THE POLITICS OF COMPREHENSIVE METROPOLITAN PLANNING:
A CASE STUDY OF BELO HORIZONTE

by

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Ithiel de Sola Pool, Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by...........
Myron Weiner, Chair, Department Graduate Committee
ABSTRACT

This is a study about the comprehensive metropolitan planning of Belo Horizonte, the capital city of the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil. The dissertation centers on the problem of planning effectiveness.

Effectiveness in comprehensive metropolitan planning does not automatically derive from the logic of modern capitalism, nor does it simply result from the calculated response of concerned elites to the growing problems of big cities. Instead, a political process determines plan effectiveness. This process involves, on the one hand, the resistance of relatively autonomous organizations to the plan, and, on the other, the support of power holders who side with the planning agency in its conflict with other centers of power.

Since it requires a generous supply of power to be effective, the literature asserts that comprehensive planning is unlikely to succeed in pluralist political systems, and it has been hypothesized that less pluralist political systems may provide a more favorable climate for such endeavors.

The political regime of Brazil in the post-1964 years provides a good setting for testing the feasibility of comprehensive planning in a non-pluralist situation. The presence of authoritarian traits at the different levels of the governmental structure in conjunction with the move toward establishing national urban policy would apparently enhance the possibilities of successful comprehensive planning in cities and metropolitan areas.

Nevertheless, an authoritarian regime does not suppress the recalcitrance of organizations to central directives, the plurality of centers holding limited power within the federal government, the autonomous clusters of actors in each state, metropolitan area, and single city, and the clash among different sets of technocrats. It does not eliminate conflicting goals in urban policies, nor the need for trade-offs among those goals, nor for attention to political costs of several kinds by policy-makers if they commit resources for implementing plan proposals.

Our research explores, in the context of authoritarian Brazil, how organizational and political factors create difficulties for effective comprehensive planning. Under what political conditions, if any, can planners be effective? What resources are available to them? What roles can they play to enhance their chances to push through integrated plans? What allies can they count on? What ideal of comprehensive planning is tenable in the circumstances planners are likely to encounter?

The planners we studied were immersed in bureaucratic politics from the start. In practice, they could not act
purely as technicians. Instead, they had to engage in intense wheeling and dealing in an attempt to influence a vast range of decisions covered by their ambitious conception of comprehensive planning. In the end, it was not feasible to implement their vision in its entirety. The planners faced resistance from actors in their environment—sectoral agents and municipalities. To overcome resistance, they needed support from power-holders, and this support varied from case to case.

At times, planners failed to win backing because the adequacy of the comprehensive approach to the scale of problems—either local or supra-metropolitan—was disputed. In other cases, the comprehensive solutions were promoted by different actors, and the planners' proposals were put aside. In a situation in which planners prevailed, they showed political ability allied with a display of technical expertise which persuaded the power holder to favor a comprehensive, rather than sectoral, solution. Although the comprehensive solution was justified because it would benefit the broad metropolitan public, in reality it was adopted because it favored the political interests of the policy-maker. In other situations, the policy-biases of the different organizations against a comprehensive solution, favoring a broader set of preferences and values, were too strong. Moreover, these biases found their way into the policy-makers' calculations too. As the defenders of different preferences and values were absent from the decision making circles in the authoritarian situation, neither deft political maneuvering nor the planners' technical expertise proved sufficient in obtaining the sought after decision. In one of the cases examined, however, the gradual liberalization of the regime made policy-makers more sensitive to the demands of the broader public, and because comprehensive solutions were attuned to these demands, planners found new leverage in influencing decision making.

The biases and resistance of organizations and centers of power, and the constant need of support from power-holders make comprehensive planning feasible only in a mitigated version. To the extent that the logic of comprehensive planning implies speaking for the interests and values of the broader metropolitan public, not usually conveyed by sectoral agents, a more open political regime, rather than an authoritarian one, holds out better hope for effective comprehensive planning.

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool
For Vera Regina
(in memoriam)
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Each of the members of my doctoral committee helped to improve the quality of my work, although of course they bear no responsibility for its flaws. My chair, Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool, devoted an enormous amount of time to counseling, reading and criticizing several drafts of the work. He helped sharpen my thoughts and kept me on the right track. Professor Brian Smith offered much valuable advice and penetrating criticism at several stages of writing. Professor Frank Colcord, who first awakened my interest in urban studies, gave me many insights into the nature of the problem this dissertation is about. I wish to express my deep appreciation for their efforts, and for their generosity in agreeing to sit on my doctoral committee.
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I wish to record my gratitude to my parents for the sacrifices they made to allow me to go to school and express the hope that I have not disappointed them.

My daughters, Ana Carolina and Ana Cristina, will certainly be relieved to know that the tese—which for them was associated with the idea of a very busy daddy, always typing or reading in his office—is finally over.

My late wife Vera Regina gave me encouragement, patience, good humor and love. This dissertation is dedicated to her memory.
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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

BDMG  Bank for the Development of Minas Gerais.

BNH  National Housing Bank (attached to the Ministry of the Interior).

CED  State Development Council of Minas Gerais.

COPASA  Company for Sanitation, which replaced COMAG.

COMAG  Company for Water and Sewerage Services, attached to the Secretariat of Public Works of Minas Gerais (Denomination changed to COPASA in 1973.)

CNPU  National Commission for Metropolitan Regions and Urban Policy, attached initially to the Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency, and now, under the denomination of CNDU, to the Ministry of the Interior.


CNG  National Geographic Council, attached to the Ministry of Planning.

CEMIG  Company for Hydroelectric Power of Minas Gerais.

COHAB  Company for Low-Cost Housing, attached to the Secretariat of Public Works of Minas Gerais.


CODEURBE  Company for Urban Development, attached to the State Secretariat of Public Works of Minas Gerais (replaced CIURBE).

DNER  National Bureau of Public Roads, attached to the Ministry of Transportation.

DER  Bureau of Public Roads of Minas Gerais.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DETRAN</td>
<td>State Department for Traffic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNER</td>
<td>National Department of Railways, attached to the Ministry of Transportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMAE</td>
<td>Department of Water and Sewerage Services of Belo Horizonte.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBTU</td>
<td>National Enterprise for Urban Transportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPEA</td>
<td>Office for Applied Economic Research, attached to the Ministry (today Secretariat) of Planning (replaced by IPEA.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGTs</td>
<td>Time-on-job Guarantee Fund.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIPLAN</td>
<td>Fund for Urban Planning, administered by SERFHAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISANE</td>
<td>National Fund for Sanitation, administered by the National Housing Bank.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJP</td>
<td>João Pinheiro Foundation, attached to CED (Minas Gerais).</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Group for Integrated Planning, attached to CED (Minas Gerais).</td>
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<td>GRANBEL</td>
<td>Association of the Mayors of the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte.</td>
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<td>HIDROSERVICE</td>
<td>Brazilian consultant firm.</td>
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<td>INDI</td>
<td>Industrial Development Board of Minas Gerais, attached to the State Secretariat of Industry and Commerce.</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCRA</td>
<td>National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Institute for Applied Economic Research, attached to the Secretariat of Planning (Federal Government). Replaced the EPEA.</td>
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<td>PLAMBEL</td>
<td>Metropolitan Plan of Belo Horizonte, a planning group located at FJP in 1971, transformed into an &quot;autarquia&quot; (semi-autonomous body) in 1973.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROGRES</td>
<td>National Program for Expressways, of the Ministry of Transportation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>SERFHAU's Program for Concentrated Action (program for planning of 457 municípios in Brazil).</td>
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<td>PND</td>
<td>National Development Plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMDES</td>
<td>Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Minas Gerais.</td>
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<td>POS</td>
<td>Land Occupancy Plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANASA</td>
<td>National Sanitation Plan, of BNH.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERFHAU</td>
<td>Federal Service for Housing and Urban Development, attached to the Ministry of the Interior.</td>
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<td>SAMAE</td>
<td>Department of Water and Sewerage Services of Contagem (município in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte).</td>
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<td>SUDECAP</td>
<td>Superintendancy for Urban Development of Belo Horizonte (agency of the Belo Horizonte City Hall).</td>
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<td>SAGMACS</td>
<td>Consulting and Planning firm, linked to French movement &quot;Économie et Humanisme.&quot;</td>
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<td>SUDECON</td>
<td>Superintendancy for Urban Development of Contagem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERETE</td>
<td>French Planning Firm, Brazilian Branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>URBS</td>
<td>Company for Urban Development of Curitiba, capital city of the State of Paraná.</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPREHENSIVE METROPOLITAN PLANNING

Effectiveness in Comprehensive Planning: an Uncertain Result of a Political Process

This is a study about an experiment in comprehensive metropolitan planning, namely, the planning of the Metropolitan Area of Belo Horizonte, capital city of the State of Minas Gerais, in Brazil. The study is centered on the problem of planning effectiveness, understood, to put it shortly, as the capacity of planners to influence policy courses according to the stipulations of a plan.

There is a tendency, in much that is written about urban problems and their possible solutions, not to consider planning effectiveness as problematic. On the contrary, it is frequently postulated that, with the aggravation of problems in cities and metropolitan areas, and the growing awareness of those problems among relevant publics, comprehensive planning will be adopted and enforced as a suitable policy to correct or, at least, alleviate urban ills.

Annmarie Hauck Walsh expresses this widely shared view in her careful international comparison of thirteen metropolitan areas:

Persistent problems of urban poverty and inconvenience have undermined faith in sequential and fragmented processes
of urban decision-making in many nations, resulting in increasing commitment, for better or for worse, to influencing by conscious forethought and technology the outcome of change according to desired ends. This commitment was illustrated at an international conference of metropolitan problems in 1967; among delegates from forty cities from around the world, agreement was substantial on the utility of comprehensive, multifunctional metropolitan planning, although its scope and methods were subject to some debate. All thirteen cities on which this study is based manifest the increasing popularity of planning concepts in the postwar period.1

Authors of a neo-marxist persuasion do not disagree with the perspective presented in Walsh's quotation, though they found it on a more complex interpretive scheme. According to them, comprehensive urban and metropolitan planning would constitute requisites, in terms of state intervention, for the functioning of societies in the present stage of the capitalist mode of production. The planning of cities and metropolitan areas would be necessary to permit the accumulation of capital, and the reproduction of the labor force. Friedland, Piven and Alford, for instance, see governmental agencies as providing "the authority to make and enforce decisions affecting the spatial efficiency of the urban economy." Those decisions would consist, among other things, in "metropolitan planning activities."2

For neo-marxists, like Friedland, Piven and Alford, planning, and related public policies towards cities and metropolitan areas, cannot be really efficacious, because the problems they are expected to solve are intrinsic to modern capitalist societies. But those writers, and those who, like Walsh, take the perspective of normative public administration, do not seem to question the capacity of comprehensive planning
to be effective. They seem to take it for granted that, once people come on this policy tool, and adopt it, resources (authority, money, commitment) will be mobilized and devoted to put planned policy alternatives into effect. Effectiveness is implicitly regarded as mostly a technical problem, to be solved through studious application of management science techniques.

We take issue with those views. The fact that comprehensive urban and metropolitan planning is regarded, by observers of, and, sometimes, participants in, policy-making, as a necessity, or requisite, for the functioning of the (capitalist) system in which the cities and metropolitan areas are inserted, does not per se ensure that policies will be shaped predominantly by what plans stipulate. If there are technical aspects to the problem of planning effectiveness, to be treated by management experts, it is also, in some essential aspects, a political problem. The road to effectual planning is strewn with political hazards. Instead of reducing the politics of planning effectiveness to the decisions of rational actors, as the upholders of the normative public administration view seem to do, or to the implicit working of a deterministic functionalist logic of the "system," as neo-marxists are inclined to do, we see the planning politics as a process with uncertain results. In that process, the plan proposals have to be put into practice by organizations which have their own policy paradigms, their routines and standard operating procedure, and their autonomous goals.
The plan proposals need the support, or acquiescence, of political actors who have their own policy preferences and interests—which might differ from those forwarded by the plan proposals—and control different power-resources. Conflicts of interest, resistance by organizations to the plan proposals, defense by different actors of alternative programs, are a part of the process of turning plans into reality. This process requires consensus building, bargaining, arbitration by higher level actors, and authoritative allocation of resources through binding decisions. Thus, effectiveness in planning is a problem worth investigating from the perspective of political science. It is necessary to focus on the difficulties that comprehensive planning encounters to pass from the realm of policy models and blueprints into that of imperative allocation of resources and determination of behaviors.³

Neglect to heed the politics of effectiveness in comprehensive urban and metropolitan planning induces—as it also does with respect to global planning—into misleading assumptions about the usefulness and potential of this tool. Such an ambitious policy is advanced and entered upon without a careful assessment of its feasibility.

A first step towards the perfecting of a policy instrument, or, if it is the case, its radical modification or abandonment, is the knowledge of its actual functioning. This study proposes to investigate the real operation of comprehensive planning, through the intensive observation of
a practical instance of such policy, viz., the planning of the Belo Horizonte metropolitan area. What are the chances of planners being effective, when they subscribe to the ideal of comprehensive planning, as they did in Belo Horizonte? Is it likely that a comprehensive plan will be accepted and adopted by the organizations and individual agents that operate in the metropolitan "policy-space," and translated into actual behaviors? Will the proposals of planners count on the support of power-holders having jurisdiction over the metropolitan area? Under what conditions will that support be given? If the roles planners play can make a difference in terms of their effectiveness, as Rabinovitz suggests, what roles are required from, and what resources are available to, planners who wish to be effectual actors in the metropolitan scene, when they subscribe to the comprehensive planning conception?

These questions will be explored in this chapter, from a theoretical perspective, and will guide the examination of the empirical material, in subsequent chapters.

The Politico-Administrative Requisites of Comprehensive Planning

What is it so peculiar about the policy of comprehensive urban and metropolitan planning that makes it appear so promising, and, as often held, necessary, a policy in the eyes of authors of so different persuasions, as students of public administration and neo-marxist writers?
It is often stressed that comprehensive planning is a new style of decision-making. The word *comprehensive* is not lightly used by the upholbers of comprehensive planning. The requisite of comprehensiveness enjoins planners to understand the complex causation systems operating in urban and metropolitan reality. In the most recent versions of the planning paradigm, the planner is urged to look not only at the physical aspects of city life, but also at the economic, social and institutional ones, and at the interrelations of those aspects with one another and with the physical ones, to obtain a fuller grasp of the functioning of the city.

Activities taking place in a specific location are investigated in their effects upon activities in other locations. Sectoral programs are explored in their unintended results, side effects, as well as hidden costs and benefits. The time perspective is also crucial in planning comprehensively. Planners are to look not only at short run interrelations of events and implications of programs, but also at long run effects. As stated by Walsh, "planning can adapt the time dimensions of policy to the time dimensions of the phenomena with which it deals." 

The comprehensive approach to planning has not only cognitive import, but also, as implicit in the preceding comment, a normative one. If consideration of the "public interest" is to guide public policies, an encompassing understanding of reality seems to be a necessary condition for the knowledge of the "public interest." The approach characteristic
of comprehensive planning permits transcending the limitations of partial interests in the definition, by authorities, of the uses to which public power will be put. By looking at the "whole," the planner, more than other actors involved in policy-making, would be able to know what is in the interest of that whole, be it a city or a metropolitan agglomeration, and to embody that knowledge in his proposals. If the "public interest" can defined, according to John Dewey, as the interests of those not a part to a transaction, but affected by it, it is more likely to be taken into consideration through the approach of comprehensive planning than through that of sectoral policies and programs. The latter are bound to neglect relevant side-effects and less apparent costs and benefits. Further, the adoption of a long-range time perspective in comprehensive planning helps incorporate the interests of future generations into the decision-making frame.

Comprehensive planning, therefore, through a thorough knowledge of the functioning of the city or metropolitan area, and a better view of the "public interest," can be translated into policies "that correlate diverse public functions and geographic sectors in the metropolis." In other words, the enforcement of comprehensive urban or metropolitan plans supposes a thorough canvassing and ordering of the goals to be pursued, the harmonization of those goals on the part of the several governmental participants in the urban arena, the adoption by them of common or compatible policies, and the
coordination of their actions in the light of the plan stipulations.

The summary description of the ideal conception of the comprehensive planning policy is sufficient to show its policy ambitions and its demands upon the politico-administrative process. What is claimed for comprehensive planning is the definition of the "utility function" that the metropolitan actors will have to make effective. Planning has to occupy a central place in the policy-making process. In the words of Walsh, "the planning arena must encompass important decision centers." Planners are expected to exert influence on all relevant decisions, initiating programs of their own, and approving or vetoing programs initiated by other actors. That influence can be exerted basically in two ways, either the planning agency acting as a staff to some public authority, or directly exerting delegated powers.

The Politics of Comprehensive Planning

(a) Comprehensive Planning and Pluralist Politics: an Uneasy Association

An important literature casts serious doubts on the feasibility of comprehensive planning in general, and on its application to city and metropolitan planning, in particular. Banfield and Altshuler, for instance, have pointed out, in their studies of urban planning, what they saw as the mutual rejection between a pluralistic political process, as practiced
in American cities, and the political requisites of comprehensive planning. In comprehensive planning, a definition of the collective welfare function is searched by planners. In pluralist politics, that function results from the expression of individual and group interests in political transactions. It is not arrived at through rational and detached exploitations by a small group of people, as planners. Political leaders would loathe entrusting to planning the functions and powers that the ideal policy of comprehensive planning seems to require. 9

Other works have focused on planning from the perspective of organization theory and decision-making theory. Though their object is not always city or metropolitan planning, their criticisms of comprehensive planning are pertinent all the same. The attempt to introduce comprehensive planning into the administrative machinery runs against the resistance of organizations and faces obstacles inherent to the process of decision-making in government. 10

In both Banfield and Altshuler, however, the possibility of the political system adopting comprehensive planning, at least in a mitigated form, is contemplated. Banfield, in the conclusion of his analysis of the Chicago political system, compares "social choice" and "central decision" processes, and suggests the possibility of a mixed decision-choice process, which he sees at work in Chicago. 11 Altshuler, 12 on the other hand, after analyzing the obstacles to the comprehensive planning ideal in the Twin Cities politics, ponders, in the
last part of his study, whether different political contexts would not be more hospitable to such planning ideal. He recognizes trends favorable to a "more influential role for general planning" in the United States. In the case of "metropolitan planning," he points out, for instance, that "the values of coordination as opposed to those of laissez faire have for many years been in the ascendant in our society." He adds that "federal aid programs have expanded rapidly and federal officials have become more and more willing to manipulate the incentives at their command so as to encourage general planning in recent years." He also examines instances in history and in other contemporary political systems "in which planning controls have been far more influential than they give any promise of becoming" in the United States. Certain conditions—for instance, the unitary constitution in The Netherlands and Great Britain, and, in the latter country, the great prestige of politicians and high civil servants, a certain opposition to capitalist ideas, the degree of consensus among the elites on the "components of good communities and good lives" and the influence of war—have favored comprehensive planning to an extent difficult to achieve in American politics.

(b) Comprehensive Metropolitan Planning in a Non-Pluralist Politics: the Case of Brazil

How would a political system like the Brazilian fare with regard to the conditions for comprehensive urban and
metropolitan planning? First, it should be stressed that, traditionally, pluralism has not been a feature of Brazilian politics. As shown in a copious literature, the Brazilian political system has been formed within a tradition of patrimonial rule and corporatism, in which the State and its bureaucracy, and attached clienteles, rather than autonomous interest groups, have played a central role in policy-making and in the definition of the "public interest." This condition would, seemingly, help planning.

Second, several other conditions could be listed, the operation of which for the last two decades could appear as highly positive to the planning policy. In the wake of the installation of a new political regime in 1964, through which new political elites took over, and the Army began to play a more direct role in government, critical institutional changes took place in the country. Political centralization, which had been a noticeable trend since the 1930s, knew an unprecedented impetus. Determining instruments for policy-making, particularly with regard to economic and national security matters, became the prerogative of the Federal government. Legislatures on all levels were curtailed. They lost their powers and were reduced to a modest role in policy-making. The presence of the State in productive activities, and in service discharge, already noted since the 1930s, has become a strong characteristic of the Brazilian socio-economic scenario in the post-1964 years.
Two other traits should be added to this brief portrayal of conditions seemingly propitious to comprehensive planning in cities and metropolitan areas in Brazil. One such trait is the military presence in governmental institutions since 1964, allowing them to influence policy-making in accordance with their doctrines which, among other things, tend to set store by planned actions. The other relevant trait is the upgrading of the role of technical experts—known in Brazil as "the technocracy"—in the public sector, on all governmental tiers. Among the "technocrats," all kinds of planners—global, sectoral, regional and urban planners—appeared to occupy center stage in public policy-making. Planning agencies have been created, or consolidated, throughout the administrative machinery, on its geographic echelons and functional divisions.

Consensus to establish goals, set up priorities, design the desirable end-states and specify the means towards achieving them through governmental endeavors—requisites of comprehensive planning—seemed assured, as assured appeared to be the powers to put plans into practice.

Why would those conditions, which seem to favor comprehensive planning on the global level, also help planning in cities and metropolitan areas? First, because some of the features of the post-1964 regime were replicated on all governmental tiers. For instance, the downgrading of legislatures in policy-making and the rise of technical experts—including planners—in policy-making bodies.
Second, because several measures taken by the Federal Government, mostly after 1964, seem highly conducive to city and metropolitan planning. The federal government has financed housing programs, road building, construction of water and sewerage networks, subways, freeways, among many other programs. Sometimes, its participation in those programs has been not only in financing, but also in project preparation and, even, in some cases, direct execution. Through the legislative acts that launched many of those programs, the federal government has explicitly sponsored, through regulation, and fund provision, the preparation of urban and metropolitan plans. A special agency was set up to see to those matters, viz., the National Service for Housing and Urban Planning (SERFHAU). Later, the government has created an interministerial council—the National Council for Urban Development and Metropolitan Areas, earlier CNPU and today CNDU—to look after urban and metropolitan planning over the whole country. Important pieces of legislation, bearing on urban planning and development have also been enacted, among them the legal recognition of nine metropolitan areas, in 1973. As federalism in Brazil has been yielding to centralist drives in policy-making, as the very nature of the urban and metropolitan problems is accounted in great part by causes not controllable at the local level, the importance of those measures—which could be regarded as setting national urban policy—should not be belittled. They appear as highly propitious to comprehensive city and metropolitan planning.
Nevertheless, when confronted with the picture of the political and institutional conditions, and the description of the policies which seem to make Brazilian politics much more hospitable to comprehensive urban and metropolitan planning than American politics, we still can have doubts about the practicability of that ambitious policy in Brazil. Some of those doubts, founded on considerations from organization theory and from the literature on decision-making processes, are of a general nature. Others bear more specifically on the problems that comprehensive planning is likely to encounter in the political context of metropolitan areas in Brazil.

(c) Administrative Politics and Comprehensive Planning:

   Pluralism in the Governmental Organization

The fact that planners have been unencumbered by the intricacies of an open political process in Brazil does not imply that they are not faced with clashes of interests, conflicts of goals, recalcitrance of organizations to implement heteronomously set programs, and dispersion of power centers. The governmental machinery is not monolithic. It is stratified on governmental tiers and is sectorally divided. It embraces semi-autonomous agencies (autarquias), boards, councils, mixed and public enterprises, foundations, side by side with traditional administrative agencies.
The hypotheses and findings of the literature on organizations and bureaucratic politics lead us to expect that, in spite of belonging to the same "whole"--the governmental apparatus--and, in theory, at least, sharing its goals, those organizations have goals of their own, too. Organizations may become foci of interest for their members. They may lose sight of the big picture and pursue self-interest. Authors point to this phenomenon. They refer to the strategies of particular organizations to deal with uncertainties and contingencies brought about by the "environment," mention a bureau's sensitivity to incursions in its "policy space," point to the "recalcitrance of organizational tools" to obey directives imparted by the upper echelons, and to their tendency to become ends in themselves.

Public organizations do not constitute an homogeneous "milieu," a neutral vehicle, exerting no diffraction, filtering or distortion in the translation of centrally imparted guidelines into behaviors. Organizations are peopled by professionals, who are held together by paradigms, a concept Jack Walker adapts from Thomas Kuhn's studies on scientific revolutions, to refer to doctrines, generally agreed hypotheses and explanatory models, methods of investigation, favorite therapies and even goals prevalent among policy experts in the several policy fields.

Paradigms may to a great extent explain differences in concrete policy conceptions among governmental agencies. But there are other sources of variation in policy-perspectives.
among organizations in the public sector. Institutional location is critical. For instance, agencies closer to the center of the apparatus, charged with policy conception and coordination—as planning agencies tend to be—may differ from those closer to its periphery—in charge of decentralized executive tasks. Agencies like planning organizations are oriented to the long-run, whereas most executive agencies have the short-run as a determining reference. Some agencies give or lend money, other receive or borrow it. For some agencies, the constituency is the general public, while for others, owing to their activities, that constituency is formed by particular clienteles.

We have so far centered the analysis on the public and semi-public organizations, on their capacity to develop their own goals, forward their own interests, and shape policies in ways unintended by those who initiated them. Yet those organizations are rooted in society. How do interests deriving from society affect comprehensive planning? Would the absence of an open, pluralistic political process in Brazil, indicate that group and class interests are not conveyed by governmental organizations, and that planners move free from the pressures of those interests, that they only have to heed the presence of fellow public actors in their planning activities?

We do not think so. If it seems wrong to consider public organizations as mere instruments for the conveyance of interests formed outside them—in other words, as organizations
entirely lacking in autonomy—it is equally wrong to look upon them as unmoored from society. Contemporary authors, of a marxist persuasion, talk about the "relative autonomy" of state agencies, both to avoid lapsing, as many of their fellow marxists do, into reductionism by regarding those agencies as mere conductors of private interests, and to escape the opposite mistake of assuming an absolute autonomy of the public apparatus with regard to social interests. 20

In the case of Brazil, recent studies focus on the links that connect public bureaucracies to private—e.g., group and class—interests. As those interests may clash with one another, concrete goals pursued by different organizations within the "state apparatus" may conflict with one another too. 21 Some of those conflicts may occur between the planning agency and fellow agencies, as we shall examine in greater detail below.

What consequences for comprehensive planning can we anticipate from the characteristics of organizational behavior? As the planning agency will be concerned with defining goals for the governmental machinery, this fact implies its interfering with fellow organizations even if it limits itself to staff functions. For a planning agency essaying to implement comprehensive planning, its "policy-space" is, in the nature of the case, that of other organizations. It will attempt to define the goals that those organizations should pursue. If organizations tend to develop goals of their own, then that interference is likely to be resisted.
Therefore, if the adoption and enforcement of comprehensive planning implies both definition and ordering of goals, and harmonized actions to implement them, and if governmental organizations tend to resist planning directives, purely indicative planning will go awry. Power will be needed to make planned proposals effectual. The planning agency will have to call on the support of the political authority within whose jurisdiction--e.g., the municipio, the metropolitan area--comprehensive planning is to work. Will that support be forthcoming?

Let us consider the hypothesis apparently more favorable to the planning agency, viz., that it is set up as a staff unit to the political authority. According to traditional administrative theory, a staff unit will be considered an extension of the power-holder's personality. Simon, Smithburg and Thompson, however, take issue with that view. They doubt that the "chief executive" will automatically side with the planning agency, or other staff units, simply because they are staff units. In their words, "there is no inherent reason why a top executive should pay closer attention to the staff units than to the line units." The reasons for this fact place the problem of planning effectiveness in the context of "decision-making" theory.
(d) The Support for Planners: the Cost-Benefit Calculations of Power-Holders\textsuperscript{23}

The support of the power-holder for planners will depend on his choices between alternatives. He may support either the planning agency, or its fellow administrative units and nuclei of power—e.g., in a metropolitan area, a local government unit, as the municipio. Which alternative occurs will depend on his cost-benefit calculations. How are those calculations framed?

A basic reference in the executive’s calculations is what the comprehensive planning proposal he is confronted with will entail in terms of exercise of influence and attendant opportunity costs. The general politico-administrative implications of the comprehensive planning conception have already been spelled out, and have served us as a benchmark in the discussion thus far. However, we must point out that there is much variation in concrete applications of the comprehensive planning ideal.

That ideal is interpreted by a concrete professional community, viz., planners, who are in permanent interaction with their socio-political environment. In that environment are included the actors whose support is needed to make plans effective. Much of what constitutes a plan will depend on the planners’ perception of, and reaction to, that environment. Those perceptions and reactions are shaped in part by the planners professional values—which may vary over time,
for individual planners and for the planning community as a whole—and in part by factors like their institutional location, or status. For instance: Are planners a group distant from execution, or close to it? Are they placed in a staff agency, or do they also have line functions? And so on.

The resulting planning approach can be looked, first, from the perspective of its scope. How encompassing is a "comprehensive plan?"

In Brazil, planners have subscribed to the concept of "integrated planning," which has become the officially accepted and sponsored form of planning. This conception, in keeping with the international trends of the city planning profession, has meant that plans are to cover not only physical items, as usual in older city plans, but also the economic, social, and administrative aspects. Those aspects should, as mentioned, be studied in their relations with one another, and with the physical aspects, and be the target of many-sided, coordinated programs. Integration has also come to mean, in the official definition, concern with the harmonization of policies carried out in cities and metropolitan areas by agencies of several governmental levels.

That is a quite ambitious conception. Given the technocratic mentality pervasive in the public sector in Brazil during the period covered in our study, with its belief in rational, technical solutions for the country's most pressing problems, and the consequent prominence of technical experts in policy-making, and overestimation of their capacity
as policy formulators and implementers, that planning conception might easily lead planners to lapse into what Downs labeled the "superman syndrome," viz., comprehensive planning taken with a vengeance. Proposals, in this case, will tend to be "extremely broad in scope, building upon numerous interdependencies that (planners) perceive in theory." In the context of the relations between the planning agency and the other agencies, there will be a serious problem in the adjustment between these proposals and the "real demands of other social agents." Hence, planners will not "check with those agents to find out whether their assumptions are feasible." 25

Second, integrated plans may differ in the contents of their proposals. What interests will a plan affect? Who is going to be rewarded, or deprived, if it is enforced?

As comprehensiveness has come to signify the consideration of economic and social aspects in planning, alongside the concern with the physical shape of the city, many new regulatory, but, above all, redistributive issues may enter the agenda of planning, more likely than in the older conception of physical master plans. In the latter, it was easier to pursue a limited set of goals—e.g., to increase the efficiency of the urban system for its economic performance through, for instance, well-conceived transport networks, to beautify the landscape, through good urban design, to avoid "inconvenient" mixture of uses, through zoning, and so on—bound to raise only limited controversy. When plans include,
as integrated plans are apt to, more aspects than the physical ones, and, thus, more goals than more restricted plans do, controversy becomes likelier. Why? Because goals referring to the social and economic aspects of city life are less likely to be treated on exclusively technical terms. They are more susceptible to politicization than physical goals.

Once the possible variations in concrete interpretations of the comprehensive planning ideal have been examined above, let us turn to the political authority whose commitment is necessary to make planning into effective, "authoritative allocations of values."

In the case of metropolitan planning in Brazil—an instance of which will be the object of our study—one of the political authorities decisive to plan effectiveness is the State governor. Under what conditions will a governor lend his support for metropolitan planners, making their proposals prevail over competing ones?

Suppose, to start with, that a particular state governor has been convinced, by planners and their allies, that the problems of the state capital city and its conurbation require treatment through comprehensive metropolitan planning, and has decided to commission the preparation of a metropolitan plan. Suppose that a planning agency has been created, with mostly staff functions in the beginning.

The commitment to comprehensive metropolitan planning on the part of the state governor should mean that,
for those matters that are within his jurisdiction, contemplated in the metropolitan plan, the governor will decide according to the stipulations of that plan.

But decisions have opportunity costs. Not everything that metropolitan planners propose is unanimously, or consensually, accepted. Sectoral agencies, of the federal, municipal, or state government itself, may favor different policy courses from those advanced by metropolitan planners. *Municipios* in the metropolitan area may feel negatively affected by the planners' proposals. Likewise with social groups, classes and classes fractions that the governor may consider politically relevant.

The governor's utility function will guide his estimate of costs and benefits of policies. When he is convinced, in the first place, to lend his support to comprehensive metropolitan planning, that support is likely to be grounded on the same reasons that the literature presents as justifying (the normative public administration literature), or determining (the neo-marxist authors), the adoption of comprehensive planning today, on which we commented in the beginning of this chapter. On the surface, comprehensive planning is an alluring style of decision-making. It has a good public image. It holds the promise to bring rationality, order, efficiency and purpose into policy-making in a field which appears plagued by problems hard to cope with through conventional policies. Further, despite the changes in the urban planning paradigm, it is still associated in elite
and public opinion with the idea of daring public works, which endear it to administrators.

Once metropolitan planning is adopted, its operation within the governmental machinery will time and again call on the governor's interference, to ensure effective policies. The first practical derivation of comprehensive planning for a governor is the attempt by planners to ensure coordinated policies over a broad range of activities included in the plan's scope. Coordination is a costly policy. If the organizations to be coordinated have different goals both with respect to one another, and with respect to the planning agency, the governor, in the example imagined, will have to impose a solution. Some of the parties to the conflict will lose. As Pressman says, "...in no case is coordination among conflicting parties a bloodless and technical process."26

Coordination also implies delayed action. If the planning agency has lapsed into ambitious comprehensive planning, the dispatch with which executive agencies will carry through their programs may be seriously endangered.27

This fact is not always bad. Some speed in program conception and execution may be considered worth sacrificing for more balanced solutions, which coordination may achieve. But often, as Downs pointed out in his description of the "superman syndrome," the coordination proposed by planners may build on theoretically identified interdependencies needed for plans to present intellectual consistency, but
lacking in practical significance. In these cases, the governor's siding with the metropolitan planners may be a costly course in terms of expediency.

Delays are likely to occur in the beginning stages of planning experiments, when planners do not have much to offer, in comparison with executives and fellow policy-experts. Comprehensive plans suppose research and diagnoses, which take time to complete. Planners would lack in realism if they were to ask for a decision truce or quarantine, during which plans could be rounded out. Further, as has been discussed with regard to development planning by Caiden and Wildavsky, it is likely that in the confrontations between executive agencies and planners, the latter will lack concrete projects to put forth as alternatives to the proposals of the former. 28 Again, the executive may be inclined not to support planners, except if he needs to play for time or is inclined to pass the buck.

The second practical derivation of comprehensive planning for the executive's calculations has to do with contents, or direction of impact, of its proposals. Efforts at reaching comprehensiveness may appear, in a governor's calculations, as factors complicating decisions. Decisions, if carried out in the way they would before comprehensive planning were adopted, would be simpler. Planners tend to point out the interdependencies between programs. They call attention to "side-effects" and "externalities" of policies. Professional values induce planners to bring into consideration
values and interests that tend to be neglected by extant biases of the political system. Planners may attempt to dull the regressive impact of redistributive policies or to turn them into progressively redistributive ones. They may, as we mentioned, convert decisions initially looked upon as predominantly technical into politicized, controversy-laden ones. This fact, considered perhaps a benefit by outside observers, is costly to the decision-maker, particularly if he has been wont, as public decision-makers have been in Brazil, to decide in closed circles, and to treat problems with limited policy criteria. Unless there occurs some change in the parameters which orient a governor or other administrators, comprehensive planners will have little influence on policies. What are these parameters?

The governor of our hypothesis has values and preferences that will include certainly the desire to conserve or increase his power. This he cannot do unless the policies he backs do not antagonize interests that have political leverage. Many of those interests happen to develop strong links to particular public agencies, which advance not only their own interests qua organizations struggling for autonomy, and survival, but also the interests of their special clienteles. Other interests, though not constituting organized clienteles to public agencies, may be perceived as politically mobilizable, important reference publics.

Many of the proposals of a comprehensive plan may be in line with the principal vested interests of a metropolitan
area. Proposals for public works that increase the economic efficiency of the metropolis may be a case in point. Some of those works can be perceived and justified as "collective goods." They benefit not only a clientele, or a class, but also the city inhabitants as a whole.  

There may be more problematic situations. Even in a political system highly biased towards a limited set of interests, as the Brazilian in the post-1964 years—a fact which would apparently ensure a greater homogeneity and consensus among those interests—there may be situations of lack of clarity in the interests, or of inconsistency among them. In those cases, the authority may not know what to do. He may chose inaction as best policy course, whereas planners will attempt to clarify interests and propose choices in line with their professional values. Situations in which regulatory policies are advanced illustrate this point.

Think of "zoning." When zoning ordinances are proffered, it is common to hear complaints about the law structures. People complain in their role as owners of real estate, if their property rights are restricted by the zoning ordinances. But they may praise and demand strict zoning ordinances when, in their other role as residents, they will be benefited by, say, prohibitions against certain land uses, or the construction of big structures in the particular neighborhood where they live. Often, inconsistent interests are represented by different sectors within the administrative machinery itself.
For instance, one organization may be advancing the interests of polluters (say, a Development Board that gives incentives to investors in the metropolitan area), whereas one other may be curtailing them (say, a Committee for Environmental Protection that enforces regulations against pollution).

In these, and in similar cases, one could anticipate that, even if regulations that would imply a clear course of action are put forward by planners, the tendency of the authority can be rather to some "structural policy." Structural policies is how Robert Salisbury and John Heintz call decisions in which straightforward allocation is shirked, or postponed. When regulatory demands are perceived by planners, but still lack actual strength to press administrators to act, "villains," i.e., the producers of public evils, which need correction, will generally be a much more organized group than the consumers of those evils. They may weigh more heavily in the administrators' cost-benefit calculations.

On a more general level, it ought to be remembered that even in a closed political system as that of Brazil for the last two decades, accelerated urbanization and creation of metropolitan agglomerates puts severe stress on government. Demands of an urban content—e.g., demands for better transportation, for basic sanitation, for control of polluting plants, for regulation of land uses, for provision of infrastructures of several kinds to productive activities, for attraction job creating investments, for cheaper housing for the lower strata, etc.—are conveyed
by available political channels. Those demands may be contradictory with one another. In some cases, response to one demand occurs at some cost of another. For instance, certain kinds of industrial investment may also bring pollution into the city. Some demands may bear on facilitation of the process of "growth," of "capital accumulation." Others, often conveyed by the same groups who are the main beneficiaries of a response to the first--the upper and middle classes--may bear on the quality of life in cities. The simultaneous, satisfactory response to both types of demands may be hard, if not impossible, to carry through. Comprehensive planners may attempt a balance in their plans between the two sorts of goals. But the balance struck may not correspond to that which the governor, for instance, feels to be politically feasible or desirable. The delivery of essential urban services may hold low priority in his scheme of things, compared with the production of infrastructures to foster economic growth. Thus, his support for planners is uncertain.

A last point must be raised with regard to the executive's reactions to planning contents. In metropolitan planning, planners tend to order goals and evaluate alternatives by having as reference what they think is the "metropolitan interest." But the metropolitan interest is not the uppermost criterion for several of the policy-makers present in the metropolitan policy-space. The metropolitan interest is not cost-free in terms of other interests, which may be
present in a governor's mind. Metropolitan proposals may appear harmful to mayors. Interests of state or federal agencies may shock with those forwarded by metropolitan planners since they may have other reference publics. Thus, the governor's taking side with planners will often imply his conflicting with other relevant public actors, whom he may wish not to alienate.

(e) The Dispersion of Policy-Makers in Metropolitan Areas:

Who Will Support Planners?

To conclude our survey of the problems that comprehensive planning is likely to face to become effective, we should deal with the power problems specific to metropolitan areas. Planners need the support of political authorities, and that support is contingent on cost-benefit calculations by those authorities. We concentrated our previous analysis on one particular metropolitan actor, viz., a state governor. But a distinctive characteristic of "metropolitan planning" not only in Brazil, but also elsewhere, is the presence of several competing power-holders in the metropolitan scene.\(^{33}\)

Take the example of transportation, when the metropolitan planning experiment object of our study was launched in the Metropolitan Area of Belo Horizonte. Transportation problems in a metropolitan area include different aspects: e.g., problems related to the road system; traffic problems; problems in public transportation and mass transit; and problems related to truckage, among many others.
Consider the road systems. The several governmental tiers are involved in decisions bearing on roads in a metropolitan area in Brazil. The Federal Bureau of Public Roads (DNER) is in charge of planning and executing outer rings in cities, federal highways that cross metropolitan areas, and metropolitan freeways. Besides, it is charged with administration of the resources from collection of the Federal Roads Tax (Taxa Rodoviária Única), a part of which it channels both to the State Bureau of Public Roads (DER) and to the municípios. DER and City Halls of the metropolitan area are charged with state and municipal roads, respectively. At the time the metropolitan planning experiment started, the Belo Horizonte City Hall had also a special agency which, among other functions, would plan and execute the works of the capital city's road system.

Consider now public transportation and mass transit. Railways are the responsibility of two Federal agencies, the National Department of Railways, and the Federal Railways Company. Regulation, supervision and granting of franchises for the operation of inter-municipal busses is under the jurisdiction of DER, which is also charged with the management of the Belo Horizonte Bus Terminal. As to regulation, supervision and granting of franchises for bus lines in Belo Horizonte, the jurisdiction was the Municipal Superintendency of Transportation's, an agency at City Hall. Taxi-cabs were under the jurisdiction of DETRAN, a State agency connected to the State Secretariat of Public Security.
How about competences in urban traffic? Much of the traffic policy, in its planning and execution, is the responsibility of DETRAN. However, the traffic police is under the responsibility of BETRAN, also a state agency, but which reports to the State Militia, rather than to Secretariat of Public Security. The Federal Government is also present, its role being mostly normative, through the activities of the National Traffic Council.

If we were to take any of the other critical problems that justify metropolitan planning in the eyes of planners, mobilized citizens and opinion groups, and administrators--land use, sanitation, pollution abatement, housing, infrastructure, recreation, to mention the most common--we would come across the same multiplicity of centers of power, distributed both vertically, on the three governmental tiers, and horizontally, through simultaneous presence of several agencies belonging to a same governmental tier. If we simplify the problem, supposing that, for agencies on each governmental tiers, power resi des ultimately in the chief executive's hands--the President, the State Governor or the Mayor--there thus being a center of power, we still come across three governments--the Federal, the State, and the Municipal. In the case of the latter, each metropolitan area encompasses several municípios, for example, fourteen in the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Area.

Here lies one crucial difference between the politics of city planning and that of metropolitan planning. City
planning takes place in a single município, which, even if its decision-making structure be fragmented, has its own center of authority. The município is a multi-purpose governmental unit. Despite being the lesser of three governmental tiers, enjoying little autonomy in Brazil's current territorial distribution of power, it is still endowed with some constitutional powers. For example, the municipal government can levy taxes, condemn property for certain purposes, exert the "police power," represent the município in contacts with higher governmental echelons, request their financial and material help, and cooperation in joint endeavors. The local Government is legally capable to initiate programs of interest to the município, including comprehensive planning. If the mayor sides with him, the comprehensive municipal planner knows that he can influence the decisions which fall within the jurisdiction of the mayor, and can also attempt, through the mayor's exertions, to influence the decisions of the other governmental tiers in the município. In metropolitan planning, there is not such an institutionalized single center of power upon which efforts to make planned programs effective in the metropolitan area can turn.

Then, how is the problem of power in comprehensive metropolitan planning going to be solved? What political authority will back planners when planned proposals are disputed, and resisted against by the multiple organizations in the metropolitan policy space?
For many planners in Brazil, as elsewhere, the ideal situation would be that in which a new, interjected metropolitan governmental tier were created. Pending such creation in Brazil—which, indeed, can be, implicitly or explicitly, an ultimate ambition contained in most metropolitan plan proposals—which can metropolitan planners do?

In our brief description of the institutional arrangements in transportation, we saw that, in many cases, coping with a metropolitan problem may require cooperation by more than one organization, reporting to different governmental tiers. Some problems may be adequately dealt with mostly by the state government. Others may require an active participation of the federal government. For most metropolitan questions, the role of the capital city município is also critical. The mayors of capital cities are not elective, but appointed officials. Nonetheless, they may often become assertive advancers of what they see as the capital city's interest. Finally, some questions involve the remaining metropolitan municípios, which, despite being generally, in Brazil's metropolitan areas, the weakest actors, can nonetheless resist proposals their elites deem to be antagonistic to their interests.

The diffusion of power centers in the metropolitan area, which the planner has to face, adds to all the difficulties to planning effectiveness. The support of no single authority, from among the several present in the metropolis, will suffice to make planners effective. The support needed
for effectiveness may vary from issue to issue, and from phase to phase in service discharge and good production. Planning effectiveness will be the contingent result of a game in which multiple players play, with different interests, stakes and political resources.

(f) Effective Planning Requires Appropriate Role-Playing by Planners

Rabinovitz, in her study of the politics of city planning, has shown that effectiveness in planning was the result of favorable combinations of role-playing by planners, and patterns of community power structures. For instance, the technician role, which some of the normative planning literature prescribed for planners, was adequate only when the planner faced a cohesive power structure, and would share the goals of the leadership groups. In cities with a divided leadership, the more appropriate role turned out to be that of the broker. In more diffuse systems, "more obviously political roles were required," the planner having to act as a mobilizer to succeed in shaping policies.

Though Rabinovitz is dealing with power structures in the community at large, whereas we are focussing on power within the governmental machinery in metropolitan areas, her analysis keeps relevancy to our discussion. All the difficulties to planning effectiveness that we have investigated in this chapter—viz., resistance of organizations
to heteronomy, cost-benefit calculations by political authorities faced with planning proposals, and, last, dispersion of power centers that have to be activated to make metropolitan plans effective—make it obvious that effectiveness in metropolitan planning will demand a very active role from planners. They will have to look for a suitable ally or allies. Those allies, who may vary greatly, from issue to issue and stage to stage in policy production, will have to be convinced by the planners' arguments. Planners will have to show them that the benefits expected from planned policies will exceed their costs, while the opposite will happen with the policies that they oppose. As those costs and benefits are measured by the utility function of the ally or allies planners need, planners must show the instrumentality of their proposals for those allies' values. Then, planners have to become deft persuaders of power holders, and mobilizers of support. Obviously, the more ambitious their interpretation of the ideal of comprehensive planning, the more strenuous their role-playing will have to be. But too ambitious a planning conception, and a hyper-active role-playing can go awry, stirring up stronger resistance to planners, and diminishing the chances of planning effectiveness. In their practice, planners will have to learn how comprehensive "comprehensive plans" have to be, how much they will have to abdicate their initial ambitions to adopt the politically effective utility function, and what role-playing, what political sources, will make them effectual in the metropolitan scene.
The Research Problem: a Summary Statement

In this section, we review the principal points that guide our investigation.

