ideas. On August 14 Generals Speidel, Heusinger and Foertsch gave Adenauer the first West German memorandum calling for establishing a new German military. They called for the creation of German units with modern equipment of up to Corps level in size, complete with their own tactical air support, who would operate within the context of an European-Atlantic defense alliance. Up to 15 "peace" divisions could be raised by 1952, given the size of the population and the abundance of militarily experienced manpower. (384)

In a meeting with the High Commissioners on August 17 Adenauer urgently requested a security guarantee for West Germany and concrete Western measures to improve German morale. He also suggested establishing a 150,000 man volunteer defense force, though he said that he hoped to avoid a full rearmament if the U.S. and the Soviet Union could come to some sort of agreement. Adenauer claimed to have discussed the issue with Schumacher and
was quite sure that the SPD would cooperate. (385)

Shortly thereafter, in an interview with The New York Times on the 17th of August Adenauer, to the considerable annoyance of the Allies, repeated much of what he had said in his supposedly secret discussions with the High Commissioners, underlining the urgency of such measures and his support of U.S. involvement in the creation of a United Europe. Adenauer also spelled out his concept of a division of labor between the Western Allies and the Germans, with the Allies assuming primary responsibility for external security against the Soviet Union and the Germans taking care of internal security, including the threat of attack by East German forces. (386).

During these frantic negotiations between Adenauer and the Western powers, Schumacher and the SPD's initial public response, regardless of what was said privately, was in keeping with the position adopted by the SPD. Schumacher insisted in speeches on July 28 and August 4 that the Soviets wouldn't dare march into West Germany since such a move would spark a third world war. They would rather fight a war of nerves. To counter this threat Germany needed a different social policy aimed at strengthening democracy (which was only possible under a socialist system of course), raising standards of living and reducing unemployment. Carlo Schmid, who was usually viewed as representing the conservative wing of the party, added a new military might threaten democracy and might provoke the Soviet Union into launching a preventive attack. Germany could best support Western
security by concentrating on economic development. (387)

Then on the 23rd of August Schumacher gave a press conference in which he reversed his party's position up to that point. Germany, he argued, must never again become a battlefield. Instead all of Germany, including its Eastern portions should be defended if Germany should agree to contribute to its own defense at all. To this end very large military forces, including armored formations must be assembled so that in the case of war they could advance quickly and drive back the Soviet Union without having to fight on German soil. In later interviews he stressed that a Soviet attack remained unlikely and that the Germans should extract greater concessions form the Western allies, such as the end of the Occupation of the Saar, stronger Allied commitment to German defense and equal partnership, in return for a West German military contribution to Western security. (388) In other words, the question was no longer one of if Germany should rearm, but rather what the diplomatic price should it extract from the Western Nations as the quid pro quo for its cooperation. Schumacher had to work hard to convince his colleagues in the SPD to follow this line. (389)

The central German labor organization, the DAB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) under Hans Böckler was remarkably silent on the subject of rearmament. There were persistent but unconfirmed rumors that the Unions had made a deal with Adenauer to hold their silence in return for Adenauer's support on the fight over worker codetermination of firm policy Mitbestimmungsrecht), which
was approaching its high point at this time. Böckler's successors, however, were to prove less supportive than he. (390)

At the same time a peace movement began to develop, spurred on by negative voices in the media (391) Opinion polls at the time showed that approximately two thirds of the population was opposed to rearmament. This popular opposition to rearmament came to be known as the "ohne mich" (literally "without me") movement, a name which reflected as much the apathy which many average Germans felt towards all matters concerning the military as their active antagonism towards rearmament.

A key element in the battle over rearmament was the split along confessional lines. While some Catholics were pacifists and felt that Germany should keep itself aloof of the struggles between the capitalist and Communist worlds, the majority, including many important catholic clergymen, seemed to solidly support the Adenauer government's measured approach to rearmament and were opposed to both Communism and neutrality in the face of the Communist threat. As Archbishop Joseph Frings of Cologne argued in an important sermon in Bonn in July 1950, according to the church doctrine of just war (jus belli) the state has both the right and the duty to defend the peace against threats. (392) On the other hand a disproportionate number of Protestants was to be found among the opponents of rearmament, including the prominent theologians Martin Niemöller, who was one of the most respected men in Germany for his negotiations with the Soviets for the release of German prisoners of war, and Helmut
Gollwitzer. Gustav Heinemann, who resigned from the government in October as a result of his disagreement with Adenauer over rearmament, was a Protestant as well, and he soon became one of the most important symbolic leaders of the German peace movement. They were joined by a host of figures, including many prominent intellectuals, writers and journalists.

The theological differences between the two camps were well reflected in the personal debates between Adenauer and Heinemann prior to the latter's leaving government. Before leaving, Heinemann sought to convince Adenauer of the essential immorality of rearmament, saying "after God has twice dashed weapons from the hands of the Germans they should not reach for them a third time; we must have patience to discern the will of God in the governance of the world and await developments peacefully and quietly." (393) In a letter sent to Heinemann at the time, Adenauer responded;

"While you are of the opinion, that we must also temporize in the face of the Soviet threat, in hope that God will guide us to peace, I am of the opinion that as Christians we are bound to use our strength to defend and preserve the peace. I believe if we adopted a passive posture towards the Soviet Union, we would actually induce the Soviet Union to break the peace. In my opinion it should be clear, in light of our experiences with totalitarian national socialism, that a totalitarian state can never be brought to give up its expansionary goals through temporization, but rather through a build up of forces which show him that he can accomplish those goals only at the risk of self destruction." (394)

In addition to questions concerning the morality of rearmament, there was also a strong nationalist dimension. Many of the leaders of the "ohne mich" movement were concerned that rearmament and integration with the West would cut off all hope
of reunification with the Eastern parts of the country. The fact that the East was for the most part Protestant, and the belief that only in a divided Germany could the heavily Catholic CDU/CSU prevail, shows how both moral and political can go hand in hand. Indeed, as with its successor in the 1970s and 80s, it was often difficult to tell whether the peace movement of the 1950s was opposed to rearmament because of its nationalistic interest in German reunification, or whether it used the reunification issue as a means of attracting support for its principled opposition to rearmament. (395)

The FDP remained noticeably silent on the military issue that Summer, though Eberhard Wildermuth and Thomas Dehler were both supporters of Adenauer's positions on the issue. Wildermuth in particular had close ties with former soldiers, and he played an important role in establishing contacts between Adenauer and the military officers who helped with planning.

The chief external obstacle at this point in time was France, which resisted intense U.S. pressures. (396) In October 1950 the French presented their own vision for German rearmament, the Pleven plan. According to the Pleven plan German rearmament would be made contingent upon the realization of the Schuman plan and the creation of united European political institutions. All military units would be integrated into a united European army under a common authority, but only those countries with already existing armed forces (i.e. all nations except West Germany) would retain national control over their forces. Various versions
of this French approach were to serve as the basis of negotiation for over four years and considerably delay the final creation of West German armed forces. This evident French ploy to restrict West German sovereignty became a rallying point for critics of Adenauer’s rearmament policy, including both the conservative ex-officers and the SPD. Nonetheless, Adenauer chose not to openly attack the French plan and sought rather to undermine it with the help of the U.S..

That November Adenauer sought to convince the German people of the necessity of a German military contribution in a speech in the Bundestag,

"The Western World finds itself in truly great danger. West Germany is a part of the Western world, and due to its geographic situation, it is more exposed to that danger than other lands. At the present time, negotiations with the Soviets for the purpose of normalizing relations can only promise success if the Soviets know that their negotiating partner is strong enough to make aggression risky. This strength can only be maintained if the Western world organized together. The Western powers are agreed that this strength will only suffice if Germany also contributes. The German people cannot refuse, not only to guard us against a lethal danger, but also because we have duties to fulfill in Europe and for the people of Western Civilization".({397})

In this passage can be seen the key points of Adenauer’s legitimation of his policies. The defense of West Germany was not to be undertaken by Germany alone, nor purely out of its own national interest, but rather in conjunction with its Western allies in order to defend the higher ideals of Western civilization (which were not shared by the Asiatic Soviets). A military contribution was not merely in Germany’s interest, it was a national duty, and could be thus seen as a way for Germany
to redeem itself in the eyes of the civilized world. It also fit in with Adenauer’s belief that in the past Germany had been too removed from the Western world, and despite his initial hesitance with regard to the Pleven plan, he ultimately seized upon it in the belief that it could be used to further his chief political goal, the integration of Germany with the West.

Adenauer’s chief opponent, Schumacher, made his position on rearmament equally clear. After warning that fear of the East should not be used as an propaganda instrument to remilitarize West German society, Schumacher went on to say that:

The great debate today is not between merely the remilitarizers and some absolute pacifists who believe they have a sure-fire formula for Peace. The great debate today is between those who simply want to push through remilitarization under current circumstances, and those who would demand that solid national and international preconditions be fulfilled without which they will say no to rearmament. Germany is an undeniable part of Europe. It is not the front yard of the other nations of Europe, but rather Germany is also Europe. The German nation and the German people are just as deserving of defense, including for the other democratic peoples, as any other non-German democratic state is. (398)

In other words, Schumacher, in contrast to the Japanese opponents to rearmament and the followers of the “ohne mich” movement, was not opposed in principle to rearmament, but merely disagreed with Adenauer over how much Germany should demand for its cooperation. The most important of these demands was to achieve full equality in terms of strategic and military planning. Events would soon show just how difficult it would be to fulfill such conditions of equality for a nation which was on the front line of any future Western defense and which was
furthermore partitioned into two halves in a way not comparable to any other European nation.

In addition to the equality and nationality issues, what was also at stake in these arguments was the question of the kind of social system Germany should develop, and for many of Adenauer's opponents the problem of reunification was also bound up with the issue of creating a more democratic and egalitarian society which did not suffer from the excesses of either the capitalist West or the Communist East. To defuse their criticism Adenauer argued that the Soviets could only be negotiated with from a position of strength. Still, there were many, especially among Protestants with ties to the East, who harbored the not wholly unjustified suspicion that the Rhinelander Adenauer, who had often in the past let his distaste for what he saw as the martialistic fanaticism of Prussia be known, was not really interested in reunification at all, but was ready to sacrifice the East for integration with the West. Thus the debate over defense became a complex mosaic of overlapping disputes over political philosophies (capitalism versus socialism), religious preferences (Catholicism versus Protestantism) and regional loyalties (North and East versus South and West Germany). Since in any group or individual there were often conflicting loyalties, this diversity of views and interests was to make the battle lines over rearmament extraordinarily fluid and complex, much more so than was the case in Japan.

In addition, unlike in Japan, there was the added dimension
of multi-lateralism and anti-nationalism. Integration with the West offered a convenient way to rearm and yet avoid dealing with the problem of nationalism. This helped defuse both domestic and foreign fears that German rearmament might trigger an aggressive nationalist revival. In the case of Japan, not only the Left, but the conservatives as well were eager to avoid becoming overly drawn into U.S. strategy in the Far East. For the next two decades the primary focus of the West German debate on defense would in good measure focus on the problem of securing equal treatment with its allies.

**Maneuvering for Rearmament 1951-1953**

The essential problem faced by the Allies was how to create, as one diplomat of the time put it "a German army powerful enough to frighten away the Russians, but not so strong that it should intimidate Belgium". The solution was to integrate any future German military in a supranational organization. But whether this framework would be NATO, or an entirely new structure like the EDC, and in what form the Germans would be allowed to participate, remained an open question. The opposite poles in this dispute were occupied by Adenauer and the West Germans, who stubbornly insisted on equal treatment (*Gleichberechtigung*) and the French, who, having been unable to prevent West German rearmament to begin with, wished to maintain the maximum possible control over any future German forces without giving the Germans
themselves any say in military planning whatsoever. This fundamental clash of interests was to complicate German defense planning immensely and prevent the creation of German forces for over 5 years. At the same time Adenauer had to overcome increasingly fierce domestic political resistance to rearmament coming from both the ongoing peace movement and an increasingly aggressive Social Democratic opposition.

The initial West German plans for defense were laid out in the confidential Himmeroder memorandum. Basically it was quite similar to the earlier memoranda written by General Speidel, and stressed the importance of improving morale through sovereignty and the moral vindication of former Wehrmacht officers, whose skills would be needed in creating a new armed forces. These forces should swear their oath of loyalty to the German people as represented by the President, with emphasis on the ideals of Paneuropeanism. The document propounded a doctrine of offensive defense based on armored forces moving as far eastward of the West German border as possible. Altogether 25 divisions would be needed in the territory of West Germany. The German contribution to this force was to be 12 armored divisions supported by an air force of 825 planes, a naval branch with 202 ships and 204 aircraft for a grand total of about 500,000 men. These forces were to be under the direction of an integrated high command including German officers. The experts specifically rejected any arrangement which would have removed West Germans from military planning and operational direction. (399)
The Himmeroder Memorandum served as the basis of the West German position at the ongoing discussions in Petersberg between the representatives of the Western High Commissioners and West German military experts in the Summer of 1951. Yet, despite strong American support, the French continued to refuse the German proposals for rearmament. (400)

At the same time some West German commentators, such as editor of the Frankfurter Hefte Walter Dirks and the influential conservative newspaper Christ und Welt, were concerned about the dominance of the U.S. in NATO and suggested that Germany throw its weight in favor of a European as opposed to Atlantic approach to integrating future German forces in order to compensate for U.S. strength. (401)

Parallel to the talks at Petersberg discussions concerning the Pleven Plan were continuing in Paris between the British, French and Americans. In response to the Petersberg report this conference produced its own interim report in which in principle at least the German right to codetermination was recognized. The U.S. then tried to reach a compromise with the French by accepting a notion of a European army, but insisting upon the equal status of all European participants in such a joint structure. (402) Out of the subsequent negotiations emerged the concept of a European Defense Community (EDC). In November, 1951 Adenauer was for the first time invited to participate in these talks, and after arduous negotiations by early 1952 two treaties, one regarding the end of the Occupation and the other the
formation of the EDC, began to take shape.\(^{403}\)

The first, serious Western plans for a joint defense of Western Europe were discussed in February, 1952 in Lisbon. Given the existing estimates of the size of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe it was believed that a total of 96 divisions would be needed to contain them, including West German units and probably requiring at least some Germans in senior command positions. The only other option was to rely on tactical nuclear weapons. \(^{404}\) In the end a compromise was decided on whereby both conventional and nuclear means would be relied upon to defend Europe. Many Europeans came to believe that too many divisions would actually undermine deterrence because it might tempt the U.S. to fight a limited conventional war in Europe and forgo the risks involved in committing its strategic might in Europe's defense. \(^{405}\)

At the same time, domestic German opposition to rearmament continued to grow. The embryonic German defense ministry, bearing the innocuous name of Office Blank (Amt Blank), so named because of its new head, the former Catholic trade union leader Theodor Blank, discovered that less than 20% of men between the ages of 16 and 30 were willing to join a new military \(^{406}\). According to a survey taken in December, 1950 only 17% of all Germans supported contributing German units to a united European army, while almost 70% were opposed. \(^{407}\) This dissatisfaction with the Adenauer government translated itself into sharp setbacks for the CDU in local elections in which much of the attention was
focused on the rearmament issue. In the German press it was generally agreed that the Union (as the CDU/CSU alliance is often referred to) was becoming out of touch with electoral sentiments. Adding to the difficulties posed by a basically apathetic population was the growing resistance from both the SPD and the peace movement.

As West Germany increasingly moved in the direction of the EDC, it became clear that the Western powers were unwilling to meet German interests as defined by Schumacher. Beginning in October 1951 Schumacher began to increase his opposition by adopting, as the Social Democrats had been unwilling to do till then, the peace movement’s argument that rearmament would damage chances for reunification. The SPD used this argument as part of its attempt to block the proposed Paris treaties on constitutional grounds, lodging a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) that rearmament would require a revision of the Basic Law because it did not in any way cover the question of the position of the military in the German state and because the treaties reduced the chance of reunification, a goal firmly enshrined in Article 7 of the Basic Law. In July, 1952 the court dismissed the case on the grounds that the legislation in question had not yet been passed by the Bundestag.

At the same time the ongoing "ohne mich" movement continued to gather momentum. In April 1951 its leadership decided to organize a people’s referendum on the rearmament issue without
government approval. Though sympathetic, the SPD and the DAB refused to cooperate with the protestors. As Fritz Erler, who was fast assuming the role of the SPD's chief expert on security affairs, argued, "An unconditional no would make Germany a Soviet satellite, an unconditional yes a satellite of the U.S."(410)

The government objected strenuously to the proposed referendum, and when the organizers refused to desist it declared that such an act contradicted the constitutional order and was therefore illegal. 7,000 arrests were made of activists trying to conduct the referendum, 1,000 of which led to trials. Oskar Neumann, the secretary of the national committee, was sentenced to three years. Communist newspapers and the Communist youth organization, the FDJ, were banned. But despite the crackdown 6,267,302 people voted, of whom 5,917,683 were in favor of a peace treaty and against rearmament.(411).

But popular resistance not withstanding, the Government pushed through with its plans, and on February 8, 1952 the Bundestag voted in favor of the Paris treaties over strenuous SPD opposition. In March, 1952 the debate intensified when Stalin sent the Western Allies a note calling for a 4 powers conference to discuss creating a neutral and united Germany. The letter included a draft treaty proposing reunification of the German nation west of the Oder-Neisse line, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and free democratic activity. Strangely it also offered an amnesty to all former Nazis, and it would permit the new German state to maintain limited air, sea and land forces as
needed for the defense of the country. The note was carefully crafted, offering German conservatives an army and a termination of war crimes procedures, and German nationalists of all political stripes reunification and national sovereignty. (412)

The Western Allies rejected the note, proposing instead that free elections be held before forming a new German government, and they characterized the creation of a national German army as a step backward. A free Germany should also have the right to enter any associations compatible with the principles of the UN, including the EDC or NATO. Adenauer as well was concerned that the Soviet Union was in this way attempting to divide the Western powers among themselves and disrupt the integration process. Even if the note were a genuine offer and such a neutral Germany could be created, it would have led to a U.S. withdrawal from West Europe, and therefore to Soviet political hegemony in the region. He argued "If we continue to move as we have, if the West, together with the U.S., is as strong as it must be, then will come the time when the Soviet government will open its ears". (413) This was a logical extension of "peace through strength" (Friede durch Stärke); reunification through strength as well. Other members of the CDU, however, such as Jakob Kaiser, were convinced that the notes had to be taken seriously. (414) The FDP as well argued that the notes could at least serve as the basis of further negotiation. (415) Even more vehement was the SPD, which, though it shared many of the Adenauer’s reservations concerning the Soviet offer, pointed out the enormous discrepancy
between the energy the government was investing in integration with the West as opposed to pursuing reunification. In a withering speech on June 8, Erich Ollenhauer, who increasingly was taking over the reigns of party leadership from the ailing Schumacher, accused the CDU/CSU government of trying to create an international capitalist and clericalist alliance while shying away from reunification because in a united Germany the SPD was guaranteed to win the national elections. Many came to consider the Stalin notes as a "lost opportunity". It also underlined the tension between progress on the national issue and, if not the armed forces, than at least defense cooperation with the West. The following years were to see a host of different plans and initiatives aimed at somehow making good on the apparent opportunity presented by the Stalin notes.

Despite these domestic political obstacles, Adenauer held his course till on May 26, 1952 West Germany signed the the General Treaty with the U.S. Britain and France, officially terminating the Occupation and recognising West German sovereignty. The Western Allies promised to work towards the common goal of a free and united Germany. Till that goal was established no peace treaty would be signed and no final position would be taken on the matter of Germany's Eastern borders. In return West Germany promised to establish armed forces without delay. On the following day West Germany also signed the treaty making it a member of the EDC.

The original General treaty included clause 7.3 which
specified that a united Germany would retain all the treaty obligations that had been assumed by the Federal Republic. The Western Allies had insisted on this clause as a means of firmly binding any future united German state to the West and preventing it from returning to its old pre-war policy of Schaukelpolitik; playing the East off against the West. This clause, however, was viewed by many in the FDP and the CDU as an unfair constraint which would greatly reduce German maneuvering room in any future negotiations for reunification. Faced with potential disintegration of the governing coalition, Adenauer was forced to prevail upon the Allies to revise clause 7.3. to saying that a united Germany would enjoy all the rights the two German states did provided that in return the new Government would also take on all their old obligations. (419)

There subsequently developed an enormous battle in the Bundestag over the ratification of the two treaties. Schumacher and the SPD ferociously assaulted the government, maintaining that the new treaties promised too much in return for too little. The German contingent in the EDC would be nothing more than a "foreign legion", and they pointed out, not at all inaccurately, that the EDC's fundamental purpose was to deny Germany an equal voice in EDC and NATO. The policy of strength was ridiculous, and without reunification Germany and little Europe (Klein Europa) (420) would serve only as a bridgehead for the U.S.. (421) The Social Democrats accused Adenauer of betraying Germany in order to form a "clerical coalition with the Allies" (422). In
the end the CDU pushed the ratification through with the help of the FDP.

At the Dortmund SPD party conference in September, 1952, the SPD had declared that if it were in power it would renegotiate the treaties as soon as possible and replace them with a system of European collective security. What exactly such a collective security system would look like, however, i was left deliberately vague, in part because Ollenhauer feared that a debate on the subject would harm party unity. (423).

After a much publicized trip to the U.S. in May, 1953 Adenauer linked together with almost holy fervor all the major domestic and foreign policy themes of his administration with the relationship to the U.S.: "The friendship with the U.S. is together with our faith in and commitment to Christianity, the social-market economy and European integration an additional important element in the self understanding of the CDU". (424)

These public relation efforts were not without effect, and according to public opinion surveys of the time, before Adenauer's trip to the U.S. 36% of those surveyed agreed with Adenauer's policies and 29% disagreed with them, but after his trip these figures improved to 41% for versus 23% against. (425)

In September, 1953 elections were held for a second time in the Federal Republic. In an unusually acrimonious campaign the SPD continued to pillory the government for its "peace through strength" positions on the grounds that they needlessly provoked the Soviet Union and actually increased the chance of a military
clash, and warned that the opportunity for reunification was being squandered, perhaps forever. The CDU for its part accused the SPD of being dupes of the Soviet Union and warned that if the SPD's policy of a neutral Germany were accepted, Germany would "be on her way to the gallows".\footnote{426} The CDU achieved for the first time 45.2\% of the total vote, as opposed to 39\% in 1949 and secured an absolute majority in the Bundestag. The SPD, weakened in addition by the death of Schumacher in August, was reduced to 28.8\% of the vote from 29.2\%, and Gustav Heinemann's GVP managed to garner but a meager 1.1\% of the vote, not enough to get it past the 5\% minimum requirement needed for a party to be allotted seats in the legislature. The victory was widely viewed as a resounding affirmation of Adenauer's policies.

The voice of the people had made itself felt at the poll boxes. Adenauer's linkage of integration, friendship with the U.S., regulated capitalism, together with his foreign policy achievements and a booming domestic economy, had proven to be a winning formula. Like Yoshida in Japan following the San Francisco and the Mutual Security Treaties, despite the misgivings many may have had over aspects of his policy, no one was willing to argue with such enormous and obvious success. Even more so than Yoshida Adenauer was blessed by the fortuitous reciprocity of the U.S.'s policies towards Germany and the Soviet Union. The same approach, European military integration, needed to cope with the overt threat of Soviet military expansionism, was also precisely the approach needed to cope with the hidden
problem of how to prevent West Germany from becoming a military
danger. By emphasizing the Soviet danger Adenauer was able to
play down this second, for West Germany more politically
disagreeable aspect of the new security system. (427)

At the same time, the opposition to rearmament and to
military integration with the West had demonstrated that it was
capable of mobilizing considerable popular support. And the
government, in suppressing it, had in many ways begun to bend the
democratic rules it was vowed to defend. With the death of the
militantly anti-communist Schumacher, the SPD was to begin to
drift further to the Left and lend its organizational strength to
the grass roots appeal of the "ohne mich" movement. Despite the
electoral defeat, the Social Democrats continued their opposition
to the CDU/CSU's social and foreign policies, reasoning that
Adenauer's victory had been the result of an anti-socialist smear
campaign, supported by the U.S.

The Unexpected Alliance

Despite the fact that the EDC treaty had been ratified in
West Germany already in 1953, over the course of the next year it
became increasingly clear that the treaty might not win approval
in France. The reasons for France's shying back from the concept
which originally had been designed to meet its needs and concerns
are many and complex, including both a decreasing sense of threat
following Stalin's death and fear of German economic competition.
The next two years saw quiet maneuvering on the part of Germany to keep the Atlantic option open in case the European one failed. At the same time the peace movement was to continue to derive strength from Germany's ongoing territorial division and its exposed condition on the front line of the Cold War. With the eventual collapse of the EDC and the decision to join NATO instead, it was to reach a new crescendo of protest.

Adenauer, who had originally harbored reservations about the proposed EDC, was not necessarily perturbed by its demise, providing that West Germany could join the Atlantic alliance instead. Officially, however, he was took great pains to avoid creating the impression that the plan had failed because of German intransigence, though already in the Fall of 1953 in an interview Adenauer revealed that he thought it might be necessary to have a European defense alliance without France. Over the next few months Adenauer quietly got U.S. and British assurances that their forces would remain even if the EDC failed. Along with U.S. troops Adenauer requested that nuclear weapons be deployed in West Germany, though for the most part the implications of this request went largely ignored.

On the diplomatic front new Soviet proposals for the creation of a united Germany were rejected by the Allies. The SPD once again accused the West of not really wanting to negotiate. What the Soviet Union needed, they asserted, were guarantees that Germany would not join an anti-Soviet coalition. The only way to do this was for Germany not to join the EDC and to create an
alternative international system of international security. (432) In the Spring of 1954, with the support of President Theodor Heuss, Erich Ollenhauer, Free Democratic leader Thomas Dehler and Jakob Kaiser of the CDU together founded a nonpartisan Committee for an undivided Germany (Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland), which worked hard to try to keep the reunification issue on the political agenda. With such powerful political figures from even within the coalition parties committed to achieving German unity, Adenauer could not afford to openly declare that reunification was a secondary goal.

When finally on August 30, 1954 the French Assembly decided not to consider the EDC treaty the SPD began to push again for reopening negotiations with Moscow on German reunification. Ollenhauer warned that entry into NATO would more clearly and unequivocally seal the division of Germany, and of Europe, than even joining the EDC would. (433) But despite the strenuous objections of both the SPD and the peace movement there ensued an extraordinarily rapid shift in German and Western policy as West Germany joined first the Brussels pact and NATO and then signed the German treaty (Deutschlandvertrag), which was virtually identical to the General Treaty signed in Paris in 1952, minus the controversial article 7.3. The occupation of Germany was at last terminated.

Adenauer repeated his 1952 promise that Germany would never seek to develop the capability to produce (as opposed to acquire) atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons, as well as long-
range missiles, large warships and bombers. In addition he vowed that West Germany would never resort to force of arms in seeking to achieve reunification. Once again, however, Adenauer insisted that only the West German government be recognized as legitimate and that the question of Germany's eastern borders could only be settled when the nation was reunited. (434) In separate protocols the Western Allies retained special reserve powers with regard to Berlin and agreed to station troops in West Germany. Unclear remained whether the West German government formally had the right to withdraw permission to deploy forces in West Germany. Yet, strangely in light of the controversies which raged over the subject in Japan, few were willing to discuss this question at the time. (435)

With blinding speed West Germany became a full-fledged member of NATO. The SPD, convinced that Adenauer had now gone too far down the road towards abandoning the East, then became extraordinarily active and for the first time lent major support to the "ohne mich" peace movement. Ollenhauer called for a year of struggle and the SPD began to explore extra-parliamentary means of opposing the government's security policies. (436) Local election results of the time and opinion polls showing that nearly 50% of the public were in favor of making reunification the primary goal of West German foreign policy further encouraged the SPD to take a more active stance.

In January, 1955 a rally attended by leading SPD and peace movement figures was held at the Paulskirche, a historically
important church in Frankfurt (437). Together they formulated a German Manifesto which rejected the Paris treaties and demanded instead a four powers meeting to arrange for German reunification. (438) The meeting at the Paulskirche signalled the beginning of a whole new series of demonstrations and signature campaigns held all across the Federal Republic. (439) There was also a proliferation of articles in the SPD journals like the Neuer Vorwärts warning that rearmament would lead to increased international tensions and was a threat to democracy. (440).

But even as the scope of the opposition broadened to include out of parliamentary activists, it had absolutely no apparent effect on the Federal Republic’s foreign policy. On February 27, 1955 the Bundestag ratified the Paris treaties and on May 9 West Germany officially joined NATO.

In many ways West Germany’s entry into NATO was comparable to the Japan’s revision of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. In both cases the final foundations of the entire post-war security system had been firmly laid, and the fundamental terms of the defense debate had been defined. Like Yoshida and Kishi in Japan, Adenauer had managed to securely anchor his nation in a security alliance with the U.S., thus regaining sovereignty and solving Germany’s security dilemma. More importantly Adenauer had aligned the nation with the democratic West as opposed to opting for a neutral position between East and West.

As in Japan there was also danger of initiating a German version of "an accumulation of fait accomplis". In 1948 and 1949
the Chancellor had promised there would be no rearmament, and after 1950 war he had promised that German forces would be part of a European army, neither of which proved true. Yet this apparent chain of broken promises did not trigger the same level of distrust of the conservative government in Germany that it did in Japan, for two primary reasons. First of all there was a greater threat level, as recognized even by the opposition, which in some ways even outdid the government in the vehemence of its anti-Communist rhetoric. And just as importantly the Left’s accusations that Adenauer was seeking to undermine the democratic order were neither as vehement nor as convincing as the Japanese opposition’s accusations against Kishi. Though there were mass demonstrations, signature campaigns and so forth, in the end the political center did not turn against Adenauer.

In addition the CDU felt absolutely no compunction about overruling the opposition, as the LDP did in Japan. While this aspect of the Japanese system is sometimes attributed to the greater (anthropological) culturally-rooted Japanese striving for harmony, it should not be forgotten that in the pre-war era, when presumably modernization should have diluted the traditional culture much less than after the war, there seemed to be no such inhibitions. (441) Rather, what worked in Adenauer’s favor on this score is the fact that his was a coalition government, reducing any popular fear that the CDU might be becoming too powerful. Moreover, for all their conservatism, few doubted that Adenauer and his colleagues were genuine committed to democracy and the
protection of human rights. Democracy thus seemed more firmly established in West Germany than in Japan, and this allowed the government to push through controversial defense legislation much more easily.

A Democratic Army - the new Military Establishment

Planning for the creation of a new German military began in 1950, a mere five years after the most devastating defeat in modern German history. While the military was not as directly associated with the Nazi regime as the Japanese military was with the militarist government of the 1930s and 40s, nonetheless there was widespread disenchantment with the nation's martial past and guilt over the atrocities the military had been involved in under the Nazis, especially during the anti-partisan campaigns in Eastern Europe.

There was also the troubling example of the 1920s, when the Reichswehr under General Seeckt, along with its associated veterans organizations, such as the notorious Stahlhelm, had been bastions of conservatism and had actively supported anti-socialist vigilantism. It was feared that the new military might exert the same kind of corrosive effect on democracy that it did during that other brief German experiment with a more liberal form of government, the Weimar Republic.

To further complicate matters, support for rearmament had to be won from two different sections of society, the nation's
youths, who were expected to make up the bulk of the common soldiery, and the former professional officers, whose expertise was needed if a militarily effective organization was to be created. According to a poll taken in March, 1950 poll 52% of those surveyed were opposed to Germany's raising armed forces, while only 37% were in favor. By November 1954 support had improved to 45%, but still a solid 37% remained in opposition. (442) In January 1955, when recruitment for the new Bundeswehr finally began, 47% of those polled said that if asked, they would advise someone against joining the new armed forces, while only 19% would advise them to join. (443) Interestingly enough, 75% of those surveyed thought that military service had a good influence on young people, and only 11% thought that it had a bad one. This can be seen as evidence that while the military as an institution was discredited, the old military virtues, including discipline, obedience and self sacrifice, were still viewed positively by the population. (444).

Youth groups, including the youth wing of the CDU, were deeply concerned about being subjected to the traditionally barbaric barrack life of the German military (known as "der Kommiss" in popular parlance), which was seen to be dehumanizing and at odds with life in a democratic society with respect for human dignity. (445) This view was shared as well by senior CDU/CSU leaders. Richard Jaeger (CSU) described the dilemma most succinctly in a 1955 speech before the Bundestag: "We must be perfectly clear that there are two different structural
principles, and one on which the democratic state is founded, the
one on which the army is based ... Democracy is built from the
bottom up. Its essential element is choice. The military is built
from the top down. It is based on command and obedience and will
have to be based on these principles for all time." (446) Yet, to
win the cooperation of the nation's youth, the new military was
forces to try to reconcile these apparently irreconcilable
principles.

Secondly, many of the former professional officers were
suspicious of the politicians and the new armed forces. During
the Occupation they had been deprived of pensions and other forms
of support under harsh laws which equated the military with
Nazism and had set out to suppress both with equal severity.
(447) Equally objectionable in their minds was the trial of
former Wehrmacht officers for war crimes. (448) Even some of
Adenauer's top military advisors felt that the execution of
Generals Jodl and Keitel at Nürnberg had been miscarriages of
justice. (449) Many former military men felt that they had been
betrayed and their honor insulted by the society that they had
fought for. Some even expressed a perverse pleasure
(Schadenfreude) in the development of the Cold War. They believed
that Nazism had served a useful function in protecting Western
civilization from the Asiatic Bolshevik menace. Since the Western
Allies had insisted on eradicating that bulwark, they felt that
it was divine justice, a vindication of both the Wehrmacht and
themselves, if they had to try to cope with that menace on their
The Federal Government thus found itself in the almost impossible situation of trying on the one hand to placate the ex-soldiers and lure them back into service, while on the other hand creating a more democratic army which would be firmly under civilian control. In this task they were unexpectedly helped by the Social Democratic leadership, which despite its opposition to rearmament before reunification, decided that since rearmament was to take place with or without their support they had best try to shape the new military as much as possible.

The first, and in many ways easiest, step in this process was to rehabilitate the honor of the old military. In January 1951, at Adenauer's behest, High Commissioner McCloy authorized the commutation of the sentences of several war criminals.\(^{451}\) Even more important symbolically was the visit that month by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who met with some of Adenauer's top generals and declared that he believed that most member so the Wehrmacht had been decent men fighting for their fatherland.\(^{452}\) Leaders of veterans groups thereupon reversed their previously critical positions towards rearmament and undertook to defend Adenauer's military advisors, Generals Heusinger and Speidel, who had been criticized for cooperating with the Allies.\(^{453}\) To contain the military and make it more democratic the Bundestag sought to institutionalize reform along two general lines. On the one hand, there were those of a primarily legal-bureaucratic nature, such as the establishment of
a parliamentary committee which would review defense decisions and the implementation of civilian control. The Ministry of Defense, headed by the Defense Minister and two secretaries, all of whom are civilians, is divided into four main sections only one of which is run by military personnel. The armed forces are constitutionally subordinated to the executive and civilian authority. The oath of allegiance is sworn to the constitution and democratic principles, and not to the head of the nation as had been the traditional practice. Also the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner (Wehrbeauftragte) was created to monitor conditions inside of the military and was given broad powers of inspection. (454)

The second set of reforms was to try to integrate the military into society. One important aspect of this was to make the army a draft rather than a professional army, as was perhaps paradoxically most strongly insisted upon by the SPD. In addition a new doctrine known as Innere Führung (literally "internal guidance") was devised and implemented for the purpose of democratizing the internal structure of the armed forces. The concepts of Innere Führung emerged early on in the planning for rearmament, and was originally proposed by Adenauer’s military advisors themselves, who saw the new military as an opportunity to reform the military and make it fit the spirit of the times. The key proposition was that any future military would have to cleanse itself of the old Nazi past and integrate itself into democratic society. Soldiers in the modern world would no longer
fight out of corpse-like obedience (*Kadavergehorsam*) but rather out of inner conviction in the value of what they were fighting for - freedom and democracy. While the principles of military rank and hierarchy were to be retained, the soldier would enjoy as many civil liberties as possible. He was no longer a being raised above his fellow countrymen, nor a creature bound to slavishly follow every command of his superior, but rather was to be a "citizen in uniform". One of the most difficult new concepts raised by this doctrine was the idea that soldiers would obey only on the basis of their own consciences, and that obedience to a higher authority would no longer be an excuse for committing crimes against international law or humanity. (455) This doctrine was to become a central element of the new military's internal subculture. (456) A special agency under the direction of Graf Wolf von Baudissin was created within the fledgling Defense Ministry to oversee the implementation of Innere Führung.

While most of the initial members of the agency seemed to have been supportive of Innere Führung, some, such as Colonel Heinz Karst, were opposed to it because they felt it was incompatible with military discipline and traditions. Others identified it with public and liberal opposition in the Bundestag. Baudissin's reform proposals were perceived by many military men, not altogether incorrectly, as direct criticisms of both themselves and the performance of the military during the Second World War in general. (457) Opposition to Innere Führung continued through the 1950s and 1960s. The officer corps was
polarized between "reformers" and "traditionalists", with the "traditionalists" enjoying the upper hand, at least internally. (458)

The weak position of Innere Führung within the bureaucracy lead to shortcomings in its implementation, such as the failure to closely screen officers for the new military and the relative neglect of the concept in the education of new Bundeswehr personnel. Because of time constraints, the training period had been reduced from two months to just over four weeks, and the first casualty of the economizing was Innere Führung. Whereas in 1952 it had been planned to cover the 73 topics relating to Innere Führung in 108 class hours, by the time actual training began this was reduced to 10 topics in 17 hours. The School for Innere Führung, designed to help officers and senior NCOs in the implementation of the reform concept, was opened in 1956. Yet it held its first lecture more than a year later, and even then difficulties were reported in getting personnel to attend. (459)

Baudissin's efforts found more success in influencing the formulation of military law. The Soldier's Law makes no qualitative distinction between the soldier and the citizen. The Superior's Law stipulates guidelines for relations between superiors and subordinates in terms of the humanistic principles of Innere Führung. And the Military Appeals Law underlined the right of the soldier to lodge complaints against their superiors. Further safeguards were provided by the Military Discipline Law of March 1957, limiting an officer's right to discipline his
subordinates without first granting them an opportunity to appeal. Finally, the Ombudsman Law allowed troops to elect their own spokesmen who would represent their interests in the operation of the unit. Yet even in this case the manuals and regulations needed to implement these laws, although prepared and partially distributed in the late 1950s, were not made fully available till the early 1970s. (460)

In light of this situation, one may conclude that the concept of Innere Führung, at least in the more idealistic form it had been presented to the public during the rearmament debate, was only partially realized in the new West German armed forces. One consequence of this was that over the next 30 years the Bundeswehr was to be periodically pilloried in a long series of affairs and incidents where perceived failings of Innere Führung have been exploited by the media. These incidents tend to be of two sorts; incidents involving the mistreatment of conscripts and incidents that reveal evidence of illiberal thinking in the officer corps. (461)

Yet, despite these incidents, the new military became a remarkably open institution, and one which was highly responsive to public criticism. While Innere Führung was not a complete success, nonetheless it became the official basis of the new armed forces, and had very concrete consequences for the structure of life in the armed forces. The new recruit enjoyed a level of dignity and freedom completely unknown to any historic German army. And the West German officer, was compelled to treat
his charges in a totally new manner. More importantly, the reform concept had not merely been imposed on the new military by external political forces, though these had played an important role as well, but had originated from inside the leadership of the new military, who felt bound by both their consciences and the changing nature of the world to try to create a military which was more democratic in its very essence.

Because of the collaboration of all the major political parties in creating the new armed forces, and because of the efforts to integrate it into society through the doctrine of Innere Führung and the institution of the draft, the Bundeswehr became, if not a much-loved or particularly respected institution of society, at least one which aroused no great suspicions. While over the years, especially during the late 1960s, the Bundeswehr was to be often accused of sinister intentions and dangerous tendencies, especially in the area of nuclear strategy, it never became viewed with the same level of suspicion that the SDF were in Japan. Unlike Japan, there was relatively little concern that the military might become the instrument of a reactionary take over in West Germany, and hence there did not emerge the same domestic political pressure for the institutionalization of restrictions on defense policy. Together with the fact that the military as an institution was less strongly associated with the old regime than was the case in Japan, this greater level of trust in their armed forces was to allow the Germans to more easily cope with military (as opposed to broader alliance and
security) issues than the Japanese and continues to be the most important difference between their political-military cultures.
Chapter 7 - The Political-Military Culture of West Germany - Circa 1956

By the beginning of 1956 the basic institutional underpinnings of post-war West German security policy had been largely determined. Since then, little has changed in terms of concrete military policy, though the acceptance of détente and the opening of ties to the East, beginning with the Harmel report of 1968, represent important additions to the overall West German approach to security. Already in 1956 the single most important decision of modern, post-war German history had been made; rather than pursue the elusive but powerful prospect of reunification, West Germany had chosen to integrate itself with the West, both economically (through the process begun with the Schuman plan) and militarily (through NATO). This was to be Germany's new solution to its classical strategic problem at the geographical center of Europe, the so-called Mittel-Lage. The old diplomatic philosophy of Staatsraison and realpolitik, the cold-blooded pursuit of state objectives legitimated by the doctrine of ultimate loyalty to the nation, had been discredited. And with it went the traditional Bismarckian strategy of Schaukelpolitik, the playing of Germany's neighbors off against one another in order to maximize its diplomatic maneuverability. Instead, Adenauer and the CDU were to try to legitimate West German foreign policy through reference to a community of common values shared with the West and endangered by the totalitarian East. In this way West Germany came to enjoy a level of international support unknown to
any of its pre-war predecessors. But this was achieved only at
the price of sacrificing its traditional emphasis on diplomatic
maneuverability and, more importantly, by compromising its
historic quest for unity. In this sense, the basic principle
underlying West German foreign policy can be described as the
calculated and limited relinquishment of its sovereignty in
return for the support of its Western allies. (462)

Moreover, basic West German military strategy discernible at
the secret Kloster Himmerod conference of 1950, crystallized and
became evident in 1955, after the collapse of the EDC initiative.
West German military planning called for a forward defense of the
nation’s borders by a highly mobile, offensive force of 12
armored and mechanized divisions acting together with U.S. and
other Western Allied armed forces. A national military
establishment had been created, complete with its own General
Staff, air force and navy. At the same time, after the conference
of Lisbon in 1952, it had been more or less decided that the
costs of a purely conventional defense of West Europe would
politically be impossible and some measure of nuclear deterrence
would be needed to compensate for Soviet numerical superiority.
Since West Germany had elected to forego developing its own
nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons production
capacities, (though it left open the right to possess such
weapons or have them deployed on its territory) this
automatically meant that it would rely for the most part on its
Western Allies to provide it with strategic cover. Much of
subsequent West German defense debates would revolve around the extraordinary difficulties involved in relying on a strategy of extended deterrence. And finally, a rather radical doctrine of civilian control had been adopted, based on the democratization and integration into society of the military institution.

By 1956 the parameters of future West German defense debates became discernible as well. Whenever West Germans thought about defense and military security a complex of issues tended together in a pattern that was to repeat itself time and time again. As in Japan, what lay at the heart of the political debate on military security was not so much a difference of opinion over the technical-rational problem of how to meet the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, but rather by disagreements regarding national identity. In many ways the key problem confronting West Germany was a new version of the key question which had occupied Central Europe over for more than a century, die Deutsche Frage, the problem of German national unity. While all major political figures of the time were committed in principle to reunifying the two halves of the nation (although certainly many in the CDU/CSU, including Adenauer, did not regret the diminishment of the Prussian influence resulting from national division), there existed enormous differences regarding the priority to be assigned to reunification as opposed to achieving other national goals.

Another central issue around which the West German debate on defense and security revolved, and which was directly related
to the problem of national unity, was also a question with deep roots in German history, namely what was the position that Germany should adopt, politically, economically and culturally, between the individualistic West and the communitarian East, whether Germany should align itself entirely with the West and adopt whole-heartedly its institutions and philosophies; or whether it should seek to serve as a bridge between these two worlds and try to temper the excesses of modernity and the hyper-individualism of the West with the traditionalism and communalism of the East. To be sure, just as all German political groups of the time were in favor of reunification, so were they united in their support of fundamental Western values, including democracy and the freedom of the individual, over Communist tyranny. But again, there existed important differences regarding the nature of these values and the priorities to be given to them. These differences again had important consequences for views on reunification, and thus to debates on defense.

Attitudes towards many other questions which came to be associated with the defense debate were in good measure determined by or subsidiary to attitudes towards these central questions. They include attitudes towards capitalism versus socialism, rearmament, NATO, nuclear weapons, military doctrine, the Soviet threat, guilt over the crimes of the Nazi era, the importance of civilian control and collective defense.

In the 1945 to 1955 period it is possible to identify three distinct ideological groupings in terms of their stance on
defense-related issues. The first could be called the peace-through-strength group, usually identified with Adenauer and the CDU. The second might be called the reunification before rearmament point of view, represented mainly by Kurt Schumacher and the main-stream SPD. And the third group was the pacifist nationalism of the peace movement. (463)

It should be noted from the outset, however, that all three groups were far more heterogeneous than the comparable ideological clusterings in Japan. This greater internal diversity can be attributed to two sources. First, to the greater heterogeneity of German society itself, with its strong sectarian and regional differences. And second, to two underlying sources of instability in the ideological constellation described above; the national issue and the tension between the Atlantic and European dimensions of Western integration.

The peace through strength group was distinguished primarily by its commitment to Western integration over against reunification. While unification was certainly one of its chief objectives, proponents of this view believed that under the then prevailing circumstances, immediate achievement of national unity was unrealistic. They believed that if West Germany together with its Western allies were militarily strong and demonstrated their political will and solidarity, eventually the Soviet Union would be compelled to negotiate with them on their terms, and then the division of Europe, including the division of Germany, could be overcome. The best way of creating such unity was through the
integration of West Germany into the developing European Community and NATO, all under the aegis of the United States.

Closely linked to this Western orientation was a concomitant commitment to the capitalist system. The United States was seen as the wave of the future, and American economic institutions were widely studied and emulated. Moreover, socialist economic controls were depicted as an encroachment by the state on the freedom of the individual and hence linked to totalitarianism and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the memories of the unbridled inflation of the 1920s and 30s (which helped give rise to the Nazi movement) as well as of the chaos of the immediate post-war years continued to haunt the German leadership, and even the conservatives recognized the need for some government regulation of the economy in order to maintain social stability. This led to the adoption of the doctrine of the social-market economy (Sozialemarktwirtschaft), which distinguishes between the economic order (or economic playing field) determined by the state, and the economic process, which should be kept strictly free of any political interference.⁴⁶⁴

Like the rest of the nation, the conservatives in Germany were deeply stricken by the crimes of the Nazis and openly acknowledged the burden of guilt that the entire nation bore for its misdeeds. Yet, the conservatives, like their political opponents the socialists, were careful to portray themselves as personally being free of any contamination by the Nazi past. Portrayal of Nazism as an extension of Prussian, North-German
militarism was a comfortable position to take for a political grouping which found much of its support among Catholics and in the Southern and Western regions of Germany. That the Protestant North was also the traditional bastion of socialism was also useful, and may have further reinforced the conservatives' suspicions of the SPD opposition's motives. More importantly, as the party in power, the conservatives were often forced to compromise on the vigorous prosecution of wrong doers. This was especially true in the case of the punishment of former military men, whose services and expertise were desperately needed for rearmament. Many in the conservative camp, especially, but by no means exclusively, the strong national wing of the FDP, felt that the prosecution of former soldiers was unjust. This did not mean that they necessarily condoned the crimes which had been committed under the Nazi regime, but they felt that the assignation of guilt to entire categories of people was itself a miscarriage of justice.

On military security issues, predictably it was this group which most strongly favored rearmament and the Western Alliance. While Adenauer and his advisors were strong supporters of the EDC concept, the evidence seems to indicate that their initial preferences were for a national military establishment integrated within a multinational alliance. In public statements at least the Soviet threat was taken very seriously, and all the available evidence suggests that Adenauer was gravely concerned with the possibility of a Soviet invasion prior to and immediately after
the Korean war. Later on, however, there is much to indicate that the immediate threat of an invasion was not taken as seriously, though guarding against its possible emergence remained a top priority. Nuclear weapons as a means of compensating for Soviet numerical superiority were accepted as a matter of course. While West Germany itself renounced the right to produce weapons of mass destruction, clearly such weapons would have to be stationed in order to deter the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, that at the time all the implications of nuclear weapons were not fully appreciated in West Germany. German military planners clearly anticipated that nuclear weapons would be employed in any future war. Thus if West German military forces were to be fully modernized to fight in the new, nuclear environment, in all probability they believed that they too would have to be equipped with such weapons. All proposals for collective security systems tended to be viewed with great suspicion by the CDU and the conservatives, who saw them as attempts to neutralize Germany. One of Adenauer's greatest fears reportedly was that some day the U.S. might return to its isolationist traditions and strike a second Potsdam-like deal with the Soviet Union which would leave Germany at the mercy of the Communists. (465)

The peace-through-strength view was the official position of the West German government during this period and much of the next, and it enjoyed the support, or at least acceptance, of the majority of the population. It was also strongly supported by the CDU/CSU party as well as its Free Democratic coalition partners,
big business, large portions of the media, many important intellectual figures as well as members of the reborn military establishment.

The chief alternative approach to defense, and indeed to politics in general, was the reunification before rearmament view, which gave reunification a far higher priority than the peace-through-strength group did. While not opposed to rearmament in principle, it was concerned that it would block any possibility for negotiating a solution to the division of the German nation. It made powerful, emotional appeals to national interests, arguing that if West Germany were to accept rearmament, it should do so on its own terms. Integration with Western Europe and/or joining NATO were seen as undesirable constraints on German sovereignty and would postpone reunification indefinitely. Instead of military alliances, a system of collective security embracing all European nations, including the Soviet Union and the U.S., was preferred.

Central to the self-understanding of the bulk of the supporters of the reunification-before-rearmament position was a commitment to the principles of socialism. Capitalism, it was felt, had proven to be a failure. Moreover the excessive accumulation of wealth in private hands was believed antithetical to democracy and to have helped create National Socialism. On the other hand, the kind of socialism, which they wished to create would be very different from the kind of totalitarian socialism of Eastern Europe. True socialism, if successfully implemented,
would be a third way to solving the problems of modernity and industrialization, and help bridge the gap between the two competing world views. This did not necessarily mean neutrality between the two competing systems, but rather independence from entangling alliance systems, which left open taking a principled stand on such values as freedom and democracy.

Like the conservatives, the reunification before rearmament group fully acknowledged the guilt West Germany bore for the war. And like the conservative leaders, the Socialist leadership maintained that it could in no way be held responsible for the previous regime. Indeed, even more than the conservatives, the Socialists were able to more credibly depict themselves as victims of Nazi persecution, and this added additional edge to their criticism of the conservative government, which they maintained was closer to the Nazis than themselves.

On defense issues there was a generally low estimation of the direct Soviet threat against the West, and a high estimation of the American willingness to defend West Germany even without a formal commitment. Socialist leaders argued that the U.S. could never afford to allow West Germany to fall into the Soviet orbit, and would intervene out of its own interests without West Germany having to make any concessions. The internal, ideological threat of Communism, on the other hand, was rated much more highly, and the only defense against it, the Socialist leadership argued throughout this period, was the institutionalization of strong, social-welfare policies. There was concern about the costs of
rearmament and the diversion of resources rearmament would entail, as well as grave concern about the use of nuclear weapons on West German soil, though this issue only really came to the fore in the late 1950s.

The reunification-before-rearmament view received its main institutional support from the SPD leadership and the labor unions. A number of influential dissidents in the other two parties, such as Jakob Kaiser and Karl Pfleiderer, were also attracted to this view. In addition it had broad popular appeal, especially on the national issue, and was promoted in the liberal and even some parts of the conservative press as well as by many intellectuals.

The pacifist movement was extraordinarily diverse and the most difficult of the three to characterize. Its two unifying themes were the absolute priority it attached to reunification as a goal and its moralistic opposition to rearmament and the use of force in general. It rejected European integration on the grounds of the first of these too, and it rejected all military alliances on the basis of the second. A powerful element of guilt over Germany's role in the last war added a sharp, moral pang to its opposition to rearmament. Germany, having inflicted so much suffering on the peoples of the world, could not psychologically or morally be expected to take up arms once again.

The pacifist's perception of the Soviet threat tended to be somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand, the threat of war was portrayed as both imminent and cataclysmic. Both sides were seen
as moving towards armed conflict, with West Germany as its unwilling battlefield. On the other hand, the view of the Soviet Union, while hardly benign, was not totally negative, and they believed that if Soviet interests were respected, the Soviets could be reasoned with.

The peace movement had the narrowest base of support of the three ideological groupings identified here. Nonetheless, it enjoyed the sympathy, and by 1955 the active support, of the rank and file of the SPD. They drew further support from the labor unions and the churches, above all from the Protestant churches, which provided a disproportionate share of leading activists. Many intellectual figures, especially on the far Left, joined the pacifist movement. And in a war-weary population which had lost interest in political ideals and wished desperately for peace, there were many susceptible to the pacifists' "better red than dead" (which works equally well in German as lieber rot als tot) message.

Unlike in Japan, this initial ideological constellation was to prove unstable for two reasons. First, in a divided nation over the long run it was to prove difficult to totally resist at least some compromise with the East, especially since West Germany's Western allies themselves began to soften their stance towards the Soviet Union. Second, there existed a latent tension between West Germany's Atlantic and European connections which first emerged at the end of the decade. Over the long run it was to provide a new source of cleavage on defense issues which
(writing from the perspective of today) was to prove even more enduring than the one over the national issue.

The following chart is offered as a brief summary of the positions of these three groupings on the central points of controversy of the West German political-military culture's complex of issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace through Strength</th>
<th>Reunification before rearmament</th>
<th>Pacifism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reunification:</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitalism vs.</td>
<td>capitalism</td>
<td>socialist</td>
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<td>Socialism: &quot;social-market&quot;</td>
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<td>Atlantic tie:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Integration:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
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<td>NATO:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rearmament:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>limited support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Guilt:</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet threat:</td>
<td>great</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Option:</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>oppose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Control:</td>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>Innere Führung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective Security:</td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
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As to be expected these views were not evenly spread across all the major sectors of the West German political system. The following is an attempt to determine the distribution of these
views within five key sectors; public opinion, intellectuals, media, industry and the political parties. (466)

I. Public Opinion (467)

Public opinion surveys during the 1945 to 1955/56 period reveal that Adenauer had an uphill battle winning acceptance of his policies. Popular attitudes towards rearmament were universally negative, and for most of the period a plurality of West Germans probably would have preferred reunification and neutrality to entry into alliance with the West. The general perception of a Communist military threat, though initially quite strong, decreased steadily after 1950, further increasing pressures for neutralization. On the other hand, Adenauer was helped by the overall positive image of the U.S. as compared to the overwhelmingly negative view of the Soviet Union.

In initial polls conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie in November 1950, only 33% of the population was in favor of rearmament and 48% was against it, while 19% remained uncertain. Given the same question in June, 1951, one year after the Korean war had broken out, support for rearmament increased to 42%, but still 41% were opposed. In the following years both public opinion seesawed between support and opposition to rearmament, with a maximum of support being achieved in February 1952 when 46% of all respondents favored rearmament while 38 were opposed, and the high point of the opposition coming in March 1953, when only 35% of the population supported rearmament and 44% opposed
it. In February 1955, as actual rearmament loomed near, 39% were for it and 44% against. But only a few months later, in June, when asked whether they were for a new military or not, the pro-side seemed to lead again with 42% favoring a military and 38% opposed.\(^{(468)}\)

According to EMNID surveys of the time a very large segment of the population, over 45%, favored neutrality over siding with the U.S.\(^{(398)}\), while only a tiny minority of between 1 and 4% favored siding with the Soviet Union. In 1956, as the SPD threw in its lot with the peace movement, support for neutrality increased to 54% in June and 62% in November, as opposed to 38% and 31% support for siding with the U.S.\(^{(469)}\) And an Allensbach study from October, 1954 showed public opinion nearly split when given a clear choice between reunification (39%) and a defensive alliance against the Russians (35%). These and other studies reveal that there was a slim preference in the West Germany of the time for neutrality and reunification over integration into the Western military alliance. Only a small segment of the population, roughly around 20%, believed that reunification could be achieved through strengthening NATO's military capabilities, as was maintained by the government.\(^{(470)}\) Moreover, large majorities rejected either recognition of the Oder-Neisse line or giving priority to European integration over reunification.\(^{(471)}\)

The problem remained, however, how to reach reunification, and in this respect the conservatives were helped by the fact that many Germans distrusted Soviet motives. A February 1955
Allensbach survey showed that even if Germany refused to sign the Paris treaties, 49% of the population thought that this would not lead to reunification, while only 20% thought that it would and 31% were uncertain. Also, many Germans seemed to recognize the government's position that neutrality would actually increase West German insecurity. Another Allensbach survey from April, 1955 showed that even if both the Soviet Union and the U.S. withdrew their forces, many West Germans felt their country would probably be militarily more insecure than if those forces remained (39 to 31%). (472)

In general there was a strong preference for a withdrawal of U.S. forces, though there was increased acceptance of the inevitability of their presence. Asked in 1952 their views of Allied forces in West Germany, a mere 14% saw them as welcome protection, while 34% saw them as an unavoidable necessity and 33% as an unwelcome burden. By July 1956, however, 11% welcomed the forces, 38% saw them as a burden but 45% saw them as unavoidable. Another series of surveys taken during this period showed strong majorities (from 43% to 71%) who felt that given the present world situation it was better that the U.S. troops remain. (473)

Fear of war was quite high in 1950. According to EMNID, in October 1950, 26% saw a World War as probable within the next three years, 48% believed one was possible and only 26% saw it as improbable. But the sense of threat steadily decreased throughout the 50s, and by May, 1956 only 5% saw it as probable, 35% as
possible, while 60% believed a new world war to be unlikely.\(^{(474)}\) Not coincidentally support for neutrality increased at precisely this time. Most West Germans clearly believed that the West was stronger than the East\(^{(475)}\), and a plurality believed that the West could halt a Soviet offensive and possibly even roll it back.\(^{(476)}\) Such views were reconcilable with the Socialist position that the West was sufficiently secure that it could afford to deal with the Soviet Union.

Clearly, overall popular opinion on defense was closer to the SPD reunification-before-rearmament position than to the CDU/CSU peace-through-strength view. Support for the pacifist position was weaker, but many agreed with the pacifist emphasis on reunification. Yet, electorally the Union won both in 1949 and by a landslide in 1953. Support for Adenauer's policies steadily rose, from 33% supporting versus 45% opposing in 1949 to 55% support and 17% opposition in 1955.\(^{(477)}\) Reunification was probably the single most important issue of the mid to late 1950s, followed by ensuring peace and improving economic conditions. According to a poll in 1956, 38% gave it first priority, over peace (16%) and the economy (28%). This emphasis on the national issue increased, if anything, over the following few years.\(^{(478)}\) But other issues taken together probably outweighed the defense-related and reunification ones. In particular economic issues were crucial, and the continued good performance of the West German economy, along with the obvious success of Adenauer’s diplomacy in bringing the Occupation to an
end, were probably the key factors giving the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government the maneuvering room it needed to push through unpopular defense policies. Only in the following years was popular support for these policies to begin to increase.

II. Intellectuals

The intellectual community in West Germany, much more so than in Japan, was deeply divided. There were many moderates and conservatives who supported, or at least accepted, the government’s positions on defense, just as there was a large, leftist minority which leaned towards the socialist or pacifist views. While there was a strong Marxist current in the West German universities and on the intellectual scene, it was in no way near to being as dominant as it was in Japan. Many important intellectual figures were openly and vehemently opposed to Communism, which was identified with totalitarianism and thus close to Nazism, and many served as occasional advisors to Dienststelle Blank, especially with reference to legal issues and how to best integrate the new military into society. (479) But still, the memories of the war were much too fresh for conservative intellectual figures to publicly and actively campaign in favor of rearmament, whatever their private views may have been. On the other hand, left-leaning intellectuals were quite vocal in their opposition to the government’s position and making their views broadly felt. Intellectual critics of the government’s defense policies played an important role in
legitimating and organizing the peace movement, and, in addition, they may have encouraged the SPD to shift leftwards in the mid-1950s.

As pointed out earlier, many prominent thinkers believed Germany should seek a third way between the communitarian East and the individualistic West. This vision was shared both by the intellectuals of the socialist Left and to a lesser degree by writers of the liberal-conservative tradition. The first group was represented by contributors to the prominent intellectual journal *Der Ruf* as well as the members of the influential Gruppe 47, an informal literary group which included many of the postwar's most successful writers and which was organized in September 1947 by the novelist Hans Werner Richter. The Soviet Union and the U.S. were both seen by thinkers of this school as being equally repugnant social systems. Instead of aligning with one or the other, Richter argued that Germany, having been given the opportunity to start over again with a clean slate by the collapse of the old order and the Stunde Null, should stay aloof from the confrontations between the two social systems and work instead to liberate Germany from its fascist traditions and firmly anchor it in a new form of social humanism. (480)

Writers belonging to the liberal-conservative tradition included contributors to the journal *Die Wandlung*, edited by the philosopher Karl Jaspers and the sociologist Alfred Weber. Like the leftists they were concerned with reforming German society, but they tended to be more moderate in their calls for social
renewal and more skeptical about the claims of Marxism. They tended to agree with the thesis of Carl Friedrich and Hannah Arendt that the primary threat of the age was out of control technology and totalitarianism, and hence were much more hostile towards the Soviet Union than towards the U.S. (481)

The pacifists were anchored in a long German tradition of pacifism and could trace their origins back to Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden (On Perpetual Peace) and Herder’s Declaration of War against War. The German Peace Society was founded in 1892 by Alfred Fried and Bertha von Suttner, and it expanded tremendously after WW I. Among its more famous pre-war members were Albert Einstein, Ernst Toller, Heinrich Mann, Kurt Tucholsky and Carl von Ossietzky. In the post-war period various pacifist groups were organized in opposition to the government’s policies of rearmament and integration with the West. The most famous of these was the "Nauheimer Kreis" under Ulrich Noack, which first gathered public attention in January 1951 with its call against rearmament and for the conclusion of a peace treaty ("Aufruf gegen Wideraufrüstung und für allgemeinen Friedenschluss"). It advocated strict, unarmed neutrality, and argued that both East and West would accept a united Germany only if they were sure that it wouldn’t join the other side against them. (482).

Another key figure in the peace movement was Martin Niemoeller, a Protestant minister who had been imprisoned in Dachau for his stand an religious freedom. After the liberation Niemoeller emerged as a symbol of that "other Germany" which had
remained true to its conscience and resisted Hitler and became one of the most widely respected German figures both at home and abroad. In particular his successful negotiations with the Soviet Union for the return of German prisoners of war won him widespread respect and helped bolster his view that East-West dialogue was both possible and could bring concrete gains on important issues. At the same time Niemoeller had a darker side to his personality. He was in many respects an old-fashioned patriot who was proud of his service as a U-boat commander during World War I and had participated in the suppression of the Kapp Putsch. He once greatly shocked Western journalists in the early 1950s with the statement that he had always felt that democracy was not necessarily the appropriate way of life (geeignete Lebensform) for the German people. Niemoeller, like many of the other pacifists (but unlike Gustav Heinemann) was in principle not opposed to the military. Rather, it was the reunification issue which weighed most heavily in his calculations. His fellow Protestant minister and organizer of the peace movement, Helmut Gollwitzer, once argued in an article most persuasively against most pacifist arguments and recognized the need to guard against totalitarianism, before concluding that the only legitimate argument for pacifism was that it was the best means of achieving national unity. Similar in his views was the writer Hermann Rausching, who wrote the 1950 bestseller Deutschland zwischen Ost und West. Rausching's central thesis was that Germany's entry into NATO meant that the West
would abandon Central Europe.

The peace movement also derived important support from segments of the Evangelical church, which in August 1950 issued a statement deploiring the potential for a civil war between troops from the two halves of Germany and opposing the remilitarization of both parts of Germany. Niemoeller and others were especially vehement in their views because they believed that the church had failed to live up to its moral responsibility during the Third Reich, and thus bore at least partial responsibility for the crimes that had been committed, including the division of the nation. Now that the new West German government threatened to once again take up arms and to further deepen the gulf separating the two halves of Germany, they felt bound to voice their objections as a matter of Christian conscience. Yet, despite the pacifists' evident popular appeal, others in the Evangelical church were closer in their views to the government. But concern for the unity of the church made them more circumspect in voicing their opinions. At the same time, they managed to prevent the pacifists from turning the church into wholly an instrument of the pacifist movement, and throughout the 1950s the issue was the object of intense internal debate. (486) In October 1952, Bishop Otto Dibelius set the official church position when he declared that the church could not interfere in matters lying within the sphere of politics, and whether one chose to oppose the government or support it was ultimately a matter of individual conscience. (487)
III. Media (488)

In the immediate wake of the Second World War all press and media had been shut down by the Allied powers. Within a short time permission was given to open new newspapers under license from the Occupation authorities. However, the Military Governments sought to guarantee that license were only granted to "acceptable" Germans with a clean past. After 1947 Communists were barred along with former National Socialists. In addition a general system of censorship was imposed.

Since many publishers and editors had been closely associated with the Nazi regime, this made finding suitable personnel quite difficult, and often almost totally inexperienced individuals found themselves in charge of entire newspapers. Perhaps the most important example of this sort was Rudolf Augstein, whose only qualification had been a few months as an intern at a local newspaper in Hannover and who went on to found Der Spiegel, West Germany's single most influential magazines. (489)

Although the Americans sought to create a non-partisan press, naturally within a short time most newspapers developed a clear ideological preference. (490) Especially after 1949, when many of the old publishers and editors were allowed to take up their old professions, there was an incredible explosion in the newspaper industry, most of which adopted ideologically profiled editorial lines. By December 1949, three months after the
adoptions of less-restrictive licensing policies, there were over 568 newspapers in West Germany, an increase of over 238%. Over the following years, because of intense competition, these decreased to 225. Nonetheless, unlike Japan, there were no truly national papers like the *Asahi* or the *Yomiuri* with readerships numbering in the millions. (491)

On the balance, most important newspapers were generally conservative in their orientation, such as the *Die Welt* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (which developed the reputation of being the newspaper of the establishment). More liberal were the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Die Zeit*. The phenomenally successful *Der Spiegel*, under the strongly pro-reunification Rudolf Augstein was perhaps the single most prominent media critic of the government. (492) At the time the comparably popular *Stern* magazine under former war correspondent Henri Nannet, was strongly pro-Adenauer. In addition, the various parties all established their press organs, such as the weekly *Neuer Vorwärts* of the SPD and the *Bayern-Kurier* of the CSU. Such newspapers represented only a small portion (13.8% in 1956) of the total press.

Prior to the Korean war, the overwhelming majority of the press either avoided the theme of rearmament or was opposed to it, with the exception of the *Rheinischer Merkur* and the *Schwäbische Post*. Thereafter the general position adopted by the newspapers depended in large measure on its support for the government. But at times the conflicting emotions involved in the defense debate, especially regarding the reunification issue,
confused these positions. For example the editorialist Paul Sethe of the generally pro-government Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung called for serious consideration of the Stalin note in 1952, a stance which latter helped lead to his removal from the paper in 1955. (493)

IV. Industry (494)

In general, industry in Germany played a much less conspicuous role regarding rearmament than it did in Japan. Naturally industry tended to support the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition because of their stand in favor of the market economy and their opposition to the socialization of industry. In addition, though traditionally Eastern European markets had been important targets for the German export industry, in the post-1945 era it offered nowhere near the potential benefits that trade with the West did. Thus, if for no other than these underlying structural reasons, West German industry was inclined to support Adenauer's policies. Yet, despite their backing of integration with Western Europe and alignment with the U.S., this did not automatically translate into support of rearmament and the building of a defense industry.

In general when the major West German industrial associations, the Federation of German Industry (BDI) and the German Chamber of Trade and Industry (DIHT), (495) expressed opinions on the rearmament issues, they were supportive of the government. Already in June, 1951, when Adenauer addressed a
Munich meeting of business leaders and explained his view of the world position, Fritz Berg, head of BDI, assured the Chancellor that German industry would be on his side and supported West integration and rearmament.\(^{496}\) In 1955, as the prospect of actual rearmament drew closer, the BDI devoted considerable attention in its annual report to the issue of rearmament. It indicated industry's basic support for Adenauer's policies and its willingness and ability to produce the armaments needed for the rearmament effort. At the same time it warned that the already severe labor shortage situation could be exacerbated, especially in certain skilled areas, given the already existing conditions of full employment and a planned 18 month period of compulsory military service. In addition it cautioned that while rearmament would have to be planned, procurement should be based on market principles, and should not lead to restrictions on exports or reductions in civilian demand.\(^{497}\) The DIHT in its report for that year was even more explicit, and warned that an increase of unproductive goods over against productive ones could harm the economy.\(^{498}\)

Reservations regarding rearmament seemed even stronger in private than the cautionary notes which the large economic federations were sounding. Many businessmen were troubled by the government's unwillingness, or inability, to provide a fixed estimate of what the new military might cost \(^{499}\), and the issue of manpower shortage and the possibility of distortions of the market brought on by massive defense procurement policies. \(^{500}\)
According to a 1952 survey of 30 leading industrialists and managers, while the majority were supportive of the EDC initiative, many had serious doubts. Some felt it was necessary to maintain good trade relations with the East as well as the West. Others believed the government should negotiate with the Russians as well. One steel manufacturer even suspected that the English wanted rearmament in order to weaken the German export industry! \(^{(501)}\) Additional factors which may have led industrialists to approach defense with caution may have been concerns about the negative image of becoming involved in defense and a belief that all major weapon systems would be supplied by the U.S..\(^{(502)}\)

Yet, despite these misgivings, soon after 1955 industry came to support defense for three reasons. First, there was new Defense Minister Josef Strauss's evident interest to use defense procurements as a means of aiding West German industry. Second, there was very strong interest in acquiring technology, both through the research funds allocated to the Defense Ministry and through licensing of technology from abroad. And third, the government would not own production facilities itself, but instead would contract work to private industry. \(^{(503)}\) In addition the reduction of the length of conscription from 18 to 12 months, and the emphasis being placed on the creation of a high quality instead of a large military, helped reduce some of the earlier misgivings. While the government did not officially try to encourage the domestic defense industry, the principle of
giving preference to the domestic production of defense goods was enshrined in the regulations of the new defense ministry, and over the following years the share of German made weapons in the Bundeswehr increased steadily from 40% in 1956 to over 80% by 1970. (504) Yet, with the important exception of the aerospace industry, defense expenditures were not used as a means to increase industrial production. Nor was there any need to do so, given the enormous success German industry, including its export sectors, was already enjoying at the time. In 1956, weapons production was merely .76% of total German manufacturing, and over the following 25 years, it never exceeded 2.18%. (505)

Interest in defense thus remained residual, and it is even more difficult to speak of a military-industrial complex in the West German case than in the American. Nonetheless, undeniably some firms, especially in the aeronautics field (506), but also in ship building, among firms traditionally engaged in arms production and some parts of heavy industry were interested in defense production. (507) Already in August 1953 there was a private exhibition in Bonn of products German industry could supply the EDC. (508) In addition, in the future a small, lucrative and highly controversial business developed in weapons exports, absorbing perhaps 20% of the total output of the West German defense industry. (509)

Also there was a certain amount of interest in the defense industry on the part of Strauss and the CSU. It is interesting to note that over the course of the post-war, Bavaria, which
traditionally was relatively insignificant for German weapons production, became one of the chief centers of arms production, while in other regions which traditionally had been centers of weapons manufacturing (such as Kassel) the defense industry stagnated.\(^{(510)}\)

Yet, while undoubtedly links were established between economic interests and the new defense establishment, they were no greater, and in fact were probably less-well organized, than similar links in other countries. Defense production remained a small if tolerated portion of the overall economy, and while it was hoped that it would help develop technology, in general these expectations were not met.\(^{(511)}\) Outside of the restricted area of defense procurements, there is little evidence that industry had much influence on security policy at this time. And its influence on broader elite or public attitudes towards defense and security issues seemed slight. \(^{(512)}\)

VI. CDU/CSU

In the beginning of the post-war period, there was considerable diversity within the CDU, and the dominant figure was Jakob Kaiser whose vision of Germany as a bridge between East and West was not far removed from that of the reunification-before rearmament and the pacifist views. The party's ambivalence towards capitalism, in keeping with the labor union roots of the party, was clearly reflected in the early party programs, which wished to restrict private ownership of capital. By 1947,
however, Jakob Kaiser had been adeptly displaced by Konrad Adenauer. Thereafter Adenauer exercised a degree of control both over his party and over the shaping of government policy which exceeded even that of Yoshida’s "one-man" rule in Japan. One noted historian even called Adenauer’s government the "Kanzler Demokratie" - the Chancellor’s Democracy. (513) And Adenauer’s long-term impact on West Germany was arguably even greater than Yoshida’s on Japan because his tenure in office was so much longer (till 1963 as opposed to till 1954).

Virtually all the positions associated with the peace-through strength group had been defined by Adenauer and were intimately associated with his person, including rearmament, Western integration and the entry into NATO. He was supported by a strong coterie of followers within the party, which grew as his own power increased, but his role in foreign policy matters was clearly overwhelming. The CDU itself in its official history emphasized that its early security policies were identical to Adenauer’s. (514)

A native Rhinelander, staunch Catholic and opponent of the Nazi regime, Adenauer was instinctively suspicious of both Prussia and the traditional German military establishment. (515) Thus for Adenauer the emotional appeal of reunification was by no means as strong as it was for many other West Germans. Furthermore, given the SPD’s traditional strength in the eastern parts of the country, he certainly had good political reasons to be apprehensive about the change of political fortunes that
reunification might bring. (516)

Adenauer also initially supported disarmament and toyed with the idea of Swiss-style neutrality, but he was opposed to both neutrality and disarmament, reasoning that unarmed neutrality was impossible. (517) Adenauer greatly feared that the Soviet Union might try to expand its influence in Western Europe, possibly by military means. Lending moral fervor to Adenauer’s anti-Soviet feelings was his acceptance of Carl Friedrich and Hannah Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, which diagnosed Communism and Nazism as being basically similar phenomena. To counter the Communist threat Adenauer saw no alternative to relying on the U.S. for support. Yet throughout his political career Adenauer was preoccupied with the fear that, as after the First World War, the traditionally isolationist U.S. might be tempted to strike a deal with the Soviet Union and withdraw back to its side of the Atlantic. It was this fear of a second Potsdam which made the Chancellor so eager to bind West Germany as tightly as possible with the West, even at the cost of delaying reunification and rebuilding the military. (518) To this end Adenauer embraced the EDC concept, despite his early reservations about its political feasibility, because it well suited his vision of a new European order freed of the specter of military competition fueled by nationalism. (519) When it failed, he quickly pushed NATO as the second best solution. Nonetheless, the appeal of a more European solution to West Germany’s security dilemma was to remain an important element in both Adenauer’s and the CDU’s future
thinking on foreign policy.

Despite CDU losses in local elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen and Baden-Württemberg, widely seen in the press as a rejection of Adenauer's positions (520), Adenauer stubbornly clung to this conception for maintaining West German security. In so doing he at least initially encountered resistance from within the party.

The most prominent of his critics was of course Gustav Heinemann, who had been taken into the cabinet to shore up Protestant support for the party. Heinemann was an anti-Marxist, but he was also a strong supporter of the Ahlener program. He was increasingly critical of the directions Adenauer was taking the party, and critically characterized CDU thinking as being “earning lots of money - soldiers to defend it - and churches, that bless both”. (521) But eventually his views led him to leave the party on grounds of moral conscience, becoming the leader of the pacifist position. He brought relatively few people out of the CDU with him into his Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei, which he founded November, 1952.

Within the party there remained a core of resistance centered around Jakob Kaiser, and many held views quite close to the reunification-before-rearmament position of the SPD. (522) Even Heinrich Brentano, Adenauer's Foreign Minister, wrote Adenauer a letter on the 22nd of August 1950 which downplayed the Soviet threat as long as the Western Allies remained in the country and argued that the domestic and international opposition
made the potential costs of rearmament too high. He added that it opened the possibility of reactionary revival. At the time there were others in the CDU who shared Brentano's anxieties. (523).

Support of rearmament by the Catholic church, whose members made up close to 50% of the West German population at the time and provided the main source of electoral strength of the party, was very important to Adenauer and the CDU. Crucial to this was the fact that also the church outside of Germany saw Communism as anti-Catholic, and Pope Pius XII in his 1951 Christmas message complained that the words "freedom and peace" were being monopolized by professional agitators. Likewise important West German members of the clergy mobilized their parishioners on behalf of the CDU and Adenauer. And Catholic youth groups came out in favor of a German defense contribution, providing that the "civilian in uniform" concept was adopted by the military. (524) It is significant to note in this context that Adenauer chose Theodor Blank, a former Catholic labor union leader, to be his first Defense Minister despite a lack of military experience. There were a few Catholic dissenters, such as Eugon Kogon and Walter Dirks, the editors of the Frankfurter Hefte, but they were largely isolated.

Also, with the important exception of Heinemann, the original Protestant wing of CDU was supportive of rearmament. Among the prominent Protestant CDU politicians who supported Adenauer were Hermann Ehlers, who argued for "a German defense contribution on the basis of Christian conscience", and Eugen
Gerstenmaier, who became one of Adenauer's closest associates. (525)

The Bavarian based CSU under the vigorous leadership of Franz Josef Strauss (who initially had been an impassioned opponent of rearmament) became a key supporter of the peace-through-strength position and was intimately involved in the formulation of West German defense policy. After 1950 Strauss and the CSU pushed for a "rational" defense policy, by which they seemed to mean the creation of a powerful, high-tech military with the most modern equipment. (526) The probable aim behind this active adoption of rearmament was to strengthen the CSU's position on the right wing of the coalition. (527) In September 1956, after being Minister for Atomic Affairs, Strauss replaced Blank as Defense Minister and subsequently played a key role formulating West German strategy. (528) His close colleague, Richard Jaeger, took over for him as head of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag. At the same time as Strauss became Defense Minister the CSU produced its own comprehensive program for rearmament called the Kirchheim Resolutions, which laid great emphasis on the economic aspects of rearmament and was sensitive to the needs of industry. The resolutions called for, among other things, a West German defense contribution; a common European-Atlantic security policy; the adoption of a 12 month instead of 18 month period of military service; the creation of high quality military forces; and the adoption of defense production and procurement policies which would benefit the West German economy. (529) In subsequent years
the CSU, secure in its electoral bastions in Bavaria, was able to draw off much liberal criticism of Adenauer by prominently supporting conservative policies. At the same time it played an important role in integrating large elements of the extreme right electorate which otherwise might have joined the many small reactionary parties which were kept out of the legislature by the 5% barrier.

Because of his strong position under the Occupation authorities Adenauer needed to pay little heed to voices within his party till the eve of the elections in 1952. He then successfully mobilized the party in his favor, including the Junge Union, the youth wing of the CDU. After exhaustive campaigning he got near unanimous approval of his policy line at the Hamburg party congress in April. (530) Thereafter, following his overwhelming electoral victory in 1953, Adenauer’s views became virtually unassailable, and there was no significant outward shift in the party’s defense and security policies till the early 1980s.

