Toward a Symbolic Theory of Policy Implementation:
an Analysis of Symbols, Metaphors, and Myths in Organizations

by

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Abstract

In this dissertation a theory of "symbolics" -- symbols, metaphors, myths, and rituals -- is developed with regard to policy implementation, using a case study to illustrate their role.

The implementation literature, seen as the nexus of public policy and organizational theories, is divided into four groups: routine administration, bureaucratic hierarchy, bargaining, and communication/diffusion of innovation. These four lenses typically share two essential assumptions: (1) implementors do or ought to implement the intent of policies as written; (2) implementation is or ought to be rational, in the sense that organizational and policy acts are understood to be goal-oriented.

The symbolic lens developed here posits a different assumption -- that policy and organizational acts are expressive. A case study of the founding and first decade of operations of the Israel Corporation of Community Centers is presented, and episodes within it are analyzed to illustrate the play of symbols, metaphors, rituals, and myths in expressive acts.

The symbolic lens is proposed as a basis for the formulation of further studies and research in policy analysis and organizational behavior, particularly where concerned with issues of implementation.

Dissertation supervisor: Leonard G. Buckle
Associate Professor of Urban Studies
To Paul Ylvisaker, who pointed a path toward this constellation.
Listen, friend: don't try to be other than who you are, for if you are not yourself, you are no one; and never abandon the culture of your father's house.

-- Berl Katznelson

The lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign.

-- Heraclitus
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Mohammed Heikal, former editor of the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram, was still imprisoned under Sadat's orders on the day of the latter's burial. He demanded of his jailer to know what Mubarek was wearing at the funeral cortège. "It is important for the future of Egypt," he reportedly said.

"When a jailer finally told him that the new Egyptian leader was wearing a dark blue suit, Heikal said he breathed a sigh of relief. 'I thanked God the new president was not wearing some gaudy uniform like Sadat, but was dressing like an ordinary man in mourning. It seemed a very important gesture, both to the Egyptian people and to the world outside.'"

-- Alan Berger, Boston Sunday Globe, 2/28/82:22

"Americans love symbols of liberty and patriotism -- that flag. We never gave it up, but we never publicly or deliberately held on to it, and so a narrow group on the far right have claimed it as their very own. And they behave in a way that indicates perhaps the rest of us don't even care about it.

"It's time not just to show we care for it. It's time to show all those who are feeling the same thing to understand they are great in numbers and to raise up a lightning rod around which to collect all their patriotic energy. And I mean patriotic in the most common, ordinary term. So if everything goes all right tonight [at a planned celebration of American patriotism], I think you will find America has taken back that flag unto itself."

-- Norman Lear, one of the founders of People for the American Way, quoted by Haynes Johnson of The Washington Post in the Boston Sunday Globe (2/28/82:18)

"Sadat, on his state visit to Ronald Reagan shortly following the latter's inauguration, went to Plains, Georgia to visit ex-President Jimmy Carter. My 50-year-old daughter asked if Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter were such good friends as to occasion this visit. 'No,' I replied. 'But Sadat wants to firm up his connection with and the importance of Camp David and the peace treaty.'"

-- Mme. Lilly Felddegen

In the early 1960's, the USSR and the US tried to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The negotiations
hinged, in part, on the willingness of each side to trust the other. In the absence of such mutual trust, each side insisted on the right to on-the-spot investigations of the other's test sites in the event explosion was suspected. It has become clear in light of recent evidence that such site visits were unnecessary for technological validation of test-ban compliance, because each side had the capacity to detect the explosion of bombs from some distance. However, they were unable to agree on this matter. Although Kennedy and Khruschev might have been able to reach agreement, each felt that Congress and the Politburo, respectively, would never agree to a treaty which did not include site visits. The end result was an agreement to a limited treaty, which excludes any ban on underground testing.

Symbols and meaning in politics and policy -- that is the subject of this dissertation: how symbols are used and their meanings conveyed; how images and impressions are created and their meanings interpreted. Specifically, these and other questions developed out of the author's reflection on her experience working in one particular situation, which is described here to illustrate how symbols and their related cultural media -- metaphors, myths, and rituals -- may affect the implementation of public policy.

I worked as a community organizer in the Givat HaMoreh (Afula Illit) Community Center -- one of the Israel Corporation of Community Center's field units -- from November, 1972 until March, 1973. Then I transferred to the ICCC's Bet Mirelman Community Center in Or Akiva, where I stayed through August, 1975, assuming the role of Adult Programs Coordinator in the last 6 months. I have pursued an analysis of this work experience out of more than simple familiarity. I have followed a strong personal desire to
make sense of a complex situation.

Innumerable obstacles persisted in frustrating my and colleagues' attempts to carry out our programs in the field. We knew our professional practice was a bit of an oddity in the ICCC: our center directors and co-workers didn't quite know what to make of our prowling around the neighborhoods, chatting with residents, while talking to them about "process", developing local leadership, and our endless committee meetings. Why weren't we sitting inside, in the center office, filling out forms and plotting class and club schedules, as they were? The fact that we had to answer to a second boss during that first year -- Amidar (National Immigrants' Housing Authority), which paid our salaries -- about housing committees and yard clean-up campaigns alienated us even more from "normal" center operations.

But we were treated well: the ICCC allowed us to go to in-service training sessions two days each month, held at resort hotels on the sea or in the Jerusalem hills. Headquarters even defended us against our bosses' and coworkers' complaints about our absences to attend these sessions. Moreover, we knew that the principles guiding our work should be the agency's way of life. The ICCC was founded on principles of citizen participation. Its programs were to be derived from local needs. We knew we were a crucial part of the agency; we also knew that our bosses and coworkers should be practicing CO principles. We were all idealists and reformers, and talented, too -- as were all
center staff people, it seemed.

That organizing a community is not easy, we anticipated. But when we began, early on, to encounter problems within our own agency, we were surprised. That interorganizational relations would be tricky to negotiate, we expected. But to find the Education Ministry's regional bureaucrats, members of our own centers' local Boards of Directors, playing budgetary, turf, and status games was a shock. When we discovered that our professional practice, which we took to be central to agency operations, was not only not rewarded but sometimes even punished, we were disillusioned, at time embittered.

My own attempts to understand the complex of ICCC policy implementation made me try to retain the observer's lenses, while I became a participant in agency life and in the lives of families and individuals in Or Akiva. Trying to make meaning of my work -- my successes and failures, but mostly, the obstacles -- led me to consider implementation and organizational theories. Finding some sense in most of them but still lacking something led me to the analysis presented herein. This is, in one sense, the culmination of a period of action and thought which has pursued me for a decade.

* * *

Rational Acts and Expressive Acts

Implementation, as an area of study and analysis, is in many ways the nexus of public policy and organizational
theories. For public policy has traditionally left off at the point where a bill becomes a law. Traditionally, the contention and bargaining of conflicting interest groups that marks the study of policymaking has been thought to end once legislation is passed and the policy recorded in the Federal Register. Then, traditionally, public administration takes over. This has become the realm of implementation studies, and their pursuit has led to a reconsideration of politicking and negotiation in this next policy phase. Although it has been thought that the dance of legislation ended with the Speaker's gavel on the final reading of a bill, it is becoming clear that its implementation is another dance, and a jitterbug at that. Whether the new law necessitates the establishment of a new agency or "merely" the promulgation of a new or revised program by an existing bureaucracy, it is here that analysis is informed by theories of organizational performance in enacting and accomplishing agency goals.

This, indeed, has been the cast of much of the public administration and organizational literatures: the executive and/or manager coordinating and controlling subordinates' behaviors so the latter would execute agency intentions and goals. The discovery of "implementation", as I will discuss in the next chapter, was the discovery that such control and execution was not as automatic or as easy as was originally thought, resulting in slippage between policy intent and organizational output or outcome. The implementation literature seeks ways to improve policy execution -- the
activities by which a policy is put into operation -- and narrow the slippage gap.

But even these new theories share with their predecessors the view that the policy process and organizational behavior are rational in their actions: that is, they are oriented toward the achievement of policy or goals. There is, however, another way to look at the actions of governments and bureaucracies. What if program evaluators obscure and manipulate information, satisfying the agency's need for a report but not maximizing information in the rational pursuit of goal attainment? Such evaluation may be seen as an expressive act, a ritual or a ceremony, instrumental or rational for accomplishing some purposes but not in the sense that is usually meant of achieving goals. The sense of policy and agency acts as expressive acts is often called the dramatist approach, and it draws its vocabulary from life as theater. Kenneth Burke is seen as the leading theorist of this approach. (1)

It is not necessary to see all the world as a stage, however, in order to appreciate policy and agency acts as symbolic. Certainly some have done so whose work lies close to a dramaturgic frame. Goffman's concepts of role, front stage and backstage, impression management, face work, and so forth are easily compatible with this perspective. But a symbolic frame also has other roots and vocabulary. It draws

(1) See his and other essays in Combs and Mansfield (1976) for a summary of this frame.
on theories of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists, who see the individual interacting with his environment and interpreting symbols in the daily making of meaning. (1) It draws on theories of aesthetics, such as Suzanne Langer (1951) presents, relating signs and symbols to ritual and myth and "the fabric of meaning." Symbology also draws on linguistic and literary analysis of symbols and metaphors such as Black (1962, 1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980). And it draws heavily on cultural anthropologists' understandings of symbols and myth, ritual and ceremony, such as Hall, Douglas, Eliade, Campbell, Turner, and Leach. (2)

Geographers' interpretations of landscapes and buildings also contribute to an understanding of the social meanings of symbols, as Lynch (1960), Appleyard (1979), and Meinig's essay collection (1979) show. John Berger's critique of art collection (1972) raises two points which are salient to an application of symbology to policy and agency acts: the reality of multiple interpretations and our choice of seeing or not seeing.

Communications theory, political culture, and political symbolism have been the traditional arena for symbology in political science. (3) Harold Lasswell's work (1952, 1979)

(1) Charon (1979) provides a good summary of these theories.
(2) Several of these and other authors' works are cited in the bibliography.
(3) Dittmer (1976) reviews these three areas of theory and research. Recent experiments pursue correlations between symbol sharing and group organization, as exhibited in
has been key to the growth of these fields. Influenced, as was Lasswell, by the concepts of psychology which were spreading at the time, Thurman Arnold (1935, 1937) discussed the role of symbols in economics and law; his writings are germane to considering government acts as expressive. Also close to this view are the writings of Edelman (1964, 1971, 1977) on political language and mass quiescence and Spencer (1970) on rhetoric.

In organization theory, analysis of the role of symbols, myths, and rituals is relatively new, although their study builds on earlier notions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1945), the garbage-can model of organizational decisionmaking and the idea of organized anarchy (Cohen and March, 1974; March and Olsen, 1976). Recent organizational literature using the expressive approach employs the vocabulary of sagas, accounts, fantasies, rituals, stories, myths and ceremonies, fairy-tales, and symbols. These have been applied to explain such organizational behaviors as structure, innovation, function, reorganization, evaluation, problem-solving, and decisionmaking. (1)

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(1) The references are to the following books and essays: Clark (1972); Cohen and Rosenberg (1977); Floden and Weiner (1978); Martin and Powers (1980); McGowan (1976); Meyer and Rowan (1977); Mitroff and Kilman (1975); Peters (1978); Scott and Lyman (1968); Trice et al. (1969); Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979).
Clearly, then, there is a rich and broad literature about symbolics on which to draw for an interpretation of policy and agency acts in implementation. The common attitude toward these acts is that they may be understood as expressive acts as well as instrumental or rationalist acts, and seeing them as the former may yield greater insight, at times, into their nature and into the nature of policy implementation problems. For, to paraphrase Arnold (1935: 34), policy is "a great reservoir of emotionally important social symbols." From this point of view, we come to see politics not only as the distribution of material rewards but as the allocation and validation of such values as self-esteem and respectability, as symbolized by legislative processes and policy substances. Prohibition and Repeal, as presented by Gusfield (1963), are examples of legislation conferring and validating status to one group over another. The Israel Corporation of Community Centers (ICCC) presents implementation efforts as expressive acts -- expressing organizational identity and image on the one hand and validating social status on the other.

The ICCC is an example of an agency that was established by government policy to accomplish many broad-aim social goals. In applying to it the analytic tools of symbol, metaphor, and myth, I argue that implementation is the process of creating an organizational identity and communicating that image to others in the agency environment or policy sector. These others include actors in the
implementation process as well as its audiences. Part of the nature of symbols, metaphors, and myths is their capacity to embody multiple meanings. Part of the implementation problem is that the conveyance or making of meanings may not be shared by others -- actors or audiences -- in the policy sector. In interpreting these media of communications, people draw on their personal, social, cultural, class, professional, ethnic, organizational and other backgrounds. The fact that policy designers and implementors come from a variety of different backgrounds almost guarantees a multiplicity of meanings made of the policy, which affects its implementation.

The other aspect of ICCC policy implementation is the expression of a particular status quo. Not only does the ICCC policy validate the position of members of that status; it also sanctions the efforts and desires of those who aspire to that status and encourages others to do likewise. This is done through the use, conscious or otherwise, of symbols representing that status, in the implementation of the ICCC and its mandated social policy. The meanings which these symbols represent or which are attributed to them affect the ICCC's success in attracting participants in its programs.

As a government policy, the ICCC is not forthrightly concerned with status. In this example, status and national identity are verboten goals of the ICCC: they may not be admitted publicly. Some of the organizational myths which deflect attention from these goals also affect policy
implementation, as will be illustrated in Chapters 12 and 13.

Ways of Seeing: Rules of Evidence and Interpretation

An elephant belonging to a traveling exhibition had been stabled near a town where no elephant had been seen before. Four curious citizens, hearing of the hidden wonder, went to see if they could get a preview of it. When they arrived at the stable they found that there was no light. The investigation therefore had to be carried out in the dark.

One, touching its trunk, thought that the creature must resemble a hosepipe; the second felt an ear and concluded that it was a fan. The third, feeling a leg, could liken it only to a living pillar; and when the fourth put his hand on its back he was convinced that it was some kind of throne. None could form the complete picture; and of the part which each felt, he could only refer to it in terms of things which he already knew. The result of the expedition was confusion. Each was sure that he was right; none of the other townspeople could understand what had happened, what the investigators had actually experienced. (1)

Another facet of symbols, metaphors, and myths is their capacity to structure or focus belief. As elements of a culture, they are created by that culture, but they also perpetuate that culture. Believing in a certain way makes one see things that way; but seeing also supports belief. The loss of belief can be a shattering blow; the loss of myths can be a time of great instability for an individual or a culture. This is particularly true of myth because of its

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role, discussed in Chapter 5, in reconciling incommensurable values.

Watergate and Nixon's alleged coverup were such profoundly jarring events in American political life because they clashed with some Americans' most cherished beliefs about political behavior and leadership, expressed most clearly and fundamentally in the myth of George Washington and the cherry tree. (1) Similarly, the discovery of implementation as problematic belied other myths about the political process and bureaucracies. On the one hand, there is the desire to believe in the mechanistic, scientific qualities of administration: if executive orders are inputs, subordinates' compliance are outputs, and inputs may be adjusted to control outputs. (2) On the other hand, as Arnold (1935:222-3) said, "...the symbol of bureaucracy... owes its emotional appeal to...the necessity which Western peoples have for believing that somewhere in this world or in the next there exists a justice beyond human caprice."

Discovering the reality of both beliefs to be flawed leads to the invention of other beliefs to patch up the flaw. Hence, "implementation", a way to improve the relation of inputs to outputs or to improve bureaucratic controls. "Men plug the dikes of their most cherished beliefs with whatever

(1) Robertson's analysis of this myth (1980, pp. 11-15) presents some interesting views of Americans' expectations of their Presidents' behavior.

(2) See Landau (1972) for a discussion of mechanistic metaphors in politics.
mud they can find."

(1)

What for some is mud, for others is a little boy's thumb. If symbols and myths are products of belief, non-believers may not see the world in the same light. If symbols and myths support multiple interpretations, what can we know about the nature of policy, organization, and other events? Is the nature of symbolic interpretation all in the eye of the beholder?

From the point of view of the policy implementor, the usefulness of his acts and speeches "should be judged by their utility in expressing the ideals that the performance aims to get across the footlights." (2) This is an area where marketing research has learned much about the projection of images and about individual perception. It extends into politics through studies of communications media in conveying and creating images, to which the political consultant is the latest comer. The present study adds to this field by considering the role of symbols in policy and the effect of images and impressions on implementation. It also adds to the organizational literature in considering organizational impression management and other acts as expressive rather than rationalist or instrumental in a goal-oriented sense.


From the point of view of the policy or organizational analyst, interpretation presents a question of validity. If symbolics allows for multiple interpretations and if observation is determined by culture and/or belief, how does a second analyst judge the validity of the other's observations and interpretation? How can the latter be falsified, as an experiment might be, if observations cannot necessarily be repeated by another researcher because different beliefs focus sight in different directions? Or even if the observed events -- interviews, for instance -- could be repeated, a second researcher could interpret them differently, given the nature of symbols. If symbols, metaphors, and myths are products of belief and also perpetuate it, and observation and belief are similarly interdependent, the footholds of certain acts and objects in my mind which allow me to resonate with them -- to see them and make meaning of them -- may be absent from another's. Does this invalidate either or both sets of observations and interpretations?

Analyzing events through a symbolic frame posits the existence of multiple realities or multiple truths. (1) It is antithetical to the positivist tradition that there is one truth out there in the world surrounding the observer, who only must look in order to perceive it; and all observers looking at the same events will see and describe the same

(1) See also Klapp (1964: 250-1) and Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979: Ch. 2, esp. p. 17) on this point.
reality. A symbolic frame seeks to account for the conflicting stories told by the actors in Akutagawa's "Rashomon" and "In A Grove", when they recount different versions of the same events in which they all participated; or to explain the incongruous descriptions of the elephant told by the four blind men of the Indian tale. The researcher herself becomes one of these actors, when using symbolics as a method of analysis.

The criterion for judging the validity of a story about events has to be its coherence in the context of those events. The criterion becomes the ability of the researcher to convey the meaning he has made of events in a way that "makes sense" to his readers. The nature of symbolics allows the possibility that another researcher will "see" another part of the elephant and describe it differently; or she will participate in the same interviews, read the same agency files and news articles, work in the same setting, and give a different account of events.

The craft of the researcher in making meaning out of cultural events is in describing them as "thickly" as possible, as Geertz (1973) discussed. Thick description is not only the tool by which the researcher seeks to convey a coherent sense of observed events. The thicker the description, the more likely the researcher is to include elements which another observer might interpret differently -- even though the researcher's conceptual frame makes him selective in recording those events which make sense through
the frame. For example, in analyzing the ICCC, I have highlighted program similarities among different centers, because this illustrates the symbolic nature of that piece of policy implementation as well as the effect of society and agency myths on implementation. Although I have argued the surprising similarity across centers of programs used, there are, of course, variances among center directors in their approaches to their roles and in their use of symbols. Some are more conscious of this use; others say they want to preserve cultural variety while building a national identity. The reader will find evidence of this variance in the case story. Although I have used the story to illustrate other points, another researcher could use the same events to tell another story.

If the objective of human action is expression, then cultural analysis is an interpretive science "in search of meaning." (1) I offer this study as a contribution to that search.

Several people have aided me in my search for meaning. This study has been helped by their efforts, and they have my gratitude: David Harman, Head of Research and Planning, JDC-Israel, for throwing me the golden apple which enabled my research in agency files and interviews, and his staff, for making my sojourn comfortable; Suzann R. Thomas Buckle and Leonard G. Buckle, for steering me through the maze one step

(1) Geertz (1973), p. 5.
ahead of the minotaur; Gary Marx, for posing just one more riddle; Paul N. Ylvisaker, for guiding me twixt sky and sea; and S. D. Cook, for making the sun stand still.
Chapter Two: The Problem Reviewed

Upstairs, Downstairs

The story of implementation starts, one might say, with a definition:

im.ple.ment: to carry out: ACCOMPLISH, FULFILL...

So began Implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky's creation, published in 1973 and credited by most with opening the door to a new academic pursuit. Those who trace the history of ideas point to the failure of the Great Frontier and the Great Society's massive social programs to accomplish their intended goals as the font of implementation awareness. Kennedy's program to put a man on the moon required gargantuan doses of public moneys, administered through new bureaucracies. Within one year of JFK's inauguration, the first moon rocket was launched; eight years later, Americans walked on the moon's surface. If one could overcome such incredible odds as to propel a man into space and bring him back safely, surely such less magical tasks as eradicating poverty and providing housing could be similarly accomplished by applications of money and talent.

From policy to outcome; from conquering outer space to rockets and moon shots; from declaring War on Poverty to the Office of Economic Opportunity and Community Action Programs; from New-Towns-In-Town to housing for the working and lower classes: the academic world has divided the policy process into two realms, in its distinction between policy-making and
public administration. The former was marked by politicking and intrigue -- a "highly malleable symbolic world" (1); the latter, by routine managerial practices.

According to this point of view - the first of four (2) which describe various aspects of the literature to date - implementation is not a problem. Rather, once policy is made, it is carried out in a series of relatively straightforward, technical steps. With the focus on how decisions are made or policies formulated, implementation was simply assumed to follow - or so it seems. Thus, Ira Sharkansky wrote:

...it is the administrator who generally implements the precise statute that is enacted by the legislature or who makes the actual delivery of public service. (3)

And Thomas B. Smith:

Once a policy has been "made" by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by the policymakers. (4)


(2) Elmore (1978) proposes four organizational models which group the literature differently.


When Johnson's social policies did not produce their anticipated results in four years or in eight, critics discovered the "missing link" in the linear policy-outcome model: implementation. (1) "Policy" was already seen as the outcome of a process - "policy-making" - which involves many actors, many decision points, questions of resources, power, bargaining, and so forth. Hence, "outcome" was discovered to be the result of a process - "implementation" - entailing similar elements. "Slippage" between the intent of the policy and its outcome could now be explained in terms of one or more implementation problems. The process of realizing policy outcomes took on an academic life of its own, no longer relegated to the downstairs arena of "administrative housekeeping". (2)

Even though implementation is brought "upstairs", as it were, the assumptions of the earlier rational, linear input-output model continue to influence its conceptualization. One of these assumptions is that the concept of bureaucratic hierarchy describes reality, rather than some Weberian "ideal" type of structural form and behavior. (3) This analytic confusion of the ideal with the real led to the understanding that policy-makers give form to policy, which their underlings in the administrative hierarchy exe-

(1) The phrase is Hargrove's (1975).

(2) Ibid., p. 27.

(3) Lipsky (1978) also discusses assumptions of hierarchy in organizations, with different long-range conclusions.
cute in keeping with the formers' intent. As Herbert Simon (1945:5) wrote:

The concept of **purposiveness** involves a notion of hierarchy of decisions -- each step downward in the hierarchy consisting in an implementation of the goals set forth in the step immediately above.

Generally speaking, the assumption of hierarchical reality characterizes the second group of theories: the bureaucratic point of view. The focus, in this group of theories, is on the policymaker or chief executive: he is the one who must exert control over the system, who must manage or direct subordinates and the organization. Action flows down from the top of the hierarchical configuration. If the problem is subordinates who are not implementing policies in accordance with the intent of their superiors, the solution must be to increase the power of the superiors and/or other constraints over their subordinates' discretion, to maximize consensus regarding policy goals (organizational or governmental) and commitment to them, and minimize the possibility of intermediate discrepancies.

The issues of accountability, coordination, and control, when introduced as means to improve implementation, may be seen as the fight against unintended consequences. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), while presenting primarily a descriptive analysis focusing on the multiplicity of actors and decision points and the complexity of joint action, nevertheless prescribed solutions to aid implementation.
Policy design and implementation should be brought closer together, they wrote. Policy designers should "consider more direct means for accomplishing their desired ends." Decision points should be minimized in order to shorten delay. And policy makers should spend time ensuring that initial agreements are followed up on by the implementing agency; they should consider "stay[ing] around for the technical details of executing a program." (1)

Eugene Bardach (1977) also proposed a solution to problems of control: the "fixer", the legislator interested personally in the policy, who shepherds it through the various intermediary actors and organizational levels until it is implemented in accordance with his or the policy's intent.

One point not discussed by the most frequently cited implementation theorists is the problem of measuring implementation or even of recognizing it. Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky (1974) make a distinction between outputs and outcomes, in an effort to shed some light on that problem. They analyze the distribution of the outputs or products of school, street, and library departments and discuss the impacts of these distributions - their outcomes - on client groups. Outcomes, as they use the word, are the concern of implementation theorists. Levy et al. suggest that in order to alter outcomes, the stimuli to which bureaucrats respond

must be changed or they should be socialized, through professional education and other means, to a new awareness of the effect on citizens of their actions in distributing outputs. "Once we understand outcomes," they wrote, "there is less reason to leave them as unintended consequences." (1)

This conclusion foreshadows the later works of the street-level bureaucrat theorists. Noting the discretion of welfare workers, policemen, teachers, and other social service "deliverers" in their face-to-face interactions with agency clients, Lipsky (1979) analyzed ways in which the workers behaved in response to inadequate resources, challenges to their authority, and ambiguous role expectations. As Prottas (1979) and Weatherley (1977) substantiated, street-level bureaucrats' modifications of their behavior were often not in accord with the intent of their superiors, producing outcomes (impacts on clients) quite different from the intent expressed in the written policy. Since discretion is structured into their roles, increasing organizational control in order to limit discretion would defeat the organizational purpose of employing street-level bureaucrats.

These studies are an important departure from the top-down, hierarchical assumptions of the earlier analyses. When it comes to prescriptions for improvement, however, the desire to fight against unintended consequences remains

strong. Rather than recommend bureaucratic paths to greater accountability and control, Lipsky moves toward the role of professional education and peer pressure as workable control mechanisms. (1)

The third grouping of the implementation literature concerns conflict-consensus behavior and focuses on negotiations and bargaining or interest-group politics. The central contention of this group of theorists is that conflicts among individual and organizational actors in the implementation scheme interfere with policy execution, either by causing delays or by railroading the project entirely. Underlying most of these theories is a normative stance that conflict is bad, consensus is healthy. The prescriptions, therefore, are for means to promote consensus.

Bardach's game theory (1977) is the most straightforward example of this group. (2) His is a model of individual actors vying, through the strategies and tactics of games, to gain control over the implementation of a policy. Implementation games, Bardach wrote, are political games; fixing the game - his prescription for seeing a policy through to its implementation - is an activity for a coalition of players. Coalition-building requires negotiations and bargaining; and a coalition then becomes an interest

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(1) Conversation with Lipsky.

(2) Cited in the first group as well, he is a good example of the intertwining of theoretical assumptions and of the great normative strength of the coordination and control assumption.
group vying with other interested parties, be they individuals or groups.

Murphy's studies of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1971, 1976) and Derthick's *New-Towns-In-Town* (1972) are also representative of bargaining and interest group theories. Murphy describes the pressures and counterpressures of various groups and the ensuing cycle of delay; Derthick, bargaining through different levels of a federated government. Both represent a subgroup of the conflict-consensus assumption: since federated governments, with their competing levels of interest, generate too many problems for getting things done, how much easier it would be if we had a centralized government which could mandate decisions! (Again, note the echo of the top-down, hierarchical command-and-execute assumption.) A sentiment commonly heard on this point is, "Given the lack of centralized authority over the organizations whose activities were important to the policy, it is not surprising that implementation became a problem." (1)

Israel has been taken as an example *par excellence* of a centralized government. Fred Lazin's study (1980) of the Israeli Welfare Ministry suggests that Ministry operations are highly similar to those of a U.S. federal Department. Linkages between different governmental levels produce interest-group pressures and bargaining similar to those in a

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federated government. Apparently - and as we shall see in Chapter 3 - centralized authority does not eliminate implementation problems. (1)

Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) also present a conflict model of implementation, within their proposed theoretical framework. "The politics of implementation may be best understood as an attempt to resolve conflicts among these imperatives": (1) legal rationality, (2) mediated by bureaucrats' concern for instrumental rationality, "yet (3) informed by the knowledge that action requires internal and external consensus." They concluded:

In general, one ought to be able to expect that clear and salient nonsymbolic goals, with as little complexity as possible in the stages of implementation, a low degree of circularity among them [i.e. interdependence among legislation, guideline writing, interest group intervention, etc.], and a large amount of resources will create programs where there is a minimum of discretion, a low level of slippage, and a maximum degree of consensus. (2)

A fourth theme running through the literature, especially in its early years, is that implementation may be explained as the diffusion of innovation or knowledge, or as communications foul-ups. Bunker (1972) proposes such a

(1) Smith (1973) also discusses the role of interest groups in influencing policy implementation in the "Third World". His article is more notable, however, for his misconceptions of implementation successes in the West.

model, although he also includes elements of political processes and administrative management. Central to realizing the adoption of a new policy is the application of suasion to key leverage points throughout the headquarters-field implementing context. Requisite interaction among these levels must be supported by "facile exchange of information." (1) Some "minimum coalition of actors" is required to minimize unintended consequences. (2)

Schon (1971) also presented policy implementation as diffusion of innovation, marked by a center-periphery model where responsibility for policy definition and dissemination resides in the center, as it does at the top under the hierarchical model. In the various forms of implementation he describes, 'central' assumes that execution will follow exhortation automatically or it encorporates one or more constraints to encourage and enforce compliance. (3)

**Toward a symbolic frame**

I have presented the implementation literature according to four themes which are useful in focusing attention on

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(1) Bunker (1972), p. 78.

(2) Ibid., p. 80.

(3) The Operations Research field uses "implementation" as a technical term, in a sense not dissimilar to that of diffusion of innovation theorists. OR considers the systems consultant the "implementor"; his activity is to find ways to persuade his customers to adopt his proposed system. This definition involves elements of top-down or center-periphery persuasion of users to adopt an innovation. Failure to implement an OR system may be due to faulty communications or to unsuccessful suasion. See Siebert (1973) for a summary of this view.
different aspects of the problem. (1) The "pre-implementation" literature, whose policy-making cum administration model is of the input-output type, is conveniently characterized by the assumption that policies are routinely executed and by an assumption of intent to implement as written. (2) Both assumptions focus our attention on the expected outcomes of policies as the yardstick against which implementation will be evaluated. After the "missing link" is discovered, the routineness of policy execution is no longer assumed. However they understand the nature of the implementation problem, the next three groups of theories agree that the link needs analyzing and fixing.

The bureaucratic hierarchy model supports the assumption that policies are to be executed by subordinates on their superiors' orders. The street-level bureaucrat theories, in challenging the operations of that model, move us away from the assumption that subordinates automatically comply with agency policy. Nevertheless, they retain the assumption that implementors ought to (be made to) comply with policy intent. The emphasis on increased control, even when it is to be exerted through professional and peer loyalties, still focuses on narrowing the gap between intent and outcome.

(1) Other theoretical frameworks are: Elmore (1978); Rein and Rabinovitz (1978); Hargrove (1975); Van Meter and Van Horn (1975).

Indeed, that normative purpose - to narrow the gap between policy intent and outcome - imbues even the more descriptive bargaining and communications models with the assumption of intent to implement as written.