Effectiveness in comprehensive metropolitan planning is regarded neither as a guaranteed product of the operation of the laws of modern capitalism--effective urban and metropolitan planning being one of the requisites for the functioning of the system--nor as only a rational response of concerned elites to the growing problems of big cities, a response which will materialize through the adoption by those elites of correct administrative measures to implement the plan.

Effectiveness is rather the end-result of a political process, contingent on the resistance of relatively autonomous organizations to the plan, and on the support of power-holders who commit resources of several kinds to the implementation of that plan. The commitment of authoritative decision-makers to comprehensive planning requires, among other things, support for the planning agency in its conflicts with fellow governmental agencies.

Being a quite demanding policy, which requires a generous supply of power to be effective, comprehensive planning is unlikely to succeed in pluralist political systems, as pointed out in the critical literature. Yet, that literature asserts that less pluralist political systems can be more favorable to that ambitious undertaking.
The political regime of Brazil in the post-1964 years provides a good ground for testing the feasibility of comprehensive planning in non-pluralist political situations. Several features of authoritarian Brazil seem to warrant purposeful, centralized governmental actions, which comprehensive plans demand. Some of these features also existed at the lower governmental tiers. The presence of these features in the governmental structure, in conjunction with the moves towards establishing national urban policy would apparently enhance the possibilities of successful comprehensive planning in cities and metropolitan areas.

Yet, several theoretical considerations lead us to foresee difficulties for effective comprehensive planning for cities and metropolitan areas even in non-pluralist politics such as that of post-1964 Brazil. Our research will explore these difficulties. An authoritarian regime does not suppress the plurality of centers holding limited power within the federal government, the autonomous clusters of actors in each state, metropolitan area and single city, and the clash among different sets of technocrats. It does not eliminate conflicting goals in urban policies, nor the need for trade-offs among those goals, nor for attention to political costs of several kinds by the deciders of policy if they commit resources to the implementation of plan proposals.

Do the foreseeable difficulties preclude any kind success for comprehensive planning? We shall attempt to
explore, in the analysis of the empirical material, under what political conditions, if any, planners can be effective. What ideal of comprehensive planning is tenable in the circumstances planners are likely to encounter? What resources are available to them? What roles can they play to enhance their chance to push through their integrated plans, what allies can they count upon?

Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we present some general information that helps to characterize the setting of the metropolitan plan examined, say a few words on our research method, and outline the contents of the coming chapters.

The Metropolitan Area of Belo Horizonte: a Summary

Description

Belo Horizonte, the core of metropolitan area, was a "new town," built near the end of the 19th century as the new capital city of the State of Minas Gerais. The political elites of Minas Gerais in that period thought that Ouro Preto, the old capital, was no longer suited to promote the state's development. That opinion became prevalent after the proclamation of the Republic in Brazil in 1889. The Republic gave the states greater autonomy. Minas Gerais needed a dynamic urban center lest its economy lag behind that of other states. The state leaders decided that a new capital city should be built, closer to the geographic center of the
state. Curral d'El Rei, a hamlet close to old mining towns and cattle raising centers, was chosen as the site for the new city.

For many decades, Belo Horizonte, instead of becoming the booming center which its founders had expected it to be, remained a modest, provincial town. At its inauguration, in 1897, its population numbered about 12,000 persons. By 1912, that population had risen to about 40,000 inhabitants, and by 1920 to about 56,000. Though those data indicate fast growth, the city was still small. Economic activity was modest, with most of the population dependent on employment in governmental activities for a livelihood. Belo Horizonte was said to be a city of funcionários públicos (public employees).

After 1930, the city's development proceeded more rapidly. Many industries began to be set up in its boundaries. This fact had a great impact on the city's growth. There was no census in 1930, but the data of the 1940 census shows that Belo Horizonte's population had reached about 214,000 persons. The city was already fusing its area of settlement with that of neighboring municípios, beginning to form a conurbation.

The emergence of the agglomeration began to be acknowledged in governmental documents in the late 1940s and early 1950s. An Electrification Plan prepared at that time referred not only to Belo Horizonte but also to the metropolitan area of which the city was the core. A plan prepared for Belo Horizonte a few years later indicated
the need for coordinating the planning of the capital city with that of the surrounding municipalities, lest measures taken in Belo Horizonte be rendered ineffective by the lack of supporting measure in the other cities. In the late 1960s, studies sponsored by the Federal Government, through the National Geographic Council (Conselho Nacional de Geografia - CNG), defined the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte as encompassing Belo Horizonte and thirteen neighboring municipalities, namely, Betim, Caeté, Contagem, Ibirité, Lagoa Santa, Nova Lima, Pedro Leopoldo, Raposos, Ribeirão das Neves, Rio Acima, Sabará, Santa Luzia and Vespasiano. 36 The CNG studies were the basis for the official definition of the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte by Federal Law no. 14, of 8 June 1973, which was enacted when the preparation of the metropolitan plan under study was already underway.

At the time of Law no. 14, the population of Belo Horizonte exceeded 1,200,000 inhabitants, according to the 1970 census, representing 77 per cent of the metropolitan area's population (1,605,306 persons). The metropolitan area's population made up, in turn, 14 per cent of Minas Gerais's population.

Despite the fact that, by 1970, the metropolitan area was responsible for 40 per cent of the state's industrial output, it was not free from the problems which affect big cities in the underdeveloped world. Its population was far from enjoying a high standard of living.
A report prepared by the metropolitan planners in 1975, for instance, revealed a high unemployment rate in the region. According to the 1970 data, 10.4 per cent of the labor force was unemployed. Wages were very low, 18.1 per cent of the labor force earning one half or less of the legally stipulated minimum wage, and 42.2 per cent earning less than one minimum wage, according to research carried out in 1972. Only 47.5 per cent of the people in the municipal seats (which correspond to most of the urban municipal section) were supplied with piped potable water and only 42.5 per cent were serviced with sewage networks. Only 44 per cent of the urban population were covered by garbage collection services.

Studies and diagnoses produced in governmental and academic circles in Minas Gerais in the 1960s and early 1970s took the metropolitan area as a frame of reference. Urban problems in the state's capital were not, in the words of those documents, only Belo Horizonte's, but also the surrounding municipalities', and had to be faced on a regional scale. It was indicated, for instance, that job opportunities for the huge contingent of migrants attracted by the metropolis should be created not only in Belo Horizonte but also in the other municipios. Water supply in Belo Horizonte required large works to be executed in the territories of those municipios. Land use regulations were to be implemented on an area-wide basis, to be effective. Transportation plans had to take commuting in the whole area
into consideration. Other problems and fields of governmental concern were also to be treated on the level of the metropolitan area.

Nevertheless, a critical feature of the metropolitan area as an environment for planning, already mentioned earlier, has to be noted. The Belo Horizonte conurbation is not coterminous with a single, new governmental jurisdiction. Federal law no. 14, which gave legal status to Brazil's metropolitan areas in 1973, did not create metropolitan governments. According to that law's stipulations, the nine officially defined metropolitan areas in Brazil are, from the politico-administrative point of view, formed by the municípios that the law enumerates in each case. The "conurbed" part in the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte is thus under the jurisdiction of fourteen units of local government, that is, the metropolitan municípios. Each município has its own mayor and city-council, the power to collect municipal taxes and to receive legally established transfers from the upper governmental tiers, and the responsibility for delivery of local public services. In the absence of a metropolitan government, with well-defined powers, the cooperation of municipal authorities is required by metropolitan programs if these programs are to succeed. In spite of the weakness of the municípios in the political organization of Brazil--a point on which we shall dwell in chapter II--they still have some bargaining power, and their acquiescence, if not active cooperation, is often critical
for some metropolitan endeavors. But acquiescence and cooperation will certainly be contingent on how the local leaders visualize the instrumentality of metropolitan programs from the point of view of the local interest. As the municipios differ a great deal among themselves in economic development, quality of life, and availability of tax and fiscal resources, it is likely that, in spite of their sharing many problems, particularly in the conurbation, they will define their interests as distinct from those of their neighbors.

To get a glimpse at the disparities among the metropolitan municipalities, some data are presented below. Table 1 presents the population data in 1970. Table 2 shows the disparities and great concentration of economic development, as measured by "value added" locally in the early 1970s. (Data are taken for that point in time, because most of the events narrated in this study took place in that period). Data on value added per-capita are shown in table 3. Spearman's "rho" between the latter distribution and that of table 2 is 0.91. It should be noted that value added constitutes the base for the state's most important tax—the value added tax (ICM)—20 per cent of which returns to the municipality where it is collected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>1,235,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem</td>
<td>111,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabará</td>
<td>45,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betim</td>
<td>37,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima</td>
<td>33,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Luzia</td>
<td>25,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caetê</td>
<td>25,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Leopoldo</td>
<td>20,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibiritê</td>
<td>19,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoa Santa</td>
<td>14,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasiano</td>
<td>12,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raposos</td>
<td>10,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribeirão das Neves</td>
<td>9,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Acima</td>
<td>5,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE - 1970 Census
### TABLE 2

VALUE ADDED IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BELO HORIZONTE (Cr$ 1,000) *1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Value Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>1,799,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem</td>
<td>500,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caeté</td>
<td>82,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Luzia</td>
<td>48,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Leopoldo</td>
<td>45,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabará</td>
<td>43,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betim</td>
<td>34,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasiano</td>
<td>17,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima</td>
<td>7,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribeirão das Neves</td>
<td>2,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoa Santa</td>
<td>1,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Acima</td>
<td>1,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibiritê</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raposos</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1973, 1 US dollar was equal to 6.2 cruzeiros


### TABLE 3

VALUE ADDED PER-CAPITA IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BELO HORIZONTE (Cr$ 1,000) - 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Value Added Per-Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contagem</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caeté</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Leopoldo</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Luzia</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasiano</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabará</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betim</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Acima</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribeirão das Neves</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoa Santa</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raposos</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibiritê</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data taken from tables 1 and 2. Population data from the 1970 Census.
It is important to note that those differences in economic development were not necessarily correlated with indicators of welfare, as the following two tables, with data on the availability of water and sewage networks in the municipalities, reveal: Spearman's "rho" between the value added distribution and that for the availability of water networks is nil, and only 0.31 between the former and that for the municipal availability of sewage networks. In fact, the more dynamic urban centers attracted more migrants, at a much faster pace than City Halls were capable to respond in terms of delivery of public services.

However, greater economic development and, consequently, greater local receipts, seemed, in the eyes of local leaders, to ensure greater municipal autonomy and potential for coping with local problems. A small survey carried out in 1972 by the metropolitan planners revealed the local leaders' opinion that higher local revenue could only come from manufacturing, which was consequently the most desired urban activity in all the municipalities surrounding Belo Horizonte. Given this, it seems likely that metropolitan proposals not favoring a more even distribution of economic activities, particularly manufacturing, among the municipalities, will encounter local resistance.
### TABLE 4

PER CENT OF PEOPLE SERVED BY WATER NETWORKS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BELO HORIZONTE IN 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>% Serviced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibirité</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caeté</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Leopoldo</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabarā</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasiano</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Luzia</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Acima</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribeirão das Neves</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoa Santa</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betim</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raposos</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PLAMBEL

### TABLE 5

PER CENT OF PEOPLE SERVED BY SEWAGE NETWORKS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BELO HORIZONTE IN 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>% Serviced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Leopoldo</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabarā</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Lima</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibirité</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribeirão das Neves</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caeté</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Acima</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasiano</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Luzia</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betim</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagem</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raposos</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagoa Santa</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PLAMBEL
Nevertheless, the presence of public power in the metropolitan area goes beyond the munícipios. Innumerable public agencies reporting to the higher governmental tiers—viz., the state and the federal government—are active in the metropolitan territory. These activities extend from regulation and financing to control and direct execution, across the several fields of governmental endeavor. We gave earlier in this introduction the example of transportation policies, which fall under the jurisdiction of many public agents of the federal and state governments. In the case studies carried out in later chapters the situation for some other critical policies will be depicted.

Let us now say a few words on our research method, and outline the contents of the ensuing chapters.

A Note on Method

The empirical material for this case-study came in part from direct, sometimes participant, observation, in part from interviews with most of the actors involved in the metropolitan planning policy in Belo Horizonte, and in part, finally, from the reading of documents produced by the planning agency and by other organizations and individuals involved with the metropolitan planning policy in Belo Horizonte and in the Federal Government. I also had access to the private files of city-planner Ney Werneck, a protagonist of the events narrated in later chapters, and to the files of
the Secretariat of Planning of Minas Gerais. I could find in those files most of the correspondence bearing on the metropolitan planning decision, in its several phases.

A substantial part of my study, as can be seen in this introductory chapter, is centered on bureaucratic politics. I will reconstruct processes of decision-making in which several actors participated. Those actors, including the metropolitan planners, had different policy perspectives and controlled different power resources. I will follow the planners' attempts to make the metropolitan plan proposals prevail over competing suggestions of other organizations. I shall observe streams of decisions, in which actors, stakes and commitments varied a great deal across policy-items and decision-stages. A major question was how to obtain evidence of the kind I needed to reconstruct the decisions that made the metropolitan planners more or less effective.

In presenting the paradigm of governmental or bureaucratic politics, Graham Allison observes, when he discusses the nature of the evidence needed by that paradigm (his Model III), that the source of information must be the participants themselves. But he adds that, ex hypothesi,

each participant knows one small piece of the story. Memories quickly become colored. Diaries are often misleading. What is required is access, by an analyst attuned to the players and interested in governmental politics, to a large number of the participants in a decision before their memories fade or become to badly discolored. Such information is uncommon. But without this information, how can the analyst proceed?40
This researcher has had a unique opportunity to investigate the planning politics in Belo Horizonte. A few weeks after the decision to plan the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte was taken in June 1971, I was invited by Mr. Gilson Dayrell, the head of the planning team, to be a part-time consultant for the group. I was requested initially to conduct some small opinion surveys among the local leaders in the metropolitan municípios. A few months later, I was invited to become a full time member of the planning team, to be in charge of its "institutional studies." By that time, I had already make up my mind to write my Ph.D. dissertation on that planning experiment.

From the standpoint of an insider in the planning group, I saw how planners attempted to translate a planning paradigm into proposals which they wished to enforce. I observed how they perceived the politico-administrative environment of planning, and how that perception varied over time, and how it influenced their planning posture. I also noted the reaction of the other actors to the planners' proposals, and observed the intricate process from which decisions--favorable or unfavorable to the planners' proposal--resulted. I knew I was an engaged, biased observer. I was solidary with my colleagues in the planning team. I was enheartened with their successes and enraged with the other people's opposition to their--our--proposals. Yet, though they were not a group of detached academic observers, the planners were receptive to internal discussion about their
planning methods, the nature of their proposals and their strategy of implementation. I was not a disguised observer in the planning team. My colleagues knew throughout that it was my intention to write my dissertation on that planning experiment some time in the future. Yet I was not considered as an outsider to the group, but rather as a full-time member of it. I could put forward my suggestions, and endorse, or disagree with, my colleagues' suggestions, with the full rights and responsibilities of a member of the planning group.

During the period of my participation in the planning activity, I tried to assemble as much direct evidence on the decision processes bearing on the metropolitan plan as possible. I took notes of the meetings in which I participated, and obtained the records of the meetings from which I was absent. I talked at length with my colleagues about the main events in the relations of the planning group with the other metropolitan agents, and wrote down my observations. I also gathered copies of the main planning documents produced by the planning group, and continued to do that even after my departure from the group in March 1974.

After I left the planning team and returned to academic life, I attempted to reconstruct the main events narrated in this study by also taking into consideration the perspectives of the other metropolitan actors outside the planning team. I conducted several interviews with the former state governor, mayors, former mayors and city-
councilmen of Belo Horizonte and the other metropolitan municípios, heads and senior officers of federal, state and municipal agencies involved in the metropolitan planning decisions, city planners, and leaders of private organizations concerned with metropolitan problems. Some of these people were interviewed more than once. I did my best to understand their points of view and the perspectives of their organizations. The greater distance from the planning team since 1974 also helped me to acquire a more neutral stand on the metropolitan planning activity in which I had been engaged. Let me add that the reconstruction of facts in this study was checked several times with the planners and other persons who participated in them. The characterization of the planning activity on the state level in Minas Gerais, carried out in chapter IV, was facilitated by the data from a study about the state planning which I and a fellow political scientist conducted shortly after I left the metropolitan planning group.41

My participation in the planning activity certainly biased my observations, despite my efforts to obtain an objective account of the events. Nevertheless, that condition gave me access to valuable, first-hand information about the real workings of the planning activity, even if at some cost to a more detached perspective.

It will also be noted that, at certain junctures in the text, I speculate on the reasons for the Minas Gerais Governor, or the Belo Horizonte Mayor, or sometimes other
actor, making one decision rather than another. Though I interviewed most of these actors, sometimes the decisions in which I was interested were remote to them at the time of interviewing. My inference, then, as noted in the relevant places in the text, had to be based on other people's accounts, and on imputation of plausible reasons for the action of those policy-makers.

Outline of the Following Chapters

In chapter II, I deal with the broader political environment of the metropolitan planning experiment investigated. I show the characteristics of the political organization and regime of Brazil, with emphasis on their implications for policy-making and planning, especially on the lower governmental tiers.

Chapter III considers whether the regime's attempt to define national urban policy has provided urban and metropolitan planners with a power fulcrum in the federal government to compensate for the loss of autonomy and of planning capacity by the states and municipalities in the post-1964 years. The passage of the federal law on metropolitan areas will be examined in detail. That chapter will conclude that the states, not the federal government, have given the metropolitan planners their principal power base.

Chapter IV is focused on the power base in Minas Gerais. It traces the decision process which led the state
planning agency in Minas Gerais to sponsor the planning of the Belo Horizonte metropolitan area, and will set forth the characteristics of that planning agency, and specify its planning approach and effectiveness in shaping public policies in Minas Gerais. That characterization is important for the analysis undertaken in chapter V, in which I examine the planning conception forwarded by the metropolitan planners in Belo Horizonte, and explore its probable determinants. One of my contentions is that the planners' connection with the state planning agency favored their adopting a too ambitious conception of comprehensive planning, highly demanding in the implementation process.

Chapters VI, VII and VIII are case studies of the planners' efforts to put their ambitious plan into effect. Their implementation strategy will be examined. I show how an ambitious planning concept embraced several critical public policies, and required an all-out attempt to involve several actors in the planning activity. Those actors' stakes and reactions to the planners' advances will be presented in each case. The probable calculations by power-holders that led to the different decisions, favorable or not to the planners' proposals, and the planners' use of political resources and role-playing that weighed in those calculations will be explored. These case-studies will show that planning effectiveness could not be taken for granted. Results were contingent upon complex decision processes, which required persistent exertion by planners in order for them to win
the cooperation of other agents, and the support of the
deciders of policy in the metropolitan area. It will also
be shown, in chapter IX, that the planners increasingly
began to address their efforts to the federal government,
in the attempt to influence the federal policy for metro-
politan areas, and to win the support of federal authorities
for their proposals.

In chapter X, as I review the main findings, I
give special attention to the instances of successful plan-
ning, in an attempt to learn what might be a feasible role
for comprehensive planners in the metropolitan context.
Notes to Chapter I

1

2

3
Our contention in this paragraph is that the politics of planning should be analyzed predominantly in terms of Allison's models II and III, rather than model I. The approaches of normative public administration and of neo-marxism to the planning policy seems framed implicitly in terms of model I. In the case of neo-marxists, the "system" which needs planning replaces the rational actor of model I. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971). I am grateful to Professor Brian H. Smith for having called Allison's analysis to my attention.

4
For a good presentation of the comprehensive planning approach, see Walsh, Urban Challenge.

5
Idem, p. 183.

6
On the concepts of "public interest" and "public," see: John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: The

7 Walsh, *Urban Challenge,* p. 182.

8 Idem, ibidem.


11 See Banfield, *Political Influence,* chapter 12.

12 See Altshuler, *City Planning Process,* chapter 9. The quotations below come from that chapter.

13 The relevant works on Brazilian politics are quoted in chapter II.

14 The features of Brazilian politics set forth up to this point will be discussed at length in the next chapter.
The efforts to establish national urban policy are discussed at greater length in chapter III.


See Poulantzas, *La Crise de L'État*.


In the preceding section, we stressed the importance of organizational factors for planning effectiveness. Planning effectiveness was looked upon to a considerable extent as an outcome of organizational processes, along the lines of Allison's model II. But the governmental authorities who back planners may tip the balance for their proposals, and overcome at least in part organizational resistance to them. Those authorities are regarded as rational actors, in the terms of
Allison's model I. Yet they are involved in political games, in which they participate as privileged players, holding greater power than the others, but not enough to allow them unilaterally to determine decisions. In other words, planning effectiveness results from a political process in which different actors, from different power positions, conflict, bargain, compromise over proposals that affect their interests in different ways. In other words, planning effectiveness results from governmental politics, which is conceptualized by Allison's model III. See Allison's Essence of Decision.

24


25

This and the preceding quotations from Downs are from Inside Bureaucracy, p. 217.

26


27


28

Caiden and Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting, passim.

28


This fact makes Allison's model III particularly appropriate to the analysis of metropolitan planning.


See Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, SEPLAN, PLAMBEL, Plano de Desenvolvimento da Região Metropolitana de Belo Horizonte, 1975.


Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, Conselho Estadual de Desenvolvimento, PLAMBEL, Pesquisas Sócio-Políticas, vol. 2. This problem will be analyzed at length in chapter VI.

See Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 181.
CHAPTER II

THE CONTEXT OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING, THE
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

In this chapter, the broader political context of
the planning experiment that is the subject of our thesis
will be characterized.

Brazil's political system has undergone substantial
changes in the recent past. A new political regime, inaugu-
rated in 1964, reshaped the country's institutions, and
modified both the contents and the style of public decision-
making, on all governmental levels.

In the wake of those institutional changes, the
country has experienced a strong centralization of govern-
mental powers, the federal government taking over most of
the competences of the other two governmental tiers, i.e.,
the States and the Municipalities, almost reducing Brazil's
federalism to a figure of rhetoric. Policies of the lower
tiers, including urban planning, became highly dependent
on policies decided at, and on resources provided by, the
central government.

Most of the events relative to the planning of the
metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, narrated and analysed
in later chapters, occurred during the presidential terms
of General Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-69), Emílio Gar-
rastazu Médici, (1969-74), and Ernesto Geisel (1974-78).
Those presidents headed an authoritarian regime.

78
The Populist Republic

To understand the authoritarian regime inaugurated in Brazil in the wake of a military-civilian movement in the end of March, 1964, it is necessary to contrast it with the Populist Republic, as the regime it replaced is named by some analysts.¹ What did Populism represent in Brazil? It was a political arrangement which started in the last years of Getúlio Vargas's dictatorship, through which the newly mobilized lower social strata were incorporated into the polity. In Jaguaribe's terms, populism was essentially a non-traditional direct relationship between the masses and a leader, bringing to the latter the allegiance of the former, and their active support for his bids for power, based on the charismatic capability of mobilizing the hope of the masses for, and their confidence in, the quick realization of their social expectations by the leader if only given enough power. It is typical of populism therefore that the relationship between the masses and the leader are direct, without the mediation of intermediary echelon and that they are founded on the expectations of rapid attainment of the promised goals, provided only that the leader is given appropriate power.²

No matter how cooptative the populist politics was, it signified a new fact in the political life of Brazil, viz., the growing importance of the masses, brought about by an enhanced franchise. The elites could no longer govern without considering the presence of the newly mobilized electorate, and had to respond, even if deceptively, to their diffuse claims. Essential to understanding the logic of populism is the elite's perception of the masses of urban workers and their potential for political uprising. In the
eyes of the political leaders, the urban masses were regarded as a dangerous force, capable of posing a direct threat to political stability in the country.

As Jaguaribe's quotation indicates, the pressures of the masses were not exerted basically through associations and political parties. Populist leaders captured votes on the basis of their electoral "charisma," and emphasized their direct links to the masses, on whose behalf they were believed to act. Populism was highly manipulative. Even when populist leaders were in power, as happened in the cases of Vargas—in the final years of the "Estado Novo" (New State) in the early 1940s, and, later, as an elected president (1950-1954)—and of João Goulart (1961-1964), this did not mean that power had been transferred to the lower classes. The upper classes continued to hold sway of government, and knew how to benefit from public policies. Somehow or other, however, policies had to have some "distributive" tenor. Sometimes, even redistribution was attempted.

A favored field for the working of populism were wage policies. As inflation eroded the earning power of wages, populist leaders would lead campaigns to raise the legally stipulated minimum wage—which is a binding reference for labor contracts--and would capitalize politically on the success of those campaigns. According to their political opponents, the wage policies of populist leaders contributed to give the inflation spiral a fresh twist, since they tended, in the critics' opinion, to set the minimum wage above the rate of inflation.
Social welfare measures, through the clientelistic performance of the social security institutes, the subsidized operation of the government owned public utilities—mass transit in Rio being a case in point—and partiality in the use of funds for public housing were also among the most important policies of populism.

Close to the end of the Populist Republic, one other critical area for the exercise of populism was the support for strikes by the Ministry of Labor. The Populist Republic had kept intact the corporatist union structure, created during the "Estado Novo." Labor Unions were not independent associations, but rather semi-official agencies, used by the government to control labor relations. The populist leaders used that machinery to further their political goals. They supported and, sometimes, instigated strikes, the demands of which were not restricted to the sphere of wage increases or better conditions of work, but rather oriented to political goals.³

Populism was coupled with clientelism. Clientelism was a political phenomenon essentially linked to the economic environment of underdevelopment. Its roots were in fact in the scarce opportunities for social mobility given the lack of economic growth. Having as background an agrarian society, whose economy was poorly articulated both sectorally and in terms of its spatial arrangement, the state had converted itself into a valuable political resource. In such an
environment, the control of the state apparatus was vital since votes were commonly exchanged for political support and violence was not a rare event. Thus the emergence of the so-called "cartorial state," to use Jaguaribe's classical expression. As Schneider has put it, following Jaguaribe's ideas,

the cartorial state is one in which public employment is used to provide positions proportional to the political needs of the elite, rather than to the requirements of effective public service. Since appointments are exchanged for electoral support, the result is an infinite pyramid of positions where innocuous papers are circulated and where the only activity is the feeding of the bureaucracy through self-benefiting practices.

Clientelism had provided a strong basis of support for the existing political order up until the thirties, when urbanization, nurtured by the migration flows from the countryside and coupled with spurts of industrialization, posed new challenges to political stability. Votes exchanged for political favors could no longer be an effective political stratagem simply because the clientele was far larger than before to be serviced through the meager public resources. That was the beginning of the populist era in the Brazilian politics in which that novel "political formula" was envisioned by the elites to secure order and political stability.

During the Populist Republic, clientelism continued widespread. Regional oligarchs and local chieftains exacted a price for their support to the political leaders. They provided votes and legislative backing, in exchange for
public works in their bailiwicks, credit facilities through the official banks, and jobs—especially in public bureaucracies—for their protégés.

Nonetheless, our picture would be incomplete if one other trait of the Populist Republic were omitted. Not all policy-making was characterized by clientelism, particularistic allocations, and "distributivism," at populism's heyday. Some decisions were, as it were, the preserve of the technical experts (the técnicos). Those were the decisions seen as critical to national development. Development oriented nationalism was a very strong ideology among civilian and military policy-makers—including populist leaders—and the policy experts who advised them, and shaped many public policies. The broader political arena was, in general, considered inhospitable to developmental decisions—precisely because of the prevalence of populistic and clientelistic criteria. There appeared to be a practical consensus to protect policies in those areas from the pressures of both the traditional political groups and the newly mobilized masses.⁸

The Populist Republic was a fragile political arrangement. It was highly dependent upon the possibility of satisfying diverse, not necessarily compatible, interests. Economic growth was a sine-qua-non condition of its successful performance. During the Goulart presidency, the last of the populistic period, there was a sharp downturn in economic growth. The apportionment of resources among the several competing claims could no longer be made as though everyone
stood to win the game. Claims for social and economic reforms gained wide currency, and polarized Brazilian politics. Inflation, and endemic phenomenon for most of the years of populism, apparently went out of control, fueling the group and class conflicts and making economic activity a frenzy. The atmosphere of radicalization of those days, marked by politically oriented and, often, officially sponsored strikes—a phenomenon already referred to earlier—and by street demonstrations and, sometimes, violent confrontation between, politically opposed groups, seemed to indicate a pre-revolutionary situation, which induced the military to step in, topple the president and take control of the Government.

The military, who had been antagonists of the clientelistic practices since the first decades of the century, and of populism, had unsuccessfully attempted to seize power and promote reforms several times before. In 1964 they felt the conditions were ripe for their intervention. Counting on the widespread support from decisive civilian circles, and on the favor of substantial fractions of public opinion, in the middle and upper classes, they toppled Goulart on 31 March, and inaugurated a new regime.
The Military and the Authoritarian Regime

To understand the 1964 regime, it is essential to clarify the nature of the military intervention in politics that it represented.

For most of the duration of the Populist Republic, the military had been developing a national security doctrine, under the leadership of a small but cohesive group, entrenched in the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra). That doctrine not only called for a remodelling of Brazilian politics—an old aspiration imbedded in the revolts of the tenentes (lieutenants) in the early twenties—but provided a rationale for implementing such a desideratum. Coupled with a geopolitical theory of international politics, which posited the strengthening of the Brazilian economic and political ties to the western world as well as a more active role in the South American continent, the national security doctrine ruled out traditional politics with its practices of political distributivism. It claimed the need for a new strategy of development that would encompass social and economic growth in line with the requirements of national security.

The doctrine of national security was but a part of a larger ideology regarding the professional role of the military in Brazil, as Stepan has perceptively pointed out. Its institutional locus was at the Superior War College, but its origins were to be found in the complex international
setting of that period, which emphasized the need for a new professionalism on the part of the military.

The new ideology of the military role, by placing a great emphasis on warfare and the threats posed to national security by internal conflict, called for the widening of the scope of the military action. Implicit in the new professionalism was a moral justification for military interventions in domestic affairs. In contrast with the old professionalism, which limited the military role to the mission of defending the nation against the external threats, the new professionalism stressed the permanent linkage between development and national security, the latter being defined in the broad terms of protection of the internal order against potential political turmoil.

Molded by the Escola Superior de Guerra, the national security doctrine would gradually become the official ideology of the state. It would be impressed both on the repressive actions which took place as a means to extirpate the evils of clientelism and populism from the Brazilian political scene and on the economic policies aimed at making Brazil an "emerging power."

Despite that common background, the governments established since 1964 have presented different outlooks. The differences among the several presidencies in the last 19 years have been profound and cannot be accounted for only in terms of the style of the political leadership.

These differences were determined by two distinct
political factors. The first had to do with the tension between the government—which was formally in command of the country—and the military forces which remained at its rear and retained the real control of the Army. The second stemmed from the very stage of development of the new regime.16

Far from being a monolithic block with control over the crucial variables of the restricted political process, the military governments faced political challenges which dramatically affected their course of action. Among these challenges were the unresolved problem of how to institutionalize the revolution, the relationship with the civilians and the rules of political succession.

During Castello's incumbency, the military group located at the Superior War College attempted to give a liberal orientation to governmental action. Castello Branco seemed inclined to a political arrangement with a strong executive and modern political elite, as Campos, the architect of the economic policy under his government, would argue for later on.17

Castello Branco would confront the opposition of the so-called linha dura (hard liners), a rightist military faction for whom the democratic process should be simply eliminated with the intensification of the political purge and measures of repression. Attacked from within the inner circle of power of that time, Castello Branco was forced to give up his political project a number of times. Under his
government, behind the political facade of democracy, punitive actions against influential political leaders who had served under Goulart's rule were intensified. Political action was restricted and the executive power was greatly enlarged.

On the economic side, Castello Branco's term would be characterized by two major goals: the fight against inflation and the modernization of the public machine.  

Inflation had been a central factor in the upper and middle classes' negative image of Goulart's populist government.

Under the guidance of Campos and Bulhões, the economic ministers of Castello Branco's government, an orthodox stabilization program was launched by mid-1964. Having to face none of the ordinary constraints that an open political process poses to such a program, Campos and Bulhões succeeded in their attempt to curb inflation, but the therapy had lasted longer than expected and had cost more than had been previously estimated. By the end of Castello Branco's incumbency, the inflation rate had dropped to nearly 20%, but the economy faced a severe depression.

Under Costa e Silva, a rather heterodox policy would be adopted in place of the orthodox approach, and Brazil would experience rates of economic growth of over 9% per annum.

Castello Branco's succession in 1967 would reveal the Achilles' heel of the authoritarian regime: the increasing institutional involvement of the Army in the political
process. After a series of crises between the government and the so-called sistema, the small group of high officers holding the control over the troops, his successor would be chosen. A member of the military junta which seized power in the days after Goulart's overthrow, Costa e Silva had forced the way to the presidency by practically imposing himself as Castello Branco's Army Minister. In spite of the Castello Branco group, Costa e Silva was nominated to be the second president of Brazil under the new authoritarian regime.  

Under Costa e Silva, two major developments took place which directly affected the prospects of the authoritarian regime: the change of the economic policy and the closing of the political system.

Partially successful, the stabilization program implemented by the Castello Branco government had failed, however, in bringing the Brazilian economy back to growth. Under the leadership of Delfim Neto, the Finance Minister of Costa e Silva, the orthodox policies of Campos and Bulhões would be reversed, and Brazil would experience a spectacular boom. The recovery of the Brazilian economy was rapid and impressive following the actions of the new economic policy: the gross domestic product grew at 4.8% in 1967, 9.3% in 1968, and 9.5% in 1970.  

Nevertheless, the accomplishments on the economic front brought no alleviation for the tensions of the political process. For one, the conflicts within the military
circle had reached a dangerous threshold with confrontation among the Castello Branco's faction—the Castelistas—the hard liners within the Costa e Silva Cabinet and the colonels, another faction of the linha dura which was getting increasingly more active. For another, civilian-military relationships were worsening, as the military projects to stay in power were becoming visible, leaving no room for the civilian leadership.

The control over the House and the Senate through the official party created by the Revolution of March—the ARENA—was gradually being undermined by the political maneuvers undertaken by what had been left of the civilian leadership with national expression grouped together at a coalition called Frente Ampla (United Front). As a consequence of both the weakening of the government and Costa e Silva's commitment to "harmonize" the political process, collective movements began to rise in the large cities in contempt of the military rule.

Facing the increasing pressure from the linha dura, Costa e Silva reacted. An incident with the House over a speech delivered by a member of the opposition party, MDB, triggered what would be in fact a new coup d'etat, or, to use an expression of that epoch, the revolution within the revolution.

A new institutional act (Ato Institucional 5) was issued on 13 December 1968 by Costa e Silva providing the government with unlimited powers for an unlimited period.
In accord with the Ato Institucional 5, the House and the Senate were indefinitely closed and a new surge of purge took place reaching again the civilian leadership and the Judiciary. In reaction against the new political order, which virtually offered no institutional channel for political expression, terrorism began to rise in the large urban areas of the country.

The successor of Costa e Silva, Garrastazu Médici, would devote a substantial part of his incumbency trying to eradicate the terrorist in the country. A new political phenomenon appeared in the scenario of authoritarianism in Brazil: the so-called repressive apparatus, or the "state within the state." Violence from the governmental side reached its highest rate since 1964. By the end of 1974, the armed movements against the authoritarian regime were almost under control. 24

In parallel with the repression, the Garrastazu Médici government would launch a tremendous news campaign to enhance the legitimacy of the authoritarian political model of Brazil. Under his rule, the Brazilian economy would experience a steady process of growth—the so-called Brazilian miracle—which marked the climax of the technocratic influence on the government, a phenomenon which will be dealt with below.

Under the leadership of General Ernesto Geisel, the successor of Garrastazu Médici (Geisel was inaugurated on 15 March 1974), Brazil would undergo a gradual process of political opening (abertura política) which is still
underway, now under the presidency of General João Figueiredo (inaugurated on 15 March, 1979). This process has consisted basically in eliminating political repression against the regime's opponents, in restituting political rights and granting amnesty to political leaders who had been purged in the previous years, in reducing the censorship over the mass media, in restoring a certain degree of freedom for the labor unions, and in re-establishing direct elections for the state governments.

Whatever the explanation of "abertura política," there is some agreement on the fact that the power-holders felt the need to increase the legitimacy of the regime, which began to erode after a period of widespread acceptance, based on its economic performance in the Médici years. In the new context of liberalization, governmental policies could no longer be made technocratically, by looking only at the perspective of indexes of economic growth, increase in exports, construction of large-scale physical capital, and postponement of social welfare policies and services, and of income redistribution, to an indefinite future, when the "pie" would be sufficiently large. When elections and public opinion begin again to count in politics, the "law of anticipated reactions" enters into operation. Governmental policies have to woo popular support. Both the Geisel and the Figueiredo administrations have upgraded social themes in public policies, with immediate effects on urban policies, which will be examined later in our study.
The Rise of the Technocracy

Under the authoritarian order, a new actor would be brought into the Brazilian political scenario: the technocrats. This is not to say that in the past there had not been experts working for the government. Lawyers, engineers and economists had for a long time joined the public sector. We mentioned that, under populism, some decisions had kept the preserve of the technicians. Never before, however, had they achieved political influence on their own, as it has occurred since authoritarianism was established in 1964.

The emergence of the technocrat as a prominent political actor was due essentially to the nature of the authoritarian regime. The new political order was strongly committed to the modernization of the country's economy. Such an objective, stressed in the national security doctrine, paved the way for the decisive role the technicians were to play under the military rule. Critical also to the rise of the technicians was the military regime's favoring of centrally planned courses of action, in accord with the War College teachings, which began to influence the public sector after 1964. Mention must be made, finally, to the military's distrust of both the political process and the civilian leadership in policy-making, which induced favoring technically inspired courses of action.

Located initially at the Planning Ministry and
later on at the Finance Ministry, the technocrats, under the leadership of Campos, in the beginning of the authoritarian rule, and further under the command of Delfim Neto, spread over the whole public machine, controlling its critical segments and imposing a new style of decision.

The political views of the technicians were allegedly neutral, dictated in their own terms by rational interests. Efficiency was the keystone of the technocrats' approach to the governmental process. In accordance with such a view, issues that in the past had been treated ideologically could and should be regarded in non-political terms, thus allowing a "technical" solution.

The limits of the technocrats' power were diffuse and partially obscured by the very nature of the authoritarian system. They were capable of implementing the controversial stabilization program which drastically affected the Brazilian economy and led to bankruptcy a number of domestic firms and industries. For three times in the past, similar programs had been attempted as a means to curb inflation: during Vargas's constitutional term, under Kubitschek in the late fifties, and in the seven months of Quadros's government in 1961.

In all these attempts, the government had to step back in fear of the popular pressures as well as of the political reactions of the business community. Despite the political and economic costs involved in the stabilization program, Castelo Branco backed up the orthodox
policies designed by Campos and Bulhões, the architects of the economic policy-making process at that time. Similarly, when Delfim Neto's policies, which relied heavily upon foreign investment, came under attack by the nationalist faction of the Army, Costa e Silva supported his orientation in spite of the costs within the military establishment.

The heavy burden placed on the working class is another example of the technocratic power under the authoritarian rule. As early as 1964, Campos had diagnosed part of the maladie of the Brazilian economy in the wage policies that had prevailed under the populist governments. During his term as the chief economic policy-maker, the minimum wage adjustments were set below both the level of the cost-of-living index and of the inflation rate. Under Delfim Neto, the regent of the economic policy-making up until 1974, such a policy kept being implemented, though less rigorously.

The working class was not the only group hurt by the technocrats' orientation in the making of economic policy. Domestic businessmen, as Skidmore has shown, were also the targets of their search for efficiency, as well as the coffee-growers, the dominant political actors during the Republica Velha.

Equally important in that regard was the dramatic expansion of the income tax in the country. In 1964 there were only 470,000 tax payers in Brazil; by 1969 the total number of tax payers had gone to 6,000,000--more than twelve
times the previous figure.

Such accomplishments indicate, on the one hand, the high discretion the technocrats enjoyed in determining the directions of the economic policy-making process and in orienting the course of the modernization of the country. They are evidence, on the other hand, of how solid the authoritarian regime was, despite the internal dissidence and the political disputes. The technocrats were not in fact an unattached group, independent from all social interests. However, in the implementation of what they decided was best for the interests of the "capitalist system" in Brazil, they often would ride roughshod over the interests of many powerful groups. The political as well as the economic costs of such actions would be unfeasible under a democratic government, as least judging from the past history of Brazil.

The influence of the technocrats was not confined to the frontiers of the federal government. Federalism was severely jeopardized in Brazil since the military came into power and the technocrats started dictating the rules of the economic game.

_Federalism under the New Regime_  

The closet Brazil has been to a Federal constitution was in the so-called _Old Republic_, a political period which extended from 1889, when the Republic was proclaimed,
until 1930, when a successful revolutionary movement displaced the old political elites and raised a new leadership to the command of the state.

The constitution of the newly established Republic represented a strong reaction against what the Republicans saw as the overcentralization of the imperial constitution. The new constitution recognized three governmental tiers, viz., the Federal Government, the States, and the Municipalities (Municípios). The two lower tiers were to have their own taxation power—though the definition of which taxes were to be municipal was the states', not the municípios'—and service responsibilities, and were to enjoy a relative political autonomy. They were entitled, for instance, to elect their own Governors and Mayors, and to have their state assemblies and municipal councils.

The prerogatives of the lower tiers varied over the years during the Old Republic. The states were a strong partner in the federal arrangement. Their de facto autonomy was great, and they influenced decisively the policies of the federal government through the "politics of the governors" (política dos governadores), a political scheme which ensured the regional oligarchies, chiefly those of São Paulo and of Minas Gerais, a determining voice in national politics. The municípios were the weakest part of that arrangement. Their autonomy was constantly infringed upon, by the states and by the federal government.
Since 1930, in the wake of the successful revolution, there began to operate powerful centralist tendencies, at the expense of both the states and the municipios. All legislative bodies, including the municipal councils, were dissolved. The state governors began to be appointed by the central government and the mayors, in turn, by the governors, in a pattern which resembled to some extent the classic French system. The states and the municipios were also deprived of part of their taxation competences, through restriction of traditional sources of tax revenue. Tax jurisdictions were revised by the constitutions of 1934 and 1937, in the latter cases eliminating what had been a major source of state revenue, viz., the export tax. The federal government was also strengthened by measures which increased its powers in the administrative sphere. Many functions previously exercised by state and local government were shifted into the area of federal competence. Skidmore reminds us, for instance, that before 1930, states such as São Paulo were in the habit of directly negotiating foreign loans to be used for facilities such as railroads and docks, or for the financing of the coffee support program. In the areas of education and labor, responsibility was left to the states. After 1930, that situation changed, the federal government gained broader powers than any previous government had ever enjoyed. Skidmore describes some of the main innovation in economic policies:
A new Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce was created in December 1930, and supervision over and production and marketing of coffee was transferred from state to federal auspices, in return for a higher level of support. New federal institutes of pine, tea, salt, and sugar and alcohol were set up after 1937; these government-sponsored cartels represented the assumption of federal responsibility in areas in which no government had previously claimed authority. 28

Thus, increased federal intervention in the economy required new federal agencies which, in turn, further weakened the relative power of the states and the municipalities.

With Vargas's downfall in 1945, and the installation of a more open political regime, there were again moves towards a greater decentralization of power. The pattern which prevailed in the Old Republic was a thing of the past, however. The new federalist thrust would never again signify a weakening of the federal government or its demise from the status it had acquired in social and economic policies.

The 1946 Constitution instituted once again a three-tiered system. The President, the Governor and the Mayor were to be chosen through direct elections. Legislatures were also re-established on the three tiers. Though the municipios remained weak partners, their taxation powers were enhanced, and a system of revenue-sharing was introduced, through which the municipios would be entitled to transfers from taxes collected both by the States and by the Federal Government. The municipios were also responsible to organize local public services. However,
in a tendency which the 1964 Revolution would reinforce, the municipios, especially the bigger ones, in particular those of the capital cities, would see the jurisdictional lines defining what should be peculiarly "local public services" become more and more blurred, as the state and the federal government would increase their role in the discharge of those services through concurrent powers.

One other distinctive characteristic of federalism under the 1946 Constitution was that, given a constantly rising inflation, particularly since 1955, the federal government and the states were better protected that the municipalities against the devaluation of the receipts they got from taxes. Local taxes—especially the property tax on buildings and improvements, the urban land tax, the licences tax—were the laggards in responding to inflation. The states were in a better situation than the municipios because most of their revenue was derived from the sales tax, which would increase together with prices. The same happened with the most important federal taxes, the income and excise taxes, which were immediately responsive to changes in prices. As a consequence, the municipios grew highly dependent on federal and state help over the years.

It has been pointed out by students of that period that the mechanism of transfers established in the 1946 Constitution worked poorly most of the time. The municipios, in particular, could not count on those resources as a safe source of income. As a consequence, the situation which Sherwood depicted:
...the constantly rising inflation... which left
the municipalities without borrowing capability
and therefore tightened the financial vise further,
undoubtedly provided the basis for the many
direct rescue operations in which the central
government increasingly engaged.29

Table I indicates the relative powers of the three
governmental tiers with regard to the availability of
financial resources derived from taxes, during the Populist
Republic.

TABLE 6
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS FROM TAXES
(1950-1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Federal Government</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<td>1957</td>
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<td>43.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>46.6</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ana Maria Brasileiro, O Município como Sistema Po-
lítico (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas,

It should be noted that the power of the federal
government to finance itself through inflation is not
revealed in this table. Though trends are small, the share of the states appeared to be increasing over the years, and that of the municipalities to be slowly decreasing from 1957 on.

The 1964 Revolution marks a new period in intergovernmental relations and relative power of the three governmental tiers in Brazil. Centralist tendencies which have been evident since the presidency of Castello Branco, have responded to both national security, and economic and fiscal policy.

A first critical change in the post-1964 period was the loss, by the states, of the right to elect their governors. After 1965, when the last direct elections to state governorships occurred, state governors were chosen \textit{de facto} by a closed circle, including the President and a few top military and civilian officials, and submitted to \textit{pro-forma} approval by the state assemblies. The state capitals also lost the right to elect their mayors, who were to be appointed by the governor of the state, with the approval of the legislature. Certain other cities, such as spas, were also deprived of the freedom to elect their own leaders.

