FROM TRAGEDY TO DIALECTICS:
THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LUKACS' PATH FROM SIMMEL TO MARX

by

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ABSTRACT:

FROM TRAGEDY TO DIALECTICS: THE THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LUKÁCS' PATH FROM SIMMEL TO MARX

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SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ON MAY 2, 1974 IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

This thesis explores the influence of the work of Georg Simmel in the social theory of György Lukács. Particular attention is paid to Simmel's approach to the problem of cultural formation and education (Bildung) and the concept of Concrete Totality as they are utilized in Lukács' History and Class Consciousness. The thesis indicates the significance of the philosophical category of Bildung for social theorizing and compares the ways in which Simmel and Hegel made use of the concept in their critiques of Kant. The formal sociology of Simmel and Lukács is then analyzed with attention to the role of part-whole mediations in the works of both individuals. Finally, Lukács' gradual development from neo-Kantian sociology to historical materialism is traced, indicating how Simmel's concepts were gradually superceded by a Hegelian-Marxist approach to critical theorizing. A set of concluding remarks stresses the limitations of Lukács' conception of Marx's dialectic and suggests the need for a reworking of the concept of Bildung in light of the primacy Marx gives to the category of labor in his critique of the Hegelian dialectic.

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To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it "the way it really was" (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of a past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger. The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers. The same threat hangs over both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from the conformism that is about to overpower it. The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of the Antichrist. Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious.

----- Walter Benjamin
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Preface

There is much that needs to be said, as a preparation, excuse, explanation, or warning for what follows -- too much, in fact, since a correct articulation of the foundations on which the work presented here rests would lead to a great alteration in the work itself. For what follows may best be read as a search for foundations, an attempt to find a tradition, and what it uncovers was by no means presupposed at the start. To attempt to impose the insights which have been gained in the course of writing this thesis to every portion of the now written thesis would result, I hope, in a very different set of conclusions. This is an effort which must be made, and for the present what I have presented here is only a prelude to what remains undone. Certain terms here remain ill-defined (I resist the temptation to make a virtue of this and call them "open significations") and will only begin to take on definition with work that lies ahead. Hence, what follows rests less on presuppositions -- methodological or ideological -- than on a situation which served as a necessary point of departure and ends less with conclusions than with the residue of what has survived the process of inquiry. This residue must be taken up as a new situation for a later point of departure which cannot be attempted here. But perhaps by way of preface I can say a few things about both the situation and the residue.

I have learned that the question of who is the writer of what "I" write is not an unimportant concern, since I have also learned, most of all from Kurt H. Wolff, that this is never a question of personal beliefs or experiences but rather an inquiry into the type of person who can produce writings which share a space with other readers and writers and perhaps even serve as a
point of departure for the thoughts of others. The labor of taking up and re-
forming a language which both is and is not my own, the attempt to appropriate
a tradition which both is and is not my own, and the struggle to institute
meanings which are accessible to others who both are and are not me, all of
these questions touch on the problem of the type of writer who writes,
and all may perhaps be viewed as another side of what is investigated here.
It would be unfaithful to what follows to attempt to neatly spell out the
prejudices which have influenced this work, since such "prejudices" are not
easily detachable from the writer (perhaps they are not even observable) and
the process of doing so might give support to the foolish notion that once we
guard against the author's distortions, we may know the undistorted object of
his intentions.

I should like to avoid any sense that this work is in any way an
application of a carefully developed set of analytic skills to a subject matter
which had long been the focus of my attention. In truth the whole project
is much more accidental, and the charm of a neatly ordered life-project,
which forms the myth from which curriculum vitae are spun, must not be
allowed to obscure the more important fact that "as it turned out" this is
what I wrote. There has been an interest among a certain type of individual
working in the social sciences over the last few years in a variety of
philosophical systems which were once thought to be safely buried. The "end
of philosophy" in the would-be sciences of society is crumbling, perhaps as
a result of the end of the "end of ideology" in the last decade. The type
of individual who helped to uncover the problems of social philosophy in my
case became interested in phenomenology, historical materialism, and Critical
Theory (I would assume the same was more or less true of others) at a time
when he should have been mastering factor-analysis, formal modeling, and survey research design. I did not begin my work at M.I.T. with the assumption that poorly learned skills at reading German would be of greater use than my more carefully acquired mathematical skills. I did not assume that the major methodological technique employed in my thesis would be the filling of countless notebooks and typewriter sheets with attempts at finding a method. Nor is my own experience unique: most of what I learned from contemporaries came from individuals who found themselves forced to relearn, alone or in groups, much of what their own disciplines had long ago decided was not worth learning.

Traditions exist in an uncomfortable relationship with their pasts. A past is to be venerated but not rejuvenated, since the apparent vitality of any tradition rests on its ability to forget its origins and conquer more and more of the present through the application of techniques which are no longer tied to a reason or a problematic. The type of person who writes this thesis found it necessary to recall the past of a tradition whose technical application had long ago lost connection with the dilemmas which first sent it on its way. Why this became necessary is not altogether clear to me, and hence an important point remains unclarified. Perhaps the motivation for my return to the past of social theorizing was motivated by the fact that I could find no way of posing the problems which concerned me in the language of the present day social sciences. Or perhaps the experience of having been studied, like others in my generation, and having read the results of inquiries into the nature of the "student movement" taught me something of the inability of social science to capture anything more than the most superficial aspects of a living, historical totality. Or perhaps my confrontation with
works which had done more than a modest share in adding to the misery of those unfortunate nations that became the objects of American military and economic "aid" had something to do with the need to understand how all of this came about.

What follows began as an attempt to investigate the methodological interconnections of phenomenology and historical materialism, the former having exposed to me the divergence between observer and actor meanings of events, and the latter having suggested why this disjuncture takes place. It was later reformulated as a study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Adventures of the Dialectic, but outgrew any of the restraints which I could impose on it, led me to investigate Lukács' intellectual influences, lingered for too long a time on the incredibly rich work of Georg Simmel, and finally turned out to be something which though no longer telling us about "Marxism" and "Phenomenology" may tell us something about their mutual task: social theorizing — or in less ambitious terms, thinking about society. Though its final form differs from that which I set out to investigate, it probably still carries the influence of Merleau-Ponty's work, as well as the important text by Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete. Both of these books have influenced my thinking more than I can indicate through footnoting. I have also been greatly influenced by the work of the Frankfurt School, especially the early writings of Horkheimer and Adorno, and most of all by the work of Herbert Marcuse. I have been less positively influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas, but it would be foolish to claim that my efforts to come to terms with his recent work has not taught me a great deal.

These then are some reflections on the situation which happened to serve as my beginning. They need to be balanced by some notes on what has turned
out to be my conclusions. The residue which survives the investigation presented here points in a number of directions, which must be viewed as leading us back to the problems I have posed here rather than forcing us to confront new issues. Nothing presented here has been "finished off." It is less a question of steps taken one by one down a path than a continual rummaging through the underbrush to find a way out of the tangle into which my thoughts have fallen. The concept of labor, which I have introduced only as a critique of Lukács, must be expanded as a means of understanding the peculiarities of reading and writing. Marx's important insight that labor is always directed towards an objectivity which does not vanish through sublation (Aufhöhung) but rather acts as the preserver of our sensible and embodied intentions, must be extended to the realm of writing and criticism as well. In both cases a subject, by virtue of its possession of a sensible body, is capable of deforming an objective world, be it a world of material things or of conceptual sedimentations. The return to my original interest in Merleau-Ponty's work can perhaps be made at this point, since it strikes me that his concern with the body-subject (a concern which strangely vanishes in his "Marxist" works) is needed to decode the rich suggestions contained in Marx's discussion of labor. This effort, of course, works against Habermas' bifurcation of human praxis into purposive-rational action and symbolic interaction and argues that laboring serves as the foundation for the body-subject's attempt to cultivate both a world of material things and of conceptual objects.

Only once the notion of labor has been clarified can the notion of the Concrete Totality become less an abstract presentation and more a name for that peculiar type of object which arises through the labor of criticism. Lukács'
analysis of reification must be re-examined, perhaps taking Kosík's analysis of the pseudo-concrete as a point of departure. My own next attempts to confront these problems will take the form of a paper on the notion of labor and embodiment in Hegel's master-slave dialectic and Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and a study of the nature of criticism as practiced in the sociology of knowledge. None of this, however, will "complete" what is written here. All I can hope is that it might serve to turn what has been done here into something else.

This work is my attempt to pin down one side of some ideas which arose in the course of conversation with a number of people, all of whom I have learned a great deal from, but none of whom are of course responsible for the version of the conversation which has been presented here. Paul Kecskemeti and Peter Ludz provided early commentaries on my proposal and Ludz first suggested that I investigate more closely the tie to Simmel. I learned a great deal from a long series of discussions with Paul Breines and Russel Jacoby, who provided me with valuable original source material and, like Andrew Arato, with major portions of their own work. The work of Arato and Breines on Lukács' intellectual development is a necessary foundation for my own work, just as I have been influenced, perhaps more than I realize, by the profound grasp on dialectical argumentation which informs every part of Jacoby's work which I have had the privilege to read. John O'Neill and Bertell Ollman influenced early versions of the manuscript and Ollman's criticisms of parts of my earlier work provided the impetus for a substantial cutting of the thesis which has enabled me to accomplish much more theoretical depth than would otherwise have been possible. Conversations
with Karel Kovanda and David Held have been of immense help, and I view their own forthcoming work as more concrete expressions of what I have been trying to do here in an overly abstract manner. I also owe Kovanda thanks for introducing me to Kosík's work and for at various times rescuing me from the grips of the "pseudo-concrete." Nancy Vaupel, David Ferriero, and David Loerzel gave me priceless help in obtaining books from various libraries. I was supported during the writing of part of the thesis by a Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellowship.

Finally, I have incurred immense debts to the members of my thesis committee. William E. Griffith went out of his way to create a sanctuary at M.I.T. where I could pursue my studies. Miles Morgan has provided me with enough criticisms to make the next appearance of my ideas in print a happier one. And Kurt H. Wolff, in addition to consenting to serving of the board at a very short notice, gave a careful reading to a previous draft of the Simmel section as well as undertaking the massive task of correcting my wretched spelling. In addition, through other contacts with him I think I have learned a bit about how seriously we must begin to take our encounters with objects, cognative and otherwise, and I am certain that I have yet to learn a fraction of what he has to teach.

A special debt is owed to the individual to whom this thesis is dedicated. Christopher Schaefer first forced me to transform an ill-focused uneasiness about the course of my education into a critical reflection on the path I was taking. He helped me to move from an irrational rejection of what I perceived to be nonsense into a critical interrogation of that nonsense which sought to uncover the reason which might lie beneath it. At a time when what paraded as scholarly objectivity had driven me to disenchantment by virtue of the basic
irrationality on which it was based, he provided a model of intellectual commitment and honesty which I doubt I will ever equal. It is my deepest hope that our apparently divergent interests may both serve to animate the same logos and telos.

May 1974
Introduction

This thesis will spend a seemingly inordinate amount of time arguing that Gyorgy Lukács' path from the formal sociology of Georg Simmel to the dialectical social analysis and praxis of Karl Marx is an event which deserves a good deal more attention within the area of the philosophy of the social sciences than it has generally received. Although this work may at times seem to be more of a contribution to the "history of ideas," I see its primary aim as being an exploration of the possibilities of a critical social theory arising from the present analytically sophisticated, but critically immature and ethically questionable social sciences. I have attempted to raise the question of how the social sciences could engage in a rational criticism of the social order by attempting to come to terms with the interesting historical fact that one of the major books within the tradition of critical Marxism was written by an individual who seems to have been greatly influenced by one of the "founding fathers" of the contemporary social sciences. This seems a fruitful endeavor since within the last few years American social science has been shaken by a number of forceful critiques of its inability to free itself from an essentially quietistic critical role, while within the tradition of Frankfurt Critical Theory, there seems to have been a general loss of direction and an almost frantic search for a basis from which critical social theory may be defended.\(^1\) By raising the problem of the relationship of Simmel and Lukács I hope to indicate the significance of an event, which is not part of the conventionally preserved heritage of the social sciences, for a series of problems which, to a very great extent, remain central to that heritage even today.

In this introduction I will indicate how this task will be approached,
first discussing the nature of the specific problem which first motivated
my interest in the problem of Lukács and Simmel, second, discussing the
ways in which Lukács has been present in the tradition of social theory over
the last fifty years, and finally, indicating what little this thesis can
attempt to do in contributing to a serious reconsideration of the significance
which the problem of Lukács and Simmel might have for social theorizing today.
As I have indicated in the Preface, in many ways this thesis can only be
regarded as a work in progress, and I will consider the effort a success even
if it only raises interest in attempting to pose these problems in a clearer
manner, let alone attempting to resolve them.

A) Some Problems: The Nature of Social Collectivities

Criticism requires some sense of what it is that it is directed toward: The
very ambiguity of the object under investigation in the social sciences is a
symptom of their inability to explore more completely their critical potential.
One rather basic way of formulating this problem is to raise the question of what
constitutes the specific or essential features of a social collectivity and what
this tells us about the possibilities for critical theorizing within the disciplines
which direct themselves toward this collectivity. On a naive level it is easy to
pose this problem in terms of a comparison between a pile of rocks and a society.
Each is, in a sense, a collection of objects extended in space, but it is
obvious that on a naive level this would not be the first type of response
which an individual might make were he or she asked to compare the two. We
seem tempted to differentiate the two, to claim that while rocks simply lie on
top of each other, people walk around, talk to each other, exchange objects
with each other, join together in activities and also separate from each other.
The list could of course be extended, but the main point which I would hope the reader would grant is that on a naive, everyday level an individual would see a number of important, perhaps qualitative differences between a collectivity of physical objects, such as the pile of rocks, and a collectivity of individuals, such as a society.

This granted, it must be stressed that we have said nothing about what the social sciences must take as their objects of investigation. But we are able to indicate that there seems to be a rather persistent problem within the philosophy of the social sciences which is very closely related to this naive tendency. We might phrase it as follows: Given that individuals have a tendency to argue that piles of rocks and societies are somehow different, does this fact have any significance for the ways in which scientific inquiry in the social and natural sciences may proceed? And if we examine the literature in the area of philosophy and methodology of the social sciences, we find two broad types of answers to the problem, one which argues that indeed this type of distinction is relevant for the way in which the social sciences must proceed, and another which states that while this tendency is present on a common sense level, it need not be made within the realm of scientific theorizing.

The first group may be said to share a general orientation which takes social action, in Weber's sense, as its object of study: i.e. "all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it."\(^2\) The distinctive feature of human collectivities is claimed to be the fact that interaction and cohesion in them is based on the meaning which actors bring to the group. Hence, rocks lie on top of one another, while individuals decide to hold meetings, form groups, travel to a distant location,
etc. The distinction may be further amplified by arguing that while the rocks only lie together for us, i.e. the concept of "lying together" is something which the individual who is observing brings to the situation, the social collectivity exists independently of the interpretations which the analyst brings to it. This viewpoint may result in any of the following directives for research in the human sciences: investigate actors' perspectives - through social psychology, ideal-type models, analysis of taken-for-granted conventions of the society, studies of the ways in which the society uses symbols, especially language.

The second group, which is perhaps best represented by the arguments of Otto Neurath, presumes the existence of primary unity of method throughout all of the sciences. While acknowledging that actors do give meanings to their actions, this tendency would argue that this does not result in a fundamental distinction in the ways in which social and natural sciences proceed, and argues that the basic structure of a true statement about either nature or society will be of the same fundamental form.

I have, of course, done justice to neither of these viewpoints, nor will I, since this argument has been adequately developed in a number of places. What I am primarily interested in is the question of what type of criticisms of a society could come from either of these two traditions. From the first we would presume to find comments on the problem of disruption of actors' meanings through misunderstanding, or perhaps even criticisms of societies from a "humanist" basis which do not permit the full self-expression of the individual. On the other side we would expect technical solutions to various problems in carrying out externally posited goals, solutions which may range from "piecemeal social engineering" of the Popperian variety to utopian
restructuring of the Skinnerian type. Problems which could be raised about
either of these approaches are numerous, and to prevent this introduction from
straying far from its proper subject matter I can only state that I do not
see it as a profitable task to attempt to deal with a generalized notion
of "humanist" or "naturalist" social science and attempt to argue its vices
or virtues. I do feel that there is another way of posing the problem, which
is attempted in the first chapter, and which captures a slightly different
version of the controversy by looking at different notions of how an
individual should be socialized and educated by a community.

This approach leads us to a study of the problem as it eventually
appeared in German sociology, where a prolonged debate over the virtues of
interpretive vs. causal analysis took place in the early years of this century.
But my return to this area is not done in hopes of finding a solution. Rather
it seems that a full examination of the German Methodenstreit would only give up
a mirror image of the debate which today seems to be shaping up between behavior-
ists and phenomenologists. Instead I will look at a development which took place
in a manner which to some extent isolated it from the Methodenstreit and thus
forced it to take on a slightly different form. György Lukács, a Hungarian scholar,
studied with Georg Simmel, a philosopher and sociologist who was on the fringes of
German neo-Kantianism and not an active participant in the controversy. After
furthering his studies with Max Weber and Emil Lask, Lukács returned to
Hungary, became a member of the Hungarian Communist Party during the Soviet
Republic there, and while in exile several years later, wrote a book which
is generally acknowledged as one of the major works of the Marxist tradition:

*History and Class Consciousness* (1923). Is it important that this event took
place? If it is worth remembering, why? What does this mean for social theorizing? These are the questions I try to address.

B.) The Uses of a Past: Lukács and Simmel

Although Lukács is hardly a well-known theorist within American social science in general and American political science in particular, he is by no means totally unknown, and in fact, his work has been revived on so many different occasions that it is questionable what more can be added. Indeed, is there any reason for devoting yet another thesis to the problem of Lukács' work? I think it can be argued that this thesis does make a slightly different contribution to the literature than that of the other works which now exist, but it does so only by building upon what has already been done by others and by narrowing the scope of discussion. This can be made clearer if we briefly examine the ways in which Lukács' work has thus far been used.

The first major discussion of Lukács' History and Class Consciousness, the work upon which his fame ultimately rests despite his regular attempts at disowning it, came immediately after its publication. The book was the major work of a broader tendency in post-World-War-I Marxism to attempt a return to the Hegelian roots of the Marxist method. With the gradual cooling of revolutionary activity in the immediate postwar period, the theoretical problem arose of what would be the nature of Marxist opposition in a period when it could not foresee an immediate overthrow of capitalism. With the explosions of the postwar period still fresh in mind, and with the general failure of Social Democratic parties throughout Europe in either halting the outbreak of hostilities or in pursuing vigorous policies when the situations seemed ripe for revolution in the period after the war, a return to the
gradualist "automatic Marxism" of the Second International seemed thoroughly discredited. With the Bolshevization of the western parties in the twenties, the work of Lukács and others took the form of a philosophical opposition to the reinstitution of many of the theoretical positions of the Second International. Today it is clear that all of this amounted only to an unsuccessful battle against the total deterioration of Marxist theory and practice with the rise of Stalin. At the time, however, the hopelessness of the struggle was less clear. Karl Korsch, whose Marxism and Philosophy had been denounced at the World Congress of the International in 1924 by Zinoviev as possessing the same "ultra-left" tendencies as Lukács' work, engaged in an active resistance to Moscow orthodoxy within the German party, while Lukács, in exile in Vienna, was involved in a factional struggle within the exiled Hungarian Party. Korsch was eventually expelled from the party for his opposition to the German-Soviet military cooperation treaty, while Lukács eventually abandoned his political opposition and made a tactical self-criticism as an "entry ticket" into the party at a time when he felt there was no organizational basis from which fascism could be opposed except for within the International. With Korsch isolated, Lukács integrated, and the rise of fascism in Germany disrupting the debate over party theory and practice, Lukács' work became of importance only to those like the Frankfurt School who sought to preserve some semblance of Lukács' critique of "automatic Marxism" within the West.

There is little indication that Lukács' work had any great impact on American social scientists in those years. Harold Lasswell cites it in connection with a discussion of the integration of individual and societal levels of analysis, but his own Freudian reductionist argument against Marx
indicates that the book was probably only of passing historical interest to him. A continuance of some of Lukács' ideas may be found in the work of Sidney Hook in the thirties and forties, but it is clear that the "Western Marxist" critique of Stalinism was far overshadowed by the appeal of Trotskyism to American academics.

The second major Lukács revival occurred in post-war France, where an intelligentsia which had been greatly influenced by a major revival of Hegel's philosophy in the later 1930's attempted to revive a Hegelianized Marxism against one of the more enthusiastically Stalinist parties in Europe. Generally this revival may be divided between the work of the group around Temps Moderne and especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose long interest in Lukács' work culminated in Adventures of the Dialectic (1955) which placed History and Class Consciousness before the public as a possible basis from which a new, non-dogmatic left could be constructed, and Lucien Goldmann's use of Lukács' both against the PCF and the Temps Moderne group. Both Merleau-Ponty and Goldmann concentrated on History and Class Consciousness and stressed the extent to which the work developed out of the neo-Kantian tradition. Merleau-Ponty preceded his discussion of Lukács with a chapter on Weber, indicating that Lukács' work can only be understood as a direct response to the problems raised by Weber's studies of the capitalist rationalization and the role of historical understanding. Goldmann argued that Lukács' early writings contain many of the themes of modern existentialism and that the passage from cultural pessimism to Marxist activism is a step which needs also to be taken by the French existentialists.

The latest rise of interest in Lukács' work is associated with the interest of the New Left in the 1960's in carrying out a program that was in many ways similar to that of Merleau-Ponty's early Marxist writings. The revival
of interest in Germany led to the publication of *History and Class Consciousness* in a number of pirate editions, since Lukács himself did not permit a reprinting of the book until 1968. These editions, along with similar mimeographed and photocopied reproductions of Lukács' writings on parliamentarianism, critiques of Lukács of the period 1923-26, writings of Pannekoek and Gorter, and the writings of the early years of the Frankfurt School, constituted much of the theoretical core of the German student left during its anti-authoritarian period. Much of this literature began to filter back into the academic Left in the United States when students of Herbert Marcuse, attending Adorno's seminars in Frankfurt, began collecting some of the massive amounts of literature which had been republished during the early sixties.

The interest in Lukács' work by radical scholars in the United States thus coincided with the republication of Lukács' collected works by Luchterhand, the massive *Festschrift* for his 80th birthday, and the publication of an ever increasing number of papers on Lukács in various American journals. Finally, within the last three years, the first English translations of Lukács' early works, including *History and Class Consciousness*, has set off yet another wave of reviews and commentaries. In terms of how the works of Lukács have been approached by English-speaking commentators, it seems justifiable to distinguish those works which stem out of the New Left revival, such as the theses of Breines, Arato, and Feenberg, from those which come out of an older generation, such as the short survey by Lichtheim and the compilations by Parkinson and Mészáros. This is not to suggest that this distinction is merely one of ideological blindnesses on the part of one or both sides. Rather, there are some important differences in what has been attempted in both of these revivals. Lichtheim and Parkinson, as well
as many of the authors of the shorter journal papers on Lukács, have tended to survey the entire course of Lukács' creative work. The result of this decision is a corpus of work which is too superficial in the treatment of the early works to serve as a basis for this endeavor. Arato and Breines, on the other hand, by limiting themselves to the period ending with the Blum Theses, have managed to produce a comprehensive historical survey of Lukács' early works. There has not, however, been a great deal of work on the theoretical significance of Lukács' early works for critical social theory, with the exception of work by Arato on the concept of reification and by Feenberg on criticisms of Soviet philosophy. The primarily historical-documentary flavor of the New Left revival of Lukács is understandable. In view of the distortions involved in the terribly biased analysis of Zitta and the cursory surveys by Lichtheim and others, the contribution of Breines and Arato in indicating the complexity of Lukács' early works is an important one. Through a concentration on Arato's part on the early Hungarian works and through Breines' attention to the early study "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas," the emphasis on the "aesthetic" side of the young Lukács has been corrected and we now see that as early as 1908, Lukács made use of Marxist sociological concepts and was capable of undertaking a sociological as well as aesthetic analysis of the cultural crisis of Bourgeois society. This fact should rob Lukács' "conversion" of some of its shock value: Lukács was indeed committed to an essentially Marxist outlook for most of his life, and what prevented this outlook from taking the form of a direct commitment to active work within a communist party was the unavailability of such an opportunity until the immediate post-World War I years. Also, this should force us to reconsider the early aesthetic works and recognize that they contain in many places, as I will indicate below, very
concrete critiques of bourgeois society.

These studies also led to a necessity for a reevaluation of the role of George Simmel as an influence on Lukács' work. Lukács himself lists Simmel as one of the major influences in his early years, claiming that his first intensive readings of Marx's work were colored by the influence of his "Simmelian spectacles." And as Breines and Arato have indicated, there is ample evidence that great use was made of Simmel's *Philosophie des Geldes* in the discussions of reification in "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas."

By contrast, there is very little discussion of Simmel's work in Lichtheim's study and only passing references to Simmel as an "influence" in Parkinson. What is also significant is that the Arato-Breines stress on the importance of Simmel and sociological tendencies in the early Lukács is also at variance with the French Left's revival, since Goldmann's stress was on the philosophical content of the early aesthetic works to the exclusion of the political and sociological content, while Merleau-Ponty makes a theoretical argument that *History and Class Consciousness* represents a critique and *Aufhebung* of Weber, but apparently never engaged in any extensive historical research into the works of the young Lukács to see if in fact there was any evidence of a theoretical link to Weber outside of passing comments in *History and Class Consciousness*.

Thus, it appears that we may finally be in a position to begin a theoretical investigation of the significance of Lukács' work for the social sciences as a result of its relationship to an important "founding father." Goldmann has already done a great deal in this direction, but apparently without an acquaintance with the possible importance of Simmel's conceptions of form-content relations, and hence he often winds up crediting Lukács with discoveries which "resemble" certain traits of modern structuralism, when, as I
will argue below, a good deal of this may be already found in Simmel. Along the same lines, it appears that the argument of Merleau-Ponty's book could be greatly enhanced by a recognition that Simmel, perhaps even more than Weber, was the major sociologist whose theories form the basis of the critique of *History and Class Consciousness*. Out of this realization could come a study of the significance of Lukács' use and transcendence of Simmel's analysis.

C.) The Plan of this Investigation

What I hope to carry out in this work is a combination of the historical accuracy of the work of Breines and Arato with the perceptive but perhaps misguided theoretical insights of Merleau-Ponty and Goldmann. I have attempted to do this through an analysis which presumes that Simmel's influence on Lukács in many ways helps to define the type of problems with which Lukács deals. If this assumption can be maintained, it would indicate that the significance of *History and Class Consciousness* lies not in its being a rejection of one type of theorizing for another, but rather that it is in many ways a deepening of certain tendencies within Simmel's sociology. It must be stressed that this argument does not attempt to reduce Lukács' thought to Simmel's, but rather attempts to see if there is a common locus within work of both Lukács and Simmel. I will introduce a concept in the first chapter which will serve as the organizing focus of our discussion. I believe that it is possible to find in the concept of "*Bildung*" — a term whose untranslatability will be discussed in Chapter I — an answer both to the question of how we may distinguish social and natural collectivities and also to the problem of what common set of problems unites the concerns of Simmel and Lukács. Chapter I will explore the meaning of the term and its
significance for social theorizing, while Chapter II will explore the use of the term in Simmel and Hegel to indicate how Lukács could make use of Simmel as a means of eventually recovering the Hegelian senses of the term. Chapter III investigates how Simmel and Lukács carried out sociological investigations of the fragmented status of contemporary culture, and serves as a prelude for a discussion of Lukács' reformation of these methods in *History and Class Consciousness*. This discussion occurs in Chapter IV which traces the ways in which Lukács developed and modified Simmel's concepts, while the final conclusions inquire into the possible significance all of this has for social theorizing today.

In closing, it might be worthwhile to give the reader a warning. Since my concern has been with a limited theoretical problem as a means of correcting a bias in a limited corpus of the literature on Lukács, I do not feel that this work is a very desirable introduction to Lukács' work and I do not think it can be read with much pleasure or enlightenment apart from the works of Breines, Arato, Goldmann and Merleau-Ponty mentioned above. *History and Class Consciousness* is a rather complex tapestry whose threads run far back into classical German philosophy and reach forward into the problems which face us today. I have not attempted, like others, to give a summary of the design of the tapestry as a substitute for looking at it or as a guide as to what might be found if one tries to look at it. Rather, I have seized onto a thread and doggedly chased it through all of its twists and turns, all of its criss-crossing of other threads. On occasion I have mentioned where other threads have been crossed, but I have attempted to resist the temptation of following them. This alone is not enough to convince anyone of the importance of Lukács' work, and those who seek an introduction might do best to turn elsewhere.
Chapter I: Intersubjectivity and Bildung: A Reformulation of the Problematic of Social Theory

It is my purpose in this chapter to reformulate the distinction which was made on a naive level in the introduction between physical and social collectivities in a manner which is more appropriate for the tasks of historical analysis and conceptual recovery towards which this thesis aims. In attempting to carry out this task I will make use of the peculiarly German concept of Bildung since this term is of great importance in indicating the distinctive characteristic of human collectivities, as well as having been the term which seems to be a central axis around which the social thought of Lukács and Simmel turns. In what follows I will first point to some central dichotomies I have noted in the introduction in terms of attempts to explain the specific features of human collectivities, and then indicate how residues of these tensions are found in the Kantian doctrines of categories and experience which were taken over by Simmel in his studies of the dialectic of life and form. A summary attempts to pull these strands together and indicate the still remaining tensions which both Simmel and Hegel explored in similar but often diverging manners.

But first it might be useful to attempt to translate Bildung, if only to demonstrate to the reader that the task is a rather thankless one and that ultimately we will probably have to leave the term untranslated and let it enter into English usage in the same manner as Geist, Gestalt, Verstehen, and Weltanschauung: by proving its use-value in actual discourse, through the power of the distinctions and operations it permits us to perform. A German-English dictionary will give us the following profusion of words: "formation," "forming," "form," "fashion," "shape," "structure," "growth,"
"organization," "constitution," "development," "generation," "education," "training," "cultivation," "culture," "civilization." Part of the logic behind this list of somehow related terms is explained by the fact that the word is a modification of "Bild" which could be translated as "picture," "image," "likeness," "representation," "idea," "emblem," "symbol." The first few possible English definitions of Bildung are clearly related to these senses of Bild. Bildung could here be grasped as the process by which an image, picture, representation, etc. comes into being, hence the stress on the verbal form in the definitions of Bildung: we are dealing with a name for a process, where every final form should carry the sense of having been the product of a process of forming. But what of definitions such as "education," "civilization," "culture," and "cultivation?" We find all of these present in the German verb "bilden" and hence it is advisable to think of "bilden" as denoting some sort of a process by which images, pictures, and forms come into being, be they inorganic ice crystals ("Kristalle bilden sich") or human talents. But, to add a bit more confusion to the picture, the verb has both active and reflexive forms: aside from someone "forming" an object out of clay, one can "form" ("educate") one's self in the art of "forming" objects out of clay.

As the term will be used most often in this text, which parallels the German philosophical usage, the most important usages will be those associated with self-formation, cultivation, education, civilization. A German dictionary will define this sense of the word to native speakers along the general line of "inner mental (geistige - which of course can in no way be merely translated as mental) formation or education." This seems to be a useful definition only until one actually tries to use it; the presence of such an ambiguous word as "geistige" in conjunction with such a traditionally
deceptive metaphor as "inner" (shades of the "ghost in the machine") should give a hint of what one quickly finds oneself dealing with.

A good deal of the confusion can be limited by pointing out the fact that these meanings of Bildung seem to be much less a product of some peculiarity of German word construction than certain other philosophical terms, such as the tremendous power gained by having both Objekt and Gegenstand to refer to "object." Rather they are the result of a conscious introduction of a new term into the language by writers at a given point in history. The birthdate of Bildung may be fixed somewhere between 1750, when phrases such as Bildung des Menschen or Charakter bildung do not yet appear in conventional speech and 1800, when such phrases have been elevated to the status of fashionable conventions.¹ The word is thus a product of the German humanist enlightenment, and as such was a valuable conceptual tool in trying to define a new ideal of the human being: Man as the "gebildete Mensch." The human would be seen as something other than a simple product of biological evolution or a simple vessel of divine rationality. The two simple reductions which I mentioned in the introduction were bypassed in favor of confronting the problem of the human being on the level of social theory through posing the problem of how a society or a culture can become a community of reasonable, cultivated, informed, human human beings.

All of this has been intended to show that our problem in defining Bildung is intimately related with the problem of criteria for critical theorizing. To the extent that one can find traces of a "Marxist humanism" in Lukacs' attempted solution to this problem, one finds an attempt to confront the problem of how humanity is formed historically rather than a postulation of an ahistorical human essence.² With the introduction of the concept of Bildung the problem of humanism becomes a social, historical, and hence,
political question, and the task of developing Lukacs' contribution to social theory, as it develops out of a use of Marx to resolve theoretical problems posed by Simmel, ultimately forces us to reexamine the philosophical tasks posed by German humanism.

A). The Fundamental Dichotomy of Early Uses of Bildung

A comprehensive survey of German humanist philosophy would take us far from our goal. All that can be pointed out here is that some of the tensions I noted in the Introduction are already present in the way in which the term Bildung" was employed in early years of its life. Hans Weil notes a basic difference in the way in which the term was employed in his comprehensive survey of the history of the concept, Die Entstehung des Deutschen Bildungsprinzips (1930). One can find cases of Bildung denoting either the "making into an image" (Bildung als zum Bilde machen") or the "cultivation of pregiven faculties or talents" (Bildung als Ausbildung vorgegebener Anlagen"). To be sure, this is in no way a logical contradiction. Rather Weil argues that these two senses of the word represent two differing stresses which the word contains and which interact in a different way throughout the career of the concept. How then can these two senses of the term be distinguished?

In the first view, "Bildung as making into an image," a general goal is already postulated as an image into which all individuals are to be made. Weil associates this position with ideas derived from the work of the English philosopher Anthony Shaftesbury (1671-1713), whose ideal of "aesthetic education" had the intent of producing "gentlemen" who would have self-control, a sense of harmony and perspective, and a taste for the beautiful, goals which Shaftesbury postulated on the basis of his classical studies. In other words,
what takes place under this conception of Bildung is a movement to a pre-established goal. Each individual member must be tailored to fit into society through a process of socialization and acculturation which in the end brings each new component of the social aggregate into harmony with all of the rest.\textsuperscript{5}

In contrast, the second sense of the term, "Bildung as the cultivation of pregiven faculties or talents," reverses the stress of goals and process that is found in the first conception. This meaning originates with Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744-1803) use of Rousseau's idea that man possesses a natural goodness as the basis for a doctrine of Bildung which employed a "vegetative analogy" along the lines of Rousseau's "on façonne les plantes par la culture, et les hommes par l'éducation."\textsuperscript{6} Here the individual, and the various differentiable talents which individuals may possess by nature, is primary, and in this sense the concept of Bildung could be employed as an aesthetic basis for bourgeois pluralist democracy in the early years of its formation.\textsuperscript{7}

It would be beyond the limits of this study to develop the intricacies of Weil's arguments concerning how these two senses of the term interacted in various combinations in the work of Humboldt and others. It is important however that we ask about the relevance that these two senses of the term can have for social theory. Obviously these two conceptions (perhaps they should be thought of as "polar ideal types") give vastly different bases from which a critique of a society could be launched. Each of them implies some concept of a "rational society;" that is, a society which in some way would be the fullest incarnation possible of the Bildungs-ideal in question. Starting from this ideal one could proceed to evaluate the way in which the society affected its members and pass judgment on the justness, rationality or
goodness of the society in question. In their pure form, however, the two notions of Bildung seem useless. One winds up evaluating the society positively or negatively in terms of how effective it is in producing a completely homogeneous mass of "gentlemen" or how effective it is in making no demands on the individual whatsoever -- in short, how far it goes towards abolishing itself. The two extremes of a goal of a society which completely dominates and reforms its individual members or which is completely dissolved by its members have no force as critical guidelines since they could both be used, with complete indifference, against any possible society. One would assume that even within the most totalitarian heroic-folkish state some residues of individual differentiation might remain, just as even in the most anarchistic community some supra-individual restraints would apply. One is forced to conclude, in the words of a later group of critical theorists,

The pure concept of society is just as abstract as the pure concept of the individual, and abstract too is the allegedly eternal antithesis between the two. Where the truth and falsity, justice and injustice, of these two moments lie... this cannot be established once and for all in terms of generalizing definitions, but only by means of the analysis of concrete social relations and of the concrete forms the individual takes on within these relations.8

In view of the popular conception in some of the literature on Lukács that his Marxism was basically a "romantic reaction" to an industrialized world, and as such was based more on sentimental ludditism than social analysis, it is important to stress that it was impossible for Lukács to make a move from tragic pessimism to Marxist activism without making an essential alteration in the Bildungs-ideals which have been presented here. Thus one of the most important aspects of the relationship of Simmel to Lukács (a relationship which, as I have noted, is totally ignored in the papers which develop the "romantic" image of Lukács) is that Lukács was able to transcend abstract
criteria similar to those outlined above through the working out of the critique of these very standards which had already been begun in Simmel's work. By pushing the two contradictory notions of Bildung to their extremes of a basic contradiction, present in contemporary society, between "Life" and "Form," Simmel indicated the necessity of finding some other critical standpoint for social theorizing. Lukács' work may be seen as an attempt to explore the Simmelian paradoxes and, upon finding no way out from within the system, to make an attempted transcendence of the dichotomy through the introduction of a new concept of totality, and with it, a new notion of Bildung.

B). Form, Life, and Bildung in Simmel and Kant

The last paragraph anticipates the conclusions of this part of the thesis: In order to be able to substantiate these claims it is necessary to make a rigorous examination of Simmel's sociological and philosophical writings. As a start in this direction, I will attempt now to indicate the way in which Simmel's work can be viewed as being intrinsically connected with the problem of Bildung and alienation as they are raised in classical German philosophy. This is especially necessary since in spite of a number of excellent studies which have appeared in this country indicating the breadth of Simmel's interests, there is a tendency among American social scientists to identify the totality of Simmel's work with that portion which has been most successfully integrated into mainstream sociology: his formal analyses of organizations and his studies of small groups.

In discussing Simmel's formulation of the problem of Bildung - and here I refer only to the general theoretical issue of the connection of form and life on a methodological level, rather than to his actual cultural critiques of the
disjuncture between form and life — it is perhaps best to start with his own self-evaluation. Simmel's "Selbstdarstellung" clearly indicates that he viewed his work as consisting of two interrelated elements, "epistemological and Kantian studies" and work in "the historical and social sciences." On the one hand he adheres to the basic Kantian "Copernican Revolution" and concludes from his work on the philosophy of history that

'history' meant the formation of immediate, experienced events compatible with the apriori of the scientifically represented spirit (wissenschaftbildenden Geistes).

But Simmel develops this "purely epistemological" doctrine further, by incorporating it as a methodological principle of a scientific sociology which investigates how this doctrine is concretely present in social interaction;

I produced a new concept of sociology, in which I separated the forms of sociation (Vergesellschaftung) from the contents, i.e. the drives, ends, material contents ...: the processing of these species of interaction has been undertaken in my book as the object of a pure sociology.

Not content to conclude his work on this level, Simmel returns to the domain of philosophy and generalizes his sociological findings;

From this sociological meaning, the concept of interaction grew in my work to a generally all-encompassing metaphysical principle. The temporal-historical (zeitgeschichliche) resolution of all substantiality, absolutes, eternalities in the flux of things, in historical mutation, in merely psychological reality appears to me only to assure an unsupported subjectivism and scepticism... The central concepts of truth, value, objectivity, etc. present themselves to me as interactions; as the content of a relativism which now no longer meant the dissolution of all certainty, but rather a certaining against this through a new concept of certainty (Festigkeitsbegriftes).

Thus Simmel's apparently eclectic concerns are tied together by a unified program: a "use of Kant against Kant" as one commentator has described it.

It is this central concern which unites Simmel's early Darwin-inspired attempts to account for the persistence of categories and forms through a study of
practical life drives, with his final attempts to elucidate a "metaphysics of life." Both begin with a basically Kantian outlook toward cognition, seeing it as an active process of forming reality along the lines of certain a priori laws, but both also attempt to concretize this notion by transforming the Kantian transcendental categories into historically immanent categories which are generated by either practical action or the dynamic of life.

In order to appreciate what is involved for social theory in this transformation it is necessary to make a brief, and thus necessarily incomplete examination of the role which the Kantian doctrine of categories plays with respect to the problems of Bildung and intersubjectivity. Since what follows is bound to be a distortion of Kant's position, it is important to indicate the general orientation from which this summary of Kant is made. I employ Lucien Goldmann's study of Immanuel Kant since his approach seems to be the most complete presentation of the view of Kant's work which dominates Lukács' approach. Goldmann stresses the significance of Kant's pre-critical works, while also concentrating on the later critiques of judgment and practical reason, as well as the more widely known Critique of Pure Reason. This view of Kant parallels the stress among the Heidelberg Neo-Kantians whose concerns extended over the entire range of the three critiques, as opposed to the work of the Marburg neo-Kantians whose attention was directed mainly toward the Critique of Pure Reason. This concern with the issues of aesthetic evaluation and moral action can be found persistently reappearing in Lukács' early work, so it seems advisable to base this summary of Kant on the one readily available text which closely approximates this position. Of course, this decision leaves open the question of the relationship of the Goldmann-Lukács Kant to the real "Kant-an sich," but such an action seems unavoidable if this portion of the text
is not to expand beyond all bounds or consist of a summary of Kant which is completely out of keeping with the way Kant was viewed by Lukács. 19

In approaching Kant's work through this perspective we immediately re-encounter the problem of the acculturation of the individual into the social and cultural sphere in its philosophical guise: the problems of skepticism and solipsism. It is here that social philosophy and epistemology join, with the question of what reasons we have for assuming that there is, or can be, a common world which is shared by a collectivity of thinking, reasoning, judging, and acting individuals. This problem seems to have become endemic to all of the major philosophies of this century (one need only think of the struggles of Wittgenstein, Ayer, Wisdom, Sartre, and Husserl with the dilemma) 20 and thus it is advisable to pose the question in the particular form in which it entered neo-Kantian philosophy. The Kantian doctrine of transcendental categories serves to tie together two distinct levels of phenomena: 1) the cognitions, perceptions, intuitions, feelings, etc. of the particular individual, which are commonly referred to through the use of terms such as Erlebnis (lived experience) or simply Leben (life in the sense in which German Lebensphilosophie developed the term: as human life and experience rather than a general vitalist concept as in Bergson), 21 and 2) categories, forms, means of expression, and symbols which are universal in some fashion, and shared by a community of individuals, thus making possible transpersonal, inter-subjective discourse about the contents of Erlebnis and Leben. In general, these means of expressions are termed Forms, and it is very important, as we shall see, that this concept of form be utilized in approaching Simmel's "formal sociology."

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason bound his own particular version of these two levels, which for lack of a better term I will call the individual and
the general, into an indissolvable unity.

If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.\textsuperscript{22}

With the requirement that empirical knowledge must be viewed as consisting of both a general, intersubjectively shared power of producing representations ("the spontaneity of knowledge") and a specific, intuited, personal experience ("the receptivity of our mind") Kant has given a solution to the problem of knowledge which neither sacrifices the individual's experience to the dictates of a higher or more enlightened intuition (such as a wisdom which can only be achieved by a limited group within the society) nor dissolves the general images and representations of discourse into a babel of competing claims and descriptions. Disagreements may arise between individuals' experience, but there exist reasonable ways of settling them, since both the spontaneity of knowledge and the receptivity of mind are general species traits of all human beings. Kant is able to win this battle, however, only at the cost of the problematic Ding an sich.

In approaching the Ding an sich it is first important that we recognize what is at stake in the problem of solipsism for the specific case of Kant, since much of Goldmann's analysis of the social significance of Kantian epistemology turns on this point, and also since Goldmann's discussion will help to illustrate the importance a resolucion of the problem of
solipsism has for social theorizing. In his *Prolegomena to Any Future Meta-
physics* Kant indicates the source from which the impetus towards critical
philosophy stemmed.

I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing
which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my
investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction.

Hume started chiefly from a single but important concept in metaphysics,
namely, that of the connection of cause and effect... He challenged
reason, which pretends to have given birth to this concept of herself,
to answer him by what right she thinks anything could be so constituted
that if that thing be postulated, something else also must necessarily
be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause.23

Hume's basic argument, vastly simplified, was that there could be no certainty
of a necessary connection between two events (cause and effect) simply through
contemplation of any one occurrence of the conjunction, nor could repeated
observations establish any greater connection between the two events than
a contingent probability that one event might be followed by another event.
This connection was only possible, on the level of empirical, contingent
knowledge; reason declared no necessary connection.

Goldmann's discussion of this point is illuminating, even if one disagrees
with the economic class analysis which accompanies the argument. He raises the
question of why British empirical philosophers, such as Hume, would be content
to accept a merely contingent notion of connection, while Kant was driven to
the development of an elaborate epistemology in hopes of salvaging some type
of necessity. Comparing the situation of class conflict in England, France
and Germany in the periods when empirical-sensualist philosophy, rationalist
philosophy, and Kantian critical philosophy respectively appeared, Goldmann
finds three distinct situations. In France, a successful bourgeois revolution
had taken place, instituting the ideals of freedom, individuality, and equality
before the law, which found their philosophical expression in a rationalist
philosophy which reproduced the demands of freedom and equality in an assertion both of man's freedom from all natural constraints and his freedom from all transcendental communal bonds. The human community now became an association of free, independent, and reasonable individuals whose sought to know and control nature through science, and influence each other through rational argument. In England, in contrast, there had been no violent struggle for power between the rising bourgeoisie and the old nobility, and consequently the philosophical thought written with the bourgeoisie in power was more pragmatic, less radically speculative and theoretical. There was no need to postulate the possibility of rational communication between individual since in the relatively peaceful English situation, such problems were never of any great immediate importance. Thus Hume's theoretical demonstrations of the uncertainty of our knowledge had no force when he left his library and went to his pub.

But for Kant the situation was markedly different. The philosophical tradition of Germany had been introspective, mystical, and had stressed the solitary individual, not the rational communication of free men or the empirical day-to-day dealings of gentlemen. This reflected a social situation where an underdeveloped economy and a fragmented political system still bore many of the traces of the Middle Ages. Hence a skeptical philosophy, such as Hume's, which cast doubt on the transcendental status of reason and community, would be much less tolerable than it had been in England. While in England there remained an empirical community even after philosophy had skeptically disposed of transcendental assurances, in Germany the transcendental assurance provided the only grounds on which one could point to even the possibility of a rationally organized community at a future date. Kant's treatment of the
relationship between individual experience and general forms and categories can be viewed as a sort of minimal program for indicating the possibility of a rational community in Germany. The prohibition of the use of transcendental categories independently of any empirical, experiential content acts as a check against any philosophies which would argue that human knowledge could obtain absolute knowledge through some type of direct, mystical intuition— an appeal which would win absolute knowledge at the price of concrete intersubjectivity.  

27 At the same time, Kant attacks any form of sceptical empiricism which would make knowledge of the unconditional and the totality inaccessible to any kind of knowledge.  

28 Thus, Kant's approach to the problem of the ideal of complete understanding, which would appear on an empirical level as the reconciliation of all controversies of judgment and hence be the principle on which the formation of a completely homogeneous community would rest, is two-sided. He defends the prospect of "divine understanding" or the archetype (Urgrund) against all the attacks of the skeptic, but can do this only by making the archetype a goal which cannot be realized empirically at present. Discussing the "ideal of pure reason" in the first critique, Kant warns, 

... to attempt to realize the ideal in an example, that is, in the (field of) appearance, as, for instance, to depict the (character of the perfectly) wise man in a romance, is impracticable. There is indeed something absurd, and far from edifying, in such an attempt inasmuch as the natural limitations, which are constantly doing violence to the incompleteness of the idea, make the illusion that is aimed at altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself—the good that has its source in the idea—by giving it the air of being a mere fiction.  

29 In Goldmann's analysis, it is important not to confuse mechanisms through which Kant restricts knowledge at present, the most important being the thing-in-itself, as we shall see in Lukács' discussion of it, with a denial of any
possible expansion of man's capabilities. The ideal of pure reason, of a knowledge of the totality, is given in man, but it is given as a goal to be achieved, not as a state of affairs already present. It is, in Goldmann's words, man's "authentic destiny" to strive for the absolute, and hence he engages in a bitter critique of the neo-Kantians since their treatment of the thing-in-itself shows that

What for Kant was a tragic limitation of man became for the neo-Kantians a normal, self-evident fact, and implicitly, an apology. 30 It is not at all clear how justified Goldmann's critique is, since the interest in the two later critiques and the problems of judgment and values at Heidelberg seemed to indicate that there the Critique of Pure Reason was not viewed simply as a setting out of the "Bounds of Sense," to employ the phrase of a recent commentator, 31 but rather was seen as a work which had to be developed and continued. Even Goldmann's own position is not always consistent, since there is at least one neo-Kantian, Emil Lask, for whom Goldmann seems to have an immense respect. 32 In any case, it is the hope of this thesis to indicate that in many ways Simmel should also be seen as trying to develop certain latent aspects of Kantian critical philosophy, and that in many ways his development of Kant parallels certain arguments in Hegel. It is through Simmel's implicitly Hegelian critique of Kant that Lukács comes to an explicitly Hegelian Marxist reformulation of the problem of Bildung.