VIII. The Social Democrats

No party was more divided over the defense and security issue than the Social Democrats were. On the one hand the SPD had a long pacifist tradition central to its self understanding, and there was considerable recrimination over the party’s occasional support for military policies in the past. (531) Furthermore, ideologically the party rejected the capitalist system and big
business of the West, which they believed was at least partially responsible for the emergence of Nazism, and insisted that true democracy could only be created on the basis of the vigorous pursuit of economic equality and social justice. Joining an alliance of capitalist nations threatened, in their eyes, to strengthen capitalist and reactionary forces in their Germany. Moreover, many in the SPD leadership were from the eastern half of the country, and in addition the party stood to gain electorally if the nation were reunited, and thus the party was far more susceptible than most of the other parties to the emotional pull of the East. On the other hand, the relationship between Communism and Social Democracy had not been a happy one in the 1920s and 1930s. Many Social Democrats who had spent the war in the Soviet Union, such as Herbert Wehner, harbored no illusions about life under the Stalinist regime, and they were painfully aware of the coercive nature of the union between the SPD and the Communist party in East Germany to form the ruling SED. Thus the while the SPD was repelled by the idea of economic and political union with the West, had deep reservations about the advisability of rearment and placed great value on speedy reunification, it nonetheless feared and mistrusted the Soviet Union and the Communist government in the East. This division was reflected in the party’s defense and security policies, which alternated between a pacifism and a position which presaged the pro-detente position the party was to later adopt in the 1960s.

From 1945 till his death in 1952 the SPD was dominated by
the personality of Kurt Schumacher, a forceful speaker and incisive if often intolerant thinker whose moral authority within the party was bolstered by his status as a survivor of the concentration camps. Initially Schumacher, like many other social democrats who had survived the Third Reich(532), was quite pacifist in his outlook, connecting the destruction of Nazism and militarism with the establishment of a new social order and the complete eradication of the military as an institution and militarism as an ideology. These views were reflected in the official party platform adopted at the party congress in Hannover in 1946. In key passages the program maintained that the only hope for peace lay in destroying the power of those who had led Germany to war in the past and creating an unalterable will for peace among the German people.(533)

With the intensification of the Cold War Schumacher began to adopt a somewhat harder line on the need for military resistance to Communism. In an interview in the SPD party journal he stressed both the need for national sovereignty and equality with other nations as well as a national readiness to defend democracy. Yet Schumacher continued to warn that the West wished to exploit Germany for their own interest and that therefore Germany must strive to achieve military neutrality.(534) And even immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war Schumacher and the rest of the party leadership continued to argue that rearmament was an invitation to destabilizing Europe and preventing reunification (535).
Yet, in August Schumacher led a remarkable turnaround in party policy and effectively demanded making greater Western sensitivity to German national interests and treatment as an equal partner the prerequisites for West German military contribution to Western security. In practice this increasingly was translated into a long SPD campaign against the EDC as a potential obstacle to reunification. The question was no longer if, but rather under what conditions the SPD would agree to rearmament. In addition, the SPD was remarkably cool to, even critical of, the growing pacifist "ohne mich" movement, even though it contributed greatly to its successes over the CDU in local state elections in the Fall of 1950 and there was strong support for it at the grass roots level of the SPD.

During this period the SPD explicitly rejected making political use of the reunification argument to criticize the government. In October 1951 Gerhart Lütkens, the party's foreign policy expert and a close confidante of Schumacher, warned in the Bundestag that rather than try to achieve sovereignty for West Germany, the government should push for a four power meeting to discuss reunification. Lütkens's remarks immediately provoked a heated controversy, and his position was hurriedly disavowed by Ollenhauer and the SPD leadership (536). At this time various figures began to appear in the SPD who favored greater integration with the West, such as Wilhelm Kaisen, the mayor of Bremen, Max Brauer from Hamburg, and Ernst Reuter, the influential mayor of Berlin. (537) These men were the political
mentors of the Seeheimer Kreis, Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner and Willi Brandt, who were to later lead the party to accept tougher positions on issues of military security. Also some of the support groups of the party at the time were in favor of a tougher line on defense. For example the refugees from the East opposed negotiations which could lead to recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and got the party's support on this issue (538). And the labor unions felt that their counterparts in East Germany had been suppressed were also in a hard-line mood. (539)

But after Schumacher's death the SPD gradually became more supportive of the peace movement. The party congress in Dortmund in September, 1952, witnessed a great debate over the defense issue. At least three currents were clearly visible, the pacifists led by Willy Eichler, those who believed that rearmament should follow reunification, for example Fritz Baade, and those who favored rearmament before the reunification of a nonaligned Germany, as argued by the party's security expert Fritz Erler. The already then prominent young Willi Brandt supported Erler, but added that it should be made clear to the Soviet Union that also a united, socialist Germany would cooperate with the West. Perhaps the most conservative position was taken by Max Brauer of Hamburg, who felt strongly that Germany should contribute to Western military security. (540) The party congress in Berlin in July 1954 saw renewed debate, and after the devastating defeat of 1953 (which gave the CDU-FDP coalition a two thirds majority) the conservatives led by Brandt,
Wilhelm Kaiser and Carlo Schmid, openly called for a German military contribution to the defense of West Europe. But still the strong grass roots appeal of the pacifists made itself strongly felt, and Ollenhauer continued to reject joining the EDC. (541)

Despite this leftward drift, the SPD remained relatively cooperative with the plans for a defense buildup, insisting on the institutionalization of Innere Führung in return for helping oversee the development of the new arms forces. Friedrich Beerman, ex-army officer and advisor to the SPD on security affairs, warned Ollenhauer that the party should develop a clear security policy and keep open lines of communication with the new military so as not alienate the future German officer corps as its predecessor did during the Weimar Republic. Beerman's actions led to the creation of the Security Affairs committee of the SPD under Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt. (542) Once the decision was made to join NATO, however, the party almost completely threw in its lot with the peace movement.

It is important to note that though in many ways in a much more stronger position than the Socialists in Japan, the SPD's ability to block legislation was actually much weaker. First, the Communist party in Germany (KPD) was electorally a relatively insignificant factor, and after 1953 it virtually ceased to exist. (543) Thus the SPD did not have to work as hard as the JSP did to attract left-wing voters. And secondly, the labor union movement was far larger and more widely spread than was the case
in Japan, giving the SPD a far larger, and richer, organizational basis. Nonetheless, because there developed no tradition of the ruling party avoiding passing legislation alone, the SPD could not hold up legislation by refusing to show up at sessions of the legislature as the opposition parties could in Japan.\(^{544}\) Thus, paradoxically the pressures for the German Socialists to compromise on defense and other matters were proportionately greater than in Japan.

VIII. The Free Democrats and the smaller parties

Between the CDU/CSU and the SPD there was a host of lesser parties, including the FDP, Deutsche Partei and the BHE. The only one of these which can be said to have played more than a totally marginal role was the FDP, which was the third largest party in West Germany and was the CDU's coalition party throughout this period.

The FDP was a diverse party which drew its electoral support primarily from upper middle-income professional groups, middle sized businesses and veterans groups. It was seen as having two chief wings; one oriented around economic issues and fiercely defending the free market system, the other embracing an old-fashioned nationalism. Consequently the FDP was on the whole considered far more conservative during this period than the CDU/CSU was. Especially its so-called nationalist wing, led by Erich Mende and Hasso von Manteufel, were considered archconservatives and were quite active in defense debates.
Of particular importance to the FDP was the rehabilitation of former soldiers, which in their eyes was a prerequisite for rearmament. Furthermore they made their support of rearmament contingent on West Germany's being treated as an equal partner in any alliance system that it should enter. Further reflecting the conservative character of the FDP at the time, Theodor Heuss, the Federal President and perhaps the party's most widely respected figure, insisted that "general military service was the legitimate child of democracy", and vigorously opposed the introduction of the right to conscientious objection in the constitution.\(^\text{545}\) The FDP Construction Minister in the first Adenauer cabinet, Eberhard Wildermuth, played a major role in establishing contacts between Speidel, Heusinger and other ex-military men and the CDU government, and occasionally he consulted with Adenauer on issues of defense and national security. \(^\text{546}\)

For both economic and national security reasons the FDP also supported Adenauer's policy of integration with the West. At its 1951 party congress in Munich it called for the creation of a European federation with common foreign, defense, economic and financial policies and a European parliament, an idea it repeated at the 1957 congress in Berlin. This they linked to the need to counter the Bolshevik threat.\(^\text{547}\)

At the same time, the FDP included a strong strain in favor of some form of greater distancing from the West. In particular, Rheinhold Maier, head of the FDP-SPD coalition government in
Baden Württemberg, and former diplomat Karl Georg Pfleiderer favored the idea of a reunited and demilitarized Germany, even at the cost of accepting the Soviet Union as the dominant power in Central Europe. Maier was far more favorable towards the Stalin notes of 1952 than Adenauer was, and he led the opposition against the Paris treaties in the Bundesrat. At the same time Pfleiderer gained considerable public attention with a plan for a neutral "little Europe" between the superpowers. And though their influence was in the end limited, they and their supporters succeeded in getting the party to call for greater efforts to ease East-West tensions. Pfleiderer’s plans excited greater influence outside of the party than it did within it. And Maier was placed under enormous pressure from his own party, including the threat of ejection, and eventually allowed the treaty to pass.

On the balance, however, the FDP supported the peace-through-strength position, and on a number of issues, especially internal military ones, was more inclined to adopt conservative policies than even the CDU was. Its power to significantly influence policy, however, was decidedly limited, and at no point could it be considered as taking the initiative in policy making or casting the deciding vote in closely contested decisions. In the future, however, as the balance of power between the two major powers became increasingly narrow, it came to play a pivotal role.

IX. The Bundeswehr
The new military was a very different institution from its predecessors in German history. Politically it was far more powerful than its counterpart in Japan. And many of its officers, while by no means Nazis, were very conservative in their political outlook. A few were known to have had at least some far right connections, though overall those who had such ties were contemptuous of the new army and did not try to influence its development as much.\(^{(548)}\) The main focus of internal debate came to be between the reformers, who pressed for Innere Führung and a new self understanding of the military as a democratic institution, and more conservative officers who emphasized the maintenance of military traditions, including discipline and obedience. During the period under consideration here, clearly the reformers had the upper hand in setting policy, though in practice their initiatives were not, and could not, always be effectively implemented. \(^{(549)}\)

In terms of actual military policy, the influence of former military officers was perhaps greatest at the start of the defense debate when there was a desperate need for their professional expertise to evaluate the potential Soviet military threat and to plan and organize the creation of the new military. Once the basic contours of defense policy had been determined, however, there is little evidence to show that they had any significant influence on decisions outside of strictly internal military ones. And even within the military, the old German tradition of military control over "operational" questions-
including procurement, internal organization and the planning and conduct of military operations (550), was irrevocably dispensed with. While the military continues to have great influence on these kinds of decisions, like the Japan Self Defense Agency the Defense Ministry is now heavily penetrated by civilian bureaucrats and three of its four divisions are run by civilian personnel.(551)

Externally, the influence of the military on the overall society was insignificant, and there were no indications whatsoever that the Bundeswehr was being greeted as a great new national symbol instead of as a necessary evil. While there were veterans organizations, the most important of which was the "Verband Deutscher Soldaten", they for the most part sought to maintain a low profile. The most important political issue for them was the social rehabilitation (Ehrenrettung), which was also as successfully lobbied for by West Germany's most important new leaders, Generals Speidel and Heusinger. (552)

The departure from the past for the military was undoubtedly made a good deal easier in the West German case than in the Japanese due to two key factors. First, the Nazi party had encountered its most serious resistance from within the old military (Wehrmacht) establishment, and indeed one of the chief concerns which had motivated Kielmansegg and the other German military reformers to advocate Innere Führung was the desire to protect the military from any further abuse by political authorities. In this sense Innere Führung was originally as much
a doctrine designed to defend the military man from corrupt military authority as to extend civilian control over the military institution. Second, the new military was a conscript army, which meant that it was subject to greater scrutiny from within than was the case in Japan (553), and it had to adapt itself to make itself more palatable to the civilian population. (554) In the long run this was also, oddly enough, to win greater acceptance of the military by the civilian population, which knew first hand what the conditions within the armed forces were like, and did not fear, as the Japanese continue to do, that the military might be used to undermine democracy. (555)

By the end of 1956 the overall constellation of ideological groupings in West Germany showed that dominant Peace through strength group, which dominated policy making, was a minority within the broader society. While the majority of the CDU/CSU and FDP, some segments of the media, and probably industry as well, supported integration with the West and a policy of peace through strength, these policies were being strongly challenged by the SPD and the Left, with powerful backing from the media, intellectuals and public opinion. Had one held a popular referendum on the question whether it would be better to integrate militarily with the West or push for Four-Power negotiations to reunify the nation and create a collective security system including the Soviet Union, it is likely that during this period the peace-through-strength position would have
lost. Precisely for this reason the CDU/CSU sought to avoid such a referendum. Yet, because other issues, including economic ones, taken together were more important than the national one, and because the SPD and the opposition was divided over the need to respond militarily to the Communist threat, the West German government, under the skilled leadership of Konrad Adenauer, was able to pursue unpopular defense policies. In the years that followed support for those policies would grow. Yet the emotional pull of reunification was to continue to exert a powerful influence on West German politics, and together with changes in U.S. foreign policy it eventually forced a realignment of policy in favor of detente and Ostpolitik.
Analytic Overview: Comparison of Japan 1960 and West Germany 1956

Given the enormous distances, cultural and historical as well as geographical, separating Japan and Germany, the two nations bore an astonishing resemblance to one another. They were similar both in terms of some of the basic conditions they were confronted with and in the kinds of political, ideological and social processes that manifested themselves in the aftermath of war and defeat. They also differed from one another in a number of important respects. These similarities and differences in conditions had an important impact on the development of West German and Japanese political behavior, including their defense and security policies. While many of these similarities and differences in behavior can be perfectly well accounted for using rational actor models, some of the most important differences are more plausibly explained as reflections of the accelerated development of their old political cultures in response to the shocks of WWII and defeat. While undoubtedly the stimulus for adopting new patterns of political behavior came from outside their domestic political systems, their responses to these stimuli were in good measure conditioned by their old political cultures. (556)

The following chart offers a summary of the main points of similarity and difference in both West German and Japanese conditions and behavior.
I. Points of similarity in conditions:
1. Defeat
2. Occupation - demilitarization and democratization
3. Cold War and forced rearmament
4. Economic and military dependency on the U.S.
5. Return to economic prosperity
6. Substitution of Western for traditional Eastern markets (more important in the case of Japan)

II. Differences in conditions:
1. More thorough German defeat and destruction of the old elites
2. Territorial division of the German nation
3. Greater security threat in Western Europe
4. Direct German experience of communist occupation
5. Japanese isolation from its neighbors
6. More German victims of Nazi oppression

III. Points of similarity in behavior
1. Delegitimation of previous regimes (more far-reaching in Germany)
2. Worries about the compatibility of their cultures and traditions with liberal democracy
3. Initial idealism, followed by a longing for stability
4. Emergence of a skeptical generation more concerned with pragmatic issues than ideological ones
5. Conservative ruling parties led by leaders form an older generation

IV. Points of difference in behavior
1. Greater SPD cooperation with rearmament - potential switch
2. No cycle of fait accomplis in Germany
3. Japanese defense taboos (including the constitution)
4. Different lessons of the war - German war guilt versus Japanese paranoia regarding the military
5. German integrationism - with its still unrealized tension between West European versus Atlantic orientations
6. Different ideological constellations

The basic common denominator for Japan and West Germany was course their catastrophic defeats and the creation of new, more democratic institutions under the supervision of basically U.S.-dominated military governments. This resulted in a profound delegitimation of the previous regimes as the peoples of Japan and West Germany scrambled to adopt the new, seemingly superior ways of life being offered by the victorious U.S.. One
consequence of this process was that the intellectual elites of both nations came to be deeply concerned with the compatibility of their cultures and traditions with the new democratic system which they were trying to adopt. In Japan this process of self-doubting was arguably broader and deeper than in Germany, combined as it was with profound doubts about the very ability of an East Asian culture to readily absorb institutions born in very different cultural and historical settings. In contrast, in Germany there were few doubts of this sort, and on balance the Germans remained confident in their ability to compete economically and technologically with other nations. On the other hand, many Germans shared a deep anxiety about the ability of democracy to sustain itself in a society which was decidedly lacking in liberal traditions, a fear reinforced by the apparent survival of the parochial bourgeois society that many intellectuals felt had given birth to Nazism.

There was also a burst of intense and widespread idealism, as reflected by the pan-European movement in Germany and infatuation with the UN in Japan. Many in those two countries sought to transcend the narrow categories of national thinking and thereby demonstrate themselves to be reformed citizens of the international community. Hypernationalism, after decades of being the driving force in Japanese and German politics and society, was at least briefly rejected in favor of transnationalism. This idealism was not confined to the approaches being adopted towards international politics, but also found its expression in domestic
politics in the search for achieving an even more egalitarian and progressive society than the one the U.S. was presenting itself to be. In the immediate post-war years even political groups that were later seen as conservatives, such as Ashida Hitoshi and Ishibashi Tanzan's wing of the LDP in Japan or the CDU under Jakob Kaiser in Germany, looked for socialist alternatives to a pure capitalist market system. And in both countries organized labor and the socialist movement reemerged, more politically potent than ever.

This idealism was spurred on initially by the U.S. Occupation authorities, especially in Japan where some parts of SCAP wished to realize in East Asian settings the New Deal as it never could be realized back in the U.S.. Yet, with the onset of the Cold War there developed growing international (and concomitantly American domestic political) pressure to place the goal of economic reconstruction above denazification, demilitarization and the creation of a more perfect society. Only five short years after the end of World War II, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the original primary mission of the Occupation, demilitarization, was reversed as both countries were pressured by the U.S. to rearm and make military and economic contributions to Western security.

Thus idealism was shelved to meet the more pressing needs of the economy and the security threat of the Cold War. There followed a period of disillusionment (referred to as genmetsu in Japan), especially among intellectuals, and in its wake there
emerged a generation which preferred to concentrate on immediate pragmatic concerns as opposed to the pursuit of higher political ideals. One prominent West German sociologist referred to this age cohort as the "skeptical generation" (die skeptische Generation), and there is evidence that suggests that a similar process took place in Japan. (557)

Instead, Germans and Japanese refocused their energies on economic production and the consumption of material goods, contributing to the tremendous expansion of the German and Japanese economic miracles. This redirection of energies was in part purely pragmatic, as both nations set about the task of digging themselves out of the rubble of the war. And in both economic reconstruction was of paramount concern to government policy makers. At the same time, this behavior may have had deeper, psychological roots as well. For some, the delegitimation of the old social and political order justified blind self aggrandizement and the pursuit of material welfare. For others, having been defeated in one area of endeavour, military expansion, they became determined to redeem themselves in another economic sphere. To this new endeavor they brought all the vigor and discipline which before had been devoted to martial pursuits. For both sorts, for those who now rejected social responsibility, and for those who found a new outlet for it, the experience of defeat lent a new fervency.

With such a strong internal drive for economic expansion, and in an environment of international free trade sponsored by
the U.S. (which then generated close to 50% of the global GNP), Japan and West Germany's economies flourished. At the same time, a longing for political and economic stability encouraged the establishment of moderate right-of-center governments who promised to pursue free market policies which by the early 50s were showing themselves capable of meeting the material expectations of the majority of the population.

Thus, though challenged by the socialist and labor union movements, both the LDP and the CDU/CSU were able to maintain a secure hold on the reins of power. In this task they were helped in no small measure by the U.S., which allowed Adenauer and Yoshida to reap the political rewards of restoring sovereignty and attracting generous foreign aid programs. The conservatives in both countries were also strongly supported by domestic business interests, which were alarmed by the socialists' economic platforms and who increasingly recognized that their economic interests lay in integrating with the industrial West and forgoing the benefits of trade with other traditional markets in Eastern Europe (for Germany) and in mainland Asia (for Japan).

At the same time there were a number of important differences in the initial conditions confronting Japan and West Germany which explain some of the differences in how they behaved. The first of these was the much more complete defeat of Germany and the correspondingly greater destruction and discrediting of its former political elites. While many Nazis may have physically survived the war, the party had ceased to exist.
In addition, because there had been more internal victims of Nazi persecution there was also a larger domestic constituency dedicated to rooting them out. This helped make it impossible for anyone with a known Nazi past to hold important political office.

Likewise, because of the division of the nation much of the old German political elite was effectively cut off from West German politics by the Iron Curtain. Regionally-based Catholic and Social Democratic political elites were thus for the first time given a free hand to reshape the nation without the influence of the traditional center of German politics in Berlin.

In Japan, in contrast, the old political elite, with the crucial exceptions of the old military and the Home Ministry, survived the war and the Occupation relatively intact. And while that elite's thinking had changed considerably as a result of the experiences of war and defeat, it still pursued a political agenda that at times threatened to depart significantly from the liberal policies implemented under the U.S. Occupation. This increased political polarization in Japan and made cooperation between the different political parties even more difficult than in West Germany.

Furthermore, in West Germany the division of the nation made the Social Democratic opposition far more suspicious of Communism than was the case with the relatively naive and inward-looking Japanese Left. And the security threat posed by the Soviet Union, as underlined by the Berlin blockade and bloody suppression of the workers' rebellion in East Germany, made many West German
Social Democrats far more ready to recognize the need for rearmament than they otherwise might have been. Not accidentally one of the main streams within the SPD contributing to the reversal of the party’s stance on NATO was to come out of West Berlin. (558)

At the same time, the emotional appeal of reunification blurred ideological boundaries in West Germany, and many potential conservatives as well as those on the Left were drawn to seek solutions which would enable a speedy reuniting of the nation. This made the peace movement in West Germany far stronger and sustained than its counterpart in Japan. In Japan popular demonstrations reached critical proportions only in 1960 when there was widespread popular perception that the Kishi government was threatening to overturn the post-war political order.

Because of this greater (if grudging) cooperativeness of the socialist opposition, there did not develop in West Germany the phenomenon of defense policy progressing by means of an accumulation of faits accompli, as there existed in Japan. Though the secretiveness surrounding much of early West German defense planning, and the reversal of government policy on NATO in 1954 certainly might have provided fertile ground in which a similar cycle could have grown, because the opposition was deliberately kept abreast of government thinking and actively participated in some of the most crucial items of legislation, West Germany was able to escape the lingering distrust of the armed forces which continues to complicate Japanese defense planning today. Thus in
West Germany defense and security policy planning was able to proceed on a far more rational basis than in Japan, though in both there were times when nonrational elements threatened to dominate the policy debate. In contrast, because of this fundamental suspicion that the Japanese conservatives were trying to use defense policy as a vehicle for achieving other domestic political goals (such as the revision of the constitution), in Japan there developed a growing network of defense "taboos"; self-imposed limitations on defense policy designed to allay popular fears that the military might grow too large and begin once again to undermine peace and democracy, as it had in the 1920s and 1930s.

One additional important difference was Japan's relative isolation in Asia as opposed to West Germany's position in relationship to the rest of Western Europe. This made economic integration more of an attractive option for West Germany than Japan, which was surrounded by economies at a far lower level of development and with very different economic interests. This also served to make Japan's economic dependence on the U.S. that much more total than West Germany's, and consequently its bilateral relationship with the U.S. became to be by far its most important external relationship. (559)

At the same time, while these similarities and differences in the conditions in which West Germany and Japan found themselves go a long way towards explaining their behavior, certain differences can be best explained through reference to
their very different historical experiences. In other words, we can understand them better by taking into account Japan and West Germany's collective memories of the past (the central element of any historical political culture). These memories, even though they in many cases they had become negative ones, continued to guide and inform German and Japanese behavior in the post-war period.

The most important example of this can be seen in the very different lessons the two nations drew from the war. In West Germany there developed a tremendous, if temporarily suppressed sense of guilt over the atrocities committed in the name of the German nation by the Nazis. The extreme nationalism of the Third Reich, and by extension the exaggerated nationalism of the Wilhelmine era widely seen as its precursor, came to be associated with Auschwitz and the Holocaust. Legitimation of foreign, and especially military policies using nationalist categories thus became extremely problematic because of the associations they inevitably conjured up in the popular imagination. Foreign policy based on the politics of national interest thus became discredited in the land which had given birth to the science of Realpolitik. (560) In addition, it was this sense of moral guilt over the policies of the old regime, even more than the extent of German military defeat and the presence of countless victims of those policies within Germany, which made it impossible for former Nazis to become important public figures. (561)
In comparison, in Japan the sense of guilt was far more limited than in West Germany, partly because of the different nature of Japanese atrocities and war-time objectives, and partly because of very different cultural patterns of dealing with the problems of moral culpability and contrition. Popular outrage over the war tended to focus much more on the suffering that had been inflicted on the Japanese people, as opposed to the suffering that they had inflicted upon others. And blame for the war was almost wholly assigned to the military institution. One perhaps counterintuitive consequence of this was that while this enabled the Japanese people to escape the sometimes debilitating burden of the past which has weighed down the West Germans, and it has thus made the expression of nationalism much easier for Japanese than for Germans, it has also made the Japanese antipathy towards the military as an institution all the stronger.

While patriotism in Japan did not escape unscathed, as reflected by the long prohibition on the use of nationalist symbols like the Japanese flag and the national anthem in schools and at other public affairs, Japanese anti-nationalist sentiments were far weaker than Germany’s. The one important change to Japanese nationalism that emerged was the prohibition against linking Shintoism and the institution of the Emperor with the state and state policies, especially military ones. Other forms of nationalism, however, were not comparably impeded.

A second important result of these differences in Japanese
and West German historical-political cultures was that West German anti-nationalism greatly facilitated the process of integration with the West, both internally and externally. Internally it made it easier for West Germany to compromise its sovereignty than was the case for other major European nations such as Britain and France. Integration with other Western nations provided a means of proving that West Germany had been reformed, that it was rid of its nationalist demon which had terrified Europe in the past. And integration reinforced this anti-nationalist message with concrete material benefits in the form of increased trade and economic cooperation. Integration also offered a way of legitimating the new defense policies in a domestically more palatable way than merely saying that the U.S. insisted upon them, as the Japanese government was frequently forced to do. Externally, anti-nationalism and war guilt facilitated integration by reducing neighboring countries' distrust of West Germany and by easing the difficult task of reconciliation with former traditional enemies such as France. Here again the contrast with Japan, which continues to be the object of fear and dislike in the rest of Asia, is quite remarkable.

A third difference attributable to their differing historical experiences was the very distinct ideological constellations which emerged in Japan and West Germany in the wake of defeat. The ideological divide in Japan revolved around the core question of tradition versus modernity, reflecting a
debate which can be traced back to the days when Commodore Perry opened Japan. In West Germany, on the other hand, the central question was the position the nation occupied relative to the East and the West, though in Japan as well there were quite similar concerns over whether Japan should see its interests as having more in common with the rest of Asia as opposed to the U.S.. Nonetheless, the issue of the regional polarity of its interest was subordinate to the more overarching concern of whether Japanese culture could and to what degree should make the transition to (Western-style) modernity.

These differences in their historical political cultures had important consequences for the development of their defense policies. Differences which were thoroughly equal in importance to the differences born of non-cultural factors and which continue to be relevant (as we shall see later) to the development of defense policy today.

The defense and security policies adopted by the two countries were quite similar in their broad outlines: a relatively moderate build up of military forces, a close alliance with the U.S. and near total reliance on American nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence. The most important difference between them was the multilateral nature of West Germany's membership in NATO, as opposed to Japan's strictly bilateral relationship with the U.S.. Yet, the internal dynamics of the political process which produced these policies, and consequently the way these policies were perceived domestically, differed fundamentally.
In both countries the new military establishments tended to be viewed as necessary evils by the majority of their political elites and by their broader publics. But in West Germany it was possible to portray the new defense policies in a basically more favorable light, as a contribution to supranational Western Defense and an important step towards national rehabilitation, while in Japan, though similar arguments were made by the Right, they did not find the same domestic resonance that they did in Germany. Instead, defense was seen in a more negative light, as appeasement of the U.S. and as a policy favored by the political conservatives for their own purposes, rather than as a means of meeting genuine national needs.

Despite these differences in the specific contents of their political-military cultures, their impact on the international system was quite similar. Both Japan and West Germany assumed a low profile in the international politics, preferring to follow the lead of other nations in foreign and security policies. While their ability for independent action was quite circumscribed at the time, in the long-run these policies removed two of the primary potential sources of military tensions in East Asia and Western Europe.

At the same time, these policies, and the political military cultures which were evolving to support them, were challenged domestically. In West Germany the challenge came from the Left and a large, well-organized peace movement, which advocated the adoption of a policy of neutrality and a substitution of
collective security for German military efforts. In Japan the challenge came most visibly from the Left as well, which wanted to pursue an even more radical policy of unarmed neutrality. In addition there was another more subtle, but perhaps even more powerful challenge from the political Right, which wished to restore Japan to the status of a military great power.

The policies instituted by Yoshida and Adenauer initially at least had relatively narrow bases of domestic political support. For much of the period, public opinion polls seemed to show that a majority of the West German population would have preferred the reunification of a neutral West Germany to integration in NATO, and the active pursuit of economic integration with the West owes much to the personalities of Konrad Adenauer and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. In Japan the dominant wing of the LDP in the second half of the 1950s, with strong support from industry, was in favor of much closer military integration with the U.S., the creation of a stronger military and a concomitant modification of the domestic political order (beginning with constitutional revision).

If we return to the theoretical models for explaining defense policy formation described at the beginning of this inquiry, it is possible to make a number of observations from the perspective of 1960. First, there was little firm evidence supporting the anthropological-cultural view that martial behavior is an intrinsic characteristic of German and Japanese societies. During this initial period there seems to have been a
significant departure from previous German and Japanese views of the military institution and its role in society. While especially in Japan there were elements which might have wished a reversion to previous patterns, these groups were unable to achieve their aims in the face of widespread popular disillusionment with and antipathy to the military. Yet, this did not rule out the possibility of an eventual reemergence of the old political-military cultures. Clearly there were signs in both countries of a "traumatization" process which might have caused the martial aspects of the culture to have gone into a temporary eclipse. And while much had changed, the basic fabric of society was not as much changed as the legend of the "zero hour" pretended. In Japan this high degree of continuity is readily evident, but even in Germany, where the traumatization of the war was even greater than in Japan, there remained at least a residual current within the electorate open to far-right ideas (at least about 10%). Even during the Occupation a shockingly high percentage of those surveyed indicated that they thought that National Socialism had been a good idea that had turned wrong, and the vast majority of the adult population was in favor of restoring German borders to where they had been in 1938, i.e. retaking the territory that had been annexed by Poland and the U.S.S.R.. A full sixth of the population (10 out of 60 million) came from those eastern regions, and even the Rhinelander Adenauer reportedly believed that eventually those territories should be returned. The German national dream, while submerged,
was far from dead, and potentially could have led to a new cycle of conflict in Central Europe were it not for the restraining influence of the Cold War. Thus, while there was no evidence pointing to a reemergence of martial traditions, it was too early to rule out its happening eventually.

The realist IR model provides a fairly plausible explanation for developments up to 1960. West German and Japanese rearmament and alignment with the U.S. was clearly the sort of balancing action needed to counter the Soviet military threat. The promise to forgo the acquisition of their own weapons of mass destruction likewise was a necessary step to hold together their alliances (though Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauss were to actively pursue at least some German control over, if not outright acquisition of nuclear weapons). And the reluctance to do more can be largely explained as a classical example of the "free rider" phenomenon. Why should Japan and West Germany contribute more militarily when the international security order was being largely underwritten at U.S. expense? The provision of a minimal contribution to prevent an isolationist reaction in the U.S. while devoting national resources to the task of economic development was, at least from the perspective of today, to prove the far wiser policy.

And likewise, West German and Japanese behavior clearly fits into those IR theories stressing the growth of interdependence and international regimes. While these processes were not as well established in 1960 as they would be in 1990, Japan and Germany,
with their enormous dependance on imports of raw materials and the general importance of international trade to their economies, were logically the major industrial nations where the adapting of foreign policy to meet the new exigencies of global interdependence might be expected to emerge first. While acceptance of this new international relations paradigm was initially forced upon Japan and West Germany, it proved to be highly successful and they soon came to realize the great benefits which could be derived from it. Ironically they thus were ahead of the victor nations in adapting to the new international system, and became what one scholar has called the first major "Trading States" of the modern era.\(^{564}\) Here it should be interjected, however, that the dominant political elites were at the time unsure that this indeed was the direction the world was heading.

Also there was some evidence for the notion that through the institutionalization of new doctrines of civil-military relations and democratic control of the military the specter of the particularistic interests of the military establishment dominating defense policy had, at least for the moment, been effectively banished. In West Germany these reforms had been especially thoroughly implemented, while in Japan similar effects were achieved by restraining the growth of the new military institution. Likewise, pressures for a military-industrial complex had indeed emerged, at least in Japan. But these pressures had been successfully stifled by a combination of
government policy and the enormous success of the civilian economy. At the same time, as long as Japan and West Germany were primarily dependent on the U.S. for their security, their new defense establishments had arguably not yet reached the critical mass where particularistic interests could really take over.\(^{565}\)

Nonetheless, the realist approach, while providing an adequate and parsimonious explanation of the actual policies which were adopted, and to a certain extent even explaining some of the domestic dynamics involved, does not fully explain the political process out of which that policy emerged. While rational calculations of the defense needs along the lines described above did indeed play an important role in those debates, so did reference to the ideals and values supplied by the new political-military cultures (such as defense of Western civilization or Japan's commitment to peace). And the lessons of the recent past played an important role in guiding the new policies which were adopted. That these policies were also consistent with the new conditions which obtained during this period is perfectly rational. But they were not necessarily adopted for reasons of ensuring national security alone. So, for example, Japanese Right Idealists supported rearmament in part because of a belief in the importance of the military to national sovereignty, as well as the need to meet the Soviet threat. And the West German government's enthusiasm for military integration with the West stemmed at least in part from Adenauer's and part of the CDU's belief that this would further broader economic and
political integration needed to strengthen West German democracy. Likewise the domestic opposition to those policies was in part motivated by non-rational (but not irrational) ideas and sentiments. Thus various issues came to be fused together to create new political-military cultures. Eventually they began to take on a dynamic of their own, and as we shall see later on, began to influence defense policy as well to go in directions which were no longer in total agreement with what strictly rationalist models of state behavior would predict.
The Introspective Phase

Chapter 8 - The Long Divide - Japan, 1960 to 1976

During the introspective phase in Japan there were fewer fierce battles over security policy than there had been in the 1950s. Nonetheless there were a number of important debates which further strengthened Japan's new political-military culture. Three events in particular deserve special attention: the Three Arrows incident, the intensification of the debate over "independent defense" in connection with the return of Okinawa, and the further codification of Japan's defense policies with the passage of the Basic National Defense Policy Outline.

The Three Arrows Incident (566)

The so-called Three Arrows incident (Mitsuya Kenkyuu Jiken) of 1965 was the first, and in many ways the most important, of a series of decisions during the Sato Eisaku's Prime Ministership which led to the further growth of an entire complex of defense "taboos", including restrictions on defense planning, weapons exports, and a reaffirmation and dramatic expansion of Japan's policy to forego acquiring nuclear weapons. These taboos served to greatly hamper future Japanese government efforts to launch new defense initiatives.

The Three Arrows incident burst on the national political scene in February 1965 when opposition Diet members sprang upon an unsuspecting Prime Minister Sato a series of questions concerning top secret defense plans (called the "Three Arrows Plan" (567)) regarding emergency measures to be undertaken in
case war broke out on the Korean peninsula. Such planning had begun already a decade ago \(^{(568)}\), and probably in any other country would have been considered standard procedure.\(^{(569)}\) Nonetheless, in Japan planning of this nature evoked memories of the military's campaign to undermine civilian government and triggered a strong negative response.

The controversy was sparked on February 10 in the Budget Committee of the Lower House when Socialist Diet Member Okada Haruo revealed the existence of the then secret plans for coping with a military emergency to a surprised Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, who was apparently completely unaware that such research had been conducted. Sato was further shocked and embarrassed when SDF representatives admitted that such plans did indeed exist. The Diet was plunged into an uproar as the stunned Prime Minister said he bore responsibility and would look into the matter. Okada then began to read to the Diet portions of the plans, which had been leaked to him,\(^{(570)}\) focusing in particular on the section regarding emergency laws giving the military authority to act without waiting for Diet approval.\(^{(571)}\)

After the uproar Sato and Director General Kozumi promised to investigate the matter fully. At first the LDP offered to destroy the plans completely in order to appease the Opposition, but the JSP, determined to obtain maximum revelation, insisted instead that the Government make them public. A special committee was created to examine the main (but by no means all) documents. It was made up of 13 members, including 8 from the LDP, 4 from
the JSP and 1 from the DSP.\(^{572}\)

The plans had been prepared in 1963 by a 84 SDF officers and JDA officials under the direction of General Tanaka Yoshio (who had been attached to the old Imperial Army staff during WW II) in 1963. \(^{573}\) They envisioned seven scenarios of increasing levels of military threat to Japan following an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. They dealt with a host of technical and strategic problems which might emerge in such a situation, and it covered seven general areas, including emergency laws, internal security, foreign relations and economic problems. Some of the more controversial aspects that were reportedly covered in them included procedures for the coordination of military efforts by U.S. and Japanese forces, provisions for the surveillance and possible arrest of subversive elements (especially Koreans living in Japan), the use of SDF units to suppress internal disorders, emergency financial measures, the possible institutionalization of a draft and rules of engagement which would allow Self Defense Forces attacked by hostile forces to fire back without waiting for Diet approval.\(^{574}\)

After Okada's revelations, the press was filled with editorials warning that the military was out of control and speculating that the plans were indeed, as the Socialists claimed, a prelude to a coup d'état. Especially the Asahi and Mainichi newspapers were concerned that the military might once again, as it did in the 1920s and 30s, use external security threats as a means of undermining civilian authority. Within a
few days, however, these fears subsided as it became evident that
a coup attempt was neither imminent not very likely. An effort
was made by intellectuals to organize mass demonstrations, but
the turn for a February 25 rally of "people of all classes" in
Tokyo was so disappointing that these efforts were
abandoned.(575)
Without popular pressure or further leaks the LDP and the Defense
Agency were able to prevent the opposition from further
capitalizing on the issue.
Initially at least, Sato and many others in the LDP as well
were apparently deeply unsettled by the plans and felt that the
SDF had gone too far.(576) However, once the plans had been
examined, the majority seemed to conclude that there was nothing
wrong with the plans' contents in and of themselves, and indeed
such plans were necessary. Indeed, many conservatives in the LDP
came to the conclusion that what was needed was tighter control
of information in the Japan Defense Agency, and they began to
campaign for the creation of an anti-spy law.(577) Sato, however,
while admitting that such planning was necessary, expressed
concern that it had been kept secret and instructed that
henceforth such planning had to be made public and authorized by
the proper political authorities.(578)
In May the investigating committee in its final report for
the most part accepted the JDA's defense (579) that the plans had
been conducted merely as an hypothetical training exercise and
that the military had had no intention of circumventing civilian
authority.\(^{(580)}\) The Committee admitted, however, that the Agency had gone too far in its speculations, and that in the future the Inspector General would exercise greater caution in order to avoid further such "misunderstandings". \(^{(581)}\) The report indicated that there was a consensus among the committee members that a major cause of the problem was a general lack of interest in defense questions on the part of the larger population. To remedy this problem it recommended raising defense consciousness and to create a standing Diet committee on military affairs to provide a forum for discussing defense issues.\(^{(582)}\)

After the report appeared, interest in the affair largely subsided. In September altogether 26 members of the SDF were punished for failure to guard internal information, only one of those seriously. General Tanaka, who had overseen the planning, retired a few months later, apparently for reasons having nothing to do with the Three Arrows incident. \(^{(583)}\) Plans for the establishment of a standing committee on military affairs fell by the way side, primarily because the parties remained too far apart to allow any effective coordination. \(^{(584)}\)

But on another different level, the incident was to have a profound significance long after the controversy over the Three Arrows Plan faded from public memory. While in the rest of the world, including West Germany, provisions for dealing with military emergencies and guarding against espionage continued to be considered routine, in Japan alone such planning became a strict taboo. For the next 15 years the SDF was unable to make
any further progress on this front, placing it in the rather unique position of being unable to plan for its own use.

The Three Arrows incident marked the beginning of a series of ever more detailed taboos designed to restrict the growth of the military establishment, including further restrictions placed upon arms exports (585) and on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. (586) These taboos were the product of the new constellation of political forces which had emerged after 1960. With the conservative government leery of further confrontations and primarily focused on economic matters, the opposition was able to win concessions on defense and security issues. In a sense these taboos can be viewed as a sort of tacit social contract between the conservative government and a broader spectrum of society that exchanges toleration of the armed forces for promises to contain their growth and activities. The need for such taboos can be traced to the continued deep, distrust of the military in the context of Japan's new political-military culture. A distrust which was held not only by the left-wing opposition, but by the center as well. While Sato and other centrist leaders did not appear to believe that a coup attempt was imminent, they did worry about the dangers which could potentially emerge out of this type of secret planning. Moreover, the costs of political embarrassment outweighed the benefits of increased Self Defense Force efficiency, reflecting once again the mentality that the new armed force's primary mission was not so much enhancing national security as satisfying alliance
expectations. The Three Arrows incident thus was both the product of Japan's anti-military culture, and helped deepen its anti-military animus.

Okinawa, Nakasone and Japanese Gaullism (587)

In the late 1960s various factors, both international and domestic, came together to rekindle the defense debate. Among the international factors were the relaxation of East-West tensions, the Vietnam war, the appearance of Gaullism in Western Europe, the worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and China and a growing perception of American decline. Internal factors included the culmination of the long Japanese political campaign to regain Okinawa, increased self confidence as Japan came to be acknowledged as the world's third largest economy, anticipation of renewed riots as the Mutual Security Treaty came up for extension in 1970, and planning for the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (Yoshibo). Right Idealists within the LDP, led by Nakasone Yasuhiro, seized upon this confluence of factors to try to effect a major redefinition of the mission of the armed forces and with it a revitalization of national defense consciousness. Nakasone and other Right Idealists in the LDP and Zaikai advocated the adoption of Jishuboei, or an independent defense posture. While Jishuboei had been an official goal of Japanese policy since 1957, (588) and generally referred to increased Japanese burden
sharing, the policies advocated by Nakasone appeared threatening to many, including more Centrist members of the LDP, leading to their rejection of Jishuboei in 1970. Ironically, the movement to establish a more independent Japanese defense policy ultimately led to the adoption of a far more moderate defense philosophy and laid the groundwork for a new consensus on the security issue based on the Yoshida doctrine and greater reliance on the U.S..

The initial impetus to this new defense debate came from Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's decision to make the reversion of Okinawa the chief objective of his Prime Ministership.\(^{589}\) Sato was determined to prevent the Okinawan issue from being exploited by Japanese opposition forces to stoke the passions of anti-U.S. nationalism. He, like most conservative leaders of the time, was convinced that 1970 would prove to be a critical year in post-war political history, for the JSP hoped to use the scheduled renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty as a rallying point for renewed mass demonstrations which this time they hoped would finally bring down the LDP.\(^{590}\) In addition Sato hoped to make his mark in Japanese history as the first Prime Minister to reunite the country, thus achieving the goal which had eluded both his political mentor (Yoshida) and his half-brother (Kishi). \(^{591}\)

Negotiations began following Sato's visit to the U.S. in 1967.\(^{592}\) Sato realized that it was vital to the success of these negotiations that Japan be perceived by the U.S. as being forthcoming on the defense issue. To this end he and General Secretary of the LDP, Fukuda Takeo (heir apparent to the Kishi
faction), launched a campaign to change national attitudes towards defense and reduce popular antipathy towards a more active security role in East Asia. (593)

Sato was evidently especially concerned that the U.S. would not be willing to forego its nuclear weapons in Okinawa. After his return from the U.S. in December, 1967 he and Fukuda launched a campaign urging the Japanese people to develop a greater understanding of nuclear weapons and rid themselves of Japan's emotional "nuclear allergy". (594) At the same time the entire complex of issues associated in the context of Japan's political-military culture with a more active stance on defense came to the fore. The LDP began to take not only a more conservative position on defense, but also on various other domestic questions. For instance Education Minister Nadao Hirokichi stressed the importance of increasing defense consciousness and incorporating lessons on national security in revised primary school syllabi. A few weeks later, in January 1968 he spoke of planned alterations to school textbooks which would emphasize the good aspects of the nation's past and increase Japanese children's sense of self confidence. (595) That same month the draft of the LDP's new Action Policy program was produced. It placed a heavy emphasis on the decline of public order and the deterioration of innate features of the Japanese nation, a decline it claimed sprang from the post-war education system and left-wing propaganda. It called for a rejuvenation of the national spirit based on the five pillars of "human love", "public spirit", "love of homeland", 
"national spirit" and "defensive consciousness", while emphasizing support of the democratic order. (596)

As part of the new mood, Sato reorganized his cabinet, giving important posts to those factions which might be won over to increased defense efforts while excluding others which were likely to be the most uncooperative. (597) Sato's campaign, however, was to prove more difficult than he had anticipated. U.S. reverses in Vietnam following the Tet offensive (which were hailed even by many conservatives) turned the mood within the party against him. And a series of incidents involving U.S. forces in Japan further solidified Japanese public opinion both against the U.S. military presence. (598) A coalition formed between LDP conservatives and the left-wing of the party which forced Sato to bring the dissidents back into the cabinet and to weaken his earlier readiness to accept American demands that it continue to be allowed to freely use its Okinawan bases. (599) Finally in November, 1969 the U.S. and Japan reached a compromise on the return of the island. (600)

Yet, despite Sato's acceptance of what was in essence a moderate, anti-military stance on the return of Okinawa, the push for Jishuboei continued unabated, pushed on by conservatives within the party and by big business interests. Nakasone emerged as the leader of those calling for a more independent defense and fostering Japan's defense consciousness. In addition to pro-defense LDP members (601) Nakasone had strong support from the Japanese business world, which had long been pushing for
increased domestic production as one of the chief goals of the Fourth Defense Buildup plan and was concerned with maintaining internal order. The conclusions of the Nikkeiren (Japanese employer's organization) Summer seminar in 1969 included passages calling for reexamination of the Mutual Security Treaty, the development of civilian nuclear power so that Japan had a nuclear weapon's option and increasing defense spending to 1.5% of the GNP. (602)

In January, 1970 Nakasone was made Director General of the Self Defense Forces. (603) Nakasone had long wished to revitalize the defense debate, and as head of the Defense Agency he was in the perfect position to do so. Nakasone was convinced that the main factor inhibiting the articulation of Japanese defense and national consciousness was attributable to obstacles at the elite level, among politicians and in the education establishment, rather than at the popular level. (604) Crucial to stimulating such consciousness was a greater Japanese role in providing for its own defense. To this end he called for a revision of the Basic Principles of National Defense, which had defined the mission of the Self Defense Forces since 1957, so that the primary emphasis would be placed on Japan's own military for maintaining national security, as opposed to relying primarily on the U.S..(605)

To help promote greater public understanding of the defense issue, Nakasone also pushed through the publication of a defense White Paper, which for the first time provided for popular
within the government, other than form the Finance Ministry which wanted to keep defense spending down as much as possible. On a symbolic level, however, the kind of major redefinition of the mission of the armed forces, and indeed of the role that the military should play in Japanese society was proposing represented a challenge to the way Centrist governments had approached defense in the post-War. His exuberant, patriotic stance began to alarm not only foreign and Japanese left-wing political observers (611), but also concerned others within the LDP and the government. (612) Strong resistance began to emerge from within the LDP as well as from within the Foreign Ministry and even the JDA. In addition to consternation over the negative overseas reaction, there were also widespread fears that once the definition of the SDF's mission was expanded there might be no end to the increase in military spending. (613)

In June, 1970 the Mutual Security Treaty was automatically extended without any debate in the Diet and with less public disorder than had been anticipated.(614) With both the Treaty and Okinawan issues settled, internal pressure to take a hard-line on defense subsided. In a meeting on the 15th of July the LDP leadership, including Secretary General of the LDP Tanaka Kakuei, Finance Minister Fukuda and LDP Vice President Kawashima, clamped down on Nakasone and forced him to abandon his planned revision of the 1957 Basic Principles. (615)

In November the LDP Security Research Council published q "new vision" for national defense, stressing that the Mutual
Security Treaty would continue to be the main pillar supporting Japanese defense and the SDF would remain in a secondary position. In this way the LDP terminated debate on a new mission for the SDF and put off indefinitely the goal of establishing a truly more independent defense posture. (616) In 1972 the Fourth Defense Plan was finally passed, after some delay as a result of opposition tactics and the oil crisis, but in greatly reduced form and without any trace of Nakasone's ideas. (617)

With it were passed various measures designed to increase civilian control as well as promises to establish concrete limits on defense growth. (618) The late 60s drive for Jishuboei, after much excitement, had passed almost without a trace.

The debate over Okinawa and Jishuboei are interesting, however, for what they reveal about the dynamics of Japan's political-military culture. Sato had been forced to take a more active position on the defense issue because in order to regain Okinawa (and thus regain control of the nationalist issue for the conservatives) he needed to convince the U.S. that Japan was not a free rider and was ready to become more serious about defense. The moment that he chose to seize on the defense and nationalism issues, however, he also found himself in alliance with Right-Idealist forces within the LDP which had been largely dormant since 1960. At the same time, increased responsibility and the need to win broader support for their views led to moderation on the part of chief Right-Idealist leaders. Though Nakasone was considered a Gaullist for his advocacy of an independent defense
stance, like Kishi he was at the same time pushing for a closer military alliance with the U.S. based on what he considered a rational calculation of national interests. He found substantial support in the business world as well as within the party. Nakasone's moderation of his views did not go far enough. and his continued efforts to change the fundamental Japanese approach to defense ran afoul of the Centrist mainstream in the party, which in the end put a stop to his efforts once the need for tough policies on defense had passed. At the same time, a new Centrist approach to encouraging the defense debate began to develop, one which adhered much more closely to the Yoshida doctrine and which eventually led to the emergence of a broader, albeit still highly limited, consensus on defense and security.

The Limited Consensus - Taiko and the 1% barrier (619)

After the late-60s campaign to launch a more assertive, self-reliant Japanese defense policy had been rejected, there still remained the monumental task of redefining the existing policies so that they enjoyed greater popular legitimacy and met the exigencies of a changing international environment. Two key events during the first half of the 1970s, the reconciliation of the U.S. and Communist China and the weakened U.S. commitment to East Asia in the wake of the Vietnam war, both eased the domestic sources of resistance to such a development, while at the same time providing the conservative Japanese leadership with a strong
motive to pursue this goal. The new, tacit consensus on defense which slowly emerged during the first half of the 1970s remained a reaffirmation and elaboration of the Yoshida doctrine rather than a departure from it. And though it helped create a new, more positive political atmosphere in which defense policy could be debated and policy initiatives could be taken, at the same time it reasserted and even strengthened the basic limitations placed upon the mission of the SDF. In this way the new post-war Japanese political-military culture which had been established in the 50s, rather than transformed by the increasingly multi-polar world of the detente era, was to emerge from the mid-1970s in a reinvigorated and more clearly articulated form than before.

Kubo Takuya, a prominent member of the JDA, presented the intellectual underpinnings of the new Centrist defense philosophy in a seminal 1971 memorandum. It stressed the improbability of a large-scale war, the need to devise a defensive strategy which made use of military as well as non-military means and underlined the importance of creating a defense system acceptable to the general populace. It presented the concept of a "standard defense force" (Kibantekiboeiryoku) as the organizing concept for Japanese force planning. The basis of this "standard defense force" would be a relatively small, modern and well-equipped, well-trained military acceptable to the Japanese people and capable of expanding to meet any future security needs. Its basic mission would be to withstand a limited invasion by its own force, and rely on assistance from the U.S. to meet larger
military threats. In this connection (and in subsequent writings by Kubo) a number of central points were made. 1) it is difficult to conceive of a direct threat to Japan; 2) hence it is possible to place a limit of approximately 1% on defense expenditures; 3) it is next to impossible to maintain military forces capable of dealing with all possible future threats to Japan's safety; 4) it is improbable that Japan can maintain forces capable of meeting the need of a full war (Yushoboeiryoku) 5) even if it were possible, it would be unbalanced without popular support and the other necessary aspects of basic national defense (civil defense, emergency laws, etc.). (620) Kubo also revealed a keen understanding of the continuing importance of the Mutual Security Treaty and the key role it played in allaying both foreign and domestic fears that Japan might embark upon a course of aggressive military expansion. Kubo felt it would be necessary to further intensify cooperation with the U.S. on all levels, including, but not only, on defense and security issues. (621)

The first attempt to implement this conception came in 1972 under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who was trying to improve ties with the PRC and win the support of the LDP doves. (622) Though Tanaka was supported by MOF and most of the LDP, he was stymied by LDP conservatives, the SDF and a united opposition, which felt accepting the plan would be tantamount to recognition of the SDF. (623)

Still Kubo did not give up, and he continued building his support basis within the JDA, to the point where in April, 1974
the Agency announced it was abandoning the principle of force planning based on possible military threats (shoyoboei).\(^{(624)}\)

That year the seemingly all-powerful Tanaka was forced to step down as the result of revelations of corrupt financial practices. In July 1974 the opposition parties made major electoral gains, achieving approximate parity with the LDP in the upper house. The LDP was thrown into a state of confusion as the opposition forces appeared to move closer to their goal of wresting power from the conservatives. In this environment of political turmoil, the dovish Miki Takeo unexpectedly became Prime Minister.

The new Director General was Sakata Michio, a politically powerful figure within the LDP. Sakata took up Kubo's ideas and embarked upon a campaign to push through a new defense plan able to win broader public support. Central to this program was the establishment of a special civilian advisory committee, the "Research Group on Defense" (Boei o Kangaserukai), under the direction of Kyoto University Professor of International Relations, Kosaka Masataka, to study peace and national security and devise a new approach to dealing with these problems.\(^{(625)}\) Sakata also entered into discussion with the U.S. designed to significantly expand cooperation in the defense field between the two nations.\(^{(626)}\)

The advisory group largely adopted Kubo's thinking and the report it presented to Sakata in September 1976 clearly bore his intellectual mark.\(^{(627)}\) The report reaffirmed Japan's basic restrictions on defense, advocated the adoption of a 1% limit on
defense expenditures and argued that defense planning should not try to meet all possible contingencies since doing so would cause anxiety in neighboring countries and lead to regional instability. (628) It also called for greater U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation in the case of war and was highly critical of Japanese public opinion, which it accused of suffering from a sort of "pacifist confusion" (Heiwaboke), which it attributed to Japan's geographical position as an island removed from the mainland and the widespread belief that Japan would be best off if it surrendered in the face of a superpower invasion. (629)

Sakata also had a new defense White Paper published which further promoted the new defense policy. It advocated moving from defense planning aimed at developing denial capability to force structures maximizing deterrence and damage limitation. (630) The White Paper also replaced the Nakasone White Paper's many references to maintaining internal security with a new emphasis on expanding the SDF's disaster relief operations, a function which opinion polls showed enjoyed widespread public support. (631)

The new emphasis on closer defense ties to the U.S. was in many ways a logical extension of this acceptance of the limits of what Japanese armed forces could do on their own. Moreover, as Kubo and Sakata both emphasized, it relieved domestic and international fears that Japan might become a great military power. A further, more hidden motive was to counter the threat of a complete U.S. withdrawal from East Asia as a result of its
defeat in Vietnam and a general decline in its sense of global mission. (632) This particular initiative, however, proved a bit premature, and much of the defense debate in 1975 was dominated by a seesaw battle over this issue. (633)

One aspect of both the White Paper and the subsequent Defense Policy Outline whose importance cannot be overemphasized was the new evaluation of the PRC as not only no longer part of a monolithic Communist threat, but as a strategic asset which could be counted on to draw off Soviet forces stationed in the Far East. This new attitude towards Communist China helped soften popular and left-wing JSP opposition to the SDF and the defense relationship with the U.S. Sakata is reported to have later said that the key to forming a national consensus had been this transformation in attitude towards China. (634)

On April 1, 1975 Sakata directed the JDA to start work on the defense plans incorporating Kubo's ideas and setting a limit on defense spending so that it would not exceed 1% of the GNP. (635) With the help of Miki and MOF Sakata was able to overcome resistance to the 1% limit from within his own agency, though the JDA was allowed to relativize the 1% clause by including the words "for the time being" (tomen) and "aims to" (medo suru) together with the promise that the government would not raise defense expenditures above 1% of the GNP. (636) In addition the JDA hoped to make 1% a spending goal rather than a barrier, and it also wanted to separate the timing of the passage of the new defense plans and the passage of the 1% limit as much as possible
so that the two would not be linked. (637)

Finally in October 1976 the new plans, entitled "the National Defense Program Outline" (Boeikeikaku no Taiko hereafter referred to as "Taiko") were ready, and were subsequently passed by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. The plans consisted of two parts. The first was a general explanation of Japan's defense policies, including an assessment of the international environment stressing growing detente, the positive role of the Mutual Security System in contributing to the stability of East Asia and an explanation of the "Standard Defense Force Concept". The second part of Taiko was an appended table (the beppyo) detailing the force goals to be achieved under the plan. A few days later, on the fifth of November, the 1% barrier was passed as well. (638)

Taiko stimulated remarkably little resistance from the opposition parties, especially in light of the fact that a mere three years earlier they had forced the abandonment of a similar initiative. Indeed, not only the increasingly pro-defense DSP (639), but also the more pacifist CGP and right-wing of the JSP seemed to even embrace the plan, much to the dismay of liberal observers in the media. (640) The new plan soon came under bombardment from various forces on the right, including former uniformed SDF personnel (641), the defense industry (642) and as of the late 70s the right wing of the LDP. (643) Nonetheless, the impact of this criticism was limited, and Taiko survived unaltered and became the chief conceptual underpinning of
Japanese defense and security policy lasting into the 1990s.

At first glance it might seem that Taiko represented a revolution in the post-war Japanese political-military culture. The opposition had at least tacitly accepted a government defense initiative, reversing over two decades of rejecting even the most limited recognition of the Self Defense Forces of the Mutual Security Treaty. Furthermore, the groundwork for intensified military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan had been laid, apparently laying to rest the inhibition, supported by the political right as well as the left, against such collaboration for fear that it would lead to over involvement in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.

Closer examination, however, of what this revolution actually achieved reveals that rather than a major departure from the already extant Japanese approach to defense, it actually represented an elaboration and reinforcement of the old Yoshida doctrine. Taiko was an explicit codification of the SDF's relatively limited defense role, one which had to be forced upon the military establishment with help from the outside. With it came new restrictions on the defense decision-making process, including increased civilian control and a concrete limit on military spending.

The new cooperation with the U.S. was likewise a continuation of Yoshida's basic strategy, which preferred relying on American military might to the economically costly and politically destabilizing alternative of relying primarily on a
Japanese defense establishment. The chief goal of the SDF was defined explicitly as a residual force capable of expanding to meet any potential future threat, and implicitly as a political tool to help keep the U.S. engaged in East Asia. Moreover, it too was a means of strengthening control over the military, towards which the Japanese leadership continued to exhibit a deep-rooted mistrust. In response to opposition questioning in the Diet, Sakata urged a formalization of defense cooperation with the U.S. because it would be preferable to a system of informal agreements between U.S. and Japanese military men which were taking place outside of civilian control. (644). This cooperation was to prove very limited in scope, and remained confined to Japan's territorial waters and air space.

The changing international environment of the late 60s and 70s, including detente and the decline in American power, had forced Japan to reconsider its military options. Having rejected the independent military option in 1970, the conservative LDP leadership was forced to take existing arrangements and adapt them to meet new conditions. As one Japanese commentator has put it, deterrence could no longer be achieved merely through the existence of the Mutual Security System, but had to rely on its functioning. (645) To make the Mutual Security System and the SDF function, Centrists within the LDP (Sakata and Miki) and the JDA (Kubo), took advantage of a slowly improving domestic political climate to launch a campaign to gain popular support. The result was that the new, post-war Japanese anti-military political-
military culture emerged from the mid-1970s far stronger than it had been at its inception in the 1950s. The new political-military culture was more firmly institutionalised within the military and defense policy, and it enjoyed a broader base of support within the LDP, the opposition parties and the JDA. Subsequent developments in the 1970s and the 1980s were largely made possible by the crystallization of domestic political support in 1976 represented by Taiko.

The Political Military Culture of Japan - circa 1976

On the surface the period between 1960 to 1976 continued to be dominated by intense polarization over the defense issue, and until 1976 the government’s room for maneuver actually shrank with the steady growth of taboos on defense. Ironically, however, the most comprehensive formulation of such restraints, Taiko, was to establish a lowest common denominator on the basis of which the entire Japanese defense system could begin to function in a more rational way. That this level of minimal consensus could be achieved was due to a prolonged process of limited ideological coalescence among the major sectors of the Japanese political culture.

I. Public Opinion (646)
For much of the 1960s and early 1970s public opinion continued to reflect profound ambivalence about the mutual security system. A series of polls taken in Tokyo indicated that support there for the MST varied from a low of 28% in the Spring of 1962, with 29% opposing and 43% responding "don't know" or "other", to a high of 40% in the Spring of 1969, with 22% opposed and 38% DK/other. (647) In 1974 this polarization of views persisted, with approximately 32% pro, 28% anti and 40% DK/other. But by late 1976 support for the Mutual Security Treaty had begun to increase precipitously, to approximately 42% supporting the Treaty, 15% opposing and 43% DK/Other. This trend was to continue into the 1980s, with support reaching over 50% for the first time in 1979. (648) Other, national polls from the same period reveal a similar trend. For example a 1968 Asahi poll indicated that only about 33% of those surveyed felt that the MST was useful, while 29% felt it was not and 38% didn't know. A similar question asked in 1978 showed those feeling it was useful had increased to 49%, while 17% felt it was not and approximately 34% didn't know. (649) This revolution in support for the Security Treaty, however, was not accompanied by a similar growth in support for expansion of the SDF or increased defense expenditures. A 1977 Kohoshitsu poll showed 29% of those surveyed felt the MST should be kept and the SDF strengthened, 29% were for keeping the treaty and the SDF at present levels, a mere 5% were for an independent Japanese military without the Security Treaty, 6% were discontinuing the treaty and reducing the SDF, and 2% were for
discontinuing both, and 30% gave other responses. (650) Support for the SDF was quite high. According to Defense Agency surveys, 65% of those surveyed in 1959 felt that it was good or at least not bad to have the SDF, increasing to 76% in 1963. Throughout the period this level of support ranged around 73 to 83%. (651) Another series of polls show some rise of support for actually increasing the GSDF, from 11% in 1972, to 17% in 1975 and 22% in 1978. But still the overwhelming preference was for maintaining them at their current level, the choice of 51% of those surveyed in 1972, 55% in 1975 and 54% in 1978. On the other hand, those in favor of reducing the SDF declined precipitously in number, from 18% in 1972 to 6% in 1978. (652)

These data indicate that what Sakata and Miki had accomplished, aided no doubt by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and improvement of relations with the PRC, was a dramatic reduction in popular fears that the Treaty system might drag Japan into a war. On the other hand, there was no rise in support for expanding the military.

At the same time confidence in the American security guarantee seemed to decline. According to Yomiuri polls in 1968, 1969 and 1978, the percentage of those who thought the U.S. would help Japan in accordance with the MST in time of need declined from approximately 35% to 30% to 21%, while those who thought it would not increased correspondingly. (653) And throughout the 60s and 70s the popularity of the U.S. decreased, dropping from its height of close to 50% in 1960 to about 20% in 1973, behind
Switzerland and France, but still ahead of the PRC. This should not necessarily be interpreted as an increase of antipathy towards the U.S.; those who said they dislike the U.S. grew relatively slightly, from 5 to about 13% over the same period. (654) This decline in U.S. popularity can only partly be explained as an erosion in confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend Japanese security, which as the survey above indicates, had never been that high to begin with and which anyway was not a question of great concern to most Japanese at the time (655). Rather these figures suggest a more general decline in admiration for the U.S., perhaps in part because of the Vietnam war, and more importantly because of a growing awareness of the deficiencies of the U.S. model and a sense that U.S. strength was waning. (656)

At the same time, the Japanese public remained unwilling to contemplate revision of the Constitution, establish an independent military or increase defense expenditures. Opposition to changing the Constitution even increased, from 62% opposing it in 1962, to 64% in 1968 and 73% in 1978. (657) And in 1972 42% of respondents to Defense Agency polls favored keeping defense expenditures at their present levels, while only 10% were for increasing them and 23% for decreasing them. In 1975 those for the status quo increased to 48%. (658)

Another interesting poll from the period was taken by Mainichi in 1972. It showed that only 6% of respondents felt that military power was an effective means of securing their country,
and 34% felt that it was somewhat effective. 32% felt it was not too effective and 14% felt that it was not effective at all. In contrast, 32% thought economic power was a very effective means of maintaining Japanese security and 43% thought it was somewhat effective. Likewise they rated diplomatic negotiations, ensuring the people's livelihood, and international exchange all as much more useful ways of ensuring national security than military power. (659)

What we can conclude on the basis of this data is that while confidence in the U.S. declined, there was no concomitant rise in the sense of threat, and rather than embark on a voyage through the uncharted waters of an independent stance on defense, an increasingly large majority of average Japanese preferred to hold onto the present system. By 1976 a solid majority emerged in favor of the Centrist position on defense and other related domestic issues, gathering strength largely at the expense of Left Idealism and, to a lesser degree (since it began with a smaller base of popular support), of Right Idealism as well.

II. Intellectuals and Media

During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s Japanese intellectuals and the media remained for the most part rather critical of the government's stance on defense, with a majority holding either Left-Idealist views or expressing strong sympathy for the Left-Idealist position. In comparison with the 1940s and
50s, however, these views did not dominate the intellectual scene as clearly as they had before, and new strains of more Centrist thinking (perhaps long-submerged by the Left-Idealist orthodoxy) began to emerge.

The most important development in the area of the media during this period was the striking shift from Left Idealism to Centrism of the nation's most prestigious monthly journal, Chuokoron. While until the early 1960s Chuokoron, like Sekai, had been a platform for criticism of the Mutual Security Treaty system (660), as of the early 1960s it began to increasingly publish the views of Centrist scholars and commentators with a more favorable perspective on the existing Japanese approach to national security. At the same time, in 1962 the Chuokoron company also discontinued its highly influential, and controversial monthly journal, Shiso, which had been a major forum for Left-Idealist scholars. (661)

The 1960s were also marked by the rise of a new generation of Centrist scholars such as Kosaka Masataka and Nagai Yunosuke (many of whom published extensively in Chuokoron), who introduced to the post-war Japanese academic discourse contemporary American thinking on international relations and national security. (662) One important characteristic which distinguishes their writings from those of the older generation of pro-defense scholars was their greater concern with national interest and balance of power and weaker anti-Communism. (663) In general they strongly supported alignment with the U.S., but at the same time advocated
expanding Japan's latitude for independent action within the confines of the existing system. (664) They expressed a general reluctance to becoming overly involved in U.S. strategy and a fairly high degree of hope that international institutions might eventually develop which might mitigate the harshness of competition between nations. (665) Supporting this was a belief that the world was moving from one focused on military competition to one in which nations would become more concerned with economic issues. (666) In short, despite enormous change in the international system and Japan's position in it, they believed that the Yoshida doctrine continued to be the most appropriate guide to Japanese foreign policy, though they now legitimated it using the language of modern international relations theory rather than the more traditional categories used in Yoshida's day.

Kosaka became perhaps best known for his rather adulatory 1968 biography of Yoshida, Saisho Yoshida Shigeru, in which he argued that Yoshida wisely steered Japan in the direction of becoming a "merchant nation". He contended that leaving the constitutional and rearmament issues vague and unclear, which in the minds of many conservatives was Yoshida's cardinal error, was in fact the best strategy for Japan, for it left open the option to arm if the need arose, while allowing the nation to avoid becoming embroiled in the U.S. anti-Communist crusade in East Asia. Moreover, Kosaka and other Centrist scholars felt that this strategy of deliberate ambivalence continues to be a valid one
for present-day Japan. (667)

What is interesting about this interpretation of Yoshida is that it seems to almost deliberately overlook Yoshida's own, very strong Right-Idealist leanings, and it omits altogether Yoshida's own belief that in the long run Japan, once it had recovered economically from the war, should in fact create a large-scale military establishment. Indeed, in later years Yoshida was to express his feeling that his failure to prepare public opinion for such a shift was his greatest error as Prime Minister. What Kosaka did (as West German scholars were to do with Adenauer) was to in effect retroactively invent a Centrist myth of the visionary, elder statesman, the politician-creator present at the birth of the new age, who had grasped with almost divine insight the nature of the newly emerging world order and had wisely plotted the nation's course through the perilous shoals of international politics.

Starting in the late 60s Prime Minister Sato adopted a strategy of courting intellectuals by inviting them to join government advisory groups and research councils. In particular he made use of intellectuals in preparing the way for the negotiations over Okinawa, Japan's entry into the ILO (International Labor Organization) and analyzing the pros and cons of amending the Constitution. (668) This strategy of incorporating academics and scholars into government policy-making, continued and broadened after Sato's tenure and helped cultivate a moderate climate ultimately leading to the spread of
Centrism within the intellectual sector of the overall Japanese political-military culture. (669) The most prominent example of this in the area of defense was the special advisory committee set up by Sakata in 1975 to formulate recommendations on the basis of which Taiko was drawn up. Not coincidentally the head of that committee was Kosaka.

At the same time, a new generation of Left-Idealist scholars and intellectuals also appeared, led by young academics such as Sakamoto Yoshikazu (670) and Seki Hiroharu. (671) They continued to preach the virtues of Japan as a peace nation, carried on the campaign against the Mutual Security Treaty system and crusaded for complete, unarmed neutrality. More moderate figures, such as the influential professor of Internationa. Relations at Sophia University, Royama Michio, tended to be more sympathetic to the Left-Idealist than the Centrist views, especially during the Vietnam war. Thus, on the whole Left Idealism remained the dominant view in the Japanese intellectual sphere. Much of the academic debate over defense and security during this period came to be dominated by representatives of the Centrist and Left Idealist camps.

At the edges of the public debate on defense there remained a few representatives of a more Right-Idealist point of view, such as example Wakaizumi Kei. (672) Also there appeared in the early 60s the histories which took a more sympathetic view of Japanese pre-war foreign policies, sparking a lively controversy among Japanese historians.
Perhaps the most important intellectual figure on the far Right, and undoubtedly the most controversial, was the famous novelist, Mishima Yukio. Mishima in his books and public appearances provided the clearest expression of Right-Idealist thinking, glorifying Japan’s martial past, railing against the degeneracy of post-war society, and advocating a return to the pre-war system of Emperor worship. Through his personal friendship with Nakasone, Mishima was able to penetrate the SDF headquarters at Ichigaya in Tokyo, taking a senior general hostage. After delivering an impassioned tirade calling for a military uprising. Mishima then, like so many of the heroes in his stories, committed suicide in the traditional manner; he slit open his own belly with a sword and was then beheaded by one of his accomplices. (673)

Mishima’s death and the spectacular manner in which he chose to arrange it sent shock waves throughout Japan. Many foreign observers as well were alarmed by what they took to be the beginning of a return to the patterns of pre-war right-wing politics. (674) Yet, Mishima’s actions were not emulated by others, and Right Idealism remained decidedly a fringe element on the Japanese intellectual scene.

III. Business

The continued power of the defense industry to influence a narrow defense procurement policy was very much in evidence
during this period. Beginning with the 2nd defense procurement plan the principle of fostering domestic production of weapons systems (kokusanka) was enshrined in every defense plan, and the JDA was under constant pressure to tailor its weapons purchases to meet the needs of industry. Contracts from the Defense Agency were of particular importance to the Japanese aeronautics industry, which continued to be unable to score successes in the commercial civilian market and was heavily dependent on the licensing of technology from the U.S. through the military.

Yet outside of weapons procurements, there is little evidence that the defense industry was able to influence government policy. It was unable to increase defense expenditures or prevent the introduction of a rolling budget. Nor was it able to overturn, or even prevent the further strengthening, of the restrictions on arms exports.

The larger business community was on the whole relatively uninterested in defense issues. It became most active on the question just prior to 1970, where there was great concern among business leaders that 1970 might see a repeat of 1960 on perhaps an even larger scale. Their concern was thus more with internal than external security, and they feared that radical forces might be able to effect a major change in the domestic political order. It was partly for this reason that the Keidanren leadership supported some of the more conservative aspects of the government program to raise defense consciousness launched in the wake of Sato's 1968 meeting with President Johnson. Once, however, that
it was shown in 1970 that the radicals could be contained, their interest in the subject faded rapidly. (675)

In the early 1970s the business community also came out in favor of increased ties with the 1970s, but there is no evidence that this was part of a sustained strategy of increased distancing from the U.S..(676) The overall tenor of the remarks by non-defense business leaders on defense was Centrist, tinged by a strong element of social conservatism.

IV. Opposition Parties (677)

Two partly countervailing trends emerged during the 1960s. First, there was a gradual decline in LDP electoral strength, culminating in the early 70s when the opposition gained control of various important municipalities, including Tokyo and Osaka, and achieved approximate parity with the LDP in the Upper House of the Diet. The LDP share of the vote declined from 57.6% in 1960 to 41.8% in 1976. Thus, for much of the period, the political current seemed to be running against the conservatives.

Second, there emerged the so-called middle-of-the-road parties; the Democratic Socialist Party which split off from the JSP in 1960, and Komeito, which was supported by the Buddhist lay organization, the Sokka Gakkai. This proliferation of parties weakened the opposition's hand in the Diet. In the past the Socialists had been able to block parliamentary proceedings by simply refusing to participate, thereby creating the image that
the democratic process was disintegrating and that an untrammelled conservative one-party dictatorship was threatening to destroy Japan's fragile new democracy. This allowed the opposition to take the budget hostage, for it had to be passed if the government was to continue functioning. Now the LDP needed only to get one of these parties, usually either the DSP or Komeito, to at least attend the proceedings and the appearance of democratic debate could be preserved.

For much of the period the potential for opposition disunity was mitigated by a strong, common ideological stand against the conservatives' defense policies. In time, however, it was to lead to a split on defense among the opposition parties, beginning in 1972, and greatly contributed to the relative ease with which the LDP was able to act on defense as of the mid-70s.

If one general trend emerged, it was that the opposition was at its most uncooperative when the LDP was strong, as under Tanaka in 1973. At such times the opposition was inclined to form a united front against the LDP. When the LDP appeared weak, however, the incentive to defect to the conservative side became greater because the middle-of-the-road parties hoped that they might be able to form a coalition government with the LDP. This seems to have been the case in 1975-1976, when the DSP was apparently negotiating with Miki about forming a new, centrist political party with the left-wing of the LDP. One of the primary points in these negotiations was the DSP willingness to accept a more main-stream approach to defense and security issues.
Consequently the DSP was strongly motivated to demonstrate its moderation on defense issues in the 1975-1976 period, despite the fact that at the time electorally such a move was believed to be potentially damaging. (678)

The JSP as well tended to become somewhat more flexible on defense during periods when the LDP was perceived to be vulnerable and the JSP sought to create a coalition with the middle-of-the-road parties capable of taking over from the LDP. Signs of such moderation could be seen in 1976 when the JSP began negotiating with the other opposition parties to create a potential coalition government (Rengo Seiken). (679)

Two factors, however, stood in the way of further JSP moderation. The first was the middle-of-the-road parties' refusal to contemplate going into coalition with the Communists. (680) The second was the JSP's unwillingness, despite the changing international and domestic political environment, to abandon its principled stand on unarmed neutrality and opposition to the SDF and Mutual Security Treaty. This stand increasingly became an obstacle to coalition as the DSP and Komeito began to move to the center on defense in the early 1970s. (681)

While in the past competition with the JCP for left-wing votes may have constrained the JSP from moving too far to the center, in the 1970s this was balanced by the emergence of the DSP and Komeito, with whom the JSP was competing for an even bigger bloc of voters in the center. (682) Coalition with these more centrist parties was the JSP's only half-way realistic
strategy for bringing down the LDP, and here again its ideological rigidity was an important obstacle. The JSP's increasing inability to mobilize large-scale demonstrations on the defense issue was yet further evidence of the bankruptcy of the strategy of ideological confrontation over the Mutual Security Treaty system.

The basic leftist model of international relations and domestic politics developed in the 40s and 50s was not easily displaced in the minds of most JSP leaders. Indeed, they saw its confirmation in various events such as the Vietnam war and the assassination by right wingers of JSP Secretary General Asanuma Inejiro in 1962. Unlike West Germany, the Left and the Right continued to be divided by a yawning abyss of mutual distrust and recrimination. Though increasingly moderates in the party wished to shift the party to the right on both defense and domestic issues (by which they meant increased tolerance, though not actual acceptance of the SDF and the MST), in 1975 the JSP continued to proclaim its belief in an international struggle between the forces of capitalist imperialism and progressive socialist pacifism, and they saw that struggle as being reflected domestically in their battle with the LDP and those they believed would push Japan in the direction of militarism. (683) The JSP's continued inability to take power was a source of great frustration for them, yet at the same time they believed that they were making a significant contribution in checking the reactionary current in Japanese politics. (684)
V. The LDP

The LDP continued to be rent by factional infighting which at times seemed to break down along ideological lines. The boundaries of these groups were highly fluid, however, and the various faction leaders were able to make alliances across them with little difficulty whenever it seemed politically expedient for them to do so. So, for example, in 1968-69 the hawkish Nakasone had no difficulty making alliances with the dovish Miki and Fujiyama to criticize Sato's position on Okinawa for giving in too much to the U.S..

In general one can speak of three major ideological currents inside the LDP during this period. The first was the basically pro-U.S. anti-Communist mainstream, led by Sato, Fukuda Takeo (Kishi's heir apparent), Ishii Mitsujirō and Funada Naka. The second was the more pro-PRC group led by Miki Takeo, Matsumura Kenzo, Maeo Shigesaburo, Fujiyama Aichiro and Akagi Munenori. The third stream was the more Gaullist-Japanese nationalist stream represented by Kono Ichiro (685) and his successor, Nakasone. Most Dietmen, including such powerful figures as Tanaka Kakuei, had rather weak ideological preferences and wandered between these groups based on narrow calculations of political advantages.

During the 1960s the LDP was riven by factional and
ideological battles over the issue of relations to Taiwan and China. Inevitably the question of the Mutual Security Treaty and the SDF were inextricably bound up in these debates. Matsumura’s decision to visit the PRC in late 1962 provided the first crisis, leading to calls for his expulsion from the party.

The Vietnam war further weakened the hand of the pro-U.S. mainstream under Sato. The B-52 raids on Hanoi revived Japanese memories of their own suffering during the war, and America’s own doubts about the morality of its actions further reinforced popular Japanese condemnation of the war. The idea of pushing forward a North East Asia equivalent to NATO (NEATO), which had been widely discussed in 1965 following the restoration of relations with South Korea, (686) was laid to rest in 1966 when Sato made it clear that Japan would only cooperate with the U.S. within its own territorial boundaries. (687) A succession of LDP leaders of all political stripes (688), began to criticize U.S. policy in South East Asia. This tendency became stronger after 1967 when many in the LDP believed that their electoral losses were at least in part attributable to over identification of the party with U.S. foreign policy. (689)

Estrangement from the U.S. intensified in the early 1970s, following what the Japanese called the "Nixon shocks", a series of unexpected U.S. policy moves culminating in Nixon’s visit to the PRC which stunned the Japanese political world and embarrassed Prime Minister Sato. (690) Though the Japanese conservative leadership was unwilling to striking out on its own,
many leaders began to push for increased foreign policy independence under a system of international multipolarity. (691) According to a Yomiuri poll before the 1969 general elections, 99% of LDP candidates supported the Mutual Security Treaty. A mere three years later, that number had fallen to 44.5%, while 47.8% supported abrogation or revision.

