The Dilemmas of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War Era

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ABSTRACT

The recent spectacular failures of United Nations peacekeeping operations have placed a question mark on the ability of the organisation to fulfil its mission to bring peace and security to areas of conflict. This thesis argues that the United Nations' difficulties are to be understood in the light of the transformations which the end of the Cold War has wrought on the international system as a whole and on the nature of conflict in particular. The fact that the post Cold War era is in large part characterised by intrastate conflict as opposed to the interstate conflicts characteristic of the Cold War era means that the task of the United Nations has become that much more difficult to carry out. What the United Nations is currently undergoing may be considered to be a transitional phase which reflects the fact that neither the organisation nor its member states have been able as yet to fully grasp the nature of the changed circumstances and systemic transformations of the post Cold War era. The liability which the Blue Helmets have come to represent in some of their missions stands out as a warning that both the organisation and the international community as a whole need to take the task of peacekeeping more seriously and more realistically. The controversy surrounding the concept of sovereignty and the notion that the rights of civil society stand above the rights of states, represent a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, alternatives to UN intervention do need to be considered as well, as will be seen in this thesis.

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## THE DILEMMAS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations has reached a unique phase in its history. For the first time since its inception following on from the 1945 Conference of San Francisco, the organisation has acknowledged that it has failed in the mission which had been entrusted to it to guarantee peace and security, in the context of the recent spectacular debacles of the peacekeeping operations which had been sent to Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone between 1994 and 2000.

This new willingness on the part of the UN to recognise its failures and even to publicly apologise for them was heralded by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s formal acknowledgement of the organisation’s responsibility in relation to the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995. The publishing of an independent and highly critical report on UN peacekeeping in August 2000 in the form of the Brahimi report confirms this desire on the part of the leadership of the organisation to remedy to the disfunctions which have bedevilled UN peace operations in the post Cold War era, beginning with an honest admission of past failure.

1 "The Triumph of Evil", BBC documentary, 01/25/01.
One of the opening statements of the Brahimi report is thus a straightforward and ready acknowledgement that “over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge [of peacekeeping], and it can do no better today”\(^2\). The manner in which the report covers a wide range of areas to reform testifies to the scope of the problem which needs to be addressed. It thus calls for recognition of peacekeeping as being core to the mission of the United Nations, for fundamental change within the department of peacekeeping operations, for improvement in the DPKO’s intelligence and planning facilities, as well as reform of the command structure of operations. It at the same time calls for more « robust » rules of engagement, for autonomous, properly trained « brigades », the establishment of « quick impact » facilities which would allow rapid intervention in conflict areas. The report also most importantly calls for an ending of the practice of voting a peacekeeping mission into action without providing it with the means of fulfilling its mandate.

This unprecedented candour and desire to rapidly identify and implement those changes which need to be made if the United Nations is to fulfil its function of peace maker effectively, reflect however not only the determination that tragedies on the scale of those which occurred in particular in Somalia and Rwanda have to be prevented in the future. They at the same time represent a realisation that it is the very credibility and future of the organisation which are now also at stake.

\(^2\) Brahimi report, p.1
The United Nations is indeed considered by many, including the organisation itself as seen with the Brahimi report, as being not only inefficient, but of putting the troops contributed by member states in harm’s way and of actually representing a liability for peace in those areas in which it attempts to intervene. It is because of this that the Brahimi report stresses in its opening pages that “there are many tasks which the United Nations should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go”\(^3\). The peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, in the course of which 50 Nigerian peacekeepers were taken hostage by the rebels of Foday Sankoh’s RUF party, represents the most recent and most mediatised illustration of the way in which UN Blue Helmets may exacerbate an already very volatile and dangerous situation, as well as expose the organisation to public humiliation and embarrassment. The fact that British paratroopers had to intervene to rescue the UN mission, as well as the fact that they did so on their own terms, publicly refusing to place themselves under the authority of an inefficient United Nations, merely served to underline the loss of credibility which the United Nations faces today. The way in which it was the UN itself which appeared to face an emergency, with media attention focusing for the first time as much on the dramatic hours through which the organisation was living, as on the drama of the conflict itself, clearly illustrated that the UN had reached crisis point. The picture of a frantic Kofi Annan desperate to secure the release of his Blue Helmets relayed to the world the

\(^3\) Ibid.
way in which the United Nations itself was taken hostage by the very conflict it had determined to resolve. Not only the credibility of the UN, but also the credibility and dignity of the Secretary-General, the world’s “moral compass”, found themselves to be at stake in Sierra Leone⁴.

This thesis will argue that the plight in which the United Nations finds itself at the moment, is due to a series of disjunctures and disconnects between those transformations which the international system and the nature of conflict have undergone in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and the fact the organisation nor its member states have adequately responded to this. It may be considered that the spectacular failures of United Nations peace operations since the end of the 1980’s stand as a reflection of a lag in institutional and political responses to global systemic changes. The organisation is in effect undergoing a period of difficult transition which was in a sense to be expected, though, as will be pointed out in this paper, lack of political will on the part of many member states has also been playing an important part in the failures of the second generation peacekeeping of the post Cold War era. In order to demonstrate the fact that the deep transformations which the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West rivalry have had on the international system are in very large part what has led to disjunctures and disconnects on the part of the UN and its member states, the first section of this paper will provide a

⁴ Interview with Kofi Annan, « World’s lonely moral compass », Financial Times, 09/06/00.
descriptive outline of the nature of conflict during the period of the Cold War, followed by an outline of the nature of conflict with the end of the Cold War.

The purpose of this is to provide points of comparison concerning the nature of conflict between the two eras which will make clear that the task which faced the United Nations in the post Cold War era, the period of second generation peacekeeping with which this paper is concerned, was much more difficult than the task which faced the Blue Helmets during the years of the Cold War. In particular, it will be pointed out that the fact that conflict in the post Cold War era has become largely intrastate rather than interstate has greatly complicated the mission of the organisation in a very short period of time, with this making the phase of adaptation even more difficult to deal with.

In addition to this the transition from a system of bipolarity to a system of anarchical multipolarity has deprived the international community of the stabilising influence which bipolarity exercised over the more troubled areas of the world. Having established the background to the conditions in which the United Nations has been called on to intervene since the late 1980’s, the second section of this paper will be devoted to examining what exactly are those disjunctures and disconnects which appear to characterise second generation peacekeeping operations.

First, the responsibilities of the organisation itself for these lags will be looked at, with them including a constitution
which has not been updated to reflect the changed circumstances in which the Blue Helmets are called on to intervene, as well as the inflexible nature of the implementation phase and problems associated with a heavy bureaucracy.

Second, the responsibilities of member states in the failure of recent peacekeeping operations will be examined, with these being more numerous and in a sense more troubling than those which can be attributed to the set-up of the organisation. This is in a sense inevitable, since the behaviour of international organisations are largely a function of the preferences and motivations of the member states which make up such institutions. These disjunctures and disconnects on the part of the member states will be seen to include in particular a discrepancy between whether intervention in an area of intrastate conflict is in reality both feasible and advisable, and the ability and willingness of member states to diagnose this correctly, with their attitudes ranging from unwarranted optimism to outright indifference in the face of many tragic civil wars.

Other elements which will be looked at will include disjunctures and disconnects linked to the motivations and policies of member states in initiating or participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as those which have emerged as a result of the nature of the humanitarian dimension of second generation peacekeeping.

Finally, an epilogue to this paper will touch on the issue of the changing concept of sovereignty. It will underline the manner in which here again the international community is still
in the throes of dealing with the question marks and uncertainties which transformations not only in the nature of conflict but also in the nature of its victims, have wrought on the international system and on the norms which are considered to be governing it.
PART 1.

From interstate to intrastate war: disjunctures in the nature of conflict.

CHAPTER 1: The Cold War period or the era of traditional peacekeeping.


The main theme of this paper is that the problems which the United Nations is currently experiencing in its peace missions are a reflection of transformations in the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War and which the UN has been as yet unable to adjust to. In particular, UN peace missions have failed to take into account the changed nature of conflict. It is for this reason that an overview of the nature of conflict first during the Cold War and second after the Cold War needs to be made before turning to problems directly relating to United Nations peace operations. The purpose of this first chapter is thus to analyse the nature of the international system and the nature of conflict during the period of the Cold War. However, such an overview needs to be set within the framework of a theory of collective security and of organisations of collective
security. This will enable us to understand what are the forces which shape the nature of conflict as well as the nature of intervention in those conflicts, with these two elements being essential to understanding the role which the United Nations was called on to play at the time, as well as the nature of the task the organisation faced.

The theory is that the behaviour and ability of organisations of collective security to deal effectively with crisis and conflicts is dependent on the nature of coalition configurations within the international system. The coalition configuration which characterised the international system in the period ranging roughly from 1945 to the late 1980’s consisted of groupings led by the two superpowers and by a group of non-aligned states. They were in effect determined by the existence of a “cold war” between the two great victors of the Second World War, which is why the Cold War is so central to understanding the nature of conflict and intervention both during that time and afterwards. It was the single most important element which determined what the United Nations was able to do in the first four decades of its existence.

A second proposition of this theory posits that the behaviour and policies of most states towards international conflicts is influenced by their perception of how different outcomes of such conflicts would affect the strength and position of their group within the international system. This is an important element of the theory, since it determined the nature of superpower intervention, especially on the African continent, as will be
seen in this chapter. In particular, during the years of the Cold War, superpower intervention in areas of conflict was in many cases determined by their perception of the psychological and ideological advantages which could be accrued from this. This concept is closely linked to the notion of "war by proxy" which will be explored below.

One final crucial proposition of the theory to bear in mind in order to understand the notion of the impact of coalition configuration on international organisations, is the fact that such organisations most often are not independent entities but are the product of arrangements between the major powers in the international system. As Haas, Butterworth and Nye state in perhaps a slightly exaggerated form, "these organisations are little more than governments linked in permanent conclave. They have no power and personality beyond the collective will of governments and no capacity to grow apart from the ability of governments to learn". Any assessment of the doctrine and action of the United Nations must therefore go through an assessment of the motivations, behaviour and impact of its member states, and especially of the major powers, as will be seen in this paper. Scholars have moreover linked the nature of the international system to the internal political processes of international organisations. This link was particularly pronounced during the period of the Cold War, with the United Nations turning into a cockpit of rivalry as a reflection of the east-west conflict. As

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Claude noted, this conflict "has brought about the politicisation of virtually every question that arises in the United Nations and in the specialised agencies where the leaders of the two blocs share membership, no matter how far removed from the political sphere the question may seem to be".

Three propositions of a theory of collective security to be kept in mind as sketched above are thus threefold: (i) the centrality of coalition configurations in determining the nature of conflict and of intervention, (ii) the importance of states' realpolitik calculations in determining their attitude towards a conflict, and (3) the fact that the behaviour of international organisations is to a large extent a function of the nature of the international system and of the will of its member states. The remainder of this chapter examines the manner in which systemic transformations have affected the nature of conflict and hence the behaviour of the UN as an international organisation for collective security.

2. The Cold War period in the colonial era.

One of the most striking features of conflict and traditional peacekeeping in the years of the Cold War is the fact that there were less conflicts to deal with than after the Cold War, particularly in the period up to the 1960's. This was in

great part simply due to the fact that there were fewer sovereign states in existence at that time, with this naturally limiting the number of interstate conflicts which occurred. At the time of the Second World War, colonies and dependencies occupied 72% of the earth’s surface and 69% of its population. On the other hand, the period 1970 onwards witnessed the emergence of over eighty new "nation-states" emerging from the ruins of post-colonial empires, with this, as K.P. Saksena has observed, constituting one of the most significant events of the post Cold War era. This was reflected in the membership of the United Nations itself, which from 51 member-states in 1945 reached 152 member-states by 19797. The number of conflicts in the world thus numbered only twelve in 1950, going down to ten in 19608. These were moreover practically exclusively interstate conflicts, with the only major exception for which the United Nations was called upon being the Greek civil war of 1946-1949, with this being moreover in actual fact largely a regional affair, involving as it did the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and which by 1950 had already largely disappeared. Thus, neither the major powers nor the United Nations were overwhelmed with conflicts across the globe which posed a threat to international peace and security. The crisis which caught the attention of the international community in the first two decades after the end of the Second World War were those directly related to the East-West

8 Figures from Vital Signs 1999, WorldWatch Institute website.
rivalry, as epitomised by the international frenzy which surrounded both the Berlin crisis in 1958 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1958-1962. Peacekeeping was thus not high on the agenda of the major powers in great part because it did not need to be. The period of the Cold War from the mid to late 1960’s onwards witnessed on the other hand a reversal of this trend as numerous states gained their independence. While in 1960 the number of armed conflicts was ten, the figure jumped to 27 in 1965, up to 30 in the early 1970’s and reached 35 in the year of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. 

3. The Cold War period in the post-colonial era.

However, as important as the rise in the number of conflicts from the mid to late 1960’s was on the one hand the fact that these new conflicts were for a large part intrastate rather than interstate, and on the other hand that they occurred largely on the African continent. It is these two factors which are fundamental to understanding the changed circumstances which the United Nations came to face. They are to be linked to the influence of the colonial powers and, once these had largely left the scene by the late 1970’s, to the two superpowers which filled the vacuum which had been left. The way in which the world’s major powers were able to have such a deep impact on the nature

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of conflict in what was referred to at the time as the "Third World", namely the African continent, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, is to be explained by the idea of a "North-South" divide. This meant that conflict in the "Third World" was largely determined by outside powers with the countries of the South being largely at the mercy of the richer, more powerful and more expansionist countries of the North.13

In the case of the African continent which witnessed the deepest transformations in the nature of conflict during this period, the colonial years after the war witnessed a slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts which erupted, dropping from 12 in 1950 to 10 in 1960. The low number of conflicts on the continent is to be attributed to the control which the colonial powers exercised over their dependencies, keeping ethnic, religious, socio-economic and irredentist claims in check. The United Nations was thus called upon only once to intervene in the area during that time, in 1963 in order to prevent the secession of Katanga.14 During the post-colonial period, the nature of conflict continued to be determined by the dominant powers of the international system, i.e. the two superpowers of the bipolar era. For what is important to note is that the achievement of independence by many African countries did not mean that they freed themselves from the tutelage of powerful outside powers. For indeed, the sudden achievement of independence left many of these states at a loss, in economic terms, in terms of coming to

grips with democratic principles, and in terms with trying to control ethnic, religious, socio-economic and irredentist claims which were surfacing. This meant on the one hand that the United States and the Soviet Union saw in this weakness of the newly independent states an easy opportunity to expand their respective spheres of influence, and on the other hand that many African states were eager for superpower patronage in the form of economic and financial aid, and in certain cases, in the form of support of irredentist claims against neighbouring countries, as was the case with the Soviet Union in the horn of Africa. The superpowers have thus been accused by scholars of having fuelled the divide between North and South and preventing those countries in their sphere of influence from learning to come to grips with their own issues, with this again impacting on the nature of conflict in particular as it was to emerge in later years.\(^{13}\)

4. Superpowers contain conflict in their spheres of influence.

For the Soviet Union, this was the case in particular for its eastern European sphere of influence. Not only were attempts at revolt and expression of the popular will to achieve self determination crushed, as in 1956 in Budapest and in 1968 in Prague, but Soviet influence over the whole Balkan area was structured in order to avoid the explosion of ethnic and socio-

economic dissatisfaction which simmered beneath the surface, and which finally burst out in the mid-1990's under President Milosevic's encouragement. Similarly, on the African continent, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained close control mainly via financial and economic support to those states and governments under their sphere of influence. As in the case of the Balkans, this meant that underlying ethnic, religious, or other cultural tensions, as well as tensions relating to the end of colonial rule and to dire economic and social conditions, were all kept under control. Moreover, in the case of Africa, the Cold War period and the importance of containing potentially explosive situations meant that the state boundaries on the continent were kept frozen, a concept which the Organisation for African Unity adhered to strictly until the end of the Cold War. Similarly, it was in the interest of keeping the continent from becoming a battleground for US-American hostility and of preventing ethnic claims from disrupting the peace that the OAU put its efforts into preventing either the United States or the Soviet Union from intervening in favour of their respective client states. The explosion of intrastate conflict which ought to have occurred with the end of the Second World War, with the end of colonialism, and as a result of long standing ethnic or socio-economic grievances, was thus postponed until the end of the Cold War. Not only this, but what mattered during the Cold War was not

North-South issues, but the East-West rivalry, of which the African continent in particular was but a secondary player\textsuperscript{15}. The major powers thus showed little interest in the dilemmas which African countries had to contend with especially during the period of decolonisation, with the resurfacing of the major power's sense of post-colonial responsibility having to wait until the end of the Cold War to begin to occur.

