ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

by

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B.S. in Applied Physics, Cornell University (1981)

Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

The Gorbachev era has witnessed an explosion of participation by social scientists in Soviet foreign policymaking. This study sets the context for the current changes by examining the role of social scientists in foreign policymaking in the Brezhnev era, the Andropov/Chernenko interregnum and the early years of the Gorbachev leadership. The dissertation explores two questions. First, did these social scientists and the institutes to which they belong have any real influence on foreign and national-security policymaking in the USSR? Second, what theoretical tools can one employ to understand better the participation of social scientists in Soviet foreign policy?

Social scientists in the Soviet Union operate in a highly structured environment. Virtually all of them work within the system of research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Many of these institutes exhibit key features of organizations that are the subject of Western organizational-theory literature — that is, they are large, hierarchically structured and functionally specialized. This study demonstrates that the Academy of Sciences’ institutes do in fact often behave as organizational theory would predict. For example, the Academy’s Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) has many times acted in a self-interested way to promote its particular organizational “mission.”

The study also concludes that it is necessary to distinguish among three different levels of analysis when examining the participation of social scientists in Soviet foreign policymaking: the organization as a whole, individuals within the organization and the organization’s external environment. The role played by individual social scientists — be they leaders or “policy entrepreneurs” within the institutes — is clearly tremendously important. Yet, the individual’s role can be both magnified and constrained by the internal (organizational) and external (environmental) settings within which the individual is operating. This interaction was particularly evident when IMEMO expanded into the area of national-security studies beginning in the mid-1980s.

On the question of influence, the study reaches two conclusions. First, social scientists at IMEMO (and elsewhere) have clearly been more
influential in shaping leadership perceptions on general matters of foreign policy (the image of the international system, views of US foreign policymaking and the nature of capitalism) than in developing concrete national-security policies (how much is enough for Soviet defense, and what are the proper means for verifying an arms-control accord, for example). While this distinction is important, it is not as clear-cut as would first seem. In fact, during both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras debates over national-security issues became intertwined with more general debates on foreign policy. Indeed, a central question related to Soviet national-security policy since the late 1960s has been whether a more cooperative approach to ensuring security is even possible with a capitalist (and, therefore, inherently aggressive) America. On issues of this type, institutions such as IMEMO had a wealth of organizational expertise and were able to exert clear influence on several aspects of Soviet policy. To put this another way: The revisionist, non-class views on the international system and the nature of capitalism held by many social scientists have mattered in the more specific debates over Soviet national security during the past 25 years.

Second, of the various possible "access channels" through which social scientists and their institutes could influence policy during the Brezhnev and early Gorbachev years, one particular channel -- personal ties to top policymakers -- has been crucially important. There is abundant evidence that IMEMO heads Inozemtsev, Yakovlev, and Primakov, as well as USA Institute director Arbatov, had the ear of certain top political leaders and their staffs. The dissertation traces how these institute leaders exploited this access by mobilizing their organizations to participate in certain key policy debates in the late 1960s and the mid-1980s. (In the late 1960s: Is a more cooperative relationship with the capitalist West possible? Is arms control a legitimate endeavor? In the 1980s: What is the nature of the international system? What is the proper correlation of class and non-class values in Soviet foreign policy? Is capitalism inherently aggressive?)

In sum, by examining the organizational context of social scientists' participation in foreign policymaking, this dissertation deepens our understanding of the role and influence of these scholars in Soviet policy over the past quarter century.

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Biographical Note

Jeffrey Checkel received his undergraduate education at Cornell University, where, in 1981, he earned a bachelor of science degree in applied physics. He is currently an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, where he holds a joint appointment in the University’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Professor Checkel teaches courses on Soviet foreign policy and international-relations theory.
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Chapter 1: Theory and Approach

The Gorbachev era has witnessed an explosion of participation by social scientists in Soviet foreign policymaking. This study sets the context for the current changes by examining the role of social scientists in foreign policymaking in the Brezhnev era, the Andropov/Chernenko interregnum and the early years of the Gorbachev leadership. I ask two questions. First, did these social scientists and the institutes to which they belong have any real influence on foreign and national-security policymaking in the USSR? If so, then on what kinds of issues and at what point(s) in the process were they influential players? Second, what methodological and theoretical tools can we employ to understand better the participation of social scientists in Soviet foreign policy?

Social scientists in the Soviet Union operate in a highly structured environment. Virtually all of them work within the system of research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Many of these institutes exhibit key features of organizations that are the subject of Western organizational-theory literature -- that is, they are large, hierarchically structured and functionally specialized. A basic goal of this work is to explore if these institutions also behave like organizations. Does, for example, a research organization such as the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) often act in a self-interested way to promote its particular organizational "mission"?

In thinking about the role of social scientists, one must distinguish among three different levels of analysis: the organization
as a whole, individuals within these organizations and the organization's external environment. A complete understanding of their role requires an explanatory framework that incorporates all three levels. In theory, one would clearly expect the role of individual social scientists -- be they leaders or "policy entrepreneurs" within organizations -- to matter. As will be argued below, however, the individual's role can be both magnified and constrained by the internal (organizational) and external (environmental) settings within which the individual is operating.

Before discussing my explanatory framework, it is necessary to address some more fundamental issues in the study of Soviet foreign policy.

**Thinking About Soviet Foreign Policy**

What explains major shifts in the orientation of Soviet foreign policy? Why did the Soviet Union seek a relaxation of international tensions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and again in the mid-1980s? A simple, neat, consensus answer has eluded Western policymakers and scholars. Of the various schools of thought on this issue, one stands out for its alluring simplicity and parsimony. This school -- best known as balance-of-power or realist -- explains these major shifts by pointing to important changes in relative military-strategic capabilities or economic potentials between the United States and the Soviet Union. In essence, this is the Reaganite argument for the dramatic shifts in Soviet foreign policy of recent years. "America is strong again." "Gorbachev realizes that the Soviet economy can't
compete or keep up with the West." "Bargaining from a position of strength has brought the Soviets to the negotiating table."

Arguments of this type, however, only tell one so much. Their implicit line of argumentation is: Gains in US military capabilities plus declining effectiveness of Soviet economy vis-a-vis the West equals policy outcome. For "policy outcome," fill in "detente" for the early 1970s and "new political thinking" for the mid-1980s. One can argue, however, that these explanations do not really address policy outcomes (or what might be called policy implementation). Rather, they reveal how a particular issue -- in this case, the question of major foreign-policy change -- reaches the public agenda in the Soviet Union.

Separating this point of agenda setting from policy implementation is a policy process that influences the outcome ("detente" or "new political thinking") in ways a realist perspective would not predict. In other words, to answer the question "why the shift?," one must also ask "how does the shift come about?"

The literature on change in Soviet foreign policy falls into two categories that are a reflection of attempts to answer these two very different questions. One viewpoint focuses on external determinants of policy change and is more concerned with asking "why the shift," while a second one focuses on internal determinants and is usually more concerned with exploring "how the shift came about." The former stresses balance-of-power considerations\(^1\) or changes in the international environment (system) as key sources of Soviet foreign-policy change.\(^2\) The latter emphasizes elite politics\(^3\) or a variety of socioeconomic forces.\(^4\)
The reality is that none of these explanations is entirely wrong. Common sense says that in any given case a number of factors are responsible for change in Soviet foreign policy. This dissertation focuses on the internal sources of policy change for the simple reason that such sources -- the domestic context of Soviet foreign policy -- have acquired increasing importance in shaping Soviet international behavior in the post-Stalin era.

In a somewhat paradoxical manner, the growing complexity of the external environment within which the USSR operates has enhanced the importance of several internal sources of policy change. To take just one example: To respond to the multiplying interdependencies of the international political setting, the Soviet leadership has found it necessary to turn to a growing array of Party, state and academic institutions for information and analysis. This was a process that began in the late 1950s, and slowly gathered force throughout the Brezhnev era.

I employ a policy-cycle framework to examine in a more systematic manner these internal sources of policy change. In its simplest form, the policy cycle consists of four stages: agenda setting, option formulation, decision selection, and implementation. Agenda setting, as traditionally defined, occurs when an issue is raised as a problem in need of attention. Option formulation involves debate and discussion about the problem, and the development of policy options for addressing it. Decision selection is the point when one particular policy option is chosen. Implementation involves turning the chosen option into practical policy.\(^5\)
This policy-cycle framework helps sort out the issue of internal versus external sources of change by suggesting that different factors — both internal and external — are dominant at different points in the cycle. Changes in the international balance of power, for example, may play an important role in getting an issue on the public agenda. At the option formulation stage of the policy cycle, however, balance-of-power considerations matter far less, this stage being dominated by organizational advocacy and conflict. In addition, the framework suggests that policies mature over time. In the Soviet context, the point is that changes in foreign policy are the product of more than elite battles within the Politburo or of changes in the international balance of power.

My chief concern is to use this framework to examine the role of social scientists in Soviet foreign policymaking. To ask whether these analysts have played some role in the foreign-policy process is to ask a rather easy question. Especially today, but even in the past, there is solid evidence of academic inputs on matters of foreign policy. A more challenging question to address is whether and how they have influenced policy. Moreover, how should one interpret the behavior of the institutions to which they belong. Have these research institutes been passive followers of leadership signals in the foreign-policy sphere, or active promoters of organizational interests on issues of foreign policy? Or some mixture of the two? The search for answers to these questions informs a key part of both the theoretical and empirical foundations of my dissertation.

I examine two cases of significant change in Soviet foreign policy:
the move toward East-West détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Gorbachev's "new political thinking" in the mid-1980s. The focus in the first case will be the issue of strategic nuclear arms control (the SALT process). The second study will examine the debate over several military and conceptual issues that have arisen during Gorbachev's attempt to redefine the basic parameters of Soviet foreign policy. In both cases, the behavior of key individuals and institutions is interpreted through the policy-cycle framework. The nature and timing of their participation in the process is examined, as is their ability to influence policy.

One particular organization, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, will be the prime focus. Long considered the premier foreign-policy "think tank" in the Soviet Union, IMEMO is also the only Academy institute specializing in international affairs and Soviet-American relations that existed throughout the years of both case studies. This fact allows for a longitudinal study of the Institute's behavior -- a study that should provide insights on the evolution of civilian participation in Soviet foreign and national-security policymaking.

**The Policy-Cycle Framework**

Students of Western politics have long recognized the legitimacy and utility of a policy-cycle approach for understanding the genesis and development of specific policies. The utility of such an approach for Soviet studies was first suggested 25 years ago. In the years since, several scholars have used it in case studies of Soviet domestic
politics,12 but virtually no studies of Soviet foreign policy have made use of the policy-cycle approach.13 Indeed, most analyses of non-crisis change in Soviet foreign policy (for example, the shift to the policy of detente in the late 1960s) assume that foreign-policy process is not an important factor.14 In such studies, the policy process commonly appears as a "black box."

Over the years, two reasons were adduced to justify this convention. Early on, when the totalitarian model of the Soviet polity predominated in Western scholarship, it was assumed that the nature of the Soviet political system minimized the effect of process. Policymaking was seen as the prerogative of one man -- Stalin -- or of a small group of individuals within the Politburo, and the system appeared to operate with minimal amounts of bureaucratic, cognitive and organizational "friction." Later, as the totalitarian model lost its explanatory power, Western analysts began to recognize the importance of process in Soviet politics. This recognition, however, was largely offset by what has come to be called the "data problem." The necessary insight into foreign-policy process was held to be unattainable due to the closed nature of Soviet political culture in general and of Soviet foreign policymaking in particular.

It is important to note that the extent of the "data problem" depends on how one conceptualizes the policy process occurring within the black box. If one assumes that it encompasses little more than Politburo meetings and Central Committee plenums,15 then, yes, there is a data problem. A broader view of the policy process, however, can both mitigate the data problem and shrink the black box.
As already noted, one can conceptualize non-crisis Soviet foreign-policy change as a sequence of four stages: agenda setting, option formulation, decision selection, and implementation. Two points are in order regarding this framework. For one, it is intended as a heuristic meant to organize a wealth of data in a systematic way. In addition, it views agenda-setting in broader terms than has traditionally been the case in studies of Soviet foreign policymaking. These previous studies defined agenda setting -- either explicitly or implicitly -- as the point when the political elites first publicly raise a new issue as meriting attention. This definition, however, is largely a by-product of one important fact: Most of these earlier studies dealt with Soviet foreign policymaking during crises. Given the crisis context, such a definition of agenda setting makes sense. A crisis erupts and the elites decide (or, more likely, are forced) to raise issues related to the crisis for discussion and decision.

This definition of agenda setting, however, is inadequate for the kind of policymaking -- non-crisis -- examined here. A broadened definition is needed to explore the possibility that what occurs before the elites publicly set the agenda can have an important effect on later points in the policy cycle. Was, for example, the idea of arms control in general, and strategic nuclear arms control in particular, being promoted by an organization such as IMEMO prior to the point in mid-1968 when the Soviet leadership first publicly raised the issue of superpower nuclear arms control? If so, how did this advocacy "play out" as the policy cycle moved from agenda setting to option formulation?

To capture such dynamics, this study defines agenda setting as
everything that occurs up to and including the point when the Soviet political leadership publicly raises a new issue as a problem in need of attention. Obviously, "everything" can mean many different things -- from unpublicized debates within the Politburo to bureaucratic battles between different government ministries to possible advocacy by institutions such as IMEMO. My focus will be on studying the behavior of organizations in the last category. Should we, for example, interpret this behavior solely as a reflection of internally-generated organizational dynamics, or, as Jerry Hough and others have claimed, as a response to hidden battles being waged at higher levels in the political system?18

The four-stage framework does not assume that policy is formed in a precise, rationalistic manner. Rather, the starting point is that policy formation is an iterative process. Raymond Bauer and others have termed this an "open system" perspective on policymaking.19 The "closed system" approach, in contrast, views an issue as having a clear-cut beginning and end, and is heavily influenced by rational-choice models of decisionmaking. Consistent with the "open system" perspective, a basic assumption of this study is that not all issues are placed on the public agenda at the same time. Indeed, entirely unforeseen issues may arise when one issue or set of issues reaches the implementation stage. As Charles Lindblom has put it, "from the seedbed of implementation, new policy problems grow and are plucked for the agenda."20 The policy cycle is in fact best viewed in terms of nested loops, where each loop consists of the stages noted above, and a feedback mechanism connects implementation to agenda setting.21
The Soviet Foreign-Policy Process

For the entire Brezhnev era and the early years of the Gorbachev leadership, it is useful to divide the individuals and institutions involved in Soviet foreign policymaking into two sets of participants: official and unofficial. The former are actors with a codified role in the process -- one that derives either from Party writ (the Politburo, for example) or constitutional sanction (the Ministry of Defense). The latter are actors that have no codified role in the policy process, but who do nonetheless often participate on an ad-hoc basis or through the exploitation of personal ties.

Official participants include members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Defense Council, the CPSU Central Committee (CC), the International Department of the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID); and the Ministry of Defense. Unofficial participants include the social sciences institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and, in particular, the focus of this study: the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEIO).

Many of the institutions listed above are full-fledged, hierarchically-structured organizations, and it is therefore important to explore the extent to which their behavior is a function of organizational politics. Do these organizations exhibit conservatism and incrementalism in decisionmaking? Do they have difficulty in addressing issues outside their core domains of expertise? Do they manifest an interest in protecting and promoting their basic sense of
organizational mission? A growing body of evidence suggests that various Soviet organizations do exhibit -- as organizational theory would predict -- some or all of these characteristics. A prime purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether organizations such as IMEMO also exhibit organizationally-inspired behavior, and, if so, how this affects the role they play in the foreign-policy process.

The task now at hand is to outline the policy-process framework in more detail -- suggesting how these various participants operate and interact at different points in the Soviet foreign-policy cycle. The focus will be the first two stages of the process: agenda setting and option formulation.

Agenda Setting

The Early Phase. Why look back in time before the agenda is publicly set? In a general sense, this "look back" is needed to set the overall context for the policy cycle. Issues placed on the public agenda -- that is, those publicly articulated -- are rarely new in any strict sense of the word. In the Soviet Union, as well as in more pluralistic democracies, issues have histories. Individuals or organizations often promote particular ideas before they reach the public agenda set by the political elites.

More specifically, this "look back" should be essential if one is to understand the response to a change in the public agenda of organizations involved in the foreign-policy process. Organizational theory suggests this response is likely to be both slow and self-interested -- slow because if the issue raised is outside the
organization's core areas of expertise, it will be incorporated into its existing goal structure only with difficulty; and self-interested because the organization may use the opening provided by the agenda change to promote issues that allow it to advance its own goals and missions. To understand either component -- slow or self-interested -- of the organizational response, one needs to know what the organization was doing prior to the change in the public agenda. What areas of expertise was it developing? What goals was it promoting?

This early part of the agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle thus captures what has been called the "context of decisionmaking,"\textsuperscript{32} and explores how this context takes shape. While there is no obvious, generalizable, time span for this early phase, the present study limits it to the four years prior to the point of public, elite agenda setting. This is sufficient time to define clearly various areas of organizational expertise and interest.

In one important sense, the early phase of agenda setting is different from all other points in the policy cycle: Issues have yet to acquire specific content. That is, the political implications -- questions of resource allocation and organizational prestige, for example -- of a particular policy change are not clear. While an issue may already be a "hot" topic of discussion, there should at this point be fewer "turf battles" among organizations than one would expect at later stages in the cycle, when concrete policy options are being formulated. Organizations are operating in an environment where no clear threats or opportunities (arising from the placement of a new issue on the public agenda) confront them. In other words, they have
more freedom, in comparison to later points in the process, to pursue their own goals. What, then, are these goals?

The organizational theory literature -- particularly those aspects that address organizational goals and decisionmaking, and the role of organizational leaders -- is helpful here. Organizational goals can be specified at two levels -- the general and specific. At the general level, the heads of organizations are motivated by self-interest to pursue what Downs calls a strategy of "aggrandizement."\textsuperscript{33} That is, they will seek to increase the influence and prestige of their organization. Thus, an organization such as IMEMO can be expected to have an inherent interest in seeking greater access to the policy process and enhanced prestige. To make this kind of argument in the Soviet context is to challenge a key assumption of several "post-Totalitarian" models of the Soviet polity: that organizations in the Soviet Union tend to be passive respondents of orders issued from on high, rather than active promoters of their own interests.\textsuperscript{34}

The general level only takes one so far. It suggests that an organization has an interest in self-promotion. More specifically, one needs to ask what goals an organization pursues in seeking to increase its importance, and how these evolve over time. The pioneering work of Cyert and March, which addresses the former, suggests that organizational goals emerge from a bargaining process among key members of the organization.\textsuperscript{35} One would expect these goals to be heavily influenced by the core domains of expertise and missions an organization has developed over time, and by its desire to protect and, if possible, promote these missions.\textsuperscript{36}
In the Soviet case, there are reasons to suspect that the goal diversity produced by this bargaining may be somewhat reduced, and organizational goals therefore more focused. A central element of both Russian (that is, pre-Soviet) and Soviet political culture is the notion of obedience to higher authority, to the vozhd' (the strong leader). The Soviet political system, with its stress on hierarchy and top-down decisionmaking, is clearly heavily influenced by this legacy. For Soviet organizations, one result of this may be less bargaining and conflict over goals, and therefore greater stability in the mix of goals pursued.

The above indicates that in the USSR leaders of organizations may play a much more dominant role than in the West in defining organizational goals and missions. Having said this, one must keep in mind that these leaders operate in a setting where traditions and bureaucratic structures constrain their ability to redefine existing organizational missions. In the extreme case -- where a single individual has headed the same organization for a number of years -- it may well be that he can effectively redefine basic organizational missions (for example, by changing structures and personnel).

When an individual has headed an organization for a more limited amount of time, however, it is more difficult for him to restructure dramatically its core missions. This suggests that, while a new leader can certainly reanimate an organization and motivate it to do a better job at what it has always done, it is quite another thing "to teach an old dog new tricks." That is, it is very difficult to motivate an organization to expand its core areas of expertise.
Organizational heads, however, also operate within an overall political environment external to the organization. Signals or incentives of the right type coming from this external setting can facilitate a new leader's task in overcoming the institutional inertia noted above.

In sum, it is neither a case simply of the leader being pushed along by the tide of organizational traditions, nor of the leader pulling the organization along behind him. The degree of pushing or pulling that occurs depends on the leader's length of tenure, how much his personal agenda differs from the organization's own sense of its basic mission(s), and the incentives emanating from the external environment.

Thus, it should be clear that the heads of organizations do not simply dictate new goals and missions to the organizations they lead. It is equally clear, however, that organizational goals do change with time. To understand this seeming paradox, one needs to examine how organizations -- taken as a whole -- process information and "decide." An extensive subset of literature within organizational theory addresses this issue, and indicates that the nature of organizational decisionmaking leads to incrementalism and conservatism in goal change. 38 This decisionmaking process is in no sense value-maximizing behavior; rather, it is what Herbert Simon and others have called "satisficing." 39 Confronted with a new issue, an organization does not systematically consider all possible options for solving it. Instead, the organization engages in "problemistic search." That is, it searches for solutions to the issue only by using that part of its skills and resources most directly related to the problem. 40 Moreover, in

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conducting this search, the organization will employ what Allison and others have called standard operating procedures (SOPs).\textsuperscript{41}

One needs to be more precise, however, in referring to "the issue" that confronts an organization. It is not the issue itself the organization addresses, but its perception of the issue. Information about it is processed in a biased way. Not only will the organization view the issue through the prism of its own ideology or mindset; in addition, the individuals studying the issue may well have their own biases, apart from those existing at the organizational level.\textsuperscript{42}

The foregoing suggests that the evolution of organizational goals during this early phase of agenda setting may not seem logical to an outside observer. Obvious new goals that would allow the organization to expand its domain may not be pursued. Clearly, the personal views of organizational leaders and the nature of organizational decisionmaking have a bearing on this lack of interest in pursuing new goals, or, to put it another way, this lack of desire to innovate. However, to fully explain this puzzle, one also needs to look outside the organization, at its environment. In an environment marked by an absence of major disturbances -- for example, the placement of a new issue on the public agenda -- the likelihood of innovation will decrease and organizational goal change will be incremental in nature.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, these goals will be heavily influenced by the organization's extant domains of expertise.

Before concluding this discussion of the early phase of agenda setting, one final issue needs to be addressed: the role of particular individuals -- aside from leaders -- in shaping organizational behavior. The ability of any one individual to change or modify basic
organizational missions is clearly highly constrained. In the first place, a process of selective recruitment usually insures that individuals with a "mindset" different from that of the dominant organizational ideology never join the organization. Moreover, once an individual has joined an organization, an array of bureaucratic obstacles and power relationships minimize his or her ability to affect its behavior in any significant way.

Having said this, it must be recognized that most organizations do contain one or more individuals who "rock the boat" and "cut against the grain" of the dominant organizational mindset. John Kingdon has called such individuals "policy entrepreneurs." Such "entrepreneurs" seek to promote particular ideas -- ideas that typically do not comfortably fit within the organization's self-defined sense of mission. Whether or not such individuals succeed in gaining acceptance of their ideas depends on several factors, including the individual's degree of expertise, his position within the organization, his negotiating skills, his personality (how persistent he is), and whether he has "connections" to higher ups in the organization or outside it.

Whether or not his entrepreneurial skills within the organization have the desired effect also depends crucially on the external environment in which the organization is operating. Two particular environmental factors are important: (1) are there problems in that external setting whose resolution would be assisted by the implementation of the entrepreneur's ideas; and (2) are there political leaders in power who recognize that such problems do indeed exist.

Public Agenda Setting. At this point, the focus of the policy-cycle
framework shifts, and the official participants in the Soviet foreign-policy process become dominant. The public agenda is set when an elite -- usually a Politburo member -- raises an issue through an article, speech or other public statement. At this point in the foreign-policy process, the elites play a powerful role, acting as "gatekeepers". The reality of Soviet politics in both the Stalin and post-Stalin eras (and through the early Gorbachev years) suggests their approval is a necessary condition for agenda change, change that opens the window for policy change.

The elites can exercise both positive and negative power at this critical point. In a positive sense, they can utilize their monopoly over the foreign-policy agenda to raise issues they feel are in need of attention. The elites, however, can also exercise negative power, that is, the power of "non-decisionmaking." They can manipulate the values, accepted rules of the game, and existing power relationships among groups to prevent incipient issues from becoming full-fledged ones.

Should one expect elite conflict at this stage in the policy cycle? Will the elites, in other words, already be clashing in a battle over power and, to a lesser extent, policy? While disagreements may indeed be present at this point, I would argue that a conflict scenario of this type best describes elite behavior at the option-formulation and decision-selection stages of the policy cycle. During public agenda setting, an issue has been raised in a general way. The concerns and interests of the elites are not engaged as they will be when the issue acquires concrete policy implications in later stages of the policy cycle.
An example from the Gorbachev period is helpful. A core conceptual element of Gorbachev's "new thinking" on international affairs is the notion that values common to all mankind (for example, peace and preservation of the world environment) should take precedence over class values (for example, the promotion of a world-wide working-class revolution). Gorbachev raised this idea to the official Soviet agenda in the fall of 1986. The initial response from Yegor Ligachev, the leading conservative on the Politburo, ranged from the noncommittal to the slightly positive. However, as the policy cycle progressed and this notion acquired more specific policy implications, Ligachev began to hint that he questioned its validity. The culmination of this process was an extraordinary public disagreement among Ligachev and several other Politburo members in August and September of 1988. The lesson here is not that elite politics do not matter, but that they matter most at certain points in the policy cycle.

Option Formulation

Once the elites have publicly set the agenda and the window for policy change has opened, the policy cycle enters the stage of option formulation. In the most basic sense, option formulation involves the development of policy options for the issue or issues the political leadership has placed on the public agenda. The development of policy options, in turn, requires a degree of expertise that the generalists sitting in the Politburo do not possess. Thus, there is an enhanced possibility for other actors -- both official and unofficial -- with such expertise to enter the process and attempt to influence policy.
Indeed, the number of organizations involved in the process will likely increase, as will the number of forums through which they articulate their views. These views should also become more specific as various organizations add their particular "spin" to the issue or issues under consideration.  

This last point is particularly important because it is an indicator of a key feature of the option-formulation stage of the process: that organizational interests are now fully engaged. There is now a publicly stated issue on which organizations can take a stand, defending ideas and organizational turf. Inter-organizational conflict should increase. E. E. Schattschneider's comment is apt here: "The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power."  

There are two key aspects of organizational behavior to consider at this point: the organization-environment interaction and the nature of organizational response to agenda change. Concerning the former, it is important to recognize that in comparison with the early phase of agenda setting, the organization is now operating in a turbulent environment, one where a new issue has been publicly raised. The organization may see it as a threat (to its core domains of expertise) or an opportunity (to expand its organizational domain).  

In both cases, the organization is motivated to respond by its basic interest in self-preservation and self-promotion. Organizational goals and missions will be defended and promoted. One would expect organizational advocacy to increase. The organization's environment has changed in a fundamental way, and this, in turn, should lead to important changes in organizational behavior.  

In addition -- and as
was argued earlier -- the newly-turbulent environment may make it easier for particular individuals within organizations (leaders or lower-level "policy entrepreneurs") to gain acceptance for new areas of research and ideas that fall outside an organization's core domains of expertise.

It is important to appreciate, however, that, in the Soviet Union, such organizational behavior does not occur in a vacuum. Especially during the Brezhnev years, the policy process operated in such a way that organizations -- be they official or unofficial actors -- would be expected to be quite sensitive to elite conflict and pressures. This sensitivity arose from a keen appreciation of the fate met by several organizational leaders who had spoken out during earlier periods of elite conflict, and who had subsequently been dismissed from their positions.57 In other words, the pure organizational -- or "bottom up" -- component to the behavior of organizations will be mitigated through an interaction with a "top down," elite component to the process. This interaction may at times produce lower levels of organizational advocacy in the USSR than one might ordinarily expect to see in a less authoritarian political system.

Despite the many changes, there are important continuities between organizational behavior at this and earlier points in the policy cycle. In particular, "satisficing" behavior and incrementalism should still be the hallmarks of organizational decisionmaking. The probability is high that organizational goals and missions will continue to change in an incremental fashion and be heavily influenced by the organization's particular areas of expertise.

One needs to keep in mind, however, that the "satisficing" and
conservative organization is now operating in an environment marked by uncertainty. An important theme in the organizational-theory literature is that such environmental uncertainty motivates organizations to innovate -- thus counteracting their normal conservatism.\textsuperscript{58}

So, which is it? Do organizations respond to agenda change by pursuing their own previously determined and incrementally changing goals and missions? Or, do they respond by aggressively innovating -- thereby modifying in a non-incremental way their basic organizational missions? The best way to address this seeming riddle is to divide the organizational response to agenda change into two components. In the near-term, an organization can be expected to respond in a way heavily influenced by its extant goals and domains of expertise. That is, the organization will address the new issue by attempting to incorporate it into its existing goal structure.\textsuperscript{59} For lack of a better term, one might call this phenomenon "linking behavior." The longer-term response will in all probability see the organization attempt to innovate and develop expertise on the new issue. Such domain expansion will allow the organization to better control the environmental uncertainty posed by the issue and to argue for additional resources to study it.\textsuperscript{60}

The foregoing analysis yields three insights on the behavior of an organization such as IMEMO during the option-formulation stage of the Soviet foreign-policy cycle. First and most generally, its pattern of behavior will in all likelihood grow more complex. Environmental turbulence, the possibility of open elite conflict, and enhanced opportunities for institutional leaders and "policy entrepreneurs" make predictions concerning organizational behavior a much more problematic
exercise. Second, in the absence of open elite disagreement, IMEMO should become more assertive and combative as the Soviet foreign-policy cycle enters this stage of option formulation. The stakes are now high: Policy options are being developed for the political leadership. Access and prestige await the organization that can play an important role at this stage.

Third, IMEMO’s response to agenda change -- regardless of whether or how much it innovates -- will be conditioned by behavior at earlier points in the policy cycle. Goals and domains of expertise years in the making are not easily or readily jettisoned.

*       *       *

In concluding, I should reiterate the central purpose of this study. Using one methodological innovation -- the policy-cycle framework -- and one theoretical tool -- organizational theory -- I attempt to address more systematically and comprehensively an issue that has been debated in the West for many years: Have Soviet social scientists and the research institutes to which they belong had any real influence on foreign and national-security policymaking in the USSR? In answering this question, I hope to demonstrate that their ability to influence policy was a function of both the political elite’s willingness to grant them entree into the process and individual and organizational dynamics internal to the research institutes to which they belonged.
Methodology and Sources

The primary method used in both case studies is a time series, qualitative content analysis of various Soviet source materials. Two additional sources of information supplement the Soviet materials. For the Brezhnev-era study, insights from previous Western research on the Soviet debate over SALT are used (and critically evaluated). The Gorbachev case study combines a close reading of primary sources with the insights of Soviet participants.61

These various sources are used to assess the degree of organizationally-inspired behavior in IMEMO’s actions and to measure its influence on actual Soviet policy. Influence is indirectly measured: The concepts and policy positions developed by IMEMO are compared to the content of official policy (as reflected in leadership statements or party/state documents).62 Whenever possible, this indirect measure is supplemented with more direct measures of influence gleaned from discussions with actual participants.

The Soviet sources include journals, newspapers, books, statements or articles by key participants, and various CPSU documents. In this material, Soviet writings on arms control and disarmament, international relations, foreign-policy ideology and military affairs are examined. The main sources of each type follow.

Journals: Voyennaya mysl'; Kommunist; Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (hereafter "Kve"); Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (hereafter "Memo"); and SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya (hereafter "SShA")63
Newspapers: *Pravda*

Books: various works, including memoirs and reference

Documents: Central Committee reports at various Party congresses;
reports delivered at Central Committee plenums.

The years surveyed for the first case study are 1964-1972. For the
second study, the years covered are 1981-88.
Notes

1. See, for example, Ulam (1974).


3. See Parrot (1988) for a recent example of this elite-politics perspective. Also see Gelman (1984).


5. For general discussions of policy cycles, see Simon (1966; 19-20), Kingdon (1984; 3-4) and Potter (1984).

6. Matthew Evangelista has made similar points concerning the innovation process in the Soviet weapons industry. See Evangelista (1988; x, 65).

7. Here, "balance of power" is defined in terms of both relative military capabilities and relative economic/scientific/technological potentials between countries.

8. For the purposes of this study, "social scientists" are the researchers who work at the international-affairs institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences (scholars such as Oleg Bykov and Aleksey Arbatov, for example). It does not refer to the physical scientists affiliated with the Academy's technical divisions (for example, Yevgeniy Velikhov and Roald Sagdeyev).

9. What has changed over time is the quality of these inputs, when they are offered in the policy cycle, and how they are presented (that is, indirect versus direct advocacy). These points will be addressed in more detail in the case studies.

10. See, for example, Simon (1966).


12. See, for example, Chotiner (1984) and Bruce (1976). For a recent affirmation of the need for a policy-cycle approach to understand Soviet domestic policy, see Motyl (1989; 85-86).


14. See, for example, Caldwell (1971) and McCgwire (1987). More generally, Jack Snyder has argued that issues of process are not really critical to an understanding of Soviet foreign policy. According to Snyder: "Why dwell on the black box [of Soviet foreign policymaking]? Why not be satisfied to study patterns of inputs and outputs without becoming unduly preoccupied with unobservable intervening variables. To drive a car successfully, it is important to know that the accelerator makes it go and the brake makes it stop; a detailed understanding of
what goes on under the hood to achieve these results is usually not essential" (Snyder [1985; 98-99]). I disagree completely with Snyder's assumption that the "black box" does not matter.

15. See, for example, Gelman (1984).

16. These labels, or variations of them, have been used by many students of Western politics. See, for example, Gergen (1968) and Lindblom (1980).

17. See, in particular, the excellent work of Jiri Valenta on the USSR's decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Valenta (1979).


19. See, for example, Bauer (1968; 16-25).


21. I am indebted to Stephen Meyer for insights on this point.

22. The discussion below is valid as of the end of 1989. Several important changes have occurred in the first half of 1990. These changes and their implications for the analysis presented here will be discussed in Chapter 11.

23. On the Politburo's role, see, among others, Hough (1979; 466-79).

24. The Defense Council is the top body that takes decisions on basic issues of defense policy -- for example, issues of military doctrine and overall defense planning. It typically includes several members of the Politburo, along with other top military and foreign-policy leaders. For a useful summary of the Council's membership and duties, see Lepingwell (1988; 15-17).

25. In theory, the Central Committee -- according to the Party statutes -- should play a key role in elaborating policy, including on issues of foreign policy. In reality, the CC appears to ratify decisions already taken by the Politburo. Moreover, over the past twenty years the CC has addressed foreign-policy issues with decreasing frequency at its formal plenary sessions. During the years 1967-72 (the key years of the first case study), the CC met in plenary session 16 times. At six of these sessions (that is, 38% of the total), foreign policy was discussed. For the core years of the second case study (1982-87), the Central Committee met in plenary session a total of 18 times. At only one of these meetings (that is, 6%) was foreign policy a topic of discussion. [These statistics are derived from the "Information Reports" published in the central Party press after each CC plenum.]

26. On the role of these last three organizations, see Wolfe (1979; 54, 59-64), Teague (1980) and Kitrinos (1984). For a more general
discussion of the role played by state ministries and Central Committee
departments, see Hough (1979; 384-96, 430-38).

27. On the role of these institutes, see, especially, Wolfe (1979; 66-
68), Hough (1979; 396-99), Scott and Scott (1980) and Polsky (1987;
Chapter 3).

28. For the classic statement on the importance of such "missions" in
shaping organizational behavior, see Halperin (1974; Chapter 3).

29. For a sampling of this evidence, see Hough (1977; Chapter 2) and

30. The idea that issues have histories, and that these play an
important role once an issue reaches the public agenda, is central to
Kingdon's analysis of the American domestic policy cycle. See Kingdon
(1984). Kingdon's examination of what I would call the early phases of
agenda setting is in fact an elaboration of previous commentary and
analysis on this subject by a small group of social scientists. See
Simon (1966; 19-20) [a passing reference], and, especially, Cobb and
Elder (1972; 10-14, 34), and Walker (1981).

31. See Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) for a helpful discussion of agenda
setting that addresses the issue of public versus non-public agendas.

32. Horelick, Johnson and Steinbruner (1975; 18-20).

33. Downs (1967: 93-94). In a similar vein, Thompson argues that the
chief organizational interest is survival of the organization. See
Thompson (1967; 6).

34. Allen Kassof's notion of an "administered society" is a classic
example of this school of thought. See Kassof (1964). Also see the
work of Alfred Meyer (1965).

35. Cyert and March (1963; Chapter 3). For a useful review and critique
of this work, see Perrow (1979; 156-60).

36. Here, Downs' excellent discussion of "territoriality" and how it
leads organizations to defend their "home bases" of expertise is
particularly helpful. Downs (1967; Chapter 17). Also see Cyert and
March (1963; 123).

37. The arguments in this and the following paragraphs are drawn
primarily from Wilson (1973; Chapters 11-12), Downs (1967; 132-43) and

38. For a good discussion of these aspects of organizational
decisionmaking, see Downs (1967; Chapter 14).

39. A useful summary of this concept is found in Lepingwell (1988; 30-
31).

41. Allison (1971; 83).

42. For a discussion of biases at the level of individuals, see Downs (1967; Chapter 7).

43. Posen provides three explanations for why organizations innovate. In two of the three, it is the organization’s desire to eliminate or reduce environmental uncertainty that leads it to innovate. [The third explanation sees innovation as a response to organizational failure.] Posen (1984; 47). From a policy-cycle perspective, one could argue that the environmental uncertainty faced by an organization increases dramatically once a new issue reaches the public agenda, and that the probability of organizational innovation, therefore, will increase at later points in the policy cycle. Organizational innovation will be discussed in more detail below.

44. For a theoretical treatment of this issue, see Downs (1967; 228-33). For evidence that selective recruitment occurs in a Soviet organization such as IMEMO, see the figures presented in Chapter 7 on the nature of the graduate degrees offered by the Institute.

45. On this, see Downs (1967; Chapters 6 and 12) and Thompson (1967; 105-108), among others.


47. The argument here and in the preceding paragraph is informed by Kingdon (1984; 17-21, 129-30, 173-91) and Walker (1981). I should note, however, that my argument extends Kingdon’s general analysis of the dynamics of public agenda change and Walker’s overview of “policy communities” to an explicitly organizational setting.

48. For useful discussions of public agenda setting, see Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) and Cobb and Elder (1972). For an application of the Cobb, Ross and Ross model to Soviet data, see Lowenhardt (1981).

49. Bachrach and Baratz (1963). This contrasts markedly with the dynamics of agenda change in the West. The US president, for example, has far less “non-decisionmaking” power.

50. The notion that the battle for power is a primary factor motivating elite behavior is a central premise of the elite-conflict model of Soviet politics. For a classic example of this model, see Linden (1966). See Parrot (1988) for a recent use of this model.

51. For example, that the USSR would sharply curtail its support for various revolutionary movements in the developing world.

52. For a review of this episode, see Checkel (1988; 7-9).
53. On these points and other aspects of the option-formulation stage of policy cycles, see Cobb and Elder (1972), and Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976).

54. As quoted in Kingdon (1984; 2).

55. Advocacy can resurface during the implementation stage of the policy cycle. It will be more bounded, however, because the organization is dealing with an officially declared state policy.

56. See Downs (1967; 211-222) for an excellent discussion of organizational behavior at this point in the policy cycle. Thompson (1967; Chapter 3) offers an analysis quite similar to Downs'. Perrow (1979; Chapter 6) provides a useful review and critique of the organization/environment literature.

57. Marshal Zhukov's ouster as Defense Minister in 1957 is a case in point. More relevant to this study is the case of Yevgeniy Varga, head of IMEMO's institutional forerunner, the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics. After speaking out during an elite debate in the late 1940s over capitalism's prospects, Varga was dismissed from his position as head of this institute. Moreover, the institute itself was subsequently disbanded. On the Zhukov affair, see Colton (1979; Chapter 8). For Varga's ouster, see Chapter 6 below.

58. See, for example, Posen (1984; 47), Allison (1971; 85) and Downs (1967; 200).

59. The argument here is not that the organization will desist in efforts to increase its influence and access by ignoring the opportunities (and challenges) posed by the new issue. Rather, the point is that the issue will be addressed — but only in ways consistent with the organization's previous experience.

60. Posen (1984; 47).

61. These insights come from numerous seminars at MIT and Harvard by Soviet scholars and policymakers. In several cases, they are based on interviews.

62. For useful discussions of measuring influence in the Soviet context, see Solomon (1978; 2-5, 128-35) and Hough (1986; 262-65).

63. Voennaya mysl' is the restricted-access journal of the Soviet General Staff (in January, 1990, it became publicly available in both the USSR and the West). Kommunist is the chief organ of the CPSU Central Committee; Kve is the journal of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy; Memo is the house journal of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, the main foreign-policy think tank; SSHA is the journal of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada.
Chapter 2: Strategic Arms Control in the Early Brezhnev Years

Soviet foreign policy in the late 1960s was in a state of change. Largely motivated by its perception of a shift in the international balance of power, the Soviet leadership was seeking a more cooperative and stable relationship with the capitalist West.¹ A key feature of this reassessment was the search for a more stable strategic environment. In part, this was a search for a solution to the USSR’s “China problem.” It was also, however, a search for a more stable Soviet-American relationship, in particular, for a more constrained and predictable competition in strategic weaponry. The Soviet debate over how to manage this competition is the focus of the analysis that follows. The behavior of key individuals and organizations involved in the debate is examined through the policy-cycle framework defined in Chapter 1.

The Issue

Strictly speaking, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) Interim Agreement signed in May, 1972, were arms-control measures and not disarmament accords. Arms-control accords constrain the future growth of or partially limit certain types of weapons systems (as did the SALT I agreement and ABM Treaty); disarmament agreements eliminate a whole class or classes of weapons. In the 20 years prior to 1972, it was disarmament proposals that dominated the public diplomacy of both the United States and the USSR.² These proposals were usually quite sweeping and often incorporated the phrase “general and complete disarmament.”³ By the end
of the 1950s, civilian specialists in the United States had moved beyond the rhetoric of disarmament and begun to develop a theory of arms control. In contrast, during this period specialists in the USSR showed little interest in the idea of arms control or, for that matter, even in developing a theory of disarmament. At the official level, Soviet spokesmen often went out of their way to belittle American proposals for arms control.

The years 1963-64 brought a noticeable change in both Soviet commentary and policy on arms control (as well as on other foreign-policy issues). This was the time of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Hotline Agreement, with the former clearly an example of arms control (constraining but not eliminating nuclear weapons testing). Despite this apparent change in attitude and policy, the Soviets reacted negatively to United States suggestions that the arms-control concept be applied to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In a January, 1964, message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), President Johnson proposed a multilateral freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The USSR’s response was decidedly negative. Replying to Johnson’s proposal, the Soviet representative to the ENDC attacked the Western preference for a "percentage reduction" (as opposed to the total elimination) of nuclear delivery systems. This conceptual objection was surely reinforced by the knowledge that any freeze at this point in time (1964) would have left the USSR vastly inferior to the US in strategic delivery systems.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the idea for SALT-like negotiations between the superpowers was a United States
initiative. In the summer of 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara first suggested -- within the American government -- bilateral US-Soviet talks to head off what he saw as an evolving superpower race in ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. By the end of 1966, McNamara had convinced President Johnson and other key figures in the US national security community that his proposals were worthy of serious attention. In December of that year, Johnson, in a private message conveyed by the US Ambassador in Moscow, proposed bilateral Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitations. His proposal focused on BMD limitations. These private exchanges in late 1966 and early 1967 marked the beginning of the long and difficult road which led to the Moscow agreements of 1972.

There is clear evidence that McNamara's concerns about BMD were influenced and furthered by civilian analysts inside and outside the US government, but the same cannot be said of the Soviet leaders. They, too, had a community of civilian analysts to whom they could turn for advice. As will be seen, a combination of reluctance on the part of the leadership to call upon these analysts and the analysts' own lack of expertise on strictly security issues guaranteed that their influence was quite small at this point on the road to SALT.

The Context

The SALT process in the USSR cannot be understood in isolation from its domestic and international contexts. Domestically, there are three chief factors to consider: elite politics; the state of the economy and of economic reform; and changes in the leadership's approach to
policymaking. At the outset, it should be stressed that the early Brezhnev years were a time of relative dynamism and change in various areas of Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{14} Today it is all too easy to overlook this fact -- particularly when Soviet spokesmen from Gorbachev on down apply the word "stagnation" (zastoy) indiscriminately to the entire Brezhnev period.\textsuperscript{15}

In the realm of elite politics, the years 1964-1971 were marked by less political conflict than had been the case throughout Khrushchev's tenure as Soviet leader. This is not to deny the existence of conflicts within the leadership during Brezhnev's early years; they clearly existed. Two facts, however, moderated the degree of conflict: (i) a strong elite consensus to prevent the re-emergence of the kind of political regime that developed under Khrushchev;\textsuperscript{16} and (ii) Brezhnev's personal leadership style, which emphasized a go-slow, consensus-building approach to policymaking. These years also saw Brezhnev slowly consolidate his leadership position. By the 24th Party Congress in March, 1971, Brezhnev was recognized as the first among equals within the political leadership.

The Soviet economy continued to grow in the years after Khrushchev's ouster, but growth rates slowed and serious structural economic problems emerged. This was a period of moderate economic reform\textsuperscript{17} and of growing recognition -- among specialists and then within important sections of the leadership -- of serious economic problems facing the USSR. This recognition, in turn, was clearly influenced by the USSR's growing awareness of the importance of scientific and technological progress, and how it was accelerating throughout the world. By the late 1960s,
there was high-level recognition that weaknesses in the USSR’s economic system were hindering both the development of new scientific achievements and their rapid assimilation into the national economy.\textsuperscript{18}

There were two possible strategies for addressing these problems. One strategy involved far-reaching reform of the economic system, including decentralization and a reformulation of incentive structures. The Soviet leadership rejected this solution because of: (i) the limited success of the economic reforms implemented in the wake of Khrushchev’s ouster; and (ii) the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 (which increased leadership fears of where any fundamental reforms might lead). The second strategy involved a dramatic expansion of East-West trade and economic ties. This was the approach eventually adopted.

A final important factor in the domestic realm was a change in the general Soviet approach to policymaking. Two concerns were at work here, and they affected two different points in the policy cycle.

First, among the political elites, there was a strong desire to avoid the improvised style of policymaking — particularly, at the decision-selection stage — which had been so typical of Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{19}

Brezhnev’s leadership style, with its emphasis on stability and consensus building, was well matched to this new-found elite concern.

Second, among specialists and some members of the leadership, there was a desire to expand participation in Soviet policymaking. Calls by Brezhnev and others for a “scientific approach” to policymaking in various realms of social and economic policy began in the immediate wake of Khrushchev’s ouster\textsuperscript{20} and continued intermittently through the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{21} There was clearly a political motive behind such calls: They
distinguished the new leadership's approach to policymaking from the subjective and "voluntaristic" one used by Khrushchev. A practical consideration, however, was also at work. From a policy-cycle perspective, such calls made it clear that the new leaders wanted greater input from informed individuals and organizations at earlier points in the policy cycle. Such inputs would permit the leadership to make more well-informed choices once an issue had reached the decision-selection stage.

In the international realm, the two most important factors to consider are the state of US-Soviet relations and the superpower strategic balance. With the exception of the three years 1965-68, US-Soviet relations were oriented toward engagement between 1963 and 1972. The extent of the engagement, however, varied over time. In Khrushchev's last years (1963-64), the US and USSR negotiated on a narrow set of security issues. The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Moscow-Washington Hotline Agreement were two results of this effort. Beginning in 1968, Soviet-American engagement was renewed and became more multi-faceted. Security issues still dominated US-Soviet relations in the late 1960s, but issues of economic and technological interchange gained increasing attention, primarily because of changes in Soviet attitudes.

The obvious lacuna in the story of US-Soviet engagement is the period 1965-68, which was marked by tension and strain. Two events especially contributed to this tension: the war in Vietnam and the instability and political crisis in Czechoslovakia. During the early part of this period, Soviet spokesmen constantly denounced US policy in
Vietnam. Everywhere in the official press -- be it Pravda or Kommunist -- the tension and condemnation were almost palpable. Relations began to improve in early 1968, and by July the United States and USSR had agreed to a September, 1968, starting date for the SALT negotiations. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, however, put a temporary end to this "thaw," and postponed the opening of the SALT negotiations for over a year.

In the realm of the US-Soviet strategic balance, the 1960s were years of "catch up" for the Soviet Union. The figures in the SALT I Chronology (see Appendix) suggest that the Soviets were largely successful in this race. By 1969, the USSR was approaching a state of strategic nuclear parity with the United States. By the decade's end, the Soviets had a powerful and still growing strategic nuclear force.

The Key Actors

The policy-cycle framework, which encompasses the periods both before and after an issue becomes a topic of public discussion, mandates that a broader circle of participants be examined at earlier periods than has been done in previous studies of the Soviet Union and SALT. As already noted, these participants can be divided into two groups: official and unofficial participants. The key official actor is the CPSU CC Politburo and its head, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. It is assumed that analyses and editorials in the central Party press (in particular, Kommunist and Pravda) are an important source for the views of Brezhnev and other elites. Two other important official actors are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Ministry of Defense
Important unofficial participants include the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and, to a lesser extent, the Academy’s Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN). Since my primary goal is to explore the role of social scientists in the Soviet SALT process, the focus of the following analysis will be on these Academy institutes -- in particular, IMEMO. Other actors will be analyzed only to the extent necessary for understanding IMEMO’s behavior and its ability to influence Soviet policy on SALT.
Notes

1. From the leadership's point of view, this shift was arising due to a confluence of several factors: the militarization of the Sino-Soviet conflict (a threat magnified by the growing irrationality of Chinese behavior as the Cultural Revolution unfolded); instability in Eastern Europe; unfavorable changes in the Soviet-American strategic balance; and growing economic problems at home -- specifically, the USSR's weakening position vis-a-vis the West in the race for scientific-technical progress. This kind of "realist" explanation for the change in Soviet policy beginning in the late 1960s is the essence of the argument advanced in Ulam (1974; Chapter 13) and Galman (1984; 116-35). Neither author, it should be noted, explicitly casts his analysis in balance-of-power terms.

Recall from Chapter 1 that throughout this study the balance of power is defined in terms of both relative military capabilities and relative economic-scientific-technological potentials between countries.

2. For an overview of the various United States and Soviet disarmament proposals of the 1950s and early 1960s, see Bloomfield, et al. (1966). The actual text of these early disarmament proposals can be found in the yearly compendium, Documents on Disarmament, published by the US Department of State (and, after its founding, by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]) beginning in 1960.

3. The USSR tended to use this phrase more often than the United States. See, for example, the "Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament" of September 19, 1959, in US Department of State (1960, Volume II; 1460-1474).

4. See, for example, the classic 1961 text by Morton Halperin and Thomas Schelling, Strategy and Arms Control. Halperin and Schelling (1985).


6. The Soviet phrase for arms control is kontrol' nad voruzhennyem. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, the Soviets began to advance proposals for what they called "partial measures" of disarmament. These included calls for nuclear free zones and nuclear test bans. On this, see Bloomfield, et al. (1966; Chapter 10).

7. See Zimmerman (1969; 61-70). These last two years of the Khrushchev era, while not the subject of this study, are worthy of further research. As a case in point, during this period the journal Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya published several very innovative articles that foreshadowed elements of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" -- 20 years prior to Gorbachev's rise to power!

8. US Department of State (1965; 7-9).

10. On this, see Baker and Berman (1982; 50-55).

11. For further details on the genesis of the SALT concept within the US government, see Newhouse (1973; Chapter 2). Also see the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix.


13. I do not mean to imply any sort of equivalence between the American and Soviet civilian analytic communities at this point in time (the mid-1960s). The Soviet community was much smaller and less knowledgeable on security issues than its American counterpart.

14. Relative when compared to the stagnation that enveloped many aspects of Soviet life during Brezhnev's later years in power.

15. For an overview of Soviet domestic policy in the mid- and late 1960s, see Breslauer (1982; Chapters 8-11). Wolfe (1970; Chapters 11-15) provides an excellent review of Soviet foreign policy (particularly toward Europe) in these years. Valkenier (1983; 11-22) examines the changes in Soviet third-world policy during this period.

16. Perhaps best described as an attempt at one-man dictatorship without the use of terror.

17. "Moderate" means the reforms attempted to make the then-existing economic system operate more efficiently; they did not attempt to alter it fundamentally.

18. Through the mid-1960s, Soviet leaders and commentators portrayed the USSR as the clear leader in the race for scientific and technological progress. By the end of the decade, however, key segments of the Soviet leadership -- including Prime Minister Kosygin and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev -- were admitting that the capitalist West, too, was doing quite well in this race. See Chapters 4-6 below.

19. One can point to numerous cases of Khrushchev's "improvised" style of policymaking. For example, in 1958 Khrushchev announced a set of educational policy reforms without first seeking Politburo approval. In essence, he was attempting to collapse the various stages of the policy cycle -- simultaneously announcing and trying to implement a new policy. One of the charges later leveled at Khrushchev -- "voluntarism" -- in part reflects the elites' discomfort at this approach to policymaking.

20. George Breslauer, citing speeches made by Brezhnev and Kosygin during 1965, documents an elite consensus to expand input from the specialist community on matters of public policy. Breslauer (1982; 169, 171). I agree with Breslauer, but would argue that the consensus only covered specialist input on social and economic policy. During these early years of the Brezhnev era, I am aware of no statements by the
leadership calling for greater specialist input on matters of foreign and national-security policy.

21. See, for example, Brezhnev (1975; 420-21) (a speech at a December, 1969, Central Committee Plenum). For additional comments by Brezhnev on this subject in 1971-72, see Breslauer (1982; 193, 215). Calls by Soviet scholars for a "scientific approach" in foreign policymaking will be discussed in Chapters 3-5 below.

22. In addition to the SALT process, the United States and Soviet Union played leading roles in bringing the negotiations for a nonproliferation treaty to a successful conclusion in 1968.

23. Parrot (1983; Chapters 5-6) provides a useful summary of this expanded agenda for US-Soviet relations in the late 1960s.

24. One might also mention a third event which, while of less importance, also contributed to the souring of US-USSR relations during these years: the 1967 Middle East war.

25. See the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix for more details.

26. Strictly speaking, the Soviets were approaching a state of quantitative (that is, equal numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs) strategic nuclear parity. In the qualitative nuclear arms race, the United States still held important advantages -- most notably in MIRV (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and BMD (ballistic missile defense) technologies.

27. That is, the point of public agenda setting.

28. In addition to the works previously cited, see Wolfe (1973), Shulman (1974), Payne (1975), and Garthoff (1978a) and (1978b).

29. ISKAN was only established in November, 1967, and not really "on-line" until the early 1970s. Its journal, SShA, began publication in January, 1970.

I will not examine two other unofficial participants in the SALT process: the Academy of Sciences’ Commission on Scientific Problems of Disarmament and its Study Group on SALT. These two bodies were dominated by physical scientists affiliated with the Academy’s technical divisions. My focus, however, is the social scientists at institutions such as IMEMO. The Commission was established in 1963 and attached to (prij) the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. It was headed by V. S. Yemel’yanov, a metallurgist and corresponding member of the Academy. According to one Soviet source, the Commission coordinated Academy research on disarmament, developed ties with foreign scientists who study such issues and conducted scientific meetings. See Aboltin (1967b; 113). Also see IMEMO Akademii Nauk SSSR (1970; 300). This Commission is the forerunner of the Academy’s Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament, established in 1979.
The Study Group on SALT appears to have been set up in late 1968 or in 1969, and was headed by Academician Aleksandr N. Shchukhin, a radiophysicist. See Shulman (1974; 111-12) and Wolfe (1979; 66-67).
Chapter 3: Agenda Setting – The Early Phase (1964 – 1967)

The goal here is to examine the USSR’s interest in arms control and, in particular, strategic nuclear arms control during the years prior to the period of public agenda setting on SALT in mid-1968. This allows one to set the context for the overall SALT policy cycle and also to ascertain the degree of organizational expertise on SALT-related topics, thus providing a better understanding of the responses of various organizations once SALT reached the public agenda.

The most striking feature about the Soviet literature of the years 1964-67 is the dearth of commentary -- any commentary -- on strategic nuclear arms control.¹ There was, as in the past, discussion of disarmament,² and various Soviet leaders and analysts approvingly referred to “partial measures” of disarmament such as a nuclear test ban, the elimination of foreign military bases, or the creation of nuclear-free zones.³ The absence of direct discussion of arms control is all the more striking given both the precedents and opportunities that existed for discussions of this issue. The precedents were the limited set of bilateral arms-control measures concluded during Khrushchev’s last two years in power (1963-64). The opportunity during this period arose from the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty.⁴ In addition, the United States had since 1964 publicly proposed measures of strategic nuclear arms limitation.

Official Participants

Politburo Level. Throughout this period both Brezhnev and the CPSU Central Committee journal Kommunist evinced interest in various
disarmament schemes which went beyond calls for "general and complete" disarmament. The tenor of analysis, however, grew more sober over time. In one of Brezhnev's first major speeches after assuming the post of CPSU General Secretary, he called for both general and complete disarmament and for arms-control measures that would set limits on the arms race. Brezhnev left open which should come first, disarmament or arms control. Given the long-standing Soviet preference for disarmament, this was a clear signal that the new Soviet leader saw some legitimacy in the notion of arms control. By mid-1965, however, his references to disarmament and arms control had acquired a propagandistic tone. They were increasingly limited to calls for general and complete disarmament, and were cast as part of the struggle against imperialism.

During the years 1966-67, Brezhnev occasionally returned to the disarmament theme, when he would argue for "practical" or "partial" steps on the way to general and complete disarmament. However, the measures he cited -- the creation of non-nuclear zones and prohibitions on underground testing or use of nuclear weapons -- were a throwback to the kind of proposals advanced by the Soviet Union during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The CPSU journal Kommunist followed the trend outlined above. The early years of the period in question saw innovative editorials that endorsed, among other things, a "policy of mutual example" in the arms-control realm, and decried the "notorious dilemma" between arms control and disarmament (without rejecting the former as an option). By August, 1965, however, editorials were echoing Brezhnev in their
simplistic calls for universal disarmament and, for example, the elimination of foreign military bases.\textsuperscript{12}

The worsening of US-Soviet relations due to American involvement in Vietnam best explains the evolution in Brezhnev’s behavior and the changing tone of commentary in \textit{Kommunist}. As US involvement in Southeast Asia escalated, official Soviet commentary became notably more harsh. Peaceful coexistence between the superpowers, for example, was made contingent on American withdrawal from Vietnam (a Soviet version of linkage!),\textsuperscript{13} and the capitalist socio-economic system was portrayed as increasingly aggressive.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Ministerial Level - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.} Throughout this three-year period and in contrast to Brezhnev and the commentary in \textit{Kommunist}, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) -- in particular, Foreign Minister Gromyko -- expressed greater optimism about the prospects for both Soviet-American relations and arms control. Gromyko’s commentary was perhaps in part a function of his own personal views, but it is also clear that his position clearly "fit" well with the Ministry’s own sense of organizational mission.

In other words, the Ministry’s behavior appeared to be determined less by the worsening state of US-Soviet relations or the concerns of the Soviet political elite and more by factors internal to it. After all, it would be in the interest of Gromyko and MID to promote improvements in US-Soviet relations and to further efforts at disarmament. Advances in these areas held the promise of granting the Ministry a more influential role in the foreign-policy process. In addition, the Ministry’s institutional "memory" certainly extended back
far enough to recall the enhanced role it played during the last period of improved US-Soviet relations in 1963-64.15

This combination of individual and organizational factors seemed present in a series of speeches Gromyko gave in 1966-67.16 During this period, US-Soviet relations reached a low point, and, as noted above, comments by Brezhnev and the journal Kommunist became increasingly hard-line. Yet on several occasions Gromyko made a strong case for negotiations with the West.17 The language was so emphatic and the invocation of Lenin so frequent, that no one could miss his message: Despite Vietnam, relations with the United States must not be allowed to deteriorate. In a speech to the 23rd Party Congress in April, 1966, for example, Gromyko contrasted two different approaches for dealing with the United States: "slamming the door" and not wasting "time or efforts on negotiations," or, alternatively, engaging the US in negotiations. He came down decisively in favor of the latter approach, calling it "the only correct" one.18 This statement is all the more remarkable considering that it was made at a time when American involvement in Vietnam was rapidly expanding.

Gromyko's advocacy of disarmament during this period was also at variance with official Soviet commentary. He argued, for example, that because other countries feared the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union must be ready to compromise on measures short of this. His language here was particularly harsh: "to occupy a position of 'all or nothing' [on disarmament] is pseudoradicalism."19 Gromyko also advanced the view that the elaboration and subsequent negotiation of disarmament proposals was acquiring growing importance
and had become a whole branch (отрасль) of diplomatic work requiring specific expertise. His point, before a gathering of diplomatic workers, was clear: The Ministry was the repository of such expertise. From an organizational politics perspective, it would appear that Gromyko, by advocating East-West negotiations and arguing that MID was the institutional home of expertise for such endeavors, was seeking to expand the Ministry's role in the foreign-policy process.

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. The Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) is classified as an unofficial participant because at this point in time (the early and mid-1960s) its involvement in policymaking was primarily on an ad-hoc basis. This occurred when IMEMO was asked by the Central Committee's International Department to produce reports on various foreign-policy issues. For this kind of participation, however, IMEMO was dependent upon other actors to grant it access to the policy process. It had no officially sanctioned or codified role.

An organizational-politics perspective should be useful for studying the behavior of a large, hierarchically-structured and functionally-specialized institution such as IMEMO. This perspective suggests that the Institute would pursue goals influenced largely by its previous experience and sense of mission, and by a desire to gain a more prominent and officially-sanctioned role in the foreign-policy process. Thus, to understand the kinds of goals IMEMO would most likely pursue during the mid-1960s, one must go back and examine the Institute's chief
domains of expertise, developed since its reconstitution in 1956. These included:

1) the political economy of contemporary capitalism;
2) imperialism;
3) the world socialist system;
4) the world revolutionary process;
5) international relations (including US-Soviet relations);
6) the strategy, tactics and ideology of Soviet foreign policy;
7) policymaking in capitalist societies;
8) international economic relations;
9) the scientific-technical revolution; and
10) disarmament.

Not all these topics received equal attention. The greatest emphasis was placed on the economics and political economy of capitalism, and, to a lesser extent, international relations.

This emphasis came as no surprise, given the institute's history and the people who had served as its directors. Between 1927 and 1947, the Institute (then known as the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics) was headed by a Hungarian-born economist, Academician Yevgeniy S. Varga. When the Institute was effectively dissolved in 1947, the majority of its work was transferred to the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics. Anushavan A. Arzumanyan, director of the reconstituted IMEMO between 1956 and 1965, was an economist by training who had been deputy head of the Institute of Economics until 1956. Thus, the Institute's two leaders between 1927 and 1965 were both economists. Given the important role of organizational leaders in
shaping their institution’s behavior, one would expect this fact to influence the development of IMEMO’s basic goals and missions. It should also be noted that, throughout most of its second incarnation (indeed, until mid-1988), IMEMO was officially part of the Economics Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

While it is true that IMEMO had a broad set of concerns encompassing various aspects of foreign policy, the evidence indicates its core domains of organizational expertise as of the mid-1960s focused on issues of economics and political economy (at the national and international level). For example, of the 46 books published by IMEMO during 1966 and 1967, 24 (or 52%) examined various aspects of the political economy of contemporary capitalism. In addition, at this point the Institute was staffed largely with researchers who were trained as economists. Finally, the emphasis on economics and political economy was reflected in its organizational structure.

Despite these facts, one could nonetheless plausibly suppose that IMEMO would be highly motivated to investigate issues of arms control and disarmament in the early and mid-1960s. As already noted, there were both precedents and opportunities for the Institute to address issues of this type during these years. Moreover, from an organizational-politics perspective, it is clear that a Soviet-American agenda broadened to include arms control would offer the Institute a chance to enhance its prestige as the premier center of foreign-policy studies by developing new expertise on arms-control issues. In fact, IMEMO’s behavior did not conform to these expectations. The reasons lay largely with the factors -- leadership, organizational structure and

59
sense of mission -- discussed above.

Various analyses of arms control and disarmament were published by IMEMO in the four years prior to 1968, most of them parts of longer articles or book reviews. All are characterized by paucity of detail and clear adherence to the line set by the political leadership. While IMEMO scholars praised the policy of "mutual example" as an important arms-control measure in 1964 and advocated "partial measures" of disarmament in writings through 1967, references to disarmament and arms control turned more polemical in 1966 and the focal point once again became "general and complete disarmament."

By the latter part of 1966, for example, one IMEMO analyst, when discussing the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons, specifically attacked the US preference for "arms-control measures" (that is, reducing but not eliminating nuclear weapons) over disarmament. This kind of polemical, propagandistic analysis was also very much evident in one of the few Institute-sponsored books on disarmament produced during these years, and published in the last months of 1966.

The point here is that because IMEMO had developed no extensive expertise on issues of arms control and thus no sense of organizational mission in this area, it had little incentive to promote its own point of view on these issues. Thus, the Institute had little motivation to challenge the views of the political leadership on matters of arms control and disarmament.

This picture of low initiative and expertise changes dramatically when one examines the Institute's performance during these years on topics at the core of its organizational expertise and sense of mission.
In these areas, IMEMO promoted a set of goals that: received the support of newly-appointed Institute head Nikolay Inozemtsev; were clearly not in step with the concerns of the political leadership; and did not reflect the worsening of relations between the United States and the USSR. These goals were:

1) advancing a more nuanced image of capitalism and, more specifically, of policymaking in capitalist countries such as the United States;

2) promoting a more complex view of the international system; and

3) arguing for a "scientific approach" to foreign policy.

The image of capitalism advocated by IMEMO was complex and nuanced. Some analysts examined the state’s independence from the ruling elites. One researcher argued, for example, that it was wrong to view monopolies as the chief actors in the US foreign-policy process, with the state appearing as only “the dumb agent” of big business. On the contrary, the role of the state -- and, especially, of the President -- in foreign policymaking was increasing. Other analysts saw differentiation within the military-industrial complex, with not all monopolies wanting war to increase their profits. One even claimed that certain parts of the military-industrial complex had developed a "known interest" in disarmament!

IMEMO scholars employed several other methods to advance a more complex image of US capitalism. Some noted, for example, that militarization was not completely pervasive in the United States. One author, using a review of a West German book on disarmament as his vehicle, hinted that the militarized economies of the capitalist states
could be transferred to the production of consumer goods.\textsuperscript{43} Many works -- including a set of Institute-sponsored "theses" strongly supported by IMEMO head Inozemtsev -- stressed the existence of competing "tendencies" within the ruling elite of US capitalism.\textsuperscript{44} The "realistic" tendency, which supported, \textit{inter alia}, improved US-Soviet relations, was portrayed as growing in strength -- particularly after Goldwater's defeat in the November, 1964, US presidential elections.\textsuperscript{45}

Some IMEMO analysts implicitly argued against the reductionism inherent in the Leninist theory of imperialism,\textsuperscript{46} and claimed that capitalist foreign policy was more than the projection of the monopolies' (aggressive) economic goals onto the international arena. One analyst, in discussing the nature of capitalist foreign policy, went so far as to claim that Lenin himself warned of the danger of reducing everything to economics.\textsuperscript{47} This is to turn Lenin on his head! In his theory of imperialism, Lenin had in fact overwhelmingly stressed the economic roots of capitalist foreign policy.\textsuperscript{48}

The image of capitalism that emerges from these analyses had little in common with official leadership views of this period. Brezhnev and others continued to stress an undifferentiated image of capitalism, of its militarism and growing aggressiveness.\textsuperscript{49} The divergence between the two images -- the leadership's and IMEMO's -- was at times so great that one could come away thinking that the object of analysis was completely different.

A second goal promoted by IMEMO throughout the years 1964-67 was a more complex vision of the international system, a vision which stressed the variety of factors comprising and affecting it.\textsuperscript{50} \textit{I} any IMEMO
analysts remarked on the growing complexity of the international system. In an editorial article published late in 1966, the Institute argued that an "enormous number" of different factors influenced events in the international arena. Implicit here was a call to move away from the mono-causal explanations of international relations so typical of official Soviet analyses.

IMEMO scholars addressed this issue of complexity in various ways. Director Inozemtsev and several other analysts examined the role of chance in both international relations and nuclear war (that is, accidental nuclear war scenarios). One of these analysts argued, for example, that the international system was defined and shaped not only by permanently operating "laws," but also by "chance," and that war in the contemporary era could in fact arise due to this "chance" factor. Analysis of this kind contradicts orthodox Marxist-Leninist teaching about the nature of war by suggesting that war occurs not only as the result of policies deliberately pursued by capitalist countries, but by chance. It would be over 20 years before arguments of this type reached the pages of the CPSU Central Committee journal, Kommunist.

The complexity of the international system was stressed by IMEMO analysts in several additional ways. Institute head Inozemtsev and one other analyst, Gennadiy Gerasimov, argued, for example, that international relations should be viewed as a non-zero sum affair. In such an international system, Gerasimov declared, the interests of states are not absolutely counterposed, and, thus, there is a role for compromises, mutual concessions and cooperation by the opposing sides. Gerasimov finished by concluding that nuclear weapons made it impossible
to view "international conflict ... as a zero-sum game." 59

Inozemtsev emphasized the complexity of the international system by discussing the growing internationalization of science, economics and technology. 60 He portrayed this "internationalization" as an "objective" process, which, in Marxist-Leninist parlance, is tantamount to declaring it a basic fact of life to which the Soviet state must adapt. 61

The third goal promoted by IMEMO throughout this early phase of agenda setting was what the Institute called a "scientific approach" in foreign policy. Early analyses on this topic were rather general and seemed to equate a "scientific approach" with a more comprehensive analysis of events in the international arena. The implicit argument here was that mono-causal explanations of foreign-policy behavior were inadequate. 62

Later analyses called specifically for a broadened foreign-policy research agenda. This broadened agenda included: (1) a call for more inter-disciplinary research on issues of foreign policy; and (2) a call for expanding the topics addressed in foreign-policy research. 63 On the first point, it was argued that due to the "enormous number" of factors influencing international phenomena, foreign-policy research required -- in addition to inputs from foreign-policy specialists -- contributions from historians, economists, sociologists, lawyers and experts on military affairs.

On the second point, IMEMO asserted that, beyond its traditional topics of research, greater attention needed to be devoted to "political interactions" between socialist and capitalist states, and to the
"interconnections" between the military-strategic and foreign-policy concepts of capitalist states. While these two topics seem rather innocuous, they in fact threatened the views and prerogatives of key actors in the Soviet foreign-policy process. The emphasis on political interactions, that is, on Soviet-American cooperation and negotiation, came at a time when the political elites were downplaying relations with the US due to that country's growing involvement in Vietnam.

In a similar fashion, IMEMO's emphasis on the connections between military strategy and foreign policy posed a threat to the prerogatives of the Ministry of Defense. In the mid-1960s, the Ministry was the chief center of institutional expertise on issues of military strategy - both Soviet and foreign. The Institute, by linking the study of issues in its traditional domain (that is, foreign-policy concepts) with military-related issues was hinting at the need to expand its research agenda to incorporate the study of the latter.

By early 1967, at least one leading IMEMO scholar was using a discussion of this "scientific approach" and the "scientific basis" (nauchnost') of Soviet foreign policy to clearly advocate closer links between Institute-sponsored research and actual policymaking. This analyst argued that what he called Soviet science on international relations -- that is, the research conducted by institutions such as IMEMO -- had to be more closely tied with the foreign-policy practice of the Soviet state. He pointedly noted that there was a "wealth of work to do" before such ties became a reality. Part of the blame for this state of affairs, he argued, rested with the nature of scholarly research on international affairs. All too often, it had carried a
purely "descriptive character" and had not devoted sufficient attention to developing practical policy recommendations.69

Overall, two messages could be distilled from these various discussions of a scientific approach in foreign policy. First, IMEMO wanted to expand its own research agenda and increase the policy relevance and quality of its work (and, one might add, the quality of Soviet foreign policy). In addition, signs had begun to emerge that the Institute desired a greater role in the foreign-policy process.70 It wanted access to that stage of the process -- option formulation -- where various institutions developed policy options for the political elites on a regular basis.