C). Summary: The Dichotomy in Bildung and Kant's Synthesis

It remains for us to attempt to pull together the various lines of argument which have been attempted in this section before moving on to an analysis of Simmel's own writings. In attempting to illuminate the senses of the term Bildung, I have argued that the word has a tendency to indicate one of two conceptions of how individuals acquire the talents, skills,
capabilities, and knowledge which enables them to function in their society and culture. Employing Weil's dichotomy of "Bildung as making into an image" and "Bildung as the cultivation of pregiven talents" I have suggested that these two modes of analysis could form the basis for vastly different, but equally absurd, standards for judging the rationality of existing societies. The problem is thus raised as to how a critical theory of society can find an effective mediation between a view of socialization and acculturation which makes the society absolute and which sees individuals as objects to be molded into the image society postulates, and a view which sees the individual as absolute, and completely formed and realized without the intervention of others. From these polar ideal types and the abstract tension they represent, I turned to the problem of the relation of experience and life to form, categories, and symbols, in order to illustrate that what is at stake in the Kantian conception of categories, the thing-in-itself and the ideal of pure reason is an attempt to find a mediation between the dilemmas which face us if we absolutize one or the other side of the Bildung dichotomy. Through Lucien Goldmann's analysis of Kant's political and cultural situation, I have attempted to concretize the doctrine of categories in hopes of showing the relevance they have for the development of critical tools through which existing societies can be criticized. 33 Kant's attempt has shown us one way in which an effort can be made to avoid an either/or choice of individual or social, experience or category, life or form, "Bildung as making into an image" or "Bildung as the cultivation of a pregiven talent." If Kierkegaard's characterization of Hegel's philosophy as a relentless avoidance of the either/or in favor of the both/and is a correct estimation of the tasks of dialectics, then it seems fruitful for us to turn our attention to attempts at resolving the Bildung question
through Hegelian analysis. This is the concern of the next chapter, which will indicate how the program which we have seen outlined by Simmel in this chapter can be approached as an approximation of the Hegelian Bildung-critique. In the chapters that follow we will investigate the contradictions which Simmel's approximation of Hegel encounters, as well as Lukács' intensification of these contradictions during his neo-Kantian phase and eventual Marxist reformulation.
Chapter II: Alienation and Recognition: Dialectical Bildung in Hegel and Simmel

In the preceding chapter I have indicated how Kant was able to reformulate the concept of Bildung by joining the two antagonistic sides of the concept in his notion of a transcendental unity of individuals. Georg Simmel summarized well the specific features of the Kantian concept of the individual when he wrote,

With the categorical imperative, the ideal of equality has become the meaning of every ought. Self-flattering arrogance has been made impossible: the individual can no longer feel himself entitled to indulge in special actions and enjoyments because he fancies that he is "different from the others." ...

Thus the eighteenth-century conception of individuality, with its emphasis on personal freedom that does not exclude, but includes, equality, because the "true person" is the same in every accidental man, has found its abstract perfection in Kant.¹

Any possible egoist claim of a unique, personal "pre-given talent" which serves as the basis for a unique process of Bildung is rejected by Kant, through the formulation of a general, trans-personal ego which contains universal, inter-subjective categories of experience. But Kant avoids a complete surrender to the position of "Bildung as making into an image" by a constant denial that this transcendentally given ego can completely realize itself in a total appropriation of content: the thing-in-itself stands as a barrier which reminds the educator that he himself has not completed his education and thus is in no position to prescribe general rules for educating and molding the individual members of society. What emerges is a unique synthesis of the two definitions of Bildung. From the idea of Bildung as the development of a pre-given potential, Kant takes the concepts which form the basis of a liberal-democratic ideal of society. But, since this society is not an
empirical given, and must only be posited on a transcendental level, Kant describes the features of this "vorgegebene Anlage" in terms reminiscent of the alternative Bildungs-ideal: an independent image (Gebilde), which is here given as a task to be realized historically through the working out of one's own innate faculties.

The brilliance of the Kantian solution surely lies in the fact that immense tensions are held together through the force of Kant's arguments alone. But the poverty of the solution must also lie on the same level: when transferred to the concrete realm of social interaction, the force of the argument weakens. There is a great gulf opened between the formal imperatives which issue from the transcendental subject and the concrete, material situations which face the empirical person. Thus, it is not surprising that both the Hegelian and Simmelian critiques of the Kantian solution begin with the conviction that the ethical imperatives contained in the system can have no meaning for the historically situated individual. In this sense it is possible to see Simmel and Hegel as Kant's "existentialist" critics: in opposition to the Kantian notion of the "true individual" who exists on a transcendental level, they pose the problem of the actual subject and its interactions with the world.

In this chapter I will attempt to indicate how this critique is made and how, with the rejection of the Kantian notion of "transcendental Bildung," a concept of Bildung as a process of estrangement and reconciliation within history is developed. This is the common project which unites Hegel and Simmel, despite their many and important differences. This similarity takes on great importance for this study since it indicates the logic which lies behind Lukács' path from Simmel, through Hegel, to Marx. From Simmel, Lukács
developed the basic outlines of a historical, dialectical conception of the cultural development of the individual. By exploring the limitations of the process in contemporary society - and here again Lukács was only carrying out what is implicit in Simmel's analysis - he was pushed beyond Simmel's formulations to a confrontation with the more complex Hegelian notions of alienation and recognition. Through a Marxian concretization of this dialectical conception of Bildung, he was able to outline the features of a critical theory of society.

But, once again, the argument has gone beyond the confines of this chapter. In what follows I will first indicate the ways in which Simmel and Hegel diverge from Kant, and then turn to a consideration of the way in which the alienation theories of each develop as attempts to historicize the Bildung process. The discussion of the contradictions Simmel sees in the process of "cultivation" will lead us to the examination of the social analysis of Simmel and Lukács which forms Chapter III.

A). The Response to Kant in Hegel and Simmel

The general features of the critique of Kant in Hegel and Simmel can be easily summarized. Both attempt to reduce a minimum the pre-given faculties which are attributed to the subject on a formal, transcendental level. Both attempt to radicalize the doctrine of categories by indicating that though the categories are still responsible for the constitution of reality (consciousness is still the active shaper of reality) the categories themselves are not outside of space and time (are not noumenal) but are rather situated in time, history, and human practice, and hence shaped by their very interaction with the objects which they constitute. So, it is possible to say that both
Hegel and Simmel attempt a "phenomenology" of categories, using the term "phenomenology" in the Hegelian sense of a study which does not leave the realm of appearance (or phenomena) for the realm of transcendental deduction but rather attempts to show that the human potentiality for reason can be shown on the phenomenal level, and must be shown on the phenomenal level alone. The divergence between Hegel and Simmel is over the extent to which the Bildung of individuals into a reasonable community can be shown to have taken place or can be indicated as necessarily having taken place. The foundation for this great divergence in the alienation theories of Simmel and Hegel can be partially traced to their initial reformulation of the Kantian doctrine of categories, which will now be examined.

1). Hegel Against Kant: Consciousness and Concept

Like any other attempt at briefly summarizing some of the key elements in Hegel's thought, what follows runs the risk of being either a gross simplification, or a less than coherent summary. It seems advisable, nevertheless, to attempt some type of presentation of those elements of the Hegelian critique which are taken up by Lukács since, despite the appearance of a number of able summaries and introductions, there still remains an inordinate prejudice against Hegel's work among American social scientists, a prejudice which is often independent of any attempts at reading Hegel's own works. The more obvious limitations of this summary will be that I will be referring almost exclusively to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, and thus will not be able to take advantage of some of the related arguments of his Science of Logic. Yet, the Phenomenology still seems the most accessible work, and the methodological discussions of the preface and introduction are fairly
explicit in their discussion of the move beyond Kantian analysis. An even more appealing reason for concentrating on the Phenomenology is that in doing so I am at least keeping my distortions consistent with those of Lukács'. Since the Phenomenology was his bridge from Simmel to Marx, it is advisable to follow him over it, although there are of course grave questions to be raised about readings which proceed from the Phenomenology to Capital, rather than from the Logic, through the Grundrisse to Capital. But these issues lie beyond the scope of this inquiry, and it seems advisable to attempt only a brief summary of the critique of Kant and the doctrine of alienation as they are developed in the Phenomenology.

To begin, it is important to keep always in mind the extent to which Hegel agreed with certain key ideas in Kantian philosophy. In his critique of the doctrine of categories, he never proposed that the Kantian Copernican Revolution be overturned either in favor of a simple intuition of immediate facts, or in favor of an immediate intuition of absolute knowledge. In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel rejects any attempt to replace a mediated, theoretical access to truth with an immediate intuition of the "feeling of existence." Hegel rejects such "edification" in favor of scientific "insight. In place of "the beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love," "ecstasy," "ferment and enthusiasm," Hegel offers only the Concept (Begriff) and "the march of cold necessity in the subject matter." The task of scientific philosophy is to follow the Bildung of concept and subject out of life itself, but never to permit knowledge to fall back to the preconscious level of intuition or common sense. Hegel’s motives in undertaking the Phenomenology seem parallel to those that motivated Kant’s critical enterprise: he wishes to avoid pretentious and uncontrolled metaphysical speculation while at the
same time rejecting a return to common-sense theorizing. But Hegel turns these arguments against Kant himself, objecting to the tendency present in transcendental analysis of substituting analytic concepts and categories for the actual task of showing the evolution of concepts out of practice. Like Hamann and Herder, he objects to a philosophy which obscures the connections between the categories used in everyday discourse and those used in philosophical speculation. A philosopher should not forsake one type of discourse for the other, he must not idolize either the common language of the ordinary man or the abstract speculation of philosophical language, but rather must show how common-sense concepts can be confronted with their own inadequacies and thus grow into a more adequate expression. One can easily see why Hegel would reject the sort of transcendental epistemological analysis in which Kant engages. Such attempts flec from the actual practice of knowing into an abstract domain where one invents terms for "knowing in general." In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy he states that in this type of analysis, What is demanded is thus the following: we should know the cognitive faculty before we know. It is like wanting to swim before going in the water. The investigation of the faculty of knowledge is itself knowledge, and cannot arrive at its goal because it is this goal already.

Accordingly, the Phenomenology does not consist of a deduction of categories, but rather of a series of interactions between subject and object. Hegel never deals exclusively with concepts and categories, but rather with the activity of doing and speaking which gives rise to new conceptual forms.

This tendency to prefer the "working the matter out" and "the process of arriving at it" to the "lifeless universal" is present throughout Hegel's work and throughout his critique of Kant. One senses it most obviously in his aversion to the abstractness of pure formal logic, but it also can be found on a more social and political level in his reaction to the
categorical imperative. In his discussions of the "Unhappy Consciousness" and the world of the "self-estranged spirit" Hegel passes over ethical systems which are similar to Kant's arguments by virtue of their stress on abstract "duty." In both cases, Hegel attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of any set of formal norms, divorced from actual content, by showing the tremendous contradictions which are generated whenever these general maxims come in contact with actual, real life situations. Findlay summarizes the dilemma of the "Moral Consciousness" as follows,

The Moral Consciousness oscillates unceasingly between the pursuit of a goal which, if realized, would soon put a term to its own life, and the desire to stave off this goal indefinitely, so that it, and its good works, may continue.

The discussion of the problem of formal ethics is by no means limited to these presentations in the Phenomenology. Indeed, the struggle to overcome a merely formal ethics rooted in "duty" with a more organic, communally held set of norms (Sittlichkeit) which take the form of almost natural responses to concrete situations, can be seen as one of the major connecting threads which link Hegel's early theological manuscripts and Jena systems to his later attempts at developing a positive role for the state in the Philosophy of Right. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to indicate all of the ways in which the dilemma of the individual and the ethical community are formulated in Hegel, but it should be stressed that there is a close relationship here between Hegel's methodological rejection of formal, transcendental analysis and his political views on the status of morals in the "civil society."

Having indicated that the first turn Hegel makes against the Kantian system consists in his criticism of its overly formal and abstract nature, we can now turn to his second major criticism: his re-evaluation of the importance of the dialectic. In developing a method of philosophizing that would take him
beyond the abstractions of the Kantian system, Hegel turned to a technique which had been employed in a section of the Critique of Pure Reason and attempted to redefine its purpose. Kant's use of the dialectic in his presentation of the various antinomies of pure reason ultimately took the form of an adjustment on the side of the subject. Confronted with a blatant absurdity, the subject refines its conception of the nature of reality.\textsuperscript{13} Hegel rejects this procedure and attempts in the Phenomenology to employ the dialectic not as a means of forcing the subject to redefine its conceptions, but rather as a technique which will avoid an exclusive concentration on either the subject or object, but instead will trace the entire process of knowing back to a dialectic of subject and object in which both terms are constantly redefined.\textsuperscript{14} Through the use of the concept of "determinate (bestimmte) negation" Hegel portrays the history of a consciousness which gradually educates itself to the level of self-sufficient Geist, and thus Jean Hyppolite's use of the term "roman de culture philosophique" and his analogy between the Phenomenology and such Bildungsromane as Goethe's Wilhelm Meister or Rousseau's Emil, must be considered one of the most felicitous metaphors yet developed for capturing the full sense of Hegel's project.\textsuperscript{15} Hegel's great pains to avoid any approach that would merely present the "truth" independent of the process of working it out, which I have previously noted as a negative response to Kantian formalism, may now be seen in a positive light. Hegel insists on preserving the "labor of the negative" since it is only through the progress of various specific, definitive and determinant negations (all of these adjectives seem necessary in order to get the full sense of Hegel's "bestimmte") that we can overcome an abstract presentation of the knowing process.\textsuperscript{16} It is on this basis that the whole doctrine of
alienation and recognition, which will be discussed at length below, arises.

Hegel gives a striking discussion of the concept of negation in the introduction of the Phenomenology from which I will quote at length. The explication of the concepts which emerge here as related to the process of negation will then lead us to the two final alterations Hegel makes in the methodology of Kantian critical philosophy. The first of these passages, where Hegel attempts to explicate the special sense of negation which he will employ throughout the Phenomenology, describes the basically dialectical nature of experience.

The dialectical movement, which consciousness exercises on itself - on its knowledge as well as its object - is, in so far as the new, true object emerges to consciousness as a result of it, precisely that which is called experience. ... Consciousness knows something, and this object is the essence or the in-itself. But this object is also the in-itself for consciousness; and hence the ambiguity of truth comes into play. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first in-itself and the second is the being for consciousness of this in-itself.

It might be useful for the moment to think of these two objects as Hegel's equivalent to what Kant had labeled noumena (the being in-itself) and phenomena (the being for consciousness of an in-itself). The passage continues,

The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into its self, a representation, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But as already indicated, the first object comes to be altered for consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is the in-itself only for it. And therefore it follows that this, the being-of-consciousness of this in-itself, is the true, which is to say that this true is the essence or consciousness' new object. This new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object.17

Here we see the result of Hegel's decision to deal with the process of knowing. If we are to talk about the way in which consciousness comes to know the world, we must turn to an examination of the objects which conscious-
ness itself has at its disposal. The method of the Phenomenology thus makes no hierarchical ordering which would somehow place the "in-itself" or the "thing-in-itself" on a more primary level than the "in-itself for consciousness," since this distinction would not be present on the level of concrete individuals who are attempting to speak truthfully. Any attempt of a philosopher to indicate that the "in-itself for consciousness" is a somehow inadequate representation of the true in-itself will be made in the medium of abstract philosophical terminology, and is unnecessary since the experiences of consciousness itself ultimately lead it to a similar, but more concrete distinction.

Natural consciousness will show itself to be merely the concept (Begriff) of knowledge, or unreal knowledge. But since it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge, this pathway has a negative significance for its, and what is actually the realization of the Concept is for it [for consciousness, J.S.] rather the loss and destruction of its self. The road may thus be viewed as the way of doubt (Zweifels) or, more properly as the way of despair (Verzweiflung). For what happens here is not what is usually understood by "doubt," i.e. entertaining a disbelief in this or that presumed truth only to return to that same "truth" once the "doubt" has been appropriately dissipated .... On the contrary, this road is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, a knowledge for which that is most real which is in truth only the unrealized Concept.19

In this remarkable passage we can see how Hegel attempts to preserve the essential Kantian truth - the incompleteness of phenomenal knowledge - but without recourse to all of the super-phenomenal apparatus of Kantian philosophy. Phenomenal knowledge shows its untruth on the phenomenal level. The Bildung of the ordinary subject takes place over a road of errors and doubt which are not doubts which take place on a purely hypothetical level at the philosopher's desk (as in Descartes), but rather in a highway of existential despair. The process is not one of losing the certainty of the world temporarily in hopes that once the impossibility of a deceiving God
has been established the entire structure which had been given to us on a common-sense level can be reassembled piece by piece on the level of philosophic certitude. Rather, the world and the truths which are lost are never regained. But the result of this process is not nihilism of solipsism, as all negations, since they take place in history and not in theory, are determinate, which brings us to the final passage I wish to cite. Hegel poses the question of the nature of the skepticism he is discussing in this introduction. He concludes

It is, namely, the skepticism which sees in every result only pure nothingness and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinate, that this is the nothingness of that from which it results. In fact, it is only when nothingness is taken as the nothingness of what it comes that it is the true result; for then nothingness itself is a determinate nothingness and has a content. The skepticism which ends up with the abstraction of nothingness, or with emptiness, cannot proceed any further but must wait and see whether anything new presents itself to it, and what this is, in order to cast it into the same abysmal void. But if, on the contrary, the result is comprehended as it truly is, as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made by which the progression through the complete sequence of Shapes (Gestaltungen) takes place of its own accord.¹⁹

Hegel's discussion of "nothing" is much abused by those who would find in it the cardinal sin of metaphysics: treating every noun the same and assuming that since "nothing" is a noun, we can form sentences with it as the subject.²⁰ But the point here is that when we are actually confronted with that frustration of expectations in the everyday world which we term "nothing" it does appear as having a certain content and as making sense in a way different from other "nothings." For the skeptical philosopher, all negations are the same. They are methodological procedures which are applied indiscriminately to every object that comes into range. But for the concrete experience of consciousness, the experience of surprise which confronts it when an expectation is frustrated has a specific and definable content as the absence
of something. The nothingness gains its meaning by virtue of the temporal and historical situation it occupies: I attempt an experiment, expecting a result which surprisingly does not occur; I go to a cafe for a friend who does not appear; I reach under the dresser for a shoe which is not there. Each "nothing" is differentiable as evidenced by the fact that each case produces different sequels: The experiment generates no result, I check my equipment and ask whether I have set up the test improperly or have I really found an anomaly in a general law. My visit to the cafe shows that my friend has not arrived; I check my watch to see if the time is correct, and then check my address book to see if I have come on the right day. Failing to find my shoe under the dresser, I look under the bed. It would be belaboring the obvious to indicate that upon the failure of an experiment I do not look underneath the lab bench for my shoe, or that after failing to find a friend in a cafe I do not run to the lab to check my equipment, but there seems to be a peculiar resistance in Anglo-American philosophical circles to the idea that nothings have a meaning and content by virtue of their placement in a historical situation.  

The above discussion has hopefully indicated the richness which comes from Hegel's decision to present the progress through the categories of truth and falsehood as a series of concrete negations within history. Since it is now no longer a question of refining a philosophical language which abstractly represents formal connections between the individual and the world, it is necessary to make a few brief comments on how the new methodology developed in the *Phenomenology* effects the Kantian *Bildung* elements of Categories and Ego. This will constitute the final two alterations Hegel makes in the Kantian *Bildung* conception.
Hegel no longer employs the terms Category of Form, but instead, as has been seen, often speaks of the Concept (Begriff - this is translated "Notion" by Ballie, I am following Dove's convention in rendering "Concept"). As was seen in the first of the passages of the introduction to the Phenomenology quoted above, the Concept arises out of the tension between subject and object in the process of knowing. Hence it is improper to attempt to identify the Concept with the subject or the object; it is neither a subjective representation nor an objective structure. To this extent it shares the quality which the Kantian category had of being something given subjectively, but possessing intersubjective validity. But since the tension is present on the historical level, as a result of the decision to carry out analysis on the level of a dialectical phenomenology rather than a transcendental deduction of noumenal categories, the concept is given in a temporal universe. At key moments throughout the text Hegel returns to the statement that the Concept is time, is realized in time, presents itself as time, etc. All of these statements seem to be insistent attempts to indicate that in this work Absolute Knowledge is to be shown as capable of being realized in concrete human history, not in the far reaches of a noumenal other-world, or at the end of an infinite progression of thinkers. Thus, to summarize in a few words the change which has occurred here: the Kantian Category, when transformed into a Hegelian Concept becomes temporal and variable, while remaining intersubjective and an active contributor of reality.

Hegel's transformation of the Kantian Ego is of no less importance. Here he pushes both the Kantian and Fichtean transcendental ego in much the same direction as the doctrine of categories: towards fluidity and temporality. The consequences here are even more striking because, while we can perhaps
easily accept the idea that the categories within the subject could be made variable, the notion that the subject itself varies and develops seems to be more difficult, hence the problems surrounding Hegel's concept of Geist. The concept of subject which Hegel is attempting to develop breaks down our initial dichotomy of Bildung ideals since it can be seen both as the Bildung of a subject through the unfolding of a pregiven property - the subject-object tension repeating itself again and again, or the making of a subject into another form - a path from consciousness to Geist. But there is very little "given" in either case, hence the possibility of Hegel reconciling the two notions. In terms of pregiven properties, all that Hegel provides are a few general considerations which produce tensions between Concept and object. In terms of a pregiven end point, Hegel gives us only the formula that concept and object, subject and object eventually coincide. But this subject-object unity is no transcendental goal, no externally driving force, but rather only a claim that now we have seen that absolute knowledge has, in fact, been achieved. There is a certain uneasiness about Hegel's formulations, since the Phenomenology which proves reason's establishment comes about only after the fact, and hence draws most of the logical necessity of its transformations from the fact that the subject has already passed through all of the stages noted on its way to becoming Geist. But the problematic nature of Hegel's proof should not deter us from appreciating the truly important alterations Hegel is able to make in the Kantian concept of subject through his development of the idea of Geist as the universal subject-object. R.C. Solomon, indicating how the notion of Geist is related to the Kantian, states:

... in philosophical discussions of the transcendental "I" there can be no reference to persons and therefore no intelligible use of "I" to
denote at all. If we wish to talk, of the transcendental subject in philosophy, it cannot be through this traditionally misleading use of the personal pronoun "I."

Hegel's Geist is Kant's Ego without the unwarranted claim that there is one Ego per person. Geist is simply the underlying unifying principle rational will "behind" all practical reason and action.24

The task of Bildung in the Phenomenology is thus not the creation of an independent, self-contained Ego, as in Fichte, but rather a demonstration of the insufficiency of all attempts at grounding reason which still appeal to an individual, egoistic subject. Hegel demonstrates as early as the first three chapters that the "I" subject is incapable of making self-consistent statements and that on a more fundamental level than the isolated ego there lies a general, trans-subjective "we" subject with language as its existential form.25 Because of this, it is impossible for Hegel to adhere to either of the two Bildung conceptions I have outlined in the last chapter. A conception which proceeds from an already formulated goal is rejected because of the formalism and abstraction which dominates all such attempts. A conception which begins with a self-composed individual is likewise rejected because of Hegel's insight into the social or inter-subjective nature of human essence. In Hegel the course of Bildung will consist in the mutual interaction of faculties which arise in individuals and social formations which are constituted "outside" the limits of consciousness of the individual. This dialectic between recognized or comprehended Concepts and alienated or estranged objects comes to an end when the two coincide.

The function of the Hegelian concept of alienation will be examined in the next section. For the present it will suffice only to summarize the points of departure which Hegel has taken from Kant, so that they may be contrasted with those of Simmel. We have seen that there are four major
ways in which Hegel attempts to expand upon the Kantian doctrine of the active role consciousness plays in shaping reality. First, Hegel indicates the inconsistency of all purely formal analyses in epistemology, logic and ethics, and argues that any foundational analysis of these areas must proceed through an observation of the actual constitution of ideas in consciousness. Second, Hegel rejects any attempts to smooth over phenomenal contradictions by appealing to a basic noumenal unity "behind" appearance. This takes the form of the methodological innovation of proceeding by observing determinate and historical acts of negation, a methodology which seems to him uniquely capable of avoiding the formalism which was initially rejected as unsuitable for philosophizing. Third, in order to capture the dynamic aspects of negation on the level of general structures of meaning, Hegel transforms the inter-subjective, noumenal categories of Kantian philosophy into inter-subjective but historical Concepts which are realized in human time. Finally, in order to capture the dynamic aspects of the subject, Hegel employs a series of alternative names for the subject pole of his analyses which proceed from simple consciousness, through self-consciousness, through self-estranged Geist and finally to absolute Geist. In turning to Simmel's divergence from Kant we will find both a remarkable similarity of arguments, and a number of important and significant differences.

2). Simmel Against Kant: Forms and Life

As has been noted in the previous chapter, Simmel was conscious of the debt he owed to Kant and considered himself to be a Kantian, although he differed from Kant on any number of points. But one finds few, if any, extended comments on how Simmel viewed himself in relation to that greatest of the dissenting Kantians, Hegel. Even the secondary literature of Simmel's
time, notably Herwig Müller's extensive discussion of the Kant-Simmel relationship, Georg Simmel als Deuter und Fortbildner Kants (1935), is curiously silent on the relationship between Simmel and Hegel. This may have been a symptom of the age. The German Hegel Renaissance which had been taking place in the Geisteswissenschaften in the last decades of the 19th century became a philosophical movement with Wilhelm Dilthey's Jugendgeschichte Hegels (1905), which concentrated on the early theological writings, portraying Hegel as a pantheist in a manner similar to Dilthey's earlier biography of Schleiermacher, and with Emil Lask's Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte (1902) and "Hegel in seinem Verhältnis zur Weltanschauung der Aufklärung" (1905) which attempted to reunite Hegel to the earlier phases of German classical philosophy. The renewal of interest in Hegel at Heidelberg seems to have persisted down to 1931 when in a lecture on the history of Heidelberg philosophy, Heinrich Rickert claimed Hegel as one of the founders of the school. However it is also clear that by the time Rickert had come to embracing Hegel as the "greatest of the Heidelberg philosophers" the school itself was disintegrating before the rising tide of Lebens- and Existenz-philosophie and Heidegger's "hermeneutic phenomenology," which since the publication of Sein und Zeit (1927) had been winning disciples even away from Husserl.

However, despite the absence of self-conscious Hegelians during the opening years of this century, and despite a Hegelian revival which was highly selective in what it chose to retrieve, there are many Hegelian ideas in Simmel's work. Perhaps their presence may be explained as a hangover from Simmel's years as a neo-Darwinist, since Haeckel and Spencer had managed to absorb a good deal of Hegelian terminology into the evolutionary materialism
they advocated. Another probable source would be Nietzsche, whose ethical writings share certain features of the young Hegel's revolt against formal ethical systems. Thus, there is a certain ambiguity in Simmel's works in that one may read them as Darwinian, pragmatic, vitalist, or nec-Hegelian and come to differing evaluations.

My procedure here will be to approach Simmel's work as a repository for latently Hegelian concepts: i.e., Simmel managed to preserve the vestiges of the Hegelian Bildung concept, although in a form altered by his other preoccupations, which Lukács could come to use in a Hegelian-Marxian manner once he had been able to free himself from the more specifically lebensphilosophische concerns of Simmel. Thus my claim is not that Simmel saw himself as a Hegelian, nor even that Lukács saw Simmel as a proto-Hegelian, but rather that today, in attempting to make sense out of the significant event in social theorizing which Lukács' shift from Simmel to Marx constitutes, it is important that we note how much of a potentially critical dialectic was present even in Simmel's work... That Lukács himself needed to trade Simmelian spectacles for Hegelian spectacles before he could properly read Marx does not alter the fact that the Simmelian spectacles were of great use to Lukács in finding where the Hegelian spectacles, which his predecessors had apparently misplaced, could be found.

As was the case in Hegel, Simmel's objections to Kantian philosophy begin with an objection to its formalism, but not with a rejection of its use of forms. The rejection of formalism is not followed by a return to immediate intuition or naive empiricism, and Simmel constantly maintains throughout his work that the world can be known only through the use of forms. Yet the limits of the Kantian use of forms can be seen when we move
from the realm of philosophical epistemology to the realm of human practice, i.e., to ethical questions. As with Hegel, the most evident failure of Kantian system occurs when we try to live by its ethical prescriptions. These dilemmas form the basis of Simmel's first major philosophic treatise, *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft. Eine Kritik der ethischen Grundbegriffe* (Vol. I, 1892, Vol. II, 1893) where Simmel confronts the Kantian ethical "subject" with the concrete human "individual." In later years, Simmel argued that this was a general tendency of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, which arose as a reaction to the abstraction of Kantian man.

Kant and his epoch make abstract man, the individuality that is freed from all ties and specificities and is therefore always identical, the ultimate substance of personality and thereby, the ultimate value of personality. However unholy man may be, Kant says, humanity in him is holy. And Schiller: "The idealist thinks so highly of mankind that he runs the risk of despising single men." The ambiguity of Kant's ethical formula can be traced back to the compromise inherent in the *Bildung* concept. Since each individual carries within him a universal faculty, which is, however, realized in individual cases, ethical maxims become either a rule which "applies in all cases, but never absolutely for a single case," or "a maxim which applies absolutely for a particular case, but which is never applicable a second time...." In attempting to overcome this dilemma Simmel turns to an analytic study of life, in hopes of coming to ethical formulae which have the possibility of applying in individual cases, yet still have some manner of generality.

Simmel's attack on the Kantian formulations in the *Einleitung* takes the form of a continual exposure of formal unities to individual, concrete facts (*Tatsachen*). Müller summarizes the conclusions of this confrontation as follows.
The equal presentation of sensuality and egoism (Selbtsucht), the omnipresence of egoistic instincts, the mere intending of desire, not of object, the generalized capabilities of each position, and the absence of conflict in the mass of duties, which appear so appropriate in the system, appear in reality as totally untrue. 38

These results should not be surprising given the inherent future orientation of the Kantian system, which attempted to overcome the ethical fragmentation of its time by postulating an ideal community as its infinite task. Simmel's repeated demonstrations of the inadequacy of the system for any contemporary situation are not valuable in and of themselves, but rather are important for the type of problems they raise for investigation. Müller argues that the ethical question of the "individuelle Gesetz" (individual law), the problem of how there can be non-formal maxims for concrete cases, can be found as the starting point for his investigations in aesthetics and in his approach to the problem of the type of explanatory concepts appropriate for dealing with psychical activities. 39 Hence Simmel's antipathy to all merely formal explanations forced him to try to indicate, as we shall see, the ways in which the "forms" which he investigates are concrete phenomena as opposed to mere analytic abstractions. In summary then, Simmel's attack on the formalism of Kantian ethics is not a nihilist rejection of all attempts at theorizing, but rather a demand that theoretical activity cling more closely to the dynamic of life and practical activity. As Mamelet aptly notes, there is

a positive concept of moral reality which comes to light with the dissolution of philosophical concepts. This reality is not at all something immutable and complete: it is the progressive work of Life. This life is also the life of a society, because individual psychology is not able to live an independent life except in terms of a long social evolution... the result of which has been the disintegration of a multitude of personal consciousnesses from the social consciousness... 40

The methodological consequences of this rejection of formal transcendental
analysis are once again similar to those which result from Hegel's critique. There is no possibility of approaching consciousness from "the outside" and it is impossible for a philosopher to conduct his analysis "without presuppositions." For Simmel, the proper method of analysis must somehow situate itself within life, and although he does not specify an analytic technique as clearly developed as the concept of "determinate negation," it is not difficult to see that many of the techniques which he does outline have the same goal as the Hegelian dialectic: placing the philosopher within the life of consciousness. The labels which commentators have applied to his methods, "interaction," "relationalism," "reciprocal interaction," etc., all capture certain aspects of his argument. But it is important that we not identify these terms too closely with their equivalents in contemporary sociology, and it is important that we attempt to find the links between the operations which are called "interaction" in one work and "relations" in another. It is only through a refusal to make Simmel too quickly the "father" of various contemporary tendencies that we will be able to see how he was the child of an older tradition.

Simmel's earliest usages of these terms directly coincide with his attack on Kantian formalism. The basis of his two earliest major works, the *Einleitung* and *Über sociale Differenzierung* (1890) is a fundamentally atomist conception of reality. This conception, with its stress on the particular fact as opposed to the general norm, had been the cutting edge of his critique of formalism. But this is not to say that it is no longer possible to talk of "forms." Even in the early works there is a concern with the question of whether the individual elements do not, through their mutual interaction, "erect themselves in types, in concepts which comprehend the
material elements and the correlative formal elements." Mamelet goes so far as to argue that even in the Einleitung there is a hint of a future development of Simmel's thought: the interaction not only of parts with parts, but of parts with various forms which have arisen out of the material apriori of consciousness.

Generalizing these observations to Simmel's other works, it is possible to see that the almost skeptical negation of Kantian forms is only the first step towards an attempt to reintroduce a type of formal certainty through the analysis of elements in interaction. Mamelet's study of Simmel's pre-1914 works grasps this fact with an insight which is remarkable, given the early date of the publication,

Relativism appears to him as solely capable of comprehending life in its totality by resolving the dualisms of being and becoming, of subject and object, of real and ideal, of matter and form, of experience and the a priori, of theory and practice; and at the same time harmonizes the different positive consciences: the moral, social, economic, aesthetic, and religious practices, and finally philosophy itself, by delimiting their proper spheres in the ensemble of life.

The outcome of this analysis is a new concept of truth in the human sciences, which is willing to accept the existence of a certain relativism because it recognizes that the somewhat ambiguous status of forms which arise through long series of interactions and which tend to alter over time is not indicative of a failure to perceive social reality clearly enough, but rather indicates an essential relativism (or better: relationalism) in social reality itself. Simmel's concern with always speaking of reality as a dynamic interaction even affects the wording of many passages in his works. Whenever possible Simmel will transform -ung endings to -en as in "Die Welt ist nicht mein Vorstellung, sondern mein Vorstellen" the sense of which can be captured a bit awkwardly in English as "The world is not my representation, but rather my representing."
Through this and other conventions, Simmel seems constantly to be stressing a primacy of becoming (Werden) over being (Sein) which is the hallmark of Hegel's own philosophical revolution.

But simple "evolution" is not an adequate reproduction of Hegel's arguments, since in Hegel it is clear that the only type of evolution that is possible is an evolution which is non-linear and driven by the tensions which arise between contradictory moments. It is less clear that these elements are present in Simmel, for reasons which will become clearer when his concept of Life is discussed below. However, some commentators have noted that his style of presentation - if not his actual world outlook - thrives with the exploitation of contradictions. Donald N. Levine has noted that according to Simmel,

The world can be best understood in terms of conflicts and contrasts between opposed categories. It was Simmel's repeatedly expressed view that the condition for the existence of any aspect of life is the coexistence of a diametrically opposed element. Sometimes these opposed qualities or tendencies are seen as stemming from an original undifferentiated unity; sometimes they are seen as joined together, so that a form is defined as a synthesis of opposites or as a midpoint between them; sometimes they are seen as varying inversely between one another. Often they are presented as only apparent contrasts, polarized dimensions of what is actually a more encompassing reality. 48

As the reader can undoubtedly see, there are several distinct senses of "contradictions" here. Contradictions may be only apparent, mutually reinforcing, mutually antithetical, etc., and it is difficult to determine to what extent these senses capture Hegel's idea of the determinate negation. The task is made all the more difficult by Hegel's failure to employ consistently the methodology he outlines in the introduction of the Phenomenology in all of the actual analyses which take place in the main body of the work. 49

Thus it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which Simmel has
adequately captured the full sense of Hegel's methodological response to transcendental analysis. To some extent, one can indicate a parallel: forms arise through interaction and opposition, truth concepts are not given apriori logical standards of clarity or non-contradiction, and there is a constant stress on dynamics and development. But in other respects it seems as if Simmel was only attempting to prop up the Kantian categories through the use of some dynamic elements, rather than completely reformulating the Kantian Bildung conception on a new basis. This uneasiness about the extent to which Simmel is a true dialectician will be shown to be justified in the analysis of concepts of totality which Lukács will undertake in his Marxist phase. For the present, I can only indicate that here we have come to one of the future spots of tension in the work of both Lukács and Simmel, and that much of Lukács' efforts in his early Marxist writings will be towards a demonstration of how the type of analysis which Simmel has undertaken is fundamentally misguided. But that must await a later presentation.

Turning to the question of how Simmel reformulates the Kantian doctrine of categories, we need only note a few characteristics of Simmel's concept of form as a means of differentiating it from Hegel's Concept (Begriff). Simmel's basic orientation towards the Kantian Kategorienlehre reflected the consensus which had been reached by other neo-Kantians of the time: the dogmatic, architectonic aspects of the doctrine were rejected, while the general principle of formal, categorical modes of analysis were preserved. What is relatively unique in Simmel's presentation is the fact that he attempted to merge a neo-Kantian formal epistemology with a metaphysics which was first rooted in Darwinian evolutionary selection theory, then based
on a pragmatic doctrine of life interests, and finally linked with the Lebensphilosophie of his final years. Despite the shifts in the metaphysical basis, Simmel's approach to the Kantian theory of categories is remarkably consistent and is marked by two major traits. First, the number of categories, forms, aprioris, and types (Simmel at various times uses all of these terms, and although distinctions can be made between them in terms of the periods during which they are employed or the levels of formation to which they refer, for the present I will treat all of them as referring to the same type of phenomenon) is vastly expanded. Instead of a few pure forms dealing with syntheses of space, time, etc., Simmel employs the term "apriori" in connection with history, society, and aesthetics, as well as arguing for something resembling synthetic-apriori forms for various experiences in the everyday life world. He argues that the Kantian aprioris were restricted to their domains by Kant's predominant interest in the problem "how is nature possible?"

Kant's answer provides release from one of the two oppressions which threaten modern man, nature and history. ... The imprisonment of our empirical existence by nature has, since Kant, been counteracted by the autonomy of mind: the picture of nature in our consciousness, the conceptualization of her forces and of what she can be for the soul, is the achievement of the soul itself.

The liberation from naturalism which Kant achieved must now be won from historicism. Perhaps the same critique of knowledge will be successful: that here, too, the mind forms the picture of psychic existence which we call history in sovereign wise, through categories which inhere in the knower alone.

Müller notes that this tremendous increase in the number of categories, which reaches the point where "Indeed, all varieties (Arten) in which man acts and creates, knows and feels, are categories," is an expansion of the Kategorienlehre well beyond the bounds which can be reasonably defended as Kantian. Yet, Simmel's approach is made a slightly less objectionable expansion of the
Kantian "soul sack" by his second major alteration in the Kantian doctrine: the forms are made dynamic and variable.

It is not necessary to belabor this point, since the outlines of Simmel's argument have already been mentioned in conjunction with his rejection of formalism. Like Hegel, Simmel regularly deals with formal categories which are not simply given in an inalterable manner, but rather arise out of the interaction of individuals with the world, other individuals or already existing formal domains such as art, literature, and philosophophy. This dynamic interpretation of Kant's concept of form is one of the most persistent features of Simmel's work and can be traced back to his dissertation on Kant's monadology. This stress on the way in which forms arise out of the natural selection process, the practical needs of the living individual, or the dynamic of Leben - depending on which period of Simmel's work we are examining, - goes a long way towards mitigating some of the objections which might be raised to his vast expansion of the number of Kantian forms. It simply does not make a good deal of sense to continue to think of these forms as Kantian forms any longer. They arise, not as the result of some innate faculty, but rather through the processes of subject-object interaction, and thus have much more in common with the Hegelian Concept at its various levels of formation. Indeed, one of the major turning points in Simmel's works seems to occur with the discussion of the nature of value at the start of the Philosophie des Geldes (1900), where Simmel is at great pains to avoid a simple reduction of his types and forms to the level of individual psychological states, and instead argues that the forms he is dealing with lie neither on a subjective nor objective level but instead inhabit a new realm: the typical.
This formulation, which on the one hand brings us very close to the Hegelian reformulation of the Kantian theory of the categories, has another side which indicates where the sharpest divergence from Hegel lies: Simmel's treatment of the Kantian subject. As I have indicated above, Hegel's rejection of the Kantian transcendental subject paves the way for the Phenomenology's attempt to indicate the true nature of the inter-subjective foundation on which reality rests by surveying of the way in which Geist comes to self-awareness. One finds none of this in Simmel, and his statements about the nature of subjectivity form the darkest portion of his philosophy, since the Kantian subject is ultimately reformulated in terms of a Leben which cannot be analysed or even spoken about. Simmel's conception of the subject may well be summarized by his own description of the nature of modern individualism: "... the individual seeks his self as if he did not yet have it, and yet, at the same time, is certain that his only fixed point is this self."\textsuperscript{58}

Initially, at least, we may approach the ambiguity of Simmel's doctrine of the subject in a way which is not too divergent from the Hegelian conception. Just as the forms of knowledge are produced through interaction, so the subject arises out of these same interactions; in Müller's words, "Our Geist does not have forms, rather it is forms."\textsuperscript{59} But while for Hegel, the important part of this interaction was the gradual transformation of the subject into Geist, for Simmel there does not seem to be an evolution of subjectivity which points in any clear direction. Rather "life" or the "soul" (Seele) is absolutized, and the lesson learned from all of the negations and reversals encountered on the "path of despair" is not the inadequacy of the individual subject, but rather the unfathomable powers of Life itself, which
is capable of sustaining so many and varied species of forms and psyches. Where Simmel does make use of the term Geist in a technical manner, it is clear that he means only what Hegel termed the "objective Geist," the various domains of culture which have arisen out of the self-estrangement process, and not "absolute Geist" - art, religion and philosophy - where the subject-object division is finally overcome and where Concept, Subject, and Substance are all integrated in historical time. Thus, while it is often difficult to separate the subject and object sides of Hegel's Bildung conception, the persistence of a subject-object break is essential for Simmel's conception. Levine notes that much of Simmel's analysis turns on the fact that he distinguishes forms by virtue of their distance from "life," i.e., the extent to which they do not confront the subject as forms which totally embrace it, but rather are in a certain sense, given from without and capable of being taken up in certain situations for certain purposes. As an example, when one examines Hegel's discussion of the "Unhappy Consciousness" in the Phenomenology, there is no question of this form of life is something which could be detached from the specific subjects who realize it in the various historical situations with which Hegel associates the form. For Simmel, however, a form such as "the stranger," is not something which completely exhausts the possible ways in which the soul can interact with the world. One can be a stranger only in certain situations and when one moves to other situations one is forced to find another form of sociation. But, in Hegel, there is no type of activity in which the "Unhappy Consciousness" can engage which will not be marked by the divided and contradictory features of that consciousness. The only way "beyond" the Unhappy Consciousness is through it; through an exploration of its contradictions the consciousness
is eventually forced to take up a new role. In Simmel, the potential for the soul to withdraw to a greater or lesser extent from the world of forms, or to move from one formal realm to another, mitigate against the necessity of the great and total upheavals which the Hegelian subject undergoes through the Phenomenology.

It is also worth noting, in this context, that an entity reminiscent of the "thing-in-itself" reappears in Simmel's conception. The subject is never co-extensive with reality, and thus it is possible for Simmel to admit a remnant of "unformed content" into his system, which he terms the "Weitstoff" (which can be translated quite inelegantly as "world-stuff"). The consequences of this concept parallels Simmel's positing of "life" as something not coequal with the forms it takes up: since the forms do not encompass all of reality, shifts from formal universe to formal universe are not the great upheavals which also occur on the object side of the Hegelian dialectic, thanks to the nature of the determinate negation as a path of total despair on which the subject constantly feels that its Concepts are reality itself. The presence of a domain of yet unformed contents, or Weltstoff, permits an extension of world formation on the part of the subject which is not viewed as a total overthrow of the world previously formed. With the reintroduction of something equivalent to the thing in itself, the urgency of present forms and categories recedes from the level it reaches in the Hegelian determinate negation, just as the level of analysis moves from the phenomenological to the transcendental. Once again there is an introduction of an idea of infinite tasks to be realized, but Simmel's eventual argument, as we shall see below, puts the final conquest of the world by reason beyond the capabilities of any conceivable subject.
Hence, when compared to the Kantian and Hegelian conceptions, the Bildung idea in Simmel is composed of a good many heterogeneous elements. Like the Hegelian concept, it argues for a more fluid interpretation of forms, and introduces a genetic concept of the subject. But unlike the Hegelian conception, the methodological consequences of the rejection of Kantian formalism do not give rise to a truly dialectical notion of the formation of an absolute, reasonable subject through a series of world-shattering reversals. The Simmelian subject is never as fully involved in its forms as the Hegelian subject, and there is always another realm left open towards which the subject may withdraw. Kierkegaard's claims to the contrary, the Hegelian subject, if not the Hegelian philosopher, is constantly faced with concrete, irreconcilable either/or choices which are never "solved" but only confronted again on another level. But at any point in the Simmelian dialectic, one finds dualities posed which are mediated by a "third something" which remains unstated. In Hegel, Bildung takes the form of a movement towards a final image which does not form the subject itself, but rather is reached because of tensions given as inherent faculties in the subject itself. In Simmel's Bildung doctrine, the assurance that the subject will indeed reach the posited goal is thrown into doubt, as we shall see in the discussion of alienation below. In response to this fact, Simmel's later philosophy, which explores the depths of the metaphysics of life and the "third region," seems to be an attempt to revitalize certain aspects of the Kantian Bildung conception, by on the one hand, reintroducing elements which make a complete realization of Bildung impossible at the present time (the thing-in-itself, the non-coincidence of subject and object) and on the other placing the transcendental ideal of Bildung once again within the subject.
Simmel's formulations attempt to be something more than just a reassertion of Kantian transcendental subjectivity, but his only means of doing this are through telling us what the subject is not, as in this fragment from his diary:

The usual presentation is: Here is the natural world, there is the transcendental, to one or the other we belong. No, we belong to a third Ineffable (Unsagbaren), of which the natural as well as the transcendental are reflections, projections, falsifications, and interpretations.65

Thus, in the final analysis the Bildung ideal of a society which can produce reasonable individuals dissolves in Simmel's philosophy with the onset of an ineffable subject which finds its authentic existence in no society. On the one hand this view may be read as a radical rejection of a certain cultural situation, as we shall see in Simmel's discussion of alienation. But the final formulation of this doctrine is, as Lukacs noted later in his bitter critique of Simmel in Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, far more conducive to a passive acceptance of a given society as no more intolerable than any possible society, than to the struggle to attain the ideal of a reasonable society which is present in both the Hegelian and Kantian formulations.66

Critical philosophy, while recognizing the limits of the individual subject and acknowledging the limitations of philosophical reason, never accepted the doctrine that what could not now be said must be passed over in silence.

B. Dialectical Bildung: Its Premises and Consequences

The fact that in the final analysis Simmel does not provide us with a suitable criterion for a critical evaluation of the Bildung processes of given societies does not, of course, mean that there is nothing within his work that can be utilized. The thrust of this section is to indicate how in
both Simmel and Hegel, one can find the traces of a theory of Bildung which reformulates the role of the individual and the universal against the background of a concrete historical development. In presenting Simmel and Hegel here side by side, I am not proposing to argue that Lukács made any type of linear move through Hegel to Marx from a starting point in the Simmelian theory. Rather, the significance of developing Simmel and Hegel together is to show how both systems highlighted different aspects of a possible dialectical approach to social theorizing, yet both failed to create a really useful criterion, since Hegel, on the one hand, sees the Bildung process as necessarily following from a few fundamental presuppositions, while Simmel sees the process necessarily failing on the basis of his presuppositions. The Hegelian system can be viewed as indicating to Lukács the potential theoretical mediations which will move him beyond the pessimism which results from the critique of culture he and Simmel had undertaken. At the same time, the Simmelian system, by indicating the types of concrete phenomena which can disrupt the easy reconciliations of the Hegelian system, serves to force Lukács to concretize his own notions about how the dialectic of recognition is to be made possible. To summarize much too crudely: Hegel brings a theoretical outlook, Simmel a concrete problem, and both are key elements in Lukacs' move to Marx.

1.) A Note on Alienation

Before turning to a more complete examination of the features of the Bildung systems of Hegel and Simmel and the contributions they make to an understanding of society, it might be useful to make a few comments on one of the key concepts of these dialectical conceptions of Bildung: Alienation. By
this date, every text which begins using the term "alienation" is compelled
to bemoan the multitude of uses to which the term has been subjected and
then either abandon the term, or indicate what alienation "really means."
Since we will be spending the rest of this thesis with individuals who use the
term constantly, I am forced to take the second path, with the qualification
that I will be speaking about a peculiar and technical sense of the term,
and will attempt no phenomenology of what the true nature of the experience
of alienation might be. "Alienation" as it is used today is a concept fed
by many sources which range from Durkheim's "anomie" through existentialist
and expressionist literary works to psychological uses by Fromm, Horney and
others. There is no question that such a mongrel term will have little
utility in social theorizing, since it carries within it the traces of
several probably incompatible ideas of what social theorizing is intended to
do. Rather than ignoring the attempts to use the term which have appeared in
recent years and make a sudden return to one sense of the term (Hegel's),
I propose here to indicate the importance of Hegel's formulation by examining
the confusions which the present usages present us. In this way, the return
to Hegel will not be a mere fiat, but rather can be shown as a necessary
operation of clarification since in one way or another, most of the
contemporary problems with the term can be viewed as the consequence of one-
sided departures from an essential synthesis which Hegel preformed in his
concept of alienation. The recovery of the Hegelian and Marxian senses of
alienation is thus essential if social theory is not to continue to function
in a manner which is still primarily pre-Hegelian. It is first necessary for
us to catch up to Hegel before we may get beyond him - which seems to be the
lesson of Lukács' development.
It is not necessary for us to re-examine all of the alienation literature of the present, since it is possible to get some idea of the type of problems contemporary theory has with alienation through an examination of the classification schemes which a few contemporary theorists have proposed. I will concentrate on two of these: one from a sociologist and the other from a philosopher, both of which expose different dimensions of the problem of defining the concept. Joachim Israel summarizes the varieties of alienation which may be found in social theorizing in the following manner:

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<tr>
<th>Theories about causes of alienation</th>
<th>Theory about human nature:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sociological</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Society oriented</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(conflict: man-society)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IIa. Individual oriented (conflict: man-society)</td>
<td>Rousseau, Marx's first theory &amp; Marcuse</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IIb. (conflict within society)</td>
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Israel explains the terms employed in classifying causes of alienation as follows,

If the theories are oriented toward social change and assume alienation to be a consequence of the organization of the society, we call them individual oriented. If they place emphasis on the individual and suggest changes in his sound adjustment, we call them society-oriented.

In this, the reader will undoubtedly recognize the old dichotomy of Bildung as making into an image (society oriented) and Bildung as the development of individual, pre-given faculties and talents (individual-oriented). The only remedy for alienation of the first variety is an increase in the socialization of the individual - there is no way to end alienation save conformity to the
external image. The remedy for alienation of type "IIa" is the destruction of that type of society which now restrains individual fulfillment. The other dimension of the chart deals with the nature of the theory of human nature upon which alienation theories rest. Like others, Israel here wants to attribute to certain varieties of alienation theory some type of propositions about the essence of man.

Theories about human nature can be of various kinds. They can be scientific, i.e. contain propositions which can be empirically tested. They can be philosophical-anthropological theories, which usually contain propositions about the properties which make up the human being or speak about "the essence" of man.70

Once again, I think we can see the split in the early conceptions of Bildung reproduced. The assumption here seems to be that either a theory of alienation must refer to an alienation from some sort of pristine human nature, in which case the theory is making a basically metaphysical claim about essences, or the theory will make no assumption about the "nature" from which the individual is alienated, and thus has no means of talking about alienation except in terms of a lack of integration into a given society. Again the differentiation seems to rest on the question of whether the unalienated human is viewed as a realization of an innate essence, or an achievement of an externally posited goal.