5. Superpower fear of escalation.

Alongside acting on the nature of conflicts by making sure these remained largely interstate rather than intrastate, the Cold War and the coalitional configurations which characterised it also impacted on the nature of intervention in conflict on the part of organisations of collective security such as the United Nations. It must be borne in mind that the nature of conflict and the nature of intervention in conflict are both closely intertwined, with in particular the type of intervention favoured by the major powers and especially the two superpowers, impacting on the nature of conflict at the time. For indeed, those conflicts which erupted in particular in the "Third World", were kept under tight control by the two superpowers in particular\textsuperscript{16}. This was due in great part, as described above, to a desire on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to keep their

\textsuperscript{15} "The United Nations and the North-South Conflict", p. 32.
spheres of influence under tight control in "Third World" areas in order to concentrate on the East-West rivalry. This was however also due to a fear of escalation, which constituted one of the main factors in determining the nature of conflict during the Cold War era. For indeed, the threat of use of nuclear weapons and of mutually assured destruction in the event of a crisis getting out of hand is what overshadowed the whole era of the Cold War and is what constituted the great factor of restraint in the behaviour of the two superpowers. What the international community therefore witnessed was not so much conflict as crises, such as in the case of Berlin in 1958-1962 or in the case of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which both superpowers preferred to resolve rather than let develop into conflict between the two of them. In the case of the "Third World", this meant that instability never developed into outright conflict which could threaten to engulf both the United States and the Soviet Union, and with them the rest of the world. It however also meant that crisis at a lower level of conflict was allowed, in the knowledge that escalation would not be let to occur, and in the knowledge that the "Third World" being at the periphery of the main East-West rivalry, it was not urgent to quell whatever instability or unrest there was on the continent.

6. War by proxy.

On the other hand, both superpowers at the same time conducted war with each other by proxy by making use of conflict and crisis in the "Third World", with this translating in particular into Soviet intervention in the horn of Africa and American reaction to the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and intervention in the Gulf area. What these developments proved is central to the nature of conflict during the Cold War era, i.e. that conflict was largely what the two superpowers made it. It was only with the end of the Cold War that conflict was less at the mercy of the two dominant powers, with the return of an era of multipolarity in which a greater pool of states played a role (or chose not to) in conflicts around the world. What the period of the Cold War underlined was that conflict in the "Third World", and in particularly on the African continent, was very largely a function of North-South inequality which remained despite the waves of decolonisation of the 1950’s and of the 1960’s. In a sense, countries of the "Third World" were at that time even more at the mercy of the wealthy and powerful nations of the North than they had been during their period of colonisation. Newly independent countries in effect entered the community of sovereign and independent states as the weak would enter the world of the strong.

The dire economic circumstances in which they found themselves, in particular with the departure of their colonial masters, the political and social unrest which they experienced,
with in particular emerging ethnic, religious and cultural pressures, meant that the two superpowers were effortlessly able to take the place of the former colonial powers and gain ascendancy over Third World countries. The two superpowers in a sense stunted the growth of the former colonies in their first steps to act as responsible and autonomous units, in order to have greater control over their own conflict, and in such a way as they defined what the nature of conflict, and hence of intervention in these conflicts, would be like in the "Third World".

Not only did they define conflict in those areas by keeping a lid on those pressures which threatened to erupt into conflict within their sphere of influence, by they also defined it by moving in the exact opposite direction, i.e. by actually exacerbating ongoing conflicts. It is thus widely believed that had it not been for the behaviour of the two superpowers, neither conflict in the horn of Africa nor in Angola would have taken on the proportions that they did. This was the result of the United States and the Soviet Union fighting their war by proxy, with the ideological element being particularly present on the African continent which hardly constituted an asset otherwise. This had moreover the effect of sowing the seeds of future conflict as it emerged in the post Cold War era. For not only were "Third World" countries, and in particular on the African continent, unable to develop independently of "northern" tutelage, but the way in which the major powers fuelled certain conflicts on the continent
translated into a massive flow of modern weapons towards those countries, and which guaranteed the continuation of conflict for years to come\textsuperscript{19}.

7. The "civilising" influence of superpower intervention on conflict in the "Third World".

Bearing in mind these circumstances, another type of impact of superpower intervention on the nature of conflict during the period of the Cold War was the fact that it meant that conflicts were not of the nihilist or raging type of the post Cold War era, but were more civilised and "optimistic" in nature. For, as has been described above, it was largely through superpower interference that conflict remained of the interstate type during the years of the Cold War. This meant that those conflicts which did occur tended to pit organised armies against each other, with norms and codes of conduct being understood and expected by both parties. At the same time, on the African continent, the fact that superpower interference occurred in very great part for ideological reasons again introduced a certain element of civility to conflicts. For indeed, the fact that the ideological and psychological dimension of the Cold War was of central importance to the East-West rivalry, the fact that it was mainly because of such a dimension that the United States and the Soviet

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 107.
\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Bill Durch, 12/11/00.
Union interfered in the affairs of African states, meant that a certain level of optimism was introduced into conflicts. For both the communist and the capitalist ideologies are fundamentally optimistic, with both having the welfare and happiness of mankind as their ultimate goal, meant that conflicts occurred within a fairly civilised framework. It has in effect been argued that the reason why nuclear weapons were never used was due to the hopeful nature of both the capitalist and communist faiths, as much as to the efficacy of nuclear deterrence itself.

This stands in contrast with the "wars" of rage largely devoid of any ideological motivation, which characterised many conflicts as a result of the end of the Cold War and of the gradual dimming of the ideological dimension of international politics and of conflict. During the period of the Cold War, the fact that crisis or conflicts occurred in some type of civilising ideological framework was reflected in the way in which peacekeeping was conducted in a framework imperial or post imperial political orders in which violence was regulated, and in which accepted standards of behaviour and norms were adhered to. Thus, it was only in the case of intervention in the Lebanon between 1982 and 1985 that a situation of "rage" had to be dealt with, and in which accepted norms of behaviour were absent. The operation ended in effect in debacle for both the West and Israel. 21


The bipolar nature of the international system, the implications of the Cold War for conflict in "Third World" countries, in particular in terms of wars being waged by proxy and along ideological lines, thus impacted the nature of conflict, particularly in the African continent. It has also been seen that the nature of conflict was also closely linked to the nature of intervention by the major powers, and in particular the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, it has been mentioned that given the centrality of the Cold War in international politics and given the impact of the coalitional configurations which resulted from this on organisations for collective security, United Nations policy must be viewed through the prism of such coalitional configurations, in this case through the prism of the bipolar model.

And indeed, United Nations intervention in conflicts during the period of the Cold War was determined by the preferences of its major member countries, and more particularly of the members of the Security Council foremost amongst which stood the two superpowers. The fact that the burden of peacekeeping which fell on the shoulders of the organisation during this period was much more light than in the post Cold War era was in effect due not merely to the smaller number of conflicts as well as to the fact that these were interstate rather than intrastate, but also to the inertia which characterised the Security Council, i.e. the
main decision making body for the launching of peace missions, during the Cold War years. This again was a direct result of the bipolar nature of the international system, and of the desire of both the East and West blocks to avoid confrontation on any issue.

Paradoxically, the desire of the international community to avoid a repeat of both World Wars and to build a new international system based on mutual understanding and the collective shouldering of matters of international security as embodied in the creation of the United Nations, was at the same time what led to the adoption of the veto system which purposefully prevented the major powers from acquitting that responsibility of solving conflicts and threats to peace and security as they emerged. In fact, as Christopher Coke underlines, "the one overriding principle in the Cold War was non-intervention in the affairs of other countries".

The United Nations during the period of the Cold War was in effect willing to intervene in situations only when these represented threats to international peace and security, as opposed to domestic peace and security. This was reflected in the fact that it intervened in Africa only once during the Cold War era, to prevent secession of the Katanga in 1964. The sanctity of the principle of sovereignty was indeed the norm which lay at the heart of the international system, and which corresponded to the Realpolitik pursued by the two superpowers. The United Nations was indeed founded with the idea of defending the sovereignty of
countries, with the notion that it would be called on to deal with intrastate conflicts thus lying a long way in the future. Yet even in the post Cold War era, the first major engagement of the United Nations, and arguably one of its most successful operations to date, was to defend the sovereignty of one country (Kuwait) against the aggression of another (Iraq).22

9. A "simple" task for traditional peacekeeping.

United Nations peacekeeping during the period of the Cold War was thus the product of the bipolar structure of the international system, both in the nature of the conflict it faced and in the fact that it was largely a function of Cold War politics as expressed in particular in the Security Council whose activities were constrained by the veto system. Turning to an assessment of the nature and level of "success" of traditional peacekeeping in the Cold War years, the first point to note is that the Blue Helmets had a relatively "simple" task at hand. This was due to the interstate nature of conflict during the Cold War which meant that the UN clearly had a much easier time intervening in such conflicts than it was to have with the explosion in the number of intrastate conflicts characteristic of the post Cold War era. During the era of traditional peacekeeping, United Nations peace missions most commonly "only"

22 Ibid., p. 29.
23 Ibid.
involved the supervision of ceasefires or truces which the parties had already arrived at. The Blue Helmets were thus called on to intervene in an area in which some sort of peace had already been achieved.

The UN would wait until the parties had fought each other to a standstill and would then respond to their call to monitor their ceasefire. Such was the case with India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, and the Israelis and the Arabs in the Middle East. The name of the UN’s oldest force, the UN Truce Supervisory Force, which was formed in 1948 and which is still operational today, in itself testifies to the relatively “simple” role which the UN was called upon to undertake in the era of first generation peacekeeping.24

Moreover, the fact that these were interstate conflicts meant that the parties to the conflict were few in number, often representing the two governments of the rival states, with this making the negotiating task of the UN much easier to deal with, especially since both parties had already agreed on the need to call in the UN, and were thus prepared to accept its presence and respect its principle of neutrality. One other important simplifying factor for UN missions was the fact that the Blue Helmets were generally called on to monitor a precise and fairly narrow area, i.e. a boundary or boundaries between states, rather than a large swath of territory.25 Finally, this last element also meant that the United Nations peace missions had only one task to

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24 “Peacekeeping”, by David Buchanan, Financial Times, 10/6/00.
25 Interview with Bill Durch, 12/11/00.
fulfil, i.e. the military task of monitoring a truce or ceasefire, with this not requiring a huge number of troops and logistics while also signifying that the mission remained fairly "basic" in comparison with the multidimensional tasks which were to face the second generation peacekeepers with the end of the Cold War.

First generation peacekeeping is thus generally described in favourable terms in assessments of the "success" of its operations, particularly in comparison with second generation peacekeeping. However, first, the "success" of first generation peacekeeping must be considered in the light of the elements described above and which greatly facilitated the task of the UN, in particular the fact that there were fewer conflicts for the UN to intervene in and because these were interstate ones. Second, the term "success" is itself difficult to define. If by "success" is meant the fact that none of the operations which the UN undertook during the period of the Cold War ended in disaster both in terms of the outcome of the conflict itself or in terms of the credibility of the organisation, then the operations of first generation peacekeeping may indeed be considered to have been "successful". However, it is arguable that traditional peacekeeping has done little to tackle the root causes of conflicts, dealing in conflict management rather than in conflict prevention or conflict resolution. The Blue Helmets may thus not have met with unmitigated disaster as they were to in the case of Sierra Leone for instance, but they had a tendency to remain in areas of conflict for years at a time, remaining in place for as
long as 10, 20 or 30 or even 50 years, as in the case of Cyprus, the Middle East India and Pakistan. This in many cases had the effect of prolonging a sterile status quo. First generation peacekeeping appears to a certain extent not only to have benefited from the more forgiving circumstances of interstate conflict, but to have also chosen the easier path, in particular since those types of operations are relatively low cost and politically easier to maintain than to remove. As the Brahimi report stated, these traditional missions were in actual fact "difficult to justify unless accompanied by serious and sustained peacemaking efforts that seek to transform a ceasefire accord into a durable and lasting settlement".

10. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that both the dynamics of the international system and the dynamics of conflict were a function of the Cold War and of the geostrategic, ideological and balance of power concerns of the two superpowers. The bipolar nature of the international system was what shaped the nature of conflict, in particular on the African continent, where conflicts were made to remain largely interstate, where they often represented the East-West rivalry played out by proxy, and in which the ideological element was strong. Yet by playing such an important

26 "Peacekeeping", by David Buchanan, FT, 10/6/00.
27 Brahimi report, p. 3.
role in defining the nature of conflict during the period of the Cold War, the two superpowers in effect prevented "Third World" countries from learning how to develop into autonomous and responsible entities, with this sowing the seeds of future intrastate conflict while perpetuating the hierarchical nature of the international system still so strongly felt today, in great part because of the conflicts which tear apart many developing countries, in particular on the African continent. Moreover, it has been seen that the United Nations during the period of the Cold War was largely at the mercy of the preferences of the major powers and in particular of the superpowers and was unable to operate efficiently as an organisation for collective security, as witnessed by the crippling effect of the veto on the Security Council. The United Nations therefore intervened seldom in conflicts which were jointly managed and contained by the superpowers. Its missions were moreover greatly facilitated in comparison with the missions it carries out today, thanks to the fact that conflicts were interstate and the principle of neutrality could be applied realistically. They moreover most often did not really seek to address the root causes of the conflict but merely its symptoms, with this resulting in a protracted UN presence which maintained the status quo in a conflict rather than solve it.
CHAPTER 2: The post Cold War period or the era of “failed” peacekeeping.

Such was the nature of conflict and the nature of superpower and United Nations intervention during the years of the Cold War. Both the nature of the international system and the nature of conflict and UN intervention could be summarised in a simple schema: the international system was bipolar in nature, as a result of which conflicts remained largely interstate, with this greatly facilitating the task of the Blue Helmets on the scene while at the same time rendering the UN fundamentally incapable of tackling the root causes of conflicts. The schema thereafter becomes more complicated, and represents a fundamental turning point away from the dynamics of the Cold War. This ushered in the period of multidimensional second-generation peacekeeping, which can be considered to have begun with the operation in Namibia in 1988, in which for the first time consent of all the parties to the conflict was not sought by the United Nations in its decision to intervene in an area of conflict.

1. The post Cold War era or the era of intrastate conflict.

The first fundamental disjuncture in the nature of conflict which radically separates the Cold War period from the post Cold War period is simply the fact that the number of conflicts had greatly increased in the meantime, with this evolution beginning
in fact before the fall of the Berlin wall, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. This disjuncture was reflected in the disjuncture in the expectations of the international community which did not realise that the end of the Cold War would in actual fact mean an explosion in the number of conflicts, but optimistically expected a new era of international peace and cooperation. However, in 1993 for instance, there numbered 52 conflicts in 42 countries, while 37 others “suffered from some form of political violence”.

Moreover, what the international community witnessed was not simply a greater number of conflicts, but an explosion in the number of intrastate conflicts, as opposed to the interstate conflicts characteristic of the Cold War era.

For indeed, as Van Crefeld underlines, the post Cold War era is no longer one of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks, but one of acrimonious internescine strife between rival ethnic and religious groups. The most radical transformation in the nature of conflict which the UN has to cope with, is the fact that conflict is now only rarely a matter of straightforward aggression of one state by another, with the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait being one recent exception of this. And indeed in this case, UN member states, and in particular the United States and Great Britain, were able to rapidly form a united front and rectify the situation. What the UN is faced with

28 The New World Disorder, Christopher Coker, p. 28.
29 « Regional and Sub-Regional Conflict Management Efforts », Amadu Sesay, in Africa in the post Cold War International System.
now is a surge in the number of intrastate conflict while being at the same time called on to take action in many more instances than in the past, now that the Security Council is no longer hampered by the veto powers of the players of the Cold War.\(^3\)

This growth in peacekeeping and surge in the number of intrastate conflicts appears clearly in the statistics: only five PKOs were in existence in early 1988, out of which only one related to an intrastate conflict. On the other hand, of the 21 missions established between 1988 and 1995, 13 related to intrastate conflict, while of the ten established during 1996, 1997 and 1998, all dealt with internal conflicts.\(^2\) However, it must be noted that those areas which witnessed such an upsurge in the number of intrastate conflicts already had a history of political instability, which in many cases had already involved internal wars since the 1960’s, in spite of superpower presence in the area which for the most part had a restraining effect on the instability which plagued African states. This was the case in Africa, with eight civil wars occurring on the continent between 1960 and 1980, while almost one third of the world’s genocides between 1960 and 1988 took place in the area. Similarly, sixty-one coups d’état occurred on the African continent between 1963 and 1985, with this constituting an average of almost three coups per year.\(^3\)

\(^{32}\) UN website
2. The end of colonialism sows the seeds of future intrastate conflict.

This growth in the number of conflicts is in the first instance to be attributed to the sudden end of the colonial era. On the African continent, one fundamental problem with this was the speed at which decolonisation took place, with this playing a major background role in the development of numerous intrastate conflicts.