There are three points to stress concerning IMEMO’s behavior during this early phase of agenda setting. First, the goals it chose to promote had little or no connection with the concerns of the political leadership. No member of the Politburo, for example, was promoting -- as IMEMO was -- a nuanced (and essentially non-Leninist) view of the international system during these years.

Second, organizational dynamics played an important role in determining the Institute’s behavior. IMEMO chose to promote the first two goals noted above because they were central to its core areas of organizational expertise, an expertise developed over a number of years. These goals also received the support of director Inozemtsev once he had joined the Institute. IMEMO, in other words, was doing what many organizations do: playing to its institutional strengths and own sense of organizational mission.

The other goal the Institute promoted -- the need to improve the
quality and importance of foreign-policy research -- represented a clear case of self-interested advocacy to increase its role in the overall foreign-policy process. The purpose here was to enhance the importance of foreign-policy expertise in the USSR. If the elites were to accept this viewpoint, then IMEMO, as the institutional home of such expertise, would see its role in foreign policymaking grow.

Third, the above review indicates that security-related issues in general, and arms control in particular, were outside IMEMO's core areas of expertise. From an organizational-politics perspective, it is therefore not surprising that throughout the period 1964-67 the Institute did not produce in-depth or innovative analyses of arms control or military affairs. Arms control was not yet the hot political topic in the Soviet Union that it would become in the late 1960s. An organizational theorist would argue that at this point the environment in which IMEMO operated was rather "benign." It was not yet "turbulent" enough to motivate the Institute to address security-related issues. Indeed, the only article on strictly military issues to be published by IMEMO during this period was a study of United States strategy and doctrine by a military officer not affiliated with the Institute.

Summary

The preceding analysis leads to three basic observations. For one, in this early phase of the SALT policy cycle, organizational dynamics played an important role in determining the behavior of IMEMO, which at this point was the home to the great majority of Soviet social scientists engaged in foreign-policy research. In addition, there was
little interaction among organizations. MID, the military\textsuperscript{73} and IMEMO each pursued a different set of goals. There was little evidence of the polemics among organizations that might be expected at later points in the policy cycle.\textsuperscript{74} Finally, during the years 1964-67, strategic nuclear arms control was not an issue that benefited from open advocacy on the part of any individual or organization.
Notes

1. That is, arms control to limit strategic nuclear delivery systems (for example, intercontinental ballistic missiles).

2. See, for example, Glushkov (1964) and Brezhnev (1970, Volume I; 9) (a speech delivered in October, 1964).

3. See, for example, Brezhnev (1970, Volume I; 27-8) (a speech in November, 1964, commemorating the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution), Gromyko (1978; 86) (a speech to the UN General Assembly in September, 1967) and Borko, et al. (1965; 74).

4. For an overview of these negotiations, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1982; 83-86).


6. For example, a May 8, 1965 speech celebrating the 20th anniversary of the end of World War II (Brezhnev [1970, Volume I; 153]).


8. See, for example, Brezhnev’s speech to the 23rd Party Congress in March, 1966. Brezhnev (1966; 46-7). Also see Brezhnev (1967; 39-40) (a Kremlin speech on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution) and Note 6 in Chapter 2.

9. Similar to page 1 editorials in Pravda, these Kommunist editorials may be taken as authoritative statements of the CPSU Party line.

10. Peresedovaya (1964; 4). Today in the West, such a policy would go under the rubric of informal arms control. For more on the fascinating story of US-Soviet discussions on this issue during 1963-64, see Linebaugh (1976).

11. Peresedovaya (1965a; 13).

12. Peresedovaya (1965b; 11).


15. Gromyko had been Foreign Minister since 1957. For documentation of the enhanced role played by the Ministry in 1963-64, see Linebaugh (1976).
16. This view is at variance with the traditional interpretation of Gromyko and MID's role, which asserts that neither were influential players in the SALT process (see, for example, Shulman (1974; 111)). The difference arises for two reasons. First, I am examining the role of Gromyko and MID at a much earlier point in the policy cycle -- where influencing the context of decisionmaking is the issue and not, as it would be later, influencing the content of specific negotiating proposals. Second, I am willing to explore the possibility that Gromyko could be the active purveyor of organizational interests, as well as the passive executor of others' demands. (Here, the universally known -- and repeated -- Khrushchev quip about Gromyko sitting on a block of ice if so ordered has hindered a fuller understanding of his role.)


19. Gromyko (1978; 86-8) (speech to UN General Assembly in September, 1967). It is not clear whether Gromyko's comments were aimed at internal opponents or at the People's Republic of China (which, throughout this period, was attacking various aspects of Soviet foreign policy).


21. See Kovalev (1967) for an additional example of organizationally-inspired advocacy by a representative of the Ministry. Kovalev -- who is not identified in the article -- was at the time chief of MID's First European Department.

22. See Wolfe (1979; 68, Note 76), Hough (1986; 262) and Polsky (1987; 61-66, 71-73). By the early 1970s, this ad-hoc participation in policymaking was given an additional boost by the growing personal ties between IMEMO's director, Nikolay Inozemtsev, and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. At the 24th Party Congress in April, 1971, Brezhnev consolidated his position within the Politburo -- becoming its dominant leader. At the same Congress, Inozemtsev was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee. Later that year, Inozemtsev addressed an important plenum of the Committee, where Brezhnev's foreign-policy program (of which SALT was a key component) was granted its tentative backing. Given Inozemtsev's candidate membership in the Central Committee, his participation in this meeting was out of the ordinary and suggests that, at least on some issues, he had the General Secretary's ear. These points will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 below.

24. The political economy of capitalism and international relations, in the Soviet sense used here, includes studies of capitalism, imperialism, the socialist-capitalist competition in the world arena and the world correlation of forces. To a lesser degree, it includes topics more familiar to Western students of international political economy -- for example, transnational economic ties.

25. For details on the early history of IMEMO, see Hough (1980; 512-13), Polsky (1987; 1-10) and Ruble (1981; 371-72).

26. One Soviet source, in discussing Arzumanyan's research interests, places questions of international relations/foreign policy last in a list of nine such interests. Leading the list were topics such as the socialist-capitalist economic competition and the crisis of the world capitalist system. This same source notes that Arzumanyan served on the editorial board of Voprosy ekonomiki (Questions of Economics, the journal of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics) for many years. See "Na uchenom sovete IMEMO..." (1984). For additional information on Arzumanyan, see Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1984, Volume I; 95) and "Yubilej uchenogo-kommunista" (1964; 27-28).

27. For a general discussion of this point, see Chapter 1.

28. See Kuchinskiy (1967) and Kuchinskiy (1968).


30. As of 1979, IMEMO had six departments and one section studying the economics and political economy of capitalist and developing countries. In contrast, it had only two departments and two sections examining issues of international relations and world affairs. See Polsky (1987; 30). Interviews with several IMEMO researchers suggest this basic structure had changed little since the mid-1960s.


32. See, for example, Moskvin (1964; 12); Andreyev, et al. (1965; 73); Nekrasov (1966); and Polyanov (1967; 52).

33. Bogatov (1966) and Kalyadin (1967a), for example.

34. Bogatov (1966; 32-33). Here, the Russian for "arms-control measures" is mery po kontrolyu nad vooruzheniyami. During this same period and in a similar fashion, another IMEMO researcher used a review of a Western book on the spread of nuclear weapons to question the preference for arms-control measures over disarmament in the West. See Kalyadin (1967b).


36. Inozemtsev was appointed head of IMEMO in May, 1966.
37. The discussion that follows confirms and extends Zimmerman's study of the writings of Soviet foreign-policy specialists. See Zimmerman (1969; Chapter 6) for his analysis of their writings on capitalism. The present analysis differs from Zimmerman's in its attempt to explain the motivating factors behind these writings.

38. See, for example, Androsov (1964), Lemin (1965), and Lyubimova's comments in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.8; 74-77).


40. Larin (1964); Lemin (1965).

41. Larin (1964; 147).

42. Lemin (1965) and Tivanov (1966). Compare these analyses to Brezhnev's declaration to the 23rd CPSU Party Congress in March, 1966, that the "militarization" of the economy was the most "distorted phenomenon" in present-day capitalist societies. Brezhnev (1966; 26).

43. Moreover, this author suggests that the monopolies in capitalist countries most interested in promoting the arms race could be restrained by forces within those countries. Tivanov (1966; 148).

44. Galkin, et al. (1964), Borko, et al. (1965), Galkin (1965), Vladimirov (1966), "Aktual'nye zadachi ..." (1966; 17-18) and Tomashhevsky's analysis in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.8; 58-60). Also see the "theses" IMEMO prepared for an international conference commemorating the 50th anniversary of Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in IMEMO Akademii Nauk SSSR (1967; 16-17). Nikolay Inozemtsev, head of IMEMO, affirmed both the authoritative nature of these theses and that they represented an institutional viewpoint by declaring that the theses reflected the "sum of views shared by the basic collective [osnovnyy kollektiv] of the Institute." This comment was delivered in Inozemtsev's main address to the conference for which the theses were prepared. "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.6; 61).


46. Lenin's theory of imperialism is reductionist because it locates the causal factors driving imperialist foreign policy at the national as opposed to the international level. For more on reductionist versus systemic explanations of state behavior, see Waltz (1979; 18).

47. Lemin (1967; 8). Also see D. Mel'nikov (1965; 8-9).

49. See, for example, Brezhnev (1966; 24-28) and Brezhnev (1967; 25).

50. Zimmerman (1969; Chapters 2-4) provides evidence that the Institute’s interest in promoting this particular goal extended back to the early 1960s.


52. "Aktual’nye zadachi..." (1966; 15). Unsigned editorial articles such as this one appeared only rarely in Mem during the 1960s. They were clearly meant to present IMEMO’s institutional viewpoint on the issue or issues at hand. As will be seen, editorial articles appeared much more often in the early and mid-1980s. Their content, however, had changed dramatically. They read less like scholarly analysis and much more like official propaganda. See Chapter 8 below.

53. Inozemtsev (1967), D. Mel’nikov (1965), Tivanov (1966) and Bogatov (1966). For explicit discussions of accidental nuclear war scenarios, see Inozemtsev (1967; 21) and Bogatov (1966; 39).

54. These are translations of zakonomernosti and sluchaynost’, respectively. In Marxist-Leninist thought, one such “law” (zakonomernost’) is the steady shift in the world correlation of forces in socialism’s favor.

55. D. Mel’nikov (1965; 10). In a similar fashion, another IMEMO analyst, in reviewing a Western book on disarmament, agreed that the "self-ignition" of war was a real possibility. See Tivanov (1966; 147).


57. See Inozemtsev (1967; 13-14) and Gerasimov (1966). Inozemtsev implicitly advocates a non-zero sum view of international relations, while Gerasimov makes the point explicitly.

58. Gerasimov (1966; 101). Gerasimov, who today is the Soviet Ambassador to Portugal, uses a discussion of Western writing on game theory to address the zero sum/non-zero sum issue. It should be noted that while Gerasimov does not directly discuss arms control, his stress on cooperation and compromise would seem to legitimize endeavors in this area.


60. For example, Inozemtsev in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.6; 62) and Inozemtsev (1967).

62. See, for example, D. Mel'nikov (1965; 9). Mel'nikov drives his point home by arguing that a "plurality of factors" stand behind any given international event. Also see "Aktual'nye zadachi..." (1966; 15). As already noted, this latter source can be taken as an authoritative statement of IMEMO's institutional perspective.


64. "Aktual'nye zadachi..." (1966; 17). As this same source made clear, IMEMO considered the study of socialist-capitalist "political interactions" a large and fruitful field for research. For further advocacy of the need to study these "interactions," see the comments by A.G. Mileykovskiy, an IMEMO section head, in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.6; 71-72).

65. See, for example, Brezhnev's comments on US-Soviet relations at the 23rd Party Congress in March, 1966, where he mixes a few positive comments on Soviet-American relations with numerous condemnations of the United States and its policies. Brezhnev explicitly links any improvement in bilateral relations to the cessation of US "aggression" in Vietnam. Brezhnev (1966; 38-47). Also see Brezhnev's comments to a Central Committee plenum in September, 1965, where he talks of a "freezing" (zarazhivanye) of US-Soviet relations due to American involvement in Vietnam. Brezhnev (1970, Volume I; 228).


67. During the eight years covered by this case study, there was only one other Institute-sponsored call for research on military-related issues. This occurred in early 1969. See Chapter 5 below.

68. I. M. Lemin in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya..." (1967, No.7; 70-71). Lemin, who would die in 1968 at the age of 71, had an affiliation with IMEMO that stretched back to 1933 (when the Institute was known as the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics). During the mid-1960s, he headed the division of IMEMO responsible for analyzing the domestic and foreign policy of the US. For more on Lemin, see the obituary published in Memo, "Iosif Mikhailovich Lemin" (1968).

69. Lemin in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ..." (1967, No.7; 70). Lemin would make many of these same arguments -- albeit in milder form -- in an article published several months after the conference. See Lemin (1967; 7-13).

70. At least one Institute analyst, however, thought the job too big for IMEMO and hinted at the need to establish additional organizations for the study of international affairs. See Zevin (1966; 23).

71. On turbulent and benign environments and how organizations respond to them, see the discussion in Chapter 1 above.

73. I have not focused on the military's behavior during this early phase of the policy cycle. Not surprisingly, during this period the military evinced little interest in arms control or disarmament. Two issues that did receive considerable attention in military writing were a greater role for the military in national economic planning and the re-establishment of a ground forces command (which had been eliminated by Khrushchev). On the first, see the series of articles published in 1965-67 in Voyennaya mysl' (calling for a new discipline of "military economics"); for the second, see Rotmistrov (1965; 20-22) and Malinovskiy (1967; 34).

74. Gromyko's particularly harsh words in September, 1967, may be an example of such polemics. See Note 19 above and the accompanying text.
Chapter 4: Agenda Change - 1968

This chapter examines the context of the Soviet political leadership's decision to accept the idea of SALT-like negotiations, the actual period of public agenda setting, and the initial responses of several organizations to this change of agenda.

Context

On the domestic side, a key factor was the emerging consensus among members of the political leadership\(^1\) that the Soviet economy was not performing well and was falling behind in the scientific-technical race with the West. On the former, both Kosygin and Brezhnev came -- during 1968 -- to portray the economy in gloomy terms. The need for "qualitative" (or intensive, as opposed to extensive) economic growth was stressed. The change in Brezhnev's oratory was particularly telling. By the latter part of 1968, he was frankly admitting that the Soviet Union faced severe economic problems.\(^2\)

The year 1968 also saw a noticeable increase in elite concern over the economy's ability to generate qualitative improvements in Soviet science and technology. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin began to portray the race in scientific-technical progress as "one of the main" arenas of the socialist-capitalist competition. In a speech to the December, 1968, plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev all but conceded that the United States was winning this race and declared the acceleration of scientific progress to be "not only a central economic [task] but a most important political task."\(^3\) Kosygin proposed a decisive increase in economic and scientific exchange with the West as one solution to this
problem of technological lag.4

Beyond this "subjective" factor, that is, elite perceptions of the East-West race in science and technology, an additional "objective" reality was beginning to be felt in the economic sphere: a clash among competing budgetary priorities. Moreover, this clash came at a time when overall economic growth was slowing. The basis for this resource crunch was laid when the leadership, following Khrushchev’s ouster, committed itself both to a very expensive increase in agricultural investment and, in the wake of growing US involvement in Vietnam, to an increase in overall levels of military spending.5

The picture was further complicated when Brezhnev -- echoing earlier statements by Kosygin -- began in the latter part of 1967 to call for an increase in resources devoted to consumer welfare. Brezhnev’s clearest declaration on this issue came in a September, 1967, Central Committee speech (excerpts of which were published for the first time in 1975), where he pledged that more resources would be committed to consumer spending. In particular, he declared that 1968 would see the largest commitment of resources to consumer welfare in the history of the USSR.6 This enhanced concern for the Soviet consumer was reflected in various other official sources.7

The growth in elite pessimism on the Soviet economy’s scientific-technical potential and a more constrained resource allocation environment, taken together, partly explain why by early 1968 there was agreement among the political leadership and most top military figures that wide-scale deployments of technologically-complex and extremely costly ballistic missile defenses (BMD) would not be in the state
interests of the USSR.8 This agreement clearly facilitated the Soviet Union’s formal commitment in June, 1968, to begin strategic nuclear arms talks with the US. It also explains why the initial Soviet stress in these talks was on limiting BMD.

Beyond these internal considerations, three external factors also played a key role in bringing SALT to the public agenda in 1968: the improving state of US-Soviet relations; changes in the strategic balance; and the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty. By early 1968, there were clear signs that Soviet-American relations were on the upswing. Confidential exchanges on the idea of SALT had accelerated in the early part of the year.9 Moreover, several official statements suggested that the most aggressive circles in the United States could be isolated.10 The implicit message was that the USSR could deal with the West.

Second, the strategic balance was changing in ways that motivated the Soviet Union to participate in SALT. On the positive side, quantitative strategic parity with the United States now appeared within reach, particularly if missile launchers under construction were taken into account.11 This gave the Soviets obvious bargaining power in negotiations on strategic arms.12 The negative change, from the Soviet point of view, was the American decision of September, 1967, to proceed with ballistic missile defense (BMD) development and deployment. The Soviet leadership’s new-found respect for American scientific-technical prowess made this decision all the more disconcerting and increased the attraction of SALT-type negotiations. They could prevent or limit implementation of the US BMD decision.
Finally, the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty during the first half of 1968 provided obvious legitimization to the very concept of arms control. The treaty gave advocates of arms control an unambiguous and successful precedent with which to strengthen their arguments.\textsuperscript{13}

The conclusion to draw both from the above and the earlier review of the years 1964–67 is that the Soviet leadership's decision in mid-1968 to place SALT on the public agenda was influenced little if at all by scholarly analysis of SALT-related issues or organizational advocacy of negotiations. Rather, the key factors were changing perceptions among the political elites -- that is, the leadership's re-evaluation of the balance of power (both its economic and military-strategic components) -- and changes in the international climate. This is clearly seen if one considers the effect of Foreign Minister Gromyko's advocacy of negotiations with the West. While Gromyko had advocated such negotiations since early 1966 -- and had done so in a way sure to resonate with the Foreign Ministry's sense of organizational mission -- they were only placed on the public agenda when a series of domestic and international factors converged in 1968. In other words, the CPSU leadership had exercised its "gatekeeper" power, keeping an issue off the agenda until its evaluation of various factors led it to open the "gate."

\textit{May–June, 1968: Public Agenda Setting}

Public agenda setting occurred during a one-month period in the middle of 1968. The Soviet leadership sent public signals -- first
internationally, and then domestically -- of interest in SALT-type negotiations with the United States. The international signals came in late May, in a speech by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In the speech, he contrasted sweeping calls for general and complete disarmament with a step-by-step process to limit nuclear arms, and clearly pointed to the latter as the proper approach to take. Kuznetsov followed this with the most specific Soviet reference yet to SALT, declaring that the USSR was ready to agree on "concrete steps aimed at limiting and subsequently reducing" strategic nuclear weapons. His remarks were not, however, cast in a bilateral US-Soviet context, and were downplayed in the Soviet central press. The Pravda report of his speech, for example, simply noted that Kuznetsov had called for the "limitation and stopping" of the nuclear weapons race, and it linked his remarks to longstanding Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament.

The domestic signals came in late June and early July, when both Gromyko and Brezhnev, in the space of a week, and using virtually identical language, noted that the United States and the USSR had agreed to "an exchange of opinions" on reducing offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Over the next few months, several other Soviet media commentaries also referred to the need for such an "exchange of opinions."

It is important to be precise concerning what had been placed on the public agenda. The Soviets, in this case, should be taken at their word. They agreed to an exchange of opinion on SALT, and nothing more. The debate that would break out in the Soviet Union over the
ensuing months and years made it clear that, in June, 1968, the USSR did not yet have an agreed position on the benefits of bilateral strategic nuclear arms control, let alone a clear position on SALT.20

Evidence from the central press bears out these points. Although Pravda carried in full the Supreme Soviet speech where Gromyko first explicitly raised the idea of SALT, it offered virtually no follow-up on the issue during the next weeks and months. Commentary on the subject was avoided on occasions when it would have been appropriate, or presented only in an indirect manner. An example of the former is the Pravda editorial that summarized Gromyko's Supreme Soviet speech. It reported none of Gromyko's references to strategic nuclear arms control and instead focused on his calls for general and complete disarmament.21 An example of the latter type of reporting is the Pravda commentary that reviewed the fall, 1968, session of the United Nations General Assembly. This report mentions in passing that during the session many states expressed support for the idea of US-Soviet talks on limiting strategic nuclear arms.22

Initial Responses to Agenda Change

The latter half of 1968 marked the beginning of the option-formulation stage of the Soviet SALT policy cycle. The elites had now publicly raised a new issue and -- whether they intended this or not -- had effectively invited input on SALT from other official actors -- the ministries -- and possibly unofficial actors such as IMEMO. During option formulation, these various institutions would be expected to play a greater role -- developing policy options on SALT-related issues. An
organizational politics perspective suggests they would address these issues in ways consistent with their previous experience and areas of expertise. Moreover, organizational conflict should now be present and observable. Raising SALT to the public agenda had made it a political issue with increasingly clear political implications (for example, of resource allocation and organizational prestige).

The validity of these assumptions will be examined by studying the behavior of three institutions. Among official participants, the key institutions are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Soviet military. At the unofficial level, the focus will again be the most important umbrella organization for social scientists working on foreign-policy issues: the Academy of Sciences' Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

**Official Participants**

**Ministerial Level - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.** During 1968, Foreign Minister Gromyko's public analyses of disarmament and arms-control issues, while remaining consistent with his earlier views, acquired both more detail and a more polemical tone. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet in late June, 1968, he cited statistics in support of disarmament and referred to the recently-concluded Nonproliferation Treaty as a foundation on which to base further arms-control efforts. He also harshly criticized the domestic and foreign opponents of disarmament and arms control, labeling them "good-for-nothing theoreticians who reproach us...that disarmament is an illusion."

Later in the year, Gromyko returned to the subject of SALT and
argued for a "serious exchange of opinion" with the United States on this issue.\textsuperscript{26} This call for a "serious exchange" -- made in a major speech at the United Nations -- and not merely an "exchange" of opinion set him apart from other participants in the discussion, who at this point continued to speak only of an "exchange." While this difference is small, it nonetheless suggests that Gromyko was a leading proponent of SALT negotiations in 1968.

This speech also provided evidence of heightening Soviet conflict over SALT. After attacking China for its general opposition to disarmament and arms control, Gromyko turned his anger towards those who engaged in "verbal fencing" and thereby slowed the development of arms-control proposals. The context indicates that the criticism was directed at his own compatriots -- most likely the Soviet military and other conservative analysts.\textsuperscript{27}

Ministerial Level -- Ministry of Defense. From an organizational perspective, the prospect of strategic arms control -- especially on offensive weapons -- was nothing but bad news for the Soviet military.\textsuperscript{28} Any SALT agreement would have adverse implications for its resource allocations and hinder the goal of strategic superiority over the West.\textsuperscript{29}

The military's response to the change in the agenda was twofold. Indirect criticism of SALT and its Soviet proponents\textsuperscript{30} was combined with a campaign to portray the United States as increasingly aggressive. The clearest example of indirect criticism came in a book review written in early September, 1968, by an Army colonel. He berated the authors of a Soviet book on war and peace for underestimating the difficulties of
realizing the Soviet disarmament program. In an allusion to SALT, he went on to attack the very concept of negotiated arms control, claiming it was impossible to agree that disarmament would result from "a calm discussion of this acute and complex question by representatives of opposing social systems."31

Portrayals of US imperialism as increasingly aggressive were intended to undercut the notion that the United States would be a trustworthy negotiating partner. While it is true that the Soviet military had always portrayed the United States as aggressive and militaristic, commentaries that began to appear in 1968 were notable both for their ominous and polemical tones and for their increasing divergence from the official views expounded in Pravda, Kommunist and speeches by various leaders.32

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. IMEMO's initial response to the changing public agenda was overwhelmingly influenced by its extant domains of expertise and its interest in promoting earlier established organizational goals. SALT was either ignored or linked to goals that IMEMO had previously promoted. As already seen, these goals included: advancing a more nuanced image of capitalism (and, more specifically, of policymaking in capitalist countries); promoting a more complex view of the international system; and arguing for a "scientific approach" to foreign-policy issues.

Throughout 1968, as the idea of SALT-like negotiations was added to the Soviet public agenda, IMEMO intensified its promotion of these three
goals. Previous innovations in its analyses of capitalism were further
developed. In one case, a leading IMEMO researcher advanced a
strikingly complex image of US foreign policymaking. Far from
portraying US policy as beholden to large monopolies, this analyst saw
the President as relying on his own foreign-policy advisors and on
"consultative groups" within the State Department when making important
decisions.33

This advocacy in favor of a more nuanced image of capitalism also
received forceful support from the Institute’s director, Nikolay
Inozemtsev. Foreshadowing arguments he would make in stronger terms in
subsequent years, he claimed that: the reactionary nature of imperialism
was mitigated by the "inevitable" strengthening of the democratic
struggle within imperialist countries34; the relationship between the
economy and politics of capitalism was much more complex than previously
thought (here, he explicitly attacked Stalin’s Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR)35; the capitalist economic system, in addition to
its well known tendency toward stagnation, contained an opposing
tendency toward progress and "rapid growth."36

Earlier innovative discussions on the nature of the international
system became even bolder. One scholar, in an extraordinary analysis
that foreshadowed the kinds of arguments made nearly 20 years later by
Mikhail Gorbachev, declared that the "political structure of the world"
had all the more come to resemble an "apartment house" (mnogokvartirnyy
dom) where the "common (obshchive) interests of security" would prevail
over the selfish inclinations of the individual apartment dwellers.37
This is a decidedly non-Leninist and, in fact, supra-class view of the
international system. The supra-class imagery was then applied to the
danger posed by nuclear war: It could bring about a disaster "common to
all mankind." Another article, published later in 1968, took another
tack and hinted that the growing complexity of the international system
required the establishment of a new science of international
relations.

One goal advocated more aggressively than any other was the need for
a more "scientific approach" to foreign policy. This topic was
addressed in numerous contexts. There were, as in the past,
unelaborated calls for a "scientific approach." In addition, however,
there were commentaries with specific proposals. IMEMO director
Inozemtsev, for example, argued the need for foreign-policy forecasting,
and noted that a group of researchers at IMEMO was devoting "serious
efforts" to such forecasts. Several Institute researchers used
analyses of what they portrayed as the growing role of specialist input
in the capitalist foreign-policy process implicitly to advocate the need
for it in the Soviet case. One analyst went so far as to claim that
such input had become a key feature of contemporary foreign policy and
diplomacy. This claim is all the more striking as it was not
specifically linked to capitalist foreign policymaking. In other words,
it should be a prominent part of socialist foreign policy as well.

This particular point of Institute advocacy was not only driven by
internal, organizational factors. Signals from the top-level of the
process played a role as well. In August, 1967, the CPSU Central
Committee issued a decree on the social sciences. The basic message
of the decree was that the leadership wanted better and more timely
analyses of foreign-policy issues from various institutions within the USSR Academy of Sciences. The decree did not call for the systematic integration of the foreign-policy community into the Soviet foreign-policy cycle. It was IMEMO researchers who made this point -- both before and after the decree was issued.

The striking aspect of IMEMO's initial reaction to the change in agenda in 1968 is precisely its lack of response to the major new agenda item -- SALT. Strategic arms control was, after all, the most significant new aspect of Soviet policy towards the United States in 1968. The issue gave IMEMO, as the main Soviet repository of expertise on the United States and, more generally, international affairs, an opportunity to expand its organizational domain in the area of security. It is evident, however, that IMEMO made little effort to do so through the end of the year.

The Institute in fact only published two articles on arms control and disarmament in 1968. While few in number, these articles were nonetheless important in two respects. For one, they were the first Institute publications to advocate -- however tentatively -- SALT-like negotiations. The techniques employed to accomplish this were quite creative. One article used a "dialogue" between two social scientists (an American and a senior IMEMO researcher) to raise and approvingly discuss negotiations on BMD and other armaments. The second article indirectly hinted at SALT by suggesting that the soon to be signed Nonproliferation Treaty "obligates" states to conduct negotiations with the aim of stopping the nuclear arms race (emphasis in the original). The treaty in fact contained no such language.
These articles were also notable for how they addressed the issue of arms control. In both cases, it was linked to long-standing concerns of Institute scholars. The Soviet participant in the "dialogue" article used the discussion of SALT-like negotiations to promote a basic goal of the Institute: the need for greater specialist input in the policy process.\textsuperscript{47} The other article used a previous IMEMO concern -- the risk of accidental nuclear war -- as the point of departure for its indirect advocacy. It was argued that the danger of such a war grew with the spread of nuclear weapons and that the Nonproliferation Treaty -- by stopping this spread -- would lessen the danger of accidental war (and force states to engage in nuclear arms control).\textsuperscript{48} As discussed in Chapter 1, this kind of "linking" is often observed when organizations grapple with unfamiliar issues.

Two factors appear to have been influencing the Institute's behavior at this point in the process. One was organizational in nature. IMEMO had very limited institutional expertise on issues of arms control and security. Moreover, its director, Nikolay Inozemtsev, was at this point evincing no interest in having the Institute begin to address such issues.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, even though IMEMO was now operating in the kind of turbulent environment where in theory one might expect it to innovate, this did not occur. The external stimulus to innovate was countered by the internal, organizational inability to respond rapidly to a changing environment -- that is, to a new issue on which the Institute had little expertise.\textsuperscript{50}

In addition to this "bottom-up," organizational factor, there was also a "top-down" influence on the Institute's behavior. Simply put,
the "signals" on SALT from the political elites were not terribly strong. References by Gromyko and Brezhnev to an "exchange of opinions" on SALT were in fact quite neutral and, at least in Gromyko's case, were sometimes watered down even further when reported in the central press. They provided no sense of a clear Soviet position on the value of strategic arms control. As will be seen, only when these elite "signals" on SALT grew more positive in 1970-71 did IMEMO begin to engage in aggressive pro-SALT advocacy.\(^5^1\)
Notes

1. In the discussion that follows, the analysis is limited to the views of CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev and Prime Minister Kosygin -- the two most dominant Politburo figures in the half dozen years after Khrushchev's ouster.

2. Compare, for example, Brezhnev's comments on the state of the Soviet economy at the September, 1967, and December, 1968, plenums of the Central Committee. Brezhnev (1975; 244-250, 371-76). For Kosygin's commentary on the economy during 1968, see Parrot (1983; Chapter 5).

3. Brezhnev (1975; 374-75). Also see Brezhnev (1968; 2) (a speech in Minsk in late December, 1968).

4. Parrot (1983; Chapter 5). For another example of advocacy in favor of this solution, see Vladimirov (1968).

5. On the former, see Breslauer (1982; 140-44). Parrot (1983; 182-85) provides evidence on the latter point.

6. Brezhnev (1975; 244-50). In this speech, Brezhnev listed a long series of measures for improving the Soviet people's standard of living in 1968, claiming that their implementation would cost "more than" 6 billion rubles. He also disclosed that the 1968 growth rate for Group B (consumer) goods was scheduled to exceed that for Group A (producer) goods.

7. In Kommunist, see especially Vladimirov (1968; 43-5). In the journal Kommunist vooružennykh sil (Kvs), see Larionov (1968; 16). In a noticeable break with earlier practice, Kvs began a series of articles in 1968 on the need to economize on various aspects of military spending. In addition to the Larionov article, see Dutov (1968), Cherepnichenko (1968) and Babakov (1968).

8. For evidence of the emerging elite/military consensus on constraining BMD, see Garthoff (1984b; 295-300) and Lepingwell (1988; 139-47). Lepingwell -- arguing from an organizational politics perspective -- sees the Soviet Air Defense Forces as the only military service dissenting from this elite/military consensus.

During the first half of 1968 and consistent with the interpretation posited here, the USSR stopped work on two of the six BMD complexes being built around Moscow. On this, see the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix.

9. See the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix.

10. See, especially, the speech by Mikhail Suslov, a Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member, in late April, 1968. Suslov argued that the anti-monopoly movement and other forms of mass struggle could in
fact "lead to the isolation" of the most aggressive groups in capitalist countries. Suslov (1968; 20). Fourteen months later, Brezhnev would articulate a further revision in the official Soviet image of capitalism and, in contrast to Suslov, explicitly link his discussion to changes in US foreign-policy behavior. See Chapter 5 below.

11. See the figures in the SALT I Chronology.

12. As the numbers in the chronology show, the USSR had no such bargaining power when the United States first broached the idea of bilateral strategic arms talks in early 1967.

13. For example, one IMEMO researcher -- writing in March, 1968 -- used an initial discussion of the Nonproliferation Treaty to legitimize his later advocacy of SALT. See Kalyadin (1968). This source will be discussed in more detail below.


18. This "convention" of Soviet politics -- that is, the persistent repetition of a particular phrase or word once an issue has reached the public agenda -- was still valid in the early years of the Gorbachev era. See Glickham (1986) for similar evidence concerning the foreign-policy initiatives Gorbachev placed on public agenda at the February, 1986, CPSU Party Congress.

19. As argued in Chapter 1, this very lack of specificity minimizes the potential for conflict within the political leadership -- that is, amongst the elites sitting in the CPSU CC Politburo -- during the period of agenda setting. I have found no evidence of Politburo disagreement on SALT during the months immediately before and after May-June, 1968. There is, however, evidence of such disagreements during the years 1969 and 1970. This will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 below.

20. One Soviet analyst has recently come to the same conclusion. See Sturua (1988; 29-30). Sturua is affiliated with IMEMO.


22. See Orekhov (1968).

23. From a policy-cycle perspective, greater detail in analysis is the result of an issue's movement into the stage of option formulation.

25. Gromyko followed this blast by declaring that "taking such a stance, you are joining forces with the most dyed-in-the-wool imperialist reaction, and weakening the front of the struggle against it." Gromyko (1978; 110). The setting of this speech, together with statements Gromyko would make later in the year, strongly suggest that his comments were directed internally as well as externally (that is, against the Chinese).


27. Gromyko (1978; 132). If the "verbal fencing" comment had been meant for the United States, Gromyko would have said this directly.

28. For contemporary Soviet evidence on this point, see Sturua (1988; 29-30).

29. This goal clearly still obtained in 1968. See, for example, Grudinin (1968; 17, 21-2), Cherednichenko (1968; 14) and Larionov (1968; 14).

30. The norms of Soviet political discourse in the late 1960s excluded direct criticism of issues the leadership had placed on the public agenda. These norms have changed significantly under Gorbachev.


32. For examples of this commentary by the military, see Peredovaya (1968); Kondratkov (1968) and Shelyag (1968; 24).

33. Lemin in "Yubileynoye zasedaniye..." (1968; 129).

34. Inozemtsev in "Yubileynoye zasedaniye..." (1968; 122) and Inozemtsev (1968; 8-9). Also see his comments in Ponomarev (1968, No.7; 104-6), where he gives this theoretical analysis a more practical flavor by arguing that there was a moderate grouping in the ruling circles of imperialist countries that favored a normalization of international relations.

35. Inozemtsev in "Yubileynoye zasedaniye..." (1968; 122) and Inozemtsev (1968; 5-6). The attack on Stalin appears in the former.

36. Inozemtsev (1968; 4-5). Both Marx and Lenin are used to justify this argument.

37. Sheynin (1968; 4-5). The textual (and conceptual) similarity to Gorbachev’s notion of a "common European home" is striking. Another Institute scholar echoed Sheynin’s analysis by arguing that the constraints imposed by the international system affected the foreign policy of all states. Lemin (1968; 20)
38. Sheynin (1968; 7). A disaster "common to all mankind" (obshchechestvocheskii) suggests that such a war would inflict equal damage to all countries, independent of their social system or class structure. This phrase, too, has become one of the buzzwords of Gorbachev's "new political thinking."

39. Gerashimov (1968). While Gerashimov does not explicitly call for the establishment of a science of international relations, this is the message implicit in his analysis. He accomplishes this subtle advocacy by providing an extensive review (the essay contains 39 footnotes -- an extraordinary number for a Memo article in the late 1960s) of the Western international-relations literature. Explicit calls for a Soviet "science of international relations" would only appear in 1969. See the discussion in Chapter 5.

40. See, for example, Lemin's comments in "Yubileynye zasedaniye..." (1968; 129).

41. Inozemtsev's comments in Ponomarev (1968, No.8; 81). Earlier at this same conference, Inozemtsev had echoed previous Institute writing on a "scientific approach" by calling for "concrete analysis of concrete situations" and a "genuinely realistic approach" in Soviet evaluations of the international arena. See Ponomarev (1968, No.7; 104).

42. Sheynin (1968; 11-13). Sheynin's comments focus on the State Department and what he calls "scientific centers" in the United States (the latter apparently refers to institutions such as RAND and Brookings). Also see Lemin in "Yubileynye zasedaniye..." (1968; 129), where he advocates a "scientific foreign policy" and discusses the role played by specialists in advising the State Department; and Gerashimov (1968; 17-18), where he uses a discussion of the US State Department's Policy Planning Council to examine (and advocate) the role of foreign-policy expertise in the policy process.

43. For the text of the decree, see Postanovleniya TsK KPSS (1967). The decree was reprinted in full in the September, 1967 issue of Memo. See also the Pravda editorial on the first anniversary of the decree, "Za novyy..." (1968). The August, 1967, decree was not the only sign of the leadership's desire to increase the quality and quantity of research on foreign-policy issues. Over the three years 1966-68, three new institutes were created within the Academy of Sciences: the Far East Institute (1966); the USA Institute (1967); and the Institute of the International Workers' Movement (1968). All three examined various aspects of foreign policy and world development. See Ruble (1981; 373-74, 394, 398).

44. The USA Institute had only been established the previous fall.

45. "Dialog..." (1968; 75). The two social scientists were Amitai Etzioni (the American) and Sergo Mikoyan.

47. "Dialog..." (1968; 75). In particular, Mikoyan called for greater specialist input on questions of war and peace. He referred to the process -- somewhat vaguely -- as the elaboration of political decisions.


49. For Inozemtsev’s public commentary during 1968, see Inozemtsev (1968), and his comments in both "Yubileynoe zasedaniye..." (1968) and Ponomarev (1968, No.7).

50. One former IMEMO researcher notes that, in any given year, it is extremely difficult for the Institute to modify its research agenda. Major research projects are approved only once yearly (in December), and any significant change in them requires cutting through a "considerable amount of red tape." Polsky (1987; 57, 67).

51. Evidence from the Gorbachev era as well indicates that leadership signals of agenda change have to be loud and clear for civilian actors in the policy process to respond on issues of security. This will be discussed in Chapter 10 below.
Chapter 5: 1969 - A Resistant Start to Option Formulation

For both the Soviets and Americans, the year 1969 marked a transition. In the USSR, it was a transition between a non-committal agreement to exchange opinions on the idea of strategic arms control and the concrete reality of actual negotiations. The dominant issue for the Soviets at this early point was not only the development of preliminary negotiating positions for SALT, but also the legitimacy of the very concept of bilateral strategic nuclear arms control. In the United States, 1969 marked a political transition -- from eight years of democratic leadership and policies to a new republican administration. The Nixon White House was just establishing itself. Its foreign-policy thinking and machinery, particularly during the first half of the year, were not yet "up to speed."1 Whether it was internal Soviet indecision or the reality of a new American administration just getting its feet wet, the two countries were slow to start their "exchange of opinions" on SALT. It was not until mid-November that agreement was reached to hold a "preliminary discussion of the questions involved."2

The behavior of several actors in the Soviet foreign-policy process also conveyed this sense of transition. As will be seen, the political elites had very little to say on SALT -- either positive or negative.3 This lack of "signals" gave other actors wide latitude in how -- or whether -- they would address SALT.

Official Participants

Politburo Level. Brezhnev's public commentary on SALT continued to be both neutral and infrequent throughout 1969.4 His most important
comments came in a major speech he gave in June to an international meeting of communist and workers’ parties. Not even mentioning the agreed upon “exchange of opinions,” Brezhnev simply declared that the USSR was ready to negotiate the “limitation and restraint” of nuclear arms.⁵

The speech is more important for the new issue -- the image of capitalism -- it raised to the public agenda. Clearly linking this issue with the original one (SALT), Brezhnev distinguished between the moderate and aggressive circles influencing the formation of American foreign policy and portrayed the moderate tendency as inclined to search “for mutually acceptable solutions” of complex international problems. He declared that Soviet foreign policy must take account the existence of this moderate tendency, and then went on to stress the USSR’s readiness to negotiate limitations on nuclear arms.⁶ The way this new issue was raised and linked to SALT strongly suggests that it had been forced onto the public agenda by the military’s (and other conservatives’) negative response to SALT -- that is, their attempts to portray the United States as increasingly aggressive and militaristic.

It should be noted that the image of capitalism articulated here by Brezhnev differed in important ways from that pronounced by the leadership as recently as the previous year. Brezhnev was in fact adopting the framework of analysis advanced by numerous INEMO scholars since the early 1960s. That is, his starting point was not the normative Marxist notion of class struggle,⁷ but the empirically verified existence of differing “tendencies” in American foreign policy. Moreover, the very fact that Brezhnev had spoken of “the formation of
foreign policy" would surely please Institute researchers who for years had argued -- implicitly and explicitly -- that there was such a process behind American foreign behavior.

The central Party press -- Pravda and Kommunist -- very slowly began to address both SALT and the changing official image of capitalism as 1969 progressed. In Pravda, there were occasional references to SALT throughout the year, but these tended to be brief, matter of fact and neutral in tone, and came in the form of reports by Pravda journalists or TASS dispatches. During the early months of 1969, SALT was mentioned rarely and only in passing. By June, the coverage, while still very infrequent, had become a bit more substantive. The end of the year saw Pravda publish several factual reports on the preliminary round of the SALT talks (held in November-December), and its first clearly pro-SALT, advocacy article.

The "signals" from the journal Kommunist were more ambiguous. In the case of SALT, there was only one clear allusion to it during the entire year: an editorial -- echoing Brezhnev’s June speech -- that linked SALT with a more nuanced image of capitalist foreign policymaking. On the specific issue of the image of capitalism, Kommunist, particularly toward the end of the year, published other commentaries that aggressively rebutted this more nuanced image. One article, for example, declared that the basic thrust of US foreign policy remained the all-out preparation for "total nuclear war."

The above indicates that as of late 1969 the political elites had yet to articulate a clear position on SALT. The absence of "signals" allowed internal dynamics to dominate the behavior of several other
actors in the emerging Soviet SALT policy debate. It allowed them, in particular, to promote goals in which they, and not necessarily the political leadership, had a vested interest.

Ministerial Level — Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The behavior of the Ministry contrasts markedly with that of IMEMO at this early phase of option formulation. The Ministry was clearly not as hindered by the lack of clear signals from the leadership on SALT. As already argued, the prospect of East-West negotiations fit well with the Ministry’s own sense of organizational mission; it therefore had strong incentives to argue in favor of SALT. This is in fact precisely what the Ministry did throughout 1969.

In January, when other actors in the process had virtually nothing to say on SALT, the Ministry issued a statement, entitled "Toward Further Progress in Resolving the Problem of Disarmament," that amounted to an extraordinary piece of pro-SALT advocacy. Using forceful language, it began by declaring that agreements on "limitations of the nuclear weapons race" were "really implementable" (real'no osushchestvʲëmyje). After discussing the Nonproliferation Treaty, the statement returned to SALT and approvingly cited United Nations support for the idea of US-Soviet strategic arms talks. It concluded by noting the USSR’s readiness "to start a serious exchange of opinions on this important question." As striking as the content of the statement was its timing: It was issued just hours before the inauguration of Richard Nixon as US President. A more obvious signal could not have been sent.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, too, continued and intensified his support for strategic nuclear arms control, and, in the process, sketched out a
more concrete Soviet position on SALT. In a July, 1969, speech to the
Supreme Soviet, he made his strongest statement yet in favor of SALT.\textsuperscript{17}
Noting that the arms race had become a "folly," he gave a fairly
detailed and sophisticated analysis of its dynamics and argued that SALT
was the way to reduce the dangers of accidental nuclear war.\textsuperscript{18} Gromyko
going on to deliver a stinging rebuke to Soviet opponents of SALT,
expressing the hope that "both" of the superpowers would take the idea
of strategic nuclear arms limitations seriously.\textsuperscript{19} In the Soviet
context, it was extremely unusual to imply any kind of equivalency
between the United States and the USSR.

\textbf{Ministerial Level - Ministry of Defense.} The Soviet military
continued both to remain reticent on the issue of SALT and actively to
promote a very aggressive image of capitalism. Military analysts
avoided any direct mention or even allusion to SALT in cases where other
actors in the process had begun -- however tentatively -- to address it.
For example, one military writer, in a brief discussion of the USSR's
disarmament proposals, failed to mention the reduction and elimination
of nuclear weapons as one of them.\textsuperscript{20} In another case, a commentator
reviewed the American debate over BMD, but, in contrast to other Soviet
commentary, made no connection to SALT. He also managed to quote Nixon
to the effect that the US planned to continue the nuclear arms race.\textsuperscript{21}

There was, however, one extraordinary instance where an important
and semi-classified military journal presented SALT in a positive light
and articulated a much more moderate image of capitalism. The article,
published in April, 1969, in the General Staff journal \textit{Voenennaya mysl'},
was unusual not only because of its content but because of its author.
It was written by Anatoliy Gromyko, a senior researcher at the recently established USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences (ISKAN). This effort to overcome military opposition appeared to have little effect as the military continued to present an extremely aggressive image of capitalism. Two senior military officials, for example, portrayed the capitalist system and its intentions toward the USSR in very negative terms -- with one declaring that the imperialists were "feverishly preparing for a new world war." 

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. Throughout this period, IMEMO responded much as it had in the latter half of 1968, showing relatively little concern for the new public agenda item, SALT, and rather more concern for promoting goals which allowed it to advance its own sense of organizational mission.

There was, for example, continuing interest in promoting a more complex image of capitalism and its foreign-policy process. In one extraordinary piece of advocacy, an Institute scholar disputed the validity of traditional Soviet notions of the "ruling elite" in capitalist countries. Writing in the Institute's journal, Memo, he stated at the very outset his clear opposition to the predominant official view that the capitalist ruling elite was composed of little more than the financial oligarchs of big business. In fact, Soviet scholars (and by implication the political leadership) had to examine the role of "other ruling groups" in addition to this elite. It was not enough to study different groupings or tendencies within the ruling elite, as other IMEMO researchers had done. The Institute needed to
move beyond this kind of analysis.\textsuperscript{25}

Later in the article, the author sought to explain how these various "groups" interacted to make policy. He described policymaking\textsuperscript{26} in the United States as a "complicated process including preparation, discussion, the decision itself, and observation of its fulfillment."\textsuperscript{27} There were two sets of actors in this process: those who "adopt decisions" and those who, while playing little or no role in making the actual decisions, still exert "real influence" on policy.\textsuperscript{28} This analysis was both more sophisticated than earlier Institute-sponsored writing on the topic and stood in marked contrast with official Soviet thinking.\textsuperscript{29}

Another Institute scholar also examined the US foreign-policy process, but employed a different level of analysis. He was concerned not so much with defining the process, but the role of key individuals within it. After analyzing the views of such key members of the new Nixon administration as William Rogers, Melvin Laird and Henry Kissinger, and of Nixon himself, he came to the conclusion that these individuals favored a "political approach to international negotiations."\textsuperscript{30} The unstated but obvious conclusion was that a more cooperative Soviet-American relationship was possible.

If the author had stopped at this point, he would have been vulnerable to the following kind of criticism: "While it is fine and good that these particular men hold progressive views, they are not the ones really making policy. That is the province of the big financial monopolies." As if anticipating this argument, the author concluded by making a more general point: The views of these men did matter because
they could directly and positively influence the "formation" of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{31}

It should be emphasized that this article, too, demonstrated empirical and conceptual development in IMEMO's studies of capitalist policymaking. They were becoming more data-oriented and relying ever less on a Marxist-Leninist conceptual framework. Four years earlier, when Johnson had been elected president, the Institute had produced no such detailed analysis examining the views and influence of individuals on US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{32}

During 1969, IMEMO dramatically increased its earlier advocacy in favor of a complex and nuanced vision of the international system. Building on their earlier discussions of this issue, a series of Institute scholars -- from Inozemtsev on down -- forcefully made the case for why IMEMO's image of the international system was the correct one. This message came across so forcefully in part because the Institute, in contrast with its earlier practices, produced a series of related commentaries on this topic in its journal, Memo. This "roundtable," as it was called, occupied approximately 40 pages in the September and November, 1969, issues of Memo.\textsuperscript{33}

Two basic themes emerged from the roundtable.\textsuperscript{34} The first was that the growing complexity of the international system required -- indeed demanded -- greater theoretical and empirical rigor in Soviet foreign-policy research. The second theme, to be discussed below, was that this increasing complexity required more active participation by Soviet foreign-policy specialists in the policy process.

Advocacy on the first point was accomplished in various ways. Most
important were the first explicit calls for a Soviet "science of international relations." The theoretical and empirical basis of this new "science," it was strongly implied, should rely less on traditional Marxist-Leninist categories and more on Western theories and methodologies of international relations.

In addition, several participants in the roundtable described in very forceful and blunt language what they saw as the realities of the international system -- realities that made a mockery of official Soviet views. For example, Dmitriy Tomashevskiy, head of the Institute's International Relations Department, talked of the "globalization" and increasingly "universal" (vsemirnyy) character of international relations, of the "thesis," advanced by the USSR even before World War II (!), on the "indivisibility of the world." He went on to discuss the growing number of international problems that "objectively" required inter-state cooperation "independent of differences in social system." Another scholar declared that the advent of nuclear weapons had made clear the "inadequacy of models of international relations" based on "zero-sum" approaches.

It would be a bit of an understatement to note that these various analyses bore little relation to the assumptions and methodologies posited in the Leninist theory of imperialism; nor did they find reflection in the views of the political leadership. What explains the extraordinary advocacy by IMEMO on this issue during 1969? Before venturing an answer, it is instructive to examine the Institute's behavior during 1969 on another of its core goals -- the need for a "scientific approach" in foreign policy.
Concerning this particular goal, the most notable difference between 1969 and earlier years was that Institute director Inozemtsev gave it unambiguous and forceful backing. In his contribution to the roundtable mentioned above, Inozemtsev engaged in some extraordinary advocacy — arguing for both an improved scientific basis for Soviet foreign policy and an enhanced role for specialists in the foreign-policy process. Observing that the "mechanism" of policymaking, including foreign policymaking, had grown very complex, Inozemtsev argued that capitalist countries had responded by raising the level of scientific research undergirding their foreign-policy activity, and that the "brain trusts" who did this research were an important part of the foreign-policy apparat. Moreover, these researchers participated in the "mechanism of adoption of [foreign-policy] decisions" and their reports "nourished" (pitayut) the thoughts of the leaders of the capitalist countries.  

Inozemtsev's next set of comments made crystal clear that the real purpose of his analysis of capitalist foreign policymaking was to establish a justification for how the Soviet foreign-policy process should operate. Arguing that a scientifically-based policy was impossible without "forecasting" (prognozirovaniya), he declared that such forecasting made no sense in the absence of a "scientific system for the utilization of expert evaluations." These experts were none other than "our scientific workers" — that is, researchers at IMEMO and possibly other institutes. Inozemtsev concluded by noting that the creation of this "scientific system" would assist the resolution of many "practical" foreign-policy problems.  

While Inozemtsev's advocacy was the most direct and his message the
most clear, other IMEMO scholars and editorial commentary in the Institute’s journal Memo made many of the same points throughout the year. While these sources vary widely in their degree of advocacy, they all were more direct and detailed than earlier Institute writing on a "scientific" foreign policy and specialist participation in the policy process.41

To return to the question posed above: Why the noticeable change in Institute behavior during 1969? Of the three core organizational goals it had developed over a number of years, two were promoted very aggressively while the other (the image of capitalism) was advocated with less intensity, but still at a level higher than that of previous years. Something, it is clear, was motivating IMEMO to behave in this way.

There are two basic alternative explanations for this pattern of behavior, and they are best illuminated by considering one particular example: the Institute’s advocacy in favor of a complex, empirically-based vision of the international system. One explanation suggests that the political elites encouraged and "sponsored" advocacy by IMEMO on this particular issue. In effect, this is a "top-down" explanation.42 A second one, however, adopts a "bottom-up" perspective and argues that the Institute’s advocacy is best understood as a function of organizational dynamics.

The first explanation appears unconvincing on several accounts. For one, commentary by Brezhnev and other members of the elite during 1969 clearly did not reflect this complex and essentially non-Leninist view of the international system. In fact, it would be over 15 years before
members of the political elite would adopt the language and framework of analysis utilized in the writings of such IMEMO scholars as Tomashevskiy. In addition, if the political elites had encouraged IMEMO's advocacy on this point, then one might expect a journal such as Kommunist, which is controlled by the elites, also to echo this vision of international relations. Yet at virtually the same time as the IMEMO-sponsored roundtable, where Inozemtsev was arguing a need to further study and learn from "bourgeois and reformist" theories of international relations, Kommunist ran an article harshly attacking such theories.

Finally, if IMEMO scholars had the backing of important members of the political elite in promoting their nuanced, complex world view, one would expect these scholars to be consistent in espousing it. After all, there would be no need to hide or repress their views for fear of being attacked by Party ideologues. Yet one promoter of a clearly non-Leninist world view at the roundtable -- Dmitriy Tomashevskiy -- did in fact hide his real opinions in a Kommunist article published at virtually the same time as the roundtable. In this article, Tomashevskiy clearly felt it necessary "to toe the line" and present a very traditional -- in the Soviet context -- explanation of the outbreak of World War II. That is, it was an explanation built on a class-based, Leninist analysis of imperialism's inherent aggressiveness. There was no hint of the supra-class terminology and framework of analysis Tomashevskiy would utilize in his contribution to the roundtable.

The second -- organizational -- explanation of the Institute's behavior seems more plausible and is based on a recognition of several
facts. First, IMEMO, as an organization, had an interest, developed over a number of years, in promoting a more rigorous, complex and empirically-based vision of the international system. Promoting such a vision allowed it to further its own sense of organizational mission. Moreover, if the political leadership were to accept this vision, the Institute, by virtue of its position as the repository of such expertise, could hope to play a greater role in Soviet foreign policymaking -- gaining prestige and, possibly, additional resources as a result.

Second, the notable change in IMEMO's behavior (that is, higher levels of advocacy) during 1968-69 on the issue of the nature of the international system -- as well as on its other two dominant institutional goals -- strongly suggests an organizationally-motivated response to the placement of SALT on the public agenda. The Institute self-interestedly promoted those issues in which it had expertise (in one case -- the need for a "scientific approach" in foreign policy -- clearly being mobilized by director Inozemtsev), and gave only secondary consideration to an issue such as SALT where it lacked extant expertise.

Third, as already shown, this "bottom-up," organizational response was facilitated by lack of clear direction from the political leadership. This state of affairs would change considerably over the course of 1970-71, and the result would be a much more complex pattern of Institute behavior.

This "pure" organizational analysis of IMEMO's behavior -- while offering a stronger explanation than the first one discussed above -- requires some modification. For one, I do not mean to suggest there was
absolutely no "top-down" component behind the Institute's behavior. It is quite possible that other actors aside from the political elites -- for example, members of the staffs of these elites or the leadership of the Academy of Sciences -- were prodding IMEMO to promote its particular view of the international system. If this were the case, the strictly IMEMO-generated, organizational component would be reduced, but not eliminated.

A more important modification, however, involves making clear the relationship between two distinct but related sets of interests within IMEMO: the individual interests of particular scholars and IMEMO's overall institutional interests. Social scientists at IMEMO (and elsewhere) during the late 1960s certainly had an interest in freeing their scholarly studies from the dogma and constraints of Marxist-Leninist ideology -- hence, their promotion of a decidedly non-Marxist world view. From this (individual) perspective, the publication of these scholars' views was simply a reflection of their desire for individual intellectual autonomy and the fact that their superiors within the Institute agreed with such analyses.

The manner in which these analyses were published and their overall content, however, suggest that institutional-organizational as well as individual interests were at work. The analyses, it will be recalled, were grouped together in a "roundtable" format. It was almost as if the Institute wanted to declare itself the repository for such expertise. More important, in many of the articles in the "roundtable" (and elsewhere), Institute scholars combined their advocacy in favor of a more complex, empirically-based vision of the international system with
calls for a greater role in the foreign-policy process for IMEMO. In other words, organizational interests -- promoting IMEMO's role in the process -- were present as well as the simple scholarly desire to publish personal viewpoints and research.

This image of aggressive organizational advocacy must be modified, however, when one considers IMEMO's treatment of security and arms-control issues during 1969. These issues continued to come in a poor second to the core organizational goals discussed above. Indeed, during 1969, there was only one article clearly advocating that the Institute take a more serious interest in security issues such as SALT.\textsuperscript{51} This article did nonetheless represent an important change for the Institute. It ran as the lead article in the February issue of Memo and was written by Aleksey Nikonov, a researcher in the Institute's Department of International Relations.\textsuperscript{52} Nikonov called for civilian (that is, IMEMO-based) research on both military affairs, including military strategy and military science, and international security, including arms control.

This was the first time that the Institute had ever publicly made such a claim. In essence, the article attempted to move IMEMO beyond its traditional studies of disarmament, which for years had focused on such issues as the economic cost of the arms race in capitalist countries, the role of the military-industrial complex in fanning such races and the importance of military force in US foreign policy.

Instead of these traditional concerns, Nikonov argued that institutions such as IMEMO should develop expertise on what might best be called "Soviet strategic studies." He declared that Soviet
"specialist-internationalists" (spetsialisti-mezdunarodniki) should study, among other issues, the problem of "international security," military strategy, and the "military-technical" side of the revolution in military affairs and of nuclear wars fought with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This amounted to an extraordinary challenge to the prerogatives and role of one particular Soviet institution: the military. For many years, and especially after Khrushchev's interventions into military affairs in the early 1960s, the Soviet military had purposefully developed a whole branch of knowledge -- military science -- for reasons that included insulating from outside interference the very topics Nikonov listed.

From an organizational-politics perspective, Nikonov was essentially picking a "turf battle" with the Soviet military. By publicly broaching the possibility of strategic arms control, the political leadership had inevitably accorded it a degree of legitimacy, and motivated various institutions to address the issue. Nikonov clearly felt that civilians -- as well as the military -- should be engaged in this process of developing SALT policy options.

The first "shot" in this "turf battle" came with Nikonov's declaration that military strategy was "fully dependent" on politics. State policy, in other words, defined the tasks of military strategy. Strictly speaking, this is correct since the tasks of military strategy are set by military doctrine, and the latter is the domain of the Soviet political leadership.

This initial shot, however, was soon followed by a cannon blast. "Naturally," Nikonov noted, research on the "purely military-technical"
side of various security issues fell within the competence of military
science. This was a statement the Soviet military could certainly
support. It turned out, though, that there was a need for close
cooperation between military science and what Nikonov was calling
"science on international relations."  

Such cooperation, he declared, was mandated by two facts. At a
general level, it was necessary because both sciences researched
problems having a direct bearing on Soviet foreign policy. More
specifically, though, it was needed since the purely military aspects of
strategy were being reduced in an era when the ties among the military,
technical, economic and socio-political aspects of Soviet external
behavior were growing ever closer. This fact placed under doubt the
wisdom of allowing problems of military strategy to be elaborated "only
by military specialists."  

It is important to note that Nikonov's call for new areas of
research was explicitly linked to IMEMO's long-standing goal of
establishing a more "scientific" basis for the study of the
international system. In other words, the new issue on the agenda,
SALT, was being "piggybacked" onto the Institute's extant goals and
missions. This phenomenon, which would occur several more times
during 1970-71, is further evidence of an organizational-politics
component in IMEMO's initial response to SALT.

While the analysis presented in this one article is quite
extraordinary, the evidence indicates it did not lead IMEMO to
significantly rethink or expand its dominant areas of organizational
expertise. As will be seen, the three years following the article's

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publication did see the Institute take an increasing interest in SALT and, more generally, arms-control issues. This, however, was a far cry from the kinds of research called for in the article. In fact, it would be another decade and a half before "Soviet strategic studies" took root at IMEMO.

How, then, should one explain the appearance of this article and that its calls for organizational domain expansion were never heeded? Was Nikonov the spokesman for an emerging consensus among the Institute's leaders that IMEMO should begin to address more rigorously issues of international security -- a consensus vetoed by actors at higher levels in the political system? Or, was his article more an expression of personal views -- views which were never acted upon because they strayed too far from IMEMO's own sense of organizational mission? A definitive answer to this question is not possible, but the evidence points to the second explanation: that Nikonov was a "policy entrepreneur" attempting to make his personal agenda an integral part of IMEMO's institutional agenda as well. Current researchers at IMEMO point to Nikonov, who was born in 1925, as one of the founding fathers of its interest in strategic studies. In fact, by the late 1970s, he had risen to be chief of the Institute's military-affairs section.

To understand why Nikonov's "entrepreneurial skills" failed him, one must again consider the interaction between individual and institutional interests within IMEMO. If in the case of advancing a complex image of the international system these two sets of interests coincided, then in Nikonov's case there appeared to be considerably less agreement between personal and institutional interests. While it is true that Nikonov
linked his advocacy for new areas of research to a long-standing Institute goal (the need for a more "scientific" approach to the study of the international system), in reality what he was proposing amounted to a dramatic change for IMEMO and a modification of its own sense of organizational mission. Given this fact, Nikonov needed allies within or possibly outside IMEMO to carry the day.

Such allies, however, were clearly lacking. No other Institute writing during 1969 addressed SALT in this way (or, for that matter, in any way) and editorial commentary in the Institute’s journal Memo offered no support for the views contained in the article. This behavior stands in marked contrast to that on issues closer to IMEMO’s core areas of expertise. In these cases, advocacy was not limited to one researcher, and commentary by Inozemtsev as well as editorial remarks in Memo lent further support to the advocacy of individual writers.

To sum up this interpretation of Nikonov’s article and to link it to the arguments made in Chapter 1, the following points can be made. Nikonov the "policy entrepreneur" failed for a number of reasons. For one, he did not have a strong bureaucratic base within IMEMO and lacked supporters within the Institute -- particularly among its leadership. Institute director Inozemtsev, who consistently emerges during these years as a strong supporter of IMEMO’s institutional goals, had little apparent interest in seeing it expand into strategic studies. In fact, throughout the key years of option formulation on SALT (1969-71), he never gave his support to the kind of domain expansion called for by Nikonov. Moreover, outside the Institute -- that is, among the
Brezhnev leadership -- there is no evidence of support for Nikonov's desire to allow civilians to "enter the fray" and develop policy options on military-technical and other issues of international security.67

The publication, under IMEMO's auspices, of a book-length monograph on disarmament issues in the last months of 1969 confirms the existence of a wide gulf between the research agenda advocated in Nikonov's article and what the Institute was actually able to accomplish in the area of security studies.68 While the book marked an advance over previous Institute-sponsored books on disarmament,69 its 16 chapters were still dominated by topics IMEMO had traditionally addressed when considering security issues. These included, among others, the socio-economic costs of the arms race; the role of military force in US foreign policy and military doctrine; the danger of nuclear proliferation; Soviet proposals for "general and complete disarmament"; attacks on the US concept of "arms control" (as opposed to disarmament); and the danger of accidental nuclear war.70 Moreover, of the three most informed and sophisticated contributions to the book, two were written not by typical IMEMO researchers, but by former military officers who had recently joined the Institute.71

Research of this type clearly did not provide a very solid conceptual or empirical basis for the development of strategic studies at IMEMO.72 In addition, the book's relatively small print run suggests that disarmament studies of any type -- traditional or new -- were still a low priority for the Institute.73

The above analysis leaves one final puzzle to address: How did Nikonov manage to get his advocacy published as a lead article in Memo?
There are several probable reasons. First, as seen in this and earlier chapters, *Memo* was often the forum for unorthodox -- in the Soviet context -- views. Second, to get his views published -- particularly in such a prominent place in the journal -- Nikonov probably had to have a connection to *Memo* editor-in-chief Khavinson, who played a key role in determining the journal's contents. Khavinson had a reputation for having a keen sense of appreciation for the prevailing "political winds." Given the improving state of Soviet-American relations in early 1969, he may have seen relatively little harm in publishing an article whose pro-arms control stance was very much in tune with those improving relations.
Notes

1. Moreover, it was initially quite skeptical of SALT. Newhouse (1973; 41, 45).

2. See the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix. The preliminary talks were held from November 17 to December 22. The actual negotiations began in April, 1970.

3. "Positive" refers to elite commentary reinforcing the public -- rather neutral -- agenda setting. "Negative" means open elite disagreement on SALT.

4. Prime Minister Kosygin also maintained a neutral stance toward SALT during 1969. For example, in an interview carried in Pravda in early January, he listed the next "concrete steps" for Soviet disarmament policy in the wake of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the last of the four steps was the "limitation and subsequent reduction" of strategic nuclear weapons and "the like." (The first three were a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, a ban on underground nuclear tests and the liquidation of foreign military bases.) See Kosygin (1969).

5. Brezhnev (1970, Volume II; 413). Moreover, this brief and neutral allusion to SALT only came after Brezhnev had discussed -- and favorably commented upon -- the Nonproliferation Treaty and Soviet proposals for collective security in Europe and Asia.


7. As had been the case in an important speech moderating the official image of capitalism given by Politburo member Mikhail Suslov in April, 1968. See Note 10 in Chapter 4 above.

8. As will be seen, this contrasts markedly with the long, authoritative and pro-SALT commentary found in Pravda during 1970-71.

9. Strel’nikov (1969a) [16 January], in an article devoted to President Johnson’s State of the Union Address, reported that Johnson had called for a renewal of Soviet-American discussions on SALT. Kolesnichenko (1969) [26 January] noted (very briefly) that SALT had been discussed at a recent news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both Strel’nikov and Kolesnichenko were Pravda correspondents.

10. Strel’nikov (1969b) [June 10] reviewed the US debate over the Safeguard BMD system and portrayed the American people as impatiently asking why the SALT negotiations had not yet begun. This was the only Pravda article to address SALT during the entire month of June.

these early negotiations in very favorable terms. The title of his article declares them a "positive step."

Despite this increase in coverage toward the end of the year, there were still surprising omissions in Pravda's reporting. For example, a long, two-page article, which summarized the year's major foreign-policy events, did not mention or even allude to SALT. Bragin (1969) [28 December]. Bragin in fact had come closer to mentioning SALT a year earlier when, in a similar year-end wrap up, he noted the USSR's desire to "limit the arms race" and its proposals for the "reduction of armaments." Bragin (1968) [29 December].

12. "Politika mira i..." (1969: 21-2). This unsigned editorial, sent to press roughly one month after Brezhnev's speech, called for "limiting the arms race ... most of all in nuclear and rocket [weapons]." This was followed by a declaration that the USSR's "scientific understanding" of the contemporary world allowed it to appreciate "different tendencies and nuances" in the foreign policy of capitalist states -- including a "more moderate" tendency inclined to seek negotiated solutions to various international problems.

In only one other case did Kommunist even indirectly hint at SALT during 1969. This hint came in the "basic document" adopted by the international communist meeting and reprinted in one of the June issues of the journal. In discussing the Nonproliferation Treaty, the document portrayed it as one "link in a chain of measures" leading to nuclear disarmament. It was left to the reader to infer that SALT might be another such "link." See "Zadachi bor'by protiv ..." (1969; 26).

13. Shabad (1969; 113). The title of this article, "Ideology of Militarism and Aggression," provides a foretaste of the hard-line analysis that follows.

14. While not casting his analysis in terms of organizational behavior and goals, Arkady Shevchenko in fact has made the same point. See Shevchenko (1985).

15. TASS (1969a). The statement was read by Leonid Zamyatin, head of the Ministry's Press Department. Zamyatin was a career MID employee who had worked both in the central apparatus of the Ministry and in various embassy postings since 1946. On Zamyatin, see Andrey Gromyko et.al., (1984, Volume I; 376).

16. TASS (1969a). This last comment echoed Foreign Minister Gromyko's earlier (October, 1968) call for a "serious exchange."


18. Gromyko's analysis of the possibility of accidental nuclear war, along with his stress on humanity losing the ability to control events,
is strikingly similar to the conclusions Gorbachev would come to nearly 20 years later. See Gorbachev (1986b; 87).

19. Gromyko would reiterate most of these points in a speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April, 1970. Gromyko (1978; 203-4).


21. Petrov (1969; 82, 84). Both this article and the one by Forofonov were published in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil.

22. Anatoliy Gromyko (1969). Gromyko, the son of Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, was at this point head of a sector at the USA Institute.

In addition to the Gromyko article, there was one other curious publication in a military journal during 1969. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, in one of its June issues, carried an unsigned article describing the activities of the Geneva-based Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The article devoted significant (for a military journal) attention to various Soviet disarmament and arms control proposals -- including one for "limitations and reductions" of nuclear weapons. See "Komitet 18 ..." (1969; 83-85). While the editors, in an introductory paragraph, claimed the article was in response to letters from several readers, it is more probable that, like the Gromyko article, it represented an unwanted intervention in the military's affairs.

23. Grechko (1969; 21) and Yepishev (1969; 68). The quote is from Yepishev. Grechko was Minister of Defense and Yepishev was head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. Also see Khalipov (1969).

24. Galkin (1969; 74). Galkin was certainly not the first IMEMO scholar to assert this point. The distinguishing feature here is that he states this point of view directly and at the beginning of his analysis. This boldness sets the stage for the advocacy that follows.


26. What he calls the adoption of political decisions.

27. In other words, a policy cycle! Galkin (1969; 76).

28. Galkin (1969; 76-77). This second set of actors is not identified as the analysis is cast in very theoretical terms. Galkin's description of this second set may very well have been influenced by his perception of the role played by scholars like himself in Soviet policymaking.

29. Galkin, for example, was going well beyond the type of analysis offered by Brezhnev in his speech to the June, 1969, international communist meeting. See above.


32. See the discussion in Chapter 3. For other Institute-sponsored writing during 1969 that stressed the complexity of US policymaking, see Zhurkin (1969) and Shamberg (1969). Zhurkin, who at this point was a sector chief at the recently established USA Institute (Dash [1982; A-190]), uses a discussion of the Vietnam war to argue that a series of "long-term" factors were beginning to influence the "formation" of US foreign policy and giving it a more moderate and "sober" character. The really striking feature of Zhurkin's analysis is that he uses the war in Vietnam as his vehicle for advocating a more cooperative US-Soviet relationship. During this period (when US involvement in Vietnam was still quite significant), other analysts who favored improved relations with the US avoided -- for obvious reasons -- any mention of Vietnam. It was in fact the opponents of improved relations who most often discussed the war.

Shamberg provides a detailed picture of the domestic and foreign policy debates early in the Nixon administration. He portrays "heated" debates and "bitter opposition" on a series of issues, and certainly does not convey a monolithic, top-down view of US policymaking.

33. The roundtable was entitled "Problems of the Theory of International Relations" and was sponsored by IMEMO's Sector for Theoretical Problems of Research and Forecasting of International Relations (which was a part of the Institute's larger Department of International Relations) and the editorial board of Memo. It had twelve participants, eight of whom worked at IMEMO. See "Problemy teorii..." (1969, Nos.9 & 11).

34. Lynch (1987; 43-48) provides a useful introduction to the roundtable.

35. In the roundtable, see the discussions by Inozemtsev, Gantman, Pechenev, and the editorial summary in "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 89), "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 96-99), "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 103-106) and "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.11; 97-98), respectively. For an explicit call in favor of this new "science" earlier in 1969, see Nikonor (1969; 5). Also see the chapter by A.V. Sergiyev, an IMEMO researcher, in Borisov, et al. (1969; Chapter 4), a book signed to press in mid-July, 1969. Sergiyev describes the imperialist "science of international relations," but his neutral and at times very positive tone makes clear that the analysis is relevant for the Soviet Union as well.