Yet, though the changing international system placed the security relationship with the U.S. under considerable strain, in the long run it was to actually strengthen it. Under Sato the Japanese mainstream party came to increasingly embrace a minimalist stance to defense. When Sato took power in 1964 he had his brain trust under the direction of Aichi Kiichi draw up a comprehensive policy platform. (692) In the section on foreign policy it explicitly embraced a Centrist view of the world, despite Sato's previous association with the strong, pro-defense right wing of his party:

"The age where war was thought of as a given is ending and we are entering an age where the peoples of the world desire peace and a rise in living standards. It is the duty of the politicians of every nation to properly give life to the hopes and efforts of the (world's) people ... In this age where the old camps of East versus West are drawing together, dividing and becoming multidimensional, our country wants to make clear to both camps and to all countries that it is seeks peaceful coexistence". (693)

At the same time Sato still fell far short of becoming a Left Idealist. He stressed to his aides that peace without military security is impossible. And he also added that Japan needed a new type of nationalism that did not interfere with international cooperation. (694)
Sato's difficulties with the U.S. pushed the LDP mainstream further towards the center. Even such very conservative figures as Fukuda became almost dovish in their views on foreign policy. At the same time, the end of the Vietnam war and the U.S.-Communist Chinese reconciliation eased misgivings on the part of the more Asianist wing of the LDP. And the Gaullist wing seemed to lose interest in defense (except for the hard-line Seirankai) after its leader Nakasone moved out of the JDA. Thus, the factional struggles and drive for an independent defense policy of the 1960s and early 70s had an almost anti-climatic ending, as a new, stronger consensus in favor of the status quo emerged in the mid-70s.

VI. JDA and Bureaucratic Actors

The bureaucratic actors' positions on defense and to one another changed little during this period. MITI was largely dormant, the Foreign Ministry continued to follow the U.S. lead on foreign policy, and MOF continued to campaign for greater restraints on the rate of growth of the defense budget. Over the time span lasting from 1960 to 1976 defense expenditures steadily decreased, both as a percentage of GNP (from 1.23% in 1960 to .90% in 1976) and as a percentage of government expenditures (from 11.57% to 8.04%).

On the other hand, because the Japanese economy was expanding with explosive speed, defense expenditures too rose
rapidly, even if not quite at the same pace as the economy. Each defense procurement plan doubled defense expenditure in absolute terms. The SDF eventually got through virtually every major defense procurement program that it was after. Despite intense pressure from MOF and the JDA's internal bureaus under Sakata's direction, the GSDF was also able to retain its authorized strength at 13 divisions. The civilians were somewhat more successful, however, in preventing the MSDF from expanding to 5 squadrons. (695)

Inflation and increases in personnel costs led to economizing in many areas, especially logistics and training. So great were the cutbacks in these areas that many experts believed that the SDF's real fighting strength was being impaired. A certain "holding out" process took hold whereby the SDF remained a well equipped, reasonably large military establishment, but one without the training and essential support structures which would have allowed it to function in a military emergency. Kubo, Kaihara and other civilian bureaucrats recognised these deficiencies and repeatedly tried to rectify them starting in the early 1960s. The uniformed members of the SDF, however, fiercely resisted these attempts and, with the help of the defense industry and LDP politicians with an interest in weapons procurements, were successful in stymieing them. (696)

Where the SDF suffered its greatest defeats was not in the area of force structure but rather in defining its mission and planning for action. These were areas in which it had fewer
natural political allies than in weapons procurements. The restrictions on its activities increased greatly during the 1960 to 1976 period, beginning with the Three Arrows incident and continuing on down to the successful institutionalization of the "Standard Defense Force Concept" of Taiko, which downgraded the SDF’s mission from defending against a regional war to repelling a limited, small-scale invasion. Taiko was a major victory for the JDA bureaucrats over the uniformed personnel, and by the mid-70s the intellectual centrism of Kubo Takuya became the mainstream within the agency.

Within the SDF there was the beginning of a generation change. While in 1970 the majority of senior officers had military experience during WW II, over the course of the 1970s they were slowly phased out and a new generation who had no direct experience of the old military began to take over.

Because the SDF continued to be an institution under siege, mistrusted by society in general and to a certain extent even by the government, it is difficult to divine the true political orientations of its members. The majority seems to have remained basically centrist if socially conservative in their views, and the troops at Ichigaya jeered Mishima when he made his impassioned ultra-nationalist plea for a restoration of the Showa Emperor. Nonetheless, some of the SDF officers revealed views after they left the military which clearly fit into the Right-Idealist world view.

The most outstanding example of this was former General
Sugita Ichiji, who was Chief of Staff from 1960-1962, and during the Security Treaty Riots was rumored to have been prepared to use the SDF to suppress the demonstrators. Sugita later became president of Japan’s largest veterans organization, which is an important source of organizational support to the LDP. In his writings Sugita claims that the U.S. during the Occupation had deliberately tried to debilitate Japan through disarmament, forcing the Peace Constitution on Japan, weakening the Japanese police, fostering pacifism and attempting to alter the structure of the Japanese family (all of which in point of fact the U.S. did try to do). He argued that Western liberal institutions were fundamentally inapplicable to Japan, and made the rather outrageous comparison of U.S. efforts to demilitarize Japan to the Soviet Union’s slaughter of Polish officers at Katyn. (697)

However, Japan’s alignment with the U.S. was appropriate, because Marxism represented an even greater threat. (698)

Other important former SDF personnel as well who publicly aired Right-Idealist views included Genda Minoru, who became an LDP member of the upper house and led the campaign against the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand senior SDF officers, such as Nakamura Ryuhei, GSDF chief of staff 1970-1972, were known to have more moderate views. (699) However, until 1976 active SDF officers were unable to express their views in public, reflecting the persistence of a public antipathy towards the military institution and the tight rein which the Internal Bureaus kept on the armed forces.
Conclusions

The 15 years between 1960 and 1976 saw a general solidification of the approach to defense and foreign policy that had been established by Yoshida in the 1950s. The ideological context in which defense issues were debated remained largely the same. A pervasive distrust of the military led to a strengthening of limitations on its functioning. The prospect of increased military efforts aroused fears on all level of society that Japanese democracy might not be able to tolerate a renewed emphasis or acceptance of the armed forces. These fears may not have been totally groundless, for when in fact efforts were made to increase defense, as in 1968-1970, it caused a shift to the right in Japanese politics which affected not only security policies, but education and internal security as well. Likewise, the way some political actors, such as the business community, tended to think of defense made it clear that it was as much a domestic as a foreign policy issue. Consequently, whenever defense was publicly debated the now-familiar pattern of leftist accusations of a planned overthrow of democracy and the threat to liberal rights (700) could be heard, backed by emotional appeals to Japan’s position as an Asian nation and warnings against over involvement in U.S. policy. The right would in turn accuse the Left-Idealists of planning to undermine the democratic political
and social order, and call for increased internal security and a redirection of educational and cultural policies to counter their influence. The growing Center in Japanese politics tended to shift to one side or the other in order to preserve the status quo. In 1968 to 1970 it sided with the Right to counter the threat of an anticipated second Security Treaty crisis. After 1970 it shifted its support again to stifle Nakasone. And thereafter it supported a limited revitalization of the mutual security system in order to counter a perceived decrease in U.S. power and commitment to the region.

In terms of the distribution of ideological tendencies (Left-Idealist, Right-Idealist, Centrist) among the different political sectors a coalescence in favor of the Center could be perceived as well. Public opinion data showed increased support not only for the armed forces, but more importantly revealed a dramatic increase in support for the Mutual Security system beginning in the mid-1970s. Intellectual opinion as well began to shift to the Center as a new generation of scholars more sympathetic to the government emerged, and as more intellectuals in general were incorporated into the policy making process. The power of the opposition parties continued to grow electorally, but their fragmentation and the rise of the middle-of-the-road parties weakened their ability to block defense legislation. Moreover, the shift in Communist Chinese policy weakened the resolve of even those within the Left-Idealist camp. Within the LDP as well, despite chronic tensions over China policy in the 1960s, those
tensions began to disappear with the reapproachment between the U.S. and China. And the party clearly rejected the nationalist Jishuboei alternative in 1970, preferring instead a yet closer relationship with the U.S..

Once again, one might ask the question: could things have gone differently? The obvious answer, given Japan's increased political and economic strength, is yes, though it would have incurred great costs. And it was precisely such a course that the nationalists advocating Jishuboei had in mind. Had they realized their ambitions Japan would have remained aligned against the Communist world, but it would have struck a much more independent pose vis-à-vis the U.S., and would have strived to keep its diplomatic and military (including nuclear) options more clearly open. Likewise the Left-Idealists continued to challenge the system, but their domestic political power base was weaker than before.

At the same time, despite this greater objective, international latitude for independent action, internally the barriers to divergence from the Yoshida line had in fact become much higher. The political Center was no longer a minority between the Left- and Right-Idealist streams. It had enough political mass to deal with threats from one direction or the other without needing the support of the other side. The one potential source of real change (barring dramatic pressures form the international system) would have been an institutional reorganization of the political Center itself, as might have
occurred if the LDP had split, with one wing going off to join the DSP to form a more liberal conservative alternative.
Chapter 9 - Consensus and Conflict - West Germany 1956-1977

The period lasting from 1956, when West Germany’s basic security policies were all in place, until 1978, when the second peace movement began, saw the development of a relatively broad political consensus on defense and security, supported by the major political parties and a broad range of public opinion. This consensus was not a stable one, however, due to two internal contradictions inherent in the system since its foundation; the unresolved dilemma of the division of the German nation and the question whether to remain closely tied to U.S. foreign policy or to ally with France and pursue a more independent course oriented towards purely European interests. There were three events which were particularly important for their impact on the political-military culture and ideological constellation of West Germany. First, the acceptance of NATO and integration with the West by the SPD. Second, the Gaullist versus Atlanticist struggle within the CDU. And finally, the development of Ostpolitik under Brandt.

The Pragmatic Conversion - The SPD accepts NATO (701)

After the Paris Treaties were ratified over its opposition, the SPD under Ollenhauer redirected its opposition from trying to block the Federal Republic’s entry into NATO to achieving reunification through a relaxation of East-West tensions. For the next 4 years the SPD campaigned hard on an anti-nuclear, anti-military platform. Though it enjoyed some success with this
strategy, and public opinion polls continued to show strong support for the SPD position, in particular with regard to the nuclear weapons issue, it was unable to convert these sentiments into victory at the polls. It became clear to a growing segment of the party leadership that the SPD would be unable to gain power without a fundamental shift in its basic outlook. Affecting such a change, however, would not prove easy because of the SPD's strong, anti-military tradition and because such a shift would require a complete transformation of the party's self understanding.

The first break with the SPD's anti-military traditions began with efforts to improve its relations with the Bundeswehr. Social Democratic security experts Fritz Erler and Fritz Beerman urged the party to reach out and establish ties to the new armed forces, arguing that one of the factors contributing to the demise of the Weimar Republic had been the pre-war SPD's refusal to deal with the Reichswehr, thus reinforcing the conservative, anti-socialist inclinations of the officer corps.\(^{702}\) Beginning in the mid-1950s the party began to cautiously signal its acceptance of the Bundeswehr, provided that it were reformed and placed under a system of democratic controls known under the rubric "internal leadership".\(^{703}\) At the same time the SPD continued to oppose German integration into NATO on the grounds that it would prevent reunification. In particular the SPD was critical of NATO nuclear strategy and the stationing of nuclear weapons on NATO soil.
After initial hesitation, the CDU government, led by Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss embraced NATO strategy and actively campaigned for the acquisition of at least tactical nuclear delivery systems for the Bundeswehr. (704) The conservatives were insistent that German troops be equipped with the "most modern weapons" in order to avoid creating the impression that German troops were merely cannon fodder and that West Germany was being discriminated against by its allies. (705)

The general populace, however, did not share these views. In 1955 NATO conducted a training exercise called Carte Blanche, which simulated the defense of Western Europe using tactical nuclear weapons. The results of the study, published by the Spiegel, showed that German civilian casualties could be expected to exceed 1.7 million, with even larger numbers wounded or left homeless. Defense Minister Strauss saw the exercise as a success, since it demonstrated that the Soviets could expect to gain little from launching such an invasion and thus would be deterred from making it. The German public, on the other hand, did not share Strauss's appreciation of the abstract concept of deterrence, and the popular response was one of horror and dismay. (706)

The SPD sided with the public on this issue, and sought to make use of it in the elections of 1953 and 1957. Even the party's military experts Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt condemned the U.S. doctrines of nuclear deterrence as "satanic wisdom" and extended deterrence as an extension of "classical
They were joined by many prominent intellectuals, beginning with an appeal from 18 nuclear scientists at Göttingen (led by distinguished physicist Carl-Friedrich von Weizäcker) that West Germany not be involved in any way with the production, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

Additional support came from the FDP under Thomas Dehler, who accused the Chancellor of not being genuinely interested in reunification and included an anti-nuclear plank in its party platform. Both parties took the CDU to task for its nuclear policy in the May 1957 Bundestag debates. (708)

While the CDU was sharply critical of the opposition parties, accusing them of wanting Germany to capitulate in the face of tyranny, fears about the impact of these debates on the coming elections grew. In a meeting of the CDU party leadership, Adenauer referred to an Allensbach poll showing that over 67% of the populace was opposed to equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. In the face of such pressures, Adenauer and Strauss were forced to back down, emphasizing that acquisition of atomic weapons was dependent on progress in arms control and that in any case it was not an immediate policy option. (709)

The subsequent election campaign was one of the bitterest in memory. In a July speech in Nürnberg, Adenauer warned that a SPD victory would spell the destruction of Germany, and in Dortmund he averred that the fundamental choice in the coming elections was between Christianity and Communism. (710) Adenauer cleverly played down the security issue, which was the main focus of the
SPD campaign, and concentrated instead on social and economic issues, such as a reform of the pension system. (711) In the end, the SPD increased its share of the vote to 31.5%, while the CDU with 50.2% for the first time achieved an absolute majority in the Bundestag. The FDP, on the other hand, saw its share of the vote decline from 9.5% to 7.7%.

Ollenhauer's position within the party was weakened, and his long-time associates on the party managing committee were replaced with the reform-minded Herbert Wehner, Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler. (712) Leading the call for change on the ideological front was the newly elected Mayor of Berlin, Willi Brandt, who urged the SPD to transform itself from a workers' into a people's party (Volkspartei). (713) Privately, some of these new leaders, like Carlo Schmid, believed the party needed to change its stance on defense. (714) But the party was not ready to move in this direction yet, and East bloc proposals for the demilitarization of Central Europe, such as the Rapacki plan, encouraged pacifist sentiments in the SPD.

That March the government introduced a new resolution that the Bundeswehr, in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it by NATO, and in order to contribute to maintenance of the peace, must be armed with the most modern of weapons until general disarmament is agreed upon. (715) Unfortunately, by one of those little tricks of that mine field which is German history, the bill was introduced on the same date as the 25th anniversary of Hitler's suspension of the Reichstag's authority. The SPD,
encouraged by opinion data showing 83% of the those surveyed (including 71% of CDU supporters!) opposed such rearmament,(716) took full advantage of the symbolic potential of the situation to launch one of the most savage parliamentary attacks in post-war West German history. Fritz Erler called the government's position the moral equivalent of Hitler's call for total war, while Rheinhold Meier, making sure the FDP's protest did not go unregistered, compared Strauss's arrogant, militaristic manner to that of the Nazis. In the end, however, the CDU/CSU stuck to its guns and passed the resolution over opposition protests. (717)

After their efforts to block government policy in the legislature had failed, and convinced that the public was on their side (718) the SPD took its struggle to the streets.(719) The SPD, FDP and the Federation of German Unions (DGB) joined together to launch the extra-parliamentary peace movement, "Fight the Atomic Death" (Kampf dem Atomtod).(720) The manifesto of the movement, delivered on March 23 in Frankfurt, warned that nuclear destruction threatened the German nation and called upon the government to support the creation of an atomic-free zone in Europe. (721)

For the first time the SPD threw its lot in wholly with the peace movement, despite the persistence of fundamental disagreements over the morality of deterrence. (722) Initially this message found considerable public support, and that Spring there were numerous demonstrations, including one attended by over 150,000 in Hamburg. Soon, however, the size of the
demonstrations decreased, and party organizers complained of their inability to mobilize but a fraction of the huge SPD and DGB memberships. (723) The failure to galvanize its members at the grass roots led to some softening of the SPD position. (724) Still, the party remained opposed both to nuclear weapons and by extension Germany's integration into NATO.

The key test of whether the SPD and FDP would be able to translate popular anti-nuclear sentiments into a parliamentary majority came in July, 1958 when state elections were held in North Rhine Westphalia. This time, unlike in the general elections of 1957, Adenauer met the SPD anti-nuclear position head on, campaigning on the slogan "nuclear disarmament for the entire world" (i.e. not in West Germany alone). The SPD and FDP again suffered a crushing defeat, with the CDU gaining the absolute majority (50.5%) and ousting the state's social-liberal government. (725)

After the defeat in North Rhine Westphalia, the "Kampf dem Atomtod" movement went into decline. First the FDP, faced with possible extinction if its share of the vote further eroded, defected from the movement. Then the DGB, worried by the lack of popular support for the peace movement, refrained from organizing a general strike to protest governmental defense policies. But the most damaging blow came in November, 1958 when the Soviets threatened to blockade to Berlin once again.

In response to the new Berlin crisis Willi Brandt adopted a strong, pro-Western stance in the Berlin Maycral elections and
used popular animosity towards the Soviet Union to purge his left-wing, more traditionalist opponents from the local SPD. (726) Following his resounding victory at the polls that December, Brandt signaled a new era of CDU-SPD relations by forming a coalition government with the CDU in the name of facing the East with a united front. (727) Soon thereafter, SPD initiatives for reunification and the demilitarization of central Europe were brusquely rejected by Moscow. (728)

After these setbacks, the forces for reform within the party were no longer to be denied and at the special party Congress at Bad Godesberg held on November the Social Democrats adopted an entirely new image. Not only did the SPD for the first time clearly support national defense and the defense of democracy, but it transformed its entire approach to economic and social issues along with its ideological self-understanding. No longer did the SPD present itself as a classical Marxist party supporting the workers in their class struggle against capitalism, but rather it redefined itself as a people's party whose mission is to promote greater social justice and democracy. Marxism was now replaced with an emphasis on humanism, classical philosophy and Christian ethics. (729) The SPD also reversed its previous position on the issue of economic planning, and moved in the direction of the "social market" (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) under the motto "as much freedom as possible, as much planning as necessary".

In short, what the SPD underwent was what in Kuhnian terms
one might call a paradigm shift. Not only did it alter its approach to one issue, such as defense, but it had to alter its entire world view in order to legitimate that shift. Still, there was strong resistance to the new course, especially from the left led by Wolfgang Abendroth and Walter Möller, the Mayor of Frankfurt. While the SPD had changed its overall position, it was still divided on the issue of the alliance, and the acceptance of national defense was followed by a continued call for disarmament, detente, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe and the removal of all foreign troops from German territory once reunification had been achieved. (730)

Yet, the back of the party's earlier ideological opposition to defense was broken, and in the course of the following few months the party increasingly oriented itself on the new party line. In June, 1960 Herbert Wehner, in a landmark speech to the Bundestag, proclaimed that henceforth the SPD accepts NATO and the Paris Treaties as the basis of any future discussion of the security issue. (731)

At the SPD's 1960 Party Congress in Hannover Willi Brandt was overwhelmingly voted in as the party's candidate for the coming elections, and the party entered the 60s with an entirely new face and a new message. While the party continued to distinguish itself from the CDU by placing greater stress on detente and arms control and downplaying the importance of nuclear weapons, this was fully in keeping with the change in the U.S. posture under Kennedy. For once the SPD seemed to be moving
closer to the U.S. line than the CDU. (732) The conversion of the SPD was complete, and in the following elections in 1961 it was rewarded with its best showing since the war, winning 36.2% of the popular vote. (733)

In retrospect what stands out about the SPD’s transformation was not that it took place, but rather that it took so long for it to do so. Again and again during the 1950s the SPD’s basic assumptions about the way the world operated were challenged both by external events, such as the Hungary uprising and the Berlin crisis, as well as by internal ones, the most important of which were a string of electoral defeats. Many outside observers had concluded already after the 1953 elections that the SPD had to fundamentally change its position if it was to have any hope of eventually getting into power. But the deep-rooted ideological mind-set of the party (its political culture, if you will) proved difficult to change. If the “Kampf dem Atomtod” movement had been able to achieve some concrete political victory, such as bringing down the Adenauer government in the same way the mass demonstrations in Japan brought down Kishi, then quite conceivably the hand of the left wing would have been sufficiently strengthened to allow it to put off the party’s conversion for even longer. But popular antipathy to Adenauer and the CDU in no way neared the Japanese distrust of Kishi and the LDP, and the SPD was simply unable to mobilize the support needed to make a significant political difference. Left without popular backing, and unable to make a success of its own foreign policy
initiative in the face of Soviet intransigence, the reformers within the party - Brandt, Wehner, Ehrler and Schmid - were able to force through a far-reaching transformation of the party platform.

Though on the surface the SPD had metamorphosed into a more centrist party, on the sub-leadership level the influence of the old anti-military culture of the party remained strong. Even after Brandt's victory the party decided not to try to purge the leaders of the peace movement, (734) and upon closer examination the SPD's acceptance of NATO and national defense was heavily qualified. Clearly the SPD did not switch over entirely to the CDU-FDP line, for to do so would have alienated a large portion of its natural constituency. In party congresses throughout the 60s and 70s time and again there were waves of resolutions urging the adoption of positions far closer to those of the peace movement activists than to the official, pro-NATO party line. But each time a relatively small group of reformers, by virtue of their positions of power within the disciplined, centrally organized party structure were able to fend off these initiatives and prevented them from becoming part of the official SPD platform. (735) Moreover, one cannot overemphasize the extent to which the SPD conversion on defense was made possible by the advent of a general warming in superpower relations, thus at least temporarily alleviating the contradiction between support for the Federal Republic's defense policies and championing rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the promotion of detente.
Despite these internal tensions, the SPD had sufficiently changed itself to become attractive to a broader strata of voters, and the party moved with confidence along the road to eventual coalition government with first the CDU and subsequently the FDP. Ultimately, however, these more pacifist tendencies reasserted themselves in the late 1970s, leading to the emergence of a newer, yet more virulent and powerful peace movement.

Which Way is West? - Atlanticists versus Gaullists in the Union

At the same time as the SPD was moving towards greater acceptance of NATO and national defense, the CDU was torn apart by internal dissension over how to define its relationship to its Western partners. While Adenauer and his party maintained the policy of integration with the West, the question then arose, which "West" did Germany have more common interests with, the West as a whole, including the U.S., or a more limited, European West centered on France and Germany? Ironically, some of the same forces which spurred the SPD to adopt a more pragmatic posture on defense also fed the debate in the CDU/CSU, especially the advent of the Kennedy administration and U.S. movement towards détente. Added to these external factors were the complex, personal rivalries involved in the struggle over who would succeed the aging but still formidable Adenauer as Chancellor.

The controversy began in the late 1950s as the result of two, inter-related developments. First there were growing doubts
about the credibility of the U.S. strategic guarantee, triggering a West German campaign to gain some measure of shared control over the nuclear weapons. (736) The second, more fundamental problem was the U.S. move towards greater detente with the Soviet Union. (737)

The debate over strategic doctrine had its roots in the fact that West Germany was a non-nuclear power dependent upon others to shield it from the Soviet nuclear threat. It faced the very real possibility of a conventional military invasion from the East whose impact could be almost as devastating as a limited nuclear war on German territory. (738) The only solution was to make deterrence as credible as possible, and the best way to do so was if West German forces themselves were in the position to launch a nuclear counter strike. (739) Since, however, it seemed that neither the Western Allie nor domestic public opinion were willing to countenance direct German acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, Straß wished to at least leave the option open by equipping the Bundeswehr with delivery systems. In addition he sought greater access to NATO nuclear planning and sought to maximize the level of uncertainty surrounding the conditions under which an Allied nuclear counterstrike would be launched.

The U.S., on the other hand, had a distinct interest in limiting conflict and confining damage to Western Europe as much as possible. The new doctrine of Flexible Response was designed to maximize U.S. control over its weapons by reducing
incalculability through a detailed system of contingency planning. (740) This ran directly counter to the West German emphasis on keeping the conditions under which escalation would occur unpredictable and invited scathing criticism from Strauss, who accused the U.S. of trying to turn Germany into a nuclear battlefield. (741) Eventually these differences were papered over, but a fundamental disagreement over strategic issues had created a serious rift in U.S.-German relations. (742)

Directly linked to the debate over strategy was an even more emotional dispute over East-West policy. While in many respects the Germans had much to gain from a relaxation of tensions, it also implied a hardening of the status quo, including the division of the German nation. (743) Consequently Adenauer and his supporters desperately sought to make arms control and any other concrete improvement in East-West relations contingent upon progress on resolving the division of Europe, and sought to use the pledges made to Germany by the Western Allies in the Paris Treaties of 1955 as diplomatic leverage. Yet, with increasing bitterness Adenauer observed that the Western powers were simply not willing to be bound by their earlier promises.

Adenauer was particularly shocked by the U.S. response to the second Berlin crisis. Though the crisis was largely diffused with the erection of the Berlin Wall in August, 1961 and the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, German confidence in its ally was shaken to the core by the American failure to prevent this intensification of the physical partition of their country
and by Kennedy's readiness to compromise. Adenauer's entire policy of reunification through strength was thrown into doubt in the public eye and the CDU/CSU loss of the absolute majority in the 1961 elections was largely attributed to the Berlin crisis. (744)

It was because of these disputes over nuclear and foreign policy that Adenauer turned to France's new President, General Charles de Gaulle, who offered a vision of a European confederation capable militarily and economically of holding its own against the two superpowers. (745) De Gaulle promised to pursue a more hard-line policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and offered to replace the uncertain U.S. nuclear commitment with the French force de frappe. While initially cautious, Adenauer became increasingly enthused over aspects of de Gaulle's plans, especially those relating to increased integration. Nonetheless, he remained convinced that the integration of the U.S. in NATO was vital to European security and was not willing to totally commit himself to DeGaulle's purely Europeanist program. At the same time he could not afford to alienate France for fear that de Gaulle might pursue an independent policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Adenauer's flirtation with de Gaulle awoke concern not only abroad, but within his own party as well. The Christian Democrats divided into two camps over how to respond to the new U.S. policy of detente. One side, the so-called Gaullists led by Adenauer and Strauss (746), was opposed to any sacrifice of German national
interests and stressed European interests. The other side, the Atlanticists, was led by Gerhard Schröder and Ludwig Erhard and favored greater acceptance of the American demands for the sake of the alliance, and emphasized German unity with a transatlantic community based on common values. \(^{747}\) These divisions were reinforced by confessional differences, as Adenauer and Strauss and most of the Gaullists were Catholic, while Schröder, Erhard and the Atlanticists were predominantly Protestant. A strong element of political rivalry was also added by maneuvering to get Erhard to succeed the aging but still vigorous Adenauer.

It may be argued that this split was not only one between two rival political groups, but also incorporated a larger debate about national identity and Germany's location in the world. In short, it was a cleavage between two political cultures. The debate over national security merely served as the agent which brought this cleavage into focus.

The mid-60s saw protracted and bitter conflict between these two groups, beginning at the CDU 1962 party congress in Dortmund where Schröder called for a new Ostpolitik. \(^{748}\) He was supported by many in the CDU as well as by Erich Mende and the FDP, the Federation of German Industry (BDI) and even by the SPD and the German Unions. \(^{749}\) Bit by bit it became clear that Adenauer was losing his grip on power. In 1962 he lost one of his chief supporters when Franz Josef Strauss was forced to step down as a result of the Spiegel affair and since 1961 Adenauer's rating in the public opinion polls began to sink slowly as a
result of his growing undemocratic image and the damage the Berlin Wall inflicted upon his reputation as a statesman.

The final blow came in 1963 after the signing of the Franco-German friendship treaty, which was to be the first step towards the realization of a new French-German strategic alliance. Erhard, deeply worried by the implications of the Treaty for U.S.-West German relations, intervened. He harshly criticized the new overtures to France (in one cabinet meeting he even compared de Gaulle with Adolf Hitler) and campaigned harder to become Chancellor. The disagreement with the Atlanticists over policy towards France was the final straw which broke the camel's back. In April, 1963 Adenauer was finally replaced by Erhard, who kept Schröder as his Foreign Minister. The Bundestag ratified the friendship treaty, but added a preamble which declared that West Germany would continue to fulfill its multilateral treaty obligations, stressed the importance of transatlantic ties and the integration of NATO forces. As one French observer later wrote "one could hardly find a more complete contradiction of the entire principle of the Treaty itself. Preamble? No, a declaration that all that followed was null and void. It was as if Ronald Reagan had written the preface to the Capital of Karl Marx."

The new Chancellor was a solid Atlanticist who believed in the importance of the free flow of goods and ideas among the nations of the Western world and the decreasing relevance of the nation state in international relations. He generally supported
the U.S. in its new arms control and detente policies, and was deeply suspicious of the machinations of the French General.

Even after Adenauer stepped down, the Atlantiker-Gaullist struggle continued to rage on in the CDU with regard to arms control and relations with East Germany. Erhard soon discovered he could not gather the necessary support in his party to effect a radical shift in its position on East Germany, nor despite his previous, less than generous comments about the General, could he afford to ignore France. Over the following years both sides suffered setbacks and betrayals—the Atlanticists in connection with President Johnson’s unilateral abandonment of the MLF project, and the Gaullists by de Gaulle’s rejection of Erhard’s proposals for greater European integration.

After 1965 the dispute largely subsided, though it continued to emerge on a number of occasions, such as the campaign to prevent German ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty. The MLF issue had disappeared, and it was clear that the force de frappe was not a realistic alternative to U.S. extended deterrence; if there was uncertainty over whether in a nuclear face-off the U.S. would be willing to sacrifice Detroit for Hamburg, there was even greater skepticism over whether the French would give up Lyon for Frankfurt. Furthermore, German demands for greater participation in NATO nuclear strategy were largely satisfied with the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group inside of NATO and the U.S. promise that West Germany would be
allowed to participate if a European nuclear force ever were created.

While the conflict within the CDU was in many ways the product of specific events, such as the Berlin crisis, and of the individual personalities involved, such as de Gaulle, Adenauer and Erhard, much of the underlying cause lay in the basic geo-strategic position of the Federal Republic, in its exposed position and national division. While the feud subsided after 1965 (or at the latest 1968), it was to reemerge again in new forms in the SPD in the early 1980s, and it remains dormant within the CDU today.

What fed this dispute, however, was not only personal rivalries, but also the existence of different world views among the German Christian Democrats. The Gaullists, including Adenauer, Strauss, Guttenberg, Richard Jaeger and Heinrich Krone, while committed antinationalists, believed that Germany is tied to the other European nations by bonds of common interest and culture which outweigh the common political values and institutions that it shares with the U.S.. In a sense, they were closer to traditional German Realpolitik thinking on foreign policy than the Atlanticists, but substituted the interests of the region for the interests of the more narrowly defined nation state. Linked to this attitude was a hard-line approach to achieving reunification with the East and an impassioned opposition to detente and to making any concessions on the issue of reunification. The Atlanticists, in contrast, though also
strong supporters of European integration, tended to stress the common values Germany shares with the U.S. They tended to see Germany as not only part of West European civilization, but also as a member of an even greater community of common values (Wertegemeinschaft). There was also a hard, more pragmatic side, as the Atlanticists tended to more keenly appreciate the economic and military might of the U.S. And though they were equally committed to reunification, the Atlanticists were also more prepared to try the flexible approach adopted by the U.S. and the SPD.

Despite their differences these two views had been united during the 1940s and 50s by the task of overcoming the Nazi past and meeting the Soviet threat. In the 1960s changes in the international environment had brought their differences into the open and confronted the German elite with the task of trying to define its new national identity within a Western world itself marked by political divisions. The Gaullists posed a challenge to the institutional arrangements of NATO, but in the end even they realized that reliance on France was not a viable alternative and could not mobilize enough political support to overcome their more mainstream Atlanticist rivals. Nonetheless, a basic cleavage in the new German political-military culture had been revealed, one which was to persist long after the battles of the 1960s were over.
Throughout the 1950s and early 60s, the West German stance towards the GDR was one of uncompromising confrontation. Not only did the Federal government refuse to recognize the existence of the East German regime, but as the sole legitimate representative of the German people it further sought to prevent the recognition of East Germany by other nations as well. This extreme, rejectionist position, known as the Hallstein doctrine, had considerable popular support, and public opinion surveys in the early 60s revealed that a majority of West Germans found the division of Germany "intolerable" (52% in 1962). As the 1960s progressed, acceptance of national partition increased, so that by 1967 54% said they were becoming accustomed to it (758), but opinion data revealed continued popular repugnance for the East German regime and condemnation of its policies, especially the order to shoot any East German seeking to escape over the wall (the Schießbefehl). (759) Still in 1967 the majority of average West Germans was opposed to recognizing the East German government, with only 26% for recognition of the GDR and 61% opposed to it. (760) In the absence of any concrete domestic economic or security-related reason to do otherwise it was quite conceivable that the Federal Republic might have continued its policy of intransigence indefinitely, much as Taiwan and the PRC or the two Koreas did in Asia. (761) At the same time, however, there was increased movement on other levels of society, in the intelligentsia, the media and the political parties, for a more pragmatic approach vis- à-vis Eastern Europe, including perforce
the GDR. Moreover the German issue became increasingly subordinated to the general Western drift towards détente with the Soviet Union (762), thereby increasing international pressure on the Federal government to abandon its hard-line position.

The CDU/CSU government, despite various initiatives beginning in 1958 (763), was unable to bring itself to take the final step of accepting that reunification was presently infeasible and negotiating with the GDR to achieve other goals. In good measure Christian Democratic inflexibility was rooted in the internecine feud between the Atlanticists and the Gaullists. (764) Over the course of the 60s West Germany was gradually forced by a combination of domestic and international political pressures to change its stance, adopting a new foreign policy of openness towards the East called Ostpolitik.

Accompanying this change in foreign policy was a profound transformation of the broader German political, intellectual and social climate, culminating in the student movement of 1968. The German Zeitgeist, the spirit of the times, had shifted in favor of social and political renewal, and the CDU, as even many new Christian Democratic leaders recognized, was incapable of adapting. This new mood not only eased the revision of German foreign policy to meet new international pressures, but gave it a distinctly German character and unleashed dynamics which made the West Germans willing to go further than their Western Allies and the U.S. was pushing them to do, eventually transforming the German issue from a major obstacle to détente to one of its
primary motors. This shift in West German attitudes was to have profound implications not only for domestic politics, but for foreign policy as well. It made an acceptance of detente and non-military diplomatic tools an integral part of how Germans tried cope with national partition and how they viewed their relationship to Eastern Europe in general.

The catalytic event in this process was the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the apparent bankruptcy of Adenauer's strategy of achieving reunification through strength. (765) The West's helplessness in the face of this hardening of the division of the German nation led many to conclude that the Hallstein doctrine and other traditional approaches to the problem were simply inadequate. (766) There then began a long, protracted groping in all three parties towards a new position on relations to East Germany and Eastern Europe.

The first tentative steps came in the FDP in 1962, but were quickly squashed by internal resistance. (767) A year later, in July 1963, Egon Bahr, Willi Brandt's chief advisor on foreign policy issues, presented his concept of "change through rapprochement" (Wandel durch Annäherung) in a speech at Tutzing. Instead of continuing to insist on reunification, Bahr argued that the only realistic policy was to encourage an improvement of political conditions and human rights in the East by increasing economic, political and social relations with the Communist nations. In the larger context of detente he felt that Germany, because of its divided status and geographical location in the
center of Europe, could make an especially valuable contribution to detente. (758) Bahr’s ideas became the basis of the SPD’s Ostpolitik of the late 60s and early 70s. Equally important, it became clear that the SPD and the emerging main stream in the FDP were closer to one another on at least this issue than either party was to the CDU.

Outside of the political parties the current of opinion moved in favor of an approach similar to Bahr’s. Many of the nation’s leading liberal newspapers, including the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Frankfurter Rundschau, the weekly Die Zeit, and the popular Stern magazine, lobbied actively for a more flexible approach vis-à-vis East Germany. (769)

Many important intellectual figures added their voices to the chorus calling for a revision of Germany’s Eastern policies, putting it in the context of a larger reform of West German society and West Germany’s role in the world. The noted philosopher Karl Jaspers published in 1966 an influential book, Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? (Where is the Federal Republic heading?) in which he criticized West Germany’s inadequate democratic consciousness and argued that a nation with Germany’s recent past had no right to make claims on other countries and should recognize the Oder-Neisse line, one of the major obstacles to better relations with Eastern Europe. Jaspers also contended that throughout German history there had always existed two rival currents of thought, one democratic and one nationalist. Were reunification actually achieved, it might prove inimical to West
Germany’s fragile democratic traditions by overly strengthening the hand of the nationalists. (770)

Other major social groups signaled their support for a new approach. Business leaders were eager to take advantage of opportunities which detente might bring, or at least were determined not to fall behind their foreign competitors in developing the potential markets of Eastern Europe. (771) And in 1965 both the Evangelical and Catholic churches came out with statements favoring improved relations with the East. (772)

In 1966, largely because of disagreements over domestic political issues, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition dissolved, to be replaced by the grand coalition of the Christian Democrats and the SPD. (773) The new Chancellor, Georg Kiesinger, openly embraced the Social Democratic “change through rapprochement” concept and made Willy Brandt his new Foreign Minister. Egon Bahr became chief of planning at the Foreign Ministry. Kiesinger and Brandt were able to drop the previous German demand that reunification should be a precondition for detente and also gave up trying to isolate East Germany. The strict application of the Ballstein doctrine was largely abandoned, and diplomatic relations with East European governments with the exception of the GDR were resumed in 1967. (774)

Nonetheless, the new government continued to refuse to recognize the GDR or abandon its claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the German people. (775) While in this way the minimum needed to adjust German foreign policy to that of its
other allies had probably been accomplished, internal pressures for change continued unabated.

In 1969 the West German domestic political environment continued to move leftwards as the sometimes violent student movement made its presence felt on campuses and city streets throughout the nation. Symbolizing the new mood was the election of Gustav Heinemann, who for decades had been Germany's leading peace activist and a prominent member of the older generation who supported the new "critical youth" (kritische Jugend), to the largely ceremonial office of Federal President. After his election Heinemann publicly pronounced that his long-held views on the Bundeswehr and nuclear weapons had been vindicated by his election. (776)

In the Federal Elections that September the SPD and the FDP gained enough votes (42.7% and 5.8%) so they could form a government with Willi Brandt as the new Chancellor. The Christian Democrats, who continued to receive a larger share of the vote than either of the new coalition members (46.1%), found themselves for the first time in the role of opposition party.

The new government rode into office on the back of a widespread perception that West German society was in urgent need of reform. Many Germans both on the Left and in the political Center felt that the opportunity for a second Stunde Null was at hand, a chance to complete the process begun after the first Stunde Null of 1945, and rid German society of the legacy of its undemocratic past. (777) Willi Brandt became the embodiment of
this new spirit of reform, one which he clearly saw as having external as well as internal dimensions. Since in policy terms the Grand Coalition had already achieved most of the Social Democratic agenda, arguably Brandt and the FDP had little choice but to emphasize foreign policy in order to distinguish themselves from previous governments. (778) Already with his inaugural address, Brandt set the tone, calling on the nation to "risk greater democracy" (mehr Demokratie wagen), and then linking the task of reform to a new Ostpolitik:

This government acts on the assumption, that the questions which confront the German people as a result of WW II and the National Betrayal of the Hitler Regime, can be answered only in the a European Peace Order (Europäische Friedensordnung) ... The Germans are not bound together merely by their common language and, with all its glory and misery, their common history; we all dwell together in Germany. We have in addition also a common mission and a common responsibility for peace among ourselves and in Europe. Twenty years after the foundation of the Federal Republic and the GDR we must prevent a further drifting apart of the German nation ... Even if two German states exist together in Germany, they cannot be as foreign lands to one another; their relationship can only be of a special nature. (779)

What made Brandt's speech a watershed in the history of German post-war foreign policy was his use of the term "two German states, tacitly acknowledging that there indeed were two German states. In addition, he made "preserving the substance of the nation" (Erhaltung der Substanz der Nation) the chief objective of his new Ostpolitik, a goal with strong appeal to both the political Left and the Right. An important hidden objective was to create an alternative in case the U.S., weakened by its fiasco in Vietnam, decided to withdraw from or greatly
reduce its commitment to Western Europe. (780) For this reason Brandt also sought a European security conference embracing both the West and the Communist East. Such conference could be counted on to further Europeanize the German question and create a peace process supported by both sides of the East-West confrontation.

While defense policy per se may not have been greatly altered by the advent of the SPD-FDP coalition, security policy, on the other hand, was revolutionized as West Germany went from being, at best, a reluctant follower of détente to one of its chief engines. Brandt and Bahr were prepared to contemplate a far greater degree of cooperation with the Soviet Union than any of their predecessors had. In some respects their ultimate vision of the future was not too far removed from the Social Democratic conception of collective security in the 1950s.(781)

Since it was clear that the East German government of Walter Ulbricht was totally unwilling to engage in serious negotiations with the Federal Republic, the initial target of West German diplomacy was the Soviet Union. Brandt and Bahr calculated, correctly as it turned out, that if the Soviet Union could be won over, more pressure could be brought to bear on the GDR. Over the next two years Brandt and Bahr launched a campaign of long and arduous negotiations, backed by massive economic incentives to the East, which ultimately succeeded in achieving a number of agreements between the Federal Republic and its Eastern neighbors, including the U.S.S.R., culminating in the normalization of relations with the GDR in 1971.
Perhaps the most symbolically significant of the many episodes in this process was Brandt's 1970 trip to Warsaw. At the signing of a new treaty on the Oder-Neisse line, Brandt once again underlined his central message that through Ostpolitik Germany was laying to rest the burdens of the past, commenting "my government accepts the results of history." (782) Even more powerful for its emotional impact was his visit to pay respects to the monument honoring the victims of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising. There Brandt fell to his knees and bowed his head, a stark symbol of German penance for the hideous crimes of the Nazi era. This gesture, along with the new treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, won Brandt a shower of accolades from abroad and in 1971 Brandt became the first post-war German statesman to win the prestigious Nobel peace prize. No modern German politician had ever enjoyed such acclaim outside of his own country, a fact deeply appreciated by a West German nation which only recently had begun to face up to its grim past and which was intensely aware of its continued pariah status in the world.

Although the various international obstacles had been removed, Brandt still had to face his critics at home. Most of the CDU/CSU was opposed to the treaties with the GDR, though they supported the treaties with Moscow and Poland. In part this opposition was born of philosophical disagreement with the entire thrust of Ostpolitik, and in part it was born out of the complicated infighting for leadership of the CDU.(783) The CDU did not oppose Ostpolitik in its entirety since public opinion
polls showed that the overwhelming majority of Germans, over 82%, had swung around in favor of recognizing East Germany. Rather the Union chose to focus its critique on the manner in which the new Ostpolitik had been conducted, arguing that too many ill-considered concession had been made to the Communists.

The new chairman of the CDU, Rainer Barzel, encouraged by defections from the FDP and by CDU/CSU victories in state elections which gave it control of the Bundesrat, decided he could topple the Brandt government through a no-confidence vote. (784) In the desperate political struggle that ensued, the SPD government survived by only two votes, including two CDU deputies who had been bribed, probably by the East German secret service. (785)

Despite this victory, Brandt was still forced to compromise after Barzel managed to block the federal budget. A preamble was then hastily worked out by Barzel and Brandt which placed a number of clear limitations on the Moscow Treaty. The new document, known as the May declaration, underlined that both peace and security were the fundamental goals of West German foreign policy, that the inalienable right to self-determination was not affected by the treaties, and it reasserted West German commitment to NATO and European integration. Only once these caveats were in place were the treaties finally ratified. Though the CDU did not vote for the treaties because of CSU pressure, Barzel managed to prevent his party from voting against it. The Basic Treaty with the GDR was then ratified after Federal
elections, which gave both the SPD and the FDP increased shares of the vote (45.8% and 8.4% respectively) and reinforced Brandt's popular mandate for Ostpolitik. (786)

CDU/CSU opposition did not cease even then, but to all intents and purposes the battle had been won by the SPD. Brandt's Ostpolitik had won public and institutional approval and now became a permanent fixture of West German foreign policy, even after it was down played following Brandt's replacement with Helmut Schmidt. It opened the way for further efforts to relax East-West tensions, culminating in the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Helsinki peace process of 1975, even as U.S. enthusiasm for detente began to wane rapidly.

Whereas as before West Germany had been one of the chief opponents of detente because of its national interests and a deeply embedded anti-Communism, those interests were redefined as a result of U.S. pressure and because of internal political forces. In this context an important legitimating role was played by the powerful German sense of moral obligation to preserve the peace and to pursue reconciliation with the peoples of Eastern Europe, who had been the greatest victims of World War II. These forces alone would not have been able to trigger the revolution of relations with Eastern Europe that was Ostpolitik. It was U.S. foreign policy which provided the decisive impetus to do so. At the same time, it was domestic factors which gave the final acceptance of detente by the Federal Republic a peculiar German
cast and brought it a strength and dynamism that went beyond what
the international system alone called for.

Ostpolitik triggered an intense domestic political battle in
which the victory of the new position was far from assured and
which might very easily have gone the other way. It would not be
inappropriate to compare the struggle and the resultant change in
West German thinking to a crisis and paradigm shift. At the same
time, West German conservatives were able to exercise a
moderating influence on the SPD government and prevent it from
moving too far in the direction of collective security as
envisioned by Bahr. Though the fundamental German approach to
military security remained unaltered, its political strategy for
increasing security had been greatly modified. Not too
surprisingly the tensions between these two goals were soon to
manifest themselves.

The West German commitment to detente was consequently much
stronger than that of any other Western power, and even in the
late 1970s the Federal Republic was loathe to abandon it, despite
increasing evidence that neither the U.S. nor the other NATO
allies were anxious to pursue it and despite growing evidence
that the Soviet Union had continued to build up its military
strength and project its power abroad. But in the meantime the
West German consensus in favor of Ostpolitik had grown and
spread, to the point that in the 1980s even after the CDU
regained power it clung to the basic course which had been set by
Brandt. (787) At the same time, a process had been set in motion
within the SPD which began to undermine the pragmatic conversion to NATO security policy it had achieved at Bad Godesberg.

The Political-Military Culture of West Germany - circa 1977

The period between 1956 to 1977 saw the further development of the West German political-military culture as the various political actors sought to adjust themselves to the realities of the Cold War and later to the emergence of detente. The polarization of the 1950s gradually gave way to a new consensus in which first the SPD accepted NATO, and then the Union was gradually forced to accept greater accommodation with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe and the reality of national partition. The earlier ideological constellation of groups (peace-through-strength, reunification-versus-rearmament and pacifist) underwent considerable evolution as various domestic political actors began to adjust themselves to the complex nature of Germany’s post-war geo-strategic position.

The key question was where one sees West Germany’s interests and identity as lying geographically; with a broader community of nations with common values and institutions; with a more narrowly defined cultural collectivity of Western Europe; or with a larger European community including Eastern Europe and possibly the Soviet Union.

This question has often runs parallel to debates over the role of common traditions and historical experiences in German
foreign policy, with those favoring an Atlanticist perspective assigning it relatively little value while the other two groups usually paying it greater heed, though with diametrically opposed perspectives on the question. (788)

The differences between these groups on different issues regarding defense and other important domestic political issues can be summarized as follows.

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Despite these points of contrast, it should be underlined that virtually all of the major leaders of the period were united
by their common denunciation of nationalism, which they
associated with Nazism and militarism, and were at least publicly
committed to the goal of achieving eventual reunification, though
they differed on how this was best to be accomplished.

The following seeks to analyze the extent to which these
different groups are distributed across the major sectors of the
West German political system.

I. Public Opinion

The single greatest shift in public opinion in the 1960s was
a move from opposition to recognizing the GDR to an acceptance of
the status quo. In 1967 still 61% of those surveyed opposed
recognition and only 27% supported it. A mere 4 years later
support for recognition had swelled to 42%, though 43% were still
opposed. (789) Parallel to this process was a steady increase in
support for accepting the territorial boundaries set by the Oder
Neisse line. In 1959 still a full 67% of those surveyed were
determined not to accept the new borders, while only 12% were
willing to do so. These numbers steadily shifted during the 1960s
until in 1971 61% were prepared to accept the Oder–Neisse line
and a mere 18% were willing to contest them. (790)

In addition by the early 70s a far larger segment of West
German public opinion believed that the Soviet Union was
genuinely interested in peace, 50% in June 1971 as opposed to
only 26% in 1966. This moment of trust proved relatively short-
lived, and in 1974 those who distrusted the Soviet Union's commitment to peace had increased to 55%. (791) At the same time the feeling of threat remained low even after popular faith in the Soviet Union's good will receded. In 1962 EMNID surveys showed that 63% felt that the Communist threat was either large or very large, while only 23% felt the threat was not so serious. By 1967 those who perceived a threat decreased to 31% and those who did not increased to 49%. In 1972 the sense of threat was a mere 31% while a full 66% felt there was little or no communist threat. Even in 1977 the perception of a Communist threat remained relatively low at 41%. (792) In other words, by 1977 the majority neither trusted nor feared the Soviet Union.

During the same period there was a dramatic increase in the popular German perception of Soviet strength. In 1962, when asked which side was militarily stronger, 36% of those surveyed felt that NATO was stronger, 8% the Eastern Bloc and 26% felt they were equal. By 1971 only 15% believed NATO stronger, 25% the Eastern Bloc and 55% felt they were equal. By the late 70s the perception of Communist strength shifted further in favor of the Soviet Union, and in 1976 35% felt the Soviets were the strongest, 13% felt NATO was and 34% felt the two sides were equal. (793)

Parallel to this development was a decrease of admiration for the U.S., perhaps owing to the negative impact of the Vietnam war and the growing perception of the shortcomings of the American system. When asked what country is the Federal
Republic's best friend, in 1965 the U.S. was the overwhelming favorite, with 59%, with France in a distant second place with 8%. The following years saw a steady decline of German trust for the U.S., to 49% in 1969 and 32% in 1973, before enjoying a limited revival in the mid-70s. West German faith in its other West European neighbors also increased, though all continued to trail far behind the U.S. There was no concomitant increase of trust in Eastern Europe. The number of those who felt that Germany had no true friends increased from 19% in 1965 to 28% in 1973 and 1975. (794)

Given increased ambivalence about the U.S. and the perception of greater Soviet might one might well have anticipated a decrease of West German confidence in their security system, which is precisely what happened with the rise of the peace movement in the late 70s and early 1980s. In the 1956-1977 period, however, the sense of threat was so low that there was no popular sense of need to reexamine the basis of West German defense and alliance politics.

Instead, there was a steady growth in support for the key institutions responsible for West German security. Support for the Bundeswehr remained high, if unenthused, with over two thirds of those surveyed in the late 60s and 1970s indicating that they thought the Bundeswehr to be either very important or important. After 1974 support even increased to over 70%. (795) The view that NATO brought more benefits than disadvantages increased, from 29% in 1956 to 33% in 1963 to 47% in 1971 and 48% in 1979.
And whereas in 1961 given a choice between alliance with the U.S. or neutrality, more chose neutrality (42%) over alliance (40%), the balance slowly shifted in favor of the alliance over the course of the following 15 years; to 46% versus 37% in 1965, 44% versus 38% in 1969, and 48% versus 38% in 1975. (796)

Likewise West German popular support for European integration grew tremendously during this period, as both the SPD and the FDP came to openly embrace the goal. In 1965, given the choice between German reunification and European unification, 69% opted for the national over transnational options. By 1973 the balance had virtually reversed itself, as 65% versus 24% preferred the European over German national reunification. (797) Support for German reunification, however, remained very high, in 1976 61% indicated that they very much hoped for reunification, while only 36% felt it no so important. There was, however, a clear difference between the generations on this issue, with a clear majority of younger Germans (52% versus 44%) viewing it as not so important. (798)

This increase in support for the pillars of West German post-war security policy should not be interpreted, however, as a growth in support for expanding Germany’s military role. In the Summer of 1965, as the U.S. looked to its allies to provide support for the war in Vietnam, polls showed an overwhelming 88% were opposed to sending German troops abroad, while only 3% were ready to support such a move. (799) Similarly there was only limited support for increasing the West German defense budget,
with no more than 16% at any point between 1967 and 1979 for increasing defense spending. (800) Also surveys from the late 1950s, when the debate over the atomic issue was at its height, show that a large majority was opposed to equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons - (69% in 1958). (801)

In summary the 1960s and 1970s saw a major increase of public support for the military security system established under Adenauer. The popular mood swung towards acceptance of all the major pillars of West German security policy, including the Bundeswehr, NATO, and European integration. A majority could even be found in favor of supporting defense expenditures at their current level. The one new development was the addition of detente to the repertoire of West German security policies. The redefinition of German national interests which accompanied this shift proved enduring even though some of the conditions which had brought it about in the first place (the increase in trust in the Soviet Union, the decrease in the level of perceived Communist threat and a pro-detente U.S. foreign policy) did not. In 1973 49% of those surveyed felt that Ostpolitik, i.e. reaching an understanding with the nations of Eastern Europe, had been worthwhile and 29% did not. In January 1980 the level of support even increased to 51% versus 25%. And the vast majority of West Germans in January 1980 favored the further promotion of Detente (Entspannungspolitik) 74% versus 17%. (802)

II. Intellectuals
Between 1956 and 1977 Germany's "critical intellectuals" wandered through a series of causes, a succession of unfulfilled and perhaps unfulfillable crusades. They first devoted themselves to the peace movement of the late 1950s, and then refocused their energies on more clearly domestic themes like war guilt and democratizing West German society. The SPD under Willi Brandt provided a new institutional home for the intellectuals and helped redirect their energies once again to foreign policy, this time combining Ostpolitik and detente with democratization and acknowledging the moral responsibilities of the German nation. At the same time a new post-war generation grew into political maturity, launching a virtual cultural revolution. Eventually the young radicals of 1968 were to become the basis of a new peace movement and the Green party, far more radical socially and politically than the older generation with its bitter experiences with Communism and the Soviet Union.

Intellectuals provided one of the main sources of support for the "Fight the Atomic Death" peace movement of the late 1950s. The leading peace activists of the early 1950s, Heinemann, Goßwitzer and Niemoeller were more active than ever. Together with other important intellectual figures such as Alfred Weber and Hans Werner Richter, they helped the SPD draft the manifesto of the peace movement in 1958. They received important support from the German scientific and artistic communities, as well as large segments of the Evangelical church.

German nuclear physicists, such as Werner Heisenberg, Hans
Bethe and Max Born and the other members of the so-called Göttingen 17, were horrified by the role that German science and scientists had played in the creation of the atomic bomb. They came to the forefront of the anti-nuclear movement in 1957. Together with other scientists formed the Federation of German Scientists, which periodically renewed its commitment to the manifesto and forged ties with other, international anti-nuclear groups.

Helmut Gollwitzer and Martin Niemoeller led a strong faction within the Evangelical church, called the Brethren, who, following the renowned theologian Karl Barth, rejected traditional Protestant teaching on just war and the separation of church and state. They argued that in an age of nuclear weapons the church had a moral duty to take an activist position opposing nuclear weapons.

Not all intellectuals, however, supported the peace activists. A number of prominent West German thinkers, most notably Karl Jaspers and Helmut Thielicke, while taking the threat of nuclear annihilation seriously, sharply criticized the peace activists, who they felt were ignoring the equally great threat to mankind posed by Communist totalitarianism. Also one of the leaders of the Göttingen 17, Carl-Friedrich von Weizäcker, soon became one of West Germany’s leading defense intellectuals, developing a sophisticated, nuanced view of atomic strategy which accepted nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal, but in the meantime recognized the need for strategic deterrence.
His 1958 book on nuclear strategy *Mit der Bombe leben* (to live with the bomb), and had an important impact on the development of the strategic thinking of SPD moderates like Helmut Schmidt. *(805)*

Weizäcker, together with Eugen Gerstenmaier of the CDU and Helmut Thielicke, also played an important role in thwarting Heinemann and Gollwitzer's attempt to make the Evangelical church an instrument of the "Fight the Atomic Death" movement. *(806)*

After Bad Godesberg and the pragmatic conversion of the SPD, the peace movement lost its main institutional basis. Thereafter Germany's intellectuals shifted their attentions to various, inner political problems, especially the failure of the general West German populace to fully face up to the horrors of the Nazi era and the related problem of (as they saw it) the unfinished state of West German democracy. *(807)* The anti-nuclear crusade continued, organizing the annual Easter marches against nuclear weapons, the numbers of whose participants swelled from 50,000 in 1963 to 130,000 in 1965. *(808)*

In the mid-60s there appeared a series of influential books by the older generation of liberal scholars criticizing the state of West German democracy and calling for its reform lest it succumb to anti-democratic traditions still latent within the society. The first of these was Georg Picht's *Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe*, published in 1964 and serialized in the popular journal *Stern*, which called upon Germany's academics to play a leading role as social and political critics. Even more influential was Karl Jasper's *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik,*
published in 1966 (809), in which he warned that the Federal Republic had not successfully cleansed itself of the forces that had given rise to the Nazis, and that with its system of social hierarchy and exaggerated respect for the authority of the state it was essentially a continuation of the Third Reich. (810)

These calls encouraged a new generation of young scholars and students to challenge the social, cultural and political institutions of the Federal Republic. While this was part of a broader, world-wide movement, arguably the difficult legacy of Germany’s past lent the student movement a particular vigor and staying power which it would have lacked otherwise. (811) Unlike their predecessors of the 1950s, the new generation had been brought up in an era of growing superpower detente and without direct experience of life under totalitarian rule. Their image of the U.S. was more likely to be colored by Vietnam than by the Marshall Plan, and having never known the kind of material deprivation that the post-war generation had, they were less appreciative of its accomplishments. They were less likely to make a distinction between the liberal democracies of the West and the Communism of the East, and instead condemned both as antithetical to the kind of egalitarian, participatory democracy they hoped to achieve. They drew their intellectual inspiration from such respected German scholars as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse (the founders of the so-called Frankfurt school of philosophy), as well as the rising star in the West German academic firmament, Jürgen Habermas. (812)
Beginning in Berlin, German cities and campuses were rocked by student demonstrations. These demonstrations became increasingly large-scale and violent, and some radical groups, notably the Bader-Meinhoff gang, went underground and began a spectacular campaign of terrorism designed to undermine the political and economic order of the Federal Republic.

Unlike Japan, the young radicals received institutional support from the SPD and, to a lesser extent, the FDP. In 1969 Brandt called on his party to take in the "generation of unrest" (Generation der Unrast) and not abandon them to the spiritual desert. If properly incorporated, they could make an important contribution to German democracy and enhance its internal stability. Brandt also brought many leading writers and journalists into his personal entourage, such as the novelist Günter Grass. This relationship between temporal power and the cultural elite, however, was inherently unstable, and already under Brandt many intellectuals (including Grass) became disillusioned with the possibilities for reform from within the system. (813) Nonetheless, the critical German intelligentsia, more so than in other advanced industrial nations, found an institutional home on the Left, helping make the revolution of 1968 more long-lasting than it was elsewhere. (814)

With the successful implementation of Brandt's Ostpolitik, followed by Brandt's fall from power, the intellectuals and young radicals of the 1968 generation drifted away from the SPD. They focused their energies on other, non foreign-policy related
issues, especially the environment and the anti-nuclear movement. They continued to be instinctively suspicious of the armed forces, the "military-industrial complex" and the alliance structure and tended to favor detente and collective security. Representative of their views on security issues were a new generation of peace researchers, including most notably the seminal theoretical works of Dieter Senghaas and Johann Galtung, as well as the more empirical work by a whole contingent of young researchers gathered at various universities and such institutions as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the recently founded Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. (815) The arguments and criticisms of existing defense policy were soon to be adopted by and provide intellectual legitimacy to the new peace movement of the late 70s.

III. Media

On balance the media in the 1960s and most of the 1970s paid relatively little attention to the issue of military security and strategy. Only a handful of reporters, such as Adalbert Weinstein and Paul Sethe of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Christian Potyka of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, regularly covered issues concerning the armed forces and military strategy. (816)

The broad editorial fronts first established during the 1950s remained largely in place in the 1960s and 70s. The Hamburg Trinity" of the Der Spiegel, Die Zeit and Stern, along with the
politically more leftist Frankfurter Rundschau were generally critical of CDU's defense policy and more supportive of the SPD. They were especially active in lobbying for a new Ostpolitik, and with it for a fundamentally different West German approach to security issues. (817)

At the same time, Augstein of Der Spiegel, who during the 1950s had been highly critical of the Bundeswehr and its proposed nuclear armament, followed the SPD in accepting NATO and extended deterrence in the 1960s, especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (818) The Süddeutsche Zeitung, guardian of the liberal tradition of South Germany, followed much a similar line. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and even more so Die Welt were more supportive of the CDU. As the 60s progressed, especially Die Welt became a major mouth piece for the Gaullists. (819)

While the printed media as a whole consolidated itself and expanded in the 1960s and 1970s (820), the circulation of liberal newspapers generally increased more than did that of the centrist and conservative papers. Rudolf Augstein’s Der Spiegel’s circulation went up from approximately 200,000 in 1955 to over 900,000 in 1970 (821), Gerd Buckerius’s Die Zeit went from 50,000 in 1956 to over 350,000 in 1975 (822), and Stern under the dynamic Henri Nannen posted perhaps the most remarkable gains, from 464,457 in 1951 to 1,688,317 in 1981.(823) Among the non-liberal papers, the more conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also grew considerably, from 55,428 in 1961 to 316,021 in
1981, but both the Rheinischer Merkur and Die Welt stagnated around 50,000 and 200,000 respectively. (824)

The conservative Springer publishing empire, which also published Die Welt, became a favorite target of the student movement, which demanded that the empire be disbanded and its possessions disappropriated. (825) Nonetheless, the concern continued to prosper, and its Bild Zeitung, with a circulation of close to 4 million, remained by far the largest newspaper in West Germany. Thus, although the liberal "quality" press may have dominated the educated, middle-class readership (especially in Protestant North Germany), and the press in general, together with the West German intellectual establishment, moved to the left, there remained influential conservative voices in the German media. And the mass press, as represented by Bild, continued to be propagate a world view very different from that of Der Spiegel and Die Zeit.

IV. Industry

During the 1960s and 70s West German industry avoided taking positions on issues of military strategy, much as it had in the 1950s. The BDI and several prominent industrial leaders, such as Wolfgang von Amerong, did support the move towards Ostpolitik, and there was considerable interest in the early 1970s in exploiting the natural resources (especially natural gas) and untapped markets of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Where business did make its presence felt was in the area of procurement policy, where it pushed for the promotion of domestic and European arms industry and for the loosening of restrictions on arms exports. Defense production, as a percentage of the general economy, however, remained small; defense expenditures, figured according to NATO criteria, rose from 7,956,000,000 in 1959 (4% of GDP) to 31,562,000,000 in 1975 (3.5% of GDP). As a percentage of total West German manufacturing it hovered around the 2% mark. While it was a highly profitable business, the Defense Ministry, heedful of the examples of Krupp and I.G. Farben in the pre-war period, successfully prevented any major German firm from becoming dependent on defense contracts alone. On the other hand, certain industrial sectors, especially aeronautics and ship building, became highly dependent on defense production, and the Social Democrats were as interested in supporting these as the Christian Democrats had been, albeit SPD governments were inclined to place the emphasis more on securing jobs (Arbeitsplätze) than on improving industrial competitiveness.

There was also considerable interest in some sectors of industry to use the defense sector as a means of improving the West German technological base, especially in the aeronautics field, where some West German leaders hoped to use Bundeswehr contracts as a way of building a competitive industry. In the 1960s this interest expanded beyond Germany's national boundaries and became linked to a drive to create a more
independent West European arms industry, especially through arms cooperation with the French.

The clearest expression of the German argument in favor of independent weapons production came in a series of articles, beginning in 1967, by a "Research Circle on Defense and Economics", published in the Wehr und Wirtschaft, the main mouthpiece of the West German arms industry. The first of these articles began by painting an ominous background of a disintegrating NATO and the threat of a renationalizing of European defense policies (at the time France had just left the integrated structure of NATO). It argued that West Germany, in order to avoid being completely at the mercy of the whims and vagaries of its allies must be capable of acting more independently militarily. It must plan a territorial defense, including a large military mobilization capacity, and keep the option of going neutral open. To this end Germany needed to develop the ability to be largely self reliant in weapons production, especially in the high-technology areas. (830)

In the end NATO was able to weather the storms of the mid-1960s, helped in part by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Consequently there was no need for a drastic course alteration in West German defense policy. West Germany, however, did develop a highly sophisticated arms industry, and many of its products, the Tornado, the Leopard I and II tanks and the U-boat, were equal to anything that the U.S. had to offer. Consequently beginning in the mid-1970s West German weapons exports began to increase
greatly. At the same time, much of the technology continued to be imported, either licensed from the U.S. or otherwise acquired through coproduction, and the widely expected technological spin-offs for the civil economy for the most part did not appear. Despite dire warnings by various peace researchers, a military industrial complex failed to emerge.

". FDP

The FDP's relatively small size forced it to try to follow the national political flow rather than to try to alter its course; if it were not able to make itself politically relevant by participating in the government, the Free Democrats ran the risk of falling below the 5% barrier and into political oblivion. Thus the FDP had no choice but to read the shifting currents of West German politics, and its success permitted it not only to survive, but made it indispensable to its larger coalition partners and turned it into the trend setter in West German foreign policy.

In the late 1950s the left and right wings of the FDP, united by a common concern with keeping alive the possibility of reunification (831), joined the SPD in supporting the anti-nuclear peace movement. (832) After the disastrous state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia, however, the more conservative, national wing of the party under Erich Mende and Rheinhold Maier reasserted its control and the FDP soon disassociated itself from the SPD campaign. In 1959 the young
Hans Dieter Genscher and Fritz-Rudolf Schultz worked out a new FDP plan which envisioned a variant of flexible response, with special NATO units responsible for nuclear deterrence. West German forces, as part of NATO, would naturally participate in such units. After 1961, they rejoined the CDU/CSU in coalition government. (833)

In the mid-1960s, with strong support from *Spiegel* and *Stern* and intellectuals like Ralf Dahrendorf, the party moved hesitantly towards a more conciliatory approach to Ostpolitik. After the FDP was unexpectedly ousted by the formation of the Grand Coalition, the trend towards Ostpolitik and opening the party to the new spirit of the 60s accelerated. Among other things, the party supported recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and shelving for the time being reunification.

Mende, who continued to oppose the new party line on Ostpolitik, was replaced by Walter Scheel. Scheel, together with Wolfgang Mischnick and Hans Dieter Genscher (called the "Saxon guard" because all three came from the East German region of Saxony) worked together to steer the party further in the direction of the SPD. (834) At the 1969 Nürnberg Party Conference the FDP adopted the idea of a European "peace order" based on a mutual renunciation of force, West German entry into the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the adoption of a clearly defensive strategy (within the confines of NATO) by the Bundeswehr. (835)

In 1969 the FDP joined the SPD to form a coalition government, largely based on their common interest in creating a
new Ostpolitik. In the mid-1970s there were two rival factions on defense and security issues. The first, led by William Borm, was more pro-detente and was committed to the idea of collective security. It advocated a more independent and united Europe, and pushed for a broader definition of security, one embracing not only military but also economic, North-South and social dimensions. (836) The second more conservative faction was led by Jürgen Mölleman. (837) While more supportive of the Atlantic relationship, it stressed closer European cooperation in defense and foreign policy for a variety of reasons, including most importantly because a Europeanization of security policy would help place Europe on equal footing with the U.S. and strengthen the integration process. (838)

In the late 1970s the more left-wing group under Borm found itself isolated as the party began to shift towards the right on defense and security issues. (839) The concept of a Europeanization of security policy and the promotion of detente, however, were supported by both the conservative "national" and the more left wings of the FDP, and were gradually incorporated into the FDP platform, and in 1977 the party passed a working program calling for an end to all atomic testing and for a German right to veto the use of NATO nuclear weapons in the FRG. (840)

The swing to the left and in favor of adopting a more Central European oriented, anti-military stance within the FDP was thus aborted. Instead, the mood within the FDP seemed to shift in favor of adopting a more independent, West European-
centered security and defense policy, though the personalities involved (Genscher, Mölleman) were more Atlanticist then Gaullist in the 'Christian Democratic sense.

In summary, in the 1960s the FDP correctly anticipated the shifting national mood and reoriented itself in favor of detente and Ostpolitik. In the 1970s, the left wing of the party wished to go further and adopt more strongly pro-disarmament policies. But unlike the SPD, in which this momentum proved unstoppable, the FDP leadership, perhaps anticipating a shift in the political current, reined it in. (841) Two factors may have been responsible for this greater FDP prudence. First, the FDP was a smaller party, and one more directly confronted with the threat of political extinction, forcing it to be more responsive to public opinion than either the CDU or the SPD. Second, while the party's social basis had shifted from the middle class in rural areas and small towns to a younger, more urban based generation of middle-class professionals (842), it did not become the receptacle of the new generation of radicalized intellectuals who formed the left wing of the SPD's party organization. The FDP's new basis of support, while on the whole more liberal than the old, was also more pragmatic and less idealistic than many of those who after 1968 made the SPD their political home.

VI. CDU

During the period under examination it is possible to identify three major groups within the CDU/CSU: the Europeanists,
also called the Gaullists, centered around Konrad Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauss; the Atlanticists, led by Erhard and Schröder; and a large group, including such important figures as Rainer Barzel and Ernst Majonica, who tended to sway in one direction or the other depending on the overall constellation of political forces within the party, but who ideologically were probably closer to the Atlanticists than to the Gaullists.

The Gaullists were the most conservative ideologically, and were convinced of the necessity of maintaining a hard-line front vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and combating Communism wherever it appeared, both externally and internally. The Gaullists, while renouncing nationalism, developed instead a sort of transnational nationalism focusing on a Europe bound together by a shared, Christian civilization and common geographically-determined interests. In the 1950s they saw the U.S. as the West's chiefly ally in defending that civilization from the "Asian" bolshevik menace, but the U.S. was not "European". (843) In the 1960s accelerating detente shook their faith in American reliability and almost in desperation they looked to de Gaulle's vision of a Franco-German entente as a substitute. There was also a strong component of economic nationalism, and they saw Europe as a separate entity in competition with the U.S.. (844)

The Atlanticists in the Union, who briefly controlled the party in the 1960s, were also committed to the vision of a united Europe, but were less inclined to legitimate that vision through reference to common cultural and historical values. Instead they
tended to focus on shared institutions, such as democracy and free enterprise and were prepared to go along with the U.S. position on detente.

The battle between the Atlanticists and Gaullists was probably as much rooted in personal animosities and rivalries as in differences in Weltanschauung, though the role of their ideological disagreements, reinforced by regional and confessional differences (the Gaullists tended to be Catholic and from the South and Western parts of the FRG, the Atlanticists Protestant and from the North and Center), should not be underestimated. In the end the Gaullists, despite their stronger position within the party leadership and support from the conservative media, were doomed to fail because of the manifest absurdity of substituting a French nuclear shield for the American. (845)

It was also painfully obvious that France was not really interested in German reunification, and sought German support only to maximize its own interests. A 1965 poll of CDU/CSU supporters, showed that when asked which country most strongly supports German reunification, 75% chose the U.S. and only 5% France, and the overwhelming majority felt that the U.S. was the nation most committed to the Federal Republic's security, 86%, while only a paltry 3% thought that France was. (846)

At best, the Gaullists could hope to use France to exert pressure on American foreign policy. When even this proved impossible the Christian Democrats were unable to reorient
themselves to meet the changing domestic and international political climate. Already in the early 1960s some of the younger members of the CDU leadership, such as Rainer Barzel, were concerned that their party was becoming increasingly out of touch with the changing times and the concerns of the new generation. In the fierce intra-party power struggles Barzel and others were unable to achieve the kind of ideological revolution which would have been needed to get the party to reevaluate its stand on Ostpolitik, and with it various other social issues.

In other words, there was no Christian Democratic Bad Godesberg; the party was unable to achieve the kind of paradigm shift that the SPD had in order to remain capable of holding power. While realists in the Union were prepared to compromise with the SPD and FDP on Ostpolitik, they remained in principle opposed to a policy which increasingly enjoyed the solid support of the large majority of the West German population. The price of that inflexibility was high; for the next 14 years the CDU/CSU, despite successes on the state and local level, was condemned to the role of opposition party in Bonn.

VII. SPD

Between 1959-1960 the SPD was able to achieve one of the most remarkable transformations of post-war West German politics. A relatively small group of leaders, including Carlo Schmid, Herbert Wehner and Fritz Erler, were able to overcome a decades-old tradition of pacifism, deep distrust of the capitalist West
and to, at least temporarily, give up the dream of national unity. They led the party to accept NATO and military integration with the West.

But despite the changes in official SPD policy, the party was in fact deeply riven by differing views on how to best pursue German national interests. On the one side, there were those, such as Herbert Wehner and Helmut Schmidt, who were basically Atlanticists. On the other side there were those like Egon Bahr and Karl Wienand who continued to harbor dreams of achieving reunification through the creation of a peace order in Central Europe. Between these two camps was the unifying figure of Willi Brandt, who was able to appear pro-American without damaging his credentials as a left-wing idealist. With Brandt’s help, and with Wehner’s iron control over which resolutions were adopted by the party congresses, the SPD was able to defend its pragmatic conversion in the 1960s and most of the 1970s.

The Atlanticists in the SPD, including Willi Brandt, were inspired by the Kennedy administration and saw in the new American policy of detente an approach to foreign policy which was reconcilable with their own preferences. As a result, the SPD became more supportive of U.S. foreign policy than much of the CDU. The Atlanticists preferred to see the Soviet Union as a status quo power, and argued that what Europe needed was a balanced approach to relations with all the major powers. (848) At the same time the Atlanticists were clearly committed to preserving the military balance of power and saw detente and
Ostpolitik as a supplement, not an eventual replacement for NATO and the Bundeswehr. (849)

Schmidt and the pragmatists were able to keep control of defense policy during the 1960s and 70s, but not without facing challenges from those in the party who hoped for a Central European solution to the problems of German military security and reunification. (850) Making matters worse in the mid-60s Brandt seemed to favor the left-wing position, saying that his own preference was for a security policy based on foregoing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, troop reductions and a legally binding renunciation of the use of force. (851)

In 1967, however, Schmidt and Brandt overcame their differences and formed an alliance. They both supported NATO and opposed any drastic reform of the armed forces. Brandt added his belief that a peace order could be reached in Western Europe and that détente and defense were not mutually exclusive. (852) This alliance was reinforced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and was reconfirmed at the 1968 Party Conference, where despite a new emphasis on the concept of a "peace order" and cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as the U.S., Brandt prevented the party from drifting further to the left and attacking NATO. (853)

In effect, a quid pro quo was established between the Atlanticists and the left wing of the SPD whereby the essential institutions on which West German security rested (the Bundeswehr and NATO) would be left unaltered while simultaneously Brandt and Bahr were permitted to pursue a foreign policy which in the long
run was hoped to make those institutions superfluous. This bargain was continued when the SPD came to power, and while Brandt and Bahr pursued their revolutionary strategy in Eastern Europe, Schmidt saw to it that the status quo was maintained in the Ministry of Defense. This compromise, however, was inherently unstable, and might well have disintegrated already in the mid-1970s had it not been for Brandt’s downfall in 1974.

After Brandt was replaced by Schmidt German security policy returned to an emphasis on stability and deterrence over against seeking to establish a European security order. \(^{(854)}\) At the same time, West Germany was confronted with a series of economic crises in wake of the oil shock of 1973, and popular attention shifted again from foreign policy to domestic political themes. In time, however, the deterioration of detente and the hardening of U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union were to force the SPD to confront the issue of defense once again. Already in 1976 the first warning signs could be seen when, in response to President Ford’s announcement that detente was finished, Egon Bahr wrote a piece for Die Zeit with the title "Detente has just begun". \(^{(855)}\)

The SPD’s move to the left was reinforced by the growing conviction that the party had lost contact with its grass roots (die Basis) and a shift of its membership from largely the West German working class to increasingly a "new class" \(^{(856)}\) of middle-income professionals in the public, academic and media sectors. The remarkable extent and speed of this transformation
was reflected in a report released on April 11, 1973, which pointed out that of the 650,000 SPD members in 1964, only 350,000 were left in 1973, while 670,000 new members had since joined the party (160,000 in 1972 alone). Of these new members, over two thirds were under 35. And while in 1962 still 55% of all members were workers, in 1973, only 28% were. \(^{857}\).

It was precisely these new members, many of whom had gone through the universities during the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 70s, who were most inclined to favor collective security advocated by Bahr. The more radical members of them joined the so-called "new social movements", a term used to refer to a great multiplicity of counter-cultural and ecological groups for whom the SPD was too conservative and who later formed the backbone of the Green party. For the first time since the 1940s there existed a bloc of voters to the left of the SPD, giving the party's left wing a new lever with which to push their policies. A new generation emerged, one without the older generation's fear of Communism or commitment to reunification, whose instincts were more truly anti-national than transnational. This new generation was to forge an alliance with the old Left as represented by Brandt and Bahr to challenge the status quo in the late 1970s.

Conclusions

The 1956-1977 period was one of remarkable turmoil in West German political-military culture, though there was little actual
change to the system that had been established under Adenauer. The one important exception was the new Ostpolitik of the Brandt government, and even in this its accomplishments remained largely confined to the diplomatic arena as opposed to security and defense policy. The new Ostpolitik was arguably more an addition to the existing security system than a complete departure, one in keeping with West Germany’s new, anti-military tendencies.

Despite continuity in the policy area, shifting pressures from the international system buffeted the ideological constellations which had formed around the defense issue in the 1950s, forcing first the Left to alter its stand on security, and then forcing the Right out of office because of its inability to adjust to the changing times. At the same time, changes in the international environment generated internal dynamics which acted in ways not necessarily determined by those external factors. The most outstanding example of this was the sustained pressure for Ostpolitik under Willi Brandt, which transformed West Germany from being the main obstacle to detente to its chief pace maker.

As a result of these shifting political tides, the 1960s and 70s also witnessed a clarification of the complicated ideological constellation of West German political-military culture. The differences between Atlanticists and the Gaullists in the CDU, who had been united during the 1950s, came into the open in the 1960s, revealing very different views on detente and the desirability of an independent Europe. Likewise the differences between the Atlanticists and the proponents of a Central European
peace order in the SPD began to become more clearly accentuated.

On the balance, as in Japan, support for the fundamental security policies created during the immediate post-war period increased greatly in the 1960s and 70s. German public opinion polls showed a tremendous swell in support not only for the Bundeswehr, but also for NATO and the continued presence of U.S. troops in West Germany. While the longing for reunification remained strong, more West Germans than ever before were prepared to accept the status quo of post-war Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line and a separate Communist regime in the East. Furthermore, German interest in European integration began to transcend a short-term desire to achieve national rehabilitation and West Germans came to increasingly view integration as being in the nation’s long-term economic and political interest. All the major parties increasingly moved in this direction, including the previously anti-integration SPD. (858)

A consensus on Ostpolitik had not yet fully coalesced. Though it enjoyed a high degree of support in the media, the intellectual community and the SPD, the CDU/CSU and a fairly large section of public opinion remained opposed in the 1970s. Eventually, however, even the CDU was to come to terms with the new policy in order to regain control of the government.

It is appropriate to ask here if things could have gone differently from the way they in fact did. Like Japan, West German latitude for independent action had greatly increased, as West German economic, technological and political power grew to
levels unimaginable in 1956. And in fact, there were indeed efforts to utilize that increased power, especially in the economic sphere.

The mid-60s was arguably the most unstable period, with pressures to wriggle free of the American embrace from both the Left (Central Europeanists in the SPD) and the Right (the Gaullists). These pressures diminished considerably after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and they were further reduced by the decline of détente in the mid-70s. West Germany could have tried to enter a special relationship with France, though the costs of such a move would have been considerable.