Thus, in Sub-Sahara Africa, over thirty colonial territories became independent states over a period of just twelve years, between 1956 and 1968, with the only exceptions to this rapid transition being the Portuguese colonies of Angola (1975), Mozambique (1975), Zimbabwe (1981) and Namibia (1990). Yet the destructive legacy of colonialism is not to be attributed solely to the colonial powers. For African nationalist movements themselves opted to adopt the western approach to statehood and act in a conservative manner in the drawing up of boundaries. Aspirations to form a pan-African union or regional attempts at integration such as the idea of creating an East African Federation were brushed aside, when they might have averted the type of ethnic and religious cleavages which many African states were to suffer from in the years to come. Thus it was that the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity was made to symbolise this belief in the virtues of independent statehood.

This was translated in actual fact in the drawing of boundaries which represented artificial creations which paid scant regard to ethnic minorities, in Nigeria for instance, or religious cleavages, such as in the Sudan. To this westernised approach on the part of the African leadership must be added other decisions on their part which again reflected the desire to build the future of the African continent on a western model which did not correspond to the radically different circumstances of post-colonial Africa. These also served to create tension and instability within numerous African states. In particular, of the thirty colonial territories which became independent between 1956 and 1968, all without exception immediately opted for democratic political systems, though in this case the African leadership was greatly encouraged by the western colonial powers. Yet here again, as with the achievement of independence, the sudden adoption of a democratic system placed a strain on African nations which had no previous experience of democracy, and which had to face their own particular problems which included high expectations, inadequate natural resources disaffected ethnic minorities, while African leaders were struggling to establish their legitimacy\(^4\). This desire on the part of African leaders to adopt approaches and policies which turned out to be quite alien to the particular culture and level of development of the African continent was to be found again in the adoption by some African states, in particular in the Horn of Africa, of a marxist-

leninist type of economic planning the ultimate failure of which triggered popular unrest and internal conflict.".

The process of independence of colonies as well as decisions on the part of the new leadership, many of whom had been educated in the elite schools of Western Europe, thus sowed the seeds of future strain leading in many cases to intrastate conflict. Yet in spite of the waves of coups and counter coups which the African continent was to experience in the 1960's and 1970's, this was to emerge even more fully after the departure of the superpowers from the continent, as underlined in the upswing in the number of intrastate conflicts on the continent after that time.

3. The responsibility of the former colonial powers.

This raises the notion of the responsibility which the colonial powers had in creating those conditions which would lead many countries down the road to civil war. For it is indeed apparent that had it not been for the manner in which the colonial powers exploited their colonies during the years of their rule, and had it not been for the manner in which they failed to grant independence in a more progressive manner to these colonies, many countries on the African continent in

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particular would not have found themselves in the dilemma that they did from the 1950’s and 1960’s onwards.

The fact that it is undeniably in great part because of the period of colonialism and the sudden granting of independence to the colonies that the number and intensity of intrastate conflict increased from the 1960’s onwards raises the question of who ought to be responsible for attempting to resolve situations of conflict within the former colonies of the major European powers. For indeed, it may be argued that few powers have an interest in intervening in these areas, and in particular on the African continent, as will be discussed in greater detail below. The United States in particular does not have any perceivable interest in the area with the end of the Cold War, nor do any other states or groups of states, with even the majority of African states staying on the sidelines of conflicts which rage on the continent.

This is one important reason why the United Nations has failed to be effective in its peacekeeping in the area. The alternative which the question of responsibility brings into perspective is that the former colonial European powers ought to be held accountable for the state in which they left their former colonies. It is they who in a sense ought to intervene in order to try and calm the situation in their former colonies, rather than abdicate all responsibility for the situation. One of the disadvantages of actually having an international organisation for collective security on the model of the United Nations is that it allows member states to pass the buck and conceal their
unwillingness to intervene to try and make up for a situation which they created. The notion that the responsibility for peacekeeping ought to rest largely with former colonial powers has in effect hardly been raised. Yet an alternative to the current situation in which if anybody does intervene, it is the United Nations which is in many cases largely ineffective, might be that the European powers acknowledge their responsibility towards their former colonies and form coalitions to intervene. The strong ties which many of them still retain with their former colonies does moreover make them the best placed to make attempts at mediation and to understand the dynamics of the situation.

Yet what may be currently seen is a situation in which the former colonial powers, far from shouldering the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in their former colonies, are still today adopting a self-centred policy towards many African states, which further contributes to create a context of tension and of threat to the local population. This may be perceived in the case of France and its former colony of Rwanda, with the French government supporting and arming the Hutu government, thus contributing to the fuelling of distrust and ethnic tension which led to genocide across the country. In such a context, the British operation which helped salvage the situation in the former British colony of Sierra Leone appears to be rather an exception to the rule, mounted as a result of the particularly dire straits in which the United Nations found itself in the area. It is perhaps time for a reassessment of who exactly ought to be responsible for either mediate or even
perhaps intervening in areas of intrastate conflict, with it being both unrealistic and unwarranted that countries who do not have any particular interest in areas of civil wars, or who are not fundamentally responsible for their occurrence, should be expected to send troops to these areas by virtue of their being member states of the UN.

It is all the more important that certain groups of countries who should be held primarily responsible for peace and security in different regions of the world, since another legacy of colonialism is that areas in which intrastate conflicts are common have not been able to set up efficient regional organisations for peace and security. That this is a legacy of colonialism is apparent through the fact that such organisations are unable to function properly due to the differences which divide the countries in which intrastate conflicts are raging, and due to the poverty of these organisations as a reflection of the poverty of the majority of former colonial countries. One clear illustration of this is the Organisation for African Unity, which is clearly unable to act as an efficient organisation able to prevent and deal with tensions within the continent.

4. The end of superpower rivalry and globalisation.

The growth in the number of conflicts is also to be explained in very large part by the abolition of what Amadu Sesay refers to as the system of "political protégés" with the
disappearance of the East-West rivalry. In the case of the African continent and United Nations peacekeeping, the end of the Cold War may be more correctly dated to 1988, when an agreement was forged over the imminent independence of Namibia which signalled the end of superpower rivalry. The end of East-West rivalry was a particularly important development in the case of the African continent, since the superpowers' interest in the area had been largely ideological, with the continent offering little in terms of resources or other geostrategic assets. Yet what the end of the Cold War meant perhaps first and foremost was precisely the disappearance of this ideological divide which had characterised a large part of the world, with the African continent thus finding itself suddenly bereft of its superpower tutelage. This meant that after 1988, the African continent was largely relegated to a marginal position in global security concerns. For indeed, the end of the Cold War meant that the two superpowers were no longer so concerned with containing conflict on the continent, nor so intent on using conflict in order to conduct their rivalry by proxy.

One first implication of this in terms of the evolution in the nature of conflict during this time was what may be referred to as the "return of the repressed". The departure of the superpowers from areas of long term simmering tension led to an explosion in the number of intrastate conflicts in particular. In

36 «Regional and Sub-Regional Conflict Management Efforts», Amadu Sesay, in *Africa in the Post Cold War International System*, p. 46.
38 Sigmund Freud, quoted by Christopher Coker, «The New World Disorder», p. 29.
the case of the Soviet Union, this was illustrated most clearly in the Balkans. The stabilising effect which the superpower had exercised over the region and even over Yugoslavia, through Tito’s own particular brand of communism which served to maintain the coherence and unity of the Republic, was what had prevented the region from collapsing under the strain of ethnic, religious and socio-economic claims. It was with on the one hand the end of Titoism and on the other hand the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s that the region fell into civil war. In the case of the United States, along with the Soviet Union, it was on the African continent that the stabilising effect of superpower influence had been felt most strongly. Yet it must be pointed out that the end of superpower presence did not create the conditions for civil war in themselves, for these had already largely been created by the legacies of colonialism and in particular by the nationalist élites agreeing to draw up artificial boundaries, as mentioned above.

The responsibility of the superpowers in terms of the development of situations of intrastate conflict particularly on the African continent holds two different aspects. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that the superpowers held many potentially explosive situations in check by “freezing” the situation and maintaining the post-colonial status quo, with this representing a stabilising influence on the continent. On the other hand, it may be argued that Africa’s current dramatic

situation, both in terms of the great poverty of the continent as a whole save perhaps for South Africa and the North African area, and in terms of the numerous civil wars which rage throughout the continent, is due to the policy of the superpowers during the Cold War. For by freezing the situation just as so many African nations were achieving independence meant they were unable to work through their ethnic, religious, political and socio-economic issues, with the passing of time arguably making many of these worse. Moreover, it has been argued that the two superpowers, by using these conflicts in order to fight out their rivalry by proxy, actually exacerbated and prolonged conflict in those areas, particularly in the horn of Africa and in Angola. Finally, with the end of the Cold War, both superpowers, but in particular the Soviet Union, used the continent as a dumping ground for their weapons, with the numerous conflicts which were exploding in the area providing them with an attractive market for this.

The complexity of the problem which organisations for collective security faced in the late 1980’s with the end of the Cold War is in effect to be linked to the way in which both superpowers used different areas of the world in their struggle for supremacy in geostrategic, balance of power and ideological terms, with the ideological aspect of the East-West rivalry gradually disappearing over time to be replaced by more purely

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geostrategic and military objectives, with this serving to even further exacerbate the domestic situation of many states, particularly on the African continent. They were able to do this thanks to the fact that their power, especially in military terms, so greatly exceeded even that of the major European powers, let alone that of much poorer regions of the world. It was this factor which meant that the nature of conflict, both during the years of the Cold War and in the post Cold War era was largely determined by the superpowers.

In the same way as the behaviour of the two superpowers during the Cold War had a dubious effect on the nature of conflicts, by both containing and exacerbating them, the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalisation had a mixed impact on conflicts. For indeed, the fact that the influence and intervention of the two superpowers came to be replaced by a myriad of non-governmental organisations but most especially by international financial institutions had a fundamental impact on the developing world. The triumph of liberalism, both political and economic, combined with the fact that countries of the Third World had now become largely dependent on the assistance which international financial organisations could provide, meant that many of these countries were now requested to adopt western type liberalism. It is possible to argue along with the opponents of globalisation that the criteria for financial assistance imposed in developing countries by institutions such as The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as embodied in the

42 « Africa and the End of the Cold War », Scott Thomas, p. 4.
Washington consensus of the 1980’s, has merely served to weaken the social and political fabric of developing countries, leading to widespread unrest and even a situation of civil war, as in the case of Indonesia in the early 1990’s. On the other hand, the shift on the part of international financial institutions from a policy of structural adjustment to the notion of poverty reduction signals their greater awareness of the need for a more “human” and more local emphasis on development needs”. This in turn could come to be reflected in greater economic, social and political stability in developing countries, with positive implications in terms of peace and security within those countries. Thus, while globalisation has been increasingly criticised by the global civil society, as underlined in the riots of Seattle and Prague in 1999, and while the IMF and the World Bank have been perceived as the “bad cops” of the developing world, the current more “listening” approach to development could come to yield positive results in terms of reducing the risk of intrastate conflict by helping reduce those conditions which tend to lead to it⁴⁴.

The end of the Cold War has thus lifted the constraints on ethnic, religious, political and socio-economic grievances and claims which the presence of the two superpowers had managed to hold in check. Moreover, the adoption by many developing countries of structural reforms imposed by the major international financial institutions have been perceived in some

⁴³ «The Listening Approach to Development », Alan Beattie, Financial Times, 01/04/01.
⁴⁴ Ibid.
cases to have exacerbated the situation by forcing governments and leaders to push through politically unviable reforms and policies.

5. The role of the former superpowers of the Cold War era in peacekeeping.

Moreover, in the same manner has it has been argued above that the former colonial powers ought to be held responsible for the predicament in which many war ridden countries find themselves, it may also be argued that the two superpowers ought also be held accountable for the development of intrastate conflict on the African continent.

Yet this is much more difficult to establish. For, has has been noted above, while it is on the one hand possible to argue that the presence of the two superpowers on the African soil has served to exacerbate conflict through the superpowers’ resort to "war by proxy" as in Angola and in the Horn of Africa and by "freezing" the status quo and hence postponing intrastate conflict till the end of the Cold War, it may on the other hand also be argued that the superpowers’ desire to contain potential sources of conflict had a stabilising influence on the region. Globally, the impact of superpower presence on the African continent may however be considered to have been positive as far as containing potentially explosive situations goes.
Moreover, as has been noted above, the difficulties which the vast majority of African states face today are largely the result of the legacy of colonialism, with this including the manner in which the superpowers were able to step in to the area effortlessly, as a result of the weakness which many African countries were in at the time at which they achieved their independence. It would thus be unrealistic to expect either the United States or the Soviet Union to step into those areas of the continent over which they exercised control during the period of the Cold War. As such, the American intervention in Somalia lay be considered in a way to be “charity work”, even though the notion of the responsibility of the international community as a whole for those countries in which gross violations of human rights are taking place is also a concept which will be further explored below and which could be used as an argument in favour of in particular major power intervention in genocidal intrastate conflicts.

Thus, while the idea that the former colonial powers ought to be responsible for dealing with a situation which they created, and while intervention on their part may be considered to be a desirable and justifiable alternative to UN intervention, the same cannot be said of the two superpowers of the Cold War era.

6. Leaders are threatened: crisis of state legitimacy.
For one of the most important consequences of the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberalism does remain the creation of instability and of a climate of violence in many countries of the developing world, again particularly on the African continent. For indeed, the decline or disappearance of the influence of powerful patrons meant that many regimes in power found themselves unable to maintain their hold over the state apparatus and the country as a whole without instoring repression and a climate of fear. In particular, the triumph of free market ideas within international financial institutions represented a threat in the eyes of many leaders of the developing world, since it demanded the reform of patrimonial regimes, as outlined above. Thus it was that from the early 1980’s onwards, African leaders in particular found the external sources of their legitimacy gravely undermined.

This prompted differing responses from different leaders, with the majority however leading to internal conflict. The first type of response involved countries such as Liberia and Somalia, in which political leaders simply refused to give up political power in the face of armed opposition. This type of response led to perhaps the most deadly form of internal conflict, with the splintering of armed factions and the collapse of the state. The second type of response involved countries such as Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo and Zaire, in which despots initially conceded to popular demands for greater democratic participation, but who then went on to rig elections and manipulate the whole political process in order to keep their grip on power. In order
to sustain this, these leaders tended to rely on smaller segments of society, based for instance on their own ethnic or religious group, with this leading to the politicisation of ethnicity or of religion and intrastate conflict. A third type of response involved countries such as Ghana or Uganda, with political leaders implementing the reforms requested by the international financial institutions and donor countries, yet arguing that it was discipline rather than greater democracy which was needed, using this argument to establish a rule of coercion. A fourth type of response involved countries such as Benin, Malawi and Zambia, in which authoritarian leaders did cede powers to democratically elected leaders and representatives. This was largely possible thanks to the fact that those leaders did not have the financial resources to mount an effective resistance to the opposition which was moreover unified. It was thus only in this last type of response that African nations were able to make the transition from colonialism and superpower clientage to independence and democracy, yet even here the prospects for sustainable democracy and domestic stability remain unclear. The three other types of response led at best to state coercion but in the majority of cases to internal conflicts.

7. The intricate nature of intrastate conflict.

First, they are difficult to deal with rapidly because they do not directly threaten the stability and security of the wider international community, and in particular of the major powers of the Security Council, none of whom are at risk from any type of intrastate conflict, and therefore none of whom are in a hurry to send troops to the area. The case of the former Yugoslavia is one exception to this, lying as it does in the neighbourhood of major Western European powers and ultimately threatening to spill in to them, as witnessed by the flood of refugees into Italy and Germany in particular, while the fact that the First World War had originated in the Balkans also playing a part in the decision, albeit belated, of UN and NATO member countries to intervene to put an end to the conflict. Yet most intrastate conflicts occur on the African continent which was left with a marginal status in the international community. In particular, the tragedy of Rwanda was not addressed in time before the genocide of thousands of Hutu natives, while the Americans intervened in Somalia largely out of a sense of guilt at not having prevented the Rwandan massacres, and following media attention which had been focusing on the tragedy which was unfolding in the country. Moreover, when UN member countries do intervene in intrastate conflicts, they do so in many cases not out of a genuine desire to bring the conflict to a halt, but with their own foreign policy agendas. Such was the case over Morocco and Western Saharan independence movements, in which France in

46 « Africa and the End of the Cold War », Scott Thomas, in *Africa in the Post Cold War International System*, p. 7
particular intervened under the auspices of the UN not so much to find a proper and just solution to the conflict, but more as a way of 'keeping the lid' on it and of maintaining its ally, the moderate King Hassan, in power47. Similarly, the conflict in Angola became a battlefield on which the US and the Soviet Union reenacted a Vietnam type of confrontation, which only served to prolong the crisis48. It is only very recently that humanitarian concerns have attracted real attention and a more forceful response from UN member countries, following on from the impact of the media, as well as from the election of two Secretary-Generals from the African continent, determined to draw attention to the plight of numerous African countries.

