

THE POLITICS OF FAILURE:
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, PUBLIC OPINION, AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES -- 1945-1980

by

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

June 1989


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ABSTRACT

Two different academic literatures--public opinion and international security studies--have produced three hypothesis to explain the mixed record of arms control success. First, public opinion may have had little or no impact on decision-making over arms control. Second, if there is a relationship between government decisions and public attitudes, a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented. Third, the "opinion and policy elite" and the "attentive public" may not have been in favor of arms control, and these elite attitudes may have eventually diffused to the general public in a top-down fashion.

This dissertation reviews data from over 500 public opinion surveys conducted from 1938 to 1988 and relates this body of data to actual government decisions made during four arms control initiatives: the International Control of Atomic Energy, the Limited Test Ban, the Anti-ballistic Missile/SALT I treaty, and SALT II.

Several findings concerning the nature of public opinion stand out from this research. First, public awareness of nuclear issues is extremely high, "functional" knowledge is relatively high compared to other public policy issues, but detailed knowledge is extremely low. Second, an attentive public exists for arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues that varies from approximately 25 to 40 percent of the public, depending on the issue. Third, an opinion and policy elite exists for nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues, but it constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. Fourth, peoples' knowledge and interest about nuclear issues form a distinctly hierarchical and bimodal pattern which favor the nuclear dimension over the arms control dimension of the issue. Levels of public awareness, knowledge, and interest of nuclear weapons are twice as high as for arms control negotiations or agreements.

Throughout this dissertation public opinion has been shown to have an important impact on decisions made at all stages of the policy process from getting on the agenda, to negotiation, ratification, and implementation. The degree to which public opinion influences arms control decisions is directly related to three factors: the level of public attitudes, awareness of the different dimensions of public opinion by competing political activists, and the sophistication of communication strategies utilized by competing political factions.

Public attitudes that maintain plurality support (under 50 percent) rarely influence decision-makers. Popular presidents can make foreign policy decisions that fly in the face of majority opinion (50-59 percent), but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched. Consensus level public opinion (60-69 percent) successfully influences the policy process even if powerful opposing bureaucratic interests exist. Preponderant public opinion (70-79 percent) not only "causes" the political system to act according to its dictates, but it also deters political opposition from challenging the specific decision. Virtually unanimous opinion (80%+) dominates the entire political system and sweeps all political opposition away.

A comprehensive review and quantitative analysis of public attitudes toward arms control finds that public opinion is relatively stable, not volatile as postulated by the dominant theories in the field. Attitudes toward arms control have become increasingly fragmented along partisan and demographic lines after the war in Vietnam, but this has not been the cause of the relative failure of arms control. Finally, there is no evidence that mass attitudes change as a result of a diffusion of beliefs from the opinion and policy elite to the "attentive public" and then to the general public.

A "two-worlds" model has been developed to explain both mass and elite attitudes change and to delineate the conditions under which public opinion has an impact on the policy process. The "first" world consists of the general or voting public. First world attitudes are formed and change in relation to real world events which are communicated directly to the mass public by the media, not through a top-down process involving the attentive public. Public attitudes are relatively immune to pressure generated by policy-makers or members of the "opinion and policy elite." However, people in the first world are selective in their attention, and this selectivity over time forms patterns in public awareness, knowledge, and interest. Even though public attention comes in short bursts and is uneven, members of the general public are quite capable of making quite subtle distinctions on complex foreign policy issues.

The "second" world consists of a small group of people, less than ten percent of the public, who constitute the opinion and policy elite. Opinions among this elite segment of society change relatively quickly in relation to media coverage, variation in government policy, and intellectual fads. Perceptions among members of this elite are extremely important because most of the time government leaders mistake attitudes held by these politically active people for mass attitudes.

The first and second world can be linked, but this requires that elite policy-makers or political activists understand the difference between the two worlds, discover the nature of mass public opinion through survey research, and develop a political communication strategy that discusses policy issues using a vocabulary that is compatible with pre-existing mass attitudes.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. George W. Rathjens

Title: Professor of Political Science

To the Memory of My Father:
Clark R. Graham

and

To the Encouragement and Support of my Mother:
Margaret Wallace Graham

Acknowledgments

Reading a long list of acknowledgments might lead the uninitiated to think that writing a dissertation is a cooperative exercise implying this would be a drastic distortion of reality. Completing a Ph.D. is like training for and running a long marathon followed by a short set of high hurdles immediately in front of the finish line. Throughout most of the enterprise a scholar must be guided by his own instincts and motivated by his own energy. However, when one has completed the task, not only is one relieved to be done, but one realizes that many people have offered support and encouragement along the way.

The most mundane, but essential, support has come in the form of financial assistance from the following organizations and individuals: The Carnegie Corporation of New York (Dr. Frederic Mosher), The National Academy of Sciences (Professors Philip Converse and William Estes), the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the Ford Foundation (Dr. Enid Schoettle), the Aspen Institute, Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, and M.I.T.'s Defense and Arms Control Program.

The chair of my committee--George Rathjens--provided just the right amount of direction, encouragement and distance. Two advisors who began this project as faculty members of M.I.T.'s Department of Political Science but who have since moved on--Walter Dean Burnham and W. Russell Neuman--have taken time out of their busy schedules to continue to read chapters and provide helpful suggestions. This effort is a testament to their dedication to scholarship and teaching. Alas, M.I.T. is a poorer place after their departures. I owe my greatest intellectual and professional debt to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. who, through his advice and his example, has shown me the importance of mastering the fields of International Relations and American politics. Finally, a very important informal advisor--Bruce Russett--has been the perfect combination of a colleague, a mentor, and a friend at Yale.

Throughout the five years of work needed to develop my collection of public opinion data on arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues, a number of people have provided essential assistance in the cooperative tradition of public opinion research: Maryilyn Potter, Lois Timms-Ferrara, and John Benson at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut; Diana McDuffy, Josephine Marsh, and David Sheaves at the Louis Harris Data Center, University of North Carolina; Professor Jiri Nehnevajsa at the University of Pittsburg; Tom W. Smith and Pat Bova at the National Opinion Research Center; Andrew Kohut of the Gallup Organization; Alan Kay of Americans Tall: Security; Tom Kiley and John Marttila of Marttila & Kiley; Clark Abt of Abt Associates; Kathleen Frankovic of CBS; Susan Pincus of the Los Angeles Times; Ronald Hinckley from the Reagan White House; Joanne Dionne of the Social Science Library at Yale University; and Al Richmand & Bernard Roshco of the U.S. State Department.

In addition, many friends and colleagues have contributed to both the form and substance of this dissertation in many ways: Marc Angelil, Chris Arterton, Robert Beschel, Lisa Brandes, Albert Cantril, Carol Cohn, Jon Cowden, Gloria Duffy, Lynn Eden, Ike Eichenberg, Martha

Feldman, Steve Flanagan, Stan Greenberg, Sarah Graham, Jan Hallenberg, Jon Halperin, Tom Hartley, Ellen Immergut, Teresa Johnson, Bernard Kramer, Richard Locke, Sean Lynn-Jones, Katherine McGraw, Jim Miller, Jerry Mullins, Marty Sherwin, Larry Smith, Jeff Starr, Paul Stern, Stephen Stillwell, Peter Trubowitz, Lawrence Weiler, and Lynn Whittaker.

Last, but by no means least, Victoria Hattam has provided the encouragement, criticism, and emotional support needed to complete this marathon. Now that we have survived each of our respective dissertations, may we enjoy the happier side of life for many years to come.

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Introduction: Why Public Opinion and Arms Control?

Chapter 1

In the late 1980s, a multiplicity of international relations scholars have begun to emphasize the importance of domestic political factors to the conduct of foreign policy. Today there is a growing consensus among international relations specialists that domestic politics is important. However, there is no agreement on what aspect of domestic politics is most important, under what conditions domestic considerations dominate those of real politics, and over what type of foreign policy issues domestic politics matters most.

While a few realist theorists continue to argue that domestic politics is essentially unimportant to the conduct of foreign policy, most scholars conclude that domestic factors are relevant to a wide array of questions in contemporary international relations (IR) theory.¹ To cite a few examples, the debate over hegemonic stability may rest more with changes in domestic psychology and mood than in actual changes in indices of power.² Some scholars believe that future developments in IR theory will require integrating the neorealist "structural" side of the equation with neoliberal "process."³ This

1 The realist skepticism of the importance of domestic factors can be seen in Waltz 1979 and Lake 1988.
2 Kennedy 1987; Nye 1988, 237; Russett 1985.
3 Keohane and Nye 1987, 744-7; Nye 1988, 238-9, 246.

requires getting a better handle on the domestic political aspect of the problem. Several authors have noted that the current focus on rational choice ignores the important question of preference formation.⁴ This process of determining preferences is heavily influenced by domestic factors. Before more precise theories can be developed about the creation of or change in international regimes, domestic political factors must be analyzed and traced to actual decision-making. We must understand the learning process and understand how elites perceive and redefine national constraints.⁵ Finally, one scholar has used the metaphor of a two-level game to characterize the process by which international negotiations are influenced by domestic factors.⁶

To date the most definitive research on these questions has come from the literature on international political economy (IPE). Many IPE scholars have emphasized the importance of state structure or the influence of particular commercial firms.⁷ However, one key caveat has been expressed by most senior scholars in the IPE field. In international affairs, domestic influences are likely to be more pervasive in issues of "low" policy such as economics than in "high" policy such as military or nuclear strategy.⁸

4 Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Jervis 1988; Keohane and Nye 1987, 742; Lebow and Stein 1987.

5 Haggard and Simmons 1987, 515-7; Keohane and Nye 1987, 742-3, 749-53; Nye 1987.

6 Putnam 1988.

7 Evangelista 1989; Frieden 1988; Friman 1988; Ikenberry 1988; Katzenstein 1978; Milner 1987.

8 See Krasner 1978, 329; Putnam 1988, 455. Several younger scholars are challenging this assumption. See Evangelista 1989; Kupchan 1988; Jentleson 1987; Larson 1987; Vasquez 1985.

To make progress in developing IR theory with respect to domestic influences, a cogent research strategy should be initiated that takes into account six factors.

First, issue areas must be selected on the basis of being easily falsifiable with respect to the agreed assumptions of both liberal and realist IR theory. This means that more cases must be chosen from the international security field, rather than continuing to come predominantly from the international political economy field.

Second, many domestic political factors can influence foreign policy decisions. These range from the well-established focus on bureaucratic politics to an emphasis on state structure, business firms, interest groups, political parties, elections, and public opinion. Public opinion often is considered the most ephemeral element of domestic politics, the one least developed in liberal IR theory, and one that is least likely to influence government decisions.⁹ For this reason, research should focus on this dimension of domestic influences. If it is possible to specify the conditions under which public opinion influences international relations decision-making, then one will be able to build a theory of domestic influences "from the ground up." Other research conducted on the influence of other domestic factors, such as interest groups, firms, and elections, can then be put into a broader framework. A complete theory will specify the conditions under which various domestic factors influence foreign policy decision-making.

9 For a discussion of the need to further develop the "sociological" strand of liberal international relations theory, see Nye 1988, 246.

Third, when evaluating domestic political factors, scholars must cite the academic literature concerning domestic politics from the country in which their cases reside. This will mean being conversant with the best ideas from the politics literature of that country.

Fourth, sufficient research must be undertaken to assure the reader that the review of the specific dimension of domestic politics being examined has been comprehensive. In most cases, this translates into a requirement for significant data collection. In many instances, this in turn will require quantitative analysis of a "new body of data."

Fifth, single case studies should be avoided in favor of multiple cases that extend over a sufficiently long time frame to ascertain whether the specific argument being made is due to the posited variable or is caused by other factors unique to one or two executive administrations. In addition, "influence" should be demonstrated by a review of primary source documents, not by relying primarily on interviews with participants or reviews of secondary sources.

Finally, an explicit, multi-stage model of the policy process must be established at the outset of the research. Narrowing the focus of research to only one or two stages of the policy process--such as negotiating or ratifying a treaty--leaves two very important stages of the policy process (getting on the agenda and implementation) out of the equation.¹⁰

10 By ignoring the process of getting on the agenda and implementation, Putnam (1988) reaches fundamentally incorrect conclusions in developing his two-level game theory.

All six factors have influenced the selection of my dissertation topic and the development of my research design. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the field of study selected has been in the international security area, specifically nuclear arms control. The domestic influence that is being examined is public opinion. Out of a review and evaluation of two different academic literatures--public opinion and international security studies--three hypothesis are developed to explain the mixed record of arms control success.

First, public opinion may have had little or no impact on decision-making over arms control. Not only is the "no-impact" hypothesis conventional wisdom among many statesmen and policy-makers, but it is also supported by many academic studies. Second, a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either because attitudes have been volatile (Almond and Lippmann) or because they have been highly fragmented (Schneider). Third, the "opinion and policy elite" and the "attentive public" may not have been in favor of arms control, and these elite attitudes may have eventually diffused to the general public in a top-down fashion.

Other elements of my research design are discussed in Chapter 2. A comprehensive review of public opinion has been undertaken, producing the most complete collection of nuclear/arms control surveys known to experts in the field of public opinion. Quantitative analysis has been employed in addition to evaluating primary source documents. Four case studies have been selected that run from 1945 to 1980, over seven presidential administration. A four stage model of the policy process

is outlined at the beginning of this research. Finally, other terms and concepts such as the attentive public and the opinion & policy elite are defined in operational terms.

Chapter 3 reviews the pattern and importance of public awareness, knowledge, and interest concerning nuclear weapons, arms control, and foreign policy issues over the period 1945 to 1988. Several important conclusions are reached. First, public awareness of nuclear issues is extremely high, and "functional" knowledge is relatively high compared to other public policy issues. However, detailed knowledge is extremely low. Second, an attentive public exists for arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues that varies from approximately 25 to 40 percent of the public, depending on the issue. Third, a much smaller group, an "opinion and policy elite" exists for nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues that constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. Fourth, contrary to existing theory, public knowledge and interest about arms control, nuclear weapons, and foreign policy issues are quite stable, not volatile. Finally, several new findings from this chapter relate to patterns found among public awareness, knowledge, and interest. People's knowledge and interest about nuclear issues form a distinctly hierarchical and bimodal pattern which favor the nuclear dimension over the arms control dimension of the issue. Levels of public awareness and knowledge of nuclear weapons are twice as high as awareness and knowledge of arms control negotiations or agreements. A similar pattern exists for the public's interest in these issues: interest over nuclear war and nuclear weapons dominates interest about

arms control at slightly less than a two-to-one ratio. These twin discoveries provide the foundation needed to understand the pattern of public attitudes toward arms control, which are discussed in Chapters 4 through 7.

Chapter 4 reviews the structure of public opinion and the impact it had on decision-making with respect to my first case study, the international control of atomic energy. In contrast to conclusions reached by most historians and political scientists, this chapter argues that public opinion had a great deal of influence on creating both the content and form of the American government's position on international control of atomic energy. An important relationship between public opinion and the policy process was discovered in the uneven level of understanding of public opinion held by elite opponents versus that of advocates of international control. Opponents of this arms control effort had a far more sophisticated understanding of the public mood and used this to frame the main issues inside the administration and in the public debate in ways that strengthened their preferred policy position. Arms control opponents' close monitoring of public opinion, content analysis of the media, and timely reaction to the political activities of the advocates of arms control made a reversal of policy--necessary for international control to be seriously negotiated--impossible.

Chapter 4 goes on to conclude that at the mass level, there was no consensus in favor of or opposed to the international control of atomic energy. The general public supported some policies, changed its opinion

on other aspects, and opposed several other elements of international control. This pattern suggests that no simple consensus existed during the Cold War concerning the international control of atomic energy. Quantitative analysis of public opinion data shows that issues associated with international control were not highly fragmented along partisan, regional, or demographic lines. At the mass level, public opinion was not volatile, as hypothesized in Almond's mood theory, but was rather stable over the five year effort to negotiate international control of atomic energy from 1945 through 1950. The "attentive public" was more supportive of international control than was the general public, but contrary to the top-down model of attitude change, there are no indications that these elite attitudes led or influenced attitudes held by the general public. Attitudes held by the attentive public and the general public changed in different directions at different times.

Chapter 5 reviews the structure of public opinion about nuclear testing and argues that public opinion had an important impact on government decision-making with respect to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). There is no question that public concern over fallout helped set the public debate over the test ban issue or influenced government decisions on several non-test ban issues. However, there is reason to question what aspect of American and international public opinion was responsible for successfully getting the test ban issue onto the Executive branch agenda.

This chapter finds that strong public support for a bilateral test ban agreement, the Eisenhower administration's correct reading of the 1956 election results, and several other technical and bureaucratic factors all combined to get the test ban negotiations onto the agenda. Survey data clearly show that public concern over fallout played a limited role in explaining the structure of public opinion and in influencing government decision-makers.

As was true during the political fight associated with negotiation of the international control of atomic energy, a very important variable turned out to be the degree to which various political actors understood the true nature of public opinion. Political efforts by Adlai Stevenson during the 1956 presidential campaign and by anti-nuclear interest groups in the late 1950s to build support for a test ban agreement by focusing on the fallout controversy failed. By failing to discover the true nature of public opinion and by pressuring the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to agree to a test moratorium for which there was little public support, arms control advocates helped to obscure strong public support for a bilateral test ban agreement. This inept political strategy was in turn indirectly responsible for producing the circumstances that forced President Kennedy to resume testing in the atmosphere and then to conclude a limited, rather than a comprehensive, test ban treaty.

Research summarized in Chapter 5 argues that the level of public support is closely related to the impact public opinion has on the policy process. Two popular presidents--Dwight Eisenhower and John

Kennedy--made foreign policy decisions that flew in the face of majority opinion (50-59%), but doing so provided their political opposition with fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" was launched. Consensus level public opinion (60-69%) successfully influenced the policy process even though powerful bureaucratic opposition existed. Preponderant public opinion (70-79%) not only "caused" the political system to act according to its dictates, but it also deterred political opposition from challenging the specific decision. Virtually unanimous opinion (80%+) dominated the entire political system and swept all political opposition away.

Public opinion on test ban-related issues was relatively stable, not volatile or moody, and a close reading of the survey data about public awareness, knowledge, and interest show that public attitudes were not contradictory as argued by some scholars. The public had a reasonably sophisticated logic which can explain the structure of mass attitudes, but the logic was different from that held by most elites.

Quantitative analysis shows that with the exception of one period, there was little fragmentation of attitudes along political or ideological lines. This tends to support the proposition advanced by William Schneider and other scholars who argue there was a foreign policy attitude consensus before Vietnam. However, the exception is important. During the 1956 election, and for six months after, public opinion was sharply split along partisan lines. This pattern supports some of the conclusions reached by Richard Brody and Ben Page (1975) with respect to the war in Vietnam. When political parties or

candidates make their differences clear on specific foreign policy issues, voters are able to discern these differences, and respond in a rationale manner.

The test ban case shows that the attentive public did not consistently lead the public in terms of attitude change. However, consistent with the findings of Gamson and Modigliani (1966) and Mueller (1973), once government policy began to change on the test ban issue, it was the highly educated opinion and policy elite that picked up the policy change and supported a test ban agreement at levels higher than the general public. The elite public thus followed changes in government policy and did not lead mass attitudes.

A final conclusion from Chapter 5 relates to the dominant paradigm in American voting behavior published in The American Voter. Not only is its analysis of the 1956 election wrong with respect to Adlai Stevenson's inability to get his foreign policy message to voters and with respect to the salience of the test ban issue, but evidence is presented that calls into question the Michigan paradigm's de-emphasis of issue voting.¹¹

Chapter 6 reviews the structure of public opinion and its impact on decision-making with respect to the ABM/SALT I treaty. Conventional accounts of the controversy over deployment of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and negotiation of SALT I paint a picture

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For contemporary research that also concludes that voters take into account foreign policy issues when voting, see Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Hess and Nelson 1985; Kessel 1988.

of increasing public opposition to building the anti-missile system as a "great" national debate unfolded between proponents (the Pentagon and conservative Congressional allies) and opponents (grass roots activists, scientists, former Johnson administration officials, and liberal members of Congress). According to this conventional view, public opinion played an important role in pressuring Congress to limit the deployment of the ABM and in pressuring the Nixon administration to initiate strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

Contrary to most academic accounts, the structure of mass public attitudes and the process of attitude change was quite different than perceived by many participants in the controversy. A plurality supported deployment of the ABM system, and a consensus favored negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union. The structure of public opinion was much like it had been during the test ban controversy. The only public attitudes that changed as a result of the ABM debate were perceptions among the tiny opinion and policy elite. Before the 1969 Congressional hearings, elite attitudes were more in favor of ABM deployment than the general public. After the hearings, elite attitudes became strongly opposed to ABM deployment.

Public opinion had an impact on some, but not all, stages of the policy process concerning both deployment of the ABM and negotiation of SALT I. However unlike the previous two cases, neither the arms control advocates nor critics were particularly well informed on the true nature of public opinion. Limited grassroots activity, concentrated television news coverage, and interest group pressure successfully created the

false impression that "the public" was against deployment of the ABM. Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam and increasingly critical public attitudes toward military spending, it is understandable that many Congressional leaders, Executive branch officials, and political activists incorrectly perceived public opinion as anti-ABM.

The concluding Chapter 7 reviews the structure of public opinion and the impact it had on decision-making with respect to the SALT II treaty. By the time SALT II was initiated, arms control had become "permanently on the agenda." Public opinion was a major reason for this phenomena. When Ronald Reagan took strategic arms control off the agenda, the political system erupted with the nuclear freeze "movement." When Reagan put it back on the agenda and resumed negotiations with the Soviets, the nuclear freeze withered and died.

The negotiating process for SALT II was under the firm control of highly trained policy experts in the Executive branch. This community ignored government public opinion experts' warnings that public opinion had to be taken into account at the beginning of the process. Thus, by the time preparations for ratification were made inside the administration, the effort was doomed. The public education strategy used by the State Department relied on the top-down model of attitude change, and development of a political communication strategy was conducted almost independent of survey research. Speeches by senior officials such as Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance that attempted to sell SALT were written in the language of the "opinion and policy elite." Survey research showed that this group heard the message and

supported SALT. However, at the mass level, public support declined with reduced Presidential popularity and strong counter political communications from the right wing of the Republican party. The whole episode was ended, politically, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis.

This final chapter concludes with a summary of the evaluation of the three key hypothesis examined in this dissertation. First, mass public attitudes are relatively stable, not moody or volatile. One can clearly reject the Almond/Lippmann volatility hypothesis. Contrary to established views in the public opinion field, the public is not uniformly uninterested or uninformed about foreign policy issues such as arms control. Also, the public is able to make quite subtle distinctions on complex foreign policy issues.

Second, moderate support for the fragmentation hypothesis has been found. Attitudes became increasing fragmented over time, but this trend began before the Vietnam war. This dissertation argues, however, that fragmentation has not been a cause of failure of arms control.

Third, there is little evidence that mass attitudes change as a result of elite opinion influence as hypothesized in the top-down model.

Fourth, contrary to the dominant theories prevailing in the field of international relations, public opinion has an impact at every stage of the policy process-- from getting on the agenda, to negotiating an agreement, to ratifying a treaty, and finally to implementing an international obligation.

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Chapter 2

I Summary

This chapter reviews four key propositions that make up the dominant paradigm in the field of public opinion about American foreign policy. These key concepts include: the limited effects proposition, the mood theory, the fragmentation concept, and the top-down model of attitude change. Even though a critique of the dominant paradigm reveals that there is reason to question the continued validity of these four main theoretical propositions, a review of the international security literature finds that existing conclusions reached with respect to public opinion and arms control are sympathetic to mainstream theory in the public opinion literature.

Out of a review and evaluation of these two different academic literatures-- public opinion and international security studies-- three hypothesis are developed which will be the focus of this dissertation. First, public opinion may have had little or no impact on decision-making over arms control. Second, a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented. Third, opinion leaders and the attentive public may not have been in favor of arms control, and these attitudes eventually diffused to the general public in a top-down fashion.

The final section of this chapter describes the scope of this research, outlines the methods employed to evaluate the three hypothesis, and defines several key terms.

II Review of Public Opinion Theory

After World War I--even before the beginning of probability-based survey research--an academic literature emerged on the subject of American attitudes toward foreign policy and national security.¹² While this literature has expanded considerably over the last fifty years, the dominant paradigm has changed very little since publication of three major books by Gabriel Almond American People and Foreign Policy, James Rosenau Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, and Bernard Cohen The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy.¹³ In the 1970s and 1980s, several "fragmentation" theorists, such as William Schneider, Ole Holsti, James Rosenau, and Eugene Wittkopf have developed public opinion theory with respect to the structure of public attitudes, but these authors have worked largely within the boundaries of the traditional paradigm.¹⁴ Four central propositions from this literature are worth highlighting because they constitute the dominant paradigm in academic theories of public opinion and foreign policy.

A. The Limited Impact Proposition

The first element of the traditional paradigm is the proposition that public opinion plays a limited role in influencing government

12 H. Hart 1933; Lasswell [1927] 1971; Levering 1978, 43-46; Lippmann [1922] 1965.

13 Recent studies which fall into the traditional paradigm include Genco 1984; Holmes 1985; Hughes 1978; Klingberg 1979, 1983; Levering 1978.

14 For a comprehensive indexed bibliography on the literature concerning public opinion and foreign policy, see Graham 1987.

policy. While this idea has been mentioned by Lippmann ([1922] 1965), Almond (1956), and other political scientists, its main proponent is Bernard Cohen (1973).¹⁵ He argues that scholars who have concluded that public opinion had an impact on decisions such as the founding of the United Nations, recognition of the Soviet Union, creation of the Truman doctrine, and non-recognition of China in the 1960s have made "non-evidential assertions."¹⁶ In addition, Cohen strongly criticizes the case study approach on methodological grounds, and he finds fault with all the research which asserts that public opinion has an important impact on various foreign policy decisions. Since Cohen discounts case studies, his research involves interviewing a sample of foreign service officers and mid-level foreign policy experts and asking them to describe the decision-making process. His study concludes that public opinion has little direct influence on almost all foreign policy decisions and that bureaucratic factors are far more important in determining policy outcomes. Another scholar who uses the same interview methodology reaches similar conclusions.¹⁷ In addition, research by several historians, who mainly study the Truman administration, also find that public opinion plays a minimal role in foreign policy decision-making.¹⁸

15 Other political scientists who support the limited impact hypothesis include Chittick 1970; Cohen 1970; Cohen & Harris 1975; Hero 1973; Holsti & Rosenau 1986; W. Miller & Stokes 1963.

16 Cohen criticizes the following authors who conclude that public opinion has an impact on foreign policy decisions: Browder 1953; Dawson 1959; Feis 1947; J. Jones 1955; A. Steele 1966.

17 Madson 1985.

18 La Feber 1977; May 1964, 1973; Patterson 1979.

B. The Mood Theory or Volatility Concept

The mood theory, sometimes called the volatility concept, is the second element of the traditional paradigm. The mood theory states that the public's attitudes toward foreign policy are unstable and are characterized by extreme shifts between moods of isolationism and internationalism. While some elements of the mood theory have been described by authors as diverse as Alexis de Tocqueville, Margaret Mead and Walter Lippmann, the intellectual founders of the foreign policy mood theory are Gabriel Almond and Frank Klingberg.¹⁹ Based on an evaluation of responses to the "most important problem" question asked in twenty-one public opinion surveys conducted from 1936 to 1949, Almond demonstrates that the public has an erratic level of interest in foreign affairs.²⁰ He argues that public interest, knowledge, and attitudes on questions of a remote nature, such as foreign policy, are unstable. When a crisis forces foreign policy issues into the American psyche, then a majority will become interested in foreign affairs for a relatively short period of time. However, when the crisis subsides, a majority will return to their natural pattern of indifference toward international issues. These alternating cycles of interest translate

19 Almond published two editions of his American People and Foreign Policy in 1950 and 1960. Except for the introduction, the text is the same in both editions. Citations used in this dissertation will be made from the 1960 edition. Almond [1950] 1960 32, 53-6, 76; Klingberg 1952; Lippmann [1922] 1965 4-18.
20 A more extensive review of data from the "most important problem" survey question for the years 1935-1984 also shows an uneven level of public interest in foreign policy. See T. W. Smith 1985.

into moods of intervention in and withdrawal from world affairs such as occurred with isolationism between World War I and World War II and internationalism after 1945.²¹

In his review and interpretation of 150 years of American history and his content analysis of Presidential speeches, Klingberg (1952) strongly supports the mood thesis. He argues that America has experienced seven alternating moods of introversion and extroversion, which occur every 20-30 years. More recently, Klingberg (1979, 1983) and Holmes (1985) independently have updated and expanded the original research and reaffirmed the validity of the mood theory.

In addition, one author associated with the fragmentation school believes that the mass public is still subject to significant shifts in mood. William Schneider argues that the mood thesis is even more applicable today than it was after World War II due to the influence of the mass media. Television has the power to mobilize those who are inattentive to foreign policy. According to this argument, the important political dynamic in public opinion is not attitude change *per se*, but the aggregate level and intensity of attitudes held by the majority of the public. If the large, inattentive, segment of society

21 Literature on isolationism and internationalism includes J. Benson 1982; H. Cantril 1940a, [1944] 1972, 1948; Chester 1975; Fensterwald 1958; Foster 1983; Free & Watts 1980; Graham 1989a; Janowitz & Marvick 1953; Jonas 1966; Link 1943; MacKinnon & Centers 1956; Modigliani 1972; Riesselbach 1960; Russett 1960; U.S. Department of State 1943; Watts & Free 1978; Williams 1945, 1947.

becomes interested in foreign policy for a short period of time, then their attitudes can "shift the balance" and have an important impact on the aggregate level of public opinion.²²

C. The Fragmentation or Breakdown in Consensus Proposition

The fragmentation concept, also called the breakdown in consensus, is the third element in the traditional paradigm. This theoretical proposition places particular importance on the Vietnam experience and its impact on public attitudes. One public opinion expert, Andrew Kohut, president of the Gallup Organization, calls the mid-1960s the dividing line between "ancient and modern history" with regard to public opinion and foreign policy.²³ Authors who are associated with the fragmentation school posit that Vietnam broke a pre-existing attitude consensus in the area of foreign affairs which was in place from the late-1940s through the late-1960s.²⁴ This period of consensus was characterized by an operational agreement both on foreign policy goals and broad tactics among the opinion and policy elite, the attentive

22 W. Schneider 1982.

23 Kohut 1988, 1989. Authors who have supported the fragmentation/breakdown in consensus model include: Allison 1970-71; Barton 1974-5, 1980; Graubard 1980; Hosti & Rosenau 1979, 1980, 1984; Levering 1978; Mandlebaum & Schneider 1978, 1979; Public Agenda Foundation 1976; Rosenau & Holsti 1983; Russett 1974, 1975; Russett & Hanson 1975; W. Schneider 1974-75, 1983, 1984, 1985; Yankelovich 1979.

24 Various authors use different dates to define the period of Cold War attitude consensus. Levering (1978) uses the dates 1946-1968; Holsti and Rosenau (1984) do not mention a beginning date but use the mid-1960s as an ending date; W. Schneider (1985) uses the dates 1948-1968.

public and the general public.²⁵ During and after Vietnam this picture changed dramatically. While the precise terms and classifications of the post-Vietnam attitude clusters differ slightly among the half-dozen authors who support the fragmentation theory, there is remarkable agreement on the basic idea: foreign policy leaders and the attentive public have been split into two or three mutually-exclusive groups. According to Schneider, elites have fragmented into three groups: liberal interventionists, conservative interventionists and non-interventionists. Using slightly different definitions, Holsti and Rosenau state that elite attitudes have been split into three belief systems: Cold War internationalists, Post-Cold War internationalists, and neo-isolationists. Russett and Hansen (1975) and Barton (1974-75, 1980) conclude that the pre-Vietnam consensus has been destroyed and that anti-interventionist attitudes have increased among elite businessmen.

While most fragmentation theorists concentrate their research and analysis on elite attitudes, one author applies his attitude clusters to the general public as well. According to Schneider, the public has been split unevenly into three groups: non-interventionists, liberal internationalists and conservative internationalists. Most of the

25 Hinckley (1988) disagrees with other fragmentation scholars and believes that no attitude consensus existed during the Cold War. He argues that contemporary and Cold War foreign policy attitudes can be divided into four clusters: unilateralists, internationalists, accommodationists, and isolationists.

public (40-60%) are non-interventionist, with the rest either liberal internationalists or conservative internationalists.²⁶

D. The Attentive Public and the Top-Down Attitude Change Model

The final concept which makes up the mainstream paradigm for public opinion on foreign policy combines the twin ideas of the attentive public and a top-down model of attitude change. The idea of an "attentive" public has been accepted by virtually all public opinion scholars, either as an explicit or implicit assumption. Based in part on his active participation in the U.S. propaganda effort of World War I, Walter Lippmann ([1922] 1965) believed that an attentive public existed, and he stressed the role that should be played by a knowledgeable elite in educating the public on foreign policy matters.²⁷ According to Lippmann, since most citizens devote so little time to reading about foreign news, the average person's perceptions of the world are based on crude stereotypes. The solution to the problem of public ignorance concerning foreign affairs is to train a professional cadre of expert policy makers and to educate a somewhat larger attentive group that could form the basic political

26 Non-interventionists are also characterized by Schneider as "popular isolationists." Without presenting any detailed rationale, Schneider says these popular isolationists are

27 different from the "ideological isolationists" of the 1930s. Lasswell [1922] 1971 xxxii; Leigh 1976, 55.

choices for the majority who are not attentive.²⁸ Gabriel Almond built on this tradition and helped to define further the concept of the "attentive" public.²⁹ According to Almond, in the area of foreign affairs there are four publics: the general public, an attentive public, a policy and opinion elite, and finally a few policy makers. In terms of providing democratic support for foreign policy decisions, the most important group is the attentive public, a segment of society that is "informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and which constitutes the audience for the foreign policy discussions among the elite."

While Almond's research did not attempt to quantify the size of this "attentive public," his discussion of several other studies suggests that he believes the attentive public to constitute approximately 25 percent of the population.³⁰ Since publication of Almond's influential book, many authors have attempted to define the attentive public in operational terms, calculate its size, or analyze the character of attitudes held by its members. Various scholars have used different indicators to define foreign policy attentiveness: knowledge-based indicators,³¹ socio-economic indicators,³²

28 Lippmann [1922] 1965 142-3. In his 1955 book, Lippmann is even more explicitly elitist than in his earlier work. Critics of Lippmann's elitist approach include Waltz 1967 and Wriston 1956.

29 Almond [1950] 1960.

30 Almond [1950] 1960, 81-84.

31 Caspary 1970; Cohen 1966; Erskine 1963b, 1962; Free and Cantril 1967; Graham 1988; M. Kriesberg 1949; National Science Board 1981, 160; 1983, 159; Rosi 1965.

32 Galtung 1969; Rosi 1965; P. Smith 1961.

behavioral indicators,³³ media exposure indicators,³⁴ and interest indicators.³⁵ Despite the intellectual pot pourri in approaches used by many scholars to measure the attentive public, most studies have reached some common conclusions. First, the actual size of the attentive public is no larger than one quarter of the population and may be as small as 10 percent of the public. A summary of findings from the literature is listed in Table 2-1.³⁶ Second, contrary to the hypothesis posited by some scholars (Almond [1950] 1960; Rosenau 1968, 1974), the attentive public has not increased in size over time despite the fact that the level of educational attainment has grown.³⁷ A third conclusion, shared by many studies, is that while high levels of education do not guarantee attentiveness to foreign policy, a majority

33 Cohen 1966; Devine 1970; Hughes 1978; J. Robinson 1976; Rosenau 1974; Rosi 1965.

34 Devine 1970; Genco 1984; National Science Board op. cit.

35 Caspary 1970; Cohen 1966; Deutsch and Merrit 1965; Key 1961; Genco 1984; Mandlebaum and Schneider 1979; National Science Board op. cit.; Rosenau 1961; Rosi 1965.

36 One should be cautious in using different indicators to measure change in the size of the attentive public over time. Table 2-1 has been produced to show that no author, regardless of methodology, has estimated the size of the attentive public to be more than one quarter of the public.

37 Using consistent indicators of attentiveness from the American National Election Survey data for 1960-1980, Genco was able to measure changes in the size of the attentive public over time (Genco 1984, 143-145.) Similar conclusions were reached concerning the public attentive to science policy (National Science Board 1981, 177.) For changes in the level of college education, see Kinder and Sears 1985, 705.

of those who are found to be attentive have at least a four year college degree.³⁸

Several authors have attempted to estimate the size of the "opinion and policy elite" mentioned by Almond (1960). Two basic approaches have been used to determine the size and composition of this elite group. The most interesting approaches--from a theoretical and methodological perspective--have been the work of Russell

Estimated Size of the Attentive Public
(percent of the population)
Table 2-1

Author	Date	Type of Indicator	Size
Free & Cantril	1967	Knowledge	26
Kriesberg	1949	Knowledge	25
Devine	1970	Behavior, Interest, Media Exposure	25
Genco	1984	Interest, Media Exposure	22
Nat. Sci. Board	1983	Interest, Knowledge, Media Exposure	20
Cohen	1966	Knowledge	19
Martilla & Kiley	1985	Knowledge	18
NORC	1947	Membership	16
Levering	1978	Knowledge	15
V.O.Key	1961	Interest	15
Rosi	1965	Behavior, Knowledge	13
Inst. Survey Res.	1947	Membership	10
Rosenau	1961	Behavior & Interest	10
Cohen	1966	Behavior & Interest	9*
SSRC	1947	Knowledge	8

* Based on analysis of a state, not a national, survey.

38 Genco (1984, 206) concludes that the exact composition of the attentive public changes over time as the foreign policy context changes. However, from 1960 to 1980, education was the most powerful univariate characteristic of attentiveness. Over 50% of the attentive public had at least a college degree. Other studies which support this conclusion include Free and Cantril 1967, 61 and NSB op. cit.

Neuman (1986) and Steve Genco (1984). Neuman examines political sophistication and has re-analyzed data from nine of the classic American voting studies conducted from 1948 through 1980. Genco calculated the size of the attentive public using five American National Election Studies completed from 1960 through 1980. Both scholars conclude that the sophisticated, highly attentive, and politically active segment of the public--which corresponds to Almond's policy and opinion elite--constitutes approximately five percent of the public.³⁹

Another academic approach that has been used to determine attitudes held by foreign policy and opinion elites has been to define a particular elite group and then to interview a sample of its members to obtain their attitudes about various foreign policy issues. By using this process, scholars have obtained information about attitudes and demographic characteristics of various elite groups such as businessmen, military officers, and foreign policy specialists. While this procedure is not designed to reconfirm the conclusions reached by Neuman or Genco on the size of the opinion and policy elite, when combined with traditional polling, it has produced a large amount of data on elite attitudes.⁴⁰

39 Genco (1980, 120) finds that 6% of the public are "very attentive" to foreign policy. Neuman (1986, 167-178) finds that 5% of the public are very sophisticated and politically active.

40 Elite surveys with foreign policy/nuclear questions include: Adler & Bobrow 1956; Allison 1970-71; Barton 1980, 1974-5; Bischoff 1985; Communication 1988; M. Gordon & Lerner 1965; Holsti & Rosenau 1980, 1984, 1986; Kohut & Horrock 1984; Oldendick & Bardes 1982; Public Agenda Foundation 1984; Rielly 1975, 1979, 1983a, 1983b, 1987a, 1987b; Rothman & Liechter 1982; Russett & Hanson 1975; J. Schneider 1979; Skelly 1986.

For this dissertation, the importance of the attentive public is its relationship with the top-down model of attitude change. The top-down attitude change model was a product of innovative research which utilized a panel study during the 1948 Presidential election. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948) concluded that ideas often flow from the media to local opinion leaders and then from these opinion leaders to the less attentive sectors of the population. Even though the model has been revised and criticized over the years by several social scientists, this elite-driven image of opinion change is the conventional wisdom in the foreign policy community.⁴¹ Not only is the model dominant in defining the public education campaigns which were used by the State Department to sell ratification of the Panama Canal treaty, SALT II and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, but many foreign policy interest groups also use the same model to organize their public education campaigns. As a result, even if the top-down attitude change model may seem outdated to some social scientists, it still lives inside the foreign policy community.

⁴¹ Reformulations of the model have been made by E. Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955, E. Katz 1957, and D. Katz 1967. A review of major critiques of the model is in E. Rogers 1973. A thorough re-evaluation of the model was conducted by J. Robinson 1976. For a review of the attitude change literature, see McGuire 1985.

III Critique of the Academic Literature Concerning Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

A. The Limited Impact Proposition

Over the last fifteen years, several criticisms have been made of the limited impact proposition. First, a large literature has been written both before and after Cohen (1973) published his book which he has not evaluated.⁴² This material has reached fundamentally different conclusions concerning the relationship between public opinion and policy-making. It suggests that the impact of public opinion on government policy is more extensive and more complex than characterized by Cohen. Not only is there evidence that Presidents work hard to influence public opinion on foreign policy in order to improve their electoral prospects, but there is evidence that successful Presidents spend a great deal of time monitoring public attitudes and use this acute awareness of public opinion to help reach, package and implement their decisions.⁴³

Second, authors who find that public opinion has an impact on policy-making conclude that public opinion has its greatest impact on

⁴² Authors who conclude that public opinion has had an important impact on policy include Beal and Hinckley 1984; Broder 1987a; Cantril 1967; Clymer 1982; Dionne 1980; Ellsberg 1972; D. Hoffman 1987; Hosmer 1984; Jacobson 1984; Kusnetz 1984; Leigh 1976; Moyer 1968; Nathan and Oliver 1975; Page and Shapiro 1983; R. Steele 1978.

⁴³ Russett and Graham's (1989) review of the literature on war and elections argues that the linkage between elections and war is as strong as that demonstrated by Tufte (1978) in terms of elections and the domestic economy. On the issue of Presidential monitoring of public opinion and its impact on policy decisions, see Beal and Hinckley 1984; H. Cantril 1967; J. Converse 1987, 153, 163, 165.

decisions made at the White House, not inside the bureaucracies of the State and Defense departments. If this is true, then studies like those of Cohen (1973) and Madson (1985), which rely on interviewing mid-level foreign policy bureaucrats, do not validate a limited impact model; they only show that public opinion has a limited impact inside executive branch agencies.

Third, it is too simplistic to conclude that public opinion does or does not have an impact on the policy process. There is no reason to believe that public opinion will have the same impact at different stages of the decision-making cycle. If the policy process is divided into distinct stages, as will be done in this dissertation, one may find that public opinion has a different quantitative and qualitative impact at various stages such as getting on the agenda, negotiation or during ratification.

B. The Mood Theory or Volatility Concept

The mood theory advocated by Almond ([1950] 1960) asserts that foreign policy attitudes, as well as interest, are unstable. However to support his proposition Almond did not systematically analyze attitudes; he only looked at levels of public interest. A closer review of foreign policy attitudes over the last fifty years produces some disturbing findings for the mood thesis or volatility concept. First, public opinion data show that isolationist attitudes disappeared in 1943 during World War II, not after the war as a result of a Cold War mood shift. Since that time, except for three years immediately

after the war in Vietnam, internationalist attitudes have been quite stable for 45 years, well beyond the 20-30 year cycle when a major mood shift should have occurred.⁴⁴

Second, a sophisticated review of attitudes and their relationship to interest in foreign policy, conducted by Caspary (1970), raises serious questions concerning the validity of using the indicator examined by Almond--the "most important problem" survey question--to study either foreign policy interest or attitudes.

Third, Klingberg's research (1952) only demonstrates that the content of elite political communication has shown a pattern of shifting from an emphasis on internal political issues to stressing foreign involvement. However, his analysis says nothing about mass attitudes or mood shifts by the general public. He did not support his conclusions by examining any survey research which was available during his hypothesized last two mood shift cycles.

A final criticism of the mood theory can be found in research completed by Shapiro and Page (1988). These scholars conclude that public attitudes are relatively stable, not volatile or moody. Based on a review of over 6,000 survey questions asked between 1935 and 1982, these researchers examined 1,128 questions which were repeated, in exactly the same form, over time. Of these repeated questions, over one-third (38%) deal with foreign policy and national defense. Out of this sample of foreign affairs questions, half show no change at all.⁴⁵ Of the remaining foreign policy questions, most attitudes

44 J. Benson 1982; H. Cantril 1948; Caspary 1970; Foster 1983; Graham 1989a; Watts and Free 1978.

45 The authors define attitude change as 6 percent.

changed only between 6-9 percent.⁴⁶ When compared with opinions about domestic issues, foreign policy attitudes were equally stable. This research clearly refutes Almond's and Lippmann's assertions that "remote" foreign policy attitudes are unstable by definition. However, one conclusion from the Shapiro and Page research provides a rationale for the existence of the conventional wisdom about foreign policy attitude instability. For the minority of foreign and domestic policy attitudes that changed quickly (20 percent of all repeated questions), foreign policy attitudes changed at three times the rate of domestic attitudes. Of these, not surprisingly, attitudes toward war changed the fastest. While no other research has demonstrated the scope and methodological sophistication of the Shapiro and Page work, other studies completed by Graham (1985), Kohut (1988), and Bardes and Oldendick (1985) also argue that attitudes tend to be relatively stable over long periods of time.

Taken together, the finding of relative attitude stability has important implications for this dissertation. If public attitudes have been relatively stable over time, then a thorough review and examination of attitudes about arms control from the 1940s and 1950s may be extremely relevant both to the historical case studies and also to academic theory concerning contemporary nuclear attitudes and politics.

46 The percent of all the repeated foreign policy questions that showed various levels of attitude change are listed in parentheses below: attitude change of 6-7 percent (21%), attitude change of 8-9 percent (22%), attitude change of 10-14 percent (28%), attitude change of 15-19 percent (15%), attitude change of 20-29 percent (12%), and attitude change of 30% or more (3%).

C. The Fragmentation or Breakdown in Consensus Proposition

While more analytically precise than much of the academic literature produced by the first generation traditionalist scholars, fragmentation theorists still present an incomplete model of public opinion about foreign policy. First, none of the authors present data on the structure of attitudes before Vietnam. As a result, their model contains no specification--either at the elite or at the mass level--that describes the degree of attitude consensus that existed before the Vietnam war. This omission makes it difficult to determine whether the breakdown in consensus is primarily at the mass level or at the elite level. This lack of specification in the fragmentation model also makes it impossible to determine what level of public agreement would constitute a reemergence of a foreign policy attitude consensus.

Second, the specific topics examined by the authors of this school under-represent military and national security subjects. Very few arms control or nuclear weapons topics have been included in the collective work of these authors. As a result, even though the stimulus to the breakdown in consensus was the war in Vietnam, it is not clear whether the fragmentation concept applies to public attitudes toward both foreign policy and national security issues.

Third, even though the fragmentation scholars have conducted more quantitative analysis than early traditional scholars, the existing academic literature in both schools is based on analysis of a relatively small number of public opinion surveys. Table 2-2 shows

Scope of Research Supporting
Theory in the Public Opinion & Foreign Policy Field
(Number of national surveys)

Table 2-2

Authors	Number of Surveys Cited	Number of Surveys Analyzed
Adler & Bobrow 1956	1 a	1 a
Almond 1950/1960	34	9
Arian 1987	1 d	1 d
Bardes & Oldendick 1985	3 c	3 c
Barton 1974-75	1 b	1 b
Caspary 1970	24	23
Cohen 1966	1 a	1 a
Divine 1970	6	6
Gamson & Modigliani 1966	1 a	1 a
Genco 1984	7	5
Graham 1988	103	0
Graham 1989a	245	90
Graham 1989b	509	~90
Holsti & Rosenau 1984	20	2 b
Jacobson 1984	15	15
Klingberg 1952	0	0
Lippmann 1922/1965	0	0
Levering 1978	~150	0
Louis 1969	1	1
Mandlebaum & Schneider 1979	11	1 c
Modigliani 1972	14	9
Mueller 1973	~250	~160
Mueller 1979	~100	~100
Paterson 1979	4	0
Rosi 1965	18	18
Rogers 1967	1 a	1 a
Russett & Hanson 1975	2 b	1 b
W. Schneider 1974-75	10	2
W. Schneider 1983	16	1
W. Schneider 1984	17	2
W. Schneider 1985	~110	3
Shapiro & Page	~400	-
P. Smith 1961	14	14

Key

- a A state or local poll, not a national survey.
- b An elite survey, not a national survey.
- c A parallel elite survey and national survey.
- d A survey conducted outside of the United States.

that with the exception of work completed by Graham (1988, 1989a), Levering (1978), Mueller (1973, 1979), Schneider (1985), and Shapiro and Page (1988), the body of theory in the field is based on analysis of approximately 50 national surveys. At first glance this might not seem so bad because the entire American voting behavior literature is based on analysis of approximately one dozen surveys. However, the main difference between the two fields of American voting behavior versus public opinion on foreign policy is that research which makes up the former has at least covered the relevant phenomena: all of the Presidential elections since 1940. The major problem with developing theory in the area of foreign policy public opinion with this relatively narrow base of research is that most academic writing ignores many of the best foreign policy surveys that were explicitly commissioned either by various Presidents or by the State Department.⁴⁷

Until this dissertation and work by Shapiro & Page, this rich body of information has not been examined systematically. This omission is particularly serious for the development of academic theory because the literature concerning the impact public opinion has on policy-making suggests that public opinion is likely to have more of an impact at the White House than in the State Department. To test this

47 Franklin Roosevelt commissioned over 70 opinion polls from before Pearl Harbor through the end of WW II. These Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) surveys were declassified in the early 1960s. The State Department commissioned the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to conduct over 90 confidential opinion surveys from 1945 through 1958 when the contract was cancelled by Congress.

proposition, one needs to review the results of Presidential and other "confidential" polling, track primary source documents to determine which policymakers were aware of public attitudes, and then determine whether Presidents take public opinion into account when making decisions.

Finally, in one important way fragmentation scholars work within the boundaries of the traditional paradigm. None of these scholars explicitly state how and under what conditions public opinion has an impact on decision-making. As a result, fragmentation theorists have not refuted the Cohen (1973) no-impact conclusion.

D. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change Model

One of the two components of this theoretical proposition has been validated by most research conducted over the past fifty years. All scholars agree that an attentive public exists. Research universally shows that one segment of society, concentrated among the highly educated minority, is more attentive to foreign policy and to politics in general. However, research completed by Genco (1984) and Neuman (1986) disagrees with one part of the original formulation of the concept of an attentive public. They conclude, in separate studies, that the size of the attentive public has not grown over the last several decades and that it may be smaller than initially estimated, approximately 10 percent rather than 25 percent of the population.

On the related issue of attitude change and the role played by the attentive public, research completed after the development of the top-down model has shown that the correlation between the attentive public and the general public is quite weak, making a causal linkage unlikely. Recent research on attitude change emphasizes the diversified nature of the audience, the limited amount of communication between an attentive public and the general public, and the independent role played in attitude change by the mass media, especially television.⁴⁸

Several studies completed by Gamson and Modigliani (1971, 1966) have shown that attitudes among the general public have been relatively stable, but those of the attentive public have been variable. This research shows that the "attentives" are the ultimate followers: often their attitudes change after government policy changes. If Gamson and Modigliani are correct, the attentive public does not seem to provide any democratic check on government policy, as hypothesized by Lippmann, due to their role as attentive judges of foreign policy. As a final criticism of the top-down attitude change model, there is empirical evidence that when the attentive public changes its attitudes, the general public does not always go along with the new ideas. The reverse is also often the case: when attitudes among the general public change, attentives' attitudes do not follow necessarily change in the same direction.⁴⁹

48 Fan 1988; Neuman 1986; J. Robinson 1976.

49 Graham 1989a; Modigliani 1972; Mueller 1973; Rosi 1965.

Other research shows that real world events, not diffusion of ideas from the attentive public or public education campaigns directed by Presidents, have the most powerful influence on attitude change. Research by Mueller (1971, 1973, 1979) concludes that mass attitudes change in relation to real world events such as casualty rates during the wars in Korea and Vietnam. He also suggests that attitudes held by the mass public may look quite different from what they may be perceived to be by elite policy makers. For example, Mueller was not able to find either a consistent "hawk" or "dove" position with respect to the wars in Korea and Vietnam even though the policy community divided itself along these lines. More recent work reviewed in Russett and Graham (1989) shows that opinion change may take place in small but quite rapid steps which are influenced by the media.

The most comprehensive research which further calls into question the top-down attitude change model was completed by Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987). They examine the influence of Presidential leadership and attitude change. These authors find that such top-down mass learning only takes place with popular Presidents, defined as those with over 50 percent in job performance ratings, and Presidential leadership has relatively little impact--only 5 to 10 percent--on public attitudes.

The strong relationship between real world events and attitude change and the limited influence that the attentive public plays in relation to mass attitude change can be seen in a review of public opinion data concerning the use of nuclear weapons. This research,

produced by Graham (1989a), shows that the public may learn one lesson from real world events, while the attentive public, opinion and policy elite, and policymakers may learn a very different lesson. Since the mid-1950s, the public has rejected the idea of using nuclear weapons unless these devices are used first by the Soviet Union. The Korean war experience, where nuclear weapons were not used, and the growing awareness that the Soviet Union could retaliate with nuclear weapons seem to have convinced the public to become cautious with regard to using nuclear weapons. At the same time this attitude was taking hold at the mass level, policymakers were implementing nuclear weapons strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response which placed the threat to use of nuclear weapons at the center of U.S. defense policy. The attentive public supported this policy, while the general public did not. In this example, mass attitudes were changed as a result of real world events, and public attitudes went in the opposite direction of attitudes held by either the attentive public or government policymakers.

IV Academic Theory Concerning Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Its Relationship with Arms Control

Prior to the writing of this dissertation, there has been no comprehensive academic study of public attitudes toward arms control throughout the nuclear age.⁵⁰ While a number of publications have looked at one or another aspect of public attitudes about nuclear power,

50 While many studies have been published on selected nuclear issues, none are comprehensive over a 40 year period.

nuclear weapons, civil defense, a specific arms control agreement, or nuclear war--none have produced an intellectual framework from which hypotheses for this dissertation can be developed.⁵¹ As a result, the hypotheses to be examined in this dissertation will be derived from the academic literature on public opinion on foreign policy reviewed above.

Even though the large academic literature on arms control and international security has not focused on public opinion, a few conclusions have been reached which coincide with the dominant paradigm from the foreign policy public opinion literature. First, there is an assumption, which has been tested rarely, that the public is in favor of peace in general and arms control in particular. This idea that the public favors peace permeates the work of Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant and, in more recent times, can be seen in speeches given by various Nobel Peace Prize winners.⁵² The second theme from the arms control literature is that public opinion played a positive role in stimulating the successful negotiation and ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. However these two cases are considered exceptional. In line with existing theory in the public opinion field, most arms control scholars conclude that public opinion usually has little impact on arms control decisions or outcomes.⁵³

51 For a list of publications about attitudes toward various nuclear issues, see Appendix 10.

52 For a review of Kant and Bentham's work with regards to peace, see Davidson 1973. For texts of Nobel Peace Prize speeches by Frank Kellogg [1929] and Sean MacBride [1974], see Laszlo, Ervin and Yoo 1986, Vol. 3, 253, 336.

53 Barton & Weiler 1976; Blacker & Duffy 1984; Epstein 1983.

Third, while there is a large literature on the politics of arms control, almost all of the work ignores the role of political parties, party platforms, elections, interest groups, and public opinion. As is true in the field of American foreign policy, the academic literature on the politics of arms control really focuses on bureaucratic politics. This means that the current conclusions about the relationship between public opinion and the politics of arms control noted above are mostly speculation, not the product of detailed scholarship.

V Hypothesis Being Tested

A The Question

Until the United States and the Soviet Union began dismantling nuclear delivery systems covered by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, one could easily characterize the history of nuclear arms control between the two superpowers as mixed, with more failure than success. Immediately after World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union failed to agree on international control of atomic energy. Negotiations held in the 1950s and 1960s to end nuclear testing resulted in an agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which improved the environment but placed only a slight constraint on nuclear testing and on the further development of offensive weapons. The corner-stone of strategic arms control, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty which eventuated from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreement, placed limits on the deployment of defensive systems; but SALT I only had a marginal effect on the number or quality of offensive systems deployed

by both superpowers. The SALT II agreement was never ratified by the United States, and while several of its provisions have been informally adhered to by the two parties, other sections have been violated by both nations.

These examples show that the history of strategic arms control from 1945 to the end of the Carter administration in 1980 has an uneven pattern of success and failure. This mixed pattern is presented in Table 2-3 below. Of the four arms control initiatives that will be the focus of this dissertation, all reached the executive branch agenda. However, while three were successfully negotiated, only two were ratified and only one has been fully implemented.

Mixed Record of Arms Control Accomplishment
Table 2-3

Arms Control Initiative	<u>On Agenda</u>	<u>Negotiated</u>	<u>Ratified</u>	<u>Implemented</u>
International Control	Yes	No	No	No
Test Ban	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ABM/SALT I	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial
SALT II	Yes	Yes	No	Partial

This mixed history raises one basic question: why have superpower negotiations to control and reduce strategic nuclear weapons produced such a dismal track record? This dissertation will attempt to answer this question by focusing on the domestic political pressures that influence American foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on public opinion.

B. Three Hypotheses

Three possible hypotheses relating to the role public opinion plays in the policy process might explain the failure to achieve significant strategic arms control in the nuclear age: 1) public opinion has little or no effect on arms control policy (the mixed pattern of success and failure can be explained by other factors); 2) there has been no mass public opinion consensus in support of arms control due to attitude volatility or fragmentation; and 3) the attentive public has not supported arms control and these attitudes have eventually trickled down to the general public in a top-down fashion.

The first hypothesis will evaluate conclusions reached by Bernard Cohen (1973) that public opinion has little or no impact on government foreign policy decisions. In the context of arms control, it would not be surprising to find that as a result of low public knowledge and limited interest in arms control, government leaders may ignore public opinion and focus instead on bureaucratic politics. In the context of this dissertation, if the no-impact hypothesis is correct, then public opinion on arms control will be found to be largely irrelevant to the

success or failure of the four cases being examined. If this is true, the pattern of success and failure must be due to other factors.

The second hypothesis is that public opinion may have had an impact on decision-making, but the mass public may not have supported arms control throughout the post World War II era. Such a lack of opinion consensus would mean that there has been no stable political constituency to support arms control. A lack of public opinion consensus could be caused by one of two factors. In the tradition of Gabriel Almond and Frank Klingberg, arms control attitudes could be volatile and fluctuate wildly as the mood of the country changes from internationalism to isolationism. A second source of instability could be that attitudes have been divided among the opinion & policy elite, attentive public, and the masses and also fragmented along ideological, partisan, and other demographic lines. Even though the volatility and fragmentation concepts are quite different, their ability to explain the failure of arms control are similar: they provide alternative reasons why a consensus of the public might not have supported arms control.

The third hypothesis is that the attentive public has not been in favor of arms control and, after a lag consistent with the top-down attitude change model, the general public eventually shared this same critical perception. This hypothesis is an outgrowth of the work by Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond concerning the importance to which decisionmakers give to attitudes held by the attentive public.

VI Scope and Methodology Used in This Dissertation

To strengthen the internal and external validity of my research, I have taken several steps to address methodological weaknesses of previous studies. First, the scope of my review and analysis of public opinion data will be the most extensive conducted to date in the field of arms control. Second, the four case studies extend over 7 Presidential terms. This will strengthen any consistent conclusions because they will be independent of a particular administration. Third, the policy-making process will be disaggregated into four distinct steps which will permit testing whether public opinion plays a different role at each step. Fourth, if a correlation can be found between public opinion and policy outcomes, primary source documents will be reviewed to help determine if the link is causal or spurious. Finally, several terms that have been used in the academic literature, but never precisely defined, will be defined.

To address the three hypotheses noted above, I have identified and reviewed all available public opinion polls which contain questions relating to my four arms control cases. Of the approximately 360 surveys that pertain to nuclear arms control from 1945 through 1980, cross-tabulation and statistical analysis have been conducted on about 90. To compare and contrast public attitudes toward the four cases with other attitudes about arms control and nuclear issues, I have created a comprehensive data-set on public attitudes which currently contains approximately five thousand questions from over 800 national surveys conducted from August, 1945 through August, 1988. The collection

includes surveys sponsored by 40 different organizations, and particular effort has been made to include questions and data which originally were considered "confidential" by political parties, Presidents or government agencies. One of the academic benefits of conducting this thorough search will be the eventual publication of a great deal of public opinion data that has never been reviewed by scholars. While it is impossible to know if my database is complete, it has been characterized by the president of the Gallup Organization and by specialists in the State Department as the most comprehensive collection in existence.

Some previous scholars have been skeptical that the case study method can be used to determine whether public opinion has an impact on foreign policy decisions. For this reason, the decision-making system has been defined for this study as a four stage process: getting on the agenda, negotiation of an agreement, ratification of a treaty and implementation of an international obligation. To determine whether an arms control issue has reached the first policy stage--getting on the agenda--several questions will be asked. Has the issue been decided by the President? If the President has been involved in making relevant decisions, has the arms control initiative successfully moved onto the next stage of negotiation? When evaluating the role public opinion has played during this first policy stage, particular attention will be paid not only to whether the arms control issue has made it onto the agenda, but also to how the arms control issues have been framed. A similar set of detailed questions will be asked at the other policy stages.

To represent the full range of arms control initiatives since World War II, the four arms control cases were selected because they reached different stages of completion. One proposal, international control of atomic energy, reached the agenda of the Executive Branch but was not successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union. One proposal, SALT II, reached the agenda, was successfully negotiated, but was not ratified. One proposal, ABM/SALT I, reached the agenda, was negotiated and ratified, and partially implemented, but the ABM agreement had difficulty at the implementation stage during the Reagan administration. The fourth agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, passed through all four policy stages, including implementation.

The four arms control case studies also cover the full range of Presidential administrations from Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy through Nixon, Ford and Carter. As a result, any conclusions reached throughout the dissertation will not be limited to a specific historical context of any one administration.

To determine that public opinion has an impact on policy, one must first show that opinion and policy correspond. If this necessary, but not sufficient condition is met and there is a positive relationship between opinion and policy, is the temporal sequence consistent with the proposition that public opinion had an impact on decision-making? If this can be shown, is there evidence from primary and secondary source documents that policymakers were aware of public opinion and took it into account in their decisions?

To address the question whether the public has supported arms control, case studies were selected that could test both potential causes of a lack of public consensus: attitude volatility and fragmentation. The four arms control cases occur throughout the post-war period from the beginning of the Cold War (International Control of Atomic Energy, 1945-1950), to the middle and "end" of the Cold War (Limited Test Ban, 1952-1963), to the Vietnam era (ABM/SALT I, 1960-1972), and to the beginning of the Reagan era (SALT II, 1973-1980). Since the mood cycles are posited to be 20-30 years long and since my four cases extend over a 35 year period, there should be striking differences in public opinion among the four cases if the volatility hypothesis is correct. If the isolationist- internationalist mood dichotomy is really an important fault-line in American foreign policy attitudes, I would expect to find that internationalists are more likely to support arms control than isolationists.

One of the weaknesses of the public opinion literature has been the absence of definitions for widely-used terms such as consensus, fragmentation, and the attentive public. An attitude consensus could have two quite different meanings.⁵⁴ One definition would be to consider a high aggregate level of public opinion as a consensus; another type of consensus could relate to close agreement among

54 Two authors have defined an elite consensus as less than a 10% difference in attitudes among various elite groups on various policy issues. See Bardes and Oldendick 1985, 12.

different segments of society such as the attentive public and the general public, Republicans and Democrats, women and men. Since both definitions seem equally valid, the data on public attitudes toward arms control will be evaluated to determine if either type of consensus can be discovered.

However, this twin definition of consensus leaves its precise operational meaning unspecified. For the mass-level meaning of consensus, the following five-level, heuristic typology has been developed. It is summarized in Table 2-4. It is based on the concept of majority rule as it applies to American foreign policy decisions that involve Congress. For this aspect of American foreign policy, decision-rules are clear-cut: a majority or a two-thirds majority are needed to support various legislation. In the context of the arms control treaties being examined in this dissertation, ratification requires a two-thirds vote. This is the main reason for defining an attitude consensus at the approximate level of two-thirds.⁵⁵

Levels of Mass Public Support
Table 2-4

CATEGORIES	LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
Virtual Unanimity	80% and above
Preponderance	70% to 79%
Consensus	60% to 69%
Majority	50% to 59%
Plurality	modal category < 50%

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Holsti and Rosenau (1988) have used 60% or more to define a consensus. Schuman and Presser (1977-78) implicitly define a consensus as 68% and above.

Two other definitions, majority and plurality levels of public opinion, are straight-forward and follow normal usage. However, the classification of public opinion into the last two levels--preponderance and virtual unanimity-- are more original. In politics, one can observe situations when a group or a nation is sufficiently powerful so that it not only controls policy, but it also dominates the entire system over long periods of time. In such cases, opposition, while extant, is muted and mostly irrelevant to the workings of the political system. To explore whether this phenomenon is applicable to public attitudes, the category of preponderance has been created.

A final category has been created to deal with rare, but important, public opinion events. Every once in a while virtually all members of a polity agree on a common position. While there may be token opposition, the overwhelming size of the majority often sweeps dissenters away and even inhibits freedom of expression involving contrary opinions. One foreign policy example which illustrates this type of virtual unanimity is passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Again, to explore whether this phenomenon is applicable to public attitudes, the category of virtual unanimity has been created.

As was true for the term consensus, the concept of fragmentation also has not been defined by scholars who argue that a breakdown in consensus occurred as a result of the war in Vietnam. To enable comparison of the degree of fragmentation of public attitudes over time, a scale has been developed in Table 2-5 below. It measures the degree to which various groups in the population--such as Democrats, men, the

high educated, high status professions, and younger adults-- hold attitudes that differ from the mean of all attitudes held by the general public. For example, if attitudes are extremely fragmented, several groups will hold attitudes that differ from the norm by over 18 percent. If attitudes demonstrate only medium fragmentation, virtually all groups will hold attitudes that differ from the mean by approximately 10 percent. If attitudes are not fragmented at all, attitudes of most groups in society will vary less than the typical sampling error of a standard national sample, i.e. less than 3 percent.

Fragmentation Scale
Table 2-5

Numerical Level	Rank	Percent
1	None	0.0% - 2.9%
2	Very Low	3.0% - 5.9%
3	Low	6.0% - 8.9%
4	Medium	9.0% - 11.9%
5	High	12.0% - 14.9%
6	Very High	15.0% - 17.9%
7	Extreme	18.0% <

If the fragmentation hypothesis is correct, I should find that a foreign policy attitude consensus supported arms control prior to Vietnam but not after it. This would translate into either consistent levels of mass support for my first two cases (ICAE and LTBT) or homogenous attitudes among various segments of the general public. As

the foreign policy attitude consensus begins to break down in the late 1960s, I should see a more distinct pattern of opinion beginning with the ABM/SALT I agreement. Ideological and partisan indicators will become more important, and a gap will grow between opinions held by the attentive public and the general public. This fragmented pattern should be clearly in force for attitudes about the last case, SALT II.

The final operational definition covers the term "attentive" public. Literature on the attentive public, summarized in Table 2-1, shows no agreement whether this concept is best defined by levels of knowledge, levels of interest, socio-economic characteristics--such as college education--or by types of behavior. Ideally, one should identify members of the attentive public by a combination of knowledge, interest, and behavioral characteristics. However, this will not be possible in this dissertation because all three measures of attentiveness do not exist on all of the relevant surveys. As a result, this dissertation will use completion of college as a surrogate for attentiveness. Three reasons led to this conclusion. First, college education was used by Almond ([1950] 1960) in his original analysis of foreign policy attitudes held by the attentive public. He found that education was a much better indicator than occupation or income to differentiate foreign policy attitudes.⁵⁶ The second reason for selecting education is that the most methodologically sophisticated

⁵⁶ Almond [1950] 1960, 126-30. Since Almond's work, many authors have reached the same conclusion that education is the best single socio-economic measure of attentiveness. See Cohen 1966; Free and Cantril 1967, 61; National Science Board 1981, 177.

studies of the attentive public, completed by Devine (1970) and Genco (1984), have come to the conclusion that the strongest correlation between membership in the attentive public and any other univariate variable is education. While completion of a college or post-college degree does not assure that a person is attentive to foreign policy issues, more than half of those who have been identified as attentive have at least a college degree. Since levels of education are recorded on virtually every national public opinion survey, a college education will be used to provide a rough approximation of attitudes held by the attentive public. Where individual surveys include interest and knowledge questions, these will be used to compare and validate the generic use of education measures. The third reason education has been selected to track attitudes of the attentive public is because the large literature on voting behavior finds close association between education and many politically relevant characteristics such as political participation, ideological and policy sophistication, and efficacy.⁵⁷

Before getting into the next chapters, one final comment on methodology should be made. Research for this dissertation has reviewed thousands of public opinion questions about arms control and nuclear weapons. Since the research is based on secondary analysis of existing surveys, one is not always able to confine evaluation to questions that have been repeated, word for word, by the same survey organization. When the exact same question has been repeated over time, the data will

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Numerous studies show that education is strongly associated with interest and participation in politics. See Campbell et. al. 1964; Converse 1964; Key 1961; Kinder and Sears 1985, 705; Nie et. al. 1979.

provide a valuable opportunity to judge whether relatively small changes in public attitudes have taken place. However, the research for this dissertation is not confined to analysis of repeated questions. The main reason is that a comprehensive review of sources of error in public opinion polling shows that question wording, question order, sample design, interview procedures, and sampling error all contribute.⁵⁸ Question wording is not the only, nor even necessarily the largest, source of error. As a result, all questions relevant to my four arms control cases will be reviewed. This will allow one to study the effects of changed question wording on a case by case basis. Using data from a large number of surveys conducted over a relatively long time-frame will allow for the possibility that many sources of error, other than question wording, may cancel themselves out. For all of these reasons, conclusions will be drawn concerning attitude change when shifts on the order of 10 percent have taken place and when data from different questions and survey organizations show the same pattern. This conservative approach will partially help to overcome the lack of true trend data for most of the four arms control cases.⁵⁹

58 Turner and Martin 1984.

59 This definition of attitude change expands on work by Shapiro and Page 1988. While they confine their analysis to repeated questions, they define attitude change as a shift in opinion of 6%. These scholars acknowledge that public opinion data is "softer" than often implied by measures of statistical significance which only measure sampling error.

The Pattern of Public Awareness, Knowledge and
Interest on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control
and Foreign Policy Issues, 1945 - 1988

Chapter 3

I Summary

Determining the level of public awareness, knowledge, and interest concerning nuclear and arms control issues is necessary as the first step in evaluating all three hypothesis which are being examined for this dissertation. The no-impact hypothesis is justified, in part, because many scholars consider the public to be ignorant of foreign policy issues. The volatility hypothesis posits that public interest on foreign issues is erratic. Existence of an attentive public is a necessary precondition to confirm the validity of the top-down attitude change model. To evaluate these hypotheses, this chapter asks four questions. What is the level of public awareness and knowledge concerning arms control and nuclear weapons issues? Is there evidence of an "attentive public" for nuclear and arms control issues, and if so, what is its size? Is there an "opinion and policy elite" for nuclear and arms control issues, and if so, what is its size? Finally, is the pattern of public interest concerning arms control and nuclear issues volatile?

A comprehensive review of approximately 250 public opinion surveys that include over 550 questions which measure public awareness, knowledge, and interest about nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues reaches some important conclusions. First, public awareness of nuclear issues is extremely high, and "functional" knowledge is relatively high compared to other public policy issues. However, detailed knowledge is extremely low. Second, an attentive public exists for arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues that varies depending on the issue from approximately 25 to 40 percent of the public. Third, there is clear evidence of an opinion and policy elite for nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues that constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. Fourth, contrary to existing theory, public knowledge and interest about arms control, nuclear weapons and foreign policy issues are quite stable, not volatile. Finally, the most unusual findings from this chapter relate to patterns of public awareness, knowledge and interest. People's knowledge and interest about nuclear issues form a distinctly hierarchical and bimodal pattern which favor the nuclear dimension over the arms control dimension of the issue. Levels of public awareness and knowledge of nuclear weapons are twice as high as awareness and knowledge of arms control negotiations or agreements. A similar pattern exists for the public's interest in these issues: interest over nuclear war and nuclear weapons dominates interest about arms control at slightly less than a two-to-one ratio. These twin discoveries provide the foundation needed

to understand the patterns of public attitudes toward arms control, which will be discussed in Chapters Four through 7.

II Questions To Be Examined

To provide building blocks to evaluate my three central hypotheses, this chapter will address four questions. First, what is the level of public knowledge and awareness concerning arms control and nuclear weapons issues? Is it true as academic research would have it that the public is poorly informed on virtually all public policy issues?⁶⁰ More importantly, is the public so ignorant as to sustain Walter Lippmann's justification for reliance on a foreign policy and opinion elite to evaluate and interpret international news for the general public?⁶¹

Second, is there evidence of an "attentive public" for nuclear and arms control issues? If so, what is its approximate size? Determining whether an attentive public exists is important because an attentive public is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for validating the top-down model of attitude change.

Third, is there evidence of an "opinion and policy elite" (Almond [1950] 1960), and if so, what is its size? Does this opinion and policy elite serve as an "issue public" which some scholars claim asserts democratic control over government policy?⁶²

⁶⁰ Kriesberg 1949; Kinder and Sears 1985, 661.

⁶¹ Lippmann [1922] 1965.

⁶² The concepts of "opinion and policy elite" and "issue public" will be used inter-changeably in this dissertation. For discussion of the concept issues publics, see Converse 1964, 245-6; Neuman 1986, 35, 67-73.

Finally, what is the pattern of public interest concerning arms control and nuclear weapons issues? Is Almond ([1950] 1960) correct in arguing that public interest fluctuates widely and follows distinct internationalist and isolationist moods?

III Scope and Quality of the Evidence

A comprehensive review of data from over 800 national public opinion surveys that contain questions about arms control and nuclear weapons finds one immediately surprising conclusion. There is a great deal of data about public awareness, knowledge, and interest in this issue area.⁶³ Approximately 200 questions, which measure either awareness or knowledge of nuclear and arms control issues, have been summarized in Appendix 1 (Volume II) of this dissertation. Appendix 1 begins with one survey question which received a 100 percent positive response from the public and ends with one which elicited only a 3 percent affirmative response. Each entry in Appendix 1 contains a short, one sentence version of each awareness or knowledge question and the percent of the public that was cognizant of that particular issue. Entries are ranked from highest public awareness or knowledge to lowest.

To compare and contrast public awareness and knowledge concerning arms control and nuclear issues with awareness and knowledge of foreign policy issues, data from an additional 165 relevant questions has been summarized in Appendix 2.

⁶³ Throughout this chapter, an attempt will be made to distinguish between public awareness, public knowledge, and public interest.

Against this background, data from 40 questions have been evaluated concerning public interest in arms control and nuclear issues, and an additional 70 questions have been examined concerning public interest about foreign policy. After completing this comprehensive review of public knowledge and interest in these areas, it is possible to conclude that the quantity and quality of this public opinion data makes it possible both to sustain and to challenge several existing theories in the public opinion and foreign policy fields.

IV Awareness of Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons

A strong pattern emerges from this mountain of data. It shows that public awareness is distinctly different from public knowledge. While often lacking in detail, public awareness of an issue is the prerequisite for more detailed mass knowledge. In addition, understanding the level, pattern, and diffusion of public awareness about arms control and nuclear issues is essential if one is to fully comprehend the meaning of public attitudes toward these subjects.

A. An exceptionally high floor of awareness provides a necessary precondition for political mobilization. Several commentators have noted that public concern over arms control and nuclear issues seems to follow a cyclical pattern.⁶⁴ During some periods, interest in arms control can be intense with hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating in the streets. At other times, the public seems totally

⁶⁴ Boyer 1984, 1985; Paarlberg 1973; Yankelovich and Harman 1988, 5-10.

apathetic. How is this dramatic change possible? One reason is that virtually everyone is aware nuclear weapons exist. Those who are unfamiliar with public opinion data may think this is a trivial finding. It is not. In no other area of public policy is at least 90 percent of the public aware of the existence of the public policy topic. This exceptionally high floor of awareness has persisted from 1945 through the 1980s, over forty years into the nuclear age.⁶⁵ As will be documented in more detail in other chapters, this high "floor" provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for extensive mobilizations of the politically active public when issues are defined in terms of nuclear war and peace.

B. A hierarchy of awareness exists, where nuclear weapons are more familiar than arms control. More important, one finds that awareness of nuclear weapons systems is much higher than awareness of arms control negotiations or agreements. For some important cases, the gap is as large as forty percent. Over 80 percent of the public have been aware of the following nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems: the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, nuclear weapons testing, the neutron bomb, Star Wars/SDI, the MX missile, and the fact that both the U.S. and Soviet Union have thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each other. Only one arms control proposal or agreement, SALT II, reached this 80

⁶⁵ Social Science Research Council 1947. See Appendix 1 for recent data on public awareness of nuclear weapons in the 1980s.

percent level of awareness.⁶⁶ Awareness of most arms control agreements falls far short of the 80 percent level. As shown in Table 3-1 below, awareness of specific arms control initiatives varies from 70 percent to approximately 25 percent.

Awareness of Arms Control Agreements & Proposals
(in percent)

Table 3-1

Level	Agreement or Proposal	Time Period
77%	Comprehensive Test ban proposals	1986
76-64%	INF talks	pre 1987 summit
75%	Stevenson's call for a unilateral US moratorium on nuclear tests	1956
73-72%	Test ban agreement	1963
70-64%	Soviet proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons	1988-1986
66%	Soviet proposal to cut nuclear weapons in half	1986
66-51%	Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal	1953
57-54%	The nuclear weapons freeze proposal	1982-1983
45-29%	The Baruch plan	1947-1946
43%	US armed forces limitation proposal	1951
41%	The Acheson-Lilienthal report	1946
36-17%	The SALT I/ABM treaty	1985
35%	Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal	1956
33%	The U.N. Special Session on Disarmament	1982
31%	The U.S. zero-zero INF proposal	1983
26%	UN Disarmament talks	1952

⁶⁶ Using definitions developed by Neuman (1986), the 80 percent level of public awareness suggests that the entire politically aware public has heard of most nuclear weapons systems. Only the 20 percent who are classified as "apolitical" remain unaware of nuclear weapons systems. For the methodology that divides the public into activist (5%), mass (75%) and apolitical (20%) groups, see Neuman 1986, 169-176.

Probably the most important single measure of awareness about arms control records that only 43 percent knew that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had concluded any arms control treaty prior to the 1987 INF agreement. Since this question measures general awareness of arms control, not public awareness of arms control jargon or the name of an esoteric treaty, it provides an important confirmation of a major conclusion reached from reviewing all of this data. Awareness of specific arms control agreements--such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, SALT I, and SALT II--is approximately half the awareness of most nuclear weapons systems.

C. Diffusion of awareness, public education and presidential leadership have their limits. During the Senate ratification stage of the foreign policy process, Presidents often attempt to increase public support for arms control treaties they have negotiated. Part of the task of selling a treaty to the Senate involves expanding the "name recognition" of the particular arms control agreement among the general public. One empirical rule of thumb, presented in Table 3-2 below, is that awareness of arms control and nuclear issues rarely increases over 20 percent from its initial base in a 6 to 12 month time-frame. For several cases, awareness of nuclear issues increased less than ten percent in the politically- relevant time period of six to twelve months necessary for Senate consideration of a treaty for ratification.

Two exceptions to this pattern--a fifteen percent increase in awareness in one month and a thirty-five percent increase in six

Increases in Awareness of Arms Control
Initiatives and Nuclear Issues
(in percent)

Table 3-2

Increase In Awareness	Arms Control Initiative	Time Period
17%	The proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons in half	8 months
16%	The neutron bomb	8 months
16%	The Baruch plan	9 months
15%	The countries involved in SALT II	11 months
14%	The Bikini test	3 months
11%	Fallout	12 months
10%	SALT II	12 months
8%	Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb	9 months
6%	The Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000	4 months
4%	The ABM system	1 month
3%	International control of atomic energy	8 months

months--are important to note. The first was the announcement by the Soviet Union that it had tested a hydrogen bomb. The second exception was the Rosenberg atomic spying trial. Both were dramatic and real world events, not public education campaigns sponsored by interest groups or administrations attempting to build support for an arms control treaty.

Often awareness of some nuclear event or issue does not diffuse as quickly or as extensively as elite policymakers think. For example, President Truman's announcement that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic device was relatively slow to diffuse (8 percent in 9 months) and only reached approximately three quarters of the public (73 percent). A

close examination of survey data shows that this key announcement did not change public attitudes about various issues such as U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the use of nuclear weapons, or the desirability of international control of atomic energy.⁶⁷

In contrast, the announcement that the Soviets had tested a hydrogen bomb diffused quickly (15 percent in one month) and reached the entire politically aware public (85 percent). Unlike the Soviet development of the A-bomb, Russian development of thermonuclear weapons seems to have changed American public attitudes toward various nuclear and arms control issues.

Understanding the level and diffusion rate of public awareness is important because there seems to be a relationship between the diffusion process and the impact public opinion has on government policy. One example from the early 1980s shows that awareness of the nuclear weapons freeze did not diffuse to a large proportion of the public (only to 57 percent). While the nuclear freeze movement generated a great deal of media and interest group attention and mass demonstrations, it is no coincidence that this arms control initiative failed to get onto the executive branch agenda.⁶⁸ A second example comes from the Reagan

67 Unlike the elite which was divided over the issue of the time it would take the Soviets to build nuclear weapons, the public believed that the Soviets would develop atomic devices within a few years. Thus, contrary to policymakers' predictions, Truman's announcement was not met by any public hysteria.

68 A review of survey data about participation in mass demonstrations shows that less than 10 percent of the U.S. population has participated in this type of activity. Thus, mass demonstrations, despite their name, are relatively elite phenomena, not mass political phenomena. See 6/1983 CBS; 3/1985 ABC/WP; 9/1985 M&K listed in Appendix 11.

administration from 1984 to 1987. The President was under political pressure to produce results on arms control. At the time, some peace activists, former arms control negotiators, and members of Congress were pressuring the administration to agree to halt nuclear weapons testing. In one of his first foreign policy initiatives, Mikhail Gorbachev unilaterally halted Russian nuclear testing and proposed that the United States agree to a test moratorium. During this time period private polling, conducted by an interest group sympathetic to the administration, reported to the White House that awareness of a proposal to stop nuclear testing declined in 1986. This data told the administration that public awareness of the Soviet test ban proposal was not diffusing throughout the public and that many people actually credited Ronald Reagan with the test moratorium proposal. This polling information convinced the White House that the Soviet test ban initiative was not a serious challenge from the political point of view.⁶⁹

D. Public awareness declines slightly after an issue has passed its prime. The public is constantly confronted with many public policy issues. Despite the importance of nuclear weapons issues, when they leave the front page and the TV news screen, they recede slowly in the public's mind. Examples include a fall-off in awareness of the controversy over nuclear power plant construction (8 percent drop in 10 years), declining awareness of the controversy involving David

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The surveys are cited in Appendix 11 as LR/NSIC. The surveys were read by senior Reagan administration officials and had an impact on their decision-making. Interview with former NSC staff member Dr. Ronald H. Hinckley.

Lilienthal and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (8 percent drop in 22 months), reduced awareness of SALT II (6 percent drop in 9 months, and a 15 percent drop in 7 years), declining awareness of the nuclear freeze (3 percent drop in 18 months), reduced awareness of the ABM system (3 percent drop in 2 months), and even a drop in awareness of the H-bomb (5 percent drop in 22 months).

E. Significant expansion or reduction in awareness is possible over longer periods of time. When the time frame is expanded from 6-12 months to several years, both awareness and knowledge of nuclear issues can increase or decrease significantly. The best example can be seen with the significant growth in awareness and knowledge of the term "fallout," by 40 percent, over a period of six and one half years. Even when less dramatic events are involved, when the time frame is expanded, awareness can increase a great deal. The number of people who could correctly identify the two countries that negotiated in the SALT/START nuclear arms talks increased 24 percent over the seven year period from 1979 to 1986.⁷⁰

On the other side of the coin, if the time-frame is extended, public awareness can drop substantially. Over a 17 years period, the number of people who could remember the location of a local public fallout shelter dropped 53 percent.

70

This knowledge question was asked five times from 1979 through 1986 in slightly different forms. The following percent of the population could identify the U.S. and Soviet Union as the countries negotiating strategic arms control: 23 percent (1/1979), 30 percent (6/1979), 37 percent (10/1981), 38 percent (11/1979), 47 percent (5/1986).

V Knowledge of Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons

As was noted earlier in this chapter, public awareness of an issue is quite different from more detailed public knowledge.⁷¹ Does a review of data about public knowledge confirm or reject the findings reached above concerning public awareness? Does a "policy and opinion elite" exist for arms control and nuclear issues? If it does, what is its approximate size?