But what if that overriding assumption is incorrect? What if, as one policymaker connected with the 1960's American urban programs said, you have to do something, "and you realize that the stars will be in that one right constellation for only a short time, so you act fast in that moment; and then you hope that when the time comes to move on it, your boys will be in there" to carry it out...? (1)

We noted earlier the linearity inherent in implementation theories, seen in the conceptual model

\[ \text{policy} \rightarrow \text{implementation} \rightarrow \text{outcome}. \]

We should note another linearity, present in the organizational conceptions of hierarchy and diffusion:

(1) Conversation with Paul N. Ylvisaker. As Director of the Ford Foundation's Public Affairs Program, he helped create the "grey areas project," the forerunner of the Office of Economic Opportunity's Community Action Programs.
This "top-down" linearity -- which moves from the position assumed to have most power/authority with respect to controlling agency resources to those with less and less power -- is modified by the street-level bureaucrats. As implementors who shape policy, they send impulses (information, policy directives, and the like) in the opposite direction, adding a reverse arrowhead to these schemes. (1)

Other theorists have begun to modify the horizontal linear model, which pictures policy implementation as a long hallway separated into sections by a series of doors; once through a door, it swings shut, locked from both sides. The modified model introduces movement in the reverse direction. Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) called this the principle of circularity: legislation is published in the Federal Register, giving interested parties a chance to respond to new proposals. "Then interest groups and the bureaucracy responsible for implementation have an opportunity to intervene." (2)

It is not simply that implementors intervene. Different implementors interpret the same policy differently. Indeed, any attempt to implement policy -- whether by street-level bureaucrats' interpretations or others' -- affects the image

(1) See also Weatherly's (1980) "donut" model.

(2) They added: "Obviously, the more negotiation with and accommodation to the groups that are to be affected by federal guidelines, the greater the disparity between legislation and practice." Rein and Rabinovitz (1978), pp. 322 ff.
of the policy. As Berman (1978:171) wrote: "If 'n' sites adopt a project, one can expect 'n' different implemented practices." Implementation is a function of "the characteristics of each particular local delivery organization." Warwick (1979:386) also noted that implementors "...may be influenced by their social environments or they may recast these environments in important ways." (1)

A fuller picture of this series of interactions and interpretations might be:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
P_i \rightarrow I_{P_i} \rightarrow P_i' \rightarrow I' \rightarrow P_i'' \rightarrow I_{P_i''} \rightarrow \ldots \\
\end{array}
\]

where \( t = 1 \ldots n \)

- \( P_i \) = one particular policy
- \( P_i', P_i'', P_i''' \) = different interpretations of \( P_i \)
- \( I, I', I'' \) = different configurations of the implementation of \( P_i \)

All I's react to the original configuration of the policy \( P_i \) and to any revisions of it which are generated by interactions among different actors at any and all levels of

(1) Milbrey McLaughlin went so far as to say that "...adaptation should be seen as an appropriate goal for practice and policy -- not an undesirable aberration." (my emphasis) "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation," Chapter 8 in Williams and Elmore (1976:180).
the policy sector of \( P' \).

We now have two of the important features of an implementation theory: (1) many actors, interacting over (2) time. The actors exist at all different organizational levels of the implementing agency and its environment. Moreover, at any single point in time, one is likely not to see the varieties of this interaction and interpretation. Only a longitudinal study would disclose these developments.

Different groups of theories present different aspects of these two features, concentrating primarily on various configurations of actors. Central to the diffusion of innovation model is the notion that there exist different levels within a policy system, each of which is a key actor in the implementation of policy. The interest-group politics model suggests a multiplicity of actors, but does not direct attention toward a diversity of points of view within each group. The federalist model is particularly limiting in this regard, focusing as it does on different levels of government alone. The bureaucratic hierarchy commits the inverse sin: it suggests potential disagreements within an organization, but does not direct attention to interagency relations or to other actors in the organizational environment. Berman (1978:165) lists the following actors in a policy sector: "governments, bureaucracies, courts, public and private interest groups, local delivery systems, clients, and individual actors." Depending on the particular policy under scrutiny, we might add others to that list, but the important
point is the multiplicity of actors - individual and organizational - who are party to a policy implementation scenario. It has been suggested that implementation problems will be found in broad-aim social policies, and most implementation cases portray broad-aim programs. However, as we acquire more experience, it becomes clearer that implementation problems also accrue to programs with more narrow mandates. Therefore, I will not claim this to be an essential feature of implementation theory.

So far, I have challenged the characteristic of linearity underlying most theories, by questioning the assumptions of routine hierarchical implementation and compartmentalization of the policy process. These are often described as elements of a rational, scientist view of planning and decision-making, a view which focuses on outcomes and goals as the raison d'etre of policy and organizational existence.

A re-iterative model of policy implementation makes a focus on outcomes problematic, for what shall we call the outcome when we evaluate implementation: I, I', I",...I^n? Shall we stop arbitrarily at some point in time and take that "I_t" as the object of our evaluation? The War on Poverty did not eradicate poverty, but for five years or so - in fact, until the dawning recognition (among certain authors) of implementation as a problem - many legislators felt they were accomplishing something, many poor people felt that their salvation was in sight, and many middle-class people were
relieved of the fear of assault by poor rioters. (1) Which one of these was the outcome of that set of policies?; or choosing one, how do we explain the other?; or what sense do we make of the impact of this policy group on the rest of the world or on American politics and social policy at some future time? Perhaps the Reagan Administration could be taken as an outcome of the War on Poverty, 20 years and 5 Presidencies later?

One resolution to the problem of defining outcomes would be to redefine the problem; that is, to construct a model of implementation where a single outcome is not of primary essence. We could either say that outcomes are not important at all, or that all outcomes are of importance. A symbolic theory, which is not based on assumptions of rationality, does just that.

Returning once again to our iterative model, we ask how interpretations of policies occur. How do we explain that the same policy, P_k, takes many forms as does I_{P_k}? The answer I propose is that policies entail symbols, metaphors, and myths; and interpretation of policy is possible - indeed, is done - through an interpretation of these symbolic elements. The interpretive, iterative model may be rewritten, for all P and I in general, as:

(1) See Piven and Cloward (1977) for their analysis of this phenomenon.
where the process is continued over time. That is, the process of policy making and implementation is mediated by beliefs and values, which we may see in their concrete form in symbols, metaphors, and myths.

I will use a case study to illustrate such a symbolic theory and to help develop the theory. As mentioned earlier, case studies are the *lingua franca* of the implementation literature. Like them, this case involves many actors and many organizational and policy levels. From the central government with its different departments or ministries and agencies, to their regional and local counterparts, local elected governments, the implementing agency in its central headquarters and its local delivering agencies, other public and private organizations, interested individuals, consultants, international and local foundations, client citizens and concerned publics. The story told is of the formative years and first decade of operations of the Israel Corporation of Community Centers, a program intended to accomplish many varied social goals. In reporting this case, I have chosen to portray the "seamless web" between policy and implementation in order to highlight the patterns of image and meaning created by symbols and myths at work and
play.

Before telling the story, I will present some elements of a symbolic theory of policy implementation, which will be used in analyzing the case.
Part 2. Tools of Analysis

Introduction

While "symbolics" is a convenient name by which to refer to the symbolic lens or frame of analysis, symbols are not the only conceptual tools used. Symbolics also includes the study of metaphors, myths, rituals, ceremonies, stories, accounts, and other elements of individual, organizational, and policy behavior. The present study is concerned primarily with symbols, metaphors, and myths, and secondarily with rituals, as analytic tools. The three chapters which follow present some definitions and concepts of these four media of communication -- for we are concerned with the conveyance of meaning and the making of meaning -- that is, interpretation -- through the vehicles by which it is conveyed. In each chapter I present the traditional context in which each term has been used and then discuss its use in a policy context. Once we share an appreciation for the tools of symbolics, it will be easier to apply this lens to a reading of the case study, which follows in Part 3.
Chapter Three. Symbols: Some Definitions and Concepts

Picture a Symbol

symbol (simb'l), n. [...Gr. symbolon, token, pledge, sign by which one infers a thing; symballein < to throw together,...]

1. something that stands for or represents another thing; especially, an object used to represent something abstract; emblem: as, the dove is a symbol of peace, the cross is the symbol of Christianity.


Symbols, signs, objects, and meanings have been discussed and defined many times in the literature of philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, and literary and art criticism. (1) The debates have a long history and doubtless will continue. I will not attempt a definitive statement here, nor even a grand synthesis. For the purposes of this paper, I will make several propositions about the nature of symbols and their meanings. These should serve as a basis for understanding the role of symbols in policy implementation.

A symbol is something that represents some other

(1) The reader may find such discussions in the works of the following authors, listed in the bibliography: Campbell, Cassirer, Eliade, Langer, Ortony, Warner, Wheelwright.
thing(s). The symbol is most often used to represent abstract concepts: the dove is a symbol of peace. The symbol is a social convention: it is an object which people have agreed on as the stand-in for the sense it conveys. Thus, a symbol is public - it is shared by many; and it is historically and culturally specific - at another time or in another place, the object may represent other things or it may not be a symbol at all. The dove in another context may be simply a greyish white bird.

A symbol may convey several meanings: a house represents security, status, wealth, shelter. A house may not mean all these things to everyone; but in the aggregate, analytically, the symbol represents more than one concept. This distinguishes it from a sign, which has only one meaning and which requires a response. As Langer (1957) wrote:

symbols represent, signs indicate;
symbols represent thought, signs indicate action. (1)

Whether an object remains itself or becomes a sign or a symbol depends on its context. A swastika in Europe or America today represents the Nazi Party; it also is a symbol of the Third Reich, of Hitler's racial theories and Aryan supremacy, and of much more. In a mail-sorting room of a university, however, the swastika over a mail slot is a sign for the mail sorter to put envelopes addressed to the Neo-Nazi Party in that slot. In the first case, the figure

(1) Langer (1957), pp. 30-1, 63.
represents an ideology and recalls events associated with that ideology. In the second, the graphic indicates a certain action required of the mail sorter. (1)

The power of symbols is in their potential to convey multiple meanings. There is a figure which is an ancient Buddhist symbol, representing a fixed center around which all moves. Wheelwright (1968:129) likens it to a wheel rotating around the sun. It looks like this:

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Recently, the resident monk hung this symbol in the prayer room of the Allston Zen Center. The practitioners in the Center removed it soon after, because several people said it looked like the Nazi swastika, and the Buddhists didn't want to convey that impression to anyone. (2)

I said above that the symbol is public. (3) To paraphrase Joseph Campbell, private symbols are the stuff of dreams. As Leach (1976:11) wrote: "A private symbol generated in a dream or in a poem... will fail to convey information to others until it has been explained by other means. ... [C]onventions can only be understood if they are

(1) S. D. Cook suggested the second example.
(2) Conversation with Jon Yanow.
(3) This also is the subject of a debate which will not be recorded here. See Firth (1973).
familiar." If a symbol is used to convey meaning, then by definition it is not an individual activity. If meanings are assigned to objects by convention, then symbols are an activity of social groups. Warner (1959) wrote: "Each society possesses its special system of meanings.... Each culture has its own sounds, noises, and silences which arouse the attention of its members and have agreed upon significance." (1) Interest groups are symbol-sharing groups, he wrote. Some symbols create a sense of belonging to a larger whole, as in Memorial Day celebrations uniting different ethnic groups in planning the festivities. Other symbols emphasize distinctions between groups, as in sectarian church activities. (2) In other words, when symbols are shared by a group, they serve to set the members of that group apart from other people or groups which do not share those symbols. At the same time, the symbols serve to unite all those who do share them.

From this we derive a definition of community which will be useful in the later discussion of policy implementation. A community is a group of people who respond similarly to the same symbols — that is, who share a set of symbols and their meanings. Gottschalk (1975:13-14) illustrates this point: "A

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(1) Warner (1959), pp. 454-5. E. T. Hall (1959, 1966) reports on physical behaviors -- facial expressions, gesticulations, stances, and so forth -- which are culturally determined and which demarcate lines of social belonging and separation.

(2) Warner (1959), Chapter 7.
proper name, shared tradition, common stigmas, or ritually valued possessions provide the basis for the integration of communal organizations. ...Symbolic ties of blood bind a clan. An exalted name, a flag, and shared heroic memories are the kind of images that bind a nation."

Knowing these names, traditions, and other symbols is important itself as a symbol of membership. "Not to know them is not to belong," wrote Hunter (1974:67), adding that "the peculiarities of intonation and connotation" allow for the simultaneous existence of individual yet shared experience." In this respect, organizations are similar to communities. An organization defined by a strong saga -- a story embodying names, traditions, heroics, and so forth -- turns its membership into a community, "even a cult." (1)

Symbols are neither true nor false. Their essence lies in the meanings they convey and in their interpretation. Since a symbol conveys multiple meanings, different communities or different individuals may interpret the same symbol differently. In terms of intentional communication, the meaning that one person intends to convey through the use of a symbol may not be the meaning understood by his partner in the event. The Buddhist monk and his swastika-like figure are a good example of such different meanings.

Put differently, the abstract concepts which a symbol represents are the values which a community shares. The

(1) Clark (1972), p. 183. Tupperware would be a good example of such an organization. See Kaible (n.d.).
community of Americans values the concepts of "liberty", "freedom", "justice for all", "equality"; these concepts are represented by the American flag. Reverence for the flag unites many groups of people who have different ethnic or religious affiliations; but it also separates them from people who revere other flags. By referring to symbols, which are concrete objects (or processes with concrete outcomes or goals), we may find a useful way of talking about values, which are abstract. By interpreting the symbols, we strive to understand their intended meanings and their value bases. The symbols come to be evidence of the values that an individual or a community believes in and practices. Klapp (1964:16) relates an anecdote which illustrates culturally differentiated values that may accrue to the same symbolic object. Franklin Delano Roosevelt would hide a row of emptied cocktail glasses behind the flower vases on banquet tables, while Josef Stalin, at his banquets, would openly drink many small glasses of sauterne, pretending it were vodka.

It is, therefore, the interpretation that can be more accurate or less accurate, according to the degree to which it matches the intent of the communicator. For the actors in an event, this match or mismatch is crucial to clear communication. To the observer, it is crucial to understanding. To the organizational or policy analyst, the situation becomes like Geertz' anthropology: "not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one
in search of meaning." (1) The recounting of a policy implementation event becomes a "thick description"; its analysis, an interpretation of meanings made, which the analyst "reads" in the layers of the event recounted.

Symbolic Policies: Substantive Symbols

What does it mean to say that a policy is symbolic or behaves symbolically? A policy may function as a symbol in two ways, by virtue of its substantive elements or by virtue of the process of its enactment. In the first case, the remedies or actions proposed by the policy - housing, for instance, or jobs, or a minimum wage - may constitute symbols: they may be the objects which represent abstract concepts. For example, housing allowance programs may allocate money to families below a specified income level to enable them to buy or rent housing on the open market. "Housing" connotes a physical structure, a shelter, a roof over one's head. Symbolically, in American culture today, home ownership or the head-of-household's ability to provide shelter represents certain values usually ascribed to the middle class, described variously as "mowing the lawn on Sunday afternoons" or "a chicken in every pot, a car in every garage." To some, "home ownership" means the kind of stability referred to by one journalist as possessing one's own plumber's snake and post-hole digger. (2) The fact of

(1) Geertz (1973), p. 5.

homeownership in contemporary American society represents more than a statement of relative wealth and financial security. Home ownership as a symbol has come to represent a congeries of attitudes and behaviors which we call upwardly mobile and itemize as acquisitiveness ('keeping up with the Joneses'), conspicuous consumption, deferred gratification ('saving for a rainy day' or "the Protestant ethic"), and so forth. (1)

Warner (1959) describes the symbolic importance of home ownership and appurtenances at length.

The decor, furnishings, paintings and their arrangements...are all symbolic objects ... which refer to the manners and morals...and express the significance of the people and their way of life... [; they] also evoke and maintain in people sentiments about who they are and what they must do to retain their superior images of themselves and keep before them an interesting and justifying vision of the superiority of their world.

The presence...of objects of art provide[s] a permanent mirror of superiority into which the upper classes can look and always see what they believe to be their own excellence....

Architecture and landscaping do the same things externally. Describing a long row of fine, old elm trees "bordering Hill Street to form a great canopy stretching for miles along that broad avenue," Warner wrote:

...their age and the agreeable and historic style of most of the houses give eloquent testimony that good form, good breeding, and a proper ritualistic consumption of wealth have been and are being maintained by the families who have lived there for generations.

Moreover, he wrote, lower-upper or new families without lineage buy these houses, thereby exerting a claim to receive the recognition accruing to other owners. Such purchase is a statement of economic position and wealth, as well as that the family is able and knows how to live according to a certain style (not to mention the public recognition of the eminence and desirability of that style). A "good house" can be used to transform money into a claim to status; but only the proper manner and form of its use can change the claim into actually achieved status. (1).

But why is this important for social policies? A housing allowance program, for example, which offers one the means to acquire a house, is also, by invoking a symbol which represents one or more abstractions, offering one the means to acquire a middle class existence. Buy a house, buy a home, a pot, a chicken, a garage, a car, 2.5 children, a dog, and a cat. The substantive item promoted by the policy brings with it the cultural values which it connotes, when it is also a symbol representing abstractions.

This may sound somewhat like a sales pitch from

advertising headquarters on Madison Avenue: "Buy a house, get 2 chickens and a dog for free!" There is a connection, but we will have to stray a bit afield before we can complete it.

(1)

John Berger (1972) characterizes the traditional European oil painting of the years 1500 - 1900 as presenting items of possible purchase, sights equivalent to what the collector already possessed. Advertisements, he argues, those cast in the vernacular of art, as well as those which "quote" specific paintings, present to some prospective buyer the possibility of possession along with associated cultural values. For example, the Ford Granada pictured against the background of an English country estate suggests that purchase of that particular automobile will bring its owner the grandeur and style of the landed gentry. The symbols infer the gap between what the person owns and what he or she would like to own, the gap between the person's actual self-image and his or her desired self-image.

The more general or less defined the background, the more powerful the symbol, because the range of possible value referents and interpretations is so broad and unspecified. Behind the Granada one might instead draw the Sphinx or the Taj Mahal or the Rocky Mountains or the White House, depending on the desired image the ad-man wants to invoke. When no image is filled in, the viewer creates his own image.

(1) Patai (1972) treats the symbolic/mythic elements of Madison Avenue in Chapter 17.
according to the value repertoire of "automobile: Ford: Granada" in his culture.

A housing policy is like the Granada ad. but it leaves its background general and vague. That shadow must be filled in within a particular cultural context. This apposition between the Madison Avenue account executive and the policy designer raises useful questions about the intentions of the policy designer in choosing one program over another, if policies are indeed symbolic in the way that I have suggested. What was the design intention of Kennedy's space program or of the Peace Corps? Did they indicate gaps between actual present and desired future self-image? How does this point of view help explain their implementation?

The analogy with Madison Avenue raises the question of policy audiences. This is addressed in the next section as we consider the symbolic meanings of legislative processes.

Symbolic Policies: Processual Symbols

A policy may function symbolically not through its substance but through its enactment. The very process by which a policy is drafted and legislated is a symbol which represents "democracy." As an abstraction, democracy embodies many ideals: equality, freedom, popular representation in decision-making, and so forth. In general, as a people, Americans believe strongly and faith-fully in democracy. But at least one difficulty with such an abstraction is that its meanings are usually not perceptible, except under conditions of external threat or internal
dissent. Under attack, in times of foreign war, civil war or "cold war", "democracy" becomes concrete as it is contrasted against the threatening entity's abstraction. Thus, Iran's hostage-holding and the USSR's Afghanistan invasion reminded Americans of their faith in democracy and made the elements of that democracy less abstract and more tangible by contrast with "revolutionary Islam" or "Communist expansion." As the Moral Majority and other groups of the extreme American right wrap themselves in symbols of democracy, their opponents on the progressive left invoke the same symbols to argue their interpretation of democracy. It is such a strongly held belief or value that the Soviet Union, Iran, and other totalitarian regimes claim to hold "democratic" elections and to be "democratic" states.

In times of relative peace, where there are not such dramatic threats without our borders that would concretize "democracy", we must find ways to illustrate the abstraction in order to renew our faith in its existence, to reassure ourselves that it has not disappeared. The activities which we have come to call collectively "the policy-making process" provide us with one way to do that. We are taught in grade school that true democracy is a representational system whereby the legislators execute the will of the people: "of, by, and for the people," we write in our Constitution and teach our children. "One man, one vote," we declare as we seek to register those who have been systematically ignored or repressed in years past. The opportunity to vote for
one's *choice* among candidates gives us one activity by which we see democracy, participate in it, and renew our faith in it and in "the American way".

In civics classes in high school we learn about party platforms and planks; as teachers, we teach that one votes for the program, not the personality. The civics books would have us believe that as voters we elect to office that person who will most embody what we believe in, present our best interests, and work for legislation that protects these beliefs and interests. When a policy is legislated, we see that legislative process -- the hours and days of drafting, negotiating, bargaining, buttonholing, managing, in short, that "dance of legislation" -- as a concrete example that "democracy" exists and that it works the way we knew it should. The forms of legislature are reassuring, as Edelman (1964) wrote. That dance becomes a symbol of "democracy." For example, the government's decision to restrain the TVA from completing its dam in order to protect the snail darter from extinction might have indicated to conservationists and other special interest groups, on a symbolic level, that "democracy works." The message sent is that "government" is indeed responsive to the needs and demands of its citizens, and "powerless citizens" can organize to defeat "powerful corporations" in the American way because our democracy is truly representational. Thurman Arnold (1935) posits that the American poor don't revolt because they believe in democracy and want their faith reaffirmed. Lipsky (1970) and
Lipsky and Olsen (1977) demonstrated the connection between protest, reference publics, and reassurance. Lipsky wrote that such symbolic occasions as ribbon cutting and walking-tour press conferences are also used to "satisfy agency reference publics that attention is being directed to problems of civic concern." While government responses reassure protest groups, they also "contribute to reducing the anxiety level of organized interests and wider publics..." not directly concerned with the policy in question. (1)

An interesting example of the symbolic importance of legislative action is presented by Joseph Gusfield (1963) in his interpretation of the American Temperance movement. He presents the Abolitionist movement, which began in 1826 and led up to Prohibition (the 18th Amendment) and afterwards to its repeal, as a conflict between two status groups. At first, Drys were the old established Federalist aristocracy and their Calvinist church leadership: "the rich, the well-educated, and the wellborn of the Eastern seaboard." The Wets were the Jeffersonia-Jacksonians, the independent farmers and the artisans. Temperance, according to Gusfield, was "a means by which a declining status group attempted to maintain social control." The movement was oriented toward "the reform of others below the status and economic level" of its members, "whose own codes of moderate drinking were made

models for the lives of the souls who had not yet achieved perfection." (1)

In its second phase, the Temperance movement "became a sign of middle-class respectability..., freed of the symbols of aristocratic dominance and converted into a popular movement to achieve self-perfection among the middle and lower classes of the nation." The new Drys were the native, rural, Protestant Americans; the Wets were the immigrant, urban, Catholic lower classes. While the Drys were certain of their dominant social and cultural position, they adopted an assimilative attitude toward the Wets: they "assumed that the drinkers should be converted to the model of life of the middle-class, respectable citizen." They also assumed that the lower classes agreed with them. (2) However, once the Drys perceived that the dominant position of their lifestyle was threatened, they adopted a coercive posture toward drinking and drinkers. Through legislative politics, they attempted to quiet "the fear that the abstainer's culture was not really the criterion by which respectability was judged in the dominant areas of the total society." (3) Public affirmation of Dry norms -- the ratification of the Prohibition amendment -- was a sign of the power and prestige and, hence, dominance of those norms, even though

(1) Gusfield (1963), pp. 39, 40, 42.
(2) Ibid., pp. 44, 82, 85.
(3) Ibid., p. 110.
enforcement of those norms was problematic. Gusfield wrote: "Even if the Law is not enforced or enforceable, the symbolic import of its passage is important to the reformer." (1) Not only is public affirmation through governmental legislation a positive statement of the worth of a particular subculture vis-à-vis others in that society — and, hence, significant for the status of that group; it also directs attention toward institutional support of those norms and away from their violation. (2)

Gusfield argues that the public actions of government grant legitimacy to one culture or status group in society over another. Repeal of the 18th Amendment was significant in that it symbolized the losses of status and prestige of one group in American society due to the removal of public, national endorsement of its norms. Gusfield wrote: "The public and visible nature of governmental acts provides them with wider consequences for other institutions than is true of any other area of social life. The actions of government can affect the tangible resources of citizens but they can also affect the attitudes, opinions, and judgments which people make about each other." (3)

The power of the legislative act or process to influence people's feelings and behavior, to cause them to degrade or

(1) Ibid., p. 4.
(2) Ibid., p. 116.
(3) Ibid., pp. 148, 168.
to defer to other people, is an example of what I have called the processual symbolism of politics. It is the legislative act, rather than the policy content, which symbolizes such abstractions as social approbation, democracy, and so forth. This is not to say that such policies may not also be symbolic by virtue of their substance. To the extent that abstaining from and later indulging in drink came to represent social status values, Prohibition and Repeal were also substantively symbolic.

The Potential Audiences of Policy Symbols

A policy has symbolic potential, as substance or process, for three audiences: (1) the groups "targeted" by the policy -- those on whose behalf the policy proposes to do something; (2) one or more other groups who are not explicitly designated by the policy as direct beneficiaries but who have some vested interest in its outcome -- the general reference groups of that policy's sector; (3) the drafters legislators, and implementors of the policy.

For example, America's community action programs (CAPs) of the 1960's, which offered community development funds to local neighborhoods across the country, might be seen as symbolic for the poor because the substance of the policy -- funds, or jobs, or the opportunity to control the local environment -- represented, for them, some other thing, some abstraction such as "landed gentry style of life." Or, in the event that a particular target group of poor had been vocal in opposition to prior government policy and might see
the CAP as a response to their protests, the legislation of
the policy might be symbolic in representing government's
response to its citizens, thereby reaffirming their faith in
American democracy.

Those not targeted by the policy, who have some interest
in its outcome -- those I have called the policy sector's
reference group -- want to be reassured that the social
changes proposed by the policy will not affect their security
and standing in society. The "general public" -- so-called
society-at-large -- share the same interest. Since their
point of view is different from that of the target group,
their interpretations of the policy -- the meanings they
attach to its symbols -- may be and often are different. The
middle class, for instance, might search in the substance of
the policy for a symbol that will reassure them that their
way of life is best and that the poor are being encouraged to
become "more like us." Such reassurance is all the more
important in a situation where they also understand the
legislative act symbolically as a reaffirmation of democratic
faith but benefitting the underdog. Such processual
symbolism -- "government is responding to the pressures and
protests of the poor" -- may be powerfully threatening to the
non-poor; but the symbolic meaning of a program which is seen
to promote a familiar life-style may have a calming effect on
threatened middle and/or upper classes.

For those drafting, legislating, and implementing
policies, the symbol lies in their acts as occupants of
those roles. Along with a mandate to govern or a job as legislative aide, a person accepts the ability to accomplish, to get things done, as a concomitant role trait. The legislative act is the symbolic representation of the ability to change the world (hopefully, for the better). The program substance is the vehicle which will foster that improvement; housing, jobs, and so forth become symbolic of a better way of life. The policy designer is, in this example, much like that executive ad-man presented earlier. His Granada is a tax rebate or a social security check; his mansion, the American way of life or the ability to acquire it, vague and open to interpretation because the backdrop of the policy is not sketched out.

**Differential Interpretation: Different Strokes for Different Folks**

The designer, however, is still a member of the potential audience of policy symbols, along with the designated beneficiaries of the policy and its general reference group. I have used the example of a housing policy to illustrate the possible meanings conveyed by a house, a home, and ownership thereof, which meanings are transmitted by the symbol in the policy, even though they are not written out in the policy. I have also proposed that the legislative process itself may be fraught with meanings beyond the text recorded in the *Federal Register*. The story is even more complex. These meanings may be transmitted but not received; or they may be not transmitted consciously or intentionally but perceived; or they may be transmitted but interpreted
differently by different people or groups of people. To illustrate the latter point, let us take another housing example, although this event is tangential to the context of policy.

In *Rubbish Theory* (1979), Michael Thompson discusses, among other things, the assignation of positive value to some things that others would consign to the rubbish heap. In one case, he draws on his experience as a North London carpenter "transforming delapidated early Victorian artisans' cottages into trendy residences for *Observer* journalists." A particular street of Georgian row houses was condemned, despite the opposition of a largely middle-class group. The latter claimed that the houses were structurally sound, architecturally and environmentally valuable, in need only of modernization. The Housing minister declared: "'These rat-infested slums must be demolished. Old terraced houses may have a certain snob appeal to members of the middle-class but they are not suitable accommodation for working-class tenants.'" (1) Mr. Thompson observes that the same structure thus falls into two different cultural categories according to its type of occupant, depending on the interpretation of the viewer — in this case (a) the Minister, (b) the current tenants, and (c) the would-be renovators. That is, one man's Georgian castle is another's rubbish heap.

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(1) Thompson (1979), pp. 34, 35.
Saying that different cultures or communities may interpret the same symbol differently raises the question of "blindness". That is, can something be a symbol to one group and a non-symbol to another group? Can a symbol for one group be invisible to another group? Thompson mentions two kinds of blindness: the one, toward things we cannot see because our world-view directs our attention elsewhere; the other, toward things we conspire not to see. (1) An invisible object may become visible as the result of a confrontation between opposing world views. But a visible object may be relegated to the realm of blindness by "conspiracy" -- i.e. intention -- if it cannot be accommodated in one's prevailing world view and one is reluctant to change that view.

Jacques Cousteau, the deep-sea explorer, lowered two submarines into Lake Titicaca (between Bolivia and Peru) a few years ago. The local Inca believed the Lake to be bottomless. Their ancestors, they believed, flung their treasures into its depths to save them from the Spaniards. Cousteau found the Lake to be a few hundred meters deep and devoid of artifacts. (2)

The Incas' response to Cousteau's discovery is not reported. One could imagine that the symbols and legends

(1) Ibid., p. 88. This latter is Thompson's rubbish category, which he describes and develops in his book.

would be strong enough to refute modern science; the Incas would be blind to Cousteau's findings. Or they could create an account to make possible the existence of Cousteau's findings with their beliefs, "conspiring" not to see the implications of his discoveries. We could also imagine Cousteau's news eventually replacing the old order of legend.

What of Cousteau's blindness to the reality of the legends? We could speculate that his world view did not change to accommodate the Inca story, that he remained "blind" or relegated the newly visible to the realm of the invisible.

In summary, borrowing from the dramaturgical approach to social relations, we may say that "audiences are different on account of their cultures and places in the social structure. ...These cultural and structural elements...may be both instruments of and ... obstacles" to the universal understanding of human drama, because of the relative specificity of symbols. (1) To overcome the obstacles which symbols pose, a drama, a policy or a legislative act must resonate with the values of several cultures. Klapp presents the Sacco and Venzetti case as an example of such overriding symbols. It "could never have become a cause célèbre if its interests had been confined to people with special group biases. Within two years it lost its 'ethnic-radical' complexion and involved thousands who had no special reason

to be identified with Italian anarchists." (1)

Status Symbols, Fads, and Organizational Learning

Symbols associated with status have a life cycle of limited duration. Development economics is full of examples of symbols "becoming" and passing out of fashion. Levis, cassette recorders, and digital watches have been, at various points in time, most desirable items of trade in black markets from Ghana to Israel to the USSR. Why have these and other items commanded such high prices, far greater than their intrinsic worth? Because of their symbolic value: they represent a gestalt, a culture, a way of life which has been identified as highly desirable. At an earlier point in time it was an O-level exam, a degree from Oxford, and mid-afternoon tea. These have been replaced, by and large, by American-accented English, Coca-cola, and a Harvard degree. Segre (1980:75-6) discusses the phenomenon of these

...symbols of class distinction or power, like motor cars, foreign fashions or domestic gadgets, which at first are the privileges of the rich and with time become the possessions of the poor. Here prestige is associated with goods purchased, not persons buying them. The result is ... the illusion of social upward mobility.... It is a source of frustration and a cause of permanent resentment on the part of the ordinary people towards the elites.

Cadillacs and television antenneae have been such symbols for America's poor. Many a social worker criticized his client's

(1) Ibid., p. 172.
purchase of such items, not recognizing in them symbols of aspiration to the same status the social worker was promoting via proper food, clothing, home, cleanliness, and an education.