36. In the roundtable, see, especially, the commentaries by Inozemtsev, Gantman, Kondakov, Razmerov, Yermolenko, and Petrovskaya, in "Problemy teorii..." (1969, Nos. 9 & 11). Inozemtsev calls for a "comprehensive theory of international relations" and asserts that it should utilize the data and methods of economics, sociology, military science, law, geography, demography, and social psychology, as well as make use of
"quantitative methods of analysis." He also declares that Soviet scholars must further study the "systems and structures" of the contemporary international arena. Gantman argues in favor of a "systems analysis" approach in the study of international relations, while Yermolenko and Petrovskaya examine the role of mathematical methods and game theory in it.

Needless to say, these analyses read less like a primer on scientific communism, and more like an introductory textbook on Western theories of international relations.

37. "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 94-95). As will be seen, Tomashevskiy's analysis is virtually identical to that offered by Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders in the mid-1980s when they talk of the "global problems" facing mankind. The main difference is that Tomashevskiy's comments were made 17 years earlier!


40. "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No. 9; 91). He went on to suggest that if specialists at IMEMO and elsewhere were to play a greater role in the foreign-policy process, they needed access to more and better quality information. Specifically, Inozemtsev argued that Soviet foreign policy had to make better use of what he called "international information" if it was to avoid superficial evaluations. In addition, he evinced concern for how institutions such as IMEMO used the information to which they did have access — calling for more serious study of "information processes" and "foreign-policy information." "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 91-92).

41. See, for example, Razmerov's comments in "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.11; 85-88); Nikonov (1969; 5, 12-14); the editorial summary in "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.11; 97-98); the chapter by A.V. Sergiyev in Borisov, et al. (1969; 110-147); the analysis by M.S. Voslenkii in IMEMO Akademii nauk SSSR (1970; 303-304) (a book signed to press in November, 1969); and "Zhiznennyi tvorchestv put'..." (1969; 15).

Razmerov and Sergiyev note how closer and more systematic ties between foreign-policy research centers and governments in the US and Western Europe have benefited the foreign policies of those states. Nikonov, the editorial summary and Voslenkii directly call for an expanded role for Soviet foreign-policy specialists. "Zhiznennyi i..." explicitly attacks earlier political interference in the work of IMEMO.
42. Parrot (1983; 194-97) adopts this perspective by arguing that IMEMO's persistent advocacy of a revised image of capitalism during these years is evidence that "someone at the top" must have been behind it.

43. See chapters 8-10 below.

44. "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.9; 90).

45. Shabad (1969; 110-11). The two parts of the IMEMO-sponsored roundtable were signed to press on August 20 and October 21. Shabad's Kommunist article was signed to press on October 10.

46. The Kommunist article, which was signed to press on September 2, was co-authored with V.M. Kulish, a former military officer who joined IMEMO sometime during 1969. See Kulish and Tomashevskiy (1969). Tomashevskiy's contribution to the Memo roundtable was signed to press on August 20. My assertion that the views expressed in the roundtable were Tomashevskiy's "real" ones is based on a review of his writing over an eight year period beginning in 1964. For Kulish as well, there is evidence that his real views were at variance with those expressed in the Kommunist article. Most importantly, see the analysis in Fedorenko and Kulish (1970), which was published in Memo six months after the Kommunist article. It also worth noting that Kulish was one of a small group of IMEMO scholars explicitly thanked by Tomashevskiy in the foreword to his 1971 book -- a book that further developed his earlier innovative analyses of the international system. See Tomashevskiy (1971; 2).

47. Kulish and Tomashevskiy (1969; 77-84).

48. See Chapter 3 above and Zimmerman (1969; Chapters 2-4).

49. I am indebted to Don Blackmer for discussions on this point.

50. In a very real sense, these social scientists were striving for the same partial freedom from ideological dogma that many of the physical sciences in the USSR had enjoyed for years.


52. See Nikonov (1969).


56. See the entry "Doktrina voyennaya" (military doctrine) in *Vovennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar* (1986; 240). Also see the discussion in Holloway (1983; 30).


58. Nikonov (1969; 14). Here, again, Nikonov backs up his points with a citation from *Vovennyi strategiya*. As will be seen, reasoning very similar to Nikonov's has been advanced by both civilian analysts and members of the political leadership in the Gorbachev era to argue for greater non-military input on questions of security policy. See chapters 9-10 below.

59. The very title of the article, "The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and Science on International Relations," hints at this link. In the article itself, see Nikonov (1969; 5, 6, 8, 11-14).

60. Nikonov, while never directly referring to SALT, does clearly allude to it at several points in the article. See in particular his discussion of the threat posed by "rocket-nuclear weapons" -- that is, ICBMs of the type to be limited by any SALT accord. Nikonov (1969; 4, 6, 14).

61. See Chapter 1 for a general discussion of this aspect of organizational behavior.

62. In addition to the evidence cited below, it is interesting to note that Nikonov, in a commentary published later in 1969, which again examined the need for a scientific study of the international system, made no attempt to link his discussion to questions of security policy. See his analysis in "Problemy teorii..." (1969, No.11; 78-80).

63. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of "policy entrepreneurs" and the role they can play within organizations.

64. This is based on an interview with one Institute scholar as well as information generously supplied by Matthew Partan.

65. On this, see Polsky (1987; 113). IMEMO's military-affairs section was established sometime in late 1969. (This unit will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.) As already noted, Nikonov, in 1969, was affiliated with the Institute's International Relations Department.

66. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

67. In the early and mid-1980s, another "policy entrepreneur" on security issues -- Aleksey Arbatov -- would emerge within IMEMO. Where Nikonov failed in his efforts at domain expansion, Arbatov succeeded. The latter's eventual success had much to do with his personal connections, new Institute leaders interested in questions of international security and a political leadership committed to bringing
civilians into option formulation on security issues. See Chapters 8-11 below.

68. See IMEMO Akademii Nauk SSSR (1970). The book, entitled Contemporary Problems of Disarmament, was set in type on May 12, 1969, and signed to press on November 3 of that same year.

69. See, in particular, Aboltin (1966b), (1967a) and (1967b).

70. See, respectively, Chapters 15, 3, 7, 5, 2, and 9. The discussion of accidental nuclear war scenarios (Chapter 9) is very sophisticated and informed. This level of scholarship probably in part reflects the Institute's long-standing interest in the topic. See Chapter 3 above.

Other topics covered in the book were: an overview of socialist (that is, Soviet) foreign policy (Chs. 1 and 14); nuclear-free zones (Ch. 8); the political economy of the US nuclear weapons industry and American arms transfers (Chs. 6 and 4); foreign military bases (Ch. 10); the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Ch. 11); the relationship of social movements and "pacifism" towards disarmament (Chs. 12 and 13). While these were not new topics for Institute researchers, several were analyzed in more detail and in a more sophisticated way than in previous studies. See, especially, chapters 6 and 12.

71. Former Major General M.F. Goryainov authored Chapter 6 (on the US nuclear weapons industry), while Chapter 9 (on accidental nuclear war) had been written by former Colonel V.I. Vaneyev. The role of former military officers at IMEMO in the late 1960s and early 1970s will be discussed in Chapter 6 below.

72. Aleksey Nikonov, the Institute scholar who had written the article calling on IMEMO to examine various strategic issues, did not contribute to the book.

73. The print run was 5500 copies. This number seems fairly typical for such studies: Three other Institute-sponsored books on disarmament published in 1966-67 all had print runs between 2800 and 5200 copies. See Aboltin (1966b), (1967a) and (1967b). In contrast, books on topics closer to the Institute's core areas of expertise usually had much larger printings. For example, a book published in 1971 by a senior Institute scholar, which examined various aspects of international relations, had a run of 17000 copies. See Tomashevskiy (1971). An examination of the print runs of the 46 books published under IMEMO's auspices in 1966-67 provides further confirmation of this point. These books are listed in Kuchinskiy (1967) and Kuchinskiy (1968).

74. This and the following are based on interviews with two Institute researchers, one of whom had fairly extensive dealings with Khavinson.

75. While above I concentrated on Nikonov's calls for organizational domain expansion, portions of his analysis could also be read as an
endorsement of the importance of strategic arms control. See Nikonov (1969; passim).
Chapter 6: 1970–72 – Images, Arms Control and Social Scientists

By early 1970, it was apparent that the Soviet SALT policy process had come to encompass more than a debate over the pros and cons of strategic nuclear arms control. A revised image of capitalism -- in particular, of the United States -- was now also on the public agenda. Two reasons explain the appearance of this new agenda item. For one, the modified image was needed to undercut the arguments of the Soviet military and other conservatives who opposed SALT -- namely, that the imperialists were implacably hostile to the USSR and therefore untrustworthy negotiating partners.

More important, the revised image was needed to legitimate the Soviet Union’s move toward a more cooperative -- as opposed to unilateral -- approach to ensuring its security and promoting its economic development. The source for the traditional Soviet image of capitalism was the Leninist theory of imperialism, which stressed the deep, economic roots of capitalist aggression toward socialism, as well as capitalism’s fundamental -- indeed systemic -- inability to generate needed levels of economic growth.¹ Such an image was fine so long as the USSR followed a more or less autarkic strategy of economic development and strove to maintain its security by unilateral means.² The cooperation of the imperialists was not needed.

For a Soviet leadership determined to pursue a more cooperative relationship with the United States, however, the traditional, Leninist, image of capitalism raised problems.³ Why expand economic and scientific-technical ties with a historically doomed economic system? Why negotiate Soviet security with an inherently aggressive adversary?
The revised image of capitalism was needed to answer -- and rebut -- questions such as these.

The analysis for the years 1970-72 is therefore divided with respect to the separate but related issues of the image of capitalism and SALT/arms control. For each issue, I will begin by examining the statements of the political elites as well as the content and evolution of official Soviet policy. Among the unofficial actors, IMEMO's behavior will again be the chief focus. However, the actions of the USA Institute (ISKAN) -- a new international-affairs institute within the Academy of Sciences -- will also be studied. A comparison of these two institutes -- organizations with different histories and missions -- should provide further evidence of the presence (or absence) of organizationally-motivated behavior on IMEMO's part. As will be seen, the social scientists at IMEMO (and ISKAN) played an important and influential role in legitimating both a more benign image of capitalism and the concept of arms control, but contributed very little to the development of policy options on the "nuts and bolts" of the Soviet SALT negotiating position.

The Image of Capitalism

By early 1970, a number of individuals and institutions were articulating views on the image of capitalism. It should be noted that what one might call revisionist discussions of capitalism -- for example, of "splits" within its ruling class -- were not really new. As already seen, analysts at IMEMO had addressed this issue for the better part of a decade. In addition, CPSU General Secretary Nikita...
Khrushchev had, on several occasions in the early 1960s, spoken of "reasonable" circles in the capitalist ruling class. Now, however, these discussions were taking place among various members of the political elite, and were tied -- often explicitly -- to the broader issue raised by SALT: Could the USSR cooperate and negotiate with the United States on questions of national security (or, for that matter, on questions of economic and scientific/technical cooperation)?

Official Participants

Politburo Level. Disagreement over issues of foreign policy -- including the image of capitalism -- among members of the CPSU CC Politburo became more evident during these years. From a policy-cycle perspective, the growth in elite conflict was to be expected because issues were acquiring more substance as the SALT policy process unfolded. It was one thing to raise the general idea of "an exchange of opinions" on SALT in mid-1968 -- as was done when the public agenda was set. By late 1969 and early 1970, however, SALT was no longer an idea, but a concrete reality: Preliminary US-Soviet discussions on SALT had been held in November-December, 1969, and the first negotiating session was scheduled to begin on April 16, 1970.

As seen, in the latter half of 1969 Brezhnev had begun to suggest the need for a more nuanced image of capitalism. He returned to this theme in at least one speech during 1970, arguing that the USSR wanted to improve Soviet-American relations in order to promote the "matter of peace and international security." This apparent allusion to SALT was then linked -- as before -- with a revisionist view of the nature of
capitalism. "Even in the USA," Brezhnev argued, "there are forces that take such a stand [that is, promoting peace and international security] and advocate a realistic approach to international affairs." 8

By 1970, Brezhnev had also begun to evince a certain respect for capitalism's ability to promote scientific and technological progress. In his address to a December, 1969, plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev noted that while the Soviet Union had caught up with Western economies in the quantitative sense (in the amount of steel produced, for example), the final result of the competition with capitalism would be "defined by other indicators." These "indicators" were such factors as productivity and the level of scientific achievement attained. In discussing these qualitative indicators, Brezhnev did not suggest the Soviet Union had caught up with capitalism. In fact, the tone of his remarks pointed to the opposite conclusion: The capitalist West was doing quite well in this regard. 9 Making this kind of analysis, Brezhnev was essentially adopting the views held by his fellow Politburo member, Aleksey Kosygin. 10

By early 1970, however, other members of the Politburo were openly disagreeing with these assessments of capitalism's economic-scientific-technical prospects and the nature of its foreign policymaking. 11 Several Politburo members -- Mazurov, Suslov, Shelepin and Shelest', for example -- openly and publicly disagreed with the more positive portrayals of capitalism offered by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Kirilenko. The implicit and at times explicit argument advanced by Politburo hardliners was that the USSR should think twice before widening its economic or security relationship with the capitalist West. 12
Disagreement over this particular issue only began to subside in the last months of 1971, after an important plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. This meeting appears to have been an important watershed -- with the Central Committee for the first time seriously addressing the issue of a more cooperative economic and security relationship with the West.¹³ It is important to note that Nikolay Inozemtsev, director of IMEMO and at that time a candidate member of the Central Committee (CC), addressed the meeting.¹⁴ Inozemtsev was in all probability brought in to state the case for a more cooperative relationship with the West. It was not, however, until late May, 1972,¹⁵ that Brezhnev’s vision of a capitalist West with which the USSR could cooperate on economic and security issues ultimately won out.¹⁶ As will be seen, this vision bore a striking similarity to analyses produced by IMEMO (and ISKAN) scholars during these and earlier years.

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. Before reviewing the Institute’s analyses of capitalism, the environment within which it was now operating needs to be described. These years saw the Soviet foreign-policy agenda grow quite crowded. It now included a general debate over Soviet policy toward the West, contention over the more specific and related issue of the image of capitalism, and important changes in Soviet policy toward West Europe¹⁷ -- as well as SALT.

These facts indicate that the policy environment with which IMEMO was interacting had become vastly more complex -- "turbulent," to use the language of organizational theory. As suggested earlier,¹⁸ such
"turbulence" can be an important cause of organizational innovation. One might therefore expect IMEMO aggressively to innovate with respect to this agenda -- particularly on issues such as SALT were it lacked previous organizational expertise. This did in fact begin to occur over the course of 1970-71, but not to the degree one might expect.

To understand fully IMEMO's behavior, one must also appreciate that conflict over the above agenda was now clearly evident among the political elites. During the Brezhnev years, one would expect organizations such as IMEMO to be sensitive to elite disputes of this type. In other words, IMEMO was operating within a political environment that might be expected to impose constraints on its organizationally-derived behavior. As will be seen, the aggressive, goal-promoting IMEMO of the latter part of 1968 and especially 1969 would in fact become a more tame -- albeit still important -- player in the SALT policy process during 1970-72.

On the issue of the image of capitalism, IMEMO did in fact maintain a high degree of advocacy throughout 1970. As they had done in previous years, Institute scholars articulated a nuanced and, in the Soviet context, highly revisionist image of the capitalist system. The notion of complexity was again stressed. One analyst adopted an empirical approach to drive home this point. In discussing the policy process in capitalist countries, he examined how the entrance of the postwar "baby boom" generation into the American work force and the growth of a bureaucratic elite needed to manage an ever more complex economy had fundamentally altered this process. The implication was that the ruling elites could no longer smoothly dictate policy; there were societal and
organizational/bureaucratic sources of friction that prevented this from happening.²⁰

Another analyst, adopting a more pedagogic tone, also addressed the complexity issue. In studying capitalism today, he argued, IMEMO scholars needed to utilize "the principle of complexity [kompleksnost']," which, among other things, meant examining the "mutual influence" of economic and political factors on capitalism's development. To place political factors on a par with economic ones contradicts the economic determinism inherent in the traditional, Leninist, image of capitalism. To drive home the importance of this "principle," he linked it to the intellectual legacy of Yevgeniy Varga.²¹ Varga, it will be recalled, was the long-time director of IMEMO's institutional forerunner, the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics, and the founder of what might be called the Soviet revisionist school on capitalism.²²

This stress on analytical rigor and multi-variate analysis in the study of capitalism also received important support from IMEMO's director, Nikolay Inozemtsev. In a speech given in the first half of 1970, he argued that it was insufficient to study the economic and social processes of capitalism. Soviet scholars also needed to study the politics (politika) of capitalism because these politics were playing "an enormous, ever growing role" in its development.²³

Inozemtsev also suggested that the lack of such a multi-variate analysis had, in the past, hindered Soviet scholars from properly evaluating capitalism -- particularly, its "significant capabilities."²⁴

As Inozemtsev's comment on capitalism's "capabilities" indicates,
IMEMO researchers were not only interested in addressing basic research questions (for example, what factors should be studied to best understand capitalist policy), but also in advancing a view of capitalism that stressed its economic dynamism and adaptability as well as the weaknesses chronicled in traditional Soviet analyses. Several Institute scholars accomplished this by returning to a topic addressed by IMEMO off and on throughout the 1960s: the role played by the state in capitalist society -- in particular, its "economic function." They argued, for example, that the state was "an arbiter" between the monopolies and workers, thereby implicitly rejecting the standard Soviet portrayal of the state as simply a tool used by monopolies to promote class interests at the expense of the overall economic welfare of the state. These scholars thus saw a "relative independence" of the state that allowed it, under certain circumstances, to promote economic growth.25

One IMEMO scholar took the extraordinary step of advocating the creation of a new "category" in research on capitalism: adaptation (prisposoblenie). While not explicitly linking this point of advocacy with an image of capitalism stressing its socio-economic potential and reserves, this was clearly what he strove to portray. To drive home the point that capitalism's ability to adapt was real and here to stay, he argued that such adaptation was a law-governed (zakonomernyy) trait of contemporary capitalism.26 In Soviet parlance, "law-governed" phenomena are those that arise at a certain stage in the historical development of a socio-economic system; in the short term, they are largely immutable.27 In other words, capitalism's ability to adapt and avoid
socio-economic crises was a fact of life that Soviet policy had best consider.

Several Institute researchers advocated a complex image of capitalism by returning to a long-standing IMEMO interest: the US foreign-policy process. One analyst, focusing on the top levels of the process, saw three different "groups" among the ruling elite, each advocating a different course for US military policy.28 This kind of detail marked a notable advance over earlier IMEMO analyses of the US ruling elite. Instead of simply claiming the existence of "splits" within it, this author adopted a more empirical approach and showed how these splits played out on a particular issue of American public policy. One might add that "it was no accident," as TASS used to declare, that he chose US military policy as the issue to highlight these splits.

In Western terms, his three "groups" corresponded to conservatives, liberals and moderates. The conservatives favored a continuing heavy emphasis on the use of force in US foreign policy, while the liberals wanted to reduce US armed forces and commitments abroad. The moderates, whom he portrayed as the majority group, argued for the preservation of the current military-strategic basis of American foreign policy, with the proviso that the US introduce "partial correctives" to that policy. While not detailing these "correctives," the author suggested that they would lead the US to place less emphasis on military power in its relationship with the Soviet Union.29 In the context of the Soviet debate over SALT, the implications of his analysis were evident: It was possible to negotiate with the imperialists, even on issues of national security.
One other IMEMO analyst, in a brief discussion of the US foreign-policy process, portrayed it from the "bottom up," instead of from the "top down." Instead of discussing the ruling elites' influence on policy, he suggested that the American public (obshchestvennost') could also influence US foreign policy and moderate its more aggressive characteristics.\(^{30}\) In addition, as this analyst noted, more and more Americans recognized that an arms race in the nuclear age produced only the "illusion" and not the reality of security.\(^{31}\) To any knowledgeable Soviet, the advocacy in favor of SALT was clear: The masses were playing a greater role in the formulation of US foreign policy, and they were against the nuclear arms race. In other words, it was conceivable to envisage a cooperative security relationship with the United States.

Throughout 1971, the Institute devoted less attention to the issue of capitalism's image. The result was to convey a sense of diminished institutional advocacy on this particular issue. One reason for the changed behavior may have been that Brezhnev and Kosygin, the two Politburo members most responsible for promoting a revised image of capitalism, grew noticeably more reticent on this topic in 1971 -- while other elites continued publicly to disagree with them.\(^{32}\)

In terms of substance, however, IMEMO continued to articulate an image radically at odds both with leadership views and key elements of the Leninist theory of imperialism. An article published in mid-1971, which examined the phenomenon of militarism in contemporary capitalist society, provides one further example of Institute revisionism on this issue. The article is typical of many published by IMEMO during these years: It combines several points of orthodoxy (for example, that
militarism is inherent to capitalism) with one or more radical departures from it. The author devotes the first three-quarters of the article to reiterating such well-known "facts" as the growing militarization of capitalist economies.

The third section of the article examines the socio-economic consequences of militarism in capitalist society, and it is here that the author dramatically departs from prevailing orthodoxy. After showing that high levels of military spending are hurting the development of the main capitalist economies (a common Soviet assertion), he then approvingly cites Western research to affirm that curbing the arms race will not only not cause an economic crisis in the United States, but, in the final account, will have an "enormous positive effect" on its economy. This directly contradicted the long-standing Soviet assumption that military expenditures are an essential motor of economic growth in the US. This theoretical point is then linked to a very practical one: SALT. The "vital interests" of all people, the author argues, require a halt to the arms race. The implication is that the US -- on simple economic grounds -- should favor such a halt.

A final point to be made on this article concerns its empirical nature. The author does not simply assert certain propositions on the nature of contemporary capitalism; he supports them with facts. This brief article (10 pages) contains 24 footnotes -- a large number for a scholarly article in the early 1970s. More important than the number of footnotes is their content. They are filled with references to Business Week, Fortune and The American Economic Review. As will be seen, many
other IMEMO scholars during these years also adopted an empirically-oriented approach towards the study of such issues as capitalism and arms control. The growing empirical emphasis was in part a response to concerns expressed by the political elites. Much more important, however, was that the emphasis on facts allowed organizations such as IMEMO to avoid the constraints and dogmas -- for example, on the nature of capitalism -- imposed by Leninist orthodoxy.

ISKAN. Throughout 1970 and 1971, scholars affiliated with the USA Institute (ISKAN) elaborated an image of capitalism similar in many ways to that advocated by IMEMO. This is not really surprising considering that several of the researchers initially recruited by ISKAN had worked previously for IMEMO. Innovative discussions of capitalism published in ISKAN’s journal, SSHA, included: analyses of the various forces -- in addition to the ruling elite -- that influenced US foreign policy; examinations of the US foreign-policy process that stressed its complexity; articles claiming that “objective conditions” were leading to a more moderate US foreign policy; and, in at least one instance, a discussion of what the speaker claimed were the two traditions in US foreign policy -- the interventionist and the democratic one!

This revisionist image of capitalism was not, at least in these early years, as broad based as that posited by IMEMO. The USA Institute was focusing on the foreign policy of United States, while IMEMO examined the economic-scientific-technical potential of contemporary capitalism as well as the narrower issue of US foreign behavior.

An additional difference between the two institutes during these years is that ISKAN promoted an image of capitalism even more
revisionist than that advanced by IMEMO. One probable -- if speculative -- reason for this difference was the reportedly close connection between the USA Institute's director, Georgiy Arbatov, and Brezhnev's personal staff. Arbatov, more than any other ISKAN researcher, was responsible for promoting the Institute's radical views on US foreign policy. If Arbatov was in fact close to the Brezhnev staff at this point in time, it is quite possible that there was a conscious collaboration between them to promote a more nuanced -- and less threatening -- image of US foreign policy.

* * *

The foregoing analysis suggests that social scientists at IMEMO (and ISKAN) did play an important role in the debate over SALT among the political elites. In particular, they provided (and had provided for many years) the framework of analysis used by Brezhnev and Kosygin to justify a more cooperative relationship with the United States. Elite disagreement over the image of capitalism indicates the importance of this issue: A revised image was needed to legitimate the concept of bilateral nuclear arms control. Brezhnev's discussion of the moderating tendencies acting on US foreign policy and both Brezhnev and Kosygin's recognition that the capitalist economic system did have significant reserves of scientific/technical dynamism were directly tied to a key aspect of Soviet national-security policy -- SALT -- as well as to the broader issue of an economic opening to the West.

It is clear that these analyses and insights did not materialize out of thin air. They incorporated essential aspects of the image of capitalism promoted by scholars at IMEMO throughout the 1960s and early
1970s -- including the key years of 1970-71 when the issue had reached the public agenda and was the subject of heated dispute among the elites. It is equally clear, however, that Brezhnev and Kosygin never came to adopt the more radical views on capitalism promoted by the social scientists at IMEMO and elsewhere. Analyses that stressed the "significant" capabilities of the capitalist socio-economic system, the "enormous positive effect" of arms control on capitalist economies or the "democratic" tradition in US foreign policy never became a feature of leadership discourse during this period. Nearly twenty years would pass before the political elites came to adopt -- albeit tentatively -- the more radical aspects of the image of capitalism being promoted by institutions such as IMEMO.45

How exactly were institutions such as IMEMO influencing the content and evolution of Soviet policy during the early 1970s? There is no evidence that they had a codified or officially-sanctioned role in the process. The evidence points to the opposite conclusion: that IMEMO and ISKAN were outsiders whose participation in the process was on an ad-hoc basis or a product of personal ties.46

In fact, it appears to have been a combination of personal access and organizational expertise that allowed such institutions to influence the evolution of official views on capitalism (an issue directly tied to the Soviet debate over SALT). This expertise meant that conservative actors such as the CPSU CC International Department and the military were unable to dominate the argumentation and debate on this particular issue during this key period of policy formation.

This expertise mattered, however, because there was an "access
channel" for communicating it to the political leadership. That is, while organizations such as IMEMO and ISKAN were "outsiders" to the foreign-policy process, their leaders were not. Personal ties between organizational leaders and the political leadership compensated to some extent for an institutional lack of access to the process. Arbatov's reputed ties to Brezhnev's staff and Inozemtsev's "cameo" appearance at the important November, 1971, plenum of the CPSU Central Committee clearly suggest the important and influential role played by these two individuals.

In discussing the ability of social scientists to influence Soviet foreign and national security policy during these key years of the SALT policy debate, it is thus important once again to distinguish between two different levels of analysis: the organizational and individual. The above review indicates that an understanding of both is crucial to any analysis of IMEMO's or ISKAN's behavior.

Leaders such as Inozemtsev and Arbatov clearly played a key role in shaping behavior within their respective organizations. As the above analysis indicates, researchers at both institutes keyed on the actions of these leaders. For example, at IMEMO, analysts were much more aggressive in advocating a revised image of capitalism during 1970, when Inozemtsev was publicly speaking out on this issue than in 1971, when Inozemtsev contributed nothing to the public debate.

It is also quite possible that one must focus on personal attributes of Arbatov and Inozemtsev -- particularly, their political status and personalities -- to explain why ISKAN was less effected than IMEMO by the presence of public elite disagreement over the issue of the image of

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capitalism.\textsuperscript{47} As for political status, during these years Inozemtsev held a more important position in the official CPSU hierarchy than Arbatov. The former was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, while the latter was only a member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission. This higher formal political status may very well have had a "conservativizing" effect on Inozemtsev.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, several IMEMO scholars who knew and/or had contact with both Arbatov and Inozemtsev argue that Inozemtsev, by nature and personality, was a more cautious individual than Arbatov.\textsuperscript{49}

Having said this, it is equally important to emphasize that these leaders were not simply pulling pliant organizations along behind themselves. Analysts at IMEMO, for example, did not simply echo Inozemtsev's words on capitalism. Most added their own particular "spin" to the issue -- sometimes going further than Inozemtsev in their revisionist analyses. In fact, as has been seen, Inozemtsev was drawing upon a rich tradition of research within the Institute in articulating his revisionist image of capitalism during the early 1970s. In other words, because of an organizationally-grounded bias in favor of the study of issues of this type, IMEMO was in a position to respond to and elaborate upon Inozemtsev's words. A core organizational mission of the Institute -- one developed over many years -- was to promote a nuanced, complex image of contemporary capitalism. It was assertive in promoting and protecting this mission -- even to the point were it attacked other actors in the process.\textsuperscript{50}
SALT/Arms Control

By 1970-71, the prospect of a strategic nuclear arms-control agreement between the US and Soviet Union was a concrete reality. Negotiating teams were established in the early part of 1970, and the first formal negotiating session began in April of that year. As already suggested, the prospect of SALT had actually placed two distinct but related issues on the official Soviet foreign-policy agenda. One concerned whether it was possible for the Soviet Union to negotiate its security with the capitalist West. The second issue concerned the conceptual and military-technical structure of any SALT agreement.51 Would it recognize the interdependence of strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces, or attempt only to limit, say, offensive nuclear weapons? What criterion would be used to evaluate any possible reductions to the Soviet strategic nuclear force posture? Would it be a Soviet equivalent of US Secretary of Defense McNamara's assured destruction criterion? Or something else?

Evidence drawn from both Soviet writings and the actual SALT negotiating record suggests that social scientists at IMEMO played a key role in the debate over the first issue, but on the second one their role was at best marginal. In fact, the available evidence strongly indicates that one actor -- the Soviet military -- dominated the development of policy on the conceptual and technical details of the SALT accords.

Official Participants

Politburo Level. In their public statements and writings throughout
this period, the elites in the Politburo focused only on the first of the SALT-related issues, that is, whether or not the capitalist West could be a reliable partner in negotiating a more cooperative security (or economic) relationship. As seen above, Brezhnev's views on the feasibility of East-West cooperation received important top-level support late in 1971, and gained the clear endorsement of the Central Committee in May of 1972. Despite these victories for Brezhnev, there were continuing signs of elite disagreement on this issue right up to and even after the Soviet-US summit in May, 1972.

Throughout 1970, virtually all elite comments (pro or con) on broadening East-West ties were not explicitly linked to SALT. The link was always implicit; it was left to the knowledgeable Soviet reader to make the connection. The year 1971 saw an important change in this pattern of elite commentary on SALT: The issue began to be addressed explicitly and in an increasingly favorable light. Brezhnev, in particular, began to comment on SALT, and he did so in a way that moved considerably beyond his vague and neutral remarks on SALT made during 1968-69.

Brezhnev's speech to the 24th CPSU Party Congress in late March, 1971, marked a transition between his more reticent and expansive commentary on SALT. In the speech, Brezhnev began his discussion of arms control with an approving reference to the Nonproliferation Treaty -- just as he had done in previous years. In doing this, his clear goal was to legitimize the notion of arms control by pointing to previous successful examples of it. Then, however, he broke with his earlier commentary by characterizing this treaty and others as only
initial (pervonachal'nyy) steps in the arms-control area. In other words, further steps were needed. His next subject of discussion -- SALT -- made clear the exact nature of these further steps.57

The analysis of SALT presented by Brezhnev was in no sense neutral. He no longer talked simply of an exchange of opinions on the issue of nuclear arms control. Now, SALT was portrayed as a goal the USSR was seriously pursuing because it was in the Soviet Union's strategic and economic interests to do so. Any accord would prevent a new round in the arms race and free "significant means" for constructive (sozidatel'nyy) purposes.58 By the middle part of 1971, Brezhnev's language on SALT had grown even bolder. The General Secretary, in an "election" speech given in June, forcefully stated the case for arms control. He claimed that the struggle for disarmament and arms control had, since Lenin's time, been "an essential feature" of Soviet foreign policy.59 Brezhnev then asked a rhetorical question: Were not plans for arms limitation marked by "unreality" (nereal'nost') in a world where capitalism still existed? He answered this question -- and denied its validity -- by noting that the proposals on SALT and other disarmament measures advanced at the 24th Party Congress were not "propaganda slogans, but slogans for action that reflected political goals." These goals, Brezhnev emphasized, had become "ever more achievable."60

The notable change in Brezhnev's commentary on SALT during these two years is in part explained by his consolidation of power. Most important in this respect were the 24th CPSU Party Congress of March-April, 1971, and a Central Committee plenum held in November of that same year. The former saw key personnel changes that established
Brezhnev as the first among equals within the Politburo. The latter saw the Central Committee give important endorsement to Brezhnev's foreign-policy program. As was seen, key changes in the General Secretary's commentary on SALT only occurred at and following the 24th Party Congress.

Brezhnev's positive portrayal of SALT beginning in 1971 was reinforced by changes in how the central press was covering the issue. Two articles, published in Pravda a little over a year a part, exemplify this change. The first article, written in March, 1970, was cautious in tone. The author even thought it necessary to begin by legitimizing the very notion of arms control. He accomplished this by noting that in the struggle for "general and complete disarmament," the Soviet Union had never been guided by the principle of "'all or nothing'." The obvious point was that measures short of full disarmament -- arms-control measures such as SALT -- were legitimate. The bulk of the rest of the article examined US policies (for example, the Safeguard BMD system) and policymakers (for example, Secretary of Defense Laird) that were undercutting or opposing SALT.

The second Pravda article, published in July, 1971, abandons the caution and neutral tone of the earlier one. This is a clear piece of advocacy in favor of SALT. The author, instead of beginning with a defense of the legitimacy of arms control, cites Brezhnev on the "growing significance" of the SALT negotiations. The remainder of the article recounts how a key hurdle -- limitations on BMD systems -- had been overcome at the negotiations in recent months, and how this had improved the chances for an agreement limiting offensive strategic
weapons as well. The author concludes by noting that the Soviet Union was ready to sign a SALT accord -- as long as it was just and fair.\textsuperscript{65}

The point to take from the above discussion is that over the course of 1970-71 the "signals" on SALT from the elites were becoming more clear -- especially when contrasted with the ambiguous and infrequent elite commentary of 1968-69. To carry the analogy a step further, if one thinks of these signals as vectors, then it is clear that their magnitude had increased while their direction had become better established. In other words, Brezhnev and the central press were addressing SALT more frequently and attempting to place it in the best possible light. In addition, no other elites were explicitly opposing the emerging Brezhnev line on SALT.\textsuperscript{66}

A key question is how -- indeed, whether -- this Politburo-level behavior was interacting with or influencing institutions such as IMEMO. Was the Institute keying on Brezhnev's words and only beginning aggressively to promote SALT once he had given it his clear endorsement in the spring and summer of 1971? Or, had the Institute not bothered to wait for Brezhnev's "signals" and, instead, already begun to seriously address SALT? As will be seen, the Institute's behavior during these years is best explained by combining these "top down" and "bottom up" perspectives.

Before turning to a review of IMEMO's behavior, official Soviet policy on SALT during this period must be discussed. This policy was aimed first and foremost at using SALT to limit American development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses (BMD).\textsuperscript{67} As noted earlier, the initial American proposal for strategic arms talks in December, 1966, in
fact focused on limiting BMD, that is, defensive strategic weapons. In early 1967, the Soviets had agreed in principle to the idea of the talks, but insisted that they cover offensive as well as defensive strategic weapons. This is not at all surprising since at that time the USSR was well behind the US in offensive strategic arms.

By 1969–70, the strategic environment had changed dramatically. As discussed above, a combination of military-technical, strategic and economic reasons had led to a situation where a majority of the Soviet military and political leadership favored using SALT primarily to restrain American deployments of missile defenses. The earlier Soviet interest in using SALT to constrain offensive weapons had clearly diminished. The attainment of parity -- at least in a quantitative sense -- and a clear desire to protect the USSR’s own strategic offensive modernization program help explain this change.

This evolution of Soviet interests in strategic nuclear arms control was reflected in actual negotiating practice at the SALT talks, which were held from November, 1969, through May, 1972. In November, 1969, and December, 1970, the Soviets proposed BMD limits as a first step in the negotiations. The USSR’s interest in using SALT to limit US BMD was reaffirmed when Soviet negotiators tabled a formal treaty proposal in March, 1971, which focused only on BMD -- proposing to limit it to capitals. It was not until May, 1971, that the Soviets and Americans could even formally agree that the talks should examine limits on offensive strategic weapons as well as BMD. The offensive limitations, however, were a continuing point of contention and were not agreed until the US-Soviet summit of May, 1972, at which the SALT accords were
signed.\textsuperscript{70}

**Unofficial Participants**

**IMEMO.** After paying relatively little attention to security questions — be it SALT, arms control in general or military affairs — during 1968–69, the Institute addressed these kinds of issues with increasing frequency in 1970–71. Two factors explain this change. One — already suggested — was that "signals" on SALT from the political elites had become more clear.

A second factor concerns structural change within IMEMO. Sometime in 1969, a Section on the Military-Political Problems of International Relations was established at the Institute.\textsuperscript{71} It was headed by a former military officer, Colonel V.M. Kulish, and was subordinated to the Institute’s Department of International Relations.\textsuperscript{72} This change was clearly an Institute effort to expand its domains of expertise to the area of security affairs. It was not the elites who had called for such an expansion, but Institute scholars.\textsuperscript{73}

There is rather clear evidence, however, that this new section and its subject matter were not high-priority items for the Institute. IMEMO director Inozemtsev, whose speeches and writings outlined the Institute’s research agenda, consistently — even after the founding of the new division — downplayed the importance of such studies. He did not explicitly do this — by claiming, for example, that they were an inappropriate subject of study. Rather, he downplayed them indirectly. What Inozemtsev called the study of capitalism’s "military potential" invariably was listed towards the end of his articles and speeches and
after many other subjects. These other subjects, it might be added, were extensions of the Institute's core areas of expertise, for example, in the political economy and foreign-policy strategy of contemporary capitalism and the nature of capitalist foreign policymaking.$^76$

Beyond Inozemtsev's comments, there were other examples of the relatively low priority IMEMO attached to security studies during the early 1970s. One such example was a listing of the 16 subjects the Institute's journal, Memo, planned to examine over the course of 1971-73 in studying "the main directions of bourgeois socio-economic thought." Of the 16 subjects, the study of US military-strategic doctrine is listed fourteenth! That only five of the 16 subjects address foreign or security policy and that these five are the last ones listed reinforces the sense of low priority given to such subjects.$^75$

In terms of organizational resources and manpower, the new military-affairs section came a poor second to IMEMO's existing departments. These departments -- for example, of International Relations -- typically had between 20 to 30 researchers. The new military section, in contrast, never -- through the early 1980s -- had a staff of more than 10.$^76$ Finally, the new military-affairs section did not -- as its name implies -- have the status of a full-fledged department within IMEMO. This state of affairs would only be corrected in 1986, when the Institute created a Department of Disarmament and International Security.

How, then, should one interpret the establishment of this new section? Was it a lot or a little? Did its establishment mark a major organizational innovation and a "victory" for Aleksey Nikonov and other
possible "policy entrepreneurs" who had argued in favor of an expansion of Institute research into the area of strategic studies? Or, was it something less -- that is, an important change for the Institute, but one whose impact was nonetheless limited by a combination of internal, organizational and external, political factors? The evidence adduced above and in subsequent chapters (on the Gorbachev era) suggests that the latter interpretation is closer to the mark. Indeed, the pattern seen in the early 1970s -- of low institutional interest in the new section's subject matter -- would, with only minor modifications, continue until the early 1980s.

The argument here is that Inozemtsev's at best neutral attitude toward the study of strategic affairs within IMEMO, the political elite's lack of interest in expanding the process to include social scientists in the debate over the strategic "nuts and bolts" of SALT and extant organizational realities within IMEMO (the lack of expertise on strategic affairs) all combined to make it very difficult for "entrepreneurs" like Nikonov to prevail in establishing the foundations of a Soviet school of strategic studies at IMEMO. In other words, an understanding of the individual (Inozemtsev-organizational head) and organizational levels of analysis within IMEMO and the external political environment is essential for explaining the Institute's ambiguous interest in strategic studies during the early 1970s.

Having said this, I should note that one could offer an alternative explanation -- namely, that the new section had Inozemtsev's full support, but that in light of military and civilian elite opposition, he was being cautious, building a research potential in this area slowly.
and modestly. The main problem with this explanation is that at the
time of Inozemtsev’s death in 1982, the military-affairs section was
still quite low on IMEMO’s ladder of institutional priorities.

Returning to the story of IMEMO’s actual response to SALT, it is
clear that the years 1970-71 saw an increase in the amount of attention
the Institute devoted to security affairs. The journal Memo now
sponsored entire articles on the theory and practice of arms control and
several articles on military strategy. The quality of these materials
was notably better than analyses written in earlier years, but they
still fared poorly when compared to Institute writing on, for example,
the economy and politics of contemporary capitalism. Moreover, the
enhanced interest in and advocacy in favor of SALT, while present by
1970, only became clearly evident after the appearance of stronger elite
“signals” on arms control in 1971.

The most notable feature about Institute writing on security affairs
during 1970 was simply the increasing amount of attention paid to it.
As in the past, there were many analyses in which only a passing
reference was made to arms control. Now, however, many of them
portrayed SALT in a very favorable light; the previous hesitancy and
neutrality were gone. This advocacy in favor of SALT was often
accomplished by making positive references to the actual negotiations --
depicting them as having made “definite progress” and as presenting a
“real chance” to limit the nuclear arms race. This commentary is
striking because it came at a time when the negotiations had in fact
made little progress.

Beyond the above analyses, IMEMO scholars, for the first time,
produced lengthy analyses that grappled with some of the "nuts and bolts" of strategic nuclear arms control. These articles were of two kinds: One provided information on SALT, while the other presented an ideological justification for it.

The best example of the former was an article published in the March, 1970, issue of Menc. Entitled "Concerning the Debates [diskussii] in the USA on Strategic Armaments," this article was produced by IMEMO's new military-affairs section and examined the issue of strategic nuclear arms control. This analysis provided information -- and lots of it. Using sources such as Time, Newsweek and The New York Times, the authors gave Soviet readers straight facts and figures on the two most important US strategic programs: the Safeguard BMD system and the "MIRVing" of the US ICBM force (that is, the installation of multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles). Never before had Institute researchers provided such data.

This new information was coupled to a rather traditional -- for IMEMO -- discussion of the nature of the debates in the United States over these programs. The discussion, in other words, portrayed the complexity of the US foreign-policy process -- with various forces influencing the development of American security policy -- and how opposition to the arms race was growing. These factors, the authors argued, facilitated the negotiation of a US-Soviet SALT agreement.

This article, along with one other, represented an important change for IMEMO. It linked an extant area of organizational expertise -- capitalist policymaking -- with an evident interest in a new area of study: US strategic policy. Its authorship and level of sophistication
nonetheless pointed to continuing weaknesses in this area. One of the authors was a former military officer recently recruited by the Institute.88

The article’s relative sophistication in discussing strategic affairs showed, paradoxically, just how far the Institute still had to go in developing expertise on such issues. In the first place, its discussion of US strategic weaponry was highly descriptive. In no sense was this an assessment of the performance capabilities or missions of these weapons. That is, no effort was made to explain how systems such as Safeguard and MIRV would modify US nuclear strategy, or how they would affect Soviet security. Second, the quality of the descriptive analysis was uneven. A straightforward and accurate account of Safeguard was followed, for example, by a seriously flawed description of MIRV. In describing the Mk-12 MIRV warheads for the Minuteman III ICBM, the authors made several egregious mistakes — claiming, in particular, that two of the three warheads carried on the Mk-12 were equipped with propulsion and navigation systems internal to the warhead.89 The Mk-12 program in fact never envisioned such terminal guidance capabilities.90

Finally, the article’s commentary on US strategic programs was notably inferior to similar analyses produced by the Soviet military during this same period. Military writers usually presented much more descriptive detail, and, more important, quite often provided assessments of how the new systems would modify US nuclear strategy and what missions they would carry out.91

A book review in the Institute’s journal, Memo, provides both
another example of this new type of informational writing on security issues and additional evidence that IMEMO's expansion into this area was being influenced by long-standing organizational concerns as well as by elite "signals" on SALT. The review discussed the latest Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It was unusually long and detailed, and provided Soviet readers with information on various kinds of arms control and on arms transfers to the developing world.92 The very fact that the review appeared when it did demonstrates that the Institute was sensitive and responsive to the debate over arms control that was taking place among the elites.93

What the author chose to emphasize in the review, however, was not SALT and strategic nuclear arms control, but the growing danger of accidental nuclear war. He accomplished this by approvingly discussing the Yearbook's analysis of the topic.94 Only after this discussion did he make a reference to SALT -- arguing that it was precisely the fear of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war that had helped bring about the negotiations.95 This argument is not correct, nor, however, is it really surprising given previous Institute concern with the "chance" factor in international politics. As far back as the mid-1960s, IMEMO researchers had pointed to the danger of accidental nuclear war in analyses advocating a more complex image of the international system.96

A second type of article reflecting the change in IMEMO commentary on SALT-related issues during 1970 addressed the legitimacy of arms control. In contrast to previous years when several paragraphs or a page in a larger article were dedicated to this subject, entire articles
were now devoted to it. The Institute published many more of this second new type of article on questions of security than of the first type (which provided information on SALT). From an organizational perspective, such a bias was understandable: Providing ideological legitimization was more consistent with IMEMO's sense of mission.

One such article, while not explicitly addressing strategic nuclear arms control, nevertheless made the point that negotiations with the US on questions of national security could work. This was accomplished by discussing the progress toward a seabed arms-control treaty.97 The author used the prospect of this treaty to advance several arguments. Most important, he argued, the treaty demonstrated that arms control was a legitimate "first step" on the road to the long-standing Soviet goal of general and complete disarmament. In addition, he claimed that despite the influence of right-wing forces in the United States, Soviet-American efforts at arms control were possible.98

During 1970, IMEMO director Inozemtsev also made a contribution to the debate over the legitimacy of arms control. In contrast with other Institute writing during this period, Inozemtsev's article raised the issue only in passing and without ever explicitly discussing arms control or disarmament.99 What is interesting -- especially from an organizational-politics perspective -- is the particular way he chose to make his point. Inozemtsev extended to security issues the framework of analysis applied in previous years to IMEMO's studies of the international system. That is, he used a non-zero sum approach to analyze nuclear war -- discussing what he called the "common-to-all-mankind (obshchevelovecheskiy) danger" posed by nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{100}

Inozemtsev's use of "common-to-all-mankind," following immediately after his discussion of the "internationalization of economic life," and the "joint efforts" and "common international policy" needed to preserve the world's environment and resources, was clearly meant to signal that similar joint efforts were necessary to control the nuclear arms race. Bilateral nuclear arms control, in other words, was possible -- even in a world where class conflict dominated.\textsuperscript{101}

Another article, published in the fall of 1970 and written by Institute deputy director Vladimir Aboltin, adopted a much more direct approach and attempted to legitimize the notion of arms control by claiming that the concept was rooted in the writing of Engels!\textsuperscript{102} The article provides a striking example of a style of Soviet discourse where a writer begins by stating a "fact" or laying out a policy position and then, in the following analysis, undermines it.\textsuperscript{103} In this case, the initial statement is a condemnation of the American theory of "arms control."\textsuperscript{104} Aboltin's subsequent analysis completely undercuts this statement by showing that Engels was a proponent of disarmament and arms-control measures.\textsuperscript{105} Engels apparently saw such measures as a real possibility and "'even comparatively easy to carry out'."\textsuperscript{106} For any remaining skeptics, Aboltin had one final ace up his sleeve: Lenin's "thesis" that "'disarmament is the ideal of socialism'"!\textsuperscript{107}

This article's clear if indirect advocacy of SALT along with the other examples of growing Institute interest in arms-control and security issues during 1970 lend general support to a basic proposition of the policy-cycle framework. That is, once an issue reaches the
public agenda and becomes a hot political topic — as SALT had by mid-1970 — organizations should become more assertive and combative in defending their views on the issue at hand. By the latter half of 1970, IMEMO had clearly begun to behave in this way. In the above article, for example, Aboltin removed the "kid gloves" and strongly criticized what he called "skeptics" of SALT within and outside the Soviet Union. He especially attacked their misuse of Marxist-Leninist classics — a serious charge in the Soviet context.  

The year 1971 saw Institute behavior on security issues continue to be influenced by a combination of external and internal factors. As already seen, Brezhnev and the central press organs had given SALT their unmistakable blessing during 1971. Apparently keying on these "signals," IMEMO increased its advocacy in favor of a strategic arms accord.  

The best example of this enhanced advocacy came in the lead article of the October issue of Memo, the Institute's journal. Provocatively entitled "Disarmament — The Ideal of Socialism" and written by V. Shestov, the article used Lenin to legitimate the notion of arms control. As Aboltin had done a year earlier, Shestov claimed that Lenin had coined the phrase "disarmament is the ideal of socialism." The different ways the two articles used this phrase exemplifies how IMEMO's advocacy on SALT was increasing. While Aboltin mentioned the phrase in passing toward the end of his article, Shestov made it the title of his essay and referred to it in his opening paragraphs. In addition to this ideological legitimization, Shestov also favorably reviewed the progress made at the actual SALT negotiations and concluded that the
prospects of achieving accords on SALT and other disarmament measures were "real and implementable."\textsuperscript{111}

The appearance of this article and one other\textsuperscript{112} published in the latter half of 1971 provide convincing evidence of a "top-down" component to the Soviet SALT policy process. IMEMO gave SALT a rousing endorsement only after Brezhnev had done likewise.

It is equally clear, though, that 1971 saw the continuation of a "bottom-up," organizational component to the process. IMEMO was attempting -- however tentatively -- to provide itself expertise on issues of strategic policy. Most important, the year 1971 saw the Institute notably expand its efforts to provide basic information on issues of arms control and strategic policy. This empirical emphasis was essential to build organizational expertise in an area where it was so clearly lacking. For the first time, articles addressed and defined such American concepts as assured destruction and strategic sufficiency,\textsuperscript{113} while continuing to provide information on various US strategic programs.\textsuperscript{114} There were also now detailed analyses on arms control that drew heavily on the Western security-studies literature.\textsuperscript{115}

In addition, several researchers raised an old Institute goal -- the need for a scientific approach in foreign policy -- and used it to advocate a specific role in the policy process for Institute-sponsored research on arms control. This advocacy was both direct and indirect. The clearest example of the former was the declaration by two Institute researchers that arms control had become an "important, independent subject of special professional analysis."\textsuperscript{116} Lest anyone miss their point, this statement was followed by the claim that the growing
complexity of the arms race had increased the importance of "reliable information, its profound, genuinely scientific study for the correct orientation" of peaceloving forces. In the Soviet context, this was an extraordinarily clear claim for a role in the policy process for Institute-sponsored analysis on security issues.

The claim for an enhanced role was also made in less direct ways. This was accomplished, for example, by pointing to the role played by "specialists" and people from the "academic world" in the American debates over strategic armaments. The views of such specialists, it was noted, were heard at Congressional hearings, and they were portrayed as counterbalancing the hardline views of American hawks.

As these examples suggest, long-standing organizational goals were also shaping the Institute's response to SALT. Moreover, these goals -- especially the call for a "scientific approach" in foreign policy -- had been modified in ways consistent with insights drawn from organizational-politics and policy-process perspectives. As an organizational theorist would predict, the new issue on the agenda, SALT, had been linked to a basic organizational goal -- the expansion of the Institute's role in the foreign-policy process. In addition, this advocacy came at a point in the policy process when it made "sense" for the Institute to behave in this way. SALT was now a hot political topic and options for the official Soviet negotiating position were being formulated.

Several caveats are in order, however, concerning the Institute's growing interest in and advocacy of security issues. First, while the interest and advocacy were clearly present by the first half of 1972,
they were still nascent. The number of Institute researchers writing on
security issues was minuscule compared to the number writing on, say,
the political economy of US capitalism.

Second, the quality of writing on security affairs continued to be
notably inferior to Institute research in other areas. As already seen,
this writing was highly descriptive and frequently the work of former
military officers.119 It was also much more cautious. Here, a
comparison with Institute research and writing on the US foreign-policy
process is helpful. On this issue, IMEMO scholars not only described
changes in US foreign policymaking. They also assessed the implications
of these changes for US external behavior -- for example, arguing in the
case of SALT that the growing complexity of the process made it harder
for conservative elements to exert decisive influence on US nuclear
policy.120 IMEMO researchers were also much more aggressive in
promoting Institute views on capitalism. Even during 1970-71, when
Institute advocacy on this issue was more muted, it still exceeded -- in
both quantity and level of advocacy -- that on SALT.121

At this point, it is instructive to compare IMEMO's writing on
strategic affairs during 1970-71 with that of the USA Institute (ISKAN).
Given the differing leaders, histories and organizational "missions"122
of the two institutions, the comparison should facilitate a better
understanding of what factor or set of factors were playing a role in
IMEMO's response to SALT.

ISKAN. By 1970, the USA Institute -- like IMEMO -- had also
established a subunit to study security issues. At ISKAN, this unit was
initially called the Division of Military Aspects of Foreign Policy and
was headed by a former General Staff officer, Valentin Larionov. In contrast to IMEMO's hesitant attitude towards security studies during these years, ISKAN showed much more interest in the subject. For example, the unsigned, lead editorial in the first issue of the Institute's journal, SShA, clearly stated that US military-strategic doctrines and concepts should be a subject of study for Institute researchers.

Indeed, the years 1970-71 saw ISKAN outperform IMEMO in both the quantity and quality of its writing on security and arms control. In simple numerical terms, ISKAN, through its journal SShA, devoted more attention to such issues than IMEMO. There was some degree of overlap, however, in how the two institutes approached this new set of issues. For example, beginning in 1970, ISKAN, paralleling IMEMO's efforts, published analyses of SALT that focused on United States interests in, and debates about, strategic arms limitation. SShA also began to publish informational articles on SALT with the clear desire to provide the Soviet foreign-policy community with more data on the relevant issues.

It was the degree of advocacy in ISKAN's analyses of strategic affairs, however, that most clearly distinguished them from those produced by IMEMO during this period. The advocacy of SALT in 1970 was quite blatant. For example, editorial commentary in the inaugural issue of SShA (January, 1970) gave SALT a very positive portrayal.

Beyond this, the journal used various techniques to aggressively advocate SALT throughout 1970-71. Commentary on the 19th Pugwash conference was used to promote the notion of strategic nuclear arms

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control in general and SALT in particular. One discussion legitimated SALT by claiming that the nuclear arms race and the threat of nuclear war posed an "identical danger" to all countries. In the Soviet context, this was an extraordinary piece of ideological heresy since it suggested that a nuclear war would wreak equal devastation on both the Soviet Union and the USA. Another commentator reviewed the US debates over strategic policy and -- putting a much more positive gloss on his analysis than a similar one published the very same month in Memo -- portrayed the proponents of arms control in the US as gaining a clear upper hand.

Finally, one analyst saw an "objective law" which dictated that any further increase in the US nuclear arsenal would not increase its security. As any knowledgeable Soviet reader understood, such laws apply universally. In other words, the USSR might as well engage in arms control since any increase in its own strategic forces could not enhance its security.

One other method utilized by ISKAN to promote SALT was to publish interviews in its journal, SShA, with prominent Americans that dealt in part with the issue of strategic nuclear arms control. "It was no accident," as the Soviets like to say, that the individuals chosen -- Averell Harriman and Herbert York -- were strong proponents of arms control. The interviews allowed the USA Institute to publish some of the strongest pro-SALT commentary seen in the Soviet press during these years.

Throughout 1970-71, ISKAN’s advocacy of SALT was generally more direct and policy-relevant than IMEMO’s. This was seen both in how it
legitimized the notion of arms control and in the quality and amount of
information it provided on SALT-related issues. On the first point,
ISKAN's attempts at legitimating the very concept of strategic arms
control were more direct than similar efforts undertaken by IMEMO.
While the latter was more inclined to use references to or quotations
from Engels and Lenin to justify arms control, the USA Institute
legitimated it by arguing that the arms race had acquired a dynamic of
its own.

This argument was made in several ways. In one case, an editorial
in ŠSShA simply asserted that the arms race had developed its own
"internal logic" and was governed by a "mechanism" which "almost
automatically" ensured its further growth. Furthermore, it had acquired
a "known independence." This reasoning was then used to argue in
favor of SALT: It could help brake this process of increasing
armaments. In the Soviet context, this type of argument was very
unorthodox. By portraying the arms race in such autonomous terms, it
insulated the SALT process from the charge that arms control was
impossible in a world where arms races were a direct consequence of
capitalism's inherent militarism and aggression.

Another analyst made the same point in more concrete terms. In
discussing the relationship between offense and defense in strategic
weaponry, he professed to discover a law-governed regularity
(zakonomernost'): The correlation between offensive and defensive means
"always gravitates toward a certain equality," that is, an action begets
a counteraction. As an example of this, the author argued that the
creation of missile defenses (BMD) inevitably would lead to the
production of new offensive technologies -- in particular, MIRV -- for overcoming them.\textsuperscript{139} Describing the correlation as a \textit{zakonomernost'}, meant that it was not a transitory phenomenon; it was a reality to which the USSR, as well as the United States, had to adapt.\textsuperscript{140} As with the first example, this portrayal of the arms race gave it an autonomous character. In other words, it was independent of imperialism's evil machinations. SALT, therefore, was not only necessary -- to prevent the arms race from spinning out of control -- but also possible.\textsuperscript{141}

On the particular issue of the dynamics of the arms race, there is clear evidence of disagreement between IMEMO and ISKAN. The USA Institute's description of these dynamics, if taken to their logical conclusion, suggested equal Soviet-American responsibility for the arms race. It was this notion of co-responsibility to which IMEMO researchers objected. In the first article published by IMEMO that dealt extensively with strategic issues, the action-reaction theory of the arms race was explicitly attacked. The article declared that the "moving force" of the arms race was not the phenomenon of action-reaction, but the political goals of imperialism.\textsuperscript{142} In addition, several other IMEMO researchers strongly criticized the notion that the US and USSR bore "equal responsibility" for the arms race.\textsuperscript{143}

The second way in which the USA Institute's advocacy on SALT was more direct than IMEMO's concerned the information it provided on SALT-related issues. This information was of three kinds: general background on SALT; examinations of US strategic policy; and details on US strategic systems. Background information included reviews of US debates over strategic weapons and policy,\textsuperscript{144} detailed overviews of the
R & D histories and budgetary prospects of various US strategic systems,143 and, in one case, a rather detailed update on the progress of the actual SALT negotiations.146 Discussions of US strategic policy included the definition and explanation of concepts such as "unacceptable loss" and "mutual deterrence"147; "first strike," "retaliatory strike" and "counterforce"148; "sufficiency" and the "worse case" method149; and "assured destruction."150 The examination of US strategic weaponry included detailed articles on the Safeguard BMD system and the MIRV program.151

The contrast with the SALT-related information produced by IMEMO during these years is dramatic. The USA Institute's analyses of SALT were more relevant to the actual negotiations. They included updates on the negotiations themselves, discussions of the strategic concepts guiding US nuclear policy, and detailed information on US strategic weapons systems. IMEMO's analyses, while touching on many of these same subjects, were less detailed and often more general (for example, discussing arms control as a concept instead of analyzing SALT as a policy). In addition, while both institutes increased their advocacy on SALT after Brezhnev gave it his clear endorsement in the latter half of 1971, the USA Institute was starting from a higher base point: Throughout 1970 and early 1971, its advocacy in favor of SALT was much greater than that of IMEMO.

It is also true, however, that the USA Institute's analyses of SALT and other strategic issues shared two characteristics with those produced by IMEMO. Most important, ISKAN's best and most detailed analyses of SALT and US strategic policy were authored by recently

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recruited former General Staff officers. Only in these analyses did one encounter assessments of US strategic policy and weapons systems that went beyond a descriptive level. Another characteristic -- one that by now should be quite apparent -- was that ISKAN's analyses, as well as IMEMO's, focused on American concepts, weapons and interests in SALT.

Moreover, it is hard to argue -- as Western scholars have argued in other contexts -- that these analyses were in fact covert discussions of Soviet strategic concepts and SALT negotiating policy. So much of it was at such a basic level and so highly descriptive that its primary purpose seems to have been providing information on a new and little understood set of strategic issues (as well as promoting SALT).

How can one best explain ISKAN's behavior on SALT-related issues during these key years of the policy cycle? Clearly, ISKAN's aggressive pro-SALT advocacy was in part a function of the close ties that existed between ISKAN director Arbatov and Brezhnev. Indeed, ISKAN's strongest advocacy of SALT came after Brezhnev gave it his clear endorsement in the spring and summer of 1971.

Beyond the Brezhnev-Arbatov tie, it is also clear that ISKAN had links with several other important Soviet officials who held pro-SALT views. In fact, during 1970-71, two of these officials served on the editorial board of SSHA. The two were Georgiy Korniyenko (head of the USA Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Dzherman M. Gvishiani (a deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology). IMEMO's editorial board, by way of contrast, was much more "academic" in nature and had no official figures of this type.
serving on it.

To understand fully ISKAN's behavior, however, one must consider several internal, organizational factors as well. First, the USA Institute faced fewer intra-organizational hurdles than IMEMO in adding arms control and security as a new field of study. IMEMO was a well-established institution that had existed in its present form (that is, without any major structural changes) since 1957. It possessed a set of well-developed missions and goals. The USA Institute, in contrast, was just over two years old. There was thus significantly less "organizational inertia" to overcome, as well as no set of extant goals with which the study of security issues had to compete.

Second, the USA Institute was headed by a man -- Georgiy Arbatov -- who took a clear public stand in favor of SALT and, more generally, the study of strategic affairs in a way IMEMO director Inozemtsev never did. Arbatov, for example, was noticeably less reticent to address SALT than Inozemtsev. During 1970, he directly referred to the SALT negotiations on at least two occasions. Moreover, in 1971, Arbatov gave them his very clear endorsement. In contrast, Inozemtsev, during 1970-71, never explicitly referred to SALT and never came close to giving the negotiations the strong support that Arbatov did.

Moreover, Arbatov's comments were reinforced by a series of unsigned editorials in the Institute's journal, SShA. One of these editorials, in the very first issue of SShA in January, 1970, expressed strong support in favor of strategic arms control. Its title directly alluded to SALT, and it provided a very positive portrayal of the preliminary round of negotiations that had been held in November-
December, 1969. Several other editorials also strove to present SALT in a very positive light. While it cannot be proved definitively, editorial commentary of this type along with Arbatov’s own articles probably had much to do with the aggressive pro-SALT line taken by numerous ISKAN researchers.

This review of the USA Institute’s behavior provides a context for better understanding IMEMO’s actions -- in particular, why it moved so much slower than ISKAN to address arms control and other security issues. Three factors are important here. First, the evident linkages between Arbatov/ISKAN and several important pro-detente policymakers (first and foremost Brezhnev and his staff, but also individuals such as Korniienko) suggest that ISKAN was being mobilized by the political elites to promote SALT. This "top-down" component to the behavior of the institutes appears to have been less significant in the case of IMEMO. While it is true that Inozemtsev held a higher position in the CPSU hierarchy than Arbatov, the latter clearly had better personal connections to Brezhnev and his staff.

The existence of such personal ties certainly helps explain the differing responses of the two institutes to SALT. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that connections of this type were more important than official status in determining personal/institutional access to key policymakers. This fact has been a pervasive feature of Soviet political culture since Lenin’s time.

If the first factor points to external mobilization to explain IMEMO’s lower interest and less aggressive posture on SALT and other strategic issues, then a second factor points to internal --
organizational -- mobilization to understand the differing institutional responses. Simply put, organizational leaders do matter -- particularly when their organizations are attempting to expand into new issue areas. Arbatov's public utterances (backed by editorial commentary) on SALT and other security issues were consistently more direct and forceful than Inozemtsev's very limited public remarks on these questions. That this difference between the two leaders really was an important explanatory variable is suggested by the fact that where Inozemtsev did speak out forcefully -- on the issue of capitalism's image -- IMEMO researchers did not hesitate to engage in aggressive advocacy. 169

The third factor is also organizational in nature and involves the differing organizational "missions" of the two institutes. A fundamental feature of IMEMO's sense of mission -- one developed over many years -- was its role as the provider of the conceptual/ideological bases of Soviet views on the international system and capitalism. Thus, it should come as no surprise that some of its most aggressive pro-SALT advocacy came in articles providing an ideological justification for SALT. 170 This sense of mission, however, put the Institute at a disadvantage when it came to addressing the more technical and strategic issues involved with SALT. The latter were precisely the kinds of issues that ISKAN addressed more consistently than IMEMO.

* * *

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, organizations such as IMEMO and ISKAN had no officially-sanctioned role in the Soviet foreign-policy
process. Beyond personal connections, their best opportunity for influencing policy on a given issue derived from their expertise. Researchers at IMEMO (and to a lesser extent at ISKAN) provided such expertise on one issue directly tied to the Soviet debate on SALT: the image of capitalism. In addition, scholars at both institutes produced articulate analyses legitimating the concept of arms control, and thereby provided a counter to the argument of Soviet conservatives that arms control with the imperialists was impossible. Analyses of this type did allow the social scientists at IMEMO and ISKAN to play an important role in the Soviet SALT policy debate -- a role that might best be called policy legitimization.

On other aspects of this debate, however, these social scientists ran into a knowledge "gap." Analysts at ISKAN and IMEMO were exerting little if any influence on the doctrinal or military-technical aspects of Soviet policy on strategic nuclear arms control. The Institutuchiki had virtually nothing to say on these "nuts and bolts" aspects of SALT. The analyses that touched on these issues were long on information and short on assessment. It was one thing to provide information, but it was quite another to assess that information and draw policy implications for the military-technical issues associated with SALT.

This lack of expertise allowed one organization -- the military -- to dominate the development of policy options on these aspects of Soviet policy. As a department head at one of the institutes noted: "We do not work on the development of a strategic arms limitation [SALT] plan. That is Marshal Grechko's province." The record makes clear that the Soviet military did in fact play a dominant role. Throughout the two
and a half years of negotiations, the Soviet side consistently placed
greater stress on limitations of missile defenses, and attempted to
minimize restrictions on offensive strategic nuclear forces. As seen
earlier, this negotiating posture correlates well with the preferences
of the Soviet military.

One IMEMO scholar has recently argued that the combination of
military expertise on strategic issues, lack of alternative centers of
information and poor coordination among various participants guaranteed
that Soviet policy on SALT in the early 1970s was inordinately biased in
favor of the military's preferences. On the basis of the evidence
adduced in this chapter, it would be difficult not to concur with such
an assessment.

Conclusions

The Soviet approach to SALT evolved in ways consistent with the
notion of a policy cycle. The cycle proceeded through several stages.
After SALT was elevated to the public agenda in May-June, 1968, debate
and discussion on it became more frequent. This debate, in turn, placed
another issue on the public agenda: the image of capitalism. In
addition, the nature of organizational behavior changed with progress
through the cycle. Organizations such as IMEMO and ISKAN clearly became
more assertive as time progressed. IMEMO, for example, was protective
in defending its core missions and goals (the issue of the image of
capitalism) and on several occasions openly attacked other actors
(individuals or organizations) who threatened these goals. The USA
Institute sought to extend its organizational domain (to SALT and, more
generally, strategic affairs).

On the issue of strategic nuclear arms control, however, two factors combined to delay and mitigate the organizationally-inspired advocacy of these institutions. One factor was a simple lack of expertise on strategic affairs. In the game of "catch up" to plug this knowledge "gap," ISKAN fared better than IMEMO. ISKAN's evident ties to several pro-detente officials may partly explain why it was better at this game, but organizational factors internal to IMEMO also clearly played a role.

In comparison to the USA Institute, IMEMO was a rather old institution with a well-established sense of organizational mission. As seen here and in preceding chapters, this mission centered on the importance of a conceptual and empirical understanding of the international system and contemporary capitalism. The study of SALT and other security issues did not "fit" well with this particular organizational ideology. Thus, while IMEMO clearly did "jump" through the window provided by a change in the public agenda (that is, when SALT was first publicly raised), its behavior was conditioned by expertise and goals developed in earlier years.

If the first factor derived from a generic feature of organizational behavior applicable across political systems, then the second factor concerned a feature particular to the Soviet context. The hierarchical, centralized nature of the Soviet political system as it existed in those years made institutions such as IMEMO and ISKAN sensitive and responsive to the concerns of the political elites. For example, while it is clear that by the latter half of 1970 both organizations were promoting SALT, their strongest advocacy only came in the period after Brezhnev
had given SALT his clear endorsement.

As for IMEMO, one cannot help but wonder if its caution in response to elite disagreement was not heightened by memories of its own institutional history. In 1947, Stalin had ordered IMEMO's institutional forerunner (the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics) disbanded after its director, Yevgeniy Varga, had run afoul of the top leadership by arguing that the capitalist socio-economic system would not experience, in the wake of World War II, a severe economic crisis similar to that of the 1930s. Given that many IMEMO scholars in the late 1960s were in essence articulating Varga's vision of capitalism (albeit under new circumstances), it is quite plausible that the eruption of elite debate over capitalism's image in 1970-71 had a particularly sobering effect on the Institute.174

The basic conclusion to draw from the foregoing is that a combination of "top-down" and "bottom-up" factors influenced the behavior of IMEMO and ISKAN in the Soviet debate over SALT. For the prime subject of this study, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), it is apparent that the mix between these two factors varied depending on the issue and the point reached in the policy cycle. For the first 18 months after SALT had reached the public agenda (in the summer of 1968), "bottom-up," organizational factors predominated in IMEMO's behavior. It seized the opportunity presented by a change in the foreign-policy agenda to promote several of its own long-standing organizational goals.

The years 1970-71 saw a more complex mixture of both these factors influencing Institute behavior. On the issue of the image of
capitalism, organizational factors dominated as IMEMO maintained its advocacy in favor of a more nuanced image. However, in apparent response to elite disagreement on this issue, the Institute moderated its advocacy during 1970-71. Thus, in this case -- where a core organizational goal was engaged -- IMEMO was more an active promoter of its own interests and less the passive respondent to elite concerns.

On issues such as arms control and strategic affairs, which fell outside the Institute's basic domains of organizational expertise, it seemed much more passive. Only after a clear top-level "line" on SALT had emerged did IMEMO join the battle and aggressively promote SALT in particular and arms control in general. Even in this case, however, factors internal to the Institute played a role in shaping its response. For one, organizational impediments (the Institute's stable organizational structure, a set of extant organizational goals developed over many years and Inozemtsev's apparent lack of interest in strategic affairs) hindered IMEMO's move into the arms-control and security area. In addition, the manner in which arms control was addressed by Institute researchers also suggested the influence of organizational factors. On several occasions in 1968-69, and even as late as 1971, SALT and, more generally, arms control were linked to issues with which IMEMO analysts were familiar or wanted to promote.\textsuperscript{175}

Both the organizational impediments and this linking phenomenon suggest that for IMEMO the problem of innovation was a real one. To put this another way: Throughout the Soviet debate on SALT during 1968-72, the Institute's behavior was heavily influenced by the expertise and goals it had developed in the years prior to the point when SALT reached

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the public agenda and became a hot political topic. Previous Western studies of this debate and, more generally, of non-crisis change in Soviet foreign policy have tended to downplay or ignore these kind of organizational dynamics. They have focused on factors such as changes in the international balance of power or elite politics, and viewed institutions in the USSR more as the passive followers of leadership signals and less as the active promoters of their own organizational goals.\textsuperscript{176}

The evidence adduced here suggests that such studies produce an incomplete picture of policy change. A shift in the balance of power may have played a key role in initiating the detente policies (and SALT),\textsuperscript{177} but the ultimate outcome -- the content of the SALT treaties -- had little relation to any such shift. More important was the Soviet military's domination of key parts of the SALT policy process -- a domination facilitated by the "knowledge gap" and organizational hurdles faced by social scientists at IMEMO (and ISKAN) as they addressed an unfamiliar set of security issues.
Notes

1. Lenin (1939). This is a complete English language translation of the original 1917 work.

2. The search for unilateral security had been a dominant theme of Soviet policy from 1917 through the mid-1960s. The one clear exception was the period 1935-45, when the USSR promoted and attempted to implement various programs of "collective security."

3. A fascinating and striking similarity in the Soviet foreign and security-policy processes of the late 1960s and mid-1980s is that, in both cases, initial discussions of security were eventually linked with the broader issue of revising the image of capitalism. The modification of this image in the mid-1980s, however, has been much more fundamental. This will be examined in the chapters devoted to the Gorbachev era.

