MOOD, FORCE AND EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVES: SOME NOTES FOR A
STUDY OF MOOD

by

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ABSTRACT

In my Thesis I explore the relation between the mood of sentences and the
illocutionary force of the speech acts performed in their utterances. It is
evident from both traditional grammar and classical philosophy and from more
recent studies that mood and speech acts are somehow associated—imperatives
express commands, interrogatives requests for information, declaratives
assertions, and so forth. The nature of this association, however, is
obscure and controversial.

In the central chapter of this Dissertation (Chap. 3), I examine and
eventually reject the prima facie plausible view that there is a one-one
relation between the mood of the sentences of a natural language and the
illocutionary force of the speech acts performed in uttering them; or (in a
weaker version) that the illocutionary force of an utterance is a function of
the mood exhibited by the sentence uttered. Against this view, I put forward
an argument, empirical in kind, which consists in presenting evidence, based
on a careful examination of plausible classifications of moods and of
illocutionary forces, that the mood of sentences of (at least currently
known) natural languages, although conceptually related to the notion of
illocutionary force, lacks any systematic relation with the actual
illocutionary force possessed by utterances of those sentences. And, at any
rate, that such a non-systematic relation holding between mood and force is
not "one-one" in kind. Crucial to the task of determining how many moods
there are in the natural language and how to classify them is the problem of
elucidating whether so called explicit performative prefixes (i.e.,
expressions like 'I state that...' and 'I request (you) to...', etc., as
they occur in sentences like 'I state that my Thesis is easy to read' and 'I
request you to read my Thesis') should be understood as moods (indicators of
force) or not. I dedicate a large part of Chap. 3 to the analysis of
explicit performative prefixes and the sentences in which they are included.
I contend that explicit performative prefixes are not indicators of
illocutionary force, but indicators of propositional content; and I propose
— following F. Recanati and others — to explain the illocutionary efficacy
of explicit performative sentences by appeal to the notion of indirect speech
act.

In Chap. 2, preceding my exposition of the empirical argument against the
contested view concerning mood and force, I occupy myself at length with the
basic but commonly ignored distinction between Verbal and Syntactic mood. I
conclude, among other things, that as a matter of fact (but not as a matter of principle) syntactic mood is not reducible to verbal mood, and that the notion of mood relevant for the discussion of the relation between mood and force is the notion of syntactic mood.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. James Higginbotham

Title: Professor of Philosophy
A MIS PADRES
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described as "my identical twin in the actual world", happens not only to exist, but also, and more remarkably, to be my closest friend and the nicest guy.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Why study mood? There are at least two reasons why the analysis of mood is important in the general context of the Philosophy of Language. It is with these two reasons in mind that I start my research in the subject. I believe that an adequate analysis or theory of mood will shed much light on two crucial and rather general problems raised in Semantics and, more broadly, in the Philosophy of Language. In other words, I envisage the study of mood as a basic part of two different (but connected) tasks:

1) To assess the possibility of extending a standard truth-conditional semantics to the domain of non-declarative sentences.

2) To get a better understanding of the relation between the meaning and the use of expressions (and, more concretely, of sentences) of a language. That is, between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning (taking now the word in its widest and non-technical, pretheoretic sense) or verbal communication.

Why is the study of mood relevant to the issues 1) and 2) above? With respect to 1), it seems accurate to say that the task of establishing a satisfactory theory of mood amounts to that of finding a satisfactory
(semantical) analysis of non-declarative sentences. If this is so, as I think it is, then it turns out that to give a theory of mood is, literally in itself, to extend semantics to the realm of non-declarative sentences.

Why is this so? Why this equivalence between the two tasks just signaled? The answer is this: To extend semantics to the domain of non-declaratives is, in itself, among other things, to explain, within the theory, the differences in meaning between declaratives and non-declaratives. Once and if we are in a position to give the semantics of non-declaratives we must also be able to understand the differences in meaning between declaratives and non-declaratives. But, prima facie, from a pretheoretical point of view, it seems clear that what makes sentences like, e.g.

(1) You will close the door.

(2) Close the door!

and

(3) Will you close the door?

differ in meaning is precisely their differences in (syntactic) mood. The situation, in our example, reduces to this: given that the theory unproblematically determines the meaning of (1), all we need to know in order to fix the meaning of (2) or (3) is how the differences in mood affect the meaning of sentences; that is, what the contribution of mood is to the meaning of sentences. Once we isolate that "element" of the meaning of a sentence we are in a position to understand, via (1), the semantics of (2) and (3).

Hence, in general, since the truth conditional semantic analysis of
declaratives is relatively unproblematic and straightforward, it seems that all that one has to do in order to carry out the "extension" in question is just to find out a way of explaining, from the inside of the theory, those differences in mood. But this is to say, as it was pointed out at the beginning of the paragraph, that to give an account of (the semantics of) mood amounts to providing a satisfactory analysis of (the semantics of) non-declarative sentences.

With respect to my second reason, 2), why I think a study of mood is worthwhile, it will suffice if I quote a very eloquent text by Davidson. He says:

One reason the analysis of mood is interesting is that it forces us to attend to the relations between what sentences mean, and their uses. We have on the one hand the syntactic, and presumably semantic, distinction among moods (such as: indicative, imperative, optative, interrogative), and on the other hand the distinction among uses of sentences (such as: to make assertions, to give orders, to express wishes, to ask questions). ("Moods and Performances", p. 109).

It is commonly agreed that there is a certain relation between the mood of a sentence and the illocutionary force of its utterances. But how should this relation be understood? What is its specific nature? As Davidson puts it, "how are assertions related to utterances of indicative sentences, for example, or commands to utterances of imperative sentences?" (Ibid., p. 110). The construction of a theory of mood should allow us to settle these questions. The relevance of the study of mood to our point 2) is clear

1. Of course, I do not mean by this that the semantics of all kinds of declaratives is easy or unproblematic. What I am saying is, rather, that the problems presented to the analysis of declaratives (which are many and pretty hard to handle) do not arise from the fact that the sentences in question are declarative in mood, but from other unrelated sources (e.g. appearance of non-extensional operators, contextual reference, etc.).
enough: To determine what the relation is between the mood and the
illocutionary force of sentences is just one special problem included within
the more general one of determining what the relation is between the
(literal) meaning and the use of sentences. In this respect, to construct a
satisfactory theory of mood is one of the (main) things that one has to do in
order to obtain a clear notion of the relation between the meaning and use of
sentences.

Now, how does a theory of mood help to clarify the connection between mood
and force? Obviously, it can be expected that once we have a satisfactory
theory of mood we are in a better position to determine more sharply and
accurately the mood/force relation. How to understand this relation depends,
of course, on how we understand mood and how we understand force. If we
succeed in providing satisfactory theories of mood and force, respectively,
we shall have made a substantial advance in our attempt to determine the
relationship between mood and force. On the other hand, what counts as a
satisfactory theory of mood (and of force) is something that crucially
depends on our pretheoretic idea about what the relation is between mood and
force. The relation between the two tasks: i) constructing a satisfactory
theory of mood (and of force) and ii) determining the relation between mood
and force is, therefore, bidirectional. Each one benefits from the other.
There is no circularity here, because each of them relies on the other, not
"simultaneously", but so to speak, at different stages of their development.
A mere recollection of Neurath's metaphor of the boat of science which is to
be repaired piecemeal at sea, while navigating in the deep waters of theory
construction, should suffice to waive any circularity qualms here.
Thus acknowledged the importance of the study of mood in the context of Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, it is time to say a few words about the specific character and content of the work on mood developed in my Thesis.

I should emphasize that my Dissertation constitutes the realization of just a small part of a much larger project. I shall very schematically describe this large project and indicate, then, the part really covered in this paper. We can distinguish two well defined tasks within my initial, general project: 1) The first was to explore the relation between the mood of sentences and the illocutionary force of utterances; and, more concretely, to criticize and eventually reject the prima facie plausible view that there is a one-one relation between mood and illocutionary force, or (in a weaker version) that force is a function of mood. Against this idea, I planned to direct two different arguments: a) One, empirical in kind, consists in presenting evidence, based on careful examination of plausible classifications of moods and of illocutionary forces, that the mood of sentences of (at least currently known) natural languages, although conceptually related to the notion of illocutionary force, lacks any systematic relation with the actual illocutionary force possessed by utterances of those sentences. And, at any rate, that such a non-systematic relation holding between mood and force is certainly not "one-one" in kind. b) The other argument, a priori in nature, is based in the controversial although rather commonly accepted idea that "non-serious" utterances of sentences (cases of play-acting or telling jokes, etc.) lack any illocutionary force. This argument is a priori in the sense that it is supposed to show, not merely that, as a matter of fact, there is not a
one–one relation between moods and forces, but also that, as a matter of principle, it is not possible that there be such a relation; and, in particular, that it is not possible for the mood of a sentence to determine the force of the corresponding utterance.

2) The second task foreseen in my original project was to examine and discuss several currently influential theories of mood in the light of the results brought out by my previous exploration of the relation between mood and illocutionary force.

As it turned out, however, my original plan proved to be far too complex and lengthy to be successfully completed within the limits of this Dissertation. Topics that, at first and from a general point of view, had appeared as relatively simple or comparatively minor and even marginal to my investigation revealed themselves, on closer scrutiny, more and more difficult to handle and increasingly relevant to my overall project. That was the case, first, with the distinction between Verbal and Syntactic mood; and second, and most acutely, with the problem of the analysis of so called explicit performative prefixes. Given this situation, it soon became clear that I had to choose between two lines of action: 1) To carry on the original plan as initially conceived, and be willing to ignore, minimize or side-step some important issues and to go quickly and superficially through many others. 2) To proceed more carefully, without worrying excessively about covering all the ground originally intended to embrace. I promptly made up my mind in favor of the second strategy. The radically incomplete (or, if preferred, "radically open") character of my Thesis is a direct result of that early and never altered decision of mine.
Thus, of the two main tasks contemplated in my original project, only the first one is undertaken in my Dissertation. And not even this first task is fully accomplished in my present study, since I leave untouched the second, "a priori" argument against the tenet that there is a one-one relation between mood and force. My Thesis consists, mainly (Chap. 3), in the detailed presentation of the first, empirical argument against different interpretations of this tenet. Very prominent among the points touched in the course of this discussion is the problem of the semantic analysis of explicit performative prefixes and of the sentences in which they are included. The exposition of the empirical argument against the contested thesis concerning the relation between mood and force is preceded by a rather lengthy examination (Chap. 2) of the basic but commonly ignored distinction between Verbal and Syntactic mood.

I cannot say that I am not a little disappointed with the slow pace of my research and the failure to complete in full the original plan of my study. Nevertheless, I certainly do not regret the decision made early on of dealing carefully and thoroughly with whatever problems and issues I encountered in the course of my inquiry. I think there is no other satisfactory way to proceed. I shall have plenty of time in the future, I hope, to address the issues left untouched here.
Chapter 2

SYNTACTIC VERSUS VERBAL MOOD

2.1 First approach to the two notions of mood

From the very first sentence of this paper on, I have been talking about mood. It is time to ask what mood is. I should make clear from the outset that the kind of mood on which I am going to focus is the so called syntactic or grammatical mood, as something different from verbal mood. This difference is clearly acknowledged (although not explained) by many scholars. For instance, Hausser warns that

the term "mood" can be used either in connection with verbal mood, such as indicative, subjunctive, optative, etc, or in connection with syntactic mood, such as declarative, imperative or interrogative ("Surface Compositionality and the Semantics of Mood", p. 93, n. 1).

Other authors prefer to refer to what Hausser calls syntactic mood as grammatical mood, thus, e.g., Bierwisch. In the words of this author, the grammatical moods are "means characterizing sentence types like imperatives or interrogatives" (p. 1).

Neither Hausser's nor Bierwisch's words quoted above throw much light on what the differences (and the similarities) are between the two notions of mood. Hausser just gives two lists of "moods" and points out that one is a list of verbal moods while the other is of syntactic moods. He does not say why this is so. No criteria nor definitions of any sort are provided. Simply, since the two lists are obviously different, the reader is expected to infer that the two corresponding notions should be different too.\footnote{Furthermore, Hausser's list of verbal moods is explicitly left incomplete, but no indication is made about how to continue it, let alone to complete it. With respect to the list of syntactic moods, there is no overt indication in the text whether it should be regarded as complete or not. It is not said, either, whether the lists have to be interpreted as enumerating English moods only, or moods belonging to a more or less wide range of different natural languages. Of course, this should not be seen as an inadequacy of Hausser's text. Rather, it indicates that Hausser, contrary to us, is only interested (at least in the passage quoted) in making a passing reference to a distinction which he takes for granted as well known and unproblematic.}

Bierwisch's quote, on the other hand, although more informative than Hausser's with respect to the notion of grammatical (syntactic) mood, does not say anything about verbal mood. But then it cannot clarify, by itself, the distinction between the two notions of mood. Despite the insufficiency of Hausser's and Bierwisch's characterizations, if put together they help to single out what seems to be an important difference between the two notions of mood: From the name 'Verbal mood' alone, one can infer that verbal mood has to do with, or is a quality of, the verb. On the other hand, syntactic mood, since it is described by Bierwisch as a means of characterizing sentence types, has to do, or is a quality of sentences. Verbal mood is mood of the verb. Syntactic mood is mood of the
sentence. The former characterizes (forms of) the verb; the latter characterizes (forms of) the sentence.

But this way of presenting the difference between the two notions of mood is not as informative or useful as it may seem at first sight. After all, sentences can be classified with respect to the mood of their main verb. Indeed, it is common practice to classify sentences as indicative, subjunctive, optative, etc. So, to say that verbal mood classifies verb forms whereas syntactic mood classifies types of sentences is not enough, since verbal mood also determines a classification of sentences.

One may try to sharpen or improve the distinction between the two notions by indicating that, although both induce a certain classification of sentences, verbal mood is still a notion primarily or directly associated with verb forms, and only secondarily or indirectly associated with sentences. Lyons, for instance, stresses this very point when drawing the difference between the terms 'imperative' and 'interrogative', "as they are traditionally employed by grammarians". He writes:

[The term 'imperative'] like 'indicative' and 'subjunctive' is used to refer to the mood of the verb, and only secondarily to particular kinds of sentences (...) The term 'interrogative', on the other hand, is never used in traditional grammar to refer to one of the moods of the verb. (pp. 747-8. Emphasis mine.)

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4. Cf. Semantics, vol. 2, pp. 747-48. Lyons, contrary to Hausser's terminology, uses the term 'imperative', to refer to a verbal mood as opposed to a syntactic mood. He reserves the term 'jussive' for Hausser's syntactic imperative mood. In my paper, I shall use 'imperative' indistinctly in the two senses. I shall proceed so whenever the context makes it clear which kind of mood I am referring to. In cases of ambiguity, I shall explicitly indicate whether the mood in question is verbal or syntactic.
Of course, Lyons is right in what he says, that terms like 'indicative', 'subjunctive', etc., refer primarily to the mood of the verb and only secondarily to kinds of sentences; whereas terms like 'interrogative' do not refer (neither primarily nor secondarily) to the mood of the verb. Strictly speaking, that is all that Lyons' text says. It leaves untouched the question of what the terms like 'interrogative', 'declarative', etc., primarily refer to; whether it is to types of sentences or something else, it is not specified by Lyons. But it is very tempting to read his words as stating, or at least "implying", that 'interrogative', 'declarative', etc., are primarily terms to refer to particular types of sentences. In this way, the difference between the two notions of mood would not be that syntactic mood generates (determines) a classification of sentences whereas verbal mood does not. We have seen that this is not true. Rather, the difference could be presented as consisting in the fact that verbal mood only secondarily determines a classification of sentences, whereas syntactic mood primarily determines a classification of sentences.

However, this amendment or qualification of the distinction is not very helpful, since it contributes very little to our understanding of the notion of syntactic mood. What does it mean to say that syntactic mood is primarily or directly associated with the sentence and not with, say, one or some of its constituents? This way of putting things seems to betray a lack of knowledge on our part about the criterion which underlies or governs the classification of sentences according to their different syntactic moods. Evidently, sentences divide up into interrogatives, declaratives, etc, due to some specific features which they exhibit. But then one may argue that 'declarative', 'interrogative', etc., refer primarily to those specific
features of sentences, and only secondarily to sentences themselves. For instance, if we were going to single out word order and intonation as the decisive factors to distinguish between (spoken) sentences of different syntactic types, it will remain open to us to contend that 'declarative', 'interrogative', etc., are terms which primarily refer to combinations of word order and (plus) intonation of the (spoken) sentence, and only secondarily to sentences as such.

This shows, then, that the important issue is not to establish whether the two notions of mood are primarily or secondarily connected to a classification of sentences. Rather, the key point is to identify the different criteria governing the two different classifications of sentences associated with each notion of mood. Of course, it will not do to define these criteria in terms of the respective notions of mood. The claim that sentences subclassify a) into indicative, imperative, subjunctive, etc., according to their verbal mood, and b) into declarative, imperative (jussive),5 interrogative, etc., according to their syntactic mood is true but perfectly trivial. It was precisely to clarify the notions of mood that we had appealed to the two classifications of sentences. It seems then, that we have to try a new start. We have to ask again the two questions: what is verbal mood?; what is syntactic mood?

5. See note 4, above.
2.2 What is verbal mood?

Let us start by having a brief look at traditional grammar. According to traditional grammars and dictionaries, verbal mood is an inflectional category of the verb, or to put it in extensional terms, mood is a set of inflectional verb-forms whose semantic function is to express "the personal attitude of the speaker" with respect to the content of the utterance—or, alternatively, with respect to the action or state expressed by the predicate.6

For languages, such as English, whose inflectional system is not very rich or developed, it is usual to distinguish between two morphologically different notions of verbal mood: a) the inflectional mood, properly so, and b) the periphrastic mood, which is formed by adding special auxiliary verb forms to the non-inflected form of the main verb appearing in the sentence.7

Also, some authors have distinguished between subjective and objective verbal mood.8 Subjective mood would be that in which the attitude expressed

7. Cf. Poustma, op. cit., pp. 2 and 6, for an explanation of the distinction.
8. Cf., e.g., Kurylowicz, op. cit., pp. 27-8; and James, Semantics of the English Subjunctive, pp. 11 and 24.
is the attitude of the speaker; objective mood would be that in which the attitude expressed is the attitude of "the agent" (Kuryłowicz) or, more generally, the attitude of someone who is not the speaker (James). Ostensibly, the characterization of verbal mood presented above deals exclusively with subjective mood, but it can trivially be extended to cover objective mood too. 9

Putting these qualifications aside, there are three points regarding our original characterization of verbal mood that I want to draw attention to:

1) First, one should notice that verbal mood is presented as a notion determined by a criterion which is in part morphosyntactic and in part semantic. Both types of considerations (morphosyntactic and semantic) are essential to the characterization of verbal mood. For our purposes, the important thing is to observe that verbal mood is, among other things, a semantic concept and that, consequently, verbal mood must be seen as contributing something to the semantic value (as opposed to the pragmatic value) of sentences.

2) The second point, like the third one, concerns the way in which the semantic function of verbal mood is formulated in the characterization

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9. All that is needed is to add the words 'or of someone else' to the former characterization of the attitude expressed by verbal mood: the semantic function of mood would be now that of expressing the personal attitude of the speaker or of someone else with respect to the content of the utterance. James, for one, strongly recommends this wider characterization of verbal mood, but I find his reasons totally unconvincing (cf. pp. 11 and 24). I do not think that the description of verbal mood should be thus stretched and that we are better off if we stick to the original identification of verbal mood with subjective mood. But I shall leave the issue untouched here.
above. The semantic function of verbal mood is described as consisting in expressing the personal attitude of the speaker with respect to the content of the utterance or, alternatively, with respect to the state or the action expressed by the predicate. Let us concentrate on the second part of this statement, in either of its two versions: Notice that allusion is made there to the content of the utterance (or respectively, to what is expressed by the predicate) as being something to which the meaning (content) of the verbal mood does not belong; in other words, the meaning of verbal mood is presented as something foreign to or apart from the content of the utterance. Prima facie, it seems that we face a puzzle here: Initially, one would say that the meaning of verbal mood should be part of "the content" of the utterance, since the utterance includes an utterance of verbal mood and since mood is a semantic marker contributing to the meaning of the utterance as a whole. But then, how can verbal mood mean (be a semantic marker of) the attitude of the speaker towards the content of the utterance if (the meaning of) verbal mood is part of that content? (A parallel consideration is pertinent with respect to 'predication', since verbal mood is part of, or contributes to determine what is predicated of the subject in the sentence.)

This difficulty is easily solved (or dissolved) if we assume that the term 'content' has a somewhat technical sense in the characterization of verbal mood at issue. The content of an utterance, in this technical sense, should not be taken as identical with what is said in or expressed by the sentence

10. It is precisely this difficulty which creates problems for Searle in his attempt to construct a "satisfactory" notion of predicational act. Cf. Speech Acts, secs. 5.6 and 5.7.
uttered; i.e., it should not be identified with the linguistic meaning (semantic information) of the sentence uttered as a whole. The content of an utterance is, in this restricted sense, just a part of what is said, namely the part which is not "said" by the verbal mood of the expression uttered. One has to distinguish, then, between the meaning (semantic contribution) of verbal mood and the meaning (semantic contribution) of the rest of the utterance. Only the latter is called, in this technical sense, the semantic content of the utterance.\textsuperscript{11} Of course, there is always a danger of confusion; i.e., of equivocating between the two possible senses of 'content' considered, the restricted one and the broader one. This equivocation or confusion may lead to the mistake of denying any semantic import to verbal mood. The fallacious reasoning would be this: since the semantic content (narrow sense) of an utterance is given irrespective of verbal mood, verbal mood has no semantic content (broad sense) and, therefore, its contribution to meaning should be explained in pragmatic terms.

But is this really a mistaken claim? That is, even if we respect the two senses of content, is it not still sound to contend that the meaning of verbal mood is not and cannot be a part of the content (broad sense) of the utterance? Let us put the question in a different but apparently equivalent manner: can the speaker's attitude towards what he is saying (towards the broad content of his utterance) be a part of what he is saying (a part of the broad content of his utterance)? Our hypothetical critic would rightly

\textsuperscript{11} We find here, for the first time, reference to an almost universally accepted concept of semantics: the notion of propositional content or of semantic content as something to which the meaning of mood (verbal or syntactic) contributes nothing.
conclude that the answer to this latter question has to be negative. But this does not entitle him to affirm that the meaning of verbal mood is not, and cannot be, part of the broad content of the utterance. The apparent equivalence between the two questions formulated above is just that, only apparent, but not real. By making (supposing) equivalent the two questions, our critic erroneously overlooks the crucial fact that the speaker's attitude expressed by verbal mood is not (at least, not conceptually) the same as the actual attitude of the speaker towards what he is saying (towards the broad content of his utterance). The former type of attitude, but not the latter, is part of what the speaker is saying (of the broad content of his utterance).

It is interesting to touch on this issue here because it appears again, almost in identical fashion, when discussing the central topic of this paper: the relationship between syntactic mood and illocutionary force. What is most revealing in this respect is that, whereas the fallacious reasoning sketched above occurs rarely, if at all, when the case of verbal mood is at issue, it is, however, all too often encountered in discussions concerning syntactic mood. This might be so because, to put it metaphorically, there is a stronger sense of the morphosyntactic "respectability" or "solvency" of verbal mood.

3) Finally, the third point with respect to the characterization of verbal mood which deserves comment is this: How to understand the expression 'personal attitude of the speaker'? The expression is very vague and none of the traditional grammars consulted explain or elaborate what these attitudes consist in. Instead, they quickly pass to enumerate the attitudes expressed
by different verbal moods. I shall consider here two different but not incompatible interpretations of these attitudes. The first is perhaps more in accordance with traditional views. I shall call it Lyons's interpretation, since it is based, no matter how loosely, in Lyons's ideas about mood and modality. The second is the interpretation offered by F. James in his book *Semantics of the English Subjunctive*.

1) Let us start with Lyons's interpretation: Very schematically, the personal attitudes marked by verbal mood are, according to this account, of two general kinds, which we may call a) "illocutionary attitudes" and b) "modal (alethic, epistemic, deontic) attitudes".\(^{12}\) To the first kind belongs the attitude marked by the imperative mood: the imperative mood "expresses" that the content of the utterance is intended by the speaker as a command, request, etc. To the second kind belongs the attitude marked by the subjunctive mood (at least by the subjunctive mood of the older Indo-European languages):\(^{13}\) the subjunctive mood "expresses" that the content of the sentence is intended by the speaker as non-factual.

Of course, the specific kind and number of attitudes of these two general kinds distinguished or marked in each particular language varies greatly. In this respect, it is wise to bear in mind Lyons' words:

\(^{12}\) I follow Lyons when drawing this distinction. He does not use, however, the labels which I have employed in the text; but I think that they convey well the core of Lyons's view: the meaning of the grammatical category of (verbal) mood cannot be identified with either modality or illocutionary force as such because both (dimensions of meaning) are semantically connected to given verbal moods. (*Cf.*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 848; and, in general, secs. 16 and 17.)

\(^{13}\) *Cf.* Lyons, *op. cit.*, p. 848.
...it is important to emphasize that, at the present stage of linguistic theory and descriptive practice, it is impossible to formulate any very clear notion of the distinctions that are grammaticalized, within the category of mood, throughout the languages of the world (p. 847).

If we restrict our attention to modern English, it seems (although this much is already controversial)\(^{14}\) that we can signal three different verbal moods: indicative, subjunctive and imperative. What are the attitudes expressed by each of these moods? More concretely, do these attitudes belong to the "illocutionary type" or to the "modal type"?

The question is complicated and not as clear-cut as one may wish, but I shall ignore, for the most part, the intricacies of the matter and provide a very schematic and simplified answer. The imperative mood, as indicated above, conveys "directive" illocutionary force. Things are less clear with respect to indicative mood: as opposed to imperative, it is often described as conveying assertive illocutionary force. But this is surely a mistake, since indicative mood may characteristically appear in interrogative sentences which, certainly, do not convey assertive force. This characterization of the indicative betrays a confusion between verbal indicative mood and syntactic declarative mood. It is plain that no direct connection can be established between the meaning of the indicative and even a very general category of illocutionary force. The indicative is also presented in opposition to subjunctive mood. This time, the opposition is described as an opposition in modal attitudes: indicative mood conveys or expresses "factuality"; i.e., it expresses that the content of the utterance

\(^{14}\) Cf. James, pp. 1 ff.
is regarded as a fact by the speaker. I shall accept (or at least, not quarrel with) this second interpretation of the meaning of indicative mood. Finally, subjunctive, as we have already seen, can be described as expressing that the content of the utterance is taken by the speaker as "non-factual".

Obscure as these characterizations may be, they suffice for our very limited purpose of schematically answering the question what general kind of attitude is conveyed by each of the three verbal moods of English. We have that the imperative expresses illocutionary attitude, whereas indicative and subjunctive express modal attitude. This is the result obtained by adopting our Lyons's interpretation of the meaning of verbal mood.

But a question arises here: what do illocutionary and modal attitudes have in common that accounts for the fact that (at least, in some languages) they can be both marked or conveyed by one and the same verbal category; namely, by the category of verbal mood? The trivial answer is that both are attitudes of the speaker towards the content of the utterance. But can we discern a more illuminating or informative connection between them? James's interpretation of verbal mood permits a more specific, positive answer to this question. Let us have a look at it:

ii) James's view: According to James, verbal mood does not exhibit the duality in semantic function postulated by what I have called the Lyons's interpretation. That is, the attitudes conveyed by verbal mood do not divide into illocutionary and modal. Now, the attitudes conveyed by mood are taken to be, in all cases (i.e., for all different verbal moods), of the modal type only. But the modalities expressed by verbal mood are of an extremely general or basic kind, much more so than those postulated by Lyons. These
basic modalities are, in James's words, "manners of representation" (p. 15). There are only two basic modalities or manners of representation and they coincide with (are identified with) Searle's two main "directions of fit" in the world-word relation:  

- a) the world-to-word direction of fit, which, in James' terminology, is the "practical" modality or manner of representation; and 
- b) the word-to-world direction of fit, which James refers to as the "theoretical" modality or form of representation.

James characterizes the meaning (semantic function) of each of the three English verbal mood thus:

The imperative and subjunctive signify ... world-to-match-words modality, and the indicative signifies ... words-to-match-world modality. The imperative is semantically distinct from the subjunctive only in two respects: first, its distribution is more limited than the subjunctive's[,] ... as it is restricted to the second person, present tense, and to independent clauses, and second, it refers the bringing about of the state of affairs represented in the clause in which it occurs to the subject of the clause. The subjunctive is not restricted syntactically in the way that the imperative is, nor does it refer the bringing about of the state of affairs to anyone in particular. The indicative is like the subjunctive in lacking the kinds of information that the imperative conveys. (p. 15)

No information about illocutionary force is directly provided by the verbal moods as they have been presented in the text above. Rather, the connection of verbal mood with illocutionary force is explained by James in contextual terms. Now it is not that some verbal moods are semantic markers of force whereas others are not. Instead, all verbal moods contextually "imply", but

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not "signify", illocutionary force:

Analysis will show that meanings which grammarians have traditionally assigned to the [verbal] moods ... are implications which derive automatically from the signification of a mood and the qualifying information in typical contexts. (p. 16)

Of course, when James refers to the meanings traditionally assigned to verbal mood by grammarians, he is thinking, among other things, of illocutionary force:

The meanings 'command' for the imperative and 'statement' for the indicative arise largely from the pragmatic information supplied by the context of independent clauses. ... In order to reconcile the indicative's uses in simple declarative sentences, simple interrogative sentences, and dependent clauses, we must extract its semantic content from the meanings it acquires in such particular uses. ... The subjunctive is no different from the imperative or the indicative in the way it gets its meaning in context. (pp. 25-6)

The picture that emerges is, then, this: Verbal mood, whose semantic content is "little more than direction of fit", when supplemented by qualifying information provided by "typical contexts", "means" (implies) illocutionary force. Or to paraphrase James, the illocutionary force meant (implied), on occasion, by verbal moods is "automatically derived" from the semantic content of verbal mood plus qualifying information provided by the context. How this "automatic derivation" is possible (let alone, how it actually takes place), is something that James does not explain. But it seems clear that at least one point which facilitates the connection between verbal mood and illocutionary force is the fact that, according to James's theory, the semantic content of verbal mood is just (little more than) direction of fit. This fact provides the desired connection because direction of fit in the word-world relation is precisely singled out in
Speech Act theory as one of the (three) essential factors determining (type) of illocutionary force. Thus, there is a conceptual connection between the semantic content (significance) of verbal mood, direction of fit, and illocutionary force. This conceptual connection is the ground for the "contextual derivation" which James talks about. Inasmuch as verbal mood signifies direction of fit, it can (conveniently qualified by context) convey illocutionary force.

I have presented here two different hypothesis or interpretations concerning the meaning of verbal mood: Lyons's based hypothesis, according to which verbal mood means both illocutionary force and modality; and James's hypothesis, according to which verbal mood means little more than Searle's direction of fit. Both interpretations have advantages and disadvantages of their own. For instance, the former is better equipped to deal with imperative mood; and the latter is better equipped to account for the meaning of indicative and subjunctive moods. We do not need to choose between them here. The important thing will be to acknowledge, at the end of the present section, that, although each interpretation may lead to a different view of the connection between verbal and syntactic mood, they agree on a crucial double point: 1) The semantic function of verbal mood is, as a matter of fact (in English and in other natural languages in which the verbal category of mood is present), different from the semantic function of syntactic mood: and, so, syntactic mood is not "reducible", from a semantic point of view, to verbal mood. 2) But granted this as a matter of fact, both interpretations coincide in leaving open the possibility that, as a matter of principle, (the semantic function of) syntactic mood may be reduced to (the semantic function of) verbal mood.
2.3 What is syntactic mood?

If, as in the case of verbal mood, we start our investigation by having a quick look at traditional grammar, one thing immediately strikes our attention: in traditional grammar, 'mood' is univocally understood as verbal mood. Absolutely no information concerning the so called syntactic mood is found under the entry 'mood' of dictionaries and encyclopedies, or in the section dedicated to mood (mode) by current, published Grammars of English or Spanish, etc. It is only under the quite different heading of Sentence, when presenting different types of sentence, that we find more or less explicit reference to what we have called here syntactic mood.  

It is through having this in mind that Lyons talks of a "restricted" versus a "broader" sense of the term 'mood'. Lyons describes verbal mood as the "traditional, rather restricted, sense" of the term; and he contrasts it with what he calls "a much broader sense [in which] many linguists and certain

17. A particularly explicit reference can be found in the 1959 edition of the Webster's dictionary. Under the heading Sentence we encounter the following description:

A group of words so related as to convey a complete thought with the force of asserting something or of asking, commanding, exclaiming or wishing. According to the forms that distinguish their forces as sense units, sentences are commonly described as declarative, interrogative, imperative and exclamatory.
logicians nowadays employ the term". The point is worth mentioning because it makes explicit the fact that the two notions of mood are, although different, conceptually related. One does not have here a case of pure equivocity or homonymy. Lyons's remarks make perfectly clear that the two senses of mood are connected by a certain relation of, e.g., "X being an extension of Y" or "Y being a restriction of X". Accordingly, when trying to draw a contrast between the two notions, we should be prepared to encounter not only differences, but also similarities between them. In particular, we must be prepared to find out similarities, as well as differences, in the semantic roles of the two notions of mood.

But we still lack a positive characterization of syntactic mood. Let us put aside for the moment the issue of the contrast between the two notions of mood and concentrate on the more urgent one of finding out what syntactic mood is. We shall turn again to Lyons for help. A careful reading of Lyons' last two chapters of *Semantics* allows one to extract (or, perhaps, construct) several proposals for characterizing syntactic mood.

1) The first proposal is suggested by what he says when introducing some terminological distinctions to avoid confusion between discourse about sentences and discourse about utterances. He writes:

> Throughout our discussion we shall maintain the terminological distinctions that have already been introduced, using 'statement', 'question' and 'command' for utterances with a particular illocutionary force and 'declarative', 'interrogative' and 'imperative' for sentences with a particular grammatical

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18. Cf. op. cit., p. 747, n. 13. Although Lyons does not use the expression 'syntactic mood', it is plain that Lyons' "broad sense" of mood is our syntactic mood.
Here, syntactic mood seems to be described, in passing, in terms of the particular grammatical structure of sentences. Thus, the criterion to distinguish between sentences in different syntactic moods would be the grammatical structure of sentences. But this criterion is not very illuminating. The expression "Grammatical structure of a sentence" is, pending further elaboration, too vague and general to shed any light on the notion at issue. Moreover, by so describing syntactic mood, it is not clear that we can distinguish between the classification of sentences (according to their verbal mood) in indicative, subjunctive, etc., and the classification of sentences (according to their syntactic mood) in declaratives, interrogatives, etc. since, after all, the verbal mood of sentences also contributes to their particular grammatical structure. This is trivially so if we allow for a sufficiently wide or weak notion of grammatical structure. Therefore, the first Lyons-inspired proposal for characterizing syntactic mood fails.

2) A second attempt is based in another passage of Semantics. When talking of the distinction between the classification of sentences in a) indicative, subjunctive, etc., and in b) declarative, interrogative, etc., Lyons gives the following differential feature for each classification:

...sentences [are] subclassified as declarative, interrogative, jussive, etc., in terms of their characteristic use and sentences ... [are] subclassified as indicative, dubitative, imperative, etc., in terms of the main verb. (p. 848. Emphasis mine.)

This passage deserves special attention because it seems to offer, not only a positive characterization of syntactic mood, but also an explicit and straightforward contrast between the two notions under consideration. The
contrast would be this: Syntactic mood is a pragmatic (or, perhaps, semantic) notion; verbal mood is a morphosyntactic one.

But this second characterization of the difference between the two kinds of mood and their associated classifications of sentences is again seriously defective. There are at least two important flaws in this characterization:

i) The first flaw has to do with the expression "characteristic use" of a sentence. For our purposes the description of syntactic mood in terms of the characteristic use of sentences is faulty on two accounts: a) it is too vague and b) it is too general.

a) It is too vague because it leaves unexplained what is and how to determine the characteristic use of a sentence. It seems plausible to suppose that sentences (and expressions, in general) have "characteristic uses" in more than one respect. For instance, a sentence like (4):

(4) The Parmenides is one of the most complex dialogues ever written by Plato.

can be seen as having a characteristic locutionary use as opposed to other possible locutionary uses (i.e., as saying or predicating of Plato's dialogue, The Parmenides, the property of being one of the most complex dialogues ever written by Plato). But it can also be regarded as having a characteristic illocutionary use as opposed to other illocutionary uses ((4) is "characteristically" used to describe or state, and not, e.g., to promise

19. Of course, 'saying' and 'predicating' should be understood here as illocutionary neutral; that is, one should not read them as synonymous with stating.
or command, etc.). Again, (4) can be considered as being characteristically used in, say, academic discourse as opposed to casual or informal conversation, etc. All these different but compatible senses in which one can understand 'characteristic use' derive or result from the fact that there are several different levels or "dimensions" of sentence use at which the characteristic/non-characteristic distinction can be drawn.