Gusfield (1963) and Thompson (1979) each seem to suggest that the creation of status-related symbols begins with an acceptance of certain lifestyles as worthy of emulation. Imitation is not only a way to appear to pertain to a desired status. One way to imitate is to isolate the characteristic symbols of the target group and to copy them, as Segre describes. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is the American expression of this phenomenon, as seen in the suburbs, America's recently trodden pathway from urban poverty to countried gentry. Lately, that road has turned back toward the city. Hence, the "gentrification" of urban neighborhoods, described by Thompson in his stories of Georgian townhouses in North London and by others. elsewhere.

The desire in American and other societies (those, perhaps, which have been "Westernized" or Americanized) to acquire status or to emulate it in order to give the illusion of having "arrived" seems to be firmly entrenched. Even the "children of the 60's" who rejected the symbols associated with their parents' status developed another status hierarchy with its own array of symbols. In effect, if not in intent, policy designers create, in policies, symbols of an accepted hierarchy of social dominance, telling the have-nots what they need and how to acquire it, and reassuring the arrivées
that their position is secure.

Why is upward mobility so compelling? Does the policy designer also create the need to move in the direction of a higher status self-image, as he creates the path of advance and the symbols necessary to arrive? The answers to these questions, if any indeed exist, lie far beyond the scope of this research. A hint, though, is given in Shils' (1961) and Geertz' (1977) discussions of societal centers and the symbolics of power. The animating centers of society -- the non-geographic "point or points in a society where its leading ideas come together with its leading institutions to create an arena in which the events that most vitally affect its members' lives take place" -- justify their existence through the use of symbols inherited or invented. (1) The ability to invoke these symbols -- to acquire them, use them, refer to them -- creates the appearance of being near the center. To the extent that people feel the need to be part of the center, they will adopt its symbols. While they may not be able to attain elite status, people near the periphery may create the illusion for themselves and for others that they are not so far removed from "where it's at." And, as Warner (1959) pointed out, the proper use or display of these symbols must be made in order to validate the claim of proximity to the center.

If elites at the animating centers invent symbols which

trickle down to and are adopted or acquired by non-elites at society's periphery, then the elites must be continuously re-inventing new symbols in order to perpetuate their place at the center. This cyclical invention and adoption may explain the faddism or fashionability of ideas and items. Moreover, if the center is the locus of leading institutions as well as individuals, the adoption and perpetuation of symbols may be part of an organizational learning process. Institutions, especially those organized with a central headquarters and field-based operations, may help in the spread of new ideas and new symbols. Some organizations, like Tupperware or Amway, thrive by creating a set or sets of symbols which are repeated at organizational gatherings at regular intervals. (1) These rituals serve to promote and strengthen the cohesiveness of organization members. Rituals address the problem that symbols may be variously interpreted by organizational members who belong to other communities with possibly other value bases, such as professionals. Rituals and ceremonies are one way in which institutions perpetuate symbols.

Will elites always reveal their symbols? Lasswell et al. (1952:21) suggest not, in a discussion of societal "attention frames," defined as "doctrinal symbols of the self and others." They wrote: "...when the controlling elite expects that the disclosure of its own information and

(1) See Kaible (n.d.).
interpretations will endanger its power position, the elite will not share its own attention frame" with the rank and file.

Symbols and Implementation

Let us draw out of the preceding discussion a few general points about the role of symbols in policy implementation. These will be useful as points of view in reading the case in the following chapter. They will be elaborated in the case analysis.

1. The power of a symbol

It has often been maintained that one of the problems in implementing policies derives from their vague, ambiguous language. If the policy does not specify parameters, how can it be turned into a program and executed "properly"? It has also been pointed out, however, that this cloud has a silver lining. Since legislation often entails negotiation among opposing factions, ambiguous language allows everyone to be happy since it obscures the point(s) of conflict. That is, ambiguous language is the result of interest group politics.

Herein lies the power of the symbol, in that it permits multiple interpretations. As we saw in North London, one man's rat-infested slum is another man's decorator townhouse. The Democrat's bill to aid the poor is the Republican's end to American economic hegemony. We may say that the more interpretations suggested, the more powerful the symbol. In
policies, the powerful symbol expands the range of possible interpretations and, therefore, of ways of implementation. If the symbol is the concrete expression of (abstract) values, then symbolic policies will be interpreted and implemented in accordance with a wide range of values.

2. The power of communities

If policymakers and implementors belong to different communities (sharing different values and responding differently to the same symbol), then implementation is likely to be different from intent; and neither form may be compatible with the local citizens' interpretation of the same policy, if they constitute yet a third community. Multiply this by the numbers of different implementing entities -- national, regional, and local; elected and voluntary; citizen-target and citizen-observer -- and one multiplies the number of possible interpretations of a single symbol, estimating the magnitude of implementation problems. It is not only that the large number of decision points creates complexity of joint action as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argued; but that any amount of decision points allows for the possibility of different meanings and, hence, different actions.

3. Evaluation

That symbolic policies allow for multiple interpretations which create implementation havoc is not
negative only. A positive aspect is the power of symbolic policies to affirm and reassure (1) that the needs of people are being attended, (2) that these needs and demands for government response are justified, (3) that there is hope for change, (4) that the security of established interests is not in jeopardy. In the temperance case, Prohibition reaffirmed the rural Protestant that his norms were right and that his social position was not threatened. It offered the urban, Catholic lower class a pathway to upward mobility. Repeal attested to the dominance of a new middle class, where drinking was socially desirable. It confirmed their status, while indicating the demise of the other group's predominance.

Evaluations often criticize policies for what they haven't done, without recognizing their accomplishments. The implementation of a policy may not achieve many things set down in the Federal Register, but it may accomplish other ends by addressing symbolically, in substance or in process, the concerns of many constituent groups. To judge the implementation a failure is to condemn it too harshly. We must also evaluate what a policy has accomplished. Implementation in its traditional meaning and study serves to direct our attention away from necessary and meaningful activities of our policy processes.

4. **Implementation participants**

Existing implementation studies focus on the roles of
federal policy-makers and local and regional officials in giving form to policy. If we accept street-level bureaucrats as responsible also for modifying the shape of policies as they carry them out, then we have enlarged the focus of the study. A symbolic interpretation of policy implementation allows us to broaden the scope even more, since it admits the general public and the policy's target group as potential audiences and interpreters of the policy. Especially in policies which are built on some form of citizen participation -- Community Action Programs, for example -- interpretation is linked to some action which is crucial to the policy's implementation. Without clients, an organization could not perform its mandated activities. When the clientele is not captive and has a choice in responding, symbols and their interpretation are crucial to policy implementation.

Some Caveats

It is unfortunate that in common contemporary parlance, "symbolic" has taken on pejorative meanings. To say that a policy was symbolic is, today, almost synonymous with saying that it was a "token" gesture, devoid of "real meaning". This implies "deception", on the one hand -- as in "Congress passed symbolic legislation with the intent to deceive us into thinking something would really happen" -- or "cosmetics", on the other -- as in "The symbolic policy only offered cosmetic changes but didn't really get down to the
nitty-gritty problems of things."

Certainly one may say that some policies are only superficial in their proposed remedies, but not all symbolic policies are cosmetic. The effect or outcome of a symbolic policy may be judged as token, if there is no follow-through promoting substantive change, but not all symbolic policies are used as token gestures. To say that a policy is symbolic is not to say that it was not intended to be enacted. The attribution of intentional manipulation of symbols is difficult to confirm and adds little to our understanding of the facts of symbol usage. If the consequence of such usage is to create an atmosphere of distrust by fostering a sense of intentional deception, the policy has failed symbolically. Perhaps the policy-maker chose a weak symbol or he was not consciously aware of the role of symbols in policymaking and erred.

In the present analysis, "symbolic policy" is used without intentional emotional overlay, to suggest merely a symbolic element in a policy which conveys meanings to several audiences.
Chapter Four: Conventions of Metaphors

Like "symbol", "metaphor" has been the subject of extended definitional and substantive debate. (1) Following Black (1962, 1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980), I define metaphor as the juxtaposition of two unlike elements in a single context, where the previously understood meanings of both interact to create a new perception of each. In other words, metaphor is "a familiar theory or concept...brought as a projective model to a new situation, where the new situation and the old theory alike come to be seen differently...." (2)

Let us take as examples some metaphorical statements about our economic situation:

"Inflation has pinned us to the wall."

"Our biggest enemy right now is inflation."

"Inflation has robbed me of my savings."

"Inflation has attacked the foundation of our economy." (3)

"Inflation," itself an older metaphor which presents the state of the economy as blown up, distorted by swelling from some more natural state, is here presented as a boxer, an enemy, a robber, a fighter seeking to destroy. Putting

(1) Schon (1963, Chapter 3) presents a brief summary of the main features of this debate. See also Black (1962, Chapter 3).

(2) Schon (1963), p. 199.

monetary swelling in a military or quasi-military setting suggests the possibility of retaliation: one does not turn the other cheek to inflation; one fights back in defense of life and liberty, family and country.

We may see in this example some of the attributes of metaphors. Metaphors channel vision and structure thought: they organize reality by highlighting some aspects and obscuring others. While they blind us to some things, metaphors give us new sight and understanding into others. They may provide a logic of discovery, moving from the known to the unknown; a way of experiencing facts; a coherence among seemingly disparate elements. (1) Seeing inflation as a fighter encourages us to look for its vulnerable places and to plan a counterattack. This metaphor precludes the possibility that inflation might not be susceptible to planning; if inflation is part of an inevitable cycle, the best defenses will not stave it off, nor the best offensive rid us of it.

In the same example we see another attribute of metaphors: their life cycle. "Inflation", one may guess, derives from the idea that an entity may be blown up or added to so as to distort its normal shape. That is, as applied to the economy rather than to balloons, "inflation" is a metaphor. Yet, we use it in common parlance without cognizance of its metaphoric nature. Inflation is an old, or

(1) See Brown (1976); Black (1962, 1979); Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
conventional, metaphor. (1) Not all metaphors become conventional parts of our language. Some grow old, fall out of fashion or use, and are put to rest.

Metaphors are similar to symbols in at least three ways. First, their meanings are more than literal; they are representative. To talk of "housing decay" is not to mean literally that the wood is moldy or that the bricks are full of dental caries. Like a symbol, a metaphor represents a repertoire of possible meanings. The decay metaphor is understood through analysis of its meaning in another situation, rather than of its literal sense in the present one.

Second, metaphors and symbols both involve the juxtaposition of two different elements in a single context. As Fernandez (1972) wrote: "However men may analyze their experiences within any domain, they inevitably know and understand them best by referring them to other domains for elucidation. It is in that metaphoric cross-referencing of domains, perhaps, that culture is integrated, providing us with a sense of wholeness." (2)

The possibility for recombination is, theoretically, endless; hence, the possibility of infinite new understandings. This possibility is, however, limited by

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(1) It would once have been called a "dead" metaphor. This is part of the debate about the nature of metaphors. See Lakoff and Johnson (1980) for a discussion of conventional metaphors.

(2) Fernandez (1972), p. 58.
cultural and historical contexts, since both metaphors and symbols are expressions of values which are themselves specific to time and place. What Fernandez called "the degree to which men can feel the aptness of each other's metaphors" (1) is a dynamic variable, changing with respect to culture and epoch. Moreover, the possibility of new combination and discovery is further bounded by fear or threat of the new challenging the old. Whether in religion or in politics, the priests of a successful revolution cast new ceremonies and liturgies in terms of the old, to minimize that threat -- as we may see in Mosse's (1975) examples of the Lutheran and Hitlerian successions. (2)

Third, like symbols, metaphors entertain the capacity for multiple meanings. (3) In this respect, policy is akin to poetry or art, in that its metaphors may suggest different responses. This capacity to yield multiple interpretations gives metaphors, like symbols, their power. Metaphors generate meaning in specific contexts; as they may be understood, so may they be misunderstood. The use of a metaphor presupposes an understanding of its literal use in some context. The literal uses of the metaphorical word, wrote Black (1962), "normally commit the speaker to

(1) Idem.


(3) Victor Turner (1974, p. 51) has called this "multivocality" -- the capacity to resonate among many meanings at once, like a chord in music resonates among many tones.
acceptance of a set of standard beliefs ... ([or] current platitudes) that are the common possession of the members of some speech community."  

That communal or cultural specificity may contribute to the multiple meanings of metaphor. "There are indefinitely many contexts," wrote Black (1962). "...where the meaning of a metaphorical expression has to be reconstructed from the speaker's intentions (and other clues).... When Churchill ... called Mussolini 'that utensil', the tone of voice, the verbal setting, the historical background..." (2) were all data necessary to an understanding of the metaphor as Churchill intended it. Compare that with a televised cooking scene where Julia Child exclaims, "That utensil...!", and you have an example of the variety of contextually-determined meanings. "Recognition and interpretation of a metaphor may require attention to the particular circumstances of its utterance," Black wrote. (3)

Some symbols may be visual metaphors. The advertisement described earlier, where a Granada is pictured before a country estate, is one example. The estate, with its lush, expansive lawn, symbolizes wealth, status, perhaps power. Its juxtaposition with the automobile suggests that these attributes accrue also to the Granada and that purchase of it

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(2) Ibid., p. 29.
(3) Idem.
will convey their acquisition as well. Metaphor, wrote Robert Nisbet, "is a way of cognition in which the identifying qualities of one thing are transferred in an instantaneous, almost unconscious, flash of insight to some other thing." (1)

Metaphor and Policy

According to Landau (1961), metaphors have always served in politics as a way of societal learning, since they cast the world in a new light. As examples he cites the mechanical metaphor of the 1700 - 1800's, which gave way to an evolutionary system metaphor in the 1890's and subsequently.

It is the power of metaphor to channel thought, direct vision, and even -- some say (2) -- to create reality, that lends it a crucial role in policymaking and implementation. The inflation metaphors cited above are examples of metaphor's power as a guide to future action. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:34) wrote, the metaphor "inflation is an adversary...not only gives us a very specific way of thinking about inflation but also a way of acting toward it." As an adversary, inflation "can attack us, hurt us, steal from us,

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(2) These include Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 159): metaphors "play a central role in the construction of social and political reality"; and Black (1979, p. 39): "...some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute."
even destroy us." The metaphor "therefore gives rise to and justifies political and economic actions on the part of our government: declaring war on inflation, setting targets, calling for sacrifices, installing a new chain of command, etc." (1)

Their capacity for multiple interpretations makes metaphors a key part of the interpretive process by which policies are implemented. Moreover, conventional metaphors -- such as economic "inflation", housing "blight", "infested" slums, metaphors which have entered our language as conventional parts of speech -- are even more powerful because they are more blinding, since they are no longer conscious attempts to seek new understanding but rather accepted parts of our culture and view of reality.

Like symbols, metaphors in policy are neither true nor false. Wrote Lakoff and Johnson (1980): "What is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor but the perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned by it. ... We draw inferences, set goals, make commitments, and execute plans, all on the basis of how we in part structure our experience, consciously and unconsciously, by means of metaphor." (2)

(1) Rein (1976) and Schon (1977) also discuss the role of metaphors in how we think about public problems and their solutions. However, their discussions focus on the setting of policy, rather than on policy implementation.

(2) Ibid., p. 158.
Chapter Five: Myths and Other Fairy-Tales

Myth analysis has traditionally focused on the past (on Greek, Egyptian or Scandinavian tales or sagas) or on "primitives" (Aborigines or African tribes) or on comparative religion (e.g. Biblical and Babylonian flood stories). There is growing recognition, however, that myth-making is also a contemporary activity, undertaken by Western, "technologized" people. (1) Recent publications analyze the American founding fathers myth (Nimmo and Combs, 1980), the Washington, Lincoln, and Thanksgiving myths (Robertson, 1980), and the "Emma Lazarus myth" (Boston Sunday Globe editorial, 1 November 1981). People make myths in organizational settings as well as in political and economic ones, as Organizational Myths seeks to demonstrate (Westerlund and Sjostrand, 1979). As a technical term, "myth" has been graced with various meanings and/or functions. Summarizing the literature, Percy S. Cohen (1969) classifies seven purposes attributed to myths: explanation; creative expression; manifestation of the unconscious; socialization; legitimation of social institutions; symbolic and/or ritualistic expression; the (structuralist) reconciliation of conflicting principles. (2)

(1) This statement is in opposition to the contention that myth-making is an activity only of pre-technologized peoples. See Cassirer (1946: Chapter 4) for one example of this view.

(2) Other classifications are given by Stith Thompson (1955) and Honko (1972).
Drawing on traditional anthropological theories, I propose the following definition of myth, to be applied in contemporary political and organizational contexts: a myth is a narrative created and believed by a group of people to explain a puzzling part of their reality. This definition includes the following five elements.

1. The form of myth is narrative. It is not logic, nor is it argument; it does not attempt to persuade, nor does it convince of veracity. As Cuthbertson (1975) said, it is "immune to factual attack." (1)

2. Myth is created: that is, it is an invention rooted in time and place, in a particular culture. Tudor (1972) and Cuthbertson (1975) suggest that the myth produced at any given time will be in response to the needs of that moment. Therefore, myth is not necessarily shared universally. Furthermore, it is potentially transient: it may be replaced by new knowledge, including a new myth. This is not to suggest that such replacement is easily accomplished. Beliefs are often held tenaciously, as the Scopes trial on Darwinian evolution versus Biblical creation demonstrated.

3. Myths are believed; the principles they express, they stories they tell are the way it is. are reality. "When in doubt," wrote Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979), "the transmitted myth can deliver you from scepticism -- you know.

For the believer the myth expresses what exists...." (1)

4. Myths are communal and, therefore, public; they are not individual or private. (2)

The following functions derive from the preceding three elements of myth.

a. Myths provide a way of knowing about the world.

b. Myths socialize: they teach a way of behaving.

According to Honko (1972), and Cuthbertson (1975), myths are models. They compel emotional as well as intellectual belief and, therefore, prompt action. As Tudor (1972) said, myths are pragmatic: they relate to the real world of action here and now.

Myths are a means to teach values, cultural forms, and behavior. Myths preserve customs, rituals, and ceremonies. (3) Myths validate and authorize beliefs, customs, rites, cultural institutions; they create, alter, and are created by them. (4)

Because myths are shared, they may be a means of communication. They may also enhance a feeling of belonging to the tribe, community or group and, hence, be reassuring. Because they conserve culture, myths

(1) Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979), p. 3.

(2) Dreams have been called private myths; vice versa, myth has been called a public dream, day-dream or "society's dream". Cf. Joseph Campbell (1981).


tend to delay changes. They may provide a feeling of security. (1)

c. Myths \textit{legitimate} the social, political, and economic order as it is vested in existing institutions.

5. The \textit{content} of a myth is the explanation of a "puzzle"; its \textit{context} is some part of life where two or more principles conflict, causing the "puzzle". As Robertson (1980) wrote: "Myths are the mechanism by which people believe contradictory things simultaneously; they are also the mechanism by which those contradictions are (as people believe) resolved -- or at least held in a tension which is not uncomfortable to the believers." (2)

Or, in other words, "...the creation of myths...may be said to represent a way...to ward off knowledge about...complexity...; it makes for peace and quiet so that they [people] can work. ...Myths...have been brought into being precisely to protect people from an awareness of that uncertainty which science seeks to clarify." (3)

One way of holding irreconcilable contradictions in a tension is to "block further inquiry" (Cohen, 1969),


(3) Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979). pp. 31, 4. Others have expressed similar notions. Thurman Arnold (1937) wrote that institutional creeds, which he also called myths, express contradictory ideals, allowing the contradictions to co-exist. (p. 356 ff.) Cuthbertson (1975) wrote: "Myths exist because of social tensions...[they] function to bridge tensions.... Myth is the antidote for a disturbed status quo." (pp. 158, 160)
deflecting continued attention to the incompatibility of similarly valued principles. Cohen relates a Talmudic legend which illustrates the point. The Biblical creation story begins with the word "BeReshit" -- "In the beginning", the first letter of which is the Hebrew "bet", written □. The Talmud asks the question, "Why was the world created with the letter 'bet'?" and gives the following answer: "Bet is blocked on three sides, and open only on one; therefore, one has no right to demand knowledge of what is above, what is below, what is before, only of what comes after, from the day on which the world is created." (1) "The gist of this," Cohen continues, "...is to provide a point of reference in the past beyond which one need not go." (2)

As with "symbol" and "symbolic", "myth" is used widely today in a pejorative sense, implying fiction, purposeful deception, lie, false belief. We may attribute such a negative attitude, in part, to the pervasiveness of the myth of rational scientism abroad in the land and growing since the 18th century, which is incompatible with a positive appreciation of myth. Evidence of it in anthropology may be

(1) Remembering that Hebrew moves from right to left, before is to the right of the letter 'bet' and after is to the left. H. N. Bialik and H. Rabinitsky, eds., Sefer HaAgadah V. I (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1939); quoted in Cohen (1969), p. 350.

(2) Cohen (1969), p. 350. This reference to a point in the past has become, for many, the essential substance of myth, as it relates to the explanation of origins. I understand cosmogonic myths to be only one type of myth. But all myths, wrote Cohen, by stopping exploration, locate themselves in some time past. Such time progression is also a characteristic of narrative, he points out.
seen in the assumption of some theorists that mythmaking is an activity belonging to pre-scientific or simply primitive peoples, a stage outgrown by civilized man. (1)

This is compounded by the popular understanding of myths as solely stories about gods and how the world came to be, featuring heroes such as Hercules, Odysseus or Prometheus. From a contemporary vantage point, belief in such tales is a false belief, and their perpetration can be only for purposes of intentional deception. Moreover, we acknowledge today no analogous sagas by which we might understand Greek or Babylonian myths. (2) The notions that myth and religion have been replaced by philosophy, science, history, and/or politics further establish "myth" as a realm of illusion and lie.

Hence, we are socialized to believe that true myth does not exist for us today. To label something as "myth" is to step back from belief to the position of critic. This critical stance is achieved only when the myth no longer sustains the contradiction between two principles. For

(1) See Tudor (1972, pp. 31-36) for a review of "myth as a primitive world-view."

(2) A related question might be raised regarding the role of the chorus in ancient Greek drama, and contemporary events which perform similar functions. In this case, however, an analogy is more readily found in some court trials which are highly publicized (Sacco and Vanzetti, Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs); some Presidential electoral debates and campaigns (Nixon vs. JFK); or some social policy processes (OEO, the Peace Corps, the New Deal). Perhaps the guerilla or street theater of the 1960's would be a more direct parallel.
example, only when the reality of Haitian refugees tossed about on the Atlantic blatantly contradicted the belief in the U.S. as a haven for refugees could the *Boston Globe* editorialize about an "Emma Lazarus myth".

Thus, when belief is challenged by new perception, myth may be recognized as such. It then may assume the quality of delusion or fake, but only for disbelievers. Hence, the myth of racial superiority perpetrated by the Nazis was reason and reality for those who believed in it, illusion and propaganda for those who did not. It is not the myth that is deceptive, wrote Thurman Arnold (1937), but the use of it. (1)

**Myths and Implementation**

Myths are far more elusive than either metaphors or symbols. Since they are believed in and not subject to factual disproof, they are difficult to perceive. Moreover, myths are protected by their believers because they have been created at points of tension or uneasiness to mask those very sensitivities. Since myths shut off further inquiry, they are difficult to discern and fathom. As they redirect attention, it is hard to see through or beyond them.

Political and organizational myths live at the most vulnerable points of institutions. Arnold (1935) wrote: "Social institutions require faiths and dreams to give them morale. They need to escape from these faiths and dreams in

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order to progress." (1) Understanding this about myths will enable us to envision their possible role in policy implementation and evaluation. While myths perpetuate belief in the power of policies to improve social conditions, they mask areas requiring evaluators' attention in order to improve implementation and improve policies. If organizational analysts and policy evaluators believe in the myths which support those organizations and policies, their insights into performance and implementation will be limited by the bracketing myths (remember the \( \Box \)) and their inquiry redirected. On the other hand, the analyst who sees beyond the myth (to a new myth?) will meet most likely with resistance to his views on the part of organizational members who continue to believe in that myth.

Under what conditions will members be likely to change their beliefs? Lasswell (1952) postulates that a political myth will more likely not be rejected if its adherents are indulged rather than deprived. That is. believers in an established myth will more probably begin to challenge it (1) if their security -- power, wealth, respect or other value -- is threatened; (2) if they see that a different myth brings greater value to its adherents, who constitute a different group; (3) if converts to the other myth are rewarded, ensuring its continuation. By extension, an established myth will be successfully transmitted from communities more

indulged to ones less indulged. "In terms of power," wrote Lasswell, "this implies that the strong will be copied by the weak." (1)

At this point, a further discussion of these issues and their relation to protest and status politics would be abstract and theoretical. Therefore, I will suspend their consideration until the case analysis, when I might better illuminate them by reference to specific events in the case which lies before us in the next section.

(1) Lasswell (1952), p. 5.
Part 3. The Story Told

Chapter 6. Admissable Evidence and the Garbage-Can Case

The case study which follows in the next three chapters is based on participant observation, interviews, agency records and files, and newspaper accounts. Case studies which recount events in a policy sector, enacted by many people, are the typical method of implementation research. They are also the best way to present the context of meaning in which events are interpreted through their symbols, myths, and metaphors. Participant observation is the way to gain an understanding of that context: of the meanings attributed to symbols in a particular culture, whether national or organizational. Since symbols and metaphors are bound in time and place, archival research is used to reconstruct historical events. Interviews provide other information about how informants remember perceiving events and about how they seek to convey meaning and make meaning through symbols. By discussing the same events with different people, the researcher begins to construct a thick description of what transpired. Seeing an event from different angles, like a Cubist painting, is the closest we can approximate its reality.

My choice of case subject derived from more than mere familiarity. My thoughts on the role of symbolics in policy and organizational behavior have developed out of reflection on that center work experience begun ten years ago. This
case is presented here to illustrate the role and use of symbols, in an effort to develop a theory about symbolics and implementation.

The nature of case study research and reporting is potentially "hazier" than modeling or experimentation, because it depends on individual experience (loosely structured interviews and participant observation) and interpretation, which are not easily reproducible. This is particularly true in the present study, which focuses on the individual nature of interpretation. However, the making of meaning is also an activity shared by people in the same community or culture, to the extent that we assume certain conventions of interpretation in the daily living of our lives. While each of us may experience the elephant differently, we consent to naming it "elephant".

Thus, with interpretive research. Another researcher might equally well have written a story different from mine after experiencing the same interviews and events, and each story could be a "good" story. The nature of its "goodness" would be its ability to "resonate" with other readers and researchers because they would share sufficient consensus regarding "truth" as to agree to some "objective reality" in the interpretation. In other words, in the midst of individual experience and interpretation, there exists a measure of common understanding among mankind as to make interactions possible; and some of us may want to call this consensus "objective reality," as we agree to the conventions
of an "inch" or a "mile". This measure, of course, will be "tighter" or "closer", the stronger the cultural ties that bind us. Presumably, members of a family will share consensuses of interpretation to a greater degree than will representatives to the U.N.

The "laws" of generalizability, I would argue, are similar. To the extent that two cases share characteristics, we may generalize at that level of detail. Within the same culture, we may find similar status issues in comparing different policies. Across cultures, we may be able to make statements about symbolics and status at a more general level. Case studies are important, however, in providing that basis from which we may begin to make more general observations.

* * *

As I noted in the Chapter 1, I began working in Afula's Givat HaMoreh Center in November, 1972, transferring to Or Akiva four months later. I remained in Or Akiva until September, 1975. The interviewing and archival research were undertaken between October, 1980 and January, 1981 under the auspices and hospitality of the Research and Planning Unit of the Joint Distribution Committee-Israel in Jerusalem. Archival sources include the files of the ICCC and JDC-Israel (and Malben, as the latter was known until 1975). I also had access to JDC's current files on their work with the ICCC. (As will become clearer in the telling of the case, JDC has
taken a large role in the ICCC's development.) These files contained correspondence, protocols of meetings, budgets, proposals, internal memos, and notes to the files. Other sources include ICCC Annual Reports (1973 - 1980); the agency's Annual Survey, conducted by Uri Yanai from 1976 on; Haim Zipori's two Surveys and Report for the Minister of Education. In addition, I was able to attend one of the ICCC's training sessions for new directors.

The Jerusalem Post is an independent, daily, English-language journal based in Jerusalem. Its archives were more easily accessible to me than either the morning or afternoon independent, Hebrew-language papers, based in Tel Aviv. Like the letters and memos in the files, the newspaper accounts provided bits of information which were useful in jogging memories and balancing selective recollections of people I interviewed. The files were especially helpful in recreating a sense of the development of the ICCC, while the newspaper columns and articles presented one picture of the mood of the times, social and economic problems, riots and demonstrations by Black Panthers and others, and so forth.

In choosing whom to interview, I selected respondents who could tell me about different aspects of the ICCC and its centers. I spoke with staff from headquarters and the field; with directors and community organizers, the two most clearly articulated groups of center staff workers; with veterans and newcomers to the agency; with staff from large centers and small ones, from development towns and city slums, from the
four general regions of the country (North, Central, South, Jerusalem); and with the early policymakers who were still alive, as well as with former staff from the centers' first years. I also visited centers of different sizes and reputations at different hours of the day. Formally, I interviewed 37 people, several of them more than once, some of whom have worn or concurrently wear different hats within the ICCC. Counting roles rather than individuals. I interviewed 12 community organizers (COs), 9 directors, 6 CO supervisors, 5 JDC staff, 5 faculty from the Schwartz Program To Train Senior Center Personnel, 4 members of local or national Boards of Directors, 5 ICCC headquarters staff, the Jerusalem Post social affairs reporter, Prime Minister Meir's Assistant for Welfare Matters, and two residents.

Interviews generally lasted from 1 to 1-1/2 hours. I asked directors and COs how their work, center, and neighborhood compared with others they knew; about their professional background; how they saw their roles and how these related to the ICCC's goals; about relations with supervisors, colleagues, co-workers, and headquarters concerning work issues; how they communicated their goals to local residents, to other agencies, and to their Boards. Other interviews focused on policy and agency history and development, or on current and future agency plans, depending on the individual's role in the agency.

Since I was carrying out a small research effort for JDC at the time, exploring the nature of CO practice in the ICCC,
people were generally receptive to my requests for interviews. COs in the field seemed intrigued that a former CO would return to interview them. As a group, they were particularly encouraging of my research. For center directors, however, the fact that I was "coming from Jerusalem" lent an aura to my visit that was initially not beneficial for my purposes. Although I welcomed the entree that "researcher from JDC" provided, I didn't want to cast myself in the role of Inspector From Headquarters. If directors perceived me in such a role, they would be more likely -- I thought -- to treat our conversation as an opportunity to send a particular image back to HQ. I hoped that by presenting myself as a former CO re-examining my own experience within the ICCC, I might encourage directors to share their reflections on their work. When I was able to approach directors through mutual friends from the network of field workers or extra-agency contacts, such reflection was more likely. On other occasions, more interview time was spent discussing aspects of "good" center practices.

Two categories of respondents are not included among the people I chose to interview. Interviewing old friends about professional matters is a quirky art. One is often tempted to lapse into familiar patterns of story-telling or philosophizing or unable to establish other patterns of conversation. Such was the case with several interviews I attempted with former colleagues and friends. We knew each other so well that I was unable to sustain and he/she to
accept a new role for myself and a new definition, however
temporary, of our relationship. For that same reason, I
refrained from revisiting Or Akiva to observe or interview.

Second, I was unable to interview residents successfully
about their interpretations of center symbols. Local
patterns of hospitality, on the one hand, preserve a certain
distance between strangers which I could not bridge to
discuss the questions I had. Answering questions of meaning
and interpretation would have meant revealing more than one
ordinarily would, to a stranger. On the other hand, people
in development towns are accustomed to survey research, since
they have been subjected to endless Ministry questionnaires.
Asking my questions drew people into a survey question
response pattern, part of which is -- again, due to
hospitality concepts -- "try to guess what answer will make
the asker happy, and give it." The two residents I did
interview I met in social or work situations, and I was able
to extend these contacts into personal relationships out of
which to draw interviews.