In discussing Israel's arguments it should be made clear that the major objections I will be making apply to the classification system itself, rather than to the placement of the individuals within the system. The possibility that Israel has or has not evaluated the contributions of certain theorists cannot be my concern as such a discussion would seem to be premised on an understanding of his classification system. Since his classification system suffers from some severe set-backs, it seems best to concentrate our
attention here. The major problem seems to be that the two levels of the chart are either redundant, or ambiguous. As I have indicated above, both sides seem to be dealing with the central tension which has been noted time and time again with respect to Bildung theories. If this is indeed the case, the problem arises of how to account for the fact that there can be entries in upper-right and lower-left cells. The problem is not as severe for the upper left hand cell, since we could assume that a doctrine of Bildung as the development of pre-given faculties could either designate these faculties as inherently subjective (hence the conflict between pure man and impure society in IIa) or inherently socially conforming (hence the conflict between the not fully developed individual and the society in I). But how can it be argued that there can be "sociological" or "psychological" scientific theories which can claim that somehow an individual's development is not being realized in society (any society in the case of IIb)? A good number of critics have argued that this is in fact impossible and hence any claim that a society is frustrating an individual's self-realization must be either something other than a scientific claim, or a claim that stands in need of more precise operationalization. 71 At this point we must admire Israel's tenacity in not surrendering himself to this position too easily, but we must note that his classification system does nothing to tell us how C.W. Mills and the old Karl Marx can be "scientific" in dealing with alienation from a human essence while Rousseau, young Marx and Marcuse remain philosophical-anthropological.

The major problem which seems to be inherent in Israel's classification system for "alienation theories" is that it introduces a series of false dichotomies which at least one alienation theory (the Hegelian-Marxist) from
its origins in the critique of the bipolarity of conventional Bildung theories explicitly rejected. While the chart may be useful in terms of indicating how theories which still adhere to the early Bildung dichotomy happen to cluster, it will invariably run into difficulties in trying classify any theories which have attempted to incorporate a dialectical stance towards the problem of Bildung. As Trent Schroyer has argued,

The idea of alienation is itself a critique of a social science based upon the explanatory model of Newtonian Science.

The separation of the individual and the societal was in fact rejected by a tradition which found "atomism" of all sorts disruptive. ...ultimately the idea's uniqueness is not that it can be applied to different "levels" but rather that it can interpret these processes in a way that relates the "particular" to the "universal."72

The either/or choice of pure individual vs. impure society or deviant individual vs. societal norms is abandoned as soon as social theory attempts to reformulate Bildung theories in ways which avoid the simplifications of metaphysical essentialism or scientific empiricism. Thus, the alternation between intemperate rejections of alienation as meaninglessness for scientific inquiry and reluctant observations that in spite of this there seems to be something problematic with the socialization processes of modern societies which marks contemporary surveys of the alienation literature must be taken as indicative of the critical exhaustion of contemporary social-scientific methodologies.73 From the viewpoint of these approaches, criticism, if practiced at all, must remain an activity which is, from the standpoint of the critic as "social scientist," totally irrational.

It is possible to make a bit more headway if we turn from the conglomerate notion of alienation derived from unsystematic fusions of psychological, sociological, literary, and philosophical notions, and examine the way in
which social scientists have commented upon Hegel's dialectical notion of alienation. This task is facilitated by the fact that one study of Hegel's idea, Richard Schacht's discussion in his *Alienation*, seems to have become a standard reference point. As an introduction to Schacht's discussion, perhaps brief notice should be given to the comments of Walter Kaufmann in the preface to Schacht's book which develops in a cruder fashion the basic problem Schacht finds with Hegel. Kaufmann's discussion of the "inevitability of alienation" argues that it is impossible to eliminate human alienation and that indeed, a little alienation may be good for us all—the he cites the mental disorders of various creative intellectuals. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether the therapeutic dose of Weltschmerz which Kaufmann advocates has anything at all to do with alienation in the Hegelian and Marxian senses, it is interesting to note that Kaufmann here treats alienation purely as a personal attribute which an individual may or may not have. This same assumption is made by Kaufmann's erstwhile admirer, Theodore C. Denise, who argues that these arguments conclusively disprove the neo-Marxist thesis that "the alienation of man is essentially a phenomenon of modern capitalist society." The fact that the only evidence Kaufmann is able to give for the presence of alienation in even primitive societies is a listing of novels about peasant society need not detain us. The real bone of contention is Denise's assumption that the only way in which "alienation" can function in social theory is as a somehow measurable or quantifiable individual psychological state which is an antecedent cause of social change. Denise makes short work of attempts to explain revolutions on the basis of the amount of alienation members of the society possess (the absence of usual conventions such as footnotes prevent us from knowing exactly which theory is being attacked), which possibly explains why one
encounters such difficulty in thinking of any attempts to explain social change in terms of covariance with personal alienation. The idea is too absurd ever to have been considered, and Denise's destruction of this straw man does little to illuminate the real uses of alienation theory in Marx and Hegel.

We can now discuss the significance of Schacht’s interpretation of Hegel, and while his critique of the ambiguity of Hegel’s terminology can be shown to be fundamentally misguided, it is, nevertheless, revealing in the way in which it happens to be misguided. Schacht notes that in the Romance languages, a dual meaning of all derivative from the Latin alienatio may be found. The word designates either a mental disorder or a transfer of property. The German Entfremdung, the term which Hegel at times employs, can mean either a mental disorder, or a transfer of property which belongs to someone else (i.e. robbery, theft) while the term Veräusserung is used to refer to legal transfer. Schacht then argues that the usage of Entfremdung in the Phenomenology is basically ambiguous and that it is necessary to make a distinction between "alienation_1:"

a separation or discordant relation, such as might obtain between the individual and the social substance, or (as self-alienation) between one's actual condition and essential nature...

and "alienation_2:"

a surrender or sacrifice of particularity and willfulness, in connection with the overcoming of alienation_1, and the attainment of unity.

Here, in more sophisticated form, is Kaufmann's distinction between "bad alienation" and "good alienation." Hegel's conception of alienation is seen as useless for social theory since it is marked by a basic duality between an oppressive separation and fragmentation brought about by an external force
and a voluntary act of transcendence which restores unity. The task of
readying Hegel for assimilation consists in distinguishing the two moments
as basically different phenomena, and Marx is particularly taken to task
for having confused the two meanings.

Probably the most important thing to note about Schacht's distinction
is the level at which the description of alienation takes place. For both
cases we are presented, as had also been the case in Kaufmann, with the
phenomenon of alienation as it might be experienced by an individual, or
by an observer whose major concern was the explanation of what the
individual was experiencing. The individual in this case either feels the
force of some type of discordant relation as an external phenomenon, or
engages in an internal, voluntary act of surrender. On this level, Schacht
may have given us an adequate description of the phenomenon of alienation
in Hegel, but it must be stressed that Hegel does not, as Trent Schroyer has
indicated and our earlier discussion of the method of the Phenomenology has
confirmed, confine himself to this one level. The discussion of the nature
of the determinate negation need only be recalled: For consciousness,
there are indeed two moments: 1). a perception of a growing discrepancy
between the object for consciousness and the object in itself and 2), an
abandonment of the object-for-consciousness and a surrender to the new object
which results from this negation. But, for "us," for the viewers of the
Phenomenology, both of these occurrences are seen as part of one operation
which we have termed "determinate negation." From this viewpoint the two
moments are inseparable.

Hence, when we turn from Schacht's discussion of alienation in Hegel to
Schroyer's, we see that while certainly part of what Schacht argues is correct,
his viewpoint needs to be broadened if we are to see the uniqueness of the
concept of alienation as employed by Hegel. Schacht's division of the term
into two terms, far from being an elucidation of Hegel's "true" meaning, is a
return to a pre-Hegelian, indeed pre-modern position. As Schroyer indicates,
the distinction between alienation as transfer (of property) and alienation
as separation and loss is repeated time and time again in the Christian
theological senses of the term as a dual focus on a unity which has been
disrupted and a "transcendence" which is the necessary therapy for healing
this disruption. A common ambiguity of the Christian discussions of
alienatio mentis is that these states of ecstasy could either be true
transcendence through a furor divinus or conversely could be a dangerous
loss of faculties or melancholia. In both cases the experiential component
of the experience would be similar, while the actual significance of the
attempted transcendence would lie outside the subject. The subject could
never be certain if the experience being undergone was one of transcendence
or mental disorder. Schroyer summarizes:

...throughout the history of the category of alienation, there persists
a basic logical form. Some essential unity has been disrupted,
sometimes by the domination of another. The various therapeutic
systems that emerged were based upon different conceptions of what
is the essential reality, the ideal state of human existence. But
continued failure to identify accurately what was a positive or
negative alienation made spiritual guidance rather unstable.

Hegel's philosophy ... addresses itself precisely to the endless
vacillations of the alienated soul. He implies only melancholy can
result from philosophical contradictions that "determine" the
experience of man trying to judge what is essential, and how to
recognize domination.

Thus the dualities which have been uncovered in alienation theories can
be seen as the residue of the tremendous task which Hegel has set himself in
the Phenomenology: to demonstrate, on the basis of an analysis which makes
no appeal to anything other than the movement of consciousness, that the Bildung of consciousness through moments of separation and transfer, estrangement and recognition, alienation and reconciliation, will invariably result in the attainment of absolute reason, and will never degenerate into a loss of mental capacities. There can be no denying that in his attempt to carry out this task there are severe contradictions, but it is important to realize that the rather trivial debate over whether alienation is good or bad, voluntary or involuntary, or even individual or social fails to expose the true significance of the attempt and its possible failure. Once we begin dividing the various both/and pairings of Hegel's system, we immediately find ourselves confronting the various aspects of the initial Bildung dichotomy. It seems clear that Hegel recognized that any social theory which remained tied to the innate/transcendent dichotomy of earlier approaches was doomed to failure. His attempt to work out the basis of an alternative approach is thus of such great importance that it seems worthwhile to confront its failures on its own terms, rather than returning to an essentially pre-Hegelian approach.

2.) Alienation in Hegel's Phenomenology

The discussion of the dualities of alienation theory in contemporary social science has returned us to Hegel's Phenomenology, which outlines the formation of intersubjectivity as a series of moments of alienation which always result in recovery and recognition. The Entfremdung of the Phenomenology must always be differentiated from other terms including Hegel's own earlier term "Entzweiung" (literally - cut in two, separated) which are used to make a moral condemnation of a state of rupture, as, for example, the
separation of God and man. Entfremdung is no longer a normative term, but rather a description of a process which may be observed repeatedly in the efforts of consciousness to make peace with the objects which confront us. Since the methodological thrust of the Phenomenology is explicitly descriptive - as a phenomenologist, Hegel observes the movement of consciousness and describes the results - it is difficult to see on what basis an ethical condemnation of alienation could be made, and hence the problems of the "good" or "bad" meaning of alienation appear as meaningless within the framework Hegel has adopted. The shift in Hegel from Entzweiung to Entfremdung marks a move from an ethical denunciation of a state of affairs linked to an activist conception of what the philosopher's intervention can do to change that state, to a "scientific" (in Hegel's sense) description of the experience of consciousness (of "phenomenology" in Hegel's sense), which makes no attempt to alter the reality, but rather merely tries to reflect its true being.

We can begin our discussion of Hegel's conception of the necessarily overcome alienation with a few comments on the famous dialectic of "Lordship and Bondage." Although it can be argued that the basic logical structure of alienation and reconciliation is present throughout the Phenomenology because of the basic logical structure of determinate negation, which as we have seen is always an experience of loss and recovery, it is best that we begin our investigation with the Master-Slave dialectic. It seems more comprehensible to speak of Bildung and alienation in a social context, and this section of the Phenomenology is the first moment when Hegel begins to move from the dialectic of consciousness and object to the dialectic of several consciousnesses and their world. It is also important to note that
Hegel argues that it is only with his first move into "social daylight" that we first begin to deal with Geist, the subject matter of the first three chapters having been the discussion of "consciousness" and its attempts to prove its own self-certainty. This is no minor point since it indicates that Hegel cannot conceive of a way of reconstructing the Bildung of Geist on any stage other than the social or intersubjective. As we will see, this is not the case with Simmel.

The discussion of lordship and bondage rests on a number of points which are either the result of the twists and turns of the first three chapters or are developed in the opening arguments of Chapter IV. Kojève argues that these points are the "ultimate presuppositions" upon which Hegel's proof of the possibility of reason being realized within human time rests. There is a certain discomfort involved in referring to these preconditions as "presuppositions," since according to the methods outlined in the preface and introduction, nothing is to be presupposed in this investigation except the movement of consciousness itself. For the present, I will accept Kojève's treatment and present these points as presuppositions, in other words, I will argue that they are his equivalents to the formal faculties which are given innately to the Kantian subject. Once we have completed our analysis we will be in a position to see that even when the most extreme charges of a priori assumptions have been made, we still find very little really presumed to be true about the Hegelian subject before the analysis starts.

The first presupposition is that the consciousness under investigation has the capability (and, as Kojève fails to note, the desire) to make statements about reality, or in Kojève's terms to reveal being through speech. Hegel, in the summary of the first three chapters seems to concur that this
is indeed a correctly deduced assumption, on the basis of what has gone before. What is referred to here is the argument of Chapter 1, which turns on the fact that it is possible to persuade the consciousness which claims that *sinnliche Gewissheit* (sense-certainty) is the most complete form of knowledge to tell what it is which it perceives. Once Hegel is able to have the consciousness attempt to set up this Concept of what is experienced, he can begin to demonstrate the contradictory nature of these claims.

Most of the next chapters of the first section are possible because of the ability of the subject to externalize a statement about the experience it is having and then be confronted with the falseness of this experience. It is quite obvious, however, that an early exit could have been taken by the consciousness if, on being requested to write down the truth of self-certainty, a position was taken similar to that of Simmel's on the ineffability of pure *Erleben*. Hegel must presume that the subject is willing and capable of being accountable for its truths and the whole of the first three chapters assumes the presence of something to which the subject is to make itself accountable, since if this were not the case, it would seem that consciousness would have no incentive to divide itself from its experience and attempt to put the experience into a socially communicable form through language.

The second major presupposition is introduced at the start of Chapter IV in a long discussion of the nature of *Leben* which parallels that of the *Logic*. In Kojève's formulation, the presupposition is that life is a negation of being; in Hegel's discussion, the argument is made that there now arises a new polarization, between a desired object on the one side (Hegel employs the term *Begierde*, which indicates a very intense desire, in his parallel discussion Simmel employs a somewhat milder term) and a negating life
on the other. The interaction between the two is seen as a constant "diremption" (Entzweiung – the term which Hegel had employed, as I indicated above as an early approximation of Entfremdung) of life into shapes and forms (desired objects) and the resolution of this (allgemeine Auflösung) by life. Hegel terms this entire cycle "Leben." What seems to be discussed here is an alternation of need and satisfaction, Kojève employs the examples of animals perceiving objects as objects capable of annihilation by being devoured. As Hegel describes it, the alteration is rather undialectical, and the negations are all abstract: there is no specific content remaining after the negation, and no advance is made to a higher level of negation. As will be seen below, this level seems to be paralleled in Simmel with the discussion of the state of pure, undifferentiated Erleben.

The way out of this purely circular alternation is created through the introduction of a third presupposition: at some point consciousness does not simply desire other objects but rather desires the domination of another desire. Kojève describes this as the presupposition that there is a number of negating desires, and Findlay has argued that in a sense this is a consequence of a general desire to make objects conform to consciousness which finally comes upon other desires as the most suitable object for domination. Whatever the basis of the assumption, its presence is of vital importance for the development of the master-slave dialectic, since it is only with the entry of an other onto the stage of the Phenomenology that consciousness is able to become self-consciousness. Once again the fundamentally social nature of Hegel's argument appears since there is never any question of the individual subjects coming to any type of self-realization of their own accord. They require other subjects with whom they can engage
in struggle if they are to prove their own self-consciousness. The consequence of the postulation of the other desire is the famous fight to the death: each consciousness attempts to force the other to recognize it, i.e., to affirm its own substantiality. The fight concludes when one of the consciousnesses perishes, a resolution which of course fails to satisfy the surviving subject since it is not possible for the subject to be recognized by the dead subject any more than it is possible for the subject to be recognized by any other organic matter that happens to come under its survey. Once again we are faced with the sort of abstract negation which takes place on the level of the simple desire/consumption cycle of the second presupposition.

The final presupposition which Kojève finds in the Phenomenology comes into play at this point: the fight must somehow end in a way which enables one of the protagonists to remain alive and thus be able to satisfy the desire for recognition of the victorious consciousness. It is only when this occurs that a concrete negation of another desire has taken place. The slave, by returning to a merely biological desire for survival rather than a human desire for recognition by another, enables the vicious circle to be broken, and although eventually Hegel explains why even here recognition is not possible for the Master, the fact of nonsatisfaction of the desire for recognition here becomes a constituent of another level of consciousness, rather than a simple circle which remains unchanged.

It is perhaps helpful to reflect at this point on the significance of these four presuppositions, since they form the basis of the theory of dialectical Bildung which is developed in the discussion of Master/Slave interactions that follows. Even if we assume that none of them can be derived from the logically
necessary (i.e., necessary through concrete negation of a former position) overcoming of a previous position, and even if each is an intervention on the part of the philosopher in the form of an a priori assumption, we can still see that they are of a magnitude which is quite different from that of the Kantian apriori categories. They are each concrete, existential components of how a consciousness exists in the world, and none contains any formal constitutive meanings which are imposed onto the world in such a manner as to leave some part of the world an inaccessible thing-in-itself. Language, desires, desire for other desires, and the potential to abandon the desire for recognition in favor of biological survival hardly tell us very much about the way in which the creature which possesses these "pregiven faculties" will function. Hence the significance of these types of pregiven faculties for a Bildung theory is that the general categories which Hegel postulates as species-specific traits are not, as in the case of Kant's categories, entities which effect the type of spontaneous meanings which consciousness will generate, but rather merely refer to the type of necessary preconditions which are required to advance consciousness to the point where it may begin to construct its own forms through interaction with the external environment.

The prototype of the way in which alienation functions in the Bildung process is immediately provided in the discussion of how the relationship of master and slave develops after the conclusion of the second struggle. The master is now related to objects in the world in a "mediated" fashion, through the work of the slave, who provides the master with immediately accessible objects for consumption. The attitude of the master toward these objects is one of pure enjoyment, he simply devours what is provided for him and hence
satisfies the biological life process of setting up objects of desire and negating them through the work of another. It would also appear that the master has satisfied his human desire of recognition, since he has engaged in battle, risked his life, and has carried out a negation of another desire which has not resulted in the other being murdered and thus reduced to organic matter, but rather has left the other alive as a living desire which recognizes the master as a pure, absolute being-for-itself. But the master's hard-won recognition vanishes in an ingenious dialectical twist which is made possible because the negation of desire which we are now discussing has been a concrete negation rather than an abstract negation as had been the case in the battle which ended with the death of the opponent. The slave serves the master, engages in work for another, restrains his own desires in service to the desires of another and thus ceases to be a pure negating activity, but rather becomes a thing which has no desires in-itself, but rather only meaning for another. Kojève summarizes the conclusions which can be drawn from the evaporation of the master's recognition:

The master, therefore, was on the wrong track. After the fight that made him a Master, he is not what he wanted to be in starting the fight: a man recognized by another man. Therefore: if man can be satisfied only by recognition, the man who behaves as a Master will never be satisfied. And since — in the beginning — man is either Master or Slave, the satisfied man will necessarily be a Slave; or more exactly, the man who has been a Slave, who has passed through Slavery, who has "dialectically overcome" his slavery.

Before examining the way in which the slave is somehow better suited for the task of attaining satisfaction, the argument above should be briefly rephrased in terms of the Bildung categories which have been employed throughout this inquiry. Hegel's rejection of the master's solution as an adequate mode of having contact with the world can, I think, be viewed as a rejection
of a conception of *Bildung* which is still fundamentally Kantian. In attempting to think of the master's access to the world as an analogy to the Kantian subject's access to the world, it is useful to remember the division Kant proposed between the receptivity of consciousness and the spontaneity of consciousness. The spontaneous, sense-giving aspect of experience is assigned to the categories, while the receptive, intuitive aspect which makes the experience *my* experience, is assigned to the individual's intuitive faculties. It is interesting that we find much the same type of relationship between the master and the slave as we find between the power of receptivity and the power of spontaneity. The master indicates the raw material which is to become *his* object, while the slave carries out the necessary operations - unknown to the master - which forms this material into an object which can be assimilated. This is, of course, a great vulgarization of Kant's argument, but I do not think that it is too outrageous to find in the critique of the master's access to the world Hegel's constant rejection of any type of access which is immediate or mediated in an unconscious fashion carried out through pure *apriori* categories or through the work of a vanquished opponent. In either case, *Bildung* remains fundamentally static since the work of the intuitive aspect remains separate from the work of the formative aspect. In the remainder of the master-slave discussion we find a repetition of Hegel's basic procedure with regard to intuition and categories: he indicates how the formative categorical aspect (the *Begriff* on an epistemological level, the slave on the level of this analysis) can be made more inclusive and can be seen as also taking over the tasks that were formerly assumed to be carried out by intuition. In both analyses, we see that both intuition and formation are not acts which can be carried out
separately, or in some sort of "mediated immediacy" as in the uneasy
division of labor between master and slave or intuition and category. In both
cases, the formative aspects begin to take on primacy through the argument
that it is no longer a simple, unconscious forcing of meaning onto objects,
but rather a laboring which brings objects into meaning.

Returning to the master-slave discussion, we can see that the truth of
autonomous self-consciousness is realized not by the Master but by the Slave.
Re-examining the results of the battle from the point of view of the slave
we find that initially there is no recognition on the part of the slave that
he is an independent, autonomous consciousness. But, as must always be rem-
embered in reading Hegel, returns to previously held positions are never
simply identical, and the "negation of the negation" is never merely
the previous assertion, but rather a re-assertion which is situated within
a temporal sequence of assertion - denial - reassertion.\footnote{103} Thus the slave's
return to the level of Leben is a return which nevertheless does not forget
the fact that the slave has felt the fear of death, has recognized the
possibility of death, and has felt the domination of another. Hegel stresses
these points emphatically.

...this consciousness [the slave] was not in peril and fear for this
or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the
fear of death, the sovereign master. It has been in that experience
melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and
all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it. This complete
perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all
its stability into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate
nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referent
existence ....\footnote{104}

The major impact of this experience seems to be that the consciousness
now has an awareness of its limits: its temporality - since it has faced the
possibility of death, and its situational limitations - since it now must obey
the commands of an other. While the master devours goods, completely oblivious to the labor of their production, the slave is forced to carry out an operation which distances him from the world: temporally distanced in that the goods he produces have some endurance since he does not immediately devour them but gives them over to an other; situationally distanced since the goods are not made according to his own desires, but rather are made for an other. Thus the slave is already beginning to function in a world of motives, ideas, and purposes rather than in a universe which is marked out only in terms of desired objects and the negation of these objects through consumption. His world is temporal, it incorporates the notion of perspectivity (through the slave's ability to shape things for an other, which can be seen as akin to taking an other's perspective on things), and it includes teleological, purposive behavior, rather than simple reflex action. Accordingly, Kojève concludes that it is only the slave who can attain any type of mastery over the world, since the master has in fact become dependent on the slave.

The slave's eventual domination of the master comes about through the fact that the slave works and it is through the examination of the nature of work in the master-slave dialectic that we can finally come to a concrete understanding of how alienation functions in Hegel's dialectical conception of Bildung. Hegel summarizes the entire movement of alienation and recognition in one sentence, which Ballie translates rather deceptively, and which seems to strain the powers of any translator.

Es [the Slave] wird also durch dies Wiederfinden seiner durch sich selbst eigener Sinn, gerade in der Arbeit, worin es nur fremder Sinn zu sein schein. In making sense out of this passage it seems important to begin with the
contrast between *eigener Sinn* and *fremder Sinn*. The former could be translated as the slave's "own sense" or "authentic sense" remembering that *Sinn*, in a fashion parallel to the French *sens* (which Hyppolite employs in his translation) carries not only the flavor of "sense" captured by "meaning" but also the teleological, directional aspects of "sense of direction," "sense of purpose," etc. There is also a decidedly non-intellectualist flavor to the term, which with the proper endings can be transformed into "sinnlich" (sensual, sensory, material). In reading "*eigener Sinn,*" we should think of something like "the meanings, functions, uses which have been placed into the world by the slave," in short, the externalizations of the slave's own coporeal, sensual and intellectual powers into an object. Now this object confronts the slave at first (or "apparently" -- "zu sein schein": "seems to be") as *alien, foreign, strange,* as a *fremder Sinn*. It is interesting that Hegel does not speak here of a *fremder Gegenstand,* an "alien object," but rather an "alien sense, meaning, direction, etc." Already the slave realizes that the "objects" of the world are the repositories of the intentional actions of their creators, and the problem in confronting any of these objects is always that of decoding the senses which they give him. The question is always "*whose* work, what meanings, what intentions are to be found in *this*?"\(^{108}\) This is an important point, as we shall see in Simmel's discussion of reification and in Lukács development of the concept. Hegel does not seem to admit that there could be a difficulty in seeing objects as being "*Sinne,*" which would be the case in the reified commodity market of Marx and Simmel, since there the products of human labor are never viewed as things which carry the work of individuals but rather as self-sufficient things-in-themselves, which are exchanged without bothering to question the
intentions which were condensed into them through the productive process.

The experience of labor (Arbeit) is thus a sort of paradigm through which the slave first learns how to deal with objectivity. He becomes familiarized with the fact that many of the "objects" of the world are in fact meaningful objects; that is, objects which are in fact a form which has been externalized into intersubjective reality by consciousness. Hegel has carried out an interesting reversal on an old philosophical theme in these passages. From its origins in Plato, the concept of the super-temporal Idea, has often been explicated in terms of the analogy of a craftsman and his finished product. The craftsman is able to shape matter into a coherent form (a table, in the case of the Republic) not by looking at other objects which are similar to the one he desires to produce, but rather by "looking" or intuiting the Idea of the object itself. While maintaining the general outlook that products of labor are the embodiment of ideas, Hegel reverses the argument as well: not only does the worker put ideas into his products, he can also recover (Wiederfinden) his own ideas or Sinne (which of course, is not equivalent to Idea) from his objectifications. The most immediate benefit of this approach is that it enables Hegel to continue the discussion of cultural ideas which dominates the rest of the book without ever leaving the realm of phenomenology for metaphysical speculation of how individuals come into contact with transcendental ideas. Contact with trans-subjective ideational entities is eventually discussed, but Hegel is able to pose the problem entirely on the phenomenal level of objectification and recovery.

The specific technical concept of alienation (Entfremdung) first appears in Chapter VI A where the dialectic of the "Self-Alienated Spirit" (Der sich entfremdete Geist) is discussed through an examination of "Bildung."
It is impossible to give a full account of the transitions in this section, and it is also, for my argument, unnecessary. The general schema which has been developed in the master-slave discussion of "objectification in the world and alienation of the self" remains in action throughout the remainder of the Phenomenology, constituting what Hyppolite has called "the two great moments of the Hegelian dialectic." While the basic form of the argument remains the same, it is important to keep in mind that the constituents involved in the process as objectifying subject and alienated object are constantly changing. As has been discussed earlier, the reason for maintaining fluid concepts of subject and object is that it enables Hegel to avoid the Kantian presupposition that "subject" needs to remain the traditional ego-subject of transcendental analysis. Rather, by playing different subjects off against different objects, Hegel indicates the necessity for alterations on both sides of the relationship. The simple model of the workman and the product must be overcome by more and more complex subject-object interactions until finally subject and object coincide with Absolute Geist, which is a universal foundation from which all objectification can be rationally constituted. The significance of alienation for this process should by now be obvious, and is summarized quite well by Hyppolite.

It is by alienation of its own natural being that the determinate individual cultivates himself and forms himself to essentiality. ...culture of the self is conceivable only by the mediation of alienation or estrangement (l'extrangeation - the French equivalent for Entaußerung)

Thus, Hegel uses the term alienation to indicate a fundamental aspect of the process by which reason enters into the world and becomes accessible to human cognition. What has been discussed here is only a furthering of the methodological critique of Kant which was discussed in the first section.
By taking advantage of the rich classical and traditional Christian senses of ecstatic transcendence through alienatio mentis, Hegel attempted to outline a process of alienation and reconciliation which would involve none of the ambiguities of the earlier conceptions by ensuring that all alienations would be cases of ecstatic transcendence and not losses of mental facilities. The only way in which this claim could be made was if the process could be shown as coming to a reconciliation of subject and object in a this worldly telos, a fact of which, as we have seen from the above, Hegel was constantly aware. Hegel feels that the Phenomenology has carried out his demonstration and can thus serve its function as an introduction to a system of philosophical sciences which rest on a speculative reason whose rationality has already been secured through the preliminary investigations carried out on the phenomenal level. What Kant had been able to achieve only as an infinite telos, realizable only in an ideal community, Hegel now argued could be achieved in the present. Hence the Bildung process of the Phenomenology is advanced as a replacement for the system of categories which constitute the Kantian assurance that individuals can, at a future date, constitute a rational community.

In summarizing Hegel's dialectical doctrine of Bildung it is important that we keep in mind the four major steps which have been discussed above:

1). The replacement of the Kantian system of category-possessing subject and fundamentally unreclaimable world (because of the thing-in-itself) with a series of subjects and their "worlds" which develop through contradictions between concept and object.

2). A reduction of a priori elements to a few non-formal drives which function as basic rules for the action of consciousness (the idea of determinate negation, and the presuppositions on which the master-slave discussion rests).

3). The development of all formal faculties on the phenomenal level as objects in the world which are recoverable alienations of the subject(s).
4). The argument that this entire process may be seen as having been shown to be realized in true reason, i.e. as subject-object identity, and hence, all alienations are overcome and reconciled with the alienating subject.

As will be seen below, Simmel's theory of Bildung and alienation, for all of its similarities to the Hegelian argument, reaches the almost completely opposite position, and far from indicating that the ideal of reason and intersubjective harmony which Kant sees as an infinite goal has in fact been realized, Simmel argues that in principle it cannot be realized.

3). Alienation in Simmel

Just as it was possible to find a great deal of similarity between the critiques of Kant's formalism that were carried out by Simmel and Hegel, so it is also possible to discuss the extent to which Simmel's writings contain a notion of dialectical Bildung which incorporates a key role for alienation in the process. But as was also noted in the discussion of the responses to Kant, there are grave differences between the approaches of Simmel and Hegel. In what may appear as a paradox, it is with the concept of alienation that the similarities and differences between the two arguments become most apparent. The paradox here is only a superficial one, and there is good reason to argue that it is when Simmel comes closest to Hegel, through the use of a vocabulary to describe the Bildung process that is distinctly Hegelian, one is able to appreciate how far apart the two really are. The seemingly trivial methodological divergences which were discussed above become amplified here into a great dissonance and we shall find, at the conclusion of this discussion, that Simmel's theory of Bildung results in a complete inversion of the Hegelian system.

The discussion that follows will be concerned first with explicating the
areas of the Philosophie des Geldes which parallel the discussion of presuppositions which prefaces the Master-Slave dialectic in the Phenomenology. My goal here will be to make a brief presentation of the assumptions Simmel makes about the production of forms and indicate both how this differs from Hegel's arguments and how it requires a theory of dialectical Bildung if it is not to remain in an estranged, relativist, solipsist state. My second concern will be to explicate Simmel's arguments on the "tragedy of culture" which can be seen as his counterpart to the Hegelian discussion of the role of alienation as a necessary stage in Bildung.

It should be stated at the outset that Simmel's formulations are decidedly less ambitious than those of the Phenomenology. The most extensive statement we get in the works of Simmel's second period of his goal of investigation limits his subject matter to the question of value (Wert). This concern may partially be explained by Simmel's view of Kant's intentions. Simmel felt that Kantian analysis had been able to discuss adequately the way in which natural being and reality (Sein and Wirklichkeit, the terms are interchangeable in this context) are constituted by human reason, and felt that his own concern should be directed towards the area which Kant explored only briefly: the question of value; especially in the social and economic spheres. 115 Simmel argues that it is improper to attempt to reduce value to the categories of being, no doubt wishing here to avoid the dilemmas which are inevitably tied up with a psychologistic reduction. 116 He acknowledges that value can be viewed as a "thing in the natural world" but denies that this does full justice to what we mean when we speak of value in everyday discourse. Hence, value is not merely a thing, but rather can be seen as the way in which the entire world may be experienced from a particular viewpoint:
our life as feeling and valuing creatures. \textsuperscript{117} \textit{Sein} and \textit{Wert} are proposed as the two irreducible categories through which we have access to the world, as is shown by the difficulty we have in ever saying explicitly what "being" or "value" means, and the only reduction possible is that of indicating that both of these domains are rooted in the human psyche (\textit{Seele}). \textsuperscript{118} Both may be viewed as the totally adequate and non-contradictory languages with which the \textit{Seele} may deal with the external reality which confronts it. This differentiation is as close as we shall ever see Simmel coming to adopting the Heidelberg distinction between disciplines which study the realm of nature and disciplines which study the realm of culture (\textit{Naturwissenschaften} vs. \textit{Geisteswissenschaften}) and it is important to remember that his formulation of what at any time can be viewed as nature and what is culture are extremely fluid. \textsuperscript{119} Rather than thinking of two different realms of reality or two different logics of inquiry, it is perhaps best to think of the \textit{Sein-Wert} distinction as "only two different ways of looking at the same phenomenon...," to borrow a phrase Simmel used to discuss the difference between nature and culture. \textsuperscript{120} The significance of this limitation of Simmel's attention to the cultural realm is of great importance for an understanding of Lukács' refusal to apply the dialectic to natural phenomena, as Engels and Hegel attempted. \textsuperscript{121} If the entire argument to be developed below is limited only to the realm of culture and values, then it is understandable why Lukács was reluctant to go so far as to extend this analysis over the entire realm of being. The aspects of dialectical analysis with which he had become familiar through Simmel were limited to the realm of value, and the explorations of Hegel and Engels in the realm of being must have struck him as incomprehensible.
In reconstructing Simmel's argument it is again useful to distinguish between what I will call the "presuppositions" of the alienation theory and the theory itself. By "presuppositions" I mean, as was the case in my discussion of Hegel, those types of innate faculties with which the subject in question must be supplied before it is capable of generating forms through an active interaction with reality. Generalizing from the case of Hegel, we would expect that if Simmel is a true advocate of a dialectical theory of Bildung, he will limit these presupposed faculties to a minimum of primitive drives, rather than presupposing that any types of elaborate formal categories exist in the subject before contact with reality was begun. This expectation is confirmed to some degree. Simmel begins his analysis with a subject whose experience of the world is labeled "Erleben," which is an explicit contrast to the Kantian "Erfahrung". A traditional distinction has grown up in the Geisteswissenschaften of using Erleben to designate experience within the realm of cultural entities and using Erfahrung to refer to experience of objects and things. This captures at least part of the distinction Simmel wants to make: he is not concerned with the "scientific" experience of categories of space and time which are the concerns of the Kantian subject. But even this distinction, as well as the convention of translating Erleben as "lived experience," fails to indicate Simmel's peculiar use of the term. For Simmel, Erleben indicates the first, and most primitive, type of contact which Leben can have with external objectivity. It is our primary relationship with the world and thus would seem to be the basis upon which both the structures of scientific Erfahrung, as well as cultural science investigations arise. As examples of this type of experience, Simmel indicates the types of undifferentiated
of objects which may be found when an individual is completely absorbed in aesthetic contemplation, when a child is first encountering the world, and the types of interaction with reality which must have been associated with primitive tribes and ancient civilizations. This experience is seen as being more primary than subject/object, I/it divisions and to a certain extent we may see parallels between Simmel's state of undifferentiated Erleben and the first level of consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology, the truth of sense-certainty. Both indicate a fundamental capacity of the subject to have contact with the world, even if the subject is not yet aware of the fact that it is differentiable from the world.

Both Simmel and Hegel indicate that the subject must move beyond this level of naive entrapment in the world. For Hegel this move takes place by indicating that the subject has a capability of revealing being through speech, and hence becomes involved with concepts rather than pure sense absorption. There is a hint that Simmel also attributes some sort of species-specific faculty to the human which enables it to lift itself above the world of sense-certainty. In his essay on "The Concept and Tragedy of Culture" (1911-12), Simmel states that man is not related in an "unquestioning" (nicht fraglos) manner to the world as is the case with animals, but rather has the ability to detach himself from reality and set himself up against the objects of the world. This stress on the ability to call existence into question anticipates some of Heidegger's discussions of the specific modes in which human existence (Dasein) is structured, and there may be a hint here that Simmel feels that human linguistic capabilities are the means through which sensual entrapment is first escaped. But this is left unexamined in most of Simmel's writings, and the more important means
by which the individual becomes freed from Erleben is discussed in the Philosophie des Geldes in terms of the role which desire (Begehren) plays in bringing about the subject-object dichotomy.

Again there is an obvious parallel to Hegel, since Hegel gives desire (Begierde) a significant role in the onset of human formal activity. But there is a possible distinction that can be made between the meaning of the words which each uses for desire, as well as a definite difference in the way in which the concept functions in the argument of each. The distinction in meaning turns on the fact that Hegel's word, Begierde, indicates a much stronger type of desire than Simmel's Begehren. Begierde could be translated as "craving," "unfettered appetite," "inordinate desire;" and is especially useful in talking about carnal desires or passions, and desires which might be attributed to animals as well as humans. By contrast, Begehren is a slightly blander term meaning wish, desire, hankering; and the word would be out of context in the more extreme of the situations in which Begierde might be employed. But this semantic difference would hardly be important enough to be noted were it not for the fact that it parallels a very important functional distinction in the way in which the two terms are applied. Simmel employs Begehren to indicate the moment when the pure consumption of Erleben is interrupted creating desiring subject and desired object. 127 Hegel's Begierde also is given the task of explaining the onset of subject and object, but as has been indicated earlier, the important distinction in Hegel is not between undifferentiated consumption and frustration, but rather between desire of objects and desire of desires. Hegel's discussion of Begierde is totally oblivious to the problem of whether unsatisfied desires exist: indeed, his discussion of life and desire as a constant
forming and breaking of objects seems far closer to Simmel's Erleben than to his Begehren. It is only when consciousness makes the move from desiring things to desiring a nothing (i.e. another desire) that Hegel begins to discuss the consciousness as a self-consciousness.

The important point which lurks behind these terminological difficulties can perhaps be best expressed by playing on the differences between the two words to much greater extent than would be justified if we had only the words to go on, and did not also have to take the function the words perform into consideration. Hegel's desire is a desire which could be present in any type of animal, and hence the type of objects with which he is dealing could be also objects which an animal would perceive. The species-specific trait assigned to humans is the capability of putting aside simple biological concerns and desiring the recognition of the other. Thus any type of formal experience, including "self-consciousness" demands a social universe which includes other subjects. By contrast, the desiring subject in Simmel becomes self-conscious without the mediation of an other. The types of desires with which Simmel seems to be dealing are specifically human desires, framed in terms of "value" and hence the species-specific trait which Simmel assigns to the human is not a social desire for recognition, but rather an egocentric capability of desiring "values."

Simmel is very explicit about the amount of credit he wishes to give Begehren in the establishment of the realm of values. In Kantian language he phrases the relationship as follows,

As Kant once said: the possibility of experience (Erfahrung) is the possibility of objects of experience - since experience means our consciousness forming sense-perceptions into objects. So also is the possibility of desire (Begehren) the possibility of objects of desire. The object which arises in these circumstances ... is called "value" by us.
Just as it is not necessary for the Kantian subject to engage in any type of contact with reality before it becomes capable of employing the pure categories which create objects of experience, so the Simmelian subject does not need to have any type of interaction with the world before it is capable of perceiving objects of value. According to this formulation, the concept of value is not a culturally derived construct, but rather an apriori capacity which forms the basis for cultural perception in general. For good measure Simmel makes much the same point on the next page using a "pragmatic" vocabulary.

Accordingly it is not difficult to acquire things because they are "valuable," rather we name these things "valuable" which pose hindrances to our desire to acquire them. 130

Once again, the subject hardly seems to need to be in a social community to carry out its formulation of value categories.

With the stress on the active role the individual subject plays in creating value categories the problem arises as to how Simmel is able to reconcile the vitalist, Kantian, and pragmatic dimensions of his theory on the relationship of desire and value. To pose the same problem in a slightly different manner, I noted at the outset that Simmel rejected a psychologistic reduction of value - but how can this explanation of value be reconciled with the Kantian system in any form other than a psychologizing of the doctrine of categories? It is in response to this problem that there emerges a concept which seems to be Simmel equivalent to Hegelian "externalization." Simmel argues that the confusion of psychological senses of value can be avoided through a recognition of a "fundamental capacity of Geist." The valuing Geist has the capacity to treat the contents which have to be represented by it as valuable as if this value was independent from the process of
representation which has been performed. Simmel renews his earlier attack against a reduction of value to the categories of being by arguing that aside from the realization of values on the level of inner psychological states, and aside from the subjective process of evaluation, there is a "third realm" in which the category of value may be placed, the "ideal," which is independent of the subject-object dichotomy. This "third realm" forms the basis of the contents of the various formal sciences (one of which will be discussed in the next chapter) which operate on the ideal forms which have emerged from the category of Erleben because of the interruption of desire, and the establishment of the valued object. Simmel argues that a parallel to this ideal realm may be found on an everyday level with the realm of economic values which can be viewed as desires which have lost much of their early impulsiveness and now become a fairly objective index, independent of the subject's momentary desires.

Simmel has apparently condensed a good many of the laborious steps of the Hegelian Bildung process into these opening pages of the Philosophie des Geldes. The concept of desire in Simmel fulfills the same role as the long and tortuous dialectic of the master and slave, since with its introduction we begin to encounter generalized forms of cultural objects. Whereas in Hegel the work of the slave is the primary form of alienation and the general model for all of the estrangements of meanings from subjects that follows, the primary form of alienation in Simmel is the positing of an ideal realm on the part of a nonsocialized consciousness whose attraction to objects has begun to lose some of its impulsiveness. In Hegel, we found that the basic form of alienation and recognition that occurred with the master-slave dialectic could also be found in the discussion of the significance of the
realm of culture. In Simmel, this parallel does not exist, and the tasks assigned to the domain of culture are different from those of creating value as a meaningful category of human action. For this reason it is not possible to make a simple shift from the prerequisites of alienation in general to the specific case of culture as alienation, as had been the case in Hegel. Instead it is necessary for us to make a brief examination of the nature of Simmel's "third realm" before turning to his discussion of culture which can then be seen as being marked by the peculiar problems which have arisen in his discussion of the practical basis of forms and categories.

As has been discussed above, Simmel's ideal realm consists of ideational entities which were at first connected with immediate practical interests, but which later became estranged into more general typicalities unconnected to an immediate practice. Following the terminology which Weingartner develops from Simmel's Lebensanschauung, it is possible to speak here of pre-forms (Vorformen), which are still connected to immediate practice, forms (Formen), which have become estranged, and finally, world forms (Weltformen). The latter are the great disciplines such as religion, art, science, etc. which function as various languages which may be used in apprehending objects in the world. To each of these levels of form, there corresponds a mode of life activity. The pre-forms are associated with the first appearance of desire, forms proper with teleological, purposive activity, and the world-forms with what Simmel terms "the turning towards freedom"; action which is no longer teleological in the sense of being a means to an end, but rather elevates the form to an end in itself. It is this last type of life activity which is of greatest relevance for the problem of culture, and it is important that we understand the status of the various world-forms. Simmel's discussion of world-forms
has a good many analogues in social theory, the closest approximation being Alfred Schutz's "finite provinces of meaning" and the best known parallel notion being Wittgenstein's language games. All of these concepts seem to share a view of the world which argues that there can be a number of different, but not mutually exclusive ways of approaching the phenomena. Simmel especially wants to stress that it is possible to find two different forms which embrace the same content, and no one of these forms may claim any primacy over the rest in dealing with any given content. For instance we could take the content "church" and discuss it within the realm of the world-form of "art" or "architecture" and explicate different aspects than we might had we chosen to discuss this same phenomenon under the world-form "religion." Whereas in the former we would discuss the different aspects of the physical structure of the building according to a series of rules which govern "architectural analysis," while in the latter our discourse rules would direct us differently and admit for discussion statements about theological question such as the relationship of the physical structure "church" to the transcendent "Church" which is realized in the world through the physical institution.

The fact that any of the world-forms seems capable of absorbing any number of objects as content, however, does not mean that any one of these forms is capable of totally absorbing reality. To admit such a claim would be to introduce something like a hierarchy of languages, a position Simmel consistently refuses to take. As a protection against such claims, Simmel retrieves a Kantian-like thing-in-itself, the world-stuff. Since I have already discussed the significance of this concept as a methodological innovation, I will only indicate here the logical argument for its existence
Simmel makes in the *Philosophie des Geldes*. If we are to make any types of distinctions between "forms" and "content," this type of discourse must be included in one of the world-forms: "philosophy." It is not necessary to examine Simmel's argument about the type of life experiences from which philosophy draws its pre-forms, since the argument bypasses these issues. We do not even have to investigate the types of claims which philosophers in the past have made to realize that there can be no statements in philosophy about a "necessary" connection between form and content, i.e., a statement which is in some way a judgment about whether a certain form is capable of assimilating a certain content. A statement of "necessity" makes use of a form, "necessity" itself, which has meaning only in the context of some other world-form and in connection with some other practical pre-forms. Hence its logical status can be no more primary than the form-content relationship it seeks to investigate. "Necessity" is nothing more than the form in which we talk about the relationship between "being" (content) and "laws" (form).

It is clear that this type of argumentation has a number of advantages. It enables different formal disciplines to arise which will investigate their respective phenomena in fashions which are non-competitive and non-reductive. Likewise, on a practical, everyday level, the existence of a number of different forms (or as they would be called in contemporary sociology, roles) permits the individual to interact with others in a variety of different manners. Yet, at the same time, Simmel is aware that the price to be paid for increased freedom in both everyday life and scientific research is an increasingly fragmented universe. The spectre of relativism is never absent from Simmel's system, perhaps because no other philosopher has gone so far down the road to complete skepticism while still arguing that the relativism could be
resolved into a less damaging "relationism."\textsuperscript{140} This problem, which is beaten back on a philosophical level in the Philosophie des Geldes resurfaces with the question of how an intersubjective community is possible, given the vast relativity of standpoints indicated by the system. Simmel's discussion of alienation occurs in this context, as a discussion of subject-object relations which arise with the realm of culture itself in the form of the problem of how to reconcile the subjective and objective realms of Geist.

The central function of culture is to assure that the various forms will have some type of connection to the intersubjective practices of the human community. This involves a struggle on two fronts: on the one hand the forms must somehow be shown to be more than subjective pre-forms, which arise and vanish in the stream of purely subjective, individual practice, and, on the other hand, they must be shown to be something other than objective - or better "subjectless" - forms which have no connection at all to human practice. It does not need to be noted that here again we have a reproduction of the initial tensions of Bildung as "faculty" and Bildung as "external form."

Like Kant and Hegel, Simmel is involved in an effort somehow to steer a course between these two extremes, and as will be seen below, his ultimate solution is highly problematic.

Simmel's most terse definition of culture is framed in a very Hegelian manner. In his essay "The Concept and Tragedy of Culture (1911)," he states,

\begin{quote}
Culture is the path from closed unity through unfolded multiplicity to unfolded unity. (Kultur ist der Weg von der geschlossenen Einheit durch die entfaltete Vielheit zur entfalteten Einheit.)\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

The various stages of this transition are significant, and the terminology at several points recurs in Lukács' work. We move from a simple, enclosed unity (geschlossenen Einheit), such as the egocentric sensual entrapment of
Erleben, through a stage of "unfolded multiplicity" (entfaltete Vielheit), as is the case in the alienation of a number of products or world-forms into a non-egocentric domain, before finally returning to a new, and higher, unity, the "unfolded unity" (entfalteten Einheit) which is no longer an isolated subject, but like the Hegelian Geist, is a self-reflective intersubjective foundation upon which the products of the cultural world rests. If this entire movement is viewed as culture, as is the case in Simmel, but is not the case in Hegel where "culture" would be the name assigned to the second stage, we can see that the task assigned to the process is that of reconciling the unfolded multiplicity with the unfolded unity, or using the Hegelian terminology Simmel employs, of reconciliating subjective and objective Geist.

For a definition of these two domains of Geist, we need to turn to Simmel's essay "Vom Wesen der Kultur" (1908).

Their term objective culture can be used to designate things in that state of elaboration, development, and perfection which leads the psyche (Seele) to its own fulfillment or indicates the path to be traversed by individual or collectivities on the way to a heightened existence. By subjective culture I mean the measure of development of persons thus attained.\textsuperscript{142}

With these definitions in mind, the connection between Simmel's concept of culture, and the broader dialectical notion of Bildung as alienation and recovery should be apparent.

The subjective and objective Geist are opposed to one another; culture asserts its unity by interpenetrating both. It implies a form of personal perfection which can be completed only through the mediation of a super-personal form which lies outside the subject itself. The specific value of being cultivated [Kultiviertheit; Simmel never uses the term Bildung] is inaccessible to the subject unless it is reached through a path of objectively spiritual realities. These again represent cultural values only to the extent that they interpenetrate the path of the soul (Seele) from itself to itself, from what might be called its natural state to its cultivated state.\textsuperscript{143}
From the above, it should be clear that Simmel's concept of culture is opposed both to the notion that the subject can perfect itself only through the use of its own resources, and to a simple infusion of cultural values from the outside. He explicitly rejects the former notion of Bildung, which we can see as associated with the idea of developing innate faculties, in a number of places. Employing a metaphor which is strikingly reminiscent of Hegel's statement that the Phenomenology is the Golgotha through which the Geist must pass to become assured that it is indeed absolute reason, Simmel states that the various domains of objective culture are "stations over which the subject must pass in order to win the particular, individual, intrinsic, value (Eigenwert) which is called its culture." Accordingly Simmel rejects as non-cultural all of those perfections of the individual which do not make use of the external, objective "stations." Mystical transcendence, pure intellectual contemplation are all cases where "the soul transverses the path from itself to itself, from its potentiality to its realization, exclusively on the strength of its subjective powers," and as such cannot be considered as examples of cultivated behavior.