There is, however, a more fundamental level in which a sentence (or an expression) can be said to have a characteristic use. It is more fundamental than the others because they all presuppose it. The characteristic use of a sentence is, in this more basic sense, its use in accordance with its literal meaning. Characteristic use is now defined in terms of literal meaning. Of course, one faces the problem of determining what the literal meaning of a sentence is. In particular, one cannot explain literal meaning in terms of use. But putting this aside and assuming that the notion of literal meaning is well established independently of the notion of use, one can try to interpret this second Lyons' based criterion for syntactic mood as follows: sentences are subclassified in declarative, interrogative, etc., in terms of their use in accordance with their literal meaning. Or, if preferred, sentences are subclassified in declarative, interrogative, etc., in terms of their literal use; that is, in terms of their literal meaning.

But if this is the way in which we have to understand Lyons's characterization of syntactic mood, then we still have strong reasons to

20. Another problem is to give precise sense to the very vague expression 'in accordance with'. When is a use of a sentence "in accordance with" its literal meaning?
discard it as unacceptable. And now the ground to reject it is not so much its vagueness as its generality.

b) The characterization of syntactic mood in terms of "characteristic use", even if the latter is understood as "literal use", is so general that it turns out to be absolutely useless for the intended task of drawing a contrast between syntactic and verbal mood. After all, sentences with different verbal moods have also, and precisely on that account, different "characteristic" (= literal) uses. Inasmuch as different verbal moods mark differences in linguistic meaning they contribute to determine the literal meaning of sentences; and, hence, if the proposed interpretation of 'characteristic use' is correct, they contribute to determine the characteristic use of sentences. In short, one can also employ the criterion "characteristic use of a sentence" to describe the notion "Sentence with a given verbal mood" (i.e., to describe the notion of verbal mood).

But the problem is worse than that. It is not only that both kinds of moods can be presented in terms of characteristic use (= literal meaning). In fact, the only classification of sentences that the proposed criterion permits is a classification of (classes of) synonymous sentences, since any two non-synonymous sentences have some difference in literal meaning. The alleged criterion is absolutely void because every (grammatical) feature of sentences is in principle relevant to determine their literal meaning and, therefore, their "characteristic use".

ii) The second and more serious flaw of this Lyons-based description of syntactic mood and its contrast with verbal mood is that it neglects the fact that syntactic mood is primarily and crucially a grammatical (syntactic)
notion. It is important to emphasize that the two notions of mood have to be regarded as grammatically defined and as having a characteristic use (contributing to the literal meaning of sentences). Therefore, any attempt to distinguish the two notions of mood by stressing that one is grammatically defined whereas the other is defined in terms of characteristic use is doomed to failure. The starting point must be to acknowledge that both notions are grammatically defined and that both have a certain characteristic use (literal meaning).

3) Let us now examine a third and last Lyons-based proposal for characterising syntactic mood. It stems from Lyons's definition of what he calls the "jussive" type of sentences. In Lyons' words, a jussive sentence is "one of a grammatically defined class of sentences that are characteristically used to issue mands."\(^{21}\) As already indicated, 'jussive' is a term used by Lyons to refer to what Hauser calls (in the quotation at the beginning of the section) 'inimperative' sentences. It is, therefore, one of the types of sentence resulting from a classification according to syntactic as opposed to verbal mood. On the other hand, 'mand' is a technical term used by Lyons to refer to what is commonly known as command; i.e., as designating a general subclass of (Searle's) Directive illocutionary acts.\(^{22}\) Therefore, if we generalize what Lyons says for the particular case of jussives (imperatives), we obtain that sentences are classified as having

\(^{21}\) P. 748. Emphasis mine.

\(^{22}\) Mands comprise orders, requests, entreaties, "commands", etc. Lyons introduces the term to avoid possible confusions between the more and less specific uses of 'command'. Cf. pp. 745-6).
different syntactic moods depending on 1) their grammar and 2) their characteristic use to perform illocutionary acts.

If we keep our former interpretation of 'characteristic use' as 'use in accordance with literal meaning', we can characterize syntactic mood thus: Syntactic mood is that grammatically defined feature of sentences whose semantic role is to single out their "illocutionary potential" (literal force).23

This new characterization of syntactic mood constitutes an improvement with respect to the former one for two reasons: a) because it restores the emphasis in the grammatical character of the notion; and b) because it is far more specific with respect to the question what the characteristic use (or literal meaning) of syntactic mood is. Moreover, the semantic role ascribed now to syntactic mood is the same as the one which James, for one, assigns to it: James writes:

'Sentence types' enumerate very general kinds of speech acts that independent clauses can be used to perform. The traditional types, declarative, imperative and interrogative, categorize independent clauses according to their potential illocutionary force...(p. 18).

Similarly, it appears to be in accordance too with traditional characterizations of different types of sentences, such as the one we have

23. For an explanation of the notion of illocutionary force potential of a sentence, cf. infra, p. 133. Of course, it has to be emphasized that the claim that the semantic role of syntactic mood is to be a marker of illocutionary force does not necessarily commit one to the much stronger claim that syntactic mood determines or guarantees the actual illocutionary force of the illocution performed by uttering a particular sentence.
already found in the *Webster's* dictionary.\textsuperscript{24} It seems, then, that we have obtained a fairly uncontroversial description of syntactic mood. Only one problem (obstacle) remains: we do not know anything yet about the particular grammatical (syntactic) features which are relevant to determine the syntactic mood of sentences.

This is a question open to discussion among linguists and, of course, different languages follow different patterns in this respect. If we restrict our attention to English (together, perhaps, with other Indo-European languages relatively close to English), we may indicate at least the following grammatical features as co-markers of, or elements contributing to, the syntactic mood of sentences: verbal mood, word order (syntactic structure) and intonation\textsuperscript{25} (or its correlate in written discourse such as the interrogative sign, '?', and the imperative sign, '!').

Normally, it is not that each of these elements functions, independently, as a marker of syntactic mood. That is, it is not that some syntactic moods are marked by, say, intonation only and some others by verbal mood only. Nor is it the case that one and the same syntactic mood may be marked sometimes by,

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{ |c|c| }
\hline
Feature & Marked Syntactic Mood \\
\hline
Verbal Mood & Sometimes Intonation Only \\
\hline
Word Order (Syntactic Structure) & Sometimes Verbal Mood Only \\
\hline
Intonation & Sometimes Word Order Only \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{24} *Cf.* supra, p. 31, n. 17.

\textsuperscript{25} By 'intonation', I refer here to what Hauser calls syntactic intonation; that is, "denotation-relevant" intonation in contradistinction to "use-relevant" intonation. Hauser illustrates the distinction thus:

...in phonology we have denotation-relevant intonation (syntactic intonation) as illustrated by the comparison of (29a) and (29b): (29a) John came. (29b) John came? (29a) denotes a proposition, while (29b) does not. On the other hand, we also find intonation features which are relevant solely in terms of use, as exemplified by different ways to pronounce, e.g.,(30): (30) It's nice to see you. (warmly, politely, routinely, etc.) (op. cit., p. 83).
e.g., intonation and sometimes by, e.g., verbal mood. Rather, it is the co-occurrence, the combined presence or action of all these elements, which yields the syntactic mood of a sentence.

To the three grammatical features just signaled, some authors add what we may call the completeness sign; i.e., the "end punctuation sign", in writing, which corresponds, in oral discourse, to a pause of a certain length between strings of speech. This punctuation sign or full pause indicates that the string of words written or spoken constitutes a complete, independent sentence; it marks the end of the sentence. F. James is one of the authors who add this fourth factor as part of the grammatical characterization of syntactic mood. This has already become apparent in the last quote of his given here, when he says that "the traditional [sentence] types, declarative, imperative and interrogative, categorize independent clauses according to their potential illocutionary force..."26 But he repeatedly emphasizes it when characterizing each of the syntactic moods:

...a 'declarative sentence' is just an independent clause which the speaker can use to make a statement ... an 'imperative sentence' is just an independent clause which the speaker can use to give a command ... an 'interrogative sentence' is just an independent clause which the speaker can use to ask a question.(pp. 19-20. Emphasis mine.)

If James is right in this claim; i.e., if syntactic mood is a property of independent sentences only, then it trivially follows that there cannot be declarative, interrogative nor imperative embedded sentences. Syntactic mood would be a property of complete sentences only. 'Declarative',

'interrogative' and 'imperative' ('jussive') would be terms applicable to complete but not to embedded sentences.

I think that James's claim is mistaken. It is true that his view seems to square well with the evidence presented by the imperative. Imperative (jussive) sentences do not occur embedded. But one should bear in mind here that this is a characteristic which imperative sentences have due to the specific verbal mood with which they are endowed. It is the peculiarity of the imperative mood (verbal or syntactic) and not the quality of being a syntactic mood which explains the fact that imperative (jussive) sentences do not occur embedded.

If we leave the imperative case and pass to consider declarative and interrogative sentences, we find that the evidence is clearly against James' claim. As E. Davies eloquently puts it, "...embedded declaratives and interrogatives undoubtedly must be recognised." Let us focus our attention on declaratives first. Consider the sentence

(5) John is eating an apple.

According to James, (5) is a declarative sentence only if it occurs as an

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27. This is a rather uncontroversial point in current linguistic studies. For instance, E. Davies, in her book *The English Imperative* (Croom Helm Ltd., Kent, U. K., 1986), says that "[i]t would seem ... that there is no clear cases of embedded imperatives in English" (p. 10). And, what is more important, she gives the revealing information that "Sadock and Zwicky (1985, p. 175) claim that their survey of 23 varied languages yielded no clear examples of embedded imperatives at all." (The article by Sadock, J. M. and Zwicky, A.M. referred to by Davies is "Speech Act Distinctions in Syntax", in T. Shopen (ed.), *Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Vol. 1: Clause Structure*, Cambridge U. P., 1985).

independent sentence, but it will lose its declarative character if it appears as a part of a more complex sentence like, say:

(6) I believe that John is eating an apple.

Strictly speaking, then, when confronted with (5) one cannot determine whether it is declarative in mood or not. Syntactic mood, from James' point of view, becomes a contextual feature of sentences. But surely, (5) presents structural features which permit one to distinguish it, in any context, from sentences like:

(7) Is John eating an apple?

\(\text{\and}\)

(8) John, eat an apple!

These structural differences remain no matter whether (5) appears independently or embedded in a larger sentence like (6). And it is precisely to account for these structural differences among sentences like (5), (7) and (8) that the notion of Syntactic mood is postulated. It is this which makes James' contention untenable. Syntactic mood is not a property of particular occurrences of sentences, but of sentence types.

In view of what has been said, we may try to amend James' defective characterization of syntactic mood as follows: Syntactic mood is a property, not of complete, non-embedded sentences only, but rather of at least every sentence which can occur as a complete or non-embedded sentence, regardless of whether it can also appear embedded or whether it actually occurs at all in any particular occasion of utterance.

But even this amended characterization proves to be inadequate when we pass
to the interrogative mood. It is inadequate because it is still too restrictive: The characterization fits only some very specific class of interrogative sentences; namely, sentences of the type of, e.g.,

(9) Who did it?,

which behaves, in the relevant respect, exactly in the same way as all declaratives do: it can indistinctly appear embedded, as in

(10) I do not know who did it.,

or non-embedded.29

But, at least in English, there are a vast majority of cases in which the main interrogative sentence does not remain unaltered when appearing as part of a more complex sentence. Thus, e.g.,

(11) What time is it?

and all the "yes/no interrogatives" like:

(12) Do you play soccer?

When embedded, (11) becomes:

(13) ...what time it is,

as in, say:

(14) John wants to know what time it is.

29. Notice, incidentally, that in Spanish, for instance, there is no formal variation at all from a root-interrogative to its correspondent embedded interrogative. In Spanish, as opposed to English, all interrogatives, without exception, share this property with the declaratives. Our amended characterization of syntactic mood accommodates well the evidence presented by Spanish.
And, at least according to a widely favored hypothesis, (12) becomes:

(15) (whether) you play soccer,

as in, say:

(16) John wants to know whether you play soccer.

Here we can no longer say that one and the same sentence appears embedded and non-embedded in different occasions of utterance; at least, not if we adopt a criterion of sentence identity which is sensitive enough to changes in surface structure. Rather, we have to talk of an interrogative main sentence and its interrogative embedded counterpart. But, at any rate, regardless of whether we take (13) in (14) and (15) in (16) to be different sentences (clauses) from (11) and (12), respectively, the fact remains that (13), (15), (11) and (12) have to be interpreted as interrogative clauses, since they all exhibit characteristic structural differences with respect to sentences like (5) or (8). Therefore, the failure of our proposed characterization of syntactic mood brings no comfort to the supporters of James's position.

Leaving aside the difficult task of finding out a satisfactory grammatical characterization of syntactic mood, the point that is important to stress here, and the one which the preceding discussion helps to make apparent, is that the difference between non-embedded and embedded sentences (clauses) is not, (at least, not necessarily nor essentially) a difference between sentences with and without syntactic mood. What is specific to independent sentences is, rather, that their utterances, in contradistinction to the utterances of embedded sentences, may give rise to or constitute (when the circumstances are otherwise appropriate) the performance of an illocutionary
act. The utterance of an embedded sentence, considered in abstraction from the utterance of a more complex sentence of which the former is a part, does not give rise to the performance of an illocutionary act. But it is wrong to identify, just because of this fact -- as James does --, 'complete sentence' with 'sentence with a syntactic mood'. To repeat, the correlation has to be made between utterances of complete sentences and possible performances of illocutionary acts, not between complete sentences and sentences with syntactic mood.

For our present purposes, the result of this already too long discussion, if we return now to the issue of looking for the grammatical features which contribute to define the syntactic mood of sentences, is that "completeness" is not one of those features. In other words, syntactic mood is not a property of complete sentences only. Therefore, I shall assume that the grammatical features contributing to the syntactic mood of sentences are the three indicated at the beginning: verbal mood, word order (syntactic structure) and (syntactic) intonation. 30

It remains to say how many syntactic moods there are. Again, as in the case of the verbal moods, this is a question open to debate among linguists. The number and kinds of syntactic moods vary throughout languages. But even if we restrict attention to English, controversy still remains. As it is to be expected, different answers are provided by different theories of grammar. I shall not enter here into this difficult and disputed question. I shall leave it entirely to the linguists. I shall simply and uncritically

follow what seems to be the dominant, traditional view of distinguishing three main syntactic moods in English: Declarative, Imperative and Interrogative.31

2.4 The relation between verbal and syntactic mood

At the present stage of our exposition, once we have examined with some detail the notions of verbal and syntactic mood, we finally are in a position to compare the two notions and see what the relation is between them. Given what has already been said in this chapter, there should be no difficulty in acknowledging the following relation: verbal mood is a co-marker of syntactic mood; that is, verbal mood is one of the elements contributing to determine the syntactic mood of sentences. This is trivially so at the syntactic level, since we saw that verbal mood, together with intonation and syntactic structure, constitute the grammatical feature which determine the syntactic mood of sentences. However, at the syntactic level, where we have to deal with complete sentences, we have to consider other factors as well, such as negation, focus, and other syntactic devices that can change the syntactic mood of a sentence.

31. Hausser, for one, adds what he calls the "Responsive" mood (cf. op. cit., p. 94, n. 8). Similarly, R. B. Long, in his book The Sentence and Its Parts: A Grammar of Contemporary English indicates, together with the three standardly recognised, a fourth one: the so called "Assertive" mood (pp. 80 ff.). Neither Hausser's nor Long's "extra" moods seem to me to be justified. The examples presented by Hausser and Long in support of their respective proposals can be interpreted as particular but relatively straightforward cases of sentences in the declarative mood. James, on his part, would probably add to the three standard syntactic moods a fourth one, which we might call "optative" or, perhaps "hortative" (cf. op. cit., pp. 26-7). It would be the syntactic mood of those complete (non-embedded) sentences whose verbal mood is the subjunctive. Examples of this "optative" kind of sentences would be, e.g., (s1) God bless you! and (s2) So be it!. But this type of syntactic construction is very rare in modern (let alone, modern colloquial) English. In my opinion, sentences like (15) and (16) should be regarded as special, archaic idioms, rather than as belonging to a full-fledged fourth syntactic mood of English.
mood of sentences. But it is so too, and not surprisingly, at the semantic level, since the meaning of both types of mood is related, in one way or another (i.e., more or less directly), to the illocutionary force potential of sentences. Thus, syntactic mood is (taken to be) a marker of the illocutionary force potential of sentences. And, depending on the interpretation of verbal mood chosen, illocutionary force potential is also a) either the meaning of some, although not all, verbal moods (Lyons) or b) the meaning of all verbal moods when qualified or supplemented by the appropriate linguistic (and extra-linguistic) context (James).

Therefore, at a sufficiently general level of description -- the only one which interests us here --, the syntactic/verbal mood relation turns out to be the same under the two views of mood considered earlier: according to both, Lyons and James, the syntactic mood of sentences is syntactically and semantically dependent (in several degrees, which vary with the particular moods considered) upon the verbal mood.

It would be tempting to assume or to postulate that this "relation of dependence" is, or can be understood as, a one-one relation. It would be tempting because it would allow us to identify the two notions of mood. The distinction between the two notions would collapse if such one-one relation could be established between them. But, of course, the proposed assumption is untenable. There is no one-one relation between verbal and syntactic mood. Imperative sentences provide, at least in English, the closest approximation to that model. Sentences whose main verb is imperative in mood are always imperative (jussive) in syntactic mood. And (if we disregard controversial cases like the 'let' construction) every sentence which is
imperative in syntactic mood is also imperative in verbal mood. But notice that in other languages the one-one relation between verbal and syntactic moods does not hold. Thus, in Spanish, for instance, no imperative verbal form can appear as the main verb of a negative sentence. The main verb of a negative imperative (jussive) sentence of Spanish is always subjunctive in mood. So, in

(17) No cierres la puerta! (Don't close the door!),

which is imperative in its syntactic mood, the verb, 'cierres', exhibits a subjunctive mood.

But we do not need to look for counterexamples in languages other than English. As soon as we turn our attention away from the English imperative, we notice that there is no one-one relation between verbal and syntactic moods in English. The relation does not hold in any of its two directions. First, there are sentences which have the same verbal mood but differ in syntactic mood. So, indicative sentences can be either declarative or interrogative, as e.g.,

(18) Paul is in the garden.

and

(19) Is Paul in the garden?

Also, at least if we accept the existence in English of a "periphrastic subjunctive" (i.e., if we regard sentences with auxiliaries like 'would' as subjunctive in verbal mood), then we have that some subjunctive sentences can be either declarative or interrogative in syntactic mood. Compare, for instance,
(20) John would have done it better.

and

(21) Would John have done it better?

Furthermore, if we accept the existence of an "optative" or "hortative" syntactic mood in English exhibited by sentences like (s1) God bless you! and (s2) So be it!, whose main verb is subjunctive in mood, then it turns out that subjunctive sentences can be classified under three different kinds of syntactic moods: optative ((s1) and (s2), etc.), declarative ((20)) and interrogative ((21)).

Second, sentences which have the same syntactic mood may differ in verbal mood. For instance, (18) and (20) are both declarative but the verbal mood of (18) is indicative, whereas the verbal mood of (20) is –we have assumed– subjunctive.

The connection between verbal and syntactic moods is, therefore, much less systematic than one might expect. However, it is important to realise that this is a purely contingent fact about English (and, admittedly, about any other language so far studied by linguists). In principle, there seems to be nothing against the possibility of having a natural language (relatively, not very different from English) in which differences in syntactic mood were marked only and sufficiently (i.e., non-ambiguously) by verbal moods. The imperative case provides –as we have seen– the best illustration of how the mood-system of this hypothetical language would look like.

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32. Cf. Lyons, op. cit., p. 748.
The reason why I stress here the difference, with respect to the syntactic/verbal mood relation, between what is the case as a matter of empirical fact and what is possible or conceivable as a matter of principle is that, later on, when discussing the different but parallel subject of the connection between (syntactic) mood and illocutionary force, we shall see that, in that case, it is not only that there is not a one-one relation between the two latter notions, but rather that there cannot be (not even in principle) such a relation -- or more precisely, that there cannot be a context-independent, systematic relation (whether "one-one" or otherwise) between mood and illocutionary force. It is with the purpose of contrasting the two cases that I have raised the point here.

The fact that there is not a one-one relation between verbal and syntactic mood helps to explain why I shall concentrate almost exclusively on syntactic mood in the remaining part of this work. For one thing, only syntactic mood is relevant to the project of extending denotational semantics to non-declarative sentences. For another, if we are interested (as we are) in exploring the relation between the linguistic meaning of sentences and the illocutionary force of utterances, we must deal with syntactic, not verbal mood, since strictly speaking (as we have seen), the former, but not the latter, is a marker of the illocutionary force potential of sentences. Therefore, from now on, whenever I talk about mood without further qualification it must be understood that I refer to syntactic mood.

The distinction between verbal and syntactic mood is often ignored, bypassed or blurred by scholars when writing on the subject. An eminent example is Davidson's already quoted paragraph of "Moods and Performances"
(Cf. supra, chap. I), where he talks about "...the syntactic and presumably semantic, distinction among moods (such as: indicative, imperative, optative, interrogative) ...". In Davidson's case, however, the inaccuracy has no major undesirable consequences. But it certainly can create unnecessary confusion and mislead the unguarded reader. Things get worse, however, in Lycan's following text:

...it is interesting that the subjunctive mood ... is in a way not on a par with the other moods of a traditional English grammar: indicative, interrogative, imperative. Each of the latter corresponds to a general type of speech act (stating, asking, ordering, etc.) ... The subjunctive mood, by contrast, corresponds to no familiar general type of speech act..." (Logical Form in Natural Language, p. 120. Emphasis mine.)

Lycan compares the subjunctive verbal mood with what almost certainly, despite his unfortunate formulation, we must interpret as the English syntactic verbal moods: declarative, interrogative and imperative. And he records as an interesting difference between the subjunctive and the rest of the listed moods the fact that only the latter correspond to a general type of speech act. But, in view of what we have already said in sections II.2 and II.3, it should be plain that what Lycan takes to be an interesting difference is rather a perfectly trivial or foreseeable one: the subjunctive mood is not like the rest of the moods listed, in its semantic behaviour, simply because, among other things, the subjunctive is a verbal mood, whereas the others are syntactic moods.

33. Lycan mistakenly writes 'indicative', instead of 'declarative', when providing the list of English syntactic moods. Obviously, what he needs is 'declarative', not 'indicative' because otherwise his claim is false: indicative sentences, as we have seen, can be declarative or interrogative and, therefore, the indicative mood corresponds to more than one "general type of speech act".
3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we distinguished syntactic from verbal mood and singled out the former as the proper object of our study. Now we must contrast (syntactic) mood with illocutionary force and explore the relations between these two notions. By touching on this topic, we directly enter into the discussion of the second main task mentioned in page 8, for whose accomplishment the study of mood reveals itself as central: the clarification of the relation between meaning and use.

In theory, the distinction between mood and force is straightforward and unanimously acknowledged: Mood is a structural property of sentences, illocutionary force is a property of speech acts. Therefore, it seems plain that the study of mood belongs to the domain of syntactic and semantics, whereas the study of force belongs to pragmatics. As McGinn,

34. I say 'it seems' because there are authors who deny that there is any "entailment connection" between 'being a structural property of sentences' and 'being the object of semantic theory'. Lycan is one of them (cf. op. cit., ch. 6).
somewhat metaphorically, puts it, "...mood is a matter of meaning, whereas force is a strictly pragmatic affair" ("Semantics for Nonindicative Sentences", p. 304).

We have indicated that the distinction, as it has been presented, remains undisputed. As a matter of fact, however, it is often disregarded or blurred in practice, when addressing problems in semantics and pragmatics. A good example of how easy it is to make this mistake is provided by Hare's opening chapter of The Language of Morals. Consider, among several others, the following paragraph:

...[W]e ... have, among sentences that are in the imperative mood proper, many different kinds of utterance. We have military orders (parade-ground and otherwise), architects' specifications, instructions for cooking omelets or operating vacuum cleaners, pieces of advice, requests, entreaties, and countless other sorts of sentence, many of whose functions shade into one another.... I shall therefore follow the grammarians and use the single term 'command' to cover all these sorts of things that sentences in the imperative mood express, and within the class of commands make only some very broad distinctions. The justification for this procedure is that I hope to interest the reader in features that are common to all, or nearly all, these types of sentence... (p. 4. Emphasis mine.)

The first sentence quoted is probably just a very unfortunate way of saying that imperative sentences can be uttered literally to perform many different kinds of illocutionary acts. This is also -- I think -- the main idea that Hare wants to convey in the entire passage above. But Hare's formulation is very mixed up. Simply, it is not true that we have in English or, for that matter, in any other known natural language, "countless" different sentence-types or sub-types (moods) to express the difference among orders, requests, pieces of advice, entreaties, instructions (let alone "instructions for cooking omelets"), etc. The mood system in English is not so
fine-grained. There seems to be in the paragraph an unwanted identification between: i) sorts of (imperative) sentence (there is only one sort in English) and ii) sorts of things that sentences in the imperative mood express. The confusion occurs three times in this short passage.

Putting aside cases like the one illustrated by Hare's text, the distinction between Mood and Force is -- as I said -- granted and acknowledged by everybody. The real problem, of course, arises when trying to elucidate what the relation is between the syntactic-semantic element of sentences, mood, and the pragmatic aspect of utterances, force.

We have seen in section II.3 that, according to a well accepted view, mood is a grammatically defined feature of sentences whose semantic role is to single out their illocutionary force potential. One may try to exploit this characterization of mood in order to reach a quick and easy solution to the present problem: trivially, the given characterization of mood would explicitly reveal the nature of the relation between mood and force: mood is a marker of illocutionary force (potential). But is this all there is to the problem of the Mood/Force relation? Are we now better off in our understanding of their connection? Of course, we are not. We have not solved the problem, we have just formulated it in a (not very) different fashion. Now the key issue is how to interpret the expression: 'mood is a marker of illocutionary force (potential)'. A fully satisfactory answer would, no doubt, require the construction of adequate theories of force and mood, respectively. Since we have neither of them available, we cannot hope to reach a final answer to the question. My aim here, however, is more modest. I just want to contend that at least one proposal that naturally
comes to mind when trying to specify the Mood/Force relation cannot be right.

3.2 Presentation of the thesis (Th.1)

The proposal, which from now on I shall call 'Th.1', is this:

(Th.1) The mood of the sentence uttered determines and is determined by the force of the illocution performed in (by) the utterance of the sentence.

Or in abbreviated form, the mood of the sentence determines and is determined by the force of the utterance. This idea is most popular when appearing in any of its two weaker versions: especially, (Th.2):

(Th.2) The mood of the sentence determines the force of the utterance;

but also, (Th.3):

(Th.3) The force of the utterance determines the mood of the sentence.

(Th.1) and its two weaker versions are, however, as popular as they are vague. They are vague because of the verb 'to determine' which crucially appears in their formulation. We can try to make (Th.1) more precise by indicating that it should be understood at least in the sense of (Th.1a):

(Th.1a) There is a one-one relation between mood and force;

that is, in the sense of the conjunction of (Th.2a) and (Th.3a):

(Th.2a) Force is a function of mood
and

(Th.3a) Mood is a function of force.

Thus, at least one thing which is meant when asserting (Th.1) that mood determines and is determined by force is, on the one hand, (Th.2a) that, given an utterance, u, if one knew the mood of the sentence of which u is an utterance, then one would thereby know the force of the illocution performed in (by) uttering u. And, on the other hand, (Th.3a) that given an utterance, u, if one knew the force of the illocution performed in (by) uttering u, one would thereby know the mood of the sentence of which u is an utterance. 35

For example, whenever we have an utterance of an interrogative sentence, we are in a position to affirm — according to (Th.1a) — that the utterance of that sentence has to be taken as having the force of a question; and viceversa, if we know that an utterance has the force of a question we can straightforwardly conclude that the sentence uttered is interrogative in mood.

As the example just presented makes manifest, (Th.1), interpreted as

35. With respect to (Th.3a), it must be noticed that the claim that mood is a function of force does not entail that every illocutionary act is to be performed by linguistic means. The possibility of non-linguistic performance is not excluded by (Th.3a): e.g., an officer can give an order to his soldiers by simply waving his hand. Suppose a case in which an officer does exactly that and a bystander describes later the officer's performance by saying: "the officer gave an order to his soldiers". Given this situation, (Th.3a) does not force one to infer that, contrary to the facts, the officer used an imperative sentence. The informant does not indicate what means the officer employed to carry out his command; in particular, the informer does not specify whether the officer used "linguistic means" or other type of device. What (Th.3a) says is, rather, this: if an illocutionary act with force f is going to be performed by uttering a sentence of L, then the sentence to utter must be of mood m, for the only sentences whose utterance give rise to an illocutionary act of force f are sentences of mood m.
is not merely the thesis that there is a one-one relation between mood and force, but also that this one-one relation is such that the following holds: if one were to draw a classification of linguistic utterances, first according to the criterion A): "sameness in mood of the sentences uttered", and then according to the different criterion B): "sameness in the force of [the illocutions performed in (by) making] the utterance", the classification obtained in the first case would be the same as the classification obtained in the second. The two criteria would provide one and the same partition of the set of linguistic (sentential) utterances. That is, the two ways of "counting" linguistic utterances would, in fact, be equivalent. In other words, utterances of sentences with mood m and linguistic utterances (counting as illocutions) with force f would be things which — to borrow R. Cartwright's lively expression — "do not differ in their arithmetics."\(^{38}\)

36. The formulation would probably gain in accuracy if we used 'sentential utterance' instead of 'linguistic utterance'.

37. Professor Cartwright uses the expression (or, rather, a very similar one) in a quite different context. Cf. Philosophical Essays, p. 40.

38. One particularly illuminating way to put the negative results which we shall obtain in this chapter with respect to (Th.1) consists in indicating that the set of equivalence classes with respect to equivalence relation B) is not a partition of the set of linguistic (sentential) utterances; rather, it is a partition of a subset of the set of linguistic (sentential) utterances. That is, the set of linguistic (sentential) utterances is wider than the domain with respect to which the equivalence relation B) induce a partition. B) is an equivalence relation which induces a partition of the set of serious linguistic utterances. B) leaves non-serious utterances unclassified. Thus, e.g., the utterance of "Snow is white" by an actor while play-acting, and as part of his playacting, does not count as an assertion nor as an illocution of any other kind. Such an utterance does not belong to any class of utterances classified by B).
(Th.1) and (Th.1a) are probably too explicit or, perhaps, too crude to be found, unqualified, in the literature. But, more or less implicitly, they can certainly be recognised, acting, as it were, as ideal models or "points of departure" for the investigation, in the writings of many authors who deal with the problem of the mood/force relation. A case in point is Dummett's tenth chapter of Frege: Philosophy of Language. We find several passages there in which Dummett seems to be defending a view very similar to (Th.1a). For instance, Dummett writes the following, when proposing his "slight amendment" to Frege's view in The Thought about the relation between force and sense:

On this view, assertoric sentences, imperatives, sentential interrogatives and optatives would all express thoughts: they would differ only in the force attaching to them—the linguistic act which was performed by uttering them. (p. 307).

And, some pages earlier, he has said:

... the correct approach is to consider utterances as conventionally demarcated into types, by means of the form of linguistic expressions employed, and then to enquire into the conventions governing the use of the various types of utterance. (p. 302)

Let us put aside Dummett's appeal to convention. Here it is only important to bring attention to the correlation which is drawn, in the first text, between sentences of a given type and "the linguistic act which was performed by uttering them"; and, in the second text, between "the form of linguistic expressions employed" (i.e., sentences in one mood or another) and "types of utterances" (i.e., types of illocutionary force).

39. I.e., the "amended" or reformed one.
We said before that (Th.1) is most popular in its weaker version (Th.2), that the mood of the sentence uttered determines the force of the utterance. Indeed, (Th.2) is present in many works on Speech Acts. Searle's *Speech Acts* and Katz's *Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force* are two paradigmatic and very influential examples; a more recent illustration is provided by, e.g., D. Wunderlich's *Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory*. Strictly speaking, both Searle's and Katz's positions are more general than (Th.2), since, according to them, what determines the force of the utterance is not necessarily the mood of the sentence but, in general, whatever illocutionary force indicating device, or devices, may appear in the sentence uttered (mood, but also performative "prefixes", certain adverbial expressions, etc.). Their view is, therefore, better expressed by saying that the meaning of the sentence (whether due to its mood or otherwise) determines the (literal) illocutionary force of the utterance. Searle's endorsement of this view is very clearly manifest in his idea that, if one succeeds in isolating the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of illocutionary acts, one can immediately derive, or in Searle's own words, "extract" from them a set of semantic rules governing the use of the illocutionary force indicating devices of the language.

With respect to Katz, the idea that sentence meaning determines the illocutionary force of the utterance can be easily traced or detected in his notion of "null context" (p. 15); and in his characterization of sentence

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meaning as "the information that determines use in the null context" (p. 21). But, moreover, the idea is explicitly advocated in the following introductory and programmatic passage of Katz's book:

The particular form of the question about where one ought to draw the line between meaning and use with which we shall deal will be, "What does the semantic structure of a sentence contribute to the speech acts the sentence can perform?" ... Our answer will be a theory of propositional structure that ... determines the illocutionary force of sentences independently of pragmatic considerations. (pp. 6-7. Emphasis mine).

Finally, D. Wunderlich is eloquent enough about his acceptance of something very much like (Th.2) when he writes:

...there are speech acts that can be marked by grammatical means: questions, requests, assertions, and most speech acts which are performed by the use of an explicit performative formula. In their fundamental characteristics these speech acts can be treated on the semantic level. My proposal now is that the main classes of speech act should be defined within the semantics of grammatical mood. (Op. cit., p. 304. Emphasis mine.)

I want to argue in what remains of this paper that any theory which goes along with the idea that mood determines and is determined by force, in any of the senses specified above, or with any of its weaker versions ((Th.3) and especially (Th.2)), is mistaken. To think otherwise is to confuse questions of linguistic meaning with questions of use. This is not to say, of course, that mood lacks any connection with force. Naturally, mood is related to force in some way, but the relation is not that of "x determines and is determined by y".

As I see it, there are two different but equally sound arguments against (Th.1) and its cognates. The first is empirical in kind; it shows that, as a matter of fact, (Th.1) is false. This empirical argument stems from an examination of plausible classifications (or attempts of classifications) of moods and illocutionary forces. The second is an a priori or "transcendental" argument, for it claims, not only that (Th.1) is in fact false, but that it is false in principle; i.e., that it is not possible that the force of an utterance be a function of just the mood of the sentence uttered. This second, a priori argument is based, essentially, on the existence of non-serious uses of sentences. In what follows, I shall occupy myself exclusively with the empirical argument and leave the a priori argument practically untouched. Let us start, then, with our exploration of the empirical argument against (Th.1).

3.3 Empirical argument against (Th.1)

3.3.1 Some presuppositions of (Th.1)

We have seen that (Th.1) is vague. It was in an attempt to make (Th.1) more precise that we advanced (Th.1a), that there is a one-one relation between mood and force. Now, it is time to have a closer look at (Th.1a): As soon as we interpret (Th.1) as (Th.1a), one thing immediately becomes clear: if (Th.1a) is true, there must be an equal number of moods and of illocutionary forces. Therefore, in order to assess the accuracy of (Th.1a) we need to be able to count, in one way or another, the number of moods and the number of illocutionary forces between which the alleged one-one relation
is supposed to hold. We need to know how many moods and how many forces there are. Otherwise, how could we decide whether the desired correlation does really obtain? Therefore, there are two questions which have to be settled before (Th.1a) can be tested: 1) How many moods are there? and 2) How many forces are there?.

But it has to be noticed that, although satisfactory answers for 1) and 2) would suffice to assess the accuracy of the simplest, and least plausible, version of (Th.1a) -- that every single illocutionary force is attached to one and only one mood --, it would still contribute very little, in case that the simplest version of (Th.1a) proved to be false, to determine what the "actual" relation between moods and forces is. In general, in order to solve the problem of the relation between the set of moods and the set of forces it is necessary, not only nor mainly to know their respective cardinality, but also and more interestingly to know how their respective members are, or can be, classified. The crucial questions to ask are, therefore, 3) How are the moods classified? and 4) How are the illocutionary forces classified? It is with these questions that we have to occupy now. Let us start with the latter; that is, with the one concerning force:

3.3.2 The classification of illocutionary forces

For simplicity's sake, I shall assume that this very hard question of how forces are to be classified has already been solved. Simply, I shall adopt here Searle's standard classification of illocutionary forces, such as it appears in his book (written in collaboration with D. Vanderveken) Foundations
I choose Searle's classification of forces, among the several available in the literature, because I think his is the best known and the most widely accepted at present; and also, because many alternative classifications are just "allegedly improved" versions of Searle's original one.