The appointment of the state secretaries of security also became the prerogative of the federal government, the new practice being the designation of some Army officer to that position. Appointments to high offices in the administration of the states and municipalities also became dependent on security clearance by the National Bureau of
Intelligence (SNI-Serviço Nacional de Informações), created in the first months of the Castello Branco presidency.

Major changes, affecting intergovernmental relations, occurred also in the taxation system. New taxes were created to strengthen the federal government finances, while the states and the municípios lost some of the taxes which the 1946 Constitution had attributed to them. The states lost the export tax, while the municípios lost the real-estate transfer tax, licence taxes, stamp taxes, and levies on amusements. To compensate for those losses, the municipalities would still share in the federal income and excise taxes, through a newly created "municipal sharing fund" (Fundo de Participação dos Municípios). The states were also to benefit from the same federal taxes source, through a new "states sharing fund" (Fundo de Participação dos Estados). The municipalities were also given a share of 20% in the state "tax on added value," which was created to replace the old state sales tax.

However, strings were attached on the monies the states and municipalities would get from federal taxes. Both the states and the municipalities were not free to apply the federal transfers to programs of their choice, but to rigidly defined purposes specified by the federal government (for instance, capital investments, education, health and basic sanitation). The compliance with those stipulations is supervised by the Ministry of Planning and by the Federal Accounting Court (Tribunal de Contas...
da União).

There was a very clear effort in the 1967 Constitution, which consolidated many of the changes we described, to use the federal-grant mechanism to force the states and the municipios into desired patterns of behavior. Paragraph 5 of Article 13, for example, declares that "No aid shall be granted by the federal government to the states or municipalities before they submit to the appropriate federal office a plan outlining the proposed disbursement of the money." Besides, the 1967 Constitution authorizes the central government to grant exemptions not only from federal levies but also from state and municipal ones. This authorization has been resorted to particularly as an instrument of the federal export policy, which grants exporters exemption from a certain percentage of the state tax on added value.

Tables II and III show the situation of the states and municipalities with regard to the income they derive from taxes after 1967 Constitution changes were introduced. Table II shows each governmental level's revenues from its own taxes as a percentage of the total taxes collected nationally. If we compare its data with those of table I, it is evident that both the states and the municipios lost relatively to the previous period. However, table III shows a different picture. In it, the funds available to the states and the municipios include both the income from their own taxes and the transfers from the other levels.
## Table 7

**Intergovernmental Distribution of Receipts from Taxes (1967-1975)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Federal Government</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8
INTEGOVERNMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS
(TAXES PLUS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS)
(1967-1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Federal Government A %</th>
<th>States B %</th>
<th>Municipalities C %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>45.4</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>48.8</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>36.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Federal Tax Revenue minus Transfers to the States and Municipalities
B = State Tax Revenue plus Transfers from Federal Government minus Transfers to the Municipalities
C = Municipal Tax Revenue plus Transfers from the Federal Government and the States

It is easy to show that the situation of the municipios improved, while that of the states deteriorated. The tax reform of 1967 not only made the states poorer, but also less autonomous to administrate their resources. As to the municipalities, more resources are available to them now, but the greatest part of these resources are earmarked transfers, with strong strings attached. Municipal dependence has thus increased.

Centralist drives obtained also in other economic and financial aspects, beyond taxation, in the post-1964 years. The 1967 Constitution gave the federal government the power to set the general conditions and terms of budgeting at all levels of government. It became a constitutional requirement that all governmental levels have both a capital and a current budget. No more than 50 percent of the total current budget could be used to pay personnel. Strict limits were also imposed on state and municipal borrowing capacity, including the issuance of state bonds, made dependent on approval by the federal government.

One other important feature of centralism came with the constitution of big holding enterprises in the federal government, to act in several sectoral fields, as electricity production and distribution (Eletrobrás), or Urban Transportation (EBTU), and to control state and municipal public or mixed enterprises acting in the same fields. The latter lost the autonomy they had enjoyed previously
to set their own investment priorities and to establish their price policy in accord with their needs. Also contributing to centralization was the federal government's ever more frequent practice to launch programs to which the states and the municípios have been forced to adhere, as a condition of borrowing federal funds or receiving federal grants. A typical example is the National Sanitation Plan (PLANASA) financed by the National Housing Bank (BNH-Banco Nacional de Habitação), which obliges the states to create their own sanitation companies and special state sanitation funds to match funds lent by BNH. Similar programs were launched in housing for low income groups and in urban transportation.

Even when not practically compelled to adhere to federally sponsored programs, the situation of the states and municípios with low incomes derived from their own taxes, but confronted with rising demands for public goods and services, induces them to pattern their programs and priorities after the availability of federal funds.

Finally, it should be added that the downgrading of the legislative power--both the Senate and the House--in national policy-making contributed, indirectly, to weakening the other tiers, especially the states, in the federal arrangement.

Federalism, as our brief description shows, has almost disappeared as a characteristic of the Brazilian political system in the wake of the 1964 revolution.
Does the National Political Context Favor Urban Planning?

Despite the strong patrimonialist tradition in the formation of the Brazilian political system—tradition which, according to many analyses, has persisted until today—and despite also the presence of clientelism and populism in the Populist Republic, Brazilian politics displayed many traits of democratic pluralism, deliberately suppressed by the 1964 regime. Direct elections to the presidency, the state governorships and the mayoralties, the strength of the legislatures in policy-making on all governmental levels, a reasonable degree of federalism, and a limited presence of the technicians in the policy-making structures were substituted by the political features of an authoritarian regime, e.g., the absence of direct elections for the most important executive positions, the curtailment of legislatures, reduced to a modest role in policy-making, a drastic movement away from federalism, which strengthened the central government at the expense of the states and of the municipios, and the seizure of many policy-making functions from political leaders by the military-technocratic alliance.

The features of the new regime, when contrasted with those of the Populist Republic, appear much more favorable to purposeful policy-making. The tendency towards a unitary constitution, the rise of the technocracy, serving
a narrow circle of power-holders united by the doctrine of national security and by a strong orientation towards the development of the country and its transformation into an emergent world power, seemed all highly favorable to the adoption of comprehensive planning in government.

As to the generalization of these conditions over the governmental machinery, it should be reminded that many of the traits that characterized the new regime were present not only in the federal government, but also in the states and in the municipios, particularly those of the capital cities, where mayors were no longer elective officials. State assemblies and municipal councils lost much of their prestige and political functions. They were not heard in important decisions. Governors and mayors tended to surround themselves with technical experts, recruited from the universities, and from public and private enterprises, creating also their own "technocracies." Agencies concerned with economic development, planning, financial control, research and data gathering were created, or reinforced, in the administrative structure of the states and bigger cities.

Nevertheless, the weakening of the states and municipalities in the federal arrangement seemed fatal to comprehensive planning on the lower governmental levels. Purposeful action, comprehensively conceived, was made very hard on the periphery of the political system. Comprehensive planning implies the setting of goals that the lower
level unit is to pursue, the control of its own activities, and the coordination of the activities of the different organizations operating in its territory, even when they belong to other governmental levels. The feasibility of this policy seems greatly diminished in the new intergovernmental frame. The process of goal-setting for the lower level units is transferred in great part into the center (in the case of the municipios and metropolitan areas, the state can also be considered, for certain purposes, a part of that center), and their capacity to coordinate activities within their territory encounters resistances from the organizations not under their jurisdiction.

As a reflex of that situation, state and regional planners in Brazil have recently subscribed to the view that planning in the states—and, for stronger reason, in the municipalities and metropolitan areas—has to forgo the autonomous setting of goals, which has become a futile task. "Negotiation planning," a type of "adaptive planning," i.e., one in which "most decisions are heavily contingent on the actions of others external to the planning system," would be the only planning feasible in that situation.

Against these arguments, however, there is the fact that policy-makers in the federal government have, since the beginning of the new regime, attempted to tackle the "urban development question," as a matter of interest both to national security and to development. The federal
government not only acknowledged its growing urban presence, through a plethora of sectoral programs, but also explicitly issued policies to foster the preparation and implementation of urban plans. Apparently, what was subtracted from the lower tiers was made up for through the official sponsoring of comprehensive urban planning policies by the federal government. If planners need a power fulcrum, and if, given the weakening of the states and of the municipios, that fulcrum may be insufficient locally, why not consider the alternative that the federal government itself, converted to the urban cause, would back urban and, particularly, metropolitan planners? This point will be taken up in the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter II

1 The term "Populist Republic" is employed by Celso Lafer to refer to the political regime which prevailed in Brazil from 1945 through 1964. See Celso Lafer, O Sistema Político Brasileiro (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1975). In this, and in the next two sections of this chapter, we relied on L.A. Gama de Andrade's helpful synthesis of recent developments in Brazilian politics in "Technocracy and Development: The Case of Minas Gerais," (Ph.D dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1980).


3 On labor relations and politics during the Populist Republic, see Kenneth P. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).


6 Clientelism was the key factor in the Brazilian political system from 1904 until 1930, as suggested by Juarez Brandão Lopes, Desenvolvimento e Mudança Social (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1971), pp. 83-94.


11 See Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.) Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki; 1964), pp. 291-341. On the basis of his study of Spain, Linz proposes the following concept of authoritarian regime: "Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some point in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones," Linz, op. cit., p. 297. Brazil, however, does not fit entirely Linz's concept of authoritarian regimes, especially with regard to the absence of ideology. For a discussion of this point, see Schneider, The Political System, p. 343.

12 On the role of the Superior War College in the military coup of 1964 and upon the formation of the military in Brazil, see Schneider, The Political System, pp. 241-279. For an authoritative view on the matter, see Stepan, The Military, pp. 213-266.


14 On the doctrine of national security, see the important issue of the Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 21 (July, 1966); and also on the subject, see Umberto Peregrino, "O Pensamento da Escola Superior de Guerra," Cadernos Brasileiros, No. 38 (November-December, 1966), pp. 29-38.

16 Since the beginning of the authoritarian rule, a crucial problem concerned the institutionalization of the revolution. The problem seems still unresolved.


18 The best analysis of the economic policies under the authoritarian regime was conducted by Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil, pp. 69-119. For a brief account of the economic policies during the Castello Branco government, see Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy Making," pp. 3-47.

19 See Fishlow, op. cit., pp. 69-119.


23 On the crisis of 1968 and the Fifth Institutional Act, see Schneider, idem, pp. 266-279.

24 On the Garrastazu Médici government, see Schneider, idem, pp. 312-330.

25 A good interpretation of "abertura política" is provided by Amaury de Souza and Bolivar Lamounier, "Escaping the Black Hole: Government Labor Relations in the 1980s," Paper presented to the IV Annual Meeting of the National Association for Post-Gradation and Research in the Social Sciences, Nov. 1980, pp. 5-6.
The role of the technocrats after 1964 remains a neglected area of study of the recent history of Brazil. Skidmore, in his "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71," deals with the subject. Guillermo A. O'Donnel, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973), defines the Brazilian political system in terms of technocratic roles or in terms of the alliance between the military and the technocrats and the linkage between authoritarianism and modernization. O'Donnel's work is, however, a hypothetical construction rather than an empirical study of the Brazilian political system.


See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 33-34.

See Sherwood, Institutionalizing the Grass Roots, p. 41.

The classical interpretation of Brazil's political tradition in terms of lasting patrimonialism is due to Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1958). See also Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972).

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL URBAN POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR METROPOLITAN PLANNERS

The Problem: the Fulcrum for Metropolitan Planners

The preceding chapter examined the main features of the political regime which displaced populist politics in Brazil in 1964. We called attention to the suppression of open politics, and to the growing centralism of Brazil's politico-administrative organization. Those features of the regime, and its commitment to economic development, would apparently favor the adoption of comprehensive planning by government. As the regime's characteristics were present also on the lower governmental levels, viz., the states and municipalities, we could presume that comprehensive planning would also be facilitated there.

We recalled, however, that the centralism of the post-1964 political organization of Brazil worked against the lower governmental echelons autonomously setting their own goals to be pursued through comprehensive planning. But that situation would not exclude the possibility that the federal government called upon itself the tasks of urban development, including the comprehensive planning of programs carried out in cities. The federal government would thus be the main backer of city planners.
The hypothesis of the federal government backing urban and metropolitan planners appeared to gain consistency in several measures taken by the policy-makers since 1964. Besides launching many programs with a direct impact on cities, the federal government seemed concerned with making its urban activities a derivation of a coherent policy framework. In other words, there were indications that the federal policy-makers would define urban policy. Among other things, the federal government appeared disposed to finance the preparation of plans for strategical urban centers, chosen in accordance with the role they played in the urban hierarchy, and to support the efforts to push through those plans.

Support for planning in the cities and metropolitan areas was expected to come especially from a federal agency created in 1964, the National Service for Housing and Urban Planning (SERFHAU). SERFHAU was expected both to finance the urban and metropolitan plans and to help their implementation, among other things by ensuring the cooperation of other agencies of the three governmental tiers which act in the cities—including, of course, the federal ones—with the comprehensive urban planning endeavor sponsored by it in those cities.

Yet, this chapter will show that the accomplishments of national urban policy fell short of expectations, particularly with regard to SERFHAU's role as the buttresser of urban planners in the administrative machine. National urban planning since 1964 has in fact encountered many inconsistencies
and blockages due to the very nature of bureaucracy involved in the urban activities at all governmental levels. On the one hand, despite the centralism of our institutions in the period following 1964, the federal authorities were loath to increase political costs to them by interfering beyond certain limits with the autonomy of the states and municipios. Metropolitan planning, especially, would imply a costly, constant need to arbitrate jurisdictional conflicts between the municipios and the metropolitan planning agency, and between the latter and other state agencies, often connected to federal agencies in the implementation of sectoral federal programs.

On the other hand, SERFHAU's intention to enforce national urban policy faced strong resistance within the federal administration itself. Several federal agencies carry out activities in cities, but they are reluctant to have these activities coordinated in the light of urban (or metropolitan) plans, even if the "coordinator" is a federal agency as SERFHAU formally entitled to that role. The expectation of advocates of national urban policy was that SERFHAU would obtain, from fellow federal agents, the observance of the guidelines of the city and metropolitan plans it financed and supervised. But agencies like the National Housing Bank, or the National Bureau of Public Roads, for instance, resist observing those guidelines. Were the higher federal authorities disposed to side with SERFHAU in the ensuing conflicts with those agencies? This chapter will show that SERFHAU lacked unconditional support from the higher centers of power. The federal agencies
have paid lip service to criteria like planning and coordination of actions in the urban space, but have given a greater weight to other policy criteria on which the agencies mentioned above and similar ones measure their performance. Our conclusion will be that SERFHAU's support for the metropolitan planners was of little avail to them in the power confrontations in the local scene. They have had to look for other backers.

Let us review the main unfoldings of national urban policy and its support for urban and metropolitan planning. Before dealing with the post-1964 policies, a brief mention will be made to the urban measures taken during populism.

National Urban Policies Before 1964

Certain public policies of the populist period could be interpreted as steps towards a national urban policy. In the late 1940s, the federal government created a Low-Cost Housing Foundation (Fundação da Casa Popular). The decree-law no. 9.128, of 6 September 1946, which created that agency, reflects that, even at that early time, the political authorities were aware that housing was only a facet of a broader problem. A more comprehensive policy than a housing program was hinted at. The decree mentioned, for instance, the need for urban improvement measures (obras urbanísticas) and the importance of financing water and sewer systems, electricity, social work, and other
programs aimed at the "upgrading of living standards" and at the "welfare of the working classes," particularly in the municipalities with lower public revenues. Studies and research about the methods and processes to make construction "less expensive" should be carried out, and "the industry of construction materials should be adequately financed." Thus, the policy-makers of that time recognized the linkages of the housing problem with other urban problems.

Almost fifteen years after the creation of that housing agency, another one was attempted, viz., the National Council for Public Housing Planning (Conselho Nacional de Planejamento de Habitação Popular), during Janio Quadros's short term in the Presidency (31 January 1961 to 25 August 1961). The Council was to "coordinate the Federal Government and the Municipalities around a national policy for the solution of the housing problems of the less favored classes." It should stimulate joint ventures of semi-autonomous public agencies (autarquias), mixed enterprises, professional associations of architects and engineers and "private bodies" (entidades particulares) in dealing with the housing field. It was expected to plan parks and housing projects for the lower classes, and to carry out research for city plans and for low-cost housing projects. The Council should also propose laws adequate to the "humanization of land-use, specially in regard to low-cost housing." That agency was stillborn, however, as Quadros
resigned from the presidency a few months after his inauguration.

The record therefore of the Populist Republic in the formulation of an explicit urban policy consisted basically of the activities of the Low-Cost Housing Foundation. Recent studies show the Foundation to have been quite ineffective. It produced only a few housing projects, allocated according to clientelistic criteria, and was unable to tackle the other items of its ambitious agenda.¹

National Urban Policy in the New Regime

The 1964 regime, which came less than three years after Quadros's resignation, wished to tackle the "urban question" on grounds both of its importance to national security and of its relevance to economic development. Two institutions were created during the Castello Branco presidency, to respond both to the more urgent need to face the "housing problem," and to the long run need--already anticipated by the policies of populism--to put housing programs within the frame of a broader urban policy.

Housing problems were to be faced immediately, through a National Housing Bank (BNH), which was created by Law 4.380 of 31 August, 1964. Housing programs were considered to have high economic and social significance at a moment when the economic recession was endangering the level of employment. Owing to its low technological
level, the construction industry was labor-intensive. The new incumbents thought also of the political implications of housing programs. In their perception, success in facing a problem that populism had been unable to cope with would certainly endear the regime to the urban masses, now deprived of their leaders.²

With the passage of the years, however, as the post-revolutionary governments embarked on ambitious development programs, aimed at transforming the country into an emergent world power, the social and political goals of BNH have been downgraded, in favor of its economic goals. Fewer and fewer low cost houses have been financed, as the BNH has increasingly addressed its programs to the higher income groups from which return is assured. But BNH has not limited itself to housing programs. As it has become a strong organization, to which huge amounts of loanable funds have been directed over the years, it added, as dynamic organizations often do, new goals and functions to its original ones. The BNH has enlarged it purview to cover a wide spectrum of urban affairs: sewerage and water networks, mass transit, real-estate markets, street paving and other urban improvements, the construction industry, building materials supply, and job-training. The financial model that BNH adopted for housing was that it be no longer a subsidized good, to be provided to the low income population, but a private good financed by a public agency—a bank—and sold to those able to pay for it. This approach was extended to all programs with which the BNH began to be concerned.
One other agency—the Federal Service for Housing and Urban Development (the SERFHAU)—created through the same law which instituted BNH, was to respond to the need for comprehensively planned courses of action. The new policy-makers favored—as we pointed out in Chapter II—planned action, neat, hierarchical organization, and guidance, through strategic calculations. The conception of the urban problem had already gained broader contours, even in the pre-1964 years. Therefore, issue-agitators—mostly architect-planners, some of them located in governmental agencies—managed to persuade the top decision-makers of the need to prepare a more encompassing and systematic policy on urban problems, of which housing should be a critical, though partial, program. That policy ought to be embodied in a national planning system, and in a corpus of modern laws and regulations. It should aim at creating an "urban-regional frame for national development," in the words of John Friedman. 3

National urban policy would, first, according to its advocates, imply actions on the level of the national networks of cities. Diagnoses pointed to great concentration of urban development in the center-south of the country. Governmental policies should, according to those diagnoses, aim at spreading that development to other points of the national territory. Urban centers in the peripheral areas should be reinforced, and new towns should be created where necessary to develop the rural frontier. Yet the large cities and the metropolitan areas should not be neglected in
governmental policies. Their growth had entrained what urban economists call "diseconomies of scale." Public actions were needed both to order that growth, so as to restore the cities' economic efficiency, and to improve the quality of life of the city inhabitants.

Among the instruments to achieve the goals proposed for the urban hierarchy was the integrated planning of single centers. This was the second level of national urban policy. Cities on the several ranks of the urban hierarchy would be chosen to be planned under federal sponsorship. The federal government would not only finance the preparation of plans but would also commit itself to the implementation of those plans.

SERFHAU was to be the pivotal federal institution in the formulation and implementation of national urban policy. Those who proposed its creation thought it was to be the national urban planning agency, which was to guide all other governmental agencies, whenever urban matters were at issue. 4

One first test of strength of SERFHAU's idea occurred at its creation. Administrative and planning logic suggested that BNH, in charge of a sectoral, specific program, ought to be subordinated to SERFHAU, which was to be a normative and planning agency. However, even before BNH became the empire of a few years later, its first President--Sandra Cavalcanti--asserted its autonomy, by not accepting a provision which subordinated the Bank to SERFHAU. The draft
of law 4.380 was changed to remove BNH from SERFHAU's control. This event portended a troublesome partnership in the future.

Actually, in the beginning, SERFHAU's role was limited. Decree 59.917, aimed at regulating the agency's functions and competences, so that it could exert its functions, was issued only in late 1966.

Under the Costa e Silva presidency (1967-69) SERFHAU took the first significant strides towards becoming the agency effectively in charge of national urban policy. It was then directed by architect-planner Harry Cole, a former advisor of Castello Branco's Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos. Cole participated in the study group which prepared Decree 59.917 to regulate the agency's authority.

There seemed to be solid ground on which to build the new policy. The EPEA (Office for Applied Economic Research, of the Ministry of Planning) had just prepared a draft proposal for a "National System of Local Planning," and, in cooperation with the National Geographic Office (CNG), had carried out a study to identify micro-regions and homogeneous spaces in the national territory. Moreover, the Ten-Year Plan prepared by the EPEA, still during Castello Branco's presidency, contained guidelines for national urban policy. That section of the Ten-Year Plan was, in fact, written by Harry Cole himself, who was later to author a similar section for Costa e Silva's Strategic Development Plan. National urban policy was to be centered
on a hierarchical construction of territorial plans, from the broader frames of the national and macro-regional plans down to the narrower ones of micro-regional and local plans. Goals were set forth for both the network of urban centers, and chosen urban centers in that network. Insofar as the network was concerned, policy guidelines were proffered for cities on each rung of the urban hierarchy, to help achieve different desiderata, as for instance: to take advantage of economies of scale in metropolitan areas; to spread development, making it territorially more balanced, through investments in micro-regional poles; to alleviate migratory pressures on the great centers through investments in "equilibrium poles" in each state. For chosen cities, a system of "integrated local planning" was proposed, to render urban investments "more rational." City problems, such as low density, sprawl, speculation in real estate, high cost of urban structures, were exposed, and modernization of local institutions was called for. A national policy on urban planning was justified on the grounds of needed public and private investments.

The circumstances seemed favorable to the role envisioned for SERFHAU. The government had created, through law 5,107, of 13 September 1966, a Seniority Security Fund (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço, FGTS), to substitute for the old labor indemnification legislation, perceived by the new policy-makers as having many shortcomings. The earmarking of FGTS's funds for housing permitted to anticipate
huge investments in housing all over the country. As Cole put it, "the impact of those investments in cities enabled one to foresee great physical and socio-economic distortions in the structure of Brazil's urban network, thus apt to generate possibly insoluble problems." In consequence, he added, "lest those effects came true, the need was clear to design a policy of integrated local development in order to control the impact of the investments of the national housing plan upon urban areas and to prompt integrated development of cities and their regions."\(^7\) BNH's board of directors issued a resolution according to which the existence, or ongoing elaboration, of a municipal plan would be considered an important factor in the allocation of funds by BNH. Besides, a fund (FIPLAN) was created to finance Integrated Local Development Plans. That fund was to be administered by SERFHAU.

Harry Cole felt that SERFHAU was sufficiently backed to embark on an ambitious program to further local, integrated planning. In SERFHAU's vocabulary, the expression "integrated" stood for both the vertical relationship among local, micro-regional, regional, and national plans, and the multi-functional coverage of the plans. To the traditional concerns of city planners with urban design, and physical planning, a new interest in the social and economic facets of city life should be added.

SERFHAU's activities seemed to have gained momentum. Through the Concentrated Action Plan (PAC),\(^8\) 457 municipios
were selected to be planned according to their sizes and role in regional development. Different kinds of plans were recommended for each category of municipal size, from the elementary Preliminary Reports for the smaller municipios, through the Plan for Immediate Action for the medium sized ones, to the fullfledged Integrated Local Development Plans for the regional poles. Not only an exhaustive coverage of strategic poles was aimed at by the PAC, but also it was ambitious "to coordinate urban efforts on all governmental levels--the federal, state and municipal--as well as those of the private sector." 9

However, despite SERFHAU's aspirations, its record was poor, so much so that the agency was reduced to a modest portfolio at the BNH in the beginning of the Geisel administration, in early 1974. Whereas the BNH managed to imprint its financial logic on the urban programs it chose for investment of its funds, the SERFHAU was much less successful in enforcing the logic of comprehensive planning on such a vast scale as it envisioned, viz., the country's whole network of cities.

The Law on Metropolitan Areas: a Test Case of National Urban Policy

One signal instance of SERFHAU's underachievement occurred in relation to its attempt to influence the federal policy for metropolitan areas, which was a decisive part of
a global urban policy for the country. One of the basic instruments of metropolitan policy is the power to define metropolitan areas for integrated planning and unified efforts by the public agencies on the several governmental tiers. The metropolitan legislation needed to answer some critical queries, as, for instance: Who should be responsible for planning and service delivery in the metropolitan areas? Who should coordinate the delivery of services by the agencies of the several governmental tiers? Should a new governmental tier be created, interjected between the states and the metropolitan municpios, or should the extant three-tiered structure be maintained, the legal text defining more precisely each tier's competences in the metropolitan areas? What services should be considered metropolitan for planning and execution? In the vocabulary of urban planners and policy-makers in Brazil, those and related questions came to be known as the problem of "institutionalization" of metropolitan areas.

The passage of the metropolitan legislation is of particular interest to our case study, centered as it is on an instance of metropolitan planning in which federal decisions have been highly relevant. On the other hand, it mirrors the difficulties to establish national urban policy and to create, within the federal government, a strong agency to take care of that policy and serve as a fulcrum for urban and, particularly, metropolitan planners.
For most planners and policy-makers in the federal government, the problem of metropolitan areas ranked on the top of priorities of national urban policy. During Roberto Campos's tenure at the Ministry of Planning (from 1964 to 1967) the studies of French geographer Rochefort had identified national and regional urban poles in Brazil. One of those studies characterized nine metropolitan areas, to be the object of special policies, including metropolitan planning.

Close to the end of the Castello Branco presidency, EPEA's urban department had also embarked upon the preparation of some laws bearing on urban affairs. Since a new constitution was being drafted, it was deemed convenient that it should contain provisions on metropolitan problems. Legal expert Hely Lopes Meirelles was requested to draft those provisions. An intricate and protracted political dispute began to be played around their nature, contents and expected impact. ¹⁰

In Meirelles's draft, the legal power to establish metropolitan areas was not the federal government's alone, but also the states'. Services and public works presenting a "regional interest" would be jointly planned and executed by a unified, intermunicipal organization. Resources for the metropolitan areas should come from both the federal and the state governments (though in Meirelles's draft that provision should await a supplementary regulating law to be enforced). In contrast, the final version of article 157, paragraph 10, of the 1967 Constitution made the creation of metropolitan
areas a prerogative of the federal government, dependent upon a "complementary law" to the constitution.

Who was to speak on behalf of the Federal Government with regard to the metropolitan subject? In spite of the existence of SERFHAU, the agency with the formal power to deal with urban affairs in the federal government, the metropolitan areas were not taken care of by any single organ or unified decision-making body in the federal administration. On the contrary, there followed a seemingly unending struggle among several federal actors to take possession of the new policy territory. Conflicts came about mostly behind the walls of public bureaucracies. Federal agencies, from the Ministries down the hierarchy to simple field branches of federal organs, engaged in constant combats. Conflicts among governmental tiers followed suit, and the matter continued unresolved during the whole Costa e Silva period, and well into the Médici one.

The squabble in the federal government had the Ministries of Planning and of the Interior as the main protagonists. The former had an urban department at the EPEA, whose técnicos felt that the metropolitan areas, as a planning target, should fall within the purview of the Ministry of Planning. But the Ministry of the Interior, embracing both BNH and SERFHAU, was a natural candidate to hold control over metropolitan policy. Nevertheless, as the metropolitan matter implied tampering with the legal organization of the country, through rearrangements in the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government, of the States and of the Municipios, it interested the Ministry of Justice also. And as the metropolitan areas needed resources, the Ministry of Finance had to be heard too. Thus, if the Ministries themselves were in disagreement, SERFHAU—a subordinate agency within one of the competing ministries—could not establish its indisputable rights to the metropolitan matter.

The changes between Meirelles's original proposal and the clause eventually written into the Constitution of 1967 show also that the issue of "centralization" was present. In keeping with the post-1964 centralist thrust in policy making, federal authorities would not surrender deliberation on the country's most populous urban centers to their state or municipal colleagues. Yet there were limits to the discretion of federal policy-makers in that matter. The ideal of local self-government is politically exploitable. Too brisk infringements on the states' and municipios' traditional preserves can make a high rank bureaucrat or agency, or a Minister, liable to political attacks. State governors and other officials, particularly from the more important states (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul), would not willingly give the juiciest portions of their territories to what they saw as low-rank federal bureaucrats. SERFHAU, for instance, was not a Ministry, but a second echelon federal agency. Mayors of metropolitan municipios could react accordingly. If elective, they would fear to be treated as bureaucrats, having goals
and programs imposed upon them which might not coincide
with, or respect, their own political priorities.

There were other obstacles in the way of the federal
definition of metropolitan policy, besides the struggle among
the federal agencies to take possession of that policy, and
the political costs which a centralist definition would
entail for the federal deciders. It was necessary to define
the problems to be considered metropolitan and to be treated
through production of public goods and delivery of public
services on the metropolitan scale. Public goods and services
offered in metropolitan regions are the joint, overlapping,
or conflicting, undertakings of innumerable municipal,
state and federal agencies. What would it mean to define
goods and services as metropolitan? Who would execute the
metropolitan works and deliver the metropolitan services?

Because of all these unsettled issues, the drafting
and passage of the Complementary Law dragged on for several
years. Different bills were put forward, fathered by federal
agencies, state governments, and members of the Chamber of
Deputies. Meanwhile, there began a tendency among some
federal actors, particularly SERFHAU, to induce the states
to lead the preparation of metropolitan plans. SERFHAU
needed to apply its funds and lead the process of metro-
politan planning, to gain leverage on the passage of the
law and thus capture the metropolitan issue into its orbit.
While Minas Gerais accepted SERFHAU's guidance, other states,
like Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo, rebuffed its sponsorship,
but engaged in metropolitan planning all the same, either investing their own resources or borrowing them from alternative sources than SERFHAU.

While squabbling among themselves, federal policy-makers observed the experiences below to see whether clearer clues would be given off. As new experiments were embarked upon in the states, new pressure began to be put on the federal government. Jurisdictional conflicts in the metropolitan areas became routine, which needed arbitration and decision.

At times, state agencies would lock horns with one another to define which was to have the final say about some metropolitan issue. Other conflicts occurred between the planning group and municipal authorities. Federal organs acting in the metropolitan area were not absent from the battlefield either. They would often make light of metropolitan plans, frequently still in preparation and regarded by them as cumbersome, time-consuming restrictions. As state governors might be divided on the issue, it would sometimes be brought up to the federal echelons. But who would settle the dispute there, if the interested parties--e.g., SERFHAU, BNH, the Federal Roads Bureau--were also to be the referees? If neutral, higher level referees would be available, on which criteria would their decision rely?

As the federal authorities stimulated the states to experiment with metropolitan planning, some tendencies began to take shape in these states. The states were afraid of
being passed over in the metropolitan decision. As the constitutional article was not clear on whether metropolitan areas should, or could, be instituted one by one, or all at the same time, groups in many states, such as São Paulo, would feel that the initiative to officialize metropolitan areas should be the state's, lest legislation from above would hurt legitimate state interests. State sponsored bills were drafted and sent to the Federal Government. Some states, particularly from the poorer regions, looked upon metropolitan areas as an additional asset to snare federal resources. They feared that piece-meal "institutionalization" would jeopardize their chances of having their metropolises, still in the process of formation, recognized and contemplated in federal programs.

Thus, pressures to have the complementary law enacted were strong, as strong were the pressures to postpone decision. The federal policy-makers' solution was to resort to a "pro-forma" decision, to appease conflicting claims for a while. The much delayed complementary law was finally hammered out through a laboriously generated interministerial agreement and enacted in the final year of the Médici presidency.

The metropolitan planners were disappointed by the law's lack of basic definitions and operative attribution of jurisdiction. According to the Law, each metropolitan area was to have two councils, one Deliberative and one other Consultative. The Deliberative Council would have as functions the preparation of an Integrated Development Plan, the
programming of common services and the "coordination of the execution of programs and projects of interest to the metropolitan area, by aiming, whenever possible, at their unification with regard to common services." But the law did not say what was the exact meaning of "coordination," and how it should be put into effect. Should the Deliberative Council coordinate the activities of state and federal agencies in the metropolitan area? Was the Deliberative Council the organ which should (and could) grant the operation of a metropolitan service to be unified to a "state entity"? Had the municipios lost their competence, or was it necessary to have their acquiescence to the proposed unification of services?

No more satisfactory was the listing of "common services." The law defined some services as "metropolitan," but omitted basic specifications. For instance: Were the listed services metropolitan in their entirety, in all the phases of their provision, and in all scales of their production? Would their "metropolization" mean that a municipality could, if it so desired, consider itself exempted from discharging that service or providing that good?

The difficulties in interpreting the law and in rendering it operational were of such an order that new moves were started, close to the end of the Médici presidency, to face the "institutional" problem of metropolitan areas.

At that time, it had become a common belief among high level policy-makers that SERFHAU had failed in its
ambition to control national urban policy, particularly with regard to metropolitan areas. Quite revealing of that realization is the fact that the new proposals bearing on the metropolitan areas were originated at the Ministry of Planning, and not at the Ministry of the Interior, where SERFHAU was located. The proposals of the Ministry of Planning suggested the creation of an interministerial commission for metropolitan affairs which would take over some central functions of SERFHAU. Nevertheless, differently from SERFHAU, which was subordinate to a Ministry, that interministerial commission was expected to coordinate metropolitan policy-programs at the very top of the federal government. The proximate inspiration of that proposal appears to have been both the extant interministerial councils of the federal government in Brazil (for price-setting and monetary policies, among others) and the French model of an Interministerial Committee for the Paris Region.

These proposals were bequeathed to President Ernesto Geisel, who followed Médici. Since the Planning Minister, Reis Velloso, was held over from the Médici administration, the implementation of those proposals seemed assured, and as the Ministry of Planning was upgraded to the status of a Secretariat to the Presidency, they would seemingly be given a high priority. Thus, a National Commission for Metropolitan Areas and Urban Policy (CNPU) was created in the beginning of Geisel's term.
In practice, CNPU's status was not what the proposals had suggested. Its composition was really "inter-ministerial," but it was not the Ministers who set on its board. Its Chairman and Secretary, for instance, were the Secretary-Generals of both the Planning Secretariat and the Ministry of the Interior, respectively. The federal policy-makers did not seem confident enough to give CNPU greater leverage. It would not embrace impressive functions, still to be performed by assertive sectoral agencies. It could however act as a new voice in a fragmented decision-making structure on behalf of metropolitan planning agencies. It was entrusted with control over a newly created fund for urban development, a substantial part of which was earmarked for urban transportation. That fund was critical to back the metropolitan planners in power contests, as we shall see in the case of Belo Horizonte. Those achievements, however, are still a far cry from the envisioned role of CNPU as the locus of national urban policy.

Why Has National Urban Policy Failed So Far?

The quandary in defining, passing and enforcing the complementary law on metropolitan areas illustrates well the difficulties to achieve a deliberate, centrally directed, national urban policy.

The considerations about the political difficulties to comprehensive planning we have gone into in chapter
remain valid in relation to national urban policy. For SERFHAU's planners to undertake the ambitious role of formulators and controllers of the national urban policy, some demanding conditions should come true. Think of policies for the national network of cities. The planners should come up with convincingly reasoned, concrete proposals for governmental actions aimed at modifying the country's urban hierarchy, diagnosed as mishapen. The proposed changes should conform with criteria which the political authorities would approve, and ideals they would share, for them to lend their support for the enforcement of the planners' proposals. However, extant knowledge about the working of urban systems is still insufficient, and convincing policy models, linking specific actions to precise results in the regional and urban field do not exist. Besides, it is difficult to obtain political consensus on what results are desirable insofar as urban hierarchies are concerned. Political leaders realize that the implications of proposed policies for their regional interests will not always be favorable. They will be reluctant to support those policies.

When we turn to SERFHAU's policy to establish a national system of local integrated planning, we see also that it ran against many difficulties. Through the "Concentrated Action Plan" (PAC), a large number of cities were to be planned according to SERFHAU's directives. Apparently, SERFHAU would also back the implementation of those plans. But SERFHAU's técnicos realized soon that the governmental
machinery would not stop to await the preparation of local plans to preside over the activities of the public agencies in the locality being planned. Once the plan was ready, it could be at most one reference, among many others, for the local activities of the organizations of the several governmental tiers. The governmental machinery, even in an authoritarian regime as that of Brazil after 1964, is not a monolithic structure, following a rigid agenda, in which all policy-courses are ranked according to a dominant criterion stipulated in a global plan. Goals proposed in an urban plan may run counter to goals pursued by strong agencies of the several governmental levels acting in the city. The developmental thrust which has characterized public policies in Brazil since 1964 has led many governmental agencies to adopt private criteria in public management, and their performance was evaluated accordingly. BNH, for instance, as mentioned earlier, has growingly modeled itself after private banks, moving away from the model of a social welfare agency, concerned with the production of a public or semi-public good. On several grounds the Brazilian state has become quite like a holding company of enterprises and kindred agencies which enjoy much autonomy, and loathe central coordination, whatever the criterion on which the latter be based. Besides, regulatory measures usually proposed by urban plans—for instance zoning or pollution control regulations—may be regarded as inimical to goals related to economic growth which other agencies of the several governmental levels pursue in the city territory.
Confronted with those difficulties to make integrated plans valid policy guides in the cities, the SERFHAU planners increasingly concentrated their attention on a narrower target, viz., the metropolitan areas. In this special field of urban policy, they thought they would capitalize on the centralist thrust of the regime and, through the complementary legislation to the 1967 Constitution, would be given a decisive role in policy-making in the Brazilian metropolises. Yet, we showed above that the federal authorities refrained from attributing that role to SERFHAU and to its institutional successor, the CNPU, and were unable, in general, to define a metropolitan planning policy.

SERFHAU was not entirely lacking in influence in urban policies. Through its funds for urban and metropolitan planning, it could help trigger planning in the cities and metropolitan areas. It made it possible that plan-mongers and planners got an institutional position from which to attempt to influence decisions. If SERFHAU could not warrant the effectiveness of the planners it sponsored, as least it helped them to have a voice in metropolitan policy-making. But as we shall see in the case study, this function was far from making SERFHAU a powerful supporter for urban and metropolitan planners, capable to tip the balance of decisions for the proposals they endorsed.
Consequences for the Effectiveness of Metropolitan Planners

The situation of metropolitan planners in Brazil is baffling. Even if they were entrusted by state and local authorities with all the legal powers to plan and see to the plan execution, this would not be sufficient to make them effective. A critical locus of power—not excluding financial resources and law-making capacities on matters relevant to cities—is elsewhere, in the federal tier. For basic matters of interest to him, the metropolitan planner cannot do without federal support. In the federal sphere, however, he comes across dispersed centers of power. Different agencies scramble for resources, different organs struggle to define their domains, and various bureaucracies attempt to achieve their goals without any minding of, or even at the expense of, an integrated perspective on the concrete urban space where their own activities, or those of state and municipal agencies dependent on them, unfold. Walsh's description of other metropolitan planning contexts seems accurate for the period covered by our case study. Despite the non-pluralist politics, planners were faced "with a maze of fragmented authorization procedures and control mechanisms" which produced a "highly pluralistic system of politics within government and bureaucracy."17

As political authorities in the federal government refrained from attributing to SERFHAU, to its successor,
the CNPU, and to other federal single agencies or collegia, overall responsibility for metropolitan planning policies, there have been incentives, from SERFAU particularly, that the states took the initiative to tackle the issue of metropolitan planning.

Most of the states with metropolitan areas seized on that opportunity. They felt that the metropolitan areas could be an asset in the contest to get a larger slice of the resources controlled by the federal government. Thus, it was in the states that the metropolitan planners met with a more sympathetic response to their case. But where, concretely, was the planners' power fulcrum in the states? Let us examine this question in the Minas Gerais case.
Notes to Chapter III

1. See the excellent study of Sérgio de Azevedo and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, Habitação e Poder: da Fundação da Casa Popular ao Banco Nacional de Habitação; (Rio: Zahar, 1981), for an original analysis of the housing policy before the BNH period.


4. The ambitions of a national urban policy during the SERFHAU years are presented in several of its publications. For a good synthesis, see Ministério do Interior, SERFHAU, "Anais do Seminário de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Local," Brasília, 1971. For the redefinition of these ambitions in later years, see the "whereases" to Decree 74.156 (6 June 1974) which created the National Commission for Metropolitan Areas and Urban Policy (CNPU).

5. We owe this information about Sandra Cavalcanti's role in impeding SERFHAU's superordination to BNH to city planner Harry Cole, interviewed on 9 December 1975.

6. For those workers eligible and opting for coverage by the Fund, employers were to deposit in a personalized...
FGTS bank account an amount equalling 8 percent of the previous month's wages. The FGTS funds were placed at the disposal of the BNH. As Reynolds and Carpenter observe, "despite the appreciable withdrawal rate, the steady expansion of the urban work force has enabled the Fund to sustain a healthy rate of growth. See Reynolds and Carpenter, "Housing Finance in Brazil," p. 151.


8 See Ministério do Interior, Portaria 214, 11 June 1969.

9 See Ministério do Interior, SENAM, Boletim Informativo do Seminário de Planejamento Local Integrado Realizado em São Paulo (ano III, no. 14).

10 On Meirelles's draft, see Harry Cole, Areas Metropolitanas e Desenvolvimento Integrado no Brasil, pp. 31-33.

11 During the Médici presidency, it was the Ministers of the Civil Household and of Justice who received these projects.


13 These proposals were based on studies commissioned by the Ministry of Planning. The final report was published in Jorge Guilherme Francisconi and Maria Adélia de Souza, Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento Urbano: Estudos e Proposições Alternativas, (Brasilia: IPEA/IPLAN, 1976).


15 See Decree-Law no. 74.156, of 6 June 1974.

Walsh, Urban Challenge, p. 163.
CHAPTER IV

METROPOLITAN PLANNING AS A STATE POLICY
IN MINAS GERAIS

As we showed in the preceding chapter, the political regime installed in Brazil in 1964 has, since its inception, been aware of the urban question, and has taken steps to define and implement a national urban policy. Yet, despite the apparent political conditions to carry that ambitious desideratum through, a national urban policy has been formulated vaguely, and poorly implemented.

In the case of the metropolitan areas, the federal government laid its claim to the new policy field, but provided the metropolitan planners neither with clear guidelines nor with well-defined competences to carry out effective planning in the metropolitan areas. In the absence of guidelines and definitions by federal authorities, the state governments, often stimulated by the federal government itself, and responding to internal pressures from plan-mongers, began to stake out the metropolitan policy as their particular concern.

On principle, several institutional arrangements could be possible in the state government to prop metropolitan planning, and those arrangements would not be inconsequential to the kind of planning ventured, and to its effectiveness. Yet, not all arrangements we could imagine would
have the same feasibility. In Minas Gerais, for instance, at about the same time that a group of metropolitan plan-mongers were attempting to persuade the political authorities to sponsor a metropolitan plan, the state was establishing its agency for comprehensive planning and coordination. At a certain point in time, a confluence of factors led that state agency to capture the metropolitan planning policy into its orbit, preempting the materialization of other institutional possibilities.

What were the characteristics of the planning agency that sponsored the metropolitan planning experiment in Minas Gerais? What was its planning conception? What was its standing among the several governmental bureaucracies in Minas Gerais? The first section of this chapter will be dedicated to answering those questions, given the importance state planning acquired for metropolitan planning in our case. A brief historical digression about the evolution of planning in Minas Gerais will be gone into, to show how the idea to adopt comprehensive planning and to establish a central planning agency crystallized in the state government, and what were the planning ideas that that agency attempted to put into practice, and what was their effectiveness in shaping state policies. In the second section, we shall examine how the idea of metropolitan planning gained support among city planners over the years, and was finally subscribed to by the state planners, who decided initially to sponsor the preparation of a preliminary metropolitan plan, and some time later, of a metropolitan plan proper.
Development Planning in Minas Gerais

When the state government of Minas Gerais decided to sponsor the preparation of the metropolitan plan of Belo Horizonte, it counted already on a certain experience with development planning. For more than twenty years, the state bureaucracy had been producing global or sectoral plans, and at least part of the developmental policies carried out derived from the suggestions of those plans. Several state agencies, oriented to the promotion of development, had been created over the years. Shortly before the commissioning of the metropolitan plan, a mission from the Latin America Institute for Economic and Social Planning (the ILPES), a United Nations' agency, had been invited to help the state technicians prepare a comprehensive economic and social development plan. And a State Development Council (CED, Conselho Estadual de Desenvolvimento) had been installed to see to the planning and coordination of development in the state.

The trajectory of planning in Minas Gerais, leading to the adoption of comprehensive state planning in the end of the 1960s, was as follows in its principal stages. After the downfall of Vargas's Estado Novo (New State), the political leaders of Minas Gerais, however divided on several other grounds, seemed to share a dismal view about the economic situation of Minas Gerais. They revived a lasting concern of the mineiro elites with the "loss of substance" of Minas's economy.
The state was lagging behind the neighboring states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, to which it was sending its unprocessed raw materials and was losing its population. It was necessary, in their view, to come to grips with the stagnation of the state's economy through more deliberate policies.

At that time, the federal government was launching its first development plan--the SALTE plan--centered on targets for health, education, transportation and food production. The French experiences with "indicative planning" was much publicized as well. The political leadership of Minas, then headed by the recently elected Governor Milton Campos, thought that the only way for the state to overcome its unfavorable, and declining, position in the federation was through the careful diagnosis of the state's problems, and the preparation of a development plan.