4. See Chapters 3-5 above. IMEMO's tendency to advance nuanced images of capitalism in fact extends back to the early post-World War II years. In 1946, Yevgeniy Varga, the director of the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics (the forerunner of IMEMO), published a book entitled Izmeneniya v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoghe vtoroy mirovoy voyny [Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of World War II], in which he articulated a complex picture of capitalism -- arguing, for example, that the state in capitalist societies could in some instances act independently of the monopoly bourgeoisie.


6. Brezhnev made such an explicit connection in his speech to the June, 1969, international communist meeting. See Chapter 5 above.

7. For a more general discussion of this point, see Chapter 1.

8. Brezhnev (1972, Volume III; 56) (a speech given to voters of a Moscow electoral district on June 12, 1970).


10. Parrot (1983; 232-34). The views of both Brezhnev and Kosygin on capitalism's level of scientific achievement were surely influenced by the success of the US Apollo space program. (American astronauts first landed on the moon in the summer of 1969.)

11. The following discussion is drawn from Parrot (1983; 231-56).


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14. My own review of the "Information Reports" published after CC plenums over the past 25 years indicates that it is very unusual for a candidate member of the Committee to address one of its sessions.

15. After a series of stormy Central Committee and Politburo meetings immediately prior to the Soviet-American summit at which the SALT agreements were signed.

16. Parrot (1983; 255). To be more precise, Brezhnev and his allies had "won" at the decision-selection stage of the policy cycle. When this particular decision was implemented over the latter half of 1972 and 1973, various individuals and organizations in the process attempted to subvert the original decision. On this, see, among others, Parrot (1983; 258-65) and Breslauer (1982; 200-19).

17. In June, 1970, the Warsaw Pact issued its "Budapest Appeal," which for the first time recognized the legitimacy of American participation in the Soviet-proposed European security conference. In addition, the Soviet-West German treaty -- signed in August -- marked a sea change in relations between those two countries. See the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix, as well as the sources cited therein.

18. See the discussion in Chapter 1.

19. See Chapter 1 for a more general discussion of this point.


21. Lyubimov in "Nauchnaya zhizn'..." (1970; 126). This is the report of a meeting held in November, 1969, which was dedicated to the 90th anniversary of Varga's birth. It was sponsored by the Economics Division of the Academy of Sciences and attended by various institutes -- including INEMO.

22. For more on Varga, see Note 4 above.

23. Inozemtsev (1970b; 17). This speech was given in late January, 1970, at a conference entitled "The Leninist Theory of Imperialism and Contemporary Revolutionary Forces," which was sponsored by INEMO and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. On the conference, see "Leninskaya teoriya ..." (1970; 4).

24. Inozemtsev (1970b; 7-8). Also see his remarks in: "Nauchnaya zhizn'..." (1970; 123-25), where he calls for "sober evaluations" of capitalism and heavily attacks a recently published book -- authored by a scholar affiliated with a Central Committee research institute -- that presented an overly simplistic and pessimistic view of capitalism; and Inozemtsev (1970a; 9-12), where he calls on Soviet "Americanists" to prepare "concrete analyses of concrete conditions" in the USA and to examine both the weaknesses and the strengths of America.
25. Aleshina and Timoshik (1970; 67-71). Inozemtsev, too, argued in favor of the state's "relative independence" from monopolies under capitalism. See his comments in "Nauchnaya zhizn'..." (1970; 124). As already noted, Yevgeniy Varga was the original advocate of an independent role for the state. See Note 4 above.


27. For more on "law-governed" processes, see the entry for "Razvitiye," in Frolov (1986a; 400-401), and the example given in Hough (1986; 68).

28. Solodovnik (1970). Solodovnik was a retired major general who joined the Institute in the late 1960s.


30. Bugrov (1970; 149). Bugrov's vehicle for stating his views was an essay reviewing a book by Hans Morgenthau. As will be seen, this indirect method of policy advocacy was used by a number of IMEMO analysts over the course of 1970-71 to make arguments in favor of SALT.


32. See above. For samples of commentary on capitalism by Brezhnev and Kosygin during this period, see their speeches at the 24th Party Congress in March and April, 1971. Brezhnev (1971; 4-25) and Parrot (1983; 249-50) [a summary of Kosygin's speech to the Congress]. Brezhnev, however, was not totally silent on this topic. In a June, 1971, speech that touched on capitalist foreign policy, he claimed there had been a recognition "among a part of the ruling circles" of the capitalist powers that the arms race was not "an indisputable good." Brezhnev (1972, Volume III; 390). Still, this was a more cautious and less radical formulation than he had used in 1969-70.

33. This particular style of discourse -- citing the prevailing orthodoxy or latest speech of the general secretary and then proceeding to undermine it with the analysis that follows -- continued to be used by various actors in the foreign-policy process during the early years of Gorbachev's tenure as Soviet leader. Many members of the Soviet military establishment, for example, have written articles over the last several years that begin with the key "buzzwords" of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" only to undermine many of its tenets in the subsequent analysis.

35. Faramazyan (1971; 36-37). This article was signed to press less than two months after Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress, in which he described the continuing growth of militarism in the United States and affirmed the prevailing orthodoxy that capitalism's general economic crisis was deepening. See Brezhnev (1971; 12-13).


37. See the discussion in Chapter 4 of the Central Committee decree on the social sciences issued in August, 1967.

38. Most importantly, this includes ISKAN director Georgiy A. Arbatov, who had headed a section at IMEMO for three years during the early 1960s. For this and more on Arbatov, see Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1984, Volume I; 93). Arbatov also served on the editorial board of IMEMO's journal, Memo, from the early 1960s until 1970. (The board is listed on the last page of each issue of the journal; Arbatov appeared under the partly pseudonymous name Yu. A. Arbatov.)

On the early personnel linkages between IMEMO and ISKAN, one Western scholar -- perhaps exaggerating the point -- has described the USA Institute as a "small scale IMEMO." Eran (1979; 250-53).


40. Solomatina (1971) provides a very sophisticated analysis of the bureaucratic and organizational politics of the US foreign-policy process. In Sheydina (1971; 114), there is a more general discussion of the role of "expert" opinion in US policymaking.

41. See, for example, Arbatov (1970b). Arbatov claimed that these "objective" factors were bringing members of US political groups -- groups that exerted a "known influence on the formation of policy" -- to argue for moderating changes in American foreign policy. Arbatov (1970b; 15-16).

42. See Arbatov's comments in "Teoreticheskaya konferentsiya..." (1970; 14). Given the ideological heresy in which he was engaging, it is not surprising that Arbatov cites Lenin on this point!

43. On these ties, see, among others, Eran (1979; 251). Several events of the early 1970s would seem to confirm the close ties to Brezhnev. At the same party congress (the 24th in 1971) where Brezhnev achieved a significant consolidation of his power, Arbatov was elected to the CPSU CC Central Auditing Commission. Moreover, when Brezhnev visited the United States in 1973, Arbatov was part of his entourage.

44. See Arbatov (1970a) and (1970b). Also see his comments in "Teoreticheskaya konferentsiya..." (1970; 12-15). Given the similarity in analysis, Arbatov was probably the author of several unsigned
articles in SShA that addressed this issue. See, for example, "Na aktual'nyu temu..." (1970; 62-64).

45. In particular, the notion promoted by Soviet scholars beginning in the early 1980s that militarism was not inherent to the capitalist socio-economic system. This will be discussed in the chapters devoted to the Gorbachev-era case study.

46. Here, I refer not so much to the conclusions of various Western scholars, but to evidence drawn from IMEMO's own behavior during these years -- particularly the advocacy of a greater role for itself in the policy process.

47. Recall that ISKAN maintained a higher level of institutional advocacy on this issue than IMEMO during 1970-71 -- that is, during the period of mounting elite conflict.

48. One IMEMO scholar, who knew Inozemtsev during the late 1970s, felt this certainly was the case. Interview.

49. Interviews.


51. Brezhnev clearly alluded to this second issue when, in his speech to the 24th CPSU Party Congress in March, 1971, he noted that the SALT talks addressed "very delicate military-technical" questions. Brezhnev (1971; 22).

52. This focus makes sense given that all members of the Politburo during the years in question were generalists with no special expertise on issues of arms control.

53. See the analysis in Parrot (1983; 231-255).

54. For examples of this earlier commentary, see Brezhnev's comments on SALT in a Kremlin speech given on July 3, 1968, where he states that the USSR and US had agreed to "an exchange of opinions" on the question of strategic nuclear arms control. Brezhnev (1970, Volume II; 248). Also see his speech to the June, 1969, international communist meeting. Here his reference to SALT is limited to a call for the "limitation and restraint of the arms race, most of all of nuclear and rocket [weapons]." Brezhnev (1970, Volume II; 413).

55. For a particularly clear example of this, see Brezhnev's speech of July 3, 1968, where he spends several minutes praising the virtues of the Nonproliferation Treaty before raising the issue of SALT. Brezhnev (1970, Volume II; 247-48).

56. Brezhnev also mentions the Outerspace and Seabed arms control treaties.


59. Brezhnev (1972, Volume III; 389). The speech was given on June 11. I have translated neot'yelemaya sostavnaya chast' as "essential feature."


61. At the Congress, the size of the Central Committee was expanded by 46 members -- providing Brezhnev with ample opportunity to staff this body with more of his supporters. In addition, the same Congress saw four full members added to the Politburo; at least three of them (Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy and Kulakov) were likely supporters of Brezhnev's policies. On these changes, see Breslauer (1982; 194).

Beyond these personnel changes, there is further evidence of Brezhnev's growing power during 1971. Beginning at the Party Congress, Brezhnev became the Politburo member who most often commented upon and analyzed various aspects of US-Soviet and East-West relations. These topics had previously been addressed chiefly by Prime Minister Kosygin. The change clearly reflected a new division of responsibilities within the leadership, with Brezhnev now overseeing East-West relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular. For more evidence on this point, see the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix.

62. On this, see, among others, Volten (1982; 72) and Breslauer (1982; 200-201). For a slightly different perspective -- emphasizing the tentative nature of the Central Committee's endorsement -- see Parrot (1983; 251-52).

63. Obviously, other factors as well were behind Brezhnev's changing commentary on SALT. For example, the improving strategic environment -- that is, the clear attainment by the Soviets of quantitative strategic nuclear equality -- certainly influenced Brezhnev's changing views.

64. Obozrevatel' (1970). The authoritative nature of this article is reinforced by the use of a pseudonym ("Observer").

65. Viktorov (1971). V. Viktorov is apparently the pseudonym of Vladimir Viktorovich Shustov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On this, see Garthoff (1984b; 307). One should not read too much into the fact that Shustov wrote under a pseudonym. This was and is a fairly common practice for policymakers. For example, in recent years deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovski has on occasion written under the name P. Vladimirskiy. In other words, the use of a pseudonym does not automatically mean that the subject being discussed is too "hot" to have one's name associated with it. Source: Interview.
66. There is a dramatic contrast here with the other SALT-related issue -- the image of capitalism -- debated during these years. As was seen, on this issue there was continuing elite disagreement.

67. The following discussion is drawn primarily from the SALT I Chronology in the Appendix and the sources cited therein. Also see the analysis in Lepingwell (1988; 139-47).

68. The military-technical reason was the Soviet military's growing realization that missiles defenses could not provide a perfect defense of the Soviet Union, and, in addition, could be negated by offensive countermeasures. The strategic reason was the September, 1967, decision of the United States to proceed with a nation-wide deployment of BMD. The economic reason was the Soviet recognition that a BMD "race" with the US would be extremely costly.

69. One Soviet analyst, writing in mid-1971, referred only to BMD when explaining the rationale for the SALT talks. He asks, in particular, which "factors in the final account led to the beginning [polozhili nachalo]" of the SALT talks? His answer: "It cannot but be noted that one of them was the really apparent possibility for the creation and deployment [sozidaniye i razvertyvanie]" of BMD systems. Viktorov (1971). Viktorov, it will be recalled, was the pseudonym for Vladimir Shustov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

70. Clearly, the United States also dragged its feet at times on the question of offensive limitations (mainly out of a desire to protect the MIRV program). In general, though, the USSR, throughout the negotiations, was less interested than the US in limiting offensive arms.

71. Wolfe (1979; 67), Shulman (1974; 112) and Eran (1979; 242-43). Prior to the establishment of this section, IMEMO for many years had operated a small "Sector for Problems of Disarmament." For a reference to this sector, see Aboltin (1967a; 4). Igor Glagolev, an emigre who once headed this unit, claims that it was disbanded in 1968. See Glagolev as cited in Wolfe (1979; 67, Note 72).

72. This department had long been chaired by Dmitriy Tomashevskiy, a senior IMEMO scholar. Kulish had been affiliated with the Institute since at least April, 1968. See the reference to him in Ponomarev (1968, No.8; 81).

73. For the views of the former, see especially Postanovleniy TSK KPSS (1967). For the latter, see the discussion in Chapter 5 of Aleksey Nikonov's February, 1969, Memo article. It should be noted that the interpretation offered here is in disagreement with that presented in Scott and Scott (1981; 81-85). The Scotts, employing rather bizarre logic, argue that the military wanted institutes such as IMEMO and ISKAN to expand into the area of strategic studies.
74. See, for example, Inozemtsev’s comments in “Nauchnaya zhizn’...” (1970; 124-25) and Inozemtsev (1970a). In the former, Inozemtsev ranks studies of the military potential of imperialism sixth in a list of seven subjects of study on contemporary capitalism. In the latter source, studies of imperialism’s military potential make second place in a list of seven research tasks. Inozemtsev, however, only devotes a few sentences to this subject while on others — for example, the study of US foreign policymaking — he devotes whole pages. The higher priority Inozemtsev gives to military studies in the second source is also explained by the fact that it was an article prepared for publication in the inaugural issue of SSA, the journal of the USA Institute (ISKAN). As the article’s title makes clear, the research agenda Inozemtsev lists is for “Soviet americanists” at ISKAN, and not necessarily for IMEMO researchers.

75. See “Vnimaniyu uchastnikov...” (1971; 3).

76. Polsky (1987; 28-39). The Information Department, which provides research support for all other departments and sections, is actually IMEMO’s largest. It employs over 200 staffers. Polsky (1987; 29).

77. Given this lack of expertise, it is not at all surprising that a former military officer had to be recruited to run the military affairs section. In fact, by the mid-1970s at least eight former military officers (in addition to Colonel Kulishe) had spent some time working within the new section. These former officers were Major General M.F. Goryainov, Colonel D.M. Prokhor, Major General A.K. Slobodenco, Major General N.S. Solodovnik, Colonel A.M. Dudin, Colonel M. Shmelev, Colonel V.V. Glazov and Colonel V.I. Vaneev. See Scott and Scott (1981; 83-84). As will be seen, several of these individuals would contribute important SALT-related articles to the Institute’s journal during 1970-71.

78. Thanks to Don Blackmer for helping to clarify my thinking on this question.

79. See Chapter 8 below.

80. See Zonov (1971; 61-62), Solodovnik (1970; 54), Gantman and Tomashevskiy (1970; 89-91) and Gantman (1970; 76, 82). Also see Yershova (1970; 149) and Bugrov (1970; 147), where SALT is not explicitly discussed, but clearly implied and promoted.

81. See, respectively, Gantman (1970; 82) and Solodovnik (1970; 54).

82. They were "lengthy" in comparison with previous analyses that devoted only a few sentences or paragraphs to SALT.

83. As shown earlier, providing an ideological justification for arms control was a basic "nuts and bolts" issue associated with the Soviet debate over SALT.

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84. One of the article's authors was V. Kulish, head of this new section. Fedorenko and Kulish (1970). Recall that six months earlier, Kulish had co-authored (with a senior IMEMO scholar) another article that examined the "lessons" of World War II. This article was published in Kommunist. See Kulish and Tomashevskiy (1969).


87. See especially Solodovnik (1970). Recall that Solodovnik was a former military officer.

88. Kulish was the former military officer. The other author, Sergey Fedorenko, was a physical scientist by training who had recently joined the Institute.

89. Fedorenko and Kulish (1970; 43).

90. The authors appear to be confusing MIRVs with MARVs (maneuvering re-entry vehicles), where the latter carry warheads equipped to perform terminal maneuvers. The US MARV research and development effort was at a very preliminary stage in 1970, and was separate from the program to MIRV the ICBM force. See Bunn (1984; 32-62) for details on the US MARV program.

91. For a review of Soviet military writing on MIRV during these years, see Checkel (1986; 11-13), and the sources cited therein. The difference between military and IMEMO writing on US strategic policy cannot simply be explained by the different source materials the two sets of writers employed. While it is true that the military analysts tended to rely more on US trade journals (especially Aviation Week & Space Technology) and IMEMO researchers more on less technical sources (Newsweek, The New York Times, etc.), both kinds of sources provided assessments of mission capabilities as well as straight information. The difference is best explained by greater military expertise on such issues. The military had in fact been examining US strategic programs for many years prior to 1970. Checkel (1986; 4).

92. Vasilyev (1970). As noted above, Vasilyev was a former military officer who had joined the Institute sometime in the late 1960s.

93. This review, as well as the Fedorenko and Kulish article, were signed to press on February 18, 1970 -- less than three weeks before the first lengthy Pravda article (Obozrevatel' [1970]) dedicated to the question of strategic arms control.

94. The change in the author's commentary is quite notable at this point. His earlier criticism -- for example, of the book's lack of balance -- is replaced by a combination of neutral and positive commentary.

96. See, for example, Bogatov (1966; 39) and Tivanov (1966; 147), and the other sources cited in Chapter 3 above.

97. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty, which was negotiated at the United Nations-affiliated Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, was signed in February, 1971. The US and USSR displayed a fair degree of cooperation during these negotiations -- for example, sponsoring a joint draft treaty in October, 1969. For more details, see United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1982; 99-101).


99. This passing and indirect reference is consistent with the apparent low priority Inozemtsev accorded the Institute’s expansion into strategic studies. The structure of Inozemtsev’s article reinforces the sense of low priority. His allusion to arms control comes on the second to last page of the article. The previous 21 pages were devoted to an extended discussion of the political economy of contemporary capitalism and the nature of the international system -- both of which were core areas of organizational expertise for the Institute. Inozemtsev (1970b).

100. Inozemtsev (1970b; 24). Inozemtsev was behaving in ways an organizational theorist would predict. He had taken a new issue -- arms control -- and linked it to a long-standing organizational goal: advocacy in favor of more nuanced view of the international system.

101. It would be over 15 years before the non-zero sum, supra-class world view advanced here by Inozemtsev (as well as by other IMEMO scholars) would be reflected in views articulated by the political elites. As will be seen, a key conceptual element of Gorbachev’s "new political thinking" is that values "common to all mankind" take precedence over class values.

102. Viewed from afar, such attempts at legitimization seem almost laughable. One must keep in mind, however, that they are an essential component in establishing the credentials of a new policy in the Soviet Union. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the need for this type of "founding fathers" justification for changes in foreign and security policy has continued in the Gorbachev era.

103. This rather confusing style of discourse allowed the author both to present an unorthodox analysis, yet also -- by stating the prevailing orthodoxy -- protect himself from attack by political opponents. As
will be seen in subsequent chapters, this style of discourse continued to be employed through the early years of the Gorbachev era.

104. Aboltin (1970; 60). Arms control is a translation of kontrol' nad vorozheniyami. Aboltin, a doctor of economic sciences and a scholar long affiliated with IHMO (he had been one of its deputy directors since 1962), had edited and helped write three earlier Institute-sponsored books on disarmament and arms control. In these works, he had written on "The Struggle for Peace and the Problem of Disarmament" (co-author), "Disarmament and the Peoples of Africa," "Socialism in the Struggle Against War and Militarism" and "The Socio-economic Consequences of the Arms Race and Disarmament." See Aboltin (1967a), (1967b) and (1966b), and also IHMO Akademi Nauk SSSR (1970). As these titles suggest, his writing was rather general -- focusing on the ideology and political economy of disarmament and arms control. In addition, as of late 1969, Aboltin was one of three social scientists serving on the Soviet Pugwash Committee, which was dominated by physical scientists affiliated with the technical divisions of the Academy of Sciences. (They occupied 12 of the 15 known positions on the Committee.) See IHMO Akademi Nauk SSSR (1970; 300) for the roster of the Committee, and US Central Intelligence Agency (1975) for the affiliation of the various academicians serving on it.

105. In discussing Engels advocacy of such measures, the author is careful never to use the phrase "arms control." His analysis makes it clear, however, that Engels was arguing for measures to reduce armaments -- that is, arms control.


107. Aboltin (1970; 63). This "thesis" would return to the pages of Memo one year later as the title of the lead article in the journal's October, 1971, issue. See Shestov (1971) and the discussion below.

108. Aboltin (1970; 61, 64-66). Aboltin's remarks make clear that he is attacking internal opponents as well as the People's Republic of China.

109. The year 1971 actually saw a slight decrease from 1970 in the number of articles published in the Institute's journal, Memo, that in whole or part examined arms control or other security issues. While fewer in quantity, these articles were more substantive in nature.


113. Fedorenko (1971; 68-69) and Mil'shteyn (1971; 30-34, 38-41). Fedorenko draws heavily on two -- now for Memo -- sources: hearings of the US House Armed Services Committee and the Congressional Record. Mil'shteyn's footnotes are a mixture of US newspapers, weekly news magazines and government documents (for example, The Department of State Bulletin).

114. The amount of detail on these programs was much more extensive than it had been in 1970. See Fedorenko (1971; 69-71) and Kalyadin and Vaneyev (1971; 141-42). This latter source, which was a review of the 1969-70 SIPRI yearbook on disarmament, provided accurate numbers on US strategic nuclear forces. This was the first time such numbers had appeared in Memo.

115. Shestov (1971), Kalyadin and Vaneyev (1971) and, especially Kalyadin (1971). Shestov examines various types of arms control (strategic nuclear, nuclear testing limits, chemical, biological). His sources include SIPRI and ACDA books, as well as American monographs on ballistic missile defense. Kalyadin (1971) reviews eight books, including works by Rathjens, Scoville and York on arms control and the arms race. Book reviews in Memo typically examined one or at the most two books.

116. Kalyadin and Vaneyev (1971; 139). The authors do not actually use the phrase "arms control," rather they refer to the problem of stopping the arms race and disarmament.

117. Kalyadin and Vaneyev (1971; 139). As any Soviet reader knew, these peaceloving forces were, first and foremost, the Soviet Union and its allies.


119. For an example of this descriptive writing in 1971, see Fedorenko (1971; 69-71). The only MEMO-sponsored article written during 1970-71 on US strategic policy that went beyond description to assessment was written by a former General Staff officer, Mikhail Mil'shteyn, who had joined the military affairs division at ISKAN sometime during 1971. In his article, Mil'shteyn defined, for example, the American concepts of assured destruction and strategic sufficiency, and then assessed what criteria they provided for sizing the US strategic nuclear force posture. Mil'shteyn (1971; 30-34). For information on Mil'shteyn, see Dash (1982; A-106) and Wolfe (1979; 67, Note 73).

120. See, for example, Fedorenko and Kulish (1970; 46).

121. This variation in Institute behavior across the two different issue areas (image of capitalism and arms control/security) appears to fit fairly well with Inozemtsev's own preferences, and once again indicates his important role in shaping MEMO's response to SALT.
122. Simply put, ISKAN’s mission was to study the United States. IMEMO’s subject matter was much broader: Study of the US was but one of several areas of research.

123. Wolfe (1979; 67) and Dash (1982; 17, A-85, A-92). Larionov would later leave the Institute (in the mid-1970s) and return to the General Staff. He was apparently briefly preceded as head of this division by another former military officer, Nikolay Lomov.


125. If one counts editorials, interviews and articles devoted in whole or in part (defined as more than a passing reference) to security issues, then during 1970-71 SSHA published 17 such items, while Memo produced 13.

126. See, for example, “Na aktual’nuyu temu...” (1970) and Larionov (1970).

127. Belousov (1970) provided information on the US safeguard BMD system, while Belousov (1971) examined the US MIRV program.

128. “Na aktual’nuyu temu...” (1970; 60-61). Khlebnikov (1970; 5-8) also discusses the actual SALT process in some detail. Svetlitskiy (1970; 71) makes a brief and positive allusion to SALT.


131. The notion that the threat of nuclear war presented an equal danger to both the US and USSR would figure prominently in several later analyses by ISKAN director Georgy Arbatov. In one case, when discussing the threat of such a war, Arbatov argued that the greatest danger arose not from a conscious decision to unleash it, but from the danger that a (conventional) conflict already underway could escalate and make nuclear war inevitable. Arbatov (1971; 56). This was an extraordinarily bold comment for a Soviet analyst to make since it suggested that the chief threat to Soviet national security was not a war deliberately unleashed by imperialism. Arbatov presented a similar if somewhat toned down analysis in his 1970 book. Arbatov (1970c; 302-303).


134. See "Interv’yu: Averell Harriman..." (1971; 81) and "Interv’yu: Gerbert York..." (1971; 66-67). In the former, Harriman argued that SALT was "the most important problem" standing before the Soviets and Americans. The York interview carried a provocative subtitle: "The Best Path for Ensuring National Security." York quickly made clear that the "best path" was arms control.

135. See, for example, Aboltin (1970; 61, 63) and Shestov (1971; 3). These ideological justifications were in keeping with a long-standing organizational mission of IMEMO: to develop and articulate Soviet foreign-policy ideology by linking the "classics" (the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin) to contemporary events.


137. "Na aktual’nuyu temu..." (1970; 60-61).


139. Larionov (1970; 27). Larionov was clearly familiar with the work of Rathjens and others in the late 1960s on the action/reaction phenomenon in the arms race. At an earlier point in the article, he devotes several paragraphs to a review of Rathjens’ argument against BMD on cost-effectiveness grounds. Larionov (1970; 26).

For another endorsement in SShA of the action-reaction phenomenon as an explanation of the arms race, see Georgiyev (1971; 54-55).

140. See the discussion of zakonomernosti' at Note 27 above.

141. Larionov makes this point in various ways throughout the entire article.


143. Vaneyev (1970; 148); Kalyadin and Vaneyev (1971; 141).


146. Georgiyev (1971). The subtitle ("A Step Forward") of Georgiyev’s article directly alluded to the May 20, 1971, announcement that the US and USSR had agreed to focus the SALT talks on limiting BMD. Georgiyev, it will be recalled, was the pseudonym of Georgiy Korniyenko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

147. Larionov (1970; 27-28). The way in which "unacceptable loss" was defined highlighted the novel nature of this vocabulary for a social-science journal such as SShA. Larionov, who was a former General Staff officer, used the phrase in passing. It was the editors of SShA, in a footnote, who felt it necessary to define the term for their readers.

149. Larionov (1971). "Sufficiency" is discussed throughout the article; the discussion of "worse case" analysis appears on p.31.

150. Mil’shteyn (1971; 31-34). In this same section of the article, Mil’shteyn also discusses sufficiency. Although this analysis appeared in Memo (the journal of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations), Mil’shteyn was either already affiliated with or would soon join the USA Institute. (He was never affiliated with IMEMO.) The article, which was written in July, 1971, identifies Mil’shteyn as a Lieutenant General and Professor. This suggests that he was still on active duty and thus not yet affiliated with ISKAN.

As already noted, Mil’shteyn’s analysis was virtually the only one published in either Memo or SSHA during this period that went beyond description to assess the implications of the concepts discussed for the US strategic nuclear force posture.

151. Belousov (1970) and (1971). In their level of detail and sophistication, these articles went beyond anything published in Memo, although they still lacked any assessment of the kinds of missions to be performed by these new systems or their impact on US nuclear strategy. As will be recalled, Soviet military analyses of these technologies often provided such assessments.

On the MIRV system, also see Larionov (1970; 21), which reproduces a large photograph of the two US ICBMs (the Minuteman III and Poseidon) equipped with MIRV technology. This was the only such photograph to appear in either SSHA or Memo during these years.

152. Valentin Larionov and Mikhail Mil’shteyn.

153. See, for example, Hough (1986; 16-26).

154. In addition to the sources already cited, see Ignat’yev (1971; 89-90). Ignat’yev, a candidate of historical sciences and a senior researcher (starshiy nauchnyy sotrudyuk) at ISKAN, uses Brezhnev’s favorable comments on SALT at the 24th Party Congress in late March, 1971, as his peg to engage in some extraordinary pro-SALT advocacy. He sees the “masses” as exerting ever greater influence on US foreign policy, and points to the SALT talks as one result of this influence. Ignat’yev also uses comments by McGeorge Bundy and a US senator to portray the negotiations in a very positive manner. In light of the article’s high degree of advocacy, it is interesting that it was published not in ISKAN’s house journal, SSHA, but in Voprosy istorii. Ignat’yev’s analysis may have been too pro-SALT even for the USA Institute at that point in time.

155. Information on the editorial board is found on the journal’s last page.
156. On the editorial board listing, he used the pseudonym K.H. Georgiyev.


158. In April, 1956, the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics was reopened under the new name of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Polsky (1987; 5-6).

159. As will be seen in Chapter 10, when IMEMO did finally move in the mid-1980s to forcefully address issues of international security, a considerable amount of "organizational inertia" had to be overcome.

160. Arbatov (1970a; 33) and (1970b; 12). Recall that Brezhnev had virtually nothing to say about SALT during 1970. Arbatov in fact had publicly engaged in SALT-related advocacy as far back as the spring of 1969. See his article (under the name Yu. Arbatov) in Izvestiya, April 15, 1969, as cited in Garthoff (1984b; 307).

161. Arbatov (1971; 56-57). Here, Arbatov emphasizes both a political and economic rationale for strategic arms control, uses US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency figures to show the expense of the arms race, and concludes that the internal situation in the US favored a positive outcome of the SALT talks.

162. The closest Inozemtsev came to an explicit reference to SALT was a general comment he made, in January, 1970, on limiting the strategic arms race. Inozemtsev (1970a; 14). It is all the more telling that this comment came not in Inozemtsev's own journal (Memo), but in an article published in SShA and intended for ISKAN researchers. (An editorial note at the beginning of the article states that Inozemtsev will present his views on the directions for research by "Soviet Americanists" -- that is, ISKAN staffers.)

163. As noted earlier, the style and content of these editorials were quite similar to that of Arbatov's own work. It is thus quite probable that the editorial commentary was also authored by Arbatov.


165. The title was "On a Timely [aktual'nyy] Theme: Between Helsinki and Vienna." The preliminary SALT negotiations had been held in Helsinki in late 1969; the first formal negotiating session was scheduled to open in Vienna in April, 1970. For the positive portrayal of the preliminary round, see "Na aktual'nyu temu..." (1970; 61).

167. By mid-1971, Inozemtsev was a candidate member of the CPSU, while Arbatov was only a member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission (a step below candidate status in the Central Committee).

168. The extent of Arbatov's ties to Brezhnev became even more evident in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See, for example, Arbatov's own discussion (in his recently published memoirs) of his close ties to Brezhnev: Arbatov (1990b; 201-202). These memoirs will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

169. Compare, for example, the first articles to appear in SShA and Memo that were entirely devoted to SALT: "Na aktual'nyu temu..." (1970) in SShA; and Fedorenko and Kulish (1970) in Memo. The former appeared a full three months before the latter, and was a much more forceful piece of pro-SALT advocacy.

170. Among others, see Aboltin (1970) and Shestov (1971).

171. This comment -- quoted in Wolfe (1979; 62) -- was made in the early 1970s. Grechko was Minister of Defense from 1967 to 1976. As will be seen, the Gorbachev leadership has sought to change this state of affairs by introducing a series of conceptual, institutional and procedural reforms designed to enhance the quality and extent of civilian participation in the national-security policy process.


173. This point could obviously be generalized to other actors in the Soviet political system.

174. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, IMEMO markedly toned down its institutional advocacy for a brief period in the early 1980s after running afoul of several key elite political actors -- including Politburo member and Moscow Party boss Viktor Grishin.

175. In several cases, SALT/arms control was linked to advocacy in favor of a more nuanced image of the international system. In another case, it was linked to the long-standing Institute goal of the need for a "scientific approach" in the study of foreign policy -- that is, for a greater Institute role in the foreign-policy process.

176. This sense of organizational passivity comes through at several points in Parrot's otherwise excellent study of the Soviet debates over SALT and capitalism. Parrot (1983; Chapters 5-6).

177. See the discussion in Chapter 2 above.
Chapter 7: Foreign Policy Change in the Gorbachev Era

Since 1985, Soviet foreign policy has been in a state of dramatic change. Long-standing assumptions informing policy have been cast aside and the USSR's behavior in the international arena has acquired a dynamism not seen in many years. These policies have been accompanied by fundamental reforms of the foreign-policy process. By introducing changes at both the agenda-setting and option-formulation stages of the process, Gorbachev and his colleagues have sought to broaden the degree of participation in it.

The policy-cycle framework outlined in Chapter 1 will be used to examine the evolution of these policy and process reforms. First, however, it is necessary to delineate the issues and set the overall context for what Gorbachev and others call the "new political thinking."

The Issues

In a marked contrast to the pattern seen in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the mid-1980s saw a series of key issues raised to the public Soviet foreign-policy agenda over a one year period beginning in the fall of 1985. These issues touched upon both the basic assumptions underlying Soviet international behavior as well as the strategic prescriptions informing day-to-day policy.¹ Changes in basic assumptions included a revised leadership view of the international system that emphasized its non-zero sum nature. Official statements discussing the inevitability of the socialist-capitalist competition were supplemented and to some extent replaced by statements stressing the "interdependence" of the world and the danger posed by "global
Another change at this level was the introduction of a new goal structure for Soviet foreign policy. The previous emphasis on the primacy of class interests was downplayed, and there was a new stress in leadership statements on interests "common to all mankind" (obshchecheleuncheskiy).\textsuperscript{3} The new hierarchy of interests clearly suggested that Soviet policy should give priority to problems that affected all nations (for example, the nuclear threat and environmental decay) over class-based interests (for example, the promotion of socialism in the developing world).\textsuperscript{4}

Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders used the changes in basic assumptions to legitimate important shifts in several strategic prescriptions for Soviet security policy. First, there was a declaratory change in the conceptualization of security. The previous emphasis on a uni-dimensional approach (focusing on military power) attained unilaterally was downgraded and largely replaced by a more multi-dimensional approach (political means as well as military power) that was to be attained mutually. Second, there was a change in the prescription for how much security was needed by the Soviet state. The previous formulation, the principle of equality and equal security, was replaced by a new one: reasonable sufficiency. Third, since the new emphasis on political means for ensuring security had given greater legitimacy to arms control, a new approach toward verification was feasible. The former emphasis on national technical means (reconnaissance satellites and the like) was supplemented with a new willingness to consider more intrusive forms of verification such as on-
site inspections.

The reasons behind the changes in basic assumptions and strategic prescriptions were at least threefold. One clear intent was to re-engage Soviet foreign policy with a changing world. The largely static and reactive foreign policy of Brezhnev's last years in power and the Andropov/Chernenko interregnum was to be replaced by a more dynamic and active policy. A second obvious purpose was to stabilize the international environment while reform was carried out at home. A third purpose was to make Soviet foreign and national-security policy more cost effective. There was a felt need for intensification -- that is, making better use of existing resources instead of devoting additional allocations to defense and foreign affairs. As a result, there was a new emphasis on the political and diplomatic dimensions of security.

The Context

Gorbachev's new thinking on foreign policy did not arise in a vacuum. It was conditioned and indeed caused by a confluence of domestic and external factors that were operative during the early and mid-1980s. Domestically, there are four prime factors to consider: changing perceptions of the vitality and capabilities of the Soviet economy; a growing appreciation of the scientific-technical gap that separated the USSR from the developed capitalist countries; a breakdown in the elite consensus on the foreign-policy strategy pursued during the Brezhnev years; and a new set of changes in the leadership's approach to policymaking.

There is clear evidence that, in the period immediately before and
after Brezhnev's death in late 1982, key members of the elite as well as academic analysts were beginning to ask fundamental questions about the vitality of their socio-economic system. Initially, during 1982 and early 1983, this concern was seen in a rather arcane (for a non-Soviet) debate over the nature of "contradictions" under socialism and the status of "developed socialism" (a term favored by the Brezhnev leadership to describe Soviet socialism).  

By the middle of 1983, the now famous "Novosibirsk Report," written by the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, was circulating (only 70 numbered copies were produced) among academics and, we now know, among segments of the political elite. In essence, the report was a call for a radical reform of the Soviet economic system. It made this point by using a Marxist framework of analysis to argue that the system of production relations in the USSR was lagging behind the development of its productive forces. By late 1984, Gorbachev, the clear heir apparent to a faltering Konstantin Chernenko, was presenting a similar analysis of the Soviet Union's economic dilemmas.

The mid-1980s also saw the Soviet elite become increasingly aware that the USSR was falling further and further behind in the race for scientific and technical progress. The "third industrial revolution" of computers and information technology had arrived and the Soviet Union was in no way ready for it. Soviet recognition of this fact was clearly demonstrated by the priorities established in Gorbachev's initial economic program for 1985 and early 1986. Its emphasis was not consumer welfare and consumption, rather it was investment -- in particular, the commitment of additional resources to overhaul and
technologically update Soviet industry and, especially, the machine building sector.\textsuperscript{10} It is indicative that one of Gorbachev's first major domestic policy initiatives after he assumed office in March, 1985, was to convene a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee to discuss what he called a "fundamental" (koreenny) question of economic policy: "the acceleration of scientific-technical progress."\textsuperscript{11}

A third domestic factor was a breakdown in the elite consensus on the foreign-policy strategy pursued during the Brezhnev era. This strategy had sought to combine detente and East-West economic cooperation with continuing efforts to increase Soviet military power and expand Soviet influence in the developing world.\textsuperscript{12} Obviously, Brezhnev's death played a key role in undermining this consensus. There was, however, another, "objective" factor at work. By the early 1980s, the Brezhnev strategy was simply not working very well. The Soviets were over-extended in the developing world, mired in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan and, on top of everything else, Soviet-American relations were skidding to a post-World War II low.

The evidence on the fragmenting consensus is threefold. First, the years 1981-83 saw an increase in public elite disagreement over issues of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{13} Second, there is evidence that by 1981-82 even Brezhnev himself was having doubts about the USSR's foreign-policy course.\textsuperscript{14} Finally, there is some evidence that the years 1983-84 saw a review of Soviet security policy within the Central Committee apparatus -- a review that focused not so much on concrete policy as on the conceptual bases for it.\textsuperscript{15}

The final internal factor was a fundamental change in the Soviet
leadership's approach to foreign policymaking. Under Gorbachev, there was a shift in the balance between two competing philosophical approaches. One approach, long favored by ideologues in the CPSU apparatus, employed a deductive framework based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Another approach, favored by academic analysts at institutions such as IMEMO, utilized an inductive-empirical framework of analysis. Obviously, with respect to leadership thinking on issues of foreign policy, it had never been a case of one approach or the other; both approaches had coexisted uneasily for many years.16

Beginning in late 1984, however, there was a clear shift in favor of the more empirical approach. In a series of speeches and articles, both Gorbachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev advocated basing foreign policy more on facts and existing realities than on Marxist-Leninist dogma. This point came across in various ways: calls to change Soviet foreign-policy "views and practice" if "life requires it"; a recognition that the contemporary world was "constantly changing [according] to its own laws" (a bit of ideological heresy from a Marxist-Leninist perspective); a recognition that the dynamism of the world was forcing a reevaluation of "conventional ideas and approaches"; and a call to bring the results of "scientific analysis" (conducted by organizations such as IMEMO) to bear on the practice of Soviet foreign policy.17

This empirical approach mandated several basic changes in the Soviet foreign-policy process. At a general level, by early 1986 Gorbachev was discussing policymaking in ways that would warm the hearts of Western students of policy studies. Asked in an interview about Soviet "policymaking," he explained that it consisted of elaborating
(vyrabatyvat'), formulating and implementing (provodit') policies. "Elaboration" involved an analysis of what issues needed to be addressed; the CPSU played the key role here. "Formulation" involved discussions and, if necessary, a "struggle of viewpoints" on the given issue; it provided the basis for taking "political decisions." "Implementation" was when political decisions were turned into actual policy.18

More specifically, the empirical emphasis required changes at two points in the policy cycle: public agenda setting and option formulation. The change in public agenda setting involved the way in which "signals" of agenda change were reinforced. Beginning late in 1985, Gorbachev raised a series of foreign-policy issues. He did not, however stop at this point (as, for example, Brezhnev had done in the late 1960s). Rather, Gorbachev and other members of the top leadership then consistently returned to these new agenda items, and reinforced their status as pressing issues for study or action. This played a crucial role in bringing new participants into the process.

This new approach to agenda setting was accompanied by reforms of the option-formulation stage of the process. The changes here had two goals. First, there has been an ongoing attempt to establish alternative sources of expertise on questions of foreign and national-security policy. Among official actors, these changes included the creation, in 1986, of arms-control sections within the Foreign Ministry and the CPSU International Department, and, during 1988-89, the formation of Central Committee commissions and Supreme Soviet committees on Soviet foreign and national-security policy. Among unofficial
actors, the changes included the creation in 1986 of a Department for Disarmament and International Security within IMEMO.

The second goal was to involve unofficial actors such as IMEMO more actively in the foreign-policy process. Mechanisms were established to give them a less ad-hoc and more codified role in policymaking. Most important here was the creation of a new center within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for coordinating, on a regular basis, academic research with leadership policy concerns.\textsuperscript{19}

Externally, there are two main factors to consider: changes in the international system and, beginning in 1980, a sharp deterioration in the international climate faced by the USSR. Soviet commentators, in explaining why the "new thinking" came about, often explicitly link it to a series of fundamental changes in the international system. Among such changes they include: the impact of nuclear weapons on the nature of international politics, the rapid increase in international economic ties and the growth of so-called global problems.\textsuperscript{20}

Soviet leaders and analysts, however, are much more reticent to analyze the impact of the second factor -- the worsening international climate. There is no doubt, however, that it played a very important role. By the early 1980s, the "objective realities" facing the USSR in the international arena were daunting. It was being condemned from all sides for its invasion of Afghanistan; in Eastern Europe, the situation in Poland was highly unstable; and US-Soviet relations were at a low not seen since the early Cold War years. On top of all this, the Soviet leadership faced a US administration whose stern anti-Soviet rhetoric and rearmament policies were a matter of great concern. By early 1984,
some members of the Soviet political elite were genuinely alarmed that the worsening international climate was simply spinning out of control.\textsuperscript{21}

In sum, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" arose from a confluence of domestic and international factors. As with the detente policies of the late 1960s, one can make a strong case that a change in the international balance of power (both its economic and military dimensions) was again leading the Soviet leadership to seek an easing of international tensions.\textsuperscript{22} Yet it is equally clear that the foreign-policy reforms begun in 1985-86 have led to a Soviet policy dramatically different from that of the detente years. This difference is partly explained by changes the Gorbachev leadership made to the foreign-policy process beginning in 1987. However, as will be seen in Chapter 8, the difference is also explained by activity within the Soviet foreign-policy community that occurred before Gorbachev and other elites placed the "new thinking" on the public agenda beginning in late 1985.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{The Key Actors}

As was done in earlier chapters, the key participants are divided into two groups: official and unofficial. During the late Brezhnev era and early Gorbachev years, the key official actor remained the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and its head, the CPSU general secretary. It is assumed that analysts and editorials in the central Party press (in particular, \textit{Kommunist} and \textit{Pravda}) are an important source for the views of the general secretary and other elites.

Since my goal is to explore the role of social scientists in the
Soviet foreign-policy process, the most important unofficial participants remain, as before, the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and its Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN). The prime focus continues to be IMEMO. The Institute's areas of expertise and goals in the early 1980s (the early phase of agenda setting for the present case study) will be examined in some detail, the purpose being to better understand its behavior at later points. Other actors will be studied only to the extent necessary to understand IMEMO's behavior during the years 1981-88 and its ability to influence Soviet policy.

At the beginning of the 1980s, IMEMO was in many respects very similar to the IMEMO of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Half its top leadership (which included a director and five deputy directors) were holdovers from the early 1970s and before. Director Inozemtsev had held his position since May, 1966, while deputy directors Strigachev and Martynov had been appointed in 1963 and 1972, respectively. The remaining deputy directors -- Bykov, Gur'yev and Ivanov -- were all appointed between 1977-79. Continuing a trend evident since the late 1950s, a majority (four) of IMEMO's six top leaders were economists or political economists by training. In addition, Inozemtsev, who was a historian by training, had consistently shown in his research and writing a preference for issues of political economy.

Reflecting the background and interests of its top leadership, IMEMO's dominant areas of expertise as of the early 1980s continued much as they had been in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The greatest expertise was on questions of economics and political economy (both at
the national and international levels) and, to a lesser extent, foreign policy and conceptual questions of international relations. This was seen in several ways. First, a review of the articles published in *Memo* (the Institute's journal) during 1981 reveals that 60% dealt with the political economy of contemporary capitalism, the political economy of developing countries and general issues of economics, while 34% examined questions of foreign policy and international relations.27 Second, continuing a trend seen in the late 1960s, the "Scientific Life" section in *Memo* -- which provides insights into the Institute's intellectual life -- was typically dominated by the reports and appearances of economists and political economists associated with IMEMO.28

The final piece of evidence is the subject matter of the graduate degrees defended at IMEMO during the early 1980s. Between October, 1979, and July, 1983, a total of 84 dissertations (12 doctoral and 72 candidate) were defended: 70 examined the political economy of capitalism and the developing world and other economic topics, while 14 explored issues of international relations and foreign policy.29 None of the dissertations in the latter category, it should be noted, examined concrete questions of international security (military strategy or conventional arms control, for example). The uneven split between the two types of dissertation topic reflects the fact that, of the seven areas of specialization in which IMEMO awarded degrees, four were in economics and political economy, while only two were in international affairs.30

Given the above, it is not surprising that the Institute's internal organizational structure was not much different from what it had been in
the early 1970s. As of the early 1980s, IMEMO had 10 research
departments and three sections. Eight of these 13 units examined issues
of international economics and political economy, while four conducted
research on various aspects of international relations.\footnote{31} Within this
stable organizational structure, however, IMEMO experienced considerable
growth during the 1970s. Between 1973 and early 1980, the number of
researchers working at the Institute had grown by nearly 50%, from 600
to over 900.\footnote{32} These numbers made IMEMO the largest by far of the
Academy of Sciences international-affairs institutes.\footnote{33} The leadership
of the Academy in fact continued to view IMEMO as the "leading
scientific center" for research on contemporary capitalism and
international relations.\footnote{34}

This brief review suggests that the IMEMO of the early 1980s held a
sense of organizational "mission" markedly similar to the one it
possessed in the 1960s and early 1970s. Research on issues of political
economy, contemporary capitalism and international relations remained
its central areas of interest and expertise. These were clearly the
issues about which it most cared and to which it devoted the most
organizational resources. How this sense of organizational mission
would evolve as the Gorbachev era unfolded and how such an evolution --
along with factors external to the Institute -- would affect IMEMO's
ability to influence Soviet foreign and national-security policy are the
central questions to be addressed in subsequent chapters.
Notes

1. The distinction made here between general beliefs and strategic prescriptions draws upon the discussion in Breslauer (1987; 430-31).

2. Global problems are problems such as environmental degradation and resource depletion that cut across national (and ideological) boundaries. Their resolution requires cooperative efforts among nations. As was seen in earlier chapters, discussions of interdependence and global problems took place among INEMO researchers in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to address global problems in any detail, they had received passing mention in the speeches of several other Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev and Andropov. See Chapter 8 below. What distinguished Gorbachev from the others is that he moved beyond a simple statement of the existence of global problems and assessed their implications for Soviet foreign policy.

3. As will be recalled, academics such as INEMO director Nikolay Inozemtsev had used the phrase "common to all mankind" as far back as the late 1960s. As far as I can determine, Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader to employ the phrase.

4. In the fall of 1987, the Soviet leadership would revise yet one more of the basic assumptions underlying Soviet foreign policy: the image of capitalism. See Chapter 10 below.

5. This was not simply a debate among Soviet academics. Both Chernenko and Andropov contributed to it, with Andropov adopting a more unorthodox position (that the "base" and not simply the "superstructure" needed to be modified to perfect Soviet socialism). On this debate see, Kux (1984). Also see Andropov (1983a), especially at pp.13, 20-22. This Kommunist article is an important theoretical/ideological statement of the new General Secretary’s reformist ideas. In late 1984, Gorbachev would further elaborate (and radicalize) Andropov’s views — arguing that any reform of the Soviet economic system must inevitably involve changes in the base-superstructure relationship. See below. For a general review of the economic debates of the Andropov/Chernenko years, see Hewitt (1988; Chapter 6).

6. For a discussion of the report’s implications for the Soviet economy as well as a copy of the report itself, see Hanson (1984). For evidence that the report had an audience among a part of the political elite, see Zaslavskaya’s comments in Nahaylo (1987; 12, 14-18).


8. Gorbachev (1984a; 7-9, 16, 21, 30). To argue that Gorbachev, by late 1984, recognized that the USSR faced serious economic problems is not to say that he had a coherent strategy of economic reform. The evidence of
the past five years clearly shows that Gorbachev had no such strategy upon assuming office in March, 1985.

9. This fact has been discussed by numerous Western analysts. See, for example, Hewett (1988; 80-83).


11. The meeting was held on June 11, 1985. For Gorbachev’s address to it, see Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 2; 251-78).

12. On this, see Parrot (1988; 2-3) and Gelman (1984; Chapter 4).

13. Parrot (1988; 2-3). However, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the years 1985-88 saw surprisingly little public elite conflict over Gorbachev’s foreign-policy reforms. Here, there was a notable contrast with the significant levels of elite disagreement over Gorbachev’s domestic policies.

14. For example, by 1981 Brezhnev had lost much of his former conviction that an aggressive, forward strategy in the developing world was the best one to pursue. On this, see Valkenier (1983; 52-59) and Albright (1989; 55-59). By the fall of 1982, Brezhnev was also questioning his previous commitment to a slow, but steady increase in Soviet military power. See, especially, his speech to a special meeting of military leaders in October, 1982. Brezhnev (1982a).

15. This will be discussed in Chapter 8 below.

16. The roots of this uneasy coexistence extend back to the 20th CPSU Party Congress in 1956, where the leadership called for a revitalization of the social sciences, including those sciences that studied the international arena. (Recall that the official announcement of IMEMO’s re-establishment came two months after the 20th Congress.) See Zimmerman (1969; Chapter 2) and Tucker (1971; Chapter 10).

17. See, respectively, Gorbachev (1984a; 38-40) and (1984b; 4); Yakovlev (1985a; 11) and Yakovlev’s comments in "Kruglyy stol Memo ..." (1984, No.7; 101).

18. See Gorbachev (1986a; 1). The interview was conducted by French journalists and reprinted in Pravda.


20. See, for example, Gorbachev (1986b; 24-25, 39-41), Slakhnazarov (1986), and Bunkina and Petrov (1986).

22. The realist (that is, balance-of-power) argument also helps explain why the initial stress in Gorbachev's economic program was on modernizing the USSR's scientific-technical base. Only with a world-class technological base could the Soviet Union hope to compete for power and influence in a game of international politics increasingly defined by economic -- as well as military -- capabilities.

23. Here, "community" refers not only to social scientists at institutions such as IMEMO, but also to Party intellectuals with expertise on international affairs, physical scientists affiliated with the Academy of Sciences technical divisions and scholars working at the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy.

24. This information was gathered from various publications sponsored by IMEMO (books and its journal Memo) as well as from several editions (beginning with 1975) of the US Central Intelligence Agency publication, Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations.

25. Deputy directors Ivanov, Martynov and Strigachev were doctors of economic sciences, while deputy director Gur'ev was a candidate of economic sciences.

26. While Inozemtsev had written on various issues of international relations and foreign policy as well as on questions of political economy, he was best known for his work on the latter. Indeed, his one State Prize was awarded in 1977 for his work on the political economy of contemporary capitalism. For information on Inozemtsev, see Andrey Gromyko, et.al. (1984, Volume I; 400) and "Akademik Nikolay Nikolayevich Inozemtsev" (1982). A 1981 article by Inozemtsev outlining IMEMO's research tasks in light of the 26th CPSU Party Congress is a typical example of his emphasis on questions of political economy and economics. In the section where he discussed the Institute's research tasks, thirteen of the 18 pages were devoted to such topics as the Soviet economy, world economic ties, capitalist economies and the political economy of contemporary capitalism. Inozemtsev (1981).

27. These figures are compiled from the annual index of articles that is published every year in the December issue of Memo. The 1981 index appears in Memo, No.12, 1981, pp.149-157. The numbers presented here do not include unsigned editorials, materials from the journal's "Scientific Life" section and book reviews. With these exclusions, there were a total of 122 articles, which broke down as shown below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political economy of capitalism</td>
<td>- 59</td>
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<tr>
<td>political economy of the developing world</td>
<td>- 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general economic issues</td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy/international relations</td>
<td>- 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>- 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122</td>
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An examination of the books published under IMEMO's auspices in 1980 provides additional evidence of the priority it gave to questions of economics and political economy. Of the 20 Institute-sponsored books published that year, 14 (70%) examined the political economy of capitalism and other economic issues, while 4 (20%) were devoted to international relations and foreign policy. See Kapranov (1981). This bias in favor of books on political economy is similar to that seen in the late 1960s. See Kuchinskiy (1967) and Kuchinskiy (1968).

28. In 1981, see, for example, "Nauchnaya zhizn': Chestyovaniye ..." (1981) and Vaulin (1981b). Most participants in these reports are identified by their academic degree (for example, doctor of economic sciences, candidate of historical sciences, etc.).


30. As of 1982, the seven areas of specialization for graduate degrees at IMEMO were:

* the world economy and international economic relations;
* the economics and allocation of productive forces of capitalist countries;
* the economics and allocation of productive forces of developing countries;
* political economy;
* history of the international communist and workers' movement and of the national liberation movement;
* history of international relations and foreign policy;
* mathematical and statistical methods of planning and management.

These areas of specialization were authorized by the USSR Council of Minister's Supreme Attestation Commission -- a fact that on occasion clearly rankled IMEMO director Inozemtsev. In 1981, he harshly criticized the Commission for only allowing IMEMO to grant degrees on "the history of international relations and foreign policy" (emphasis added). (This episode will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 below.)


31. Interview. Also see Ruble (1981; 398) and Polsky (1987; 28-39). The thirteenth unit is the Information Department, which provides research support to all units within IMEMO. The four units studying international affairs were: the Sector of Current Problems; the Department of International Relations; the Department of International Organizations; and the Sector on Military Affairs.

32. See Eran (1979; 259) and Polsky (1987; 29). "Researchers" includes senior researchers (starshvy nauchnyy sotrudnik), researchers (nauchnyy sotrudnik) and junior researchers (mladshyv nauchnyy sotrudnik).
33. The USA Institute (ISKAN), for example, employed approximately 300 researchers in the early 1980s. Ruble (1981; 395).

34. See "Nauchnaya zhizn': Vysokaya..." (1981; 140), and Fedoseyev and Koval' (1983; 123). The quote comes from the former source, which is a report of remarks by Academician Petr Fedoseyev (a vice president of the Academy). The latter source is the text of a decree approved by the Social Sciences Section of the Academy's Presidium.
Chapter 8: Agenda Setting - The Early Phase (1981–85)

Strictly speaking, the "new thinking" -- with its notions of interdependence, global problems, supra-class interests, common security, sufficiency, and the like -- is not really new. Such concepts have a long intellectual history. In the West, to cite but a few examples, one has the writings of the Club of Rome (founded in 1968) on globalism, the emergence of the transnationalist school of international-relations theory (beginning in the early 1970s) that emphasized notions of interdependence, and the advocacy of common security by the Palme Commission in the early 1980s.¹

Of greater importance for the present study is that the new thinking has an intellectual history in the Soviet Union as well. As seen in earlier chapters, scholars at IMEMO were discussing and analyzing notions of common security, supra-class interests and global problems as far back as the late 1960s. These discussions, which took place in a variety of institutions and fora in addition to IMEMO and its journal Memo, continued on and off throughout the 1970s.²

These discussions not only continued into the early 1980s, but also acquired a more structured character. Between June, 1979, and May, 1983, the Academy of Sciences established two new scientific councils and a special committee, all of which -- as can be seen from their published work -- addressed aspects of what later became the new thinking.³ During the same period, several Academy journals established rubrics that carried new thinking-type analyses.⁴

In other words, the early phase of agenda setting in the present case was dramatically different from that seen in the mid-1960s.
Various individuals and organizations (including IMEMO) within the Soviet foreign-policy community were engaged in their own agenda setting and advocacy on issues directly related to those the leadership would raise to the public agenda beginning in late 1985. For at least one of these actors -- IMEMO -- there is strong evidence this advocacy did influence the content of the agenda for foreign-policy reform that Gorbachev would eventually come to articulate.

Official Participants

Politburo Level. As noted in Chapter 7, the early years of this period saw the gradual fragmentation of the elite consensus on the Brezhnev foreign-policy strategy, as well as signs of doubt from Brezhnev himself on its continuing validity. The early (1981-82) rhetoric of the Reagan administration gave Soviet hardliners an additional rationale for claiming that Brezhnev’s strategy was floundering and had been too soft on imperialism. Nonetheless, the years 1981-82 saw Brezhnev continue as the chief spokesman for Soviet foreign policy, and the line he articulated was at best a minor adaptation of the strategy of the 1970s.

Brezhnev’s speech to the 26th CPSU Party Congress in February, 1981, provides a good example of this combination of a little new and much old in Soviet foreign policy. As for the new, his comments on Soviet relations with the developing world were more restrained than they had been at the previous Party congress in 1976. Yet, he still felt confident enough to speak of a “union” of class interests between world socialism and the national-liberation movement. Brezhnev also
indirectly referred to so-called global problems -- noting various problems that were global in scale (for example, disease and illiteracy), without actually calling them "global." This, however, was less specific language than that he had used in 1976-77.

The remaining part of the foreign-policy section of Brezhnev's speech was basically a repetition of long-standing Soviet assumptions and policies. The general crisis of capitalism was portrayed as deepening; the activities of US monopolies were seen as stimulating further inter-imperialist contradictions; US-Soviet relations were portrayed as worsening due to US policies and actions; and the "Peace Program" elaborated at the 24th and 25th Party congresses was seen as a "reliable compass" for Soviet arms control policy (here, a rather standard series of Soviet proposals was presented).

In his discussion of security, Brezhnev broke no new ground when he declared that nuclear arms control negotiations should be conducted on the basis of "equality and equal security." This "principle," as it was often called, had been a part of Soviet parlance since the early 1970s. Taken to its extreme, it allowed the USSR to have armed forces as powerful as all its opponents combined. For example, where the US might call for global ceilings on a particular weapon system, the USSR -- under the principle -- would demand that an allowance be made for its military confrontation with China. Soviet adherence to this principle explains why, throughout the early 1980s, the USSR insisted that the French and British nuclear forces be included in the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe.

The overwhelming impression one takes from Brezhnev's report to the
congress was that the best strategy for Soviet foreign policy was "more of the same."12 While Brezhnev and other elites clearly recognized that Soviet foreign policy had encountered some problems and that "storm clouds were rising" in the international arena,13 they saw such problems as temporary and thus proposed no fundamental changes in policy to correct them.

This same message comes through in other elite-level speeches and analyses of the early 1980s.14 Even in the few cases where conservatives made veiled attacks on the Brezhnev strategy, what they offered in its place could best be characterized as "more of the same plus." That is, they sought a continuation of the Brezhnev strategy, but with greater emphasis on its military component.15

The last 6 months or so of Brezhnev's life brought a slight but perceptible hardening in the regime's foreign-policy pronouncements.16 In part, this was a reaction to the Reagan administration's continuing anti-Soviet rhetoric. It was also, however, a natural reaction for a system approaching its first leadership change in nearly 20 years. The evident difficulties associated with the long-postponed succession would make any elite think twice before they "rocked the boat" -- for example, by tampering with the tried and true verities of Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, to the extent that the elites were locked in a power struggle over the future leadership of the Party, it would be very disadvantageous for any of them to be seen as "soft" or revisionist on questions of foreign or security policy.17

Andropov's tenure as CPSU General Secretary (11/82 - 2/84) saw a continuation of the trend evident in Brezhnev's last years. While
Andropov and other elites clearly saw that Soviet foreign policy faced some problems, their words and actions suggested that they felt such problems could best be resolved by pursuing the Brezhnev foreign-policy strategy. Indeed, the overwhelming impression one gets from the record of Andropov's ten healthy months in power (he first fell seriously ill in August, 1983) is that changes in domestic policy were the clear priority of the Soviet leadership.\textsuperscript{18}

There were numerous examples of the essential continuity in the Andropov leadership's approach to issues of foreign policy. The year 1983 saw the Soviets continue to make rather inconsequential concessions at the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) talks in Geneva.\textsuperscript{19} There were also new proposals for political/declaratory agreements -- for example, a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on mutual non-use of force.\textsuperscript{20} These simply echoed proposals made during Brezhnev's years in power. Various other elite-level speeches and commentaries praised, for example, the Soviet "Peace Program" and called for a return to "detente";\textsuperscript{21} noted the importance of "peace offensives" to Soviet foreign policy;\textsuperscript{22} praised the class essence of Soviet policy, while articulating long panegyrics to the policy of peaceful coexistence;\textsuperscript{23} and declared that "not a single major problem" in the international arena could be solved without the USSR's participation.\textsuperscript{24}

The last four months of 1983 brought a notable worsening in US-Soviet relations. The destruction of a Korean commercial airliner by Soviet fighters, the beginning of the deployment of new US nuclear weapons in Europe and other events\textsuperscript{25} led the Soviet leadership to sharpen its attacks on the US, while concern mounted in Moscow that the
degree of international tension had reached a dangerous level. On the key issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, Soviet efforts to mobilize opposition among the West European publics to prevent the new US deployments had failed miserably. The Soviets had left themselves little choice except to break off all arms-control talks -- which they did in late November, 1983.

By early 1984, Soviet foreign policy had reached a low point not seen in many years. The pattern of elite commentary and Soviet behavior suggests a policy immobilized. All the evidence indicates that the Andropov interregnum had not seen any questioning of the basic assumptions and policy prescriptions informing Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, Andropov’s only innovative comments on international affairs came when he made a passing reference to global problems. However, even in this case he used the same indirect language that Brezhnev had employed at the 26th Party Congress in 1981, and failed to note that the resolution of such problems required cooperative efforts among all nations.

The phrase that best captures the thrust of top-level commentary and Soviet foreign-policy behavior during Chernenko’s year as CPSU General Secretary (2/84 - 3/85) is “damage control and more of the same.” The damage-control element aimed at preventing a further deterioration in Soviet-American relations. The elites clearly saw a need to rescue Soviet policy from the dead end it had reached during Andropov’s last months in power.

In attempting to fulfill this mission, Chernenko gave high priority to improving relations with the United States. A little over two weeks
after assuming power, he articulated a set of "norms" to guide US-Soviet relations. While the norms themselves represented no radical departure for Soviet policy, the comments accompanying them made it clear that Chernenko was looking for an improvement in Soviet-American relations. On several other occasions during 1984, Chernenko reiterated the importance the Soviet leadership attached to improving relations with the US.

On other issues of foreign policy, however, elite-level commentary during 1984 was "more of the same." For example, in one of the May issues of Kommunist, the lead editorial presented a very orthodox analysis of the nature of capitalism. It discussed the crisis of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism and the growing influence of the military-industrial complex, among other Marxist-Leninist verities. Other examples of the lack of change abounded. The principle of equality and equal security was reaffirmed as the basis on which to conduct nuclear arms-control negotiations, as was the importance of a class approach for understanding international affairs. In one case, Chernenko actually used the subversive -- for a Marxist-Leninist -- phrase "global problems." However, he linked both the existence and resolution of such problems to "the development of the class struggle".

Aside from this rather traditional-sounding Soviet commentary, perhaps the most notable feature of Chernenko's brief tenure as general secretary was the increasingly important role played by Gorbachev within the Soviet leadership. By the late spring of 1984, Gorbachev was the clear heir apparent to a faltering Chernenko, and as "second secretary"
was overseeing international affairs within the Central Committee Secretariat.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, anything he had to say on issues of foreign policy should be accorded special attention.

Through most of the year, however, Gorbachev had little new or different to say on foreign policy, and was seemingly content, like Chernenko, to do little more than reiterate the need for an improvement in Soviet-American relations.\textsuperscript{38} In other words, Gorbachev was articulating a foreign-policy line similar to that of Chernenko and other elites -- combining calls for an improvement in East-West relations with a reiteration of many of the assumptions that had informed Soviet policy for years.

In two important speeches given in mid-December, 1984, however, Gorbachev began publicly to break with the prevailing Leninist orthodoxy on questions of foreign policy. The first speech was to an ideology conference and was devoted mainly to domestic matters.\textsuperscript{39} The foreign-policy section of Gorbachev’s report was a mixture of old and new. He began by declaring that socialism "exerted and exerts its main influence on world development through its economic policy" -- a statement sure to provoke the displeasure of Soviet ideologues. Almost as if to smooth any ruffled feathers, Gorbachev followed this with a hardhitting critique of capitalism -- its militarism, terroristic policies and profound moral crisis.\textsuperscript{40}

Gorbachev, however, did introduce one important nuance in his discussion of foreign-policy issues. In particular, he argued that "if life requires it" the CPSU should "in a timely way introduce one or another corrective to our views and practice."\textsuperscript{41} This statement was an
early indication of a key Gorbachev trait: his empirical, pragmatic approach to understanding issues of world development.\textsuperscript{42}

The second speech, given a little over a week later, was presented before the British Parliament. The context is important here. This was Gorbachev's first trip to the West after it had become clear that he was to be the next leader of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, then, the trip received extensive coverage in the Soviet media.\textsuperscript{43} The speech itself was a synthesis of old verities and new (for the Soviet leadership) assumptions. Gorbachev began with a very positive characterization of the policy of detente, and blamed the US entirely for its breakdown. At another point, he declared the USSR's fidelity to the principle of equality and equal security as the basis of any arms-control agreement. These statements, to say the least, broke no new ground.\textsuperscript{44}

It was his description of the international system that marked an important departure from the prevailing official orthodoxy. Most notable was Gorbachev's claim that the world was "constantly changing [according] to its own laws."\textsuperscript{45} This statement neatly undercut the assertion -- long a staple of Soviet pronouncements -- that the main moving force in the international arena was the class contradiction between capitalism and socialism, and gave legitimacy to Gorbachev's discussion of such non-class notions as "global problems" and the "interconnected" nature of the contemporary world.\textsuperscript{46} In the address, Gorbachev also used, for the first time, the phrase "new political thinking" -- although he was vague on what it meant.\textsuperscript{47}

Overall, the speech appears to have been the foreign-policy
equivalent of the domestic-policy address Gorbachev had given eight days earlier at the ideology conference. That is, he used it to advance several of the conceptual elements of his reform program -- in this case, on foreign policy. In fact, the speech's clear strength was its conceptual innovation. At the level of concrete policy prescriptions, it had little new to offer. Did this constitute formal, public agenda setting with respect to the new thinking? The evidence suggests that it did not. For one, Gorbachev himself would have very little additional to say about the new thinking for the next ten months. In addition, the central press did not begin a campaign to propagandize the need for new thinking in foreign policy.

In beginning to articulate publicly his agenda for foreign-policy reform, Gorbachev had started from what a physicist would call "first principles" -- that is, the basic assumptions underlying Soviet policy. As will be seen, there had been earlier advocacy for revising these "first principles" by institutional actors such as IMEMO. In one very important sense, this prior advocacy by IMEMO (and others) mattered: When Gorbachev finally placed the principles of the new thinking on the public agenda beginning in late 1985, he had allies and sources of expertise to whom he could turn to help influence the policy debate.

The contrast with Brezhnev's foreign-policy reforms of the late 1960s could not be more dramatic. Brezhnev started with questions of security (the SALT process). When he first raised SALT to the public agenda in mid-1968, Brezhnev was essentially raising a new -- in the Soviet context -- idea. There had been no previous advocacy in favor of SALT-type negotiations, in part because there were no institutional
actors with the requisite skills to argue convincingly in their favor. Brezhnev thus had no allies ready to promote his reform agenda -- whereas Gorbachev did. This difference helps explain why the Gorbachev foreign-policy reforms unfolded so much quicker than those of the early Brezhnev years.

A final point needs to be made on Gorbachev's public -- and increasingly unorthodox -- commentary on foreign policy during 1983-84. There is evidence that the changes in his public commentary were preceded by a private questioning of the basic tenets of Soviet foreign policy as practiced under Brezhnev. In his recently published memoirs, Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USA Institute, claims that Gorbachev had first begun to turn his attention to issues of foreign policy in the immediate wake of Brezhnev's death in November, 1982.52 Under Andropov and, especially, Chernenko, Gorbachev -- according to Arbatov -- "constantly met with specialists," formulating and sharpening his position on "basic questions of domestic and foreign policy."53

Unofficial Participants

In analyzing the behavior of civilian institutes such as IMEMO and ISKAN during these years, one is struck by two things. First, levels of institutional advocacy generally remained high even though the overall political climate had turned markedly more conservative. Second, institutions such as IMEMO had a greater number of forums than in the late 1960s through which to express their views. On this latter point, it is important to recall that in 1979-80 the Academy of Sciences had established two new scientific councils in which scholars from IMEMO and
other institutes collaborated on joint research projects.

The first new council was the Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament. It was established in June, 1979, and chaired by Nikolay Inozemtsev, head of IMEMO. The purpose of this council, as of any Academy scientific council, was to coordinate work among various individuals and institutions on a particular subject -- in this case, on issues of arms control. The council appears to have been closely affiliated with IMEMO. The most obvious link was that IMEMO director Inozemtsev also chaired the council. In addition, the council's organizational infrastructure was based in IMEMO's Department of International Organizations. Moreover, the five sections (sektsey) of the council addressed topics traditionally within IMEMO's sphere of interest. During the early 1980s, IMEMO's journal (Memo) published several reports on the activities of these various sections.

In addition to research on "problems of peace, disarmament and international cooperation," the council had a clear propaganda/lobbying function. Inozemtsev himself declared that the council should aid Soviet public organizations engaged in the "struggle for peace" and establish contacts with foreign scientists, public and cultural figures who were working to improve the international climate. Moreover, the council's main publication series -- Mir i razoruzhenie -- was, from its inception, published in five languages: Russian, English, French, German and Spanish. Finally, it is quite likely the council's creation was influenced by the elite's realization that there was a need to rectify the USSR's growing image problem abroad -- in particular, by more effectively propagandizing Soviet policy.
It is equally probable, however, that members of the council saw it as a vehicle for promoting Soviet-American relations in general and arms control in particular. As seen in earlier chapters, the social scientists on the council (from IMEMO and other institutes) had been promoting such goals since the late 1960s. In addition, there is good evidence that by 1977-78 the top leaders of both IMEMO and ISKAN were concerned that the Brezhnev regime's growing conservatism was hindering further progress in arms control. A scientific council would give institutions such as IMEMO and ISKAN an additional forum for promoting their views.

The second new scientific council established in the early 1980s was the Scientific Council on Philosophical and Social Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution. It was chaired by Ivan Frolov, a reformist Marxist philosopher who has since become one of Gorbachev's closest aides. This council had a section on the Global Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution, which was headed by Yevgeniy Fedorov. The fact that global problems were being studied in a council that examined issues of philosophy was itself a breakthrough. In the Soviet context, philosophy means Marxism-Leninism. In other words, one of the purposes of the council and its section was to study the effects of global problems on Marxist-Leninist ideology.

During the early 1980s, IMEMO evinced greater interest in the subject matter and activities of this second scientific council than in the council on peace and disarmament research. This seems odd given that the latter council was chaired by IMEMO director Inozemtsev. Part of the answer to this seeming riddle was that both Inozemtsev and IMEMO
Researchers were more at home with basic conceptual issues of international relations (global problems, the nature of the international system, the nature of security) than with specific issues of international security (nuclear strategy or verification). This preference for the pure over the applied was clearly rooted in IMEMO's own institutional history. It is also quite probable that the second council evoked greater interest among scholars at IMEMO because it was seen as a more serious enterprise, one less devoted to propagandizing Soviet policy abroad.