A. Knowledge of nuclear weapons and arms control show the same hierarchical pattern as for awareness. Often a relatively large percent of the population has detailed knowledge of specific nuclear weapons-related facts such as the targets selected for the Bikini test (78 percent after the test, 63 percent before the test), description of the H-bomb (63 percent), description of the neutron bomb (63 percent), description of feasible ways a nuclear bomb could be delivered (51 percent), knowledge of the radius of destruction for an A-bomb (50 percent) and for an H-bomb (43 percent), description of SDI/Star Wars (43 percent), and correct identification of the materials which produce atomic energy (30 percent).

In contrast, fewer people had knowledge of various arms control phenomena: identified the purpose of SALT (58 percent), knew the U.S. was negotiating international control of atomic energy (53 percent), knew that the U.S. did not ratify SALT II (48 percent), named the countries involved in the strategic arms control negotiations (47-23

71 In terms of survey research methodology, most knowledge questions rely on an open-ended question format. In contrast, most questions used to measure awareness use a closed-question format.

percent), knew that the U.S. and Soviet Union had concluded an arms control treaty (43 percent), knew Ronald Reagan opposed the nuclear weapons freeze (30 percent), knew about the ABM treaty (17 percent), and had a clear idea about the Baruch plan (15-14 percent).⁷²

B. Survey data shows a small opinion and policy elite. Survey data show that a knowledgeable "opinion and policy elite" exists for arms control and nuclear issues, in support of the general proposition made by Almond ([1950] 1960). However, this opinion and policy elite is quite small, probably under 10 percent.⁷³ A review of Appendix 1 shows that less than 10 percent of the public believe themselves to be well informed on various arms control and nuclear-related issues such as SDI, SALT, arms control, the MX missile, nuclear winter, Soviet medium range missiles, the INF agreement, or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Not only do data from these self-defined knowledge questions point to a very small opinion and policy elite or "issue public" for nuclear and arms control, but data from "objective" knowledge questions show the same pattern.⁷⁴ Two major surveys, which developed objective indicators to determine the level of public knowledge and used these indicators to create knowledge scales, found that less than 10 percent of the public is quite knowledgeable about arms control and nuclear

⁷² Given that relatively few questions that probe for public knowledge about arms control, it is difficult to determine whether the two to one ratio that existed for awareness of nuclear weapons versus awareness of arms control holds for knowledge. However, knowledge of nuclear weapons clearly is more extensive than knowledge of arms control.

⁷³ Cohen 1966; Graham 1988.

⁷⁴ See Appendix 1 for the specific questions.

issues.⁷⁵ In addition, there is some evidence that the small size of the opinion and policy elite has been true throughout the nuclear age. In the 1950s, only 5 percent of the public could define the term "preventative war."

C. Functional knowledge exceeds understanding of abstract arms control concepts or terms. Can one conclude from this evidence that the public is ignorant of many first principles of the nuclear age? Probably not. When broader questions are asked, the public comes out as being "functionally knowledgeable." For example, on the topic of nuclear deterrence, when asked whether the U.S. has given up the right to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, 83 percent gave the correct answer of "No."⁷⁶ While only 23 percent of the public could name the countries that participated in the SALT talks at one point in time, when this question was asked several years later, 49 percent correctly provided the answer. In 1980, when the ability to recall that the U.S. and Soviet Union were participating in the SALT negotiations hovered at the one third mark, 58 percent could identify the purpose of the negotiations. Few people (31 percent) knew about the "zero-zero option" when it was under negotiation at the INF talks, but 76 percent knew that the Russians had walked out of those arms control talks. When U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions resumed, 77 percent knew that the

75 Marttila & Kiley 1985; Social Science Research Council 1947.

76 This data shows that, contrary to the conclusions made by some authors, the public is not totally ignorant of U.S. policies concerning the use of nuclear weapons. See Yankelovich & Doble 1984.

first meeting was just to arrange for future talks, not to conclude an agreement. In the 1950s, only 12 percent knew that the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission had stopped its deliberations, but 63 percent knew that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had failed to reach agreement on the international control of atomic energy. These examples suggest that the public may have functional knowledge of many nuclear and arms control issues which is far higher than its ability to recall specific technical or arms control jargon.

D. Measurement of public knowledge through survey research shows consistent results and stability. There has always been a concern among social scientists that knowledge measured by public opinion surveys may not be very accurate. The public might say that they know of a particular issue only to please an interviewer or to appear well-informed. Despite these concerns, there is reason to have moderate faith in the data presented in this chapter concerning levels of public awareness and knowledge. Data from several questions, included in Appendix 1, show that there is a great deal of temporal stability in responses to similar knowledge questions which have been asked over time. One set of repeated survey questions, which asked respondents to tell researchers the percentage of electricity produced with nuclear power, shows remarkably similar results even though the surveys were conducted two years apart. The same pattern of temporal stability was reaffirmed in another set of surveys when respondents were asked to

define the percentage of the defense budget spent on nuclear weapons.⁷⁷

On occasion, some social scientists also have been unsure whether it is valid to use respondents' own self-perceptions to provide an accurate measure of public knowledge. This is an important issue because many survey research organizations use self-defined knowledge questions because they are simple and do not take valuable time. A review of Appendix 1 shows that these self-defined measures of knowledge are fairly good, but not perfect, indicators of actual public knowledge. The pattern of responses to self-defined knowledge questions demonstrates the same temporal stability which was discovered in responses to factual questions noted above. Also, answers to several "objective" questions--such as the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, the specific provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the definition of terms associated with nuclear deterrence--all show levels of affirmative responses which coincide with results from self-defined knowledge questions. Again, this data indicate that the nuclear opinion and policy elite constitutes between 5-10 percent of the population.

Finally, social scientists wonder to what extent people exaggerate their knowledge about particular issues. In the entire data set of surveys about nuclear issues, four pairs of questions first asked respondents whether they had heard about or knew about a particular

77 I am arguing that levels of public knowledge can be stable over time, not that public attitudes or knowledge is necessarily internally consistency. The large psychological literature on this subject is discussed in Ross et.al. 1976; N. Wood 1985.

nuclear issue and then followed up by asking them to provide specific descriptions of the particular nuclear issue. Between 16 and 37 percent of those who said they knew of a particular nuclear issue were unable to provide any specific information about that issue. These data are important for two reasons. First, they show there is an inflation factor in responses to self-defined knowledge evaluations of approximately one fifth to one third. At the same time, this level of public exaggeration is not so extensive as to call into question data obtained from such self-defined knowledge survey questions. Second, taking this inflation factor into account reinforces the conclusion that the opinion and policy elite for arms control is no larger than 10 percent of the public.⁷⁸

E. Question wording effects may be exaggerated. Since changes in question wording can have a dramatic impact on survey results, most scholars limit trend analysis to data from exactly repeated questions from the same survey organization.⁷⁹ A review of Appendix 1 reveals that similar, but not identical, questions asked by different survey organizations in the same general time frame often produce equivalent results. This is true even though question wording or survey organization vary. Examples include awareness of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (73 and 72 percent), awareness of the nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl (93 and 92 percent), and awareness of the Israeli

78 Thus, data which shows that 14-15 percent of the public had a good understanding of the Baruch plan has not led me to increasing the estimated size of the nuclear issue public above ten percent.

79 Belson 1968, 1981; H. Cantril [1944] 1972; Payne 1951; Schuman and Presser 1977; Sudman and Bradburn 1982.

bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor (86 and 80 percent). These data support the methodological approach used in this dissertation that all questions should be reviewed and analyzed, and that time series analysis should not be restricted exclusively to repeated questions.

Scholars must be aware of possible effects due to changes in question wording, but an approach that rejects evaluating all but true time series data would have the effect of severely restricting the subjects appropriate for academic study.⁸⁰

V Public Awareness and Knowledge Concerning Nuclear Versus Foreign Policy Issues

To determine whether awareness and knowledge patterns concerning arms control and nuclear issues are unique or whether they share common characteristics with awareness and knowledge of foreign policy issues, data from approximately 165 relevant questions have been summarized in Appendix 2. The same format used in Appendix 1 has been used with these foreign policy questions. Survey questions that received the highest level of awareness/knowledge are listed first, and questions are thereafter listed in descending order of public awareness/knowledge. A comparison of the two sets of opinion data concerning awareness/

80 The pattern of equivalent results from different questions asked in the same time frame did not occur for the issue of the neutron bomb. Two pairs of questions which measured awareness of the neutron bomb varied by 10% and 9% even though the surveys were conducted within one month of each other: 89% versus 79% in March/April 1978 and 74% versus 65% in August 1981.

knowledge for nuclear versus foreign policy issues is summarized in Table 3-3 below.

A. Many patterns are the same. As with public awareness and knowledge of nuclear and arms control issues, a distinct hierarchy exists concerning awareness and knowledge of foreign policy issues. Not surprisingly, for foreign policy issues, awareness of military conflict leads the list. Presidential summits are next and receive 20 percent more public awareness than do major diplomatic meetings between foreign ministers. Awareness of landmark diplomatic initiatives--e.g. the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Security Pact--is much higher than awareness of other, more day-to-day, foreign policy initiatives such as the Good Neighbor Policy or bilateral trade treaties. Knowledge of the function of various foreign policy institutions--the U.N., the foreign service, the Voice of America, UNESCO, and reciprocal trade agreements--is less than half as extensive as awareness of the institutions themselves.

Again, consistent with the empirical findings discovered for nuclear and arms control issues, there are limits to the diffusion of awareness for foreign policy issues. A maximum awareness diffusion level for foreign policy of approximately 20 percent is discernible for most issues: 19 percent (Suez conflict), 18 percent (United Nations), 13 percent (Indochina conflict), 12 percent (Truman's Point Four Program),

Awareness and Knowledge of
Nuclear and Arms Control
Versus Foreign Policy Issues
(percent)

Table 3-3

	Nuclear & Arms Control	Foreign Policy
A-Nuclear weapons (90s)	x	
A-Nuclear testing (90s)	x	
A-Nuclear accidents (90-80s)	x	
A-Nuclear weapons systems (80s)	x	
A-Major military conflicts (80-70s)		x
A-Presidential summits (80-70s)		x
A-United Nations (80-70s)		x
A-Landmark diplomatic initiatives (80-70s)		x
A-Deployment of nuclear weapons (70-60s)	x	
A-Test ban proposals (70-50)	x*	
K-World War II facts (60s)		x
K-Nuclear weapons facts (60s)	x	
A-Initial awareness of military conflict (60-50s)		x
A-Secretary of State's name (60-50s)		x
A-Major foreign policy controversies that have domestic implications (60-50s)		x
A-Foreign minister's conferences (60-40s)		x
A-Foreign leaders' names (60-30s)		x
A-Arms control efforts (60-20s)	x*	
A-Foreign policy jargon (50-20s)		x
K-Mainstream diplomatic facts (40-20s)		x
K-Basic arms control facts (40-20s)	x*	
K-Function of diplomatic institutions (40-10s)		x
A-Domestic foreign policy debates and issues (30-20s)		x
A-Obscure diplomatic events (30-20s)		x
K-Implementation of foreign policy (30-10s)		x
K-Function of obscure diplomatic institutions (20s-5)		x
K-Detailed knowledge (10-5)	x*	x

Key

A- Awareness

K- Knowledge

* Arms control related

10 percent (NATO), 9 percent (the term Cold War), 9 percent (Truman Doctrine/Aid to Greece), and 8 percent (SEATO).⁸¹

As was true for nuclear and arms control issues, functional knowledge is higher than recognition of foreign policy terms or jargon. While few people (~10 percent) could define the term "reciprocal trade agreement," a plurality (47 percent) knew that the basic American trade policy in the 1950s encouraged rather than discouraged imports into the U.S. More people knew that the U.S. and U.K. were members of NATO than were able to define the acronym "NATO." While less than one third of the public could identify the location of Iran in a 1951 survey, a majority (57 percent) could describe the reason for conflict between Iran and Britain.

Again, similar to the discoveries concerning awareness of nuclear and arms control issues, when an issue is no longer on the active political agenda and reported in the media, public awareness can decline. Fall-off in attentiveness occurred for several foreign policy issues such as the United Nations and the concept of world government.

Finally, data concerning foreign policy awareness supports the methodological approach taken in this dissertation that it is acceptable to compare data from questions which have not been repeated, word for word, by the same survey organization. Often, surveys that ask the same

81

Two examples associated with major developments in U.S. foreign policy did not fit this pattern. Awareness increased 38 percent concerning the term North Atlantic Security Pact and 33 percent for the Marshall Plan.

basic question, during the same general time period, record very similar results.⁸²

B. New evidence about the opinion and policy-elite and the attentive public suggests that the former is very small. A review of Table 3-3 above and Appendix 2 provides support for the proposition that the "opinion and policy elite" is quite small, under 10 percent. This is true both for nuclear and arms control issues as well as for foreign policy issues.⁸³ It is also clear from the data that this key group has not grown over the past 40 years.

On the other hand, the "attentive public" is quite a bit larger than the opinion and policy elite. To the extent that one uses knowledge-based indicators to define the attentive public for foreign policy, approximately 25 percent of the population falls into this category. About one quarter of the population is aware of foreign policy debates and issues, aware of somewhat obscure diplomatic events, and possess knowledge concerning the implementation of various foreign policy initiatives.

This review of public awareness and knowledge of foreign policy reinforces the conclusion reached by Genco (1978) that the size of the attentive public has not changed over time. For example, a review of results concerning awareness and knowledge of UNESCO suggests that the

82 See the following surveys listed in Appendix 2: awareness of 67% vs 64% regarding trouble at the Suez canal; awareness of 23% for Truman's Point Four Program (recorded by two different surveys); awareness of 80% vs 77% concerning the Moscow summit conference; and awareness of 74% vs 70% regarding the United Nations.

83 This conclusion reinforces similar findings made by Genco 1978 and Newran 1986.

percent of the population that had heard of UNESCO (30 percent) had not changed over time. However, there are indications of a slight improvement in the quality of information possessed by those attentive to foreign policy. Over time, more of the people who were aware of UNESCO were able to describe its function.⁸⁴

Awareness & Knowledge of Foreign Policy Terms
(in percent)*

Table 3-4

Define the term united command	60
Define the term isolationist	59
Define the term Cold war	57
Define the term tariff	49
Define the term 38th parallel	47
Aware of the term peaceful co-existence	41
Define the term foreign policy	41
Define the term Iron Curtain	40
Aware of the Connally Resolution	37
Aware of the term Four Freedoms	35
Define the term bi-partisan foreign policy	30
Define the term world government	29
Aware of the principle of self-determination	24
Aware of the Atlantic Charter	21
Aware of the Bricker amendment	19
Define the term peaceful coexistence	8

* For question wording, interview dates and survey organizations, see Appendix 2 and Appendix 11.

C. Use of abstract terms and jargon in foreign policy debates inhibits greater diffusion of awareness and public participation. The language used in foreign policy debates often is abstract and filled with jargon. Data summarized in Table 3-4 show that the majority of the

84 From 7 percent in April 1953 to 11 percent in August 1955.

public are able to define only very broad terms such as "united command," "isolationist," and "Cold War." Awareness of many specific foreign policy terms--such as the Connally resolution, the four freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, or the Bricker amendment--is much lower. More complete knowledge, such as the ability to define these abstract phrases, is often extremely low.

This finding suggests that the language used by foreign policy experts "shuts out" a majority of the public most of the time from participating in foreign policy debates. This is an important finding with respect to this dissertation because it relates to the first step of the policy process, getting on the agenda. As E. E. Schattschneider argues, the outcome of every political conflict is determined in large part by the extent to which the "audience" becomes involved.⁸⁵ The data presented in this chapter shows that the audience for foreign policy and arms control issues depends on the way a specific issue is framed. If arms control and foreign policy debates focus on very specific negotiating issues, the audience will be limited to the opinion and policy elite which constitutes less than 10 percent of the population. If slightly broader policy goals are discussed, approximately one quarter of the public (i.e. the arms control attentive public) is able to comprehend and participate in the debate. If an issue can be defined in terms of nuclear war or nuclear weapons, then the issue can diffuse to the entire politically aware public.

85 Schattschneider 1960.

These conclusions suggest that there will be a distinct incentive for advocates of arms control to attempt to define their proposals in terms of nuclear weapons or nuclear war. More people are aware of nuclear weapons than of any other foreign policy or arms control issue. From the point of view of developing political strategies, it seems logical that by focusing on the nuclear dimension of the issue, the chances are increased that political pressure can be organized to get a specific arms control issue onto the agenda. As will be shown in the following chapters, this is exactly what has happened on many historical occasions.

However, a review of data on public awareness and knowledge shows that there is a problem with relying on a nuclear-centric political communications strategy. The data in Table 3-3 show a clear bimodal distribution. Awareness about nuclear weapons is high, but it is also quite distinct from awareness about arms control. Awareness of arms control, other than for test ban proposals, is much lower than for nuclear weapons, i.e. approximately 60 percent to 25 percent for arms control compared to 80 percent and higher for nuclear weapons. It seems that extensive awareness about nuclear weapons has not translated into substantial awareness about arms control. This same pattern exists for public knowledge. Most arms control issues are quite far down the public knowledge list (approximately 40 to 20 percent), similar to most mainstream diplomatic initiatives. Thus the perceived political incentive to frame an arms control initiative in terms of its nuclear dimension is a mirage: it might produce some short-term interest, but a

closer analysis shows that it provides no long-term political benefits. This can be seen in Table 3-5, below. In comparison with other domestic and foreign policy subjects, the public believes that it knows less about arms control than about any other related foreign policy subject. For example, in 1963 among four foreign policy and nuclear subjects, individual respondents believed themselves to be least knowledgeable about arms control. Compared to nuclear issues in general, people thought they were better informed on civil defense issues than about arms control. A similar survey was conducted in 1978. It found that among six domestic, foreign policy, and nuclear issues, individual respondents believed themselves to be least knowledgeable about civil defense issues and most knowledgeable about the economy and energy situations. Unfortunately, there was no arms control question in this 1978 survey. However, if one assumes that the relative ranking between knowledge about civil defense and knowledge about arms control stayed the same between 1963 and 1978, then one could infer that arms control was still the least familiar subject to the public in 1978.

Self Evaluations of Knowledge on Nuclear,
Foreign Policy, and Domestic Issues
(percent)

Table 3-5

12/1963 This is the last scale. In this instance, 10 means that an individual knows all, or practically all, there is to be known about a given issue. Five represents a medium amount of information. Zero means that he has no knowledge of the issues at all. Everything considered . . . (NORC SRS-330)

- A. How well do you consider yourself informed about the issues of the Cold War in general?
- B. How well are you informed about the effects of nuclear weapons?
- C. How well do you consider yourself informed about civil defense in America?
- D And finally, how much information do you feel you have about arms control and disarmament efforts?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Low			Medium				High			
A	5	4	7	9	7	46	6	7	6	2	3
B	6	6	7	10	8	32	7	9	8	4	4
C	7	5	10	12	11	32	7	7	6	2	3
D	12	7	12	14	10	28	6	4	4	1	2

12/1978 People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all. Using any appropriate number on this scale, how would you characterize the amount of information you have about . . . A) the overall world situation; B) the economy of America; C) national defense in general; D) the Soviet Union; E) civil defense in America; F) the energy situation? (MIS/N)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Low			Medium				High			
A	3	3	7	13	10	24	11	11	11	3	3
B	2	3	6	9	10	21	13	14	13	5	5
C	7	6	11	16	14	20	9	8	6	2	2
D	11	10	15	18	11	16	6	5	4	2	2
E	10	10	17	17	13	16	6	4	4	2	1
F	4	3	5	10	11	21	10	15	12	6	4

Up to this point, this chapter has focused entirely on public awareness and knowledge. The finding that the public has relatively low levels of awareness and knowledge about arms control (versus other nuclear issues) forms the first structural "pillar" of a model of public attitudes toward arms control. The second pillar consists of public interest about arms control, and it will be discussed in the next section. The third pillar, actual public attitudes toward specific arms control initiatives, will be discussed in Chapters Four through Seven.

VII Interest in Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons Issues

A review of data from 40 questions which measure public interest about arms control and nuclear weapons issues is contained in Table 3-6 below. Several distinct patterns emerge from this data. First, interest in nuclear issues is higher than interest about arms control. While the magnitude of the difference is slightly less than the gap found concerning awareness/knowledge of nuclear weapons versus arms control, the same general hierarchical pattern is discernible.⁸⁶ Second, while interest or concern about nuclear war can often reach very high levels, there are indications that it is quite shallow. For example, during the 1980s when public concern about nuclear war was extremely high, only 6-7 percent worried about nuclear war "a great deal of the time." In another era in the early 1960s, only 15 percent were so concerned about the possibility of nuclear war that they said they had changed their future plans.

86 The ratio of awareness/knowledge of nuclear issues versus awareness/knowledge of arms control was approximately 2 to 1. The ratio of interest in nuclear issues versus interest in arms control is approximately 1.4 to 1.

Public Interest in Nuclear and Arms Control Issues
Table 3-6

Interest About Nuclear War, Nuclear Power Accidents or Nuclear Bombs

74%	Interested in the atomic bomb [2]*	5/46	NORC 142
69%	Very closely follow TMI nuclear accident [3]	5/79	Roper 79-5
60%	Worry a lot re possibility of nuclear war [3]	12/83	YSW/T
59%	Worry a lot about possibility of nuclear war [3]e	9/83	YSW/T 5642
57%	Great concern re control use of nuc weapons [4]	10/64	G/IISR
55%	Good deal interest atomic bomb [3]	9/46	NORC 243
54%	V concerned about nuc power plant accident [3]	6/82	Roper 82-7
52%	Worry a lot re possibility of nuclear war [3]	2/84	YSW/T 5661
46%	V closely follow Chernobyl accident [4]	7/86	Gallup/TM
46%	V interested in Hydrogen bomb test [3]	3/55	NORC 370
44%	V int in children's fears re nuclear war [4]	8/86a	Harris
42%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]	12/84	YSW/T 5702
42%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]	4/79	YSW/T 8181
38%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]e	6/83	YSW/T 5632
37%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]	12/83	YSW/T
37%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]	2/84	YSW/T 5661
32%	Interested in Bikini test [3]	8/46	Minn 36
29%	Worry a lot re nuclear plant accident [3]	8/79	YSW/T 8182
25%	V interested in hydrogen bomb [3]	3/50	NORC 276
18%	V closely follow discussion over Star War [3]c	10/86	AIPO 1269G
16%	Follow Star Wars v closely [3 pt scale]	1/85b	AIPO 1249G
15%	Follow Star Wars v closely [3 pt scale]	10/85	AIPO 1258G
15%	Fear n war/fallout affect outlook/future plans [2]	11/61	AIPO 652K
7%	Worry great deal of time re ch nuclear war [4]	1/85	LAT 93
6%	Worry great deal of time re ch nuclear war [4]	3/82	LAT 51

Interest in Arms Control

53%	Paying attention to nuclear freeze discussion [2]	5/82	CBS/NYT
50%	Follow very or somewhat closely strategic arms limitation negotiations [4 pt scale]	11/78	G/CCFR
44%	V interest in control of atomic bomb [3]	6/48	NORC 158
42%	SALT II very important [3]	5/79	ABC
34%	V closely follow news re SALT II [3]b	1/80	Roper 80-2
30%	Arms control most important of five problems [5]f	11/85a	CBS/NYT
30%	V interest in share atomic energy [3]	6/55	NORC 372
29%	V closely follow news re arms control neg [3]d	11/86	G/CCFR
27%	Talk to friends about control nuc weapons [2]	2/47	NORC 148
24%	Closely follow news re ac negotiations [4]	5/85	YSW/T 5714
23%	V closely follow news re arms control neg [3]d	11/82	G/CCFR
23%	V closely follow nat security news [4]	10/87	M&K/ATS
16%	V closely follow nuclear weapons issues [4]	9/85	M&K
16%	V closely follow news re arms control neg [3]d	11/78	G/CCFR
16%	Closely follow SALT II [3]	12/79	LAT 21
12%	Attentive to news on arms control negotiations [9]a	1/85	LAT 93
2%	Follow news story re anti-missile protest [9]a	11/83	LAT 73

* For a Key of Abbreviations, see next page

Table 3-6
(con't)

KEY

- * [2] indicates that the question included two response options, such as yes or no; [3] indicates three response options were available such as high, medium and low; and [4] indicates four response options.
- a Respondent's choice among 9 listed news stories.
- b This question was asked 11 times from 11/77 through 1/80; the highest response was 34% (1/80), the lowest was 27% (2/78), and the average was 31%.
- c This question was asked 3 times in 1/85, 10/85, and 10/86; the lowest response was 15% and the highest 18%.
- d The question was repeated three times; all are summarized on the chart.
- e The question was repeated twice; both surveys contained two questions that compared interest about a nuclear power accident with interest about nuclear war; worry about nuclear war declined 8% in 3 months; concern about a nuclear power plant accident was stable.
- f This question was repeated 3 times. The responses varied from 30% (11/85), to 28% (6/85), to 19% (7/85).

For purposes of comparison, a review of data from 70 questions concerning interest in foreign policy is presented in Table 3-7 below. A summary of similarities and differences in levels of interest for arms control/nuclear issues and foreign policy can be seen in Table 3-8. The basic conclusion from these two tables is that a hierarchical pattern of public interest also exists in the area of foreign policy. Interest about war and weapons dominates interest about diplomacy and arms control. This is the same pattern that was discovered for public awareness and knowledge.

Interest in Foreign Policy Issues

Table 3-7

74%	V interest in relations with Russia [3]	9/46	NORC 243
71%	V interest war in Korea [3]	4/53	NORC 339
55%	V interest increasing armed forces [3]	6/48	NORC 158
54%	Watch Col. North Congressional testimony [2]	7/87	ABC
51%	Worry re US-Soviet relations	12/84	YSW
50%	Pay a lot attention news Iran-Contra issue [3]	1/87	NBC/WSJ
49%	V interest in relations with Russia [3]	9/49	NORC 169
48%	V interest in Korean peace talks [3]	12/51	NORC 315
48%	Importance of Iran-Contra matter [3]	3/87	CBS/NYT
45%	V interest in occupation of Germany [3]	12/46	NORC 147
45%	V interest in relations with Russia [3]	6/48	NORC 158
45%	See/hear Reagan speech on Iran Contra [2]	11/86a	ABC
43%	V interest in occupation of Japan [3]	12/46	NORC 147
42%	V interest in change in Russian government [3]	4/53	NORC 339
42%	Importance of Iran-Contra matter [3]	5/87a	CBS/NYT
41%	V interest in European peace treaties [3]	12/46	NORC 147
41%	V interest in Berlin question [3]	11/48	NORC 162
39%	V interest in trade w other countries [3]	9/46	NORC 243
38%	V interest in our govt's foreign policy [3]	12/51	NORC 315
36%	V interest in Berlin situation [3]	10/48	NORC 161
36%	V interest in Formosa situation [3]	3/55	NORC 370
36%	V interest in amount of aid sent allies	5/53	NORC 340
36%	V interest in allies defense build-up [3]	12/51	NORC 315
36%	V int Congress investigation of State Dept [3]	4/53	NORC 339
36%	V interest in United Nations [3]	11/48	NORC 162
33%	V interest in United Nations [3]	9/49	NORC 169
32%	V interest in big 4 Geneva conference [3]	8/55	NORC 374
31%	V interest in United Nations [3]	6/49	NORC 166
31%	V interest in Marshall plan [3]	11/48	NORC 162
31%	V interest in Marshall plan European recover [3]	2/48	NORC 155
31%	V interest in Formosa situation [3]	4/55	NORC 371
31%	V interest in Formosa situation [3]	6/55	NORC 372

Table 3-7 (con't)

29%	V interest in United Nations [3]	2/48	NORC 155
29%	V interest in German rearmament [3]	3/55	NORC 370
28%	V interest in German unification [3]	6/55	NORC 372
24%	Follow Iran-Contra situation v closely [4]	11/86b	ABC
24%	V interest in policy toward Palestine [3]	6/48	NORC 158
23%	V interest in way foreign service works [3]	12/46	NORC 147
23%	V interest in policy toward Palestine [3]	2/48	NORC 155
23%	Follow national security issues v closely [3]	10/87	M&K/ATS
23%	V interest in relations with Latin America [3]	3/55	NORC 370
21%	V interest in what's going on in Germany [3]	3/50	NORC 276
20%	V interest in Indochina war [3]	5/53	NORC 340
20%	V interest in spread of Communism in Asia [3]	3/50	NORC 276
20%	V interest in United Nations	3/55	NORC 370
20%	V interest in visit of Russian farmers [3]	8/55	NORC 374
19%	V interest in way State Dept handle job [3]	2/48	NORC 155
19%	Follow situation in Persian Gulf v closely [4]	6/87b	ABC/WP
18%	V interest in policy towards China [3]	11/48	NORC 162
18%	V interest in publication of Yalta papers [3]	4/55	NORC 371
17%	V interest in Policy towards China [3]	6/49	NORC 166
17%	V interest in policy towards China [3]	9/49	NORC 169
17%	V int England's present financial situation [3]	9/49	NORC 169
16%	Follow Iran-Contra Cong hearings v closely [4]	8/87	ABC/WP
16%	Follow Iran-Contra situation v closely [4]	11/86b	ABC
16%	V interest in tariff policy [3]	5/53	NORC 340
16%	V interest in policy towards Palestine [3]	11/48	NORC 162
16%	V interest in policy towards Palestine [3]	10/48	NORC 161
13%	V interest in four power Paris conference [3]	6/49	NORC 166
13%	V interest in North Atlantic Pact [3]	6/49	NORC 166
12%	V interest in tariff policy	4/55	NORC 371
12%	V interest in policy toward Korea [3]	2/48	NORC 155
12%	V interest in Indochina war [3]	4/53	NORC 339
12%	V interest in policy toward Spain [3]	10/48	NORC 161
11%	V interest in work of the foreign service [3]	4/55	NORC 371
10%	V interest in policy toward Korea [3]	10/48	NORC 161
9%	V interest in UNESCO [3]	8/55	NORC 374
9%	V interest in relations with Yugoslavia [3]	3/50	NORC 276
7%	V interest in policy toward Spain [3]	11/48	NORC 162
6%	V interest in policy toward Spain [3]	6/49	NORC 166
4%	V interest in UNESCO [3]	4/53	NORC 339

Interest in Arms Control & Nuclear Issues
Versus Interest In Foreign Policy Issues
(percent of public very interested)

Table 3-8

	Nuclear & Arms Control	Foreign Policy
Conflict involving the US or its major allies (70s)		x
Nuclear war (60-50s)	x	
Nuclear accidents (60-40s)	x	
Military strength (50s)		x
International security issues (40-30s)		x
Arms control negotiations (40-20s)	x	
Main stream diplomacy (30-20s)		x
Actively follow arms control (20-10s)	x	
Diplomatic details and implementation (10s)		x
Obscure diplomatic issues (under 10)		x
Anti-nuclear protests (under 10)	x	

However, two new patterns emerge from this data on public interest. Nuclear war and nuclear weapons do not rank first in public interest: they rank second behind military conflict such the Korean war.⁸⁷ Also, interest in the "strength" issues of international security is slightly higher than interest in the "peace" issues of arms control. This latter conclusion is important because William Schneider's work highlights the fact that the American public often prefers to have both strength and peace.⁸⁸ However, when reviewed

87 Nuclear war ranks ahead of conventional war in terms of awareness but behind conventional war in terms of interest.

88 See Table 3-3 and Table 3-7.
W. Schneider 1984, 1985, 1986b.

from a historical perspective, it seems that most people are more interested in strength than in peace even if they want both. One other conclusion about patterns of interest can be shown by reviewing data in Table 3-9. This summary of public interest concerning a variety of foreign policy and domestic issues shows that, on average, the public is twice as interested in domestic issues as they are in foreign policy issues.

In addition to illustrating various patterns of public interest in nuclear and foreign policy issues, data from Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 provide additional evidence of the existence of an attentive public for arms control, nuclear issues, and foreign policy. These data also illustrate several new patterns that have not been mentioned in the academic literature. First, no single number can be used to estimate the size of the attentive public. The size of the attentive public depends both on the specific topic (arms control, nuclear or foreign policy) and on the format of the survey question.⁸⁹ If one restricts calculations to data obtained from the more numerous three-point response scale, it is possible to estimate the approximate size of the attentive public for several different issues. For arms control issues, about one third of the public seems to be attentive.⁹⁰ For nuclear

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The size of the attentive public depends on whether the survey question uses a 3 point or a 4 point response scale. A three point response scale would ask people to indicate whether they have high, medium or low interest in an issue. A four point scale might ask respondents to indicate whether they follow news about an issue very closely, fairly closely, not very closely or hardly at all.

90

The mean and standard deviation for data from 8 questions that measure interest about arms control are 29.25 and 9.95 respectively.

Interest in Domestic Versus Foreign Policy Issues
(percent very interested)

Table 3-9

<u>Domestic issues</u>	64	[average]			
Communists in govt	53 g				
Inflation	82 l	82 m	80 n	61 p	
Possible depression	62 i	46 j			
Presidential elections	60 l	46 m			
Shortage of food	73 p				
Strikes	60 h				
<u>Foreign policy</u>	28	[average]			
Allies defense increase	36 g				
Atomic bomb/energy	30 b	44 m	55 p		
Berlin	41 k	36 l			
China	17 i	17 j	18 k		
Communism in Asia	20 h				
England finances	17 i				
European peace treaties	41 o				
Foreign aid	36 e				
Formosa	31 b	31 c	36 d		
Four power conference	32 a	28 b	13 j		
Germany	28 b	29 d	21 h	25 i	45 o#
H bomb/tests	46 d#	25 h#			
Increasing armed forces	55 m				
Indochina war	20 e	12 f			
Japanese occupation	43 o				
Korea	71 f#	48 g#	10 l	12 n	
Latin America	23 d				
Marshall Plan	31 k	31 n			
NATO	13 j				
Palestine	16 k	16 l	24 m	23 n	
Relations with Russia	20 a	42 f	49 i	45 m	74 p
Spain	6 j	7 k	12 l		
State Department	11 c	36 f	38 g	19 n	23 o
Tariffs/intl trade	12 c	16 e	39 p		
UNESCO	9 a	4 f			
United Nations	20 d	33 i	31 j	36 k	29 n
Yalta papers	18 c				
Yugoslavia	9 h				

KEY

denotes significant difference in question or response wording.
 Letter abbreviations: a (8/55 NORC 374); b (6/55 NORC 372);
 c (4/55 NORC 371); d (3/55 NORC 370); e (5/53 NORC 340); f (4/53
 NORC 339); g (12/51 NORC 315); h (3/50 NORC 276); i (9/49 NORC 169);
 j (6/49 NORC 166); k (11/48 NORC 162); l (10/48 NORC 161); m (6/48
 NORC 158); n (2/48 NORC 155); o (12/46 NORC 147); p (9/46 NORC 243);
 q (5/46 NORC 142).

issues (not including arms control), approximately forty percent of the public seems to be attentive.⁹¹ For foreign policy, between one quarter to one third of the public seems to be attentive.⁹²

Where question wording and the survey organization are kept constant, producing narrowly defined "trend" data, one can see that the level of interest in a particular foreign policy, arms control or nuclear subject is quite stable. For example, with respect to arms control, levels of public interest varied only 13 percent over an eight year period. As measured by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, interest in arms control was relatively low in 1978 (16 percent), moderate when measured again in 1982 (23 percent), and relatively high when measured in 1986 (29 percent). For foreign policy issues such as Berlin, the United Nations, Formosa and Palestine, levels of interest varied only from 5 to 8 percent over periods of approximately two years. This data hardly present a pattern of volatility, as argued by Almond.

Two exceptions to this pattern of stability are important to note. The level of interest about Korea increased 60 percent from before to during the Korean war. Interest about Russia declined approximately 30 percent from a high of approximately 75 percent to 45 percent from 1946 to 1949. However, during these periods of dramatic change in public interest about these two specific foreign policy

91 The mean and standard deviation for data from 19 questions that measure interest in nuclear issues are 40.63 and 15.14 respectively.

92 The mean and standard deviation for data from 60 questions that measure interest about foreign policy are 26.95 and 15.28 respectively.

issues, the general level of interest in foreign affairs did not change significantly among the general public. This conclusion suggests that Almond's mood theory does not stand up when it is put to a test using precise indicators of public interest on a wide array of foreign policy issues over a period of forty years.

VIII Conclusions and Implications for Academic Theory on Public Opinion

This review of public opinion data concerning mass awareness, knowledge, and interest has produced important findings that relate to all three hypotheses being examined in this dissertation.

The no-impact hypothesis is justified, in part, on the "fact" that the public is considered to be ignorant of foreign policy issues. Data presented on public awareness and knowledge show that this academic perception of public ignorance is incorrect. Levels of public awareness about nuclear issues are extremely high, and the public possesses "functional" knowledge pertaining to nuclear and arms control issues.

At the same time, this data presents convincing evidence that an "issue public" or "opinion and policy elite" exists for arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues. This finding, based both on knowledge questions, which used objective and self-defined indicators, and on interest questions, re-confirms the concept developed by Almond ([1950] 1960). However, my data show that the issue public is extremely small, under 10 percent of the population. Also, the size of the issue public does not vary (for this elite audience) depending on whether the issue is defined in terms of its nuclear, arms control, or foreign policy dimension.

Additional findings concerning public awareness, knowledge, and interest go beyond the existing academic literature and are relevant to the larger question concerning the impact public opinion has on policy decisions. First, public awareness is quite distinct from public knowledge. For the issues being examined in this dissertation, the public is twice as aware and knowledgeable about nuclear weapons issues as they are about arms control. Public interest in the nuclear dimension of the issue is also twice as high as the arms control dimension. This consistent pattern produces a strong political incentive for arms control activists to frame their issue in the context of its nuclear dimension. However, such a political strategy will produce only short-term results related to getting an issue onto the agenda.

Second, there seems to be a limit to the diffusion of public awareness of an arms control or nuclear issue once real world events place it on the political agenda. Even popular Presidents are unable to substantially influence this phenomena.

Third, the public can learn about arms control issues, but to occur to any significant extent, this mass learning takes more time (one year or longer) than is relevant for most political decisions. This relatively slow rate of learning in turn reinforces in policymakers and scholars the incorrect perception that the public is ignorant.

Fourth, a new variable has been identified that links levels of public awareness, knowledge, and interest to the policy process. It is the degree to which policymakers are aware of public attitudes. The

higher the level and the faster the rate of diffusion of public awareness and knowledge, the greater the chance policymakers will have an accurate perception of actual public opinion. However, an incorrect or insufficient reading of public opinion by policymakers also can have an impact on decision-making.⁹³

When all these findings are combined, one central conclusion can be drawn: how a policy question is framed will determine the level and quality of public opinion about the policy question. If an arms control issue is framed in terms of nuclear war and peace, the entire politically active public can become engaged in the debate. If the issue is framed in terms of traditional issues of foreign policy, then a quarter of the public--the attentive public--can become involved. If the issue is defined in terms of very specific negotiating details, then less than 10 percent of the public--the "issue public"--will become involved. Thus, the communications strategy used by activists involved in the policy fight will determine the size and composition of the audience that will become engaged in the issue. In line with the thinking of E.E. Schattschneider, in a democratic system all of these factors will determine both the degree to which public opinion influences policy and the actual outcome itself.

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The series of decisions made after the U.S. learned about the Soviet A-bomb test in September 1949 all assumed, incorrectly, that the public would react to the announcement with hysteria. This perception among elites was a major reason decisions were made to drastically increase the stockpile of atomic weapons and to produce the H-bomb.

The second hypothesis being examined for this dissertation focuses on the degree of public support for arms control. A lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented. An examination of public awareness, knowledge and interest has been able to answer part of this question which focuses on volatility. Does this data support the proposition made by Almond ([1950] 1960) and Klingberg (1952) that public interest in foreign affairs fluctuates widely? The short answer is NO. Quite to the contrary, the levels of public interest, knowledge, and awareness are quite stable, and the patterns are distinct and logical. Public interest and knowledge vary depending on the issue: actual military conflict, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, and summits being at the top of the list, mainstream diplomacy in the middle, and arms control near the bottom. This pattern is not one of uniformity, but within each specific issue area, it is one of relative stability. Thus, in keeping with the research findings on public attitudes discovered by Shapiro and Page (1988), one finds stability not volatility. A review of Table 3-10 below also finds a consistent pattern among public awareness, attitudes, interest, and knowledge. More people are aware of an issue than pay attention to it. More people have an opinion about an issue than have heard a lot about it. More people follow an issue a great deal than actually know a lot about it. Again a hierarchy emerges with awareness on top, followed by interest, then opinion, and finally knowledge. The stability of this pattern shows that despite changes in the level of

Hierarchy of Awareness, Interest, Opinions, and Knowledge
(percent)

Table 3-10

	Arms Control Initiatives										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Aware	87	82	89	76	77	-	88	99	45	-	-
Paying Attention	-	63&	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Heard a lot/ some	67	-	-	64	-	50	50	62	-	-	49
Know enough to have opinion	47	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	92	-
Heard a lot	24	8	34	20	-	-	20	-	-	-	20
Follow closely	16	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Know a lot	10	3	-	4	6	7	7	8	15	-	-

KEY

- 1 SDI/Star Wars
- 2 SALT
- 3 Neutron Bomb
- 4 INF/Geneva arms control talks
- 5 Limited Test Ban Treaty
- 6 Arms control negotiations
- 7 MX missile
- 8 Nuclear arms
- 9 Baruch plan
- 10 Soviet arms control treaty violations
- 11 START talks
- & This question was asked 2 times: 79% (1/80 Roper 80-2) and 63% (1/75 Roper 75-2).

interest the public has with respect to specific foreign policy issues, such as interest in Korea measured before and during the Korean war, the general level of interest in foreign issues throughout the period from 1945 to 1988 has been stable. Almond's mood theory is totally inconsistent with data presented in this chapter and was the product of superficial research.

The third hypothesis being examined in this dissertation focuses on the top-down model of attitude change. Existence of an "attentive public" is a necessary precondition to confirm the validity of the top-down attitude change model. In this instance, the essential element of existing public opinion theory is confirmed: there is substantial evidence that an attentive public exists for nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues.⁹⁴ However, the size of the attentive public varies depending on the issue. For arms control, approximately one quarter to one third of the public is attentive, depending on whether one uses knowledge or interest indicators of attentiveness.⁹⁵ The attentive public for foreign policy seems to be approximately 25 percent of the public. However, for nuclear issues, approximately 40 percent of the public are attentive.

94 This chapter thus has validated some, but not all, of the ideas developed by Almond [1950] 1960.

95 If one uses knowledge indicators, the attentive public is approximately one quarter of the population. If one uses interest indicators, about 30 percent of the public is attentive to arms control.

A major conclusion from this chapter does not relate to past academic literature, but is entirely new. Again and again, a comprehensive review of data on public awareness, knowledge, and interest finds that the most important findings relate to patterns not to absolute levels. Many patterns of public awareness, knowledge, and interest about arms control seem more similar to those associated with foreign policy than to those associated with nuclear war or nuclear weapons. As a result, even though the subject of nuclear weapons is logically linked to arms control, in the the public's mind, these two issues seem quite distinct. This bimodal characteristic of public perceptions will prove to be important in each of the four arms control case studies when I examine public attitudes toward these arms control initiatives and trace the impact public opinion has on policy-making, in Chapters 4 through 7.

A final conclusion relates to methodology. For foreign policy, nuclear, and arms control issues, one finds that similar survey questions (not exactly the same questions) can be used for analysis of broad trends. By reviewing data from hundreds of surveys and thousands of questions, it is possible to draw clear conclusions despite the absence of true "trend data." While conclusions reached after reviewing exactly repeated questions will allow one to be more precise concerning the magnitude of opinion change, an extensive review of similarly-worded questions will suffice to be able to fully characterize the nature of public opinion with respect to my four arms control case studies.

International Control of Atomic Energy:
Forging the Cold-War Consensus, 1945-1950

Chapter 4

He [Oppenheimer] says they [Baruch and his staff] are enthusiastic about proceeding right away with negotiations and proposals, but have no hope of an agreement. They talk about preparing the American people for a refusal by Russia.

-- David E. Lilienthal⁹⁶

We can't do that [force a confrontation with the Soviets and terminate the negotiations]. We must go on until the people generally come to the opinion we have.

-- Bernard M. Baruch to Fred Eberstadt [member of the U.S. delegation to U.N. Atomic Energy Commission]⁹⁷

In the long run, the Baruch Plan, inspite of its rejection by the U.S.S.R., must be considered historically as an astute move and a very considerable victory for American diplomacy. For so great was the success with which this specious plan was put across in most countries as a wise and generous measure, that it became possible to brand the Soviet Union, by her rejection of it, as the sole obstacle to world peace.

-- P. M. S. Blackett⁹⁸

I Summary

From the quixotic attempt to restrict publication of scientific papers on atomic energy in 1939 through the termination of the United Nation's Atomic Energy Commission in 1950, concerned individuals and

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Lilienthal 1965, 43.

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Bernstein 1974, 1043; Herkin 1981, 177; Gerber 1982, 92.

98

Blackett 1949, 158.

governments grappled with the issues of controlling the military uses of atomic energy. In contrast to the conclusions reached by most historians and political scientists, this chapter argues that public opinion had a great deal of influence on creating both the content and form of the American government's position on international control of atomic energy.

Analysis of relevant public opinion data concerning international control of atomic energy from thirty-five national and four state surveys (131 questions) and a review of primary source documents conclude that public attitudes and diplomatic pressure from the British government forced a reluctant Democratic administration to begin negotiations to control atomic weapons. With major bureaucratic actors strongly against international control and with secret U.S.-U.K. war-time agreements precluding multilateral international nuclear cooperation, the main question was not why did this negotiation ultimately fail, but rather why and how did it get onto the policy agenda? Public opinion, measured and reported to policy makers by confidential polling conducted for the State Department, provides an important part of the answer.

However, the impact of opinion on policy was not limited to "getting on the agenda." It also influenced the transformation of the initial American negotiating position from the "radical" Acheson-Lilienthal plan into the almost non-negotiable Baruch plan. While public opinion played a role in Baruch's developing his negotiating strategy, it also played a key role in an unusual form of

implementation: it made a policy reversal by arms control advocates impossible.

Another important relationship between public opinion and the policy process was discovered in the uneven level of understanding of public opinion held by opponents versus advocates of international control. Opponents of this arms control effort had a far more sophisticated understanding of the public mood and used this to frame the main issues in the policy and public debate in ways that strengthened their position. Their close monitoring of public opinion, content analysis of the media, and timely reaction to the political activities of the advocates of arms control made a reversal of policy--necessary for international control to be seriously negotiated--impossible.

In terms of the other hypothesis being tested for this dissertation--was there a consensus in support of arms control, were attitudes fragmented, were attitudes volatile, and was there evidence of top-down learning-- data from this case study challenge some existing academic theories. At the mass level, there was no consensus in favor of or opposed to the international control of atomic energy. The general public supported some policies associated with international control such as the idea that atomic arms control negotiations should be conducted and that atomic facilities should be under international ownership. The public changed its opinion on other aspects of international control such as the willingness to take unilateral U.S. initiatives to obtain an agreement to control nuclear weapons and the

question of building atomic weapons. In other areas--such as using the bomb against Japan, sharing the atomic secret and cooperating with the Soviet Union--the public was against these elements of international control. This pattern suggests that no simple Cold War consensus existed concerning the international control of atomic energy.

Quantitative analysis of relevant public opinion data shows that issues associated with international control were not highly fragmented along party, regional or demographic lines. There were slight differences in attitudes along age, region, sex and veteran status lines. In general, younger people, women, those outside of the South, and veterans were more supportive of international control than the general public.

At the mass level, public opinion was not volatile, as hypothesized in Almond's mood theory, but was rather stable over the five year effort to negotiate international control of atomic energy from 1945 through 1950. With one exception, opinion stability or only small changes in attitudes persisted despite massive media attention and dramatic events such as the Bikini atomic test and the announcement that the Soviets had developed atomic weapons. When public opinion changed, it did so in a coherent, not erratic, pattern toward the policy positions supported by opponents of international control.

In terms of evaluating the top-down model of attitude change, the "attentive public" was more supportive of international control than was the general public. However these are no indications that these elite attitudes led or influenced attitudes held by the general public.

Attitudes held by the attentive public and the general public changed in different directions at different times.

II Public Attitudes on International Control of Atomic Energy

Public attitudes concerning the international control of atomic energy were as complex as the scientific and diplomatic aspects of the problem debated in the high councils of government. Public opinion toward eleven specific issues, summarized in Table 4-1, provide a comprehensive picture of the public's views concerning this first nuclear arms control effort. Public attitudes can be grouped into four general categories: those consistently in support of international control, those consistently opposed to international control, those that changed against international control, and those about issues which were contested.

A. Public Opinion in Support of International Control

1. Negotiating International Control

The public strongly believed that arms control negotiations should be conducted.⁹⁹ Initially, there was preponderant-level support for

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As described in Chapter 2, the five categories being used throughout this dissertation to describe mass opinion include: plurality (the modal opinion category under 50%), majority (50%-59%), consensus (60%-69%), preponderance (70%-79%) and virtual unanimity (80%+).

Eleven Dimensions of Opinion On International Control

Table 4-1

- A. Public Opinion Consistently in Support of International Control
 - 1. International control should be initiated;
 - 2. Atomic facilities should be under international ownership;

- B. Public Opinion Consistently Opposed To International Control
 - 1. The bomb should have been used against Japan;
 - 2. The atomic "secret" should not be shared with any country;
 - 3. Satisfaction with the government's atomic energy job performance;
 - 4. Pessimistic perceptions concerning the possibility to successful negotiations;

- C. Public Opinion That Changed in Opposition to International Control
 - 1. Initial support, then opposition to initiating a unilateral step toward nuclear disarmament;
 - 2. Initial reluctance, then support for basing U.S. on building atomic weapons;
 - 3. Disbelief that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States.

- D. Public Opinion On Contested Issues Related to International Control
 - 1. Strong support for inspection in any international regime;
 - 2. Belief that the bomb would spread to other countries.

the basic idea of international control of atomic energy.¹⁰⁰ The public continued to support the generic idea of conducting negotiations

100 All survey questions concerning international control are reproduced in Appendix 3. In the following footnotes, they will be identified by data and survey number. For support for international control, see 12/1945 NORC T42 and 3/1946 NORC 140.

on this issue well into 1950.¹⁰¹ Over time, there was a moderate reduction in the level of support for conducting negotiations, but even after the public had become pessimistic about the chances of success, a majority still wanted this diplomatic effort to continue.¹⁰² After President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb, support for negotiations increased to the level of consensus. However, eight months later, the level had subsided to a majority.

In the first 18 months of the nuclear age, several other indicators suggest that there was strong support for international control of atomic energy. Early in 1946, there was majority support for international control even if it meant the U.S. would have to take the radical step of stopping production of bombs and destroying its existing stockpile.¹⁰³ A majority supported the idea of trusting America's national security to the United Nations and international control rather than building U.S. security on atomic weapons.¹⁰⁴ Placed in the historical perspective of Cold War attitudes that were to follow, these beliefs seem utopian. Many people also thought that arms control could be effective. A plurality thought that an international organization might be able to control the atomic bomb so that no country could use it

101 Either a majority or a plurality supported international control through 1950: 7/1946 NORC 143; 2/1947 NORC 148; 7/1947 NORC 151; 10/1947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170, and 6/1950 NORC 282-3.
102 2/1947 NORC 148; 6/1948 NORC 158; 6/1950 NORC 282-3.
103 3/1946 NORC 140. This attitude was to change- see 6/1946 and 8/1946 Psy Corp 173 & 178.
104 7/1946 NORC 143.

to start a war.¹⁰⁵ Finally, the public was not opposed to giving an international organization some elements of national sovereignty if this was needed to control atomic weapons. For example, seventy-seven per cent of the public thought the international organization should be able to punish people who attempt to make nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁶

When all this data is reviewed, one gets a clear impression that the public held many idealistic hopes for the world and wanted to give international control a chance.

2. International Ownership

From 1947 through 1949, there was weak majority support for international control of atomic energy if it meant that the U.S. had to place all of its atomic factories under the control of an international agency.¹⁰⁷ This attitude did not change over time, and was not influenced by President Truman's announcement that the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb.¹⁰⁸

B. Public Opinion Opposed To International Control

1. Use of The Atomic Bomb Against Japan

For all but a handful of nuclear scientists and senior officials in several governments, the nuclear age began with the bombing of

105 7/1946 NORC 143. Slightly different results are obtained in 6/1946 and 8/1946 Psy Corp 173 & 178.
106 7/1946 NORC 143.
107 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152; 10/1949 NORC 170.
108 10/1949 NORC 170. The only outlier to the pattern of weak support for international ownership was registered in a 1946 survey-- 7/1946 NORC 143.

Hiroshima on August 5th 1945. Polling on atomic issues, which started that same month, showed that the public strongly and consistently supported President Truman's decision to drop the bomb on Japan. Depending on the timing of the survey and the question wording, support ranged from the level of virtual unanimity to consensus. The first opinion survey of the nuclear age, conducted by the Gallup Organization (AIPO) in August, showed that the public was virtually unanimous in its opinion that atomic weapons should have been used against Japanese cities: 85 percent approved.¹⁰⁹ When the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) asked people what decision they would have made concerning using the bomb, a consensus (67 percent) said they would have used the bomb against Japanese cities; only 27 percent said they would have opted for a demonstration where no people lived.¹¹⁰ Another poll, conducted by the Roper Organization for Fortune magazine (RFOR), showed that 77 percent of the public either would have dropped the bomb just as was done or would have dropped more bombs. In this survey only 14 percent of the public supported a demonstration against a target which was not populated.

The reason for this public support for Truman's decision is not hard to find. A majority believed that without using the atomic bomb, Japan would have continued to fight for at least 6 more months.¹¹¹

109 8/1945 AIPO 353k&t. The complete wording and data for all questions concerning use of atomic weapons against Japan are included in Appendix 4. For an analysis of data on the general topic of use of nuclear weapons, see Graham 1989a.
110 9/1945 NORC 237A&B.
111 10/1945 RFOR 50.

The public seems to have accepted the argument presented by Secretary of War Stimson and President Truman that the alternative to dropping the bomb was an invasion of Japan. Even though the decision whether the United States should have dropped the bomb is still debated by historians today, the question whether Japan would have surrendered without using the bomb was not a serious public topic in 1945.¹¹² Not only did the public support the decision to use the bomb at the level of consensus or greater, but virtually all segments of the public shared in this belief.¹¹³ The only exception to this pattern of support for dropping the bomb on Japan was recorded in a survey conducted among atomic scientists at the Manhattan Project laboratory in Chicago. In this informal poll, 37 percent of the atomic scientists wanted a demonstration in the U.S. or before Japanese officials, 46 percent wanted a demonstration against a strictly military target in Japan, and only 15 percent supported use by whatever means were necessary to cause Japan to surrender.¹¹⁴

The relevance of the issue about dropping the bomb on Japan to international control of atomic weapons is that many of the same people who opposed dropping the bomb against Japan became leading advocates of international control. This opposition to dropping the bomb came through in much of their political communication and reduced their

112 Bernstein 1976; Miles 1985.

113 In surveys asked from the late 1940s through the 1980s, the American public has continued to support the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan. See Appendix 4: 8/1945 AIPO 353; 9/1945 NORC 237; 10/1945 RFOR 50; 9/1948 RFOR 70; 6/1965 Harris; 1/1971 Harris 2053; 3/1982 Harris/AS, and 7/1985 CBS/NYT.

114 Lieberman 1970, 109.

credibility, in the eyes of the public, on the issue of international control of atomic energy. As illustrated in this first horrible example of the nuclear age, the divergence between attitudes held by these elite, pro-arms control scientists and those held by the general public are important. Unfortunately for the sake of arms control, this gap will persist throughout the next forty years. Unfortunately, what transformed the scientist's arte into hubris and ultimately tragedy for all future arms control efforts was their unwillingness to learn why arms control policy positions often do not receive mass public support.

2. Sharing the Atomic Secret

From the very beginning of the nuclear age, the public strongly and consistently rejected the idea that the United States should share the atomic "secret" either with the United Nations or with any other country.¹¹⁵ This attitude was at the preponderant or consensus level from August 1945 until relevant questions were last asked in October 1946.¹¹⁶ It is hard to overstate the intensity of this attitude or to exaggerate its importance to the entire debate concerning international control of atomic energy.¹¹⁷ This one issue of sharing the secret

115 An exception to this attitude occurred after the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb. In this survey, slim plurality supported sharing the secret, see 10/1949 NORC 170.
116 Repeated questions include 8/1945 AIPO 354; 10/1945 AIPO 357t; 4/1946a AIPO 368; 10/1946 AIPO 379k&t. Other relevant questions include 9/1945 NORC 237a&b and 10/1945 NORC 135.
117 This intensity was picked up in both traditional survey research and also in more qualitative research conducted by specialists at the University of Michigan. See Social Science Research Council 1947 pp. 113-115.

framed the debate over international control and, for the public, may have sealed the fate of the entire exercise. Every survey conducted on this issue came up with the same result. A majority of the public was against sharing the secret. This was true even if questions posited that the U.N. could control the secret so that atomic arms could not be used to start another war.¹¹⁸ The intensity of feelings against sharing the secret can be gauged by reviewing results from questions which combined the idea of sharing the secret with otherwise popular policies such as negotiating international control or establishing an inspection regime. In every case, the critical attitude against sharing the secret prevailed over all other aspects of the problem of international control and caused people to reject any form of international control that involved sharing the secret.¹¹⁹

3. Job Performance on Atomic Energy Policies

As will be described below, actual U.S. government policy concerning international control of atomic energy was designed to conduct high-visibility negotiations but to make no serious effort to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union. As a result, public approval of the administration's atomic policies had the effect of supporting this de facto anti-international control policy. Unfortunately, only two questions were asked that measured public satisfaction with the government's policies toward atomic energy. They

118 10/1945 NORC 135.

119 10/1945 NORC 135; 12/1945 NORC T42.

both recorded a consensus approving the administration's job performance.¹²⁰ Results from several other questions, indirectly, support the proposition that the public was satisfied with the government's efforts to negotiate international control. The public increasingly credited the government with working to obtain international control.¹²¹ At the same time, the public did not believe this negotiation would result in sharing the atomic secret with the rest of the world, which most people opposed.¹²²

4. Chances of Successful Negotiations

Perhaps the most critical attitude with respect to the negotiations of arms control agreements in the 40+ years of the nuclear age has been that people give these negotiations very little chance of success. This skeptical attitude has been strengthened by real-world negotiations that rarely produced agreement. In early 1947, one-third of the public believed that international control had a chance of success.¹²³ However, by October 1947, the public had adopted what was

120 2/1946 NORC 139; 2/1947 NORC 148. In contrast, Truman's general job performance declined over 50 percentage points from April, 1945 through December 1946 when serious negotiation over international control of atomic energy ended. From January to March 1947 his popularity increased 25% before repeating a slow decline. See Mueller 1970; Hibbs 1973-74; Public Opinion V. 9, No. 1, 36-7.

121 2/1946 NORC 139; 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152. This perception grew by 16%. This magnitude approximates the twenty percent empirical maximum discussed in Chapter 3.

122 2/1946 NORC 139.

123 2/1947 NORC 148.

to become a post-World War II norm: less than 15 percent thought the chances of successful negotiation were "good."¹²⁴

C. Public Opinion That Changed Toward Opposition to International Control

1. Unilateral U.S. Initiatives For Disarmament

In 1946 a majority of the public opposed the United States unilaterally turning over its bombs to an international organization.¹²⁵

What is unusual about this public perception was that only a 52 percent majority opposed this quite radical step. This was the only time in the entire nuclear age when the public was only moderately opposed to America taking a unilateral step to achieve nuclear arms control. By the end of 1946, a consensus (68 percent) was against taking such a unilateral action. By this time, only a small minority (28 percent) thought that taking this step would facilitate an agreement with the Soviets.¹²⁶ This rejection of any unilateral steps continued throughout these negotiations.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ 10/1947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170. The only exception to this pattern was after the Soviet A-bomb test when a slim plurality believed an agreement could be reached if an international conference were called. See 6/1950 NORC 282-3.

¹²⁵ 6/1946 AIPO 373k&t.

¹²⁶ 11/1946 AIPO 383t.

¹²⁷ 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152. The public reacted favorably to a slightly different question that called for disarmament of the U.S. "and all other countries" after the Soviet Union had tested its atomic bomb. See 10/1949 NORC 170.

2. Building Atomic Weapons

On the question whether the United States should continue to build nuclear weapons, public attitudes seem to have changed. Initially in 1945, a slim plurality of the public believed that the United States should not rely on making better atomic bombs for its security, but rather should rely on an international agency to prevent any country from using nuclear weapons.¹²⁸ This survey shows that immediately after World War II, this element of international control was quite popular.

By mid-1946, this attitude seems to have changed, with a consensus or a majority believing the U.S. should continue manufacturing atomic bombs.¹²⁹ By late 1946, a consensus was against stopping production of bombs and destroying those already in the United States stockpile. A majority of the public also rejected the idea that unilaterally terminating U.S. bomb production and destruction of America's stockpile would bring about an agreement with Russia.¹³⁰

Unfortunately, no single question asked during this period was repeated over time. Often the polling questions that asked about building nuclear weapons were worded in such a way as to link them with other issues. Due to these survey research methodological problems, before one can conclude that opinion change took place, each survey question must be examined closely. In October 1945, 48 percent of the

¹²⁸ 9/1945 NORC 237.

¹²⁹ 4/1946b AIPO 369 k&t; 6/1946 NORC 143; 6/1946 PSY CORP 173;
8/1946 PSY CORP 178.

¹³⁰ 11/1946 AIPO 384t; AIPO 384k.

public were opposed to continuing to build nuclear weapons. By April, June, and November of 1946, opposition to building nuclear weapons dropped to one-third and then to one-quarter of the public.¹³¹

Was this "attitude change" merely an artifact of question wording? Not entirely. If one asked the simple question whether the U.S. should continue to build atomic bombs, then it seems that attitude change took place and that the public increasingly became more hawkish. However, if the context of the question changed, the public was marginally more sympathetic to freezing America's production of nuclear weapons. When question wording separated the issue concerning terminating production of additional nuclear weapons from the issue whether the United States should unilaterally destroy its nuclear weapons, and when stopping nuclear weapons production was placed in the context of international control of atomic energy, a slim majority supported the radical step of stopping production of atomic bombs.¹³² After the Soviets had tested their first atomic weapon, this willingness to stop production of atomic weapons to obtain international control grew to a consensus.¹³³ When people were asked whether the United States should temporarily stop making bombs for one year to facilitate negotiating international control, a slim plurality supported this more moderate position.¹³⁴

131 Since these questions are not repeated exactly, word for word, this author is able to conclude only about the direction of the attitude change, not its magnitude. 8/1945 NORC 237 a&b; 4/1946b AIPO 369k&t; 6/1946 NORC 143 and 11/1946 AIPO 384k.
132 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152.
133 10/1949 NORC 170.
134 11/1946 NORC 146.

The data presented above paint a complex picture of public attitudes on the issue of building nuclear weapons. In the abstract, the public increasingly supported building atomic weapons and basing U.S. security around nuclear deterrence. However, a detailed examination of the data shows that if one makes important distinctions among various questions, then public attitudes created political opportunities for advocates of international control.

3. Attitudes Toward Russia

Since survey researchers first began asking questions about Russia in the 1930s, two types of attitudes have been measured--perceptions about Russia and policy preferences toward Russia. The perceptions category of questions focus on broad attitudes toward the Soviet Union such as will the Russians cooperate with the United States or will it be possible to reach a diplomatic agreement with the Soviets. The policy category of questions include specific steps which the United States should take with respect to Russia. A review of both types of questions reveal four interesting conclusions.

First, there are many more survey questions that ask about perceptions than ask about specific policy steps. Most of the academic analysis of attitudes toward the Soviet Union focuses on broad public perceptions, not on attitudes about policy toward the Soviet Union.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ This finding is not reflected in the existing literature. See Buckley 1978; Caspary 1970; Filene 1967; R. Gordon 1952; Grayson 1978; Levering 1976; Nincic 1985; Schneider 1984; M. Smith 1947-48; T.W. Smith 1983; Whitney 1962b.

The second discovery in this data is that attitudes concerning perceptions have gone through several four phases in the 1940s. However, for the entire period from 1942 through 1949, a majority of the public rarely thought the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States.¹³⁶ The data, which is presented in Figure 4-1, falls into four general phases. From February through June 1942, as the war-time alliance was being formed, perceptions that Russia would cooperate with the U.S. "after the war" averaged in the low 40s.¹³⁷ This level will be considered the "norm" against which other data will be judged. The second phase existed from July 1942 through the end of World War II in September 1945. During this "marriage of convenience," public perceptions that cooperation would continue after the war averaged in the high 40s.¹³⁸ Even though this second phase registered the "high-water mark" in public support for Russia, it is important to note that positive perceptions of the Soviet Union never consistently reached more than a plurality.¹³⁹ The third phase coincided with the active negotiation of international control of atomic energy and the beginning of the geo-political and attitude transition from alliance to the

136 The questions and data presented in Figure 4-1 are contained in Appendix 5.

137 Mean 40.75; standard deviation 2.68.

138 Mean 48; standard deviation 3.89.

139 This fact has important implications for developing political strategies to achieve arms control. In short, for arms control to succeed, positive attitudes toward the Soviet Union do not have to reach a majority. Negative attitudes need to be neutralized to below 60 percent of the public.

Figure 4-1




Figure 4-1

to the Cold War. It covers the period from October 1945 through December 1946. During this third attitude phase, perceptions of a cooperative Soviet Union averaged in the mid-30s.¹⁴⁰ The fourth period, which ran from February 1947 through the Soviets' first atomic bomb test announced in 1949, registered perceptions of US-Soviet cooperation in the low 20s.¹⁴¹

Perceptions about Russia are more moderate than attitudes on specific U.S.-Soviet policy issues. This third finding is shown in data from a number of Soviet-related policy questions, presented in Table 4-2. It shows a consistent pattern that attitudes on many policy questions are more extreme than are general perceptions of the Soviet Union. When perceptions of the Soviet Union were relatively positive from 1942 through September 1945 (i.e. ~40 percent positive), several pro-Soviet policy initiatives received public support that ranged from 80 percent to 50 percent. Once generic perceptions toward Russia turned more strongly negative (i.e. 20 to 35 percent positive), large majorities of the public (50 to 80 percent) supported adopting tough policies toward the Soviet Union.

140 Mean 36.9; standard deviation 5.66.
141 Mean 21.9; standard deviation 4.34.

Public Opinion on Policy Issues Concerning
the Soviet Union, 1945-1949

Table 4-2

Survey Dates (percent)	Question	Level
Positive Attitudes Toward Soviet Union		
4/45-12/45	Send Germans to rebuild Russia	80-50
10/45	Approve loan to Russia if get quid pro quo	74
10/45	If loan, Soviets will repay in part or in full	59-57
3/45	U.S.-U.S.S.R. should sign a permanent alliance	49
10/45	Approve loan to Russia	40
10/45	Approve loan to Russia	27
10/46	Russia should have its sphere of influence	36
8/46	Agreement with Russia is possible	36
6/46-9/45	Russia should have more say in Eastern Europe	34-33
10/46-10/45	Should U.S. compromise more	15-13
10/47	U.S. is insisting too much on its own way	12
8/46	U.S. should compromise with Russia	11
6/48	U.S. should compromise with Russia	10
8/46-3/46	Approve Russia's foreign policy	7
10/46	Follow U.S. foreign policy debate and supports Wallace's (dove) position	7
Negative Attitudes Toward Soviet Union		
6/48	U.S. policy is right or should be firmer	79
8/48-10/47	U.S. too soft on Russia	73-62
9/49	Too little/enough U.S. concern with stopping Russia	72
12/47	Stop US shipments oil/machines to Russia	71
9/47	Send troops or threaten war to defend Greece	68
8/46	U.S. should be firm toward Russia	63
12/47	U.S. should negotiate Japanese peace treaty w/o Russia	60
10/46-10/45	U.S. should be firmer even if it means trouble	59-53
3/48-3/46	U.S. should be firm or build military	56-45
8/46	Russia would respect U.S. more if U.S. increased its military	55-50
12/1947	U.S. should try to stop Russia	52
2/47	U.S. should be firmer with Russia	51
9/47	U.S. should not make too many concessions	50-46#
10/46-3/46	U.S. should try to stop Russia	46
10/46	Try to stop Russia even if increase chance of war	35
3/46	Approved Churchill's Iron Curtain speech	31-21
9/47	U.S. should pull out of U.N. (because of Russia)	13
#	Question asked before and after Soviet atomic test.	

The fourth finding reveals no clear consensus on Soviet-related policy questions until 1947. For example, in 1945 there was support for sending Germans to help rebuild Russia, approval for giving the Soviet Union a loan if the U.S. received a quid pro quo, and even plurality support for forming some type of U.S.-Soviet alliance. During the early post-war period, policy attitudes were neither consistently pro-Soviet nor anti-Soviet.

By 1947, when positive perceptions of the Soviet Union had dropped to the low 20s, public support for moderation in terms of policy preferences had been reduced to minority status. By 1947, the Cold War and anti-Soviet attitude consensus had been formed. At the preponderant level, the public thought the U.S. should be firmer with the Soviets and should stop economic trade with Russia. A consensus supported attempting to stop Soviet expansion in certain situations such as in Greece, and a majority supported strengthening the U.S. military.

D. Public Opinion on International Control-Related Issues That Were Contested

1. Inspection

The public strongly supported international inspection. One initial question, which was repeated over a period of several months, showed the public was in favor of inspection at the level of virtual unanimity or preponderance.¹⁴² Another poll recorded a consensus for

¹⁴² 12/1945 NORC T42; 3/1946 NORC 140.

the proposition that an international inspection system could verify whether a country was making many bombs.¹⁴³ In 1946, a plurality who favored inspection continued to favor it even if such a regime meant that U.S. property would be searched and that inspectors might find out some details concerning making atomic weapons.¹⁴⁴ Over time, support for inspection continued at a slightly lower levels, but always at a consensus or above.¹⁴⁵ By 1948, this here-to-fore uniform support for inspection showed its only decline. When a question asked about international control in the context of inspection, support was reduced from its "normal" majority or higher to plurality.¹⁴⁶

2. The Bomb Will Spread

From the very beginning of the nuclear age, the public believed that the ability to produce atomic weapons would spread to other countries. The level of support for this proposition was extremely high, often virtually unanimous. The public, unlike many experts, correctly believed that the bomb would spread to other countries in less than five years.¹⁴⁷ As early as October 1945, long before the Cold War attitude consensus was formed, a majority thought that the atomic secret

143 12/1945 NORC T42.

144 3/1946 NORC 140.

145 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152; 10/1949 NORC 170.

146 6/1948 AIPO 417.

147 9/1945 NORC 237a; 10/1945 RFOR 50; 10/1945 NORC 135; 12/1945 NORC 42T; 2/1946 NORC 139.

would spread to Russia.¹⁴⁸ By 1946, a plurality thought that other countries were already making atomic bombs.¹⁴⁹ One final data point on this aspect of international control relates to survey research methodology. Introduction of "expert" testimony into question wording on this issue did not seem to dramatically change mass opinion. When questions clearly stated that scientists believed that the bomb would spread, only 5 percent more people thought nuclear weapons would proliferate than was the case when questions without the reference to scientists' attitudes were asked.¹⁵⁰

E. Summary of Mass Public Opinion on International Control

A summary of public attitudes toward international control of atomic energy is included in Table 4-3. It shows that strong public support (preponderant-consensus level) existed for international control in the context of holding arms control negotiations. In addition, there was weak support for international ownership of atomic facilities and a willingness to give up elements of national sovereignty to achieve international control. In 1945 and early 1946, the public did not want to base U.S. security on building atomic weapons and was not strongly opposed to America taking unilateral steps to make negotiation possible. These latter two attitudes are quite remarkable in the history of American opinion toward international security in the nuclear

148 10/1945 RFOR 50; 12/1945 NORC 42T; 4/1946b AIPO 369k&t.
149 4/1946b AIPO 369k&t; 6/1947 AIPO 398k&t.
150 9/1945 NORC 237a and NORC 237b.

Summary of Public Opinion and Policy Positions On
International Control of Atomic Energy (ICAE)
Table 4 - 3

Issue	Public Attitudes	Policy Position Of ICAE Advocates	Policy Position Of ICAE Opponents
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PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT FOR ICAE

Negotiating	Pro level 3-4 #	Pro	Anti
International ownership	Pro level 2 *	Pro	Con

PUBLIC OPINION OPPOSED TO ICAE

Use Against Japan	Pro level 3-5 *	Anti	Pro
Sharing the secret	Anti level 4-5 *	Pro	Anti
Job Performance	Pro level 3 *	Con	Pro
Chance of successful negotiations	No level 3-4 #	Yes	No
Cooperative USSR	No level 2-4 #	Yes	No

CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ICAE

Unilateral U.S. initiative	Pro to Con level 2-3 #	Pro	Con
Building atomic weapons	Con to Pro level 1 to 2 #	Con	Pro

PUBLIC OPINION ON CONTESTED POLICY ISSUES

Inspection	Pro level 4-5 #	Pro	Pro
Will the bomb spread	Yes level 4-5 *	Yes 3-5 years	Yes 7-10 years

KEY Level 1- Plurality (less than 50%); Level 2- Majority (50% to 59%);
Level 3- Consensus (60% to 69%); Level 4- Preponderance (70% to 79%);
Level 5- Virtually Unanimous (80% and above).

* Attitudes were stable.

Attitudes changed in the direction of the opponents of ICAE.

age. Together all these findings suggest that crucial opinions needed to develop a domestic political strategy to achieve international control existed for the first 18 months of the nuclear age. Not all attitudes supported the idea of international control of atomic energy, but a solid attitude foundation existed to support this first arms control proposal.

At the same time, right from the beginning of the atomic age, important and powerful attitudes were opposed to international control. Strong support for use of nuclear weapons against Japan undermined the credibility of scientist-dominated arms control activists who advocated international control. More important, the public was totally opposed to "sharing the secret" with any other country or with the United Nations. Over time, a majority became increasingly pessimistic about the chances of successful negotiation and increasingly critical of the Soviet Union. All of these attitudes presented advocates of international control with serious political problems.

Finally, on two issues the public, advocates of international control, and opponents of international control all seemed to be in agreement. All groups thought the bomb would spread (the only disagreement was over the time). All were in favor of international inspection. However, as will be shown in the next section, opponents of international control were more effective in framing the valence issue of inspection in ways that supported their policy preferences.

III Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy-making

Throughout the nuclear age the politics of arms control have been dominated by the activities of a few elite scientists, military officers, politicians, and civilian defense "intellectuals." As reviewed in Chapter 2, most scholars have reinforced this elite-focused view and concluded that public opinion plays an insignificant role in the making of foreign and arms control policy. Indeed, the first efforts to limit the potential military uses of atomic energy fit this elite pattern. Public opinion played no appreciable role in the first five unsuccessful attempts to place this issue on the executive branch agenda.¹⁵¹ It is important to review these early, unsuccessful, attempts to get international control onto the agenda because they provide a sharp contrast with latter efforts: early efforts were not aided by public opinion pressure, while later efforts benefited from strong public support.

A. Getting on the Agenda

The first attempt at controlling the military uses of atomic energy started before nuclear weapons existed. On February 2, 1939, Leo Szilard wrote a letter to French physicist Frederic Joliot imploring him

151 During these early efforts, public opinion was mentioned on only two instances. Vanover Bush and James Conant were concerned about public opinion in the context of domestic control of atomic energy, and James Byrnes was worried about public reaction about the large expenditure for the Manhattan Project if the bomb did not work. See Lieberman 1970, 59; Sherwin 1977, 121, 138.

to withhold publication of scientific information related to atomic fission.¹⁵² This nascent movement, organized by many of those who later would form the first pro-arms control interest group after World War II, received support from a number of prominent American and British scientists. However, this effort was destroyed both by the explicit refusal of Joliot to cooperate and by the sheer magnitude of the international research effort being conducted at the time. Joliot's March 1939 publication of a paper suggesting the possibility of a chain reaction was followed by a flood of other papers: by the end of 1939 almost 100 related articles had appeared in print. Dissemination of this information led to the creation of nuclear weapons programs in several countries and ended this first attempt at "arms control."

The second effort to place international control on the agenda was much more sophisticated and concerted, but also was unsuccessful. World famous physicist Niels Bohr began advocating international control of atomic weapons in 1943 soon after he had escaped Nazi-controlled Denmark. For the next two years, he and other American atomic scientists, such as Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein, successfully lobbied senior atomic scientists, American and British scientific administrators, and diplomats.¹⁵³ This effort triggered extensive staff work by Vannevar Bush and James Conant which eventually had a powerful and positive impact on Secretary of War Stimson. Bohr received

¹⁵² Sherwin 1977, 17-29; A. Smith 1965.

¹⁵³ Bernstein 1974, 1006-7; Lieberman 1970, 28-35, 70; Sherwin 1977, 90-114, 127, 167.

personal audiences with both Churchill and Roosevelt. However, his arms control proposition was explicitly rejected by both heads of state with the signing of the Quebec, Hyde Park, and other secret U.S.-U.K. subsidiary agreements.¹⁵⁴

A third attempt to raise the issue of international control was initiated by Secretary of War Stimson and was stimulated by bureaucratic pressure exerted on him by his senior atomic and foreign policy specialists John J. McCloy, Harvey Bundy, Vannevar Bush, and James Conant. On several occasions Stimson tried to raise the issue of international control with President Roosevelt, but only succeeded in getting FDR to inform then Secretary of State Stettinius of the existence of the Manhattan project. While Stimson saw this as a small, but necessary, success needed to initiate State Department planning for the diplomatic and post-war consequences of the bomb, his effort failed to place international control on the agenda during the Roosevelt administration. The detailed examination of post-war atomic policy, promised by President Roosevelt, never took place before his death.¹⁵⁵

The fourth attempt to place international control on the agenda was a continuation of Secretary Stimson's efforts with FDR, but this time it was focused on the overwhelmed new President, Harry S. Truman. Truman agreed to Stimson's proposal that issues of the atomic bomb be

154 Loewenheim, Langley & Jonas 1975, 32-3, 332, 366, 648; Acheson 1969, 167; Bernstein 1974, 1005-7; Groves [1962] 1983, 401-2; Lieberman 1970, 36-8; Sherwin 1977, 6-7, 38, 124-127.
155 Sherwin 1977, 124-127, 138-9, 144-5; Lieberman 1970, 41, 46-59; Herken 1981, 12-14; Bernstein 1974, 1009-10.

studied, and the President authorized formation of the Interim Committee. While this famous committee focused most of its attention on a variety of issues other than international control, its discussions on this subject found two very powerful people, General Groves and soon to be Secretary of State Byrnes, strongly against such an effort.¹⁵⁶ The Committee never issues a formal report on the subject of international control. Ironically, one reason why this effort failed in placing international control on the agenda was that Secretary Stimson--the ultimate insider advocate of international control--changed his mind several times on the desirability or feasibility of international control. By vacillating on this issue before the bomb was used against Japan, he forfeited several opportunities to get this complex issue onto the Presidential agenda.

The final failed attempt to get international control on the agenda was a semi-comic effort by Leo Szilard to use low-level Kansas City political "connections" to talk directly with President Truman. Truman did not grant Szilard an interview, but instead sent him to talk with future Secretary of State James Byrnes. While this effort went nowhere, it left lasting impressions with both men. Szilard, and many of his scientific colleagues, came to the conclusion that all policy makers were ignorant of the relevant facts; for his part, Byrnes concluded that scientists were both naive as to the realities of world politics

¹⁵⁶ Bechhoefer 1961, 32; Bernstein 1974, 1011-2; Gerber 1982, 71; Herken 1981, 16; Lieberman 1970, 70-85; Sherwin 1977, 169-70, 202-10.

and arrogant.¹⁵⁷ While each attitude had some basis in fact, neither perception was to help further arms control in the years ahead.

International control of atomic energy finally made it onto the agenda when President Truman's made a public statement on the subject, in the context of the proposed May-Johnson bill for domestic control of atomic energy. In his October 3, 1945 message to Congress, Truman stated his intentions to negotiate with his war-time allies, Canada and the U.K., over the issue of exchange of scientific information and renunciation of the use and development of atomic weapons.¹⁵⁸

President Truman followed up this message with a press conference a few days later and a major speech given on Navy Day which clarified his position that the process of negotiating with Canada and the U.K. did not mean he intended to share the "secret," i.e. disclose details relating to the manufacturing process which produced the bomb. These public presentations were followed by an important trilateral conference with the British and Canadians which produced a public declaration that stated that international negotiations would be undertaken before the United Nations.¹⁵⁹ As a result of Truman's actions, international control had finally reached the Executive branch agenda--the first step in the policy process. However this history leaves one outstanding question: why did Truman make this decision?

157 Sherwin 1977, 200-2; Lieberman 1970, 75-7; Yergin 1977, 136. Churchill's similar negative reaction to Bohr one year earlier also hurt the prospects of international control.

158 Bernstein 1974, 1021-2; Herken 1981, 35-40; Yergin 1977, 140-1.

159 Truman 1955, 538-9, 542-4; Walton 1976, 60-1.

Two possible answers to this question can be rejected almost immediately: interest group pressure and bureaucratic politics. There is no evidence that Truman or any member of his cabinet, other than Henry Wallace, either had direct communications or agreed with any arms control or foreign policy lobby group which supported international control of atomic energy.¹⁶⁰ There are no indications from the historical record that interest group-led political pressure was ever mentioned by senior officials when they discussed international control. As a result, it seems that interest group politics can be ruled out as a possible explanation.

At the same time, a majority of Truman's cabinet were on record as against international control. In the special cabinet meeting set aside for this topic, which was Secretary Stimson's last official government action before retirement, a majority of the domestic cabinet was against international control. In addition, the majority of foreign policy decision-makers, such as Secretary of State Byrnes, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Groves--still head of the functioning Manhattan project--were all against Stimson's proposal concerning international control.¹⁶¹ Truman clearly knew about the near-universal bureaucratic opposition to international control because he asked all cabinet members, even those who were not at

160 Henry Wallace met with scientists and also supported international control. See Seaborg 1987, 61-65.

161 Herken 1981, 29-31; Bernstein 1974, 1018-20; Truman 1955, 525-30; Walton 1976, 55-7; Donovan 1977; Lieberman 1970, 144-9; and Millis 1951.

the meeting, to communicate their views to him in writing. Thus, one can reject a bureaucratic politics hypothesis concerning getting international control onto the agenda.¹⁶²

Two factors which favored entering into negotiations over international control were diplomatic pressure, in the form of correspondence from British Prime Minister Atlee, and public opinion. The former reason was explicitly acknowledged by President Truman in his memoirs and is accepted by most historians who have studied the period.¹⁶³ The latter hypothesis, that public opinion was an important factor in placing international control onto the agenda, is a more original proposition. It is supported by three arguments. First, a review of polling data discussed above shows that public support for initiating negotiations was at the level of preponderance or greater. As is often the case when public attitudes are this clear-cut, the alternatives to such opinion--even if supported by strong bureaucratic factions--are not taken seriously by the ultimate policy maker, in this case the President. While key actors could and did argue against the substance of international control, no person or organization made an explicit argument against initiating negotiations per se. Once the bomb had been used and became a public issue, it was impossible for even powerful bureaucratic opponents to keep arms control negotiations off the agenda. This example illustrates how preponderant or unanimous

162 Congressional attitude at the time also was critical of international control.

163 Lieberman 1970, 156-60; Truman 1955, 534-5.

level public opinion creates a context for ideas and thereby has an important, but subtle, impact on decisions.

The second factor which supports the public opinion hypothesis is that British Prime Minister Atlee was encouraging President Truman to initiate negotiations because the Prime Minister was under his own political pressure from an aroused Labor party and public opinion.¹⁶⁴

The third reason that supports the argument that public opinion played a role in getting international control on the agenda relates to the fact that one key member of Truman's cabinet changed his opinion on international control, Secretary of State Byrnes. Public opinion, measured by confidential polling conducted for the State Department, was an important factor which reinforced his growing support for international control.¹⁶⁵ To my knowledge, no historian who has written on this period has discovered these surveys or has understood their significance. One poll in particular--completed at the Secretary's personal request and conducted at significant expense within a period of 24 hours--illustrates how private polling can have an important influence on senior policymakers.¹⁶⁶

The history of attempts to get international control onto the agenda shows that before the bomb was used against Japan, bureaucratic

164 Gowing 1964, 50-51, 64-70, 77; Lieberman 1970, 161.

165 At this time, all of the survey work conducted for the State Department by NORC was considered confidential, and results were only circulated within the Executive branch.