Thus, most of what I write about residents'
interpretation of agency symbols is drawn from my years of
working with the citizens of Or Akiva or from interpretations
made by others who have worked and/or lived as intimately
with development town or slum residents. For it is only such
intimacy that allows one to begin to understand the meanings
people make and the images and impressions they create and
form in interpreting symbols and myths. No amount of survey
research or man-in-the-street interviews could accomplish this.

The case study presented here is similar to other implementation cases in that it presents a public policy with broadly-conceived social goals, covering several levels of government and agency organizations and multiple decision points. It also has a "fixer" in the agency's CEO, a man whose party membership, political connections, and personal charm enabled him to see the agency through the period of its establishment and growth. He could, if necessary, call people together after midnight and have a problem solved by morning.

I have told the case involving more actors and covering a longer period of time than most implementation cases, in order to illustrate the play of symbolics in the case. This approach entails the following assumptions: (1) implementation covers a wide range of symbol-sharing communities, some but not all of which may overlap; (2) the interpretation of symbols and the making of meaning change over time; (3) actors who share symbol meanings at one time may not share them at another time in the course of implementing a policy; (4) relationships among actors, policy goals, and implementation may change over time.

As a result of its time and organizational spans, this story includes many events and details that another type of case study might not. I like to call it a "garbage-can case", to illustrate a point about policy and expressive
acts.

In the imposition of meaning on events observed and recorded, we bring into consideration whatever elements are at hand. For us to observe them, they must have what Vickers (1968) called "a foothold in the mind"; but in ordering them into a meaningful picture or story, we don't always record the footholds in their chronological sequence. Something read today makes meaning of yesterday's experience, to which may be added tomorrow's insight. The same admixture of events out of sequence characterizes the meaning we make of policy-making and implementation and organizational behavior as we arrange decision intents and outcomes in the effort to understand them. A garbage-can case portrays this mixing-up over an extended time period, while it shows us the footholds and remaining footprints of social ideas in the public's collective cultural mind.
The Israel Corporation of Community Centers, Ltd.: 1965 – 1980

Introduction *

The Israel Corporation of Community Centers (ICCC) recently completed its 12th year of operations. Its current Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board were among its founders. The Corporation has over 100 centers in operation throughout the State, located in slum areas of the cities and in development towns.

Israel's population more than doubled through immigration within the first two years of Statehood. Most of the Europeans entering in those years, refugees from Hitler's extermination efforts, moved into cities, suburbs, and communal settlements to be near surviving relatives and landsleit. Those escaping North African and Asian Islamic countries had few cousins to join. Coming with limited monetary, linguistic and other resources, they were dependent on the State for shelter, food, clothing, jobs, schooling and so forth. The State settled them in the development towns. These -- Israel's "new towns" -- were established between 1955 and 1963 for the purposes of settling immigrants, dispersing the country's population beyond the sprawling metropolitan areas into the hinterlands, in order to bolster security in outlying districts, create new economic and, hence, employment opportunities, and take advantage of the

* This case study has benefitted from a critical reading by Helen Yanow, for which I am grateful.
severely limited water resources.

Because of so-called ethnic differences resulting from centuries of living in different cultures and absorbing different customs and traditions, European-Western Jews and Asian-African-Eastern Jews were alien to one another. Even among the religiously-observant, ritual practices differed. Immigrants to Israel from Western Europe and the Americas were often university-educated cosmopolitans. Those from Asia and Africa were more often unlettered town and rural folk; the elites of these communities immigrated to the West rather than to Israel. Their different settlement patterns in Israel institutionalized the separation: the cities became a magnet drawing the curious, upwardly-mobile Easterners; the development towns remained unknown areas, somewhat mysterious, even, to the Westerners. Since Europeans ruled the army and much of the political, economic, and social life of the new country, their ways became established as those to be desired and imitated by any who would call themselves "Israeli".

The following is the story of the founding of the ICCC, its growth and struggle to establish itself. Its overriding purpose seems to be - and has been - the "absorption" of new immigrants into Israeli society. But there is yet no national consensus as to what is the nature of "Israeli society"; even the question of who is a "new" immigrant is not always clear. And certainly the nature of "absorption" has not even been raised in Israeli policy circles. The
following account describes the central social issues of the first period of the ICCC and shows how the Corporation staff has presented its goals to themselves and to others.

There already were community centers in Israel at the time of the founding of the ICCC, as well as places called other names which served functions similar to community centers. What was unique about the ICCC - among other things which will be discussed later - is that, unlike the other centers which were partisan or which limited their service in some other way, the ICCC's centers were promoted by the government at the national level to address one or more issues of social policy. They were not to be idle meeting places for people after work, simply to pass time in pleasant company, as were the kibbutz's Bet Am ("people's house"). Rather, there was a social purpose to be attained through such gathering in an ICCC center. And the center was to be part of a nationwide chain, not an isolated building in a single municipality. So, although pre-existing centers may have served as models for the ICCC (as one man interviewed suggested), they were, as well, models for differentiation. I will consider this point in a later chapter.
Chapter Seven: The Founding Years

The late Zalman Aran, Minister of Education and Culture in the 1960's, is remembered by his associates as a bright, sharp, creative and innovative administrator. More than anything, say those who worked with him, he was noted for his curiosity and his openness to new ideas and schemes.

Minister Aran had three special assistants: Dan Ronnen, David Harman, and Haim Zipori. (1) Zipori was brought in to the Ministry in late 1963 as assistant director of the new Adult Literacy program, one of Aran's brainchildren. As Zipori tells it (1972:1-2), at the beginning of 1964 he and program director Yitzhak Navon (2) brought some 500 soldier-teachers (women who fulfill their military service by teaching) to development towns and other immigrant settlements.

For me, this was my first introduction to, my most basic encounter with what was then called "the second Israel". Directly, through the soldiers, by way of home visits and home-based classes, we came to know the nature of things in the development towns, as insiders.

Zipori left Adult Literacy at the end of 1965 to begin developing an "Arts for the People" program. "This operation was also directed toward development towns and poverty

(1) The following discussion is based on conversations with David Harman and Dan Ronnen. I was unable to interview Mr. Zipori.

(2) Later President of the State.
areas," he wrote (ibid.). "Its objective was to bring theatre, concerts and other passive [i.e. non-participatory] art activities to new audiences." One of his undertakings was a study entitled "Organizational Aspects Connected with Bringing Artistic Productions to Development Areas", presented to the Minister in June, 1966.

According to David Harman, however, Zipori and Aran had a falling-out at this time over political loyalties. Zipori chose to follow a faction (1) which was splitting from the mainstream Labour Party to which Aran adhered. Harman claims that Aran removed Zipori from the literacy campaign, one of his pet projects, and transferred him to the more field-oriented Popular Arts program in order to distance him somewhat from the center of Ministry activities.

However that may be, Zipori recalls that at this time, Aran began to voice his curiosity about the "new society" of immigrants in the development towns, new neighborhoods of the large cities, and other immigrant settlements. He was concerned about their social and cultural lives, according to Zipori, in terms of art and education. He was aware that parents' problems influenced their children's studies and their development.

Although each of us was caught up in his own bailiwick, Aran began to weave the pieces — adult literacy, popular arts, supplementary education [i.e. elementary

(1) Called Rafi - the Israel Labour List - and headed by former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, it split from Mapai, Israel's Labour Party, in 1968.
and high school equivalency], youth houses, sports centers — into a comprehensive whole.

One Fall day in 1966 (1), Aran called Zipori into his office.

"I know how people in the cities spend their time," Aran is reported to have said, "but I don't know what people in the development towns do. Haim, I want you to find out for me how those people spend their free time. Fly over the development towns, lift up the rooftops, and find out what people do in the evenings."

So Zipori, drawing on his development town connections from his Popular Arts work, began a four-month journey around the State. (2) From October, 1966 to January, 1967, he covered some 40 settlements, meeting the local folk on their streetcorners and in their cafes, chatting about their preferred activities, available facilities, their desires and dreams.

One day during the 4-month period that Zipori was on the road, Aran received a visit from Ralph Goldman, then director of the Israel Education Fund (a disbursal arm of the United Jewish Appeal), and some potential donors from the United

(1) There is a dating problem here. Zipori's first Report to Aran carries a March 1966 publication date. However, in the Report reference is made to an "earlier study" dated June 1966. Since all other informants corroborate a later publication date, I have assumed that the March 1966 date is a typographical error which should read 1967.

(2) Israel is physically about the size of New Jersey and had a population then of about 2-1/2 million.
States. (1) Goldman, a social worker trained in the U.S. Jewish Community Centers, wanted to know whether Aran didn't think that "community centers" would be an institution suitable to solve some of Israel's social problems. Goldman and his guests elaborated on the idea and left.

The next day, Aran called Dr. Yael Pozner, head of the Ministry's Comprehensive Schools Program, into his office.

"Do you know what a community center is?" she recalls he asked her.

"I think so," she says she replied.

"Do you know," he said, "three Americans were here, and they asked me whether it wouldn't be a good idea to set up something like this in Israel. I don't know what this thing is. Why don't you set up a committee and decide."

So I asked him, "What exactly do you want to know?"

And then it became clear to me that for a long time he had been preoccupied by the question of what really went on in the development towns, especially during the evenings and on the Sabbath. And he thought that putting up such "community centers" in these towns might possibly be the answer for residents who might be bored.

So I set up the committee. We had a sociologist, a town planner, an educator, a representative of the Housing Ministry, and a director of a community center in Haifa [among others - ed.]. We collected information on what they were doing in America in this field. But primarily we began traveling around the country in the evenings. We sat in the cafes and on the streetcorners. We asked people what was on their minds.

(1) The following section is based on my interview with Dr. Yael Pozner and on Zvi Lavi's interview with her (1979).
Dr. Pozner, a German-trained physicist who entered the arena of Youth Aliya (immigration) and nonformal education during World War II, remembers the social issues that were on the minds of Israeli educators at the time.

It was as if we awoke suddenly to find that two Israelis had developed between 1950 and 1960. We didn't expect it; we didn't anticipate it. In the "first" Israel, the children were well-integrated, but in the development towns, in the "second" Israel ---. A tremendous gap was revealed between the two populations. We had an enormously troubling problem: how to deal with this gap. There were two routes: the Reform (1) and informal education. The community center program fell into the latter category.

David Harman remembers that Aran "dreamed of a national network of 'something' -- he didn't know what to call them, 'Aran Houses', perhaps." Harman also says that Pozner was brought in on the project because Aran no longer trusted Zipori's politics since the latter had joined the splinter Labour group.

Pozner's committee began meeting late in 1966. She relates the story that one day, in the hallway of the Ministry building, a young man approached her and introduced himself.

"My name is Haim Zipori. I've been going around to the different development towns doing a study of leisure time

(1) Initiated by Aran, this restructured secondary education through the establishment of "junior high schools" which, by absorbing students from various backgrounds, were intended to pull the "disadvantaged" up to the level of their urban cohort.
activities, and I hear you have a committee investigating a related idea. Could I join your committee?"

Pozner welcomed him; and he and her committee continued their work, separately and together.

In the meantime, David Harman had inherited Zipori's former job in the Adult Literacy department. In early 1967 he engineered the establishment of the first multi-function recreational center in a development town.

I had an army unit from Nahal teaching adult literacy in Bet Shemesh and they needed a place to meet. There were no youth movements, no place for adult education. Mayor Louk wanted to build a basketball court; I suggested putting it near the old town hall, which the Habimah Theater used for its productions when it traveled locally. Through Zipori's connections with Habimah, we were able to get the building for our use -- it became a community center!

There were also other places, Harman said, which served as community centers: Tcherner House in Yaffo was set up by the Tel Aviv municipality in late 1967, and the Jerusalem YM-YWHA had been going since the early 1950's.

Harman claims to have originated the idea of a multi-purpose program as well, following the 1967 war.

I had another army unit in Netivot*, and we conceived of the idea of laundry centers or clubs, where mothers could use washing machines in a central location and study Hebrew at the same time. And we also developed the idea of using bomb shelters [as meeting places] after that, in Dimona*, to teach literacy classes.

* Two development towns in the southern desert.
"Community centers," said Dan Ronnen, "was an idea that Aran learned from other people," such as himself and David Harman, both of whom had been in the U.S. and brought Aran ideas from there and from the professional journals they read. The American idea was a multi-service Jewish Community Center, which provided a variety of activities "all under one roof." The notion of a community center had been around for a while, said Ronnen.

There were many youth clubs sponsored by the various political movements; there were cultural centers; there was Rothchild House in Haifa and four others following [director Yaakov] Malchin's ideas of community centers; and there was the influence of the kibbutzim's "people's houses".

But Aran and especially [Finance Minister Pinhas] Sapir were sensitive to the readiness of Americans to give money to a familiar concept. Whereas they might not jump to support a youth club or a pensionnaires' club, they would contribute to a Jewish Community Center sort of thing.

Zipori presented his "Survey of Culture, Youth and Sports Centers in the Development Towns and in Immigrant Cities" to Aran in March, 1967. His "Survey of Culture, Art, Recreation, and Sports Activities on Sabbath Eves", delayed by the June war, was submitted in September. He reported that there were not enough public, non-partisan facilities to support recreational activities for the non-urban people studied, and that much of what was available was inadequate and run-down.

Pozner submitted her committee's report to Aran in early
1967 also. Based on their own research and on Zipori's findings, the committee recommended that two or three community centers be set up on an experimental basis. "It was in [the southern desert development town of] Yeruham that the committee derived its motto," said Dr. Pozner. "One young fellow with whom we spoke told us, 'There's no place pleasant to hang around and kill time. Our apartments are small; our families are large. There's nowhere to go.' And we conceived of the mandate of the community center as providing 'someplace' to go."

"On the other hand," she continued,

Haim's report proved that we weren't coming to a *tabula rasa*. Most places had programs for youth or for adults, but without coordination, and without any comprehensive view. ...Sometimes there was competition [between the providers of different activities]. We felt that the community center could introduce some order and a directed approach, if only partially.

Aran accepted the committee's recommendations, with the single reservation that two to three centers would be too small an experiment. Thirty was a more likely sample, he thought. He appointed a second committee, again under Pozner's leadership, charged with developing plans for building and programming the 30 experiments. The new Committee for Culture, Youth, and Sports Centers included the Education Ministry's director of sports, its youth department director, and its budget officer; the Histadrut (National Federation of Labor) culture and education director; Ralph
Goldman of the Israel Education Fund; a representative of the United Jewish Appeal (one of the central coordinating bodies of American Jewish fundraising); a university researcher; Haim Zipori; and others. The Committee met for a year and a half, gathering information on Jewish and non-Jewish centers in Europe, especially in the Scandinavian countries, and traveling around Israel, trying to involve local townspeople in the design of the centers.

Zipori wrote (1972):

We convened those who held their fingers on the social pulse of the town and we told them we wanted to know their needs so the building design would reflect them. We divided them into sub-committees -- for youth activities, sports, culture, arts... and collected all these ideas... and had them set priorities.... I think we were the first and only ones in Israel to go this most difficult route....

"We wanted the entire population using the community center to take an active part in directing it and setting its programs." said Ralph Goldman.

This means that local residents must be on the Board, feel that the Center is theirs and direct it. Although most of the funds come from the government Ministries and other public institutions who also have ideas, the main responsibility rests with the local volunteers.

...The innovation of volunteer work, of a Board of Directors which is not nominated by government or public bodies, was alien to the people. [They]... were accustomed...to get help from government. We had, therefore, to teach the community members to start thinking in different terms, to learn to help themselves, to decide what is good for them and to attempt to achieve it on their own, rather than to
wait for some government clerk to decide something should be done for them. There are many things which the government must do for its citizens. However, there is no lack of things which each citizen must do himself for himself -- not just to receive but also to give. (1)

"They didn't understand us," said Pozner.

"What are you asking us for?" they said. "Let the Housing Ministry build it, and we'll use it."

We discovered how difficult it really is to bring them to [the point where they could] identify their needs and to express what they really needed.

In Dimona we had a surprise. We were exerting ourselves in an effort to explain what a community center is, what they should think about and how to express their wishes. They stopped us in the middle: they were astonished that we were bringing them models from the U.S. Why were we telling them stories? Why, in Casablanca they had a similar institution!

We were very embarrassed that we hadn't known. They told us more about their center, where the Jewish community had organized the same sorts of social and cultural activities as we had just been describing. We asked why they hadn't recreated such a center in Dimona, and they said they had no idea that it could be done in Israel too. (2)

The Committee submitted a report calling for the establishment of a network of community centers under a single coordinating body, with a five-year building plan to be funded through the Israel Education Fund and foreign donors, and an educational/social/cultural program to be

(1) Lavi (1980).

(2) Lavi (1979), p. 10.
funded by the Ministry of Education and Culture through its standard regional and local allocations procedures.

According to Dr. Pozner, committee members wanted the proposed community centers' programs, no less than their building design, to grow out of the field through resident involvement. They wanted an independent, public organization, not a government body. Therefore, government lawyers recommended they adopt the legal status of a "Government Corporation," established by authority of the Knesset [Parliament] under the aegis of the Minister of Education and Culture. Its shares would be owned by the Government, and it would be directed by a voluntary Board appointed by the Minister, who would serve as its Chairman or designate a substitute. The Board of Directors would have 21 members, 10 of whom would be government officials and 11, members of the public. Each individual center would also incorporate as a non-profit entity, under the guidance of a Board of local government officials and citizens.

On May 4, 1969 the Prime Minister's Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs voted to establish the Corporation for Culture and Sports Centers (for Youth and Adults), Limited; the government ratified the recommendation. On June 4 it was registered legally as a Government Corporation, and on August 11 Minister Aran signed the papers establishing it. (1)

Aran resigned his position shortly thereafter and died

(1) ICCC Annual Report, 1975.
six months later. Haim Zipori was appointed the Corporation's first Executive Director, a position he still retains. Elad Peled, then Director-General of the Education and Culture Ministry, became Chairman of the Board of the new Corporation. Yael Pozner continued to work in the Ministry, becoming Assistant Director-General in 1976 until she retired in 1979. She was Peled's Vice-chairman and Chairman of the Executive Board, succeeding him as Chairman of the Board in 1976, a position she retains today.

Zipori operated the Corporation under the aegis of the Ministry of Education and Culture, out of its offices and drawing on its support staff, until March or April, 1971, when he moved it into separate office space in Jerusalem.

In 1979 the Corporation marked the completion of its first decade of operations.

What's in a Name?

The Corporation of Culture and Sports Centers (for Youth and Adults), Ltd. is the formal name of the agency which Aran helped midwife. What happened to the "community center" notion? Why is that term not present in the official title?

According to David Harman, the story is that as far as Aran was concerned, "community" as a concept and term fell in the province of the Ministry of Welfare, which "belonged" to the National Religious Party. Since he and the Ministry of Education and Culture belonged to the Labour Party, Aran insisted on another name that would guarantee an identity
separate from another Ministry and another party, so whatever political kudos might be forthcoming from the new agency would be attributed clearly to the correct parent.

Another version is offered by the Corporation's data collector and researcher, who understood Aran's concern to have been that Welfare already had "community centers." [17]* And Ralph Goldman wrote (8/31/70), Aran "refused to use the term 'community center' only because the words...had been pre-empted as a term by the Ministry of Social Welfare." That is to say, political fortunes aside, Aran wanted a new name for his new project.

Dan Ronnen asked why the word "Adults" was in the title or why it was necessary to include the parenthetical phrase, "for Youth and Adults." He answered his own question: "Essentially, the centers were merely big Youth Clubs, and they had to prove to themselves that they served other age groups as well."

The three bureaus within the Ministry of Education and Culture which lent the most support, budgetary and technical, to the new enterprise were culture, youth, and sports. The individual centers became known as "Centers for Culture, Youth, and Sports" -- a name whose Hebrew acronym is "matnas" (matnassim in the plural); and the central agency became the "Corporation of Matnassim."

In their English-language correspondence and

* Numbers in brackets refer to interviews.
publications for foreign consumption, the central agency became the Israel Association of Community Centers (IACC). Locally, however, they remain the Israel Corporation of Community Centers (ICCC). "Corporation" is the proper expression of their legal status, as an agency of limited liability and a Government Corporation. "Association", however, is more befitting the sense of a non-profit entity -- a semantic distinction made in an exchange of letters and legal opinion in 1977 by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJ-JDC) -- a fund-disbursing agency which includes the ICCC among its major recipients. JDC requested the Israel group refer to itself in all its literature as the "Association", because "Corporation" would suggest profit -- and, hence, the wrong image -- to the potential American donors whom the JDC was planning to solicit for funds. The ICCC refused JDC's request, after consulting government lawyers. In the opinions of the latter, the ICCC might be jeopardizing its legal standing in Israel if it referred to itself as other than a "corporation". They reached a compromise: JDC would refer to the agency as the IACC in its American literature; the agency would refer to itself as the ICCC in English-language literature of its own devising.

In an interview in 1979, Dr. Pozner discussed changes in the image of the matnassim from centers which dealt with culture, youth and sports to centers whose programs touched on all subjects and all ages.
"Then, hasn't the term 'matnas' passed its time?" she was asked.

"Certainly," she replied. "That's why we [ICCC staff] call them 'community centers.'"

"If so, why don't you change the name?"

"We haven't succeeded in uprooting the name 'matnas,' which has become so fluent in the mouths of so many people that they can't give it up. I would guess that most of those using the name don't even know what it stands for.... The word catches the ear -- it has a ring to it." (1)

The word does indeed seem to have earned a place for itself, as seen in the following story, related by Dan Ronnen. The Board of Directors of the Jerusalem Theatre was debating its future course of activity. One member summed up the crossroads they were facing as follows: "Is the Theatre going to continue to be a source of excellence, or is it going to be a 'matnas'?"

Organizational Logistics

Pozner's inter-ministerial committee handed over to the new ICCC an initial five-year plan to build 42 centers, calling for a budget of 40 million Israeli lirot (pounds). (2) In its September 14, 1969 meeting, the ICCC's

(1) Lavi (1979).

(2) At the time, U.S. $1 = IL 3.5. This sum was equivalent to US $11,250,000. Since the mid-1970's, there has been rapid devaluation of the Israeli currency. For instance, April, 1981 exchange rates were US $1 = IL 85, and the sheqel has since replaced the lira as the unit of currency
Board of Directors approved the appointment of the first two matnas directors and mandated the establishment of local Boards of Directors for those two centers, in cooperation with the Local Councils (the elected local governments). The next five centers were opened in 1970, followed by numbers 8 and 9 in 1971.

By then, "the social gap and the distressed conditions in...slum quarters in the large cities...gave birth to the urgent need to widen the network of Community Centers," and an additional five-year plan was submitted in June, 1971. (1) It called for construction of some 30 additional centers in 17 municipalities and a budget of IL 50 million.

By the Yom Kippur War of October, 1973, nineteen centers were built and operating, with another six working out of schools in the afternoon and evening hours.

A typical center might offer some or all of the following activities:

**Sports:**
- karate
- judo
- wrestling
- weight-lifting
- tennis
- field exercises
- basketball
- soccer
- swimming
- ping-pong
- gymnastics

(IS 1 = IL 10). Moreover, Zipori cited the following comparison: when they started calculating building costs, the average cost of public sector construction was IL 400/square meter. Six years later, in 1972, the average cost was IL 1000/square meter. And costs were higher the farther one went from the center of the country —- that is, where most of the ICCC facilities were located. See Zipori (1972:14).

(1) "Community Centers in Israel" (1971).
**Dance:**
- folk-dance (Israeli; international)
- ballet
- jazz
- modern

**Hobbies:**
- drama
- jewelry-making
- batik
- photography
- metal-working
- film clubs
- ceramics
- sewing
- knitting
- wood-working
- enamel
- psychology

**Music:**
- chorus
- drums
- recorder
- violin
- guitar
- accordion
- piano
- music appreciation

**Art:**
- painting
- sculpture

**Library:**
- free book loan
- homework help
- children's library
- authors' lectures

**Education:**
- English
- Hebrew
- Arabic
- French
- mathematics
- Bible
- supplementary
- Talmud
- literacy
- "parenting"

**Activities:**
- immigrant absorption
- senior citizens
- student council
- street-gang work
- concerts, theater
- mobile art exhibits
- local arts and crafts
- lecture series
- exhibits
- Housing-Project committees
- Citizens Information Center

New activities were added with time: "weight-watchers" clubs, for instance, were offered by the late 1970's.

The diagram on the next page illustrates the structural division of the typical center's activities and its sources of funds.
Building funds for the ICCC enterprise came from private donations, mostly foreign, channelled through the Israel Education Fund. Operating funds came from the various departments of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Local allocations followed their normal disbursal pattern: the Ministry's departments budgeted funds by region, and their regional counterparts distributed the moneys to Local Council or municipality recipients. Agreements were made locally, regionally and/or nationally that the matnas would receive these moneys and assume local responsibility for providing recreational and non-formal education programs.

Three of the nine members of the local matnas Boards of Directors were to be regional Ministry staff; another three were to be Local Council members. These six were usually the parties responsible for the allocation of Ministry funds. They were being appointed to these positions seemingly to ensure the smooth flow of money to the community centers. The other three Board members were to be local lay leaders. Problems arose at the onset, however, regarding the particular personages to be chosen for these slots and the manner of their choosing. Even by 1975, few lay Board members had been appointed; the matter has remained problematic.

The network of inter-organizational connections was wide and varied from the beginning. Some ten different departments of the Ministry of Education and Culture were involved with funding and programming, among them the
Department for Youth, the Sports Authority, the Department for Bible Education, the Adult Education Division, the Department of Libraries, and the Popular Arts Project. The Ministries of Welfare (Department of Community Work), Immigrant Absorption (Department of Social Absorption), Housing (Association for House Improvement), and Defense (Youth and Nahal Division) were also involved. In addition, various voluntary associations (such as Rotary International, Bnai Brith, the Moroccan Immigrants' Society) and public sector organizations (including Amidar - the Government Immigrants' Housing Corporation, Workers' Councils, the Histadrut/Labour Federation's Department for Neighborhoods, and the Joint Distribution Committee-Israel) gave advice and money and were encouraged to co-sponsor activities.

The ICCC made a distinction between cooperation and partnership, as illustrated by their experience with the Histadrut in 1972. The Labor Federation proposed to Zipori that the ICCC take over several of their youth movement facilities, personnel, and budgets, according to Ralph Goldman. (1) In return, the Histadrut wanted "formal representation for its leaders on the boards of the local Centers." They also wanted priority treatment for some of the Histadrut groups in using the Center facilities.

The ICCC Board, wrote Goldman, responded, almost unanimously that if

a Histadrut leader happens to be interested in community center work and is prepared to join a board of the Center ad personam, naturally he would be welcomed. But under no circumstances should we allow "official" Histadrut or Labour Council representation on the boards of the Centers. Just because a man happens to be chairman of the Local Labour Council or other Histadrut agency is no reason why he ex officio should serve on the Center Board. ...Such representation, it was argued, would produce a board of vested interests, rather than a board which is primarily motivated by community interests and concern.

Headquarters staff was small in the early years: Zipori, an accountant, a lawyer, an architect cum interior designer, and one or two secretaries. By late 1974, field workers felt the need for counseling and supervision by field-based staff, rather than by the Executive Director based in Jerusalem. Two years later, headquarters staff had swelled to include 7 regional consultants to directors, as well as national coordinators for music, parent-child, toddler, camping, and community work activities. By 1980, there were also a director of planning and evaluation, 3 consultants on infants, a director of development, 2 directors of a newly-acquired camping site, a spokeswoman, a coordinator for "neighborhood rehabilitations" (Project Renewal), a director of community schools, 2 consultants on art, a coordinator for Judaism and Tradition, a director of community services, a publication editor, a personnel director, a coordinator of adult education, 2 consultants on programs for the aged, 3 community work supervisors (and
several others on a contractual basis), 7 regional consultants, and 19 clerical workers -- a staff exceeding 50 persons.

Staffing and manpower development were critical problems during the first phase of operations. Since the enterprise was new and its functions, somewhat ambiguous, early applicants for center directorships covered a wide range of qualifications and experience. Those hiring directors felt that there was no model in Israel of the director's job which could serve the applicant as an example. Zipori recalled that the first pool of applicants numbered 75; only 7 or 8 were suitable. The scarcity of qualified applicants was exacerbated by the fact that few centers were located near the country's population centers. Becoming a center director in Mitzpe Ramon, for instance, would be similar to exile to the proverbial Oshkosh, in American parlance. Zipori concentrated hiring efforts on new immigrants with experience in community centers overseas and on rereturning Israeli emissaries with similar experience. In the Fall of 1971, the one-year, post-B.A. Schwartz Program To Train Community Center Directors was inaugurated at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in the School of Social Work with the cooperation of the School of Education.

Center directors are employed under contract with the ICCC itself. Zipori's rationale was (1972:23):
a. to ensure uniform staff qualifications;

b. to prevent the hiring practices that, to our sorrow, are accepted in many settlements where personal preferences, political pay-offs, and nepotism form the basis for employment; and

c. to guarantee mobility from one center to another without loss of seniority and other benefits.

"In this way," he said. "we are trying to guarantee the execution of work according to the spirit, intentions, and directions which we want for the centers. Otherwise, we doubt that it would be possible to withstand all the pressures while carrying out the changes."

Directors' employment benefits were superior to those of workers at comparable civil service levels in other agencies. In addition to a higher salary, said Zipori (1972:24), the director's position "as the representative of a central body sent to work in a particular settlement or neighborhood...gains him a special status that's pretty strong."

Each director hires his own staff, under contract to the community center. A typical ICCC center might have several units under the overall direction of the director, organized by age group and/or by function. One center might have a Youth Unit, an Adult Unit, a Pensionnaires Unit, a Sports Unit, a Library, and an Art and Crafts Unit. Unit Heads plus the director came to be known as the center's senior staff. Each Unit Head was responsible for programming activities in his unit, hiring teachers to conduct the activities.
purchasing equipment, recruiting students, and finding funds and donors to supplement the center's budget to operate these programs.

Staffing a center was no less difficult for the directors than it was for Zipori: Unit Head positions were also new and required relocation to distant places. The Schwartz Program's title was changed after a few years to include "Senior Staff"; it added a few Unit Heads to the network.

In 1971 Amidar, the Government Immigrants' Housing Corporation, approached the ICCC with an offer to fund community workers who would operate out of local centers. Amidar had a Community Organization (CO) unit. Its workers included former union and party organizers; few were university-trained, but Amidar provided in-service training sessions. They operated out of local Amidar offices, which were often small or otherwise not conducive to satisfactory work performance. Apparently, the ICCC's new buildings, located in the immigrant settlements where much of Amidar's housing stock was also found, were attractive as potential CO work sites. In 1972, Amidar and the ICCC signed a one-year contract to co-sponsor community organizers in centers. That Fall, the ICCC hired two supervisors and 11 new organizers, 10 of whom were college graduates in social work or the social sciences, and they joined a training program with Amidar's other new organizers.

At the time, the senior staff in some of the smaller or
more remote towns consisted only of a director and a community worker. All the problems of a generally more-educated group, with professional loyalties to CO practice encouraged by the training sessions and organizational allegiance to HQ which managed their hiring, exacerbated by the newness of the profession in Israel and the relative vagueness of occupational description, characterized relations between community workers and their co-workers. Moreover, the theoretical similarity of CO principles to the community center's mission made the organizers, in their own eyes, the arbiters of center practice. Their professional supervisors in headquarters and Amidar expected them to teach their directors and colleagues about community organization, considered the proper professional method of center work. Their immediate superiors, the center directors, resented what they regarded as undue meddling in their affairs by employees of another organization -- the CO supervisors. Intra- and inter-organizational tensions abounded.