IMEMO. The IMEMO that entered the 1980s was a rather stable organization. The top leadership had not experienced dramatic turnover in the 1970s, and its organizational structure had changed little. The Institute's dominant areas of expertise continued to be, first, economics and political economy (both at the national and international levels) and, second, foreign policy and conceptual issues of international relations. It should come as no surprise, then, that several of the goals IMEMO promoted during the early 1980s were similar to those of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It continued, for example, its advocacy in favor of a complex, empirically-based view of the international system. In other cases, however, earlier Institute goals were accorded considerably less attention. The goal of a greater role in foreign policymaking -- pursued so aggressively in the late 1960s -- seems simply to have been dropped.

The stability mentioned above, however, was shaken by two events within IMEMO during 1981-82. First and perhaps most important, in August, 1982, Nikolay Inozemtsev died unexpectedly of a heart attack at
the age of 61, ending a 16-year tenure as head of the Institute.\textsuperscript{74} It was not only the Soviet academic community that held Inozemtsev in high esteem. Within IMEMO as well, he was seen as a highly competent scholar and effective defender of Institute interests.\textsuperscript{75}

In the immediate wake of Inozemtsev's death, the Institute had two leaders. In 1982-83, Vladlen A. Martynov, a deputy head of IMEMO, stepped up to serve as acting director.\textsuperscript{76} Martynov was basically a bureaucrat and administrator (he had run IMEMO's administrative affairs throughout the 1970s), who had a reputation for being more of a follower than a leader.\textsuperscript{77} In his "caretaker" role, Martynov appears to have been content to keep the Institute on the course set by Inozemtsev.

In September, 1983, Aleksandr Yakovlev was appointed head of IMEMO, a position he would hold for nearly two years.\textsuperscript{78} Yakovlev was an outsider to both IMEMO and, more generally, the Academy of Sciences.\textsuperscript{79} As will be seen, under his guidance the Institute experienced a revitalization and its journal, Memo, became more interesting to read.

The second important event to occur during these two years affected both IMEMO's leadership and the Institute as a whole, and provides a classic example of the difficult political context within which Soviet organizations had to operate during the latter years of the Brezhnev era. Writing in his memoirs, Georgiy Arbatov has revealed that throughout much of 1982 IMEMO was the target of a pressure campaign that apparently had backing at high levels within the CPSU.\textsuperscript{80} The campaign began in the early months of the year when an Institute deputy director was arrested on what Arbatov claims were trumped up corruption charges.\textsuperscript{81} While the charges against this individual were eventually
dropped, IMEMO’s troubles were only just beginning.

In fact, by the spring of 1982, the pressure campaign had acquired a qualitatively different dimension. Sometime during the spring, the KGB arrested two Institute researchers for purported dissident activity.⁸² Next, a CPSU commission was formed to investigate IMEMO’s work; it was headed by Politburo member Viktor Grishin, a figure known for his hardline views. Among other charges, the commission accused IMEMO of ideological "failings" (proval) and harboring zionists among its staff. Needless to say, in the Soviet context these were very serious charges. The summer months saw a lessening of the pressure on IMEMO. According to Arbatov, however, the damage had already been done: Morale within the Institute was shattered.

With Inozemtsev’s death in August, the pressure was once again turned up, and plans were announced for another Party investigation of the Institute’s affairs. This investigation was apparently terminated only after Arbatov and the journalist Alexandr Bovin had personally appealed to the ailing Brezhnev in September, 1982, to stop the campaign against IMEMO.⁸³

The fall of 1982 thus marked the end of an extraordinarily difficult 10 month period for IMEMO. It had lost its respected longtime leader and been subjected to considerable political pressure. As will be seen below, these events had a tremendous influence on the Institute’s behavior over the course of the year.

Beyond the above instance of direct political interference in the Institute’s affairs, it is clear that, in a more indirect sense, the Institute’s behavior in the early 1980s was clearly being affected by
the increasingly conservative political environment of those years. Inozemtsev himself was often not as aggressive in promoting Institute goals as he had been in the late 1960s. While he still did defend and promote them, his advocacy was at times less strident than during earlier years. In the Institute's journal, there were still numerous bold examples of advocacy. Yet, this advocacy often coexisted with bland analyses that parroted the official line.

This type of bland analysis was especially typical of the "editorials" Memo ran during these years. These were very different from those of the late 1960s, which had expressed IMEMO's own institutional viewpoint. The "editorials" of the early 1980s were often so fulsome in their praise of Brezhnev and Soviet policy that they could just as easily have appeared in such central Party organs as Kommunist or Partiynaya zhizn'. Given their content, it is in fact quite likely that these editorials were produced by higher-level CPSU functionaries and then "recommended" to the Institute for publication.

An additional piece of evidence indicating the external constraints being imposed on institutions such as IMEMO by the conservative political environment is that in early 1982 the press run of Memo dropped dramatically (over 18%). This cut came after a period of slow but steady growth throughout the 1960s and 1970s. At exactly the same time, the press run of the USA Institute's journal, SSHA, was also cut by a similar percentage (14%). Thus, the two leading foreign-affairs journals in the USSR both experienced major circulation cuts early in 1982. A likely explanation for the cuts is that both journals had been consistent advocates of improved superpower ties throughout the 1970s.
During a period of worsening East-West relations (as was the case by early 1982), conservative elites within the Politburo or Central Committee apparatus surely saw such advocacy as counterproductive.

Several Institute researchers have suggested one additional cause for IMEMO's at times more cautious and conservative behavior during the early 1980s -- namely, that too many senior scholars at the Institute had held their positions for too long, and had thus acquired an interest in keeping things stable and predictable. In other words, the stagnation (zaetov) so evident elsewhere in the political system had left its mark on IMEMO as well. The fact that the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences felt it necessary to criticize IMEMO on essentially these grounds lends some credence to this argument.

The weight of the evidence presented below, however, is that the particular pattern evident in IMEMO's behavior in the early 1980s was not so much a function of organizational zaetov as it was an indication of a still healthy institution grappling with the reality of a change in its own leadership, as well as the growing conservatism of the country's political leadership. One clear piece of evidence in support of this interpretation is that the analysis offered in Memo's official-sounding editorials was simply not reflected in the articles and books published by IMEMO scholars.

The task now at hand is to examine what topics most interested IMEMO analysts during the early 1980s, and how these topics related to the set of issues that eventually reached the public agenda beginning in late 1985. These issues, it will be recalled, concerned both basic assumptions underlying Soviet foreign policy and strategic prescriptions.
for Soviet national security. The basic assumptions included a revised image of the international system (interdependence, global problems) and a new goal structure for Soviet foreign policy (common to all mankind interests over class interests). The new strategic prescriptions for Soviet national security included a modified conceptualization of the nature of security (stressing that it was multi-dimensional and should be attained mutually), a change in the prescription for how much security was needed (the notion of sufficiency) and a new approach to verification (favoring more intrusive forms).

The purpose here is not to show that the issues Gorbachev raised were first discussed among academics. This is widely known and it is ultimately not a very interesting or useful exercise. Rather, the purpose is to explore the utility of an organizational-politics perspective for better understanding the behavior of IMEMO and its ability to influence Soviet foreign and national-security policy. Which of the issues that reached the public agenda in 1985-86 was IMEMO addressing in the early 1980s? Why -- if at all -- were certain kinds of issues favored over others? How did the Institute’s behavior during the early phase of agenda setting affect its response once the public agenda had changed?

The following analysis looks first at IMEMO’s writings in the early 1980s on the conceptual bases of international relations and of security, and then at its studies of arms control and other more concrete security issues (such as verification). In each case, the writings will be compared to statements and commentary by the political leadership, the purpose being to determine the Institute’s sensitivity
to elite concerns and how, if at all, this sensitivity varied by issue. The chapter concludes with a brief comparison of the research output of IMEMO and the USA Institute during these years, the purpose being to discern which aspects of IMEMO’s behavior were unique and which were shared with international-affairs specialists at other research institutes.

* * *

Throughout the years 1981-85, IMEMO continued, as it had in the late 1960s, aggressively to promote a complex, empirical and essentially non-class vision of the international system. When it came to discussions of global problems, the structure of the international system and the nature of security, for example, the Institute had clear goals and often aggressively promoted them. In addition, these goals received strong support from both Inozemtsev and, to a slightly lesser extent, Martynov, his successor as Institute head.

During 1981, the Institute devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to one particular aspect of the international system: so-called global problems. Memo in fact ran a special article rubric on global problems that serialized key chapters from an Institute monograph on the same subject. The advocacy in the articles was cautious, but nonetheless clearly present. For example, Margarita Maksimova (a senior Institute scholar) presented an essentially non-class definition of global problems (stressing their "planetary" character), but felt it necessary to call the definition "very conditional." This sense of
caution also came through in the way Maksimova and other IMEMO researchers felt it necessary to ground their analyses in the trappings of a Marxist-Leninist, class-based framework.\textsuperscript{93}

In other forums less conspicuous than a journal article, however, Institute scholars were considerably less restrained. Maksimova herself provided a good example of this type of behavior. Her report at a meeting on global problems, sponsored by the Scientific Council on the Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology, was remarkable for its advocacy. She argued, for example, that a comprehensive study of global problems was "dictated" by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Party Congress (this was simply not true) and that there must be further study of such (non-class) categories as world science and a single world (vsemirny) economy.\textsuperscript{94}

At this same meeting, Ivan Frolov, chairman of the council, made crystal clear what Maksimova and others had implied, but not explicitly stated. Research on global problems, he declared, was incompatible with "old stereotypes of thinking" and required the adaptation of the "basic categories of scientific communism."\textsuperscript{95} In other words, the prevailing, class-based Marxist-Leninist framework must be adapted to "new phenomena" of the present era.\textsuperscript{96}

IMEMO director Inozemtsev and others also made it clear that the Institute as a whole had a basic interest in developing Soviet research on global problems and, more generally, international relations. In his article summarizing the Institute's research tasks in light of the 26th CPSU Congress, Inozemtsev stressed that IMEMO had given research on global problems a high priority and, in particular, had created a series

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of "special groups" within the Institute for their study. Maksimova likewise emphasized the various organizational changes IMEMO had implemented to expand its research on global problems.

Inozemtsev, in addition to his specific comments on global problems, engaged in some organizationally-inspired advocacy on the more general topic of the Institute's study of international relations. He accomplished this by attacking the fact that IMEMO could only award graduate degrees on the "'history of international relations and foreign policy'." Given that international relations was an "independent scientific discipline," which undertook more than simply historical studies, Inozemtsev argued that additional, non-historical degree categories were needed in the international relations specialty. As will be recalled, the promotion of a "science of international relations" had been a core organizational goal of the Institute since the late 1960s.

The above commentary was clearly at odds with the analysis of the international system being offered by Brezhnev and other elites during the early 1980s. While Brezhnev was willing to admit the existence of problems of a global scale, researchers at IMEMO were quite willing to explore the implications of such problems for basic tenets of the Marxist-Leninist world view. The Institute's boldness on this issue is best understood if one recalls that the study and promotion of such issues fit with the sense of organizational mission IMEMO had developed over a 25 year period. Calls for further research on global problems were simply an extension of earlier advocacy (for example, in the late 1960s) for a greater empirical emphasis in Soviet studies of the
international system.

If the above suggests that only organizational factors explain the Institute's actions, then a review of IMEMO-sponsored writing on the international system during 1982 suggests that other -- extra-organizational -- factors also conditioned its behavior. Throughout 1982, Institute scholars were much more hesitant to advance unorthodox views on these issues.

On the issue of global problems, this hesitancy was especially evident. The article rubric on global problems in the Institute's journal, Memo, became a book-review heading. More important than this change was the actual content of the reviews. In four of the six reviews, the phrase "global problems" was not even mentioned, or was used only in connection with attacks on "bourgeois" conceptions of such problems. These reviews also virtually ignored an important theme of earlier Institute writing on global problems: the international cooperation needed to resolve them. A fifth review began by saying a few kind things about Western conceptions of "global problems," but ended with a propaganda blast at the West for ignoring what the reviewer saw as the main global problem: universal disarmament.

One book review published in 1982 did review global problems in a less negative light. This review, however, was the exception that proved the rule. It was written by a CPSU functionary, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, not affiliated with the Institute. His review, in contrast to all the others, discussed a Soviet book on global problems. Shakhnazarov's comments were a confusing mixture of orthodoxy and revisionism. At some points, he praised "bourgeois
scientists' for their contributions to the study of what he called "globalistics," while later attacking the (class) limitations of their research.108 His "bottom line," however, was revisionist: He specifically called for the establishment of a "special scientific discipline" of globalistics in the USSR.109

It is thus quite clear that, during 1982, IMEMO "toned down" its earlier institutional advocacy in favor of a complex, non-class image of the international system.110 This change in behavior was not simply a result of the steadily worsening state of Soviet-American relations during 1982. Indeed, during 1983 -- when superpower relations were even worse than in 1982 -- the Institute would once again begin to promote aggressively several issues. Nor was the change a function of Inozemtsev's death. His unexpected death came in August, but advocacy in Memo was noticeably absent for many months prior to this point.

Rather, the clear reason behind this shift in Institute behavior was the pressure campaign waged against it throughout most of 1982. There can be no doubt the campaign had a considerable effect. This year was the only one of the 16 examined in this study where IMEMO seemed virtually to lose its institutional "voice." This episode points to a continuing serious weakness in the "access route" through which social scientists could influence Soviet foreign and security policy during the Brezhnev years. This "route" -- because it was not codified and often depended upon personal ties to operate -- could easily be ruptured.

Throughout 1981-82, the Institute had little to say on another conceptual issue: the nature of security. In Memo, the only article to address this question was written by a mid-ranking Foreign Ministry
official, Vladimir Petrovskiy. Petrovskiy, in the midst of a rather polemical attack on US policy, had some interesting things to say about the concept (pontative) of security. In particular, he argued there was a need to modify the "essential components of the traditional concept of the system of security." Military force, he declared, could no longer be the "main principle" of security. An IMEMO scholar had made the same point in 1981. His comments, however, appeared in an Institute-sponsored book with a small print run.

During the period 1983–85, Institute advocacy on the nature of the international system rebounded dramatically from the low point reached in 1982. In addition, IMEMO began to address the issue of the nature of security with increasing frequency. Two events early in 1983 were in part responsible for this change in behavior. The beginning of the year saw a major restructuring of Memo's editorial board as well as strong criticism of IMEMO from the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. One clear purpose of the editorial restructuring was to bring some innovative thinkers onto the board.

The essence of the Academy's criticism of IMEMO was that it was producing too many superficial studies at a time when so many new phenomena were arising in the international arena. Writing later in the year -- and apparently heeding the Academy's criticism -- a prominent Institute scholar, Vladimir Razmerov, called for a reinvigoration of the Institute's research on the international system, as well as on capitalism.

These two events set the stage for a personnel change later in the year that was destined to have a dramatic impact on IMEMO's ability to
influence Soviet policy. This change, of course, was Alexandr Yakovlev's appointment as Institute head in September, 1983. By this point, Yakovlev already had clear ties to Gorbachev, ties first established when the two men met in Canada during the summer of 1983.\textsuperscript{117} The consensus among Western analysts is that Gorbachev was directly responsible for Yakovlev's return to Moscow in the fall of 1983.\textsuperscript{118}

Yakovlev's ties to Gorbachev explain why, in contrast to the pattern of Institute behavior seen in the late 1960s, IMEMO was engaging in some pronounced advocacy prior to the time when the public agenda began to change in late 1985.\textsuperscript{119} As already noted, Gorbachev -- at the latest by early 1984 -- had privately made it known that he was open to the discussion of new ideas on foreign as well as domestic policy. The argument here is not that Gorbachev had a concrete blueprint in hand for the "new political thinking" prior to becoming general secretary in 1985. He had, however, communicated his openness to new ideas. Yakovlev was clearly in a position to sense this openness and, as will be seen below, was able and willing to mobilize IMEMO in an attempt to influence the emerging policy debate.

Within IMEMO, Yakovlev's arrival had a noticeable impact.\textsuperscript{120} He brought a more democratic atmosphere to IMEMO and encouraged serious, scholarly research, while downplaying the importance of ideological constraints.\textsuperscript{121} In light of the radical changes Yevgeniy Primakov would bring to IMEMO beginning in 1986, it is interesting that one senior researcher claims that Primakov was Yakovlev's personal choice as his successor at the Institute.\textsuperscript{122}

Yakovlev's tenure at IMEMO also brought important changes to the
Institute's journal. In 1984, three new rubrics appeared in Memo. One concerned global problems. More important, however, were the other two newly-created sections: "Tribune of Economists and Internationalists" and "Discussions-Debates." Articles appearing under these two rubrics were among the most interesting in a given issue of the journal. They were often the vehicles for pronounced advocacy, and at times openly polemicized with other Soviet authors.

The changes during Yakovlev's years at IMEMO are a clear indication of the importance of top leaders in shaping organizational behavior in the Soviet context. Is this a valid generalization? After all, there are numerous examples in the USSR where a change in leadership does not lead to changes in organizational behavior -- even when the new leader wants change (Gorbachev and the CPSU being a prime example).

The key to understanding Yakovlev's evident impact on IMEMO is that -- as the evidence presented below indicates -- he mobilized the Institute to address issues that were compatible with its core sense of organizational mission. He was not trying "to teach an old dog new tricks." Rather, he was urging a relatively healthy dog to improve upon its existing repertoire of "tricks." This fact allowed Yakovlev to play a greater role in shaping organizational behavior than might otherwise have been the case, especially given his status as an organizational "outsider."

Turning to an analysis of IMEMO's research output during the years 1983-85, there are numerous examples of the Institute's renewed interest in and advocacy of a complex vision of the international system. Once again, and in dramatic contrast with 1982, there were calls for further
conceptual and empirical research on global problems. During 1983 alone, IMEMO sponsored at least two conferences on this subject.

Given these facts, it is not surprising that the amount of Institute writing on global problems grew considerably beginning in 1983. If there was a common message in all this writing, it was that global problems were a reality to which Soviet foreign policy must adapt. At first, there was no single institutional viewpoint on the best approach for studying such problems. Some Institute scholars emphasized a Marxist, class-based approach, while others seemed little concerned with notions of class and class conflict. By early 1985, however, the non-class approach was clearly being emphasized.

Institute advocacy on global problems, however, paled in comparison with that on two other issues concerning the international system: the correlation between class and non-class values in the world arena and the specific nature of the international system. On both these issues, IMEMO engaged in extraordinary advocacy throughout the years 1983-85. Moreover, in many instances, this advocacy came in the work of senior Institute scholars writing in the lead article of a given issue of Memo.

The very clear message that emerged from Institute advocacy on the relationship of class to non-class values was that the former should be subordinated to the latter. While this theoretical distinction might at first glance seem to have little practical significance for Soviet foreign policy, this, in fact, was not the case. Beginning in 1986, Soviet scholars and, eventually, Gorbachev and other leaders would use the notion of the primacy of non-class values to delegitimize one key class-based element of the foreign-policy strategy inherited from the
Brezhnev/Andropov/Chernenko leaderships -- support for national-liberation movements -- while simultaneously legitimizing the importance of such non-class notions as "global problems" and "interdependence."

The Institute's extraordinary advocacy on the primacy of non-class values began in early 1983.136 Writing in the lead article of the February issue of Memo, two researchers noted that together with class and national interests, a new "objective category" had appeared in world politics: the interests of "the development of mankind as a whole."137 The authors clearly recognized the extent of their ideological heresy as they managed to cite not just Marx, not just Engels, not just Lenin, but all three men as the source of this newly (re-) discovered insight.138 Lenin, in particular, had apparently recognized the priority of 'the interests of social development' before 'all remaining' interests.139 The authors hinted at the concrete significance of this insight for Soviet policy by declaring that it had acquired special "topicality" (aktual'nost') due to the scientific-technical revolution and the nuclear threat.140

Throughout 1984, Institute scholars professed to have found an "organic connection" between socialism's class interests and interests common to all mankind (obshcheelovecheskly). This point was made by Oleg Bykov, a deputy director of IMEMO and head of its Department of International Relations, in the opening paragraphs of his lead article in the March, 1984, issue of Memo, and was repeated word for word in another lead article later in the year by a senior scholar in this same department.141 In addition, two scholars not affiliated with the Institute made virtually the same point (albeit in a more cautious way)

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The boldness of the Institute's advocacy here can only be appreciated when one recalls the extremely poor state of Soviet-American relations in late 1983 and early 1984. As seen above, these ties were virtually frozen by the time of Andropov's death in February, 1984. It is true that the Chernenko leadership made clear efforts to bring an end to this freeze by renewing the policy of "detente," but commentary to this effect in no way sanctioned the ideological heresy in which Institute scholars were now engaging.

In early 1985, Lukov and Tomashevskiy -- the authors of the initial February, 1983, article -- returned again to the theme of the relationship of class and non-class interests. The authors articulated all the same points they made in their earlier article, but now their comments were more extensive and their advocacy even more bold. At one point, they asked a rhetorical question: Today, in analyzing international relations, is it possible to limit oneself to categories of class and national interests? Their answer was a resounding no! The common interests of mankind were now an "objective category" that any "realistic" foreign policy must consider. The extraordinary advocacy in this article is quite probably a function of the fact that it was signed to press one week after Gorbachev took over as General Secretary.

On the second issue -- the specific nature of the international system -- the Institute was almost equally outspoken throughout the years 1983–85. The two buzzwords for Institute researchers were "interdependence" and the notion of a "world [vsemirnyy] economy."
point here is not that such words (and the non-class framework of
analysis they implied) were new to the Soviet scene. Academics and
other specialists had been discussing them off and on for years. The
difference now was that the language was much more forceful ("objective
realities" and the like). In addition, much of this analysis came at a
time when East-West relations were so bad that the political climate
within the USSR did not provide an objective basis (to borrow some
Sovietspeak) for thinking in such non-class terms.

Nonetheless, beginning early in 1983, Institute researchers employed
the concepts of interdependence and world economy with increasing
frequency. One scholar, for example, writing in March, simply asserted
the "interdependence of states" as a fact, but offered no supporting
commentary. Later in the year, Margarita Maksimova, a leading
Institute scholar, returned with renewed vigor to a favorite topic of
hers -- the notion of a single world economy. Using very forceful
language, she explained why the concept of a world economy should be
understood in supra-class terms (as a "certain single whole"), attacked
Soviet opponents of the concept, and argued that the world had become
"ever more interconnected." In a similar fashion, an Institute
researcher, writing later in 1983, declared that "interdependence" among
countries was increasing.

The advocacy was even greater in 1984-85. Writing in the lead
article of the May, 1984, issue of Memo, a scholar declared that in the
final account all states were "interconnected and interdependent," and
that such interdependence had become "ever more stable and multi-
sided." Several months later, an Institute researcher returned to
the concept of a single world economy and engaged in some aggressive, indeed combative, advocacy. He envisioned a world economy where "certain common economic laws" operated in both its capitalist and socialist parts.¹⁵¹ In making this argument, he named and then bitterly attacked a Soviet opponent of the concept.¹⁵² This polemizing over the notion of a single world economy continued on the pages of Memo into 1985.¹⁵³

Beginning in 1983, articles in Memo began to address another conceptual issue -- the nature of security. The amount of attention and the degree of advocacy on this issue were not nearly as great as on the conceptual issues discussed above. It was, nonetheless, clearly present. During 1983, there were several hints of the need for a new approach to security. One scholar cited an American academic to argue that traditional approaches to security were no longer adequate; there had to be a greater stress on non-military methods.¹⁵⁴ In another case, an Institute researcher went further and declared that there existed an "objective community [obshchnost'] of interests of international security." This meant, he noted, that in pursuing their own security states had to take into account the interests of other countries.¹⁵⁵ Near the end of the year, deputy Institute director Bykov stated -- without any elaboration -- that the realities of nuclear war had "cancelled many traditional postulates of politics and strategy."¹⁵⁶

In 1984, the advocacy in Memo became more pronounced. In April, one scholar used forceful language to argue there was a need for "very essential correctives" in the traditional approaches to national and international security. Today, in the face of the nuclear threat, he
declared, the interests of all states should be "mutually considered" when it came to questions of security.\textsuperscript{157} Several months later, Vladimir Petrovskiy of the Foreign Ministry contributed an article to \textit{Memo} that made much the same point.\textsuperscript{158} By year's end, another scholar was citing former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the effect that security for the USSR and the US could only be attained if it was "joint [sovmeanstvay'] security."\textsuperscript{159}

By early 1985, there was a clear contrast in IMEMO's advocacy of a complex, empirical vision of the international system, on the one hand, and of a revised view of the nature of security, on the other. In the former case, the advocacy was very pronounced, was often by leading IMEMO scholars and many times came in the lead article of a given issue of \textit{Memo}. On the nature of security, the advocacy was much less pronounced and there was less of it.

Yakovlev, it would seem, had only been fully able to mobilize the Institute behind a certain subset of foreign-policy issues. Yet "second secretary" Gorbachev was apparently open to new ideas on a range of foreign-policy questions, \textit{including} security. While the evidence on this last point is not definitive, there is a clear correlation between Gorbachev's growing stature and power within the Party leadership in the spring of 1984 and signs, which first began to appear in April and May of that year, of a serious re-evaluation of the Soviet approach to security.\textsuperscript{160}

The above suggests that a complete understanding of the Institute's behavior at this point requires examining not only Yakovlev's important role, but the organizational context within which he was operating.
Simply put, theoretical and empirical analyses on the nature of the international system were "bread and butter" issues for IMEMO. It had a wealth of organizational expertise in these areas and, as was seen in earlier chapters, the promotion of a complex vision of the world arena had been a core organizational goal as far back as the late 1960s.

Questions of security -- conceptual ones or more applied ones like conventional arms control or verification -- had always taken a second place to these broader issues of international relations. IMEMO was not a strategic studies center (a la RAND), but a foreign-policy (and economics) think tank. It was natural that the Institute would most vigorously promote those issues which allowed it to protect and extend its core sense of organizational mission.

* * * *

IMEMO entered the 1980s with a slightly higher level of interest and expertise on security issues than in the late 1960s. The difference is explained partly by organizational factors -- IMEMO's small military-affairs section had now existed for over a decade. More important, however, was that by the early 1980s issues of arm control and security had been the central element in US-Soviet relations for over a decade.

Yet, the study of such issues remained -- as it had in the sixties -- a low priority for the Institute. On questions of conventional and nuclear arms control, and arms-control verification, for example, IMEMO scholars were usually not willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. IMEMO's sense of organizational mission, it would seem, had not been
modified to include the study (and promotion) of security issues as a basic part of its research agenda.

There were numerous indicators of this fact. The military-affairs section was still dwarfed in size and prestige by the Institute's full-fledged departments (for example, those on international relations, international organizations and the political economy of developed capitalism). As a result, scholars not affiliated with the Institute contributed articles to Memo on security topics much more frequently than they did on other issues. The Institute also continued to show little interest in establishing ties with other organizations (both within and outside the USSR) that addressed questions of international security.

In addition, when Inozemtsev discussed IMEMO's research tasks in the security realm during the early 1980s, his proposals sounded strikingly similar to those outlined in the late 1960s. While it is true that by 1981 Inozemtsev was indeed calling for more specific research on arms control and the arms race, it is important to note the topics he included under this category. Many were the same as those first elaborated in the late 1960s.

In his article outlining IMEMO's research agenda in light of the 26th CPSU Party Congress in 1981, for example, Inozemtsev called for research on the following security-related topics: the role of the military-industrial complex, the goals Western countries sought in increasing their "military potentials" (a favorite phrase of Inozemtsev's since the 1960s) and the basic tendencies in Western military "preparations." This is not exactly a call for serious
strategic research. Furthermore, this discussion of security issues came -- as it always had -- after Inozemtsev had outlined the Institute's research tasks in the international relations sphere.

Thus, there appears to have been no attempt to update and expand IMEMO's research agenda on security to account for new -- compared to the 1960s -- issues such as conventional arms control or verification. In contrast, on issues closer to the Institute's core areas of expertise, research agendas had been expanded. One example is IMEMO's very evident expansion into the field of global problems and globalistics in the late 1970s and early 1980s.\(^{167}\)

The lower priority accorded to security issues was also evident in the overall tone of the articles on this topic published in Memo. Much more so than on other issues, Institute researchers were content to simply cite -- and not challenge -- the established dogma. One such dogma was that arms-control accords could be adequately verified with the use of national technical means (satellites and the like) alone.\(^{168}\) This was simply taken as a given by numerous IMEMO analysts.\(^{169}\) Another was that US policy was undermining "international stability" or, as was sometimes claimed, "strategic stability."\(^{170}\) Here again, most IMEMO analysts used the phrase and never questioned the validity of the assertion, let alone define what stability meant.\(^{171}\)

One other dogma of the 1970s and early 1980s was that arms control agreements had to be based on what the Soviets called the "principle of equality and equal security."\(^{172}\) Many IMEMO analysts cited this principle when discussing arms control, but none attempted to define it.\(^{173}\) Given this willingness to simply reiterate the prevailing
"wisdom" on security issues, it should come as no surprise that one searches in vain for cases where these analysts questioned or even discussed Soviet security-related strategic programs.

It is instructive to compare this behavior with how IMEMO analysts treated another "principle" underlying Soviet foreign and security policy -- the principle of peaceful coexistence. Here, they were often willing to define the principle and put their particular "spin" on it.

The sense one gets from many of the articles on security was that Institute researchers were content to promote the official line. In terms of a policy cycle, they seemed to have felt their mission was to aid the implementation of established policy. The evidence here is at least twofold. First, there was the manifest fact that so many of the Institute's analyses on security issues were in whole or part simply devoted to parroting the official line.

Second, virtually all the reports and commentary carried in Memo on the activities of the scientific council established to coordinate research on arms control and security stressed its role in propagandizing Soviet policy. Inozemtsev's comments at the 1981 yearly meeting of the council were typical. In the opening moments of his report, he declared that the council should be concerned with the "practical implementation" of Brezhnev's foreign and security-policy program. Comments of this type -- made by ranking members of the council -- continued for the next three years.

It needs to be said that not everything published by the Institute on security during these years was propagandistic and official sounding. IMEMO still had an interest -- first developed in the late 1960s -- in
promoting the concept of arms control. As argued in earlier chapters, a
Soviet policy of seeking arms-control agreements had to be premised on a
more cooperative security relationship with countries like the US.
Building this kind of relationship — no matter how limited the Soviet
leadership envisioned it to be — required information on the
international environment within which the USSR acted. IMEMO would be
an important source for such information. Thus, promoting the
concept of arms control protected and helped to further a key part of
the Institute’s sense of organizational mission: the development of a
complex, empirically-based vision of the international system.

Now, of course, arms control was no longer as hotly debated within
the top political leadership as it had been in the 1960s. Brezhnev
himself, as was evident from his speech to the 26th Party Congress in
February, 1981, was still very committed to the arms-control agenda
established in the 1970s. Thus, any Institute advocacy in favor of
arms control during the early 1980s, while important as an indicator of
organizational behavior, was not as risky to undertake as it had been in
earlier years when there was no elite consensus on the issue.

Institute advocacy on this subject was indeed evident throughout
this period, and it was similar to that seen in earlier years.
Scholars, for example, used reviews of Soviet and Western books on arms
control to cast the concept in a favorable light. In other cases,
they pointed to the positive benefits attained from the arms-control
agreements of the 1960s and 1970s. Other researchers provided
ideological justifications for arms control, and one even managed to
rediscover that well-worn Lenin quote: ‘disarmament is the ideal of
Overall, though, the level of advocacy was nowhere near as great as that on issues such as global problems, which were closer to one of the Institute’s core areas of expertise.

During these years, the Institute also produced a small security-studies literature that was different in several important ways from IMEMO’s efforts in this realm during the late 1960s. First, in contrast to the late 1960s when most analyses of this type were written by former military officers, several civilian Institute researchers were now making a contribution in this area.

Second, the overall quality of their analyses was better. The kind of glaring factual mistakes seen at times in the late 1960s was no longer present. These writers were obviously better acquainted with the Western security-studies literature than they had been in earlier years. Some analysts, for example, produced informative reviews of the history of US strategic concepts or of particular arms-control negotiations. Overall, however, these studies by IMEMO’s civilian analysts were still inferior in their level of "strategic expertise" to those of the Institute’s former military officers.

One civilian analyst at IMEMO during these years stands out for his efforts to break new ground in the security-studies area. This was Aleksey Arbatov. Arbatov, the son of Georgiy Arbatov, began his career at his father’s institute (ISKAN), but moved to IMEMO in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, he had established a reputation as a "young firebrand" with an "encyclopedic" knowledge of American national-security policy. Building on this knowledge, in 1984 he published a book and article on US nuclear strategy and doctrine that went far
beyond previous Institute efforts in this area.\textsuperscript{195} Indeed, one Soviet commentator, in a review of Arbatov's book, made precisely this point.\textsuperscript{196}

In the article, Arbatov made several interesting points. He implicitly argued, for example, that an assured second strike capability should be the main criterion in developing the Soviet nuclear force posture.\textsuperscript{197} He also argued (in both the article and book) that the existing strategic stability was robust (it had "significant reserves") and clearly suggested that the USSR therefore need not respond to every new US strategic program.\textsuperscript{198} This was a kind of strategic analysis never before produced by the Institute or seen on the pages of \textit{Memo}. In a radical break with previous Institute practice, Arbatov's article -- with its unconventional (for IMEMO) strategic-affairs type analysis -- was placed as the lead one in \textit{Memo}.

Arbatov's article, however, is the exception that proves the rule, the rule being that analyses of this type were not one of IMEMO's institutional strengths. The degree of sophistication in Arbatov's analysis was far beyond that in any of the articles by civilian researchers discussed above. The basic point here is that while social scientists at IMEMO (and elsewhere)\textsuperscript{199} were gaining expertise on security issues, they were still -- with the possible exception of Aleksey Arbatov -- in no position to challenge the Soviet military's monopoly of expertise on an array of military-technical issues.\textsuperscript{200}

How, then, should one understand the appearance and prominent placement of Arbatov's article? After all, his substantive interest did not seem to fit with IMEMO's core areas of expertise and sense of
mission. Explaining this seeming paradox involves examining factors at two different levels of analysis: the individual and that of the organizational leader.

At the individual level, Arbatov is best viewed as an aspiring "policy entrepreneur" within IMEMO. He had the combination of expertise, forceful personality, and "connections" to cut successfully against the grain of IMEMO's dominant organizational mindset. The article and book discussed above are suggestive of his high level of expertise on strategic issues. His personality is, to say the least, forceful and aggressive. And, finally, given his father's position as head of an important Academy of Sciences institute, Arbatov would seem to have the necessary "connections" to climb the career ladder within an Academy-affiliated institution such as IMEMO.

Arbatov's initial success, however, in bringing strategic-affairs expertise to IMEMO and the pages of Memo required an important assist from Institute head Alexandr Yakovlev. In fact, Yakovlev had been instrumental in helping Arbatov create a small Disarmament Section within the Institute's Department of International Relations in late 1983. In making this bureaucratic change within the Institute, Yakovlev did not seek a major redefinition of IMEMO's core areas of expertise (note that the newly-created unit was a section and not a department). Rather, he seems to have wanted the Institute to do a better job at the strategic-affairs research it had been doing on a small scale since the early 1970s.

At this point, it is instructive to compare the contrasting fortunes of two different "policy entrepreneurs" on security issues within IMEMO:
Aleksey Arbatov and Aleksey Nikonov. By 1983-84, Arbatov had achieved a degree of success far beyond that attained by Nikonov in 1969-70.205 The reasons for this are threefold. First, Nikonov, in the late 1960s, had nowhere near the level of expertise on strategic issues that Arbatov had developed by the early 1980s.206 Second, Nikonov did not have the "connections" to important patrons that Arbatov had.207 Third, while Arbatov had bureaucratic allies within IMEMO (at a minimum, Institute head Yakovlev) who supported his research agenda, Nikonov appears to have lacked such institutional support.208

In sum, the Institute's expertise and interest in security issues was clearly higher by 1983-84 than it had been in the late 1960s. As of late 1984, IMEMO was operating not one, but two small sections that addressed security issues: Arbatov's and the military-affairs section first established in 1969. Neither section, however, had the resources or prestige of a full-fledged department (and, in fact, both were administratively subordinated to the Institute's International Relations Department). This state of affairs would only begin to change in 1986, when an additional factor -- one external to IMEMO -- would facilitate the expansion of Arbatov's section into a much larger Department of Disarmament and International Security.209

Thus, overall, the evidence adduced in this chapter indicates the interest in security issues remained a secondary one. By early 1985, IMEMO was aggressively promoting clear viewpoints on a series of issues concerning the nature of the international system and, to a lesser extent, the nature of security. In addition, on the particular issue of global problems, the Institute had introduced a series of organizational
changes to allow it to better study this topic. On security issues, its advocacy was much less pronounced. By early 1985, the only clear goal it was promoting on issues of national security was that arms control was a useful tool for controlling the Soviet-American military competition and that there should be more of it.

ISKAN. Before examining the research output of ISKAN during these years, a few general comments are in order. First, the ISKAN that entered the 1980s was similar to IMEMO in that it had experienced very little turnover in its top-level leadership. Georgiy Arbatov continued as Institute head (a position he still holds), and three of ISKAN’s four deputy directors were holdovers from the mid-1970s or before.210 Second, ISKAN was still a relatively small institution in comparison to IMEMO, employing roughly 300 people as of 1981.211

Third and most important for the present study, by the early 1980s, it was clear that ISKAN had developed an organizational "culture" and sense of mission different from IMEMO’s in several ways. For one, ISKAN, continuing a trend evident in the early 1970s, showed greater interest than IMEMO in issues of international security. Director Arbatov continued, as he had in the early 1970s, to speak out forcefully on security issues.212 Given this interest of Arbatov’s, it is not surprising that during the early and mid-1980s the Institute’s journal, SSHA, carried a significant number of articles that addressed security and other military-policy issues.213 The early 1980s also saw ISKAN establish ties with the Soviet foreign-policy apparatus, some military officials, and several committees and institutions (both within and outside the USSR) that were addressing security issues.214 As noted
earlier, this kind of "networking" activity on security issues was not occurring at IMEMO.

A second contrast between the two organizational cultures was ISKAN's greater interest in scientific and technical issues. Most issues of SSHA, for example, had a section on "Science and Technology," where one might find articles on microcomputers or artificial-intelligence research in the United States. In addition, and in notable contrast to the situation at IMEMO, one could find researchers at the USA Institute who had technical training or degrees (for example, candidate of technical sciences). Several of these researchers would play key roles in ISKAN's development of strategic-affairs expertise during the 1980s.215

As will be argued below, this organizational "context" is crucial to any understanding of ISKAN's behavior as the 1980s unfolded, and especially for explaining why the Institute moved so much faster than IMEMO to address a host of international security issues in the years both before and immediately after Gorbachev's accession to power.

Indeed, in terms of both quantity and degree of sophistication, ISKAN's research on security issues during the years 1981-85 greatly surpassed that of IMEMO. Some articles simply provided information -- for example, on the US Trident SLBM program; the workings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the US arms-control process; the findings of the Sco:croft Commission (on US strategic forces); and the early history of US nuclear strategy (here, extensive use was made of David Rosenberg's International Security articles).216
One particularly important example of this type of article was an abridged version of the Palme Commission report published in SSHA in the fall of 1982. The report presented to Soviet readers -- probably for the first time -- a detailed overview of a radically different (in the Soviet context) approach to ensuring national security, one which argued that "security in the nuclear age means common security." Two years later, SSHA would publish another report of the Palme Commission that again urged a new approach to security.

While these informational articles on security issues differed little from the types of analyses produced by ISKAN researchers in the early 1970s, a second kind of article represented a qualitative change for the Institute. Articles of this latter type were quite often military-technical in nature, analyzing various aspects of US military strategy or the technical details of different weapons systems.

There were, for example, analyses of the technical issues involved in any attempt by the US to deploy a space-based ballistic missile defense system; reviews of current US naval strategy; an analysis of US plans for conducting strategic anti-submarine warfare; a technical overview of the C³I modernization program undertaken by the Reagan administration; a detailed review of the US Strategic Defense Initiative that was published only seven months after Reagan's March, 1983, speech announcing the program; an analysis of improvements in US ballistic missile technology that included a discussion of circular error probable (CEP); and a sophisticated review of US military-strategic concepts that distinguished between "declaratory" and "operational" levels.
The above analyses were much better than similar studies conducted ten years earlier. This was at least partly because many ISKAN researchers were now using source material drawn from the US defense and technical communities. In the articles cited above, one finds citations to *Strategic Review*, *Scientific American*, *Defense Electronics*, *Signal*, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, *Survival*, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Armed Forces Journal*, *Air Force Magazine*, *Naval War College Review*, and *International Security*. The contrast with IMEMO is especially striking here: With the exception of Aleksey Arbatov, virtually no IMEMO researchers were making use of this type of source material.

Like IMEMO, however, there is one individual who stands out for his contribution to the USA Institute’s growing interest in security affairs during the early 1980s. This is Andrey Kokoshin, a doctor of historical sciences (with previous training as a radioelectronic engineer) who was made a deputy director of ISKAN in late 1984. In 1985, Kokoshin published two articles in *SSHA* that demonstrated an extraordinary (in the Soviet context) familiarity with an array of military-technical issues and source material. In the first article, he examined US nuclear policies, argued that the current Soviet-American strategic balance was quite stable (despite the Reagan administration’s nuclear buildup), and defended the concept of nuclear deterrence (*sderzhivaniye*).  

The second article extended this kind of expertise to issues of conventional strategy and weapons. Kokoshin began the article with an overview of the air-land battle strategy and its proposed application
in a European setting (the so-called "Rogers Plan"). His sources were of a type never before utilized by Soviet social scientists -- including Aleksey Arbatov. His citations included the US Army manual (FM 100-5) that explained the basics of the air-land strategy, several TRADOC (the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command) documents and Soviet military sources (the journal Foreign Military Review and the newspaper Red Star). In the last pages of the article, Kokoshin moved from analysis to advocacy, and ever so gently suggested there was a need to restructure the Soviet conventional force posture in Europe on more defensive principles.

The above review should make clear some basic differences between ISKAN and IMEMO when it came to the study of security issues. Simply put: ISKAN's expansion into strategic studies in the 1980s was starting from a higher base than Aleksey Arbatov's similar efforts at IMEMO, and it was occurring within a different (and more facilitating) organizational context.

Moreover, during the early 1980s, ISKAN undertook a much more systematic effort than IMEMO to further increase its strategic expertise by establishing contacts with other groups studying such topics. Of the ties noted above, perhaps most important were the connections ISKAN established with the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. By late 1983, the Institute had seven researchers working with various "working groups" of the Committee, while IMEMO only had two. These organizational factors explain why, once the Soviet political leadership began in 1986-87 to call on social scientists to examine a host of security issues, ISKAN "got into the
game quicker" and was a more influential player than IMEMO.

The organizational factors also help explain one other contrast between the behavior of ISKAN and IMEMO during these years. ISKAN had virtually nothing to say on two sets of issues being heavily promoted by IMEMO: the nature of the international system and the correlation of class and non-class values in Soviet foreign policy. Both of these conceptual-ideological topics, it would seem, fell outside the domain of applied research issues preferred by ISKAN scholars.

The overall impression one gets of ISKAN’s behavior during the first half of the 1980s is that, while it certainly promoted certain viewpoints, Institute head Arbatov was not intent on mobilizing ISKAN the way he had in the early 1970s or the way Yakovlev was mobilizing IMEMO beginning in 1983. One cannot help but wonder whether this striking contrast in institutional behavior is not at least in part explained by Arbatov’s relative loss of access to the top political leadership in the wake of Brezhnev’s death.

Summary

The picture that emerges from this review of IMEMO’s behavior (and its comparison to that of ISKAN) during 1981-85 is of an institution most interested in defending and promoting foreign-policy issues in those areas closest to its core areas of expertise and sense of organizational mission. This speaks for the utility of an organizational-politics perspective for interpreting its actions. The virtual disappearance of this behavior in 1982 due to a pressure campaign sponsored by elite actors (Grishin and others) demonstrates
that, at least during the Brezhnev era, this organizationally-inspired behavior could be severely limited by factors external to the Institute.

The above analysis also indicates the key role of individuals within organizations -- be they aspiring "policy entrepreneurs" like Aleksey Arbatov or, even more important, organizational heads like Yakovlev. IMEMO's behavior changed dramatically beginning in 1983-84, and it is clear that Yakovlev was in large part responsible for this shift. He mobilized the Institute to promote in a very forceful way particular viewpoints that could lead to fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy if they were adopted by the country's political leadership. This mobilization, however, occurred within an institutional context. That is, virtually all the issues that Institute scholars began actively to promote under Yakovlev had histories within IMEMO. They were topics that "fit" with its sense of organizational mission.

As will be seen in the next two chapters, Gorbachev would come to adopt many of these issues as his own as he articulated and refined what came to be known as the "new political thinking." IMEMO, in other words, would exert considerable influence on the shape of Gorbachev's emerging agenda for foreign-policy reform. This influence derived from both its expertise and -- much more importantly -- the close ties between Institute head Yakovlev and the new general secretary.

Concerning the question of expertise, the Institute's strengths and weaknesses with respect to the issues Gorbachev would first raise to the public agenda in late 1985 and early 1986 should now be quite clear. The conceptual aspects of Gorbachev's initial foreign-policy program (a revised view of the international system, a new goal structure for
Soviet foreign policy, a new concept of security) were IMEMO's strengths. The Institute, however, was ill-equipped to address the more concrete and applied aspects of this program (a changed view of verification, a new approach to defining Soviet defense requirements). Not surprisingly, there would be much less evidence of Institute influence on this second set of issues during the years 1986-88 -- despite continuing close ties between its leadership and Gorbachev.
Notes

1. See, respectively, Clemens (1990; 121-22, 148), Keohane and Nye (1977; Preface, Chapters 1-2) and Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982; Chapter 1).

2. Among Soviet sources, see, for example, the groundbreaking roundtable, "Chelovek i sreda ego obitaniya" (on global problems), in Voprosy filosofii, Nos. 1-4, 1973, Los' (1983) and Los' (1985). The latter two provide an extensive review of Soviet research on global problems in the 1970s and early 1980s. The best Western sources that analyze Soviet writings on these issues during the 1970s are: Clemens (1978), Lynch (1987; Chapters 4-7), Shenfield (1987; Chapters 6, 8), Lynch (1989; 10-28) and Clemens (1990; Chapters 5-6).

3. The first council, created in June, 1979, was the Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament. The second council, established in the summer of 1980, was the Scientific Council on the Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology. It contained a Section on the Global Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution. The committee was the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. It was established in May, 1983. More details on these bodies will be provided below.

4. Beginning in 1981, Memo introduced a new rubric for articles, "Contemporary Global Problems." In 1982, the rubric name was changed to "Global Problems" and was for book reviews (not articles). The rubric disappeared entirely in 1983, and returned in 1984 as a book review rubric, "Relations East-West. Global Problems."

The journal of the Academy's Institute of Philosophy, Voprosy filosofii, also introduced several new rubrics during these years. In the early 1980s, it began a rubric entitled "Contemporary Global Problems: Socio-Philosophical and Methodological Aspects." A very important new rubric was introduced in the journal's December, 1982, issue: "Socio-Philosophical Problems of Peace and Progress."

The content and significance of these rubrics will be discussed below.


9. Brezhnev (1981a; 16-25). The arms-control measures listed on pp.22-25 included: confidence-building measures in Europe (here, there was a new proposal to extend such measures to the entire European part of the USSR); a call to renew strategic nuclear arms-control negotiations with the US; a proposal for a moratorium on the further deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe (this at a time when the USSR had deployed several hundred such weapons and the US none!); and various political/declaratory measures (creating an international committee to prevent nuclear catastrophe; proposals for no first use of nuclear and conventional weapons).

10. Brezhnev (1981a; 24). Equality and equal security is a translation of ravenstvo i odinakovaya bezopasnost'.

11. See the definition of the principle in Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1985, Volume II; 440), where it is stated that any nuclear arms-control agreement must consider a series of factors that define the strategic situation: "the structure of [a country's] nuclear armaments, the particularities of [its] geographic situation, the paths of development of the strategic armaments of each of the sides and the like." Also see Holloway (1983; 75).


14. See the following editorials in Kommunist: "V bor'be za budushchee chelovechestva" (1981), "Posledovatelnaya i chestnaya politika mira" (1982). Also see Suslov (1981; 5-6), Brezhnev (1982b) and Andrey Gromyko (1982).

15. Parrot (1988; 2). The characterization "more of the same plus" is my own, not Parrot's.

16. On this, see Clemens (1990; 132-35).

17. For a plausible (kremmlinological) interpretation of the elite maneuvering during Brezhnev's last year, see Gelman (1984; 181-85).

18. For example, the three Central Committee plenums held during Andropov's tenure as General Secretary were all devoted to questions of domestic socio-economic policy. (This information is derived from the "Information Reports" published in the central party press after the plenums.) In addition, Andropov's only major theoretical pronouncement during this period dealt with questions related to Soviet domestic policy. See Andropov (1983a). Also recall that 1983 saw the preparation and circulation among a part of the political elite of the "Novosibirsk Report" -- a document that called for radical reform of the Soviet economic system. On this, see Chapter 7, Note 6, and the accompanying text.
19. These are catalogued in Andropov (1983b; 14).

20. See the listings under the year 1983 in Appendix II.


23. Andrey Gromyko (1983; 16-17, 24-27). In discussing peaceful coexistence, Gromyko explicitly stated (at p.26) that it was "a specific form of the class struggle" between capitalism and socialism.

24. Gromyko (1983; 17). Here, Gromyko was repeating almost word for word a comment he made in the heady days of detente in the early 1970s. On this, see Legvold (1982; 159).

25. See Appendix II.

26. See, for example, Andropov's pessimistic comments in an interview he gave to Pravda in late October. Andropov (1983b). On the worsening mood among Soviet elites in Moscow, see Bialer (1984).


28. A fact that was obviously facilitated by Andropov's growing incapacity to function as Soviet leader (his speech to the December Central Committee Plenum had been read on the dying leader's behalf).


30. A dead end best exemplified by the USSR's decision to break off all arms-control talks in late 1983.

31. Chernenko (1984a; 10-13). The six norms included: making the prevention of nuclear war the main goal of Soviet and American foreign policy; a call to adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; and obtaining the eventual elimination of such weapons. Much more important than these norms was the general tone of the speech. Rather than slam the door on US-Soviet relations (as had been done in Andropov's last months in power), he made it clear that the USSR was willing to do its part to improve them. He noted, for example, that the tense international situation "obligates" the Soviet Union "to double, to triple [its] efforts in conducting a policy of peace and international cooperation"; and that the policy of detente had "deep roots." Commentary of this type represented a notable change from that of Andropov's last months.

32. See, for example, Chernenko (1984b; 21) and Chernenko (1984c; 23). Also see the joint declaration issued by the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in June, 1984. "Deklaratsiya stran-chlenov..." (1984; 30). For additional evidence of Chernenko's
commitment to improving Soviet-American relations, see Parrot (1987; 55-56).

Zlotnik (1984; 30) presents Kremlinological evidence that Chernenko's moderate line toward the US was supported by most key members of the top leadership -- including Prime Minister Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko. As will be seen below, this group also included Gorbachev.

33. "Aktual'nye voprosy..." (1984; 8-10). The editorial also attacked those Western Marxists who, instead of relying upon the law-governed regularities (zakonomernosti) uncovered by Lenin, utilized an empirical approach for understanding capitalism (p.6). (As seen in earlier chapters, this was an accusation that could be applied equally well to IMEMO researchers.) This part of the editorial ended with a stern warning:

The nature of imperialism is unchanged, its interests are incompatible with mankind's interests. The inspiration [pafoe] and growing topicality of these Leninist thoughts should find full reflection in our literature (pp.11-12).


36. Chernenko as quoted in " Kommunisty i problemy..." (1984; 100).

37. Archie Brown has provided the most extensive documentation of these points. Brown (1985; 14-17). Additional evidence of Gorbachev's number two position was his appointment as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet on April 12, 1984. Until the recent (1988-89) restructuring of the Supreme Soviet, the chair of this Commission was usually also the "second secretary" within the CPSU -- that is, exceeded in the party hierarchy only by the general secretary himself. For example, Yegor Ligachev, the apparent second secretary between 1985 and November, 1988, held this chairmanship from July 2, 1985 until early 1989. On Ligachev, see Rahr (1988; 1).

By the late spring of 1984, Gorbachev was apparently overseeing, in addition to international affairs, the ideology, culture, economy and party cadres portfolios within the Secretariat. See Brown (1985; 15).

Vadim Pechenev, who served as an aide (pomoshchnik) to CPSU General Secretary Chernenko, has recently claimed that at the "very first" Politburo meeting after Chernenko's election as general secretary, it was decided that Gorbachev would chair meetings of the Secretariat and, in Chernenko's absence, Politburo sessions. This would indicate that Gorbachev was in fact the second secretary within the CPSU as early as February, 1984. Pechenev's "insider account" is based on his regular attendance at Politburo meetings during 1984-85. See Pechenev (1991).
38. For Gorbachev's orthodox commentary during this period, see his Supreme Soviet election speech on February 29, 1984; a speech in Smolensk on June 27; and his speech in Sofia, Bulgaria on September 8 -- Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 2; 17-19, 61-64, 71-73). In these speeches, Gorbachev attacked American "militarism"; declared that the US was attempting to achieve military superiority over the USSR; praised the revised "Peace Program" promulgated at the 1981 Party Congress; attacked the US policy of "state terrorism"; argued that any arms-control negotiations must be based on the principle of equality and equal security; and stated that the CPSU pays "unremitting attention to strengthening the [USSR’s] defense capability."

For evidence of Gorbachev's desire for an improvement in Soviet-American relations, see Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 2; 64, 73). Also see Parrot (1988; 3).

39. Although Gorbachev's domestic policy is not the subject of this study, it is important to note that he used this speech to lay out an extensive program of economic, social and political reform. Gorbachev (1984a) -- especially at pp. 7-9, 16, 21, 30. Not surprisingly, only parts of this speech were published in the central press. However, the pamphlet form of the address cited here had a press run of 100,000 copies.

40. Gorbachev (1984a; 35). Gorbachev's analysis of capitalism was strikingly similar to that espoused by Alekandr Yakovlev during 1983-84. See, for example, Yakovlev (1984a). At this point, Yakovlev was serving as head of IMEMO. The similarity in analysis suggests that Yakovlev's role as a key Gorbachev advisor -- a role so evident in the late 1980s -- was already established by late-1984. Additional evidence on this point will be provided below, and in Chapters 9 and 10.

41. Gorbachev (1984a; 40).

42. Indeed, earlier in the speech Gorbachev noted that a "more thorough study" of the processes of world development was needed and that the social sciences should undertake this task. Gorbachev (1984a; 11).


44. Gorbachev (1984b; 4). This is the Pravda report of the speech.

45. Gorbachev (1984b; 4).

46. In contrast to earlier leadership statements on global problems, Gorbachev did not hesitate to note that they could only be "solve[d] together," by all countries.

47. He simply declared that the "nuclear age inevitably dictates new political thinking." Gorbachev (1984b; 4).
48. The identical point applies to Gorbachev's speech at the ideological conference.

49. There are two plausible reasons why this was the case. First, the three months immediately following the speech in Britain probably saw Gorbachev preoccupied with the imminent succession. Second, Gorbachev's clear and overwhelming priority upon assuming power in March, 1985, was setting the agenda for domestic socio-economic reform.

50. As will be seen in Chapter 9, the behavior of both Gorbachev and the central media would change dramatically once the period of public agenda setting actually began in the fall of 1985.

51. In setting this public agenda, Gorbachev would add a concrete issue of security policy -- "sufficiency" -- to the conceptual elements of the new thinking. As will be seen, the pattern of behavior concerning this issue was very similar to that seen on SALT in the late 1960s. That is, there had been no previous open advocacy of "sufficiency" or related concepts, and social scientists at INMEN and elsewhere were slow to address the issue after it had been placed on the public agenda. As in the 1960s, lack of expertise was a crucial factor in explaining this behavior.

52. This statement and the following are taken from Arbatov (1990b; 221). This source is an excerpt from Arbatov's memoirs published in the journal Znamya.

53. Arbatov also lends further support to the contention that Gorbachev was the clear heir-apparent to Chernenko -- noting that throughout Chernenko's tenure as general secretary Gorbachev chaired meetings of the Secretariat and, in Chernenko's absence, Politburo meetings as well.

54. Inozemtsev was, at this point, an academician and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. The council was jointly founded by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Collegium of the State Committee on Science and Technology and the Presidium of the Soviet Committee in Defense of Peace, and received financial support from the Soviet Peace Fund. See Inozemtsev (1980a; 5). This council was probably the successor to the Academy's Commission on the Scientific Problems of Disarmament. The Commission was established in 1963 and was dominated by physical scientists associated with the Academy's technical divisions. It was, for example, headed by a metallurgist (V.S. Yemelyanov). The council, in contrast, was chaired by a social scientist (Inozemtsev).

55. Based on who has participated in the council's work, these individuals and institutions include: the various international affairs institutes of the Academy; the State Committee on Science and Technology; the Soviet Committee in Defense of Peace; the Soviet Peace Fund; physical scientists from the Academy's technical divisions; journalists; and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Ministry itself. See the various articles in
the council's main publication series, Mir i razoruzhenie. Nauchnye issledovaniya; Inozemtsev (1980a), Inozemtsev (1982a), Fedoseyev (1984), Fedoseyev (1986) and Fedoseyev (1987). One institution clearly not represented in the council's work was the Ministry of Defense. Through 1987, one military figure had contributed to the Mir i razoruzhenie series: Deputy Minister of Defense Shabanov writing on SDI. See Fedoseyev (1987; 73-86).

56. Inozemtsev (1980a; 5).

57. The five sections and their heads were:

* Problems of Peaceful Coexistence and the Stabilization of Detente -- Oleg N. Bykov (a deputy director of IMEMO);
* Problems of Disarmament -- Georgiy A. Arbatov (head of ISKAN);
* The Developing Countries and Problems of Peace and Disarmament -- Yevgeniy M. Primakov (head of the Oriental Studies Institute);
* Cooperation of Scientists Researching Problems of Peace -- M.A. Markov (a physical scientist and head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee);
* Scientific-Technical Progress and Assuring Peace -- D.M. Gvishiani (deputy head of the State Committee on Science and Technology and director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Systems Analysis of the Academy of Sciences and Gosplan).

The section heads also serve as deputy chairmen of the council. See Inozemtsev (1980a; 5-6) and Inozemtsev (1982a; 184).

58. See, for example, Zaytseva (1981) and Zaytseva (1983).

59. Inozemtsev (1980a; 6).

60. Here, one sees a clear parallel with the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat (established in 1983). For both the council and the committee, an important initial mission was to lobby Western scientists and political figures in favor of Soviet policies. On the committee's early role, see Parrot (1988; 12), and the sources cited therein.

61. Inozemtsev (1980a; 6). As will be seen below, this propaganda function received significant attention in the council's early activities.

62. The Central Committee's International Information Department was established in 1978 for precisely this reason. From December, 1983, the first deputy head of this department, N.N. Chetverikov, sat on the council's governing body. Fedoseyev (1984; 245-46).

The image problem stemmed from a series of factors, including: Soviet interventions in the Horn of Africa in the latter half of the 1970s; deployments of SS-20 medium range missiles in Europe beginning in 1977;
growing Western awareness that Soviet military writing continued to stress the possibility of victory in nuclear war; and, most importantly, the USSR’s December, 1979, invasion of Afghanistan.

63. See, in particular, the extraordinary piece of pro-arms control advocacy in Bykov, et al. (1978), a book co-sponsored by IMEMO and ISKAN. For examples of the book’s advocacy, see p.12, where arms control is defined as both a "common-to-all-mankind" problem and a class problem (thus partially insulating it from class-based analyses), and p.165, where there is a discussion of "mutual security" (one of Gorbachev’s buzzwords). Also see the "insider account" of the genesis and preparation of this book: Polsky (1987; 59-61). Polsky is a former researcher at IMEMO.

64. Inozemtsev, for example, uses his introductory essay to the first Mir i razoruzheniye volume to promote points of view long held by numerous IMEMO researchers. For example, he discusses the growing danger of accidental nuclear war and the complex nature of the international system. On the latter, he describes the world’s "global integralness" and argues the resolution of "global problems" can only be achieved via the "collective efforts of people ... independent of their social system." See Inozemtsev (1980a; 11-12, 16). As seen above, such points of view were clearly not shared by the Brezhnev leadership.

65. This council was attached to (pri) the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.

66. Frolov at this point was a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. For background on Frolov, see Graham (1986) and Graham (1987; 20-21, 153-55). In 1986-87, Frolov was editor in chief of Kommunist; in 1987-89, he was a personal aide (pomoshchnik) to Gorbachev on ideological matters; today, he is a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and editor-in-chief of Pravda.

67. The specific purpose of the section, which first met in early 1981, was to coordinate the activity of research institutes and specialists working on global problems. See Los’ (1981; 142). Fedorov, an academician and candidate member of the Central Committee, was a physical scientist who headed the Academy’s Institute of Applied Geophysics. In addition, he was a vice chairman of the other recently formed council: the Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament.


69. Especially during 1981, there was clear evidence of IMEMO’s greater interest in the workings and subject matter of this second council. Twice that year, Memo published reports of the council’s section on global problems. See Los’ (1981) and Vaulin (1981a). The year 1981 also saw Memo serialize (as articles) chapters from a new Institute book on global problems. Memo has never done likewise for any Institute-sponsored book on international security. Evidence adduced in earlier
chapters indicates this difference is at least partly explained by the fact that the analysis of security issues did not "fit" with IMEMO's sense of organizational mission.

In June, 1983, IMEMO and the second scientific council would jointly sponsor an all-union symposium on global problems. See the announcement in Memo, No. 4, 1983, p.129, and in Voprosy filosofii, No. 4, 1983, p.87.

70. See Chapters 3-6 above.

71. Several pieces of evidence suggest the more serious nature of the Scientific Council on the Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology. First, its only organizational link was to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences (an academic body). In contrast, the first council (for research on problems of peace and disarmament) had organizational links to the Soviet Committee in Defense of Peace and the Soviet Peace Fund (both rather propagandistic organizations), as well as to the Academy's Presidium. Second, the council on science and technology -- judging from its first meetings -- was composed chiefly of specialists (Los' [1981; 142], Vaulin [1981a; 133]), while the council for peace and disarmament research included among its members, aside from specialists, leaders of mass organizations, cultural figures and journalists (Inozemtsev [1980a; 5]).

72. Even the leadership changes that did occur (at the level of deputy director) were all promotions from within IMEMO.

73. As seen in Chapter 5, Inozemtsev had been one of the strongest proponents of a greater role for IMEMO in the foreign-policy process. Thus, his death (discussed below) may go a long way toward explaining why this particular goal was dropped.


75. Interviews. Polsky (1987; passim) provides further evidence of the high regard in which IMEMO scholars held Inozemtsev.

76. He is identified as such in Fedoseyev and Koval' (1983; 121). "Acting" is a translation of ispolnyayushchiy obyazannost'.

77. Partan (1990; 3) provides further confirmation of this point. Mr. Partan is a doctoral candidate at MIT who conducted research at IMEMO throughout much of 1988-90.

78. One senior IMEMO researcher claims that the only reason Yakovlev ended up at IMEMO was that Gorbachev wanted him back in Moscow (he had been serving as Soviet ambassador to Canada) and needed a "safe" place for him. Interview.
79. Yakovlev had spent most of his career in propaganda work within the Central Committee apparatus. The one exception was his 10 year term (1973–83) as Soviet ambassador to Canada. For more background on Yakovlev as well as a partial listing of his publications, see Checkel (1990).

80. The following is based on the excerpts of Arbatov’s memoirs published in the journal Znamya. See G. Arbatov (1990a) and (1990b). The details on IMEMO can be found in Arbatov (1990b, 200–202).

81. Arbatov does not name this individual.

82. Their names were Fadin and Kudyukin.

83. Arbatov claims that he and Bovin were present in Brezhnev’s office when the latter called Grishin and demanded that the attacks on IMEMO be halted. Grishin denied that any investigation was occurring. After Brezhnev hung up, Arbatov declared to Brezhnev that a Politburo member had just lied to the CPSU general secretary. In response, Brezhnev —according to Arbatov—"only grinned." Arbatov (1990b, 202).

84. One IMEMO researcher felt that, in addition to the cautioning effect of the overall political environment, Inozemtsev himself had grown more conservative by the early 1980s because of his close relationship to Brezhnev and, after 1981, his full membership in the CPSU Central Committee.

85. For examples of these editorials in 1981–82, see "Leninskim kursom mira i sotsial’nogo progressa" (1981), "Vysokaya otvetstvennost’ za sud’by mira" (1982) and "Politika razuma i mira" (1982). Official sounding editorials of this type continued to appear in Memo through the end of 1986.

86. In 1964, Memo’s press run was a little over 21,000 copies. By 1981, 38,000 copies of each issue were being distributed. In January, 1982, this number fell to 31,000. (By early 1988, the number had further dropped to 26,000).

87. The press run numbers are printed on the last page of each issue of the journals.

88. This factor might best be called organizational inertia.

89. Interviews with two IMEMO researchers.

90. Fedoseyev and Koval’ (1983; 122–23). Note that this criticism came not from the political leadership (who virtually every year had some complaint about the work of the social sciences), but from the highest governing body of the Academy itself.
91. For the book itself, see Inozemtsev (1984) [a translation of the Russian version published in 1981]. Memo had actually begun serialization of the book in its March, 1980, issue. The versions of the chapters reproduced in Memo are obviously shorter and the degree of advocacy is often less than in the book.

92. Maksimova (1981; 37). Maksimova was a department head at IMEMO and also deputy head of the section on global problems of the Scientific Council on the Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology. She was also the wife of IMEMO director Inozemtsev.

There are cases of such caution by non-IMEMO scholars as well. For example, in a 1981 book on the subject of global problems by Ivan Frolov (the head of the above mentioned council) and Vadim Zagladin, the very first page carries a disclaimer that the whole subject matter of the book is diskussionnaya -- a word best translated as "debatable," "conditional" or "controversial." For further details on Frolov and Zagladin's writing on global problems during the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Clemens (1990; 131-35).

93. See, for example, Maksimova (1981; 34-37, 46-47), Ivanov (1981; 30, 37, 44) and Shapiro's comments in Vaulin (1981b; 143). Ivanov was a deputy director of IMEMO.

94. Maksimova in Vaulin (1981a; 133-34). Vaulin’s report is in the "scientific life" section published toward the back of Memo. In addition, Maksimova used such phrases as "common to all mankind" and "interdependence," which are decidedly non-class in the Soviet context. Also see Maksimova's comments in Los' (1981; 142) -- another report under Memo’s "scientific life" rubric.

As will be seen, the notion of a single world (vaemirnyy) economy -- which is based on law-governed regularities (zakonomernosti) common to both capitalism and socialism -- would become a subject of heated debate several years later.

95. Vaulin (1981a; 137).

96. This inductive-empirical framework of analysis would be the one eventually adopted by Gorbachev as the basis for his foreign-policy reforms. As already noted, Frolov would later become a key Gorbachev adviser.

97. Inozemtsev (1981; 17, 21).

98. Maksimova in Vaulin (1981a; 133-34). She went into considerable detail, noting, for example, a "definite reorientation" of research and the creation of new departments and "research groups" -- all with the purpose of further developing Institute research on global problems.
99. Inozemtsev (1981; 18). The graduate degree categories to which
Inozemtsev referred are under the control of the Higher Attestation
Commission attached to the USSR Council of Ministers.

100. See Chapter 5 above.

101. In his speech to the 26th Party Congress in February, 1981. See
above.

102. That is, instead of devoting entire (10-15 page) articles to global
problems, the journal ran 1-2 page reviews on books that discussed the
issue. Five of the six reviews examined Western books.

103. Gornostayev (1982) and Suetin (1982a) never mention the phrase;
Levin (1982) used it once; Suetin (1982b) used it to attack Western
notions of global problems. The title of Suetin (1982b) captures the
flavor of these reviews: "The Class Limitation of Western Globalistics."
All these reviews were the last item in the given issue of Memo.

104. The one exception was Suetin (1982b; 156). Recall that by
definition global problems cut across national (and ideological) borders
and thus require joint international action to resolve. For Soviet
definitions making this point, see Maksimova (1981; 37), Inozemtsev
(1981; 17), and Frolov and Zagladin (1981; 8-9).

105. Bezudnyy (1982). When the Soviets wanted to use the notion of
"global problems" in a propagandistic manner during the early 1980s,
they emphasized the political issue of disarmament as the main such
problem and downplayed or failed to mention the more traditional
ecological and resource-related global problems. On this, see Clemens
(1990; 131-134).

106. Shakhnazaryan (1982). Shakhnazaryan, a doctor of juridical sciences,
was at this point a deputy head of the Central Committee's department
for relations with socialist countries. He was also head of the Soviet
Association of Political Sciences.

In mid-1984, Shakhnazaryan would author a very important article that
addressed (and redefined) the conceptual bases of the Soviet approach to
security. See below.

107. This was the Frolov and Zagladin book mentioned above.
Shakhnazaryan's review was also the only one of the six published in Memo
during 1982 that was not placed as the very last item in the given issue
of the journal.


110. Maksimova, who had so much to say (and advocate) on this topic in 1981, was much more reticent in 1982. Her only comments on the nature of the international system came early in the year and were actually based on a report that she had given in the summer of 1981. In these remarks, she again discussed the rather unorthodox notion of a single world (veemirnyy) economy, which operated on the basis of (non-class) laws common to both socialism and capitalism, but the earlier degree of advocacy was gone. See her comments in "Nauchnaya zhizn': Mirovoy..." (1982; 138). This was a "scientific life" report published in the back of Memo.

111. Petrovskiy was at this point head of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organizations Department, a position he had held since June, 1979. He is a doctor of historical sciences who often (both in the early 1980s and today) contributes articles to academic journals. The article thus should not be interpreted as expressing the Ministry’s viewpoint.

112. Petrovskiy (1982a; 9-10).

113. The scholar was Daniil Proektor, a former military officer who had worked at IMEMO since the early 1970s. See his comments in Nikonov (1981; 40-41). The print run of this book was 4500 copies.

114. The shake up, which occurred in January, 1983, involved dropping six members of the editorial board and adding 12 new ones. (The board is listed on the last page of each issue of Memo.) Never previously had there been editorial changes of this magnitude during the 25 years of Memo’s existence.

Of the 12 members added to the board, 7 had reputations as reformist-innovative thinkers: Oleg Bykov, Vadim Zagladin, Nikolay Kosolapov, Margarita Maksimova, Vladimir Petrovskiy, Valentin Falin and V. Shenayev. In a notable break with past practice, three people unaffiliated with the Institute joined the board at this point: Zagladin (a deputy head of the Central Committee’s International Department), Petrovskiy (head of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organizations Department) and Falin (head of the editorial department at Izvestiya). One Institute researcher feels that these reformist official-type figures were added because Editor-in-Chief Khavinson saw them as useful conduits to what he (mistakenly) perceived as the liberalizing Andropov leadership (installed only three months earlier). Interview.


116. Razmerov (1983; 13-14). This was the lead article in the August issue of Memo. At a later point, Razmerov, a senior scholar in the Department of International Relations, added that Institute researchers should proceed from “objective realities” -- be they positive or negative -- in their work. In essence, this was an argument for an empirical, non-class approach to foreign-policy research. He later hedged on this point by citing Lenin on the importance of class factors.
in foreign policy. Razmerov (1983; 14). The overall impression he
left, however, was that the former, non-class approach was the correct
one. One year later, Razmerov would make essentially this same point,
but in a more forceful way. See the discussion below.

117. Gorbachev was touring the country as the head of a Supreme Soviet
delegation. Yakovlev was at that time the Soviet ambassador to Canada.

118. See, among others, Harris (1990; 6, 12), and the sources cited
therein. Institute scholars interviewed for this project were unanimous
in their belief that Gorbachev alone was responsible for Yakovlev’s
return to Moscow.

119. Recall that in the late 1960s IMEMO’s advocacy only became
noticeably more pronounced after the elites had begun to change the
public agenda.