166 The survey was NORC T42. These overnight polls, which were extremely innovative at the time, attest to the fact that on occasion senior policy makers want detailed data on public opinion.

opposition to any form of international control was sufficiently strong to keep the issue off the agenda. Neither the interest group-type pressure from atomic scientists nor the strong personal appeal of Secretary of War Stimson were able to get Roosevelt or Truman to take this issue seriously and place it on the agenda. However, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, overwhelming public opinion in the U.S. and U.K.--at the level of consensus to preponderance--forced a reluctant Truman administration to initiate negotiations over the international control of atomic energy.

B. Defining An Issue: How An Issue Is Placed On The Agenda

A more important relationship between public opinion and the policy process goes far beyond determining whether public opinion helped place international control onto the agenda. Public opinion played a very significant role in defining how the issue of international control was defined once it reached the agenda. Two aspects of international control--sharing the secret and inspection--became key to the policy debate. A review of Table 4-3, above, shows that the public wanted negotiations to be initiated. However, at the same time, the public did not want to share the atomic secret. Senior policy makers were aware of these divergent public attitudes as documented by the fact that polling information on this particular issue was discussed at the Cabinet meeting which first, briefly, debated the issue of international control.¹⁶⁷ As a result, Truman mentioned in his memoirs that the

167 Herken 1981, 29.

issue of sharing nuclear technology--part of the most ambitious plans for international control--was not an issue. "Stimson did not propose that we 'turn the bomb over' to Russia. As far as I was concerned, this was not a matter for discussion."¹⁶⁸ This example illustrates a pattern previously noted that when opinion is clear-cut at the preponderant level or above, alternative arguments tend not to be taken seriously by the final decisionmaker. Not only was a radical form of international control, advocated by some scientists, precluded from Presidential consideration, but opponents of any form of international control leaked information to the press and inaccurately characterized proponents of international control of advocating "sharing the secret."¹⁶⁹ Even though President Truman responded to these inaccurate press reports and stated that arms control proponents had suggested no such thing, the parameters of the public debate had now become set. Advocates of international control started on the defensive and had to explain why they were not for sharing the secret.¹⁷⁰

The second key aspect associated with framing the issue of international control involved the issue of inspection. As Table 4-3 indicates, the public was strongly and consistently in favor of inspection. Even before the executive branch began its effort to establish a formal negotiating position, the idea of inspection became paramount. In addition to strong public support, this position was

168 Truman 1955, 525.

169 Herkin 1981, 31; Truman 1955, 528; Lieberman 1970, 149.

170 The Association 1945.

forcefully advocated by Senators Vandenberg and Connally and was quickly agreed to by President Truman. Inspection had to be extremely rigorous and had to proceed before other aspects of an agreement were implemented.¹⁷¹ It was in this public opinion and policy context that Secretary of States Byrnes appointed a committee to study the feasibility of international control, the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee.¹⁷² After two months of intensive work the committee sent to the Secretary of State and the President a proposal for international control of atomic energy.¹⁷³ In the subsequent months, many of its provisions were deleted or modified in ways that totally transformed the plan. This was possible in part because members of the Acheson-Lilienthal committee were totally ignorant of public attitudes and as a result were unable to develop a political strategy to defend their proposal.

Even before the Acheson-Lilienthal report was completed, critics went to work to water-down its major provisions. One fact that aided this political campaign was that most of the policy positions taken by critics of international control were more in step with public opinion

171 Lieberman 1970, 218-23, 235; Tate 1969, 230, 242; Bechhoefer 1961, 35.

172 A great deal has been written on the Acheson- Lilienthal effort. See Barton & Weiler 1976, 70; Tate 1969, 220-33; Bechhoefer 1961, 35-6; Groves [1962] 1983, 411-12; Lieberman 1970, 233-59; Acheson 1969, 152-6; Bernstein 1974, 1029-30; Hewlett and Anderson 1962. However, this author believes the current literature exaggerates the importance of the failed Acheson-Lilienthal effort.

173 For a text of the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the official history of the negotiations at the United Nations, see U.S. Department of State 1946b, 1946a, 1948.

than were the policy positions advocated by proponents of international control. The first move to undermine the substance and spirit of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, and the decision that in the end proved to be the most important, was the agreement by Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman to appoint conservative financier Bernard Baruch to represent the United States as Ambassador before the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.¹⁷⁴ Almost immediately, Baruch objected to the widespread discussion of the Acheson-Lilienthal report because it created the impression of representing government policy.¹⁷⁵ He also fought hard, but unsuccessfully, to keep the report from being published.¹⁷⁶ Over the next two months, until the U.S. position was presented before the U.N., Baruch threatened to resign three times.¹⁷⁷ Historians, who have emphasized Baruch's ego, have missed the crucial point. Each time Baruch threatened to resign, he received concrete assurances from the Secretary of State or the President which had the effect of undermining key provisions of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal. Baruch's threats and his effective use of the press were part of his political communications strategy to transform the Acheson-Lilienthal plan into his own version of a proposal on international control of atomic energy.

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- 174 Advocates of international control were immediately opposed to Baruch's appointment. See Acheson 1969, 154; Lilienthal 1965.
- 175 Bernstein 1974, 1033; Gerber 1982, 74; Herken 1981, 160; Lieberman 1970, 263. The main proponent of publication was Secretary Byrnes- see Lieberman 1970, 265-69.
- 176 Public opinion data indicates why Baruch was concerned. Awareness of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was more universal than was awareness of the Baruch plan. See Appendix 1.
- 177 Lieberman 1970, 267-75.

In the fight that transformed the Acheson-Lilienthal plan into the official U.S. government position, four major changes were made.¹⁷⁸ One revision severely limited international ownership of atomic-related facilities such as uranium mines. The uranium mine owners lobbied Baruch and found him sympathetic to their arguments.¹⁷⁹ A review of public opinion on this subject shows that only a weak majority favored international ownership of the nuclear fuel-cycle. This example illustrates an important conclusion reached in this dissertation concerning the relationship between the level of public opinion and policy formation. For public opinion to be effective against organized economic or bureaucratic opposition that has access to the policymaker, public attitudes must be at the consensus level or above. Even if a majority approves of a certain policy issue, as was the case concerning this issue of international ownership of the nuclear fuel-cycle, when attitudes are below the 60 percent consensus threshold, public opinion rarely determines policy outcomes.

The second major change to the Acheson-Lilienthal plan waived the provision of the U.N. charter that gave a permanent member of the Security Council, such as the Soviet Union, a veto to stop action taken by the United Nations. A review of public opinion data shows that

178 A key meeting, where the differences between the Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch plans were discussed, was held with Baruch, his staff, and the Acheson-Lilienthal committee. See Acheson 1969, 155-6; Bernstein 1974, 1034-6; Lieberman 1970, 279-85.

179 Lieberman 1970, 275-6.

eliminating the U.N. veto was popular with the public.¹⁸⁰ While this issue had been debated in the Acheson-Lilienthal group, it had been rejected because this practically assured that the Soviet Union would oppose any form of international control. While the prediction came to pass, Baruch stuck to his position that the Security Council veto should not apply to atomic issues, and he retained the full support of President Truman on this issue.

The third change, requiring that safeguards be implemented before any other provisions of international control, had been etched into policy in the process of international control being placed on the agenda. As discussed above, the public strongly supported the idea that safeguards be applied and did not differentiate between the positions taken by international control advocates and critics. However, the strong public support for inspection tended to strengthen the policy position taken by critics of international control such as Senator Vandenberg who used this position to narrow the U.S. negotiating position on this issue.¹⁸¹

The final change in the Acheson-Lilienthal plan involved addition of Baruch's call for "swift and immediate sanctions." Unfortunately, there is no available public opinion data to determine mass attitudes on this specific issue. However, with the "Munich analogy" so wide-spread,

180 See public attitudes about the United Nations in Cantril and Strunk 1951. This same idea is supported by unpublished polling conducted for FDR by the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR).

181 Vandenberg 1952.

it would seem likely that the public would have supported this aspect Baruch's position.

C. Negotiation

Not only did public opinion play an important role in the transformation of the Acheson-Liliental plan into the Baruch plan, it also played an important part in the development of Baruch's strategy for conducting the negotiations before the United Nations. Baruch's knowledge of polling data and his detailed review and analysis of press reaction to his presentation made him aware that his position was vulnerable in two areas: disarmament and building nuclear weapons.¹⁸² As reviewed earlier in this chapter, the public was in favor of the idea of disarmament, but they were unsure whether it was good to base U.S. security around building nuclear weapons.

Aware of his potential political vulnerability, Baruch kept in close touch with foundations and interest groups which were advocating international control to learn about their political strategy.¹⁸³ He used this information to tailor his negotiating position to anticipate "counter-attacks" by his domestic or foreign opponents. His superior knowledge of public opinion meant that he knew more about the political

182 See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library, "Press Reactions, 1946-1947" dated June 15, 1946 and a series of memoes prepared by General Grove's staff at the War Department which began June 27, 1946.

183 The groups ranged from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the Federation of American Scientists and various faculty groups at the University of Chicago, Colgate, and University of Denver.

strategy that would be most effective in criticizing his effort than did his opposition. For example, he knew that the public was sympathetic to calls for disarmament. As a result, in his discussions with Secretary of State Byrnes, Under-Secretary Acheson, and President Truman, Baruch strongly pressed for the authority to be able to discuss the issue of disarmament. He did not want to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to exploit this rhetorical position. Truman rejected Baruch's requests several times.¹⁸⁴ As it turned out, Baruch's fears were well-founded. The Soviets indeed perceived this weakness in the United States negotiating position, and called for disarmament both in their initial response to Baruch and in Molotov's major counter-attack of November, 1946. In his attempt to get his negotiating instructions reversed, it is clear from previously classified correspondence that Baruch's rationale was not understood by Dean Acheson, who served as the communications link between Baruch and Byrnes and Truman. Acheson did not realize that Baruch did not want to advocate disarmament per se, but that he wanted to use the rhetorical weapon of disarmament to fend off Soviet propaganda initiatives.¹⁸⁵ It turns out that the Soviet counter to Baruch was too little and too late.¹⁸⁶ However, what is

184 Gerber 1982, 85; Bernstein 1974, 1036-7; Lieberman 1970, 287-98.

185 Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library under several files: Acheson, Dean (6/26/46, 11/2/46), Senator Warren (11/2/46) and Byrnes, James (11/2/46).

186 The key "swing" group in this, and some future, negotiations was the Europeans. Baruch spent a great deal of time trying to keep them "in line." Had he not done this, it is possible that this first international nuclear arms control negotiation could have caused a split between the U.S. and its European allies on fundamental security issues even before the creation of NATO.

clear from the primary sources and a review of public opinion data is that Baruch's close watching of public opinion and monitoring of the national and international press reaction to his effort made him the first person to realize his own political vulnerabilities. This allowed him time to develop political and communication strategies to support his position and to undermine potential counter-attacks by his opposition. This is the essence of strategic planning in political campaigns and is a classic demonstration of the effective use of public opinion in the policy process.¹⁸⁷

Another important relationship between public opinion and this negotiation concerned the achievement of Baruch's main goals: to convince the American public that it was necessary to build nuclear weapons and to base U.S. security on nuclear deterrence, not on disarmament.¹⁸⁸ Polling data reviewed above showed that from 1945 through the middle of 1946, the public was not so sure it wanted to follow this approach and structure America's national security around the production and deployment of nuclear weapons.¹⁸⁹ This created a potential opening for advocates of international control. By this time, the major political opposition to Baruch's position came from former Vice President Henry Wallace. Wallace's celebrated dissent from the

187 For a review of similar uses of public opinion by various Presidents (not including Truman), see Sudman 1982.

188 This is clearly seen in the recommendations section of Baruch's memo to Truman asking for approval of his final set of negotiating instructions. See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library, Truman, Harry 9/19/46, p. 21

189 See the previous discussion in this chapter and data in Appendix 3.

emerging Cold War foreign policy positions of Baruch and Byrnes, and his controversial resignation from the cabinet created a vocal opposition.¹⁹⁰ Wallace increasingly called for the United States to stop building atomic weapons and to be more forthcoming with regard to its position on international control. However, Wallace's political challenge failed for four reasons. First, he and his political allies failed to focus their attack by recommending that the United States temporarily stop making nuclear weapons. Public opinion data clearly shows that people supported a temporary halt even as public attitudes turned against the combined steps of terminating production and destroying America's atomic bombs.¹⁹¹ This is one example where question wording was extremely important. By focusing the public political debate on unilateral steps--which were not popular--rather than on temporary, limited steps to prove America's good faith, Wallace's political communication missed his main audience.¹⁹²

The second reason for Wallace's failure to mobilize support for his position relates to a "cycle" in political communications.¹⁹³ When viewed graphically, this cycle follows an "S" curve. Ideas rarely spring up overnight. To diffuse ideas, it takes a great deal of effort

¹⁹⁰ Lieberman 1970, 345-6; Walton 1976.

¹⁹¹ Reviewing 40+ years of survey data on arms control leads to the conclusion that the American public is extremely reluctant to take steps which are perceived of as being unilateral in nature. This same point is made by Kohut 1988.

¹⁹² Baruch followed this data carefully and used Gallup data to evaluate the strength of his position. See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library, Lindsay, Frank A. (11/25/46).

¹⁹³ For a discussion of this concept, see Neuman 1986.

before a "take-off" point is reached. Some times public attitudes change. Other times the public holds ideas for long periods of time before a political leader discovers them. If one happens to be advocating an idea at the time a take-off occurs, then one is credited as being a leader who can mobilize public opinion.¹⁹⁴ As a corollary, if one begins advocating an idea when it is at its plateau or on the decline, one is characterized as a failed leader. Wallace began his calls for America to stop building atomic weapons as public opinion in support of this idea was on the decline. As a result, his political efforts reinforced the elite perception of Wallace as a failed leader rather than as an innovative statesman. Thus, his advocacy of international control had the political effect of hurting, rather than helping, the chances for conclusion of this arms control agreement.

The third reason for Wallace's failure was the success of a vicious counter-attack on him organized by Bernard Baruch. This campaign characterized Wallace as an appeaser and pro-Russian advocate. Public opinion data is clear that Baruch's negative message, not Wallace's, was heard and accepted by the public. Gallup data showed that 40 percent of the public had heard of the Wallace criticism of the Truman administration's foreign policy (more than those who had heard of

194

Rarely is such a leader actually responsible for creating such an attitude change, but few political actors delve into the causality of attitude change. For an example that describes how the Committee on the Present Danger was able to claim (incorrectly) that it was responsible for changing attitudes toward increasing military preparedness in the late 1970s and 1980s, see Graham 1985.

the Baruch plan). Of these who had heard of the controversy, 80 percent supported the hard line policies advocated by Secretary of State Byrnes over those advocated by Wallace.¹⁹⁵

Finally, as discussed in the public opinion section above, in 1946 public opinion was turning against the Soviet Union. As a result, attempting to "market" a challenge to Baruch's policies by emphasizing cooperation with the Russian's, as Wallace did, was bound to fail. Baruch's superior knowledge of public opinion put him in an excellent position to develop a political strategy that had the best chance of success. At the same time, arms control advocates--whether dovish atomic scientists or Henry Wallace--either were not aware of public opinion or did not take it seriously. As will be demonstrated in future chapters of this dissertation, this pattern where arms control advocates adopt political strategies without paying any regard to public opinion will repeat itself throughout the nuclear age. In general, this has been a major reason why arms control has a mixed pattern of success.

D. Implementation

Another important relationship between public opinion and policy formation for international control of atomic energy involved the ultimate consummation of Baruch's victory. This required terminating

195 See AIPO 379.

Baruch's negotiations at the appropriate time and making sure that this victory was not reversed after he resigned as Ambassador to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.¹⁹⁶ After it had become clear to participants of the U.N. discussions that no agreement was possible, U.S. delegation member Fred Eberstadt held an unauthorized meeting with Soviet representative Gromyko and suggested that the negotiations be terminated. When he found out about this diplomatic end-run, Baruch strongly rejected this position and berated his close advisor both in private and at a staff meeting. He told Eberstadt "We must go on until the public generally come to the opinion we have."¹⁹⁷ Baruch made sure that this message got through to all members of his staff by telling them he would not end the negotiations until he perceived the time "was right." He told them they had no reason to be discouraged with the "progress" of the negotiations, but at the same time he made it clear that NO changes were to be considered in the U.S. negotiating position.¹⁹⁸

For Baruch, the confirmation that the public was accepting "the opinion we have" became clear in the Fall of 1946 as public opinion polls indicated increased support for the United States building atomic

196 Since this negotiations did no produce a treaty, there was no ratification stage. However, there was an implementation stage which lasted from Baruch's resignation in January 1947 through the announcement that the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb in 1949. Radical shifts in public opinion in this time period could have provided an opportunity for the liberal opposition to reverse American policy.

197 Bernstein 1974, 1043; Lieberman 1970, 336-7.

198 Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy), Princeton University Library, Notes on Meetings 1946 (8/1/46, 8/23/46).

weapons and increased criticism of the Soviet Union. With this knowledge of public opinion in hand, Baruch asked for and received authorization from Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman to conclude the negotiations before the end of 1946.¹⁹⁹

Terminating the negotiations would assure that agreement on international control of atomic energy would never be concluded, but this strategy also had its diplomatic risks. By this time, America's European allies were more interested in continuing arms control negotiations than was the United States. The Soviets belatedly attempted to convince France and Britain that agreement was possible, but this effort was very limited and failed. During this last stage of the negotiations, Baruch spend much of his time trying to convince French and British diplomats that no agreement was possible. With America's allies reluctantly supporting its position, the United States brought the Baruch plan--in exactly the same form as it was when presented to the world in June 1946--to a vote on December 30, 1946.²⁰⁰ Even though proforma negotiations continued at the United Nations through 1950, this final vote in 1946 terminated the real discussion of international control of atomic energy. By this time the

199 Baruch, rather than Byrnes or Truman, seemed to be in control of the political strategy for these negotiations. Baruch instructed his staff to begin work to terminate negotiations before he had received authorization to do so. See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy), Princeton University Library, Memoranda, Misc. 1946 (10/28/46). On his instructions, see Lieberman 1970, 368-9.
200 Acheson 1969, 156; Dupuy and Hammerman 1973, 313-20; Gerber 1982, 73.

attitude foundation for the Cold War had been established, and Baruch's work was completed.²⁰¹

IV. Diversity and Dynamics of Public Opinion

Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes toward international control of atomic energy and evaluated the impact public opinion has had on policy-making at various stages such as getting on the agenda or negotiation. This material has demonstrated that the Cohen (1973) no-impact thesis can be clearly rejected.

This final section will address the two other major hypothesis being examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? Have opinion leaders and the attentive public been against arms control, and have these elite attitudes eventually changed mass attitudes to be critical of arms control through a top-down diffusion process? To answer these two larger hypotheses, four specific questions must be answered. Does the public opinion data presented in this chapter show that a consensus of the general public supported international control? Is there evidence that attitudes were fragmented along political or demographic lines? Were there any indications that attitudes held by the attentive public had more of an impact on government policy than did attitudes held by the general public? Is there any evidence that mass attitudes changed in a manner consistent with the top-down model?

201 For a discussion of the impact of the Truman doctrine on attitudes, see Kernell 1986.

A. Attitude Consensus

The first aspect of an attitude consensus has been defined for this dissertation as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) and relative attitude stability over time. Whether such an attitude consensus existed in support of international control has been partially answered. At the mass level, there was no simple consensus either in favor of or opposed to the international control of atomic energy. The general public supported some aspects of international control, such as the idea that atomic arms control negotiations should be conducted and that atomic facilities should be under international ownership. On other elements of international control, the public changed its opinion. These include the willingness to take unilateral U.S. initiatives to obtain an arms control agreement, the question of building atomic weapons, and the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union. In other areas--such as using the bomb against Japan and sharing the secret--the public was against these elements of international control. This complex pattern suggests that no simple attitude consensus existed concerning the international control of atomic energy.

Even though there was no clear consensus, data from this arms control initiative does not show that a lack of a consensus was due to attitude volatility. As summarized in Table 4-3 (above), within each issue area, public attitudes were quite stable. Significant attitude change (over 10 percent) took place in only two areas: perceptions of the Soviet Union and willingness to build atomic weapons. In neither

area were attitudes volatile; they changed gradually and in one consistent direction. As a result, data from this first arms control case tends to further undermine the validity of Almond's mood or volatility theory.

B. Attitude Fragmentation

The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the relative homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along political or demographic lines. To address this issue, quantitative analysis was performed on 8 national surveys that were conducted over the entire period of the when international control was being discussed from August 1945 through 1950. Cross tabulations and correlations were run on all questions relating to international control and a number of other social and political variables.²⁰² By using a seven-point fragmentation scale discussed in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes showed very low to moderate fragmentation along partisan, ideological, or demographic lines. A summary of the quantitative analysis is reviewed in Table 4-4 below. It shows that issues associated with international control were not highly fragmented along partisan, regional, or demographic lines. One finds that party identification, voting behavior or preferences, and perceptions of the President's/government's job performance had little to do with attitudes toward international

202 Since virtually all of the results were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, separate chi square values will not be presented for each result.

Fragmentation of Opinion Concerning
International Control of Atomic Energy
(7 point scale)#

Table 4-4

Variables	Surveys							
	8/45	6/46	2/47	10/47	6/48	10/49	2/50a	2/50b
AGE	2	0	1-2	0-1		0-1	3	1
ISOL	3					1-3		
JPERFP					1			
JPERPRS	0							
PTYID	0					0-1	0-1	0
PTYBEST	0							
RACE	3	0	3-5	2-5	4	1-4	2	2
REGION/South	0	0	1-2	0-2	0	0-2	1	1
SEX	0	0-2	1-3	0-2	2	0-1	2	1
VET	1	3	1-2	2				
VOTE	0-1		1-2				1	1
VOTECONG							0-2	1
VOTEPRS	0-1		1-2	1-2	0-1		1-2	0

Variables

AGE- age; ISOL- isolationism/internationalism; JPERFP- job performance about foreign policy; JPERPRS- presidential job performance; PTYID- party identification; PTYBEST- party best to handle the most important problem; RACE- white or non-white; REGION- South; SEX- male or female; VOTE- voted in the last presidential election; VOTECONG- party voted for in Congressional election; VOTEPRS- candidate voted for in the last Presidential election; VET- veteran status.

Surveys

8/1945 AIPO 354; 6/1946 NORC 143; 2/1947 NORC 148;
10/1947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170;
2/1950a AIPO 452k; 2/1950b AIPO 452 tps.

#

Fragmentation Scale

1= 0%-2.9% (none); 2= 3.0%-5.9% (very low); 3= 6.0%-8.9% (low);
4= 9.0%-11.9% (medium); 5= 12.0%-14.9% (high);
6= 15.0%-17.9% (very high); 7= 18.0%< (extreme).

control. There were slight differences in attitudes along age, region, sex, and veteran status lines. In general, younger people, women, those outside of the South, and veterans were more supportive of international control than the general public. What is interesting to note is that the magnitude of these differences was extremely small, usually under 10 percent. Non-whites were the only group that held divergent attitudes. They often answered "don't know" in unusually high numbers (up to 50 percent) and did not consistently support or oppose international control.

C. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change

To answer the two questions whether government policy was more sensitive to attitudes held by the attentive public and whether mass opinion was influenced by the attentive public, attitudes of this elite segment of society were determined. To study the issue of attentiveness in the context of international control of atomic energy, one survey (NORC 148) was examined in detail because it included six different indicators that could be used to measure various levels of attentiveness: awareness of the Baruch plan; professional, business or white collar occupations; interested in international control; membership in interest groups that discussed foreign policy issues; a college degree, and upper class status. As summarized in Table 4-5 below, these six different indicators define various levels of attentiveness that range in size from 45 percent to 2 percent of the

Opinion & Policy Elite and Attentive Public
 Attitudes Toward International Control of Atomic Energy:
 [Analysis of NORC 148]
 (in percent)

Table 4-5

	Indicators of Attentiveness						General Public
	Heard of Baruch Plan	Upper Occupation	Interest in ICAE	Club member	College Graduate	Upper Class	
percent in population	45	40	27	18	10	2	(100)
<u>Question</u>							
1	51	47	51	55	53	57	(49)
2	52	53	53	54	58	64	(45)
3	35	38	34	39	47	43	(32)
4	63	56	60	62	64	61	(55)
5	-	37	43	43	48	45	(32)
6	65	62	64	67	69	68	(53)
7	49	45	46	50	56	43	(39)
8	79	76	78	78	78	64	(67)
9	63	57	62	65	66	50	(51)
10	53	47	50	50	58	54	(40)

Questions

1) Approve the government's foreign policy; 2) Approve the government's atomic policy; 3) Believe Russia can be trusted to meet the U.S. half way; 4) Supports international control of atomic energy (icae); 5) Had a fairly clear idea of the Baruch plan; 6) Would support icae if it meant the US had to stop building bombs; 7) Would support icae if it meant the US had to destroy its existing stockpile; 8) Would support icae if there was verification; 9) Would support icae if it meant international ownership of atomic facilities; 10) Would support icae if it meant the U.S. had to share some atomic technology with the international organization.

population. The attitudes held by these six groups were compared with the general public on ten different issues concerning international control and foreign policy. Two general conclusions emerge. First, all six indicators of attentiveness show that by any definition of attentiveness, the attentive public was more in favor of international control than was the general public. Support for international control of atomic energy registered approval by a majority of the public (55 percent). All the various attentive groups supported international control, on average, at the level of consensus (61 percent.) Those ten percent of the public with a college degree supported international control at an even higher levels (64 percent).²⁰³

The second conclusion that emerges from this data relates to determining the most appropriate indicator of attentiveness. As shown in Chapter 3, both knowledge-based and interest-based indicators place the size of the attentive public for arms control and foreign policy at approximately 25 percent of the public. Most scholars use college education as a surrogate variable to indicate membership in the attentive public.²⁰⁴ This approach is being used in this dissertation. A review of Table 4-5 shows that opinions held by those

203 In this survey, those with a college degree could be considered not only attentive, but also members of the "opinion and policy elite."

204 One scholar, Genco (1984), strongly criticizes the use of knowledge-based or socio-economic based indicators of attentiveness. This author disagrees with Genco on this point. Data from Table 4-5 shows that use of college education to measure attentiveness is justified to determine the direction of attitude difference between the attentive public and general public.

with a college degree were approximately the same as those who could be deemed "attentive" either by their interest in international control (27 percent of the public) or by their participation in an interest group that discussed foreign policy topics (18 percent of the public). While attitudes about international control held by college graduates differed by as much as 10 percent from attitudes held by other types of "attentives," in all cases the direction was the same. All attentive groups were more in favor of international control than was the general public. This finding is important because it justifies using the college education indicator to identify attitudes held by the attentive public.²⁰⁵ When surveys contain questions that measure interest and knowledge toward foreign policy issues, these indicators will be used to check whether they agree with results obtained by using college education as a measure of attentiveness.

Data from all eight surveys that were analyzed find that the attentive public was relatively strongly in support of international control of atomic energy, compared to the general public, from 1945 through 1947. By 1948, the attentive public became increasingly skeptical that international control would be successfully negotiated, and their level of support declined to the approximate level of the general public. However, after President Truman announced that the

205

For surveys conducted from the 1930s to the mid-1960s, before the large expansion in the percent of the population with a college degree, use of a college degree to define attentiveness will have the effect of measuring attitudes of a smaller, more elite group of the public than would be the case if one used interest-based based indicators of attentiveness.

United States would develop the hydrogen bomb, the attentive public and the general public both supported the idea of international control at significantly higher levels. One interesting observation, shown in Table 4-6, is that in response to Truman's dramatic announcement, the attentive public changed its attitude more than the general public.

Dramatic Attitude Change
(in percent)

Table 4-6

	AIPO 452k 2/1950a*	AIPO 452tps 2/1950b**	Attitude Change
College graduates	50	79	+29
Attended college	51	72	+21
General Public	49	69	+20

* Question: "Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb before we try to make a Hydrogen bomb?" (Asked before Truman's announcement that the U.S. would proceed with making the H-bomb.)

** Question: "Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb and the Hydrogen bomb?" (Asked after Truman's announcement that the U.S. would proceed with making the H-bomb.)

Not only were attitudes held by the attentive public more in favor of international control than the general public, but attentives also were more positive regarding the possibility that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States.²⁰⁶ During World War II, in April 1943 and August 1945, people with business and professional occupations

²⁰⁶ Cantril and Strunk 1951, 371.

were approximately 10 percent more positive regarding the possibility of Soviet cooperation with the U.S. than was the general public. Those with a college education were more optimistic (from +7 percent to +17 percent) regarding cooperation with Russia from 1944 through December 1946. In 1946, as public attitudes concerning possible U.S.-Soviet cooperation were becoming more pessimistic, attitudes held by the attentive public continued to stay relatively positive toward Russia.

The data presented above support the concept discovered by Almond that attitudes of the attentive public often are quite different from those held by the general public. However, there is no indication that government policy was more responsive to public opinion held by the attentive public than to the general public. In some areas, such as perceptions of a cooperative Soviet Union, government actions seemed to be more in step with mass attitudes than with attentive attitudes.

Concerning the attentive public and the top-down attitude change hypothesis, there is no evidence that public attitudes changed in the direction of attitudes held by the attentive public. Not only were most attitudes held by the general public relatively stable, but changes in attitudes by members of the attentive public did not seem to influence or lead attitudes held by the general public. Mass public attitude changed with respect to U.S.-Soviet cooperation, unilateral steps to achieve disarmament, or the desirability of building atomic bombs. However, in some of these instances attitudes held by the attentive public either did not change, or changed in the opposite direction as did attitudes held by the mass public.

D. Academic Theory and Public Opinion

The most important conclusion from this chapter finds that public opinion clearly had an impact on decision-making at all stages of the policy process. The no-impact hypothesis, advocated by Bernard Cohen, clearly can be rejected for this first arms control case. Public opinion was the key reason that explains why international control got onto the agenda when it did over the opposition of powerful bureaucratic actors. Public opinion also influenced the transformation of the initial American negotiating position from the "radical" Acheson-Lilienthal plan into the almost non-negotiable Baruch plan. Public opinion also played a key role in the development and timing of Baruch's actual negotiations before the United Nations.

Two additional findings concerning the impact public opinion has on decision-making are original to this research. First, there is a relationship between the level of public opinion and its influence in the policy process. When attitudes are relatively clear-cut (at preponderance or higher, i.e. above 70 percent), public opinion dominates the decision-making process and is able to determine outcomes even in the face of powerful bureaucratic opposition. Second, a review of public opinion data and primary source documents find that different interest groups and government actors have very different levels of understanding of public attitudes. In this case, the person who had the best understanding of public opinion, Bernard Baruch, dominated the policy process even though he was not the de jure decision-maker.

Concerning the second hypothesis, no support was found for the mood theory/volatility hypothesis. While no simple attitude consensus existed at the mass level concerning international control of atomic energy, this was not due to attitude volatility. It also was not caused by fragmentation. Data on international control do not find a great deal of fragmentation of opinion along political, regional, or demographic lines. As a result, findings from this base line case tend to support the fragmentation hypothesis posited by scholars such as William Schneider: in this pre-Vietnam case, attitudes were not highly fragmented.

With respect to the third hypothesis, while there was evidence that attitudes held by the attentive public concerning international control of atomic energy differed from attitudes held by the general public, there was no evidence that attentive attitudes had a more important impact on government policy than did mass attitudes. In addition, no support was found that top-down learning took place from the attentive public to the general public.

Some conclusions from in this chapter, when combined with data on levels of public awareness, knowledge, and interest from Chapter 3, reinforce the importance of a key concept originated by E. E. Schattschneider. He argues that the scope of political conflict is an important determinant with respect to the policy outcome. Throughout the nuclear age, awareness, knowledge, and interest in arms control has been relatively low. This has had the effect of directing political fights about arms control upward into elite circles rather than having

them unfold at the mass political level. For this first arms control case, there was relatively low awareness of both the Baruch plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal plan. More importantly, awareness of the Baruch plan is positively correlated with supportive attitudes toward international control of atomic energy. As reviewed in Table 4-5, those who had heard of the Baruch plan were almost 10 percent more supportive of all aspects of international control than was the general public. This suggests that low awareness of arms control, which is the product of the type of communications strategies adopted by arms control advocates, has translated directly into lower support for arms control. In the context of Schattschneider, keeping arms control as an esoteric subject known to relatively few people has reduced its chances of success.

A final conclusion concerns attitude change. One corollary to Almond's and Lippmann's theories has been a conventional wisdom that mass attitudes are vulnerable to dramatic events while elite attitudes, being more well thought out, are considered to be more stable. Data summarized in Table 4-6 clearly refutes this conventional wisdom of elite attitude stability. My findings support two theoretical concepts developed by Mueller and by Gamson & Modigliani. First, real world events, not top-down diffusion of attitudes, change public opinion. Second, contrary to a common sense understanding of elite attitudes, the attentive public, rather than the general public, are the real "followers" in terms of attitude change. Elite attitudes are much more susceptible to dramatic events than are attitudes held by the general public.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty:
Partial Success, 1952-1963

Chapter 5

I Summary

Contrary to the no-impact hypothesis from the public opinion literature, most writings about arms control posit that the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was the product of massive U.S. and international public pressure mobilized over the issue of radioactive fallout. According to this literature, the LTBT case demonstrates that public opinion can have a strong impact on government policy when the public is activated by nuclear phenomena which can be directly linked to peoples' everyday lives.

In terms of the structure of public opinion, most authors argue that public attitudes about nuclear fallout and nuclear testing changed over time and were quite volatile, consistent with traditional public opinion theory. The eventual strong public support shown for the LTBT was a result of effective Presidential leadership after the Cuban missile crisis, and attitude change followed a top-down process.

This chapter argues that the existing arms control literature is wrong on several important points both about the structure of public opinion and its impact on policy. My findings sustain the argument that public opinion had an important impact on government decision-making with respect to the LTBT. In this instance, the arms control literature

is more correct than the non-impact hypothesis from the public opinion literature. There is no question that public concern over fallout helped set the public debate over the test ban issue or influenced government decisions on several non-test ban issues. However, there is reason to question what aspect of American and international public opinion was responsible for successfully getting the test ban issue onto the Executive branch agenda.

This chapter finds that strong public support for a bilateral test ban agreement, the Eisenhower administration's correct reading of the 1956 election results, and several other technical and bureaucratic factors all combined to get the test ban negotiations onto the agenda. However, survey data clearly show that public concern over fallout played a limited role in explaining the structure of public opinion and in influencing government decision-makers.

As was true during the political fight associated with negotiation of the international control of atomic energy, a very important variable turned out to be the degree to which various political actors understood the true nature of public opinion. Political efforts by Adlai Stevenson during the 1956 presidential campaign and by anti-nuclear interest groups in the late 1950s to build support for a test ban agreement by focusing on the fallout controversy failed. By being ignorant of the true nature of public opinion and by pressuring the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to initiate or continue a test moratorium for which there was little public support, arms control advocates helped to obscure strong public support for a bilateral test ban agreement and are

indirectly responsible for producing the circumstances that forced President Kennedy to resume testing in the atmosphere and then to conclude a limited, rather than a comprehensive, test ban treaty. President Kennedy only learned of strong public support for a bilateral test ban treaty after he made the key decision to negotiate a limited agreement.

This chapter clearly shows that the level of public support is closely related to the impact public opinion has on the policy process. Popular presidents can make decisions that fly in the face of majority opinion, but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched. This occurred when President Eisenhower and then President Kennedy agreed to or continued the test moratorium with the Soviets. Consensus level public opinion can influence the policy process even though powerful bureaucratic opposition may exist. This was demonstrated when President Eisenhower, with consensus level public support, overruled his military and atomic energy advisors and pressed forward with negotiating a bilateral test ban agreement. Preponderant public opinion not only "causes" the political system to act according to its dictates, but it also deters political opposition from challenging the specific decision. The successful ratification and implementation of the LTBT illustrates this aspect of the relationship between public opinion and the policy process. Virtually unanimous opinion dominates the entire political system and sweeps all political opposition away. President Kennedy's decision to resume testing after the Soviet Union broke the test moratorium clearly demonstrates this phenomena.

A comprehensive review of 42 national, 18 state, and 1 elite public opinion polls concludes that public opinion was relatively stable, not volatile or moody as argued by Almond ([1950] 1960). The public perceived the test ban controversy not as a single issue but as two distinct issues. If all public opinion questions on the test ban are divided into two separate groups--should testing continue and should a bilateral test ban agreement be concluded--one finds that the major fault-line in public opinion ran between strong opposition to unilateral termination of atmospheric testing and solid support for a negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing. Throughout the entire period from 1945 to 1963, a majority of the public opposed American atmospheric testing only in one survey conducted during the U.S.-Soviet testing moratorium. However, by 1961, this anti-testing attitude disappeared, and a majority or a consensus of the public supported renewed testing by the U.S. before the Soviets unilaterally resumed testing in the atmosphere.

A close reading of the survey questions and a review of public awareness, knowledge, and interest concerning the test ban issue show that public attitudes were not contradictory. The public had a reasonably sophisticated logic which can explain the structure of mass attitudes, but the logic was different from that held by most elites.

In terms of fragmentation of attitudes, quantitative analysis of 17 surveys shows that with the exception of one period, there was little fragmentation of attitudes along political or ideological lines. This tends to support the proposition advanced by Schneider and other

scholars who argue there was a foreign policy attitude consensus before Vietnam. However, the exception is important. During the 1956 election and for six months after the voting, public opinion was sharply split along partisan lines. This pattern supports some of the conclusions reached by Brody and Page (1975) in the context of the war in Vietnam. When political parties or candidates made their differences clear on specific issues, voters are able to discern these differences, and attitudes in turn become more split along partisan lines.

In terms of the top-down learning hypothesis, the test ban case shows that the attentive public did not consistently lead the public in terms of attitude change. Before Eisenhower switched his public position on the test ban treaty in 1957, the attentive public was more supportive of nuclear testing than was the general public. The attentive public was particularly unreceptive to the argument that fallout was a major public problem and was strongly opposed to the U.S. unilaterally terminating its testing program. However, consistent with the findings of Gamson and Modigliani (1966), once government policy began to change on the test ban issue, it was the highly educated attentive public that picked up the policy change and supported a test ban agreement at levels higher than the general public. The attentive public thus followed changes in government policy and did not lead mass attitudes.

The pattern of mass and elite attitude change and the relationship between public opinion and policy decisions is best analyzed in the context of a "two worlds" model.

A final conclusion from this chapter relates to the dominant paradigm in American voting behavior, The American Voter. Not only is its analysis of the 1956 election wrong with respect to Adlai Stevenson, the importance of foreign policy, and the test ban, but evidence is presented that calls into question general conclusions made concerning the ability of the public to vote in line with their attitudes toward specific issues.

II Public Attitudes on Nuclear Testing and a Test Ban

A. Traditional Academic Analysis

By 1989 one might well consider the academic literature on the Limited Test Ban Treaty to have reached a mature stage. Approximately one dozen books and major articles have been written on this subject, and many researchers have had an opportunity to review and evaluate both secondary source and previously classified primary source documents.²⁰⁷ More importantly, all these academic publications agree on two major points that relate to public opinion and its impact on the policy process: the test ban issue was placed on the agenda by the emergence of public controversy over atomic fallout, and this public concern over fallout had an important impact on the eventual conclusion of the treaty. In addition, most authors argue that public attitudes about nuclear testing changed over time and were quite volatile.

207 The most important academic accounts of the Limited Test Ban Treaty include Affelder 1983; Ball 1986; Daalder 1987; Dean 1966; Divine 1978a; Jacobson and Stein 1966; Lepper 1971; R. Miller 1986; Rosi 1967b; Seaborg and Loeb 1981; Terchek 1970.


Traditional accounts of the test ban saga begin with public controversy over fallout that began with the 1954 Bravo thermonuclear test in the Pacific which contaminated a Japanese fishing boat-- the Lucky Dragon. In the twelve months that followed, Indian Prime Minister Nehru called for a test ban, the Pope issued Easter warnings about the dangers of fallout, the White House received substantial mail calling for a halt in testing, one of the fishermen on the Lucky Dragon died of radiation poisoning, numerous private and government studies on the health risks of fallout were initiated, and President Eisenhower tried to diffuse the controversy by appointing Harold Stassen as his Special Assistant for Disarmament.²⁰⁸ There is no debate over these events or whether public concern over fallout helped set the public debate over the test ban issue. However, this chapter argues that the existing literature is wrong on several important points about both the structure of public opinion and its impact on policy.

Why do these academic accounts of the test ban controversy reach the conclusions that they do? With respect to characterizing public attitudes as volatile, an initial review of the data confirms this conclusion. If all the opinion data about the nuclear testing issue, that is concerning both the desirability of placing constraints on nuclear testing and the desirability of a test ban are graphed (see Figure 5-1, below) one finds great attitude instability. Since

208 This appointment carried with it cabinet rank and for a time made Stassen a potential power center in competition with the State, Defense, and Atomic Energy departments. Divine 1978a, Chapter 1; Blacker and Duffy 1984, 45; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 20.

Public Support for Placing Constraints on Nuclear Testing
of Concluding a Test Ban

Figure 5-1



policy makers are bombarded with data from different opinion polls at many different points in time, it would be reasonable for them to conclude from a quick review of this data that public attitudes were indeed volatile. Following this logic, it is understandable that scholars have discovered this same pattern of variability and in turn have concluded that current public opinion theory is correct concerning foreign policy attitude instability. However, a closer examination of the questions and the data shows that such a conclusion would be inaccurate.


B. Support for Continued Nuclear Testing

A detailed review of relevant public opinion data shows that the general public perceived the test ban controversy not as a single issue but as two distinct issues. If all public opinion questions on the test ban issue are divided into two separate categories--should testing continue and should a bilateral test ban agreement be concluded--one finds that relative attitude stability, rather than volatility, becomes the dominant pattern.²⁰⁹ Data from all questions which asked whether nuclear testing should continue are presented in Figure 5-2. While the graph shows that some changes took place over time, over the entire

²⁰⁹ While Rosi (1967b) noticed this duality in public attitudes, he went on to argue that public attitudes were volatile. However, his limited research focus (public opinion from 1954 to 1958) led him to many conclusions that are not shared by this author. Unfortunately his work has served as the basis for most other academic analysis of public attitudes on the test ban treaty.

Support for Continued Nuclear Testing

Figure 5-2



Opposition to Continued Nuclear Testing



period from 1946 through 1963, the mean of all survey questions shows support for continued nuclear testing at the level of consensus (60 percent) compared to opposition to testing at a mean of 28 percent.²¹⁰ This public support for continued nuclear testing began with the nuclear age itself. In 1946, either a plurality (43 percent) or a majority (51 percent) supported nuclear testing.²¹¹ Even before public attitudes associated with the Cold War became dominant throughout America, only one-third of the population had reservations about early U.S. atomic testing. Not only was the public supportive of these early atomic weapons tests, but they also were extremely reluctant to put any constraints on the American atomic testing program. For example, a consensus (66 percent) opposed allowing representatives from other countries to observe U.S. tests, a majority (50 percent) opposed similar observation by United Nations' officials, and a consensus opposed sharing any information from the tests (63 percent).²¹²

The first public opinion survey conducted in 1954, after the international uproar caused by contamination of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon, indicated that a preponderance (71 percent) of the public supported going ahead with U.S. hydrogen bomb tests.²¹³ In 1955 and 1956, survey questions, worded without reference to the idea

210 These means are not weighted by sample size as suggested by Stewart (1984, 115-116) because all of the sample sizes are similar in magnitude and quite large, averaging about 1500.
211 4/1946a AIPO 368 k&t; 2/1946 MINN 31. All test ban related questions and data are reproduced in Appendix 6.
212 2/1946 AIPO 365k&t; 2/1946 MINN 31; 8/1946 MINN 36.
213 4/1954 AIPO 529k.

that some people called for termination of nuclear testing, recorded public support for continued testing as virtually unanimous (80-84 percent).²¹⁴ Either a majority or a consensus supported continued nuclear testing throughout the Presidential campaign in 1956 during which time the test ban issue received a great deal of publicity. This stable and relatively high level of support for nuclear testing continued on into 1958.²¹⁵

Contrary to conventional academic accounts of this period that characterize the public as becoming increasingly opposed to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, throughout the entire period from 1945 to 1963, a majority of the public opposed American atmospheric testing only in one survey conducted during the U.S.-Soviet testing moratorium. This relatively rare opposition to U.S. atmospheric testing occurred only after the Eisenhower administration had announced that it would join the Soviet Union in a testing moratorium that would last as long as the Soviets refrained from testing.²¹⁶ However, by 1961 and the beginning of the Kennedy administration, this anti-testing attitude disappeared. Thereafter a majority or consensus of the public supported renewed testing by the United States. It is important to note that this changed public attitude, or rather a return to the "normal" pro-testing pattern, occurred before the Soviets resumed atomic testing in August, 1961.²¹⁷

214 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382.

215 10/1956 MINN 154a&b; 10/1956 AIPO 573k; 7/1957b AIPO 586k;
4/1958 MINN 170; 4/1958 AIPO 598k.

216 3/1960 MINN 190.

217 1/1961 MINN 201; 6/1961 AIPO 647k; 7/1961 MINN 206.

After the Soviet Union abruptly resumed its own nuclear testing in the atmosphere, a majority of people in several large American cities supported renewed U.S. nuclear testing.²¹⁸ After President Kennedy announced that the U.S. would also resume testing and after the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had conducted its first nuclear test in 34 months, the public supported this step at the level of virtual unanimity (89 percent).²¹⁹ American public attitudes continued to harden over the next year as initial plurality opposition to resuming testing in the atmosphere switched to plurality and then consensus support for testing above ground.²²⁰ All of this data show that the general public did not support the argument presented by many peace activists and arms control advocates that the U.S. should terminate or restrict its nuclear testing.

The data presented in Figure 5-2 actually overstate the degree of change in public opinion on the generic issue of nuclear testing. In addition to the survey conducted during the U.S.-Soviet test moratorium which showed majority opposition to resumed testing, a close review of question wording shows that two data points which find low levels of support for continued testing come from surveys which asked whether the U.S. should resume atmospheric testing.²²¹ Since these surveys were conducted at a time when the U.S. had already resumed underground testing, plurality support for resumed atmospheric testing

218 9/1961 Gallup special.

219 9/1961 MINN 208.

220 11/1961 AIPO 652k; 1/1962 AIPO 654kb; 3/1962 AIPO 656k.

221 11/1961 AIPO 652; 1/1961 AIPO 654kb.

actually represents very aggressive support for continued nuclear testing, and opposition to resuming testing in the atmosphere at this time should not be considered opposition to nuclear testing in general. If one calculates the mean and standard deviation for data concerning continued testing and excludes these three questions noted above, the level of support increases to 63 percent (from 60 percent for all questions) and the level of temporal stability increases, i.e. the standard deviation declines to 12.6 (from 14.5 for all questions). While this data does not paint a picture of perfect attitude stability supporting continued nuclear testing, it is difficult to characterize public opinion as volatile.

C. Awareness and Knowledge of Fallout and Testing Related Issues

One possible reason that could explain the generally pro-testing attitude described above could be that knowledge of atomic testing and fallout might have not diffused widely throughout the population. If this is true, relative public ignorance could just mean that the public held permissive attitudes toward government actions, in this case meaning that the public supported testing because it was government policy. A review of data that measure awareness and knowledge of atmospheric testing, presented in Table 5-1, concludes that this explanation has no empirical support. From 1946 through the 1960s, awareness of U.S. nuclear testing and fallout was extremely high, and public knowledge eventually grew to relatively high levels.

Awareness and Knowledge of
Fallout and Testing-Related Issues
Table 5-1

Date	Survey	Topic	Aware- ness	Know- ledge
6/1946	PSY CORP 173	Bikini test (pre)	75	-
8/1946	PSY CORP 178	Bikini test (post)	89	-
3/1955	AIPO 544	Fallout	-	17
10/1956	NORC 398T	Test ban proposal	75	-
4/1957	AIPO 582	Fallout	61	-
4/1957	ISR 423	Fallout	66	27
4/1958	AIPO 598	Fallout	72	-
11/1961	AIPG 652	Fallout	-	56
3/1963	AIPO 669	Test ban proposal	72	-
8/1963	AIPO 676	Test ban agreement	77	-
12/1963	ISR 728	Test ban agreement	73	60

In the mid-1940s, people were aware of the planned Bikini test at the level of preponderance (75 percent). After the test took place, awareness had reached the virtually unanimous level (89 percent). The public also had relatively detailed knowledge of the purpose of the tests and the targets that were bombarded with atomic weapons.²²²

In the 1950s, awareness of atomic fallout was at the level of consensus or preponderance.²²³ In addition, public responses to open-ended questions demonstrated a substantial increase in relatively detailed knowledge about nuclear fallout. From 1955 until 1961, public knowledge about fallout increased from 17 percent to 56 percent.²²⁴

222 4/1946 AIPO 369k&t; 6/1946 PSY CORP 173k&t; 8/1946 PSY CORP 178k&t.
223 4/1957 AIPO 582k; 4/1958 AIPO 598k.
224 3/1955 AIPO 544; 11/1961 AIPO 652.

This is the largest increase in public knowledge on any nuclear or arms control issue that has occurred in the atomic age. In 1963, awareness of the nuclear test ban talks consistently reached the level of preponderance.²²⁵ By the end of 1963, relatively detailed public knowledge of this treaty had diffused to a majority of the population.²²⁶ When this data is compared with forty years of data on awareness and knowledge about other nuclear and arms control issues, one can see that both awareness and knowledge of atmospheric testing and the test ban negotiations were extremely high from a historical perspective.²²⁷

D. Public Interest in Nuclear Testing Issues

A second reason that might explain the generally strong pro-testing attitude among the American public might have to do with the level of people's interest in the subject. If public interest in this issue was low, then all the knowledge in the world about fallout might not translate into critical attitudes toward nuclear testing. The data available to evaluate this question, summarized in Table 5-2, is fragmentary, a bit complicated, but sufficiently good to draw two conclusions. First, there was relatively low public interest in issues associated with the test ban and fallout controversies. Second, determining the exact level of public interest depends critically on the format of the survey question.

225 3/1963 AIPO 669; 8/1963 AIPO 676k; 12/1963 ISR 729.

226 12/1963 ISR 729.

227 See Chapter 3 and Graham 1988.

Public Interest in Nuclear Testing-Related Issues

Table 5-2

Public Interest in Nuclear Testing-Related Issues
Table 5-2

Date	Survey	Topic	Question Format	Level %
8/1946	MINN 38	Bikini test	closed (A)	32
1/1955	NORC 366	Atomic/hydrogen bombs	closed (B)	23
3/1955	NORC 370	H bomb tests	closed (C)	46
10/1956	MINN 154	Test ban proposal	closed (D)	17
4/1957	ISR 423	Atomic bomb fallout	closed (A/C)	60
11/1963	ORC 466	Test ban treaty	closed (E)	28
6/1956	RCOM 63	Stop A-bomb tests	open (F)	1
10/1956	RCOM 68	Stop A-bomb tests	open (F)	5
2/1959	AIPO 610	Nuclear testing	open (G)	1
4/1959	AIPO 612	Nuclear testing	open (G)	1
7/1959	AIPO 616	Nuclear testing	open (G)	1
9/1959	AIPO 618	Nuclear testing	open (G)	3
12/1961	MINN 210	Atomic bomb tests	open (H)	3

KEY

- A Three point scale: greatly interested, moderately interested and not interested. Data for greatly interested put into the table.
- B List of four domestic and foreign policy issues presented to the respondent.
- C Three point scale: great deal of interest, some interest, practically none.
- D Two point scale: is or is not a major election issue.
- E List of issues presented to the respondent.
- F Two open ended questions asked what is the most important issue in the Presidential election this year and what is the second and third most important issue in the election.
- G Open ended question: what is the most important problem facing this country today?
- H Open ended question: what problem should Congress deal with first?

As a first approximation, the hypothesis that the public had relatively low to moderate interest about test ban issues seems to be confirmed. The exact magnitude of public interest depends on the format of the survey question. When people are asked "open ended" questions, only between one to five percent of the public expressed interest in nuclear testing issues.²²⁸ For the public to indicate their interest in nuclear testing issues when answering these "open" questions, they had to respond without any help or prompting from an interviewer. In a sense, this type of survey question is quite conservative and may tend to underestimate public interest in any particular issue.²²⁹ However, if survey respondents are presented with "closed" questions, that is a list of issues and then asked whether they were interested in one particular issue, data indicate that their level of interest in nuclear testing issues is recorded at substantially higher levels. In the case of the nuclear testing, the average interest was 34 percent if the question format was "closed."²³⁰

It is impossible to determine whether the 1-5 percent or the 34 percent level represents the "correct" measure of public interest in the

228 6/1956 RCOM 63; 10/1956 RCOM 68; 2/1959 AIPO 610; 4/1959 AIPO 612; 7/1959 AIPO 616; 9/1959 AIPO 618; 12/1961 MINN 210.

229 Despite this conservative "bias" to open ended questions, they are extremely valuable research tools and are used by virtually all survey organizations in the form of the "most important problem" question. A review of long time series data from Gallup's version of this question shows that major issues of the day such as war and peace or the economy can reach high levels of public interest. See T. W. Smith 1985.

230 8/1946 MINN 38; 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 10/1956 MINN 154; 4/1957 ISR 423; 11/1963 ORC 466.

test ban issue. However, when these open-ended and closed questions are compared with similar data for other issues, it is possible to conclude that public interest in nuclear testing issues was not extremely high. As dramatic as the debate over the health effects of nuclear fallout seemed to be for many scientists and peace activists, survey data show that the general public was only moderately interested in the subject. Data obtained in response to a series of closed questions record the relative degree of public interest in test ban issues compared to other domestic and foreign policy issues. This evidence indicates that nuclear testing and fallout issues were of less public interest than issues concerning the chance of war, personal health, or the domestic economy. However, interest in nuclear testing issues was not at the bottom of the list. There was relatively more public interest in nuclear testing issues than in other mainstream diplomatic topics such as the U.N., German rearmament, relations with Latin America, or many science topics.²³¹

E. Concern Over Fallout

Even though interest in nuclear testing issues remained moderate throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as knowledge about nuclear fallout increased from 1955 to 1961, the level of public concern over the negative health implications of fallout increased. By 1957, a slim majority (52 percent) of the public thought that fallout was a danger,

²³¹ 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 4/1957 ISR 423.

and by 1958, a large plurality thought that it was a threat to future generations.²³² By 1961, the public had a high degree of knowledge about atomic fallout with many people believing that it would cause disease and cancer.²³³ However, this data lead to an intellectual quandary. If concern about atomic fallout increased but support for continued nuclear testing remained relatively constant, does this indicate that public attitudes were "inconsistent?"²³⁴ A close reading of the data suggests that the public had a reasonably sophisticated logic behind its structure of attitudes, but the logic was different from that held by most elites who are as a general rule very knowledgeable, interested, and highly politically active. First, while the public had become increasingly concerned about atomic fallout, a consensus (61 percent) did not think that there was enough radiation in the air to present a current, as opposed to a future, danger.²³⁵ All of the political mobilization and public education by anti-testing scientists and interest groups had not convinced a large segment of the public that fallout was a near term problem of sufficient magnitude to change its generic support for continued nuclear testing.

If there was a relatively weak relationship between concern over fallout and opposition to continued testing, what can explain the conventional wisdom on this subject-- that concern over fallout

232 4/1957 AIPO 582k; 4/1958 AIPO 598k.

233 11/1961 AIPO 652k.

234 Daniel Yankelovich often interprets the public as being "contradictory" or "inconsistent." See Public Agenda Foundation 1984, 4.

235 11/1961 AIPO 652k.

stimulated opposition to nuclear testing? The main data that supports the proposition that concern with fallout stimulated opposition to continued nuclear testing comes from histories of the period that rely on the activity of interest groups, editorials, or participation in mass rallies. While all of this political activity actually took place, only a very small percent of the public was involved in these activities.²³⁶ This example illustrates the danger of using indicators other than public opinion data or election results to determine mass attitudes or political involvement. The public controversy over fallout fully mobilized the arms control "issue public," but as discussed in Chapter 3, this is a relatively small segment of the population. Survey data show that only a relatively small percent of the total population, approximately 10 to 20 percent, was sufficiently concerned about fallout to give it as the reason to stop nuclear testing or to support a test ban agreement.²³⁷ As reviewed in Table 5-3 below, this finding is relatively consistent both in state and national surveys conducted from 1958 through 1963.

The third reason for continued public support for nuclear testing relates to Americans' well-documented faith in technology.²³⁸ For at

236 Survey data from a wide array of sources indicate that less than 10 percent of the population have ever participated in a "mass" demonstration.

237 5/1958 MINN 170; 3/1960 MINN 190; 11/1961 AIPO 652; 11/1961 IOWA 166; 4/1962 IOWA 167; 7/1963 Harris; 8/1963 AIPO 676; 9/1963 Harris.

238 La Porte and Chisolm 1980; J. Miller, Prewitt and Pearson 1980; J. Miller 1981, 1982; National Science Board 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983; Pion and Lipsey 1981; Tavis 1972.

Concern With Fallout and
Opposition to Testing or Support for a Test Ban

Table 5-3

Date	Survey	Level (per- cent)*	Issue
5/1958	MINN 170	12	Gave fallout as their reason for stopping testing
3/1960	MINN 190	10	Mentioned fallout as a disadvantage of continued testing
11/1961	AIPO 652	21	Believed that the current level of fallout constituted a health danger
11/1961	AIPO 652	15	Concern over fallout has effected one's outlook on life
11/1961	IOWA 166	9	Gave fallout as the reason for thinking the U.S. should not resume testing
4/1962	IOWA 167	14	Gave fallout as the reason for thinking the U.S. should not resume testing
7/1963	Harris	6	Gave fallout as the reason for approving the test ban treaty
8/1963	AIPO 676	6	Gave fallout as the reason for approving ratification of the test ban treaty
9/1963	Harris	17	Gave fallout as the reason for approving the test ban treaty
10/1963	IOWA 172	9	Gave fallout as the reason for approving the test ban treaty

* Since these figures are calculated on the basis of the percent of the entire public, they may appear at first glance to be slightly different than data presented in Appendix 6.

least the first two decades of the nuclear age, this positive attitude toward technology applied to nuclear testing. In the 1940s, a consensus of the public believed that the reason for testing was to experiment with new technologies, not to demonstrate U.S. power.²³⁹ In the 1950s, a plurality (49 percent) were persuaded by the argument put forward by advocates of continued testing--that it was needed to produce a clean bomb. A larger consensus (60 percent) thought that testing was necessary to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes.²⁴⁰

A fourth reason why worry about fallout did not translate into critical attitudes toward nuclear testing was that dramatic nuclear events, such as those conducted at the Bikini atoll in the Pacific, did not trigger a negative attitude toward nuclear testing in general. After the 1946 tests, a majority believed that atomic weapons did less damage than they had expected. However, this belief did not lead to a simplistic or planless attitude toward nuclear weapons, as a majority of the public continued to believe that atomic weapons were terrible. On the other hand, early atomic testing did not convince the public that the United States could rely exclusively on atomic, rather than conventional, weapons. After the Bikini tests, the public supported

239 4/1946b AIPO 369k&t. In contrast, at a much later period, a majority of the public (55%) believed that Soviet nuclear testing was to frighten the U.S., create tension, and remind the world of Russian military power. See 9/1961 MINN 208.
240 7/1957b AIPO 586k.

maintenance of a slightly larger conventional military force than they had before the atomic explosions.²⁴¹

A fifth and final explanation for the lack of an attitude linkage between concern over fallout and support for nuclear testing relates to the ever-present critical attitude toward the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons given by people who wanted to continue testing was a lack of trust in Russia.²⁴² As can be seen in Table 5-4, this critical attitude did not change throughout the entire period of negotiation and ratification of the test ban.²⁴³

Lack of Trust of the Soviet Union
Table 5-4

Date	Survey	Level (per- cent)	Issue
4/1957	MINN 160	87	Could not count on Russia to stop tests if the U.S. halted its tests
7/1957	MINN 162	80	Could not count on Russia to live up to test ban agreement
11/1961	AIPO 652	79	Believe Khrushchev was bluffing about his proposal for a test ban agreement
3/1963	AIPO 669	65	Could not count on Russia to live up to test ban agreement
11/1963	Harris 1285	73	Believed that Soviet agreement to the test ban did NOT mean Russia had become more peaceful

241 6/1946 PSY CORP 178k&t; 7/1946 AIPO 385k; 8/1946 PSY CORP 178k&t; 8/1946 MINN 36.

242 4/1958 MINN 170; 9/1958 MINN 174; 8/1963 MINN 226.

243 Some authors conclude that attitudes towards the Soviet Union improved in 1962 and 1963. A review of data in Appendix 5 shows that while the public shifted its attitudes on the relative threat of the Soviet Union (compared to China), critical attitudes toward the Soviet Union stayed the same during the negotiation and ratification of the test ban.


F. Support for Bilateral Test Ban Agreement

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the public held one attitude that was uniformly supportive of a nuclear test ban: a consensus supported a negotiated test ban agreement with the Soviet Union as long as the question made it clear that the United States was not unilaterally terminating its testing program. As can be seen in Figure 5-3, this positive attitude (mean of 67 percent with a standard deviation of 13.4) was both higher and more stable than public attitudes that favored continued nuclear testing. The public made a clear and consistent distinction between objecting to the U.S. stopping its nuclear testing (which people assumed would be unilateral if the survey question was ambiguous) while at the same time supporting a bilateral test ban agreement that included some form of verification.²⁴⁴ As will be discussed in greater detail in section III of this chapter, virtually all anti-testing or pro-arms control groups failed to understand this basic distinction in the public mind. A consensus of the public supported a bilateral test ban agreement prior to discussion of nuclear testing in the 1956 election campaign, before anti-nuclear interest groups were organizing around the fallout issue, before influential columnists had voiced support for a test ban, and before President


244 This distinction in attitudes was first discovered by Rosi 1964. However not only does his analysis of public attitudes differ from this authors', but the scope of his research (public opinion data from 1954-1958 and no review of primary source documents) was much more limited than research conducted for this chapter.

Support for Bilateral Test Ban AGREEMENT

Figure 5-3



Opposition to Bilateral Test Ban AGREEMENT



Eisenhower supported a bilateral test ban.²⁴⁵ A close reading of two questions repeated in two different surveys in 1955 and 1956 is essential to understanding public attitudes on the testing and test ban issues. The first question asked whether the United States should stop its hydrogen bomb tests. Eighty percent of the public answered "No." Fifteen percent answered "Yes." The 80 percent who answered "No" were then asked if it would be a good idea or a bad idea if all countries, including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement to stop any further H-bomb tests. Sixty two percent of these people answered "Yes." When the results of these two questions are combined, one finds that 15 percent of the public could be considered hard-core supporters of unilateral cessation of American nuclear testing. One could logically assume they would support a test ban agreement; 50 percent supported a U.S.-Soviet agreement to stop testing, but in the absence of such a bilateral agreement favored continued U.S. testing; only 27 percent opposed a U.S.-Soviet test ban agreement and wanted to continue testing regardless; and 8 percent had no opinion. By this reconstruction of the data, a consensus (65 percent) supported a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the Soviets to stop hydrogen bomb testing. A review of Figure 5-3 shows that this consensus level

245 A systematic review of the development of interest groups and the writings of major columnists was conducted by Rosi 1964. I have drawn on his conclusions in these two areas. For the polls, see 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382.

support for a test ban agreement stayed relatively constant throughout the 1950s and 1960s.²⁴⁶

The data presented in Figure 5-3 probably under-estimates public support for a test ban agreement because it includes three questions that either required the public to answer a filter question (having the effect of significantly increasing the percent of the public coded into the "no answer" category), framed the test ban treaty issue as a Russian proposal, or asked about the test ban treaty in the context of support for Barry Goldwater. If one calculates generic support for a test ban agreement without including these three questions, average support increases from a level of consensus to a level of preponderance (from 67 to 73 percent), and the stability of this attitude increases (from a standard deviation of 13.4 to 10.7).

G. Other Lessons From This Public Opinion Data

Three final observations can be made by reviewing public opinion data concerning the test ban treaty. First, throughout the entire period from 1958 through 1963, a majority of the public were skeptical that an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could be concluded.²⁴⁷ Second, throughout the nuclear age, arms control advocates have attempted to communicate to the public by using the

²⁴⁶ 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382; 4/1957 AIPO 582k. Support for ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty reached consensus levels and higher: 8/1963 AIPO 676k; 8/1963 MINN 226; 10/1963 IOWA/IAPO 172; 12/1963 ISR 729.
²⁴⁷ 9/1958 MINN 174; 3/1963 AIPO 669k.

press as opposed to the mass media (i.e. radio or television). This strategy made sense in 1946 when slightly more people gained their news about nuclear testing from newspapers than from radio.²⁴⁸ However, as radio and television gained the dominant position as the source of news for the public, this print-dominated media strategy would be less and less effective. By 1957, approximately one-quarter of the population relied on newspapers for most of their news.²⁴⁹ Third, there is little evidence that the Cuban missile crisis changed public preferences for a test ban agreement or for, in the absence of a bilateral agreement, continued nuclear testing. This dual pattern in public attitudes had been firmly established in the public mind well before the crisis. However, the Cuban missile crisis increased the level of public fear of the chance of war between the two superpowers and also stimulated President Kennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev to negotiate a test ban agreement.²⁵⁰ In this manner, despite its lack of impact on public opinion concerning the test ban per se, attitudes about the Cuban crisis had an impact on the negotiation of the test ban agreement.

248 8/1946 MINN 36.

249 4/1957 AIPO 582. This survey reports that 85% of the public had TVs and that only 27% would find giving up newspapers, rather than TV or radio, as difficult.

250 Two surveys (AIPO 665 and 666) indicate that a total of 59% and 43% of the population listed "Cuba" or "a chance of war" as the most important problem during the crisis. On Kennedy-Khrushchav correspondence, see Pope 1982.

III Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy

A. Getting on the Agenda

As noted in the summary of this chapter, traditional accounts of the Limited Test Ban negotiations begin with the public controversy generated by the 1954 Bravo thermonuclear test in the Pacific which contaminated the Lucky Dragon. There is no dispute that the H-bomb test generated a great deal of public controversy. However, there is reason to question what aspect of American and international public opinion was the most important factor responsible for successfully getting the test ban issue onto the Executive branch agenda. Several early efforts to get a test ban onto the agenda failed during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. However, a test ban finally reached the agenda and moved onto the negotiation stage well after public concern over fallout had become evident. This suggests that public attitudes over fallout were not the aspect of public opinion that influenced government decisionmakers.

Prior to the 1954 Bravo explosion, nuclear testing by any country generated little public controversy. In 1946, when public support for testing was at the level of consensus, America's two nuclear tests in the Pacific generated only token public opposition by a small veteran's group and a few dozen Socialist protesters.²⁵¹ The United States next conducted three tests in 1948; the Soviet Union conducted its first

²⁵¹ Affelder 1983, 8, 44-47.

test in 1949; the British tested their first atomic weapon in 1952. None of these atomic explosions triggered public controversy among the general public.

The first effort to get a test ban treaty onto the Executive branch agenda occurred before any public controversy was expressed about nuclear testing. The idea of a test ban was first raised by Vanoever Bush in 1952, two years after President Truman had ordered development of the hydrogen bomb. Bush proposed to Secretary of State Acheson and to President Truman that the first United States H-bomb test, code named Mike and planned three days before the presidential election, be postponed and that an overture be made to the Soviets to prohibit all hydrogen detonations. After briefly considering the idea, President Truman decided to go ahead with the test because weather conditions would have caused a delay of 6 months if the test was not conducted in early November.²⁵² This failure of arms control quickly led to the thermonuclear arms race. Less than one year after the first American thermonuclear test, the Soviets took a temporary lead in the nuclear arms race with their test of a deliverable H-bomb in August, 1953. However, this event, did not stimulate serious government or public discussion of a test ban.

The second attempt to get the test ban idea onto the executive branch agenda was made by the sole remaining Democrat on the Atomic Energy Commission, Thomas Murray.²⁵³ In February, 1954, he proposed

252 Divine 1978a, 16; Lepper 1971, 24

253 Murray was not a classic liberal arms controller. He had opposed the International Control of Atomic Energy.

to President Eisenhower that United Nations observers be invited to the Castle test series and that a test moratorium be proposed as an inducement for the Soviets to enter into disarmament negotiations. Eisenhower rejected both ideas and approved the fateful Bravo test which was subsequently held in March, 1954.²⁵⁴ It is worth noting that public opinion was supportive of President Eisenhower's decision to continue testing and to exclude foreign observers from the testing area. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the public did not back proposals like those of Commissioner Murray that would have required the United States to take unilateral arms control initiatives.

After the 1954 Bravo test, a substantial amount of public and political pressure was placed on the Eisenhower administration to halt testing and to deal with the problem of atomic fallout.²⁵⁵ However, most of the administration's efforts over the next two years were directed at public relations damage control, rather than making changes in United States nuclear testing or arms control policy. In the month after the Bravo test, senior administration officials held several news conferences, declassified and released photographs of the first H-bomb test (Mike), and showed a 30 minute film of it on prime time television.²⁵⁶ Secretary of State Dulles was forced to defend

²⁵⁴ Divine 1978a, 24.

²⁵⁵ Political pressure to negotiate a test ban came in many forms: Prime Minister Nehru's call for a test ban; petitions from over 100 Labor members of the British parliament; a private letter to the White House from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. See Jacobson and Stein 1966, 20.

²⁵⁶ Divine 1978a, 17-23.

America's policy of continuing testing to the normally supportive NATO foreign ministers. As non-government scientists published analysis that fallout would have major negative health and genetic effects, they set the political agenda and put the administration constantly on the defensive. Congressional hearings were held, and the fallout issue stayed in the press and became the focus of various interest groups' activities for the next several years.

Public opinion, supplemented by interest group and Congressional pressure, forced the administration to engage on more than just public relations efforts. It is clear from a comprehensive review of primary and secondary sources that public opinion did have an impact on some U.S. government policy. However, these policies were only indirectly related to the test ban treaty. The administration took several steps which key decisionmakers attributed to public opinion. For example, immediately after the Bravo test in 1954, President Eisenhower made a public announcement that the United States would not build bigger hydrogen bombs.²⁵⁷ In 1955, Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen as a cabinet-level advisor to coordinate and publicize America's disarmament policy. Later in that same year, the administration reversed its original position and agreed to national and international scientific studies on the fallout issue.²⁵⁸ On the international diplomatic

²⁵⁷ Affelder 1983, 97; Divine 1978a, 23.

²⁵⁸ These studies were eventually carried out by the National Academy of Sciences and the United Nations. Divine 1978a, 56-7, 63.

front, the United States attempted to take the initiative by proposing its "Open Skies" arms control and confidence building measure.²⁵⁹ In 1959, Eisenhower transferred supervision of radiation safety from the Atomic Energy Commission to a new Federal Radiation Council.²⁶⁰

However, despite all the public controversy immediately after the Bravo test and various changes in policy directly attributed to public opinion, the administration did not change its policy with respect to negotiation of a test ban agreement. Thus, public opinion did not have the impact on test ban decisions that is often attributed to it. After a thorough interagency study completed in June, 1954, President Eisenhower reaffirmed his opposition to a test ban treaty.²⁶¹

Throughout 1956 and 1957 this Eisenhower position against negotiating a test ban was supported by all of the major press commentators.²⁶²

While there is evidence that public opinion caused the administration to engage in various public relations activities and to make policy changes noted above, two years after Bravo, the test ban issue had not moved from Executive branch consideration to being truly on the agenda.

Even in the face of Soviet initiatives and growing international pressure, the Eisenhower administration did not change its basic anti-test ban position until mid-1957 or 1958.²⁶³ After the Soviets proposed a reciprocal test moratorium in late 1955 and the Pope called

259 Blacker and Duffy 1984, 103; Lepper 1971, 28-9; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 5.

260 Divine 1978a, 262-78, 330.

261 Divine 1978a, 25.

262 Rosi 1967b, 315-6.

263 Blacker and Duffy 1984, 104-5; Divine 1978a, 61-62.

for a test ban in his New Year's message, the United States responded by proposing a cutoff in the production of fissionable material and linking a test ban to Soviet acceptance of this initiative. Knowing that the United States by this time had an overwhelming advantage in stockpiled nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material, few scholars have considered this a serious arms control proposal.²⁶⁴ The key point to emphasize is that despite the significant amount of public controversy about fallout from 1954 through 1956, public opinion did not force the administration to begin test ban negotiations.

In 1957 and 1958 things began to change inside the Eisenhower administration. Several technical and bureaucratic changes, combined with a correct analysis of public opinion in the context of the 1956 election, were responsible for placing the test ban issue onto the Executive branch agenda. However, public opinion was only one of several factors that finally get the test ban issue on the agenda. The proximate cause for the test ban getting onto the agenda was that President Eisenhower became increasingly supportive of a test ban agreement in his second administration. While he rarely directly overruled the recommendations of his defense and atomic energy advisors, the pattern of his decisions shows that he became increasingly supportive of concluding a test ban agreement. In May 1957, Ambassador Stassen was given instructions to obtain European support for an Eisenhower proposal for a test moratorium. Even though this initiative

²⁶⁴ Blacker and Duffy 1984, 104-5; Divine 1978a, 66.

failed and effectively ended Stassen's influence in the administration, this was the first indication that the test ban idea was firmly on the Executive branch agenda. A month later, Eisenhower was inclined to go along with a Soviet proposal for a two to three year test moratorium until he was convinced by scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission that further U.S. testing was needed to develop a clean bomb, to perfect peaceful nuclear explosives, and to improve the design of tactical nuclear weapons for Europe. By April 1958, Eisenhower asked his departments to study whether the U.S. should break from its past diplomatic position and de-link the test ban from a cutoff in the production of fissionable material. This study, and a flawed analysis completed by Hans Bethe on the ability to verify a comprehensive test ban, convinced Eisenhower that technical talks should be initiated with the Soviets. This led to a conference of Soviet and American experts and represented the first time that test ban issues were being seriously negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Throughout this period Eisenhower mentions that public opinion was a pressure on him to negotiate a test ban agreement.²⁶⁵ Not only does the public opinion data show that there was clear support for a bilateral test ban agreement, but White House mail was supportive of a test ban, and newspaper columnists shifted from being opposed to split over a test ban.²⁶⁶ The Eisenhower administration discovered from its

265 Divine 1978a, 146-150; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 15, 28;
Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 8-9.

266 Divine 1978a, 139; Rosi 1967b, 315, 317.

own polling that the public was in favor of a test ban agreement if the Soviet Union were a party. Thus, the important element of public opinion that helped get the test ban treaty negotiations successfully onto the Executive branch agenda was support for a bilateral test ban agreement, not concern over fallout. Discovering this pattern in public opinion required relatively detailed polling and sophisticated knowledge of public attitudes.

However, one should be cautious in concluding that public opinion was the main factor in moving President Eisenhower toward a pro-test ban position. Other factors also influenced his change in attitude. By 1957, the United States had demonstrated for itself the feasibility of testing large nuclear devices underground. As a result, halting testing in the atmosphere would have less cost in terms of the development of nuclear weapons technology than was believed in 1954 and 1955. Several changes in bureaucratic politics also strengthened the pro-test ban cause. Secretary of State Dulles, citing world opinion, took an increasingly pro-test ban position especially after his bureaucratic rival, Harold Stassen, resigned. Also, the powerful Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy, Lewis Strauss, stepped down in mid-1958. While his replacement continued to take an anti-test ban position, this change in personnel diminished the AEC's influence over President Eisenhower.

B. The 1956 Presidential Election

Ironically, by incorrectly framing the issue, Adlai Stevenson's actions in the 1956 election served to delay the test ban issue from getting onto the agenda. The test ban issue entered the 1956 presidential campaign when Adlai Stevenson proposed in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that the United States stop future large H-bomb tests.²⁶⁷ Throughout the campaign, Stevenson either explicitly called for unilateral U.S. suspension of testing or failed to emphasize that his proposal would require a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union. As summarized earlier in this chapter, by calling for a unilateral cessation of testing and by failing to call for a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union, Stevenson's proposal was flying in the face of public opinion. However, throughout the campaign, there is no indication that Stevenson understood the fundamental error in his political communications strategy that emphasized fallout and a unilateral test moratorium. President Eisenhower, who had access to the detailed "confidential" State Department polling on the test ban issue, quickly countered with an effective political communications strategy.²⁶⁸ As the campaign moved into September and October and Stevenson's discussion of the test ban issue brought new activity to his campaign, Eisenhower responded by emphasizing the unilateral nature of Stevenson's proposal and stressed

267 Brown 1961, 201-2; Davis 1967, 327; Divine 1978a, 72-73;
Rosi 1967b, 23-25.
268 Eisenhower 1965, 17-18.

the need for strict verification of any test ban agreement.²⁶⁹ In Stevenson's rejoinder to Eisenhower, the Democratic nominee did not deny that he was advocating a unilateral U.S. step and failed to address the issue of inspection. Stevenson's strategy for raising the test ban issue was strongly supported by liberal scientists associated with the Federation of American Scientists and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and supported by a majority of people who wrote to Stevenson and to the White House on the issue.²⁷⁰ However in a pattern that was remarkably similar to the failed efforts of Henry Wallace a decade earlier, in the 1956 campaign arms control advocates used a political communication strategy that insured that the majority of the public would reject it. By failing to consult survey research, by relying on imprecise indicators of the public mood such as mail, the size and enthusiasm of crowds at campaign rallies, and positions taken by interest groups, Stevenson actually set back the cause for reaching a test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. His efforts undercut initiatives that were being taken inside the administration in mid-September 1956 to advance the cause of a bilateral test ban treaty.²⁷¹

Soviet attempts to interject their proposal to immediately end testing into the presidential campaign, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, and the Soviet invasion into Hungary all combined to end what

269 Brown 1961, 203-5; Davis 1967, 341; Divine 1978a, 84-97;
Lepper 1971, 62; Rosi 1967a, 27.

270 Divine 1978a, 107.

271 Brown 1961, 212-13; Divine 1978a, 110-112.

little momentum Stevenson had achieved in the campaign. On election day, Eisenhower won the election with fifty-eight percent of the popular vote and carried 41 states. Most political reporters concluded that raising the test ban issue had hurt Stevenson more than it helped him. A review of polling data would have confirmed this evaluation. However no analysis of the election revealed the pattern discussed earlier in this chapter that public support for a test ban was quite strong if the proposal emphasized that any such agreement would be bilateral, not unilateral. The Eisenhower administration did not misread the election results as a popular vote against a test ban, and after the election began to move toward negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union. At the same time, scientists and interest groups that had pressured Stevenson to raise the test ban issue ignored the election results and continued to pursue their failed political communication strategy which emphasized atomic fallout.

The 1956 election was also important because it provided the empirical basis for what became the dominant paradigm in American electoral behavior, published as The American Voter. The standard interpretation of the 1956 election, based on the American National Election Studies (ANES), is that voters shifted their opinion in favor of the Republican party for several reasons. Voters favored the party on economic issues, believed the Republicans were the best party for keeping out of war and handling foreign policy, and strongly approved of Eisenhower's personality.²⁷² Issue voting in this election was

²⁷² Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1964, 18-32.

relatively small, and foreign policy issues were dominated by Eisenhower's personality as a World War II hero who also had ended the Korean war. To quote The American Voter:

In neither year [1952, 1956] did Mr. Stevenson make any marked impression on the electorate in relation to foreign affairs. In view of his great concern with foreign policy, the attention he gave to foreign issues in his campaign addresses, and his travels abroad between elections, this fact suggests how deep may be the gulf that separates the public's view of a candidate and the image he seeks to project. Mr. Stevenson probably had had more contact with foreign affairs than most presidential candidates. Yet this contact failed to cross the threshold of public awareness.

Out of the 1948, 1952, and 1956 elections came the Michigan model of voting behavior that emphasizes party identification, the importance of personality, and the relative unimportance of issues. A second-order aspect of the model, which was to be strengthened in later years, was that bread and butter economic issues were far more important than foreign policy issues in determining voters' preferences.²⁷³

The evidence used by the authors of The American Voter to substantiate these conclusions was based in large part on responses to "open-ended" questions about respondents' likes and dislikes of each candidate. As documented earlier in this chapter, the level of public

273 Tufte 1978.

interest in issues varies a great deal depending on whether the format of the question is open or closed. By using the open format, the ANES produced results that were bound to conclude that issue voting was low. Similarly, with respect to the importance of foreign policy, some of the conclusions made by the ANES were a by-product of their survey design. The ANES for the 1956 election did not include any question on a major foreign policy issue and did not include any question on the primary foreign policy issue of the campaign, the test ban.²⁷⁴

A review of other survey research shows that several of the ANES conclusions about issue voting and the relative importance of foreign policy are wrong. First, when presented with a closed question format and a list of various topics, the public demonstrated a moderate interest in the test ban issue. Second, surveys record that the public was aware of the different positions taken by Stevenson and Eisenhower on the test ban issue. Thus, the problem for Stevenson in 1956 was not related to being unable to cross a threshold of public awareness, as concluded by The American Voter. The problem was that the public heard Stevenson's message--a call for a unilateral U.S. termination of nuclear testing-- and rejected it in favor of Eisenhower's position that any test ban agreement had to be bilateral and backed up with strong

274 A review of the ANES codebooks shows that the lack of foreign policy questions has been a consistent characteristic of their survey design from 1948 to the present. For the 1946-1960 and 1965-1970 periods, less than 1% of the publications from Michigan's Survey Research Center covered foreign policy topics.

verification. The public did not support Eisenhower solely because he was a war hero. Large majorities supported Eisenhower on the test ban issue because his political communications message was consistent with perceptions held by a majority of the public. The public was not uninterested or fixated on symbolic issues, but relatively attentive and rationale. Stevenson's failure was due to his development of a political communication strategy in complete ignorance of public attitudes toward the nuclear testing issue. The ANES conclusion that foreign policy was not particularly important in the 1956 campaign was an artifact of its reliance on open-ended questions and the lack of relevant foreign policy questions on its survey. The conclusion that foreign policy was not important in the 1956 election is directly contradicted by results obtained from other national surveys conducted at the same period of time.

Conclusions from the 1956 election have had an important impact on the study of American electoral behavior.²⁷⁵ Both scholars and commentators have concluded that elections are won or lost on domestic issues, personality, and party identification, not on foreign policy issues. The data and analysis presented in this chapter calls into question this basic conclusion. As shown in Chapter 3, public attentiveness to foreign policy issues varies with the issue. In some instances, interest in foreign issues is quite high. The fact that

²⁷⁵ In particular, surveys conducted at Michigan's Survey Research Center/Institute for Survey Research constitute 40 percent of published political science articles that use survey data. See Turner and Martin 1984, 99.

there is a weak relationship between elite political communication and voters on many foreign policy issues is the result of inadequate knowledge of mass public opinion by elite political actors. This phenomena has made it difficult for many politicians to comprehend that the logic followed by the public may be different than the logic used by policy specialists. In this case, the public did not see the test ban controversy as one logically-linked issue, but as two distinct issues: unilateral termination of U.S. nuclear testing (which was strongly rejected) versus concluding a bilateral test ban agreement (which was strongly supported). Concern over fallout did not change these basic attitudes because people saw the fallout danger as a future, not a current, problem. Since Eisenhower's personality and the perceived strengths of the two political parties made many voters inclined to vote for Eisenhower, when Stevenson articulated a issue position on a salient foreign policy subject that all but a few voters rejected, this action reinforced most voter's "choice candidate."²⁷⁶ Thus Stevenson's inept attempt to further the test ban issue served to cement voters' electoral decision in favor of Eisenhower. Voters were acting perfectly logically, given their level of knowledge and interest, their set of attitudes, and the political communication received from the two candidates. This is true despite the fact that the public actually supported a test ban agreement.

276 Simon [1945].

This alternative model of voter decision-making suggests that foreign policy issues can play an important role that either reinforce voter's party and image predilections or, if a candidate's position differs from that of the voter, causes the voter to reconsider his decision. However, determining the pattern of voters' preferences on issues requires a great deal of polling over an extended period of time.

C. Negotiations

Throughout the test ban negotiations, two fundamental issues were debated. First, should the U.S. agree to a test moratorium prior to concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union? Second, was verification technology sufficiently advanced to allow the United States to conclude a comprehensive test ban, rather than the partial test ban that was eventually negotiated? As was found in Chapter 4 on International Control of Atomic Energy, public opinion influenced the negotiations. However, it had less of an impact on decisions made at this stage of the policy process than in getting on the agenda or ratification.

After completing a massive test series in 1958 and after the successful U.S.-Soviet technical conference in Geneva, President Eisenhower publicly proposed a renewable, one year test cessation.²⁷⁷ This presidential decision was opposed by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the United Kingdom. Foreign policy specialists, such as Henry Kissinger, and influential correspondents,

²⁷⁷ Divine 1978a, 229-31; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 14.

such as the military writer for the New York Times, also opposed this decision. With these powerful bureaucratic actors, foreign policy elites, and an important ally against this decision, what was the primary reason for taking this step? Two scholars have concluded that foreign opinion, as opposed to American opinion, was responsible for shifting the position taken by the Department of State to support this position.²⁷⁸ This shift in the State Department position and Eisenhower's own growing support for a test ban can explain this decision.