The Amidar contract was not renewed, but the principles of CO practice had taken root. All local CO personnel were retained; the ICCC undertook to support them and the two supervisors. The Joint Distribution Committee probably influenced this decision. For one, its senior staff were social workers, many of them from American community center backgrounds where social work was seen as an integral part of center work. Ralph Goldman, by now Associate Director of
JDC-Israel, retained his connection with Zipori and his influence on the ICCC's development. (1) Secondly, Zipori was looking for direction, especially in a professional context. The Americans had extensive center experience: the lure of ideas American bolstered the attraction that professionalism held. Thirdly, JDC had money. Although the ICCC absorbed the salaries of the organizers, at least initially, JDC could fund the supervisors, especially since manpower development was one of its own central interests.

The ICCC's relationship with JDC grew because of the joint appeal of professional advice and financial support. JDC, in turn, sought someone experienced in center work and social work education to serve as consultant to the ICCC. The agency was able to draw experienced center men for one-month junkets; then William Kahn from St. Louis came for a six-month advisory Sabbatical; and later, Ernest Segal came from Texas for an extended period, arriving just before the 1973 war. Segal succeeded in introducing a program concept of in-service training that greatly advanced the ICCC. He was succeeded by Dr. Arnulf Pins, a social work educator with center experience, who influenced the professional development of the JDC was well as the ICCC, the latter in the direction of community organization practice and manpower training.

(1) The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJ-JDC) has offices in Geneva, New York, and elsewhere. Its Jerusalem office is called JDC-Israel.
Manpower training and program development followed a course influenced not only by JDC and ICCC personnel but also by the succession of contemporary social and political events. These influences are traced in the next chapter.
Chapter 8. Public Social Concerns

Introduction

According to Zipori, planning committee members took one of three approaches as the purpose of the community center. In the first approach, the purpose of the centers was to educate the population. Whether that meant supplementary schooling for youth or adult education, whether in the arts or in scholarship or in physical education, the emphasis was to be pedagogic. Personnel in the field were to be well-versed in psychology, didactics, and educational problem-solving skills; their aim was to be causing individual change in the person attending the center. Of course, there was no opposition to this view, he recalled; debate concerned the relative emphasis on and dominance of the educational approach in theory and deed.

The second major view was the welfare or social approach, which placed group development at the heart of the community centers' work. The central problem was not merely changing individual values but rather more comprehensive social change: to cause a settlement of immigrants who had been brought together by way of refugee camps (ma'abarot) or transferred directly from their ships to weave the fabric of an active social grouping and community.

The third view was called the service approach: services for the citizen, the family, the group. The goal was to raise the level of services, with an emphasis on
quality, in order to raise the level of the population.

All three approaches were reflected in the committee's recommendations, Zipori said, and this comprehensiveness became one of the hallmarks of the program, as it was innovative as compared with other social policies and projects. (1)

In his April, 1971 "Report and Background Material" on the ICCC for a conference with the Director-General of the Ministry of Education and Culture, Zipori presented a "Definition of Purposes" of a community center. He wrote:

The community center was a vehicle for:

a. Social integration, by creating a meeting place for all sections of the population

b. Social and cultural values

c. Enlightened utilization of the individual's and family's leisure time

d. Improving services to the citizen in the sphere of culture, recreation and entertainment

The Center will merge and combine all existing types of activities. The Center will be a social and cultural creation of the community itself. It should provide a base for the development of initiative and the members of the community are partners in the responsibility for its operation. Centralization of activities will bring about the large increase in the number of participants in group activities in the social, cultural, artistic and sports areas. The Center will take the place of the 'street' and the various 'cafes' and will fill the leisure hours with cultural content. Activities will be guided and

controlled and will take place in a cultural and pleasant atmosphere. The varied choice of activities will meet the needs of all age groups and will be suited to the demands and inclinations of the individual, the family and the social group -- all under one roof.

Conceptions of the centers' roles were influenced by general perceptions of societal problems. An awareness of problems grew in the late 1960's, some say due to the increase in physical and economic security resulting after the June 1967 War. (1) Also, Russian immigration increased dramatically, from 9 in 1969 to 33,500 in 1973 -- not without problems. Not only did this immigration highlight differences in treatment and in status among groups; it also focused national attention on local problems of sub-groups of the Israeli population, and this attention extended to older immigrant groups from North Africa and Asia. (2) In addition, there was the delayed impact of social developments throughout the world, particularly the Kennedy and Johnson social programs in the U.S., at the lag of five to seven years typical among developing countries emulating the West.

One set of social issues concerned the fate of the development towns. Some people related their success or failure, in part, to another set of issues -- the newly reported increase in leisure time, and recreation as the solution to the problem of what to do with it.

(1) See discussion in Iris and Shama (1972).

(2) Macarov (1974) makes this second point.
Leisure time and the development towns

Toward the end of the 1960's, the public became aware of the concept of "leisure time" -- time free after work and family chores -- and the notion of its "constructive use". The main tenets of this concept were expressed by Dr. Hillel Raskin (1979) of the Hebrew University's Department of Physical Education and Recreation, as follows:

Today, we live in a leisure age, in which the character of society and the quality of life of people are determined to a great extent by leisure time activities. In this leisure age, for better or for worse, culture is fashioned by patterns of behavior of people mainly during leisure. The spontaneous and voluntary leisure activity of people may enrich or impoverish the quality of both individual and cultural life.

...The central problem posed by leisure is the question of how a civilization, in which leisure is the right of each and every individual, can assist each of its citizens in achieving an optimal balance in his free choice of his needs for rest, entertainment and participation in social and cultural life.

...The problem of the exploitation of leisure for both individual and social development in modern society is one which should occupy a special place in the society's order of preference. Appropriate leisure behavior of the individual in society will not develop on its own, but as a result of education, social conditions and the possibilities available.

The first research on Israelis' use of leisure time was undertaken in 1966. This pilot study, sponsored by the Institute for Applied Social Research and the Hebrew University's Communications Institute, focused on two cities. After television was introduced into the country two years
later, the researchers returned to update their study. A larger effort was completed in May - July, 1970: 4000 interviews were conducted in 56 settlements throughout the country, following Minister Aran's request before he left office. Their findings reported the use of leisure time as a function of education and stage of life ("a mix of age and family statuses"). Attendance at theater, concerts, and museums was a function of educational attainment. Concert audiences -- the reference seems to be to symphonies -- were "limited, almost absolutely, to adults, graduates of higher education institutions." Among the researchers' findings were the following:

+ Those living in small or new settlements complained about the lack of appropriate possibilities for leisure entertainment and the lack of appropriate company with whom to socialize.

+ Populations of the same age and schooling across different settlement types evidenced no difference in their demand for cultural activities.

+ Orientals attended theater and concerts less than Europeans of the same age and schooling. Among the second generation, the gap remained for those of average or low schooling, but it narrowed among those who attain higher education.

+ The ethnic factor does not influence educational activity.

+ Religious observance and education are the factors which
determine behavior and value differences in culture. 

+ In general, it seems that housing conditions have no particular effect on one's ability to read or on the amount of time devoted to reading. 

(1)

According to the ICCC's statistician, this research -- especially the pilot study and its immediate follow-up -- became part of the basis for defining a need for cultural/recreational facilities. The research also influenced Zipori's conceptualization of the community centers' task. [17]

Leisure time and the lack of recreational facilities were used to explain part of the difficulties the development towns were encountering. One of the objectives of these new towns, built between 1955 and 1963, was to disperse the State's population throughout its territory, away from the growing metropolitan center of Tel Aviv, especially toward its borders, for security as well as economic reasons. Toward the end of the 1960's, the fact that the development towns on the whole were losing residents while the cities (Tel Aviv in particular, where over 1/3 of the State's population was concentrated) were gaining came to the public's attention. (2)

(1) Katz and Gurevitch (1972).

(2) According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, development towns lost population at the rate of 7.1 per 1000 in 1970 and 8.9 per 1000 in 1975. Cited in the Jerusalem Post (1/26/81).
The main reason given for this internal migration was the lack of appropriate employment prospects -- or their absence entirely -- for youth returning from their army service. The 1967 war highlighted this problem, which became the focus of the annual National Conference of Mayors of Development Towns in January, 1969. According to the reporter who covered that Conference, the continued existence of each development town would depend on its success in providing work for its youth and in "enabling them to establish families there after their army service." The problem was seen as a lack of variety of employment opportunities and vocational training.

The reporter continued:

An important development is that from year to year the number of youth who study at the universities and other institutions of higher learning is increasing. These youngsters who take up advanced studies are a source of encouragement to the new towns, but there is always the anxiety among the inhabitants as to whether their children will return to the town or will seek work outside the place where they were raised. Naturally, during their studies the big city will tend to attract youth away from the small town.

The proposed solution? "In order to keep these youth attached to their home town after completion of their studies, it is necessary to improve housing facilities, amenities, taxes and credit facilities to help those starting out in life." (1)

But increased facilities and amenities are a function of town size. Where once it was deemed necessary to have a local population of 10,000 in order to provide adequate services, by 1969 the number had risen to 20,000, according to the same reporter. That is, to stem the emigration tide, one needed to provide better services; but to justify the State's expense to provide "adequate" services, one needed a 20,000 minimum resident population -- this, at a time when development town populations varied from 6000 average for a small one to 15,000 for a large one. Another reporter wrote at that time: too many development towns have remained too small to solve the problems of services, education, health, etc. ...The lack of entertainment possibilities is one of the factors causing dissatisfaction among population of these towns, though obviously it is not worthwhile to open such establishments in some of the smaller towns. ...It is clear today that a town needs a population of at least 50,000 in order to be able to develop independently and economically in the matters of education, cultural services, etc. The few who are successful leave them....

New immigrants are not going to live in the towns, he continued. Thus, no local intelligentsia will develop in them. The small towns are condemned to a "long life of poverty," and he recommended closing some down. (1)

These concerns are reflected in planners' views of the community centers' roles as they saw them then. Pozner

(1) Tevet (1970). The development towns will be discussed further in the next section.
recalled that the center was to be a meeting place to fill free time and to integrate residents of the community. It was to turn "a gathering into a community and an apartment block into a neighborhood", she said, playing on the Hebrew forms of these words. The center would stand out as a magnet and pull people together. In their leisure time they would "hang out" together, meet for entertainment, and thereby acquire additional education and solve other problems: the provision of infant care, a day care center, self-help, and social welfare services. "The great thing about it," said Pozner, "was that as the work developed, we learned about problems that existed. Spontaneously. And the social problem aspect joined the 'leisure time' concept -- as we learned that the problems weren't characteristic of leisure time [i.e. of an excess of free time with nothing to do]." [31]

One JDC staff member wrote that the centers "are designed to:
a. Assist the various immigrant groups in their respective communities to more effectively integrate into Israeli society.
b. Help development towns to become more attractive places within which to live.
c. Provide supplementary education for the children in these towns."

Reporting on his October, 1970 round of the existing 7 centers, the staff member noted that "the actual
program...focused primarily on school age children.... There is a definite plan to emphasize young adult, adult, and senior adults activities, but, to date, there has only been limited success in these areas." (1)

Ralph Goldman was asked recently why he thought at the time "that a replica of an institution that proved good for the American community would be good for Israeli society." He replied:

I grew up and was trained in community centers, so the subject is in my blood. ...I believed that despite the fact that the Community Center was an American institution in character, it could help in the development of the new State, mainly in absorption of new immigrants that began streaming in from all over the world. [It could be] a tool for social and cultural integration, in every sense.... There are some universal languages -- painting, for instance, music, dance. The Community Center is the only place where each [immigrant] can speak his own language and still be understood by the others. ...We must not forget that the Community Center was established in the U.S. at the end of the last century by Jews for Jews, who came from all over the world, to ease their integration in the new community. The Community Center achieved this goal. (2)

The social gap

To the concern for the fate of the development towns and their residents was added a concern for immigrant integration. By 1970, Pozner noted, people seemed suddenly

(2) Lavi (1980).
to awaken to the perception that somehow, while no one was looking, two Israels had grown up side by side, with a large gulf or gap separating them economically, socially, educationally, culturally. This social gap, as it was called, was seen to divide Israeli Jews of European and American origin — "Israel A" — from those who came from the Islamic states of North Africa and the Middle East — the "second Israel". For 20 years, Israel had avoided or denied charges of discrimination. Suddenly, stories of Westerners' discrimination against Easterners were rampant.

This specific classification of the population into two groups is more a generalized attribution than a demographically-accurate fact. There are Eastern or Oriental Jews among Israel's elite and middle classes; and there are Jews of Polish and Rumanian origin among the development town poor. (1) The more salient feature of such a bi-polar grouping would be the geographic distinction between metropolitan area residents and those of the development towns. As one researcher points out: "...income gap is even a function of geography, reflecting the clustering of the

(1) The gap descriptions ignore, by and large, the rural agricultural sector: kibbutz and moshav collectives have succeeded and failed, economically and socially, independent — to a great extent — of the geographic or ethnic origins of their members, in the long run. There are American/European kibbutzim which have been in the red for years (such as Gezer and Gesher HaZiv); there are Yemenite moshavim which have turned a profit only in the last two years; and there are other collectives, including Oriental ones, which have been independent of central movement aid for a decade and more.
various ethnic groups in Israel's different types of urban communities." (1) Generalizing about population clusters makes the distinction appear to be between Westerners as "haves" and Easterners as "have-nots". Evidence in support of the discrimination argument, whatever its parameters, includes the following data.

**Immigration**

Immigration policies changed over time, as did the ethnicity (or country of origin) of the immigrant pool. (2) In the 1950's and early 1960's, the government had neither the time nor the resources to develop an immigrant "absorption" program. In all, 1,209,000 people immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1964. (3) The housing shortage was

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(1) Greenberg (1979), p. 132.

(2) Data in the following discussion are drawn from Facts About Israel (1977:61-96).

(3) In the post-Statehood period of 1948-1951, 687,000 immigrants more than doubled Israel's pre-State population of 452,000. These people came from:

- British internment camps on Cyprus (Europeans escaping Hitler) (25,000)

- displaced person camps in Germany, Austria, Italy
  - Poland (103,732)  Bulgaria (30,000)  Yemen (47,000)
  - Romania (118,940)  Libya (30,500)  Iraq (121,500)

About 48,000 newcomers were settled on 345 new agricultural kibbutzim and moshavim; some 130,000 were housed in abandoned Arab property in areas later designated as development towns (e.g. Ramla, Lod, Bet She'an); 250,000 were housed in 113 transit camps (ma'abarot - tent cities later converted to tin or wood shacks).

Another wave of immigrants followed in 1955-6: from
severe; resources were rationed. Those who had family already in Israel were usually helped by them to settle — often in cities and suburbs. Those who had desired skills and/or capital were able to contend with the open market and settle themselves in cities, towns or agricultural areas as they chose. These were mostly educated refugees from the urban centers and towns of Europe.

The remainder — mostly North African, Polish, Romanian, and Islamic-state immigrants — were incorporated in what became known as "direct absorption." They lacked — or were told that they lacked — desired and useful skills; and they arrived without capital or family contacts. In most cases, they came without their communal leaders. The latter and the elites of these communities had immigrated to France, England, Canada, the United States, and South America. The traditional religious leadership which came to Israel was dispersed and not integrated into the bureaucratized rabbinate of the State. (1) These people became, in short, dependent on the State for housing, employment, and all other help. Since the major social policy during those years was

Morocco and Tunisia following independence there; from Poland following an expulsion of Jews from the Communist Party; from Hungary after the revolution (8,680); from Egypt after the Sinai Campaign (14,000) — 165,000 in total. The next wave came between 1961 and 1964, bringing 215,056 people from Eastern Europe and North Africa, including 7,700 from Algeria.

(1) Shokeid (1980:esp. p. 218) discusses the incorporation of traditional communal positions, of which the office of rabbi is one, into civil service patterns, which the new State inherited from British and Ottoman laws and customs.
population dispersal (for security, water resource, and economic reasons), the State directed these immigrants to the development towns, the primary instrument of population dispersal.

Immigration policy changed in the mid-1960's, as did the immigrant pool. Between 1968 and 1972, the fourth wave of immigration brought 205,000 Jews from Western Europe, Latin America, the British Commonwealth, the U.S., and the USSR. With the notable exception of the Soviet Georgians, these have been professionals, academics or entrepreneurs, largely financially independent. According to the Israel Information Centre publication, "In 1965, to answer the specific requirements of members of the academic professions, the [Jewish] Agency opened residential ulpanim," intensive courses in basic Hebrew. (1) These immigrants' "indirect absorption" has been through such residential hostels provided by the government and largely subsidized, including job counseling, school placement for children, and other assistance in addition to the language classes. Moreover, they have been able to purchase housing on the open market or have been eligible for government housing of a standard much higher than the housing made available to earlier immigrants.

Government policies toward these later immigrants capitalized on the apparent readiness of "Anglo-Saxons" and others to immigrate for the first time in the State's

(1) Facts About Israel, p. 92.
history. In order to offer a standard of living that would match, as nearly as possible, what the Western immigrant was leaving behind, the State extended tax rebates and customs exemptions to new immigrants. For example, they were excused from the 100% customs duty on cars, ovens, refrigerators, and other "luxuries", a levy which veteran citizens and "new immigrants" from the 1950's and 1960's had to pay.

The result appeared as a pattern of conspicuous consumption, making visible the "social gap". The development towns -- with their concentrations of poor, unskilled, unemployed, non-literate adults and their children -- became noted for their absence of such "luxuries", for their overcrowded housing conditions, and for their high percentage of welfare recipients. Cities and towns, with their wealthier residents, stood in marked contrast. Thus, the economic, social, and cultural differences of the so-called two Israels, seemingly correlated with ethnic divisions, are more accurately seen as a geographic distinction. This is not to deny the high correlation between Asian-African background and low economic class, but rather to suggest other components of the problem which make it appear in a certain light.

Indicators of Disparity

One indicator of the disparity between population groups has been housing density. European families, averaging 4 persons, and Asian-African families, averaging 7 persons, have been housed in apartments of identical size. Thus, in
1957, more than half of the Asian-African population lived with a density of 3 or more persons per room. The comparable figure for Europeans would be 75% at 1.3 persons per room.

(1) Another indicator of disparity between groups is educational attainment. Among the poor, secondary education was often prohibitively expensive. Until 1969, schooling was compulsory and free through 8th grade only. Then, compulsory and free schooling was extended through 9th grade, and in

(1) Data are from the Central Bureau of Statistics, reported in the Jerusalem Post.

The question of desired densities was not raised in academic circles, let alone in policy arenas, until the late 1970's. The assumed preference followed the European/American model of parents sleeping in one room and no more than 2 children together in different rooms, with sexes separated. Among Asian/Africans, the accustomed and apparently desired density was higher. There was no separation between eating, sleeping, and living areas. Different activities were accommodated often simultaneously, in the same room. At night, several children would sleep together in the same bed; parents and children often slept in the same room.

Seen through Western eyes, this represented extreme backwardness, poverty or both. Because of their ignorance of Western customs, including flush toilets and apartment buildings, the most rural of the Asian-Africans came to be called "primitivism" with intoned disdain and disgust. By 1972, these people had adopted Western custom to such an extent that they called the newly arrived Soviet Georgians "primitivism" for themselves hanging chickens in apartment hallways or washing clothes in toilets.

Whether the Asian/Africans considered 3 and more persons per room intolerable density in 1955 is today, moot. At the time, no one asked the question. Today, it is sometimes the subject of historical reconstruction and conjecture, with all the limitations of those exercises. Social research for the Ministry of Housing in the mid-1970's did, however, raise the question, concluding that Asian/Africans often felt lonely at the lower densities considered desirable by Westerners, since they expressed preferences for housing conditions of higher densities.
some development towns, through 10th grade. In the early 1970's, one year of high school cost more than one year of college, due to government subsidies of the latter.

Features of the development towns exacerbated the problem of high schooling costs. Since most were located in remote areas of the country, it was usually difficult to attract qualified teachers, as well as other professionals. The quality of schooling and other services, therefore, was generally inferior to that in the cities.

Educational attainment among development town residents is markedly lower as compared with urban residents, due to these and other factors, including the tradition of adolescents working to help support the family. The following tables present some of these statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High School Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of pupils beginning first grade who continued on through 8 - 12 grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of origin</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Europe/America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa/Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, reported in the *Jerusalem Post* (1/26/81).

+ Statistics present the figures as indicative of ethnic distinctions rather than geographic distinctions. The reader should bear in mind that Asian/Africans constitute the majority of development town residents, but the problem has generally not been seen as a settlement problem.
University Attendance +

Percent of total students registered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>1969/70</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe/America*</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa/Asia</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes foreign students

Source: Idem.

Higher Education Attainment: 1970 +

Percent completing 11 or more years of schooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Immigrant generation</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe/America</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Katz and Gurevitch (1972).

The percent of development town residents needing welfare support has been very high, due to such factors as selective assignment of unskilled workers and their families to these towns and continual emigration of upwardly mobile people. In one town, for example, 60% of the families in 1972 received monthly support payments, and an additional 30% received biannual "gifts" — food, clothing and shoe allowances, for instance, for the New Year and Spring holidays.

This picture of two Israels, divided geographically and ethnically, is summed up in the words of one woman explaining
why she chose not to move to a development town: "I wanted my children to learn good Hebrew — and to really know what Independence Day is all about." (1) The negative image has even been adopted by the residents themselves: "Anyone who is successful, leaves," as one said. (2)

**The Black Panthers**

Government efforts in the late 1960's - early 1970's to improve the lot of the development towns -- through tax incentives, industrial development, housing schemes, educational plans -- were at worst ineffectual and at best, inconsistent, because the different Ministries varied on their definition of what actually constituted a development town. Be that as it may, the decade of the 1960's saw no public protest of development town conditions. When protest did begin, it started in the city slums, populated almost exclusively by Asian-Africans. Several reasons are offered in explanation of the seemingly sudden end to this quiescence:

- Israel had new secure borders after the 1967 War and could direct attention to internal social problems.
- The "second Israel", feeling insecure about their social position before the War, had substantial numbers fighting alongside Westerners in 1967, and fighting valiantly and well. Having "proved" themselves in battle, they felt

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(1) *Jerusalem Post*, 5/6/77.

(2) Personal communication.
that they "belonged" and could now demand and expect the status and treatment they perceived that Westerners enjoyed.

- The post-War influx of Western immigrants was greeted by government concessions on taxes and by apartments of a new, standard, large size. Easterners, who still had to pay 100% customs duty on automobiles and appliances, and who now felt cramped in their smaller apartments, saw themselves done out of conditions they claimed were also rightfully theirs.

(1)

The slums exploded in January, 1971, starting from Jerusalem's Musrara section. Young Israelis of Eastern background demonstrated outside the Knesset [Parliament] building in Jerusalem. According to Jerusalem Post reporters, their main complaints were the lack of job opportunities and their poor, crowded housing conditions [3/1/71]; they were demanding rehabilitation through vocational guidance and an end to "Oriental ghettos" and slum conditions, as well as "clubs and better roads in our areas." [3/12/71] The demonstrators adopted the name "Black Panthers". They posted signs around the city such as the following:

ENOUGH!

We are a group of exploited youth and we are appealing to all others who feel they are getting a

(1) This would support an argument that density and crowding are social concepts. Iris and Shama (1972) and Smooha (1972) discuss these feelings at greater length.
raw deal.

Enough of not having work;
 enough of having to sleep 10 to a room;
 enough of looking at big apartments they are
 building for new immigrants;
 enough of having to stomach jail and beatings...;
 enough of unkept promises from the Government;
 enough of being underprivileged;
 enough discrimination.

How long are we going to keep silent?...
We are protesting our right to be treated just as
any other citizen in this country. [JP, 2/5/71]*

A 22-year-old Black Panther told a Post reporter:

All this talk about Russian Jews bugs me.
They never made any fuss about the Jews in
Iraq. We know why they want the Russian
Jews: it's because they think they're all
scientists. They think Oriental Jews are
stupid. [JP, 2/5/71]

In a country that enjoyed a history of public social
consensus, the demonstration of dissent was not taken
lightly. There had been riots before, in 1959, of
disgruntled slum dwellers, most memorably in Haifa's Wadi
Salib. As seems to have happened then, these demonstrators
were initially dismissed. After a community worker in the
Jerusalem Municipality's Social Welfare Department leaked a
story about the incipient demonstrations, his Unit and
Department Heads "decried the story as cheap, sensational and
largely untrue." [JP, 2/5/71] The "Black Panther" label
alienated many otherwise-potential supporters. The name

* The Jerusalem Post will be abbreviated JP in the following
pages.
itself conjured up an image "of an Israeli Huey Newton parading about Dizengoff Circle in Tel Aviv [then the fashionable center of Israel's "society"], brandishing a[n] Uzi submachine gun," wrote Iris and Shama (1972:37). The late Golda Meir, then Prime Minister, said, "They are not nice boys." A Labor Ministry official claimed that "they have not looked for work seriously." [JP, 3/1/71]

Public expressions of sympathy for the Black Panthers came first from abroad. A clinical social worker from California who frequently visited Israel wrote a letter to the editor of the *Jerusalem Post* (2/15/71), saying that she was reminded of her experiences in the Los Angeles ghettoes of 20 years earlier, which led to the Watts riots. "To be sure, no one seems to know exactly what a Panther is" in the Israeli context, she wrote.

But presumably, people in Israel think of the Panthers as a militant, violence-oriented group which is politically aligned with Fatah [the P.L.O.] and the Third World movement.

I suspect that "Panther" means something quite different to young gang members. While the Panthers are often considered "outsiders", the truth is that they are frustrated would-be "insiders". They want money, status, and a say in determining their own destiny. They feel they have been forced to take the revolutionary stance because there is no other way to make an impression on the "Establishment".

It is easy to see why the young gang members of Jerusalem are angry and frustrated. They see the new apartments in Ein Kerem and Ramat Eshkol [two middle class neighborhoods] filled with newcomers. But
they continue to live in their miserable hovels and dark alleys. There are plenty of jobs, but none for them of the type which will raise their self-esteem. There are schools, but none suited to their particular needs. They are forgotten.

And most tragic for them, even the army will not have them. Since in Israel the army has much status and is the badge of true "belonging", rejection from the army amounts to rejection from society. (1)

Speaking of alleged discrimination against certain communities, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education Yigal Allon told a reporter "that the large majority of Oriental immigrants had come to Israel with no property at all, but they had been able to get homes and jobs, and they benefit from progressive social services. Pockets of poverty still existed, but these would be eradicated -- he hoped, within a very few years." [JP, 5/23/71]

Policy Minister Shlomo Hillel, himself of Oriental background, said:

The economic and social gap is one of the world's most painful problems, and Israel suffers from it more seriously than most, because of the need to create a country in a generation or two. Scars had remained in Israeli society from the days of mass immigration, some of them still open and painful, but they proved that Israel's society was vigorous and alive. [JP, 5/25/71]

(1) The army does not draft men and women who are illiterate or who have criminal records, two characteristics of this population group. At the time, street-gang workers were trying to convince the army to change this policy. The army did experiment with drafting juvenile delinquents; the outcomes were mixed; and the experiment was subsequently dropped.
Dr. Israel Katz, then director of the National Insurance Institute, was among the first vocal Israeli sympathizers. He cited the following statistics:

+ Easterners were 55-60% of the total Jewish population.
  - 10% of Members of Knesset were Easterners
  - 90% of prison inmates were Easterners  [JP. 8/4/71]
+ 92% of all families with 5 and more children were Easterners.
  - the average Eastern family size is 1.5 times that of the average European family
  - per capita consumption of the average Eastern family equalled 67% of the average Israeli Jewish family's per capita consumption in 1959; it equalled 43% of the latter's in 1969  [JP. 11/10/71]

+ Among Easterners, 1 student in 20 matriculates high school; among Europeans, 1 student in 3 matriculates high school.  [JP. 11/10/71]

Speaking in May, 1971, Dr. Katz said:

giving money to the poor sounded very good. but in a modern state what counted was social services for the whole population. ...There can be no talk of social services just for the poor. ...Poor neighborhoods have poor services, partly because people don't know how to secure their rights.... The people who can demand good services are the middle classes, and that is why services should be universal. Otherwise we are running the very serious danger of having two populations.  [JP. 5/25/71]

Six months later, he said:

Israel's Black Panthers have made an important contribution to Israel by increasing the nation's sensitivity to its social problems. ...While every social indicator showed enormous progress in absolute terms for every sector of Israel's population, the majority of Israelis today demand progress in relative terms too.
There are groups in Israel which have not been truly absorbed. [JP, 11/10/71]

In their September, 1971 meeting, the Public Council for Community Work -- including Pozner, Zipori, and representatives of the Ministry of Welfare -- discussed "Social and Economic Gaps in Israeli Society: the Contribution of Community Work to Narrowing the Gaps." [protocol, 9/7/71]

**Juvenile delinquency and the Katz Commission**

With the focus on other social problems, public attention to juvenile delinquency and its concomitant problems of drug use and prostitution grew. JDC-Israel reported an increase in the number of juveniles referred to probation services from 3650 in 1966 to 11,000 in 1968, levelling off at over 10,000 through 1970. Recidivism increased from a steady 32% to 38-40%. [JDC report to Geneva, 11/9/72]

On February 21, 1971, the Government decided to constitute a committee to study these problems. In May, Prime Minister Meir appointed 130 sociologists, psychologists, educators, and other social policy experts to the Commission on the Plight of Underprivileged Youth, under the chairmanship of Dr. Katz. The Katz Commission, as it became known, was seen by many as a response to the Black Panthers' demonstrations and "the swing in public attention toward the plight of the poor" [JP, 11/15/72] -- a
correlation Mrs. Meir denied, citing her early initiative in forming the Commission as proof of her own personal concern for social problems. [JP, 3/28/73]

The Commission met for over a year, delivering its 3-volume report on November 12, 1972. Its recommendations included changes in existing patterns of formal and non-formal education, health care, and recreational facilities, as well as a minimum guaranteed income. In the chapter on community work, they wrote:

One of the outstanding problems...is the absence of knowledge and clarity regarding methods and substance appropriate to the needs of youth; and especially...against the background of the fact that the majority of the existing methods and content are taken largely from the social and cultural world of the established middle classes.
Chapter 9. The Social Mandate of the ICCC

Introduction

The Katz Commission created impetus, legitimacy, and budgets for the community center effort, according to the ICCC statistician. [17] While the community centers had been developed as answers to problems of recreation and leisure time, the new public focus on social problems led to new roles for the centers. These roles are discussed in this chapter.

The ICCC Mission: 1969 - 1973

Before the first 5-year plan matured, a second 5-year plan was added, incorporating slum areas into the ICCC's province. Haim Zipori presented these changes in a letter explaining his postponement of a scheduled trip to New York: the delay was made necessary by our preparations for a major undertaking on the part of the centers in connection with a new plan in the battle with poverty, in consequence of the arousal of sensitive groups to the subject of the social gap.

We have just crystallized a program to build another 30 matnassim in distressed areas of the large cities (until now we have attended to development towns only), and it was submitted two days ago to [Finance] Minister Sapir.... (1)

A JDC proposal for projects to support Israel's community centers, written at the end of 1971, described centers as "a new experiment following a thorough

(1) H.Z. to Asher Tarmon, Director, World Federation of Jewish Community Centers, N.Y., 5/26/71. [Hebrew original]
investigation and study of the possibilities to advance weak communities in need of social integration and community development." The proposal continues:

Last spring, when the Israel public's attention was drawn to the problem of poverty by the "Black Panthers", the mayors of the development towns and large cities began to plead for more Community Centers in their poverty stricken areas. ...There was a general feeling that Community Centers can advance social integration and reduce ethnic tensions.

In the following description of the ICCC's mission, quoted at length from its first promotional brochure, published in 1971, we find the various social concerns of the time interwoven with earlier conceptions of the purpose of the community center.