According to Searle & Vanderveken, there are seven factors defining the notion of illocutionary force. Or, if preferred, an illocutionary force has seven interrelated components: Illocutionary point, Degree of strength of the illocutionary point, Mode of Achievement, Propositional content conditions, Preparatory conditions, Sincerity conditions and Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions. Of these seven components, the most important one — the one that determines the generic kind of force to which a particular illocutionary force belongs — is the illocutionary point. Searle & Vanderveken leave the notion of illocutionary point undefined and regard it as a primitive concept of the theory of illocutionary acts. But they provide some informal characterizations of it. For instance, they write:

42. The classification proposed by Searle & Vanderveken in this book is practically the same as the one originally conceived by Searle in 1975, in his paper "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts". Among the differences between the two works, the only one which — to avoid confusion — needs to be indicated here is a purely terminological one: In his former article, Searle uses the label 'Representative' for the type of illocutionary acts which he will later call 'Assertive'. I shall follow Searle's new terminology in this paper.

43. Of course the first and initially most influential classification of illocutionary forces is due to Austin. But, as Searle and others have pointed out, Austin's taxonomy is clearly defective. At least, it is more seriously defective than Searle's. Cf., e.g., Searle, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts" and Bach & Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, p. 40.
Each type of [illocutionary force] has a point or purpose which is internal to its being [a force] of that type. ... Each of these points or purposes we will call the illocutionary point of the corresponding [force]. By saying that the illocutionary point is internal to the type of illocutionary [force], we mean simply that a successful performance of an act [possessing a force] of that type necessarily achieves that purpose and it achieves it in virtue of being an act [possessing a force] of that type. It could not be a successful act of that type if it did not achieve that purpose. (pp. 13-14).

Given this characterization, it is clear that in Searle & Vanderveken's classification there are exactly as many genera or types of illocutionary force as illocutionary points.

In Searle & Vanderveken's view, there are only five illocutionary points. These five points are: the assertive, the commissive, the

44 These five points are: the assertive, the commissive, the

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44. This is so because, in their own words:

The illocutionary point of an illocutionary force always relates the propositional content of that illocutionary force to the world of the utterance, and there are a limited number of ways ["directions of fit"] that propositional contents can be related to a world of utterance. ... The five different illocutionary points exhaust the different possible directions of fit between the propositional content and the world." (pp. 52-53)

For an explanation of the notion of "direction of fit", and of Searle & Vanderveken's reason to affirm that there are five illocutionary points, cf., respectively, op. cit., sec. 5.II and secs. 3.I-3.II. Notice, incidentally, that the authors' terminology in the last quotation is quite misleading. They refer there to "the propositional content of an illocutionary force". Given Searle & Vanderveken's analysis of an illocutionary act in two components, illocutionary force and propositional content (cf. infra, pp. 95 ff.), it is certainly inappropriate to present the propositional content as an element of the illocutionary force. By definition, propositional content is that component of an illocution which is not part of the illocutionary force. Obviously, what Searle & Vanderveken should have said (and what the most probably mean) is something like this: "...the propositional content of an illocutionary act possessing that illocutionary force..." It is important to realise, however, that Searle & Vanderveken's analysis of illocutionary acts in two elements, illocutionary force and propositional content, is compatible with the idea that one of the features defining illocutionary
directive, the declarative and the expressive points. The authors informally describe each of them thus:

The assertive point is to say how things are. ... The commissive point is to commit the speaker to doing something. ... The directive point is to try to get other people to do things. ... The declarative point is to change the world by saying so. ... The expressive point is to express feelings and attitudes. (pp. 37-38).

These five illocutionary points determine or give rise to five general types or "categories" of illocutionary force:

As far as illocutionary forces are concerned there are five and only five illocutionary ways of using language. One can say how things are (assertives), one can try to get other people to do things (directives), one can commit oneself to doing things (commissives), one can bring about changes in the world through one's utterances (declarations), and one can express one's feelings and attitudes (expressives). (p. 52)

In Searle & Vanderveken's conception, therefore, every illocutionary force, if it is indeed an illocutionary force, must belong to one of the five generic categories mentioned above. And within each of these five categories, different illocutionary forces are identifiable and distinguishable from one another by differences in some or all of the six components of illocutionary force other than illocutionary point. Thus, a begging and an order, although both are directives (both share the directive illocutionary point), differ, among other things, in the "mode of achievement of the illocutionary point"; in turn, an order and a suggestion differ in forces is "propositional content conditions". My criticism to Searle & Vanderveken does not extend to their idea of regarding propositional content conditions as a component of illocutionary force.

45. For a more formal, informative and complete characterization of these five points, cf. op. cit., secs. 2.III and 3.II; also Searle's "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts".
their respective "degrees of strength of the illocutionary point". 46

Searle & Vanderveken's classification of illocutionary forces does not solve, in itself, the question of how many illocutionary forces there are. Nevertheless, one can extract very useful information in this respect from the author's definition of illocutionary force. An illocutionary force is a septuple whose components are those already indicated above. 47 This alone should already prepare us to expect that the (potential) number of illocutionary forces must be large. Granted, not all septuples which can be logically generated from the systematic combination of elements of these seven components constitute illocutionary forces. And this because the seven components defining illocutionary force are not logically or conceptually independent. They are interrelated. So, for instance, different illocutionary points determine different sincerity conditions; and, in general, we can say that the illocutionary point of an illocutionary force imposes more or less strict conditions on all the remaining six components of

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46. These two examples are taken from Searle & Vanderveken:

...a speaker who issues an order achieves the directive illocutionary point by invoking a position of authority or power over the hearer. A speaker who begs the hearer to do something achieves the same directive illocutionary point in a humble way. (p. 40)

And:

...suggesting that the hearer leave the room is weaker than ordering him to leave the room. (p. 41)

47. Cf. supra, p. 63.
force. But even after acknowledging that there is this restriction in the number of septuples constituting different illocutionary forces, the number of forces is still (potentially) very large. Indeed, if I am correct, that number is (denumerably) infinite. This is so because two of the seven components of illocutionary force are "degrees of a certain magnitude" — these two magnitudes being: a) strength of the illocutionary point and b) strength of the sincerity conditions. Now, of these two magnitudes, at least the first one has the property of being isomorphic with the set of integers.

As Searle & Vanderveken explicitly indicate:

We use the infinite set $\mathbb{Z}$ of integers to measure the degrees of strength with which illocutionary points are achieved because there is no theoretical finite lower or upper limit on the strength of most illocutionary points. (p. 42. Emphasis mine.)

But if there is an infinite number of degrees of strength of the illocutionary point then the number of septuples defining different illocutionary forces must be also infinite.

It turns out, then, that Searle & Vanderveken's conception of illocutionary force commits one to the view that there is an infinite number of illocutionary forces. This is certainly not good news for (Th.1a) and its weaker version (Th.2), whose soundness we are trying to evaluate here. If there is an infinite number of illocutionary forces, then (Th.1a), in its least restricted interpretation, (Th.1aI), that there is a one-one relation between moods and individual forces, is refuted right away, since the

48. cf. op. cit., sec. 2.IV.

49. And, evidently, the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the case of (Th.2) if interpreted as (Th.2I), that mood determines individual force. In
natural language does not (and cannot) have an infinite number of moods.

Thesis (Th.1a) may still be rescued, however, if one reinterprets it in such a way that the one-one relation between mood and force is understood as a relation, not between mood and individual force, but rather between mood and a more general type of force -- the idea being; naturally, that the number of types of force at the chosen level of generality is presumably much smaller than the number of "individual" forces; in particular, one must assume that the number is finite. For instance, one may reinterpret (Th.1a) as (Th.1aS):

(Th.1aS) There is a one-one relation between moods and species of force.

If (Th.1aS) were correct, the sub-specific differences in force would not be registered by, or directly related to, the moods. Now, the relevant question is not a) how many (individual) forces are there?, but rather, b) how many specific forces are there?

A problem which immediately arises when trying to answer b) is how to distinguish between species and sub-species, etc., of illocutionary force. Searle & Vanderveken's classification does not give us any clue to draw this distinction. Their classification discriminates only between generic and "sub-generic" levels of force; but there are no further, systematic sub-divisions in species and sub-species, etc. An appeal to other, more fine grained classifications of force will not help, for Searle & Vanderveken's classification of forces is typical in this respect and, to my knowledge, no general, what I say in this section about (Th.1a) can be applied to (Th.2) as well.
alternative classification currently available in the literature offers a
sensibly more "detailed" taxonomy than that of Searle & Vanderveken's.50

Therefore, strictly speaking, from the point of view of Searle &
Vanderveken's classification, the proposed reinterpretation of (Th.1a) as
(Th.1aS) is not feasible. The only reinterpretation of (Th.1a) clearly and
non-problematically permitted by Searle & Vanderveken's classification of
forces is (Th1.aG):
(Th.1aG) There is a one–one relation between moods and genera
of force.

Nevertheless, despite Searle & Vanderveken's classification, and
disregarding whether we can find a rigorous, methodologically adequate
procedure to single out specific versus sub-specific differences in
illocutionary force, it is intuitively perceived that sub-generic differences
between, say, requests and orders, promises and assurances, resignations and
adjournments, predictions and objections, apologies and congratulations,
possess a "higher" level of generality than sub-generic differences between,
say, enthusiastic and half-hearted congratulations or between diffident and
aggressive assertions. It is sub-generic differences of this "higher level"
that we could, informally and somewhat loosely, call 'differences in species

50. Cf., for instance, Austin's classification in How to Do Things with
Words; Bach & Harnish's in Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts; and
Recanati's in Meaning and Force. A basic question -- but one that I shall
leave untouched here -- is whether one can project a (more or less) neat
treelike organization into the realm of sub-generic forces. It may very well
happen that distinctions in force below the generic level do not allow such a
strict categorization (cf. Recanati, p. 158). If that were the case, Searle &
Vanderveken's typical procedure of classifying forces merely according to
their genus, without further sub-divisions, would certainly look like a sound
policy.

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of illocutionary force', if only to distinguish them from more subtle
differences like those existing between enthusiastic and half-hearted
congratulations. In other words, we may exploit the intuitively perceived
fact just signaled to construct a rough and ready notion of species of
force. We cannot properly define this notion; but at least we can establish:
principle (Pr):

(Pr) Differences in meaning between illocutionary verbs are
or reflect differences in "species" of illocutionary
force.

As formulated, (Pr) is clearly defective, because -- as Searle & Vanderveken
indicate 51 -- there are some illocutionary verbs which do not (genuinely)
denote illocutionary forces. These are verbs which do not "imply an
illocutionary point as part of their meaning." (p. 180). For instance, the
authors mention the verb 'Announce' as a case in point;52 the verb "Answer"

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51. Cf. op. cit., pp. 179-80 and 182.

52. Searle & Vanderveken do not give any reason why "Announce" is, in their
view, a verb not genuinely denoting an illocutionary force. They just
indicate, as a matter of fact, that "announce" is a verb of this kind:

The verb "announce" ... does not name an illocutionary force
since almost any illocutionary force can be announced.
Announcing carries no restriction as to its illocutionary point.
One can announce statements, promises, warnings, orders,
apologies, etc. (p. 189)

Perhaps, we could help to make Searle & Vanderveken's claim less obscure by
providing the following examples of announcements that are, respectively, an
assertion, a promise, a warning, an order and an apology. 1) The assertion
made by the news-man to his tv-audience that president Bush has already
departed from Washington and is in his way to Kennebunkport. 2) The promise
made by John to his boss that he will make the required phone-call to
Philadelphia early next morning. 3) The warning made by the teacher to her
students that all those who fail to take the final exam will have to repeat
the course next term. 4) The order issued by the captain to his soldiers
that they must clean the latrines on Friday. 5) The apologize offered by
-- we shall contend later\textsuperscript{53}-- is another.

\( (Pr) \) is, therefore, in need of refinement. One can avoid the problem created by illocutionary verbs of the kind of "Announce" and "Answer" by restating \( (Pr) \) as \( (Pr^*) \), below. Let us call illocutionary verbs genuinely denoting illocutionary forces 'verbs of kind \( K \)'. Then, \( (Pr^*) \) can be put thus:

\( (Pr^*) \) Differences in meaning between verbs of kind \( K \) are or reflect differences in "species" of illocutionary force.

Of course, for \( (Pr^*) \) to be useful we must suppose that there is a reliable way of distinguishing illocutionary verbs genuinely denoting illocutionary forces from those which do not do so. Let us suppose that we have such a procedure at hand. Now, given \( (Pr^*) \), we can immediately answer our former question b), "how many species of force are there?": There are at least as

Paul to Lucy for having forgotten to feed her tortoise last weekend. Now, suppose that someone who has been a witness of the performance of each of these five illocutionary acts wants or is in need to report or describe these illocutions to a third party. Our reporter may very well carry out his description by saying (or writing), respectively, sentences \( (s_1) \)-\( (s_5) \):

\( (s_1) \) "President Bush has already departed from Washington and is in his way to Kennebunkport." -- The news-man announced.
\( (s_2) \) "I'll call Philadelphia first thing in the morning." -- John announced to his boss.
\( (s_3) \) "Those of you who don't take the final in May will have to repeat the course in September." -- The teacher announced to her students.
\( (s_4) \) "You'll clean the latrines on Friday!" -- The captain announced to his soldiers.
\( (s_5) \) "I'm sorry Lucy, it won't happen again." -- Paul announced to Lucy.

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. infra, pp. 87-88.
many "species" of force as non-synonymous verbs of kind $K$ are in the language.

Unfortunately, for our purposes this answer is not satisfactory, because, by leaving open the number of species of force which may exist beyond or above those denoted by the verbs of kind $K$ of the language, it does not exclude the possibility that the total number of species of force be infinite. But we need to rule out this possibility, for, otherwise, our new interpretation of (Th.1a) as (Th.1aS) would obviously not be better off than (Th.1aI). We can amend our answer to question b) by making it relative to a given language and a given period of time. Our answer to b) would, then, be this: For every natural language, $L$, and every time, $t$, the number of "species" of force communicable in $L$ at $t$ is the same as the number of verbs of kind $K$ possessed by $L$ at $t$.

Of course, by making our answer to b) relative to a language and a time we also and thereby make (Th.1aS) relative to a language and a time. This, however, does not really diminish the original strength and scope of (Th.1a), since the claim is generalised for all natural languages and for all times in the history of these languages. Obviously, there still remains the problem of how to characterize, in a non-circular or non-question begging way, the notion of communicable (species) of illocutionary force. I shall not try to solve this problem here. I shall simply presuppose, for the sake of (Th.1aS), that this notion is "legitimate".

54. I owe the substance of this suggestion to J. Higginbotham.
In view of our amended answer to b), the issue now should be to determine how many illocutionary verbs of kind K there are in a given language at a certain time; and, were (Th.1aS) ever to be confirmed, this should be done for all (or at least for a representative sample of) the existing natural languages. Naturally, the overwhelming enormity of such a task discourages any possible attempt to undertake it. But suppose that, as a beginning, we choose English as it exists today (i.e., roughly, in the last three decades 1960-90). Again, and despite the drastic reduction in scope, the vastness of this enterprise goes well beyond the limits of both my skills and the purposes of this paper. I leave that task to the lexicographer. Here it suffices to notice that Searle & Vanderveken themselves have already registered more than one hundred verbs of kind K existing now in English. The verbs listed by Searle & Vanderveken do not exhaust the number of verbs of kind K which are presently available in English, but they serve well enough to our practical purposes of evaluating (Th.1a). If (Th.1a), interpreted as (Th.1aS), is true, then the number of moods belonging to (present) English must certainly be the same as the number of illocutionary verbs of kind K available now in English. This means that, if the number of moods in English is smaller than the number of verbs studied by Searle & Vanderveken (exactly one hundred and seven), then (Th1.aS) is already empirically refuted.

To recapitulate: for the purposes of evaluating (Th.1a), one should bear in mind the following results of our quick exploration of the problem concerning how to classify illocutionary forces: First, if (as we have assumed) Searle & Vanderveken's notion of illocutionary force is correct, the number of individual illocutionary forces is infinite. Second, Searle & Vanderveken's
classification of forces (and, to my knowledge, any other classification of forces proposed in the literature) is exclusively a classification in wide genera of forces. In between those genera and the vast quantity of individual forces no intermediate level or levels of generality are formally offered or systematically discerned. Third, from the former, second point we draw the consequence that, strictly speaking, we are allowed only two possible ways of interpreting (Th.1a): as (Th.1aI), that there is a one-one relation between moods and individual forces; or as (Th.1aG), that there is a one-one relation between moods and genera of forces. Fourth, from the first point we can immediately conclude — without any need to wait for the results of our forthcoming analysis of the notion of mood — that (Th.1aI) is false, since the number of moods of the language is not (and cannot be) infinite. This leaves (Th.1aG) as the only plausible reading of (Th.1a), pending, of course, an examination of the concept of mood. Fifth, In an attempt to improve the chances of (Th.1a) being confirmed, I have proposed, despite Searle & Vanderveken's, to consider one "intermediate" level of generality in the classification of forces. For convenience, I suggested to call this level 'the specific level of generality'. Although our criterion to single out "species" of force is deficient in many ways, it permits us to register the intuitively perceived fact that differences between, say, ordering and requesting, possess a higher degree of generality than differences between, say, vehemently and reluctantly promising. Once and if we are prepared to acknowledge this level of "specific" force, then we obtain a new possible way of interpreting (Th.1a). The new interpretation is (Th.1aS), that there is a one-one relation between moods and those "species" of force which are communicable in a given language at a certain time; or abbreviately, that
there is a one-one relation between moods and "species" of force.

In order to find out whether (Th.1a), either interpreted as (Th.1aS) or as (Th.1aG), is tenable we must turn now to the classification of moods.

3.3.3 The classification of moods

We have already encountered the problem of how to identify, count and classify moods in the last chapter, when looking for a characterization of syntactic mood as opposed to verbal mood. As we indicated there, the question is not an easy one and, not surprisingly, it is a subject of controversy among linguists; different theories of grammar provide different (tentative) answers. One point, however, upon which there seems to be unanimous agreement is that there is not a unique mood-system common to, or shared by, all natural languages. Different languages have different numbers and types of moods. The differences in type come either from the different kind of illocutionary forces which may be signified by the moods of different languages or from the different kind of syntactic devices which may function as markers of mood in each language or family of relatively similar languages. This shows that the search for a classification of moods, if it is going to serve to our main goal of assessing (Th.1a), has always to be made relative to a specific language or group of related languages. On its turn, by so relativizing the classification of moods, we impose an analogous relativization on (Th.1a): the thesis that there is a one-one relation between mood and force has to be primarily understood as a thesis about the relation between illocutionary forces and the moods of a given language. It will not do to identify and count all the different moods which can be found
in different languages and see whether the number so obtained matches the number of illocutionary forces. Therefore, in its most general form, (Th.1a) has to be formulated thus:  

(Th.1a*) For every natural language, L, there is a one-one relation between the moods of L and the set of illocutionary forces.

This formulation is such that, although compatible with the counterfactual possibility that every language share one and the same mood-system, it certainly does not entail nor presuppose that such a possibility be the case.

Once (Th.1a) is presented in its more precise fashion, (Th.1a*), the task of assessing the thesis unfolds, in fact, in a set of many parallel tasks; namely, those consisting in examining, for each particular natural language, whether (Th.1a) holds or not. Only in the case that all languages had the desired property, would (Th.1a*) be confirmed. Of course, we cannot try to carry out such a vast investigation program here. We shall just focus on the specific case of English. The tenet to be evaluated is, thus, a particular instance of (Th.1a*):  

55. For reasons of simplicity, the notion of illocutionary force is left unqualified in (Th.1a*) and, in general, all throughout this section. Strictly speaking, however, and in accordance with the results of last section, the notion of force should be understood here in one of the two restricted senses which permit at least a prima facie plausible reading of (Th.1a); that is, either as generic force or as "specific" force. So, strictly speaking, (Th.1a*) does in fact unfold in two alternative theses: (Th.1a*G) and (Th.1a*S).

56. Cf. the last footnote.
(Th.1a***) There is a one-one relation between the moods of English and the illocutionary forces.

By so restricting our study to English, we are not, however, necessarily limiting the power or scope of our eventual results. This is so because, obviously, whereas (Th.1a***) can be maintained even if (Th.1a*) is proved to be wrong, the opposite is not the case. If (Th.1a***) is false, then it is no longer possible to defend (Th.1a*), unless, of course, we are willing to introduce ad hoc restrictions or modifications. But, anyway, if (Th.1a***) fails, (Th.1a*) cannot remain unchanged. Consequently, if our investigation concerning English reveals that (Th.1a***) is true, we will still have not gained much in the business of evaluating (Th.1a*). But if it turns out that (Th.1a***) is false, then we are in a position to reject (Th.1a*) as well.

Our next step is, therefore, to ask how many moods there are in English and how to classify them. Needless to say, these questions are the subject of much controversy among linguists, and different theories of grammar propose different answers. For simplicity's sake, in sec. II.3 I decided to follow -- without further discussion or critical examination -- what I take to be the dominant, traditional view of distinguishing three main moods in English: the declarative, interrogative and imperative moods. I proceed in the same manner here, but I need to add an important qualification: to hold the view that declarative, interrogative and imperative are the main English moods does not necessarily amount to holding the stronger claim that these three moods are the only ones there are in English. We need to explore the possibility of finding some "secondary" moods in English besides the three

57. Cf. supra, sec. II.3.
main ones referred to above. There are at least three senses in which we can interpret the expression 'main moods of English', and each of these senses opens the way to a different, very rudimentary and rough principle of mood-classification. First, and least interestingly, 'main mood' may be read as most common or most frequently used mood. In these reading, the three moods mentioned may be seen as the main ones in the sense of being those which most frequently appear in sentences of English normally used by native speakers. Thus, the three moods mentioned would be the main ones in contradistinction to, e.g., an optative or exhortative mood which, if it exists at all in modern English, it is certainly very rarely used.\(^{58}\) This sense is not very interesting because the resulting division between main and secondary moods is made attending to a criterion which,\(\textit{prima facie}\) at least, is completely external or foreign to grammar: mood more or less frequently used by the speakers of the language. There might be, of course, "grammatical reasons" explaining or underlying these different frequencies in the use of different moods by the speakers, but the criterion at issue is absolutely opaque in this respect; i.e., it does not contribute anything to the understanding or to the identification of those hypothetical "grammatical reasons".

Second, the expression 'main mood' may be interpreted as signifying primitive or simple or non-derivative mood. In this sense — which we may as well call the syntactic sense —, the three moods signaled, declarative, interrogative and imperative, would be main moods because they are not

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58. Cf.\(\textit{supra}\), p. 46, n. 31.
derived from or constructed out of any other more "primitive" mood. Notice, incidentally, that in this reading the alleged optative or exhortative mood, which had to be regarded as a secondary mood according to the criterion resulting from the first interpretation of 'main mood', must appear now as one of the main moods, since it is not derived from any other, more primitive mood. Declarative, interrogative and imperative moods (together, perhaps, with the optative, if we are willing to accept it as a full-fledged mood of English) would be the main moods of English because all the others, if any, can be seen as the result of combining or putting together one of the primitive moods with some other syntactic devices of the sentence.

This picture fits well with some of the "extra" moods proposed in the literature. Take, for instance, the case of sentences of the form of (22), (23), (24), (25) and (26), respectively:

(22) May/Can I borrow your coat (please)?
(23) Can you drive me home tonight (please)?
(24) Might/could I borrow your coat (please)?
(25) Could you drive me home tonight (please)?
(26) Will you (please) stop acting silly now?

(22)-(26) can be described as special interrogative sentences. (They would be special because, although being interrogative in mood, the main illocution which their (serious and literal) utterance give rise to is not a question but a more or less polite request ((22)-(25)) or a more or less compelling order ((26)).) But alternatively, they can be characterised as sentences

with a "complex mood"; namely a mood which results from the combination of a simple mood, the interrogative, with a modal, auxiliary verb-form such as: 'may', 'might', 'can', 'could' or 'will'. Each of these combinations could be interpreted as a different "secondary" mood, or if preferred, all of them could be regarded as special cases of one single secondary mood, which could be described thus: interrogative mood plus one of the auxiliary, modal verb-forms: 'may', 'might', can', 'could' or 'will' plus — optionally — the sentential adjunct 'please'.

Other possible candidates for secondary moods, according to this "syntactic reading" of 'main mood', would be the so called explicit performative prefixes (epp's); that is, expressions like (X) 'I order you to ...'

and

(Y)'I promise (you) that ...',

which consist of an illocutionary verb in one of its first person, simple present tense forms, prefixed either to an infinitive clause ((X)) or to a 'that-' clause ((Y)). As before, epp's may be understood as special cases of one of the main moods. Now, the main mood in question is not the interrogative but the declarative. Sentences starting with epp's (i.e., explicit performative sentences) could be regarded as special declaratives for the same reason — mutatis mutandis — that (22)-(26) could be considered

60. There are cases in which the explicit performative formula does not function as a prefix at all. Thus, for instance, the sentence 'I salute you'...
special interrogatives; namely, because the main illocutions to which their (serious and literal) utterance gives rise are not determined by the declarative mood of the sentences but by the particular illocutionary verbs occurring as part of the epp of the sentences. Thus, a serious and literal utterance of 'I request you to do it' counts not as an assertion but as a request. 61. But alternatively, and again in an analogous way to the cases of (22)-(26) formerly considered, explicit performative sentences may be interpreted not as special declaratives but as sentences with a mood other than the declarative; i.e., with a "complex mood". This time, the complex mood would be the result of combining the declarative mood with an illocutionary verb appearing in a first person, simple present tense form as the main verb of the sentence. Once and if the epp's are interpreted as complex moods, one faces two options: one may take all epp's as special cases of a single complex or secondary mood which, if so wished, might be named the "performative mood". Instead, one may see each epp (i.e., epp's with different illocutionary verbs) as a different complex mood. In the latter case, one would have to allow as many "performative moods" as illocutionary verbs there are in the language. In the former, one single performative mood would suffice to give an account of the epp's phenomenon.

Finally, we may consider a third sense of the expression 'main mood', which can be labeled the semantic sense: a mood would be a main mood in this sense.

61. To simplify the exposition, I proceed here as if the declarative mood were straightforwardly associated with assertive force. We shall see later that this common assumption is rather problematic. In fact, I think it is better to interpret the declarative mood as neutral with respect to every particular species of illocutionary force. Cf. infra, sec. III.3.6.3.
if it is a marker of a main category of illocutionary forces. That is, a main mood would be one associated with an illocutionary force of an "appropriate" level of generality, where by 'appropriate level of generality' we refer, for instance, to the genus and the species levels of generality but not to broader nor to more fine-grained categories than these two. So, for example, if the language had a mood for promising as opposed to, say, requesting, we would classify those two moods as main ones because, at least from a pre-theoretical point of view, promising and requesting seem to be two different species of illocutionary acts and, therefore the two moods would mark different species of force. On the other hand, if our language had a mood for, say, promising wholeheartedly as opposed to promising reluctantly, etc., such a mood would have to be considered as a secondary one, according to this third sense of 'main mood'. Now, the declarative, interrogative and indicative moods of English would again turn out to be main moods inasmuch as they are associated with (or correspond to) the assertive, erotic and directive illocutionary forces respectively, which are all forces that, at least within Searle's classification of forces, qualify as either generic (assertive and directive) or specific (erotic) in kind. According to this third criterion, a number of moods discussed in the literature would have to be considered secondary moods. That is the case, for instance, with R. Long's Assertive mood and with R. Hausser's Responsive mood.

62. Cf. last note.

63. Cf., respectively, R. Long, The Sentence and Its Parts, A grammar of contemporary English; and Hausser, "Surface Compositionality and the semantics of mood" and "The Syntax and Semantics of English Mood".
Long characterizes his assertive mood as follows:

Like ... main declaratives, ... assertives are expressions of opinion or of fact. Like declaratives (and interrogatives) they have common-mode or hypothetical-subjunctive verb forms as predicators. They characteristically differ from declaratives in that their subjects are preceded by complements (or parts of complements) and/or by predicators (or parts of predicators) (p. 80).

Examples of sentences in assertive mood are:

(27) How I suffered with that dentist!
(28) Still more were we pleased with the beaches.
(29) Nowhere is there a lovelier island.
(30) Off he went.

Notice that in the above characterization, the semantic role of assertive mood does not seem to differ from the semantic role of the declarative mood: assertive and declarative sentences alike are "expressions of opinion or of fact". But as the examples (27)-(30) contribute to show, there is a semantic difference between the two moods. Long's "explanation" of this difference consists in indicating that assertives differ semantically from declaratives in that they are "[e]xpressions of opinion or fact felt as extraordinary"; i.e., the assertive mood, unlike the declarative, is a marker of "extremitive [assertive] force" (ibid.). Evidently, these remarks are as vague as they can be. What is this "extremitive force"? At first sight, one would feel more inclined to regard (27)-(30) as exclamatory in character; but Long

64. In Long's terminology, what is normally known as the indicative mood of a verb receives the name of 'common mode'.

65. Ibid. Emphasis mine.
discards this suggestion and talks, instead, of this alleged extremitive force. Be this as it may, the special semantic role assigned by Long to his assertive mood squares well with our third, "semantic" notion of secondary mood. Assertives are secondary moods, in a semantic sense, because they are not markers of any species or genus of illocutionary force, but rather they mark a relatively subtle shade (variety) of a certain genus of force (the assertive force). On the other hand, Long's assertive mood would probably have to be regarded as a main mood if 'main mood' is understood in its "syntactic" sense, since the assertive is not a complex mood: i.e., it is not composed out of a certain simple mood and other syntactic devices of the sentence.

With respect to Hausser's responsive mood, the situation is as follows: let us introduce the notion with an example: Suppose that a speaker, S, asks to his interlocutor, T:

(31) Who came?

And T answers by uttering either (32) or (33):

(32) Peter.
(33) Peter came.

Similarly, suppose that S asks to T:

(34) Where is your bicycle?

66. Cf. op. cit., p. 80.

67. The example is taken, with some changes and simplifications, from Hausser (cf. "Surface Compositionality and the Semantics of Mood", pp. 87-8). In this article Hausser uses the term 'respondative' for what he later will call responsive mood (cf. "The Syntax and semantics of English Mood").
And T answers by uttering either (35) or (36):

(35) In the courtyard.
(36) It/(My bicycle) is in the courtyard.

The surface expressions (32) and (35) are, according to Hausser, "non-redundant answers" relative to (31) and (34). By contrast, (33) and (36) are "redundant answer" expressions relative to (31) and (34). The responsive mood would be, in Hausser's view, the mood proper of "non-redundant answer expressions" like (32) and (35). The author signals three distinctive features of expressions in the responsive mood:

They are expressions which (i) are not a complete declarative expression, (ii) denote a truthvalue (proposition) if interpreted relative to a suitable interrogative expression, and (iii) exhibit highly specific structural properties which delimit the class of interrogatives they may function to answer. ((1980), p. 88).

Of these three features, only (i) and (ii) are interesting for our purposes. We shall disregard (iii) completely.

There are some problems concerning Hausser's notion of responsive mood. In the first place, one may think that Hausser's postulation of a specific mood for expressions like (32) and (35) is entirely superfluous. While Hausser describes as expressions in the responsive mood could simply be explained, instead, as straightforward cases of ellipsis. Simply, in order to avoid redundancy, etc., the language allows for these elliptical expressions. One does not need to pose a new mood to explain expressions like (32) and (35). They just witness the existence of an elliptical way of saying what could be said by uttering the corresponding complete sentences. But Hausser could reply that, by claiming that (32) and (35), etc., are "sentences" in a special, responsive mood, he is defending a position which is not really
different from the one advanced by his opponent. Hausser would be fully
prepared to characterize expressions in his responsive mood as elliptical
(declarative) sentences. Precisely, the responsive mood would be the
"surface syntactic construction" of elliptical (declarative) expressions. It
might be, therefore, that the question whether to regard "sentences' like
(32) and (35) as responsive in mood or as elliptical declaratives is mainly a
terminological dispute.

But Hausser's responsive is definitely inadequate on another account: As it
is plain from features (i) and (ii) of the above characterization of
responsive expressions, Hausser restricts the responsive mood to the case in
which the complete sentence "replaced" by a "sentence" in responsive mood is
a declarative sentence. Indeed, all the examples he provides of re sponsive
sentences are ellipsis of declarative answers. This restriction seems
completely unjustified. The -- shall we say -- "elliptical phenomenon"
proper of non-redundant answer expressions occurs as well when the complete
sentence to be replaced is non-declarative in mood. For instance, imagine
that a speaker, S, which has been looking for his wallet without success,
runs into a friend of his, T, and tells her:
(37) I can't find my wallet. Do you have any idea of where it is?

To (37), T, which recalls having seen S's wallet lying under S's green sofa
many times, although not particularly in this occasion, may very well answer
by uttering (38):
(38) Under the green sofa, (perhaps)?

(38) is an elliptical version (a non-redundant answer expression), not of a
declarative, but of an interrogative sentence such as (39) or (40):
(39) Is it (perhaps) under the green sofa?
(40) Have you looked under the green sofa?

Similarly, consider the case in which S asks to T:

(41) When do you want me to mail the letter?

and T responds by uttering:

(42) As soon as possible, please!

Again, (42) is an elliptical version, not of a declarative, but an imperative sentence, (43):

(43) Send it as soon as possible, please!

These two examples sufficiently show, against Hausser, that the alleged responsive mood is not exclusively related to the declarative mood, but to all the three main traditional moods (and, in principle to every, or at least to many, possible moods -- other than the responsive itself -- that we may distinguish in the language).

Parallel to this inadequacy detected in Hausser's notion of responsive mood, there is another one which has to do with (the way in which he understands) his treatment of the act of answering. He seems to assume that Answers are specific illocutionary acts, analogous in this respect to, say, Questions, Promises, Requests, etc. But contrary to Hausser's assumption, answers are not specific illocutionary acts. Here, it may be useful to recall Searle & Vanderveken's correct comment that:

68. Cf., e.g., (1983), p.102): "Traditionally, moods and speech acts are correlated in the following way: ... declarative-statement; imperative-request; interrogative-question; responsive-answer". 
Several illocutionary verbs are not names of illocutionary forces at all, since they do not imply any particular illocutionary point, but, for example, refer only to the style or manner in which an illocutionary act is performed.... Furthermore, different non-synonymous illocutionary verbs may be used to name the same illocutionary force. The difference in meaning between them has to do with the fact that there are feature of conversations connected to the meaning of such verbs which go beyond their illocutionary components... (Op. cit, p. 179. Emphasis mine).

The verb 'answer' is -I think- one of the illocutionary verbs of English to which Searle & Vanderveken's remarks clearly apply. The verb 'answer' does not name any illocutionary force in particular. Illocutions with practically any illocutionary force can play the role of answers, provided that they occupy the appropriate place in a conversational setting. Thus, as the examples drawn earlier patently manifest, we can have answers that are questions (e.g.,(serious and literal) utterances of (38 ), (39) and (40)), but also answers that are requests (e.g.,(serious and literal) utterances of (42) and (43)) and answers that are assertions ((serious and literal) utterances of (32), (33), (35) and (36)).

From the point of view of our semantic sense of 'main mood', if we interpret Hausser's responsive mood "a la Hausser"(i.e., without making any amendments to the inadequacies just signaled in his notions of responsive mood and of the act of answering), we have to classify the responsive mood as a main mood. This is so because, according to Hausser: 1) expressions in the responsive mood are elliptical versions of declarative sentences only; and 2) the act of answering is a species of illocutionary acts. Given 1) and 2), if we further assume -- as we have done all along this chapter -- that 3) moods
are markers of force, then we have to conclude that 4) the responsive mood is a marker of illocutionary acts with the specific force proper of answers. On its turn, since, from 1) and 3), 5) the responsive mood must be a marker of a kind of force of which the declarative mood is a marker too; and since 6) the declarative mood is a marker of generic assertive force, then, by 4), we obtain that 7) the force marked by the responsive mood must be understood as a species of the genus of assertive forces. And, finally, from 7) we reach the desired conclusion that 8) the responsive mood, according to our semantic sense of 'main mood', is a main mood.

But, in view of the already mentioned inadequacy of Hausser's notions of responsive mood and of the act of answering; i.e., since -- as we saw -- we have to reject the idea that responsive expressions are elliptical versions of declarative sentences only and the idea that there is a specific illocutionary force which is proper of (which characterizes) the act of answering, we cannot maintain that the responsive mood is, in the semantic sense, a main mood. Once the appropriate corrections are made to Hausser's two notions here examined, we are forced to count the alleged responsive mood as a secondary mood, because it would be a marker, not of a species of force,

69. It must be well understood that assumption 3), like 6) below, are entirely foreign to Hausser's conception -- the reason being, at least in part, that Hausser does not accept the theory (Th1.a) which we ultimately are trying to assess in this chapter. Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that Hausser is eager to classify his responsive mood as a main mood on all fours with the three main moods traditionally distinguished. So, although Hausser would not agree with some of the premises of the present argument 1)-8), he surely would agree with its conclusion.

70. Cf. supra, p. 81, n. 61.
but rather a marker of a certain "conversational feature"\textsuperscript{71} which can "qualify" or be added to practically any kind of illocutionary force.

Leaving aside our already too lengthy discussion of Hausser's responsive mood, let us continue our examination of the semantic sense of 'main mood', by indicating that the epp's (or, at least many of them), which according to the "syntactic" sense of 'main mood' had to be classified (if accepted as moods at all) as secondary moods, would now have to be regarded, from the semantic point of view, as main moods. And this because many epp's are indicators of generic or specific illocutionary force.