Another type of activity which fails to incorporate an external moment is that host of practices which Simmel calls "stylist." In the Philosophie des Geldes Simmel notes that with the development of cultures dominated by monetary exchange, we find a greater role given to pure will. From the viewpoint of form-content relationships this development is seen as an increased tendency to apply forms to reality with little concern for the appropriateness to the contents which they subsume. The general "characterlessness" of modern reality, which manifests itself in legal rationalization, intellectualist domination, and monetary measurement, can be viewed as a symptom of the type
of relationship between objective and subjective culture which is dominant in a society where subjective mastery has become the dominant mode of meaning bestowal.\textsuperscript{147} This general tendency, which Simmel equates with the rise of liberal society, can be found in day-to-day social interaction in the guise of the freedom which the modern individual has of moving from style to style in his contacts with others.\textsuperscript{148}

However, this tendency is by no means the only form of inauthentic cultivation of the individual which can take place. Simmel notes that along with the freedom gained by having any number of forms to impose upon reality, a related enslavement gradually develops. "Stylism," the feeling of being able to move freely from form to form, begets its own contradiction in the form of "specialism," the feeling that the forms of interaction and discourse have become so complex that they require incredible sacrifices on the part of the individuals who attempt to take them up. Simmel is quite explicit in stating that these two contradictory forms of relationship with reality are both present in liberal society. Law, for instance, is both more accessible to the individual — since in a liberal society the rationalization of legal statutes has the dual effect of making the statutes potentially known to everyone, by virtue of their being codified, but practically knowable only by the few who specialize in law, by virtue of the quantity and complexity of the material.\textsuperscript{149} Specialization is thus presented as the tendency to treat the objective Geist as if it had an objectivity independent of its role in bringing about a cultivation of the total individual. The specialist's use of the objective Geist results in a one-sided development of his Seel, since the individual formal domains of the objective spirit are left on the level of "unfolded multiplicity" and never synthetized on the level of
subjective spirit into an "unfolded unity." We find that contact with cultural objectivity no longer results in a development of our "inner totality," and never leads to "the perfection of the whole," but rather begins to take the form of a contact with impersonal things. 150

This detachment of the components of objective culture from their role as developers of the subjective spirit forms the basis of Simmel's analysis of the breakdown of the cultivation process in the twentieth century. Before turning to this discussion, it is important that we reflect briefly on what has been said so far about the way in which culture is supposed to function as an ideal. Simmel's presentation of the dialectic of culture can be seen clearly to be an attempt to somehow synthesize the two notions of Bildung which we noted at the start of our investigations. On a programmatic level, Simmel rejects attempts to describe cultivation as the development of innate subjective faculties or as the simple molding on an individual according to an external ideal. Rather, both must be seen as moments which are to be unified in the process of cultivation. In his lectures on education Simmel summarizes his ideal of education in terms of a negation of both of these extremes.

Education is not the mere having of the content of knowledge nor is it merely a contentless state of being of the psyche. Rather, he is educated whose objective knowledge has entered into the vitality of his subjective development and existence, and whose mental energy is filled with as large as possible and always growing area of contents that are valuable in themselves. 151

However, it is questionable if Simmel's system includes the conceptual tools necessary to make this ideal anything more than a posited norm. As I have indicated before, in contrast to the Hegelian argument, Simmel's presuppositions about the way in which forms come into existence contain a much more pronounced slant to the individual, isolated subject. While Simmel fights a valiant
battle against the idea of culture as a simple development of an independent individual, even here this general slant reappears. It is interesting that in his two major discussions of the concept of culture, Simmel employs the vegetative analogy of the cultivation of plants as an introduction to his argument. In fact, in "Vom Wesen der Kultur" Simmel even identifies the process of cultivation (albeit agricultural cultivation at this point of his argument) with the development of "organischen Anlagen" (organic predispositions, talents, faculties, etc.). Thus, there appears to be a tendency at work in Simmel's system from the start which robs the move through the Golgotha of culture of the necessity which it possesses in the Hegelian system. There is a persistent resistance on the part of the Seele to leave the state of Erleben, and Simmel insists that the fundamental predisposition of the Seele is not towards cultural enrichment, but rather towards simple self-preservation. Cultural values become of importance to the subject only to the extent to which they can be associated with the more fundamental interest in self-preservation.

Given this general orientation, it might be interesting to ask if there is any case at all where Simmel sees an example of a successful completion of the process of cultivation. There is one obvious case which reappears in a number of works and which is presented in a terminology reminiscent of the alienation dialectic in Hegel: aesthetic appreciation. Simmel regularly employs the mode of artistic production and appreciation as an example of an authentic case of cultivation in contrast to the conditions of production under the division of labor where the process of cultivation is frustrated. This is felt to be a worthwhile comparison since "Of all human works, the work of art is the most enclosed unity (geschlossenste Einheit), the most self-
satisfied totality." What is significant about works of art is not the mere fact that they are adequate and unified expressions of the artist's subjectivity, but rather that they can transcend the primary stage of "closed unity" and be valued in and of themselves as components of the "unfolded multiplicity" of the objective culture. The peculiar value of works of art thus lies in the fact that they encompass the complete cycle of the process of cultivation. They move from the level of immediate enclosed unity to the level of objectively mediated cultural phenomena.

...the merely formal fact that the subject has produced something objective (ein Objektives hingestellt hat), that its life has become embodied outside of itself (sein Leben sich aus sich heraus verkörpert hat), is perceived as something significant, because the independence of the object thus formed by the spirit (Geist) can only resolve the basic tension between the process and the content of consciousness.

Simmel consciously employs phrases which impart a dynamic sense of externalization to the process of artistic creation. The production of an object of art is described as a "setting out" (the literal translation of "hingestellt" in the passage above), as an incarnation of the life of the subject in an object which is external to it. This entire process is felt to be the only way the subject can resolve a fundamental tension (Grundspannung) between the elements of consciousness which possess a quasi-objectivity (ideas, forms, meanings, etc.) and those elements of consciousness which are undefinable in objective terms (processes, modes of perception, etc.).

But this "merely formal fact" of externalization (or to use Hegelian terminology, "alienation") does not exhaust the process of cultivation. The multiple objective cultural phenomena which exist as self-sufficient objects in the world must be reclaimed by human consciousness and through a synthetic act of appropriation be reunited with other artistic creations in the "unfolded unity" of the cultivated Seele. Hence not all artistic creations serve the
ends of cultivation. Some artistic productions are too personal ever to be assimilated by subjects other than their producers, just as some other works of art are too great to be assimilated by any but the most cultivated. The products of some epochs are too "tired out" to continue to inspire the cultivation process, while there are other epochs whose products are so rich and self-enclosed that we in the present are unable to have any intercourse with them. Hence an object of art, if it is to function in the cultivation process, has importance not in the same way as objects of nature, no matter how inspiring or beautiful. We must be able to "decode" the subjectivity which is embodied in the work of art, and cases where no such subjectivity is present - as in the case of natural beauty, or cases where such a subjectivity cannot be easily recovered, as in the products of deep or tired epochs, or the great and the personal in art - cannot be viewed as potentially cultivating objects.

While the product of objective forces can only be subjectively valuable, the product of subjective forces attains for us a kind of objective value. Material and non-material structures which have been invested with human will, artistry, knowledge, and emotions represent such objective items.

The basic point Simmel seems to be making here can be seen as a repetition of Hegel's argument about the type of relationship which the slave has with the products of his work. It will be recalled that the slave saw the products not as mere objects, but rather as embodiments of his own intentions, as Sinne. Hegel apparently feels that this recognition is an unproblematic certainty; everything produced by man will be viewed as a human product and hence employed as a means of Bildung. Simmel, however, even in the area where he argues that cultivation through the mediation of cultural objects is most possible, notes that the completion of the cycle of recognition and recovery is only fortuitous,
and never necessary. Not all externalizations or alienations can be recovered, and at this point it might make sense to begin to introduce terminological distinctions between these two concepts. While for Hegel all alienation was merely a moment in the dialectic of externalization-recognition-recovery, for Simmel there are some externalizations which are not recovered, which will now be given the technical names "alienation" (to refer to the disrupted process of externalization and recovery) or "reification" (to refer to the resultant objects left unrecovered as a result of the process). In what follows we will see that Simmel comes close to reversing the Hegelian conviction that all alienations are externalizations and arguing that almost all externalizations remain alienations or reifications, i.e. remain components of an objective culture which cannot be reclaimed by the subject.

This brings us to one of the greatest peculiarities in Simmel's conception of Bildung. He outlines a general schema which indicates what it means to be cultivated, i.e., what a successfully functioning Bildung process would look like. This outline can be seen as for the most part partaking of Hegelian terminology and in many places even can be read as directly analogous to the Hegelian system. But then he makes a series of arguments to the effect that not only is this system not now working, but that there is no conceivable way in which the system can function properly in the future. This fact is of great importance for our reading of Simmel, as well as of being of more immediate importance in my presentation of Simmel's arguments. There is a passage in "The Concept and Tragedy of Culture" where Simmel discusses the metaphysical assumption of subject-object identity as the result of the cultivation process, as would be the case with Hegel. He then states that the general metaphysical assumptions must find "a historical answer." At
this point one is tempted to assume that like Marx, Simmel intends to turn the Hegelian system against itself, and to argue that Hegel has provided a merely formal solution to a problem which must find its solution in a concrete historical situation where the transcendence of alienation is not guaranteed. If this were the case it would seem logical to turn to the concrete social inquiries of Simmel and Lukács and see how they provided an historical answer to the Hegelian presuppositions. But this would be to confuse a very important point. There seems to be a basic reluctance on Simmel's part to give the merely historical answer "alienations today are not recovered" and instead he makes a broader argument that "alienations can no longer be recovered." Every specific case of unrecovered alienation which Simmel analyses is treated by him as a proof of a more general, indeed almost metaphysical assumption. The division of labor, as analyzed in the Philosopmie des Geldes, is not employed as an example of a root cause of reification and alienation, but rather as a specific example of a more general fact: the necessity of all externalizations becoming reifications. Simmel then, and not Marx and Engels, is the true "inverter" of the Hegelian system. Marx did not merely stand Hegel on his head, preserving the general ideal of an idealist Bildung through subject-object identity in the form of a materialist principle of economic necessity. We must give far more attention to his claim of having found within the Hegelian system a "rational kernal": Marx preserved a portion of the system, rejected other parts, and in general made a selective appropriation of Hegel which did not simply reduplicate the Phenomenology in economistic clothing. But Simmel, in a strange way, is an inversion of the Hegelian system, an inversion which leaves most of the operating assumptions in tact but which comes to a diametrically opposite set of conclusions. His inversion
takes the form, as we have seen, of a basic equivocation at the start of
the cultural dialectic, when he attributes a different set of predispositions
to the naive consciousness. His egocentric subject then attempts to complete
all the necessary stages assigned to the Hegelian eccentric (or other-oriented)
subject, and when it fails to complete the Bildung process prescribed therein,
Simmel does not question the concepts of subjectivity or culture which he has
adopted, but rather sees these results as demonstrating that culture is a
necessarily tragic process.

Thus, when I delay the presentation of Simmel's concrete investigations
of phenomena such as the division of labor or the commodity fetish until the
next chapter I am only following the point which he constantly makes. These
phenomena are not historically situated breakdowns of an otherwise functioning
process. They are not the result of a particular stage of class conflict or
a particular mismatch in productive forces and social relations. Rather they
are the inevitable consequences of the immanently tragic nature of the process
of externalization. 165 It is this fact which lies behind Simmel's choice of
the term "tragedy of culture."

The situation is tragic: even in its first moments of existence, culture
carries something within itself which, as if by an intrinsic fate, is
determined to block, to burden, to obscure and divide its innermost
purpose, the transition of the soul from its incomplete to its complete
state. 166

In order to understand why Simmel feels that culture is necessarily tragic we
must return to his discussion of the relationship between objective and sub-
jective culture (or as he termed the distinction in another context, "the
culture of things" and the "culture of man" 167). This will give us the
logical structure which underlies the empirical examples which will be
examined in the next chapter.
As we have seen, Simmel defines the cultivation process in terms of a use of the objective Geist as a means of bringing the subject from its natural state to its cultivated state of subjective Geist. His argument in support of the necessarily tragic outcome of culture is centered on a demonstration that a break has occurred between objective and subjective Geist which has the consequence of preventing the subject from ever fully transcending its natural state on the one hand, and leaving the objects of culture in an unsynthesized multiplicity on the other. Simmel locates this break at some point in the nineteenth century, but once again it must be stressed that we must not suppose that we can find some cause of the rupture in that period. One cannot argue that the life style of a community in any way causes a break in the link between subjective and objective culture since the life style of a community is itself determined by the structure of objective culture - subjective culture relations. If there is any type of causal primacy to be found, it lies more on the side of the way the two cultures are related than on any material or historical factors. Simmel is quite willing to put forward such idealist tinged speculations as the following.

The adornment and overloading of our lives with a thousand superfluous items, from which, however we cannot liberate ourselves; the continuous "stimulation" of civilized man who in spite of all this is not stimulated to expression of individual creativity; the mere acquaintance with or enjoyment of a thousand things which our development cannot include and which stay in us only as ballast - all these long-lamented cultural ills are nothing more than reflections of the emancipation of the objective spirit.

Since the "emancipation of the objective spirit" seems to take on a causal primacy with regard to various specific cultural ills, is there anything which may be said about why the spirit became emancipated? We find that,
indeed, Simmel does frequently make arguments about the reasons behind the emancipation of the spirit, and perhaps it is wisest if we view both the antecedents and consequences of the emancipation in terms of reciprocal causation, since Simmel remains, in spite of his occasional habits of phrasing relationships, opposed to any type of simple causal reduction, be it idealist or materialist. Accordingly it is possible to find throughout Simmel's work a hint that the phenomenon which brings about the emancipation of the objective spirit from its role of cultivating the subjective spirit is associated with the tremendous growth in the quantity of cultural artifacts which compose the objective spirit. 171

The infinitely growing supply of objectivated spirit places demands before the subject, creates desires in him, hits him with feelings of individual inadequacy and helplessness, throws him into total relationships from whose impact he cannot withdraw, although he cannot master their particular contents. Thus the typically problematic situation of modern man comes into being: his sense of being surrounded by an innumerable number of cultural elements which are neither meaningless to him, nor, in the final analysis, meaningful. In their mass they depress him, since he is not capable of assimilating them all, nor can he simply reject them, since after all, they do belong potentially within the sphere of his cultural development. 172

Thus it is the sheer quantity of products, rather than any of the specific ways in which these products are created which accounts for the state of reification in Simmel's analysis. This is an important point, and it must be stressed when we turn to an examination of Simmel's discussion of the division of labor that it is not clear how even non-divided labor could be anything but an alienating experience, given the fact that the concept of alienation seems to be based on a simple extension of the artistic model to all sectors of society. Everywhere Simmel demands that a decoding process not only be carried out for the objects with which the individual has contact, but also with respect to all of the objects which potentially come within his
survey. Although there are obvious problems with this criterion, it does have a strangely authentic ring, especially with regard to the Hegelian assumption of subject-object identity which dominates Simmel's model of artistic production. Walter Kaufman notes that in Hegel's time,

...it was still possible to read, and to have read, all the masterpieces of the Greeks and the Romans, and of European literature and philosophy and to try at the same time to keep up with the sciences. Hegel's philosophy confronts us as the work of a man who has not shunned this tremendous effort.173

We can go further and state that Hegel's Bildung ideal is closely connected with an era in which this experience of mastery was still possible. The occult thing-in-itself could be made to appear as a potentially uncoverable phenomenon at a period when it was possible to study exhaustively the entire catalogue of cultural creations. Simmel still maintains the bourgeois-humanist ideal of education, cultivation and Bildung, but at the same time is capable of noting the obvious fact that this ideal can no longer have any possibility of realization.174

The problem may be rephrased in one final form which indicates the extent to which Simmel is carrying out a clear, yet perhaps not conscious, negation of the Hegelian assumptions with regard to the actuality of Bildung. Among other things, we could say that the Phenomenology presents us with an exposition of a "logic of Bildung." As an introduction to the subject of logic in general, the Phenomenology traces the path by which chance encounters with objectivities result in a necessary advance of consciousness to the level of absolute reason.175 The logical structure of the objects of consciousness is thus in accord with the logic of the Bildung of the subject. At several key points in his exposition Simmel states that the realm of the objective spirit begins to
follow a logic of its own (an *Eigenlogik*). This may be read as a further illumination of what is occurring in that type of uncultivated development which we have earlier discussed as "specialization." As the realm of cultural objectivity becomes detached from its role in the cultivation process, one increasingly finds the interaction of the subject and the objects of culture taking the form of the subject's attempting to master the rules of a foreign technique. It is no longer a question, even in the domain of art, of the subject externalizing its own life with the goal in mind of having this life recovered by other subjects. Rather the artist now tries to master the rules of a certain technique, and thus is no longer concerned with the expression of life, but rather with the mastery of a form.

With the split in the realms of objective and subjective *Geist* we have come to a complete reversal of the Kantian *Bildung* ideal. Simmel's dialectical theory of *Bildung* culminates in a view of a society which argues that while the individual consciousness still has a certain receptivity in the form of an immediate and personal contact with *Erleben*, it no longer has any inter-subjective validity. The spontaneous bestowal of meaning which was once carried out by the apriori forms of cognition has vanished, and the forms themselves have taken up residence in a realm which is not inter-subjective, but rather anti-subjective. The ideal of a reasonable community where the ideal of pure reason could be potentially realized as well as the Hegelian idea of an actual realization of absolute reason have both been negated by a view of a realm where reason is the sterile and relentless growth of an objective culture which no longer speaks to the subject, and subjectivity shrinks into itself in search of its "ineffable" foundations in Life. With Simmel we come to the absolute negation of the syntheses which Kant and Hegel had attempted
in their reworkings of the basic tenets of the bourgeois-humanist concept of Bildung.

In this chapter I have traced the way in which Simmel and Hegel responded to the Kantian Bildung comprise. Hegel can be viewed as the great preserver of the bourgeois-humanist Bildung tradition, and his dialectical approach to the problem of intersubjectivity constitutes a remarkable claim that the achievement of absolute reason can and must be placed within the domain of human history. Simmel can be viewed as the great negation of this tradition in that he clung closely to its fundamental principles, remaining much more attached than even Hegel to the idea of the fundamentally autonomous subject, and yet was forced to conclude that culture, far from realizing the realm of reason on earth, was an inherently tragic process from which life was forced to retreat. Both have a great significance for Lukács' attempt to develop a critical theory of society.

Simmel's great merit lies in the fact that he was able to indicate that the Hegelian presumption that all human artifacts would necessarily be viewed as human creations could no longer be assumed. By opening up the possibility that all externalizations were not recoverable, Simmel was able to indicate that the Hegelian Bildung system required historical answers to the metaphysical solutions it proposed. Yet, ultimately Simmel cannot provide the historical answers because of fundamental methodological weaknesses. He merely replaces an optimistic metaphysics with a Lebensphilosophie of cultural pessimism. It is for this reason that Lukács cannot simply move from Simmel to Marx but must make a detour through Hegel. In Hegel we find a thoroughgoing unity in the modes of analysis employed. At every level, Hegel employs the historical
and dialectical concept of the determinate negation, be it as a methodological tool as in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, as a means of discussing the phenomenon of work, as is the case in the master-slave dialectic, or as a way of discussing the function of cultural alienation, as is the case in the discussion of the self-estranged spirit. Through the employment of a mode of analysis which always remains on the phenomenal, historical level and always makes reference to the social aspects of the formation of consciousness, Hegel avoids the constant retreat to individual subjectivity that plagues the discussion in Simmel. Each level of Simmel's analysis is haunted by the spectre of an ineffable Leben, be it the "third realm" beyond subject and object where the forms reside, the dimension where subjective contact with reality produces immediate forms without the need of social interaction, or the constant flight of life from the domain of the objective spirit.

A number of paradoxes are encountered here. Hegel pays greater attention to the social and historical basis of consciousness and meaning, yet bases his analysis on an ahistorical assumption that all cultural alienations will be recovered. Simmel attempts to provide a concrete historical alternative to Hegel's speculations, yet winds up with an equally ahistorical cultural pessimism. By examining both we have been able to see a potential means of reconciling the two alternative concepts of *Bildung* into a criterion for undertaking a critical evaluation of society. Yet, in Hegel's hands the method fails to indicate any chance of society not fulfilling the postulated *Bildungs* ideal, while in Simmel's hands we see no possibility of any society fulfilling the ideal. Thus far the dialectical conception of *Bildung* does not seem to have been any more useful than the initial one-sided criteria discussed in Chapter I.
All of these criteria either apply everywhere or nowhere - in other words, none of them have any critical power in dissecting and evaluating concrete historical situations.

But this is not to say that the dialectical conception is inherently useless, for as we shall see over the next few chapters it is possible to avoid the extremes of Simmel and Hegel - but only by going through their dilemmas. That is the concern of the next chapter which indicates how Lukács, through an exploration of the concrete examples of the dilemmas which Simmel indicated, began to give the crisis of culture a determinate historical content.
Chapter III: Formal Studies of a Fragmented Society: Simmel and Lukács

The tasks and the main thrust of this chapter differ from those of the previous ones. Whereas before I was concerned with explicating a number of texts whose primary orientation was philosophical and attempting through the use of the concept of Bildung to show how these seemingly abstract issues were intimately tied to fundamental problems of social theorizing, my concern in this chapter will be with texts which are obviously concerned with social problems. Since no one questions that works like Simmel's Soziologie or Lukács' Sociology of the Modern Drama are "about society," my major task in this section will be to indicate the ways in which these works are inseparable from the complex issues which have preceded them. Where my task in the first two chapters was to deal with topics with which most social scientists are not familiar and attempt to show that these issues are in reality encountered on an everyday level in social theorizing, now I must take studies with which many social scientists are probably familiar and indicate the unfamiliar aspects of Simmel's famous inquiries into social formation which link these studies to his comments on the crisis of objective and subjective culture. Once this has been accomplished it will be possible to examine one of Lukács' earliest studies and see the extent to which it builds upon the methodological prescriptions of Simmel's formal sociology.

It is necessary to reconstruct the many points of contact between Simmel's formal sociology and his studies of cultivation and alienation because of a phenomenon of which I have spoken earlier. The assimilation of Simmel's formal sociology into American sociology has taken place at the price of a loss
of Simmel's own concept of the relationship between form and life, and it is necessary to rebuild this link if we are to understand his importance for Lukács.

The entire issue can be conveniently discussed by raising the following questions: What is the ontological status of Simmel's forms? Is his formal sociology an analytic process of making hypotheses about formal interaction aided by a construction of ideal formal models or is it rather an attempt to extract an already existing form from its societal embodiment? In short, are Simmel's forms nominalist conventions employed by the researcher or are they real constituent parts of the society under investigation? Perhaps all of these ways of posing the question are in some ways misguided, but they do serve to indicate a basic dispute that has arisen in the literature which has grappled with Simmel's formal sociology. Perhaps there is no better way to indicate what seems to be the bone of contention than by contrasting the following statements, the first by F.H. Tenbruck and the second by Theodore Abel.

"Forms are not general concepts arrived at by generalization and abstraction, and formal sociology is not the analysis of such general concepts. "Abstracting" (a form) must be understood in the radical sense of extracting from reality something which is not a directly observable and common element in it. ...Forms represent a specific "layer" of reality. Although they cannot — and are not meant to — account for interaction itself, they are operative in it; they account for its patterns."²

"...in his sociological studies the methodological requirement to study forms in their purity is not maintained by Simmel but analyzed are different social situations from the point of view of the processes that take place in them, the factors that constitute the process and the conditions which influence it. ...The formal procedure is abstract, speculative, synthetical; the analytic procedure is concrete and deals with observable phenomena. ...With the formal procedure as a basis sociology becomes a philo-
sophical discipline, while the inductive procedure establishes sociology as an empirical science. 3

In what follows, I will defend the thesis that Simmel's use of form can only be understood in a manner similar to that defended by Tenbruck, although I cannot claim that the conclusions I draw from this fact would be the same as his. Since this puts me squarely opposite Abel's position, and since Abel's arguments have found a following within some parts of the discipline of sociology by providing a rationale for accepting Simmel's researches and abandoning his methods, the nature of Abel's claim should be sharpened.

Abel's treatment of Simmel can in many senses be paralleled to Parsons' treatment of Weber. Following Parsons' effort to indicate that Durkheim and Weber both share a common view of social action, Abel eventually argued that in attempting to establish an independent science of society, Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim "support and complement each other." 4 This claim apparently concerns the actual practice of the three rather than their methodological claims, since a simple reading of any of the critiques of Simmel which may be found in Weber and Durkheim's writings indicate great differences between them. 5 What is argued is that Simmel's methodological statements do not influence his actual scientific practice, or if they do have an influence, this influence may be regarded as purely detrimental. Hence, while Simmel may believe that he is dealing with pure forms, extracted from reality, which to a certain extent are a constituent element of that reality, it is possible to reformulate all of his empirical work within the language of a positivist, nominalist approach, and see that his "forms" and "types" are not phenomena inherent in reality itself, but rather abstractions imposed upon reality by the scientist in accordance with standardized conventions of scientific hypo-
thesis formulation and testing.6

This approach to Simmel's formal sociology dispenses with a good many of the more problematic aspects of his general social theory. The philosophical problem of the role which externalized forms play in the process of Bildung has been severed from the role forms play in the analysis of society. There is no longer that problematic, but important, link between the cultural problem of a separation of subjective and objective culture and the reflection of this separation in the general independence of forms from life within the social sphere. Karel Kosík's discussion of political economy aptly summarizes what is lost when the problem of the ontological status of forms is reduced to a nominalist convention employed by the investigator.

The more fetishized the science (political economy) is, the more it presents the problem of reality to itself as an ultimately logical or methodological question. Bourgeois political economy has already lost the consciousness that "economic man" is connected to the economic reality of capitalism, in which the human becomes reduced really and practically to an "economic man." The homo oeconomicus is for political economists a "rational fiction" (Menger), a "necessary logical fiction" (H. Wolff) or a "working hypothesis" and "essential caricature" (H. Guitton). 7

Once we have begun to treat forms as only being real for the scientist, we have removed all questions of the extent to which these consistent patterns of interaction might be of great importance for the daily life of individuals within a specific society. Once the scientist has lost consciousness of the possible social importance of his research typologies, forms either become merely fictions of the observer or first attempts at a general form of interaction which lies in an ahistorical realm beyond any of its immediate realizations. In Simmel's work it is possible to see an attempt to give the forms of the social order a real status in daily social interaction, and the entire
thrust of Simmel's arguments can be shown to mitigate against the positivist rehabilitation and absorption of his work. This will be demonstrated in an examination of Simmel's methodological writings.

But once this has been shown it is necessary to pose the question of what sort of objectivity Simmel grants to his social forms. Since this answer has already been approached in a somewhat oblique fashion in the preceding chapter, my second concern will be to examine some of Simmel's actual researches and indicate how they can be seen as supporting his general theses on the relationship between objective and subjective culture and inevitability of life's finding only tragedy in the cultural sphere. This will indicate that he refuses to argue that the separation of objective and subjective culture is a peculiarity of a particular society. We find instead that Simmel's formal analysis, for all of its attempts to remain based in concrete social life, ultimately results in the positing of universal laws of cultural development which are independent of any one concrete society.

Finally I will examine Lukács' early study on the evolution of modern drama and indicate how it utilizes Simmel's methodological techniques on a subject matter which prevents Lukács from too easily mystifying the results of his studies. I will argue that this early work shows signs of a more concrete approach to the problem of how the process of Bildung can collide with unassimilable forms as a result of concrete, historical contingencies.

A.) Formal Sociology and the Independence of the Societal Level

As I have indicated above, my intent in this section is to explicate
Simmel's contention that formal sociology must direct itself to an independent level of reality, and is concerned with the extraction of pure forms of "sociation" (Vergesellschaftung) which exist independently of any given social interaction, but which are intimately connected with every given interaction. In approaching this contention, I will examine Simmel's major methodological statements on the science of "formal sociology": the introduction and "Ex-cursus: How is Society Possible?" from his 1908 Soziologie and his 1917 text Grundfragen der Soziologie (Individuum und Gesellschaft) (Fundamental Questions of Sociology - Individual and Society). The concern here will be primarily exegetical, although at one point I will have to indicate that I am pushing Simmel further than he himself seems willing to go, though even here I still view my discussion as being an internal rather than external critique.

Simmel's methodological statements occasionally argue that previous attempts at establishing sociology as an independent science have in some form been basically misguided and cannot serve as the foundation on which a truly independent study of society could arise. Simmel never indicates who had made these arguments, but it is safe to assume that they may be connected with either the German Geisteswissenschaften tradition of idiographic historiography or the French philosophie positive tradition of nomothetic sociology. By relating Simmel's criticisms to these two schools we will be able to understand how he viewed the relationship of the science he was attempting to establish to already existing studies of the social order.

The German Geisteswissenschaften tradition found its fullest expression in the "idiographic" analyses of historical phenomena which were carried out to a certain extent in the works of Ranke and Dilthey and were given their
ideal, logical formulation in Windelband's famous Strassburg rectoral address "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft" (1894) ("History and Natural Science") and Rickert's subsequent elaborations on the same basic theme. In attempting to carry out a logical formalization of a practice which had grown up in the actual historical evolution of the historical and natural sciences, Windelband proposed that the sciences be classified according to the methods which they employed rather than through the traditional classifications of the German university faculties which he claimed were still based on a separation of Mind and Body or Natur and Geist. He concluded that

The principle of division is the formal character of their ends of knowledge (Erkenntnisziele). The one seeks general laws, the other particular historical facts: expressing this in the language of formal logic, the end of the one is general, apodictic judgments, of the other: singular, assertoric sentences.

Windelband's speech had an impact which went far beyond what anyone reading the text today would expect. To some it sounded like "a declaration of war against positivism," and its primary significance was its call for the investigation and formulation of explanatory logics of individual, unique events which could be used as an alternative to the existing natural science logics of causal explanation. While there is no space here for a consideration of whether the reactions to the speech were at all in harmony with the argument of the neo-Kantians, it is important to realize that the effect of the speech was to provide a new argument for the distinction between natural and historical sciences, as well as assuring that the efforts of German history, philology, social theory, and the other Geisteswissenschaften could continue to be oriented toward their traditional concern with the explication of the individual and the unique.

Simmel never makes a detailed critique of this position, although he clearly
is unimpressed by it.

In our day, we are used to asking of every science whether it is devoted to the discovery of timelessly valid laws or to the presentation and conceptualization of real, unique historical processes. Generally, this alternative ignores innumerable intermediate phenomena dealt with in the actual practice of science. It is irrelevant to our conception of the problem of sociology because this conception renders a choice between the two answers unnecessary.\(^{14}\)

The most extensive critique he makes of any argument which might be traceable to the Windelband–Rickert distinction is found in his frequent rebuttals of the view that "society" must be merely an abstraction since only the "individual" is real. This view is, of course, not held exclusively by the Geisteswissenschaften tradition and could be applied with equal appropriateness to any types of psychologicist approaches to sociology or even to Weber's interpretive sociology of rational action.\(^{15}\) Simmel claims that this argument can be shown to be self-defeating since the claim that only the concrete individual can be the fundamental component of social reality starts a process of atomization which need not be stopped on the individual level, but could be instead continued to the physical-chemical level. The "individual" is not an irreducible primary atom, it is rather an object which we experience in a certain way, and as such has no more validity as an Urphänomenon than other abstractions such as "the Gothic style," or "the Greeks," or even "cities," "political territories," etc.\(^{16}\)

...a conception that considers only individuals "real" lets what should be considered real get out of hand. It is perfectly arbitrary to stop the reduction, which leads to ultimately real elements, at the individual. For this reduction is interminable. ... In other words, the alleged realism that performs this sort of critique of the concept of society, and thus of sociology, actually eliminates all knowable reality.\(^{17}\)

The argument which follows this reductio ad absurdum could easily be read
as an assertion that the forms with which sociology will deal are only nominalist conventions unless we keep in mind that the relativism Simmel is proposing here is so extensive that there is no type of knowledge which would escape being "nominalist" if we are consistent with our use of the term. The term simply ceases to be useful, since it is applicable everywhere. Simmel now introduces the view that the various sciences may be viewed as analogous to various distances from which we look at an object. At each different distance we obtain a different picture of the object, but "at each distance... the picture is correct in its particular way and only that way." 18 All of these arguments have the goal of permitting the study of social forms to emerge as an inquiry which does not need to be reduced to some more primary phenomenon, but rather which can be studied in its own right. The argument is won only because Simmel adopts a standpoint of thoroughgoing relativism, arguing that all approaches to reality are abstractions and thus denying that any one of them can be ever in a position to invalidate any of the others. 19

The argument here should be somewhat familiar, since it repeats many of the same steps which have been previously discussed in connection with Simmel's refusal to grant that any one form ever has a necessary connection to the Worldstuff. We can therefore see a parallel between the status of the various independent world-forms and the various formal sciences. This methodological argument has a great significance for Lukács' future critical practice. Simmel's defense of society as an independent stratum of reality enables Lukács to see that the world is not simply a collection of facts, but rather is a series of relationships which take on differing meanings as they are viewed in differing contexts. 20 This point can be examined in a more concrete form in the discussion of Simmel's formal sociology below. For the present we must turn to a
discussion of the second type of sociological analysis which Simmel rejects: the French positivist tradition of causal analysis.

Once again, one cannot point to any specific discussion of the French positivist tradition in Simmel's work, and here even hints that Simmel is discussing Comte or Durkheim are rather slim. Perhaps the strongest claim that can be made is that Simmel advances a number of arguments which would seem to be opposed to certain of the ideals of positive sociology, although we have no reason to think that Simmel is actually consciously making such a critique. On the most general level, it is clear that Simmel never would have been willing to accept the Comtean convention of attempting to deduce the individual from the laws and dynamics of the social realm.\textsuperscript{21} Wolff has argued that Simmel maintained an ambivalent attitude toward "the socialization of the spirit" and that accordingly one finds a constant reluctance on Simmel's part to claim too broad a field as the proper domain of sociology.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, Durkheim's critique of Simmel centers on the argument that Simmel's definition of sociology as the study of pure forms eliminates any possibility of "society" being conceptualized as a real, historical force.

To be sure, not all that happens in society is social; but this cannot be said of all that occurs \textit{in} and \textit{through} society. Consequently, in order to eliminate from society the various phenomena which constitute the web of social life, one has to demonstrate that they are not \textit{the work of the collectivity}, but come from wholly different origins to place themselves within the general framework constituted by society.\textsuperscript{23}

Durkheim's use of the concept "society" as the \textit{cause} of certain types of activities, or his notion of the "work of the collectivity" find no equivalent in Simmel's conception. Simmel sees no advantage in proposing that sociology can be presented as a general science of man which investigates the way in which
social laws influence human actions. Simmel rejected this attempt to "give sociology everything" as failing to create an independent "distance" from which to view reality.

...jurisprudence and philology, political science and literary criticism, psychology and theology, and all the other disciplines that have divided up the study of human life among themselves will certainly continue to exist. Nothing new is gained by throwing their sum total into a pot and sticking a new label on it: "sociology."24

"Nothing new is gained," assuming, as we have seen Simmel does, that the combination of the various relative perspectives does not produce some type of final objective view of man's development.

Simmel's rejection of a nomological conception of sociology helps to expand the picture which was created by his critique of the Geisteswissenschaften approach, even though the only way which this expansion can be made at present is through a series of statements which must only be taken as first approximations to a definition of Simmel's views. Hence, while Simmel rejects a view of sociology which would be based ultimately on the individual, he also rejects a view of sociology which would transform it into a science which could make an exhaustive causal analysis of the individual. He recognizes that the individual is not as free as the individual of the "rational choice" models of social theory, yet at the same time he stresses that one-way causality fails to explain any of the phenomena of social reality. His constant stress is on the interaction of individual and form and he is reluctant even to treat a case such as the domination of one individual by another as a phenomenon which has only one dimension. While the dominator should of course be studied, Simmel also argues that we must see what the dominated brings into the relationship.25 Once again, here is a point that runs through-
out Lukács' critique of the Marxism of the Second International. Proletarian class consciousness is a vital aspect of revolutionary change because the proletariat is not just the victim of external oppression, but rather is to a certain extent the contributor to its own oppression through its failure to break with the bourgeois mode of consciousness. Thus the "last crisis of capitalism" is not merely the removal of external domination through an economic crisis which breaks the grip of the bourgeoisie, rather the periodic crises of the business cycle must be accompanied by a "free conscious act" of the proletariat if there is to be a "last crisis" and not a continued barbarization. 26

Thus far I have attempted to depict Simmel's conception of sociology through an examination of what he rejects. It would be tempting to present at this point a statement of "Simmel's Program for Sociology," but such a neat contrast is impossible. Simmel's actual proposals about how "formal sociology" functions are among the most ambiguous of his writings, and the proper way of discussing them must take a somewhat oblique course. First we will examine Simmel's requirements for having any kind of independent science. Next we will turn to what will be called "border disciplines" and examine two types of sociology which Simmel discusses at great length, even though neither of them is an independent science of social forms. Only after this can we pull together what has been said and make a few comments on the nature of formal sociology proper, before turning to an examination of the actual practice of formal analysis in the hands of Simmel and Lukács.

Simmel's two requirements for an independent sociology have already been stated implicitly in the discussion of Simmel's criticisms of German and French
sociology. The first requirement, which was discussed above in terms of a science being a specific "distance" from which reality is viewed, states that sociology must have some type of specific methodology which produces its specific distance from reality. Stated in the most general terms, sociology deals with

what happens to men and by what rules they behave, not insofar as they unfold their understandable individual existences in their totalities, but insofar as they form groups and are determined by their group existence because of interaction. Sociology thus is founded upon an abstraction from the concrete reality, performed under the guidance of the concept of society.27

The second requirement, which we have discussed above in terms of Simmel's argument that sociology must not merely be a name under which all of the presently existence human studies can continue to flourish, states that sociology must have some form of objectivity which is isomorphic with the methods it develops for the purpose of abstraction. This is a point which needs to be stressed since it is ultimately Simmel's final check against nominalism. He argues against a view which would hold that science creates its own epistemological objects at the moment in which it carries out its abstraction. Rather, the abstraction must proceed to uncover some already existing status of reality if it is to be an appropriately scientific abstraction. In the introduction to Soziologie Simmel argues that the concepts which the sociologist produces through his particular abstraction,

...must be constructed upon the recognition of the fact that certain characteristics of these data ... actually belong together and therefore constitute the subject matter of one science....However urgently such abstractions may be demanded by the needs of cognition itself, they also require some sort of justification of their relation to the structure of the objective world. ... Certainly naive naturalism errs in assuming that the given itself contains the analytic or synthetic arrangements through which it
becomes the content of a science. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the given are more or less susceptible to such arrangements. In this one may detect a trace of the familiar Kantian argument that the forms of cognition require some sort of objective reality if they are to become empirical experience, but Simmel's argument goes even further and approaches certain points which were more fully developed in Lask's notion of concretization. He is arguing that the reality investigated must in some way be commensurate with the way in which we investigate it. At first sight we appear to be back to the dilemma which Hegel ridiculed Kantian epistemology for falling into: this sounds very much like wanting to swim before going into water, for how are we to know anything about the appropriateness of our forms and their relationship to reality except by exploring that reality through those forms? We will not be able to understand the point which Simmel is attempting to make here until we have examined his conception of the purposes of sociological epistemology. But the investigation of that "border discipline" seems best postponed until we establish that this second requirement is indeed an important part of Simmel's conception of sociology and not, as critics might argue, a remnant from Simmel's philosophy of life which is of little or no importance for Simmel's actual sociological theory and practice.

One way of establishing this fact is by examining a clear case where Simmel discusses a sociology which proceeds in its investigations with a specific viewpoint or method, but which makes no claims about the objective validity of these methods. The case I have in mind is the "border discipline" of "general sociology" which has been a major problem in the explication of Simmel's sociology for some time, since it is intimately connected with Simmel's previously noted ambivalence for the "socialization of the spirit." "General Sociology"
is explicitly discussed only in the 1917 *Grundfragen* although the only way that any sense at all may be made of the distinctions which it involves requires references to the requirement of "objective validity" which Simmel proposes in the introduction to *Soziologie*. Hence the reader will have to tolerate a good deal of jumping between two texts before the significance of the claims of the *Grundfragen* may be established. The first, and in some ways the greatest difficulty the reader of Simmel's *Grundfragen* has is in actually determining what it is that Simmel is discussing at any given moment in the text. The text is divided into four sections; three "examples" of sociology; general, formal and philosophical sociology; and an introduction which explains the assumptions, methods, purpose, and significance of each of these types of sociology. Beyond that, there are no divisions in the text, and in the introduction in particular there are few guidelines to aid the reader in determining when Simmel has shifted from one topic to another.  

These problems are particularly acute when one attempts to determine what are the specific features of "general sociology" as opposed to "formal sociology," since the first mention one finds of "general sociology" in the text comes after Simmel has completed a discussion of it. He notes in passing that a long series of comments on "sociology as a method" have given us a first glimpse of the first problem area: general sociology. As if this did not present a great enough problem, the section on general sociology concludes rather ambiguously as Simmel notes in passing that he has now advanced beyond the first problem area which has dealt with "the entirety of historical life in so far as it is formed socially," and that now he is concerned with the second problem area, which deals with "the forms themselves, which constitute society and societies out of the mere sum of living men." The question which
now faces us is that given this presentation, which leaves us with many doubts as to when we begin discussing general sociology as well as when we pass beyond it, is there any series of definitive features which may be associated with general sociology? Taking a clue from the requirements suggested in the introduction to Soziologie, I think it can be argued that there is a possibility of defining "general sociology" clearly if we assume that is basically the method of sociological analysis applied indiscriminately to all aspects of human life.

Simmel states, in what is the closest we ever come to a definition of general sociology, that in the past science has always alternated between two ways of studying man: objectively, as an object among other objects and determined by similar rules, and subjectively, in terms of individual nature and creativity. Simmel proposes that now there is a third possibility: we may examine man socially. These three options echo a point which was made nine years earlier in the introduction to Soziologie, when Simmel noted that historical phenomena may be considered from three different viewpoints:

First one may focus one's attention upon the individual existences - these are the true bearers of connections. Second, one may concentrate on the formal types of interactions. ...Third, one may study the contents of the conditions and events which can be formulated in concepts. Here the inquiry is ... into the purely objective significance of the conditions and events themselves.

In both of these contexts, however, Simmel takes great pains to stress that these options are only different ways of looking at history and man, and that they cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive or even competing. In the Grundfragen, Simmel stresses "...and this is the point - no one of them can claim to be the only or the only adequate manner cognition." All of these statements should strike the reader as reminiscent of Simmel's discussion of the
"distances" from which sciences perform their abstracting and the relative truth all of these distances possess. But while the argument in that context was used against the instinctance of the geisteswissenschaftliche tradition on the ultimate reality of the individual, we can see here how this argument is used against any attempt to elevate the examination of man through sociological methods to the level of the science of man. Simmel thus counters the positivist attempt of making sociology the queen of the human sciences by completing his argument that nothing new is added by putting all the human sciences into a new pot and calling it sociology with a step that is somewhat akin to giving each of the human sciences their own pot of "sociology."

Insofar as it is based on the notions that man must be understood as a social animal and that society is the medium of all historical events, sociology contains no subject matter that is not already treated in one of the extant sciences. It only opens up a new avenue for all of them. It supplies them with a scientific method which, precisely because of its applicability to all problems, is not a science with its own content. 36

In this same context, Simmel likens sociology to "induction": it is a method which is useful for any subject matter, but which is itself unrelated to any one specific area. 37

Further light may be cast on this question by examining the actual example of "general sociology" which Simmel uses in the second chapter of the Grundfragen. In the exposition which occurs here, Simmel is loyal to the criteria set forth in the introductory section of the Grundfragen. We find no content here which has not already been examined by some other social science, since the examples which support his arguments consist solely of dicta by authors such as Schiller, Heine, von Weber; accounts and statements attributed to historical figures such as Solon and Cardinal Retz; and evaluative remarks by his-
torians such as Freeman. Clearly Simmel is building on contents which others have assembled, and uses this assembled mass of materials not for the purpose of illustrating some central form of social interaction, as is the case in his formal sociology, but rather as a corpus of statements which are simply taken as valid and important in themselves. But what is the contribution of the sociologist here? Although the sociologist provides no new answers, he does indicate that, among other things these are answers to a series of questions which request information about man's nature as a social being. Hence in the juxtaposition of von Weber's statement "The individual is an ass, and yet the whole is the voice of God," and Schiller's "Seen singly, everybody is passably intelligent and reasonable; but united into a body, they are blockheads," the sociologist adds no information about individuals or masses, since that is assumed to have been provided by these authors. Rather the sociologist shows that this material can be read as indicating that there is generally a tendency to view the single person as intellectually superior to the mass, while the mass tends to be the object of emotional attachments.

In summary it can be seen that Simmel's rejection of a sociological method divorced of specific content unites two aspects of his critique of the sociological heritage. Like positivist sociology, it would only be a new name for already existing disciplines, and like the Geisteswissenschaften, there is a danger that such an enterprise might think that it had successfully located the ultimately real stratum of human existence, and hence failed to see that it is only a perspective from which reality may be viewed. Hence we could say that "general sociology" is not a formal science, as would be the case with formal sociology, but rather is itself a form, i.e., a language which may be
used to discuss the features of reality but which can neither exhaust that reality nor make claims which would somehow argue that its perspective was more valid than any other perspective. Finally, we have seen that Simmel's actually practice of "general sociology" is in accordance with his methodological outline. Hence his argument is not a philosophical statement removed from his actual practice, but rather true reflection of his working definition of general sociology. 40

If general sociology can become a true formal science only through a process which would indicate that indeed it does have an objectivity which corresponds to its methodological operations, how is this claim to be established? How can we tell if the type of sociology we are employing simply imposes forms on reality regardless of content, rather than actually discussing forms which are already present, or in Tenbruck's phrase, actually "extracting forms?" The task of establishing the validity of the claim of formal sociology to be a formal science is not made within the domain of formal sociology itself, but rather requires a subsidiary discipline, "philosophical sociology." Simmel notes that this type of sociology surrounds formal sociology from two sides. One aspect of philosophical sociology goes beyond the partial claims of formal sociology and attempts to make general statements about the state of man. Simmel calls this discipline "sociological metaphysics." We need not detain ourselves with a discussion of it, since it is of little relevance to the problem at hand. 41 However, the second type of philosophical sociology, "sociological epistemology," is of great relevance for this problem, since it functions as a sort of preparatory operation which ultimately must establish the validity of the claim of formal sociology to possess a
subject matter in addition to its methods. In the discussion of sociological epistemology that follows, I will be concerned with two examples of the discipline, each of which has a slightly different concern since each of them is preceding a different variety of formal analysis. The first, and best known, example is the "Excursus: How is Society Possible?" from the Soziologie which provides support for the claim that the synchronic analysis of forms contained in that text indeed relates to a real content. The second example is less well known and much less clearly stated. It is taken from the Grundfragen and provides the rationale behind a diachronic method which is then employed in the example of formal sociology in the Grundfragen. The specific nature of both of these methods will be discussed after we have looked at the reasons Simmel gives for employing them.

Turning to the discussion of "How is Society Possible?" we may first be struck by why the problem of "society" is raised. Why not ask "How is Sociology Possible?" We need only remember the point which has been made above: sociology — that is formal sociology, the independent science — will be possible only if it can be shown to have method and content. It can presumably take care of developing its own methods, but who is to see if it has a content and how is this to be shown? One way the existence of some sort of objective isomorphism between the methods of a science and the structure of reality could be shown would be simply to compare the two. But, and here we are back to the problem of how to swim without getting wet, what can tell us "how social reality is structured"? Simmel makes a speedy exit from this vicious circle and it is not clear how convincing his resolution of the problem is: he argues that an operation similar to Kantian transcendental analysis can do the trick by
indicating that society, if it is to be possible at all, must possess forms somewhat like those which the sociologist employs. Mamelet provides an apt summary of Simmel's line of reasoning,

How, in general, is society possible? It is true that one might be tempted to turn to history for an answer to this question, but history can in no way account for the origin of the societal tie. Simmel ... shows, quite easily, that society could not have originated in an initial conviction as to its utility because such a conviction is of necessity the product of a long social evolution ... This means that, if in fact there are any necessary preconditions for the existence of society, they must be discovered through a priori reasoning, and this involves, not the historian but the philosopher as theoretician of knowledge.

Lest this seem to fly in the face of my earlier argument that Simmel always treats the apriori forms of Kantian epistemology in a relativist manner, we need only turn to the text in question to see that Simmel's categories in no way resemble the Kantian forms and are such general types of preconditions that they might better be called the fundamental tenets of a social ontology. Indeed, Simmel argues that they are fundamentally unlike Kantian apriori forms, in that they do not organize society in the way nature is organized through the categories of space and time, but rather work within and among the constituents elements of society itself.

... the unity of society needs no observer. It is directly realized by its elements because these elements are themselves conscious and synthesizing units. Kant's axiom that connection, since it is the exclusive product of the subject, cannot inhere in the things themselves does not apply here. For societal connection immediately occurs in the "things," that is the individuals.

Two things need to be noted here, the first being the point which Simmel makes explicitly in this passage. These forms are not the apriori categories of a subject which merely observes, as is the case when Kant establishes the validity of causal analysis in the natural sciences through an analysis of the ca-
tories of the ego, but are in fact the forms which are present in the objects of investigation themselves. Or, to state the case more strongly, they are forms whose presence makes the object of investigation (society) possible through a direction of the individual constitutive parts which make up the object (people). If this point is established, Simmel will have demonstrated that forms are present in society as well as in sociology, and hence there is at least a minimal fit between the discipline and the subject matter. In order to understand what is argued here, it might be useful to imagine the sort of mismatch which would result if sociology used formal models while society itself was actually organized along the lines of fairly simple economic causality. The sociologist might capture some aspects of the reality, but his entire presupposition about what held society together would be invalid.

The second point that needs to be made is that Simmel is by no means slipping into the Geisteswissenschaften-Naturwissenschaften distinction which was discussed earlier. He does not deny that it is possible to investigate society as one investigates nature with the assumption that the elements have no type of internal relationship and that all that can be done is to look for external covering laws. But, he would presumably request that those who adopted this standpoint explicate the sociological epistemology upon which their arguments rest, should they wish that their method be accorded scientific status rather than simple pragmatic utility.