The plan that governor Campos commissioned to the technicians then located at the State Secretariat of Agriculture was entitled Plan for the Economic Recovery and Furtherance of the Production (Plano de Recuperação Econômica e Fomento da Produção), a name that says a great deal about how the regional economy was perceived at the time. Recurrent throughout the plan was the topic of the "loss of substance" by the state. Among its many theses, the plan called attention to the state's lack of a center that would enable it to internalize the benefits of economic activities and serve as a pole for its whole economic space. Minas was looked upon
as a colonial state, exploited both by the more developed economies of Rio and São Paulo, and by foreign investors. The Recovery Plan identified also the need to provide the state with abundant hydroelectric energy, a bottleneck to its industrial development. An Electrification Plan was prepared and delivered in 1950, with proposals to face that bottleneck.\(^4\)

Though from a party opposed to that of Governor Milton Campos, Governor Juscelino Kubitschek, who followed him, did not hesitate to implement the Electrification Plan. He created a public enterprise, the CEMIG (Centrais Elétricas de Minas Gerais), which took over the task of providing Minas Gerais with the abundant hydroelectric energy needed by her development.

For a long time, CEMIG was not only a sectoral agency, but also, in practice, a planning office, concerned with other aspects of Minas's development than the production of electricity. Placed at one of the extremes of the productive process, that enterprise had to be concerned with the consumption of the power surplus it generated. It was interested in orienting and inducing investments in industries which would consume the energy it produced. In the late 1960s, during governor Israel Pinheiro's term, CEMIG helped to create the Industrial Development Board (INDI, Instituto de Desenvolvimento Industrial), the main function of which would be to attract investors into the state. The INDI would elaborate projects for them, and would call the attention of
public decision-makers to the social-overhead capital the
state needed to become a competitive site for investments.
It would also engage in aggressive "marketing," addressed to
potential investors from other states or from abroad.

One other institution decisive for Minas Gerais' development was the State Development Bank (BDMG, Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais), created by Governor Magalhães Pinto, in 1962. As the CEMIG, the BDMG also engaged in planning, which its executives thought necessary to orient the Bank's loan policy. However, differently from the CEMIG, which was manned mostly by engineers, the BDMG technicians were mostly economists. The kind of planning they favored was more comprehensive than that of CEMIG's engineers, inspired as it was by macro-economics and by the theories of regional development planning.

The BDMG had an important offshoot, the State Development Council (CED, Conselho Estadual de Desenvolvimento), which was to work as the State's Secretariat of Planning and Coordination, and which came from the Bank's Department of Studies and Planning (DEP, Departamento de Estudos e Planejamento). The CED was created, as the INDI, in the late 1960s, during Governor Israel Pinheiro's term. At that time, some sectors within the mineiro technocracy were convinced that planning, instead of being carried out by sectoral institutions, as until then, needed a specifically designed agency to be taken care of. Some important steps towards the creation of a central planning agency were taken during Governor Israel Pinheiro's term.
Governor Israel Pinheiro was elected in 1965, in what were to be the last direct elections to the states governorships after the installation of the 1964 regime. His election, and that of Governor Negrão de Lima in Rio de Janeiro, were not easily suffered by the top leadership of the regime, and by the military. They were candidates of the opposition, and their victory was considered a challenge to the regime by its most radical supporters. Castello Branco managed to ensure their inauguration, but at the price of issuing Institutional Acts no. 2 and 3 (respectively on October 27, 1965 and February 5, 1966), which, among other things, abolished the existing parties and replaced direct election of governors with selection by state legislatures.

Pinheiro was to know a harsh treatment on the part of the federal government. With the practical elimination of federalism in Brazil after 1964, pointed out in chapter 11, it is easy to realize that the federal government's lack of sympathy towards a state government could mean real deprivation.

An active man, well-known for his long tested capacity as an executive, Pinheiro had to adapt himself to the new situation. He was forced to forgo carrying out visible, large-scale public works and other ambitious programs to which he was accustomed, and to concentrate his efforts on less visible
activities. Among the latter, were the forging of institutional and legal tools for development, and the formation of human resources. INDI, already mentioned, was one of the institutions set up during his administration, to take care of industrial planning and promotion. The BDMG was upgraded in the state machinery, and given a critical role in the financing of industry, agriculture and mining. New agencies were set up for agricultural development, and old ones were reshaped. A set of incentives—tax exemptions, subsidized credit, and site subsidy in industrial estates—was deployed to enhance the state's locational advantages for industries.

To put all those efforts within a consistent frame, some sections within the state technocracy—particularly at BDMG's DEP—upheld the need of a comprehensive development plan, to be prepared by a central planning agency instead of by the planning departments of sectoral agencies, and to be implemented under that agency's supervision.

Pinheiro's successor, Governor Rondon Pacheco, chosen under the new rules of Institutional Act no. 3—that is, indirect elections by the state legislative assembly—was quick to realize the great potential of the instruments devised by Pinheiro. In contrast to Pinheiro, however, Pacheco had full access to the higher decision circles of the day. He had been the Minister of the Civil Household during General Costa e Silva's presidency, and had later been the chairman of ARENA, the governmental party created in 1966. As the governor of Minas Gerais, he skillfully used
that political leverage to secure policies beneficial to the state.

Pacheco's term coincided with that of President Garrastazu Médici, in which, as shown in chapter II, the country knew an economic boom, but the political regime increased its authoritarianism. In keeping with the central government's practice, Pacheco also strengthened Minas Gerais' technocracy, much to the resentment of the "political class."

Pacheco's administration was marked by a large afflux of new investments to Minas Gerais. Since the early 1960s, it was felt that the creation of infrastructures was insufficient to bring the state irreversibly back on the trail of development. The creation of the BDMG in the beginning of the decade, and of the INDI, close to its end, reflected the perception that a new effort to attract directly productive activities should be made to overcome Minas Gerais' lagging behind Rio and São Paulo, which persisted despite the great sacrifice the state had incurred in the post-war years with the creation of economic infrastructures.

Nevertheless, it would be possible to identify two different perspectives on what should be done. Those perspectives were already present in Pinheiro's administration, but were consolidated during Pacheco's term. One of them favored a more comprehensive approach to the state's development effort and was, as mentioned above, upheld particularly
by the technicians in the Department of Studies and Planning of BDMG. The other perspective, espoused by the CEMIG-INDI group, favored a more pragmatic approach to economic policies, through sectoral—that is, not global or comprehensive—planning and, principally, project preparation and expediting, and the attraction of investors.

Comprehensive Planning in Practice: the Role of the State Development Council in Developmental Policies

During Pinheiro's governorship, the national economic recession affected Minas Gerais, so the conflict of opinions in the state's technocracy had no practical consequence. When Pacheco took over, however, the country had already resumed economic growth. The international economy was in the upswing, and Brazil became a favorite location for foreign investments. The mineiro policy-makers sensed the new climate, and seized on the new investment opportunities. The CEMIG-INDI current in the state technocracy began to put their ideas into practice. The groundwork of INDI during the Pinheiro years greatly facilitated the task of attracting investors to Minas Gerais. When Pacheco finished his governorship in 1975, scores of new enterprises had been installed in the state territory.

What was the role of the State Development Council in the new policies and achievements? The CED, as seen, was an outgrowth of the BDMG's planning office. The DEP had expanded
so much inside the Bank that its existence became a source of organizational strain. Its size was much beyond the needs of BDMG. The cost of maintaining the DEP personnel was an unnecessary burden for the bank, and could not be justified in managerial terms. When Governor Pinheiro approved the creation of a central planning unit in Minas, the Bank planners were transferred into the new agency, where—it was alleged—their tasks would be more appropriate and needed. Once there, the planners managed to have an agreement for technical aid signed with the United Nations' Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES). Under the provisions of that agreement, ILPES would orient CED's staff in data gathering and analysis, and in drafting a comprehensive state development plan.

When Pacheco was inaugurated, CED was working at full steam. The planners were busy in the analysis of the state's economic and social situation. They were giving the final touches on the sectoral diagnoses, and delineating the global picture that should be the basis of the state's development plan.

The planning conception of CED's planners deserves comment. It was to a great extent acquired from ILPES. For several years, that Institute had been diffusing in Latin America, through courses, publications, and field missions, the idea that plans should be comprehensive. Plans should build upon broad economic aggregates, and should exhaustively cover the several economic and social sectors
(in practice, the latter would not always be perfectly integrated with the former, except insofar as requisites to the process of economic development). Scenarios for the future should be sketched for the whole socio-economic system, and strategies should be devised to guide governmental actions over the years covered by the plan. Global and sectoral plans and programs should be prepared to be materialized through concrete projects. Budgeting was to be an instrument of planning. A multi-year capital budget should be outlined, and annual program-budgets adopted. The machinery of government should be streamlined. Related sectoral agencies should be grouped in "operative systems," which would be charged with the governmental functions or services. The agencies within an "operative system" should be under the command of a secretariat of state, in order that they would act in unison. To secure planned and coordinated activities, each "operative system" should have its own planning and coordinating staff, subordinated to the sectoral secretariat, but answerable "technically" to its sectoral counterpart at the CED.

According to the planners' view, CED should function as a true "Council," a politico-administrative collegium to help the State Governor to conduct the whole state machinery, and secure concerted action and shared purpose on all fronts. Under the Governor's chairmanship, all the state secretaries were to come together at CED's meetings, to report on their sectoral activities, and to discuss future programs. Joint undertakings should be proposed, actions at cross-purpose
avoided, and overlapping efforts made mutually compatible. The Secretary of Planning was to be the Council's Vice-Chairman, and its main executive. He should be in command of CED's staff, and should prepare the Council's agenda, and see to it that its deliberations should be put into effect. He was to be the Governor's main advisor for planning and coordination.

When Governor Pacheco chose his auxiliaries, instead of appointing one of CED's senior planners to be Secretary of Planning, he invited Mr. Paulo Lima Vieira, a well-known engineer and entrepreneur in the heavy construction sector. Vieira was no novice to the public sector. He had close connections to the upper cadres of the late National Democratic Union party (UDN) to which Rondon Pacheco too had belonged before its extinction by Institutional Act no. 2, in 1966. He had been the President of METAMIG, a state enterprise in the mining field and of Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, the publicly owned, leading steel mill in the Country. From the same generation as Pacheco's, he was an old acquaintance of his. Yet, he was not a planner, at least in the sense that CED's staff and their ILPES's advisors espoused.

For another critical department for economic policies, the Secretariat of Finance, Pacheco appointed a young economist, Mr. Fernando Reis, then one of the Directors of Brazil's Federal Reserve Board, and a former leader of the CED planners.
How did the relations between CED and the "operative systems" work during Pacheco's administration?

When Pacheco was inaugurated, the planners were still giving the final touches on the State's Economic and Social Development Plan. Vieira, despite his background as an engineer and entrepreneur in heavy construction, displayed a great deal of respect towards the work of CED's staff. He did not attempt to imprint on it a different planning style, more attuned, perhaps, to his engineering experience. The plan, issued in 1971, came practically unchanged from what had been conceived by CED's staff in the Pinheiro days.

Vieira also backed CED's proposal for reform of the state machinery, on the lines described above, to make it more responsive to comprehensive planning and coordination. A host of foundations, public and mixed enterprises, semi-autonomous sectoral bodies, financial institutions, had been created over the years and, from the planners' perspective, were acting chaotically. Nevertheless, despite the state-law no. 5.792 of 8 October 1971 and decree no. 14.446 of 4 November 1972, which attempted to put into practice the administrative reform devised by the CED, implementation was hard beneath the level of formal reshufflings of boxes in the table of organization. Groupings on the basis of the reformers' view about functional affinities were less important than the pre-existing administrative cliques. The guiding role the planners expected to play in the center of the machinery, by extending their sensors into the heart of the sectoral agencies, proved also formal and void.8
As to planning, the guidelines of the plan produced by the CED tended to be general, not operational. The planners did not come forward with implementable projects. Their work had centered on the production of the macro-economic plan. Projects, according to the comprehensive planning methodology, should come only after that previous stage.\textsuperscript{9} Many of the executive agencies—the most dynamic ones—were not waiting for the planners' initiatives, however. The plan had broad guidelines, they had implementable projects. They were already deeply involved in doing what they had already decided to do, often irrespectively of the plan's general orientations. Much of what was taking place in Minas, while the State Plan was being drafted, or even after its publication, did not receive the planners' approval, worse yet, was not even submitted to their appraisal. A case in point was the industrial promotion policy followed, which relied heavily on the attraction of multinational capital, against the "nationalist" opinion, suspicious of foreign investors, prevailing among most of the CED planners. Another example was the plan's stand in favor of diverting investments from the metropolitan area, slighted by the industrial promotion agents whenever it would appear to conflict with the private investors' locational choices.\textsuperscript{10}

To complicate the situation of CED, it faced the opposition of the Secretariat of Finance. Much to the despair of Reis's former colleagues at the CED, he was, as Secretary of Finance, much more than a mere accountant,
concerned only with financial balances and budgetary equilibrium. Had his role been limited to that, he could none the less have become a serious obstacle to the planners' aspiring role.\textsuperscript{11} But he was an energetic executive too. Certainly taking inspiration from Delfim Netto's ruthless style in the federal government, he went much farther than what the traditional function of Secretary of Treasury would entitle one to expect in Minas Gerais. He put into effect several reforms in the Finance machinery, and increased enormously his control over financial matters in the State. Unlike his forerunners, he knew how much money was available, who was spending how much on what, and how to secure extra-funds for a program or project he would support. His approval became indispensable to make any proposal feasible. He had his own ideas about Minas's priorities, which often would not coincide with that of this fellow planners at CED. He would not disguise his criticisms of the plan, advanced by his former colleagues, exposing what he deemed to be its lack of realism as to resources and other implementation means. Surely, it became obvious to him, when faced with the concrete task of deciding on how to allocate resources, that the plan's guidance, without projects to embody it, was vague, remote, unfalsifiable. Yet projects were not missing on the Governor's desk, brought forward by the more dynamic sectoral agencies. If we put ourselves in Reis's shoes, we conclude that he was left with little choice but to select those projects that, in his professional judgement
of priorities, seemed more promising, whether or not the plan contemplated them. 12

It should be stressed that the model of "comprehensive planning" adopted at CED, with Vieira's support when he became Secretary, was not explicitly challenged by most of those who, in practice, made for CED's foundering. The protagonists of the events narrated would not in general raise doubts as to planning's legitimacy and indispensability to efficient modern government. 13 Simultaneously, however, they would hold that central planners should not meddle in their sectoral activities, and should not trespass "general, overall coordination and guidance" over public programs to the extent that those programs "would overlap." What those abstractions could mean operationally was not clear. They certainly could not imply tampering effectively with what their own department was doing. 14

Furthermore, the impact of federal programs in the state administration made planning and coordination increasingly difficult. As we noted in chapter II, it has become a practice of federal agencies to deal directly with state agencies, bypassing the authority of state organs responsible for central planning and coordination. As will be seen in the study of the metropolitan planning experiment, CED's authority was constantly challenged by sectoral organs that would deal directly with their counterparts in the federal government, on which they depended for funds.
It is not hard to understand the fate of comprehensive planning in Minas Gerais, during the Pacheco governorship. By examining his governmental record, and interviewing him and some of his auxiliaries, it was not hard to see that he was a highly pragmatic executive. He would quickly grasp the difference between concrete projects, ready for negotiation, and possible realization during his terms, and the vaguer orientations of the Development Plan. He probably realized that planning was a remote activity, and that coordination in abstract would imply wasting time to decide on formalities. Furthermore, when confronted with the haste of federal agencies to apply their money in Minas Gerais, the state planners' insistence on more studies, more discussion, and more coordination was likely to appear as an unbearable complication for his decision-making, and he would prefer to support the sectoral agency whose project had the chances of obtaining federal resources, rather than the planning organ.
The CED Planners Decide to Back the Metropolitan Planners

Among the many tasks CED set about to undertake was the planning of the metropolitan area. That idea was not on CED's agenda in the beginning. Nevertheless, CED's first incursion in metropolitan affairs came about still during Governor Pinheiro's term, when SERFHAU's funds were borrowed to finance the preparation of a Preliminary Metropolitan Plan, commissioned by CED from a private planning firm, the HIDROSERVICE. Later, when Governor Rondon Pacheco had already taken over, CED created a metropolitan planning group in one of its affiliated institutions, the João Pinheiro Foundation (FJP, Fundação João Pinheiro). That group, besides being charged with the preparation of the metropolitan plan, was also conceived to be the embryo of a future planning and coordinating agency for the metropolitan area.

When those events took place, CED was still being consolidated. The functions proposed for it would seemingly make it a strong and respected agency. It had not yet known the decline in influence which we described in the preceding section. Thus, apparently, the metropolitan plan would be solidly buttressed by CED's sponsorship.

How did the metropolitan matter enter the jurisdiction of the state planners? How did they become the official sponsors of the metropolitan planners? In this section we shall follow the main stages of the process which culminated in CED's taking possession of metropolitan policy. The idea
to plan the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte can be traced to two different movements of opinion, which finally converged on the decision to prepare the metropolitan plan, one among the state planners, the other among the Belo Horizonte planners. We shall start with the perspective of the state planners.

The Metropolitan Area in the State Plans

The city of Belo Horizonte was especially created as a new town, in the end of the 19th century, to be the new capital of Minas Gerais. Brazil was starting her republican period, and the political elites of Minas thought that a new capital was indispensable to bring the state back on the trail of progress, from which it had strayed since the decline of mining in the end of the 18th century. Yet, many decades after Belo Horizonte's foundation, when the Recovery Plan was drafted in the late 1940s, its authors were disappointed at the weakness of the capital city as a growth pole. It was not a pole for substantial parts of the state's territory, and unless it were strengthened, they thought, the developmental measures proposed in the plan would be in jeopardy. The Electrification Plan came forward with a more optimistic view about the capital city's actual role in Minas Gerais. The capital was considered a metropolitan area in formation, and was seen as fulfilling some critical functions for the whole economic space of the state. Nevertheless, those
functions were put at risk because of persistent bottlenecks. In the planners' own words.

It is no novelty that this area is in dire need of electricity and transport. Unless we change the current conditions of its wealth, and create sources of production of abundant power, the incipient vitality of its industrial park and, for that matter, of its economy, will begin to wane, and stagnation will set in.16

Both plans saw Belo Horizonte and its surrounding area as a target for planned actions. Those actions, however, would consist in investments in directly productive activities and economic infrastructures, not in traditional city planning, which, at that time, the state planners did not visualize as having anything to do with the functions expected from Belo Horizonte.

With the passage of the years, planning in Minas Gerais changed hands, as shown in the preceding section. New professional groups began to replace the engineers who drafted the Recovery and the Electrification Plans in planning the state economy. Instead of being located, as their forerunners, at the Secretariat of Agriculture (the authors of the Recovery Plan), or at the CEMIG (the authors of the Electrification Plan), they were located now at the BDMG's DEP, and came mostly from economics and sociology. What were their views about the role of Belo Horizonte?

The new planners shared, to a great extent, the views which the social sciences in Latin American began to hold about the urban phenomenon in the continent, in the 1960s and 1970s. According to those views, the industrialization
of Latin American countries was building upon a modern, capital-intensive technology, and would not make for rising levels of employment. Migrants from the impoverished rural areas and smaller towns would not encounter jobs in the cities, particularly in manufacturing. They would be driven into lowly paying jobs in the "swollen" service sector, a misnomer for disguised unemployment or, as many began to put it, "urban marginality." The authors sharing these views would draw attention to the distortions of the network of cities in Latin American countries. Swelling metropolitan centers would stand out amidst a void of intermediate size cities and a dust of small towns. For many of those diagnoses, the metropolitan areas would, on balance, exert a negative influence on the entire urban system. They would parasitically draw the best resources from the interior. Worse yet, they constituted, for many, the wedges of imperialism driven into Latin America. In their internal structure would predominate unemployment, low-standard housing, and social, economic, ecological and cultural marginality. Several plans and documents drafted by the state planners during the 1960s laid emphasis on the themes of "favelization" (that is, the emergence of squatter settlements in the cities), "marginality," scarcity of jobs in the secondary sector and "artificiality" of the growth of the tertiary in the cities' economies. Belo Horizonte's growth, in particular, was seen as pathological. It is difficult to see how metropolitan planning could be accepted and sponsored by state
planners who held so negative a view about the role of the big city.

While the urban views of the state planners followed the trajectory described above, the ideal of metropolitan planning was attaining ripeness among city planners, mostly at the Belo Horizonte City Hall, but also in other governmental niches.

The City Planners Discover Metropolitan Planning

Belo Horizonte was planned in accord to an old city planning model. The uppermost concern in the selection of its site was physical. Its plan, prepared by engineer Aarão Reis, centered on street layouts and on a primitive zoning.

Engineer Aarão Reis's "blueprint" began to be breached over the years. Even as the city expanded, the rigid gridiron pattern of its street layout gave place, outside the perimeter surrounding the legally defined "urban zone," to unplanned, untidy growth, characterized by irregular, discontinuous street arrangements, and by the lack of urban infrastructures.

The topic of the original plan's non-observance gained currency in elite opinion circles. Nevertheless, the return to the Reis blueprint was never proposed. The city had already expanded far beyond its founders' anticipations, and it was not possible to undo what many years of spontaneous growth had consolidated. Rather than undertaking a thorough revision of that primitive plan, or putting forward an
altogether new one, local policy-makers engaged in piece-meal regulation, attacking only such aspects as could bear no more delays. But it was officially acknowledged that piece-meal regulations were emergency measures. A more encompassing framework for decisions was awaited.

In the late 1940s, the idea that a "Master Plan" was needed was frequently retaken, all the more so that State-Law no. 28, of 22 November 1947, with the guidelines for the organization of the State's municipalities, had provisions about the preparation of Master Plans in its articles 19 and 20.

In 1950, engineer Américo René Giannetti, who a few years before, as the State Secretary of Agriculture, had headed the team that prepared the Recovery Plan, was elected Mayor of Belo Horizonte. In June 1951 he submitted to the City Council an Administrative Plan-Program for the city. It was not a Master Plan, but it was meant as a step toward, and a strong call for, that Master Plan.

The Plan Program was justified on ground of the city's socio-economic importance, of its role as a "development pole" for Minas Gerais:

The industrial concentration in the whole region has Belo Horizonte as a pole for its activities. Hence, its functioning today as one of the most important financial centers of Brazil, as a real economic metropolis in the interior of the country, as the point of convergence of all the currents of progress... and as the natural center of commercial irradiation...22

The plan warns against considering Belo Horizonte in isolation from the wider context. On the contrary, there is
"a lively assortment of industrial and commercial activities in the capital, which thus functions as the center of the whole economic system upon which the State's progress is built." 23

What was needed, according to the Giannetti plan-program? Among many important things, it proposed the creation of a "Master Plan Department" which would be charged with turning the city's growth into a "harmonious and rational process." Otherwise, growth would go on "disorderly and tumultuarious."

All the activities of the "urbs" ought to observe a general orientation, originating in its Master Plan, which likewise consider the remaining elements bound to exert, either directly or remotely, some influence upon the life of the "civitas." 24

Coordination was called for. For want of coordination, it was pointed out, great undertakings, highly beneficial for the community, became detrimental to coequal, similarly beneficial, activities.

The Giannetti plan did not stop at the proposal to set up the Master Plan Department, after the creation of which more concrete policies would ensue. It presented also a list of the public works having higher priority, a list which came to guide efforts of several subsequent administrations, and called attention to the actions needed in the social services and cultural areas in Belo Horizonte.

Not much of that plan was implemented during Giannetti's term, interrupted by his untimely death in 1954. Giannetti had managed to enlist the cooperation of state
and federal agencies, principally the state and federal Bureaus of Public Roads, in the implementation of part of his roads and streets plan. As to the remainder, as most of the plan's proposals were quite sensible, they were to orient some decisions in subsequent administrations. The plan-program was indeed to be recalled in later years as one of the best contributions of the Giannetti period. Moreover, Giannetti attracted to City Hall a group of young experts who were to form the nucleus of its Master Plan Department. Though the Master-Plan proper, which the Plan-Program called for, was not drafted, that group was instrumental to keep alive the idea that such a framework was needed for land-use decisions. Despite the absence of a Master-Plan, and despite the fluctuation in prestige of the group in the Master Plan Department, many non-routine decisions on land-uses had bo be examined by its members, and actions detrimental to the public interest were foiled.  

The idea to prepare a Master Plan for Belo Horizonte was to be retaken only a few years later, during Mayor Celso Melo de Azevedo's term. In a visit to São Paulo, in 1958 Mayor Azevedo became acquainted with the planning activities developed there by SAGMACS, a consulting firm affiliated with the international movement *Economie et Humanisme*, an outgrowth of French "Social Catholicism." Its members, under the leadership of the dominican friar, sociologist and social reformer, Louis Joseph Lebret, were imbued with the idea that the amelioration of the human condition could be achieved
through the use of modern "territorial" planning techniques, including city planning. At the time of Mayor Azevedo's first contact with SAGMACS, it was already engaged in planning the city of São Paulo, and in preparing a regional plan for the Paraná-Uruguay River Basin. As a preliminary step, Azevedo hired SAGMACS to carry out a diagnosis of the city's socio-economic situation. That diagnosis laid particular emphasis upon the impact of physical structures on the population's wellbeing.

In the SAGMACS city planning approach, a Master Plan was intended to orient the city's physical growth, but it should not be considered in isolation from the remaining aspects also in need of planned actions. It should contain the norms, criteria, guidelines and laws that would regulate land-uses and, through a correct distribution of land occupancy and use, and the construction of an adequate network of streets, provide the "urban organism" with a structure. Plans and documents bearing on facets other than physical aspects would be linked to the Master Plan insofar as decisions as to location, size, and scale of structures and activities, ensued from them.

The SAGMACS plan proposed a two-fold task for the municipal government. First, the regulation and guidance of Belo Horizonte's expansion. Second, the adoption, by the municipality, of modern administrative techniques. The latter task would enable the local government to attack the former, "through the execution of public works, the provisions of public services, and the enhanced efficiency in the use of available financial resources."

Coupled with the idea of planning Belo Horizonte, the SAGMACS plan submitted also the proposal that, in that instance, an area-wide scope for planning ought to be adopted. In terms of the contract they were observing, the planners pointed up that only a plan for Belo Horizonte should be drafted. Nonetheless, they stressed:

The city of Belo Horizonte already embraces areas of other municipios... the formation of a metropolitan complex such as this would require consideration of those areas as well. Otherwise, neighboring municipios may come to know a kind of expansion that will run counter to Belo Horizonte's regulations, thus jeopardizing its efforts to bring order and harmony to bear upon urban growth, and creating nearly unsoluble problems for those municipios also... the Master Plan must, therefore, be strengthened by the creation of an effective system of integration of interested municipal governments."27

As Belo Horizonte was the core of a metropolitan area, the SAGMACS planners laid emphasis on the need for not only striking an intermunicipal covenant, but also coordinating the local, state and federal efforts deployed in the area.

Nonetheless, despite its realism and soundness, the SAGMACs plan was to gather dust on the City Hall shelves. The final plan was ready only after Mayor Azevedo's term had expired. Mayor Amintas de Barros, who followed him, ignored the plan.

Those earlier plans were no signal instances of successful implementaion. The Giannetti plan, however, fared better than the SAGMACS plan on that ground. Yet they have been critical to shape a mentality favorable to city planning in governmental circles. They helped instill into influential, or at least vocal, actors in the local scene--particularly
university professors and journalists—the conviction that growth should proceed in a more orderly fashion than had occurred till then, and that a city plan was necessary to avoid uncontrolled growth. Besides, particularly since the SAGMACS plan, local city planners grew accustomed to thinking of the Belo Horizonte problems in broader terms. Belo Horizonte was the core of a metropolitan area, and the satisfactory solution of its problems would need a wider planning frame.

However, the lack of implementation of the central proposals of the plans was also a cause of distress among many city planners, particularly those located at the City Hall. With the passage of the years, many of them became skeptical about grandiose planning schemes, as a metropolitan plan risked to be. They would see the possibilities of planning only in helping the local authorities to avoid more obviously wrong, piece-meal decisions, in the light of some general criteria, derived from an actual or future plan. They would consider some of the SAGMACS plan's criteria, in the former case, and would avoid decisions that would irreversibly condition later developments in the city, in the latter case.

Still, even at City Hall, there were planners who would support a metropolitan plan, and would later favor the decision to start the preparation of that plan. Some of the members of the Master Plan Department at City Hall were also professors in the University, in engineering and, particularly, architecture. They helped to form a young generation of planners.
Some of the latter had the chance to work at City Hall as research and planning assistants, and to become familiar with the earlier proposals of the Giannetti and the SAGMACS plan. Some of them were more optimistic than their elder at City Hall about the possibilities of city planning. Past failures were not sufficient in their view to prove the unsuitability of planning in the local context. Conditions missing in the past endeavors could be provided in future efforts, they thought. Perhaps there had not been a sufficient attention to administrative arrangements, enough enlightenment of political leaders on the merits of the plans, or steady efforts to push the cause forward. Planning itself, they argued, was a technique in constant progress, and was becoming increasingly popular in Brazil. The ideas about urban planning and national urban policy had gained wide currency after 1964. The subject of "metropolitan areas," in particular, which the local plans had already raised, was underway. The young planners, and some of their elders, saw in it the great hope of successful planning in Belo Horizonte. For one thing, it would be commensurate with the nature of the urban problems in their new, supra-municipal scale. For another, as its scope was micro-regional, the state should participate in it, and everything seemed to indicate also that the federal government had a high interest in the matter and would not be absent from the metropolitan area.

A decisive role in pushing forward the idea of metropolitan planning in Belo Horizonte was played by some
of the mentioned young architect planners who had gathered at a state agency, an understaffed Low Cost Housing Department at the State Secretariat of Labor, in the mid-1960s. 30

Those architects had been exposed some years earlier, while still in college, to attempts on the part of the Belo Horizonte City Hall to face the dearth of low-cost housing in Belo Horizonte. Mayor Azevedo had created a Municipal Housing Department (Departamento de Bairros Populares) during his tenure. As he declared to us:

As Mayor of Belo Horizonte, I had always been concerned with the problem of illegal constructions in the outlying, non-approved districts and in "favelas." I created that Department along the same lines as, some years later, inspired the creation of the BNH. We set about evicting some "favelas," but at the same time we launched the construction of some housing projects, to shelter the evicted people. How did we finance those projects? With a special, non-budgetary 3% tax levied on all projects submitted to the Mayoralty for approval. That tax was very low, but provided us with enough revenues. Here I part company with the current BNH philosophy. Housing, public transportation, and other services ought to be subsidized...31

The architecture students disagreed with Mayor Azevedo's and his staff's approach to the housing question. According to one of them, the problem was too narrowly envisaged and the solution, centered on house construction, was far from satisfactory. 32 In 1966, as young professionals in the Housing Department, they carried out a survey on the lower-strata housing conditions in Belo Horizonte. Reporting on their findings, 33 they pointed out that the solution of the housing problem required global planning. In local terms, this implied not only integrated municipal planning, but also metropolitan planning.
However, as the activities of that planning group did not receive the support of the then Secretary of Labor, the planners disbanded. Some were absorbed by the staff of the State Development Council, which had recently been created. They convinced the older members of CED to create a nucleus for city planning there, the Group for Integrated Planning (GPI). Thus, quite fortuitously, the state planners and the city planners came together.

Yet, as we mentioned earlier, the stand of the state planners at the CED was rather anti-urban. How could they lend their support to the idea that planning the metropolitan area—-that is, a big city, tending, in their views, to play a parasitic role in the state—-was a priority for the state? Apparently, despite the state planners' stance, other pre-dispositions, on both their, and the city planners', side, made for their joining their forces. On the state planners' side, their catholic conception of planning would render the idea of "integrated" metropolitan planning—-that is, one in which not only physical items, but also socio-economic ones would enter—-palatable. Further, their planning conception led the state planners to aspire toward a vast policy territory. Metropolitan planning was regarded by them—-in part owing to the GPI city planners' very efforts—-as an instance of micro-regional planning, which they thought was under their jurisdiction. On the city planners' side, on the other hand, their moving to the CED, rather than looking for some other niche in the state administration,
was not casual. They though that their planning conception, which was then widely publicized by SERFHAU, was congenial with that of CED's planners, and they were convinced that the latter would in time assimilate the importance of city planning for the state planning. They would loath being linked to other state agencies, such as the Secretariat of Public Works, which was also a candidate to the urban policy within the state, because of the that secretariat's sectoral planning focus. But we should not neglect SERFHAU's role in promoting the cooperation of state and city planners at the CED.

The Help of the SERFHAU to the Metropolitan Plan Mongers

At the time the events narrated in this section were taking place, the SERFHAU was being refurbished in the federal government, and about to launch its ambitious effort to establish a "national system for integrated development planning. By then, not only the theme of a national system of integrated planning was in the air, but also the issue of metropolitan areas. The 1967 Constitution's provision on metropolitan areas had awakened city planners all over the country to the vast, uncharted field ahead. Partisans of metropolitan planning were not long in coming into view.

In Minas, at the CED, the architect-planners were beginning to convince their fellow economist planners that, in the planning of micro-regions, "integrated" city planning
should be practiced, instead of only economic or social planning, or any other kind of sectoral planning. In the metropolitan region, they alleged, a metropolitan plan could fuse the architect-planners' physical concerns with those of regional economist and sociologist planners.\textsuperscript{36}

SERFHAU, bent on enlarging its organizational domain through control of the metropolitan issue, began to instigate the states to launch the planning of their metropolises by offering them its funds. Not the least, many consulting firms set about pressing the states and the municipalities to have their plans prepared, as a condition for them to obtain federal funds. The circumstances had become favorable to the former members of the State Housing Department, now at the CED.

The new Secretary of Planning, Mr. Victor Brito (1967), was not, in the beginning, totally convinced of the importance of a metropolitan plan, or at least of its urgency. As an agronomist, however, who had for a long time worked at the State Secretariat of Agriculture, he was interested in constructing a Central Food Supply Agency for the Metropolitan Area (CEASA).\textsuperscript{37} To finance the preparation of that project, Mr. Brito called on SERFHAU, whose representatives, according to the agency's philosophy, and also because of their collusion with the GPI planners, made the financing of the CEASA project conditional upon the preparation of a preliminary metropolitan plan. Had the intense proselytism of the GPI's planners not been enough, the new support from
SERFHAU was determining. Thus, the same consulting firm—São Paulo's HIDROSERVICE—hired to prepare the CEASA project was also requested to prepare a Preliminary Plan for the Metropolitan Area.

Though that was not all which was wanted, it represented a signal victory for the GPI planners. In accord with the planning systematics of SERFHAU for larger cities and metropolises, a preliminary plan was meant to be a preparation for an integrated development plan. To incur the costs of a preliminary plan and not to give sequence to the planning process would sound foolish, the GIP's planners thought. But they were to learn soon that, unless they went on unremittingly with plan-mongering, that partial achievement—the commissioning of the preliminary plan—would be to no avail.

The Decision to Plan

Once the Preliminary Plan was delivered to CED, in the beginning of 1969, the GPI planners felt that the momentum should not be lost. Support was needed to secure the decision to prepare the Metropolitan Plan proper.

By then, the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) had been hired to assist the state planners in the preparation of the State Development Plan. The metropolitan plan-mongers realized soon that in the ILPES conception there was little room for city and
metropolitan planning. To complicate things further the Preliminary Plan came forward with a stance in favor of concentrating growth in the metropolitan area, which contributed to weaken its persuasiveness in the eyes of the state planners and of their ILPES's advisors. As mentioned earlier, the opinion these planners held was that Belo Horizonte was too congested already. New investments should, they thought, be deflected to smaller urban centers in the interior of the state.

Nevertheless, after protracted discussion, the state planners appeared to realize that a metropolitan plan could help to bring some order to bear upon the until then uncontrolled growth of the metropolitan area. They also seemed to be more and more convinced that, in spite of the "dysfunctions" of the metropolis for the state, which they had exposed in several occasions, it could also fulfill some positive functions as a growth pole in the center of Brazil. Metropolitan planning, along the lines of "urbanism"—this word standing for "city planning" in the vocabulary of planners in Brazil—would help the metropolitan area to play that role. Besides, as the metropolitan policy was apparently being defined in the federal government, the state planners would not accept that Minas Gerais should be excluded from a likely program because of the state's delay in preparing a metropolitan plan. Finally, one cannot dismiss the hypothesis that the capture of the metropolitan policy by the state planners responded also to empire-building tendencies, which were strong at CED since its creation.
The following quotation, from the First Plan for the
Economic and Social Development of Minas Gerais (the PMDES),
issued in 1970, allows grasping the state planners' new
outlook on metropolitan planning.

... the world trend towards growth of the great urban
concentrations, which, in the case of Minas Gerais, is
embodied in the growing demographic denseness of the
metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, is acknowledged.
The state government is concerned with the problem, and
will henceforth dedicate to it a great deal of attention.
In order to obviate it, several steps are to be taken,
among them the elaboration of a Master Plan for the
Great Belo Horizonte, aimed at the definitive (sic) so-
lution of its problems, and at the anticipation of
initiatives to discipline its growth, and to avoid the
accumulation of difficulties apt to rival those observed
today in Rio and São Paulo. ... The "urbanistic" planning
of the Metropolitan Area of Belo Horizonte, to be implanted,
will be aimed at solving extant problems, and to create
the necessary conditions for the area to become the
gravitation center of Brazil's Mid-West. 38

The HIDROSERVICE had presented its own proposal for
the preparation of the Metropolitan Plan. But both the contents
of the Preliminary Plan and the price which the HIDROSERVICE
would charge for the new task weighed against it in the state
planners' refusal to hire it again. The metropolitan plan
mongers at GPI became afraid that that refusal would imply
postponing the metropolitan plan for a long time. They felt
they would need to build a new supporting coalition for
the planning decision. Their concern was now that that the
plan should be prepared with a much greater participation
of the local planners than had occurred in the SAGMACS and
in the HIDROSERVICE cases. 39

In the meantime, there were rumors that the Belo
Horizonte City Hall was about to undertake the revision of
the city's old building code. The GPI planners felt that it was a critical occasion to step in, and again to attempt to proselitize in favor of a broader metropolitan plan. By then (1969), Belo Horizonte's mayor, engineer Luiz Souza Lima, had set up an executive agency—the Superintendency for the Development of Belo Horizonte (SUDECAP)—modeled after a similar agency in Rio. The idea behind SUDECAP's creation was to have a semi-autonomous body (autarquia) able to compete with the private enterprises for good professionals, and to expedite the execution of public works. The planners quickly grasped the new agency's potential as a tool for plan implementation, and set about winning the agency's newly appointed chairman, Mr. Gil César Abreu, over to their cause. A well-known engineer, who had recently headed the team charged with the construction of an imposing soccer stadium in Belo Horizonte, Abreu became attracted by what a metropolitan plan could mean in terms of large public works. "I realized," said he, "that the mayoralty was in dire need to set up priorities for the execution of public works. Which works should come first? What primary objectives should the mayoralty pursue"?

A strategy to associate the CED and the Mayoralty in the preparation of a Metropolitan Plan was devised. It was thought that if the newly created SUDECAP pressed the Mayor for an agreement with the CED, that idea would certainly be accepted. The State Secretary of Planning was talked into sending a letter to the Municipal Secretary of
Public Works to dissuade him from preparing any isolated, municipal Master Plan, and obtain his support for the Metropolitan Plan.

That letter was sent. It stressed the need to plan Belo Horizonte in order to prevent future problems or, at least, to anticipate the solution of those problems. Because the city was at the core of a booming metropolis, its planning could not afford to ignore problems shared with the neighboring cities, problems which would require joint solutions, through intermunicipal cooperation. A Master Plan should be prepared before a building code. With the broader context in view, CED and the Mayoralty should join their efforts. SUDECAP, specifically, should be one of the parties to the agreement. That agreement should, besides, be open to the adhesion of the municipios in the area. Mayor Souza Lima, however, refused to embark on the proposed joint-venture.

With the Mayor's refusal, little else could be done, because the State authorities would be reluctant to embark on a project against the will of the mayor of the principal municipio in the metropolitan area. The planners' perseverance would have to be demanded again, and the metropolitan plan would have to await more favorable circumstances.

With a new state governor beginning his term, and appointing a new mayor for Belo Horizonte in early 1970, the plan mongers had to start their efforts from scratch. New actors held center stage now. Fortunately, engineer Roberto
Vicchi, a long-time official in the Belo Horizonte Master Plan Department, and supporter of city planning, was appointed Municipal Secretary of Planning. He was won to the metropolitan cause. Early in 1971, he retrieved the letter that the former State Secretary of Planning had sent to the Municipal Secretary of Public Works, and handed it to Mr. Pieruccetti, the new Mayor. Vicchi convinced Pieruccetti of the importance of the proposed agreement. At about the same time, architect-planner Ney Werneck, the indefatigable leader of GPI, started again his plan-mongering efforts in the state government. He prepared a brief report on the past negotiations regarding the metropolitan plan for the newly appointed Secretary of Planning, engineer Paulo Lima Vieira. In that report, Werneck recalled that the consulting firm responsible for the preparation of the preliminary plan had already presented a proposal for the elaboration of the definitive plan. That proposal had not been accepted, he reported, because of its high cost, and of the low participation of local planners in the planning tasks, which was likely to endanger implementation in the future. Werneck stressed that the local team who would be in charge of executing the plan should likewise participate in its preparation, "instead of merely supervising it."^44

About a couple of weeks later, Werneck wrote again to the Secretary of Planning to tell him of the interest of Belo Horizonte's Secretary of Planning, Mr. Vicchi, whom he had contacted, in the metropolitan plan. Mr. Vicchi's favorable
attitude would make it possible the preparation of the Metropolitan Plan through a joint municipal-state venture, as had suggested in the older correspondence then retrieved. Since the state government had created a planning and research agency attached to CED--the João Pinheiro Foundation (FJP)--a few months before Governor Pacheco's inauguration, Werneck came up with the idea that the CED and the Belo Horizonte Mayoralty should contract that agency to prepare the plan. Because of FJP's mixed legal nature, both public and private, Werneck reasoned that it appeared to be the ideal instrument to achieve both efficient performance and public control.

Those were critical considerations at that time. For one thing, as we noticed in chapter III, the SERFHAU policy was not to entrust the preparation of the plans it financed to public agencies, but to private planning firms. The João Pinheiro Foundation was, according to the Brazilian law, a private institution, even if attached to the public sector. For another, the opinion of some influential circles in the state technocracy--mostly the CEMIG-NDI people--was that important planning works, including the metropolitan plan, should be commissioned to renowned, international firms, because of the lack of local expertise. The João Pinheiro alternative would give a great deal of flexibility to the state, since that agency was not encumbered by civil service regulations and could hire its personnel and consultants in Brazil or abroad, remunerating them competitively.
Werneck's sense of urgency was increased by changes at SUDECAP. It had now a new directorate, and was shaping as a competitor to the GPI people regarding the metropolitan plan. Its Director for Planning, who would become its Chairman later, ambitioned to have the metropolitan plan prepared by SUDECAP itself.

The Secretary of Planning, faced with the competing claims, and convinced by Werneck's arguments that the time was ripe for CED's intervention, made up his mind to launch the metropolitan plan at once. The acquiescence of Belo Horizonte's authorities was important, and had already been obtained, but, as mentioned above, the new disposition of the SUDECAP heads could endanger an arrangement in which the CED planners would have the upper hand. Vieira managed, however, to obtain the Mayor's approval for CED's entrusting the preparation of the plan to Fundação João Pinheiro, which was, as seen, an agency attached to CED. Should the other municipalities participate in the agreement? In Werneck's draft of the agreement, the alternative of their being invited to participate was contemplated. But, in keeping with the tenor of Brazilian federalism in those years, the word invited was replaced by summoned in the final text of the agreement. The metropolitan municípios were thus summoned to participate in the metropolitan plan, and should defray a part of the costs of its preparation to boot. The agreement was signed on 30 June 1971, with the participation of all the municípios of the metropolitan area.46
Concluding Remarks

The main backer of metropolitan planning in Minas Gerais was the state central planning agency. That agency was created implement comprehensive development planning in Minas Gerais.

The hazards besetting comprehensive development planning were well described by Caiden and Wildavsky in their well-known book on planning and budgeting in poor countries. The agency in charge of comprehensive development planning needs control over the budget, and compliance with the guidelines it issues by sectoral agencies, which are to translate the targets of the plan into concrete programs and projects. The planning agency is expected to play a guiding role over the whole machinery of government, and to act as an extended arm of the chief executive. These highly demanding conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled in practice, especially in the very context for which they are postulated, that is, the situation of underdevelopment. Caiden and Wildavsky—as Hirschman did before them—propose that comprehensive planners settle for a more modest, but potentially more effective, planning ideal, centered on projects and on selective interference with reality.

The Minas Gerais experience examined in the first part of this chapter showed instances of successful planning of a non-comprehensive kind, carried out by agencies not
formally charged with planning, as the Electricity Company, the Development Bank, the Industrial Board. It showed also how, despite these experiences with informal, limited planning, the idea of comprehensive planning, diffused by, among others, the World Bank, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Institute for Economic and Social Planning, made progress in the state bureaucracy, and prompted the creation of CED, a central planning agency. CED's planning record exemplified well the shortcomings of comprehensive development planning, so vividly depicted by the Caiden and Wildavsky book.

At a certain point in CED's trajectory, it came to conceive metropolitan planning as also falling within its all-embracing planning jurisdiction. We showed how, in a first stage, although the several state plans, and other documents produced by state planners, were aware of the importance of the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte as the state's most important pole, they did not regard it as a target for city planning (that is, planning along the lines of "urbanism"). Furthermore, in more recent years, the state planners began to hold a dismal view about Belo Horizonte's role for the state's urban system. Their outlook became anti-urban. It would be difficult to conceive of those planners sponsoring the preparation of a metropolitan plan.

We showed, however, that the ideal of preparing a metropolitan plan for Belo Horizonte was acquiring ripeness
among the city planners at City Hall and in other governmental niches, and at the University. At a certain point in time, those planners became converted to the idea of integrated local plans, which was becoming widely known in the Brazilian city planning circles, and was officially sponsored by SERFHAU.

A group of the city planners more enthusiastic for metropolitan planning managed to move from the State Low-Cost Housing Department, were they had been working, to the CED, where they set up the GPI, a group for integrated planning along the lines set forth by SERFHAU. Their persistent proselytizing work, helped by SERFHAU's timely presence as a financing agency for urban planning, induced the state planners, who counted on the acquiescence of some critical people at the Belo Horizonte City Hall, to sponsor the metropolitan plan. It was pointed out that in the state planners' conversion to the metropolitan planning policy weighed the perception of the metropolitan plan as an instrument capable of bringing some order to bear on the metropolitan area's growth, and of reinforcing it as a development pole, the desire not to let Minas Gerais be excluded from a federal program—viz., the metropolitan areas policy—which, at that time, was perceived as a potential source of federal resources for the State, and probably, some empire-building drives also. The implications of the institutional connection of the metropolitan planners with the state planning agency will be one of the topics of the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter IV


2 As the State did not have a Secretariat of Planning at that time, the governor resorted to the "técnicos" in the Secretariat of Agriculture, which also had jurisdiction over the areas of Commerce and Industry.