120. The following is based on interviews with two researchers at IMEMO,
as well as on information generously provided by Matthew Partan. The
following is not based on Yakovlev’s writing during these years. Much
of this writing was devoted to simplistic and often vitriolic attacks on
US policy and, more generally, imperialism. For representative examples
of his writing during this period, see Yakovlev (1984b), his comments in
Kokeyev (1984; 106-110), Yakovlev (1985b) and his chapter “Hir po-
Amerikanski’ i real’nosti epokhi,” in Fedoseyev (1984; 164-81). Allen
Lynch has also noted the contrast between Yakovlev’s writing and his
reputation within the Soviet Union as one of the moving forces behind
the campaigns for democratization at home and new thinking in foreign
policy. See Lynch (1989; 54).

121. In his dislike of ideological dogma, Yakovlev was much like
Inozemtsev. One of the few public hints Yakovlev provided on this issue
came in his comments at a May, 1984, roundtable organized by IMEMO,
where he argued for a serious, "scientific analysis" of the numerous
changes that had occurred in the world in the late 1970s and early
1980s. See his remarks in “Kruglyy stol Memovo...” (1984, No.7; 101).

122. Primakov may have been Yakovlev’s choice, but ultimate approval of
his appointment probably lay with the CPSU Central Committee (CC).
While evidence on this point is — to my knowledge — largely anecdotal
in nature, Yakovlev himself has in fact indicated that earlier heads of
IMEMO were in the CC nomenklatura. During a 1984 meeting commemorating
Anushavan Arzumanian, the first director of IMEMO, Yakovlev noted that
the CPSU CC had "approved" (poruchil) Arzumanian to head the Institute.
See Yakovlev’s comments in “Na uchenom sovete IMEMO: Pamyati...” (1984;
133).

123. This was actually a renewal of a 1982 rubric that had lapsed during
1983.

124. "Discussions-Debates" is a translation of Diskussii.
125. During 1984, a total of 12 articles appeared under these two rubrics.

126. For an example of the former, see Krasin (1984). Shishkov (1984) is an example of the latter.

127. See Chapter 1 for a fuller explication of this point.

128. The one possible exception is Yakovlev’s attempt to improve the Institute’s study of security issues. This will be discussed below.

129. The contrast to the case of Gorbachev and the CPSU is both dramatic and illustrative of the point being made here. Gorbachev met with limited success in his attempts to bring about major change within the CPSU precisely because he was simultaneously attempting to alter fundamentally its core sense of organizational mission. The case of Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I would argue, is similar to that of Yakovlev/IMEMO. Shevardnadze attempted to mobilize the Ministry in ways consistent with its own sense of organizational mission, and it is therefore not at all surprising that he met with tremendous success. For a useful overview of the Ministry's behavior under Shevardnadze, see Van Oudenaren (1990).


132. See, for example, Suetin (1983), Mileykovskiya’s comments in "Nauchnaya zhizn’: Sovremennyy..." (1983; 130) and Maklyarskiy (1984; 136).

133. See, for example, Lukov and Tomashevskiya (1983; 5-9), Maksimova’s comments in "Vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya..." (1983, No.7; 72-75), Aleksandrov (1983) and Novikov’s remarks in "Rol’ OON v sovremennom..." (1984; 116-19).

134. See Obminskiy (1985) and, especially, Lukov and Tomashevskiya (1985; 19-21).

135. As will be discussed below, what made it so extraordinary was just how "out of synch" it was with top-level commentary of this period.

136. IMEMO scholars were not the only ones addressing this particular issue at this point. In December, 1982, Voprosy filosofii (the journal of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy) began a new article rubric: "Socio-Philosophical Problems of Peace and Progress." The first article published under this rubric raised the issue of the correlation of class and non-class interests, and came to essentially the same conclusion as the IMEMO scholars discussed below (that is, values common to all mankind must be given priority). See Burlatskiy (1982; 61-63). Burlatskiy had in fact made this same point as far back as 1971 in a
paper prepared for UNESCO that was never published in the Soviet Union. On this, see Shenfield (1987; 44).

Burlatskii, at the beginning of his Voprosy filosofii article, noted it was based on a report he gave at the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee. Given the new thinking-type analysis he presented, it is interesting that a former official of the Central Committee’s International Department has recently claimed that this same institute contributed much to the early development of the new thinking. See Hamman (1989). For general information on the Institute of Social Sciences, see the detailed account in Krasin (1990).

137. Lukov and Tomashevskiy (1983; 5). In the Soviet context, to call something an “objective category” is to indicate it is a reality to which the USSR must adapt. See the entry entitled “Objective and Subjective Factors of History,” in Frolov (1986a; 337).

Tomashevskiy was a senior Institute scholar and a former head of its Department of International Relations. As seen in earlier chapters, he was a strong proponent of revising orthodox, class-based notions of the international system as far back as the late 1960s. Lukov, in addition to this article and another one he would write with Tomashevskiy in 1985, was the author of an earlier Memo review that was notable for the exceptionally complex (and realistic!) image it presented of US foreign policymaking. See Lukov (1982).

138. Lukov and Tomashevskiy (1983; 5). Recall that this “founding fathers” legitimization was used in the 1960s to provide ideological support for the USSR’s interest in bilateral nuclear arms control. See Chapter 6.

139. As will be seen in the next chapter, Gorbachev himself would rediscover this Leninist behest in October, 1986.

140. Aktual’nost’ could also be translated as “relevance for today.”

141. See Bykov (1984; 23) and Razmerov (1984a; 13). Bykov’s article was preceded only by the official announcements concerning the Andropov-Chernenko succession. An official-sounding editorial summarizing a recent Comecon summit meeting was placed ahead of Razmerov’s article.

142. See Krasin (1984; 87-88) and Tikhvinskiy (1985; 137). Krasin was at this point a member of the Consultant’s Group of the Central Committee’s International Department as well as a prorector at the Academy of Social Sciences attached to (pri) the Central Committee. Tikhvinskiy was rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. Both the Academy of Social Sciences and the Diplomatic Academy are research organizations. Thus, Krasin and Tikhvinskiy should not be read as articulating a Central Committee or Foreign Ministry viewpoint. For information on the Academy of Social Sciences, see Voronitsyn (1987; 51-55); on the Diplomatic Academy, see Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1984, Volume I; 307).
143. See Notes 31 and 32 above.

144. Lukov and Tomashevskiy (1985). This article was again placed first in Memo, after the various announcements concerning the Chernenko-Gorbachev succession.


146. On the notion of a single world economy, see, for example, Maksimova's comments in 1981-82 discussed above. On interdependence, see Clemens (1978; passim) and Shenfield (1987; Chapter 8).


148. See her comments in "Vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya..." (1983, No.7; 72-76).

149. Aleksandrov (1983; 143).

150. Shemyatenkov (1984; 10). This article provides another example of a style of discourse seen as far back as the late 1960s. That is, Shemyatenkov combined numerous reassertions of the official orthodoxy (for example, that the Reagan administration served the interests of and was brought to power by monopoly capital) with one or more revisionist statements.

Lukov and Tomashevskiy, in their April, 1985, Memo article would again raise the notion of the "interdependence" of nations. Indeed, one clear message of their entire article is that interdependence was a reality to which Soviet policy must adapt. Lukov and Tomashevskiy (1985; 32).


152. Shishkov (1984; 74). According to Shishkov, this opponent (an economist by the name of G. Sorokin) was opportunistically using the then tense international climate "to torpedo" the notion of a single world economy.

153. See Shapiro (1985) and Pletnev (1985). The Shapiro article is another clear case of advocacy in favor of the concept. Pletnev's article is a response to and attack on the Shapiro piece. Both these articles appeared under the Diskussiya rubric created by Yakovlev.

154. Davydov (1983a; 143). Although he was writing in the house journal of IMEMO, Davydov was actually affiliated with the USA Institute at this point.


156. Bykov (1983a; 3).
157. V. Kortunov (1984; 50). These statements come in the concluding paragraph of Kortunov's article.

158. Petrovskiy (1984; 9). Petrovskiy cited the 1982 Palme Commission report on security and noted that a series of new, "realistic ideas" for ensuring security were entering into international practice. These (unspecified) new ideas negated those "traditional views" that emphasized military power.

159. Davydov (1984a; 27-28). Davydov followed this piece of advocacy by declaring that the nuclear age "dictates" new criteria of security. After this bold statement, one expects him to list criteria (a la Gorbachev in 1986) such as mutual security. Instead, Davydov advanced Chernenko's "norms" as the new criteria.

On the notion of joint/common security, also see Vadimov (1985; 147-48). In this October, 1985, book review, Vadimov declared that the Soviet approach to security was not based on a "zero-sum" view of the world. Rather, it was premised on the need for "common efforts" by states for ensuring equal (odirakovaya) security.

160. In April and May, 1984, two middle-ranking members of the Central Committee apparatus -- Yuri Zhilin and Georgiy Shakhnazarov -- wrote articles on the nature of security in the contemporary era. Both articles appeared in academic journals -- Zhilin's in Rabochiy klass i sovremennyi mir (the journal of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement) and Shakhnazarov's in Voprosy filosofii (the journal of the Institute of Philosophy). Zhilin at this point was head of the Consultant's Group in the Central Committee's International Department. (Such groups exist in most Central Committee departments. Consultants are freed from day-to-day work, and instead prepare major decisions or conduct long-term studies of issues the leadership considers to be of particular importance. On this, see Hough [1979; 422]). Shakhnazarov was a deputy head of the Central Committee's department for relations with socialist countries.

Both articles, which appeared at a time of severely strained Soviet-American relations, essentially made the same point: in conditions of nuclear overabundance, traditional views of security had become obsolete; it was impossible to separate national from international security; and attempts to attain security unilaterally had become "fiction." See Zhilin (1984) and Shakhnazarov (1984). The quote comes from p.66 of the Shakhnazarov article, which appeared under the rubric "Socio-Philosophical Problems of Peace and Progress." As discussed earlier, this rubric -- first established in December, 1982 -- had previously carried other unorthodox viewpoints. Shakhnazarov seems to have been cognizant that he was advancing extremely unorthodox views. In the article's penultimate paragraph, he noted that his framework of analysis might "conditionally" be called "the logic of political thinking in the nuclear era". Shakhnazarov (1984; 74).
Three months later, in August, 1984, a book advancing very similar views on security was published, with a press run of over 100,000 copies, by the propagandistic and non-scholarly "International Relations" publishing house. (By way of contrast, Zhilin’s journal article had a run of 10,000 copies, while Shakhnazarov’s had a printing of 27,000 copies.) It was entitled Novye myshlenie v yaderny vek (New Thinking in the Nuclear Age). See Gromko and Lomeyko (1984; Chapters 9-10). The characterization of the book’s publisher comes from Hough (1986; 99). According to Washington Post correspondent Dusko Doder, the book was so popular that it sold out in one week. Doder (1985). The authors of the book are a curious mixture of academic analyst and publicist. Anatoly Gromko, the son of then Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, is an academic and diplomat who, since 1976, has headed the Academy of Sciences Africa Institute. Previously, he held various academic and diplomatic posts -- including a brief stint at the USA Institute, and embassy postings in Great Britain, the GDR and the US. Lomeyko, in contrast, is more of a publicist. Although he holds the rank of diplomat, the great majority of his work has been press related -- including ten years at the Novosti Press Agency and, from 1984 to mid-1986, as head of the Press Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lomeyko also spent two years (1966-68) working in the Central Committee apparatus. For background on Gromko and Lomeyko, see their entries in Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1984, Volume I; 275) and Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1985, Volume II; 154), respectively.

Whether or not Gorbachev was the instigator of these particular articles and book, he was clearly aware of the kinds of arguments employed by these authors. Recall that by December, 1984, he, too, was talking of the need for "new thinking" on questions of foreign and security policy.

161. It was precisely the attempt by some IMEMO scholars to make the Institute more of a strategic studies center that would become the subject of intense intra-Institute polemics in 1987-88. See Chapter 10 below.


163. In the early 1980s, the military-affairs section had only 8-10 researchers. See Polsky (1987; 35-36). Recall that within IMEMO sections were considerably smaller than departments.

164. These scholars included: Petrovskiy of the Foreign Ministry; Tikhviniskiy and Vorontsov of the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy; Karaganov and Kokoshin of the USA Institute; and Velikhov of the Academy of Sciences.

165. There are at least three examples of the Institute’s lack of interest in establishing such ties:

  * The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security - this international body met between September, 1980 and April, 1982; the
two Soviet participants were both from the USA Institute (Georgiy Arbatov and Mikhail Mil’shtein);

* The Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat - this group was established in May, 1983; it was dominated by physical scientists (23 of 25 members); the two social scientists on the committee were from the USA Institute (Kokoshin) and the Africa Institute (Anatoliy Gromyko);

* The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - in September, 1983, it held a conference on "common security"; of the three Soviets who participated, one was from the USA Institute (Zhurkin), one was a Central Committee staffer (Zagladin) and one was a physical scientist (Silin).

166. See Inozemtsev (1981; 17-18). The research agenda on security issues that Inozemtsev presented later in 1981 to the Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament (which he chaired) differed little from the above. See Inozemtsev’s remarks at the council’s yearly meeting, as reported in Zaytseva (1981; 131-32).

Several years later, Vladimir Razmerov, a senior scholar in IHMO’s International Relations Department, would propose a research agenda on security issues that was again remarkably similar to the agendas of the late 1960s. See Razmerov (1984b). (Razmerov is here advancing proposals in the name of the Soviet section of the Permanent Commission for Problems of European Security and Cooperation of the Scientific Institutes of Socialist Countries. The Soviet section is based at IHMO.)

167. On this, see, especially, Maksimova’s comments in Vaulin (1981a; 133-34). Also see Inozemtsev (1981; 12, 17).

168. See, especially, the following statement by Brezhnev.

We are confident that national means provide for the needed control. The capability of these means of control, in particular those that are space-based are constantly improving ... [U]nder all conditions, the priority should remain with national means of control, they best provide for the interests of the security of the state.

Brezhnev (1981b). "Control" is a translation of kontrol', the word most Soviet commentators use to mean verification. For a more extensive elaboration of the then prevailing views on verification, see Timerbayev (1983; passim). Timerbayev was at that point a deputy head of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organizations Department.


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170. Soviet commentators used one of two words for stability: *stabil'nost* or *ustovchivost*.

171. See, for example, Inozemtsev (1981; 15), Kolikov (1983; 20), Bykov (1983a; 14) and Davydov (1984b; 154). In one case, an Institute researcher did define stability in a fairly intelligent way. "Strategic stability," in his view, existed when no state could launch a first nuclear strike with the hope of "prevailing" (oderzhat' verkh) in a nuclear war. Stashevskiy (1984; 32).

172. See the discussion earlier in this chapter.

173. See, for example, Astaf'yev and Nikonov (1982; 8), Bykov (1983a; 13) and Tomilin's comments in "Rol' OON v sovremennom ..." (1984; 106).

174. Here, there is a notable contrast with Institute behavior on global problems and other conceptual issues of international relations. On these issues, Institute analysts seemed to feel their mission was to advocate certain policy options and not to implement established policy. In terms of a policy cycle, they saw a role for themselves -- at least on these issues -- at the option-formulation stage.


176. In contrast, Memo's reports on the scientific council that was set up in 1980 to study (in part) global problems never discussed the need to propagandize Soviet policy abroad.

177. Inozemtsev in Zaytseva (1981; 131). For similar comments, see the remarks -- at this same meeting -- of Yevgeniy Fedorov, Yevgeniy Primakov, M. Markov, Vitali Zhurkin and Oleg Bykov (all deputy heads of the council). Zaytseva (1981; 132-34).

178. See the comments by Primakov and Morozov in Zaytseva (1983; 139), and the remarks of Fedoseyev and Morozov in "Nauchnaya zhizn': V nauchnom ..." (1984; 142). For example, Fedoseyev, who at this point (1984) was head of the council, declared that its goals should be the explanation of Soviet policy initiatives and the unmasking of the falsifiers of the policy of peaceful coexistence! Also see the propagandistic appeals issued by the council, as reproduced in "Zasedaniya nauchnogo soveta ..." (1985).

The 1982 and 1984 editions of the council's main publication (Mir i razoruzhenie, Nauchnye issledovaniya) confirm the impression that a large part of its mission was to promote and lobby on behalf of official Soviet policy. Both books are divided into three sections: one
containing articles on various topics; another with reports by various
Soviet public organizations on their activities in the sphere of "peace
and disarmament"; and a final one that includes informational material
(official statements, appeals, chronologies). The quality of the
articles varies considerably. Some are by serious scholars addressing
topics they might address in an academic journal (for example, Oleg
Bykov of IMEMO on the nature of "military equality"); some are less
serious efforts by artists and other cultural figures; and some are
propaganda pure and simple. (The winner for most ridiculous article
title is: "Muslims of the USSR are for Peace and Disarmament"!)
The section of reports by public organizations offers little of interest.
(This is where to turn if you want an update on the Soviet Women's
Committee and its efforts on behalf of peace!) The section of
informational material has one useful part: a short bibliography of
recent Soviet works on arms control, disarmament and other foreign-
policy issues. For full citations to the two books, see Inozemtsev
(1982a) and Fedoseyev (1984).

179. Polsky (1987; Chapters 3-4) provides examples of the various
requests the leadership made to IMEMO during the 1970s for information
of precisely this type.

180. Certainly, there were still disagreements among the elites over
arms control. The issue, however, was no longer the one it had been in
the 1960s: the fundamental legitimacy of the very notion of arms
control.

181. Brezhnev (1981a; 21-25). This section of the speech reads at times
like a somewhat plaintive plea for a resumption of the Soviet-American
arms-control dialogue of the 1970s.

182. See, for example, Shvestov (1981), Akhtamzyan (1981), Davydov
(1984b; 153) and Obminskiy (1985).

183. See, for example, Svetlov (1981; 25-27) and Misharin (1982; 85).

184. Bykov (1983b), for example.


186. The level of advocacy also did not noticeably change in 1983-84, as
had been the case on other issues (global problems, the correlation of
class and non-class values, the structure of the international system,
the nature of security).

187. By security-studies literature, I refer to analyses of: strategic
concepts and weapons; military strategy and missions; and conventional
and nuclear arms control. In the United States, the best example of a
journal offering analyses of this type is International Security.
188. In the early 1980s, these civilians included: Aleksey Arbatov, Vladimir Baranovskiy, Alexandr Kalyadin, Alexey Nikonov, Gennadiy Stashevskiy and A. Vavilov. Three former military officers who were affiliated with IMEMO during this period, and who published fairly regularly, were A.R. Astaf’yev, Vadim Makarevskiy and Daniil Proektor.

189. Recall how one Memo article published in early 1970 claimed that the warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM had terminal maneuvering capabilities (which was not the case). See Fedorenko and Kulish (1970; 43).

190. This was evident from the sources cited in their footnotes. Note that I said Western security-studies literature. At this point, there was no civilian Soviet literature of this type. Moreover, in comparison with Western analysts, the Soviet civilian analysts faced a "data gap" when it came to information on their own armed forces. This last point would become a matter of growing concern among Soviet civilian researchers beginning in 1987-88.

191. On the former, see Baranovskiy (1981). On the latter, see Vavilov (1983), which provides a historical overview of chemical weapons and chemical-weapons arms control; and Kalyadin’s review of the history of the Nonproliferation Treaty and efforts to ban nuclear weapons tests, in Bogdanov (1983; Chapter 1).

192. See Makarevskiy (1984) for an informed analysis of conventional weapons and arms control in Europe. Another of the Institute’s former military officers, sounding as if he were a student of retired MIT Professor William Kaufmann, discussed US naval strategy in terms of missions and capabilities: See Astaf’yev (1982; 18-21). Also see Astaf’yev’s chapter (on the same subject) in Nikonov (1981; Chapter 9).

Tyrus Cobb, in his review of "national security perspectives" within IMEMO and ISKAN during the late 1970s, comes to much the same conclusion on the continuing analytic weaknesses of the security-studies research conducted by civilian specialists. See Cobb (1981).


195. A. Arbatov (1984a) and A. Arbatov (1984b), respectively.

196. See Likhotal’ (1984). Among other things, Likhotal’ praised Arbatov for introducing data and concepts on US nuclear weapons and strategy never before seen in the Soviet "scientific (that is, civilian) literature." At another point, Likhotal’ strongly hinted that more books like Arbatov’s were needed if Soviet civilian researchers were to challenge the military’s dominance in the area of strategic analysis. To quote him: Books such as Arbatov’s "facilitate an orientation toward complex military-political problems for those interested in the
development of contemporary international relations." Likhotal' (1984; 139).

197. Arbatov (1984b; 5–6, 9).

198. Arbatov (1984b; 6–8). I use the verb "argued" because Arbatov presented facts and analysis to back up his claims. Also see Arbatov (1984a; 243–261).

199. For example, throughout the early 1980s, Gennadiy Vorontsov of the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy published informative analyses of European and other security issues in Memo. See, in particular, Vorontsov (1985), where he demonstrated rather detailed knowledge of US conventional weaponry and strategic concepts (for example, "air-land battle"). Vorontsov is a doctor of historical sciences.

200. For example, on arms-control verification and assessing the balance of conventional forces. As seen above, civilian analysts at IMEMO displayed no expertise on matters of verification. Nor did any of these analysts attempt to assess the balance of conventional forces. A former military officer at the Institute did in one instance conduct such an assessment, but employed nothing more sophisticated than static ratios and "bean counts." See Makarevskiy (1984; 20).

In contrast, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat — a body dominated by physical scientists — was clearly beginning to pose a challenge to the military’s monopoly of expertise. During 1983–85, the Committee published a series of sophisticated — in the Soviet context — analyses of strategic stability and strategic defenses. Through 1985, the Committee had published one article in Memo. See Velikhov and Kokoshin (1985), which discussed and defined such concepts as strategic stability and the strategic balance, and also offered an informed analysis of the vulnerabilities of a space-based strategic defensive system. As already noted, this Committee was formed in May, 1983, and, initially, it seemed destined to play a role similar to that of the scientific council on peace and disarmament — that is, to propagandize Soviet policy. See Parrot (1988; 12). By 1985–86, however, it was beginning to have some impact on the formulation of policy, in particular on the Soviet decision to undertake a unilateral halt to nuclear testing. This information comes from remarks made by Academician Vitaliy Gol’danskiy, a former member of the Committee, at MIT in the fall of 1987. Also see Gol’danskiy (1987; 13).

201. See Chapter 1 for a general discussion of the role "policy entrepreneurs" can play within organizations.

202. I am not arguing that Arbatov, at this point, was — in terms of expertise — a match for military officers working within the Soviet General Staff. Rather, the argument is that relative to other civilian analysts, he was in a class by himself.
203. Here, I am relying on my own observations of Arbatov during several visits he made to MIT and Harvard in 1987-89, as well as Cobb’s characterization of him as a “young firebrand.” Cobb (1981; 54).

204. On this, see Partan (1990; 2).

205. On Nikonov, see Chapter 5.

206. Compare Nikonov (1969) with A. Arbatov (1980), (1984a) and (1984b). Nikonov’s important 1969 article in fact shows little knowledge of strategic issues. Rather, it is a call for civilian analysts (like Nikonov) to begin addressing such issues.

207. Georgiy Arbatov, head of ISKAN and Aleksey Arbatov’s father, was apparently a close personal friend of IMEMO director Primakov. Interview.

Nikonov did have “connections” of a sort, but they were not the type that would help him at an institution such as IMEMO. It turns out he is the son-in-law of former Foreign Minister and Stalin confidant Vyacheslav Molotov! I am indebted to Robert Legvold for this information.

208. As I have endeavored to demonstrate, Institute director Inozemtsev consistently downplayed the importance of strategic-studies research within IMEMO.

209. This external factor was a political leadership with the desire to see institutions such as IMEMO conducting research on military-strategic issues. See Chapter 9 below.

210. Deputy directors Radomir Bogdanov, Vasily Ponomarev and Vitaly Zhurkin had been appointed on or before June, 1975, June, 1976, and June, 1971, respectively. Deputy director Georgiy Skorov had held his position since August, 1979. This information comes from various editions of Directory of Soviet Officials; National Organizations, a publication of the US Central Intelligence Agency.

211. Ruble (1981; 395-96). Recall that IMEMO had nearly 1000 employees at this point.

212. See G. Arbatov (1982; 7), where he strongly advocates a new approach to security that would not rely on outdated “conventional notions”; "Discussion at a Session ..." (1982, No.6; 99), where Arbatov calls on Institute researchers to investigate the "nuances" of US military policy; "'Common Security' ..." (1982, No.9; 79-81), where he gives a very strong endorsement to the Palme Commission report on common security; and G. Arbatov (1985; passim), where -- in a speech one week before Gorbachov’s election as general secretary -- Arbatov issues a resounding call for a new, more cooperative approach to ensuring national security.
Recall that longtime IMEMO director Inozemtsev never addressed security issues in this way.

213. Moreover, SShA had a subheading in its year-end cumulative table of contents specifically for articles that addressed "Foreign Policy and Questions of Military Strategy." (The cumulative table of contents is found in the December issue of the journal.)

214. During these years, ISKAN operated an exchange with the Foreign Ministry that involved 8-10 Ministry diplomats and Institute researchers each year. See Cobb (1981; 53). On ties to active duty military officers, see, for example, the meeting held at ISKAN in early 1982 in which a General Staff professor (Major General Slobodanko) participated. "Discussion at a Session ..." (1982, No.5; 88).

The other committees and institutions included:

* The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security - this international body met between September, 1980 and April, 1982; Georgiy Arbatov and Mikhail Hil'shtein of the USA Institute were the only Soviet members of the commission;

* The Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat - this group was established in May, 1983; it was dominated by physical scientists (23 of 25 members); Andrey Kokoshin of the USA Institute was one of only two social scientists on the committee (the other was Anatoliy Gromyko of the Africa Institute);

* The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - in September, 1983, it held a conference on "common security"; Vitaliy Zhurkin of ISKAN was one of only three Soviets who participated in the conference (the others were a Central Committee staffer [Zagadnin] and a physical scientist [Silin]).

ISKAN's ties with the Committee of Soviet Scientists will be discussed in more detail below.

215. These analysts included Andrey Kokoshin, Alexandr Konovalov and Aleksey Vasil'yev.


219. See Chapter 6 above.
220. These articles were a logical extension of the kind of analysis found in a 1980 Institute-sponsored book that, in essence, was a primer on the strategies and weapons systems of US nuclear and conventional forces. See Bogdanov, et al. (1980).

221. See Stashevskiy (1981; 56). What made this brief discussion all the more notable was that it was published nearly a year and a half before Reagan's March, 1983, speech inaugurating the Strategic Defense Initiative. Stashevskiy would later move to IMEMO.


223. Sturua (1985). Sturua, who would later (in 1986 or 1987) move to IMEMO, provides a very competent overview of US plans for ASW warfare (including, for example, several pages on the SOSUS acoustic detection system for tracking Soviet ballistic missile submarines).


225. Kokoshin (1983a). Here, Kokoshin, relying on the Western security studies literature, provides a detailed overview of the concept of a multi-layered ballistic missile defense system.


227. Mil'shteyn (1984). Mil'shteyn, a retired military officer who had worked at ISKAN since the early 1970s, curiously devotes two long paragraphs to the complaints of US military officers that civilian defense "intellectuals" all too often interfered in their work (pp. 8-9). Given ISKAN's evident and growing interest in an array of defense/security issues, this could be an indirect criticism of the small number of Soviet civilian researchers who were beginning to address military-technical issues (for example, people like Kokoshin and Georgiy Sturua within ISKAN, and Aleksey Arbatov at IMEMO).

228. According to my records, Kokoshin had been affiliated with ISKAN since at least the mid-1970s.

229. Kokoshin (1985a) and (1985b). Both were lead articles.

230. Kokoshin (1985a; passim). On nuclear issues, also see Kokoshin (1983a) [discussed above].

231. Here, one sees an important contrast between Kokoshin and Aleksey Arbatov. While Arbatov focused overwhelmingly on nuclear strategy and weapons, Kokoshin seemed at ease with nuclear and conventional issues.

233. Kokoshin (1985b; 11-13). He accomplished this by reviewing the concept of non-provocative defense, and then matter-of-factly noting that West European advocates of the concept favored the restructuring of the Soviet force posture on such principles. The article’s dual purpose (analysis and advocacy) was clear from its title: “The ‘Rogers Plan,’ Alternative Defense Concepts and Security in Europe.”

234. See Note 214.

235. The ISKAN researchers were Kokoshin, Mil’shteyn, Aleksey Vasil’yev, M.I. Gerasov, Alexandr Konovalov, S.A. Kulik and S.K. Oznobishchev. The IMEMO researchers were Aleksey Arbatov and A.G. Savel’yev. This information comes from Yevgeniy Velikhov’s introduction to an abridged version of a Committee of Soviet Scientists’ report published in SSHA. See “Dokumenty: Strategicheskiye ...” (1985; 112-14).

236. For example, on the notion of “interdependence,” I found only one reference to (and advocacy of) the concept. See Sheydina (1981; 11). There was no Institute writing on the correlation of class and non-class values.

237. For example, throughout this period, ISKAN scholars advanced a very nuanced and complex image of the US foreign-policy process. See Yegorova (1981), Dolgopolova (1982), Kokoshin (1983b), and, especially, Podlesnyy and Trofimenko (1986) [written in 1985 and published in early 1986]. The last source, a book entitled The Mechanism of the Formation of US Foreign Policy, is a fascinating empirical study of the vast array of individuals and interest groups that participate in US foreign policymaking.

As the discussion here and earlier in the chapter suggests, this particular topic (the US foreign-policy process) seems to have “migrated” from IMEMO (where it was extensively studied in the late 1960s) to ISKAN. While the reasons for this are unclear, part of the explanation is surely that ISKAN had been founded for the sole purpose of studying the United States.

238. Relative in the sense that Yakovlev and Primakov were (and are) clearly closer to Gorbachev than Arbatov has ever been. For evidence of Arbatov’s diminished status relative to Primakov during the early Gorbachev years, see Glickham (1986a; Note 56).
Chapter 9: 1985-86 - Public Agenda Setting

By mid-1985, there were growing signs that a change in the public foreign-policy agenda was imminent. These signals correlate well with the assertion later made by Gorbachev that the April, 1985, Central Committee plenum had undertaken a major review of the "character and scale of the nuclear threat."¹ Gorbachev himself, however, would have nothing public to say on the need for new approaches in foreign policy until October.

The evidence that "something was up" is twofold. First, official figures who had previously only hinted at the need for new approaches in defense and foreign policy became bolder in their advocacy. Vladimir Petrovskiy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides one such example. In a book published during the summer of 1985, Petrovskiy's earlier hints at the need for new thinking were replaced by more detailed commentary and clear advocacy in favor of new approaches in foreign policy. He now explicitly called for "new political thinking," argued that security could only be secured by political means and declared that the search for unilateral security was "absolutely unrealistic."²

A second piece of evidence is a change in forum for the writing on foreign-policy issues of several CPSU intellectuals. Articles written in 1984 by Yuriy Zhilin and Georgiy Shakhnazarov, which had advocated a new approach to security and been published in small-circulation academic journals, were now reproduced in a book sponsored by the main CPSU publishing house, Politizdat.³ The book had a press run of 70,000 copies.⁴

While it is possible that both the Petrovskiy and Politizdat books
were published on the explicit orders of Gorbachev or his allies, the evidence suggests another explanation. That is, various individuals and institutions were cognizant that Gorbachev was open to new ideas and were cautiously exploring -- in the wake of the leadership change -- how far they could push their advocacy in favor of new approaches in foreign and defense policy.\(^5\)

It should be noted that at this point the comments by Petrovskiy, et al., on new thinking were not appearing in the central press (Pravda, Kommunist). This would only happen after Gorbachev began to repeatedly and publicly discuss the need for new thinking -- that is, after the public agenda had begun to change.

**Official Participants**

Politburo Level. Beginning in October, 1985, Gorbachev returned to and expanded upon the kind of revisionist foreign-policy commentary he had first articulated 10 months earlier while visiting Great Britain. On a visit to Paris in early October, he again portrayed the international system in essentially non-class terms, using more forceful terminology than he had in Great Britain. There was, according to Gorbachev, a "reality" that all people had to accept: that the world had become "ever more closely interconnected and interdependent."\(^6\) Gorbachev then explained that this condition had arisen due to the development of international economic ties, scientific-technical progress and the accelerating exchange of information.

Gorbachev also raised questions of defense and security several times while visiting France. In his speech to the French parliament, he
declared, with no elaboration, that the USSR had begun to rethink its "conventional" approach to various issues, including military ones.\(^7\) A day earlier, he had raised the long-standing Soviet goal of general and complete disarmament. In the near term, Gorbachev confessed, it was not practical. Instead, one should at least negotiate about "reasonable sufficiency of armaments" and strive to preserve "strategic stability" at the lowest possible level of "this sufficiency."\(^8\) While it was not clear at this point whether Gorbachev intended that the notion of sufficiency replace the previously sacrosanct "principle of equality and equal security" as the chief criterion for developing the Soviet force posture, it is interesting that, in contrast to his earlier speeches, he failed to mention the principle.\(^9\)

In the above, there is a notable contrast between Gorbachev's comments on sufficiency and those on the international system. In the latter case, he had not only discussed interdependence, but also explained why it had arisen. On the notion of sufficiency, he was more vague and seemingly content to assert the concept while making no attempt to explain it. This pattern -- specificity on the need to revise the conceptual bases of Soviet policy and vagueness on the notion of sufficiency -- would be repeated several times over the next three months.\(^10\)

The fall of 1985 also saw a change in elite commentary on the Soviet approach to verification. Beginning in October, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze first hinted at and then explicitly declared the USSR's readiness to consider, as a supplement to national technical means, intrusive forms of verification such as on-site inspections.\(^11\)
By December, this same point was being made in editorials published in the central press. 12

Gorbachev's various comments on foreign and security policy in the fall of 1985 served as a prelude for the bold and forceful commentary he would employ at the 27th Party Congress in February, 1986. Indeed, in the opening moments of his report to the congress, Gorbachev declared that the changes in the contemporary world were so profound that they required a "rethinking and comprehensive [kompleksnaya] analysis" of all factors influencing its development. 13

Later in the report, Gorbachev would discuss and, in many cases, expand upon concepts he had been articulating over the previous four months. He forcefully reiterated that global problems were a reality to which Soviet policy must adapt, and that cooperation amongst all states to resolve such problems had become a "categorical demand" of the times. 14 Gorbachev again stressed the complex, interdependent nature of the contemporary international system. 15

Consistent with his previous comments, Gorbachev again vaguely referred to the notion of reasonable sufficiency. Now, however, he seemed to tie the level of sufficiency specifically to the level of armaments possessed by the US and NATO. 16 In addition, Gorbachev, as well as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, failed, at the congress, to discuss "the principle of equality and equal security," thereby suggesting that the notion of sufficiency should replace the principle. 17 The implicit message here -- that "the principle of equality and equal security" must be rejected along with the large Soviet force posture it legitimized -- was in fact made explicit in less
public forums several months later. While rejecting this principle, Gorbachev and other members of the leadership did not seem to have a clear idea of what should replace it. Elite commentary on the notion of sufficiency remained vague throughout 1986.

Gorbachev's comments at the congress on the nature of security were bolder and more detailed than his earlier commentary. In particular, he now argued that reliance on military-technical means for ensuring security was no longer possible and that political means were therefore acquiring growing significance. Moreover, security -- in the context of US-Soviet relations -- could only be maintained if it was "mutual" (взаимная).

As if to make clear he was setting a new agenda for Soviet foreign policy -- both the basic assumptions informing it and the strategic prescriptions guiding actual policy -- Gorbachev followed his innovative comments on interdependence, the nature of security and the like with a strong attack (his first public one) on the foreign-policy strategy pursued by his immediate predecessors. Implicitly drawing a contrast with the approach favored by Brezhnev and others, Gorbachev argued in favor of a more empirical emphasis in the formation of Soviet foreign policy, one that would proceed from the "realities of the contemporary world."

Several other pieces of evidence indicate that Gorbachev's address to the congress was meant to signal a clear change in the public foreign-policy agenda. First, his comments did not come in just any speech or in an address to a foreign audience. Rather, they came in a report to the highest tribune of the CPSU -- its five-yearly Party
Second, most of Gorbachev's comments on foreign and security policy were reflected in the resolutions of the congress. This suggests that Gorbachev, in elaborating the new thinking, was not just speaking for himself; his innovative comments enjoyed some level of support among the Party elite as well. Third, the central press organs, in the period immediately before and after the congress mounted a campaign to promote and propagandize the need for new approaches and new thinking in foreign policy. Finally, in the wake of the congress, the two ranking Party members with oversight of foreign policy forcefully reiterated the need for new thinking, employing much of the same language and analysis as Gorbachev.

Not everything Gorbachev had to say at the congress on foreign policy was innovative and revisionist in the Soviet context. His discussion of capitalism and its lack of economic dynamism, and of the nature of imperialism was quite congenial to the "old thinking." He talked of the aggressive intentions of the "ruling wing of the monopoly bourgeoisie" in the US, the deepening of capitalism's "general crisis," "new outbreaks" of inter-imperialist contradictions and the "growing militarization" of policy and thinking in the United States. In essence, he was advancing an image of capitalism little different from that articulated by Brezhnev or other Soviet leaders. On this particular issue, Gorbachev seemed curiously wedded to Marxist-Leninist verities, and little interested in using the empirical approach he so often championed.

The public agenda on issues of foreign policy changed in two other important ways over the remainder of 1986. In March, Gorbachev returned
to the issue of arms-control verification. Now, he not only indicated Soviet willingness to consider on-site inspections, but also stated that discussions of verification could take place "from the very beginning" of any negotiations. This latter point marked a revision of another long-standing Soviet position: that questions of verification only be discussed after the outlines of any arms-control accord were agreed.

Further evidence that a new approach to verification was on the public agenda came just 10 days later, when Deputy Minister of Defense Shabanov published a long article on verification in Izvestiya. The article echoed Gorbachev on two key points: that national technical means could be supplemented by more intrusive forms of verification (it explicitly mentioned on-site inspections), and that verification issues could be addressed from the very beginning of any negotiations.

In the fall of 1986, Gorbachev placed a final issue on the public agenda: the relative priority of class and non-class values in Soviet foreign policy. Reversing the previous ranking, Gorbachev, beginning in October, gave precedence to non-class values. He accomplished this by asserting the "priority" of values common to all mankind (that is, non-class values) over the interests of any particular class. In making this claim, Gorbachev even managed to cite Lenin in support of it! Central Committee Secretary Dobrynin and Politburo member Ligachev soon echoed the general secretary on the priority of non-class values, thus providing confirmation that this issue, too, had reached the public agenda.

As should be apparent from the above review, Gorbachev's approach to setting the public agenda during 1985-86 was radically different from
that of Brezhnev in the late 1960s. One key difference was that Gorbachev, as well as other members of the leadership, continually reiterated, in the months after the Congress, the key themes of what had by that time become known as the "new political thinking."36 This reinforced the initial signals of agenda change, and indicated to individuals and institutions involved in Soviet foreign policymaking that the need for new approaches in foreign and security policy was a top priority of the leadership.

There were at least three factors behind this different pattern of agenda setting in the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. One was the very different political styles of the two leaders. Brezhnev was a passive consensus builder. Gorbachev, in contrast, was an active agenda setter. Not surprisingly then, he was very aggressive in raising new and unorthodox issues.

A second factor was the lack of public elite disagreement over the new thinking at this early stage. This gave Gorbachev greater freedom to raise new issues than Brezhnev had in the late 1960s. Yegor Ligachev, who in later years would criticize several elements of the new thinking, at this point spoke favorably of it.37 The elite conflict that did erupt in these early years of Gorbachev's tenures as general secretary was primarily over issues of domestic policy.38 One clear sign that domestic policy was a matter of greater disputes within the Party than foreign policy was that none of the seven Central Committee plenums held during Gorbachev's first two years in power dealt with foreign-policy issues. They all focused on various domestic socio-economic questions.39
A third factor behind Gorbachev’s more aggressive and revisionist agenda setting was the apparent influence exerted on him by two men: Alexandr Yakovlev and Yevgeniy Primakov. Both men held unorthodox views on foreign policy and both successfully mobilized the institutional resources at their disposal — namely IMEMO — to convince Gorbachev of the validity of these views.

There is in fact a striking correlation between the issues IMEMO actively promoted during Yakovlev’s tenure (1983–85) and the early part of Primakov’s Institute leadership (beginning in late 1985) and at least three of the issues placed on the public agenda by Gorbachev through the end of 1986. These issues were: a revised image of the international system (interdependence, global problems and the like); a new goal structure for Soviet foreign policy (the priority of non-class over class values); and a revised conceptualization of the nature of security (a mutual over unilateral approach, and political means over military ones).

Obviously, a correlation is not the same thing as a causal explanation. The latter would argue it was the personal and institutional advocacy of Yakovlev–Primakov–IMEMO that directly led Gorbachev to place these particular issues on the public agenda. However, the close ties of both men to Gorbachev (and probably to members of Gorbachev’s staff as well) and the fact that both served as heads of IMEMO strongly suggest that Gorbachev, prior to setting the public agenda, was aware of and willing to listen to the types of arguments being advanced by various Institute scholars during 1983–86. Gorbachev could thus forcefully set the public agenda on these issues.
because there was a well-developed body of expertise on them (at IMEMO) and because there was a "channel" (Yakovlev and later Primakov) to bring them to his attention.\footnote{43} 

This point is best illustrated if one compares Gorbachev's agenda setting on such issues as the nature of the international system with that on security topics. On the latter -- and, in particular, on the issue of sufficiency -- Gorbachev and other members of the leadership were consistently vague. They knew what they did not want -- the principle of equality and equal security -- but seemed at a loss to offer a well-developed concept in its place.

On security issues like sufficiency, however, the political leadership had few sources of expertise aside from the Soviet military to which it could turn at this point.\footnote{44} IMEMO, the largest and most prestigious center of foreign-policy research, was still quite weak on the more concrete issues of Soviet national-security policy.\footnote{45} Thus, Yakovlev (or Primakov) could not serve as a conduit to Gorbachev or his staff for "new thinking" on security issues the way he could on other topics; the necessary combination of institutional expertise and access was lacking. As a result, on security matters, Gorbachev had no ready-made alternatives available to place on the public agenda.\footnote{46}

By mid-1986, the political leadership had clearly recognized that the military's monopoly of expertise on questions of national security was a problem in need of rectification. The first public hint of this recognition came in an important speech given by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in April. Speaking on the anniversary of Lenin's birth, he declared that Soviet foreign policy should be characterized by a
"scientific approach" to its understanding of various international problems.\textsuperscript{47} For scholars at IMEMO, such an approach was synonymous with a greater empirical emphasis in Soviet policy, one which required greater inputs from the academic community into the policy process.

Several months later, it became clear this was Shevardnadze's understanding of "scientific" policymaking as well. Sometime in the early summer of 1986, a new unit -- known as the Scientific Coordination Center -- was created at the Foreign Ministry with the specific mission of coordinating, on a regular basis, academic research and leadership policy concerns.\textsuperscript{48} The establishment of this center heralded a fundamentally important change for an institution such as IMEMO.

In theory, the new center gave the Institute another access route to the policy process -- one that was both more routinized and stable than the "Institute head-personal access" channel that had served as IMEMO's prime connection to the process so often in the near (Yakovlev) and more distant (Inozemtsev) past. In fact, by early 1987 scholars from IMEMO (and from other institutes) were indeed working with the center on several policy-related issues.\textsuperscript{49}

While this initial change made it clear that the leadership wanted to grant academic analysts a greater role in the policy process, it said nothing about the kind of issues they should address. In a late May, 1986, speech to a conference of academic analysts, International Department chief Anatoliy Dobrynin addressed this latter point and made it very clear that the leadership wanted researchers at IMEMO and elsewhere to study issues formerly only examined by the military.\textsuperscript{50} In the speech, Dobrynin praised various institutes within the Academy of
Sciences for developing expertise on foreign-policy and military-political problems, but also noted there was a need for even more research on "international and military-political problems." His language here was particularly forceful.51

Dobrynin then spent several minutes outlining a research agenda whose content made it clear that the top leadership was willing to sanction studies by social scientists of topics formerly in the domain of the Soviet military and its General Staff. Among the problems in need of "rapid scientific analysis" were: the relation between offensive and defensive weapons; possible arms-control agreements covering various types of weapons systems; defining the level of "reasonable sufficiency" of military potentials; and problems of arms-control verification.52 Dobrynin, in making this call for civilian research on national-security issues, was clearly not just speaking his own mind. In addition to being published as part of the conference proceedings, his speech was also reprinted as one of the lead articles in a June issue of Kommunist.53

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. Yevgeniy Primakov was appointed head of IMEMO in late 1985, succeeding Aleksandr Yakovlev.54 For the first time since Inozemtsev's death, the Institute had a widely known and respected scholar as its director.55 Primakov's appointment was somewhat of a homecoming: He had been a deputy head of IMEMO in 1970-77.56

The Institute flourished under his leadership. Even more so than under Yakovlev, IMEMO was aggressive in promoting issues and adopting
clearcut institutional viewpoints. This enhanced institutional assertiveness was a function of three factors. First, the "new thinking" was now clearly entering its stage of option formulation, and, as was argued in Chapter 1, institutional assertiveness would be expected to be higher.

Second, the reforms Gorbachev was beginning to implement (particularly, the policy of glasnost') were radically changing the external environment within which institutions such as IMEMO operated. In contrast with past times (for example, 1982), this external setting placed virtually no constraints on the Institute's behavior. In fact, the opposite was the case: This setting encouraged greater institutional assertiveness. 57

Third, Primakov -- like Yakovlev -- was clearly intent on mobilizing IMEMO to back up and substantiate the arguments he was in all likelihood presenting to Gorbachev in private. As will be seen, this mobilization was both similar to and different from the one undertaken by Yakovlev. The similarity was that under both men the greatest mobilization was seen on issues that fell within IMEMO's basic sense of organizational mission. Primakov, however, seemed willing to countenance a redefinition of this mission -- one that would make the study of security issues a much more serious enterprise within the Institute.

Primakov's impact on the Institute was seen in various ways. For one, Memo became even more interesting than it had been in 1983-85. New rubrics were introduced; articles by prominent foreigners were published; there was even a reader survey that could be torn out and mailed back to the Institute. 58 In addition, Primakov continued the two
rubrics begun by Yakovlev -- Diskussii and Tribuna ekonomista i mezdunarodnika -- that had often carried advocacy-type articles.

Primakov's early years at the Institute also saw the creation of several new departments, most importantly, the Department of Disarmament and International Security.59

The sense one gets from these various changes was that Primakov was determined to bring some "fresh air" to the Institute. Two senior researchers in fact described Primakov's influence on IMEMO in just such terms. Both men praised the more open and "democratic" atmosphere he established.60

During the first full year of his tenure at IMEMO, Primakov published a series of articles. The articles served two clear purposes: to promote the new foreign-policy strategy being articulated by Gorbachev and other top leaders; and to promote certain goals in which IMEMO had a long-standing interest.61 By late 1985, it was clear that Primakov had become a close adviser to Gorbachev.62 This fact became even more evident when Primakov published two important articles in Pravda early in 1986 -- one a month before the Party congress and the other a week after its close. More important than the timing of the articles was their content. They delineated all the basic principles of what would eventually become "the new political thinking."63

Primakov's writings in 1986, however, did not simply reiterate the Gorbachev leadership's foreign-policy agenda. With respect to two issues, Primakov seemed more attuned to Institute concerns than to those of Gorbachev or other top leaders. One was the concept of a single world (vsemirnove) economy. As was seen in Chapter 8, IMEMO researchers
had elaborated this concept as a supra-class category that united the socialist and capitalist economies in a single system operating with common economic laws. Primakov now gave the concept a ringing endorsement and urged Institute scholars to conduct further research on it. This advocacy came at a time when elite actors were not addressing the issue.

The other issue Primakov raised that was not on the public agenda at this point was the image of capitalism. Here, he was addressing an issue of long-standing interest to the Institute, but one on which it had curiously little to say during the early 1980s. The main point Primakov wanted to make -- and it was one to which he returned repeatedly over the course of the year -- was that capitalism, despite all its problems and deepening "general crisis," was still capable of significant economic growth. Primakov himself almost sounded like a capitalist with his talk of venture capital and the micro-electronic revolution. He was clearly impressed by how successfully the capitalist West had adapted to the scientific-technical revolution.

Primakov also had something to say about capitalism’s external behavior, that is, its imperialist foreign policy. Here, his point was that despite imperialism’s inherent militarism, there existed externally-imposed constraints on how aggressively it could act. The main external constraint was the presence of the world socialist system and the military-strategic parity it had attained vis-a-vis the United States. In one case, Primakov went a step further and very cautiously suggested that capitalism could somehow outgrow militarism.

In sum, Primakov was using his leadership position within IMEMO to
both promote and attempt to modify Gorbachev's foreign-policy program. Primakov was neither simply Gorbachev's man at IMEMO nor a complete captive of organizational interests within the Institute. His role was a complex combination of both these "ideal types."

To appreciate that Primakov's views did not totally coincide with those of Gorbachev it is enough to note that the image of capitalism Primakov was promoting was clearly not the one being discussed by the new General Secretary. As already seen, at the Party congress, Gorbachev's analysis of capitalism and militarism sounded remarkably similar to that of earlier Soviet leaders.

Later in 1986, Gorbachev still found very little good to say about capitalism. While visiting the Soviet Far East in late July, he attacked capitalism's "imperialistic ambitions," its "class narrowness, primitive ideological" pretensions, and foresaw the "growing political influence of militarism." While Gorbachev's position on capitalism was not the most extreme one possible, it was in the Soviet context somewhat to the right of center. Primakov's position on capitalism, in contrast, was very much left of center.

One could argue that, given the close relationship between Gorbachev and Primakov, the General Secretary had simply "tasked" Primakov to promote this nuanced vision of capitalism while Gorbachev hid his true -- revisionist -- views on the topic. This explanation, however, fails to account for two facts. First, Gorbachev had been more than willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy on a host of issues (with his discussions of interdependence, global problems, common security and the like). Why, then, would he be so hesitant on this particular issue?
Second, there was an obvious source for Gorbachev's image of capitalism — Aleksandr Yakovlev. Yakovlev, who at this point was already one of Gorbachev's most trusted advisers, had consistently promoted an image of capitalism that was strikingly similar to the one now being articulated by Gorbachev. Yakovlev's influence on Gorbachev is thus clear on this particular issue. However, as will be seen, over the course of 1986-87 Primakov would mobilize the institutional resources at his disposal — namely IMEMO — to help change Gorbachev's mind on this question.

The task now at hand is to analyze the Institute's behavior during this year of public agenda change. Which items on the public agenda were addressed and which were ignored or accorded a lower priority? The following analysis will look first at the Institute's response to the various conceptual issues Gorbachev had placed on the agenda, and then at its response to the more concrete security issues that were also now on it. The analysis concludes with a brief examination of the USA Institute's behavior at this point, and of how and why it differed from IMEMO's actions.

* * * * *

During 1985-86, the pattern that had dominated the Institute's behavior for much of the past two decades began to change. The previous clear preference for issues closest to its core areas of expertise (for example, the study of capitalism or the conceptual aspects of international relations) coexisted to an increasing degree with an
interest in more "applied" issues (such as questions of international security). Nonetheless, the basic pattern seen so many times before was on the whole preserved. That is, issues closest to IMEMO's own well-developed sense of organizational mission were favored. To put this another way and relate it to the role of the Institute's new leader: Primakov's mobilization of IMEMO took place within a pre-existing set of organizational constraints.

The Institute addressed the conceptual issues now on the public agenda in two different ways. One way saw Institute scholars continue to examine and promote issues like interdependence and global problems. Now, however, they often explicitly linked their analyses to Gorbachev's new thinking. While this behavior clearly showed IMEMO's sensitivity to leadership concerns, it was not terribly surprising since Institute scholars had been examining such issues for a number of years. In a sense, then, IMEMO, under Primakov's leadership, was clearly willing "to help Gorbachev out" by promoting his policy agenda.

The second way in which IMEMO responded to Gorbachev's agenda of conceptual issues was more interesting -- particularly from an organizational-politics perspective. The Institute used one of the new agenda items -- the interdependence of nations -- to legitimize a goal it had been promoting for several years: the concept of a single world (vesemirnoye) economy. As already noted, Primakov, in his Memo article highlighting the Institute's research tasks in light of the 27th Party Congress, gave high priority to further research on the concept. In addition, of the two corrections the "collective" of IMEMO suggested for the draft of the new Party Program, one was that the "category" of
world economy be introduced into the document. Later in the year, an Institute scholar explicitly used Gorbachev’s comments on interdependence to legitimize his aggressive advocacy in favor of the concept of a single world economy.

The importance of the organizational context within which Primakov acted as Institute head could be seen in other ways as well. Most important, researchers at IMEMO were able to respond quickly to Primakov’s calls for a re-evaluation of the internal (economic) and external (foreign policy) components of the then dominant image of capitalism. This response was not surprising since this was a "bread and butter" issue for the Institute -- one which it had addressed many times in the past and on which it possessed considerable organizational expertise.

The rapid response came in several ways. First, by September, 1986, IMEMO had organized and begun publication of a diskussii series on the theory of state-monopoly capitalism. The series examined the internal, economic component of the Soviet image of capitalism. An indication of the extent to which this topic coincided with the Institute’s core areas of expertise was that the series was one of the most extensive ever published by it on one particular issue.

The essays in the series were heavily empirical in nature. Their starting point was the evident fact that many of the processes occurring in contemporary capitalist economies (privatization and de-regulation, for example) found no reflection in the (largely deductive) Soviet theory of state-monopoly capitalism. The essays contained a range of viewpoints, some conservative and some radical. It is telling, though,
that the article summarizing the entire series clearly sided with the radicals. This summary article attacked the notion of nationalization and -- resurrecting an Institute viewpoint from the late 1960s -- argued that the state was not a tool of the ruling class, but an "independent arbitrator" of various interests. 82

During 1986, the Institute also addressed this internal component of the image of capitalism by advocating a revision in the official Soviet definition of the capitalist military-industrial complex. Examining the draft of the new Party Program early in the year, the "collective" of the Institute directly stated that the draft's language on the complex was wrong. IMEMO felt the definition in the draft was too broad, and proposed a narrower one in its place. 83 The Institute, however, lost out on this issue. The final version of the new Program retained the draft's language on the complex. 84

There is one final example of the Institute's renewed interest in articulating a more nuanced image of capitalism. In this case, however, it was what IMEMO did not say that revealed the interest. In an editorial reviewing the 27th Party Congress, the Institute gave extensive coverage to Gorbachev's remarks on interdependence, security and arms control, but completely omitted his hard-hitting attack on capitalism. 85 This editorial, it should be noted, was the first one published in the 1980s that did not simply read like official propaganda.

IMEMO also quickly responded to Primakov's more tentative call for a re-evaluation of the external, foreign-policy component of the Soviet image of capitalism. The issue raised here by Institute scholars was
the phenomenon of militarism and whether it -- and the aggressive foreign-policy posture it produced -- was inherent to the capitalist socio-economic system. The advocacy here was extremely cautious, in part because the issue of militarism was directly tied to the central element of the prevailing orthodoxy on capitalism’s external behavior: Lenin’s theory of imperialism. IMEMO’s "collective," in discussing the draft Party Program, ever so cautiously hinted -- as had Primakov -- that the militarism of contemporary capitalism could be externally constrained by the growing strength of the socialist countries.

Writing in this same issue of Memo, Ivan Ivanov, a deputy director of the Institute, took the analysis one step further and suggested that militarism was not a permanent feature of capitalism. He was, however, extraordinarily cautious, describing his comments on militarism as diskussionnye momenty (perhaps best translated as "points for discussion"). He began with the rather standard declaration that militarism was deeply rooted in contemporary capitalism. Several sentences later, in a very confusing passage, he seemed to argue the opposite: that capitalism could outgrow militarism.

It was a non-Institute scholar, Yuriy Krasin, who was the boldest on this particular question. Writing in the January, 1985, issue of Memo, he began, like others, by arguing that there were external constraints that in effect limited the dangerous consequences of militarism. Then came a question that, in the Soviet context, amounted to a bombshell: Can capitalism develop without "an arms race and the total militarization of the economy?" Krasin gave a qualified yes to this question, pointing to the experience of Finland, Austria and
Switzerland. 90

Three final observations reinforce the impression that it was a combination of pre-existing organizational preferences within IMEMO and Primakov's own views that were shaping the Institute's behavior in this key year of agenda change. The first concerns how the Institute chose to publicize the late-May, 1986, conference at which Dobrynin had delivered his call for institutions like IMEMO to conduct more security-related research. Instead of reproducing Dobrynin's address, the Institute chose to publish -- as the lead article in the No.8 (1986) issue of Memo -- the speech delivered by Ivan Frolov to that same conference. Frolov's speech touched on such topics as global problems, the scientific-technical revolution, "global thinking" and the growing internationalization of human life -- in other words, issues closest to the Institute's core interests in the international relations field. 91

The second observation concerns the issues IMEMO chose to emphasize in articulating its views on the draft of the new Party Program. The advocacy came on concepts such as "world economy" and "military-industrial complex." There was no advocacy on the one concrete security issue (the problem of war and peace) examined in the Institute's report on the draft program. Moreover, on this particular issue, the "collective" felt it necessary to emphasize the importance of "widely propagandizing" the humanistic nature of Soviet foreign policy. 92 Thus, here too, the issues emphasized were the ones most clearly consonant with the Institute's sense of organizational mission.

The final observation is that Primakov himself -- at this point -- had very little to say about security issues. In his article discussing
IMEKO's research tasks after the 27th Party Congress, Primakov's comments on security were little more than a repetition of what Gorbachev had said at the Congress (on mutual security, etc.). While he did declare that the Congress' discussion of a universal system of international security had placed "serious tasks" before academic analysts, these tasks remained unspecified. This lack of specificity should be compared with Primakov's discussion of capitalism's adaptation to the scientific-technical revolution. Here, he provided a long list of research tasks for Institute scholars. This same pattern was evident in Primakov's other publications during 1986. Moreover, he never addressed or even alluded to a major new security issue on the public agenda: reasonable sufficiency.

* * *

In comparison to earlier years, Institute interest in security issues during 1985-86 was higher. Indeed, by mid-1986, IMEMO had taken a major step toward rectifying its evident weaknesses in the study of security issues by creating a full-fledged Department of Disarmament and International Security. The new unit was headed by Aleksey Arbatov, one of the few analysts at IMEMO well-versed in strategic affairs. After 17 years, the Institute had finally upgraded the study of security issues, giving it the prestige and resources of a department.

Why this department was created testifies to the important role individuals can at times play within organizations. Aleksey Arbatov, the aspiring "policy entrepreneur," had finally succeeded. His success
was a function of the factors discussed earlier (his expertise, personality, connections and allies within the Institute), plus one additional and crucial change: Political leaders now explicitly calling for research on security issues by institutions such as IMEMO. As seen above, by the late spring of 1986 Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and, especially, Dobrynin had all given clear signals precisely along these lines.

The first published output of this new department was a November, 1986, Memo article, co-authored by Arbatov and Vladimir Baranovskiy. It combined Arbatov’s strategic affairs expertise with the kind of general, descriptive overviews of arms-control and other security issues the Institute had been producing in the early 1980s. The article, whose topic was nuclear testing, began with a review of the history of attempts to ban such tests. This section provided a typical -- for IMEMO -- overview of the subject at hand.

The article’s next two sections examined issues that were really more military-technical in nature: how to verify a testban and whether testing was needed to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons. The section on verification dealt in an intelligent and informed way with such topics as the ground and surface waves produced by a nuclear explosion, and the phenomenon of “decoupling” (where a nuclear device is detonated in a large underground cavern in order to hide its “seismic signature” from detection devices). The section on reliability also demonstrated a high level of knowledge -- especially for Soviet social scientists -- of the issues involved. There was, for example, a good critique of the argument that testing was needed to insure the
reliability of nuclear weapons already in a country's stockpile. 107

One purpose of the Arbatov-Baranovskiy article, which was the lead one in that issue of Memo, was presumably to show that the soon-to-expire Soviet unilateral nuclear testing moratorium could be extended. The overall quality of the analysis was such that one could actually imagine that it might influence some decisionmaker at a higher level to consider extending the moratorium beyond its January 1, 1987, expiration date. 108 No such decision, however, was taken. On February 26, 1987, the USSR detonated an underground nuclear device, thereby terminating its 18 month moratorium.

Thus, on this particular issue the Institute -- through Primakov -- failed to influence Soviet policy. Part of the reason for the failure was its relative lack of expertise on such questions. 109 However, even if there had been sufficient expertise, it is not clear that Primakov could have served as a "conduit" to Gorbachev on this issue. In fact, the evidence suggests that on the question of nuclear testing Gorbachev was relying on a different set of civilian analysts for non-military viewpoints: The Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, headed by Yevgeniy Velikhov. 110

Beyond this "in-house" measure (that is, the creation of Arbatov's department) to improve its knowledge of security issues, the Institute, under Primakov's guidance, increasingly turned to outside experts for analysis on such issues. Considerably expanding upon a trend evident in earlier years, Memo published a series of high-quality articles on issues of security by Institute outsiders during 1985-86. A researcher from the USA Institute, for example, contributed a very informed
overview of the history of US efforts in the area of strategic
defense.\textsuperscript{111} An article by former US Secretary of Defense McNamara
analyzed the force levels needed to maintain a situation of mutual
deterrence.\textsuperscript{112}

In another case, two physical scientists affiliated with the
Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear
Threat examined the strategic and economic consequences of the American
strategic defense initiative. Among other things, their analysis
defined stability, defended mutual deterrence, presented detailed
calculations of the cost of a space-based defensive system and correctly
described how partially effective strategic defenses could undermine
"crisis stability."\textsuperscript{113} In terms of its strategic and military-technical
expertise, this analysis was by far the most sophisticated one ever
presented to the readers of \textit{Memo}.\textsuperscript{114}

A \textit{Memo} article on US naval strategy was yet another example of a
high-quality strategic analysis contributed by an Institute outsider
during 1985-86.\textsuperscript{115} The article examined US naval strategy, providing
good information on several weapon systems (for example, Nimitz-type
aircraft carriers and Tomahawk cruise missiles) and on various missions
the US navy performs in war and peace.

Aside from its sophisticated analysis, the article introduced the
readers of \textit{Memo} to several terms and sources never before seen in an
Institute publication. For example, it used the Soviet acronym for CEP
(circular error probable - a measurement of the accuracy of ballistic
missiles): KVO (krugovoye veroyatnoye otkloneniye).\textsuperscript{116} In addition, the
article, in its source materials, cited a June, 1984, issue of \textit{Voyennaya

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mvel' (Military Thought), the semi-classified organ of the Soviet
General Staff. At this point in time (mid-1986), it was very rare
for Institute publications to contain references to Soviet military
writings -- let alone a restricted-access General Staff journal!

Despite this new-found institutional interest in strategic affairs,
there were continuing and at times glaring weaknesses in IMEMO's
treatment of such issues. For example, the two new security issues
Gorbachev had placed on the public agenda in late 1985 and 1986 -- a new
approach to arms-control verification and reasonable sufficiency -- were
for the most part ignored or treated in a very simplistic manner by
Institute scholars.

On verification, the specific issues raised by Gorbachev and
others -- the USSR's willingness to consider on-site inspections and to
discuss verification questions from the beginning of any arms-control
negotiation -- were virtually ignored by the Institute. The only
article in Memo to address either of these issues at any length was
written by Vladimir Petrovskiy of the Foreign Ministry. In his article,
Petrovskiy simply repeated the point Gorbachev had made in March, 1986:
Verification could be discussed at the early stages of any
negotiation.118

On the issue of sufficiency, IMEMO also had very little to say. In
two cases, Institute scholars did attempt to define the concept.
Writing early in 1986, Deputy director Bykov declared that nuclear force
levels should be "sufficient both from the point of view of the national
security of each side and simultaneously from the point of view of their
mutual security."119 It was left to the bewildered reader to figure out
was this could possibly mean. At the conference addressed by Dobrynin in late May, one Institute researcher seemed to argue that the level of reasonable sufficiency should be determined by political conditions in the world. The four other Institute scholars at the conference did not address the concept.

In only three other instances was the notion of sufficiency even discussed. In two instances, it was mentioned, but not defined, and in one case, a scholar from the USA Institute, writing in Memo, offered a vague definition of it. Perhaps the best indication of the evident low priority the Institute accorded this issue was the fact that many researchers continued to cite "the principle of equality and equal security," which the concept of sufficiency was meant to supplant.

Reasonable sufficiency was not the only security concept used by Institute researchers in a confusing or ill-informed way. Following a pattern evident in earlier years, analysts often talked about stability (or strategic stability), but never really defined it. Deputy director Bykov was particularly guilty in this respect. On several occasions, he discussed "strategic stability" -- arguing that it was the basis for maintaining peace in the nuclear age -- but never explained exactly what he meant by it. Given this clear lack of understanding of some basic strategic concepts, it is not at all surprising that in December, 1986, a scholar associated with the USA Institute criticized a recent IMEMO book on the arms race for giving "military-technical" issues "practically no illumination."

In another case, two Institute scholars discussed the consequences of nuclear war and simply took the onset of "nuclear winter" as a
However, by this point (late 1986), the early nuclear-winter scenarios were being heavily criticized in the West for their modelling errors and for exaggerating the (admittedly already dire) consequences of nuclear war. This criticism was accessible to Institute scholars, but found no reflection in the articles mentioned above. It is telling that one of the articles approvingly cited a statement by Carl Sagan that any country launching a first nuclear strike would be committing suicide. Sagan was one of the early proponents of the overzealous interpretation of nuclear winter seemingly favored by these Institute scholars.

The above review should make clear that while IMEMO -- as of late 1986 -- was evincing a growing interest in strategic issues, it was an interest that continued to coexist with some glaring analytic weaknesses in this area. In a sense, this should come as no surprise. Arbatov's department had only been created in mid-year, and it obviously takes time to develop institutional expertise and redefine organizational missions. That Primakov had indeed set out to modify IMEMO's sense of organizational mission would become more evident over the next two years as a series of scholars within the Institute attacked Arbatov and his department for leading IMEMO astray from its core research strengths.

ISKAN. Utilizing its stronger base of institutional expertise on security issues and replicating a pattern of behavior first seen in the early 1970s during the Soviet debate over SALT, the USA Institute -- beginning in 1986 -- addressed a range of security issues in a more direct and policy-relevant way than IMEMO.

ISKAN researchers, for example, quickly addressed the two security
topics placed on the public agenda by Gorbachev in late 1985 and early 1986 -- a new approach to verification and reasonable sufficiency. In February, 1986, SSHA published the first academic article entirely devoted to the issue of arms-control verification. Entitled "Questions of Verification [kontrol'] and Arms Limitations in Soviet-American Agreements," the article provided technical information on various elements of the US verification system (for example, the "Keyhole" satellites). It also explicitly recognized the need to go beyond national-technical means (satellites and the like) in developing verification measures. Echoing the recent commentary of Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the article suggested that "on-site verification" measures would be necessary in some cases.

On sufficiency, Lev Semeyko, a retired military officer who had long worked at ISKAN, argued in SSHA toward the end of the year that the concept, as applied to conventional forces, should mean their restructuring for "defensive functions" only. However, he provided no analysis to back this advocacy. Semeyko's article, which essentially said very little, at least went beyond the vague definitions of sufficiency being offered by IMEMO scholars at this point. This kind of analysis in fact presaged some very pronounced advocacy by ISKAN scholars on sufficiency beginning in 1987.

Beyond these two issues, the year 1986 saw a qualitative jump in the amount of military-technical and military-policy issues receiving attention from ISKAN researchers. In this 12 month period, SSHA published: additional technical overviews of the US SDI program, a detailed analysis of the human and technological errors that could lead
to the accidental launch of nuclear weapons; an informed overview of the strategic implications of the SDI program for Western Europe; and military-technical overviews of the US B-1 strategic bomber program and the C3I system for US nuclear forces.

Two final points can be made in summarizing this review of ISKAN's research output. First, this year of public agenda change saw the USA Institute respond more quickly than IMEMO to the political leadership's calls for civilian research on a host of security issues. Building on expertise and ties (especially with the Committee of Soviet Scientists) from earlier years, the Institute showed itself to be capable of addressing a range of military-technical issues.

Having said this, a caveat is in order. While it is true that relative to IMEMO, scholars at the USA Institute demonstrated an overall higher degree of military-technical expertise, these same scholars were, with few exceptions, not yet operating at the analytic level of the Soviet military. In particular (and in stark contrast to the military), the overwhelming majority of the ISKAN analyses cited above were on Western strategies and weapons systems, and they utilized primarily Western sources.

Second, during 1986 ISKAN had virtually nothing to say on a topic that was gaining increasing attention within IMEMO: a revision to the internal and external (foreign policy) components of the Soviet image of capitalism. As with security issues, differences in institutional leadership (in this case, Primakov's activism concerning the image of capitalism), expertise and missions go a long way toward explaining this contrast in behavior.
Summary

By the end of 1986, the Soviet public agenda on issues of foreign policy had experienced a sea change. Gorbachev and his allies had legitimized a host of changes in the basic assumptions informing Soviet foreign policy as well as for the prescriptions defining Soviet national security. The evidence adduced in this chapter indicates that IMEMO -- through directors Yakovlev and Primakov -- had played an influential role in shaping the content of these revised basic assumptions. On the new prescriptions for security, however, the Institute acted by and large as if it were “on the outside looking in” -- playing a very minor part in the evolving policy debates.

While Primakov (and before him Yakovlev) had clearly played a key role in determining the Institute’s response to this changing public agenda, it would be wrong to conclude that only his interests and evident ties to Gorbachev were shaping IMEMO’s behavior. Organizational factors internal to the Institute played a role as well. At times, IMEMO acted in ways consistent with basic tenets of organization theory, that is, like an organization concerned with advancing its own sense of organizational mission. For example, it exploited the opening provided by a changing agenda to promote an issue in which it had a long-standing interest: the concept of a single world economy. This behavior suggests that director Primakov, in mobilizing IMEMO behind Gorbachev’s emerging foreign-policy program, was also sensitive to the Institute’s own well-developed set of interests.
Notes

1. Gorbachev first made this claim at the 27th Party Congress in February, 1986. See Gorbachev (1986b; 86). However, the published version of Gorbachev's speech to the April, 1985, plenum is devoted almost entirely to domestic matters and provides no evidence that a major review of the nuclear threat (or, more generally, foreign policy) had taken place. For his plenum speech, see Gorbachev (1985a). More recently, Marshal Akhromeyev has claimed that a major review of Soviet military doctrine was begun sometime during Gorbachev's first year in power on the orders of the Party leadership. On this, see Odom (1989; 130).

2. Petrovskiy (1985a; Introduction, Chapter 3, Conclusion). Chapter 3 is entitled "New Parameters of Security." This book was signed to press on July 31, with a printing of 10,000 copies. Compare the analysis here with Petrovskiy (1984a; 9), Petrovskiy (1985b; 3, 8, 11) and Petrovskiy (1984b; 117-119). The first two sources are articles in Memo; the latter is a book review published in Kommunist.

3. See Zagladin (1985). This book was signed to press on April 20, and was apparently prepared by the Sector of Ideological-Political Problems of the Contemporary Workers' Movement of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement [Zagladin (1985; 18)]. Zhilin's April, 1984, Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir article appears as Chapter 5, while Shakhnazarov's May, 1984, Voprosy filosofii article is reproduced as Chapter 9. For information on these two articles, see Note 160 in Chapter 8.

4. In contrast, the earlier articles by Zhilin and Shakhnazarov had printings of 10,000 and 27,000 copies, respectively.

5. On Gorbachev's openness to new ideas on foreign policy, see the discussion in Chapter 8.

MEMO was one such institution clearly "testing the winds" in the wake of Gorbachev's accession to the post of general secretary. Recall from Chapter 8 that the April, 1985, issue of Memo contained two extraordinarily pronounced pieces of advocacy in favor of altering the conceptual bases of the USSR's approach to foreign and security policy. See Lukov and Tomashevskiy (1985), and Velikhov and Kokoshin (1985). These articles, which appeared as the first two in that issue of the journal, were signed to press on March 18, that is, seven days after Gorbachev's election as General Secretary. This sequence of events strongly suggests that the Institute had delayed publication of the articles until Gorbachev was in power.

6. These comments came in the opening moments of Gorbachev's address to the French Parliament. See Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 2; 460).