Perhaps most importantly, there was nothing inevitable about the redefinition of West German interests in the wake of Brandt’s dramatic opening to Eastern Europe, which in turn led to the CSCE and Helsinki process. Far less would have been sufficient to satisfy U.S. demands. Nonetheless, Germans on both the Left and the Right came ever more to see themselves as a country balanced between East and West with a special duty to promote peace and stability. A new political-military culture was solidifying that to a remarkable extent resembled the Japanese idea of a "peace nation". A dramatic shift had occurred in Germany, one which was to change the face of the Cold War in Europe.
During the 1960s and 70s the security arrangements which had been set in place during the 1950s became more stabilized, enjoying a greater degree of support across broad sectors of their societies. At the same time these policies continued to evolve to meet changed domestic and international conditions. In the case of West Germany, change was greater, partly because detente more directly affected German interests than it did Japan's, and partly because of the inherently more unstable geopolitical position of the Federal Republic owing to its national partition and integration into Atlantic and European structures that were not perfectly compatible with one another. But even in the case of West Germany, the basic institutions designed to secure German security - the Bundeswehr, integration into NATO and into the European Community - survived largely unchanged. Ostpolitik and the active pursuit of improved relations with the East was an addition to the already existing system, but it can be understood as more an outgrowth of West Germany's new anti-military culture rather than a radical departure from it.

In this sense the 1960s and 70s were a period in which the new political-military cultures of Japan and West Germany matured and grew stronger, nurtured by the relatively benign international environment provided under the U.S. system of military hegemony and global free trade. There were other similarities in their behavior which again can be attributed to similar situations that they found themselves confronted.

At the same time, there remained important differences
between West German and Japanese security behavior during this period. Some of these differences are attributable to the dissimilar international situations the two nations found themselves in, others to structural differences in their domestic political environments. Yet others can only be explained with reference to the two countries' rather different historical experiences and attitudes, which continued to shape their perceptions of and responses to the conditions that they were confronted with.

The following chart offers a summary of the main points of similarity and difference in both West German and Japanese conditions and behavior during this period.

I. Points of Similarities in Conditions:
   1. High growth and increasing prosperity
   2. International detente - affecting U.S. relations with first the Soviet Union, and then the PRC
   3. Decreased sense of threat
   4. Loss of confidence in U.S. resolve, especially after Vietnam

II. Differences in Conditions:
   1. The increasingly pronounced choice between France and the U.S.
   2. The continued influence of territorial division on West Germany - including vulnerability to Soviet pressure because of West Berlin
   3. Longer tradition of the welfare state and larger "new class"
   4. Ongoing European integration process
   5. Splintering of the Japanese opposition

III. Points of Similarity in Behavior:
   1. Increased popular acceptance of the current security arrangements
   2. The growth of a founder myth - Yoshida-Adenauer
   3. Massive peace movements in the late 50s
   4. Radical student movements in the late 60s early 70s
   5. The emergence (and failure) of Gaullism - battle over NPT, looking for alternative security arrangements, drive for domestic defense production
IV. Differences in Behavior:
1. Flux in the West German ideological constellation
2. The inability of the Japanese student movement to sustain itself past 1970.
3. The different nature of the two Gaullisms - Europeanism versus nationalism
4. Failure of the JSP to accept the security relationship to the U.S. - linked to their failure to take power
5. Accumulation of defense taboos in Japan
6. West Germany's active promotion of detente

The key similarities between Japan and West Germany during this period on the domestic level were their continued enjoyment of political stability and economic prosperity, and on the international level the impact of superpower detente and the concomitant decrease in the sense of military threat. Linked to detente was a widespread perception that the U.S., torn by internal domestic strife and bogged down in the quagmire of Vietnam, was in a state of decline and would become both less willing and less able to maintain its commitments abroad. (859) These two factors led to quite similar behavior on the part of both Germans and Japanese.

The first of these was the remarkable increase in both countries of popular support for both the new armed forces and the alliances with the West. Support for the armed forces, which were less of a novum in the two countries’ histories, rose first, and in both cases by the early 1960s were supported by a solid majority of approximately 60% of the population. This level of popular approval, or at least acceptance, rose slowly but steadily thereafter to over 70%. Perhaps even more remarkable, and arguably more important, was the rise of support for their
countries' alliances with the U.S.. In the 1950s in both countries at best a slight plurality supported the new alliances, and a substantial minority clearly would have preferred neutrality. Support for alignment with the U.S. slowly but surely rose throughout the 60s, until by the mid 1970s a narrow but firm majority (50% in 1979 in Japan, 51% in 1974 and 48% in 1975 in West Germany) favored the alliances. The rate of increase of support for the U.S. treaty was noticeably lower in Japan than in West Germany, and only a minority of Japanese believed that the U.S. would actually come to Japan's aid in case Japan was attacked. This supports the view that the Japanese were not so much in favor of the treaty for the sake of military security, but rather because it was part of the status quo. (860)

An interesting side aspect of this growth of support was the development of legends concerning Adenauer and Yoshida as infallible founder-statesmen. Though increasingly unpopular while in office, after their deaths they became to a broad spectrum of conservative and centrist scholars the symbols of a new approach to politics and foreign policy. Present at the moment of creation, they were believed to have successfully grasped the nature of the new, post-war age and charted out a safe course for their countries through the treacherous waters of international politics. Ironically, both Adenauer and even more so Yoshida may have harbored rather different ideas about the best long-term strategy for their nations, and in their later years became advocates of a radically different, more independent (Gaullist)
approach to foreign policy, aspects of their political careers that their later biographers tended to conveniently ignore or downplay. (861)

At the same time as general support for the new security system increased, it was challenged in both countries at different points from both the Left and the Right. Initially the first challenge came just as the new alliance systems were being implemented. In both countries masses of average citizens took to the streets to protest government defense policies, in West Germany in the late 1950s as part of the "Fight the Atomic Death" campaign, and in Japan in 1960 to protest the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty. In both cases the primary target of the leftist and pacifist organizers of these movements was not achieved, the alliance with the U.S. was successfully solidified in Japan as well as Germany, the Mutual Security Treaty was revised and nuclear weapons were deployed on German soil. But also in both countries important goals were realized which were perhaps of greater concern to the average citizen upon whose participation in the demonstrations the ultimate success of these mass campaigns largely depended. In Japan the Kishi government was brought down, ending the potential threat that conservatives in the LDP would use the defense issue as a lever to change the constitution, and with it the whole of the new democratic order. In Germany the impact was more limited, but still important; Adenauer and Strauss were forced to abandon any notions they may have entertained of directly acquiring tactical nuclear weapons
for the Bundeswehr, a step which would have considerably eroded the West German perception of their nation's following an essentially defensive military strategy.

In the late 1960s there was a renewed outbreak of left-wing protest in both Japan and Germany. This movement was part of a larger global phenomenon affecting all the advanced industrial countries. This time the movements were more limited in scale, and were primarily aimed at more purely domestic political issues. They also contained a strong element of criticism of the established approaches to defense and security, which were seen as supporting unjust and repressive political systems and perpetuating a history of foreign domination. Both countries' movements were the product of a combination of factors, including the emergence of a new generation with very different experiences than those of the previous generation and concerned that democracy had been sacrificed for the pursuit of material prosperity. In both Japan and Germany there was a changing perception of the moral legitimacy of U.S. hegemony as a result of the severe domestic crises that were rocking the U.S. and because of the Vietnam war.

The new defense systems were also challenged from the political Right in both countries as a result of increased German and Japanese economic and political power and the perception of U.S. weakness and unreliability. In Japan as well as Germany there was the emergence in the right wing of the ruling conservative political parties of so-called Gaullism, though
there were important differences between the character of these two Gaullisms (see below). This led to remarkable parallels in behavior. In both countries there was fierce conservative resistance to the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (862) There were efforts to seek alternative security arrangements, a groping towards independence in the Japanese case, a quest for creating a Franco-German entente in the European. Finally, in both countries the arms industry saw in these developments an opportunity to further their own interests, pointing to the threat of U.S. withdrawal to argue that Japan and West Germany must develop self-sufficiency in weapons. This movement was strongest in the aeronautics field, where there were strong hopes of using military production to also improve the technological level of the civilian sector. And in Japan and West Germany these Gaullist tendencies were stifled by Centrists worried that if let go too far the post-war system might be endangered.

There were also many differences in conditions which help explain some of the differences between West German and Japanese behavior. In other cases these differences in behavior require further reference to other, non-structural factors rooted in German and Japanese political-military cultures. (863)

While, as argued earlier (864), the ideological constellations in the West German and Japanese political-military cultures were largely the product of their historical experiences, the greater flux in the West German situation was in
good measure the result of structural forces. The split between Atlanticists and Gaullists in the CDU/CSU was greatly encouraged by the split within the Western Alliance between the U.S. and France, without whose support the Gaullist position would have been far less viable. Likewise the precipitating event in the emergence of Gaullism, the erection of the Berlin Wall, was a factor beyond the Federal Republic's control. And the underlying issue involved, the continued division of Germany, was also a fundamental condition with which West Germans were confronted. National division also was a key factor in the latent split in the SPD between the Atlanticists and those who favored a Central European solution.

Another important dissimilarity which was almost purely due to structural factors was the relative inability of the Japanese peace movement to sustain itself much past 1970, whereas in Europe the generation of student radicals of 1968 found a political home or at least support for their efforts in social-democratic governments throughout Europe.

In addition, the class structure of Japan still differs considerably from that of other advanced industrial countries which have a longer tradition of a welfare state and a growing specialized service sector catering to various "life-style" issues (e.g. psychotherapists, marriage counselors, human services of all sorts, etc.). Thus there was a large sector of the West German economy which was ready to absorb the radicals of 1968 and which gave them the freedom, and even incentives, to
cultivate their political ideals. In comparable Japanese institutions (for example in the universities and parts of the media) there was indeed some survival of radical thought, but it did not occur on anywhere near the scale of West Germany (and, indeed, other advanced industrial countries). (865) One result in West Germany was the proliferation of new social movements, which were largely concerned with countercultural and environmental issues for most of the 1970s. (866) As a result, given this stronger popular and institutional basis, the potential for a revival of a peace movement was greater in West Germany than in Japan.

Another dissimilarity which had its roots largely in structural factors was the rather dissimilar character of Japanese and West German Gaullism. In the Japanese case Gaullism was much more clearly nationalistic, whereas in West Germany the primary focus was on a larger notion of West Europe. In this sense the Gaullism of Nakasone, Genda Minoru and the members of the Seirankai was actually far more Gaullist then that of Strauss and Adenauer. Adenauer and Strauss, in a certain sense, were transnationalist nationalists, essentially Realpolitik thinkers who substituted European civilization for the German nation. Nonetheless, this placed them in a fundamentally different category from de Gaulle and the Japanese Gaullists. (867) This West Europeanism was obviously an outgrowth of West Germany’s integration into the European Economic Community and the WEU, whereas Japan was not embedded in any comparable regional
structure, and the opportunities for creating one were decidedly limited.

Here, however, historical cultural factors began to make a difference. First, as was argued earlier (868), the success of European integration was in good measure made possible by the rise of German anti-nationalism, which in turn had its roots in the profound delegitimation of the national ideal in the wake of World War II, a phenomenon linked to the complicated issue of war guilt. Second, while West German Gaullism had some domestic components (including a tendency towards a adopting a hard-line stance against domestic opponents (869)) it was far weaker than in the case of Japanese Gaullism, which tended to link a more independent defense posture with the cultivation of patriotism in the schools, reverence for the Emperor and revision of the constitution. These linkages were the product of the peculiar features of pre-war Japanese political-military culture, which for historical reasons had survived the transition to the post-war better than it had in Germany. One consequence of this was that the Japanese Gaullists were far more of a threat to the post-war order than the Germans were, thus exciting greater alarm than in Germany and ultimately marginalizing them to a far greater extent.

Another crucial difference with both structural and historical-cultural origins was the failure of the JSP to accept the new security system. There was no Japanese equivalent to Bad Godesberg. A major structural factor involved here was the
splintering of the political opposition in Japan, making the incentive to compromise weaker than in Germany because the chances of joining the government were more remote, and because of the existence of a fairly large party, the JCP, to the left of the Socialists strengthened the hand of radical elements within the JSP who argued that the party needed the cooperation of the Communists or, at least, that it had to move to the left to gain control of this bloc of voters.

Yet, at the same time, there were strong, countervailing structural forces which should have pushed the JSP in the other direction, including the growing presence of centrist votes to the right of the JSP, the changing position of the PRC towards the Mutual Security Treaty, and the growing inability of the JSP to mobilize mass demonstrations on defense. Indeed, had the Socialists acted early enough, they might have been able to prevent the emergence of the middle-of-the-road parties. Their unwillingness to contemplate compromising on defense was rooted in historical-cultural factors, especially the deep ideological polarization of the Japanese political scene, with an at least partially reactionary right-wing ruling party and a Socialist and labor union movement with a long history as targets of brutal suppression. In addition, the 1960 demonstrations had been the one major accomplishment of the Socialist party, and their stance on defense became central to their identity.

In contrast in West Germany relations between the two major parties, while hardly friendly, were marked by a certain degree
of cooperation and trust. While both sides traded accusations, even the staunchest of CDU partisans was compelled to recognize Schumacher’s (and later Wehner’s, Schmidt’s, Brandt’s and Erler’s) committed anti-Communism. Likewise even the most bitter SPD critic was likely to acknowledge that, despite Hans Globke, the CDU was not full of out and out Nazis. In addition, while anti-militarism was an important part of the SPD’s traditional identity, it could also draw other, negative lessons from its failure to reach out to the new armed forces during the Weimar Republic, and of the danger of being labeled unpatriotic (Vaterlandslose Gesellen - rascals without a Fatherland) because of an overly idealistic opposition to national defense. (870)

One difference which was probably largely the product of cultural forces was the accumulation of taboos on defense in Japan. While comparable limitations existed in West Germany (such as Innere Führung or the limitations on arms exports(871), they were not nearly as strong or as far reaching. In the Japanese case, the restrictions on defense planning imposed in the wake of the Three Arrows incident would have severely hindered the SDF in the case of an outbreak of hostilities. Such limitations were never seriously considered in the West German case. In Japan, this accumulation of taboos was largely the result of the enormous distrust of the military, based on the experiences with Japanese militarism in the 1920s and 30s, and it was part of the price the Japanese government had to pay to win popular support, or at least tolerance, of the new armed forces.
The final important difference was West Germany's adoption of the active pursuit of detente as part of its approach to ensuring national security while pursuing national interests. In the case of Japan one could compare Ostpolitik to Japan's long-standing policy of omni-directional diplomacy (Zenhokeeping) and more specifically with efforts to improve relations with the PRC under Tanaka in 1972 and then later Fukuda in 1977. Relations with the Soviet Union were remarkably little affected by detente, in part because of the Northern Territories issue. (872) But despite the lofty rhetoric, Japanese diplomacy has in fact been largely passive, and the openings towards China were only undertaken in the wake of major U.S. initiatives, the Nixon visits and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by President Carter. Moreover, the Japanese never went as far as Brandt and Bahr, who pushed (much to the alarm of many in the U.S.) for a major new round of negotiations aimed at creating a greater European Peace Order.

Here again there were strong structural elements involved, namely the powerful interest in national unity as well as the pressures towards greater accommodation with the East exerted by detente and the threat of a lowering of the U.S. commitment to Europe. But here too, historical-cultural elements would help condition the German response to structural factors. First, German national identity and the powerful, romantic norm of German unity are in themselves cultural artifacts. (873) Secondly, until 1970 West Germany had pursued almost precisely
the opposite strategy for dealing with national division and while the gains had been minimal, other countries (for example Korea) have endured similar partitions for much longer without any softening of their positions. Certainly the West Germans went far beyond what their Western Allies were demanding of them, and a very large segment of domestic opinion was highly skeptical about the gains made by Brandt’s Ostpolitik (indeed, the growth of such concerns contributed to Brandt’s downfall as Chancellor).

While the initial stimuli towards Ostpolitik were external (the Berlin Wall and U.S.-Soviet detente), internal factors imparted to it dynamic impetus of its own. A widespread sense that the FRG was in need of democratic reform and renewal, the emergence of an idealistic youth movement, feelings of guilt over Nazi atrocities in Eastern Europe, all became fused with the issue of relations to the East. Fanned by the media and intellectual opinion, this peculiar mix of hopes and sentiments created a political climate favorable to a new approach to Ostpolitik. It was in this climate that the SPD-FDP coalition was formed, and long-dormant ideas (mostly dormant since 1960) concerning the possibilities for some form of collective security in Central Europe blossomed once again.

Thinly concealed nationalism and the new anti-military West German approach to security affairs combined in a potent fashion to make the active pursuit of detente a central feature of the new West German political-military culture. In time even the CDU
(with a somewhat different rationale) was forced to accept it, even after it had become clear that the initial hopes for the creation of collective security were unrealistic and U.S.-Soviet relations had entered a new ice age.

If we once again turn to the theoretical models for explaining security policy formation that we wish to compare, it is possible to make a number of further points from the perspective of the late 1970s. First, the adherent of an anthropological-cultural approach, which sees behavior as being rooted in deep social structures and thus resistant to change, might see in the rise of Gaullism in both countries some evidence for a reemergence of their old political-military cultures, especially in Japan where it had strong, politically reactionary dimension. But in both cases the Gaullists ultimately lost out in the policy-making process. Furthermore, in the case of the West German Gaullists, who had the greater political influence, their emphasis on economic integration with the West as the key element of their approach to securing German security differed fundamentally from that of traditional German political-military culture.

Some, especially conservative critics of Brandt and Bahr, might argue that Ostpolitik was in fact a return to traditional nationalism and German Schaukelpolitik. It was also combined, however, with an almost virulent anti-militarism and a strong preference for negotiations and collective security which was the diametric opposite of the old German norm.
Finally it should be noted that in neither country was there any observable broad-based revival of interest in the armed forces or martial traditions, Mishima notwithstanding. Furthermore armed forces of both countries, despite the Three Arrows incident, continued to respect the primacy of civilian authority, enjoyed only a limited and declining share of the national budget and GDP, and had relatively little political influence outside of a very narrow range of primarily internal military matters, such as procurement policy.

Rational actor models focusing on domestic political factors provide some insight on the forces shaping West German and Japanese security policies, but fall short of providing an adequate explanation by themselves. In both countries there was a drive on the part of the domestic arms industries to indigenize defense production and efforts to relax restrictions on arms exports (successful in Germany, despite a Socialist government, but unsuccessful in Japan, despite a conservative government and a supposedly stronger role of industry in the policy-making process). Nonetheless, there is little indication that the arms manufacturers tried to influence any area of policy outside of defense procurement. Even in West Germany weapons production remained but a small, if profitable, portion of total manufacturing (2% in the FRG). And unlike France or the U.S., there was no major firm which was largely dependent on defense contracts for its business.

Explanantory approaches which focus on the dynamics of
inter-party and intra-party competition also are helpful for explaining a number of puzzles, including why the JSP found it so difficult to adopt a more pragmatic posture on defense, the internal ossification of the CDU/CSU on Ostpolitik and the shifting position of conservatives like Nakasone on the defense issue. Such approaches alone, however, are inadequate to understanding why any major initiative on defense was taken or for expaining how and why they were formulated.

Finally, the realist model of international relations, modified to take into consideration economic variables and free-rider dynamics and focusing only on the broad macro-level of inter-state behavior, continues to be able to provide explanation for most aspects of West German and Japanese defense and security policies during this period. The one important exception is the Ostpolitik of the FRG, which, though it arguably was in the national German interest (to preserve the cultural and emotional ties of the two halves of Germany and prevent them from further drifting apart), was not necessarily in the interest of the West German state. Though Ostpolitik did produce a Soviet concession on the Berlin question, a rather limited improvement of contacts between the two Germanies and access to Soviet markets and resources, against these benefits must be weighed the fears of self-finlandization that it aroused in its chief ally, the U.S.. And in fact Ostpolitik did raise popular expectations of what detente could accomplish to unreasonably high levels. Moreover, all these concessions, especially the supply of gas from the
East, were potentially two-edged swords, given that they could be withdrawn by the Soviets over little domestic opposition, while public opinion in democratic countries could be expected to lock their leaderships into positions they might no longer wish to maintain. That Ostpolitik ultimately failed was, from the point of view of the realist analysts, perfectly predictable. That it was tried at all, and that it continued to exercise a hold on West German foreign policy even after it failed, was not. Moreover, if one looks beneath the macro-level at the actual political process out of which defense policy seemed to emerge, the various participants seemed often motivated by feelings and ideas that had very little to do with the cool calculation of national interest.
Chapter 10 - The Limited Consensus - Japan 1976-1989

The late 1970s and 1980s saw a marked increase in Japanese defense efforts and an even greater upsurge in the domestic debate over defense and security issues. The solidification of the new defense consensus based on Taiko created the domestic environment in which these developments could take place, while the relative decline of U.S. power and the increase of the Soviet military presence in East Asia provided the external stimulus for a series of policy initiatives designed to increase the effective functioning of the Self Defense Forces and of the alliance with the U.S. At the same time, these events focused public and elite attention on questions of national security. One notable feature of this new debate was that for the first time the voices of Right Idealists made themselves heard in the mainstream debate, though their impact on policy was limited.

The most important event during this period was the intensification of U.S.-Japanese cooperation in defense and security matters beginning with the establishment of "The Guidelines on U.S. Japanese Defense Cooperation" in 1978. On the surface this new policy seemed to represent a major departure from the traditionally cautious Japanese approach to working together militarily with the U.S., and marked a shift in both elite and popular attitudes on this crucial subject. Yet, on closer examination the Guidelines, much like Taiko, were more a modification of the Yoshida doctrine than a departure from it. By adapting the Centrist approach to international relations to
the changed security environment the Guidelines actually helped strengthen and reaffirm the new political-military culture. Moreover, Japan continued to limit cooperation with the U.S. to the task of defending itself, and public aversion to other defense initiatives with domestic political implications remained strong, as evidenced by the outcry against the attempt to pass legislation covering military emergencies. When in the mid-1980s Prime Minister Nakasone, like Hatoyama and Kishi and other Right Idealist leaders in the 50s and 60s, tried to use breaking the 1% barrier to spark a new debate on nationalism, he was soundly defeated by a coalition of Centrist and Left-Idealist forces. Instead, the new anti-military political-military culture was reaffirmed, even as the Cold War and the U.S. strategic hegemony in the Far East, which had nurtured that culture and allowed it to unfold, seemed to be coming to an end.

The Centrist Revolution - Accelerating Defense Cooperation(874)
Since the early 1970s Centrist reformers like Sakata and Kubo had sought to maintain Japan's military security in a multi-polar world without embarking on the dangerous course advocated by those who wished Japan to adopt a more independent approach to foreign and defense policy. (875) They also believed that increased defense cooperation would improve civilian control over the military by regularizing and bringing out into the open the contacts which existed on an informal level between the U.S. and Japanese military. Furthermore they thereby hoped to enhance Japan's ability to influence U.S. decision making, putting teeth into the otherwise largely ineffectual prior consultation clause in the Security Treaty. (876)

This aspect of the Centrist strategy only came to full fruition after the establishment of Taiko in 1976. In the late 1970s they managed to achieve this transformation of Japanese defense policy largely without much public debate or controversy, leading many observers to worry that a silent revolution was taking place with potentially dangerous consequences for Japanese involvement abroad and for democracy at home. (877)

In the early 1970s U.S. demands on Japan mounted as the protracted U.S. disengagement from Vietnam sparked a whole series of discussions and initiatives leading up to the formation of the Security Consultative Group (SCG) in May 1973. (878) The U.S. wished to obtain increased Japanese military commitment to East Asian security in order to compensate for the
decreased U.S. presence there. The Japanese for their part were increasingly concerned with preserving their security link to the U.S. (879)

Many Japanese leaders who previously had little interest in defense and security issues began to become more involved as a result of these changes in the international environment. Perhaps the most important example of this was the influential LDP power broker and later General Director of the JDA, Kanemaru Shin. Kanemaru was worried that the U.S., if forced to choose between Europe and Asia because of resource constraints, would select Europe because of its greater cultural and blood ties there. At the same time Kanemaru rejected Japan's acquiring the nuclear forces needed for it to adopt a truly independent defense posture, arguing that such a move would be lethal to its trade-dependent economy. (880)

In 1975 the Japanese government, partly in response to U.S. pressures for increased burden sharing, proposed the creation of a Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation (SDC). (881) Over the next three years members of the JDA, SDF and Foreign Ministry, together with their American counterparts, labored to produce a comprehensive set of guidelines for U.S.-Japanese joint defense planning and cooperation. In November, 1978 the "Guidelines on U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation" (commonly referred to as "Guidelines") were made public and were approved in short order by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. (882)

The Guidelines arranged for joint U.S.-Japanese defense
consultations on a wide range of topics. In keeping with the Centrist approach to defense, they deliberately excluded questions regarding constitutional limitations on defense and the three non-nuclear principles. They also emphasized that the product of such consultations had no legal binding force, thus obviating the need for Diet ratification. Likewise, consistent with the goals established under the Taiko, they envisioned the SDF's main mission as being to repel limited and small scale invasions, relying on the U.S. to help cope with larger threats. The Guidelines identified three general areas for consultation: attacks or the threat of attack on Japan, other events in the Far East with implications for Japanese security, and joint training and military maneuvers. (883)

There are a number of points with regard to the Guidelines which are worth noting. First, it was agreed that in the case of actual or impending hostilities a special coordinating office (Chosei Kikan) was to be set up to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Japanese forces. While this falls far short of the kind of joint command structure that exists in NATO, it represents a quantum leap in the integration of the two nations' armed forces. Second, for the first time the Japanese government openly acknowledged that one of the functions of the security relationship with the U.S. was to provide extended nuclear deterrence to Japan. (884) Third, the Japanese government participated in detailed discussions of U.S. planning in the West Pacific, providing it with greater opportunity to influence
U.S. policy or at least prepare themselves for U.S. actions. (885) Finally as a result of the Guidelines military men on both sides were in direct consultation with one another, together formulating official policy proposals. This has had the effect of greatly increasing the authority of uniformed SDF personnel, whose expert knowledge was indispensable for formulating such plans and whose morale has been greatly boosted by their direct contacts with the U.S.. This new role for the uniformed personnel subtly altered the balance of power within the JDA. (886)

Despite the Guidelines' enormous policy implications they were ratified without Diet approval and attracted relatively little public attention. At the time the opposition and the media were largely focused on the related, but much more controversial Emergency Laws legislation, which appeared far more threatening to the existing democratic order than the Guidelines. To further blunt possible criticism, the government reemphasized that the consultations were in no way legally binding, and in response to opposition questioning specified that Taiwan was not considered part of the Far East for the purposes of the consultations, thus reducing the chance of conflict with the PRC. (887)

With the Guidelines in place, U.S.-Japanese military cooperation began to accelerate, spurred on by the growing Soviet military presence in the Far East (888) and by intense pressure from the U.S., especially in the wake of the November
1979 invasion of Afghanistan. (889) The most visible manifestation of this new collaboration was the beginning of a whole series of joint exercises between U.S., Japanese, and other allied forces. Because the exercises occurred under the aegis of the U.S., domestic fears of revived militarism remained largely muted, while the traditional fear of being dragged into a conflict by the U.S. appeared to have largely evaporated. (890) The government continued to avoid the thorny constitutional issue by insisting that joint exercises were aimed at merely honing technical skills, and thus did not constitute joining a form of collective defense. (891)

These exercises brought into the open the division of labor between the SDF and U.S. forces which in the past had remained largely implicit; in case of hostilities, Japanese forces would act as a "shield" (tate), defending the U.S. forces, whose role was that of the lance (yari), launching offensive operations against the Soviet Union.

The new, closer relationship with the U.S. also strengthened politically the Centrist coalition seeking to upgrade Japan's defense capabilities. The key move in this direction came in 1979 with the decision to hold regular Summer meetings in Hawaii, conveniently timed to influence the Japanese budget debate in the Fall Diet. (892) Already that July the Japanese participants in the first of these meetings presented to the Americans, on their own initiative, a plan for increasing defense spending over the next three years. They thus raised
American expectations and effectively mobilized U.S. diplomatic support to achieve their spending goals in the face of domestic resistance from the opposition parties and the Ministry of Finance.\(^{(893)}\)

From the perspective of the new, pro-defense coalition such pressure was sorely needed, for while Fukuda had been supportive of increased Japanese defense efforts, his successors, Ohira and Suzuki were decidedly less so, preferring to define Japan's contribution to the international order in the broadest terms possible under the rubric "Comprehensive Security".\(^{(894)}\) Though Ohira supported closer cooperation with the U.S. and at least qualitative improvement of the SDF \(^{(895)}\), he warned the U.S. that Japan alone would decide its defense policy. \(^{(896)}\) Suzuki was even more passionate in his resistance to U.S. demands that Japan raise its defense spending. Warning the U.S. that the Japanese people were determined never again to seek the status of a great military power, he went on to argue (in a way reminiscent of Yoshida) that forcing Japan to increase defense spending threatened to invite a popular backlash which could end 30 years of conservative rule.\(^{(897)}\) While Ohira and Suzuki did not fully give in to U.S. demands, they were forced to increase defense far more than they would have without U.S. pressure. Thereafter U.S. pressures (called Gaïatsu) became a permanent feature of the Japanese domestic defense debate.\(^{(898)}\)

The political perils involved in this new collaborative relationship became apparent during Suzuki's ill-fated 1981 trip
to the U.S.. The continued public sensitivity to collaboration with the U.S. was revealed by the popular outcry against Suzuki's use of the word alliance (Domeikankei) in the joint communiqué. In the subsequent uproar Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi was forced to resign. On the other hand, of far greater long-term significance was Suzuki's announcement during that same trip that Japan was committed to defending its neighboring waters out to several hundred nautical miles and to defend major sealanes out to the distance of 1,000 nautical miles. This announcement came as a complete surprise to many of Suzuki's colleagues, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi. (899) Only two months prior to Suzuki's trip, Ito had stressed that Japan was not ready to make such a commitment. (900) In May, however, Suzuki's announcement apparently reversed Japanese policy. What made this reversal particularly embarrassing was that Suzuki apparently had been completely unaware of the import of his statements.

Suzuki's slip-up was to haunt him upon his return home and his commitment to the defense of the sea lanes was turned into a major point of attack for the opposition parties and the media. The government was ill prepared to handle proling questions from the opposition, and in any case Japan clearly did not have the military wherewithal to accomplish this task. But once the Prime Minister had committed himself in such an open and even spectacular way, it was impossible for the Japanese government to renege on its public pledge. (901)
In part this misunderstanding can be attributed to differences in the U.S. and Japanese terms for sea lanes, and there was considerable confusion even within the Japanese government over the exact definition of the term, a confusion which evidently transmitted itself to Suzuki. (902) This still does not adequately explain why the Foreign Ministry personnel accompanying Suzuki on the trip failed to warn him of the full import of the communique and the probable domestic response. Suzuki came to believe, not without cause, that he had been the victim of a plot on the part of the pro-defense faction within the Foreign Ministry working together with the U.S. to embarrass him personally and to increase Japanese defense efforts. Suzuki's Prime Ministership was dealt a blow from which it was never to recover and which contributed to its rather early demise. (903)

Suzuki was succeeded in November 1982 by Nakasone Yasuhiro who almost immediately set out to challenge Japan's defense taboos. Beginning with a series of statements he made during his first trip as Prime Minister to Washington in January, 1983 Nakasone expanded on Suzuki's commitment to defense of the sea lanes and pledged even greater defense cooperation with the U.S. (904) Though pilloried in the Diet Nakasone and the JDA not only stuck to their guns but systematically continued to extend Japan's commitment to the defense of U.S. and merchant shipping in its territorial waters against possible Soviet aggression, providing Japan had already been attacked. The JDA could thus
continue to insist that because such actions would come as a joint response to Soviet aggression (nichibei kyodo taishokodo) and it was "individual" (kobetsu) and not collective defense. (905) In addition that year Japan signed an agreement permitting the export of military technology to the U.S. and promoting the joint development of weapons systems. (906)

After 1983 U.S.-Japanese consultations and joint research continued, and the contacts between the two armed forces continued to grow throughout the decade, particularly in the important area of intelligence sharing. (907)

In this way what had been originally planned on a hypothetical, non-binding basis in the U.S.-Japanese consultations over time became official Japanese policy. Even under the dovish Ohira and Suzuki administrations this process sustained itself, and with the advent of the conservative Nakasone Prime Ministership it came to its full fruition. Despite considerable protest from the opposition and media, the LDP was able to achieve these major changes in Japanese security policy through a process of graduated steps and reinterpretation avoiding a major political confrontation. The evolution of this policy presents a classic example of how post-war Japanese defense policy progressed by the means of the accumulation of fait accomplis (kiseijijitsu tsumoriagari).

In the process, one of the basic taboos of post-war Japanese defense policy, the refusal to become integrated in U.S. strategy, had been greatly weakened though not completely
destroyed. This new policy can be seen as an extension of the Yoshida’s doctrine reliance on the U.S., and obviated the need for either a major military buildup, as Right Idealists would have preferred, or dependence on a regional collective security system, as called for by the Left Idealists. Given the new realities facing Japan in the international arena this Centrist revolution in defense cooperation in no way can be seen as a deviation from the post-WW II political military culture, but rather was a pragmatic adaptation to the necessities of a changed security environment.

Moreover, it is important not to overlook what the new relationship with the U.S. had not accomplished. Japan continued to resist American pressures to integrate itself into a NATO-like structure which would have required it to act automatically in support of its allies. Whereas a joint U.S.-Japanese response to a direct Soviet attack on Japan could be expected, it remains unclear whether Japan would, for example, have closed the straits to block a Soviet fleet movement to challenge the U.S. in a showdown in the Middle East, even though Japan’s oil supplies would have manifestly been at risk in such a confrontation.\(^{(908)}\) Likewise, while the U.S. may have helped Japanese defense spending escape the severe limits on government spending in the 1980s (under Nakasone a 0% spending limit was imposed on all programs except defense and foreign aid), it was unable to alter Taiko procurement goals or push Japan up to levels of spending comparable to those of other U.S. allies.
Though U.S. pressures may have been a contributing factor in the breaking of the 1% barrier, they clearly were not the decisive factor.

That very real limitations imposed by the new political-military culture continued to hamper the development of the military establishment was revealed both by the constraints that continued to apply to the new Japanese-U.S. military relationship, as well as by the failure of defense initiatives in other areas, such as the Emergency Laws.

The Emergency Laws

At the same time as steps were taken to intensify U.S.-Japanese military ties in order to meet the increased security needs of the post-detente era, similar efforts were made to improve the ability of the SDF to act in time of war. These efforts were centered on the so-called Emergency Laws (Yujihosei), a broad package of measures covering such things as the emergency procurement measures, civilian defense steps, emergency broadcast procedures, the protection of military secrets and so forth. In short, a whole series of legal measures which in most countries are taken for granted as part of the fundamental legal underpinning of the armed forces, but which had become taboo as a result of Japan's historical experience with militarism and the use of engineered incidents and emergencies to subvert democratic control in China in the 1930s.
The Emergency Laws posed a much more direct challenge to Japan's post-war political-military culture than the Guidelines did and were more heavily laden with ideological overtones. Consequently they became the target of considerable political controversy and only limited progress was made in realizing them.

Remarkably the SDF had existed without such a legal basis for action since its inception in the 1950s. In the eyes of many military men this merely underlined the essentially ornamental nature of the armed forces in Japan.\(^{909}\) The Three Arrows research designed to rectify this defect had to be frozen in 1965 because of strong domestic sentiments against the potential of a militarization of Japan. \(^{910}\)

When in the mid-seventies surreptitious moves were made to resume planning for the passing of emergency laws considerable care was taken not to provoke once again popular fears of an out-of-control military.\(^{911}\) To this end three limitations were incorporated in the new "Defense Research" proposal: 1) adherence to the Constitution and the principle of civilian control, 2) the especially sensitive subject of domestic unrest and internal security was left out, and 3) spontaneous civilian support (i.e. no system of mass conscription or placement of controls on the media or freedom of speech).\(^{912}\)

Many in the JDA and the SDF were unconvinced that this last point could be adhered to. Nonetheless opinion polls at the time showed that 37% of those surveyed were ready to support the SDF in time of war in some form or the other. Since 37% of the young
male population was equal to over 10 million men, the JDA argued that there was no need for a system of conscription. As the Asahi newspaper pointed out, the conservatives were relying on a new form of my-homeism (my homu shugi) nationalism qualitatively different from the old reactionary nationalism of the 1960s. (913) Hopes were high that the government could get the new legislation through the Diet, especially since at the time even the JSP seemed to be taking the first steps towards modifying its stance on defense. (914)

The new research progressed largely without any public notice till July, 1978 when attention was drawn to this issue by the controversial Air Force General and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kurisu Hiromi. (915) In a series of provocative statements Kurisu was to argue repeatedly that Japan desperately needed to reserve the right to launch counterattacks in case of Soviet aggression. (916) According to the existing rules of engagement, the SDF could engage in combat only after being ordered to do so by the Prime Minister acting with Diet approval (in emergencies the law allowed the Prime Minister to obtain approval ex post facto).

Kurisu’s comments immediately triggered an intense public debate. In part this debate focused on the problem which Kurisu had pointed to. But overshadowing this was the widespread fear that Kurisu’s remarks represented an attempt to undermine the post-war system of civilian control, and even those who were in general agreement with Kurisu’s point of view on the need for
new rules of engagement were concerned that Kurisu appeared to be challenging the post-war system of civilian control.

In particular Director General Kanemaru Shin, though he recognized the underlying logic of Kurisu's position, was angered by Kurisu's remarks, feeling that they threatened to upset his efforts to achieve some measure of consensus on defense. (917) Moreover, Kanemaru probably genuinely took seriously Kurisu's threat that the SDF might act independently in case of an emergency. In a speech at Keidanren Kanemaru warned "The war with China began with the Marco Polo Bridge incident. There is a danger still today the danger that an officer or military unit might take measures which could develop into a terrible problem." (918)

While Kurisu was supported by many in the LDP, including Nakasone, Nakagawa Ichiro and Tamaki Kazuo, (919) even other hawks like Genda Minoru were against him. (920) On July 25 Kurisu, under pressure from Kanemaru, was forced to resign. (921) His resignation was welcomed by all the major parties, with the exception of the DSP, which argued that it is unreasonable to forbid military personnel from expressing their opinion. (922)

Nonetheless, the problem which had been identified by Kurisu had now been brought to public attention, and Kanemaru and the JDA Noboru were forced to admit, to their embarrassment, that if Japanese forces were attacked by surprise, the only legal recourse open to them was to flee. (923) The JDA insisted
that the Emergency Laws and the problem with the SDF rules of engagement identified by Kurisu were independent of one another, but inevitably the two were linked in the popular and political debates.

There existed a broad consensus within the LDP as well as the JDA that Kurisu had been essentially correct on this point, but that given his position as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he did not have the right to publicly raise the issue. (924) Fukuda underlined the importance of continuing with the Emergency legislation, and added that civil defense measures should be considered as well. (925) The JSP, JCP and the Social Democratic Party (Shaminren, a JSP offshoot) all opposed the new Emergency legislation as unconstitutional (926), but the middle-of-the-road parties in contrast seemed readier than they had been before to support the proposed legislation, especially with regard to new measures for dealing with a surprise attack. The DSP even argued that such measures were long overdue (927), while Komeito expressed support as long as such laws remained within the framework of the constitution. (928) Their suspicions were raised, however, when the government indicated that it also wished to include measures to improve the protection of secrets and to limit individual freedoms in times of emergencies. (929)

The government was forced to back down and promised that such measures would not be included, but was unable to to alleviate rising anxieties. Heightening domestic misgivings about the Emergency Laws was the general drift towards the Right
under Fukuda. On the 15th of August Fukuda became the first Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni in an official capacity (Miki had visited the shrine as a private citizen already in 1976). Fukuda also promoted singing of the old national anthem, *Kimi ga yo*, at state occasions and the adoption by government offices of the old calendar system based on the reigns of the Japanese Emperor. While these issues were in and of themselves unrelated to defense and the Emergency Laws, taken together with Kurisu's comments and the JDA's evident interest in limiting individual freedoms, they quite quickly created a political atmosphere in which Centrists began to worry that the Right-Idealists (to whom Fukuda, at least in terms of his domestic political views clearly belonged) (930) were trying to use defense once again as a lever to achieve a reactionary transformation of Japanese society. (931) Consequently in late August-early September the tide began to turn against the Emergency Law legislation.

That month the JSP and Sohyo held a rally in Tokyo and formed a National "National Conference for the Destruction of the Emergency Legislation" (*Yujiippo funsai zenkoku kyoto kaigi*) and a petition signing campaign was launched. The JSP felt increasingly confident that this was an issue from which it could benefit politically. Some Socialists even hoped to mobilize the kind of mass support that they had in 1960. (932)

The middle-of-the-road parties also began to express reservations about the legislation. DSP Chairman Sasaki Ryosaku announced that while his party continued to support better rules
of engagement, it was opposed to the broader legislation which threatened individual liberties. (933) Komeito soon followed suit. Citing Fukuda’s visit to Yasukuni and Kurisu’s comments, it decided that the LDP was using the issue to try to mobilize support for changing the constitution and creating a system of mass mobilization in war time. (934) Indeed, Komeito support not only of the Emergency Laws, but even of the SDF began to show signs of eroding. (935)

Faced with the prospect of facing a united opposition, Centrist support within the LDP began to evaporate as well. While the Nakasone faction strongly supported Fukuda on the Emergency Laws, the Ohira and Miki factions expressed reservations about pressing forward with the legislation. (936) Also Kanemaru Shin, sensing the shifting political mood, began to argue in favor of proceeding only with research on Emergency laws to be enacted in times of emergencies. (937) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well joined the chorus of voices concerned that a divisive debate on this issue might reverse the recent trend towards opposition moderation on defense. (938)

The government was forced to beat a path of retreat, and Fukuda instructed Kanemaru that there was no need to submit the legislation yet. Thereafter the JDA narrowed the scope of the research and separated it from the counter-espionage law and surprise attack issues. Henceforth preparations were to continue (much like defense consultations with the U.S.) purely as research, and not as potentially legally binding legislation.
Though the right wing of the party wished to press ahead with the legislation, Centrists like Kanemaru and Foreign Minister Sonoda warned of the potential domestic and international repercussions.\(^{940}\)

Despite steady progress and expansion during the 1980s, the Emergency Laws remain legally speaking merely a set of hypothetical laws, though in case the threat of hostilities actually emerged, JDA experts have little doubt that such laws could be speedily pushed through the Diet.\(^{941}\) What the debate over the emergency legislation clearly demonstrates is both the extent to which a Centrist consensus on defense had solidified, as well as the limitations and the political tensions inherent in dealing with defense in the context of Japan’s new political-military culture.

The Kurisu incident had revealed the potential for precisely what the Centrists were concerned to avoid. Without clearly established guidelines, the response of the armed forces in a real military crisis would be unpredictable, and could lead Japan into commitments which were contrary to its interests as defined by the Centrists. Rather than leave the topic of how to deal with a military emergency in the nebulous realm of the taboo, Centrists felt it necessary to try to map out how the military would behave in a manner consistent with the new political system.

At the same time, the opposition’s fears about where the government was going, reinforced by Kurisu’s comments and the
evident drift to the right by the Fukuda administration, limited their acceptance to a tacit one - research on the topic was tolerated, but the actual passage of laws was not. While this had costs in terms of military effectiveness, and Right Idealists in the LDP felt that the opportunity to widen the defense debate had been missed, it was an outcome which was probably preferred not only by centrists such as Ohira, Sonoda and Kanemaru, but was probably even acceptable to Fukuda. Once again, a compromise solution to the problem of enhancing military effectiveness within the framework of Japan's new political-military culture had been achieved.

**Breaking the Defense Taboos: Nakasone and the 1% Limit**

Perhaps the most telling example of the continued strength of Japan's new anti-military political-military culture can be found in the events surrounding Nakasone's efforts to break the 1% spending barrier on defense.

In November 1982 Nakasone, who for nearly two decades had been perhaps Japan's most outspoken Right Idealist, became Prime Minister. (943) Taking over from the dovish Suzuki, Nakasone made challenging Japan's postwar taboos on defense one of the chief goals of his administration. (944) Though he was quick to reassure the public by announcing that he had no intention of raising the constitutional issue and would for the time being respect the 1% of GNP spending limit on defense (945), during
his trip to Washington that following January, Nakasone adopted a hawkish rhetoric when discussing defense that had not been heard from a Japanese Prime Minister since the days of Kishi. Nakasone described the U.S.-Japanese relationship as an alliance, spoke of a U.S.-Japanese joint destiny in the Pacific (Unmei Kyodotai), and portrayed Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" facing the Soviet Union. More importantly Nakasone also committed Japan to protecting U.S. forces in Japan's territorial waters as well as to the defense of the three strategic straits, and further expanded its commitment to defend the 1,000 nautical mile sea lanes. (946)

These remarks provoked a hail of domestic Japanese criticism, and Nakasone had to back down from some of his comments. According to public opinion polls, support for the Prime Minister dropped precipitously. According to Asahi, in November the support/do not support ratio was exactly even at 37%. Two months later support had dropped to 29%, while the percentage of those who did not support the new cabinet rose to 43%. (947) As elections approached, Nakasone adopted a more dovish tone and avoided defense and security issues for the duration of the campaign. (948)

The next major effort by Nakasone to challenge the defense taboos came in the Summer of 1985, when he decided to tackle the 1% issue. The 1% barrier had been passed in November 1976 as part of the quid pro quo for opposition acceptance of Taiko. (949) Already at the time of its inception the 1% barrier had
been intended (at least by its JDA drafters) to last for no more than 5 or 6 years. (950) Since then, despite constant criticism from the SDF and LDP pro-defense Dietmen (951) it had become firmly enshrined by the media and the opposition as the most important, concrete brake on the military establishment, and the Finance Ministry had used it to resist growing demands from the U.S. for more defense spending. Nonetheless, as step by step Taiko's procurement goals were fulfilled, and as both personnel and equipment costs spiraled upwards while international pressures to increase spending continued unabated, it seemed only a matter of time until the barrier would have to be broken. For these reasons the JDA and pro-defense Dietmen were hopeful that the barrier could be breached that year, and offered a new Mid-Term Defense Program (Chukibo) that guaranteed breaking the barrier within the next 5 years. (952)

Nakasone chose to take up the issue for personal-political as well as ideological motives. That year his political promoter and master, Tanaka Kakuei suffered a stroke, and for the first time in his Prime Ministership Nakasone became a free man. Whereas in 1983 he had been forced to call elections at a politically inauspicious moment in order to cover for Tanaka, and consequently had to take the blame for disastrous election results, (953), it is believed that this time he wished to call his own elections in order to solidify his political base and angle for another term in office. Since all the opposition parties except the DSP could be counted on to oppose
breaking 1%, it seemed to be the perfect issue to dissolve the Diet with. (954)

However, unlike the JDA and the pro-defense Dietmen, Nakasone wished to take up the 1% issue in a highly visible fashion. In the Summer of 1985 Nakasone sounded the call to battle at the annual LDP seminar at the resort town of Karuizawa. On the 27th of July he told reporters:

"the opposition parties are aiming to use the 1% issue as an avenue of political attack, but defense problems must not become an instrument of partisan struggles. (Seiso) (we must) slowly and with courage walk the path of kings. Let the people pass judgement on the defense problem. This is a chance to reform defense consciousness." (955)

That same evening he gave a speech in which he once again sounded one of his pet themes, the final resolution of post-war politics.

"In the prewar there was a vision of Japanese history as being that of the Empire. (Kokushikikan) After the defeat there emerged instead a view of history dominated by the Pacific war, in other words the historical perspective of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Under the laws of the Allied Nations Japan was accused and judged in the name of civilization, peace and humanity. With regard to this (the validity of this view), history will eventually decide. Nonetheless, at that time, an intellectual current of self flagellation which saw Japan as totally evil was born. This has remained with us to this day. There is a tendency to say that it is fine to right about Japan's weak points, about the evils of the pre-war; I am opposed to this trend. Win or lose, we are a nation. To cast aside the humiliation, to march forward in the search for glory, that is to be a nation, that is the pose of the people (kokumin). From this perspective it is necessary to look at the accomplishments of the past and secure Japan's identity and independence."

"In this way, the outstanding problems of the post-war will be terminated one by one, a national consensus will be formed and Japan will progress majestically towards the 21st century. This is the final resolution of post-war politics (sengo seiji no sokessan). Not dwelling on the past, but rather reaching for consensus and solidarity for the 21st century. (956)"
At that same seminar Nakasone announced his intention to visit the Yasukuni shrine in his official capacity as Prime Minister. While all of these steps — like the final resolution of post-war politics and the visit to Yasukuni — were not directly linked to one another, Nakasone was clearly bringing them together. Only a few days later he told an interviewer from the Los Angeles Times that his real goal was the creation of a new nationalism. (957)

Like Ashida, Hatoyama, Kishi and other conservatives had before him, Nakasone was using a defense policy issue as a stimulus to a national debate on security, patriotism and the entire post-war system. His idea of a "final resolution of Japanese politics" was to rid the Japanese nation of the entire debilitating burden of post-war Japanese history; to begin anew, with a healthy sense of patriotism and an approach to national defense comparable to that which could be found in other countries. In other words, Nakasone wished to transform Japan's post-war political-military culture. (958)

To this end Nakasone set out to gather support from wherever he could find it, and had Director General Kato Koichi prepare plans for breaking the barrier. (959) At the same time, Nakasone began to encounter increasing resistance, not only from the media and the opposition parties, but also from within the LDP. At the forefront of this counter-movement were the so-called party elders, former Prime Ministers Fukuda, Suzuki and Miki, who already before the Karuizawa seminar had publicly expressed
reservations over breaking the 1% barrier. When Kato went to appease them, he was met with stubborn resistance. Both Miki and Suzuki stressed the importance of the 1% barrier as the basis of the people’s trust in the government with regard to defense, and warned that reversing the policy might do irreparable harm to Japan’s fragile defense consensus. Ironically, the more conservative Fukuda was even more outspoken in his opposition, warning that removing the barrier might trigger out of control military spending as in the 1930s.

Like Nakasone, behind the party elders’ opposition stood a complex set of motivations. Chief among these was their concern that Nakasone intended to use the 1% issue to call elections. They had reason to believe that if elections were called Nakasone was prepared to lose as many as 30 LDP seats, but was confident that he could hold unto power through a coalition with the DSP. The party elders were thus concerned about the political costs Nakasone’s actions might incur, and were determined to prevent Nakasone from firming his grip on the Prime Ministership.

In the face of this opposition Nakasone found that he was unable to mobilize the support that he had been expecting from the pro-defense Dietmen and the generation of upcoming party leaders. Increasingly the Centrist core of the LDP, who did not share Nakasone’s ideological commitment to rekindling nationalism and who believed that Nakasone was willing to sacrifice the party’s interests for personal political gain,
began to turn against him. The decisive blow against Nakasone's ambitions was dealt by the General Secretary of the LDP, Kanemaru Shin, who until then had been actively campaigning on Nakasone's behalf. (962) After a meeting with the Prime Minister, Kanemaru told reporters that Nakasone was determined to break the barrier even at great personal cost (doro o kabuttemono), and he described the Prime Minister as resembling "a rat who might bite the cat who cornered him (kyuussooneko o kamu). This was widely interpreted as confirming both that Nakasone might dissolve the Diet to call elections, and that Kanemaru himself had turned against him. (963)

The political current against Nakasone now turned into an unstoppable torrent. Within the LDP even many of those close to Nakasone were opposed to the idea of calling elections. (964) The leaders of the LDP's junior coalition partners, the New Liberal Club, threatened to leave the coalition if Nakasone continued on this course. Even the DSP, which had originally supported the policy, now turned against it, and the JSP and Komeito were even more outspoken in their opposition, claiming that they were ready to boycott all Diet functions for as much as one or two months if Nakasone continued down the path towards military expansionism.(965)

Perhaps the most extraordinary comments were made by former Prime Minister Fukuda, who in a speech entitled "We must not once again walk down the dark road of the pre-war" evoked the imagery of pre-war militarism to warn against giving in to the
JDA's request for increased defense spending. Fukuda began by recounting his personal experiences as a young bureaucrat in the Finance Ministry during the 1930s when former Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was assassinated by young Army officers during the February 1936 incident. After then recalling the horrors WW II inflicted on the Japanese people Fukuda continued:

As you know, 40 years later Japan has become a nation which produces over 10% of the world GNP. There are many factors which allowed this miracle to happen - educational advances, the superior qualities of the Japanese race (minzoku no yushusei), the excellence of the post-war system - but above all I believe it is World Peace. As long as there is peace Japan can import raw materials and export manufactured goods... but world peace today is in terrible danger, because since 1975, East-West tensions have increased greatly. Its symptom is the arms race...As a result, the U.S. is confronted with a deep economic crisis with swollen budgetary and trade deficits, and the Soviet Union as well is in desperate economic straits...social instability may result... The most important thing is to prevent the U.S. and Soviet Union from fighting. .. Japan has little military might, but much economic strength. If we do not expend our energies on the military, naturally we will have a surplus of strength. Let us devote that strength to the poor nations of the world...We must not once again walk down the dark path of the prewar. (966)

Whether Fukuda believed all of this, or was more concerned with thwarting the ambitions of his long-time political nemesis, Nakasone, is an open question. Fukuda himself, after all, was a staunch conservative and had been the target of similar criticisms during the Emergency Laws debate. Nonetheless, the very fact that he was able to make these charges, and with effect, is because they appealed to a broad range of Centrist opinion in the context of Japan’s anti-military political-military culture. This ideological cloak legitimated Fukuda’s
turning against his party's leader and joining with the opposition, much as Kono Ichiro in 1960 had been able to turn against Kishi on the Mutual Security Treaty revision.

Finally on September 6 Nakasone was forced to accept the decision of his party to postpone breaking the 1% barrier. He had suffered the bitterest personal defeat of his Prime Ministership. At a meeting with the vice-ministers of all the different agencies 10 days later the despondent Prime Minister reportedly sang an anti-war song to the astonished bureaucrats and remarked bitterly that he had "withdrawn all his savings" (lost his public approval ratings). {967}

Yet the saga of the 1% barrier had not ended. On the 4th of September Kanemaru reportedly had dinner with Mihara Asao, leader of the pro-defense Dietmen in the LDP, and explained to him that for the coming Diet breaking the barrier would probably be impossible. Mihara indicated his understanding, but added that "even if in name the elimination of the limit could not be realized, its contents should be." {968} A few days after Nakasone had acknowledged his defeat Finance Minister Takeshita and Director General Kato in an all-night negotiating session agreed to allocate 18 trillion 500 billion yen to the new Mid-Term Defense Program, 1.038% of GNP over the same 5 year period. In other words, breaking the 1% barrier had become an inevitability, if not in 1986, than in 1987. At the NDC and Cabinet meetings on the 18th of September this new program was approved by the very same leaders who had previously opposed
Nakasone. Foreign Minister Abe reportedly commented with regard to breaking the barrier "one can pass the gate blowing a trumpet or bowing one's head, the result is the same. This is the problem with Nakasone's methods". (969)

On the 14th of October the opposition swarmed to attack the new defense plan. In response to questioning about whether the new Mid-Term Plan did not effectivley breaking the 1% barrier Nakasone merely responded that the government intended to "respect the spirit of the 1% barrier". The opposition and the mass media of course did not accept this explanation and continued to pillory the Prime Minister, criticizing him and the government for shameless duplicity. (970) On the 28th the opposition suspended deliberations in anger over the government's continued bland denials of their charges, recommencing only after the LDP promised to keep the limit till at least 1986, at which time it was widely expected that Nakasone would be out of office and the government would be more flexible on the issue. (971)

In June of 1986 double elections for the upper and lower houses were held. Neither the opposition nor the LDP chose to take up the issue, focusing on various internal issues instead. In particular the opposition chose to attack Nakasone's personality and style. Nonetheless, the LDP won an overwhelming victory, and Nakasone was able to extend his tenure in office despite his political reversal of the previous Fall.

Thereafter the breaking of the 1% barrier was accomplished
with remarkably little serious political controversy. In the Fall of 1986 the JDA presented a budget for 1987 which would increase spending past 1%. In Diet the opposition for the most part devoted little energy to the issue, focusing instead on the issue of electoral reform, while General Secretary Kanemaru promised that he would "do his best" to keep the limit. The opposition leaders for the most part expressed their continued support for the 1% barrier, but added that more important than the actual sum of money was the consensus on defense strategy and how that money was put to use. While some accused the opposition of selling out to the LDP, for the most part it was felt that there was little they could do to stop the process. Without the aggressive, Right Idealist rhetoric which Nakasone had employed in 1985, opponents were not able to mobilize the same levels of Centrist political support. (972)

After final intra-government negotiations, on the 30th of December the Finance Ministry announced as part of the overall government budget a JDA budget which brought defense spending to 1.04% of the GNP. (973) The barrier had been broken, a fait accompli achieved in the back door manner characteristic of almost all major Japanese defense decisions during the post-war. Remarkably, in the final stages after 1985, almost all deliberations did not involve the Prime Minister, who seems to have almost deliberately been excluded from the process. (974)

What the 1% issue shows perhaps more clearly than any other debate on security in the late-1980s was the enduring power of
the post-war political-military culture despite the continuing evolution of defense policy. Unlike in the 50s and the 60s, it was possible to reverse an important limitation on the defense establishment like the 1% barrier without provoking an all-out confrontation. At the same time, what Nakasone had sought to achieve in the Fall of 1985 went far beyond merely changing one specific policy. The manner in which he adopted the issue represented a challenge to the fundamental premises of the post-war political-military culture of Japan, which favors the separation of defense and nationalist appeals, and prefers to accomplish its goals quietly, without the kind of popular mobilization or public debate of strategic issues characteristic of discussions of defense in most other nations. Had Nakasone chosen to adhere to a low-key approach to the issue, many in the JDA were convinced that the barrier could have been broken a year earlier. (975) Nakasone's methods gave his enemies in the LDP, the party elders, the ammunition that they needed, and once again, like Kishi and Hatoyama and all the other Right Idealist leaders before him, Nakasone was forced by the weight of post-war Japanese attitudes towards defense to (to borrow Abe's image) pass through the gate with his head bowed down in humble silence instead of raised in pride.

The Political-Military Culture of Japan - Circa 1989

The new Japanese consensus on defense and security embodied
in Taiko was the product of the era of detente, and Taiko's fundamental premises reflect the strategic realities of the early to mid 1970s. (976) Paradoxically, Taiko also helped create a domestic political atmosphere which gave the Japanese government greater room for maneuver to cope with the demise of detente.

The rise of the perception of a Soviet threat engendered a considerable increase of interest in defense, both on the popular and elite levels. For the first time hard-line Right Idealist views on defense, which had always been present but largely ignored since the 50s, were given a hearing in mainstream journals and newspapers. And in Nakasone Right Idealists had a spokesman at the very highest level of Japanese politics. At the same time the Left appeared increasingly disorganized and unsure of itself, as Socialism was ever more discredited internationally, and seemed less relevant than ever before domestically.

Despite these drastic changes in the internal and external political environments, the basic post-war Japanese approach to defense and security, its new political-military culture, with the important exception of increased cooperation with the U.S., had in fact changed relatively little since 1976. While defense policy continued to evolve, albeit at a slower pace than either the U.S. or Japanese security experts would have preferred, the new political-military culture easily beat back every major attempt to challenge it.
I. Public Opinion

The late 70s and early 1980s saw a continuation of the trend towards increased public support for both the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty system, reaching a plateau sometime in the 1985 period. With the exception of a brief period immediately after Afghanistan, there was no concomitant increase in the sense of external military threat. Moreover there was a growing popular disenchantment with the U.S. and an accelerating perception of U.S. economic and social decline, creating at least the potential for an erosion of the security relationship as well.

After Afghanistan there was only a slight increase in the popular perception that more needed to be done for defense. Asahi polls showed that fear of a foreign attack went from 30% in 1978 to a peak of 38% in 1954, before dropping dramatically with the emergence of a new era of East-West detente in the mid 1980s to 33% in 1988. (977) These perceptions translated into a overall support for continuing the status quo with regard to defense spending. According to polls conducted by the Prime Minister’s office during this period support for the present level of defense spending increased steadily, from 48.2% in 1975, to 47.6% in 1978, 47.3% in 1981, 54.1% in 1984 and 58% in 1988. Those who thought spending should be increased rose from 12.7% in 1975 to a peak of 20.1% in 1981, before dropping back
down to 14.2% in 1984 and 11.2% in 1988. Over the same period those for a decrease in defense spending dropped from 23.6% in 1975 to a mere 11.7% in 1988. (978) Likewise, when given a choice of budget items which they thought could be cut, the overwhelming favorite choice was defense spending (46% in 1983, followed by public enterprises at 33% and local government finance at 7%). (979)

At the same time, according to a 1981 survey conducted by the Yomiuri newspaper and Gallup organization there was a large gap between the U.S. and Japanese perceptions on how Japan could best safeguard the nation. Most of the American respondents chose answers stressed the military dimension of security, such as strengthening the defense capability of the West (47%), strengthening the military alliance with the West (46%) followed by strengthening the free world's economic system (33%). In contrast, the option most popular with Japanese respondents was strengthening the UN (29%), followed by adopting a neutralist policy (28%) and strengthening the defense capability of the West (25%). (980) This preference for a non-military approach to foreign policy continued into the 1980s. When asked how to best preserve the peace, the number one answer was to increase aid to developing countries (30%), while only 7% chose cooperation with the Western bloc. (981)

Recognition of the need for the SDF increased somewhat, from 79% in 1975 to 86% in 1978 and stayed in the 80% range for the rest of then 1980s. (982) At the same time, while there was
increasing acceptance that the SDF's main purpose was the security of Japan (from 57% in 1975 to 63.5% in 1988), they tended to be more valued for their role as disaster relief workers than as guardians of the nation.\(^{(983)}\)

Interestingly, when support for the SDF is controlled for party preference, the LDP showed a general tendency towards greater Centrism, with those supporting keeping the SDF at its present level increasing from 58% in 1980 to 68% in 1988, while LDP supporters favoring an increase in the SDF declined from 34% to a mere 11%, and those advocating a reduction grew from a mere 4% to 17%. These figures indicate clearly that the traditional Right-Idealist approach to defense was losing its appeal even in the LDP. The DSP showed a similar trend, with those preferring the status quo growing to 79% from 60%. And in the JSP support for the status quo declined, from 63% to 52%, while support for reduction or abolition increased from 20% to 37% (13% and 7% reduction/abolition to 32%/5%). Komeito supporters revealed almost identical attitudes, with 56% for the status quo in 1988 and 33% for reduction or abolition (25 and 8%).\(^{(984)}\)

Likewise support for the Mutual Security Treaty remained strong, though less than support for the SDF. When asked if the Treaty had been useful, 66% said yes in 1978 and 1981, 72% in 1984 (when perceptions of a new Cold War was at their height) and 68.8% in 1988. \(^{(985)}\) At the same time, while on the surface the level of support had changed relatively little, the reasons for doing so had. In 1981 the defense of Japan was thought to be
the main reasons that the Treaty was believed to have been useful (13%), followed by stabilization of U.S.-Japanese relations (11%) contribution to Japan's economic prosperity (8%) and contribution to the stability of East Asia (8%). But in 1988 the U.S.-Japan angle had leaped ahead in the importance ascribed to it in the popular view (20%), and while the treaty's usefulness to economic prosperity (9%) and East Asian stability (9%) remained largely unchanged, the view that it was useful for the defense of Japan had dropped into fourth place with 8%.(986)

In addition, as was already the case in the 1970s, there remained considerable doubt that if there were a military attack on Japan whether the U.S. would make a major effort to defend it. (987) According to a 1984 Asahi poll, only 29% thought the U.S. would seriously make an effort to defend Japan if attacked (Honki de mamotte kureru), while 56% thought it would not. (988) Even more disturbing was a widely cited 1987 poll which showed that while only 38% of middle school students thought that Japan might be at war in the future, the U.S. led the Soviet Union 49% to 41% as the nation when asked who was most likely to be the enemy in such a conflict. This trend may be attributable to the spread of essentially anti-American comic books and war games. (989) Against this should be balanced other polls of adults which show that in 1988 while like the middle schoolers only 33% expected conflict, the plurality expected the Soviet Union would be the enemy (20% of all respondents) and only 3% the U.S. (990)

Support also remained high for the Constitution, well over
80% throughout the period. Indeed, there was some indication that for the average public it was no longer a serious political issue. (991) And the Japanese public was overwhelmingly opposed to the notion of dispatching Japanese forces to the Gulf both in 1987 and again in 1991. (992) Likewise support for the three non-nuclear principles remained high at 78% in 1988. (993) And 70% were in favor of keeping the three principles restricting weapons export. (994) Support for the 1% barrier also remained high even after it had ceased to be government policy. According to a 1988 Asahi survey, 54% felt that defense spending should remain within or around 1% of GNP. (995)

Despite the high acceptance of the SDF, there existed also a latent suspicion of the military which was not always reflected in the public opinion data, but which nonetheless exerted a powerful influence on the fundamental popular orientation towards the military. This latent suspicion revealed itself on such occasions as when in July 1938 the MSDF submarine "Nadashio" collided with a boat full of revelers, sinking it and causing 30 passengers to drown. While as in any other country, there was a great deal of criticism of the military in the wake of the disaster, what was peculiar about the Japanese case was the extent to which the criticism focused not only on lack of proper safety procedures and inadequate preparation, but also on the attitude of the crew of the Nadashio, who were widely reported to have ignored the cries for help of the survivors of the collision. As a result, many took this to be a sign that the
military still saw itself as being superior to civilians (32%) and could not be counted on in times of crisis (26%). So severe was the public condemnation, that eventually the Director General of the JDA was forced to resign. For weeks after the accident the flames of popular antipathy against the SDF, fanned by a hostile mass media, burned bright, with much of the criticism focusing on what was believed to be the reactionary nature of the military exposed by the incident. It is against this background of lurking doubts about the compatibility of the military with post-war society, still potent 43 years after the militarist government had been toppled, that the Japanese popular demand for limitations on the military must be understood.

II. Intellectuals and the Media

The late 1970s and first half of the 1980s saw an explosion of media interest in defense and military security. By one measure, the number of pages devoted to military affairs in Bungeishunju increased from 7 in 1976, to 64 in 1978 to 157 in 1980 and 231 in 1982. For Chukokoron the number of pages for the same years were 42, 74, 238 and 144. Likewise, there was a considerable increase in books aimed at the popular market concerning defense and security issues.

Curiously, polls from the period show only a relative increase in popular interest in the defense issue.
The available data suggest that what had occurred was a lifting of previously existing taboos on discussing defense, especially in the quality journals like *Chuokoron*, rather than a great surge of public interest in defense. (1004)

At the same time the main focus of the debate shifted. Whereas until the late 1970s the main battle had been between the Left Idealists and the Centrists, as of around 1980 the core debate became one between Centrists and Right Idealists. (1005) Until the late 1970s, the Right Idealists had been largely dormant and had not attracted much attention. This changed dramatically in 1980 with the publication of Shimizu Ikutaro's *Nihon yo, kokka tare!: Kakku no Sentaku* (Japan! Be a Nation!: The Nuclear Option*). (1006) Shimizu had been the intellectual mentor of the radical student Zengakuren during the 1960 Security Treaty riots, and he continued to be widely regarded as one of the grand men of Japanese letters thereafter. His conversion from far-left anti-American nationalism to far-right anti-American nationalism was taken by many to be a sign of the times, reflecting a fundamental shift in Japanese intellectual currents, comparable to the opposite conversion of the mystic militarist Ishiwara Kanji to mystic pacifism after WW II. (1007)

Shimizu's book was a perfect crystallization of all the classic post-war Right-Idealist themes, including calls for revision of the Constitution, veneration of the Emperor, dissolution of the Mutual Security Treaty and, as the title
would suggest, the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition he presented a nationalist interpretation of Japanese history, which saw WW II as a justifiable response to Western colonialism, the U.S. Occupation as determined to permanently hobble the Japanese nation and the Japanese military as the victim of an internal enemy who betrayed it on the home front when victory was in sight. This, as Inoki Masamichi later pointed out in his withering critique of Shimizu, was in effect a post-war Japanese equivalent to the Dolchstoß (stab in the back) myth favored by the Nazis.

Other Right-Idealist writers who have gained prominence since the late 70s include Eto Jun, Tetsuya Kataoka, Nakagawa Yasuhiro and Miyoshi Osamu. All exhibit a strong sense of nationalist assertiveness, a remarkably favorable view of prewar and wartime Japan, advocacy of a large-scale increase in the size of Japan's armed forces, and varying degrees of ambivalence towards the U.S., ranging from basic distrust (Kataoka) to virulent hatred (Eto).

On the other side of the debate are the Centrists, led by Inoki Masamichi and his disciple Kosaka Masataka, along with other respected experts on security and strategy such as Nagai Yonosuke. One important wing of this group includes Sato Seizaburo of Tokyo University and Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, who while sharing the basic Centrist view of foreign policy, became closer to Nakasone and the ideological right wing of the LDP during the late 70s and
1980s. These two subgroups could be termed the Liberal Centrists versus the Conservative Centrists to reflect the difference in their ideological nuances. Sato's work in particular is an interesting reflection of the changing texture of the Japanese intellectual scene, and is part of a new movement of Japanese academics who are far more vocal in their support of the LDP and of Japanese conservatism than was possible for any of their post-war predecessors. \(^{1020}\) Despite their political and ideological differences, both sides remain united in their support for the continuation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Both are highly critical of the Right Idealists' anti-Americanism and exaggerated rhetoric, though the conservative Centrists are more sympathetic to the Idealists' nationalist message. \(^{1021}\)

The Left Idealists have been greatly weakened by the continuing shift to the Right of the Japanese political spectrum and have been demoralized by the discrediting of Socialism, the Soviet Union and the PRC, which has stripped them of a viable positive program to offer as an alternative to the current political-economic order. Even more than before their role has been reduced to a largely negative one, criticizing the new increased defense relationship with the U.S. \(^{1022}\) and sounding desperate warnings about the perceived ideological shift to the Right of Japanese politics and society. \(^{1023}\) Prominent representatives of this view include Sakamoto Yoshikazu \(^{1024}\) and Kobayashi Naoki \(^{1025}\), as well as the more scholarly Ohtake Hideo and the prominent \textit{Asahi} journalist Chuma Kiyofuku. On the
balance the Left-Idealists are far less influential politically than they were before the mid-1970s, but they still constitute an important segment of academic and intellectual opinion and are supported by such institutions as Sekai and the Iwanami publishing Empire (not to mention communist publishing houses like Aoki Shoten).

With the advent of Gorbachev and the thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations interest in defense and military security issues cooled rapidly and soon became overshadowed by the looming specter of U.S.-Japanese trade and economic frictions. Right Idealists began to focus their attention on economic as opposed to military nationalism, an area where they are likely to enjoy far greater success because it does not run against the current of Japanese culture the way defense activism does, though the new Right Idealists continue to exhibit a strong level of interest in security matters. Even Centrists like Momoi Maxoto and Okazaki appear to be not totally unaffected by the new anti-American trend and seem to be braced for a serious reversal in U.S.-Japanese security relations. On the balance, however, Centrists continue to urge caution and seem inclined to favor making compromises in order to preserve the special security relationship with the U.S. (1026)

Eto Jun’s Nichibei Senso wa Owatte Inai: Shukkumei no Taiketsu – Sono Genzai, Kakko, Mirai ("the U.S.-Japanese War has not ended: A confrontation of destinies - its past, present and future") can be seen as the beginning of this new trend. (1027)
In many ways Eto is even more extreme than Shimizu Ikutaro (who has since passed away), and as the title suggests, he portrays the U.S. and Japan as being locked in a protracted confrontation dating from at least the beginning of the Pacific War. Pre-war Japan is portrayed as dedicated to the principles of national sovereignty, contributing to world peace through the establishment of stability in East Asia, and racial equality. The U.S. in contrast is seen as fundamentally driven by a quest for world domination (1028). While acknowledging the Soviet threat, Eto argues the U.S. does not really wish Japan to develop the power to deal with that threat. (1029) Eto makes the now standard Right-Idealist calls on Japan to develop the ability to defend itself, necessitating a change in the domestic political system, the passage of the Emergency Laws, and fostering Japanese values and traditions. (1030) Eto adds a new emphasis on Japan's economic and technological strengths, and sees its destiny lying in high tech. He even argues that a Japanese version of SDI would allow it to overcome the barrier posed by its non-nuclear status. (1031)

Perhaps the best-known, but by no means only, example of the new technonationalist Right Idealism is Morita Akio (chairman of Sony) and Ishihara Shintaro's (a colorful member of the LDP) No to Ieru Nihon ("A Japan that can say no"). (1032) Morita's contributions are relatively inoffensive to American ears, largely repeating criticism he has made elsewhere of American management style and the Japanese government's
inability to stand up to unfair U.S. demands. \(^{1033}\) In his conclusions he makes the typical Centrist point that the U.S. and Japanese economics are increasingly interdependent and are by now almost inextricably linked. \(^{1034}\) Ishihara, on the other hand, blames Japan bashing on American racial prejudice \(^{1035}\), suggests the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, not Germany because of the race factor \(^{1036}\), calls for Japan to rid itself of its subservient attitude towards the U.S. and of a military alliance designed only to help the U.S. \(^{1037}\), criticizes Western materialism \(^{1038}\) and ends with a call for Japan to lead East Asia into the new Pacific Era. \(^{1039}\)

The key shift that took place during this period is that whereas in the past Right Idealists like Shimizu linked the nationalist transformation of Japanese consciousness with new military policies, now a new generation of Right Idealists like Ishihara link it with the technological revolution instead. Thus the martial nationalism of old-style militarism is in the process of being replaced with a new, technology oriented technonationalism. \(^{1040}\)

In the media the most important change has been the movement of Yomiuri, whose circulation outstripped Asahi's to become Japan's largest newspaper, from a Left-Idealist/left of center view of defense and security issues to a clearly Centrist stance. The key institutional change is said to have come in 1980 with the appointment of Watanabe, a former Naimusho official with close ties to Gotoda Masaharu and Nakasone, as
chief editor. Thereafter the *Yomiuri* became increasingly pro-defense, beginning with its evaluation of the U.S. 1981 Annual Defense Report, which called for greater Japanese defense cooperation in the wake of Afghanistan. (1041) *Yomiuri* consistently advocated the Centrist military buildup, and was supportive of improved U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation (1042), the military technology agreement with the U.S. (1043), breaking the 1% barrier (1044) and SDI. Nonetheless, it still supports keeping Taiko and Article 9. (1045)

The other leading newspapers have continued to follow more or less the line that they had in the earlier periods. *Sankei* remains the most right-wing among the major newspapers, and even advocated amending Article 9 (1046), while *Nikkei* remains solidly in favor of the post-war approach to defense. *Asahi* and *Mainichi* are still the two most important liberal newspapers and continue to offer a stream of criticism of the government’s defense policies and over involvement in U.S. global strategy. (1047)

Among the journals, the most notable development is *Bungeishunju*’s continued drift to the right, and its creation of an even more conservative journal, *Shokunin*, which has become a main-stream forum for right-of-center and Right-Idealist views. (1048)

In summary, what this period has seen is a movement of the Japanese intellectual establishment towards the nationalist Right. At the same time, there remains a strong Left Idealist
element which increasingly finds itself in a sort of intellectual limbo. There is also a larger than ever Centrist group writing on military affairs which bitterly opposes Right Idealism even as some within that Centrist core have been pulled toward it. In the second half of the 1980s there was a relative decline of interest in purely defense and security matters, to be replaced with a new emphasis on economic and trade conflicts. The new Right-Idealist technonationalism may prove more seductive in the post-Cold War era, in part because it does not have to overcome the same burden of Japan’s past, its anti-military political-military culture, as the old, military Right Idealism did.

III. Industry (1049)

Beginning around 1980 there was a sharp intensification of interest in the defense issue among business circles in Japan. There was a variety of factors involved in this process, the most important of which included the increased technological sophistication of Japanese industry, which became increasingly capable of realizing the long-held goal of achieving an independent defense production base, and the concomitant rise in U.S. interest in gaining access to that technological base. These two goals were for a time mutually compatible, especially during the Nakasone administration when the Japanese government was prepared to cooperate with U.S. efforts to counter growing
Soviet strength. In the late 80s, however, economic and security goals began to clash, creating deep strains in the alliance.

After the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, Japan came under increasing pressure from Iran and the Arab world to become an alternate source of weapons to the region. (1050) Many Japanese business leaders, such as Kono Fumihiko of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce Nagano Shigeo, advocated Japan loosen its self-imposed restrictions on arms exports. Looking to the example of France, they argued that Japan had no choice but to accede to these demands in order to secure access to vital raw materials, especially oil from the Middle East. (1051)

Other Japanese business leaders, such as Hyuga Horai of Kansai Keidanren, pointed to growing Soviet military strength in the Far East, and urged that Japan meet this threat by greatly expanding its defense capabilities and instilling patriotism and defense consciousness through a national education program. (1052) Surveys from the time indicate that also many younger business leaders generally agreed that Japan needed to adopt a more active military role. (1053)

The Japanese Centrist mainstream, however, led by Keidanren Chairman Doko Toshio and Ineyama Yoshihiro, vetoed lifting restrictions on arms exports, and instead supported the government's tightening of regulations in 1976 and 1981. They argued that by becoming an arms supplier Japan would not only not guarantee its supply of oil, but might run the risk of being
drawn into foreign conflicts instead. Further many business leaders feared being labelled "merchants of death", hurting their image both at home and abroad. (1054) This did not imply out and out pacifism, but rather must be seen an extension of the cautious pragmatism typical of post-war Japanese Centrism. (1055)

Though the argument that Japan needed to export arms to secure supplies of vital raw materials was rejected, fear of the Soviet threat continued unabated. There was also growing anxiety that the appearance of Japanese "free riderism" could be detrimental to relations with the U.S. (1056) Consequently, as of 1981 Japanese business leaders began to devote greater attention to defense and security issues, and a major reorganization of the Defense Production Committee was undertaken to synchronize its lobbying activities with those of Keidanren. (1057) In particular, the business leaders together with government bureaucrats focused on improving U.S.-Japanese exchange of military technology as a means of both meeting U.S. demands and to help foster high-technology defense-related industries. (1058) After Nakasone took over the Prime Ministership from Suzuki, who had bitterly resisted increased cooperation with the U.S. plans for the exchange of military technology between the two countries began to forge ahead. In November 1983, on the occasion of President Reagan's trip to Japan, an agreement to increase joint defense projects and liberalize the export of Japanese military-related technology to
the U.S. was signed.

While on the surface this agreement represents a major departure from Japan's traditional stance strictly opposing arms exports, much like the 1978 Guidelines on U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation it must be seen as a Centrist response to a changing international environment. As Japan's economic strength and self confidence grew, domestic and international pressures mounted to increase defense-related production and exports. Within the parameters of Japan's new political-military culture, it was impossible to adopt an independent approach to arms production comparable to say Britain or France (and to a lesser extent West Germany as well). The Centrists who dominate the Japanese business world feared that to do so would entangle Japan in foreign conflicts and would be incompatible with Japan's new self understanding as a peaceful, trading nation. Therefore the Centrist leadership in Japan opted instead to rely on its relationship with the U.S. to cope with these demands.

However, almost as soon as the new agreement was signed, troubles began to emerge. Those companies, especially in the electronics and new materials sector, in whose technology the U.S. was the most interested, proved also the most reluctant to share their know-how with the outside world. (1059) These fears intensified as the U.S.-Japanese economic rivalry began to heat up. The 1987 Toshiba incident, in particular, convinced many Japanese businessmen that the U.S. was attempting to use export controls as a means of crippling the Japanese economy. (1060)
The very strength of Japanese industry and technology, which had attracted U.S. interest in joint production and exchange of militarily relevant technology in the first place, now began to undermine the process.