Although we have now seen the general way in which Simmel proposes to defend his thesis that formal sociology has both a method and a specific layer of reality to investigate, it will be useful to look at the nature of the a-priori forms. I do not intend to engage in an argument with Simmel over the
validity of these three aprioris as the ultimate grounding of social reality. But I do want to indicate, as Simmel does not seem to do explicitly, that the very grounds which he claims make his formal sociology possible are the same grounds upon which the crisis of culture ultimately rests: the estrangement of forms from life. Simmel states that unlike the Kantian categories, his categories cannot be easily denoted by a single name, however, for ease of discussion, I will adopt O'Neill's convention of calling the three apriorities "typification," "presentation," and "vocation-symbiosis." Typification, as Mamelet points out, has a long history of development in Simmel's work and finds its origins in the thesis which is first presented in the Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie and which argues that is is impossible for us ever to have total knowledge of other individuals. This, of course, is nothing more than an application of Simmel's general doctrine of the non-exhaustive nature of forms to the domain of "our knowledge of others." In the social sphere this phenomenon is responsible for the fact that what ultimately ties society together is not the capability of one individual to perceive the uniqueness of the other, but rather the ability of individuals to accomplish interactions on the basis of what is typical in others, e.g. on the basis of what in the other is "like me." The relevance of this point of "sociological epistemology" for actual research in formal sociology can be found simply by turning to Simmel's discussion of the "intersection of social circles." Here he takes this basic apriori constituent of social reality and explores it further to see what more specific statements can be made about group cohesion and members' attitudes towards each other. For the present we do not need to discuss the method employed, but rather only need to note that
this analysis ultimately rests on the broader basis provided by this first apriori.

Presentation develops the corollary to this point: there is always more to an individual than that aspect which shows itself in any given interchange. Hence individuals may manage their interactions through a greater or lesser degree of personal commitment, and the entire society may be seen as made up of people "who stand inside and outside it at the same time."53 While the first apriori dealt with the way in which individuals function through the use of forms, this apriori stresses the degree to which the individual has a life independent of any one form and is capable of "taking-up" one form while discarding others. There is no shortage of cases in Simmel's formal analyses which build on this apriori: Simmel's analysis of fashion, his discussion of domination, and his famous essay on the Stranger, share a fundamental stress on the way in which all of these apparently factual situations need to be seen as interactions between a subject and a form.54

In many ways symbiosis-vocation fails to capture the full sense of what is involved in Simmel's third apriori, and here the label must be taken more as a referential tool than as an exhaustive definition of what transpires in this section. Part of the problem with the term can also be found in Simmel's explication. He is quite clearly dealing with the same type of phenomenon which had been explored in the Philosophie des Geldes in terms of the split between objective and subjective culture, but rarely notes that this is the case. The fundamental ambivalence which Wolff has noted in regard to Simmel's prohibition against sociology engaging in the general "socialization of the spirit" reappears here within the more limited domain of formal sociology. It
can be easily seen that the very same phenomena which Simmel noted in the Philosophie des Geldes (and which are explored more deeply in the writings on culture which follow the Soziologie) provide the rationale behind the third apriori, and hence as I have stated before, the very possibility of an independent sociology presumes a culture where a severe disruption of the process Bildung — as it is defined in Simmel’s theory — has taken place. Simmel’s resistance to indicating that this is the case, and the absence of the more pronounced sense of tragedy which accompanies Max Weber’s work on the sociology of rational-legal authority is striking, especially in view of the fact that Simmel’s own analysis of the phenomenon of reification is both more philosophically explicit than Weber’s and indeed provides the basis upon which Weber himself builds his discussion of rationalization. 55

What then is Simmel’s argument and in what ways can I claim that it parallels the discussion of the tragedy of culture? Simmel begins the discussion of the third apriori by noting that when society is considered from the "outside" (or as he puts it "phenomenologically") that is, independent of what we may know about the intentions of the individual members, it appears as a vast network of "functions and function-centers."

Purely personal and creative aspects of the ego, its impulses and reflexes, have no place in this system. To put it otherwise: The life of society (considered not psychologically but phenomenologically, that is, exclusively in regard to its social contents) takes its course as if each of its elements were predestined for its particular place in it. In spite of all discrepancies between it and ideal standards, social life exists as if all of its elements found themselves interrelated with one another in such a manner that each of them, because of its very individuality, depends on all others and all others depend on it. 56

Clearly this is a "phenomenological description" far different from that which Alfred Schutz developed on the basis of Weberian interpretive sociology. 57 Yet,
in this very sharp contradiction with what Weber and Schutz present as the fundamental experience of social life we can find one of the more profound points which Simmel passes on to Lukács. While Simmel acknowledges that the experience of "understanding" (Verstehen) is a fundamental, primordial, everyday event in the course of our interactions with others and with our predecessors, he nevertheless maintains that this fact alone does exhaust the experience of society. Society is not simply "other people": it is also a quasi-objective structure of roles, vocations, rules of conduct, etc. As Kosík has argued, and as Simmel appears to support here, we must realize that although the individual certainly is an element in the social system which "bestows meaning" on its social world, man can nevertheless only appear in the social world through the mediation of a system. The romantic protest which wants to destroy all restraints on individual presentation, as well as an idealist reduction of sociology to meaning-constitutive acts of individuals, fails to recognize that man is always determined in his appearance by some type of super-human system, although of course this system is a historical entity which is the result of generations of sedimented human praxis and not an ontological eternal condition for mankind.

What Simmel is developing here can be seen as a parallel to the requirement of his Bildung system that the individual realize himself not as a natural being on the level of primitive and pre-social forms (Vorformen), but rather through an appropriation of available world-forms of the objective culture. Hence society emerges as yet another case where man must undergo a process of cultivation, an appropriation of objective elements which have been created by other subjects with the goal of permitting a subjectivity to be realized in
a common world. But what hope do we have of seeing this process carried out if the forms which are to be appropriated have no longer the quality of being mere "stations" over which the subject passes on its way to realiza-
tion but rather have taken on their own logic (the Eigenlogik) and are now no longer simply serving the needs of individuals for cultivation but rather function as objective components of an economic system as the various voca-
tions within a general division of labor? Remarkably, Simmel dodges the question, and gives a Kantian rather than Hegelian solution to the problem of social Bildung. The individual may very well be phenomenally determined, i.e., he may be forced into one of the prearranged slots of the society, but he is nevertheless noumenally free, i.e., he determines the exact manner in which he will appear and disappear from the social space (from apriori 1 and 2). Mamelet summarizes this argument as follows:

...socialization cannot be held to be a simple matter of the net effect of a multiplicity of efficient causes, but rather the goal of a conscious individual - the causal sequence which eventuated in the establishment of society transforms itself into a teleo-
logical sequence. From now on, society appears as an environment in which each individual finds an already prepared place which determines the role he is to play. The interactions whose play constitutes the web of social life are realized inside this teleological sequence ....

Clearly this coincidence of teleology and causality - or as the Marxian Lukács might put it, the realization of freedom through the overcoming of necessity - is a possibility in certain societies, but as Simmel has argued in his critique of the present culture, today it seems that such freedom will be purely irration-
al and subjective, i.e., realized on a natural instinctive level rather than through an objectively mediated subjective Geist.

But, even if we grant that this apriori does indeed have ties to Simmel's
studies of culture, could it not also be argued that it is nothing more than a throwback to those writings, and indeed there is no reason for including it in this essay since the first two aprioris are adequate in providing the epistemological foundation of sociology? For the purposes of the argument, I am willing to grant that it is extremely difficult to find any specific substantive writings in the Soziologie which seem as directly tied to the content of this apriori as, for example, the study of the stranger is tied to the second apriori. But, while the third apriori adds no new objective content to the domain of formal sociology it is nevertheless vital to the claim that formal sociology possesses an objective validity since it supports the broader argument that all of the various forms generated by the first two aprioris can be treated as general cases of social forms. In other words, the first two apriori merely tell us that in carrying out interactions individuals use forms in certain ways, while the third apriori tells us that all of these various objective forms have a dwelling place in a broader form which we call society. All of the forms do belong together as the subject matter of a science of society, and what we define as "society" is the objective body of intersubjective forms which are used to make interactions between contemporaries possible. The stress on personal interaction frees other formal domains such as history (the relationship between individuals and a past), religion (the relationship of individuals to an absolute), art (the relationship of a particular genre of objective externalizations of individuals to other individuals), etc., from the domination of any one master discipline of sociology.

We can attempt to make a brief statement of how formal sociology carries out its analysis, before turning to yet another type of sociological epistemo-
logy and yet another type of formal sociology, that which is found in the
Grundfragen. Simmel's discussion of superordination and subordination will
be used as an example, since this example will be explored more fully in the
next section. Simmel's analysis begins from the primary assumption that all
types of domination can be viewed as moments of interaction and then pro-
ceeds to make refinements in the general class of "subordination" and "super-
ordination." This serves both to define more clearly what these terms mean
in general as well as indicating what subforms the general form may take. Ac-
cordingly, Simmel begins by examining the way in which an individual may be
subordinated and indicates the general features of subordination under: 1) an
"individual" (a ruler, judge or a tribunal, if the latter functions in a uni-
fied manner, a member of a group, or an outside arbitrator), 2) a group or
plurality, 3) stratified subordinants, 4) objects and things (which provides
a glimpse of Lukács' analysis of reification and the commodity fetish), 5)
moral codes or conscience. This whole analysis is then supplemented with a
discussion of how subordination differs in relationship to the various degrees
of domination which are possible. 

In making sense out of Simmel's analysis it is important to remember what his aim is: he is not attempting to carry
out an empirical and historical description of one type of domination and the
way in which it functions at a given point in space and time. Rather he wants
to know what type of form any conceivable type of domination must take.

Clearly no type of empirical analysis will be helpful in answering this question, and the use of empirical examples must be taken in the same sense as the use of examples in Husserl's eidetic variation. Indeed, if one wants to find a
close parallel to Simmel's methods, they can be found in Husserl's insight that
efforts at investigating the meaning or essence which phenomena have for us must proceed by examining numerous examples of the phenomenon in question, altering different aspects through imaginative variation so as to see which aspects of the phenomenon are accidental elements which do not effect our sense of what the phenomenon is essentially (i.e., the fact that an empirical cube may be red or blue, made out of cardboard or wood) and what aspects of the phenomenon seem incapable of alteration without changing the entire meaning of the object (i.e., the fact that a cube has six sides). Husserl, however, is a good deal more concerned with how this "purified" essence which is seized at the transcendental level can be related to the mundane operations on the level of the everyday life-world. Simmel seems to want to argue that the purified forms of his formal sociology are somehow operating on the everyday level, but he seems also to want to avoid a claim that the subjects he is studying will be fully aware of the nature of these forms.

The types of forms which are explicated here can thus be said to possess the following qualities: 1) They make social interaction possible by providing a set of rules which enable subjects to encounter each other without having to reconstruct society from the ground up with every encounter. They are, so to speak, the rules by which the game of society is played. 2) They have their location not in the conscious action of every subject at every moment, but must occupy some realm other than the objective or subjective (as usual Simmel does not explicate the nature of this realm: subconscious, social, relations of production, etc.). 3) These types of forms may thus be spoken of as what results from a scientific explication of society as a horizontal totality of interacting functions viewed at a given moment; i.e., as
the result of a *synchronic* analysis. This type of analysis, as is also the case with the synchronic study of a grammar, is indifferent to the problem of genesis and alteration of its structures. Hence, much of the hostility towards the atemporality of Simmel's sociology which Lukács later displays can be traced to the fact that much of Simmel's sociology is indeed anti-historical or at least indifferent to the problem of historical change. That this should be the case in synchronic analysis is not surprising, but what is remarkable is that Simmel's discussion of a second type of analysis — which can be viewed as his attempt at a *diachronic* approach — is equally ahistorical in its conclusions even through it uses a historical analysis to arrive at them.

So, it is of great importance that we look at his other example of formal sociology, which is to be found in the 1917 *Grundfragen* since here we find a basically static conception of social reality which is not traceable to a methodological choice of the *Nebeneinander* (synchronic) over the *Nacheinander* (diachronic), but which rather can only find its resolution in Simmel's views on the separation of objective culture and subjective culture. This reinforces the thesis which has been developed here that Simmel's formal analysis of society is essentially one with his critique of the reified nature of the cultural sphere. The example of formal sociology which is given in the third chapter of this thesis does not employ the variational technique which has been described above. Instead, Simmel conducts a historical-genetic study similar to that which is connected with the discussion of the concept of value in the *Philosophie des Geldes*. It will be recalled that rather than conducting a general analysis of the ways in which something can have value, Simmel attempted here to indicate how value develops out of practical life interactions with
objects, and in the remaining chapters of the "analytic" part of the Philosophie des Geldes he is concerned with the more specific problem of how the phenomenon of monetary exchange can be derived from human practice.\footnote{68} Assuming that it is possible to examine how a general form can arise out of a series of concrete uses until a point is reached where the general form is completely separate and self-sufficient, on what basis does Simmel claim that this method of sociological investigation has a specific objective correlate in the social realm? This is an especially troubling problem since the example of philosophical sociology which is given in the final chapter of the Grundfragen is a case of "sociological metaphysics" and thus says little about the epistemological presuppositions on which the investigation of a diachronic formal sociology might rest. We might assume that Simmel would refer the reader to the sociological epistemology of the Soziologie, since that would provide some evidence that the forms which are investigated here bear some resemblance to the forms which are used in everyday social interaction (perhaps the third apriori could serve as a basis for such an argument).

But there seems to be a much simpler way around this problem. There is a sociological epistemology in the Grundfragen, but it is hidden in the "example" of formal sociology itself. Simmel makes a number of general statements about forms in this text which go beyond the dimension of formal analysis and instead must be read as a sort of epistemological prolegomenon to the analysis which immediately follows. We find a number of statements which repeat the claims of the Philosophie des Geldes about the origin of forms in practical life drives and their gradual detachment from those drives.

... these materials, these forces and interests, in a peculiar manner remove themselves from the service of life that originally produced
and employed them. They become autonomous in the sense that they are no longer inseparable from the objects which they formed and thereby made available to our purposes. They come to play freely in themselves and for their own sake .... 69

Here, once again, is the general thesis which was earlier discussed in terms of a turning away from simple teleological, purposive behavior towards the freedom to act according to the form itself. What has been added here is an indication that this type of purely formal behavior finds itself most clearly realized in what Simmel will come to call "play-forms."

In both art and play, forms that were originally developed by the realities of life, have created spheres that preserve their autonomy in the face of these realities. It is from their origin, which keeps them permeated with life, that they draw their depth and strength. Where they are emptied of life, they become artifice and "empty play" (Kunstleik und Spielerei) respectively. 70

Accordingly, another way of carrying out formal sociology would involve the process of tracing the historical evolution of certain forms of social interaction up to the point where the form of the interaction had freed itself from the practical content which it had previously involved and now has become an empty play form.

This is the actual course that Simmel takes in the Grundfragen example, albeit in an extremely condensed manner. His concern is the "play-form" of "sociability" (Geselligkeit) and his analysis consists in part of a discussion of how certain social conventions can be traced back to the brotherhoods of knights in the Middle Ages, where the social conventions had some connection to life purposes, but which after the fourteenth century gradually had their contents wither away until all that is left is the sociability of aristocratic organizations. 71 This historical illustration of the form of sociability is preceded by a discussion of the various aspects of sociability today. There
is not a clear relationship between the two discussions, although Simmel seems to be arguing that the formal analysis of coquetry, social games, etc. which precedes the "historical example" is in some way supported by this "sociological epistemology" takes the form of a genetic-historical analysis. Any attempts to make Simmel's argument in this case any clearer would probably have the dubious result of making a fundamentally inconsistent argument take on an imported consistency. All that can be done here is to indicate that Simmel does at times utilize an alternative to the variational technique and does accompany this alternative with an argument which though related to that of the third apriori, is nevertheless a separate and distinct case of sociological epistemology.

In summary, what appears most striking about Simmel's sociology is that the ahistoricality of its formal analysis is not altered when one turns from synchronic to diachronic analysis. Far from serving as an indicator that the present "horizontal totality" (the Nebeneinander) of society is only a momentary pattern of relationships in a rapidly shifting "vertical totality" (the Nacheinander), both analyses converge on a picture of contemporary social reality as an iron cage that has been generations in the making. In a manner which is consistent with the more metaphysical claims of his studies Bildung and culture, Simmel depicts contemporary society as a domain littered with the lifeless forms of countless previous generations. It is as if all innovation has halted and all that remains for modern social life is a restless jumping from stylized form to stylized form. Formal sociology becomes a chronicle of the petrification of social relationships, a fossil hunting ex-
pedition that finds only the shell of previous lives. It is clear that this sociological vision was consistent with a general cultural pessimism in European intellectual circles at the turn of the century. But are these pessimistic conclusions the result of a method which in some way fails to find alternatives, or is the method sound but the application open to question? Or indeed, is it possible that Simmel’s pessimism is justified and that the only form a critique of the contemporary order can take is an ethical rejection which appeals to norms which lie outside of history?

There is, of course, no final answer to these questions. All that can be attempted here is to indicate that in pursuing our problem of how it is that Lukács was able to overcome his neo-Kantian past, it is important that we examine the way in which he utilizes Simmel’s methods. In developing the contrast between where Simmel and Lukács locate their forms, we can begin to understand what lies behind Lukács’ break. In examining Simmel’s forms of sociation, one encounters a great diversity in the types of forms. On the one hand there relatively simple and stable forms such as the dyad and triad which indeed seem to be timeless and influenced by their contents only in a few easily definable ways. Hence if we are interested purely in the structural aspects of triadic relationships, it does seem likely that a typology of purely formal patterns of interaction could be established. But this does not appear to be the major sense in which Simmel wants to use the concept of form, and it certainly is not the sense in which the term is used in the studies of reification and the crisis of culture. Here we encounter forms such as "exchange," "superordination," and "group identification," which are not easily reducible to a few formal components. To state this in another fashion, it is with these
types of forms that Simmel has his greatest difficulties in assembling the neat lists of modes of formal action which accompany the discussions of the dyad and the triad. Here it seems that the ways of taking up a form, the situations in which the form is present and the contents which it includes are of a much greater relevance than is the case with dyad or triad. These forms can only be studied adequately if a great deal of attention is paid to their contents, since it appears that they lie much closer to the historical dynamic of the society than the forms of the "third realm" which have totally divorced themselves from life. The triadic and dyadic forms may draw their staying power from fundamental features of human embodiment or perceptual limitations, but the general form of "exchange" finds its rules not imprinted in the third realm or in the human condition but rather in a specific type of social organization.

Thus in what follows, we will no longer be concerned simply with what kinds of forms Simmel and Lukács find, but rather with the ways in which they see these forms perpetuated. In examining Lukács' earliest works in German we find that there is already a hint of a divergence with his teacher in this regard.

B. The Form of Reification - an Example of Simmel's Formal Analysis

As a means of giving a concrete example of how Simmel employs both diachronic and synchronic analysis to events in the social world, the phenomenon of "reification" will be explored. The advantage of using this example is that it will not only indicate to us how Simmel proceeds methodologically, but it will also orient us towards the issue of how Simmel and Lukács attempted to in-
vestigate the breakdown of the cultivation process through historical and social analyses. But one cavaet must be given. Although Simmel talks of the problem of the reified (Sachliche) nature of cultural objects in many parts of his works, there is no sustained formal analysis of the phenomenon of reification that is in any way comparable in clarity or completeness of his discussions of forms of conflict, forms of group association, etc. Nevertheless, faced with the choice between an unclear example of formal analysis, which provides an important insight into the issues which Lukács would later investigate, and a more precise example of formal sociology, which would have little significance for Lukács' researches, it is obvious that the former must be chosen, in spite of the difficulties involved. In reconstructing Simmel's arguments on reification I will draw primarily upon the discussion of "subordination under objects" in the Soziologie, which is a clear, though very brief discussion of the synchronic and diachronic forms which reification manifests, and then supplement this discussion with more concrete examples from the Philosophie des Geldes.

The major part of the analysis of subordination under objectivities in Soziologie is concerned with a synchronic analysis of the various ways in which objective subordination may be compared with subordination in general and the various forms which may be derived from the general case of "subordination under objects." In both cases the analysis literally takes the form of a laying out of properties next to each other. Side by side Simmel examines how subordination under an individual, under a group, and under an objective principle may be differentiated, making primary references to how the example selected differs from the particular form of subordination under one person.
Then he carries out a parallel analysis which breaks the case of objective subordination into the sub-forms of subordination under laws, under concrete objects, and under moral imperatives. As I have noted above, formal analysis on the synchronic level attempts to make differentiations within a totality of events. To a certain extent, all of the Soziologie may be seen as a breaking apart of the general notion of "social life" into various levels of formal interactions. The degree to which Simmel abstracts from the whole varies from level to level, beginning with the first divisions of "social life" into the aggregate of the various tensions of "conflict," "group formation," "domination," "spaciality," etc., which form the major topics of investigation. Within each of these we turn to an investigation of tensions within the individual category: all of the examples analyzed under the topic "conflict" share the quality of possessing some common form which differentiates them from other aspects of social life, but upon an examination of this common form, we find that it too can be subdivided, and so on. Thus, the particular case we are examining, subordination under a thing, is defined by the way in which it is differentiated from the general case of subordination under an objective principle, which in turn is defined by the way in which it is differentiated from other examples of the general case of subordination, which in turn is defined by the way in which it is differentiated from other examples of the general form "social life" - the topic of the Soziologie - which is itself an object for formal investigation by virtue of the fact that it has been differentiated from other aspects of Leben in general. The point which should emerge quite clearly from all of this is that one never finds Simmel dealing with a "social fact." Rather, in a fashion which to some extent duplicates Lukács'
general procedure in his Marxist writings, social reality is seen as a network of relations.

The results of this type of differentiation may be seen by examining our particular case. If we want to know how Simmel approaches the form of subordination which we will term "reification" (subordination under a thing), we must examine the way Simmel's differentiation process proceeds through the general case of subordination under objective entities. He begins with an analysis of the ways in which potentialities for interaction differ in cases where an individual is subordinated under an objective principle and under a person, arguing that one feature of the former form is that interaction is drastically reduced since the subordinated faces an abstract law instead of a concrete individual. A further exploration of this phenomenon is made by comparing subordination under a principle and subordination under a person in terms of the way in which each exercises its influence. This results in the discovery of a continuum of "flexibility in application vs. force of application" on which the individual and the law occupy the respective polar positions. Hence, an individual may innovate but not have a real force while the law cannot adopt to changing situations, but can apply firmly to the situations which it does cover. Simmel next examines subordination under a thing and subordination under a law, and argues that while the experience of a law is that of a subject experiencing an object, the peculiar features of subordination under a thing is that the thing becomes living and the subject becomes a thing.

In other words, the objects which dominate the individual - the concrete cases which Simmel mentions are the transfer of slaves through patrimony and the situation of the modern factory worker - determine his fate in much the same way
that a master would, except that while the master would leave him an individual dominated by another individual and while legal subordination still leaves him a human, albeit dominated by a thing, domination by concrete objects "involves a humiliatingly harsh and unconditional kind of subordination" where "he himself psychologically sinks to the category of mere thing." 77

All of the analyses which have been mentioned thus far are made almost in passing, and the first major discussion which is encountered involves the problem of subordination under conscience. This point is significant for our discussion because, even though strictly speaking it is not a case of domination by things, it is through an examination of this phenomenon that Simmel deduces a general diachronic law which describes how the general form of domination under any type of objective principle comes into existence. The synchronic discussion which leads to this law is concerned with comparing the differences between norms of conscience and social norms. Simmel argues that both forms are essentially the same and the one may look at the phenomenon of conscience as a repetition of the phenomenon of group-individual tension reproduced inside the individual. 78 But this is only true for certain stages of morality, and Simmel makes a further differentiation which states that certain experiences of conscience are not simply reproductions of the individual-group form, but rather take on the characteristics of the individual-object relationship. 79

With this analysis we are at a point where the problem of the nature of formal objectivity may be reposed, and with his discussion of the way in which society functions as a "third element" bridging conflicts between the individual and objectivity, Simmel shifts from a synchronic analysis which simply
places society, individual, and object next to each other and describes how they may be differentiated with a horizontal totality to a diachronic analysis which looks into the origins of these three orders. The general law which emerges argues that all three orders may be conceptualized as belonging to the same process of evolution, and hence that the presence of any one of the elements on a synchronic level is an indication that it has evolved diachronically out of one of the other two, or is in the process of transforming itself into one of the other two. The hierarchy which is developed corresponds remarkably to the discussions in the Philosophie des Geldes of the evolution of value, and indeed the three examples which are given of the diachronic law include value as well as justice and morality. 80 Within each of these realms we find first the appearance of a purely individual, expedient type of activity which involves no subordination of the individual to any order other than that of his own desires and immediate needs. In the realm of value this is a parallel to the type of activity which was discussed as "Erleben" in the Philosophie des Geldes and which resulted in the positing of pre-forms which had no inter-subjective or objective status. This level is soon resolved into a domain of inter-subjective meaning, and value, justice, and morality are no longer simply personal rules or decisions, but rather become group norms which are worked out through the interaction of individuals and enforced in terms of a subordination of the individual under the group. But this stage also gives way to the final level, as again was the case in the Philosophie des Geldes when teleological, group generated activity gave way to pure formal activity. The group norms become transformed into an ideal sphere where they now function as objective principles. The values of economic objects, for in-
stance, are no longer the result of group debate or general communal conventions: they simply are viewed as the objective value of the object, independent of any social decision making.

What has just been presented is viewed by Simmel as a general form to which all individual phenomena adhere. Thus if we want to explore the problem of reification diachronically, we need only examine the way in which products of labor undergo an alteration which takes them through these three stages. Simmel does not carry out this analysis in Soziologie but since he does indicate how the phenomenon of value as analyzed in the first chapter of Philosophie des Geldes can be reformulated as an example of the law, it is not difficult to perform a similar reformulation using the example of the production of commodities from the final chapter of that book. This can be accomplished by examining how the process of labor is first connected to the production of an object which is desired for personal expedience, becomes altered to suit the needs of producing social objects, and finally results in the production of objects which seem completely independent from any needs.

On the immediate individual level of production, Simmel maintains that a parallel can be found between works of art and work in general. Both find their origin in an activity which is concerned primarily with the externalization of an idea or a desire. The worker is presented as an artisan who uses tools as a means to realizing certain objective ends which are determined solely by the individual's own wants and needs. However, even in this simple model of production, there are hints of tensions which will work against the subject-object unity which is present in art. The most primary form of a turning from pure individual externalization occurs when tools begin to function as general
means to appropriate reality, rather than as specific instruments designed for a particular task. Our means of shaping reality begin to determine the type of contact we can have with reality and hence we are no longer in a position to make a fresh approach to reality. Rather we have begun to be determined by previous efforts in a long teleological chain. With the development of these standardized means of appropriating reality the worker is already beginning to come under the domination of a social collectivity and his work is already beginning to exhibit general features which are more related to the style of a culture or a period than to his own immediate interests. But the most severe break with personal meaning occurs with the beginning of division of labor in general and the separation of the worker from the means of production in particular.

It is these phenomena which provide the impetus for a gradual decay of even "social meaning" and bring about the gradual destruction of the cultural community (Kulturgemeinschaft) which at least had the potential of reintegrating the objective culture with its individual members. The separation of the worker from the immediacy of production of desired objects is no more disastrous in itself than the separation of consciousness and desired objects which occurs when the individual leaves the state of Erleben. A properly functioning culture should be able to bring about a reintegration of the individual and the social. But this reintegration becomes impossible when objects cease to be social objects and begin to take on a quasi-objectivity. And this occurs with the division of labor. The process of recognition was possible when the producer, be he an artist or a worker, was able to examine an objective entity and discover that this was the result of his own intentional actions. Even if
the individual was now producing an object for another, as was the case with Hegel's slave and which seems to be the case in Simmel's primitive market economy, it is possible for the worker to recognize the value of the goods he sells since they represent the embodiments of his own creativity. But when a product is produced by many workers functioning together, each of whom performs only a part of the activity which is necessary to produce the final product, the result which confronts the worker will no longer be interpretable as his labor, but rather will be an alien object. Simmel employs an example here which relates this discussion to his previous arguments about subordination under objects and under things. The change which takes place when a product becomes the result of many individuals' labor is parallel to the change which takes place when the state ceases to be easily identifiable with the actions of a monarch and a few advisors and instead becomes the result of the combined actions of innumerable bureaucrats. Gradually all human associations with the product have been lost; it is no longer an object produced for me; it is no longer even an object which I produce for others. I am simply facing an object, the creation of which involves my time and effort, but whose final form betrays none of this.

Once we have reached this level, all that is left is an analysis which seems to be either synchronic or diachronic, since as has been previously noted, the final result of Simmel's diachronic analyses is a series of forms which are emptied of all life content and thus apparently beyond human alteration. The description of the products of divided labor is paralleled by the discussion of the alienation of the cultural objects of the objective spirit,
as should be expected since both are subject to the same general law. Therefore when Simmel attributes certain features of the alienation of the product to the laborer, we are faced with an ambiguous relationship of a concrete social form and a general formal law. Simmel states quite explicitly that it is the institution of the capitalist mode of production which brings about the final transition of human products into non-human objects. But is it possible that some modification can be made in the social relations of production such that the worker could regain control over the means of production? And if this were the case, would the problem of the commodity fetish be resolved? And with this resolution, would the Bildung process begin to function again and the gap between objective and subjective culture close? Simmel argues that this would not be the case. In the "Concept and Tragedy of Culture" Simmel argues that the division of labor, "(i)f examined more closely ... appears as an extremely radical case of an otherwise general human-geistig fate," and that "The fetish character" which Marx assigns to economic objects in the epoch of commodity production is only a particular modified case of the general fate of our cultural contents." Diachronic analysis goes no further than indicating that the current synchronic organization of society is the inevitable result of historical evolution.

C.) Modern Drama and the Tragedy of Culture: Lukács' Formal Analysis of Bourgeois Theater

One of the remarkable aspects of Lukács' life work is the extent to which his theoretical writings grow out of his actual practice. History and Class Consciousness is dominated by research into the question of why the proletarian revolutions have faltered, just as Tactics and Ethics had been born out of
the revolutionary situation in Hungary and the need to cast theoretical ref-
lection on the merger of the Social Democrat and Communist parties. Simi-
larly, Lukács' non-political works arise out of actual life situations: the
remarkable "Von der Armut am Geiste" is a prolonged reflection on the possi-
bility of communication between individuals prompted by the suicide of a
friend, and Theory of the Novel is shaped by the desire to withdraw from what
seemed to Lukács to be the final destruction of Western culture to analyse the
disaster through aesthetics. Much the same can be claimed for the work which
is to be examined here, the introduction to Lukács' History of the Evolution
of Modern Drama (A modern dráma fejlodásékek története). The two-volume history
was completed in the winter of 1908-09, one year before Lukács' journey to Berlin
to study with Simmel, and was published in Hungary in 1911. The work has not
been translated as a whole, although Lukács did translate the methodological
introduction for a 1914 publication in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik, a journal co-edited by his friend Max Weber. In this work
Lukács attempts a theoretical reflection on the problem of bourgeois drama,
a question which had occupied him in an immediate practical fashion for several
years before the beginning of his academic work. We know that the young
Lukács, at the age of fifteen or sixteen, wrote a great number of plays gener-
ally patterned on the work of Ibsen or Hauptmann. Also, Lukács was active
in founding the Thalia theater group in 1904, which performed works that had
not yet been produced in Hungary, as well as attempting to bring the theater
to the working class. Thus in examining the introduction to this work, which
is titled "Towards a Sociology of the Modern Drama" in its 1914 version, we
are looking not only at an example of how Lukács uses certain methods of formal
analysis, we are also examining one of his earliest reflections on his own active political practice. This is an important fact to keep in mind if we are to avoid the all too common view that Lukács was politically totally inactive until the Hungarian revolution of 1919. In the essay in question he is not using formal analysis for its own sake, but rather is embarking on a study that while admittedly more academic than much of his later work, nevertheless is informed by his early practice and directed toward what appears as a clarification of certain problems of his early dramatic work.

The work is remarkable also in that it is a good deal more concerned with sociological questions such as class structure and conflict than is the case with the works which immediately follow it. At this point Lukács was familiar with Marx's Communist Manifesto, the Eighteenth Brumaire, and the first volume of Capital and had also studied Engels' Origin of the Family. In preparing his work on modern drama he also drew upon Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes and Soziologie as well as Weber's work on the Protestant ethic. In his discussion of the influences on this work he places Simmel among the most influential arguing that his entire knowledge of Marx was mediated through Simmel, hence his failure to find anything more in Marx than "sociology."92 Lukács' argument here is not merely a shifting of blame for his failure to become an orthodox Marxist at this point, but rather indicates a very real problem in this work. As Paul Breines has noted, there is a central paradox in Lukács' early works which turns on this very point.

Where Lukács is, so to speak the most Marxist, as for example ... in "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas" ... he is farthest from grasping Marxism as a theory of revolution. On the other hand, where he is least Marxist - as in Die Seele und die Formen or "Von der Armut am Geistes" - he appears to be straining toward and nearly reaching revolutionary Marxism. Reduced to a formula one could say that as a
theory of aesthetics and as an aesthetic critique of alienation, Lukács' thought is activist, even implicitly revolutionary, although it stands explicitly and completely outside the realm of social action—while as a quasi-Marxist sociology of bourgeois culture and social life, his thought tends to be relatively passive, detached and "scientific." 

There is a very strange ambivalence in Lukács' early work and as Breines has suggested, perhaps it can be best understood as a failure of Lukács' part to grasp "both sides" of Marx. Hence what Lukács later calls his "sociologizing" of Marx is manifest in the modern drama study by his use of Marxian categories as already worked-out analyses which are then contrasted with his own research on the nature of dramatic forms. For all of its appearances to the contrary, Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas, while certainly Lukács' most sociological work, is in many ways less in touch with society as an immediate and present force than many of his later aesthetic works.

The specific problem which Lukács investigates is the question of how aesthetic value becomes realized in the world. It is important to note that he has limited himself to a consideration of only one type of value and is not attempting a general deduction of Wert as was the case in Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes. The peculiar feature of the aesthetic value which he is investigating makes this study of particular interest: of all the works of art, the drama is in many ways the most social. The drama is social both in the fact that it requires the interaction of individuals within the space of the stage, as well as requiring a general arena in which the action can be staged. Unlike the poem or the novel, the drama can speak only of human actions (and only indirectly of internal monologues, perceptions, emotions) and can speak only to an audience which is assembled as a collectivity. Thus by a simple
choice of subject matter, Lukács is forced to deal with forms which are histori
cally and socially concrete. The drama derives its formal-constitutive elements not from a series of apriori elements in a "third realm," but rather from a series of stage directions written on pieces of paper which must bring about the realization of the dramatic ideal within a concrete and historical cultural setting. Lukács is remarkably less ahistorical than Simmel, perhaps because of these very considerations. He is not concerned with "drama" as an abstract, but rather with "bourgeois drama" since that is what we find struggling to be realized today. While Simmel analyses the dynamic of "Kul-
tur," Lukács recognizes that if we use the word "culture" today, all that we are really talking about is "bourgeois culture." Thus while Lukács does not concern himself with what types of future alterations may take place beyond bourgeois culture, he nevertheless never forgets that what he is analyzing is a phenomenon attributable to the bourgeois world and not a general law of geistige evolution.

Lukács is concerned with four main problems, each of which discusses one dimension of the problem of how dramatic forms can come to realization. He questions how a drama can come before a public and discusses the problem of the arena in which a drama is performed. He examines what type of content can take place on the stage, first examining how history enters drama as a background and then turning to a discussion of how the individual characters interact with this background. Finally he returns to the level of the first investigation and raises the problem of how a drama can be written today. It is in this last section, as well as the summary that follows, that a point which has been implicit throughout the text is finally stated: the aesthetic
and stylistic problems within the drama are reflections of the social problems of a society. Drama at present is impossible because bourgeois culture has not produced the necessary forms which could be reformulated aesthetically and concretized on a stage. 98 Within each of these areas his analysis is primarily akin to Simmel's diachronic discussions of the *Philosophie des Geldes*. What takes place is an analysis of how certain dramatic conventions (the dialogue, the role of servants, the confidant) have lost their ability to become realized on stage since there has been a parallel loss of similar functions in society itself. Without the real life basis of these forms, dramas which make use of traditional conventions degenerate into empty formalism. If the great strength of this analysis is the constant attempt to use form in a historically and socially concrete sense, the great weakness, as noted above, is the fact that the analysis of social form is never carried out, but merely transferred from Marx, Simmel and Weber as a series of already formulated observations.

This may in part explain why Lukács, at the time of its translation, prefaced the piece by stating that while he was still in basic agreement with most of the arguments of the work, the methodology now seemed inadequate. 99

None of these reservations should prevent us from making a brief survey of the work, since even though the method of form extraction employed may be in some ways deficient, many of the arguments are nevertheless important for an understanding of how Lukács came to confront the problem in his later investigations. The work begins with a discussion of the most basic problem of dramatic form: how is a dramatic form to be transferred from the writer's imagination to the presence of the audience. The peculiarity of modern drama is that as a dramatic form it requires a stage on which it can be presented, but
that as a modern drama it is written for a theater which does not yet exist. Lukács notes that since Kleist's work, we find that "the truly new theater persists only as an idea, only as something that should be realized, but which cannot be realized." Thus Lukács' study of drama shares the same negative orientation as his later study of class consciousness: History and Class Consciousness raises the problem of why proletarian class consciousness has not appeared; Zur Soziologie der modernen Dramas questions why a truly modern drama can be defined only by the fact of its non-appearance. Thus the problem of formal analysis ultimately winding up in a synchronic affirmation of what presently exists is bypassed by never simply dealing with drama as a given empirical form drained of all contradictions with a past, but rather through a constant attempt to analyze the tension between a form whose essential characteristics are deduced historically (drama requires a stage) and a situation in which the realization of this form is impossible.

Lukács then analyses the reasons why the drama cannot be presented on the stage as it now exists. He draws on Simmel's analysis of the city and argues that today there has been a general loss of the sense of ceremony which once nourished the theater in classical times. Today the audience wants only amusement or sensationalism and the theater can only be a spectacle and not a place where a community can confront its own interactions transposed into the realm of art. Since drama has been driven from the stage it is forced to find other forms in which it can be presented to a public, but both of the alternatives which Lukács examines - the "book-drama" or the "intimate theater" of small groups - result in fundamental alterations of the essential form of the drama. When the drama loses the medium of the stage and becomes presented only through the medium of a book, the arena in which it is portrayed ceases to be
an actual physical space within the community and instead becomes the imagination of a single reader. The mode of assimilation changes from that of concrete perception, carried out in the presence of others, where the stage forms the focus of attention for a community, to intellectual, rationalized appropriation. Lukács argues that the content does not stay the same through this change in presentation, but that rather there is a decisive loss of the function of drama when it leaves the arena of a community and takes up residence within the imagination of a single isolated individual. "Intimate theater" creates no less problems, since here the audience is no longer a community but rather merely the aristocracy which can afford to support the venture.

Once again, the limitations on what can be done within "intimate drama" are not merely questions of aesthetic choice: even if a dramatist wanted to stage dramas which would create a feeling for the presence of masses of individuals, he would be prevented from doing this by the formal restraints of the medium.

Thus Lukács' first discussion of the problem of drama reveals that his use of form has managed to combine the two usages within Simmel's work. He preserves the clarity of Simmel's analysis of the dyadic and triadic forms by dealing with a situation where "formal problems" are present on a very immediate level. Yet he links these pure forms intimately to social organization, rather than to a timeless "third realm." The reason behind the formal restrictions on the realization of the pure form of drama are not found in a general law of how forms are drained of content, rather they are explained in terms of socio-economic shifts in the community within which the drama is presented. While Lukács ultimately attributes the change in dramatic presentation to a change in life forms, it is clear that his use of Leben denotes features of
everyday social reality rather than transcendental laws of how Leben in general can be seen to function as is the case with Simmel's final works.  

Lukács' next analysis moves to a consideration of what occurs within the drama itself, and examines the stylistic problems of foreground and background relations. At first glance this would seem to drive him away from the social analyses of the first section, but in fact his consideration of stylistic issues within the drama results in an even deeper consideration of social change, since he eventually reposes this whole problem in terms of the question of how history enters the drama. Lukács argues that the French Revolution is the great watershed that alters both the life of society and the form of drama. On an experiential rather than intellectual level ("als Lebensform und nicht als Wissenschaft") man first begins to encounter history as an alien force, rather than merely as other men. Perhaps this could be more properly phrased by saying that before the French Revolution neither the human community nor the dramas which arose from that community had an experience of "History" that was in any way differentiable from the experience of everyday interaction. With the revolution, history enters social life as an alien force which dramatically influences the lives of the individuals who make up society. And with this experience within society of man as historically determined, the problem of how to represent the setting of drama on a stage is posed in new forms. Within the drama we now see that the background gradually frees itself from the events of the foreground and becomes an organic life force within the play itself.  

This raises the immediate stylistic problem of how to deal with the background in such a way that it does not stifle the action on the stage. His-
the "new individualism" of the modern drama can only arise once life itself has
drawn into the typical capitalist mode of rationalized production and become
reified. As a phenomenon of dramatic style, Lukács sees this historical
alteration manifesting itself in the form of a shift from "naïve" to "sentim-
ental" individualism. The old drama dealt with "individuals" in a manner
which was unconscious of the fact that it was in fact concerned with such a
phenomenon, just as it dealt with "history" without ever elevating it to the
level of a character in the drama. But the new drama deals not with "indivi-
duals" but with "individualism," the problem of how the individual of the old
drama can survive against the historicism of the new. Where in earlier
dramas "tragedy" was an a posteriori attribute of the individual and one had
to wait until the drama was concluded before it could be determined if the
individual was indeed subjected to a tragic fate, today's dramas are a priori
tragic, simply because the mere attribute of individuality is a tragic phenom-
emon in a society dominated by alien forces. In general, individual life
cannot be represented within the "contrapuntal necessity" of modern drama
except as a denial that the individual can be represented by the available
forms. Life escapes into the poetic, the epic, or into the novel, while the
various facts of life are left to the drama.

In these last two sections Lukács has made extensive use of Simmel's con-
cept of reification and Weber's complementary notion of rationalization. Since
both of these themes recur in History and Class Consciousness as important
components of a Marxist critique, it seems strange that the next works which
Lukács produced should be so absent of this type of analysis and that paradox-
ically Lukács earliest works are much closer to the content of History and
Class Consciousness than the works of the period 1909-1919. Are the works of the Heidelberg and Berlin years a pause between two periods of concrete critical analyses of bourgeois society and hence of little importance for the shift in Lukács' thinking of 1919? I will argue that though there is an extensive use of Marxist analysis in these first works, it would be a grave mistake to ignore the fact that there is a great difference in the use of alienation and reification in the early works, where it serves as an explanation for the formal structure of bourgeois art, and his use of the concepts in History and Class Consciousness. The shift involves a constant rethinking of the task of critical analyses is and the works of the intervening period are of great importance in bringing this about. In fact, it is possible to note a beginning of a turn towards these concerns at the end of the present work. It must be remembered that thus far Lukács' major concern had not been with developing the notions of alienated production and reification which are used in the text. Rather he had taken these over unaltered from Marx and Simmel and devoted his own attention to a formal analysis of how these same phenomena could be found present in bourgeois drama. It is only with the last section of the work that Lukács makes the first step towards a type of analysis which does something more than describe how reification and alienation are present in the drama. He now turns to a problem area which will occupy his attention for the next ten years: how are artistic works produced? It is an analysis of this issue which will eventually lead him to a consideration of how alienation and reification are produced and reproduced within capitalist society, which in turn will force him to confront the problem of how there can be a critique of these conditions which is not itself subject to the distortions of the very situation
it attempts to confront.

The fourth section of "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas" is in a sense a return to the level of analysis which was employed in the first section. We are no longer examining the "inside" of a drama in order to see how the external historical situation reproduces itself, rather we are once again examining how it is that dramas can come into the world in the first place. But while the first section dealt with problems of "form" in the sense of problems of how dramas can be physically present in the world - i.e. how they can be staged - this section asks how it is that dramas can be written. Of course this point has been raised throughout the work, and Lukács continually stressed that problems of style need to be analyzed as also as problems of the culture. But it is only with this section that Lukács comes to an extended analysis of the fact that the tension between the ideal, historical form which dramas have generally taken and the form which drama takes today must be seen as a specific example of the more general tension which exists between fully developed bourgeois society and the society of the pre-bourgeois and early bourgeois periods. Dramatic style is nothing more than an attempt to reformulate the relationship of man and world within the dimension of the theater. 121 Hence it is possible to proceed in the opposite direction from that which had been taken in the first three sections. Before, Lukács examined social phenomena and argued that the new forms of social relationships which others had noted could be shown to correspond to the new forms of bourgeois drama which he has discovered. Now, it is possible to begin with art itself and examine the ways in which the artist's stylistic crises are indicators of a more general problem. In making this analysis in "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas," Lukács discovers little that
has not been previously noted by Marx, Simmel and Weber. But this does not alter the fact that the demonstration that it is possible either to begin with social contradictions and discover contradictions in artistic forms or to begin with stylistic crises in art and move on to a discussion of the way in which these parallel the contradictions of the social realm represents an important insight which will illuminate much of the work which takes place in *Die Seele und die Formen* and *Theory of the Novel* where this latter type of deduction is the major type of analysis employed.

As I have noted, Lukács' analysis here uncovers little that has not already been discussed, although there is perhaps a slight increase in the forcefulness with which Lukács makes his points (perhaps because now they are his points and not the transposed results of another investigator). For instance, in examining the stylistic problem of how to have a confidant present on stage, Lukács argues that the current practice of abandoning the convention of giving the major character a person with whom he can discuss his views on how the action is proceeding has the result of indicating an absence of community in a much more powerful form than could be done simply by presenting the characters as devoid of contacts. Hence community can be replaced by the longing for community, while silence can be employed to mark out the truly significant moments of dramatic action. The absolute negativity of modern drama is further heightened by the problematic aspects of writing a tragedy in a situation where none of the individuals ever acts, but rather is acted upon. Conflict has now descended into the character and it becomes questionable if this is a deepening or a disappearance of drama. Hence the final and most authentic form of bourgeois drama becomes the inability to write a drama at all:
"The new drama is the drama of the bourgeoisie - and there are hardly any bourgeois dramas. All of the dramatic forms have been emptied of life, and they cannot be refilled through the will of the dramatist, since drama can only be a totalization of the man-world relationship of the society in which it is situated. Drama requires some public beyond it if it is to create a form which will not be purely formal, but this public has vanished, and the external world has become a domain which is ruled by the blind power of things. The work ends with a call for new forms, but clearly this is an ethical response which can draw no hope from the present situation. As with all of his pre-Marxist works, Lukács leaves the future open to possible alteration, but gives no indication of how any changes can arise out of the present. Like the Angel of History in Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Lukács' back is turned toward the future and all that he can see in front of him is the "one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage." Lukács' conviction that he is dealing with "bourgeois culture" rather than "culture" is a purely utopian gesture towards a possible future, rather than a result of critical analysis.

In this chapter I have analysed two attempts at developing a means of studying the phenomenon of the breakdown of the Bildung process which was discussed in the second chapter. Through an investigation of Lukács' methodological roots in the formal sociology of Georg Simmel I have attempted to locate elements which could become transformed into a critical social theory which would be adequate for the task of providing a concrete description of the phenomenon of the reification of Bildung. I have argued that Simmel's insistence that sociology
must proceed with an analysis which extracts forms of interaction from a special level of reality which is reducible neither to the acts of individuals nor to the objective forces of the natural realm represents an important step in many respects towards Lukács' later developments. But I have also indicated that Simmel obscures these achievements through a failure to recognize that the formal science itself he is advocating is predicated upon the breakdown of culture which is rejected on ethical grounds in his cultural studies. Similarly, he mystifies his real insight into the quasi-objective status of social forms by interpreting the specific phenomenon of commodity production in terms of a general law of the diachronic development of cultural phenomena. Hence his work culminates in an ahistorical sociology which ignores potential alterations in the social structure.

Lukács' work, though deeply grounded in Simmel's conceptions and though it makes extensive use of Simmel's analyses, is in some respects an advancement over the work of his teacher. The formal analysis of the nature of modern drama utilizes a much more concrete conception of form than had been the case in Simmel's Soziologie. Yet at the same time, we must not be deceived by the fact that Lukács makes extensive use of Marxian class analysis and seems to view the present situation as a concrete historical state rather than as the inevitable fate of mankind. His use of categories from historical materialism is little more than a mechanical transfer of social analyses which have been carried out by others. The real contribution of the study is the beginning of a consideration of the problems of artistic expression which sheds light on the nature of social production in general. Lukács' future development of this point is only hinted at in this text. Thus, Lukács' rejection of bourgeois cul-
ture remains an abstract, ethical negation and will only begin to take on a more concrete form only after his studies with Simmel.
Ch. IV. The Concrete Totality and Lukács' Theory of Proletarian Bildung

In confronting the task of discussing the evolution of Lukács' thought in the years 1908-1923, (i.e. from the time of the completion of the first essays of *Die Seele und die Formen* (1911) to the completion of the essays of *History and Class Consciousness*) we may take some comfort in the fact that what follows is definitely not the "whole story" of Lukács' path to Marx.¹ My attention will be directed solely to the gradual evolution of what Lukács terms "the category that governs reality"; the "concrete totality."² Even with this limitation, the task is sizable, and I will place most of my emphasis on the arguments of *History and Class Consciousness*, although an initial discussion of some of the important writings of the preceding pre-Marxist (1908-1918) and Marxist years (1918 onwards) will serve a useful purpose in introducing the basic components of Lukács' dialectical theory of proletarian Bildung. With this analysis I will have come to the end of the task of tracing the recovery and reformulation of the classical concept of dialectical Bildung, since with *History and Class Consciousness* we find a complete appropriation of the Hegelian terminology recast in a Marxist framework. Simultaneously, by examining the various modifications which take place in Lukács' theory of the concrete totality, we will be able to trace the form of Lukács' critique of the work of his teacher Georg Simmel. In the final chapter, I will examine the strengths of Lukács' critique as well as discuss some of its more important limitations.
A). The Pre-Marxist Period (1908-1918)

The period 1908-1918 in Lukács' life is the area in which greatest scholarly interest has justifiably been concentrated. These are the years of his travels to Berlin and Heidelberg, his contacts with Simmel, Lask, and Weber, and his final return to Budapest where his work with the "Free School for Studies of the Human Spirit" comes to an end with his entry into the Hungarian Communist Party in December. The two great theoretical works of the period, Die Seele und die Formen (1911) and The Theory or the Novel (written 1914-15, published 1916) are also justly famous. They remain among the greatest products of German neo-Kantian aesthetics, were widely read in their own time, and as Lucien Goldman demonstrated, can still provide us with useful points of departure for studies of literature and culture. Yet, as becomes more evident with the publication of other materials from this same period, it is important to remember that these two books are but a minor portion of Lukács' work during these years. "The" work of this ten year period of study was to be a monumental Aesthetic, which kept turning into a "six-legged monster," outgrew the limits assigned to it, and could never be brought to a conclusion. As György Markus has revealed recently, Lukács worked during the period 1911-1914 on a comprehensive study termed "The Philosophy of Art," which was interrupted and then begun again as the sequel which would follow Theory of the Novel. This second attempt occupied his attention from 1915 to 1917, and the only portion of this work to be published within Lukács' lifetime was a study in Logos on the subject-object relationship in aesthetics.
Obviously, this is a period not easily summarized, but in a sense Lukács' 1918 Nachruf for Georg Simmel comes close to an outline of the tensions in both Simmel's and Lukács' work during this period, as well as indicating how Lukács evaluated Simmel at a time when he had, to a certain extent, distanced himself from Simmel's work but still held an obvious admiration for the man. After an examination of this text, we will be in a better position to make a brief analysis of the two earlier books. Lukács begins by noting that Simmel had an ambiguous effect on his students. Despite the fact that "all of the truly philosophically talented of the younger generation of thinkers" had "for a shorter or longer time lain under the spell of his thought," he left no school of followers. Thus Simmel must be viewed, according to Lukács, as an Übergangserscheinung -- a transitory figure -- who, although a great stimulus, is in essence an individual who brings a line of thought to its culmination rather than bringing new insights which can be developed further. Using the terminology employed in Simmel's studies of Rembrant, Lukács likens Simmel's philosophy to "impressionism," in that both "perceived and valued the great, solid, and internal forms as administrators of life," but states that Simmel is "a Monet" who has yet to be followed by "a Cézanne." The need for a Cézanne is great, since the forms themselves have become problematic. Impressionism can no longer be content merely to reproduce forms, but rather must become "a protest of life against forms which numb it . . . ." But Lukács states that the protest against the forms cannot be a mere retreat to a level of unformed experience. Impressionism must give way to "a new classicism, through which sensibility becomes perceptible, rendering
eternal the fullness of life in new, strong, but above all, all-encom-
passing forms."9 To what, then does Simmel lead?