One should notice that the semantic sense of main mood is, from the point of view of its practical applicability to discern different kinds of moods, seriously inadequate or, at best, severely limited. This is so because the semantic notion of main mood straightforwardly depends on or presupposes that we already have a classification of illocutionary forces. Therefore, the resulting classification of moods is not independent from a classification of forces and different classifications of forces may result in different classifications of moods. Moreover, the semantic criterion, if it is going to be practicable at all, presupposes that the classification of forces on which it has to rely is of a very particular kind; namely, the semantic criterion presupposes or takes for granted that the realm of illocutionary forces admits of a nice, sharp, complete and systematic categorization in a hierarchy of tree-like structure; it presupposes that one can identify, from among the range of illocutionary forces, which of them are species and genera

\textsuperscript{71} The expression is taken from Searle & Vanderveken; cf. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 182.
of forces and which are sub-species or sub-sub-species or "super-genera", etc. As we have already seen, this assumption seems too optimistic, or if preferred, too naively simple to be true.

But disregarding the question of how useful or operational each of the senses of 'main mood' above examined are, what we have to ask now is this: what is the outcome of our exploration of the different senses of 'main mood' with respect to our central concern of constructing a classification of moods? One important result is the following: we have seen that each of the senses of 'main mood' reviewed yield different results with respect to the issue of which mood should be classified as a main one and which as a secondary one. Nevertheless, one thing remains constant under the three criteria of classification. The three moods: declarative, interrogative and imperative — and only these three — turn out to be main moods with respect to any of the senses of 'main mood' considered. This so being, we can reasonably conclude that declarative, interrogative and imperative are the main moods of English because, in contradistinction to other moods (or pseudo-moods) which are sometimes brought into consideration, they score as main moods in the three senses distinguished above.

The question still remains, however, of what secondary moods, if any, can be added to our list of three moods. In this respect, we can indicate a second, and perhaps not very encouraging, result brought up by our former inquiry: Our exploration has contributed to make clear that, in the attempt to find secondary moods, the problem arises of where to draw the line between "genuine" or "legitimate" secondary moods (i.e., moods which are, in one way or another, subsidiary from a main mood) and just special cases of main
moods. We very clearly encountered this problem in discussing the second, "syntactic" sense of 'main mood', when we left open the possibility of interpreting sentences of the form of (22)-(26) and explicit performatives either as mere special cases of interrogative and declarative sentences, respectively, or as sentences with a "complex", secondary mood different from, although dependent upon, the interrogative or declarative moods. The difficulty at issue consists in how to discriminate between features of sentences which bring differences in mood (no matter whether main or secondary) and features which do not. The first, obvious move which comes to mind when trying to solve this problem is to appeal to a syntactic criterion of mood. If we remember our discussion in sec. II.3, we indicated there that there are three syntactic features which contribute to characterize the syntactic mood of sentences: verbal mood, word order (syntactic structure) and syntactic intonation. Shall we rely on this syntactic criterion? Shall we say that only differences in these three syntactic features can bring differences in mood? Surely, such a proposal strikes us as somewhat arbitrary. After all, when we gave the list of those three features as characterizing the syntactic notion of mood we were presenting an open list which was taken to be based on purely empirical data. It was certainly not presented as the result of a conceptual analysis of the notion of mood. Moreover, if Lyons is right — as I think he is — in his remark that syntactic mood, as it is usually understood by linguists and philosophers, is a very wide notion (in contradistinction to verbal mood), the idea of reducing the syntactic features defining mood to the three mentioned appears

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72. Cf. supra, p. 32, n. 18.
to be even less justifiable. Why rule out apriori the possibility of finding moods which have different (or partly different) distinctive syntactic features?

It seems, then, in view of these negative considerations, that we must abandon the attempt of finding a purely syntactic criterion to decide what elements of a sentence contribute to fix its mood. If, instead, we focus on the semantic aspect of the characterization of mood, we obtain the following, initially more plausible, criterion: a syntactic feature of a sentence should be regarded as part of the mood of the sentence if it contributes to determine the illocutionary force (potential) of the sentence. But notice that, in the absence of a clear, well accepted definition of illocutionary force and of a criterion for individuating forces, by endorsing this semantic criterion, we get dangerously close to the point of having to admit as many moods as different, non-synonymous sentences there are in the language. And this, because, at least from a certain point of view, it can be maintained that every device of a sentence contributes, in one way or another, to determine its illocutionary force (potential). Let us spell out in more detail the steps which may lead to this position: We can see it as the result of putting together the following assumptions:

1) There are as many illocutionary forces as different kinds of illocutionary acts. (Of course, assumption 1) is, pending a satisfactory criterion for individuating illocutionary forces, not easy to verify (or to falsify, for that matter). Another way of putting assumption 1) is this:

73. Cf., e.g., Hausser, op. cit., p. 81.
Differences in kinds of illocutionary act consist in, or are determined by, differences in illocutionary force. Assumption 1) just capitalizes (and, perhaps unduely, generalizes) the fact that, intuitively, different kinds of illocutionary acts, such as promises, requests, threats, assertions, etc., are perceived as having different illocutionary forces; so that any theory of illocutionary forces which has as its consequence that promises and requests, etc., have the same illocutionary force is, eo ipso, materially inadequate.

Now, again because of the lack of a satisfactory criterion for individuating forces, a — shall we say — "overzealous friend of illocutionary plurality" may feel justified to suppose that even the slightest differences among illocutions (types) bring differences in kind of illocutionary act; and, therefore, that every different, individual illocution (type) constitutes a different kind of illocutionary act. So, for instance, the serious and literal utterances of (44) and (45):

(44) Close the door at your left!
(45) Close the door at your right!

would be seen as constituting not only two different illocutionary acts but also, and for the same reason, two illocutionary acts of different kinds.

This paves the way to the second assumption of our argument:

2) There are as many kinds of illocutionary act as different illocutionary acts (types).

From 1) and 2), 3) straightforwardly follows:

3) There are as many illocutionary forces as different, particular illocutionary acts (types).
If we add, now, assumptions 4) and 5), we obtain the intended consequence, 6).

4) The (serious and literal) utterance of non-synonymous sentences gives rise to different illocutionary acts (types). (I take 4) as well accepted or common enough as to make unnecessary any further explanation.)

5) Moods are those features of sentences which mark (differences in) illocutionary force (potential). (Assumption 5), like 4), should be, at least at this point of our discussion, fairly uncontroversial.)

If one accepts 3)-5), then one should also accept that there are as many moods as different illocutionary acts (types) can be performed by (seriously and literally) uttering sentences of the language. If every different illocutionary act (type) has a different force (3)); and if every two non-synonymous sentences give rise, when seriously and literally uttered, to two different illocutionary acts (4)), then sentences as a whole are markers of illocutionary force, and every difference in the grammatical structure or in the lexicon of the sentence will count as a difference in mood. Therefore (by 5)):

6) There are as many moods as different, non-synonymous sentences there are in the language.

Of course, the thesis stated in 6) strikes us as bizarre. Not every difference among illocutionary acts is a difference in force. And, analogously, not every difference in the syntactic/semantic structure of sentences is a difference in mood. To avoid this unwanted inflation of illocutionary forces and moods, it is necessary (or at least convenient) to
find out a way of analysing illocutionary acts as consisting in structures with more than one component. An analysis of this kind is the familiar and by now standard one given by Searle in terms of illocutionary force and propositional content. According to Searle,

[i]n general an illocutionary act consists of an illocutionary force \( F \) and a propositional content \( P \). (S.&V., p. 1).

And so,

we can say that the illocutionary act ... has the logical form \( F(P) \), where the capital \( F \) stands for the illocutionary force, and \( P \) for the propositional content.\(^4\) (S.&V., p. 8).

The distinction between force and propositional content is easy to grasp. It can be simply illustrated by paying attention to the following two pairs of illocutionary acts: First, consider the two illocutions, \( a) \) and \( b) \), which result of the serious and literal utterance of (46) and (47), respectively:

(46) You will leave the room.
(47) Leave the room!

Second, consider the two illocutions, \( c) \) and \( d) \), which result of the serious and literal utterance of (48) and (49), respectively:

(48) Did you buy a new car?
(49) Are the children still in bed?

In both cases, \( a) - b) \) and \( c) - d) \), there is something which the illocutions

\(^{74}\) Not all illocutionary acts are of this form. There are two main kinds of exceptions to the general norm: \( a) \) those illocutions which lack propositional content; that is, utterances like, e.g., 'Hurrah!' or 'Congratulations!'. And \( b) \) illocutions which are composed of other, (more) simple illocutions. For instance: 'Go to bed or finish your homework, but don't watch more tv!' (Cf., Searle (1969), p. 31-33. And S.&V., pp. 3-5 and 9.). From our purposes, we can ignore these two exceptions.
compared have in common and something which sets them apart. According to Searle's analysis, that which illocutions a) and b) have in common is their propositional content (i.e., their being about your leaving the room in the next future), and that which is different in a) and b) is their respective illocutionary force: a) has the force of, e.g., a prediction, whereas b) has the force of an order or a request, etc. On its turn, that which illocutions c) and d) share is their illocutionary force (both are questions), and that which sets them apart is their propositional content (their being, respectively, about your buying a new car in the past (c)) and about the children still being in bed (d)).

Once we so analyse the structure of illocutionary acts, premises 2) and 3) of our argument above, have to be immediately rejected. The two illocutions c) and d), just discussed, constitute an eloquent example of why this is so: c) and d) have been described as two different illocutionary acts which, nonetheless, have identical illocutionary force (belong to the same kind of illocutionary act). But this is precisely what is ruled out by 2) and 3). Against 2) and 3), Searle's analysis allows (or forces) us to deny that all differences among illocutionary acts are differences in force. Illocutions may differ because of having different forces or because of having different propositional contents.

Now, since the theory of speech acts has it that "the characteristic grammatical form of the illocutionary act is the complete sentence", parallel to or correlative with this analysis of illocutionary acts in two

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elements, illocutionary force and propositional content, there is an analysis
of the semantic structure of sentences in two parts: the indicator of force, $f$, and the indicator of propositional content, $p$:

From the point of view of the theory of speech acts, then, the
general form of such simple sentences, which express elementary
illocutionary acts of form $F(P)$, is $f(p)$. (S.&V, p. 2)

But if the general form of (simple) sentences is $f(p)$, it is clear that the
conclusion of the argument 1)-6) above, that there are as many moods as
different, non-synonymous sentences there are in the language, has to be
rejected too. One can no longer hold that sentences as a whole are markers
of force (moods). 6) has to be rejected because of a reason strictly
analogous to the one which made us reject statement 3): if the general form
of sentences is $f(p)$, then it is obvious that there must be non-synonymous
sentences with identical mood; namely, all those sentences which, although
being indicators of the same force, are indicators of different propositional
contents. Differences in the meaning of sentences are not always to be
interpreted as differences in illocutionary force, they may very well be
differences in propositional content. For instance, that is precisely what
is the case with sentences (44), (45), (48) and (49).

In short, given Searle's analysis of illocutions and sentences, the number
of syntactic features of the sentence which have to be understood as
contributing to (or relevant to) determining its mood reduces substantially.
And, likewise, the number of possible moods of English diminishes
accordingly.

Once equipped with this tool (i.e., with the distinction between indicator
of illocutionary force and indicator of propositional content), are we in a
better position to draw the line between "legitimate" secondary moods and mere special cases of main moods? We surely have found a device which blocks the way to the most extreme of the "inflationary" views regarding moods and illocutionary forces. As we saw, now it is not possible to defend that there are as many moods as non-synonymous sentences in the language. But granted that, it is quite reasonable to expect that controversy will still remain with respect to the more interesting cases, namely with those candidates for mood, such as those reviewed before, that are normally discussed or proposed in the literature. Besides, one should not forget that our main aim in looking for extra (secondary) moods other than the three main moods already acknowledged from the outset, is to give (Th1.a**) its best chance. But it is by no means clear what benefits would bring, for the purposes of confirming (Th1.a**), to add one or several of the discussed "secondary mood candidates" to our list of accepted moods. The task of systematically matching moods with forces one to one would still remain entirely unfulfilled. Moreover, there are strong reasons to suspect that, were we going to accept as secondary moods some of the candidates proposed, we would in fact make things more difficult for (Th1.a**). Take, for instance, Long's assertive, Hauser's responsive or sentences of the form of (22)-(26). Semantically, all these "moods" tend to overlap among themselves or with one or the other of the main moods. The force marked by assertives is just the same force marked by declaratives (assertive force), although qualified to indicate that the whole or a part of what is asserted is regarded as "extraordinary". The responsive mood can indicate any force whatsoever, provided that the illocution possessing that force happens to occur as an answer to a former question. The semantic job of the responsive mood,
therefore, would interfere or overlap with the role of the declarative, interrogative and imperative moods. Finally, the forces of which sentences (22)-(26) are taken to be indicators are forces already indicated by the imperative mood.  

Because of these reasons, I think we are justified if we leave to the linguists the painstaking task of deciding which of the second moods proposed in the literature is "genuinely" a mood, and proceed as if the only moods of English were the three standardly accepted: declarative, interrogative and imperative. There is, however, one exception to make in this policy: the exception concerns the epp's.

3.3.4 Are epp's indicators of force? First approach

Of all the possible secondary moods mentioned or suggested above, there is one type which deserves closer attention: the epp. This is so, because — to repeat — our main goal in this chapter is to assess the thesis (Th1.a) that there is a one-one relation between mood and force. Our search for secondary

76. Usually, cases like (22)-(25) are described as devices for polite or well mannered requesting or commanding, etc. Even if we granted that, the politeness feature which (22)-(26) are supposed to contribute is not, in itself, a kind of illocutionary force; it is rather a particular "shade" common to several directive forces. If the language had to systematically register differences in "shade" of illocutionary force as relatively subtle as this one, then the number of moods to be postulated would be enormously big. But, in fact, sentences like (22)-(26) cannot be (at least, not always) characterized as polite markers of directive force: as Davies has pointed out, there are many cases in which this is not so. Consider, for instance, (X) and (Y): (X) Could you, please, leave the fucking glass on the table? (Y) Shall you shut up now? It is unclear, then, what special semantic function is played by the alleged secondary mood of sentences like (22)-(26).
moods is just part of our strategy to concede the best chance to (Th1.a)\textsuperscript{77} and, consequently, of exploring ways of enlarging the number of moods of English. Prima facie, if epp's turn out to be moods, the prospects for a positive assessment of (Th1.a) would considerably improve. This is so, not only because there is a considerably large number of epp's in stock to be matched with illocutionary forces, but more importantly, because the nature of epp's is such that, in principle, every illocutionary force that is explicitly discriminated in a given language has a corresponding epp "allocated" to it. This is so, at least if by 'illocutionary force explicitly discriminated in the language' we understand illocutionary force for which there is a special illocutionary verb which names the act performed with that force.\textsuperscript{78} On the other hand, if epp's are not moods, (Th1.a) seems much more at risk.

Let us occupy ourselves, then, with the question whether epp's are (secondary) moods or not. This question can be posed now in the following terms: Are epp's indicators of illocutionary force or are they indicators of propositional content? We can formulate the question this way because, given our accepted characterization of mood as that grammatically defined feature

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} The examination of (Th1.a) is, of course, carried out via an instantiation, (Th1.a**), of its relativized version: (Th1.a*). Cf. supra, pp. 75-76.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Strictly speaking, not all forces explicitly marked in the language have this property. A well known exception are the forces proper of the so called "self-defeating" illocutionary acts; i.e., illocutionary acts like insulting and boasting such that the illocutionary verbs which "name" them do not have a performative use. Cf., e.g., Vanderveken, "Illocutionary Logic and Self-defeating Speech Acts". But clearly, we can disregard these exceptional cases here.
\end{itemize}
of sentences which contribute to specify their illocutionary force
(potential), we can obviously identify the notion of mood and the notion,
just introduced, of indicator of force.

In order to answer the question at issue, we need however to learn a little
bit more about the two notions of indicator of illocutionary force and of
indicator of propositional content. Searle & Vanderveken introduce the
former thus:

Any element of a natural language which can be literally used to
indicate that an utterance of a sentence containing that element
has a certain illocutionary force or range of illocutionary
forces we will call an \textit{illocutionary force indicating device}.
(p. 2)

This text allows us to make an important qualification: By indicator of force
it is not understood \textit{every} sign or expression which refers to, or otherwise
means, illocutionary force or illocutionary act. For instance, the noun
'promise' in the sentence 'John made a promise to his mother before lunch' is
not a marker of commissive force (or of any other force), despite the fact
that it is used to refer to a promise. As stated in the quote above, an
indicator of force is a sign which can be used as an indicator of the force

79. Cf. supra, sec. II.3.

80. Needless to say, the question whether the traditional main
moods, declarative, interrogative and imperative, are indicators of force does
not even deserve to be risen. Since we have agreed that declarative,
interrogative and imperative moods are moods, then, given the identification
of the notions of mood and of indicator of force, we equally have to agree
that they are indicators of force. Moreover, a mere glimpse to the examples
with which we have illustrated the distinction between force and
propositional content, should suffice to make one realise that if there are
any indicators of force at all in English, the three traditional main moods
must be counted among them.
(potential) which the utterance of the sentence of which the indicator is a part will have. In other words, a sign is an indicator of force if it can be used to indicate the force (potential) of the very same utterance in which it occurs.

With respect to the indicator of propositional content, since the propositional content of the illocutionary act is always a proposition (or a propositional function, in the case in which the illocution consists in an utterance of a so called Wh-question) we can say that a sign or element of the sentence, s, is an indicator of propositional content if it contributes to determine the proposition (or propositional function) literally expressed by the utterance of s. How can we know whether an element of s contributes to determine the proposition literally expressed by an utterance of s? To answer, we have to say a little bit more about propositions, as they are standardly understood in speech act theory. Searle & Vanderveken single out several features of propositions which need to be made explicit "for the purposes of illocutionary logic". One of these features is the one already signaled here that propositions are the (propositional) content of illocutionary acts. Other, and the last which is relevant for our exposition, is that:

81. Cf. Searle & Vanderveken, p. 32: "A[n] ...important feature of propositions for our study is that propositions are the contents of illocutionary acts, i.e., they are the contents of assertions orders, promises, declarations, etc. A speaker who performs an illocutionary act with a propositional content thereby expresses a proposition."


83. Cf. op. cit., pp. 31-36.
...each proposition represents a state of affairs and has a truth value. Understanding a proposition consists in knowing its truth conditions, i.e. in knowing what states of affairs must obtain in order that it be true. (pp. 31-32).

Therefore, given this characterization of propositions, we can assume that a sign or element of a is an indicator of propositional content if and only if it contributes to determine the truth conditions of (the proposition expressed by a literal utterance of) a. This, on its turn, allows us to

84. One might want to reject this characterization of the (propositional) content of sentences because it seems to yield the unwanted result that sentences (or rather, utterances of sentences) of all syntactic types, declaratives and non-declaratives, have to be regarded as having a truth value. If sentences of all types are indicators of propositional content, and if propositions are described -- as they should -- in terms of truth conditions, then sentences of all types have truth conditions. In particular, imperatives and interrogatives have truth conditions and, therefore, they can be true or false. But, intuitively, neither imperatives nor interrogatives can be true or false.

Although I do not want to deny or otherwise diminish the relative importance of this problem, I think that the difficulty is not as serious as it seems and that, at least in the way it is often presented, it stems from an equivocation on the expression 'content of a sentence' (cf. supra, sec. II.2). When we say that sentences of all syntactic types are indicators of propositional content we are not talking about the whole semantic content (literal meaning) of sentences. We may distinguish two senses of the expression 'content of a sentence': a) the wide sense, according to which the content of a sentence comprises, given the above characterization of the semantic structure of sentences as f(p), both its propositional content and the force indicated by f. That is, both p and f contribute to determine the wide content of the sentence. b) The narrow sense, according to which the content of a sentence is its propositional content, as described above. Now, we can still maintain that sentences of all types, declaratives and non-declaratives alike, have truth conditions without thereby being necessarily committed to the view that non-declarative sentences are true or false. Very informally and schematically, sentences of all types have truth conditions inasmuch as they have propositional content. But only declarative sentences are true or false because only they possess a wide content of the appropriate kind. Declaratives are such that the result of adding what is indicated by f (declarative mood) to their propositional content leaves the propositional content unaltered. In other words, in the case of declarative sentences, the propositional content and the wide content coincide. But this is not so in the case of non-declaratives. The wide content of non-declaratives is better described, not in terms of truth conditions, but
describe the notion of an indicator of force in purely negative terms as that sign (or set of signs) of s which does not contribute to determine the propositional content (truth conditions) of (an utterance of) s.

Now that we have obtained a better idea of what is to be an indicator of force and an indicator of propositional content, we have to ask again the question: are epp's indicators of force or indicators of propositional content? The answer is not easy because it seems that we can discern in epp's features which are characteristic of indicators of force but also features which typically belong to indicators of propositional content.

Epp's share with indicators of force the property that they mark (refer to) the illocutionary force possessed by (typical) utterances of the sentences in which they occur. That is, epp's are similar to other indicators of force in that a (typical) utterance of an explicit performative sentence actually serves to perform the illocutionary act marked by the sentence (i.e., the force marked (named) by the illocutionary verb of the epp in question). For example, a typical utterance of (50):

in terms of, say, satisfaction conditions (imperatives) and answerhood conditions (interrogatives); and so, non-declaratives, instead of being regarded as true/false, are viewed as, say, satisfied/non-satisfied or answered/unanswered. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that satisfaction conditions and answerhood conditions —as here introduced— can be characterised in terms of truth conditions; and that these truth conditions include those which define the propositional content of the non-declarative sentence at issue. For instance, the sentence (X) John, close the door! is satisfied if an only if the propositions a) that John will close the door in the near future (propositional content of (X)) and b) that John will do that as a response to the utterance of (X) are true. In conclusion, if well understood, there should be nothing wrong in talking, in general (i.e., disregarding the syntactic type of the sentence) about the truth conditions and the propositional content of sentences. (What I have here presented in such an informal and metaphorical way can, however, be shaped in a more rigorous and precise semantic fashion —cf., for instance, C. McGinn, "Semantics for Nonindicative Sentences").
(50) I promise that I'll do it.

counts as a promise that I shall do it; and a typical utterance of (51):

(51) I state that snow is white.

counts as an assertion that snow is white. In fact, it might be held that epp's are the most genuine indicators of force available in English. This seemed to be Austin's (and early Searle's) position. After all epp's own their name to the fact that, unlike other indicators of force, they indicate explicitly, that is, without ambiguity, the force of the utterance in which they occur. Austin's distinction between explicit and primary or non-explicit illocutions is a distinction which depends on the kind of force-indicator possessed by the sentence uttered in each case. Thus, whereas a (serious and literal) utterance of (52):

(52) Put on your shoes!

may be, depending on the context, an order, a request, a begging, etc., a (serious and literal) utterance of (53):

(53) I order you to put on your shoes.

is, if having directive force at all, always an order.

Also to be counted as a feature of epp's which brings them close to (other) indicators of force is the fact that when someone utters (54):

(54) That's true.

as a reply to somebody else's utterance of, e.g., (51), we normally interpret the intended reference of 'That' in (54) to be the proposition, \( p \), that snow is white, not the proposition, \( q \), that the utterer of (51) states that snow
is white. In other words, if someone responds to an utterance of (51) by uttering (54), we normally understand, not merely that the utterer of (54) believes that \( q \), but rather that the utterer of (54) believes that \( p \). When one utters (51) what is stated (if anything) is not that one states that snow is white, but that snow is white. 85 If we interpret this from the perspective of our distinction between indicators of force and indicators of propositional content, we have to draw the conclusion that the propositional content of an utterance of (51) is \( p \) (that snow is white) and, therefore, that the epp in (51), 'I state that', contributes nothing to the fixation of the propositional content of utterances of (51). But if the epp does not contribute to fix the propositional content of (utterances of) (51), then, if it contributes at all to the meaning of (51), it must contribute to determine the force of (utterances of) (51). 86 In short, the epp has to be regarded as an indicator of force.

However, together with these two aspects of epp's which seem to support the characterization of epp's as indicators of force, there are other features which clearly seem to count as evidence in favor of an alternative

85. As Lycan dramatically puts it: "One would not escape a perjury charge by pointing out that when one tokened [(S) I state that I have never been a Communist] while testifying before HUAC one did in fact state something and so was telling the truth". (Op. cit., p. 132). The phenomenon here illustrated is widely acknowledged in the literature. If we are going to give credit to Recanati, recognition of this point can be traced back to the medieval and classic logicians (Cf. Recanati, op. cit., p. 24).

86. To continue with Lycan's illustration presented in the former footnote, "It is important to note that the truth-value of 'what the speaker said' in uttering [(S)] is determined by the speaker's political affiliation alone; the performative preface 'I state that' does not figure in this determination". (Ibid.)

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characterization of epp's as indicators of propositional content. Thus, although we have pointed out that, intuitively, what the utterer of (51) asserts (if anything) is that snow is white, it seems also natural to suppose that there is a difference in the propositional content (truth-conditions) of (51) and the propositional content of the simpler sentence (55): 

(55) Snow is white.

Indeed, an "untutored truth-conditional semanticist" who analysed sentences (51) and (55) would not assign them the same truth-conditions (propositional content). But if (51) and (55) differ in truth conditions (propositional content), the propositional content of (51) cannot be the proposition that snow is white, since that is the propositional content of (55). In fact, our semanticist would characterize the truth-conditions of (51) as having to do with the question whether the speaker states something or not. And this means that the epp 'I state that' in (51) contributes to specify the truth-conditions (propositional content) of (51), not the force indicated by (51).

There is more evidence supporting the contention that epp's are not indicators of force, but indicators of propositional content. For example, we may consider the case of (at least a certain kind of) embedded explicit performatives: The distinction between indicator of propositional content and indicator of force permits us to state the following principle, (pr.1):

87. I have borrowed the lively quoted expression from Lycan. Cf. op. cit., p. 136.

88. In the two cases discussed next, I follow, rather closely, Recanati's exposition in Meaning and Force, sec. I.7.

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(pr.1) Indicators of force contribute nothing to the specification of the propositional content indicated by the sentence.

By (pr.1), if epp's were indicators of force, they would contribute nothing to the propositional content indicated by the sentences in which they occur. Therefore, given a sentence, $s$, in which an epp occurs, the elimination, in $s$, of the occurrence of the epp should not alter the propositional content indicated by the sentence. This squares well with the examples (50), (51) and (53), examined so far. But now consider the sentence (56):

(56) If I concede that Alfred is very able, John will be satisfied.

If we remove 'I concede that' from (56), the resulting expression is (57):

(57) If Alfred is very able, John will be satisfied.

But, obviously, (57) differs in propositional content from (56). It turns, then, that (at least certain kinds of) embedded explicit performatives violate (pr.1). But this constitutes evidence, if (pr.1) is sound, in favor of the view that epp's are indicators of propositional content, not indicators of force.89

Another case in point is the following: Suppose that Peter is the utterer of (51), and consider the sentence (57):

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89. In "Moods and Performances", Davidson makes a point very similar to the one examined here: "One way of establishing the fact that I am not asserting that it is raining when I utter the words 'It is raining' is by prefixing the words 'Jones asserted that'. According to most analysis of such sentences, the same effect should be expected if I prefix the words 'I assert that'." (p. 118)
(57) Peter states that snow is white.

(57) differs from (51) only in that the place occupied by 'I' in (51) is occupied by 'Peter' in (57). But, given the standard interpretation of propositional content,\(^90\) and as Recanati points out, "in general, [the propositional content] of an utterance does not change when 'I' is replaced by the name of the speaker" (op. cit., p. 23). We should conclude, then, that the propositional content of (51) and (57) are the same. But the propositional content of (57) is, uncontroversially and trivially, the proposition that Peter states that snow is white. If (51) has the same propositional content as (57), we can no longer maintain that the propositional content of (51) is the one indicated by the expression which follows the prefix 'I state that' ('snow is white'). That is, we can no longer maintain that epp's do not contribute to the propositional content of the sentences in which they occur. Again, this example supports the view that epp's are indicators of propositional content, not indicators of force.

At this point, it begins to look as if we had reached an impasse. We have found — *prima facie* — equally sound evidence both in favor and against the proposal of counting epp's as indicators of force. How shall we decide on this matter? Shall we discard part of the evidence presented above? But which part and on what grounds? It would be tempting to try a quick way out from our predicament by adopting here what we may call "Frege–Dummett's" syntactic criterion for indicator of force. This criterion can be formulated thus: *If a sign or expression is an indicator of force, then it cannot occur*.

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90. Cf., for instance, Kaplan's characterization of this notion as opposed to the notion of "the character of an expression" in *Demonstartives*. 
as part of an embedded sentence. 91 If we could just help ourselves to Frege-Dummett's criterion, our difficulties to determine the semantic status of epp's would immediately vanish. Trivially, epp's would not be indicators of force because, as we have already seen, 92 epp's can occur embedded. But, unfortunately, Frege-Dummett's criterion is too powerful. It disqualifies as indicators of force, not only epp's but the declarative and interrogative moods as well. 93 Frege-Dummett's criterion disqualifies these two main moods, at least if we suppose -- as we have done in sec. II.3 above -- that they can occur embedded. Of course, if, contrary to our contention in sec. II.3, we envisaged (syntactic) mood as a feature of complete sentences only, then the declarative and interrogative moods would obviously satisfy Frege-Dummett's criterion. But in that case, 1) we would have to look for an explanation of the alleged semantic difference between the "real" (complete)

91. Cf. Dummett's Frege, Philosophy of language, ch. 10; esp. p. 316: "A sign which conveys force must always relate to the whole complete sentence in which it occurs; it cannot form part of a subordinate clause". And p. 327: "We have seen that a sign for the force attached to a sentence, i.e. a sign conventionally used to indicate which linguistic act is being performed by uttering the sentence, cannot significantly occur within a clause which is a constituent of a complex sentence, but can attach only to a complete sentence as a whole. Or, at least, this is Frege's doctrine". See also, p. 335.

92. Remember, e.g., (56), and also (13) and (14).

93. I must indicate that what for us is an intolerable (or at least, undesirable) consequence of this criterion would not necessarily be regarded as such by Dummett. This is so -- I believe -- because Dummett's notion of sign or indicator of force is a notion that no sign can really exemplify. That is, Dummett assigns to his notion of sign of force a role that no sign can possibly fulfill; namely, the role of (conventionally) effecting or guaranteeing, as opposed to indicating, that an illocution with a certain kind of force has been performed. The confusion between the force indicated by a sentence and the actual force, if any, of a given utterance of a sentence is clearly present in Dummett's notion of sign of force.
declarative and interrogative sentences, from one side, and their respective embedded counterparts, from the other. And it would certainly be very difficult to explain, e.g. how can (58):

(58) Who did it(?)

lack the character of being a marker of erotetic force when it appears in (59):

(59) Frank does not know who did it.

After all, we call sentences like (59) indirect questions. More importantly, the maneuver of restricting the notion of mood as a property of complete sentences only, can be equally extended or applied to the case of epp's. So, we might contend that, strictly speaking, epp's do not occur embedded because epp's are not just expressions of the form 'I f (you) that' or 'I f (you) to' (where 'f' is a variable ranging over illocutionary verbs), but rather epp's are expressions of that form as occurring as prefixes of a complete sentence. That is, an epp is not just an expression, but an expression together with a certain syntactic environment. Of course, we may protest that this notion of epp is highly ad hoc and void of explanatory power. But then -- I believe -- we have to be equally dissatisfied with the parallel view concerning the moods.

It turns out, then, that Frege-Dummett's criterion does not settle the question whether epp's should be counted as indicators of force or as indicators of propositional content. We need to try a different approach. Let us have a look at several representative analyses of epp's in the hope of finding, if not an outright solution to our problem, at least a better understanding of the epp's phenomenon and some clear ideas about what the
best alternatives are to tackle the problem at issue. We shall examine fundamentally three different analyses of epp's. Our survey will be shaped by and directed towards the resolution of the question: what are the consequences of adopting one or another of these views for the purposes of testing (Th1.a**)?

Very schematically, the three analyses to be considered here are these:

1) Searle's in *Speech Acts*: Epp's are indicators of force as legitimate as the main moods. For all (semantical) purposes, epp's are identified as moods. And each specific epp, i.e. each epp containing a different illocutionary verb, is a different indicator of force (mood). Therefore, there are at least as many indicators of force (moods) in the language as different illocutionary verbs which can occur in an epp construction.  

2) Bach & Harnish's: There are two kinds of epp's, corresponding with two general kinds of illocutionary acts: the "conventional" and the "communicative" illocutionary acts. For the first of these kinds of epp's (those associated with conventional illocutions) something very similar to Searle's former analysis applies. For the second kind of epp's (those associated with communicative illocutions) a totally different analysis is provided: they are understood, not as indicators of force, but as indicators of propositional content. Therefore, according to Bach & Harnish's thesis, there are at least as many indicators of force as different epp's of the

94. The latter qualification is necessary because, as we indicated before, there are some illocutionary verbs which cannot occur as part of an epp. Cf. supra, p. 101, n. 78.
3) Recanati's: Epp's are not indicators of force. They are indicators of propositional content. Only the three main moods are indicators of force (in English).

In general, Recanati's view and the best part of Bach & Harnish's (i.e., Bach & Harnish's analysis of epp's associated with communicative illocutions) constitute different versions of what one may call the "Indirect Speech Act Approach" to the analysis of epp's. The two views differ, essentially, in the way in which the indirection relation is understood. Bach & Harnish interpret it as a case of conversational implicature. Recanati, however, understands it as a case of illocutionary entailment. This brings Recanati's view close to that adopted by Searle & Vanderveken in Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. In the course of examining Recanati's idea I shall repeatedly refer to Searle & Vanderveken's thesis as well.

Our survey will lead us to reject, first, position 1) and, eventually, position 2) as inadequate, and to favor — however tentatively — a mixture of Recanati's and Searle & Vanderveken's approaches. The rejection of position 1) and the endorsement of position 3) are especially important from our perspective, because positions 1) and 3) constitute, respectively, the most and the least favorable cases for the purpose of confirming (Th.1a**).

3.3.5 Searle's analysis of epp's in "Speech Acts"

As I have already indicated, Searle's view in Speech Acts consists in accepting epp's as straightforward indicators of the force named by the
illocutionary verbs occurring in them. For all semantical purposes epp's behave like the three main moods, declarative, interrogative and imperative:

Illocutionary force indicating devices in English include at least: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and the so-called performative verbs. I may indicate the kind of illocutionary act I am performing by beginning the sentence with 'I apologize', 'I warn', 'I state', etc. (Speech Acts, p. 30).95

This view on epp's, however, seems to ignore or, at least, to leave totally unexplained the phenomena referred to in pp. 107-110 which -- as we saw -- bring strong evidence in favor of regarding epp's as indicators of propositional content. Initially, Searle's following comments -- appearing a few lines later on the same page quoted above -- might be seen as preparing the ground for an attempt to accommodate the recalcitrant evidence. He says:

If this semantic distinction [i.e., the distinction between indicator of force and indicator of propositional content] is of any real importance, it seems likely that it should have some syntactic analogue, even though the syntactical representation of the semantic facts will not always lie on the surface of the sentence. (Ibid. Emphasis mine.)

Searle's remark might be interpreted as a hint that he is going to exploit the distinction between deep and surface levels of grammar to try to make his analysis of epp's compatible with the hostile data. The idea would be to contend that, although at the surface level explicit performatives do not differ in structure from standard declarative sentences, however, at some

95. In the text, Searle signals as illocutionary force indicating devices, not epp's properly so, but the illocutionary (performative) verbs occurring within epp's. There is no doubt, however, that he must be thinking of the whole epp construction, and not merely of the illocutionary verb appearing in it. The last sentence in the passage quoted clearly shows that this is the way in which we should interpret Searle's words.
deeper level of analysis (and this would have to be the level in which the mood of sentences is really determined) explicit performatives have a different structure than that of standard declarative sentences. Of course, the concrete form or structure exhibited by explicit performatives at the deep level (what Lycan would call their "semantical representation") would have to be precisely specified. In particular, the structure proposed would have to be such that the indicator of force (i.e., that part of the deep structure of the sentence which, after undergoing the pertinent transformations, would allegedly yield an epp at the surface level) lacked any trait proper of indicators of propositional content. Also, and no less important, the particular "transformation path" leading from the deep to the surface structure of explicit performatives would have to be duly specified. This strategy may be regarded as seriously flawed in several respects -- because of the considerable vagueness of its formulation, etc. -- and rejected from the outset as inadequate. But what is interesting to notice is that, had it been proposed or considered by Searle, it would at least reveal a willingness, on Searle's part, to acknowledge that his analysis of epp's faces the problem of accommodating some recalcitrant evidence; namely, the evidence favoring the interpretation of epp's as indicators of propositional content.