However, if this Presidential decision was made in the name of public opinion, it was mistaken. The American public supported continued testing and only weakly supported the idea of a moratorium for a relatively short period of time. Thus, President Eisenhower initial decision was not supported by the public, and this lack of public support eventually undermined political support for continuing the test moratorium in the Kennedy administration. This example illustrates that popular presidents can make decisions which fly in the face of majority opinion, but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched.²⁷⁹

Initial criticism of the moratorium came from two conservative publications--Fortune and U.S. News and World Report--in mid-1959.²⁸⁰

278 Affelder 1983, 112-4; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 87-8.
279 Throughout the moratorium period (11/59 to 8/61), President Eisenhower's public job approval averaged 64 percent and Kennedy's averaged 75 percent.
280 Divine 1978a, 259-61.

After President Eisenhower extended the test moratorium for another year from August 1959 to August 1960, against the wishes of the military and atomic energy bureaucracies, political pressure started to mount to resume testing. Republican presidential candidate Nelson Rockefeller advocated resumed testing underground and was backed in his proposal by former President Truman, Senator Henry Jackson, and Paul Nitze.²⁸¹ After the Soviets bitterly attacked American scientists at technical talks, Eisenhower issued an angry statement at the end of 1959 officially ending the moratorium but pledging not to actually resume testing without prior notice and as long as the test ban talks showed progress. With the test ban talks making no progress, Eisenhower advised President-elect Kennedy to resume testing in 1960.²⁸² Thus, after making a decision that did not sustain popular support, President Eisenhower eventually "reversed" his decision on the moratorium at the end of his administration.

President Kennedy entered office in favor of a test ban, and he did not want to resume testing. However, over his first 18 months in office, he approved detailed preparations for resumed testing.²⁸³ Had President Kennedy been on strong ground with the public, which he was not, he would have been in a better position to resist the bureaucratic and partisan political pressure to resume testing. Once the Soviets announced that they would resume nuclear testing, public opinion moved

281 Divine 1978a, 289-91.
282 Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 25.
283 Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 63-75.

to become virtually unanimous and Kennedy had no choice but to resume testing. In a final attempt to mollify public opinion, before the United States resumed testing, it proposed a limited test ban agreement to the Soviets. Once the Soviet Union rejected this proposal, the U.S. then resumed its own testing.²⁸⁴ In the next six months, the United States tested 20 nuclear weapons, all underground. However this did not end the controversy associated with the moratorium. Political pressure--supported by growing public opinion and the bureaucratic power of the weapons laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff--succeeded in forcing President Kennedy to resume testing in the atmosphere in the Spring of 1962.²⁸⁵

This short history of the political fight over resuming atmospheric testing illustrates several important points concerning the relationship between public opinion and policy formulation. First, majority public opinion can easily be ignored by Presidents in the foreign policy arena. This occurred when Eisenhower agreed to a test moratorium in spite of the fact that majority American opinion disapproved of his decision. Second, if a President makes a decision that flies in the face of majority attitudes, this provides the political foundation for undermining implementation of any such decision. By itself, majority opinion is not sufficiently strong to overture a presidential decision in the foreign policy arena. However,

284 Barton and Weiler 1976, 106; Dean 1966, 90; Lepper 1971, 40; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 77-85.

285 Divine 1978a, 331; Lepper 1971, 41; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 116, 119-20, 126-139, 150-158.

in the case of the moratorium, bureaucratic forces, public opinion, and Soviet actions forced President Kennedy to resume nuclear testing underground. Third, when a President is either unaware of public attitudes or chooses to ignore them, his credibility is diminished. This leaves him in a weak position to resist organized political pressure to force a policy change that goes much farther than the original public opinion data suggests would be supported by the general public. This occurred when President Kennedy was forced to resume testing in the atmosphere.

All three of these examples suggest that majority public opinion can be ignored in the short run, but "presidential leadership" is limited in the long run and dependent on the President acting in line with pre-existing public beliefs. Presidents are not free to make and implement policy and then able to convince the public of the wisdom of any possible decision. Successful Presidents tailor both the timing of their political decisions and their political communication strategies to public opinion. Otherwise, as President Kennedy found out, they will be pushed by events into making policy decisions that run contrary to their original intent.

The second fundamental issue that was debated throughout the negotiation of the test ban treaty concerned verification. Public opinion played a minor, but important, role in this aspect of the negotiations. Throughout the nuclear age, the American public has been skeptical about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. This

attitude was been remarkably stable for several decades.²⁸⁶ This generic public belief has provided the attitude foundation for the political "requirement" that verification of any arms control agreement be stringent and go well beyond the requirements to gather intelligence.²⁸⁷

The perception among senior policy makers that it would be possible to verify an agreement to stop underground testing provided the first breakthrough in the test ban negotiations. Dr. Killian and Hans Bethe reported to the National Security Council on a President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) study that it was feasible to verify underground testing using seismic waves.²⁸⁸ After hearing a brief summary of this report and without consulting either the AEC or Department of Defense, President Eisenhower instructed Secretary of State Dulles to draft and send a letter to the Soviets proposing that technical talks be initiated between the two countries. The subsequent Geneva conference held in 1958 marked the first time that the test ban issue was clearly on the Executive branch agenda. However, given the nature of public opinion concerning verification, this Eisenhower decision became vulnerable to reversal by organized political interests.

286 See Appendix 7.

287 Not only does the public opinion data support this proposition, but one senior actor in the test ban negotiations, as British Prime Minister Macmillian, believed that the U.S. position concerning on-site inspection was being made to satisfy American public opinion. See Dean 1966, 44.

288 Devine 1978a, 206; Killian 1977, 156.

Within months of the conference, Senator Gore--a powerful member of both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--and former AEC member Murray proposed that the administration agree to a test ban treaty covering atmospheric tests but excluding underground testing.²⁸⁹ Once analysis was completed by the RAND Corporation and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory that refuted the Bethe study and showed that verification of underground tests was much more difficult than characterized at the Geneva technical talks, momentum built up to conclude a partial or limited, rather than a comprehensive, test ban. More importantly, for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, the President remembered that in its initial briefing the PSAC had failed to inform him that the Bethe conclusions were based on data from a single test series. As a result, President Eisenhower became cautious in attempting to pressure the Atomic Energy Commission or the Department of Defense to conclude a comprehensive test ban.²⁹⁰ Even though Eisenhower was supportive of the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty, for the rest of his administration he proposed a limited test ban treaty to the Soviets.

The final stage of negotiations for the Eisenhower administration in 1960 came close enough to reaching a treaty that it caused opponents of any test ban agreement--the U.K., France, China, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy--to force Eisenhower to harden the U.S.

²⁸⁹ Divine 1978a, 244-5; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 126-9; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 15.

²⁹⁰ Divine 1978a, 252-60, 330; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 19-22.

negotiating position concerning verification. This final phase of negotiations effectively ended with the U-2 affair.²⁹¹ During this stage in the negotiations, public opinion played a relatively minor role compared to technical factors, the bureaucratic positions taken by opponents of a test ban agreement, and the negotiating positions taken by several nations (i.e. the U.K., France and China) that wanted to preserve their own right to test nuclear weapons. By allowing the debate to focus on technical issues of verification, advocates of an agreement were put into a weak political position.

New hope for a test ban agreement was found in the 1960 Presidential campaign. To balance his hawkish criticisms that the Eisenhower administration had been weak on defense, candidate Kennedy called for upgrading the U.S. organizational capability to conduct arms control negotiations and supported a comprehensive test ban treaty.²⁹² The transition between administrations brought a successful Pugwash meeting which facilitated U.S.-Soviet scientific discussion about test ban-related topics, and it also brought many new people into the administration who were advocates of a test ban agreement.²⁹³ After the Kennedy administration had completed its review of the test ban issue, the President decided to try and complete a comprehensive test ban agreement.²⁹⁴ A review of primary source

291 Divine 1978a, 330-1; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 22-24.

292 Clarke 1979, 15, 19; Lepper 1971, 39.

293 One key appointment was Glen Seaborg as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Unlike his predecessors, he supported a test ban agreement. However, three of the five commissioners continued to be against a test ban. Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 33-5.

294 Dean 1966, 89; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 57-8.

documents show that one of the main reasons for taking this position was a belief among senior members of the Kennedy administration that the United States must be seen in the eyes of the public as working for a comprehensive test ban.²⁹⁵ The change in the U.S. negotiating position from the Eisenhower emphasis on a limited test ban treaty was due to Kennedy's perception of public opinion, not because any scientific facts had presented the verification problem or U.S. testing needs in a new light.

After several unproductive negotiating sessions in 1961 and growing U.S.-Soviet tensions over summits and Berlin, the Soviets announced an end to their test moratorium and proceeded to conduct 50 atmospheric tests in a period of 60 days.²⁹⁶ In a move taken entirely for purposes of public diplomacy, the U.S. and United Kingdom proposed a limited test ban treaty (quickly rejected by the Soviets) and then resumed their own testing.²⁹⁷ Public opinion had been moving toward strongly supporting U.S. resumption to testing. After the Soviet action, the public was virtually unanimous in supporting U.S. resumption of testing.

Over the next year, while internal debates over the test ban raged, the administration attempted to manage public opinion by resuming testing in the atmosphere and, at the same time, publicly calling for a test ban. At this stage, President Kennedy made the key decision to

²⁹⁵ Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 57-60.

²⁹⁶ Barton and Weiler 1976, 106; Dean 1966, 90; Lepper 1971, 40; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 77-85, 90.

²⁹⁷ Barton and Weiler 1976, 106; Dean 1966, 90; Divine 1978a, 331; Lepper 1971, 40; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 77-88, 90.

proceed with a limited test ban, rather than a comprehensive test ban agreement. This position was communicated to the Soviets when test ban negotiations resumed in 1962. The United States tabled a detailed draft treaty on a limited test ban which was quite close to the final agreement concluded in 1963.²⁹⁸ While the final political impetus to conclude a test ban agreement grew out of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was forced to drop any serious attempt to negotiate a comprehensive test ban in the face of Congressional opposition and Soviet opposition to on-site inspection.²⁹⁹

President Kennedy made the key decision to conclude a limited agreement without knowing one important fact: had he framed the issue in terms of a bilateral agreement with verification provisions he would have been on strong grounds with respect to public opinion. However, neither his pollster, Louis Harris, nor his National Security Council staff were aware of the duality in public opinion in support of a bilateral agreement, but in its absence opposed to the moratorium or any unilateral constraint on testing. Only after the Cuban missile crisis and after the key decision was taken to proceed with a limited agreement did President Kennedy come to learn, through the crude measure of crowd responses to his speeches, that the public strongly supported a bilateral test ban agreement.³⁰⁰ Only after a limited test ban was initialed in July, 1963, did presidential pollster Louis Harris and

298 Dean 1966, 20, 40-1, 52-3, 90-8; Lepper 1971, 76-77; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 168-71.

299 Pope 1982; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 172-5.

300 Interview with former Kennedy administration NSC staffer Dr. Karl Kaysen 3 April 1989 and 13 May 1989.

commercial pollsters begin asking survey questions which revealed the depth of public support for a bilateral agreement.³⁰¹ This data became part of the political competition concerning ratification, but it had no effect on the final stages of the negotiations.

It is not clear whether President Kennedy would have attempted to override strong bureaucratic and allied opposition to a comprehensive test ban or whether this would have been successful had he been thoroughly briefed on the nature of public opinion. However, several key advisors believe that once the President learned of strong public support for arms control, he regretted that he had not negotiated a comprehensive test ban.³⁰² This historical example strongly demonstrates the importance of having policymakers fully briefed on the nature of public opinion. While successful negotiations require managing bureaucratic politics, mastering complicated technical issues, and negotiating with both friendly and hostile countries, successful negotiations are impossible when key decisionmakers develop political strategy without mastering public opinion.

D. Defining an Issue: The Political Impact of Incorrect Issue Definition

Until the ratification phase of the policy process, advocates of a comprehensive test ban treaty focused their political communication on

301 Harris 1973, 18-20.
302 Wiesner 1988.

the issues of fallout or a test moratorium.³⁰³ Opponents of a comprehensive test ban focused their political communication on the issues of the need to continue U.S. testing or the requirement that any agreement be verified. A review of Table 5-5, shows that by selecting their respective communication strategies, opponents of a test ban agreement were on much stronger attitude grounds than were supporters of a test ban agreement. This was true because until 1963, advocates of a test ban agreement did not emphasize in their political communication the theme that any test ban agreement explicitly include the Soviet Union and also contain verification provisions.

Public Support for Competing Themes
Related to the Test Ban Debate

Table 5-5

Percent	Themes Used by Test Ban <u>Advocates</u> : 1954-1962
30	Support for A Test Moratorium
20	Concern Over Fallout
	Themes Used by Test Ban <u>Opponents</u> : 1954-1962
70	Support for Strong Verification Requirements
60	Support for Continued/Resumed Testing
	Themes Used by Test Ban <u>Advocates</u> : 1963
70	Support for a Bilateral Test Ban Treaty

303 Norman Cousins organized 30 pro-arms control interest groups to lobby for a test ban agreement. However, his efforts formally began only in October, 1962 and only produced mass communications that explicitly emphasized the bilateral aspect of a test ban agreement by the late Spring of 1963. See Lepper 1971, 61-6, 142-149; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 180, 207-8; Terchek 1970.

The key to the ratification of the Limited Test Ban was framing the political debate in terms of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Once this occurred, for the FIRST time in the nuclear age, advocates of arms control were on strong grounds with respect to public opinion. However, this political communication strategy was more the produce of luck than the result of any detailed study of public opinion.

E. Ratification

Once the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, it took the Senate less than two months to ratify the document by a vote of 80 to 19. Most accounts of the ratification process attribute President Kennedy's success to his ability to persuade elite actors, such as former President Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to support the treaty. While these factors were important, to be complete, this conclusion needs to be supplemented with an analysis of the role played in the process by public opinion.

The preliminary political fight over Senate ratification of a test ban began well before the agreement was signed. Throughout 1963, Congressional opponents of a comprehensive test ban made sure that President Kennedy was aware that such an agreement probably would be defeated in the Senate. On different occasions powerful Republican and Democratic members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate Armed Services, and Senate Foreign Relations committees such as Rep. Craig Hosmer, Senator Pastore, Senator Dodd, Senator Jackson, and Senator Gore held hearings and made statements critical of any attempt to negotiate a

comprehensive test ban agreement.³⁰⁴ In May, Senators Dodd and Humphrey introduced a resolution recommending a limited test ban, and a private survey of senators showed that a comprehensive test ban would fall short, by ten votes, of that needed for ratification.³⁰⁵ The White House was aware of this information, and when this factor was combined with Russian refusal to compromise over verification provisions, the decision to pursue a limited agreement was finalized.

Even after Kennedy's dramatic speech given at American University and Averell Harriman's arrival in Moscow as a Presidential envoy, it was not clear to participants that a limited agreement was feasible.³⁰⁶ Successful negotiations required extremely tight control of negotiating instructions and reporting within the U.S. government, no consultation with members of Congress, and strong persuasion by Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Kennedy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰⁷ After the agreement was initialed, the White House took great pains to gain Congressional support.³⁰⁸ Interest groups were formed to fight ratification of the agreement, and bipartisan Senatorial opposition was expected.

304 Jacobson and Stein 1966, 437; Lepper 1971, 53, 78, 90-101; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 186-7, 195, 227; Terchek 1970, 17, 37-39

305 Dean 1966, 91; Lepper 1971, 95; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 227.

306 Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 229-53; Terchek 1970, 22-3.

307 Terchek 1970, 30.

308 Examples include refusing to allow Adlai Stevenson to attend the signing ceremony in Moscow and encouraging members of the Senate, not President Kennedy, to represent the U.S. in Moscow. See Barton and Weiler 1976, 108; Lepper 1971, 83-6, 89-91; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 258-62; Terchek 1970, 11.

What fundamentally changed the dynamics of the ratification fight was that at this point several public opinion polls were conducted and released that showed that public support for the treaty varied from the level of consensus to virtual unanimity. At this point it became clear to Senators who in the past had opposed President Kennedy on various foreign policy, weapons procurement, and arms control initiatives that there was no political benefit to fighting a life and death battle to stop ratification of the Limited Test Ban.³⁰⁹

F. Implementation

The Limited Test Ban Treaty is the only U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement negotiated from 1945 to 1980 that has not been the subject to controversy over its implementation. Two reasons could explain this. First, the facts could indicate that no questions of treaty violation have been raised because none have occurred. A review of the records for U.S. and Soviet underground testing from 1963 to the present indicate this explanation does not suffice: many violations of this agreement have occurred.³¹⁰

A second reason, which relates to the role public opinion plays in the policy process, is much more plausible. Given the strong level of public support for the agreement (from consensus to virtual unanimous),

309 Twenty three Senators consistently voted against the Kennedy administration on related issues. Thus only a dozen additional votes would have been needed to defeat the test ban treaty.

310 See Terchek 1970, 204-6.
Duffy 1988, 25, 52-54, 187.

conservative political actors who were critical of arms control were deterred from pressing this verification and compliance issue. When this strong public opinion environment was combined with "safeguards" granted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as a commitment to increase testing and to maintain a standby ability to resume atmospheric testing, there was little political incentive for conservative Senators to fight against ratification.

IV. Diversity and Dynamics of Public Opinion

Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes toward nuclear testing and the test ban and evaluated the impact public opinion had on policy-making at various stages. This material has demonstrated that the Cohen (1973) no-impact thesis can be clearly rejected. Public opinion influenced decisions at every stage of the policy process.

This final section will address the two other hypothesis being examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? Have opinion leaders and the attentive public been against arms control, and have these elite attitudes eventually changed mass attitudes to be critical of arms control through a top-down diffusion of attitudes?

A. Attitude Consensus

The first aspect of an attitude consensus has been defined for this dissertation as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) and relative attitude stability over time. The initial graph presented in this chapter (Figure 5-1) portrayed attitudes as extremely volatile. This finding thus supports conclusions made by Rosi (1967b). However, a closer examination of the data reveals that attitudes were relatively stable if opinions are divided into different dimensions. The public consistently supported continued nuclear testing (Figure 5-2), consistently supported a bilateral test ban agreement (Figure 5-3), consistently considered the Soviet Union encrustations (Table 5-4), and consistently perceived that verification of an arms control agreement was problematic (Appendix 7). On the two dimensions for which there is the most data, variation in attitudes occurred, but in each case the standard deviation for each series of questions was relatively small, approximately 10 percent.³¹¹ In addition, public awareness of nuclear testing, fallout, and a test ban agreement was relatively stable. The only area that showed a clear change was in the increased level of detailed knowledge about atomic fallout.

Not only were public attitudes relatively stable, but for the main policy questions concerning continued testing and a bilateral test ban agreement, attitudes were at relatively high levels-- either a consensus

311 The standard deviation for questions that most precisely measure support for continued testing was 12.6 and 10.7 for a bilateral test ban agreement.

or preponderance. Thus, one is able to conclude from a comprehensive review of data that a public consensus existed on issues relating to the test ban controversy. Again, the Almond and Lippmann mood or volatility theories are not supported by the evidence.

B. Attitude Fragmentation

The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the relative homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along political or demographic lines. To address this issue, quantitative analysis was performed on 15 national and 2 state surveys that were conducted over the entire period of the test ban controversy. By using a seven-point fragmentation scale discussed in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes showed very low to moderate fragmentation along partisan, ideological, or demographic lines.³¹² These findings with respect to questions that measured public support for continued testing are presented in Table 5-6 (below). Several interesting conclusions can be reached by reviewing this table. First, while little fragmentation is found along party identification, ideological, voting, or presidential job performance lines for most of the time period, when nuclear testing issues were hotly debated in the 1956 election, attitudes became sharply split along political lines. This finding supports concepts originally discovered

³¹² As described in Chapter 2 (Table 2-5), the seven-point fragmentation scale is as follows: 1 None (0.0-2.9%), 2 Very Low (3.0-5.9%), 3 Low (6.0-8.9%), 4 Medium (9.0-11.9%), 5 High (12.0-14.9%), 6 Very High (15.0-17.9%), 7 Extreme (18.0%+).

Fragmentation of Attitudes About
Continued Nuclear Testing

Table 5-6

	A 2/46	B 4/46	C 4/54	D 3/55	E 1/56	F 10/56
Age (youth)	+3	+5	+2	+3	-1	+2
Attentive (yes/no)				+3/-3		+2/-2
Chance of War (yes)				-3	-3	
Class (upper/upper-middle)	+7/+6	+3/+3		+1/+3	+2/+2	
College (degree/attend)	+7/+4	+2/+3	+3	+4/+3	+3/+3	+7/+4
Dove/Hawk				-1/+3	-3/+3	
Ideology (lib/con)						
Internationalism/isolat	+2/-5			+3/-5	+1/-2	+4/-7
Pres. Job Approval (app/dis)	+6/-1	+1/+1		+3/-3	+2/-3	
Occupation (prof/busin)		+2/+4				+6/+5
Party ID (Dem/Rep)	+1/-1		-1/+2			-4/+6
Race (non-white)		-6		-2	-6	-4
Region (spread)		+3/-3	+2/-2			+3/-2
Sex (female/male)	-1/+1	-3/+3	-2/+3	-1/+1	-2/+2	-2/+3
Veteran (yes)	+1	+7				
Vote (Dem/Rep)	+1/-1	+1/-1		+1/+2	+1/+2	-5/+7
<hr/>						
	G 10/56	H 11/56	I 6/61	J 11/61	K 1/62	L 3/62
Age (youth)	+4	+4	+2	-5	-1	+3
Attentive (yes/no)	+1/-1		+2/-4	-3/+2	+3/-3	+3/-3
Chance of War (yes)			+5			
Class (upper/upper-middle)	+5/+3	+7/+3				
College (degree/attend)	+6/+5	+1/+3	+1/+3	+2/+2	+3/+2	+6/+3
Dove/Hawk			-3/+4	-4/+2	-2/+3	
Ideology (lib/con)			-1/+3		+1/+2	
Internationalism/isolat		+1/-3	+3/-7	+3/+1	+1/-6	
Pres. Job Approval (app/dis)			-1/+4	+1/+2	-1/+5	+1/+2
Occupation (prof/busin)	+6/+6	+1/+4	-2/+4	+1/-1	+3/+4	+4/+2
Party ID (Dem/Rep)	-5/+6		-1/+2	+1/+1	-2/+3	+1/+2
Race (non-white)		-1	-4	+1	-1	-7
Region (spread)			+5/-2	+4/-2	+4/-5	+4/-4
Sex (female/male)	-1/+2	-1/+1	-2/+3	-3/+4	-3/+3	-2/+3
Veteran (yes)	+4					
Vote (Dem/Rep)	-7/+4	-6/+5	+1/+2	+1/+2	-1/+3	-2/+2

Abbreviations: (see next page)

Table 5-6 (con't)

Abbreviations:

A 2/1946 MINN 31; B 4/1946 AIPO 368; C 4/1954 AIPO 529; D NORC 370;
E 1/1956 NORC 382; F 10/1956 AIPO 573; G 10/1956 MINN 154;
H 11/1956 NORC 399; I 6/1961 AIPO 647; J 11/1961 AIPO 652;
K 1/1962 AIPO 654; L 3/1962 AIPO 656.

- + The sub-group in the population was more supportive of continuing nuclear testing than the mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5.
- The sub-group in the population was less supportive of continuing nuclear testing than the mean for the general public.

College (4 year degree/attended some college but did not graduate);
Region: the most extreme difference from any region in the country.

by Brody and Page (1975): when political leaders take clear stands on foreign policy issues, voters perceive these differences and take them into account when evaluating candidates.

Second, the direction of attitudes--either in relative support or opposition to nuclear testing-- followed expected patterns with respect to many independent variables. For example, doves, women, and isolationists were relatively more critical of nuclear testing while hawks, men, internationalists, and veterans were more in favor of continued nuclear testing. With respect to the gender gap, given the large literature on the gender gap, the only surprising fact was that the gap was so small.

Third, by all measures of attentiveness (interest, college education, upper class status, and occupation), the attentive public was more in support of nuclear testing than was the general public. In most cases, those with a college degree (averaging less than 10 percent of the public throughout this period) were more supportive of testing than those who had only attended up to 3 years of college. In addition, attitudes held by the attentive public showed the most extreme fragmentation with respect to the general population, many times registering fragmentation levels from "very high" to "extreme."

Fourth, several unexpected findings were also discovered. Younger adults were not as a general rule more critical of nuclear testing until the last set of surveys in 1962. Adults from the South were not particularly "hawkish" on nuclear testing issues; people in the Rocky Mountain states were far more strident in their support for nuclear testing, and those on the Pacific Coast were the most critical. However, regional fragmentation was not extreme.

All in all, this data tends to support a weak version of the fragmentation hypothesis advocated by scholars such as William Schneider. There was some fragmentation of attitudes with respect to nuclear testing issues, but the degree of fragmentation, except during the 1956 election, was rather moderate. However, in comparison with data presented in Chapter 4, there was relatively more fragmentation of attitudes than was evident for the international control of atomic energy in the 1940s. Thus, attitude fragmentation seems to have been increasing prior to the war in Vietnam.

This quantitative analysis of public opinion data also reveal an interesting relationship between the structure of public opinion and the impact public opinion has on policy makers. Since President Eisenhower and President Kennedy were on weak grounds with the public in their agreeing to a test moratorium with the Soviet Union, political and public opinion pressure built up which contributed to reversing the decision. The people who were the most critical of President Kennedy on the testing issue were strongly Republican, conservative, and hawkish. However, they did not change their view of Kennedy once he resumed testing in the atmosphere. Thus, by initially acting against mass public opinion on the moratorium issue but then being forced to reverse his decision, President Kennedy neither neutralized his critics nor strengthened his support among his natural constituency. Kennedy's failure to understand the true nature of public opinion was one factor that was responsible for not concluding a comprehensive test ban agreement. There is also some limited evidence from polling conducted shortly before Kennedy's assassination that this failure to correctly read public opinion also could have cost him the 1964 election.³¹³

C. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change

Evidence presented to date (Table 5-6) clearly shows that attitudes held by the attentive public on the nuclear testing issue were

³¹³ A survey completed just prior to Kennedy being assassinated indicates that he was in trouble with the electorate. See 11/1963 ORC 466.

quite distinct from attitudes held by the general public. However, is there evidence that mass attitudes change moving from the attentive public to the general public in a top-down fashion? The data clearly indicate that the top-down model is not correct. In its place one finds evidence for a "two-worlds" model.

There is no evidence that the attentive public eventually persuaded the general public to share its perceptions with respect to nuclear testing or the test ban treaty. Quite to the contrary, the public consistently supported nuclear testing and did not adopt this attitude after it trickled down from the elite. The same can be said about attitudes concerning a bilateral test ban treaty. Throughout the entire period, when the public was asked about the desirability of a bilateral test ban treaty, they consistently approved. A consensus of the public supported a bilateral test ban agreement prior to discussion of nuclear testing in the 1956 election campaign, before anti-nuclear interest groups were organizing around the fallout issue, before influential columnists had voiced support for a test ban, before President Eisenhower supported a bilateral test ban, and before the attentive public support a test ban agreement. As shown on Table 5-7, when relevant questions were first asked in 1955 and 1956, it was the attentive public, not the general public, who opposed a test ban agreement. Mass attitudes were relatively volatile while public attitudes were relatively stable. It seems that the attentive public changed its mind in 1957 after President Eisenhower began speaking out

Fragmentation of Attitudes Concerning
A Bilateral Test Ban Agreement

Table 5-7

	A	B	C	D	E
	3/55	1/56	4/57	1/58	8/63
Age (youth)	-4	+3	-1	+1	+5
Attentive (yes/no)	-3/+4		+2		
Chance of War (yes)	+3	+6	-1		
Class (upper/upper-middle)	-5/-5	-1/-3			
College (degree/attend)	-3/-5	-4/-1	+4/-1	+1	+7/+7
Dove/Hawk	+3/-3	+2/-2			
Internationalism/isolat	-2/+4	+1/-1			
Job Approval (app/dis)	-1/+1	-1/+1			+3/-4
Occupation (prof/busin)			+4/+3		+7/+5
Party ID (Dem/Rep)			+2/-1		+1/-1
Race (non-white)	+7	+2	+1		-6
Region (spread)			+3/-1	+1/-4	
Sex (female/male)	+2/-3	+1/-1	-1/+1		-3/+4
Veteran (yes)				-1	
Vote (Dem/Rep)	+2/-2	-1/-1	+2/-1		+3/-2

Abbreviations:

A 3/1955 NORC 370
 B 1/1956 NORC 383
 C 4/1957 AIPO 582
 D 1/1958 AIPO 594
 E 6/1963 AIPO 676

- + The sub-group in the population was more supportive of a nuclear test ban agreement than the mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5.
- The sub-group in the population was less supportive of a nuclear test ban agreement than the mean for the general public.

on the desirability of such an agreement. After this switch, the attentive public supported the test ban agreement at levels higher than those held by the general public. It seems that the attentive public did not lead public opinion, but that it "caught up with" mass support for a test ban agreement.

A "two-worlds" model better explains mass and elite attitude change and the conditions under which public opinion has an impact on the policy process. With respect to the "first" world, my two worlds model posits that mass attitudes are usually relatively stable, full of common sense, and are formed in relation to real world events. Mass public opinion is relatively immune to pressure generated by political activities of the "opinion and policy elite" and the "attentive public." This is true in large part because most of the time the public chooses not to listen to or engage in the political debate.

The "second" world consists of the attentive public and the opinion and policy elite. Opinions among people in this more elite segment of society change often in relation to media coverage and variation in government policy.³¹⁴ Rather than being true "leaders," people who live in this second world often become followers of cultural fads and changes in government policy. Even though attitudes held by this group do not change mass attitudes, perceptions among members of this elite are extremely important because most of the time government leaders mistake attitudes held by people in this second world with those

314 My research is supported by conclusions reached by Gamson and Modigliani 1966.

of the general public. In many instances, foreign policy decisions are made without reference to mass opinion and rely imprecisely on attitudes held by members of of this second world.³¹⁵

The two world can be linked, but this requires that elite policymakers or political activists understand the true nature of public opinion and develop a political communication strategy that discusses policy issues using a vocabulary that is compatible with preexisting mass attitudes in the "first world." More often than not, elites develop political communications strategies without taking the time to understand public opinion. As a result, many political communications strategies are almost guaranteed to reach only a very small attentive audience, not to the general public. For many issues, this lack of genuine communication between the two worlds does not create a problem. However, for arms control, communications between these two worlds holds the key to success. Powerful bureaucratic actors are able to stop arms control unless arms control activists inside and outside of government are capable of mobilizing public support. To mobilize public support, these political actors do not need to change public opinion but they need to tap into existing attitudes which are sympathetic to the goals of arms control. However, this is not an easy thing to do. In this chapter, neither Adlai Stevenson nor John Kennedy understood the true

315 This part of the model agrees with Almond's idea that policy makers listen to the attentive public. However, Almond was wrong both on the ability of the attentive public to change mass attitudes, and on the impact mass attitudes can have on policy-making.

nature of public opinion with respect to nuclear testing and a bilateral test ban agreement. As a result, until the Spring of 1963, themes which they used reached relatively few people. As can be seen in Table 5-8, when arms control activists framed specific messages in the context of stopping nuclear testing, up to approximately 15 percent of the public could be sympathetic depending on the exact message. However, if arms control political communication was framed in terms of a bilateral agreement, up to 30 percent of the public could be receptive. The mere mention of a bilateral agreement was not sufficiently strong to guarantee majority public support, but by focusing on stopping testing, arms control advocates precluded reaching beyond the nuclear and arms control "issue public." In the late 1950s, arms control activists sensed that they were "breaking through." Membership in interest groups, participation in mass demonstrations, and vocal protest against nuclear testing was very much in evidence. However, arms control activists exaggerated the scope of this activity (because they did not look beyond the second world), and they incorrectly attributed it to public concern over fallout, rather than to genuine support for a bilateral test ban treaty.

The findings from this chapter are quite robust because they have been picked up by multiple public opinion indicators from several survey organizations which have polled over several years. If this research design had not been used, one might not have discovered the fact that

Framing the Issue and
The Size of the Attentive Public

Table 5-8

Size	Date	Linked Attitudes
<u>Stop Testing</u>		
16%	4/46	The U.S. should not conduct the Bikini test, and the U.S. and Russia can get along. (AIPO 368)
17%	3/55	Correctly defined the term "fallout." (AIPO 544)
3-5%	3/55	The U.S. should stop nuclear testing, and (1) there is a chance that hydrogen bombs will be used against the United States, or (2) the U.S. should not send troops to defend Formosa (NORC 370)
8-11%	3/55	All countries, including Russia should stop testing, and (1) and (2) from above. (NORC 370)
6-12%	10/56	H bomb testing is a major campaign issue; the U.S. should not continue nuclear testing; and support Stevenson on his anti-testng position (MINN. 154)
6%	11/61	The U.S. should not resume atmospheric testing, and Khrushchev's test ban proposal is <u>not</u> just a bluff. (AIPO 652)
<u>Bilateral Test Ban</u>		
9%	1/56	A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, and tactical nuclear weapons should not be used against Formosa. (NORC 382)
29%	1/56	A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, and H-bombs should not be used against Chinese cities. (NORC 382)
29%	4/57	A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, and fallout constituted a danger. (AIPO 582)

the public saw the test ban controversy as two distinct issues. If one had only examined one set of questions asked by one survey organization (the traditional approach to studying public opinion) the essential nature of public opinion would have been missed and the complicated relationship between public opinion and the policy process probably would have remained hidden.

Deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System
and the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT I) Talks:
Pyrrhic Victory, 1960 - 1972

Chapter 6

I Summary

Conventional accounts of the controversy over deployment of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and negotiation of SALT I paint a picture of increasing public opposition to building the anti-missile system as a "great" national debate unfolded between proponents (the Pentagon and conservative Congressional allies) and opponents (grass roots activists, scientists, former Johnson administration officials, and liberal members of Congress). According to this traditional view, public opinion played an important role in forcing Congress to attempt to limit the deployment of the ABM and pressuring the Nixon administration to initiate strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

Contrary to most academic accounts of this case, the structure of mass public opinion and the process of attitude change was quite different than perceived by many participants in the controversy. A plurality supported deployment of the ABM system, and a consensus favored negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union. The structure of public opinion was much like it had been during the test ban controversy. Public attitudes changed as a result of the ABM debate only among the "opinion and policy elite." Before the 1969 televised Congressional hearings, elite attitudes were more in favor of ABM

deployment than the general public. After the hearings, the highly educated were much more critical of ABM deployment than the general public.

Public opinion had an impact on some, but not all, stages of the policy process both concerning deployment of the ABM and negotiation of SALT I. However unlike the previous two cases, neither the arms control advocates nor critics were particularly well informed on the true nature of public opinion. Limited grassroots activity, concentrated television news coverage, and interest group pressure successfully created the false impression that "the public" was against deployment of the ABM.³¹⁶

Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam and increasingly critical public attitudes toward military spending, it is understandable that many Congressional leaders, Executive branch officials, and political activists incorrectly perceived public opinion as anti-ABM.

Chapter 6 illustrates an additional element of the two worlds model discussed in Chapter 5. When neither "second world" side in a policy debate is well informed about attitudes in the "first" world of the mass public, and when neither side employs a cogent communication strategy, decisions are strongly influenced by bureaucratic politics, activities of interest groups, and attitudes of the opinion and policy elite who all reside in the "second" world. This second-world dominated decision-making system closely approximates the system described in the

316 Many scholars also have made this same mistake. The original work on agenda setting written by Cobb and Elder (1972) examined the ABM case and reached several incorrect conclusions.

current mainstream literature on American foreign policy. Most of the time it is correct. However, in important instances, the current literature is totally wrong.

However, public opinion had a powerful influence on policy in the last stage of the policy process: implementation. The ABM treaty was in reasonably good shape until Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative. Contrary to the impressions of policy specialists and the "opinion and policy elite," President Reagan's initiative was presented to an already very sympathetic mass audience. Reagan did not change public attitudes, but he isolated the dimension of the issue for which would produce the strongest level of public support, and he communicated to the public in language they could understand. This had the political effect of mobilizing political resources to support several Reagan policy positions such as defeating the nuclear freeze movement, strengthening his bargaining position vis a vis the Soviet Union, and "creating" a major strategic program which previously had been a disconnected set of research projects.³¹⁷ Ronald Reagan, supported by a professional team of survey researchers and communications experts, understood the relationship between public opinion and the policy process and used it to its fullest. His arms control opponents, following a long and noble path, did not even understand what the "game" was all about.

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If one measures the impact in terms of books, seminars, and discussions, Reagan's SDI initiative can be considered an intellectual revolution. Large segments of the defense "intellectual" community had to switch gears and focus on SDI and nuclear issues on Reagan's terms.

II Public Attitudes on ABM Deployment and SALT I

A. The Great Debate?

Participants in the debate over deployment of the ABM and the negotiation of SALT I often refer to the period as "the great debate."³¹⁸ In the process of reviewing the extensive academic literature on the ABM deployment decision it became clear that a substantial political debate over U.S. strategic offensive and defensive programs took place before the Congress and in the press. Table 6-1 summarizes press coverage of the debate in the New York Times from 1966 to 1969. One can see that by reviewing a variety of "indicators" reported in the New York Times, it might seem logical to conclude

New York Times Coverage of the ABM and SALT I Debate
Table 6-1

Year	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
1966	46	2	3	2	0	1	2	0	1	3	3
1967	122	15	6	3	0	1	3	0	1	7	19
1968	115	15	14	5	0	3	3	1	2	5	14
1969	547	114	45	16	8	8	32	9	10	15	149

Key A) Total number of articles about the ABM system and SALT I negotiations; B) Number of letters to the editor; C) Number of editorials; D) Number of columnists' articles; E) Number of paid advertisements; F) Number of book reviews; G) Number of references to interest group activities; H) Number of cartoons; I) Number of references to local protest activities; J) Number of texts of speeches that were reproduced; K) Number of days with multiple articles either on the ABM or SALT.

318 Rathjens 1983.

that a great debate took place. The total number of relevant press stories rose substantially from 1966 to 1969, increasing numbers of letters to the editor were published, activity of interest groups increased, local protest activity was reported, and especially during 1969 many multiple press stories on the ABM/SALT I debate were published on the same day. To the extent that all of these indicators measure the political activities of elites, one can clearly conclude that elite political activity associated with the ABM deployment decision reached a very high level.

B. Public Awareness, Knowledge, and Interest

Does survey research on public awareness, knowledge, and interest concerning the ABM show that a "great" debate took place among the general public over this issue? The short answer is "No." Evidence both from the New York Times coverage and from survey research reveal that the "opinion and policy elite" became engaged in a debate over United States strategic nuclear weapons, but this debate did not extend down to the general public. From the limited survey data available, one can determine that awareness of the ABM system was relatively high, at the level of consensus or preponderance (69-72 percent).³¹⁹ However, in comparison with data on public awareness toward nuclear weapons in

³¹⁹ 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780k; 7/1969 AIPO 784k. All survey questions and data about the ABM and SALT I are reproduced in Appendix 8.

general, presented in Chapter 3, public awareness of the ABM system was lower than awareness of several other nuclear weapons systems. Also, public awareness of the ABM was lower than public awareness of the Limited Test Ban. In contrast to this moderate level of awareness of the ABM system, there was very low awareness of the SALT I negotiations and treaty.³²⁰ Even in the context of the contemporary 1980s debate over President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, awareness of the ABM treaty continues to be quite limited, with only approximately only one-third of the public aware of the agreement.³²¹ This survey data suggests that from the point of view of the general public, there was no "great" debate over deployment of the ABM, and there was even less public focus on the SALT I treaty.³²²

Survey data about SALT I reconfirm two conclusions reached earlier in this dissertation. First, an "opinion and policy elite" exists for nuclear and arms control issues. Second, this elite group constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. Relatively few people had any detailed knowledge of the ABM system. For example, in the mid-1960s before the "great" debate, only a handful of people (5 percent) were aware that a nuclear warhead would be the primary "kill" mechanism in

320 6/1971 ORC/Nx. Surveys conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation followed by the "Nx" abbreviation were sponsored by the Nixon White House and were originally considered confidential.

321 2/1985 Finkelstein; 9/1985 M&K.

322 For comparison, as summarized in Chapter 3, approximately 70 percent of the public were aware of the LTBT, 50 percent aware of the nuclear freeze, and 40 percent the Acheson-Lilienthal plan.

any of the then proposed ABM systems; only 6 percent knew the U.S. had no anti-missile defense; and only 2-6 percent rated America's non-existent defenses against bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs as poor.³²³ After the ABM issue became the topic of elite political discussion and substantial media coverage in 1968 and 1969, detailed public knowledge of the anti-missile system did not increase above the 4-8 percent level.³²⁴

One factor that can account for low levels of public awareness and knowledge of the ABM system and SALT I treaty relates to the pattern of mass interest about national problems. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, when these strategic nuclear weapons issues were debated among the experts, the public focused its entire foreign affairs attention on the war in Vietnam, not on nuclear weapons issues. After the war, economic issues became the dominant "most important problem." As a result, the period from the end of the test ban debate (1963) until the late 1970s can be characterized as the "quiet nuclear age."³²⁵ Low or moderate public interest about the ABM system and SALT I is consistent with the quiet nuclear age proposition. Throughout this period when the opinion and policy elite focused on strategic nuclear weapons issues (and as the Soviet Union gained parity in nuclear weapons with the United States), the public was focused not on these symbolic

323 6/1964 NORC SRS 640.

324 6/1968 ORC/N; 5/1969 ORC/Nx.

325 Aspen Strategy Group 1989, 55; Graham 1985. For data on public perceptions of the most important problem during this period of time, see T. W. Smith 1985.

issues, but on the real war in Southeast Asia. This is a very important finding because arms control advocates in the 1970s and 1980s often assume that the public has some basic understanding of the ABM debate that took place from 1968 to 1972.

When asked specifically about the ABM system, only a moderate number of people (approximately 40 percent) were sufficiently interested to have an opinion on the issue.³²⁶ When survey respondents were asked about their interest about a number of issues of the day, most people showed little interest about the ABM missile defense program.³²⁷ Additional, indirect, evidence supports the conclusion that the ABM deployment issue was not particularly salient to most of the public. Since most people believed that the United States already had an existing anti-missile system and were generally satisfied with this state of affairs, it is logical to suggest that most people were not intensely interested in building a nuclear defense system.³²⁸ Public interest about SALT I is impossible to judge because no survey data exists to measure mass interest in this arms control treaty. However, given the extremely low levels of mass awareness of this agreement, it would be logical to assert that public interest in this first strategic arms control treaty with the Soviet Union was also relatively low.

The data on public interest and knowledge about ABM/SALT I provide additional support for the conclusion reached in Chapter 3 that the

326 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/1969 AIPO 784.

327 10/1969 Harris 1970.

328 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 5/1969 ORC; 4/1979 Harris 792106.

public is both more aware and more interested in nuclear weapons systems, such as the ABM system, than they are concerning arms control, like SALT I. This bimodal and hierarchical pattern of public knowledge and interest about strategic nuclear issues is in sharp contrast with intense interest demonstrated by a small number of anti-ABM and pro-arms control activists who mobilized protests in half a dozen cities throughout the United States.

C. Generic Feasibility of Building An Active Defense System

From the beginning of the atomic age, the American public has consistently believed that it is technically feasible to build an active defense against nuclear weapons.³²⁹ This attitude has persisted, at the level of majority or consensus, from 1945 through the 1980s.³³⁰ Data summarized in Table 6-2 shows clearly that even after the "great debate" those who did not believe that it would be possible to build an active defense against nuclear weapons were in a distinct minority. The 1969 ABM debate seems to have changed this attitude and increased the number of people who were skeptical of the feasibility of building a

329 10/1945 AIPO 357; 6/1946 PSY CORP 173; 6/1946 SRC; 8/1946 PSY CORP 178; 8/1946 SRC; 2/1947 MINN 42; 11/1949 AIPO 449; 12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N; 4/1969 Harris 1926; 5/1969 ORC. For similar data in the context of the Strategic Defense Initiative, see Graham 1986.
330 Only one survey question out of the dozen asked on this topic from 1945 to 1969 indicated that the public realized the difficulty of building a defense in the nuclear age. However this unusual question, 12/1945 NORC 42T, contains a statement in the question itself that senior military officials and scientists believe that no defense is possible. This question wording difference is very important.

defense system from approximately 20 percent to approximately 30 percent. However, at no point did this attitude become a majority opinion.³³¹ This consistent public attitude that defense is possible is noteworthy for three reasons. First, this generic positive attitude toward defense is in sharp contrast with the professional opinion of most independent, non-government scientists who are experts in the relevant technologies that would be needed to produce an effective defense system. Despite the massive academic and professional literature that has been written on the technical difficulty of building an anti-missile system, the persistence of this mass attitude that defense is possible suggests that little or no "top-down" learning has

Active Defense Not Possible in the Nuclear Age
Table 6-2

Date	Survey	Level
10/1945	AIPO 357	21
6/1946	PSY CORP 173	19
6/1946	SRC	19
8/1946	PSY CORP 178	19
8/1946	SRC	25
2/1947	MINN 42	20
11/1949	AIPO 449	19
12/1963	NORC SRS 330 (0-2 on 10 point scale)	8
6/1964	NORC SRS 640 (0-2 on 10 point scale)	10
6/1964	NORC SRS 640	23
6/1968	ORC/N	23
6/1969	Harris 1926	40
5/1969	ORC/Nx	30

331 Changes in question wording make it impossible to calculate the exact magnitude of this probable attitude change. On a separate issue, when open-ended questions were asked on this issue, ~20 percent believed that a defense was impossible, but the percent who were not sure increased. See 6/1946 and 6/1946 SRC.

occurred in this area. Second, the stability of this attitude--before the ABM became controversial, during the 1969 ABM debate, and today in the context of SDI--suggests that public attitudes can be extremely stable over long periods of time. In this area, attitudes have not demonstrated a volatile characteristic that would be consistent with the Almond and Lippmann mood theory. Third, this public attitude that defense in the nuclear age is feasible contradicts the fundamental premise of the dominant school in nuclear strategy that stability is created by deterrence and the dominance of the offense over the defense.³³² As will be shown later in this chapter, divergent attitudes between elite nuclear scientists and strategists and the public on this very issue became quite important in the context of the political fight over deployment of the ABM system.

D. Building a Defensive System Was Popular

Contrary to much of the academic literature on the ABM issue which characterized the public as increasingly opposed to ABM deployment, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more people supported building an ABM system than opposed such a system.³³³ While the exact level of public approval of an ABM system varied from the level of preponderance to plurality depending on the survey question wording, this data refutes the conventional wisdom that the public opposed deployment of the ABM in the late 1960s.

332 Brodie 1946; Freedman 1981.

333 12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 2/1966 NORC SRS 876; 6/1968 ORC/N; 12/1968 Harris 1900; 4/1969 AIPO 777; 4/1969 Harris 1926; 5/1969 ORC/Nx; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/1969 AIPO 784; 3/1972 MIS/N; 7/1972 Field/LMH; 5/1974 Field/LMH.

A great deal can be learned about public attitudes on different dimensions of this subject by comparing the level of public support for the ABM depending on various survey question wording and formats. When the entire public was asked about the desirability of building an anti-missile defensive system throughout the 1960s, support was recorded at the level of consensus or above.³³⁴ This finding was reached by several different survey organizations whose research was sponsored by various groups.³³⁵ When the focus of the question asked about support for building a limited ABM system, the public approved such an action at the level of preponderance.³³⁶ No question asked during this entire time period (except those that emphasized cost) found a plurality or a majority agaist deployment of the ABM. Public support for the ABM was approximately 10 percent higher when the question asked about building an ABM system around American cities (a virtually unanimous attitude) than when the question asked about building an ABM around a respondent's own city (a preponderant attitude).³³⁷ At least a majority supported

334 12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N;
12/1968 Harris 1900.

335 Several surveys--conducted by NORC, ORC and MIS--were commissioned by partisans in the public debate, such as the Department of Defense or the Nixon White House. However, their basic results agree with surveys conducted by independent organizations such as the Gallup Organization and Louis Harris and Associates.

336 5/1969 ORC/Nx.

337 Two questions were asked on this topic in 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. This survey data would foreshadow the localized opposition to ABM deployment that would develop in 1968. Other questions asked in 6/1964 (NORC SRS 640) and 6/1968 (ORC/N) showed an approximate 15 percent drop in support for living in "defended" cities.

building an ABM even when people were presented with the following critical arguments against building such an anti-missile system: if radar might cause television reception problems, if local opposition was shown, if land values went down, or if there was a possibility of accidents.³³⁸ At least a plurality supported building an ABM even if it would be only partially effective in defending against incoming Soviet nuclear weapons.³³⁹ After respondents were given various arguments for and against building an ABM, there was only a slight reduction in the level of support for building the anti-missile system, and this drop took place primarily among those who initially were extremely in favor of building a defensive system.³⁴⁰ After reviewing data from all of these survey questions one can firmly conclude that more people supported deployment of the ABM than opposed it. The lowest level of support for the ABM was found when a series of filter questions asked respondents whether they had heard of the ABM and whether they had an opinion on the subject. Using this filtered format, the level of support for building the ABM was reduced to a small plurality.³⁴¹ However, for all of these surveys throughout the entire period, those who opposed building an ABM were in a distinct minority that varied from 5 to 25 percent.³⁴²

338 6/1964 NORC SRS 640.

339 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. Support for a total defense registered 89 percent and 68 percent for the two respective surveys. Support for a partial defense registered 78 percent and 42 percent for the 1964 and 1968 surveys.

340 6/1964 NORC SRS 640.

341 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/1969 AIPO 784.

342 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 4/1969 AIPO 777; 6/1969 Harris 1926; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 5/1969 ORC/Nx; 7/1969 AIPO 784.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, attitudes toward the ABM were quite stable. Only two dimensions of public opinion toward building an ABM showed some change. First, when people were asked whether they would rather live in a defended city versus an undefended city, in 1964 a consensus (65 percent) chose a defended city. When this question was repeated in a slightly different form in 1968, only a plurality (49 percent) selected the defended city. Those who opted for living in an undefended city increased from 13 percent to 23 percent over this four year period.³⁴³ Second, there was some change in perceptions over what locations should be defended. When first asked in 1964, the public wanted to defend military facilities, industries and then cities--in this order. When specific cities were mentioned, Washington, D.C. headed the list as the city people most wanted to defend.³⁴⁴ By 1972, the public wanted to defend cities and only some military bases.³⁴⁵ By the 1980s, people did not want to defend missile sites, military facilities and Washington, D.C.³⁴⁶

E. Security Implications If An ABM Is Deployed

Many critics of the ABM took the position that deployment would increase the chance of war, trigger an arms race, convince the Soviets that the U.S. was interested in developing a first-strike capability, and wreck chances for concluding an agreement to limit strategic

343 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N.
344 6/1964 NORC SRS 640.
345 3/1972 MIS/N.
346 9/1985 M&K.

offensive weapons. Also, one of the most persuasive anti-ABM arguments stated that a defensive system could be overwhelmed by an enemy who simply and cheaply builds more offensive weapons.³⁴⁷ While public attitudes did not reject all of these arguments, on balance they did not present anti-ABM activists with a sympathetic audience. The public was evenly split on the question whether deployment of the ABM would increase the chance of war.³⁴⁸ However, at least a majority rejected the proposition that American deployment of ABM defenses would threaten the Soviet Union and make the Russians think there was a greater chance of war.³⁴⁹ The public rejected the argument that an ABM system would be overtaken by new offensive weapons.³⁵⁰ People did not perceive the ABM system as a full proof defensive system that would replace nuclear deterrence, but they saw it as a supplement to strengthen our nuclear forces which would in turn make an enemy less likely to attack.³⁵¹ Relatively few people believed that deployment of an ABM in their city would make them a target in a nuclear war.³⁵² Finally, the public was sympathetic to the "bargaining chip" theory that the United States needed to deploy an ABM system to increase pressure on the Soviets to begin discussions and then to conclude an arms control agreement.³⁵³

347 Both supporters and critics of the ABM cite the Garwin and Bethe article (1968) and Panofsky testimony (1969) as the most influential presentation of this argument.
348 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N.
349 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N.
350 Those who agreed with this Panofsky critique increased from 13% in 1964 to 21% in 1968. Unfortunately, this question was not repeated after his 1969 testimony before Congress. See 6/1964 NORC SRS 640 and 6/1968 ORC/N.
351 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N.
352 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N.
353 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 4/1969 Harris 1926.

F. Soviet ABM Development

Just as the public believed that the United States had an existing ABM system, at least a consensus of the public believed the Soviets had an anti-missile system.³⁵⁴ When questions included the idea that the Soviets had an ABM system, support for building an American nuclear defense system varied from a majority to a consensus.³⁵⁵ The most persuasive "anti-Soviet" argument in favor of building an ABM focused on the development of Soviet offensive, not defensive, nuclear weapons.³⁵⁶

G. Limited Public Criticism of the ABM

The public accepted only two of the major propositions argued by critics of the ABM. First they believed that building an anti-missile system would increase the arms race with the Soviet Union.³⁵⁷ However, in contrast to public attitudes evident two decades later about the Strategic Defense Initiative, the intensity of public concern with the arms race aspect of building an ABM was relatively low. This was probably due to the lack of public attention given to strategic nuclear issues during the late 1960s. As a result, there was a big gap between elite knowledge that the Soviets were gaining nuclear parity with the U.S. and public attitudes which did not focus on the Soviet nuclear

354 However, only 30 percent of the public believed that China had an ABM system. 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N; 5/1969 ORC/Nx.

355 4/1969 Harris 1926; 7/1969 Harris 1939.

356 When this elements was added to the question, public support reached levels approaching preponderance. See 4/1969 Harris 1926.

357 6/1964 NORC SRS 640.

build-up until the late 1970s. Second, as the ABM debate heated up and as generic support for military spending began to decline in the context of the war in Vietnam, the issue of cost eventually turned the public against spending additional money to deploy the ABM.³⁵⁸ In 1964 and 1968, cost was not a major criticism of the ABM.³⁵⁹ After President Nixon announced his decision to build the Safeguard ABM system, one survey recorded increased public concern over the cost issue. However this 1969 Harris poll still did not show that a majority opposed deployment of the ABM in the context of its financial cost.³⁶⁰ However, by 1971 the issue of cost had become the main criticism of the ABM.³⁶¹ By this time a plurality wanted to spend less money on the ABM.³⁶²

H. Arms Control Agreement to Limit ABMs

Data about the last dimension of public opinion on the ABM issue reveal a pattern very similar to the one found in public attitudes concerning the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Even though there was public

358 For an evaluation of public attitudes toward Vietnam, see J. Mueller 1973. For a comprehensive description and analysis of American attitudes towards military spending, see Graham and Hartley 1989.

359 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. In these surveys, only between 17 and 23 percent of the public opposed the ABM system when the issue of cost was introduced into the survey question. When the cost was listed as \$ 5 billion, opposition was recorded at 13 percent. When the cost was listed as \$ 40 billion, opposition rose to 23 percent.

360 4/1969 Harris 1926.

361 1/1971 Harris 2055; 3/1972 MIS/N; 9/1972 Harris 2234.

362 However spending on the ABM was more popular than spending for the military in general. See 9/1972 Harris 2234.

support for deployment of the ABM, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s there was extremely strong mass support for concluding a bilateral arms control agreement to limit (not ban) ABMs, provided that both the United States and the Soviet Union were parties to the treaty. Support for an arms control agreement to limit ABMs never dropped below a majority. In the 1960s, public support for an agreement varied, depending on question wording, from a majority to virtual unanimity.³⁶³ By the early 1970s, support for an ABM agreement was recorded at the level of consensus or higher.³⁶⁴ However, it took many years for the public to support a total ban on ABMs. In 1972, one survey recorded 59 percent of the public in favor of an agreement to limit ABMs, but only 39 percent favored a total ban on anti-missile systems.³⁶⁵ By 1978, a plurality of 49 percent supported a total ban on these nuclear defensive systems.³⁶⁶

363 6/1968 ORC/N; 4/1969 Harris 1926; 7/1969 Harris 1939.
364 6/1971 Harris 2124; 2/1972 Harris 2154; 3/1972 MIS/N;
6/1972 Harris 2216; 6/1973 Harris 2330; 11/1973 Harris 2351
365 3/1972 MIS/N.
366 12/1978 MIS/N.

III Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy Making

Determining whether public opinion played a crucial role in getting this arms control case study onto the Executive branch agenda is complicated by three factors. First, two issues--the decision to deploy the ABM and to negotiate SALT I-- have their own histories and thus have to be evaluated separately even though the subjects are inextricably linked. Second, two different administrations (Johnson and Nixon) made distinct decisions on both of these issues, thereby transforming a single question about the role played by public opinion in getting this case onto the agenda into four separate questions summarized in Table 6-3. Third, a key distinction must be made between "politically active" opinion and public opinion. During 1968-1972 attitudes held by a small group of political activists, a tiny minority of the population that was engaged in the ABM debate, were quite different from attitudes held by the general public. For this reason, attitudes of the former group will be referred to as "popular" opinion in contrast with attitudes held by the general public which will be referred to as "politically active" opinion.

Public Opinion Influence on ABM/SALT I Decisions:
Table 6-3

Presidential Decision	Degree of Influence
Johnson's Decision To Deploy the Sentinel ABM	High
Johnson's Decision To Initiate SALT I	Moderate
Nixon's Decision To Deploy the Safeguard ABM	Moderate
Nixon's Decision To Initiate SALT I	Moderate

A. The ABM Issue From the Eisenhower thru the Johnson Administrations: Getting on the Agenda and Implementation

With respect to the deployment of the ABM, for over a decade public opinion played virtually no role in causing President Eisenhower or President Kennedy to focus on the issue. From 1956 to 1966 sufficient bureaucratic pressure was exerted by the Army, the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Congressional hawks to keep the ABM issue on the agenda and thereby require annual Presidential budget decisions to determine whether various version of the Nike system should be deployed. In this period successive Presidents were able to defer a deployment decision and satisfy their bureaucratic problems by funding significant ABM research and development.³⁶⁷ Despite scattered press stories that argued the Soviets were ahead of the U.S. in ABM development, neither the 1960 nor 1964 Presidential campaigns focused on a defensive, as opposed to an offensive, strategic weapons "gap."³⁶⁸ On occasion, such as after Sputnik or after President Kennedy's 1963 refused to deploy an ABM in the face of growing Soviet defensive capabilities, Congress or its committees added more money to the ABM research budget than was requested by the administration. However this

³⁶⁷ The most comprehensive review and analysis of this early period of the ABM issues is contained in Jayne 1969, 46-7, 58-60, 105-13.

³⁶⁸ Jayne 1969, 92, 103-4, 251; Newhouse 1973, 48, 61.

action did not trigger a major political fight over the ABM issue.³⁶⁹
In 1964 and 1965--despite growing Soviet ABM capabilities paraded in Moscow, China's nuclear test, technical improvements in U.S. ABM-related phased array radar, and successful testing of the American Sprint missile--President Johnson supported Secretary of Defense McNamara's recommendation to delay an ABM deployment decision because an ABM was neither cost-effective nor strategically wise.³⁷⁰

This basic political calculus, and the influence of public opinion on decision-making, changed in 1966 and 1967. President Johnson became concerned that the Republicans would run their 1968 Presidential campaign on the theme of an "ABM gap" and that this might be a successful political strategy.³⁷¹ In addition, an increasingly impatient Congress added substantial money (\$ 167.9 million) for "preproduction" of the Nike-X ABM system.³⁷² As a result of these political pressures, which were consistent with public opinion, Secretary McNamara had to change his complex maneuvers to delay ABM

369 President Eisenhower impounded the "extra" ABM money in the FY 1957 budget and neutralized post-Sputnik political pressure with respect to the ABM by unifying all ABM research into ARPA. In 1963, the Senate Armed Services Committee's effort to add \$ 196 million to the defense authorization bill to deploy Nike-Zeus was defeated by the full Senate 56:16 after a secret session. See Flanagan 1979, 99; Jayne 1969 184-186.

370 Jayne 1969, 251-65, 284-97; Kaplan 1983, 320-324; Newhouse 1973, 73-5; G. Smith [1980] 1985, 94.

371 President Johnson's guess about public attitudes is consistent with the public opinion data presented earlier in this chapter. For Republican efforts to focus on the "ABM gap," see Flanagan 1979, 100-101; Halperin 1972, 83; Jayne 1969, 336-338.

372 Cahn 1971, 80, 241; Flanagan 100; Jayne 1969, 312-317.

deployment. He obtained President Johnson's approval of a compromise strategy where the administration would propose funding pre-production tooling and procurement of Nike-X, but not deploy the system until the U.S. was able to negotiate a limit on extensive area defense ABMs with the Soviet Union.³⁷³ The basic reason for making this decision was domestic politics, of which public opinion played an important part. President Johnson's letter to Premier Kosygin proposing arms control talks explicitly mentioned Congressional and public opinion pressure on the administration to deploy an ABM system.³⁷⁴ Since Secretary McNamara was willing to resist the bureaucratic pressure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but not break with LBJ on the ABM issue, President Johnson's evaluation of the political situation overrode McNamara's logical, technical, and strategic objections to the anti-missile system.³⁷⁵

Despite President Johnson's step towards deploying an ABM, domestic political pressure mounted on the administration in early 1967 to go farther. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, publicly called for immediate ABM deployment, and the Senate approved standby funding for ABM deployment if arms control talks failed.³⁷⁶ Against this background, the inability of McNamara to convince Kosygin that an agreement on ABMs would be in the mutual

373 Halperin 1972, 84; Jayne 1969, 333-48; Kahan 1975, 121-122; Kaplan 1983, 338-348; Newhouse 1973, 81-86.
374 Flanagan 1979, 104.
375 Halperin 1972, 80-81
376 Finney 1967a, 2; 1967b, 1.

interest of the United States and the Soviet Union led President Johnson to inform McNamara that some type of ABM deployment would have to be made prior to January 1968.³⁷⁷ After the failure of the June 1967 Johnson-Kosygin "summit" in Glassboro, N.J., Congressional pressure increased for immediate ABM deployment, and Republican Presidential candidate Nixon called for deployment of an anti-missile system at any cost.³⁷⁸ As a result of these political pressures, in September 1967, Secretary McNamara announced deployment of a \$ 5 billion "thin" ABM system which would be directed against an attack from China.³⁷⁹ Implementation of this decision happened quickly as the Senate approved the required funding within one month and ten possible ABM sites were announced by the army.³⁸⁰

There is no academic debate over these events or over the general proposition that Johnson's decision was based primarily on political, rather than on strategic, grounds.³⁸¹ However, no previous scholar has shown explicitly that President Johnson and his Republican challengers read public opinion correctly. More people supported deployment of an ABM system than opposed it. While some commentators

377 Cahn 1971, 242; Flanagan 1979, 106; Halperin 1972, 87; Kaplan 1983, 346; Jayne 1969, 368-371; Rathjens 1983, 381
378 Cahn 1971, 243; Flanagan 1979, 106.
379 Cahn 1971, 113; Flanagan 1979, 107; Jayne 1969, 388-403; Kaplan 1983, 346-8; McNamara 1968; Newhouse 1973, 95-7.
380 Barton and Weiler 1976, 178; Cahn 1971, 45-46, 188; Halperin 1972, 89.
381 Most (60%) anti-ABM scientists believed this decision was political (Cahn 1971), and former Johnson aid R.N. Goodwin confirmed this idea in the September 30, 1967 "News and Comments" section of the New Yorker.

have implied that Johnson's actions were unnecessarily "political," I would argue that they were entirely rational.³⁸² Thus, the fundamental reason for President Johnson's 1967 decision to deploy the ABM was due to public opinion with additional pressures coming from Congress, the Republican party, and bureaucratic actors. Since public opinion was not at overwhelming levels (consensus or higher) it is conceivable that President Johnson could have successfully implemented a no-deployment strategy. However to do this, he would have to develop an alternative political strategy, not just rely on the logical policy analysis that was provided to him by McNamara. There are no indications from documents written at the time that any anti-ABM advisors were even aware of relevant public opinion. It is clear from the existing academic literature that none of these advisors took the additional step of attempting to develop an alternative political strategy that would have been needed to sustain continued delay in deploying the ABM.

B. The ABM Issue During the Nixon Administration: Getting on the Agenda and Implementation

By the time Richard Nixon took office, the ABM issue was clearly already on the Executive branch agenda, and unlike the 1956-1966 time period, the issue was framed in broader terms than just the Defense Department budget. In the 1968 Presidential election, Richard Nixon campaigned on restoring American nuclear "superiority," negotiating

382 Reston 1967.

strategic nuclear reductions from a position of strength, and also supported ABM deployment. Thus the issue for him was not whether or not to build an ABM, but what type of system to deploy. Once in office, after a month-long review conducted by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, the administration announced plans to deploy a modified ABM system which would focus on the Soviet threat to American ICBMs as well as provide limited protection for cities from a Chinese nuclear attack. The renamed Safeguard system also was initially designed to be cheaper than the Democratic Sentinel system.³⁸³

Public opinion played only a moderate role in influencing Nixon's deployment decision. First, public attitudes influenced Nixon's campaign statements on strategic nuclear issues. This set up the problem in his mind as not "whether" but "what type" of ABM should be deployed.³⁸⁴ Second, the desire to limit the expense of an ABM was also due in part to public attitudes which were growing increasingly critical of military spending.³⁸⁵ This aspect of the problem, reinforced by Congressional cuts in the administration's defense budget, was emphasized by Henry Kissinger.³⁸⁶ The electoral and budget influences on Nixon's ABM deployment decision had very important

383 Kissinger 1979, 205, 207-9; Newhouse 1973, 151-2.

384 This perspective is clearly shown in the television news interview with David Packard shown on CBS for February 18, 1969. See Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts.

385 Graham and Hartley 1989.

386 Kissinger 1979, 199-201, 204, 212-215. For the definitive study which shows the relationship between public opinion about military spending and Congressional action to cut, add, or maintain the size of the defense budget, see Jacobson 1984.

components of public opinion in them. However, my analysis suggests that public opinion played less of a role in influencing Nixon's ABM deployment decision than it had in the Johnson administration. The key change from the Sentinel to Safeguard system involved protecting U.S. ICBMs. This latter decision was the product of strategic thinking of conservative analysts such as Senator Jackson, Deputy Secretary Packard, and Albert Wholstetter. There is no indication from public opinion data that the public had clear-cut opinions on this subject, and no Nixon administration documents indicate that this aspect of the deployment decision was made on grounds other than the "logic" of nuclear strategy, as seen by conservatives.

However, once Nixon's decision was announced, a major political controversy developed over implementing his ABM program. Some accounts of the ABM debate of 1969 imprecisely attributed it to increasing public opposition to deployment of an ABM.³⁸⁷ However, the review of public opinion data presented earlier in this chapter clearly shows that the general public remained supportive of ABM deployment. If this is true, what accounts for the political pressure generated in 1969 which almost led the Senate to defeat funding for the ABM? Several factors can explain the growth, but ultimate failure, of this political opposition to ABM deployment. In short mobilized "politically active" opinion, as opposed to mass "public" opinion almost defeated implementation of Nixon's ABM deployment plans. However, despite the intensity of

387 Cahn 1971.

attitudes held by this group, all indications show that this group was quite small in numbers (less than 10 percent of the public) and never grew beyond the "opinion and policy elite." The inability of elite advocates of arms control to communicate with the general public on important nuclear issues has been a consistent pattern discovered in this dissertation.³⁸⁸ What makes the ABM/SALT I case unique is that one can clearly document that this failure in communications was not due to lack of press (print) or media (television) coverage. The failure was due to elite political actors developing their political strategy in ignorance of actual public opinion. Anti-ABM leaders allowed their perceptions to be strongly influenced by politically active opinion such as interest group activity, letters to the editor, or protest demonstrations. This political strategy used by ABM critics succeeded in convincing twelve additional Senators that ABM deployment was futile. However, all of this political effort did not make a dent in attitudes of the general public and ultimately did not provide the political foundation to stop the ABM.

What factors can explain why the ABM debate became such a large political issue among the opinion and policy elite? First, with a shift in administrations, influential Democrats such as former Secretary of Defense Clifford were no longer in a position to have to defend ABM funding so that the United States could negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.³⁸⁹ A second, but related, factor was

388 The same problem also occurs for many "grassroots" groups which often have leaders who are quite elitist.
389 Grose 1968, 1.

that many former mid-level Kennedy and Johnson administration officials with requisite technical and strategic backgrounds were dismissed from their advisory positions by the incoming Republican administration and were now free to express their anti-ABM opinions in public. This factor accounted for many anti-ABM "inner" scientists.³⁹⁰ Third, local protest activity in half of the cities with proposed ABM sites took place in 1968 and in 1969.³⁹¹ However, several of these factors had been present in 1967 and 1968 and had not created the major political issue that came to pass in 1969. A fourth factor brought all of these disparate influences together to create the "great debate." It was press and media coverage. As reviewed earlier in Table 6-1, press coverage of the ABM debate was extensive. In addition, coverage of this subject on the mass media--television--was also extensive.³⁹² A review of Table 6-4 on press coverage in the New York Times for 1969 clearly shows that "politically active" opinion was strongly against deployment of the ABM. Letters to the editor and book reviews ran 2 to 1 against the ABM. Editorials, columnists, advertisements, interest groups, and local protest activity were even stronger against deployment of the ABM.³⁹³

The importance of all of this anti-ABM political activity to the generic issue of the politics of arms control is that activists who were engaged in the ABM debate and scholars who have studied this case have

390 Cahn 1971, 58.

391 Cahn 1971, 50, 71, 189-192, 244; Cobb and Elder 1972, 71-75.

392 See Vanderbilt Television Index and Abstracts for 1968 and 1969.

393 It is not surprising that the Nixon administration blamed a "biased" press on its difficulty to sell the ABM.

New York Times Coverage of the 1969 ABM Debate
Table 6-4

a	<u>total</u> number of nytimes articles on abm systems	387
a-1	number of letters to the editor (hawk/dove)	35/72
a-2	number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove)	1/30
a-3	number of columnists (hawk/dove)	0/12
a-4	number of advertisements (hawk/dove)	2/6
a-5	number of book reviews (hawk/dove)	3/5
a-6	references of interest groups (hawk/dove)	5/22
a-7	cartoons	9
a-8	references to local protests/marches (hawk/dove)	0/10
a-9	number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes	10
a-10	number of days with multiple articles on related subjects	117
b	<u>total</u> number of nytimes articles on icbm/mirv systems	87
b-1	number of letters to the editor (hawk/dove)	1/6
b-2	number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove)	1/11
b-6	references of interest groups (hawk/dove)	0/1
b-7	cartoons	4
b-8	references to local protests/marches (hawk/dove)	
b-9	number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes	1
b-10	number of days with multiple articles on related subjects	15
c	<u>total</u> number of nytimes articles on strategic arms control	160
c-1	number of letters to the editor (hawk/dove)	2/5
c-2	number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove)	0/14
c-3	number of columnists (hawk/dove)	0/4
c-6	references of interest groups (hawk/dove)	0/5
c-9	number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes	5
c-10	number of days with multiple articles on related subjects	32

mistaken "politically active" opinion for public opinion. By using false "indicators" of public attitudes such as letters to the editor, participation at rallies, and press editorials, arms control advocates (who were ABM critics) fooled themselves into thinking that they had really broken through and communicated with the general public. Actual evidence from public opinion polls shows this did not happen in this

arms control case, or in any other examined in this dissertation. For the ABM case, politically active opinion diverged radically both in intensity and in content from actual public opinion.

The anti-ABM forces achieved the relative success that they did in part because the Nixon administration was far less professional and sophisticated in its understanding and use of public opinion than several previous administrations. It conducted relatively little of its own confidential polling, and its crude efforts to publicize the results of one of its surveys--rather than use that knowledge in the development of a cogent communication strategy--backfired.³⁹⁴ As important as public opinion is to the workings of the political system, a more important factor is the use of public opinion by political activists. On this score, both anti-ABM and pro-ABM advocates were relatively uninformed and unprofessional.³⁹⁵

C. Getting SALT I on the Agenda: The Johnson Administration

In contrast to the complicated story associated with the ABM deployment decision, getting SALT I on the agenda was relatively simple. As reviewed in Table 6-3 (above), I argue that public opinion

394 The Nixon White House conducted only 2 surveys on the ABM/SALT I issue: 1969 ORC/Nx; 6/1971 ORC/Nx. For the controversy over activities associated with dissemination of these polling results by the Citizens Committee for Peace with Security, see the New York Time, June 6, 1969, p.1; June 13, 1969, p. 69; August 4, 1969, p. 1.

395 Defense Department public relations efforts, while expensive, were also relatively crude, and as the polling data show, ineffective. See Cahn 1971, 244; Fulbright 1970, 1-16.

only played a moderate role in this process. The primary advocate of beginning arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the Johnson administration was Secretary of Defense McNamara. He not only wanted to start strategic arms control talks with the Soviets to help him delay deployment of the ABM system, but he hoped to transform the action-reaction arms race cycle into a more stable and secure relationship.³⁹⁶ Only a small part of McNamara's desire to initiate arms control talks with the Soviets revolved around domestic politics. The same was not true for President Johnson. He wanted to balance arms control talks with the Soviets with deployment of an ABM to present the electorate with images of peace and strength at the same time.³⁹⁷ In this context, public opinion influenced the decision to attempt to negotiate talks with the Soviets. However, it was not the only factor in the decision, nor as in the case of the decision to deploy the ABM was it running contrary to strong bureaucratic pressure. For these reasons, I conclude that public opinion had only a moderate impact on this decision to initiate the SALT talks.

Even though public opinion had some influence on the Johnson administration's SALT decision, neither the President nor Robert McNamara comprehended the preponderant level of public support for arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Neither of them did sufficient research on the political aspect of this problem to realize that success in starting arms control negotiations might be sufficiently popular to

396 McNamara 1968.

397 Halperin 1972, 85.

obviate the need to deploy the ABM. In the context of public attitudes of the time, the survey data suggest this was a potentially successful political strategy. In all of the staff work conducted by the small group of people working on this subject in the Pentagon and State Department before and after President Johnson's December 6, 1966 decision, no review of relevant public opinion data was conducted, nor was any independent polling initiated.³⁹⁸ As is often the case inside the foreign policy community in the Executive branch, staff time was concentrated on technical details, bureaucratic politics, and diplomatic discussions.³⁹⁹ However, all of McNamara's and Johnson's hopes for initiating arm control talks with the Soviets were dashed on August 20, 1968, when the U.S.S.R. invaded Czechoslovakia, ending all serious efforts to reach an agreement on mutual restraint in the Democratic administration.

D. Getting SALT I on the Agenda: The Nixon Administration

Similar to President Johnson's decision to initiate arms control talks with the Soviet Union, in the case of Richard Nixon, public opinion played only a moderate role in influencing the administration. Not only was politically active opinion of arms control advocates pressuring Nixon to start the SALT talks immediately upon entering office, but by this time European governmental, bureaucratic (ACDA and

³⁹⁸ Kissinger 1979, 148; Newhouse 1973, 86-7, 111-115, 122, 127-130; Smith [1980] 1985, 27.

³⁹⁹ This pattern is particularly true in Democratic administrations.

State), press, and Congressional pressure all were pushing in the same direction to get the administration to begin arms control talks.⁴⁰⁰ Public opinion was thus one of several pressures which were being exerted on the Nixon administration. By the time President Nixon made his decision to initiate strategic arms control talks with the Soviet Union in June, 1969 one publicly released Harris survey recorded strong public support for such negotiations.⁴⁰¹ To the Nixon administration, initiating the SALT talks was important not so much to reach an agreement with the Soviets but to provide a "bargaining chip" rationale for deploying the ABM system and for fending off Congressional cuts in military spending. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, public opinion supported this concept.

By the beginning of the Nixon administration arms control with the Soviet Union was "permanently" on the Executive branch agenda. From the end of the Johnson administration through the Carter administration, arms control negotiations can be considered a given, with most political controversy focused on the negotiation and ratification stages of the policy process. When President Reagan took strategic arms control off the agenda in the early 1980s and began talking about war fighting, the American political system erupted, and the administration was forced to resume START talks to undermine the nuclear freeze movement. This latter example demonstrates the important, but subtle, influence that public opinion has on arms control decision making.

400 Kissinger 1979, 73, 137-8, 145, 403-4.

401 Harris 1900 was reported in the New York Times February 4, 1969 on page 18.

E. Negotiating SALT I

During the negotiations to limit strategic offensive and defensive systems, public opinion played a limited, but important, role in influencing several American decisions. Early on in the SALT negotiations the Soviet Union agreed to limit, but not ban, ABMs.⁴⁰² Polling data show that the American public supported this position: limit ABMs, but do not ban them. The U.S. negotiating position quickly accepted this position, and the rest of the ABM focus of the negotiations emphasized the number of sites and their location. Asymmetrical Soviet ABM deployment (protecting Moscow) and American public opinion caused a key problem for U.S. negotiators. Congress and the public were reluctant to spend additional money to defend Washington D.C., and this made it impossible to negotiate a symmetrical ABM agreement.⁴⁰³ For several years the Nixon administration grappled with this public opinion-caused problem before reaching an agreement to limit ABM deployment to two sites, only one of which could defend ICBM bases.

A second crucial aspect of the SALT I negotiations focused on multiple-independently retargetable vehicles (MIRVs). Many arms control advocates believed the inability of SALT I to limit this system was the major failure of the negotiations.⁴⁰⁴ While many factors were responsible for placing no restraints on this system (not the least of

402 Barton and Weiler 1976, 89; Newhouse 1973, 165, 170-176; Smith [1980] 1985, 75-99.

403 Flanagan 1979, 163, 201, 217-219; Kissinger 1979, 538-545, 813, 822

404 Greenwood 1975.

which was Soviet reluctance to control MIRVs), it is worth mentioning that the negotiating position supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was clearly in line with public opinion. The JCS agreed to place a MIRV ban on the agenda provided that the Soviets agreed to on-site inspection.⁴⁰⁵

At the same time, arms control advocates called for unilateral U.S. deferral of missile flight testing which would have been needed to allow negotiation of a verifiable MIRV ban. This position was not supported by the public. While public opinion did not determine this arms control outcome with respect to MIRVs, when the public opinion dimension is added to the analysis of decision-making, it provides one additional explanation why the position taken by the JCS prevailed over the position taken by those who advocated controls. Arms control advocates can not hope to win their preferred policy positions when they are opposed both by powerful bureaucratic actors and also by public opinion.

The final element in the eventual SALT I agreement was to combine limited constraints on offensive systems with a near-ban on ABM systems. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger attribute this decision to public opinion and Congressional pressure which throughout the negotiations was constantly cutting funding for various U.S. strategic programs.⁴⁰⁶ These three examples demonstrate that the basic

405 Kissinger 1979, 540, 545; Smith [1980] 1985, 117-120. For relevant public opinion data on attitudes toward verification, see Appendix 7.

406 Flanagan 1979, 208-214; Kissinger 1979, 725, 799-803, 819-822; Newhouse 1973, 217.

negotiating position taken by the United States was influenced, in part, by public opinion.

F. Ratification of SALT I

By the time a treaty was signed by the United States and Soviet Union in May, 1972 public opinion surveys showed that the agreement was very popular. In August the agreement was approved by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2.⁴⁰⁷ The lack of political controversy surrounding approval of this agreement is often associated with President Nixon's conservative credentials and strong public support. My research reinforces this conclusion, but this analysis misses the fact that the entire spectrum of the American public supported this arms control agreement, and the small (10 percent) segment of conservatives who supported the agreement because it was negotiated by Richard Nixon were not essential to its ratification.

G. Implementation of SALT I

Public opinion had a powerful influence during the last stage of the policy process: implementation. The ABM treaty was in reasonably good shape until Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. Contrary to the impressions of policy specialists and the "opinion and policy elite," President Reagan's initiative was presented

⁴⁰⁷ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1982, 139.

to an already very sympathetic mass audience. Reagan did not change public attitudes, but he isolated the dimension of the issue which would produce the strongest level of public support, and he communicated it to the public in language they could understand. This had the political effect of mobilizing political resources to support Reagan's pro-SDI policy positions. In the process he killed the nuclear freeze movement, strengthened his bargaining position vis a vis the Soviet Union, "created" a major strategic program which previously had been a disconnected set of research projects, and brought heavy political pressure to bear to withdraw from the ABM treaty. Since arms control advocates and virtually the entire expert defense community were totally unaware of the broad public support for building defensive systems (because they exclusively followed "politically active" opinion during the ABM debate), Reagan's speech and the quick confirmation that the public supported it (through now ubiquitous, media-funded public opinion polls) gave further credence to the "great communicator" image of the President. This also led to speculation among pundits, unsupported by any opinion data, that mass attitudes on nuclear issues are volatile. This elite "logic" perceived the public as becoming strongly "anti-nuclear" as a result of the nuclear freeze movement and then

becoming "isolationist" in its desire for a utopian defensive shield of SDI. Ronald Reagan, supported by a professional team of survey researchers and communications experts, understood the complete meaning of public opinion and used this superior knowledge to its fullest. His arms control opponents, following a long and noble path of failure neither understood the meaning nor importance of public opinion. As has been true throughout the nuclear age, most arms controllers have not even realized what the "game" was all about.

IV Diversity and Dynamics of Public Opinion

Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes toward the ABM and SALT I and have evaluated the impact public opinion has had on decision-making at various stages of the policy process.

This final section will address the two other hypothesis being examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms control either because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? On a second issue, have opinion leaders and the attentive public been against arms control, and have these elite attitudes changed mass attitudes to be critical of arms control through a top-down diffusion of attitudes?

A. Attitude Consensus

The first aspect of an attitude consensus has been defined for this dissertation as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) and relative attitude stability over time. On two very important

dimensions of the ABM/SALT I case, public attitudes have achieved a consensus. Over a forty year period, the public has believed that it is feasible to build an active defense against nuclear weapons. On the second dimension, there has been consensus or preponderant support for reaching an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to limit ABM systems. In a third area, while public opinion has not always reached the level of consensus, at least a plurality has supported building an ABM system, and some surveys came close to recording a consensus on this issue.

In all of these areas, public attitudes have been relatively stable, not moody or volatile as characterized by Almond and Lippmann. Attitude change took place on only two aspects of ABM/SALT I public opinion. On the question whether people wanted to live in a defended or undefended city, from 1964 to 1968 sixteen percent fewer people wanted to live in a defended city. In a second area, over a longer period of time from 1964 to the 1980s, the public changed its mind on the desirability of defending Washington, D.C. In the context of the general decline in support for institutions that took place from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the constant anti-Washington rhetoric from Presidents Carter and Reagan, attitude change against protecting Washington, D.C. is not surprising.⁴⁰⁸ However, in these two areas where attitude change took place, there was no sign that the change was unusual or that attitudes went back and forth in a volatile pattern. As

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For a review of declining public support for most institutions, see Lipset and Schneider 1983.

in all the previous chapters, I have found that attitudes on different dimensions of various arms control cases have been quite clear and relatively stable.

B. Attitude Fragmentation

The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the relative homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along political or demographic lines. To address this issue, quantitative analysis was performed on 9 national surveys that were conducted over the entire period of the ABM/SALT I case. By using a seven-point fragmentation scale discussed in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes showed low fragmentation along some partisan and demographic lines but medium to high fragmentation along other lines.⁴⁰⁹ These findings are reviewed in two tables on attitudes toward building an ABM system (Table 6-5) and attitudes about the SALT I treaty to limit ABMs (Table 6-6).

On the issue of building an ABM, there was low fragmentation along regional, party, gender and voter lines. These results are a bit surprising in that women were not strongly opposed to building an ABM, and people in the South were not strongly in favor of the system until the 1970s. However, there was medium to high fragmentation along educational, income and presidential job performance lines. Attitudes of the highly educated show an extremely interesting pattern where those

409 As described in Chapter 2, the seven-point fragmentation scale is as follows: 1 None (0.0-2.9%), 2 Very Low (3.0-5.9%), 3 Low (6.0-8.9%), 4 Medium (9.0-11.9%), 5 High (12.0-14.9%), 6 Very High (15.0-17.9%), 7 Extreme (18.0%+).

Building An ABM: Attitude Fragmentation
Table 6-5

	A	B	C	D
	12/68	4/69	7/69	1/71
College (post/degree)	+3/-3	-2/-3	-5/-1	-4/-1
Income (highest)	+5	+2	+5	-2
Region (South/West)	+1/-1	+1/+3	-2/+1	+4/-1
Party ID (Dem/Rep)	-1/-1	-1/+3	-2/+2	-1/+2
Pres. job approval (e/g)	-1/+1	+6/+1	+7/+4	
Sex (female/male)	+1/+2	-2/+2		-2/+2
Voted (yes/no)	+1/-2	+1/-1	+1/-2	

Abbreviations

A Harris 1900
 B Harris 1926
 C Harris 1939
 D Harris 2055; this survey focused on spending more money for an ABM.