Lukács evaluates Simmel's major contribution to philosophy as being
less of a positive doctrine than a holding action against "a high-tide
of the dullest and most soul-less materialism and positivism."10 By indi-
cating an "unending multiplicity of possible philosophical settings and
objects," Simmel managed to avoid a sterile monism and can be seen as the
necessary first step toward the "now blossoming neo-idealism."11 Lukács
does not view this tendency to illustrate the unending number of possible
positions as merely a destructive relativism, but rather -- like Simmel him-
self -- argues that this "relativism" is itself the only way to get beyond
a rootless and sterile relativism.

Simmel upholds the absoluteness of each separate standpoint,
he regards each as necessary and unconditional, only he does
not believe that therefore each apriori standpoint can give
to the world that totality which life truly embraces. Each
offers only an aspect; an apriori and necessary aspect, but
still only an aspect and not the totality itself.12

Lukács views Simmel's doctrine of the non-competitive and non-exhaustive
nature of forms as a protection against a too quick reduction to a single
cause. This leaves the question of the "totality" which "life" embraces
protected from vulgar materialism and reductionism, but still apparently
open for further analysis. Thus Simmel's statements on the ineffability of
life are not taken very seriously by Lukács at this point. We must speak
of the totality, and, thanks to Simmel's restraint, we have learned that we
cannot speak of the totality in monist terminology.
The only sign which Lukács gives which indicates that he also feels Simmel might have something more than a purely negative function is a series of comments on Simmel's concerns with sociological and historical studies. Here, he argues, Simmel was able to make a major contribution.

This specificity of both disciplines [history and sociology J.S.] is based on a new unity of the interchangeable permeation of heterogeneous standpoints (wechselseitigen Durchdringung heterogener Standpunkte), on the interaction of determined and undetermined. As an example of this type of unity, Lukács discusses the Philosophie des Geldes, stressing that it is not merely a study in economics, but more of a contribution to neo-Kantian philosophy or social theory. What seems to be important for Lukács here is the two-fold structure of the work, which permits Simmel to talk both of the way which money arises out of life-processes and the way in which money in turn influences these same processes. This indicates a way of approaching the totality without simply reducing it to one primary cause. Rather the totality is to be viewed as a network of relations between elements that are both determined and undetermined. There is no way of making this brief argument any clearer, since the text itself is a brief and rather dense statement made only two months before Lukács formalized the shift in his allegiance from neo-Kantian social theory to Marxism by joining the Hungarian Communist Party. However, since theoretical breaks are never as simple as party allegiances, we will find ample illustrations of what Lukács seems to be driving at if we look to either side of the date in question. In the early pre-Marxist works we find a gradual definition of the tensions which are outlined here in Simmel's work in the form of an almost constant battle within Lukács' studies against an incredible number of dicot-
omies, all of which seem to be reducible to the central problem of the dis-
junction between form and life, but all of which serve to illuminate the later
solution of the tension in History and Class Consciousness through the use of
the "concrete totality."

Since this heightened awareness of the significance of part-whole rela-
tions is not present, at least on a conscious level, in the study of the
modern drama, we must turn to Lukács' works in aesthetics in the period of
this association with Simmel, Weber and Lask to see if while working purely
within the realm of the artistic product itself he was able to develop a
methodology which would be useful in approaching society itself. I will
concentrate on the published works, thus avoiding the very complex arguments
which occur throughout the unfinished, and perhaps, unfinishable aesthetic.
What is typical of the works throughout this period is that, unlike Simmel,
Lukács does not resign himself to the inevitable status of "life" as the
unexpressed. Rather, the tension between life and form is maintained and
Lukács continually explores both ends of the dilemma trying to find a more
satisfactory formulation. A maxim which Mészáros states Lukacs learned
from Simmel and frequently stated to his own students seems particularly apt
in describing Lukacs' method over these years:

... do not stop half-way but follow uncompromisingly
the idea to its conclusion; the sparks produced by
the collision of your head with the wall will show
you that you have reached the limits.14

Lukács was sparing neither with his head nor of the walls.
A remarkably consistent theme throughout Lukács' life is his distaste for the unmediated, instantaneous solutions to dialectical tensions proposed by the German romantic tradition. Even in *Die Seele und die Formen* (1911), one of Lukács' most subjective collections of essays, the least sympathetic treatment is given to the *Biedermeier* writings of the German high bourgeoisie and the romantic "panpoeticism" which culminated in Novalis' totally other-worldly life and works. The more affirmative portraits in the book, which takes the form of short essays -- which "ironically" talk about the "ultimate questions of life but always in the tones as if . . . speaking of . . . the inessential and pretty ornaments of the great life" are of individuals who tried to unite both ends of the tension, and tried to account for both life and form, rather than opting for formless, incoherent lives or lifeless forms. All are ultimately shown to be failures, but then this book records the sparks produced by heads against walls, rather than a finished synthesis. Kierkegaard tries to integrate "life" and the "Absolute" with the "gesture." Stefan George attempts to create new, integrated forms that will be adequate to his own life, yet winds up tracing a *Bildung* path that leads purely inward; Lukács describes it as "Wilhelm Meister's vagrancy." In Charles-Louis Philippe, Lukács finds a notion of poetry as consisting in a tension between the lyric and epic forms, the first approximation of the schema used in *Theory of the Novel*. And in a remarkable dialogue concerning Laurence Sterne, Lukács develops a figure ("Joachim") who is the very prefiguration of Naptha, Thomas Mann's own portrait of Lukács in *The Magic Mountain*. Joachim disrupts a pleasant romantic rumination on the unlimited power of life and the infinite capabil-
ities of the human soul with the forceful and persistent claim that life and art gain definition only through a contradiction with their limits.\textsuperscript{22}

Finally, Lukács' portrait of the critic Rudolph Kassner, which opens the book, contains a passage which summarizes all of the dilemmas of the book in concise fashion.

Kassner sees synthoses only with closed eyes; if he looks at the things, he sees so many, so fine details, so much unique that everything comprehended must seem as if a lie, as if a conscious falsification. And then he nevertheless follows his desire, he closes his eyes, in order to see the things comprehended in Valeurs, but his honesty forces him forthwith to look at them anew and there they are again separated, isolated, airless.\textsuperscript{23}

The sole "synthetic" moment of the book, Lukács' discussion of the "tragic vision" as an ethic for a time in which all immanence has departed from the stage on which life is played out,\textsuperscript{24} is shattered almost immediately by the suicide of his close friend Irma Seidler and the failure of his ethic of resignation to a single "caste" in life to deal with the problem of the understanding of the other in an adequate fashion.\textsuperscript{25} This "thought exercise," "On the Poverty of Spirit," represents an important phase in Lukács' development since here he confronts the problem of how intersubjective understanding can be possible in a world where the disruption of Bildung has taken place. It is interesting the Lukács argues that even if the male protagonist had possessed "Goodness" -- the ability to have instantaneous empathetic understanding of the other -- it is not at all clear that this would have altered the death of the protagonist's friend by her own hand. "Goodness" plays an interesting role, totally in keeping with Lukács' ethical rejection of capitalism at the end of Zur Soziologie des modernens Dramas, in that it functions solely as a negation of the assumption that non-communication must
be the eternal lot of mankind, while not providing an insurance that it alone could have changed anything.

Goodness is useless, just as it has no foundation. Because consequences lie in the outer world of mechanistic forces - forces that are unconcerned with us - and the motives of our acts come from the bare sign-world of the psyche, from the periphery of the soul.26

Thus, like the "Hidden God" of the tragic vision, Goodness is never given a positive role to play: what is demanded is the creation of a milieu in which understanding could function in an unambiguous fashion, although this demand is based on the purely negative and powerless fact that understanding was once possible and through Goodness, still is possible, but ineffective.27

These ideas reach their fullest expression in The Theory of the Novel, which was written in the winter of 1914-15 as the introduction to an aesthetic based on Dostoyevsky but never completed.28 The opening chapters develop a distinction between the "problematic" and "integrated" cultures, the latter being associated with classical antiquity and the medieval church.29 But, despite the flowery tone of this hymn of praise to the departed glories of Geschlossenheit, Lukács states quite definitely that no revival of Greek glories is possible.

Once this unity disintegrated, there could be no more spontaneous totality. . . . any resurrection of the Greek world is a more or less conscious hypostasy of aesthetics into metaphysics - a violence done to the essence of everything that lies outside the sphere of art, and a desire to destroy it; an attempt to forget that art is only one sphere among many, and that the very disintegration and inadequacy of the world is the precondition for the existence of art and its becoming conscious. . . . A totality that can be simply accepted is no longer given to the forms of art . . . .30
This whole dichotomy may be reformulated in terms of the tensions between epic and dramatic forms, a point which Lukács had been developing since the study of the drama. As in the earlier study, the drama is viewed as a merely formal, apriori intensive totality, a collection of conventions and symbols which does not create a real world for living life, but rather is a self-enclosed universe, a "second nature" which is impenetrable by the subject. 31 The epic, on the other hand, had been an intensive totality which includes a world which is not merely a set of formal, constitutive rules but is rather a "concrete totality."

As for the community, it is organic -- and therefore intrinsically meaningful -- concrete totality; that is why the substance of adventure in an epic is always articulated, never strictly closed; ... 32

It would not be useful to articulate what Lukács means by concrete totality at this point, since its meaning does not seem to be parallel with his later usage. The divergence stems from his connection of the term here with a primordial, unconscious unity, while the discussion in History and Class Consciousness of the work of art as a concrete totality, as indeed the discussion which follows in Theory of the Novel, places a greater stress on the concrete totality being the result of the fact that the art work is the mediated product of a consciously creating subject, rather than "spontaneous totality." 33 In any case, Lukács is quite clear that it will not help us a good deal to meditate on the lost glories of the epic: it cannot be written today, since unlike the drama, it requires the support of an integrated community and a life world that has not been totally fragmented and rendered alien. It is no longer a question of an author choosing to write one or the other; according to Lukács the epic is simply not a viable artistic style. 34
All that can be done is to make an attempt within the realm of a fragmented culture to capture some of the features of the epic, by developing a new art form in opposition to the drama. The dangers of this undertaking lie in the fact that it may substitute, in place of the objective, impenetrable logic of the dramas' "second nature," a merely subjective, internal solution (this dilemma has already been glimpsed in the earlier case of Stefan George, Novalis and the German romantics). This then is the difficult task which the novel sets for itself: the creation of a new concrete totality, which can make no appeals for aid from a spontaneous objective totality, but which must work through subjective totality towards an objective concreteness.

And, as might be expected, it is with this task that Lukács confronts the problem of Bildung head on. What has been ruled out from the start is that the Bildung process of the novel can follow the course of the epic, which did not need to confront the problem at all, since all of its characters functioned as completely formed, self-possessed individuals, acting in harmony with others and nature from the very start. In a sense the epic lacks a Bildung concept simply because it appears simultaneously as if the Bildung processes operated both internally and externally; i.e., each individual unfolds his faculties, but the unfolding of these faculties is predestined to make the individual act in complete conformity with the objective image which functions as the societal norm. There is never a disjunction between the two senses and hence they probably have no explanatory use whatsoever in approaching the epic.
It is in the novel that all of the classic problems of the Bildung dichotomy resurface, although in a modified form, since from the start Lukács has ruled out the "Bildung as a making into a form" variety since the entire process in some way or another must be conducted from a subjective basis. He does, however, come up with a threefold division of solutions to the novel, which bear a remarkable resemblance both to aspects of our earlier discussion of internal, external and dialectical Bildung as well as to Lukács' later critique of syndicalist and revisionist approaches to political practice. The three types which Lukács discusses can be summarized as follows.

1). The novel of "abstract idealism," whose ideal-type representative is Don Quixote and whose specific feature is that the "soul" of the individual is "narrower" than the world. Interaction with the external world is frustrated by this fact and the general form of the novel consists of the soul constantly being thrown back by the world in its attempt to realize an ethical ideal. Thus, the world becomes known to the subject only as an atomized series of forces which frustrate its attempts at imposing its will.

2). The novel of "romantic disillusionment" in which the soul is "wider" than the world. Contacts with the world take the form of a mystified reproduction of the entire totality of the world as the subject's creation. The peculiar dialectic involved in this form is not fully developed until Lukács develops Novalis' critique of Goethe in the course of the discussion of the third type.

3). The third variety is an attempt at a synthesis between the two and at one point Lukács terms it "a novel of education" (Erziehungsroman). Lukács' description of the goals of this form could easily be interchanged with the
description of the "dialectical Bildung" of Simmel and Hegel which has been discussed above. Its theme is

the resignation (Sichehfinden) of the problematic individual, guided by the lived experience of the ideal, to concrete social reality. . . . reconciliation between interiority and reality, although problematic, is nevertheless possible; . . . the soul is not purely self-dependent, its world is not a reality which is, or should be, complete in itself. . . . Such an interiority represents on the one hand a wider and consequently more adaptable, gentler, more concrete idealism, and, on the other hand, a widening of the soul which seeks fulfillment in action, in effective dealings with reality, and not merely in contemplation.38

The obvious ideal-type is Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. Virtually all of the moments of the Hegelian and Simmelian Bildung theories are present in a condensed form in this description: subject-object tension, the creation of new definitions of reality as the result of those tension, reorientation of self-consciousness after each new meaning is constructed, etc. And like Hegel, it "deals only with ordinary, human things; nature and mysticism are quite forgotten. It is a poeticized story of bourgeois domestic life."39

But this is Novalis speaking, and not Lukács, and at this point the second round of the battle against romanticism is fought, with Lukács choosing Goethe's bourgeois, acceptance of social reality over Novalis' romantic negation.

Lyrical, mood-dominated romanticizing of the structures of social reality cannot, given the fact that the present stage of development lacks pre-stabilized harmony, relate to the essential life of the interiority. Since Novalis rejected Goethe's solution of seeking an ironical, fluctuating balance maintained from the point of view of the subject and touching as little as possible upon the actual structures of society, no other way was left open to him but to poeticize these structures in their objective existence and to create a world which was
beautiful and harmonious but closed within itself and unrelated to anything outside . . . a world which therefore could not become a true totality.

Thus the first two of these attempts culminate in something less than a concrete totality. Bildung fails in the first case because on the one hand there is no coherent form in the external world towards which the subject can mold itself (because of the lack of immanent meaning at this historical period) and on the other because the internal image which the subject attempts to force on reality is constantly frustrated by that reality. Hence the subject has contact with a fragmented externality and an internality which takes the form of a battle-scared ethical ideal. Bildung in the second case fails because, once again, on the one hand there is no external image which the subject can absorb. However, since the subject is contemplative and does not actively interact with the world (i.e., its soul is not dependent on the world), it can create a totality of sorts, albeit a purely formal totality which is a mystification of the external incoherence and can be maintained only because the subject does not rejoin the world (hence the significance of Lukács' claim in die Seele und die Formen that Novalis so perfectly realized the romantic ideal simply because his entire life, since the loss of his beloved, was oriented away from the world, towards death).

But what of Goethe's synthesis? Does dialectical Bildung succeed in Goethe where it failed in Simmel and became a mystification in Hegel? Apparently not, since the only way in which Goethe can insure the success of the process is through a series of tricks which run parallel to those of the Phenomenology. The encounters of the subject and the world need to take place within a rational community which, while affirming the structures of
social life as necessary forms of intersubjectivity, nevertheless sees in these forms not a "rigid political and legal being-for-themselves" but rather instruments for aims which lead beyond them. In Simmel's terminology, the structures of the "objective Geist" must serve the end of cultivating a communal "subjective Geist" which will enable the individual to have a contact with objectivity which is not merely that of a natural, animal-like subjectivity confronting an alien objectivity. Lukács recognizes here that Goethe's structure assumes a community of already gebildete individuals; individuals who have already created a healthy intersubjectively shared milieu which assures that the "novice" coming into the society will not be faced with impossible tasks, i.e., alienations which could not be overcome. Since there is an assurance on neither the subjective nor objective sides of the interaction which makes Bildung necessary, all gains in cultivation are tied to the quality of the interaction between subject and object, and thus to the historical milieu in which the dialectic transpires. Lukács' criticism of Goethe is based on the aesthetic question of the function of various fantastic apparatuses at the conclusion of the test: all-knowing Masonic initiates who direct the progress of the novice, their mysterious tower, etc. Goethe has been much criticized for the introduction of these devices, which derive from the romantic epic form, but Lukács notes that they are absolutely necessary for Goethe's novel.

He absolutely needed these methods in order to give sensuous significance (sinnlichen Bedeutsamkeit) and gravity to the ending of the novel, and although he tried to rob them of their epic quality by using them lightly and ironically thus hoping to transform them into elements of the novel form, he failed. . . . reality refuses to be forced up to such a level of meaning, and, as with all the decisive
problems of great literary forms, no artist's skill is
great and masterly enough to bridge the abyss."

Thus these devices are interventions on the part of the author which attempt
to create a supportive milieu where none is in fact present, just as the
various overly simple transitions of the Phenomenology (such as the exist from
the inverted world, the resolution of the unhappy consciousness, etc.) are
not sincerely carried out of necessity within history but only draw their
strength from the "we" who is observing the passage of history telling the
reader periodically that this means such and such "for us," while for the
subject it only appears as this or that. The Phenomenology relies on the
presumption of a completed dialectic, and when this is called into question,
as seems to have been the case with Hegel's struggles in the Philosophy of
Right, Hegel too is forced to introduce "fantastic apparatuses" in the form
of the class of bureaucrats who, like Goethe's initiates, intervene in the
Bildung process at key intervals to assure the passage from objective Geist
to absolute Geist.

I cannot, of course, claim that at this point Lukács had worked out the
complete parallel critique of Hegel, although there is no reason to believe
that given the critique which has been performed on Goethe he would have
any troubles with Hegel's philosophical Bildungsroman. What is important
to note is that with the critique of Goethe Lukács has theoretically recon-
structed Marx's insights into the weakness of the Philosophy of Right -
that it takes the form of a vast mystification of the actual process of
historical Bildung by elevating the bureaucracy to a position where it
can somehow mediate the strife of the civil society. But what has not
been done, and indeed, will not be done until 1930 when Lukács first reads
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in Moscow, is a reconstruction of Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic itself, i.e., the basic mechanism on which the Bildung process is constructed. Thus, as a result of his aesthetic studies, Lukács had developed a critique of two forms of Bildung which could later be easily transformed into a critique of revisionism and syndicalism as revolutionary tactics. He had also absorbed enough of the dialectical concept of Bildung through Simmel, Hegel, and Goethe, to be in a position to see the extent to which it was limited by being predicated upon a satisfactory cultural milieu, a milieu which did not seem present and hence invalidated the process of Bildung by forcing it to fragment between objective culture and subjective culture (as in Simmel) or mystify itself through either a falsification of reality or a leap outside of human history (as in Goethe and Hegel). Hence, when with the Russian and Hungarian revolutions a "window on the future" was opened for Lukács in the form of a change in the milieu, it is not surprising that he began working on a social and political level with the dialectical Bildung system which he had explored for the ten previous years.

B.) Lukács' Early Formulation of the Concrete Totality

It is somewhat artificial to divide Lukács' work of the period 1919 to 1923 into two periods, since even though History and Class Consciousness does not appear until the end of the period, it is made up of essays which in one form or another had existed in some cases since 1919 and in most cases since 1920-21. But while there is no radical break to be found in this period, there is a gradual development of a more complex notion of the totality, which
does not reach its most explicit formulation until the reification chapter of 1922 and the review of Lassalle's letters of 1924. An almost organic growth took place in the concept of concrete totality in these years, and in order to indicate what changes this involved I am forced to make an overly sharp distinction between the earliest and latest works in the series. The greatest problem, of course, is with the works in the middle of the development, which constitute the bulk of History and Class Consciousness. Since many of these were rewritten for publication in that book, I will lump them with the rest of the 1922 works, and for polemical purposes compare them with a 1920 essay which, though foreshadowing many of the themes of the reification chapter, was never republished. The main point behind this admittedly arbitrary decision is that I feel it can be shown that Lukács' first approaches to the problem of the concrete totality and the task of Bildung in an unalienated culture are basically direct transfers of the theoretical framework worked out at Heidelberg and Berlin. While this direct transfer is possible when a suitable milieu exists, i.e., when the Hungarian Soviet Republic exists, Lukács must later reformulate the issues after its collapse.

Since the history of the period leading up to the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic has been dealt with extensively elsewhere I will present here only a brief outline. A Social-Democrat party had existed within the monarchy since the 1890's, and adopted a parliamentary strategy modeled on that of the German Social Democrats. Opposition to these policies came mainly from Ervin Szabó, an anarcho-syndicalist and eventually the associate editor of Huszadik Század (Twentieth Century), the journal of the Social-Scientific Society which David Kettler has likened to the German "Verein für
It was with the Social-Scientific Society's establishment of a "Free School for Social Studies" in 1906 that a large and fairly organized opposition to the Social Democrats developed, although for the most part this was not manifested in political activity but rather in educational programs among the workers. This group was closely allied with the "Galileo Circle" which had formed under Szabó's leadership and which in turn gave guidance to the "Revolutionary Socialists," a group of students who were formed in the fall of 1917 and were in turn in close contact with the Zimmerwald group in Germany. All of these groups had become interested in recent works of the Geisteswissenschaften in Germany, anarchist and syndicalist literature, and since 1917, news of the progress of the Russian revolution. In general, they combined in the creation of an atmosphere in which a Marxist analysis of society, tinged with a strongly voluntarist conception of political action, could flourish.

With the deterioration of conditions in the dual monarchy as a result of the First World War, agitation took a more overtly political form. Syndicalist activity outside of the Social Democrat Party led to a general strike in January 1918, and the efforts of the party to settle the strike caused a growing alienation of the union leaders (including Lukács' future leader in the struggles with Kun in the period after the republic, Jenő Landler). Arrests of the anarcho-syndicalist Korvin group followed in May, a second strike occurred in June, with Landler leading the railroad workers and eventually also being arrested, and finally members of the Galileo circle were involved as defendants in a political trial which was used as a vehicle for denouncing both the monarchy and the Social Democrats. On November 4, 1918 Bela Kun who had been a prisoner of war in Russia and there had formed an exile
group under the guidance of Lenin and Trotsky, established the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP). The monarchy had resigned on November 1, and a peaceful transition occurred in which Mihály Károlyi formed a democratic government while Rumanian, Czech, Serbian and French forces applied pressure on the borders, forcing Károlyi in one of his earliest acts as premier to give up about half of the territory of the country. In this situation the Social Democrats represented the only organized group, but had little real power since their ties with the working class had long been questionable, and were at this point in the midst of losing what support they had. It was in this atmosphere of almost total chaos that Lukács joined the MKP in December, 1918.

Lukács, as had been noted a number of times, had a familiarity with Marx's works long before his entry into the MKP. He had been a member of the Social Scientific Society and was a frequent contributor not only to Twentieth Century but also to Nyugat (The West) a more literary oriented journal which was a vehicle for expressionist writings, and had been in a group of students organized by Szabó as early as 1901. The major activity in which Lukács was engaged in the period immediately prior to the Soviet Republic was a Sunday afternoon group which became nicknamed "Szellemekek" ("sprites") because of its obsession with "spirit" (szellem - equivalent to Geist). This group soon expanded its activities into a "Free School for Studies of the Human Spirit" which offered a series of lectures and courses in 1917-18. Some idea of the aims which this school sought to realize may be obtained by examining Karl Mannheim's opening address for the lecture series of the school's second semester and the lecture series outline which accompanied it when it was published as a pamphlet the next year.
presentation makes frequent use of Simmel's objective culture - subjective culture split as a means of analyzing the ills of the time and proposes that the task of the school should be an attempt to provide a point of attraction (Anziehungspunkt) for those who wish to obtain some sort of unified insight into the objective culture and thus be able to absorb this into their own subjective cultivation. In other words, the free school was an attempt to provide a milieu within which some reclamation of the objective spirit could take place: its function was that of the "mysterious tower" of Wilhelm Meister although now no longer carried out merely in a novel, but brought down into history. It is not clear how seriously Lukács was committed to this venture, since in 1970 he wrote that even at the time "It did not really mean anything important to me since it was essentially linked to a way of thinking and acting that I had already gotten over." In any case, the program is consistent with the type of political program which conceivably could be derived from a Simmelian analysis of the cultural crisis. But with the changes in the external milieu, Lukács apparently reached a decision that it might now be possible to carry out such a program on a general social level, and officially aligned himself with the MKP in mid-December. Although the move came as a shock to some of his companions, it is not insignificant that he was followed shortly by his fellow "Szellemkéks" Bálazs and Fogarási, while Varjas became an active left-Socialist.

It is not necessary to follow in detail Lukács' actions within the Party, or his role in the government after the merger of the Social-Democrats and the MKP on March 21, 1919. The Károlyi government was under tremendous pressure from the military forces of the Entente, and had been given an ultimatum by Colonel Vyux, the French military representative in Budapest, ordering a
further withdrawal of Hungarian troops away from the borders to which they had been driven in November. The rationale behind the Social-Democrats' decision to join with the Communists seems to have been predicated on the one hand on a belief that it would be impossible to keep struggling against the Communist agitation (Kun and others had been arrested earlier and a wave of demonstrations had followed his imprisonment and beating), and a hope that through an alliance with Russia which Kun could negotiate, because of his friendship with Lenin, some of the territory might be preserved. 53 Lukács was given the task of providing a theoretical analysis of this merger, and while the text he produced is divorced from the grim realities of the feebleness of the position of the Hungarian proletariat vis-à-vis the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, who were disturbed by the worsening situation of the economy and the defeats on the military front, the text nevertheless enables us to return once again to the issue of Lukács' concept of the concrete totality and see how his position has altered now that he feels there is a possibility of bringing about cultural change.

The great weakness of Tactics and Ethics, Lukács' discussion of the merger, lies in the fact that it merely assumes that a proper milieu for cultural restoration is present. Given this assumption, all of Lukács' previously unrealizable theories are called into action. The Marxist analysis of class structure from the modern drama study is no longer tied to an ethical rejection of capitalist society, but rather is now vindicated by the Soviet Republic, and hence once again operative. And the dialectical concept of Bildung which had been denied any effectiveness in the study of Goethe, now is applicable without alteration, since an organic community has the potential for being
realized. These problems appear on two levels of the work, first in the absence of a clearly defined notion of totality as an analytic category and secondly in the absence of any alteration in the Simmel-Hegel Bildung theory except for the fortuitous removal of the previously present blockages. 59

The problem of the underdevelopment of the notion of concrete totality may be seen by examining the 1919 version of "What is Orthodox Marxism?," an essay which in revised form would become the opening chapter of History and Class Consciousness. Lukács' approach to the primary aspects of Marx's method centers around an argument that Marx sees a predominance of the whole over the parts.

... the following fundamental principle of the dialectical method, the theory of the Hegelian concrete concept ... means that the whole takes precedence over the parts, that the parts must be construed from the whole and not the whole from the parts. ... It is this unconditional hegemony of the totality, of the unity of the whole over the abstract isolation of the parts, which constitute the essence of Marx's social theory, the dialectical method. ... 60

Explained in this manner, it is not at all clear that Lukács has succeeded in distinguishing what I will later term the "formalist" totality from the much more ambiguous notion of concrete totality, which in the formulation of History and Class Consciousness is differentiated from both the atomist analysis of society as an aggregate of parts and the formalist reduction of society to a general synchronic structure. Lukács does seem to want to move in this direction, and argues that the categories employed in the totality which Marx analyzes must possess the same type of self-negating behavior which takes place within the dialectical conception of Bildung.
Only the dialectical method of Marx makes it possible to view social phenomena in this way: to recognize first, that they are necessary, and secondly that they are at the same time also transient and destined to perish. Both points of view are crucial: the former as a guard against the abstract Utopianism to which all petty-bourgeois social reformers incline; the latter as a corrective to the over-estimation of the power and indispensibility of the given institutional orders which characterizes the vulgar Marxists. . . . 61

In terms of Simmel's levels of analysis, what is being assumed here is that the diachronic moment of the social totality is capable of reproducing something other than the arrangement of social forms which had been uncovered at the synchronic level. Hence there must be some type of historical analysis which will not simply terminate with the lifeless forms which had been previously analyzed through an atemporal essential analysis, but rather will bring some new type of formation into play. But this is no longer formulated as a purely apocalyptic hope and Lukács apparently wants to argue that the possible future alteration builds upon the present stage of social formation. Thus there must be a way of looking at society which analyzes present forms as necessary and real arrangements of social forces, yet which sees these forces altering. This much is implicit in the fact that Lukács apparently feels that dialectical Bildung is now possible again. But there is no discussion of how Marxism, as a theoretical reconstruction of a concrete totality, can make this claim. For all of the importance given to the Marxist method, Lukács has not at this point given an adequate explanation of its procedures.

Another indication that Lukács has not yet totally consolidated a break with his earlier positions can be found in the final appearance of the problem of the "necessary sin" in his work. The question of the paradox facing
ethical systems of the necessity for unethical activity had been a constant pressure in Lukács' work at least since "On Poverty of Spirit," and quite early during his stay at Heidelberg became related in his mind with a problem presented by Ropschin (Boris Savinkov), the leader of a terrorist group in the Russian Revolution of 1905, in one of Savinkov's novels. 62 Lukács summarizes the problem in the following manner:

murder is not allowed, it is an absolute and unpardonable sin, it 'may' not, but it 'must' be committed. Elsewhere in the same book he (Ropschin) sees, not the justification (that is impossible) but the ultimate moral basis of the terrorist's act as the sacrifice for his brethren. not only of his life, but also of his purity, his morals, his very soul. In other words, only he who acknowledges unflinchingly and without any reservations that murder is under no circumstances to be sanctioned can commit the murderous deed that is truly - and tragically - moral. 63

What is particularly interesting about the way Lukács handles this problem is that he never fully leaves the realm of formal ethics, and hence produces a negative ethic that remains as unconnected to the concrete individual as the general injunction not to kill. Here we have another case of a failure to have created a fully operative analytic method, since Lukács is attempting to solve a concrete question in terms of a formal maxim which will apply in all cases. It is revealing that at the start of the essay Lukács expresses regret that Hegel did not formulate an ethic. 54 Lukacs' inability to see that the very form of a statement of an ethical nature is impossible within a system which denies the meaningfulness of a separation between evaluational and factual judgments indicates the extent he has not yet been able to master the application of an analysis which would attempt to unravel the interconnections of the "social" order and the "ethical" order by proceeding, as Bertell Ollman has suggested, from the problem
"Why are approval and condemnation represented in our society as value judgments?" It should be noted, however, that Lukács prefaces the essay collection with a note which states that the essay in question was written before the dictatorship of the proletariat and hence, "The change in function of ethics consequent upon developments under the dictatorship have given these studies a documentary, historical value." Thus ethics is not overcome analytically, but rather altered historically, and Lukács does not indicate what form a dialectical treatment of ethical problems would take.

There is one more text from this general period which should be examined so as to provide a sharper contrast between Lukács' early Marxist works and the formulations of History and Class Consciousness: "the Old Culture and the New Culture." The work was written after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Lukács was forced to flee into hiding in August 1919 before eventually escaping to Vienna in November. Deportation back to Hungary and certain execution by the Horthy regime was halted by an appeal by a number of German and Austrian literary and cultural figures. It was here that he worked on the ultra-left journal Kommunismus which from February 1920 until September 1921 served as a forum for the introduction of "western Marxist" approaches into the Third International. "The Old Culture and the New Culture" is interesting in that it represents one of Lukács' first explorations of the problem of reification since the comments in Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas. There is a remarkable consistency with Simmel's analysis, even to the point of discussing the separation of economic reality and ideology in terms of a "form-content" split and a use of the appropriately Simmelian notion of "fashion" as a key to the dynamics of a waste producing market.
Also present is his earlier argument from the study of Theodor Storm, that the basis of social organization in capitalist society has been directed towards the accumulation of value, rather than towards the ends of human cultivation. But what is new is the view that the phenomena which have been analyzed in terms of the decay of culture and the resultant fragmentation of social reality are not merely a new state of affairs to be bemoaned, but rather the indication of a basic instability in the entire rule of the bourgeoisie:

the starting point of the following set of ideas is the view that the culture of the capitalist epoch had collapsed in itself and prior to the occurrence of economic and political breakdown. Therefore, in opposition to the anxieties [of the bourgeoisie], it is a necessity, precisely in the interests of opening the way to the new culture, to bring the long death process of capitalist society to its completion.

This formulation of the breakdown of Bildung thus stands in an uneasy position between Lukács' earlier cultural pessimism and his views of History and Class Consciousness, and it is a moot point if this represents a failure of theoretical insight or whether at this point Lukács simply did not express the complete argument which lies behind the position. On the one hand, Lukács has accepted a basic definition of the ills of capitalist reality which is framed within the general terminology of his early Kultur-critique. On the other hand, he has begun to attempt to connect this with both a future economic reorganization of society (the "new culture") and a coming series of economic disorders within the present culture. What is needed is a link to the arguments about the limits of proletarian consciousness which are made in the March 1920 study of class consciousness which is reprinted in History and Class Consciousness. This is accomplished through the chapter
on reification in *History and Class Consciousness* which draws its analytic power from the successful resolution of the question of the nature of totality which has been accomplished in the rewriting of the first chapter.

Thus, in summary, the works of the period immediately connected with the Soviet Republic represent in many ways a continuance of the basic arguments of the pre-Marxist period, but now "turned on their heads." Whereas before the proper milieu had been missing within which a dialectical Bildung process could again be put into operation, with the revolution, Lukács assumes that this theoretical framework can become functional. With the works of exile we begin to get a second analysis of Bildung processes in a hostile milieu, but at this point Lukács can no longer simply return to his previous practice of essentially leaving the future of the fragmented culture an open question through ethical devices such as the "Hidden God" or the notion of "Goodness."

In *History and Class Consciousness* an analysis takes place of the tensions which act as restraints on Bildung and an effort is made to formulate an analysis of the process necessary to remove these blockages and once again make culture possible.

C.) *Bildung* and Totality in *History and Class Consciousness*

In *History and Class Consciousness* we find Lukács' final reformulation of the concept of dialectical Bildung and at the same time his most complete discussion of the nature of Marx's use of the category of "concrete totality." These are both fused by a discussion of the role of theory in connection with revolutionary practice which finally binds together the various diverse threads.
of Lukács' early political writings into a unified presentation. Whether
the difference in theoretical sophistication was a result of a change in out-
look as a result of the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, or whether
in Vienna Lukács simply had the time to make explicit what had been the im-
licit rationale behind his earlier arguments is a point which admits of
no definitive answer. In any case, for all of its appearances of being a
fragmentary, poorly connected collection of essays, *History and Class Con-
sciousness* as Lukács himself argued in the preface to the first edition,
"does have a definite unity" even if the presentation does not yield a
"scientific system." The attempt to follow the argument on the nature of
the concrete totality and its relationship to the problem of Bildung in
pre-revolutionary society, I will first examine the way in which Lukács
now presents the tensions which the category of concrete totality is inten-
ded to overcome theoretically and then turn to a discussion of the types
of methodological operations which Lukács feels are the essentials of Marx's
method. Finally I will turn to a discussion of the analysis of reification
and indicate what role the proletariat plays as an element of society whose
Bildung, if followed to its possible conclusion, would bring about a signifi-
cant alteration in the structure of the culture of the entire society. Such
a discussion cannot, of course, claim to do justice to the complexity and
the richness of a book such as *History and Class Consciousness* and perhaps
what is written here should be read more as an introduction which sets out
a way of approaching a text than as an attempted summary.
In order to appreciate fully Lukács' use of the notion of concrete totality in *History and Class Consciousness*, it is useful to turn to two texts by later authors who make what I feel to be a similar distinction between varieties of analytic totalities, but do it in a much clearer fashion than is immediately present in Lukács' work. The danger of this approach, of course, is that there is a tendency to read back a clearer argument onto a distorted text, and thus perhaps miss some of the important ambiguities which stubbornly refuse to be covered by a neat synthesis. But, there seems no other way to proceed, and as Lukács himself notes,

> It is of the essence of dialectical method that concepts which are false in their abstract onesidedness are later transcended (*zur Aufhebung gelangen*). The process of transcendence makes it inevitable that we should operate from these one-sided, abstract and false concepts. These concepts acquire their true meaning less by definition than by their function as aspects that are then transcended in the totality. 74

Thus the one-sidedness and abstractness of the formal definition of concrete totality which will be given at this point will be filled out by concrete examples of how Lukács uses the distinctions which are here made abstractly. 75

In *Dialectics of the Concrete* the Czech philosopher Karel Kosík notes that there are three distinguishable notions of the totality which have appeared in the history of philosophical thought:

1. the atomistic-rationalistic conception, from Descartes to Wittgenstein, which understands the whole or totality as simple elements or facts;  
2. the organicist or organicist-dynamist conception, which formalizes the whole and raises the priority of the whole to a position of domination over the parts (Schelling, Spann)  
3. the dialectical conception (Heraklitus, Hegel, Marx), which grasps the reality as a structured, self-unfolding and forming whole. 76
For my purposes the names associated with these three positions are not of a great deal of importance, since it seems that Hegel can be viewed as either an organic-dynamicist or a dialectical thinker, depending on whether accent is placed on the dialectical or phenomenological elements of his system. Also, for convenience in bringing this typology into closer alliance with Ollman's similar typology, I will term the second totality concept the "formalist" totality, since the viewpoint is generalizable to present day structuralists who might argue for a predominance of a formal set of relations and transition operators over the given individual cases in which relationships become manifest. Ollman differentiates the third conception of totality which I will term the "concrete totality," from the other two by discussing how it is possible to see relationships taking place between the whole and the part, since each is given only a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the other. These relations allow interactions following general types, some of which may be found present also in Lukacs' work.

(1) the whole shapes the parts to make them more functional within this particular whole (so it is that capitalism, for example, gets the laws it requires);
(2) the whole gives meaning and relative importance to each part in terms of this function (laws in capitalism are only comprehensible as elements in a structure that maintains capitalist society, and are as important as the contribution they make);
(3) the whole expresses itself through the part, so that the part can be seen as a form of the whole . . . (a study of any major capitalist law which includes its necessary conditions and results will be a study of capitalism); and
(4) the relations of the parts with each other, as suggested above, forge the contours and meaning of the whole, transform it into an ongoing system with a history, a goal, and an impact. 78
I will argue in what follows that it is something like this view of the totality that Lukács develops in History and Class Consciousness. This view may be seen as the fruition of the work done in aesthetics in the years 1908-1918 which in our discussion, culminated in Lukács' Nachruf for Simmel, where we found a brief appreciation of Simmel's role in working out a new relationship between "determined and undetermined" elements. In developing this claim I will first examine the nature of Lukács' critique of inappropriate analyses of the totality and then attempt to summarize his own claims about the nature of analysis from the standpoint of the concrete totality.

Lukács' sense that his method was in opposition to at least two viewpoints on how to approach reality often takes the form of an argument that apparently contradictory tendencies within a political philosophy or a method of research are in fact both manifestations of the same level of analysis. For instance, in discussing the approaches of bourgeois historians, Lukács notes a tendency to see the objects of study as transhistorical forms on the one hand or to attempt to account for historical change on the basis of an appeal to the "great man."

In the first case it ceases to be possible to understand the origin of social institutions. The objects of history appear as the objects of immutable, eternal laws of nature. History becomes fossilised (erstarzt) into a formalism incapable of comprehending that the real nature of socio-historical institutions is that they consist of relations between men. . . . In the second case, history is transformed into the irrational rule of blind forces which is embodied at best in the 'spirit of the people' or in 'great men.' It can therefore only be described pragmatically but it cannot be rationally understood (vernünftig begriffen). 79

Thus the limits of bourgeois rationality is a purely formal understanding of reified relations, while any type of change must be attributed to the irrational
intervention of forces which cannot be understood. There is a remarkable parallel to the situation in Lukács' early thought as well as to the basic dilemma of forms and life in Simmel. Both distinguish between a static, comprehensible totality, which remains synchronically invariant and which is the inevitable result of any conceivable diachronic process; yet at the same time both insist that something is left out of this petrified world. For Simmel this is "life" itself, which increasingly plays a dominant role in his later works, while for Lukács the irrational element which remains outside of the frozen totality is a purely inexplicable ethical rejection: "Goodness," "The Hidden God," or the refusal to discuss future alterations of the social structure as is the case in the study of the modern drama. It should be noted, however, that if Lukács and Simmel represent the "both/and" of this dichotomy, Lukács seems to be suggesting here that in a less subtle approach to history, one might find a shuffling back and forth between the two poles of the dichotomy, or an exclusive concentration on one side or the other.

This same problem reemerges in political economy by virtue of the fact that from the standpoint of the bourgeois political economist, one can only observe individual, isolated manufacturers and overpowering "supra-personal 'laws of nature'."80 Here, once again, we have a transfer of an earlier argument to the sphere of economic analysis. The notion of "second nature" which had previously been employed in the Theory of the Novel to denote the world of reified conventions which have become impenetrable to the individual subject, has been used in the present case to analyse the problem of a science which cannot integrate the individual and the general
because it fails to transcend the limits of a view that takes in only atomized objects or independent formal structures. The argument seems to give political economists the credit of being unable to sink back to the either/or choice of the historians, but nevertheless notes that the dichotomy of form and life has only been reproduced here in economic terminology, but not transcended.

The clearest and most significant explorations of these types of dichotomous approaches are those associated with Lukács' critique of revisionism and voluntarism. This is one of the earliest formulations of the dichotomy in Lukács' Marxist work, a threefold typology of revisionism, fatalism and voluntarism having been employed in Tactics and Ethics. There Lukács noted that in examining the ways in which Kautsky, bourgeois economy, and syndicalism have looked at the process by which the proletariat comes to revolutionary consciousness, one finds the following misinterpretations of the process: 1) revisionism sees the attainment of revolutionary change as the result of an incremental process which inevitably brings the proletariat to power, 81 2) bourgeois economy finds any change inexplicable since it sees only a harmonious set of laws of production, 82 and 3) syndicalism sees these same restraints as abstractions alienated from actual life and argues that they can be overthrown immediately by concentrated action. 83 Reformulating these errors in terms of the analysis of History and Class Consciousness we find that the revisionists view history solely as a set of simple causal laws from which a new society will be deduced and thus overestimate the extent to which society can be viewed as a formal totality which brings about a new state of affairs by simple diachronic progression; bour-
geois economics fails to move beyond a formal conception of the economy as a self-maintaining formalist totality; and syndicalism fails to see that society is not simply an aggregate of atoms whose rearrangement can take place with little or no difficulty.

In the manner in which this is formulated in Tactics and Ethics, where the argument is much more condensed than is the case in History and Class Consciousness, it is easy to trace the intellectual lineage of each of the analyses. The rejection of revisionism can be found already present in Georg Simmel's comments on historical materialism in Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. Simmel castigates the would-be "materialism" of an approach to history which explains all occurrences in terms of the "self-evolution" of economic categories, pointing out that such an assumption is no less metaphysical than any animism which somehow attributes autogenesis to nonhuman objects. What Lukács brings to this discussion is a knowledge that Simmel's critique, though valid for the Marxism of the Second International, is not in fact a critique of Marx's own procedures per se. The second two criticisms bear a striking resemblance to Lukács' comments on the various types of Bildung schemas present in novels: the bourgeois economists reproduce Novalis' error of merely contemplating a formal totality and thereby lapsing into a static view of reality, while the syndicalists engage in a Quixotic act of running into various parts of the totality without ever coming to grips with the full nature of the system they are confronting.

Lukács' argument in History and Class Consciousness develops this point, and a full enumeration of the classification scheme he develops would seem to require a recognition that the "atomist"-"wholist" dichotomy needs to be supplemented by a "fatalist-activist" dichotomy. Hence within a world
which sees all of reality as determined by overarching formal laws, one can either engage in an activist exploitation of the laws for individual gain, or in a fatalistic resignation to merely internal, ethical rejections. Lukács sees the latter present in the renewed importance of Kantian-type ethical systems within revisionism.\textsuperscript{85} Parliamentarian opportunism and ethical purity are seen as lying on the same plane. The point of Lukács' analysis is that these dichotomies: the individual vs. the whole, as well as voluntarism vs. fatalism must be viewed as the consequences of an abstract analysis of the social totality, and thus both sides can be placed on the same level. While this is an important insight, the way in which it is sometimes presented tends to collapse all of these categories much too quickly into an undifferentiated whole. For instance, his failure to make a consistent distinction between the errors which result from atomist totalities and formalist totalities may lie behind his tendency to equate revisionism and positivism as two undifferentiated historical trends.\textsuperscript{86} It would seem that a distinction of the sort present in the atomist totality/formalist totality argument would be necessary to distinguish the Second International's use of a formalist determinism from the growing tendency of positivists as early as the empirico-criticism movement to give expressions about the "totality" only the status of nominalist conventions. This distinction is probably even more crucial today, as I will argue in the final chapter, if a critical analysis of the concrete totality is to be distinguished from empiricist analyses on the one hand and formalist structural approaches on the other.
Having examined these theoretical positions to which Lukács is opposed, it is now possible to examine what he claims are the unique features of analysis from the standpoint of the concrete totality. Lukács defines this notion in his rewrite of "What is Orthodox Marxism?" as follows,

Only in this context which sees isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. This knowledge starts from simple, pure (to the capitalist world), immediate, natural determinants and progresses from them towards a knowledge of the concrete totality, as the conceptual reproduction of reality. This concrete totality is in no way immediately given to thought. 87

Lukács wishes to make a distinction between this concrete totality and the idealist delusion of "confusing the intellectual reproduction of reality with the actual structure of reality itself." 88 The intellectual reproduction is not an immediate intuition of a formal totality, but is rather a process of totalization which must constantly be developed through a confrontation with individual phenomena. 89 But it also must be stressed that the role of the social facts of the capitalist world are not merely absorbed as unaltered facts to be fed into an analysis which constructs the whole from the simple aggregate of the parts. Rather, the parts are starting points from which the analysis must necessarily begin, but the end goal of the analysis is not a generalization about the average features of the conglomerate of facts, nor a summary of their features as would be the case in a statistical description. The goal of the analysis is a conceptual reproduction of the totality of society, and the nature of this reproduction may be grasped from a number of other statements which Lukács makes both here and in the chapter on reification.
One of the features of this totality is that it will be a **contradictory totality**. Lukács apparently believes that one of the reasons why the atomist and formalist totalities are inadequate for social analyses is that they tend to flatten out the reality which they should be explicating by ignoring data that does not fit into the general patterns of the formal totality, or by constantly redefining the nature of the atomist totality as each new particle enters. In neither of these cases does the possibility emerge of seeing if there might be a tension between different aspects of the totality, a tension which might bring about an alteration in the status of the **now existing totality**. This is claimed to be a possibility if the analyst realizes that the categories with which he is dealing are not merely conventions which may be used as he chooses, but are rather "forms of being, conditions of existence." This guards the theorist against assuming that contradictions encountered in data collecting must be either ignored or camouflaged and closely resembles Simmel's insistence that the forms used in social analysis must have a real claim to be something more than analytic conventions. But Lukács goes even further by demanding that there must be a consistent demonstration that the "forms" which are utilized for analysis must be shown to be connected with actual social processes. This latter point is simply the explicit statement of what had in fact been Lukács' procedure in most of his aesthetic works and his sociology of the drama: to use the term "form" to indicate some type of structure which could be seen as present due to actual limitations and influences on the creation of the work (e.g., the connection of drama to stage, of epic to cultural situation, etc.).
Lukács argues that if the totality is approached in this manner, the tensions encountered in any one part will lead us down the path necessary for insight into the more primary tensions which may be discoverable throughout the society. This knowledge of the whole, according to Lukács,

is only attainable because the relationship between parts and whole has become fundamentally different from what it is in thought based on the categories of reflection. . . . the essence of the dialectical method lies in the fact that in every aspect correctly grasped by the dialectic the whole totality is comprehended and that the whole method can be unraveled from every single aspect. 93

This is, of course, the point which was made by Ollman above, that it is possible to obtain a picture of the whole by examining any one of its parts and by tracing the way in which the part is determined by the relations it has with the other segments of the social totality. 94 Lukács very often argues in this same manner, for instance, in discussing the general structure of consciousness of capitalist society, he claims that an examination of the behavior of a worker vis-à-vis the machine he serves could serve as a "structural analogue" to the other forms of contemplative practice which gradually come to dominate the culture. 95 In another instance, Lukács claims that the factory contains "in concentrated form the whole structure of capitalist society." 96 This can be seen as a consequence of the fact that Lukács demands that all categories of analysis be closely tied to the actual forms of social existence which they attempt to reconstruct. He would argue that the fact that all of the various components of the society do enjoy a certain degree of harmonious integration means that they must to an equal extent be capable of reflecting the various tensions which hold together the entire structure. The picture which emerges here may recall the discussions of
Simmel's view of the way in which the whole of society whether analyzed synchronically or diachronically exhibits the same general features. Lukács clearly wants to preserve some aspects of this orientation, although at the same time he wants to leave open the possibility of new formulations resulting in different social forms which would once again become generalized throughout the society.