3 Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, Plano de Recuperação Econômica e Fomento de Produção, (June, 1947).

4 Governo do Minas Gerais, Secretaria de Viação e Obras Públicas de Minas Gerais, Plano de Eletrificação de Minas Gerais, (1950). This plan was prepared by Companhia Brasileira de Engenharia.

5 The selection of governors through "indirect" elections results from informal and formal procedures. A very narrow circle, formed by the President of the Republic and some high civilian and military assistants chooses the "candidate" from a publicly unknown pool of potential candidates. The governmental party officially endorses the candidate thus chosen, and his name is submitted to the legislature, which functions as an electoral college. Recently, that "college" has been enlarged by the presence of municipal and state delegates.

6 The ILPES approach to comprehensive planning is presented, for instance, in Carlos Matus, Estrategia y Plan (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veinte Uno, 1972), and Gonzalo Martner, Planificación y Presupuesto por Programas (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veinte Uno, 1970), among many other works produced by ILPES's staff. See, also, Antônio Octávio Cintra and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, "Planejamento," and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, "Technocracy and Development."
7
A factor that certainly contributed to Reis's invitation was his good connection to Delfim Netto, Médici's strong Finance Minister. In Brazil's federalism, a good rapport with Brasília is critical for a state governor's success.

8
An evaluation of the administrative reform inspired by the CED planners is carried out in Antônio Octávio Cintra and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, "Planejamento."

9
We do not mean to say that the comprehensive planners were against the preparation of projects. Projects, as we explained above, should be the terminal point of the planning effort. Nevertheless, as Caiden and Wildavsky show, and is confirmed by the mineiro case, the tasks of preparation of a macro-economic plan are time consuming, and the economist planners do not in general have the professional training for project preparation. Therefore, projects are likely to be missing at the end of the planning process. See Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: John Wiley, 1974). See, also, Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

10
On these breachings of the PMDES, see Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, "Technocracy and Development."

11
On the structural determinisms which lead planning and finance organs to disagree with each other, see Caiden and Wildavsky, passim, and Stephen S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chap. 4.

12
The above speculation on Reis's reasons is based on interviews with some of his colleagues, both at CED and at Finance, and on informal talks with him. Some of our information came from Mr. Otto Jacob, former Under-Secretary of Planning and General Coordination of Minas Gerais (Interview on 28 May 1974), and Mr. Álvaro Fortes Santiago, a top official in the State Secretariat of Planning in the Vieira years, and later Head of the Staff of Planners at the State Secretariat of Finance (Interview on 27 May 1974).

13
Some of those people were interviewed by us, both in the research for this dissertation and in another project on planning in Minas Gerais. The latter is reported in A. O. Cintra and L. A. Gama de Andrade, "Planejamento."
In general, such stands are common to people in charge of unitary agencies, some of them public enterprises. Given the dominance of a certain goal in those agencies, sectoral planning and coordination are feasible. The aspiration to plan the whole state brings in its train a change of scale, however. To cope with the latter task, the planners would have to come to grips with many conflicting goals, and with the need to resolve the tradeoffs among them. Many of those goals were sponsored and promoted by those very sectoral agents who favored planning in theory, but who would not brook the planners' judgement on how their sectoral goals should fare against other strongly sponsored goals in a global "welfare function." They would not tolerate the planners' command over the allocation of resources on the basis of that judgement. On these points, see Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 435.

Rondon Pacheco, interview on 13 October 1975; Ildeu Duarte Filho, interview on 22 September 1975; Paulo J. Lima Vieira, interview on 25 November 1975. We have also talked at length about Pacheco's governmental style with one of his chief auxiliaries, Mr. Francisco Noronha, Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Tourism during Pacheco's administration.


The literature advancing these views is extensive. See, for instance, the essays collected in Manuel Castells et al., Imperialismo y Urbanización en America Latina (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili, 1973), for a sample of important texts.

See, for instance, Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, BDMG, Diagnóstico da Economia Mineira, vol. III, "População e Infra-estrutura".

From the 1930s on, several decrees and assorted ordinances were issued. Sidewalk construction and repair were regulated in 1930 by Decree 61. Building setbacks and height, the bulk and other features of structures, and a rudimentary zoning, were the matters dealt with in 1933 through Decree 165. Urban land subdivisions were regulated by Decree 54, while Decree-Law 83, issued in 1940, set up standards for water and sewerage networks in private dwellings. In 1940, one other important regulation, the city building code (Decrees-Laws 83 and 84), was enacted. The provisions
of Decree 165 had to be modified in 1946 by Decree-Law 1.910, which enlarged the "commercial" zone of the city. In that zone, a more intensive use of the lots was allowed. An interesting point is contained in the Decree's "whereas": "... bearing in mind that it has not yet been possible to establish the general urbanization plan for the city..."

20

In the Brazilian territorial organization, the municípios ought to observe the stipulations of a State Chart bearing on their organization.

21

Américo Renê Giannetti, Plano Programa de Administração para Belo Horizonte (Belo Horizonte, June 1951).

22

Idem, p. 25.

23


24


25

Mr. Ney Werneck, one of the protagonists of the metropolitan plan decision, called our attention to this role of the officials at the Master Plan Department. (Interview on 4 June 1974).

26


27

Idem, p. 27.

28

The reconstruction of the young city planners' opinions is based on the information provided to us by one of the participants in that group, architect-planner Ney Werneck. (Interviews on 4 June 1974, 25 September 1975 and 13 January 1981).

29

Those events were taking place at about the same time that some sectors in the federal government— as described in chapter III— were awakening to the importance of metropolitan planning. The communications between local planners and planners from other parts of Brazil was frequent, particularly in the meetings of the Brazilian Institute of Architects (IAB), a very active professional association.
So far as we could ascertain, the demand for a metropolitan plan was never widespread. The metropolitan reality was not a salient issue for representative politicians and holders of higher public offices in the metropolitan area and in the state, nor for leaders of private associations. Though we have not investigated this point systematically, it came out clearly in several of the interviews we conducted with the people involved in the metropolitan planning issue (former mayors of Belo Horizonte, heads of public agencies, former state governors, politicians, "technocrats," etc.). We examined the transcripts of Belo Horizonte's City Council's meetings for the years of 1966 through 1968, which immediately preceded the decision to commission the preparation of the Preliminary Plan. In only one instance did we come across a demand for a Master Plan being voiced by a City councilman, on 24 October 1966. That councilman, Mr. Henrique Novaes, was a political scientist and a young Catholic militant, familiar with the SAGMACS activities in Belo Horizonte some years earlier. SAGMACS, let us recall, was a "mixed nature" group, both a planning firm and a branch of Social Catholicism's movement "Économie et Humanisme." The technicians who worked in it were also militant social reformers. Novaes shared many of their ideas as to social reform. His demand was not, thus, quite typical, and was ignored by his fellow councilmen.

Interview on 1 November 1975.

Those events were taking place at the heyday of populistic mobilization. The construction of low-cost houses was the initial, but not exclusive, motivation of the populistic "urban reform" thrust. The speculation on real estate appreciation, the holding out of vacant land and unoccupied apartments in the inner city, and the forcible, costly occupancy of outward districts by the lower class people have also been stressed, among other issues.

Governo Magalhães Pinto, Secretaria do Trabalho e Cultura Popular, Departamento de Habitação Popular, Levantamento da População Favelada de Belo Horizonte (Belo Horizonte, 1966), pp. 53-54.

The reconstruction of these motivations is based on our talks with Messrs. Ney Werneck (interviews mentioned), Alípio Pires Catello Branco (Interview on 16 September 1975), and Alvare Fortes Santiago (interview mentioned).

These reasons were presented to us by Ney Werneck (interview mentioned).
These facts were reconstructed from the interviews with Werneck, Castello Branco and Santiago, mentioned in note 34.

Mr. Victor Brito (interview on 3 November 1975).


Information from Ney Werneck (interviews quoted). To be sure, that opinion was not unanimously shared. The participation of consulting firms, particularly foreign ones, was hailed by some groups in the State as substantively fit and politically expedient. The CEMIG and INDI people, for instance, would have favored the trusting of the metropolitan plan to some well- know international firm. They tended to look askance to local or national groups in fields such as these. This position was confirmed by Paulo Valladares, one of the members of the INDI, and Secretary of Planning in the last year of Rondon Pacheco's administration (interview on 6 September 1975).

Interview with former Mayor Luiz Gonzaga Souza Lima, on 24 November 1975.

Interview with Engineer Gil César Moreira de Abreu, first SUDECAP superintendent, on 18 November 1975.

Letter of Mr. Victor Brito, Secretary of Planning during Israel Pinheiro's administration, to Mr. Mario Werneck, then Secretary of Public Works in Belo Horizonte (19 March 1970).

When interviewed, Mayor Souza Lima said that he had not been against a Metropolitan Plan, on the contrary, he insisted, he had even taken some preliminary steps towards a plan during his tenure. What is sure, however, is that he was much more oriented to public works or, at most, to sectoral planning, than to any sort of comprehensive plan. Mr. Souza Lima gave us access to his personal files, where we came across a draft of what was probably a press-release in which his planning and administrative conception, along these lines, is pretty clear.
Letter of 29 March 1971, of Ney Werneck to Paulo L. Vieira, Secretary of Planning of Minas Gerais.

We referred to that attitude above, in note 39.

Information from Mr. Ney Werneck, in whose files there are copies of the original and of the modified draft of the metropolitan agreement.

Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).

CHAPTER V

THE SUPERMAN SYNDROME SETS IN

In the preceding chapter, we described the protracted process which led the state planning agency in Minas Gerais—viz., the State Development Council (CED)—to take possession of the metropolitan policy in the state. We showed, first, how CED sponsored the preparation of a preliminary metropolitan plan, and, second, how, after striking an agreement with Belo Horizonte and the remaining municípios of the metropolitan area, it commissioned the preparation of the metropolitan plan proper to Fundação João Pinheiro, one of its affiliated institutions.

In this chapter, we shall deal with the critical matter of what kind of a product was proffered by the metropolitan planners. The location of the metropolitan planners in the state planning agency, rather than in other institutional niche, together with other determinants to be indicated in this chapter, helped to shape the planning policy which was attempted in the metropolitan area. It is not enough to say that our metropolitan planners subscribed to a comprehensive planning ideal. The main debates were indeed about the scope of the plan and in particular about the relations of physical to social planning. Even the shared comprehensive ideal could, in practice, be materialized in different ways. The particular choice the planners made was conditioned by factors which
we shall examine. The importance of this point for the politics of planning effectiveness hardly needs stressing.\footnote{1}
The support that planning will obtain from the power-holders will depend, as we put it in the introductory chapter, on what the comprehensive planning proposal they will have to enforce will entail in terms of exercise of influence on their part, and in terms of the opportunity costs of that exercise. What is the scope of the proposed intervention? What actions will have to be initiated? What actors will have to be mobilized to observe the planners' recommendations? Is the coordination required by the plan a complex task, implying interdependent activities on the part of many different agencies? Do these agencies come up with simpler proposals, easier to enforce than those of the planning group? Do the planners' proposals lead to delayed action, when the authority would prefer to act fast, or, on the contrary, to decision and definition, when the authority would prefer to postpone action? What interests are forwarded by the metropolitan plan's proposals? Are they the same as the power-holders want to promote? Those, and related questions, which have to do both with the scope of planning, and with its contents, show how crucial it is to know what the planners are forwarding in the concrete planning situation. As we shall show, what is advanced by planners is, in fact, to a great extent, determined by their perception of the planning situation.
The Metropolitan Planners' Planning Conception

Soon after the signature of the agreement for the preparation of the Metropolitan Plan, Secretary Vieira, acting on delegation of the convening parties, charged the João Pinheiro Foundation with the preparation of the plan. A planning group was formed there. However, instead of appointing city planner Ney Werneck its director, Vieira invited Gilson Dayrell, an electrical engineer and city planner to head the planning team. Dayrell had been working at SERETE, a French consulting and engineering firm located in São Paulo. Vieira explained to Werneck that he wanted him to act as CED's representative in the planning group, but as Werneck insisted on participating in the planning activity itself, Vieira appointed him deputy director of the planning group.² To occupy the chief positions in the planning team, Dayrell invited some fellow planners from SERETE, rather than planners from the GPI or from the Belo Horizonte City Hall. Those decisions were locally resented, but Dayrell thought it indispensable to have a planning team of tested and dependable competence, which he thought was not case with the local planners.

That planning group—Plano Metropolitano de Belo Horizonte (PLAMBEL)—was intended by Vieira to be the embryo of a future metropolitan agency, to be established as soon as the federal legislation bearing on the metropolitan areas would be enacted. The nature of that agency, its competences, were not precisely defined at that time. It was vaguely thought that it should have the necessary powers to
put the metropolitan plan into practice and to coordinate the metropolitan programs. The status of PLAMBEL was thus somewhat ambiguous. Like private consultant firms, it was expected to deliver a plan, after some contractually set lapse of time. Intermediate products were also to be delivered along the way. Still, from the outset, the Secretary of Planning—the planners' main interlocutor—and, sometimes, the Mayor of Belo Horizonte, would request special tasks from the planners. Since PLAMBEL's inception, it was called upon, and willingly accepted, to interfere more actively in the events, by giving its opinion or passing judgement on proposals thought to have some metropolitan impact. In other occasions, the planners themselves took the initiative to interfere, when some proposal appeared to call for their examination, technical approval or, often, expert "veto." The stage of plan preparation was not sharply differentiated from implementation. The planners were immersed throughout in the political-bureaucratic world of the metropolitan area. They were not producing an academic report. They were not private consultants either, like the drafters of the Preliminary Plan. The PLAMBEL planners were involved in the realm of politics and power, at least from the moment it was decided that the metropolitan plan should be prepared within a state agency. They would be forced to chart paths towards achieving their goals in this context. But the context was filtered by the planners' perception of it, and their planning approach was conditioned by that perception.
It is possible to grasp the planners' approach from the examination of two of their first products, the Plan Proposal, and the Structure Scheme Outline, which will be examined next.

The Plan Proposal

The Plan Proposal (Escopo do Plano) was the first official product of PLAMBEL's work. It was tendered just a few weeks after the group set about its task. The Proposal was the basis for the contract to be signed between the convening parties—CED, the Belo Horizonte and the other municpios' City Halls, and SERFHAU, which was to finance the preparation of the plan. According to SERFHAU's provisions, the Proposal should list the main planning tasks and products.

By examining that proposal, it is easy to see that it was stating an ambitious conception of planning. According to the Proposal, the plan was to cover a wide range of topics, encompassing both physical and non-physical aspects of the metropolis. Its main components were to be:

(a) an economic development plan for the metropolitan area;
(b) a physical-development plan;
(c) a plan for infrastructures (public utilities);
(d) a social plan (most of the classical social service items), and
(e) proposals for novel institutional arrangements in the metropolitan area.

It is not only the wide coverage, across so many items, that strikes us, since all the plans sponsored by
SERFHAU were expected to reach out for as broad a range of aspects. In the present case, however, each of the promised plans was, in addition, highly ambitious. The physical plan, for instance, was to unfold on several levels, from the area-wide "Structure Plan" to the "Plan for the Central Business District of Belo Horizonte." On each level, plans would branch into more specific plans. The Metropolitan Structure Plan, for example, would include a Land-Use and Occupancy Plan, a Transportation Plan, an Open-Spaces Plan, and an Industrial Parks Plan. Each one of these would, in turn, fork into more specific plans. The whole endeavor outlined in the Proposal would have to build upon a massive data collection and an enormous basis of information. Throughout, the planners did not attempt in that Proposal to clarify the problems in the area which should be considered metropolitan, and those which should be left to sectoral or municipal plans.

Not all members of the planning group's directorate were of one mind about the Plan Proposal. Mr. Ney Werneck, who had played a decisive role in the decision to plan, espoused a different conception. His dissent from his planning fellows could, in part, be interpreted as deriving from a certain resentment for his not having been entrusted with the leadership of the planning group, after he had indefatigably struggled for the planning decision. But it surely derived in great part from Werneck's own previous experience in the government. Unlike his fellow PLAMBEL planners, Werneck had, as we saw in the preceding chapter, been connected to the
State bureaucracy in Minas Gerais for a long time. Still, he had not been a member of the bureaucratic circles involved in the state's material development. During Pacheco's administration, those circles enjoyed a rise in strength and prestige, while other agencies and their cadres remained in a modest rank. Werneck had worked at the Secretariat of Labor, a modest portfolio in the State bureaucracy, where the under-staffed State's Low-Cost Housing Department was located. His previous experience was that of having been linked to the "suffering" side in the public sector, not to its "triumphant" side. The issues he had espoused until then usually ranked very low in the state policy-making circles. He was afraid that, despite the decision to prepare the metropolitan plan, sufficient support would not be forthcoming for an ambitious undertaking. No wonder, he would propose careful treading. This background information is not intended to explain away, or to invalidate, Werneck's stand on his fellow planners' proposal. On the contrary, some essential points bearing on the "technology of planning" and its relation to the "politics of planning" were at issue, and deserve examination.³

Some months before the signature of the metropolitan planning agreement, Werneck had presented his own views about the contents that a metropolitan plan should have, in a letter sent to Paulo Vieira.⁴ With the support of Jorge Wilhelm, a well-known city-planner from São Paulo, Werneck outlined a proposal for the plan, centered mostly on physical development, on the one hand, and on the organization of the "Metro-
politan Planning System," as he called it, on the other. In their view, the physical plan would consist in "defining the physical structure of the metropolitan area within the time-horizon of 1980." That structure would be materialized through:

(a) the "compatibilization" of public works and projects programmed for the area on all governmental echelons;
(b) the listing of all high-priority projects;
(c) the listing of the principal metropolitan and municipal tasks for continuance of the plan; and
(d) the preparation of the basic legislation on land-use and subdivisions, and of the building-code, as instruments to put the plan guidelines into practice.

Though the scope of Werneck's proposal was much narrower than that of his colleagues at PLAMBEL, it still hid much complexity, and some implementation traps, which we shall point out below.

Werneck was defeated in the discussions which led to the Plan Proposal finally proffered by PLAMBEL. A persevering man, he returned to Secretary Paulo Vieira to express his dissent from his colleagues on that proposal, and to insist again on his own points of view. For him, the planners' concern should be the physical development plan ("territorial organization," as he put it). The remaining topics were to be included only as they would condition the proposed physical structure. The planning strategy, he thought, should be rather cautious. An embryo of the "metropolitan agency" should be formed and placed "under the shadow of CED's prestige." He advanced that that embryonic organization might, through a well-conceived strategy, which should avoid conflicts with the agencies operating in the area, grow
into the full-fledged metropolitan agency in the future. He went on to explain that a preliminary view of "the city as a whole" was not only possible but also needed. It would permit triggering the "planning process," by providing the information needed for the coordination of public works and projects already in execution. The planners would be able to move from proposals into action immediately. Only thereafter, he stressed, should the planners embark on new studies. To these considerations, he added:

To us, professionals working in the public sector, there is a strategic element which we consider perfectly appropriate to bring to bear here... the experience shows that, when activities are taken from existing organizations to constitute the function of novel organizations, the latter will be looked at askance, and will be subjected to pressures...

He concluded that the metropolitan planning group should set about its job by acting in sectors the competences for which were not yet well-defined. Those were, he said, the typical grounds for the appearance of neglected metropolitan problems.

Werneck would, thus, settle for a more modest planning ideal than that of his planning fellows. As he did not produce a fully developed document, it is not possible to carry out a detailed comparison of his proposal with the approved one. He proposed a strategy akin to Downs's "shrinking violet syndrome." 7

An architect, Werneck adopted the profession's more intuitive approach to city-form, instead of relying, as his
fellow metropolitan planners, on sophisticated mathematical modelling.

Werneck was not alone in his dissent. Before final approval by Vieira, the Plan Proposal was submitted, on the planners' own initiative, to a discussion seminar held early in December 1971 and attended by experts from SERFHAU, representatives from CED and Belo Horizonte's City Hall, and some external consultants, among them Jorge Wilhelm, and a French planner, Melchior D'Aramon, working at SERETE at the time.

D'Aramon's reactions to the Plan Proposal were presented in public during the Seminar, in private conversations with the senior planners, and in writing, through a critical opinion sent to the planning team a few days after his departure.

D'Aramon, an engineer, upheld a metropolitan plan centered on proposals for physical development. But the physical plan he upheld was justified in terms of a higher goal, viz., the creation of the "conditions for a better quality of life in the metropolitan area" regarded as a "functional whole." That paramount goal was translated into two lower order goals, i.e., the conception of the "physical framework" (cadre de vie) for life in the area, and the realization of that framework.

D'Aramon took it for granted that actions on the physical framework would be beneficial for the quality of life. He held that, no matter how tempted the planners might be to intervene in other sectors, because of the "gravity of social and economic problems," the metropolitan plan was
not the appropriate means to deal with them. Furthermore, he assumed that a future metropolitan agency would be entitled to treat only the physical aspects of the cadre de vie.

On the basis of that rationale, D'Aramon set about to glean, from the Plan Proposal, the topics he saw as relevant to the principal task. Many of the Proposal's items should, according to him, be laid aside. Others should be accepted only on grounds of political expediency. The problems on which the latter bore did not appear to him to be metropolitan problems proper. They should none the less be taken on, because of their intrinsic relevancy. The planners' contributing to their solution would, he said, help to form a favorable image for them in the local public opinion, image on which they could eventually draw as a power resource when dealing with real metropolitan problems. A typical problem with these characteristics was, he thought, the plan for Belo Horizonte's CBD.

Besides appraising the relevancy of each of the proposed planning tasks to the conception and implantation of the cadre de vie, D'Aramon resorted to an additional criterion of selection of the plan contents. Were the problems on which they bore already under the clear responsibility of some existing agency? If yes, the metropolitan plan should not tamper with them, except for those problems which, even if not really metropolitan in their characteristics, could be effectively tackled by the metropolitan planners.
Another point in D'Aramon's critique are the planning methods. In the examination of Werneck's stands, we pointed to the differences in approach between him, and probably also Wilheim, as architect-planners, and the other head-planners, who were engineers. D'Aramon, however, who was also an engineer, disagreed strongly with the planners promised reliance on heavy mathematical modelling, simulation techniques, etc., for structure design and transportation planning. His arguments, however, unlike Werneck's, were set forth explicitly. Mathematical modelling, he put it, would require sophisticated research, which would eat into the planners' time and resources. A simplified approach was both needed and possible, at least to start with. Even in regard to transportation planning, and the conception of the roads network, he held it desirable to avoid too much sophistication. The metropolitan planners should forgo embarking on ambitious research, before being able to "raise questions oriented by real problems." They should venture their hypotheses about the land occupancy needs, the hierarchy of the "central places," the quality of the environment, and the network of roads, however lacking in precision those hypotheses might be. As to roads, for instance, a field in which the reliance on research and modelling was seemingly imperative, he observed: "There is a consensus on the interest to build an oriented gridiron system of roads, to break with the present radial, concentric system." The planners should not therefore waste the critical beginning period immersed in massive research and data analysis.
The Metropolitan Structure Scheme

The conception of planning forwarded by the metropolitan planners was more explicitly set forth in the Metropolitan Structure Scheme: First Outline (Esquema Metropolitano de Estruturas: Primeiro Esboço), a document put into circulation eight months after the initiation of the planning tasks.

Differently from the Plan Proposal, which stirred much controversy within the planning group itself, the preparation of this document seemed to be more consensual. In part, this was due to its being still a "first outline," in which, therefore, even the more mathematically minded planners had to rely more on intuition about city form, than on time-consuming research and heavy mathematical modelling. This characteristic of the Structure Scheme Outline assuaged Werneck's methodological dissent from his fellow planners. In part also, Werneck, after some months of working together with his new colleagues, had been coopted into the group, and was less radically critical of their planning approach than he had been when of the preparation of the Plan Proposal.

What were the ideas advanced in this Structure Outline? The planning of the metropolitan structure was said to be "the most important part of metropolitan planning." The Structure Outline, still an expression of the planners' initial outlook, has the advantage over the Plan Proposal of being a full-fledged presentation of their planning philosophy,
including a good case for the need and specificity of physical planning. Moreover, as it was drafted after some months of work "in the field," the views it conveys cannot be said to reflect only the "inputs" brought by planners from other planning experiences and contexts. The planners were already working in the metropolitan area, and their perception of its particular administrative and political environment could already be said to be an important factor in their outlook.

What is the Scheme? Inspired in the British Town Planning Acts—at that point influential in Brazil, among other things through official contacts promoted by SERFHAU with planning agencies and schools in Great Britain—and also, in French models, particularly through the presence of a young French planner, Mr. Alain David, in the senior staff, the Structure Scheme Outline is a regional plan. It does not get down to the details of concrete sites and to problems of city design. Its provisions are said not to be binding, but merely indicative. It is rather meant to provide the "long-run, basic guidelines for the organization of the space on the scale of the region as a response both to the imperatives of social and economic development, and to the need to offer satisfactory living conditions for the region's inhabitants." It does not confine itself to laying out the physical alternatives for the area, but also attempts to articulate physical planning with socio-economic planning.
The great challenge of planning the metropolitan area, it is put by the planners, is the need to "shelter a population of upwards of 5 million inhabitants by 1990." The metropolitan area needs economic development. But the metropolitan area can also be the basis for the development of a wider region. Its development can spread its effects over other points of the territory. Belo Horizonte has to become a true "metropolis of equilibrium, to support Minas's progress, and help to balance the development of Brazil's Center-South."

But development alone is not sufficient, the plan alerts. "There are countless instances of cities in which the rise in living standards has not been accompanied by a betterment of the quality of life." Therefore, the metropolitan plan has also to pursue the betterment of the quality of life, which is not an automatic by-product of development. The city has to favor "the access of people to the greatest range of alternative life-styles" through its physical framework. That framework will provide the inhabitants with a "greater freedom and better prospect for self-realization when making the essential decisions of their lives, viz., choosing an abode, a job, a lifestyle..."

An extensive case is made in the Structure Outline for planned intervention in physical structures, because social and economic problems have a physical aspect too. Belo Horizonte, the central city, "concentrates most of the wholesale and retail commercial activities, the services, the banks, the governmental offices." The relationships of
the other cities to it are dependency, not complementarity, relationships. "The population and the jobs are distributed in an imbalanced way, affecting negatively the conditions of life and decreasing the access of the people to the urban goods and services." But, if the socio-economic problems have a physical expression, they have to be faced also through physical planning: "The need is evident for a metropolitan structure built on a hierarchy of centers that will perform complementary functions." When proposals are made to solve the metropolitan area's problems, physical development measures are not forgotten, as, for instance, "the re-structuring of the location of the activities in the area." It is posited that their effects will be in terms of both efficiency and equity.

A planned "built environment" is set as a planning goal in its own by the metropolitan planners. Physical problems are considered real problems, even if their deeper causes may lie elsewhere. They have their own impact upon problems in other spheres--on the conditions of life, for sure, but also on the conditions for economic efficiency.

The spontaneous urban growth is to blame for its consequences. Among those consequences, the planners mention:

(a) the "sprawl," caused by an "unbridled process of land subdivision;
(b) the "lack of structure" of the metropolitan space;
(c) the imbalance in the distribution of activities within the area;
(d) the insufficient development of an infrastructure of public utilities;
(e) the quantitative and qualitative deficits in housing, and
(f) the low level of "social integration," since many groups--mostly in the lower classes--are physically isolated from the "benefits of urban life," because of the spatial concentration of these benefits.
How to obtain a planned "built environment"? The metropolitan planners present, in this Outline, the preliminary traits of three alternative metropolitan structures from which the political leaders should choose the future configuration of the metropolitan area. Each alternative contemplates the location of the main tertiary activities, of the industrial estates, of the residential areas, of the metropolitan parks and other metropolitan equipments, and proposes the construction of the network of the principal roads and systems of mass-transit. The proposal of these alternative structures is certainly the most controversial part of the Structure Scheme Outline. In delineating them, the planners claim to be taking the perspective of the whole metropolitan area, and to be speaking on behalf of the metropolitan interest. But the alternatives were not immaterial to the interests of the metropolitan municipios. Different proposals for the location of industrial estates, or of the main metropolitan roads, for instance, would affect differently the several metropolitan municipios. Some of them would be rewarded, while others would be deprived by the different structural choices. Would those whose support was needed to put the metropolitan proposals into practice be willing to concur with the planners' view in the definition of the metropolitan interest, with its contradictory impacts upon the municipal interests?

With regard to conflicts of interest of the above kind, and others—such as, for instance, could be provoked
by physical development proposals apt to have a redis-
tributive impact—the metropolitan planners seemed to take
it for granted, in the Structure Scheme Outline, that it
was possible to achieve a broad consensus on the plan
proposals, through what they called "a broad political
process." Their proposals, they assumed, could be widely
discussed by all layers in society, and could entrain
widespread support through their demonstrable rationality.

Yet, the aspiring goals of the Structure Scheme
Outline could be achieved only if there were a "change in,
and adaptation of, the existing institutions." Control
over the city's physical growth called for a "radical trans-
formation in the activities of the public authorities."
Planning meant a change from a reactive, or passive, posture,
mostly oriented to the short-run, to a voluntaristic one,
addressed to the long-run. Improvements on the agencies of
the three governmental tiers which acted in the metropolitan
area were in order. As planning is a great joint effort,
the several actors have to act in unison to carry it out.
Spontaneous development is disorderly. No single agent
would be capable to grapple with the problems brought about
by the lack of planning. A "metropolitan agency" was needed
to put into practice "the difficult task of agglutinating
efforts to secure the goals set." Each municipio or public
authority in the area should take on its role in the
collective effort, and harmonize its actions with the metro-
politan goals. Otherwise, it would be nearly impossible
to surmount the difficulties in the way of the organization of the metropolitan region. The final Structure Plan, anticipated by this Structure Scheme Outline, would, in the planners' view, orient the integration of the actions of the local authorities, the state government, the public agencies on all governmental levels, and would guide the metropolitan investment program. It could also set out the main directives and parameters for the Land Use Plan and the Roads Network Plan.

The planners claimed for planning and for planners a privileged position in the metropolitan process. This document reflected that the planners were highly confident that they were supported, and would be able to control the metropolitan dynamics. They took if for granted that they would be able to harness the actions of the several authorities around a common purpose, set forth in the plan. High control over the environment and high autonomy were assumed.¹³

Incrementalism was turned down in the conception advanced. The government should not merely react to immediate problems. It had to forecast the future, and guide conscious efforts to secure the alternatives chosen. Despite an apparent adherence to what city-planners call a "process style of planning,"¹⁴ as expressed in statements like the following: "The Structure Outline (is not aimed at) imposing definitive solutions, through fixing, once for all, the trajectory of development, as a function of a well defined future," the planners tended
to adopt an approach more akin to "blueprint planning." ¹⁵

The planners did not surrender the prerogative of setting the framework and drawing the picture, leaving only details for others to complete.

Yet the assumption of high control and high autonomy was not unambiguously held. When presenting the conception of alternative structure designs for the area, the planners seemed to prefer those the implementation of which would require the creation of a "land development corporation," which would, among other things, build the new "tertiary centers" (new towns) contemplated in those structure alternatives. The "heavier" alternatives (that is, those which implied greater transformation in the city structure) would call for instruments more amenable to the planners' control and more reliable for execution of the planned programs than the existing agencies appeared to be.

The PLAMBEL Planning Approach: Its Constraints and Determinants

In this section we shall try to explain the planning approach adopted in Belo Horizonte in terms of the constraints and determinants operative in that planning situation. Some basic elements interacted there. The metropolitan planners brought into play their own planning conception, that is, a certain planning paradigm, with, in particular, a certain interpretation of the comprehensive planning ideal, a view
about the items in the city to be interfered with through the planning endeavor—physical structures, social services and utilities, institutions, codes and ordinances, and so forth—and an approach to planning strategy. The ideas promoted by SERFHAU since the late 1960s, expressed in that agency's official doctrine and requirements for the financing of urban plans—which should be "integrated" plans—were a parameter for them. In the Belo Horizonte case, for instance, according to SERFHAU's provisions, the planners had to take as reference the terms set by the Preliminary Plan prepared by HIDROSERVICE, which, as shown in chapter IV, was also financed by SERFHAU. Not to be forgotten, either, the repertory of diagnoses, recommendations and memories of former planning efforts in the area, kept alive among some of the planning staff's members, as recalled in chapter IV, which were a part of the metropolitan area's "planning culture."

The planners operated in a planning setting. There was an environment close to them—the organizations and groups peopling the metropolitan policy space that, somehow or other, were interested in what the planners would do—and a more distant environment, namely, the wider socio-political context of Brazil. In the former environment, there was bound to be a constant play of actions and reactions between the planners' intentions and proposals, on the one hand, and the vested interests of fellow organizations, on the other. The broader environment bounded the planners'
initiatives through, among other things, the nature of the political regime, the prevailing ideological climate and technocratic mentality, the policy biases in the public sector, the nature of the inter-governmental relations, and the parameters of the national urban policies.

In what follows we shall inspect the likely impact of some of these interacting elements upon the planners' approach to their task.

The Scope of the Plan

One first aspect deserving examination in the Belo Horizonte experiment, because of its consequences on the politics of planning effectiveness, is the ambition of coverage shown by our metropolitan planners. They seemed to be lapsing into the Downsian superman syndrome we mentioned in our introductory chapter.

In part, that syndrome would be induced by factors pertaining to the broader environment, such as the technocratic mentality pervasive in the public sector in Brazil, and described in chapter II. That mentality favored the policy-makers' overestimation of their capacity as policy-formulators and implementers. Our planners were true to type, and reflected the general trend.

But we cannot neglect the role of SERFHAU either, as the federal agency which was financing the preparation of the metropolitan plan. What was its influence on the
local planning process? It was much smaller than what the proposals for SERFHAU's role in the national urban policy would have liked it to be. It was more formal than substantive. Yet, even the formal compliance with its requirements had implications for the work of the metropolitan planners. During the preparation of the plan, progress reports were to be submitted to that agency. At set time intervals, a group of SERFHAU's experts would come to Belo Horizonte, to examine the work being done, and sometimes suggest modifications and raise questions about obscure points. They would "monitor" the work. According to the SERFHAU planning provisions, the metropolitan planners ought to pattern their proposal on the "terms of reference" of the Preliminary Plan prepared by HIDROSERVICE.16

The Preliminary Metropolitan Plan had proceeded to a brief diagnosis of the main problems to be tackled by the definitive Metropolitan Plan, and had advanced the guidelines for the preparation of that final product. Specifications about what should be the main contents of the Metropolitan Plan, centered on the "socio-economic and territorial development of the metropolitan area "were advanced. There should be, it stipulated, a "Development Plan," covering a five-year period, and a "Model for Territorial Organization," spanning a twenty-year period, and containing a "Plan for the Expansion of the Settled Area," a "Metropolitan Land-Use Plan," a "Roads Plan," and a "detailed plan for the CBD" of Belo Horizonte. Besides,
some sectoral plans should be prepared, four of them considered "principal"—namely, those bearing on trans-
portation, basic sanitation, food supply and distribut
tion, and housing—and two "secondary," one on education, another on health. The "principal" sectoral plans implied "options that (would) bind the long-range development of the area, because they (had) decisive consequences upon the Plan for Territorial Organization and (depended) directly upon the guidelines issued in the Economic Development Plan." Terms of reference with regard to all those plans were outlined.

The metropolitan planners would have to develop their proposal within that wide-covering framework, officially adopted by the financing agency. Their ambitious proposal could not be considered the fruit of idiosyncrasy only. Its broad scope had an official model on which to justify its own amplitude.

Nevertheless, the Downsian syndrome, which those factors abetted, was to a great extent accounted for by the planners' connection to the CED. In Downs's hypothesis about the likelihood of bureaus' lapsing into the superman temptation, he insists on the importance of power-settings that provide the bureaus with "slow and weak feedback." This situation is likely to happen with planners distant from the agents charged with implementation. As Downs phrases it, "greater distance between planners and operators implies weaker feedback." The connection to CED put the metropolitan planners in a situation bound to present the
characteristics postulated in the Downs hypothesis. The conception of the plan, of the activities to engage in, or to cast aside, and, implicitly, the view of the goals to pursue, was influenced by the planners' perception of the "politics of planning" from the vantage point of CED's sponsorship.

CED was a strong unit when the Metropolitan Plan was commissioned, in the end of 1971. Its decision to commission the plan cannot be underestimated. The arrangement obtained, through which CED and Belo Horizonte City Hall were to be the plan's joint clients, the adherence of the remaining municipios to the agreement, including their acquiescence to incur a part of the planning costs, represented no mean achievement. Governor Pacheco was happy with the prospect of having some important projects to execute in the Metropolitan Area, as a result of the plan. Our contention is, however, that the same factors that contributed to CED's eventual failure as an effective "planning and coordinative" agency in Minas Gerais, would influence PLAMBEL's planning conception and work against its fulfilling that function in the metropolitan area.

CED aimed at an overall function of "planning and coordination," but, as we saw, a huge gap yawned between that high aim and the day-to-day practice of the State administration. The metropolitan planners' being linked to an organization like CED, rather than to an operative agency, seemed to favor unresponsiveness to the political
and administrative structures of implementation. The planners were not uninterested in implementation—quite the opposite, as we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter and shall examine in the next chapter. But CED's apparent omnipotence—as the agency, that is, in charge of planning the overall governmental endeavor, monitoring it, and carrying out the general coordination of governmental activities—has not contributed to discipline their "comprehensive" approach, and to dissuade them from loading the plan with more tasks than they would have the dexterity or the power to manage. Their mistake was not that they intended to use sophisticated research designs and modelling techniques (as discussed, they made a reasonable case for that), or wished to deduce land use plans from an area-wide structure plan, or wanted the latter's conception to be articulated with the area's economic development plan and with the overall roads and transportation plans, or aspired toward the cooperation of the executive agencies, in all areas encompassed by the proposal, in joint planning efforts, and so on, but rather that they wanted all that simultaneously, and counting on a quite modestly sized staff (as consultant D'Aramon had exposed). Metropolitan planning was a novelty of unknown practicability in Brazil. Even simpler city planning exhibited very few, and only partially, successful instances in the country. With so aspiring a conception of the planning task, our planners would be under hard pressure to legitimize their role, to broaden their supportive coalition,
at least in proportion to the intended, vast scope of the promised activities. Those points were not authoritatively brought home to the planners by their institutional client, viz., CED, but only, and not indisputably, by fellow planner Werneck, and consultants Wilheim and D'Aramon.

What if the planners had been linked to some of the more dynamic executive agencies present in the state administration at the time?

There were possible candidates to be the main supporters and clients for the plan within the Minas Gerais administrative machinery. Among them, the Secretariat of Public Works, within whose pale were some of the agencies in charge of sectoral urban problems, as basic sanitation, low-income housing programs, public works and, in part, land development. That alternative was not explored at the time. For one thing, the chief metropolitan plan-mongers were already located at CED before thought had been given to the institutional placing of the Metropolitan Plan. Though, as we say in chapter IV, the metropolitan plan-mongers would not always meet with the comprehension and sympathy of the economist and sociologist planners at the CED, that environment seemed more attuned to their concerns than that of other organizations in the state. At least, it was a planning agency concerned with comprehensive planning. For another thing, they were against the idea of reducing the scope of the plan to the areas of
concern of the Secretariat of Public Works and its attached companies. Other sectoral agencies, such as CEMIG or the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce—the latter recently created at that time—might also have shown up as candidates to sponsor the metropolitan plan. At the time of the decision to plan the metropolitan area, CEMIG and that Secretariat were intimately connected, the Secretariat being an outgrowth of CEMIG. CEMIG was influential in the state's policy-making machinery much beyond what the state's formal administrative arrangements would suggest, as we saw in chapter IV. But under the doctrines in vogue as to what an urban plan should be, particularly as advanced by SERPHAU, it would be considered unorthodox for the metropolitan plan to be sponsored or forwarded by those agencies. Even if CEMIG and kindred agencies might have intended to interfere with the metropolitan matter, they would not have felt legitimate enough to lay their claims in the open. Besides, the plan-mongers were already institutionally, and "culturally," linked to another agency, the CED. They did not have to worry much with the prospect of having the metropolitan plan outside the circuit to which they were familiar. They would not run the risk of being placed in an organizational milieu in which they would not certainly be heard, because of a different planning tradition. However, had these different institutional sponsorships been materialized, they would have signified the planners' accountability to agencies forced to plan within the range of the viable, which had to present
visible results. These agencies had to approach their programs by focusing on the powers they could effectively deploy, the resources they could harness, and the criteria with which their performance would be judged. In Faludi's terms, they were aware that they enjoyed little autonomy, and had therefore to perform within the range of things desirable but also possible.\textsuperscript{19}

Instead, the PLAMBEL planners set out in the belief of enjoying high autonomy. Differently from Werneck, Wilheim or D'Aramon, they did not seem worried with specifying a-priori, if not the concrete, limited portion of the metropolitan reality which would deserve being treated in a metropolitan, rather than in a local or sectoral, plan, at least the criteria on which the choice of that portion was to be based. Their approach was rather undiscriminating. Almost everything which could be the target of public policies in the metropolitan area, either the competence of sectoral agencies or of multi-purpose governmental levels—e.g., the municipios—seemingly had to fall within the scope of the metropolitan plan. They tended to develop—still in Faludi's terms—"wide-range images" covering the area of their presumed control, and were encouraged to see many connections and interdependences which, under the assumption of high autonomy, they should take into account.\textsuperscript{20} Those assumptions had somewhat contradictory implications for their view about implementation and strategy. In theory, the metropolitan programs would imply many-sided attacks on problems, all agencies
proceeding in unison under the guidance of the plan. But the planners seemed to display an acute awareness that other agencies would only seldom comply with the guidelines and proposals of the plan—instead of continuing their activities as usual—unless overwhelmingly convinced on technical grounds, induced by significant rewards or, failing that, unless coerced. Thus, the Structure Outline showed—and the planners would retake this point later—their preference for the creation of novel instruments of implementation—for instance, a land development corporation—which should be directly answerable to the planners in its activities.

We may wonder whether the metropolitan planners would feel comfortable with some institutional shelter other than CED, as we contemplated above. They would be likely to go on pointing to the sectorally-sponsored plan's insufficiencies, for, for instance, not having taken into consideration enough side-effects and global impacts of the single programs. We might perhaps witness their more strongly advocating a more comprehensive metropolitan plan, to make up for the sectorally-sponsored plan's actual or anticipated negative effects. 21
The Contents of the Plan

The other aspect of the planners' proposals to be explained are their contents. The PLAMBEL planners subscribed to the conception of integrated planning, which was officially championed by SERFHAU, and responded to an international trend in the city planning profession to hold the old, single-minded, concern with physical structures in contempt. In the PLAMBEL documents examined in this chapter, however, we saw that integration did not mean relinquishing the physical emphasis. That emphasis remained, although sophisticated by the use of socio-economic and demographic data and projections. A model of the city's or metropolitan area's economic development was, in this new approach, called for, to found the physical plan. Plans bearing on social items—education, health, recreation, and so on,—were foreseen, though not necessarily "integrated"—except for consideration, sometimes, of their locational requisites—with the physical plan. The impression is that they often entered a Plan mostly to round out the picture.

The PLAMBEL planners' Proposal perhaps differed from Werneck's and D'Aramon's ideas rather on the scale of operations and on the methodologies espoused than on its being more socially oriented, or even more integrated. Thus the plan's backbone was to be a physical development plan, even if bundled in the package of an "integrated plan, " and
legitimized because of its anticipated, and--in the planners' thought--direct impact on the people's welfare.

The metropolitan planners wanted a plan to make the metropolis a real development pole for Minas Gerais and the Center-South region of Brazil. Yet they wanted it also to be a plan to make the metropolitan area a better place to live, particularly for the worst-off in the social pyramid. They thought the structure plan permitted a synthesis of the two perspectives.

In the first perspective, the plan proposals would seem free from controversy, since a collective good--the city functionality for development--would be secured. The collectivity represented in this "collective good" was the metropolitan area as a whole, on whose behalf the planners claimed to speak. But the metropolitan interest, as advanced, for instance, in the Structure Scheme Outline, would often imply hurting the interests of the metropolitan municipios. The siting policy, for instance, which is at the heart of the structure plan, is not immaterial to the interests of the diverse localities in the metropolitan area. Rather, it affects them in different ways.

In the second perspective, given the strong role expected from regulation and, even, from redistribution, the plans would be directly exposed to conflict and controversy.

However, as we pointed out earlier, the Structure Scheme Outline conveyed the planners' optimism. They seemed to believe in their proposals' capacity to overcome controversies,
and elicit consensus, through their rationality. Locational proposals could be shown to be technically sound. The social goals forwarded in the structure alternatives would be realized through physical works—"new towns," freeways, transportation networks, metropolitan equipments—and, in the planners thought, this fact permitted to ward off political controversy.

Those political assumptions of the metropolitan planners reflected the technocratic posture pervasive in Brazil's public sector when PLAMBEL was established. The adoption of the integrated plan view seemed to drive the planners away from too narrow an approach to physical planning. One can speculate also that, had the planners been connected to some other agency than CED, their plan's scope would have been more reduced, as in the hypothesis we examined above, but would have also had a strong physical accent, with perhaps less need to justify physical structures in terms of their impact upon the people's quality of life. The other possible sponsors of PLAMBEL we mentioned were less concerned than the state planners with redistributive policies. They had a tradition of building physical infrastructures to increase the efficiency of the economic system. Their engineering paradigm tended to center on fewer variables than is usual today in the city planning paradigm. Our metropolitan planners shared the city planning profession's current concern with redistributive goals, which are manifest even if the planners' emphasis remains—as in the Belo Horizonte
case—on physical items. Those items are not exclusively, or even predominantly, judged on grounds of the efficiency of the urban system, which they will enhance, but also on grounds of the people's welfare and of the spatial justice they will condition. Thus, with regard to this aspect, the planners' linkage to CED, rather than to CEMIG or the Public Works Secretariat, for instance, was favorable to a more socially oriented planning approach, even if still technocratic in its conception. The economists and sociologists of CED, concerned, as we saw earlier, with regional imbalances in the state's development, and with poverty and "urban marginality," were less likely than the engineers of those two other institutions to conceive of a metropolitan plan which would not contemplate some redistributive social goals, and would not justify physical capital investments in terms of those goals.