But Searle does not use the distinction between deep and surface levels of grammar to solve the difficulty at issue. He just brings this distinction up because he wants to obtain a totally unified analysis of all explicit performative sentences, disregarding "minor" differences in what, having this distinction at hand, one may describe as their surface structure. Thus, the "standard" surface structure of explicit performatives favored or proposed by
the author is 'I $f$ that $p$' (where '$f$' is a variable ranging over the set of illocutionary verbs and '$p$' is a sentential variable ranging over declarative sentences), and he needs a way to accommodate this claim with the fact that very many explicit performatives are, superficially, of the form 'I $f$ to $Q$' (where '$Q$' is a variable ranging over infinitive clauses), as in 'I order (you) to do it'. The distinction between levels of grammar constitutes the adequate tool. Of course, there is a good reason why Searle chooses the (deep) structure of explicit performatives to be 'I $f$ that $p$', and not, say, 'I $f$ to $Q$': since, according to the author, clauses beginning with 'that...' (but not infinitive clauses) "are a characteristic form for explicitly isolating propositions",96 it is clear that by assuming that the general form of explicit performatives is 'I $f$ that $p$' he obtains a simple and easy criterion to discriminate, within explicit performatives, between those parts of the sentence which are indicators of force and those which are indicators of propositional content:

...[I]n the sentence, 'I promise to come', the surface structure does not seem to allow us to make a distinction between the indicator of illocutionary force and the indicator of propositional content. In this respect, it differs from, 'I promise that I will come', where the difference between the indicator of illocutionary force ('I promise') and the indicator of propositional content ('that I will come') lies right on the surface. But if we study the deep structure of the first sentence, we find that its underlying phrase marker, like the underlying phrase marker of the second, contains, 'I promise + I will come'. (Ibid. Emphasis mine.)

As this text makes patent, from Searle's point of view, the task of identifying those parts of explicit performatives which count as indicators

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96. Cf. op. cit., p. 29.
of force and those which count as indicators of propositional content is problematic or tricky only when the surface structure of the explicit performative in question is not of the standard form, 'I f that p'. But, given that standard form, Searle does seem to find absolutely no difficulty in isolating the epp, within the explicit performative, as its straightforward indicator of force. Therefore, according to Searle, there seems to be no problem whatsoever in flatly asserting, without qualification, that epp's are indicators of the force indicated by the illocutionary verbs occurring in them. This is why I said earlier that Searle's view seems to ignore entirely the problem posed by epp's. (But, of course, the evidence presented in pp.107-110 goes against the view that epp's are indicators of force, no matter what standard, deep structure we decide to assign to them).

If Searle seems to ignore this crucial problem, it must be, not because he is unaware of it, but because he feels confident that there is a satisfactory solution to it. Indeed, although not explicitly stated as such in Speech Acts, there is a "solution" which, if not openly adopted by Searle, is at least highly congenial with Searle's attitude towards epp's in Speech Acts. I shall call it, in the absence of a better name for it and despite its inexactitude, "Searle's solution" to the problem of epp's.

The first step towards "Searle's solution" consists in acknowledging, or calling attention to the fact that epp's and the corresponding explicit performative sentences are ambiguous. It is the way in which this ambiguity is explained which provides the alleged solution.

Explicit performatives are ambiguous because, depending on the occasion, they can be used either a) to perform the act named by the illocutionary verb
appearing in them or b) to inform or report that the speaker is performing
the illocutionary act named by the illocutionary verb appearing in them. For
instance, if I seriously and literally utter:

(60) I ask you to leave town immediately.,

I may thereby be requesting the hearer to leave town; but alternatively, if
my utterance of (60) is, say, in response to a question from my interlocutor
about the contents of the letter which I am currently engaged in writing,
then, in uttering (60) I am reporting or informing of the contents of my
letter, rather than asking the hearer to leave town. Following D. Lewis,
we call the former use, a), of explicit performatives "the genuinely
performative use", which is also the most common and the one which Austin,
Searle and Speech Acts theoreticians in general have in mind when talking
about "the phenomenon of explicit performatives". The latter and much less
common use, b), may be referred to, in purely negative terms, as the
non-performative (Lewis) or the descriptive (Recanati) use of explicit
performatives.

Now, the next and last step conducive towards "Searle's solution" is to
assume that, parallel to these two uses of explicit performatives, there are
two different readings of the epp's. And that it is precisely the existence
of these two readings of epp's which accounts for the fact that there are two
different uses of explicit performative sentences. Therefore, the ambiguity
affecting explicit performatives is, from this point of view, purely semantic

97 The example is taken, with little variation, from Recanati (cf. op. cit.,

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in nature. Not surprisingly, the postulated two different readings of epp's are these: A) The performative reading, according to which epp's are indicators of illocutionary force, identical in all semantical respects with the three main moods, imperative, interrogative and declarative. And B) the descriptive reading, according to which epp's are indicators of propositional content. Depending on which of the two readings is given to the epp occurring in an explicit performative, the sentence will be analysed as having a different semantic structure. So, given the general, semantic form assigned by the Speech Act theory to (simple) sentences of natural languages, f(p), the underlying semantic structure of an explicit performative like (60) whose epp is interpreted descriptively is, informally:

(i) D + (my asking you (in the letter which I am currently writing) that you leave town immediately),

where 'D' refers to the force potential proper of ordinary declarative sentences. On the other hand, the underlying semantic structure of (60), when its epp is interpreted performatively, is:

(ii) R + (your leaving town immediately),

where 'R' refers to the requestive force.

98. In this paper, I follow the procedure of representing the propositional content of sentences a la Hare (Cf. The Language of Morals); that is, by means of a gerundive clause, instead of a declarative sentence. I proceed this way to emphasize that the indicator of propositional content does not contain any indication of, nor is otherwise related to, illocutionary force. It is true that, in my opinion, the declarative mood is best analysed as being force neutral, itself (cf. infra, sec. III.3.6.3.). But to be force neutral does not mean to be semantically unrelated to force. The difference with respect to force between declarative sentences and gerundive clauses may be put thus: the declarative mood is force neutral because or inasmuch as it leaves open the force of the act which can be performed in a literal and serious utterance of a declarative sentence. Illocutionary acts with any
A quick examination of structures (i) and (ii) allows us to discern at least the following differences between readings A) and B): First, while under the descriptive reading (non-assertive) explicit performatives are straightforwardly and uncontroversially either true or false, under the performative reading, however, (non-assertive) explicit performatives are neither true nor false, since their epp's have to be understood, semantically, as non-declarative moods. Second, in the descriptive, but not in the performative reading, the meaning of epp's can be characterised as in accordance with the so called principle of compositionality: the descriptive meaning of an epp is a function of the meaning of its parts ('I', 'ask', 'you'). In the performative reading, however, epp's are semantically unstructured formulae, void of propositional content, whose only function is to indicate (as opposed to describe) the performance of the act named by the illocutionary verb occurring within them. The meaning of an epp under its descriptive reading is systematically "related" to the meaning of expressions which are similar in surface structure to epp's but for changes in the person or the tense of the verb-form occurring in them. By contrast, under the performative reading, the meaning of epp's is totally unrelated to the meaning of non-first person, non-present tense variants of epp's.99.

force whatsoever can be literally performed in serious utterances of declarative sentences. On the other hand, serious and literal utterances of gerundive clauses do not and cannot, in themselves, give rise to the performance of illocutionary acts of any kind. To put it metaphorically: declarative sentences are neutral with respect to force; gerundive clauses are barren with respect to force.

99. Here, it may be useful to present C. Ginet's remark about Austin's "conventionalist" approach to the analysis of (the performative reading of) explicit performatives:
So, according to this analysis, there are two alternative readings an epp may have, the performative and the descriptive readings. Now, how may this move be presented as a solution to the problem of making compatible Searle's view that epp's are indicators of force with the recalcitrant evidence encountered in pages 107-110 above? Very roughly, the postulated semantic ambiguity is offered as a solution to the issue because, now, the recalcitrant evidence can be interpreted as a set of phenomena or a set of

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If we were nevertheless, to follow Austin ... and to say that one who Vs by uttering 'I hereby V' cannot be stating that he/she Vs in so uttering, ... what explanation could we give of what makes the verb phrase 'V' such that one can V by uttering 'I hereby V'? I see no option for the Austinian view but to say that for every performative verb there is just a brute convention of the language that stipulates that that verb plus complement can be used to perform the act signified by the verb phrase."


The question raised by Ginet with respect to Austin is perfectly relevant for Searle's case as well. It seems that Searle must postulate also a "brute convention of the language" to explain the performative reading of explicit performatives. Notice, however that, at least in Searle's case, this "brute convention" cannot be understood as, shall we say, "superimposed" upon the literal (compositional, non-performative) meaning of the explicit performative. In Searle's view, the performative reading of explicit performatives and epp's has to be perfectly literal, since epp's are indicators of illocutionary force, and he characterizes the latter as "[a]ny element of a natural language which can be literally used to indicate that an utterance of a sentence containing that element has a certain illocutionary force or range of illocutionary forces." (Searle & Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, p. 2. Emphasis mine.) Searle, therefore, does not adopt, with respect to explicit performatives, the interpretation which he himself will offer later, in Indirect Speech Acts, for the case of what Bach & Harnish call "typical standardized indirect illocutionary acts" (i.e., cases of utterances of sentences like 'Can you pass me the salt?'). Searle (at least at the time of writing Speech acts and "Indirect Speech Acts") does not regard utterances of explicit performatives, under their performative reading, as performances of indirect speech acts. To the contrary, the act of f-ing that p performed in uttering an explicit performative of the form 'I hereby f that p' is, in Searle's view, a perfectly direct illocutionary act. (For the notions of indirect illocutionary act and of standardized illocutionary act, cf. infra, secs. III.3.6.1 and III.3.6.2.)
properties which explicit performative sentences have only inasmuch as their epp's are read in the descriptive sense. Since epp's allow two readings, the apparently contradicting phenomena reviewed in pages 98-100 are not really such. Epp's are indicators of propositional content when interpreted in their descriptive sense. But epp's are indicators of illocutionary force when understood in their performative sense. The problem plaguing the analysis of epp's vanishes once epp's are adequately disambiguated.

But this alleged solution to the problem of epp's is untenable because the ambiguity detected and signaled by its (hypothetical) defendants is not of the kind proposed above. It would be tempting, in our attack against this "solution", to adopt the simple counterargument, used cautiously by D. Lewis and, more boldly, by Recanati -- among others --, that the ambiguity affecting uses of explicit performatives is not semantic, as the advocate of the former solution crucially claims, but purely pragmatic in character.

Thus, Lewis has remarked that:

A distinction in uses need not involve a distinction in meanings of the sentences used. It can involve distinction in surface form; or distinction in conversational setting, intentions, and expectations; or distinctions of some other sort. I see no decisive reason to insist that there is any distinction in meanings associated with the difference between performative and [descriptive] uses of performative sentences, if the contrary assumption is theoretically convenient. ("General Semantics", p. 211. Emphasis mine.).

In turn, Recanati indicates that:

The difference between the two readings [of explicit performatives] is not a question of what is said -- which would be the case if the performative verb contributed to the propositional content of the utterance in only one of the two readings- but of how what is said is to be taken. ... Rather than a semantic ambiguity in a sentence-type, it seems that we are faced here with a pragmatic ambiguity affecting the utterance. (Op. cit., pp. 62-63).
In the proposal suggested by Lewis and Recanati, there would be only one semantic reading for explicit performatives and their corresponding epp's; and the different ways (other than that licensed by the semantic structure of the sentence) in which explicit performatives are to be understood would be explained, for instance, purely in terms of the pragmatic notion of "indirect speech acts". This line of argument, although appealing, is not correct. The fact is that the cases discussed earlier, concerning the two possible uses of sentence (60), do really show that there is a semantic ambiguity affecting epp's, even though the ambiguity in question is not of the kind postulated by the supporter of "Searle's solution". When explicit performatives are used performatively, the epp's occurring in them have to be interpreted as being self-referential. But when explicit performatives are used non-performatively, their epp's must be regarded as lacking any self-referential character. It is the presence or absence of this self-referential factor in epp's which distinguishes, semantically, the two

100. This is the line taken by Recanati, himself; but also by many others like, for instance and very typically, Bach and Harnish in Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. The manner in which Recanati exploits the notion of indirect speech act in this context differs considerably, however, from that adopted by Bach & Harnish.

101. This line of argument is appealing only inasmuch as it makes use of the notion of indirect speech act to explain the phenomenon of (performative readings of) explicit performatives. But that move is totally independent and should be detached of the mistaken idea that the ambiguity between the performative and descriptive uses of explicit performatives is pragmatic in nature. The notion of indirect speech act is needed, not to explain this ambiguity, but to give an adequate account of the performative reading of explicit performatives. Appeal to pragmatics is relevant once we are engaged with the question: how the utterance of an explicit performative, under its performative reading, may count, given its semantic structure, as an illocution of the type denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in the corresponding epp.
possible uses of explicit performatives. Thus, in our example, if (60) is used performatively we have to understand it as synonymous with:

(61) I hereby ask you that you leave town immediately.

where 'hereby' refers to the very act of utterance which is then being performed. In turn, if (60) is used non-performatively, we must read it as synonymous with:

(62) I ask you in the letter I am presently writing that you leave town immediately.

That is, it is as if the deep structure of epp's (and of explicit performatives) included a parameter to mark "the physical means" by which the illocutionary act presented by the sentence as being performed at the time of

102. Recanati acknowledges that this is the case in a footnote. cf. p. 62, n. 6.
103. This caveat concerning the reference of 'hereby' is necessary because there may be cases in which the speaker utters (61) but he is not referring to his present utterance of (61) (I owe this observation to J. Higginbotham). Suppose, for instance, that the speaker utters (61) while pointing with his finger at the letter, which he has just finished writing, lying on his desk. In this case, the speaker refers by 'hereby' to the letter, not to his utterance. In this example, the utterance of (61), despite containing an occurrence of 'hereby', would not be self-referential and would have to be interpreted as a case of descriptive use of an explicit performative. In short, strictly speaking, the appearance of 'hereby' in an explicit performative sentence does not guarantee self-referentiality, and therefore, does not guarantee that the sentence, if used, is used performatively. Only in the case that the reference of 'hereby' is the current act of utterance can we assume that the utterance is self-referential, and therefore, that the sentence is being used performatively. For reasons of convenience, however, I shall ignore, in my exposition, this possibility of non-self-referential uses of 'hereby', and represent the performative reading of explicit performatives by simply introducing 'hereby' as part of the epp of the sentence. Obviously, our procedure could be easily (even if awkwardly) modified to accommodate the recalcitrant, non-self-referential uses of 'hereby'. At any rate, it is important to realize that nothing in our position is endangered by the existence of non-self-referential uses of 'hereby' in epp's.
utterance is performed. This marking being of such a kind that it only
discriminates between, on the one hand, A) a very specific way of performing
the illocutionary act in question, namely the way consisting in uttering
(given the right circumstances) the appropriate kind of sentence and, on
the other, B) all other possible means of performing the given illocutionary
act. So interpreted the semantic ambiguity of epp's, the difference in
semantic structure between the performative and non-performative uses of (60)
can no longer be presented as a difference between structures (i) and (ii),
but rather, between structures (i) and (iii):

(iii) D + (my hereby asking you that you leave town immediately)

But if this is the semantic difference underlying the two possible uses of
explicit performatives, two things become immediately clear:

First, against Searle, epp's turn out to be indicators of propositional
content (not of illocutionary force) in their performative reading as well as
in their non-performative reading. It is no longer necessary (or possible,
for that matter) to postulate a special (non-descriptive) meaning for
performative uses of epp's. On the contrary, the new analysis of the
semantic difference between the two readings of epp's underwrites the fact
that epp's always contribute to determine the propositional content of
(utterances of) the sentences in which they occur. The difference between
(i) and (iii) is a difference in propositional content potential, not in

104. Bach & Harnish, commenting on the self-referential character of explicit
performatives say: "[In sentences like I hereby order you to leave] the
speaker thereby makes explicit not only the force of his utterance (that it's
an order) but the vehicle of that force, namely, the utterance itself." (Op.
cit., pp. 207-208. Emphasis mine.)
Illocutionary force potential. The latter, D, remains constant, no matter what reading we assign to the epp 'I ask you that'.

Second, the semantic difference underlying the two possible uses of explicit performatives does not suffice to explain why when an explicit perative is used performatively the utterance in question typically counts as an illocution of the type named by the corresponding illocutionary verb. As we shall see later, it is to solve this problem that appeal to pragmatic notions, concretely to the notion of indirect speech act, becomes relevant and useful. Turning again to (60), we have seen that the semantic analysis of a performative reading of (60) renders the structure (iii). But given (iii), we have to interpret (60) as declarative in mood, and hence as having the illocutionary force potential proper of sentences in the declarative mood, which certainly does not include requestive force (unless vacuously, if we suppose that the declarative mood is force-neutral); also, we are forced to interpret (60) as having as its propositional content the propositional function\textsuperscript{105} that "I hereby ask you to leave town immediately". But how can a sentence possessing those indicators of force and of propositional content typically count, when uttered, as a request by the speaker that the hearer leave town immediately? Moreover, if we are

\textsuperscript{105} I say 'propositional function' instead of 'proposition' because (60) contains indexical expressions like -- most conspicuously -- 'I' and 'you' (but also, 'town' and the present tense of the verb-form, 'ask'), whose reference can only be fixed contextually. In fact, to avoid an undesirable assimilation of these indexical expressions of sentences of the natural language with logical variables, even better than using here the notion of propositional function is to use D. Kaplan's notion of character. I shall explicitly introduce Kaplan's notion of character later on, when talking about the propositional content potential of sentences of the natural language. Cf. infra, pp. 134-35.
right in assigning structure (iii) to the performative reading of (60), it is clear that utterances of (60) can and should be characterized as having a truth value. If utterances of declarative sentences in general are true/false, there is no reason to deny that property of (utterances of) sentences like (60), because, given (iii), (60) is just a declarative sentence. Indeed, there is no difficulty in assigning truth conditions to (utterances of) (60): An utterance, u, of (60) is true as uttered by S at t if and only if, by means of S's uttering u, S asks his audience at t to leave town immediately. (The underlined proviso is crucial to preserve the self-referential character of the performative reading of (60)). But now the question formulated, and left unanswered, a few lines above arises again in a different fashion: how can an utterance of (60), which — as we have just argued — is always characterizable as true/false, be a request? Requests are not true nor false; they are satisfied or unsatisfied. How can an utterance be at once, both true/false and a request?

This question constitutes a problem only if we accept Austin's claim that (non-assertive) explicit performatives are neither true nor false and (therefore) that utterances of (non-assertive) explicit performatives do not count as assertions or descriptions of any kind, but rather, as illocutions of the type named by the illocutionary verb included in the epp's

106. Cf. How To Do Things With Words, Lecture I.

107. From now on, whenever I talk about explicit performatives and their utterances, or about their corresponding epp's and their utterances, I will refer, (unless explicit indications to the contrary are given in the text) to their performative reading, not — of course — to their non-performative reading.
of the sentences uttered. Thus — Austin would claim —, someone who
(seriously) utters (60) is not asserting nor otherwise "saying" that he or
she is making a request at the time of utterance, but requesting that his or
her audience leave town immediately. The utterer of (60) is not saying
anything true (or false) but, simply, making a request. 108

But Austin's claim is mistaken. Austin is perfectly right in emphasizing
that an utterance of an explicit performative typically counts as an
illocution of the kind denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in (the
epp of) the sentence. But, as it has been pointed out by many commentators,
that is not a reason to deny that utterances of explicit performatives are
true/false, or that they may count, in addition, as descriptions or
assertions of a certain kind. As Lewis concisely but eloquently puts it:

To utter 'I am speaking' is to speak, but it is also to speak the

Although Austin never gives an explicit argument in favor of his tenet, it
looks as if he presupposed that something like the following "principle", (Pr
A), holds: 109

(Pr A) Illocutionary acts sufficiently "different" from one another (in
a sense to be defined) cannot be performed by the same
utterance.

108. No doubt, very influential in Searle's idea that epp's are indicators of
force is his acceptance of this Austin's tenet. If explicit performatives
are neither true nor false, if they do not describe anything, it is clear
that the epp's occurring in them cannot contribute anything to the
propositional content potential of the sentence. Any analysis of explicit
performatives which regards the meaning of their epp's to be part of the
propositional content indicated by the respective whole sentence forces us to
assume that the explicit performatives have truth values.

109. This formulation of (Pr A) is taken from Recanati, op. cit., p. 91.
But, clearly, (Pr A) is false. It goes against the solid evidence presented by the overwhelmingly vast number of utterances (types) which are commonly classified in Speech Act theory as cases of indirect speech acts. Cases of indirect speech acts -- as described by Searle and Vanderveken -- are precisely cases of utterances in which:

...two speech acts are involved: the non-literal primary speech act ... is performed indirectly by way of performing a literal secondary speech act. ... The speaker may convey indirectly a different illocutionary force or propositional content from what is directly expressed; hence in one utterance act he may perform one or more non-literal indirect illocutionary acts. (Op. cit., pp. 10-11. Emphasis mine.).

So, for example, if while walking along the streets of Manhattan, I stop by a news-stand and say to the person in charge (63):

(63) Do you have the New York Times?

I am normally to be understood, not merely as having asked a question to the newspaper-man concerning the specific brands of papers which he happens to keep in his stand. By asking whether he has the New York Times I am also, at the same time, requesting him to sell me a copy of the New York Times.

Likewise, normally if a traffic policeman approaches you and says (64):

(64) Sir, you have parked your car in front of a garage entrance

the policeman has certainly stated that something is the case (namely, that you have parked your car in front of a garage-entrance). But in uttering (64), the policeman has also and simultaneously told, demanded from or

110. For the classic characterization of indirect speech acts, cf., Searle's article "Indirect Speech Acts".
commanded you to remove your car from the place it is parked.

The act of requesting, in the first example, and the act of commanding, in the second, are indirect speech acts.

The two examples just presented suffice to refute (Pr A). They are cases in which one utterance gives rise to, or counts as, two illocutionary acts of fairly different kinds. But if (PrA) is false, there seems to be no good reason to affirm Austin's tenet that the utterance of an explicit performative cannot simultaneously constitute, both, an illocution of type f and a statement (or a declaration) that such an illocution of type f is being performed.

So far, we have mentioned and brought up here the notion of indirect speech acts to refute (PrA) and, consequently, to show that there is no good reason to maintain Austin's tenet just stated. But the real interest of the notion of indirect speech acts lies, for our purposes, in that it provides, in itself, an excellent reason to affirm what Austin's tenet denies. An utterance of an explicit performative can and does, in fact, simultaneously count as an illocution of type f and as an statement or a declaration that such an illocution of type f is being performed because the utterance in question is a case of indirect speech act. And once we accept that utterances of explicit performatives are cases of indirect speech acts, we find ourselves equipped with an adequate tool to answer the question which came up in p. 110, above: how can a sentence like (60), whose semantic

111. That is, if the utterance is serious.
structure is (iii) and which is characterizable as true/false, typically count as a request that the hearer leave town immediately? More generally, the view that utterances of explicit performatives are cases of indirect speech act allows one to maintain -- against Searle -- the tenet that epp's are indicators of propositional content, without giving up the intuitive idea that (serious) utterances of explicit performatives count as illocutions of the type denoted by the corresponding illocutionary verb.

Of course, in order to make our latter claim convincing, we need to say more about indirect speech acts. I shall postpone, however, this necessary task till next section, when we examine Bach & Harnish's and Recanati's analysis of epp's, which crucially appeal to the notion of indirect speech acts. Presently, we are only concerned with the critical review of Searle's early view on epp's, as he presents it in Speech Acts. We have already argued that it is mistaken. The only remaining point is to examine what the consequences of rejecting Searle's analysis of epp's are for the purposes of assessing the validity of (Th.1a**). The consequences are, obviously, negative. The hope of having at one's disposal a huge and systematic body of indicators of force with which to match, one to one, illocutionary forces has to be abandoned. The rejection of Searle's early position is clearly a serious setback for any attempt of defending (Th1.a**).

3.3.6 The Indirect Speech Acts approach to the analysis of epp's

3.3.6.1 Indirect Speech Acts and Explicit Performatives

In the text quoted a few paragraphs earlier, Searle & Vanderveken employ
three key notions to characterize indirect speech acts: They are non-literal, primary and performed by way of performing another (direct) illocutionary act. Let us briefly examine these three notions. If it turns out that (serious) utterances of explicit performatives count as illocutions which can be described as non-literal and primary (in the sense to be presently clarified), and as performed by way of the performance of a direct act, then there is a good case to affirm that those illocutions are indirect speech acts.

1) Non-literal illocutionary act: We can define a non-literal illocutionary act in purely negative terms as an illocutionary act which is not literal. In turn, an illocutionary act is literal if and only if it is in accordance with the illocutionary act potential of the sentence uttered. But 1) what is the illocutionary act potential of a sentence?, and 2) what does it mean for an illocutionary act "to be in accordance with" the potential of the sentence uttered? 1) The illocutionary act potential of a sentence, s, consists of two elements: a) the illocutionary force potential, which is the illocutionary force indicated by the particular indicator of force occurring in s. And b) the propositional content potential, which is the propositional content indicated by the indicator of propositional content occurring in s. For instance, the sentence (65):

(65) Eat your pie!

has the following illocutionary act potential: a) Since (65) is imperative in mood, its illocutionary force potential is Directive force; and, in principle, any illocutionary force subsumable under the directive genus (forces like those proper of orders, requests, pleas, beggings, etc.) falls
under the illocutionary force potential of (65). b) We may describe the propositional content potential of (65) as the propositional function expressed by the open sentence (66):

(66) \( x \) (the hearer) eats his pie at \( t \) (in the near future).

We say that the propositional content potential of (65) (like the one possessed by the vast majority of sentences of English) is a propositional function, instead of a proposition, because the referential terms contained in (65) are contextually determined. Actually, it is better to understand the propositional content potential of a sentence in terms of D. Kaplan's notion of character than in terms of the notion of propositional function. The character of a sentence is a function from contexts of utterance into propositions. 112 For instance, if we take the context of an utterance of (65) to be the one in which Bill is addressing (65) to Lucy at time \( t \), and in which he is referring to Lucy's birthday pie, then the value of the character of (65) will be the proposition that Sally eats her birthday pie at a time, \( t_1 \), later than, but fairly close to \( t \). 113 So, the character of a sentence, exactly like a propositional function, is a function whose values are propositions. Kaplan's character is preferable over the notion of propositional function because the latter is always associated with open sentences. But ordinary sentences of English with contextual terms are obviously not open sentences. Kaplan's character permits to acknowledge the contextual dependency of ordinary sentences of the natural language like

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113. I ignore here the very difficult problems posed by this treat ment of time for sentences like (65), etc.
(65), while avoiding the unsatisfactory result of having to understand the referential terms occurring in those sentences as pure variables. For this reason, I shall understand here the notion of the propositional content of a sentence as the character of (or expressed in) that sentence. So, any proposition which may be regarded as the "value" of the character of (65), given the appropriate context of utterance as argument, will fall under the propositional content potential of (65). Since the illocutionary force potential and the propositional content potential of (65) are as described, examples of illocutions falling under the illocutionary act potential of (65) are, say, the order issued by John to Paul (by means of uttering (65)) that Paul eat his pie, and the request made by Mary to Bob (by means of uttering (65)) that Bob eat his pie; but not the statement that Paul is eating his pie nor the request to pick up the phone made by Rose to Ann.

Given this characterization of the illocutionary act potential of a sentence, the answer to 2) can be put this way: An illocutionary act is in accordance with the illocutionary act potential of the sentence uttered if it is associated with the sentence by the semantic rules of the language. It is to acts of this kind that we (and Searle and Vanderveken) call 'literal illocutionary acts'. If we look back at our two examples of indirect speech acts given earlier, it is patent that of the two acts performed in each case (namely, (63a) the question addressed to the newspaper-man whether he has the New York Times, and (63b) the request addressed to the newspaper-man to sell me (the speaker) the New York Times; and (64a) the statement that you (the reader) have parked your car in front of a garage-entrance, and (64b) the command by the policeman, issued to you (the reader), that you remove your car from the garage-entrance), only (63a) and (64a) are literal in the sense
just defined, since only they are in accordance with the illocutionary act potential of the sentences respectively uttered, (63) and (64).

ii) **Primary illocutionary act**: The indirect, non-literal act is called the primary one relative to the direct, literal act by way of which it is performed. This means that the illocutionary act primarily intended by the speaker is not the one performed directly, but the one performed indirectly.

This terminology of "primary" and "secondary" acts and intentions is, however, somewhat misleading, for it dangerously suggests that the illocutionary intentions possessed by a speaker when uttering an indirect speech act are hierarchically organized or structured. To avoid this unwanted implication, instead of talking of primary and secondary intentions, we may characterize the phenomenon at issue by indicating that the indirect act is the act for whose sake the direct, literal act is performed. The performance of the direct act is intended by the speaker "as a means of" or "as an instrument for" the performance of the indirect act. The intention of the speaker is to perform the indirect, non-literal act by means of the corresponding direct act. Having made this clear, I shall, nevertheless, continue using the expression 'illocutionary act primarily intended' and its cognates in this paper. I proceed in this way for reasons of convenience and, also, because it is common practice in the literature about indirect speech acts. At any rate, to remind the reader of the reservations with

114. I owe this observation to James Higginbotham.

115. Cf., e.g., Searle, "Indirect Speech Acts", pp. 30 and 43; Bach & Harnish, p. 174; and Lycan, pp. 172 and 178.
which the expression is used here, I shall always enclosed it in quotation marks.

iii) Illocutionary act performed by way of performing another: This is the trickiest of the three features of indirect speech acts here examined. It is by no means clear how to make the expression 'by way of' more precise. A first, even if very modest, step towards the clarification of this notion is Bach & Harnish's remark that:

[An illocutionary act] is indirect in the sense that its success is tied to the success of [another, direct illocutionary] act. That is, securing uptake requires [the hearer] to identify the indirect act by way of identifying the [other, direct] act. (Ibid., p. 70).

Now, how does the hearer identify the indirect act "by way of identifying the direct act"? Very roughly, the most popular or widespread answer consists in assuming that the hearer uses Gricean principles and what is mutually

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116. For Bach & Harnish notion of "successful illocutionary act", cf. op. cit., p. 15: "An illocutionary act is communicatively successful if the speaker's illocutionary intention is recognized by the hearer." For a characterization of the crucial although very elusive (difficult) notion of "the speaker's illocutionary intention", cf. op. cit., pp. 15-ff.; and, e.g., Recanati, op. cit., chap. 7. The issue of the speaker's illocutionary intention is too complex and problematic to be treated here. We shall simply assume that there are such things as illocutionary intentions, but we shall not engage in a discussion of the analytic problems which this notion engenders.

117. Of course, the first problem we encounter when trying to solve this question is the obvious one that we have not said anything here about the way in which the hearer is supposed to identify direct illocutionary acts (let alone, indirect illocutionary acts). We shall put aside this problem and presuppose -- for the sake of our exposition -- that there is (or that we can construct) an adequate explanation of the process by which the hearer identifies the direct illocutionary act performed by the speaker. (Attempts of carrying out such an explanation abound in the literature about speech acts. Cf., e.g., Searle, Speech Acts, and Intentionality; Bach & Harnish, op. cit.; and Recanati op. cit.)
believed (by speaker and hearer) to be shared background information to infer that, in addition to the direct illocutionary intention, there is an ulterior illocutionary intention which the speaker possesses in the particular act of utterance at issue; and once the hearer has inferred this, he then uses speech act theory and more (shared) background information to identify what that ulterior intention is.

So, for instance, according to Bach & Harnish, and paraphrasing their own text, the general pattern of indirect speech act recognition can be spelled out this way: 118

When identifying an indirect illocutionary act, the hearer goes through the following general process of inference, (Inf.a):
1a) S is performing the (direct) illocutionary act A.
2a) S is respecting the (Gricean) Conversational Maxims.
3a) S could not be merely performing A.
4a) There is some illocutionary act, B, whose performance is connected in a way identifiable under the circumstances to the performance of A, such that in performing A S could be performing B.
5a) S is performing A and thereby performing B.

For our purposes, what is most important to notice with respect to (Inf.a) is that it constitutes a clear case of conversational implicature. In Recanati's words,

An illocutionary act is conversationally implicated if and only if the hypothesis of its performance is needed to reconcile the utterance with the speaker's presumed respect of the conversational maxims. (Op. cit., p. 139).

This is exactly what happens in the case of the indirect illocution, B, alluded to in (Inf.a). Leaving aside the difficulties and the vagueness

118. Cf. op. cit., pp. 70-77.
plaguing premise 4a), the premise which confers 1a)-5a) its character of being a conversational implicature, is 3a). 3a) is obtained from 1a) and 2a) together with the hidden premise, 1a*):

1a*) If \( S \) is merely performing \( A \) in the present context of utterance, he is violating one (or several) of the Conversational Maxims.

If we hold 1a), 2a) and 1a*) together, we have to conclude that \( S \) is not merely performing \( A \); that is, that there is another ilocutionary act, in addition to \( A \), that \( S \) is performing on the occasion of utterance, which is such that its performance exonerates \( S \) from the charge that he is violating the Conversational Maxims. (Finally, 4) helps us to identify which "extra" illocutionary act \( S \) may be performing in addition to his performance of \( A \).

Let us illustrate this with an example. Consider the case, presented above, of the utterance of (63):

(63) Do you have the New York Times?

Upon the circumstances, if my utterance of (63) counted merely as the question, \( Q \), addressed to the newspaper-man, whether he has the New York Times, then my utterance would violate, at least, the conversational maxim of Relevance, since it is part of the background information shared (and mutually believed to be shared) by me and the newspaper-man that, e.g., I am not conducting a sociological survey concerning the relation between, say, kind of newspaper stand and the kind of newspaper brands it offers to the public, etc.; and, therefore, there seems to be no point in my raising the issue about the New York Times. But, since by hypothesis, I am respecting the conversational maxims, I must be interpreted as doing something more than just asking the question \( Q \). One of the extra possible illocutions that I may
be performing in uttering (63) is the request, \( R \), addressed to the
newspaper-man, that he sell me (a copy of) the New York Times. This is so
because, among other things, a necessary condition for the fulfillment of \( R \)
is that the state of affairs questioned in \( Q \) obtains. Only if the
newspaper-man has copies of the New York Times in his stand can he sell one
of such copies to me. Also, politeness often dictates, or makes it
advisable, to request (or command, etc.) in a roundabout manner. Given the
particular context of the utterance, by asking whether such a necessary
condition for the fulfillment of \( R \) obtains, I am politely requesting the
newspaper-man to sell me the New York Times.

In short, Bach & Harnish's explanation of the "by way of" relation, linking
the direct illocutionary act with its corresponding indirect act, consists in
interpreting indirect illocutions as conversationally implicated by their
corresponding direct illocutions. The indirect illocution \( B \) is performed by
way of performing the direct illocution \( A \) inasmuch as (in the sense that) \( A \)
conversationally implicates \( B \).

It is important to notice that, although Bach & Harnish's Gricean method of
explaining the "by way of" relation works reasonably well for a large number
of cases of indirect speech acts, however, there are cases for which it is
inadequate or, at least, for which there are better, alternative models of
explanation at hand. I shall contend later, following Recanati, that the
primary acts performed in serious utterances of explicit performatives
constitute cases of indirect speech acts for which it is clearly better to
adopt a non-Gricean account. Because of this circumstance; that is, because
there are (or there may be) instances of indirect speech acts which are not
conversationally implicated by their corresponding direct acts, it is advisable to give a formulation of the pattern of inference which the hearer supposedly goes through to conclude that the speaker is performing an indirect speech act and to identify the particular speech act performed by the speaker, which be more general or more schematic than (Inf.a). I suggest to make use of a modified version of (Inf.a). The modification consists, simply, in dropping premise 2a) (plus the hidden premise 1a*)) from (Inf.a). Thus, we obtain (Inf.b):

1b) S is performing the (direct) illocutionary act A.
2b) S could not be merely performing A.
3b) There is some illocutionary act, B, whose performance is connected in a way identifiable under the circumstances to the performance of A, such that in performing A S could be performing B.
4b) S is performing A and thereby performing B.

(Inf.b) is, naturally, less informative than (Inf.a), since it provides no clue of how the hearer is supposed to go from 1b) to 2b). But it is precisely this lack of commitment concerning the step from 1b) to 2b) which makes (Inf.b) more attractive than (preferable over) (Inf.a), because it leaves open the possibility that there may be other ways, besides the one favored and singled out by Bach & Harnish, in which the indirect act B is performed "by way of" performing a direct act A.

Now, given this rough and ready characterization of features i)-iii) of indirect speech acts, shall we say that utterances of explicit performatives are cases of indirect speech acts?

Let us have a look at our favorite example, an utterance of (60):

(60) I (hereby) ask you to leave town immediately.
One thing is clear, a serious utterance of (60) typically counts as a request, from the speaker to the hearer, that the latter leave town immediately. Let us call all (possible) requests of the general form just described, which may be performed in utterances of (60), 'requests of the form \( R \)'. It is patent, that the illocutionary act "primarily intended" by the speaker in a typical utterance of (60) is a request of the form \( R \). Let \( r_1 \) be one of such requests of form \( R \), performed in a particular occasion of utterance of (60). Is \( r_1 \) a direct or an indirect illocutionary act? From what we have already said, it follows that, if the utterance of (60) in question does in fact constitute a case of indirect speech act, \( r_1 \) must be non-literal and performed by way of the performance of another, direct illocutionary act.