He is able to do this by altering the conception of the relationship of the theorizer to the reality described which had existed in Simmel's work. The general viewpoint of Simmel, as is the case with all formal and atomist views of the totality, is that the truth of a statement about reality was in some way related to a correspondence to the reality described; an accurate mirroring of the formal structures of the society in the case of the formalist, and an accurate generalization about the aggregate of atomic facts in the case of the atomist conception. Lukács rejects a strict correspondence theory of truth, but does not, as Piccone argues, commit himself simply to a coherence theory. Rather, the argument seems to be closer to a claim that the task of analysis is to provide correspondence with a potential future state and that this potential future state comes about in part because of the intervention of the theorist. Hence the argument is predicated upon the existence of a class whose status in society is such that it is both necessary for it to have a correct understanding of its position and for it to be capable of bringing about social alterations as a result of its correct self-understanding. In discussing the relationship of this theory to the process which brings about alterations in the reality about which the theory speaks, Lukács writes,
the links between the theory which affirms this and the revolution are not just arbitrary, nor are they particularly tortuous or open to misunderstanding. On the contrary, the theory is essentially the intellectual experience of the revolutionary process itself. In it every stage of the process becomes fixed so that it may be generalized, communicated, utilised, and developed. Because the theory does nothing but arrest and make conscious each necessary step, it becomes at the same time the necessary premise of the following one. 98

Lukács refuses to give the theory a foundation which is somehow outside of the historical process and thus capable of reflecting on the process without in any way altering either the situation examined or its own foundation. Historical materialism must be applied to itself, and hence cannot claim to be a theory which is somehow free of the historical tensions surrounding class conflict. 99 Thus theory itself is not a reflection on a Bildung process, but rather is an integral part of it. Having accepted a viewpoint which demands that all phenomena be viewed in terms of their relations with each other in forming a concrete social whole, it would be inconsistent for Lukács to exempt his theory from being subjected to the same type of analysis. The truth status of the theory of society can only be the degree to which it both enlightens and is enlightened by the growing consciousness of the revolutionary class. 100

Thus we have come to the end of our ability to discuss the analytical concept of concrete totality and must pass on to a discussion of the process of proletarian Bildung. What is important to remember in summary is that the type of analysis which Lukács proposes to carry out through the use of the category of concrete totality requires a certain arrangement of elements in the society which enables the theoretical reflection to work in concert with an emerging class which both helps constitute the predominant relations with-
in the society and yet finds it possible to break with this type of activity and thus form a new social order. The concrete totality is a theoretical reproduction of the totality of a society so structured and thus serves as an agent in the process of transformation. It is not merely the result of a reflection on transhistorical forms nor is it simply a way of uniting scattered elements into a theoretical unity. Rather, it is a conceptualization of the broader significance of the day-to-day activities of the members in the class which gains its value as a truth only to the extent to which its articulation leads to a heightening of the class's self-consciousness and to resultant efforts at altering that reality.

It is now necessary to trace the path which leads Lukács to conclude that the proletariat is indeed the class which fulfills the requirements outlined. It is difficult to determine what type of theorizing is involved here, since for the most part, it is not formulated in a way which would serve the functions of communication and generalization which is associated with theory in the discussion above. Lukács' deduction that indicates that the proletariat is capable of altering reality is not apparently directed at the proletariat itself, and hence the long chapter on reification stands unconnected to the description of theorizing just completed. Perhaps the only purpose which can be assigned to the chapter is that of a theoretical reconstruction for Lukács himself and the others within the Third International who at that point were engaging in the debates that followed the general dissipation of revolutionary activity which had broken out after the first World War. If one seeks the potential audience of the reification chapter, one can only hope to find
it among the "geistige Elite" which, according to Ludz, Lukács hoped could oppose the merely "political elite" whose bureaucratic mentality had led, in Lukács' eyes, to the failure of the proletarian uprisings in the immediate post-war period.

Lukács' analysis of the phenomenon of reification in the first section of the chapter essentially takes the form of a repetition of the analyses of "The Old Culture and the New Culture" and perhaps even "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas." His major theoretical advance comes in the second section which attempts to relate the entire phenomenon of reification to the appearance of unresolvable contradictions in bourgeois philosophy. The tactic of analysis here is remarkably similar to what had been worked out earlier in literary analyses. He turns from an analysis of social relations to the parallel phenomenon of breakdowns in the ideological sector. By examining the efforts of the bourgeoisie to confront the problem of reification in its philosophical guise Lukács hopes to be able to indicate the requirements for overcoming the problem of reification on a social level.

Classical philosophy is able to think the deepest and most fundamental problems of the development of bourgeois society through to the very end — on the plane of philosophy. It is able — in thought — to complete the evolution of class. And — in thought — it is able to take all the paradoxes of its position to the point where the necessity of going beyond this historical stage in mankind's development can at least be seen as a problem. 102

Around this specific question Lukács develops an analysis which in an extremely dense manner reformulates all of the oppositions which we have discussed in the first two chapters and indicates that they can come to rest only with the realization that the proletariat is the sole conceivable subject which is capable of recovering the series of alienations which constitute the second
nature of forms and conventions which dominate bourgeois life.

Briefly summarized, Lukács' discussion traces the way in which the problem of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself was treated in classical German philosophy. Like Hegel, he feels that the Kantian solution of "infinite tasks" fails to bridge the separation of subject and world. The positing of a delayed solution to the problem of an adequate intersubjective access to reality is viewed as an attempt at pushing a problem for which bourgeois philosophy has no solution off into the infinite future. A qualitative break, the radical disjuncture between the ideal formal community dictated by the apriori forms and the empirical community, is reformulated as a mere quantitative break with the assurance that the ideal of pure reason, while not realizable at the present, will some day come to pass. The problem of aesthetic solutions to the separation of man and world is once again examined, and again the same dangers as before are noted: one either winds up in a state of resignation and the poetizing of extant reality or one mythologizes the aesthetic mode into something which shapes all of reality in which case the subject is open for Quixotic disillusionment the moment it attempts to act on those beliefs within the reality of the empirical world.

It is only with Hegel that Lukács feels that the problem has been posed in the proper manner, and he endorses Hegel's decision to attempt to resolve the problem of the irrationality of contact with reality by means of a dialectical Bildung process which reshapes both subject and object.

... the subject is neither the unchanged observer of the objective dialectic of being and concept (as was true of the Eleatic philosophers and even of Plato), nor the practical manipulator of its purely mental possibilities
(as with the Greek sophists): the dialectical process, the
ending of a rigid confrontation of rigid forms, is enacted
essentially between the subject and the object. 105

Lukács accepts the basic schema that the reintegration of the subject and
the world cannot take place through either infinite task.. or intuitive
understanding but must proceed as in Hegel, through a series of necessary
fragmentations and reintegrations. Lukács has distinguished the specific
features of Hegel's conception from Simmel's by his stress on the way in
which the subject undergoes alterations as a result of the process. The
implications of Hegelian Bildung, as I have indicated earlier, are much
more radical than those of Simmel's or Goethe's formulations of the dialecti-
cal Bildung in that the subject at the end of the process is no longer
assumed to be in the form of an individual ego, but is rather a collective
"we" subject. Lukács accepts the formal structure of this argument but
objects to the nature of the subject that Hegel has chosen, charging that
the final result of the operation lapses into a mystification.

Having failed to discover the identical subject-object
in history it (Hegel's philosophy) was forced to go
beyond history and, there, to establish the empire of
reason which has discovered itself. 106

Lukács argues that the withdrawal of the Bildung process from history results
in an inconsistent devaluation of the very history which was to be the ultimate
proof of the Hegelian system. Real history now becomes viewed as having
been only contingently tied to the workings of the absolute spirit or its
path to the realms of art, religion and philosophy, and, even more seriously,
one reason has been established, history must be assumed to have come to
an end. And, of course, empirical history quickly takes its revenge on
the system by tearing it to pieces, a process in which the ex-Young Hegelian
Marx plays an important role. As had been the case with Wilhelm Meister, fantastic devices are required outside of the allegedly totally self-unfolding process if it is to function properly. Lukács correctly sees that the dialectic, at least in the case of the Phenomenology, is forced to draw its strength at regular intervals from sources outside of the movement of its own contradictions.

This leads Lukács to the claim that while Hegel had correctly viewed the necessary type of subject, in opposition to Kant and Fichte who still assumed that the subject would be an individual ego, he ultimately is unable to find the subject anywhere within empirical history and is thus led outside of history. This is a significant point: unlike Marx, who seems to have regarded the entire idea of an identical subject-object with great suspicion, Lukács rejects only the idea of a non-historical identical subject-object. His claim is that there is a subject within history which can be viewed as possessing the necessary attributes of Hegel's purely speculative subject-object. Lukács develops these attributes in terms of finding a place where "genesis and history" coincide. This is possible if two conditions are fulfilled.

On the one hand, all the categories in which human existence is constructed must appear as the determinants of that existence itself (and not merely of the description of that existence). On the other hand, their succession, their coherence and their connections must appear as aspects of the historical process itself, as the structural components of the present. Thus the succession and internal order of the categories constitute neither a purely logical sequence, nor are they organized merely in accordance with the facts of history.
What is accomplished by this statement is an affirmation that the coincidence of synchrony and diachrony which has been observed in Simmel's work, especially his analysis of social forms, and Lukács' aesthetic discussions of the ways in which necessity and chance unite in modern dramas is an important analytic insight. But we must not present the point in an abstract or overly formalized manner and rather must carry Simmel's insistence that the forms bear a resemblance to the reality they describe to its logical end and insist that the forms of analysis always be studied in terms which connect them to the real determinants of historical existence. Hence a purely formal-mathematical model of the social universe, even though it might provide a high degree of descriptive and predictive power and perhaps even of isomorphism with various stages of the social process, would not fulfill Lukács' demands unless it was translatable into a description which would indicate how on a day-to-day level this formal regularity perpetuates itself in the world. What Lukács seems to be demanding is an application of Simmel's fairly consistent tendency of always discussing forms in terms of how they are experienced by those who participate in them, rather than how they can be summarized with a high degree of logical formalism. \textsuperscript{111} In short, what would emerge from this type of analysis is a sort of "verstehende Soziologie" of a reified world: an interpretive sociology which does not begin with the apriori assumption that human interaction can be explained solely in terms of rational choices, but must also include descriptions of the processes by which choices are excluded and how these exclusions are experienced by the participants. \textsuperscript{112} Lukács immediately notes that this entire approach is predicated on the assumption that the reality which confronts man "exhibits a kind of objectivity which
if properly thought out and understood - need never stick fast in an immediacy similar to that of the forms found earlier on.\textsuperscript{113} Hence the objectivity accorded to these social forms must not be that of a second nature, but rather that of a "mediating between past and future."\textsuperscript{114} Thus the proletariat's self-knowledge must consist of an ability to see that the forms which confront it are on the one hand the real determinants of their day-to-day existence and on the other as the result of a historical process which has led to the composition of the present. Since the proletariat will find that it itself has been a key party in this constitution, it stands in a relationship to reality which gives it the possibility of viewing this reality not as mere fact, but as a set of relations which are historically determined and capable of alteration. In other words, the proletariat has the capability of seeing all of the relations of capitalist society as a stage in a process of its own Bildung which must be overcome.

Among other things, this point explains that the failures of theoretical insight on the part of the atomist and formalist totalities must be viewed as symptoms of the same interruption of the Bildung process which only the proletariat (for reasons which will be developed later) can resolve. Lukács' critique of revisionism can now be seen as a critique of a failure to realize that the forms of capitalist society are not capable in themselves of leading to a successful alterations of the class struggle. His critique of bourgeois economy can now be seen as a critique of a failure to recognize that aside from being the forces which determine to a large degree the day-to-day existence of the capitalist society, the forms are also the result of a genesis through history which need not stop at the present state of synchronic equilibrium.
And his critique of the syndicalists, as well as his later critique of Lassalle,¹¹⁵ can be viewed as an argument against either a dismissal of the reality of the formal objectivity of capitalist society or the mystification of the totality into a force which can be altered by the acts of a "great individual." Thus the theoretical failure to achieve an analysis of capitalist society from the standpoint of the concrete totality is one and the same with the failure to recognize that the process of Bildung within capitalist society can only be successful if it is viewed from the standpoint of the proletariat as a potential identifical subject-object.

It is now necessary to examine the claim that the proletariat has the necessary attributes to be the only possible subject which can overcome the reifications of contemporary society. This will entail an analysis of the nature of the objectivity which has been externalized as well as of the proletariat and its role as the subject which carries out the task of recognition and Aufhebung of this reality.

On the objective side, Lukács maintains that a good part of the analyses by bourgeois sociologists are useful as descriptions of a contemporary state of affairs. Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes, for example, is regarded as "a very interesting and perceptive work in matters of detail" which falls into error only because it remains, like all bourgeois studies of reification, "stuck fast in its self-created immediacy" and hence "even thinkers who have no desire to deny or obscure its existence and who are more or less clear in their own minds about its humanly destructive consequences remain on the surface and make no attempt to advance beyond its objectively most derivative forms, the forms furthest from the real life-process of cap-
Lukács' analysis proceeds in the exact opposite direction from that of Simmel. Rather than taking the commodity fetish as the particular exemplar of a general diachronic rule which governs the loss of content from cultural forms, Lukács proposes that the Marxian analysis of the commodity must be utilized as the sole way possible of giving the phenomenon of reification a basis in real, human categories rather than in a mysterious realm which is unrelated to daily human practice. Through the use of a methodology which draws on analytic procedures such as the previously discussed attempt to reconstruct the totality from the relationships which can be found in its single parts, Lukács indicates in the first section of the reification chapter how all of the subject-object relationships in capitalist society take on a resemblance to the basic form of the relationship of the worker to the machine.

We should not assume that Lukács is arguing for anything so simple as a causal link between the experience of the worker with the machine and the rest of the relationships in the society. Rather the claim seems to be something more on the order of an argument that it can be demonstrated that in some way the worker-machine relationship is a particularly clear illustration of the general way in which relations in society are structured. Yet unlike the other cases, it appears that the worker-machine relationship is in some ways radically alterable, since the subject of this interaction -- as will be developed below -- is capable of being brought to the consciousness that he must alter this type of interaction if he is to survive. With the alteration of this one relationship, Lukács feels that a general restructuring of social relationships would begin to take place throughout the society, but he is not explicit as to how along this transfer might be. Clearly in "The Old
Culture and the New Culture" he felt that the removal of cultural production from the realm of economic necessity would bring about, in fairly short order, a complete change in culture in general. But by "L'art pour l'art und proletarische Dichtung" (1926) he is arguing that initially there will not be a great alteration in the nature of culture and art once the proletarian revolution has taken place.\(^{117}\) Aside from Breines' reading which argues that the latter essay is part of a tactical withdrawal on Lukács' part after the condemnation of *History and Class Consciousness* at the World Congress of the International in June 1924\(^{118}\), I think it can be argued that Lukács' position here is far more consistent with his attempts to avoid a crude deduction of cultural phenomena from the economic base than his more messianic position of the earlier essay. It would be inconsistent to claim that the products of bourgeois culture can occasionally overreach the limitations of the economic base and then turn around to claim that the simple substitution of one economic relationship for another will be enough completely to rid all types of proletarian writings from the vestiges of bourgeois reification.\(^{119}\)

The significance of the objective forms of social life in capitalist society is that they pose a set of problems to be overcome and set the stage for a new type of social formation by defining the way in which the proletariat as a unique subject encounters objective reality. The proletariat is conceived as that group within society which most directly experiences the "analytic" forms of bourgeois social analysis an oppressive and ever present reality. Lukács argues that if one seeks the most perfect product of rationalized society, one could very well find it in the proletariat since through its own life experience it recapitulates on a concrete level all of
the modes of reification and alienation which have been studied only abstractly by the social analysts. It is this inclusion in capitalist society which is of great importance for the proletariat's coming to consciousness of its role in the maintainence of the forms of objectivity and its potential role as the agent which brings about the end to these objective forms. The practical experiences of the proletariat enable the theoretical practice of the critical theorist to have an access to social reality which is, in Lukács' terminology, "mediated." Lukács argues that

The methodological function of the categories of mediation consists in the fact that with their aid those immanent meanings that necessarily inhere in the objects of bourgeois society but which are absent from their mental reflection in bourgeois thought, now become objectively effective and therefore enter the consciousness of the proletariat. . . . if the bourgeoisie is held fast in the mire of immediacy from which the proletariat is able to extricate itself, this is neither purely accidental nor a purely theoretical scientific problem. The distance between these two theoretical positions is an expression of the differences between the social existence of the two classes. 121

What seems to be argued here is that only the proletariat has an experience of reality which in some ways resembles that of the concrete totality. It is possible for a theoretical reproduction of reality to emerge in the form of the concrete totality simply because the proletariat experiences the objects of capitalist society in a way which leads it to be forced to think in terms of "internal relations" on a pretheoretical level. The immanent connections of the various segments of the bourgeois world outlook are experienced by the proletariat as an integrated whole, simply because the proletariat as a class is a commodity produced by the workings of the total society, yet a commodity which can become conscious of the interconnections which create it.
Thus the proletariat is capable of carrying out a determinate rather than abstract negation of the estranged reality, since it never is in a position to question that this reality is not a real and threatening presence. Unlike the subject of Simmel's Bildung process which can withdraw to live on a pre-social level, the proletariat is forced to stay within the reality marked out by the processes of objectification which have led up to the present state of affairs. Unlike the bourgeois social scientist who might occasionally employ an analysis which makes use of economic factors as causal antecedents as an "ideal-type," arguing that life, of course, consists of much more than economic factors, the proletariat experiences reality as economically determined.

So far we have seen that Lukács argued that the social processes of the society produce a subject which can possibly overturn the reality since it plays a major role in it. He has also been argued that only the proletariat can have the capability of experiencing reality with the necessary mediations to make a consciousness of this fact possible. Lukács does not go much further beyond this argument and does not state that there are any assurances that the proletariat will necessarily take the steps which will bring this alteration about. All that can be said is that there exist certain tensions at this stage of the Bildung process, incapable of resolution except in the form of an overthrow of the present order of social organization. The famous concept of "imputed class consciousness" (zugerechnete Klassenbewusstsein) does not make any claims about the empirical status of the consciousness of any individual member of the class, but rather expresses the type of consciousness logically required if the class is to transform itself from object to subject. Logically analysed, the situation of the proletariat is seen as
being both within society (as an element of the synchronic arrangement of commodities exchanged) and outside of society (as a subject which cannot come to self-realization within the present arrangement of forms). Lukács sees no way of reconciling this duality theoretically, as the revisionists had through an approximation of Kant's infinite series which gradually brings the proletarian society into existence automatically, thus explaining the present dissonance as a temporary status. Nor did he see it possible to leave the duality unreconciled as a special case of an eternal state of all individuals in the society. Rather he seeks to make the task of theorizing contingent on this very dissonance, and argues that the purpose of theory, which now becomes equated with the activities of a party which is no longer simply an aggregate of bureaucrats but rather would seem to require a considerable theoretical competence among its members, is not to explain or describe the tensions which exist between form and life, subject and object, individual and society. Rather what is required is an explication of these tensions to a subject which at this point in history possesses the possibility of practically overcoming these separations as a part of the very process which brings it to consciousness of them.

At this point it is possible to attempt a very broad summary of the argument which has been developed in History and Class Consciousness before turning to an evaluation of a portion of the position which is developed in the book. In pulling the various threads of the argument together, it might be most useful to attempt to relate them to the whole course of the argument of this chapter, which has been concerned with tracing these themes in a very
condensed form from their origins in Lukács' early work. In this way we will begin to see the degree to which *History and Class Consciousness*, while firmly rooted in the tradition of dialectical conceptions of *Bildung*, does make significant departures from the tradition in two areas. Significantly, these two departures also represent the two major innovations Lukács makes in his own view of the problem in the period 1908-1923.

But first I will examine the points in Lukács' argument which remain fairly consistent and can easily be traced to the works of Simmel and Hegel. From Simmel's sociological studies, Lukács accepts the general formulation of the totality as consisting of a mixture of determined and undetermined elements which coexist in a fairly stable relationship. The synchronic arrangement of forms within the society is seen as undisturbed by the diachronic series which lead up to the present state. Lukács clearly adheres to this viewpoint in his sociology of the modern drama, where the general phenomenon is analyzed in terms of the specific case of the gradual departure of action from the stage in favor of an overarching formalism. This notion becomes even clearer in Lukács' discussion of the relationship of life and form in *Die Seele und Formen*. Here the idea of a tragic acceptance of frontiers and limitations as being the only ways to define existence and the idea of a coincidence of "chance" and "necessity" at the moment of tragedy capture the literary and ethical senses of Simmel's union of synchronic and diachronic sequences. In *History and Class Consciousness* this notion is still present but placed within a different framework. Now this coincidence is significant because it gives one of the diachronic sequences -- the development of the proletariat into a commodity -- the insight necessary to see that it is both the subject and
the author of the current state of social relations and thus has the power to alter the arrangements of social interaction in favor of its own realization.

Another consistent theme is the idea of reification as the predominant mode of modern existence. There is remarkably little development in the descriptions of the phenomenon throughout the writings, the connection of the contemplative attitude of contemporary science having been present as early as the drama study. What alters is that by the end of this period, Lukács has found a new subject which is capable of overcoming these alienations. This is a topic which will be discussed below. As a phenomenon related to this theme, it should be stressed that throughout this period Lukács has regarded the categories of social analysis as not mere nominalist conventions, but rather as real and functioning social forces, again, in accord with one of Simmel's basic arguments.

A final consistency, again related intimately to the problem of reification, is Lukács' basic identification with the dialectical conception of the Bildung process. There is no evidence that he ever considered either innate categories or a simple shaping by external reality as an adequate description of the process by which the individual is brought into an intersubjective union with others. But he does insist, again throughout the period, that this process is no longer functioning properly because it lacks the proper milieu. This is apparent as early as "On Poverty of Spirit", where he argues that even an act of grace which conveys intersubjective understanding is not an adequate assurance that the individual will be able to make any use of this gift in ethical actions in the concrete world. In
Theory of the Novel this same point was developed in the form of a critique of the artificiality of the milieu which Goethe employs in Wilhelm Meister. No simple artistic convention is capable of providing a successful creation of the epic form in a world where the appropriately integrated community has been lost. In his work with the Free School we see a limited attempt at attempting to create a proper milieu through action, and with his activity in the Soviet Republic we see a proof that given a milieu which he felt was promising, he was willing to engage in the task of attempting to realize his cultural ideals. Finally, in History and Class Consciousness, we find a reposing of the question of what type of action is possible to create a milieu in which the proletariat will attempt to complete the tasks of re-claiming the alienations of the capitalist society. It is here that the party aided by the theoretical insights of the viewpoints of "concrete totality" plays an important role in preventing the proletariat from lapsing into a state of "immediacy" and failing to see the objects of capitalist society as objects in need of practical negation and reclamation.

The two great breaks in this period are connected with an insight into the altered status of theorizing and an altered notion of the nature of the subject necessary to carry out the Bildung process. The concept of Concrete Totality drastically alters Lukacs' notion of the task of theorizing since it proposes that theory must include itself within the province of phenomena with which it works. Thus theory becomes not a passive reflection on objects or forms which exist independently, it becomes an active participant in the reality towards which it is directed. It is a functioning element in the Bildung, rather than a simple description of the inevitability of the
failure of the process and is tied to a party and a class as an agent which
congitively reproduces the ongoing experiences of both and thus serves as
guide to the practice of regarding capitalist society as an alienation which
can be overcome.

This insight is connected to Lukács' claim that with the proletariat he
has discovered the one subject in society which is capable of overcoming
the objects of capitalist society through a dialectical recognition that
the society is the result of the class's own self-alienation in labor. This is
a shift from Lukacs' earlier discussion of the Bildung process as having an
ego subject and it signifies a major shift from Simmel to Marx.

Since these last two points are the essential contributions of Lukács'
arguments to critical social theorizing, my final chapter will be devoted to
an analysis of their importance and limitations.
V. Concluding Remarks: The Concrete Totality and Critical Social Theory

It would be deceptive, to say the least, to claim that what has been presented here can be brought to a series of "conclusions." My concern throughout has been more to open up a series of problems than to attempt to finish off a group of facts into some convenient order. All that can be done in this chapter is to pull some of the arguments of the last few chapters into a contemporary context. I will attempt to do this by building on Lukács' own self-critique of History and Class Consciousness which if pushed a bit farther than Lukács seems willing to take it, leads to the posing of a number of questions about the possible justifications for critical theorizing and the connection of critical theorizing to contemporary analysis. This path will take us through a number of criticisms of Lukács' work by other commentators, as well as indicate how some of his concerns have been reformulated.

It is desirable first of all to attempt a brief summary of the arguments which have been presented in the last sections of the previous chapter. As we have seen, Lukács' theoretical development takes the form of a gradual assimilation of the Hegelian notion of Bildung as a means of filling out portions of Marx's argument on the role of class conflict in the materialist conception of history. Because of the political situation at the time of Lukács' writing, this was hardly a merely philosophical problem, but rather leads to fairly concrete questions of the nature of political action, party-mass relationships, and the tasks of theoretical work vis-à-vis political practice. In approaching all of these questions, Lukács found it necessary to return continually to an examination of Marx's method, as a guard against a return to a sterile, mechan-
ical employment of an abstract formula to all concrete problems, be it the revisionist's conception of organic evolution or the Third International's Bolshevization of all national parties.

The key element of the Hegelian system which Lukács found useful in explicating Marx was, as has been noted, the dialectical notion of Bildung. Through an application of this principle the immediate problem of revolutionary praxis becomes the location of a subject in society which seems to be adequate for the task of carrying out the negation of capitalist objectivity. Lukács' changes in the Hegelian Bildung process are relatively minor, and he merely substitutes active practical negation for contemplative negation and changes the Geist subject to a class subject.¹ The result of these substitutions is a preservation of the essential form of Hegel's argument, but with the constitutive actors in the process being replaced by Marxist notions such as "classes." The result is a formulation of the ends of revolution which has a decidedly messianic and metaphysical cast to it. Lukács often speaks as if the destruction of capitalist society results in the same type of reversal which takes place with each of the negations of objects in the Hegelian dialectic, i.e., a complete loss of the former reality.² This point is connected to the problematic notion which has been discussed above concerning the relationship of the proletarian revolution and the general cultural revolution. Lukács seems to argue that the alteration of economic and social-class relationships of society brings with it an automatic alteration of all modes of cultural and social intercourse in the society as a whole.

We must, in addition, remember that Lukács here defines "proletariat" in terms of the relationship of a negating subject towards a objective total-
ity which is to be negated. That is, the "proletariat" of Lukács' discussion is an "imputed class consciousness" which does not correspond to the empirical consciousness of the members of any given social class in the society. Indeed, the absence of this imputed consciousness brings theory into being in the first place, since the theoretically informed party serves as a reflection of the tension which exists between the empirical consciousness of the proletariat and the "objectively possible" imputed class consciousness. Just as the question of organization is seen as the mediation between the dichotomy of theory and practice, so the party is the mediation between the dichotomy of empirical and imputed class consciousness.³ Lukács' constant stress on the philosophical significance of the problem of organization and his efforts to indicate that the party must not be a bureaucracy which merely manipulates the masses but rather a theoretically enlightened group which has the capability of interposing itself between the potential and actual levels of class consciousness indicates the degree to which he wishes to avoid a simple model of the party as a device which brings the proletariat into line with an externally posited ideal.⁴ A party which simply imposed its will on the proletariat would be only a reproduction of the undialectical notion of externally forced Bildung, just as the notions of spontaneity which Lukács also attacks represent a regression to the Bildung notion of a development of an internal disposition.

These two considerations, the Hegelian conception of the class subject and the conception of the party as a mediating agent in a process of dialectical Bildung, constitute the great central dilemma of Lukács' work, various aspects of which have been touched on by a number of later critics, including
Lukács himself. We can phrase the problem as follows: Is the ideal of class consciousness which is opposed to the present consciousness immanently related to the current oppositions of subject and object, or is it a logical abstraction imported from outside of the historical process? If this latter is the case, then the party ceases to be a mediation, which arises out of a tension and at the same time is the agent which resolves the tension, but is rather only a mechanical force, pushing the mass towards an ethical ideal which bears little relationship to the tensions of the society at this historical moment. Lukács' four major criticisms of *History and Class Consciousness* all turn on points related to this problem.

Writing in the 1967 Preface, Lukács notes that he now feels that the notion of the identical subject-object must be rejected as an ideal for the Bildung process. Lukács raises the question of whether this notion has the potential for being concretized or whether it must remain a metaphysical entity which could not be transferred into a historical materialist system. He concludes that it cannot have a real, historical form.

In the *Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel rightly dismisses the notion of a mystical and irrationalistic realization of the identical subject-object, of Schelling's "intellectual intuition," calling instead for a philosophical and rational solution to the problem. His healthy sense of reality induced him to leave the matter at this juncture; his very general system does indeed culminate in the vision of such a realization but he never shows how it might be achieved. Thus the proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist consummation that overcomes the constructions of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel.5

But it is not enough merely to reject the ultimate solution of the point-by-point transformation of Hegel's system into materialist clothing. Since the identical subject-object is the telos towards which all of the other moments
of the Bildung process are directed, there is good reason to believe that they too will have to be altered if they are to be transformed into a materialist dialectic. Lukács acknowledges this, and in a sense his three other objections to the arguments of *History and Class Consciousness* may be viewed as the consequences of the rejection of the identical subject-object. Lukács argues further that his book shared Hegel's basic prejudice of treating all objectifications as alienation, and hence equates the transcendence of alienation with the transcendence of objectification. Arato has suggested that what is required is a gradation of levels between "reification," "objectification," and objective, primordial nature, and notes that one can find hints of a move in this direction in Lukács' text when he argues that reification does not effect all types of human relationships in the same way. This hierarchy would seem to demand an alternative formulation of the notion of Bildung, since it now admits elements to the process, such as "primordial nature" which are not to be overcome and sublated by the subject, but rather apparently are only accessible in a "one-sided" rather than dialectical fashion. Hence, Lukács' third criticism is of great importance in this context since it is directed against his failure to develop a notion of "labor" upon which the analyses of the book could take place. The impact of Lukács' reading of the *1844 Manuscripts* is obviously present here, as will be explored more completely below. Finally, Lukács notes a related failure to develop an adequate notion of praxis which would help him advance beyond the notion of an idealized imputed class consciousness. As Arato and Piccone have noted, this failure is intimately connected with the lack of a theory of needs which would give some indication that the "objectively possible" class consciousness finds
its basis within the proletariat although at an unconscious or pre-thematic level. Again, Arato argues that traces of such an argument may be found in the reification chapter, in the fact that the analysis of reification takes the form of a development of the possibilities immanent in the dynamic of reification rather than in the simple positing of an identical subject-object.

Thus Lukács' self-criticism, as well as the arguments of some of his more sympathetic critics all seem to turn around the question of the need for a reformulation of the arguments of *History and Class Consciousness* in line with a theory of alienation which is rooted in the concept of labor and a dialectic of needs. In our terms, this can be rephrased as the question of how the dialectical Bildung process needs to be reconceptualized if we are applying it to the tasks of social analysis rather than to a generation of conceptual objectivities, as is charged was the case with Hegel. The dialectical notion of the constitution of the subject cannot remain indifferent to the content which it absorbs, and although there is a fundamental harmony between Hegel's use of dialectics and Marx's method of criticizing political economy, it should not be assumed that the formal resemblance of the two procedures will be present at every point of their actual application. Hence, in turning to the *1844 Manuscripts* we are able to see how, in carrying out an analysis of the concept of labor which owes a great deal to Hegel's *Phenomenology* in terms of a logical structure, Marx nevertheless made considerable alterations in the nature of the concrete categories. Subject-object identity is no longer the goal, but rather a notion of a harmonious, total appropriation of objective reality by an objective,
embodied subject forms the telos of the communist society. This type of goal does not presuppose the elimination of all objective reality with each negation, but rather requires that there be a persisting subject-object tension throughout the Bildung process.

To be objective, natural, sentient and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, nature and sense for a third person, is the same thing. ... A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being and does not share in the being of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for a third being has no being for its object, i.e. it is not objectively related and its being is not objective. A non-objective being is a non-being.

The subject of this process is not conceived as "Consciousness" but rather as a "natural being," which stands in need of some type of natural background which remains un-negated in the process of development towards a rational social order.

The understanding of the development of this type of individual is closely tied to a correct understanding of the dialectic of labor, a topic to which Lukács turned in his later years, but which had already been discussed by Herbert Marcuse in the decade immediately following the publication of History and Class Consciousness. With the goal of the Bildung process now reconceptualized as the creation of a social situation in which labor can act in a free relationship of appropriation with nature, a number of the problems Lukács indicated in his work can be avoided. Marcuse notes that while reification serves as a disruption of this goal, objectification does not. Hence the idea that a successful completion of the Bildung process must result in the overturning of all objective reality is rejected once we turn to a theory of labor which recognizes the existence of objectification as a normal species
trait. Indeed, the creation of permanent objects may be conceptualized as a basic species need and labor has the task — essential to human existence as such — of self-creating, of creating forms endowed with duration and permanence. In fact, the first and final meaning of labor is to "gain by laboring" the being of human existence itself, in order to "guarantee" it in duration and permanence. All individual wants are ultimately grounded in this primordial and constant want that existence has, i.e. its full self-creation (Selbsterwicklung) in duration and constancy.

Similarly, the problem of the division of labor becomes reposed in a less problematic fashion. In Simmel's work and latently in Lukács' conception, the simple fact that the individual did not achieve an adequate objectivation of his own intentions in products produced under the division of labor was sufficient to cause a rupture in the Bildung process. In a Bildung process rooted in labor an analysis of the historical forms of labor is necessary to determine whether certain aspects of the division of labor are not unavoidable, and if it is not so much the simple fact of divided labor which is of importance for the disruption of the Bildung process, but rather the social significance of the division of labor in maintaining a certain form of domination within a society. Finally, while under the analysis of a Bildung conception oriented towards the concept of labor the problem of the commodity still plays the major role which it does in Lukács' reconstruction, it cannot be assumed that the sole importance it has is in the impenetrability which for Lukács constitutes the erection of a second nature. Rather, the commodity must now be defined more in terms of its lack of connection to the needs of the workers who produce it and the entire relationship of domination and servitude which surrounds its production. This in turn would force a greater concentration on the relationship between the class conceived as a logical entity standing
opposite the commodity and the individuals who constitute the class, who are connected with each other in terms of a similar frustration of needs and constraints on their own productive capabilities. 21

It should be stressed that what has been attempted here is only the briefest outline of how the reorientation to a Bildung process specifically concentrated on the way in which subjects and objects are constituted through labor might serve to purge Lukács' argument of some of its more problematic elements. A more complete exploration of these points would obviously have to involve a consideration of Lukács' last efforts in the Ontology of producing what appears to amount to a reformulation of many of the key arguments of his early discussions in terms of a constant stress on the concept of labor. 22 It should be noted that the procedure of deducing the logical features of the proletariat from an analysis of the object which is to be overcome is rejected, and with this, the question of the status of class consciousness would have to be reposed. As Lukács' indicated in his criticism of the work, History and Class Consciousness, in its theory of party organization, does not move beyond ascribing a logical level of class consciousness and arguing that the party must serve as the mediator between this objective possibility and the empirical reality. With the recognition that Lukacs' conceptualization of the "objective possibilities" of the proletarian revolution is questionable, the role of the party as mediator becomes a problem which must be re-examined. This is especially important since along with the theoretical problems with "imputed class consciousness," there are today great problems with the level of empirical class consciousness which seems to be assumed in Lukács' notion of the vanguard party as an expression of the "actuality of the revolution": 23
as Lenin said, the group of professional revolutionaries does not for one moment have the task of either 'making' the revolution, or — by their own independent, bold actions — of sweeping the inactive masses along to confront them with a revolutionary fait accompli. Lenin's concept of party organization presupposes the fact — the actuality — of revolution. ... The party ... is conceived as an instrument of class struggle in a revolutionary period.

Since the connection of theory and practice which forms the basis of Lukács' notion of the party as an expression of the tensions in class consciousness during the revolution is so closely tied to the actuality of revolution, the problem of the theory-practice relationships in periods of nonrevolutionary activity becomes particularly pressing. In this context, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's insistence that with the gradual disappearance of the proletariat as a historical force in both socialist and capitalist countries Marxism as a critique of society must lose its status as a truth which can be something more than a contending ideology or ethical rejection is only a consistent application of Lukács' arguments. 24

No group of dialectical thinkers has confronted this problem as extensively as the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and although a complete discussion of their various attempts to provide a solution to the problem of where critical theorizing can be based with the loss of the mass party would be a task which would go beyond the limits of this thesis, a few important points should be noted. 25 With the birth of the "authoritarian state" as a world-wide political phenomenon the notion of mass parties as an embodiment of the theoretical and practical negation of social reality has become no longer a possible tactic. 26 In its earliest arguments, the Frankfurt School presented Critical Theory as a promotive factor in the development of a mass political consciousness, which in many ways was still conceived as la-
tent in the same sense as Lukács' imputed class consciousness. One can even 
sense a return to the general outlook of the Mannheim-Lukács group during the 
days of the Free School: the task of the theoretician is to attempt to pro-
vide a milieu in which a negation of the present social order can take place. 
This task is carried out through an indication of alternatives which are not 
analyzed by contemplative theorists who merely confirm "what is" at a given mo-
ment. A non-party connected theoretician addresses a non-present class.

In periods when there seems no immediate possibility of class action, 
however, the task of the theorist becomes less one of agitation than of pre-
serving a past which is in danger of vanishing from memory. Thus, the much 
condemned obscurity of the works of the school may be seen as an attempt to 
preserve a mode of thought which is in great danger of vanishing in a society 
where the ultimate test of the staying power of a theory in the social sciences 
is its ability to produce a "pay off" in terms of insights which are useful in 
the prediction of public behavior. The alleged theoretical function of 
causal analysis as a means of approximating a more and more complex model of 
social behavior should not conceal the fact that the greatest consumers of 
"social science" or "policy science" are not primarily interested in a total 
model of society with a high degree of part-by-part isomorphism but rather 
in a useful mechanism for the prediction of market behavior, voting behavior, 
etc., which need not manifest a great deal of theoretical precision as long 
as it serves the interest of their clients. To the extent to which the 
Frankfurt School has succeeded in preserving some aspects of traditional con-
cerns in social theory from being lost in a tidal wave of interest in social 
engineering, the school may at least have achieved a partial accomplishment of
its ends.

In terms of a broader social function, perhaps the preservation of critical concerns in social theory can find its reproduction in the role of the critical theorist in providing a critique of the existing social order, which while no longer conceived as having an immediate impact on a mass level, nevertheless keeps alive the notion of criticism in a discipline which is quickly moving towards unconscious affirmation. Habermas' recent arguments on the importance of the university as the arena which must be the focus of the critical theorist's attention can perhaps be reconciled with older traditions of the school if it is indicated that this focus of attention can by no means be presumed to be a theoretically justified tactic for all times, but is rather the result of a current arrangement of social and economic forces. However, his assumption that the organization of education is now more important than party or cadre actions seems to represent a tendency to transform the theorist into too privileged a position vis-à-vis changes in the social order. Similarly, there is Merleau-Ponty's conception of a "non-communist left" which would carry out a constant "harrasing action" against both the established communist and capitalist systems and which does not believe that the institutions of capitalism are the sole means of exploitation, but ... does not judge them to be any more sacred than the polished stone hatchet or the bicycle. They are, like our language, our tools, our customs, our cloths invented for a definite usage and have found themselves bit by bit charged with an entirely different function. A complete analysis of this change in meaning needs to be made, beyond the famous analysis of surplus value and a program of action established as a consequence.

This conception needs to be continually reminded of the fact that the temporary ability to carry out this analysis within the framework of the liberal bourgeois state must always be measured by the "barometer of revolution" if it is not
to wind up supporting the established order at every turn with the argument that all other options seem so much worse. Critical Theory in this sense would have to abandon the quest for some positive basis in transcendental human interests and explore more fully the traditional functions which skeptical thought has played in periods when social instability has not taken on an organized class form. Such an investigation would, like Merleau-Ponty's and Horkheimer's essays on Montaigne, have to concern itself with the way in which the skeptic functions within a community as a determinate negation which, while hardly serving the function of a mediation to a theoretical resolution of social problems, would at least serve as a marker which indicates that there are social problems which stand in need of a resolution which goes beyond the available repertoire of social engineering within the liberal welfare state. 34

What form this reconsideration of the nature of critical theorizing might take can again be indicated by an appeal to the notions of Bildung and Concrete Totality. Lukács' conception of theorizing gradually led to a connection of theoretical activity to the class struggle with the insight that theory does not merely reflect the various tensions in society. Rather, being a part of society, the efforts of the theorist are part of those struggles. Lukács arrived at this insight from a slightly different direction from that which I will depart: while for Lukács this was an indication that theory must enter into class struggle and serve a creative function in the education of the revolutionary class, it seems equally valid to suggest that today the question is not so much one of theory contemplating reality and only being needed to be pushed into action, as a struggle with social sciences which quite regularly intervene in social reality throughout society with questionable results.
Thus, as Herbert Marcuse has indicated recently, the "intellectualization" of the New Left, of which I suppose this thesis may be seen as a symptom, can no longer be viewed as a withdrawal from political struggle or as a preparation for political struggle. What is involved is a continuation on a different level of a general struggle throughout the society against a general deterioration of mental and cultural faculties. The effort of this thesis has been to confront the present-day social sciences with an event in their past evolution which has now been forgotten. This thesis was written because I could not find a work which connected Lukács into the tradition of neo-Kantian social theory, because I could not find an adequate explanation of what theoretical insights Lukács developed which might be relevant for our own theoretical concerns. But what is even more remarkable is that the forgetfulness of social sciences does not stop with the perhaps understandable tendency of not recording the efforts of those who took paths differing from the mainstream. Instead, when we turn to Simmel, we find that the forgetfulness of contemporary theory has prevented us from even getting beyond the basic tensions which he had confronted half a century ago. As Paul Diesing's helpful typology of competing "ontological bases" for social science research shows, today we see the social sciences inhabited by the various fragments of Simmel's arguments. The formal-modeling school takes part of his work, the case-study groups other parts, and so on. But what is lost in the process is Simmel's sense that all of these parts somehow belong together yet in their present form cannot be brought together without serious difficulties. Hence, posing the question of a possibility of critical theory does not involve an attempt to indicate to already firmly established sciences that there is a third type of "interest" which they could pursue beyond the concerns of inter-
pretation and manipulation. Instead it can begin with an indication that any consistent attempt to understand the foundations on which our social theorizing rests will invariably bring us back to the forgotten dilemmas which Simmel, Weber, and others had confronted long ago.

Thus the question could probably be raised if the posing of the problem of the possibility of a critical orientation to social theory accompanied by an insistent pointing to a past which has vanished from view is not itself an exercise in criticism, if not critical thinking. The problem of understanding the nature of the way in which labor shapes both objective world and subject finds its reflection in the question of how criticism, moving within the domain of forgotten ideas and sedimented achievements, serves to shape and renew a tradition which has abandoned its roots and to educate subjects who are involved in the radical search. By posing these two problems together: the Bildung of labor and the Bildung of theory, I am not suggesting a return to a split between culture and economy, thought and labor, "purposive rational action" and "interaction." The question of critical social theory is not something which needs to be resolved before the problem of unalienated labor can be correctly grasped; rather they can be approached, through the notion of a concrete totality, as one and the same problem. This does not, of course, provide us with any answers, but perhaps it serves to rule out a few ways of posing the problem.
Notes

Introduction

1. The recent literature on the uncritical nature of contemporary American social science is too vast to even attempt to note. On recent problems within Critical Theory, see Russell Jacoby, review of Adorno, Aufsätze zur Gesellschaftstheorie, Telos 6(1970), pp. 346-348. Unfortunately, a major criticism of Habermas' recent work from the standpoint of the earlier locus of Frankfurt theory has not appeared.


3. Otto Neurath, Empirische Soziologie (Vienna: Springer, 1931). Neurath's work is unique within the positivist tradition in that he attempted to maintain a critical Marxist viewpoint while remaining within the general methodological orientation of the Vienna Circle.


5. Two good brief discussions, with extensive bibliographies may be found in Hannah Fernieh Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), Ch. XI and XII, and Maurice Natanson, ed. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (New York: Random House, 1963).


14. Goldmann's earliest use of Lukács' was in his book on Kant, which was not translated into French until the late 1960s. However, he was present at the Geneva debates in 1946, and published an introduction to Lukács' early writings in 1950, cf. "Georg Lukács, L'Essayiste" in Recherches Dialectiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1959) - as well as using some of Lukács' concepts in his debate with Georges Gurvitch in his The Human Sciences and Philosophy (1952), trans. Hayden V. White and Robert Anchor (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).


17. This paragraph is based on conversations with Russell Jacoby and Paul Breines.

18. Among the earliest studies were those of Morris Watnick, in Soviet Survey in 1958-59, later republished in a shortened form in Leopold Labedz, ed. Revisionism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), and Victor Zitta, George Lukács' Marxism: Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution (Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1964). The latter has the dubious distinction of being almost universally recognized as a hostile and generally inaccurate attack.


24. Lichtheim's discussion is somewhat confused, apparently crediting Lask with being a major influence on Die Seele und die Formen which was in fact completed several years before Lukács came into contact with Lask; Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 4-5. For critical reviews of Lichtheim, see Rudolph L. Tőkés, "György Lukács: His Class and Consciousness," Studies in Comparative Communism V, (1972), p. 455ff. and Paul Breines, Telos 6 pp. 318ff.
Chapter 1


2. Lukács objects to any simple formulation of Marxist humanism rooted in an a priori, universal human essence, arguing that the concept of "man" itself must be historicized and subjected to dialectical alterations over time, p. 373, HCC, pp. 186-87. Werke II.

3. Ibid. pp. 6-7. Weil's study concentrates mainly on Humboldt, who according to Weil is the father of the "specifically German" sense of Bildung (p. 85). Unfortunately Weil's excellent study does not investigate the broader philosophical usage the term took on as a result of Hegel's use in Ch. VI (R) of the Phenomenology of Mind, "Der sich entfremdete Geist. Die Bildung". The related problem of for whom these two notions of Bildung are only different stresses and not logical contradictions should also be raised. One might argue that the statement that two meanings are somehow only differing stresses on one plane and thus logically non-contradictory implies that the person making the argument has adopted a specific and distinct philosophical position which enables him to see things in this manner and hence needs to be enunciated.

4. Ibid., pp. 38, 40-41.

5. Karel Kosík, Dialektik des Konkreten, trans. from Czech by Marianne Hoffman (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967) seems to evaluate Shaftesbury in a different manner. According to Kosík, Shaftesbury "presupposes unalterable entities, which through their realization form society; and with him, man is from nature social - that is, he is already social before society." (p. 88) This view is much closer to Weil's presentation of Rousseau than to his presentation of Shaftesbury. Perhaps the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that while Weil contrasts Shaftesbury and Rousseau, Kosík contrasts contrasts Shaftesbury and Mandeville.

6. Weil, op. cit., pp. 42,45, 47. As we shall see below, the "vegetative analogy" permeates Simmel's work, see Chapter II; Sec.B:2.

7. Ibid., p. 265. There is a "possessive individualist" sense of character here. Herder, whose literary works were part of the Sturm und Drang revolt of subjectivity, often uses phrases such as "meinen charakter zu bilden", (p. 55). C.B. MacPherson notes that one of the central metaphors of liberal democracy is the image of the "market" where "the individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities for which he owes nothing to society." The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

8. Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology (1956), trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1972), p. 46. Also, "Whoever glorifies culture at the expense of civilization today is more concerned with setting up cultural preserves than with humanity" (p. 93). "The chaotic and frighten-
ing aspect of contemporary technological civilization has its origin neither in the concept of civilization nor in technology as such, but rather in the fact that technology has assumed a specific structure and position in modern society, which stands in a highly disrupted relationship to the needs of human beings. It is not the rationalization of the world which is to blame for the evil, but the irrationality of this rationalization...with an automobile one can escape from all sorts of abominations - Karl Krauss said he used his car in order to be able to hear a nightingale once in a while. But the monstrous chariots which periodically change their color, simply because that is obligatory, have something malevolent about them... ...(E)conomic insanity...threatens the spirit and today even the material survival of mankind, and not technological progress itself" (pp. 94-95).

9. For instance see Neil McInnes, "Georg Lukács," Survey, No. 72, Summer 1969, pp. 125, 132, on Lukács' alleged romanticism. Neil McInnes, "The Young Marx and the New Left," Journal of Contemporary History VI:4 1971, which argues that Lukács attempted to reformulate Marx's social theory into the language of "absolute idealism," setting the stage for a union with German anti-scientific irrationalism resulting in a "'fascist' style of New Left theorizing," pp. 154-55. (McInnes' characterization of Horkheimer and Adorno follows the same line charging that they were "anti-scientific" while Marx was "pro-scientific," pp. 149-50, 156-7. This claim needs only to be confronted with the last quote in footnote 7, above, to illustrate how superficial his analysis of the Frankfurt School is in fact); and Alasdair MacIntyre, "Marxist Face and Romantic Mask," in Against the Self Image of the Age (London: Duckworth, 1971), p. 66 which equates the ideal of unalienated man with Schiller's "romantic" concept of "Selbstbestimmung."


11. For recent evaluations of Simmel's significance for sociology, see Michael Landmann, "Einleitung des Herausgebers" in Simmel Das individuelle Gesetz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 21-29. Theodore M. Mills, "Some Hypotheses on Small Groups from Simmel" in Lewis A Coser, Georg Simmel, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965); Theodore Abel, "The Contribution of Georg Simmel: A Reappraisal," American Sociological Review, 24:4 (1959), pp. 473-481, and Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (New York: Free Press, 1956). The latter work contains a statement which is typical of the treatment Simmel receives in current evaluations. "Simmel's ideas are not derived from a general theoretical framework, as are those of Freud or Marx. Thus although a theory can be found in nuce in Simmel's work, this theory can be more effectively stated by incorporating it into the central ideals on this matter of other sociologists." (p. 31) Perhaps the rationale behind the partial incorporation of Simmel's hypotheses or concrete observations into a different theoretical framework is found in Simmel's famous diary entry, "I know that I will die without intellectual heirs (geistige Erben)(and that is good). My estate is left in cash which many heirs..."
may divide..." Simmel, Brücke und Tür, eds., Margarete Susman and Michael Landmann (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1957), p. vi. But, it should be remembered that Simmel's evaluation of the prospects for his works after his death is hardly a denial that they possess in themselves a unity which could be maintained. For my purposes, it is important that the immediate "cash value" of Simmel's works be bypassed in hopes of finding a deeper use - value for contemporary theorizing. For a discussion of possible reasons behind the strange usages (or lack of use) of Simmel in America, see Donald N. Levine "Introduction" to Georg Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

12. Simmel, "Anfang einen unvollendeten Selbstdarstellung," in Kurt Gassen and Michael Landmann eds. Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel, (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958). The text is from Simmel's Nachlass; no date is given. However, the last passage cited here (p. 9) is followed by the parenthetical comment "Philosophie des Geldes"; suggesting that the text might be of an earlier date than the final "metaphysics of life" period, since the new metaphysics of relativity draws only on the earlier Philosophie des Geldes. Of course the text could be from a later period and the citation of the Philosophie des Geldes is only an indication that the "neue Festigkeitsbegriff" was first established in that work.