Moreover, not only have UN member states been reluctant or uninterested in becoming involved in intrastate conflicts which for the most part do not present a direct threat to their own peace and security, but UN peacekeeping faces a second type of challenge in the way in which intrastate conflicts are by definition much more difficult to resolve than interstate conflicts. While interstate conflicts are for the most part a fight over boundaries or access to natural resources, which can be negotiated by career diplomats, and generally involve only two fairly civilised and disciplined parties and armies, intrastate conflicts involved a greater number of participants and issues. These range from power struggles between two or more factions, to a fight over ethnic and religious rights, and with in many cases

a population living under the threat of starvation and genocide. In addition, not only may several factions be involved in disputes which will often have deeply local and cultural roots difficult for a group of outsiders to fully understand, but the difficulty of the situation may be compounded by the involvement of external actors, i.e. foreign powers or interest groups. Second generation UN peacekeeping missions may thus have to contend with for instance arms vendors, buyers of illicit commodity exports, regional powers which send forces of their own into the conflict in question, as well as neighbouring states which host refugees. As the Brahimi report states, these are cross-border effects in which both state and non-state actors may be involved, and which give post Cold War conflicts a particular “transnational” dimension which the UN still appears to be at a loss to deal with”. Moreover, among this diversity of parties to a conflict, the United Nations has to contend with what the Brahimi report refers to as “spoilers”, with this being yet another important element of conflict characteristic of the post Cold War period. According to the report, it is these “spoilers”, i.e. groups or signatories who renege on their commitments and throw a country back into chaos, which in particular jeopardised peace implementation in Cambodia, while throwing Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone back into civil war, while orchestrating the murder of over 800,000 people in Rwanda. One way in which in

49 Brahimi report, p. 3.
50 Ibid.
particular the UN is only just beginning to deal with this development is in cutting off the source of income of "spoilers". It is only in the more recent case of Sierra Leone that the UN has attempted to draw attention to and tackle the diamond trade which has been fuelling rebel leader and Blue Helmet hostage taker Foday Sankoh's rebel group and represents one crucial stake of the civil war.

An additional difficulty linked to today's intrastate conflicts is that they most often no longer involve disciplined armies, as in the case of interstate conflict. They are often fought by irregular military forces, which are one the one hand much more difficult to distinguish from civilians since they do not wear uniforms. They are also more violent and dangerous than regular soldiers, with UN peacekeepers having to face for instance gangs of youths which most often do not hold the Blue Helmets in any respect. Moreover, these irregular forces may involve into splinter groups who may wreck negotiations and engage in a campaign of terror. This often targets civilians, with the mission of UN peacekeepers being all the more sensitive to conduct. Finally, leaders of these irregular forces use hate mongering tactics in order to galvanise their troops. This makes such movements and the intrastate conflicts they provoke difficult to put an end to.

At the same time, intrastate conflicts are difficult to resolve since they include a crucial social dimension. For

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51 Brahimi report, p. 4.
indeed, their roots, as noted above, are also socio-economic, linked to poverty and distress, and are as such difficult to resolve permanently.

8. How intrastate conflicts become regional.

Finally, one fundamental problem with intrastate conflicts is that they have the propensity to spread and become regional, with this posing much greater difficulties for peacemaking and peacekeeping.

This is possible in the first instance because rebel groups may decide to take shelter in neighbouring countries, with this often occurring with the agreement of the host country. Such was the case with Uganda hosting rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. A state may alternatively be the victim of the need of rebels for a source of income. This was the case with Sierra Leone in 1991, with soldiers belonging to Liberia’s Charles Taylor entered the country in order to plunder its diamond mines and subsequently allying with the local villagers and arming to fight their own government, thus sparking off civil war in the country. Another way in which conflicts have come to spread across borders in the post Cold War era occurs when governments make incursions in neighbouring countries in order to root out rebels which may have taken refuge there, as well as to

intimidate and discourage the country which has given them refuge. This was the case throughout the 1980’s, when South African soldiers raided neighbouring Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in order to kill members or supporters of the ANC. A country may at the same time fuel instability in other countries by assisting rebels or opposition groups. Such was the case again with South Africa, which, by way of punishing countries which had given sanctuary to its own opposition, actively assisted opposition groups such as the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) or the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). One final way in which conflict spreads to neighbouring countries is through one country supporting rebels or the invaders of another country in order to retaliate for that country’s meddling with its own rebel groups. Such was the case when the Zairian state trained and even actually led the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in 1975, with this in turn leading to the Angolan government sponsoring the rebels which had invaded Zaire’s Shaba province in 1978. Similarly, it was Uganda’s support for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which prompted the Sudanese government to train and assist rebels in Northern Uganda. This has led to a criss-crossing of different types of rebel movements and conflicts in different countries, with many countries using this type of intervention as a proxy for interstate war, thus violating the OAU rule of non-intervention in the affairs of another state. Peacemaking and peacekeeping thus does not just have to deal with those problems related to the highly volatile and unstable domestic situation of
a country in the throes of civil war or unrest, but must deal with the additional complexities of a conflict which in many cases may have intricate regional ramifications.⁵³

9. The desirability of intervention.

What these two last sections underline is thus the highly intricate and volatile nature of intrastate conflict. The fact that intrastate conflicts tend to spread and become regional would appear to argue in favour of intervention before it reaches that stage and threatens the peace and security of a whole region.

However, though intrastate conflicts do tend to spread, with in particular neighbouring regimes having a hand in either exploiting the situation or in giving shelter to rebel groups, it is rare that an intrastate conflict actually comes to engulf a whole region in fully fledged fratricidal war. Thus, the intricacy and highly dangerous nature of intrastate conflict does beg the question of whether members of the international community ought to intervene at all. This does not stand in contradiction with the idea explored above of the responsibility of former colonial powers towards countries torn apart by civil war, but rather represents another potential alternative which would need to be examined by member states. For indeed, because the United Nations tends to respond to requests for intervention

⁵³ Ibid., p. 590-601.
rather than "pick" conflicts itself, it largely fails to analyse the situation in terms of whether it would actually be practical an reasonable to intervene, but rather in terms of whether enough political will may be summoned among member states to mount some type of operation. This one reason why the Brahimi report urges the United Nations to reconsider before sending in troops to areas of conflict.

In the cases of Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone for instance, it is arguable whether anything much could actually be done to resolve the situation and put an end to the atrocities which were being committed in those areas. The fact that the answer to such a question may be negative is hinted at by the failure of the operations which were mounted in the area. For though problems such as inadequate troops, or lack of political will were undeniable major factors in accounting for these failures, as will be explored below, the intricacy of the situation itself by the time outside intervention did actually take place, also played a crucial role in dooming peacekeeping operations. It has in effect been argued that perhaps the best solution may after all simply to let the situation be. Moreover, the fact that all peacekeeping operations occur once the situation has already reached a critical stage, or once the greater number of atrocities has already been committed, underscores this point (and indeed, the very fact that the situation has been left to deteriorate is what leads to peacekeeping operations to be set up in the first place).
For one fundamental problem with contemporary peacekeeping is that the UN and its member states intervene only once the conflict has reached a stage at which it has become extremely difficult to resolve. This has the double impact of creating disillusionment as to the relevance of peacekeeping operations as these come to fail, and of raising false expectations among the local population, as was the case in Rwanda. Instead of intervening once the conflict has in effect already reached the point of no return, with this being quickly achieved in the case of intrastate conflict and the high levels of fear and mutual recrimination which are reached, the United Nations ought either to intervene at a much earlier stage in the conflict and ideally engage in much more conflict prevention than they currently do, or not intervene at all. Moreover, the fact that the Blue Helmets intervene in situations in which ethnic cleansing has nearly reached its conclusion, is yet another argument in favour of non intervention, since the UN might then just as well let the remainder of the conflict run its course, with this holding a higher chance of producing a lasting settlement to the war than intervention at that stage in an attempt to impose a settlement on the country.

Finally, it appears that the UN is even then largely unable to halt the atrocities which are being committed, as underlined again in the case of Rwanda when, even following on from a decision on the part of the Security Council to send reinforcements to the area, atrocities still continued until the situation reached a standstill of its own accord. All that was
here achieved was the image of a largely ineffectual organisation. The best alternative to belated and weak UN intervention does however remain that of active conflict prevention and conflict management at an early stage, preferably carried out by former colonial powers with both the responsibility and the connections to resolve the situation. It is only of this has failed that the desirability of intervention ought to be careful assessed, with the option of non-intervention needing to be taken into consideration.

10. Conclusion.

This first section has sought to outlined the conditions which faced the United Nations both during the Cold War and in its aftermath, as this is essential to understanding the chances which the Blue Helmets have of actually being successful. In terms of the UN’s peace missions, it is the fundamental differences between these two eras in terms of the nature of conflict which has been pointed out. In particular, the colonial era up to the 1960’s had a stabilising effect on many “Third World” countries, as did the presence of the two superpowers, particularly on the African continent. This however was not a uniform phenomenon, as the “freezing” of the status quo merely served to delay the eruption of conflict, while the way in which both superpowers played out their rivalry by proxy actually
exacerbated conflict in certain cases. It is undeniable that with the end of the Cold War, the United Nations faced a much tougher situation.

With the end of the Cold War "veto" within the Security Council, the organisation was called upon to act much more frequently. At the same time, the post Cold War era has been the era of intrastate conflict which presents peacemakers and peacekeepers with a fundamentally different and more difficult situation. The mission of the Blue Helmets became as a result of this more dangerous, more sensitive, more englobing and more intricate. Yet the failure of many of the peace missions in this context has led to widespread criticism and even denunciation of the organisation. The next section of this thesis will argue that the fundamental reason why peacekeeping today has appeared to "fail", is because the organisation as well as its member countries have failed to fully comprehend and adapt to the transformations in the nature of conflict described above. The notion of a "lag" in the United Nations' response to intrastate conflicts is a central to this.
PART 2.

New challenges, new victims, new mission.


This chapter is devoted to examining those disjunctures and disconnects which may be attributed to the United Nations itself, as opposed to the member states, with this being examined in the following chapter. This is a difficult task since, as was outlined at the outset of this paper, the behaviour of an organisation for collective security is largely a function of the preferences of the member states which make up that organisation. It is however possible to single out elements which are particularly characteristic of the actual doctrine, approach and bureaucratic set up of the organisation, and which hamper it from acting coherently and efficiently, with this being the intent of this section.

1. Achievements of the United Nations second generation peacekeeping must first be identified.

However, before carrying out a critique of United Nations doctrine and approach in its peace missions, it is necessary to
point out that there is a correlation between intervention by the Blue Helmets and the improvement of areas of civil war. It is undeniable that the track record of UN peacekeeping particularly since the 1990’s has been disappointing, with in particular the highly mediatised disasters of Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone pointing to the situation of stalemate which the United Nations and the international community appear to have arrived at. However, the organisation, and in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have also “performed miracles” as its head, Bernard Myiet, recently pointed out. In particular, the more quiet successes of short-term conflict prevention and peacemaking are to be recalled, such as the achievement of a ceasefire in the Islamic republic of Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the freeing of the last Western hostages in Lebanon in 1991, or the avoidance of war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan in 1998. Peacekeepers have indeed undertaken tasks ranging from escorting humanitarian aid convoys to protecting civilian populations, to controlling heavy weapons and even to administering whole provinces, as in the case of Kosovo and East Timor. The UNHCR has similarly performed miracles, able to dispatch aid to the 2 million Kurds who fled from northern Iraq into the mountains in the aftermath of the Gulf War, as well as to the 1 million Hutus who crossed into Zaire in just four days in order to avoid massacre at home and to the 1 million who left their home in Kosovo in the spring of 1999.

54 Brahimi report, p.3
Moreover, one second point which needs to be stressed prior to examining the failures and disjunctures of second-generation peacekeeping, is the fact that the achievements of first generation peacekeeping missions may themselves not have been as deep and lasting as they seem. The more spectacular failures of recent second generation peacekeeping appear indeed to point to first generation peacekeeping as having been by comparison something of a "golden age" in the track record of United Nations peace missions. Yet in the first instance, first generation or traditional peacekeeping benefited from more forgiving circumstances than those faced by second generation peacekeeping, as outlined in the first section. For indeed, during the era of "traditional" peacekeeping, missions most commonly "only" involved the supervision of ceasefires, usually between warring states. The UN would wait until the parties had fought each other to a standstill and would then response to their call to monitor their ceasefire. Such was the case with India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, and the Israelis and the arabs in the Middle East. The name of the UN's oldest force, the UN Truce Supervisory Force, which was formed in 1948 and is still operational today, in itself testifies to the relatively "simple" role which the UN was summoned to undertake in first-generation peacekeeping. Though it is undeniable that this type of approach treated the symptoms rather than the root causes of conflicts, the UN was at least in a situation in which its doctrine and role were very clear cut, with peacekeepers simply sitting interposed between two parties to a conflict, and
remaining resolutely neutral between the two of them. In such circumstances, the UN's mission could but be relatively "easy" to fulfil.

Furthermore, in the second instance, while second generation peacekeeping is in need of a more clearly defined "entry" strategy such as traditional peacekeeping had, it does have a more elaborate "exit strategy", in that it does attempt to undertake those peacebuilding and peacemaking tasks which are necessary in order to address the sources of conflict rather than merely addressing its symptoms, as first generation peacekeeping had been doing. First generation peacekeeping appears to a certain extent not only to have benefited from more forgiving circumstances, but to have also chosen the easier path, in particular since those types of operations are relatively low cost and politically easier to maintain than to remove. In the words of the Brahimi report, these traditional missions are in actual fact "difficult to justify unless accompanied by serious and sustained peacemaking efforts that seek to transform a ceasefire accord into a durable and lasting political settlement". Before criticising the doctrinal shortcomings of second generation peacekeeping, it is therefore opportune to question whether first generation peacekeeping did in actual fact fare any better in this respect than its successor.

2. An obsolete constitution.
Having said this, the fact does nevertheless remain that, as the Brahimi report concludes and as the head of Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) himself concurs, the United Nations has “repeatedly failed to meet the challenge” of keeping the peace in the last decade. For indeed, both the nature and importance of the United Nations’ peacekeeping task have changed over time. Yet this has not been reflected in the updating of the UN Charter, which even today still does not mention it specifically anywhere at all. This represents a first fundamental disjuncture in United Nations second-generation peacekeeping, with the Brahimi report underlining the pressing need for peacekeeping to be recognised as now being core to the mission of the organisation.

The concept of peacekeeping indeed still remains difficult to define, with the best approximation of a clear and authoritative definition which may be used as a starting point being that of the Peace Academy, which defines international peacekeeping as “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain the peace”. As for the official United Nations account of peacekeeping, “The Blue Helmets”, it gives an even more general definition of the standard peacekeeping operation which “involves military

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55 ibid.
personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict". What the United Nations has in effect been unable to do is to adapt its constitution as embodied in the UN Charter to evolving circumstances. For though the founding members of the organisation did not envisage peacekeeping as being part and parcel of the purpose of the United Nations, UN peace missions did rapidly become accepted practice beginning with the Suez crisis of 1956 and the efforts which the organisation undertook in order to end the war between Israel and Egypt.

Moreover, other than being unclear about even the concept of "peacekeeping" as such, the United Nations remains unclear as to the exact nature of the approach which the Blue Helmets are supposed to adopt once on the field. For indeed, peacekeeping as "defined" by the UN lies in practice between Chapter VI of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" and Chapter VII of the Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". United Nations peacekeeping operations have been carried out by extrapolating on an ad hoc basis from both these clauses in the Charter, which clearly is unsatisfactory. Peacekeeping implies a concrete military presence and not merely those recommendations for settlement or simple fact-finding missions as mentioned in Chapter VI. However, it is not either purely a military matter

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56 Peacekeeping Survey, Financial Times, 05/09/00.
falling exclusively under Chapter VII\textsuperscript{58}. Yet though the UN has in theory since the late 1980’s been distinguishing between enforcement and peacekeeping operations, this has not been reflected at the operational level. The Security Council is indeed still issuing mandates which lie within a ‘grey area’, neither falling precisely within Chapter VI nor within Chapter VII but within what has been coined a “chapter VI-1/2”. Yet the fact is that what UN troops and personnel which find themselves deployed in the field most need to know is whether they are to limit themselves to Chapter VI peacekeeping missions, or whether their mandate allows them to undertake fully-fledged enforcement missions as outlines in Chapter VII\textsuperscript{59}.