Let us examine, first, whether \( r_1 \) is literal or not. If we recall, the semantic structure of (60) is, according to our analysis,\(^{119}\) (iii):

\[
(iii) \ D + \text{(my hereby asking you that you leave town immediately)}.
\]

For \( r_1 \) to be literal, it would have to fall under the illocutionary act potential of (60). That is, 1) its illocutionary force would have to fall under the force potential of (60) and 2) its propositional content under the propositional content potential of (60). But, obviously, this is not the case:

1) Things are a little bit complicated, and not totally settled, in the case of force: Given (iii), the illocutionary force potential of (60) is a

\(^{119}\) Cf. supra, p. 126.
Assertive force, if we interpret the declarative mood as an indicator of assertive force (Bach & Harnish, etc.); or b) any force whatsoever, if we interpret the declarative mood as force neutral (Davidson, Recanati, etc.). If the first interpretation is correct, then we are thereby forced to suppose that \( r_1 \) (the request of the form \( R \)) is non-literal. On the other hand, if we accept the second interpretation, then the force of \( r_1 \) is trivially in accordance with the illocutionary force potential of (60), since every type of illocutionary force is in accordance with it.

2) It is with respect to propositional content that the non-literal character of \( r_1 \) becomes definitely apparent. Given (iii), the propositional content potential of (60) is the character, \( (p^*) \), that I hereby ask you to leave town immediately. If the proposition, \( q \), which constitutes the propositional content of \( r_1 \) fell under \( (p^*) \), \( q \) would have to be "a value" of \( (p^*) \); that is, \( q \) would have to be "the result" of contextually fixing (determining) the reference of the indexical terms occurring in (60). But, of course, \( q \) is not a value of \( (p^*) \). Quite trivially, \( q \) is a value of the character \( (q^*) \), that you (the hearer) leave(s) town immediately.

It turns out, then, that from the point of view of its propositional content, \( r_1 \) is not literal. Therefore, no matter how we interpret the force potential of (60), we must conclude that \( r_1 \) is non-literal.

Finally, we need to explore whether \( r_1 \) is performed by way of performing another, direct illocutionary act. Here, it may be profitable to make a

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120. Cf. supra, p. 127, n. 105.
detour concerning the nature of direct illocutionary acts and the relation between the direct/indirect and literal/non-literal distinctions. If every non-literal illocutionary act were indirect, then, by showing that $r_1$ is non-literal, we would already have shown that $r_1$ is indirect. And, therefore, the only remaining task would be to look for the (particular,) literal illocutionary act directly performed in (an) our utterance of (60), by means of which $r_1$ is performed.

But several authors have contended that one cannot identify non-literal with indirect act, nor — correspondingly — literal with direct act. For instance, both Bach & Harnish and Lycan maintain that, although every indirect speech act is non-literal, not every case of non-literal use of language is a case of indirect speech act. Both, Bach & Harnish and Lycan, present irony, exaggeration, metaphor and other "figures of speech" as crucial examples supporting their contention. But although this tenet that irony, metaphor, etc., do not constitute cases of indirect illocutionary acts may well be correct, however, neither of the "arguments" actually given by these authors in support of the thesis convinces me. I cannot pause here to examine those arguments carefully. I shall only make the following general critical remark: It is very revealing that the reason given by Bach & Harnish in support of the tenet that ironic and metaphoric utterances, etc., are not indirect speech acts flatly contradicts the reason given by Lycan to defend the very same tenet. That is, if what Bach & Harnish argue is true, then Lycan's reason to claim that irony, etc., are not cases of indirect speech acts prove to be invalid. And vice versa. Both, Bach & Harnish and Lycan, deny that ironic and metaphoric speech acts are indirect because, in their view, there is only one act performed in these cases. But, curiously enough,
while Bach & Harnish maintain that the only act performed in those cases is
the "primarily intended", non-literal one, Lycan claims that the only act
performed in those cases is a literal one. So, for example, suppose that
someone **ironically** utters the sentence (67):

(67) Smith's argument is a real winner.

**meaning that the argument in question is poor.** According to Bach & Harnish,
the speaker of (67), although "saying" (locutionary, sense of 'saying') that
Smith's argument is a real winner, does not **state** that. Rather, the only
illocutionary act performed by the speaker is the non-literal one of stating
that Smith's argument is poor. On the other hand, according to Lycan, the
speaker of (67), in our example, would only perform the literal illocutionary
act of stating that Smith's argument is a real winner; the ironically
intended content, that Smith's argument is poor, would be "merely conveyed"
(p. 171), but not stated, by the speaker in a "derivative" (p. 172) or
"secondary" (**ibid.**) way.

In short, Bach & Harnish and Lycan share the view that there is only one
illocutionary act performed in non-literal uses of language such as irony.
But, of the two types of act (literal/ non-literal) that may possibly be
chosen as the one performed in those non-literal uses, Bach & Harnish choose
one type of act, while Lycan chooses the other. It is this discrepancy which
makes one naturally wonder whether their view is really sound. Why not agree
with Lycan that there is a literal act performed in uttering (67) ironically;
while agreeing, also, with Bach & Harnish that there is, in addition, a
non-literal act performed in uttering (67) ironically? That is, why not
assume that the non-literal act of stating that Smith's argument is poor is
performed by way of performing the literal act of stating that Smith's argument is a real winner? To hold that only one of these acts is performed seems quite arbitrary, in view of Bach & Harnish's and Lycan's mutually defeating reasons in support of this idea.

Nevertheless, although my criticism of Bach & Harnish and Lycan makes patent that their reasons to claim that there are direct, non-literal illocutionary acts must be flawed somehow, it does not show that the claim, in itself, is wrong. And, hence, I have not shown that every non-literal act is indirect. Consequently -- going back to the issue which motivated our detour --, we cannot deduce that r₁ is indirect from the fact that r₁, as performed in uttering (60), is non-literal.

Therefore, we need to find an "independent" reason to hold that in the utterance of (60) as the request r₁ there is, in addition, another literal illocutionary act performed, by means of whose performance r₁ (the request of form R) is performed. In the attempt to find one such independent reason, a good way to proceed is to examine what kind of illocutionary acts could be literally performed in uttering (60). If, once we have identified that kind (or kinds) of act, we find that the assumption that one of those literal acts is performed in a typical utterance of (60) is plausible and helps to explain why or how the utterance may count as a request of form R, then we have a good reason to classify (typical) utterances of (60) -- and, in general, typical utterances of explicit performatives -- as cases of indirect speech acts.

Since, according to our analysis, explicit performatives are declarative in mood, and since -- as we saw -- there are at least two different ways of
interpreting the illocutionary force potential of declarative sentences, we need to explore two possibilities here: a) The one in which declarative sentences are regarded as having Assertive force potential. b) The one in which declarative sentences are taken to be force neutral.

3.3.6.2 **Bach & Harnish's analysis of explicit performatives**

Suppose that declarative sentences are Assertive in their illocutionary force potential. Is it plausible that by way of stating that I hereby request you to leave town immediately I manage to request you to leave town immediately? Many authors have believed so. For example, and very conspicuously, Bach & Harnish themselves maintain this thesis. They hold that serious utterances of (a majority of) explicit performatives are cases of indirect speech acts such that the direct but "secondarily intended" illocutionary act, by means of which the non-literal but "primarily intended" act is performed, is an assertion. Bach & Harnish's explanation of how the speaker of (60) performs a request of form İ would be this: 121 In a typical utterance of (60), the speaker, S, intends (and intends the hearer, H, to recognise that he intends) H to go through (something like) the following inferential process, (Inf.c):

1c) S is saying (non-assertive, locutionary sense of 'saying') "I (hereby) request you to leave town immediately".
2c) S is stating that he is thereby requesting me to leave town immediately.
3c) If S's statement is true, then he must be thereby requesting me to leave town immediately.

121. Cf. op. cit., p. 208. Although the example chosen by us differs from Bach & Harnish's, the inferential process which we present here is, in every relevant detail, the same as the one appearing in Bach & Harnish's text.
4c) If $S$ is thereby requesting me to leave town immediately, it must be his utterance that constitutes the request.

5c) Presumably, $S$ is speaking the truth.

6c) Therefore, in stating that he is thereby requesting me to leave town immediately he is requesting me to leave town immediately.

$S$ succeeds in requesting $H$ to leave town immediately if he succeeds in securing $H$'s uptake; i.e., if he succeeds in triggering (something like) (Inf.c) in $H$.

The pattern of inferential recognition, (Inf.c), particularly designed for the case of utterances of (60), can be easily generalized to cover (utterances of) many explicit performatives. Generalizing from (Inf.c) we obtain the schema (Inf.c*): In a typical utterance of an explicit performative, $S$ intends (and intends $H$ to recognise that he intends) $H$ to go through (something like) the following scheme of inferential process, (Inf.c*):

1c*) $S$ is saying (non-assertive, locutionary sense of saying)

"I (hereby) $f$ (you) that $p$."

2c*) $S$ is stating that he is thereby $f$-ing (me) that $p$.

3c*) If $S$'s statement is true, then he must be thereby $f$-ing (me) that $p$.

4c*) If $S$ is thereby $f$-ing (me) that $p$, it must be his utterance that constitutes the $f$-ing.

5c*) Presumably $S$ is speaking the truth.

6c*) Therefore, in stating that he is thereby $f$-ing (me) that $p$ he is $f$-ing (me) that $p$.

There are at least two difficulties undermining Bach & Harnish's proposed explanation of how an assertion of (60) may constitute a means of making a request of form $R$; and, in general, of how an assertion of an explicit

122. Where '$f$' ranges over species of illocutionary acts and '$p$' over propositions.
performative may constitute a means of performing an illocutionary act of the kind denoted by the corresponding illocutionary verb. Both difficulties refer to or have to do with the suggested process of inference, (Inf.c*), which the hearer is expected to go through in order to recognise the speaker's illocutionary intention.

But before presenting these two difficulties, I want to indicate a more fundamental problem affecting Bach & Harnish's overall approach to explicit performatives. This more basic problem has to do with the fact that their analysis of utterances of explicit performatives in terms of indirect speech acts is not regarded by the authors as valid for all explicit performatives. Bach & Harnish present their analysis as applying to a very important and large but restricted class of explicit performatives. The flaw in Bach & Harnish's interpretation of explicit performatives is not, however, that their explanation via indirect speech acts lacks complete generality. Rather, what makes Bach & Harnish's proposal inadequate is the kind of alternative explanation which they adopt for the remaining class of explicit performatives. This alternative explanation is inadequate because -- as we shall see in a moment -- it forces us to suppose that what in principle is a mere difference in the type of illocutionary act performed in (seriously) uttering one or the other kind of explicit performative does in fact stem from, or is correlated with, alleged differences in the semantic structure (concretely, in the indicator of force) of the sentences involved. In other words, Bach & Harnish overall explanation of the illocutionary efficacy of explicit performatives leads to the view that (relevantly) different explicit performatives have a different indicator of illocutionary force (i.e., that different explicit performatives have different moods). And this -- as
argued in my earlier section about Searle — is clearly wrong.

The problem, very schematically put it, is this: According to Bach & Harnish, the explanation in terms of indirect speech acts holds only for (utterances of) those explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a so-called "Communicative illocutionary act". But such an explanation does not apply to the case of (utterances of) explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a "Conventional illocutionary act". Paradigmatic examples of communicative illocutionary acts would be, e.g., asserting, asking a question, warning and requesting. Communicative illocutionary acts are also sometimes referred to in the literature as "purely linguistic" and "non institutional" illocutions. On the other hand, paradigmatic instances of conventional illocutionary acts would be acts like baptizing, resigning, opening or adjourning a meeting, blessing, etc. These conventional illocutionary acts are often alternatively called "extra-linguistic" and "institutional" illocutions. The distinction between communicative and conventional illocutions is disputable and controversial, and presumably not as clear-cut as their advocates would like it to be. There are different and more or less plausible ways of understanding this distinction, but the basic point underlying it is the intuition that there seem to be characteristic

123. Bach & Harnish subdivide conventional illocutions into two categories: Effectives and Verdictives: "Effectives effect changes in institutional states of affairs; they are necessarily conventional inasmuch as they achieve their effects only because mutually believed to do so. Only thus is a student graduated, a bill vetoed or a site consecrated. Verdictives are judgments that by convention have official, binding import in the context of the institution in which they occur. Thus, to call a runner out, to find a defendant guilty or to assess a piece of property..." (pp. 110-11). Also, Bach & Harnish point out (p. 292, n. 2) that their conventional illocutionary acts are "essentially the same" as Searle's Declarations.
differences in the conditions of successful performance possessed, respectively, by acts like assertions and requests, etc., on the one hand, and acts like blessings and resignations on the other. The problem, of course, is how to identify and properly characterize these different conditions of success. According to Bach & Harnish, the difference is this:

Communicative illocutionary acts succeed by means of recognition of intention, whereas conventional ones succeed by satisfaying a convention. (p. 110).

And, again, we find the same idea a few pages later:

Both communicative and conventional illocutionary acts are utterances issued with the intention that the utterance count as an act of certain sort. The means are different in the two cases, intention by means of recognition of intention in one case and intention by convention in the other. (p. 116)

It might be said that the two former quotations are not particularly illuminating since they do not clarify what Bach & Harnish's notion of convention is. This is true, of course, but I am not interested here in clarifying the author's version of the communicative/conventional illocutionary act distinction—which, by the way, I think is not quite correct.\textsuperscript{124} Neither am I concerned here with the problem whether such a distinction, explained a la Bach & Harnish or otherwise, is well taken or not (although I think it is). Rather, all I want to show is that Bach & Harnish's way of conceiving the notion of conventional act, together with their semantic analysis of declarative sentences, leads to the unwanted result of having to postulate a non-declarative mood for those explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a conventional illocutionary

\textsuperscript{124} This issue is briefly discussed later: of infra, pp. 156-62.
For our purposes, the crucial characteristic of conventional illocutionary acts, as conceived by Bach & Harnish, is that they must be performed literally:

In general, conventional illocutionary acts must be performed literally, since the conventions that govern them specify what must be said, not meant. (p. 118)

Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we concede the authors that this is the case. An immediate consequence of it is that conventional illocutionary acts cannot be performed indirectly, since for an act to be performed indirectly it has to be performed non-literally. Now, an utterance of an explicit performative whose illocutionary verb denotes a conventional illocutionary act \(A\) counts, in itself, typically and "primarily", as a conventional illocutionary act of that very same kind \(A\). Thus, for instance, a typical utterance of (68):

(68) I hereby resign.

counts as an act of resignation. This means that the illocutionary acts performed in (typical) utterances of explicit performatives whose illocutionary verbs denote conventional illocutionary acts are themselves conventional illocutionary acts. And, since they are conventional illocutions, they must have been performed literally. For clarity's sake and before continuing with the argument, let us reformulate the steps obtained so far in the following simplified manner:

1) Conventional illocutionary acts must be literal acts.

2) Typical utterances of explicit performatives whose illocutionary verbs denote conventional illocutionary acts give rise to conventional illocutionary acts.
3) Typical utterances of explicit performatives of the kind alluded to in 2) give rise to literal illocutionary acts. (From 1 and 2).

Now, if 3) is true, then, by the definition of literal illocutionary act, it follows that the illocutionary force of an illocution performed in a (typical) utterance of an explicit performative of the kind specified in 2) must fall under the illocutionary force potential of the explicit performative in question. Thus, if the explicit performative uttered is (68), the illocutionary force possessed by the conventional act performed in the utterance (an act of resignation) must fall under the illocutionary force potential of (68). But what is the illocutionary force potential of (68)? To answer, we have to look at the semantic structure of (68). The semantic structure of (68) is:

(iii') D + (my hereby resigning)

As we know, 'D' is the sign for declarative mood. But we have been supposing all along, in accordance with what I think is Bach & Harnish's practice, that:

4) The declarative mood is an indicator of assertive force.

If this is the case, the illocutionary force potential of (68) has to be assertive. But this clashes with the assumption that the act of resignation

125. Most probably, Bach & Harnish would deny that they hold assumption 4) in their book cf., e.g., pp. 35-6). But if one looks closely at their own definition of L-compatibility for sentences in the declarative mood (p. 34) and at their characterization of the different kinds of illocutionary acts (Chap. 3), we discover that, contrary to what seems to be their professed view, the only illocutionary force "L-compatible" with the declarative mood is (according to their own definitions) the Assertive (Constative) force.
performed in uttering (68) is literal. If the act of resignation in question is literal, the illocutionary force potential of (68) would have to be, not Assertive, but that proper to acts of resignation. We see, therefore, that the conjunction of tenets 3) and 4) forces us to reject (iii') as the semantic structure of (68); more concretely, it forces us to hold that 5):

5) (68) and, in general, explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a conventional illocution, are not declarative in mood.

But what structure other than (iii''), what mood other than the declarative, can we plausibly assign to (68)? It looks as if Bach & Harnish's position left us no option but to adopt, with respect to (68) and the rest of explicit performatives of its kind, the same kind of "semantic analysis" offered by Searle for all explicit performatives. Accordingly, the structure of (68) would not be (iii''), but perhaps (ii''):

(ii'') RES + (my hereby resigning),

where 'RES' would be the indicator of the specific illocutionary force proper to the act of resigning. In general, each explicit performative whose illocutionary verb denotes a different conventional illocutionary act would have a different (non-declarative) mood; and, correspondingly, there would be at least as many different indicators of force as different illocutionary verbs denoting different conventional illocutions. But we have already argued, when discussing Searle's proposal, that this view on explicit performatives is untenable.2 This alone gives us enough grounds to discard

126. Cf. supra, pp. 118 ff. Notice, moreover, that in the case presently at issue there is an additional problem which does not arise when the explicit performative under consideration exhibits the most customary form 'I hereby
(ii') as a correct analysis of (68). But there is another important reason why we want to avoid such analysis; namely, the attempt to preserve uniformity in the analysis of explicit performatives. It seems plain to me that, whatever the difference may be between the semantics of (68) and the semantics of any given explicit performative whose illocutionary verb denotes a "communicative" illocution, (e.g., (69) 'I state that the sun is not a planet'), this difference is certainly not a difference affecting the mood (force indicator) of the sentences. Consequently, if we do not want to give up uniformity in the semantic analysis of explicit performatives, or better, if we do not want to deny that sentences like (68) are as declarative in mood as sentences like (69) are, then we must reject at least one of the premisses, 3) and 4), upon which tenet 5) depends. But this means that we have to reject Bach & Harnish's analysis of explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a conventional illocutionary act.

Of the several possible ways of "amending" Bach & Harnish's analysis of explicit performatives denoting "conventional" illocutions, probably the least damaging to, or the most congenial with, the authors' overall interpretation of utterances of explicit performatives would be the one consisting in dropping tenet 3), while keeping tenet 4). This amendment would be the least disruptive for Bach & Harnish's overall picture because, by

(you) that p'. The form of (68), like the form of most, if not all, explicit performatives denoting a conventional illocutionary act, is not 'I hereby f (you) that p', but the more simple 'I hereby f (+ compl)' Being this so, Searle's standard pattern of analysis for explicit performatives cannot be applied. Or, at least, it cannot be straightforwardly applied. There is no easy way of separating indicator of force potential and indicator of propositional content potential in simple explicit performatives like (68). The structure suggested above for (68), 'RES + (my hereby resigning)' is, therefore, at best highly heterodoxical from the point of view of Searle's analysis, and, at any rate, it seems flatly redundant.
keeping intact the assumption that the declarative mood is assertive in
force, one could straightforwardly extend the authors' treatment of
utterances of explicit performatives denoting "communicative" illocutions to
the remaining class of explicit performatives. The "amended" Bach &
Harnish's picture of explicit performatives would, therefore, be this:
typical utterances of explicit performatives of all kinds are direct
assertions which conversationally imply the performance of another
illocution; namely, the illocution named by the illocutionary verb occurring
in the sentence. It is this hypothesis which we have to explore next.

But, first, let me clarify the following point: Naturally, my rejection of
Bach & Harnish's analysis of those explicit performatives whose illocutionary
verb denotes a conventional illocution and my amendment just suggested
consisting in dropping tenet 3) go hand in hand with, or amount to, rejecting
Bach & Harnish's characterization of conventional illocutionary acts. But
although I disagree with Bach & Harnish's presentation of the notion of
conventional illocution, I do not want to deny that the so called
conventional illocutions constitute a special kind of (illocutionary) acts.
A very important thing to notice is that the term 'conventional illocutionary
act', as used by Bach & Harnish, is ambiguous: we have to distinguish between
a) the act of declaring that a certain "conventional" illocutionary act is
performed, and b) the act of performing a "conventional" (illocutionary)
act. These two different acts are often blurred or mistakenly assumed to be
just one and the same.

The first type of act is a declaration (i.e., an illocution whose
successful performance brings about the truth of its propositional
content)\textsuperscript{127} and it is not conventional in character. At least, it is not so if we abide by Bach & Harnish's thesis that conventional illocutionary acts are not communicative illocutionary acts. Declarations are perfectly legitimate communicative acts, as can be easily demonstrated by looking, first, at Bach & Harnish's definition of communicative acts and, second, to Searle & Vanderveken's description of declarations. Bach & Harnish (informally) characterize the notion of communicative illocution thus:

In our view, then, an act of linguistic communication is an act of expressing an attitude by means of saying something. What type of attitude is expressed determines the kind of illocutionary act being performed. (p. XV)\textsuperscript{128}

Obviously, Bach & Harnish themselves do not present any "attitude" typically and properly expressed by Declarations, since, first, they do not acknowledge the category of Declarations in their taxonomy of illocutionary acts and, second, they regard Declarations as Searle's own (inadequate) version of their Conventional illocutions,\textsuperscript{129} which, by hypothesis, are not Communicative in kind. But given Searle & Vanderveken's standard description of Declarations, it is immediately clear that there is no reason to deny that acts of declaring are acts in which a certain attitude is expressed. In

\textsuperscript{127} For a clarification of the notion of Declaration, cf. infra, sec. III.3.6.3.

\textsuperscript{128} The authors define the notion of "expressing an attitude" thus: "For S [the speaker] to express an attitude is for S to R-intend the hearer to take S's utterance as reason to think S has that attitude." (p. 15) (As used by the authors, 'R-intend' means "to have a reflexive intention". For a valuable discussion of this Gricean notion, cf., e.g., Recanati, op. cit., chap. 7.)

\textsuperscript{129} Cf. p. 293, n. 2.
fact, given Searle & Vanderveken's characterization of Declarations, it is quite easy to single out the particular attitude (or pair of attitudes) expressed in acts of Declaring. They themselves explicitly specify it:

A speaker who declares that P expresses simultaneously his desire to bring about the state of affairs represented by P and his belief that his utterance is bringing it about. (pp. 57-58. Emphasis mine.)

The second type of act -- that for which we reserve the label of 'conventional act' -- is not a declaration, and, I am not sure whether it should be considered an illocutionary act. If an illocutionary act at all, is what Recanati calls a non-content-conveying type of illocution; i.e., it is such that there is no proposition or state of affairs to which the speaker performing it refers. Consider for instance the case of excommunicating. The act of excommunicating is not content-conveying, because it lacks any propositional content. Unlike promises, requests, assertions, declarations, etc., an excommunication cannot be described as the excommunication that so and so. A promise is always a promise that a proposition (what is promised) will be the case. Similarly, a declaration is always a declaration that a proposition (what is declared) is the case by way of being so declared. But an excommunication (or a baptism, a resignation, an adjournment, etc.) is not an excommunication that something is the case or will be or has to be the case. There is no proposition that is excommunicated in an act of excommunication. Bach & harnish claim that conventional acts are not communicative is true provided that we understand the expression

130. For the notion of non-content-conveying illocutions as opposed to content-conveying illocutions, see Recanati, Op. cit., pp. 156-57.
'conventional act' as referring exclusively to this second (non-declarative) type of act.

Bach & Harnish's use of 'conventional illocution' betrays this confusion between the two kinds of act just distinguished, at least inasmuch as they point out that their conventional illocutionary acts are roughly the same kind of acts as Searle's acts of declaration. But since Searle's declarations are obviously content-conveying, it is not possible to interpret acts like excommunicating, etc., as cases of declarations. This does not mean that the act of uttering the sentence (Z):

(Z) I hereby excommunicate you.

does not count as a declaration. An utterance of (Z), if serious and otherwise adequate, will be both a declaration that I excommunicate and an excommunication. In fact, by the definition of declaration, if the utterance of (Z) does indeed count as a declaration that I excommunicate you, it must count as an excommunication as well. But the declaration and the excommunication, although one and the same event (token), are conceptually two different types of act.

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132. There is no doubt, and it is not controversial, that declarations have propositional content. Among many others, the following text is explicit enough: "In a declarative illocution the speaker makes the world match the propositional content simply by saying that the propositional content matches the world." S. & V., pp. 53-54.

133. Unfortunately, Searle himself writes very often, and quite misleadingly, as if those acts themselves were declarations.
What is left, then, of Bach & Harnish's distinction between Communicative and Conventional illocutions? Bach & Harnish are right in setting conventional illocutions apart from communicative illocutions, even if their use of 'conventional illocution' is ambiguous. Conventional acts (in our sense) are not communicative because they are not acts "of expressing an attitude by means of saying something". But in my opinion, there are two important, additional reasons why conventional illocutions differ from all other illocutions:

The first of these additional reasons is that the conditions of successful performance of conventional illocutionary acts are "more elaborate" or "more complex" than those of communicative illocutions. For a non-conventional illocutionary act to be successfully performed it is sufficient that the speaker possess the "right illocutionary intention"\(^{134}\) when uttering a sentence with the adequate illocutionary act potential.\(^{135}\) So, for instance, for a speaker of (X):

\[ (X) \text{Tigers live in Asia.} \]

to state that tigers live in Asia it is sufficient that, in uttering (X), he possess the intention to state that tigers live in Asia. In the case of conventional illocutions, however, it does not suffice to have the right illocutionary intention. In addition, it is necessary to observe the

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\(^{134}\) By 'right illocutionary intention' I mean, simply, an intention to perform an illocution which falls under the illocutionary act potential of the sentence uttered.

\(^{135}\) There is -- I believe -- only one exception to this general principle: declarations of performance of conventional acts. (cf. infra, p.162.)
relevant conventional rules and procedures, and to enjoy the relevant status of authority, etc. For instance, for a speaker of (Y):

(Y) I hereby baptize you John.

to carry out the intended baptism it is not enough that he possess the intention to thereby baptise the person referred to by 'you' with the name of 'John'. In addition, the speaker has to satisfy other requirements essential to the institution of baptizing: being a priest (or a minister, etc.), being accompanied by the appropriate type and number of witnesses, pour the required holy water at the right time on the person to be baptized, etc.

In short, the first additional difference between conventional and non-conventional illocutionary acts may, then, be adequately conveyed by the following statement:

(Statement 1) To perform both conventional and non-conventional illocutionary acts, it is necessary to possess the right illocutionary intention. And, given the utterance of the appropriate sentence, having the right illocutionary intention is also a sufficient condition for performing a non-conventional illocutionary act, but not for performing a conventional act.

The second additional reason why conventional illocutions differ from the majority of illocutions is that they are always performed indirectly: Once we acknowledge that there is a distinction between the act of declaring that I perform a conventional act and the act of performing such a conventional act, it becomes clear that, contrary to Bach & Harnish's claim, it is not the case that conventional illocutionary acts must be performed literally; moreover, it happens that, inasmuch as they are performed by uttering a sentence, conventional illocutions cannot be performed literally; more exactly, they cannot be performed directly. They are always performed indirectly. That
is, they are always performed by way of declaring that they are so performed. A serious utterance of (Z) is, given the appropriate circumstances, literally and directly a declaration that I excommunicate (its propositional content is always a value of the character of (Z) that I hereby excommunicate you). In addition, that utterance of (Z) is (and is intended to be) *eo ipso* an act of excommunication.

It is worth while noticing that the utterance of (Z) counts as a declaration of excommunication only if all the required conditions for excommunicating hold at the moment of utterance. Otherwise, the intended declaration will remain a failed attempt to declare someone excommunicated. For this reason, we have to assume that declarations of conventional illocutionary acts (declarations of excommunication, etc.) share with conventional illocutions the property that it is not sufficient for their successful performance to have the right illocutionary intentions. I, who am not a bishop, cannot declare that I excommunicate you simply by uttering (Z) and having the intention of declaring to excommunicate you. If my act of uttering (Z) were to be a successful declaration, its propositional content would have to become true "as a result of" my uttering (Z). But that is not the case. Since my uttering of (Z) does not count as an act of excommunication, it cannot count either as a declaration that I excommunicate, even if I have the intention to so declare it.

We have just argued that Bach & Harnish's overall picture of explicit performatives is incorrect. But our criticism has focussed on, and exclusively referred to, the authors' treatment of explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a so-called conventional illocution. So
far, it is only inasmuch as I think that their analysis of this kind of explicit performatives is incorrect that I have discarded their overall interpretation of explicit performatives. But my criticism has left intact Bach & Harnish's approach to the majority of explicit performatives; namely, those whose illocutionary verb denotes a so-called communicative (instead of a conventional) illocutionary act. It is for this kind of explicit performatives that Bach & Harnish propose their indirect speech act approach and their model of inferential recognition which we have reconstructed above as (Inf.c*). In our suggested amendment of the authors' treatment of explicit performatives denoting a "conventional" illocution, this indirect act approach would apply to all kinds of (utterances of) explicit performatives. It is time to examine whether this Bach & Harnish's interpretation is adequate or convincing enough. In my opinion, it is not. Let us see why.

I remarked earlier on that there are two difficulties undermining the authors' explanation of how an assertion of an explicit performative may constitute a means of performing an illocution of the kind denoted by the corresponding illocutionary verb; and that these difficulties concern the suggested process of inference, (Inf.c*), which the hearer is expected to go through in order to recognize the speaker's illocutionary intention. But I did not say then what these difficulties are. Now it is time to discuss them at length.

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137. Cf. supra, pp. 148-49.
i) **First difficulty:** The first difficulty is that \( (\text{Inf.c}^*) \) seems to be "artificially elaborate". If we turn again to our example (60), intuitively, one would say that the hearer "automatically" grasps that the "primary" illocutionary intention of the speaker, when uttering (60), is to make a request of the form \( R \). The "primary" requestive intention of the speaker is, in normal circumstances, immediately evident to the hearer. This problem is, in fact, one that affects, not only nor specifically Bach & Harnish's proposal, but, in general, every attempt to explain explicit performative utterances via indirect speech acts. Bach & Harnish explicitly acknowledge the existence of this difficulty\(^{138}\) and advance their own solution to it. What I find faulty in Bach & Harnish's proposal is precisely their alleged solution to the difficulty.

Bach & Harnish's solution to the problem consists in assimilating the indirect acts performed in uttering explicit performatives with a kind of indirect illocutions which they call "standardized illocutions".\(^{139}\) Bach & Harnish describe this kind of indirect illocutionary act thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[(70)] Can you pass me the salt?}.
\text{[(71)] You might consider dropping out.}
\text{[(72)] I must ask you to leave.}
\text{[(73)] I want to thank you for coming.}
\end{align*}
\]

Although each can be used literally, [(70)] as a question and the others as constatives, they are forms of sentences standardly used for acts of requesting, advising, demanding, and thanking,

\[138\text{ Cf. op. cit., p. 208.}\]
\[139\text{ Cf. op. cit., chap. 9.}\]
What makes these standardized illocutions interesting is that they are indirect illocutionary acts which do not seem to fit the pattern of inferential recognition, (Inf.a), that — in the authors' own view — is characteristic of indirect speech acts.\textsuperscript{140} Rather, standardized illocutionary acts like the request performed in an utterance of (70) are such that, in Bach & Harnish's words,

...the hearer can determine the speaker's illocutionary intent just as immediately as if a literal act were being performed. (p. 174)

That is, these standardized illocutions do not seem to be conversationally implicated by the performance of a corresponding direct, literal illocutionary act:

[In the case of standardized illocutions,] not only is the indirect illocutionary intent not inferred from the direct one, the direct one does not even enter into the determination of the indirect intent (or if it does, one is not aware of it). (p. 175)

The problem posed by standardized illocutions is, therefore, how to accommodate a) the fact that they have the property just described with b) the assumption that they are full-fledged indirect illocutionary acts.

The crucial step towards the solution of the puzzle is — according to the authors — to assume that "these standardized illocutions become standardized through use over time." (p. 193. Emphasis mine). That is:

Only by accumulating precedent for indirect use do such sentences [like (70)-(73)] come to be standardized[.] (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{140} Cf., supra, p. 138.
Once this is assumed, one has to acknowledge that -- despite appearances to the contrary -- the process of inference, (Inf.a), characteristic of "normal" cases of indirect speech acts (cases like, e.g., the act of asking you to stop stepping on my shoe by way of asserting (literally) that you are stepping on my shoe), not only can take place in cases involving sentences like (70)-(73), but in fact must have taken place countless times for the standardization phenomenon to have come into effect. Once this standardization comes into effect, however, the inferential process, (Inf.a), becomes "short-circuited":

Because [the use of sentences like (70)-(73)] is standardized, the process of inference spelled out in [Inf.a] is short-circuited: instead of having to rule out the literal intent as primary and infer S's indirect intent, H can identify the indirect intent without having to search for it. (pp. 173-4).

This way, the puzzle is solved -- or so the authors claim.

Now, Bach & Harnish argue that the case of explicit performatives is similar, in all relevant respects, to the case of sentences like (70)-(73). Hence, they have their answer ready when confronted with the problem that the inferential process (Inf.c) is "too artificially elaborate". They concede that (Inf.c) is artificially elaborate, but it is so -- they argue --

... because there is ample precedent for it. The performative practice short-circuits the steps of this inference pattern, both as intended by the speaker and as carried through by the hearer. ... The hearer's intended inference ... is compressed by precedent. The explicit performative formula is standardized for the indirect performance of the illocutionary act named by the

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141. I.e., the inferential process which, given an utterance of (60), the hearer is allegedly expected to go through in order to identify the speaker's illocutionary intent. Cf. supra, p. 147.
performative verb. (p. 208).

There are, of course, a number of very unclear points which the advocate of this line of explanation has to worry about. For instance, we are left totally in the dark with respect to the nature, psychological or otherwise, of the proposed "short-circuiting" mechanism.\textsuperscript{142} Also, are we supposed to believe that an actual, historical process of standardization has taken place through time, or has it to be regarded as a mere methodological device?

But be this as it may and leaving these internal difficulties aside, even if we were prepared to accept that Bach & Harnish's "standardization solution" works well with respect to the case of indirect acts like the request made in uttering (70), etc., it seems plain to me that this model of explanation cannot be exported or extended to the case of explicit performatives. Any plausibility which the appeal to a historical process of standardization may have with respect to cases like utterances of (70)-(73) vanishes when the cases in target are utterances of explicit performatives.

A fact which clearly supports my rejection of the "standardization" hypothesis for the case of explicit performatives is this: There is a crucial difference between sentences like (70) and explicit performatives. (73) may be uttered, on occasion, as a perfectly literal and direct question about the hearer's ability to pass the salt — for instance, as used by a physician who wants to check whether his patient, afflicted with arthritis, is getting better. But there is not such a possibility in the case of explicit performatives.

\textsuperscript{142} For critical remarks concerning this popular metaphor of the "short circuited mechanism of inference", see Lycan, op. cit., pp. 180-81.
performatives. An utterance of an explicit performative can never count only as an assertion \(^{143}\) that the act denoted by the illocutionary verb included in the sentence is taking place. If in uttering (74):

(74) I promise you to do it.

I assert that I promise you to do it, I have thereby promised you to do it.

Because (70) is such that it can be uttered with an exclusively literal or direct illocutionary intent, it is at least possible to hypothesize that the indirect requests usually performed in uttering (70) have become standard (and are immediately identifiable) as the result of a historical process. In other words, it is possible to suppose that this standard requestive interpretation of (70) "was preceded historically by a pattern of indirect departure from [its] basic literal one" \(^{144}\). But no such hypothesis is possible for the case of explicit performatives. The recognition, by the hearer, of the "primary", non literal illocutionary intent possessed by a (serious) utterer of (60) or of (74) is immediate, not because an alleged "force of habit" allows, or even compels, the hearer to short-circuit an otherwise longer process of inference. To put it differently, if the speaker succeeds in requesting when asserting (60) and in promising when asserting (74), it is not because there have been very many previous instances in which members of the speaker's and hearer's linguistic community have followed a

\[^{143}\text{Since we are reviewing Bach & Harnish's ideas, I adopt here their interpretation of the declarative mood as an indicator of Assertive force. So, the literal, direct utterance of an explicit performative must be an assertion.}\]

\[^{144}\text{Cf. p. 174.}\]
similar procedure of requesting and promising by way of asserting (60) and (74), respectively. Quite to the contrary, it seems fair to say that, even if the particular utterances of (60) and (74) considered were the first (or relatively early) instances in which (60) and (74) had been ever (seriously) uttered, the hearer would have no difficulty a) in identifying a request and a promise as the primary illocutions respectively intended by the utterer of (60) and (74); nor b) in identifying the request and the promise immediately, without any need to go through an elaborate process of inference governed by Gricean principles.