Nonetheless, the institutional support of CED and of Secretary Vieira were not felt as sufficient to make PLAMBEL effective. Even when CED was still in the apex of prestige, it remained an agency without the power to execute. It should, if successful in its institutional role, influence decisions in accordance with the plan stipulations, and obtain coordinated actions from the plan implementers. The metropolitan plan should be adopted by the executive agents, and should count on the support of political authorities—the State Governor, the Mayor of Belo Horizonte, the other mayors of metropolitan area—and top administrators of the several
agencies operating in the metropolitan area. To obtain that support, the physical emphasis of the metropolitan plan was apposite, and in keeping with the tenor of the time. The country was growing fast. Large public works were being undertaken. Minas Gerais was engaging in the policy of development promotion described in the preceding chapter, which implied, among other things, heavy investment in physical capital items. The PLAMBEL planners were attuned to this mood. The Structure Outline envisaged the metropolitan area in its role as supporter of the state's development. It mentioned the construction of new freeways, industrial estates, and even new towns. These aspects were likely to increase its acceptance. What if the other concern with the redistributive aspects of the metropolitan plan would be taken in earnest? And what, if the structure plan also claimed to promote a metropolitan interest which often conflicted with the interests of the metropolitan area's component units, viz., the municipios? These points will be examined later, in the case studies of some of the decisions in which the metropolitan planners participated.

Concluding Remarks

The metropolitan planners were immersed in politics since the inception of their task, in the preparation of the metropolitan plan. Their approach to planning reflected not only their previous planning background, but also the
politico-administrative context in which they were located. The way the planners conceived of their task and role in the metropolitan area, the scope and substance of the plan they were preparing, intensely reflected their perception of the planning setting, of their capacity as planners to shape policy courses. The controversies within the planning team were not merely academic disputes. Both the drafters of the Plan Proposal, and their critics, founded their stands not only on the internal logic and intrinsic rationality of positions, but also on the anticipated practicability of what was promised as product of planning. Practicability meant, in part, the planners' having the technical competence and time, staff, and funds to turn out the promised plans. It meant also the capacity to secure political support from the relevant actors who should commit resources of several kinds to the realization of the planned proposals, or who should not, at least, oppose them. Obviously, the availability of resources for preparing the plans depends already on political support for the planners.

Many planners, even within the planning team, advised careful treading, because they anticipated how jealously the organizations and groups involved in the metropolitan policies would defend their territories. The perspective which eventually prevailed, however, was that of drafting an ambitious plan, which would reach for aspiring goals. The underlying assumption was that PLAMBEL was strongly supported by a powerful sponsor. But both the amplitude of
the plan's coverage, and the interests that the plan conveyed, would be likely to arouse reactions. The other bureaus could feel their policy territories trespassed by the planning agency's proposals, because those proposals were coming from a "rival" organization. Or the bureaus might resist the planners' proposals because of their contents. As the planners subscribed to the integrated plan view, which incorporated a concern with social goals, and with the redistributive impact of physical development measures, they might run afoul of the penalized interests, often forwarded by the public organizations themselves. The municipios too might feel negatively affected by the plan's conception of the metropolitan interest, not necessarily coincident with their interests, and rise against the planning agency.

We can therefore anticipate that the planners will meet with political conflicts in their attempt to be effective. Their coping with those conflicts, the support they will get, and the resources available to them will be examined in the next chapters.
Notes to Chapter V

1
"Whatever else it is, a policy--or program--implementation process is an assembly process... 'Implementation problems'... are control problems, but they are specific to the assembly activities that constitute some 'implementation process.' What sorts of parts go into this policy machine? Of course, the detailed answer to such a question would depend on a specification of what the machine was supposed to do and where it was to be located." From Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law (Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 36.

2
Vieira's decision not appoint Werneck to conduct the planning work was probably rooted in two sorts of considerations. First, by inviting a city planner who worked at an international firm, he probably thought he would mitigate the criticisms from those in the state who favored a different solution to the metropolitan plan, namely, the hiring of an international consulting firm to prepare the plan. Second, as a civil engineer himself, and an entrepreneur, he probably would trust better a fellow professional, with an experience at a private firm, than an architect planner like Werneck whose whole career had been spent in government, and who still lacked the experience to lead a complex task as the preparation of the metropolitan plan promised to be. Though we did not directly question Vieira on that decision, we could infer his motives from the explanation he gave us of the decision he took not to hire an international firm to carry out the planning work (Interview on 25 November 1975). We also talked at length with Werneck and Dayrell about this subject (Werneck's interviews already mentioned; Dayrell, interview on 4 August 1975).

3
When of the preparation of that Proposal, the planners were not altogether aware of how costly that requirement would turn out to be. The head of the planning team later acknowledged to us that the data available were worse, in both quantity and quality, than what he and his colleagues had expected. Yet, he was quick to add that one of the functions of planning would be precisely to help generate a reliable data-basis on which any serious policy proposal for the area would have to build, and which would in his estimate constitute one of the planners' critical resources. It is acknowledged in the literature that metropolitan planners tend to dedicate much of their time to research and data gathering. That tendency represents not only a response to techno-scientific needs, but is also a political strategy
chosen by planners. While collecting data and doing research, the planners are saved from political attack, if they do not feel strong enough to face them. On the other hand, the planners may feel that realizable information constitutes a crucial political resource to strengthen their position in the planning and power setting of the metropolitan area. In the Belo Horizonte case, according to Gilson Dayrell's declaration in his interviews, the latter interpretation would apply. On data-gathering as strategy, see Alan A. Altshuler, The City Planning Process, pp. 377-79. See also Edward C. Banfield, The Uses and Limitations of Metropolitan Planning in Massachusetts," in H. Wentworth Eldredge, ed., Taming Megalopolis 2 vols., How to Manage an Urbanized World vol. 2 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 710-11.

4

5

6
Idem, ibid.

7
Letter from Ney Werneck to Paulo Lima Vieira, December 1971. The following references are taken from this letter.

8

9
Melchior D'Aramon, "Quelques observation et suggestions sur le Programme de Travail du PLAMBEL," São Paulo, 16 December 1971, (typewritten). Unless otherwise specified, the references below come from this document.

10

On this, see this comment by Faludi:
"The time which it takes for results of research to become available is often considerable. This is a runaway world in which action is taken all the time, either or without adequate intelligence. Research findings therefore may all too easily address themselves to yesterday's problems."

Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, Conselho Estadual de Desenvolvimento, PLAMBEL, Esquema Metropolitano de Estruturas: Primeiro Esboço, 1972. Unless otherwise specified, the quotations in this section are from this document.


For a discussion of "control over the environment" and "autonomy," see Faludi, Planning Theory, chaps. 7 and 8.

Idem, chap. 7

The foregoing statement was immediately preceded by the following paragraph, to which it was appended as an attenuation:
"The Structure Scheme Outline is an attempt to set up, within a coherent frame, guidelines for action which will permit to direct the factors bearing on the region's development, and to order its future."


Interview on 13 November 1975.

Idem, ibid.

The most likely course, indeed, had the CEMIG or the Secretariat of Public Works sponsored the Metropolitan Plan, would have been its being commissioned to a private, probably foreign, consulting firm, as was more usual with regard to engineering projects in those days. In that hypothesis, our metropolitan plan mongers would not be the metropolitan planners, and they would probably feel frustrated with the plan tendered by the consultant firm.
CHAPTER VI

THE MUNICIPIOS AND THE METROPOLITAN PLAN

In this chapter, we shall examine how the metropolitan planners attempted to put their planning conception into practice. To be effective, the planners needed support for their proposals. Those proposals extended over a wide range of activities in the metropolitan area and did not choose to discriminate the problems which required metropolitan treatment from those for which a sectoral, or municipal, plan was indicated. Their proposals were produced on the assumption of planners being backed by the State Economic Council, the CED, an agency the planners believed strong and capable of overcoming resistance to the plans.

Yet CED was not an executive agency. It did not provide the metropolitan planners with their own implementing tool. How, then, did the planners visualize the effectuation of their planning efforts? From the examination of their first products, and from personal observation of their conduct in their beginning years, it is possible to see that the planners' ideas on the future metropolitan agency were not totally clear regarding the degree to which the planners could be involved in execution, or how much control they would have over it. If they conceived of their function as entitling them to a privileged policy role in the area, they were none the less aware of their utter dependence on the cooperation of
innumerable other agents. Although they seemed to believe in the rationality and cogency of planning, they did not think those attributes were sufficient in practice. We could observe also, on their part, a certain contempt for most of the actors who occupied the metropolitan policy-space before them. That contempt was in part rooted in the ideology of "comprehensive planning," which tends to treat both sectoral agents and local authorities as "suboptimizers" whose behavior has undesirable side-effects and externalities which appear as no great concern of theirs. "Lack of coordination," actions "at cross-purpose," "limited range of goals," and other negatively valued expressions were often used by our planners in their writings and talks to refer to the situation without planning. On the other hand, our metropolitan planners considered themselves more knowledgeable, more up-to-date on the several policy-fields encompassed by the plan proposal than most of the other agents and policy-experts in the metropolitan area.

Yet, the planners were well aware that planning effectiveness would be in jeopardy, if they could not win acceptance and cooperation from the other actors. As they did not as a rule look on those actors' contribution as substantively relevant, their strategy led to attempts at, in Selznick's sense, "formal cooptation." They needed "to share the responsibilities for or the administrative burdens of power, rather than power itself."² Their very effort to involve the other actors is evidence of the planners' initial
intuitive feeling that despite the formal trappings of CED's authority, the power to execute lay elsewhere. With the passage of time, that intuition became indisputable realization.

The planners' strategy for implementation of the plan involved a series of steps after the stage of plan preparation. They proposed initially the creation of a Consultative Council. The Preliminary Plan of HIDROSERVICE had already suggested that, during the preparation of the Metropolitan Plan, a Council of the Metropolitan Region, composed of the Mayors, the City-Councils' presidents, and the Secretary of Planning, be set up.

The PLAMBEL planners accepted that suggestion, but gave their Council a different composition. On PLAMBEL's Consultative Council would sit also representatives of the several Federal and State bureaucracies acting in the metropolitan area, together with representatives of private associations and the Church.

The planners did not expect that that large Council would actually deliberate. Its function was very much that of a "public relations" instrument, a mechanism through which the planners would from time to time report on their activities to decisive elements in their "power-setting," in order to cultivate a favorable public image and win their acceptance to the plan proposals.

More advanced on the road of involvement of other agencies seemed to be two other formal instruments. One of them
was the "follow-up group" (grupo de acompanhamento), in which technical representatives of all the "municipios" would monthly gather to be informed about planning progress. The other, which attempted to go farther in the association of executive agencies with the plan was the establishment of working agreements with those agencies. In a Progress Report sent on 31 August 1972 to CED and SERPHAU, the planners revealed that agreements had been signed with seventeen different agencies, aiming at "the integration of interests, the transfer of personnel from those agencies to PLAMBEL, and the joint execution of research."³

The Report indicated also that new agreements were being negotiated with the Superintendency for the Development of Belo Horizonte (SUDECAP), the State Superintendency of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (which shortly thereafter was to become a State Secretariat), and the Secretariat of the Interior.

Thus, insofar as formal attempts to create a positive image on the part of fellow organizations acting in the metropolitan area, and to obtain endorsement of the plan proposals was concerned, the planners were active. Also, the conduct of some "opinion surveys," among municipal and metropolitan formal and informal leaders, the private sector, and neighborhood associations, were foreseen, "to auscultate community opinion," and allow preparation of a plan "which would meet the demands of people."

Many of the contacts of the planners with the agents in their power-setting—namely, the sectoral agencies of the
three governmental levels, and the municipalities--centered, in the beginning, on the planners request for information and cooperation in the studies and research needed by the metropolitan plan. But, as we mentioned in the introductory part of chapter V, there was also an early involvement of the metropolitan planners in decisions bearing on the metropolitan area. On the one hand, the planners themselves did not want to let any decision they deemed critical--and the range of those decisions, owing to their planning conception, was vast--to escape their overview. On the other hand, authorities, as the Mayor of Belo Horizonte, the Secretary of Planning, and the State Governor, would often consider that, even before the completion of the metropolitan plan, the metropolitan planners' opinion on topics which, in those authorities view, had metropolitan implications, was fitting.

The metropolitan planning task was, therefore, aimed at a broad planning-setting, and encompassed a wide range of activities, from data collection and research, to the passing of opinion on, and the attempt to influence, decisions of outside agents deemed to carry some metropolitan interest.

How successful were the planners in their efforts to be effective? Did the instruments they devised and the strategy they used help them to influence courses of action in the metropolitan arena? Was CED's sponsorship strong enough to ensure their proposals' prevalence over competing proposals, or did they need other sponsors? What resources did the planners count on to convince their sponsors, and the
decision-makers, to support their proposals, rather than competing proposals? What interest were at stake in the eventual resistance to the planners' proposals?

These, and related questions, will guide the analyses of this and the remaining empirical chapters. We shall examine some of the critical cases in which the metropolitan planners attempted to influence decision courses in the metropolitan area, and win support for their proposals. The range of these cases reflects the ambitious view of metropolitan planning our planners were attempting to put into effect. The policy territory to which the planners laid their claims embraced the metropolitan municipalities, including Belo Horizonte, and a large number of agencies of the three governmental tiers.

This chapter will focus on the planners' attempt at influencing decisions in the municipalities, to make them conform with their view of the metropolitan interest, as conveyed by the metropolitan plan.

The Interest of the Whole Was not That of its Parts

The involvement of the municipalities in the metropolitan area in planning activity was attempted by the metropolitan planners early in their work. The participation of the metropolitan municipios in the agreement from which resulted the preparation of the metropolitan plan implied their defraying a part of the planning costs. It was
thus natural that the municipal authorities would have an interest in knowing the use to which their money was being put, and the benefits which the municipalities would derive from the plan.

The metropolitan planners' first steps in the metropolitan area revealed goodwill towards the municipios. Besides creating the instruments of municipal participation in planning mentioned above, the senior planners paid visits to all the municipios in the first weeks of their activities. During those visits they made contacts with the municipal authorities and the informal leaders, and discussed the local problems in the light of what they anticipated would be the guidelines of the metropolitan plan.

However, should the municipalities be involved in the metropolitan planning endeavor since so early? Was there enough ground for the planners and the local leaderships agreeing on common goals to be pursued? What could the "cooptation" of the municipalities mean at the early moment in the planning activity? To what extend would the interests conveyed by the metropolitan plan coincide with the interests of the municipios? Was the attempt to "bring in" the municipios to the planning endeavor worth the trouble?

From our observation of their conduct towards the municipios, we could see that the metropolitan planners, despite knowing that only a limited set of the local activities of most of the metropolitan municipios was of interest to the metropolitan plan, thought it advisable to "pre-empt," as it
were, the field of municipal policies. That pre-emption appeared to them the safer course. They preferred not to take
the pains to clearly demarcate the metropolitan turf ahead of time, out of fear that something relevant might go
unnoticed, escaping their control and doing damage to the metropolitan interest.

What was the perspective of the municipal leaderships? We showed in our introductory chapter that the municipios in
the metropolitan region were unevenly developed. Though Belo Horizonte, the capital city municipio, was far from
presenting a bright picture on indicators of development, the situation tended to be worse in the "peripheral"
municipios. One critical aspect of local development is the presence of industries in the municipio. Manufacturing
is the basis of the most important state tax in Brazil, that is, the tax on added value (ICM), 20% of which belongs
to the municipality where it is collected. Since industries in the metropolitan area are concentrated in only a few
municipios (the capital city and a few adjacent municipios) there are great differences among municipios in terms
of public revenues. The municipal authorities that the metropolitan planners met wanted industries, to which
they attributed--rightly so--greater revenues and greater local capacity to respond to the demands for public services.
A small opinion survey carried out early in 1972 in all the metropolitan municipios, except Belo Horizonte, to assess
their leaders views, observed that "the industrial function
was the most intensely desired by the municipal elites."

The survey report went on with these comments:

Even in the municipios where it is realized that requisites for manufacturing are lacking, that function is highly desired.... Most assuredly, the high desiderability of manufacturing has to do with the elites' perception of the importance of the industrial function in determining the ICM shares and in providing jobs for the municipal inhabitants.4

The local authorities' strong preference for industrial activities in their municipios bore a great potential for conflict with the metropolitan planners.

That potential was abetted by the different scale of approach to problems the planners and the local authorities adopted. When the metropolitan planners thought of the several urban functions to be performed in the metropolitan area, they took that area as a whole and tended to neglect the political and administrative divisions the municipalities represented. In a "Structure Scheme," as examined in the preceding chapter, there were to be locations, on the scale of the region, for industries, housing, tertiary activities, water and sewerage treatment stations, open spaces, and so on. The metropolitan planners thought also in terms of big "systems," as for instance the metropolitan transportation systems, the large water-works, the high space-consuming urban structures and activities. In contrast, the local authorities not only tended to be oriented to the small-scale,
but also rejected considering their *municipio* part of a larger whole for which it would have to perform a given function stipulated in the metropolitan plan. The local authorities regarded their municipio as a whole itself, which had to perform all urban functions, particularly those, like the industrial one, which would enhance the local tax base. We could observe that, for any mayor of the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, the faintest suggestion that, owing to some objective factor, such as a hilly topography, the presence of water streams' sources, or the predominant direction of winds, his *municipio* was not suitable for industrial location, would be taken as an insult. 5

One other potential source of conflict between the metropolitan planners and the local authorities was the planners' view of land development as a metropolitan, rather than municipal, problem. The "unbridled" process of land subdivision was regarded as unsoluble in the municipal jurisdiction alone. In the planners' thought, all the municipios should take measures proposed by the planners to curtail that process. They should suspend the grant of new subdivision permits till the Land Use Plans were ready. That proposal would not be easy to accept, however, if only because the mayors regarded new subdivisions as an additional source of real estate taxes.

As a result of the planners' attempt to "bring in" the local authorities to the planning activity, a new reality
began to take shape for the **municipios**. The metropolitan plan was a policy invention that matured gradually in the local scene, chiefly within the technical cadres. It was not a response to a grass-roots demand. Once the agreement joining the **municipios** and the state in financing the preparation of the Metropolitan Plan was signed, and once the **municipios** began to be contacted by the new actors, viz., the metropolitan planners, their interests with regard to the metropolitan plan started to be structured. The opinion survey we mentioned above, carried out in early 1972, showed that 92% of the respondents had heard "something about the metropolitan plan which was being prepared." Asked about the creation of a "metropolitan agency" (**entidade metropolitana**) to take care of metropolitan affairs, 50% said they regarded that fact with optimism, and 38% "in a positive way." But were the benefits expected the same as a metropolitan plan might be expected to offer?

During the planners round of visits to those **municipios**, in the meetings with the local elites, these elites voiced demands for specific services and works in their **municipios**. In one of them, Caeté, for instance, the Mayor insisted on the need for a better water supply, and a better road connection with Belo Horizonte. Owing, however, to that **municipio's** unusual location in the Metropolitan Area (for instance, with regard to the main water-basins) the metropolitan plan would not include Caeté in its water and sewerage plan. The solution to that problem was, in the
planners' opinion, to be local. The desired road connection was not considered metropolitan either. In three other municipios, Raposos, Rio-Acima and Nova Lima--very poor localities, whose labor-force worked either in rural activities or in mining and in which unemployment, particularly of the female population, was very high--the chief demand was for industries and creation of job opportunities. However, the metropolitan studies for the Metropolitan Structure Scheme did not recommend those municipios as suitable sites for new industrial parks. Those few examples are sufficient to show the mismatch between the metropolitan "frequency band" and that on which most of the municipios were tuned.  

The potential conflict of perspectives became actual when the planners presented the Metropolitan Structure Outline in mid 1972. In that document, locations for the main metropolitan activities and functions were chosen on the basis of criteria of specialization and comparative advantage. As a consequence, many of the municipios would have to forswear their expectations of building their own industrial estates. The main alternatives for the organization of the metropolitan space were also outlined. One of them consisted of reinforcement of tendencies in the spatial structure, while the others put forward suggestions for a heavier public interference in shaping the area's future through the creation of new "tertiary centers," i.e., "new towns." The municipios that were not contemplated by the
proximity of the "new centers" began to feel deprived. They felt that all the alternatives the planners had proffered favored a spatially concentrated development that would not benefit them.

To make things worse for the municipalities, the local authorities would experience metropolitan planning on its "repressive" side. They had to approve an "urban planning law," prepared by PLAMBEL, one of the clauses of which contemplated the prohibition of new subdivisions in the municipio pending the completion of the metropolitan plan. That prohibition was, as seen above, perceived by the municipal leaders as a restriction upon an already narrow local tax base. Besides, many municipal initiatives were opposed by the PLAMBEL planners whenever they considered them to be in conflict with the metropolitan plan directives. Most of the municipios of the metropolitan area had little power to resist the planners' interference. They depended on the state for some critical service delivery and program financing, and would not dare to oppose a state program which they imagined to be strongly supported within the state administration. That situation enabled the metropolitan planners to influence local decisions in the beginning stages of the metropolitan planning activities.

With the passage of time, as the planners were entering their second year of activity, the municipal authorities attitude towards the metropolitan plan changed from hopeful acceptance to open hostility. The local leaders, particularly
in the poorer municípios, seemed to have realized that they would not reap the benefits they had expected from the metropolitan plan, which, however, was costing them a part of their scarce revenues. True, the metropolitan planners made some effort to respond to some of the municipal demands. They prepared some small projects for the municípios, or gave them some help in terms of administrative and legal consultantship. But, as the PLAMBEL personnel could not be diverted from the main task in the preparation of the metropolitan plan, these activities meant only a token effort to assuage the local authorities' complaints. Therefore, what PLAMBEL would give the municípios was felt either as too distant programs for their impact upon the local welfare to be estimated, or as measures with negative effects upon that welfare, or as político-administrative burdens or restrictions upon the local administrations.

Some of the metropolitan municípios had more political leverage to resist the metropolitan planners. The most obvious case was that of Belo Horizonte, the central city, which will be treated in the next chapter. Among the peripheral municípios, the conspicuous case was that of Contagem, to which we turn in the next section.

**Clashes between the Local and Metropolitan Planner:**

**the Case of Contagem**

Contagem was outstanding among the "peripheral" municípios of the metropolitan area because of its place in the
metropolitan hierarchy, second only to Belo Horizonte in economic development. The first industrial park in Minas Gerais had been built in Contagem in the early 1940s; it had recently undertaken the construction of a second industrial park (Centro Industrial de Contagem--CINCO) and of a large water dam to supply both the new industries and the growing municipal population with abundant water by counting mostly on its own resources.

Its Mayor was elected, free from most of the political constraints that would tie the Mayor of Belo Horizonte's hands, in his deals with the PLAMBEL planners.

In 1973, Contagem hired architect Alipio Castello Branco to direct its Land Development and Urban Services Company (SUDECON). Castello Branco had, together with architect Ney Werneck, been one of the most active metropolitan plan-mongers some years earlier. How would he behave in his new role as a municipal planner? In his own words:

I started my work in Contagem with the idea not to duplicate PLAMBEL's work, but rather to take its guidelines, and prepare the projects for Contagem by having them in mind. However, in the light of my experience in Contagem, I think that a metropolitan planning agency hardly realizes the specific local problem. I do think that there ought to be a local effort too. ¹⁰

One first important event in the relationship between Castello Branco and the metropolitan planners took place when he proposed SUDECON's use of the funds of Projeto CURA, a program created by the National Housing Bank (BNH) in early 1973. According to CURA's rationale, one of Brazil's
most serious urban problems was the existence of poorly serviced subdivisions in the cities. Through CURA, BNH would finance cities that wanted to upgrade subdivisions, providing them with adequate infrastructures. The cities contemplated by the program had to commit themselves to increasing the taxes on vacant lots, a measure the BNH technicians thought would force the owners of those lots to put them up for sale and would increase the supply of suitable urban land.

Contagem was one of the first municípios to apply for the CURA funds. Castello Branco prepared a project for upgrading an extense area in Contagem. The CURA area would, in his opinion, "give a structure to the whole urban fabric of Contagem." However, that project was prepared without hearing the metropolitan planners' suggestions. As Contagem was within the metropolitan conurbation, land use development in its territory was, the metropolitan planners thought, within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan plan. The CURA project forwarded by SUDECON was, in the interpretation of the metropolitan planners, a premature attempt to structure the city space, without due consideration of the metropolitan perspective.

Yet, BNH was interested in having its funds applied with dispatch, in order for the new program to serve as a showcase. At the request of PLAMBEL, Secretary Paulo Vieira wrote to the President of BNH, insisting on the importance of rendering the Contagem project compatible with the
metropolitan plan, but received no reply. Castelo Branco went ahead with his CURA proposal.

A second occasion for conflict with PLAMBEL was Contagem's roads program, prepared by Castelo Branco in mid 1974. That program had to be approved by the local city-council, at a moment the relationships between the Mayor and the city councillors were not good. Before voting the project, the councillors decided to consult with the PLAMBEL planners about the plan's adequacy. The planners showed which of the proposed roads were compatible with the metropolitan roads plan, and which were not. The latter, the reply said, deserved a detailed explanation of why and where they would conflict with the metropolitan proposals. The planners were, however, quite careful to say that SUDECON had prepared its plan--a part, they insisted, of the global plan--in contact with the PLAMBEL, hence "the satisfactory degree of mutual compatibility found, and shown in this report." The Contagem councillors thought otherwise, however, and considered the conflicts with the metropolitan plan indicated by the PLAMBEL report sizeable enough to justify voting down SUDECON's proposal.

One other proposal of Castello Branco met with strong opposition from PLAMBEL. One of the main metropolitan arterials sectioned one of Contagem's square, which Castello Branco judged important as a leisure area for the município. He prepared a landscape project for the transformation of the square, and a project to deviate heavy traffic through
a by-pass. The metropolitan planners—in this case with the support of the State Traffic Department (DETRAN)—thought the project ill-advised and technically wrong. After protracted conflict and negotiations, the project was given up by SUDECON.

Only in a fourth instance was a "non-zero-sum" solution obtained in the relations between PLAMBEL and the Contagem planners. In this case, Castello Branco asked PLAMBEL's support for his proposal for an alternative route for the freeway the plan for which was being prepared at the time by HIDROSERVICE, at the State Roads Department's (DER) request. The proposed freeway would pass across a heavily settled area in Contagem. Castello Branco thought that an alternative route was feasible, without increasing project costs. The metropolitan planners pondered the matter, and decided to uphold the initial route proposal. They put forward the argument that, though Contagem's stand as to the "harm of the original layout for local urban functions" was well-founded, the alternative advanced by SUDECON was not advantageous from the point of view of the "regional traffic" needs. That conclusion, they added, was supported by a "comparative analysis of the two alternative routes loaded with the 1972 traffic demand data, on the hypothesis of the expressway being constructed." However, the metropolitan planners changed their mind once Castello Branco brought forward a new datum, viz., the proposal to lengthen one of Contagem Avenues. This work would connect the freeway
in the new route he wanted to the industrial areas, thus permitting the traffic flow generated by those areas to be diverted to the freeway. The metropolitan planners thought that solution was satisfactory in the light of the "regional traffic" requirements, and gave their support to the Contagem proposal.

Thus, in only one, out of four decisions of interest to Contagem, did the metropolitan and the Contagem planners come to a consensual solution, in which both sides felt that technical considerations and legitimate metropolitan and local interests had been given their due. In the other three cases, the interests clashed. The local planner found solutions that, in his view, would benefit the município's population. The metropolitan planners considered that all the projects put forward by Castello Branco had a strong metropolitan impact. Those decisions soured the relationship between Contagem's City Hall and PLAMBEL.

**PLAMBEL's Failure in its Municipal Strategy:**

The Creation of GRANBEL

The frustrations of the municípios with the metropolitan plan crystallized in a movement that led, near the end of Governor Pacheco's term, to the creation of an association of metropolitan municípios.

The movement was led by Mayor Newton Cardoso of Contagem, a município which had strong grievances against PLAMBEL. Cardoso, a skilled politician, chose the right moment to launch
his attack on PLAMBEL. He wanted to sensitize the future state governor and his auxiliaries on what he defined as the "metropolitan planning problem." He contacted his fellow mayors, and after a few meetings persuaded them to create the Association of the Metropolitan Area's Municípios (GRANBEL). In GRANBEL's meetings, harsh criticisms were addressed to the metropolitan planners, charged with lack of sensitivity towards the local problems and with preparation of a plan the benefits of which the municípios would not reap. Those attacks enfeebled the metropolitan planners' stands before the state authorities, and contributed also to the tarnishing of their image before the future incumbents.12

Thus, if the planners' involvement of the municípios in the metropolitan planning endeavor had some result in terms of planning effectiveness, including the protection of the metropolitan plan integrity against municipal initiatives which might endanger it, it also contributed to the undermining of the planners political support among the political authorities, initially on the municipal level, but eventually on the level of the state. Yet, if the attempt to coopt the municípios into metropolitan planning was disputable on both technical and political grounds, it could be justified with regard to Belo Horizonte, the capital city. In that case, owing to the weight of that city in the metropolitan dynamics, the distinction between what is local and what is metropolitan becomes blurred. How were the
relations between the metropolitan planners and Belo Horizonte? This matter will be examined in the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter VI

1. The analysis of motivations and self-perception of the metropolitan planners carried out in this chapter is based on direct—sometimes participant—observation of their behavior over a period of two years, and on later interviews conducted with the head planners. I read also most of the material produced by the planners for a period of four years, in which their views are directly or indirectly presented.


3. The agencies, and the object of the agreements, mentioned in that report, were:

i. The Belo Horizonte City Hall: a general purpose agreement.

ii. SUDECAP (agency already mentioned in chapter IV, in charge of planning and executing larger public works for the Belo Horizonte City Hall): agreement bearing on study of problems of storm drainage, and traffic research.

iii. DETRAN (the State Department for Traffic, linked to the State Secretariat for Public Security): agreement bearing on staff cession, data supply, and work integration.

iv. The State Public Force’s Traffic "Batallion": agreement bearing on staff cession, and exchange of information.

v. DER (State Bureau of Public Roads): agreement on staff cession, and exchange of information.

vi. DNEF (Federal Department of Railways, local branch): agreement on the indication of a consultant.

vii. BNH (National Housing Bank): agreement on the indication of a consultant.

viii. DEMA (Belo Horizonte’s City Hall Department of Water and Sewerage Works): agreement on "general expert advice" and integration of studies.

ix. DNER (National Public Roads Department, linked to the Ministry of Transportation): agreement on integration of research.

x. CEMIG (State Company for Hydro-Electric Energy): agreement bearing on integration of studies.
xi. State Secretariat of Health: agreement on staff cession and study integration.

xii. State Secretariat of Education: agreement on staff cession, data supply, and study integration.

xiii. Department of Sanitation Engineering of the Federal University of Minas Gerais: agreement on laboratory analyses of "hydric resources" and "air pollution."

xiv. SAMAE (Contagem's City Hall Department for water provision and sewerage works): agreement on integration of studies, and "general expert advice."

xv. FSESP (Foundation of Public Health, linked to the Ministry of Health, specialized in providing sanitation works for smaller communities): agreement on integration of studies and "general expert advice."

xvi. State Secretariat of Public Works (to which were answerable the State Company for Water and Sewerage Networks--COMAG, later COPASA--the State Company for Low-Cost Housing--COHAB--and the State Company for Urban Development--CIURBE, later CODEURBE): agreement on staff cession and integration of studies.

xvii. Computer Center of the Federal University of Minas Gerais.

4

Governo de Minas Gerais, Conselho Estadual de Desenvolvimento, PLAMBEL, Pesquisas Socio-Políticas, vol. 2, p. 5 and 45.

5

We could observe that attitude in the meetings held with the local elites during the visits paid by the PLAMBEL planners to the municípios, and in the interviews held with the metropolitan mayors.

6

That was an open-ended question. The perusal of its responses shows that the local leaders expected benefits in general, and a change for the better in the status-quo. See Pesquisas Socio-Políticas, vol. 1, pp. 47-61.

7

The transcription of the municipal leaders' opinions that follows comes from may personal notes, taken during the metropolitan planners' meetings with the local elites.

8

The planners' embarrassment when asked how the metropolitan plan would help solve local problems was too evident in those meetings. Local requests were not within their competence to tend, and the metropolitan plan was framed on too high a level to make local leaders responsive.
This point came often in interviews with mayors and other policy-makers in the metropolitan area.

Interview with Castello Branco, on 16 September 1975.


In later years, the relationships between the metropolitan planners and the municipalities improved substantially. The metropolitan planners became such more willing to offer the municipalities the skills of its staff to help solve local problems. By doing this, they appeased the municipios' criticisms that they only contributed to PLAMBEL's funds without receiving commensurate benefits. GRANBEL has become a forum for mayors to voice their grievances against PLAMBEL, and the metropolitan planners realized the importance of heeding those grievances. The meetings of GRANBEL also are attended by representatives from PLAMBEL.
CHAPTER VII

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: METROPOLITAN AND CENTRAL CITY PLANNERS INTERPRET THE WORD "METROPOLITAN"

If the involvement of the peripheral municipios in the metropolitan area seemed marginal, the same cannot be said in regard to Belo Horizonte. In this case, what was peculiarly, or predominantly, local, tended to be residual, in comparison with what was metropolitan. Yet, how was the support for the planners' proposals structured? Even with the unswerving championship of Vieira, the Secretary of Planning, the planners confronted a much stronger political authority than the other mayors of the metropolitan region in the case of Belo Horizonte.

Though Mayor Pieruccetti, of Belo Horizonte, had not been elected, but appointed to that office by the state governor, his rank in the governmental hierarchy in Minas Gerais was not lower than that of any State Secretary.¹ On the contrary, the Mayoralty of Belo Horizonte is considered in political circles an office second only to the state governorship. It is highly sought after within the governing party. The practice has, since direct elections have no longer been held for the capital city mayoralty, been for the governor to entrust the job to some close political ally. It would be unwise and vain for Vieira, therefore, to attempt to treat Pieruccetti as a subordinate official. Pieruccetti was as strong as, or even stronger than, Vieira
before the state governor. He represented the município before authorities in the state and in the federal government, and despite the local limitations, particularly with regard to funds, he could take his own initiatives in launching local programs to be financed by the higher governmental levels. The presence of a metropolitan plan would signify, on the part of the mayor, a certain commitment to implement the plan's proposals, and to make local initiatives compatible with the plan. As we saw in the case of Contagem, with Projeto CURA, a município could attempt to by-pass the metropolitan planners, by going directly to the federal financing source, in that case the BNH. Even the support of a state authority—the Secretary of Planning—was not enough to secure the metropolitan planners' influence on a decision in which the local authority and BNH cooperated without minding the metropolitan plan.

Mayor Pieruccetti's attitude towards the metropolitan plan was positive, however. He certainly expected benefits for Belo Horizonte from the new program he co-sponsored. Nonetheless, many of his assistants strongly resisted the metropolitan planners' initiatives, and erected many an obstacle to PLAMBEL's influence on decisions in Belo Horizonte.

Where was the resistance of Belo Horizonte's City Hall to PLAMBEL rooted? First, Belo Horizonte had its own City Planning Department (Departamento de Urbanismo), with planners who had participated in the pioneering planning
efforts in the early '50s we described in chapter IV. Their idealism in those earlier years had been replaced by scepticism as to the possibilities of planning in what they considered a milieu of petty politics and administrative inefficiency: The enthusiasm of the PLAMBEL young turks did not affect them. Second, Belo Horizonte had its recently created Superintendence for Urban Development (SUDECAP), with its own planning department. The young architect-planner who directed it, Mr. Nelson Lisboa, was ambitious to have SUDECAP plan Belo Horizonte. When PLAMBEL began its work, SUDECAP had already had, for some time, a city planner from Edinburgh giving advice to its staff in transportation and land use planning. Some research was already being carried out on those topics. Lisboa did not wish to interrupt his efforts, and postpone pet projects, to wait for the results of the Metropolitan Plan. Third, PLAMBEL was not looked on as a necessary and effective mediator for securing resources for Belo Horizonte. The city could obtain them directly.

The PLAMBEL planning approach implied a great deal of interference with Belo Horizonte. The Roads Classification Plan, the Urban Structure Scheme, the Land Occupancy Plan, the Zoning Law, the Freeways Plan, the Plan for the Central Business District, all of them had Belo Horizonte as the main target. The metropolitan planners considered those plans vital for their whole endeavor, and, despite the formal participation of the Belo Horizonte City Hall as the main
partner, together with the State, in the metropolitan plan agreement, they soon started negotiations with SUDECAP to have a cooperation agreement signed, so as to avoid duplication and incompatibility of studies, and planning efforts. Lisboa continued to carry out his own research, and to make his own plans and projects, an awkward situation for the metropolitan planners. They discovered, in that particular case, the fragility of their power, and how costly it would be to attempt to apply it. The planners began to realize that reliance upon a scarce resource, growingly critical in local decisions, i.e., technical expertise, would be more effective than the attempt to resort to formal competences, hard to put into effect. They were offered some occasions in which to display expertise against SUDECAP sponsored proposals, and to impede decisions they considered technically faulty and ill-advised with regard to the metropolitan interest. They were more successful at vetoing proposals than at forwarding their own projects and conceptions. Some of the main instances are examined below. The protagonist to be persuaded by PLAMBEL's display of technical competence was, in these cases, the Mayor, who had to decide between the conflicting proposals and arguments the competing groups of technicians were bringing forward.

The Raul Soares Square Project

One of the city's most pleasant places for leisure in past years, with a beautiful garden layout, promenades and a fountain, the square had, over the years, become known
mostly for its difficult traffic conditions. Traffic jams were constant at peak hours.

When SUDECAP was created, in the final year of Mayor Souza Lima's administration, its first superintendent set about having projects prepared for what were considered urgent public works, mostly aimed at easing traffic flows. A group of architects was commissioned to prepare a project for the Raul Soares Square. Not knowledgeable in traffic studies and techniques, the architects prepared a project which required much expensive work. The square, where four wide, heavily travelled thoroughfares converge, would yield to a complex interlocking of underpasses and overpasses. The work proposed was not undertaken by Mayor Souza Lima. Only after the first year of Pieruccetti's administration was it retrieved by the new directorate of SUDECAP. Because of the high cost of the project, Mayor Pieruccetti thought it advisable to ask for the metropolitan planners opinion before embarking on its construction.

The PLAMBEL planners were happy with the chance to display their talents and capacity. They were eager to show, first, that decisions on the scale of the proposed work required more sophisticated technical knowledge than was usually marshalled by local policy-makers. Second, and relatedly, they wanted also to prove that no good solution could be arrived at for problems like that one unless the "metropolitan" aspects involved would be taken into account. The metropolitan planners wanted to demonstrate that the
integration of municipal and metropolitan planning for most of the critical decisions in Belo Horizonte was indispensable. Traffic congestion in the square was not generated there, but elsewhere. An analysis of the traffic function of the thoroughfares converging on the square was indispensable. That analysis required reference to the metropolitan roads system, on the one hand, and to the factors generating traffic flows in that system, on the other. Third, as in other documents they were to produce upon request of the Secretary of Planning or of the Belo Horizonte Mayor, they wanted to reiterate the metropolitan lesson. The task would not yield to a piece-meal solution; it should rather be carried out as a step in the implementation of a comprehensive plan.

The planners worked fast. Within two-weeks, they carried out a traffic survey at the square, analysed the data, made their evaluation of the architects' project, and wrote up the final report, to be handed to Mayor Pieruccetti.

In the report, they proceeded first to their own characterization of "the Raul Soares square problem." The report was almost pedagogically structured to show how a more integrated approach to an apparently isolated problem should be put into practice. They considered first the landscape and amenities aspect of the problem. The square functions for recreation, leisure, and enjoyment of esthetic values were considered, and the obstacles--particularly difficulty of access--to the fulfilment of those functions
canvassed. Lynch's ideas were resorted to, to justify conserving much of the original square layout:

Experience shows that every citizen has a visual image of his city around some focal points. Public opinion will become hostile to sudden changes which destroy its frame of reference; these changes also make for rising feelings of insecurity, so characteristic of inhabitants of metropolises.²

Next, the report tackled the traffic aspects. The functions of the thoroughfares that converge on the square were to be defined, before undertaking major urban surgery. In the current situation, the square's contribution to peak-hour traffic congestion could be made up for through traffic-control measures, and some slight redesigning in the square's rotaries layout, aimed at allowing easier interlacements. In fact, the traffic survey showed that the main trouble in the square itself was the difficulty of making those interlacements. Minimizing that difficulty was far from requiring major public works, digs and cuts, elevations and depressions, particularly those that would imply definition of traffic function for some of the thoroughfares converging on the square. That definition could not be done without due consideration of the whole street system in the conurbation.

In contrast, what was proposed in the architects' project for the square? A radical change in the square's layout and landscape. The alteration in landscape aspects was unnecessary and inconvenient in the metropolitan planners' view. Besides, a costly surgery would be no solution to the problem of traffic congestion, which the architects had not
correctly diagnosed. It would imply, through proposed underpasses and overpasses, rigid and technically ill-advised definitions of traffic function for some of the major thoroughfares that cut the square.

The report concluded by showing that the project examined was no good alternative to the slight changes the report itself proposed. The metropolitan planners observed:

It is a basic goal of this administration, since its inauguration, to rationalize the decision process insofar as public investments are concerned. As stressed in the Federal Government's Plano Estratégico "new infrastruc-
re investments will be oriented by the analysis of costs and benefits of the project, including the direct and indirect effects of the investment and its potential in generating traffic."

So cogent was the planners' argumentation and exposure of the project's fragility that Mayor Pieruccetti immediately gave up the idea of having it executed. The intentions of the metropolitan planners had been realized. From that point on, it was likely that the Mayor of Belo Horizonte would not authorize any major work without consulting PLAMBEL. That was no negligible achievement.

However, despite defeat by the metropolitan planners' overwhelming display of technical competence, the SUDECAP planners did not give up the ambition to themselves prepare the Master Plan for Belo Horizonte, set up local priorities for public works, and carry out their own transportation and land use surveys. Architect Lisboa considered that the metropolitan planners were meddling with local affairs. For him, metropolitan problems were those that
involved the several municipios at once. Why should the metropolitan planners interfere with the planning of Belo Horizonte's central business district, for instance? This meant an encroachment upon local autonomy. Though his stand was easy to falsify on technical grounds, it was efficient politically. For the whole period of the plan preparation, the metropolitan planners were to be confronted with SUDECAP's open or covert unwillingness to work together with PLAMBEL, let alone to observe their recommendations and accept their proposals. This can be seen in the case of the Law on Urban Planning, to which we turn.

SUDECAP Turns Down a City-Planning Chart

As they had proposed for the other municipios, the metropolitan planners also thought it necessary that Belo Horizonte adopt a Law on Urban Planning, prepared by them. That Law, inspired by the French national legislation bearing on urban planning and development, would constitute a municipal commitment to certain planning principles. Among those principles, was the need to make local plans and programs compatible with the metropolitan plan's guidelines and proposals. It set out some broad goals for urban development, social services, transportation, and infrastructure construction. It also specified that "any work or service, public or private, ...will be executed only in accord with the planning guidelines" set out in the law. Those guidelines
required that the city orient its activities through priorities translated into plans. There should be a Structure Scheme, a Land Occupancy Plan (POS), and a Roads Classification Plan, to be closely connected with the POS. At the end of its provisions, the Planning Law stipulated that new subdivisions would be forbidden for one year from the date of enactment.

Before sending the metropolitan planners' bill to City Council, Mayor Pieruccetti asked SUDECAP's opinion. At that time, Lisboa had hired a group of city planners from São Paulo to help SUDECAP's staff in the preparation of the Belo Horizonte plans. Planning Belo Horizonte was a prerogative Lisboa would not easily surrender to his metropolitan colleagues. Moreover, eager to repay the metropolitan planners for the devastating report on the Raul Soarea project, Lisboa asked his consultants to evaluate the Urban Planning Law and draft a report to be handed to the mayor.

The consultants started their report by indicating that the proposed law was not "self-enforceable." It depended on other legal instruments. They understood it rather as a "pedagogic" instrument. However, they added,

Keeping in mind the agency which proposes it, PLAMBEL, one might take it for granted that said Law would deal chiefly with metropolitan aspects, that is to say, those which transcend specific problems in each municipio... Yet the proposed law deals mostly with aspects presenting a municipal interest. It does not locate municipal problems within the metropolitan frame. 5

Thereafter, entering the Law's more substantive import, the consultants took issue with the planning conception they
thought the Law conveyed. They said it was inimical to "a continuous and flexible process of intervention in the urban frame." The PLAMBEL approach was too technical. It neglected the fact that planning,

in its application, depends on political conditions and opportunities, on financial and human resources, on administrative behaviors, and on other non-technical aspects which require flexible actions. Technically perfect plans that gather dust on shelves are legion.6

In contrast to the PLAMBEL approach, the consultants extolled the work they were doing for SUDECAP, which would be translated into a set of urban laws that would reflect a "flexible strategy." They also pointed out that the PLAMBEL law itself acknowledged the need for a complementary set of regulations which the SUDECAP laws would contain. There was not, thus, in their view, an insuperable incompatibility between the Law on Urban Planning, and SUDECAP's more operative laws, except that the former postulated the previous preparation of a global Scheme of Structures and of a POS. Those grand plans, in the SUDECAP consultant's view, would only reflect PLAMBEL's over comprehensive approach to planning. What was needed, they reiterated, was a stepwise, incremental tuning up of policy measures, conveyed by less ambitious plans.

In the remainder of their opinion, the consultants proposed changes in several of the PLAMBEL Law articles.

The consultants' report was sent to PLAMBEL by Mayor Pieruccetti, together with the draft of the laws the consultants themselves were preparing for SUDECAP. The metropolitan planners
were thus given the chance to reply to the consultant's arguments and to counterattack at the same time, through evaluating the consultants' proposals.

What was the gist of these proposals? The consultant, some of whom had worked several years before in the SAGMACS plan, retrieved some of the ideas of that old plan. Among them, the idea that it was important to force occupation of vacant lots in existing subdivisions, and to protect outlying open spaces so that the city would preserve its rapidly vanishing green belt. The supply of lots should be increased, but not at the expense of the remaining non-subdivided periphery. There was already a great stock of vacant lots in the city's settled area. The consultants proposed that the "urban perimeter," which is the legal boundary which marks off the urban area from the rural one, be extended to coincide with the municipal outward boundary. The municipal competence for control and surveillance over subdivisions in the periphery—which, in the rural area of the municipio belongs to the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA)—should, accordingly, be extended to its peripheral areas. The consultants' assumption was that the municipio would more effectively exert supervision on those areas than INCRA.