That this may in fact constitute the single most crucial element in determining whether the operation will be a success or a failure was underlined particularly in the Somalia and Bosnia operations which struck a deep blow at the credibility of the UN. In the case of the mission to Somalia, the Security Council created a highly ambiguous and volatile situation on the terrain which had moreover the effect of alienating several member countries, starting with Italy, by provoked an escalation of the mission’s objectives after the US-led phase. The mission was now not only to undertake political and humanitarian tasks, but also to disarm warring tribal factions and implicitly to manhunting for General Aidid and carry out an offensive against his clan’s leaders in retribution for an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers.

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. United Nations Charter, United Nations website.
This ultimately led to three different types of forces engaged in three different missions being deployed in the streets of Mogadishu: a traditional UN peacekeeping force for the humanitarian task, a quasi-autonomous US Quick Reaction Force for reinforcement, and a detachment of US Army Rangers to find General Aidid. The outcome of such confusion was that both the UN and the United States were forces to finally evacuate Mogadishu, despite what humanitarian progress had been made. Similarly, in Bosnia, the major powers found themselves unable to agree on clear guidelines for the deployment of troops, as underlined in the United States’ all-or-nothing policy which prevented any deterrent strikes whatsoever from being carried out, while the French tried to focus on the creation of “safe havens” only to see these routinely raided, and the British tried to impose a novel concept which they referred to as “wider peacekeeping”. The UN civilian and military command in the field was thus left to fumble on its own for a viable doctrine on which to act.

The net effect of these precepts and of this running at cross-purposes were catastrophic, with peacekeepers deployed in insufficient numbers and with restrictive rules of engagement, and thus ending up in a highly vulnerable position. As in Somalia, this led to a pervasive sense of embarrassment and failure, with a unilateral decision on the part of the US

Congress to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, and the creation of a more heavily armed UN Rapid Reaction Force being all that was left to do. This in spite of the fact that calls for a clear operational doctrine were being voiced at the highest level since the beginning of the 1990’s.

In particular, in 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had, in his Agenda for Peace, called for a new military role for the UN which may not require consent of the parties. Yet while this had already clearly been understood and accepted by member states and members of the Security Council, no heed seems to have been paid to Boutros-Ghali’s specification that peace-enforcement units should be utilised “in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance”, with this leading to “mission creep” in which intervention gradually slips from peacekeeping to peace enforcement in the absence of a clear mandate. The Secretary General’s inability to translate words into action testifies at the same time to the all in all relatively modest impact of the SG on even the general direction of difficult and risky operations.

The issue of the constitutional status of peacekeeping clearly illustrates the disconnect between the doctrine and general approach of the organisation and the rapidly evolving circumstances of the post Cold War era. Moreover, the United Nations appears to lack coherence also in the sense that it has

61 Ibid., p. 10-11.
62 Ibid., p. 5-6.
to a large extent adapted the content of its missions to the changed nature of conflict yet without undertaking a corresponding adaptation of its doctrine. It has thus made the transition from first generation to second generation peacekeeping, with the latter constituting a much wider mission which involves not merely a military presence, but tasks such as humanitarian intervention, demining, training, election monitoring and sometimes even the running of whole provinces as in the case of Kosovo.

This represents the recognition that intrastate conflicts require a different type of intervention. Yet still the doctrine as embodied in the mandates issued by the Security Council remain disconnected from the realities of intrastate war. One reason for this may be that the very vagueness of SC mandates have been providing the organisation with a very useful tool. All the SC needs to do is indeed to issue mandates which include only a passing acknowledgement of the Charter by the formula "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter". Resolutions like Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990, in which the Council made express reference to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter to denounce and take action against the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait, are rare. This lack of precision provides the Council with great flexibility and helps smooth the way towards agreement within the SC and the issuing of mandates.

64 « Enforcement Measures Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter : UN practice after the Cold War », Jerzy Ciechanski, in The UN Peace and Force, Michael Pugh ed., p. 84.
In so doing, what the organisation has in effect been relying on is the notion of "implied powers" which has been accepted by the international community, with this permitting it to function without having to confront the fact that its constitution does need to be formally updated. The Security Council in particular has benefited from the powers granted to it by article 24 of the Charter which designates it as being the organ of the United Nations which is to "restore and maintain international peace and security". The Certain Expenses case settled by the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on expenditures for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (UNEF 1) and in the Congo (ONUC) in 1962, similarly introduced the notion of implied powers and represented a highly liberal interpretation of the Charter. In particular, in its discussion of the ONUC, the Court stated only that "the Charter does not forbid the organisation to act through instruments of its own choice", adding that the operation could be mandated not just by the Security Council, but by the General Assembly as well. It was thus already since 1962, barely six years after the launching of what is considered to be the United Nations' first peacekeeping operation, that the idea had been accepted that UN organs may undertake any action within the UN, the sole restriction being that the UN Charter should not forbid it. Peacekeeping on these terms has been considered since that time to be "clearly lawful". Yet the organisation should now realise that the concept of implied powers ought not to dispense

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it from formally laying out a new doctrine in which the purpose and powers of peacekeeping operations are clearly stated. It is at this first basic yet crucial level that the United Nations must reconnect with the post Cold War circumstances in which it is called on to intervene, i.e. in complicated and dangerous intrastate conflicts.


Yet the Constitution of the United Nations does not only fail to reflect the changed nature of conflict which requires a Charter which takes this into account, but a disconnect also exists between the Constitution of the organisation and the changed nature of the victims of conflict. For indeed, as underlined in the first section of this paper, the explosion in the number of intrastate conflict in the post Cold War era has meant that civilians are now more than ever the target of atrocities. The manner in which the organisation has invented the concept of second generation peacekeeping which includes a heavy humanitarian element, reflects the fact that the UN has been attempting to adapt to this new dimension characteristic of post Cold War conflict, in particular on the African continent. Nevertheless, in the same manner as the switch from interstates to intrastate conflict was not reflected in a reassessment of the doctrine for intervention of the organisation, the fact that it
is the local population which is victimised in civil wars is not reflected in a reassessment of the UN Charter. What the organisation has failed to do is to push for a redefinition of the mandate of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which is still enshrined in the UN refugee convention which dates back to 1951. As a result of this, only half of the UNHCR's caseload consists of refugees who have crossed national frontiers as defined by the Charter, and are entitled to international protection. Yet the reality is that more than 5 million are internally displaced people (IDPs) within their own countries. This in turn represents only a fraction of the estimated 20 to 25 million IDPs worldwide for whom UNHCR has no legal mandate to protect.

The importance of dealing with this disjuncture stands in proportion to the dimensions of the problem. The issue of large flows of refugees is indeed already very difficult to deal with as it is, without the added inconvenience of not having a proper mandate on which to intervene. To give but a few examples, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, 2 million Kurds fled from northern Iraq into the mountains, while in 1994, after the Rwandan genocide, more than 1 million Hutus crossed into Zaire in just a few days. Similarly, in spring 1999, 1m ethnic Albanians left their homes in Kosovo only to return a few weeks later. The task of peacekeepers is also rendered more difficult since humanitarian relief will either be resisted or viewed suspiciously by the parties to the conflict. For civilians are in many cases not incidental casualties of civil war, but its prime
target. In particular, in the case of intrastate conflicts which may be religious or ethnic in nature and which may result in deliberate victimisation of specific sections of the population, humanitarian relief will often be resisted by the perpetrators of this type of campaign. The changing nature of both conflict and its victims has in effect contributed to placing new organisational and logistical strains on the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, with the task of bringing relief to displaced populations being all the more difficult since these population movements will generally take place in a massive scale in a very short period of time, as noted above. The fact that the organisation has to face up to difficulties created by factors which are largely outside of its control, i.e. the transformations in the nature of conflict and its victims of the end of the Cold War, underlines how important it is that it should work on those disjunctures and disconnects in its doctrine and mandate over which it does have a hold.

4. Disjunctures and disconnects in the implementation phase of peacekeeping.

Although second generation peacekeeping has evolved into a number of different missions, the military component of UN peace missions still remains core to the success or failure of a mission. Yet the way in which the organisation plans the intervention of the military at its disposal hampers the latter
from performing its tasks efficiently. In particular, the fact that military planning takes place in New York rather than on the field, and appears in certain cases to have been set in concrete months or even years before the operation actually begins, leads to a military which is restricted to playing a limited and at times irrelevant role in the area in which it has been deployed. Such was the case with ONUMOZ, the UN mission to Mozambique which took place between December 1992 and December 1994, even though it was heralded by the Secretary General as "a major success story in UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian and electoral assistance". Yet little flexibility was used in determining where the military ought to be deployed and to what use. In particular, the armed contingents were supposed to "assume immediate responsibility for verifying and ensuring the security of strategic and trading routes, adopting the measures necessary for the purpose". This was however interpreted in an extremely narrow manner, with one officer from an African contingent complaining that the rules of engagement reduced his troops to noting the license plate number and the number of passengers in vehicles which were loaded with weapons. The military commander did not question his orders, while the Secretary General's Special Representative did not appear to be interested in remedying to the situation either, in great part since he would have met opposition not only from his military

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67 Ibid.
commander, but from New York headquarters as well. Moreover, military deployment in Mozambique was such that soldiers were sent where they were not needed, with whether so many troops should be sent to defend corridors which were threatened only by the occasional highway robber having become quite dubious by the end of the operation. For the criteria for deployment is most often made in terms of logistical necessities rather than in terms of the real military requirements of the situation. In particular, for fear of offending certain member countries, the UN treats all units as being equally capable and hence equally deployable. Finally, one additional problem faced by the organisation in terms of planning and implementation is that it suffers from a natural tension between planners, who prefer to prepare for different contingencies, and the administrators, whose task is to keep the budget down.

The UN is thus precluded from formulating a coherent and integrated plan for its missions. As Whitman and Bartholomew note, “the lack of functional political-military machinery within the UN, to assist in the framing of resolutions under Chapters VI or VII and to manage any military aspect of their implementation and control, is a fundamental institutional gap that must be filled if the use of collectively sanctioned military measures is to be effective”69. This discrepancy between the planning which occurs at UN headquarters, and the absence of open channels of communication and of flexibility on the ground stand as a

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reflection of the disjuncture between the changed circumstances of peacekeeping in the post Cold War era and the conservative and rigid approach adopted by the organisation.

5. Post Conflict Peacebuilding.

Another important disjuncture proper to the organisation itself in its implementation of its mandates lies in the organisation's "after sales" services, i.e. what has been called "post conflict peace building" (PCPB). The United Nations is indeed not equipped from an institutional point of view to deal with this crucial element of peace making. In particular, the organisation needs to make clear where the responsibilities for PCPB lie, both on the institutional and operational levels.

That it has been unable to do so is a consequence of the emergence of a post Cold War order in which the number of actors on the international scene has exploded. In the field of peace building and development, this is reflected in the emergence of a multitude of agents of international assistance and cooperation, i.e. different departments and agencies within the UN itself, other multilateral bodies, bilateral actors, and the numerous foundations and Non Governmental Organisations. Though this has undoubtedly had a beneficial impact on the least developed and the developing world, another consequence of this is a lack of coherence and clarity in PCPB.
The United Nations at the same time lacks a clear agreement on the nature of the relations between the organisation and state and local authorities, local NGOs and civil society. As a result of this, PCPB has tended to concentrate on short term solutions rather than devising more long term strategies which would address the root causes of the problem. As a UN report notes, "the international response to conflict and reconstruction has increasingly veered to short term and spectacular measures at the expense of assistance in the political and development fields".\(^{70}\)

Once again, the United Nations needs to catch up on post Cold War developments. In the case of PCPB, these include on the one hand the fact that intrastate conflicts will require post-conflict reconstruction where interstate conflicts generally did not, and on the other hand the emergence of a multitude of agents of international assistance and aid. The need to devise a coherent strategy for PCPB is moreover all the more important since member countries in the post conflict phase will tend to revert to the pursuit of their own purpose, with the initial unity of purpose tending to disappear as a result of this, while getting former enemies to unite in the interests of rebuilding their country is at the same time a particularly daunting task.


Other than disjunctures in the organisation's constitution and in the phase of implementation and of post conflict reconstruction, it is also the United Nations' internal bureaucracy which does not reflect the flexibility which the rapidly evolving and increasingly delicate post Cold War situation require. One example of this lies at the level of funding and of the UN budget, with the financial aspect of peacekeeping being one of the most difficult to resolve and being one of the organisation's greatest handicaps. The UN's bureaucracy indeed appears to be inefficient and unnecessarily heavy. The regular budget is not an ideal mechanism for dealing with peacekeeping finances since it precludes lasting support to UN peacekeeping operations as it is impossible to predict which conflict will lead to a mission. The second mechanism used by the UN, separate assessments and through which most peacekeeping operations are in fact financed, is more appropriate since countries are made to contribute according to their economic strength. Yet even here the system is not fully efficient, since some poorer members such as states which belonged to the Soviet Union are assessed and made to pay as developed states, while conversely, some high-GNP countries such as oil exporters or newly-industrialised countries, are classified as developing countries and thus pay lower UN dues. Similarly, reserve funds are difficult to maintain at an adequate level, with such schemes as the Working Capital Fund, the Reserve Fund for Peacekeeping,

71 The United Nations and International Peacekeeping, p. 34.
72 Ibid.
or the Trust Fund failing to raise the required funds\textsuperscript{73}. The UN is at the same time hampered from making full and rapid use of the funds at its disposal through its bureaucracy and multiple levels of authorisation. The preparation of the budget in particular is an all too lengthy process: the Secretariat has to prepare the budget which it then submits to the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in consultation with the DPKO, after which it goes to the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, then to the GA for formal approval\textsuperscript{74}. This process is extremely slow, which makes it very difficult to mobilise and deploy troops rapidly, with on average only 36% of peacekeeping dues paid in the first three months of a mission\textsuperscript{75}. Yet it is sometimes precisely the first few months of an operation which are the most critical, compounded by the fact that many operations are frequently of an unpredictable emergency character requiring immediate financing. All the Secretary-General has in such circumstances is an annual cumulative $10 million spending authority for "unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances". This constraint was particularly dangerous in the case of UNTAC in Cambodia, in which the UN was left with just four weeks in which to order all the material, equipment and transport needed to begin the operation\textsuperscript{76}.

This need for an efficient financial set up within the UN is moreover all the more important since it is already impossible

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 36
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{75} Financing an Effective United Nations, Ogata and Volcker, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{76} The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p. 48.\end{flushleft}
to achieve complete coordination between the budget schedule of the United Nations and the different budget schedules of member states. Indeed, it is in effect a matter of pure luck if both types of fiscal schedules coincide, hence if a government can take UN requests into consideration when outlining its budget. The United States budget process for instance begins in October, Japan’s is decided on in June, while Germany has its two budget sessions in January and June, while the UN due date for its regular budget is January 31. As a result of this, at the beginning of the year 1993, which witnessed the UN’s worst financial crisis to date, the organisation had receive only 25% of what member states had pledged to contribute to the organisation.

Moreover, an efficient financial set up is also particularly crucial since the cost of peacekeeping has soared in the post Cold War era, as a result of the organisation of second generation peacekeeping missions which require more personnel, equipment and logistical support. Thus, while the number of troops involved in UN operations stood at around 9 600 in 1983, by 1993, the number stood at over 75 700, mainly as a result of operations begun in 1992 in Cambodia, Mozambique, Senegal and the former Yugoslavia. The cost of peacekeeping has become particularly high for missions of the type that was carried out in Cambodia, with UNTAC having to repair roads and buildings, as well as run five government ministries until the holding of

77 The UN and International Peacekeeping, Agostinho Zacarias, p. 195.
78 Ibid.
elections. Similar costly non-military tasks were undertaken particularly in Somalia and Namibia where humanitarian relief had to be delivered to the population. Though UN peacekeeping costs have now fallen from their 1994 peak (which reflected operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia and reached $4.0 billion) they still stand at nearly $1.0 billion today. In light of this, it is essential that the United Nations take action in order to resolve the disjunctures which exist within its financial set-up.

7. The need to reconvene.

What this section points to is that, in the wake of the post Cold War transformations, the United Nations needs to reconvene to reconsider the very basis on which it founds its action. As outlined above, the fundamental problem appears to be that the UN is facing a radically transformed situation, yet the organisation is still using those same tools and principles that had been created in the late 1940's to deal with those problems which were characteristic of that age. And indeed, those principles were well adapted to those situations which the international community had to deal with at that time. Thus, the principle of neutrality, of use of force in self defense only, and the very limited amount of constitutional recognition which peacekeeping

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80 Ibid.
received in the UN Charter, all corresponded well to a situation in which “all” that had to be dealt with was the occasional interstate conflict, if the veto problem within the Security Council ever allowed intervention at all.