But Bach & Harnish may concede that what we have indicated in the last paragraph is true, and still defend their "short-circuiting" account of the phenomena a) and b) above. For instance, they may claim that, although it is not plausible to suppose that explicit performatives acquire, at a certain point in the history of their use, an illocutionary efficacy not previously attached to them, the fact remains that there is an inference to be made in order to pass from the recognition that the speaker's utterance of (60) counts as an assertion that he requests to the recognition that the speaker's assertion is true. The fact that competent users of English do not go through that inference when interpreting other speaker's utterances of explicit performatives like (60) would be evidence of the existence of this "standardized short-circuiting" mechanism. And this, regardless of whether explicit performatives have been ever used as mere direct assertions or not. But to this hypothetical reply of Bach & Harnish's we have to counter that the connection between the act directly performed in uttering an explicit performative like (60) and the truth of its propositional content is not one for whose recognition the interpreter -- in the absence of an alleged
inferential "short-circuit" -- needs to go through an elaborated Gricean process of inference. And therefore, that there is no need to assume the occurrence of a "short-circuit" affecting this inferential process in order to account for the immediacy of the interpreter's recognition of the truth of what is said by the speaker.

This, however, does not mean that the request and the promise of our examples are literal, direct acts. We have already seen that they are not literal: requests of form R do not fall under the illocutionary act potential of (60); and exactly the same considerations can be made with respect to promises performed in uttering (74). We can agree with Bach & Harnish that the request and the promise are indirect illocutionary acts; but disagree with them in the explanation of this phenomenon. As I shall contend later (in a moment), what accounts for the immediate recognition of the requestive and commissive intents of utterances of (60) and (74), respectively, is the particular type of illocutionary act literally and directly performed in those utterances. But this leads us to the second difficulty or inadequacy affecting Bach & Harnish's explanation of the indirection of illocutions performed in uttering explicit performatives.

ii) Second difficulty: The second difficulty concerns, again, the inferential scheme, (Inf.c*), proposed by Bach & Harnish to explain how the hearer recognises that the speaker's directly assertive utterance of an explicit performative counts also as an illocution of type f. The problem has to do with the manner in which (Inf.c*) depicts the relation between the direct assertion and the the truth of its propositional content.

Let us proceed, once more, by having a careful look at our favorite
instantiation of (Inf.c\#), (Inf.c); that is at the inferential process which
the hearer is expected to go through when confronted with an utterance of
(60). The first thing to notice is that, \textit{prima facie}, (Inf.c) does not seem
to follow the general inferential pattern of indirect speech act recognition,
(Inf.a), proposed by the authors themselves. This is quite remarkable --
to say the least --, given that Bach & Harnish notoriously contend that
(typical) utterances of explicit performatives constitute special cases of
indirect speech acts. If modeled after (Inf.a), (Inf.c) would have to
contain at least the following steps:

1) $S$ is stating $a$, that he is thereby requesting me to leave town
   Immediately.
1') If $S$ is merely stating $a$, he is violating the Conversational
   Maxims.
2) $S$ is respecting the Conversational Maxims.
3) $S$ is not (could not be) merely stating $a$.
4) The request, $r_1$, from $S$ to me, that I leave town immediately
   is connected in a way identifiable under the circumstances to the
   performance of the statement $a$, such that in performing $a$
   $S$ would be performing $r_1$.
5) $S$ is stating $a$ and thereby requesting $r_1$.

But certainly, one does not find these premises in (Inf.c). There is not
even any (explicit) reference to the speaker's presumed observance of the
conversational maxims in (Inf.c).

Upon a second, closer look, however, we realise that (Inf.c)'s departure
from the general pattern of indirect speech act recognition, (Inf.a), is only
apparent. The crucial clue leading to this conclusion is premise 5c) in
(Inf.c): "Presumably, $S$ is speaking the truth". As it stands (i.e., in the
context of (Inf.c)), premise 5c) strikes us as somewhat odd or inadequate

\[145. \text{Cf. supra, p. 138.}\]
because it seems too strong to be introduced as inferred from previous steps of (Inf.c). Why is the hearer to assume that the speaker of (60) is presumably saying the truth? Not just because the latter is asserting, since it is a characteristic of assertions that they may be true or false. In principle, a false assertion is as "legitimate" and successful as a true one. There is nothing in the act of asserting, taken in itself, that allows one to infer, from the fact that someone is asserting, that he is presumably saying something true (the speaker might be lying or simply mistaken). If it is not the act of asserting itself, it must be the content of the assertion which makes the hearer "presume" that the speaker is saying something true. But the proposition asserted in an utterance of (60) is a perfectly contingent proposition which, in principle, may as well be false. This problem of justifying premise 5c) disappears, however, once we drop the unwarranted presupposition that [Bach & Harnish hold that] the hearer relies only on 1c)-4c) in order to affirm 5c). What happens, of course is that Bach & Harnish do not claim that 5c) follows from 1c)-4c) alone. Rather, we must interpret them as claiming that the hearer is expected to obtain 5c) from 2c) together with the hidden or missing premise (pr), that the speaker is respecting the Conversational Maxims. Given 2c), 5c) follows from (pr) because, if 5c) is not the case, the hearer has to suppose that the speaker has violated either the first or the second Maxims of Quality. 147

146. Unless, of course, one assumes that the speaker is respecting the conversational maxims.

147. In Bach & Harnish's own formulation these two maxims of quality, as applied to the particular case of assertions, are: "1) The speaker attempts to make his [statement] true. 2) The speaker has adequate evidence for what he [states] (or assumes in [stating])." Cf. also Grice, "Logic and
Conveniently supplemented with premise (pr), (Inf.c) can be easily interpreted (reconstructed) as a straightforward instance of (Inf.a). To see this, one has only to make the following reflection: if the speaker of (60) is both i) stating that he is thereby requesting the hearer to leave town immediately [1a]) and ii) respecting the Conversational Maxims [2a]), then (one must presume that) the speaker cannot be merely stating [3a]), since that would make his statement blatantly false, which, in turn, would go flatly against the accepted assumption that he is respecting the Conversational Maxims. Finally, the propositional content of an assertion made in uttering (60) is such that, if the assertion is true, the speaker thereby manages to make a request of form R. This gives us the required "connection" between the assertion and "some other illocutionary act", alluded to in premise 4a). Therefore, since from 1a)-3a) we have determined (are entitled to presume) that the speaker's statement is true we (or rather, the hearer) can conclude [5a]) that the speaker, in stating (a) is thereby making the request r1.

Once we have so clarified the way in which (Inf.c) constitutes a particular case of (Inf.a), we are in a position to present the second difficulty undermining Bach & Harnish's "solution" to the problem of explicit performatives. Bach & Harnish's (reconstructed) explanation of how the hearer is intended and expected to reason when confronted with an utterance of (60) forces us to understand the relation between asserting the propositional content of (utterances of) explicit performatives and the truth of those asserted propositions in a much weaker sense than that which --

Conversation", p. 46.
intuitively -- seems to be the case. Under Bach & Harnish's explanation, the hearer does not have a better or more compelling reason to infer that the proposition \( a \), asserted by the speaker in uttering (60), is true other than the presumption that the speaker is observing the Conversational Maxims. So, the relation between asserting \( a \) and the truth of \( a \) is not different, in this case, from other, ordinary instances of asserting in which the sentence uttered is not an explicit performative. According to Bach & Harnish's view, the statement made in seriously uttering an explicit performative like (60) may or may not be true depending, among other things, on whether the speaker is respecting the Conversational Maxims or not.

It is this feature, or this consequence, of Bach & Harnish's explanation which makes it defective. There is a crucial point which the authors entirely fail to acknowledge. This crucial point is, simply, that (60) cannot be stated falsely. Or better, that if an utterance of (60) counts as a statement, the statement is true. And that is to say that by way of asserting the proposition \( a \), in uttering (60), one cannot but request.\(^{148}\)

\(^{148}\). What we indicate here for the particular case of utterances of (60) holds for the generality of explicit performatives, with the notable exception of those whose epp contains an illocutionary verb denoting a conventional illocution. Because of the "institutional" and "extra-linguistic" character of acts of this type, it is quite possible that the utterance of the corresponding explicit performative be serious and count as a successful assertion while the propositional content asserted is, nonetheless, false. For instance, an impulsive and overzealous religious person, deeply offended by what he takes to be the inordinately irreverent and blasphemous conduct of his interlocutor, may feel the sudden urgency to severly punish the offender. So, momentarily ignoring or forgetting, in the spur of the moment, that only the competent religious authority can perform excommunications, the speaker decides to excommunicate his interlocutor. Accordingly, he quite seriously and literally utters (Z):

(Z) I hereby excommunicate you.
Notice that to affirm that a statement performed in uttering (60) must be true does not mean that what is stated in uttering (60) is a necessary proposition. Naturally, the proposition expressed in an utterance of (60) is contingent and may very well be false. But the conditions under which this proposition is false are precisely the conditions under which an utterance of (60) does not count as an assertion. The proposition in question is false only if (60) is uttered "non-seriously" (e.g., when play-acting, or practising elocution., etc.).\textsuperscript{149} But non-serious utterances of sentences do not count as illocutions of any kind, since they violate what Bach & Harnish themselves have called "the communicative presumption";\textsuperscript{150} and, therefore, non-serious utterances of (60) do not count as assertions.

The point which Bach & Harnish overlook is, therefore, that if serious and literal utterances of explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb denotes a "communicative" illocution count as assertions, they count as true assertions; and, consequently, they count also as illocutions of the kind denoted by the corresponding illocutionary verb.

In this case, the speaker's utterance of (Z) counts (given the analysis of explicit performatives under consideration) as a quite successful though false assertion that the speaker thereby excommunicates his interlocutor. The speaker possess the right intention; namely the intention to excommunicate by way of asserting that he thereby excommunicates, but other crucial conditions for the performance of an excommunication are missing. Excommunicating, like baptizing, etc., requires something else besides seriously asserting that one is thereby performing the act (cf. supra, pp. 160-61).


\textsuperscript{150} For an explanation of this notion, cf. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 7. Davidson has also repeatedly emphasized that non-serious utterances of sentences do not count as illocutions of any kind. Cf. "Moods and Performances" and "Communication and Convention".

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But how can it be that perfectly contingent propositions of the form expressed by the general scheme
(S) I hereby f (that p)
become true just because they are asserted?

3.3.6.3 Recanati's analysis of explicit performatives

It is when trying to answer this question that suspicion starts to grow concerning the idea that the illocutionary force potential of explicit performatives is assertive. So far, we have assumed the standard view that the illocutionary force potential of declarative sentences is assertive and, therefore, we have proceeded -- following Bach & Harnish -- as if the literal act performed in (seriously) uttering an explicit performative were an assertion. But the extraordinary property of such alleged assertions (i.e., the fact that inasmuch as they are assertions they are true) should already put us on guard that this assumption may not be true. Let us simply abandon that assumption and entertain the possibility that serious and literal utterances of explicit performatives are not assertions. But if not assertions, what are they? The crucial question is this: What kind (if any) of illocutionary act is such that whenever it is (successfully) performed its propositional content is or becomes true? The answer is straightforward: Only Declarations have such a property. Searle & Vanderveken's authoritative characterization of declarations leaves no room for doubt in this respect. Consider, for instance, the following three very eloquent texts. The last one is particularly clear:

The illocutionary point of a declaration is to bring about changes in the world, so that the world matches the propositional

By definition, a declarative illocution is successful only if the speaker brings about the state of affairs represented by its propositional content... (p. 57)

All successful declarations have a true propositional content and in this respect declarations are peculiar among speech acts in that they are the only speech acts whose successful performance is by itself sufficient to bring about a word-world fit. In such cases, "saying makes it so". (Ibid.)

Precisely, it is this "peculiarity" of declarations which singles them out, among all types of illocutionary acts, as the kind of illocutions that can be directly performed when seriously uttering explicit performatives. Now, the fact that serious utterances of (many) explicit performatives are true just because of being seriously uttered should not strike us as being extraordinary or mysterious any more. Since the nature of declarations is such that (if successful) their propositional content is true, it follows that if the utterance, \( u \), of an explicit performative, \( s \), counts as a direct declaration whose propositional content is that the speaker is thereby (i.e., in uttering that very same sentence) performing a certain illocutionary act, \( A \), then \( u \) must count also as the (indirect) performance of \( A \).

In view of what we have said, it seems to me that the idea that serious utterances of explicit performatives are direct declarations is reasonably plausible. This is the view adopted by Recanati and by Searle & Vanderveken,\(^{151}\) and it is the one which I feel most comfortable with.\(^{152}\)

\(^{151}\) Recanati writes:

The speaker who says 'I order you to come' intends not to report a fact that is independent of his utterance but to create a fact by his utterance -- namely, the fact that he is ordering the
hearer to come. Consequently, the utterance has performative force, and specifically it has the force of a declaration. The speaker "declares" that he is performing the illocutionary act denoted by the performative verb. Because the declarative mood is illocutionarily neutral ..., there is no reason to deny that this act is performed directly. (op. cit., pp. 170-71. See, in general, secs. 41 and 47).

In turn, Searle & Vanderveken say this:

In this book we will try [an] approach according to which performative utterances are declarations whose propositional content is that the speaker performs the illocutionary act named by the performative verb. On this account, the illocutionary force of a performative sentence is always that of a declaration, and, then, derivatively, the utterance has the additional force named by the performative verb. (Op. cit., p. 3.)

152. It has been objected that an appeal to the notion of declaration when attempting to explain the peculiar illocutionary efficacy of explicit performatives is not very illuminating nor particularly helpful because it lacks any explanatory value in the context at issue. And, therefore, that to claim that my act of seriously uttering (s1) 'I hereby request you to leave' is a literal declaration that I request you to leave is just to redescribe the very fact that needs to be explained; namely, the fact that in saying (s1) I manage to request. To this objection I shall reply merely by indicating that if appealing to the notion of a declaration in the analysis of utterances of explicit performatives amounts to redescribing the facts, it amounts — at any rate — to a correct redescription of those facts. If we accept (as for the sake of the argument we do here) Searle's classification of illocutionary forces and try to determine under which type of force distinguished by Searle the direct act performed in uttering an explicit performative falls, we must conclude that the most suitable candidate for the job is the type of declarations. Of course, to acknowledge that the direct act performed in uttering an explicit performative is a declaration is not yet -- I agree with the objector here -- to explain how it is possible that utterances of explicit performatives count as declarations; i.e., in our example, how it is possible to perform a request by way of declaring that one so performs it.

Before trying to briefly address this problem, and in case someone is still uneasy with the notion of declaration (either because one does not accept Searle's classification of forces or for other reasons), let me indicate that my proposed analysis of explicit performatives as sentences whose propositional content is, schematically, 'my hereby f-ing that p', and my analysis of their utterances as indirect acts can be reformulated in terms of assertion; i.e. they can be reformulated by going back to the hypothesis that utterances of explicit performatives are direct assertions. This does not force us, however, to go back to Bach & Harnish's amended approach to the
problem of explicit performatives, for we would still retain two
characteristic features of our proposed analysis in terms of declarations: 1) The declarative mood would still be regarded as force-neutral. 2) Most importantly, the relation of indirection holding between the direct assertion and the act performed by way of so asserting would be one of what we call later "illocutionary entailment", and not one of conversational implicature (cf. infra., pp. 186 ff.) Nevertheless, in our text we shall consider only the hypothesis that the direct act performed in uttering an explicit permissive is a declaration.

Going back to the problem of how it is possible to perform an illocutionary act \( F \) by way of declaring that one is so performing it (or alternatively, by way of asserting that one is so performing it), I must admit that I do not have a clear idea of how to solve it. But this is a problem which nobody else, as far as I can tell, has successfully tackled. I shall merely suggest what seems to me to be the most natural answer: it is because the acts denoted by the illocutionary verbs occurring in explicit performatives are illocutionary acts, that utterances of explicit performatives can count as direct declarations. It is because the nature of the acts of requesting, promising, etc., is such that they can be performed, given the appropriate circumstances (i.e., given that the speaker has the "right illocutionary intention", if the illocution is not conventional; and given that the speaker has the "right illocutionary intention" plus something else, if the illocution is conventional), by uttering a certain sentence, that serious utterances of explicit performatives count as declarations. It is because I can promise to lend you my book by uttering the sentence \( (s_2) \) 'I'll lend you my book' that I can promise to lend you my book by declaring (asserting) that I so promise it. On the other hand, the utterance of the sentence \( (s_3) \) 'I hereby eat an apple' does not and cannot count as a declaration (cannot bring about the truth of its propositional content), because the act denoted by the verb occurring in \( (s_3) \) (the act of eating) is such that it cannot be performed by uttering the appropriate sentence, no matter how favorable the circumstances are.

However, as J. Higginbotham has pointed out to me in conversation, there is an objection to this line of answer. The objection is this: Consider the case of promises. Suppose that there is a foreign community whose members make promises but in which it is not possible to promise by saying that one promises. This would be a community in which it is not possible to promise by way of declaring (asserting) that one promises. If there were such a community, then, clearly, the fact that we can promise by declaring (asserting) that we promise could not be explained by appeal to the nature of the act of promising itself, since, by hypothesis, there is a community whose members manage to promise but cannot do so by declaring (asserting) it. My provisional (and, perhaps, not altogether adequate) answer to this would be simply to deny that there can be such a community. To the extent in which it is possible to promise, it should be possible to promise by declaring (asserting) that one promises. To suppose the contrary is to assume that the illocutionary efficacy of 'I promise ...' when uttered as part of an
Once we acknowledge that serious utterances of explicit performatives are direct declarations, three points become clear:

1) The acceptance of the thesis that serious utterances of explicit performatives are direct declarations makes it impossible to hold that the illocutionary force potential of sentences in the declarative mood is exclusively assertive. This is so, of course, unless we are prepared to drop the standard assumption that explicit performatives are declarative sentences, and contend — perhaps — that explicit performative sentences have a special, "complex" mood of their own. But I do not see any "independent" (i.e., non ad hoc) reason to favor such a move. ¹⁵³ There are at least three possible ways of consistently reinterpreting the illocutionary force potential of the declarative mood: a) Simply, to add the force proper to declarations to the range of forces falling under the illocutionary force potential of declarative sentences. This way, both, assertions and declarations alike, would be "literal" (although not explicit) illocutions, explicit performative in our community is a matter of convention; i.e., that there is a convention according to which saying the words 'I promise ...' counts as promising. But I don't think that the commissive illocutionary efficacy of 'I promise' is a matter of convention. The speaker who seriously utters 'I promise' declares (asserts) that he promises and it is inasmuch as he succeeds in performing that declaration (assertion) that he manages to promise. But there is nothing conventional in the act of promising by declaring (asserting) that one promises. If it were in virtue of a convention that the act of (declaring) asserting that one promises counts as a promise, then it would be possible to imagine a community whose members promised by way of performing a non-assertive (non-Declarative) illocution; i.e., a community in which people promised by way of, say, asking whether one promises or by way of requesting someone else to promise. In the imagined community, the convention would be that asking whether one promises count as promising, or that requesting someone else to promise count as promising. But, again, I do not believe that there could be a community like that.

¹⁵³. Cf. supra, pp. 80 ff.
if performed in uttering the adequate declarative sentence. b) To regard the declarative mood as force neutral. c) To interpret the declarative mood, not as totally force neutral, but as having a very wide force potential, in such a way that only Directive forces would remain beyond its scope.

Of these three possibilities, the first, a), should be immediately discarded as blatantly ad hoc. b) and c) are both reasonably plausible and it is not easy to decide which one to endorse. Recanati chooses b), but I do not find his position entirely convincing. If, as Recanati contends, b) is true, then there is no kind of illocutionary act which cannot be directly performed in uttering declarative sentences. This contrasts sharply with the standard picture resulting from the traditional view on the declarative mood as an indicator of assertive force. According to that picture, every non-assertive illocation performed in uttering a declarative sentence is an indirect illocution performed by way of performing a direct assertion.

Promises made in uttering (75):

(75) I'll help you with your homework.

complaints made in uttering (76):

(76) I hate this weather.

and orders issued in uttering (77):

(77) You'll clean the latrines tomorrow.

would be all indirect illocutions. This has the somewhat odd consequence that very many kinds of illocutionary acts (in fact, all but assertives and

directives) cannot be performed directly in English (or, for that matter, in many other natural languages), since English does not have syntactic moods to specifically indicate those types of force. The view, formulated in b) and favored by Recanati, that declarative sentences are force neutral avoids that consequence but, in turn, commits us to affirming that orders and, in general, directives made in uttering declarative sentences are direct illocutions, not differing, in this respect, from directives made in uttering imperative (and interrogative) sentences. Now we have that, e.g., orders given in uttering (77) are as direct as those issued in uttering (78):

(78) Clean the latrines tomorrow!

And this seems, again, somehow bizarre.

Position c), however, while avoiding the somewhat odd consequence attached to the traditional view, does not commit one to the suspicious (dubious) position which follows from b). In a sense, therefore, c) inherits the best of the two former, mutually contrary views without inheriting their respective drawbacks. Nevertheless, and despite the reservation just signaled, I shall tentatively follow here Recanati's line of favoring solution b). I proceed in "his way because, prima facie, b) is methodologically more simple than c) and, moreover, it seems to be more promising for the purposes of constructing a "semantically tractable" theory of mood. 155

With respect to the analysis of utterances of explicit performatives, a

155. Cf. e.g., Davidson, "Moods and Performances".
very important consequence of interpreting the declarative mood as force neutral is this: We indicated earlier that, in general, indirect speech acts may be indirect because of their illocutionary force or because of their propositional content. But there is only one source of indirectness for illocutionary acts performed in uttering explicit performatives. The "indirect character" of an illocutionary act, A, "primarily" performed in uttering an explicit performative, does not (and cannot) stem from a disparity between the illocutionary force potential of the sentence and the actual illocutionary force of A, but from a disparity between the propositional content potential of the sentence and the propositional content of A. Thus, a request of form R, rI, performed in uttering (60), is indirect, not because its requestive force does not fall under the scope of (60)'s declarative mood (since, by hypothesis, the declarative mood is force neutral), but because rI's propositional content, q: that you will leave town immediately, does not fall under the propositional content potential of (60), the character p*: that I hereby request you to leave town immediately. It is this difference between q and the propositional content licensed by p* which gives rI its indirect status.

2) The thesis that serious utterances of explicit performatives are direct declarations permits a unified account of the semantics and the illocutionary efficacy of both explicit performatives whose verb denotes a non-conventional illocution and of explicit performatives whose verb denotes a conventional illocution. In other words, according to our view, the difference between non-conventional and conventional illocutions does not manifest itself or corresponds with a difference in the semantic structure of explicit performatives.
One of the crucial distinctions between the two kinds of illocutions was this: in order to successfully perform a non-conventional illocutionary act $A$, all that is required, given the utterance of a certain sentence $s$ whose illocutionary act potential comprises $A$, is that the speaker possess the "right illocutionary intention". In the case of the successful performance of conventional illocutionary acts, something else, besides the speaker's possession of the right intention, is required. But this extra condition for the performance of conventional illocutionary acts must have already been fulfilled when the utterance of an explicit performative like (X):

(X) I hereby excommunicate you.

counts as a direct declaration. If that utterance does indeed count as a direct declaration then, due to the nature of declarations and given its propositional content (that I hereby excommunicate you), it must count also as an act of excommunication (indirect illocutionary act performed in the utterance of (X)). This pattern of explanation is exactly the same as the one adopted for the case of utterances of explicit performatives denoting non-conventional illocutionary acts: given that the direct act performed in the utterances of (Y):

(Y) I hereby promise that I'll do it.

is a declaration whose propositional content is that I hereby promise that I shall do it, then the speaker has managed to perform (in addition) the promise that he will do it (indirect act performed in the utterance of (Y)). What is different between the cases of uttering (X) and (Y) is the set of general conditions which have to be fulfilled in order for the utterance to count as a successful declaration. In the case of (X), having the right
illocutionary intention ¹⁵⁶ is not enough; whereas in the case of (Y) it is.

3) The acceptance of the view that utterances of explicit performatives count as direct declarations allows for, an leads straightforwardly to a non-Gricean explanation of the connection between the two illocutionary acts involved in the utterance of explicit performatives. As we saw, it is essential to the Gricean explanation that, in the process of inferential reasoning, (Inf.a), which the hearer is supposed to carry through in order to conclude that the speaker is performing an "extra" act, besides the direct assertion, the hearer assume (and be expected to assume) that the speaker is respecting the Conversational Maxims. It is this basic premise which, in Bach & Harnish's account, eventually leads the hearer to conclude that the speaker of an explicit performative is performing an indirect illocutionary act: since the hearer assumes that the speaker is respecting the conversational maxims, the hearer cannot attribute to the speaker the intention of just asserting, because that would amount to assuming that the speaker is violating the conversational maxims. ¹⁵⁷

But this pattern of explanation is not required at all if one accepts, following Recanati, that the direct act by way of which the speaker of an explicit performative performs another indirect illocutionary act is a declaration. The phenomenon of indirectness which characterizes the utterance of an explicit performative is now explained -- as I have already

¹⁵⁶. I.e., the intention of making it the case by way of uttering (X) that the speaker excommunicates the hearer.

indicated — by 1) the nature of the illocutionary act of declaring (i.e.,
the fact that declarations are such that, if successful, they bring about the
truth of their propositional content), together with 2) the particular
propositional content proper of declarations directly performed in uttering
an explicit performative. Given the nature of declarations, since the direct
declaration, A, performed in seriously uttering an explicit performative is
always a declaration that a certain other illocution, B, is thereby being
performed, the very same performance of A constitutes, or brings about, the
performance of B. Now, the relation between the two acts, A and B, cannot
(should not) be understood as a relation of conversational implicature,
because the speaker who performs a direct declaration in the utterance of an
explicit performative does not violate any conversational maxim. Recanati
proposes, instead, to interpret this relation as a relation of "illocutionary
entailment":

The indirect act is entailed by the direct act quite independent
of any assumption that the speaker has respected a conversational
maxim (of whatever sort). (p. 133)

Also, and less succinctly:

[O]nce it is established what act is directly performed, the
indirect act can be inferred without any need to bring in, as an
extra premise, the assumption that the speaker is adhering to the
conversational maxims. If the speaker declares that he is
ordering (or, to be more precise, that he is ordering by means of
the present utterance), then, automatically, he is ordering; if
he declares that he is claiming that P, then he is claiming that
P. Rather than being conversationally implicated, the indirect
act is "entailed" by the direct act of self-referential
declaration. (p. 175. Emphasis mine.)

Of course, the crucial point now is how to understand the notion of
"illocutionary entailment". Recanati does not offer any clarification of
this notion. He gives just a purely negative characterization of it: he
emphasizes that the relation of illocutionary entailment is not a relation of conversational implicature.

Despite Recanati's obscurity concerning the notion of "illocutionary entailment", we can easily obtain a good grasp of this concept once we avail ourselves of Searle & Vanderveken's notion of "strong illocutionary commitment". I propose to interpret Recanati's concept of "illocutionary entailment" as a specification of Searle & Vanderveken's notion of "strong illocutionary commitment". Searle & Vanderveken define the relation of strong illocutionary commitment thus:

An illocutionary act \( A_1 \) strongly commits the speaker to an illocutionary act \( A_2 \) ... iff it is not possible to perform the first without thereby performing the second. (Op. cit., p. 78)

The relation of strong illocutionary commitment is, as defined above, a triadic relation which holds among a speaker and two illocutionary acts. We may regard Recanati's illocutionary entailment as a dyadic relation holding between any two illocutionary acts which are related by the relation of strong illocutionary commitment. Informally, the relation of illocutionary entailment is just the relation (between two illocutionary acts) which results from the relation of strong illocutionary commitment if and when we omit (drop) every reference to the speaker. Therefore, we can straightforwardly define illocutionary entailment in terms of strong illocutionary entailment:

158. Cf. also, pp. 23, 25 and 175.
An illocutionary act, A, entails another, B, iff A strongly commits the speaker to B.

But, why call a relation between illocutions a relation of entailment? A quick (but, I think, essentially sound) answer may be this: "By analogy with respect to the notion of propositional entailment". The standard notion of entailment is a relation between propositions: informally, a proposition q is entailed by another p, if and only if it is not possible that p be true and q be untrue. Analogously, if our definition of illocutionary entailment is correct, an illocution entails another if and only if it is not possible to perform the former without performing the latter. To further clarify the sense in which the two entailment relations are analogous, we might exploit Recanati's metaphorical use of the term 'automatically' in the text above: just as in the case of illocutionary entailment, "if the speaker declares that he is ordering, then, automatically, he is ordering"; analogously, in the case of propositional entailment we may say that, if the (complex) proposition that all numbers are abstract objects and three is a number is true, then, automatically, the proposition that three is an abstract object is true.

Once we interpret the notion of illocutionary entailment in the way just proposed, it becomes evident that this notion "fits" the case of explicit performatives perfectly well: The connection linking the two acts which -- we have argued -- are involved (or are performed) in serious utterances of explicit performatives is the relation of illocutionary entailment. My declaration that I hereby request you to leave town immediately, literally performed in uttering (60), entails the (non-literal but "primarily intended") request of form R that you leave town immediately; and this is so, because, or in the sense that, it is not possible to perform the declaration
without thereby performing the request. 159

We have found, for the case of explicit performative utterances, a precise sense in which the speaker (non-literally) performs an illocutionary act by way of (literally) performing another. It is inasmuch as the literal illocution performed in uttering an explicit performative entails another non-literal illocution, that we can affirm that this second illocution is performed by way of performing the first. The "by way of" relation characterizing indirect illocutionary acts in general takes, in this case, the concrete form of the relation of illocutionary entailment.

The interpretation of explicit performative utterances which I -- following Recanati and Searle & Vanderveken -- have put forward here, allows us to accommodate two crucial properties of utterances of sentences of this kind. These properties are: First, the property which -- we saw -- distinguishes utterances of explicit performatives from utterances of other

159. Indeed, Searle & Vanderveken themselves explicitly appeal to their parallel notion of strong illocutionary commitment when "explaining" the characteristic illocutionary efficacy of serious utterances of explicit performatives. They write:

A speaker who declares that he is performing an illocutionary act is committed to performing that illocutionary act. This is why successful utterances of [explicit] performative sentences, which express declarations of performance of illocutionary acts, constitute performance of those acts. (p. 175. Emphasis mine.)

Although the authors choose here a weak formulation of their claim; i.e., although they talk about the relation of "commitment", instead of that of "strong commitment", it is clear that their contention is true too (and most interestingly so) if formulated in terms of "strong commitment". (Cf. ibid., pp. 23-25.)

sentences normally used to perform indirect speech acts, such as (70)

(70) Can you pass me the salt?,

etc.; namely, the fact that utterances of explicit performatives can never count as direct, literal illocutionary acts only, and, therefore, that they always count, in addition, as another, indirect (non-literal) illocutionary act. Second, the property which utterances of explicit performatives share with other cases of indirect speech acts, such as those standardly performed in uttering sentences like (70); namely, the fact that the hearer recognizes the non-literal, "primarily intended" illocution just as immediately or, so to speak, as automatically as if the act in question were being performed literally.¹⁶¹

We saw that Bach & Harnish's hypothesis of the standardization phenomenon, although consistent with the second property of explicit performative utterances just mentioned, is not consistent with the first. This was, in effect, one of the reasons why we abandoned Bach & Harnish's "solution" to the problem of explicit performatives. By contrast, our view that the literal illocution performed in uttering an explicit performative is a declaration whose propositional content is that a certain illocution act, A, is thereby performed, and which entails that very same illocution A, is consistent with the two properties mentioned above.

With respect to the first property, it is easy to see that it does not pose any problem to our analysis. Quite the contrary, the mere nature of

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¹⁶¹. Cf. supra, p. 164.
declarations, as characterized above (i.e., the fact that, if successful, their propositional content is true), taken together with the peculiar propositional content (potential) of explicit performatives, suffices to "explain" why a serious utterance of an explicit performative cannot count just as a literal illocution, but has to be, also and eo ipso, an illocution of the type denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence. This very same point, that our view on explicit performatives is consistent with the first of the properties at issue, can be made also in a slightly different manner: simply, one just needs to recall that -- in our analysis -- the two illocutions involved in the serious utterance of an explicit performative are connected by the relation of illocutionary entailment. If my declaration, \( B \), that I hereby request you to leave town immediately entails my request, \( r_1 \), that you leave town immediately; i.e., if it is not possible to perform \( B \) without thereby performing \( r_1 \), then, it trivially follows that my utterance of (60), 'I hereby request you to leave town immediately', can never count as the literal declaration \( B \) only. Quite to the contrary, if it counts as the declaration \( B \) at all, then it must also count as the request \( r_1 \). Our view, therefore, not only is consistent with the first property, but also predicts it.

With respect to the second property, we can also show that our analysis is consistent with it. This time, however, I shall not appeal to the notion of illocutionary entailment. I could only make profitable use of the notion of illocutionary entailment here if I had found a definite, affirmative answer to the two following questions: First, given two illocutionary acts, \( A \) and \( B \), such that \( A \) entails \( B \), does the intention to perform \( A \) have always (necessarily) to be accompanied by the intention to perform \( B \)? In other
words, is it the case that, if it is not possible to perform A without thereby performing B, then it is not possible either to intend to perform A without having the intention to perform B? And, second, supposing that we answer the first question affirmatively, does the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention to perform A warrant the hearer's (immediate) recognition of the speaker's intention to perform B? The first question must be answered affirmatively, since a necessary condition to perform an illocutionary act is, obviously, to have the intention to perform it.162 But things are not so clear with the second question. No doubt, this second question receives also an affirmative answer when the illocutions considered are the two performed in the (serious) utterance of an explicit performative (the speaker's declaration that he thereby f's and the speaker's f-ing). But I am not sure that this is the case, in general, for all pairs of illocutionary acts related by the relation of illocutionary entailment.

Consequently, I shall not (directly) appeal to the fact that the act non-literally performed in an utterance of an explicit performative is entailed by the corresponding literal declaration, in my attempt to show that our analysis of explicit performatives is consistent with the second property of explicit performatives at issue. Instead, I shall simply rely, once again, on the nature of declarations and in the peculiar propositional content possessed by literal utterances of explicit performatives.

If the hearer manages to recognize that the speaker's illocutionary

162. There might be exceptions to this "condition" of illocutionary act performance. Cf. infra, p. 203, n. 171.
intention, in uttering sentence $s$, is to declare that $p$, then the hearer must thereby immediately recognize the speaker's intention that his utterance of $s$ count as the bringing about of the truth of $p$. This is trivially so because what we have presented here as two intentions is, in fact, one and the same intention. By the definition of the act of declaring, the speaker's illocutionary intention that his utterance count as the declaration that $p$ is just his intention that his utterance count as the bringing about of the truth of $p$. Now, in the case of declarations performed in uttering explicit performative sentences, the propositional content, $p$, of the declaration is that the speaker is thereby (i.e., by means of the utterance he is presently uttering) performing an illocutionary act $A$. Therefore, in this case, the speaker's illocutionary intention that his utterance count as the declaration that $p$ is no other than the speaker's intention that his utterance count as the performance of the illocutionary act $A$. And this means, by straightforward instantiation, that, if the hearer manages to recognize that the speaker's illocutionary intention, in uttering an explicit performative $s$, is to declare that he is thereby performing an illocutionary act $A$, then the hearer must thereby immediately recognize the speaker's intention that his utterance count as the performance of the illocutionary act $A$.

Once, and to the extent in which, the hearer recognizes that the speaker of an explicit performative is performing a declaration, the hearer must immediately recognize that the speaker is performing, also and thereby, the illocutionary act declared to be performed. This squares quite well with what we have called the second property of utterances of explicit performatives.
We have just seen that the view on explicit performative utterances which I -- following Recanati and Searle & Vanderveken -- support here is consistent with two salient properties of this kind of utterances. This is, in itself, an improvement with respect to Bach & Harnish's theory, since, as we saw, their theory seems to be at odds with the first property of explicit performative utterances here considered. But there is also another reason to prefer our view over Bach & Harnish's. This reason is that -- in contradistinction to Bach & Harnish's -- our favored conception permits a unified account of (utterances of) explicit performatives of all kinds, no matter whether the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence denotes a "conventional" or a "communicative" illocutionary act. According to our analysis, (typical) utterances of explicit performatives of all kinds are literal declarations that a certain other illocutionary act, A, is thereby being performed. The success of the declaration brings about the performance of the illocution A, which is performed, not literally nor as a result of being conversationally implied by the corresponding declaration, but inasmuch as it is illocutionarily entailed by the declaration. Our (Recanati's and Searle & Vanderveken's) view is to be preferred not only over Bach & Harnish's actual theory, according to which only utterances of explicit performatives denoting "communicative" illocutionary acts are understood as cases of indirect speech acts. Our view is also better off than the "amended" version of Bach & Harnish's conception, which we suggested earlier on; namely, the conception that (typical) utterances of explicit performatives of all kinds are direct assertions which conversationally imply the illocution named by the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence. We have already seen how this view (whether restricted to a particular kind of explicit performative
utterances or not) conflicts with the conspicuous property of explicit performative utterances that they can never count as literal, direct illocutionary acts only. After all, Bach & Harnish are right when they deny that utterances of explicit performatives denoting "conventional" illocutions achieve their illocutionary efficacy by way of conversational implicature. But Bach & Harnish fail to realise that this is equally true of utterances of explicit performatives of any kind; or, to put it more cautiously, they fail to realise that, to the extent in which this is true of utterances of explicit performatives denoting "conventional" illocutions, it is also true of utterances of explicit performatives of any other kind.