Even more damaging to U.S.-Japanese relations was the painful acrimony over the selection of the next generation of Japanese military fighter planes, the FSX. After long and arduous negotiations, a carefully hammered out agreement on joint U.S.-Japanese production of the aircraft came under withering criticism from the U.S. Congress, the Commerce Department and the media, all of whom felt that U.S. economic interests were being ignored by the Pentagon and that in effect the Defense Department was helping Japanese industry conquer one of the few surviving bastions of American high technology. The U.S. government, over the objections of the Japanese and the Defense Department, was forced to reconsider the project. (1061)

In Japan both Left and the Right Idealists took advantage of the crisis to urge scrapping the entire project, while Centrists urged calm and warned the U.S. that changing the project now would feed Japanese distrust and strengthen those who favor unilateral development. (1062) Japanese industry as well was alarmed and infuriated by the apparent U.S. reversal, and many, such as Makino Noboru, chairman of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, felt that the U.S. response was motivated by fear at losing its position of power and wounded national, even racial, pride. (1063) Many observers in both countries were
concerned that economic frictions and a rising tide of "technonationalism" in both countries were beginning to erode the security relationship between the two countries.\(^{1064}\)

Toshiba, FSX as well as the moves to block the acquisition by Japanese companies of firms deemed to be vital to U.S. national security interests \(^{1065}\) strengthened the hands of those who had been opposed to U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation in military technology to begin with. They reinforced the view that the U.S. was trying to use defense technology as a means of gaining access to Japanese technology and restricting the Japanese high-technology exports while offering nothing in return. As a result Keidanren and the JDA greatly increased the share of military research in the Japanese defense budget in order to lay the foundations for an defense industry independent of the U.S..\(^{1066}\) Likewise the JDA announced plans to replace U.S. missiles and helicopters with domestically designed and produced models.

At the same time the Defense Production Committee was turned into a standing committee of Keidanren, a move that had been deemed too politically sensitive for 40 years \(^{1067}\), and in February 1989 for the first time its recommendations on procurement were invested with the full authority of Keidanren. \(^{1068}\) The defense issue was receiving a degree of attention in Japanese circles totally out of proportion to the still very limited role it played in the Japanese economy (increasing from .37% of all manufacturing in 1977 to .51% in 1985, though some
sectors are more dependant than others). (1069)

In sum, the picture of industry's position on defense which emerges at the end of the Cold War is a mixed one. On the one hand, Japanese trust in the U.S. was been shaken by the spill over of economic frictions into the security area, and there are some signs of movement towards creating the basis for a defense economy independent of the U.S.. Likewise, with the increase in technology with both civil and military applications the Japanese ability to create such an independent military basis is growing even without any special encouragement. This also makes maintenance of the three non-export principles increasingly difficult.

On the other hand, there is little indication that mainstream Japanese business leaders are really very interested in creating an independent military industry in the way Right Idealists such as Ishihara Shintaro would prefer. Instead, there exists very much the perception that large-scale defense spending and the orientation of scientific research towards meeting military needs (50% in the U.S.) are among the prime causes for the relative decay of U.S. competitiveness and economic strength. (1070) While there is little doubt that Japanese self confidence is on the increase, Centrist Japanese business leaders, such as Moroi of the Keizai Doyukai and LDP leaders such as Shiina Moto, feel that this type of technonationalism is as much or even more a threat than are U.S. efforts to use joint production as a means of gaining control
over Japanese high technology.\(^{1071}\)

IV. The Opposition Parties \(^{1072}\)

During the late 70s and 1980s the opposition parties were forced to move further towards acceptance of the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty, partly as a result of the decreasing ideological appeal of the Soviet Union and the PRC, and partly because of the middle-road-parties' efforts to make themselves attractive coalition partners for the LDP. Hampering this process was the continued influence of the left wing of the JSP, which insisted on retaining the party's Left-Idealist stance in favor of unarmed neutrality. Moreover the LDP demonstrated a surprising capacity to turn around the slow erosion of its electoral basis by attracting swing voters.

The long march to the Center continued to be most apparent among the middle-of-the-road parties. The DSP became the most openly pro-defense of the major opposition parties, perhaps even more so than the LDP. The first step in this direction came in 1975 when the Central Committee accepted, at least for the time being, the Mutual Security Treaty, thereby abandoning its previous stance in favor of the Treaty without the stationing of U.S. troops (Churyu naki Ampo). \(^{1073}\) Over the next few years the DSP steadily moved towards an increasingly pro-defense position, dropping the final pretense of opposition at its 1982 Party Congress. Thereafter it supported virtually all major
government initiatives on defense, including increased defense spending, defense of the sea lanes, the transfer of military technology, research on Emergency Laws, and breaking the 1% barrier. (1074) The DSP even outdid the LDP in calling for the abrogation of Taiko as inappropriate in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan.(1075) Though pro-defense, the DSP did not display the kind of ideological Right Idealism of the right wing of the LDP. In short, by the mid-1980s the DSP had a position regarding defense much like that of the right-wing of the SPD had in the 60s and 70s in Germany, following the government where military-technical rationality seems to demand it, and at times even taking the initiative when the government failed to do so.

Komeito as well moved towards a more centrist position, though the overall tenor of its remarks remained far more idealist than those of the DSP. Like the DSP, this process began in October 1975 when Komeito dropped its demand for immediate abrogation of the treaty, and instead called for abrogation through diplomatic relations (gaiko kosho ni yoru) in order to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.. Subsequently Komeito moved towards tacit acceptance of the Mutual Security Treaty system, and 1981 made its abolition a distant ideal contingent upon the consent of the U.S. (Goihakki). (1076) Thereafter it has been generally supportive of the government's defense proposals, opposing the transfer of military technology and the defense of the sea lanes, but supporting Emergency Laws research and the
breaking of the 1% barrier. Unlike Right Idealists, however, Komeito legitimated new defense policies through reference to the defense of individuals and their prosperity, not through nationalistic appeals to the nation or Japanese civilization.  

In both cases the primary factor behind the middle-of-the-road parties increasing moderation was a combination of the decrease in the popular antipathy to the issue area as a whole and the prospect of going into coalition with the LDP. \(^{1078}\) In addition, in the case of the DSP there was the important impact of the labor unions in defense related industries, who were an important component of Domei, the DSP’s main base of support. \(^{1079}\) In the 1984-1986 period hopes of a coalition rose higher after the LDP took a beating in the 1983 elections. Nakasone arranged for informal negotiations with both Komeito and the DSP in which both indicated readiness to make further concessions on defense and security issues, though in the end the talks foundered as a result of resistance from former Prime Minister Tanaka. After the great Liberal Democratic victory in the double elections of 1986 all interest on the LDP side in a coalition vanished. \(^{1080}\)

The JSP as well moved slowly towards a more realistic policy on defense. The Socialists, however, remained far less willing to compromise, in part because unlike the DSP and Komeito they had little hope of joining a grand coalition with the LDP. Throughout the period, the right wing of the party, led by
faction leaders Yamaguchi Tsuruo, Tanabe Makoto and security expert Ishibashi Masashi, sought to win approval for at least limited acceptance of the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty. Even though they are said to enjoy the support of the majority of the party membership, they were stymied by the continued fierce resistance of the party left (1081) until 1984, when the party accepted the paradoxical formulation that the SDF was legal, though unconstitutional. (1082) At the same time the Socialists continued to be the LDP's major opponent in the Diet, and together with the JCP, they opposed every defense initiative taken by the government. But except when the JSP had the support of the middle-of-the-road parties, as during the debate on the Emergency legislation, its opposition remained remarkably ineffective.

After the 1986 elections, the opposition parties were given new opportunities following the LDP's introduction of a value-added sales tax and the outbreak of the Recruit scandal. The JSP, the DSP, Komeito and the splinter party Shaminren entered into negotiations to see if they could form a united alternative government to the LDP, going even so far as to create a sort of "shadow cabinet". The JSP's continued reluctance to abandon its goal of dismantling the Mutual Security Treaty and the SDF proved the key stumbling block in these negotiations. (1083) The left wing of the party, with the firm support of the otherwise moderate new Socialist Chairman Doi Takako, remained adamant in its position and threatened to
split off if the majority changes the parties Left-Idealist stance. (1084)

Thus, while on balance, the opposition has continued on the Center-ward trajectory begun in the mid-70s, deep-rooted JSP Left-Idealist inclinations, combined with an unfavorable political environment of opposition fragmentation continues to limit the progress which can be made towards achieving an even stronger Centrist consensus on defense.

V. The LDP

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a growth of interest in defense and security within the LDP, accompanied by an increase of Right Idealist sentiment in the party. Among the most important signs of this shift were the Right-Idealist leaders Fukuda and Nakasone becoming Prime Minister, an upsurge in provocative statements by Right-Idealists in the party, and an increase in the numbers of Dietmen who professed an interest in defense and security issues. Thus, at least on the surface, it might appear that the LDP as a whole had shifted to the Right. A closer examination of each of these phenomena, however, reveals a more mixed picture.

Fukuda and Nakasone were clearly the most openly conservative Prime Ministers since Kishi. They instituted an entire series of measures designed to increase national awareness and pride, including the singing of the old national
anthem and the flying of the national flag at official ceremonies, and educational reforms such as the abolition of the social studies course and using a historical military figure (Admiral Togo) as a role model in school textbooks. Also under both Fukuda and Nakasone important new defense policy initiatives were launched. Especially in Nakasone's case the ideological character of these moves was clear, and he defined the overcoming of these defense taboos, so that Japan could become a "normal" nation, as one of the central missions of his Prime Ministership. (1085)

The contrast with the two other Prime Ministers, Ohira and Suzuki, who were considered traditional LDP doves, is a useful one. Both moved to tone down the conservative ideological policies left behind from the Fukuda administration, and both resisted U.S. demands that Japan increase its defense efforts. While Suzuki did commit Japan to the defense of the sea lanes, he clearly had no idea of what he was doing, and there is even evidence which suggests that he had been tricked into doing so by pro-defense members of the bureaucracy. (1086)

On the other hand, there is no evidence which suggests that Nakasone and Fukuda became Prime Minister because of their Right Idealism. In both cases the chief factors behind their rise to the office had more to do with the constantly shifting balance of power between the different factions within the LDP, in which the ideological factor was only one element, and one decidedly inferior to the ability to raise money.
In addition, Fukuda, while very conservative on domestic policy issues, was decidedly more dovish when it came to foreign policy. In strongly emphasizing the cultivation of ties with the PRC and South East Asia and reliance on foreign aid to create a stable international order, Fukuda consistently advocated an approach to foreign policy which was closer to that of the doves in his party than it was to either the Right Idealists or the Centrists. (1087)

Finally whenever it seemed that Fukuda or Nakasone were moving too far too quickly on defense policy initiatives, support within their own party quickly evaporated, and they faced the unpleasant prospect of members of their own party siding with the opposition. Thus Fukuda had to watch as Ohira and Komoto turned against him on the Emergency Laws. (1088) Likewise Nakasone was frustrated by Fukuda, Ohira, Miki and ultimately even Kanemaru Shin on breaking the 1% barrier. During the first Gulf Crisis in 1987, when many of Nakasone’s closes advisors were urging him to dispatch minesweepers to the region, the move was effectively vetoed by his own Chief Cabinet Secretary, Gotoda Masaharu. (1089) Regardless whether they were motivated primarily by ideological opposition to Fukuda and Nakasone’s policies, or by personal and political rivalry (the evidence suggests a mixture of both), the internal ideological fragmentation of the LDP continued to serve as an effective brake on dramatic shifts in defense policy.

During the late 1970s there emerged an active and vocal
stream of LDP Dietmen who transcended factional cleavages and openly espoused such typically RRight-Idealist policies as constitutioal revision, dismantling of the Teacher's Union, fostering patriotism and military expansion. At its height their organization, the Seirankai (Blue Storm Society), could claim as many as 80 members and included many later crucial figures such as Watanabe Michio (who was to take over Nakasone's faction) and Agriculture Minister Nakagawa Ichiro. (1090)

The Seirankai's primary goal was to support Fukuda's bid for the Prime Ministership. Once this mission was accomplished, it fell dormant. Though many members continue to hold Right-Idealist views, the majority no longer express them publicly. (1091) A small minority, such as Ishihara Shintaro and Mori Kiyoshi, continue to take profiled ideological positions on defense and other, related issues. (1092) Also some non-Seirankai LDP members, such as Justice Minister Okunc Keisuke and Kamai Shizuka, have made comments reflecting similar views on the defense and nation. (1093) Within the parameters of the new political-military culture, however, their ideological position is more of a handicap than an advantage, and currently none are in position to take control of a faction, much less the Prime Ministership. (1094)

It is also questionable whether the number of Right Idealists in the party has increased. Rather it seems more likely that, like Right-idealist intellectuals, they have become more visible because the domestic political climate allows them
to more freely and openly express their views than they had been able to since 1960. Indeed it may be argued that, if anything, the lack of openly ideological Right Idealists in top positions suggests a decline in their overall strength, or, as Fukuda's foreign policy dovishness and Ishihara Shintaro's technonationalism would suggest, they are redefining their ideology in such a way that it no longer brings them into conflict with the new, anti-military political-military culture.

Finally there has been an increase in the number of LDP members who express an open interest in defense issues and are generally pro-defense in their views. In the past there was only a small handful of members, mostly World War II veterans like Genda Minoru, who actively pursued the defense issue, the rest of the LDP considering it tantamount to political suicide to do so. By 1986, however, there were 85 members on the LDP security subcommittee, 43 on the defense subcommittee and 51 on the committee dealing with issues concerning military bases. (1095) A 1981 Asahi survey estimated that there are 184 "hawks" in the LDP (defined as those who would increase defense spending and cooperation with the U.S.), 151 doves and 61 "neutrals". (1096) The hawks came together in the late 1970s under the leadership of Kanemaru Shin and Mihara Asao to form a defense tribe (boeizoku) actively pursuing the defense issue and trying to promote the interests of the relevant groups. (1097)

However, a closer examination of why more LDP Dietmen show an increased interest in defense does not suggest an increase in
Right-idealistic convictions. Much of the increase stems from Centrists who are more concerned with such mundane, non-ideological issues as winning financial support from the defense industry or influencing government policy on military bases. Their influence on procurement policy remains limited compared with the power of more established zokus (a term meaning literally tribes, but referring in this context to party policy experts), like those in agriculture and construction, and the actual number of active participants is far less than committee membership might suggest. According to one observer there are no more than approximately 17 or 18 members who are really actively engaged in making defense policy on a regular basis. (1098)

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a distinct change in the ideological outlook and style of the leading boeizoku, as old-style Right Idealists, such as Genda Minoru and Tamaki Ichitoku, have been replaced by more Centrist, internationally oriented figures like Shiina Moto and Kato Koichi. Interestingly, among the more active members there are none who openly espouses Right-Idealist views. (1099)

In conclusion, there is little doubt that there has been an increase of interest in defense in the LDP, and that there continue to be many Dietmen who make provocative Right-Idealist remarks. This trend, as has been argued, is due to a number of factors, the most important being the greater societal and political consensus in favor of defense which has created new opportunities to benefit politically from posturing on national
security issues. At the same time, it is important to understand that precisely because interest in defense has increased that it has become ever less the domain of Right Idealists in the party. Within the context of the new Japanese political-military culture, Right Idealism and the ability to push through new defense initiatives are mutually exclusive. This may be one of the chief reasons that Right Idealists like Ishihara Shintaro have seized on new issues, mainly economic, technological and trade issues, to propagate their nationalist message. (1100) Defense continues to be handicapped by the fact that it simply does not mobilize the electorate. As in the 1950s, it remains the accepted wisdom in the LDP that defense simply does not connect to votes (boei wa hyo ni tsugaranai). (1101)

VI. The Ministries

The 1980s saw a rise in the power of the Japanese Defense Agency, though it remained relatively low-status in the overall hierarchy of the Japanese bureaucratic world. (1102) The clearest reflection of this shift can be found in the rapid rate of expansion of the defense budget at a time when a zero ceiling was imposed on all other areas of government expenditures, except for foreign aid, and social security. Likewise, the removal of the 1% barrier over the objections of the Ministry of Finance was a major triumph for the JDA, though in return it had to grant MOF greater say in determining the content of its new 5
year plans. In addition, in the 1980s the JDA began producing its own top bureaucrats, contributing greatly to its sense of institutional pride and integrity.

Much of this increase in strength was dependant on U.S. pressure (gaiatsu), and through the increasingly extensive network of ties between the U.S. and Japanese defense establishments, a certain level of coordination between the two for purposes of pushing though increased defense spending was achieved. (1103) Additional factors were closer cooperation with the Foreign Ministry and the emergence of a larger, better organized group of pro-defense LDP Dietmen who supported the JDA, including not only right-wingers, but also powerful Centrists such as Kanemaru Shin, Sakata Michio and Yamashita Genri. (1104) In the late 1980s, however, some of these sources of strength began to diminish. Cooperation with the U.S. became increasingly rocky as a result of economic tensions and the Foreign Ministry began to focus on other, largely Third World issues.

Within the JDA there remains a deep cleavage between the basically Centrist JDA bureaucrats and the often more hard-line, and in some cases Right-Idealist SDF. (1105) The specialized knowledge of the SDF is becoming increasingly crucial to making policy decisions on sophisticated strategic and military-technical issues, and direct contact with their American counterparts has given the SDF an increased sense of pride, and improved their ability to act independently of the JDA. (1106)
There have been a few incidents of senior military men publicly trying to influence the defense debate in defiance of Agency regulations. In these cases civilian control was quickly reasserted and their statements can be viewed as a sort of last hurrah of the older generation before their retirement. \(^{1107}\) And certainly not all, or even most of the top SDF leadership was Right Idealist, and many are clearly have Centrist views. \(^{1108}\) The new generation of SDF members have been raised in a totally different environment from their predecessors, and the majority have entered the armed forces no longer out of personal attachment to military service formed in the days of the Imperial Army and Navy, but for the most part to get a job or acquire technical skills. While some observers are concerned about the degree to which the SDF has become a world unto itself, uncomfortably cut off from civil society, \(^{1109}\) to date there have been no clear signs that it represents a threat to the post-war democratic system.

Conclusions

During the 13 year period between 1976 and 1989 the tenuous consensus on defense continued to grow stronger as various sectors of society (the media, the intelligentsia, public opinion and the political parties) all came to show an increasingly high level of support for the fundamental premises of post-war defense policy: a close alliance with the U.S. aimed
at securing a U.S. security guarantee for Japan without involving Japan in conflicts abroad and the maintenance of a carefully regulated and constrained national defense establishment. In short, the doctrine laid down by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru nearly 4 decades earlier as a provisorium to last until the nation had recovered from the trauma of a lost war has since become firmly anchored in Japan's institutional structures and is reinforced by the spread of Centrist attitudes in its distinctive political-military culture.

While there has been a shift away from Left Idealism in public and intellectual opinion, and the opposition parties have become increasingly ineffectual, this shift has been accompanied by a shift to the center within the LDP. And though public pride in Japan has increased, it has not focused on the military establishment, but rather on Japan's economic accomplishments. Whenever Right Idealists tried to link defense and nationalism, they met with sharp reversals as not only public, but perhaps more importantly, elite opinion turned against them.

What makes the continued strength of the Centrist consensus all the more remarkable is that it has prevailed and grown stronger despite drastic changes in Japan's national stature and the international environment. Despite Japan's movement to the forefront of the world economy and despite the disintegration of first detente and then of the entire East-West confrontation on which the Yoshida doctrine was based, the Japanese approach to
defense has changed remarkably little. There have been some modifications, to be sure, but largely of an incremental nature. More importantly, the two primary political assumptions on which defense policy is based have been institutionalized and are increasingly accepted by a new generation with little experience of the War: a deep-rooted distrust of the armed forces, and a complementary belief in the relative efficacy and desirability of economic and diplomatic foreign policy instruments compared to military might.

The one truly new development is that even though the defense debate has not died, it has taken on a new dimension as the former Right Idealists now look increasingly to trade and economic issues rather than military ones to push their nationalist political agenda. In other words, they have substituted technonationalism for military nationalism, and they now seek to utilize trade disputes to stir up nationalist emotions and pride in Japanese cultural and racial qualities. What makes this new form of Right Idealism more potent is that it does not as suffer from the restrictive burden of the past as military nationalism does and therefore does not run against the new anti-military political-military culture. Though many on the Center are leery of the nationalist appeals of Ishihara Shintaro and Eto Jun (1110), the Right Idealists may have greater success in the economic arena than they had tackling defense issues. If the Right Idealists should succeed in fostering technonationalism, they will almost inevitably achieve a
revolution in defense as well. For technonationalist policies would lead to the destruction of the Mutual Security System, raising uncomfortable questions for the Japanese regarding nuclear security and the preservation of peace and security in the Far East.
Chapter 11 - The New Divide - West Germany 1977-1989

The late 1970s and 1980s saw a rekindling of the defense debate in West Germany. The disintegration of detente led the leaders of the Western nations to try to balance the perceived increase in Soviet military might with the deployment of medium-range missiles and improvements in NATO's conventional defenses. This increase in defense efforts confronted the German populace with questions it had long preferred to ignore. This dilemma was further exacerbated by the activities of a new generation of political activists who, untempered by any direct experience with Communism, were even more idealistic and utopian in their aspirations than their predecessors in the 1950s were. The resultant political controversy tore apart the tenuous consensus on defense in the SPD, and, on the surface at least, appeared to signal a transformation of German attitudes towards defense. Yet, despite its ability to organize impressively large street demonstrations, ultimately the peace movement had only limited appeal to the larger West German population and its only real achievement was to contribute to the demise of 14 years of Social Democratic government.

At the same time the new Christian Democratic government of Helmut Kohl, while distinctly more hawkish than even the right wing of the SPD embodied by Helmut Schmidt and Hans Apel, moved closer to the new West German consensus on security by openly embracing Ostpolitik and detente. Consequently, even in midst of the Winter in East-West relations during the first half of the 1980s, the right wing of the German political spectrum moved
closer towards the post-war West German consensus on defense and security which demanded diplomatic openness to the East along with military measures designed to deter military attack.

Thus this period, while on the surface marked by an erosion of support for the Federal Republic's post-war approach to security and an apparent a weakening of consensus in its new political-military culture, can also be understood as its reaffirmation. A powerful challenge to the entire West German approach to defense and security was beaten back, though only after having caused a greater degree of political upheaval than in any other Western nation. At the same time, the conservatives who were more inclined to make the necessary changes in defense policy, underwent a quiet revolution in which they essentially came to see active, non-military diplomatic efforts and economic initiatives as the necessary complement to the more traditional policy of military defense and deterrence.

1. Cracks in the Consensus - The Neutron Bomb Controversy (1111)

Though criticism of NATO strategy had been growing for a number of years among a new generation of peace researchers, led by such figures as Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and Horst Ahfeldt, it was not until 1977 that the issue attracted wider attention. The trigger to the renewed debate was the announcement that the Carter administration was planning to build a new type of atomic weapon, the neutron bomb. Led by Egon
Bahr, a new coalition of peace researchers, substantial portions of the media, the ecology movement and the left wing of the SPD came together to openly challenge the West German consensus on defense and security. The debate on the neutron bomb foreshadowed the larger controversy which was to break out over the deployment of the Pershing II, and it signaled the beginning of the end for the Schmidt government. Under increasing pressure from its left wing, the party was in effect compelled to step back from its decision at Bad Godesberg to support NATO strategy.

Since the mid-1970s the U.S. had become increasingly concerned about the continued Soviet buildup of its conventional and theatre nuclear forces, despite detente and ongoing arms control negotiations. In 1974 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recommended that the U.S. develop further limited nuclear options, and in 1975 to 1976 his successor, Donald Rumsfeld, oversaw the drafting of plans for the improvement of conventional and theater nuclear forces. (1112) It was in this context that in the Summer of 1977 the Carter administration began to seek Congressional funding for a new type of nuclear warhead which produced more radiation, but less blast and fire effects. The official acronym for this weapon was ERW, Enhanced Radiation Weapon, but it came to be popularly known as the neutron bomb. (1113)

European military experts, in particular the West Germans, strongly supported the new technology. They were especially
interested in its potential as a tactical nuclear war head, and it was believed that it could be particularly useful against Soviet tank formations, though later on they were to try to downplay their initial support. (1114)

The suddenly, without consulting the SPD leadership, Egon Bahr published a scathing critique of the neutron bomb in the July 21rst edition of the party journal, Vorwärts, entitled "Ist die Menschheit dabei Verrückt zu Werden? Die Neutronenbombe ist ein Symbol der Perversion des De's..." (Is mankind about to go mad? The neutron bomb is a symbol of the perversion of thought). Bahr denounced the new weapon in the strongest possible terms, objecting to it primarily on moral, and not on political or military grounds. His argument was based on humanistic ethics and Christian conscience and was openly anti-materialist and potentially anti-capitalist.

Here is the scale of all values stood on its head. The goal has become the preservation of material goods, human beings have been relegated to a position of secondary importance... With his brain man is reducing himself to less than a slave of the machine: in case of war it is not man, but the machine which is considered worth saving. The Neutron bomb is a symbol of the perversion of thought... Regardless of whether one thinks in terms of Christianity or of the maxims of humanistic ethics... with the Neutron bomb man has displaced himself from the center to the margin, since now in the center is the material. Materialism in triumphant excess, or life - what is it that we wish to defend? (1115)

This was a remarkable emotional outburst for a man who was noted for his intellectual capabilities and was considered one of the architects of post-war West German foreign policy. It was also seen as highly significant by many inside the party, since Bahr was also Willi Brandt's closest confidante, and his
defection was widely viewed as a sign that the left and the left of center within the party was beginning to move away from Schmidt and the rest of the party leadership on defense and security issues.

Curiously, while on the surface Bahr's article marked a major shift to the left, only a few weeks earlier he had been instrumental in threatening the SPD youth wing, the JUSOS, with disciplinary action if they did not pull out of a planned joint peace demonstration with a Communist organization. Throughout the 1970s the JUSOS and other SPD youth and student groups, had moved closer to the hard Marxist-Leninist left. In hundreds of campus government elections they consistently joined groups like the German Spartakus League against the more conservative, CDU-affiliated student groups. (1116) The SPD viewed this trend with apprehension, fearing that the JUSOS were moving too close to the Communists and thus potentially alienating portions of the SPD electorate. For this reason the party leadership issued a statement warning that while the SPD favored detente and active measures for peace, the Communists were trying to use the demonstration to blur the line between themselves and the Social Democrats. (1117) The SPD also expelled from the party a number of JUSOS leaders, including its newly elected President, Klaus-Uwe Benneter, and the prominent student activist Gerhard Stuby.(1118)

Many in the SPD, however, were increasingly concerned that the party was losing contact with its grass roots (Basis) and
with the younger generation. There was a feeling that the party needed to rejuvenate itself and to find a new direction to match what it saw to be the changing mood of the times. (1119) Just as Brandt defined Ostpolitik not only as a diplomatic opening to Eastern Europe, but also as an opening up of German society to more democracy and to the student movement, so Bahr's stance on the neutron bomb may be understood as an opening up of at least one wing of the SPD to these very same forces 8 years later.

The Bahr article triggered an avalanche of similar criticism of the neutron bomb. Der Spiegel, which made the neutron bomb the cover story of its July 18th edition, portrayed the American decision to produce the weapon as being motivated by Cold War ideology and anti-Soviet hysteria rather than balance of power considerations, and focused heavily on the type of damage that such weapons might do if used on German territory. It also depicted Carter's idealistic human rights campaign was a threat to detente. (1120) The influential journalist Peter Bender made similar arguments, decrying the inhuman cruelty of the weapon. (1121) Though right-of-center conservative newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine and the more conservative Die Welt supported the new weapon, the liberal press was nearly unanimous in portraying it in the most unfavorable light possible. (1122)

Bahr's article was the signal for a fierce debate within the SPD, and though Schmidt and his defense minister, Georg Leber valiantly defended their position supporting the U.S.
decision, they soon found themselves in the minority within their own party. Among the opponents there were some, like Bahr, who based their opposition on moral and ethical grounds. But the majority of the critics, focused more on the danger that it would lower the nuclear threshold and thus make atomic warfare more probable in the event hostilities actually broke out. Even Herbert Wehner apparently was to some extent persuaded by this line of reasoning. (1123) Other Social Democrats like Karsten Voigt, one of the youthful leaders of the 1968 generation in the SPD, focused on the negative impact that the neutron bomb might have on détente and arms control and urged unilaterally foregoing development as a gesture of good faith to the Soviet Union. (1124)

The SPD’s Free Democrat coalition partners also initially showed some signs of dissatisfaction with the weapon, but the main leadership under the direction of Foreign Minister Hans DieterGenscher and his protege Jürgen Möllemann was far more supportive of the U.S. position. Möllemann was quite harsh in his criticism of Bahr’s idealism, and warned that those who would criticize the U.S. decision should be careful not to let their arguments take on the tone of anti-Americanism. (1125) At the same time Genscher pointed out that there was a need to counter growing Soviet military capabilities. (1126)

Ironically it was the opposition CDU’s Philip Jenninger, Alois Mertes, and Manfred Wörner who were the most outspoken in their support of the neutron bomb and harshest in their
criticism of Egon Bahr. Wörner saw the neutron bomb as being more than merely a strategic issue, and warned that the Soviet Union was trying to make use of fear of nuclear weapons to achieve the psychological disarmament of the West. (1127)

Voigt and other Social Democratic critics of the neutron bomb were joined by a host of political activist groups and organizations, such as the Köln branch of the JUSOS, the Catholic peace organization Pax Christi and SPD women's groups in issuing appeals for opposition to the neutron bomb. Various new social movements, which had grown steadily throughout the late 60s and 70s and up to then had been mostly active in opposing the construction of atomic power plants, also began to become involved in the anti-neutron bomb campaign. The most important of these was the BBU (Bundesverband Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz), a citizens coalition for environmental issues. (1128) It was out of this coalition of traditional pacifist groups and the new social movements that the second West German peace movement was born, and they lent grass-roots support to Bahr and Voigt and the other SPD critics of the neutron bomb.

The new peace movement received its intellectual leadership from the growing network of peace researchers, whose activities and prolific writings suddenly received more public attention with the onset of the neutron bomb controversy. The first of this new wave of literature was the former 60s activist Anton-Andreas Guha's The Neutron Bomb or the Perversion of Human
Thought (1129) which became virtually an overnight hit, selling over 100,000 copies. Guha's book became paradigmatic of a whole wave of literature, combining rather detailed descriptions of the technical questions and the political debates surrounding the nuclear issue with a unreflective critical condemnation of Western defense policies. Much more so than the older generation of peace researchers (such as Weizsäcker and Ahfeldt), Guha's writing reflected the hard, Marxist Leninist world view which had become popular among German radical students in the late 1960s. In his foreword he denigrates the defense of the West as a pathetic effort on the part of the bourgeoisie to protect its privileges and criticized the SPD for playing along against its better conscience.(1130)

Faced with this barrage of criticism from the media and from within their own party, Schmidt and Leber were forced to step back from their earlier position and qualify their support, linking it to lack of progress in arms control. (1131) At the November SPD party congress Schmidt and Leber continued to find themselves on the defensive, and the committee in charge of setting the party platform rejected no fewer than 18 proposals attacking the neutron bomb before settling on a final draft supporting Schmidt and Leber's position. Egon Bahr played an important role in placating the left-wing critics, arguing that the best way to avoid the deployment of weapon if the party placed its trust in the judgement of its leadership and not hinder the Social Democratic government. (1132)
The FDP at its party Congress in Kiel also watered down criticism from its youth wing and from the more liberal party committee on defense and security committee. But even the FDP youth wing and other critics of the neutron bomb based their criticisms on arms control considerations and specifically rejected the distinction made by Bahr and the SPD radical critics between humane and inhumane weapons, and Genscher and the party leadership had a far easier time than Schmidt did in getting the party to accept deployment contingent on developments in the arms control negotiations. (1133) Unlike their Social Democratic coalition partners, the FDP was little moved by the growing peace movement. (1134)

In January 1978, once an internal political consensus within the two ruling parties had finally been achieved, the Federal government formulated its position on the neutron bomb, basing its support of the weapon on five key points; 1) as a non-nuclear state the FRG has nothing to say with regard to the production of the weapon; 2) if produced, the neutron bomb should be included in arms control negotiations; 3) the FRG will accept deployment in West Germany should there be no progress on arms control within 2 years 4) the neutron bomb should not be deployed in the Federal Republic alone, at least one other European nation should accept the weapon as well 5) the FRG must not be overexposed as a non-nuclear power; relations with the Soviet Union and the East European nations should be included in considerations of whether to deploy the weapon or not. (1135)
The government's position was the product of crosscutting internal and external political pressures. Its solution to this was to link the deployment of weapons with the more politically palatable goal of arms control, and to mask its responsibility within the context of the alliance. By insisting that the neutron bomb not be deployed in West Germany alone, two goals were fulfilled. First the appearance was avoided that West Germany alone was bearing the risk of becoming the site of a nuclear battlefield. Second, it made the acceptance of deployments not purely a West German national decision, but rather an alliance issue. This allowed the Federal Government to claim that it was not acting only to defend itself, but also out of loyalty to the alliance. A few years later the West German government was to adopt virtually the same position vis-à-vis the Pershing II missiles. (1136)

This attempt to dilute the West German government's responsibility for national security was to ultimately backfire. The U.S. government was less than pleased with West Germany's lukewarm support, and was particularly reluctant to accept deployment contingent on arms control talks. Nonetheless, with support from the other European powers, the West German position prevailed and became the basis of the NATO approach. (1137) Thereafter President Jimmy Carter became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy, feeling that there was no point in pushing through an unpopular measure designed to improve European security if the Europeans themselves were not ready to
take the political responsibility for the deployment. (1138) Ultimately, in April 1978 Carter decided to defer production.

Officially both the SPD and the FDP were compelled to hail Carter's decision as beneficial to detente and arms control. Domestically, West German conservatives and defense-oriented centrists were outraged at what they interpreted as a refusal to face the Soviet threat. (1139) Also Der Spiegel and the Left chastised the U.S. for its inconstant leadership. (1140) Privately Chancellor Schmidt, who had expended a great deal of energy and political capital in rallying political support for the bomb, was infuriated by Carter's reversal and worried by what he saw to be conclusive evidence of the unreliability of the U.S. as an ally.

Thereafter the neutron bomb issue disappeared from the political stage, only to reemerge briefly in 1981 when the Reagan administration decided to revive the project. By then, however, it was completely overshadowed by the much larger controversy over the Pershing IIs. Nonetheless, the neutron bomb controversy must be understood as a signal, a signal of a change in the constellation of forces making up the German political-military culture. The SPD's tenuous support of defence and deterrence had been put to the test by the decline of detente and efforts by the U.S. to counter growing Soviet military strength. At the same time there was a growing minority at the left-end of the German political spectrum that rejected not only West German society, but the entire hierarchy of values that it
represented. Important elements of the SPD leadership, hoping to integrate this potential source of political support into their party, and unwilling follow the U.S. in its increasingly hard-line stance towards the U.S.S.R., deserted the pro-defense, pro-Atlanticist Helmut Schmidt and other Atlanticists in the party. Though the neutron bomb controversy ultimately fizzled out, cracks in the consensus had appeared. As detente continued to decline, those cracks were to spread.


Already weakened by the 1978 neutron bomb battle and under increasing pressure from the growing new peace movement, the SPD's Bad Godesberg consensus on defense was to come completely unravelled during the early 1980s. On the surface the primary focus of the debate was the decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs in Western Europe. But what was really at issue was the utility of the Atlantic alliance and the validity of conventional doctrines on deterrence and defense. The West German approach to ensuring its national security faced its greatest challenge since the 1950s, and the central issues surrounding defense in the context of its political-military culture were reopened once again to debate. Emotional questions were once again raised about the lessons to be drawn from German history, and about the
role that Germans should strive to play in international society. Thus, more so than most security debates, the decision to deploy the new missiles turned into a cultural battle over fundamental social values and understandings rather than a disagreement over strategy. In the end, the challenge from the Left to the consensus in the main-stream political culture and its associated policies was decisively repelled. The West Germany's consensus on defense and the political-military culture which supported it was reaffirmed and in some respects even strengthened.

The decision to deploy the new theatre nuclear weapons was made at the meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers in December, 1979 in response to the ongoing Soviet deployment of the highly accurate, intermediate-range SS-20 missiles. German strategic experts were concerned that left uncountered, the SS-20 would create a "gap" in the spectrum of scenarios that flexible response could meet, increasing the possibility for Soviet nuclear blackmail and potentially leading to a strategic uncoupling of the U.S. and Western Europe. (1141) It was also possible to argue precisely the opposite, as the critics of the decision were to do; that the deployment of the missiles threatened a strategic decoupling and created the potential for restricting a nuclear conflict to Western Europe. It is impossible to determine which of these two views are correct purely on the basis of strategic-military logic, since both arguments rest on untested assumptions about U.S. and Soviet
behavior in the event of a crisis. Nonetheless, aside from the strategic imponderables, it was clear that some political response was needed, both in order to maintain the psychological balance of power in Europe and for the sake of alliance unity. At the same time, to forestall domestic political criticism of the new initiative, the West German government insisted that the decision to deploy the missiles be coupled with efforts to negotiate an arms control agreement on such weapons with the Soviet Union. This coupling of projects, the deployment of missiles and the simultaneous pursuit of arms control, was called the dual-track decision.

Only two weeks after the dual-track decision was made, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the international environment changed dramatically. The U.S. embarked on a major program of military expansion to counter growing Soviet military power, and President Carter chose to indefinitely postpone the ratification of SALT II. The following year the Reagan administration came into office determined to pursue a hard-line approach towards the Soviet Union. The final blow had been dealt to détente and the outlook for arms control was bleak.

West German public opinion data from the early 80s revealed that public support remained unshaken for the main institutions on which German security policy rested, including the Bundeswehr, the NATO alliance and the stationing of U.S. troops in West Germany. And while the perceived threat of war shot up following Afghanistan, the sense of being
threatened was for the majority of the population not too acute, and concern over national security continued to consistently trail other, more mundane issues such as unemployment and social security. (1146) What the new environment did put into question was the widespread West German support for detente, shared, according to an Allensbach poll not only by 74% of all Germans, but even by a majority of CDU voters (59%). (1147) Closely linked to this was a profound West German ambivalence about the utility of military means, especially nuclear weapons, for national defense, with a full 37% rejecting all forms of military force, and a further 18% rejecting the use of nuclear weapons to defend against military aggression. (1148) This attachment to detente and continued ambivalence about defense and nuclear weapons, central features of West Germany's new anti-military political-military culture, provided the new peace movement with fertile grounds in which to mobilize public opposition.

The peace movement in its essence consisted of the same coalition of diverse groups which had opposed the neutron bomb, embracing artists and intellectuals like Günter Grass, peace researchers such as Gert Bastian, Dieter Lutz and Alfred Mechtersheimer (1149), the various ecological and counter-cultural groupings that were forming the Green party, and various Christian pacifist groups. This time, however, the peace movement was to dramatically expand its base of support, mobilizing large numbers of protestors with the help of the
left-wing of the German media. In July 1980, Rudolf Augstein warned in Der Spiegel against over reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, warning that it might trigger a "Kaiser Wilhelm effect", i.e. an unrestrained military competition fueled by mutual paranoia and culminating in war. In subsequent editorials Augstein accused the U.S. of planning to wage a proxy atomic war and declared that while he preferred to live in a U.S. colony (i.e. the FRG) to a Communist one, he would not do so if he had to die as the U.S. unnecessarily pushed the Soviet Union towards a final confrontation. (1150) Also the popular weekly Stern and the daily Die Frankfurter Rundschau adopted editorial positions based on the arguments of the peace movement. (1151)

The common ideology that linked together this loose coalition had become more clearly articulated since 1979. The central tenet of faith was that it was the U.S. and Ronald Reagan that was largely responsible for the increase in East-West tensions, that the deployment of the Pershing II missiles was the first step towards a nuclear conflagration confined largely to Western Europe, and that both sides in the Cold War were morally bankrupt. There was a general tendency to discount the importance of the Soviet SS-20s, and a belief that what drives the arms race is not the intentions of the political leadership but the very existence of nuclear weapons and the arms race dynamics that they engender. (1152) This was often combined with an ideology critical of a Western civilization
believed to be trapped and driven by the forces of non-human technical rationality.

As an alternative to the present security system, the peace movement revived the old idea of a "third way" between the two military blocs. This time, in contrast to the 1950s, the idea broadened its focus to embrace not only the two Germanies, but also all of Europe. Paradigmatic of this kind of thinking was the prominent journalist Peter Bender. In his book *Das Ende des Ideologischen Zeitalters*, Bender declared that the era where Europe was dominated by the ideologies of the backward East and the soulless West was coming to an end. Instead he saw a new a Europe bound together by common geographically determined interests and a common civilization emerging as an alternative to these two bankrupt hegemonies. (1153) Though censorious of the Soviet Union, Bender clearly felt that the opportunity for change lay in the West, arguing that if Western Europe could free itself of the shackles of its superpower master the way would be opened for the emancipation of Eastern Europe as well. Bender's views represented a peculiar blending of the paneuropæan Gaullism of the German Right and the Central European orientation of the Left, in both cases making use of transnationalist ideologies to legitimate nationalist power-political arguments, which have been stigmatized above all on the Left in the context of West Germany's political culture.

Bolstering this vision for the future was an interpretation of the lessons to be learned from Germany's past that differed
radically from the understanding of history held by the Right and by countries which had been the victims of German aggression. This difference in historical perspectives came out most dramatically in 1983. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* one of the leaders of the new Green party, Joschka Fischer, claimed that preparations were being made for a new mass extermination comparable to Auschwitz, this time based not on a racial ideology but on the East-West conflict. Heiner Geissler, Secretary General of the CDU and one of the party's leading strategists, expressed outrage over Fischer's remark in the Bundestag. Geissler asserted that it was precisely the kind of pacifism advocated by the Greens that had made Auschwitz possible in the first place by weakening the resolve of the Western democracies to face up to Hitler's dictatorship. He drew a direct line between the pacifism of the 1930s and its contemporary descendent, arguing that once again it was necessary to underline the differences between two systems so that democracy not succumb to tyranny. Following Geissler's remarks there was a howl of protest from the banks of the opposition, where not only the Greens but also the SPD protested in the strongest possible terms what they perceived to be Geissler's shameless distortion of history, and they demanded his removal from the government. Horst Ehmke of the SPD countered that Chamberlain, far from being a pacifist, had been a British right-winger who had hoped to use Hitler against Stalin, that it was the Right in Germany that had put Hitler in
power, and that Geissler's remarks show that the same tradition of thought continued to dominate conservative thinking in Germany today. The SPD's new chairman, Hans Jochen Vogel backed up Ehmkke, charging that Geissler and other conservatives were reviving the "stab in the back" legend which had fueled the right-wing revival of the 1930s, and were obscuring the true reasons for Hitler's rise by blaming it on the pacifists. (1154)

In the end little came of the incident, and Geissler survived a vote for his dismissal from the cabinet. Nonetheless, the exchange had revealed the fundamentally opposed nature of the historical understandings guiding the two sides in the debate over the Euromissiles. Geissler's remarks were of course in full agreement with the lessons which most Western statesmen had drawn from the 1930s on the dangers of appeasement. But the Left in Germany had learned the opposite lesson, that it was their own and the German people's failure to stand up to the Nazis that allowed them to come into power, and that Hitler had been driven by a logic of power that was comparable in its general murderous dynamics to the balance of power reasoning of the U.S. and the conservatives. The term "atomic Auschwitz" as employed by Fischer had brilliantly brought together this concept of history and the INF issue, imbuing it with the powerful moral onus of the Holocaust and suggesting that the guilty German nation had a special duty to prevent its reoccurrence.

The ideology of the peace movement spread in the SPD during
the INF concept, and the small, realist wing around Helmut Schmidt and Defense Minister Hans Apel found themselves increasingly on the defensive as the controversy dragged on. In the forefront of the SPD opposition to the missiles were Egon Bahr, Oskar Lafontaine and Erhard Eppler, each representing somewhat different ideological currents. Eppler, a former Protestant minister with a long-standing concern with Third World and ecological issues, was closest to the peace movement, criticizing the Cold War and technocratic thin' ing behind the dual track decision and calling for the elimination of antagonistic images of the Soviet Union (Feindbilder) and the adoption of a non-confrontational military strategy based on a system of territorial defense. (1155) Oskar Lafontaine, the Chief Minister of the Saarland, likewise made use of many of the arguments of the peace movement to argue for a Europeanization of Europe and a German withdrawal from NATO, but placed greater emphasis on the united European angle than Eppler did. (1156) Finally Egon Bahr, perhaps the most influential of the Social Democratic critics of the dual track decision, advocated that Germany remain in NATO in order to continue to influence Western security policy, but called for a veto of the deployment of the Pershing IIs as an assertion of German sovereignty. Bahr emphasized the difference in interests between nuclear and non-nuclear states, and suggested, in the fashion of adherents of the Central Europeanist position, that the non-nuclear states on both sides of the Iron Curtain work together to further the
cause of detente and create a security partnership between the two alliances in Europe. (1157)

At the Berlin party congress in December 1979, Bahr and Herbert Wehner continued to support the Chancellor, and despite a barrage of initiatives critical of the proposed missile deployments, got the party to approve the dual track decision. Their support, however, was based not on the acceptance of Helmut Schmidt's argument that the balance of power had to be preserved, but rather on the need to support the party's Chancellor and the hope that an arms control agreement could be reached. (1158) In 1980, however, this support began to evaporate as the peace movement demonstrated its ability to mobilize great crowds of demonstrators, beginning with a gathering of prominent peace activists at Krefeld in November 1980. A declaration was issued calling for the dual track mission to be rescinded, and by April 1982 over 2 million signatures were gathered in support of the appeal. A few weeks later, in response to the Krefeld meeting, the JUSOS organized their own rally at Bielefeld. (1159) Public opinion also grew increasingly skeptical of U.S. intentions and the missile deployments. Whereas in 1981 62% of those surveyed expressed confidence in the U.S. ability to master current world problems by January 1983 this had declined to 43%. (1160) And the number of those who feared that the missile deployments would increase the chance of a nuclear war on German soil rose from 45% to 54%. (1161)
Against this background of rising popular dissatisfaction, over the following year and a half the party turned increasingly against Schmidt and his small band of supporters. Even Herbert Wehner indicated his disagreement with the basic direction of the Chancellor's policies. \(^{(1162)}\) Bahr, Vogt, Lafontaine and others increasingly openly voiced their disagreement with the Chancellor, undermining his authority. \(^{(1163)}\) At the party congress in 1982 Bahr and Brandt were still able to prevail upon the party to back Schmidt, but suggested that their support was contingent on the government's exerting pressure on the U.S. to cancel the deployment. \(^{(1164)}\)

The Social Democratic shift to the Left began to alarm not only the CDU/CSU opposition, but also the SPD's coalition partners, the Free Democrats. Though some in the FDP were inclined to support the peace movement, the party leadership under Foreign Minister Genscher turned decisively against them, at times even threatening to resign to ensure his party continued to support the dual-track decision. Others in the party, most notably the powerful Otto Graf von Lambsdorf, were also concerned by the direction in which the SPD feelers towards the Greens was taking the government. In August, 1982 Genscher began to openly side with the CDU on the defense issue, warning that the SPD was blurring the distinction between dictatorship and democracy, and that West Germany had to comply with the dual-track decision for the sake of the Atlantic alliance. While he did not share the CDU's ideological fervor, and was more pro-
detente than Helmut Kohl, Genscher represented the Atlanticist main stream in the FDP which was profoundly wary of the Central Europeanist fantasies that the SPD appeared to be succumbing to. The next month Genscher resigned and formed a new governing coalition with Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrats. (1165)

Once out of power, the SPD began to shift rapidly even further to the Left and at the November 1983 party convention in Köln it openly rejected the INF deployments and adopted Bahr’s argument that British and French nuclear systems should be included in the arms control negotiations. (1166) In the months following their exit from power and before the next federal elections the SPD campaigned hard to capitalize on anti-nuclear sentiments, making the INF issue its central theme. The Social Democrats claimed that they were representing Germany’s real interests and were "left patriots". The CDU for its part accused the SPD of being, whether conscious of it or not, agents for the Soviet Union. (1167) Also Genscher and the FDP warned of the SPD trend towards neutralism and emphasized that the two pillars of German foreign policy were its commitments to both the Western alliance and detente. (1168) At the same time, wary of public opinion polls which gave the SPD an edge on the anti-nuclear issue, Kohl chose to concentrate primarily on economic and social policy themes, where the Union was perceived to have an advantage over the SPD. (1169)

In March general elections were held and the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition won handily; the CDU garnered 45.8%
of the vote, the FDP 6.9%, the SPD 38.2% (down 4% from the previous election) and the Greens came into the Bundestag for the first time with 5.6%. Though large-scale demonstrations continued, they were powerless to stop the eventual deployment of the Pershing IIs in November.

Although various other factors, especially economic issues and divisions on the Left, played an important role in the Social Democratic defeat at the polls, clearly the SPD had been unable to translate anti-nuclear sentiment into electoral gains as they had hoped. (1170) The left-wing challenge to Germany’s approach to defense and security, as in the 1950s, had been turned back by a combination of the an Atlanticist consensus in the center and right-wing of the political establishment and by a lack of enthusiasm for experiments with security policy on the part of the electorate. Indeed, despite the tremendous amount of noise generated by the debate over INF, the peace movement of the 1980s was arguably even weaker than the one of the 1950s. The new Atlanticist consensus had spread beyond the CDU to include also most of the FDP, and the emotional pull of potential reunification seemed a lot weaker than it had two decades earlier. Also the SPD did not wholly side with the peace movement even after 1983, and it did not officially call for an early German exit out of NATO.

This did not mean, however, a return to the ideological situation of the 1950s. Despite their electoral defeat, the influence of the peace movement within the SPD grew stronger
during the mid-1980s and there would be no new Bad Godesberg in which the SPD would rejoin the Atlanticist fold. Moreover the Union had not been left unmarked by its 13 year sojourn in the political wilderness, and the sheer magnitude of the peace movement made both the conservatives and planners within the Defense Ministry wary of the potential for a reigniting nationalism on the left. Consequently, instead of returning fully to the peace-through-strength stance of the Adenauer period, the Kohl government had to strike a far more delicate balance between confrontation and detente. A transformation had taken place in the CDU comparable to the transformation of the SPD at Bad Godesberg and it had become more closely attuned to the new anti-military features of the new political-military culture. The clearest reflection of this can be seen in the new CDU approach to Ostpolitik.

3. Doves in spite of Themselves - The CDU and Ostpolitik

Still in the mid-1970s the CDU/CSU remained largely opposed to the Social Democratic policy of Ostpolitik and to detente in general. Christian Democratic critics argued that Brandt’s policies had betrayed German interests in return for benefits which could be withdrawn at any time, and they feared that in the long run they might undermine West Germany’s integration into Western Europe and NATO. Beginning in the late 1970s the Union began to slowly move towards greater acceptance of both
Ostpolitik and detente. By the time the CDU/CSU had regained power it began to actively pursue detente, even as tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were reaching new heights. This process of adaption was far from quick or easy, but it marked a consolidation of support in the West German political system for an approach to security that combines acceptance of deterrence and the active pursuit of peace through diplomacy.

During the early and mid-1970s a number of reformers within the party, including Rainer Barzel, Richard von Weizsäcker, Kurt Biedenkopf and Helmut Kohl, cautiously tried to bring the party around in support of greater acceptance of Ostpolitik. A number of factors, both international and domestic propelled them in this direction.

On the international level, it seemed increasingly clear that the Adenauerian reunification-through-strength policy had little prospect for success in the foreseeable future. Even if in West Germany there were the political will to pursue such a course, it was manifestly evident that many of West Germany’s Western allies were perfectly content with the status quo and totally uninterested in putting the German issue back on the international agenda. In addition, even hard liners in the Union were prepared to admit that Ostpolitik had brought some concrete benefits, especially in connection with the stabilization of the status of Berlin.

On the domestic front, public opinion showed overwhelming support for both Ostpolitik and detente, and even among CDU
voters the majority was in favor of continuing these policies. Moreover, while polls continued to show that two thirds of all West Germans favored reunification, expectations that this could be accomplished were low, and West Germans were increasingly showing signs of developing their own, separate identity. (1171) Perhaps more importantly, the CDU needed the support of the FDP to build a stable government, and the FDP was deeply committed to the foreign policies that it had helped create. Continuity in Ostpolitik was one of the prerequisites for a Christian-Democratic-Liberal coalition. (1172)

In light of these factors, and considering that the CDU/CSU had lost power in 1969 largely because of its inflexibility on Ostpolitik, it is surprising that the CDU did not moderate its stance earlier. Nonetheless, the influence of the hard liners in the party, including the CSU and the organizations representing the refugees from the East, remained strong into the 1980s. Many in the CDU were genuinely troubled by the direction that Ostpolitik was taking, and were determined to contain the SPD through their opposition in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.

In 1978, temporarily freed of the constraining influence of the CSU, the CDU created a new party program that, while stressing the basic values it shared with the West and underlining the party's anticommunism, for the first time indicated that the Christian Democrats were ready to accept all treaties with foreign nations and the GDR as binding. (1173) In 1978-1980, the leading hard-liner, Franz Josef Strauss, began to
make more positive noises both about Ostpolitik and the Soviet Union. (1174) In 1980 the CDU put forward its concept of "comprehensive policy" (Gesamtpolitik) which would combine East-West cooperation with solidarity with an integrated Western Europe and support for U.S. demands for increased defense efforts. (1175) In a speech to the Bundestag in November 1980 Kohl finalized the CDU's conversion by recognizing that Ostpolitik was not merely a fait accompli, but an essential component of West German foreign policy, valuable both for humanitarian reasons and for helping to preserve the substance of the German nation. (1176)

Along with this shift towards acceptance of Ostpolitik, the Union also sought to demonstrate its commitment to detente and that it was not ready to slavishly follow the U.S. lead on foreign policy, especially with regard to economic sanctions against Eastern Europe. (1177) At the 1982 CDU party Congress in Berlin the Christian Democrats went even further, embracing the CSCE and Helsinki process as the means to eventually create a lasting peace order in Europe. (1178)

After the CDU came into power in 1982, there was virtually no change in Ostpolitik, and arguably the new government pursued it even more actively than did the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt. Despite the extremely tense superpower relationship of the early and mid-1980s, and though the CDU staunchly supported the new U.S. defense policy and the deployment of the Pershing IIs in West Germany, the CDU/CSU chose to actively pursue its
own mini-detente with East Germany. Over the course of the next five years the two Germanies signed a number of agreements pertaining to travel, cultural exchange, and economic and technological cooperation. (1179) Ironically, the old cold warrior Franz Josef Strauss became one of the key figures in arranging new, large-scale credits for the East German government. (1180) Foreign Minister Genscher explained the new policy as a contribution to peace and stability in Europe, "The task facing the two German states in the awareness of their joint responsibility for stability in Central Europe presupposes that they themselves are stable. A healthy economy is one of the main pillars of stability, and loans are an appropriate means of promoting economic development." (1181) The high point of the mini-detente came in 1987 with the long delayed visit of Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic. Though no major new agreements emerged out of his trip, its symbolic importance was enormous, and in the eyes of many it constituted an acknowledgement by West Germany of Germany's divided status. (1182)

This diplomatic minuet between the two Germanies in the dead of winter of the new Cold War of the 1980s was viewed with some apprehension by the Federal Republic's Western allies, who feared that the desire for reunification could undermine the German commitment to its alliance with the West. (1183) Nonetheless, the CDU felt compelled to pursue this process because of strong domestic political pressures, and tried to reassure the U.S. through a strong stand on defense. Alois
Mertes, CDU speaker on foreign policy affairs, sought to explain the German position to Americans in a 1984 article in the New York Times as follows:

"We see no contradiction between our ties with them and our overtures toward the East. On the contrary, it is our view that it is the moral substance of our links with the West that prevents us from abandoning the demand for the rule of law and freedom for the Germans arbitrarily denied these rights. This demand is part and parcel of the aspiration to lasting peace in Europe. West Germany must continue to press this demand for freedom if democracy and the West are to have any credibility among German generations to come."

At least two factors contributed to the Union's determination to pursue Ostpolitik after 1983. The first was a product of the conservatives' interpretation of both recent history and the events of the 1930s. The CDU believed that the primary force behind the new peace movement was a reemergence of romantic German nationalism, which was trying to gain popular support through anti-Americanism and pursuit of reunification. Kohl and his advisors were therefore concerned that the Left not be allowed to monopolize the national issue by a failure on the part of the CDU to pursue Ostpolitik. While the CDU felt reassured by its recent success in deploying the Pershing IIs over SPD and peace movement resistance, many feared that nationalist feelings, if not properly channeled, could spread to the right in the form of a reaction against the left nationalism, thus creating a dangerously polarized ideological climate in Germany similar to that of the 1920s and early 30s.

Feeding these fears were the activities of the SPD at the
time, which continued to promote Bahr’s idea of a “security partnership” with the Soviet Union and which pursued an Ostpolitik of its own even though out of power. Willi Brandt made a number of trips to East Germany, meeting with high East German officials, upstaging the CDU on German-German relations. And in 1986–1987 the SED and SPD held talks which produced a joint document calling for the creation of a nuclear free zone and tacitly indicated that both systems were morally equal. (1186) Thus the CDU and SPD found themselves competing with each other on Ostpolitik, each side trying to demonstrate to the electorate the superiority of its own approach to relations with the East.

Nonetheless, the CDU’s approach to detente and Ostpolitik was qualitatively different from that of the SPD in a number of crucial aspects. The most important of these differences was the CDU’s insistence on emphasizing the differences between the two political systems and the Federal Republic’s solidarity with other Western nations not only on the basis of common interests, but also on the basis of shared values. To help drive this point home the Union emphasized stressing human rights in its negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe. Also, in contrast to the Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, to the FDP, in justifying the new Ostpolitik the Union tended to deemphasize its importance in preventing conflict. Instead, following the tradition established by Chancellor Georg Kiesinger in the 1960s (1187), the primary legitimization was
based on improving human rights in the East and, more importantly, on the preservation of the social bonds which held together the nation even though the state was divided.

Inevitably the new Ostpolitik brought with it a greater acceptance of relations with all East European states. To legitimize this the conservatives found themselves arguing that by improving its social and economic ties to Eastern Germany it was helping overcome the division of Europe in general, a process which was referred to as "the Europeanization of the German question". In this way, the Union equated two former opposites, Ostpolitik and European integration, unconsciously converting German nationalism into Euronationalism and in effect assuming that was good for the German nation was good for all of Europe. (1188) With the advent of Gorbachev and perestroika in the Soviet Union, this viewpoint spread even to the ideological right wing of the CDU/CSU and was accepted by some of the former bitterest critics of detente. (1189)

In this way the CDU managed to square the circle and retain its anti-Communist ideology while pursuing diplomatic and economic relations with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. While there was something quite self-serving about the legitimation offered for this apparent contradiction, the CDU leadership seemed to have accepted it not only out of political expediency or purely for the sake of German national interests. In the aftermath of the Cold War, West Germany emerged as the strongest spokesman among the Western nations for offering the
Soviet Union a "helping hand", even though reunification had been achieved, the Soviet military threat had greatly diminished, and its Western allies were far more restrained in their enthusiasm for aiding Eastern Europe. During the 1980s the CDU had shifted in delayed response to a larger shift in the political-military culture, further institutionalizing and reinforcing the new attitudes towards national security so that they would continue to guide behavior even after the initial conditions motivating that change had largely disappeared.

4. The Political Military Culture of Germany - Circa 1989

Despite the domestic challenges from the Left on the one hand and from the harsh international environment of renewed superpower hostility on the other, the new West German anti-military political-military culture actually gained in strength over the course of the late 70s and 1980s. While the SPD came under the influence of the peace movement, the dominant position was the more cautious approach of Egon Bahr, which had long been the main-stream view of the SPD, but had been submerged by detente since the 1950s. Only when tested by international developments did the fragility of the Social Democratic support for defense come out into the open. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU came to accept detente and Ostpolitik even as it was being challenged by changes in the international system. Though the CDU’s conversion was not as dramatic as the SPD’s, nor was
it accompanied by as large a shift in its self understanding, it may prove to be all the more stable for it.

The one new development which bears mention is the emergence of yet a fourth stream alongside the Atlanticist, Europeanist and Central Europeanist ideological groupings that make up the West German political-military culture: the pacifist neutralism of the Greens. The chief feature that distinguishes the Universal Pacifists from the more traditional members of the German peace movement is their more ambiguous relationship to the German nation and their fundamental rejection of the goal of eventual reunification. For the most part, they are members of the post-war generation, and their attachment to their own country and to what they hold to be its shallow, materialistic culture is tenuous at best. The Universal Pacifists' emphasis is on the individual or the small group, and the classical German question, what is the geographical locus of the nation, is for them irrelevant.

The Universal Pacifists fully subscribe to the left-wing intellectual reading of German history, which sees Nazism as the product of petit-bourgeois parochial nationalism and the dynamics of power politics. By extension they are inclined to see similar trends as existing in all other countries. Though frequently accused by conservatives of being concealed nationalists,\(^{1190}\) it is at least a very different nationalism from that of the old Left. These stark differences were revealed during the events leading to reunification in 1989 to 1990, when
the Left dramatically split on the question of German unity.

While the Universal Pacifists are for the most part critical of Communism, they tend to see capitalism as a more direct threat to peace, the environment, and human values. The history of their movement has been a series of social and political crusades, focusing on ecological, third world, and anti-military issues, all part of a quest to achieve some vaguely defined, more pure and humane utopia. The chief institutional platform for Universal Pacifist thinking is the Green party, though it is also strongly represented among intellectuals in general, in the SPD and, to a much lesser extent, in the media and public opinion.

On defense policy the universal pacifists have been opposed to virtually every aspect of traditional security policy, beginning with nuclear deterrence, the NATO alliance, the Bundeswehr and indeed the use of force in general. They dream of a world where the social and technocratic structures that they believe create the human urge for violence no longer exist. Short of this goal they would prefer to rely on some combination of collective security and civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{1191} Whereas the traditional peace movement had always aimed to achieve reunification through the creation of a neutralized and largely demilitarized German state, the Universal Pacifists tend to reject both reunification and even the limited territorial defense advocated by peace researchers like Horst Ahfeldt.

The following is a summary of the views of the different
ideological groupings in West Germany around 1989.

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The following will try to analyze the strength of these different groups in the different sectors of the West German
political system.

1. Public Opinion

Until the mid-1980s popular support for the main institutions of the West German security system remained quite high. From 1979 to 1984 over 70% of those surveyed indicated that they believed the presence of American troops on German soil was indispensable, and support for the Bundeswehr ranged between 87 and 90%. (1193) Likewise support for remaining in NATO in its present form ranged between 81 and 75%. (1194) A plurality (46%) in 1984 even was willing to agree with the statement that it is thanks to deterrence through atomic weapons that there has been no war in Western Europe for the last 30 years, while 28% thought that it was not true and 26% percent did not know. (1195) This despite the fact that during the 1980-1983 period opposition to the deployment of the Pershing IIs increased dramatically, to 54% from 40%, and support for one sided disarmament measures as a show of good faith increased from 33% to 47%. (1196)

In this sense the claim often made by the Left that the "security consensus" had broken was clearly much exaggerated. What had occurred was that the average West German became convinced that the INF deployments were bad, and that the U.S. should make greater efforts to win the Soviet Union's trust. This did not translate, however, into a desire for neutralism or
abandoning the basic institutions upon which West German security policy rests. One of those institutions, at least since 1970, was Ostpolitik and diplomatic openness towards the East, support for which was already high at the beginning of the 1980s and continued to rise throughout the period.

After 1985, the advent of Gorbachev, and the new thaw in East-West relations there was a dramatic transformation of attitudes towards favoring equally closer cooperation with both the Soviet Union and the U.S. as opposed to the U.S. alone. Whereas in 1981 over 50% favored working with the U.S. and about 35% were for equally close cooperation with the U.S. and the Soviet Union together, this increased about 46% for both as opposed to a bit over 40% favoring the U.S. for the 1982-1983 period. Support for equidistance widened dramatically after Gorbachev came into office in 1985, so that by 1985 over 60% were for equal cooperation with both and less than 30% for cooperation with the U.S. alone. (1197) This did not mean, however, that there was an increase in distrust in the U.S., but rather it meant that faith in the Soviet Union had increased dramatically, and faster than was the case in the U.S.. (1198)

Support for NATO began to erode somewhat as the sense of threat from East Europe began to decrease, and the pressure to reduce spending on defense grew as well. (1199) But according to an EMNID study still in 1990 nearly half of the Germans living in the West (49%) favored remaining in NATO, albeit leaving out the territory in the East, and 27% were for making both parts of
Germany part of NATO. Thus over 70% were for preservation of the status quo in some form. Only 23% of West Germans were in favor of leaving NATO. (1200) And 59% of those surveyed in October 1989 said they would regret a withdrawal of U.S. troops, while 24% said they didn't care and only 17% said they would welcome such a development. (1201) Not surprisingly, support for NATO and U.S. troops was much greater among CDU/CSU and FDP voters (76% and 72%) than among SPD and Green voters. (1202)

West German desire for reunification remained high (over two thirds in 1981) but hopes of actually realizing reunification in the foreseeable future continued to decline right up to 1989. At the same time, support for the principle of European integration remained as high as ever, over 70% (1203), but popular confidence in the European Community grew greatly, from 49% who thought membership was useful in 1988 to 63% in December 1989. (1204) And between 1978 to 1984 support for faster European integration rose, from 38% to 62%. (1205) At the same time, Germany's own patriotic sentiments remained a subdued affair. While they certainly existed, there was a taboo against their expression which was only partially lifted with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, 1989. (1206) According to a massive 1986 study, only 1% of all Germans said they were proud of their nationality, compared to 79% of all Americans and 55% of all Englishmen. (1207)

The overall picture which emerges shows that the basic German preference for a low-key approach to defense and security
has changed remarkably little despite a turbulent international environment which went from a dramatic sharpening of the East-West confrontation to the most friendly relations since WW II. The improvement in East-West relations had encouraged Germans to hope that more could be achieved than had been thought possible only a few short years before. Nonetheless, while there was support for a reduction in the Bundeswehr and NATO forces, support for the retention of the basic institutions which have been in place since WW II remained high. Until 1989 there were no clear signs of a major reawakening of strong nationalist feelings, and even with the emergence of what German commentators prefer to call "togetherness feeling" (Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl) (1208) in the wake of the reunification there is no evidence whatsoever that the patriotic feelings which did emerge are in any way connected to Germany's military might. What there has been instead is a renewed emphasis on the integration of Germany into the larger economic and political structures of a united Europe, based on the potentially precarious assumption that German and European interests are more or less equivalent.

2. Intellectuals and Media

Beginning in the late 1970s there was a tremendous surge in
interest, at the popular level and among intellectuals, in the question of German national identity. The first manifestation of this came with the enormous success of the Staufen exhibition in Stuttgart, followed by an even more popular 1981 Berlin exhibition on Prussia. Soon a whole host of both popular and scholarly books and articles began to appear on the issue of German and West German identity, comparable in many ways to the Japanese Nihonjinron boom, but more historical and less psychologistic in basic approach. Inevitably this raised once again the difficult issue of how to deal with the Nazi past, the Holocaust, and Germany's military heritage, sparking a fierce new debate with strong political overtones among historians.

This dispute was closely linked to the defense debate of the late 70s and 1980s in two ways. First, because it raised the question of the nature of the West German state and how West Germans should view their relationship with the GDR. More importantly, the search for a German identity was linked to the national security issue because at the root of the defense debate is a deeper debate about morality and Germany's right to assert its national interests. Josef Joffe of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, a prominent observer of these debates, was particularly eloquent in describing the link between the historians' debate and the struggle over the deployment of Pershing IIs.

"They (the new generation) had no part in the "Teutonic deed" that was Auschwitz, but they had to live with the indelible stigma of moral inferiority. They came to adulthood without any sense of nation, continuity or pride... It was only a matter of time before the West Germans would try to sever it... With the battle against the Pershing and Cruise missiles
uniting Social Democrats and the Greens ... a "Movement of national re-awakening" had finally appeared on the German scene. The Federal Republic is an "occupied country" thundered the former SPD mayor of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, and the Americans are conspiring to turn it into a "shooting gallery of the superpowers" ... Though separated by time and ideological color, the Battle of the German Historians and the War against the American Missiles are clearly related - like two brothers fighting over patrimony or primogeniture. In both cases, the real object of conquest was that the past that would not fade away... (the Left's) progressive cause - national reassertion and the reclamation of moral worth - was no different from the quest of the revisionist historians."(1210)

The debate over identity and security during the 1980s was polarized into two camps. On the Left there was an alliance of the traditional Central Europeanists and Universal Pacifists, united by a similar interpretation of history and a common preference for detente over deterrence. In the process of forming this partnership, Central Europeanists began to adopt many of the ideas of the Universal Pacifists, which had the added benefit of allowing them to appeal to popular sentiments in favor of West European integration, thus overcoming one of the handicaps which Central Europeanists had labored under during the 1950s. On the Right there was a similar alliance of West Europeanists and Atlanticists, who were also united by a view of history incompatible with that of the Left and a preference for deterrence over detente.

In the 1980s Central Europeanism in the SPD began to take on both paneuropean and universalistic overtones. The first, clear formulation of this new trend came in 1979 when the prominent Social Democrat Horst Ehmke published an essay entitled "What is the German Fatherland?". (1211) Ehmke argued
that even though Germany was divided into two states, the FRG and the GDR shared a special common responsibility for peace and stability in Europe (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft), and warned against making too much of their common cultural heritage (as Brandt and earlier Central Europeanists in the SPD had done). Ehmke proposed the cultivation of good relations with the East, including the Soviet Union, even at the expense of relations with the U.S., in order to foster peace and to create conditions in the East which would allow it to implement reforms. Later Ehmke was to expand the range of nations sharing in the common responsibility to include the rest of Western Europe. (1212) These ideas began to spread and became a central motif of Left criticism of West Germany's approach to defense and security. (1213) Left-wing intellectuals were important organizers of the peace movement of the early 1980s and continued to campaign actively against government defense policy after 1983 as well.

The conservative point of view came into the open with the ferocious debate over modern German history which intensified soon after Helmut Kohl became Chancellor. Kohl and his advisors, in particular the noted historian Michael Stürmer, were concerned with the lack of what they considered a healthy patriotism in West Germany, and feared that it was because of this deficit that the peace movement had been able to mobilize such large numbers of citizens. Left unchecked, the new Central Europeanism threatened to undermine the values that support West Germany's defense policy and could ultimately destroy West
German democracy itself.(1214)

In good measure the German Chancellor's insistence on President Reagan's visit to the Bitburg military cemetery was motivated by the fear that such a gesture was needed to shore up the popular perception of solidarity with the U.S. (and indeed, whatever one may think of its ethical implications, the Bitburg visit did help boost the American image in West Germany).(1215) Other leading conservatives joined in the chorus of voices calling for more West German pride in its accomplishments and less anguish over the misdeeds of the past. (1216)

In this new, more conservative political atmosphere a number of conservative historians, most prominently Andreas Hillgrüber and Ernst Nolte, presented a new view of Nazism which tried to place it in the context of the larger development of totalitarianism in the 20th century and emphasized the tragic implications of WW II for the German nation.(1217)

Almost immediately they were criticized by the left wing of the German intelligentsia, led by the prominent philosopher Jürgen Habermas and joined by a host of other prominent intellectuals, such as the historians Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Wolfgang J. Mommsen.(1218) Habermas accused the revisionist historians of what he saw as shameless attempting to relativize the Nazi atrocities, and saw their efforts as part of a larger conspiracy to revitalize German nationalism.(1219) Other historians, including Michael Stürmer, while differing with aspects of their analysis, defended Nolte and Hillgruber, and
the intellectual battle, fought out in the journals and bookstores of the nation, raged unabated right up through the reunification in 1989-1990. Dolf Sternberger of the Frankfurter Allgemeine probably spoke for the majority, however, when he argued that Auschwitz could not be explained, only reported, effectively calling for a moratorium on debate of the subject. (1220)

Between these two ideological camps were a number of intellectuals who, while wary of the thesis that Germany needs a new patriotism, were also critical of the SPD and the peace movement's radical idealism. The two chief representatives of this position are the historian Hans Peter Schwarz and the political scientist Arnulf Baring, both of whom argued that what Germany needed was an Atlanticist approach to defense and security based on what Hans Peter Schwarz called "responsible power politics". (1221)

It is impossible to judge which of these three positions enjoys the largest following, though on the balance the ideological Right remains probably in the minority among German scholars and is greatly outnumbered by the Left. But the Left as well clearly does not enjoy an undisputed position in the universities and other intellectual settings. The growing influence of the peace movement and the Universal Pacifist ideas adopted by the SPD have alienated many former Social Democratic supporters, especially among the older generation of academics and in the media. (1222)
3. Industry

The West German defense industry remained during the 1980s a small, but profitable branch of industry as a whole, with especially high concentrations in aeronautics and ship building. About 3% of the total West German GNP was devoted to defense, of which approximately a third went into weapons procurement, over 85% of which was fulfilled by equipment purchased from domestic producers. (1223) With the development of detente in the second half of the decade the defense industry scrambled to meet the challenge of anticipated declining defense expenditures. Three strategies were adopted to cope with this problem: an increase in exports abroad, a consolidation of the domestic arms industry into a few giant firms (the most important of which was the Daimler Benz - MBB fusion), and a renewed and increased emphasis on joint projects with foreign firms.

Beyond these relatively narrow issues, the one security related issue of concern to industry as a whole concerned trade with Eastern Europe. On this issue German industry clashed with the U.S. on a number of occasions, most spectacularly in connection with the construction of a gas pipeline from the Soviet Union through the FRG. (1224) While the Reagan administration was determined to weaken the Soviet economy through economic sanctions and prevent the Europeans from becoming overly dependent on Soviet energy supplies, West German
government and industry felt that sanctions were largely ineffective and that the economic instrument was one of the few means of getting the Soviets to cooperate on Ostpolitik. In addition, though trade with the East remained well under 10% of total West German trade, it was often quite profitable and those firms engaged in it were determined to pursue it.

A similar combination of government philosophy and industry interests served to frustrate efforts to place more effective controls on German arms exports. In 1982, while still under a Social Democratic government, export restrictions were actually loosened. (1225) Curiously, later efforts to strengthen restrictions ran into objections from not only the arms industry, but also from the SPD and the Greens on the grounds that such controls would create an internal security apparatus which could become a threat to civil liberties. (1226)

The trend towards greater cooperation with foreign arms manufacturers had the greatest potential for becoming an issue with important ideological and political ramifications. Since the early 50s West Germany sought to integrate its major arms development programs with those of its European and American allies, both in order to reduce costs and to alleviate fears that West Germany might become an independent military power. Particularly in the aeronautics field this creates the potential for conflict with the U.S., as the FRG together with its European allies, used the development of military aircraft, in particular of the Tornado fighter bomber, to help promote the
development of their civil aeronautics industries.\(^{(1227)}\) Despite tremendous budgetary pressure, similar interests were at work in the development of the planned successor to the Tornado, the Jäger 90.\(^{(1228)}\) Thus there is an innate propensity towards West Europeanism in the West German defense industry, one which received a further boost as Europhoria and the plans for the European Common market of 1992 developed.\(^{(1229)}\) Needless to say, this development has been viewed with some trepidation by the U.S.. \(^{(1230)}\)

A number of factors, however, continue to serve as brakes on the development of an independent West European defense industry. The first of these is undoubtedly a desire on the part of the Atlanticist mainstream in German government and industry to avoid antagonizing West Germany’s most important security partner, the U.S.. Second, in an era demanding greater cost control, it is cheaper to buy from the U.S.. \(^{(1231)}\) Finally the French, who would have to be key players in the development of such a European weapons industry, have insisted on a leadership role in all major projects involving them, preferring to relegate the Germans to the role of defense subcontractors.\(^{(1232)}\)

The creation of a giant arms concern through the takeover of the defense aeronautics firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm by Daimler Benz, threatens to further reduce the opportunities for integration with other European arms manufacturers. \(^{(1233)}\) But while there is interest in using defense as a means of
developing domestic avionics, the major defense contractors, who make the bulk of their profits outside of the military sector, are ambivalent about defense and would prefer to see government subsidies spent directly on subsidizing the air and space industries. (1234)

4. Political Parties
a. The Greens

Along with an emphasis on the ecology, the Greens' opposition to nuclear deterrence and the alliance with the U.S. has been the party's most important defining feature. The Greens are the politically organized expression of the universal pacifism of the West German peace movement, and they have brought their views into the Bundestag since 1983, when they entered with 5.6% of the vote. (1235)

Though peace movements arose in every major advanced industrial country in the world, and Green parties sprang up all over Europe, the Greens in West Germany were particularly successful politically. The exceptional strength and vigor of the German Green movement can be attributed to two factors. The first is the German tradition of anti-materialist, youth-oriented romanticism, which was the back bone of the German national movement in the 19th century and therefore has an unusually central role in West German culture and history. (1236) The second stems from the profound impact of the Nazi past and the desire of many Germans to escape categories of
nationalist and power-politics thinking which they associate with the Nazis and German imperialism. This combination of factors gave a sharp edge and popular resonance to the student movement in the 1960s, and continued to influence the Greens in the 1980s.

While a highly heterogenous group, it is possible to identify within the Greens two major wings, the comparatively pragmatic "Realos" or realists, and the idealistic "Fundis", or fundamentalists. The key distinguishing feature between the two groups is their willingness to compromise with the SPD, with the "Realos" seeking to increase their influence on policy making through cooperation, while the "Fundis" oppose this as a betrayal of the ideals of the movement and prefer to vote on the basis of their consciences, untempered by messy political compromises. (1237) After all it was dissatisfaction with the SPD security policies of the Helmut Schmidt era which provided one of the main impetuses for the formation of the Greens in the first place.

The feud between these two wings has paralyzed policy making at a national level, and the party has threatened to split on a number of occasions. Yet, both the "Realos" and the "Fundis" remained united in their fundamental distrust of the U.S., their opposition to the use of force and the NATO alliance, and their advocacy of unilateral disarmament measures (1238) Even the zero option offered by Reagan at Reykjavik was considered insufficient from a Green perspective.
The "Realo" perspective, however, would condone a phased replacement of NATO through the creation of a Central European collective security regime, while the "Fundis" insist on an instant withdrawal. The Greens, in contrast to the West Europeanists, are also suspicious of efforts to promote "European patriotism" or a European military bloc, even if it were independent of the U.S., seeing in it the road to a new form of militarism. 

b. The FDP

Having acted first as a brake on the left-ward drift of the SPD-FDP government prior to 1982, the FDP lived up to its role as the "balancer" of the West German political system by being the voice for left-of-Center views on defense and security in the subsequent CDU/CSU-FDP government. In the process the FDP suppressed those within the party who were leaning towards the SPD and the peace movement, causing the party on the balance to shift to the right.

In contrast to the CDU/CSU, which tended to strongly emphasize the ideological aspect of the struggle with Communism, the FDP tended to legitimate its support for the deployment of the Pershing IIs more on the basis of needing to demonstrate solidarity with the U.S. and as a means of strengthening the West's position in arms control negotiations than on purely technical military grounds. Thereafter, the FDP became the primary spokesman for the continuation of detente within the
coalition, in good measure in order to profile itself against its much larger Christian Democratic coalition partner. This policy came to be called "Genscherism" by its critics abroad, though it was by no means pushed by Genscher alone. \(^{1242}\). These tactics paid off electorally, and in the 1987 general elections helped the FDP to recover the losses it took in 1983, especially among younger voters. \(^{1243}\)

FDP moderation on the defense issue manifested itself in a number of ways, including its opposition to SDI, its support for the zero option proposed by Reagan at Reykjavik, and its opposition to the Jäger 90 project beginning in 1989. This emphasis on détente was combined over the course of the 1980s with West Europeanist thinking, which began making inroads into the FDP. The first step in this direction came in 1978 when Genscher protege Jürgen Möllemann advocated a Europeanization of security policy in order to become equal to the U.S. and Canada, to increase the standardization of armaments in NATO, and to increase unity within the alliance.\(^{1244}\) At the 1983 FDP Party Congress in Karlsruhe Genscher called for a Europeanization of the German national issue in order to forestall its use by those who would try to lead Germany into neutralism. At the same time, Genscher also adopted the SPD concept of a special German responsibility for peace (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft), which he called an expression of Germany's (new) national identity. \(^{1245}\) In 1984 this led to Genscher's proposal for the revitalization of the moribund WEU as a means of creating a
"European pillar" inside of NATO.\(^{(1246)}\) And in 1986 the ideological implications of this trend became further obvious as Genscher emphasized the need to create a sense of European patriotism; "the self assertion of Europe in the world is not only a question of securing peace and our economic-technological ability to perform; it depends on whether we succeed to bring to life the spiritual identity of Europe in the minds of all Europeans and to project this identity abroad". \(^{(1247)}\) This new Europe, it was argued by some in the party, was needed in order to compensate for the American propensity to rely overly much on military means for preserving security. \(^{(1248)}\)

The FDP thus managed, with its typical fluidity, to adopt a pose which promises all things to virtually all people. In terms of its emphasis on enhancing European competitiveness and cultural identity, it is West Europeanist in orientation. In terms of its continued proclaimed loyalty to NATO, which is not necessarily incompatible with strengthening the WEU, it is Atlanticist. And it is Central Europeanist in stressing detente and a common German responsibility for creating peace in Europe.