As outlined above, the most apparent and crippling disconnects between those same principles and the new realities of today’s intrastate conflicts refer to the principles according to which the Blue Helmets are asked to act upon and the principles according to which the UNHCR operates, with both failing to take into account that UN troops now need to take sides and to be able to defend themselves, while the new tragedy of IDPs also requires a reconsideration of the mandate of that department. Similarly, the organisation needs to reconvene in order to decide on new ways of adapting its bureaucracy of levels of authorisation on order to adapt to the realities of intrastate conflict. For what the UN needs is to adopt a much larger measure of flexibility. As noted above, this would apply first to the problem of command and control. New York headquarters indeed need to delegate much more to commanders on the ground, since it is them who have as full a grasp as can be achieved of the actual requirements of the situation, rather than determine months in advance the manner in which the operation will be undertaken. At the same time, the problem of funding is but one example of the manner in which the heaviness of the United Nations bureaucracy is no longer acceptable in today’s age of numerous, expensive, and rapidly evolving intrastate conflict, where it was perhaps less of a

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81 The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p. 44.
handicap during the period of the Cold War and of interstate conflict.
CHAPTER 4: The disjunctures and disconnects of member states.

This chapter is particularly crucial since it is under the umbrella of member state behaviour that the majority of the disjunctures and disconnects of UN peacekeeping may be categorised. The factors which may be more specifically related to the actual set-up of the organisation which have been outlined above are fewer in number while they are also perhaps slightly less controversial.

1. Disjunctures in the perceptions of the major powers.

As noted at the outset of this paper in "A theory of collective security", the behaviour of international organisations is largely a function of the behaviour and preferences of the member states which compose it, and in particular the more powerful of those member states. This is the most fundamental problem which bedevils the United Nations, as will be explored in this chapter. It is true however that this problem has lessened over the years since the creation of the United Nations in 1945. As noted in the first chapter of this paper, the proper functioning of the United Nations was made impossible by the existence of the Cold War which had a crippling effect on in particular the activity of the Security Council. The end of the Cold War and the fact that membership of the
organisation has steadily expanded as former colonies achieved independence and new sovereign nation-states have emerged, have somewhat diluted the domination of the organisation by a handful of major powers. Yet the fact that a greater number of powers are now members of the United Nations with each one of them having the right to vote in General Assembly and with the composition of the Security Council being now challenged, have not prevented the continuance of the problem of the dominance which a few major powers exercise over the organisation.

One fundamental problem linked to this is the fact that these major powers who in effect decide whether an operation will be mounted or not, appear to misread the nature and importance of conflict and of the situation of countries experiencing domestic unrest. In effect, they appear at different points in time to have been either wildly optimistic concerning prospects for peace and prospects for successful intervention in conflicts, or disinterested in situations which need tending to. This phenomenon appears to be particularly pronounced since the end of the Cold War, and can in effect be considered to be the single most important factor in explaining the current failure of and disillusion with peacekeeping. It represents a fundamental and crucial disjuncture between the perceptions and preferences of the member countries and the reality of the situation in areas of conflict.

At one end of the spectrum, member countries have appeared to be excessively eager to take action as well as excessively optimistic as to their chances of success in intervening in certain conflicts. This was particularly the case at the end of the 1980's. For indeed, the end of the Cold War saw the international community look forward to and expect a period of international cooperation and harmony, in which the United Nations would at last be able to fully play its role of guardian of international peace and security. This was reflected in particular in George Bush's and James Baker's vision of a New World Order which placed heavy emphasis on the United Nations as leading the way forward in this new era of world peace and harmony. It was this mistaken perception of world harmony and of endless opportunity which led the member countries of the United Nations, foremost amongst which the United States as noted, to in a sense rush into areas of conflict, at a time when the nature of conflict was undergoing drastic transformation for the worse, as outlined in the first section of the paper. This is generally considered to have led to the debacles of in particular Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and it is the failure of these operations which is responsible for the current mood of disillusionment with the United Nations and of the retrenchment
of international peacekeeping. In the case of Somalia, the violence of the situation on the ground, and in particular in the area of Mogadishu, appeared to take the Americans by surprise, and in particular the leaders of the American military establishment and the American Congress, with the latter putting pressure on the President to call back all American troops rapidly once casualties had occurred. This reflects the way in which the government of the United States failed on the one hand to fully comprehend the dangers of the situation in Somalia, with the Rangers having been murdered by a gang of rebels with little respect for the Blue Helmets, with these types of opponents being more violent and reckless than the traditional soldiers of interstate conflict, as noted above. On the other hand, the government of the United States appeared to be falsely optimistic as to its ability to see the operation through, with congressional pressure getting the better of the administration’s policy. The result of this sense of false optimism was that the United States pulled out of the area suddenly, leaving the United Nations to fill the void as best it could. The UN mission which replaced the American-led UNITAF, UNOSOM II, was in this sense doomed to fail from the beginning, since it was not familiar with the situation on the ground, nor did it have the military capacity to see the mission through to a successful conclusion.

83 Why Peacekeeping Fails, Dennis C. Jett, p. 31.
which would probably have required actually fighting the rebels, given the desperate nature of the situation. Miscalculation on the part of major member states linked to the changed conditions of post Cold War conflict as described in the first section of this paper, thus bears a very important responsibility in the current plight of UN peacekeeping. It reflects the disconnect and the lag which exist between the perception and policies of member states and post Cold War realities.

3. The problem with humanism and indiscriminate intervention.

One important ingredient of this sense of false optimism which was pervasive of much of the international community with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, was the emergence of more "humanitarian" foreign policies. This was again particularly pronounced in the case of the United States, with humanitarian concerns being one of the prime motivations for the American intervention in Somalia. It must however be stressed that this type of humanitarian approach characterises certain conflicts only, with other areas of conflict in which equally disturbing violations of human rights being ignored by the major powers, with this issue being discussed below. This emergence of an approach which embodies a

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85 Ibid., p. 311.
concern over human rights in a sense represents a positive step and ought to contribute to the development of United Nations peace missions. Yet in the instance of the operation in Somalia which more than any other operation represents in large part an attempt to put an end to a conflict in which civilians were the prime victims, this growing awareness of the responsibilities of the major powers for what was increasingly considered to be a civil society which took precedence over the sovereignty of states, clouded the issue of the dangers of the situation and of the practicability of intervention. This again represents a disjuncture between an international community which is developing a humanistic sense of responsibility, and the nature of conflict which is becoming more dangerous and complicated, and ought therefore to be carefully assessed and considered before a decision to intervene is taken.

This post Cold War disjuncture is all the more important since it is debatable whether the best solution is to intervene rather than actually let the conflict run its course. This is a particularly pertinent issue today, as the United Nations appears to intervene once mass genocide has already occurred, with UN intervention after that stage has been reached perhaps contributing to the remaining chaos rather than help smooth the situation. Moreover, the organisation, once it intervenes at the stage when one clearly identifiable section of the population has massacred another clearly identifiable section of the population, it still does not take sides, and by doing so appears to condone

\[^{86}\text{Ibid., p. 319.}\]
the aggressor, with this being an important criticism which was
levelled against the United Nations in the case of the genocide
in Rwanda. Furthermore, if the organisation does choose to
intervene at that stage, it will antagonise the aggressors who by
then have gained the upper hand over the country, with this
further jeopardising the position of the victims, as well as
putting the Blue Helmets themselves in danger. Finally, the
complexity of the situation may be such, and the nature of the
conflict may be so local and parochial, that it is questionable
whether intervention by an army from a completely foreign culture
intent on imposing its view of the situation on unwilling
parties, may not in fact create added instability and violence
rather than reduce them. As A. James has noted, “sometimes the
United Nations should be willing to stand back from involvement,
or leave a situation which seems temporarily beyond recall. It
is, perhaps, a modicum of modesty and humility which is called
for.”

4. The problem of indifference.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, international community
disinterest in many areas of conflict has proven to be at least
equally lethal to the United Nations’ desire for international
peace and security and represents a disjuncture to the same

87 Why Peacekeeping Fails, p. 56.
extent as false optimism did in the 1980's and early 1990's". This is to a certain extent the natural result of the deep transformations in the structure of the international system which accompanied the end of the Cold War and the return to a system of anarchy and self-help. Given this, it was in a sense to be expected that the individual preferences of member states would undermine the unity and cohesion of the organisation. The indifference which the member states manifest towards many conflicts, and in particular towards conflicts which occur on the African continent which is the great loser of the post Cold War era, does nevertheless still represent a disjuncture between the behaviour of the members of the United Nations and the needs of the international community taken as a whole. Moreover, this notion that member states ought to be fully responsible for the rest of the peace and security of all areas of the world may not be as idealistic as it may seem even in the anarchical post Cold War era, since, as noted above, many countries, and in particular in the developed world, are becoming increasingly aware that they do have responsibilities as well as national interests in the different regions of the world.

Yet the decision of different member states to vote for an operation clearly depends first and foremost on whether they have a stake in the situation or not, and in particular on whether the conflict in question poses a threat to their national security, as noted in the first section of this paper. It is because of this that different areas of conflict around the world will
receive vastly different levels of attention from the international community. This is one problem with United Nations peace missions which both Secretary General Boutros Ghali and Secretary General Kofi Annan have underlined, in an attempt to bring back the African continent in particular back onto the agenda of United Nations member states. In the case of Africa, there is a very important and apparent disjuncture between the indifference of the majority of member states in the area, with this having emerged particularly with the end of the Cold War, and the plight of so many of the countries of the continent, with this also being a result of the end of the Cold War. They are thus receiving little attention, right at the moment when they need it most. Practically all those areas of conflict which benefited from the assistance and intervention of the major powers of the Security Council (though in certain cases whether they did actually benefit from this or whether it did not worsen the situation on the ground being a matter of debate, as noted above), were of geostrategic interest to their own national security or national interests.

Thus, those areas of conflict which witnessed heavy-handed military intervention by powerful developed countries, were those which were in geographical proximity to them or their allies, or who presented a threat to their supply in energy. In the case of United Nations intervention in Iraq as led by in particular the Americans and the British, this was clearly prompted by the threat to the developed world, and especially the US’s, oil

90 Interview with Bill Dunch, 12/11/00.
supplies, as well as by the threat to America’s Saudi and Israeli allies. In the case of intervention in the Balkans, this was clearly prompted by the geographical proximity of the area to the countries of Western Europe, as well as by the United States’ desire to avoid the risk of another major European war being sparked off in the area, with the First World War having begun in that same area. At the same time, the western European states were beginning to feel the strain of the flow of refugees which streamed into in particular Italy, Greece and Germany. Similarly, the United Nations mission to East Timor was led by the Australians, with the area of conflict lying in their region of the world. On the other hand, the question of whether the United Nations should put together an operation to intervene in Chechnya, for instance, is clearly not on the agenda of either the Security Council or the General Assembly, for fear of antagonising Russia.

Moreover, on occasion, the indifference of member states may even include an unwillingness to actually resolve the situation of conflict even as they intervene in the area. Such was the case with Morocco and Western Saharan independence movements, in which France intervened under the auspices of the UN not so much to find a proper and just solution to the conflict, but more as a way of ‘keeping the lid’ on it and of maintaining its ally, the moderate King Hassan, in power”. Member states will also in many cases intervene not in order to stabilise the situation or to lend assistance to a distressed local population, but simply in
order to evacuate their own nationals. This was illustrated most dramatically in the case of Rwanda. Member countries indeed ended up sending troops only to evacuate their nationals, with even the embassy dog being personally escorted up into an aircraft by heavily armed soldiers. Governments around the world indeed voiced their deep concern for the handful of nationals which remained in the country while hardly mentioning the plight of the local Hutu population which on departure of those troops was left to be massacred by the Tutsi population. The case of Rwanda moreover stands as a dramatic illustration of a situation in which member states did initially summon the political will to send some troops to the area, yet ordered the retreat of those troops and the end of UNAMIR as soon as the first casualties occurred and their national security appeared to be at stake. This disjuncture in the behaviour of member states appears to be all the more cruel since the presence of the Blue Helmets in the area was meant to reassure the local population and ensure it of its protection, yet the grouping together of local Hutus under the supervision of the Belgian contingent only served to ultimately facilitate the task of the Tutsi murderers who knew where to find their next batch of victims once the Blue Helmets had departed. The tragic implications of the inability of member countries to follow through with their commitment and of their abandonment of the local population to a terrible fate was clearly illustrated by the request of the Hutus who had sought shelter with the Belgian contingent that they be all shot by the

91 Why Peacekeeping Fails, p. 41.
Blue Helmets before these departed, rather than be left to be savagely slaughtered by the Tutsis with their machettes\(^2\).

The fact that member states attempt on many occasions to avoid intervening in areas of conflict in which their own national interest is not at stake is reflected in the language used to describe the situation which is unfolding in those areas. In order to avoid acknowledging that genocide is in effect what is occurring in some areas of conflict, the notion is clouded in bureaucratic vagueness and semantic subtleties, as illustrated most clearly in the American administration insisting on using the term "acts of genocide" rather than the term "genocide" whenever questioned on the situation in Rwanda. This unwillingness to take a stand is moreover reflected at the level of the United Nations, with officials describing at the time the dramatic situation in Rwanda in which the local Hutu population was being annihilated at five times the speed at which the Nazis exterminated the Jews, as representing a "breakdown of the cease-fire"\(^3\).

Finally, it remains to be pointed out that the indifference of certain member states to the plight of countries in the throes of genocidal civil war is on occasion neither a reflection of narrowing down the agenda strictly to issues of national security and of the national interest, nor of concern for the safety of troops, but quite simply a reflection of a deep lack of sensitivity and vision. This was illustrated in the case

\(^{2}\) « The Triumph of Evil » BBC television broadcast, 01/25/01.

\(^{3}\) Ibid.
of the US administration, with concerns having been apparently raised by some of its members that were they to acknowledge that the situation in Rwanda was one of genocide without then intervening in the area, they would leave themselves open to a defeat in the next round of congressional elections. It was therefore deemed a better idea to keep as low a profile as possible on the subject.\textsuperscript{94}

5. The need for greater realism and consistency.

It has been outlined at the outset of this chapter that the member states of the United Nations have in the post Cold War era appeared to oscillate between a sense of false optimism or on the other hand an attitude of indifference towards many tragic intrastate conflicts.

What member states need to do is to readjust their perception of the practicability of intervention as well as its desirability to the realities and requirements of each situation. This is however one area in which the United Nations as an organisation is as responsible as the member states are in their approach towards many of these conflicts. For indeed, one important reason why member states are in many cases disconnected from the requirements of many intrastate conflicts and appear to adopt a stance which miscalculates the situation, is because the

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.

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UN does not have a doctrine which clearly outlines the different types of mandates which apply to different types of situations. This point has been discussed at greater length in the previous chapter in an examination of the obsolete nature of the UN Charter and constitution as embodied in particular in the "chapter VI ½" problem. For if the United Nations updated its constitution, member states would be clearer about the implications of setting up an operation in accordance with more clearly defined mandates. The fact does nevertheless remain that member states do misjudge the nature of the situation on the ground, as well as the desirability of intervention. This is linked once again in great part to the novelty of post Cold War conflict, and also to the fact that many of these conflicts occur in areas with which the majority of the member states are not fully acquainted. In particular, it is difficult for western governments to empathise with the complicated and unpredictable "wars of rage" of the African continent, with this including even the former colonial powers. This is one additional reason why many member states prefer to remain on the sidelines of conflicts which appear to be obscure and complicated. Linked to this, the notion of "otherness", i.e. the concept that vicious intrastate conflict is characteristic of the brutal psyche of the African nations and is as such inevitable, also forms one element of the indifference of many member states towards the plight of the African peoples.
6. The problem with troops.

This represents another critical disjuncture which hinders the Blue Helmets from being effective on the ground. It is because so many UN troops which are sent into areas of conflict have been understaffed, underequipped and undertrained by member states that many missions are doomed to fail even before they begin. This disjuncture between the humble resources given to the UN and the ambition of the mandates of the Security Council lies in effect behind virtually every single second generation peacekeeping mission which the United Nations has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. It is all the more crucial since it creates a vicious circle which is difficult to break. For indeed, the fact that the vast majority of UN missions are neither sufficiently staffed nor sufficiently equipped to perform the task which has been assigned them by the Security Council means that the likelihood of casualties occurring is higher, as illustrated in the cases of the Rangers in Somalia and the Belgians in Rwanda, which in turn results in member states being even more reticent to contribute troops for the next operation etc.

The difficulty of rapidly finding the required number of troops is clearly illustrated by the figures. In particular, in 1994, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that 35,000 troops would be needed to deter attacks on UN “safe areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet Member States authorised only 7,600 troops and took a year to provide them. Similarly, in Rwanda
in 1994, the Security Council unanimously decided that 5,500 peacekeepers were urgently needed to stop the genocide. Yet it took nearly six months for Member States to provide the troops, even though 19 governments had pledged to keep 31,000 troops on a standby basis for UN peacekeeping. Even the standby arrangement created in the wake of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, in the hope of remediying to this problem, have failed to improve matters. Indeed, the problem remains the same since the deployment of these standby units still depends entirely on the willingness of individual countries to provide them. The limits of the Standby Arrangements (SA) are in fact tragic, as highlighted in particular by the Secretary-General’s vain efforts to expand the UN mission in Rwanda in May 1994: out of the 19 governments that were participating at that time in the UNSA, only 5 agreed to contribute military forces.