+ The sub-group was more supportive of building the ABM than the mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5
 - The sub-group was less supportive of building the ABM than the mean for the general public.

College degree (post graduate college work/a bachelors college degree); Income of the highest 3-5 percent of the public; Party Identification (Democratic/Republican); Presidential job approval (excellent/good); Voted in the last Presidential election (yes/no).

with post-graduate education initially were more supportive of building the anti-missile system than the general public; but as a result of the ABM debate, these people who one could consider in the "opinion and policy elite" changed their attitude to become strongly against building an ABM. This evidence clearly shows that those who participated in the "great ABM debate" and the massive print and media coverage of the issue helped to change attitudes of an important segment of the public.

However, this segment of society constitutes only about 5 percent of the entire population. Not only does survey research reveal that attitudes of the "opinion and policy elite" were anti-ABM, but other indicators of elite attitudes such as letters to the editors, interest group activity, and editorials also show a similar anti-ABM pattern. As discussed earlier in this chapter, these attitudes held by the minority opinion and policy elite convinced anti-ABM advocates that the public was on their side.

People with only a college degree started out before the ABM debate as skeptical about building an ABM and remained so, at low levels, throughout. As one moves into the late 1960s through the 1980s with the explosion in the number of people who have attended college, it has become increasingly important to track foreign policy attitudes not just of those with a college degree but those with more than a bachelors degree. It turns out that attitudes of these two groups can diverge in important ways. The ABM debate was the first time such a pattern has been discovered with respect to foreign policy attitudes.

Another interesting shift in attitudes relates to attitudes of those who approved the performance of the President. When President Johnson was in office, people who strongly approved his performance were slightly against building an ABM. When Nixon came to office, those who strongly approved his job performance were strongly supportive of an ABM. This shows that Johnson's efforts to build an ABM, which were directed at strengthening his political position, actually split his own base and strengthened the position of his opponent, Richard Nixon.

Had the Johnson administration conducted detailed polling on this issue before he made his decision to deploy the ABM, this information might have bolstered Secretary McNamara's position. However, when foreign policy makers and pollsters live in separate worlds, this type of information does not get into the decision-making stream.

On the related issue of public support for the SALT I treaty (Table 6-6, below), attitude fragmentation was low with respect to party, gender, and voting participation. One unusual aspect of this finding is that women, while slightly less supportive of building the ABM, were slightly more "hawkish" with regards to supporting the SALT I treaty. This pattern is explained by the fact that through the 1970s, women expressed "No Opinion, Not Sure, or Don't Know" in higher proportion than did men. Thus on many foreign policy issues, women do not fit the classic "dove" model assumed by many feminist theorists.

At the same time, fragmentation along education, income, and region was moderate to high. Those with high levels of education and with high incomes were strongly supportive of SALT I. Thus, one can conclude that the attentive public was strongly in support of SALT I. For the first time in analysis of surveys on arms control, respondents from the South became more conservative. It seems that Southerners may not necessarily be more supportive of building nuclear weapons systems than those in other parts of the country, but they are much more cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union than are people from other regions.

One change took place in attitudes toward SALT I which is worth noting. Initially, those who strongly supported Richard Nixon's job performance were very anti-SALT I. However, Nixon was able to convince this group, over time, that SALT I was his initiative and was a good thing. This data confirms the conventional wisdom that a conservative President is better situated politically to negotiate with the Soviets

SALT I Agreement to Limit ABMs: Attitude Fragmentation
Table 6-6

	A 7/69	B 9/70	C 6/71	D 2/72	E 6/72	F 11/73
College (p/d)	+7/+1	+6/+5	+7/+4	+4/+4	+4/+4	+5/+3
Income (highest)	+2	+6	+7	+4	+2	+4
Region (S/W)	-5/+1	-5/+3	-4/+2	-3/+2	-3/+2	-4/+1
Party ID (D/R)	+1/-1	+1/-2	+1/+1	-1/+2	-1/+2	-1/+2
P. job apprvl (e/g)	-5/-1	-1/-2	+1/-1	+2/+2	+2/+1	+1/-1
Sex (f/m)		-2/+1	-2/+2	-2/+3	-1/+1	-1/+1
Voted (y/n)	-1/+2	+1/-1	+1/-2	+2/-3	+1/-1	+1/-3

Abbreviations

- A Harris 1939
- B harris 2037
- C Harris 2124
- D Harris 2154
- E Harris 2216
- F Harris 2351

- + The sub-group was more supportive of building the ABM than the mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5
- The sub-group was less supportive of building the ABM than the mean for the general public.

College degree (post graduate college work/a bachelors college degree); Income of the highest 3-5 percent of the public; Region (South/West); Party Identification (Democratic/Republican); Presidential job approval (excellent/good); Voted in the last Presidential election (yes/no).

and to get completed agreements ratified. However, few scholars have noted that while this phenomena exists, it is limited to approximately 10 percent of the population. Thus, having conservative Republican presidents is not the only way to successfully negotiate and ratify arms control agreements.

C. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change

Evidence cited above shows that the attentive public were critical of developing an ABM and strongly supportive of the SALT I treaty. This case study provides the most definitive evidence possible to refute the top-down attitude change model. Throughout the nuclear age scholars and strategists have believed that it is not possible to build an active defense against nuclear weapons. The general public has consistently disagreed with this idea. During the ABM debate, the "opinion and policy elite" became convinced that building an ABM was neither feasible or desirable. The public did not follow their lead. This was true despite the fact that there was more press and media coverage of this subject than there had been of any other nuclear subject since Sputnik.

At the same time, this chapter provides a clear example of the phenomena that when competing groups of political activists are not well informed about mass public opinion, the political system can easily be influenced by politically active opinion. This happened in terms of influencing the Senate to almost terminate funding for the ABM. However, when the political system operates in such a manner, it becomes vulnerable to being dominated by a political actor who accurately

evaluates the true nature of public opinion and then uses that knowledge to develop a cogent communication strategy. While it took several years for this to occur, this is exactly what happened when Ronald Reagan created the Strategic Defense Initiative "out of thin air." He did an end-run around both liberal and conservative elites who had been overly influenced by politically active, rather than public, opinion. Reagan proposed and then sustained SDI as a population defense which neither liberal arms control supporters of MAD nor conservative supporters of defense of ICBMs wanted. What is even more remarkable is that President Reagan accomplished this feat without many people learning the secret of his success. This, like so many other of his accomplishments, was not primarily due to his smooth manner on television, but to Reagan's feel for public opinion which was supplemented by superior survey research. In this instance, Ronald Reagan--much like Franklin D. Roosevelt three decades earlier--illustrate how and under what circumstances public opinion can have a decisive influence on foreign policy making.

Concluding Comments and SALT II, 1973-1980

Chapter 7

I SALT II and Public Opinion Theory

The current mainstream academic literature on public opinion and foreign policy, reviewed in Chapter 2, argues that public opinion has little or no impact on foreign policy decisions. Not only is this proposition dominant in universities, but senior foreign policy makers often spend little or no time understanding public attitudes because they assume public opinion plays a limited role in the entire policy process, with a possible exception during the treaty ratification stage. In addition, academic theory posits that public attitudes are volatile (Almond) and, after the trauma of Vietnam, highly fragmented along demographic and partisan lines (Schneider). Both an older generation of scholars and many contemporary foreign policy-makers believe in the top-down model of attitude change which asserts that a President can influence public attitudes on foreign policy issues by taking a high profile position and giving numerous speeches.

SALT II provides a useful ending of this dissertation because it demonstrates that existing public opinion theory with respect to foreign policy is inadequate, and in some cases totally wrong. In addition, a review of the politics of SALT II reveal the consequences for actual political outcomes when one set of policy makers (those in the Carter administration) are largely unaware of both relevant public attitudes and the conceptual role public opinion plays in the policy process.

Throughout this dissertation public opinion has been shown to have an important impact on all stages of the policy process from getting on the agenda, to negotiation, ratification, and implementation. Evidence from the arms control cases of the international control of atomic energy, the Limited Test Ban, and ABM/SALT thus refutes the no-impact theory put forth by scholars such as Bernard Cohen. The degree to which public opinion influences international security and foreign policy decisions is directly related to three factors: 1) the level of public attitudes, 2) the awareness of the different dimensions of public opinion by competing political activists, and 3) the sophistication of communication strategies utilized by competing political factions.

With respect to the various levels of public opinion and the policy process, public attitudes that maintain plurality support (under 50 percent) rarely influence decision-makers. Popular presidents can make foreign policy decisions that fly in the face of majority opinion (50-59 percent), but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched. Consensus level public opinion (60-69 percent) successfully influences the policy process even though opposing powerful bureaucratic interests may exist. Preponderant public opinion (70-79 percent) not only "causes" the political system to act according to its dictates, but it also deters political opposition from challenging the specific decision. Virtually unanimous opinion (80%+) dominates the entire political system and sweeps all political opposition away.

By the time SALT II was initiated in November, 1972--only six months after SALT I was signed and only a few weeks after it had entered into force--arms control had become permanently on the agenda.⁴¹⁰ Few scholars of the arms control process, and almost no policy-makers ever bother to ask why this is true. They just assume that because the issues of nuclear war and peace are so vital, arms control should be considered a given. However, many important public policy issues never make it onto the executive branch agenda. Strategic arms control is permanently on the agenda because preponderant level public opinion (70 percent) supports the idea of negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union.⁴¹¹ Public opinion pressure is so strong it deters opponents of arms control from attempting to keep negotiations from taking place. As a result, opponents of arms control focus their efforts at limiting the scope of any agreement and attempt to strengthen bureaucratic forces that oppose arms control agreements. The relationship between public opinion and arms control's permanent status on the agenda is shown by survey research cited above, and it is also illustrated by recent political history. When the Reagan administration took strategic arms control off the agenda in the early 1980s and began talking about nuclear war fighting, the American political system erupted with the

410 Talbott 1979, 31.

411 All survey questions and data on SALT II are reproduced in Appendix 9. For indicators of public support for arms control negotiations see: 9/1972 (Gallup/Potomac), 6/1973 (Harris), 11/1973 (Harris), 12/1974-11/1982 (Harris/CCFR & Gallup/CCFR), 8/1976 (Harris), 3/1977-5/1979 (Harris), 4/1977-11/1978 (CBS/NYT), 1/1978-10/1979 (NBC/AP), 6/1978-6/1979 (CBS/NYT), 1/1979 (CBS/NYT), 11/1980 (Harris), 1/1981 (YSW), 5/1981 (YSW).

nuclear freeze "movement." When the administration put nuclear arms control back onto the agenda, resumed negotiations with the Soviets, and toning down his rhetoric, these actions mollified public opinion and in turn deflated the nuclear freeze movement.

The negotiating process for SALT II was under the firm bureaucratic and intellectual control of highly trained professional legal and policy experts in the Executive branch. A review of the negotiating history of this agreement reveals that public opinion played a very limited role during this policy stage. As has been demonstrated with my earlier arms control cases, public opinion often plays less of a role during this policy stage than it does when getting an issue onto the agenda or ratification. However, several factors about SALT II make the extremely limited influence public opinion had over the negotiations somewhat surprising. First, during the time of its negotiation and unsuccessful ratification, more survey research was conducted on this arms control subject than existed on any other arms control or nuclear issue in the atomic age.⁴¹² Unlike in the previous cases, virtually all of this polling was made public, and much of it was extremely sophisticated from the methodological perspective. Thus, at relatively low cost in terms of staff time, policy-makers and participants in this arms control debate could be relatively well informed on public attitudes about strategic arms control. Second, by the time SALT II was

412 One hundred and twelve surveys included questions on strategic arms control and SALT II. They were conducted by 11 different survey organizations from 1972 to 1987. Ninety eight surveys were conducted when SALT was an active issue from 1970 to 1980.

negotiated, an office in the State Department regularly monitored public opinion and reported its findings to relevant decision-makers inside the Executive branch.⁴¹³ Thus, relevant policy-makers were advised of pertinent public attitudes. Third, during the Carter administration, presidential pollster Pat Caddell conducted his own surveys which included questions on SALT. Not only did President Carter read these surveys, but he also believed Caddell's polls to be accurate.⁴¹⁴ If all of these factors were true, why didn't public opinion have more of an impact on decisions made at the negotiation stage?

The key to explaining the lack of public opinion impact lies in the perceptions of elite policy makers toward the nature and importance of public opinion. Understanding the nature of public opinion toward SALT II revolved around a dispute over interpreting survey data. Several researchers, such as Pat Caddell, Louis Harris and Dan Yankelovich, believed that strong public support for arms control negotiations, recorded from 1972 to 1981, meant that the public would strongly support SALT II.⁴¹⁵ Other public opinion experts such as

413 From October, 1976 to December, 1980 eleven memoes on public opinion toward SALT were sent to various offices in the Department of State, ACDA, DOD and the White House. See U.S. Department of State 1976; 1977a; 1977b; 1978a; 1978b; 1978c; 1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1979d; 1980.

414 Carter 1982, 114 cited in Caldwell 1989.

415 Pat Caddell's memoes on this subject are dated May 10, 1978 and February 15, 1979 and are cited by Caldwell 1989. Conclusive evidence that the public saw support for arms control negotiations and for SALT II as distinctly different is shown in five public opinion surveys conducted by NBC/AP from 3/1979-10/1979 which included both a generic arms control and a SALT question on each survey.

Bernard Roshco and Al Richmand (in the State Department) and Bud Roper (President of the Roper Organization) explicitly rejected this interpretation and pointed to polls which showed only a plurality favored SALT II. They believed that support for arms control negotiations and support for SALT II were two totally distinct issues with respect to public opinion. Rarely are these type of debates answered conclusively. However, in this case one survey organization asked two different types of questions on the same survey. One question followed the format of questions used by Pat Caddell and Lou Harris and asked about public support for strategic arms control in general. A second question asked about public support for SALT II specifically. These results showed that generic support for arms control negotiations remained stable at the level of 70 percent throughout the SALT II era. However, support for SALT II was much lower and declined over time. This survey research demonstrated that opinion asserted by public opinion experts in the State Department, not Pat Caddell, were correct. The public supports arms control negotiations at the level of preponderance, but they do not necessarily support a specific arms control agreements at these high levels. However, this early positive polling data which documented support for arms control, supported by Pat Caddell's interpretation, reinforced a proclivity inside the small group of SALT decision-makers to focus on negotiating details and to take public opinion seriously only after the agreement was near completion.

At a more abstract level, policy-makers in the Carter administration were working implicitly with conceptual models of public opinion derived from the mainstream academic theories from the foreign policy field. Upon entering office, many believed that public opinion doesn't and shouldn't play an important role in the process of negotiating strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union. According to this perspective, good policy would be made by negotiating a "solid" agreement that did not incorporate the ambiguous language such as key provisions in SALT I. These officials believed that ambiguous language was responsible for the political controversy over Soviet verification controversies which in turn undermined public support for arms control.⁴¹⁶ In academic terms, senior Carter administration decision-makers agreed with the Cohen no-impact hypothesis. They believed public opinion was not important until the ratification process at which time it could be "dealt with." Senior policy-makers also implicitly believed in the top-down model of attitude change. While this dissertation has demonstrated again and again that the no-impact hypothesis and the top-down attitude change model are incorrect, Carter administration officials accepted these major tenants from the old paradigm concerning public opinion and foreign policy.

The senior SALT decision-making community ignored both State Department public opinion experts' warnings and political forces which

416 My reading of arms control policy-maker's attitudes toward public opinion is derived from four years working as a Foreign Affairs Officer for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1981.

were building outside of the bureaucracy and did not take public opinion into account at the beginning of the policy process.⁴¹⁷ Thus, by the time preparations for ratification were made inside the administration, the effort was doomed. The public education strategy used by the State Department was based on the top-down, elite-led model of attitude change. It assumed that sending hundreds of executive branch officials around the country to give speeches to local "opinion leaders" would mobilize public support for SALT. The public education strategy also assumed that President Carter and several cabinet secretaries could take a high public profile and give numerous speeches for several months after an agreement was concluded, and this could win-over the public to support SALT.⁴¹⁸

The fact that public opinion on foreign policy and arms control is relatively stable--a key finding of this dissertation not known to Carter administration officials. Two other conceptual ideas were also unknown to those who planned the SALT II public education effort. First, as shown in this dissertation, mass attitudes are not greatly influenced by attitudes of the "opinion and policy elite." Second, only popular presidents (over 50 percent in job approval rating) can lead public opinion, and this has a limited effect of changing mass attitudes

417 Such a proposal was advocated early on in the administration by Senator Hart and his principle assistant Larry Smith and others members of Congress.

418 The most comprehensive review of the administration's political communication strategy is outlined in an "eyes only" memo from Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter dated December 6, 1978. I am grateful to Profesor Dan Caldwell for drawing my attention to this document.

by a maximum of 10 to 15 percent.⁴¹⁹ At the time SALT II was signed, Jimmy Carter was well below this threshold giving him no ability to exert a positive influence over mass attitudes toward SALT II.⁴²⁰

The political communication strategy adopted for selling SALT seems to have been developed independently of relevant findings from survey research. Many of the assertions made about public opinion and attitude change in the key planning memo written by Jerry Rafshoon to Jimmy Carter were inaccurate. In addition, the content of speeches by senior officials such as Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance made sense only to the small group of people who can be considered part of the "opinion and policy elite."⁴²¹ Just as occurred with previous arms control cases such as ABM/SALT I, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and international control of atomic energy, this political communication strategy was destined to influence a very small group in the population. Evidence from survey research shows that a very small group, approximately 6 percent of the public, heard the detail-dominated message and supported the logic of arms control and SALT II.⁴²²

Mass public support for SALT, for whatever reason, started at a maximum of about 40 percent. This level of public approval was quite low compared to previous arms control agreements. To make matters worse

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Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987.

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This point, without elaboration or any reference to research completed by Page et. al., is made by Caldwell 1989.

421

Warnke 1979a, 1979b.

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See polling conducted by the Gallup Organization 3/1979 to 10/1980. It shows that an average of 6 percent of public were able to name advantages of SALT which equated even remotely to the purpose of the treaty.

for arms control advocates, public support for SALT II declined over a two year period to a point where a slight plurality opposed the treaty by September or October 1979.⁴²³ What can explain this declining support for the SALT II agreement? I would argue the drop in public approval for SALT II was related directly to two factors: the degree of knowledge of public attitudes by competing political activists and the sophistication of the political communication used by competing political actors. Advocates of strategic arms control were relatively unaware of public attitudes and had a poor, detail-dominated message which was focused on the logical reasons for supporting the SALT II agreement. This message had the ability to reach only a very small national audience. In addition, on balance the message was delivered sporadically over a limited period of six months. In sharp contrast, opponents of SALT II had a clear message which was in tune with preexisting public attitudes. Their message was targeted to specific audiences among both the elite and general public, and it was delivered in a sophisticated manner. It did not focus on the details of the SALT II agreement but on the need for increased U.S. military spending and the growing threat of Soviet nuclear superiority.⁴²⁴ Some scholars have argued that the conservative opposition to SALT, such as the

423 4/1975-1978 CSR/C; 11/1977-8/1978 Roper; 5/1978 YSW;
11/1978-11/1980 Roper; 3/1979-10/1979 NBC/AP; 3/1979-10/1980
AIPO.

424 Pat Caddell also picked up these public attitudes and feared that SALT would not get a fair hearing on its merits. However, he failed to follow his own logic and design a political communications strategy capable of keeping this from happening.

Committee on the Present Danger, actually changed public opinion into becoming anti-SALT and more pro-defense.⁴²⁵ Evidence from survey research reveals that mass attitudes were moving in a more hawkish direction before these conservative groups were organized. If one plots public opinion data on a graph, the "slope" of attitudes on generic issues such as military spending demonstrate no appreciable change before or after major political efforts were undertaken by these anti-SALT groups. Thus, it is probably inaccurate to attribute mass attitude change on the broad subjects of defense and foreign policy issues to conservative groups. However, conservative groups like the Committee on the Present Danger was able to frame the SALT II debate in ways that strengthened their anti-arms control policy position by linking it to broader national security issues for which the public had already become relatively conservative by 1976. By framing the debate in this fashion--combined with the totally inept political communication generated by supporters of SALT II--the Committee on the Present Danger may have been partially responsible for declining public support for SALT II. The magnitude of this change was relatively small, 10 percent at most. However, in politics these relatively small changes can be very important.

The key point is that opponents of SALT II had a better understanding of public attitudes than did SALT supporters, and they used this knowledge to frame political communication which would be

⁴²⁵ Kupperman 1980; Sanders 1983, 342; Tyroler 1984, xx.

accepted by an already sympathetic mass audience. In addition, no competing pro-arms control group refuted the Committee's claim that it was responsible for the declining public support for SALT. As a result, among members of the opinion and policy elite, this further strengthened the political power of the Committee on the Present Danger, and the whole process in turn strengthened the anti-SALT political position of conservative interest groups. All of this happened even though the Committee was responsible for changing public attitudes a very small amount, if they are the cause of attitude change at all. The key to the Committee's success was accurately framing the issue in a way which would elicit public support and give them the appearance of leading public opinion.

In contrast, by attempting to change public attitudes to become more supportive of SALT II, rather than by searching survey data to find the best way to frame the public debate over strategic arms control, administration experts showed that they had little understanding of either the nature of public opinion, the process by which attitudes change, or the conceptual relevance of public opinion to the policy process. For example, SALT II required the Soviets to destroy several hundred ICBMs, but the agreement did not require the United States to dismantle any ICBMs. This aspect of the selling SALT public campaign was not emphasized because, consistent with the dictates of policy experts, Soviet destruction of so few missiles has no strategic consequences. as a result, it was not considered important. However, from the public opinion point of view, analysis of survey data clearly

showed that public criticism of SALT was closely related to confidence in the U.S. negotiating team.⁴²⁶ Emphasizing the fact that the Soviets had to destroy missiles but the U.S. did not have disarm at all could have been used to demonstrate that U.S. negotiators had not been "taken to the cleaners" by the clever, devious Soviet Union. However, the mere fact that the agreement entailed Soviet reductions was left to the bottom paragraphs in speeches written to "sell" SALT II.

One final point concerning public attitudes toward SALT II must be discussed because it related to the fragmentation hypothesis posited by William Schneider and evaluated throughout this dissertation. During the SALT II debate, attitudes had become relatively more fragmented in line with theories advocated by William Schneider. However, fragmentation of attitudes is neither responsible for the 30 percent gap in support for strategic arms control negotiations versus support for SALT II nor does it explain the reason for declining support for SALT. Thus, while it is accurate to note the increase in attitude fragmentation that occurred during the SALT era, this is not the fundamental reason for the failure of SALT II.

II An Alternative Two Worlds Model

Evaluation of public attitudes toward SALT II reinforces several conclusions reached in previous chapters of this dissertation concerning

⁴²⁶ Moore (1979) has shown that public attitudes toward U.S. negotiators were strongly correlated with support for the SALT II agreement.

the relationship between public opinion and the policy process. If public opinion has an impact at all stages of the policy process (refuting the Cohen hypothesis), if attitudes are relatively stable (refuting the Almond/Lippmann volatility hypothesis), if attitudes do not change in a top-down manner, and if attitudes have become increasingly fragmented (supporting the Schneider hypothesis) but are not the cause of arms control's mixed record of success, what model can explain the entire process with respect to arms control decision-making and public opinion?

A "two-worlds" model is needed both to explain mass and elite attitudes change and to delineate the conditions under which public opinion has an impact on the policy process. The "first" world constitutes the polity, or in survey research terms, the general public. Since public attitudes rarely vary much between the general public and the voting public, the first world in this model also can be thought of as the voting public.

With respect to "first" world foreign policy attitudes, public opinion is usually relatively stable. Opinions relate to general goals and values, not to specific details which dominate expert discussions. First world attitudes are formed and change in relation to real world events which are communicated to most people directly by the mass media, not through the prestige press such as the New York Times or through a top-down process dominated by elites. First world public attitudes are relatively immune to pressure generated by policy-makers or members of the "opinion and policy elite."

Contrary to established views in the public opinion field reviewed in Chapter 3, the public is not uniformly uninterested or uninformed about foreign policy issues such as arms control. However, people are selective in their attention, and this selectivity over time forms patterns in public awareness, knowledge, and interest. Most of the time the general public disengages from the foreign policy and arms control debate just as they disengage from active participation in politics on most occasions. When an event occurs which is perceived as interesting, important, and different from what has proceeded it, people "plug into" the foreign policy debate for a short period of time. Even though public attention comes in short bursts and is uneven, members of the general public are capable of making subtle distinctions on complex foreign policy issues. Inattentiveness most of the time should not be confused with ignorance or apathy.

The lessons the public learn from a real world event may be quite different from those learned by policy makers or those in the "opinion and policy elite." For this reason, it is important for policy makers to conduct regular survey research and to evaluate the results from the point of view of the public, not from their own elite perspective. Understanding public attitudes on any particular foreign policy subject requires examining a great deal of survey research which focuses not only on attitudes but also measures public awareness, knowledge, and interest. When all of this data is put together, the picture that emerges is usually quite logical, even if it the "logic" is quite different from that taken for granted by policy makers or those in the opinion and policy elite.

The "second" world consists of a small group of people, less than ten percent of the public, who constitute the opinion and policy elite.⁴²⁷ Opinions among this elite segment of society change relatively easily in relation to media coverage, variation in government policy, and intellectual fads. As demonstrated by Gamson and Modigliani two decades ago, elite attitudes can take on a "follower" characteristic. Elite attitudes often follow changes in government policy, not the reverse. Perceptions among the opinion and policy are extremely important because most of the time government leaders mistake attitudes held by these politically active people in the "second" world as general public opinion.

In many instances, foreign policy decisions are made without reference to mass opinion in the first world and rely imprecisely on attitudes held by members of the opinion and policy elite in the second world. Virtually all interest group activity, correspondence in newspapers, and participation at "mass" demonstrations reflect opinions of people in this second world. However, attitudes held by people in this second world can differ substantially from those who reside in the first world. As a result, relying on indicators of second world opinion to develop political strategy is dangerous. If a policy issue remains de-politicized, then decisions can be made without much influence by mass public opinion. However, if one competing group of political

427 While I emphasize terms coined by Gabriel Almond, many of the theoretical concepts developed in this part of my model are derived from work completed by Russ Neuman 1985.

actors can strengthen their position by broadening the scope of the political conflict, then public opinion of the first world will likely play an important role.⁴²⁸

The first and second world can be linked, but this requires that elite policy-makers or political activists understand the difference between the first and second worlds, discover the nature of mass public opinion through survey research, and develop a political communication strategy that discusses policy issues using a vocabulary that is compatible with pre-existing mass attitudes. More often than not, members of the opinion and policy elite develop political communications strategies without taking the time to understand mass public opinion. As a result, many political communications strategies are almost guaranteed to reach like-minded people in the second world. For many issues, this lack of genuine communication between the two worlds does not create a problem. However, for arms control, communications between these two worlds holds the key to success. Powerful bureaucratic actors are able to stop arms control unless arms control activists inside and outside of government are capable of mobilizing public support. To mobilize public support, "second world" political actors do not need to change mass public opinion but they need to tap into the correct dimensions of existing public opinion which is sympathetic to the goals of arms control.

428 On the relationship between the scope of the conflict and policy outcomes, see E. E. Schattschneider 1960.

When neither side in a policy debate (who all reside in the "second world") is well informed about mass attitudes in the "first" world, and neither side employs a communication strategy designed with public opinion in mind, decisions are strongly influenced by bureaucratic politics, activities of interest groups, and attitudes of the small segment of elites in the "second" world. This decision-making structure closely approximates the current main-stream literature on American foreign policy decision-making.

However, at various times--especially when public attitudes are at the virtually unanimous or preponderant level--public opinion has a fairly direct impact on the policy process. With attitudes at the level of 70 percent or above, public opinion dominates the policy process. At lower levels, when public opinion constitutes a consensus (60 percent range), successful initiation and implementation of foreign policy initiatives require that the two worlds be joined. When public opinion is at the level of majority (50 percent range), only extremely sophisticated understanding of public opinion, excellent political communications, or no organized opposition is needed for public opinion to influence policy decisions. When attitudes are below a majority (50 percent), public opinion does not have sufficient strength to influence the policy process. This was the case with public opinion about SALT II. Even though a plurality supported SALT II for 18 months, this was not sufficient to carry the day.

The "two worlds" model is extremely relevant for arms control. Despite forty years of political fighting between advocates of arms control and advocates of building nuclear weapons, virtually no advocate of arms control has ever developed a detailed picture of public opinion on relevant issues. Arms control advocates usually rely imprecisely on attitudes of people who reside in the second world of elites. As a result, political strategies designed to further arms control have often been developed in a hurried manner, and the result has been that the arms control message has diffused out to a maximum of about 10 percent of the public who are members of the opinion and policy elite. This segment of the population has been fully mobilized to support the Limited Test Ban, to oppose ABM deployment, and to support SALT II. However, in a democracy which requires two-thirds of the Senate to approve any arms control treaty, achieving success in arms control requires working within the parameters of the two world model. This means developing consensus-level public support by defining arms control issues in terms that can receive broad public support and in the limited cases when attitudes can be changed, "educating the public." Accomplishing this is possible even for liberal Democratic presidents, but it requires developing political strategies from the bottom up and implementing them at the beginning of the policy process.

APPENDIX 1

A HIERARCHY OF AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE:
Nuclear and Arms Control Issues

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
100%	Read or heard about atomic bombing of Japan	8/1945	MINN 25
99%	Know of the atomic bomb	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
98%	Know of the atomic bomb	8/1946	PSY CORP 178
96%	Heard or read about atomic bomb	8/1945a	AIPO 353
95%	Heard or read about hydrogen super-bomb	2/1950	MINN 79
95%	Knew about Bikini atomic test	8/1946	MINN 36
93%	Know about Chernobyl accident	7/1986	P&S/CPD
92%	Heard enough to have opinion on Soviet cheating	7/1982	LAT 58
92%	Heard of Chernobyl accident	4/1986b	NBC/WSJ
91%	Heard enough to have opinion on Soviet cheating	3/1982	LAT 51
90%	Heard of TMI nuclear accident	5/1979a	NBC/AP 41/117
89%	Know of atomic weapons testing at Bikini	8/1946	PSY CORP 178
89%	Heard or read of neutron bomb	5/1978	Roper 78-5
88%	Heard or read about MX	1/1983	ABC/WP 68
87%	Heard or read of Star Wars	1/1985	LAT 93
86%	Know both US and USSR have thousands of nuclear weapons for use against each other	9/1985	M&K
86%	Heard of Israeli raid on Iraq reactor	6/1981a	AIPO 1175G
85%	Heard or read about MX	6/1983	ABC/WP 76
85%	Heard or read about hydrogen bomb	2/1950b	AIPO 452TPS
84%	Heard or read about neutron bomb	9/1981	Roper 81-9
83%	Know US policy has NOT foreclosed use of nuclear weapons under any conditions	5/1984	PAF
83%	Heard or read about MX missile	9/1983	ABC/WP 84
83%	Heard or read about MX missile	3/1985	ORC
83%	Heard or read of hydrogen bomb	3/1950	NORC 276
82%	Heard or read about SALT II	6/1979	AIPO 1131G
81%	Heard or read about SALT II	9/1979	AIPO 1138G
81%	Heard or read about SALT II	10/1979	AIPO 1139G
81%	Heard or read Carter decision halt B-1 bomber	7/1977	AIPO 979k
80%	Heard or read about hydrogen bomb	1/1953	AIPO 510k
80%	Heard Israeli raid on Iraq reactor	6/1981	CBS/NYT

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
79%	Paying attention to SALT II	1/1980	Roper 80-2
79%	Heard about US-USSR arms control talks	2/1978	ORC
79%	Heard or read about neutron bomb	5/1978	AIPO 1101G
78%	Could name targets at Bikini [post test]	8/1946	PSY CORP 178
77%	Heard of comprehensive test ban proposal	6/1986	LR/NSIC
77%	Heard or read nuclear power plant construction	6/1976a	AIPO 953k
77%	Know that 1/85 US-USSR meeting to set date	1/1985a	CBS/NYT
76%	Heard or read about SALT II	3/1980	AIPO 1149G
76%	Know of Reagan plans to deploy the MX	9/1985	M&K
76%	Know Russians walked out of INF talks	12/1983	YSW/Time
75%	Know about US plan for Bikini atomic test	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
75%	(Japanese pop) knew Japan not have nuc weapons	7/1985	CBS & TBS
75%	Heard Stevenson's call unilateral test ban	10/1956	NORC 398T
74%	Heard or read about Reagan decision to produce the neutron bomb	8/1981	AIPO 1181G
73%	Heard or read about Limited Test Ban Treaty	12/1963	ISR 729
73%	Believe Russia had atom bombs [post announce]	7/1950	AIPO 458k
73%	Heard or read about neutron bomb	8/1977	Roper 77-8
73%	Recall local public fallout shelter	6/1964	NORC SRS 640
72%	Heard or read about Limited Test Ban Treaty	8/1963	AIPO 676k
72%	Heard or read about test ban discussions	3/1963	AIPO 669k
72%	Heard about SALT II	6/1978	CBS/NYT
72%	Heard or read about ABM program	5/1969	AIPO 780
72%	Aware USSR spends more than US on civil def	8/1982	SIND
72%	Heard or read about fall-out	4/1958	AIPO 598k
71%	Heard about Reagan INF proposal	11/1981	ABC/WP 46
70%	Heard or read about hydrogen bomb	2/1950a	AIPO 452k
70%	Heard of proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000	6/1986	LR/NSIC

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
69%	Heard or read about SDI/Star Wars	9/1985	M&K
69%	Heard or read about ABM program	7/1969	AIPO 784
69%	Heard or read about nuclear power controversy	6/1986	Gallup
67%	Heard about SALT II treaty	6/1986	Gallup
67%	Heard or read about ABM program	4/1969	AIPO 777
67%	Followed Star Wars debate very or fairly closely [3 pt scale]	1/1985b	AIPO 1249G
67%	Heard of comprehensive test ban proposal	9/1986	LR/NSIC
67%	Read articles re nuclear war or fallout shelter (Of Catholics) Aware of U.S. Catholic bishops letter on nuclear arms issues	6/1963	NORC SRS 110
66%	Could conceive of impact of a nuclear war	9/1985	M&K
66%	Aware US citizens accused of atomic spying	3/1982	LAT 51
66%	Heard proposal to cut nuclear weapons by 50%	4/1951	NORC 302
66%	Heard Ike's Atoms for Peace proposal	6/1986	LR/NSIC
66%	Heard Ike's Atoms for Peace proposal	1/1954	NORC 351
65%	Heard or read about Star Wars	4/1983	ABC/WP
65%	Heard Reagan decision to build neutron bomb	8/1981	NBC/AP 69
65%	Knew Russia able to make atom bomb [post test]	10/1949	NORC 170
64%	Read a lot/some about Geneva talks [3 pt sc]	1/1985a	CBS/NYT
64%	Heard Gorbachev proposal eliminate nuc weapons	2/1986	ABC/WP
63%	Familiar with SDI/Star Wars	10/1985	P&S/CPD
63%	Paying attention to SALT II	1/1975	Roper 75-2
63%	Described the H-bomb	2/1950a	AIPO 452k
63%	Knew US-USSR not agree to international control	6/1948	NORC 158
63%	Heard or read about Star Wars	1/1985	ABC/WP 179
63%	Knew targets before Bikini nuclear tests	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
63%	Heard or read about nuclear energy w/in month	6/1960	SIND/GE
63%	Could describe the neutron bomb	5/1978	AIPO 1101G
62%	Could describe the neutron bomb	8/1981	AIPO 1181G
62%	Self described as having great/some knowledge on nuclear arms issues [4 pt scale]	4/1984	P&S/CPD
61%	Heard or read about fall-out	4/1957	AIPO 582k
61%	Heard or read about SALT II in last weeks	6/1986	ABC/WP

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
59%	Aware US citizens accused of atomic spying	11/1950	NORC 294
59%	Know US & USSR are negotiation arms control	7/1986	P&S/CPD
58%	Identified purpose of SALT from list	11/1978	Roper 78-10
58%	Knew Reagan's meeting w Gorbachev was his 1st	9/1985	M&K
58%	Heard or read about SALT II	3/1979	AIPO 1124G
58%	Aware controversy over AEC and Lilienthal	6/1949	AIPO 443
58%	Heard of CTB proposal & verification	6/1986	LR/NSIC
57%	Heard or read about nuclear weapons freeze	4/1982	ABC/WP 53
56%	Correctly identified the term fallout	11/1961	AIPO 652
56%	Heard or read about nuclear weapons freeze	4/1983	ABC/WP
56%	Knew US was trying international nuc control	10/1947	NORC 152
55%	Had good idea of what to do if a nuclear bomb hit in this area	5/1961	AIPO 644k
55%	Heard of 50% nuclear cuts proposal & verification requirements	6/1986	LR/NSIC
55%	Heard or read of INF agreement	12/1987	ABC/WP
54%	Heard a lot/some re Star Wars [4 pt scale]	1/1985	LAT 93
54%	Heard or read about nuclear weapons freeze	9/1983	ABC/WP 84
54%	Seen movie on TV about nuclear war or fallout	6/1963	NORC SRS 110
53%	Knew US was trying international nuc control	2/1947	NORC 148
51%	Described feasible ways a nuclear weapon could be delivered	3/1946	NORC 140
51%	Heard or read about Atoms for Peace	7/1955	NORC 372
51%	Heard idea basement fallout shelter	12/1978	MIS/N
50%	Informed on US-USSR arms talks [3 pt scale]	4/1983	CBS/NYT
50%	Heard great deal/fair amount re MX [4 pt sc]	3/1985	ORC
50%	Identified radius of destruction of A-bomb	1/1953	AIPO 510k
50%	Said knew of peaceful nuclear uses	1/1956	AIPO 558k

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
49%	Seen local public fallout shelter	2/1966	NORC SRS 876
49%	Heard Gorbachev [50% cuts] arms control proposal	10/1985	P&S/CPD
49%	Know a lot/moderate re START talks [4 pt sc]	7/1985	YSW/Time
48%	Knew US did not ratify SALT II	6/1986	Gallup
48%	Know nuclear power plants exist in Japan	3/1982	Harris 822104
47%	Have sufficient info on SDI to have opinion	10/1986a	R/USNWR
47%	Correctly named 2 nations involved in SALT	5/1986	SIRC
46%	Named Rosenbergs as atomic spies	4/1951	NORC 302
46%	Know less than 10 nations have nuclear weapons	9/1985	M&K
46%	Knew that missiles in Europe would be eliminated in the INF agreement	12/1987	ABC/WP
45%	Heard of Baruch plan	2/1947	NORC 148
43%	Could describe Star Wars/SDI	9/1985	M&K
43%	Identified radius of destruction of H-bomb	1/1953	AIPO 510k
43%	Know US-USSR have treaties that limit nuclear weapons	1/1985a	CBS/NYT
43%	Heard US armed-forces limitation proposal	12/1951	NORC 314
41%	Heard or read about Acheson report	5/1946	NORC 142
40%	Heard of the term nuclear winter	7/1987	Nehn/Pitt
38%	Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT	11/1979	CBS/NYT
38%	Very/fairly familiar re SS-20 debate [4 pt sc]	3/1983	YSW/Time
38%	Know a lot/something about MX [3 pt scale]	1/1983	Roper 83-2
38%	Remember Kennedy for Cuban missile crisis	11/1983	Harris 832112
37%	Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT	10/1981	ABC/WP 42
36%	Aware of ABM treaty	9/1985	M&K

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
35%	Heard Ike's Open Skies proposal	10/1956	NORC 398T
34%	Knew enough about the neutron bomb to have an opinion [2 pt sc]	7/1977a	CBS/NYT
34%	Correctly identify countries in SALT	11/1978	Roper 78-10
34%	Heard a lot re neutron bomb [3 pt scale]	5/1978	Roper 78-5
34%	Said could name materials make atomic energy	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
33%	Heard of '82 UN Special Session on Disarmament	3/1982	Harris/AS
33%	Knew budget for conventional forces is larger than budget for nuclear weapons	5/1984	PAF
33%	Heard Carter's speech on SALT	6/1979	AIPO 1131G
32%	Aware U.S. has no ballistic missile defense	8/1982	SIND
32%	Know of local civil defense organization	12/1978	AIPO 1118G
31%	Heard or read of INF zero option proposal	4/1983	CBS/NYT
31%	Heard a lot re neutron bomb [3 pt scale]	9/1981	Roper 81-9
31%	Could describe neutron bomb	7/1977a	CBS/NYT
30%	Identified materials used for atomic energy	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
30%	Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT	6/1979	CBS/NYT
30%	Know Reagan opposed to nuclear weapons freeze	5/1982	CBS/NYT
30%	Knew Canada & UK helped Manhattan project	10/1949	NORC 170
29%	Heard or read about Baruch plan	7/1946	NORC 143
29%	Heard or read about SALT I	6/1971	ORC/Nx
28%	Knew US had no international nuclear cooperation immediately after WW II	10/1949	NORC 170
27%	(US pop) know Japan not have nuclear bombs	7/1985	CBS/NYT
27%	Knew how much basement bomb shelter protect	12/1978	MIS/N
26%	Knew location of nearest fallout shelter	12/1976	AIPO 964k
26%	Heard UN disarmament talks	6/1952	NORC 325
24%	Know location of nearest bomb shelter	12/1978	AIPO 1118G
24%	Heard a lot re neutron bomb [3 pt scale]	8/1977	Roper 77-8
24%	Heard/read a lot re Star Wars [4 pt scale]	1/1985	LAT 93
23%	Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT	1/1979	CBS/NYT
22%	Know approximate percent of defense budget spent on nuclear weapons [less than 20%]	10/1985	P&S/CPD
22%	Know it is US policy to use nuclear weapons if Soviets invade Europe w conventional force	5/1984	PAF
21%	Know location of nearest fallout shelter	4/1982	ABC
20%	Heard a lot re START talks [3 pt scale]	1/1985a	CBS/NYT
20%	Know location of nearest bomb shelter	6/1981a	AIPO 1175G
20%	Heard great deal re MX [4 pt scale]	3/1985	ORC
20%	Heard a lot re Geneva arms talks [3 pt sc]	1/1985a	CBS/NYT

Level Know- ledge	Issue	Year	Survey
19%	Know approximate percent of defense budget spent on nuclear weapons [less than 20%]	4/1984	P&S/CPD
19%	Know US does not have a "no-first use" policy	9/1985	M&K
17%	Identified the term "fallout"	3/1955	AIPO 544k
17%	Knew about ABM treaty	2/1985	FINK
17%	Read a book about nuclear war or fallout	6/1963	NORC SRS 110
16%	Know US policy is NOT to use nuclear weapons only if allies are attacked first with them	5/1984	PAF
15%	Had clear idea of Baruch plan	6/1948	NORC 158
15%	Know US policy is NOT to use nuclear weapons only if US is attacked first with them	5/1984	PAF
14%	Knew ~ per cent nuclear generated electricity	6/1981	Roper 81-6
14%	Knew ~ per cent nuclear generated electricity	6/1979	Roper 79-6
14%	Had fairly clear idea of Baruch plan	2/1947	NORC 148
12%	Heard UN AEC had stopped discussion	6/1948	NORC 158
11%	Know it is US policy to use nuclear weapons anytime we or our allies are threatened	5/1984	PAF
11%	Named Rosenbergs as atomic spies	11/1950	NORC 294
10%	Know that both US & USSR signed SALT II	5/1984	PAF
10%	Know a lot about SDI [3 pt sc]	10/1986	YCS/Time
10%	Certain they knew countries signed SALT	5/1984	PAF
9%	Identified Leslie R. Groves	6/1946	PSY CORP 173
8%	Heard great deal re SALT [4 pt scale]	2/1978	ORC
8%	Know the US has fewer nuclear weapons today than 15 years ago	4/1984	P&S/CPD
8%	Know great deal re nuclear arms [4 pt scale]	4/1984	P&S/CPD
7%	Know the US nuclear stockpile is less destructive than 15 years ago	4/1984	P&S/CPD
7%	Know a lot re MX [3 pt scale]	1/1983	Roper 83-2
7%	Well informed on arms control [3 pt scale]	4/1983	CBS/NYT
7%	Remember Kennedy for test ban treaty	11/1983	Harris 832112
6%	High level of knowledge re nuclear winter	7/1987	Nehn/Pitt
6%	Very familiar re Soviet INF [4 pt scale]	3/1983	YSW/Time
6%	Full understanding of Limited Test Ban Treaty	12/1963	ISR 729
5%	Correctly define term preventative war	8/1954	AIPO 536k
4%	Know a lot re Geneva arms talks [4 pt scale]	7/1985	YSW/Time
3%	Know good deal about SALT II [4 pt sc]	6/1986	Gallup
3%	Knew a good deal of INF agreement [4 pt sc]	12/1987	ABC/WP

APPENDIX 2

A Hierarchy of Awareness and Knowledge: Foreign Policy Issues

94%	Heard or read about plan to send food overseas	4/46b	AIPO 369
92%	Heard or read about plan to send food overseas	3/46b	AIPO 367
88%	Heard of United Nations	3/46	NORC 141
88%	Knew US was a member of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
85%	Knew UK was a member of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
85%	Heard of John Foster Dulles	12/54	NORC 365
88%	Identified abbreviation UN	8/59	G/IISR 12
83%	Heard or read of trouble over Suez canal	9/56	NORC 393
83%	Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece	4/47	NORC 149
82%	Heard or read about trouble in Formosa area	4/55	AIPO 546
82%	Heard or read of civil war in China	2/50a	AIPO 452k
82%	Heard or read of loan to England	5/46	NORC 142
82%	Heard or read of Marshall plan	11/48	AIPO 432k
80%	Heard or read of Big Four summit conference	11/43	NORC 217
78%	Heard of war in Indo-China	3/54	AIPO 528
78%	Heard or read of Marshall plan	4/48	NORC 156
78%	Heard or read of summit meeting attended by Ike	8/55	NORC 374
78%	Heard or read of trouble with USSR over Berlin	12/58	AIPO 608
78%	Heard or read of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
77%	Heard of communist takeover in Czechoslovakia	4/48	NORC 156
77%	Heard or read of good neighbor policy	3/44	OPOR 23
77%	Heard or read of Big Four summit conference	11/43	AIPO 306t
75%	Heard or read of Marshall plan	3/48	NORC 155
75%	Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece	3/47b	AIPO 392
75%	Heard or read of FDR-Churchill plan	9/41	AIPO 246k
74%	Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece	3/47	NORC 49T
74%	Heard of the United Nations	7/42	NORC
73%	Heard or read Dean Acheson appointed Sec State	1/49b	AIPO 436
73%	Heard of the United Nations	5/42	NORC
72%	Heard/read Truman speech on world food shortage	5/46	AIPO 370t
71%	Heard or read of Big Four summit conference	11/43	NORC
71%	Heard or read of Great Power conference	12/43	OPOR 19
70%	Heard of the United Nations	6/42	OPOR 817
70%	Know US supports the Contras vs Nicaraguan govt	11/87	P&S/CPD
70%	Heard or read of San Francisco UN conference	3/45	AIPO 344

68%	Heard or read of changed Soviet leadership	3/55	NORC 370
68%	Heard or read of Churchill's Iron Curtain speech	3/46b	AIPO 367
68%	Knew Britain controls Gibraltar	2/41	OPOR 806
67%	Heard or read of Geneva foreign ministers meeting	6/59	AIPO 614
67%	Heard or read of British-Egyptian troubles	2/52	NORC 317
67%	Correctly identified Dean Acheson's job	5/51	AIPO 475k
66%	Correctly identified Nasser	8/56	AIPO 568
65%	Identified job held by Joseph Goebbels [from list]	7/42	OPOR 819
65%	Heard of war in Indo-China	8/53	AIPO 519k
64%	Heard or read of trouble at Suez canal	1/52b	AIPO 485
64%	Heard/read about foreign technical assist program	5/55	NORC 371
62%	Heard/read Wallace criticism of Truman for policy	10/46	NORC 145
62%	Heard or read of Paris peace conference	9/46	NORC 243
61%	Knew Lindberg's views on aid to Britain	5/41	AIPO 235
60%	Could define the term unified command	4/46b	AIPO 369
60%	Heard of General Dynamics DOD cost overruns	3/85	Harris/BW
59%	Could define term isolationist	1/51a	AIPO 469
59%	Heard or read Ike speech urge Israel withdrawl	3/57	AIPO 579k
59%	Heard or read of NATO	4/49	NORC 165
58%	Knew France and Communists fighting in Indochina	3/54	AIPO 528
58%	Heard or read of foreign ministers conference	12/55	NORC 379
57%	Heard or read of Israel-Arab conflict	12/55	NORC 379
57%	Knew USSR was not a member of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
57%	Knew of people to people exchanges with USSR	4/56	NORC 386
57%	Named Prime Minister of UK	6/55b	AIPO 549k
57%	Knew Dean Acheson's job	7/51	NORC 303
57%	Knew Brazil is largest country in South America	3/40	AIPO 186k
57%	Heard of Quemoy & Matsu near China	5/55	NORC 371
57%	Could define the term Cold War	1/51a	AIPO 469
56%	Knew John Foster Dulles' job	9/56	AIPO 570
56%	Heard/ read discussion re send troops to Europe	8/51	AIPO 478
56%	Could define the term Cold War	12/55	AIPO 557
55%	Heard of Quemoy & Matsu near China	3/55	NORC 370
55%	Heard or read of French-Algerian fighting	7/56	NORC 390
55%	Knew China has a Communist government	5/50a	AIPO 455k
55%	Heard or read of NATO	1/50	NORC 273
55%	Heard of the United Nations	1/42	NORC
54%	Heard or read of USSR military force reduction	7/56	NORC 390
53%	Heard or read of NATO	4/53	NORC 339
53%	Heard of International Court of Justice	3/46	NORC 141
53%	Heard of diplomatic conference in Rio de Janeiro	4/42b	OPOR 814
52%	Knew John Foster Dulles' job	12/54	NORC 365
52%	Heard or read about Voice of America	11/48	AIPO 432k
52%	Heard or read of foreign ministers' meeting	5/46	NORC 142
51%	Named capital of Spain	6/55b	AIPO 549k
51%	Heard or read of foreign aid bill before Congress	3/58	AIPO 596
51%	Knew cause of trouble in Iran due to oil	5/51	AIPO 475k
51%	Knew location of Manchuria	4/51	AIPO 474
51%	Knew of the Johnson act	12/40	AIPO 225
51%	Heard or read of Lindberg's radio speech	8/40	AIPO 205
50%	Heard or read about Voice of America	5/49	AIPO 442

49%	Heard or read of Marshall plan [first survey]	7/47	AIPO 400k
49%	Understood lend-lease supplies must be paid back	7/45	NORC 235
49%	Heard or read of Cordell Hull's trade treaties	2/38	AIPO 112A
49%	Could define the term tariff	9/46	NORC 243
47%	Could define the term Cold War	11/48	AIPO 432k
47%	Heard or read of foreign ministers' conference	6/49	NORC 166
47%	Knew US trade policy favored open markets	5/55	NORC 371
47%	Knew meaning of the term 38th parallel	4/51	AIPO 474
46%	Heard of foreign ministers' meeting	10/45b	AIPO 358
45%	Knew US backed opposition to Nicaragua	5/87	Gallup/TM
45%	Heard or read of foreign ministers meeting	6/50	NORC 282-83
45%	Heard or read about the Marshall plan	10/47	NORC 152
45%	Heard or read of Cordell Hull for policy report	12/43	OPOR 19
44%	Knew England recognized Communist China	1/50	NORC 273
44%	Heard or read proposal send US troops to Europe	4/49	NORC 165
44%	Heard or read of United Nations meeting in NY	12/47	NORC 154
43%	Heard or read of NATO	3/52	NORC 320
43%	Knew Quemoy/Matsu in non-communist hands	4/55	AIPO 546
43%	Identified Clement Attlee's job	7/51	NORC 303
43%	Identified Chiang Kai-Shek's job	7/51	NORC 303
43%	Heard or read of US arms limitation proposal	12/51	NORC 314
43%	Heard/read Cordell Hull talk on foreign policy	4/44	AIPO 316
43%	Knew good neighbor policy was about Latin America	3/44	OPOR 23
42%	Knew what Voice of America is	5/51	AIPO 475k
41%	Heard or read of SEATO	3/55	NORC 370
41%	Heard or read of term peaceful co-existence	12/54	AIPO 540
41%	Could define job of the State Department	2/53	NORC 337
41%	Could define the term foreign policy	8/51	AIPO 478
40%	Heard of Israel's answer to Ike re withdrawl	3/57	AIPO 579
40%	Could define term Iron Curtain	11/51	AIPO 482
40%	Could describe function of the UN	1/52a	AIPO 484
39%	Heard of John Foster Dulles	10/48	AIPO 431
38%	Knew Khrushchev had met Ike before 7/59	8/59	G/IISR 12
37%	Correctly identified Nasser	8/58a	AIPO 602k
37%	Heard or read of Connally for policy resolution	12/43	OPOR 19
37%	Correctly names first city where UN organized	6/55b	AIPO 549k
36%	Names all 4 governments occupying Germany	5/50	AIPO 450k
35%	Knew Turkey was a member of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
35%	Heard of the Four Freedoms	7/42	NORC
34%	Heard or read of Bandung conference	5/55	NORC 371
33%	Heard or read of SEATO	12/54	NORC 365
33%	Knew details of Big Four summit conference	11/43	NORC 217
33%	Identified Jawaharlal Nehru's job	7/51	NORC 303
33%	Heard or read of St. Lawrence seaway project	3/49	NORC 164
32%	Knew US was sending military supplies to Greece	12/47	NORC 154
32%	Heard of US foreign service	5/55	NORC 371
32%	Named country where Waterloo was fought	6/55b	AIPO 549k
32%	Heard or read of reciprocal trade agreements	4/48	NORC 156
30%	Identified Marshall Tito's job	7/51	NORC 303
30%	Heard of UNESCO	8/55	NORC 374
30%	Heard of UNESCO	4/53	NORC 339
30%	Knew the term bi-partisan foreign policy	5/50a	AIPO 455k

29%	Knew location of Formosa	4/51	AIPO 474
29%	Correctly define term world government	7/53b	AIPO 518
29%	Could define reciprocal trade treaty	12/43	AIPO 308
27%	Knew Sweden was not a member of NATO	8/59	G/IISR 12
27%	Knew US supports El Salvador government	11/87	P&S/CPD
27%	Heard or read of military aid to Pakistan	1/54	NORC 351
27%	Knew location of Iran	5/51	AIPO 475k
24%	Recalled the principle of self-determination	1/56b	AIPO 559
23%	Heard or read of Truman's point four program	4/50	NORC 280-1
21%	Heard or read of the Atlantic Charter	1/42	AIPO 259
20%	Strongly agree that they have good understanding of national & international affairs	11/86	LR/NSIC
19%	Knew spy Jonathan Pollard worked for Israel	4/87	CBS/NYT
19%	Heard/read of Bricker's constitutional amendment	7/53b	AIPO 518
18%	Knew job of US foreign service	5/55	NORC 371
17%	Knew national language of Brazil	6/55b	AIPO 549k
14%	Defined reciprocal trade treaty	5/45	AIPO 346
12%	Knew the term Atlantic Pact	4/51	AIPO 474
11%	Could define main purpose of UNESCO	8/55	NORC 374
10%	Defined reciprocal trade treaty	1/40	AIPO 182K
8%	Could define the term peaceful co-existence	12/54	AIPO 540
7%	Could define the main purpose of UNESCO	4/53	NORC 339
6%	Knew approximate size of foreign aid request	3/58	AIPO 596
6%	Knew purpose of Truman point four program	4/50	NORC 280-1
5%	Named occasion of Khruchev-Ike meeting	8/59	G/IISR 12
4%	Knew purpose of Truman point four program	5/50a	AIPO 455k
4%	Consider self well informed on Marshall plan [3]	12/48	NORC 162
3%	Could define function of NATO	9/51	AIPO 480

APPENDIX 3

International Control of Atomic Energy:
Public Attitudes, 1945 - 1953

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Repeated Questions

8/1945- Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put
10/1946 under the control of the new United Nations Security Council,
or should the United States and England keep this secret to
themselves? (AIPO 354T, 357T, 368K&T, 379K&T)

	8/45b	10/45a	4/46a+	10/46+
Security Council	19	24	25	18
U.S. and England	73	64	68	75
No opinion	8	12	7	7

+ slight variation in wording which excluded England

12/1945- Do you think the world organization should pass a law and be
3/1946 given the power to enforce it so that no country in the world
can make atomic bombs, or don't you think so? (NORC T42, 140)

	12/45	3/46
Should	74	72
Should not	19	20
DK	7	8

12/1945- It has been suggested that the world organization have
3/1946 inspectors who could search any property in any country at any
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one
American working together. Do you think there should be such
an inspection or not? (NORC 42T, 140)

	12/45	3/46
Should	81	75
Should not	13	17
Don't know	6	8

2/1946- In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our
2/1947 government's policy on the atomic bomb? (NORC 139, 148)

	2/46	2/47
Satisfied	66	45
Dissatisfied	15	18
Don't know	19	37

Repeated Questions

6/1946- 8/1946	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the United Nations Organization, or should the U.S. keep the secret to itself? (PSY Corp 173k&t, 178k&t)		
		6/46	8/46
	UNO control	21	18
	US should keep	72	75
	No opinion	5	5
	Qualified answers	2	2
6/1946- 8/1946	Which of these three statements comes closest to what you think the U.S. should do? a) The U.S. should go on making atomic bombs and not depend on systems of international control of the bombs; b) We should go on making atomic bombs for the time being, but try to work out a system of international control to prevent any nation, including our own, from using atomic bombs; c) We should stop making atomic bombs right now and try to work out a system of international control to keep other nations from making them too. (Psy Corp 173k&t, 178k)		
		6/46	8/46
	a	21	22
	b	49	47
	c	25	26
	No opinion	5	5
6/1946- 8/1946	As far as you know, is the secret of how to make atomic bombs known only by the U.S. or do you think some other countries also know how to make atomic bombs? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t)		
		6/46	8/46
	Only US	27	30
	Known to others	60	56
	Don't know	13	14
6/1946- 8/1946	(Asked of the 60%, 56% who answered known to others) What other countries do you think know how to make atomic bombs? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t)		
		6/46	8/46
	Russia	41	41
	England	28	22
	Germany	18	17
	Canada	13	7
	Japan	4	2
	Spain	2	1
	France	1	1

Repeated Questions

6/1946- (Asked of the 40%, 44% who answered only US or Dk above) How
8/1946 long do you think it will be before another country learns how
to make atomic bombs? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t)

	6/46	8/46
Soon	3	4
Within 2 years	8	8
3 to 5 years	10	10
6 to 10 years	4	5
More than 10 years, very long time	3	2
No opinion	12	15

6/1946- (Asked of the 40%, 44% who answered only US or Dk above) What
8/1946 other country do you think will learn to make atomic bombs
first? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t)

	6/46	8/46
Russia	25	26
England	5	5
Germany	3	5
Others	2	2
No Opinion	5	6

6/1946- Do you think a system of international supervision and
8/1946 control can prevent all countries from making atomic bombs and
using them against each other? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t)

	6/46	8/46
Yes	35	37
No	50	50
No opinion	13	13

Repeated Questions

2/1947- Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it
 10/1949 meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed
 to and set up? (NORC 148, 152, 170)

	2/47			10/47			10/49+		
	F	O	Dk	F	O	Dk	F	O	Dk
A. We had to stop making atomic bombs?	53	33	14	59	31	10	68	22	10
B. We had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand	39	49	12	40	52	8	57	32	11
C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements?	67	19	14	79	14	7	77	13	10
D. We had to place all our atomic factories under the control of an international agency?	51	31	18	55	33	12	54	30	16
E. We had to give the international agency all the information it needs about atomic energy?	40	44	16	41	48	11	45	40	15

+ slight variation in wording added "and all other countries" (asked after announcement of Russia's atomic test).

10/1947- Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at
 6/1950 the present time to the international control of atomic energy? (NORC 152, 158, 170, 282-3)

	10/47	6/48	10/49	6/50
Yes	63	48	62	58
No	25	36	23	31
DK	12	16	15	11

8/1945	It has been suggested that the new United Nations Security Council use the atomic bomb to help keep peace by putting it under control of a special international air force. Would you favor such a plan or should the United States try to keep control of this weapon? (AIPO 354K)	
	U.N. Air Force	15
	U.S. Control	73
	No Opinion	12
8/1945	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the new United Nations Security Council, or should the United States and England keep this secret to themselves? (AIPO 354T) (trend see repeated questions)	
	Security Council	19
	U.S. and England	73
	No opinion	8
9/1945	In order to defend itself, do you think our country should rely more: on our own ability to make better atomic bombs than any other country--OR--on the ability of the world organization to prevent any country, including our own, from ever using such bombs in another war? (NORC 237A&B) (similar question see 9/1946 NORC)	
	Our own ability	43
	World organization	48
	DK	9
9/1945	If the world organization does try to prevent any country from ever using atomic bombs in another war, which one of these two ways do you think would have the best chance of working? (NORC 237A&B)	
	World police force	30
	Pass law, use an FBI	54
	DK/NA	16
9/1945	Do you think the United States should try to keep the secret of how to make atomic bombs as long as we can, or do you think we should let some other countries also know how to make them? (NORC 237A&B)	
	Try to keep secret	84
	Let others know	13
	DK	3

9/1945	Most scientists agree that within 10 years other countries will find out by themselves how to make atomic bombs, even if we don't tell them. Do you think the United States will be able to keep for just its own use the secret of how to make atomic bombs, or will other countries be able to find out by themselves how to make them? (NORC 237B)	
	Able to keep secret	10
	Others will find out	86
	Don't know	4
9/1945	Do you think the United States will be able to keep for just its own use the secret of how to make atomic bombs, or will other countries be able to find out by themselves how to make them? (NORC 237A)	
	Able to keep secret	14
	Others will find out	81
	DK	5
9/1945	(Asked of the 81% who said others will find out) About how long a time would you guess it'll take before some other countries find out as much about atomic bombs as we know now? (NORC 237A)	
	Under 1 year	15
	1 to 5 years	54
	6 to 10 years	17
	11 to 50	6
	Over 50 years	*
	Don't know	8
10/1945	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the new United Nations Security Council or should the United States keep this secret to itself? (AIPO 357K)	
	Security Council	21
	United States	70
	No Opinion	9
10/1945	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the new United Nations Security Council, or should the United States and England keep this secret to themselves? (AIPO 357T)	
	Security Council	24
	United States and England	64
	No Opinion	12

10/1945	Do you think the United States can keep this secret to itself or do you think other nations will develop atomic bombs? (AIPO 357K)	
	Can Keep	22
	Others Develop	65
	No Opinion	13
10/1945	It took the United States about 5 years to develop the first atomic bomb. About how long do you think it will be before some other country will develop one if we don't give them any help at all on it? (RFOR 50)	
	Less than 5 years	53
	About 5 years	13
	More than 5 years	12
	Never	4
	Don't know/NA	18
10/1945	Which nation or nations do you think will be likely to be the first to develop the atomic bomb? (RFOR 50)	
	Russia	40
	Germany	29
	Great Britain	9
	Japan	7
	Other	2
	No nation will ever develop atomic bomb	5
	Don't know/NA	19
10/1945	The United States, England and Canada are now the only countries that know how to make the atomic bomb. Do you think we should share this secret with the other United Nations, or should we try to keep it to ourselves? (NORC 135)	
	Share with others	22
	Keep it ourselves	72
	No opinion	6

10/1945	(Asked of the 72% who answered keep to ourselves) Do you think we should share the secret, if the United Nations organization could control the bomb, so that no country could use it to start a future war? (NORC 135)	
	Yes, share	41
	No, don't share	54
	No opinion	5
10/1945	If we did share the secret with the other United Nations, do you think it would be possible for the world organization to control the bomb, so that no country could use it to start a future war? (NORC 135)	
	Yes	32
	No	52
	No opinion	16
10/1945	Do you think it will be possible to keep the secret permanently, or will other countries be able to find out for themselves how to make the bomb? (NORC 135)	
	Can keep permanently	13
	Others will find out	83
	No opinion	4
10/1945	About how long do you think it will take other countries to discover the secret--a year or two, around five years, around ten years, or longer? (NORC 135)	
	Year or two	29
	Around five years	39
	Around ten years	15
	Longer	5
	No opinion	7
12/1945	Do you think Russia will have her own atomic bombs within the next three years, or don't you think so? (NORC 42T)	
	Yes	64
	No	23
	Dk	13
12/1945	(Asked of the 23% who answered no) How many years do you think it will take--about 5 years, 10 years, or longer? (NORC 42T)	
	5 years	9
	10 years	7
	Longer	4
	Dk	3

- 12/1945 It has been suggested that the world organization have inspectors who could search any property in any country at any time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one American working together. Do you think there should be such an inspection or not? (NORC 42T)
- | | |
|------------|----|
| Should | 81 |
| Should not | 13 |
| Don't know | 6 |
- 12/1945 Do you think the world organization could set up such a system of inspection so that it will always be able to tell if any country is making a great many atomic bombs? (NORC 42T)
- | | |
|------------|----|
| Could | 64 |
| Could not | 27 |
| Don't know | 9 |
- 12/1945 Do you think the world organization should pass a law and be given the power to enforce it so that no country in the world can make an atomic bomb, or don't you think so? (NORC 42T) (trend see repeated questions)
- | | |
|-----------------|----|
| Should pass | 74 |
| Should not pass | 19 |
| DK | 7 |
- 12/1945 (Asked of the 19% who said should not) Well, how would you answer if you were positively convinced that Russia would have her own atomic bombs within three years and that there is no possible defense against these bombs? Then would you be for or against the world organization having a law that no country can make atomic bombs? (NORC 42T)
- | | |
|---------|---|
| For | 9 |
| Against | 8 |
| DK | 2 |
- 12/1945 If the world organization did pass a law that no country could make atomic bombs, do you think people who break this law should be punished by the world organization or by their own country? (NORC 42T)
- | | |
|--------------------|----|
| World organization | 77 |
| Own country | 17 |
| DK | 6 |

12/1945	Suppose Russia's price for letting inspectors into her country was for the US and other countries to tell the world organization now all they know about atomic bombs. Would you want to pay this price or not? (NORC 42T)	
	Would	30
	Would not	61
	Don't know	9
2/1946	Do you think it will be possible to keep the secret of how to make the atomic bomb permanently, or will other countries be able to find out for themselves how to make the bomb? (NORC 139) (similar question 10/1945)	
	Can keep permanently	10
	Others will find out	85
	DK	5
2/1946	(Asked of those 85 % who answered others will find out) About how long do you think it will take other countries to discover the secret--a year or two, around five years, around ten years, or longer? (NORC 139)	
	They know already (vol)	13
	Less than a year (vol)	4
	Year or two	37
	Around five years	30
	Around ten years	6
	Longer	1
	DK	9
2/1946	In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our government's policy on the atomic bomb? (NORC 139) (trend see repeated questions)	
	Satisfied	66
	Dissatisfied	15
	Don't know	19
2/1946	As far as you know, what is the policy of our government on sharing the secret of how we make the bomb? Are we going to tell other countries how we make it, or are we going to keep this information to ourselves? (NORC 139)	
	Tell others	16
	Keep to ourselves	62
	Don't know	22

2/1946	How about our policy toward control of the bomb? Are we going to try to continue to keep control in our own hands, or are we going to work with other United Nations toward international control of the bomb? (NORC 139) (see 2/1947 for a similar question)	
	Keep in our own hands	34
	Work with others	40
	DK	26
2/1946	Generally speaking, are you well satisfied or not so well satisfied with the way our government is handling the atomic bomb problem? (MINN 31)	
	Satisfied	36
	Not satisfied	24
	Don't know enough about plans	40
2/1946	How long so you think we can keep the atomic bomb secret, not very long, for a few years, as long as we wish? (MINN 31)	
	Not very long	60
	For a few years	23
	As long as we wish	10
	No opinion	7
3/1946	Do you think the world organization should pass a law and be given the power to enforce it so that no country in the world can make atomic bombs, or don't you think so? (NORC 140) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Should	72
	Should not	20
	DK	8
3/1946	(Asked of the 72% who answered should) If passing a law that no country can make atomic bombs meant that the United States would not only have to stop making more, but would also have to destroy all atomic bombs now on hand, then would you be for or against passing this law? (NORC 140)	
	For	77
	Against	18
	Don't know	5

3/1946	It has been suggested that the world organization have inspectors who could search any property in any country at any time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one American working together. Do you think there should be such an inspection or not? (NORC 140) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Should	75
	Should not	17
	Don't know	8
3/1946	(Asked of the 75% who answered should be inspection) Would you be willing for these inspectors to search American property if it meant that they would find out how we make atomic bombs, or would that be going too far? (NORC 140)	
	Willing	39
	Going too far	33
	Don't know	3
4/1946a	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the United Nations Security Council, or should the United States keep this secret to itself? (AIPO 368K&T) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Security Council	25
	United States	68
	No Opinion	7
4/1946b	Do you think any other country(ies) is already making atom bombs? (AIPO 369K&T)	
	Yes	42
	No	40
	No Opinion	18
4/1946b	(Asked of the 42% who answered YES) Which country(ies)? (AIPO 369K&T)	
	Russia	30
	England	7
	Germany	5
	Spain	4
	Japan	1
	Canada	1
	France	*
	South America & Argentina	*
	Misc	1
	Don't know/no answer	50

4/1946b	Should the U.S. continue to manufacture atom bombs? (AIPO 369 k&t)	
	Yes	61
	No	30
	No opinion	9
5/1946	Did you hear or read anything about the report on the control of atomic energy, which was published by the State Department a few weeks ago? It's sometimes called the Acheson report? (NORC 142)	
	Yes	41
	No	59
5/1946	If every other country in the world would turn over to a world organization all their military information and secrets, and allow continuous inspection, would you be willing for the United States to go along on this? (RCOM 24)	
	Yes	47
	No	38
	Don't know/No answer	15
6/1946	Would you be willing to have the U.S. turn over control of all her armed forces and war weapons, including atomic bombs, to a world parliament or congress, provided that other countries did the same? (AIPO 373K&T)	
	Yes	40
	No	52
	No Opinion	8
6/1946- 8/1946	see repeated questions (PYS Corp 173k&t, 178k&t)	
7/1946	In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the progress that the United Nations has made so far? (NORC 143)	
	Satisfied	40
	Dissatisfied	40
	Don't know	20

7/1946	(Asked of the 40% who were dissatisfied) Why? (NORC 143)	
	General lack of progress	25
	Too many disagreements	20
	Countries too selfish	9
	Russia won't cooperate	26
	England not doing all it should	5
	US not doing all it should	5
	Handling of peace treaties, territorial adjustments	3
	Handling of <u>atomic</u> bomb	1
	Handling of miscellaneous specific issues	1
	Objections to veto power	2
	Isolationist objections	4
	Miscellaneous criticism	2
	No answer	4
7/1946	Do you think there should eventually be some sort of international control of atomic bombs and atomic energy, or should each country remain free to make its own bombs and carry on its own experiments? (NORC 143)	
	International control	58
	Each country free	34
	Dk	8
7/1946	(Asked of those 58% who answered international control) If international control of the bomb meant that the US eventually had to turn over our atomic factories to an international agency, would you be willing to do this, or not? (NORC 143)	
	Willing	45
	Not willing	48
	DK	7
7/1946	Do you think it would be possible for the world organization to control the atomic bomb, so that no country could use it to start a future war? (NORC 143)	
	Yes	48
	No	36
	DK	16
7/1946	Have you heard or read anything about the official American plan for control of atomic energy, which Bernard Baruch presented to the United Nations recently? (NORC 143)	
	Yes	29
	No	71

7/1946	(Asked of the 29% who said yes) Was there anything you didn't like about the plan? (NORC 143)	
	Yes, didn't like	6
	No	12
	DK/No answer	11
7/1946	(Asked of the 29% who said yes) How do you feel about the plan in general? Do you approve of it, or disapprove of it? (NORC 143)	
	Approve	17
	Disapprove	4
	DK	8
7/1946	(Asked of the 29% who said yes) According to the plan, would it still be possible for some nation to make atomic bombs secretly? (NORC 143)	
	Yes	10
	No	10
	DK	9
7/1946	(Asked of the 29% who said yes) Suppose some nation didn't live up to the plan, once it was adopted. Would the United Nations have the right to punish that nation immediately, or would the country have the right to prevent any action against itself? (NORC 143)	
	UN could punish	15
	Country could prevent	3
	DK	11
7/1946	As you know, this country is still making atomic bombs. Do you think we should continue to make them at the present time, or should we stop making them now? (NORC 143)	
	Continue making	58
	Stop making	34
	Don't know	8
8/1946	(Asked of those 94% who had heard of the Bikini atomic test) How long do you think we can keep the atomic bomb secret- not very long, for a few years, or as long as we wish? (MINN 36)	
	Not very long	54
	For a few years	17
	As long as we wish	7
	Isn't secret now (vol)	13
	No opinion	8

9/1946	(Asked of Veterans) Here is a list of some things the government in Washington might try to do in the next year. Which two things on the list would you pick as the most important to make an immediate start on ... (RCOM 25) (data not presented in order asked)	
	Make better housing available	52
	Prevent inflation	43
	Pay a cash bonus to veterans	21
	Arrange for international control of the <u>atomic</u> bomb	21
	Regulate labor unions more strictly	21
	Make more jobs available	16
	Reduce taxes	13
	Tell more people abroad about our way of life in this country	6
	Regulate business more strictly	4
	Other (vol)	1
	Don't know	1
9/1946	If the US could do only one of these two things during the next few years, which one do you think would give us the best chance of keeping peace in the world? Should we try to keep ahead of other countries by making more and better atomic bombs and rockets? OR Should we try to make the United Nations organization strong enough to prevent all countries, including the US, from making atomic bombs and rockets? (NORC 144)	
	Trying to keep ahead	28
	Making the United Nations strong	67
	Don't know	5
10/1946	Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put under the control of the new United Nations Security Council, or should the United States keep this secret to themselves? (AIPO 379K&T) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Security Council	18
	U.S. and England	75
	No opinion	7
11/1946	Do you think that the United States should stop making atom bombs and destroy those already made to prove our good intentions in asking for international control of atomic bombs? (AIPO 384T)	
	Yes	18
	No	68
	Qualified yes	4
	No Opinion	9

11/1946	Do you believe that this (ceasing production of atomic bombs and destroying those already made) would help in bringing about an agreement with Russia regarding international control of atomic bombs? (AIPO 384T)	
	Yes	28
	No	52
	No Opinion	20
11/1946	Do you think the United States should stop making Atom Bombs and destroy all those we now have? (AIPO 384k)	
	Yes	20
	No	73
	No opinion	7
11/1946	Suppose the United States stopped making Atomic Bombs and destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then agree to let a United Nations Committee check to see that Russia does not make Atom Bombs? (AIPO 384k)	
	Yes	13
	No	72
	No opinion	15
11/1946	As you know, the countries are now trying to work out a way to put atomic bombs under international control. While they're trying to do this, it has been suggested that the US stop making atomic bombs-- for say one year. Do you think we should do this or not? (NORC 146)	
	Yes, stop making for one year	47
	No, keep making	42
	Don't know/No answer	11
2/1947	Here's a list of some things that have been in the news lately. During the last week or so, have you been talking about any of these subjects with your friends? (NORC 148)	
	(not in the order asked)	
	The housing shortage	65
	Sending food & relief to Europe	46
	How to settle labor problems	40
	Budget for the Federal government	35
	How we should deal with Russia	34
	How to control atomic bomb	27
	What's going on in China	20
	Our military bases in Pacific	19
	Peace treaty with Germany	18
	Tariffs and foreign trade	13
	None/Don't know/Don't remember	20

2/1947	Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at the present time to have all production of atomic energy controlled by a special agency of the United Nations organization? (NORC 148)	
	Yes	55
	No	29
	DK	16
2/1947	As far as you know, is the United States trying to get other countries to agree to the international control of atomic energy or not? (NORC 148) (see similar question 2/1946)	
	Yes, is trying	53
	No, is not trying	10
	Don't know	37
2/1947	Have you heard or read anything about the official American plan for international control of atomic energy--often called the Baruch plan? (NORC 148) (see similar question 6/1946)	
	Yes	45
	No	55
2/1947	(Asked of those 55% who answered yes) Do you feel you have a fairly clear idea of the plan in general, or not? (NORC 148)	
	Yes, have clear idea	32
	No	65
	DK	3
2/1947	(Asked of those 55% who answered yes) Do you think this plan has a good chance of being agreed to by the United Nations organization? (NORC 148)	
	Yes	31
	No	20
	DK	49

2/1947 Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed to and set up? (NORC 148)(for trend see repeated questions)

	Favor	Oppose	No Opin
A. We had to stop making atomic bombs?	53	33	14
B. We had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand	39	49	12
C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements?	67	19	14
D. We had to place all our atomic factories under the control of an international agency?	51	31	18
E. We had to give the international agency all the information it needs about atomic energy?	40	48	11

2/1947 Which one of these statements comes closest to summing up your opinion about international control of atomic energy? (NORC 148)

A. International control of atomic energy has a very good chance of working, and I think we should try it	28
B. International control has only a fair chance of working, but I think we ought to try it	32
C. International control has only a fair chance of working, and I don't think we ought to risk it	15
D. International control can't possibly work, and there's no use trying it	13
E. Don't know	12

2/1947 In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our government's policy on the atomic bomb? (NORC 148) (for trend see repeated questions)

Satisfied	45
Dissatisfied	18
Don't know	37

2/1947	(Asked of those 63% who answered satisfied or dissatisfied) Why? (NORC 148)	
	They have not properly guarded the secret, and not protecting American interests	48
	They are trying too hard to keep the secret, aren't working with other countries toward control	10
	They don't have any policy; aren't getting anywhere, too much politics	8
	They should stop making bombs, forget about it, never should have been invented or used	15
	Should put more emphasis on constructive peaceful uses	2
	Don't know/no answer	17
6/1947a	Do you think any other nation or nations are now making their own Atom Bombs? (AIPO 398K&T)	
	Yes	60
	No	22
	Qualified, yes trying to	5
	No Opinion	13
6/1947a	(Asked of those 65% who answered yes) Which nation or nations? (AIPO 398K&T)	
	Russia	76
	England	12
	Germany	5
	Argentina	2
	Japan	2
	France	2
	Canada	1
6/1947	If a world commission were set up by the United Nations to control atomic energy, do you think the United States should or should not turn our atomic bomb secrets over to the commission? (MINN 46)	
	Should	15
	Should not	71
	Qualified	10
	Undecided	4
6/1947	(Asked of those 71% who said should not) Would you still feel that way if Russia agreed to cooperate with the commission by permitting regular inspections inside Russia, the same as in other countries? (MINN 46)	
	Yes	67
	No	25
	Undecided	8

6/1947	Do you think that any other nations besides the United States today know how to make their own atomic bombs? (MINN 46)	
	Yes, Russia	32
	Yes, England	9
	Yes, Germany	8
	Yes, Canada	1
	Yes, Japan	1
	Yes, other	3
	No	38
	Don't know	8
7/1947	In your opinion, should there be international control of atomic bombs and atomic energy, or should each country remain free to make its own bombs? (NORC 151)	
	International control	47
	Each country free	30
	DK	9
	Qualified answer	14
10/1947	As far as you know, is the United States trying to get other countries to agree to the international control of atomic energy or not? (NORC 152)	
	Yes, is trying	56
	No, is not trying	14
	Don't know	30
10/1947	Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at the present time to the international control of atomic energy? (NORC 152) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Yes	63
	No	25
	DK	12
10/1947	What do you think are the chances that such a system of international control will be set up within the next year or two--good, only fair, or poor? (NORC 152)	
	Good	14
	Only fair	36
	Poor	35
	DK	15

10/1947	Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed to and set up? (NORC 152) (for trend see repeated questions)			
		Favor	Oppose	No Op
	A. We had to stop making atomic bombs?	59	31	10
	B. We had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand?	40	52	8
	C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements?	79	14	7
	D. We had to place all our atomic factories under the control of an international agency?	55	33	12
	E. We had to give the international agency all the information it needs about atomic energy?	41	48	11
10/1947	Do you believe that the United States should agree to stop making atomic bombs before an international control agency is set up? (NORC 152)			
	Yes			15
	No			78
	Don't know			7
4/1948	Would you favor or oppose having the U.N. adopt a plan for the control of atomic energy which would permit the U.N. to inspect atomic plants in the U.S. and any other country at any time? (AIPO 417)			
	Favor			42
	Oppose			40
	Qualified			3
	No opinion/No answer			15
4/1948	Would you favor or oppose having the United Nations adopt a plan for control of atomic energy which would permit the United Nations to inspect atomic plants in the United States and any other country at any time? (AIPO 417)			
	Favor			43
	Oppose			39
	On opinion			18
6/1948	Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at the present time to the international control of atomic energy? (NORC 158) (for trend see repeated questions)			
	Yes			48
	No			36
	Don't know			16

6/1948	As far as you know, have the United States and Russia been able to reach an agreement on international control of the atomic bomb? (NORC 158)	
	Yes they have	3
	No, they haven't	63
	Don't know	34
6/1948	(Asked of the 63% who answered US and USSR had been unable to agree on international control) What are some of the points about the control of the atomic bomb that they have not been able to agree on? (NORC 158)	
	Russia wants the secret, we won't give it to them	20
	They disagree about inspection of atomic activities	7
	They disagree about supervision and control of atomic activities	9
	Russia wants us to destroy our bombs and we won't agree	6
	Russia wants to outlaw atomic bombs as a weapon and we won't agree	1
	They disagree about the use to make of it	6
	Exchange of information	3
	Miscellaneous	2
	Don't know/No answer (Multiple answers)	55
6/1948	(Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable to agree on international control) What do you think are the chances that a system of international control of the atom bomb will be set up within the next year or two -- Are the chances good, only fair or poor? (NORC 158)	
	Good	12
	Only fair	33
	Poor	45
	DK	10
6/1948	(Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable to agree on international control) Have you heard or read anything about the recent decision of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations to stop its discussions for the time being? (NORC 158)	
	Yes	19
	No	81

6/1948 (Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable to agree on international control) Do you think the United States should continue to try to get the Russians to agree to our plan of international control of atomic energy, or do you think we should stop trying? (NORC 158)

Continue trying	51
Stop trying	42
DK	7

6/1948 (Asked of 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable to agree on international control) Some people say we should now take certain steps in order to make an agreement with Russia more likely. Would you favor or oppose the United States
 a Announcing to the world we will not use the atom bomb except in self defense;
 b Destroying all our atomic bombs (NORC 158)

	a	b
Favor	71	4
Oppose	25	93
Don't know	4	3

6/1948 We'd like to know how much interest the public takes in a number of questions. For example, do you yourself take a great deal of interest, a mild interest, or practically none at all in . . . (NORC 158)

a News about our relations with Russia
 b News about the cost of living
 c News about our policy toward Palestine
 d News about the coming election for President
 e News about increasing our armed forces
 f News about control of the atomic bomb

	a	b	c	d	e	f
A great deal of interest	45	83	24	49	55	44
A mild interest	43	14	50	39	35	41
Practically none	10	2	24	10	8	13
Don't know	1	1	2	2	2	2

9/23/49 President Truman announced that Russia had tested an atomic bomb.