In a second law, regulations bearing on subdivisions were forwarded. Restrictions on subdivisions in the periphery were made very strict.

A third law established progressive taxation on
unoccupied land in the area already subdivided. Both the second and the third laws were expected to force occupation of existing subdivisions and to provoke an increase in the stock of lots put up for sale because of increase in land taxation combined with restriction on new subdivisions.

A fourth law contained a proposal for zoning the city, and a fifth law defined criteria for the city's street system.

PLAMBEL prepared a detailed opinion conveying both the metropolitan planners' reaction to the consultants' criticisms of the Urban Planning Law and their own criticisms of the consultants' set of urban laws.

The metropolitan planners set about showing first the "inconsistency" of the argument that they were encroaching on the legitimate municipal preserve when they set out guidelines for local planning. As one of the SUDECAP consultants had formerly been the Director of the São Paulo Metropolitan Planning Agency (GEGRAN), the drafters of the PLAMBEL opinion inserted in it, with malice, a quotation from a GEGRAN report on metropolitan areas throughout the world. In that report, the essential metropolitan activities and functions were defined. They were: planning, transportation, housing, and location of great employment centers and traffic generators. "If these activities are outside the coordinated metropolitan system, planning becomes ineffectual," the GEGRAN report said. In planning, the metropolitan planners added, "are included all the sectoral studies basic for the metropolis,"
in particular transportation and land use plans, "whose importance for strategic decisions is fundamental today in all large cities." Therefore, they concluded, the land use problem had to be treated on the metropolitan level. Since the city had already expanded beyond municipal boundaries, the metropolitan agglomeration was a more realistic basis for intervention and control.

Second, the planners responded to the criticisms that their approach was rigid. On the one hand, owing to the metropolitan character of problems, there ought to be a minimum of uniformity among the municipios.

It is impossible to prepare long term plans for services and utilities necessary for the metropolis without a long term plan for the use and occupation of the metropolitan land. That plan should not result from the mere juxtaposition of municipal plans prepared in isolation of one another...8

On the other hand, the hierarchy of plans foreseen in the Planning Law that PLAMBEL wanted all the municipios to observe was not arbitrary, nor an attempt to impose a "blueprint" on the municipios.

Since today's decisions will have long term effects, they should be based on clear orientations about long term development. We adopted a style of work in which there is a logical and chronological concatenation among the several elements. Those elements, though of different natures, are complementary: the Metropolitan Structure Scheme, the Urban Structure Scheme (for the conurbation), the POS, the Street Classification Plan, the Subdivision and Building Codes.9

Some of those plans were sets of long-term guidelines; others were to be enforced in the short-run. The latter, however, should be based on long-term studies, "which permit
to foresee results with safety." Counter-attacking, the metropolitan planners retorted that the set of laws brought out by SUDECAP's consultants was not supported by previous studies, global or oriented towards the long-run. Besides, documents with the same subject-matter were under preparation at PLAMBEL through—they reminded the SUDECAP consultants—an agreement PLAMBEL had signed with SUDECAP itself... After these remarks, the planners proceeded to a detailed examination of the consultants' proposals. They argued that the laws bearing on land subdivision and occupancy would produce results contrary to those it intended to produce. They would foster dismemberment of the remaining vacant land within the settled area, and would favor the subdivision in what had until then been the municipio's rural area. Among other things, the metropolitan planners contended that, through stretching the "urban perimeter" so that it would embrace the whole municipal territory, the formerly rural area would no longer be under the legal purview of INCRA. Yet, they said, INCRA, as a federal agency, had the legal, administrative and financial means to help the municipio to control effectively the parcelling of rural land.

The consultants' zoning proposal, and streets network plan, were criticized also. Again, one main argument was their lack of support in research, particularly in studies guided by the long run view of city dynamics. How could the consultants arrive at a zoning law without information on the topography, access, economic value of the land, on
whether it was serviced by utilities and social equipments? In the absence of that information, zoning for zoning's sake presented great risks. In their caustic words, "a bad zoning ordinance is worse than none at all." Since it was prepared without any study of the city development, no reference to a global plan, the SUDECAP proposed zoning model was looked upon as arbitrary by the metropolitan planners. It was likely to conflict with the long-run planning guidelines, the evolution of the city and, worse still, with the zoning laws of the neighboring municipios.

As to the street network plan, the metropolitan planners pointed also to the absence of integration with the metropolitan roads foreseen in the Metropolitan Structures Scheme. The number of planned arteries, for instance, was insufficient given the number of freeways stipulated in the Metropolitan Scheme.

PLAMBEL's opinion did not go unanswered. In a letter dated 8 March 1973 sent to SUDECAP's superintendent, the consultants presented their reactions to the metropolitan planners criticism. The essence of conflict resided, they said, in a different strategy on how to go about the "continuous process of planning." PLAMBEL, they said, seemed to prefer the traditional form, already tried in several cities, of "preparing first a global and exhaustive plan, and using it as an instrument to trigger the planning process." However, they went on, experience shows the need for a new way of going about the planning process in our municipios and
and metropolitan areas. That new way, they added, would consist in putting a plan—or even parts of plans—into practice while the "process of plan" (that is, plan preparation) is going about. Voluminous and complex plans should not be injected into the administrative machinery in one full swoop. This was why "super-plans" had thus far been unable to trigger the "planning process," and had had little influence on real decision processes. Only planning as a continuous process would be capable to agglutinate the actions of scores of federal, state and municipal agencies, on which would depend implementation of a metropolitan or municipal plan. Those agencies would hardly submit at all to the directives of a single planning agency.

Besides replying to PLAMBEL's general criticisms, in which they saw mostly a difference in planning philosophy and strategy, the consultants also confronted the criticisms addressed to their specific proposals. They rejected PLAMBEL's charge that their laws would have effects contrary to those intended in regard to land subdivision. They also cast doubts on INCRA's capacity to control the process of subdivision of the remining rural area of the municipio without the latter's cooperation. They reminded that INCRA's responsibility extended over the whole country:

It is absurd to believe that INCRA is effectively supervising and putting fines on land subdividers who breach regulations over thousands of municipios all over the country.12

By extending municipal competences for supervising land subdivision to the rural area, the municipio would, in
their opinion, be able to control "its expansion in accord with its own goals," without necessarily dispensing with INCRA's help. As land use would continue to be rural, INCRA's responsibility would not cease.13

Besides the exchange of written reports and opinions that went on for some time between the SUDECAP consultants and the PLAMBEL planners, there were some meetings to discuss the issues under contention. However, no consensus was really obtained. The metropolitan planners did not manage to challenge the SUDECAP consultants with an overwhelming technical superiority, forcing them to concede defeat. The issues at stake were more complex than those in the Raul Soares project.

On the other hand, PLAMBEL's plans remained promises, not facts, during most of Pieruccetti's administration. The metropolitan planners' over deductive methodology, demanding massive data gathering, and huge interpretive efforts, caused great delays in the production of the principal plans. The preparation of the Metropolitan and Urban Structure Schemes revealed itself an extremetly difficult task for the planners, in particular because of the attempt to articulate land use and transportation aspects, a technology that the planners did not yet master well at the time. In a heroic move, after one and a half year of plodding, the metropolitan planners decided that, though the work on the "structures scheme" would go on, the Land Occupancy Plan (POS) should no longer be delayed. The data from the land use survey were
analyzed fast, and the planners set about articulating a more intuitive, less deductive approach to the Land Use Plan for the conurbation, starting from its core in Belo Horizonte.

Though the Land Occupancy Plan, and the attached zoning code for Belo Horizonte were practically ready in 1974--the last year of the Pieruccetti administration--the stalemate continued. Previous skirmishes with regard to the Urban Planning Law, sponsored by PLAMBEL, and the SUDECAP consultants' set of land use laws, led to a deadlock. For one thing, Pieruccetti did not endorse the Urban Planning Law, because of SUDECAP's "veto." For another, SUDECAP did not risk forcing passage of the consultants' laws on land use. The criticisms of PLAMBEL had made Lisboa less sure about the goodness of those laws. When the POS was ready, in turn, Lisboa did not display any interest in adopting it. As Pieruccetti's term was about to finish, the metropolitan planners themselves thought it advisable to wait for the new mayor to present the final plan.

**Concluding Remarks**

In the case of Belo Horizonte, the metropolitan planners faced a different situation from that of the peripheral municipios. The latter mumbled their grievances against PLAMBEL, but did not, except for Contagem, raise their voice for a long time. In the case of Belo Horizonte, the metropolitan
planners faced a political authority second in rank only to
the state governor. Mayor Pieruccetti could not be enjoined
to do things. He had to be persuaded. He acknowledged to us
in an interview that, as a politician, he had to decide
between the alternatives brought forward by the technicians.
If the technicians' arguments converged, he had grounds to
make or avoid a decision. Otherwise, he would prefer to
postpone action, unless one of the side's arguments had
in his judgment been overwhelmingly better than the other's. 14
In the Raul Soares case, the metropolitan planners managed to
show, in confrontation with the SUDECAP sponsored project,
several critical things. First, the importance of a physical
project for a square in the light of comprehensive planning,
resorting to several relevant criteria besides the ease of
traffic flows in that particular place. They pointed up, for
instance, the square's importance as a focal symbol in the
people's perception, its leisure functions, and its landscape
aspects. Second, they called attention to the importance of
not treating a traffic problem through a piece-meal solution,
likely to aggravate traffic jams at other points in the
city. Third, they indicated the importance of using sophis-
ticated, up-to-date, and tested planning techniques whenever
these be available and, fourth, they stressed the importance
of cost-considerations, which the SUDECAP project seemed to
ignore by presenting an expensive project without comparing
it with alternatives. The cogency of their arguments against
the SUDECAP project, the simplicity and low cost of the
alternative they brought forward was such that the Mayor decided not to carry out the SUDECAP project. The planners were effective in showing how the metropolitan perspective could help to solve a local problem, without doing damage to legitimate municipal interests.

In the case of the urban laws, no such a situation existed. The metropolitan planners could insist on the high metropolitan interest involved in the city-planning policies. But the technical debate which involved the metropolitan planners and the SUDECAP consultants was not enlightening to the Mayor. On the one hand, the arguments brought forward by the metropolitan planners against the urban laws concocted at SUDECAP did not appear to him overwhelmingly convincing. In fact, on reading the pieces of the debate, one gathers the impression that no side was able to mobilize a devastating argument against the other. On the other hand, the "urban planning law" that PLAMBEL proposed to be Belo Horizonte's "planning chart" would, as the consultants rightly pointed out, require a decision quarantine in the city. Were that law approved by Belo Horizonte, the city-planning instruments needed by Belo Horizonte were to wait for the completion of the complex, time consuming plans the metropolitan planners were preparing, namely, the metropolitan structure scheme, and the other plans that were dependent upon it. The metropolitan planners were not confronting the local authorities with concrete alternatives, as they did in the Raul Soares case. They came forward only
with negative arguments against the SUDECAP laws, a fact that weakened their case. They were effective only to the point of dissuading the Mayor to approve the SUDECAP laws, but not to that of convincing him to suscribe to the urban planning law and wait the preparation of the metropolitan products stipulated in the laws.

What interests were at stake? There was, first, a clash of different organizations, each forwarding its own policy perspective on policies. The metropolitan planners aspired to control the initiatives of SUDECAP, and SUDECAP wanted to have its own way, free from the control of PLAMBEL. The Mayor had in his calculations to weigh these organizational interests. As an appointed mayor, therefore presumably soli-
dary with the state administration, he could not simply discard PLAMBEL's considerations, because PLAMBEL was a state sponsored program, which, besides, he formally co-sponsored. He had also to heed his political interests. The Raul Soares project's flaws, including its costs, had been exposed by PLAMBEL. It appeared politically inconvenient to him. In that case, his political interests, and the interests imputed to the metropolitan collectivity--which the metropolitan planners claimed to be upholding--appeared to coincide. The planners effectiveness in keeping the integrity of the metropolitan plan in that concrete decision seems to have led to a better solution which did not conflict with the local interest. In the other decision, no such and indis-
putable superiority of the metropolitan interests, as
translated by the metropolitan planners' proposal, seemed to be at stake. The Mayor's non-decision, and the metropolitan planners' partial failure, could not undeniably be judged detrimental to the metropolitan interest.

Let us now turn to the study of the involvement of the metropolitan planners in sectoral decisions.
Notes to Chapter VII

1
The elections of mayors of capital cities was eliminated by Institutional Act 3, issued on February 5, 1966. They would henceforth be selected by the governors of the states.

2

3
See Lynch, idem.

4
Interview on 16 September 1975.

5

6
Idem, p. 2.

7
PLAMBEL, "Comentários à Minuta da Legislação Urbanística Apresentada pela SUDECAP," s.d., p. 3.

8
Idem, ibidem.

9
Idem, pp. 5-6.

10

11

12
Idem.

13
That interpretation was correct from the legal point of view.

14
Interview on 10 September 1975.
CHAPTER VIII

ATTEMPTS AT EFFECTIVENESS IN SECTORAL PLANNING

If the involvement of the metropolitan planners with the peripheral municípios appeared untimely and if that involvement was, in the case of Belo Horizonte, sometimes excessive, a different situation obtained in relation to the sectoral agencies. Some of them were active in programs whose metropolitan import was direct.

PLAMBEL's efforts to be effective in sectoral planning implied, to a great extent, being concerned with programs under the State Secretariat of Public Works' purview.

Pacheco's Secretary of Public Works, Mr. Ildeu Duarte, was a competent sanitation engineer, who was working in the Washington Headquarters of the World Bank as a consultant for sanitation programs at the time Pacheco invited him to join his administration. The Secretary's first challenge at the Secretariat was to exert real command over the public enterprises which the Administrative Reform Law had placed within the Public Works "operative system." The Secretariat which Duarte inherited was an obsolete organization, which had lost many important executive functions over the years. Highway construction, for instance, had passed to the sphere of the State Roads Bureau. Construction of school buildings was now carried out by CARPE, a state-owned construction company under the jurisdiction of the State Secretariat.
of Education. The staff of the Secretariat was old and bound to routine. Instead of attempting to change its characteristics, the new Secretary chose to strengthen the agencies under his purview, and to delegate to them the execution of the Secretariat's crucial functions. The "indirect" sector, as those agencies are called in Brazil, was constituted by three companies, one for Water and Sewer works--COMAG, later renamed COPASA--another for housing for low income people--COHAB--and a third one, CIURBE, created during Israel Pinheiro's government to carry out the limited functions of building an "exhibition hall," and subdividing and selling some public land the State owned in one of Belo Horizonte's upper-class districts. COMAG, which had been in existence since 1963, was to be transformed by Duarte into a big sanitation enterprise, the State's instrument to put BNH's National Sanitation Plan (PLANASA) into effect in Minas Gerais. As to CIURBE also, Duarte wanted it not only to be in charge of construction of public buildings, but also to undertake more ambitious public works, related to urban development. These transformations did not occur overnight, however, and, at many points, the trajectory of the Secretariat of Public Works in carrying them out collided with that of PLAMBEL and CED. In what follows, we shall go into a brief narration of the main episodes in PLAMBEL's search for effectiveness in relation to public works.
Effectiveness in Controlling a Water Basin: the Creation of a Metropolitan Water and Sewer Company

The Metropolitan Planners had scarcely started their studies when Secretary Vieira called on them to give their technical opinion on an agreement about to be signed between DEMAE and SAMAE, the agencies in charge of water and sewer services in Belo Horizonte and Contagem, respectively. Following the agreement, SAMAE would sell a part of the water impounded in the newly built Várzea das Flores dam in Contagem to Belo Horizonte, for a certain number of years, pending completion of works to tap water from Rio das Velhas to supply Belo Horizonte. The possibility of that agreement stirred reaction from enterprises located in Contagem and in a Belo Horizonte district adjacent to Contagem. Worried entrepreneurs asked Governor Pacheco's intervention. They were afraid the agreement would endanger the water supply to their plants. In the appeal sent to Governor Pacheco, it was alleged that the Várzea das Flores dam was built to supply the demands of Contagem's industries, facilitating their growth, and to provide Contagem's population with water. The reservoir was built with resources generated in part by the enterprises. The appeal ended stressing that an agreement would be acceptable if there would be a higher-level agency to take care of the water demand over the whole metropolitan area.

SAMAE and DEMAE answered the entrepreneurs's concerns over the agreement by showing that their fears were unfounded.
There was, they said, plenty of water to meet needs and to allow sale of water to Belo Horizonte. DEMAE pointed out, also, that the agreement was not for a long period, but for just seven years. SAMAE showed that the sale of water would be advantageous. It would permit it to anticipate revenues and liberate Contagem from earmarking its resources for payment of debts incurred with dam construction.

Again, as had happened with the Raul Soares project, the metropolitan planners felt the situation favored display of technical competence and advancement of the metropolitan idea. They could show the need for a metropolitan company (an idea that the entrepreneurs themselves had volunteered). To respond to Vieira's demand--on request of Governor Pacheco--they carried out a brief, but careful study of the metropolitan water problem, calculating water demand in Belo Horizonte, the Metropolitan Area as a whole, and Contagem, and comparing it with the capacity of the SAMAE and remaining water systems in operation or being constructed in the metropolitan area to meet that demand. The study concluded that the agreement should be signed, for it was advantageous for both Belo Horizonte and Contagem. There was, it said, no reason to fear restriction on current or foreseen demand in Contagem. The planners observed also that

conflicts of demand such as this one tend to become sharper in areas with metropolitan characteristics, where the need to use water resources rationally requires planning and actions on the metropolitan level. Growth and diversification of demands, together with dispersion of resources in the area, render isolated solutions difficult, when not unviable.1
After expanding on the future needs of the whole area, the planners said:

Similar problems have taken place in all metropolises of the world, those of Brazil not excepted. So far, the adopted solution has been the creation of agencies that act on the metropolitan level, capable to plan and executive works to tend to a joint demand, and to exert discipline over the use of water resources in the region.²

They closed their opinion with this statement: "there will be, in the future, a metropolitan water agency in the Belo Horizonte area."

On the basis of this opinion, Vieira wrote a report for Pacheco, recommending that the agreement be authorized, and endorsing PLAMBEI's proposal for a metropolitan company to be created in the near future. He also authorized the metropolitan planners to go on with their studies on the sanitation problem in the metropolitan area, and to prepare a substantiated proposal for the création of the Metropolitan Water Works Company. Vieira and the planners were excited at the prospect of having, under their control, that powerful instrument to put metropolitan proposals into effect in a critical field. Would the project materialize, they would be able to dispense with the endless negotiations that, by then, they had realized would be inevitable for most of the problems covered by their planning conception. The idea of having their own implementing tools was more and more alluring to them.

Before the end of 1972, the planners presented Secretary Vieira with a study on which to base the constitution of a
"Metropolitan Company for Water and Sewerage Works." The study summed up the diagnosis of the area's problems in sanitation and surveyed institutional attempts to cope with those problems. It showed that the three governmental tiers acted in the metropolitan space, in the administration and operation of water and sewerage systems and in the financing and execution of works. Among other things, it pointed out that COMAG operated in a very small portion of the metropolitan area only, viz., the municipios of Pedro Leopoldo and Contagem, and was about to construct a new water supply system for Betim. Most of the metropolitan municipios had their own water agencies, some of them municipal autarquias (semi-autonomous bodies). The study stressed that, with such a dispersal of activities, there would be no condition to carry out the huge works required by the mounting sanitation problems. Therefore, they concluded, the need for a metropolitan company, to be in charge of wholesale water production and gross distribution, and of sewerage disposal. A detailed discussion of the enterprise's technical, financial, and politico-institutional viability was gone into, and a proposal for its administrative structure was put forward.

Beyond more conventional aspects, the planners' study called attention to some important regulatory aspects currently neglected: the lack of "discipline" in the use of water resources for water supply, and of pollution control. As to the latter, they described the situation of mining works throwing waste into the headwaters of Rio das Velhas and
Rio Paraopeba, both of them sources of water for the metropolitan municipios. Besides, they exposed the practice of throwing domestic and industrial waste refusal into the area's water courses. The same situation obtained for ponds and dams all over the metropolitan region. The planners concluded in this vein:

The technical conception of water and sewer systems in metropolitan regions requires a global study. It should not be subject to restrictions stemming from administrative boundaries. Isolated solutions, though possible, are in general uneconomical and inimical to the general interest. It is advisable to attribute to (that) enterprise responsibilities in both water supply and sewerage disposal, in order to respect the need of integration among those services, from the stage of work programming, through system administration and operation.3

Supported by the planners' study, Vieira wrote to Governor Pacheco, summing up the main points, and asking authorization for the establishment of the metropolitan company. He added:

CED, which is the State representative in the agreement with the metropolitan City Halls (for the Metropolitan Plan), and the Secretariat of Public Works, which oversees the State programs in basic sanitation, will, provided you agree to it, take those measures together.4

A few days later, the metropolitan planners sent a note to Vieira, re-stating the arguments in favor of creating the new metropolitan company, instead of "simply transferring the services to a company already in existence." They contended that any agency in charge, simultaneously, of the metropolitan area and of other regions of the state would perforce neglect the former. Further, they insisted that it was highly convenient for the State to have a Metropolitan Water and Sewer Company because the Federal Government was interested in
putting programs into effect in the metropolitan areas. Companies acting in the metropolitan area only would, in their opinion, be more adequate to tap those resources, which "would obviously be used only within the area."

Again, Secretary Paulo Vieira wrote to Governor Pacheco, endorsing the planners' view.

What was underlying the planners worries triggering that barrage of arguments in favor of a metropolitan company, and against strengthening any company "already in existence"? The planners had COMAG in mind. If, for many years, it had been a modest enterprise, the new Secretary of Public Works had ambitious plans for it. In that, he was helped by a BNH's new program, PLANASA, launched in 1971. For several years since 1964, National Development Plans had been setting out goals for sanitation. In 1967, a Financing Fund for Sanitation (the FISANE) was created and entrusted to BNH's administration by the Ministry of the Interior. BNH issued directives to give incentives to the States to establish their own Sanitation Funds (FAE), to serve as matching funds for BNH's financings.

BNH's policy, in accordance with the rationale commented on in chapter III, had the following basic traits with respect to sanitation plans: first, programs would no longer be funded by federal grants without financial returns; second, an adequate pricing policy should be followed: water and sewerage services would no longer be provided free, or charged much below real costs, as usual in municipal practice;
third, instead of dealing directly with the municipios, BNH would favor the strengthening of a single interlocutor in the states. That interlocutor would be responsible for securing franchise to discharge water and sewer services in all their stages from the municipios; that interlocutor--a state owned enterprise--should also be responsible for application of FAE's resources in the state, and should be the borrower of the BNH funds; fourth, not to operate at a loss, and to provide poorer localities with water and sewer systems, state enterprises should perform secure franchises to operate sanitation systems in the larger cities, where service operation was financially viable, and transfer part of the profits to subsidizing consumers in the poorer communities. Within this policy framework, PLANASA was put forward in 1971, with the goal to provide 80% of Brazil's urban population with water and 50% with sewerage networks, by 1980.\textsuperscript{6}

PLANASA strengthened Secretary Duarte's case. He strongly resisted the metropolitan planners' proposal that Secretary Vieira had endorsed. There ought not, in his view, to be a metropolitan company independent from COMAG.

Confronted with PLANASA's requirements, the metropolitan planners' arguments appeared weak to Governor Pacheco. The state could not put in jeopardy the chance to obtain BNH funds for crucial infrastructure works. BNH defined the rules of the game by displacing all uncertainty to the states. COMAG would have to embark on a endless struggle to survive financially. A condition of its success was to secure
municipal franchises in large cities. Belo Horizonte and the other municipios in the metropolitan area became a central target for COMAG. The metropolitan planners' considerations ought not to balk so powerfully sponsored a policy.

Metropolitan Water and Sewer Company was not, however, the only point of contention between the metropolitan planners and the Public Works Operative System. At about the same time, another fight was developing. Let us see what issues were at stake.

**Holding Sway Over Land Use and Development: the Planners Propose a Land Development Corporation**

In the Metropolitan Structure Scheme, put out in the mid 1972, the metropolitan planners advanced ideas for a Metropolitan Land Development Corporation. That corporation would, after the model of similar institutions in Great Britain, France, and other countries, be in charge of building the new tertiary centers contemplated in two out of the three structural alternatives for spatial organization of the metropolitan area proposed in the Structure Outline. Some time later, in February 1973, BNH organized a conference of all the Mayors of capital cities in Giranhuns, Pernambuco. Belo Horizonte's Mayor, Mr. Oswaldo Pieruccetti, wanted to submit some theses to that conference, and requested one of them, on a housing policy for Belo Horizonte, from PLAMBEL.

The paper PLAMBEL prepared—"Bases for a Land Development Policy in Belo Horizonte"—started with a diagnosis of
the housing problem in Belo Horizonte, showing that only a small part of the housing demand was catered to by the National Housing Financing System (SFH), through its several programs. According to PLAMBEL's computation, only 15.6% of growth in the stock of housing units in the Metropolitan Area was accounted for by BNH's programs. Much of the new construction was carried out through the process known as "clandestine construction." Dwellings were generally built through "self-help" in loteamentos clandestinos (non-legal subdivisions). According to PLAMBEL's diagnosis, the principal handicaps of that situation were no so much "the quality of the buildings themselves, generally acceptable, or susceptible to improvement," but rather the lack of on-site and off-site services and the bad quality of the "life environment." The paper proposed the creation of a Land Development Corporation. It would be involved in both upgrading existing subdivisions and servicing new areas, to permit supplying the market with suitable lots, located in "carefully selected sites" and financially accessible to the poor. In other words, policy emphasis would shift from the sale of constructed housing units, as usual in Brazil, to the supply of serviced lots. Lot purchasers were assumed to continue resorting to self-help to construct their houses, and BNH funds should be made available to them.

Mayor Pierucetti presented the paper at the Garanhuns conference. The ideas in it were welcome by the BNH directory. In that same conference, "Land Development Companies" were
much discussed. Many of the authorities present looked on those agencies as a promising urban policy instrument. The examples of Curitiba (capital city of Paraná, considered one of the best examples of city planning in Brazil), with its URBS, and of São Paulo, with its EMURBE, were widely approved.

Stimulated by the favorable reception of the paper ideas and by the discussions in Garanhuns, Pieruccetti requested PLAMBEL to prepare a full-blown study about the viability of the land development company.

By that time, the idea that CIURBE, an already constituted enterprise, might be transformed into the proposed Metropolitan Land Development Corporation began to take shape. Despite statutory powers, CIURBE had done very little until then. As the Belo Horizonte City Hall was, together with the State Government, CIURBE's biggest shareholder, the idea of transforming the agency into the envisioned Land Development Corporation seemed attractive to both the PLAMBEL planners and Pieruccetti's assistants working on the matter.

In March 1973, the PLAMBEL study on the agency was ready to be handed to Mayor Pieruccetti. It was declared a study "to change the statute and organization of CIURBE."

The planners seemed to ignore that CIURBE was within the "Public Works System," according to the terms of the Administrative Reform Decree. The system was under the command of Secretary Ildeu Duarte, who, we have already seen, was an alert executive, watchful of his institutional preserve and somewhat bent on empire building. Some months earlier,
he had made an attempt to expand his system's reach through attracting to it another state company, CARPE, in charge of constructing school buildings. CARPE was in the jurisdiction of the State Secretariat of Education Duarte had sent a note on the subject to the Governor, who asked for the Secretary of Planning's opinion on his colleague's claim. Vieira, in turn, asked PLAMBEL's opinion. Among the arguments Duarte had submitted to Governor Pacheco, he had put forward the following:

The concentration of COMAG, COHAB, and CIURBE activities under the guidance of the Secretariat of Public Works is a basic requisite to put into practice, in an orderly and systematic way, a unified policy of urban development for the State. CIURBE's statutory powers limit its operational capacities substantially...On the other hand, attached to the Secretariat of Education, is CARPE, an enterprise assigned to construction and upkeep of school buildings... the spirit of Decree 14.566...which established the Operative Systems, is breached, because of existence in that system of an isolated agency that plans, programs, and executes public works... I therefore ask you permission to carry out studies on the fusion of CARPE and CIURBE to execute public works in the field of social infrastructure, needed by the state's urban development.10

Though his plea did not meet with a favorable reception, the arguments of Duarte were clear as to his high claims for CIURBE. The metropolitan planners', as well as Pieruccetti's, claims to an alternative role and location for CIURBE, were unlikely to be welcome by Duarte.

What was proposed for CIURBE by the metropolitan planners? Their new study was a more elaborate presentation of the Garanhuns paper arguments. A diagnosis on the consequences of Belo Horizonte's fast growth was gone into, along the same terms of the Metropolitan Structure Outline. Among
those consequences, two aspects were singled out: the anarchic expansion of the city's "fabric," and the low quality of existing subdivisions. Public interference was claimed, the document said. Public power should deploy regulatory instruments under its control, incentives--subsidies and financing--and taxation to orient the private investors and make up for the undesirable effects of the play of market forces, and should also resort to direct action "to orient urban expansion and supplement the initiatives of private investors." 11

The study centered on the latter kind of instrument. The Government should take on an "active role" in urban development. It should put to work the "real estate market forces themselves, in order to reach the goals set out by planning." 12 In other words, a Land Development Company should be set up.

The study went on to explain the role desired from the agency and to show its viability.

The agency's chief aim would be to interfere in the real estate market through formation of land stocks in the outlying areas of the city, and in places more distant, using profits stemming from... the sale of "urbanized" (serviced) lots at a later point in time for the community's benefit. 13

Returns on the sale of lots would be used by the agency to acquire more land, to be kept in stock in order to "preserve the quality of life in the Metropolitan Region."

Since unused areas suitable for urban use in Belo Horizonte were already scarce, the Land Development Corporation should operate in the whole metropolitan region to become viable. It should upgrade extant subdivisions, prepare new areas for
"urban expansion," supply the market with lots within the reach of the poorer people, and form reserves of open spaces to protect the natural environment and improve the living conditions of the inhabitants. As BNH was launching a new program for upgrading extant subdivisions—Projeto CURA—the study proposed that the Land Development Corporation should be the instrument to execute that program in the city.

The metropolitan planners' proposal handed to Mayor Pieruccetti_vied with Secretary Duarte's proposal for the modification of CIURBE. Duarte wanted CIURBE to become the agency in charge of all traditional and new public works necessary for "urban development," a field he considered to fall legally under his Secretariat's purview. He made this point clear to the metropolitan planners during a visit they paid him. Dayrell reported on the visit to Secretary Vieira^14 pointing out that Duarte had not hidden from his visitors that he felt responsible for the urban field in the State.

Vieira wrote a strong note on the subject to Governor Pacheco. He mentioned that if the proposed new agency would be in charge of preparing Integrated Development Plans, that competence would overlap completely with that of PLAMBEL in the metropolitan area. Since the Complementary Law on the Metropolitan Areas was about to be sent to the Federal Legislature, and CED had already a Superintendency in charge of municipal matters (SUPAM), he deemed it indispensable to avoid conflicting competences in the urban field.
Faced with the competing claims of Secretaries Duarte and Vieira, and the Belo Horizonte Mayor, Governor Pacheco replied to Vieira:

It is urgent that coordination on this initiative be carried out. The problem has already been brought to me under the exclusively municipal aspect (he was mentioning Mayor Pieruccetti's original proposal to set up a Belo Horizonte Land Development Corporation, through incorporation of CIURBE, a part of whose shares Belo Horizonte owned). The suggestion of the Secretary of Public Works was also considered, which centers exclusively on a state public enterprise. The Belo Horizonte Mayor and the Secretary of Public Works ought to be listened to on this matter.16

Following Pacheco's instruction, Vieira contacted both the Secretary of Public Works and Mayor Pieruccetti. However, as Duarte was abroad, contacts were held with Mr. Euler Brina, the deputy Secretary. Brina reiterated that a State Company to promote public works and urban development ought to be created, and that CIURBE should be its basis. As to a Metropolitan Company, the initiative to create it should not obstruct that of creating a State Company.

Vieira wrote to Pacheco, informing him about the results of his coordinating efforts. Yet, instead of being a referee's opinion, his was the report of one of the parties to the contest. CIURBE, he said, ought to be transformed into the metropolitan company, and a new company should be created by the Secretariat of Public Works. In his own words: "the new CIURBE should be linked to the State Government through CED, which is in charge of conducting the institutionalization of the metropolitan area."17

Pacheco agreed that the two companies be created simultaneously, one state-wide, the other metropolitan,
controlled by CED, the state being the larger shareholder of both. At the end of his reply to Vieira he reminded that the problem of resources ought to be examined. On 29 June, Vieira suggested to the Governor the creation of a Special Committee, to take the steps towards the transformation of CIURBE into the Metropolitan Company, and constitute the company for Public Works, linked to the Secretariat of Public Works. On the Committee, to be presided by the Secretary of Planning, would sit, according to Vieira's suggestion, the Head of PLAMBEL, the President of CIURBE, and representatives of the Secretariats of Public Works and Finance, and of the Belo Horizonte City Hall. The Governor told Vieira, however, that a final decision should await Duarte's return.

As one could expect, Duarte did not agree to cede CIURBE to the metropolitan planners. In a letter sent to Pacheco on 8 August, he reiterated that the company should not only remain within the system he commanded, but also be upgraded to play a new role in the construction of "community infrastructures." It was an executive agency, and should not thus be attached to the CED, a planning agency. He disputed also CED's competence in the metropolitan field. Complementary Law 14, recently issued, he reminded, required the creation of a "Deliberative Council" for the Metropolitan Region. He adduced that the competence to see to the programming of the metropolitan services, and to their unification in accordance with the Law provisions, was the Deliberative
Council's, not CED's. To create a metropolitan company before the establishment of said Council was an encroachment on the Council's competence. His stand was that not only there should be a State Public Works Company within the Public Works System, but that it should also operate in the metropolitan area. If necessary, its "metropolitan branch" could be detached later to constitute a Metropolitan Public Works Company.

If the metropolitan planners and the Secretary of Planning had placed for so long so high hopes in the enactment of the federal Complementary Law on metropolitan regions, Secretary Duarte's interpretation of that law, once enacted two months earlier (8 June 1973), against their claims to the metropolitan matter, was quite ironic. Governor Pacheco seemed persuaded by Duarte's arguments, and an independent metropolitan company was not created. The metropolitan planners' ambition to control land development through their own executive arm had been foiled.

*Freeways for the "Metropolitan Region": Bringing in New Policy Perspective*

There seemed to be little doubt that the metropolitan interest was at stake and the metropolitan planners had something to say on the proposal of a system of freeways for the metropolitan area, to be financed by PROGRES, a new program launched by the federal government. The proposed
freeways would connect others centers in the metropolitan area to Belo Horizonte's central business district. Some of the principal municipios of the metropolitan area, including Belo Horizonte, would be directly affected by the freeways. Their impact upon the future metropolitan structure was to be large.

Yet, despite the supra-municipal character of the project, and the scale of the investment and physical work involved, the role of the metropolitan planners in the "freeways decision" was not automatic. As in the other cases examined, the planners had to assert and validate their title at every stage of the decision process. Further, they could not afford to await conclusion of studies, research, and drafting of the metropolitan plan to start worrying about its implementation. If in the relation with Belo Horizonte, for instance, they often wanted to slow the flow of decisions, and force local policy-makers to await the completion of the promised set of interconnected plans, in this case they were caught by the stream of events. They had to follow it, in the attempt to wring outcomes compatible with their own metropolitan conception.

In the Metropolitan Structure Outline, the metropolitan planners had advanced the conception of a system of freeways for the metropolitan area, which would both respond to current and future transportation demands, and induce the future metropolitan structure. Common to all the alternative structures in the outline was the proposal of two freeway
routes, one running from the West of the conurbation into the heart of Belo Horizonte downtown, the other connecting the South and Center sections of the conurbation, passing through downtown. The planners had begun to publicize the main points of the Outline, including the basic conception of the freeways system, in the middle of 1972. The official presentation of the document was made in a meeting of the Metropolitan Consultive Council held on 4 October 1972. In the end of that month, President Medici announced PROGRES. That new federal program for financing "expressways" was aimed at "integrating the national roads network and the urban roads network, to establish a fast and economic system of transportation (circulação)." As stated in the decree creating PROGRES the "Master Plans which regulate the development of the urban areas ought to be taken into account in the planning and execution of the program's works."19

PROGRES could become a powerful instrument to permit the planners to put their proposals into effect. But they felt that they had to be present in the critical decisions bearing on the program. Besides, they were convinced since the beginning that the program should not be exclusively a transportation program, in particular with regard to the of the East-West freeway along the valley of Arrudas river, which crossed the Belo Horizonte downtown. Only a small portion of the Arrudas was canaled within Belo Horizonte. Industrial and sanitary waste disposal was driven without treatment and sewerage pipes into the river-bed which had
become a very polluted watercourse. Floods during the rainy season were frequent. Land uses along riverbanks consisted in a mixture of warehouses, small industrial plants, old, dilapidated buildings, and favelas. Railtracks ran along its left bank.

The Preliminary Plan prepared by HIDROSERVICE contained, among its central recommendations, a proposal for an integrated study for reclamation of the Arrudas valley. In the beginning of the Pieruccetti administration, a group of SERFHAU consultants prepared, at the Mayor's request, the terms of reference for a study and plan for the area. The terms of reference stipulated that reclamation and utilization of the valley should contemplate the following aspects: canalizing or covering of the watercourse; location of sewerage mains; regulation of land use on the riverside; execution of roadways along both borcers, and use of the valley for a mass transportation system.

When the SERFHAU consultants carried out their work, PLAMBEL had already been created. As SERFHAU was also financing the metropolitan plan, the metropolitan planners were consulted often and kept up to date with work progress during the preparation of the terms of reference. Mayors Pieruccetti created a work group, charged with "preparation of a program for the execution of the Arrudas Valley project." Dayrell (PLAMBEL), Lisboa (SUDECAP), the president of DEMA (the municipal water and sewerage department), and the municipal Secretaries of Public Works and Planning composed the work
group. In the report sent to Pieruccetti, it was suggested that SUDECAP should contract the integrated study for reclamation and utilization of the valley.  

In the meantime, as their work progressed, the metropolitan planners settled on the idea that the route of the East-West freeway foreseen in the structure outline should coincide, in a large section, with the river valley. As their transportation studies turned out the first results, it became obvious to them that the freeway should not be used mostly by automobiles. They became convinced that only a solution in terms of public transportation would justify such an expensive project. Yet, though there seemed to be a certain consensus on that point of the SERFHAU consultants, the technicians at the Belo Horizonte City Hall, and the PLAMBEL planners, a new actor entered the stage—the roads engineers of the National Department of Public Roads (DNER), and of the State Roads Department (DER). As known from planning experiences everywhere, that professional group is not wont to think about the roads problem in its broader urban implications. The mass transportation problem was largely absent from their concerns.

DNER had been involved in the metropolitan area since about the same time the metropolitan agreement from which PLAMBEL resulted had been signed. Late in 1971 it had requested a study on the widening of Belo Horizonte's outer-ring, by then insufficient to cope with the traffic demand. In January 1972, Dayrell wrote to Secretary Vieira
on the "need to coordinate the DNER studies with those of PLAMBEL." Some exchange of information took place between the two agencies, but no deeper involvement occurred.

As soon as it was established that a state agency should be indicated as the local interlocutor of DNER for PROGRES, Secretary Vieira wrote to Governor Pacheco to press home the importance of PLAMBEL's playing a central role in transportation policies. He argued that, if DER were charged with the freeways program, it should avail itself of PLAMBEL's advice for determination of the highest priority routes. Vieira also reminded the Governor that the Metropolitan Structure Outline had specified the metropolitan needs in terms of freeways. 22

Worries about DNER's insensitivity to the broader aspects of the freeway project seemed unwarranted in the first moment. Elizeu Rezende, DNER's Director General, came to Belo Horizonte early in December, 1972, and insisted on the need for consensus among the several agencies interested in the project. In January, 1973, the DER director reported to Secretary Paulo Vieira on a recent talk with Rezende in which the DNER director reiterated that no major public work should be undertaken with the PROGRES money in the absence of a comprehensive study. On 10 January 1973, DER, SUDECAP and PLAMBEL sent a report to Elizeu Rezende stating that there was a substantial agreement on the freeway problem. They all agreed on the need for an integrated project for the Arrudas valley. They reported that the terms of reference
for that study had already been prepared by the SERPHAU consultants, and had been approved by the commission which Mayor Pieruccetti had set up. All the studies, including those commissioned by DNER to HIDROSERVICE, they reminded Rezende, confirmed the need for a major thoroughfare along the Arrudas Valley to respond to increased future demand. "Having in view the studies developed, and the common interest of all the agencies involved...it is urgent to begin the works of the Arrudas Valley complex." As a first step, there should be a study on the reclamation and integrated utilization of the valley, along the lines of the terms of reference approved by SERPHAU. "The most convenient solution," they added, "would be the joint participation of DNER, the State and the Belo Horizonte City Hall in the project, by sharing its costs."

However, the DNER mood began to change soon after, when confronted with project financing. One of the firms contacted, a Brazilian branch of Tippets-Abbet-McCarthy-Stratton from New York presented so expensive a budget for the preparation of the whole project that it would use up most of the PROGRES funds for Minas Gerais in a year. Faced with the high cost of the integrated project preparation, not to speak of construction works, DNER decided that, in the first stage, the aspects of public transportation and land use along the valley—then conceptualized in terms of "urban renewal"—should be ignored by PROGRES, for they were outside the program's—as well as DNER's—scope. In a meeting with DNER's executives in charge of PROGRES, in which DER,
SUDECAP, and PLAMBEL participated, it was recommended that the state agencies should undertake the other parts of the integrated study, not any longer considered a concern of PROGRES, however.

By the time, both DNER and DER seemed bent on keeping the metropolitan planners away from decision-making on the freeways. Once they realized that funds would be scarce, they fell back on their safe preserve, that is, the construction of a freeway discarding the need of an integrated project.

To complicate matters, despite the promising cooperation that there seemed to be developing for some time between the metropolitan planners and the Belo Horizonte City Hall around the idea of a comprehensive plan for the Arrudas Valley, architect Nelson Lisboa, SUDECAP superintendent, now seemed inclined towards a less "integrated" solution. He upheld the idea that the watercourse should be covered in about 4 km of its length, so that the covered surface might be used for traffic. He seemed so fascinated with the prospect of securing the funds for that work that he apparently forgot the previous consensus on the need to have a comprehensive plan for the valley. Beside deserting the coalition with the metropolitan planners, Lisboa also tried to convince Mayor Pieruccetti that the decision on the freeway was being delayed by the metropolitan planners' stubborn defense of an integrated solution. Pieruccetti expressed his concerns to Governor Pacheco:
I must tell Your Excellency that I am worried by the conflict of opinions among the involved agencies, which has already delayed the development of studies and works.23

Attached to his letter, Pieruccetti also sent a report by Lisboa, in which the metropolitan planners of PLAMBEL were blamed for "decision paralysis" in the freeways decision, and said to "lack objectivity."

Pacheco asked Secretary Vieira to inform him on the matter at his earliest convenience. In his answer Vieira informed the Governor that a new meeting in Rio with the DNER people had been scheduled for that same week,24 during which all the interested parties would discuss the conflicting issues to secure a consensual solution. He reminded the Governor that the "terms of reference" for the Arrudas Valley project, which resulted from the joint work of PLAMBEL and SUDECAP, together with other municipal agencies, established that there should be studies of solutions for mass transportation, to be carried out simultaneously with the studies bearing on the remaining aspects. There had been until then, he added, consensus on the need at least to define, and to reserve rights-of-way for, the future mass transportation system. He concluded emphatically:

Omission with regard to a future mass transportation system will be considered an unjustifiable flaw in the near future, flaw which will compromise the whole project, and ought not to occur.25

However, as the railway line ran parallel to the watercourse, the PROGRES technicians at DNER suggested that it should be used for the mass transportation system, independently from the project.
The meeting between the DNER authorities and the State and municipal agencies involved in the freeway decision, to which Vieira made reference in this answer to Governor Pacheco, took place on 13 September 1973. The DNER Director General, present in the meeting, made the point that, because of the project's high cost, it was necessary to simplify it. Resources should be concentrated on the East-West freeway, the project of which would encompass two sections, one of them coincident with the Arrudas Valley. In this section, it was essential to come to grips with the problem of sanitation. Yet PROGRES resources could not be used for that. He did not mention public transportation, though. When Dayrell brought the issue to discussion, insisting on its high priority, and on the need to have it studied together with the sanitation aspects, Rezende's posture was that it should receive as much attention as the sanitation aspects, but should not be financed with PROGRES funds either. In the end of the meeting, he suggested an agreement of the executive agencies involved. As PLAMBEL was a planning group, its participation was to be examined, particularly because the data it was gathering would be needed by the firm in charge of preparing the project.

On 8 November 1973, Rezende wrote to Governor Pacheco, reporting on the final decision. The freeway section coincident with the Arrudas Valley should deserve an integrated project. Among the aspects making up an integrated project, he mentioned urban traffic, sanitation, the straightening
of the watercourse, but not mass transportation. He stressed that it should be the State's responsibility, not DNER's, to take care of the aspects other than the freeway proper. Governor Pacheco agreed to the terms of Rezende's proposal, and replied that he was ready to sign the agreement with DNER. 27

At the time of the latter events, Vieira was no longer the Secretary of Planning. PLAMBEL had lost its great supporter, and in the ensuing period, until the end of Pacheco's term, the tendency of state authorities was to ignore PLAMBEL in decisions. However, the metropolitan planners could not be entirely passed by, if for no other reason than, at that point, given the critical data that their research effort had made available, the group had to be consulted time and again by the actors who shared among themselves the relevant decisions.

In the sequence of events, DER hired the firm HIDROSERVICE to prepare the freeway project, including also canalizing of the Arrudas river. Sanitation aspects were excluded, however, because the Public Works Secretary, Ildeu Duarte, thought COPASA could prepare the project in that area, and make it compatible with the freeway project. Also excluded was the study of alternative solutions for mass-transportation, which, as seen, DNER was unwilling to finance with the PROGRES funds. However, as the freeway route and the railways tracks would cross at some locations, DER required HIDROSERVICE to study the possible compatibilization of the freeway project with the railway line.
In March 1974, General Ernesto Geisel was inaugurated President of the Republic. Attendant on ministerial changes, a new directorate was appointed to DNER. As the petroleum crisis had already fully set in, the new authorities were more sensitive now to the issue of public transportation. In a meeting held in Rio on 17 June 1974, it was noticeable among the PROGRES people that they were having second thoughts about the Belo Horizonte project because of lack of provisions for public transportation. At the end of the meeting, the DNER technician in charge of PROGRES proposed that PLAMBEL should again be called upon to participate in the continuation of the studies being carried out. Its data about loading of the transportation networks under study were considered vital. Besides, PLAMBEL was also to participate in the studies about the Arrudas Valley "to supply information, particularly about mass transportation." 28 As a consequence of that proposal, the DER had to sign an agreement with PLAMBEL, which stipulated that PLAMBEL was to be kept informed about work progress through monthly reports prepared by DER. Those reports, however, were never forwarded by DER until the end of Pacheco's administration. HIDROSERVICE went on with its conventional freeway project, caring little about any additional study on mass transportation alternatives. Besides, the project was quite insensitive to such aspects as the destruction of neighborhoods and condemnation costs in routing the freeways.