This is no doubt a reflection of the FDP's perennial fear of slipping under the 5% barrier and of its policy of maximizing its leverage by keeping the option of a coalition switch open. Not by accident, this imperative to constantly occupy the middle ground has also made its policies perhaps the purest expression of where the center lies in Germany's new political-military
culture. The most recent trend in the FDP towards West Europeanism combined with a moderate approach to the creation of a European "peace order" can be seen as an outgrowth of larger West German ideological trends towards anti-militarism and transnational nationalism.

C. SPD

In the late 1970s there were three ideological currents within the SPD, the Atlanticists under Helmut Schmidt, the Central Europeanists under Willi Brandt and the Universalist Pacifists represented by Erhard Eppler. As the Universal Pacifists grew stronger, both within the party and outside it in the form of the peace movement and the Greens, the consensus supporting the SPD's pragmatic approach to defense and deterrence began to disintegrate. Willi Brandt and Egon Bahr, feeling much as they did in the late 1960s that these youthful forces had to be integrated into the party, in effect defected and began to question the party consensus on defense. The aging Wehner, former pillar of the Atlanticist wing of the party, perhaps sensing the shifting political tides and perhaps because of his own attachment to detente, began to waver in his support of the Schmidt government. (1249)

As a result the Schmidt government was increasingly undermined from within the party, ultimately triggering the disintegration of the coalition with the FDP. After the last restraints of the responsibility of governing were removed form
the party, it moved rapidly to a clearly Central Europeanist position. In 1982 Egon Bahr advanced the concept of "mutual security" (gemeinsame Sicherheit) as a long-term replacement for the doctrine of military deterrence. Others, such as Oskar Lafontaine, went further and called for the phased dissolution of the alliances. At the 1984 party congress in Essen the concept of European collective security was made part of the party platform, which also rejected the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In the mean time the Atlanticists in the party were systematically forced out of the party or were effectively neutralized.

The SPD moved further towards Universal Pacifism with the development of a new approach to military security calling for a denuclearization of West German defense and a reliance on purely defensive military forces equipped primarily with anti-tank weapons. While it called on the Soviets to reduce their armored forces, it saw the main threats to West German security as stemming from the existence of nuclear weapons and from U.S. paranoia. At the same time, the SPD, while seeking to incorporate the peace movement, did not fully convert to Universalistic Pacifism, rejecting an explicit call for exiting NATO and unilateral disarmament.

While in many respects the new SPD position resembled that of the late 1950s, there were two crucial differences. First, there was a far greater readiness to recognize the legitimacy of the SED regime in the GDR, as reflected by the production of a
joint paper by the SPD and the SED, Die Streit der Ideologien und die Gemeinsame Sicherheit, in 1986. (1256) Second, whereas in the 1950s the SPD had opposed integration with Western Europe, beginning at the latest in the mid-1980s it embraced it as a means of weakening the influence of the U.S. and strengthening detente by the development of European peace diplomacy. (1257)

This shift was in effect a resurrection of the old concept of Germany as a bridge between East and West, but this time it was recognized that Germany by itself was too small to play such a function and that it needed to pool its strength with that of other European nations. At the same time, in contrast to both the Central Europeanism of Schumacher or the traditional West Europeanist thinking of Adenauer, it rejected holding out any hope for reunification as inimical to progress towards peace between the East and West. Likewise, an immediate abandonment of NATO was rejected in favor of increasing the European voice in the alliance and shifting its focus from military to political activities. (1258)

Thus, even as the SPD had abandoned its main-stream approach to defense in the early 1980s, it reformulated its traditional Central Europeanism in such a way that it brought the party closer to one of the central elements of the new West German consensus on defense and security, the pursuit of integration into Western Europe.
D. CDU/CSU

The dominant current within the CDU/CSU during the 1980s has been the Atlanticist view represented by Helmut Kohl and Volker Rühe, tempered by their acceptance of Ostpolitik. At the same time, two rival ideological currents can be perceived. The first is a certain measure of sympathy for Central Europeanism and Universalistic Pacifism. The most prominent representative of this view was the former party General Secretary, Kurt Biedenkopf, who was highly critical of nuclear deterrence as a long-term solution to West Germany’s security problems and, though critical of the SPD concept of a "security partnership", spoke of a need for a "partnership for survival" between East and West.\(^{(1259)}\) Biedenkopf’s position represented a clear minority within the party, supported primarily by the Catholic wing of the peace movement. But after the advent of Gorbachev, the party steadily lost in electoral strength, primarily to the FDP. The left wing of the CDU, led by Heiner Geissler and the Catholic trade unionist wing of the party, argued that the Union needed to adopt a more activist, Genscherist stance on Ostpolitik in order to appeal to the growing body of floating voters.\(^{(1260)}\)

A second group was the ideological hard-liners in the party, whose views were close to the party’s traditional "Peace-through-strength" line on security policy. The main leaders of this movement included Alfred Dregger, Manfred Wörner, the organizations representing German expellees from her former
Eastern territories, and most of the CSU. While in the early 80s quite Atlanticist in their rhetoric, in the late 1980s as the U.S. moved towards new arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, some of the party's hard liners reacted much as did the Gaullists of the early 1960s.

The breaking point came with President Reagan's startling announcement of a removal of all medium range missiles in Europe following his summit meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Many hard liners were infuriated by the U.S. reversal, and were concerned that the defense of Western Europe would devolve to tactical nuclear weapons, which would most likely be used on German soil. The outraged Alfred Dregger exclaimed "the shorter the range, the more German the effect". (1261) At Dregger's behest CDU deputy Wilhelm Friedman produced a proposal calling for a connection between German reunification and disarmament while hinting at a nationalization of German defense policy if the Western allies did not comply. (1262) Though Friedman's proposal was quickly squelched by Kohl and Rühe (1263), dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s new policies lingered on, leading many hard liners to look to France and the creation of a European security union and a greater European identity. Such a union would include joint military forces and a European nuclear deterrent, but would complement, not replace, the American military presence in Europe while increasing Europe's ability to act on a global political level. (1264) Franz Josef Strauss reverted to
form by citing the psychological burden of depending on the U.S. for West Germany’s freedom in his argument for the creation of a European army. (1265)

Even the Atlanticists, however, became more West Europeanist in their thinking as the prospects for successful European integration have improved. While there was little mention of European defense cooperation in the early 1980s, in 1984 the CDU’s committee on security policy produced a paper calling for an intensification of all levels of European cooperation in the defense and security field, including in the area of joint arms production and R&D. (1266)

Thereafter the Atlanticist mainstream in the Union has tried to ride both horses, supporting both cooperation with the U.S. and increased military cooperation between West European nations, as reflected by the West German decision to participate both in SDI and the French counterproposal, EUREKA. (1267) Mindful of the damage inflicted on the party by the Atlanticist-Gaullist debate of the 60s, the party leadership has been careful to stress that strengthening the European pillar of NATO would help increase European security and reduce the burden on the U.S., while at the same time it would eventually overcome the partition of the continent. (1268) Furthermore there is a widespread belief that the full West European economic and political integration will also require a security component.
Conclusions

The subject of this study is the dramatic transformation of German and Japanese attitudes towards defense and national security issues since World War II that has become one of the most distinctive features of the contemporary politics of these two nations. This transformation presents the analyst with a genuine intellectual puzzle. Namely, if there ever have been any advanced industrial countries which could be called militaristic, then surely they were pre-war Germany and Japan. Yet, if there are any major powers in the world today which seem to be anti-militaristic if not even pacifist in their approach to defense and security, than once again they seem to be Japan and Germany.

The main objective of this study has been to identify and analyze the various forces that caused this profound revolution in attitudes, to trace their development over the course of the post-Cold War period and to examine their impact on policy formation. In particular we have sought to demonstrate that the external environment (the occupations, relations with the U.S. and foreign fears of a militarist revival) and domestic conditions (the crushing experience of defeat, the association of the military with an anti-democratic past and the urgent task of economic reconstruction) forced both nations reluctantly into alliances with the U.S. and to adopt cautious approaches to rearmament.
Emphasis was laid not so much on the details of the national security issues in both countries, but upon the policymaking process itself and the broad political constellations that set the parameters within which defense policy was made. Particular attention was paid to the arguments marshalled by the different participants in the public discourse. Whatever avowed purposes and interests may have motivated individual political actors and the groups they represented, the study demonstrates that in the course of the public debate and subjected to the realities of democratic politics, often very divergent views and aims were forced to confront and adjust to one another. Over time they came to interpenetrate one another and became the constitutive elements of a new national consensus, albeit a fluid one, on defense.

The governments of these two nations had to mediate between two types of pressures. Externally, demands were placed upon them by their allies and the military threat of the Soviet Union. Domestically, they were compelled to legitimate highly unpopular defense policies to a reluctant public. In the course of the debates that ensued both governments were forced to delineate clear limits on their defense establishments. Over time these limits on defense policy and their corresponding legitimations became institutionalized in the West German and Japanese political systems. They have become, in the Durkheimian sense, "social facts" that cannot be easily or quickly altered.

At this point, there are three further questions that
suggest themselves. First, what does the political-military cultural approach bring to our understanding of German and Japanese defense policy and policy making? Second, what do the examples of Japan and Germany show about the larger dynamics of historical political cultural change? And third, what are the implications of this transformation in attitudes towards defense and security for the way in which Japan and Germany understand their history and define their national identities?

I. The Influence of Political-Military Culture on Policy and the Policy Process

The analysis of the evolution of post-war political-military cultures helps improve our understanding of the German and Japanese approaches to defense and security in a number of ways. First, it helps illuminate the internal dynamics of the policy making process, helping explain why certain policy-making patterns tend to reoccur. Second, it explains certain policy outcomes which other theoretical approaches have difficulty explaining. In the foregoing analysis of West German and Japanese defense and security policy a number of cases have been identified in which the influence of political-military cultural factors acting as independent variables has been particularly clear. It is useful to review the most important of these here.

In the case of Japan, for example, there are any number of events which reflect the impact of embedded historical memories. For example, the 1960 riots over the revision of the Mutual
Security Treaty were generated only in part by anti-Americanism or doubts about whether the new treaty per se would fail to serve Japanese national interests. Though the JSP and JCP opponents of the Treaty articulated often quite valid criticisms of the Treaty on these grounds, these arguments played only a secondary role in mobilizing the middle class opposition to the Treaty. What motivated these Centrist protestors was rather the image projected by the Kishi government of a kind of bureaucratic authoritarianism reminiscent of the pre-war period. The popular fear was that Kishi might use the defense issue as a vehicle to effect a reactionary revival that would bring down the post-war democratic system. Once Kishi was removed, the protests died down and the Treaty was ratified without exciting much notice. When the Treaty was renewed in 1970 there seemed to be no comparable reactionary danger from the Sato government. Consequently the protests were limited to the left-wing of the Japanese political spectrum.

In West Germany similar dynamics can be discerned in the West German peace movements of the 1950s and of the late 70s to early 80s. As in Japan, the opponents to NATO nuclear strategy had reasoned and at least partly legitimate arguments on their sides. It is far from clear that these arguments were in and of themselves the primary motive for most of the participants in the massive protests of those two periods. In both eras principled Christian pacifism, such as that of Gustav Heinemann, played an outstanding role in providing institutional and moral
support to the protestors, and in the 1980s counter-cultural pacifism, sometimes mixed with Christian elements or substituted for by neo-pagan ecologism, served a similar function. Closely linked to both sorts of pacifism was the problem of war guilt and the moral obligation Germans bore to Eastern Europe as a whole for the suffering it had inflicted during WW II. This moral dimension lent a sharp, emotional edge to the peace movements and greatly reduced their willingness to compromise.

What is especially noteworthy about the peace movement of the late 70s and early 80s is that this moral element was as strong or even stronger among a new generation of protestors who in many cases had not even been born at the time these crimes had been committed. The moral guilt Germans bear over the past has been institutionalized in German society in a way which is not true of Japan. In Japan, in stark contrast to West Germany, almost precisely the opposite feelings have been retained. Instead of guilt over the nations past misdeeds, there is almost a feeling of moral superiority based on the belief that the Japanese people were victimized, first by the Western imperial powers, then by their own military and finally as victims of the world's only atomic attack. As a result there exists a greater potential in Germany than in Japan for mobilizing mass opposition to government defense policies.

An additional factor in both German peace movements, and in the development of Ostpolitik as well, is the problems posed by national partition and hopes for reunification. What makes this
a particularly interesting problem from a theoretical point of view, and a thorny one for rational choice theories, is the centrality of the issue of national identity. While even if one presumes all actors strive to maximize their utility, before one acts one must decide whose utility is being maximized. In this case the question is which Germany's interest should Germany try to maximize, that of the greater German nation (as advocated by the Central Europeanists), that of the West German nation (as the West Europeanists might urge) or of Germany as part of a community of nations that share a common commitment to capitalist democracy and the protection of civil liberties (which is the Atlanticist view)? To be sure the concrete interests of individuals and sub-groups who make up a nation may influence that choice. For example business leaders may be inclined to stress Atlantic ties because of their interest for trade, or individuals may favor the Central European option because of personal ties to the East. Empirically, however, West German debates on this subject are rarely framed in terms of these kind of interest alone. Instead, they almost always rely heavily upon symbolic appeals based on emotional bonds and higher values. Such symbolic appeals are cultural artifacts (including the very notion of a "nation"). The costs of not doing so can be high. A major factor behind the defeat in the 1990 West German elections of SPD candidate Oskar Lafontaine was his over reliance on appeals to narrow interests and his failure to make effective use of the symbolism of national
identity. (1270)

Japan's distinctive political-military culture also helped contribute to certain recurring patterns of its policy making. For example, the extreme distrust in which the military is held by both the public and much of the elite has forced defense policy making to proceed by means of an accumulation of fait accomplis. This distrust has also necessitated the establishment of defense taboos that act as brakes on further developments and are difficult to remove (e.g. the 1% barrier or the use of the word alliance with regard to the U.S.) if not actually inviolable (the Constitution or the three non-nuclear principles). This distrust is the result of Japan's historical experience with militarism in the 1930s and of the fact that the suffering of the Japanese nation is directly attributable to the military, whereas in Germany it was the Nazi party that was most clearly at fault.

In both countries the political-military culture has created fault lines along which the political elites split when the established approach to defense and security is threatened in a fundamental way. In 1960s in West Germany, the political center, which in the last few decades has been represented by the FDP, sided with the Left when conservatives seemed too divided among themselves to adapt to the changing current of detente. It shifted back to the Right when the SPD began to drift towards Universalistic Pacifism in the early 1980s. In Japan, the pattern is more subtle, but equally well established.
Whenever Right Idealists seem poised to try to reestablish the link between nationalism and the armed forces, important segments of the political center defect or threaten to defect from the LDP.

While the foregoing examples have been primarily focussed on the political processes, it is important to note that there are also some clear cases where political-military culture had a direct and observable influence on the policy outcomes of these processes. In the case of Japan the taboo on defense planning seems to have been largely the result of the memories of the Manchurian incident and the military's use of staged military emergencies to bring down civilian governments. These fears first surfaced in 1965 following the Three Arrows incident and they revealed their potency again in 1978 during the political struggle over the proposed Emergency Laws legislation. In no other country in the world is the military as circumscribed in preparing to fulfill its primary mission of defending the nation as in Japan, despite the fact that there has been no clear evidence that the SDF harbors praetorian ambitions along pre-war lines. No concrete economic interests seem to be involved in the opposition to the Emergency Laws, and while the JSP hoped to capitalize on the issue electorally at least in 1978, they could only do so if their fears seemed justified in the popular eye. The sole motivating factor in this case seems to have been the models of reality based on the memories that the historical political culture supplies to Japanese political actors.
Likewise, the decisions of the LDP party leadership to squash Nakasone's initiative towards a more independent defense posture in 1970, and his linkage of breaking the 1% barrier with nationalism in 1986, seem to be largely the product of Centrist fears of the kind of dynamics that such policies might generate. To an outside observer Nakasone's proposals for a broader Japanese military role commensurate with its new status as an economic power may have seemed eminently reasonable, and even long overdue from a burden-sharing point of view. Similarly, his efforts to mobilize patriotic support for defense were nothing out of the ordinary, given international standards or even the standards of other advanced industrial democracies such as the U.S. or France. But in the Japanese context, Nakasone's rhetoric set off alarm bells not only on a popular, but also on an elite level, as it threatened to give defense and the military a prominence which most Japanese leaders in the post-war period have considered too risky to condone.

Likewise, both the Ostpolitik of the late 60s and the CDU Ostpolitik of the 1980s seem to have been heavily influenced by historical cultural factors. In the case of Brandt's opening to the East, the image of atonement for the crimes of the past lent a powerful emotional impetus to his initiatives, and helped him link the new diplomatic strategy to Germany's first experience with a full change of government and the democratization of German society. It also helped to alleviate the traumatic experience of national division, a problem for which the
typical, hard-line response of nations which feel they have been wrongfully robbed of territory - for example Korea, Vietnam or pre-WW II Germany - seemed inadequate. This gave Brandt's Ostpolitik a dynamic thrust which survived the international environment of detente which gave it birth. The CDU/CSU adopted Ostpolitik, despite originally bitterly opposing it. The Christian democrats felt compelled to do so because of Ostpolitik's enormous popularity, and because of fears that the national issue, left uncontrolled, could feed first left- and ultimately right-wing nationalism, thus threatening post-war democracy.

Finally, taking a broader perspective, one can argue that both Japan and West Germany have adopted an approach to foreign policy which prefers to concentrate on diplomatic mediation and economic incentives to achieve foreign policy goals. The clearest reflection of this can be seen in their responses to the Gulf crises of 1987 and 1990-1991. Despite enormous allied pressure to risk at least token forces to show solidarity with the UN forces confronting Iraq, both governments fell into a state akin to policy paralysis. The economic costs of sending a small force would have been minimal, whereas the political costs of an American backlash, not to mention the political and economic costs of an Iraqi victory, could have been enormous. But the dispatch of national forces into a combat situation has become one of the strongest taboos of Germany and Japan's new political-military cultures, one which could not be overcome.
even by a crisis of the magnitude of the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.

To be sure, political-military cultural factors have not dominated all defense decision policy making, though they have been of particular importance at a number of key junctures. Nor is this culture immutable. WW II seems to have fundamentally altered Japanese and German behavior, and after nearly 50 years there is still no firm evidence of a reemergence of the old pre-war nexus between the state, the nation and the armed forces. Likewise, the Ostpolitik of the 60s was a major new response to the continued dilemma of a divided nation deepened by the shock of the erection of the Berlin wall. But the pace of change in attitudes is limited, and barring major shocks is very slow as well. In turn these attitudes seem to both limit the kinds of policies that can be adopted and shape the German and Japanese responses to outside stimuli in important ways.

II. The Dynamics of the Evolution of Historical Political Cultures

This study has concentrated on the development of the specific political-military cultures of Japan and West Germany, which, in many ways, are pronounced examples of the influence of historical cultural factors. There is no reason, however, that a similar approach could not be adapted to the study of defense policy and attitudes towards defense in other societies. Likewise, a similar approach could be used to try to explain
other aspects of the historical political cultures of nations, for example economic policy or citizenship laws. It is therefore appropriate to ask, in more general terms, what the cases of West German and Japanese political-military cultures can tell us about the dynamics of this kind of cultural change. Two points in particular seem worth touching upon here: the process of adjustment and sedimentation and the interrelated, aggregate nature of political issues.

The first point to be made in this context is that there was a striking similarity between the two cases in the way in which their political-military cultures evolved, despite the enormous differences in their geo-strategic location and their historical and cultural backgrounds. In both Japan and Germany there was an initial wave of demoralization in the wake of the catastrophic defeat in the war, and disillusionment with the old political, economic and social orders was widespread. There emerged a highly fragmented political environment made up of various political groups with profoundly different world views. One of the key points of contention between these groups in both cases centered on the question of rearmament and alliance with the West.

Over time the differences between these various ideological groups became less pronounced as the established defense policies withstood various political challenges and became an accepted part of the status quo. The many and fierce debates on defense played an important role in this process. First, these
debates bestowed legitimacy to the defense policies which were adopted. Second, the different political actors were forced to adjust themselves to the structural constraints with which they were faced and which they learned about through these debates. This process was not a smooth one, and adjustment proceeded in a series of sudden jumps. In the Japanese case the conservative main stream decided to in effect call a moratorium on the discussion of defense issues after the Security Treaty riots. With the passage of Taiko the opposition parties ceased to challenge every new defense initiative, focusing instead on those which seemed to pose a challenge to the status quo. In West Germany it was first the Left and the SPD which came to terms with the established approach to defense at Bad Godesberg in 1959, and then the Right and the CDU/CSU which accepted Ostpolitik and détente in the early 1980s.

There were steps backward as well, most notably the SPD move to the left in the early 1980s due to the disintegration of détente and the emergence of the Greens. But the overall picture in both Japan and West Germany is that of a long march towards the center as the different sectors of their political cultures, the political parties, intellectuals and public opinion, became increasingly supportive of the status quo. In the case of Germany, it is important not to overlook that though the SPD moved towards Universalistic Pacifism, unlike in the 1950s it neither called for an immediate exit out of NATO nor did it promise reunification in the near future. Even more importantly,
while the Social Democrats called for more distancing from the U.S., they also wholeheartedly embraced the cause of European integration. As the SPD moved left, the CDU/CSU moved more towards the center in its acceptance of detente, so that the overall shift of the political system was one of coalescence around the center.

Likewise, in Japan, in the late 70s the opposition parties lost much of their capacity to resist new defense policy initiatives as a result of increased fragmentation. At the same time major Right Idealist figures, such as Fukuda and, to a lesser extent, Nakasone, shifted to the center on broader foreign policy issues. In both countries there has been an observable process of sedimentation, as bit by bit different aspects of the defense system become accepted by such a broad range of political actors that they leave the active political agenda. They become increasingly institutionalized and are taken for granted. Generational change tends to reinforce this process since political actors recently socialized into the system may no longer be aware of the arbitrary nature of these policies. So for example, both the draft and the doctrine of Innere Führung is now accepted without much thought by virtually everyone in Germany, even though in fact the latter is, internationally speaking, a highly unusual approach to the problem of civilian control. In contrast, in Japan, only a few figures on the Right continue to consider a return to the draft as a serious option.

One important consequence of this has been that although
national self confidence and a sometimes hidden sense of patriotic pride began to reemerge in the late 1970s, these sentiments did not turn, as had been feared by many observers both at home and abroad, into either a left-wing or right-wing nationalism which could have undermined the basic German and Japanese post-war approaches to defense. Instead, in both countries defense took a back seat to economic and social issues as the main focus of public concern, and security has been defined increasingly in non-military terms. In West Germany this has led to an almost invincible belief in the desirability of diplomacy. In Japan this has taken the form of the doctrines of "comprehensive security" and omni-directional diplomacy, which treat military security as only one component to be balanced off against others, such as energy security, access to markets, improving the standard of living, etc.. Another manifestation of this in the Japanese case is the emergence of technonationalism, as traditional Right Idealists like Ishihara Shintaro have shifted their focus from military security to economic and technological competition. In West Germany a parallel can be seen in the spread of a Euronationalism emphasizing the ability to compete economically with East Asia and the U.S.. In this sense, the same energies which fueled pre-war German and Japanese military expansionism has now been redirected into the pursuit of economic and technological expansion.

It is important to note that there was nothing inevitable about this process. There are no a priori reasons why already in
the 60s the Germans and the Japanese could not have taken quite different courses had they desired to. There were many domestic political actors who were intent on plotting a very different foreign policy course for their nations, including ironically both of the founders of the post-war approaches to defense and security, Adenauer and Yoshida. While in the 1950s Japan and Germany were too weak economically and politically to do much more than follow the foreign policy dictates of the U.S. and its allies, in the 1960s they gradually gained in economic strength and international respectability. By the end of the decade either Japan or Germany was in a position where, if they were willing to pay the price, could have either distanced themselves from the Western alliance, or significantly played a more active role within it. Both Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the Japanese conservatives’ campaign for a more independent and nationalistic defense policy (Jishuboei) were in part reflections of this change in Japan’s and the Federal Republic’s economic and international standing. That instead both countries chose to adhere to their traditional, low-profile approach to national security was in large measure due to the strength of their new political-military cultures, which enjoyed a marked increase in both popular and elite support beginning in the 1960s.

It is also important not to confuse political-military culture with consensus. Political-military culture refers to the distribution of attitudes towards defense and security issues within a particular society. Regardless of whether it is divided
or relatively unified, a political-military culture sets certain parameters for the kind of policies that can be adopted. Arguably, however, the stability of a political-military culture depends on the level of consensus on existing defense policies. It is more difficult for dramatic change to occur when the level of consensus is high, though incremental adjustments can and do occur at all times. So, for example, it may be difficult for Japan or Germany to send regular military units into a Gulf-type situation in the near future, but logistic units or lightly armed forces as part of a U.N. peace keeping force may be another story.

While until now the emphasis of the discussion has been on the broad similarities between the political-military cultures of Japan and West Germany and the way they formed, it is important not to neglect the very important differences between them. In the German case the historical experience of the broad-based ultra-nationalist Nazi movement and the recognition of the atrocities it inflicted on the peoples of other nations has made it profoundly difficult for Germans to deal with their past or to openly take pride in their national identity. As a result, the ideology of transnational integration (whether regional or global) has a peculiar force in the German context that it does not have anywhere else.

In contrast, in Japan there has not been an equally deep sense of remorse for the suffering inflicted on other nations, nor has there been such a deep discrediting of nationalism as in
West Germany. Hence there has been no systematic effort to overcome these burdens through integration with other nations, except in a diffuse way via the UN. On the other hand, the memory of the war has been focused on the losses inflicted on the Japanese people by their own military, which though it was ultra-nationalist and enjoyed broad-based support, was not elected to power as the Nazis were. Thus the deep-rooted suspicion and aversion towards the military in Japan is far greater than in West Germany.

Finally, there is an interesting aspect of historical political culture which is worth briefly noting, namely its aggregate character. In every country there is a political Left, Right and Center, in a general sense defined by their relationship to the status quo. The Left seeks to reform the system, the Right tries to preserve it and the center tends to pragmatically balance these two tendencies. The specific contents of what constitutes left, right and center can, however, vary enormously from country to country. There may be outriders on the extreme right or left which do not fit into these larger categories, for example the Universal Pacifists in Germany, but because of the demands of political coalition building, over time they tend to fit somehow into the Left-Right political spectrum.

These political wings represent not only concrete interests, but also associated ideological world views, or subcultures which their members use to interpret the world and
which helps them coordinate their activities. Thus change in world view, when it occurs, resembles a paradigm shift as described by Thomas Kuhn or Imre Lakatos. At Bad Godesberg, not only did the SPD change its position on defense, but it also dropped its emphasis on the nationalization of industry and a planned economy as the sine qua non for social justice, officially downplayed its Marxist ideology and redefined itself as a "people's party" (Volkspartei,) as opposed to the party of the working class. Similarly, in Japan in 1968 when Sato decided to take a more activist stance on defense, not only did the government change its stance on foreign policy, but it also placed a new emphasis on defending the social order and reforming the educational system to promote patriotism.

The kind of issues which are interconnected depends on the historical-cultural context. So, for example, in Japan promoting patriotism through education is seen as an indispensable aspect of national defense by a broad range of conservative opinion. In contrast, in Germany only a few figures, usually on the far Right, would dare make such a claim. Likewise, in Germany the draft is seen as an important instrument for civilianizing the armed forces and in this way is thought to be a vital aspect of civilian control. In Japan, almost precisely the opposite is believed, and those who propose a draft are seen as far Rightists seeking to increase the military's power over society.

The aggregate nature of political issues within the context of a historical political culture, and the way they form
ideological clusters that can be located on the political spectrum, has important implications for how historical political cultures change. First, it makes change more difficult, for to change attitudes towards one issue may involve changing attitudes towards many other issues. This interconnectedness of issues helps explain why it is sometimes so difficult for political actors to bring themselves to accept what on the surface are simple and obviously necessary changes. For example, it took the CDU 10 years to accept Ostpolitik even though in retrospect the political costs of not doing so may seem obvious. The CDU as a whole was unwilling to make this change because it meant modifying the party's view of the nature of the Communist threat and of the kind of national interests which West German foreign policy should serve. Likewise the JSP has never been able to bring itself to accept the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty because of its implications for Japan's relations to mainland Asia and its newly defined role as a peace nation.

The Japanese case also shows how associations between issues, specifically between defense and Japan's domestic political order, can increase opposition to defense policies. As pointed out earlier, the Left and Center is Japan have always feared that Right Idealists might use new defense policy initiatives as a vehicle for domestic political change and therefore have united to oppose them whenever there is a danger that they might succeed.
III. Reinterpreting National Identity

The final set of findings of this study concerns a phenomenon which was quite unanticipated at the outset of the empirical research and relates to both the points made earlier concerning the aggregate nature of political issues and the process of the sedimentation of political attitudes over time. In both countries there is occurring a process of cultural reinterpretation, albeit in very different ways. One of the most extraordinary aspects of the West German reaction to the prospect of reunification was the broad-based denial by the German centrist and conservative commentators that there is anything nationalistic about the process, even though Kohl, Brandt and others have made use of patriotic themes in trying to turn these events to their political advantage. And the Left, including the Greens and at least half the SPD, opposed reunification, in part because they feared the reemergence of nationalist forces.\(^{1273}\) In other words, nationalist themes have become so stigmatized by the Nazi experience that it was difficult for political leaders to admit they are using them even at the moment the greatest German national dream of the post-War era was being fulfilled. At the same time, there has emerged a tremendous consensus in favor of European integration and the fostering of a greater European identity, perhaps as an ersatz identity for a German national one. This is in stark
contrast with the situation in the 1950's, when the Left strongly opposed the integrationist theme because it might cut Germany off from the East. It differs also from the much more tepid support integration enjoys in other major European industrial powers such as Britain or France. This West German antipathy to nationalist themes and preference for another, broader European or global identity can be found on all levels of German political life, and is reflected in opinion polls, voluminous writings on national identity by intellectuals, media coverage of issues with nationalist overtones, as well as the speeches of political leaders. While perhaps this process may yet be reversed as the reunification process moves forward (popular use of the West German flag is one major, new development) or if the European integration process collapses, the very genuine German desire to escape nationalist thinking should not be underestimated and is likely to remain a long-lasting feature of German political-, as well as political-military culture.

What has occurred in Japan is in some ways even more remarkable, for not only has the present been reinterpreted, but the past as well. Beginning in the late 70's there was a tremendous boom in popular literature dealing with Nihonjinron, the debate about what are the unique features of the Japanese people and culture. The idea that they might be basically very similar to other cultures is not even seriously considered in most quarters. A common strand in this literature is that Japan,
a historically isolated, ethnically homogenous island nation, has never experienced the successive waves of conquest and forced assimilation of different peoples which has shaped civilization in Europe and the Asian mainland. Thus, though there was sometimes fierce competition between members of the Samurai warrior class, this was intrinsically different from military struggles elsewhere in the world, which are seen as far more unrestrained and brutal. According to this perspective Japan is not only a peaceful country today, but has always been peaceful compared with the rest of the world. Supposedly, this inexperience in the ways of international competition has put Japan at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and was one of the reasons for its embroilment and defeat in the Second World War. This rather self-serving view of Japanese history is remarkably widespread, crossing social and ideological boundaries. These ideas appear again and again in the writings of university professors, politicians, military men and even senior members of the Foreign Ministry. In interviews with political elites in Tokyo these views emerged repeatedly, irrespective of the ideological leanings of the interviewee, though the conclusions drawn varied. The Left feels that this merely confirms that Japan should strictly adhere to its peace diplomacy, whereas the Rightists argue that leadership must be exercised and educational reforms must be instituted to counter this weakness. What makes this new self understanding all the more remarkable is that this represents a complete
reversal of the old Japanese ideology of Bushido, the way of the warrior, and the pre-war self image of Japan as the land of martial virtues.

In sociological terms one can speak of culture as being made up of cognitive definitions of reality, how the world is, and normative ones, how it should be. What has been occurring in West Germany and Japan is that over time cognitive definitions of reality are coming to approximate normative ones. Rather than bear the burden of a past deeply at odds with their new democratic norms and values, both nations have embarked on a project of reinterpreting their national identities. In the German case, this has meant repudiating its nationalist past in favor of a self-image as a solid, reliable member of a growing transnational community based on common values (though what those values should be is still open to debate). In Japan, with its long tradition of retaining old forms in order to legitimate the changes in their contents, the process of reinterpretation has been more subtle and far-reaching. Instead of rejecting the past, they have redefined it so that it reinforces the Japanese view of themselves as victims and Japan’s national mission as merchants rather than warriors. While these reinterpretations are in many ways self serving, and even wishful, it may be one important aspect of cultural change. They are also one of the surest indications that the transformation of the political-military cultures of Germany and Japan will be of a lasting nature.


3. Talk given by former LDP Dietman Shiina Moto at MIT. Post-war German and Japanese debates on possible participation in international peace keeping forces should also be understood in this context. See Der Spiegel 3/25/1991


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6. The rationalist view can trace its intellectual roots back to such figures as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hume. In more recent times this approach has achieved wide currency among political scientists and, using insights from rational choice and games theory as originally developed by economists, has become the dominant paradigm in such sub-fields as voting behavior, the study of conflict and coalition bargaining. The culturalist view will be discussed below.


8. See pages below for a more detailed discussion of some of these approaches.


10. Martin Wight, op.cit., chapter 6, for example recognizes that a view of history as the product of successive ideological revolutions as a plausible alternative to his realist conception. Nonetheless he remains true to the realist rational-choice paradigm and prefers the opposite causal view that these ideologies are simply masks for national interests.
11. While the rationalist approach has been the dominant one in international relations theory in recent years, during the 1940s and 1950s there was perhaps even greater emphasis on the role of ideology, especially in trying to explain the behavior of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. See for example Nathan Leites The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York, 1951, Felix Gross Foreign Policy Analysis, New York, 1954, Gabriel Almond The American People and Foreign Policy, New York, 1960 and Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington Political Power: U.S./U.S.S.R., New York 1963. Ideology continues to be used as an important explanatory category by later scholars as well, see Ole Holsti "Foreign Policy Decision Makers viewed Psychologically: Cognitive Process Approaches" in G. Matthew Bouham and Michael J. Shapiro (eds) Thought and Action in American Foreign Policy, Basel, 1977, Stephen Krasner Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press 1978 (especially page 344). The problem with this approach is two-fold. First, the term ideology automatically is pejorative, suggesting hidden interests and the conscious manipulation of information and emotions. For this reason many scholars have tended to define anything that smacks of ideology as being intrinsically "bad", associating it with revolutionary doctrines such as communism; "the other guy has ideology; we have principles". So, for instance, see Stanley Hoffman Gulliver's Troubles: On the Setting of U.S. Foreign Policy, New York, 1968 p.114-115, where he identifies ideology with revolution and hence declines to apply the category to the U.S.. Similarly, ideology is also frequently seen as being "non-rational", the product of passion and demagoguery, and therefore a thing to be avoided. Second, even if one tries to develop a non-evaluative definition of ideology (which was one of Karl Mannheim's great goals) one runs into the very thorny problem of trying to distinguish ideology from other belief systems, such as culture. Such efforts usually wind up with descriptions of ideology which are very close, if not even identical, with political culture, see for instance Holsti op. cit.. Clifford Geertz as well sees ideology as a cultural system, Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973, chapter eight. If one defines ideology as being purely those belief systems which have been consciously articulated, as does for example Walter Carlsnaes Ideology and Foreign Policy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1986, p.156 (Carlsnaes uses the unnecessarily opaque term "self-conscious word systems") one is left with the question of why these particular beliefs have been turned into political doctrines in the first place, as Carlsnaes himself admits, p.180.


15. Friedman and Lebard, op.cit..

16. For examples of views that can be described as neo-realist in contrast to Mearsheimer's classical realism see Stanley Hoffman in The Herald Tribune 5/29/90, William Pfaff The Herald Tribune 5/20/90. Both Pfaff and Hoffman, it should be added, see nothing inevitable about these developments, and they emphasize the importance of maintaining institutional networks (especially NATO in one form or another) to remove any incentive for a return to a classical balance of power competition in Europe.

17. And through him more distantly to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder and the Italian thinker Giambattista Vico.


19. It is undoubtedly possible to find further levels of political culture and refer them to different levels of behavior, though the two levels identified here probably represent the two major poles. Also, it remains an open question to what degree and in what manner do historical and anthropological political culture influence one another. This is a question which becomes even more pressing the more additional levels one seeks to identify.

20. It would be interesting to explore the connections between the different levels of political culture, but such an undertaking goes beyond the scope of the present dissertation.

22. The fatal blow to the national character approach was delivered in 1954 by an article by Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levenson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Socio-cultural Systems" in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson Handbook of Social Psychology, First Edition, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison Wesley 1954. See Lucian Pye on the history of the concept of political culture in Political Culture Revisited, unpublished manuscript, especially pages 9 to 10 which deal with the national character school. Inkeles and Levenson did not reject the concept per se, they merely set requirements that made it very difficult to use.


24. See for example Samuel Huntington American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, Cambridge, Belknap Press 1981. While on the one hand Huntington rejects the national character approach to political culture (p.155), which clearly belongs to the anthropological approach, on the other hand he sees these cycles of creedal passion and passivity as being rooted in the American beliefs and values which define our national identity and which have changed but little over the last 200 years. The roots of this system, he claims, are to be found in the English revolution of the 17th century and has important religious (Calvinist) dimensions which continue to influence us to this day (p.14 to 23 and p.149 to 160). Huntington's approach thus has characteristics of both approaches, an emphasis on historical forces shaping the original culture, and pessimism about the prospects for cultural change.

25. See Lucian Pye's The Mandar and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan 1988, especially pages 25 - 26 and chapter 3. Huntington, op.cit. p.33-34, also speaks of internal inconsistencies built into American culture which help make his cycles possible.


28. The vast literature on political socialization, which is part of the still vaster socialization literature, has in general moved from emphasizing the role of primary agents in socialization to secondary socialization, and finally effectively gutting the explanatory power of the whole concept by focusing on life-time learning. See David O. Sears "Whither Political Socialization Research? The Question of Persistence" in O-it Ichiliov *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education and Democracy*, New York, Teachers College Press, Columbia University 1990. See also the articles in Stanley Allen Renshm, op.cit., especially the articles by Paul Allen Beck and James Davies. On the cumulative nature of socialization see Harry Eckstein, 1988.


30. Parsons saw society as being determined by the interaction of three systems, the social, the personality and the cultural systems. For Parsons the cultural system is society’s symbolic component including, at its most basic level, language. See Talcot Parsons *Social Systems*, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press 1951.

31. This notion of culture can already be found in Parsons

32. So for example, the core beliefs of the Marxist Research Program (class struggle, exploitation and the inexorable progress of history marked by revolutions) were preserved when Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin developed a theory of imperialism to explain why the long-awaited revolution in the advanced industrial countries had failed to appear, arguing that it had been merely stayed off by extending the class struggle beyond national boundaries and exploiting the peoples of the colonial world. Likewise, when the old empires collapsed the Marxist research program was kept alive by thinkers like Hernandez Cardoso and Johann Galtung, who argued that while *pro forma* imperialism had disappeared, in reality it had been preserved through the development of *comprador* classes in the developing world who did the capitalists’ dirty work for them.
34. See Imre Lakatos "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs" in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1970 and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, op. cit., chapter 4. See also Donald Moon "Strategies of Political Inquiry" in Fred Greenstein and Nathan Polsky, Handbook, op.cit., Vol.1, which helps locate Lakatos in the context of the debate over the philosophy of science. It would be interesting to further develop this parallel between culture and theories of development, but this would go beyond the boundaries of the present discussion. It is worth noting, if just in passing, that one of the critical issues that might emerge if one pushed on with this approach is the extent to which the core elements are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. One might refer to this dimension of a culture as its core density. Cultures with a high core density are likely to be more resistant to change than cultures with a low density. The anthropological approach to culture assumes a very high level of cultural density, with attitudes on child rearing, authority, and so forth, all being intimately interconnected. The historical view would tend to portray these links as being weaker or more flexible.

35. Care should be taken, however, to define human needs broadly so as to include subjective cultural needs, for example for meaning or solidarity, as well as objective needs such as human life or material prosperity. Otherwise one risks reducing culture to a dependant variable and return to a form of the rational-choice approach. So for example some cultures may disappear because they obviously cannot compete with others. For example the Japanese culture of Meiji Japan came to the conclusion, even without being colonized, that they would have to change their society if they wished to survive, even though they strove to preserve as much of the old, essential core as they could. This is an example of cultural change brought on by objective needs. On the other hand in order to explain the spread of christianity in ancient Rome or the spread of Buddhism in South and East Asia one might well wish to examine the ability of new religions to better satisfy subjective, spiritual needs relative to the old religious orders.

36. There are a number of reasons for why the type of culture focused upon by the anthropological approach is more resistant to change than the kind of culture dealt with by the historical approach. The first is the stage of life at which the individual is socialized into a culture. Such deeply rooted aspects of culture such as personality structure or basic patterns of interpersonal relationships are developed very early in life, and empirically traits which are acquired at this time are very difficult to change. Secondly, the anthropological approach
believes that the connection between deep culture and political behavior are subtle and often unreflected. Typically people are not even aware that a relationship exists between their culture and their political attitudes. So, for example, to borrow an argument from Pye, op.cit., 1986, the Japanese are not clearly aware of the link between their preference for the personalistic exercise of political power and the political corruption endemic to Japanese politics. Thus attempts at solving this problem through institutional reforms are likely to only meet limited success as long as this deeper, root cause of corruption remains intact (assuming the Japanese would be willing to change this core element of their culture even if they were more fully aware of its negative consequences).

37. Any number of additional subsets can be identified within any particular culture, such as a political-legal culture, a political-party culture or a political-economic culture, referring to a culture's orientations towards law and politics, the functioning of political parties and the legitimate role of business in politics, respectively.

38. In fact determining national interest is one of the most complicated links in the rational actor model. A clearly formulated definition based on the rational choice approach is given by Klaus Knorr The Power of Nations, New York, Basic Books, 1975, p. 30, who treats it as the aggregate values of the society ranked in terms of marginal preference or utility. See also pp.29-37. Most realist and neo-realist theorists are more ambiguous in defining of national interest but they clearly share a similar view. National interest may vary a great deal from nation to nation, but all are held to have an irreducible interest, that of defending the integrity of the state and its institutions. See Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 553.


40. Ideally one would want to examine the defense and national security policies of a nation where cultural factors would seem least likely to play a role. France or Britain suggest themselves as suitable candidates for investigation. Such a study would a "critical case study" in the sense that Harry Eckstein uses the word; if cultural factors are shown to play an important role there, it seems likely that they do so everywhere. Such an investigation, however, goes beyond the scope of the present study.

41. At the time of this writing (Summer 1991) the growing strength of Germany in the field of technological does not seem to be widely appreciated outside of the Europe. There is even the potential of Germany becoming a leader in not only applied technology but, unlike Japan up to now, in basic research as well.
42. Originally the author thought of using the terms "actor" or groups as opposed to the more obtuse "sector." However, group suggests a higher degree of uniformity than in fact exists in these sectors. Likewise, the term actor suggests that somehow they participate in a coordinated fashion in the security debate or policy making process, which is not the case with respect to public opinion or the intellectuals.

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43. John Toland The Rising Sun: The decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, New York, Bantam Books, 1970, pp.944 to 946

44. Exact figures on the number of Japanese captured by the Soviet forces are hard to come by. The only official information coming from a May 20, 1949 Radio Moscow Broadcast, reported in Akahata, May 22, 1949. It is reasonable to assume that even more Japanese were actually captured, but had died in captivity, the Soviets not including them in their figures for political reasons.

45. The Konoye group came into being shortly after the battle of Midway in 1942 and included Prince Konoye Fumimaro, the Marquis Kido Koichi, Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichiro (both latter Prime Ministers of Japan), Baron Harada Kumao (private secretary to Prince Saisenji), Ikeda Seishin (former director of Mitsui kinyu, governor of the bank of Japan, Finance Minister and Minister for Commerce and Industry at various times in the 1930s) and various other powerful figures, including a large number of military men. See John Dower Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 1878 to 1954, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979 p.231 ff.

46. The decision to end the war is to this day shrouded in mystery, though the literature on the topic is both voluminous and very detailed. A short "standard" historical description can be found in Hugh Borton's Japan's Modern Century New York, the Ronald Press Company, 2nd edition 1970, pp.443 to 453. John Toland, op. cit. pp.833- 854, 912 - 960, provides a highly detailed and enjoyable account aimed at the average reader. Also informative are John Welfield An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War Alliance System - A study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, London, Athlone Press 1988, Hata Ikuhiko, Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi, Tokyo, Bungei Shinju 1976, chapter 1, and The End of the War in Asia. New insights will undoubtedly be gleamed from the recent publication of the late Marquis Kido Koichi, who was the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and by the spate of books and articles triggered by the recent Emperor's demise. However the complete story will probably never be known, partly because of the secretive, factional nature of the decision-making process, and more importantly because of the Emperor's involvement in the decision. While the Emperor is usually portrayed as having been the decisive factor in tipping
the balance of power in favor of those trying to end to war, he has also been portrayed as a powerless figurehead, something like the Emperor Pu Yi in Bertolucci's popular film "The Last Emperor". There would seem to be an obvious contradiction between the image of the powerless figurehead and the various times the Emperor apparently played a decisive role in Japanese politics, including ending the War in 1945, bringing down the Tanaka Giichi government in 1928, and in putting down the February 2, 1936 coup attempt.

47. Many would dispute the descriptions of given here both German Fascism and Japanese Militarism, but space does not allow me to go into much further detail here. For a brilliant comparative analysis of Nazism and Japanese Fascism see Maruyama Masao's classic "The Theory and Psychology of Ultranationalism" (originally published In Sekai, May 1946) and "The Ideology and Dynamic of Japanese Fascism", both of which can be found in Ivan Morris, editor Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, London, Oxford University Press 1969. For an excellent analysis of Nazism as a social revolution, see David Schoenbaum. Many (especially many Marxist historians) would dispute this view of Nazism as being a separate development from the old German political elite and would stress the essential continuity between two. Similarly many Japanese scholars would dispute this view of the Japanese militarists. For one interesting contrasting view presented by a Western Scholar, see Richard Smethurst The Social Origins of Japanese Fascism.

48. Unlike Germany, where all form of government had collapsed completely and the Allies were forced to set up a military government, in Japan the various staff sections of SCAP were designed to work through their respective opposite numbers among the ministries of the Japanese government. A good reflection of the differing character of the German and Japanese post-war regimes can be seen if one compares Yoshida Shigeru and Konrad Adenauer, the two dominant political leaders in the early post-war period in their respective countries. Whereas Adenauer was opposed to the Nazis during his period as governor of Cologne on moral as well as political, and spent the war either out of power or in prison, Yoshida was closely linked to the Japanese war-time leadership, and basically supported the policy of territorial expansion, though he strongly argued it was a tactical mistake to go to war with the Anglo-American powers and was suspicious of the military.

49. Much has been written on how this near miraculous transformation in relations could be achieved. Some ascribe it to the benign nature of the American occupation, others to the special role played by the personalities of the Emperor and MacArthur. Yet others have stressed special features of Japanese culture, such as its respect for authority or situational ethics
which allow Japanese to rapidly adjust to new social or political situations. For a good summary of some of the different arguments see Kazuo Kawai Japan’s American Interlude, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1960 Chapter 1. Kawai himself cites all of these as factors, but ultimately attributes the peaceful nature of the occupation to Japanese situational ethics.

50. See Phillip R. Piccalgallo The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crime Operations in the Far East 1945 to 1951 Texas, UP 1971. In addition it should also be pointed out that as many as 10,000 Japanese, many of them guilty of war crimes and many of them not, were believed to have been executed on the spot, without recourse to a controlled legal trial, throughout the Pacific and South East Asia.


52. Susie and Meirion Harries, op.cit., p.128-129

53. The issue of whether the Emperor should have borne at least some of the guilt for the war is needless to say the most controversial issue involved in the trial, an issue which recently reemerged after the Emperor’s death. A number of scholars have argued that the Emperor indeed should have been prosecuted. Perhaps the best known exponent of this view is David Bergamini, who wrote a controversial book on the subject The Imperial Conspiracy, the introduction to which was written by Sir William Webb, the chief justice presiding over the Tokyo Trials who latter made it a sort of one-man crusade to bring the Emperor to justice. In Japan the issue is so shrouded with political controversy that it is virtually impossible to hold an objective public discussion of the issue. The political left has actively argued since the end of the war the emperor shares the responsibility for the war, though notably the JSP (Japan Socialist Party) backed off from this position during the Emperor’s illness, perceiving it as being politically inexpedient to pursue the issue. The politically right, and in general Japan’s conservative mainstream, is adamant that the Emperor bore
no blame for his war-time role and anyone who takes a different position is branded a radical. The following is just a small sampling of enormous attention which recently has been paid to this subject in the Japanese media Japan Times 11/8/88, 11/15/88, 10/28/88, Shukan Bunju 10/6/88, 10/20/80, Asahi 10/15/88 evening, 1/25/89, 1/17/89, 1/12/89, 12/8/89, 12/19/89, 1/9/89, Japan Times 8/5/88, Shukan Asahi 1/25/88 Japan Times 1/18/89, 1/14/89, 1/19/89, 2/11/89

54. Even the main witness for the prosecution, General Tanaka Ryukichi, latter claimed that he had only cooperated with the Allied authorities in order to protect the Emperor from prosecution and reportedly was in contact with members of the court in efforts to get Tojo to reverse testimony he had given that the Emperor had decided to start the war. See Hata Ikuhiko Showashi no Gunjintachi, Tokyo, Bungeishunju 1982, pp. 100 to 101.

55. See Meirion and Susie Harries, op.cit. pp.155 - 168 for a brief account of Tojo’s defense.


57. This notion of the Emperor, while it had very ancient roots in Japanese culture, was not necessarily dominant throughout Japanese history. Indeed as Professor Carol Gluck of Columbia has shown in her excellent Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Pinceton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1985. the cult of Emperor worship, along with state Shinto, was largely the creation of the Meiji oligarchs who needed to create a popular ideology to unify the nation. See Gluck, chapter 4.

58. See for example Kamishima Jiro, Bamba and Hower Pacifism in Japan, 1978 pp.253-257, Takeshi Ishida Japanese Political Culture, Transaction Books 1983, pp.5 - 14, 34-35 for more on the relationship between religion, the Japanese concept of the nation state as an extended family and Japanese views of morality. Note also that the idea of purity of intentions becomes very important. One must be careful not to allow personal, individual biases to interfere with carrying out one’s duty to the group. In the pre-war period this thinking became associated with the doctrine of shushin, or the pure heart, whereby young plotters were forgive even when they broke the law and even killed senior leaders of state. Their intentions were good, and thus they could be excused of even the most grievous of crimes.

59. As pointed out by Maruyama Masao
60. See Yoshimura Katsuna *Sengo Sori no Hogen-Shitaugen* Tokyo, Bunjunnbunko 1986. As Yoshimura points out, use of this phrase in 1945 caused considerable controversy because it implied that not the military and political leadership alone was responsible for the war, but the entire Japanese people were. It is interesting to reflect that during this same period many German politicians were making similar speeches which did not raise even the shadow of controversy.

61. Again some Japanese I have talked to recall how after the surrender their teachers impressed upon them that they must rebuild a strong Japan in order to avenge the insult to the national honor and pacify the spirits of the war dead.


63. See for example Hata Ikuhiku *Shiroku Nihon Saiqunbi* Tokyo, Bungei Shunju 1976. Many conservative Japanese, including many prominent politicians, are even more critical of the occupation and believe it's main purpose was to permanently cripple Japan by prohibiting armed forces and making it an economic and military dependency of the U.S..

64. Needless to say the Japanese aeronautics industry did what it could do to minimize the impact of these restrictions. For aircraft designers formed a Paper Airplane club whose real purpose was to meet to try to keep abreast of the latest developments in the aeronautics world. And large industrial concerns like Mitsubishi switched whole teams of aeronautic engineers to other areas such as ship-building and bicycle manufacturing just in order to preserve these teams for use when some day Japan would be allowed to have an aeronautics industry again.

65. Zaibatsu had often been as much the targets as the helpers of the Japanese militarists in the 1920s and 1930s. The ultranationalist right wing, an extraordinarily diverse grouping, included elements which wished to outright nationalize and destroy the great industrial combines, were identified as the enemies of Japan's traditional peasant masses (from whom many if not most of the radical officers came from) and held responsible for the nation's spiritual and moral decline. A number of industrial leaders, most notably the highly westernized Baron Dan Takuma, managing director of the Mitsui combine, were assassinated by the far right in the 1930s. Note however that there were a number of so-called Shinkozaiibatsu, newly rising zaibatsu, who were closely associated with the overseas Japanese empire and had ties with the far right leadership. The most famous of these was Nihon Sangyo, which became Nissan after the
war.

66. For text of the declaration see Hugh Borton Japan's Modern Century, op. cit., Appendix 1, p. 567-568


68. For example General Courtney Whitney, head of the Government (GI) section of SCAP and one of MacArthur's closest co-workers, was quite emphatic on this point.

69. See Nakauchi Toshio Genkokubidan to kyokasho, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1988, p. 208

70. See Benjamin Duke Japan's Radical Teachers

71. See Bergamini, op. cit., p.


74. Professor Minobe had proposed his theory in the 1920s, but in the reactionary mood of the 1930s his works became singled out by the ultranationalists, who, to the horror of liberal Japanese of the time, succeeded in having his works banned and finally forced Professor Minobe himself from his post at Tokyo University.

75. See Hata, op. cit. pp. 50-54
76. Harries, op.cit., p.91

77. See Harries, op.cit. p.91-92.

78. Committee on the Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate Military Situation In the Far East, Saturday, May 5, 1951 and Shidehara Kijuro Gaike gojunen Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1951


80. Nishi, ibid., p.94

81. See Kokaiigijiroku (the minutes of debate in the Diet) June 28, 1948 for the Nosaka- Yoshida exchange

82. See Kokkaiigijiroku June 26, 1946 for Yoshida's response to Hara Fujiro of the Shidehara's Progressive party. Hara, in a very respectful fashion, said of course everyone supports renouncing war (after all, Article 9 was officially proposed by the head of his party), but one should attach the condition of achieving world unity under the United Nations. Though Yoshida rejected this position, as we shall see this line of approach was latter incorporated in the Ashida amendments to the constitution.

83. In response to criticism by Nambara Shigeru that Article 9 was over idealistic (ironically Nambara, who was a highly regarded Left-leaning diet member and latter President of Tokyo University, was to become one of the leading lights of the Japanese Peace movement) Yoshida said merely that above all else Japan needed to become independent and that he could not at this time (1946) say anything further. See Kokkaigijiroku August 17, 1946.

84. Mori Nobutatsuno "Heiwa Kokka no Kensetsu" in Kenso January, 1946.

85. See Hata, op.cit., p.43-46

86. See Hata Ikuhiko "The Post War Period in Retrospect" Japan Echo Vol. XI, Special Issue, 1984, p.13-14

87. Though it is worth adding that within two more years the Navy plans were more or less actualized with the creation of the Maritime Safety agency, and that the ultimate scale of Japanese rearmament was to prove very close to the 227,000 proposed by the Army.
88. The best source on this is Arisue's own account, Arisue Seizo Arisue Kikancho no, Fujo Shobo, 1976. See also Hata, op.cit., p.156-157.

89. See Meirion and Susie Harries, op. cit. p. 226-227

90. See Meirion and Susie Harries, op.cit., p.193

91. Department of State Bulletin 16, May 18, 1947 pp. 991-994

92. Schaller, op.cit., p.90

93. See Schaller, op.cit.p. 90 Note that this idea seems never to have completely dissappeared, and was to resurface again in the 1980s.

94. See Meirion and Susie Harries, p.231

95. See Hata, op.cit., p.93 to 96

96. See Meirion and Susie Harries, op.cit. p.233


99. See Welfield, op.cit., p.205

100. Note that the Ashida note is frequently used to show that there was an essential consistency in Japanese foreign policy even under the brief center-socialist coalition government under Katayama, See Weinstein, op.cit., p.20-22. However, it should be noted that much latter, in 1976, Katayama himself would claim the government fell because of the escalating U.S. demands for rearmament. The Ashida note, however, was sent on the Foreign Minister's initiative and represented a substantive step forward towards rearmament. This leads to one of two possible conclusions, either Katayama in 1976 was refusing to admit the facts and was trying to falsify the record, or Ashida and others deceived him. See Hata, op.cit., p.88-89

101. The Army estimated that the U.S. could provide within 180 to 270 days the infantry equipment needed for limited Japanese rearmament and noted there was a pool of several million Japanese with military experience that could be drawn on. See Meirion and Susie Harries, op.cit.,p.235. Undoubtedly General Willoughby's group was laying the groundwork for such a mobilization.
102. See for example Asahi August 10, 1950

103. See Hata, op.cit., p.143

104. Ohashi’s remark was made to the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 26, 1950.

105. Asahi

106. Mainichi

107. Asahi, November 15, 1950

108. See Asahi 8/28, 9/4, 9/5, Sankei 9/10 Yomiuri 10/7 Mainichi 10/13, and 11/28 Nikkei 11/20/1950

109. For an overview of the debate in this period see Terazawa Hitoshi “Saigunbi no sunseiron hantairon no Tenbo” in Chuokoron, 67-12, 1952

110. See Ashida Hitoshi “Eisei churitsu fukanoron” in Bungeishunju 50, Kinkyusokei, July 1950; “Chusensenso no Tsugi ni Kuro Mono” in Daiyamondo, August, Chujungo, 1950; “Jieibusoron” Daimonodo, February Jojun 1950, “Jiyu to heiwa no tame no tataki Bungeishunju, March 1950; “Jiyu to heiwa o mamaru saigunbi” Seikai shubô, 10/11/1950. See also Ito Masatoku “Nihon Kokubo no Saizen no hoshiki – Nihonretto no Sensyaakuteki igi” in Bungeishunju October 1950, and “Aete Nihon no Shigunbi o teian suru – Riku-Kai-Gun heiryoku no zettairyo ni tsuite” in same, November 1951, and Kozumi Nobomi “Heiwaron – issai ni Heiwa o negau mono to shite” in Bungeishunju January 1952. Ito’s work explained Japan’s strategic significance in the Far East and in the world and went on to make suggestions on what kind of limits were appropriate to place on the Japanese military. Kozumi’s work strived to give moral legitimation to rearmament, arguing, in reverse to Morito Tsustumio and the other proponents of Japan as a peace nation, that in order to really contribute to world peace Japan must actively side with the U.S. and stand prepared to stand up to communism. There were many other note-worthy contributions being made to defense by commentators taking a conservative-pragmatic position. See for example Sasaki Soichi, noted constitutional scholar from Kyoto who had worked with Konoe on a new constitution before the Prince’s suicide, “Saigunbi Mondai to Kenpo”, Sekai Jishio, 1950, who defended rearmament from a legal point of view.

111. See Abe Takanari “Putatabi Heiwa e no Ketsui o erabu” Kaiso, October 1949
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112. Yoshida himself expressed this opinion, see Dower pgs. 316, 424, as did many other conservative political and economic leaders of the time. See for example Tsutsui Kiyotada Ishibashi Tanzan: Jiyushigi Seijika no Kiseki, Tokyo, Chuokoronsha, 1986.


114. Yoshida, as did most members of the Japanese elite of his generation, possessed an attitude towards the Emperor which can be best described as near-religious veneration. In a letter sent in June 1921 to his father-in-law and political mentor, Makino Nobuaki, he described his feelings as ecstatic after attending the Emperor during his visit to England that year, and commented in length on the Emperor’s "inborn beautiful characteristics", his embodiment of the virtue of modesty, and the clear and ringing quality of his voice. He went on to explain how important it was to infuse the academic world with the doctrine of Kokutai, indicating that it was necessary to ensure political stability and to meet ideological challenges emanating from the West. See Dower, op.cit., p.52-54. While he fell short of outright calling the Emperor a divine being, the tone and language being used here is clearly that of the ideology of Emperor worship. The ascribing of unnatural grace and perfection to members of the Imperial household, who to Western eyes appear stiff and unprepossessing, is a common to advocates of this ideology and can be found in the works of such as the Yukio Mishima (see for example Spring Snow) and in the flood of articles commemorating the departed Emperor in early 1989. See, for example, every issue of Bungeishunju and Shokun during this period. It is worthwhile noting that here again one may see this as a reflection of Japanese, especially Shinto, religious ideas which do not clearly divide the divine and the mundane as in the West and see beauty and purity as a reflection of transcendence. The Emperor, as the link between the Japanese nation and the divine, naturally is expected to have these qualities.

Yoshida’s intense devotion to the Emperor, and this view that the Emperor is essential in filtering out dangerous corrupting ideological influences had a great deal to do with Yoshida’s staunch advocacy of the Matsumoto draft constitution in 1946; the drawing up by Yoshida’s Minister of Education Amino Teiyu of “An Outline of ethical Practice for the Japanese People, which called for reintroducing reverence for the old Imperial Rescript on Education and stressing the role of the Emperor in general; and in 1959 Yoshida’s call for the revival of Shinto for the sake of strengthening patriotism.


118. See James Auer, op. cit., p. 63-73.

119. See for example, Ohtake, 1988, op. cit., P. 66-69, who argues convincingly and at length that Yoshida was deeply concerned with having a firm spiritual foundation for rearmament before actual material rearmament began.

120. See Schaller, op. cit., p. 256-247.

121. The most important and influential expressions of this line of argumentation are to be found in the declarations of the "Peace Problems Discussion Group" (Heiwa Mondai Tanwa Kai), a group of over 50 prominent academic leaders from leading Japanese universities, including Abe Kamenari, Shimizu Ikutaro and Maruyama Masao, see "Senso to Heiwa ni Kansuru Nihon no Kagakusha no Seimei", *Sekai*, January 1949, "Kowa Mondai ni Tsuite no Seimei", same, January 1950 and "Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite", same, September 1950. The impact of the Peace Problems Study Group on both public opinion and the JSP was tremendous. See the round-table discussion between Takayanagi Kenzo, Arahata Ransun and Tsuma Atsuki (spelling: "Heiwa Mondai Danwakai no Bijin" in *Jiyu no hata*, October 1952.

122. The principle of unarmed neutrality had been officially adopted as part of the platform of the JSP in December 1949. This was later adopted into the Three Peace principles of 1. support multilateral peace treaty with all belligerents, 2. maintain permanent neutrality, and 3. no military bases to be supplied to any foreign power. See J.A.A. Stockwin *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutrality: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy*, London & New York, Cambridge University Press, 1968, Chapter 3. This was latter expanded into the four Peace principles in January 1951 by adding the opposition to rearmament.

123. The Asahi in particular warned strongly against the dangers of Makikomare and in its editorials supported the position that Japan's safety could only be attained through neutrality. See
Asahi 2/14, 3/4, 4/2, 5/3, 6/30, 8/4 and 11/6, 1949. Other major newspapers came out with the position that while neutrality was ideal, it was not realistic. See Mainichi 11/4/49 and Yomiuri 1/24/50.


125. Hatoyama, when he listened to the reports on Yoshida's signing of the peace treaty in San Francisco, reportedly shed tears of rage and jealousy, for he felt that if Yoshida had fulfilled his promise and returned control of the Liberal Party to him, it would have been he, Hatoyama, who would have been credited with restoring Japan to its independence. See Toyoda Jo's laudatory biography Hatoyama Ichiro: Eizai no Kake. Tokyo, Kodansha, 1989 p.435-409. For much of the next four years the conservative parties were to be dominated by the struggle between these two bitter rivals.

126. Very useful, and I believe accurate, profiles of these leaders with a special emphasis on their views on defense are to be found in Ohtake, 1988, op.cit., p.124-167.

127. See Asahi 9/12/1952.

128. For a detailed description of the background and contents of this memorandum and the meeting in which it was given to Dulles, see Tsutsui, op.cit., p.8-28.

129. See Hata, op.cit., p.173

130. Ibid., p.29-30.

131. See the Ekonomistu, August 1, 1951

132. See interview with Miyazawa Kiichi, "Keiryo subeki Wagagenten" Chuokoron, March 1980

133. See the slightly differing accounts in Schaller, op.cit. p.276-277, and Dower, op.cit., p.383-384.

134. See Dower, op.cit., p.393. Note that Dower's account differs from that of many others, such as Nishimura Kuma'o's, which claim Dulles backed down because he was loathe to debate military matters with the General. Also Dower seems to have his dates a bit confused, and has this exchange occurring during Dulles's first trip to Japan in June. See Hata, op.cit. p.131-133, 185-190, Weinstein op.cit., p.49-50, 59-61.
135. See Ohtake, op.cit., p.71. Cites a Tokyo Shimbun article, 5/13/77. Welfield as well, though he does not cite the article, feels that Yoshida made such a deal, op.cit., p.78. Hata cites secret Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearings in which Dulles claimed that Yoshida had promised that once Japan had been reinstated as a member of international society it had a duty to rearm. Hata suggests that this was close to perjury, see op.cit. p.188. In light of the 1977 article, and given the course of latter events, it seems likely that Dulles had indeed told the truth.

136. See Dower, op. cit., p.400-414


138. See Mainichi 9/13, 9/14, Yomiuri 9/29 and 8/15

139. See Nikkei 10/18/51, Yomiuri 9/10/51, Tokyo 9/10/51 and Asahi 10/11/51

140. See Osamu, op.cit., p.40-41


142. See Boeicho Jietai Junen Shi, Tokyo, Boeicho, 1961 p.20 for text of the U.S. memorandum to the Japanese government on the mission and organization of the new forces.

143. See Mammitzch, op. cit., p.104-105.

144. See Ohtake, 1988, op.cit., p.49


146. See Ohtake 1988, op.cit., p. 87-89.

148. See Hata. ibid., p.173. Note that Tatsumi, while an ex-military man, was not a member of the Hattori group, and though he had many contacts with them, relations between them were uneasy at best. During the pre-war period he had been the naval attache to the the Japanese Embassy at London at the same time Yoshida was there and had openly supported Yoshida in pushing for more conciliatory policies towards the English and the Americans. This won him Yoshida's trust, and in the post-war period he became Yoshida's chief advisor on military affairs.

149. See Doba, et.al, p.208-21

150. See Mammitzch, op.cit., p.108

151. See Doba, et. al, op.cit. p.213-215. Hayashi was to become the first post-war Japanese Chief of Staff, a post he was to hold until his retirement in 1964. It is rumored that Hayashi was recommended by the Emperor, see Mammitzch p.109. While Hayashi, as he himself admitted, was an amateur when it came to military matters, his father had been a well-known general in the pre-war period.

152. Doba et. al, op.cit. p.211

153. See Doba, et.al. p.216-22

154. Aikokushin-Aikokuminzoku no Seishin, see Hata, op.cit., p.172.

Note that minzoku is often translated as "race", but many Japanese translators dispute this, pointing out that the Japanese word jinshu is closer in meaning to the English word "race. For example the phrase racial discrimination is translated as Jinshu sabetsu and not minzoku sabetsu. At the same time, Japanese often describe their nation as a tan ichi Minzoku Kokka, a nation-state with but one minzoku, whereas the U.S. is described as a mulit-minzoku nation (which is frequently cited as one of its sources of weakness). If one attempts to examine the Chinese characters from which these two words are derived, one finds that minzoku comes from the Chinese characters for people and family, while jinshu is comprised of the characters for person and kind. The matter is further complicated by the fact that in Japan it is widely believed that the Japanese nation and the Japanese race are one and the same. In short, it is very hard for someone who is not a linguistical expert and intimately familiar with both languages to decide which is the best translation. This is not a minor technical point, I would like to add, because of the loaded meanings that the word "race" has for an English-speaking, especially American audience. How one translates the word minzoku, which frequently appears in Japanese political
discourse, thus has a major impact on how that discourse is perceived in English. Given the difficulty involved, I prefer translate minzoku as "nation", since in English as well the word "nation" orginally included the meaning of race.


156. See Kowalski, op.cit., p.129-133

157. For a good discussion of the system of civilian control in English, see Osamu, op.cit., p.119-130, and Leonard A. Humphrey "The Japanese Military Tradition", in Buck The Modern Japanese Military System. A highly detailed but somewhat abstract and legalistic account in Japanese can be found in Nishioka Akira Gendai no Shiberiuan Kontroru, Tokyo, Chishikisha, 1988. As we shall see latter, in the 1970s and 1980s, this system created intense dissatisfaction among the uniformed personnel and eventually was challenged in the Kurisu Hiromi affair of 1978.

158. See Asahi 8/9/51 and Welfield, op.cit., p. Ä?Ü


160. See Mainichi 8/5/52


162. For accounts of the MSA negotiations see Dower, 1979, op.cit., p.449-470, and Ohtake Bideo 1984, op.cit., p.51-58

163. See Yoshida, Memoirs, p.188

164. For Kimura's statement see Yomiuri 1/30/52 evening. For the storm over Yoshida's statements see Asahi 3/7 to 3/10/52, including the 3/10 evening edition.

165. See the legal opinion presented by the government in November that year. Asahi 11/26/52.

166. See Asahi 5/21/52 evening edition, quoted in Ohtake 1988, op.cit., p.168 - 169. This section on the election is largely based on Ohtake's excellent work.


170. See Asahi, 3/31/1953. For more on these ex-servicemen’s organizations, see Doba, et.al., op.cit., last chapter. Most of these organizations had been founded to apply political leverage on military pensions and other such issues. They were largely rurally based, and many were also involved in Left versus Right battles over land reform, building monuments for the war dead, etc..


173. See Schaller, op.cit., p.205-296. Schaller is a bit off claiming most of this demand was non-military. All of it was non-military until the Spring of 1952, but thereafter military procurements became the number one product sold to the U.S..


176. See chart in Sakai, op.cit., p.163.

177. See Yomiuri Shimbun Sengoshi Hanhen Saigunbi no Kiseki, Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1981, p.340

178. Based on my own count using bibliographic material obtained from Professor Terry MacDougal of Boston University.

179. Keidanren Boei Seisan Iinkai Junen shi, Tokyo, Keidanren, 1964. The formulator of this plan was Watanabe Tetsuzo, whose group, “The Economic Research Institute” is interestingly enough is also said to have received 250,000 yen from Yoshida himself (See Auer, p.76).

181. See Sankei 2/28/53

182. See Ohtake 1984, op.cit., p.19-20. See also Zaikei August 1953, p.12-13 and January 1954, p.9-107 and Abe Takajiro, Seki Katsuki, Sakurada Takeshi and Fujiyama Aiichiro (all prominent Zaikei leaders who came out at this time against over reliance on Tokujyu and military aid) in the Ekonomisuto 9/19/53. For some of the concerns being express in the financial industry at this time, see for example Tokyo 2/10/53, Yomiuri 1/4, 2/18/53, Jiji 3/7/54, Mainichi 12/1/52.


185. Same as footnote 188.

186. See for example Yomiuri 8/20/53, Asahi 9/30/53.

187. See Nikkei 3/23/53

188. See Ohtake, op.cit., p.51-56.

189. See Nikkei 1/20, 3/8/1955

190. At the tiwme there was considerable speculation that Japan might export weapons throughout Asia, especially to Taiwan and French Indochina. However, both markets were already saturated with goods from the already well-established U.S. and European arms industries, and the under-developed economies of the region had but limited buying power to begin with. The one conceivable market might have been the Communist powers, especially China, which were clearly ruled out by the alliance with the U.S. In addition popular opposition, especially in the Diet would have been fierce, and the conservatives may have felt that they had taken already as much damage as they could afford on the political front.

Welfield's work is the most provocative. Hara, who makes extensive use of interviews and recently released documents, is by far the most comprehensive work there is on the factional politics and thinking in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


193. Even if Hatoyama had managed to get the majority that he needed in the diet, it is doubtful that he could have gotten the requisite majority in the popular referendum that would have further been required for changing the constitution.

194. It is ironic that Hatoyama, the strident anti-communist should have been the one to reestablish ties with the Soviet Union. There were at least three factors behind this move. 1) Soviet support was needed if Japan was to be admitted to the United Nations, which was indeed achieved in 1957. 2) A certain interest in balancing the Communist bloc against the U.S. in order to create a more independent Japan. 3) Hatoyama's burning hatred of Yoshida led him to seek ways to distinguish his policies from those of his predecessor, and nothing was more closely associated with Yoshida at the time than reliance on the U.S.. See Nomose Hisroshi "Futatsu no Taisei no Aida de" in Watanabe Akio, op. cit..


196. See Weinstein, op.cit., p.64

197. See Hara, op. cit. p.82-83.


199. See Asahi 9/3 and 9/15/55

200. See Weinstein, op. cit., p.79-80 and Hara, op.cit., p.84-86.


202. See Mainichi 4/15/57, 5/2/57 evening, Asahi 5/20/57 evening. see also Hara, op.cit., p.109. The translation here is the author's own.

203. See Weinstein, op. cit. and Asahi 6/22/57 evening. The U.S. had become more flexible on the Treaty issue since Europe was also not being as cooperative as had been expected and Japan was
proving a better ally than they had at first hoped. (U.S. Congress, Commission on Foreign Relations, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, 86th Congress, 2nd session, 1960, p. 8 - 22). In addition, the U.S. government was intensely aware that Japan had the potential to become a real threat to American interests in the region and wished to any further increase in anti-American, neutralist forces in the country. See Hara, op. cit., p.127-130.

204. See Yomiuri 8/6/57, evening edition.

205. Kishi during his tenure as Foreign Minister had included improving ties with the PRC among his goals, but, in contrast to Ishibashi, he made it only one part of his larger foreign policy conception.

206. See Welfield, op. cit., p.148 and Hara, op. cit., chapter 3, and Tokyo Shimbun, 12/10/1959. Fujiyama told Welfield in an interview that he believed the opposition from within the Foreign Ministry was being orchestrated by Yoshida. Yoshida had told Fujiyama directly that he opposed revising the treaty. Asahi 12/8/1958.

207. See Packard, P.77-80 and Yomiuri 3/18/1960. According to the Yomiuri Ikeda promised to support Kishi till the treaty had been passed, but was free to criticize Kishi’s methods thereafter.

208. See Asahi 11/10/1959 evening


210. The new party was supported by portions of the labor movement, Uemura Kogoro of Keidanren, and many more moderate intellectuals such as Morita Tatsuo, Royama Masamichi and Inoki Masamichi.

211. See Yomiuri, October 1959

212. See Tokyo Shimbun 7/19/1959.

213. See Yomiuri, op. cit.

214. See Mainichi 8/26/1959.

215. See packard, pp.

217. See Asahi 6/29, 8/22, 11/19/1959 and Yomiuri 6/28, 12/9/1959. See also Asahi 1/14/60 when the newspaper sharpened its criticism of the new treaty.

218. See Mainichi 6/26, 8/27, 10/12 and 10/29/1959

219. See Sekai April, 1960 and Fukushima Shingo "Shijyo oyobi Sogoenjyo no moto ni" in Chuokoron February 1960


223. For an excellent discussion of the Zengakuren and its origins, motives and tactics, see Packard, op. cit., chapter 3.

224. See Asahi 2/8 and 2/11/1960. For more on the ongoing debate on the issue see Asahi 3/27 evening Mainichi 2/13 and Nikkei 2/16/1960

225. See Yomiuri 4/17/60 and Asahi 4/24/1960

226. See Asahi 5/20/1960

227. Asahi 5/18/1960

228. See Asahi 5/31/1960 evening

229. See Nikkei 5/20/1960

230. Asahi 5/28/60. According to Packard, one of Kishi's secretaries told him that at the time Kishi was receiving a great deal of mail supporting his stance on the Security Treaty. Some of the letters were even written in blood, reminiscent of the pacts made by radical young officers in the 1930s. Packard, op. cit., p.245.


232. See Asahi 5/31/1960. Centered on Kono Ichiro and his friend Katsumata Seiichi of the Wada faction of the JSP.

234. The Self Defense Forces, whose original purpose, as the reader may recall, had been to handle internal subversion, had been training for anti-riot operations since the Winter of 1960, and the Staff concil had drawn up detailed mobilization plans. (See Sugita Ichiji (then head of the Ground Self Defense Forces) Wasurerareta iru Anzen Hoshō, Tokyo, Jiji Tsushinsha 1967, p.90 ff. Cited in Welfield, op. cit., p.90ff.

235. See Kishi Nobosuke, Yatsuji Kazuo and Ito Takashi "Ampojyoyakukaiitei to Hantaiundo", Chuokoron May 1980, p.233 and author’s interview with Akagi, Tokyo,


233. Carried by all the major papers, including the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Nikkei, Sankei, Tokyo Shimbun and 50 local papers, excluding the radical Hokkaido Shimbun. See Lee, op. cit., p.168-169


240. See Packard, op. cit., p.323-326

241. Packard, op. cit., p.308

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242. This was one of the smaller sticking points in the Treaty revision negotiations with the U.S., for the U.S. was worried that without anti-spy laws prior consultation with the Japanese government could tip off an adversary when U.S. military action was imminent.

243. This admittedly first became an issue in 1964 and the Three Arrows incident, after the 1945 to 1960 period under discussion here. It is included here, however, since this is meant as a discussion of the ideological currents of Japanese society in general.


245. There have been a fair number of attempts to classify the different views on defense into three or more groupings. Michael Mochizuki, "Japan's Search For Strategy" International Security, Winter 1983/84, Vol.8, £3, breaks identifies three groups: neutralists, neo-gaullists and the centrists. He argues that in the late 1970s the pragmatists began to split into two subgroups, the political pragmatists and the military pragmatists,
distinguished by the weight they give to either political or military factors. Umemoto Tetsuya, *Arms and Alliance in Japanese Public opinion*, a dissertation done at Princeton, 1985, while accepting Mochizuki's basic distinction, denies that such a split is taking place, arguing that the basic worldviews of all three groups remain more or less the same, though the political power of the left has declined and that of the right has increased. Umemoto also uses slightly different terminology than Mochizuki does. Professor Ito Kobun of the National Institute for Defense Studies, *Japan's Defense: Its Present and Future* a booklet put out by the NATO Defense College, Rome, June 26, 1985, presents a six-fold classification system, while Chuma Kiyofuku, *Saigunbi no Seijigaku*, Chishikisha 1985, p.177-180, adds a fifth category, moratorium realists, to Mochizuki's basic four. Ohtake Hideo *Nihon no Boei to Kokunaiseiji*, Tokyo, Sanichishobo, 1983, in the prologue identifies several different groups within the LDP and the bureaucracy without developing an explicit typology.

In creating the typology I use here I basically accepted the Kochizuki framework. However, I agree with Umemoto's emphasis on their basic worldviews, including, but also going beyond, their view of foreign policy and defense issues. It is precisely this feature of these groupings which leads me to evaluate Japanese defense in cultural terms. I differ, however, from Umemoto as well as the others on how to define these differing world views. First, I prefer the term "centrist" to "pragmatist", since the word pragmatism implies both rationality and a certain value judgement concerning their position. In addition, both the far Left and the Right are basically neutralist, albeit in different ways. Also I find the term "Gaullist" somewhat confusing, as the Japanese Right Idealist political agenda is really quite different from anything DeGaulle had in mind. What really distinguishes these three groups, as I argue here, is their positive or negative evaluation of Japan's history and traditions.