The amount of leisure time at the disposal of modern society is continuously growing. People who have ample means use this time in a variety of well directed ways, but in new immigrant development towns and in the city slums there simply isn't any spare money in the people's pockets. Their possibilities for entertainment or the utilization of their free time, therefore, are very limited. Youth spend their free time aimlessly hanging around the street corners, and their elders fill their days with meaningless occupations.

Once in a while a cultural event comes to the small town. After the curtain goes down, the artists pack their sets and move on to the big city. The local Culture House very often does not fulfill the needs. It offers very little and its appearance is depressing. This is not the place for both teenagers and adults.

Eventually the social desolation prevailing [sic] in many immigrant development towns brings about depression and spiritual degeneration and leads the youth to a street life, the outcome of which is unfortunately predictable.

* * *
[Looking at the experience in the developed countries:] For example -- America, where Community Centers are often found in cities quite a distance from the cultural scene. Among trees and green landscape, large facilities have been erected to serve as centers for the widening of horizons for the whole community. Those who want to stretch their limbs at sports will find football and basketball fields, special physical education equipment and a swimming pool. For those interested in cultural activities there are libraries, clubs, lectures and many other edifying activities for their leisure time.

The [study] committee's purpose was to adapt all this to the realities of Israel in general and the development towns in particular. They were convinced that in Israel it was also possible through Community Centers to bring about fruitful meetings among the various social groups, whether this was in Ashkelon or Afula, Dimona or Yavneh. These and other places are known for being melting pots which absorbed communities from different countries, with differing customs and cultural backgrounds[,] and forged them into one community.

The Centers were also meant to be a place where positive use could be made of leisure time and where entertainment of a higher quality could be offered....

* * *

In 43 development towns and immigrant centers, cultural life was sorely lacking. Cultural and social activities in those towns were run by various and strange [i.e. estranged] bodies, when one often did not know what the other was doing. Veterans returning from the army could not stand the social desolation of the town where they had lived many years, and a number left their families and turned towards the beckoning lights of the big cities, while their brothers looked at them with envy, hoping to follow them some day.

There was a lack of capable instructors and professionals who would be able to provide fruitful cultural activities for the residents of these towns, as well as a lack of funds and appropriate facilities.

This problematic situation could only be solved by the founding of such Community Centers
that would integrate most of the social and cultural activities of immigrant settlements, widen the horizons of and attract both young and old.

* * *

The Community Center will be located in the center of each town, within everyone's reach. It will be a large building, spacious and comfortable. In the center of the facility, a big auditorium will be built for performances which had to be staged in less suitable halls in all sorts of places. The stage at its focal point will be able to accommodate shows with many participants.

Every room and corner in this building has to be put to maximal use. Thus, for instance, the dressing rooms can be used as club rooms, the entrance hall can be used for exhibitions, and so on....

The Center will also include a Friendship Club, structured on the model of the homey clubs one finds in some kibbutzim. The equipment of this club will include comfortable armchairs, a counter and self-service expresso [sic] machine, periodicals, table games like backgammon, checkers, chess and other accessories that will bring the members together and offer them a pleasant atmosphere of social and cultural well-being which is often absent from their impoverished dwellings.

They also proposed that Community Centers offer adequate activities for pre-school children and for retired senior citizens. A wide range of courses would be geared to people with different needs and tastes: they will range from dance and ceramics to drum instruction, weightlifting, sauna and judo. The athletic minded will go for the weightlifting equipment and those more intellectually inclined will opt for the chess club.

The committee also decided that a library is a must in every Center. It will be run by professional librarians and will include study rooms for adults and children, music rooms and audio-visual equipment.
Youth will be able to dance in a discotheque proposed for every Community Center. Possibly the spacious air raid shelter in every Center could be used for dancing.

A real Community Center would include a Nursery. The parents would be able to leave their children in the trustworthy professional hands of the nursery teachers, while they would profit from other useful occupations in the Center.

Community Centers must have genuine sports activities. It was decided to recommend a swimming pool, a lighted basketball field, tennis courts, a gymnasium and table tennis rooms.

And still the list of clubs and activities to be included in these Centers according to the original plan was not complete. Drama Clubs, a Classical Film Club, Folklore Clubs, the plastic arts such as painting and sculpture, artistic photography, music, theatrical performances and other similar entertainment. [sic]

Also to be included in the Center's activities were: Popular Education on high school and college levels, Popular Science Clubs, Natural History and Topography and others. Youth would gain from supplementary education courses as well as a variety of sports activities.

The Center would be the place where authors would meet their readers, new immigrants would meet old-timers and army veterans -- their friends. Senior adults and even the handicapped would spend their time here, women learn home economy, sewing and participate in Parents' Clubs.

(1)

A proposal to evaluate community center operations, written in May, 1972, described the ICCC's mission in similar conjunction with solving social ills:

The recent recognition of pervasive social problems in Israel society has brought with it persistent demands that something be done about them. The government has committed itself to

(1) "Community Centers in Israel" (1971).
explore a number of avenues designed to eliminate the causes of these problems and/or to reduce their consequences and/or to offer the victims of these problems a new chance or a new start. High on the list of priorities is the development of forty or more community centers in as many cities and towns throughout the land.... Each community center is expected to develop its own program, geared to unique problems of the locality in which it is located; yet there will be similarities in program due to the similarity in social problems and the similarity in expectations of the local population for service. (1)

In his first report on Community Organization in the ICCC, Shlomo Segev, national coordinator of that unit, wrote the following about the origins of the community centers (1973:3).

The economic growth that has been visited upon Israeli society in the last few years (since the Six Day War) has also reached the development towns and city suburbs. But it has not brought with it the social development expected. On the contrary, the social gap has deepened; the many hopes and dreams of social change have not been realized. Many of the development towns continue to be transit stations on the road to the center of the country...; those who remain lack the means necessary to contribute to the development of the towns.

Teachers and social workers watched with concern the increase of school dropouts, juvenile delinquency, and girls turning to prostitution. GIs left the towns where they grew up for nearby cities to learn a trade and enjoy the entertainment facilities there. Housing shortages...grew.

It was, therefore, necessary to find a solution for this social destitution. The late Zalman Aran, Minister of Education and Culture, ...saw in the community centers one of the tools with which cultural activities for all ages could be provided....

Segev continued that "self-help" was one of the basic ideas in operating the centers: "full participation of residents in the self-management of the center." The building itself was to be "multi-storey, restful, furnished and outfitted with great taste, and used to the hilt."

In May, 1973, in the Report to the Second Annual National Conference of the ICCS, Chairman of the Board Elad Peled wrote:

The matnas building...is often a contradiction to the houses surrounding it. Its cultured, spacious, restful atmosphere makes the acute social and cultural problems stand out. Despite this, when it was decided to build the centers, it was clear...that the center itself and its programs would belong to the world of a higher level of aspirations, which would serve as an example of what could be the legacy of its visitors. [Hebrew]

He concluded with a vision of the center as an all-inclusive, comprehensive coordinating body of educational and cultural services, serving the settlement as a single unit — the only way to make a great stride forward in the solution of social problems.

The actual programs of the centers were many and varied. In two fund-raising letters, Ralph Goldman described some of the activities he saw in the Bet She'an center on one of his visits:

Only four years ago, in the summer of 1968, I visited Beit Shean.... You know what the town was like then, politically, socially and economically. How different Beit Shean is in the fall of 1972. I naturally visited the Community Center. The first program I saw there was a group of 15 to 20 little girls, ages 8 to 12, on the stage of the
"air-conditioned" auditorium dancing ballet. How proud some of the citizens of Beit Shean must now feel that even their youngsters can study ballet. . . . It is not ballet that is important, but the fact that in this little God-forsaken town, the youngsters of the poor have an equal opportunity to be exposed to today's cultural activities as are the youngsters of the Tel Aviv residents. . . . I could mention many, many things that I saw in Beit Shean this time which have given the town greater self-confidence, greater pride, and a desire to remain there and develop their town. (1)

With regard to programs addressing problems of juvenile delinquency, recidivism, prostitution and drugs, JDC wrote about the "crash program to activate community centers in the depressed urban areas and development towns. . . . Such centers. . . can serve as major tools of social integration. . . . Community centers already exist in Israel. What is new is the concept of a community center as a dynamic instrument of social change, with special emphasis on attracting disadvantaged youth." Housing density is linked to success in school: "It was recently estimated that 250,000 children in Israel live in overcrowded housing conditions which do not give them the minimum of privacy and quiet essential to their progress in school and thus their success in the future." The new community center buildings "include libraries so that children from crowded homes can study at the center under the watchful eyes of a tutor." (2)

Wrote Harold Trobe, Executive Director of JDC-Israel:

(1) Letters to Mrs. B. S. and Mr. E. C. (9/29/72).
(2) JDC-Geneva public relations department (11/9/72).
"What we are aiming for is that kids from the poorer neighborhoods will be welcomed, in fact invited, to parties and other activities in the 'better' neighborhoods, and the other way around. This will not happen unless the educational level becomes more equalized." (1)

There are a few indications that developing a conception of the center's purpose and its program was a difficult task. Ralph Goldman presented one such picture in a letter.

Our contribution in the field of Community Centers would be welcome by those in power not just because of the funds but because of the professionalism and the access to professionals which we can provide. To my mind there is an additional crucial consideration.

Today, the Community Centers Program is understood by some in the Ministry of Education and not understood, and perhaps deliberately misunderstood, by others. As long as the source of funds for this program is only the Ministry of Education, some of the officials of that Ministry, because of departmental pressures, would like to convert the Centers Program into another Ministry of Education department.

The late Minister Aran in conceiving the idea of setting up a "Government Corporation" understood fully the significance of developing an independent voluntary organisation so that a creative community center program would be developed without the restrictions of the usual governmental bureaucratic regulations.

If JDC were to come in at this time with a program of some dimension, small to start with but with a plan for greater involvement in the future, there is no question in my mind but that this would affect the entire future of the Centers Program in Israel. If the Minister and Director General of the Ministry of Education knew that in addition to their funds outside financing would be possible, even for a limited period of time, they

(1) Letter to S. S. (11/20/72).
would view the whole Community Centers Program differently. (1)

During the first several months of 1971, the Public Council for Community Organization held a series of discussions on the nature of the community center in Israel. The group, attended by representatives of the Ministries of Education and Welfare, concluded that there was a need to define the purpose of the center and to distinguish among different kinds of centers in operation under the aegis of various agencies. [protocol, 7/15/71]

An American center director visited Israel for six months in early 1973, as a consultant to the ICCC and its operating centers. At a meeting with the JDC staff, he reported the following observations on center programs.

As we met and were trying to define a little more what the Community Centers are to do, I think there was agreement that in some ways there are parallels between the Community Center in Israel today and the Settlement House in the States of some years ago. One of the roles of the Center is to get into the community, get into the very fabric of the community and try to deal with some of the concerns of community life, in terms of motivating the kids as far as education goes -- that there is a future in it, to try to help parents define their role in the family and thus deal with the cultural gaps that exist with children who are into the Israel scene and parents whose life styles may be of another culture. A couple of the Centers began doing this, and they are meeting with success. The Center is more than just a happy house for basketball, clubs and batik. It must help build the community and work with the entire family.

(;) To S. S., JDC-Geneva (7/19/71).
Also at that meeting we agreed on the importance of the Center having a gymnasium. Israel will be hitting the health bug in the years ahead, like other Western countries. In America today you have great difficulty driving down the street because of the joggers everywhere, everybody is doing exercises and attempting to be in good condition and good shape.

* * *

At Yahud [a development town], the women of Savyon [Israel's fashionable "Upper East Side"] come for the slimnastic classes. When I was there I found some of the Savyon kids in the theater group. No one says, of course, "Hey, I'm from Savyon and you're from Yahud and we gotta integrate, man, and we gotta do our thing together." But there's an attractive show they're putting on, they've got a very good choreographer and kids are coming in from everywhere.

I don't know if they are going to socially integrate, but there are relationships that are developing. In some of the development towns the Center is seen as the place for the North African, the Rumanian and the Grizini [sic - Soviet Georgian]. Many of the directors have a beautiful sense of mission in this concept of respect for cultural differences and yet building a sense of community.

Generally, our Centers have a positive status in development towns. In Jerusalem, the Centers have a real fascinating mix of people. At the Lown Center it's amazing -- the skin pigmentation, the hair, the language, it's a real mixture. And the Center staff sees a chance of making a contribution to the country. That's what excites me. (1)

The ICCC and the Yom Kippur War: October 1973 - Summer 1974

Black Panther protest activity petered out after its heyday in 1971 and 1972. Hopes were high that the Katz Commission's Report, submitted in November, 1972, would

(1) Bill Kahn (7/5/73).
effectively address -- even solve -- problems of juvenile delinquency and the "newly-discovered" social gap. The community centers took these missions seriously: they hired street-gang workers and sent their staff to training sessions in combating the use of drugs.

The impetus of this new attention to social problems was interrupted and then diverted by the October, 1973 war which erupted suddenly on Yom Kippur. Israel sustained the largest per capita ratio of losses of any of her previous four wars; and while militarily not vanquished, socially and psychologically Israel suffered. The total lack of preparation for an attack and questionable management practices during the war precipitated a degree of public dissent from government policies unprecedented in Israel's history. This led, politically, to the downfall of Golda Meir's government in the short run and to the routing of the Labor Party in the long run. Immigration from the West, which had risen to new heights after the 1967 war, plummeted; emigration of Israelis swelled. Of the summers of 1974 and 1975 it was rumored that there were more Israeli citizens outside the country's borders than remained within.

The community centers during the War faced their first crisis. Most of the directors -- all men -- were drafted. Many of the centers remained open and operated "crisis programs" under the direction of the librarians, community workers, adult education or arts coordinators -- the female personnel. Some buildings were requisitioned by the Civil
Guard or the army for various operations. Programs were run in cooperation with them: patrols of high school students were sent out to inspect bomb shelters; others recruited sandwiches and balaklava helmets from local housewives and distributed them at nearby crossroads to troops en route to the front. Centers' telephone lines were opened to field telephones; as the war wore on, letter-writing campaigns to maintain contact with drafted community residents were mounted. Pre-army youth volunteered for agricultural work at nearby kibbutzim, and center staff coordinated transportation and assignments. Some centers were able to run programs to keep children off the streets during hours that were normally filled by school (although in some places, mothers kept their children indoors throughout the War period).

Parents were "relieved to know that their children were engaged in constructive activities, particularly inside buildings with excellent air raid shelters," noted Haim Zipori. "It was especially useful for families where the male parent was mobilized and the mother had her hands full with all the additional chores that she was now forced to carry out. Since the centers are located in areas with large concentrations of families with many children and low income, this program was of particular importance and a real service." (1)

When it was all over, the ICCC congratulated itself on a

(1) Quoted in JDC press release (n.d.).
job well done. Their internal reports and JDC-Israel's press releases described the war as a sort of trial or initiation into the society of social institutions, which the centers passed with flying colors. The war also served to consolidate the centers internally: there was a feeling within the organization that they had proved themselves, that they had "arrived" at last.

"The centers played a key role during the actual war period," Zipori reported, in a second JDC press release which claimed that the community centers provided "vital homefront services" and "proved a godsend, beyond all previous expectations." Zipori also said:

The centers proved they were an integral part of the community, that they were fully adaptable and could be counted on in time of emergency. By carrying out the thousand-and-one small but essential tasks for individual families, they gained the confidence of the entire community and made many new friends. Steps are now being taken to attract them to the centers during peacetime as well since this will help to integrate them much faster into the social fabric of the country.

In the same press release, Ralph Goldman, who had become JDC-Israel's Associate Director, said that the war "hastened a desirable process among the country's community centers. It pressed them into becoming multi-service centers, providing a wide variety of community services in addition to the recreational and educational activities which had been their primary endeavor until now."
A Supermarket of Services: 1974 - 1977

The multi-service idea, popular in American social work circles in the late 1960's, came into its own in Israel as the crisis period receded. The Katz Commission had laid the groundwork in a sense, by recommending comprehensive revisions of the social service structure, coordination of the various youth-serving agencies, and a "super-agency" of welfare services. The coordination concept fell on already fertile ground in the ICCC, which drew on the programs, budgets, and guidance of many departments within the same Ministry and crossed the boundaries of several Ministries.

The idea found its early organizational expression in the conception of the community center as a "supermarket of ideas and programs for all ages, at all levels." (1) Yael Pozner recalled that when her committee began to invent the model community center, they tried to design a building that would be "a functional supermarket" in meeting the maximum number of desires. It would contain space for performances and sports practices, for different clubs or classes, and a "members' lounge". (2)

The phrase evolved into "a supermarket of classes". As the multi-service center concept came into vogue, the "supermarket of classes" became a "supermarket of services", oriented toward different sub-groups of the population.

(1) "Jerusalem Community Centers" (1974); also, ICCC Annual Report (1975).

(2) Lavi (1979).
Coordination of these services became a major issue.

At the time the Katz Commission made its recommendations, public attention was focused on such problems as the duplication of social services and bureaucratic runaround and red tape. This focus was created largely by new immigrants from the West, who suggested the need for coordinated provision of information and the coordination of services themselves. For example, it was proposed that the community centers be the coordinators of immigration services: "Designed to be sensitive to, and to serve, the specific needs of their localities, the autonomous nature of the centers gives the residents, including new immigrants, a sense of belongingness and a proprietary interest in the center which enhances their participation."

Given its mandate and resources, the proposal continues, the center is uniquely suited to be the agency to coordinate "all of the information needed by new immigrants," "as many as possible of the services" needed, "informal educational activities", and the fostering of friendships and "good intergroup relations." (1) One month later, an inter-Ministerial meeting was held to arrange the coordination of all agencies offering community organization services. [protocol, 7/19/72]

While implementation of the Katz Commission's recommendations was diverted by the war (and deflected

(1) JDC proposal (6/20/72).
afterward by political and other considerations), the idea of coordinated services took root, and the centers' war experiences were assimilated into this conceptual context.

Thus, one JDC staffmember wrote that "just as the pressure of events forced the centers to move to new levels of achievement, the presentation to them of a master plan which emphasizes services to the entire community will be very productive." (1)

Haim Zipori called the community center "the integrator of welfare services" at the local level. As examples of the administrative complexity of some services, he cited the five agencies responsible for juvenile delinquents -- Police, Army (Gadna), Welfare, Labor, and Education and Culture's Youth Department -- and the seven responsible for caring for the elderly -- Welfare, Health, National Insurance, Medical Clinics, JDC, ICCC, and the Elder-Care Agency (sponsored jointly by JDC, Welfare, and Health). Added to these were the Local Councils and their departments parallel to the national Ministries. The matnas, he wrote, can and should cut across all these entities as their common local agent, adapting its service provision to local need and not the contrary. The effort demands maximal coordination, not only for efficiency but also for effectiveness. (2)

In an interview, Zipori was more direct in his comments:

(1) File memo on community centers (11/29/73).
(2) File memo (n.d.).
"The integration of services through the community centers would avoid the inflexibility of the local welfare and education departments, which are bound by policy of their Ministries or the mayors who appoint them."

Initial child-oriented programs such as "Head Start" or "Home Start" grew into comprehensive "Early Childhood Education Services". At the request of the Ministries of Welfare and Education toward the end of 1972, JDC took on the development of day-care centers, drawing on its experience in Moslem countries, with financial support from the Central British Fund for Refugee Relief. The ICCC centers, already receiving funding and professional guidance from JDC, were obvious places to house these day-care centers.

The first such program opened in Dimona in October, 1973, enabling "underprivileged families to send 30 children for daytime care while the mothers partake in a wide variety of activities at the Center," including home economics, sewing, home decorating, and child psychology. A multi-service center necessitated multi-use space, and JDC commissioned "a unique set of furniture which can be completely folded each day, closed into a space no larger than six square meters, and placed unobtrusively in a corner, thus freeing the room for other afternoon and evening activities."

(1) Quoted in the Jerusalem Post (1/6/77).
(2) File memo (11/9/72).
(3) JDC press release (1/13/74).
activities." (1)

JDC expanded its Schwartz Program to Train Senior Center Personnel to include directors of early childhood programs. These programs received a boost from a different angle, the "laundry club". Because of the high initial cost of a washing machine and the additional 100%-of-value customs duty levied, few poor families could afford their purchase. Nor were laundromats available. Many of the families in the development towns and city slums had young children; since the average family had 5 children, hand-washing laundry took up a large amount of a mother's time. Borrowing an idea tried earlier, two or three centers arranged laundromats on a small scale, but with a difference: while the machines washed, the women were to socialize over a cup of tea. Socializing gave way to classes on knitting and lectures on health. When women said they couldn't come because they had small children on hand, the supermarket expanded to offer child drop-off rooms with toys and babysitters. As they added cribs, the idea of a day-care center grew. The 1973 war added impetus to this effort: since schools were not in session, children were presumably at home under foot, and mothers could not accomplish their usual marketing and other tasks. The centers introduced "central babysitting", where a woman could drop off her children to run her errands.

Another project also reinforced the Early Childhood

(1) Idem.
Education service. After the War, with increasing public attention to the idea that parent-child interaction was necessary in the pre-school years, the idea of toy libraries was developed, and many centers adopted it. The libraries stocked "educational" games and toys, which children could use on the premises under the librarian's supervision. Parents were involved in training sessions designed to improve constructive child-oriented time. After a series of sessions, the parent could borrow games for home use. Sometimes out of this activity grew greater parental involvement in the school and classroom. The ultimate objective of the game library was to improve the quality of schooling to a level comparable to urban schools.

By August, 1974, the ICCC could declare:

One of the goals of the Community Center is caring for special groups in the community in order to turn them into "consumers" of its services and to make them happier and more ordinary. Among the special groups are: disabled soldiers, work accident victims, the blind, the chairbound, rehabilitated ex-convicts, pre-delinquents, drug addicts or reformed drug addicts, school dropouts, non-Jewish community members, tourists, students from nearby universities, etc. (1)

The task of the community centers, as stated in another request for funding, is to bridge "the gap between them [Jews of Asian-African origins] and their fellow Jews whose roots are in the modern Western tradition." The former, "because of the handicaps imposed upon them by life in the countries

(1) Memo, "Caring for Special Groups in the Community".
from which they came, ...were wholly unprepared from the standpoint of education, training and the mental and social outlook for life in a modern industrial society...." The proposal continues:

In keeping with this concept, the community centers have set as their goals the raising of the quality of life in the communities, removing the walls that separate the various ethnic groups from one another, dissipating the feeling of non-belonging that persists among the people who came from the culturally impoverished areas, motivating people to do for themselves things that will improve their condition, and encouraging collective action in shaping a community in which the people can take pride.

...Programmatically, these aims are expressed in efforts to secure better housing conditions for the people; to fight illiteracy; to provide cultural programs that broaden the horizons and stretch the mind; to involve housewives in programs that will make them more competent in running their household; to teach mothers what they must do to meet the intellectual and psychological needs of their children; to help children with learning difficulties overcome their handicaps; to induce children who should either be working or studying and who are doing neither, to return to some educational framework or to enter a working framework; to promote for the benefit of infants from severely retarded backgrounds day care centers where they can be stimulated to engage in activities essential for their physical, mental and emotional growth; to inculcate within each ethnic group a pride in its culture as well as an appreciation of the culture of other groups; to provide opportunities for people of different origins to meet in a natural and relaxed atmosphere and to learn how much they have in common despite their differences; to encourage the formation of interest groups with a social, recreational or artistic base; to motivate people to try their hand in the plastic or performing arts in the hopes that it will lead to activities that will permanently enrich their lives and to encourage the development of local
leadership. (1)

The debate about the multi-service nature of the matnas, at its height in 1975-6, cooled by the following year. Dr. Arnulf Pins, JDC's consultant to the ICCC and a social worker by training, described the seeming-fatality of the issue in the 1975/6 Annual Report. He wrote (pp. 9, 13):

Lately it has become popular to describe the Community Center as a multi-service agency or to urge that it become one.

...The issue of whether the Community Center in Israel is or should become a multi-service agency is not a real question or a productive debate.

The purposes of the Community Center and its methods of programming naturally lead to the emergence of a multi-service agency. It is not a question of a plan or a decision. The Center has no choice, it will become a multi-service Center unless it changes its purpose and method of work.


Menahem Begin's Likud Party, in the opposition for 30 years and in the opposing underground before that, swept the elections in 1977. He rode in on the support of the Asian-African Jews, who believed his campaign pledge to reorient government policies to their benefit, eliminating the gap once and for all. It was a victory of urban, petit bourgeois, laissez-faire politics over agricultural, anti-urban, socialist labor -- of the downtrodden's hero over

(1) "Community Centers in Israel: Growth, Program and Needs" (February, 1974), pp. 4-6.
the Establishment. The elation of victory was short-lived; by 1980, most were disappointed in Begin's lack of follow-through. (1)

Nevertheless, he seemed to begin on the right track. In 1977, shortly after his election, Begin announced a dramatic urban renewal plan, in conjunction with world Jewry, to infuse money into the towns and slums, for social as well as physical rehabilitation. Project Renewal, budgeted at $60 million, was to be carried out locally, where possible, by the community center staffs who were so familiar with local conditions.

In Begin's coalition, the Ministry of Education and Culture passed into the hands of the National Religious Party for the first time in the State's history. The question arose as to whether the ICCC would now have to establish "religious community centers" alongside its "secular" ones, similar to the parallel organization of religious and secular schools in the State. Zipori resisted this pressure, but attention was focused on the role of the community center in inculcating Jewish religious values among its members and participants. In an internal JDC-Israel memo (9/27/79), the Joint's Director wrote: "There seems to be some misconception...that Matnassim are not conveyors of Jewish identity and that they are primarily interested in recreation

(1) Since this was first written, Begin has managed once again to rally his disaffected supporters in numbers sufficient to win re-election.
and social activities. ...It will be important for us to begin to look at the Matnassim and their 'Jewish activity'.'"

In 1978, two rabbis were invited to address the ICC Field Supervisory Staff on the potential role of the matnas in disseminating and inculcating Jewish values and traditions. The summary of that meeting states: "The matnassim can help in the development of the individual's internal meaning, and in developing a new page in the subject of Jewish heritage, in closing gaps, and in creating a framework for the realization of the spiritual experience that is in Judaism...." As a result of the discussion, the protocol continues, "it was decided to devote a full day to a discussion on the how: how to begin the activity, where, who could be turned on [to the idea], and which centers to involve in such a project...." [protocol, 9/17/78]

Zipor hired a National Coordinator of Jewish Programs. He also hired a National Coordinator of Camping Programs, for camping as a recreational/social/educational experience had become a major ICCC project. "It is accepted in the Western world that camping is an integral part of the activities of the Community Center," wrote the first coordinator. (1)

The ICCC entered into its second joint venture with Amidar, the Government Immigrants' Housing Corporation, to fund and promote community organizers through the centers. The goals of the project were:

(1) ICCC Annual Report (1976/7), p. 44.
1. to help families and groups in the community organize to improve the quality of their lives, through the acquisition of habits of cleanliness, the design of living quarters, the development of self-help skills in house maintenance -- paint, plaster, fencing, general repairs, etc.;

2. to help families and groups improve their residence conditions and to organize their free time through striking social and cultural roots in their places of residence by referring them to matnas activities...;

3. to develop good neighborly relations...;

4. to help residents personally solve their problems through house councils and voluntarism...;

5. to encourage citizen participation.... [protocol, 9/3/78]
The First Decade: Summaries and Prognoses

At a national convention in January, 1979, the following concepts were recorded in an open discussion among center directors about the nature of the matnas:

- the matnas must be the warning light signalling [the existence of] local problems in comprehensive service delivery;
- the matnas must be a catalyst, an umbrella organization;
- the matnas' function is to educate for democracy.

One director asked what the goal of the matnas was. Zipori answered: "improving the quality of life -- values, spirituality, attitudes, and so forth." [protocol, 2/5/79]

Six months later, at a session the ICCC's Executive Committee held with the Minister of Education and Culture, Zipori elaborated on the purpose of the matnas: "Improving the quality of life by community development in the towns and neighborhoods through a comprehensive approach to all age groups with their needs in the areas of culture, art, education, social activity, and community activity, intended for the individual, the family, the group, and the community." In discussing plans for the coming decade, Zipori mentioned that the pressure to build new centers was exceedingly strong. "How do we determine [where to build]?" he asked. "The question recurs whether we are a service to the poor. What is the requisite [population] size? Whom do we assist?" [protocol, 7/13/79]
The newly appointed director of research and evaluation for the ICCC wrote, in her first interim report, that a necessary prerequisite for planning and setting policy was "the crystallization of a consensus on the general objectives of the community center and on principles of its activities." (1)

Many staff maintained a commitment to ideals ascribed to the ICCC. As one center director wrote in resigning his post:

We all came to the ICCC from different personal and educational backgrounds, but it seems to me that the work, the shared discussions, and the readiness to work in distant settlements and poverty neighborhoods have turned us into brothers and partners in an important social idea. I feel today that I belong to a group...where societal values and willingness to help one's fellow man inform its activities more than the chase after personal gain.... [9/6/79]

Writing in 1978, Dr. Eliezer Jaffe, head of Jerusalem's Welfare Department at the time of the Black Panther riots, expressed the opinion that Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem had, once again, diverted attention from internal matters to foreign affairs. "The danger," he wrote, "lies in the fact that inattention to the internal social problems 'discovered' here in recent years may eventually undermine the kind of life we would like to enjoy in peacetime." [Jerusalem Post, 11/6/78]

The Begin Government cancelled a large part of the

(1) ICCC Newsletter #32 (June, 1979).
government subsidization of public transportation and basic food items such as bread, oil, and dairy products. In 1979 there were riots and demonstrations in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to protest further cancellations of food subsidies. The inflation rate rose to 133% in 1980; food prices rose by 152%, 165% for vegetables and fruit. Israeli currency was floated: one U.S. dollar brought 10 Israeli lirot in July, 1977 and 100 in May, 1981.

The *Jerusalem Post* editorialized (1/16/81) that "the poor get poorer", bearing the weight of higher food costs, lower real wages, higher taxes, under the "anti-social" effects of the government's economic policy on income distribution. "The social gap continued to widen last year, as it has for several years now," wrote the *Post*’s Shlomo Maoz in reporting the Central Bureau of Statistics latest figures.

The so-called "milk riots" of November, 1979 were organized by a group called "Ohel", a successor to the Black Panthers. On June 8, 1980, Ohel organized young couples from a Jerusalem slum in a "tent city" demonstration against the continued unavailability of housing. One of Ohel's demands, according to *Jerusalem Post* reporter Robert Rosenberg, was for community center facilities. The aim of their struggle -- "an equal society, where people won't be discriminated against for the music they like or the color of their skin," as one Ohel leader told him. In December, 1979 Rosenberg had predicted unrest the coming summer. He wrote then:
For almost 30 years, Israel has awaited the children of the ma'abarot [transit camps] -- the original slums of the country -- hoping that the second generation of North African and Asian immigrants would break out of the poverty of their parents.

But many of the children of the Moroccans, the Kurds, the Iraqis. and the Yemenites are still trapped in slums and frustration. ...It matters little whether their complaints about poor housing, ineffective education, limited career opportunities and little ethnic representation on government bodies is real or imagined, for the anger is there, in self-image and in the crowded flats of the Katamonim, Musrara or Shmuel Hanavi [Jerusalem slum neighborhoods].

He continued: "Project Renewal is as much about the re-education of the slum quarter population as it is about the rehabilitation of the buildings those residents live in."

[12/19/79]

One year later, commenting on a recent riot in Jerusalem's Musrara quarter, Rosenberg wrote [Jerusalem Post, 11/20/80]:

Some people...may be prompted to offer a contribution towards [building] a new community centre. [But they]...would be wrong. What is needed is some tough...thinking about what has been wrought in Musrara. Hopeless, frustrated... the children of Musrara are the children of every slum quarter in the country. ...It doesn't matter whether the Ashkenazi establishment intended the Sephardi to be the laborers of the Jewish state. It worked out that way, and those who are paranoid cannot be convinced otherwise.