Moreover, one disturbing aspect of the problem of troops is that not only are they usually not deployed in sufficient number when needed, but they are most often not adequately trained. Overall, the better trained contingents are those provided by rich developed countries, while poorer countries will be less willing and able to divert funds to training contingents for UN field operations. Moreover, for those countries that do train UN troops, this is more often than not considered to be an extension of traditional military training, with little time devoted to

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95 United Nations website.
96 A UN Permanent Volunteer Army, Stephen P. Kinloch, p. 169.
developing those skills necessary for complex and varied UN missions. This is the case for instance for the Canadian program, which is undertaken as a continuation of traditional military exercises, with more in-depth “contact” skills not being deemed necessary. The Irish program does represent an improvement on this, with the recognition that peacekeeping operations do require the learning of skills which differ from standard military training. Yet even here, these are considered to be a continuation of Irish ‘internal security’ exercises and thus only a matter of rehearsing well-trodden ground. Yet as was described in the first section of this paper, intrastate conflict, and in particular the “wars of rage” of the African continent involve an opponent more out of control than the disciplined soldier encountered in traditional interstate conflict, while intrastate conflicts have deeply parochial characteristics which need to be understood before any attempt to deal with the situation may be made in an effective manner. “Cross-cultural” awareness is indeed an essential ingredient of second generation intervention which is sorely lacking in the training of troops contributed to the UN. It represents another important disconnect between the new realities of conflict and the way in which they are approached by the international community.

The only peacekeeping programs operated by individual nations which do purposefully aim at preparing troops for the contingencies and specificities of UN operations are in effect

98 Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping, p. 182-184.
99 Ibid., p. 188-191.
those undertaken by the Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden, in line with their tradition of active contribution to world peace. The Nordic system is in effect the only one which is based on the assumption that peacekeeping requires specific training. Nordic Standby forces, trained in National Training Centres (UNTCs), thus receive training in areas such as the manning of checkpoints, identification of various types of arms, identification of the sound of guns, knowledge of the range of weapons, map reading, up-to-date information about the particular UN mission, culture, habits and characteristics of the local population, religions prevailing in the area etc.

Moreover, the Nordic countries are the only ones to have a regional cooperation system of training, within which Denmark trains military police, Finland trains observers, Norway provides logistics and transport training, and Sweden trains staff officers. However, despite the fact that the Nordic approach is based on the notion of the importance of not just “conflict control” but of “conflict resolution” skills, it still does not in practice give enough time to the development of the ‘cross-cultural awareness’ required by second generation peacekeeping and the greater number of parties to conflicts with increasingly parochial roots.

Civilian training is taken even less seriously by member countries than the training of the military. With the exception of a small number of training programs of international agencies,

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100 Ibid., p. 191-194.
civilian training is conducted on an ad hoc, decentralised and uncoordinated basis. This includes all four UN civilian groups, i.e. the regular staff from the UN in charge of administration and logistics (though these are more familiar with the tasks at hand), the staff in charge of election supervision and police monitoring and the staff brought in for its specific area of expertise, hired on short-term contract. The only type of training available for civilian peacekeepers is that dispensed by international agencies, in particular the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the Austrian Study Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR). Within UNITAR, a "Fellowship Programme in Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy" was established in 1993, but is in jeopardy for lack of financial support. The IPA has a fairly extensive training activity, with over 5000 people from 150 different countries having participated in its seminars since it was founded in 1970. It is in effect the organisation itself which must bear the brunt of proper UN-specific training.

One final problem lies in the fact that selection for UN operations lies with individual countries and hence outside UN control, increasing the chances of inadequate personnel being sent, as was the case in the Namibian operation. Training for UN operations is thus seriously deficient, although it has undeniable improved over the years, with a more standardised and

103 Ibid., p. 207.
holistic approach being now adopted. While it may be adequate for the actual military task at hand i.e. for a "conflict-control" mission, it is inadequate for the more important and complex task of "conflict resolution", with this being a particularly important aspect of second-generation peacekeeping.

This raises the fundamental question of whether it is responsible to send unprepared and insufficiently equipped civilian and military staff to areas of conflict, in particular in view of the fact that this ineffectiveness of UN contingents has meant mounting pressures to give peacekeepers enforcement powers, which would undoubtedly spell the end of impartial UN missions. What the deployment and training of troops underlines is the gap which exists between the commitments of the member states to contribute to United Nations peace missions, and their willingness and ability to see this through. The fact that the Blue Helmets now appear to be themselves at risk, as illustrated most clearly in Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, while also potentially jeopardising the processes of conflict-control and conflict-resolution themselves, is the most apparent consequence of the unwillingness and/or inability of the member states to shoulder their responsibilities and commitments to the organisation. It is one of the disjunctures which most urgently needs to be remedied to as it directly threatens the credibility of the organisation as well as the lives of the Blue Helmets themselves. For the mandates of the Security Council disregard

104 UN Peacekeeping Encyclopedia, p. 245.
the fact that troops are most often not properly trained and equipped for the operation, with one of the most important recommendations of the Brahimi report being that the SC should not vote to send in troops in such circumstances\textsuperscript{106}.

7. The motivations of troop contributors.

The explanation for this disconnect becomes apparent when one considers the motivations of the contribution of troops by the member states. This is again linked to the return to an international system of anarchy and self-help, in which individual member states will act according to their own national interest, with the disappearance of the East West rivalry signally the emergence of more individualised foreign and defense policies. The situation is further complicated for the United Nations since its membership has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War, with the coordination of the preferences of 185 member states being difficult to achieve, even though it is true that much of the organisation’s agenda is dominated by the handful of states which sit on the Security Council. Thus, the majority of those countries which choose to participate in United Nations peace missions and operations do so largely out of self-interest, and it is largely because of this that the UN has difficulty in finding troops which have actually been trained and equipped to do the job properly.

\textsuperscript{106} Brahimi report, p. 4.
In particular, countries participate in peace missions in order to put themselves on the list of potential future beneficiaries of United Nations intervention were it needed. Such has been the case for instance for the three Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in case they came to need international assistance against Russia in particular, and in order to increase their chances of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Similarly, others, such as Fiji, will contribute purely for financial reasons, with the organisation reimbursing each country for its contribution in dollars. The recipient country may thus benefit from an inflow of dollars while at the same time in some cases making a profit, with the cost of training and sending one soldier being lower for some countries than the standard price which the organisation pays for it.\footnote{Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, Trevor Findlay ed., Oxford University Press, 1996, p.8-9.}

Other countries may participate in United Nations peace missions in order to gain credibility on the international scene. Such was the case for Eastern European countries which, with the end of the Cold War, were eager to leave their Warsaw Pact years behind them and become fully integrated and accepted within the international community.\footnote{Ibid.} Still others will participate or increase their contribution in UN operations to give weight to their aspirations to join the club of permanent members of the Security Council. This is reflected in the fact that candidates that can be considered to be closest to gaining a seat on the SC
have become important contributors: India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. Moreover, non-permanent members of the SC will also increase their participation in UN operations in order to give their voice more weight in Security Council discussions and deliberations, as was in part the case for New Zealand and its participation in UNPROFOR.

Finally, as noted above, member states will intervene first and foremost when they perceive their national security to be at stake, as analysed above. Linked to the notion of national security, yet from an entirely different perspective, other governments will on the contrary avoid becoming involved in peace missions, for fear of being next on the UN’s list of countries to intervene in, or in defiance of the rest of the international community, with this clearly being the case of countries like Iraq or Cuba. It is because of these different types of motivations, and because they are largely centred on what governments perceive to be directly in their own interest or in that of their country in spite of growing concern with the issue of human rights, that troops are so hard to muster, train and equip properly.

An additional dimension of this problem is that the growing number of member states of the United Nations and the growing number of states which participate in the organisation’s peace missions, with the majority of these now coming from the least developed and developing world, mean that operations are put

109 Ibid.
together with an ad hoc mixture of troops from different countries, who are there for different reasons, and who have been differently trained and equipped, as noted above. This poses an important problem in terms of the logistics of the operation, with in particular the better trained and equipped contingents having to provide other contingents with the equipment they need, and having to train them to use it. Moreover, one additional problem in the implementation of operations, in terms of the variety of participants and of their motives, is one of command and control. This illustrates particularly clearly the impact of a multipolar anarchical international system on the organisation. For once on the ground, the majority of the commanders will take their orders from their own national military leadership rather than from the United Nations' military adviser.  

It must however be noted that this is in a sense the inevitable consequence of countries placing their men in danger, with the fact that governments would rather retain control over their own troops being understandable, even though this undeniably remains a problem. Again, what this underlines is the way in which the behaviour of the international community jeopardises the work of the United Nations just at a time when the task which the organisation is facing has become both larger and more difficult. The link between the motivations of contributing countries and the quality of the troops and equipment provided is clearly shown in the case of those

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countries which do contribute to the United Nations’ peace missions out of a genuine desire to serve the cause of international peace and security. For indeed, those troops which are the best equipped and trained, are provided by the Scandinavian countries of Northern Europe who have a more altruistic vision of their role within the international community, as described above\textsuperscript{112}.

8. A United Nations held back by the United States.

This problem reflects another type of disjuncture which, until recently, has concerned the United States, i.e. the most important member state of the organisation. The United States has indeed in the post Cold War era not appeared in some respects to take its role as a powerful member of the United Nations as seriously as it ought to. This has been reflected between the mid-1980’s up until the recent months in the fact that the US had been refusing to pay its dues to the organisation. Up until recently, it thus owed the organisation $1 billion-plus in arrears as a result of the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment of 1985 with which the American Congress choked off contributions to various international organisations including the United Nations\textsuperscript{113}. The majority of the other member states of the organisation are on the whole up to date with their payments.

\textsuperscript{112} « Running the Show : Planning and Implementation », W.J.Durch, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{113} The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p. 40-41.
This disjuncture refers to the manner in which the one remaining superpower appeared unwilling to face up to its responsibilities and to stand by its commitment to the United Nations, with the fact that it is by far the most powerful state in the world and one which the organisation cannot afford to antagonise by penalising it, enabling America to refuse funding to the UN. Yet, as noted above, it is precisely at this time that the organisation needs the most funding, since second-generation peacekeeping involve a much greater number and variety of tasks than did first generation peacekeeping. Moreover, the United States appears to be using the organisation to give its own foreign policy greater credibility and legitimacy. Such appears to have been the case with the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, even though the other members of the coalition which formed under the auspices of the United Nations were also committed to freeing Kuwait and punishing the Iraqi leader. It is undeniable that one reason for American involvement in the region was in part prompted by concerns for the security of the whole region, whose stability is in the interest of the international community as a whole, as well as by the importance of punishing “rogue leaders” like Saddam, with this also being in the interests of the international community. Yet the fact that the US depended on the region for its oil supply and was also committed to defending its own Israeli and Saudi allies also played a crucial role in American intervention in the area. Similarly, in the case of Somalia, the United States also benefited from the fact that it was operating under the auspices of the United Nations. For with
the failure of the operation, with this having clearly been due
to the Americans who were in charge of the operation, they were
able to blame the United Nations and thus deflect criticism of
their action\textsuperscript{114}.

Yet at the same time, the United States has been failing to pay its dues to the organisation which, in the same way as it
does not have an army of its own and is hence dependent on
contributions from member countries, does not have the authority
to draw credit from any financial institution and is entirely
dependent on the goodwill of member countries to finance its
operations. It appears clearly that, as noted, the United States
has been failing to shoulder its responsibility as a member of
the international community, with this being all the more serious
since the US is by far the most important contributor to the
organisation as its contribution corresponds to 13\% of the United
Nations' budget\textsuperscript{115}. However, once considered more closely, it
appears that the motivations of members of the American Congress
in refusing to pay arrears due to the organisation, are a
consequence of the dilemmas and disjunctures which the UN has
been going through since the end of the Cold War in particular,
with the fact of the US failing to pay its dues further
reinforcing those dilemmas, with the end of gridlock having only
recently been achieved with a vote in Congress to pay part of the
dues. For the issue of the payment of UN dues, far from being an
issue exploited by opposition party, i.e. the Republicans, in

\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Bill Durch, 12/11/00.
\textsuperscript{115} CQ Weekly, 21 Oct 1995, UN Marks 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary, Congress Demands Change.
order to undermine the authority and credibility of the administration, brought together members of Congress from both sides of the political divide, as few issues had done before.\textsuperscript{116}

The fundamental reason for this is that the failures of UN peace operations in the last decade have given rise to the belief that United Nations peacekeeping operations do not deliver, and hence are not worth the financial investment.\textsuperscript{117} In light of the failures of Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, such a point of view is in part understandable, with those failures having been the result of the disjunctures discussed in this paper. One second motivation was the perception that the structure of the United Nations needed reform, with this also corresponding to a disjuncture noted above in particular with reference to the multiple layers of authorisation and oversight of the organisation's budget.\textsuperscript{118} The fact does nevertheless remain that the behaviour of the United States during the 1980's right up to the end of the 1990's clearly underlines the negative consequences on the United Nations, of the pursuit of individualist policies by member states and the disjunctures this creates between the mission which the Security Council assigns to the Blue Helmets and the means which the member states put at its disposal.

\textsuperscript{117} CQ Weekly, 13 Dec 1997, A Tug of War over Dues.
\textsuperscript{118} CQ Weekly, 21 Oct 1995, UN Marks 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary, Congress Demands Change.

There are several critical disjunctures and disconnects related to the mandates of the Security Council. The first type of disconnect is that these mandates more often than not do not reflect the realities of the situation on the ground. In the majority of instances, the Blue Helmets do not have sufficient resources at their disposal to carry out the instructions embodied within Security Council mandates. For the officials who sit on the Council have little or no familiarity with the situation on the ground in the area of conflict in question. This creates exasperation within the mission's leadership, as was most strikingly highlighted in the case of the UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia, with its commander, General Francois Briquemont, not reading UN resolutions anymore, them being so totally unconnected with reality. Another type of disjuncture which is perhaps even more critical than the one just noted, is the fact that the issuance of mandates appears in certain instances to be a substitute for taking concrete and immediate action. Thus, in the case of the conflict in Rwanda, the Security Council did finally take action and issue a mandate to strengthen UNAMIR, this after the brunt of the massacre had already occurred, yet this was not followed up by the action required. However, even though troops and aircrafts were sent, these were left stationed in

neighbouring Angola until the Hutu rebels had finally managed to
defeat their Tutsi torturers. Moreover, in the same way as the
mandates either do not reflect the realities of the situation on
the ground and or end up having little or no practical impact in
the area of conflict, discussions within the Security Council do
similarly appear to reflect either an unwillingness to actually
debate the matter at hand properly, or the fact that it does not
occur to delegates that perhaps they ought to do so. In effect,
the bureaucratic rituals in a way represent a safety net thanks
to which real debate is discouraged and may be thus fairly easily
avoided. This was most apparent again in the case of the dramatic
situation in Rwanda, no member of the Council requesting that the
Rwandan representative justify the actions of his Tutsi
"government", with the Rwandan ambassador actually happening by a
stroke of irony to be presiding over the debates of the SC at the
time. Instead, a simple vote to withdraw UNAMIR troops from the
area was passed and the matter dismissed without any type of
questioning having taken place.

This type of disjuncture and disconnect is in effect
closely linked to the culture characteristic of the work of the
Security Council, and indeed of the General Assembly as well. The
work which is undertaken at New York headquarters, the voting
procedures which take place within the SC and the resolutions
which are drawn up, reflect a failure on the part of delegates to
empathise with the situation on the ground. The fact that SC
resolutions in many cases do not take into account the realities
and requirements of intrastate conflict, as so many UN military
commanders on the ground have deplored, is not merely linked to the fact that many of the members of the Security Council are in certain cases unwilling or at best slow to understand the realities of the situation. It is also linked to the inability of delegates to fully register the depth of the crisis which many countries find themselves plunged in. The episode mentioned above of local civilians in Rwanda requesting that the UN do the job of killing them in a humane and more dignified manner rather than leave them to be brutally murdered by the perpetrators of atrocities is one which delegates sitting in committee rooms in New York will inevitably fail to empathise with. This is underlined by the fact that the Blue Helmets on the ground were fully aware of the terrible implications which their departure would mean for those Hutus who had come to seek shelter in their compound, and felt a sense of dismay at being ordered to withdraw from the area, as opposed to the delegates and member governments of the Security Council, who did not appear to have any misgivings at voting for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR\(^\text{120}\).