9. Gorbachev, for example, had faithfully reiterated the "principle" in his speech to the April, 1985, Central Committee plenum. Gorbachev (1985a; 18).

10. See, for example, Gorbachev's November 27, 1985, report to the Supreme Soviet on the results of the Geneva summit meeting. Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 3; 100, 108). Here, Gorbachev spent several minutes discussing various global problems and the need for joint and unified efforts to resolve them. In contrast, his comments on sufficiency were brief and somewhat confusing. He first linked the level of sufficiency to the maintenance of a "reliable defense," and then declared that it should be much lower than present force levels. In this speech, Gorbachev again failed to employ the phrase "equality and equal security."

11. In his speech to French parliamentarians on October 3, Gorbachev hinted at the USSR's willingness to use on-site inspections by suggesting that the verification provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which include the possibility of on-site inspections, be applied to a treaty banning chemical weapons. See Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 2; 464). Shevardnadze, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in late October, made a similar hint, declaring that the USSR was willing to consider, in addition to national technical means, any "mutually agreed upon [verification] procedures." Shevardnadze (1985). By January, 1986, Gorbachev was openly stating the USSR's readiness to discuss on-site inspections or "any other additional measures" to verify a nuclear arms accord. Gorbachev (1986c). For a general overview of the USSR's changing attitude toward verification during 1985-86, see Glickham (1986b).

Yevgeniy Primakov has since revealed that Gorbachev, in private comments delivered to Soviet arms-control experts at the November, 1985, Geneva summit meeting, stressed the importance of relaxing the Soviet Union's intransigence on the issue of verification. See Primakov (1988a).

12. See, for example, "Yadernye vzryvy - pod zapret" (1985), an editorial published in Pravda.


14. Gorbachev (1986b; 39). Gorbachev discussed two global problems: environmental degradation and resource exhaustion. At one point in his remarks, Gorbachev seemed to hint that he favored a class-based approach to understanding global problems, citing Engels to the effect that such problems were aggravated by the "blind game of market forces." He followed this comment, however, with a strong affirmation of the "common-to-all-mankind" -- that is, non-class -- nature of global problems. Gorbachev (1986b; 39).
15. Gorbachev (1986b; 41). The importance of the comments on interdependence was heightened by the fact that they were placed as one of the concluding remarks of this section of Gorbachev's report. The section itself was entitled "The Contemporary World: Basic Tendencies and Contradictions."

16. Gorbachev (1986b; 90). To quote Gorbachev: The USSR favors "restricting military potential[s] to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. But the character and level of this limit continues to be limited by the positions and actions of the USA, [and] its bloc partners." Several minutes later, Gorbachev again mentioned sufficiency, but in this case did not link its level to the external threat. Instead, he simply declared a need to lower the "military potentials of states to the limits of reasonable sufficiency." Gorbachev (1986b; 98).

17. For Shevardnadze's address to the Congress, see Shevardnadze (1986a). Shevardnadze also failed to mention the principle in an important speech he delivered on the anniversary of Lenin's birth in April. See Shevardnadze (1986b).

18. In a speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early May of 1986 that was not published until mid-1988, Gorbachev in effect denounced the principle by declaring it was wrong for the USSR to maintain armed forces as strong militarily as any potential coalition of antagonistic powers. Parrot (1988; 10). Also see Glickham (1986a; 17). For earlier Soviet definitions of this principle, see Note 11 in Chapter 8, and the accompanying text.

19. See, for example, Gorbachev's comments on sufficiency in Vladivostok in late July, where, with no elaboration, he applied the concept to conventional arms control in Asia. Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 32). Shevardnadze was equally vague on the notion of sufficiency in a speech at the UN in late September. Shevardnadze (1986c; 12).

20. Gorbachev here hinted at the danger of accidental nuclear war by noting that the growing sophistication of nuclear weapons could complicate "political decisions on questions of war and peace" during a crisis. Gorbachev (1986b; 86-87). He had made similar comments in a Supreme Soviet speech the previous November. Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 3; 92). Gorbachev was coming close to overturning a long-standing Marxist-Leninist assumption -- that wars could only start due to a conscious decision taken by inherently aggressive capitalist powers. This assumption would in fact be overturned several months later when a Central Committee consultant, writing in Kommunist, declared that a nuclear war could begin and end "without the taking of political decisions." See Zhulin (1986; 120-22).

21. Gorbachev (1986b; 87).
22. Gorbachev (1986b; 88-89). Gorbachev clearly wanted to communicate to his audience that a radical break with past foreign-policy practice was needed:

Of course, it is not possible to solve the problem of international security with one or two peace offensives, even very intensive ones ... Continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with the simple repetition of what has been done before, especially in the approaches to problems that have been mounting up.

23. Gorbachev (1986b; 88). Several months later, while on a visit to Vladivostok, Gorbachev would even more clearly indicate the empirical approach that lay behind the new thinking. He noted, in particular, that the new thinking was "not a scheme which can be applied to any situation, rather it is principles and a method that are guided [opiravushchivesya] by experience." Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 26).

24. For the resolutions, see "Rezolyutsii XXVII s'ezda ... " (1986). Also see the analysis in Glickham (1986a; 5).

25. This campaign included articles in Komsomol'skaya pravda, Kommunist and, especially, Pravda. In Pravda, see, for example, Ovchinnikov (1986); in Kommunist, see "O zhurnale ... " (1986; 8-9) and "Novoye politicheskoye ... " (1986). Also see the various articles cited in Glickham (1986a; Notes 12 and 20). As was seen in earlier chapters, this pattern of central press behavior had been a sign of public agenda change in the Brezhnev era as well.

26. See Shevardnadze (1986b) and, especially, Dobrynin (1986a). Shevardnadze was Foreign Minister; the speech cited here was published on the front page of Pravda. Dobrynin was head of the Central Committee's International Department; the article in question was a lead article in one of the June issues of Kommunist.

27. Gorbachev (1986b; 30-41).

28. By the fall of 1987, however, Gorbachev would switch and begin to employ a more empirical approach to the Soviet understanding of capitalism. See Chapter 10.

29. Gorbachev had little interesting to say on verification in his report to the 27th Party Congress. In fact, he sounded much like Brezhnev when he declared that "disarmament without verification [kontrol'] is impossible, but verification without disarmament also makes no sense." Gorbachev (1986b; 90).

30. Gorbachev (1986e). This was a clear concession to the US position on this question.
31. For one example of this insistence that verification be treated last in the negotiation process, see Timerbayev (1983; 98). When he wrote this, Timerbayev was a deputy head of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organizations Department.

32. Shabanov (1986). To my knowledge, this was the first article to appear in the central press that was entirely devoted to verification issues.

33. The article also showed, however, that the military was not entirely happy with the new approach to verification. While endorsing the Gorbachev changes, Shabanov also managed to hint that the old approach was not all bad. He accomplished this by reciting almost word for word a 1981 Brezhnev declaration to the effect that national technical means should be accorded “indisputable priority” over other types of verification. Shabanov, however, did not attribute the statement to Brezhnev. For the 1981 Brezhnev statement, see Brezhnev (1981b).

34. Gorbachev (1986f; 2). These comments came in a speech to cultural figures from various countries. As Stephen Shenfield has noted, Gorbachev, in citing Lenin as the source for this new understanding of the correlation of class and non-class values, was taking great liberties with what Lenin had actually said. Shenfield (1987; 46).

At the Party congress eight months earlier, Gorbachev had only vaguely hinted that the then prevailing view on the correlation of class and non-class values needed to be revised. See Gorbachev (1986b; 41).

35. See Dobrynin (1986b; 23-24) and Ligachev (1986; 3). While seemingly content at this point to support Gorbachev’s emphasis on the priority of non-class values, Ligachev would publicly denounce this position two years later. On this episode, see Checkel (1988; 7-8).

36. For examples of Gorbachev’s reiteration of the key themes of the new thinking during the summer and early fall of 1986, see Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 3; 489-494) [a July 14 speech in Moscow to an international meeting of scientists]; Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 19-33) [a July 28 speech in Vladivostok]; and Gorbachev (1986d; 4-5) [an October 1 speech in Moscow to an all-union meeting of social scientists].

For statements by other members of the leadership emphasizing the need for new thinking during this period, see, in addition to the sources already cited, Shevardnadze (1986c; 4, 12) [a September 23 speech to the United Nations General Assembly]; Dobrynin (1986b; 15-16, 23-24) [an article in one of the October issues of Kommunist]; Ligachev (1986; 3) [a November 6 speech in Moscow on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution]; and Yakovlev (1986; 3) [an article in one of the November issues of Kommunist].

38. For a detailed review of the differences between Gorbachev and Yegor Ligachev over various domestic socio-economic and ideological issues during 1985-87, see Harris (1989; 11-26). Ligachev, at this point, was the most vocal conservative critic of Gorbachev’s policies within the leadership.

39. This information comes from the "Information Reports" published in the central press after each plenum.

40. For evidence of Yakovlev’s close ties to Gorbachev, see Chapter 8. Primakov succeeded Yakovlev as head of IMEMO in December, 1985. This appointment as well as Primakov’s ties to Gorbachev, which first became apparent in the fall of 1985, will be discussed below.

41. For IMEMO’s promotion of these issues during 1983-85, see Chapter 8 above.

42. Also recall Georgiy Arbatov’s claim that throughout 1983-85 Gorbachev was meeting with academic specialists to discuss/debate issues of foreign and domestic policy. See Chapter 8.

43. As will be seen in Chapter 10, a similar combination of institutional expertise and personal access would play a decisive role in leading Gorbachev to place a fundamental revision of the Soviet image of capitalism on the public agenda in late 1987.

44. As noted in Chapter 8, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat was one potential source of civilian expertise on security issues. The Committee, however, was dominated by physical scientists who were well suited to produce technical analyses of the US strategic defense initiative or of the impact on Soviet nuclear-weapons technology of a test moratorium (both of which they had in fact done). They lacked the kind of expertise needed, however, to conduct studies of security issues less technical in nature -- for example, the balance of conventional forces.

45. Recall from Chapter 8 how IMEMO analysts during the early 1980s were content simply to repeat -- and not challenge -- the official line on the principle of equality and equal security and on verification. Aleksey Arbatov, the one analyst at IMEMO with some genuine knowledge of security affairs, could not by himself serve as an alternative source of expertise on military issues. As will be seen below and in Chapter 10, two facts limited the value of his strategic analyses to Soviet policymakers: (1) his analytic strengths were only on one particular subset of security issues (strategic nuclear weapons and policy); and (2) through at least the end of 1986, he appeared to have virtually no information on or knowledge about Soviet weapons and security policies.

46. An alternative explanation for Gorbachev’s reticence on the issue of sufficiency would argue that a newly elected general secretary, who was still at the preliminary stages of consolidating his power, would be hesitant to challenge the prerogatives of an influential political actor.
such as the Soviet military. This would explain Gorbachev’s hesitancy on an issue like sufficiency, which so directly affected the military’s interests. There are several problems with this explanation. First, it fails to account for why Gorbachev was willing to challenge numerous ideological conservatives within the Party apparatus by raising such concepts as interdependence, global problems and the priority of non-class values. After all, within the Central Committee -- the body to which Gorbachev was ultimately responsible -- conservatives of this type were a far larger group than the military. Second, there were other signs that Gorbachev was willing to challenge the military’s interests: his decision not to promote to full Politburo membership Marshal Sergey Sokolov, Ustinov’s replacement as defense minister; the June, 1985, ouster from the Politburo of Grigory Romanov, a strong supporter of military and defense-industrial interests; and Gorbachev’s advocacy, beginning in early 1986, of mutual security ensured primarily by political means.

47. Shevardnadze (1986b; 2).

48. The unit was headed by Vladimir Shustov. On the center, see, especially, the comments by the then Rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy: Peresypkin (1988). Also see the sources cited in Chapter 7, Note 19.

49. On this, see Van Oudenaren (1990; 30).

50. The top leadership was not only interested in fostering expertise on security issues at academic institutions like IMEMO. During this same period, new arms-control sections were set up in the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee’s International Department. See Chapter 7.

51. Dobrynin (1986a; 26). According to Dobrynin: "The Party and government expect from Soviet scientists [uchenye] -- especially those who study international relations, foreign policy and military-political problems -- new, serious works. Life itself demands that this entire branch of science be raised to a qualitatively new level."

52. Dobrynin (1986a; 27-28). Dobrynin went on to list additional research topics that were primarily for physical scientists. (Here, he included topics such as the technical aspects of the destruction of nuclear weapons.)

53. The citations here are to the Kommunist version. The version of the speech published in book form contained one very curious addition. It was a paragraph on military doctrines that strongly hinted at the need to revise Soviet military doctrine as well as other unspecified "concepts," basing them on "defensive principles." See Fedoseyev (1986; 32). This book was signed to press on November 12, 1986, approximately six months after the conference itself. This addition to Dobrynin’s original address probably was, as TASS used to declare, no accident. Beginning early in 1987, numerous Soviet commentaries would address the issue of a revised Soviet military doctrine. See, for example, the
comments by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Varennikov.
Varennikov (1987; 11-12).

54. According to Radio Liberty’s Red Archive, Primakov was first
publicly identified as head of IMEMO on December 1. Yakovlev moved to
the Central Committee apparatus, becoming head of its Propaganda
Department.

55. Like Inozemtsev, Primakov was a full member of the Academy of
Sciences, having been elected in 1979. For positive evaluations of
Primakov’s scholarly credentials, see Hough (1986) 63, 245, 255 and
Polsky (1987; 115-16).

56. Primakov, who was born in 1929, had spent the early part of his
career in the central media: during the 1950s and early 1960s, he worked
for the State Committee for Radio and Television; between 1962 and 1966,
he was a deputy editor of Pravda; and from 1966 to 1970, he was a Pravda
correspondent based in the Middle East. After his stint at IMEMO during
the mid-1970s, he moved to the Institute of Oriental Studies, where he
was director from 1977-85. Most of his writing prior to the mid-1980s
had focused on the developing world. For this and other background on
Primakov, see Andrey Gromyko, et al. (1985, Volume II; 421-22).

57. Also see Note 49, above and the accompanying text.

58. The rubric was entitled "Foreign Meetings, Interviews," and featured
various Western academics. The two full-length articles by prominent
Americans were Lester Thurow’s in issue No.10 and Robert McNamara’s in
issue No.12 of 1986. Judging from their content, the articles’ purpose
was to expose the journal’s readership to unorthodox (from a Soviet
perspective) views. See Turou (1986) and McNamara (1986). The
reader’s questionnaire was published in the No.10 issue. It asked for
reader input on the kind of articles and rubrics the journal should
carry. See "Anketa" (1986).

59. This will be discussed below.

60. Interviews.

61. In writing with this dual purpose in mind, Primakov was clearly
returning to the kind of behavior exhibited by Inozemtsev. In contrast,
the articles Yakovlev published while director of the Institute served
primarily the first purpose (promoting official policy).

62. Primakov, for example, was part of Gorbachev’s entourage at the
November, 1985, Geneva summit. For further evidence of his status as a
Gorbachev adviser, see Lee (1985).

63. See Primakov (1986e) [published on January 22] and Primakov (1986a)
[published on March 17]. Not surprisingly, Primakov was made a
candidate member of the Central Committee at the Congress.

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64. See Primakov (1986d; 85), where he directly stated that capitalism and socialism were connected by "the existence of a single world [vsemirnoye] economy," and especially Primakov (1986b; 4). The latter source, the lead article in the May, 1986, issue of Memo, defined the Institute's research agenda in light of the 27th Party Congress. The very first topic Primakov raised was the further study of what he called the law-governed regularities (zakonomernosti) of the world (vsemirnoye) economy. As seen in earlier chapters, to describe a concept in such terms was to indicate that it was a reality to which the USSR (and any other country) must adapt.

65. For the previous (1960s, early 1970s) Institute interest and advocacy on this issue, see Chapters 3-6 above. During the early 1980s, most Institute researchers were simply content to repeat the more tepid of the formulations they had used in the late 1960s -- discussing the existence of different "tendencies," "splits" and "realistically thinking" politicians within the capitalist ruling elite. For examples of such commentary, see Inozemtsev (1981; 17-18), Babich (1982; 141), Lukov and Tomasevskiy (1983; 10), Ivanov (1983; 31), Shemyatenkov (1984; 9) and Razmerov (1984a; 17, 20-21). One notable exception was the analysis in Lukov (1982), a book review that went into some detail on "the process of formation" of American foreign policy.

66. See Primakov (1986b; 6-9), Primakov (1986c; 104-107) and Primakov (1986d; 86).


68. Primakov (1986c; 109). Primakov first stated the standard orthodoxy: capitalism inevitably begets militarism. He then, however, introduced a qualifier: "But this unarguable proposition is not identical to the idea that capitalism cannot exist without it." Primakov did not elaborate on this statement. As will be seen in Chapter 10, this cautious hint was a foretaste of much bolder advocacy in 1987.

69. Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 20-21). At another point (p.20), he declared: Left to its own volition, capitalism "will never begin to produce children's toys instead of rockets. Such is its nature." Also see his speech in Khabarovsk on July 31. Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 37, 39).

70. He did not, for example, see the military-industrial complex as "all powerful." Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 21).

71. During 1986, Yakovlev continued his meteoric rise through the ranks of the CPSU. In March, he was simultaneously made a full member and secretary of the Central Committee.


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73. The period actually covered is October, 1985, through December, 1986.

74. See, for example, Osipov (1986; 21, 23-24), Razmerov (1986; passim), Kortunov (1986; 16, 20, 22-24), Fedorov and Vladimirov (1986; passim), and, especially, Bykov (1986b; passim). Several scholars not affiliated with the Institute also published articles in Memo promoting the conceptual elements of Gorbachev’s new foreign-policy agenda. See especially Frolov (1986b), Krasin (1986; 3-4, 11-12), Shakhnazarov (1986; passim) and Petrovskiy (1986; passim). The above sources addressed one or more of the following topics: mutual security, interdependence, global problems and values common to all mankind. Most at some point explicitly linked their analysis (and advocacy) to Gorbachev’s report at the 27th Party Congress.

75. Primakov (1986b; 4).

76. Officially, this was the draft of the new edition of the Third Party Program.

77. "Obzushdayem preds’ezdovskiye ... " (1986; 31). The other correction IMEMO suggested was in the draft’s definition of the military-industrial complex. This will be discussed below. There are two important points to make about the above-cited source. One was simply the fact that it had appeared. This kind of institutional advocacy -- where IMEMO spoke as a whole -- had not been evident in the early 1980s. The report was in fact very similar to the advocacy-type editorials Memo had published under Inozemtsev’s leadership in the late 1960s. The second point concerns the issues on which IMEMO chose to introduce corrections. Both issues were close to its core areas of expertise (conceptual aspects of international relations and the political economy of capitalism).

The practice of organizations (and individuals) proposing changes to Party or State documents and laws in itself is nothing out of the ordinary. During a 1983 debate over educational reform, for example, numerous organizations proposed changes to a draft law on education. Author’s research. In the years covered by this study (1964-72, 1981-88), however, such activity was new for IMEMO.

78. Bunkina and Petrov (1986; passim). Bunkina was a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee; Petrov worked at IMEMO. The authors managed to quote Gorbachev four different times on the reality of interdependence! They then used the notion to legitimate the existence of a world economy that operated on “common laws of development” for its socialist and capitalist parts. Bunkina and Petrov (1986; 52). Also see Slavinskiy (1985).

79. This rapid response contrasted markedly with the Institute’s virtually non-existent reaction to another issue that was being consistently raised by the political leadership: reasonable sufficiency of military potentials. See below.


82. For an excellent review of this entire series, see Taylor (1990; 10-18).

83. "Obsuzhdayem ... " (1986; 30). The draft defined the complex as:

Monopolies that produce weapons, generals, the state bureaucracy and ideological apparatus, and militarized science.

The Institute argued that the phrase "tied to them" (that is, to the monopolies and generals) should be added directly after "apparatus." This addition would obviously produce a more narrowed definition of the complex. In the very next issue of Memo, the Institute again argued in favor of a narrow definition of the complex. See "Nauchnaya zhizn': Gosudarstvenno ... " (1986; 136-37).

84. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoy ... " (1986; 566).

85. "Po-Leninski zhit' ... " (1986).

86. This theory held that militarism and militarization of the economy were inevitable consequences of imperialism, the last and highest stage of capitalism. See the entries "Imperializm," in Frolov (1986a; 161-62), and "Militarizm," in Akhromeyev (1986; 443).

87. "Obsuzhdayem ... " (1986; 30).

88. Ivanov (1986a; 77). Specifically, he declared that militarism was in no way the "only and fatal argument [argument]" of the monopoly bourgeoisie who governed capitalist countries. Writing in that same month in the journal of the USA Institute, Ivanov again cautiously asked whether capitalism could develop without militarism. See Ivanov (1986b; 22-23). This was the only "revisionist" discussion of militarism published by SShA during 1986.

89. At this point, Krasin was one of the deputy heads of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee. As was noted in Chapter 8, Krasin had previously published other unorthodox articles in Memo. See, in particular, Krasin (1984). I should also reiterate a point made earlier: CPSU intellectuals such as Krasin often published articles in the academic press that expressed their own personal views, and not those of the organization for which they worked (in Krasin's case, a Central Committee research institute). The writing of Georgiy Shakhnazarov would be another example.
90. Krasin (1986; 6-7).

91. Frolov (1986b). Frolov was a deputy chair of the section of the conference that discussed global problems. See Fedoseyev (1986; 6). Recall that during the early 1980s, Frolov headed a scientific council that in part was devoted to the study of global problems.

92. "Obsuzhdayem ... " (1986; 30). On the problem of war and peace, the Institute was content simply to declare that there could be no victors in global war or the arms race.

93. Primakov (1986b; 11-12).

94. Primakov (1986b; 13).

95. Primakov (1986b; 6-8).

96. See Primakov (1986a) and (1986c-e).

97. Partan (1990; 2). This was a considerably enlarged version of the Disarmament Section established within the Institute in late 1983.

98. See the discussion of his 1984 book and Memo article in Chapter 8 above. Arbatov had also headed the Disarmament Section.

99. Recall from earlier chapters that both in the late 1960s and early 1980s, sections (seksiya) were smaller organizational units than departments (otdel) within IMEMO. Also see the personnel figures for various sections and departments at the Institute, as reported in Polsky (1987; 29-36). The Institu' 's original military-affairs section -- created in 1969 -- was disband ed sometime in 1986 or 1987. Partan (1990; 2).

100. See Chapter 8.

101. Kingdon (1984; 183) is especially instructive on the crucial importance of such political variables. Also see the discussion in Chapter 1 above.

102. One senior researcher at the Institute saw an additional factor behind the establishment of the new department and, especially, the appointment of Aleksey Arbatov as its head: the close personal relationship between IMEMO head Primakov and Arbatov's father, Georgiy Arbatov (head of the USA Institute). This researcher also claimed there was no resistance within IMEMO to the creation of this new unit. Interview. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, however, there is clear evidence that not everybody at the Institute was happy to see the new department established.

103. Arbatov and Baranovskiy (1986).
104. For examples of these overviews, see Baranovskiy (1981), Astaf'yev (1982) and Makarevskiy (1984). Also see the discussion in Chapter 8.

105. Arbatov and Baranovskiy (1986; 3-6).

106. Arbatov and Baranovskiy (1986; 6-12). Their sources included: SIPRI yearbooks, the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Nuclear Weapons Databook (Volume 1), Scientific American articles, congressional hearings and several other books (for example, a 1984 Brookings book on ballistic missile defenses).

107. The article correctly noted that most nuclear tests are used for upgrading and modernizing nuclear weapons.

108. The argument here is not that the Arbatov/Baranovskiy analysis could match the quality of military-technical sophistication of, say, a General Staff study. Rather, the two men provided the type of information and analysis that was previously found only in military studies.

109. The one fairly sophisticated Institute article on nuclear testing (by Arbatov and Baranovskiy) was surely no match for the probably much more numerous and technically literate General Staff studies arguing that a continuation of the test ban would seriously harm Soviet national security.

110. This information comes from a seminar given by Vitaliy Gol’danskiy, then a member of the Committee, at MIT in the fall of 1987. Recall that this Committee was dominated by physical scientists, not the social scientists who are the subject of this study.


113. Rodionov and Sagdayev (1986; passim).

114. The critical Western analyst might argue that Rodionov and Sagdayev had done nothing more than "crib" analyses conducted by the US Government’s Office of Technology Assessment or the Union of Concerned Scientists. This may be so. The point here, however, is that wherever the information came from, it was information (and analysis) of a qualitatively different type than ever before seen by the readership of Memo.

115. Balyev (1986). I have not been able fully to identify Balyev, but as the discussion below will make clear, he appears to have been a military officer unaffiliated with the Institute.

117. In mid-1989, Voyennaya mys' \textquotesingle would lose its semi-classified status when restrictions on its distribution were removed.


120. The researcher was Danil Proektor, a former military officer who had worked at the Institute for a number of years. His rather vague definition of sufficiency went as follows:

\begin{quote}
Reasonable sufficiency is most of all the correspondence of military potentials of states to political conditions in the world and its corresponding regions, both in a given period and also in the foreseeable future. It is evident that it is one thing the quantity of forces needed in peace time, [it is] another [the quantity of forces] needed in periods of tension, of international crises and conflicts.
\end{quote}

See Fedoseyev (1986; 128). Given this not terribly helpful definition, one would have to agree with Proektor that there was a need for "profound study of the concept of sufficiency." It is useful to compare Proektor's advocacy here with the Institute's advocacy on issues closer to its core areas of expertise -- for example, the concept of a single world economy. On the former, the advocacy was by one person and it came in a book (press run of 8,500). On the latter, it was by the Institute as a whole (the "collective") and came in a Memo article (press run of 27,000). See "Obsuzhdayem preds'ezdovskiye ... " (1986; 31).

121. The four were Yevgeniy Primakov, Yevgeniy Bugrov, Aleksey Nikonov and Oleg Bykov. See their comments in Fedoseyev (1986; 112-32).

122. See "Po-Leninski zhit' ... " (1986; 13) and Kozyrev (1986; 37), which both simply repeat Gorbachev's vague comments on sufficiency at the Party Congress.

123. Lukin (1986; 72) mentions sufficiency in the context of conventional arms control in Asia and seems to suggest that it can be achieved through proportionate reductions of Soviet and Chinese ground forces.

124. Recall that Gorbachev had stopped using "the principle" in the late fall of 1985. For examples of Institute commentary that continued to use this principle, see Osipov (1986; 24), Lebedev (1986; 136), Bykov (1986b; 32) and Razmerov (1986; 7).
125. Bykov (1986a; 14) and Bykov (1986b; 31). Lukov (1985; 108-109) simplistically attacked the proposed Midgetman ICBM as destabilizing due to its small size and mobility, and ignored the stabilizing effect of de-mirving the US ICBM force. He concluded by approvingly citing Vitaliy Zhurkin (a deputy head of the USA Institute at that point) to the effect that only the full rejection of nuclear weapons could be a "really effective measure of stabilization"! Kozyrev (1986; 40) discussed a joint, synchronized deployment of strategic defensive systems by the USSR and the US, and then confusingly argued that such joint actions would undermine "strategic stability" because in any outbreak of hostilities the attacking side would "win" (vyigryvala).

126. Semeyko (1986b; 145). Semeyko is a former military officer.

127. V. Kortunov (1986; 19) and Istyagin (1986; 142).

128. There had been, for example, a series of commentaries in Foreign Affairs -- a journal regularly cited by Institute scholars -- criticizing the early nuclear winter scenarios. In Foreign Affairs, see "Comment and Correspondence" (1984), Schneider and Thompson (1986) and "Comment and Correspondence" (1986).

129. V. Kortunov (1986; 19).


131. Abarenkov, Kalamanov and Kokoshin (1986). Abarenkov, in particular, seems to have developed considerable expertise on various issues relevant to US arms-control policy. See, for example, Abarenkov (1984), where he examines the role of the Standing Consultative Commission (among other topics); and Chapter 5 in his 1987 book [Abarenkov (1987)], where he provides a detailed overview of ACDA's role in the US arms-control process.


133. See Above.


135. Semeyko (1986a; 80).

136. See above.

137. See Gerasev (1986). Recall that Gerassimov was one of the ISKAN researchers who had been working with the Committee of Soviet Scientists. Also see Bubnova (1986), which provides a solid overview of the 1985 two-part Daedalus series on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
138. Mil’shteyn (1986). This lead article appeared approximately three months after a Central Committee staffer had written an article in Kommunist that legitimated further research and discussion of accidental nuclear war scenarios. See Zhilin (1986).

139. Karaganov (1986). In a first for a Soviet social science researcher, Karaganov included a discussion of anti-tactical ballistic missile systems in his analysis (pp. 38-42). Karaganov’s evident expertise was in European security matters. See, for example, his very competent overview of US/NATO military strategy in Europe, printed as Chapter 10 in Yu. Davydov (1986).

140. See, respectively, Karabanov (1986) and Chapis & Podberezkin (1986). The technical sophistication of Karabanov’s analysis is such that it could have been published in a military journal. At one point in his analysis, he even reproduces a schematic diagram of the B-1 taken from the Soviet military journal Foreign Military Review.

141. Andrey Kokoshin was perhaps the one exception.
Chapter 10: 1987 - The Process Expands

During 1987, the process changed in several ways that are consistent with insights drawn from the policy-cycle framework. First, over the course of the year various institutions became more aggressive in defending their interests.\(^1\) This was so because the process, after having seen a series of issues placed on the public agenda, was now clearly moving into its option-formulation stage. The outcome of debates during this latter stage could directly affect the interests and resources of various organizations. Second, the Gorbachev leadership, apparently recognizing that the dynamics of option formulation were different from those of agenda setting, sent several very clear messages that it now wanted various institutions to develop policy options on a range of issues.

Official Participants

Politburo Level. During 1987, there was an important change in the overall context within which the new political thinking was being elaborated. This change saw elite commentary on foreign-policy become both more specific and in some cases more radical. The increase in specificity could be attributed to the logical development of the policy cycle.\(^2\) As Gorbachev himself noted in late September, 1986: "After outlining our general goals at the [27th Party] Congress, it has become necessary to give specific form \(\text{konktratizirovat'}\) to them."\(^3\)

The growing radicalism seemed to stem from a new-found appreciation by Gorbachev and others of the extent of the reforms needed to revitalize Soviet society and the economy,\(^4\) and how the success of those
reforms depended on a calm international environment.\textsuperscript{5}

Gorbachev continued during 1987 to be the most forceful and consistent articulator of the new thinking among the elites. Throughout the year, he returned to, and in some cases elaborated upon, themes first placed on the public agenda in 1985-86. At the most general level, he reiterated at several points the inductive, empirical basis of the new thinking.\textsuperscript{6} By returning to the themes of interdependence and global problems, he re-emphasized the revised nature of the (new) Soviet world view.\textsuperscript{7} Here, in several cases, he went beyond what he had said earlier -- for example, using the notion of interdependence to legitimize the idea of a common European home.\textsuperscript{8} Gorbachev also returned to the question of security -- once again declaring that it could only be mutual and stressing its non-military components.\textsuperscript{9}

The General Secretary also reiterated that in the correlation between class and non-class (that is, "common to all mankind") values, the priority must go to the latter.\textsuperscript{10} In one case, he used this notion to justify an important revision to Soviet revolutionary theory.

In particular, Gorbachev suggested that the class-based mission of socialism to assist revolutionary movements should be subordinated to the common-to-all-mankind value of maintaining peace. He accomplished this by arguing that the "right to a social status quo" was "an exclusively internal matter" for each country to decide upon its own, and, furthermore, that the maintenance of this "sovereign right" was an "obligatory condition" for maintaining peace and international security.\textsuperscript{11} Previously, the Soviet leadership had insisted it was the mission of socialist countries to assist those forces in the non-
socialist part of the world that were striving to change the
(explosive) social status quo.\textsuperscript{12}

During 1987, Gorbachev reiterated that the USSR had changed its
approach to verification issues. After opening the door for an
agreement on nuclear weapons in Europe (by delinking this issue from
SDI),\textsuperscript{13} Gorbachev made clear that the new approach to verification
should apply to the emerging INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces)
agreement. In particular, he stated that any such agreement should
include provisions for on-site inspections.\textsuperscript{14}

An additional sign that a new approach to verification had been
placed on the public agenda was the extraordinary recantation issued by
a former Foreign Ministry official who had earlier offered one of the
most clear-cut endorsements of the old approach. Early in 1987, this
official, Roland Timerbayev, published an article on verification in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In it, Timerbayev essentially argued
against many of the points he had made in a 1983 book.\textsuperscript{15} His
acknowledgment of the need for intrusive measures of verification (such
as on-site inspections), for example, was a virtual repudiation of the
position he had articulated in the book.

On the question of sufficiency, Gorbachev and other elites became
much more specific. Beginning early in 1987, Gorbachev began to suggest
the concept of sufficiency was more than a simple replacement for the
"principle of equality and equal security," and advanced more specific
criteria for determining Soviet force levels under the concept.\textsuperscript{16} For
example, in February he indicated that a sufficient level of armaments
was one that excluded the possibility of conducting surprise attacks.\textsuperscript{17}
Several weeks later, he suggested that the principle of sufficiency would allow the USSR to avoid copying -- "unthinkingly and automatically" -- every new weapon system the West produced.\(^{18}\) By early April, Gorbachev was indicating that sufficiency was a level of armaments necessary for the resolution of "defensive tasks" alone.\(^{19}\)

The above commentary implicitly suggested that the USSR would have to revise both its military strategy and the structure of its armed forces to reach the level of sufficiency. By September, Gorbachev was explicitly making this point. In a major statement on issues of international security, he defined sufficiency as meaning armed forces that were based on a defensive strategy and were structurally incapable of offensive operations.\(^{20}\) In making this statement, Gorbachev was simply giving more concrete form to the definition of sufficiency contained in a major Warsaw Pact declaration made three months earlier.\(^{21}\)

The Soviet military quickly responded to these more elaborate formulations of sufficiency by offering the kind of specific definitions one would expect during this stage of option formulation.\(^{22}\) One common element united the military’s analyses of sufficiency at this point: None defined it in a way that would have required a major restructuring of the armed forces or the adoption of a purely defensive strategy.\(^{23}\) This was not terribly surprising since it was clearly not in the Defense Ministry’s interests to see its forces restructured on defensive principles. Such a change would entail, among other things, a major reorientation of the Ministry’s traditional emphasis on offensive operations and a probable reduction in the resources allotted to it.\(^{24}\)
The year 1987 also saw a truly extraordinary effort on the part of several elites to bring actors such as IMEMO into the option formulation on various aspects of the new thinking, including sufficiency. The key role here was played by Aleksandr Yakovlev. In series of speeches, he urged Soviet social scientists to avoid ideological dogma (the deductive method) in their research on the contemporary world, and instead utilize a more empirical approach. In this effort to mobilize the social sciences, Yakovlev went far beyond the many previous Soviet leaders who had simply called for the "creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory." For example, in a November speech to a group of educators Yakovlev declared that any social science proceeding from earlier established ideals to life was "condemned to emptiness." The "only effective path of research is to go from life to ideals." If one understands "life" as the facts and "ideals" as ideological dogma, then the essence of Yakovlev's approach is clear.

One speech more than any other made it clear that Yakovlev (as well as Gorbachev and others in the leadership) wanted the social sciences to re-examine a host of issues. This address, delivered to the Social Sciences Section of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences in mid-April, was in the Soviet context revolutionary. In the speech, Yakovlev tore down one dogma after another on matters of domestic and foreign policy -- for example, on the nature of "contradictions" in the contemporary world and on the allowable forms of property ownership under socialism. In a fascinating contrast with previous practice, he offered no ready answers in place of the old dogma. Instead, he simply appealed for more research. It was no accident, as TASS used to
declare, that various portions of this speech were reprinted in
Kommunist, Pravda and Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR (the main journal of
the Academy of Sciences).

In the speech, Yakovlev made several specific points on issues of
foreign and security policy. At one level, he again reiterated that an
excessively deductive approach in the social sciences had hindered the
USSR from fully comprehending the changes occurring in the world.\(^3\)
More specifically, he outlined several research tasks for Soviet
"scientists-internationalists."\(^3\) First, Yakovlev called on them to
give operational meaning to the concept of "sufficiency of military
potentials."\(^3\) In addition, he urged social scientists to analyze --
"jointly with military specialists" -- Soviet military doctrine.\(^3\) This
amounted to a direct call for civilian research on topics formerly only
in the domain of the Soviet military.\(^3\)

Beyond the above, the various themes of the new thinking also found
reflection in other elite-level commentary. The central press, more so
than in 1986, began forcefully to propagandize the basic categories
(interdependence, global problems, mutual security, values common to all
mankind, and the like) of the new approach in foreign policy.\(^3\) In
addition, a number of elites -- aside from Gorbachev -- continued to
promote various elements of the new political thinking.\(^3\) Others, such
as Yegor' Ligachev, had virtually nothing to say on issues of foreign
policy.\(^3\) One member of the elite -- Minister of Defense Dmitriy
Yazov -- however, did begin to hint at resistance to the new thinking as
its implications for the Soviet military became more clear.\(^3\)

The one major addition to the public foreign-policy agenda in 1987
involved another of the basic assumptions informing Soviet policy: the official image of capitalism. Throughout 1985-86, Gorbachev had articulated an image of capitalism very much in keeping with the one officially promulgated in the bad old days of stagnation (kastron).\textsuperscript{40} Through the first half of 1987, Gorbachev continued to portray capitalism in gloomy terms, although his language was not quite as harsh as it had been in 1986.\textsuperscript{41}

In November, however, there was a dramatic shift in Gorbachev's commentary on capitalism. The setting was a major speech, given on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, where Gorbachev raised a series of "difficult questions."\textsuperscript{42}

* Could external factors somehow constrain imperialism's inherently aggressive nature?
* Could capitalism free itself of militarism, could it function economically and develop without it?
* Could capitalism function without neocolonialism, without its exploitation of the developing world?\textsuperscript{43}

While Gorbachev began by suggesting that only "life would give answers" to these questions, he in fact answered them all with a tentative "yes."\textsuperscript{44}

In the Soviet context, the first question (and Gorbachev's answer to it) did not mark a complete break with prevailing orthodoxy. Soviet leaders since Khrushchev's time had suggested that imperialism's innate aggressiveness could be restrained by external factors, but the factor they typically noted was the growing power of capitalism's class antagonist: the world socialist community.\textsuperscript{45} Gorbachev, however, did
not utilize such class-based categories. Instead, and in keeping with
the basic (non-class) assumptions informing the new thinking, he
suggested that imperialism's aggression would be restrained by the "new
level of interdependence and integralness [теслостность']" of the
world.46

The second question, however, was in the Soviet context somewhat of
a bombshell. In this case, Gorbachev was not so much "creatively
developing" Leninist theory as turning Lenin on his head. The issue he
had raised was not external constraints on an inherently aggressive
capitalist system, but whether changes internal to capitalism could lead
it, in effect, to outgrow this aggressiveness and militarism.

Here, Gorbachev adopted an empirical approach to make his case. He
pointed to the post-World War II 'economic miracles' in Japan, West
Germany and Italy as examples where capitalism had thrived without
militarization of the economy. While Gorbachev admitted that the
economy of all three countries had eventually become militarized, he
argued this came about not because of any basic "laws" of the
functioning of contemporary capitalism, but due to "attendant features"
of the capitalism of those years.47 These features were a product of
such factors as the Cold War and "prestige considerations."48 In other
words, the militarism and external aggression that Lenin had foreseen as
permanent features of capitalism, were in fact transitory phenomena.49
Gorbachev finished this section by ever so cautiously hinting that the
main imperialist power -- the USA -- could also outgrow militarism.50

A final point to raise here is perhaps the most important one: Why
did Gorbachev now feel it necessary to hint at such a dramatic revision
to the official Soviet image of the capitalist system? Two factors best explain the appearance of this new public agenda item. First, Gorbachev probably had found it necessary to raise this issue for precisely the same reasons Brezhnev had broached it (admittedly in a much less radical way) nearly 20 years earlier: to both legitimate his attempts at establishing a more cooperative relationship with the (capitalist) West and undercut the ideological rationale (that capitalism was inherently aggressive) for conservative opposition to that new relationship.51

Second, the appearance of this new agenda item and, especially, its radical content hint strongly of the influence of IMEMO director Primakov on Gorbachev. There is a very strong correlation between the kinds of arguments on capitalism made by Gorbachev in his 70th anniversary address and those being advanced throughout much of 1985-87 by Primakov and other researchers at IMEMO.52 As will be seen below, during 1987 Primakov, even more so than in 1986, forcefully marshaled the institutional resources of IMEMO to advocate dramatic changes in the Soviet image of capitalism. This combination of institutional expertise and Primakov’s access to Gorbachev and his staff appears to have played a key role in shaping Gorbachev’s views on this particular question.

In this game of influencing the General Secretary’s views on capitalism, there was a clear loser: Alexandr Yakovlev. While it is true that throughout 1986-87 Yakovlev had given very strong support to various elements of the new thinking, not once had he suggested any revisions to the prevailing image of contemporary capitalism. In fact, he seemed quite content with the orthodox, hardline image. This was true even after Gorbachev’s 70th anniversary report. In a press
conference the day after the speech, Yakovlev put a distinctly more pessimistic "spin" on the same three questions the General Secretary had raised concerning capitalism's nature. Where Gorbachev had supplied a rather clear "yes" answer to these questions, Yakovlev could only bring himself to state that time would provide an answer. Moreover, he declared that "we will not anticipate time's answer" -- which was exactly what Gorbachev had done in his report.53

In the wake of Gorbachev's report on the 70th anniversary of the revolution, it quickly became apparent that a revised image of capitalism was also now very much on the public agenda. Articles addressing the relationship of capitalism to militarism quickly began to appear in the central press.54 Moreover, Gorbachev himself would again raise the issue in his speech to the February, 1988, Central Committee plenum.55

By the end of 1987, the following set of major foreign and security-policy issues was on the public agenda.

**Basic Assumptions Informing Soviet Foreign Policy**

* A revision in the official view of the international system (interdependence, global problems)

* A revision in the goal structure of Soviet policy (the correlation of class and non-class values)

* A revision in the prevailing image of capitalism

**Strategic Prescriptions for Soviet National Security**

* A revision in the conceptualization of security (from a predominantly unilateral approach to a more mutual one)
* A revision in the criteria guiding the development of the Soviet force posture (the principle of reasonable sufficiency of military potentials)

* A revision in the approach to arms-control verification (greater willingness to accept intrusive forms)

All these issues received considerable attention from Gorbachev, other elites and various central press organs. In comparison with 1985-86, several issues were now addressed more frequently in leadership commentary: the correlation of class and non-class values, the image of capitalism (a new issue) and reasonable sufficiency. Even more so than in 1986, the window of agenda change was clearly open; Soviet foreign policy was in a state of considerable flux. The question now is how institutions like IMEMO were responding to this evolving public agenda.

Unofficial Participants

IMEMO. Throughout 1987, there were continuing signs of the change Primakov was bringing to IMEMO. This was especially seen in the Institute’s journal. For the first time since the late 1970s, Memo, during 1987, carried no editorials that in whole or part supported and praised official policy. Several other changes in the structure of the journal were clearly intended to stimulate a greater level of openness and criticism. Most important, the lead article in the July issue was a fascinating self-criticism by the Institute’s “collective” of IMEMO’s performance during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The new spirit of criticism was directed outward as well. In one instance, Memo published a biting, polemical attack on an article in Novyy mir that had
criticized key elements of Gorbachev’s emerging program of economic reform.57

In addition, the "scientific life" section of the journal was expanded, giving readers a better sense of the Institute’s interests.58 The section was also made more open: Many more speakers than in the past were identified.59

There were, as well, continuing attempts to make Memo more informative for its readers and responsive to their concerns. On the former, a new rubric was introduced to provide additional information on recently published Soviet books on economics, political economy and international relations/foreign policy.60 In any given issue of the journal, this new rubric typically provided brief (up to one paragraph) reviews and publishing information on 20-25 new books. The journal also strove to portray itself as being responsive to its readers’ concerns. Another tear-out survey soliciting reader opinion was published in December.61 In addition, twice during 1987 Memo published information on meetings where the journal’s editorial board had solicited input from readers.62

The new "democratic" spirit pervading the Institute was perhaps best symbolized by a major change in the composition of Memo’s editorial board. Late in 1987, Yakov Khavinson was dropped as chief editor, a position he had held for 30 years.63 While Khavinson was apparently somewhat conservative, Memo had nonetheless published numerous bold and innovative articles during his tenure.64 The symbolism of the change thus came not so much from the removal of Khavinson as from who replaced him.
The new chief editor was German Diligenskiy. Within IMEMO, Diligenskiy had a reputation as a radical -- one who was respected for his creativity in research and for a fierce independent streak.\textsuperscript{65} During the late 1970s, he had frequently been in conflict with the Institute’s administration. In 1982, Diligenskiy and Georgiy Mirskiy (another scholar at IMEMO) had helped several Institute radicals produce an unauthorized in-house publication. As a result of this activity, Mirskiy was demoted and Diligenskiy fired.\textsuperscript{66} Now, five years later, Primakov had not only brought Diligenskiy back to the Institute, but made him editor-in-chief of Memo!

It was not only Primakov’s actions within IMEMO that indicated his commitment to radical change. Even more so than in 1986, his speeches and articles during 1987 were filled with bold commentary. Concerning issues already on the public agenda, he again gave a strong endorsement to notions of interdependence, global problems, values common to all mankind and, in language stronger than any he had used previously, argued the need for a new approach to national security.\textsuperscript{67}

As for issues not yet on the public agenda, Primakov again argued in favor of the concept of a single world economy and advanced a revisionist image of capitalism.\textsuperscript{68} On the latter issue, he reiterated that the USSR had consistently underestimated the ability of the capitalist economic system to adapt and grow. On the particular question of militarism and its relationship to capitalism, Primakov went considerably beyond what he had said in 1986. Two and one-half months before Gorbachev would argue something similar, Primakov attacked the notion that capitalism “organically cannot exist without militarism" --
pointing to the non-militarized politics and economies of Japan and a series of West European countries.

Not content to stop at this point, however, Primakov then extended his analysis to the large and militarily-powerful capitalist states. He clearly indicated that even in these states there could be a reversal of the militarization of the economy and politics, and this would reduce the influence of the most reactionary elements in the "process of elaborating foreign-policy decisions." The bottom line here was clear: Even countries like the United States could outgrow militarism and come to adopt a less aggressive foreign-policy posture.

In mid-1987, Primakov for the first time raised one other issue that had been on the public agenda for over 18 months: reasonable sufficiency. He defined the concept for both conventional and nuclear forces. For nuclear forces, Primakov indicated that sufficiency was defined by that level of forces capable of carrying out an assured second strike. He then hinted that the size of this retaliatory force should be determined by the so-called McNamara criteria: the ability to destroy 60% of industry and 30% of the population. On conventional forces, Primakov was much less specific. In this case, he defined the level of sufficiency as the ability "to repulse attacks." He concluded with a general comment: The concept of sufficiency meant that the USSR should no longer match every new weapon system produced by the US.

That Primakov had even raised a rather concrete security issue like sufficiency was somewhat of a breakthrough. Over the 16 years covered by this study, this was the first time an IMEMO director had ever publicly raised such an issue. Obviously, this behavior was in part a
response to the explicit call Yakovlev had made several months earlier for social scientists to engage in more security-related research. However, by publicly raising a security issue, Primakov was also furthering his own attempts to modify IMEMO’s sense of organizational mission to include the study of strategic affairs. As will be seen below, this attempt gathered speed during 1987.

In striving to bring his own agenda of change to IMEMO, Primakov nonetheless clearly had to contend with existing organizational preferences within the Institute. Several examples suggest the tenacity and "staying power" of such preferences during 1987. First, one has the subject matter of the "scientific life" reports in Memo. Virtually all of them continued to examine issues of political economy or conceptual aspects of both international relations and security. In the few cases where one of these reports discussed more concrete issues of security, it was usually very brief and devoid of the kind of advocacy seen on issues closer to IMEMO’s dominant areas of expertise.71

Second, Memo’s new book-information rubric, in a pattern consistent with that seen in earlier years, gave first priority to issues of political economy, with a secondary emphasis on questions of international relations-foreign policy. Of the 104 books reviewed or publicized in the rubric between August and November, 1987, 64% dealt with political economy, while 36% discussed books on international relations-foreign policy. The latter category included virtually no analyses of more concrete security issues (conventional arms control in Europe or nuclear strategy, for example).72

Third, a less direct -- but still telling -- measure of continuity
in the Institute's core areas of expertise was provided by the various responses readers offered when asked about the contents of Memo.\textsuperscript{73} The readers were virtually unanimous in asking for more analyses of economic issues, the political economy of capitalism, the internationalization of economic life and the socialist-capitalist economic competition.\textsuperscript{76} In only a few cases did they ask for more analyses on issues of foreign policy and international relations (for example, new trends in the developing world). There was not a single reported request for more Institute analyses on security issues. In other words, the readers were asking the Institute to do more of the kinds of things at which it had always been good.

The above should make clear that the motives behind Primakov's behavior during 1987 continued -- as they had in 1986 -- to be several in nature. He continued to promote Gorbachev's foreign-policy agenda, but at the same time was clearly intent on modifying it as well. Indeed, one Soviet official has privately argued that many of the views Primakov articulated during 1987 were those of his Institute and not those of the political leadership.\textsuperscript{75} Within IMEMO, he was attempting to mobilize the Institute and modify its research agenda, but did so within a set of well-developed organizational preferences.

With this background in hand, the next task is to examine in greater detail IMEMO's behavior during this second full year of the "new political thinking." As before, the Institute's response to the basic assumptions and conceptual issues on the public agenda as of late 1987 will be examined first. A second section will analyze IMEMO's response to the more concrete security issues also a part of this agenda. I will
conclude with a brief comparison of the behavior of IMEMO and the USA Institute.

* * * *

The pattern of Institute behavior during 1987 grew more complex. Responding both to external influences (calls for new areas of research by Yakovlev and Dobrynin, for example) and internal changes (the creation of Arbatov's new department), security issues received more attention than ever before. Overall, however, the Institute continued to evince the greatest interest and strongest advocacy in those issues closest to its dominant areas of expertise: conceptual questions (of international relations and security) and the political economy of contemporary capitalism.

This was seen in a number of ways. The notion of interdependence, for example, received considerable attention, and was employed in more concrete ways than it had been in 1985-86 -- consistent with the fact that the process was now increasingly moving into its option-formulation stage. Instead of simply repeating Gorbachev's words on the world's growing interdependence, Institute scholars used the concept to legitimize several emerging policies. One scholar used it to justify the new approach evident in the USSR's dealings with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), while several others used it to legitimize an opening of the Soviet economy to the world at large.

Just as in 1986, however, IMEMO researchers used the notion of
interdependence not only to support Gorbachev's policy agenda, but also to promote a particular goal of the Institute: the concept of a single world economy. Aside from Primakov's comments, deputy Institute director Martynov addressed and supported the concept, and the dissusiya rubric in Memo was again used to allow an Institute scholar aggressively to promote it.78

Throughout the year, IMEMO continued its advocacy in favor of the more political approach to ensuring national security being articulated by Gorbachev and other elites. Deputy director Bykov, in a lead article published in Memo early in the year, gave very strong support to the USSR's "new philosophy of peace and disarmament" and the mutual nature of Soviet-American security.79 Later in the year, the Institute published a set of "theses" that, among other things, strongly endorsed the new approach to security.80

Another basic assumption Gorbachev had placed on the public agenda -- the correlation of class and non-class interests -- was the beneficiary of pronounced Institute advocacy. One researcher, in a lead article pegged to the first anniversary of the Party congress, saw the "indisputable" priority of interests common to all mankind over class interests.81

Later in the year, in another lead article, an Institute scholar discussed the correlation of class and non-class interests in more policy-relevant terms. In analyzing what he called the "priorities" of Soviet foreign policy, this scholar argued that the proper understanding of this correlation -- that is, the dominance of non-class over class interests -- had practical significance in the elaboration of the USSR's
foreign-policy strategy.82

While he developed his argument no further, the implication was that the dominance of non-class interests should lead to changes in that aspect of Soviet policy traditionally most dominated by a class approach: support of national liberation movements.83 In a further demonstration of how this particular issue engaged the Institute's interests, the scholar closed his discussion by explicitly attacking those who held narrow and dogmatic understandings of the correlation.84

The Soviet image of capitalism -- another basic assumption -- was the one issue on which IMEMO engaged in its most forceful advocacy throughout 1987. This advocacy, it should be noted, came before the issue reached the public agenda in the last two months of the year. In contrast to 1986, the Institute's advocacy in favor of revising both the internal, economic, and external, foreign-policy components of the official image of capitalism was bolder and more extensive. On the internal component, Memo continued -- throughout 1987 -- its diskussiya series on the economic features of contemporary capitalism.85 As noted earlier, the series utilized an empirical focus to undermine central elements of the largely deductive Soviet theory of state-monopoly capitalism.86

Separately from the series, the Institute produced additional commentaries on this subject. Writing in the lead article in the November issue of Memo, Institute deputy director Igor' Gur'yev advanced a very optimistic portrayal of the "vitality" of contemporary capitalism and its ability to adapt to new situations.87 Another Institute scholar made virtually the same point in yet another lead article published
earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{88} In addition, a well-known liberal journalist, Aleksandr Bovin, was given space in \textit{Memo} to make a very forceful argument for the durability and adaptability of the capitalist system.\textsuperscript{89}

It was, however, a fundamental revision to the external, foreign-policy aspect of the official image of capitalism that IMEMO promoted more forcefully than any other issue throughout the year. Writing in mid-January, deputy director Bykov returned to an issue raised by several Institute scholars in 1986: the relationship of capitalism to militarism. Like these researchers, however, Bykov was very cautious in reassessing the relationship. He simply asserted, with no elaboration, that militarism was to an ever lesser degree "inscribing itself" (\textit{vpisvavayetsya}) onto the course of world events.\textsuperscript{90}

By the early spring of 1987, both Primakov and other Institute scholars had clearly come to understand there was an evident barrier standing before any truly radical revision to the prevailing image of capitalism. This was the aggressive nature and militarism that, according to Leninist theory, were inherent to the capitalist socio-economic system. By late March, IMEMO was addressing precisely this issue -- and doing so in a major way. In that month, the Institute helped organize a scientific-theoretical conference on "The Contemporary Features of the General Crisis of Capitalism."\textsuperscript{91} The conference proceedings received extensive coverage in \textit{Memo}, being reported in four different issues of the journal over the course of 1987.\textsuperscript{92} One of the key issues addressed by the conference was the relationship of militarism to capitalism.

The overall tone for the conference was set by the opening speeches
of Primakov and Academician Petr Fedoseyev (a vice president of the Academy of Sciences). Fedoseyev directly asked to what degree "militarism [was] inherent to contemporary capitalist society?" He provided no answer, but noted that this question required "serious, comprehensive research." Primakov went much further and declared that key aspects of Lenin's 1917 essay on imperialism were no longer applicable. In particular, there was a need to revise Lenin's five "characteristics" (priznaki) of imperialism. Primakov strongly suggested that militarism and foreign-policy aggression should not be included in any such listing of imperialism's essential "characteristics."

Over the remainder of the conference, many IMEMO analysts (as well as several from other academic institutions) addressed the relationship of capitalism to militarism. Deputy director Bykov, Yevgeniy Bugrov (head of IMEMO's Department for Military-Economic and Military-Political Research) and researcher Danill Proektor (a former military officer) all argued that various external constraints and "realities" were limiting the effects of militarism. Bykov, in particular, argued that imperialism, faced with the danger of nuclear war if it did act on its militaristic impulses, was therefore ready to search for ways to preserve peace.

Other Institute scholars, however, went much further. Building on Primakov's initial comments, two researchers (Pevzner and Shenayev) presented arguments as to why Lenin's five basic "characteristics" of imperialism had to be modified to account for current realities.

Another researcher explicitly argued that it was wrong to see the
process of militarization as an "inherent characteristic" (priznak) of imperialism. He did not simply assert this, but provided empirical evidence to back his point. The example was Japan. In that country, he argued, military production was becoming ever more risky and expensive, while there were growing prospects for stable sales from civilian production (for example, in the consumer electronics sector). 99

The advocacy on this issue testified to the Institute's expertise in this area. Keying on Primakov's comments, Institute scholars had rapidly responded -- in several cases, offering detailed and empirical justifications of why capitalism could, in effect, outgrow militarism. It is telling that at this same conference -- one of whose sections dealt with problems of international security -- not a single IMEMO scholar raised the notion of sufficiency (or for that matter any concrete security issue).

As already noted, there is a striking correlation between this IMEMO-Primakov commentary on the relationship of capitalism to militarism and the "difficult questions" Gorbachev would first raise in November of 1987. Such "questions" had been asked and to some extent answered within IMEMO for nearly a year and a half prior to Gorbachev's speech. While the evidence is not conclusive, it seems that Primakov had mobilized the Institute on what amounted to a "bread and butter" topic for it (the political economy of contemporary capitalism), and then presented -- via his personal access channel -- these arguments to a skeptical Gorbachev. 100 This combination of expertise and access prevented conservative organizations such as the Soviet military from dominating the process on this particular issue. 101
During 1987, the Institute's interest in security issues reached new heights in terms of both quality and quantity. Clearly responding to the promptings of IMEMO head Primakov and Central Committee secretaries Dobrynin and Yakovlev, building on its own small but growing institutional expertise, and making use of some extremely capable outside experts -- IMEMO for the first time began to address some "nuts and bolts" security issues.

Throughout 1987 and into the early months of 1988, Institute scholars began -- really for the first time -- to discuss and describe the concept of sufficiency, and the related issues of military strategy and restructuring. Early in the year, two researchers provided an intelligent overview of the discussions of alternative defense concepts and military strategy that had taken place at the February, 1987, Moscow forum "For a Nonnuclear World, for the Survival of Mankind."\textsuperscript{102} Their stated purpose was to summarize arguments and provide information -- which is exactly what they did.\textsuperscript{103} They provided no analysis of their own.

The same approach was evident in the chapter on conventional arms reductions in the inaugural edition of IMEMO's \textit{Yearbook on Disarmament and Security}, published early in 1987.\textsuperscript{104} The very fact that the yearbook was produced testified to an increased level of interest on security issues within IMEMO. Compiled and written by various researchers in Arbatov's year-old department, the yearbook combined
standard IHMO-type overviews of security issues with analyses that were more military-technical in nature.\textsuperscript{105}

The yearbook's chapter on conventional force reductions provided an extraordinary amount of information for a non-military Soviet publication. Drawing on Brookings books, publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Soviet military journals as well as more standard Soviet sources (Pravda, Whence the Threat to Peace), the chapter discussed such topics as NATO military strategy in Europe, strategic mobility and alternative defense concepts. Most of this discussion, however, focused on Western concepts and weapon systems.\textsuperscript{106}

The impression one gets is that the primary purpose of the chapter (and the yearbook) was to provide information to a largely information-starved Soviet civilian analytic community.\textsuperscript{107} What the chapter lacked was analysis. For example, there was virtually no discussion of sufficiency as applied to conventional forces or of how its adoption as a force-planning criterion would effect Soviet military strategy and force posture.

Later in the year the entire yearbook was in fact criticized precisely on these grounds -- that is, for its descriptive, non-analytic focus. Writing in the December issue of Memo, Viktor Karpov, head of the Foreign Ministry's arms-control directorate, complained that the yearbook spent too much time reviewing literature and the current status of various negotiations, and not enough time developing forecasts, based on concrete calculations and evaluations, of how particular negotiations might be concluded.\textsuperscript{108}
For overviews of sufficiency that were more analytic in nature, IMEMO still seemed to lack the necessary in-house expertise and thus had to turn to several researchers not affiliated with the Institute. Two of these researchers, in particular, demonstrated a sophisticated knowledge of security affairs: Andrey Kokoshin (of the USA Institute) and Valentin Larionov (a General Staff officer who in the early 1970s had worked at the USA Institute). Over a 12 month period beginning in July, 1987, Memo published three articles by Kokoshin and Larionov, all of which addressed the issue of sufficiency (especially at the conventional level) and questions of military strategy in a concrete and analytic fashion.  

The articles were a clear and bold attempt to address issues formerly the prerogative of the Soviet military. Kokoshin was quite blunt in declaring that a "sharp and profound politicization of traditional military questions" had taken place, one that required the creation of a new civilian discipline: military-political research. Moreover, the authors did not limit themselves to reviews of the Western literature. Rather, they discussed and analyzed Soviet military history, concepts and writers. One article in particular was a clear attempt to use historical analogies (from Soviet combat operations during World War II) to argue that reaching a level of sufficiency required a restructuring of the Soviet armed forces on more defensive principles.  

These articles were indicative of a more general trend that saw a sharp increase, beginning in June, 1987 (as the process moved into the stage of option formulation), in the number of Soviet civilian analysts
addressing the question of sufficiency as applied to both nuclear and conventional forces. By November, for example, IMEMO's fellow social scientists at the USA Institute had published two detailed analyses of sufficiency, one of whose proclaimed purpose was to give more concrete definition to the concept. IMEMO's own researchers, however, were failing to jump on this sufficiency "bandwagon." On other security issues, however, the Institute demonstrated a significantly higher level of in-house analytic expertise. In particular, over the course of 1987 and early 1988 researchers in Arbatov's department produced a series of informative and often analytic surveys of nuclear arms control and related strategic issues. Early in the year, one of these researchers produced for Memo a long review of the latest US academic literature on nuclear arms control and SDI. His clear purpose was to provide information -- and lots of it.

The sources he chose, however, provided a telling indicator of the state of strategic-studies research conducted by many Soviet civilians. Where an American graduate student might have chosen sources such as International Security or the Adelphi Papers (of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) for his or her review, this Institute researcher chose five articles from Foreign Affairs, two from Arms Control Today and one from Foreign Policy. He did nonetheless provide an intelligent overview of the issues raised in the various articles.

Longtime readers of Memo may have experienced a feeling of deja vu when reading this particular article. In November, 1971, during an earlier Soviet debate over security (in that case, over SALT), an IMEMO
scholar had published a virtually identical (in style) review that discussed the then latest US academic research on arms control.\textsuperscript{119}

By the end of the year, Arbatov and one of his researchers, Aleksandr Savel'yev, had combined to produce an excellent, high-quality (in the Soviet context) analysis of the effect on strategic stability of vulnerabilities in C$^3$I (command, control, communication and intelligence) systems.\textsuperscript{120} In part, this article was informational in nature. It used literature from the Western security-studies community to define and explain such terms as C$^3$I, launch on warning, and positive and negative control.\textsuperscript{121}

The article, however, did more than simply provide information. It analyzed vulnerabilities of various C$^3$I systems and was also the vehicle for some clear advocacy on the part of the authors. While their advocacy -- on the particular features a C$^3$I system should possess to enhance strategic stability -- might strike a Western analyst as "old hat," it was, for the readership of \textit{Memo}, completely new.\textsuperscript{122}

At several points, the authors also strongly criticized the harmful effect of "purely military logic" on the maintenance of strategic stability. This "logic," they argued, led military planners to develop combat missions for nuclear forces that could effectively undermine political control of those forces during crisis situations.\textsuperscript{123} This thinly-veiled criticism of the Soviet military was an early hint of the bitter polemics that would later break out between Arbatov and several military specialists.\textsuperscript{124}

In the first half of 1988, Arbatov published a two-part article in \textit{Memo} that advocated deep cuts in US and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces. Here, Arbatov again demonstrated his extensive familiarity with strategic nuclear issues. He examined the issue of deep cuts from what might be called a strategic analyst’s perspective. That is, he analyzed in concrete terms how deep cuts in nuclear forces might affect the maintenance of strategic stability. This approach to the issue was dramatically different from the one more typically adopted by Institute researchers, which stressed the political effects of dramatic cuts in nuclear weapons and paid little attention to the strategic-technical details of how such cuts would be implemented.

As a supplement to the increasing expertise of Arbatov’s department on strategic nuclear issues, Memo -- during 1987 -- also published several other detailed strategic analyses by Americans and researchers from the USA Institute (ISKAN). Raymond Garthoff (an American security-studies specialist at the Brookings Institution) contributed an article that examined and provided considerable information on the relationship of SDI to the ABM Treaty. In another case, B. Surikov, a retired general at ISKAN, presented an informed review of technical issues associated with ballistic missile defenses. Finally, G. Kochetkov and V. Sergeyev -- also both researchers at ISKAN -- analyzed the impact of new technologies on military command and control.

Three points need to be made about the IMEMO’s growing interest and expertise on security issues. First, there is the question of influence. There is little evidence that, as of the end of 1987, the Institute had played a key role in influencing the political leadership’s views on security issues such as sufficiency. This was so because the two factors -- significant institutional expertise and an
access channel to the leadership -- that had allowed it to play an important and at times influential role on other, more general foreign-policy issues were not operative when it came to issues of national security. Indeed, it appears that Aleksey Arbatov, the driving force behind IMEMO’s growing interest in security issues, was also largely responsible for its lack of ability at this point to establish access channels to important political and military figures involved in security policymaking.129

This state of affairs would change dramatically only beginning in mid-1989. The convening of the revamped Supreme Soviet in the summer of that year and the creation within it of two committees with oversight of defense and foreign-policy issues would qualitatively change and improve the access of institutions such as IMEMO to the national-security policy process.130

Second, the articles discussed above reveal a key aspect of IMEMO’s growing expertise on security issues: the dominant role being played by Aleksey Arbatov. As of early 1988, it was still quite clear that the Institute had few other researchers with Arbatov’s level of strategic expertise. Within the Institute, Arbatov -- the "policy entrepreneur" -- had enjoyed tremendous success in establishing, largely through his own personal efforts, a new area of research.131 In essence, Arbatov, with crucial help from both Institute head Primakov and the Gorbachev leadership (especially Yakovlev and Dobrynin), had succeeded in beginning to reshape IMEMO’s sense of organizational mission.

Third, the inherent difficulty in modifying organizational missions132 explains why the Institute’s enhanced expertise in security
affairs was clearly coexisting -- at times uneasily -- with other long-
standing interests and preferences within IMEMO. The evidence here is
twofold. First, IMEMO's interest and advocacy on issues in the security
realm continued during 1987 to be greatest on those questions closest to
its core areas of expertise. As was noted above, throughout 1987 the
Institute continued aggressively to promote the Soviet Union's new
"political" approach to national security.

In addition, 1987 saw IMEMO promote another security-related issue
that "fit" with its political-economy expertise. This was conversion of
military production to civilian uses. The Institute's advocacy on
conversion was particularly notable for two reasons: it came over a year
before Gorbachev and other elites would begin publicly to address the
issue;\(^\text{133}\) and it was an issue Institute head Primakov was not
publicly addressing. In a set of "theses" published as the lead article in the
August issue of Memo, the Institute argued that any state -- independent
of its social system -- stood to benefit from transferring part of its
military economy to civilian production.\(^\text{134}\)

Writing in the same issue of Memo, former deputy Institute director
Ivanov argued that conversion was a real possibility and could be
implemented in a "relatively short time."\(^\text{135}\) While Ivanov was
ostensibly talking about conversion in capitalist countries, his earlier
discussion of the USSR's defense burden ("it is not cheap")\(^\text{136}\) made
clear that his remarks were applicable to the Soviet Union as well.

By the end of the year, the advocacy on conversion had become
explicit and bold. In December, Yevgeniy Bugrov, head of IMEMO's
Department of Military-Economic and Military-Political Research, co-
authored an article that directly called for "scientific research" on conversion in "both capitalist and socialist countries." As any Institute scholar knew, such research was carried out at institutions like IMEMO. Just in case this point was missed, the authors drove it home by specifically calling on Soviet specialists to develop a "general-state plan of conversion in our country". Needless to say, with its extensive expertise on economics and political economy, IMEMO was well placed to benefit from any expansion of Soviet research on conversion.

Beyond the above, there was a second, more conflictual way in which the Institute's well-established sense of organizational mission was interacting with its new-found interest in security issues. This was the reaction of a series of Institute researchers to the creation of Arbatov's Department of Disarmament and International Security. To put it mildly, they were not happy. Beginning early in 1987, these scholars -- at first indirectly and then directly -- attacked Arbatov and his strategic-studies approach to the study of international security. These scholars were all in IMEMO's Department of International Relations and included deputy Institute director Bykov, Vladimir Gantman and Elgiz Pozdnyakov. The fact that the dispute received wide publicity in the Institute's journal, Memo, suggests the strong feelings this issue generated within IMEMO.

The dispute seems to have been triggered by divergent evaluations of the sweeping disarmament proposals advanced by the USSR at the Reykjavik summit meeting in October, 1986. Early in 1987, Bykov strongly defended these proposals, arguing that they would have allowed both sides to
avoid the "labyrinth of expert comparisons of endless technical details, of fruitless data discussions" so typical of actual negotiations. Bykov clearly preferred the Reykjavik "model of the political resolution of the problems of nuclear disarmament." Later in the year, Vladimir Gantman offered very similar comments. In particular, he criticized "our research" for spending too much time examining the technical aspects of various weapon systems (he gave SDI as an example) without having satisfactorily analyzed the overall political context.

Pozdnyakov, writing in the October issue of Memo, agreed with Bykov and Gantman on the priority to be accorded to political factors. In a clear allusion to Arbatov's new department, Pozdnyakov noted that research on military-strategic issues was rapidly increasing, but then attacked this research for asserting the priority of military-strategic factors in international affairs. For Pozdnyakov, the opposite was true: Any given level of armaments was a "direct consequence" (emphasis in the original) of political factors. Research on these political factors, therefore, was more important than any analysis of weapons or strategies.

These scholars, in essence, were defending IMEMO's traditional way of analyzing arms control, particular weapons systems or other security issues. This was an approach that emphasized political factors broadly construed (for example, US relations with its allies, the strength of different factions within the US government or the correlation of forces). It was not one that focused on military strategy or the technical characteristics of weapons systems.

In early 1988, this "hidden polemic" came into the open when Aleksey
Arbatov publicly responded to his foes. At the very beginning of his two-part Memo article on deep cuts in nuclear forces, he noted the existence of two approaches among Soviet scholars who studied issues of security and disarmament. The "technocrats" felt that to study such issues one needed a thorough knowledge of military strategy, weapons systems and the balance of military forces. The politiki, in contrast, felt the main emphasis should go to political factors, and that too much attention to military-technical details only detracted attention from the basic question under study. Arbatov then bluntly stated that these two approaches coexisted within IMEMO (as well as ISKAN), and this had led scholars at the Institute to reach different conclusions on the same (unnamed) issue.\textsuperscript{142}

Over the course of the two articles, it became clear the issue was how to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. Again and again, Arbatov attacked -- often quite bitterly -- the (political) approach favored by Bykov and others within the Institute.\textsuperscript{143} If one were to argue in favor of radical reductions in nuclear weapons, he declared, then one needed detailed and professional military-strategic analysis to support his arguments.\textsuperscript{144} The message was clear: Yes, there was a role for the kind of analysis IMEMO had always done, but this had to be supplemented with the military-technical expertise Arbatov was attempting to bring to the Institute.

As of late 1988, these two approaches coexisted -- uneasily -- within IMEMO. Arbatov's department was there to stay, but other researchers continued publicly to criticize his approach to the study of international security issues.\textsuperscript{145} The redefinition of organizational
missions, it would appear, was not -- even with the support of Primakov and a very propitious external political environment -- an easy task.

ISKAN. There is no evidence that the USA Institute's growing interest in "nuts and bolts" strategic issues was encountering the kind of resistance Aleksey Arbatov had found within IMEMO. Both the organizational and individual levels of analysis help explain why this was the case. At the organizational level, it has been argued throughout this study that ISKAN, since its founding in the late 1960s, had developed a different sense of organizational mission than IMEMO -- one that encompassed the study of security-policy issues. It is probably no accident, as TASS used to declare, that a Kokoshin (with his military-technical and security interests) would rise to be a deputy director of ISKAN, while an Aleksey Arbatov (with very similar interests) would only rise to the level of a department head within IMEMO (and even then encounter resistance).