246. For some interesting insights into the nature of these pre-war divisions see Dower's, op. cit., discussion of the anti-war movement, Welfield, op.cit., chapter one, on the response to the Western challenge and its impact on Japanese foreign policy.

247. See Watanuki Joji, in Giovanni Sartori and Steiner Rokkan


249. The right idealists can be seen as the ideological descendants of the Meiji oligarchs, and in particular of Yamagata Aritomo who developed many of the basic institutions underlying Imperial Japan, including the army and nationalist education, though Ito Hirobumi and the other so-called more liberal oligarchs did not differ too much in their basic Weltanschaung. It is interesting to note in this context that Yamagata and the others were quite
different from the latter radical militarist leaders of the 1930s, believing in a cool-headed, realpolitik approach to diplomacy which would have been as perfectly at home in the foreign chancellories of 19th century Europe. Indeed, the aging Yamagata played an important role in reigning in some of the rashier spirits in the Japanese army after their rather Pyrrhic victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. For an interesting reevaluation of Yamagata by a leading Centrist analyst see Inoki Masanichi, "Yamagata Aritomo no Saihyoka" in Seiron, November 1978.

250. See the very revealing exchange between Funada and in the lower house committee in

251. See Tokyo Shimbun 9/21/1958 cited in Welfield pp. 94-95

252. See J.A.A Stockwin, op. cit., Chapter 3

253. In the early 1950s, as the defense industry roared back into existence, this issue received considerable attention among business and non-business journals alike. See section 9.

254. See Nishihiro Kazukichi "NichiBei Ampotaisei" in Jiyu, January 1981, p.18 -19. It should be pointed out however that this was just two months after the Korean war had broken out and Occupation censorship was still in effect, heightening the sense of Communist threat and dampening the voice of domestic criticism.


256. See ibid., Yomiuri September 1959 survey.

257. Ibid., according to a Asahi January, 1960 poll 37% thought the U.S. would use its forces even if Japan did not give its consent, and only 27% thought that it would not. Likewise a March, 1960 Mainichi poll showed a full 41% agreed that the Treaty should give Japan an explicit veto power over the use of U.S. forces stationed in Japan if it was to have effective control, while only 15% thought that it would not be necessary.

258. Ibid., Mainichi August, 1959, 29% approved and 41% were opposed.

259. Ibid., Mainichi March, 1960 16% thought it was good that the Diet ratify the revised treaty, while 19% thought that it was unavoidable and 28% felt that it should not do so. After the treaty was passed a July Mainichi polls showed that still 15% thought it was good that the treaty had been ratified, and only
22% thought that it was bad, while a full 34% thought that it had been inevitable.

260. ibid., Mainichi July, 1960 survey


263. For a frank confession of the nationalistic dimensions of the neutralist movement in Japan see Maruyama Masao, "Nationalism in Post-War Japan" Institute of Pacific Relations, Bulletin, October 1950, p.16, as cited in Packard, op. cit., p.29. See also "Aru Jiyushugisha e no Tegami" in Sekai, September, 1950, quoted in Ohtake, 1988, op. cit., p.177-178

264. Interviews with Professors Inoki Masamichi, Munakata Iwao and Sato Seizaburo.

265. See for example the generally callous dismissal of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 as the work of capitalist agents and ex-Nazi sympathizers in the leading journals of the day. Kojima Ryo Hangari Jiken to Nihon, Chuko Shinsho 1987, chapter 2 and especially pages 52-57.

266. Note that the word Kakushin means literally reform or renovation, but in the context of the intellectuals' movement it has often been translated as "progressive. See for example Packard, op.cit., Chapter 1. In the pre-war context Kakushin Kanryo was the term used to refer to those sections of the bureaucracy which espoused fascist-militarist views. Ironically Kishi was seen as one of the leaders of this group.

267. Nishina is rumored to have been one of the leaders of the Japanese war-time atomic bomb program. Latter he was also one of the first scientists sent to examine the destruction at Hiroshima, and the horrors he saw there, combined with guilt he may have felt over his own part in efforts to create a similar weapon of destruction, made him a confirmed believer in the necessity to do away with the evil of war for all time.

268. There were however, a few noteworthy figures who did come to the defense of the government. See for example Fukuda Tsuneari Jyoshiki ni Kaere Shidosha, 1960, Rto Jun Hitsuke ya aru Bunsho Chikuma Shobo 1960 and Inoki Masamichi "Seijiteki no Kiki no soko ni aru mono" in Chuokoron August, 1960. We will see Rto Jun again latter as one of the most prominent of the Right Idealist writers of the 1970s and 80s, while Inoki can well be seen as the founder of the Japanese Centrism among political scientists.
269. See for example the famous Asahi editorial of November 7, 1945, cited in Lee, op. cit.


271. Both Ito Masanori of the Sankei editorial board and Hasegawa Saiji, managing director of Jiji press, were members of the Pro Treaty Revision Aampo Mondaiken Zenkoku Kondankai. See Packard, op. cit., p.


274. See Tahara Soichiro Shusho o Ayatsutta Hitotatchi Tokyo, Kodansha 1988 for an entertaining but non-scholarly description of some of these rivalries, based on numerous interviews with leading business figures.

275. See Doba, et. al., op. cit., final chapter.

276. The Japanese system of multi-candidate electoral districts is said to virtually guarantee the emergence of factions, since the party must put up several candidates in each district if it wishes to hold a majority in the Diet. This means, of course, that candidates from the same party will compete with each other for votes. Such candidates are always supported by the different factions. At the same time, since if too many LDP candidates run in a single district this will split the conservative vote and possibly open the way for an opposition candidate to steal the show, the number of official LDP candidates has to be limited. Nomination as an official LDP candidate is thus an important favor which a faction leader can bestow on a prospective politician.

277. This is another reason why the term "pragmitist" is confusing when used to try to identify the ideological differences on defense and security issues in Japan. Almost all LDP leaders are forced to be pragmatic if they wish to continue to remain an a political force within the party. This does not mean, however, that there are not very deep, and indeed significant ideological difference between different LDP leaders. The real question is why the opposition parties have refused to be more pragmatic compared to the right.

278. See Sangyoshinbun 2/26/1951

279. See Yomiuri 3/9/1952 and 3/2/1952
280. See Yomiuri 11/26/1953

281. See Stockwin, op. cit., p. 33


283. The debate between those who preferred parliamentarian means to taking power and those seeking violent overthrow of the system dates back to the pre-war and first re-emerged in the post-war period in the famous debate between Inamura Junzo and Morito Tatsu in 1949. Inamura urged the Socialist party to become a workers party (rodoshakaikyuu no seito) and work together with the Communist party to overthrow the present regime. Morito, on the other hand, felt that the future of the JSP lay in turning itself into a mass party of all working people (kinrodochakumindai shu no to) and stressed the historical antagonism between socialism and Communism. In the end the Chairman of the party, Katsumada Seiichi, papered over the differences between the two factions with the oxymoronic formula (loosely translated) that the socialist party should be a “class-oriented mass party” (Kaikyutekidaishuseito).

284. Interview in Tokyo with MOF official formerly loaned to the JDA, Spring 1987.

285. As best illustrated by the Kurisu Hiromi incident of the late 1970s, and can also be seen in the writings of some ex-military men, including Kurisu himself. See also Sugita, op. cit.

286. It should be noticed in this context that one of the primary reasons that integratiopn is usually said to be more difficult in the East Asian case is the disparate levels of economic and political development, as well as the diplomatic complications which would result from an overly tight embrace of Taiwan. Moreover, the countries of the region, having just shaken off the yoke of colonialism, were perhaps wary of substituting new bonds of dependance on Japan and the U.S. Another complicating factor is undoubtedly Japan’s reluctance to accept the version of WW II which other countries have. All of these factors are today far less severe then they were in the 1950s and 60s, improving prospects of greater regional integration, this time possibly excluding the U.S. Still, it is not inconcievable that Japan could have entered into some sort of more cooperative arrangement with the U.S. and at least South Korea, and possibly Taiwan and Singapore as well.

287. This is not to say, however, that if a socialist coalition actually had managed to take power during the 1950s it would have adopted a neutralist foreign policy. It is quite likely that once in power the socialists would have greatly moderated their policies and satisfied themselves with merely altering the
security treaty and further reforming the SDF as opposed to abolishing them.

288. A similar pattern can be found in a large number of other ideologically sensitive issues areas, areas, such as the police and education, though nowhere was it as extreme as in defense.

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292. See Reimer Hansen Das Ende des Dritten Reiches Die deutsche Kapitulation 1945, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlag 1966


295. During the latter stages of the war very large numbers of Germans had been taken prisoner by the Soviet Union, many of whom perished in the horrendous conditions which prevailed in the Soviet Gulags. While accurate numbers are not available, it is known that approximately 1,955,000 German prisoners of war were returned to Germany by 1950. A further 28,000 (West and East German) prisoners or so remained until 1955. See Bark and Gress, op. cit., p. 360-364.


298. See de Zayas, op. cit. p. XXV for a very useful chart of demographic shifts in the Eastern territories formerly belonging to Germany.

299. This is indeed precisely what occurred, as will be argued latter, in the late 1970s. In 1945, however, no one would have predicted the extent to which this movement would take on an exclusively anti-American stance while absolving the Soviet Union of moral responsibility for the division of the country. German historians of all political stripes have been highly critical of the Allied, and especially the U.S. stance at Yalta. See Hans Ahrens Demontage München Universität, 1982 and Alfred de Zayas Die Anglo-Amerikanern und die Vertreibung der Deutschen: Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Folgen München, dtv, 1980.

300. In the initial elections of 1933 Hitler came to power with only a plurality of the vote. However, by the mid-1930s the NSDAP (Nationalistische Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, understandably referred to as the Nazis for short) was winning overwhelming majorities time and time again. Though the amount of coercion and lack of alternatives should not be underestimated, Hitler was broadly accredited with bringing the country out of the most severe economic crisis it had ever known and the depth of popular support for his regime was considerable.

301. The relationship between Nazism and the old German political elite is a point of great contention among historians, one with considerable political significance. Basically those scholars with left political leaning argued that Nazism was the product of the German political, economic and social systems, and consequently the roots of national socialism could only be
extirpated when the entire capitalist system which gave it birth were wiped out. Scholars of a more right-wing political leaning tend to instead stress the extent to which Hitler was an aberration in the course of the historical evolution of Germany and was separate from the old political elites. See David Schoenbaum Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Germany 1933-1939 New York, Doubleday 1966 and Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Big Business and the Rise of Hitler Oxford, Oxford University Press 1985.


303. The Allies had originally wished to place Alfried Krupp, one of the heads of the enormous Krupp combine, on trial. However the Americans mistakenly placed the name of Gustav Krupp, the aged patriarch of the Krupp clan, on the list of those to be prosecuted. They soon found the older Krupp in a state of senile dementia and obviously incompetent to stand trial. When the Americans subsequently proposed simply resubstituting the younger Alfried for the older Gustav, they encountered the adamant opposition of the British representative, who felt that such switching about of defendants was a mockery of justice. In the end the judges decided to forego trying any industrialists at all. See Robert Conot, Justice at Nuremberg New York, Caroll and Graff, 1983, p.75-77. Alfried was later tried and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and his fortune was sequestered. His trial did no enjoy anywhere near the publicity of the Nürnberg trials, and he was later restored to his former position of wealth and power. See also William Manchester The Arms of Krupp: 1587 - 1968, Boston, Little Brown 1968. In later war crimes trials during the early 1960s members of I.G. Farben, which had been involved in manufacturing the poison gas used at Auschwitz and built factories with slave laborers who were worked to death, were prosecuted. But despite overwhelming evidence against them, 12 executives were found not guilty and 11 others were given relatively light sentences ranging from one to eight years.


305. See Bradley Smith The Road to Nuremberg 1981, p.249. Even the French and the Russian members of the international tribunal were uncomfortable with the implications of ex post facto prosecution and collective guilt. See Smith, 1971 op. cit, p.51. As Smith
notes with grim humor, in the case of the Soviets there may have been a sort of admiring envy of the utility of the concepts.

306. See Smith, 1971, op. cit., p.101-102. Particularly embarrassing to the prosecution might have been Soviet documents concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact dividing Poland and parts of Rumania between them.


310. Allensbach survey, 1951, cited in Martin and Sylvia Grieben, *Ein Schwieriges Vaterland: Zur politischen Kultur Deutschland* Munich, List, 1979, p.331, and M. Kaase "Demokratische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" in R. Wildenmann (ed) *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, Vol.1, Munich 1971, p.324, also cited in Grieben, ibid., p.333. If one were to total the percentages of those who strongly, relatively and weakly agree to the statement "Was National Socialism a good idea that was poorly executed", the total is an astounding 50%. The responses, however, were clearly influenced by the age and education of the respondent. Only 43% of all youths surveyed agreed, and only 9% of all students did.


314. See ibid. The relationship of the Catholic church to the Nazi government continues to be a subject of some controversy in Germany. Though the Catholic Church did at times resist the Nazis, and many Catholic priests, as well as Protestant ministers, were victims of the concentration camps, the Church also signed a Concordat with the regime in which it followed a policy of limited cooperation with the Nazis in return for the granting of certain freedoms in the internal and educational spheres. See Guenter Lewy *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

315. Though the actual strength of that claim became very much a political issue, especially since the Social Democrats could claim a cleaner record than many of the CDU/CSU leaders could.
316. See Donald Abenheim *Reforging the Iron Cross* and also pages
318. See Grosser, op.cit., p.42.
320. See Norbert Muhlen *Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries*, Chicago, 1953, p.33. Only a few months later, in December, however, U.S. public opinion had changed dramatically, with 36% believing that Germany had learned its lesson and while 46% thought that it would try again.
321. As a result there is an ongoing debate among historians of the period concerning the essential character of the Occupation. Compare Harold Zink *The United States in Germany 1944-1951* New York, Van Nostrand, 1957, p.94 with Grosser, op.cit., p.25. The debate is made more complicated by its connection to the earlier discussed German debate over whether one should see the end of WWII as a defeat or a liberation.
322. The issue of demilitarization and decartelization was linked by the Soviets to the contentious reparations issue. See Daniel Yergin *The Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1977, p.223-228.
324. Since old uniforms was often the only clothing left to be had, this aspect of the directive proved problematic. The solution was to demand that all Germans who wished to wear their old uniforms to dye them. As one British mocking summed up the essence of the new order "dye or die". Wettig, op.cit., p.106.
325. See Peterson, op.cit., p.151. Overall only 10% of the total population and 29% of the adult population had been in the party. However, 60% of the population (70% of the middle class) was indirectly connected to the Nazis through family ties.
326. See Alfred Grosser *Germany in our Time* New York, Praeger 1971, p.43.
328. See Oeterson, op.cit., p.153
329. See Niethammer, 1972, op.cit., p.227-232


333. See Fitzgibbon, op.cit., p.114

334. See Wettig, op.cit., 114-121

335. See Peterson, op.cit., p.126-131

336. "Das Kapitalistisches Wirtschaftssystem ist dem Staatlichen und sozialen Leben des deutschen Volkes nicht gerecht geworden." Recently there has been something of a revival of interest in the Ahlen Program because many in the East German branch of the CDU, including its head Lothar de Maziere, have expressed agreement with its principles.

337. In fact the Basic Law had two different provisions concerning the possibility of reabsorbing the Eastern Germany, one which provided for a new constitution and one which allowed individual Länder to enter under the provisions of the old constitution. When the two Germanies united in 1990 it did so under the provisions of the later clause and the Basic Law became the constitution of a united Germany with absolutely no modifications.

338. See the speech of Carlo Schmid, September 8, 1948 in Parlamentarischer Rat, Stenographische Berichte Volume 1, Nr.2 p.15-16.

339. Adenauer, much like Ashida in Japan, was to later, in 1952, declare that already in 1940 he had fully foreseen the future course of events and the eventual necessity of rearmament. Wettig, op.cit., p.241. See also interview in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1/7/1960.

341. See Kobayashi Hiroaki Kokubo no Ronri, Tokyo, Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha, 1981 for an interesting juxtaposition of the legal basis of German and Japanese defense. Later the Basic Law was amended to cover the expansion of military forces, and under the new provisions it was stated that the armed forces are for the purpose of self defense. As we shall see, this became the subject of debate later on, especially with regard to the American Air Land Battle 2000 plan in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, clearly the Constitution in Germany has never been the topic of controversy to anywhere near the extent it has been in Japan.

342. See Gaddis, op.cit., p.199,207-209

Steininger, op.cit., p.76-93

344. Wettig, op.cit., p.78-79.


350. See Schwarz, Adenauer, Der Aufstieg op.cit., p.580

351. See Wettig, op.cit. p.244


353. These units were called the KVP (Kasserniete:volkspolizei), or barracked People’s Police. It was believed that their numbers could be raised to 150,000 on short order.

354. Schwarz, Adenauer, Der Aufstieg, op.cit., p.581-582

356. Wettig, op.cit., p.248-249


358. Die Welt 12/14/1948, see also resolution of the SPD Party Leadership in Vorstand der SPD [1941] Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1947/1949, Hannover, p.136, reproduced in Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschen Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden, Ulmer, Diestel Verlag, 1984. The resolution specifically rejects speaking with representatives of the old military, whether Nazi or nationalist - an obvious referral to Adenauer’s talks with Speidel and other former military officers.

359. Wettig, op.cit., p.250


363. See Wettig, op.cit., p.251

364. Cleveland Plain Dealer interview 12/4/1949, picked up by the NYT (among others) 12/10/1949.


366. See Jacobsen, op.cit., p.63-64.

368. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, stenographische Berichte, Vol.1, p.734-735ff. Already the day after the Plain Dealer interview Adenauer in a press conference had made it "once and for all" clear that he was opposed to the rearmament of the Federal Republic.

369. Steininger, op.cit., p.28-31


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372. In fact we know now that the Communist invasion of South Korea was not a well planned plot as was believed at the time. At a recent gathering of historians in Moscow it was revealed that the idea had originally come from the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung. When he visited Stalin, the Soviet dictator tried to dissuade him from launching an attack, but then the Chinese Communist leader, Mao Ze Dong, offered his support and the invasion was undertaken by the North Koreans even without clear Soviet sanction. See NYT, 12/27/90.

373. In fact the Soviet Union probably had far fewer weapons than the U.S. believed at the time. See NIT 12/17/90, op.cit.

374. See FAZ, Frankfurter Rundschau, Rheinischer Merkur and Spiegel of the week from June 25 to June 30, 1950.

375. Wettig, op.cit., p.310-311

376. Wettig, op.cit., p.314 and Steininger, op.cit., p.63-66. It is not clear to what extent McFloy was informed of the meeting between Adenauer and General Bays.

377. See Steininger, op.cit., p.70-74, for a detailed discussion of the contents of the memo.

378. Wettig, op.cit., p.316-318

379. Schwarz, 1986, op.cit., p.748-749

disagreement among German historians over the extent to which the first memo is linked with the second. H.P. Schwarz - 1986, op.cit., p.764-765 - emphatically argues that the two were not strongly linked and that the prime motive behind Adenauer's offer of German troops was the urgent security situation of the time. The more conventional view is that like Yoshida in Japan, the linkage was in fact quite strong and Adenauer wished to use rearmament as a means of regaining sovereignty. See for example Edwin Hartich Fourth and Richest Reich, New York, Macmillan, 1980, p.164 and Herbert Blankenhorn Verständnis und Verständigung, p.175. Also Adenauer's own memoirs indicate that sovereignty was one of his chief goals at the time. Steininger takes adopts a compromise position, arguing that both security considerations and the hope to win concessions from the Allies weighed heavily in Adenauer's calculations of the time, see op.cit., p.56-58. The author is inclined to agree with Steininger on this.


382. See also Wettig, op.cit., p.326-328

383. See Steininger, op.cit., p.141-158

384. See Klaus von Schubert, 1979, op.cit., Vol.II, p.71-81. There was some rivalry between the different generals advising Adenauer on military security matters at the time, in part reflecting the different relationships that these generals are said to have had to the different Western Allies. Generals Heusinger and Gehlen were said to be close to the U.S., while Speidel was said to have ties to the French and Schwerin to the British. See Schwarz, 1986, op.cit., p.754-755. Graf von Schwerin was dismissed in September 1950 in part because Adenauer wished to make clear that he favored the Pentagon line on German rearmament. Schwarz, ibid, p.829. See also the very different description of events surrounding Schwerin's dismissal in Wettig, p.322-323.

It is interesting to note that General Heusingers' representative (stellvertreter) was General Franz Halder, who worked on an operational history on WWII in the historical section of the U.S. army and who later, in 1948, ran the analysis division of Gehlen's intelligence service. Also in the August 17 talks with the High Commissioners, Adenauer mentioned that for remobilization he would need the personnel records (personalakten) of the Wehrmacht which were being held by the Americans. Because of the remarkable parallels to the Japanese case, it would be interesting to know if work similar to that of the Battori group was being conducted in this section. If so, at the risk of sounding like a revisionist, the author would suggest that this would confirm that figures like General George Patton were not isolated in the Pentagon, and that U.S. preparations for German rearmament as part of a strategy for eventual conflict
with the Soviet Union began earlier than is usually believed. See also Mary Ellen Reese General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection Fairfax VA, George Mason University Press, 1990., especially p.83,104 and 119.


387. Drummond, op.cit., p.42-43

388. See Butterwegge, op.cit., p.254-256 for the text of the interview. See also FAZ 12/13/1950 and Drummond, op.cit., p.44-48

389. Drummond, op.cit., p.47-48


392. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel Katholizmus und Wiederbewaffnung, Mainz, Grünwald, 1981 p.84-85


395. Ernst Nolte, op.cit., p.241-285 and 382-390, along with many other generally conservative commentators the peace movement, essentially makes the argument that the peace movement is a nationalistic force. In the West German political context, labeling ones opponents "nationalists" is a common ploy for discrediting them, and needless to say representatives of the peace movements generally are outraged by such suggestions. Yet, at the same time, for obvious reasons they are loathe to make the contrary argument, that they use the reunification issue to rally support. And conservatives as well are reluctant to make this argument for fear that their charges of "nationalism" might boomerang back upon themselves. In reality, probably both claims these are true. However, in the 1950s the nationalist dimension was probably much stronger than in the 1970s and 80s, as was
shown by the Left's response to German reunification when it finally was realized.

396. See Wettig, op.cit., p.344-345.


399. See Schubert, 1977, p.91-98 for parts I and II, 262-274 for Part III, which details the forces to be created. This document was first released to the public by the Military-Historical Research Office in 1977.


401. Schubert 1972, op.cit., p.106,

402. See Schubert 1972, op.cit., p.35-36

403. See Wettig, op.cit., p.429-487 for a very detailed description of the events surrounding


407. NZZ 10/23/90

408. See Drummond, op.cit., p.65. See also Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1952/1953, p.16-19

409. See Drummond, op.cit., p.69-73, and Bark and Gress, op.cit., p.316-318

410. Fritz Erler Soll Deutschland Rüsten? - Die SPD zum Wehrbeitrag, p.49. See also Drummond, op.cit., p.70.

411. Burns, op.cit., p.78-79
412. The English text of the notes can be found in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, Washington, GPO 1961, p.87, and a German translation can be found in Schubert 1977, op.cit.,Vol.1, p.167-170.

413. Schwarz 1986, op.cit., p.912


415. FAZ 3/31/1952


418. The rationale for this was that war had been declared on a united Germany, and by extension peace could only be made with a united Germany. To sign a separate peace with the Western government would in effect have solidified the boundaries between the two countries. See Wilhelm G. Grewe Rückblenden: Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen deutscher Außenpolitik von Adenauer bis Schmidt Frankfurt, Propyläen 1979, p.145-157.

419. See Grewe,op.cit..

420. A reference to the 19th century German debate over whether should be one Germany embracing all the German-speaking peoples of central europe, or many, the so-called "little German solution" (klein Deutschland Lösung) to the nationality problem.


426. See Drummond, op.cit., p.103-109. Adenauer's comment about the gallows were made at a press conference with foreign correspondents in Bonn.


428. For background on the French decision see Raymond Aron and Daniel Praeger France Defeats EDC New York, Praeger 1957, especially the articles by Raymond Aron, Jean Stoetzel and Andre Philip. See also Alfred Grosser 1984, op.cit., p.132-142.


430. See Cioc, p.21

431. Cioc, op.cit., p.23-25


433. Drummond, op.cit., p.124


435. See Bark and Gress, op.cit., p.330-332

436. Uwe Löwke Für den Fall, daß...SPD und die Wehrfrage.1945-1955, Hannover, 1969, p.207.

437. The PaulsKirche was the meeting place of delegates from all around Germany in 1848 and became a symbol of the pan-germanic movement of the 19th century. To this day the building, which has since been made into a museum and meeting place, continues to serve as a rallying point for political groups, especially those pushing for German unity.

438. The text of the declaration can be found in Butterwege, op.cit., p.289-291.

439. See Burns, op.cit., p.84, Drummond, op.cit., p.133-139 and Gerhard Stuby Die SPD in der Phase des Kalten Krieges p.340-345

440. Burns, op.cit., p.85

441. It is possible, however, to argue that this cultural element had been there all along, but had merely been dormant before 1945, for one of two possible reasons. The first being that native Japanese culture had no fully adapted itself to Japan's new institutions, a process which was only completed in the post-war. One could even argue that this acculturation process has
made Japan's democratic institutions stronger than they were in the pre-war. The second argument would be fit into a modified version of the cycles of history theory, which might argue that Japan's non-aggressiveness in foreign policy behavior, and its displacement of samurai values from the political arena to the economic one, would bring to the surface an alternative, more compromise-seeking face of Japanese culture, which just as readily may disappear when external conditions change again.


444. Anecdotal evidence from the time suggests that military experience was a positive criterion for employment in West German industry.

445. Interview with Willi Weiskirch, June, 1990, former member of the CDU and Wehrbeauftragte of the Bundeswehr. Weiskirch began his political career in the CDU youth wing and was active in campaigning against the revival of the old military style. CDU pamphlet by Willi Weiskirch Nie Wieder Komm: Es muß alles anders werden, circa 1955.


448. See von Schubert 1972, op.cit., p.73-84.

449. Heusinger defended General Jodl at a 1953 posthumous denazification trial in Munich. NYT 2/28/1953. Heusinger himself was reputed to have been classified as a minor war criminal on the original list prepared by the Allies at the end of WW II.

450. Tauber, op.cit., p.260ff. See also von Schubert 1972, op.cit., p.73-84.


452. See Charles W. Thayer The Unquiet Germans New York, Harper and Row, 1957, p.223-252. Thayer had been the State Department's expert on West Germany at the time and had been instrumental in helping arrange Eisenhower's visit.


456. On the relative weakness of the sub-department for Innere Gefüge see Genschel, op.cit.. Genschel's work has been the subject of much controversy, and was written at a time of much internal debate over the future course of military reform. See refutations by Norbert Wiggershaus "Zur debatte um die Tradition künftiger Streitkräfte 1950-1955/6" in MGPA Tradition und Reform in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr Herford, 1985. While Genschel's critique that Innere Führung was purely a PR ploy designed to placate the SPD and peace movement is probably overstated, there is no doubt that the implementation of the doctrine was gravely impaired, first by the pressures for a speedy rearmament, second by personal rivalries among the reformers, and third by the problems brought on by the extreme idealism of the doctrine itself.

457. Simon, op.cit., p.96-197


459. Genschel, op.cit., p.216-222

460. Genschel, op.cit., p.201-204. See also Innere Führung und Recht, Texte und Studien Zentrum Innere Führung, Heft no.1, Koblenz 1983, p.33-34.

461. For a summary of these and other affairs, see Simon, op.cit., p.61-72.

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462. The author is indebted to Professor Wolfgang Pfeiler of the
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for pointing this concept out in a series of conversations in Bonn, Spring 1990.

463. In the West German literature on defense there is a high degree of awareness of the importance of linkage between security and various non-defense issues, a linkage which is explained in a historical-cultural way. This could hardly be otherwise given the enormous importance that above all the national issue has played in these debates. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, there has been little effort to systematically analyze over time the various groups involved in the defense debate in a manner comparable to what, for example, Michael Mochizuki or Ito Kobun did for Japan. This is probably due to the extreme fluidity of the ideological constellation discussed later in this section. One exception is Thomas Risse-Kappen's Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik Mainz-Munich, Kaiser Grünwald, 1988, which distinguishes between four different groups: peace through strength: deterrence+detente; priority to deterrence and arms control; and anti-deterrence. He goes on to try to identify the strength of these views in different social groups. Risse-Kappen's work however, focuses more on these groups view of military issues and does not seek to track their historical evolution. Berthold Meyer's "Die Parteien der BRD und die sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit in West Europa" HSFK report 1, February 1987 does trace historically the interconnection of views on security and national identity, but does so only for political parties. Other interesting analyses include Nolte's, op.cit., view of the peace movement in the 1950s, and Anne-Marie Barley's very interesting typology of West German views of the national issue "The Once and Future German Question", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990. Much of the literature on the second peace movement of the late 1970s and 1980s does include consideration of the cultural element, but does so almost exclusively to understand the views of the protesters themselves, as opposed to the views of the larger society.

For brief but interesting discussion of the historical cultural context of West German defense see for example Helga Haftendorn Sicherheit und Entspannung, Baden-Baden, Noma Verlagsgesellschaft 1986, esp. pages 19-25, and Gert Krell "Die Entwicklung der Sicherheitsbegriffe" in Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung, Nr.3, 1980, though neither tries to analyze different groups or actors. Strangely Hanrieder, who talks of German economic culture, does not include the cultural factor at all in his discussion of the military one.

464. See Hanrieder's excellent and concise summary of the issues involved in the formation of West Germany's "economic culture" (his term, not mine). Hanrieder, op.cit., p.228-230 and 243-245. The Sozialemarktwirtschaft has become one of the most enduring pillars of post-war Germany, and it is interesting to note active German efforts to export the concept to the liberalizing economies of Eastern Europe.
465. See H.P. Schwarz, 1986, op.cit.,

466. In the West German case it is possible to make the argument that a rather different typology of forces would be appropriate. Most sectoral studies of the domestic politics behind West German defense policy include separate sections on the churches and the unions. On the other hands, the media is rarely included in such analyses (basically, this author believes, because of methodological difficulties), and the role of industry is discounted except by Left-leaning analysts, who then focus exclusively on the military-industrial complex. See for example Rissee-Kappen 1986, op.cit., Baring 1969, op.cit., and Jacobsen, op.cit.. For the sake of greater comparability this study employs the same categorization scheme as for Japan. The role of the Catholic churches has been dealt with in the context of the intellectuals and the CDU/CSU, while the position of the unions is touched upon in the context of the SPD.

467. This section is especially indebted to the materials presented in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen “Zur Rolle der Öffentlichen Meinung bei der Debatte um die Wiederbewaffnung 1950-1955” in K Mostly Aspekte der deutschen Wiederbewaffnung, Boppard, Harald Boldt Verlag, 1975 and Berthold Meyer Der Bürger und seine Sicherheit Frankfurt, Campus Verlag 1983. Elisabeth Noelle Neumann’s monumental remains the single most important and convenient source of public opinion data, both in the English and German literatures.

468. See Meyer, op.cit., p.261, table 9.1.1

469. Meyer, op.cit., p.216, table 3.2.1

470. See Meyers, op.cit., p.240, table 5.1.6.1.1

471. See Meyers, op.cit., p.243 table 5.1.9.3.1 and p.247, 5.8.1. From 1951 on through the 1960s the preference was for reunification by ratios of two to one or even larger, with the turning point coming in 1973 and the implementation of Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik, when 65% stressed Europe over 23% reunification. In March, 1951 80% were unwilling to accept the Oder-Neisse line, and only 8% were ready to accept it. By 1956 this had improved slightly to 73% to 9%.

472. See Meyer, op.cit., p.219, table 3.3.6 and 3.3.7

473. Meyer, op.cit., p.221, tables 3.0.1 and 3.8.2.1. See also p.222, table 3.8.2.6.1, which shows that according to Allenbach surveys from July 1956, 51% of those asked would welcome it if they read in their morning newspapers that the U.S. was withdrawing its forces, and only 22% would regret it. But, as the previous survey shows, many of those accepted the stationing of
those troops as an unavoidable necessity.

474. See Meyer, op.cit., p.197, table 1.1.1.

475. Meyer, op.cit., p.233, table 4.3.3.1

476. Meyer, op.cit., p. 231, table 4.2.1


479. See Jacobsen, op.cit., p.89-90. Many of those mentioned by Jacobsen as having been of service during the rearmament, such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, were far from conservatives in their overall political views, and were closer to the SPD position on rearmament. Their cooperation was probably intended to help ensure that the rearmament process did not wander off in harmful directions. Others, such as Helmut Schelsky and Ulrich Scheuner, were true conservatives. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even this level of cooperation by so many leading intellectual figures, while falling far short of the role U.S. intellectuals played in directing U.S. post-war policy, was unknown in Japan.

480. Burns, op.cit., p.28

481. See Bob Burns and Wilfred van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany, New York, St.Martin's Press 1988, p.27-31.

482. Nolte, op.cit., p.252. The Nauheimer also included later right wingers such as Wolf Schenke.

483. See Nolte, op.cit., p.256


485. Berlin, 1950
486. Interview with Peter Berger, who in 1955 studied at the Evangelical Seminary Bad Boll which was the site of many of these debates. See also Jacobsen, op.cit..

487. See Jacobsen, op.cit., p.76-81. This position was of course in keeping with the Lutheran tradition.

488. For a variety of reasons it is far more difficult to investigate the position of the press on rearmament in Germany than it is in Japan. This is for a variety of reasons. First of all, as indicated below, there are far more newspapers in the West German than in the Japanese cases. Secondly, in Japan all the major newspapers publish compendiums of all their issues reaching back to before the war, which are carried in most major libraries. In contrast, in Germany newspaper archival materials are much more difficult to use and access to them tends to be more restricted. Finally the secondary literature on the subject is uncharacteristically sparser in Germany than in Japan, undoubtedly due in part to the reasons just given. The following account is based on the few sources the author himself was able to find, in addition to conversations with German journalists.


492. See for example his Oct.2, 1948 article under the pen name Jens Daniel which reflected his sense of doomed resignation and bitterness over the division of Germany by the Allied powers. But Augstein became increasingly critical of the government for failing to more actively pursue reunification, and in a 3/27/1951 article argued that negotiating with Stalin for reunification was more important than joining the West. At the same time he shared the SPD leadership's (Augstein was on close terms with Schumacher) distaste for the Communists, and he saw Korea as a "test war" (probekrieg), which could be a prelude to war with the U.S..

493. See FAX 4/15/1952

494. To date there is no single, comprehensive study of the West German defense industry and of the relationship of industry and defense in general. The most important work on the period under consideration here is Gerhard Brandt Rüstung und Wirtschaft in der Bundesrepublik, Witten and Berlin, Eckart Verlag, 1966. Typical of the more ideological studies on this subject of this time, and one that makes some interesting counter arguments to
some of Brandt’s theses, is Fritz Vilmar Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt/Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1965. For some brief surveys of the views of business leaders see also Gabriel Almond “The Political Attitudes of West German business” in World Politics, January 1956, Nolte, op.cit., 274-276, and Baring 1969, op.cit., p.318-326. There is also a large critical literature on the West German defense industry, though for the most part it is oriented towards the period after 1955, and in particular focuses on the problem of arms exports. Of these, perhaps Ulrich Albrecht, Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf Mit Rüstung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit, Hamburg, Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag 1982, especially chapter 2, is of greatest interest for the early development of German defense industry. Also useful is Michael Brzoska Rüstungsexportpolitik, Frankfurt/Main, Haag+Herchen 1986. The best single work in English, and one of the best in either language, is Regina H.B. Cowen’s very informative Defense Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany: Politics and Organizations, Boulder and London, Westview, 1986.

495. Bundesverbandes der deutschen Industrie and Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag, respectively. In addition there is the Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeber (BDA) - Federation of German Employers, but it deals almost exclusively with issues of labor-management relations. Also, as noted by Baring 1969, op.cit., p.318-319, the DIFT was at this time largely absorbed with internal struggles and was not at this time a significant factor in influencing opinion, though later it was to frequently try to publicly address foreign policy issues.


499. Brandt, op.cit., p.163-164. See also Cowen, op.cit., p.6-7.


501. “Der Verteidigungsbeitrag der Bundesrepublik und die deutsche Industrie”, from the Archives of the German Society for Foreign Policy, cited in Nolte, op.cit., p.274 -274. This last source reported that a discussion among leading industrialists supposedly took place, including Hjalmar Schacht, who had been tried and acquitted at Nürnberg, in which it had been discussed
whether rearmament shouldn't be sabotaged in order to protect West German industry.

502. See also the reminiscences of leading German industrialists about industry hopes and fears of the time in Wehrtechnik issues nos. 9 and 10, 1975.

503. Cowen, op.cit., p.25-26

504. See Cowen, op.cit., p.29-30 and table on page 194. Even more informative is the table in Michael Brzoska, op.cit., p.159.

505. Brzoska, op.cit., p.159

506. Like the Japanese, West German firms took extraordinary steps to try to preserve their production capacity. In the German case, they sent teams of aeronautics engineers to third world countries to carry on design work there. For example a Dornier team in Madrid designed a short-range airplane. Another Messerschmitt group in Spain developed a trainer which was later rejected by the new West German Air Force. Another team assisted Peron in Argentina in his efforts to build up a domestic military aeronautics industry, and yet another group developed a helicopter for the military in Brazil. See Albrecht, et.al., op.cit., p.61-63

507. Brandt, op.cit., p.57-58

508. Die Welt 9/23/1953 and Albrecht, et.al., op.cit., p.59

509. See Cowen, op.cit., p.193. Perhaps no other aspect of the West German armaments industry has sparked greater controversy than arms exports, especially to the Third World. Only the nuclear weapons issue surpasses arms exports in sparking alarm and protest among academics (including peace researchers) and the media.

510. See Albrecht, et.al. op.cit., p.63, Pöttering, op.cit.. See also Gerd Schmückle Ohne Pauken und Trompeten Stuttgart, DVA 1982, who reports that in his early conversations with Strauss the Defense Minister indicated he also felt that the military security of the nation was needed to increase investor confidence and improve the economy. p.175. Strauss also stressed the importance of a small, highly skilled defense industry acting technological pace setter to help give West Germany the advantage it needs in high technology (the term used at the time was Hochleistungstechnik) indispensable to an export nation like West Germany. He also said he dreamed of the day when West Germany had an aeronautics industry capable of competing with the U.S. 's, ibid., p.175-176. A dream which other West German politicians, notably Helmut Schmidt, was to share. For more on the role of industry, technology and competition with the U.S. in Strauß's
world view, see Detlef Bischoff Franz Josef Strauß, die CSU und die Außenpolitik: Konzeptionen und Realität am Beispiel der Großen Koalition Meisenheim am Glann, Anton Hain 1973, p.120-131. See especially the footnote 1 on page 122 for a listing of Strauss's business connections. To see what the fruits of this strategy for Bavaria have been, see the recent book Rüstungsindustrie in Bayern Frankfurt/Main, Campus Verlag 1990, which describes in detail the incredible concentration of defense firms there without going into the political background behind this development.

511. See for example Brzoska, op.cit., p.161-162. Especially spectacular were failures in the aeronautics area. On the other hand, where German weapons exports were most successful, for example tanks, they owed much to "spin ons" from the civilian economic sector.

512. The one arguable exception might be the defense industry's influence on the CSU. There is no evidence, however, that the CSU's views on defense and security would have been any less positive without the defense industry. On the contrary, it was probably the CSU's innate conservatism, and its relative immunity to the siren call of reunification, which made it an active supporter of the defense industry, rather than the other way around.


515. In one discussion with Murphy of the American Military Government Adenauer even warned him that Schumacher was a typical Prussian - intolerant and fanatical. See also Schwarz, op.cit., p.449.

516. At the same time, this did not necessarily mean, as many of his critics in the press (Rudolf Augstein) and in the political parties (Gustav Beinemann and even Thomas Dehler) charged, that Adenauer had never really wanted reunification. Like most politicians of the time, a near permanent partition of the German nation was close to unimaginable for Adenauer. Rather, his emotional distance to the East allowed him to subordinate reunification to other political goals, as even the relatively critical Peter Koch Konrad Adenauer: Eine Politische Biographie Hamburg, Rohwolt Verlag 1985, p.323-325, would argue.

518. Schwarz, op.cit., p.833-838, 842, and Grabbe, op.cit., p.188-189, 191. It should be noted that at least prior to and shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Adenauer was apparently genuinely concerned by the possibility of a Communist invasion of the West. Soon thereafter, however, those fears began to fade.


520. Jacobsen, op.cit., p.61


524. Interview with former wehrbeauftragte Willi Weiskirch, op.cit..


526. Believed by many to have been a euphemism for tactical nuclear weapons.

527. Pottering, op.cit., p.93-94

528. See Enders 1984, op.cit., who convincingly argues that much of the Bundeswehr's strategic thinking owes a great debt to Strauss.

529. Pottering, op.cit., p.189-190


531. Especially over the 1914 decision of the party to support the war effort and the late 1920s decision to approve the construction of armored cruisers (the so called Panzerkreuzer debate).

532. See for example the "Manifest of the former Social Democrats of the former Concentration camp Buchenwald", April 13, 1945, in Butterwegge, op.cit., p.246-247. Among the signers were the prominent West German Social Democrat Hermann Brill and the leader of the Social Democrats in Austria, Benedikt Rautsky.
537. It is interesting to note that elite of Hamburg was traditionally anglophile in outlook, and as citizens of a great port city perhaps especially concerned with trade and commerce with the West. And undoubtedly Ernst Reuter, who originally had been an outspoken opponent of rearmament, was influenced by his experiences as a mayor of a city at the forefront of the Cold War.


539. Nolte, op.cit., p.278. In addition Adenauer was able to strike a bargain with the unions on the co-determination issue.


541.Drummond, op.cit., p.124-128


543. This is contrary to Joseph Joffe’s thesis that the peace movement in West Germany becomes a significant force whenever an electoral rival on the Left emerged for the SPD. After 1949, when the KPD got approximately 6% of the vote, the SPD actually began to adopt harder line on defense. And in 1953, when the KPD got only 3% of the vote, under the 5% minimum needed to be apportioned seats in the Bundestag, the SPD began to shift to the left. While Joffe would might argue that it was not so much the KPD as the emergence of the "ohne mich" movement which worried the SPD, electorally speaking (and the key focus of Joffe’s argument is electoral) that sentiment it was not being organized. The one party which actively represented its views was Heinemann’s GDR, and it garnered even less of the vote than the Communists did.

544. It is interesting to speculate why this tradition emerged in Japan and not in West Germany. Here it is important to note that this tradition was actually new to Japan, and in the pre-war there were evidently no inhibitions about overriding a minority. The new reluctance to do so is probably best explained by the uncertain legitimacy and popular distrust of the LDP which made them reluctant to act without the opposition. Over time this practice has become ingrained in the Japanese political system
and is now quite difficult to change (I would argue it has become part of Japan’s historical legislative-political culture). It is now stronger than ever not only because it has become objectified, but also because it has become the chief means of preventing the extended LDP one-party rule from turning into a virtual dictatorship. In West Germany the CDU/CSU did not suffer from such a deficit in legitimacy, partly because it was freer of the taint of the previous, undemocratic regime, and partly because it was already in coalition with the FDP.


546. Schwarz, op.cit., p.755

547. Wagner, op.cit., p.39 and 56

548. See Tauber, op.cit., p. and Simon, op.cit, p.56-61 and interviews with German officers wishing to remain anonymous,

549. Good overviews of this debate can be gotten from Abenheim, op.cit., Simon, op.cit., and Martin Esser Das Traditionsverständnis des Officerkorps Heidelberg Hamburg. R.v. Decker’s Verlag G. Schenck 1982, which has some very useful survey data. Genschel, op.cit., remains the most important source for the period under consideration here.

550. For a history of the historical German debate on this subject, which began relatively early in the 19th century, see Gordon Craig The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 London- New York, Oxford University Press 1955


552. Wettig, op.cit., p.401

553. And this also helps explain why the Bundeswehr has been plagued by an even greater number of political scandals than the SDF has been.

554. Which always had the option to escape military service through the constitutional guarantee to the right to conscientious objection and which furthermore could exert electoral pressure for reform if military service were unpopular enough.

555. Unfortunately for the Bundeswehr, military service does not also translate into greater liking for the military as an institution or military service itself. This, however, is as it should be, for one of the great concerns is that the military should not once again aspire to be a “school of the nation” and inculcate the society with martial values. See Karl Hegner, Ekkehard Lippert and Roland Wakenhat Selektion oder

The one great exception to civilian control the Schneiz affair of 1969, in which the media uncovered plans for a considerable dilution of Innere Führung and civilian control of the military and used terminology which could be described as ideologically right wing. Nonetheless, here too, the civilian authorities reacted quickly to squelch these plans and General Inspector Schneiz was forced into early retirement. See H. Fred Krause Das Konzept der Inneren Führung und die Hochschulen der Bundeswehr Bochum, Bockmeier Verlag, 1979, p.226-262.

556. In this context it should be noted that it is possible to describe a third model of explaining human behavior, let us call it the psychological model, which is analytically distinct from the rationalist and the culturalist ones discussed earlier. Like the rational actor model, the psychological approach assumes that what guides human behavior are certain universal characteristics common to all men, and under similar conditions (or within similar structures) very similar patterns of behavior are evoked in all human beings. Where it differs from the rationalist model is that it rejects or at least severely down plays the role that rational calculations of interest play in guiding behavior. It it prefers to use other, irrational or nonrational forces, such as emotional responses or structural predispositions, to explain individual or social actions.

Two classical (and very different) expressions of this model of human behavior are Vilfredo Pareto’s Mind and Society and Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theory of culture. Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom can be seen as a non-political scientist’s attempt to explain political behavior (in this case Nazism) using this type of approach. In political science this model is implicit in many approaches to explaining the emergence of certain social processes or decision making. See for example Irving Janis’s work on the development of irrational forces in small groups of decision makers in crisis situations, Victims of Group Think, Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1972. Likewise most theories of nationalism, such as Karl Deutsch’s Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, MIT Press 1962, and Anthony Smith’s The Theories of Nationalism, 556. New York, Holmes and Meier 1983, fall into this category. In all of these studies there is a common view that any individual, or groups of individuals, when subjected to similar structural forces, be it the pressures of decision making in a small, cohesive group, or the impact of industrialization and modernization on traditional societies and their intellectual elites, will behave in an identifiably similar fashion.

Some of the points listed below of similarity in post-war German and Japanese behavior can be explained using a psychologistic approach. For example the emergence of a "skeptical generation" and the longing for stability leading to electoral support for moderate-conservative one-party domination are both responses which are not necessarily rational and which
any people might exhibit in the face of the near-complete delegitimation of the old political order and profound social and economic dislocation. This is different, however, from trying to explain them in terms of a rational calculations of interest. Note that it might be possible to construct rationalist explanations for the examples cited, or for that matter anthropological cultural ones, though on the surface at least a psychologicist interpretation seems more plausible.

Where both the rationalist and the psychologicist approaches differ from the cultural one is in their rejection of the notion that there exists an autonomous or semi-autonomous realm of shared ideas and values which operates outside the individual and which guides behavior. In this sense they share the view that structural factors dominate non-structural ones. To repeat a point made earlier, one consequence of the culturalist approach is that individuals or societies who find themselves in the same situations may behave in quite different ways because of the values and models of reality that their cultures supply to them.

It is necessary to once again stress here another point made earlier; all three of these models - rationalist, psychologicist and cultural - are ideal types in the Weberian sense. In the real world, all three types seem to coexist, though reasonable men may disagree as to their relative significance in different cases.

For the present inquiry, the prime argument is between the rationalist model and variants of the culturalist model. The psychologicist one has been left out because it has, at least to the author's knowledge, not been widely applied to explaining the problem which this study seeks to address, namely how to explain the formation of defense and security policies.


558. The other came from Hamburg, which was also close to the East German border and which in addition had been traditionally the most anglophile region in Germany.

559. One can make the case that Article 9 should be added as one of the crucial difference between the two nations. Yet, though usually viewed as having its origin in the rather unique idealism of MacArthur and Shidehara, in fact rather similar ideas emerged when the West Germans were contemplating the Basic Law in 1949. Nonetheless, in the West German case these ideas were greatly toned down because of the evident worsening of East-West relations at the time, a process which could not as clearly be foreseen in 1946. Moreover, more than Article 9 itself, what is interesting is the evident immutability of Japanese anti-militarism, which arguably owes more to the development of the ideological balance of forces in the domestic political system than to the events surrounding the birth of the Peace constitution.
560. A point which has been made the most eloquently by Hans Peter Schwarz Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergesessenheit (The Tamed Germans: From the Obsession with Power to the Neglect of Power) Stuttgart, Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag 1985.

561. In Japan as well there were many who could claim to be victims of the militarist regime, though admittedly the militarists did not massacre their internal opponents with quite the same zeal that the Nazis did. And while far more Nazis were killed or imprisoned, there was certainly no shortage of people with questionable pasts who could have played a more active role in politics.

Note also that this war guilt was in large measure a West German affair. East Germany rejected the notion that it bore any burden of guilt for the past by arguing that blame lay with the old capitalist-Nazi system, and as a socialist state it had freed itself of any moral obligation. Indeed, it allowed the SED regime to portray itself as one of the victims of the old regime, in this respect more resembling the Japanese than the West Germans in its stance on the guilt issue. One consequence of this is that East Germany refused to pay any compensation to the victims of the Holocaust.

562. French motives for actively pursuing integration have been quintessentially nationalistic, allowing them to neutralize their great traditional enemy, Germany. Arguably, even without the experience of military defeat some smaller European nations, such as Holland, have views of integration much closer to the Germans' than to those of the French or British. The views of other smaller European nations, most notably Switzerland and Sweden, (which did not have the experience of defeat in WWII) are not.

563. See for example The Far East Asian Economic Review, 1/31/91, 38-39. This is not to say that the Germans have been viewed with universal admiration and understanding in the rest of Europe for their forthright acknowledgement of guilt. Nor are most Europeans as convinced of the relative weakness of German nationalism as the Germans themselves tend to be. It has, however, served to greatly allay fears that West Germany might harbor any immediate ambitions for territorial expansion.


565. Though some German and Japanese theorists proposed that in fact what occurred was that the military industrial complex had in fact become mere subcontractors to the U.S. complex. That their new defense industries and defense establishments were a sort of security-related "comprador" class serving not so much their own, but rather the interests of a larger political-
military elite.

Endnotes - Chapter 8

566. For this section, in addition to interviews and newspaper accounts, use was made of Mommertz, op.cit., which has a long case study regarding the Three Arrows incident, and Nishioka Akira, op.cit.. Also former Air Force General Goda Yutaka has upon a number of occasions written upon the debilitating effects of the "Three Arrows incident" on the subsequent defense planning. See Goto "Mitsuyakenkyuu kara 24 nen" in Shinboeironshu April 1987.

567. The name mitsuya probably rame directly from its official title, Showa sanzuyuhatinendo togoboefuzujo kenkyu (which can be loosely translated as the "Showa 38 combined forces map plan"). The words "three" and "eight" together sound the same as "three arrows" in Japanese, and thus could be taken as an allusion to the old Japanese folk tale about a Samurai who, to demonstrate the virtue of unity to his three sons, had each of them first try to a single arrow and then had them try to break three arrows bundled together. The three arrows were meant to symbolize the three branches - air, land and sea - of the SDF, and the plan was intended to coordinate them successfully. Professor Ian Gow has pointed out there have been a number of alternative interpretations. The most provocative of these are that mitsuya can also be interpreted as referring to the three powers, U.S., Korea and Japan, implying a NATO-like alliance which was forbidden according to the government's interpretation of the right to collective defense under the constitution. Another possible reference is to the 38th parallel whose crossing by Communist forces is the premise upon which the plan is based. See also Mommertz, op.cit., p.172-173.

568. See Mainichi 1/10/1955 regarding the decision to begin combined services defense planning.


570. To this day it is not known who leaked these documents to Okada. There is a great deal of speculation, including the theory that it had been leaked by Sato's enemies within the LDP.

571. See Chuokoron, April, 1965, which contains the entire protocol of the Diet proceedings. For an excellent summary (in German), see also Mommertz, op.cit., especially p.156-174. For a further account of the initial uproar see Asahi 2/10/1965, evening edition.

572. See Asahi 3/11/1965
573. See Mammitzch, p. 190-192. While most American readers might find this reassuring, for the Japanese it seemed to substantiate the JSDF's charges that Japanese security interests were being subordinated to those of the U.S.

574. Without full access to the documents, it is impossible to judge whether they in fact went too far in undermining civilian authority or not. Albert Axelbank in his Black Star over Japan: Rising Forces of Militarism Tokyo, Tuttle 1973, p. 51, claims that the plan suggested using Tojo's "Basic Principles for the Empire's National Policy" as part of the plan's introductory remarks. If true, this would suggest at the very least a disturbing lack of sensitivity to the dangers of the military's pre-war policies on the part of the drafters of Three Arrows.

575. Responses in the press and media to the Three Arrows incident are summarized in Ishikuro Takeo "Mitsuya Kenkyu' to Shiberian Kontrororongi" in Rippo to Chosa, June, 1980 and Hirakawa Kuro "Mitsuya Kenkyuu to sono ato no shinso" in Ushio April, 1965.

576. See Yomiuri 2/12/1965

577. See Mammitzch, op.cit., p. 185-187. Under the existing system Defense Agency personnel were treated as civilians and tried under civilian law. The maximum penalty for divulging internal government information was a fine of 30,000 yen and imprisonment of up to 1 year. To date, however, no such law has been enacted, despite years of lobbying by the LDP, the JDA and media campaigns sponsored by right-wing groups.

578. See Asahi 2/16/1965 evening edition. Centrist commentators on the affair agreed that while such planning was necessary, it should no be kept secret. See Fukushima Gengo "Shiberian Controru va ika ni arubeki ka" Asahi Jyaanaru February, 1965.

579. The Self Defense Forces position was published a month earlier in "Iwayuru Mitsuyakenkyu' ni tsuite" in Seisaku Geppo, April 1965.

580. A rather unconvincing claim in light of the enormous care and effort that had evidently gone into drafting these plans. If had been intended purely as a hypothetical exercise, there would have been no need to have 84 of the top level members of the SDF and JDA devote the better part of a year to it.


582. The text can be found in Nishioka, op.cit., p. 264-279. See especially p. 266 on the need for a committee.
583. One knowledgeable source claims that in fact Tanaka had been widely viewed within the Agency to be slated for promotion to the chief of staff level, and that the fact that he had not been so was the equivalent to early retirement.

584. The LDP was concerned that the Left would use such a committee to paralyze all further defense initiatives and as a forum for attacking the conservatives. The JSP for its part was concerned that by joining such a committee that it would tacitly be acknowledging the constitutionality of the military and the Mst, and that they would be outmaneuvered and stone-walled as they had been on the Three Arrows investigatory committee. See the excellent collection of interviews with Genda Minoru, Ohira Masayoshi and Ishibashi Masashi in Yama Shigeyoshi "Shiberian Controru no hozon" in Chuokoron July, 1966.

585. In the wake of a scandal involving the export of rocket technology to Yugoslavia, Sato's government extended restrictions on the export of military technology to cover not only Communist countries and countries with sanction placed on them by the U.N., but also any country which may be involved in international disputes (including the U.S.) These came to be known as the three non-weapons' export principles (Bukiyushutsu sangenzoku) See Asahi 4/22/1967. The Self Defense Agency almost immediately added that countries which use those weapons purely for self defense were not affected Asahi 4/26/1967. This loophole, however, was later closed in 1976.

586. See John Welfield, op.cit., chapter 10 and by the same author, ,and John Endicott, ,on Japan's nuclear allergy. In 1966 Foreign Minister Shina announced the government's position that the Japan would not allow the U.S. to establish bases and introduce nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. He also added that Japan would not participate in multilateral strategic nuclear planning (as West Germany was to do with the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group in NATO). Asahi 2/16/1966 evening. In 1968 Prime Minister Sato made the three non-nuclear principles formally part of Japanese policy, stating in the Lower House that Japan would not develop, allow the introduction or the transport of nuclear weapons in Japan (kaihatsu shinai, mochikomasenai, hoyu shinai), Asahi 1/31/1968. It was voted into by the Lower House in 1971, Asahi 11/25/1971. For the background on that decision see the following section on the return of Okinawa. Note also that for the first time in 1968 Japan developed the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons, and the issue became more urgent.

587. For the defense debate in this period (1966-1972) the most useful secondary sources are Ohtake 1983, op.cit., Welfield, op.cit. , especially chapter 9, and Hirose Katsuya Kanryo to Ganjin: Funminosei no Genkai Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten 1989 and Nihon Kokusaiseiji Gakkai Ed. Okinawakenkankosho no Seijikatei Tokyo, Yuhikaku 1975. For insight on Prime Minister Sato's
thinking at this time, see also Senda Hisashi Sato Naikau Kaiso Tokyo, Chuoko Shinsho 1987.

588. Soon after the establishment of the Basic Principles of National Defense, the National Defense Council had agreed in May 1957 to organize a more independent defense posture (Jishuteki ni boeitaigei o seibi suru) based on the Mutual Security system with the U.S.. American officials of the time greeted the decision. See Mainichi 5/7/1957, evening. Thus the term Jishuboei should not be interpreted, as it has been by some commentators, as meaning the creation of dependant posture independent of the U.S.. In fact, historically as a goal it has been accompanied by efforts to increase defense cooperation with the U.S.. However, Japanese Centrists have feared that pursuance of this goal, especially by the Right, might lead to a broader militarization of Japanese society which might even undermine relations with the U.S..

589. Every Japanese Prime Minister since Yoshida had been working towards a reversion of Okinawa, but till Sato no one had succeeded in getting more a few relatively mild concessions out of the U.S. on this issue. See Hayashi, op.cit., p.11-121, 208-211. The basic problem was that the U.S. wished to continue to have unrestricted use of the bases to support U.S. policy in East Asia, while popular sentiment in Japan pressed for precisely the opposite. The Vietnam war further increased this gulf in U.S.-Japanese interests as Okinawa became a base for B-52s bombing North Vietnam. This increase in pressure is well reflected in the shift Japanese positions regarding the necessity of prior consultation under the MST between 1966 and 1968. See Asahi 2/19/1966 evening and 3/13/1968.

590. The importance of the anticipated struggle over the Treaty renewal cannot be overemphasized, and played a crucial role in coloring the political atmosphere of the late 60s. For a detailed account, see Ohtake 1983, chapter

591. For Sato's thinking of the time see Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.47. Sato was apparently also very impressed by a discussion he had with DeGaulle in 1962 about the shortcomings of detente and acceptance of the status quo and about the need for a new sort of nationalism that did not harm international relations. See Senda, op.cit., p.32-37. It seems probable, however, that DeGaulle's views were merely an affirmation of Sato's own inclinations rather than their inspiration. A not uncommon Japanese pattern.

592. See Asahi 11/16/1965 evening

593. Senda, op.cit., p.51-52 Sato apparently warned the U.S. of rising nationalism, both on the Left and on the Right. A warning the U.S. agreed apparently took to heart, see Henry A. Kissinger,


596. See Asahi 1/17/1968 and Welfield, op.cit., p. . It is interesting to note the rather Confucian quality of these 5 principals.

597. See Welfield, op.cit.,


599. See Welfield, op.cit., p. and Senda, op.cit., p.78-81 and See Mainichi 2/4/1969 evening. The goals of the dissident faction leaders were probably not swayed by these incidents. Their primary objective was to increase their share of political resources in the shape of cabinet and party posts. Rather, these incidents created a climate of public and elite opinion which these dissident leaders could exploit to bring greater pressure on Sato. Moreover, these incidents may have shaken Sato and his advisor's calculations of at least the political, if not also strategic-military, risks involved in pushing for a special status for the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa.

600. Asahi 11/22/1969, Welfield, op.cit.,, p. . Though Sato presented the agreement as a great victory for Japanese diplomacy, it is evident that the U.S. and Japan could not achieve full agreement on the nuclear issue and that in fact they had merely papered over their differences so that the reversion could go forward. See Senda, op.cit., p.88-89. See also Kissinger op.cit., p.332-335. In addition, full agreement was probably also not reached on the prior consultation issue. See Welfield, op.cit., p. .

What this agreement, as well as the internal LDP debate concerning Okinawa, also reflects was the continued Japanese reluctance to be drawn into any type of regional security structure. It is worth reminding ourselves in this context that it would be unthinkable for West Germany, or any other West European power (including Britain, whose geo-strategic position is closer to Japan's) to be so ambiguous in expressing it's
interest in its neighbors' security.

601. The faction leader and prominent pro-defense dietman Funada Naka proposed in 1969 his own initiative for a more independent defense posture, including increased domestic defense production, the lifting of restrictions of defense exports and the creation of a million man home guard. These proposals were picked up by then Director General of the SDF, Arita Kichi. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p. 32-33.


603. Sato needed to shore up right-wing support, see Asahi 1/15, 1/18/1970.

604. See interview with Nakasone in the Ekonomistu 8/18/1976

605. Already in March 1969 Nakasone was pushing the idea of Jishubosei, see Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.31. See also Asahi 1/1, 3/19 evening, 5/18/1970 and "Seijizadankai 'Kokubo' O Saikento suru" Kokubo October, 1970.

606. The White paper had been in preparation since 1966 - see Ohtake 1984, op.cit., p.33-34 and Ekonomistu 10/7/1969. Also Keidanren pushed the idea, see Nikkei 6/10/1969. Perhaps not coincidentally in the same year the Bundeswehr under Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt also produced the first West German defense White Paper in order to garner public support.

607. See Hirose, op.cit, p.138. See Kokubo, January 1971 for a sampling of foreign reactions. Axelrod's book, op.cit., was very much the product of this wave of anxiety. It should also be noted that at this time there was a wave of new concern over the nuclear issue, both because of the negotiations over Okinawa, and because of stubborn conservative Japanese opposition to the Non-proliferation treaty. This movement was being led in the LDP by Genda Minoru, the famed WW II fighter ace who was known for proudly recalled his role in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. See Welfield, op.cit., chapter 10 and John Endicott "The 1976-1976 Debate over the Ratification of the NPT in Japan", op.cit.

608. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.39-42

610. Contrary to Ohtake's general alarm about the buildup, see op.cit. 1983, p. 27. As Hirose, op.cit., p.132-136, points out, the defense budget has more or less consistently doubled with each new defense plan. Ohtake himself later admits that Nakasone's plans differed little from those of his predecessor, Arita, Othake 1983, op.cit., p.64, 69.

611. Naturally the opposition saw this as the first steps to the revival of Japanese Imperialism driven by a new industrial-military complex. See "Jishuboeiron o Dangai suru" in Gekkan Shakaito January, 1970.


613. See "Rikakuchukyuron to kokubo no Hoto" Kokubo January, 1971. A discussion between the editorialists of the three leading newspapers, Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri. See also Doba Hajime (top defense journalist for Yomiuri) "Nihon no 'Jishuboei' wa kano ka" in Chuokororon September, 1970. The most influential member of the internal bureaus in the SDF during this period was Kubo Takuya, who was to formulate the basis of the 1976 consensus on defense. See the next section in this chapter. On the philosophical differences between Kubo and Nakasone, see Hirose, op.cit., p.144-154. Hirose agrees here Chuma, op.cit., and disagrees with Ohtake 1983, op.cit., who prefers to see the internal bureau (or technocrats, as he calls them) working together with the right idealists, albeit for different reasons.

614. Note that Ohtake disagrees with Welfield on this point. Welfield, op.cit., p. , stresses the large scale of the demonstrations and the violent confrontations which broke out on Japanese campuses that year. Ohtake, 1983 op.cit., p. , however, is quite correct in pointing out that whatever the scale of the disturbances, it did not meet the expectations of its organizers and had nowhere near the political impact of the riots in 1960.


616. See Ohtake, p.36-37 and Nikkei 11/7/1970

617. Asahi 10/9/ 1972, evening


619. The best secondary literature accounts on this subject are to be found in Ohtake 1983, op.cit. chapter 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Hirose, op.cit. p.p.155-205, and Chuma Kiyofuku, op.cit., p.147-169 and Kamanishi Boeiryoku Seisaku no Kensho: GNP 18 Waku Tokyo,
Kakugawa Bunko 1986, p.147-178. In addition extensive use was made of literature and journal sources, in particular the writings of Kubo Takuya in Kokubo (a useful collection, Boei kankei Ronshu, was put out by the National Defence Research Institute) and the report by the Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai.


621. See Kubo "Nichibei Ampojyoyaku o Hinaosu" in Kokubo, June 1972, especially pages 113,-134,135-137, 142-144. In many ways the clearest and most comprehensive expression of strategic Centrist thinking.

622. Asahi 10/10/1972 and Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.89-96. Note that this was the first time in post-war Japanese political history that the government had been forced to modify its budget as the direct result of opposition political pressure.

623. Asahi 11/13/1972 evening Asahi 1/5/1973 Asahi 2/6 evening, 2/13/1973, Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.115-117. MOF was arguing that training and personnel expenses, which were already eating up an increasing share of the defense budget as a result of the post-oil shock surge in inflation, should be given first priority in order to help improve relations with the PRC and to avoid alarming Japan's neighbors.


625. Asahi 3/3/1975. The members of the commission were Aragaki Hideo (of the left-literary Asahi newspaper), Kakuda Noboko (female commentator and representative of the distaff side on the commission), Hirazawa Kazue (NHK), Gyuba Nobohiku (former Ambassador to the U.S. Kanemori Hisao (of the Nihon Keizai Kenkyujo economics research institute), Murano Kenya (NHK science expert), Ogata Kenji (NTT), Kono Yoshikatsu (former upper house member), Arai Isao (formerly of the Cabinet Legal Affairs Division), Saiki Kiichi (Nomura Research Institute) and Kosaka Masataka.

626. Sakata after stepping in as Director General was reportedly amazed by the relative absence of U.S.- Japanese arrangements for defense cooperation. See Ohtake, op.cit., p.

627. Asahi 6/21, 9/15, 10/30/1975, Kamanishi, op.cit., p.163

628. See the report, Heiwaji no Boeiryoku no Genkai, p.34-35. Also published as Boei o Kangaerukai Waqakuni no Boei o Kangaeru Tokyo Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975.
629. This differs significantly, however, from the type of explanations usually offered by right idealists for Japan's "Heiwa boke". Rightists would tend to stress the role played by the Occupation reforms and the corrupting influence of liberal values and the left.

630. See advisory group report, op.cit., p.41.

631. Interview with Ito Kobun. Needless to say, military men do not like seeing their public role being reduced to the level of paramedics. Interview with ex-SDF officer in Tokyo.


633. See for example Asahi 4/3, 4/24, 5/30, 6/4, 6/12, 6/13, 6/17, 6/19, 6/25, 7/15 evening, 8/30, and 10/22/1975. See also section 1 and in chapter 11. Note that to a remarkable degree 1975 set the stage for many subsequent events, including the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines in 1978 and the debate over the 1000 nautical mile sea lanes in the 1980s.

634. See Mainichi Shimbun Seijibu Ampo - Meiso suru Kakushin Tokyo, Kakugawa Bunko 1987, p.20-278. See also pages below.

635. Asahi 4/2, 5/3/1975

636. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.177-178 and Ito Keiichi article


638. Asahi 10/13 evening, 10/28, 11/5/1975 evening. See also Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.133-138. At the time planners within the JDA believed that it was understood within the government Taiko and 1% were only provisional measures and would be lifted in 10 years. As events were to prove, they were only at best half right. Interview with Ito Keiichi.

639. The DSP at the time is reported to have been seeking to enter into coalition with the left-wing of the LDP under Miki. See the section on opposition parties below.

640. Asahi 11/15/1976. See also Kaminichi, op.cit., who was a reporter for the Mainichi.


642. For defense industry views, see Nikkei 10/30 and 11/6/1976. Once passed, the defense industry decided to push for reduction in SDF personnel in order to be able to divert resources to the purchase of heavy weaponry and other types of equipment, Nikkei
12/9/1976. This must not have been a very popular initiative from the point of view of the SDF, and reveals a basic conflict of interest between the two groups. In addition, it underlines the purely self-interested nature of the defense industries actions (in contrast to the more political-strategic view of defense sporadically exhibited by the larger business community)


644. Hirose, op.cit., p.187-188

645. Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p. 143

646. For this section once again the two articles by Nishihira, op.cit., were of great use, as was the article by Watanabe Akio "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973", and the charts in the 1987 Boei Hando Bukku Tokyo, Asagumo Shimbunsha. Note that data for the early to mid-1960s is somewhat sparse, due not to a lack of technical capacity but rather to an apparent lack of interest in the topic, itself an interesting phenomenon.

647. See Watanabe, op.cit., table 11 on page 137.


649. Hirakawa, ibid., p. 28 and table 3, page 27 and table 30, p.32. See also the chart in the Boei Hando Bukku, op.cit., p.498, which shows support for the MST and the SDF going from 41% in 1969 and 1972 to 54% in 1975 and 61% in 1978. Note that it specifically says at "under present circumstances" (Genjodoori) which could be interpreted in a variety of ways and says nothing about the desirability of the system.

650. See Nishihira, op.cit., table 10, p.37.

651. See Boei Hando Bukku, op.cit., p.496. Note that this may in fact somewhat underestimate the growth in support, since till 1963 responses included "its OK to have the SDF" (atte mo yoi) and "it is best to have them" (atta ho ga yoi). In later surveys the first response, which expresses somewhat more lukewarm support than the second, was dropped.

652. See Umemoto, op.cit., table IV-7, using Gekkan Yoron Chosa. What is also interesting is that those questioned were first handed a table showing the size of the GSDF of Japan and of various other nations. Since Japan's military is much smaller than those of the countries indicated, support for the military should be expected to be higher than it normally would be when the question is stated in this manner.
653. Hirakawa, ibid., table 6, p.38. Asahi polls from the same years show an even lower level of confidence, but the question omits any reference to the Mutual Security Treaty, probably reflecting an increased, if marginal, increase in security on the part of the respondents when reminded of the Treaty.

654. See Watanabe, op.cit., charts 2 and 4, pages 125 and 126. The same period witnessed an enormous decrease in the number of Japanese respondents who expressed dislike towards the PRC, from a height of over 40% in 1968 to less than 10% in 1973.

655. See Watanabe, op.cit., chart 5 on p.134, using Tokyo data from 1962 to 1971. There was a far higher degree of interest in local issues such as traffic and prices than in defense.

656. During this same period there was also a remarkable rise in the Japanese public’s level of self confidence. Watanabe, op.cit., p.119-122.

657. See Umemoto, op.cit., Table IV-9 on page 87. See also Nishihara February 1981, op.cit..


660. See for example Terazawa Hitoshi et.al. "Shinamopoijyoyaku" Utagai wa Fukumaru bakari" in Chuokoron, June, 1960.

661. The key factor in this conversion was supposedly an incident in 1962, when Chuokoron published a short, fictional piece in which the protagonist dreams of killing the Imperial household. Thereafter the journal became the target of a campaign of right-wing harassment and intimidation, culminating in a break in at an editor’s home in which his maid was killed and his wife was severely wounded. Interview with Yasue Ryosuke of the Iwanami publishing company, and former assistant to the Tokyo’s first left-wing mayor, Minobe Ryokichi. This type of right-wing intimidation of the media had undoubtedly played a role in discouraging the publication of views offensive to the right wing, such as insults to the Emperor or raising the issue of war guilt. There is a similar sort of self-censorship with regard to other, non right-wing issues which touch upon the problems of minorities in Japan, such as the Burakumin and the resident Korean community. In any case, it is important not to overemphasize this kind of pressure’s impact on actual editorial policy, as some journals, such as the Asahi and Iwanami have withstood them for decades.
Kosaka's most important theoretical work of the period was his **Kokusaiseiji** Tokyo, Chuokoshinsa 1966 and Nagai Yosuke's **Heiwa no Daisho** Tokyo, Chuokoronsha 1967. Both speak fluent English and have had studied in the U.S. (Kosaka for 2 years at Harvard). Among others, they frequently cited the works of Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffman, Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, Morton Halperin and, of course, Hans Morgenthau.

A point also made by Welfield, op.cit., p.


See Kosaka 1966, op.cit., p.200-204


See Kosaka, **Saisho Yoshida Shigeru** Tokyo, Chuo Gyosho 1968, p.54-71.

See Senda, op.cit., chapter 3, especially p.123-129. The list of members of Sato's study group on international relations reads like a who's ho of prominent Centrist scholars, and included Kosaka, Nagai and later prominent proponent of Right-Idealist views, Eto Jun. ibid., p.125

Interviews with Yasue of Iwanami Shoten and Inoki Masamichi of the Research Institute for Peace Studies. Yasue views this process as part of the gradual corruption of the intellectual establishment by conservative political forces. What needs to be further researched is the extent to which these academics in fact concretely influenced policy and the thinking of ruling politicians and bureaucrats.

**Kakujidai no Kokusaiseiji**, Tokyo Iwananmi, 1968

**Kiki no Nishiki** Fukumura Shuppan 1969

"Chukoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzenhosho" in Chuokoron February 1966.


See for example Axelbank, op.cit., chapter 4.


See Welfield, op.cit.,
677. The best scholarly work on the opposition parties during this period, especially on the DSP and Komeito is Horie Fukashi and Iike Masaru Nihon no Seito to Gaiko Seisaku Tokyo, Keio Tsushin, 1980 and Stockwin, op.cit., Yoshihara Tsuneo and Nishi Osamu Nihon no Anzenhosho to Kakuto no Boeiseisaku, Tokyo, Kyokusha 1979 has a useful overview of the parties’ positions during the 1970s. Ohtake 1983, op.cit., has in addition to its many other merits an interesting chapter on Komeito and security policy.

678. See Kamanishi on the DSP negotiations with Miki, op.cit., p.216-223. The relationship between the opposition parties’ stance on defense and the chances of coalition have been noted by a number of others, including Kamanishi, ibid., and Umemoto, op.cit., p.175-180.

679. See Asahi 8/21/1975 and Yomiuri 12/2/1976. As we shall see, the same phenomenon could be observed in the late 1980s after the LDP was shaken by the Recruit scandal.

680. The DSP is bitterly opposed to the Communists for ideological reasons, while Komeito has a difficult relationship to the JCP because they are competing largely for the same strata of voters, the disaffected in Japanese society who for one reason or another have been left out in the material prosperity of the Japanese economic miracle.

681. The DSP had always been at least potentially Centrist in its views; it had split off from the JSP because of the Socialists stance on revision of the Mutual Security Treaty and the party’s founder, Nishio Suehiro, had long been close to the center-left mainstream in the LDP. During much of the 1960s, however, it had called for a gradual abolition of the SDF and the MST. In the early 1970s a number of factors, above all the hope of coalition, led the DSP to move more to the right and accept a modified version of the present system. One factor which may have contributed to this development was the influence of unions in defense-related industries and belonged to the Domei labor confederation, which is the source of the DSP’s main institutional and electoral support. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.98-99 and Nikkei 2/26/1972 and Asahi 2/12/1972.

682. Admittedly the JCP was weaker in the 1950s and early 1960s then it was in the later half of the 60s and early 70s, when it, together with Komeito, enjoyed considerable electoral success at the expense of the JSP, DSP and LDP. Thus at the point in time when a shift to the right might have seemed to make sense in order to breach the gulf between the JSP and the new middle-of-the-road parties, the countervailing attraction of the JCP was also increasing.
683. See for example the special issue of Gekkan Shakaito February, 1975.

684. See Yoshihara and Nishi, op.cit., p.20.

685. Kono, as Hatoyama’s successor, had been an advocate of closer ties to the Soviet Union (in part also spurred by his interest in negotiating better fishing rights for his constituents) and was also reported to have been greatly impressed with DeGaulle’s nationalistic break with the U.S.. In 1962 he advocated a unilateral easing of tensions with the Soviet Union and the PRC and a more active Japanese role in South East Asia. See Kono, "Nihon no Iwake, Soren no Iwake" Bungeishunju July 1962.

686. Funada Naka in 1964 called South Korea Japan’s "outer moat" Jiyu, Aug. 1964. See also Asahi 10/15/1965.

687. Asahi 5/14/1966


689. Nikkei 4/20/1967 evening

690. Nixon and Kissinger felt betrayed by Sato on trade issues and consequently deliberately kept him uninformed about U.S. foreign policy moves, including ones which were of great importance to Japan. Interview with Sato Seizaburo


692. Senda, op.cit., p.23-32

693. ibid., p.25-27

694. Ibid., p.30.

696. Hirose, op.cit., p.192-196 and interviews with Kaishara Osamu (who himself was something of an exception in this respect) and former air force major Kondo.


698. ibid., p.186


700. See for example Ishibishi Masaji, 1966, op.cit.

Endnotes - Chapter 9


703. Die Welt 1/25/1957

704. See Thomas Enders 1984, op.cit., especially p.93-98, for Strauss's understanding of nuclear weapons at the time.

705. See Kelleheer, op.cit., p.92-95

706. Cioc, op.cit., p. 31-32
707. See Schmidt's speech Verhandlungen 20th session, 3/22/1958, p.1041. Ironically, many years later Egon Bahr made use of very similar, emotion-packed rhetoric to attack Schmidt's decision to support the deployment of the neutron bomb and then Pershing II missiles on West German soil. What is not clear is the extent to which Erler and Schmidt at this point were ignorant of the new strategic arguments (as Thomas Enders, op.cit., 1984 argues) or whether they were merely towing the party line. On the balance, evidence seems to favor the former position, especially as Grabbe, op.cit., shows that until 1960 there was very little communication between the SPD and American strategic experts, but the later position still cannot be ruled out. It is quite possible that in 1958 Schmidt and Erler might have intuitively been aware that their's was an overly simplistic view of nuclear deterrence, but given their party's overwhelming opposition to nuclear weapons had not wanted to admit it even to themselves.

708. Verhandlungen Band 36, 1957 s.12077-12080 + 1284. The SPD proposal, had it been realized, would have in effect established a German equivalent to Japan's 3 Non-Nuclear principles.

709. Verhandlungen, ibid., p.12138, Grabbe, op.cit., p.203

710. See Konrad Repgen "Finis Germaniae: Untergang Deutschlands durch einen SPD-Wahlsieg 1957?" in Dieter Blumenwitz et.al. Konrad Adenauer und Seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit des Ersten Bundeskanzlers Stuttgart, DVA 1976. Right after the election he told the Party leadership "Only the fact that we stand together on the basis of our common Christian faith, gives us the strength to overcome economic and foreign policy crises. Only this foundation can give us the stamina needed to withstand the Eastern materialism, whose perils in my opinion is in no way sufficiently recognized ... In particular we must cultivate in our party, and in particular among our youth, the philosophical world view (Weltanschauliche) that carries us. I know that there are those who ask what questions of philosophy have to do with a political party. Perhaps a hundred years ago one could ask such a question. But in our era this is no longer a valid question. In light of the way in which the situation in Europe and the world has developed, our foremost task is to fight the battle against Eastern materialism with idealistic and ethical means." quoted in ibid., footnote 64. In many respects Adenauer and the CDU's thinking as reflected in this passage (which by no means is atypical for the party) resembles that of the Japanese conservatives.


712. See Peter Koch, Willi Brandt, op.cit., p.231-232

713. Struve, ibid., p.26-27
714. Carlo Schmid Erinnerungen p. 619-620

715. This resolution links the deployment of weapons systems with the lack of progress on arms control, thus presaging the dual-track approach of the Harmel report of 1968 and the decision to deploy the Pershing IIs in 1979.