13. Ibid., p. 9


15. As an example, see his "Über eine Beziehung der Selektionslehre zum Erkenntnistheorie" (Hereafter "Selektionslehre"), (1895), in Gertrud Simmel, ed. Zur Philosophie der Kunst (Potsdam: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1922), which argues that if Kant's study of categories could be reduced to the sentence: "the possibility of cognition produced for us similarly the object of cognition," then "the theory presented here means: the necessity of cognition produced for us similarly the object of cognition," p. 125. A discussion of the influence of Darwin in Simmel 's earliest works, Über Soziale Differenzierung (1890) and Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (1892-93) may be found in Paul Honigseh, "The Time and Thought of the Young Simmel," in Wolff, op. cit., pp. 170-173.


17. Lücién Goldmann, Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants (1949); I will refer to the translation by Robert Black, Immanuel Kant, (London: New Left Review Books, 1971), which in turn is based on Goldmann's revised French translation, Introduction à la philosophie de Kant (1967), which deleted one chapter from the German (Ch X on Heidegger and Lukács) but added additional material on the "tragic vision" in Kant.
18. T.K. Oesterreich, *Die deutsche Philosophie des XIX Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart*, Volume 4 of *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin: E.S. Miller, 1923), pp. 416-470, distinguishes seven general tendencies within neo-Kantianism: 1) a physiological tendency primarily concerned with sense perception as apriori forms of cognition (Helmholtz and Lange), 2) a metaphysical tendency concerned with devices for eliminating the thing-in-itself (Liebman and Volkelt), 3) a realist tendency, concerned with arithmetic relationships in the phenomenal world, (Riehl), 4) a logical tendency (the Marburg School), concerned with the investigation of different logics in different spheres of phenomena (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer), 5) a tendency oriented towards value criticism (the Heidelberg School) which was concerned with truth values in differing realms of phenomena and especially in the cultural sciences (Windelband, Rickert, Lask), 6) a "relativist tendency" -- a term reserved for Simmel alone, and 7) the psychologic tendency of the "heu-Friesche" school.

19. It should be indicated that Goldmann's and Lukács' views on Kant are not completely isomorphic. Goldmann indicates (ibid., pp. 53-54) that the critique of neo-Kantianism found in Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* is already present in Kant's own work, and hence should not be read as a critique of Kant himself. Thus, Goldmann's respect for Kant's work is possibly even higher than Lukács', in that Goldmann finds many more pre-Hegelian and Marxian elements (e.g. the concept of "totality") in Kant's work than Lukács appears willing to admit.


21. On the distinction between "life" in Simmel and Bergson, see Weingartner, op. cit., p. 15. It might be better to state that while Bergson develops a metaphysics of life which is somehow related to all empirical life, Simmel's transcendental concept of life is related solely to empirical human life.


27. Ibid., p. 163.

28. Ibid.


31. The term comes from Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, (London: Methuen, 1966), a study of the first critique from within the tradition of British analytic philosophy.

32. Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, p. 54.

33. I have not been concerned with developing here Goldmann's arguments about the "ideal community" which he claims constitutes the center of Kant's work aside from indicating that Kant's approach to the problem of experience and form is a means of establishing the possibility of an intersubjective community. For Goldmann's discussion of the form this community takes in Kant, see Ibid., pp. 125-6.
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5. Ibid., pp. 13-14, trans. p. 70.

6. The roots of his allegiance to the Kantian ideal of critical philosophy may be found in his publications of the Jena period (1801-07) collected in the Werke II. See especially his statement of purpose for the Kritische Journal der Philosophie, pp. 171ff., his review article attacking Krug's common-sense philosophy, pp. 188ff, and his discussion of Kant, Jacobi and Fichte, Glauben und Wissen (1802), pp. 287ff.


11. Findlay, op. cit. p. 126. In a similar vein, the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology*, op. cit., argues that "one of the central motives for Hegel's critique is the contention that in Kant's moral philosophy the constitutive role of the social moment is neglected in favor of the abstract subjectivity of the moral individual." p. 42.


20. Rudolph Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" (1932) trans. Arthur Pap in A.J. Ayer ed. *Logical Positivism* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 73. The problem seems to be one of guilt by association since Carnap's main target is Heidegger. Since their arguments are by no means the same, the attack is unjustified.

21. The one obvious exception to this tendency is the work of Karl Popper. Even the transition from logical analysis to ordinary language analysis
has not clarified matters, one finds Sartre counterposed to Austin with the comment that the example of shoes under the bed is somehow a more appropriate starting point for an analysis of the meaning of "nothing" than a friend's absence from a cafe. See Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore eds., British Analytic Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 14. Sartre's point, however, is not a general defense of ascertaining meaning of "nothing" but rather an argument that the meaning of nothing will always be determined by the way in which it is an absence of something, or in Sartre's overly profound words, "nothingness haunts being." See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes (1953) (New York: Washington Square, 1966), p. 49; for a discussion of the role of negation in dialectics pp. 33ff. This general orientation can be compared with Roland Barthes' concept of "degree-zero" writing, see Writing Degree-Zero (1953), trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith, (Boston: Beacon, 1970), esp. pp. 74-78.

22. For a good summary of this point see Dove, op. cit. pp. 619-620.


26. Müller, op. cit. Weingartner's more recent study notes the use of Hegelian terminology in Simmel's studies of culture — see Weingartner, op. cit. pp. 72, 83-84, 186.


30. For a general discussion of Darwinism in Germany see Daniel Gasman,

31. This point is not developed in Löwith, op. cit. who tends to look upon Nietzsche as the final destroyer of the Hegelian world. However, Nietzsche's frequent use of genetic analyses of concepts and morals betrays traces of a concern for the Bildung of concepts through contradictions and negations.


34. Müller, op. cit. p. 10.

35. Simmel, Grundfragen..., p. 82, trans. p. 70. Also see Mamelet, op. cit. p. 26 on Simmel's criticism of the abstractness of Kantian anthropology.


37. Ibid., pp. 37, 10, 89.

38. Müller, p. 8.


42. Müller, p. 10, Mamelet, p. 37, this point is not discussed in Honigsheim, op. cit.
43. Mamelet, p. 37.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., pp. viii-viv.


47. This example comes from Georg Simmel, Kant: Sechzehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Berliner Universität, 4th ed. (München: Duncker and Humblot, 1918), p. 50. One finds the same tendency throughout Georg Lukács, Die Seele und die Formen (1911) (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1971).


49. See Findlay, op. cit., pp. 70-71 for a discussion of the different types of transitions which occur in Hegel's work.


52. See Weingartner, op. cit. pp. 56-61 for a lucid discussion of the different levels of formation in Simmel.


54. Müller, op. cit., p. 28.


58. Simmel, Grundfragen..., p. 92, trans. p. 79.


60. In this context, Spykman notes that Simmel's philosophy is "genetic and dialectic, but while for Hegel the absolute was the self-unfolding Ideal [i.e., Concept, - Begriff] for Simmel the absolute was Life itself": op. cit., p. xxiv.


63. For a discussion, see Weingartner, op. cit., pp. 28-29, 31-32.

64. Müller, op. cit., p. 22, for a discussion of the "third realm" in Simmel's last works, see Bauer, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

65. Simmel, Fragmenten und Aufsätze (1923), op. cit., p. 3.

66. Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (1954), Werke 9, (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962) pp. 386-401. This work is one of the most problematic of Lukács' creations. In general it suffers from most of the ills of his Stalinist years: a vulgar treatment of the base-superstructure relations, a connected tendency to engage most philosophical arguments on the level of personal or class vilification, and an allegiance to Leninist epistemology which is not clarified and developed but merely dogmatically evoked. Yet, the book is not as bad as it seems on first glance, and certainly not as worthless as Lichtheim would make it seem (op. cit. Ch. VII). The discussion of Simmel is a microcosm of all of these problems. While denying that Simmel is a conscious supporter of the fascist mentality (p. 363), the discussion of Simmel's work itself makes constant reference to the "parasitism" of the "imperialist-entier" intellectuals. For the most part the discussion is aimed at Simmel's later Lebensphilosophie which is attacked, justly I would argue, for merely stating that a "third way" beyond the dicotomies it posits has been found in Life and Erlebnis, but never develops the point (of course the same may be said of Lukács' use of Lenin in this book) (p. 387). Lukács also rightly notes that the Lebensphilosophische tendencies in Simmel's work are not a peculiarity of his last period, but are rather latent in all of his earlier 'pragmatic' works, (pp. 386,388). Similarly, his discussion of Simmel's philosophy of religion points up the fact that it culminates with a general obscurantist-mystical "religious atheism" (pp. 390-95, although Lukács does not use this as an opportunity to develop many of the important arguments in Marx about the positive role religion plays as a social
organism as opposed to the inherent anti-social nature of quietism and mysticism). Lukács devotes very little of his brief survey to Simmel's cultural studies, although he does make the important point, which will be developed below, that Simmel tends to ontologize the present condition of individuals within a given culture into "an 'eternal' tragedy of 'the' Culture in general..." (p. 397). What is missing, is any sensitivity to the fact that Simmel was working within a determinate historical situation and that his own perspectives were created not merely by a personal failure to identify himself with the progressive forces of history, the proletariat (which seems to be Lukács' fundamental charge), but were also possibly intimately related to the unavailability of an alternative at this point, given the generally dismal state of European Marxism, with a very few exceptions. There is no consideration of the positive aspects of Simmel's work and Lukács' eagerness here to cut himself off from his own past gives us little indication of how he could have managed to work through this past to a critical stance. In short: we have here a superficial and abstract negation, not a critical analysis.

67. Frank Johnson, ed. Alienation Concept, Term, and Meanings (New York: Seminar, 1973), gives ample evidence of an almost hysterical confusion about what is to be done with the term, as we shall see below.


71. The former is Sviták's argument, the latter is what seems to motivate the search in Johnson's book for some instrument of measuring alienation.

72. Trenton O. Schroyer, Alienation and the Dialectical Paradigm (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School of Social Research 1968), pp. 188, 195-96. Parts I and II of this study have been reworked into Schroyer, Critique of Domination (New York: George Braziller, 1973), pp. 44-100. Whenever possible I will cite parallel passages in the latter text. None of these arguments should be read as stating that a "psychological" approach to alienation is impossible. However, it cannot be assumed that there can be a successful use of the concept of alienation within a psychology which has not reformulated its conception of the subject. For an extensive discussion of these problems, see Russell Jacoby, "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism," Telos 14, (1972) and Critique of Conformist Psychology (forthcoming).
73. For examples see Frank Johnson, "Alienation: Concept, Term and Word," and Denise, op. cit., both in Johnson, op. cit.

74. Richard Schacht, Alienation, (Garden City: Anchor, 1971), pp. 25ff. The popularity of Schacht's analysis, which serves as the basis for much of the discussion of Hegel in Johnson, op. cit., especially pp. 29, 149-50, is somewhat extraordinary, given the brief discussion of Hegel which takes place and the availability of more extensive commentaries.

75. Walter Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation," in Schacht, op. cit., pp. xxix+xff, where we learn, among other things that Kant, that model of German sobriety, was in fact alienated. "...he did not care to leave his city and wander in the country. He was totally alienated from nature. And like Plato, he considered it not ultimately real": p. xxxii.

76. Denise, op. cit., p. 151.

77. Kaufman's anthropological data consist of Zorba the Greek, Train to Pakistan, and The Painted Bird: Kaufmann, "The Inevitability...", op. cit. p. xli.

78. Denise, op. cit., p. 142. Denise commits himself to considering only causal analysis as an explanatory mode by his failure to discuss theories of "internal relations" beyond the vacuous statement that it has "lost much of its plausibility in the philosophical wars that occurred some time back." For a serious study of the function of internal relations in Marx's theory of alienation, see Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Theory of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1971) especially Part I and the appendix.


80. Schacht, pp. 43-44.


82. Schacht, p. 112.

83. Schroyer, Alienation..., pp. 8-9, Critique..., p. 47.

84. Schroyer, Alienation, pp. 9ff, Critique, pp. 47-54.

85. Schroyer, Critique..., pp. 52-53.

86. Hegel uses "Entwirfung" in his Differenz zwischen dem Fichteschen und Schelling'schen System der Philosophie (1801), Werke II, to indicate a state of division which is to be remedied through the intervention of philosophy. See especially pp. 20-25.
87. Parallels to Husserl are discussed in Kojève, op. cit. and Dove, op. cit., p. 615, 621-622.

88. This view is in agreement with Istvan Mészáros' summary of the historical development of alienation up to Marx:

1) the formulation of general moral postulates (from Rousseau to Schiller), 2) the assertion of a necessary supersession of capitalist alienation accomplished speculatively..., maintaining an uncritical attitude towards the actual material foundation of society (Hegel), 3) the assertion of the historical supersession of capitalism by socialism expressed in the form of moral postulates intermingled with elements of a realistic critical assessment of the specific contradiction of the established social order (the Utopian Socialists), Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin, 1970), p. 61.

89. Hegel, Phenomenology section IV (A) 3. For the classic discussion of this section, see Kojève, op. cit., "In place of introduction." Also see Tran Duc Thao, "The Rational Kernel in the Hegelian Dialectic," Telos 6 (1970) and "The Phenomenology of Mind and its Real Content," Telos 8 (1971) Other helpful discussions include George Armstrong Kelley, "Notes on Hegel's Lordship and Bondage," in MacIntyre, op. cit. and Richard Bernstein, op. cit. pp. 25-29.


91. Kojève, op. cit., p. 36ff.

92. Part of my hesitation in calling these points "presuppositions" stems from the fact that Kojève's analysis of the first three chapters is extremely cursory, even in the complete French edition of his book. For a more complete discussion of these chapters see Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," op. cit.


94. Ibid., p. 84, trans. p. 151 where Hegel requests that consciousness attempt to write down what is experienced in sense-certainty. See also the note on language p. 85, trans. p. 152.


98. Kojève, p. 40, Findlay, p. 94.


100. Ibid., p. 150, trans. p. 254, Kojève p. 41.
101. Ibid., pp. 150-155, trans. pp. 234-240. Of particular relevance in this context is Mészáros' discussion of early uses of the German Verdinglichung (transformation into a thing - hence "reification") in translating passages from the Odyssey, "Fröhling, willst du dich wohl bei mir zum knechte verdingen" op. cit., p. 35. The status of the slave as an inhuman object is intimately connected with the Greek notions of public and private. Since the slave could not leave the household and appear in public space, he had no history and was thus inhuman. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: Anchor, 1959), sec. 5, 11. The possible classical origins of Hegel's discussion of slavery may serve to explain why, as Tran Duc Thao notes, Hegel is not concerned with slaves who are enslaved for other reasons than surrender in battle (Telos 6, p. 132). Arendt points out that in contrast to the slavery connected with the early phases of capitalist expansion and colonialism, Greek slaves were for the most part vanquished foes "of the same nationality as their masters; they had proved their slavish nature by not committing suicide..." p. 311. M.I. Finley, However, notes that there was a sharp increase in the purchasing of slaves from the barbarians after the 6th century, The Ancient Greeks (New York: Viking, 1964), p. 30, cf, pp. 53-54, 126-127.


103. The recognition that Hegel's logic is primarily a temporal logic has inspired some attempts at formalizing time series logics, see Michael Kosok, "A Formalization of Hegel's Logic," in MacIntyre, op. cit., and "The Dialectical Matrix" in Telos 5 (1970).


105. The awareness of limits, as we shall see in Lukács' discussion of Paul Ernst, is one of the hallmarks of the tragic vision.

106. Kojève, p. 29.


109. Hegel speaks of the Form which has been hinausgesetzt (literally: set-out; externalized). Bailie translates the term as "objectified." Hegel, Werke III p. 154, trans. p. 239.

110. Plato, Republic Book X. For a discussion of the significance of the analogy, see Arendt, The Human Condition, Ch. IV. It should be noted that Arendt's discussion suffers from a failure to distinguish reification (Verdinglichung) from objectification (Vergegenständlichung) (for a discussion see note 163 below). Arendt translates both terms indifferently as reification. Also, she translates Marx's "Erzeugung einer gegenständlichen Welt" as erection of an objective world of things" - the "of things" in this
in this translation is obviously deceptive. See p. 89. For a more complete
critique of Arendt, which nevertheless is a sympathetic development of many
of her points, see John O'Neill, Sociology as a Skin Trade, (New York:

111. The titles of section (BB) of the Phenomenology consist of a state-
ment about the status of Geist followed by an indication of the topic which
will illustrate this state. Hence under the general "VI. Der Geist" we find,
"A Der Wahre Geist. Die Sittlichkeit.," "B. Der sich entfremdete Geist. Die
Bildung" and "C. Der seinerselbst gewisse Geist. Die Morallität."

112. Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, p. 72.


114. The Phenomenology was originally announced as the first part of Hegel's
system of science. See the reproduction of the 1807 title page in Werke III,
p. 9, and Hegel's announcement in the Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of
Oct. 28, 1807 in ibid., p. 593. This system was never completed and was
superseded by the 1817 Encyclopedia.

115. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 5.

116. Ibid. pp. 3-4. Simmel later responded enthusiastically to Husserl's
critique of psychologicist reductionism in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."
See Simmel's 1911 letter to Husserl, in Gassen and Landmann, pp. 87-88.

117. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 4.

118. Ibid., pp. 6-7. Seele is a difficult term to translate (I will employ
both psyche and soul), and must be distinguished from the Hegelian Geist.
Weingartner argues that Simmel's use of the term is based on his desire to
avoid a subject which is merely cognitive, and rather wants to portray the
"entire individual" who is "involved in each of his acts..." op. cit., pp.
46-47.

119. See Simmel, "Von Wesen der Kultur," (1908) in Brücke und Tür, op. cit.,
p. 86, trans. by Donald N. Levine as "subjective Culture" in Simmel, On
Individuality and Social Forms p. 227, where he argues that all sequences
of human creativity could be viewed as "nature." Simmel was clearly ambivalent
to the stricter separations of Natur and Geisteswissenschaften proposed by
Dilthey and in a different form by Windelband and Rickert.

120. Ibid., p. 87, trans. p. 228.

121. Lukacs, Werke II, p. 174, HCC p. 24. He later modified this position
through an argument that human praxis linked both realms. See the 1967 pre-
face to Werke II, pp. 18+19, HCC pp. xvi-xvii. This alteration is probably
sincere rather than tactical, since there are a number of places in the 1844
Manuscripts where Marx discusses the social nature of "nature."
122. Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes*, p. 9, for a specific discussion of Erleben, see "Die Historische Formung, in Fragmenta und Aufsätze*, pp. 149-150.

123. Simmel, *"Historische Formung,"* p. 150.


125. Simmel, *"Der Begriff und Tragödie der Kultur,"* in *Philosophische Kultur* (Leipzig: Klinkhart, 1911), p. 245 (note: this essay and *Der Konflikt in der moderne Kultur* are both more readily available in Simmel, *Das Individuelle Gesetz*, op. cit., translated by K. Peter Etzkorn, in *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Teacher's College Press, 1968), p. 27. (Note: in general Etzkorn's translation is unreliable and I will frequently be forced to retranslate passages.)


128. This interpretation differs from that of Weingartner, op. cit., p. 43-45, who argues that desires in Simmel are socially formed. While there is certainly a social formation and influence present, the point I am arguing is that Simmel's concept of the subject seems to be based on the idea that the subject can form value categories in isolation from other subjects. This plays down the more social orientation of Hegel's subject which I think can be shown to be a more sensible approach to the question of the learning of values, although it is admittedly cast in a mystifying, if not mystified, form.

129. Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes*, p. 12, note the similarity to the quotation from the *Selektionslehre* cited in Ch. 1, footnote 15.

130. Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes* p. 13. This same formulation is used later in this text in Simmel's pragmatic definition of truth, which states that essential human practices are "fundamentally not essential because they are true, but rather the opposite: we equip each representation, which has a real power for us or which brings about a profitable state of affairs with the honorable name of truth," p. 70. Simmel viewed authentic pragmatism as a form of Lebensphilosophie insisting that the term should not be restricted to the "American" usage, *Der Konflikt in die Moderne Kultur*, (1918), (München: Duncker and Humblot, 1921), p. 18, trans. in *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays*, p. 19. Weingartner seems to be unaware of this claim in his discussion of Simmel's antipathy to pragmatism, op. cit., p. 186.


137. For a discussion of Simmel's views on philosophy, see Weingartner, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3.


140. For Simmel's complex arguments against relativism see *Philosophie des Geldes*, pp. 65-68. The arguments are ably summarized by Mamelet, *op. cit.* Ch. IV. For an enthusiastic review of the *Philosophie des Geldes* as the first great work of the "new relativism" see Paul Ernst, "Philosophie des Geldes" in *his Politische Studien und Kritiken* (Paul-Ernst-Gesellschaft, Jahrbuch 1938). Ernst was, as we shall see, of great importance to Lukács also.


143. Simmel, "Begriff und Tragodie..." p. 256, trans. p. 34, slightly modified.


145. Simmel, "Begriff und Tragodie..." p. 247, trans. p. 230. Cf. "Von Wesen der Kultur" p. 89, trans. p. 230 which states "...culture exists only if man draws into his development something that is external to him. Cultivation is certainly a state of the soul, but one that is reached only by means of the use of purposely created objects (Objekte)."


147. For Simmel's discussion of Cartesian rationality see Ibid., pp. 499-500. For an excellent summary and discussion of theories of rationalization see Kosík, *op. cit.* pp. 95-104.


159. Weingartner, "Form and Content in Simmel's Philosophy of Life," op. cit., pp. 37-38 notes a parallel between elements of Simmel's thought and Husserl's concepts of noesis and noema. The distinction developed in Weingartner's context seems equally valid here. Husserl distinguishes between the content of consciousness or the intentional object of consciousness (noema) and the manner in which this object is intended (noesis). Hence one may speak of noetic acts of "feal" "remembrance" "clear intuition" etc. and their connection with noematic objects such as "dogs" "mountains" "an idea." For a good brief discussion see Dagfin Følesdall, "Husserl's Notion of Noema," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXVI: 20(1969), p. 680ff.


163. These conventions are derived from Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *New Left Review* #35(1966), with some modifications. My use of the term "externalization" in translating Entäusserung seems to be close to their sense of "objectivation": "the process whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products that are available to oneself and one's fellow men as elements of a common world" and "objectification": "the moment in the process of objectivation in which man
establishes distance from his producing and its product, such that he can take cognizance of it and make of it an object of his consciousness. I am not convinced that there is a great deal to be gained by this level of distinction, and it does not appear to have been demonstrated that these terms carry any precise meanings in the works of Marx, Simmel and Lukács. However it is useful to have the term "objectivation" as a means of translating "Objektivierung" in a way which is distinguishable from "objectification" (Vergegenständlichung). Alienation (Entfremdung) will be used to denote "the process by which the unity of producing and the product is broken" while reification (Verdinglichung) will indicate "objectivation in an alienated mode" or "the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing-ness becomes the standard of objective reality." p. 61. Simmel does not use the term Verdinglichung but rather employs differing variations of the other term for "thing," Sache. I will render these as "reification" except when the context would prohibit such a practice. In any case, all translations as "reification" other than Verdinglichung and its variants will be followed by the German term in parenthesis.


165. Simmel, Begriff und Tragödie, pp. 267, 270, 272, trans. pp. 41, 42, 43.

166. Ibid., p. 277, trans. p. 46.


172. Simmel, "Begriff und Tragödie" p. 273, trans. p. 44.


175. For a discussion of the relationship between the Phenomenology and the Logic, see Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, Ch. 9.
Chapter 3


3. Theordore Abel, Systematic Sociology in Germany (1929), (New York: Octagon, 1965) pp. 43, 46-47. The portion quoted is also grammatically obscure in the original and the ellipses at the start delete nothing that would clarify the sentence structure.

4. Theodore Abel, The Foundations of Sociological Theory (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 95. For the purposes of this analysis I find the arguments of the earlier book more useful. However, it should be noted that apparently Abel no longer holds the earlier position. In his contribution to the American Sociological Review Simmel-Kurkheim memorial issue, 24:4(1959) Abel downplays his earlier negative critique of Simmel's philosophical apriorism and argues that in fact Simmel never employs formal analysis but rather is closer to what would today be called structural functionalism (pp. 476-477). In his rejoinder, Robert Nisbet employs the earlier work of Abel as a critique of the later argument (pp. 479-480).


7. Kosik, op. cit. p. 89,

8. This is the convention employed in Wolff's translation. For its antecedents and some problems in rendering the term see his discussion in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, pp. lxxiii-lxiv.

9. The methodological introductions to Soziologie have been translated by Kurt H. Wolff as "The Problem of Sociology," and How is Society Possible?" in Wolff, ed. George Simmel, op. cit., pp. 310ff and 337ff respectively. The Grundfragen has been translated by Kurt H. Wolff as the first section of Wolff ed., The Sociology of Georg Simmel, op. cit., i.e. as the intro-
duction to a text which consists for the most part of translations of portions of Soziologie.


11. Windelband. op. cit., p. 9. It should be noted that Windelband and Rickert stress that they are engaging in a logical reconstruction of an already evolved practice rather than using logical norms as a means of "reforming" science. Ibid., pp. 5-6, Rickert, p. 4, fn., trans. p. 146.

12. Windelband, p. 11.

13. For a sampling of reactions to the speech see H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 46-47, the quote in the text is from Meinecke. This reaction as well as much of the approach to neo-Idealism by Hughes (pp. 183-200) and Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 476ff. obscures the specific argument which Windelband is making by too quickly merging it with Dilthey's early formulations of a distinction between natural and cultural sciences. The stress in Windelband was on a logical reconstruction of a practice of the times. He states, "The knowledge of general laws has, above all, the practical value of making possible foresight into future conditions and the regular intervention of men into the course of things. This is valid for alterations of the inner world [i.e. psychology], as well as for the material outer world... Of no less importance, however, is the purposeful activity of pointing out the experience of historical knowledge for the general life of man. Man is, to vary an old phrase, the animal who has history. His cultural life is a historical complex condensing itself from generation to generation: whoever wishes to enter into this living co-operative enterprise must have an understanding of its evolution" op. cit., p. 19.

14. Simmel, Soziologie, p. 10, trans. p. 321. In fairness to Rickert, it should be noted that he never stressed that any one science necessarily had to be exclusively particularizing or exclusively generalizing and instead came to speak of both as tendencies within any given science. Cf. Rickert, preface to 6th and 7th German editions, trans. in Science and History, p.xxi.


17. Ibid., pp. 9-10,


19. Nor could the possibility of an eventual totalization of all reality be seen as a way out of this limitation by Simmel. In the Philosophie des Geldes he notes that all truths have meaning only in relation to other truths and that "The totality of knowledge is as little "true" as the entirety of matter is heavy. Only in the relation of each part to each other is a quality evaluated; this one cannot say of the totality without contradiction.", p. 68.


23. Durkheim, op. cit., p. 46, final emphasis is mine.

24. Simmel, Grundfragen, p. 6, trans., p. 4.


29. Emil Lask, Lukács' teacher and friend at Heidelberg, insisted that neither form nor content could be separated from the moment of concretization when form and content were both purged of their irrationality through an action of a form on a content which already had been formed as the result of previous concretizing operations, See his Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre, Gesammelte Schriften, II, op. cit. Also, for a summary, see Lukács' own eulogy, "Emil Lask: Ein Nachruf," Kantstudien XXII:4 (1918), p. 349ff.

30. Wolff's helpful subdivisions clarify much of the text, although I feel they do raise problems for the interpretation I will advance if the reader is not aware of the fact that they are not in the German original and that at the point in question -- when Simmel begins his discussion of General Sociology -- the break in the text is not as clear as Wolff's divisions would make it appear. My major argument is with the separation of the section "Sociology as a Method" (trans. pp. 13-16) from the discussion which is termed General Sociology and immediately follows p.16. In the
German, the sentence which begins Wolff's discussion is buried in the midst of a long paragraph (German pp. 16ff) which does end at the point of Wolff's next break (German, p. 20), but which "ends" a bit ambiguously: a dash follows the concluding sentence, perhaps indicating that the reader is to consider what follows as something which is still connected with the paragraph just completed. In any case, the break is not in the original and hence my insistence that general sociology and sociology as a method are one and the same conflicts with no distinction in Simmel's text.

32. Ibid., p. 27, trans. p. 22. my translation.
34. Simmel, Soziologie, p. 13, trans. p. 325.
37. Ibid., both references.
39. Ibid.
40. What has not been shown thus far is that formal sociology is not reducible to general sociology (this seems to be Abel's later position). This view will be refuted below.

41. Simmel, Soziologie, pp. 20-21, trans. pp. 333-335, Grundfragen, pp. 31-32, trans. p. 25. It is difficult to determine exactly where the "sociological metaphysics" begins and the "metaphysics of life" ends. Hence it is difficult to determine into which category we would put Simmel's discussion in the Philosophie des Geldes and in the later cultural criticisms of the problematic relationships between subjective and objective culture.

42. This would seem to be precisely the type of operation which was called for by Sheldon Wolin as a means of avoiding an application of one method to all reality, indiscriminate of content. "Method is not a thing for all worlds. It presupposes a Kantian type of question, What must the world be like for the methodist's knowledge to be possible?" "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review, LXIII:4 (1969), p. 1064.

44. John O'Neill, "On Simmel's Sociological Apriorities" in George Psathas ed. *Phenomenological Sociology* (New York: John Wiley, 1973) further removes the transcendental tendency in the argument by showing how each may be viewed as "an everyday practical accomplishment which continuously resolves its own contingencies in ways that do not invite existential absurdities" (p. 93) and employs works by Mead, Goffman, and Schutz to support his discussion.


47. This presumes that science has a notion of truth beyond simple technical utility. This is a point which, as Karel Kosík has indicated ("The Crisis of Socialism," *Telos* 13 (1972), is in need of defense at a time when on a social level the institutions of both are becoming inseparable and indistinguishable. See also the discussion of Kosík's teacher Jan Patocka, "The Principles of Scientific Conscience, *Telos* 18 (1973-74) which in turn ultimately rests on arguments of Husserl's *Crisis*.


49. O'Neill, "On Simmel's Sociological Apriorities," *op. cit.*. I am not entirely satisfied with the last name given, for reasons which will be indicated below.


58. Simmel, "Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehen" (1918), in *Brücke und Tür*, op. cit., pp. 61-65.

59. Kosík, pp. 94-95. These remarks need to be expanded into a critique of certain excesses of phenomenological sociology in the direction of an idealist reduction of all interaction to meaning-bestowal. As I have indicated elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty's notion of "institution" as it has been developed by John O'Neill might be helpful in finding a reorientation. See James Schmidt, Review of John O'Neill Sociology as a Skin Trade, *Telos* 14 (1972).

60. O'Neill makes a brief mention of a tension between society as a "deterministic environment or force (milieu) and as our very element or beneficial shell (ambiance)," but then appears to argue that the possibly real historical tension between the two can be resolved on the level of everyday intersubjectivity. See O'Neill, op. cit., pp. 101-102.


63. To be sure, this operation results in a rather abstract analysis of society. See the critique of Vierkandt's similar efforts in Frankfurt Institute, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 26-27, 52-53 and 65-67.


65. In his *Logos* paper which as has been indicated above, Simmel read with interest after the publication of *Soziologie*, Husserl argues for the necessity of an essential analysis of phenomena as opposed to an analysis of their being. A more precise discussion of the process of eidetic variation may be found in section 70 of *Ideen I* (trans. *Ideas*), all editions. This is, of course, not a claim of direct influence since the notion has a long history in German thought, going back at least to Goethe's analysis of plant types (interestingly enough, Lukács uses Goethe's example in a discussion of the method of determining literary genres which could just as easily have been credited to Simmel.


67. The use of the term synchronic as employed in linguistics to denote relations between static and structurally connected aspects of a language (e.g., grammar at a given period of the language's development) is less of an importing of a foreign — and unfortunately overly fashionable — term into social theory than it may at first appear. Simmel was fond of likening "formal sociology" to linguistics, and Kurt H. Wolff has found synchronic and diachronic useful tools in translating Simmel's frequent comparisons of Nebeneinander (next-to-each-other) and Nacheinander (following-one-another); see his translation of Soziologie p. 27, trans. p. 349. For an introduction of the concepts as employed in the early years of structural linguistics, see Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1915), trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, reprint, 1966), pp. 101-102, 91-100, 7-11.

68. The synthetic part of the book reverses the process and looks at how life is influenced by money, ef. Philosophie des Geldes, p. v.


70. Ibid., p. 51, trans. p. 43.

71. Ibid., p. 65, trans. pp. 54-56.

72. Expansions on such simple formal relationships might also be possible in conjunction with small group research. Cf. J.L. Moreno, ed. The Sociometry Reader (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).

73. What follows is a general description of Soziologie Ch. III, trans. Sociology of Georg Simmel, part III, and the role which the particular section on subordination under an objective principle plays within the section as a whole.


75. Ibid., pp. 148-149, trans. p. 252.

76. Ibid., pp. 149-150, trans. pp. 253-254.

77. Ibid., p. 149, trans. p. 253.

78. Ibid., p. 150, trans. p. 254.
79. Ibid., p. 151, trans. p. 255.


82. Ibid., pp. 480-482.

83. Ibid., pp. 497-489. The general style of the post-Cartesian world's appropriation of reality through mathematical abstraction would be one example (pp. 499-500).

84. Ibid., p. 514.

85. Ibid., p. 512, 526-527.


87. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 514.


92. Lukács, "Mein Weg zur Marx," op. cit., pp. 324-325. Here he claims familiarity with only the Philosophie des Geldes, however he does use an example from the section of the Soziologie on subordination in the text p. 673. (the example is from Soziologie, pp. 147-48, trans. p. 251).


95. Ibid., p. 675.

96. Ibid., p. 304.


101. For an analysis of the significance of the non-appearance of the revolutionary subject and the Frankfurt School's development of the theme, see Russell Jacoby, "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism," *op. cit.*. Lukács discusses the negativity of modern drama in "Zur Soziologie..." p. 308.

102. *Ibid.*, pp. 309-310. This represents an early formulation of his later argument that the bourgeois consciousness was fundamentally contemplative.


117. *Ibid.*, p. 665-666. Lukács uses Simmel's "Versachlichung" rather than his own later "Verdinglichung." It should also be noted that like *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács here argues that the methods of the natural sciences reify the world in much the same manner as the processes of capitalist production.


Chapter 4

1. The "whole story" is a staggering task, which will hopefully be performed in the forthcoming book by Breines and Arato. At this point it seems hopeless to attempt a biographical study of Lukács without knowledge of the early Hungarian writings. Aside from the work of Arato, Zitta, and Mészáros, the only other major study of Lukács' work making use of these writings is Arpád Andrew Kadarkay, Georg Lukács: An Intellectual Portrait (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara), but this study, in attempting to cover Lukács' complete career, can give only limited attention to the early period. Another helpful study, which is devoted exclusively to the neo-Kantian origins of many of the concepts of History and Class Consciousness is Thomas R. Hanson, The Early Works of Georg Lukács: Sources and Criticism, op. cit. This work suffers from a lack of familiarity with Simmel's work as well as a tendency to see Lukács' early work as completely uninfluenced by Marxist concepts. Ehrhard Bahr, Georg Lukács (Berlin: Colloquium Verlang, 1970) adds little that is not available in any of the English language studies.


3. Cf. Lucien Goldmann, The Hidden God, op. cit., which develops the concept of the "Tragic Vision" which is found in the Ernst essay of Die Seele und die Formen.

4. The description is attributed to Lukács by Mészáros, "Lukács' Concept of Dialectic", in Parkinson, op. cit., p. 57.


6. This obituary has not been analyzed extensively, though Breines discusses it briefly in "Introduction to Georg Lukács' 'Old Culture and the New Culture,'" Telos 5 (1970), p. 8 noting that Ernst Bloch was a "fellow agitator" in Simmel's seminar along with Lukács and had a similar admiration for some aspects of Simmel's work. The obituary appeared in Pester Lloyd on Oct. 2, 1918, all citations will be to the reprinting in Gassen and Landmann, op. cit., p. 171-176.

7. Ibid., p. 171.

8. Ibid., p. 173.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 175.


15. See the essay on Theodore Storm in Lukács Die Seele und die Formen, op. cit., especially the attack on the formalism of bourgeois ethics, p. 84, and the critique of Storm's romanticization of "everydayness," pp. 98ff. Also of importance for later works is the Roman - Novelle distinction (p. 108) which forshadows the discussion of extensive and intensive totality in Theory of the Novel.

16. See the Novalis essay in Ibid., especially pp. 80-81 for a very ambiguous evaluation of Novalis' work based on an argument that while Novalis is the most complete expression of the Romantic yearning for a new life, this was only possible because he desired only a "beautiful death" and hence his achievement was a "death-verdict" on the entire school.

17. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

18. Ibid., pp. 44-45. Cf. p. 50 for a very Hegelian critique of Kierkegaard which raises the problem of whether Kierkegaard's decision to see life "without compromise" is not itself a compromise.

19. Ibid., p. 121, cf. p. 120.

20. Ibid., pp. 150-151.


22. Lukács, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 213.

23. Ibid., p. 39.

24. It is impossible to do justice to Lukács' argument here, cf. Goldmann, The Hidden God, Ch. II - IV.


26. Georg von Lukács, "On Poverty of Spirit," in Philosophical Forum III (1972), p. 374. Cf. the essay on Richard Beer-Hoffman in Die Seele und die Formen, p. 163, where a distinction is made between simple misunderstanding - i.e. the absence of understanding and the tragedy associated with the fact that "there is never any strength in understanding" even when it is functioning properly.
27. Ibid., p. 373, on the role of the Hidden God as a check on nihilism. See Goldmann, The Hidden God, pp. 57-61.


29. Lukács, Theorie des Romans, Ch. 1.

30. Ibid., p. 32 trans. p. 38, Bálázs' diary records the following observation from Lukács in the same period, "...Art is luciferous. It makes a better world than God, it creates anticipatory perfection, harmony before salvation," Bela Bálázs, "Notes from a Diary" New Hungarian Quarterly XIII:47 (1972), p. 127.


35. Ibid., pp. 72-73, trans. p. 74.


41. Ibid., pp. 136-137, trans. p. 133-134.

42. Ibid., pp. 146-147, trans. pp. 142-143.

43. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', trans. Annette Jolin, and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), Lukács had read the portions of this work in Marx, Nachlass I, by the time of his writings of History and Class Consciousness. Here I am only suggesting that
the logical inadequacies of the Hegelian argument had been perceived several years before this date.

44. Lukács Werke II. pp. 38-39, trans. p. xxxvi discusses the impact of the manuscripts on Lukács. A full discussion of their importance would require an examination of Lukács' later arguments in Ontologie: Arbeit (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1973) and Ontologie: Marx (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1972). I will make a brief sketch of the problems which the manuscripts raise in the conclusion, but will delay commentary on the Ontology for a later work.

45. All of the chapters of History and Class Consciousness are claimed to have been previously written except for the reification chapter and "Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization." However, some of the rewriting--especially in the opening chapter--is so extensive that there is little resemblance between the final and original forms.


47. I will not attempt to connect the gradual shift in his notion of the concrete totality with the alterations in his conception of the party, although this does seem to be a promising and challenging issue.


50. Kettler includes valuable information based on communications with Ilona Duznska, one of the defendants and her husband, Karl Polanyi and makes an interesting contrast to Tökés' summary. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

51. Kettler, pp. 50-54.

52. Ibid., pp. 54-58, Kettler states that there were weekly meetings at the home of Bela Bárázs, a writer who was one of Lukács' closest friends. Clearly Lukács could not have attended all of these meetings, since he lived in Heidelberg for a time in 1916 and again in 1917 before his final return at the end of 1917.

53. Ibid., p. 59. Ludz calls this group the "Freie Schule für die Geisteswissenschaften" in "Bibliographische daten," in Lukács, Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik, op. cit., p. 710, but this group should not be with the earlier free school of the Social Scientific Society.


57. Ibid., p. 69, Mannheim attempted to keep the group together during the republic without Lukács.

58. Tükés, Ch. 7, Kettler, pp. 71-73.

59. Both of these "weaknesses" may have been unavoidable. As Kettler argues, it is probably only in hindsight that the revolution appears doomed, since at the time there was a general expectation, even within segments of the bourgeois press, that the supportive European revolution was imminent.


61. Ibid., p. 67, PW, p. 25.

62. The reading of Raposchin's book must have helped Lukács in reformulating the problem which he had previously raised in "On Poverty of Spirit," op. cit., p. 378, "One wants to save another and behaves badly, fiercely, tyrannically, and every act might be a sin. But in such a case even sin itself is no antithesis to Goodness, it is neither more nor less than a necessary dissonance in the harmony." For previous discussions of Raposchin, see Lukács, Review of the Th. G. Masaryk, Zur russischen Geschichts und Religionsphilosophie Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik XXXVIII (1914), p. 873 which discusses the question in terms of its being the fundamental issue of a moral system which unlike Tolstoy's "ethical Maximalism" is concerned with the "concrete individual." Also see his letter to Paul Ernst of April 14, 1915, New Hungarian Quarterly Vol. XIII: 47(1972), p. 90, which notes that he is now "primarily interested in the moral problem of terrorism" and is interested in getting a collection of memoirs of terrorists published since, "I feel that a new type of man has appeared whom we must get to know..." Cf. ibid., p. 91, for another letter on Raposchin, and p. 94 (May 4, 1915) where the quote from Hebel's Judith which is employed in Tactics and Ethics is cited. Lukács had met Ljena Grabenko,
a former Russian revolutionary activist who eventually became his wife, in 1913 and in the April 14, 1915 letter he notes that she had read him portions of the works of the terrorists in Russian.

63. Lukács, Werke II, p. 52, PW, p. 11.

64. Ibid., p. 49, PW, pp. 6-7.


67. Volume 15 of the Werke was announced as being Lukács' "Ethic" but it is not clear if there is any material remaining in the Nachlass which will be published dealing with this problem.


69. See Breines, "Introduction to Georg Lukács...," op. cit., pp. 1-2, for a discussion of the journal.


73. Lukács, Werke II, p. 163, HCC p. xli.

74. Ibid., p. 168, HCC p. xlvii.

75. A critically important third step, which cannot be attempted here, would be to see how the theoretical insights of History and Class Consciousness were employed in Lukács' political practice in the period leading up to the Blum Theses. This would serve to clarify still further what significance they have for actual analyses.

76. Kosík, op. cit., p. 45. There is a not always reliable English translation of the Italian translation of the Czech original of this chapter in Telos 4 (1969), pp. 35ff. A general discussion of dialectical logic and its historical development which makes great use of Kosík may be found in Paul Piccone, "Dialectical Logic Today," Telos 1:2(1968), pp. 38ff., especially pp. 57-59. I disagree with Piccone's analysis of the conception of totality presented here but developed more fully in his "Dialectic and Materialism in Lukács," especially pp. 126-127 -- both of which distort
Lukács's failure to make a clear distinction between positivist and romantic totalities into a complete failure in making such a distinction. For a similar typology see Bertell Ollman, "Marxism and Political Science," Politics and Society 3(1973), pp. 495-496, although Ollman argues that Hegel can be placed in with the formalists. Ollman has acknowledged the influence of Kosík in his formulations (conversation Dec. 1, 1973). Much of what follows is indebted to his reformulation and thus may not be entirely faithful to Kosík's own argument.

77. Whether this is a methodological distinction between an empirical and an epistemological subject as in Jean Piaget, Structuralism, trans. Chananah Maschler (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 68-69, whether the predominant structures take on a real historical role, as they appear to do in Michel Foucault's recent work is a point which cannot be developed here.

78. Ollman, "Marxism and Political Science," p. 496.

79. Lukács, Werke II, p. 221 HCC pp. 48-49, the last phrase, "vernünftig-begriffen" is rich in Hegelian associations, since Hegel views the goal of the Phenomenology as a demonstration that Reason (Vernunft) and the history which is understood in the progress of the Begriff (Concept) can be equated. For a related criticism of bourgeois historians cf. ibid., pp. 336-337, HCC pp. 153-154.

80. Ibid., p. 238, HCC p. 63.

81. Ibid., pp. 63-64, PW, pp. 21-22.

82. Ibid., p. 65, PW pp. 22-23.

83. Ibid., pp. 65-66, PW p. 23.


85. Lukács, Werke II, pp. 210-211, HCC p. 38.

86. He is critical of this error in the 1967 Preface: ibid., p. 36, HCC p. xxxiii.

87. Ibid., pp. 179-180, HCC p. 8. I have made minor modifications.


89. Cf. Ibid., pp. 326-327, HCC pp. 144-145 where Lukács describes the process by which Hegel constructs a concrete totality by constantly confronting a conceptual system with new unique events which must be assimilated.

90. Ibid., pp. 181-182, HCC pp. 10-11.
91. Lukács in quoting Marx's Contributions to a Critique of Political Economy, *ibid.*, p. 175, HCC p. 4.


94. Cf. Ollman, Alienation, Ch. 2 and 3, especially pp. 15-16, 18 and 253-254.


98. Werke II, p. 173, HCC p. 3.


100. The logic of this argument is somewhat similar to Karl-Otto Apel's discussion of the logic employed in an idealized psychoanalytic situation. See Karl-Otto Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (1965), trans. Harold Holstelilie (New York: Humanities, 1967), pp. 56-57. This is developed further by Jürgen Habermas into a general methodological ideal for critical analysis in his *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970) and *Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit.*, Part III. He employs one of his more recent developments of this argument in a critique of Lukács' theory of the party in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1973), pp. 31ff. It is not at all a convincing argument to reject Lukács' theory of mass-party mediations on the basis of an idealization of either clinical psychoanalytic practice or an ideal speech situation. Unless the argument is concretized by exploring what actual limits exist on the specific situation of discourse within revolutionary parties it seems impossible to judge the relevance of Habermas' arguments.


105. Ibid., pp. 323-324, HCC p. 142.

106. Ibid., p. 329, HCC p. 147.


108. This point has been developed in Ch. 2 above.


111. Simmel's discussion of the dyad makes use of actor-perspective descriptions such as "each of the two feels himself confronted not only by the other...", "'Triviality' connotes a ...consciousness that a content of life is repeated..." etc. Emphasis mine, these examples are drawn from Soziologie, pp. 58-61, trans. pp. 122-126.

112. Lukács' objections to "verstehende Soziologie" rest both on his distrust of the lack of rigor with which the concept of Einfühlung is formulated as well as his sense that a greater sensitivity to objective formal limitations is needed. See his "Zum Wesen und zur Methode der Kultursoziologie," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XXXIX (1915), pp. 216ff.


114. Ibid.

115. See the review of Lassalle's letters, Werke II, especially pp. 262-627, PW, pp. 162-163. This essay is significant in that Lukács makes his position on the concrete totality much clearer by arguing against a concept of the totality which is solely indebted to Hegel.

116. Ibid., pp. 269-270. HCC pp. 94-95. In this context see Arato's discussion of how Lukács attempted to employ the works of Simmel, Weber and Marx himself in the same manner that Marx used the works of Smith and Ricardo and Attempted a "critique of sociology: i.e., the critique of the totality of capitalist society and the self-critique of Marxism," Arato, "Notes on History and Class Consciousness," op. cit., p. 387.


119. Lukács, of course, does take a rather messianic position in parts of *History and Class Consciousness*. As he noted in a 1968 interview, neither he nor Korsch were able to overcome completely an economic determinist outlook. Lukács, "On His Life and Work," *op. cit.*, p. 51. (He feels Gramsci was most successful in freeing himself from these traces of the outlook of the Second International).


Chapter 5


2. Cf. Ibid., p. 363, HCC p. 178, where he argues that "the act of consciousness overthrows the objective form of the object."


5. Ibid., p. 25, HCC p. xxiii.


11. Ibid., p. 54. Nevertheless, Piccone's indication of Lukács' failure to examine shifts in the composition of the working class (Piccone, "Materialism and Dialectic." p. 115) is important.

12. A more complex way of posing the question, in view of the recent interest in Hegel's Jena Systems would be a comparison of the Marxian and Hegelian notions of labor.

13. The general similarity has been related to the fact that Hegel developed the notion of the dialectic in part through an examination of work in political economy. See Iring Fetscher, Marx and Marxism (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 51-52 for a summary of Lukács' argument to this effect in Der junge Hegel.


16. In addition to Marcuse, "Foundation..." especially pp. 7, 22, see Herbert


18. Marcuse, "Concept of Labor..." p. 21. This should help to clarify the argument which Arendt obscures through her failure to distinguish between reification and objectification in Marx, as was noted above.


22. The entire Ontology has not yet been published. Aside from the volumes noted above, see Georg Lukács, *Die ontologischen Grundlagen des menschlichen Denkens und Handelns* (Vienna: Hundsbüme Editone, 1970), a brief lecture which outlines his argument.


25. The problem is not covered on an adequate theoretical level in Martin Jay's helpful history of the school, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973). A preliminary discussion of the logical problems involved has been undertaken from a standpoint closely linked to the recent tendencies within the school by Thomas A. McCarthy, "On the problems of Truth and Objectivity in the Early Writings of Max Horkheimer" (mimeo, Department of Philosophy, Boston University), which argues that Habermas' recent work in communicative competence can provide an alternative to the problematic materialization of the Hegelian dialectic. This view however plays down the role of labor by subsuming it under "instrumental action" thereby reconstituting a Natur-Geist type of separation.


notion of "recollection" in Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon, 1972), pp. 69-74. This same tendency is a dominant motif in Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung.


31. Habermas, Theory and Practice, pp. 31-32.

32. Merleau-Ponty, Aventures de la dialectique, p. 305.

33. Ibid., p. 306.


35. Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, pp. 32, 40, 56.

36. Paul Diesing, Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971). For a discussion of what I have called the "formalist totality" see his "Implicit Ontology of Formalists," pp. 124ff. His presentation of the "holist" standpoint (pp. 286ff) captures the tendency already present in Simmel of hyperempiricism transforming itself into a non-theoretical reproduction of reality. For Simmel this takes the form of a postulation of the ineffability of life, for the case-study method, this takes the form of the ineffability (in theoretical language) of facts. See also his important typology of case-study, survey research-experimental methods, and formal methods on pp. 208-210.
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