The second part of the explanation, involving the individual level of analysis, centers on the simple fact that Arbatov has a rather difficult style, and often rubs people the wrong way. Kokoshin, in contrast, seems in many respects to be the opposite: Someone who fosters a collegial and less combative atmosphere.146

Turning to an analysis of ISKAN's research output during 1987-88, the most notable change from earlier years was that the Institute, responding to further calls by the political leadership for civilian research on security,147 began to analyze and advocate positions on Soviet forces, strategies and weapons systems.148 Indeed, a lead article published in SSHA late in the year explicitly called for ISKAN
researchers (as well as other social scientists) to develop "concrete recommendations for practical policy" on a host of foreign-policy issues -- including "military-political questions." 149

There are in fact several notable examples of ISKAN scholars, writing in SSHA, who addressed issues of Soviet national security during this period. 150 For example, early in 1987, Kokoshin, along with Institute researchers Gerasev and Vasil’yev, forcefully argued that the USSR should respond "asymmetrically" (that is, not by deploying its own defensive system) to any US deployment of space-based ballistic missile defenses. 151 Later in the year, Kokoshin and Vasil’yev reiterated this position in a two-part article they wrote with Aleksey Arbatov of IMEMO. 152

On the issue of sufficiency, ISKAN researchers greatly expanded upon their tentative commentaries of 1986. Aside from the two detailed analyses of sufficiency published in October-November by Karaganov, Kortunov and Zhurkin, 153 the Institute published at least two other advocacy-type analyses on the topic during the year. In June, Kokoshin and Kortunov addressed sufficiency in some detail in a lead article in SSHA. For nuclear weapons, they defined sufficiency as having an assured second strike capability; for conventional weapons, sufficiency meant having no ability for offensive operations at the levels of "military strategy" and "operational plans." More generally, they argued that sufficiency would allow the USSR to practice "unilateral" restraint in the face of increases in its opponent's force posture. 154

Later in the year, another Institute researcher declared that, operating under the principle of sufficiency, the USSR need not respond
to every new weapons system created by the US.\textsuperscript{155}

The above review leads to two conclusions. First, despite the great strides IMEMO had made in developing strategic expertise during the mid-1980s, the USA Institute, as of early 1988, still maintained an edge in this area. Aside from the evidence presented above, there was the simple fact that it was much more common to find ISKAN researchers writing on security issues in \textit{Memo} than it was to find IMEMO analysts addressing such issues in \textit{SShA}.\textsuperscript{156}

Second, while Andrey Kokoshin was clearly all-important to ISKAN’s growing interest in security issues, he was surrounded by a stronger supporting cast than Aleksey Arbatov at IMEMO. Researchers such as Kortunov, Karaganov, Vasil’yev, Gerasev and Sergeyev all had made significant contributions to ISKAN’s study of various military-technical and security issues. Several of these researchers (Vasil’yev and Gerasev, for example) appear to have profited and learned from their work on strategic issues with the Committee of Soviet Scientists.

The analysis here and in the two preceding chapters indicates the importance of factors operating at the individual as well as organizational levels for explaining the differing “speeds” at which IMEMO and ISKAN were moving into the field of strategic studies. At the individual level, while both Kokoshin and Aleksey Arbatov seemed equally committed to developing strategic studies within their respective institutes, Arbatov’s problematic and difficult style made his task within IMEMO more difficult than it should otherwise have been.

At the organizational level, Kokoshin had several additional factors working in his favor. These included a higher base level of
expertise on security issues, less organizationally-motivated opposition to expanding expertise on security questions, an institutional willingness to establish ties with other groups investigating issues of international security and a more technical organizational culture (which brought people with technical backgrounds to ISKAN). These factors -- both the individual and organizational -- explain why Kokoshin was able to establish the foundations of a Soviet civilian school of strategic studies more quickly at ISKAN than Aleksey Arbatov was able to at IMEMO.

A final question to address is whether ISKAN -- with its greater strategic expertise relative to IMEMO -- was not only an informed, but also an influential player in the evolving Soviet debates on security issues during 1986-88. While a definitive answer to this question is not possible, it is important to note that during this period ISKAN/Kokoshin developed a greater number of "access channels" to the security-policy process than IMEMO/Arbatov. By early 1989, for example, at least two ISKAN researchers had served or were slated to serve on the Soviet delegation to the CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) negotiations.¹⁵⁷

In addition, during 1987-89 Andrey Kokoshin -- in stark contrast to Aleksey Arbatov -- was cultivating ties with a series of General Staff officers (including Marshal Akhromeyev when he was Chief of the General Staff).¹⁵⁸ While the cultivation of access channels to key policymakers certainly does not guarantee institutional influence, the experience of Yakovlev/IMEMO and, later, Primakov/IMEMO indicates that the existence of such personal ties was often an essential prerequisite for
translating institutional expertise into institutional influence during the early years of the Gorbachev era.

Summary

It is clear that through the first three years of the era of "new political thinking," IMEMO's ability to influence Soviet foreign and national-security policy relied heavily on a combination of institutional expertise and, especially, the personal access its director -- Yevgeniy Primakov -- had to the political leadership. It was no accident that it was most influential on issues that fell within the core areas of expertise it had built over a 30 year period. On these issues -- the image of capitalism, the correlation of class and non-class interests, the Soviet "world view" and the like -- the Institute, as has been seen, was easily mobilized.

For the Institute to play a more influential role on specific security issues, however, two changes were needed -- one external and one internal to it. By mid-1987, the needed external change -- a political leadership wanting institutions like IMEMO do address security issues -- was in place. The change internal to IMEMO, however, was only just beginning. The process of change within the Institute really involved two aspects. First, bureaucratic structures had to be changed. This was accomplished with the creation of Aleksey Arbatov's department in 1986. Second, the Institute's sense of organizational mission had to be modified. This task, however, was more problematic. There was clearly considerable sentiment within IMEMO -- as in organizations anywhere -- for not "rocking the boat" and continuing to do the types of
things it had always done.

Indeed, the evident conflict induced by the creation of Arbatov's department indicates the difficulty IMEMO was encountering as it attempted to change and innovate. This suggests that to understand fully the behavior of the Institute -- and ultimately its ability to influence policy -- one must examine both the role played by key individuals such as Primakov (the organizational head) and Arbatov (the "entrepreneur") and the organizational context within which such individuals operate.
1. This was particularly true of the Soviet military. See below.

2. During this stage of option formulation, one would expect more detailed commentary on issues that had initially been placed on the public agenda in a more general way. See Chapter 1.


4. By the fall of 1986, Gorbachev had clearly begun to realize that his plans for economic revitalization would fail unless they were accompanied by reforms of the political system. In September of that year, he had first begun to talk about the need for "democratization." See Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 96-102) [a speech to the Krasnodar party aktiv on 18 September]. The January, 1987, Central Committee plenum devoted considerable attention to issues of political reform (within the Party, the work place, the soviets, and society). See, especially, Gorbachev's address to that meeting: Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 299-354). As Gorbachev put it in his speech to the 18th Trades Union Congress in late February, 1987: "The Central Committee Politburo has come to a simple conclusion: Perestroyka will bog down [zabukuyvat'] unless ... the main force [glavnoye deystvuyushchee litso] -- the people -- are included in it." Gorbachev (1987c; 1).

5. See Gorbachev's forceful commentary to this effect before an international meeting of scientists and public figures held in Moscow in mid-February, 1987, and during British Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to the USSR in late March. Gorbachev (1987d; 1) and Gorbachev (1987e).

6. See, for example, his speech on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, where he implicitly rejected a deductive approach (based on "declarations and appeals") and instead argued that the new thinking would change and "continue to develop together with the course of objective processes in the world." Gorbachev (1987b; 3C). Also see Gorbachev (1987g; 4) [an article published in Kommunist] and Gorbachev (1987h; 1) [an interview with an Indonesian newspaper reprinted in Pravda]. In the latter source, Gorbachev echoed academic analysts at IDEMO when he argued that the USSR examined the contemporary world from a "strictly scientific, realistic position."

7. See, for example, Gorbachev (1987d; 1-2), (1987c; 1), (1987g; 4), (1987h; 2), (1987; 1) [a front page Izvestiya article that, in essence, announced a new Soviet approach to the United Nations] and (1987j; 2-3) [a November speech to heads of communist and workers' parties].

8. Gorbachev (1987f; 2) [a mid-April speech in Prague]. Also see Gorbachev (1987b; 30), where he spent several minutes explaining why an interdependent world had arisen (pointing, for example, to the
internationalization of economic ties and the impact of the scientific-technical revolution).

9. See Gorbachev (1987g; 4, 6-10) and, especially, Gorbachev (1987i; 1-2). The latter source provides an extensive discussion of the non-military components of security.

10. See Gorbachev (1987g; 4), where he declared that the maintenance of peace should be accorded top status in the "hierarchy of human values and political priorities"; (1987b; 30), where he once again discovered the "Leninist idea of the priority of the interests of social development"; and (1987j; 3), where Gorbachev argued that the class interests of socialism and interests common to all mankind had been "as if merged together." Also see Gorbachev (1987d; 1), (1987e) and (1987h; 2), where he stressed the importance of common-to-all-mankind values and problems.

11. Gorbachev (1987i; 1). This argument was simply a logical extension of the point IMEMO scholars had been making quite explicitly since 1983: In analyzing the international system, the USSR must give priority to non-class values.

12. See, for example, Brezhnev (1981a; 10-13) [his report to the 26th Party Congress in February, 1981], where he spent several minutes describing the USSR's economic, ideological and military aid to developing countries -- aid based on "the alliance [sovuz] of world socialism and the national-liberation movement."

13. This occurred in late February. See Appendix II.

14. See, especially, Gorbachev (1987f; 2) [a mid-April speech in Prague], where he talked of the "qualitatively new significance" questions of verification had acquired in the context of nuclear arms control in Europe, and clearly stated that the Soviet Union would accept on-site inspections in an INF agreement. Also see Gorbachev (1987a, Volume 4; 463) [a statement issued in early April].

15. See Timerbayev (1987). For his book, see Timerbayev (1983), and the discussion in Chapter 8 above. At this point, Timerbayev was Soviet deputy ambassador to the United Nations. When he wrote the book, he was a deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Department.

16. Recall that under the "principle" the USSR could maintain armed forces as powerful as any possible coalition of hostile powers. Gorbachev's early commentary on sufficiency -- where he simply replaced the principle with sufficiency without defining the latter -- only indicated that the criterion for determining force levels would be different, and in fact lower (the phrase used throughout 1986 usually mentioned "lowering" military potentials to the limits of reasonable sufficiency). How much lower, however, had been left unclear.
17. Gorbachev (1987d; 2).

18. Gorbachev (1987c; 2).


20. Gorbachev (1987i; 1). This was Gorbachev’s mid-September Izvestiya article. Dobrynin (1987) offered a virtually identical definition of sufficiency.

21. See “O voyennoy doktrine ... ” (1987). The declaration stated that the Warsaw Pact’s armed forces should be strictly held to the limits of “sufficiency for defense, for repulsing possible aggression.”

22. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Petrovskiy, in a talk at MIT in October, 1987, argued it was only after the promulgation of the May, 1987, Warsaw Pact declaration -- signed by all the Pact’s party leaders -- that the Soviet military began to understand that the new thinking was for real. In policy-cycle terms, the Pact declaration drove home two points to the military: (1) the previous public agenda setting had been real (and was not simply propaganda designed for foreign consumption); and (2) the process was already moving into its option-formulation stage.

23. See, especially, the definition of sufficiency offered by Minister of Defense Yazov: Yazov (1987a) and (1987b; 29-34). The latter source made it quite clear that sufficiency should not exclude the ability to conduct offensive operations. Yazov’s definition of sufficiency was very similar to that being articulated by other military writers. See, for example, Kirshin (1987; 33, 37-38), Gareyev (1987; 14-17, 36-37) [Here, Gareyev began with an approving reference to Gorbachev’s definition of sufficiency, but later completely undermined its emphasis on offensive operations], Skorodenko (1987; passim) and Kostev (1987; 13). All the sources cited here were published or signed to press by late September, 1987. For further evidence that the military was not -- through January, 1988 -- defining sufficiency in terms of a purely defensive strategy or a major force restructuring, see Phillips (1990; 18-24, 55-56).

24. The argument here is not that defensive forces are cost free. In relative terms, however, they are cheaper than forces structured for rapid and wide-ranging offensive operations.

25. In January, 1987, Yakovlev was made a candidate member of the Politburo; in June, he became a full member.

26. See, for example, Brezhnev (1981a; 63).

27. Yakovlev (1987d). Also see Yakovlev (1987e; 13) [an article in one of the May issues of Partivnaya zhizn’] and Yakovlev (1987c) [an April speech to the intelligentsia of Tadzhikistan].
28. This is not simply my evaluation. Tat’yana Zaslavskaya, a leading social scientist and Gorbachev adviser, would later allude to the mobilizing qualities of this speech -- referring to it as a "revolutionary lecture" that undercut old dogmas and cleared the way for new ideas. See the interview with Zaslavskaya in Nahaylo (1987; 8).

29. Yakovlev (1987a; passim). This version of the speech was the lead article in one of the May issues of Kommunist.

30. Such research was desperately needed since, as he scornfully noted, the social sciences were "on the whole still at the level of the 1930s." Yakovlev (1987a; 8).

31. As Yakovlev put it: "The objective laws of socialism were often conceived outside the context of world development." Yakovlev (1987a; 10-11).

32. This is a translation of uchenye-mezhdunarodniki, and is a direct reference to the kind of scholars who worked at IMEMO.

33. In Yakovlev’s own words, there was a need to "uncover and fill with material content" the concept of sufficiency. Yakovlev (1987a; 18). From a policy-cycle perspective, this is precisely the type of language one would expect. An issue had reached the public agenda and now needed to be given practical content. Later in the year, Gorbachev would make the same point (albeit in less forceful language), noting the need "to investigate" the concept of sufficiency. Gorbachev (1987k; 3).

34. Yakovlev (1987a; 18). Previously, social scientists at IMEMO (and ISKAN) had only analyzed Western military doctrine.

35. Military specialists primarily researched the military-technical side of doctrine. On this, see the entries "Doktrina voyennaya" and "Voyennaya nauka" in Akhromeyev (1986; 240, 135-36). Thus, Yakovlev, in calling for civilians to "jointly" research doctrine with the military, was in effect calling for civilian analysis of this military-technical aspect of doctrine.

36. In Kommunist, see: "Kursom XXVII s’ezda KPSS" (1987; 18-19) [an editorial]; "K 70-letiyu Velikogo ..." (1987; 59-60, 68) [an unsigned, and hence authoritative, article]; "Chelovek - tehnika - priroda ..." (1987; 81-83) [a roundtable sponsored by Kommunist and the Polish journal Nove drogi]; G. Smirnov (1987; 31-32) [Smirnov was director of the Central Committee’s Institute of Marxism–Leninism]; and "Dialektika novogo myshleniya" (1987; 7-12) [an editorial].

For commentaries in Pravda, see: Zhdanov (1987) [compare this analysis with his more cautious treatment of the same subject (the correlation of class and non-class values) one year earlier in Pravda — Zhdanov (1986)]; and Pantin (1987).
Overall, there was a higher level of support for the new thinking in Kommunist. This was probably due to the fact that it was under the editorship of the reformer Ivan Frolov (who in May was promoted to the position of personal aide [pomoshchnik] to Gorbachev), while Pravda was headed by Viktor Afanas’ev, a more conservative figure. To see the contrast between Frolov and Afanas’ev, compare the evaluation of the new thinking in Afanas’ev (1986) [a December, 1986, Pravda article] and Frolov’s comments in K. Smirnov (1987; 115–117) [an April, 1987, Kommunist article]. Frolov’s replacement at Kommunist was N.B. Bikkenin. The change in editorship had no apparent effect on the journal’s contents.

37. See, for example, Ryzhkov (1987; 3) [a speech on the anniversary of Lenin’s birth where he gave a solid endorsement of the new thinking], Razumovskiy (1987; 10), Dobrynin (1987) [probably his most radical endorsement of the new political thinking], Yakovlev (1987a; 4, 17–18), Yakovlev (1987b) [a very strong endorsement], Yakovlev (1987c) and Vadim Medvedev’s comments in “Velikiy Oktyabr’...” (1987) [a forceful endorsement]. All these men were Politburo members (candidate or full) or Central Committee secretaries.

38. In Ligachev’s case, he seems to have been willing at this point to leave matters of foreign policy to Gorbachev. See, especially, his wide-ranging December, 1987, interview with Michel Tatu, where Ligachev never once raised issues of foreign policy. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (1987). Tatu’s personal evaluation, given after the interview, was that Ligachev was indeed content to leave foreign policy to Gorbachev. See his comments as carried by Sovet’ on December 3, 1987.

39. See Note 23 above.

40. As indicated in Chapter 9, the source for this image was probably Gorbachev’s closest confidant: Aleksandr Yakovlev.

41. Gorbachev’s commentary on capitalism contrasts so markedly with his sober and calm discussion of so many other foreign-policy issues (interdependence and values common to all mankind, for example), that it is worth quoting him at length to make clear the extent of this contrast. The following comes from comments Gorbachev delivered at a Kremlin dinner in honor of British Prime Minister Thatcher on March 30, 1987 (Gorbachev [1987e]):

One has to say that in the West there are many dilettantes [lyubiteli] who talk about the right to freedom of choice. By this, however, they mean the choice of the capitalist system. But when one or another people -- be they in Nicaragua, or in Africa, the Near East, Asia -- in practice express a desire to search for another, their own, a more suitable path, these same dilettantes fence them in with dollars, rockets and mercenaries. They begin with hypocrisy and end with bloodshed. As a result, ‘volcanoes’ of regional conflict are boiling.
Also see Gorbachev (1987c; 2), where he upbraided "imperialism" for keeping international tension at a high level and attempting to portray the USSR as the "cause of all evil and misfortune."

42. Gorbachev (1987b; 31).

43. Gorbachev (1987b; 31-32).

44. Gorbachev (1987b; 32-36). Given the extremely revisionist tenor of these remarks, it is perhaps not surprising that in his address to the October, 1987, Central Committee plenum, where he outlined the "basic propositions" of the report being discussed here, Gorbachev completely omitted the "difficult questions" listed above. He only noted that the 70th anniversary report would "broadly [krupno] raise questions about the prospects of the capitalist system." See "Plenum TsK KPSS - Oktyabr' 1987 goda ... " (1989; 209, 222). This stenographic report of the plenum was reproduced in the second issue of Izvestiya TsK KPSS, a new Central Committee journal that began publication in January, 1989.

45. On this, see Shenfield (1987; 57).

46. Gorbachev (1987b; 31-32).

47. "Attendant features" is a translation of privkhodyashchive momenty.


49. According to Lenin:

Modern militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms, it is the 'vital expression' of capitalism -- as a military force used by capitalist states in their external conflicts and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of movement, economic and political, of the proletariat.


50. Gorbachev (1987b; 33). His language was much less forceful here. He simply pointed out that excessive militarization was no longer stimulating, but crippling the US economy. Gorbachev drew no conclusions, but the implication -- following on his previous analysis -- was that the US, too, could outgrow militarism.

51. In the address, Gorbachev in fact clearly linked his revisionist comments on the image of capitalism to the USSR's search for a more cooperative economic and security relationship with the West. See Gorbachev (1987b; 31-32).
52. For IMEMO-Primakov commentary on capitalism during 1985-86, see Chapter 9.

53. Yakovlev (1987b). Yakovlev began the foreign-policy portion of the press conference by giving very strong support to the notion of the priority of values common to all mankind over class ones, calling the former "a reality of our times" that was not some kind of "abstract, philosophical category." However, when he came to the issue of capitalism, there was a notable change in tone. Not only did he refuse to provide an answer to the questions Gorbachev had raised, but he also employed much harsher language. For example, where Gorbachev had simply asked if capitalism could liberate itself from militarism, Yakovlev asked whether capitalism could do without its "militaristic narcotic."

In light of the various Yakovlev articles and speeches cited in chapters 9-10, one sees a distinct and confusing contrast between Yakovlev the "new thinker" on interdependence, non-class values, sufficiency and the like, and Yakovlev the "old thinker" when it came to the issue of capitalism. Yakovlev's reticence to revise official notions of capitalism probably stems in large part from his deep and at times visceral dislike of the main capitalist country: America. This dislike is evident from the titles alone of many books Yakovlev wrote in the sixties, seventies and eighties -- titles like Call to Murder: American Falsifiers of the Problem of War and Peace (1965), The USA: From 'Great' to Sick... (1969) and On the Edge of the Abyss: From Truman to Reagan (1984). For a partial listing of Yakovlev's publications since 1961, see Checkel (1990). For a useful overview of several of these publications, see Harris (1990; 8-10, 12-15).

Several Western correspondents who interviewed Yakovlev in recent years have also noted his profound ambivalence toward America. See, in particular, Taubman (1988), Keller (1988) and Keller (1989; 40-41). I am also indebted to Professor Loren Graham of MIT for sharing his insights on Yakovlev. (Professor Graham met and first became acquainted with Yakovlev during the year Yakovlev spent at Columbia University in the late 1950s.)

Finally, and in addition to the sources cited elsewhere in this chapter, see Yakovlev (1988a), which is the English translation of a book on capitalism that Yakovlev edited. (It was originally published [in Russian] in mid-1987 by Politizdat.) This book is a rather "old thinking" look at contemporary capitalism. See, especially, Yakovlev's introductory chapter: Yakovlev (1988a; 7-25). Also see the review of the Russian version of the book that was published in Pravda: Porokhovshiy (1987).

54. In Kommunist, see Bushuyev and Maslennikov (1987; 44-49) [signed to press on December 7]. For commentaries in Pravda, see Tsagolov and Kireyev (1988) [published on January 4] and, especially, Krasin (1988) [published on January 28].
55. Gorbachev (1988a: 3). In this speech, Gorbachev -- using only slightly different language from that he had employed the previous November -- discussed the first two of the three "difficult questions": the influence of external factors on capitalism's inherent aggressiveness; and whether militarism was an inevitable characteristic of the capitalist system.

56. See "K nasheму читателю" (1987). Among other things, this unprecedented article criticized the excessive number of "duty" (dezhurnye) articles -- that is, articles whose main purpose was to promote official policy -- Memo had published in the early 1980s; promised a series of new rubrics, many of a diskusivye (debating/polemical) character; and declared that, henceforth, Memo would provide more information from international sources. On the first point, the present study can add one additional insight: The greatest number of "duty" articles were on topics not within the Institute's core areas of expertise -- for example, issues of security or arms control. There were many fewer "duty" articles on topics within these core areas -- for example, the issue of global problems. See Chapter 8 above.

57. See Pozdnyakov (1987a). The title alone let the reader know something unusual was in store: "Letter to the Editor: Is it possible to be "a little bit pregnant"? (The Opinion of a Dilettante)." Later in 1987 and 1988, Pozdnyakov would use his polemical skills to good effect in a debate with Aleksy Arbatov. See below.

58. Recall that the "scientific life" rubric carried information on Institute-sponsored conferences and other meetings that IMEMO scholars attended.

59. See, for example, Laptev (1987). This new-found openness would soon spread to most other sections of the journal. For example, beginning early in 1988, the authors of almost all articles were identified.

60. The rubric, which began in the June issue, was entitled Korotko o knizakh (Briefly About Books). Its contents will be discussed below. In many respects, this new section marked a revival of the brief, informative annotations published by Memo in the late 1960s and early 1980s. See Kuchinskiy (1967), Kuchinskiy (1968) and Kapranov (1981).


62. See "Vstrecha s chitatelyami" (1987) and "Vstrechi chitatel`ami v Kishineve" (1987). These will be discussed in more detail below.

63. At this point, Khavinson was 86 years old. He had been editor-in-chief of Memo since its inception in 1957. For this and more information on Khavinson, see "Yakov Semenovich Khavinson" (1989).
64. The information on Khavinson comes from interviews with two Institute researchers, one of whom had fairly extensive dealings with him. On Memo’s numerous unorthodox articles, see Chapters 3–6, 8–9 above.

65. The following information comes from an interview with an Institute researcher. For additional insights on Diligenskiy (which support those presented here), see Polsky (1987; 106).

66. While Georgiy Arbatov does not specifically mention either Diligenskiy or Mirskiy in his account of Party/KGB interference in IMEMO’s work during 1982, it would appear their demotion and firing were related to this pressure campaign. See Chapter 9 for details of Arbatov’s account.

67. See Primakov’s comments in “Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.6; 69-71), Primakov (1987a) and Primakov (1987b; passim). The first source is a conference report published in Memo; the second is a Pravda article; and the third is an article in Kommunist.

68. On the former, see Primakov (1987a) and (1987b; 103). In both cases, he strongly asserted the existence of a single world economy that operated on the basis of “processes and law-governed regularities [zakonomernosti] common” to both capitalism and socialism. On the image of capitalism, see Primakov’s comments in “Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.6; 68-70) and Primakov (1987b; 103-107). These latter two sources were signed-to-press in mid-May and mid-August, 1987, respectively. Gorbachev, as already seen, would first place a revised image of capitalism on the public agenda in early November, 1987.

69. See, especially, Primakov (1987b; 106). He mentioned no particular country, but it was quite clear he was referring to such states as the US, Great Britain and West Germany. To quote Primakov: It is necessary “to raise the question of the possible reversibility of the militarization of the economy, even in those capitalist countries where it has attained serious development.”

Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, had advanced many of the same arguments on the relationship of capitalism to militarism in an article published in January, 1987. See G. Arbatov (1987; 111-114). Aside from Arbatov, I found, through early 1988, no other USA Institute researchers who were addressing this issue.

70. Primakov (1987a). That Primakov was much more specific on nuclear sufficiency probably had much to do with the fact that within IMEMO Aleksey Arbatov had been arguing since 1984 in favor of an assured second strike capability as the main criterion for developing strategic nuclear forces. See A. Arbatov (1984b; 5-6, 9) and the discussion in Chapter 9 above.

Primakov addressed the issue of sufficiency in one other article, but had less to say about it -- arguing simply that it was defined in the
nuclear sphere by the ability to conduct a "destructive retaliatory strike." Primakov (1987b; 109). He did not address the issue at all in his remarks to the international conference. "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.6; 68-71).

71. Compare, for example, the detailed, nine-page report of three conferences that addressed economic matters as well as the political economy of both capitalism and the developing world, with the bland and rather propagandistic report of a conference that examined security in Asia. See, respectively, "Nauchnaya zhizn'" (1987) and Grabenschikov (1987).

72. The aggregated book totals for Nos.8-11 (1987) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political economy of capitalism</td>
<td>33 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political economy of the developing world</td>
<td>6 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political economy (general)</td>
<td>28 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international relations/foreign policy</td>
<td>37 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>104 books</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Political economy (general)" includes books on international political economy (for example, the role of transnational corporations), socialist political economy (for example, integration processes within Comecon) and Soviet political economy.

The above percentages are virtually identical to those for all articles published in Memo during 1981. See Chapter 7, Note 27, and the accompanying text.

73. The following is based on Nazarova (1987), a summary of the responses to the survey Memo published in October, 1986, and on two meetings the journal's editorial board held with readers during 1987: "Vstrecha s ..." (1987) and "Vstrechi chitatel'yi ..." (1987).

74. Here, the readers not only asked for more information and analyses. They also explicitly requested that such analyses be comparative in nature -- for example, data on the world economy that included data on the USSR's role in it, and comparative data on the USSR and the European Economic Community. See Nazarova (1987; 138-39) and "Vstrechi chitatel'yi ..." (1987; 136).

75. Remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy during a discussion at MIT in October, 1987.

76. Khvoynik (1987). This is a review of the seventh UNCTAD conference, held in July-August, 1987. At several points, Khvoynik explicitly linked the changed conduct of the USSR at the conference to its new approach to international economic affairs -- an approach brought about, he argued, by the Soviet Union's appreciation of the world's growing interdependence. Implicit throughout Khvoynik's commentary was the judgment that the political demands of the developing world at the
conference (for example, the establishment of a new world economic order) would have to be subordinated to the realities of international economic interdependence. His title clearly was meant to suggest this revised set of priorities: "Imperative of Interdependence (Toward the Results of UNCTAD VII)." The change in Soviet conduct at the conference was in fact the culmination of trends evident in Soviet scholarship and official commentary since the late 1970s. On this, see Valkenier (1983; 113-117).

77. Avakov and Baranovskiy (1987; 31) forcefully argued that in an interdependent world "there cannot and should not be closed economies." Medevkov (1987; passim) drew on the US experience to present a more realistic assessment of the good and bad aspects of the "growing tendency to the economic interdependence of states."

78. See Martynov's comments in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No. 6; 76-80). For the dissusseviya article, see Shishkov (1987). Shishkov polemicized with foes of the concept and provided extensive empirical justification for it. (The article contained 42 footnotes!)


80. "Nekotlozhnaya problema ... " (1987; 3-4). During 1987, there were many other examples of the Institute's support of the new approach to security. See, for example, Kapchenko (1987; 8-10) and Razmerov (1987; 122-125). The former stressed the importance of political means for resolving disputes, while the latter emphasized the importance of new concepts of security, and the need for East-West cooperation on economic and security issues.


82. Kapchenko (1987; 9). This was written at virtually the same time as Gorbachev's mid-September izvestiya article, where Gorbachev had made a similar point about the implication of the priority of interests common to all mankind for Soviet foreign policy. See Note 11 above, and the accompanying text.

83. It was precisely this interpretation of the priority of non-class over class interests that would provoke Yegor' Ligachev's first public attack on the new thinking. See Ligachev (1988), where he argued that the resolution of non-class, common-to-all-mankind problems in no way meant there should be a lessening in support for the national liberation struggle.


85. The series ran in Nos. 1-4, 6, 7 and 12 of 1987.

86. See Chapter 9, Notes 80-82, and the accompanying text.
87. Gur'yev (1987; 5-9). The quote comes from p.9. Gur'yev's subject matter was actually the prospects for communist and workers' parties in industrially-developed capitalist countries. To address this subject, however, he obviously had to examine the capabilities of the capitalist system against which such parties struggled.

88. Shapiro (1987; 8-9, 11-15). This was published in the April issue of Memo. Shapiro began his discussion of capitalism by criticizing "economists-internationalists" (that is, his fellow IMEMO researchers) for having failed to sufficiently study the new processes occurring in capitalist countries. Later, he argued that the state-monopoly capitalism of today was very different from the capitalism of previous years, and was exhibiting many new processes and tendencies. While Shapiro did not explicitly delineate these new processes, the diskussiya series running in Memo did discuss them in great detail. These were phenomena such as privatization and deregulation. For details, see Taylor (1990; 10-18).

89. See Bovin's comments in "Dialog: Na poroge ... " (1987; 52-57).


91. Academic institutions such as IMEMO participated in (or helped sponsor) two different types of conferences: scientific-theoretical (nauchno-teoreticheskaya) or scientific-practical (nauchno-prakticheskaya). The former was attended chiefly by academic specialists, while the latter was usually attended by a mixture of specialists and policymakers (from various ministries). See Laptev (1987) for a report on a scientific-practical conference addressed by academic analysts and several ranking officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In light of the bold, revisionist views that were advanced at the March conference being discussed here, it is perhaps not surprising that it was a scientific-theoretical meeting -- that is, one where no policymakers were present.

92. See "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, Nos.6-8, 11). The proceedings covered a total of 40 pages in Memo. In both its length and bold willingness to challenge official orthodoxy, this report reminded one of Memo's coverage of the Institute's 1969 roundtable on international relations. See "Problemy teorii ... " (1969, Nos.9, 11).


94. These five characteristics, elaborated in Lenin's 1917 essay, were: (1) the decisive role of monopolies in economic activity; (2) the merging of banking and financial capital; (3) the key importance of the export of capital; (4) the division of the world into spheres of influence by the capitalist powers; and (5) the completion of this territorial division of the world among the capitalist powers. See Lenin (1939; 89) [a translation of the 1917 essay] and Bottomore (1983; 224). For present purposes, it is the fourth and fifth characteristics that are of most interest. Taken together, they implied unceasing
foreign-policy aggression and wars on the part of imperialism as the
great capitalist powers battled to redivide an already divided world.
In other contexts, Lenin would label this inclination to foreign-policy
aggression as "militarism." See Lenin as quoted in Yakovlev (1988a;
116-117).

95. "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.6; 69-70).

96. For the comments of all three men, see "Mezhdunarodnaya
konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.7; 69-61). On the issue of limiting
militarism, it was actually a scholar affiliated with the USA Institute
who employed the most forceful language, arguing that militarism could
be "limited and constrained, and even fully eliminated." See Semeyko's
comments in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.7; 60).
Semeyko was a former military officer who had been at ISKAN for a number
of years.

97. "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.7; 60). Aleksandr
Bovin used forceful language to make much the same point in his
contribution to the December issue of Memo. See "Dialog" (1987; 60).

98. "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.8; 85-86).

99. See Rosin's comments in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987,
No.8; 88).

100. Recall that Gorbachev's commentary on capitalism had remained
extremely orthodox throughout the first 10 months of 1987.

101. For military commentary during this period stressing a very
aggressive image of capitalism, see, among others, Yazov (1987b; 3-4,
16, 30, 83), Gareyev (1987; 3-4) and Kirshin (1987; 30-31).

102. Avakov and Baranovskiy (1987; 22-26, 30).

103. Avakov and Baranovskiy (1987; 20).


105. For examples of both types of analysis, see, respectively, Chapter
7 (on the chemical weapons arms-control negotiations) and Chapter 2 (on

106. IMEMO Akademii Nauk SSSR (1987, Volume 1; Chapter 10).

107. It is indicative that the last section of the chapter was entitled
"Discussions in the West on Questions of Reductions of Armed Forces and
Conventional Armaments."

108. Karpov (1987). Karpov devoted half his review to various
criticisms of the yearbook -- an extraordinarily large amount by Memo
standards. (A typical review would have one or two paragraphs of criticism, usually coming at the very end.)


112. On this, see the figures in Phillips (1990; 49-50). Phillips’ well-argued study presents a rather exhaustive review of Soviet writing on sufficiency.


115. Aside from the sources cited above, Memo published only one other commentary on sufficiency in 1987 and early 1988. This was by deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy. See Petrovskiy (1987; 4-5), where he confusingly argued that sufficiency: (1) was defined by the requirements of defense from aggression; (2) meant the exclusion of “offensive potentials” from armed forces; and (3) was not so much a military concept as a “political one.” Deputy Institute director Bykov, who had so much trouble defining sufficiency in 1986, seemed to have given up on the concept in 1987. In a February article pegged to the October, 1986, Reykjavik summit, Bykov claimed that the Soviet arms-control proposals advanced at that meeting were based on the principle of equality and equal security! Bykov (1987; 4). Recall that the concept of sufficiency had been intended to replace this “principle.”


117. To repeat a point made earlier: “Civilian” here refers to social scientists at institutions like IMEMO and not to the physical scientists who had played such a dominant role in the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.

118. Recall, however, that not all civilian researchers used sources of this type. As was seen in Chapters 8 and 9, a number of analysts at ISKAN had been making use of sources such as International Security and the Adelphi Papers (plus many similar ones) for several years.

120. Arbatov and Savel'yev (1987).


Earlier in the year, Savel'yev had reviewed a new book by the Union of Concerned Scientists (In Search of Stability: An Assessment of New US Nuclear Forces), and in the process, provided new for the pages of Memo information on how particular features of nuclear weapons could affect strategic stability. The features he (and the book) discussed were lethality, flight time, survivability and control. See Savel'yev (1987).

122. Arbatov and Savel'yev (1987; 20-23). Their ideal C³I system included the following characteristics:

* the system should be able to survive a surprise attack, but not be able to function for more than "several hours" after the beginning of a nuclear exchange;
* redundancy (that is, back-up mechanisms) should be built into the system;
* the system should allow the political leadership of the country to exercise full negative control (that is, nuclear employment is impossible without the specific sanction of the political leaders).

123. Arbatov and Savel'yev (1987; 18, 22).

124. See, in particular, Arbatov (1989), and the response to this article by several military writers in International Affairs (Moscow), August, 1989, pp.136-139. The military’s basic complaint was that Arbatov was "incompetent".

125. A. Batov (1988a) and (1988b).


127. Compare, for example, Arbatov (1988a) and (1988b) with Bykov (1987). As will be seen below, this difference in approach eventually resulted in a bitter debate between Arbatov and several other researchers at the Institute.


129. See Partan (1990; 3, 5). The contrast here with Andrey Kokoshin is particularly striking. See below.
130. MEMO was clearly aware of the opportunities for involvement in security policymaking the revamped Supreme Soviet presented. The Institute quickly established an "Observer" -- Georgiy Sturma -- at the Supreme Soviet. For his first two reports, see Sturma (1990a) and (1990b) -- both of which focused on the Supreme Soviet's handling of security issues.

For an ISKAN perspective on the changed nature of the access, see Kokoshin (1991; 137-38), where he argues that institutes such as ISKAN and MEMO are becoming "increasingly involved in the decisionmaking process in the new Supreme Soviet" on arms-control questions (as well as other issues).

131. Partan (1990; 2) confirms the interpretation given in earlier chapters that Arbatov's dynamic personality and "connections" explain much of his success at MEMO beginning in the mid-1980s.

132. On this particular point, see Halperin (1974; 39-40). Also see the discussion in Chapter 1 above.


134. "Neotlozhnaya problema ... " (1987; 6-7).


137. Alekseyev and Bugrov (1987; 72). Alekseyev was a senior researcher in Bugrov's department.


139. See Gantman's remarks in "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya ... " (1987, No.7; 61).

140. Pozdnyakov (1987b; 28).


142. Arbatov (1988a; 11). The phrase "hidden polemic" is Arbatov's.

143. Arbatov (1988a; 15, 19, 21) and (1988b; 18-20, 29-30). It should also be noted that Arbatov, in attacking Bykov, et al., was also criticizing the approach Gorbachev and other political leaders had endorsed at Reykjavik. That approach was first to clear away the political obstacles (SDI) and reach sweeping political agreements (the
complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons in 10 years), and then (at a later point) to worry about the technical details.

144. Arbatov (1988a; 21).

145. See, in particular, the rather bitter exchange between Arbatov and Pozdnyakov in the October, 1988, issue of Memo. Arbatov (1988c) and Pozdnyakov (1988). Partan (1990; 2, 4) confirms the existence of personal and professional disagreements between Arbatov and a number of scholars in the Institute’s Department of International Relations.

146. This is primarily based on my own observations of Arbatov and Kokoshin on several trips they have made to the United States. Partan (1990; 3-4) also notes the very different styles of the two men, with Arbatov often having more adversarial relationships than Kokoshin with other individuals and institutions.

147. For example, Yakovlev’s April speech to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. See above.

148. And, through the early months of 1988, it was doing this in a much bigger way than IMEMO.


150. This is in addition to the three articles written or co-authored by Kokoshin that addressed Soviet national security and were published in Memo. See above.


On the general topic of ballistic missile defenses, SSHA published two other high-quality analyses during 1987. See Ushanov, Vasil’yev & Voronkov (1987), which provides a detailed overview of the organizational and R & D infrastructure of the US SDI program; and Kulik and Sergeyev (1987), which is a sophisticated military-technical analysis of the C3I problems associated with an echeloned ballistic missile defense system.

152. A. Arbatov, Kokoshin & Vasil’yev (1987a) and (1987b). The advocacy favoring an asymmetric response to SDI comes on p.24 of the latter source. Although surely unintentional, it is an apt indicator of the differing degree of strategic expertise of their institutions that two of the authors of this important set of articles were from ISKAN, while one was from IMEMO.

153. See above.


156. Through early 1988, I found only two instances in which IMEMO scholars contributed articles on security to SShA: the two-part article Aleksey Arbatov co-authored with Kokoshin and Vasil’yev (see above); and an analysis of conventional weaponry written by Vadim Makarevskiy, a retired military officer at IMEMO [Makarevskiy (1987)]. Compare this number to the numerous instances cited in this and earlier chapters of ISKAN analysts contributing articles on security topics to Memo.

157. The two were Alexey Vasil’yev and Alexandr Konovalov. See Roberts (1990; 184). Both men, it is interesting to note, have some technical training.

158. I am indebted to Matthew Partan for this information. See Partan (1990; 5). I use the phrase "stark contrast" because Arbatov seems to have spent less time cultivating ties with the professional military than attacking them. See above.
Chapter 11: Conclusions

This study began by asking two questions. First, during the Brezhnev and early Gorbachev years did social scientists working at the Academy of Sciences international-affairs institutes have any real influence on foreign and national-security policymaking in the USSR? If so, then on what kinds of issues and at what point(s) in the process were they influential players? Second, what tools can we employ to understand better their behavior and participation in Soviet foreign policy? We are now in a position to provide some answers.

Influence. There are really three separate questions to address here: influence on what kinds of issues, via what types of access channels and at what point(s) in the process. On the first point, the present study indicates that institutions such as INEMO (and ISKAN) have been much more influential in shaping leadership perceptions on general matters of foreign policy (the image of the international system, views of US foreign policymaking and the nature of capitalism) than in developing concrete national-security policies (how much is enough for Soviet defense and what are the proper means for verifying an arms-control accord, for example).

This distinction between foreign and national-security policies, however, is somewhat artificial, and in the Soviet context it is in fact quite misleading. As we have seen, in both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras debates over national-security issues have become intertwined with more general debates on foreign policy. This intertwining has in part come about because the past quarter century has seen the Soviet political leadership coming to the slow realization that unilateral
approaches to ensuring national security (and autarkic strategies of economic development) must be replaced or at least supplemented with more cooperative approaches.¹

This shift in emphasis has inevitably led to greater security (and economic) interaction with both the outside world in general and the USSR's chief adversary, capitalist America, in particular. Questions of national security, which were relatively straightforward when a unilateral approach dominated, have become increasingly complex as a more cooperative approach has come to the fore. For example, a central question related to Soviet national-security policy since the late 1960s has been whether a more cooperative approach to ensuring security was even possible with a capitalist (and therefore inherently aggressive) America. On issues of this latter type, institutions such as IMEMO had (and have) a wealth of organizational expertise.

Thus, the revisionist, non-class views on the international system and the nature of capitalism held by many scholars at IMEMO and ISKAN have mattered in the more specific debates over Soviet national security during the past 25 years. To state this evident fact, however, is to beg the more important question: How have these views mattered? That is, how have social scientists at IMEMO or ISKAN influenced Soviet policy? Through what channels? Perhaps key policymakers were regular readers of Memo or SSHA. What we know of the Brezhnev leadership generation (and its intellectual inclinations!) suggests the existence of such an influence channel is rather doubtful, to say the least.

What about the Gorbachev era? After all, this is clearly a much more enlightened (and indeed intellectual) set of leaders. Even now,
however, it is quite doubtful that there are any regular readers of academic journals among top policymakers. A reality of top-level policymaking in all types of political systems is that there is little time for long and nuanced academic analyses.²

A second possible access channel is the acknowledged practice whereby institutes like IMEMO send slimmed-down, more policy-relevant reports to the Central Committee apparatus.³ However, as a deputy head at ISKAN has recently frankly admitted, such position papers were indeed sent, but usually with the vain hope that someone would read them.⁴

The evidence adduced in this study indicates that a third possible access channel -- personal ties to top policymakers and their staffs -- was in fact a crucially important one for institutions such as IMEMO during both the Brezhnev and early Gorbachev years. There is abundant evidence that IMEMO heads Inozemtsev, Yakovlev, and Primakov, as well as ISKAN director Arbatov have had personal access to various members of the top political leadership. This study, however, sheds some light on how these organizational heads have exploited this access by mobilizing their institutions to influence on-going policy debates. (In the late 1960s: Is a more cooperative relationship with the capitalist West possible? Is arms control a legitimate endeavor? In the 1980s: What is the nature of the international system? What is the proper correlation of class and non-class values in Soviet foreign policy? Is capitalism inherently aggressive?)

An evident problem with this type of access channel is how easily it can be ruptured. In 1982, for example, whatever influence and access IMEMO had (through Inozemtsev) to top policymakers was apparently
completely disrupted by a KGB/Party "intrigue" against the Institute. Likewise, a comparison of the behavior of IMEMO and ISKAN in the early and mid-1980s suggests that Georgiy Arbatov (and ISKAN) -- who had been so close to Brezhnev -- seemed to have suffered a relative decline in his access (and hence ISKAN's ability to influence policy) in the post-Brezhnev period.⁵

Given the clear importance of personal ties between institute heads and policymakers, we need to ask whether we are talking about the institutional influence of an organization such as IMEMO, or the personal influence of individuals such as Primakov or Arbatov. As I have endeavored to show, the answer to this question is not of the "either, or" variety; rather, it is more a matter of "both, and." We are talking about both personal and institutional influence.

The case of Yevgeniy Primakov provides the best example. Primakov seems to have exerted considerable personal influence on Gorbachev -- for example, in altering the General Secretary's thinking on the nature of capitalism. Yet, surely one of the reasons Primakov was able to do this was that he had a "mobilizable" institutional resource -- IMEMO -- at his disposal. He could (and did) mobilize Institute scholars to substantiate the arguments he was in all probability making to Gorbachev or his staff in private. It is worth recalling that Primakov was competing with Alexandr Yakovlev for the General Secretary's ear on this particular issue, and Primakov -- the one with direct institutional expertise at his disposal -- eventually won out.⁶

The final question to address in this section is at what point or points in the process have social scientists and their institutions been
influential players? Recall from Chapter 1, that we have distinguished between four stages of the process: agenda setting (including its early phase and public agenda setting), option formulation, decision selection and implementation. This study, which has focused on the first two stages, makes clear there is no set answer to this question. In the 1960s, IMEMO appeared to be influential at certain points during option formulation as director Inozemtsev and other Institute scholars made the case for both a more nuanced image of American foreign policy and the very concept of arms control.7

In the early and mid-1980s, by contrast, IMEMO appears to have been an influential and active player in the process both before and after the public agenda was set.8 The contrast between the 1960s and 1980s is in fact rather easily explained. IMEMO became an important player in the process once its top leader had established ties to key elite policymakers. In the late 1960s, this occurred in 1969–70 -- the height of option formulation over SALT -- as Inozemtsev was first drawn into Brezhnev’s circle of advisers. In the 1980s, IMEMO’s director (first Yakovlev and then Primakov) has been a member of Gorbachev’s closest set of advisors since late 1983, that is, well before the public agenda setting on the “new thinking” began in late 1985 and early 1986.

Behavior and Participation. Evidence from both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras indicates that the organizational-politics model advanced in Chapter 1 is indeed helpful for interpreting the behavior of an institution such as IMEMO.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, and once again over a decade later, the Institute was most assertive on those issues that best fit
with its core sense of organizational mission and areas of expertise. On these issues, the assertiveness was evident in an extraordinary number of different ways: explicit attacks on opponents; advocacy from Institute directors and deputy directors; advocacy in lead articles published in *Memo*; advocacy on these issues in roundtables, *diskussiya* articles, Institute editorials (in the 1960s), or in Institute-authored "theses" (in the 1960s and 1980s); giving extensive coverage to conferences that examined such issues.

The concept of organizational "mission" also helps one to understand why Institute behavior with respect to various security issues was more passive. The study of security issues had never been fully incorporated into IMEMO's dominant sense of mission. This fact alone goes a long way toward explaining why IMEMO was slower than ISKAN to get into the new game of security studies in the late 1980s -- and why entry into this new field created greater internal strife within IMEMO than within the USA Institute.

Finally, a knowledge of IMEMO's sense of mission is crucial for appreciating why, in both the late 1960s and mid-1980s, the Institute seized upon open "policy windows" (created by a changing public agenda) to promote several of its own long-standing goals.

To this point, I have talked of organizational missions as a given. This, however, begs another question: How are organizational missions defined and how do they change? To answer this question, we must turn to a consideration of the role of individuals within organizations.

The evidence presented in this study suggests a modification is needed in what I argued in Chapter 1 concerning the definition of
organizational missions. In particular, I would now give slightly
greater weight to the role of institutional leaders (at least in the
Soviet context) in defining (and redefining) these missions. The case
of IMEMO and security studies is illustrative of this point. One can
correctly note -- as I have above -- that as of early 1988 IMEMO still
trailed ISKAN (and, needless to say, the Soviet military) in terms of
its expertise on strategic affairs.

The more proper standard for measuring change, however, is within
IMEMO itself. Here, the extent of change and organizational mission
redefinition -- in a little over two years (1986-88) -- is quite
remarkable. Obviously, Institute head Primakov was aided in this task
by a very facilitating external environment (political leaders calling
for civilian study of security issues) and an able "policy entrepreneur"
(Aleksey Arbatov) within the Institute. Nonetheless, his accomplishment
seems impressive. One only need pick up two issues of Memo, one, say,
from 1985 and the other from 1988, and glance at the table of contents
to appreciate the degree of change.

The mention of Aleksey Arbatov serves as a useful reminder of
another point: Organizational leaders are not the only important players
within organizations. "Policy entrepreneurs" like Arbatov can, given
the right conditions, play key roles in shaping organizational behavior.
Arbatov seems to have had the right combination of drive, expertise,
connections and institutional support -- along with a very propitious
external environment -- to succeed in a major way. Paradoxically, some
of Arbatov's other attributes (in particular, his abrasive style) seemed
to have partially undermined his success within IMEMO -- for example, by
hindering the establishment of access and influence channels to key security policymakers.

The above paragraphs should drive home an important fact in the study of organizations and their behavior. They are "messy" things. The "ideal types" very rarely, if ever, exist. With IMEMO, it was never simply a case of its leader pulling a pliant organization along behind himself or of this leader simply being pushed along by the tide of organizational traditions. The appointment of new organizational leaders, changing external environments and the presence of "entrepreneurs" make predictions concerning institutional behavior a problematic exercise.

Why bother, then, with this detailed "look inside" an institution such as IMEMO? For the simple reason that it matters. As this study has shown, a full appreciation of IMEMO's participation in Soviet foreign policymaking and its ability to influence policy requires an understanding of not only the political environment in which it operates, but its own organizational context as well.

The Future

In considering the changing role of IMEMO and other social-science institutions in Soviet foreign policymaking, one could be quite optimistic and argue that the institutchiki have never had it so good. After all, not one but two former IMEMO directors -- Primakov and Yakovlev -- are in Gorbachev's closest circle of advisers. This fact alone suggests that the Institute's ability to influence current policy is quite high. Indeed, a researcher recounted a recent episode where
the Institute disagreed with parts of an official Soviet-Japanese communiqué that was being prepared. Changes reflecting the Institute's preferences were made, he claimed, after "a few phone calls" were placed to the Institute's "friends" in the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{10}

As this study has shown, this particular access channel for influencing policy -- personal ties to the political leadership -- is nothing new for IMEMO. As we have seen, a basic problem with this channel is its fragile nature. Needless to say, if Gorbachev were to be replaced by a more conservative figure, IMEMO (as well as social scientists at other institutes) could see an immediate and dramatic reduction in its ability to influence policy.

This "worse case" scenario, however, is not as grim as it used to be. The last three years have seen an increase in the number of access channels that social scientists at IMEMO and elsewhere have established to the policy process. There is, for example, the newly revitalized Supreme Soviet. It has two committees with oversight of foreign and national-security policy, but little of its own "in house" expertise on foreign policy. Members of both these committees have in fact turned to researchers at IMEMO and ISKAN for an array of advice and information.\textsuperscript{11} IMEMO has even accredited its own "Observer" to the committees.\textsuperscript{12}

Another new access channel has been established at the Foreign Ministry. This particular channel had its origins in the Scientific Coordination Center established within the Ministry in mid-1986.\textsuperscript{13} Originally set up simply to coordinate the research of social scientists with the policy concerns of the political leadership, the Center (as well as other parts of the Ministry) are now commissioning and paying
analysts at both IMEMO and ISKAN to prepare reports.\textsuperscript{14}

Along with these new opportunities, however, researchers at IMEMO and elsewhere face several problems and dilemmas. One is the durability of these new access channels. While it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby the changes of the past six years were simply reversed, it is unfortunately all too easy to picture a future -- more conservative -- political environment in which one or more of these new channels might "dry up" to a considerable extent.

A second set of problems relates specifically to IMEMO. First, the Academy of Sciences is now more or less on self financing. Partly as a result of this fact, IMEMO, over the last two years, has seen its research and support staff slashed by roughly 20\% -- from 1,000 to 800.\textsuperscript{15} Second, Primakov's successor as director, Vladlen Martynov, is not highly respected within IMEMO.\textsuperscript{16} Given the key role previous Institute directors have played in mobilizing IMEMO and shaping its overall organizational climate, this appointment is not an encouraging development.

Finally, the Institute is apparently having considerable difficulty retaining its younger cadre of scholars -- that is, the people who in large measure represent its future. The allure of the USSR's new (albeit limited) private enterprise climate and the prospect of paid private consulting jobs are clearly taking their toll. Among these younger scholars, the Institute's two-decade-long quest for a more "scientific" foreign policy is competing with more prosaic needs: the chance to make some money and travel abroad.

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Notes

1. I would date the beginning of this realization to the late 1960s.

2. While top policymakers may have little time for academic analyses, it is quite possible that staff members to these policymakers are "consumers" of such writing. Indeed, the views of an Inozemtsev, Yakovlev or Primakov may have first been brought to the attention of the general secretary (be it Brezhnev or Gorbachev) through members of his staff. Thanks to Don Blackmer and Stephen Meyer for helping to clarify my thinking on this point.


5. I am not arguing that Arbatov/ISKAN have had no influence on policy in recent years; rather this influence has declined relative to that of Yakovlev-Primakov/IMEMO as both IMEMO heads were clearly closer to Gorbachev.

6. During 1987 -- the key year of debate over this issue -- Yakovlev headed no particular organization (as did Primakov). Rather, he was a Politburo member with general oversight responsibilities of various institutions.

I realize the somewhat speculative nature of my argument here. A more definitive answer awaits interviews in Moscow.

7. Recall, in particular, Inozemtsev's "cameo" appearance at an important Central Committee plenum held (in November, 1971) during the Soviet debate over SALT. See Chapter 6.

8. That is, during the early phase of agenda setting and option formulation.

9. In March, 1990, both men were appointed to the new Presidential Council. This council, however, was disbanded in the late fall of 1990. It has now (spring 1991) been at least partially supplanted by a newly created National Security Council. Primakov, but not Yakovlev, is a member of this new body.

10. Interview. This episode occurred in 1989. Partan (1990; 2) provides further confirmation that the close ties among Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Primakov have enhanced the Institute's ability to influence top-level policymakers.

11. I am indebted to Martha Snodgrass for this information. In December, 1990, Ms. Snodgrass visited a series of Academy research institutes as part of a delegation of American women scholars interested
in issues of international security. At most institutes, they met with fairly high-ranking researchers (for example, meeting with Kokoshin, Konovalev and Larionov at the USA Institute).

12. This is Georgiy Sturua. For his first reports in Memo, see Sturua (1990a) and (1990b). Recall that Sturua's research interests include several security issues (strategic ASW and naval strategy, for example).

13. See Chapters 7 and 9 above.

14. Again, thanks to Martha Snodgrass for this information, which comes from a meeting held at the Ministry's Planning and Assessments Directorate in December, 1990.

15. These figures come from Clemens (1989; 31). The Institute is attempting to adapt to this new fiscal environment, and, like many Soviet organizations, it has been busily establishing various joint ventures. See, for example, the announcement of the joint venture "Business in the USSR" established by IMEMO and The Economist Group of London, as printed in The Economist, November 17, 1990, p.18.

16. This observation and the information in the following paragraph come from interviews with two Institute researchers. Recall that Martynov served as acting director of IMEMO in the immediate wake of Inozemtsev's death.
SALT I Chronology

1966

March-April: 23rd CPSU Party Congress; Kosygin indicates that, after year-long review, case for larger defense expenditures has carried the day

Mid-1966: US Secretary of Defense McNamara first suggests (within US government) idea of SALT-like talks; his concern is to head off US-USSR race in ballistic missile defense (BMD)

July: Warsaw Pact Conference in Bucharest; collective security, detente and cooperation in Europe are stressed (7/5)

December: Johnson (through US Ambassador Thompson in Moscow) proposes bilateral US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations; his proposal focuses on BMD limitations (12/6)

[Note: United States had first proposed dissociating strategic arms limitation from comprehensive disarmament plans at the Geneva-based Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, where, in January 1964, it had proposed to explore a freeze on US-Soviet offensive and defensive strategic delivery systems]

1967

All Year: Kosygin and Johnson exchange private messages on proposed negotiations; Soviets agree in principle to idea, but do not want time/place for talks fixed; Soviets want offensive as well as defensive strategic weapons covered in talks; US immediately agrees to this

All Year (into 1968) Debate within Soviet military over BMD: majority of top military leadership argues that BMD cannot be totally effective; Air Defense Forces disagree

January: Number of operational ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers reaches 2280 for US, 750 for USSR (if missile launchers under construction are included, the Soviet number rises to 1200)

Outer Space Treaty is signed (1/27)

March: Johnson announces that Kosygin has indicated a
willingness to begin discussions on strategic nuclear arms control; US proposes to send a high-level team to Moscow to begin talks; Soviets reject proposal (3/2)

April: Meeting of European communist/workers’ parties in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia; European security issue is stressed (4/24-26)

Grechko is appointed Minister of Defense

May: US government spokesman, in a change of position, indicates that a strategic arms limitation agreement could be verified without on-site inspection

June: Six-Day War fought in Middle East (early June)

Glassboro Summit: Johnson makes strong pitch for SALT; McNamara pushes hard for reciprocal BMD restraints; Kosygin seems noncommittal

Kosygin states that limits on offensive and defensive strategic weapons must be linked (late June)

August: CPSU Central Committee issues decree on social sciences (8/14)

September: US decides to deploy nation-wide BMD system (9/18)

November: ISKAN is established

1968

All Year: Confidential exchanges on SALT continue between United States and Soviets

Sometime in Year: Soviets stop work on 2 of 6 Galosh BMD complexes around Moscow

February: Kosygin’s gives speech stressing USSR’s economic problems; he advocates a shift from domestic to Western sources of new technology (2/14)

March: Preparatory work on Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) begins

April: CPSU Central Committee Plenum held; foreign-policy issues are addressed (4/10-11)

May-June: Debate peaks over entry into SALT talks
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's speech to First Committee of the United Nations (5/20)

Private bargaining takes place between Johnson and Kosygin

UN approves Nonproliferation Treaty (late June)

Gromyko delivers speech to Supreme Soviet (6/27)

July:

Johnson announces agreement with USSR to begin discussions on limiting offensive and defensive strategic systems (7/1)

USSR sends memorandum to UN "Concerning Certain Urgent Measures to Stop the Arms Race and Achieve Disarmament" (SALT-like strategic arms limitations are one of nine arms control/disarmament measures proposed); this is the basis of Soviet public disarmament policy for the next 15 months

US and USSR agree on September 30 starting date for SALT talks (linked to proposed September summit meeting in Leningrad between Johnson and Kosygin)

August:

First test flight of US MIRV system

Soviet forces invade Czechoslovakia on eve of public announcement of SALT talks; summit and SALT are postponed

September:

Number of operational ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers reaches 2275 for US, 1150 for USSR (ii missile launchers under construction are included, Soviet number rises to 1650)

October:

CPSU Central Committee Plenum; foreign-policy issues are addressed (10/30-31)

October-Nov.:

Soviet military press regularly deletes Soviet references to proposed SALT talks

November:

Nixon is elected President of United States

Soviets signal to incoming Nixon administration their willingness to begin SALT talks promptly (November-January)

December:

CPSU Central Committee Plenum; Brezhnev shows heightened concern over economy (12/9)
1969

Sometime in Year:
USSR Academy of Sciences establishes a study group on SALT-related issues; group is staffed with physical scientists, not social scientists

March:
Soviet-Chinese border clashes
Warsaw Pact issues Budapest Appeal (3/17)

June:
International Communist meeting; Brezhnev’s speech stresses East-West cooperation/negotiation
Brezhnev proposes Asian collective security system

September:
IMEMO sponsors roundtable on "Problems of the Theory of International Relations"

October:
Brandt becomes Chancellor of West Germany
Sino-Soviet border talks open
US and USSR announce that SALT talks will begin on 11/17/69 for "a preliminary discussion of the questions involved" (10/25)

November:
Total (= operational plus under construction) ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers: 2235 (US), 2035 (USSR)

Nov.-Dec.:
First round of SALT talks held in Helsinki; United States takes lead in presenting elements of agreement; Soviets suggest severely limiting (but not banning) BMD (11/17-12/22)

December:
CPSU Central Committee Plenum; Brezhnev now arguing that increases in economic efficiency will determine winner in East-West competition; he harshly criticizes Soviet economic performance; foreign-policy issues also discussed (12/15)

Soviet government announces that official Soviet defense budget will increase 1.1% in 1970, compared to increases of 15% in 1968 and 6% in 1969 (12/16)

1970

All Year:
Brezhnev devotes more attention to foreign-policy issues
in his speeches (possible indicator that he is gaining more power or authority relative to Kosygin)

All Year (into 1971)

Arms control discussions/arguments that first appeared in SSHA and Memo begin to appear in Brezhnev’s speeches and in Pravda, Izvestiya and Kommunist editorials

Tension/debate builds over resource allocation: should priority be given to agricultural investment and consumer goods or to heavy industry and defense?

Early 1970:

Academic specialists become more assertive; USSR seems more serious about SALT

January:

Journal SSHA begins publication

April:

Main SALT negotiations open in Vienna on April 16; both sides tentatively propose a MIR ban and are close on issue of BMD limitations; Soviets present outline of basic provisions of any agreement; US proposes to limit BMD to capitals only (4/12); USSR accepts this (4/27)

Warsaw Pact’s “Budapest Appeal” includes—for first time—the US and Canada as participants in proposed European security conference (6/26)

August:

US tables new proposal in SALT talks: limit BMD to capitals or a total ban on BMD; Soviet response is negative (8/4)

Soviet-West German treaty is signed (8/12)

December:

In SALT talks, Soviets formally propose (as a first step) limiting BMD systems (12/1)

Civil unrest in Poland

1971

All Year (into 1972)

US shows more interest than USSR in limiting strategic offensive arms

New division of responsibilities within Soviet leadership becomes apparent: Brezhnev now overseeing East-West relations; Kosygin oversees the Middle East and less-important West European countries; Podgorny assumes responsibility for relations with Third World countries
Sometime
in Year:

Soviets resume work on Galosh BMD system around Moscow

January-May:

High-level "back channel" in SALT talks includes Nixon/Kosygin letters; Kissinger/Dobrynin conversations

February:

Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) is unveiled after 30 month delay; Group B (consumer) goods projected to have higher growth than Group A (producer) goods

Seabed Arms Control Treaty is signed (2/11)

March:

In SALT talks, Soviets present in treaty form their 12/1/70 proposal on limiting BMD to capitals (3/19)

Confusion grows in US SALT delegation over US proposals on BMD: limit it to one or four sites? (late March)

March-April:

24th CPSU Party Congress; Brezhnev launches his "peace program" and further consolidates his internal position (four of his supporters are elevated to the Politburo); Brezhnev gives SALT his clear endorsement; some evidence (see the Congress resolutions) that Brezhnev's foreign policy/arms control program not fully supported

May:

Brezhnev replaces Kosygin as the Soviet spokesman in all high-level exchanges in SALT talks

Brezhnev publicly announces Soviet readiness to begin MBFR-like negotiations

Breakthrough in SALT negotiations is reached: BMD limits and certain limits on strategic offensive weapons to be negotiated; Soviets soften their position on US forward-based systems in Europe (5/20)

June:

Soviets propose a nuclear disarmament conference of the five nuclear powers (6/15)

July:

Kissinger makes first visit to China

August:

Four-power agreement on Berlin is reached

September:

Brezhnev meets Brandt (privately) in the Crimea

Gromyko and Rogers sign agreement on "Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War between the US and the USSR" and the Hotline Upgrade agreement (9/30)

Four-power agreement on Berlin is signed

October:

Brezhnev visits France; "Principles of Cooperation"
agreement is signed

November: CPSU Central Committee Plenum (foreign-policy issues); candidate Central Committee member Inozemtsev addresses the meeting; Central Committee for first time publicly endorses Brezhnev’s foreign-policy initiatives (11/22-23)

1972

February: Nixon visits China

April: Kissinger visits Moscow

Biological Weapons Convention is signed (4/10)

May: Nixon orders mining of North Vietnamese harbors (5/8)

CPSU Central Committee Plenum (foreign-policy issues); Brezhnev’s line is supported (5/19)

Five days of intense, high-level negotiations held in Moscow: ABM Treaty already basically agreed upon; problems on Interim (SALT) Agreement; Politburo meets at least four times in this period; Brezhnev’s greatest concern at Summit is Soviet-American trade (5/21-26)

SALT I agreements and Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations are signed at Moscow summit (5/26)

October: US-Soviet trade agreement [is signed]

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Sources: Author’s research. In addition, see Wolfe (1970); Caldwell (1971); Leonhard (1973); Wolfe (1973); Payne (1975); Garthoff (1977); Garthoff (1978a) and (1978b); Payne (1980); United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1982); Volten (1982); Parrot (1983); Garthoff (1984a) and (1984b); Gelman (1984); Griffiths (1984).
APPENDIX II
Gorbachev Era Chronology

1979

January: Communist Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visits US

June: USSR Academy of Sciences forms Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament

SALT II treaty signed

November: US embassy personnel taken hostage in Iran

December: USSR invades Afghanistan

NATO adopts its "two-track" decision on deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe

1980

Sometime in Year: USSR withdraws a "contingent" of troops from East Germany

January: US imposes grain embargo on USSR

Summer: USSR Academy of Sciences forms Scientific Council on Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology; it has a Section on Global Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution

July-August: US boycotts Olympic Games in Moscow

August: Agreements legalizing Solidarity are signed in Poland

October: Kosygin resigns as Soviet Prime Minister; is replaced by Tikhonov

December: Kosygin dies

1981

All Year: Memo contains new article rubric - "Contemporary Global Problems"

January: Reagan administration takes office; US hostages in Iran are freed

Feb.-March: 26th CPSU Party Congress
April: Reagan administration cancels grain embargo on USSR

November: Reagan proposes "Zero Option" for INF talks (11/18)
          Brezhnev visits West Germany; proposes moratorium on further deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe (11/22-25)
          USSR-US negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe are opened

December: Martial law is declared in Poland

1982

All Year: Memo's 1981 article rubric for "Contemporary Global Problems" becomes a book-review rubric and is shortened to "Global Problems"

Sometime in Year: Palme Commission report is published in USSR

January: Memo's press run drops by approximately 20 percent
          Suslov dies

March: At 27th Congress of Trade Unions, Brezhnev announces unilateral Soviet moratorium on further deployments of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe (3/16)

April: Conclusion of Palme Commission; its report on security is issued (Commission was formed in 9/80, with Georgiy Arbatov, Mil'shtein as participants)

May: Andropov is elected Secretary of CPSU Central Committee; he drops KGB post
          Reagan declares US readiness to renew strategic nuclear arms-control talks (5/9)

Summer: US decides not to re-start the US-USSR-UK negotiations on nuclear test ban
          Rise of nuclear freeze movement in US

June: USSR proposes convention prohibiting/limiting use of certain kinds of conventional weapons (6/2)

June-July: 2nd Special Session of United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament; USSR declares (unilaterally) that it
will not use nuclear weapons first and proposes to place "part" of its peaceful nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision

August: Inozemtsev dies (8/12)

Fall: NATO Commander-in-Chief Rogers elaborates "Rogers Plan"

October: Brezhnev addresses special gathering of top military officials

November: Brezhnev dies; Andropov is elected CPSU General Secretary (11/11-12)

USSR and People’s Republic of China open series of semiannual consultations

December: Voprosy filosofii introduces new rubric: "Socio-philosophical Problems of Peace and Progress"

Major shake-up of Memo’s editorial board

1983

All Year: USSR celebrates 100th anniversary of Marx’s death

No Memo rubric for global problems

January: Warsaw Pact declaration on Treaty about mutual non-use of military force (made at meeting of Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee) (1/4-5)

Martynov is identified as IMEMO’s acting director (1/6)

March: IMEMO holds meeting on "Marxist-Leninist Theory and Problems of World Economy, Political Development"

Reagan’s SDI speech

April: Scowcroft Commission issues report on strategic forces

May: Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat is founded at all-union conference in Moscow (Committee is headed by Velikhov, a vice president of USSR Academy of Sciences) (5/17-19)

Soviet Government declares that USSR will take measures to increase its "defense capability" due to US actions (5/28)

US House of Representatives passes resolution calling
for US-USSR nuclear weapons freeze

June:

CPSU Central Committee Plenum (on ideology, educational reform, social sciences)

Soviets propose a US-USSR nuclear weapons freeze

All-Union symposium on "Marxism-Leninism and Contemporary Global Problems" is held (sponsored by Scientific Council on Philosophical and Social Problems of Science and Technology and by IMEMO)

August:

US and USSR sign long-term grain agreement

Andropov falls seriously ill

Zaslavskaya's "Novosibirsk Report" is leaked to the West

September:

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute holds conference on "common security" (Zagladin participates)

KAL airliner is shot down by Soviet forces (9/2-3)

US Secretary of Defense Weinberger visits People's Republic of China

Yakovlev appointed head of IMEMO

October:

US invades Grenada

November:

USSR announces suspension of arms-control talks (11/24)

December:

NATO begins deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe

1984

All Year:

Memo runs a new book review rubric - "Relations East-West. Global Problems"

February:

Andropov dies; Chernenko is elected General Secretary (2/11-13)

March:

Chernenko proposes "norms" for US-USSR relations (3/2)

April:

Zhilin's article in Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir is signed to press (4/3)

Gorbachev is appointed chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet (4/12)
May: Shakhnazarov’s *Voprosy filosofii* article is signed to press (5/3)

August: Anatoliy Gromyko/Lomeyko book is signed to press (8/6)

November: NATO’s Military Planning Committee formally adopts Rogers Plan

December: Gorbachev visits UK

1985

January: Gromyko and Shultz meet and agree to restart arms-control negotiations on 3/12/85

February: USSR signs agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency placing part of its nuclear industry under IAEA inspection regime

New Warsaw Pact proposal at Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks

March: Chernenko dies; Gorbachev is elected General Secretary (3/11)

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks begin in Geneva (3/12)

April: USSR announces unilateral halt to further deployments of medium range nuclear weapons in Europe (4/7)

May: USSR celebrates 40th anniversary of end of World War II

USSR announces anti-alcoholism campaign

June: CPSU Central Committee meeting on accelerating scientific-technical progress

August: USSR announces unilateral halt to nuclear tests (8/6)

First International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of a Soviet reactor

August-September: 3rd Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference

October: Sofia meeting of Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee emphasizes closer economic ties among East-bloc countries (10/22-23)

Gorbachev visits France
Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 is announced; it emphasizes "acceleration"

November: Primakov is appointed head of IMEMO (11/1)
Reagan/Gorbachev summit in Geneva (11/19-21)

1986

January: Gorbachev proposal to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (1/15)

February: 27th CPSU Party Congress

May: US announces it will no longer feel bound to observe the unratified SALT I treaty (5/27)
Second All-Union Conference of Scientists on Problems of Peace and Prevention of Nuclear War held in Moscow (5/27-29)

Gospriemka is created

USSR announces 3rd extension of unilateral nuclear test moratorium

June: USSR proposes program of "Star peace"

July: Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech (7/28)

August: USSR announces 4th extension of unilateral nuclear test moratorium - to 1/1/87 (8/18)

October: US-USSR summit meeting in Reykjavik (10/11-12)

November: USSR and India promulgate Delhi Declaration on the Principles of a Nuclear Free and Nonviolent World (11/27)

1987

January: CPSU Central Committee Plenum (cadre/personnel policy)

February: International forum "For a Non-nuclear World, for the Survival of Mankind" is held in Moscow (2/14-16)

USSR tests underground nuclear device, breaking 18 month moratorium (2/26)

USSR "decouples" INF from other arms-control talks
May: Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meets in Berlin and issues statement on Pact's military doctrine (5/28-29)

July: Gorbachev, in newspaper article, proposes global "Double-Zero Option" for INF (7/21)

September: USSR and US agree to set up nuclear risk-reduction centers (9/15)

November: 70th anniversary of Bolshevik revolution (11/7)

December: Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington; INF Treaty is signed

Sources: Author's research. In addition, see Bjorkman and Zamostny (1984); Gelman (1984).
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The following abbreviations will be used:

Kve - Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil;
Memo - Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya;
SShA - SSHA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya;
USA - USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology; and
JPRS - Joint Publications Research Service.

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