One additional problem of the SC and indeed of the UN as a whole and which leads member states of the United Nations to undertake missions which tend to freeze the status quo in favour of regimes in power, is linked to the fact that only officially recognised governments are represented at the United Nations. Rebel movements are thus at a disadvantage, even though the international community is supposed to view all sides of the situation. Yet the sheer fact that governments are better able to

\(^{120}\) «The Triumph of Evil», BBC documentary, 01/25/01.
present their case and to lobby other governments both bilaterally and through the forum offered by the organisation, places the opposing parties in a tougher situation. This is one problem which the organisation itself can do little about, since it is hardly conceivable that it should admit rebel movements as members of the United Nations. Rather, this is a case once again for the sense of responsibility and objectivity of individual member states, and in particular the major powers. This reflects once more the existence of a disjuncture between the changing nature of conflict, which is intrastate and hence has parties which in most cases do not benefit from any type of official recognition, and the return to a system of self help in which countries will be tempted to follow their own interests and will be sensitive to the lobbying of their fellow member-states, rather than act fairly in the interests of collective peace and security.


In light of the disjunctures and disconnects which characterise so many facets of contemporary peacekeeping, alternatives to the current type of UN intervention have been considered above. However, what may also be considered is the role which non governmental organisations and of church

organisations. The latter in particular appear in some instances to have been effective where the United Nations has not. In particular, religious organisations do provide an interesting alternative to UN intervention or even to UN mediation as they project a stronger image than does the UN of neutrality and of being harmless since they act independently from governments and since they do not have any military power whatsoever.

One illustration of the constructive role which religious organisations may come to play in smoothing over the situation in conflict ridden areas is that of the "diplomats" of the community of Sant'Edigio, operating with the blessings of the Vatican, and who have acquired an international reputation in conflict mediation. They were thus responsible for the signing of a truce in Mozambique in 1992, after over two years of mediation, with the community being thereafter widely respected, with both the Algerians and the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda turning towards Sant' Edigio in order to resolve their conflicts. Moreover, the emphasis which religious groups such as these place on relieving poverty in conflict ridden countries, the manner in which they underline the role which socio-economic distress plays in fuelling conflict, adds another dimension to peacekeeping which the UN lacks. Similarly, other Non-Governmental Organisations could be encouraged to play a role in mediation, in particular since they too benefit from an image of impartiality and of being pacific. This is all the more important since it is the question of the neutrality and impartiality of United Nations peacekeeping which to a certain extent now stands in the way of parties to the
conflict accepting the presence of the UN in their area. Moreover, the fact that religious groups and non governmental organisations are obviously not able to mount military operations even if they did wish to do so, makes them more acceptable as peace mediators to parties who fear that UN military intervention may upset the position which they may have been able to gain.

11. Conclusion.

This section has examined the disjunctures and disconnects of UN peace missions which can be attributed in the first instance to the actual constitution and set-up of the organisation itself. It has in the second instance examined those more numerous and troubling disjunctures and disconnects which can be attributed to the behaviour and approach of the member countries, and in particular those who sit permanently on the Security Council. The first area of disjuncture which has been looked at with reference to this relates to member states' approach towards areas of intrastate conflict, which ranges from false optimism in the late 1980's to indifference to the plight of local populations, both of which have had a negative impact on the ability of United Nations peace missions to reduce the incidence and the violence of intrastate conflict, in particular on the African continent. The undeniable fact that member states contribute to UN peace missions according to their own individual agendas is what has created a second area of disjuncture, namely
the inadequacy of troops which are neither sufficiently trained or equipped to perform the task assigned to it by often unrealistic Security Council mandates. Finally, it has been underlined that while growing concerns of violations of human rights represents a positive development, member states still prefer on the whole to avoid becoming embroiled in civil wars in which they do not have a direct stake, with this creating a disjuncture between the humanist rhetoric of governments and their actual willingness to act on it.
CHAPTER 5: Epilogue.

The notion of a post Cold War lag and the changing concept of sovereignty.

This thesis has argued that the recent series of spectacular failures of United Nations peace operations is the result of a series of disjunctures and disconnect which reflect the presence of a lag between transformations in the international system and in the nature of conflict, and in institutional responses on the part of the organisation, as well as in the approach and behaviour of the member states. It has moreover been underlined throughout the paper that the responsibility for this lag lies in part with the organisation itself, which needs to adapt its doctrine, constitution and set-up to these changed post Cold War circumstances, but that it rests in effect for the most part with the member states which make up the organisation, and in particular the major powers of the international system and all those which hold permanent seats on the Security Council. In order to demonstrate the link between changes in the international system which accompanied the end of the Cold War, and the apparent inability of the United Nations to fulfil its mandate and to respond to the trust which the international community, and in particular the international civil society, has placed in it, this paper has in its first section provided a comparison between the nature of conflict and of the international system during the Cold War, and the nature
of conflict and the international system after the Cold War. It must however be pointed out that there are some overlaps between the two, with in particular intrastate war not having suddenly appeared with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union, but having begun to emerge already during the period of the Cold War, and in particular on the African continent from the 1950’s and 1960’s onwards, following on from disruptions provoked by the sudden disappearance of the colonial powers from the scene and the all too rapid switch to independence and democracy. Similarly, the fall of the Berlin Wall did not signify a sudden transition from a system of bipolarity to a system of multipolarity more permissive of intrastate conflict. The end of the Cold War, i.e. in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s and the demise of the Soviet Union, did nevertheless represent a significant landmark in the nature of the international system and in the nature of conflict. What the first section of the paper outlined is the fact that during the Cold War period, conflicts were generally interstate, with the United Nations hardly getting involved in any other type of conflict, with the organisation’s Charter, mandate, doctrine and approach being geared to this. The Blue Helmets were thus called on to intervene much less frequently, in particular because of the crippling effect of the veto within the Security Council, and were at the same time able to intervene in conditions which corresponded to both their means and their doctrine. For interstate conflict meant the Blue Helmets could intervene in relative safety, could uphold their principle of neutrality and
use of force in self defense only, and with only a military mission to accomplish which most times involved the monitoring of a truce already arrived at by two parties who both agreed on the UN presence.

What the end of the Cold War did was to radically alter these favourable conditions, and it is the radical nature of these transformations which point to the fact that it is this which provided the background of the equally radical failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990's in particular. Conflict became largely intrastate as a result of the disappearance of the stabilising influence of superpower rivalry. It thus became far more violent, involved a greater number of parties all of whom did not agree on a UN presence, jeopardised the safety of the Blue Helmets, and targeted the civilian population on an unprecedented scale. In the face of these deep transformations, the doctrine and resources of the United Nations were clearly obsolete, and even represented a liability, both in terms of the resolution of the situation on the ground, as well as in terms of the safety and credibility of UN peace missions themselves. This has been presented throughout this paper as representing a point of disjuncture between the new realities of post Cold War conflict and intervention, and the mandate and resources of the organisation.

The nature of this disjuncture, as well as its causes, have been examined in the second section of this paper. A separate assessment was made of those types of disconnects and
disjunctures which may be attributed to the United Nations per se, i.e. to its own set-up and constitution, and of those which may be linked to the policies and behaviour of the individual member states. While the organisation itself is responsible for certain disjunctures, it has been found that the majority of those disconnects which may be identified are to be attributed to the member states themselves.

This is moreover to be expected since, as was pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the behaviour of organisations for collective security are largely a function of the preferences and varying levels of influence of the member countries which make up those types of international organisations. In terms of the disjunctures which may be laid at the door of the organisation itself, these may be considered to be primarily an obsolete constitution, with the concept of peacekeeping still holding an uncertain place, between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, and with even the term “peacekeeping” still not being mentioned anywhere in the Charter, even as peacekeeping has become so core to the role of the United Nations in the post Cold War era. At the same time, the unpracticability of the concept of “neutrality” jeopardises the safety of UN troops on the ground while appearing to condone violators of human rights in areas of conflict, while the heavy bureaucracy and multiple layers of authorisation hinder the organisation from functioning efficiently, as in the matter of the financing of peace operations.
In terms of the behaviour and policies of individual member countries, many more numerous disjunctures have been identified. These include in particular an all too frequent disconnect between the perceptions of member states of both the desirability and feasibility of United Nations peace operations, with these appearing to verge either on the side of a sense of false optimism as in the early 1980's as a result of the euphoria which accompanied the end of the Cold War and the final lifting of the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction, or on the side of lack of interest in areas of conflict which represent situations of emergency, with this being particularly reflected in the marginalisation of the African continent in the international security system as the geostrategic importance of the area disappeared along with the East-West rivalry.

The false optimism of the end of the 1980's was no doubt the most lethal of the two, since it is generally considered to have been directly responsible for the manner in which member states appeared to rush into setting up peace operations without fully realising the implications of the transformations in the international system and in the nature of conflict which characterised the end of the Cold War. This would have been the basic underlying disjuncture and disconnect which led to the disasters of in particular Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. At the same time, another type of disjuncture which contributed to the downward spiral of UN peace missions and which was linked to the general sense of optimism which accompanied the end of the Cold War was the impact of the rise of a new doctrine of
humanism, as encouraged by the media. While in certain instances it did have a positive impact on collective peace and security by attracting attention to areas of conflict which might otherwise have been discarded by powers hitherto concerned practically exclusively with their own national security, it also prompted member countries to intervene in areas without thinking through the implications of intervention and without them actually having the domestic political backing to see the operation through to a successful conclusion. The operation in Somalia and the manner in which the Americans ended up withdrawing from the area as hastily as they appeared to intervene there, is the most clear illustration of this type of disjuncture. Moreover, while some of the more major powers of the organisation may decide to mount what is in practical terms their own peace operation, they do not appear to take the training and provision of troops to the organisation seriously enough. This again has been seen to represent a disjuncture between the growing needs of the organisation in the post Cold War era and the unwillingness of member states to shoulder their responsibility in the matter. This disjuncture is all the more serious since it is considered to have been one of the determinant elements in the disaster of in particular the Sierra Leone, with the poor training and equipment of the UN contingents leading to their kidnapping by the rebel forces of Foday Sankoh. That this is so is the result of the self-serving behaviour of nation-states in an international system characterised by the return of multipolarity and anarchy. This appears clearly through an examination of the
motives of troop contributing countries, with only a handful of member states, i.e. the scandinavian countries of Northern Europe, being prepared to contribute to the United Nations out of altruism and a commitment to ideals of the organisation. As such, it is the troops of these countries which are the best trained and the best equipped of all of the Blue Helmet contingents. There is thus a fundamental yet perhaps to a large degree inevitable disjuncture between the cohesion and solidarity which all members of the international community ought to show in today’s era of vicious and destabilising intrastate conflicts, and the reality of nation-states who prefer to follow their own agenda. This is again reflected in the unwillingness of the United Nations’ most powerful and needed member to shoulder its financial obligations towards the organisation. Finally, the second section of this paper has paid particular attention to the place which the humanitarian element of peacekeeping holds in the new difficulties which the organisation has to face up to in the post Cold War era. It has thus been found that another set of profound disjunctures are here again apparent. In the same way as in the assessment of the different aspects of the respective responsibilities of the United Nations as an organisation and of the member states, it has been found in this paper that the majority of identifiable disjunctures and disconnects which are associated with the specific issue of the humanitarian dimension of peacekeeping in the post Cold War era are to be linked to the policies of the individual member states which make up the UN. In particular, it is apparent that member states tend to use
humanitarian concerns to lend justification to their participation or initiation of United Nations peace missions, even though it is undeniable that the integration of a humanitarian element to the definition to the "national interest" and the appearance of a collective conscience with regard to the sanctity of human rights, have also emerged in member states in the post Cold War era.

Yet the fact that member states will invoke violations of human rights in order to intervene in certain areas while being either uninterested or unwilling to intervene in other conflicts in which violations of human rights are to all appearances even greater and better documented, with the contrast between the situations in Kosovo and the situation in Rwanda or Chechnya coming to mind, points to the resilience of the Realpolitik element in the agenda of the member states of the organisation. This again represents a disjuncture which is unfortunately to be expected until a system of accountability or of sanction of governments for their criminal acts against their own population is devised and upheld by the international community, and not merely in the case of countries in which intervention has taken place.

The reason why special attention has been given in conclusion to the second section of this paper to the humanitarian dimension is moreover not only because it has become a central element of second generation peacekeeping and because it stands as a reflection of many disjunctions and disconnects within post Cold War peacekeeping, but also because it is linked
to what is probably the most controversial concept in contemporary international relations. This refers to the notion of the sovereignty of the state, and of the justification for intervention.

That this controversy has emerged and that it is so central to the whole concept of peacekeeping today is linked to the question of human rights and to the notion of an international civil society. For indeed, the picture of the gross violation of human rights, ranging from intimidation through mutilation to outright genocide, in the case of intrastate conflict which is relayed to the public begs the question of whether the hitherto sacrosanct sovereignty of states should be disregarded by the international community in order to lend assistance to civilian populations in distress.

What is now being placed above the notion of the inviolability of state borders for the first time in the history of humanity, is the concept of a civil society whose rights stand above those of the state. It corresponds to the idea that it is the states which are at the service of the people and not vice-versa, and that it is the entire international community which is responsible for the safety of the civil society, regardless of whether a state is willing to let it intervene or not. The issue has however not yet gained universal acceptance, with the fact that the international community has appeared to intervene belatedly in conflicts in which violations of human rights have been occurring, being due in part to a reticence to intervene in the affairs of another state. Moreover, as was pointed out in the
previous chapter, elements of self interest will most often come into play in a state's decision to intervene in a conflict in the name of human rights, with this leading to some areas in which gross violations of human rights are occurring being completely ignored by governments, as in the case of Chechnya.

One fundamental concern indeed remains that the notion of the right of a state to intervene in the affairs of another in the name of human rights may be exploited and used as justification for an intervention which may in reality be motivated by another type of agenda, with the manner in which the international community and in particular its most powerful member i.e. the United States, does appear to discriminate between different conflicts with at least equally unacceptable violations of human rights, lending credence to this to a certain extent. Yet the recent tragedies of Rwanda and Somalia, and the admission of guilt by some member states and by the United Nations itself do reflect a growing sense on the part of member states that it is the international community as a whole which is responsible for the safety of the global civil society.

Nevertheless, in spite of failure on the part of both the organisation and its member states to raise the alarm earlier on in several instances, and in particular on the African continent, and in spite of the failure of operations particularly in recent years, it must be underlined that the United Nations has had to deal with a series of difficulties which taken altogether do to a certain extent represent mitigating circumstances. For the series of disjunctures and disconnects which have been outlined
throughout this paper are the result of very dramatic transformations in the international system. The first section of this paper was in effect devoted to describing and assessing exactly what those transformations were, focusing on changes for the worse in the nature of conflict, in order to underline the fact that the organisation had to deal with factors which were largely beyond its control and which occurred in a relatively short period of time. It is in a sense inevitable that the organisation should as a result go through a difficult period of understanding and adapting to these deep transformations, with this being all the more difficult since it would be unrealistic to expect that all member states should altruistic pursue the common good in an era of anarchical multipolarity.

While a long list of disjunctures and disconnects on the part of the organisation may be drawn up, these are to a certain extent largely the result of one big disjuncture and disconnect in the international system itself: this lies in the dichotomy mentioned above, namely the fact that we are now in an era of intricate, particularly violent and cruel, intrastate conflict which in order to be solved require an international community which acts swiftly, with resolve and in unison. Yet just at the time when this began to occur, we embarked on an era of multipolarity in which the players act largely out of self interest, in spite of a growing concern on the part of public opinion and the media with regard to violations of human rights. As a result of this, the Brahimi report itself underlines how "it should have come as no surprise that these missions would be hard
to accomplish". The fact does unfortunately remain that, in the last resort, it is a lack of political will on the part of member states which means that disjunctures and disconnects which are product of the dichotomy mentioned above are left to persist. In particular, the fact that the notion of sovereignty is the subject of controversy is also linked to the fact that member states are reluctant to admit that gross violations of human rights, resulting in certain cases in what must be termed genocide, occur in many intrastate conflicts. For, as has been noted in this paper, the admission that a situation of genocide is unfolding in an area of conflict might put pressure on member states to take action when they do not perceive their national interest to be directly at stake.

This is why alternative methods of mediating in conflicts have been touched on in this paper. In particular, it has been noted that in the case of the many conflicts which rage on the African continent, the former colonial powers of Western Europe should be the member states which are called upon before all others to intervene. At the same time, non governmental organisations, and religious groups such as the community of Sant'Edigio, provide other credible alternatives to UN mediation and intervention, in particular as they are perceived to be largely independent of the politics of member states and as being more impartial and non threatening than the UN, as noted above. Finally, it may also be hoped that the manner in which international norms are slowly evolving, as shown in particular

\[\text{\footnotesize 122 Brahimi report, p. 4.}\]
and most importantly with the erosion of the westphalian concept of sovereignty, may end up having a positive impact on the conscience of member states, small as it may be.
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