716. See Rupp, op.cit., p.149.


718. Public opinion polls taken after the March debates showed that support for the SPD had pulled within a hair's breadth of that for the CDU/CSU. Rupp, op.cit., p.162

719. A further factor was the realization after the March debate that the Deutsch Partei, a small (17 seats), conservative party supported largely by refugees from the East, was in full agreement with Adenauer on the atomic weapons question and the SPD had no chance of winning it over to their side. Rupp, op.cit., p.153

720. Cioc uses the official English title of the movement "German Campaign against Nuclear Death". This lacks, however, the emotional impact of the original German, and the author has taken the liberty to use "Fight the Atomic Death" instead.

721. For another English translation see Cioc, op.cit., p.119. The German text can be found in Rupp, op.cit., p.283. The manifesto had been drafted already in February at a meeting in Bad Godesberg, reflecting the fact that even before the March debates the opposition was convinced it would have to resort to extra-parliamentary protests. The drafters included such figures as writers Heinrich Böll, Walter Dirks, Eugen Kogon, sociologist Alfred Weber, physicists Carl von Weizäcker and Werner Heisenberg, long-standing peace activists Martin Niemöller, Helmut Gollwitzer, Gustav Heinneman, DGB representative Georg Reuter, Josef Ungeheuer of the FDP and Oellenhauer and Walter Menzel of the SPD. See Rupp, op.cit., p.127-135

722. At the time the SPD, following the advice of Fritz Erler, had accepted the concept of nuclear deterrence, while Heinneman and other peace activists rejected it as immoral. They agreed, however, that nuclear weapons should not be stationed on German territory (the SPD arguing that the presence of NATO nuclear weapons outside of Germany sufficed for the purposes of deterrence without endangering reunification).

724. See the excerpt from the protocol of the Stuttgarter Parteitag, quoted in Butterwegge and Hoffschén, op.cit., p.304-305.


728. Grabbe, op.cit., p.245-249

729. Willi Brandt actually wished to go further and issue a solid condemnation of Marxism. Bark and Gress, op.cit., p. 445-446. The idea of a Volkspartei was not entirely Brandt's invention. Already in 1954 the youth wing of the SPD had been toying with a version of the idea. Koch, op.cit., p.232.

730. See Bark and Gress, op.cit., p.441-448, Drummond, op.cit.,

731. See Verhandlungen 6/30/1960, p.7052-7061. Prior to the speech, Wehner had been increasingly isolated within the party and had not been invited to a high-level party conference to discuss the coming elections. His speech can be interpreted as an effort on his part to seize the initiative and move closer to the rising star of Willi Brandt. Koch, op.cit., p.248-249.

732. See Grabbe, op.cit., chapter 7


734. Cioc, op.cit., p.175

735. In interviews with Hans Apel, former Social Democratic Defense Minister, and Bierman, SPD defense and security expert, both expressed the opinion that on a basic level the party had changed relatively little as a result of Bad Godesberg.

736. A detailed descriptions of the many complicated issues involved during this period are to be found in Kelleher, op.cit., especially chapters 5 through 10, and Haftendorn, op.cit., p.172-215.

737. It was reported in Die Welt 5/17/1959 that Eisenhower was considering the establishment of a neutralized buffer zone in Central Europe.

738. For Strauss even limited war was unacceptable. See Frankfurter Rundschau 4/11/1959. It was for this reason, paradoxically, that Strauss was so sanguine about the results of Carte Blanche. Even though the exercise showed that millions of German casualties would result, it also demonstrated the Soviet
Union had nothing to gain from an invasion. See Verhandlungen 7/16/1955, p.5605.

739. In late 1956 Strauss believed that sooner or later Germany would have to acquire atomic weapons. See FAZ 11/16/1956.

740. For contrasting views of this debate see Kelleher, op.cit., chapter 6, especially pages 159-160, 163-164, 168, and compare with Enders 1984, op.cit., p.102-110, 134-146. This controversy is one of the best researched areas in the literature on U.S.-German relations, and researchers continue to uncover new aspects of the dispute that sheds new light on the nature of U.S.-German military relations. See for example Pöttering, op.cit., p.210-220, Haftendorn, op.cit., p.180-190. It is impossible to determine who was "right" in this doctrinal controversy, since, as far as we know nuclear deterrence was never really tested. The empirical fact remains that judging by the author's interviews, views not dissimilar to Franz Josef Strauss's continue to be held by many conservative German military thinkers today. (Interviews with von Kleist, Enders). It is worth pointing out (as it has been to the author) that Helmut Schmidt, who in the 60s strongly supported the American position, himself developed doubts similar to Strauss's as his appreciation of the problems of nuclear deterrence increased.

741. See also Strauss's article "Glaubhafte Sicherheit durch Abschreckung" in Außenpolitik, August 1961


743. As Heinrich Krone, one of Adenauer's closest allies in the CDU put it, "everyone pushes for coexistence, coexistence on the basis of a divided Germany". Aufzeichnungen, p.136. In this sense, despite its almost extraordinary willingness to cooperate in most matters with its allies, West Germany was not a status quo power. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, having gained the most from the War, had strong interests inclining them towards maintaining the status quo.


746. Or more properly Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg.

747. See Bark and Gress, op.cit., p.484-486 for a description of this initial dispute.
748. Grabbe, op.cit., p. 314-321


754. The chief reasons for the U.S. change of heart was the victory of the anti-MLP Labour party in Britain and Congressional ambivalence about the project. See Grabbe, op.cit., p.463-467, and Kelleher, op.cit., p.247-254. The American turnaround was a shock for the reformers in the SPD as well, who had expended tremendous energy getting the Social Democrats to approve of the MLP at the Karlsruhe party congress in November. See Helmut Schmidt Menschen und Mächte, p.176. And indeed, in 1978 Schmidt was to be the victim of a similar U.S. reversal on the Neutron bomb.

755. Grabbe, op.cit., p.486-488

756. Here again the East German issue dominated the debate, with the German Gaullists opposing the treaty on the grounds that by giving up the option to acquire nuclear weapons it was surrendering important bargaining leverage which could be used in negotiations for reunification. They saw the Treaty as a blatant effort to achieve global superpower codominium and freeze the status quo.

757. Along with rearmament and the battle over the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in the early 80s, the 1972 revolution in the Federal Republic’s relations with the GDR is one of the most exhaustively researched areas in West German foreign policy. Some of the books which I found useful include Hanrieder, 1989, op.cit., Haftendorn, op.cit., William E. Griffith The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978, Walter Bahn’s very important article “West Germany’s Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr” Orbis Winter 1973, Wilhelm Bruns Analysen: Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen Opladen, Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH 1982, Peter Bender Die Ostpolitik Willy Brandts, oder Die Kunst des Selbstverständlichen, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, Rowohlt 1972. Also useful were the collections of documents in Boris Meissner Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970 Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1970 and Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon

758. In June, 1962 52% of those surveyed said they found the division of Germany "intolerable", while 28% said gradually getting used to it. Institut für Demoskopie (IfD) Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung 1958-1964, p.491. In 1967 the figures shifted to 31% and 54% respectively. IfD Jahrbuch 1965-1967 p.506.

759. IfD Jahrbuch 1968-1973, p.514, which showed over 85% of all those surveyed, regardless of party preference, found the schießbefehl unjustifiable.

760.

761. Arguably in the case of Korea the incentive to negotiate with the North is even greater than it was in Germany because the threat of invasion was much more real.

762. Banrieder refers to this process as the "Europeanization of the German question", 1989, op.cit., p.177.

763. In 1958 Adenauer secretly suggested that East Germany be neutralized along the lines of Austria, putting off immediate reunification for an improvement of conditions in the East. In 1959 he advanced the so-called "Globke Plan", which had been drafted by his aide, Hans Globke, which suggested holding in ten years time an U.N. supervised national referendum on reunification in the two halves of Germany. Griffith 1978, op.cit., p.85-87.

764. Adenauer's earlier initiatives indicate that Gaullist intransigence vis a vis the GDR was not as absolute as is sometimes believed. The fierce leadership struggles within the
CDU the right-wing Gaullists made use of the national issue to criticize the Atlanticists around Erhard and Schröder.

765. From the perspective of 1991, however, it now seems that Adenauer, like George Kennan in 1948, had been essentially correct, merely that the expected disintegration of the Soviet empire took 30 years longer than had been anticipated.

766. Willi Brandt wrote later in his memoirs that from that time on all illusions about the chances for reunification had been stripped away, that the East Germans had been allowed to kick the Federal Republic in the shins and the U.S. had merely frowned. Einsichten und Begegnungen, op.cit., p.17. At the same time he recognized, or at least later claimed to recognize, that there was little that could have been done, Errinnerungen op.cit.,p.55-64 also Koch 1989 op.cit., p.277-285. Such a perception of U.S. weakness, rather than indifference, may have served to further heighten his frustration.


768. Bahr's speech at Tützing is considered one of the most important documents in the development of Ostpolitik and is reproduced in most German collections of documents. See Schubert Vol. II, op.cit., p.550-553, Meisner, op.cit.,p.45-49.


774. The rationale for restoring diplomatic relations while not abandoning the Hallstein doctrine was that the nations of Eastern Europe (as opposed to third world nations) had no choice but to
recognize East Germany at the time of their post-war governments were formed and thus should not be discriminated against by West German foreign policy. This was known as the "birth-defect" theory.

775. Griffith 1978, op.cit., p.133-134, Peter Bender, Die Ostpolitik Willi Brandt's Reinbeck bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, p.34.

776. For the details of Heinemann's election, as well as the important symbolic significance of the president in West German politics, see Baring 1982, op.cit., p.51-71. See also Hildebrand, op.cit., p.398.


781. Walter S. Bahn "West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr" Orbis, Winter 1973. This article caused quite a stir at the time of its publication, and the CDU/CSU used it to attack the SPD government in the Bundestag. The SPD hastened to underline its loyalty to the alliance, but at the same time did not renounce Bahr's plan as an ultimate goal. See Enders 1987, op.cit., p.131. At the time of the reunification of Germany in 1989-1990, Bahr once again put forward not too dissimilar ideas at the 1990 annual Wehrkunde meeting in Munich.

782. See also Brandt's comments in Reden, op.cit., p.379-382

783. See Christian Hacke 1975, op.cit..

784. Griffith 1978, op.cit., p.216-217

785. See Baring, p. 583. Karl Wienand, one of the SPD leaders at the time, said he got 5 coalition members to defect, and Wehner admitted in 1980 that parliamentarians had been bought, ibid. p.422-423. After the fall of the GDR it was learned from former East German agents that the dreaded State Security Police, the Stasi, had been involved Der Spiegel. If true (and there is no reason to believe that it isn't) it represents another, rather incredible example of the degree to which the Soviet Union and its allies was at least occasionally capable of penetrating and manipulating the West German political system. It also raises the potentially rather embarrassing suspicion (not touched on in the Spiegel article) that Wienand and Wehner later admitted to the bribery in order to cover up the East German role.
A number of scholars have offered somewhat different typologies of the ideological constellation of the era. William E. Griffith identified three groups operating at this time: flexible Atlanticists, inflexible conservatives and flexible leftists. See Griffith 1978, op.cit., p.112-120. The distinguished German diplomat, Waldemar Bessen, offered a similar scheme in his now classic study of German foreign policy, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Munich, Piper 1970, p.329-333. I personally would be tempted to add a fourth group, inflexible leftists, who had gone at least temporarily into eclipse after Bad Godesberg when a combination of flexible leftists and flexible Atlanticists took over the SPD. Also Baring, 1982, op.cit..p.205-211, offers a tripartite scheme of Atlanticists, pragmatic all-German (gesamt-deutsch) patriots and Gaullist. Peter Bender in Zehn Gründe für die Anerkennung der DDR Frankfurt/M., Fischer 1968, adds a further refinement when he distinguishes between those in the German left with a more nationalist orientation (like Bahr) and others who were more cosmopolitan and anti-nationalist in their orientation, including many if not the majority of the members of the student movement and the leaders of the future Green party.

Originally I thought to follow Anne Marie le Gloannec’s scheme of categorizing the West German ideological scene along two axes, with one axis describing geographical orientation (Central Europe versus Western Europe versus Atlantic) and the other focusing on the priority given to reunification, with unification occupying one pole of the axis and two states (zweistaatlichkeit) occupying the other. Depicted schematically, such a typology would look something like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Two States

Upon further reflection, however, I decided that while this scheme has the virtue of encompassing all possible positions on these two central questions of German foreign policy (including the ones described in the schemes above), it exaggerates the strength of anti-nationalism in West Germany. Throughout the post-war support for reunification has enjoyed overwhelming political support. Only in the 1980s, with the emergence of the
Greens, did the anti-national position receive an independent institutional basis, and even they were unable to bring themselves to make opposition to reunification the official party position after the Berlin Wall went down in 1989, even though clearly much of the party was inclined to do so. Had the post-war division continued another decade or two, quite conceivably this particular position on reunification might have become a more significant factor. Nonetheless, for the period looked at here, as well as when considering the future course of West Germany, this group can be largely discounted as a significant factor.


790. See ibid., p.525

791. Meyer 1983, op.cit., 250, table 6.1.5.1


793. See EMNID-Institut Meinungsbild zur Weltpolitischen Lage Herbst, 1977 in Meyer 1983, op.cit., p.228. Allensbach surveys in the late 70s showed an even stronger perception of Soviet strength when the question left out the military angle and simply asked which side was stronger. In 1976 57% felt the Eastern Bloc, only 5% the West and 24% felt they were equal.

794. EMNID surveys, see Meyer 1983, op.cit., p.215, table 2.8.


796. Meyers 1983, op.cit., table 3.2.2.1


801. See IfD Jahrbuch 1958-1964, p.471. In 1960 opposition declined to 49%, but still only 23% supported outfitting the West German armed forces with atomic weapons. See also Meyers, op.cit., p.271, where he quotes DIVO surveys showing still in 1960 a two thirds majority opposing nuclear weapons.

802. See the Allensbach survey in Stern 1/24/1980.
803. The text and a description of the events leading to its formulation can be found in Rupp, op.cit., p.73-90 and, in English, Cioc, op.cit., p.75-80. For a detailed (but in some points disputed) account by one of the leading members of the group, see Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker Der Bedrohte Friede Munich, Carl Hanser 1981.

804. Karl Jaspers Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen Munich, Piper 1958, esp. p.268-277 and Helmut Thielicke, Die Atomwaffe als Frage an die Christliche Ethik Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr 1958. It should be added, as Cioc, op.cit., p.84-85, points out, that Thielicke was inclined to take a middle position between the stances of the Göttingen 17 and of the West German government,


807. The belief that West Germany, while it might have adopted the formal institutions of liberal democracy, was in fact not wholly democratic was also quite prevalent outside of West Germany. Perhaps the best known exponent of this view was Gabriel and Almond 1963, op.cit., p.312-313, 362-364. Like many West Germans, Almo. and Verba felt that the Germans had an overly passive, as opposed to participatory orientation towards the political system. Unlike the Germans, they also listed the cleavage between the political parties as an important negative trait.

808. See Burns and Van der Will, op.cit., p.91-94.

809. Karl Jaspers Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik, Munich, Piper 1966.

810. Other works making similar arguments included books by Hans Magnus Enzensberger and Ralf Dahrendorf.

811. It also spawned the most violent and long-lasting terrorist movement of any of the advanced industrial nations, though this in part may also be attributable to the large-scale support of the DDR, the full extent of which became known only after the old SBZ state fell apart. For an interesting cultural interpretations of the world-wide student movements and the subsequent emergence of the so-called "new social movements" see Ronald Inglehart The Silent Revolution, op.cit.. See also the various theorists who have worked on the notion of a new class, including Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Anthony Giddens and Irving Kristol. A highly interesting new interpretation of the new class is offered by Hausfried Kellner and Frank Reuber in , forthcoming. For an interesting interpretation of the peculiarly German character of the student and peace movements in
West Germany, stressing its historical roots in German romanticism, see Walter Laqueur West Germany Today 1985, op.cit., esp. p.87-89.

812. Obviously it would be beyond the scope of this study to even begin to review the works of these scholars, or other important contributors like Hans Apel and Niklas Luhmann. The most influential theoretical works by these scholars included Herbert Marcuse's The One-dimensional Man 1964, (first translated into German in 1968) and Eros and Civilization, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's The Dialectic of the Enlightenment (which actually was first published in Germany in 1947, but which enjoyed something of a revival in the 60s) and Jürgen Habermas's The Legitimation Crisis 1973.

813. For an interesting discussion, see Martin and Sylvia Griefenhagen 1979, op.cit., p.185-192.

814. In contrast, in Japan during the same period, the shift was to the right as conservative intellectuals were brought into the governmental process by the government of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku.

815. Senghaas 1969, op.cit., Galtung 1970, op.cit., See also Studiengruppe Militärpolitik Ein Anti-Weiβbuch: Materialen für eine alternative Militärpolitik Reinbeck bei Hamburg, Rohwolt 1974 which includes essays by many of the young scholars, such as Wilfried von Bredow, Peter Lock, Ulrich Albrecht and Peter Schlotter who diligently researched the Bundeswehr and defense from a critical perspective. Also an important source of critical new thinking about defense and security were the more policy-oriented works produced under the aegis of the Max Planck institute at Starnberg (which was under the direction of Weizäcker and Habermas). Horst Ahfeldt Durch Kriegverhütung zum Krieg?, Munich, Hanser 1972 and Verteidigung und Frieden Munich, Hanser 1976, Carl-Friedrich von Weizäcker Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung, Munich,Hanser 1971 and Wege in die Gefahr Munich, Hanser 1976, and Emil Spannocchi and Guy Brossolet Verteidigung ohne Schlächt Munich, Hansert 1976. For more on the background of the Starnberg institute, see Gress, op.cit., p.76-80.

816. See the highly informative articles by Christian Potyka "Die Vernachlässigte Öffentlichkeit: zur Diskussion militärpolitisch-strategischen Fragen in der Bundesrepublik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Presse" in Klaus Dieter Schwarz Sicherheitspolitik Osang Verlag 1977.

817. See Mende, op.cit., p. 324-325

818. See Der Spiegel 9/16/1968, p.27-28. For the first time the journal clearly accepted the necessity of extended deterrence offered by the U.S. and even suggested (in keeping with the arguments of Helmut Schmidt and the reformist wing in the SPD)
that present conventional force levels were inadequate.

819. In 1967, (Die Welt 11/11/1967) it even suggested that the Federal Republic should leave NATO if the allies signed the NPT. The regional Bayerische Kurier was perhaps the only newspaper even more clearly aligned with the Gaullists.

820. The daily press expanded from 201 papers with a yearly circulation of 14,948 million (sold) in 1958 to 121 papers and 25,278 sold in 1976. See the chart in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, op.cit., p.371.

821. See Jakobs and Müller, op.cit., p.51.

822. Ibid., p.112.


824. ibid. The Rheinischer Merkur posted a major increase in the early 80s as a result of its merger with the Christ und Welt, going up to 136,945 in 1981.

825. The term used by the students was enteignen, which was also the term used in East Germany for the confiscation of the former possessions of the great land owners after 1945. The campaign against Springer was sparked after it was learned that the would-be assassin of Rudi Dutschke was an avid reader of Bild and was believed to have been influenced by its conservative world view.

826. See the chart in Carola Bielfeldt "Rüstungspolitik und Rüstungskomplex in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" in Karl-Dieter Schwarz, op.cit., p.596. The high point as percentage of GDP was reached in 1963, 5.4%, and thereafter declined slowly till reaching 3.5% in 1975.

827. BMVg Weißbuch 1979, p.35-36.


^30. See Forschungskreis Wehr und Wirtschaft "Die Krise der deutschen Wehrpolitik" Wehr und Wirtschaft January 1967. See also the follow up article "Grundfragen der deutschen Wehrpolitik"
Wehr und Wirtschaft January and February 1969. The mastermind behind the articles is said to have been the former French Lieutenant Colonel and noted expert on defense and security affairs, Ferdinando Otto Milsche. See Enders 1987, op.cit., p.45. For more of Milsche’s views see his book Vom Kriegsbild Stuttgart, DVA, 1976.

831. An additional factor was the personal animosity between Adenauer and Thomas Dehler, who was convinced that the CDU wished to destroy the FDP under the banner of electoral reform.

832. See FDP Hamburg Aktion Program, in Peter Jüling Programatische Entwicklung der FDP 1946-1969, Einführung und Dokumentation Meisenheim, Bain 1977, p.163. Erich Mende, the leader of the national wing of the FDP, was for equipping the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons, but drew the line at German production of nuclear weapons. Cioc, op.cit., p.41.


835. Jüling, op.cit., p.207-208


837. Interview with Berthold Meyer, who was a member of the Borm commission. Meyer points out that one reason for the lack of cooperation between the two groups was the poor personal relationship between Borm and Mölleman.


841. After 1973 public opinion polls showed an increase in popular distrust of the Soviet Union.

842. Conradt, op.cit., p.100
843. Still in 1961 Strauss spoke of an Atlantic Union embracing the U.S., Canada and the nations of Western Europe, but after the Berlin Wall he changed his mind. See Strauss The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Reunification London 1965 - published the following year under the German title Entwurf für Europa by DV, Stuttgart. See also his comments on how, after Hitler, he held Roosevelt responsible for the decline of Europe. Bayerischer Kurier 1/21/1973.


845. First, France and Germany together, even if fully supported by all the other nations of Western Europe, simply did not have the military and economic wherewithal to counter the Soviet military threat. Second, the essential strategic dilemma faced by West Germany as a non-nuclear nation on the front line with the Soviet Union could be no better resolved by French extended deterrence than by American. If anything, the French guarantee would be considerably less reliable. Third, at times the French were as ready to consider detente with the Soviet Union as the U.S., merely they were determined to pursue it on their own, not American terms. Finally, the French vision of a united Europe differed considerably from the German, and moreover they were notoriously fickle in their support of transnational integration. See also Strauss, Entwurf, op.cit., p.123.

846. Infas No.589/340, 8/2/1965 - "Vertrauen zu den Verbündeten"


849. Schmidt, 1968, op.cit., p.117

850. Karl Wiemann "Mit einer neuen Politik die Entspannung fördern. Vorschläge für eine Zeitgemäße Sicherheitspolitik" in zwätts 12/7/1966. Wienand drew heavily on ideas from the newsworthy body of SPD defense experts - including the industrialist Ludwig Bölkw, who believed with the help of high-tech antitank weapons it would be possible to create a perfect conventional defense system), Bernhard Büssman (of the DGAP) and Helmut Roth - an active officer in the Bundeswehr. Enders 1989, op.cit., 32-35. These ideas can be traced back to the controversial Bonin plan of the 1950s, and even earlier to SPD proposals for alternatives to a mass-army from before the turn of the century. For details on how Schmidt responded to Wienand's criticisms see
Enders, op.cit., p.57-62.

851. FAZ 8/16/1967 and Enders 1987, op.cit., p.63-64


854. Haftendorn, op.cit., p.734


856. See the brief discussion of this phenomenon in analytical Overview 2


858. See Meyer 1987, op.cit.

859. These perceptions were fueled in good measure by the internal American political debate, which was near apocalyptic in its prognosis of the U.S.'s future. The parallels with the current situation are obvious. For an interesting comparison of visions of America's decline, see Samuel Huntington, Foreign Affairs.

860. See chapter 9, pages 32-33 and chapter 10, page 59.

861. For Japan, see chapter 5, p.37-38. In interviews with Centrist LDP politicians, it is interesting the extent to which still today they will speak approvingly, even reverently of Yoshida's foreign policy insight and its continued applicability today. On Germany, see Noelle-Neuman, 1982, op.cit. for fascinating public opinion data on Adenauer's changing image among the West German populace. See also the adulatory tone adopted by Rainer Barzel in writing about Adenauer in Barzel 1969, op.cit., p.276-281, even though in the book Barzel's reflections on the Atlantic alliance differed fundamentally from those of Adenauer in his later years, a fact which Barzel of course knew. See ibid., pages 113 (community of values), 126 (praise for McNamara), 129-131, 138-140, 172-180, 184 (support for the alliance with the U.S. and detente). While the German capacity for altering the historical record seems more limited than Japan's, nonetheless there is a tendency among more centrist and conservative scholars to play down the Gaullist aspect of Adenauer's thinking. See R.P. Schwarz Ärzte, op.cit.

862. Unfortunately there has not been space to discuss these fascinating battles. For Japan see Endicot, op.cit., and Welfield, op.cit.. For West Germany, see Haftendorn, op.cit.,
p.632-694, and Hildebrandt, op.cit. There were important differences between the motives of the West German Gaullists and those of their Japanese counterparts. The Japanese Gaullists like Genda Minoru were probably primarily motivated by a desire to leave open the option of later Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. In West Germany, while some may have harbored such notions, the concerns were probably more subtle, with fears that this represented the first step to a new U.S.-Soviet division of the world, a new Potsdam, which would have sealed the partition of the German nation. A further, related argument which appeared to carry great weight was the argument that by leaving the option of nuclear weapons acquisition open West Germany could gain diplomatic leverage to negotiate with the Soviet Union for German reunification. In both countries the Gaullists eventually lost out in their struggle to prevent ratification, but only after a long struggle lasting till 1968 in Germany and 1976 in Japan.

863. The term "structure" has had a large variety of meanings attached to it in the social sciences. Here it refers to those forces which are not directly related to cultural ones, i.e. economic conditions, levels of military threat, etc. Note that at least in principle also these may be indirectly the product of, or influenced by cultural forces.


865. There is a shortage of serious comparative research on this important issue of the social and institutional bases which can sustain radicalism. The foregoing analysis owes a great deal to discussions the author had with Professor Munakata of Sophia University and Professor Akuto of Tokyo University, as well as Professors Hansfried Kellner of Frankfurt and Frank Heuberger of Boston University.

866. The subject of new social movements, and even more so in the Green party which is their main political expression, has in recent years attracted a great deal of interest among scholars studying Western European politics. See for example Inglehart, 1977 and 1990, op.cit., Burns, op.cit.

867. See Schröder, op.cit., who argues that Adenauer was in fact not a true Gaullist. The term Gaullist is only used here because it happens to be the term which was used in the countries themselves to describe these two groups. Note that the issue of the definition of identity is a crucial one, as is discussed below.

869. Ironically one of the most controversial measures designed to counter internal subversion, the "extremist directive" (Radikalenerlass) was enacted by the Brandt government in response to rising concerns about terrorism. It blocked all those who did not swear to support the free and democratic order as established under the Basic Law from entering public employment.

870. This was said to have been an especially important factor in Wehner's and Erler's thinking.

871. Perhaps the most important limitation in both countries was to forgo acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but this was as much a product of outside pressures as of domestic political resistance.

872. Professor Kosaka Masataka, in an April 24, 1991 talk at the U.S.-Japan program at Harvard, pointed out that this disagreement on territory has been the main obstacle to improved Soviet-Japanese relations. He made the interesting argument that in the modern era, while territory is less crucial to state power than it was in the past, it is more fiercely coveted because of popular national passions. Of course, while generally true, this argument rings strangely in the ears of most Germans, who after all were willing to compromise (admittedly only after a considerable time had elapsed, and with great difficulty) on an enormous chunk of territory (approximately 20% of the pre-war total) in order to achieve better relations with their neighbors in the East. This merely underlines some of the perhaps unique features of the West German case.

873. The definition of identity is the most central element of all historical-political cultures, and battles over that identity tend to be fought in cultural terms. West Germany is a particularly interesting case to study from this perspective because of the different possible identities (Atlantic, Western European, Central European) that it can choose from. The political battles being examined here, including the Atlanticist versus Gaullist struggle in the CDU/CSU, and the controversy over Ostpolitik, were both fought in good part in cultural-symbolic terms.

Endnotes - Chapter 10

useful are Asonuma Hirosato and Somura Yasunobu Umi no Seimeisen Tokyo, Hara Shobo 1983, NHK Shuzaihan Umi no Shirein Boeisen Tokyo, Nihonhosho Shuppan Ryokai 1983.

875. See Chapter 9, section 2.

876. In 1975 the Socialist member of the Diet, Ueda Tetsu, confronted Sakata in the Upper House Budget Committee, demanding to know if the U.S. and Japan had a secret agreement concerning defense in the waters surrounding Japan. Sakata denied that such an agreement existed, but indicated that in the future he would like to see such an agreement in order to prevent the military from secretly making plans without civilian supervision. See Hirose, op.cit., p.187-188, Asahi 4/3/1975. Miki later confirmed Sakata's remarks. Asahi 5/30/1975. See also Miyazawa's comments on the weakness of the prior consultation clause in Asahi 4/24/1975.

877. This is the point of view of such astute observers of Japanese defense policy such as Ohtake and Chuma, both of whom recognize that Sakata and Kubo are not true right wingers, but believe that inadvertently they have helped trigger a process of remilitarizing of Japanese foreign policy and, what is ultimately of equal concern, of Japanese society as well. Most journalistic commentators tend to share their perspective. See for example Masuda Koji "Shindankai in haittta Nichibei Kankei: 'Keizai' to Anpo' de Semeigai" in Ekonomisuto 11/20/1980, Yasuhara Kazuo "Kishimihajimet Sengo Boei no Wakugumi: Shudanjieiken, Hikaku 2.5 Genzoku e no Kennen" Ekonomisuto 7/10/1980.

878. Asahi 1/20, 5/31/1973

879. Chuma 1985, op.cit., p.81

880. Kanemaru Shin Waga taikenteki Boeiron, Tokyo p.55 and 170-172. It is worth noting that West Germany as well was concerned about the strength of the U.S. commitment, despite having the kind of ties whose absence in the Japanese case was of such concern to Kanemaru Shin and others.


883. The broad range of what the Guidelines would cover had been already decided in 1976, see Nikkei 12/7/1976.
884. A point which was reconfirmed by the JDA almost immediately after the publication of the Guidelines, *Yomiuri* 11/20/1978.

885. *Asahi* 1/9, 1/18, 1/19/1978. Like West Germans had with access to NATO and nuclear planning in the RPG before them, the Japanese had now discovered the virtues of military-level consultation as a means of exercising control over allied policy and the movement of foreign troops.

886. A point which is frequently made by Japanese observers of the armed forces. Interview with Professor Hata.


888. In 1979 Soviet forces were reported to have reached division strength in the Northern Territories *Nikkei* 11/26/1979.


891. Hirose, op.cit.,p.226. See also the materials presented on 12/11/1979 by the JDA to the Lower House Budget Committee on MDSF participation in RIMPAC, reproduced in the *Boei Handobukku* 1987, op.cit., p.413-415, especially section 3.

892. *Mainichi* 6/11/1981. It should be cautioned, however, that one should not necessarily view these meetings as a conspiratorial gathering of U.S. and Japanese hawks, as some observers are prone to do. Rather, the meetings are said to resemble more closely a negotiating session than a strategy meeting or seminar, with the Japanese participants often resisting U.S. demands. Moreover that some degree of coordination between U.S. and Japanese demands is both necessary and useful to avoid needless conflict between the two countries (interview with foreign ministry personnel in Tokyo).

893. *Asahi* 7/29, 8/4, 8/5/79. The JDA had compiled internally its 5 year plan shortly before the Hawaii meeting, see *Asahi* 7/19/1979, which would have achieved all the procurement goals set by Taiko by 1984.

894. See this chapter, section 4, the bureaucracy for more on "Comprehensive Security".

896. *NYT* 1/15/1980


898. Note that this can be seen as part of a larger pattern in the Japanese political system. Kent Calder has argued that whereas domestic political crises had been the driving force behind change and adaption in Japan into the 1970s, thereafter the domestic sources of crises began to dry up as a result of increased affluence and growing general inertia. Japanese political actors then began to turn to the outside world for the stimulus needed to overcome obstacles to change. In this sense _gaiatsu_, which is so often portrayed as a negative influence by Japanese commentators, actually serves a salutary purpose in helping bring about changes which in the long run are in the interest of the Japanese nation as a whole, as in for example the areas of financial liberalization and privatization. In short, Japan had begun to substitute external for internal crises to maintain its dynamic evolution. See Kent Calder _Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan_ Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press 1988, especially pages 122-125. In this sense one could even argue that defense provides both the earliest and clearest example of this process, since it began in the late 1970s and until then the pro-defense lobby had been a relatively weak force in society. One might also add that, while largely unknown in the U.S. till recently, it is a far from uncommon pattern in other countries. Indeed, in the defense field it is especially true with regard to West Germany which often uses the alliance as a cloak within which to make strategically necessary but domestically unpopular decisions.


901. Of course, Japan would be capable of performing this mission were it willing to make the necessary commitment of economic resources, but according to one estimate this would require doubling the Japanese defense budget to somewhere between 1.5 and 2.0% of Japan’s GNP. See NHK _Shuzaihan_, op.cit., p. 269-286.

902. See Chuma, op.cit., p.122-1.23

903. See Chuma 1985, op.cit., p.122-123. Interviews in Tokyo indicate that whether the mistake was deliberate or not, at the very least many in the Ministry were not unhappy to see Suzuki make a fool of himself.
904. See *Washington Post* 1/19/1983. Because of the negative response in Japan, Nakasone was forced to moderate some of these statements the following day, though his efforts to deny them completely failed when the *Washington Post* revealed that the conversation had been recorded. Yoshimura, op.cit., p.10-11.

905. See Chuma 1985, op.cit., p.141-146. Nonetheless, many observers felt that Japan’s commitment to defending U.S. forces around Japan could inevitably drag Japan into a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, a fear heightened by the deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of carrying nuclear as well as conventional warheads, aboard U.S. carriers in the Pacific. See Yasuhara Kazuo, op.cit..

906. See pages 49-51 for more on these developments.

907. See for example *Asahi* , 8/29/1987, 1/4/1988. Note also that it was Japanese monitoring bases that intercepted the radio transmissions of the Soviet interceptors that shot down the KAL 007 in 1987. The procurement of AWACs and the Aegis destroyers were important steps in giving Japan the capability to take over intelligence functions in the Far East. It also not incidentally improved Japan’s capacity for independent evaluation of Soviet and Chinese military abilities and thus increased their capacity to pursue a more independent security policy if it so desires. Interviews with MOFA and ex-JDA officials. See also Okazaki Hisahiko *Joho-Sen'yakuron no Nooto* Tokyo, PHP Kenkyujo 1984, especially chapter 1 on the importance of developing better intelligence abilities. Okazaki, it should be added, was the first head of the intelligence and research division of the Foreign Ministry.

It might also be added that the purchase of the Aegis at one billion dollars apiece was also seen in many quarters as a means of improving the trade imbalance with the U.S..

908. Interviews with Nishihara and Sato.

909. Interview with former Air Force general Goda.

910. See chapter 9, section 1.


913. Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.233

914. In the beginning of July the JSP appeared to be moving towards a recognition that its advocacy of unarmed neutrality was unrealistic *Nikkei* 7/6/1978.
915. Already at the time of his appointment as Chief of Staff in 1977 Kurisu created a stir by demanding that the occupant of his post have the right to report directly to the Prime Minister. See Mammitzsch, op.cit., p.201-202. This of course provoked memories of the pre-war situation where one of the principle sources of the military's political influence was its right to report directly to the Emperor. A second controversy involving Kurisu and which is not discussed in the following is Kurisu's revelation during a television interview in June 1978 of major Soviet maneuvers on the northern island of Etorofu (one of the four Northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union claimed by Japan), directly contradicting JDA testimony on the subject. This led to accusations that military men were trying to directly influence public opinion. Also JDA non-uniformed bureaucrats were made unhappy by this erosion of their monopoly on public relations. See Mammitzsch, op.cit., p.202-205.


917. Kanemaru, op. cit., p.139-141.

918. Asahi 7/27/1978, also see Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.186-187 and Mammitzsch, op.cit., p.208-210. In addition, Kanemaru must have been upset by Kurisu's making these comments at a politically very sensitive time, just as U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation was intensifying, efforts to push through the Emergency laws were coming into the open and the issue of increased Japanese financial support for U.S. bases in Japan had be pushed through the Fall Diet in time for Defense Secretary Brown's visit in November. Any one of these critical initiatives could have been effectively blocked by the opposition if it chose to treat Kurisu's comments as a political casus belli. See Mammitzsch, op.cit., p.222. For more on the payments issue see Nikkei 6/9/1978 evening, Asahi 6/10, 6/13 evening, 6/21 evening, 8/12 and 11/13/1978. Tahara Soichiro claims that Kurisu's comments were actually orchestrated by Kanemaru and other conservatives in order to stimulate the defense debate, pointing to the generous treatment that Kurisu was accorded by the government when he resigned. See Nihon no Kanryo Tokyo, Bunshunbunko 1984. This seems rather unlikely in light of the open disagreements which broke out within the LDP on this matter, as well as the fact that Kurisu's comments clearly more harmed than helped the passage of the Emergency laws and potentially could have upset other important defense goals being pursued at the time. In any case, any gratitude that may have been felt was purely limited, and later the LDP refused to support Kurisu in his candidacy for a seat in the Upper house. On the other hand, there is little doubt that Kurisu enjoyed the support of many other military men, as was reflected by the comments of General Takeda a few years later.
919. Yomiuri 7/26 (Tamaki) and 7/28/1978 (Nakasone) and Nikkei 7/28/1978 evening (Nakagawa)

920. Yomiuri 7/26/1978

921. See for example Asahi 7/25/1978 evening.

922. See the Yomiuri 7/26/1978. The summary of all the political parties views in Mammitzach, op.cit., p.213-218 is very useful. It should be pointed out that the DSP’s position was hardly that of the far right.. Also such Centrists as Inoki Masamichi, "Bunmintosei o Kangaeru" Bungeishunju September 1978, made the same point.

923. Asahi and Mainichi 7/26/1978. Kanemaru is said to have groaned out loud when asked questions on this point.

924. Even Nakasone was forced to concede this point. See Yomiuri 7/28/1978. Nonetheless Nakasone was sharply critical of the way in which his arch-rival Fukuda had handled the dismissal: “as the leader of 200,000 SDF personnel he (Kurisu) should have been handled as a Samurai and given a way to commit honorable seppuku (suicide, but here meant in the sense of resignation). Such treatment would have avoided harming the morale of the troops.”

925. Asahi 7/28/1978

926. See Asahi 7/29 and 7/30/1978

927. Asahi 8/5/1978

928. Asahi 8/22/1978

928. Asahi 8/17, 8/22/1978

930. Fukuda’s interest in these right-wing ideological issues clearly place him into the category of a right-idealist, as does his position in the party as heir to Kishi Nobusuke. At the same time, in the early 70s he became quite dovish on foreign policy issues, becoming a leading advocate of foreign aid and an opponent of increased defense spending. His background as a former MOF bureaucrat undoubtedly helped shape his views on this matter. In 1980 Fukuda even continued to advocate that Japan make an economic rather than military contribution to world affairs in 1980, after the Afghanistan invasion. See his “Waqa Shussho Jidai” in Chuokoron October, 1980, p.292. It is also worth noting that Fukuda was in competition with Nakasone for the right wing of the LDP at this time, and the ultra-conservative Seirankai was one of his chief supporters. He thus had intra-party motives to peddle to the right at this time.
931. This is Ohtake’s main argument with regard to the Emergency laws. See Ohtake, 1983, op.cit. chapter 18.

932. See Ishigawa Masanobu “Sensenshiko to Sengokaiki ni” in Asahi Jyanaaru, 9/22/1978

933. Asahi, 9/2/1978

934. Asahi, 8/31, 9/7/1978, especially young CGP party members were said to have opposed the party’s earlier support of the Emergency law regulations.

935. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.237-238

936. Asahi, 9/13/1978. See also Ohira’s comments in Nikkei 10/16/1978

937. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., p.236

938. Asahi, 9/16/1978

939. Se Ohtake, op.cit., p.239


941. Interviews

942. The only secondary source on this subject is Kamanishi Akio’s highly informative GNP 1% Waku Boeiseisaku no Kensho Kakugawa Bunko 1986. Other useful sources include Akasaka Taro “1% waku de Tsumazuita Nakasone Shuho” in Bungeishunju November, 1985, Shioda Ushio “Kane to Boei” Chuokoron May, 1986, “1% waku Kekkai no 500 hi” in Chuokoron April 1987, Ito Keiichi “1% Waku no Rekishiso Mondaiten” in Seiron March 1987, and Takeuchi Yasuo “GNP 1% waku rongi o warau” Bungeishunju January 1986.

943. Genda Minoru was perhaps even more outspoken and willing to publicly take hard-line positions, but was considerably less powerful than Nakasone. Kishi, on the other hand, was still very powerful, but was discredited and less in the public eye than Nakasone.

944. “Nakasone Shusho — Hatsugen no Kiseki” Sekai October 1985, p.100


947. Yoshimura, op.cit., p.13, citing Asahi polls. Mainichi polls for the same time showed the drop to be from 39%/31% to 34%/35% and Yomiuri from 40%/37% to 34%/45%.


949. See chapter 9, section 3


951. Already in the JDA had worked hard to decouple Taiko and the 1% barrier, and afterwards tried to define the barrier as only being "approximately 1%" (1% teido) as opposed to an absolute limit to be strictly adhered to. Nikkei 8/23/1977, Asahi 10/16/1977.

952. Takeoka, op.cit., p.143 - citing interview with Nakasone ally Yamazaki Taku.

953. Judgement had finally been passed on Tanaka in connection with the Lockheed scandal and he had been sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined 500 million yen. Tanaka wanted elections called so that he could be reelected and thus defiantly proclaim that he had been vindicated by the people.

954. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.24-25

955. Yoshimura, op.cit., p.13

956. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.21-22

957. LA Times 8/1/1985

958. Nakasone also had a perfectly legitimate geo-political rationale for breaking the 1% barrier, as described in detail by Sat\' Seizaburo, one of Nakasone's chief intellectual advisors. See Sato, "Naze, soshite dono yo na Gunjiryoku ka" in Chuokoron December, 1985. Sato's argument is based on an analysis of the international system which sees the world as being dominated by two blocs, the liberal, capitalist, economically interdependent West, including the NICs, and an authoritarian East. In the West there are conflicts, but they are non-military ones, and there is a movement from U.S. hegemony to a form of multilateral leadership. The Eastern bloc, in contrast, is dominated by power politics, and it is inferior in every way to the West except militarily. Sato goes on to argue that the U.S. needs Japan's help to counter the East. To do this Japan must take on more of a defense burden, including replacing 1% with approximately 1.5%, a reevaluation of Taiko (he warns U.S. could only send a limited number of forces to
Japan in a crisis, and hence Japan needs full conventional defense capacity) and acceptance of collective defense. Sato also advocates the acquisition of spy satellites and OTH radar and establishing joint weapons development projects with the U.S. While a quite convincing and sophisticated articulation of Nakasone's thinking on international politics, it largely overlooks the domestic political angle which seems to have been of far greater emotional importance to the participants, including Nakasone, and which in large measure determined both the timing and the way in which the barrier was ultimately broken.

959. See Asahi 8/7/1986 evening

960. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.52-54

961. Akasaka, op.cit.. Nikaido had been placed in charge of negotiating with Komeito by Nakasone to see if the party was ready to accept breaking 1% and, if necessary, enter into coalition with the LDP, while Tanaka Rokusuke was in charge of negotiating with the DSP.

962. Kanemaru is said to have always been leery of Nakasone. At the same time Kanemaru had a few years earlier founded a strategic studies institute, Nihon Senryaku Kenkyu Sentaa, staffed mostly by ex-SDP officers and which book put out in 1983 advocating increasing defense spending to 3.5% of GNP. Kanemaru's thus in principle at least should have had no objection to removing the 1% limit.

963. Kamanishi, op.cit.,p.62-63

964. See Akasaka Taro, op.cit..

965. Akasaka Taro, op.cit.. Akasaka (note that this is an obvious pen name) believes that the NLC's actions were probably coordinated by Kanemaru.

966. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.66-68. A longer version was published as "Rekishi no Kyojin ni Manabu Heiwadaikoku e no Michi" in the Asahi Jyaanaru 10/4/1985, with a forward by Chuma Kiyofuku.

967. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.73


969. Akasaka Taro, op.cit..

970. Asahi and Mainichi 10/18/1985

971. Kamanishi, op.cit., p.85-92


975. Interviews with Kumagai Akira and Ito Kobun of the Defense Research Institute.

976. Interview with Ito Keiichi

977. Asahi 11/6/1988

978. See Asahi 6/27/1988. A joint poll conducted by Yomiuri and the Gallup organization in November 1981 showed even more dramatic results when the question did not focus specifically on defense spending. Whereas in 1978 in the U.S. 1978 43.2% felt enough was being done for defense in the U.S., this figure had declined to 29.67% by the end of 1981, while the percentage of those who felt not enough was being done on defense increased from 19.0% to 28.4%. In Japan during the same period the percentage of those who felt enough was being done decreased from 56.9% to 32.9%, while the number of those who felt more was needed increased from 27.1% to a near majority of 49.1%. Yomiuri 11/14/1981.

979. Umemoto, op.cit., p.89

980. Yomiuri 11/14/1981

981. Asahi 11/6/1988

982. Boei Handobukku 1987, op.cit., p.496-497


984. Asahi 11/6/1988


988. Asahi 6/18/1984

989. See Japan Times 9/1/1987, p.3.


992. See introduction


994. *Yomiuri* data cited by Umemoto, op.cit.,


998. See for example *Shukan Bunshun* 8/4/1988, *Shukan Yomiuri* 8/14/1988 and *Sansei Mainichi* 8/14/1988. There were also some efforts to defend the SDF on the part of large conservative journals, such as *Bungeishunju* October, 1988, (which stressed inaccuracies in the media coverage of the event) and *Shokun* October, 1988 (which pointed out that part of the blame for the poor rescue attempts can be attributed to the historically poor relations between the MSDF and the Maritime Safety Agency). See also Inoki Masamichi’s interview in *Shukan Yomiuri*, op.cit., where he argues that the lack of Emergency Laws was one of the most important and fundamental problems revealed by this incident.

999. Two excellent English-language surveys covering the recent debate from the mid-70s to the mid-80s are Mochizuki 1983/1984, op.cit., and Umemoto 1985, o.cit..

1000. A point made by both Mochizuki and Umemoto, ibid.

1001. See the chart in Umemoto, op.cit., p.113

1002. Typical of this sort of book is Basegawa Kentaro *Nihon no Kokuboryoku* Tokyo, Non book, first printing 1980, 24th in 1985. It is part of the Non series for White Collar workers. Basegawa emphasized the tremendous economic vitality of Japan, and boasted of the high morale and educational level of the SDF (p.115-141) and the superiority of Japanese technological skills (p.143-148). In comparison the two superpowers are depicted as decrepit giants fettered to failing economies (p.22-26). Yet at the end of this sometimes rat or exaggerated display of chest beating, the basic conclusion is that Japan had best adhere to a low-level military establishment while devoting itself to economic progress and making economic contributions to world peace and development (149-152, 204-232). Another example of similar reasoning can be found in Tahara Soichiro 1988, op.cit., p.80-87.
1003. In 1978 public opinion polls showed that 40% expressed interest in SDP and defense issues (12% very interested, 36% somewhat) while 50% did not (39% said not very interested, 11% completely uninterested). By 1984, when the defense debate was at or near its height, the position shifted only slightly with 50% expressing interest (13% and 37%) and 48% uninterested (37% and 11%). Roei Randobukku 1978 op.cit., p.482.

1004. This is supported by the views expressed by various participants in such debates - interviews with Inoki Masamichi and Sato Seizaburo.

1005. As pointed out by Umemoto, op.cit., p.129.


1007. For an interesting attempt to analyze Shimizu’s intellectual odyssey, see Fukuda Tsuneari “Kindai Nihon Chishkijin no Tenkei Shimizu Ikutaro o Ronzu” in Chuokoron October, 1980.

1008. See pages 12-23, 53-59, 90-94.

1009. p.9-11, 27-30,32.


1011. Professor at the Tokyo Institute of Technology (TIT). For a recent expression of Eto’s rather extreme views see the discussion of his book, Nichibei Senso Owatte Inai below. In the final chapter of his book Eto argues for the preservation of Japanese values, the increase of the Japanese population (not only in Japan, but world wide) and the establishment of true independence from the U.S. Despite these extreme views (in West Germany such views are confined to the lunatic fringe) Eto is not only a frequent contributor to Japanese journals such as Chuokoron and Bungeishunju, but is also often cited in the Western press. See for example Newsweek 4/2/1990, p.18.

1012. Waiting for Pearl Harbor, op.cit..


1015. Inoki, op.cit.

1016. Kosaka, op.cit. and "Sainen shita Bei-So Taiketsu no Mito Sensu Seikaku" Chuokoron March 1980

1017. Professor Emeritus at Tokyo Institute of Technology and Professor at Aoyama University, Heiwa no Daisho, op.cit., is Nagai's most important book, but he continues to be a frequent participant in various colloquia and seminars on defense and contributes articles to journals. See his very important "Moratorium Kokka no Boeiron" Chuokoron, January 1981 and more recently "Rekishi no Owari ni mieru mono" a colloquy with Eto Jun in Bungeishunju January, 1990.

1018. Professor Sato's most important work is on the LDP and deals with domestic, not international politics (Jiminto Seiken Tokyo, Chuokoronsha 1986 written together with Matsuzaki Tetsuzaki). He is nonetheless one of the most influential writers on international affairs and has written many scholarly articles on the subject. See Sato, op.cit., and "Jidai no Benka ga yori Kyoko na Domei o Motomeru" ("Changing Times Demand a Stronger Alliance") in Chuokoron March 1990.

1019. Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and now Ambassador to Thailand. Okazaki is as much a scholar as he is a diplomat, and is the author of numerous works on history and diplomacy. His most comprehensive work on foreign policy is Senryakuteki Kanqeakatta to wa Nani Ka Tokyo, Chukoshinsho 1983. See also Joho Senryaku nito, op.cit.

1020. Other important figures in this movement include Murakami Yunosuke, Komo Shuhei and Nishibe Susumu. Perhaps the most important works produced by this group are Murakami, Komo and Sato's Bunmei to shite Ie no Shakai Tokyo, Chuokoronsha 1979 and Murakami's Shinchukainashb no Jidai Tokyo, Chuokoronsha 1984. See also Nishibe's call for intellectuals to become more involved in government "Chishikijin yo, Kenryoku kara tobi suru" in Chuokoron June 1990. It should also be added that all of these figures became involved in a ferocious, partly ideological, controversy over faculty appointments leading all except Sato to leave the University.

1021. Interviews with Sato and Inoki.

1022. Chuma 1985, op.cit. falls into this category. See also Symposium with Chuma, Kamo Takehiko (Professor at Waseda) Maeda Hisao and Kagawa Kazuhiko "Ikokuheiwashugi o koete" in Sekai November 1988.

1023. Obata 1983, op.cit., fall very much into this category. See also his comments on Japanese politics in Asahi 8/3/1987 evening. See also for example Shirotsuka Boboru "Aspo-Boeiron no

1024. Professor at Tokyo University. His most important works include Kakujidai no Kokusaiageji Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten 1982—in which he warns of how a world war and East-West tensions will almost inevitably lead to a global nuclear conflagration.

1025. Professor and leading constitutional scholar at Tokyo University. Kempo daikyuryu Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten 1982.

1026. See Momoi Makoto Nihon ga Nichibeide Domei no Kokai o Osorenae Riiyu (Why Japan does not fear the Collapse of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance") Tokyo, Kappa Books 1988. and the series of articles in Bunseishunju (beginning January 1990) "Oranda ni Nihon ga Mieru" ("One can discern Japan in Holland"). Momoi warns that disarmament and detente will mean the U.S. turning its attention to meeting the Japanese economic threat, (p.30-33, 46-49), that the U.S. may try to divide the world up with the Soviet Union and the PRC (p.52-58,139-141) and that the world is plotting against a Japan that is becoming economically and technologically too powerful (chapter 3). Yet, despite a style which is clearly designed to shock, Momoi's book shares none of the nationalist rhetoric of a Shimizu Ikutaro or Eto Jun, and instead is founded on a cynical, realpolitik view of International relations (see p.76-87). Moreover, Momoi rejects the notion that armed neutrality is a viable option for Japan (p.166-169), and argues that it should concentrate its energy on economic development and actively try to export manufacturing abroad. Okazaki's articles (which will eventually be turned into a book) sees in 17th century Holland, a basically non-military trading nation that became the victim of its former allies Britain and France's envy, a useful lesson for Japan. Contrast these views with Kosaka Masataka "Anitus na Pucho ga uma 'Nihon tataki’" in Chuokoron February, 1989. Note that even Kosaka seems to share the Right Idealists' belief that there are cultural roots to Japanese success, though he links it to a kind of humble populism which may be calculated to strengthen the appeal of his argument, ibid., p.133. Also Sato Seizaburo and Inoki Masamichi stress the importance of continuing the relationship, though Sato is also fond of stressing that burden sharing also entails responsibility sharing (ie. a greater say in global policy for Japan) and hints, Ishihara-like, that if Japan chose to rearmand life would become very difficult for the U.S.


1028. ibid., p.14-22

1029. Ibid., p.161
1030. ibid. p.164-165,170-173

1031. op.cit., p.223-227


1033. See Morita and Ishihara, op.cit., p.87-116. His views on U.S. management were popularized in his book Made in Japan.

1034. Though it is possible to charge Morita with lending legitimacy to Ishihara's views by agreeing to coauthor a book with him.

1035. ibid., p.35-46

1036. ibid., p.38. A charge also made by some American revisionist historians - Alperowitz.

1037. ibid., p.146-151

1038. ibid., p.156-157

1039. p.157-158

1040. ibid., p.19-21


1042. 8/15/1983


1044. Yomiuri 11/19/1986

1045. See for example Yomiuri 8/29/1981

1046. Sankei 1/1/1981


1048. See the bitter attack on Shokun, Yomiuri by Kokuo Tatsu "Ideorogii de Me ga kumoru Yomiuri 'Shokun' no Gunjihenko" in Asahi Jyaaanaru 5/24/1985.

1049. During the 1980s there was a considerable increase in interest in the defense industry. Some of the books which have appeared on the topic in Japanese include Sakai Akio Nihon no Gunkaku Keizai Tokyo, Aoki Shoten 1988, Kamada Satoshi Nihon no Heiki Koji Tokyo, Kodansha 1983, Mainichi Shimbunsha Gunjimonzai Shuzaihan Heiki Bizinesu Tokyo Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982, Asahi


1051. Maeda, op.cit., p.102-103. It is believed that Nagano was at least in part motivated by ship building interests (which he represented) which hoped to compensate for sagging civilian demand through military exports. See also statements by other figures from the shipbuilding world Mainichi 6/8/1980 cited in Ohtake 1983, op.cit.p.328.


1055. Nikkei 4/9/1980 Doko was obviously about the question of arms sales to Arab countries, which would have created a major crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations. Okawa, op.cit., p.174-176.


1057. Kurogawa, op.cit., p.222


1059. Asahi 7/23/1987
1060. See Asahi 7/18/1987 on doubts about the validity of U.S. accusations. For the anger provoked on both sides (complete with a photo of the famous sledgehammer scene) see Asahi 8/12/1987. For a balanced view on the differences in perceptions, see Murakami Yoshio in Asahi 7/19/1987. See Morita's article "America ni futatabi Mono o mosu: Toshiba 'seisai' wa Nippon Kyosei shuyo o omoidasaseru" Bungeishunju November, 1988.


1063. See Asahi 3/30/1989 and Japan Times 2/1/1989


1066. See Aera 5/30/1989 p.17. Already in 1985 trade frictions had led to an increased emphasis on domestic military research, see Kurogawa, op.cit., p.226, 230-231

1067. Samuels and Whipple, op. cit., p.34

1068. Asahi 3/18/1989 Miritech series £22

1069. 81.54% of aeronautics and 5.15% of shipbuilding, .55% of electronics Boei Handobukku 1987, op.cit., p. 224.

1370. Interviews with Moroi and Chiba.

1072. The following looks at only the JSP, DSP and Komeito as effectively the most important parties for the further development of the defense debate. The JCP, Shaminren and the New Liberal Club are regrettably omitted because of limits on space and time.

1073. For the text of the report, "Ajia no Heiwa to Nihon no anzenhosho ni tsuite", see Kakushin December 1975. The following month it was adopted by the Central Committee, see Kakushin January 1976. For more on the background of the symposium see Borie and Kobayashi, op.cit., p.51-59.


1075. Nagasue Eichi (later Chairman of the DSP and a leading figure in the party - belongs to the same ex-Navy men club as Nakasone) "Wagakuni Anzenhosho no Mondaiten" in Sekai to Gendai November, 1980.


1077. See Yamaguchi Sadamaru "Komeito no Mezasu 'Genjitsu' to wa nani ka' in Sekai January 1981, esp. pages 34-35.

1078. See for example Yano's support for Takeire's initiative on defense as necessary to make Komeito an acceptable coalition partner (Yomiuri 1/12/1978 evening

1079. See for example Asahi 1/29/1981

1080. See Kamanishi, op.cit., p.184-189, 193-196

1081. The position towards which the JSP moved towards had been already outlined in 1966 by the party's leading security expert, Ishibashi Masashi, but had been rejected as revisionist at the time. The fundamental premise of Ishibashi's view had been that the SDF and MST are unconstitutional, but legal (ikengoho) and the task that the JSP should set itself is to create an international environment which would allow their phased dismantling. See Matsuzaki, op.cit.. p.69-71 Asahi 11/23/1979,

1082. See Asahi 1/13, 1/21, 1/31, 2/28/1984


1084. Interviews with Eda Satsuki, Maruyama Hiroyuki and Takazawa Torao

1085. See section 3 of this chapter. According to a high diplomatic source close to the former Prime Minister (Okazaki), Nakasone had told him shortly before leaving office that he was reasonably satisfied with this record, having removed one (1) and a half (the three non-export principles) of the taboos he had hoped to tackle. Nakasone had also told that source that he that at the beginning of his term he had wanted to also tackle the three non-nuclear principles, but the opportunity had not arose. The constitutional issue even Nakasone recognized as being too thorny to tackle.

1086. The two other Prime Ministers from this period, Takeshita Noboru and Uno Sosuke, were in office at relatively quiet times in terms of defense policy, did not launch any major new initiatives, and were totally preoccupied with domestic issues—the sales tax controversy, the Recruit scandal and Uno’s unfortunate (politically speaking at least) love life.

1087. For a recent expression of his views, see Asahi 3/30/1988 as well as his article in Chuokoron 1980, op.cit.. According to a former assistant to Fukuda (Cornelia Meyers) a major reason that Fukuda was interested in South East Asia was his business connections with Indonesia. And according to one of his financial backers (Matsuura) he was anything but belligerent when the PRC challenged the Japanese claim over the Senkaku islands and would have greatly preferred to have avoided a confrontation if the right wing, including members of his own party and the Foreign Ministry, had not forced him to adopt a hard line position.

1088. See section 2 in this chapter. Also see the fascinating interview with Ohira on this subject and the need to correct shifts which go too far to the right in "Nihonjin no Heikokankaku ni Shinrai" (Trust in the People’s sense of balance“ in Asahi Jyaanaru 9/22/1978.

1089. For more on the Japanese response to the first Gulf crisis, see Asahi 7/7 evening, 9/5 and especially 10/30/1987, Japan Times 9/22, 9/23, 10/8/1985. For more on Gotoda’s views, see his book, p. , in which he stresses concern over how the MDF would respond if fired upon by Iranian forces. According to a diplomatic source in close contact with Gotoda at the time
(Shigeie) Gotoda was concerned that such a situation could spark an unpredictable domestic response and was sharply critical of the younger generation of bureaucrats who he felt did not have a proper appreciation of the dangers involved. See also Gotoda on the lessons of history in an otherwise rather whimsical talk between Gotoda and authoress Shiono Nanami in Chuokoron February 1989, p.176. It should also be added that Gotoda, though like Nakasone a former Naimusho official, an arch-conservative in his domestic views and the chief architect of administrative reform and privatization during Nakasone's Prime Ministership, was rather contemptuous of Nakasone, who he and many other former Naimusho officials viewed as a political light-weight who played to the peanut gallery. See Tahara Soichiro Keisatsucho no Kaibo Tokyo, Kodansha 1988 and interview with Kahiha Osamu, who knew both men from his own time as a Naimusho official.

1090. See Ohtake 1983, op.cit., chapter 7. Interview with Matsuura, a financial backer and one of the principal organizers of the Seirankai.

1091. Interview with Nagao Eichi. He supports spending 3% of GNP or more on defense, revision of the constitution, promoting patriotism through education as a crucial element of national defense and, at least in principle, is not opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons though he feels it is imprudent to do so at this time.

1092. See p. on Ishihara Shintaro, and Asahi 9/23/1991 for Mori's views on constitutional revision and 9/21/1991 where he asserts that Japan has a right to belligerency. Interview with Mori Kiyoshi, who has been especially active promoting constitutional revision and the anti-espionage legislation, though he is decidedly more cautious on the atomic issue and consequently sees the necessity for continued and improved ties with the U.S. despite intensifying trade and economic frictions.

1093. Okuno has made a series of provocative comments, including most recently his claim that Japan's advance into East Asia was not a war of aggression and that the facts were being distorted and manipulated by the PHC in order to earn diplomatic pressure on Japan. Kamei attracted a great deal of attention for his provocative position taken in the wake of the FSE controversy that the Mutual Security Treaty would eventually have to be replaced because of U.S. irrationality and the need for Japan to assert its sovereignty. Interview with Kamei.

1094. According to one former backer of the Seirankai, with the exception of Ishihara Shintaro, the strength of the majority's commitment to Right Idealism was questionable, and most had joined merely as a means to gain publicity or funds from financial backers with right idealist inclinations. Interview with Matsuura
1095. Habara Kiyomasa "Kokubōzoku to wa Dare Ka" Sekai December, 1986 p.84-85 and unpublished manuscript by Michael Green on the Boeizoku.

1096. Asahi 9/20/81

1097. Green, op.cit.

1098. Green, op.cit.. Inuguchi Takeshi and Iwai Tomoaki identify a total of 21 to 25 Boeizoku in their Zoku Gijin no Kenkyu Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1987,p. 304. Mike Green, however, has had more direct contact with the LDP and his figure is probably more accurate.

1099. Mihara Asao probably fulfills someplace between the two, and is at times quite pragmatic, (as in the LDP debate) and other times has expressed quite drastic views, as when he advocated that Japan take over the defense of not only the sea lanes but the entire West Pacific, prompting fierce criticism by LDP doves led by Kosaka Zentaro. See Mihara's comments in Karo Kimi et.al., editors Nichibei Domei Kongo no Nijyunen Tokyo, Jiyusha 1981, and the response, discussed in Ohtake 1983, op.cit.,p.360. Kandamaru is more clearly Centrist, though it he has also supported calls for much greater defense spending.

1100. See Abe's comments on passing the gate on pages and interview with Ito Koubun and Kumagai Akira of the Boeikenkyuo.

1101. All interviews with opposition as well as LDP politicians.

1102. Kent Calder 1988, op.cit., chapter 10, especially pages 413-426, does a fine job summarizing the various weaknesses of the JDA in getting its budget approved, including its relatively weak grass roots support and bureaucratic penetration by MOP, which has an inherent interest in keeping defense spending down.

1103. Hirose, op.cit., p.225, example of 1% and interviews.


1105. This conflict came out in the open in a most graphic form in the Kurisu Hiromi incident in 1978 and the remarks made by General Takeda, who called for the draft, defense spending at 3% and criticized Japan's strictly defensive posture or defense. See Asahi 2/2, 2/2 evening, 2/4 evening. For more on the background of this incident see Nishioka, op.cit., p.293-297 and Oikawa, op.cit., chapter 4. Unlike Kurisu, Takeda was merely reprimanded for statements which in fact were far more critical, but because of the General's ties to the DSP the government at the time felt it could not afford to dismiss him.
1106. Hirose, op.cit., interviews with Kondo and Professor Hata.

1107. Interviews with General Nishimura and Professor Hata.

1108. See for example the book by former ASDF Chief of Staff Tamura Hideaki Beikoku no Powaaporitikusu Tokyo, Nishinhodo 1988, interview with Admiral Sakonjo.

1109. Interview with Professor Hata

1110. For example Shiina Moto, op.cit., Moroi interview and Komori Yoshihisa (reporter for the Sankei newspaper) "Nihon no Neo-nashonariszumu o hihan suru" in Chuokoron March, 1990, to cite examples from the Japanese political, economic and journalistic worlds.

Endnotes - Chapter 11


1113. The technology had been in existence 1113. since the late 1950s, but at the time different branches of the armed forces did not see any need for its deployment. For a detailed history of the development of this weapon, see Matthew Evangelista Innovation and the Arms Race: How the U.S. and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press 1988.

1114. See Lothar Ruehl, op.cit..


1118. Butterwege and Hofschen, op.cit., p.341-342

1119. Interviews with Hans Apel and Wolfgang Biirmann

1120. See Der Spiegel 7/18/1977 p.19-27 and also the following week's issue, 7/25/1977


1122. See Karl Feldemeyer in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 8/9/1977 and chief editor Herbert Kremp in Die Welt. Kremp made the perhaps unfortunate argument that the beauty of Dresden would have been spared if the neutron bomb had been available, leading outraged liberals to ask the question of whether it would have made a difference for all those who died in the city. See Matth e, op.cit., p.60-61 for a overview of the press reaction.

1123. See interview with Wehner in the Stuttgarter Zeitung 8/26/1977


1125. Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz 7/22 and 7/27/1977

1126. Matth e, op.cit., p.68-70

1127. Verhandlungen 9/8/1977 p.2993. One CDU member, Walter Liesler Kiep, did come out against the new weapons on the grounds that they would make it more likely that nuclear war could be waged-Frankfurter Rundschau 8/3/1977


1131. In an important speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in October 1979, Schmidt, though supportive of the weapon, emphasized that it impact on arms control had to be examined. Text in Schubert Vol.II, op.cit., p.120. See also Georg Leber at the November 1977 SPD part congress, Vorstand der SPD, ed., Parteitag der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 15. bis 19. November in Hambe... Protokoll der Verhandlungen, Anlagen p.276-277.
1132. Matth e, op.cit., p.123-127

1133. SDZ 2/22/1978, Matth e, op.cit., p.128-129, 137-139 see also William Burm "Zynismus in Reinkultur Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik August 1977 - critical of the weapon, but states he has no sympathy with Bahr.

1134. Interview with Berthold Meyer


1136. Matthe , op.cit., p.200-212


1138. See Cyrus Vance Hard Choices and Jimmy Carter


1142. See for example Hans Günter Brauch Die Raketen Kommen: Vom NATO-Doppelbeschuß bis zur Stationierung Köln, Bund Verlag 1983, especially pages 89 to 115. For a more balanced weighing of the pros and cons see Risse-Kappen Null Lösung, op.cit.. These concerns were shared by many outside of Germany as well, see Graeme P. Auton "European Security and the INF Dilemma: Is there a better Way?" in Arms Control May 1984. See also Hanrieder 1989, op.cit., p.111-112.


1144. See Meyer op.cit., p.216-217, 221-225

1145. In July 1979 2% felt a new world war likely, 17% possible and 80% unlikely. In January 1980 10% saw a new world war as likely, 48% as possible and only 41% as unlikely. This new level of threat perception was to persist more or less until 1985 and the thawing of superpower relations after Gorbachev came to power. Meyer, op.cit., p.197.


1147. Stern 1/24/1980
1148. See Peter Schmidt "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Elite and Mass Opinion in a Comparative Perspective", part of the Rand Paper Series P-7016, September 1984, p.33. What is especially interesting about this data is that in West Germany pacifist sentiments seem far more widely spread than in any other Western country, including Britain, France, the U.S. and even Holland.


1151. See for example the book by Stern editor Wolf Perdelwitz Wollen die Russen Krieg? Hamburg, Stern Bücher 1980. Perdelwitz claimed the CIA and the Islamic rebels in Afghanistan were working together to encircle the Soviet Union (p.178) and that the US was plotting to keep a nuclear war confined to Western Europe. (p.274).

1152. See Senghaas, op.cit..

1153. Peter Bender Das Ende des Ideologischen Zeitalters, op.cit. especially pages 14-19, 157-166.

1154. See Jeffrey Herf's excellent account in Herf, op.cit., p.186-192.

1155. See Erhard Eppler Wege aus der Gefahr Reinbeck bei Hamburg, Rowohlt 1981


1158. Enders 1987, op.cit., p.216-217


1160. Schmidt, op.cit., p.47


1162. See Herbert Wehner "Deutsche Politik auf dem Prüfstand" Neue Gesellschaft February, 1979

1163. For example Bahr openly supported the Soviet demand that British and French nuclear forces be included in strategic arms control talks. Herf, op.cit., p.142


1165. Herf, op.cit., p.159-163 For more see R.E.M. Irving and W.E. Paterson "The Machtwechsel of 1982-1983: A significant Landmark in the Political and Constitutional History of West Germany" in Parliamentary Affairs Autumn 1983. For Lambsdorff as well as Genscher one of the key factors in deciding to dissolve the coalition was the SPD’s drift towards the peace movement on the missile issue. Interviews with Meyer, Ronneburger.


1167. Herf, op.cit., p.167


1173. CDU Grundsatzprogram der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschland 1978 p.51-60. Many observers at the time, including the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, were disappointed by the overall lack of progress being made by the Union. See Clay Clemens Reluctant Realists Durham and London, Duke University Press 1989, p. 173-176.


1175. Clemens, op.cit., p.198-203


1177. Clemens, op.cit., p.218-225

1178. Risse-Kappen, Krise op.cit., p.142


1182. On the background of initial Soviet resistance to the trip, see R. Asmus "Pravda Attacks East-West German ties" RFL-RL Background Report 145, 8/8/1984. For an overview of the events leading up to the visit and a balanced perspective on its significance, see Karl Wilhelm Fricke "Der Besuch Erich Honeckers in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" in Europa Archiv 23,12/10/1987.


1184. The New York Times 10/12/1984

1185. Interviews with Michael Stürmer, Uwe Nerlich and Gebhard Schweigler. See also Horst Teltschik "Aspekte der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der Ost-West Beziehungen" Politik und Zeitgeschichte 2/16/1985, especially pages 4-5, and Clemens, op.cit., p.293-29.

1187. See Christian Backe, op.cit., p.395

1188. Teltschik 1985, op.cit., p.12-13, Volker Rühe "Gemeinsame Sicherheit in der Allianz als Grundlage für gegenseitige Sicherheit zwischen Ost und West" in Daniel Proekter, Volker Rühe, Karsten Voigt Mehr Vertrauen, Weniger Waffen: militärische Entspannung in Europa aus sowjetischer und deutscher Sicht, Stuttgart, Bonn Aktuell 1987, especially p.156-157. There was also hope that by stressing the European angle support could be won from the other Western European nations for reunification. See Teltschik in FAZ 9/9/1989


1190. See for example Wolfgang Pohrt Endstation: Über die Wiedergeburt der Nation Berlin, Rotbuch Verlag 1982

1191. Representative of this kind of thinking is Theodor Ebert Soziale Verteidigung: Formen und Bedingungen des zivilen Widerstandes Waldkirch, Waldkircher Verlag 1981. Vols. I and II.

1192. On the balance for both generational and ideological reasons the Universal Pacifists have a weaker sense of war guilt than do the Central Europeanists. The Universal Pacifists tend to come from a generation which has not been directly involved with the war or the Nazi atrocities, and hence tends to have a certain moral distance from these events. In addition, because of their more tenuous connection to the German nation they tend not to feel as constrained by their nationality as do others with a stronger sense of German identity. One reflection of this has been the recent phenomenon of left-wing anti-semitism, which has tended to take the form of condemnation of the state of Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians. See Bark and Gress, op.cit., p.440-443.


1194. Ibid., p.158

1196. Schweigler, op.cit., p.196


1198. ibid., p.105-108

1199. ibid., p.105

1200. Der Spiegel 4/23/1990. p.103. See also an earlier EMNID study in Der Spiegel 10/23/1989 which showed 64% were in favor of the BRD remaining in NATO and only 35% for a neutral West Germany. The views of East Germans, however, who make up one quarter of the new united German population, is almost the exact opposite of that of the West German population on this issue, with 53% for a neutral united Germany.

1201. Der Spiegel 10/29/1989, p.43. A later 1990 poll, however, is said to reveal a decline in support for the presence of U.S. troops. See The International Herald Tribune 4/26/1990

1202. Der Spiegel ibid.


1205. Schweigler, op.cit., p.86.


1207. Noelle-Neumann, ibid., p.17-18

1208. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in PAX 10/23/1989

1209. See David Gress Peace and Survival: West Germany, the Peace Movement and European Security Stanford Calif., Hoover Institution Press p.57-62


1211. Horst Ehmke "Wo liegt das Deutsche Vaterland?" in Jürgen Habermas ed. Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit" Frankfurt, Suhrkamp 1979
1212. See below, pages


1215. According to an Allensbach poll, 70% of all Germans were in favor of the trip, and 65% felt that it had been a good thing afterwards, despite the protests which threatened to mar the proceedings. Only 17% felt that it had been a mistake. It also improved the U.S. stance - whereas in Spring 1984 only 25% felt that U.S. policy was more moral than that of the Soviet Union, 48% felt it was no better. After Bitburg 30% felt that the U.S. was more moral and 37% felt they were no better than each other. Noelle-Neumann in FAX 6/25/1985.


1217. The opening shots in this debate were Ernst Nolte "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will" in FAX 6/6/1986 and Andreas Billgruber Zweierlei Untergang: die Zerschlagung des deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums Berlin, Siedler 1986.


1219. Habermas, ibid.

1220. FAX 4/6/1988

1222. For example Arnulf Baring, Helga Haftendorn and Karl Kaiser, all leading experts on German foreign policy with Social Democratic leanings, have in recent expressed grave concerns about the direction their party is going. Likewise traditionally pro-SPD Die Zeit in the 1991 elections came out against Lafontaine for his criticism of reunification. The Süddeutsche Zeitung has also in recent years taken a stance much more critical of the SPD’s position on defense.

1223. Cowen, op.cit., p.194


1227. Cowen, op.cit., p.225


1233. Deubner, op.cit..


1235. The Greens have attracted enormous scholarly attention. For more on the origins of the party and its development, see Gerd Langguth The Green Factor in German Politics: From Protest


1237. See for example the rather peculiar dialogue between members of the SPD and the Greens in "SPD & Grünen, ihr Verhältnis zur Friedensbewegung und die Geschichte der Atomraketen" Frieden und Abrüstung No.23, March 1987, beginning with the introduction


1241. See Risse-Kappen, Krise, op.cit., p.256-261, 318-320 on the changes in FDP views on security issues.

1242. See for example the article by Wolfgang Mischnerk Ost-West Beziehungen und Sicherheitspolitik im Lichte der Politik des 'neuen denkens' in Liberal 9/3/1988, especially pages 39, where he lists common East-West security interests, and page 42 suggests in only slightly less strident tones than Bahr did 6 years earlier for the inclusion of French and British atomic weapons in arms control talks.

1243. See Karl H. Cerny, "Campaign and Election Outcome" in Cerny, op.cit., p.245-246, 251-252. See also p.226-228 for more on the background going into the elections.

1245. See Meyer 1987, op.cit., p.42-44

1246. See also Wolfgang Mischnick 'Die Einheit Deutschlands, der Frieden Europas - Perspektiven der Freiheit' in Liberal August, 1989, p.110

1247. Meyer 1987, op.cit., p.45


1249. In a 1979 television interview Wehner expressed his view that the Soviet Union was basically defensive in orientation. Risse-Kappen, Krise, op.cit., p.155.


1251. See Lafontaine 1983, op.cit., p.81-91


1253. Interview with Hans Apel


1255. See for example Peter Glotz "Die Linke und die Friedensbewegung" in Neue Gesellschaft/ Frankfurter Hefte 1/1/1984.

1256. FAZ 8/28/1987


1258. See for example Peter Glotz "Deutsch-böhmische Kleinigkeiten, oder: Abgerissene Gedanken über Mitteleuropa" and the following essays in Neue Gesellschaft 7/7/1986.

1259. See Kurt Biedenkopf "Wir Können nicht einfach aussteigen, Aber Friedenssicherung durch atomare Abschreckung ist kein Dauerzustand" in W. Heisenberg and D. Lutz Sicherheitspolitische Kontroverse: Auf dem Weg in die neunzigen Jahre Schriftenreihe
See also the collection of essays in Biedenkopf and Christliche
Demokraten für Schritte zur Abrüstung Sicher auf neuen Wegen,
Impulse für christlich-demokratische Friedenspolitik Warendorf,
Diethelm Gohl und Heinrich Niesporek 1986

1260. See Clemens, op.cit., p.289-297
1261. See Dregger in FAZ 9/30/1986 and Risse-Kappen Null Lösung,
op.cit., p.150-170.

1262. FAZ 10/8/1987. Only 2 years earlier Dregger had been in the
forefront of those who criticized Kissinger for suggesting that
Europe play a larger security role. The chief problem was what
Dregger viewed as the "free ride" in security which France was
enjoying at the expense of the FRG. See Dregger "Paris muß Farbe
bekennen. Sicherheitspolitik kann nicht auf nationalem Alleingang

1263. Die Welt 2/18/1988

1264. See for example Karl Lamers "Abrüstung und Sicherheit in
Europa" in Rühe 1988, op.cit., p.74-81. Interviews with Willi
Wimmer and CDU staff members. Note that Karl Lamers replaced the
more ideological Jürgen Todenhöfer as disarmament speaker of the
faction, and at the time was viewed as more of an Atlanticist
than a West Europeanist.

1265. See SDZ 4/9/1984
1266. See Meyer 1987, op.cit., p.14
1267. See Meyer, op.cit., 18-19
1268. Volker Rühe "Gemeinsame Sicherheit in der Allianz als
Grundlage für gegenseitige Sicherheit zwischen Ost und West",
Interviews with Peter Peterson and defense and foreign policy
experts close to the government.

1269. From the point of view of a rational choice theorist one
solution to this problem is to assume that individuals will
support the collectivity that will most benefit them as
individuals or as members of their family. This assumes a level
of dispassionate calculation that empirically speaking seems to
be missing from most debates over national identity in the world.
Most people are born into cultures which define their extended
identity for them. These identities set the boundary of the
extended group and are cultural artifacts. They are usually not
questioned until the individual is forced to do so by external
events - for example intra-cultural conflict, religious
movements, etc.. Identities may change, as may any cultural
artifacts, but they did so slowly and only with great difficulty, accompanied by the emotional stress commonly associated with the phrase "identity crisis".

1270. Though on the surface Lafontaine's position might appear to be have been a pure appeal to petty economic interest, one could argue that it actually was ideologically based. Lafontaine's views may have been closer to the Universal Pacifism of the left wing of the SPD, who opposed reunification on the grounds that the age of such nationalist feelings had passed, and to once again use such an ideology would be highly dangerous and immoral. This view of national identity, however, was held by too a minority to be appreciated by the larger public, who viewed Lafontaine as opposing national unity in order to reduce petty economic costs.

1271. Note that both are extremely reluctant to use economic sanctions. This is probably attributable to the great emphasis that both nations place on foreign trade in their national strategies and the strength of industry as an interest group. In addition, in the German case both the SPD and the FDP are very reluctant to create the kind of intrusive policing systems needed to enforce economic embargoes, again at least in part a product of Germany's culturally transmitted historical experiences.

1272. See Vilfredo Pareto's theory of residues in Mind and Society

1273. According to an EMNID poll published in Der Spiegel 10/29/1989 while only 40% of those surveyed felt that there can be no reunification, 61% of Green voters and 45% of SPD voters were inclined to think this way, as opposed to 34% of FDP voters and 30% of CDU voters.

1274. See for example Suzuki Takao Tozasareta Gengo - Nihongo no Sekai Tokyo, Shincho Sensho 1975 p.190. Even more extreme are claims that the West is more aggressive because of fundamental biological differences. See, for example, Sakagami Shoichi's argument that Japanese honey bees are less aggressive than Western ones because Japan's natural environment is supposedly more bounteous than that of Europe, decreasing the need for aggressive competition between different species. Sakagami goes on to claim that this explains the aggressive nature of British tactics at the battle of Imphal during WW II compared to those of their Japanese opponents. See Peter N. Dale, op.cit., p.188-189.

1275. See for example the sophisticated version of this view presented by Okazaki Hisahiko 1983, op.cit., p.9-12, 24-26. See also ASDP General Tamura Hideaki Beikoku no Pawaaporitikusu Nishinhodo 1988, p.51-52, 193-195