10/1949 Do you think all countries, including the United States, should agree at the present time to the international control of atomic energy? (NORC 170) (for trend see repeated questions)

Yes	62
No	23
DK	15

10/1949	Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it meant that after the system of control had been set up. . . (NORC 170) (for trend see repeated questions)	Yes	No	DK
	A. We, and all other countries, had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand?	57	32	11
	B. We, and all other countries, had to stop making atomic bombs?	68	22	10
	C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements?	77	13	10
	D. We, and all other countries, had to place all our atomic factories under the ownership and control of an international agency?	54	30	16
	E. We, and all other countries, had to give the international agency all the information it needs about atomic energy?	45	40	15
10/1949	Now that Russia may have the atomic bomb, what do you think are the chances that a system of international control of atomic energy will be set up within the next year or two -- Are the chances good, only fair or poor? (NORC 170)			
	Good		11	
	Fair		31	
	Poor		40	
	DK		18	
10/1949	Asked of those 55% who answered good or poor) Why do you feel that way? (NORC 170)			
Good	Russia will be more willing now, will accept control			4
	U.S. will be more willing now, will press harder for control			1
	Both Russia and U.S. will be more willing now, mutual fear			4
	Control is inevitable now, all know or will know, world will force it			8
Poor	Russia will be even less willing now, more conscious of its power			9
	Russia doesn't want control, won't share information, admit inspectors			13
	Russia is treacherous, doesn't want peace can't be trusted			13
	Russia won't agree, won't cooperate, will never change			27
	U.S. & Russia both distrustful, world not ready			15
Don't know/No answer				7

10/1949 Here are some things our government is doing now, in order to meet the Russian problem. I'd like to know whether you approve or disapprove of each one. For instance, do you approve or disapprove of . . . (NORC 170)

- a Sending economic aid to western Europe under the Marshall Plan?
- b Sending military supplies to strengthen the countries of western Europe?
- c Spending money on radio broadcasts to explain our point of view to the people of Russia and other countries?
- d Increasing the number of our atomic bombs?
- e Strengthening our armed forces in other ways?

	a	b	c	d	e
Approve	64	50	65	63	86
Disapprove	26	40	28	21	8
Don't know	10	10	7	16	6

10/1949 Suppose we can not get any agreement with Russia for an effective system on international control of atomic energy, would you approve or disapprove of the United States making an agreement to destroy all the atomic bombs we have on hand, if Russia and all other countries promise to destroy theirs (NORC 170)

Approve	31
Disapprove	59
Don't know	10

12/1949 The United Nations is talking about a world organization to take over control of atomic energy work all over the world. Would you be willing to have that kind of organization take over control of this country's atomic energy work, or would you be opposed? (MINN 77)

Would be willing	28
Would be opposed	49
No opinion	18
If Russia will agree to control, too	2
Other qualified	3

12/1949	Are there any world problems that you feel are more important than the question of world control of atomic energy at this with? (MINN 77)		
	No, none more important		56
	No opinion		16
	Yes, but don't know or no answer given		1
	Yes, world peace		7
	Yes, communists & communist countries; Russia & our relations with Russia		4
	Yes, taking care of our own people first		1
	Yes, the standard of living, housing, food, poverty		4
	Yes, helping other countries get settled		2
	Yes, the German situation; unification		1
	Yes, economic problem		3
	Yes, other problems		5
2/1950a	Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb before we try to make a Hydrogen bomb? (AIPO 452 K)		
	Should		49
	Should not		44
	No opinion		7
2/1950	President Truman announced the U.S. would develop the hydrogen bomb		
2/1950b	Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb and the Hydrogen bomb? (AIPO 452 TPS)		
	Should		68
	Should not		24
	No opinion		8
2/1950	Do you think such an attempt to work out an agreement with Russia would be successful, or not? (AIPO 452 K & 452 TPS)		
		2/50a	2/50b
	Would	10	17
	Would not	70	61
	On opinion	20	22
3/1950	Do you think our government should do any more than it is doing to reach an agreement with Russia on the atomic bomb? (NORC 276)		
	Yes, should do more		25
	No, doing enough		57
	Don't know		18

3/1950	(Asked of those 25% who answered should do more) What more should our government do to reach an agreement with Russia on the atomic bomb? (NORC 276)	
	Call a conference, send representatives over there	29
	Outlaw the bomb, use atomic energy only for peace	15
	Soften our policy a little, be more willing to compromise	5
	Get through, threaten them, force them into line	7
	Work through UN	3
	Come to terms, make peace, reach an agreement	12
	Don't know/no answer	29
6/1950	Do you think all countries, including the US, should agree at the present time to the international control of atomic energy? (NORC 282-83) (for trend see repeated questions)	
	Yes	58
	No	31
	DK	11
6/1950	(Asked of those 31% who answered no) Why not? (NORC 282-83)	
	US should not share, it should be kept for ourselves	15
	You can't trust other countries, they might use it, might not stand by their word, might use it against us	25
	You can't trust Russia, Russia might information or communists might get it	15
	We should keep it for our own defense, increase or preserve our own strength, keep our advantage	16
	It's safer with us, US not aggressive, would use it only for defense	6
	It wouldn't work, not feasible, too soon to try it	10
	Isolationist sentiment	2
	Miscellaneous	5
	Don't know/No answer	4
6/1950	(Asked of those 58% who answered yes) As you know, the Russians have so far refused to agree to the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy and have walked out of the UN discussion on this problem. Do you think the US should invite Russia and other countries to a special conference in an attempt to get agreement on international control? (NORC 282-83)	
	Yes	65
	No	26
	DK/NA	9

6/1950	(Asked of those 65% who answered yes) Do you think there's a good chance that such a conference might bring about an agreement with Russia on atomic energy? (NORC 282-3)	
	Yes	48
	No	39
	Don't know	13
4/1953	Would you favor or oppose a plan for the international control of atomic energy (atom bombs) which would allow the UN to inspect atomic plants in all member countries, including Russia and the United States? (AIPO 514K)	
	Favor	59
	Oppose	31
	No opinion	10
8/1953	Now here is a list of things, some of which the United Nations now has the power to do, and some it could do with a change in its charter. As you may know, the charter revision conference is due next year. Going down the list, would you like to have the United Nations go ahead and find a way to . . . Control atomic energy, or do you think it shouldn't have the power to do that? (RCOM 80)	
	United Nations should go ahead and do	56
	UN shouldn't have power	25
	Don't know	19

APPENDIX 4

Use of Atomic Weapons Against Japan:
Public Attitudes, 1985 - 1945

7/1985	Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Dropping atomic bombs on Japan in World War Two was morally wrong. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly? (CBS/NYT)	
	Agree strongly	20
	Agree somewhat	18
	Disagree somewhat	30
	Disagree strongly	25
	Don't know	7
7/1985	(Asked the American public) Can you tell me what comes to mind when you hear the word Japan? (CBS/NYT)	
	Imports/trade deficit	30
	Cars	29
	Electronics	14
	Industry/economy/money	12
	War	12
	Efficiency/management	7
	Technology/high technology	7
	Pearl Harbor	6
	<u>Atomic bomb</u> /Hiroshima/Nagasaki	3
	Enemies (general)	1
7/1985	(Asked the American public) These days, do you think most Japanese people hold it against the United States for dropping atomic bombs on Japan, or don't they hold it against us, or don't you know enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT)	
	Hold it against US	27
	Don't hold it against US	31
	Don't know	41
7/1985	(Asked of Japanese public) These days, do you hold it against the United States for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or do you not hold it against them, or don't you know enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT/Tokyo Broadcasting)	
	Hold it against US	44
	Don't hold it against US	47
	Don't know	9

7/1985	Do you agree or disagree with this statement: One of the major reasons that the United States was willing to drop the atomic bombs on Japan was the Japanese people are not white. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly with that? (CBS/NYT/Tokyo Broadcasting)		
		US	Japan
	Agree strongly	3	9
	Agree somewhat	4	24
	Disagree somewhat	15	42
	Disagree strongly	73	20
	Don't know	5	5
1/1971	By the way, do you feel it was necessary and proper for the US to drop atomic bombs on Japan during World War II, or do you think we were wrong to drop the bombs? (Harris 2053)		
	Necessary and proper		63
	Wrong to drop bombs		21
	Not sure		16
6/1965	As an American, have you often, sometimes, or hardly evr felt badly because . . . the U.S. was the first country to drop the atom bomb? (Harris 1531)		
	Often		9
	Sometimes		21
	Hardly ever		19
	Never (vol)		47
	Not sure		4
9/1948	As you look back on it, how do you feel about our use of the atom bomb in the war? Do you think: (RFOR 70)		
	A. We should have used more of them than we did, or		15
	B. That we used them in just about the right way, or		51
	C. That we should have dropped one first on some unpopulated place as a warning, or		14
	D. That we should not have dropped any at all?		12
	E. Don't know		8

10/1945	How much longer do you think the Japanese would have held out if it had not been for the atomic bomb? (RFOR 50)	
	No longer	8
	1 month less	10
	2-5 months	17
	6 months	17
	7-11 months	3
	1 year	15
	Over a year	18
	Don't know	12
10/1945	Which one of these comes closest to describing how you feel about our use of the atomic bomb? (RFOR 50)	
	A. We should not have used any atomic bombs at all	5
	B. We should have dropped one first on some unpopulated region, to show the Japanese its power, and only dropped the second on a city if they hadn't surrendered after the first one	14
	C. We should have used the two bombs on cities, just as we did	54
	D. We should have quickly used many more of them before Japan had a chance to surrender	23
	E. Don't know	6
9/1945	If you had been the one to decide whether or not to use the atomic bomb against Japan, which one of these four things do you think you would have done? (NORC 237A & B)	
	Refused to use	4
	Where no people	27
	One city at time	43
	Wiped out cities	24
	DK	2
8/1945	(Asked of 96% who had heard of the atomic bomb) Do you approve or disapprove of using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities? (AIPO 353K&T)	
	Approve	86
	Disapprove	10
	No Opinion/No answer	4

APPENDIX 5

Perceptions of the Soviet Union, 1942- 1987

World War II through International Control of Atomic Energy

2/1942-10/1945 Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us after the war/when the war is over? (NORC, OPOR, AIPO)

	2/42a NORC	4/42b OPOR	6/42c OPOR	7/42d OPOR	
Yes	38	39	41	50	
No	37	39	33	30	
Don't know	25	22	26	20	
	1/43e AIPO	4/43f AIPO	10/43g OPOR	11/43h AIPO	12/43i AIPO
Yes	46	44	51	47	51
No	29	34	27	27	27
No opinion	25	22	22	26	22
	1/44j AIPO	6/44k AIPO	11/44l AIPO		
Yes	40	47	47		
No	37	36	35		
No opinion	23	17	18		
	2/45m AIPO	5/45n AIPO	8/45o AIPO	10/45p AIPO	
Yes	55	45	56	38	
No	31	38	28	45	
No opinion	14	17	16	17	

see bibliographic notes next page

Notes

- a Buckley (B) lists as 2/14/42; Capspary (C) listed as 3/42; Cantril & Strunk (C&S).
- b OPOR 813. C lists as AIPO 3/42; B and C&S lists correctly as 3/26/42 OPOR; Codebook dates 3/26/42 with interview dates 4/42.
- c OPOR 817k. B and C&S as 6/17/42; interview dates 6/42.
- d OPOR 819k. B and C&S as 7/15/42; interview dates 7/42.
- e AIPO 287k&t. B, C&S, Gallup 1972 p. 367.
- f AIPO 293k&t. B, C&S, Gallup 1972 p. 382.
- g OPOR 18. Codebook date 10/14/43, interview date 10/43
- h AIPO 306T. B, C, C&S Gallup 1972 p. 419.
- i AIPO 308 & 308k. B and C&S.
- j AIPO 310k. B and C&E.
- k AIPO 320k&t. B, C, C&S, and Gallup 1972 p. 453.
- l AIPO. B, C, and C&S.
- m AIPO 341k&t. B, C, C&S, and Gallup 1972 p. 492.
- n AIPO 347k&t. B, C and C&S.
- o AIPO 353t. B, C, C&S, and Gallup 1972 p. 523-4.
- p AIPO 358k. B and C&S.

5/1942-10/1945 Do you think Russia can be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war? (NORC)

	5/42a	7/42b	7/42c	8/42d
Yes	45	45	43	51
No	25	26	27	25
Don't know	30	29	30	24
	9/42e	11/42f	12/42g	6/43h
Yes	42	51	52	48
No	30	24	26	27
Don't know	28	25	22	25
	11/43i	4/44j	9/45k+	10/45l+
Yes	48	50	52	40
No	20	22	-	44
Don't know	32	28	-	16

+ slightvariation in question wording

Key a	Buckley (B) as 5/6/42; Caspary (C) as 5/42; Cantril & Strunk (C&S)
b	B and C&S as 7/1/42; c as 7/42
c	B and C&S as 7/18/42; C as 7/42
d	B and C&S as 8/21/42; C as 8/42
e	B and C as 9/42
f	B and C&S as 11/19/42; C as 11/42
g	B and C&S as 11/27/42; C as 11/42
h	B and C&S as 6/18/43; C as 6/43
i	B and C&S as 11/15/43; C as 11/43
j	B and C&S as 4/8/44
k	C; NORC 133; "now that the war is over"
l	C; NORC 135; "now that the war is over"

10/1945-12/1946 Do you think Russia will cooperate with us in world affairs? (AIPO 358t, 366k&t, 369k&t, 379k&t, 386k&t)

	10/45	3/46	4/46	10/46	12/46
Yes	44	35	45	32	43
No	40	52	38	53	40
Don't know	16	13	17	15	17

2/1946- Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us during
3/1947 the next year or two? (NORC 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 49T)

	2/46	3/46	5/46+	6/46+	10/46+
Yes, she will cooperate	(41)	34	33	30	28
Fairly sure	25				
Not certain	16				
No, she won't cooperate	(46)	45	52	55	58
Fairly sure	30				
Not certain	16				
Don't know	12	21	14	15	14

12/46* 3/47+

Yes	35	25
No	46	63
Don't know	19	12

- + slight variation in question wording
- + significantly different question wording

2/1947- Do you think we can count on Russia to meet us half-way
10/1949 in working out problems together? (NORC 148, 151, 152, 154,
158, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170)

	2/47+	7/47	10/47+	12/47
Yes	33	25	22	16
No	52	62	67	73
Don't know	15	13	11	11

6/48 8/48 10/48

Yes	25	20	16
No	64	70	76
Don't know	11	10	8

	2/49	6/49	7/49	8/49	9/49	10/49
Yes	19	24	22	24	20	19
No	72	66	67	67	69	69
Don't know	9	10	11	9	11	12

- + slight variation in question wording

Limited Test Ban Treaty

3/1951-
11/1964

Version A: Do you, yourself, think it is possible or impossible for the United States to reach a peaceful agreement with Russia? (AIPO 472)

Version B: Do you believe it is possible or impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with Russia? (AIPO 622k, 639, 654KB, 674K, 676k, 686, 701)

Version C: Do you believe that it is possible or impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences between Russia and the West? (AIPO 666)

	3/51	12/59	12/60	1/62
Version	A	B	B	B
Possible	43	67	50	53
Impossible	47	22	28	34
No opinion/NA	10	11	22	13

	12/62	6/63	8/63	3/64	11/64
Version	C	B	B	B	B
Possible	61	49	44	47	57
Impossible	32	37	39	39	26
No opinion/NA	7	14	17	14	18

2/1961-
2/1967

Looking ahead to 1970, which country do you think will be the greater threat to world peace- Russia or Communist China? (AIPO 641k, 669, 689k, 701k 741k)

	2/61	3/63	4/64
Russia	49	33	27
Communist China	32	46	56
Both	-	2	-
No opinion	19	19	17

	11/64	2/67
Russia	20	20
Communist China	59	71
No opinion	21	9

ABM/SALT I and SALT II

10/1953- You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the
5/1987 highest position of plus 5-- or something you like very much/have
a very favorable opinion of-- to the lowest position of minus 5--
or something you dislike very much/have a very unfavorable
opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would
you rate the following nations . . . Russia/Soviet Union (AIPO,
Gallup & NORC)

	10/53 AIPO	8/54 AIPO	9/54 AIPO	12/56 AIPO	12/66 AIPO	12/67 Gallup
	521	535	537	576	738	
+5	a	b	a	b	1	1
+4	a	b	a	b	1	1
+3	a	b	a	b	4	3
+2	a	1	a	1	3	5
+1	1	3	1	2	8	9
-1	6	5	4	5	10	9
-2	3	2	2	3	6	6
-3	7	6	5	6	12	12
-4	4	5	4	5	8	13
-5	71	71	73	69	40	37
DK/NA	7	6	10	7	7	4
Favorable	2	5	2	5	17	19
Unfavorable	91	89	88	88	76	77
No opinion	7	6	10	7	7	4
Very Favorable	0	1	0	1	1	2
Favorable	2	4	2	4	16	17
Unfavorable	16	13	11	14	28	27
V Unfavorable	75	76	77	74	48	50
No Opinion	7	6	10	7	7	4

10 Point Scale (con't)

	5/72 AIPO 852	4/73 AIPO 868k	7/73 AIPO 874K	3/74 NORC GSS	3/75 NORC GSS	6/76b AIPO 954k	3/77 NORC GSS
+5	3	3	4	3	3	2	2
+4	4	4	5	3	3	2	1
+3	11	7	9	12	12	3	8
+2	9	7	9	10	10	5	7
+1	13	15	20	17	16	9	13
-1	7	12	11	11	10	10	12
-2	6	6	6	5	5	7	5
-3	9	8	7	8	8	9	9
-4	6	6	4	4	5	9	5
-5	25	23	16	22	21	37	30
DK/NA	6	9	7	5	7	7	8
Favorable	40	36	47	45	44	21	31
Unfavorable	54	55	46	50	49	72	61
No opinion	6	9	7	5	7	7	8
Very Favorable	7	7	9	6	6	4	3
Favorable	33	29	47	39	38	17	28
Unfavorable	22	26	24	24	23	26	26
V Unfavorable	31	29	20	26	26	46	35
No Opinion	6	9	7	5	7	7	8
	4/78 AIPO 998K	2/79 AIPO 1123G	1/80 AIPO 1147G	2/81 AIPO 1168G	3/82 NORC GSS	8/82 AIPO 1200G	
+5	2	3	1	1	1	2	
+4	1	3	1	2	1	2	
+3	4	8	2	5	5	4	
+2	6	8	4	5	5	4	
+1	13	12	5	8	10	9	
-1	12	10	7	9	10	9	
-2	7	5	6	7	6	7	
-3	11	11	9	13	9	11	
-4	7	7	9	9	7	7	
-5	27	27	53	38	43	40	
DK/NA	10	6	3	3	3	5	
Favorable	26	34	13	21	22	21	
Unfavorable	64	60	84	76	75	74	
No opinion	10	6	3	3	3	5	
Very Favorable	3	6	2	3	2	4	
Favorable	23	28	11	18	20	17	
Unfavorable	30	26	22	29	25	27	
V Unfavorable	34	34	62	47	50	47	
No Opinion	10	6	3	3	3	5	

10 Point Scale (con't)

	3/83 NORC GSS	9/83 AIPO 1224G	3/85 NORC GSS	3/86 NORC GSS	5/87 Gallup/ TM
+5	1	4	2	1	2
+4	1	2	1	1	f
+3	4	1	3	7	23
+2	5	1	4	7	e
+1	12	1	11	16	e
-1	12	7	11	13	38
-2	7	6	8	7	d
-3	13	8	11	11	d
-4	7	8	7	6	33
-5	34	59	36	26	c
DK/NA	4	3	5	4	4
Favorable	23	9	21	32	25
Unfavorable	73	88	73	63	71
No opinion	4	3	6	4	4
Very Favorable	2	6	3	2	2
Favorable	21	3	18	30	23
Unfavorable	32	21	30	31	38
V Unfavorable	41	67	43	32	33
No Opinion	4	3	5	4	4

Abbreviations

a When combined, the frequencies for the first four categories equalled 1%. For AIPO 521, out of a sample size of 1488, the following number of individuals selected the first four categories: 3, 3, 7, and 1. For AIPO 537, out of a sample size of 1466, the following number of individuals selected the first four categories: 2, 1, 3, 6.

b When combined the frequencies for the first three categories equalled 2%. For AIPO 535, out of a sample size of 1626, the following number of individuals selected the first three categories: 11, 3, and 11. For AIPO 576, out of a sample size of 1539, the following number of individuals selected the first three categories: 4, 8 and 15.

c [-4,-5] equals very unfavorable.

d [-3,-2,-1] equals unfavorable.

e [+1,2,3] equals favorable.

f [+4,5] equals very favorable.

APPENDIX 6

The Limited Test Ban Treaty
Public Attitudes, 1946 - 1984

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Repeated Questions

1/1955- 2/1956	Do you think the United States should continue its hydrogen bomb tests, or should we stop them now? (NORC 366, 370, 382)			
		1/55	3/55	2/56
	Continue	84	80	83
	Stop	11	15	12
	Don't know	5	5	5
3/1955- 2/1956	(Those who answered continue tests were then asked) Do you think it would be a good idea, or a bad idea, if all countries, including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement to stop any further H-bomb tests? (NORC 370, 382)			
			3/55	2/56
	(asked of)		80	83
	Good idea		62	61
	Bad idea		34	35
	Don't know		4	4
3/1955- 11/1961	Would you tell me what is meant by the "fallout" of an H-bomb? (AIPO 544, 652)			
			3/55	11/61
	Correct		17	56
	Incorrect, vague		10	16
	Don't know		73	28
6/1956- 10/1956	As things look now, what do you think is likely to be the one most important issue in the Presidential election this year? (RCOM 63, 64, 68)			
		6/56	9/56	10/56
	Disarmament, stop A-bomb tests	*		2
	* less than 0.5%			
6/1956- 10/1956	Can you name one or two other issues you think will also be important? (RCOM 63, 68)			
			6/56	10/56
	Disarmament,, stop A-bomb tests		1	3

Repeated Questions

4/1957- 4/1958	Have you heard or read anything about the "fallout" of radio-active matter in H-bomb tests? (AIPO 582K, 598k) (see 3/1955 and 11/1961 for related questions)				
			4/57		4/58
	Yes		61		72
	No/no answer		39		28
2/1959- 9/1959	What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today? (AIPO 610, 612, 616, 618)				
		2/59	4/59	7/59	9/59
	Nuclear testing, danger from atomic explosions	1	1	1	3
7/1963- 9/1963	Do you approve of the limited Test ban Treaty? (Approximate question wording) (Harris)				
			7/63		9/63
	Unqualified Approval		52		81
	Qualified approval		29		11
	Opposed		19		8
			7/63		9/63
	Unqualified Approval				
	Cut fallout		12		21
	Must end tests		18		21
	End risk of atomic war		12		15
	Stop world suicide		6		13
	Step to world peace		0		9
	Halt cost of testing		4		5
	Qualified Approval				
	If Russia keeps word		12		8
	Only with inspection		12		2
	If on our terms		5		1
	Opposed				
	Russia will break it		17		4
	Hurts U.S. defense		2		4

Repeated Questions

8/1963- The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have
 10/1963 signed a treaty in which each country agrees not to test
 nuclear weapons in the air, under water, or in outer space. Do
 you think the test ban will or will not strengthen world peace?
 (MINN 226, IOWA/IAPO 172)

	8/63 Minn	10/63 Iowa
Will	78	56
Will not	14	21
No opinion	6	23
Depends on Russia; reservations about Russia	2	*

2/1946	This summer our Navy plans to make tests at sea to find out how effective the atom bombs would be in naval warfare. Do you think that representatives of other nations should or should not be allowed to watch these tests? (AIPO 365K&T)	
	Should	26
	Should Not	66
	No Opinion	8
2/1946	Do you approve or disapprove of giving other nations a complete report of the results of the [US atomic] tests? (AIPO 365K&T)	
	Approve	28
	Disapprove	63
	No Opinion	9
2/1946	Next July, the United States is planning to bombard a fleet of old battleships with atomic bombs. Do you think it is a good or a bad idea to test the atomic bomb in this way? (Minn 31)	
	Good idea	51
	Bad idea	31
	Undecided	18
2/1946	Who do you think should have more to say about the conduct of this test, scientists or the armed forces? (Minn 31)	
	Scientists	41
	Armed Forces	20
	Both	30
	Neither	1
	No opinion	8
2/1946	Do you think that representatives of the United Nations should be allowed to be present? (Minn 31)	
	Yes	38
	No	50
	Undecided	12
4/1946a	Do you think the United States should carry out the atom bomb test on Bikini Island, or should this be given up? (AIPO 368K&T)	
	Carry Out	43
	Given Up	37
	No Opinion	20

4/1946a	Some persons say that animals should not be used in making atomic bomb tests at Bikini Island. Do you agree or disagree? (AIPO 368K&T)		
	Agree		42
	Disagree		42
	No Opinion		16
4/1946b	From what you have heard or read, what do you think is the main purpose for the atom bomb tests which are to be held in the Pacific? (AIPO 369K&T)		
	To see what it will do, find out destructive power		32
	To see what it will do to a Navy ship, sea warfare		20
	Further experimentation, defense research		17
	Show the world its power to frighten other countries		7
	To show how powerful we are, prove US strength		3
	To prevent/outlaw war		1
	To prepare for next war		2
	Experiment for industrial use		1
	Test effects on sea life, living things		*
	Miscellaneous		2
	No answer		19
6/1946	Do you happen to know whether there is any plan to test the atomic bomb in the near future? (Psy Corp 173k&t)		
	Yes		75
	No/Don't know		25
6/1946	(Asked of those 75% who answered yes) Will you tell me what the targets are going to be in testing the bomb? (Psy Corp 173k&t)		
	Correct		84
	Incorrect		16
6/1946- 8/1946	(Asked of those 75% and 89% who had heard of a recent test) Do you think the test will/has show(n) that the Navy will need more or fewer men in the future than you have said the Navy should have now? (Psy Corp 178)		
		6/46	8/46
	More	11	21
	Same	25	35
	Fewer	33	25
	Don't know	31	19

7/1946	Did the atomic bombs in the recent tests do more damage or less than you thought they would? (AIPO 375K)	
	More Damage	18
	Same	11
	Less Damage	53
	No Opinion	18
8/1946	Were you greatly interested, moderately interested or not interested in the Bikini atom bomb test? (Minn 36)	
	Greatly interested	32
	Moderately interested	47
	Not interested	16
	Don't know about the tests	5
8/1946	(Asked of those 95% who had heard of the Bikini tests) Where did you get most of your information on the atom bomb tests- newspapers, the radio, or from talking with other people? (MINN 36)	
	Newspapers	62
	Radio	54
	Talking with other people	5
	Other	6
	Don't know	1
8/1946	(Asked of those 95% who had heard of the Bikini tests) Now that the atom bomb tests have been made, do you think the information gained should be kept in the United States, or shared with the other United Nations countries? (MINN 36)	
	Kept secret	66
	Shared	19
	Undecided	14
8/1946	(Asked of those 95% who had heard of the Bikini tests) From reports of what happened at Bikini, do you consider the atom bomb a more or less terrible weapon than you had thought before the tests took place? (Minn 36)	
	More terrible	26
	Less terrible	32
	About the same	33
	Don't know	8
8/1946	Do you happen to know whether there has been any test of the atomic bomb recently? (Psy Corp 178k&t)	
	Yes	89
	No/Don't know	11

8/1946	(Asked of those 89% who had heard of a recent test) Will you tell me what the targets were used in testing the bomb? (Psy Corp 178k&t)	
	Correct	88
	Incorrect/Don't know	12
8/1946	(Asked of those 89% who had heard of a recent test) Did the atomic bombs in recent tests do more damage or less than you thought they would? (Psy Corp 178k&t)	
	More damage	15
	Less damage	58
	Same (vol)	15
	No opinion	12
6/1953	Some people say that the recent heavy rains and tornadoes in various parts of the country have been caused by the atomic explosions in Nevada. Do you believe there is something to this, or not? (AIPO 516k)	
	Yes	29
	No	51
	No opinion	20
4/1954	Some people say that the US should call off the rest of the hydrogen bomb tests that have been planned. How do you feel--should we call off the rest of the tests, or should we go ahead with them? (AIPO 529K)	
	Call off	20
	Go ahead	71
	No opinion	9
1/1955	Do you think the United States should continue its hydrogen bomb tests, or should we stop them now? (NORC 366) (see repeated questions)	
	Continue	84
	Stop	11
	Don't know	5

1/1955 Here's a list of topics that have been in the papers lately. During the last week or so, have you talked about any of these things with your friends? (NORC 366) (multiple answers; data not presented in order asked)

Danger of World War III	42
Crime and juvenile delinquency	35
Communists in the United States	27
<u>Atom or hydrogen bombs</u>	23
No, None of them, Don't know	45

3/1955 Do you think the United States should continue its hydrogen bomb tests, or should we stop them now? (NORC 370) (see repeated questions)

Continue	80
Stop	15
Don't Know	5

3/1955 (Those 80% who answered continue were then asked) Do you think it would be a good idea, or a bad idea, if all countries, including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement to stop any further H-bomb tests? (NORC 370) (see repeated questions)

Good idea	62
Bad idea	34
Don't Know	4

3/1955 How much interest do you take in . . . -- a great deal of interest, some interest, or practically none? (NORC 370) (data not presented in the order asked)

	GD	S	N	DK
A. The United Nations organization?	20	59	19	2
B. Our relations with Central and South America?	23	42	32	3
C. The rearmament of Germany?	29	44	24	3
D. The Formosa situation?	36	41	20	3
E. <u>The hydrogen bomb tests?</u>	46	41	11	2

3/1955 see Repeated Questions (AIPO 544)

2/1956 Do you think the United States should continue its hydrogen bomb tests, or should we stop them now? (NORC 382) (see repeated questions)

Continue	83
Stop	12
Don't Know	5

2/1956	(Those 83% who answered continue were then asked) Do you think it would be a good idea, or a bad idea, if all countries, including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement to stop any further H-Bomb tests? (NORC 382) (see repeated questions)	
	Good idea	61
	Bad idea	35
	Don't Know	4
6/1956	See Repeated Questions (RCOM 63)	
9/1956	see Repeated Questions (RCOM 64)	
10/1956	Now a question about the hydrogen bomb. Have you heard or read anything about Adlai Stevenson's proposal that the United States take the lead in offering to stop any further hydrogen bomb tests, assuming Russia and England will do the same? (NORC 398T)	
	Yes	75
	No	25
10/1956	In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 398T)	
	Approve	41
	Disapprove	47
	DK	12
10/1956	Some people say that the US should call off Hydrogen Bomb tests for the present. Do you agree or disagree with this viewpoint? (AIPO 573K)	
	Agree	24
	Disagree	56
	No opinion	20

- 10/1956a A. Of course, there are lots of problems and issues in this years presidential campaign, but which one are you personally most concerned about? (RCOM 65)
 B. Are there any other problems or issues that are also important to you? (RCOM 65) (data not presented in order asked)

	A	B
Maintaining peace; keeping us out of war	17	9
<u>H-bomb issue, testing of nuclear weapons</u>	16	12
Farm problem	14	13
Segregation/Integration, racial issues		
civil rights	13	12
Foreign affairs	5	4
Electing the right candidate	4	1
Taxes	3	5
Economic, business welfare, prosperity	3	6
Draft issue	2	4
Education, improving schools	2	4
High cost of living, inflation	2	3
Labor problems, Taft-Hartley law	2	2
Higher wages	2	4
Social security	1	3
Nixon, Ike's health	1	2

10/1956b See Repeated Questions (RCOMa-c 68)

11/1956 As you may know, Adlai Stevenson proposed that the US take the lead in offering to stop any further hydrogen bomb tests, assuming Russia and England will do the same. In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 399)

Approve	42
Disapprove	52
Don't know	6

11/1956	Now on a different subject. The question of hydrogen-bomb tests has been discussed quite a bit in the election campaign this Fall. Do you think our government should or should not continue making H-bomb tests? (Minn 154A&B)	
	Should Continue	64
	Should Not continue	22
	No opinion	9
	Other	5
11/1956	Is the H-bomb test matter one of the major election issues this fall, as far as you personally are concerned, or not? (Minn 154A&B)	
	Yes, it is a major election issue	17
	No, it is not a major election issue	78
	No opinion	5
11/1956	In the debate over H-bomb testing, do you agree more with Adlai Stevenson, or more with Eisenhower? (Minn 154A&B)	
	Agree with Stevenson	27
	Agree with Eisenhower	54
	No opinion	17
	Other	2
4/1957	Russia had proposed that all nations with atomic weapons call a halt to any further tests of H-bombs or A-bombs, for an indefinite period. If we agree to stop the tests, do you think we could count on Russia's halting her tests, or not? (MINN 160)	
	Could count on Russia	7
	Could not	87
	No opinion	5
	Other	

4/1957 In the next set of questions I would like to ask about science stories you may have read or heard about. Just so we are thinking of the same things, let me tell you what I have in mind when I speak of science. It includes everything scientists discover about nature- it would be the discoveries about the stars, or atoms, about the human body or the mind- any basic discovery about how things work and why. But science also includes the way in which this information is used for practical uses- it might be a new way of curing a disease, the invention of a new auto engine, or making a new fertilizer. Here are some examples of science stories that you might see or hear about. As I read each one, would you tell me how interested you would be in reading or hearing such a story- very much interested, somewhat interested, or not very interested? (ISR 423) (data not presented in the order asked)

	Very much	Some- what	Not very	NA
a New ways of treating disease/can science protect you against heart disease	70	21	8	1
e The causes of depressions and hard times in the United States/how you can protect your family against hart times	63	23	13	1
c The effects of <u>atomic bombs</u> on human beings/will atom bomb tests affect your health	60	24	15	1
i New scientific ways to prepare food/food that won't ever spoil	50	27	22	1
g The psychology of how to raise children/will today's children be smarter than their parents	44	28	27	1
d How molecules are held together/new chemical cheory doubles mileage of gasoline	29	23	47	1
f The discovery of ancient civilization/discovery of ruins confirms Biblical story of Ruth	27	28	44	1
h Rocket ships and space travel/test of new rocket for first flight to moon announced	22	21	56	1
b The discovery of a new star/newly discovered star gives clue to how world began	19	25	55	1

4/1957	Have you heard of radioactive fallout or dust from atomic bombs? As you understand it, what is radioactivity like? (ISR 423)	
	Yes, but only misinformation	2
	Yes, but no answer or don't know what	12
	Yes, vague statements	25
	Yes, non-technical facts	21
	Yes, more or less technical facts	6
	No, not heard anything about radioactive fallout	33
	No answer	1
4/1957	Have you heard or read anything about the "fallout" of radio-active matter in H-bomb tests? (AIPO 582K) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	61
	No	39
4/1957	Do you think there is real danger from "fallout" of radio-active matter from the testing of H-bombs and A-bombs now being done, or not? (AIPO 582K)	
	Yes	52
	No	28
	Don't know	20
4/1957	If all other nations, including Russia, agreed to stop making anymore tests with nuclear weapons and H-bombs, should the US agree to stop, or not? (AIPO 582K)	
	Should agree to stop	63
	Should not	27
	No opinion	10
7/1957a	Do you think it is time to call another meeting, such as the Geneva conference two years ago, to discuss world disarmament? (AIPO 585k)	
	Yes	42
	No	31
	No opinion	27
7/1957a	If such a conference is held, would you like to have Eisenhower suggest a ban on H-bomb tests among all nations, including the United States and Russia? (AIPO 585k)	
	Yes, would	64
	No, would not	22
	No opinion	14

7/1957b	Do you favor or oppose stopping hydrogen bomb tests at this time? (AIPO 586K)		
	Favor		35
	Qualified favor		5
	Oppose		40
	Qualified oppose		3
	No opinion		17
7/1957b	Some authorities say that any new bombs that will be tested would have less and less radioactive "fall-out." Do you think this is a good argument or a poor argument for continuing hydrogen bomb tests? (AIPO 586K)		
	Good argument		49
	Poor		29
	No opinion		22
7/1957b	Some authorities say that the testing of hydrogen bombs must be continued if we are to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses. Do you think this is a good argument or a poor argument for continuing hydrogen bomb tests? (AIPO 586K)		
	Good argument		60
	Poor		25
	No opinion		15
7/1957	The Russians have proposed that all nations agree to stop all hydrogen and atomic bomb tests for two or three years, and have offered a plan to supervise the agreement to make sure it's not broken. Do you yourself feel, now, that we can count on Russia to live up to such an agreement, or that we cannot? (MINN 162)		
	Feel we can		12
	Feel we cannot		80
	No opinion		7
	Other		1
1/1958b	In a recent note to the US, Bulganin, the Russian Prime Minister, made these suggestions to improve relations between the East and West. Do you think that the US and its Western allies should or should not agree. . . To ban atomic and hydrogen weapon tests for at least 2 to 3 years if Russia also agrees? (AIPO 594K)		
		US	UK
	Should	49	74
	Should not	36	15
	No opinion	15	11

3/1958	Some people think the A-bomb and H-bomb tests in different parts of the world already have made certain changes in the weather. Other people disagree. What is your opinion- Do you think bomb tests have or have not had an effect on the weather? (MINN 169) (see 6/53 and 2/1963 for similar questions)	
	Have effect	45
	Have not	42
	No opinion	12
4/1958	Do you think the United States should stop making tests with nuclear weapons and H-bombs? (AIPO 598K)	
	Yes	29
	No	60
	No opinion	11
4/1958	Have you heard or read anything about the "fallout" of radio-active matter in H-bomb tests? (AIPO 598K) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	72
	No	27
	No answer	1
4/1958	If these tests are not stopped, do you think "fallout" is likely to become a threat to the health of future generations? (AIPO 598K)	
	Yes	46
	No	27
	No opinion	27
5/1958	Our government has scheduled a series of hydrogen-bomb tests out in the Pacific this year, but since Russia's latest proposal that all nations call a halt to H-bomb testing, some people think we should still cancel our tests. Other people think we should still carry out our plans. What is your opinion- do you think our government should make the tests, or cancel them? (MINN 170)	
	Should make tests	62
	Cancel them	24
	No opinion	11
	Cancel them if we're sure Russia will keep her agreement	3

5/1958	(Asked of those 88% who expressed an opinion) For what reason, mainly? (MINN 170)	
	(Those who favored holding the tests)	
	Don't know why; no special reason	2
	We must be prepared; we need a good defense	21
	Russia can't be trusted	32
	Russia has completed her tests; Russia is ahead of us	7
	We must keep up with advances in science	13
	We should experiment for a "cleaner bomb"	3
	We must keep up with Russia	13
	We should make our own decisions, go ahead with our own plans	4
	Other	5
	(Those in favor of cancelling the tests)	
	Don't know why; no special reason	4
	There's too much danger of fallout; harmful to nature, people's health	44
	The tests effect the weather, disturb the elements	6
	We should strive to cooperate; we're tempting Russia to war	13
	I disapprove of the H-bomb; atomic warfare should be outlawed	10
	Spending a lot of money; too expensive	7
	Other	15
7/1958	(Elite poll) Should the U.S. halt testing? (approximate question wording) (Gallup)	
	Should not halt testing	~50
	Should halt testing, even if unilateral	~25
	Approve halt testing in principle if get assurances from the Russians	~30
9/1958	The United States and Great Britain are going to meet this Fall with Russia to talk about putting an end to atom-bomb and Hydrogen-bomb testing. Do you feel the three countries will or will not succeed in reaching an agreement to stop the tests? (MINN 174 A&B)	
	Will succeed	21
	Will not	67
	No opinion	12

9/1958	(Asked of those 88% who expressed an opinion) Why do you feel that way? (MINN 174)				
	(Those 21% who said WILL succeed)				
	We have to succeed; it's either success or complete destruction				63
	Russia is getting more cooperating; even Russia wants to avoid war				17
	Other				12
	Don't know				8
	(Those 67% who said will NOT succeed)				
	Russia won't agree; Russia will stop all agreement; the 3 countries won't agree				64
	Russia can't be trusted; they will agree but won't follow through				16
	None of the countries really wants to stop; the 3 countries don't trust each other				9
	Other				8
	Russia (no further explanation)				1
	Don't know				3
9/1958	What would you say we gain by continuing our A-bomb and H-bomb tests? (MINN 174)				
	Scientific knowledge in general; find out new things				25
	Nothing will be gained				23
	Improve weapons for war/defense; protect our country				22
	Keep ahead/up to Russia				12
	Develop peacetime uses for nuclear power				5
	Other				1
	Don't know				11
2/1959- 9/1959	What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today? (AIPO 610, 612, 616, 618)				
		2/59	4/59	7/59	9/59
	Nuclear testing, danger from atomic explosions	1	1	1	3

11/1959	The United States and Russia have made an agreement to stop testing H-bombs until the end of this year. Would you like to have this agreement continued next year, or not? (AIPO 620)	
	Yes	77
	No	11
	No opinion	12
3/1960	For more than a year our government has not carried out any A-bomb or H-bomb tests, nor set off any nuclear explosions. Do you feel there would be advantages in our STARTING again to carry out nuclear tests? What advantages? (MINN 190)	
	Advantages	32
	Disadvantages	67
	No; no advantages; none	25
	Can only learn by testing; tests are necessary to find out how much progress is being made; can't make improvements unless you know what's wrong	8
	Keep up with Russia; keep up with other countries	7
	Other	1
	Don't know	8
3/1960	Do you feel there would be disadvantages if we were to start nuclear tests again? What disadvantages? (MINN 190)	
	Fall-out; radio-activity; dangerous to our health	15
	No; no disadvantages; none	12
	Waste of money; too expensive	5
	Other countries would lose faith in us; we'd lose allies; it would anger others; world opinion would be against it	5
	Other countries would also start testing	4
	Affects the weather; bad effect on the weather	1
	Dangerous, scary, damaging	1
	Other	1
	Don't know	7
3/1960	Taking everything into account, do you yourself think it would be a good idea or a poor idea for the United States to start making nuclear tests again this year? (MINN 190)	
	Good idea	28
	Poor idea	51
	No opinion	18
	Should start tests again, only if other countries do	2
	Other	1

1/1961 Two years ago, the United States stopped its testing of nuclear weapons-- the A-bomb and H-bomb-- in the hope of working out a treaty with Russia to cancel all such tests in the future. However, no treaty has yet been signed. In view of that, do you feel the United States should or should not resume tests of nuclear weapons this year? (MINN 201)

Should	61
Should not	30
No opinion	7
Other	2

6/1961 Since November, 1958, the US and Russia have been trying to reach a permanent agreement on the control and inspection of nuclear bomb tests. During this period each country voluntarily agreed not to conduct any tests, but no permanent agreement has been reached. Do you think the US should resume tests at this time, or not? (AIPO 647K)

Should resume tests	55
Should not	26
No opinion	19

7/1961 Over two years ago, the United States stopped its testing of the A-bomb and H-bomb, and other nuclear weapons in the hope of working out a treaty with Russia to cancel all such tests in the future. However, no treaty has yet been signed. In view of that, do you feel the United States should or should not resume tests of nuclear weapons this year? (MINN 206)

Should	66
Should not	24
No opinion	9
Other	1

9/1961 (Asked in New York, Chicago & Los Angeles) What do you think the U.S. should do now- start tests again, or continue her ban on H-bomb tests? (Gallup)

	Favor	Oppose	No opinion
3 US cities	59	30	11
Great Britain	30	64	6
New Delhi	18	69	13

9/1961 (Asked in New York, Chicago & Los Angeles) Do you think that recent American actions are or are not in any way to blame for Russia resuming tests? (Gallup special)

	Considerably to blame	A Little to blame	Not at All to blame	No Opinion
3 US cities	5	18	70	7
Great Britain	16	32	46	6
New Delhi	26	18	39	17

9/1961 After going more than two years without testing nuclear bombs, Russia recently began such tests again. Why do you think Russia did so? (MINN 208) (data not presented in order obtained)

To frighten or bluff us; to make us think they are more powerful than they are	28
Propaganda effect; to remind the world of their military power; to prove their strength; to show off	19
To catch up with the US; they thought they were behind so had to catch up; wanted to get ahead of us	17
To test and perfect their weapons; they had a large stockpile of weapons and needed to test their effectiveness	12
Cold War maneuver; to create tension; to frighten smaller/neutral nations into siding with Russia; to gain in Berlin crisis	8
To prepare for war	6
They have been testing all along, making underground tests	2
Other	5
Don't know	12

9/1961 The United States began testing nuclear weapons again soon after Russia did. Do you approve or disapprove of our action? (MINN 208)

Approve	89
Disapprove	8
No opinion	2
Other	1

11/1961 Russia has been testing nuclear bombs in the atmosphere above ground, while the US has been testing underground. Do you think the US should or should not start tests in the atmosphere? (AIPO 652K)

Should	44
Should not	45
No opinion	11

11/1961	Mr. Khrushchev has said that he will agree to a ban on the testing of H-bombs if that ban is part of a program for total disarmament. Do you think Mr. Khrushchev is bluffing or do you think he sincerely wants total disarmament? (AIPO 652K)		
		US	UK
	Bluffing	79	50
	Wants total disarmament	9	21
	DK	12	29
11/1961	As you probably know, fallout is radioactive matter than comes from the testing of nuclear bombs in the atmosphere. Do you think there is enough fallout in the air right now to be a danger to people, or not? (AIPO 652K)		
	Yes		21
	No		61
	No opinion		18
11/1961	What do you think are the effects of fallout on human beings? (AIPO 652K) (data not presented in order obtained)		
	Causes disease, sickness, sterilization		35
	Will effect future generations, misformed children		13
	Causes cancer, leukemia		11
	Will be disastrous, there would be no one left alive		9
	No effects		4
	Will ruin the land so food would be ruined		3
	Make children's bones soft		2
	Fear, panic		1
	Miscellaneous		1
	No opinion		33
11/1961	Have your fears about nuclear war or fallout had any effect on your outlook on life or your plans for the future? (AIPO 652K)		
	Yes, in what ways		15
	No		84
	No answer		1

11/1961	(Asked of the 15% who answered that fallout has had an effect on their outlook) In what way? (AIPO 552k) (data not presented in the order obtained)	
	Dread, fear, general	29
	Shelters: planning to, thinking about, building a fallout shelter; making changes in home to protect against nuclear attack	16
	Don't have any plans; it is hard to plan for the future; I can't make any plans at this time	11
	Pessimistic outlook; I think "What's the use?" I don't know whether or not I will wake up alive each day	10
	Future generations, children growing up, worry about children growing up, fear of their future	9
	Live life fully; eat, drink and be merry; I try to get all I can from life each day, appreciate and live life to the full	8
	Moving: thinking of moving away to another state or to the beach; getting out of this area	4
	Bringing children into the works; thinking about, afraid to bring children into the world; will cut down on our family	2
	Will not live; I think I will not be able to live out my full life	1
	Miscellaneous	3
	Don't know/no answer	6
11/1961	How do you feel about the United States resuming nuclear bomb testing in the atmosphere. Do you think the U.S. should resume testing or not? (IOWA/IAPO 166) (see 4/1962)	
	Should	55
	Should not	32
	No opinion	13
	Other	5
11/1961	(Asked of those 55% who answered should resume testing) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 166) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Should keep up with other countries	40
	Russia has been testing	25
	For our own protection	15
	Improve our own knowledge of bomb	11
	Other	9

11/1961	(Asked of those 32% who answered should not resume testing) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 166) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Fear danger exists in testing (fallout)	36
	Testing is not necessary	21
	If we don't, others might quit	15
	Too much expense involved	9
	Testing should be done underground	5
	Other	14
11/1961	If the United States resumes nuclear bomb testing, do you feel there will be more chance or less chance of war in the future? (IOWA/IAPO 166)	
	More	14
	Less	57
	Undecided	30
12/1961	Congress begins a new session in January. What problem would you like to see Congress deal with first? (MINN 210) (data not presented in order asked)	
	Peace	16
	The farm problem	10
	Economic problems in U.S.	8
	Taxation	8
	Old age assistance	7
	School problems	5
	Nuclear weapons- <u>atom bomb testing</u>	3
	Military defense	3
	Civil defense	2
	Civil rights	2
	Foreign aid	2
	Redistricting	1
	Better control over welfare benefits	1
	Other	12
	Don't know	32
1/1962	Last fall Russia resumed testing of nuclear bombs with a series of tests in the atmosphere (above ground). The US then resumed testing of nuclear bombs, but all of the tests have been underground. Do you think the US should or should not resume tests in the atmosphere? (AIPO 654 KB)	
	Should	46
	Should not	43
	No opinion	11

3/1962	Here is a question about the resumption of nuclear bomb tests in the atmosphere (above ground). What is your opinion--do you think the US should or should not resume tests in the atmosphere? (AIPO 656K)	
	Should	66
	Should not	25
	No opinion	9
4/1962	How do you feel about the United States resuming nuclear bomb testing in the atmosphere. Do you think the U.S. should resume testing or not? (IOWA/IAPO 167) (see 11/1961)	
	Should	61
	Should not	23
	No opinion	16
4/1962	(Asked of those 61% who answered should) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 167) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Should keep up with other countries	52
	Russia has been testing	23
	For our own protection	16
	Improve our own knowledge of bomb	9
4/1962	(Asked of those 23% who answered should not resume testing) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 167) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Fear danger exists in testing (fallout)	61
	Too much expense involved	17
	Testing is not necessary	11
	If we don't, others might quit	7
	Testing should be done underground	3

11/1962- Of the many problems facing this country, which one gives
 12/1962 you the greatest worry or concern at this time? (AIPO 665,
 666) (data not presented in the order obtained)

	11/62	12/62
The Cuban situation	37	22
Threat of war, cold war, <u>atomic</u> war	25	18
Russia	9	8
Threat of Communism	7	6
Economic problems, inflation, high taxes	6	8
Berlin situation	6	3
The threat of war with Russia (specific)	4	3
Unemployment	3	4
China	3	2
Civil rights	2	5
Foreign situation	2	3
Apathy and indifference of public	1	1
Nuclear testing	1	5
Farm problem	*	1
Nothing	3	4
Miscellaneous	6	13
Don't know/no answer	3	3

2/1963	Some people think the A-bomb and H-bomb tests are changing the weather. Other people say the bomb tests have no real effect on the weather. What is your opinion- Do you think the bomb tests are or are not changing the weather? (MINN 221) (see similar question 3/1958)	
	Are changing	42
	Are not	41
	No opinion	16
	Other	1
3/1963	Have you heard or read about the discussions regarding the banning or prohibiting of nuclear weapon tests? (AIPO 569K)	
	Yes	72
	No	28
3/1963	(Asked of those 72% who answered yes) Do you think the day will come when we have a nuclear test ban treaty with Russia, or not? (AIPO 669k)	
	Yes	49
	No	51
3/1963	(Asked of those 49% who answered yes) When do you think this will be--within one year, within ten years, or later than this? (AIPO 669k)	
	Within 1	6
	Within 10	71
	Later	8
	Don't know	15
3/1963	If a test ban treaty were put into effect, do you think Russia would live up to her part of the agreement, or not? (AIPO 669)	
	Yes	19
	No	65
	No opinion/no answer	16
7/1963	See Repeated Questions (Harris)	
8/1963	On the next subject, have you heard or read about the agreement with Russia to have a partial ban on the testing of nuclear weapons? (AIPO 676K)	
	Yes	77
	No	23

8/1963	(Asked of those 77% who had heard or read about the agreement) Do you think the Senate should vote approval of this ban, or not? (AIPO 676k)	
	Yes, should	63
	No, should not	17
	No opinion	20
8/1963	(Those 63% who answered that the treaty should be approved by the Senate were asked) Why do you say this? (AIPO 676k) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	A move toward peace, a first step, may break tensions become friendlier, may lead to other agreements	41
	Atmosphere has become contaminated, too much fallout	9
	Don't approve of nuclear bombs or testing	8
	Approve, but I don't trust Russians; must be cautious	6
	There has been too much testing already; bomb already big enough, effective enough; nuclear weapons spreading too fast, dangerous	6
	May be able to get all nations to comply, stop spread of weapons	3
	Approve, but must not reduce our safety, military preparedness	2
	Approve, but Senate should study carefully	1
	Miscellaneous	18
	Don't know/no answer	5
8/1963	(Those 17% who answered no) Why do you say this? (AIPO 676k) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Don't trust Russians, they are unreliable, their word is not good	60
	It's in Russia's favor, not ours; to her advantage not ours	7
	It's in Russia's favor, not ours; to her advantage not ours	7
	Should be prepared for war; treaty will reduce preparedness	5
	Miscellaneous	20
	Don't know/no answer	7
8/1963	(Those 20% who answered No opinion) Why do you say this? (AIPO 676k) (data not presented in order obtained)	
	Can't trust the Russians	8
	I haven't had an opportunity to study; not well enough informed yet to state an opinion	5
	Miscellaneous	5
	No answer/No opinion	82

8/1963	The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty in which each country agrees not to test nuclear weapons in the air, under water, or in outer space. Do you think the test ban will or will not strengthen world peace? (MINN 226)	
	Will	78
	Will not	14
	No opinion	6
	Depends on Russia; reservations about Russia	2
8/1963	In past years, Russia would not accept the terms to stop nuclear testing that she does now. Why do you think Russia was willing to sign such a treaty at this time? (MINN 226) (data not presented in the order obtained)	
	Russia is afraid of Red China; wants West to be on her side against China	28
	Russia can't be trusted, has ulterior motives; is using this treaty to have own advantage some way; wants to put up good front; wants to relax west temporarily; is stalling for time	18
	Russia thinks US is ahead of her; is afraid US has more weapons	15
	Russia doesn't want war, wants to be friends with US	12
	Russia has done all the testing she needs to do; has all the information she wants	9
	Domestic problems: agriculture, Khrushchev is in trouble at home, economy is strained	3
	Increased radioactivity; concerned about fallout	2
	Russia is afraid	1
	Other	5
	Dcn't know	17
8/1963	Any of the countries signing the treaty-- including the United States-- can drop out of the treaty by giving three months notice to the other signers. Do you like or dislike that provision? (MINN 226)	
	Like it	44
	Dislike it	43
	No opinion	13

8/1963 As far as the United States is concerned, the treaty still must be approved by the U.S. Senate before it becomes formally effective. Do you think the Senate should approve the treaty, or reject it? (MINN 226)

Approve treaty	84
Reject it	7
No opinion	9

8/1963 Of all the things that have happened during his first term in office, which do you think will help to win votes for President Kennedy in the 1964 election? (MINN 226)
Which of the things that happened in his first term do you think will take votes away from President Kennedy in the 1964 election? (MINN 226) (items in parenthesis are the negative versions)

	Help	Hurt
Civil rights; his stand on integration	18	30
Cuba; stood up to the Russians in Cuba; (Bay of Pigs invasion)	17	18
<u>Nuclear test ban treaty</u>	10	1
Peace; easing of tension with Russia; good relations with other countries	6	-
Nothing; he won't win any more votes than he did in 1960; (won't lose votes)	6	8
Medicare; attempts to pass old-age hospitalization bill; concerned for old people; (Socialized medicine)	3	1
Tax cut	3	-
Personality; young, eager, religious, sincere, family man; (too much publicity about family)	3	1
Strong leadership; decisive, effective; (weak leadership; indecisive; can't put his programs across)	2	2
Goodwill tour; traveling; meeting people	2	-
Labor policies; has helped laboring class, poor people, less unemployment; helped settle strikes; (interference in US steel dispute)	2	2
Separation of church and state; has not shown favoritism to his religion; (being Catholic)	1	2
Vague	1	*
Too many Kennedy's in office	-	2
(Farm program)	-	2
(Spending too much money)	-	4
Other	8	6
Don't know; can't think of anything	19	22

9/1963	See Repeated Questions (Harris)	
10/1963	The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty in which each country agrees not to test nuclear weapons in the air, under water, or in outer space. Do you think the test ban treaty will or will not strengthen world peace? (IOWA/IAPO 172)	
	Will	56
	Will not	21
	No opinion	23
10/1963	Do you favor or oppose the United States signing the nuclear test ban treaty that prohibits testing? (IOWA/IAPO 172)	
	Favor	69
	Oppose	13
	No opinion	18
10/1963	(Asked of those 69% who favored the treaty) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 172) (data not presented in the order obtained)	
	Promote world peace	37
	Should eliminate all nuclear weapons	23
	Eliminate fallout	13
	Prevent war	11
	Shows U.S. is leader in world peace	4
	Have enough information about nuclear weapons	3
	Spend money for other worth while things	2
	Beneficial to U.S.	1
	Other	2
10/1963	(Asked of those 13% who opposed the treaty) Why do you feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 172) (data not presented in the order obtained)	
	Don't trust Russia	43
	U.S. must be prepared	16
	Indefinite	15
	U.S. should continue to test	9
	Won't do any good	4
	Miscellaneous	6
	Other	8

11/1963

Are there any accomplishments of the Kennedy administration which are important to you? What are they? (ORC 466G)

	Public
No accomplishments	36
Aid to the aged	6
Civil Rights	4
Cuba	4
Tax-cut efforts	4
Good economic performance	4
General approval of JFK	4
Cold War, Communism, Russia & Berlin	2
<u>Nuclear agreement/test ban</u>	2
Draft bill/increase military pay	2
Domestic issues	2
Other answer	12
Don't know/No answer	18

11/1963 Please tell me whether you think the Kennedy administration is doing a very good job, a fairly good job, not so good a job, or a poor job on each of these . . . the nuclear test ban treaty? (ORC 466G) (data not presented in the order asked)

	VG	FG	NSG	P	DK
<u>The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</u>	34	31	10	a	25
Aid to education	27	42	16	a	15
Handling of strikes and labor problems	26	41	21	a	12
Handling of Cuba	23	26	<u>39</u>	a	12
Improving US prestige throughout the world	23	34	25	a	18
Providing medical care for aged	23	32	31	a	14
Helping depressed areas in this country	22	38	23	a	17
Winning the cold war with Russia	19	38	29	a	14
Dealing with the problem of segregation	19	27	45	a	9
Keeping employment high	18	47	26	a	9
Relations w our European allies	18	45	16	a	21
Making country more prosperous	16	45	26	a	13
Developing a good tax program	14	35	31	a	20
Making government more efficient	14	38	28	a	20
Relations with business generally	14	42	22	a	22
Berlin and the Berlin Wall	13	32	27	a	28
Holding down living costs	11	46	37	a	6
Handling of foreign aid	11	31	35	a	23
Handling the country's farm prog	11	30	28	a	31
Assistance on the problems of big cities	10	30	12	a	48
Getting the Administration's legislative program passed by Congress	8	32	33	a	27
Handling the situation in Vietnam and Laos	8	24	33	a	35
Balancing the Federal budget	8	22	44	a	26
Reducing the outflow of gold from the US	8				
Holding down unnecessary government spending	7	26	50	a	17

a Data for the two categories not so good and poor combined

11/1963 Would you please look over this list of issues that we have just been through and pick out those that you are most concerned about. Just give me the letter. (ORC 466G) (data not presented in order obtained)

Public

Holding down the living costs	58
Dealing with the problem of segregation	53
Keeping employment high	46
Providing medical care for aged	44
Developing a good tax program	44
Aid to education	41
Holding down unnecessary government spending	39
Helping depressed areas in this country	33
Winning the cold war with Russia	32
Handling of Cuba	31
Making the country more prosperous	31
<u>The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</u>	28
Handling of strikes and labor problems	26
Making government more efficient	26
Balancing the Federal budget	24
Improving US prestige throughout the world	23
Handling of foreign aid	18
Relations with our European allies	17
Reducing the outflow of gold from the US	16
Berlin and the Berlin Wall	16
Handling the country's farm program	16
Handling the situation in Vietnam and Laos	14
Relations with business generally	12
Getting the Administration's legislative program passed by Congress	10
Assistance on the problems of big cities	7

11/1963 Since Russia agreed to a test ban on atomic testing, some people think Khrushchev has become more peace-minded. Do you think Russia is now really more for peace than before, or do you think there has been no real change? (Harris 1285)

Really more for peace	16
No real change	73
Not sure	11

11/1963 I want to read you some stands on issues that have been identified with Senator Goldwater. Do you tend to agree more or disagree more with Senator Goldwater on . . . This country should not have signed the test ban treaty with Russia? (Harris 1285)

Agree More	25
Disagree more	52
Not sure	23

11/1963 How would you rate the job President Kennedy has done on
 --excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris
 1285)

- a) getting Russia to agree to an atomic test ban;
- b) handling Khrushchev;
- c) working for peace in the world;
- d) standing firm in Berlin;
- e) selling wheat to Russia;
- f) keeping the military defense of the country strong;
- g) (the standard job performance question)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Excellent	27	21	28	30	14	27	18
Pretty good	39	42	43	44	37	49	38
Only fair	14	23	18	13	14	13	25
Poor	7	9	5	4	17	8	15
Not sure	13	5	6	9	17	8	4
Positive	66	63	71	74	51	76	56
Negative	21	32	23	17	31	21	40

12/1963 A few weeks ago Russia and the United States signed an
 agreement about the testing of atom bombs. Did you happen to
 read or hear about that? (ISR 729)

Yes	73
No	25
Don't know/No answer	2

12/1963	(Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) As you understand it, what did they agree to do? (ISR 729)	
	Gives evidence of full understanding or knowledge of treaty's provisions and makes a specific mention that underground testing is not included in the treaty	6
	Gives evidence of full understanding or knowledge of treaty's provisions but does NOT mention that underground testing is not included in the treaty	*
	Gives evidence of some or fragmentary understanding of the treaty and makes a specific mention that underground testing is not included	14
	Gives evidence of some or fragmentary understanding of the treaty but does NOT mention that underground testing is not included	40
	Some accurate information, some misinformation	12
	Gives misinformation; no understanding	16
	Mentions agreement on controls, inspection only	1
	Other	*
	Don't know	11
12/1963	(Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) Would you say it was generally a good idea or a bad idea for our country to sign that agreement? (ISR 729)	
	Good idea	51
	Good idea with qualifications; on whole more good than bad	13
	Pro-con; good in some respects, bad in others	2
	Bad idea with qualifications; more unfavorable than favorable aspects	2
	Bad idea	15
	Depends	1
	Don't know/No answer	14
12/1963	(Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) Some people think the agreement to stop testing will have a good effect on business conditions in this country. Others think it will have a bad effect. How about you, do you think it will have any effect on business conditions? (ISR 729)	
	Good effect	14
	Good effect with qualifications	2
	Pro-con; better in some respects, worse in others	1
	Bad effect with qualifications	1
	Bad effect	5
	Will have no effect on business	51
	Don't know/No answer	27

12/1963	(Asked of those 19% who answered that it would have a good or bad effect? Why is that- what kind of effect? (ISR 729)	
	Good effect	
	Reduction in tensions, worries, and uncertainties as a favorable implication for business and consumers	34
	Lower taxes, less government spending	*
	More consumer spending	4
	Other good effect	15
	Bad effect	
	Cut in defense spending, fewer jobs	12
	Increase in unemployment	4
	Makes business worse	3
	Other bad effect	3
	Don't know/No answer	24
11/1983	Let me read you a list of things some people have said they remember most about President Kennedy. From this list of things, which one or two do you most remember him for . . . ? (Harris 832112)	
	The missile crisis in Cuba	38
	The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba	29
	His stand on civil rights	25
	His inauguration speech	22
	The first Catholic to be elected to the White House	15
	His winning the 1960 election	12
	His standing firm on the Russian threat to Berlin	11
	The way he handled live news conferences	11
	His starting the Peace Corps	11
	His negotiating the first <u>nuclear test ban treaty</u> with the Russians	7
	Other (vol)	5
	Nothing (vol)	4
	Not sure	3

9/1984

How much effect, if any, do you think the following government actions have had or will have to reduce the chance of nuclear war? A great deal, a moderate amount, almost no effect? (ABT 4)

- A. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I banning deployment of anti-ballistic missiles
 - B. Future ratification of the SALT II US-USSR agreement slightly reducing the number of offensive nuclear missiles
 - C. Past US-USSR agreement not to test nuclear bombs in the atmosphere?
 - D. Future agreement on a freeze of future testing, production or deployment of nuclear weapons?
 - E. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I that placed a cap on the number of nuclear missiles each side could build
 - F. Future US build-up of our conventional forces to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons
 - G. Future agreement over no-first-use of nuclear weapons
 - H. Future agreement to ban anti-satellite weapons
 - I Future agreement to ban chemical weapons
- (data not presented in the order asked)

	Great Deal	Moderate Amount	Almost No effect	Don't know No answer
D. Freeze	29	32	33	6
G. NFU	27	27	37	9
I. CW	27	28	39	7
H. ASAT	26	34	32	8
C. LTBT	21	31	41	8
F. Convent	21	40	32	7
E. SALT I off	12	33	47	8
B. SALT II	12	38	42	8
A. SALT I/ABM	10	34	46	9

APPENDIX 7

Perceptions Concerning Verification of Arms Control Agreements,
1945 - 1988

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Repeated Questions

2/1947- Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it
10/1949 meant that we had to stop making atomic bombs after the system of control had been agreed to and set up? (NORC 148, 152, 170)

- A. We had to stop making atomic bombs?
B. We had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand?
C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements?
D. We had to place all our atomic factories under the control of an international agency?
E. We had to give the international agency all the information it needs about atomic energy?

	2/47			10/47			10/49+		
	Favor	Oppose	DK	Favor	Oppose	DK	Favor	Oppose	Dk
a.	53	33	14	59	31	10	68	22	10
b.	39	49	12	40	52	8	57	32	11
c.	67	19	14	79	14	7	77	13	10
d.	51	31	18	55	33	12	54	30	16
e.	40	44	16	41	48	11	45	40	15

+ slight variation in question wording

3/1958- Would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide organization
11/1981 which would make sure, by regular inspections, that no nation, including Russia and the United States, makes hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, and missiles (AIPO 596 K I&II, 1182G, 1186G)

	3/58	9/81+	11/81+
Favor	70	75	83
Oppose	16	17	10
No opinion	14	8	7

+ slight variation in question wording

7/1953- Do you think we could count on Russia to live up whatever
10/1955 agreements may result from these meetings? (NORC 341-2, 374, 376, 379)

	7/53+	8/55	10/55	12/55
Yes	58	49	21	15
No	30	42	68	78
DK	12	9	11	7

+ variation in question wording and asked of a sub-population

Repeated Questions

10/1978- For the past few years, the United States and Russia have had a
10/1985 policy of trying to reach agreements which will relax tensions
between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live
up to such agreements or don't you think so? (NBC/AP 33,
35/107; 40/113; 45/121; NBC/WSJ, NBC/WSJ, NBC/WSJ)

	8/78	10/78	3/79	9/79	10/85+
Can be trusted	21	24	26	21	17
Cannot be trusted	69	66	64	71	74
Not sure	10	10	10	8	9

10/86a 3/87

Can be trusted	26	32
Cannot be trusted	64	59
Not sure	10	9

+ variation in question wording

3/1982- If the United States and the Soviet Union were to reach
11/1985 agreement on nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union
could be trusted to keep its part of the bargain, or not--or
haven't you heard enough about that yet to say? (LAT 51, 58,
93, 100)

	3/82	7/82	1/85	11/85
Could be trusted	17	17	23	24
Could not be trusted	66	68	68	66
Haven't heard enough	9	8	-	-
Not sure	7	7	9	10
Refused	1	-	-	-

4/1982- I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear
9/1983 freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree
with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on
that statement. . . . The Soviet Union would try to cheat on
any nuclear freeze agreement and get an advantage over the
U.S. (ABC/WP)

	4/1982	9/1983
Agree	80	80
Disagree	13	14
DK	7	6

Repeated Questions

4/1984- Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or
4/1987 violating existing nuclear arms control agreements? (P&S/CPD)

	4/84	10/85	4/87
Adhering	13	13	16
Violating	70	64	66
Don't know	17	22	18

5/1984- Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we
7/1988 should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms.

	5/84 PAF	10/87+ M&K/ATS	7/88+ DYG/ATS
Agree	45	50	53
Disagree	50	45	41
DK/NS	5	5	6

+ slight variation in question wording

1/1985- Do you think it is possible to negotiate a fair arms control
11/1985 agreement that the Soviet Union will live up to? (CBS/NYT)

	1/85	11/85+
Yes	48	39
No	39	50
No opinion	13	11

+ slight variation in question wording

1/1985- Some people say that, before the US enters into any nuclear
11/1985 weapons agreement with the Russians, we must have ways to find out if they are living up to their part of the bargain, but other people say there is no such thing as absolute verification and to insist on it would result in no agreement at all. To what extent would you be willing to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt about complying with a nuclear weapons agreement? Would you want to be 100 percent certain they were complying, or 75 percent certain, or 50 percent certain, or would you be willing to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt if you were less certain than that? (LAT 93, 100)

	1/85	11/85
100 percent certain	58	48
75 percent certain	19	19
50 percent	11	15
Less certain	9	12
Not sure	3	5
Refused	-	1

Repeated Questions

2/1985- 11/1985	If such an agreement [to limit nuclear weapons] were reached, do you think the Soviet Union would honor it, or don't you think so? (NBC)		
		2/85	11/85
	Would honor	34	32
	Would not honor	50	48
	Not sure	16	20
10/1985- 4/1987	What is more important to your view-- negotiating new arms control agreements or getting the Soviets to abide by existing agreements? (P&S/CPD)		
		10/85	4/87
	New agreements	35	42
	Existing agreements	54	51
	Don't know	11	7
1/1988- 7/1988	Do you think Gorbachev is a person we can trust a great deal, somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS, DYG/ATS)		
		1/88 MOR/ATS	7/88 DYG/ATS
	A great deal	6	14
	Somewhat	67	69
	Not at all	24	12
	Don't know/Refused	3	5
1/1988- 7/1988	Do you think we can trust Gorbachev more, less, or about the same as past Soviet leaders? (MOR/ATS, DYG/ATS))		
		1/88 MOR/ATS	7/88 DYG/ATS
	More	53	67
	About the same	38	23
	Less	6	6
	Don't know/refused	3	4
5/1988- 8/1988	Does the fact that the Soviets are actually withdrawing troops from Afghanistan -- after promising to do so -- make you trust them more, less, or about the same? (M&K/ATS)		
		5/88	9/88
	More	13	19
	Less	10	10
	About the same	75	70
	Not sure (vol)	1	2

10/1945	Russia has asked this country for a loan of 6 million dollars to help Russia get back on its feet. Would you approve or disapprove of the United States making such a loan? [28% approved, 59% disapproved, 13% no opinion] If we lend Russia this money, do you think we will be repaid, in part, in full, or not at all? (AIPO 357K&T)	
	In part	28
	In full	25
	Not at all	32
	No opinion	15
12/1945	It has been suggested that the world organization have inspectors who could search any property in any country at any time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one American working together. Do you think there should be such an inspection or not? (NORC T42)	
	Should	81
	Should not	13
	Don't know	6
12/1945	Do you think the world organization could set up such a system of inspection so that it will always be able to tell if any country is making a great many atomic bombs? (NORC T42)	
	Could	64
	Could not	27
	Don't know	9
3/1946	It has been suggested that the world organization have inspectors who could search any property in any country at any time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman, and one American working together. Do you think there should be such an inspection, or not? (NORC 140)	
	Should be	75
	Should not	17
	Don't know	8

3/1946	(asked of those 75% who answered should be) Would you be willing for these inspectors to search American property if it meant that they would find out how we make atomic bombs, or would that be going to far? (NORC 140)	
	Willing	52
	Going too far	44
	Don't know	4
7/1946	(Asked of those 29% who had heard of the Baruch plan) According to the [Baruch] plan, would it still be possible for some nation to make atomic bombs secretly? (NORC 143)	
	Yes	34
	No	34
	Don't know	32
7/1946	(Asked of those 29% who had heard of the Baruch plan) Suppose some nation didn't live up to the plan, once it was adopted. Would the United Nations have the right to punish that nation immediately, or would the country have the right to prevent any action against itself? (NORC 143)	
	UN could punish	53
	Country could prevent	9
	Don't know	38
11/1946	Suppose the United States stopped making Atom Bombs and destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then agree to let a United Nations Committee check to see that Russia does not make Atom Bombs? (AIPO 384K)	
	Yes	13
	No	72
	No Opinion	15
11/1946	(Asked of those 75% who agreed the U.S. should reduce the size of its army and navy if other countries agree) Would you favor or oppose a system of inspection--where a group of inspectors from the United Nations organization could go into any country, including the US, to see if it actually was keeping down the size of its armed forces? (NORC 146)	
	Favor	92
	Oppose	5
	Don't know	3

11/1946	(asked of those 27, who did not favor reducing the army and navy) Would you favor such an agreement if al' the governments, including the US, agreed to let inspectors from the United Nations organization come into their countries to see if they actually were keeping down the size of their armed forces? (NORC 146)	
	Yes, would favor them	56
	No	35
	Don't know	9
11/1946	Do you think all countries would agree to reduce their armed forces and to let inspectors in? (NORC 146)	
	Yes	22
	No	64
	Don't know	14
11/1946	(asked of the 22% who answered yes) Do you think such an inspection system would really work? (NORC 146)	
	Yes	70
	No	16
	Don't Know	14
12/1946	(Asked those 71% who would favor a mutual reduction in armed forces) Would you favor or oppose a system of inspection- where a group of inspectors from the United Nations organization could go into any country, including the United States, to see if it actually was keeping down the size of its armed forces? (NORC 147)	
	Favor	92
	Oppose	5
	Don't know	3
2/1947	see Repeated Questions (NORC 148)	
10/1947	see Repeated Questions (NORC 152)	
10/1949	see Repeated Questions (NORC 170)	
1/1950	(Asked of those 73% who approved an agreement not to use nuclear weapons if other counties don't) If all the countries signed such an agreement, do you think they would live up to it, and not use their atomic bombs if war broke out? (NORC 273)	
	Yes, they would	26
	No, they wouldn't	56
	DK	18

4/1953	Would you favor or oppose a plan for the international control of atomic energy (atom bombs) which would allow the UN to inspect atomic plants in all member countries, including Russia and the United States? (AIPO 514K)	
	Favor	59
	Oppose	31
	No opinion	10
7/1953	(Asked of the 85% who thought leaders of the US, UK, France, and Russia could reach agreement on any of the big problems of the day) Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to any such agreements? (NORC 341-2) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	58
	No	30
	DK	12
4/1954	The United States and Russia have both suggested plans for outlawing the atom and hydrogen bombs as weapons of war. However, they haven't been able to agree on how to inspect each other's supply of atomic material. Which ONE of these ideas comes closest to your own opinion? Please call off your answer by number. (AIPO 529K)	
	1. The United States should go farther than ever in trying to reach an agreement- even if it means giving in on some of our demands for strict inspection	10
	2. We should keep on trying to reach an agreement- but not accept any plan that doesn't meet our demands for strict inspection	69
	3. We should give up trying to reach an agreement altogether	13
	4. No opinion	8
4/1954	(Asked of the 60% who thought the U.S. should agree not to use atomic weapons) Do you think the Russians would live up to such a promise [not to use nuclear weapons]? (NORC 355)	
	Yes	18
	No	64
	DK	18
1/1955	Russia has proposed that all countries should sign an agreement promising never to use atomic or hydrogen bombs. Do you think the Russians would live up to their promise if such an agreement were signed? (NORC 366)	
	Yes	13
	No	77
	DK	10

6/1955	Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to whatever agreements may result from this conference of the heads of government? (NORC 372)	
	Yes	23
	No	61
	DK	15
6/1955	(Asked of those 40% who thought the U.S. should agree not to use nuclear weapons but who also thought the U.S. could not count on the Russians living up to agreements.) Well, I notice on the other question you felt we probably couldn't count on Russia to live up to its agreements. I'm interested now in why you feel we should sign this agreement with them not to use atomic bombs. (NORC 372)	
	Agreement be in writing, there would be guarantees	3
	If all countries sign, Russia more likely to keep agreement	5
	If Russia & other countries sign, we have to also, can't refuse	10
	Russia is likely to keep this agreement, poison gas agreement worked	10
	It would show our desire for peace	8
	If they break the agreement, we can't	21
	It's worth trying, its better than nothing	10
	Atomic & hydrogen bombs should never be used or only as last resort	17
	Misc	5
	Irrelevant	9
	No answer	2
	(multiple coding permitted)	
6/1955	(Asked of those 54% who thought the U.S. should not sign an agreement not to use nuclear weapons) Do you think we should agree to such a promise, if there were some kind of international control to see that all countries live up to the agreement? (NORC 372)	
	Yes	74
	No	22
	DK	4
8/1955	Do you think we would count on Russia to live up to whatever agreements may result from these meetings? (NORC 374) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	49
	No	42
	DK	9

8/1955	At Geneva, President Eisenhower offered to let Russian planes take photographs of our military bases in the United States, if the Russians let American planes take similar photographs in Russia. In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 374)	
	Approve	39
	Disapprove	50
	DK	11
10/1955	President Eisenhower has offered to let Russian planes take photographs of our military bases in the US, if the Russians let American planes take similar photographs in Russia. In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 376)	
	Approve	39
	Disapprove	57
	DK	4
10/1955	Would you approve or disapprove of letting teams of international inspectors visit our military bases, if Russia and other countries let them visit theirs too? (NORC 376)	
	Approve	59
	Disapprove	36
	DK	5
10/1955	If our side were free to inspect military bases in Russia, do you think this would make a surprise attack on the US almost impossible, or somewhat less likely, or wouldn't it help at all? (NORC 376)	
	Almost impossible	5
	Less likely	43
	No help at all	42
	DK	10
10/1955	Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to whatever agreements may result from this meeting? (NORC 376) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	21
	No	68
	DK	11
12/1955	President Eisenhower has offered to let Russian planes take photographs of our military bases in the US, if the Russians let American planes take similar photographs in Russia. Do you think this kind of inspection system would make a surprise attack on the US less likely, or more likely, or wouldn't it make any difference? (NORC 379)	
	Less likely	13
	More likely	43
	No difference	38
	DK	6

12/1955	In general, do you think we can count on Russia to live up to any agreements we may make with her? (NORC 379) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	15
	No	78
	DK	7
2/1956	(Asked of those 62% who thought the US should agree to limit the size of our armed forces) Would you favor or oppose a system of inspection--where a group of inspectors from the United Nations organization could go into any country, including the United States, to see if it actually was keeping down the size of its armed forces? (NORC 382)	
	Favor	90
	Oppose	5
	DK	4
2/1956	(Asked of those 31% who thought the U.S. should not agree to limit our armed forces or didn't know) Would you favor such an agreement if all the governments, including the United States, agreed to let inspectors from the United Nations organization come into their countries to see if they actually were keeping down the size of their armed forces? (NORC 382)	
	Yes	45
	No	44
	DK	11
10/1956	Have you heard or read anything about President Eisenhower's offer to let Russian planes take photographs of our military bases in the US, if the Russians let American planes take similar photographs in Russia? (NORC 398T)	
	Yes	35
	No	65
10/1956	In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 398T)	
	Approve	28
	Disapprove	62
	DK	10
4/1957	Russia had proposed that all nations with atomic weapons call a halt to any further tests of H-bombs or A-bombs, for an indefinite period. If we agree to stop the tests, do you think we could count on Russia's halting her tests, or not? (MINN 160)	
	Could count on Russia	7
	Could not	87
	No opinion	5
	Other	

7/1957	The Russians have proposed that all nations agree to stop all hydrogen and atomic bomb tests for two or three years, and have offered a plan to supervise the agreement to make sure it's not broken. Do you yourself feel, now, that we can count on Russia to live up to such an agreement, or that we cannot? (MINN 162)	
	Feel we can	12
	Feel we cannot	80
	No opinion	7
	Other	1
1/1958b	In a recent note to the US, Bulganin, the Russian Prime Minister, made these suggestions to improve relations between the East and West. Do you think that the US and its Western allies should or should not agree . . . To set up an aerial and ground inspection system extending 500 miles either side of the Iron Curtain as a measure against surprise attacks? (AIPO 594K)	
	Should agree	62
	Should not	20
	No opinion	18
3/1958	Would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide organization which would make sure, by regular inspections, that no nation, including Russia and the United States, makes hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, and missiles (AIPO 596 K I&II) (see repeated questions)	
	Favor	70
	Oppose	16
	No opinion	14
3/1958	If this inspection organization were set up, would you favor or oppose making it each person's duty to report any attempt in their country to secretly produce hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, and missiles? (AIPO 596K I&II)	
	Favor	73
	Oppose	11
	No opinion	16
3/1958	If you, yourself knew that someone in the United States was attempting to secretly make forbidden weapons, would you report this to the office of the worldwide inspection organization in this country? (AIPO 596K I&II)	
	Yes, would	80
	No, would not	6
	No opinion	14

3/1963	If a test ban treaty were put into effect, do you think Russia would live up to her part of the agreement, or not (AIPO 669)		
	Yes		19
	No		65
	DK		16
1/1976	Do you feel that the Russians have lived up to the terms they agreed to under the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT Treaty) with the US, or don't you think the Russians have done so? (Harris 7588)		
	Russians lived up to agreement		11
	Not lived up to agreement		49
	Not sure		40
2/1978	If the United States and Russia sign an agreement to limit the number and spread of strategic weapons, do you think . . . Russia/ the United States will live up to its part of the agreement? (ORC)		
		Russia	US
	Yes	18	71
	No	64	19
	No opinion	18	10
6/1978	If the United States and Soviet Union were to sign an agreement to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)		
	yes		21
	no		64
	No opinion		15
6/1978	Do you think the United States would live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)		
	Yes		71
	No		19
	DK,/NA		10

8/1978	see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 33)	
10/1978	see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 35)	
3/1979	see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 40)	
5/1979a	China has offered to let us put special electronic monitoring devices in that country to take the place of the monitoring equipment we had to take out of Iran. Would you favor or oppose our putting special electronic monitoring devices in China? (Harris 792107)	
	Favor	63
	Oppose	29
	Not sure	8
5/1979	(I'm going to read some statements about world affairs and I'd like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with each.) The next statement is: "There are no conditions under which we can trust the Soviet Union." Do you . . . (ABC)	
	Agree strongly	22
	Agree somewhat	24
	Disagree somewhat	34
	Disagree strongly	17
	No opinion/DK	4
5/1979	Next month in Vienna, President Jimmy Carter and the Russian leader, Leonid Brezhnev, will sign a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty called SALT. Do you think the Russians will honor this agreement and cut back on their nuclear weapons, or do you think they will secretly try to end up with more missiles or bombers than the United States? (LAT 17)	
	Honor agreement	18
	More missiles	68
	No opinion	14
5/1979	How concerned are you that the United States may not be able to verify whether the Russians are living up to their part of the arms limitation--are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned? (LAT 17)	
	Concerned	78
	Not concerned	20
	No opinion	2

6/1979	If a SALT treaty is approved, do you think the Soviet Union would or would not live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)	
	Would	28
	Would not	47
	DK/NA	25
6/1979	If the Soviet Union tried to cheat on the treaty, do you think the United States would or would not be able to catch them at it? (CBS/NYT)	
	Would	54
	Would not	27
	DK/NA	19
9/1979	see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 45/121)	
3/1981	Here are some arguments that have been made in favor of stressing military strength and relying less on negotiation and economic tools. Which two or three, if any, do you find most convincing? (Roper 81-4)	
	a. The only thing our enemies understand is military power	32
	b. The only way we can get the respect of our allies and neutral countries is if they think we are the strongest militarily	37
	c. We've been pouring money into other countries and it has gotten us nowhere. It's time to stop international welfare and concentrate on defense	45
	d. Arms control and other agreements with the Russians are a waste of time, because the Russians never hold up their end of the bargain	38
	e. None	12
	f. Don't know	9
5/1981	How likely do you think the Soviet Union would be to abide by such an agreement [not to build any more nuclear weapons]-- very likely, fairly likely, or not at all likely? (AIPO 1173G)	
	Very likely	6
	Fairly likely	27
	Not at all likely	60
	No opinion	7

5/1981	How likely do you think the Soviet Union would be to abide by such an agreement [to destroy all nuclear weapons that have already been built]-- very likely, fairly likely, or not at all likely? (AIPO 1173G)	
	Very likely	4
	Fairly likely	16
	Not at all likely	73
	No opinion	7
9/1981	Would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide organization which would make sure, by regular inspection, that no nation, including the Soviet Union and the US, makes nuclear weapons? (AIPO 1182G) (see repeated questions)	
	Favor	75
	Oppose	17
	No opinion	8
11/1981b	If an arms agreement between the US and the Soviet Union is reached, would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide organization which would make sure, by regular inspection, that neither the US nor the Soviet Union violates this arms agreement? (AIPO 1186G) (see repeated questions)	
	Favor	83
	Oppose	10
	No opinion	7
3/1982	In general, how much or little trust do you have in the Russian government to honor its treaties and other international agreements . . . great deal of trust, fair amount of trust, only a little trust, or no trust at all? (A&S/Merit)	
	Great deal of trust	1
	Fair amount of trust	10
	Only a little trust	32
	No trust at all	51
	No opinion	6
3/1982	see Repeated Questions (LAT 51)	
3/1982	The major problem in arms control is the difficulty in verifying whether the other side is complying with the agreement. Some people feel that verification is essential for such an agreement. Others feel that it is more important for the United States to halt the growth of its nuclear arsenal even if we cannot be sure the other side is doing the same. Which is more important in your view? (Gallup/NW)	
	Verification	67
	Halting growth	25
	Don't know	8

4/1982	see Repeated Questions (ABC/WP)	
5/1982	(Asked of those 79% who favored a nuclear freeze or didn't know) What if either the US or the Soviet Union could cheat on the number of its nuclear weapons without being detected by the other side--would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS/NYT)	
	Favor	18
	Oppose	71
	DK/NA	11
5/1982	(Asked of those 28% who opposed a nuclear freeze or didn't know) What if both the US and the Soviet Union could catch the other country if it were cheating on the agreement--would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS/NYT)	
	Favor	83
	Oppose	12
	DK/NA	5
7/1982	see Repeated Questions (LAT 58)	
11/1982	Do you think it would or would not be possible to set up a system for verifying or checking whether the Soviet Union is living up to the terms of a nuclear freeze agreement? (AIPO 1204G)	
	Possible	39
	Not possible	47
	No opinion	14

4/1983 (Asked of split samples) Here are some arguments that have been made against an immediate nuclear freeze (Card shown respondent.) For an argument to be convincing it has to be both important and true. If it isn't important, or isn't true, it isn't convincing. Would you tell me for each of those arguments whether you find it a very convincing argument against an immediate nuclear freeze, or somewhat convincing, not very convincing, or not at all convincing? . . . (Roper 83-5)

1. An immediate nuclear freeze would reduce international tensions and the threat of nuclear war.
2. A freeze would cause Soviet foreign policies to become more reasonable and moderate.
3. A freeze would cause the U.S. foreign policies to become more reasonable and moderate.
4. A freeze now would establish a stable nuclear arms balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
5. A nuclear freeze now would encourage the Soviets to agree to nuclear arms reduction later.
6. A freeze on nuclear weapons would enable the U.S. to spend more on domestic social and economic programs.
7. An immediate nuclear freeze would remove Soviet incentives to negotiate for reductions in nuclear arms in the current Geneva talks.
8. The Soviet Union can not be trusted to live up to the terms of a nuclear freeze agreement.
9. A freeze now would leave the Soviet Union ahead of the U.S. in nuclear capability. (Roper)
10. A freeze would prevent the U.S. from modernizing its aging weapons and introducing more reliable, less vulnerable nuclear weapons systems.
11. A freeze would be a real gamble because neither side would know whether the other side was living up to the agreement.
12. We should not sign a nuclear freeze agreement with the Soviet Union as long as it pursues expansionist policies against other countries abroad, such as Afghanistan.