"Ideology is what we are short of now," Zipori wrote in the 1975/6 Annual Report (p. 7), "and by answering these questions [of values] we are beginning to formulate one."
In the same Report (pp. 9, 14), JDC's Pins wrote that other agencies with financial and personnel resources were proposing new functions for the Centers, leading to a feeling among local centers and in the national movement "of lacking clear direction or of having lost control." "The goals and methods of any agency should be constantly redefined in the process of trying to realize them," he wrote.

The ICCC "is in a crisis now," said Dan Ronnen in October, 1980 [13]. "The push of ideas which brought it up to now has come to a dead end and can't carry it further. It must establish its ideological concept now."
Believing Makes It So

Examining the ICCC's record more than ten years after its establishment, one finds over 100 centers in operation, more than tripling the initial experimental thirty. The centers offer a variety of programs. All are staffed, to one extent or another. Headquarters has evolved from essentially a one-man operation to a full-fledged support staff of program officers, professional supervisors, and administrators. The agency has a large annual budget, a certain independence to set priorities and plans, and a widespread network, nationally and internationally, of interagency connections. In short, in terms of policy output, the ICCC has established itself, and successfully so -- with one major exception.

As government policy, the ICCC was intended to improve the lot of development town and slum residents, with their cooperation and participation. Participation was built in to the policy in several ways. In the pre-planning stage, residents were to have a role in designing the center building. Once the center was built and staffed, residents were to share in the programming of center activities, first through their role as Members of the Board, later through the input of Members Committees -- voluntary steering groups of the more active participants in matnas life. Most basically, center programs were to be derived from residents' needs, and
the ICCC employed community organization professionals for
the purpose of eliciting those needs.

This aspect of the policy has hardly been implemented. As Pozner, Zipori, and Goldman discovered, getting citizens to participate in center design was difficult. Residents did not understand the role they were being asked to play. "Just get the Housing Ministry to build it and we'll use it" was a response typical of people accustomed to a passive stance vis-à-vis government action. Active participation in planning was a new concept to them. It was also new to the architects and policy designers, who proceeded to plan the centers without citizen input.

Citizen participation in program planning is, and has been, also minimal. Most centers have yet to fill the requisite three seats on the Board of Directors set aside for local residents. Center directors continue to view their Boards as obstacles to realizing their own plans, and they use Board members (or try to, at least) to rubber stamp their proposals. Citizen initiation of local programs is rare, considering that the ICCC's first operating principle is that programs should derive from local needs. While the ICCC proclaims principles of community organization which foster citizen participation, development of local leadership, and the like, their operations rarely follow these principles. Headquarters rewards behavior which is not in compliance with these principles. CO professionals are often at loggerheads with center directors and their co-workers, even now, after
they have had over ten years to smooth out obstacles. Although the ICCC promotes CO principles in its in-service training and in the Schwartz Program (the post-B.A. certification of directors and senior personnel), many directors say they don't understand CO practice beyond its abstract principles.

Furthermore, in terms of policy outcome -- the intended effect of outputs on agency clients -- the ICCC has not accomplished its goals. The social gap continues, even "widening" (according to the Jerusalem Post's Maoz, cited in the case). The poor, mostly Easterners, continue to demonstrate and riot in protest against government economic policies and their social implications. Upwardly mobile young adults continue to migrate out of development towns which are still perceived negatively and/or which have an inadequate economic base. Few stay, trying to improve the towns' images through political and economic changes. Competition and conflict among local service agencies still exist; although in some towns they have lessened with time, overall program coordination is still rare. Ethnic tensions have decreased over the years between different national groups. On the more general level of Easterner versus Westerner, however, they have not abated, as the 1981 elections showed. (1) Local political parties and sometimes

(1) See, for example, two New York Times columns: Anthony Lewis, "Israel: The Two Nations" (6/28/81) and Allyn Fisher, "Ethnicity Issue Rises in Israel" (Survey of Education, 1/10/82).
local elected governments are still run by extended families.

From the perspective of a field worker, getting things done -- implementing a specific project for a certain target group in the population or implementing agency/government policy to "narrow the gap" or "improve quality of life" -- is a quagmire of multiple decision points, complex joint action, political bargaining, negotiating interpersonal and interagency games, persuading people to adopt new ideas, making the ambiguous concrete, and much more. Problems abound at the simplest operational level: due to cinema union contracts, centers can't screen movies in a Film Appreciation Series. The street-level bureaucrat in the ICCC has a great deal of discretion in interpreting and implementing agency policy. Much of his energy is expended struggling not to bog down in the mire. There seems never to be enough money to acquire equipment for classes, to finance nonroutine programs or to pay teachers' and group leaders' salaries. Indeed, in the less central development towns, program plans are often abandoned due to the lack of trained teachers or paraprofessionals. Hustling interagency cooperation and co-sponsorship to secure additional funds for equipment or "imported" personnel is a major occupation of center directors and community organizers.

Attendance in most development town centers averages 5-10% of the total population. The majority of participants are school-age children and teens. Programming for adult activities is the weakest area of center performance, by the
ICCC's own admission. Youth and adults still hang out on street corners and in cafes.

These are the grounds for evaluating ICCC policy implementation as a failure. Yet, no such criticism has been forthcoming in over a decade, far longer than the lifespan of the War on Poverty policies from birth to criticism. Local residents, government officials, the general public -- no one has complained that ICCC policy output or outcomes have not matched expectations of its intent. On the contrary, a community center has become a desirable entity in development towns and slums. In the clamor against government subsidy cuts, protestors called for the establishment of a "matnas" in their neighborhood. Even of agency personnel who quit, few criticize the ICCC for not accomplishing its objectives. They may resign because they "burned out" working intensely 12-14 hours a day; they may resign to save their family lives from the destruction such commitment wreaks. But they don't question that the agency is implementing its mandated policy.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) contended that the complexity of joint action impedes implementation. While such a theory might explain the apparent "failure" of ICCC policy outcome, it is contradicted by the success of policy output. Surely the complexity of joint action and multiple decision points should have made impossible the acquisition of land and capital and operating budgets, construction, start-ups, take-offs, and survival until now -- especially a new agency in such politically vicious national and local
environments, competing within and without its sponsoring Ministry. Murphy (1971) and Derthick (1972) might counter that in such a highly centralized-planning government as Israel's, land and budget acquisitions would be no problem. The central government would exercise its control over its regional and local counterparts and make them cooperate. Moreover, the agency itself hired community organizers to create citizen demand for services; combined with Black Panther pressure on the government, it should have increased successful implementation. While this may explain output success, it doesn't account for outcome failure. The same would be true for Bardach's "fixer" (1978), a role Haim Zipori certainly filled. Again, if the existence of a "fixer" explains output success, shouldn't it bring about outcome success as well? How do we then explain implementation failure in the presence of a fixer? The same problem exists with communications or diffusion theories: they do not explain the simultaneous existence of success in output and failure in outcome.

Given co-existent judgments of apparent success and failure and the lack of criticism of the latter, should we determine that this is complacency, feeling "lucky that anything got done at all"? I think not. As much as staff might complain about the long hours, they don't change their work schedules. The going might be rough, but they believe in what they are doing and in the agency and its goals. Similarly, local and national politicians, bureaucrats, and
publics appear to believe in the ICCC and its mission, and this desire to believe neutralizes or suspends any criticisms they might have. It also makes implementation possible, in the face of many obstacles. Believing makes it so, to paraphrase; "if you will it, it's no dream," said Theodore Herzl of the founding of the State of Israel. Beliefs are supported by images and perceptions, which are created and maintained by symbols, metaphors, and myths. In the following chapters, I will present a succession of events from the ICCC case which illustrate the play of symbolics in policy implementation.

Organizational Impression Management

The case study of the first decade of the Israel Corporation of Community Centers is a story of the establishment of a new organization to implement social policy objectives. The implementation process was not "simply" a matter of soliciting building funds, negotiating budgets, constructing buildings, hiring and training staff, developing programs, bargaining with local governments and Ministerial division heads. In order to do all that and more, the Chief Executive Officer, his Board of Directors, and other "guardian angels" had to establish an organizational identity and communicate that identity to clients, constituents, staff in headquarters and in the field, professional and management counterparts in other Ministries and agencies, fundraisers and philanthropists,
related foreign institutions, and so forth.

This is a story of creating impressions and making meaning; of managing impressions; and of saving organizational face. (1) Identity carries the message of organizational purpose. Organizations manage impressions through the media of symbols, metaphors, and myths. Each one of these media contains the potential for multiple interpretations. Implementation difficulties may be caused by one party interpreting a symbol, a metaphor or a myth in a manner different from another party.

The four chapters which follow present several stories about organizational impression management in the ICCC. Chapter 10 examines attempts by the agency to communicate a particular message about its purposes and identity through its building, programs, and name and different meanings ascribed to its messages. Chapter 11 looks at individual impression management -- the interactions among ICCC and center personnel and local, regional, and national politicians and bureaucrats -- and the use of power symbols. Chapter 12 focuses on intra-organizational impressions and identities, specifically the tension between two conflicting interpretations of organizational purpose and their implications for implementation. Chapter 13 discusses several myths that aid or confound implementation, but which are necessary to organizational impression management.

(1) Goffman (1959) originated the concept "saving face" in the context of individual behavior.
Chapter 10. Buildings, Programs, and Names: Creating and Communicating Organizational Identity

Section 1: The Edifice Complex: Or, "You Can't Hang a Plaque on a Program" (1)

The typical community center was to be "a large building, spacious and comfortable," centrally located and easily accessible. Central location was not always possible. Town planning design for the development towns featured a large, cement-tiled central plaza with plant boxes, sometimes a fountain, cement park benches, around which would be clustered municipal office-buildings, local shops, health clinic and other services, cinema and banks. Residential buildings were planned to radiate out from this center. The plaza was to serve the social function of causing town residents to intermingle, thereby breaking down barriers between strangers.

Central siting for the community centers in the development towns meant locating them near these central plazas. Since the centers were planned six years after the completion of the last development town, such siting was not always easy. Newer city neighborhoods had also been planned around central park and service cores; sometimes land was still available centrally to accommodate the addition of a community center.

In the case of Or Akiva, for example, an additional

(1) From a conversation between S. D. Cook and Devora Ronnen, Esq., Jerusalem, 1980.
cement-tiled area was added on to the central town plaza, and the center was built there, adjacent to the large open-air market and a public garden. Standing in the plaza, one could see the top of the two-storey center building over the roofs of the other buildings, all single-storey, in the square. The long, wide expanse leading up to its large, glass-paneled entrance, its two-storeys, and its unusual stone construction materials set the center apart from its surroundings and accord it a stature different from any other building in town, with one exception. The Workers' Council (Histadrut) building is also two storeyed, but its landscaping and short exterior access give it a quieter, less ostentatious appearance.

By virtue of its size, shape, and exterior space, the center in Or Akiva is also markedly different from the town's residential structure. One may distinguish there among five periods and styles of residential construction, which have their general parallels in other development towns. Or Akiva was established in 1951 as the Caesarea ma'abara, a regional tent camp for immigrants arriving at that time. The tents were replaced by cement-brick structures, called "azbestonim": two-family, single storey units of 112 square meters combined (that is, approximately 600 square feet per family), encompassing three small rooms and a kitchenette. The town was incorporated as an immigrant settlement in 1955, and permanent building began in 1956: 263 azbestonim with indoor plumbing and land for truck-farming were spread around
the central area of the town. In 1957-8, 13 two-storey buildings were added to the central part of town. In 1963, the Kennedy subdivision north of the town center was developed with three- and four-storey apartment buildings, followed by the Ben-Gurion subdivision of similar structures to the north-west in 1976. Housing unit sizes grew with each new stage of building: an average apartment in the Kennedy neighborhood was 64 square meters, luxurious at the time but small compared to the 86 and 112 square meter units going up in Tel Aviv by 1973.

Size, landscape, and building materials are not the only things which set the community center apart from other public and residential buildings. Its interior architecture and its furnishings also mark the center as different. The entrance chamber of Or Akiva's Mirelman Center is cavernous -- the size of a hotel reception area -- and is sparsely furnished with Scandinavian-style, upholstered armchairs and coffee tables. The walls are hung with reproductions of colorful paintings by Modigliani, Matisse, Picasso, and others. One of the walls is wood-paneled. In a side el is a console television (installed at a time when few local people could afford one) and a radio. Adjacent to this area and directly across from the main entrance is a small room with an espresso machine and a display case for fresh cakes. Behind the building is a basketball-tennis court, with built-in cement bleachers and night lighting.

The Or Akiva center was one of the first built, in 1971.
Center #104, opened in November, 1980, follows an even more
grandiose design. Erected in one of the suburbs of
Jerusalem, the center — like others in city slum areas —
does not have the central plaza siting of the development
town facilities. However, the East Talpiot center does not
lack for reasons to call it to attention. Designed by a
Mexican sculptor, a proponent of "emotional sculpture," the
building has three storeys and five levels. "Its windows and
light sources are concealed from exterior view," wrote one
architecture critic, who explained that sculptor-designer
Goeritz pioneered the use of the sharp angle which I. M. Pei
later used in the National Gallery (Washington, D. C.) and
the John Hancock building (Boston). (1) Like Pei's Hancock,
this "fortress-like" community center is a source of much
attention and design controversy. To say that it stands in
marked contrast to its surrounds would be a gross
understatement.

One community worker interviewed said she felt that she
and her colleagues were telling their client-constituents:
"Here's a building. You fill it with content — and turn it
into the center of a community." [18] (2) But a building is
more than four walls; with its landscaping and furnishings it
presents more than a tabula rasa. The ICCC's policy-makers
and executives intended the building to be something, to

(1) Meir Ronnen, "Architectural sculpture," Jerusalem Post
(10/17/80).

(2) Bracketed numbers refer to interviews.
convey a particular message. The centers were to provide children with escape from what the planners saw as their overcrowded homes. Center design was also to teach norms of cleanliness and behavior to both children and adults. The policy-makers wrote, for example, that the community center should present to the local residents "a pleasant atmosphere of social and cultural well-being which is often absent from their impoverished dwellings." (1) Or then-Board Chairman Peled's expectation that the buildings' "cultured, spacious, restful atmosphere," in contrast to their surroundings, "would belong to the world of a higher level of expectations, which would serve as an example of what could be the legacy of its visitors." (2)

"This building -- you come in and feel you're someone," said a community worker, straightening his shoulders and standing tall. "It's sited near the villas (3) and upper class of R—-. It's filled with activities and lots of people come -- not poor people, but the local elites."[22]

A senior researcher at JDC-Israel, familiar with the community center programs, related the following:

The centers which have lots of activities are those which are built very differently from the way the community's houses are built. The more closely the community center resembles the houses, I would predict that it would be less successful. If you put a community center in a building that

(1) "Community Centers in Israel" (1971).
(3) In Israel, single family dwellings are called "villas".
looks like public housing, no one will come there. Look at Jerusalem. The "successful" community center is the one built on the American model -- with all the varied facilities, a swimming pool, rich programs and many, many classes.

If it has nice armchairs, if it's spacious and all sorts of ashtrays are floating around -- if you tell me that's not the ideal attributed to the middle class, I don't know what is. From the point of view of external symbols, that's it. And it comes to sell leisure activities -- that is, the patterns and habits of the middle class -- nothing else.[9]

The policy-makers had in mind a certain image which they wanted the buildings to convey. The centers' staffs work with the physical plant they are given to make it conform to that image (or to an image of their own, if their is not congruent with that of headquarters). They feel that residents will come to the center if its image conveys the right message. A center director made the following observations.

I got a Youth Club [building]. My job was to turn it into a community center. You could see it was growing by the number of kids who came to the building. But this didn't do anything for the image of the Center.

People see a nice [renovated] building and very strict discipline [i.e., no street gangs are allowed inside, because they are a destructive force]. And they ask why we don't have a center like South. In part it's a function of physical plant: [South] built a brand new building, with separate and identifiable youth and adult wings. In part it's a function of your starting point: the people who come [to South] are of middle class orientation -- if you put up a poster advertising a new club, people read it and come and register. I did that in C---- for 3 terms, and one person signed up. So our classes are filled by people from outside the neighborhood.
If the building were different, they'd show up. Prestige is a fundamental problem of the neighborhood. There's a basic sense in the neighborhood that it's been neglected. People feel like they were promised things which were never delivered. ...So if there is some activity elsewhere that they don't have in C----, they feel deprived. It's almost irrelevant whether they need the activity or not. They feel that it should be there.[3]

Sometimes, the image conveyed by the building and its appurtenances seems to be contrary to the message that the center staff want to convey. As one community worker related:

When I first came [to Israel from the U.S...], ...I told you and Linda: "I can't believe how excited people are, how wonderful they think it is, that 'Great, we've finally found a space, what we call a "shelter"' -- where there's no room, where there's no air, where there's no windows, and they're so thrilled, and they're writing articles about how we provide services. And I thought, This is an accomplishment?

...For me, that was such a foreign idea. What do you mean, you use a room like this? I mean, in America, can you see putting your middle class American, not even middle class, lower class, anybody -- where I came out of a Jewish community center, where we were working with lower and middle class..., 'We're going to take your kids and put them in a room where there's no natural air?!' And we're going to applaud about that? I mean, hardly! [1]

As this story suggests, the meaning attributed to a symbol may change over time. After this worker had been on the job for a while, he began to appreciate the shelter as an asset, as his fellow workers had from the beginning. The shelter, an available space in a location where places were scarce, came to represent an opportunity to hold a class or a
program, rather than the stultifying place it had originally been for this worker.

The architecture, landscaping, interior design and furnishings of the community center buildings are symbols which represent concepts of European or Western, middle-class Israeli life. The use of these symbols conveys an image of what the community center's purpose is. Policy-makers, agency executives, center directors and staffs participate in creating and manipulating these symbols. By choosing Matisse rather than Andy Warhol, a still-life of sunflowers rather than a madonna, the director manipulates the suggested symbolic meaning of the paintings he hangs on the wall. Even the choice to hang paintings is symbolic: the director could have left the walls empty (as they had been for 5 years), or hung local originals instead of reproductions, or mounted cartoon posters instead of "oil paintings". The fact that he hung the pictures close to the ceiling might represent a pretension on his part: pretense to the status of art connoisseur without the knowledge of conventional display heights. The symbolic functions of the building and its trappings propose a moral by analogy: if you visit here, you may acquire the social status represented by the edifice and its cultural trappings.

There is another hint concerning the way the planners expected residents to interpret these symbols, if not to their actual interpretation, in a letter written by JDC-Israel's Ralph Goldman to Haim Zipori. Goldman forwarded
Zipori a guide for planning and development standards for community services to the aged, with the recommendation that a similar guide be adopted for community centers. He wrote:

I recognise the dangers involved in the preparation of such a Standards Guide because it might produce pressures from the local communities for the inclusion of the maximum in their own community center.... We could find ways to overcome the psychological problem of [raising the communities'] level of expectation. [The lack of a Book of Standards brings about] a lopsided type of Center...; but equally important is the fact that if you have proper plans, the contributor might have contributed more funds. (5 August 1971; 14 March 1972)

In other words, Goldman and Zipori understand the building to represent high status. They expect local residents to understand this also and not to settle for anything less than the best.

The contrast between the center building's size and furbishings and those of local residences raises the question of the design appropriateness of the building to its location. I will suggest two possible answers. First, the local resident entering the building is removed from the context of his familiar reality. The relatively massive scale of the center indicates that the building frames an activity that is not ordinary life. It is, if you will, larger than life. Such a stage creates, in the participant, a "heightened sensitivity" to "connotations...[and] authority." (1) In other words, without the immediate

reference point of what he knows, the resident becomes receptive to the messages suggested by the building's scale and furnishings.

Secondly, while the building's scale may be inappropriate to its immediate surroundings, it may be intended to convey a message to some audience at a farther distance. Its scale may be entirely appropriate to sending that message. (1) One such audience is the philanthropist.

The donor's name on a plaque in public view is a statement -- to the donor, to his family, friends, and community, and to the world at large -- of importance -- to the donor, again, and as an example to potential donors whom the agency would like to attract -- attesting to the generous nature of the contributor. To attract a donor, the agency's fundraisers must be able to communicate the essence or image of the thing they want supported. The American model which the Israeli community center imitated -- with its swimming pool and tennis courts and its mammoth (in Israeli terms) size -- conveyed a meaning which the potential American donor could easily interpret, since it was based on something familiar to him.

An American model appeals also to audiences at home, although for different reasons. It is a point of now-conventional wisdom that citizens of developing countries

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ape clothing, automobiles, appliances, and so forth which represent the West, America in particular. This is also true of Western Europe and the USSR. In this case, the American style of the community centers serves to entice local residents to attend, because of the appeal of things American. For the same reason, the large buildings are also symbolic to the general Israeli public, representing their development success and their status as a nation.

Moreover, as Edelman (1964, page 100) also points out, settings address a wider audience than that immediately present to observe the acts therein contained. The buildings' visibility calls attention to the fact that government moneys were used to build something in development towns. The message conveyed is twofold: (1) the buildings represent government's attention to the needs of its poorer citizens; (2) the buildings represent to the general public that they have responded and are continuing to respond to social problems. "People want to think they're doing something," one director said. [27]

These messages are borne out by the programmatic content of the centers, discussed in the next section.
Section 2: The Lady and the Maid -- Community Center Programs

The story could begin, "Once upon a time..."; but it begins "...at the very beginning

in Y--- [a development town], where it was marvellous: the people of S--- [a wealthy community], right next door, who love good music, who know how to value this notice [of an up-coming chamber music concert], were the people who came. People from as far as R--- G--- would come to these [concerts].

...If the purpose is having concerts in this area to serve the area, I think it is ... a very good organizational project.... If your purpose is, "Let's have music, classical music, help bring together ... neighbors [who otherwise] get together as the lady and the maid ..." -- that's fine.... But if you are saying to me when you propose this [concert series] -- "Yes, we're bringing music to people who never had music" -- then you've failed. [2]

The next story also takes place at the beginning, during the first years after the opening of the Or Akiva community center. Its cavernous entry, some 900 square feet of open space, was furnished with tables and chairs, one set of which stood three feet inside the main door. Soon after the center was dedicated, a group of middle-aged men from Spanish Morocco adopted this location for their daily domino game. They would appear in the afternoon at about 4:15, after working the day shift or before going off to the night shift, order coffee or tea and cakes, and play orderly and quietly, talking and sometimes laughing, watching the comings and goings of center visitors but keeping to themselves and their
game, until about 6 o'clock, when they would move on, homeward or to the factory.

As center staff discovered, however, due to the men's presence, few women from the town came to the center between those hours, and most also kept their girls away, during what were prime hours of afternoon activity. The custom in North Africa and Islamic countries was for men to gather for afternoon tea in neighborhood cafes, to gossip and exchange news and pass time. These areas were forbidden to women; even in the direst emergency, a woman would find a child to send for her husband or brother before she would think to go to his cafe herself. These customs were not left behind when the people immigrated to Israel. The French Moroccans, the Libyans, the Persians each had their own hangout. When the community center opened, the Spanish Moroccans began to congregate there. As they positioned themselves in the entrance to the building — the better to observe passersby between the market and the plaza outside — anyone entering the center had to pass their table. This effectively put the center out of bounds for most of the town's female population, much to the puzzlement of the center's Czechoslovakian director, who enjoyed the idea that his center was providing a meeting place for a recreational game of dominoes. The domino players also contributed to his good reputation in the ICCC, since Haim Zipori told him he liked the impression of life in the building that hit the visitor stepping inside the door.
A senior member of the ICCC's executive board told the following story.

One day, I went to a Board meeting of a Jerusalem community center, where I am a member of the Board of Directors. We were talking about their music programs, which I thought were terrible. So I suggested that we start from scratch.

Another member of the Board, a local neighborhood politician, slammed his fist down on the table. "And I suppose you're going to tell me that we should teach Beethoven!" he yelled. "All you Ashkenazim want is to listen to Beethoven."

When I told him that I was going precisely to suggest that the children study the oud, he sat stunned and disbelieving. [31] (1)

Center programs, clubs, and activities are symbolic. Depending on what they represent or how they are understood, they serve to attract some people to the center and keep other people away. Sometimes residents' interpretation of their meaning can be elicited after a bit of research, as with the domino game. At other times, the surface meaning seems intuitively clear: people read notices and subscribe to classical music series when such activities are part of their cultural repertoire.

The symbolic message of a program may be clearly perceptible to some and opaque, differently understood or non-existent to others. Ballet classes have been a perennial favorite in the community centers, attracting a constant flow of little girls. One young woman, Tunisian by birth, with a

(1) The oud is a stringed instrument resembling a lute, which is used in North Africa and some other Mediterranean countries. Ashkenazim are Israelis of European extraction.
B.A. in English literature, enrolled her two daughters in a Jerusalem center's ballet class. She complained that the high cost put such classes out of reach of many of her friends and neighbors; but she was thankful that the class gave her girls a chance to acquire what urban, European children had. [34]

Goldman's fundraising letters, quoted in the case, convey his sense of the meaning of ballet classes:

How proud some of the citizens ... must now feel that even their youngsters can study ballet. ...It is not ballet that is important, but the fact that in this little God-forsaken town, the youngsters of the poor have an equal opportunity to be exposed to today's cultural activities as are the youngsters of the Tel Aviv residents.

In the case of the Tehila School, a literacy and high school equivalence curriculum for adults, some centers had a difficult time getting the program going for lack of participants. The center's staff do not always know, nor can they discover, what is the program's image in the eyes of the residents, nor is it always a single image. But some of the center workers are aware that whatever the image is, it is keeping people away from that activity. One director documented the tenfold increase in Tehila enrollments resulting from having "broken through the wall of that image that the residents have of Tehila." [5]

Nor are the residents the only ones who hold fast to their images. The same director said it took him two to three years to change the image the Ministry of Education's
regional bureaucracy held of his operating the Tehila program. Whether the image was based on past experience with another director, on the poor reputation of the town, on experience with local residents or officials, the bureaucrats insisted that he could not operate Tehila locally, until he "broke through the wall of their image" as well. [5]

An image may also change under the impact of external, social or other forces. In 1973, the Or Akiva center tried to offer tennis lessons. One high school junior signed up. In 1974, they renovated the court, added night lighting, and hired a certified instructor. No more than a handful of youngsters registered. Tennis was seen as an elite sport and an "Anglo" sport; it had no audiences and no local appeal.

Between 1975 and 1978, a South African immigrant, a professional tennis trainer, started coaching youngsters at the Tel Aviv Country Club. He entered them in international competitions, and they placed. The news coverage reported the prize moneys. One boy made the top 50 seeds in the international juniors ranking. A national tennis court and stadium was built just outside Tel Aviv. Tennis was "in". By 1980, the center in Or Akiva had more requests for tennis classes than it could handle. (1)

(1) There have been a few studies of the symbolism of national sports competitions such as football and baseball leagues. The impact that Jackie Robinson had on the American black and white communities may be explained in symbolic terms. The organizational importance of being a "team player" attests to the symbolic importance of sports off the field. See Robertson (1980), pp. 252-7 for one discussion, including "Casey at the Bat."
The ICCC was conscious of the symbolic content of constituents' paying for classes, programs, and the like. It is one of the agency's ten principles that people pay -- some amount, at least, and in kind if not in currency -- for classes, etc. "If it doesn't cost anything, then that's how it looks and that's how the people take it. If it costs something, then they look at it in a different light," said one staffer. [21]

The use of a symbol is an effort to communicate meaning. If the other party or parties to that effort understand the meaning as it was intended, he or they may respond by entering the context of meaning or by rejecting the invitation to share meanings. Or the other party may not understand the intended meaning -- that is, may misunderstand, may understand it differently -- or may not perceive an attempt to share meaning at all. These invitations and their acceptances and rejections, in their various forms, must be taken together in order to decipher the underlying motif. The symbolism of center programs and their receptions and rejections suggest a motif of preferred and desired upward social mobility. In ethnic terms, it suggests that some Easterners desire to be like Westerners. In geographic terms, that some development town residents want to be like urban residents. In socio-cultural terms, that West and urban are perceived as being of higher status and therefore desirable. In socio-political terms, that West and urban are perceived as being closer to the center of
power and therefore desirable. The tasks of the community centers are to teach the values of Western and urban culture, provide Eastern development town residents with the means to acquire a higher status, and pacify them at the same time since they are neither Western nor urban. (1)

The centers accomplish these tasks through their clubs and programs, which represent -- in the Israeli context -- Western and urban values. Ballet classes and concerts of classical music are the Israeli version of Cadillacs and color televisions in the U.S.: attendance at programs and the acquisition of skills associated with society's upper strata are surrogates for the possession of objects, but they carry the same illusion of acquiring status. The following stories, told by center directors and staffers, provide examples of these processes.

"People don't have realistic expectations of the community center," said a Jerusalem Post reporter who covered social problems.

They think, "If I attend a class for a whole year, at the end I'll become Ashkenazi." The community centers promise that attending classes will lead to a better life. A better life means being Ashkenazi. They say to people who can hardly make ends meet: "Your life is empty. Maybe you work; you watch TV; your kids go to movies. We'll expand your horizons." ...The real role of the community centers is to come up with Israeli culture. "Quality of life" is a catch phrase for

(1) Nor can they ever be Western. However, by intermarrying, their children can almost become Western. Indeed, when asked about ethnic discrimination and social gaps, many Israelis point to rising intermarriage rates as an indicator of declining discrimination and narrowing gaps.
something vaguely Anglo-Saxon, because the Levant is imitative. For example, they choose a large color TV, arrange the living room to focus on it, and think that this is America, this is Quality of Life. [25]

A community worker in a well-respected center related some similar opinions.

Ashkenazi is the desirable status in the world. It just is -- that's a fact. Someone who marries an Ashkenazi becomes Ashkenazi. Even a Sphardi who makes it, is no longer seen as a Sphardi -- he's identified as an Ashkenazi. ...There is a big feeling of them and us [between] the Sphardim of higher status and those lower.

He took a group of local residents on a weekend trip as a center program, intending to discuss social integration. When they arrived at the camp site, they split into two groups, according to status, and the groups camped at opposite ends of the grounds. They told him they weren't willing to have integration done at their expense.

"How would I know you were from the upper status group?"

I asked him.

Because of the schools I send my kids to. The head of the Neighborhood Committee is of Iraqi-Bavli extraction, which associates him with the marketplace [in many people's eyes]. He sends his children to the Conservatory; he bought a piano, even though he has a small apartment. [N.b.: The State levies a luxury tax of 100% of value on such a purchase.]

The upper group will go to chamber music concerts, piano duets, etc., or the person whose brother-in-law is an Ashkenazi [will go], because the Ashkenazim go. He won't like the music, but he'll go, so he can say later that he's been to the concert. [22]
"Not everyone wants classes," said another community worker and center director.

Maybe the majority don't want classes, but they want something. On Chanuka, on Simchat Tora [two holidays] -- they don't want to go to N--- [the nearest city]. They want in D--- [their neighborhood] a gala parade and a show and all kinds of things. We did it together with them.... Everyone was involved in it, the planning, execution, everything. That's what they wanted. But once a week they don't want a class.

Exercise, crafts -- we do these in the youth movements. Maybe when they grow up they'll want it as a class, but their parents don't want it. Little by little, maybe we can get to that point where the kids will understand what a class is -- that it's an enriching thing, that it's expressive, and it's a hobby. People don't have hobbies. If we start little by little, maybe ten years from now when they're young adults and there's a community center, then it will be filled and people will be happy and the same people who didn't want classes before will want them for their children. [21]

"Ninety percent of community center activities are classes," explained a senior researcher at JDC-Israel. "But it's the middle class that has leisure time to spend on classes, because they are not concerned with making ends meet. The community center is designed to give an example of middle class life. But the community center population is not middle class and it needs income, housing, health care, education." [9]

A community center director discussed his population, residents of a development town in the desert.