At this point we are clearly in a position to answer the question which motivated our lengthy discussion of Bach & Harnish's, Recanati's and Searle & Vanderveken's views on explicit performatives. The question was: Is there a good reason to suppose that in the utterance of (60) as a request there is, in addition, another (literal) illocutionary act performed, by way of which the request of form R in question is performed? In general, is there a good reason to suppose that in the utterance of an explicit performative as an illocutionary act of the kind denoted by the corresponding illocutionary verb there is, in addition, another (literal) illocutionary act, by way of which the first illocutionary act is performed? Our exploration of Recanati's and Searle & Vanderveken's ideas provides -- I believe -- quite a good reason to so suppose it. We have argued that it is perfectly plausible to assume that the literal illocution performed in

163. Cf. supra, p. 146.
(serious) utterances of explicit performatives is a declaration. And that the "by way of" relation connecting the non-literal, "primarily intended" illocution to the corresponding literal declaration is the relation of illocutionary entailment.

Shall we say, then, that the illocutionary acts "primarily intended" in uttering explicit performatives, such as the request of form R performed in uttering (60), are indirect speech acts? If we recall, we signaled three main characteristics of indirect speech acts: 1) they are non-literal; 2) they are "primarily intended" (i.e., they are the illocutionary acts for whose sake the corresponding literal (direct) illocutionary act is performed); and 3) they are performed by way of performing another, literal illocutionary act. A request of form R performed in an utterance of (60) possesses those three characteristic properties and, therefore, to the extent in which these three properties suffice to define the notion of indirect act, we are entitled to conclude that our request of form R (and, in general, the non-literal illocution performed in typical utterances of explicit performatives) is indeed an indirect illocutionary act.

However, many authors think that indirect illocutionary acts are not sufficiently characterised by the three properties just mentioned. They would object that our third characteristic is too broad. They would restrict the way in which the third characteristic is to be understood. According to them, the "by way of" relation has to be interpreted as conversational implicature. Only if the non-literal and "primarily intended" act is

164. Cf. supra, p. 132.
performed by way of being conversationally implied by another illocution are we before a case of indirect illocutionary act. This is the position held by Bach & Harnish, and -- it seems -- it is also the position accepted by Searle & Vanderveken. 165 If we understand indirect illocutionary acts in this "narrow" sense, then our request of form R performed in uttering (60), although non-literal, "primarily intended" and performed by way of another illocutionary act, is not indirect, since -- we have argued -- it is not conversationally implied by the corresponding literal illocution. If only acts conversationally implied by another qualify (if the circumstances are otherwise adequate) as indirect acts, then, clearly, our request of form R is not an indirect act. But if we are more liberal about the condition which we impose on the "by way of" relation connecting indirect and direct speech acts; i.e., if we are prepared to distinguish different possible ways of satisfying this relation, then there is no reason to deny that our request of form R is an indirect illocutionary act. It turns out, then, that the question whether the non-literal, "primarily intended" illocutionary acts performed in typical utterances of explicit performatives are indirect or not is terminological. The answer depends on whether we decide to reserve the label 'indirect act' for cases of conversational implicature only, or whether we decide -- instead -- to use the expression to refer to cases of illocutionary entailment as well. Bach & Harnish and Searle & Vanderveken choose the first line of action. Recanati adopts the second, and, for reasons of convenience, I proceed here in the same way. At any rate, I do not think that this matters much, provided that we clearly distinguish -- as

165. Cf. op. cit., p. 25.
Recanati and Searle & Vanderveken, but not Bach & Harnish, do -- between two different cases of non-literal acts (whether they are both cases of indirection or not). One, the case of what in the literature on speech acts appear as paradigmatic examples of indirect illocutionary acts; e.g., those like my act of requesting the hearer to stop stepping on my shoe, which is performed by way of (conversationally implied by) my literal assertion that the hearer is stepping on my shoe. Another, the case constituted by, at least, the illocutions "primarily intended" by the speaker in a typical utterance of an explicit performative sentence, which are performed by way of (entailed by) the literal performance of another illocutionary act.

Putting aside the terminological dispute, what is really important and valuable in Recanati's claim that utterances of explicit performatives constitute cases of indirect speech act is the double point: 1) that serious utterances of explicit performatives give rise to (involve) two illocutionary acts, one literal and the other non-literal; and 2) that the relation between these two acts is one of illocutionary entailment, not of conversational implicature.166

3.3.6.4 Epp's are not indicators of force

Once we acknowledge that the "primarily intended" illocution performed in a typical utterance of an explicit performative is indirect (in my and

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166. Of course, these two tenets are held by Searle & Vanderveken also. And it is because Recanati and Searle & Vanderveken agree on this matter that we have presented here their respective analysis of explicit performative utterances as being practically identical.
Recanati's sense of the term), we are in a position to defend, against Searle's early view and the view of many others, that epp's are indicators of propositional content; that is, that the semantic structure of explicit performative sentences is of the form (iii*):

(iii*) D + (my hereby f-ing (that p)),

where 'D' refers to the force potential proper of declarative sentences, 167 'f' ranges over illocutionary forces, and 'p' ranges over propositions. If we recall, there was a serious obstacle for the adoption of this thesis: 168 How is it possible that explicit performative sentences, whose semantic structure is of the form described in (iii*), typically count, when seriously uttered, as illocutions of the type denoted by the illocutionary verb, f? Equipped with our interpretation of typical utterances of explicit performatives as cases of indirect speech acts, we can straightforwardly answer this question: Simply — and to repeat —, there are two illocutionary acts performed when (seriously) uttering an explicit performative: One — the declaration that the speaker is thereby f-ing —, literal and directly performed. The other — the speaker's f-ing (the act "for whose sake" the declaration is made) —, non-literal and performed indirectly; i.e., entailed by the speaker's declaration.

When we first approached the issue of explicit performatives, we found that there seemed to be good evidence both, in favor of analysing epp's as

167. Since, in our view, declarative sentences are neutral with respect to force, we shall stipulate that the illocutionary force potential referred to by 'D' is the (or a) "neutral force potential".

indicators of propositional content potential, and in favor of analysing them as indicators of illocutionary force potential. 169  A materially adequate theory of explicit performatives must, therefore, (convincingly) accomodate these apparently contradictory data. It was precisely Searle's failure to do so in Speech Acts which prompted our rejection of his analysis of epp's as indicators of force potential. Is our interpretation of epp's as indicators of propositional content potential and of explicit performative utterances as indirect speech acts better off, in this respect, than Searle's early position? Of course, for us, the problem is just the opposite of Searle's: we have to find a way to accommodate the hostile evidence in favor of analysing epp's as indicators of force potential. As we saw, there were two key points favoring such an analysis. 170 Of these two points, the first and most important (i.e., the fact that a typical utterance of an explicit sentence actually serves to perform the illocutionary act denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence) has already been taken care of. Our answer -- which we have just given in the preceding paragraph -- to the closely connected question of how it is possible that explicit performatives typically count, when seriously uttered, as illocutions of the type denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in them constitutes, in itself, a sufficient explanation of the fact under consideration. This fact is perfectly compatible with the thesis that epp's are indicators of propositional content if one is prepared to accept -- as we do -- that the illocution denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence is

169. Cf. supra, pp. 105-110.

performed indirectly (i.e., that it is illocutionarily entailed by the
speaker's corresponding literal declaration).

With respect to the second point, it turns out -- upon closer examination
-- that it does not really constitute good evidence in support of analysing
epp's as indicators of force potential. The second point was based in the
fact that if someone utters (54):
(54) That's true.

as a reply to somebody else's utterance of, e.g., (51):
(51) I state that snow is white.

the speaker of (54) is typically and correctly understood as referring by
'That' to the proposition, p, that snow is white, and not to the proposition,
q, that the utterer of (51) states that snow is white. This would allegedly
show that 'I state that', in (51), is a formula void of propositional
content; i.e., that it contributes nothing to the fixation of the
propositional content of utterances of (51); and, therefore, that it
functions as an indicator of illocutionary force potential. But notice that
a parallel phenomenon occurs in contexts in which this explanation is not
available. Consider sentences like, e.g., (79)-(82):

(79) I believe that snow is white.
(80) My opinion is that (In my opinion,) snow is white.
(81) There's no doubt that snow is white.
(82) Nobody will(would) deny that snow is white.

Similarly to the case involving (51), one may respond to utterances of any of
these sentences, (79)-(82), by saying (54), 'That's true'. And, again like
in the case involving (51), we would interpret the utterer of (54) as
referring by 'That' to the proposition p, that snow is white, not,
respectively, to the more complex propositions: \( r \), that the speaker of (79) believes that \( p \); \( s \), that the opinion of the speaker of (80) is that \( p \); \( t \), that there is no doubt that \( p \); or \( u \), that nobody will deny that \( p \). But, of course, now we do not conclude that the "prefixes" 'I believe that', 'My opinion is that', 'There's no doubt that' and 'Nobody will deny that' in sentences (79)-(82) are indicators of force potential. But, if they are not indicators of force, unless we suppose that they have no semantic function at all (i.e., unless we suppose that the logical form of (79)-(82) is exactly the same as that of (55): 'Snow is white'), they must be indicators of propositional content.

As a matter of fact, the "indirect act" hypothesis, which we have adopted for the case of utterances of explicit performative sentences like (51), works equally well with respect to the case of utterances of (79)-(82). We may regard a serious, typical utterance of (79) as a direct, literal assertion, \( A \), whose propositional content is the proposition \( r \), that the speaker believes that snow is white. By performing \( A \), the speaker thereby manages to perform a non-literal but fully intended assertion, \( B \), whose propositional content is the proposition \( p \), that snow is white. In other words, the speaker of (79) performs \( B \) by way of performing \( A \), and his performance of \( A \) is intended as an "instrument" for, or as a means to, achieving the performance of \( B \). And the same holds, mutatis mutandis, of utterances of (80)-(82). Now, of course, the question is: What is the nature of the "by way of" relation linking the two acts \( A \) and \( B \)? That is, what kind of indirection is here at work? Is it a relation of illocutionary entailment or of conversational implicature? I think it is a case of conversational implicature. This sets utterances of (79)-(82) apart from utterances of
explicit performatives. To focus on (79), if the relation between A and B were one of illocutionary entailment, then, by our definition of this notion, it would not be possible to assert A without thereby asserting B. But I think that this is not true. I think that there are occasions in which it is possible to assert that one believes that p without thereby asserting that p. I base my opinion on the widely acknowledged assumption that a necessary condition to perform an illocutionary act is to have the intention to perform it. I think there are circumstances in which one may (intend to) assert that one believes that p without having any intention of thereby asserting that p. Consider, for instance, the case in which (79) is uttered by a student in response to his teacher's asking the question Q1: "Who believes that snow is white?". Or, to make the example clearer, suppose that the question is about a belief in something regarded as extremely obvious both by the speaker and his interlocutor. Suppose, e.g., that a psychiatrist is treating several patients afflicted with a temporal disfunction of their brains, caused by injury, whose most conspicuous effect is the loss or disruption of arithmetic skills. The psychiatrist, who wants to test the improvement (or lack thereof) made by his patients so far, get them together in his office and starts his test by asking them Q2: "Who believes that two

171. Slips of the tongue constitute, probably, a counterexample to this assumption: If, by a slip of the tongue, someone utters the sentence 'Most oriental people are good at mathematical skills', when what she wants to assert is that most oriental pupils are good at mathematical skills, she, despite her illocutionary intentions, has in fact asserted that most oriental people are good at mathematical skills. This is a case, it seems, in which the speaker performs an illocution which she does not intend to perform. Nevertheless, I shall ignore this very special case here. At any rate, and although the manoeuver is not particularly appealing, we could safely keep our assumption by restricting its validity for cases of performance of illocutionary acts in which slips of the tongue do not occur.
plus two equals four?". One of the patients, who is already in a state of practically complete recovery, immediately and confidently answers by asserting (83):

(83) I believe that two plus two equals four.

When the patient answers by uttering the sentence (83), he, evidently, is not interested in asserting that two plus two equals four, since it is absolutely obvious to him and -- he assumes -- to his psychiatrist that this is so. There is no point in informing the psychiatrist of the fact that two plus two equals four. The patient knows that what the psychiatrist wants to know is not whether two plus two equals four but whether he, the patient, believes it. The patient, in uttering (83), merely intends to assert that he believes that two plus two equals four, not the unquestioned triviality that two plus two equals four.

It is precisely this fact -- namely, the fact that it is quite possible that the utterance of (79) or of (83) may count, given the right, even if somewhat farfetched circumstances, as a mere, literal assertion about the speaker's beliefs -- which sets apart utterances of sentences like (79), etc., from utterances of explicit performatives. And, of course, the same can be said of utterances of sentences like (80)-(82), which are entirely similar, in the relevant respect, to utterances of (79) and (83).

The relation of indirection between assertions A and B performed in uttering (79) is, therefore, not one of illocutionary entailment. Instead, as I have already indicated, the relation is one of conversational implicature. None of the difficulties preventing us from interpreting assertion B as illocutionarily entailed by assertion A are encountered when
the relation of indirection proposed is that of conversational implicature. It is quite easy to sketch a pattern of inferential recognition along the lines of scheme (Inf.a) above. I offer here what I think is a plausible way of sketching this inferential process. I shall call it '(Inf.d)', and, of course, it is meant to be an instantiation of (Inf.a): In a typical utterance of (79), the speaker, S, intends (and intends the hearer, H, to recognise that he intends) H to go through (something like) the following inferential process, (Inf.d):

1d) S is asserting, A, that he believes that snow is white.
1d') Upon the circumstances, if S is merely asserting A, he is, violating, at least, the Conversational Maxim of Relevance, since it is absolutely irrelevant -- for the purposes of our present conversation -- to know what S's beliefs are.
2d) S is respecting the Conversational Maxims.
3d) S is not (could not be) merely asserting A.
4d) S's assertion B, that snow is white is connected in a way identifiable under the circumstances to the performance of assertion A, such that in performing A S would be performing B. (Very roughly, the "connection" between A and B is -- at least, in part -- provided by the fact that a necessary condition for someone to sincerely assert that p is that he believes that p. This necessary condition for sincerely asserting helps the hearer to identify the extra act which, given the circumstances, the speaker is likely to be performing.)
5d) S is asserting A and thereby asserting B.

Naturally, what we have said of utterances of sentences like (79) applies to utterances of sentences like (80)-(82) as well.

To sum up, going back to explicit performatives and disregarding the problem whether utterances of (79)-(82) are cases of indirection "due to" conversational implicature or "due to" illocutionary entailment, the truly important issue which I hope to have established in the former discussion is

that the alleged "second point" in favor of interpreting utterances of explicit performatives as indicators of force potential does not really support such an interpretation. Our hypothesis that epp's are indicators of propositional content is, therefore, quite compatible with the evidence on explicit performatives gathered or presented in this paper.

It might be claimed that my way of disposing of the so-called "second point" is somewhat too thrifty or indirect. In order to assuage whatever doubts my treatment of this subject may have provoked, let me try a second, more direct attempt to accommodate our recalcitrant "second point". Our former argument against it was mainly negative: it consisted in showing that the second point allegedly in favor or regarding epp's as indicators of force does not really constitute evidence in favor of this tenet. But our argument left untouched the problem of how specifically to explain the phenomenon upon which the "second point" is based, given the supposition that epp's are indicators of propositional content.

The question is this: If 'That', in an utterance of (54) issued as a reply of an utterance of (51), refers -- as it does -- to the proposition p (that snow is white), and not to the proposition g (that the speaker of (51), by means of uttering (51), states that snow is white), how is it possible to assume that 'I state ...', in (51), contributes to determine the propositional content of (51)? How can one maintain both 1) that 'I state ...', as it occurs in (51), is an indicator of propositional content potential; and 2) that 'That', in an utterance of (54) as a reply of an utterance of (51), refers to p and not to g?

Notice that the problem is farther complicated by the fact, (F), that it is
only in response to explicit performatives whose illocutionary verb is assertive in kind that it makes sense to reply by uttering (54). When someone says seriously (83):

(83) I order you to polish your boots!

it makes no sense, in normal circumstances, to reply by uttering (54). And similarly, for the case of utterances of 'I promise that ...' or 'I request you to ...', etc.

Initially, fact (F) may be interpreted as good news for our idea that epp's are, in general, indicators of propositional content. And this, because (F) seems to show that the problem created by the "second point" affects only the case of explicit performatives whose verb denotes an assertive illocutionary act, but does not extend to other types of explicit performatives; and therefore, that it can be regarded as a peculiarity of a very special kind of explicit performatives. But, on a second look, it becomes evident that the recognition of fact (F) does not make things easier for the thesis that epp's are indicators of propositional content. Actually, the supporter of the opposite view, that epp's are indicators of force, may claim that (F) adds plausibility to his view: it is hardly surprising — this theorist would say — that it does not make any sense to reply by uttering (54) to an utterance of (83), etc. This is so, because truth is predicated only of what is asserted, but not of what is commanded, promised or requested. Now, if epp's are indicators of the force denoted by their illocutionary verb, 'I assert that ...' is an indicator of assertive force. So, it makes sense to reply by uttering (54) to an utterance of (51), since — in this view — a serious and literal utterance of (51) is an assertion that snow is white. But 'I
order (you) to ...' and 'I promise, that ...' are not indicators of assertive force, but of directive and commissive force, respectively. This means that a serious and literal utterance of (83) is an order that you polish your boots and, therefore, that it makes no sense to refer to the content of the order as true (or false, for that matter). The position of the idea that epp's are indicators of force seems to be reinforced, not imperiled, by the recognition of fact (F).

But let us leave aside whether fact (F) adds or eliminates difficulties to the task of accommodating the "second point" with the tenet that epp's are indicators of propositional content. For our purposes, what is important is that our hypothesis that typical utterances of explicit performatives are indirect speech acts permits us to successfully accomplish such a task. Simply, the solution consists in acknowledging that there are two illocutionary acts performed in typical utterances of (51) and (83), etc. One of them is literal, and directly performed; namely a declaration (or, if preferred, an assertion) whose propositional content is that an act of the type denoted by the illocutionary verb occurring in the sentence is thereby being performed. The other illocution is not literal, but is the one for whose sake the literal declaration (assertion) is performed; and it is illocutionarily entailed by the performance of the former, direct act.

Now, take the case of (51): from our point of view, a serious utterance of (51) by a speaker, S1 is both a direct declaration (assertion) that g and an indirect assertion that p. In principle, there are two different propositional contents to which the speaker, S2, of (54), in reply to (51), may be referring: the directly declared (asserted), g; and the indirectly
asserted, p. Why is it that it is immediately perceived as evident that S₂ refers by 'That' to the content, p, of the indirect assertion and not to g? I can think of two reasons:

1) Because the indirect assertion is the one for whose sake the indirect illocutionary act has been performed. S₁, in uttering (51), intends to perform the assertion that p by way of declaring (asserting) that he so asserts. The direct act is only an instrument to perform the "primarily intended", indirect assertion. If S₂ has correctly interpreted S₁'s utterance of (51), S₂ must have realised that S₁'s aim, in uttering (51), is to (indirectly) assert hat p. Therefore, it is only to the content of that act that S₂ may relevantly refer when uttering (54).

2) There is another reason why the reference of 'That' is p instead of g; namely, because the truth of g must appear as trivial to S₂, or must be taken for granted by S₂, once he correctly interprets S₁'s utterance of (51). Since g is true just by the mere fact that (51) is uttered seriously; i.e., since S₁'s act of asserting that p is illocutionarily entailed by S₁'s act of directly declaring (asserting) that g in an utterance of (51), and since the content of S₁'s direct declaration (assertion) is precisely that g (i.e., that S₁ is thereby asserting that p), it is absolutely irrelevant or uninformative for S₂ to reply by confirming that g is true. But that is what S₂ would be doing if he referred by 'That' to the declared (asserted) proposition g.

The same pattern of explanation allows us to deal with fact (F). Thus, a serious utterance of (83) is both a direct declaration (assertion) that the speaker, S₁, thereby orders S₂ to polish S₂'s boots and an indirect order,
issued by S1 to S2, that S2 polish his boots. It makes no sense to reply to an utterance of (83) by uttering (54) because the act "primarily intended" by S1 is an order and the content of orders are not true nor false. This leaves the content of the direct declaration (assertion) performed in uttering (83) (that S1 thereby orders S2 to polish S2's boots) as the only candidate to serve as the reference of 'That' in a possible utterance of (54). But if the potential interlocutor, S2, of a speaker, S1, of (83) interprets correctly S1's utterance (i.e., if S2 realizes that S1 is performing an order by way of declaring (asserting) that he is so performing it), then it must be obvious to S2 that S1's direct declaration (assertion) is trivially true and, therefore, that there is no ("conversational") point in confirming its truth.

3.3.7 Thesis (Th.1a) revisited

Our inquiry on epp's and explicit performatives concluded, and consequently at the end of our very long exploration of the problem of the classification of moods, it is time, now, to retake once again the task of (empirically) evaluating thesis (Th.1a). I shall finish this paper by briefly examining the consequences, for (Th.1a), of my study of the classification of moods.

First of all, let us explicitly indicate the main result of my study of epp's for the classification of moods: Very briefly, I have argued that epp's are not indicators of illocutionary force potential; that they are indicators of propositional content potential. Hence, epp's cannot be treated and do not function as moods. Therefore, and given our discussion on the classification of moods carried out in sec. III.3.3, we have to provisionally conclude that there are only three (main) moods in English: declarative,
imperative and interrogative.

Once this is established, we are in a position to address our main question: what are the consequences for (Th.1a) of our results obtained with respect to the problem of the number and classification of English moods? As it is quite easy to foresee, the consequences are not very favorable for the advocate of (Th.1a). If we recall, our quick study of the issue of how to classify illocutionary forces led us to distinguish three possible interpretations of (Th.1a): (Th.1aI), that there is a one-one relation between moods and individual forces. (Th.1aS), that there is a one-one relation between moods and species of illocutionary force which are communicable in a given language at a given time. And (Th.1aG), that there is a one-one relation between moods and genera of illocutionary force. Of these three, (Th.1aI) had to be discarded right away, because, given what I take is the most serious and sophisticated theory of force available today (Searle & Vanderveken's), (Th.1aI) entails that the number of moods of the language must be infinite. Hence, at the end of our section about the classification of forces we were left with just two possible interpretations of (Th.1a) to be tested: (Th.1aS) and (Th.1aG).

Now, after our inquiry on the classification of moods, the two following "preliminary points" become evident:

First and very trivial: (Th.1aS) and (Th.1aG) must be reinterpreted as
(Th.1a*S) and (Th.1a*G); i.e., our study of mood accentuates the necessity of relativizing (Th.1a) to a given (historical stage of a) language. We already encountered the need for this relativization when formulating (Th.1aS) but, at the time, it did not appear immediately evident that (Th.1aG) required the same treatment. Now, because of the obvious relativization of the notion of mood (or, rather, of the notion of "system of moods") to a given natural language, it becomes apparent that, not only (Th.1aS), but also (Th.1aG) (and any other workable formulation of (Th.1a)) must be understood as relative to a given language.

Second, properly speaking, we are only in a position to evaluate here theses (Th.1a**S) and (Th.1a**G); i.e., those particular instantiations of (Th.1a*S) and (Th.1a*G) which refer to (present) English. This being so, if any of these two theses proved to be empirically adequate, the respective general theses, (Th.1a*S) or (Th.1a*G), would still remain unconfirmed. On the other hand, if the particular theses (Th.1a**S) and (Th.1a**G) turn out to be empirically refuted, then the respective general theses will need, at best, (ad hoc) modification and, at worst, they will have thereby been refuted.

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173. Cf. supra, p. 76, where we define (Th.1a*) thus:

(Th.1a*) For every natural language, L, there is a one-one relation between the moods of L and the set of illocutionary forces.

174. I have defined (Th.1a**) thus:

(Th.1a**) There is a one-one relation between the moods of English and the illocutionary forces.

Cf. supra, p. 76.
What is, then, the result of our analysis of mood for theses (Th.1a**S) and (Th.1a**G)?

Let us deal with (Th.1a**S) first: Since we have rejected the hypothesis that epp's are indicators of force potential, (Th.1a**S) becomes immediately refuted. Without any need to undertake a detailed study about how many (communicable) species of force there are, it is plain that there must be more than three species of force. As we indicated in sec. III.3.3, Searle & Vanderveken explicitly list more than one hundred non-synonymous illocutionary verbs genuinely denoting illocutionary forces. Given our principle (Pr*), that differences in meaning between illocutionary verbs of that kind are or reflect differences in species of illocutionary force, it is evident that there are certainly more than three species of force. But we have acknowledged only three moods in (present) English. So, the species of force which are communicable in English outnumber badly the moods available in the language. Furthermore, of these three moods, only one, the interrogative, which indicates erotetic force, can be regarded as an indicator of specific force (provided, of course, that one understands erotetic force in the customary way, as a species or, at least, a sub-type of the Directive genus of force). The imperative mood is, by all accounts, an indicator of generic force: it "indicates" the genus of Directive forces. In turn, the declarative mood, if not neutral with respect to force as we have claimed it is, would have to be understood, according to the standard view, as an indicator of generic force; that is, as an indicator of the genus of Assertive force. Consequently, not only there is not enough moods to match with the species of force which are communicable in (present) English, but also and worse, some of the available moods are not indicators of specific
As far as I can tell, the only way to substantially improve the lot of (Th.1a**S) would be one of regarding epp's as moods. If this were the case, then, trivially, for every species of illocutionary force communicable in English there would be a corresponding English mood, because, by our suggested principle (Pr*), a species of force communicable in English is a force for which there is an illocutionary verb denoting it in English. And for each of those illocutionary verbs there is, in general, a corresponding epp in the language. This way, the path towards the confirmation of (Th.1a**S) would seem to be almost thoroughly paved. I say 'almost', because a new complication would immediately appear: Now, the problem would be, not a lack of a sufficient number of moods but, inversely, an excess of them. The stock of moods in English would consist now of all the different epp's plus the three formerly acknowledged moods: interrogative, imperative and declarative. This situation poses two different problems for (Th.1a**S): First, there would be at least a case in which two alternative moods are connected with the same illocutionary force. We would have that the "role" of the interrogative mood as an indicator of erotetic force is the same as the "role" of the epp: 'I ask (you) whether/who/.../'. Strictly speaking, this would suffice to falsify (Th.1a**S), for it suffices to falsify its weaker version (Th.3a**S), that the mood of a sentence of English is "determined" by (is a function of) the specific force possessed by the corresponding utterance. Only thesis (Th.2a**S), that the specific force of

175. Cf. supra, p. 71.
an utterance of English is "determined" by (is a function of) the mood of the sentence uttered, would not be endangered by this circumstance.

Second, there would still remain the problem that the imperative and declarative moods do not indicate specific force. As we said, the imperative is an indicator of generic Directive force; and the declarative is force-neutral or, at best, an indicator of the generic Assertive force. Again, this means that (Th.1a**S) would have to be rejected, since the fact that some moods of English do not indicate species of illocutionary force obliges us to reject (Th.1a**S)'s weaker version, (Th.2a**S).

Therefore, strictly speaking and because of the two problems just mentioned, (Th.1a**S) remains disconfirmed even in the most favorable (counterfactual) case in which epp's were indicators of force. But, at least, this much would be true: for every species of force communicable in (present) English there would be a mood in (present) English.

Actually, although the counterfactual hypothesis that epp's are indicators of force is not enough to salvage (Th.1a**S), the hypothesis could be used more successfully to support another possible interpretation of (Th.1a**). This new interpretation would be the result of abandoning the idea presupposed in the other interpretations of (Th.1a**) examined so far, that there is only one particular level of illocutionary force generality at which the one-one relation between moods and forces obtains. Once this presupposition is dropped, the possibility is left open that different moods indicate forces of different levels of generality. Thus, some moods (all epp's, if our suggested principle (Pr*) were correct) would indicate species of force, but others may indicate non-specific forces (generic, sub-specific, ...
etc.). I shall call this new version of (Th.1a**) '(Th.1a**U)', where the
'U' is meant to emphasize the uncommitted character of this thesis with
respect to any particular level of generality which may be distinguished in
the realm of illocutionary forces. (Th.1a**U) can be formulated thus:

(Th.1a**U) There is a one-one relation between the moods of
(present) English and the illocutionary forces
communicable in (present) English.

Because (Th.1a**U) is uncommitted in the sense just indicated (i.e., because
it does not require that the one-one relation be established between moods
and just one particular, single level of generality of illocutionary force),
the existence of the imperative and declarative moods, neither of which is an
indicator of specific force, would not constitute a problem. (Th.1a**U)
would, therefore, avoid the second problem plaguing (Th.1a**S). It would
remain, however, the difficulty posed by the coexistence in English of two
different moods for the specific erotetic force. For this reason,
(Th.1a**U), like (Th.1a**S) before, would, in the end, have to be rejected.
But, since the second problem plaguing (Th.1a**S) has now been avoided, it
would be possible to maintain (Th.1a**U)'s weaker version (Th.2a**U), that
the force of an utterance of English is "determined" by (is a function of)
the mood of the sentence uttered.

This -- I think -- is the most favorable result which the advocate of
(Th.1a**) could obtain with the help of the hypothesis that epp's are
indicators of illocutionary force. But, of course, even this relatively
modest thesis, (Th.2a**U), has to be discarded by us, since we have argued
that epp's are not indicators of illocutionary force, but indicators of
propositional content.
Finally, let us examine the remaining interpretation of (Th.1a**), (Th.1a***G): Since, according to the classification of forces which we have adopted here there are five genera of illocutionary forces, there would have to be also five moods in (present) English for (Th.1a***G) to be confirmed. But, as we have repeatedly indicated, we only acknowledge three moods in (present) English. So, again, there is a mismatch between the number of moods and the number of generic forces. But the situation is worse than that: as we have already said, of these three moods, imperative, declarative and interrogative, only the first one is (according to our interpretation) an indicator of generic force. The interrogative mood indicates a species or a sub-genus of the Directive force; and the declarative mood is neutral with respect to force. In short, (Th.1a***G) is as untenable as all the previous interpretations of (Th.1a**) here examined. And so they are, of course, their weaker versions (Th.2a***G) and (Th.3a***G).

One may object that the discouraging results obtained by our investigation do not necessarily show that (Th.1a**) (in one or another of its interpretations) is false. Rather, one may want to regard these negative results as a strong indication that our adopted or postulated classifications of moods and forces are wrong. But this objection is not as well grounded as it may initially seem: First, our selection of a classification of moods has by no means been arbitrary. Quite to the contrary, we have gone out of our way (as our long study of epp's clearly demonstrates) to try to find a classification of moods which made things easier for the advocate of

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176. Cf. supra, p. 65.
Second, given our results concerning the classification and number of moods, it is very hard indeed to conceive of any minimally accurate classification of illocutionary force -- whether Searle & Vanderveken's or someone else's -- which be in accordance with (Th.1a**). Neither Austin's nor Bach & Harnish's, nor Recanati's (to mention those I am most familiarized with) are better off than Searle & Vanderveken's for the purposes of confirming (Th.1a**). Simply, the mood system of English (and, to my knowledge, of any other natural language studied so far) is not rich enough to allow for a one-one relation between moods and illocutionary forces.

Should these consistently adverse results with respect to (Th.1a**) be interpreted as a signal that the mood of the sentences of English are not related to force? Naturally, the answer is no.

What our (empirical) study of the classification of moods and forces shows is this: First, that there is no systematic relation between the moods of English (or, for that matter, of any other natural language known to date) and the set of illocutionary forces. And, second, that the "indication" of force provided by the moods of English (and, again, of most if not all other known natural languages) is never, or almost never, fully explicit. That is, mood alone does not suffice to unambiguously identify the specific (let alone sub-specific, etc) type of illocutionary force which the (serious and literal) utterance of a sentence may have. Mood helps to "delimit" the

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177. Notice that the notion of "Explicitly indicated force" is not identical with the notion of literal force. The latter is wider: Explicitly indicated force is always literal force, but literal force is not always explicitly indicated, because part of the literal force of an utterance may be non-explicit. For instance, the explicitly indicated force of an imperative
range of forces that a literal and serious utterance of a sentence may have. Mood co-determines (but does not determine), together with context, the force of the illocution performed in seriously and literally uttering the sentence.

Now, it would be the right moment to introduce the important point that, even if contrary to what happens to be the case, English had a mood for every single (communicable) specific (or sub-specific, etc.) illocutionary force, there would still be a powerful reason to reject the thesis that mood determines force, or more strongly, that there is a one-one relation between mood and force. This reason constitutes what in an earlier section of this sentence (or of an imperative sentence) like (s) "Eat your pie!" is — if we accept Searle's taxonomy — just the generic "Directive" force. But different utterances of (s) may count, depending on the context, as orders, requests, entreaties, etc. Requests, orders and entreaties performed in uttering (s) are surely to be described as literal in force, if only to distinguish them from cases of indirect performance such as, e.g., the request (order, etc) to eat your pie made, given the appropriate context, by uttering (p): "Your pie is on the kitchen-table". What happens is that the specific directive illocutionary force which each of those utterances of (s) have in their respective context is, although quite literal, not indicated in (s). Explicitly indicted force is, primarily, a property of sentences; literal force is, primarily, a property of utterances. But in what we may call the "limiting" or extreme case — that is, in the hypothetical situation in which the mood system of the language were so powerful that it exhaustively conveyed or registered the specific and sub-specific differences in illocutionary force — the explicitly indicated force of sentences and the literal force of utterances would coincide. It is important to realise, however, that this "limiting case" would still not be a case in which explicitly indicated force determines (or is in a one-one relation with) the force actually had by utterances of sentences of the language. And this because of the same reasons why literal force does not determine actual force; namely, 1) because the actual force of the utterance may be non-literal and 2) because the utterance in question may be non-serious and, therefore, lack any actual illocutionary force.

178. This point has been forcefully made, among others, by Bach & Harnish (cf. op. cit., pp. 10-11 and 34) and by Recanati (cf. op. cit., pp. 166-8 and 220-1).
paper we have called, in passing, 'the a priori argument' against (Th.1a) and (Th.2a) in any of their possible interpretations. The reason is the one stressed by Davidson, and also by Bach & Harnish and Recanati, that non-serious utterances lack illocutionary force of any kind. The point is forcefully, even if schematically, made by Recanati when he writes:

However explicit an utterance is, it is impossible to know, independent of the context, whether it is serious or not. This implies that a contextual inference is always required to conclude from the fact that the speaker has said something that he has performed a certain illocutionary act. If the utterance is "explicit", ... the hearer is in a position to know, without contextual inference, which illocutionary act the speaker performs if he is performing one, but he will never know whether or not this illocutionary act is actually performed. ... Speech-act understanding is irreducible to sentence understanding, not only as a matter of (contingent) fact but as a matter of principle. (p. 235)

As C. McGinn remarks, somewhat cryptically:

Mood, to be sure, conventionally and standardly signifies force, but it cannot guarantee it. ("Semantics for Nonindicative Sentences", p. 303. Emphasis mine.)

No matter how powerful a language may be in its resources to indicate force, there is always a contextual factor inherent to the performance of illocutionary acts that cannot be eliminated; that is, that cannot be encoded in the language. There cannot be a sign which guarantees seriousness of utterance.


180. Cf. op. cit., pp. 7, 10, 19, 34 and 288-9, n. 11.

There is no time left, however, to deal properly with this "a priori argument" against (Th.1a). To attempt such a task would lead us well beyond the limits we have imposed to this work. The "a priori argument" deserves, in itself, a whole new Thesis. We shall, therefore, leave it merely indicated. If we have mentioned it here, it is only to justify a statement we made at the beginning of this paper, when dealing with the distinction between verbal and syntactic mood. We said there that, although as a matter of fact the notion of syntactic mood is not identifiable with the notion of verbal mood, however, as a matter of principle, the identification is possible.\footnote{182}{It is possible to conceive a natural language -- we said -- in which differences in syntactic mood were marked only and sufficiently by verbal moods. But -- we added -- there is no parallel situation in the case of the distinction between syntactic mood and illocutionary force (or, if preferred, between indicated and actual force). It is not possible to identify the notion of indicated force (force indicated by the mood of a sentence) with the notion of actual force (force actually possessed by a given utterance of a sentence). The reason why this second identification cannot even in principle be made is, precisely, the existence of non-serious but perfectly legitimate uses of language such as play-acting and reciting poems, etc.}

Naturally, this contention is controversial and, as stated, may very well sound unwarranted. Fair enough. But, what better way to finish my paper than by offering a polemical (even if hardly original) thesis for future

\footnote{182}{Cf. supra, p. 50.}
discussion? I surely know now what the next step should be in my quest for a satisfactory theory of mood.
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