Pro-freeze results	1	2	3	4	5	6	Average
Very convincing	23	11	12	14	9	29	16
Somewhat convincing	35	26	35	27	27	35	31
Not very convincing	22	34	31	27	29	17	28
Not at all convincing	14	21	13	23	24	11	18
Don't know	5	8	9	9	11	8	8
Anti-freeze results	7	8	9	10	11	12	Average
Very convincing	13	40	30	24	27	39	29
Somewhat convincing	33	26	30	31	26	27	29
Not very convincing	30	16	19	23	23	16	21
Not at all convincing	12	10	9	11	12	10	11
Don't know	12	7	12	11	13	8	11

5/1983	Do you think the Soviet Union will or will not agree to on-site inspection of nuclear weapons in their nation? (AIPO 1214G)	
	Will agree	10
	Will not agree	78
	No opinion	12
9/1983	see Repeated Questions (ABC/WP)	
9/1983	If the U.S. and the Soviet Union did come to a new agreement to reduce both nations' nuclear arms, how confident or not are you that the Russians would live up to this agreement? . . . very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at all confident? (A&S/Merit)	
	Very confident	2
	Somewhat confident	13
	Not too confident	36
	Not at all confident	43
	No opinion	6
11/1983	If there were such an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons do you think the Soviet Union would cheat on that agreement or not? (ABC/WP)	
	USSR would cheat	79
	USSR would not cheat	14
	Don't know	7
11/1983	Do you think the United States would cheat on such a nuclear weapons freeze or not? (ABC/WP)	
	US would cheat	40
	US would not cheat	53
	Don't know	7
4/1984	How important is verification in any arms control agreement--very important, somewhat important or not very important? (P&S/CPD)	
	Very important	76
	Somewhat important	16
	Not very important	3
	DK	4

4/1984	If the Soviet side of a nuclear freeze agreement with the US could not be verified, would you favor it or oppose it? (P&S/CPD)	
	Favor	22
	Oppose	70
	DK	8
4/1984	Do you think the Soviets can be trusted to honor an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons at the current levels? (P&S/CPD)	
	Trusted	21
	Not trusted	71
	DK	8
4/1984	Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or violating existing nuclear arms control agreements? (P&S/CPD)	
	Adhering	13
	Violating	70
	DK	17
4/1984	see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD)	
5/1984	Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms. (PAF) (see repeated questions)	
	Agree	45
	Disagree	50
	DK/NS	5
5/1984	Unless the Soviets agree to on-site inspection, we should refuse to sign any arms agreements with them. (PAF)	
	Agree	74
	Disagree	22
	DK/NS	4
5/1984	Because of our satellites in space, we really don't need on-site inspection to know if the Russians cheat on arms control agreements. (PAF)	
	Agree	32
	Disagree	60
	DK/NS	9
5/1984	The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty and agreement they've ever signed. (PAF)	
	Agree	61
	Disagree	24
	DK/NS	15

5/1984	The degree to which the Soviets cheat on arms control treaties is overstated by Americans who oppose negotiating with them in the first place. (PAF)	
	Agree	44
	Disagree	41
	DK/NS	15
5/1984	In a dangerous world, there are times when all countries must take risks- make decisions without knowing for sure how they'll turn out. I'll read you some things the U.S. might do, but all of them involve some risk. For each, please tell me whether you think it's an acceptable risk for the U.S. to take or not. Sign an arms control agreement with the Soviets even if foolproof verification can't be guaranteed--is that an acceptable risk for the US to take or not? (PAF)	
	Acceptable	56
	Not acceptable	40
	DK/NS	4
7/1984c	If a nuclear arms treaty were made between the Soviet Union and the United States, do you think the Soviet Union would be likely to live up to this agreement, or not? (AIPO 1238G)	
	Yes, would	17
	No, would not	74
	No opinion	9
11/1984b	One of the problems in any nuclear arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia is the question of verification-- how to be sure each side is living up to what has been agreed upon. Do you think it is possible or not to come to a nuclear arms control agreement with the Russians, under which each side would be able to accurately determine if the other is living up to an agreement? (Harris)	
	Possible	40
	Not possible	55
	Not sure	5
11/1984b	Some Reagan Administration arms negotiators now believe it is possible to come to a nuclear arms control agreement with the Russians without setting up a foolproof means of verifying whether the agreement is being lived up to. The two sides would just agree to reduce nuclear arms according to a timetable. Does this kind of approach make sense to you, or not? (Harris)	
	Make sense	42
	Does not make sense	54
	Not sure	4

1/1985	If the two countries (the United States and Soviet Union) did agree to limit their nuclear arms do you think the Soviet Union would cheat on that agreement? (ABC)	
	Would cheat	72
	Would not cheat	21
	No Opinion	7
1/1985	The United States should negotiate a nuclear arms limitation agreement even if there is a risk that the Soviets would cheat on that agreement (ABC)	
	Agree	76
	Disagree	18
	No Opinion	6
1/1985a	If the United States and the Soviet Union were to sign an agreement to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)	
	Yes	24
	No	59
	Don't Know	17
1/1985a	Do you think the US would live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)	
	Yes	71
	No	19
	No opinion	10
1/1985a	Do you think it is possible to negotiate a fair arms control agreement that the Soviet Union will live up to? (CBS/NYT) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	48
	No	39
	No opini	13
1/1985a	Do you think the Soviet Union has violated the arms treaties it has had with the US? (CBS/NYT)	
	Yes	67
	No	11
	No opinion	22

1/1985a	(Asked of those 67% who thought the Soviets had violated arms control treaties with the US) Do you think those violations have given the Soviet Union any important advantages over the US, or haven't they made much difference? (CBS/NYT)	
	Advantages	33
	Haven't made difference	61
	No opinion	6
1/1985	see Repeated Questions (LAT 93)	
1/1985	If the US and the Soviet Union were to reach agreement on nuclear weapons control, do you think the Russians could be trusted to keep their part of the bargain, or not? (LAT 93) (see repeated questions)	
	Trusted	23
	Not trust	68
	Not sure	9
2/1985	see Repeated Questions (NBC)	
7/1985	Do you think the Russians will or will not live up to any agreements that they may make at the (nuclear arms control) talks in Geneva? (YSW/Time)	
	Will live up to agreements	33
	Will not live up to agreements	55
	Not sure	13
9/1985	Now I'm going to read some pairs of statements describing opposite viewpoints on different nuclear weapons issues. Please listen to each set of opposite opinions, and tell me which one you agree with more strongly. . . . a) The Soviet Union almost always cheats on the treaties it signs with us, even though the U.S. abides by them, or b) the truth is, both the U.S. and Soviets cheat on treaties to some extent-- it's just part of the game. (M&K)	
	Soviets cheat- much	12
	Soviets cheat- somewhat	8
	Both cheat- somewhat	42
	Both cheat- much	31
	Not sure	7

9/1985	If an agreement is reached at the [November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev] summit meeting, do you think we can trust the Soviet Union to keep its word? (YSW/Time)	
	Yes	19
	No	72
	Not sure	9
10/1985	Do you think the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor future arms control agreements or not? (P&S/CPD)	
	Can be trusted	15
	Can't be trusted	75
	Don't know	10
10/1985	Should the U.S. insist on on-site inspection to verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements or do satellites offer enough information? (P&S/CPD)	
	On site-inspection	65
	Satellite enough	18
	Don't know	16
10/1985	Should the United States continue to abide by arms control treaties that the Soviets are violating? (P&S/CPD)	
	Yes	38
	No	50
	Don't know	12
10/1985	see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD)	
10/1985	see Repeated Questions (NBC/WJS)	
11/1985a	Do you think it's possible to negotiate a fair arms control agreement that the Soviet Union would live up to? (CBS/NYT) (see repeated questions)	
	Yes	39
	No	50
	DK/NA	11
11/1985	Suppose the US and the Soviet Union did come to an agreement to limit nuclear weapons. Do you think the Soviet Union would try to cheat on a nuclear arms agreement and get an advantage over the US or not? (ABC/WP)	
	Yes, Soviets would try to cheat	75
	No, Soviets would not try to cheat	17
	No opinion	6

11/1985	If the US and the Soviet Union were to reach agreement on nuclear weapons control, do you think the Americans could be trusted to keep their part of the bargain, or not? (LAT 100)	
	Trusted	70
	Not trusted	23
	Not sure	7
11/1985	see Repeated Questions (LAT 100)	
11/1985	Here are some impressions people have reported about Gorbachev. For each one, tell me whether you agree, disagree, or have no impression of your own: He may say he wants to reach an agreement with us on arms control and other issues, but he can't be trusted to keep this word. (YSW/Time)	
	Agree	47
	Disagree	25
	No impression	21
	Not sure	7
11/1985	see Repeated Questions (NBC/WSJ)	
6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard/read about SALT II) Do you think the Soviet Union has or has not lived up to the terms of the treaty? (Gallup)	
	Yes	6
	No	76
	No opinion	17
7/1986	(Asked of 93% who knew about Chernobyl nuclear accident) Did the way the Soviets handled the accident give you more trust that they would carry out arms agreements honestly, less trust or not change your mind? (P&S/CPD)	
	More trust	9
	Less trust	46
	No change	41
	Don't know	4
7/1986	Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or violating existing nuclear arms control agreements? (P&S/CPD)	
	Adhering	11
	Violating	69
	Don't know	20

7/1986	Do you think that the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor future arms control agreements or not? (P&S/CPD)	
	Can be trusted	22
	Can't be trusted	68
	Don't know	9
10/1986	Do you agree or disagree with these statements about the summit meeting? . . . It's just as well that an agreement was not reached at the Summit because you can't trust the Soviet Union to keep its word anyway? (YCS/Time)	
	Agree	54
	Disagree	38
	Not sure	8
10/1986a	In the past, the United States and the Soviet Union have had a policy of trying to reach agreements to relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements, or don't you think so? (NBC/WSJ) (see repeated questions for trend)	
	Can be trusted	26
	Cannot be trusted	64
	Bit sure	10
10/1986a	see Repeated Questions (NBC/WSJ)	
3/1987	see Repeated Questions (NBC/WSJ)	
4/1987	Do you trust the statements of Soviet leader Gorbachev on arms control? (P&S/CPD)	
	Yes	20
	No	71
	Don't know	9
4/1987	Do you think Soviet leader Gorbachev is more trustworthy, less trustworthy or about as trustworthy as the Soviet leaders who came before him? (P&S/CPD)	
	More	38
	Less	11
	Same	47
	Don't know	4
4/1987	Would you favor or oppose such an agreement (eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe if it left the Soviets with an advantage in conventional forces) if it could not be verified? (P&S/CPD)	
	Favor	11
	Oppose	83
	Don't know	6

4/1987	The United States has proposed very detailed procedures for verifying Soviet compliance with the agreement, which the Soviets are considering. If the Soviets reject the proposed U.S. verification procedures, should the agreement be signed without them or not be signed? (P&S/CPD)			
	Should be signed		18	
	Should not be signed		74	
	Don't know		8	
4/1987	Do you think that the Soviets are reluctant to agree to effective verification because such measures are unnecessary, or because, without effective verification, they know they could violate the agreement without the West knowing? (P&S/CPD)			
	Verification is unnecessary		12	
	Violate		77	
	Don't know		12	
4/1987	see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD)			
5/1987	In your opinion, which is the greatest risk to peace -- trusting the Russians to live up to their side of an arms agreement or being too suspicious of the Russians so that we never get an arms agreement with them? (Gallup/TM)			
	Trusting Russians greatest threat		43	
	Being too suspicious is greatest threat		41	
	Can't say/don't know		16	
10/1987	I am going to read some statements that have been made recently. Please tell me whether you are inclined to agree or disagree with each statement . . . (M&K/ATS) (see repeated questions)			
		Agree	Disagree	DK
	Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms	50	45	5
1/1988	A. Do you think the Soviet Union is a country that we can trust a great deal, somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS) B. Do you think Gorbachev is a person we can trust a great deal, somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS) (see Repeated Questions)			
		USSR	Gorbachev	
	A great deal	3	6	
	Somewhat	61	67	
	Not at all	35	24	
	Don't know/Refused	1	3	

1/1988	In reaching agreements on nuclear arms control, do you think the Soviet Union can be trusted to keep their part of the bargain or not? (MOR/ATS)	
	Can be trusted	35
	Can not be trusted	55
	Don't know/refused	9
1/1988	Do you think we can trust Gorbachev more, less, or about the same as past Soviet leaders? (MOR/ATS) (see repeated questions)	
	More	53
	About the same	38
	Less	6
	Don't know/refused	3
1/1988	Do you think the United States can or can not be trusted to keep its part of the agreements in the [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] treaty? (MOR/ATS)	
	Can be trusted	76
	Can not be trusted	18
	Don't know/refused	6
1/1988	Do you think the Soviet Union can or can not be trusted to keep its part of the agreements in the [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] treaty? (MOR/ATS)	
	Can be trusted	43
	Can not be trusted	48
	Don't know/refused	10
1/1988	If we kept our part of the agreements in the treaty but the Soviets do not keep theirs, would that put the United States and its European allies in a dangerous position or would this situation not be all that dangerous? (MOR/ATS)	
	Dangerous position	71
	Not be all that dangerous	25
	Don't know/refused	4

1/1988 Here are some statements that have been made about the treaty and for each one I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?
(MOR/ATS)

- a This treaty is a good way to find out if the Soviets can be trusted before we agree to more arms reductions;
- b Signing the treaty will help the United State's image around the world;
- c This treaty, like all treaties with the Russians, isn't worth the paper its written on;
- d President Reagan is well-known for his anti-communism, so if he thinks this is a good deal, it must be;
- e This treaty represents an important breakthrough for more agreements on reducing arms.

	a	b	c	d	e
Strongly agree	49	41	17	20	37
Somewhat agree	37	42	17	39	47
Depends (vol)	1	3	3	3	2
Somewhat disagree	6	7	30	18	6
Strongly disagree	6	5	30	16	6
Don't know/refused	2	3	3	4	2

2/1988 The next step of the treaty is for the U.S. Senate to ratify it. As a part of their approval of the treaty the U.S. Senate can require that certain conditions be met before the treaty can take effect. For each of the following please tell me if you think the U.S. Senate should or should not require that condition be met before the treaty can take effect.

- A. That the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies, which include their troops, tanks, jet fighters, and the like, are roughly equal to the conventional forces of the United States and its NATO allies in Europe before the treaty can take effect;
- B. That the Soviet Union remove its restrictions on Jews who wish to leave the Soviet Union before the treaty can take effect;
- C. That President Reagan certify that the Soviet Union is adherence to all past arms control agreements before the treaty can take effect. (DYG/ATS)

	Should Require	Should Not	Don't Know
A	68	25	7
B	60	34	6
C	79	16	5

2/1988 If the Soviets actually withdrew their troops from Afghanistan, would you trust the Soviets more, less, or about the same? (DYG/ATS)

More	15
Less	8
Same	75

5/1988 (Asked of those 85% who answered same or less) If the Soviets ended all their involvement in Afghanistan would you then trust them more, less, or about the same? (M&K/ATS)

More	17
Less	8
About the same	73
Not sure (vol)	2

5/1988 See Repeated Questions (M&K/ATS)

7/1988 We've been talking about trusting other countries. As far as you're concerned, how important is each of the following things in our being able to say we trust another country--absolutely essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not at all important? (DYG/ATS) (data not presented in the order asked)

- A. They abide by their treaty commitments;
- B. They tell the truth in dealing with us;
- C. They would never attack us militarily;
- D. Their citizens enjoy basic human rights
- E. They are fail in their trade policies;
- F. We have foreign policy interests in common with them;
- G. We can lend them money with full confidence that they will repay it;
- H. they are a democracy;
- I. They have never been at war with us;
- J. Their customs, culture, and language are similar to ours.

	Absolutely	Important	Not very	Not at all	Not sure
A.	68	22	4	1	5
B.	67	24	3	1	5
C.	66	22	4	2	6
D.	53	35	7	1	4
E.	53	33	7	2	5
F.	40	47	7	1	5
G.	39	36	13	6	6
H.	29	43	17	6	5
I.	25	41	18	9	7
J.	14	35	32	15	4

7/1988	Compared to ten years ago, do you think we can trust the Soviet Union more, less, or about the same? (DYG/ATS)	
	More	44
	Less	6
	Same	35
	Not sure	15
7/1988	(Asked of those 44% who answered can trust the Soviets more) Why do you say we can trust them more? (DYG/ATS) (multiple answers)	
	Gorbachev	28
	Summits, meetings, improved communication with US	26
	More openness than in the past	26
	Basic changes in philosophy, leadership	11
	Common interest in world peace	10
	Arms control treaty agreement	8
7/1988	(Asked of those 6% who answered can trust the Soviets less) Why do you say we can trust them less? (DYG/ATS)	
	Don't, can't trust Soviets	33
	They lie and are deceitful	27
	They want to dominate the world	13
	Distrust leaders, Gorbachev	10
	Don't live up to treaties, agreements	7
7/1988	(Asked of those 35% who answered can trust the Soviets the same) Why do you say we can trust them the same? (DYG/ATS)	
	Nothing has changed	28
	Don't, can't trust Soviets	19
	Still are communists, have same philosophy	13
	They lie and are deceitful	8
	They want to dominate the world	7
	Don't live up to treaties, agreements	6
7/1988	I am going to read you some statements that have been made recently. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree . . . Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we should not sign any more agreements limiting nuclear arms. (DYG/ATS) (see repeated questions)	
	Strongly agree	23
	Somewhat agree	49
	Somewhat disagree	20
	Strongly disagree	12
	Not sure	4

7/1988	What do you think the Soviets could do to make the United States trust them more? (DYG/ATS) (multiple answers)	
	Keep their word, honor treaties, agreements	15
	More openness, open policy and society	14
	Free and open borders, freedom to emigrate	12
	To tell the truth and be honest	10
	Disarm, eliminate nuclear weapons	10
	Give citizens more freedom and civil rights	8
7/1988	We've been talking about trust. When it comes to arms agreements, some people have said there are three levels of trust we can have. Which of those levels of trust comes closest to your view of how much we should trust the Soviet Union. (DYG/ATS)	
	A. We have no reason to trust the Soviets to keep any kind of agreement; we shouldn't negotiate arms agreements with them even if they're willing to negotiate;	
	B. We should negotiate arms agreements with them, but not take any big risks; we should require proof that they are doing what they agreed to do;	
	C. We'll never be able to have 100% "proof" that arms agreements are being kept, but we should take some risks and sign these agreements expecting that the Soviets will honor them in good faith;	
	D. Don't know/not sure (vol)	
	A.	5
	B.	67
	C.	24
	D.	4
7/1988	See Repeated Questions (DYG/ATS)	
8/1988	Does the fact that the Soviets are withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan--after promising to do so--make you trust them more, less or about the same? (M&K/ATS)	
	More	19
	About the same	70
	Less	10
	Not sure (vol)	2
8/1988	See Repeated Questions (M&K/ATS)	

APPENDIX 8

ABM and SALT I: Public Attitudes,
1945 - 1987

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Repeated Questions

12/1963- On some of these cards are written things you personally might
3/1972 very much like to happen. On other cards are things you might like less, and on still others may be things you would dislike very much. Please take the cards from the first pocket and sort them into this row of pockets-- on the line that is next to it. Sort them into this row according to how much you want the thing written on the card to happen. The pockets in each row have numbers written on them. Minus three stands for something that you would dislike very much. Plus three stands for those things which you would very much want to happen. Zero stands for those situations that you don't particularly care about one way or another. You may use any of these seven pockets you wish. (NORC SRS-330, NORC-SRS 640, NORC-SRS 876, MIS/N) (The introductory wording varied slightly over time.)

12/63 Desirability of ballistic missile defense

6/64 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.

2/66 The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles that no enemy would think of attacking us.

3/72 Protecting most of our big cities and important military bases with anti-missile missiles (ABM's)

	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK	Total	Total
									+	-
12/1963	59	16	8	5	2	3	8	*	83	13
6/1964	67	13	6	4	1	2	5	1	86	8
2/1966	69	9	7	4	2	1	7	2	85	10
3/1972	40	15	13	13	4	3	6	5	68	13

Repeated Questions

6/1968- 6/68 Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial
3/1972 disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of ABMS (ORC/N)

3/72 Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty?
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of anti-missile missiles (ABM's) (MIS/N)

	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK	Total +	Total -
6/1968	44	10	9	10	2	3	11	12	63	16
3/1972	40	14	10	13	5	3	8	7	64	16

4/1969- (Of those [69%, 72%, 69%] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen
7/1969 to have an opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by President Nixon? (AIPO 777, 780k, 784k)

	4/69	5/69	7/69
Yes, have opinion	40	41	42
No	27	31	27
Not heard	33	28	31

4/1969- (Of those [40%, 41%, 42%] who had heard of and had an opinion of
7/1969 the ABM) Do you favor or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 777, 780k, 784k)

	4/69	5/69	7/69
Favor	25	25	23
Oppose	15	14	18
Not heard/No Opinion/NA	60	61	59

Repeated Questions

3/1972- 3/72 Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, I
12/1978 would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If
our government decided to sign general disarmament
treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would
want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at
a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our
country actually signs a treaty? (MIS/N)
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles
(ABM's) at all

12/78 Now using the same desirability card as we did just now,
I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament.
If our government decided to sign general disarmament
treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would
want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at
a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our
country actually signs a treaty? (MIS/N)
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles
(ABM's) at all?

	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK	Total +	Total 1
3/1972	27	5	7	16	8	6	21	8	39	35
12/1978	30	9	7	12	7	7	21	8	46	35

10/1945	Do you think we can develop a way to protect ourselves from atomic bombs in case other countries tried to use them against us? (AIPO 357T)	
	Yes	49
	No	21
	No Opinion	30
12/1945	As you may have heard, General Arnold and many scientists say that there is no real defense against a surprise attack by fast long-range airplanes and rockets carrying atomic bombs. Do you think there is a real defense or not? (NORC 42T)	
	Yes	11
	No	69
	Don't know	20
6/1946	Do you think the US will be able to work out an effective defense against the atomic bomb before other nations could use it against us? (PSY CORP 173k&t)	
	Yes	54
	No	19
	No Opinion	27
6/1946	Do you think we will be able to work out a defense against the bomb before other countries learn how to make it? (SRC)	
	Yes	35
	Yes, with qualification	5
	Undecided, Don't know	36
	No, with Qualifications	1
	No	18
	Opinions not ascertained	4
	Not know what atomic bomb was	1
8/1946	Do you think the US will be able to work out an effective defense against the atomic bomb before other nations could use it against us? (PSY CORP 178k&t)	
	Yes	56
	No	19
	No Opinion	25

8/1946 Do you think we will be able to work out a defense against the bomb before other countries learn how to make it? (SRC)

Yes	36
Yes, with qualification	4
Undecided, Don't know	29
No, with Qualifications	1
No	24
Opinions not ascertained	4
Not know what atomic bomb was	2

2/1947 Do you believe scientists will find some defensive weapon against the atomic bomb, or do you think no defense against atomic bombs will be found? (MINN 42)

Will find defense	61
Won't find defense	20
Undecided	19

11/1949 Do you think scientists will be able to develop any defense against the atom bomb within, say, the next ten years? (AIPO 449)

Yes	60
No	19
No Opinion	21

12/1963 Now here are some cards. On these cards are printed various possible future situations which may exist in our civil defense. On this folder are pockets which show how likely something is. As before, the zero pocket on the bottom of the folder stands for something that is impossible or nearly impossible. The top pocket-- 10-- stands for something you consider certain or just about certain to happen. Five means that something is as likely to happen as not-- the chances are about fifty-fifty. Would you please put these cards into the pockets according to how likely it is that each situation will come about in five years or so -- about 1968? You may use as many pockets as you want, and any number of cards may go into any pocket. (NORC SRS-330)

Likelihood of ballistic missile defense

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
3	2	3	5	4	13	8	9	12	16	24	*

12/1963 On some of these cards are written things you personally might very much like to happen. On other cards are things you might like less, and on still others may be things you would dislike very much. Please take the cards from the first pocket and sort them into this row of pockets-- on the line that is next to it. Sort them into this row according to how much you want the thing written on the card to happen. The pockets in each row have numbers written on them. Minus three stands for something that you would dislike very much. Plus three stands for those things which you would very much want to happen. Zero stands for those situations that you don't particularly care about one way or another. You may use any of these seven pockets you wish. (NORC SRS-330)

Desirability of ballistic missile defense

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
59	16	8	5	2	3	8	*

6/1964 Here is the card with the scale on it again, with numbers from zero to ten. I'm going to read you three statements. As before, if you think our defenses against nuclear attack are very good or almost perfect, use ten. If you think they are very bad, use zero. If you think they are somewhere in between, use any number between zero and ten. (NORC-SRS 640)

A. Now, how good are our defenses against enemy bombers?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
1	*	1	1	1	7	5	9	21	18	35	1

B. How good are our defenses against guided missiles?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
2	1	3	3	3	12	10	13	18	13	20	1

C. How good are our defenses against submarines?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
1	1	1	3	4	12	7	12	19	13	24	1

6/1964 Please sort the cards you now have depending on how likely you believe these various civil defense situations will be within the next five years, or by about 1968.

In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations. (NORC-SRS 640)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
4	3	3	3	4	15	11	10	12	11	23	1

6/1964 Now will you please sort these cards once again, depending on how much you personally want or do not want each of these civil defense situations.

In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations. (NORC-SRS 640)

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
67	13	6	4	1	2	5	1

6/1964 As far as you know, is there any defense possible against enemy missiles? (NORC-SRS 640)

Yes	55
No	23
Don't know	22

6/1964 (Asked of 45% who said no or don't know) Do you think any defense against enemy missiles will become possible during the next five years or so? (NORC-SRS 640)

Yes	68
No	14
Don't know	18

6/1964 (Asked of those 55% who answered yes) What kind of defense is there/will there be against enemy missiles? (NORC-SRS 640)

Answer included missile	42
Other means	30
Don't know	28

6/1964	(Asked of those 42% who mentioned missiles) Do you happen to know how these anti-missiles (would) work? (NORC-SRS 640)	
	Mentioned nuclear warhead	5
6/1964	The kinds of weapons that could be used against enemy missiles are called anti-missile missiles. As far as you know, does the United States already have these anti-missile missiles ready for action? (NORC-SRS 640)	
	Yes	66
	No	6
	Not yet, but will	4
	Don't know	24
6/1964	Does Russia already have these anti-missile missiles ready for action? (NORC-SRS 640)	
	Yes	59
	No	7
	Not yet, but will	3
	Don't know	31

6/1964 Here is a kind of scale like one you used before. It shows how desirable or wanted something is. Plus 3 means that something is very desirable. Minus 3, that it's extremely undesirable. Zero stands for something you don't particularly care about one way or another. (NORC-SRS 640)

	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
A. Using this scale, how desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around all larger cities in America?	61	17	9	2	2	1	6	1
B. How desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around your city/ the city, or cities nearest you?	46	16	14	7	3	3	6	1
C. How desirable is it even if real estate values went down a little because of it?	39	17	13	8	4	3	2	1
D. Even if it involves some risk that these missiles could be fired by accident?	29	15	15	4	7	6	9	1
E. How desirable is it to put the anti-missile around our cities even though the radar to go with these missiles may cause poorer television reception around here?	42	15	13	7	3	3	3	1
F. How about shelters? How desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around our cities if it means we must set up shelters for everyone?	40	16	13	6	4	3	3	2
G. How desirable is it to go ahead even though there might be some local opposition to putting anti-missile missiles around some cities?	40	19	13	7	3	3	2	1
H. Even if they take up a lot of acres that could be used differently, how desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around our cities?	40	19	14	5	3	3	3	1
I. If you knew that these anti-missile missiles could shoot down just about all enemy missiles attacking a city, maybe nine out of ten, how desirable is it to put such weapons around cities	67	14	8	2	1	1	4	1
J. And suppose you knew that they could shoot down about one out of three enemy missiles?	42	19	17	4	4	3	4	1

6/1964	Now I'll read a few more statements to you. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement, or whether you are undecided. (NORC SRS 640)	SA	A	D	SD	NS
	A. If we have anti-missile missiles around our cities, there will be less need for fallout shelters	7	35	38	7	12
	B. If we have anti-missile missiles around our cities, we will need fallout shelters even more than we need them now	11	30	42	4	13
	C. There is no need for anti-missile missiles or for fallout shelters	2	5	48	34	9
	D. If we have such missiles around our cities, we should have shelters to protect against fallout because some enemy weapons will get through the defense anyway	18	65	7	2	8
	E. Even if cities are defended, enemy attacks on them would produce lots of fallout, so anti-missile missiles make sense only if we have fallout shelters for everyone	12	51	20	2	14
	F. Putting anti-missile missiles around our cities will make people think that war is more likely	6	41	40	4	8
	G. Such missiles will make the Russians think that we are going to start a war; therefore, they might start one	3	21	53	8	13
	H. These missiles will give Americans a false sense of security	3	28	52	4	12
	I. Anti-missile missiles will make Americans more anxious	3	31	49	3	12
	J. Anti-missile missiles will lead to a stepping up of the arms race	4	44	33	2	16
	K. Such missiles will cost too much money to be worth while	3	14	58	10	17
	L. New offensive weapons will soon put anti-missile missiles out of date, so it really is not worth having them	1	12	53	7	25
	M. Putting in anti-missile missiles makes it more difficult to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament	2	28	47	4	18
	N. Anti-missile missiles will make America stronger, and an enemy will be even less likely to attack us than without these missiles	15	61	13	2	8
	O. With such missiles around our cities, an enemy will be less likely to try to push us around than he might otherwise do	14	62	13	1	7

6/1964 Not all cities might be defended by anti-missile missiles. Would you rather live in a city, or near one, that is defended by anti-missile missiles or in a city that does not have any such anti-missile missiles around it? (NORC-SRS 640)

In protected city	65
No difference	16
In unprotected city	13
Don't know	6

6/1964 Now will you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with these statements concerning your feelings about living in or near a city that has anti-missile missiles? (NORC-SRS 640)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis- Agree	Strongly Disagree	Un- Dec
A. I would feel guilty to be in a defended city when other Americans are not defended as well	3	29	54	5	8
B. I would feel that I want to move out of the city	1	9	71	9	8
C. I would feel lucky that my city is better protected than some other city	12	60	17	1	8
D. I would feel worried living in a defended city when other cities are not defended by missiles, because this would mean that my city will surely be attacked in the event of a war	3	26	55	5	9
E. I would feel angry, because I am opposed to having anti-missile missiles around here	*	5	73	14	6
F. I would feel that I can do nothing about the missiles	5	64	19	2	8
G. I would feel more secure than if I were living in a city that is not protected with anti-missile missiles	8	50	28	3	10

6/1964 Using the same card, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with these statements about living in a city that does not have anti-missile defenses when some other cities have them. (NORC-SRS 640)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis- Agree	Strongly Disagree	Un- Dec
A. I would feel that it is unfair that some cities are defended when my city is not	5	37	47	2	7
B. I would feel that I want to move to a defended city	4	31	49	2	12
C. I would feel more worried than if I were in a city that is protected by anti-missile missiles	3	36	48	3	8
D. I would feel more secure living in an undefended city because this would mean that my city might not be attacked in the event of a war	2	22	59	6	11
E. I would feel that I can do nothing about the missiles	5	67	18	2	8
F. I would feel lucky that I don't have to put up with missiles around here	1	18	61	6	13
G. I would feel that I ought to do something to make sure that my city also gets missiles like other cities	7	46	28	1	16

6/1964 Now, no matter how the government might want to defend all American cities, it may be that only some can be protected by anti-missile missiles. On this card are listed some of the factors that may go into these difficult decisions. Please look at the kinds of cities listed on the card. A) Which of these kinds of cities is the most important to defend if all of them cannot be? B) Which would be next most important? C) Which of those kinds of cities would be least important to defend, if all of them cannot be? D) And which would be next least important, as you see it? (NORC-SRS 640)

	Most	Next Most	Least	Next Least
1) Cities with the largest population	19	12	4	10
2) Cities with the most industry	24	36	3	4
3) Cities with military establishments around them	43	25	3	3
4) Cities that are important in American history	1	2	48	32
5) Sea and land transportation centers	9	20	7	9
6) Cities which are drawn by lot to insure that all have equal chances to be defended	2	2	33	39

6/1964 One more question along these lines. Here is a list of a few American cities. Suppose only seven of these cities could be defended. If you were in a position to make the decision right now, which of these cities would you say should have anti-missile defenses? (If respondent is opposed to the whole idea-- Even though you are opposed to the idea, please try to put yourself in the position of a person who would have to make this decision- which seven cities should it be?) (NORC-SRS 640) (data not presented in the order asked)

Washington, D.C.	90	Seattle	37	Dallas	11
New York	88	Philadelphia	29	St. Louis	8
San Francisco	71	Miami	29	Kansas City	8
Chicago	65	Boston	28	Omaha	8
Los Angeles	57	New Orleans	19	Indianapolis	7
Detroit	47	Houston	14	Tulsa	3
Pittsburg	39	Denver	12	Tuscon	3

Your own city, unless included on this list 18

6/1964 I have only two small items left. A while back, we used a scale that measures how desirable something is to you, or how undesirable it is. Please remember that plus 3 means it is very desirable, and minus 3 that it is very undesirable. (NORC-SRS 640)

+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 DK

A. With some of the information that you now have, how desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around our cities?

52 20 12 4 2 2 5 1

B. How desirable is it to put anti-missile missiles around your city/city or cities nearest you

40 16 16 7 5 3 10 1

2/1966 Let me give you a few more cards. On these cards are written some [8] possible international situations that may come about in about five years or by the early 1970's. We shall use the folder again that you already saw when we talked about the Cold War in general. Please sort the cards you now have depending on how likely you believe these various world situations will be within the next five years, or by the early 1970's.

The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles that no enemy would think of attacking us. (NORC-SRS 876)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK

11 7 6 6 7 20 9 7 8 8 12 1

2/1966	Now will you please sort these cards once again, depending on how much you personally want or do not want each of these international situations to happen. The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles that no enemy would think of attacking us. (NORC-SRS 876)	
	+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 DK	
	69 9 7 4 2 1 7 1	
6/1968	Do you think there is any defense possible against enemy missiles now? (ORC/N)	
	Yes	55
	No	23
	Don't know	22
6/1968	What kind of defense are you thinking about? (ORC/N)	
	Missile	36
	Other	10
	Don't know	54
6/1968	How would these missiles work? (ORC/N)	
	Correct answer (simple)	16
	Correct answer (sophisticated)	8
	Don't know	72
6/1968	Does the U.S. already have some ABM's ready for action? (ORC/N)	
	Yes	70
	No	4
	Don't know	25
	Not yet	1
6/1968	Does Russia already have some ABM's ready for action? (ORC/N)	
	Yes	71
	No	1
	Don't know	27
	Not yet	1
6/1968	How about China? (ORC/N)	
	Yes	30
	No	17
	Don't know	43
	Not yet	10

6/1968 If we had an ABM system in full operation, what would our nation's need for fallout shelters be? (ORC/N)

Needed for everyone	14
More needed	18
About the same needed	39
Fewer needed	29
Not needed	6
Don't know	14

6/1968 Would you rather live in or near an area that is defended by ABM's or in an area that does not have such protection? (ORC/N)

Protected city	49
No difference	16
Unprotected city	23
Don't know	12

6/1968 Why would you say that? (ORC/N)

(Those 49% who answered protected city- first response)

Safety	13
Protection	24
Survival	8
Don't know/NA	54

(Those 23% who answered unprotected city- first response)

Safety	2
Survival	1
Not target	12
Live away from city	2
Don't know/NA	83

6/1968 I am going to read you some statements about ABM's. I would like to know how desirable or wanted each action is. This will be the scale that you will use. The minus 3 stands for something that you would dislike very much. Zero stands for something you don't care one way or another about. Plus three stands for something you would very much want to happen. You may use any number on the scale that best fits your opinion. (ORC/N)

	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
How desirable is it to put ABMs around all large cities in America?	48	11	9	9	3	3	5	11
How desirable is it if they only could shoot down about one out of every two missiles?	23	10	9	9	5	7	22	16
In late 1967, the government announced that it was starting a limited ABM program costing about five billion dollars in the next five years. How desirable is such a program to you	39	13	11	10	3	3	7	14
A bigger program costing about 40 billion dollars has been suggested. How desirable is such a program to you	26	8	9	16	5	4	14	17
If we know that the Russians have an active ABM program, how desirable would it be that the U.S. have one?	66	9	5	5	1	1	3	9

6/1968 Here are some possible consequences of this ABM program. I would like to know for each one whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that it might be a consequence. (ORC/N)

	SA	A	D	SD	DK
Having ABM's around our cities will make people think that war is more likely	13	37	36	6	8
If we have ABM's, the Russians will think that we are going to start a war	5	25	50	9	11
Having ABMs will make America stronger, and an enemy will be less likely to attack us	26	48	15	3	9
New offensive weapons will put ABM's out of date, so it is really not worth having them	4	17	43	9	27

6/1968 Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be. (ORC/N)

Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of ABMs

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
44	10	9	10	2	3	11	12

12/1968 Now let me ask about a number of specific areas where it has been suggested the U.S. military defenses be strengthened. For each, tell me if you think this ought to be done or not? (Harris 1900)

	Ought to be Done	Should Not Do	Not Sure
1. Build up a system of anti-missile defenses	60	23	17
2. Increase the number of airplanes which can carry nuclear warheads	48	33	19
3. Increase the number of nuclear warhead long-range missiles	51	28	21
4. Increase the number of men in the U.S. armed forces	31	52	17
5. Give NATO a real capability for waging nuclear warfare	25	48	27
6. Convert the space program into a system of nuclear weapons space stations	25	49	26

12/1968 A. Now I want to read you some statements about what some people have said they expect President Nixon to do when he gets into office. For each one, tell me if you think he probably will do it or not.

B. For each item on that list, tell me is this something you would like to see President Nixon do or not? (Harris 1900)

	A			B		
	Will Do	Will Not Do	NS	Like	Not Like	NS
He will try to work out a peaceful settlement on arms control with the Russians	74	10	16	86	5	9

4/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion of the ABM program- that is the antiballistic missile program? (AIPO 777)

Yes	69
No	31

4/1969 (Of those [69%] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by President Nixon? (AIPO 777)

Yes	40
No	27
Not heard	33

4/1969 (Of those [42%] who had heard and had an opinion of the ABM) Do you favor or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 777)

Favor	25
Oppose	15
Not heard/No Opinion/NA	60

4/1969 President Nixon recently made a decision to go ahead with building the "thin" Sentinel-Safeguard missile defense system. At the beginning this would involve putting in the system at two of our missile bases in Montana and South Dakota for seven billion dollars. Do you tend to approve or disapprove of President Nixon's decision to go ahead with the anti-missile system (Harris 1926)

Approve	48
Disapprove	25
Not sure	27

4/1969 Let me read some statements about President Nixon's decision to go ahead with the Sentinel Safeguard anti-missile system. For each one, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree:
(Harris 1926)

	Agree	Dis- Agree	Not Sure
Many scientists think the system is a mistake because it could not prevent the loss of millions of U.S. lives in an atomic attack	40	28	32
The Russians have already installed 66 ABM's, so we should have some, too	60	19	20
By taking this step, President Nixon hurt the chances of reaching arms control agreements with the Russians	19	52	29
President Nixon's decision was a cautious first step, not even going as far as President Johnson wanted to go	46	14	40
We could have used the seven billion dollars better for our education, health, housing, and poverty needs at home	49	31	20
It is better to be over prepared militarily than to be caught short without proper defenses	78	9	13
In a nuclear age, the U.S. should concentrate on peaceful arms control rather than building more missile systems	47	29	24
President Nixon has now shown he will follow a tough line on military matters	50	18	32
We would be better eliminating the 10% income tax surcharge than building the Sentinel Safeguard missile system	31	40	29
The Russians are developing super-nuclear missiles and we need to be defended against them	68	10	22

5/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion on the ABM program- that is the antiballistic missile program?
(AIPO 780)

Yes	72
No	26
No Opinion	2

5/1969 (Of those [72%] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by President Nixon? (AIPO 780)

Yes	41
No	31
Not Heard and No opinion	28

5/1969 (Of those [41%] who had heard and had an opinion) Do you favor or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 780)

Favor	25
Oppose	14
Not heard/No Opinion/NA	61

5/1969	Do you think it is possible to build a defense system against enemy missiles? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes	53
	No	30
	Don't know	17
5/1969	As far as you know, does the United States already have some ABMs in place and ready to use? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes	61
	No	8
	Not yet, but will (vol)	2
	Don't know	29
5/1969	Do you think the United States should have some sort of ABM defense system, or should not? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes, should	84
	No, should not	8
	No opinion	8
5/1969	As far as you know, does Russia already have some ABMs in place and ready to use? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes	63
	No	3
	Not yet, but will (vol.)	1
	Don't know	33
5/1969	As far as you know, does China already have some ABMs in place and ready to use? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes	30
	No	21
	Not yet, but will (vol.)	8
	Don't know	41
5/1969	President Nixon has come out for a limited ABM system--called the Safeguard System-- which is supposed to protect our ability to strike back at an attacker. Do you think Congress should approve this system, or should not? (ORC/Nx)	
	Yes, should approve it	73
	No, should not approve	10
	Depends	3
	No opinion	14

7/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion on the ABM program- that is the antiballistic missile program? (AIPO 784)

Yes	69
No	31

7/1969 (Of those [69%] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by President Nixon? (AIPO 784)

Yes	42
No	27
Not heard	31

7/1969 (Of those [28%] who had heard and had an opinion) Do you favor or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 784)

Favor	23
Oppose	18
Not heard/No Opinion/NA	59

7/1969 Let me read you some statements which have been made about events in the news. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree: (Harris 1939)

	Agree	Dis- Agree	Not Sure
The Safeguard ABM anti-missile system is necessary in order for us to keep up with the Russians in the nuclear arms race	50	24	26
It is better to be over-prepared militarily than to be caught short without proper defenses	84	7	9
In a nuclear age, the U.S. should concentrate on peaceful arms control rather than building more missile systems like the Safeguard ABM	50	24	26

10/1969 A. I am going to give you a list of problems the United States faces at home. For each, tell me if you would like to see a great deal of attention paid to it, some attention to it, or not much attention paid to it . . . ? (Harris 1970)
 B. If you had to choose, which two or three on the list are most important to you personally?
 C. And which two or three do you feel most urgently need attention?
 (Data not presented in the order the question was asked.)

	A				B	C
	GD	S	NM	NS		
Crime on the streets	88	10	2	*	49	48
Taxes and inflation	79	16	3	2	31	29
Organized crime	79	17	3	1	10	12
Education	77	20	3	*	30	19
Poverty	70	25	4	1	24	24
Air and water pollution	70	23	4	2	20	17
Health care	64	31	3	1	17	11
Racial discrimination	53	33	11	3	15	16
Consumer protection	51	39	7	3	6	4
Conditions of the cities	51	37	7	4	5	6
Housing	50	40	8	2	8	8
Mass transportation	37	43	14	5	4	5
<u>Missile defense</u>	32	42	20	6	4	4
Highway construction	29	52	17	2	2	2
Recreation	27	48	22	2	2	2
Space exploration	20	43	32	3	2	2

9/1970 Would you favor or oppose agreement between the U.S. and Russia on (Harris 2037) (data not presented in the order asked)

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
Exchanging scholars and cultural groups	78	11	11
Getting European countries to pledge not to go to war against each other	77	8	15
Joint action to keep Communist China from starting wars	76	8	16
Taking joint action if another nation threatens to use nuclear weapons	73	12	15
Expanding trade between the 2 countries	73	14	13
<u>Limiting anti-missile (ABM) systems</u>	69	16	15
Joint exploration of the oceans	69	15	16
Exploring outer space	61	27	12

1/1971 How would you rate the job Congress has done . . . -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris 2053) (data not presented in the order the question was asked)

	E	PG	OF	P	NS
Requiring pollution-free car engine by 1975	41	35	9	6	9
Banning cigarette advertising on TV	35	28	10	16	10
Giving the vote to 18 year olds	28	27	12	24	9
Extending federal aid to education	20	39	15	11	15
Rejecting the supersonic transport (SST) subsidy	17	20	12	16	35
Turning down Haynesworth and Carswell for the Supreme Court	10	16	15	19	39
<u>Passing the bill expanding the ABM missile defense system</u>	9	27	16	17	30
Overriding President Nixon's veto of the hospital building bill	7	19	14	20	39
Not passing Pres Nixon's welfare bill	7	18	17	31	28
Passing a new anti-crime bill	6	30	26	14	25
Not increasing Social Security benefits	2	11	16	54	17
Not passing the bill on federal-state revenue sharing	2	8	14	31	45

1/1971 Do you favor or oppose the U.S. and Russia coming to an agreement to limit both countries' missile systems? (Harris 2055)

Favor	81
Oppose	10
Not sure	9

1/1971 Would you like to see the federal government increase the amount of money spent, cut back, or not change the amount of money spent (Harris 2055) (data not presented in the order asked)

	I	CB	NC	NS
Programs to control air & water pollution	85	3	9	3
Aid to public schools	67	5	25	3
Aid to cities	58	9	25	8
Support prices for farmers	44	17	28	11
The space program	17	49	29	5
<u>The ABM missile system</u>	15	40	32	13
Foreign military and economic aid	10	51	30	8
The war in Vietnam	6	63	24	7

6/1971	Would you favor or oppose agreement between the United States and Russia on . . . limiting anti-missile (ABM) systems (Harris 2124)								
	Agree							71	
	Disagree							14	
	Not Sure							15	
6/1971	Have you heard or read anything about the so-called SALT talks that are being held between the United States and Russia? (ORC/Nx)								
	Yes							29	
	No							70	
	No opinion							1	
6/1971	(Asked of those 29% who answered yes) Do you believe these talks are now making progress, or aren't they? (ORC/Nx)								
	Are making progress							33	
	Are not making progress							38	
	No opinion							29	
2/1972	Would you favor or oppose agreement between the U.S. and Russia on limiting anti-missile (ABM) systems (Harris 2154)								
	Agree							74	
	Disagree							13	
	Not Sure							13	
3/1972	There are, of course, other important things that various people have been talking about and suggesting. Not all of them are likely to come about, but regardless of how likely they are, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. Here is a scale on which minus three indicates that you personally would not like to see this happen, zero indicates that you are neither opposed nor in favor of it, and plus three indicates that you would very much like to see it happen. You may use any number on the scale to indicate your opinion.								
	Stopping all plans to put anti-missile missiles (ABM's) around some military bases and cities. (MIS/N)								
		+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
		11	6	6	14	11	12	32	7
	Protecting most of our big cities and important military bases with anti-missile missiles (ABM's) (MIS/N)								
		+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
		40	15	13	13	4	3	6	5

3/1972

Here is another simple card. I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few program. The card shows the approximate total amount for one year.

How much do you think was spent on the anti-missile missiles (ABMs); that is, missiles that could shoot down enemy missiles before they could hit us?

And about how much should we spend on anti-missile missiles (ABM's) each year? (MIS/N)

	Was Spent	Should Spend
0	1	6
5 million	*	*
10 million	2	5
15 million	-	*
20 million	3	4
35 million	*	1
50 million	4	6
75 million	*	1
100 million	4	6
150 million	*	*
200 million	5	6
300 million	1	1
400 million	7	5
700 million	1	1
1 billion	10	9
1.5 billion	1	-
2 billion	7	4
3.5 billion	1	*
5 billion	9	5
7.5 billion	1	1
10 billion	7	5
DK/NA	38	38

3/1972

Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty?

Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of anti-missile missiles (ABM's) (MIS/N)

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
40	14	10	13	5	3	8	7

Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles (ABM's) at all.

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
27	5	7	15	8	6	21	9

6/1972 Do you approve or disapprove of the agreement between Russia and the U.S. . . . to limit the manufacture of nuclear defensive missiles (ABM's) (Harris 2216)

Agree	79
Disagree	12
Not Sure	9

7/1972-
5/1974 Missiles which can intercept and destroy enemy rockets launched against this country before they get near enough to cause serious damage:
If a development like the one described above were to be put into operation, how much would it change your own life?
(Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Very much	21	21
Quite a bit	24	23
Slightly	15	14
Not very much	14	13
Not at all	24	24
Don't know	2	4

7/1972-
5/1974 How much do you think it [defensive missiles] would change life for most people? (Field-LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Very much	21	25
Quite a bit	30	25
Slightly	18	21
Not very much	15	12
Not at all	12	13
DK	3	4

7/1972-
5/1974 How sure do you feel that this development would have beneficial results? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Absolutely sure	18	21
Quite sure	35	35
Not too sure	30	32
Would have none	11	9
DK	5	6

7/1972- (Asked of those 54%/56% who were absolutely sure or quite sure
5/1974 of beneficial results) What do you see as the most important
benefits or good things that might result if such a development
were actually to take place? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Provide added protection, protect, safeguard country, make country secure, protect us	25	27
Make us feel safe, protected, help us have peace of mind, less tension, fear	15	12
Would deter aggression, enemy would not attack	13	20
Would save lives, people would survive, keep us from being wiped out	12	14
Always need better defenses, necessary for country	12	4
Might help bring peace, promote peace, be no sense in war	3	5
Would intercept missiles before they got here, before they do damage	15	14
Would make jobs, increase employment	4	3

7/1972- How sure do you feel that this development would have a
5/1974 drawback or bad results? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Absolutely sure	9	10
Quite sure	19	23
Not too sure	35	40
Would have none	22	19
DK	15	9

7/1972- (Asked of those 28%/33% who were absolutely sure or quite sure
5/1974 of bad results) What do you see as the most important
drawbacks or bad things that might result if such a development
were actually to take place? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Cost too much, cost to develop too high	18	8
Should spend money for other things, not weapons	7	10
It could be misused, used against others	3	3
It could lead to war, annihilation	19	18
It continues the arms race, they have same thing	20	20
All complaints against policy of armaments, violence wrong, nations should trust each other	23	26
Too much potential for error, human error, could go wrong	10	11
All others	-	2

7/1972- How much would you like to see or how strongly would you be
5/1974 opposed to missiles which can intercept and destroy enemy
rockets launched against this country before they get near
enough to cause serious damage? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Very strongly opposed to	15	15
Somewhat strongly opposed to	6	5
Slightly opposed to	4	4
Neither opposed to nor would like to see	13	12
Slightly like to see	14	13
Somewhat strongly like to see	22	16
Very strongly like to see	34	37
DK	1	-

7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups listed in the question
5/1974 above DO you think actually has the MOST say in deciding
whether space stations which would be manned by military
personnel who can aim rockets and missiles at targets on earth
should be built? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Technical experts	19	19
Business leaders	4	4
Top government leaders	57	61
Congressmen	12	13
The courts	*	*
Organized consumer groups	*	*
Individual people/the public	2	1
No one	*	*
DK	4	-

7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups listed in the question
5/1974 above do you think has the LEAST say in deciding whether space
stations which would be manned by military personnel who can
aim rockets and missiles at targets on earth should be built?
(Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Technical experts	1	2
Business leaders	5	4
Top government leaders	1	1
Congressmen	1	1
The courts	8	4
Organized consumer groups	12	11
Individual people/the public	60	76
No one	4	1
DK	7	-

7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups mentioned in the
5/1974 question above in order to protect the public interest, SHOULD
have the MOST say in deciding whether space stations which
would be manned by military personnel who can aim rockets and
missiles at targets on earth should be built? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Technical experts	19	22
Business leaders	1	1
Top government leaders	25	24
Congressmen	10	13
The courts	1	1
Organized consumer groups	3	2
Individual people/the public	35	34
No one	2	1
DK	4	-

7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups mentioned in the
5/1974 question above in order to protect the public interest, SHOULD
have the LEAST say in deciding whether space stations which
would be manned by military personnel who can aim rockets and
missiles at targets on earth should be built? (Field/LMH)

	7/72	5/74
Technical experts	4	6
Business leaders	24	31
Top government leaders	14	20
Congressmen	5	3
The court	10	10
Organized consumer groups	11	16
Individual people/the public	9	11
No one	12	3
DK	11	-

9/1972 Would you like to see the federal government spend more money,
less, or about the same amount of money on (Harris
2234) (data not presented in the order the question was asked)

	M	L	S	NS
Research & development of new weapons systems	25	27	41	7
Nuclear submarines	19	30	38	11
U.S. bases here in the U.S.	18	22	51	8
Aircraft carriers	16	30	43	10
<u>Anti-missile system</u>	15	33	41	11
Nuclear missile systems	11	39	41	9
Defense in general	11	38	44	7
U.S. bases overseas	10	39	40	10

6/1973 Let me read you some possible areas of agreement that might come out of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Washington this month. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose this agreement (Harris 2330) (data not presented in the order the question was asked)

	A	D	NS
Getting Russia to allow Jews to leave that country more easily	84	4	12
Undertaking joint exploration of the oceans	75	10	15
<u>Further limiting anti-missile (ABM) systems</u>	73	10	17
Taking joint action if another nation threatens to use nuclear weapons	73	10	17
Exchanging scientists and other technical missions	69	17	14

11/1973 Let me read you some proposals which have been made for possible agreements between Russia and the United States. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose this agreement. . . . (Harris 2351)

Jointly recommending East and West European countries not to go to war against each other	89	4	7
Bringing about a Middle East settlement	89	3	8
Undertaking joint efforts to solve the world energy shortage	88	4	8
Undertaking joint efforts to curb air and water pollution	87	5	8
Getting Russia to give more freedom to its writers and scientists	83	5	12
Getting Russia to allow Jews to leave that country more easily	81	6	13
Limiting the number of nuclear submarines each country has	76	12	12
<u>Further limiting anti-missile (ABM) systems</u>	74	12	14
Reducing the number of American and Russian troops in central and western Europe	74	11	15
Exchanging scientists and other technical missions	72	14	14
Expanding trade between the U.S. and Russia	71	16	13
Give Russia favored nation status in trade as most Western nations have with us now	48	32	20

5/1974 see 7/1972 (Field/LMH)

1/1976 Do you feel that the Russians have lived up to the terms they agreed to under the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT Treaty) with the United States, or don't you think the Russians have done so? (Harris 7588)

Russians lived up to agreement	11
Not lived up to agreement	49
Not sure	40

1/1976	Do you feel that the Russians have lived up to the terms they agreed to under the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT Treaty) with the United States, or don't you think the Russians have done so? (Harris 7588)	
	Russians lived up to agreement	11
	Not lived up to agreement	49
	Not sure	40
2/1978	Recently a Russian nuclear satellite accidentally fell out of the sky and exploded in western Canada. Some pieces of the satellite gave off radiation where they fell. Did this falling of a nuclear satellite to earth worry you deeply, only somewhat or hardly at all? (Harris)	
	Worried deeply	33
	Only somewhat	40
	Hardly at all	25
	Not sure	2
2/1978	Do you favor or oppose an agreement between the US and the Soviet Union outlawing the use of all nuclear-powered satellites in space? (Harris)	
	Favor	59
	Oppose	25
	Not sure	16

2/1978 Let me read you some statements about satellites which have nuclear-powered plants in them. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. (Harris)

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Is it good that the US and the Soviet Union are able to cooperate fully on knowing what nuclear satellites are in space and where they are	82	6	12
As long as countries like the Soviet Union and the US have nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered satellites ought to be allowed, making sure all safety precautions are followed	62	22	16
It is important to use the most efficient fuel possible on satellites, and nuclear power is probably the cheapest source of power for this purpose.	54	16	30
If the Russian satellite had fallen in the middle of a deeply populated place instead of the northwest woods of Canada, it would have caused people to be burned from radiation.	82	7	11
The real worry is that countries can have nuclear-powered satellites in space that could be crashed deliberately into population centers, causing nuclear destruction	77	12	11
It was shocking that both the Soviet Union and the US knew about the nuclear-powered satellites in space and kept it a secret from the world.	60	26	14

12/1978 Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty? (MIS/N)

Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles (ABM's) at all?

+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	DK
30	9	7	12	7	7	21	8

4/1979b	How effective do you feel our military defense is against a Russian missile attack on this country--very effective, only somewhat effective, or not very effective? (ABC/Harris 792106)	
	Very effective	31
	Only somewhat effective	43
	Not very effective	21
	Not sure	5
2/1985	Did you know that the United States has a treaty with the Soviet Union not to protect Americans from a Soviet missile attack? (Fink)	
	No	83
5/1985	Would you favor development and an eventual deployment of a "Star Wars" defense system for the United States, even if it meant that the U.S. would have to renegotiate or withdraw from our existing arms control agreements with the Soviet Union? (SIND/CPD)	
	Yes	69
	No	7
	No opinion	24
7/1985	Supporters say such weapons could guarantee protection of the United States from nuclear attack and are worth whatever they cost. Opponents say such weapons will not work, will increase the arms race, and that the research will cost many billions of dollars. How about you: would you say you approve or disapprove of plans to develop such space-based weapons? (ABC/WP)	
	Approve	41
	Disapprove	53
	Don't know	5
7/1985	(For those 41% who approved) Currently the U.S. and the Soviet Union have an anti-ballistic missile treaty that prohibits both nations from developing certain weapons. Suppose the U.S. had to violate or abandon that treaty in order to develop the space-based weapons. Would you still favor the development of those space-based weapons, or not? (ABC/WP)	
	Yes, would still favor	63
	No, would not still favor	32
	Don't know or no opinion	5

9/1985 In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM treaty, which prohibited either nation from testing or deploying a national system of defense against long-range nuclear missiles. Had you previously been aware of this ABM treaty, as far as you can recall? (M&K)

Yes	36
No	64

9/1985 Supporters of the ABM treaty say it has made the world safer by giving both the United States and the Soviet Union the security of knowing that the other side cannot use nuclear weapons without being destroyed in retaliation. At some point, development of Star Wars will require the U.S. to either withdraw from the ABM Treaty or violate the Treaty. If you had to choose between developing Star Wars or keeping the ABM Treaty, which would you choose? (M&K)

Develop Star Wars	37
Keep ABM Treaty	48
Not sure	15

9/1985 The Reagan administration is now working on this program known as Star Wars. It will attempt to build a new defensive system in outer space that could shoot down nuclear missiles fired at the U.S. Since the program is currently only a research project, it is impossible to predict how complete a defense it will provide. I'm going to read a list of four possible Star Wars systems. For each one, tell me if you would strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly oppose building each type of system. (M&K)

- A. A system that was perfect and could successfully defend against all incoming nuclear weapons;
- B. A system that could protect our missile sites and some population centers, but could not guarantee the safety of many of our major cities;
- C. A system designed only to protect U.S. missiles, key military bases, and Washington, D.C., but not other areas
- D. A system that could provide a complete defense against long-range nuclear missiles, but cannot defend against missiles fired from submarines or bombers

A	58	28	5	4	4
B	12	32	34	16	6
D	8	32	34	17	10
C	5	16	39	34	5

11/1985 There is some question about whether research on Star Wars violates a 1972 treaty that the United States signed with the Soviet Union in which we promised not to develop, test or deploy anti-ballistic missiles. Would you still be in favor of going ahead with research on Star Wars even if it was in violation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty? (LAT 100)

Go ahead	65
Don't go ahead	29
Not sure	6

12/1986 (Asked of those who supported or opposed Star Wars) Why do you support/oppose the project? (LAT/Econ)

	US	UK	FRG
Support			
It would make the world safer, /protect the West	37	38	38
It allows the US to have/maintain its superiority	30	12	16
It can be used as a bargaining chip on arms control	13	21	21
A lot of new/useful products, technologies will result	7	7	6
Other reasons	13	26	18
Don't know	na	7	6
Oppose			
It's expensive, waste of money	31	25	23
It won't work	25	13	16
It will lead to an arms race in space	17	20	48
It blocks a nuclear arms agreement	7	14	14
Other reasons	20	32	30
Don't know	na	7	6

10/1987 At some point, development of Star Wars will require the U.S. to either withdraw from or violate the ABM Treaty, which prohibits either nation from testing defense systems against long-range nuclear missiles. If the U.S. had to choose between continuing its development of Star Wars or continuing to live by the ABM Treaty, which would you choose? (M&K/ATS) (similar question asked 9/1985)

Develop Star Wars	37
Keep ABM Treaty	46
Not sure	17

APPENDIX 9

SALT II: Public Attitudes, 1972 - 1987

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6/1972 The United States should go further in negotiating with Soviet Russia with a view to reducing armaments on both sides.
(Gallup/PA)

Agree	81
Disagree	7
Don't know	6

10/2/72 SALT I entered into force; it was ratified by the Senate on 8/3/72

11/1972 In his second term in the White House do you think President Nixon will . . . , or don't you think he will do that? Come to further major agreements with the Russians on arms control limitations. (Harris)

Will	76
Will not	13
Not sure	11

6/1973 Let me read you some possible areas of agreement that might come out of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Washington this month. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose each agreement (Harris 2330)

A Reducing the number of American and Russian troops in central and western Europe;
B Jointly recommending that East and West European countries pledge not to go to war against each other;
C Taking joint action if another nation threatens to use nuclear weapons;
D Agreeing to limit the number of nuclear submarines each country has.

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
A	70	13	7
B	-	-	-
C	73	10	7
D	72	10	8

11/1973 Now let me read you some proposals which have been made for possible agreements between Russia and the US. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . (Harris 2351)

A Jointly recommending East and West European countries pledge not to go to war against each other;
B Limiting the number of nuclear submarines each country has;
C Reducing the number of American and Russian troops in central and western Europe.

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
A	89	4	7
B	76	12	12
C	74	11	15

12/1974- Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United
11/1982 States might have. For each one, would you please say whether
you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal
of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal,
or not an important goal at all . . . (Harris/CCFR-Harris 2536,
Gallup/CCFR)

Worldwide arms control

	12/74 Pub	12/74 Lead	11/78 Pub	1/79 Lead	11/82 Pub	11/82 Lead
Very important	64	86	64	81	64	86
Somewhat important	23	12	23	16	25	12
Not important at all	5	1	5	3	6	2
Not sure/NA	8	1	8	1	6	0

12/1974 (For those 87% who answered very or somewhat important) How
would you rate the job the U.S. is now doing in . . . worldwide
arms control-- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?
(Harris/CCFR-Harris 2436)

Excellent	6
Pretty good	39
Only fair	27
Poor	6
Not sure	6
NA	16

12/1974 Looking at this list again, which goal would you say should be the most important foreign policy goal of the United States? And which would you say should be the least important foreign policy goal of the United States? (Harris/CCFR-Harris 2436)

	Most Important	Least Important
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	1	7
Containing communism	7	7
Helping to improve standards of living in less developed countries	3	4
Keeping peace in the world	31	*
Worldwide arms control	2	2
Defending our allies' security	*	5
Promoting and defending our own security	8	*
Promoting the development of capitalism abroad	*	14
Securing adequate supplies of energy	3	*
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	*	10
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	*	3
Protecting the jobs of American workers	6	*
Maintaining a balance of power among nations	1	4
Combating world hunger	5	1
Helping solve world inflation	5	2
Strengthening the United Nations	1	9
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us	*	4
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy	13	2
None	1	3
Not sure	6	18

12/1974 Now let me read you some proposals which have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet union. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . (Harris 2436)

Substantially limiting the number of nuclear missiles each country has

Favor	76
Oppose	13
Not sure	11

1/1975-
1/1980

Of course, everyone is more interested in some things being carried in the news than in others. Is news about . . . the proposed arms control or SALT agreement between the US and Russia something you have recently been following fairly closely, or just following casually, or not paying much attention to? (Roper 75-2, 77-10, 78-3, 78-7, 79-2, 79-3, 79-5, 79-6, 79-7, 79-8, 79-10, 80-2)

	1/75	11/77	2/78	7/78	
Following closely	27	31	27	33	
Following casually	46	42	42	41	
No attention/DK	27	27	30	26	
	1/79	2/79	5/79		
Following closely	28	32	32		
Following casually	46	42	42		
No attention/DK	27	26	26		
	6/79	7/79	8/79	11/79	1/80
Following closely	28	33	30	32	34
Following casually	44	42	42	44	45
No attention/DK	28	25	29	24	21

4/1975-
1978

Have you heard of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT talks) with the Russians? (CSR/C)

	4/75	3/76	1/77	77	78
Yes	65	66	65	78	73
No	22	21	-	22	21
Not sure	13	12	-	-	6

4/1975-
1978

(Asked of those who had heard of SALT) Do you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of such talks? (CSR/C)

	4/75	3/76	1/77	77	78
Favorable	37	33	35	39	37
Unfavorable	13	18	17	15	18
Can't rate	15	15	13	24	17
Not heard/not sure	35	33	35	22	27

12/1975- 1/1976	Now let me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . Extend SALT to a new treaty controlling nuclear warheads each country can possess. (Harris 2732, 7588)			
			12/75	1/76
	Favor		59	58
	Oppose		14	13
	Not sure		27	29
3/1976	see 4/1975 (CSR/C)			
8/1976	Now in the area of foreign policy, do you favor or oppose . . . Trying to get agreement with Russia on a reduction of strategic nuclear arms and missiles? (Harris 2624A-1)			
	Favor			80
	Oppose			10
	Not sure			10
1/1977	see 4/1975 (CSR/C)			
1/1977	Here are some of the things Jimmy Carter says he wants to do as President. Please tell me whether you think he will, or will not, be able to do them? . . . Do you think Jimmy Carter will, or will not, be able to negotiate a treaty with the Russians to cut back on military weapons (CBS/NYT)			
	Will			31
	Will not			41
	Not sure			29
3/1977a- 5/1979	Would you favor or oppose the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement? (Harris)			
		Favor	Oppose	NS
3/1977a	(Harris 2732)	66	8	26
3/1977b	(Harris 7781)	77	8	15
5/1978	(Harris 7882)	75	12	13
6/1978	ABC/Harris	72	17	11
1/1979	(harris 792102)	74	16	10
4/1979	(ABC/Harris 792106)	75	14	11
5/1979a	(Harris 792107)	72	18	10

- 3/1977a Now let me read you some statements that have been made about President Carter's strong objections to the way the Russians have treated dissidents in their country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree (Harris 2732)
President Carter is being so critical of the Russians that it will be hard to justify any agreement he might make with them in the future.
- | | |
|----------|----|
| Agree | 25 |
| Disagree | 46 |
| Not sure | 29 |
- 3/1977a Compared to when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, do you think the chances of working out agreements with Russia are better under President Carter, worse, or not much different? (Harris 2732)
- | | |
|--------------------|----|
| Better | 22 |
| Worse | 9 |
| Not much different | 50 |
| Not sure | 19 |
- 3/1977a Do you feel that President Carter's staunch and continued emphasis on the human rights of Russian dissidents will improve his ability to come to agreement with the Russians, will hurt his ability to negotiate with them, or won't make much difference? (Harris 2732)
- | | |
|---|----|
| Will improve his ability to reach agreement | 20 |
| Will hurt his ability to negotiate | 23 |
| Make no real difference | 38 |
| Not sure | 9 |
- 3/1977b As you know, the Russians flatly turned down President Carter's plan to have the two countries agree to limit nuclear weapons. Do you feel this was a major set-back for President Carter, a minor set-back, or not a set-back at all? (Harris 7781)
- | | |
|-----------------------|----|
| Major set-back | 19 |
| Minor set-back | 44 |
| Not a set-back at all | 22 |
| Not sure | 15 |

3/1977b Now let me read you some reasons which some people have given for the US and Russia having failed to come to an agreement in their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). For each reason, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. (Harris 7781)

	Agree	Dis- agree	Not Sure
The Russians don't want to agree to any reduction in the number of nuclear warhead missiles that they have	70	10	20
President Carter made a mistake in presenting his proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.	40	33	27
The Russians only want agreements under which they can gain an advantage	78	7	15
President Carter made the mistake of announcing publicly what he planned to offer the Russians before they knew what the offer was	49	25	26
The Russians didn't want to move too fast in coming to an agreement with a new President	70	9	21
President Carter hurt his chances of getting an agreement on SALT because he kept talking about how the Russians were violating human rights	46	25	29
The US and Russia are still talking, so the first Russian turndown of Carter's proposals might not have been so serious	73	5	22
President Carter showed his lack of experience in foreign affairs by the way he handled the Russians in the SALT talks.	44	26	30

3/1977b Do you feel the chances of the US and Russia coming to an agreement over arms limitations are excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris 7781)

Excellent	5
Pretty good	30
Only fair	39
Poor	14
Not sure	12

/1977b see 3/1977a (Harris)

4/1977- Do you think the US should or should not negotiate a treaty
11/1978 with the Russians to cut back military weapons? (CBS/NYT)

	4/77	11/78+
Should	68	70
Should not	20	30
Not sure/NA	12	-

+ slight variation in question wording

5/1977 We are currently engaged in talks to reach an arms agreement with Russia, and Russia is one of the countries President Carter has criticized for denying its citizens human rights. Do you think Carter's criticisms will decrease the chances of reaching an arms agreement with Russia, or increase the chances of reaching an agreement, or won't effect the outcome of the talks one way or the other? (Roper 77-5)

Decreases chances	31
Increase chances	9
Won't affect outcome	46
Don't know/No answer	15

6/1977 Would you favor President Carter continuing to speak out on human rights violations in Russia and elsewhere even if that made it harder to reach arms control limits with the Soviet Union? (PIOR)

Yes	53
No	29
Undecided	18

11/1977- The United States and Russia are trying to come to a new
8/1978 agreement limiting each country's nuclear weapons. This agreement would replace the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty called SALT, that ran out last October. Are you in favor of, or opposed to signing a new SALT agreement with Russia, or haven't you been paying much attention to this issue? (Roper 77-10, 78-6, 78-8) (for additional Roper time series with different wording, see 11/1978)

	Favor	Opposed	Not paying attention	It depends	DK
11/1977	43	10	29	8	10
6/1978	45	11	30	6	8
8/1978	41	16	29	8	6

11/1977 Would you favor or oppose a new SALT agreement with Russia if the agreement leaves the US and Russia equally strong in overall nuclear weapons -- with the US maybe ahead in some kinds of nuclear weapons, but Russia ahead in some other kinds? (Roper 77-10)

Favor	52
Oppose	20
DK	27

11/1977-1/1979 When US officials negotiate with the Russians, how much confidence do you have that they will protect U.S. interests on nuclear arms control, and won't sign agreements that might endanger American security -- a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all? (Roper 77-10, 79-2)

	11/77	1/79
Great deal	14	16
Fair amount	39	42
Not very much	29	26
None at all	12	9
DK	8	8

11/1977 see 1/1975 (Roper 77-10)

1977 see 4/1975 (CSR/C)

1/1978- Do you favor or oppose a new agreement between the United
9/1979 States and Russia which would limit nuclear weapons (NBC/AP...,
32/101, 33/103, 35/107, ep, 37/111, 39/112, 40/113, 41/117,
43/119, 45/121)

	Favor	Oppose	NS
1/1978	74	19	7
6/1978	67	22	11
8/1978	71	22	7
10/1978	70	21	9
11/1978 +	71	17	12
12/1978	75	17	8
2/1979	81	14	5
3/1979	71	18	11
5/1979a	68	22	10
7/1979a	65	25	10
9/1979	62	30	8

+ Wording variation: "Do you favor or oppose agreements between the United States and Russia which limit nuclear weapons?"

2/1978 see 1/1975 (Roper 78-3)

2/1978 How much have you heard or read about the negotiations that the United States is conducting with Russia to limit the number and spread of strategic weapons-- a great deal, a fair amount, very little, or nothing at all? (ORC)

Great deal	8
Fair amount	29
Very little	42
Nothing at all	19
No opinion	2

4/1978a (As you know), the Russians have sent over a billion dollars worth of military weapons and supplies and thousands of Cuban troops into Ethiopia in their war with Somalia on the horn of Africa. The horn of Africa is important because it stands at a key place controlling seas that lead to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and can affect the shipment of oil to the US and other countries. Now, if the Russians and Cubans do not get out of Ethiopia, but remain there as a threat to take over that part of Africa, would you favor or oppose . . . President Carter warning the Russians that we won't agree to negotiating on arms control or trade unless they get out of Ethiopia? (Harris)

Favor	69
Oppose	13
Not sure	18

5/1978 see 3/1977 (Harris 7882)

6/1978 The government is attempting to negotiate a new agreement with Moscow called SALT III [sic] limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons either country will manufacture. Do you favor our signing this kind of agreement with the Russians or do you think it is too risky? (YSW/Time)

Favor	33
Oppose	56
Not sure	11

6/1978 Have you heard about the discussions that are taking place between the United States and the United States to limit the use of nuclear weapons? (CBS/NYT)

Yes	72
No	35

6/1978-6/1979 Do you favor or oppose the United States and Russia coming to an agreement to limit nuclear weapons? (CBS/NYT)

	6/78	1/79+	6/79
Favor	78	63	77
Oppose	14	26	15
DK/NA	8	11	8

+ variation in question wording

6/1978 If the United States and Soviet Union were to sign an agreement to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would live up to its share of the agreement?
Do you think the United States would live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)

	Soviet Union	U.S.
Yes	21	71
No	64	19
No opinion	15	10

6/1978 Do you favor or oppose the United States breaking off arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union pulls out of Africa? (CBS/NYT)

Favor	48
Oppose	33
DK/NA	19

6/1978 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 32/101)

6/1978-3/1979 Do you think any such agreement limiting both side's weapons would strengthen our national security or weaken it? (NBC/AP 32/101, 37/111, 39/112, 40/113)

	6/78	12/78	2/79	3/79
Strengthen our security	45	51	57	50
Weaken our security	36	30	27	28
Not sure	19	19	16	22

6/1978 see 3/1977a (ABC/Harris)

6/1978 see 11/1977 (Roper 78-6)

7/1978 Do you feel that President Carter's continuing emphasis on the Russian violations of human rights of dissidents in that country has . . . made it more difficult to reach agreement with the Russians on SALT, arms control and other important issues? (Harris)

Has	62
Has not	26
Not sure	12

7/1978 As a result of the Russians convicting Shcharansky and Ginsburg, do you think the US should or should not . . . stop negotiations on a SALT nuclear arms agreement? (Harris)

Should	22
Should not	67
Not sure	11

7/1978 see 1/1975 (Roper 78-7)

7/1978 Some people feel the US should not discuss a new nuclear weapons agreement with Russia as long as the Russians are trying to expand their influence in Africa. Others feel that signing a new nuclear weapons agreement is more important than what the Russians do in Africa. Which comes closest to your view -- that discussion of a new nuclear weapons agreement with Russia should or should not depend on what the Russians do in Africa. (Roper 78-7)

Should depend on Soviet actions in Africa	35
Should not depend on Soviet actions in Africa	46
DK	19

8/1978 see 11/1977 (Roper 78-7)

8/1978 Do you think that the US should break off negotiations with Russia aimed at limiting nuclear weapons because of Russian violations of human rights, or do you think negotiations should continue? (NBC 33/103)

Break off negotiations	15
Continue negotiations	76
Not sure	9

8/1978 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 33/103)

9/1978a Now let me ask you about some issues and problems that some people would like to see the next Congress do something about. For each, tell me how important you feel it is for Congress to do something about it--the top priority, very important, only somewhat important, or hardly important. (ABC/Harris 3848T) (for a similar question, see 5/1979b)

Backing a SALT agreement with Russia to control nuclear weapons.

The top priority	28
Very important	40
Only somewhat important	17
Hardly important at all	8
Not sure	7

9/1978a-10/1978 Now, just as far as this Congressional District is concerned, if you had to choose, who do you feel would do a better job on . . . -- the Republican or Democratic candidate for Congress? (ABC/Harris 3848T, 3959)

Backing a SALT agreement with Russia to control nuclear weapons.

	9/78	10/78
Republican	30	27
Democratic	34	36
Both (vol)		12
Not sure	36	25

10/1978-3/1979 For the past few years, the United States and Russia have had a policy of trying to reach agreements which will relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements or don't you think so? (NBC/AP 35/107; 40/113)

	10/78	3/79
Can be trusted	24	26
Cannot be trusted	66	64
Not sure	10	10

10/1978 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 35/107)

10/1978 see 9/1978 (Harris 3959)

11/1978-11/1980 In June 1979a979, President Carter for the US and President Brezhnev for Russia signed a new SALT treaty. The treaty, which would last until 1979a985, limits each country to a maximum of 2,250 long-range nuclear missiles and bombers. As you know, there's a good deal of controversy about this proposed treaty. Do you think the US Senate should vote for this new SALT treaty or against it? (Roper 78-10, 79-2, 79-5, 79-7, 79-9, 79-10, 80-2, 80-10)

	For	Against	Mixed Feelings (vol)	DK
11/1978+	42	20	17	20
1/1979+	40	21	19	20
5/1979+	33	24	20	23
6/1979	31	29	21	19
9/1979	30	39	15	17
11/1979	30	35	19	17
1/1980	22	42	17	18
11/1980	26	36	20	19

+ Slight variation in question wording: "The U.S and Russian negotiators have about reached agreement on a SALT treaty. The treaty, which would last until 1979a985,(the rest of the question is the same."

11/1978	On another subject, do you happen to know which countries are taking part in the SALT talks? (Roper 78-10)			
	US and Russia only			34
	US, Russia & others			2
	Russia only			5
	US only			1
	Russia & other only			1
	Other only			4
	No/DK			53
11/1978	Actually, the SALT talks involve Russia and the US only. To the best of your knowledge, which one statement best describes the main goal of the SALT talks? (Roper 78-10)			
	To limit the number of US & Russian long-range nuclear weapons			58
	To stop the sale of advanced weapons to poor countries			6
	To increase US trade with Russia			6
	To reduce the number of US and Russian troops in Europe			3
	DK			27
11/1978- 11/1986	How closely would you say you personally have followed news about the following issues and events-- very closely, somewhat closely, or not very closely . . . the negotiations for strategic arms? (Gallup/CCFR)			
		11/78	11/82	11/86
	Very closely	16	23	29
	Somewhat closely	34	36	40
	Not very closely	46	38	29
	Not sure	4	4	2
11/1978	Would you favor or oppose . . . an agreement with Russia limiting nuclear weapons? (CBS) (see similar questions 4/1977)			
	Favor			70
	Oppose			30
11/1978	see 12/1974 Harris/CCFR (Gallup/CCFR)			
11/1978	Do you favor or oppose a new agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would limit nuclear weapons? (NBC/AP ep)			
	Favor			71
	Oppose			17
	Not sure			12
11/1978	see 1/1978 (NBC ep)			

12/1978 Which ONE of the following issues do you think the new Congress should act on first? (NBC/AP 37/111) (data not presented in the order asked)

Inflation	32
Cuts in federal spending	16
Crime	11
National health insurance	10
Energy	10
Tax cuts	7
US military strength	5
<u>Treaty with Russia to limit nuclear weapons</u>	4
Something else	1
Not sure	4

12/1978 Which ONE of the following issues do you think the new Congress should NOT act on in 1979? (NBC/AP 37/111) (data not presented in the order asked)

National health insurance	21
US military strength	21
Treaty with Russia to limit nuclear weapons	19
Something else	5
Tax cuts	5
Crime	3
Cuts in federal spending	3
Inflation	2
Energy	1
Not sure	20

12/1978 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 37/111)

12/1978 see 6/1978 (NBC/AP 37/111)

1978 see 4/1975 (CSR/C)

1/1979 Now let me read you some statements that some people have made about the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree. (Harris 792102)

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
At a time when it is possible for the US and Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons it is vital for the two countries to reach an agreement to limit nuclear arms	85	11	4
If our military and Defense Department leaders say that the SALT agreement with the Russians is a good deal for us, then the US Senate should ratify such an agreement	65	22	13
It is better for us to forget nuclear arms treaties with the Russians and build up our military strength to be sure we are superior to them	57	30	7
Because the chances are that we will keep our end of the bargain and the Russians will not, we should not sign any agreement with them limiting nuclear weapons	44	47	9
If we don't come to an agreement with the Russians on controlling nuclear weapons, then one day we will end up in a nuclear war that would destroy ourselves and the world	60	33	7
Even though we will insist on an inspection system to be sure both sides are carrying out a SALT agreement, it will all be worthless because the Russians will find a way to cheat	58	34	8

1/1979 see 3/1977 (Harris 792102)

1/1979- Now another subject. Can you tell me which countries are
5/1986 involved in the SALT treaty-- the treaty that would limit
strategic nuclear weapons? (CBS/NYT)

	1/79 CBS/NYT	6/79 CBS/NYT	11/79 CBS/NYT	10/81+ ABC/WP	5/86+ SIRC
U.S./U.S.S.R.	23	30	38	37	47
Partially correct	18	14	14		3
Incorrect	6	9	4	13	1
No Opinion	53	47	44	50	49

+ Slightly variation in question wording

1/1979 Do you think the United States should or should not negotiate a
treaty with the Russians to limit strategic military weapons?
(CBS/NYT) (see similar question 6/1978)

Should	63
Should not	26
DK/NA	11

1/1979 Do you think a treaty with the Soviet Union limiting weapons
will or will not enable the United States to spend less money
for defense? (CBS/NYT)

Will	39
Will not	45
DK/NA	16

1/1979 Do you think an arms treaty with the Soviet Union will or will
not reduce the risk of war with Russia? (CBS/NYT)

Will	40
Will not	44
DK/NA	16

1/1979 see 1/1975 (Roper 79-2)

1/1979 see 11/1977 (Roper 79-2)

1/1979 see 11/1978 (Roper 79-2)

2/1979 Why do you favor such a treaty? Is it because the treaty would reduce the chances of war, or because it would slow down the arms race, or because it would cut defense spending, or because it would increase the status of the United States in the world? (NBC/AP 39/112)

Reduce chances of war	60
Slow down arms race	20
Cut defense spending	10
Increase US status	5
Not sure	5

2/1979 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "No matter what happens--even signing a new agreement limiting nuclear weapons--the arms race will continue." (NBC/AP 39/112)

Agree	86
Disagree	10
Not sure	4

2/1979 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 39/112)

2/1979 see 6/1978 (NBC/AP 39/112)

2/1979 see 1/1975 (Roper 79-3)

3/1979-10/1979 At the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union are close to reaching agreement on a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, usually called SALT II. Have you already heard or read enough about it to have an opinion? (If yes) Do you favor or oppose this new SALT agreement? (NBC/AP 40/113, 43/119, 45/121, 48/125)

	3/79	5/79	7/79a+	9/79a+	10/79b+
Not heard enough to have an opinion	79	64	58	54	44
Favor	13	26	21	20	25
Oppose	6	7	17	23	26
Not sure	2	3	4	3	5

+ Slight variation in question wording: "Recently the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, usually called SALT II. Have you . . . (the question is the same from here)"

3/1979- Have you heard or read about SALT II, the proposed nuclear arms
10/1980 agreement between the United States and Russia? (AIPO 1124G,
1131G, 1139G, 1149G, 1163G) (see similar question 6/1986)

	3/79	6/79	10/79	3/80	10/80
Yes	59	82	81	77	77
No	41	18	19	23	23

What do you think would be the advantages of such a treaty?