Thus, though new trends in the federal government seemed to give new leverage to the metropolitan planners,
they were still insufficient to redress the balance of forces in the state, quite unfavorable to metropolitan planners in the end of Pacheco's administration. It took new policy changes in the federal administration, and inauguration of a new state government to tip the scale more advantageously for the metropolitan planners. With the Geisel administration, as described in chapter III, there was a new disposition to give the "planning and coordinating" criterion, as advocated by the urban planners, a greater weight in federal governmental decisions. A National Commission on Urban Policies and Metropolitan Regions (CNPU) was created, to be in charge of integrating federal urban policies. CNPU did represent some progress in the federal policy-making context regarding cities. It was given some critical powers, among them the control over a newly created fund—the National Fund for Urban Development (FNDU)—of which the main component—the Fund for the Development of Urban Transportation (FDTU)—was earmarked for investment in urban transportation. At the same time, PROGRES was significantly deflated. The financing of freeways aimed mostly at easing the flow of automobiles in the cities began to sound like a foolish policy after the petroleum crisis. Consequently, DNER's strength in metropolitan decisions was decreased.

In its first meeting with representatives of all the metropolitan regions, held early in 1975, the CNPU authorities explained the priorities in the use of the FNDU. The existence of a metropolitan plan was a pre-requisite
for any region to apply for the new resources. Any work to be financed was to be justified by the metropolitan plan.

The CNPU institutionalization came at a critical moment for PLAMBEL. Though the funds controlled by the Commission represented only a small fraction of the resources invested in metropolitan areas by public agencies, they gave the metropolitan planners leverage in vital decisions. The freeways program was a case in point.

When CNPU began its activities in 1975, after some months of preparation in the second semester of 1974, Governor Pacheco had already been followed by Governor Aureliano Chaves. Dayrell, who, after Vieira's resignation, had been held over as head of PLAMBEL by Valladares, the new Secretary, was replaced by engineer Hélio Braz, a close friend of Governor Chaves.

Hélio Braz took over in a position of force. A practical man, he thought that PLAMBEL had already produced too many plans. Its task was thenceforth that of seeing to the implementation of the plans.

With the new CNPU policies, PLAMBEL was in a highly favorable position. The plans were ready at last, and programs for investment could be presented in Brasília soon. As most of the funds at CNPU were for public transportation, the planners convinced Braz of the need to reverse the freeway decision, still in the stage of project preparation. Braz immediately secured from the Governor that PLAMBEL oversee the matter.
DER was forced to reopen discussion of the whole freeway project. It became clear that HIDROSERVICE, with the support of DER, had held fast to the conventional freeway idea. The metropolitan planners pressed home the point that federal funds would no longer be available for such a work. FDTU could only finance works aimed at improving public transportation. Hence, the whole philosophy of the project had to be changed. As PLAMBEL was also the agency through which the new funds would be channelled to the region, it could enforce the new approach. The freeway should be primarily used for public transportation, only secondarily serving private cars. The proposal was accepted by CNPU, and the project adapted accordingly.

Concluding Remarks

In sectoral programs, PLAMBEL's attempts to exert surveillance over executive agencies, and to have their programs under its institutional coverage, generally ran against the successful defense of organizational territory by the agencies at stake. The planners counted on the unflagging support of Secretary Vieira for their claims. That support was insufficient, however, to make their points of view prevail in the disputes with the sectoral agencies. Those agencies were either within the jurisdiction of State Secretaries equal in rank to Vieira, or under the control of the Federal Government. The Secretariat of Planning was
formally in charge of "coordinating" the governmental activities, but, as we say in chapter IV, that formal right was hard to enforce. CED's failure to exert its role in the metropolitan planning policy illustrates well the obstacles it faced in other policy fields as well. In two of the cases examined, viz., the metropolitan planners' proposal of a Metropolitan Company, and their attempt to transform an existing company into a Metropolitan Land Development Company, CED laid its claim to controlling, through PLAMBEL, two policy fields to which a sectoral department also laid its claim. CED and PLAMBEL revealed, with their attempt to have an executive arm, that they saw no better means to exert the planning and coordinating functions than direct control over execution. However, as the sectoral agent resisted surrendering what it thought were its attribution, the dispute had to be taken up for the governor's arbitration.

Unlike the case of the Raul Soares Square examined in chapter VII, in the case of the Metropolitan Water Company the planners did not display more technical expertise than the sectoral agents. PLAMBEL could not dispute the competence of the state company's (COMAG) sanitation engineers. They tried to show, however, that the metropolitan interest would be better served by a metropolitan company under CED's and PLAMBEL's control than by a state-wide company under the Secretariat of Public Works' control.
That argument lacked cogency. In the field of water works and sanitation engineering, the professional paradigm requires an integrated approach. The COMAG technicians had to think of their problems in terms of water-basins. The metropolitan planners could not convincingly argue, for instance, that COMAG was likely to neglect the protection of the regional watersprings against pollution.

For a metropolitan water company under the metropolitan planners' control to coordinate its activities with, for instance, the land development activities, the latter should also be under the metropolitan planners' control.

In this hypothesis, however, COMAG could be successful too. It would be enough that it followed, in its metropolitan programs, the metropolitan planners' land-use plans. And in the hypothesis the planners would not control land development, the metropolitan company would not be in a better situation than COMAG. Secretary Duarte argued, also, that nothing would impede COMAG to have a metropolitan branch, to tend better the metropolitan needs. 29

Would a metropolitan company have a greater flexibility in its rating system, and provide less expensive services? Not likely. That company would also depend on the BNH funds, lent under very strict financial conditions, which would determine the company's rating policy.

Duarte's definitive argument against CED's and PLAMBEL's claim was provided to him by BNH. That agency required, he showed the Governor, a single state company
to borrow the funds of the national sanitation program (PLANASA).

The governor's decision favorable to Secretary Duarte was not, therefore, surprising. In the land development company, however, though the metropolitan planners' solution was not undeniably better than that of the sectoral agent either, a good case was made that this was a critical instrumental to implement the metropolitan plan. The Governor's decision also favorable to Secretary Duarte in that case was probably a consequence of his lack of confidence, at that time, in CED. By then, he was more and more inclined to support the state executive agents, and more and more reluctant to hear the state planners, on whom the metropolitan planners depended. 30

In the third case we examined, the metropolitan planners attempted to transform a sectoral decision, based on too narrow criteria, into an integrated program. They intended to do this through coordination of the actions of outside agents, rather than through direct control over execution, as they did in the former cases. In this case, Secretary Vieira's capacity to back them was even smaller. A powerful federal actor, the National Roads Bureau (DNER), was involved. Even if the state governor would give his support to his Secretary of Planning, this would not have been sufficient, for DNER was not subordinated to the state government. But the governor's being persuaded by the planners' arguments would have been important. If he
ided with them on that issue, DNER and the other interested agencies would not so uninhibitedly uphold their narrow proposal. The planners did make a good case for a comprehensive solution. The freeway project espoused by DNER would, in their thought, not even solve the traffic problems which seemed to rank high in that agency's approach. The planners also attempted to introduce into the transportation decision the consideration of a social criterion. Mass transportation should, in their view, be given priority. However, DNER had the PROGRES funds. Though it paid lip service to need of an integrated project, its behavior revealed its interest in applying with dispatch its funds in the highway construction.

The governor's decision was, again, against the metropolitan planners' proposal. He could not afford to disdain the federal money which DNER wished to apply in the metropolitan area. But in bowing so easily to that agency, he was following the policy criteria of the day. Mass transportation as a priority did not have, at that time, the urgency it later acquired, both because of the energy crisis, and because of the political demands the liberalization of the regime entrained. The metropolitan planners' proposal was, so to speak, coming too early.

It took changes in the federal policies for the cities, in the Geisel government, for the metropolitan planners to be heard in the freeway dispute. They succeeded in rendering a sectoral plan into an integrated project that
promised to be more beneficial to the metropolitan collectivity than that which it replaced. 31

Those changes, which permitted the planners' effectiveness in the freeway decision, had been for a long time waited by the metropolitan planners, as they attempted to implement their aspiring conception of metropolitan planning against the resistance of the municipal and sectoral agents. In the next chapter we shall examine the attempt they made to wring a metropolitan planning mandate from the federal government still during the Médici administration.
Notes to Chapter VIII


2  Idem, p. 11.

3  Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais, CED, "Estudo para Constituição da Companhia Metropolitana de Água e Esgotos de Belo Horizonte," s.d., p. 10.

4  Letter of Secretary of Planning Paulo Vieira to Governo Rondon Pacheco, 12 December 1972.

5  Except for the smallest and poorer municipios taken care of by the SESP Foundation, of the Ministry of Public Health.


7  The conference lasted from 5 through 9 February 1973.


10  Letter of Secretary of Public Works Ildeu Duarte to Governor Rondon Pacheco, 27 September 1972.


12  Idem, p. 6.

13  Idem, p. 12.

15 Secretary of Planning Paulo Vieira's letter to Governor Rondon Pacheco, 4 April 1973.


17 Letter of Secretary Paulo Vieira to Governor Pacheco, 5 June 1973.


19 Federal Decree no. 71.273, 30 October 1972.

20 Report sent to Mayor Pieruccetti on 31 July 1972.


22 Memo no. 116/72, of Secretary of Planning Paulo Vieira to Governor Rondon Pacheco, 24 November 1972.

23 Letter of Mr. Oswaldo Pieruccetti, Mayor of Belo Horizonte, to Governor Pacheco, 4 September 1973.

24 Letter of Secretary of Planning Paulo Vieira to Governor Rondon Pacheco, 12 September 1973.

25 Idem, ibidem.

26 Letter of Mr. Elizeu Rezende, Director-General of DNER, to Governor Rondon Pacheco, 8 November 1973.

27 Letter of Rondon Pacheco to Elizeu Rezende, 21 November 1973
28
From a transcript of the meeting held at DNER headquarters in Rio on 17 June 1974.

29
COMAG, which Secretary Duarte renamed COPASA, became a powerful state water and sanitation company. Today it is a very dynamic enterprise, particularly in the last five years. It has invested heavily in water provision and basic sanitation in the whole state of Minas Gerais. COPASA has just completed very important water works for the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte.

30
One could speculate whether the governor's deciding the Land Development Company favorably to Secretary Duarte was not because of the contents of the metropolitan planners' and CED's proposal. They were proposing a public enterprise that would interfere in the metropolitan land market. However, the planners' arguments were not based on socialistic arguments, and the examples they mentioned of similar enterprises came from neo-capitalist countries. Besides, it should be remembered that the idea to create that company counted on the approval of Mayor Pieruccetti and Secretary Vieira, conservative men, never suspected of leftist leanings. And Governor Pacheco also supported the idea for some time. Duarte's arguments against the company were not based on its proposed policies, but rather on what he thought was CED's and PLAMBEL's infringement upon his jurisdiction.

31
As of April 1983, the East-West freeway, a project which, as seen, was corrected under the metropolitan planners' supervision to include exclusive bus lanes is not yet finished. The already completed section is being used by automobiles and buses. As to the remaining parts of the integrated project for the Arrudas Valley, these were only recently started, and the works are being carried out slowly, because of insufficient funds.
CHAPTER IX

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE METROPOLITAN PLANNERS

The most important decisions in regard to the Metropolitan Plan were justified because of provisions in both the 1967 and the 1969 Federal Constitutions about the establishment of metropolitan regions. Anticipation of the "Metropolitan Law" was resorted to by the metropolitan planners, plan-mongers, and their supporters, to induce policy-makers into "thinking metropolitan" and adopt the planners' proposals.

Once the metropolitan plan was commissioned and its preparation started in the Pacheco administration, and the planners attempted to unravel strategies for dealing with the vast power-setting implied by their planning view, they began increasingly to feel that, without support from above, the "planning and coordinative" powers of CED would not be enough to give them influence in metropolitan decisions. Every bit of influence they secured had to be struggled for. CED's generic, ill-defined powers and enforcing legal competences were resisted in concrete decisions, and the planners realized that their most efficient weapon was their--often overwhelming--superiority in technical expertise. They felt however that, if such a superiority could, many times, balk some bad decisions--such as in the Raul Soares case--it was not enough to bring about the decisions they
favored. They realized that stronger allies than CED were needed.

Their hope was placed on the federal government. The planners could act to some extent through manipulating expectations. As the dependence of the states and municipios on federal resources and policies is high, information on policy trends in federal circles is essential for policy-makers. It permits anticipatory measures, and helps attempts to influence policy-courses in the center.

Yet, there is often a great lack of information in the periphery, not only because of secretive practices among federal policy-makers, but often also because of confusion, lack of clarity in the federal decision centers themselves. If, owing to the "information gap" in the periphery, some actor talks others in the policy-setting into believing he is an insider in some policy area, he can add to his influence. This happened to some extent in the metropolitan arena.

In local power contests, the planners—and before them the plan-mongers—often resorted to information and expectations about the metropolitan policy to be issued by the federal government. They pretended that there was more consensus above than in fact there was, and somehow managed to convince others that they were accredited interlocutors for the federal policy-makers. They knew, however, that they were bluffing. Sooner or later, their claims would have to be substantiated.
In March 1972, when plan preparation was still in the beginning, SERFHAU sponsored a conference on metropolitan areas, in Belo Horizonte. SERFHAU's superintendent's speech, looked forward to by the PLAMBEL planners, was anti-climatic. He spoke only in generalities about the future law's contents, which, certainly, he did not know.

The metropolitan planners did not rest, however. As they noted SERFHAU's marginal role in metropolitan policy-making, and realized that the issue was disputed by several federal agencies, they felt they should play a more active role in the passage of the law. They felt that they should, if possible, "wring" the decision from the federal government. The state government should be mobilized to that end.

Apparently, there were two tendencies among federal policy-makers, one in favor of issuing a general law through which all regions would be officially established at once; another in favor of establishing each region through an ad-hoc, specific law.

Convinced by Secretary Vieira, Governor Pacheco requested the planners, first, to prepare a version of a general law, and, later, one of a specific law (aimed at creating the Belo Horizonte region), to be offered to the federal authorities as a contribution of Minas Gerais to so important a policy. In both drafts, the planners included provisions on the creation of a metropolitan agency (entidade metropolitana), defining a broad jurisdiction for it. In the draft of the general law—the first the planners
prepared early in 1972—the entidade metropolitana would "administer the metropolitan region." It was stated that "federal, state, and municipal agencies that operate in the Metropolitan Region are due to harmonize their actions with that of the metropolitan agency." Provisions on resources were added, and it was declared that the release of federal resources for municípios belonging to a Metropolitan Area would be dependent upon approval by the metropolitan agency of their plans and programs.

The draft of the specific law was prepared by the metropolitan planners with more information on definitions among federal authorities about some of the institutional features of the metropolitan regions. In the new draft, there also ought to be an entidade metropolitana, to plan and coordinate "the realization of works, services and common activities presenting a metropolitan interest." That agency would have a consultative and deliberative council. It should play an active role in something close to execution, if not execution proper. The entidade should coordinate the works, services and activities presenting a metropolitan interest. It should "promote, through competent agencies, the supplementary execution of local activities that are beyond the executive capacity of the municípios."

Those efforts were of little avail, however. The Complementary Law was not in fact enacted in 1972, as promised in Médici's Message to the Federal Legislative,
but only in the middle of 1973, when the PLAMBEL planners had already spent much of their energy in attempts to assert their jurisdiction over metropolitan policies. Besides, the Complementary Law constituted a great disappointment. Instead of bringing to the planners the unequivocal support needed the law dodged important definitions and shirked declaring what the "metropolitan interest" implied in terms of power arrangements and competences in the metropolitan areas.

Since Complementary Law 14 received a detailed analysis in chapter III, suffice it to recall that the federal government opted for a general law, through which the metropolitan regions were officially recognized. The law declared only vaguely the services which were to be considered metropolitan. It stipulated the creation of two metropolitan councils, one deliberative and another consultative, but did not mention the creation of any executive agency. The Federal Government was not present—contrary to some earlier versions of the bill—in either council.

In the Belo Horizonte case, the planners deluded themselves into believing that the law did confer on them many powers and set about acting accordingly. Their task was to extract from the federal text every possible implication to justify their desired pivotal role in the metropolitan process. With Secretary Vieira's approval, they prepared the draft of a state law, meant to apply the dispositions of Law 14 in the state.
In the state law proposal, the planners attempted to read into the anodine text of Complementary Law no. 14 all the definitions and "allocative" decisions that the federal legislator had carefully avoided. Besides provisions on the creation of the two councils foreseen in the federal document, the planners' proposal stipulated the creation of a metropolitan autarquia, to "realize services common to the municipios of the metropolitan region."¹

In the planners' interpretation the two metropolitan councils written down in their bill would be a part of the new agency, which, besides, would have an executive superintendency.

To the generic functions of the Deliberative Council set out in the federal law, the PLAMBEL proposal added a considerable specification of legal competences. It attempted, however, not to trespass too obviously the contents of the higher legal instrument. The "metropolitan authority" would, among some conventional functions of planning and doing research,

coordinate the common services of metropolitan interest carried out by the State and the Region's municipios.

It would

connect itself with the Federal organs in order to achieve the compatibilization of programs of metropolitan interest...set up programs and projects of public works...set guidelines and norms for the municipal development plans, and help the municipios to prepare them, to ensure their compatibility with the planning of the metropolitan region...put into operation or grant franchises, authorize and control services in the metropolitan interest...²
The functions of the Deliberative Council, as stated in Law no. 14, were also "unravelled," so as to make them more operational.

To compensate for Law 14's vagueness, the planners made an almost pedagogic effort in their law to explicate the meaning of the metropolitan services in Law 14. The services had "phases" in their discharge: planning, putting into operation, execution. The planners' law was a drastic effort to make up for the federal legislator's omission. It was not altogether clear, however, in their bill draft, whether they considered the listed services metropolitan in all aspects and stages stipulated. Probably yes. Their bill was a "trial balloon": if the other actors in the policy-setting would not protest, this might perhaps be taken as an indication that they had aquiesced in the planners' claims.

What was the other agents' reactions to the metropolitan planners laying their power claims in the open? The strongest reaction stemmed from Secretary Duarte. The bill was published in the State Register (Minas Gerais) on 24 September 1973. By the time, as seen, skirmishes had already occurred in the guerilla warfare between PLAMBEL and CED, on one side, and the Public Works Secretariat on the other.

On 4 October, the State Register published amendments that Governor Pacheco proposed in the bill, at the suggestion of Secretary Duarte. Duarte took issue, first,
with the expression "to realize services" through which the planners' bill referred to the legal competence of the _entidade metropolitana_. It meant the power to execute, while, Duarte reminded, Law no. 14 talked of "coordination of "services," not of their "execution." The clause in the bill which would give the metropolitan agency the power to grant franchises (concessões) for services in the metropolitan interest was questioned by him, and he proposed its replacement by a diluted clause. Duarte did not want the interjection of any agency between his system's enterprises and the _municipios_ in their efforts--particularly on the part of COMAG--to secure franchises for operation of services in the metropolitan area. In the definition of the "basic sanitation" service, the amendment he inspired stipulated that "the activities of basic sanitation in the Metropolitan Region will be executed in conformity with the "National Sanitation Plan (PLANASA)." This implied that COMAG would be in charge of sanitation in the Metropolitan Region. This point was made explicit in another amendment.

There followed a reply of Vieira insisting on the original text, against Duarte's arguments. The squabble was going on when Vieira submitted his resignation to Pacheco in mid November 1973.

Engineer Paulo Valladares, invited to substitute for Vieira, was against what he considered the metropolitan planners' "premature" involvement in implementation. A man from the State Industrial Development Board (INDI), he thought
that agency's successful experience should be repeated in metropolitan planning. That is, only when plans were finished and ready for implementation should the planners become involved in the political arena in the way the PLAMBEL planners attempted. One of his first steps was to withdraw the bill and replace it by another, prepared by his legal advisors. The new bill was a complete reversal of the planners' proposal. Aside from creating a state authority, and the two councils foreseen in Complementary Law no. 14, it practically was a repetition of the terms of that Law. As said in the "whereases" of the Valladares Bill:

Inasmuch as the regulation of Metropolitan Regions is, in all countries, a highly complicated legal matter, and, in Brazil, an absolute novelty--a fact which led the federal legislator himself to be extremely concise and parcimonious in dealing with such a matter--everything recommends that the state law-maker...be likewise cautious and concise...³

Thus, after two years of work, it was becoming clear to the planners that there was no disposition, on the part of the several actors in their power-setting, to entrust them with the role their planning conception advocated for them. The limited success that they could have was likely to depend on their firmness, constancy, permanent disposition to bring the "metropolitan angle" into play whenever a chance would offer, mostly in decisions in which their technical expertise and--increasingly as the preparation of the plan advanced--their holding of critical information about the metropolitan area showed themselves superior to that of the other actors.
However, as was illustrated by the freeway decision in the preceding chapter, there has been, since the Geisel presidency, a greater disposition on the part of the federal government to give a greater voice to the metropolitan planners in decisions bearing on the metropolitan areas. The creation of the National Commission on Urban Policies and Metropolitan Region (CNPU) by the federal government raised PLAMBEL's status in the metropolitan area. Besides allowing the planners to reverse the freeway decision, as examined in the preceding chapter, the new situation also encouraged the planners to try to give effect to other parts of their plans.

They obtained from INCRA the supervision and approval of subdivisions in the metropolitan region's rural areas. They managed to have Land Use and Zoning Law prepared by them approved in Belo Horizonte, with very few changes in the original bill during passage.

A recent report, prepared three years ago, in the end of Governor Chaves's term, conveyed the metropolitan planners' critical appraisal of the recent past's experience:

The institutional problem—viz., fuzziness of roles, competition with the Belo Horizonte City Hall, plurality of sectoral organs acting in the metropolitan space—has led PLAMBEL to specialize mostly in some technical functions, for instance in the area of urban transportation, relatively marginal until now. Thus, the agency counts today on what is perhaps the best staff of experts in urban transportation in the state... PLAMBEL has also attempted to exert a coordinating function through the Commission for the Compatibilization of Urban Services, on which sit the agencies whose works have to be rendered mutually compatible...The practical difficulty is that several of those agencies do not present a concrete program, many works being decided "ad hoc," allowing no reasonable forecast.
Thus, the planner themselves acknowledge the performance of a limited role, at least in contrast with the ambitions proffered at the group's beginning years. Should the planners continue to strive for the more ambitious role they sought in the beginning? Does the limited role they have played thus far represent an unacceptable compromise on the planning ideal, or does it show a more realistic picture of the possibilities of planning in a context of plural centers of power and competing policy views which a metropolitan area constitutes? We shall deal with these questions in the concluding chapter.
1 Projeto de Lei nº 868 of 1973. The word realize the planners used in the Bill they drafted was highly imprecise, and interested local interpreters would take issue with it.

2 See Projeto de Lei nº 868/73, articles 8 and 9.

3 Substituto ao Projeto nº 868/73, published in Minas Gerais (State Register), 20 March 1974.

CHAPTER X

TOWARDS FEASIBLE PLANNING: SOME LESSONS
OF THE BELO HORIZONTE EXPERIMENT

Effectiveness in Comprehensive Metropolitan Planning
the Support for Planners

We investigated in this study the problem of effectiveness in urban and metropolitan planning, when planners subscribe to the ideal of comprehensive planning. In our introductory chapter, we pointed to the fact that that ideal requires a considerable concentration and mobilization public power to be put into practice.

Many authors have pointed out that pluralist political systems are unlikely to confer significant powers on planners. Is the ideal more practicable in less pluralist political context? We thought the Brazilian situation provided a good case for the examination of that possibility. We showed in chapter II how the political regime established in Brazil in 1964 has increasingly deviated from pluralism. Among other important facts, it downgraded the legislatures, put severe restrictions on political participation by associations and political parties, and strengthened the bureaucracy and the technocracy in policy-making. These new characteristics would favor unified purpose and coordination of actions, required by comprehensive planning.
Authors of a neo-marxist persuasion would also add that the 1964 regime was committed to the consolidation of capitalism in Brazil. Urban and metropolitan planning being, in their views, functional for that goal, its effectiveness was not considered a problem.¹

Yet, our study has shown that, even in a authoritarian context as that of post-1964 Brazil, the effectiveness of planners who subscribe to the ideal of comprehensiveness in urban planning is limited. The centralism of the 1964 regime, not compensated by a clear assignment of powers to ensure an influential role for planners in urban decisions, diminished their chances of being effective. In metropolitan planning, especially, the planners have, despite the absence of a pluralist politics in society at large, had to face plural centers of power within the government, on which they depend for the implementation of the plan proposals. However, those centers of power often back interests contrary to those promoted by the metropolitan planners. They tend to resist the planners' interference with their policy preserves. The resulting conflicts between the planners and the other agents require political arbitrators whose arbitration will be made in the light of the latter's utility scales and cost-benefit calculations.

Our metropolitan planners in Belo Horizonte, as their fellow comprehensive planners in other contexts, would envision an ideal situation in which the political authority supporting them would, as it were, give them a blank
endorsement, by approving the planning operation and entrusting the planners with the power to make concrete decisions and push through their plan. Altshuler aptly expresses this ambition of comprehensive planners, and its conflict with the politicians' perspective:

The comprehensive approach implies that politicians need only approve general policy statements periodically, leaving the rest to be deduced by experts. Politicians not unnaturally react to this ideal with hostility. They recognize that if they are to be the actual deciders of policy, they must exercise their influence continuously, at levels of generality sufficiently low so that their decisions may affect the matters of interest to their constituents. They may forego interference with administration below certain levels of generality, but they must never let administrators persuade them to set the cutoff point too high.²

The unfolding of decisions in Belo Horizonte shows that, from the perspective of their interests, the political authorities were right in not allowing their generic commitment to planning to be interpreted as a full delegation of powers to the metropolitan planners in concrete decisions. The perspective of the planners, the interests they forwarded did not always rank at the at the top of the authorities' utility scale, and had political costs these authorities could not safely ignore. The planners' proposals for the municipípios, for instance, harmed some of these municipípios. It was beyond the governor's legal competence to make up for that harm (by, for instance, compensating the municipípios not contemplated to have industrial estates in the metropolitan plan with a share in the revenues of the industrialized municipípios.) Thus, the planners' proposal was not
likely to count on the governor's support. In the case of
the proposed metropolitan water-works company, even if the
governor would consider the need for integrated planning
of water resources, he would not have to take the side of
the planners against that of the upholders of an alternative
proposal, since the latter also contemplated the need for
integrated planning of water resources. Moreover, siding
with the planners would, in that case, put in jeopardy the
federal help to water and sanitation works in the state.
In the East-West freeway decision, the criteria upheld by
the metropolitan planners were not central in the governor's
and in the federal authorities' hierarchy of priorities.
Siding with the planners and backing up an integrated
project would, in the governor's perspective, delay decision
and endanger the financing of the freeway by the Federal
Bureau of Public Roads.

Our study reveals, therefore, how unrealistic it is
to expect, even in the context of an authoritarian regime, a
steadfast commitment of power-holders to the proposals of
comprehensive planners. Does this realization mean that
there is no role for comprehensive planners in metropolitan
policy-making? One might be tempted to arrive at that
conclusion. Yet, we believe that, in complex societies,
the planning policy has a positive role to play, even if
limited by severe constraints that the planners should not
ignore.
Feasible Functions for Planning: the Mitigated Comprehensive Approach

Our planners did not achieve a guiding role in metropolitan policies, and did not subordinate all the relevant sectoral and municipal decisions in the metropolitan area to the guidelines of the overall plan. Nevertheless, they succeeded in influencing some decisions in which relevant collective interests were at stake. In these cases, they managed to show the usefulness of holding a comprehensive perspective. If we refer to Rabinovitz's listing of some of the contributions that real, non-perfect, planning can make to the political process, we see that our planners did not fall short of what could; with realism, be expected from them. They did help public officials find ways to solve existing physical problems. They helped decrease "the tendency of political systems to undervalue the future," and correct "the tendency to ignore the system-wide consequences of single-projects." Finally, they also made planning a device for enabling the metropolitan area "to tackle problems that normally have no direct route to policy-makers' attention."

These contributions are a far cry from the ambitions our metropolitan planners nurtured when they fell victim to the "superman syndrome," in the beginning of the planning activity. Yet they are within the domain of the possible in a political and administrative context.

We put forward, in chapter V, the hypothesis that
a more realistic view of the possible role for planners would be forced on them, had they not been linked to the state planning agency. Yet, alternative institutional connections—to executive agencies, for instance—might have induced the metropolitan planners into taking a too circumscribed planning approach, which would have limited their potential contribution to policy-making in the metropolitan area. In that hypothesis, the planners might have ended up not differentiated from other policy experts. They would renounce the critical functions that can be expected from them, along for instance the sensible lines set forth by Rabinovitz. From this point of view, the connection to the state planning agency had, side by side with the shortcomings we exposed, its positive aspects. At least, it did not inhibit the fulfilling of planning functions similar to those suggested by Rabinovitz.

If we heed the lessons of the Belo Horizonte experiment, we can see that, in the instances of successful planning we studied, the planners embraced a mitigated comprehensive approach. There was a place for an overall view of metropolitan reality to help solve some of the city's most acute problems. Yet, the need for this global view war far from condoning the planners's claim to command the whole process of metropolitan development. Our analysis seems to suggest that the most appropriate planning approach should probably combine the proposals of city planners Werneck, Wilhelm and d'Aramon, presented in chapter V, that
planning should focus on the problems not taken care of by the existing sectoral and local public programs, with attention to a few other areas of problems already under the jurisdiction of existing agencies. These latter would be problems which technical analysis and normative considerations would indicate to be in need of a more comprehensive approach than that which they might be receiving. The planners will not forego comprehensiveness, but will not take it for the fantasy to grasp and control all of relevant reality.

Despite their conscious strivings to perform according to a highly demanding script, the Belo Horizonte planners were forced by the political context to play a role more akin to the one we are proposing. They were taught to forgo interfering with all aspects in the metropolitan world. The political costs of excessive interference were greater than the benefits they could reap from it.

A case in point was the metropolitan planners' overzealous and, in our opinion, premature attempt to control the municipal activities considered to have a metropolitan impact (for instance, land development or changes in local road systems in peripheral municipios). This attempt alienated municipal support for the planners, and did not bring them, in exchange, a commensurable gain in terms of the goals they wanted to promote and the values they wanted to protect.

In the other fields—for instance, water and sanita-
tion works—an integrated perspective, attentive to the side-effects of programs, and to the long-run needs of the metropolitan area, was to a reasonable extent already held by the executive unit from which the planners wanted to snatch control over that field.

In yet other cases, the metropolitan scale which the metropolitan planners proposed for problem facing was insufficient for the purpose. The attempted control over real-estate speculation could be cited in that connection. It would require federal policies, beyond the reach of the metropolitan planners.

Finally, a few cases showed the relevance of a comprehensive approach for problem conceptualization and treatment, and the importance of the planner's presence for protecting the integrity of the plan and of the interests it forwarded. In transportation programs, for instance, the planners had something new to contribute, and their interference was apposite. Problem solution required the comprehensive approach, capable of providing answers technically better than those proffered by the other agents. The Raul Soares square decision was a good case in point. The planners could also convincingly show that, by defending a comprehensive approach, the interests of the metropolitan public would be better served. This could be seen in both the Raul Soares and in the East-West freeway decision.
Roles and Political Resources in Effective Planning

The Belo Horizonte experiment conveys other important lessons. We mentioned, in the Introduction, suggestions as to adequate roles to make planners effective in the different contexts. Our study shows that, even if they played a more modest role than the one to which they had aspired, that role deviated greatly from that of aloof passive technical experts who would merely tender their proposals to the implementation process. There was nothing automatic in the passage from the planners' proposals to their embodiment in concrete programs, as a view of planning as a functional requirement of capitalism in its present phase would make us believe. The planners' influence on decisions was a contingent result. To achieve influence on decisions, the planners had to be very active in the search of support for their proposals, persuading potential backers and, sometimes, as in the freeway decision, building pro-planning coalitions with other interested actors. Certain personal qualities of the planners and of their supporters--firmness, constancy, permanent disposition to bring the "metropolitan angle" into play whenever a chance would offer--did certainly count in power contests with other actors. Their capacity to influence outcomes varied a great deal across issues, and decision-arenas and scenes of action.

As technical experts, the planners' claim to influence policies had to be founded, basically, on their knowledge
and reputation for expertise, which were soon perceived as critical resources they would have to muster and apply to be effective. That perception came out clearly in chapter V, where the planners' and consultants' discussion about the Metropolitan Plan was examined. In the special case studies, also, we could see that, in the planners' relations with other actors, knowledge, expertise, demonstrable rationality of solutions were often determining resources. Technical expertise gave the planners legitimacy to interfere in decisions. It was, in their case, referred to the planners' taking a comprehensive approach. The planners had to show that, to solve problems satisfactorily, their global view was better than less global views. Yet, that resource was not always sufficient for the planners to succeed. They were not always more knowledgeable than the other actors. 4

The global view of the planners permitted also their speaking for the whole metropolitan community, particularly for the publics absent from the decision-making process—the lower-classes, the consumers of the city environment, the future generations—and this further justified their interference in decisions. Yet that self-assigned function of representatives of the metropolitan interest was not always sufficient to give them legitimacy before the centers of power on whom they dependend to push through the plans. Those centers of power did not always share policy references with the planners.
The Politics of Effective Comprehensiveness: a Reading of Successful Cases in Belo Horizonte

Among the cases we examined, we dwelled on two instances of relative success of the metropolitan planners. Let us summarize their characteristics.

In the decision on the Raul Soares Square project, the planners' resource for influence was their superior expertise brought to bear upon a decision that lent itself to rational examination and required a comprehensive technical treatment. The planners succeeded in having the original project suspended and finally cancelled.

In the East-West freeway decision, expertise counted, but to a much smaller degree than in the former case. The correctness of a conventional, sectoral, freeway project to solve a complex problem was debatable. A comprehensive program had its appeal. But the road engineers could argue that, given the nature of the federal program--the funds of which were earmarked for financing of freeways--and the limitation of resources, the problem should be simplified, divided into its main components, to be attacked consecutively, not simultaneously, even if this procedure would not lead to an optimal solution. But what parts of the integrated project were to be selected? The answer was contingent on the political strength of the actors who upheld the different parts into which the global program could be decomposed.

The bias of the federal program--PROGRES--was to
improve traffic service and favor transportation on private vehicles. There was a nucleus of interests and power, in which private clients and public agents (in this case, chiefly the National Bureau of Public Roads - DNER) interacted, aglutinated by a program with the characteristics of PROGRES. Sanitation— one other item required in the comprehensive solution forwarded by the planners— might also rest on an inchoate power nucleus that connected BNH, the State Secretariat of Public Works, and private clients and was thus included in the original project by DNER (provided however the State would take responsibility for its study and execution).

Other items critical in a multi-frontal attack were neglected, among them public transportation and planning of adjacent land uses (for urban renewal, low-cost housing and collective equipment). They lacked political support. Public transportation, for instance, was not at that moment under the jurisdiction of a "bureau" whose survival would depend upon raising that issue and advocating public policies bearing on it.

In the case of low cost housing, the same was basically true. Despite declared goals, BNH's practical priorities shunned subsidized housing programs. The current BNH programs were sufficient to sustain a high level of activity in the sectors dependent on its funds so as to keep the issue of public housing dormant, although there might be private clients interested in those issues— planning and engineering firms
or urban developers, for instance. Despite the fact that
the potential beneficiaries of the housing and public
transportation programs were the majority of the population,
they lacked political organization and formal channels to
influence public bureaucracies and public policies.

Thus, expertise and defense of a comprehensive solution
counted more when the power-holder could see that the interests
he or she represented would be more clearly benefited by the
metropolitan planners' comprehensive solution than by competing
proposals. In a case like the Raul Soares project, for
instance, the planners' view of the metropolitan interest
was less controversial, and the power-holder could identify
with it without incurring significant costs. In the freeway
decision, though technical aspects were also involved, the
solution the metropolitan planners forwarded—that is, the
Arrudas Valley integrated project—was justified in terms
of a certain view of the metropolitan interest with which
the power-holders of the day did not identify. A compre-
hensive view required attention to the social aspects, and
the intention to benefit, or at least not to harm, the
interests of the less favored publics, who counted very
little politically at the time.

These two cases permit us to speculate on the dif-
ferent politics that the comprehensive approach implies in
the different modes in which it appears in the planning
activity. These modes are exemplified in the two cases
examined.
When comprehensiveness is, as it were, technically required by the problem—a traffic problem, for instance—and a strong professional paradigm built on comprehensive approaches develops, there may appear powerful pressures favoring integrated public programs, as we described above. Many of the items demanded by urban economic functionality are being conceptualized and increasingly programmed with the help of complex models and through systemic treatment. These are not intellectual tools only, aimed exclusively at understanding phenomena. They intend to be instruments for action. They imply concerted administrative actions sometimes across many fronts. Traffic and transportation problems, public utilities and infrastructures are cases in point of fields treated nowadays under a comprehensive focus. In these fields, it may become easy for public authorities to introduce in policy-making criteria of rationality and efficiency which call for integrated planning as against excessively sectoral actions and piece-meal solutions. Certain of those latter solutions become so glaringly inadequate that decision-makers are forced to think twice before embarking on them.

A project like that for Raul Soares Square in Belo Horizonte, for instance, even at a moment in which many local decisions lacked technical sophistication, was not lightly entered upon by the Belo Horizonte Mayor. Considering the project's scale, cost, and expected impact, he thought that the metropolitan planners should be consulted. Besides showing the technical inadequacies of the concrete proposal,
the planners succeeded in proving that the problem was bigger than what a piece-meal solution could cope with. The whole conception of the road network—the implantation of which would require the cooperation of state and federal agencies also—should be brought out to solve the problems in that and in other points of traffic congestion more thoroughly and justify the expensive public work proposed. The comprehensive approach functioned, in that case, negatively: a considerable waste of money in a ill-conceived work was avoided. The saving of money was a crucial incentive for compliance with the planners' suggestion (which meant not to go ahead with the project, condemned in the light of a comprehensive view of the problem).

The political requirements of effective planning are more strenuous when comprehensiveness is aimed to advance programs in the interest of non-mobilized publics, or redistributively oriented, as the Arrudas Valley integrated project intended to be, and not only the interests of economic urban functionality. The biases normally mobilized by public organizations in their symbiotic relations with private interests in Brazil favor producers as against consumers, and are seldom propitious to redistribution and socially generous programs. They neglect the production of public goods and services, broadly understood (e.g., the abatement of pollution, the protection of open spaces, the conservation of historical monuments and neighborhoods, and so on).

When planners move from the realm of decisions as
the Raul Soares project, in which they are concerned mostly with more rational, technically better solutions that favor established interests, which rank high in the authority's utility scale—in other words, decisions centered on the functionality of the city for production—to decisions such as the East-West freeway project, in which such interests are directly challenged, and which present higher political costs for the authority, they encounter new types of difficulties. Here, it is not only a matter of being given a chance to display one's expertise and, as in the fields where the "rationality" of a comprehensive solution has gained wider acceptance, have proposals accepted because of their demonstrable technical superiority.

When comprehensive solutions are advanced because of their consequences on different, non-mobilized publics, the planners' capacity to advance such group interests runs against solid obstacles. The planners' ability to defend silent publics, if it rests only on the planners' self-assignment of this role, is doomed to failure in power confrontations. Sometimes the planner can carry his or her case to a higher political jurisdiction. Our metropolitan planners attempted that course by having recourse to federal policy-makers. But restrictions similar to those afflicting the metropolitan planners existed also for the socially concerned policy-makers operating in the federal government. Astute planning strategies are not sufficient either, nor are institutional gimmicks to locate the planners better in the
administrative machinery. In the case we examined, it took changes in the political regime for the policies forwarded by the metropolitan planners to win the support of the powerholders. That support was materialized, among other things, in the entrusting to the metropolitan planners of the control over the CNPU funds for transportation in the metropolitan area.  

The issue discussed in the preceding paragraph leads to the final lesson of the Belo Horizonte experiment we wish to emphasize. Contrary to the assumptions that a less pluralist politics could favor urban and metropolitan planning, it was precisely the process of liberalization of Brazil's political regime which gave the planners the needed leverage to influence a critical decision in the metropolitan area and foreshadowed the possibility of success in similar policies in the future.

**Concluding Remarks**

The findings of our study are not surprising to the reader familiar with the literature on planning produced by empirically oriented social scientists. That literature has shown that comprehensive planning, on the level of nations, regions or cities, is heavily taxing on the political and administrative machinery, and is doomed to frustrate the higher expectations placed on it. Yet, our personal observation in Brazil is that practitioners of planning are
loath to accept the findings of the social science litera-
ture. In part, this attitude can be justified by that
literature's skepticism about proposals of social guidance.
Most analyses, by focusing on obstacles and difficulties
to deliberate social intervention, while neglecting to
propose feasible alternatives, may create "an aura of
hopelessness" that justifiably cause them to be held in
low repute among those concerned with social change.

It is not that planners, particularly urban planners,
are blind to reality. The group of planners whom we observed
in this study learned a great deal from their practice, and
certainly would not, were they to start again, commit the
same mistakes. However, many of them still hold to the
belief that what they are doing is only a poor substitute
for what they should do, were the political authorities
better enlightened on the merits of comprehensive planning.
Here we part company with them.

We do not think our study endorses a passive attitude
with regard to city problems, nor supports merely incre-
mentalism in metropolitan policy-making. It shows against
the upholders of big plans, that even a closed political
system does not present the politico-administrative conditions
postulated by an all-embracing ideal of comprehensive plan-
ning. Holding to such an ideal represents much waste of
talent and creative energy, and may eventually lead to
planning's low repute among political authorities. But it
shows, also, that a mitigated version of the comprehensive
approach has a place in policy-making, even in the context of an authoritarian regime.

Our findings suggest that planners should not forgo holding a global view of the metropolitan problems, nor should they abdicate looking at the long-run. Yet they should resist the superman fantasy of grasping the whole reality in their models and attempting to shape it through all-out implementation efforts. They will apply a comprehensive approach to a few chosen areas, where they will concentrate their persuasive capacity in order to elicit a superior problem treatment. They are not going to be the sole influencers of policies. They are not likely to get themselves into a position in which they will be able to push through their plans without resistance. They will have to persuade fellow policy-experts, display technical expertise, and be able to convince the deciders of policy that their interests will be better served by the planners' solution. This will be a continuous process, without definitive achievements or failures. It will be a learning process for both planners and their backers in which the planners' capacity to influence a decision at a point in time may increase or decrease as their advice in former decisions has led to favorable or unfavorable results from the perspective of their backers.

However, planners cannot dismiss the hypothesis that, even with abertura política, and a growing pluralism in Brazilian politics, the "mobilization of bias" in our political
system will keep many issues, likely to be raised by comprehensive urban plans, outside the main channels of influence. Some of the values for which the planner speaks may continue to be weakly asserted in the process of political influence and rank low on the political authorities' scale of preferences. Planners should avoid making the mistake at thinking that their pressures within the decision-making circles will substitute for the actual process of political influence and mobilization of the interested parties. They should know, however, that their firm stand for certain stepchild issues can represent—as it did in the freeways case—a preliminary stage in the process of "agenda-building." Planners can help keep issues alive, until they are able to attract sufficient political support, either through direct pressure of the interested groups, or through the operation of the "law of anticipated reaction" among political elites.

Planners are likely to be disappointed with what we think would be a realistic role for them. This disappointment is likely to derive from the exaggerated hopes that the theory of integrated plans in which they have been socialized has instilled in them and from their professional concern for the betterment of city life, which calls for a comprehensive approach over which they ought not to compromise. But as planning experiences accumulate in Brazil, and as planners and planning students meditate on the lessons of those experiences, we believe that the current mismatch between theory and practice will be overcome in this policy field.
We hope that our study can make some contribution to that desirable goal. Holding to an unpracticable policy model will ultimately do a disservice to the planning profession's generous purposes. It will lead to ritualism and cynicism.

Only by overcoming the current neurotic fission between ideal and realization in planning will planners and policy-makers be able to use the potential of this policy tool to the fullest in coping with urban problems. Planners are not to abdicate their continual concern for the common good, and much less their advocacy for unmobilized, "silent publics," a concern which is a characteristic of the more recent versions of the comprehensive planning paradigm. They are to look for good pragmatic adaptability, which means resisting the technocratic lure to embrace a too vast, but unpracticable, scope of intervention. To have leverage, planners should be more realistic in their expectations. But they are not to compromise over the maintenance of a healthy idealism which ought to characterize their role in policy-making. This attitude is not neurotic or naive but, in fact, constitutes a "healthy realism" needed to offset the narrowness of many political authorities.
Notes to Chapter X

1
See, for instance, Benicio V. Schmidt, "The State and Urban Policy in Brazil" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1979).

2

3

4
In chapter IX we called attention also to the fact that the planners often resorted to the manipulation of expectations about the contents of the federal legislation on metropolitan areas to get the upper hand in decisions. As we mentioned in that chapter, the planners attempted to convince the several actors in the planning setting that the federal law would confer great powers on the metropolitan agencies.

5
For a very good discussion of the politics of comprehensive transportation planning, see Alan Lupo, Frank Colcord and Edmund P. Fowler, Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. City (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), chapter 15.

6
Professor Brian Smith has called my attention to the fact that this empirical finding confirms the conclusion reached by other groups in Brazilian politics—even those closely associated with the regime, such as national industrial leaders—that liberalization offers them possibility of more leverage over governmental policies. Authoritarian rule, although pro-business in its orientation, has led to the growth of sectors of the public bureaucracy who are insensitive and unresponsive to the goals of many Brazilian private entrepreneurs since these technocrats are expanding state control into the most dynamic and profitable areas of industry. If this is the case with groups whose interests were originally expected to benefit from the authoritarian rule, it is even truer with regard to interests of unmobilized "silent publics," whom comprehensive metropolitan planners want to make beneficiaries of their plans.


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