Reduce nuclear proliferation: limit nuclear arms on both sides, control nuclear power, cease manufacture of atomic weapons, more nuclear control.	6	8	4	10	6
Restrict arms/limit arms (no mention of nuclear): curtail explosive arms race, keep main powers at a minimum.	6	9	7	10	6
World peace/keep us out of war: more security, world security, deterrent to armed conflict, lowering tensions.	10	14	10	12	11
None/no advantages/ none for the US. Don't trust the Russians, all on the Russian side, you can't trust everybody, Russia doesn't keep its word.	12	19	23	31	22
Each would know what the other had: they couldn't build any weapons we didn't know about and vice versa.	2	2	2	1	2
Advantage in treaties in general: keep both sides at the negotiating table, to have an agreement with the Russians.	2	5	4	4	3
Will help the economy: less defense spending, more money for other things, concentrate on our own people	3	3	2	2	1
Dangerous Russian buildup needs to be controlled: we have to control the Russians.	1	1	1	1	1
No opinion because of lack of information	2	3	5	4	2
Equality of defense ability of each nation	1	*	1		2
Would be good thing/ would be great	1	2	2	1	3
Miscellaneous	*		*		*
Don't know	15	22	24	26	20
Not asked -- haven't heard/read of SALT II	41	18	19	23	23

3/1979- And what do you think would be the the disadvantages of such a
10/1980 treaty? (AIPO 1124G, 1131G, 1139G, 1149G, 1163G)

	3/79	6/79	10/79	3/80	10/80
Lack of proof of compliance: must have enforcement, monitoring of Russia	9	10	7	9	5
Can't trust the Russians: Russians will lie, Russians are not trustworthy, we would always be skeptical of what the Russians are doing.	10	13	10	18	11
None/no disadvantages Russia will not abide by the agreement/ will take advantage of the US: Russians would expect us to abide by the agreement, we will be left holding the bag.	7	9	7	9	6
Russia is too much ahead: it would surpass the US in power, leave US at our existing or lower level and permit Russia to hold higher level.	7	8	6	16	12
War: a war with communist country, if we went into a war we wouldn't have enough weapons, we're leaving ourselves wide open for an attack by any other major power.	2	9	11	11	8
Eliminates only obsolete weapons: doesn't eliminate A-bomb and hydrogen bomb, still threat of nuclear weapons.	3	3	4	4	3
False sense of security: some people might be lulled into a sense of false security.	1	1	1	1	1
Miscellaneous	1	2	1	2	2
Don't know	1	4	2	2	2
Not asked -- haven't heard/read of SALT II	19	28	31	32	27
	41	18	19	23	23

3/1979- (Asked only of those who knew about treaty) Everything
10/1980 considered, would you like to see the United States Senate
ratify (vote in favor of) this proposed treaty, or not?

	3/79	6/79	10/79	3/80	10/80
Ratify	51	48	34	39	39
Not ratify	18	26	35	36	32
Don't know	31	22	31	25	29
(asked of ___ % of public)	(59)	(82)	(81)	(77)	(77)

3/1979 The United States is now negotiating a strategic arms agreement
with the Soviet Union in what is known as "SALT TWO." Which
ONE of the following statements is closest to your opinion on
these negotiations: (GFR/CPD)

a I strongly support SALT II	8
b SALT II is somewhat disappointing, but on balance I would have to support it	12
c I would like to see more protection for the United States before I would be ready to support SALT II	42
d I strongly oppose the SALT II arms agreement with the Russians	9
e I don't know enough about the SALT II Treaty to have an opinion yet	30

3/1979 I am going to mention several U.S. aims in foreign policy.
Please tell me which one you think is most important: (GFR/CPD)
(data not presented in the order asked)

A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel	30
A Strategic Arms Agreement with Russia	18
A stable government in Iran friendly to the U.S.	17
Strengthening NATO's ability to defend Europe against possible Russian attack	15
Strengthening ties with Communist China	9
Don't know/refused	11

3/1979	I am going to read you several statements about the proposed SALT II Treaty. Please tell me whether you think each statement is true or false. (GFR/CPD)	True	False	DK
	a. The Treaty would require the U.S. and Russia to reduce military spending	48	38	15
	b. The Treaty would restrict the explosive power of nuclear warheads on both sides	65	22	13
	c. The SALT II Treaty would require each side to reduce its capabilities for making a nuclear attack on the other	58	29	13
	d. All arms restrictions in the Treaty will be subject to full verification regarding compliance	58	24	19
	e. The Treaty would not regulate the number of strategic nuclear missiles to be retained or manufactured by each side	27	57	16
3/1979	The Soviet Union has a modern bomber called the "Backfire" which is capable of attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons. If the proposed SALT Treaty does not count the "Backfire" bomber as a Soviet strategic nuclear delivery system, would you then be: (GFR/CPD)			
	a. Definitely opposed to the Treaty			42
	b. Somewhat inclined to oppose the Treaty			31
	c. In support of the Treaty, nevertheless			16
	d. Don't know/No Opinion			11
3/1979	By the end of the proposed SALT Treaty, that is- by 1985, the ability of Soviet ballistic missiles to destroy American missile sites and other protected military targets is expected to be ten times that of U.S. ballistic missiles' ability to destroy similar targets in Russia. In view of this information, which of the following statements comes closest to your feelings about the SALT Treaty: (GFR/CPD)			
	a. I am much more inclined to oppose the Treaty			27
	b. I am somewhat more inclined to oppose the Treaty			21
	c. I am somewhat more inclined to support the Treaty			11
	d. I am much more inclined to support the Treaty			7
	e. It does not change my position			25
	f. Don't know/No opinion			10

3/1979	If you were convinced that there was no adequate way for the United States to check on whether or not the Russians were living up to one or more parts of the agreement, how would this affect your position on the SALT Treaty? Would you then: (GFR/CPD)	
	a. Definitely oppose the agreement	45
	b. Be more inclined to oppose the agreement	32
	c. Still support the agreement	15
	d. Don't know/No opinion	8
3/1979	With what you now know about the proposed Strategic Arms Agreement, if one of your Senators voted against the Treaty, which of the following would be your reaction? (GFR/CPD)	
	a. I would definitely oppose him for reelection	8
	b. I would be more inclined to oppose him than now	10
	c. I would be more inclined to support him than now	8
	d. I would definitely support him	6
	e. It wouldn't make that much difference; I would make up my mind on his overall record	61
	f. Don't know/Refused	7
3/1979	see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 40/113)	
3/1979	see 10/1978 (NBC/AP 40/113)	
4/1979	The government is attempting to reach a new SALT II agreement with Moscow limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons which either country will manufacture. Whom do you think will benefit the most from this agreement--the United States, the Soviet Union, both countries equally or neither one? (YSW/Time 79-8181)	
	United States	5
	Soviet Union	39
	Both countries	32
	Neither one	24
4/1979	Do you favor our signing this kind of agreement with the Russians, limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons either country will manufacture, or do you think it is too risky? (YSW/Time 79-8181)	
	Favor	41
	Too risky	48
	Not sure	10

4/1979b	Do you feel the proposed new SALT arms control agreement with Russia will . . . or will not? (Harris 792106)			
		Will	Will	Not
			not	Sure
	Slow down the nuclear arms build-up by both the US and the Soviet Union through 1985	47	38	15
	Make the Russians cut back on the number of nuclear missile launchers they now have	27	60	13
	Make the US cut back on the number of nuclear missile warheads we planned to produce	49	38	13
	Limit the number of cruise missiles we could launch	48	30	22
	Prohibit testing of nuclear missiles by either side	35	48	17
	Make the US and Russia roughly equal in nuclear strike capability	55	31	14
4/1979b	see 3/1977 (Harris 792106)			
5/1979	Of course, two-thirds of the Senate must agree to this treaty before it can go into effect. If the Senate should refuse to ratify this SALT agreement, do you think the United States would be better off or worse off, in the long run? (LAT 17)			
	Better off		32	
	Worse off		43	
	No opinion		25	
5/1979a	China has offered to let us put special electronic monitoring devices in that country to take the place of the monitoring equipment we had to take out of Iran. Would you favor or oppose our putting special electronic monitoring devices in China? (Harris 792107)			
	Favor		63	
	Oppose		29	
	Not sure		8	

5/1979a

Now let me read you some statements that some people have made about the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree. (Harris 792107)

	Agree	Disagree	NS
At a time when it is possible for the US and Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons it is vital for the two countries to reach an agreement to limit nuclear arms	85	12	3
If our military and Defense Department leaders say that the US has adequate devices to monitor a Russian nuclear arms buildup, despite the loss of our monitoring systems in Iran, then the US Senate should ratify a SALT agreement	66	19	15
Refusal by the US Senate to ratify a new SALT arms agreement could lead to a serious nuclear arms build-up both in this country and in Russia, which would bring us dangerously close to a nuclear war	67	24	9
Because the chances are that we will keep our end of the bargain and the Russians will not, we should not sign any agreement with them limiting nuclear weapons	42	50	8
Although the new SALT treaty will say the US and Russia will have roughly equal nuclear strike capacity, the chances are good the Russians will find a way of cheating on the agreement	72	20	8
Unless President Carter agrees to develop the powerful M-X missile and other weapons to insure our military strength, then the US Senate should not ratify the new SALT agreement	54	31	15
All in all, do you favor or oppose the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement?	76	17	7

5/1979a see 3/1977 (Harris 792107)

5/1979b I'd like to ask you about some issues and problems that some people would like to see Congress do something about. If you had to choose, which one do you feel is most important for Congress to do something about? (Harris 792108)

Keeping inflation under control	31
Passing an energy bill to make the U.S. more energy self-sufficient	20
Helping the elderly and the poor get a better break	10
Keeping the military strength of the U.S. at least as strong as that of the Russians	9
Giving relief to taxpayers	9
Cutting federal spending	7
Supporting stronger measures to control crime	3
Backing a SALT agreement with Russia to control nuclear weapons	2
Achieve peace in the Middle East	2
Passing a comprehensive health insurance bill	2
Not sure	5

5/1979b-10/1979 Now let me ask you about some specific things President Carter has done. How would you rate him on . . . -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris 792108, . . ., . . ., . . ., 792114) (excellent and good coded as positive)
His working for a SALT arms agreement with the Russians to limit nuclear arms

	5/79	6/79	7/79a	7/79b	10/79
Positive	42	43	40	36	33
Negative	46	44	46	52	60
Not sure	12	13	14	12	7

5/1979 How much would you say you know about the recent SALT (II) Agreement? Would you say you know . . . (ABC)

A great deal	5
Some	40
A little	49
Nothing	6

5/1979	As you may know, the Salt II Agreements is an agreement between the US and the Soviet Union for both to limit their ability to fight a nuclear war. Would you say you favor or oppose such a treaty? And do you . . . (ABC)	
	Favor strongly	47
	Favor somewhat	22
	Oppose somewhat	12
	Oppose strongly	15
	No opinion/DK	5
5/1979	How important an issue would you say the SALT II Agreement is to you? It is . . . (ABC)	
	Very important	42
	Somewhat important	44
	Not at all important	11
	No opinion/DK	2
5/1979	Some people say that the SALT (II) Agreement with the Soviet Union will reduce US defense spending. How likely do you think this is? (ABC)	
	Very likely	13
	Somewhat likely	35
	Not likely at all	47
	No opinion/DK	5
5/1979	From what you know about the SALT (II) Agreement (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) do you feel it will reduce the chance of war . . . (ABC)	
	A great deal	10
	Somewhat	38
	Only a little	28
	Not at all	21
	NO opinion/DK	4
5/1979	What effect do you think the SALT (II) Agreement will have on the military power of the two nations? Will the SALT agreement . . . (ABC)	
	Make the US stronger militarily than the Soviet Union	8
	Make the US weaker militarily than the Soviet Union, or	26
	Have no effect on the comparative strength of the two nations	54
	No opinion/DK	12

5/1979	What effect do you think the SALT II Agreement will have on the technological advancement of weapons in the two nations? Do you think SALT will . . . (ABC)	
	Help the US more	7
	Help the Soviet Union more	20
	Affect both the same	66
	No opinion/DK	6
5/1979	Some people worry that the Soviet Union would cheat on a SALT II Agreement. How worried are you about that? (ABC)	
	Very worried	24
	Somewhat worried	48
	Not at all worried	27
	No opinion/DK	2
5/1979	There might be a risk that the Soviet Union would cheat on the SALT II Agreement and that the US would not be able to verify it. How much of a risk do you think the US should take in achieving an arms limitation with the Soviet Union? (ABC)	
	A lot of risk	15
	Some risk	36
	Very little risk	29
	No risk	16
	No opinion	3
5/1979	Some people say that after the present SALT II Agreement is signed, that the US should try to reach further agreements with the Soviet Union to limit arms. How do you feel about this, do you . . . (ABC)	
	Agree strongly	43
	Agree somewhat	33
	Disagree somewhat	12
	Disagree strongly	8
	No opinion/DK	4
5/1979	see 1/1975 (Roper 79-5)	
5/1979	see 11/1978 (Roper 79-5)	
5/1979a	see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 41/117)	
5/1979a	see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 41/117)	

6/1979	Did you happen to see or hear President Carter's speech Monday evening on SALT II? (AIPO 1131G)	
	Yes	33
	No	67
6/1979	see 3/1979 (AIPO 1131G) (2 questions)	
6/1979	The Senate will debate the US treaty with the Soviet Union which limits strategic nuclear weapons--called SALT. From what you know about this SALT treaty, do you think the Senate should vote for or against it, or don't you know enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT)	
	For	27
	Against	9
	Don't know enough	54
	DK/NA	10
6/1979	If a SALT treaty is approved, do you think the Soviet Union would or would not live up to its share of the agreement? (CBS/NYT)	
	Would	28
	Would not	47
	Don't know/NA	25
6/1979	If the Soviet Union tried to cheat on the treaty, do you think the United States would or would not be able to catch them at it? (CBS/NYT)	
	Would	54
	Would not	27
	No opinion	19
6/1979	Do you think the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union will, or will not reduce the risk of war with Russia? (CBS/NYT)	
	Will	41
	Will not	35
	DK/NA	24

6/1979	Here are some things people tell us are important problems facing the country. I'd like to know if you think an effective President would be able to solve them, or whether they're beyond any President's control. Would an effective President be able to...., or is that beyond any President's control? (CBS/NYT)						
		Able to Control	Beyond Control	No Opinion			
	a. control inflation	45	47	8			
	b. handle the energy problem	57	36	7			
	c. control the arms race	48	37	15			
6/1979	If there is a SALT treaty with the Soviet Union, do you think the United States should or should not cut defense spending? (CBS/NYT)						
	Should			34			
	Should not			49			
	Don't know/NA			17			
6/1979	If the SALT treaty is approved, do you think the United States would then be superior, would be about equal, or would not be as strong as the Soviet Union? (CBS/NYT)						
	Superior			7			
	Equal			43			
	Will not be as strong			27			
	No opinion			23			
6/1979	People are already talking about the 1980 Presidential election, and the issues that might affect the way people vote for President. These are some issues Presidential candidates will be talking about. I'd like to know whether you'd be more willing or less likely to vote for someone who took these positions, or whether the issue won't make that much of a difference to you? Would you be more likely or less likely to vote for someone who . . . or won't that issue make much of a difference to you? (CBS/NYT) A wants a comprehensive government health insurance program; B would stop construction of more nuclear power plants; C wants to increase defense spending; D is in favor of gasoline rationing; E supports the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union to limit strategic nuclear weapons; F supports wage and price controls to limit inflation.						
		A	B	C	D	E	F
	More likely	43	43	38	32	48	64
	Less likely	17	26	33	44	17	20
	No difference	32	23	21	18	22	10
	Don't know/No answer	8	8	8	6	13	6

6/1979	See 6/1978 (CBS/NYT)	
6/1979	see 1/1979 (CBS/NYT)	
6/1979	see 1/1975 (Roper 79-6)	
6/1979	see 11/1978 (Roper 79-6)	
6/1979	see 5/1979b (Harris 792108)	
7/1979a	see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 43/119)	
7/1979a	see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 43/119)	
7/1979	see 1/1975 (Roper 79-7)	
7/1979a	see 5/1979 (ABC/Harris)	
7/1979b	If President Carter asked your advice today, would you tell him that with all the problems of inflation, energy, SALT and others facing the country, he should announce he is not going to run for re-election, so that he can concentrate on solving the country's problems? (ABC/Harris)	
	Would	50
	Would not	44
	Not sure	4
7/1979b	see 5/1979 (ABC/Harris)	
8/1979	In the past month or two, President Carter has taken a number of steps. Will you tell me for each of the following, whether this particular action made you think more, or less, of President Carter, or didn't it make any difference one way or the other? . . . His support for a new SALT agreement with the Russians (YSW/Time 79-8182)	
	More	36
	Less	31
	No Difference	23
	Not sure	11
8/1979	The government is attempting to reach a new SALT II agreement with Moscow limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons which either country will manufacture. Whom do you think will benefit the most from this agreement--the United States, the Soviet Union, both countries equally, or neither one? (YSW/Time 79-8182)	
	United States	3
	Soviet Union	47
	Both countries	24
	Neither one	16
	Not sure	9

8/1979	Do you favor signing this kind of agreement with the Russians, limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons either country will manufacture, or do you think it is too risky? (YSW/Time 79-8182)	
	Favor	34
	Too risky	57
	Not sure	9
8/1979	see 1/1975 (Roper 79-8)	
9/1979	(Asked of the 81% who had heard of Soviet troops in Cuba.) Do you think that the Senate should delay action on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty until these Soviet troops are removed from Cuba, or don't you think so? (NBC/AP 45/121)	
	Yes	67
	No	22
	Not sure	11
9/1979	(Asked of the 46% who had heard enough of SALT to have an opinion) Do you think this (SALT) agreement would strengthen our national security or weaken it? (NBC/AP 45/121)	
	Strengthen our security	38
	Weaken our security	43
	Not sure	19
9/1979	see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 45/121)	
9/1979	see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 45/121)	
9/1979	Let me ask you how likely you think it is that President Carter will be able to succeed in accomplishing his objectives. Do you think he will . . . get the SALT II treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate or not? (ABC/Harris)	
	Will	43
	Will not	39
	Not sure	18
9/1979	see 10/1978 (Roper 79-9)	

10/1979 (Asked of the 87% who had heard of Russian troops in Cuba)
 What, if anything, do you think the US should do in regard to
 this situation (the presence of Russians troops in Cuba?) (AIPO
 1140G) (multiple responses)

Get them out: give ultimatum- get out or else; we should insist on their removal, ask them to leave	21
Nothing: stay out of the situation, we use the base there too, it its right for us its right for them	21
Keep eye on them: keep a good watch on troops in Cuba; increase surveillance over Cuba; don't allow them to expand forces	14
Strengthen our defenses: build up our armed forces escalate defenses; get ready to defend ourselves; keep a strong army and nave	6
Take a stand: we should stand firm-protect our interests, it is necessary to decide something, show them we won't back down	6
Use diplomacy: handle very diplomatically; delegate diplomacy which does not include making demands we can not expect to be honored, we should find out their purpose in being there and then evaluate what should be done; someone who knows what they're talking about should talk with the Russians, ask for a response from the Russian leader	6
Use military force: blast them out, use force if necessary	3
Economic boycott: if they want our wheat, get their troops out, shut down exports to Russia	3
Not by force: not aggressively, without war	2
Refuse to ratify <u>SALT treaty</u> : hold up SALT Treaty, don't ratify SALT at all.	2
Blockade	2
Miscellaneous	2
Don't know	10

10/1979 Do you favor or oppose the US Senate ratifying the new SALT
 nuclear arms agreement between the US and Russia? (Harris
 792114)

Favor	42
Oppose	37
Not Sure	21

10/1979 Now let me read you some statements that some people have made about the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree.
(Harris 792114)

	Agree	Disagree	NS
At a time when it is possible for the US and Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons it is vital for the two countries to reach an agreement to limit nuclear arms	86	11	3
The US Senate should ratify the SALT II treaty if our military and Defense Department leaders say that the US has adequate devices to monitor a Russian nuclear arms buildup	70	20	10
Refusal by the US Senate to ratify a new SALT arms agreement could lead to a serious nuclear arms build-up both in this country and in Russia, which would bring us dangerously close to a nuclear war	55	37	8
Now that President Carter has agreed to go ahead with the new MX mobile missile system and to raise the defense budget by 3 percent, the United States should ratify SALT II	46	35	19
Unless the Russians agree to withdraw their combat troops from Cuba, then the US Senate should refuse to ratify the SALT II treaty	63	27	10
Although nuclear arms control is desirable, the SALT II treaty which President Carter negotiated does not adequately protect US security	58	26	16
Although the new SALT treaty says the US and Russia will have roughly equal nuclear strike capacity, opponents of SALT II are right when they claim that if SALT II is approved, Russia will have nuclear superiority by the middle of the 1980s	53	32	15
Because the chances are that we will keep our end of the bargain and the Russians will not, the US Senate should not ratify the SALT II treaty President Carter signed in Vienna last June	50	39	11

10/1979 All in all, do you favor or oppose the US Senate ratifying the new SALT nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia (Harris 792114)

Favor	47
Oppose	39
Not sure	14

10/1979	see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 48/125)	
10/1979	see 3/1979 (AIP 1139G) (2 questions)	
10/1979	see 5/1979b (Harris 792114)	
11/1979	The Senate is considering the US treaty with the Soviet Union which limits strategic nuclear weapons--called SALT. From what you know about this SALT treaty, do you think the Senate should vote for or against it, or don't you know enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT)	
	For	25
	Against	20
	Don't know enough	40
	No opinion	15
11/1979	Do you think the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union will or will not reduce the risk of war with Russia? (CBS/NYT)	
	Will	30
	Will not	42
	DK/NA	28
11/1979	There are 3000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. Do you think the U.S. Senate should delay voting on the SALT treaty until the troops are removed, or do you think the troops in Cuba should not be connected to the Senate vote on the SALT treaty? (CBS/NYT)	
	Should delay	38
	Should not be connected	39
	No opinion	23
11/1979	see 1/1979 (CBS/NYT)	
11/1979	see 1/1975 (Roper 79-10)	
11/1979	see 11/1978 (Roper 79-10)	
12/1979	Of course, everyone is more interested in some things in the news than in others. During the past several months, is the SALT II Treaty something that you have been following closely, or just following casually, or not paying much attention to? (LAT 21)	
	Following closely	16
	Following casually	56
	Not much attention/DK	28

1/1980 Has the Iran crisis made you more favorable to the Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union to limit nuclear weapons, less favorable to the treaty, or hasn't it changed your opinion? (Roper 80-2)

More	12
Less	27
Hasn't changed	47
DK	14

1/1980 see 1/1975 (Roper 80-2)

1/1980 see 11/1978 (Roper 80-2)

1/1980b President Carter is taking the following steps as an answer to the Russians invasion of Afghanistan. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose that step (Harris 802104)

Favor Oppose NS

Getting the U.N. General Assembly to demand that Russian troops leave Afghanistan	86	9	5
Halting all future shipments of technology to Russia	78	18	4
Canceling the delivery of 17 million tons of US grain to Russia	77	18	5
Asking the US Senate to delay ratification of the SALT Treaty with Russia	71	19	10

1/1980 How effective do you feel . . . will be in discouraging the Russians from trying invasions of other countries in the future (Harris 802104)

very moderate
eff eff Not NS
eff eff

Cancelling the delivery of 17 million tons of US grain to Russia	40	35	20	5
Halting all future shipments of technology to Russia	37	38	18	7
Getting the UN General Assembly to demand that Russian troops leave Afghanistan	20	32	41	7
Asking the U.S. Senate to delay ratification of the SALT Treaty with Russia	12	38	42	8
Deferring opening new consulates in this country with Russia	11	32	45	12

2/1980	Would you be more likely or less likely to vote for a candidate who took the following positions? . . . a) Favors the SALT treaty; b) favors building nuclear power plants; c) favors large increases in defense spending. (Gallup/NW)			
		A	B	C
	More likely	46	36	64
	Less likely	33	39	20
	No difference/No opinion	21	25	16
3/1980	see 3/1979 (AIPO 1149G) (2 questions)			
6/1980	The Senate has been considering the U.S. treaty with the Soviet Union which limits strategic nuclear weapons-- called SALT. From what you know about this SALT treaty, do you think the Senate should vote for or against it, or don't you know enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT)			
	For			20
	Against			28
	Don't know enough			46
	No opinion			6
10/1980	From what you've heard, do you feel that Ronald Reagan is for or against . . . ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union? (YSW/Time)			
	For			23
	Against			45
	Not sure			32
10/1980	How about Jimmy Carter-- from what you've heard, do you feel that Jimmy Carter is for or against . . . ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union? (YSW/Time)			
	For			74
	Against			7
	Not sure			19
10/1980	How about John Anderson-- from what you've heard, do you feel that John Anderson is for or against . . . ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union? (YSW/Time)			
	For			32
	Against			12
	Not sure			56

- 10/1980 And how about you personally, are you for or against . . . ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union? (YSW/Time)
- For 50
Against 30
Not sure 20
- 10/1980 see 3/1979 (AIPO) (2 questions)
- 11/1980 In general, do you agree or disagree with President-elect Reagan that the SALT II treaty, which was not ratified by the United States Senate, should be scrapped and negotiations should be started again for a new nuclear arms agreement with the Russians? (Harris 802125)
- Agree 64
Disagree 28
Not sure 8
- 11/1980 Now let me read you some statements that some people have made about the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree: (Harris 80125)

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
At a time when it is possible for the US and Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons it is vital for the two countries to reach an agreement to limit nuclear arms	83	14	3
Refusal by the United States to agree to a new SALT arms agreement could lead to a serious nuclear arms build-up both in this country and in Russia, which would bring us dangerously close to a nuclear war	50	43	7
Because the chances are that we will keep our end of the bargain and the Russians will not, we should not sign any agreement limiting nuclear weapons	47	48	5

11/1980	All in all, do you favor or oppose President-elect Reagan sitting down with the Russians to try to come to an agreement on controlling nuclear arms? (Harris)		
	Favor		90
	Oppose		9
	Not sure		1
11/1980 4/1981	Do you approve or disapprove of the SALT II nuclear weapons agreement? (LAT 38, 43)	11/80	4/81
	Approve	34	35
	Disapprove	38	36
	DK	27	27
	Refused	-	2
11/1980	see 11/1978 (Roper 80-10)		
1/1981	Then, of course, there is the question of our relations with the Soviet Union. Do you think that at this time we should or should not try to work out a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union? (YSW/Time)		
	Should		60
	Should not		19
	Not sure		21
4/1981	Do you approve or disapprove of the SALT II nuclear weapons agreement? Do you feel strongly about that? (LAT 43)		
	Approve strongly		15
	Approve		20
	Disapprove		15
	Disapprove strongly		21
	Not sure		27
	Refuse		2
5/1981	Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose . . . : (YSW/Time 8607) Reopening strategic arms limitations treaty discussions with the Soviet Union?		
	Favor		65
	Oppose		25
	Not sure		10

5/1981-
9/1981

- a. Now I'd like to ask you a few more questions about just some of these issues. People have told us that on some issues they have come to a firm conclusion and they stick with that position, no matter what. On other issues, however, they may take a position, but they know that they could change their minds pretty easily. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you could change your mind very easily, on this issue, and 6 means that you are likely to stick with your position no matter what--where would you place yourself on each issue? (YSW 8607)
- b. On some issues, too, people feel that they really have all the information that they need in order to form a strong opinion on that issue, while on other issues they would like to get additional information before solidifying their opinion. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you feel you definitely need more information on the issue and 6 means that you do not feel you need to have any more information on the issue--where would you place yourself on each issue?
- c. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you and your friends and family rarely if ever discuss the issue and 6 means that you and your friends and family discuss it relatively often--where would you place yourself on each issue?
- d. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that the issue affects you personally very little and 6 means that you really feel deeply involved in this issue--where would you place yourself on each issue?
- e. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you are very likely to change your mind on this issue and 6 means that you almost certainly will not change your mind--where would you place yourself on each issue? (YSW/Time)

Reopening strategic arms limitations treaty discussions with the Soviet Union

5/1981

	1	2	3	4	5	6
a. could change mind	12	5	18	15	11	40
b. more information	24	9	19	12	9	28
c. discuss	39	15	17	9	6	15
d. affect one	26	12	17	14	8	23
e. likely change mind	13	7	18	15	12	36

9/1981

	1	2	3	4	5	6
a. could change mind	12	4	17	15	12	40
b. more information	23	9	20	13	10	26
c. discuss	36	18	19	7	5	15
d. affect one	26	11	18	13	10	22
e. likely change mind	14	5	21	17	11	33

9/1981 Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose:
(YSW/Time 4648)

	Favor	Oppose	Not Sure
Reopening arms limitations treaty			
discussions with the Soviet Union	64	27	10
Building the MX missile	45	35	20

10/1981 Do you happen to know which two nations have been involved in what are known as the SALT talks, or is that something you are not familiar with? (ABC/WP)(see 1/1979 CBS/NYT for similar question)

U.S. and Soviet Union			37
All other responses			13
Don't know, No opinion			50

5/1982 President Reagan recently proposed that the US and the Soviet Union sit down to negotiate a new agreement to control nuclear weapons. Let me ask you about the major provisions of that proposal. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose that provision. (Harris 822106)

	Favor	Oppose	Not Sure
Both the US and Russia would cut back by one-third the number of nuclear weapons they now possess.	82	15	3
The Russians would give up their present superiority in land-based nuclear missiles in return for the US holding back production of missile-carrying submarines, bombers, and cruise missiles.	82	15	3

6/1982 Some people feel that President Reagan has changed some of his views on foreign affairs, others feel he has the same views as when he ran for office. Do you feel he has changed his views on . . . supporting the previous SALT I and II agreements with the Russians even though they have not been voted for by the Senate . . . a lot, a little, or not at all? (YSW/Time)

A lot			13
A little			47
Not at all			41

7/1982 Strategic arms reduction talks--called START--are due to begin (began) in Geneva on June 29th. Do you think these negotiations on nuclear weapons control will end in success, or do you think they will end in failure--or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say? (LAT 58)

Not heard	35
Success	17
Neither (vol)	8
Failure	32
Not sure	8

11/1982 see 12/1974 (Gallup/CCFR)

11/1982 see 11/1978 (Gallup/CCFR)

6/1983 For each of these statements about US-Soviet relations in the past ten years, please tell me if you believe it to be true or not true. (YSW 83-5632)

	True	Not true
During the 1970's, when we were trying to improve relations, the Soviet Union was secretly building up its military strength	94	6
We usually keep our promises, they usually don't	66	34
The Soviets treat our friendly gestures as weaknesses	76	24
The Soviets are gaining political influence in the world, and the US is losing political influence	54	46
Our failure to sign the SALT II agreement has been a major cause of tension	61	39
The US has to share some of the blame for the bad relations between the two countries	82	18

5/1984	To the best of your knowledge, which country- the U.S. or the Soviet Union- refused to sign the most recent arms control agreement, SALT II, or was that agreement signed by both countries, or by neither one (PAF)	
	US did not sign	10
	Soviet Union did not sign	17
	Both countries signed	10
	Neither country signed	31
	Don't know, not sure	32
7/1984	I'm going to read you some recent events, and for each one would you tell me which of the statements on this card best expresses your feeling about whether the US or the Soviet Union is to blame? . . . The breakdown of the START nuclear arms control talks in Geneva? (Roper 84-7)	
	Soviet Union entirely to blame	23
	Both to blame but USSR more	19
	US and USSR equally to blame	25
	Both to blame but US more so	6
	US entirely to blame	2
	Neither to blame (vol)	1
	DK	24

9/1984 How much effect, if any, do you think the following government actions have had or will have to reduce the chance of nuclear war? A great deal, a moderate amount, almost no effect?
(ABT 4)

- A. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I banning deployment of anti-ballistic missiles?
- B. Future ratification of the SALT II US-USSR agreement slightly reducing the numbers of offensive nuclear missiles
- C. Past US-USSR agreement not to test nuclear bombs in the atmosphere?
- D. Future agreement on a freeze of further testing, production or deployment of nuclear weapons?
- E. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I that placed a cap on the number of nuclear missiles each side could build?
- F. Future US build up of our conventional forces to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons?
- G. Future agreement over no-first-use of nuclear weapons?
- H. Future agreement to ban anti-satelite weapons?
- I. Future agreement to ban chemical weapons?

		Great Deal	Moderate Amount	Almost No Effect	DK/NA
a.	SALT I/ABM	10	34	46	9
b.	SALT II	11	39	42	8
c.	LTBT	21	31	41	8
d.	Freeze	29	32	33	6
e.	SALT I offense	12	33	47	8
f.	Conventional build-up	21	40	32	7
g.	No-First-Use	27	27	37	9
h.	ASAT	26	34	32	8
i.	CW	27	28	39	7

- 9/1985 I am going to mention some things that some people feel might reduce the chance of nuclear war and improve our relations with the Soviet Union. For each item I mention, please tell me if you feel it would be extremely helpful, very helpful, only somewhat helpful, or not very helpful. (M&K)
US ratification and completion of nuclear arms control agreements, like SALT II, which have already been negotiated with the Soviet Union.
- | | |
|---------------|----|
| Extremely | 12 |
| Very | 28 |
| Only somewhat | 37 |
| Not very | 15 |
| NS | 9 |
- 11/1985 Missing from any agreement at the (Nov.85) summit (between Reagan and Gorbachev) were the following things. For each, tell me if you think it is highly significant that nothing was done on them, somewhat significant, not very significant, or hardly significant at all. . . .No agreement to extend the SALT II Agreement that expires the end of this year. (Harris 851105)
- | | |
|----------------------|----|
| Highly significant | 37 |
| Somewhat significant | 31 |
| Not very significant | 14 |
| Hardly significant | 14 |
| Not sure | 4 |
- 5/1986 see 1/1979 CBS/NYT (SIRC)
- 6/1986 The Administration says the U.S. will no longer be bound by the SALT II agreement and that it wants a new treaty with the Soviet Union. Critics say that the U.S. should stick to the terms of the SALT II agreement until another one is agreed on. Which of these views is closer to your own? (Harris)
- | | |
|-----------------|----|
| Administrations | 29 |
| Critics | 60 |
| Not sure | 11 |

6/1986 President Reagan recently decided that the US government would end its living up to the SALT II treaty with the Russians later on this year. His argument for doing this is that Russia had not lived up to the treaty and he wanted to put pressure on the Soviet government to come to an agreement on nuclear arms reduction in Geneva. Others, however, disagree and say that if SALT II is scrapped it will start another round of a buildup by the US and Russia of major nuclear weapons reduction. Are you pleased that President Reagan is ending US compliance with SALT II or are you concerned that it will touch off another nuclear arms race? (Harris)

Pleased	35
Concerned	49
Not sure	6

6/1986 Nearly all of the allies of the United States have complained that they were not consulted by our government before the decision was made to give up abiding by the SALT II agreement. Do you think it was wrong or not for President Reagan to make a decision like that without consulting with most of our allies? (Harris)

Wrong not to consult	56
Not wrong	34
Not sure	10

6/1986 Now let me read some statements about President Reagan's decision to not live up to the SALT II treaty. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. . . (Harris)

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
At a time when it's possible for the US and Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons, it is important to keep any previous agreement that might help control the nuclear arms race	72	21	8
By saying we will not live up to SALT II, we are giving the Russians an excuse to begin a big nuclear arms buildup again	49	43	8
By getting rid of SALT II, we are making the Russians face the fact that only by making a new arms reduction agreement can the nuclear arms race be controlled	61	26	13
Since Russia violated the SALT II treaty, the only honest thing to do is to just announce we will not abide by it in the future	51	37	12

6/1986	Have you heard or read about SALT II- the 1979 strategic arms limitation treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? (Gallup)	
	Yes	67
	No	33
6/1986	Do you happen to know whether or not the U.S. has ratified this treaty? (Gallup)	
	Yes, has ratified it (incorrect)	15
	No, has not ratified it (correct)	48
	No opinion	38
6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard or read of SALT II) Do you think the U.S. has or has not lived up to the terms of the treaty? (Gallup)	
	Yes	39
	No	45
	No opinion	16
6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard or read of SALT II) The Reagan Administration announced that it no longer feels bound by SALT II and that it may abandon the treaty's nuclear weapons limits. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision? (Gallup)	
	Approve	44
	Disapprove	45
	No opinion	9
6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard or read of SALT II) Do you think this decision is likely to increase the arms race a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all? (Gallup)	
	Great deal	12
	Quite a bit	28
	Not very much	44
	Not at all	12
	No opinion	4

6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard or read of SALT II) Do you think this decision is likely to increase or decrease the chances of a nuclear war? (Gallup)	
	Increase	46
	Decrease	22
	No difference (Vol)	25
	No opinion	8
6/1986	(Asked of those 67% who had heard or read of SALT II) Do you think this decision will help or hurt the U.S. to reach future agreements with the Soviet Union on strategic arms? (Gallup)	
	Help	32
	Hurt	49
	No difference (vol)	13
	No opinion	7
6/1986	Have you read or heard anything in the past several weeks about the nuclear arms limitation treaty or SALT TWO agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union? (ABC/WP)	
	Yes, have read or heard	61
	No have not	39
	Don't know/no opinion	1
6/1986	How much would you say you know about the SALT TWO agreement: a great deal, a fair amount, not much, or nothing at all? (ABC/WP)	
	A good deal	3
	A fair amount	30
	Not much	52
	Nothing at all	15
6/1986	Reagan says the U.S. will no longer be bound by the SALT TWO agreement and that he wants a new treaty with the Soviet Union. Critics say that the U.S. should stick to the terms of the SALT TWO agreement until another one is agreed on. Which of these views is closer to your own? (ABC/WP)	
	Reagan's view	29
	Critic's view	61
	Don't know/no opinion	10
6/1986	Would you say the United States should follow the terms of the SALT TWO agreement or not? (ABC/WP)	
	Yes, should follow terms	50
	No, should not follow terms	29
	No difference	3
	Don't know/no opinion	18

7/1986 SALT II is a nuclear arms agreement that was never ratified by the U.S. However, the U.S. has continued to abide by its terms. President Reagan recently announced that because the Soviets have violated SALT II the U.S. would no longer be bound by it. Do you agree or disagree? (P&S/CPD)

Yes	70
No	22
Don't know	8

11/1986b Since 1979, the United States has observed the arms limits set by the SALT 2 agreement with the Soviet Union, even though the treaty was never approved by the Senate. Ronald Reagan has decided that the United States will no longer abide by those limits. Do you approve or disapprove of Reagan's decision, or haven't you heard enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT)

Approve	24
Disapprove	20
Haven't heard enough for opinion	53
DK/NA	3

11/1986 see 11/1978 (Gallup/CCFR)

1/1987 With the Democrats in control of both the Senate and the House in Congress, it is highly probable there will be some serious disagreements between President Reagan and the Congress. If you had to say, who do you think will be more right- Reagan or the Congress-- in their difference over having the US live up to the terms of the SALT II treaty, favored by Congress but opposed by Reagan? (Harris)

Reagan	30
Congress	56
Both or neither (Vol)	1
Not sure	13

APPENDIX 10

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APPENDIX 11

Interview Dates, Sample Sizes, Sample Populations, and Abbreviations for Public Opinion Surveys Consulted and Analyzed

Reference Survey Date	Survey	Code-book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Surveys cited	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
2/1938	AIPO 112A	2/14	2/16	2/21	2837	nat adult	509	2
1/1940	AIPO 182k	1/19	1/21	1/26	3199	nat adult		2
3/1940	AIPO 186k	3/6	3/8	3/13	3180	nat adult		2
8/1940	AIPO 205	8/8	8/10	8/15	5825	nat adult		2
12/1940	AIPO 225	11/30	12/1	12/6	3024	nat adult		2
2/1941	OPOR 806	1/28	1/29	~2/8	-	nat adult		2
5/1941	AIPO 235	4/25	4/27	5/1	2334	nat adult		2
9/1941	AIPO 246k	8/26	8/26	9/2	3022	nat adult		2
1/1942	NORC	1/9*	-	-	-	-		2
1/1942	AIPO 259	1/23	1/24	1/30	-	nat adult		2
2/1942	NORC	2/14	-	-	-	nat adult		5
4/1942a	OPOR 813	3/26	-	-	-	nat adult		5
4/1942b	OPOR 814	4/3	4/3	4/11	2464	Chicago		2
5/1942	NORC	5/6*	-	-	-	-		2,5
6/1942	OPOR 817	6/17	6/18	~6/28	2903	nat adult		2,5
7/1942a	NORC	7/1*	-	-	-	-		2,5
7/1942b	NORC	7/18	-	-	-	nat adult		5
7/1942	OPOR 819	7/16	7/17	~7/27	-	nat adult		2,5
8/1942	NORC	8/21	-	-	-	nat adult		5
9/1942	NORC	-	-	-	-	nat adult		5
11/1942	NORC	11/19	-	-	-	nat adult		5
12/1942	NORC	11/27	-	-	-	nat adult		5
1/1943	AIPO 287k&t	1/7	1/9	1/14	3352	nat adult		5
4/1943	AIPO 293k&t	4/6	4/8	4/13	2948	nat adult		5
6/1943	NORC	6/18	-	-	-	nat adult		5
10/1943	OPOR 18	10/18	-	-	-	nat adult		5
11/1943	NORC 217	11/15*	-	-	2560	nat adult		2,5
11/1943	AIPO 306k&t	11/9	11/11	11/16	3049	nat adult		2,5
12/1943	OPOR 19	11/22	11/23	~12/3	-	nat adult		2
12/1943	AIPO 308	12/15	12/17	12/22	3031	nat adult		2,5

Reference Survey Date	Survey	Code-book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1944	AIPO 310k	1/18	1/20	1/25	1602	nat adult	5
3/1944	OPOR 23	3/1	3/2	~3/12	-	nat adult	2
4/1944	AIPO 316	4/12	4/14	4/19	3142	nat adult	2
4/1944	NORC	4/8	-	-	-	nat adult	5
6/1944	AIPO 320k&t	6/7	6/9	6/14	2924	nat adult	5
2/1945	AIPO 341k&t	2/20	2/22	2/28	3057	nat adult	5
3/1945	AIPO 344	3/15	3/17	3/22	2989	nat adult	2
5/1945a	AIPO 346	5/2	5/4	5/9	3053	nat adult	2
5/1945b	AIPO 347k&t	5/15	5/17	5/23	3167	nat adult	5
7/1945	NORC 235A&B	7/45	-	-	2572	nat adult	2
8/1945a	AIPO 353K&T	8/8	8/10	8/15	2956	nat adult	1,4,5
8/1945b	AIPO 354K&T	8/22	8/24	8/29	3106	nat adult	3
8/1945	MINN 25	8/21	-	-	-	state-Minn	1
9/1945	NORC 133	8/31	-	-	1259	nat adult	5
9/1945	NORC 237A&B	-	-	-	2533	nat adult	3,4
10/1945	RFOR 50	-	9/24	10/1	3512	nat adult	3,4
10/1945a	AIPO 357K&T	10/3	10/5	10/10	3096	nat adult	3,7,8
10/1945b	AIPO 358K&T	10/17	10/19	10/24	3168	nat adult	2,5
10/1945	NORC 135	10/17	10/18	10/27	1260	nat adult	3,5
12/1945	NORC 42T	12/7	12/7	12/8	526	nat adult	3,7,8

Reference Date	Survey	Code- book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
2/1946	AIPO 365K&T	2/13	2/15	2/20	2946	nat adult	6
2/1946	NORC 139	2/2	2/3	2/12	1263	nat adult	3,5
2/1946	MINN 31	2/26	-	-	-	state-Minn	3,6
3/1946	AIPO 366k&t	2/26	2/28	3/5	3122	nat adult	5
3/1946b	AIPO 367	3/13	3/15	3/20	3249	nat adult	2
3/1946	NORC 140	-	-	-	1285	nat adult	1,3,7
3/1946	NORC 141	3/20	3/21	3/30	1293	nat adult	2,5
4/1946a	AIPO 368K&T	3/27	3/29	4/3	3225	nat adult	3,6
4/1946b	AIPO 369K&T	4/10	4/12	4/17	3152	nat adult	2,3,5,6
5/1946	RCOM 24	-	5/1	5/14	-	nat adult	3
5/1946	NORC 142	5/17	5/18	5/27	1292	nat adult	1,2,3,(3),5
5/1946	AIPO 370t	4/24	4/26	5/1	3226	nat adult	2
6/1946	AIPO 373K&T	6/12	6/14	6/19	3071	nat adult	3
6/1946	PSY CORP 173kt	6/6	-	-	3090	nat adult	1,3,6,8
6/1946	SRC	-	-	-	600	nat adult	8
7/1946	NORC 143	6/21	6/22	7/1	1307	nat adult	1,3,5,7
7/1946	AIPO 375K&T	7/24	7/26	7/31	3123	nat adult	6
8/1946	PSY CORP 178kt	8/12	-	-	2894	nat adult	1,3,6,8
8/1946	SRC	-	-	-	600	nat adult	8
8/1946	MINN 36	8/13	-	-	577	state-MINN	1,3,(3),6
9/1946	RCOM 25	8/46	8/21	9/9	5256	veterans	3
9/1946	NORC 243	-	8/22	9/3	2504	nat adult	2,(3)
9/1946	NORC 144	9/46	-	-	1265	-	3
10/1946	AIPO 379K&T	9/25	9/27	10/2		nat adult	3,5
10/1946	NORC 145	10/2	10/3	10/13	1308	nat adult	2,5
11/1946a	AIPO 384K	11/13	11/15	11/20		nat adult	3,7
11/1946b	AIPO 384T	11/14	11/16	11/21		nat adult	3
11/1946	NORC 146	11/15	11/16	11/25	1263	nat adult	3,7
12/1946	NORC 147	12/11			1286	nat adult	(3),5,7
12/1946	AIPO 386k&t	12/11	12/13	12/18	3029	nat adult	5

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2/1947	MINN 42	2/4	-	-	875	state-Minn	8
2/1947	NORC 148	2/20	2/21	2/28	1300	nat adult	1, 3, (3), 5, 7
3/1947	NORC 49T	3/18	3/19	3/22	537	nat adult	2, 5
3/1947b	AIPO 392	3/12	3/14	3/19	2884	nat adult	2
4/1947	NORC 149	4/3	4/4	4/13	1307	nat adult	2
6/1947a	AIPO 398K&T	6/4	6/6	6/11	3171	nat adult	3
6/1947	MINN 46	6/24	-	-	-	state-Minn	3
7/1947	AIPO 400k	7/2	7/4	7/9	3027	nat adult	2
7/1947	NORC 151	6/24	6/25	7/1	1300	nat adult	3, 5
10/1947	NORC 152	10/10	10/10	10/20	1290	nat adult	1, 2, 3, 5, 7
12/1947	NORC 154	12/4	12/5	12/14	1290	nat adult	2, 5
3/1948	NORC 155	2/25	2/26	3/5	1265	nat adult	2, (3)
4/1948	NORC 156	3/25	3/26	4/5	1289	nat adult	2
4/1948	AIPO 417	4/21	4/23	4/28	3165	nat adult	3
6/1948	NORC 158	6/2	6/3	6/13	1295	nat adult	1, 3, (3), 5
8/1948	NORC 160	7/30	7/31	8/10	1261	nat adult	5
9/1948	RFOR 70	-	9/13	9/20	3795	nat adult	4
10/1948	NORC 161	10/13	10/14	10/23	1258	nat adult	(3), 5
10/1948	AIPO 431	10/14	10/16	10/21	3062	nat adult	2
11/1948	AIPO 432k	11/1	11/3	11/8	1542	nat adult	2
12/1948	NORC 162	11/23	11/26	12/5	1288	nat adult	2, (3)
1/1949b	AIPO 436k	1/20	1/22	1/27	1661	nat adult	2
2/1949	NORC 163	1/26	1/27	2/6	1261	nat adult	5
3/1949	NORC 164	3/3	3/4	3/13	1302	nat adult	2
4/1949	NORC 165	4/19	4/20	4/30	1282	nat adult	2
5/1949	AIPO 442	5/19	5/21	5/26	2751	nat adult	2
6/1949	NORC 166	6/1	6/1	6/11	1283	nat adult	2, (3), 5
6/1949	AIPO 443K&T	6/9	6/11	6/16	2765	nat adult	1
7/1949	NORC 167	6/30	7/1	7/11	1284	nat adult	5
8/1949	NORC 168	8/11	8/13	8/22	1232	nat adult	5
9/1949	NORC 169	9/16	9/20	9/26	1272	nat adult	(3), 5
10/1949	NORC 170	10/12	10/14	10/23	1650	nat adult	1, 3, 5, 7
11/1949	AIPO 449K&T	10/28	10/30	11/4	2903	nat adult	8
12/1949	MINN 77	11/29	-	12/4	-	state-Minn	3

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1/1950	NORC 273	1/18	1/19	1/28	1284	nat adult	2,7
2/1950a	AIPO 452K	1/26	1/28	2/2	1548	nat adult	1,2,3
2/1950b	AIPO 452TPS	2/3	2/5	2/10	1351	nat adult	1,3
2/1950	MINN 79	2/21	-	-	595	state-Minn	1
3/1950	NORC 276	3/1	3/2	3/11	1300	nat adult	1,3,(3)
4/1950	NORC 280-1	4/17	4/18	4/27	1274	nat adult	2
5/1950a	AIPO 455k	4/28	5/1	5/6	1506	nat adult	2
6/1950	NORC 282-83	6/14	6/16	6/24	1276	nat adult	2,3
7/1950	AIPO 458K	7/7	7/9	7/14	1427	nat adult	1
11/1950	NORC 294	11/8	11/9	11/19	1272	nat adult	1
1/1951a	AIPO 469	12/30	1/1	1/5	1369	nat adult	2
3/1951	AIPO 472k	3/2	3/4	3/9	1375	nat adult	5
4/1951	NORC 302	4/18	4/18	4/27	1289	nat adult	1
4/1951	AIPO 474	4/14	4/16	4/21	1266	nat adult	2
5/1951	AIPO 475K	5/17	5/19	5/24	2070	nat adult	2
7/1951	NORC 303	6/29	6/29	7/16	1225	nat adult	2
8/1951	AIPO 478	8/1	8/3	8/8	2057	nat adult	2
9/1951	AIPO 480	9/19	9/21	9/26	1986	nat adult	2
11/1951	AIPO 482	11/9	11/11	11/16	2020	nat adult	2
12/1951	NORC 314	11/22	11/22	12/1	1282	nat adult	1,2
1/1952	NORC 315	12/28	12/29	1/8	1237	nat adult	(3)
1/1952a	AIPO 484	1/4	1/6	1/11	1963	nat adult	2
1/1952b	AIPO 485	1/18	1/20	1/25	2076	nat adult	2
2/1952	NORC 317	2/5	2/6	2/15	1255	nat adult	2
3/1952	NORC 320	3/19	3/20	3/29	1260	nat adult	2
6/1952	NORC 325	5/28	5/29	6/8	1264	nat adult	1
1/1953	AIPO 510K	1/9	1/11	1/16	1558	nat adult	1
2/1953	NORC 337	2/11	2/12	2/21	1288	nat adult	2
4/1953	AIPO 514K	4/17	4/19	4/24	1520	nat adult	3,7
4/1953	NORC 339	4/1	4/2	4/11	1251	nat adult	2,(3)
5/1953	NORC 340	5/14	-	-	-	nat adult	(3)
6/1953	AIPO 516k	5/28	5/30	6/4	1549	nat adult	6
7/1953	NORC 341-42	6/30	7/6	7/18	1303	nat adult	7
7/1953b	AIPO 518K	7/23	7/25	7/30	1532	nat adult	2
8/1953	AIPO 519K	8/13	8/15	8/20	1613	nat adult	2
8/1953	RCOM 80	8/53	8/22	8/29	2006	-	3
10/1953	AIPO 521K	10/7	10/9	10/14	1488	nat adult	5

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1/1954	NORC 351	1/21	1/22	1/31	1250	nat adult	1,2
3/1954	AIPO 528	3/17	3/19	3/24	1562	nat adult	2
4/1954	AIPO 529K	4/6	4/8	4/13	1482	nat adult	6,7
5/1954	NORC 355	4/22	4/25	5/2	1207	nat adult	7
8/1954	AIPO 535K	8/3	8/5	8/10	1626	nat adult	5
8/1954	AIPO 536K	8/24	8/26	8/31	1562	nat adult	1
9/1954	AIPO 537	9/14	9/16	9/21	1466	nat adult	5
12/1954	NORC 365	11/26	11/29	12/8	1201	nat adult	2
12/1954	AIPO 540	11/30	12/2	12/7	1481	nat adult	2
1/1955	NORC 366	1/21	1/21	1/31	1207	nat adult	6,7
3/1955	AIPO 544K	3/1	3/3	3/8	1320	nat adult	1,6
3/1955	NORC 370	3/11	3/12	3/22	1225	nat adult	2,(3),6
4/1955	AIPO 546	4/12	4/14	4/19	1531	nat adult	2
5/1955	NORC 371	4/29	4/30	5/9	1226	nat adult	2,(3)
6/1955b	AIPO 549k	6/22	6/24	6/29	1590	nat adult	2
7/1955	NORC 372	6/23	6/24	7/3	1263	nat adult	1,(3),7
8/1955	NORC 374	8/55	8/5	8/15	1262	nat adult	2,(3),7
10/1955	NORC 376	9/29	9/30	10/10	1268	nat adult	7
12/1955	NORC 379	11/23	11/25	12/6	1276	nat adult	2,7
12/1955	AIPO 557	12/6	12/8	12/13	1433	nat adult	2
1/1956a	AIPO 558K	1/4	1/6	1/11	1385	nat adult	1
1/1956b	AIPO 559	1/24	1/26	1/61	1545	nat adult	2
2/1956	NORC 382	1/26	1/27	2/6	1238	nat adult	6,7
4/1956	NORC 386	4/20	4/21	4/30	1224	nat adult	2
6/1956	RCOM 63	6/56	-	-	-	nat adult	6
7/1956	NORC 390	6/26	6/27	7/5	1275	nat adult	2
8/1956	AIPO 568	8/1	8/3	8/8	2173	nat adult	2
9/1956	RCOM 64	-	-	-	2968	nat adult	6
9/1956	NORC 393	9/13	-	-	1263	nat adult	2
9/1956	AIPO 570	9/7	9/9	9/14	1979	nat adult	2
10/1956	AIPO 573K	10/16	10/18	10/23	2175	nat adult	6
10/1956	NORC 398T	10/25	10/26	10/29	541	nat adult	1,6,7
10/1956a	RCOM 65	-	-	-	3003	nat adult	6
10/1956c	RCOM 68a-c	-	-	-	-	nat adult	6
11/1956	NORC 399	11/15	11/16	11/26	1287	nat adult	6
11/1956	MINN 154A&B	10/29	10/30	~11/4	999	state-Minn	6
12/1956	AIPO 576	12/12	12/14	12/19	1543	nat adult	5

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3/1957	AIPO 579K	2/26	2/28	3/5	1531	nat adult	2
4/1957	AIPO 582K	4/23	4/25	4/30	1626	nat adult	1,6
4/1957	MINN 160	4/57	-	-	-	state-Minn	6,7
4/1957	ISR 423	2/57	3/57	4/57	1919	nat adult	6
7/1957a	AIPO 585k	6/25	6/27	7/2	1520	nat adult	6
7/1957b	AIPO 586K	7/16	7/18	7/23	1534	nat adult	6
7/1957	MINN 162	7/5	7/5	7/7	-	state-Minn	6,7
1/1958b	AIPO 594K	1/22	1/24	1/29	1542	nat adult	6,7
3/1958	AIPO 596I&II	3/4	3/6	3/11	1610	nat adult	2,7
3/1958	MINN 169	3/26	3/26	3/30	-	state-Minn	6
4/1958	AIPO 598K	4/14	4/16	4/21	1439	nat adult	1,6
5/1958	MINN 170	4/30	5/1	5/4	-	state-Minn	6
7/1958	Gallup	9/6*	-	-	650	elite	6
8/1958a	AIPO 602k	7/28	7/30	8/4	1621	nat adult	2
9/1958	MINN 174A&B	9/17	9/17	9/21	-	state-Minn	6
12/1958	AIPO 608	12/1	12/3	12/8	1509	nat adult	2
2/1959	AIPO 610	2/2	2/4	2/9	1616	nat adult	6
4/1959	AIPO 612K	3/31	4/2	4/7	1738	nat adult	6
6/1959	AIPO 614	5/27	5/29	6/3	1536	nat adult	2
7/1959	AIPO 616	7/21	7/23	7/28	1538	nat adult	6
8/1959	G/II&R 12	7/27	-	-	2695	nat adult	2
9/1959	AIPO 618k	9/16	9/18	9/23	5778	nat adult	6
11/1959	AIPO 620K	11/10	11/12	11/17	2750	nat adult	6
12/1959	AIPO 622K	12/8	12/10	12/15	2550	nat adult	5
3/1960	MINN 190	2/26	2/26	3/1	597	state-Minn	6
6/1960	SIND/GE 7250	-	-	-	1500	nat adult	1
12/1960	AIPO 639K	12/6	12/8	12/13	2846	nat adult	5
1/1961	MINN 201	1/13	1/13	1/17	-	state-Minn	6
2/1961	AIPO 641k	2/8	2/10	2/15	2873	nat adult	5
5/1961	AIPO 644K	5/3	5/4	5/9	3545	nat adult	1
6/1961	AIPO 647K	6/21	6/23	6/28	2843	nat adult	6
7/1961	MINN 206	7/7	7/7	7/11	-	state-Minn	6
9/1961	Gallup	9/6	-	-	-	sec loc	6
9/1961	MINN 208	-	9/22	9/26	-	state-Minn	6
11/1961	AIPO 652K	11/15	11/17	11/22	2765	nat adult	1,(3),6
11/1961	IOWA/IAPO 166	-	-	-	588	state-Iowa	6
12/1961	MINN 210	12/1	12/1	12/5	-	state-Minn	6

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1/1962	AIPO 654KB	1/9	1/11	1/16	3421	nat adult	5,6
3/1962	AIPO 656K	3/6	3/8	3/13	3485	nat adult	6
4/1962	IOWA 167	4/13	-	-	776	state-Iowa	6
11/1962	AIPO 665k	11/14	11/16	11/21	4426	nat adult	6
12/1962	AIPO 666k	12/11	12/13	12/18	3193	nat adult	5,6
2/1963	MINN 221	2/15	2/15	2/19	-	state-Minn	6
3/1963	AIPO 669K	3/6	3/8	3/13	4337	nat adult	1,5,6,7
6/1963	AIPO 674	6/19	6/21	6/26	3488	nat adult	5
6/1963	NORC SRS 110	6/63	-	-	-	-	1
7/1963	Harris	-	-	-	-	nat adult	6
8/1963	AIPO 676K	8/13	8/15	8/20	3560	nat adult	1,5,6
8/1963	MINN 226	8/16	8/16	~8/20	600	state-Minn	6
9/1963	Harris	-	-	-	-	nat adult	6
10/1963	IOWA/IAPO 172	-	-	-	601	state-Iowa	6
11/1963	Harris 1285	11/63	-	-	1283	-	6
11/1963	ORC 466G	-	10/15	11/12	1506	nat adult	6
12/1963	NORC SRS 330	-	12/2	12/31	1557	nat adult	(3),8
12/1963	ISR 729	-	11/3	12/2	1322	nat adult	1,6
3/1964	AIPO 686	2/26	2/28	3/5	3503	nat adult	5
4/1964	AIPO 689k	4/22	4/24	4/29	3509	nat adult	5
6/1964	NORC SRS 640	6/64	-	-	1464	nat adult	1,8
10/1964 ^c	G/IISR	-	9/64	10/64	3175	nat comb	(3)
11/1964	AIPO 701	11/4	11/6	11/11	3432	nat adult	5
6/1965	Harris 1551	6/65	-	-	522	nat adult	4
2/1966	NORC SRS 876	-	-	-	1479	-	1,8
12/1966	AIPO 738	12/6	12/8	12/13	3542	nat adult	5
2/1967	AIPO 741k	2/14	2/16	2/21	3509	nat adult	5
12/1967	Gallup	-	-	-	1583	nat adult	5
6/1968	ORC/N	6/12	-	-	1508	nat adult	8
12/1968	Harris 1900	12/68	12/12	12/18	1544	nat adult	8
4/1969	AIPO 777	3/25	3/27	4/1	1502	nat adult	1,8
4/1969	Harris 1926	3-4/69	4/5	4/11	1573	-	8
5/1969	AIPO 780	5/13	5/15	5/20	1523	nat adult	1,8
5/1969	ORC/Nx	-	4/25	5/2	1508	nat adult	8
7/1969	AIPO 784	7/8	7/10	7/15	1517	nat adult	1,8
7/1969	Harris 1939	7/69	7/16	7/22	2087	-	8
10/1969	Harris 1970	10/69	10/16	10/22	1982	nat adult	8
9/1970	Harris 2037	8/70	9/18	9/24	1609	nat adult	8

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1/1971	Harris 2053	1/71	-	-	1613	-	1,4,8
1/1971	Harris 2055	1/71	-	-	3092		8
6/1971	Harris 2124	6/71	6/9	6/15	1614	nat adult	8
6/1971	ORC/Nx	-	6/5	6/6	1016	nat adult	1,8
2/1972	Harris 2154	2/72	2/8	2/14	1579	nat adult	8
3/1972	MIS/N		-	-	1302	nat adult	8
5/1972	AIPO 852	5/23	5/26	5/29	1541	nat adult	5
6/1972	Harris 2216	6/72	6/7	6/12	1303	nat adult	8
6/1972	Gallup/PA	6/72	-	-	1137	nat adult	9
7/1972	Field/LMH	-	6/20	7/10	980	state-Ca.	8
9/1972	Harris 2234	8/72	8/30	9/1	1624	nat adult	8
11/1972	Harris	-	-	-	-	nat adult	9
4/1973	AIPO 868k	4/3	4/6	4/9	1528	nat adult	5
6/1973	Harris 2330	6/73	6/14	6/18	1511	nat adult	8,9
7/1973	AIPO 874k	7/3	7/6	7/9	1544	nat adult	5
11/1973	Harris 2351	11/73	11/13	11/16	1460	nat adult	8,9
3/1974	NORC/GSS	-	2/74	3/74	1484	nat adult	5
5/1974	Field/LMH	-	5/1	5/30	786	state-Ca.	8
12/1974	Harris/CCFR, 2436		12/6	12/14	1513	nat adult	9
12/1974	Harris/CCFR, 2436L				330	elite	9
1/1975	Roper 75-2	-	1/11	1/25	2000	nat adult	1,9
3/1975	NORC/GSS	-	2/75	3/75	1490	nat adult	5
4/1975	CRS/C	-	-	-	-	-	9
12/1975	Harris 2732	-	12/20	12/30	1394	nat adult	9
1/1976	Harris 7588	12/75	12/18	1/2	1400	nat adult	7,8,9
3/1976	CSR/C	-	-	-	-	-	9
6/1976a	AIPO 953k	6/7	6/11	6/14	1524	nat adult	1
6/1976b	AIPO 954k	6/22	6/25	6/28	1544	nat adult	5
8/1976	Harris 2624A	8/76	8/27	8/30	1471	nat adult	9
12/1976	AIPO 964K	12/7	12/10	12/13	1559	nat adult	1

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1/1977	CBS/NYT	-	1/7	1/13	1234	nat adult	9
1/1977	CSR/C	-	-	-	-	-	9
3/1977a	Harris 2732	3/77	3/1	3/7	1546	nat adult	9
3/1977b	Harris 7781	4/77	3/15	3/21	1547	nat adult	9
3/1977	NORC/GSS	-	2/77	3/77	1530	nat adult	5
4/1977	CBS/NYT	-	4/21	4/25	1707	nat adult	9
5/1977	Roper 77-5	-	4/30	5/7	2002	nat adult	9
6/1977	PIOR	-	5/27	6/1	800	nat adult	9
7/1977	AIPO 979K	7/5	7/8	7/11	1518	nat adult	1
7/1977a	CBS/NYT	-	7/19	7/25	1447	nat adult	1
8/1977	Roper 77-8	-	8/20	8/27	2005	nat adult	1
11/1977	Roper 77-10	-	10/29	11/5	2005	nat adult	(3),9
1977	CSR/C	-	-	-	-	-	9
1/1978	NBC/AP	-	1/10	1/11	-	nat adult	9
2/1978	Harris	-	2/11	2/18	1510	nat adult	8
2/1978	Roper 78-3	-	2/11	2/25	2002	nat adult	(3),9
2/1978	ORC	-	-	-	1015	nat adult	1,7,9
4/1978	AIPO 998k	3/28	3/31	4/3	1574	nat adult	5
5/1978	AIPO 1101G	4/25	4/28	5/1	1539	nat adult	1
5/1978	Harris 7882	4/78	4/29	5/6	1567	nat adult	9
5/1978	Roper 78-5	-	4/22	5/3	2003	nat adult	1
6/1978	CBS/NYT	-	6/19	6/23	1527	nat adult	1,7,9
6/1978	NBC/AP 32/101	-	6/27	6/28	1600	nat adult	9
6/1978	Roper 78-6	-	6/3	6/10	2002	nat adult	9
6/1978	YSW/Time 8149	-	5/30	6/5	1022	reg voter	9
7/1978	Harris	-	7/25	7/27	1238	nat adult	9
7/1978	Roper 78-7	-	7/8	7/15	2001	nat adult	(3),9
8/1978	NBC/AP 33/103	-	8/7	8/8	1600	nat adult	7,9
8/1978	Roper 78-8	-	8/19	8/26	2001	nat adult	9
9/1978a	ABC/Harris 3848	-	9/8	9/12	1529	nat adult	9
10/1978	ABC/Harris 3859	-	10/21	10/22	1200	nat adult	9
10/1978	NBC/AP 35/107	-	10/16	10/17	1600	nat adult	7,9
11/1978	NBC/AP	-	11/7	11/7	23,450	voter ep	9
11/1978	Gallup/CCFR	-	11/17	11/26	1546	nat adult	(3),9
11/1978	CBS	-	11/7	11/7	8769	voter ep	9
11/1978	Roper 78-10	-	10/28	11/4	2000	nat adult	1,9
12/1978	NBC/AP 37/111	-	12/11	12/12	1600	nat adult	9
12/1978	AIPO 1118G	-	12/8	12/11	1552	nat adult	1
12/1978	MIS/N	-	9/16	12/15	1620	nat adult	1,(3),8
1978	CSR/C	-	-	-	-	-	9

Reference Survey Date	Survey	Code-book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1979	Gallup/CCFR	-	11/20	1/12	366	elite	9
1/1979	CBS/NYT	-	1/23	1/29	1500	nat adult	1
1/1979	ABC/Harris	792102	1/17	1/22	1498	nat adult	9
1/1979	Roper 79-2	-	1/6	1/20	2003	nat adult	(3),9
2/1979	NBC/AP 39/112	-	2/5	2/6	1600	nat adult	9
2/1979	Roper 79-3	-	2/10	2/24	2004	nat adult	(3),9
2/1979	AIPO 1123G	2/20	2/23	2/26	1534	nat adult	5
3/1979	NBC/AP 40/113	-	3/19	3/20	1600	nat adult	7,9
3/1979	AIPO 1124G	3/13	3/16	3/19	1563	nat adult	1,9
3/1979	GFR/CPD	-	2/23	3/3	1211	nat adult	9
4/1979b	ABC/Harris	792106	4/6	4/9	1200	nat adult	8,9
4/1979	YSW/Time 79-8181	-	-	-	1024	reg voter	(3),9
5/1979a	Harris 792107	4/79	4/26	5/1	1199	nat adult	7,9
5/1979a	NBC/AP 41/117	-	4/30	5/1	1600	nat adult	1,9
5/1979	LAT 17	-	5/20	5/25	1304	nat adult	7,9
5/1979b	Harris 792108	5/79	5/18	5/22	1499	nat adult	9
5/1979	ABC 8232	5/79	-	-	839	nat adult	(3),7,9
5/1979	Roper 79-5	-	4/28	5/5	2007	nat adult	(3),9
6/1979	CBS/NYT	-	6/3	6/6	1422	nat adult	1,7,9
6/1979	AIPO 1131G	6/19	6/22	6/25	1571	nat adult	1,9
6/1979	ABC/Harris	-	6/13	6/17	1496	nat adult	9
6/1979	Roper 79-6	-	6/2	6/9	2006	nat adult	1,(3),9
7/1979	Roper 79-7	-	7/7	7/14	2000	nat adult	(3),9
7/1979a	NBC/AP 43/119	-	7/16	7/17	1599	nat adult	9
7/1979a	ABC/Harris	-	7/17	7/21	1496	nat adult	9
7/1979b	ABC/Harris	-	7/27	7/29	1496	nat adult	9
8/1979	YSW/Time 79-8182	-	8/21	8/23	1049	reg voter	(3),9
8/1979	Roper 79-8	-	8/18	8/25	2005	nat adult	(3),9
9/1979a	NBC/AP 45/121	-	9/10	9/11	1599	nat adult	7,9
9/1979	AIPO 1138G	-	9/7	9/10	1538	nat adult	1
9/1979	Roper 79-9	-	9/22	9/29	2009	nat adult	9
10/1979	AIPO 1139G	9/25	9/28	10/1	1520	nat adult	1,9
10/1979	Harris 792114	10/79	9/26	10/1	1500	nat adult	9
10/1979	AIPO 1140G	-	10/5	10/8	1547	nat adult	9
10/1979b	NBC/AP 48/125	-	10/15	10/16	1600	nat adult	9
11/1979	Roper 79-10	-	10/27	11/3	2008	nat adult	(3),9
11/1979	CBS/NYT	-	10/27	11/3	1385	nat adult	1,9
12/1979	LAT 21	-	12/16	12/18	1047	nat adult	(3),9

Reference Survey Date	Survey	Code-book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1980a	AIPO 1146G	1/2	1/4	1/7	1620	nat adult	9
1/1980b	AIPO 1147G	1/22	1/25	1/28	1597	nat adult	5
1/1980	Roper 80-2	-	1/5	1/19	2005	nat adult	1, (3), 9
2/1980	Gallup/NW	-	2/1	2/11	1111	reg voter	9
3/1980	AIPO 1149G	2/26	2/29	3/3	1572	nat adult	1, 9
6/1980	CBS/NYT	6/26*	6/18	6/22	1517	nat adult	9
10/1980	AIPO 1163G	10/7	10/10	10/13	1593	nat adult	9
10/1980	YSW/Time 8605	10/80	10/14	10/16	1632	reg voter	9
11/1980	LAT 38	-	11/9	11/13	1829	nat adult	9
11/1980	Harris 802125	11/80	11/7	11/10	1198	nat adult	9
11/1980	Roper 80-10	-	11/8	11/15	2004	nat adult	9
1/1981	YSW/Time 8606	-	1/6	1/7	1219	reg voter	9
2/1981	AIPO 1168G	1/27	1/30	2/2	1609	nat adult	5
3/1981	Roper 81-4	-	3/21	3/28	2000	nat adult	7
3/1981	CBS/NYT	-	2/28	3/1	1174	nat adult	(3)
4/1981	LAT 43	-	4/12	4/16	1406	nat adult	9
5/1981	AIPO 1173G	5/5	5/8	5/11	1519	nat adult	7
5/1981	YSW/Time 8607	-	5/4	5/12	1221	reg voter	9
6/1981a	AIPO 1175G	6/16	6/19	6/22	1526	nat adult	1
6/1981	Roper 81-6	-	5/30	6/6	2003	nat adult	1
6/1981	CBS/NYT	-	6/22	6/27	1433	nat adult	1
8/1981	NBC/AP 69	8/18*	8/10	8/11	1601	nat adult	1
8/1981	AIPO 1181G	8/11	8/14	8/17	1534	nat adult	1
9/1981	YSW/Time 8608	-	9/15	9/17	1222	reg voter	9
9/1981	AIPO 1182G	9/15	9/18	9/21	1540	nat adult	7
9/1981	Roper 81-9	-	9/19	9/26	2000	nat adult	1
10/1981	ABC/WP 42/8999	-	10/14	10/18	1505	nat adult	1, 9
11/1981b	AIPO 1186G	11/17	11/20	11/23	1508	nat adult	7
11/1981	ABC/WP 46/754910	-	11/17	11/22	1512	nat adult	1
3/1982	LAT 51	-	3/14	3/17	1503	nat adult	1, (3), 7
3/1982	Gallup/NW	-	3/17	3/18	757	nat adult	7
3/1982	A&S/Merit	-	3/22	3/25	-	nat adult	7
3/1982	Harris/AS 822007	-	3/5	3/21	1599	nat adult	1
3/1982	NORC/GSS	-	2/82	3/83	1506	nat adult	5
4/1982	ABC	-	4/8	4/10	1005	nat adult	1
4/1982	ABC/WP 53/7674	-	4/21	4/25	1521	nat adult	1, 7
5/1982	CBS/NYT	-	5/19	5/23	1470	nat adult	1, (3), 7
5/1982	Harris 822106	-	5/25	5/30	1251	nat adult	9
6/1982	Roper 82-6	-	6/5	6/12	1980	nat adult	(3)
6/1982	YSW/Time 8611	-	6/8	6/10	1010	reg voter	9
7/1982	LAT 58	-	6/27	7/8	1102	nat adult	1, 7, 9
8/1982	AIPO 1200G	8/10	8/13	8/16	1543	nat adult	5
8/1982	SIND	-	7/15	8/4	2718	nat adult	1
11/1982	AIPO 1204G	11/2	11/5	11/8	1540	nat adult	7
11/1982	Gallup/CCFR	-	10/29	11/6	1546	nat adult	(3), 9
11/1982	Gallup/CCFR	-	11/3	12/12	341	opin lead	9

Reference Survey Date	Survey	Code-book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1983	ABC/WP 68	-	1/18	1/22	1510	nat adult	1
1/1983	Roper 83-2	-	1/8	1/22	2000	nat adult	1
3/1983	YSW/Time 8614	-	3/1	3/3	1008	reg voter	1
4/1983	ABC/WP 7995	-	4/8	4/12	1516	nat adult	1
4/1983	CBS/NYT	-	4/7	4/11	1489	nat adult	1
4/1983	Roper 83-5	-	4/23	4/30	2000	nat adult	7
5/1983	AIPO 1214G	5/10	5/13	5/16	1540	nat adult	7
6/1983	ABC/WP 76/8075	-	6/15	6/19	1501	nat adult	1
6/1983	YSW/Time 5632	-	6/27	6/29	1007	reg voter	(3), 9
9/1983	AIPO 1224G	9/13	9/18	9/19	1533	nat adult	5
9/1983	A&S/Merit	-	9/17	9/21	1205	nat adult	7
9/1983	ABC/WP 84	-	9/22	9/26	1506	nat adult	1, 7
9/1983	YSW/Time 5642	-	9/20	9/23	1017	reg voter	(3)
11/1983	ABC/WP 91	-	11/3	11/7	1505	nat adult	7
11/1983	Harris 832112	11/83	11/9	11/14	1252	nat adult	1, 6
11/1983	LAT 73	-	11/12	11/17	2004	nat adult	(3)
12/1983	YSW/Time	-	12/6	12/8	1000	reg voter	1, (3)
2/1984	YSW/Time 5661	-	1/31	2/2	1021	reg voter	(3)
4/1984	P&S/CPD	-	3/31	4/2	1000	nat adult	1, 7
5/1984	PAF	-	5/24	5/30	505	nat adult	1, 7, 9
7/1984	Roper 84-7	-	7/7	7/14	2000	nat adult	9
7/1984c	AIPO 1238G	-	7/13	7/16	1532	nat adult	7
9/1984	Abt 4	-	9/4	9/10	1002	nat adult	6, 9
11/1984b	Harris	-	11/26	11/29	1255	nat adult	7
12/1984	YSW/Time 5702	-	12/10	12/12	1024	reg voter	(3)

Reference Date	Survey	Code- book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1985a	CBS/NYT	-	1/2	1/4	1525	nat adult	1,7
1/1985	ABC 8803	-	1/4	1/6	504	nat adult	7
1/1985	ABC/WP 179/8807	-	1/11	1/16	1505	nat adult	1
1/1985	LAT 93	-	1/19	1/24	1454	nat adult	1,(3),7
1/1985b	AIPO 1249G	1/22	1/25	1/28	1528	nat adult	1,(3)
2/1985	FINK	-	-	-	1005	-	1,8
2/1985	NBC	-	2/3	2/4	1598	nat adult	7
3/1985	ORC	-	-	-	995	nat adult	1
3/1985	Harris/BW	-	3/8	3/11	1254	nat adult	2
3/1985	NORC/GSS	-	2/85	3/85	1534	nat adult	5
5/1985	SIND/CPD	-	5/7	5/27	2318	nat adult	8
5/1985	YSW/Time 5714	-	4/30	5/2	1014	reg voter	(3)
7/1985	ABC/WP 9067	-	7/25	7/29	1506	nat adult	8
7/1985	CBS/NYT	-	7/16	7/21	1569	nat adult	1,4
7/1985	CBS & TBS	-	-	-	1428	Japan	1,4
7/1985	YSW/Time 5731	-	7/23	7/25	1013	reg voter	1,7
9/1985	M&K	-	9/5	9/15	1008	reg voter	1,(3),7,8,9
9/1985	YSW/Time 5732	-	9/17	9/19	1014	reg voter	7
10/1985	AIPO 1258G	-	10/11	10/14	1540	nat adult	(3)
10/1985	NBC/WSJ	-	10/7	10/8	1573	nat adult	7
10/1985	P&S/CPD	-	10/6	10/9	1000	nat adult	1,7
11/1985a	CBS/NYT	-	11/6	11/10	1659	nat adult	(3),7
11/1985	LAT 100	-	11/1	11/7	2041	nat adult	7,8
11/1985	ABC/WP 9225	-	11/10	11/13	1507	nat adult	7
11/1985	NBC/WSJ	-	11/22	11/23	1584	nat adult	7
11/1985	YSW/Time 5733	-	11/14	11/18	1020	reg voters	7
2/1986	ABC/WP 6373	-	2/6	2/12	1504	nat adult	1
3/1986	NORC/GSS	-	2/86	3/86	1470	nat adult	5
4/1986b	NBC/WSJ	-	4/28	4/29	1599	nat adult	1
5/1986	SIRC	-	4/7	5/6	2427	nat adult	1,9
6/1986	Harris	-	6/11	6/16	1250	nat adult	9
6/1986	ABC/WP	-	6/19	6/24	1505	nat adult	1,9
6/1986	Gallup	-	6/9	6/16	1004	nat adult	1,7,9
6/1986	LR/NSIC	-	6/7	6/11		nat adult	1
7/1986	P&S/CPD	-	7/21	7/23	1004	nat adult	1,7
7/1986	Gallup/TM	-	7/10	7/24	1504	nat adult	(3)
8/1986a	Harris	-	7/29	8/7	1254	nat adult	(3)
9/1986	LR/NSIC	-	9/6	9/9		nat adult	1
10/1986a	NBC/WSJ	-	10/6	10/7	1590	nat adult	7
10/1986	YCS/Time	-	10/15	10/15	806	nat adult	1,7
10/1986a	R/USNWR	-	10/15	10/16	1006	nat adult	1
11/1986c	CBS/NYT	-	11/30	11/30	687	nat adult	9
11/1986	GALLUP/CCFR	-	10/25	11/12	1585	nat adult	(3),9
11/1986	LR/NSIC	-	11/15	11/20	2000	nat adult	2
11/1986a	ABC	-	11/13	11/13	510	nat adult	(3)
11/1986b	ABC	-	11/19	11/19	508	nat adult	(3)
12/1986	LAT/Econ	-	12/6	12/9	1800	nat adult	8

Reference Survey Date		Code- book Date	Begin Survey Date	End Survey Date	Sample Size	Population	Appendix/ (Chapter) Number
1/1987	Harris		1/9	1/13	1249	nat adult	9
1/1987	NBC/WSJ		1/22	1/23	1576	nat adult	(3)
3/1987	CBS/NYT		2/28	3/1	1174	nat adult	(3)
3/1987	NBC/WSJ	-	3/15	3/17	2153	nat adult	7
4/1987	P&S/CPD	-	4/3	4/5	1004	nat adult	7
4/1987	CBS/NYT	-	4/5	4/8	1045	nat adult	2
5/1987	Gallup/TM	-	4/21	4/25	5/10	nat adult	2, 5, 7
5/1987a	CBS/NYT	-	5/5	5/6	749	nat adult	(3)
6/1987b	ABC/WP	-	6/25	6/29	1506	nat adult	(3)
7/1987	Nehn/Pitt	-	5/87	7/87	1595	nat adult	1
7/1987	ABC	-	7/7	7/7	510	nat adult	(3)
10/1987	M&K/ATS	-	10/15	10/18	1002	reg voter	(3), 7, 8
11/1987	P&S/CPD	-	10/31	11/5	803	nat adult	2
12/1987	ABC/WP	-	11/30	12/2	1000	nat adult	1
1/1988	MOR/ATS	-	1/7	1/14	1000	reg voter	7
2/1988	DYG/ATS	-	2/17	2/24	1004	reg voter	7
5/1988	M&K/ATS	-	5/24	5/27	1003	nat adult	7
7/1988	DYG/ATS	-	6/25	7/7	1006	reg voter	7
8/1988	M&K/ATS	-	7/31	8/7	1005	nat adult	7

ABBREVIATIONS

~	Approximate Date
*	Release Date
+	Variation in Question Wording
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ABC/Harris	American Broadcasting Company/Louis Harris Associates
ABC/WP	American Broadcasting Company/ <u>Washington Post</u>
ABT	Clark Abt Associates- Cambridge, Ma.
adult	Survey of non-institutionalized adults 18 years of age & older
AIPO	American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup Organization)
A&S/Merit	Audits and Surveys/Merit- New York, N.Y.
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CBS & TBS	Columbia Broadcasting System & Tokyo Broadcasting Service
CBS/NYT	Columbia Broadcasting System/ <u>New York Times</u>
CSR/C	Cambridge Survey Research (Pat Caddell)- Washington, D.C.
DK	Don't Know
DYG/ATS	Daniel Yankelovich Group/Americans Talk Security
elite	an elite survey
ep	exit poll of voters who exited the precinct
Field/LMH	Field Survey (Californai)/LaPorte, Metlay & Heyer
FINK	Arthur J. Finkelstein, New York, NY
Gallup	The Gallup Organization (also called AIPO)
Gallup/CCFR	American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup)/Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Gallup/NW	The Gallup Organization/ <u>Newsweek</u>
Gallup/PA	The Gallup Organization & Potomac Associates (Formerly IISR)
Gallup/TM	Gallup/Times Mirror
G/IISR	Gallup/International Institute of Survey Research- Washington, D.C.
GFR/CPD	George Fine Research/Committee on the Present Danger
GSS	General Social Survey (NORC)
Harris	Louis Harris & Associates
Harris/AS	Louis Harris & Asahi Shimbun
Harris/BW	Louis Harris & Associates/ <u>Business Week</u>
Harris/CCFR	Louis Harris/Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
IOWA/IAPO	Iowa state poll
ISR	Institute for Survey Research- University of Michigan
Japan	Survey of Japanese adult population
LAT	<u>Los Angeles Times</u>
LAT/Econ	<u>Los Angeles Times/Economist</u>
LR/NSIC	Lawrence Research/National Strategy Information Center
M&K	Marttila & Kiley- Boston, Ma.
M&K/ATS	Marttila & Kiley/Americans Talk Security
MINN	Minnesota poll
MIS/N	Market Information Service- Atlanta, Ga. for Professor Nehnevajsa
MOR/ATS	Market Opinion Research/Americans Talk Security

Abbreviations (con't)

NA	No answer
nat	a national survey
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NBC/AP	National Broadcasting Company/Associated Press
NBC/WSJ	National Broadcasting Company/ <u>Wall Street Journal</u>
Nehn/Pitt	Nehnevajsa/University of Pittsburg
NORC	National Opinion Research Center- Chicago, Illinois
NORC SRS	National Opinion Research Center, special surveys,- Chicago, Illinois
NORC/GSS	National Opinion Research Center/General Social Survey- Chicago, Illinois
NYT	<u>New York Times</u>
opin lead	a survey of opinion leaders
OPOR	Office of Public Opinion Research
ORC	Opinion Research Corporation- Princeton, NJ
ORC/N	Opinion Research Corporation/Nehnevajsa civil defense surveys
ORC/Nx	Opinion Research Corporation/Nixon surveys
PAF	Public Agenda Foundation- New York, N.Y.
P&S	Penn & Schoen Associates- New York, N.Y.
P&S/CPD	Penn & Schoen Associates/Committee on the Present Danger
PIOR	Public Interest Opinion Research
PSY CORP	Psychology Corporation
pt sc	point scale
RCOM	Roper- commercial polls
reg	registered (voter)
RFOR	Roper- Fortune polls
Roper	The Roper Organization
R/USNWR	The Roper Organization/ <u>US News & World Report</u>
R/USNWR/CNN	The Roper Organization/ <u>US News & World Report/Cable News Network</u>
sev local	Several local polls
SIND	Sindlinger & Company, Inc- Media, Pa.
SIND/CPD	Sindlinger & Company/Committee on the Present Danger
SIND/GE	Sindlinger & Company/General Electric
SIRC	Strategic Information Research Corp. (for Overseas Development Council)
SRC	Survey Research Center, University of Michigan
State	A survey of a particular State population
voter ep	exit polls of voters
YSW	Yankelovich, Skelly & White
YSW/Time	Yankelovich, Skelly & White/ <u>Time</u>
YCS	Yankelovich, Clancy & Shulman
YCS/Time	Yankelovich, Clancy & Shulman/ <u>Time</u>

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