In D--- when I talk about services to people, I'm speaking -- very generally -- about two levels. The first is the cultural elite, the intelligentsia. Not the elite of political
leadership -- that's another category -- but the intellectual elite, the various educational establishment folk, academics who work in the factories -- the people who came to D--- of their own accord, who could equally have chosen to live elsewhere, but didn't.

And they'll stay here of their own accord. If it's not good for them here, they'll leave. D--- needs them. Their cultural demands are high and broad, and are based on what they knew in their former towns of residence. Most of these people came here through internal migration; they're not the original settlers. The more we remind them of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem or Haifa -- they'll feel better here. It's that simple. The more we can help them to think, "You know, I'm not so bad off being here in D---," the easier it will be for us to keep them here.

Our second class of citizens don't have leisure time, so how can we even talk to them about leisurely recreation? Their problem is how to create free time, how to structure priorities so they'll open time for new things. This -- the majority -- population we're trying to introduce to theater, to music, to do something just to enjoy it. Their problem is how to feel good about being here. Interestingly, for someone who had no choice about living in a development town, but who is here because he's here, there's a feeling of psychological exile or banishment. We're trying to create the feeling that you're here because you want to be, not because you were forced, not because by chance you were dumped out on the sands.

Even though the Tel Avivnik doesn't take advantage of everything available, at least he has the feeling that he could if he wanted to. In a development town the feeling is: "We have nothing." You're distant, you're not where it's happening. You feel like even if you wanted to, you couldn't.

One of our jobs is to moderate that feeling. If we can bring Habima [one of Israel's major theaters] here to do "Moroccan King", the fact that it's Habima adds a powerful psychological element. If, two weeks later, we bring the Cameri [another theater] doing "Death of a Salesman", the same person who otherwise would never go is hooked by our publicity and by everybody talking about
the Cameri, and the Cameri has come to him -- it has a very important psychological element, that he has managed somehow to escape his isolation, his exile, from the source of light. We have to create the feeling that we're near Tel Aviv, but also that things are happening here.

"What is the importance of precisely Habima and the Cameri?"

I asked him.

Because Habima is prestige and the Cameri is prestige. Habima is Tel Aviv; Cameri is Tel Aviv. It's not the Beersheva Theater; that's something else. That's local, it's "ours", it's familiar. But Habima, Tel Aviv....

They try to bring the big, beautiful things of Israel League A closer to themselves, so they're not cut off from the central, prestigious things. [4]

There is also what might be called a more radical interpretation of community center programs, in which classes are seen as an intentional distraction of people's attention from their real problems. A University professor involved with the ICCC for many years called signing up for a class or program "a surrogate for real involvement" in community problems. [2] And a veteran center director, who claimed that his mission was to get local residents to take over the center and to cease operating as director himself, called "the entire community center undertaking -- shamanism or witch-doctor medicine designed to create the perception of something being done. What's really needed," he said, "are clean streets, window panes in the schools, good teachers.
preparation for matriculation, and university educations. 'Underprivilege' has become the norm. The community center is a practice hall to rehearse the population." In other words, he added, the poor development towns are imitating the city suburbs. [27] (1)

These discussions point toward a tension in center management between serving the local or area elite and the local poor. One community organizer/director referred to adult classes as the "showcase" of the ICCC. [3] On the other side of the showcase, his phrase suggests, are the programs the center does not put on display. The ICCC's choice of names for itself as an agency and for its field units also showcases some aspects of its purpose and not others, as described in the next section.

(1) Macarov (1974) makes a related point when he says that poverty, inadequate housing, etc. are national problems that the community centers can't solve. If community center activities are successful, he suggests, they might divert people's attention from these problems.
Section 3. What's in a Name? — a Corporate Identity Crisis

Choosing a name is a crucial part of organizational identity management. In the case under discussion, two organizational names had to be chosen: one for the agency as a whole and one for its field-based operating units.

The agency name chosen was the Israel Corporation of Community Centers — literally, the "agency for centers of culture and sports (for youth and adults) ltd." The choice had some legal foundation. Since its development depended on building funds to be contributed by foreign donors, Americans in particular, and such donors would be enticed by tax shelter possibilities, the agency had to be a legally constituted, non-profit entity, and not a special division within the Ministry of Education and Culture. [19] Its constitution as a "government agency" provided it with quasi-governmental status, but it was independent of government machinery to such an extent that it could circumvent the bureaucratic restrictions of the government's Service Regulations. This meant that the agency could set its own salary scale and benefits schedule for employees, thereby attracting personnel who would have been bound by more restrictive civil service codes in regular government. [28]

Efforts to attract American moneys foundered, however, (at least theoretically) on another naming point: the insistence of the agency, backed by legal counsel, to refer
to itself as a Corporation rather than as an Association. As described in the case, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) -- a big brother of sorts to the ICCC, especially with regard to American donor contacts -- expressed the opinion that "corporation" implied profit and, hence, was unsuitable for the type of work in which the ICCC was engaged and unpropitious for attracting donors, who would be more attracted by the non-profit image of "association". The two reached a compromise: the ICCC continues to refer to itself as such, and the JDC refers to it as the IACC in its U.S.-oriented publications.

As to why the agency's official Hebrew name is what it is, there seem to be two explanations. The major sources of its initial budgets were the divisions of culture, youth activities, and sports of the Ministry of Education and Culture, within which or out of whose collective rib the agency was fashioned. To acknowledge this sponsorship, the name taken includes reference to these divisions. If that is the case, why does the title include "adults"? The answer Ronnen gave to his own question may contain more than a few grains of truth: the agency had to prove to itself that it did not only serve youth. [13] Since the Ministry's Youth Division was giving the agency a significant part of its budget, and since Youth Houses were the most prevalent precursors -- and, hence, models -- of community centers, the ICCC needed "adults" in its title to create an image for potential clients, as well as to send a message to the Youth
Division that the centers were going to serve other population groups and would not allow themselves to be coopted as Division flunkies.

Youth Houses were not the only forerunners of the community centers. There were also People's Houses in the collective settlements and Culture Halls in cities and towns; a well-known Club for the Aged in Jaffa which sponsored community activities [2]; and Y's and other community centers in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. The ICCC needed a name for its field units which would express their purpose and differentiate them from other types of activity centers.

Regarding an English-language name, the appeal to American donors entered once again. "Community center" was considered a known entity: the United States had a well-developed network of Jewish Community Centers, as well as cousins in their settlement houses and Y's. The concept existed in Europe as well, especially in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. It also has roots in British community development work and French "animation" in Africa and Asia. (1) It was American philanthropists who introduced the concept to then-Minister Aran as a possible solution to Israel's problems. The functions the community centers would perform already existed in Jewish life in other forms -- the study house, the community theater for the Purim holiday play, the folk orchestra to play at celebrations, the summer

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(1) I have written about the history of centers in another context. See Yanow (1976).
camp for Maimouna holiday outings. [2, 27] And they had one in Casablanca, as Dr. Pozner discovered to her embarrassment--so she was not introducing a new concept to some development town residents, as she originally thought.

The choice of a Hebrew name was not so straightforward. "Community center" in Hebrew does not trip lightly off the tongue; as a linguistic construction it is slightly foreign to the logic of the language. But political considerations were of more paramount concern to the founders. "Community" was the well-established province of the Welfare Ministry, whose portfolio had always been in the firm grasp of the National Religious Party. Mr. Aran, Minister of Education and Culture, which was no less firmly identified with the Labour Party, had no intention of confounding the public when it came to claiming recognition for a job well done, not to mention possible votes to be wooed on that basis. "Community center" would not do; it needed another name. And so they were christened "centers of culture, youth, and sports"--"matnas", by Hebrew acronym--for reasons already mentioned.

The choice of "matnas" might have seemed fortuitous for another reason. As a new name, it would be free of any unfortunate associations. Substantively, as we shall see, that was not the case, for the "community center" concept and its American parallels lived on and affected the image of the matnas. Moreover, its newness made the task of explaining its identity more difficult because "matnas" had no nominal ancestors to illuminate its nature.
The matnas developed a welfare connection. Whether this happened by virtue of some lingering "community" tie to the Welfare Ministry is not clear. What is certain is that among the planners of the ICCC were several Americans who had been Jewish Community Center professionals in the U.S. and knew that required training for JCC staffs was a Masters degree in Social Work. The ICCC contract with Amidar to sponsor community organizers (COs) cemented this influence, since the most common professional training for a CO is an MSW. In Israel through the late 1970's, social workers in the Welfare Ministry handed out money. In many development towns and city slum areas, when you went to collect your dole, you prepared to argue with "your" social worker and, if things didn't go your way, you overturned her work-table. For the matnas to suggest a welfare connection was and is not a desirable image. This led Dan Ronnen to say:

The best community center in Israel is the Country Club. [North of Tel Aviv on the Mediterranean coast, it is the only country club in Israel. It has a pool and tennis courts; and membership is not exclusive, if you can afford it.] The matnassim should have been called country clubs -- never mind "services to the people." Then, everyone would know what they were supposed to do -- swimming pool, tennis, etc., without a social work orientation. [13]

On the other side of this split identity is the fact that the matnas has its personnel, budgetary, and organizational roots in the Ministry of Education and Culture. The matnas was set up to provide recreational and cultural facilities and programs before the social service
and multi-service center concepts came along. They did contain the seeds of citizen participation, public Boards, and inter-agency cooperation, however, which may have made them fertile ground for grafting on a welfare image. These seeds, though, were sufficiently strange within their organizational home to make them an anomaly as it was. "The expectation was that its activities, personnel, and organizational ties would develop along familiar Ministry lines," said the ICCC's Assistant Director.

But the community centers do non-Education activities (in doing housing, labor, welfare, etc. programs [which also means crossing party lines]). employ non-Education professionals [community organizers], and maintain inter-organizational relations far afield from Ministry functions. That is, the political behavior of the ICCC was, in its early years, quite alien to the accepted mode of Israeli political-organizational culture.

"There is no fight," he added, "over the matnas name [vs. "community center"], but rather over its ability to function and to avoid inter-agency warfare." [12]

* * *

I asked the director of a center where I am a member of the Board to tell me how his community center was different from a school. The director began to spout slogans about community centers, so I asked to see his work schedule.

"So you have folk dancing from 5 - 7 on Tuesdays. So someone comes and teaches the ABCs of dancing, and by July the person has learned 30 dances. So it's like a school."

Replied the director, "But it's in a matnas!" [13]
The matnas-community center has created an image. That image, however, conveys different meanings to different people. For the residents of the Jerusalem neighborhoods who demonstrate in front of the Knesset against cuts in government food and transportation subsidies, shouting "We want a matnas!" -- it is a symbol of government responding to social problems. Matnas has a similar meaning for the Jerusalem Post reporter who wrote that in response to teens rioting in poor neighborhoods, some people "may be prompted to offer a contribution towards a new community center." (1) Personally, he views it as a palliative measure, while he understands the inclination to contribute money so a government agency can build a center, as the desire of concerned wealthy people to think they are doing something to alleviate social problems by passing the task on to someone else and turning a blind eye to the unremediated nature of the problems. [25] To the Board of Directors whose debate concerning the future of their Jerusalem Theatre is quoted in the case, "matnas" means something that is the antithesis of "a source of excellence": a mediocre hodge-podge of popular culture rather than a selective, culturally highbrow institution.

The name "community center" carries with it conceptual problems. Especially in Hebrew, where it is not a catch

(1) Rosenberg (1980).
phrase, it raises the questions, "What is a community?" and "What is center?" In most locations, people are resident because they were sent there on arrival; "community" in the sense of an affective association is nonexistent. Moreover, the Hebrew word is associated with a congregation for religious or organizational purposes -- specifically, prayer or tax collection to ransom a captive or pay off the Czar. In some cases, the building is not centrally located. In others where it was central in 1972 or 1975, it no longer is now that new residential areas have been developed. Neither is it central culturally; the synagogue, the marketplace, and the cafe are more central as social gathering places. How do you turn a building into the center of what is not (yet) a community? As a senior Executive Board member said, "In the beginning, for the thinkers and philosophers, "community center" was a [real] concept, but it never came about [in reality]." [33] "The directors themselves are still ambivalent about what they want the centers to be," said a veteran CO supervisor: "a Culture Hall or about clubs or about community. And, they may still get contradicting messages from HQ or Amidar." [8]

Today in the neighborhoods, it is called by a variety of names: community center, matnas, maknas -- apparently a common mispronunciation [5], Culture Hall, Youth House, or by the name of its donor -- Walker Hall, Mirelman Hall, Lown Center. On the other hand, a matnas is a matnas. It has a clear government connection, sometimes to an extreme:
The center is seen as the representative of the government in the neighborhood; because it is more visible and accessible, it becomes a lightning rod for criticism (and praise, when appropriate) of such things as poor local transportation, the lack of shopping, etc. [When it's extreme or undue praise:] then you get interagency fighting because people praise the center for activities someone else sponsored. [3]

The matnas name is very closely tied with its physical image. There is an architectural and landscaping style which immediately identifies a building as a matnas. This may create identity questions -- not to mention linguistic confusion - if one inherits an old, "non-matnas" building.

As one director/community worker said, sitting in a renovated but still shabbily recognizable Youth Club shack:

...I feel very comfortable here, even though we don't have the matnas, the building. To me, this is the matnas. The community center-matnas has different connotations, because matnas is -- you know, a matnas. "Community center" is more appropriate because we work in a community. Maybe it's better that way, that we don't have the matnas. If we had the matnas, maybe I'd sit there all the time [instead of circulating in the neighborhood].

If you'd ask them [local residents] what a "community center" is, they'd probably say it organizes cultural and sports activities, and [it's a place to take] any ideas, suggestions, or problems we have. But more than likely they wouldn't [identify "community center" with us] because many of them know what a community center is, a matnas, from P--- or other places [i.e. and the shack doesn't look like one of those others]. [21]

The two names -- community center and matnas -- co-exist and are used interchangeably by ICCC personnel in casual
conversation without indicating a difference in meaning. However, they point to a tension between two concepts of center purpose, two images whose co-existence determines both conception and implementation of agency policy. One director described its expression in his small southern town.

The matnas was, in the hands of its former director, a sort of Cultural Center [the proper name of Tel Aviv's major center, like New York's Lincoln Center or Washington, D.C.'s Kennedy Center], apart within the town, like an independent entity.

The character of its activities was Cultural Center style, for upper class residents: the building, the library, the children's library, discussions, lectures, upper class things. It set an example for the outside, to bring upper class residents to Y---, so they'd see a fixed-up, organized place.

And nobody came. That is, upper class residents came. But there are few of them. The folkdance club, for instance, there were 30-40 participants. Of course, it was clean and orderly with a good atmosphere. Theater -- 50, 60, 70 people. Quiet, relaxed, pleasant, etc.

Community organizing -- the work with the lower classes -- was done outside the building. That was the theory, and it has a certain logic to it.

I see the center more as a popular culture house. I'm also aware of the price I'm paying: the elite, the "snobs", don't come any more. I've distanced them from the matnas. They don't come to a show because in the theater are sitting 250-300 people, and the chairs scrape [the floor] every now and then, and somebody helps the actors -- they warn him [to look out] for the murderer behind him. We're fighting this, the dirt at Sunday night dancing -- when you have 300 people, you also get dirt; but we want 300 there. We bring the lowest class here too. They mess things up and disturb people. We are fighting that phenomenon, but I prefer to see the residents here.... [5]
The ICCC has created a name for itself in Israel in three areas, according to Dan Ronnen.

It has established high standards for building construction, not only in design but also in following up the execution. It has set high standards of professionalization, in several ways: through manpower training, both in-service and planned; the latter, through the Schwartz Program, which not only gave a name to a new profession but also gave it status by virtue of its university connection; and by paying directors high salaries and giving them good benefits, on par with the position of high school principals. The ICCC also gave its centers a lot of political clout, by giving directors central headquarters' seal of authority [since HQ hires directors].

These three have given the community center a particular status in the field and linked it with the middle class. This status link was enhanced because community centers were known to exist beforehand in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv, which meant they were not solely an invention for development towns. The American model for the idea of the community center also lent it a middle class aura, as did its large budget. Moreover, the ICCC's goal to serve the entire community served to set it apart from other field-based services like welfare and Amidar (housing), whose clientele came from the poorer subgroups of the general population. Even schools taught children divided, de facto, along class lines, because of the class-based allocation or choice of housing.

And this [status] was communicated to the molders of public opinion, so that it became important for the mayors of the development towns -- who wanted to dissociate themselves from the "trap" of poverty by identifying themselves with some other group or idea or movement -- to associate themselves with the matnas.

On the other hand, since its inception, the matnas has had a social work identification. "Giving services." So it is somehow connected with the lower classes. [13]

Matnas -- community center; recreation -- welfare; elites and middle class -- poor. A name is a symbol; it
carries meaning; it conveys images. Part of the name may be metaphorical; it brings associations from another sphere. A name may focus the conceptualization of a policy, a problem, an answer. Implementation of a policy often entails creating a new organization or a new program within an existing organization. Such implementation depends in part on making a place for the new organization or program within the map of existing organizational relations. Making a place depends upon not only creating new identity but conveying that identity to other people. Like buildings and programs, names are important conveyors of meaning in the work of managing organizational impressions.
Chapter 11. Symbols and Power: 
Individual impression management and local politics

While ICCC planners and executives are working to create and manage organizational impressions through its building, program, and name, its employees are managing personal impressions which also affect the ICCC's image. The quality and image of the community center is a reflection of its director, said the ICCC's Assistant Executive Director. [12] The director may choose among a variety of symbols with which to create his and the center's image, as do the community organizer and other members of the center's staff. The creation and management of an image are important in communication with politicians, both local and national, and with residents. This chapter explores some of these issues.

Soap-box Politics

"Your name around here is like a box of soap," said a new staff member to a veteran worker. The latter had claimed that he had been able to accomplish a particular project after working with a committee for only one year. The new worker was correcting him: since he had been around for four years beforehand, he was a familiar entity in the neighborhood. Since people knew and trusted him, they were prepared to follow him, and he could get things done. [3a]

A personal name and reputation is not the only way to communicate power and/or prestige. Title and position may also work at times. Senior staff in the community centers carried the title, "Unit Coordinator," which commanded a
salary bonus for administrative activities. Although community workers were also senior staff and eventually also earned the additional salary, they did not carry the Unit Coordinator title. A change in policy which gave them such titles improved organizers' standing in some centers. Said one community worker: "The staff were my friends; but even so -- ; it made me more equal." [18]

Title and position together carry weight and create impressions. The Director of the Schwartz Program To Train Senior Center Personnel felt that the fact that he had a Ph.D. in community organization (CO) and also taught the CO course gave more weight to the argument that CO was indispensable to center practice. [10] Sometimes, proximity or the illusion of such to the center of the organization is sufficient to create the needed impression of power and/or authority. A CO supervisor spoke of her work at introductory training sessions for new center directors, at which she led 2 1/2 hour workshops on the subjects "community" and "community work". (1) The fact that these sessions were organized by headquarters, she felt, emphasized the importance of CO: "It's as if it's coming down from the top, and CO consciousness is beginning to sink in." [8]

In the Israeli context, a university degree conveys a sense of importance and accomplishment. Aside from providing

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(1) Note: In Hebrew, "community organization" is called "community work". I use them interchangeably throughout this paper.
a knowledge-base for authority, the university connection conveys a sense of power and prestige, due to the cultural value of learning or perhaps from contact with a societal "center". It was important in this way that the Schwartz Program have a university base. According to its Director, the Program became, for the ICCC, "the source of Wisdom and Insight." [10] (1) By extension, perhaps, or possibly because it was valued in America and/or the West, professionalism also contributed to the image of power. The role of "center director" became a new profession in Israel. "The director is a professional of the first degree," said the ICCC's Assistant Executive Director. "In the neighborhood, he is a lord. The matnas Board can't fire him; he can maneuver around and through them." [12]

In order to maneuver, center directors, it was originally thought, needed to be of a particular type: "ex-Army officers, the bulldozers, who knew how to punch through things, ... make a 200-km. push into enemy territory, and your unit is still together." [15] (2) Local residents want the director to convey an image of strength, which the

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(1) Unfortunately, the feeling in academia was not mutual. The Hebrew University valued theoretical research, according to Dr. Gidron, which was not useful to the ICCC. But if Schwartz Program faculty were to do applied research, they would not be creditable within the University. [10]

(2) The type necessary to be the ICCC's Chief Executive Officer was described in similar terms by this informant, a senior JDC-Israel official: "a paratrooper, at home in the development towns, who could play all the games of the Ministry of Education, who could get all the budgets."
directors understand as authoritarian behavior. Said one: "The Jewish Agency tells the immigrant where to live and work, and Amidar [the Housing Corporation] tells him where to live and that he can't have an additional room; so if the director isn't authoritarian, it must be because he's afraid." [3] Another related his experience with a local resident hired to direct a program. "The program head wants the director to tell her what to do. If he doesn't, it's a sign that he's weak. They want him to be aggressive." [5]

The timing of activities may also create the impression that the director or staff member is strong or powerful. "I'm given credit for being able to influence things over which I have absolutely no power," said a director. The coincidence that he began work in one neighborhood at the same time that Amidar authorized home improvements there created the impression, in his words, that he could influence Amidar. [3] (1)

The roles of center director and staff have their own trappings which convey impressions of power. A veteran community organizer, a former American who had worked for the Peace Corps in Chad, told the following stories.

I have a briefcase. The briefcase means you're important. If you go to talk to the Ministries in their offices without a briefcase -- to Welfare, for instance -- they look at you as if

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(1) It would be possible to develop the notion of center director as hero or symbolic leader. Such leadership, according to Klapp (1964), derives from meaning attributed to the leader's role by other people. I will not pursue this point here.
you're no one. So I took my case with me, even though it only had in it socks and sandwiches. But if you go into someone's house in the neighborhood with a briefcase, they're afraid you're from the Income Tax or some other inspector. So I would hide it behind the bushes or under the house and go in.

When I worked in Africa, I took a tie with me. If you went to the Arabs with a tie, they knew you were a Franji, a stranger. But you couldn't go in to the clerks without a tie. So I kept one, rolled up, with me, and put it on when I needed it. And I kept a change of clothes in a locker in the city, so I could dress appropriately. [24] (1)

While center personnel are using various symbols to convey an image of their power to local bureaucrats and politicians, the latter are doing the same, vice versa. One way to create a power image is to communicate the potential to influence the implementation of your opponent's plan. Whether the potential can be realized depends on the magnitude of the bureaucrat or politician's power. If his decision can be appealed, or if his opponent has the ability to muster greater power, then his own potential is limited; but he may be encouraged to aggrandize the display of his potential power in the hope of masking its real limits. Images and beliefs are real and are interesting and convincing in their own right, regardless of their accuracy. Beliefs about power in others stem from observations of a

(1) On the subject of explaining CO to a center manager or a layperson, this man said: "The man in the Hasid robe is not necessarily religious, but you don't doubt it on seeing him. The boy in soldier's clothes is not necessarily a soldier, but you don't question that he is one. Dress a man in CO's clothes, and people will think him a CO."
process, wrote Enderud (1976), not of their outcome. This jousting for the symbols of power and for the reality of scoring a hit provides much of the intrigue of implementation politics.

A veteran community organizer recounted his and some colleagues' jousting experiences with one particular bureaucrat.

...the small clerk can stop anything you want to get done. He will tie you and your programs up in knots. But I would go the same clerk, give him the feeling that he is important to me, not his signature, and involve him in the planning of the activity. And the same ugly, old, humpbacked, crumpled clerk who humiliated the social workers, especially the women, especially the pretty ones -- he would tell them, "Light my cigar," "Fetch me a cup of coffee," and they were dependent on his signature because he could screw up all their plans -- this same clerk, in his wheelchair, would fight for us and my project and would run around the office getting things done for us, because I let him feel that he was important and that he was involved in the planning. [24] (1)

The joust runs the gamut (so to speak) from playful teasing to more serious battle. In bossing the pretty social workers around, the wrinkled clerk was playing out a power symbol that gave him, temporarily, higher status than the

(1)

He added: "It's like the X-ray technician at Hadassah [Hospital]. I was wounded in the Army and hospitalized there, and they were going to strike over low pay, and I asked him, 'Why are you joining the strike?'

"And he said: 'I'm going to show them how important I am.'

"He wasn't striking over salary; he wanted to feel that he was important, and he couldn't just stand up and say, 'I'm important.' He could only feel that or show it by striking and stopping work."
university-educated or certified professional. After they lit his cigar and brought him coffee -- playing symbols of deference to acknowledge his symbols of power -- he presumably signed their proposals. One could imagine a pretty lady turning the tables on the clerk, extending to him symbolic recognition of his importance, as the narrator did. At the other extreme are the more serious battles over territory, money, and other life supports of a threatened organization or individual. (In most cases, I think, the individual is threatened when his agency is, because his position and identity in that role are dependent on the continued existence of his organization.)

When the ICCC fielded its own community workers where Welfare, Amidar, and the Histadrut (the Israel Labour Federation) already had organizers, battles ensued over geographic or functional divisions of work. In some places such battles still exist and there are still manipulations by municipality welfare bureaus to oust matnas organizers. [10] Agreements to cooperate have been signed by executive officers of the different agencies at the national level.

But, as one director said:

It's not the paper that will settle that matter. Things aren't fixed by Agreements or Memoranda. If you have a healthy system, it will work. But if the [local] atmosphere is 'I'll guard mine and you guard yours,' there will be problems. You can realize cooperative activity only after you sit down at the same table [with those with whom you must work]. [6]
Even sitting down together at the same table is no guarantee that problems won't arise months later. In one case, after each had gone through several cycles, a head-start program and a day-care center ran afoul of other agencies. The head-start teacher had begun to innovate when she saw that parents and children were growing bored with repetitive programming. The supervising Ministry official canceled funding for the program on the grounds that he could no longer approve it since the teacher was not following the specified curriculum. After one or two years, the matnas day-care center had more registrants than either of the other more veteran centers in town. One of the two would have had to shut down due to insufficient enrollment. Instead, reason was found to close the matnas' center. [3]

In the case of one small town, the symbols of power were so baroque as to make the center director's working situation untenable. The community center was so closely intertwined with the Local Council that, contrary to ICCC regulations, the center didn't have its own bank account, nor was it legally registered as a corporate entity.

Everything was dependent on the Local Council. Whatever the Council signed and said, "OK, you can do," you do. And the matnas first of all had no idea what its budget was because the allocation from the ICCC [i.e. its share of the local budget] came straight from [i.e. by way of] the Council; and the Council didn't put any [additional] money into the matnas because the matnas had no bank account. And the [matnas] workers were getting paid by the Council; so I felt I was working for the Council and not the matnas.

...because of the problems in the Council,
... your hands are tied. The Head of the Council is Likud [Party]; the Secretary of the Council is Ma'arach [the political party in opposition to Likud]. And one puts a knife in the back of the other. There's no way in a very closed situation like that, that you can be very effective. You can be effective to a certain point, and then you're considered a politician and then you get involved in all those things.... [21]

When the intrigue of power play becomes so convoluted as to render work impossible, one may opt to leave the position, as this man did when he moved to another center. There are other situations and other options. One director thought of himself as educating a potential threat to a different view of the world. A new Local Council Head was appointed in his town. (1) Council Heads are members of center Boards in almost all cases. Soon after his appointment, he came to call on the director and asked him if he were "'at all persuaded as to the effectiveness of community organization.' It's already a matter of the way he sees the world." said the director, "not even of any experience with it [CO]. If he decides to cut CO budgets, of course it will influence our activities."

"Was he content with a simple 'Yes' answer?" I asked the director.

"No," he replied. "Since I saw that here's a problem, I decided -- very simply -- since he's new in town, I would

(1) This is a rare but not unusual case of an Appointed Council, where different regional officials of various Ministries are appointed by the Ministry of the Interior to stabilize the affairs of a town whose elected officials mismanaged them, after Interior disbands the elected council.
expose him to the system (as I do in other areas of work), to the workers. my staff, the population, our events. That's the only way to address such a problem." [6]

Pre-emptive education -- showing off the successes of one's operations and how much they're needed -- is similar to showing the clerk that he's important by involving him in program planning. In this case, the Council Head learns how important his budget decision is to the lives of town citizens. Involving someone who has the power to thwart your actions in the decisionmaking behind those actions is one way of describing "cooptation". In the case of the ICC, threatening agents were coopted at both national and local or regional levels. As late as 1974-6, according to JDC's liaison officer with the ICC, the centers "were very fragile." The organization was still fighting for its existence and carving out its budgets. Everybody was kind of learning what it was, and we had to protect it -- [JDC] protected it, Arnie [Pins] did, I did. [Q: From whom?] A lot of people. Everybody wanted to eat it up. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs [then Welfare] thought it threatened its local offices; the Ministry of Education didn't want to give up its budgets and independence. No one was convinced yet...; it hadn't proved itself. [15]

One of the ways in which the centers were protected was by appointing representatives of each threatened and threatening agency to the Boards of Directors. national and local, as Haim Zipori related: the heads of the Youth Division, the Sports Authority, Bible Culture, the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, etc. The result: "all their
opposition has been forgotten, and they see themselves as landlords over the centers." (1980b)

"Today, it [the ICCC] is a very strong animal," said the JDC liaison officer.

We don't have the fights today that we had then. Today, even the political clout of the ICCC is huge -- ...you can't touch it. ...For example, the Ministry of Education's local units of Culture, Youth, and Sports are now operating through the mabnas in over 40 of the [100-odd] centers. ...The centers are taking major roles in Project Renewal. There's a professional director -- they have the most professional staffs in town.

[15]

It may be the case at the national level, where Ministry unit heads sat down at the same table with ICCC officials, that no one can touch the agency. The feeling of security and protection may even extend to nearly 50% of the centers. But, as Selznick (1949) wrote, cooptation demands a tricky balancing act between sharing the symbols of power while retaining the actual potential to exercise power. Zipori was very sensitive to this point and strove to make his directors aware of it as well. As he told a group of new directors (1980b), "If the municipality has other ideas, it can scuttle your whole project -- if it has any control."

Many directors have found this balance difficult to achieve, especially as regards their local Boards. As one director said:

The public Board, in most cases in the centers in Israel, is a coterie that includes political people or agents of the money-holders, representatives of the funding institutions. Each one comes with some particular interest which is
not necessarily the interest of the community which the matnas serves. Usually, even the public's representatives are appointed by the Local Authority [Municipality or Council].

The bottom line is: "The Board is authority which will interfere or will not interfere with the director doing what he wants to do." [4]

In the process of managing the cooptation balance or of seeking to protect the agency's fragility, it is possible to misuse the symbols of power. Presenting a symbol at the wrong time, in the wrong place or to the wrong person -- any inappropriate judgment regarding the display of power symbols -- may upset the balance, accomplishing the opposite of what one intended. A director's story illustrates two such events.

There appeared P. H. A class A expert on the subject of ----, there's none like him. He comes to Y---, sits for an hour, speaks with the center director, and builds him a program for the center that they'll have to live with for another 40 years, and goes home. It makes you furious. P. H. for nearly a year doesn't enter Y---, because the Council Head and the Council will throw him to Kingdom come. They didn't want to say a word to him, because after being here only an hour, he presents a proposal to move the matnas to the other side of town. A wonderful program -- I mean, beautiful -- but he read the picture incorrectly, he didn't read the internal political struggles right. And I'm also not convinced that it was a correct solution, because I can't believe that in one hour, it's possible to come up with solutions.

Haim Zipori did the same thing. Haim Zipori is worse, because he's Haim Zipori, he's the CEO. He comes here and spouts off without knowing the reality. He sits with the director for a quarter hour and then goes to the Council and blurts things out.
Today it's easy for me, because the Council Head used to be a company man and knows Haim and the value of his promises. But one day they almost threw him [Zipori] at me. He came to the [then-] Council Head and said, "--- --- [the center director] is to be head of Project Renewal." [It didn't matter that] the previous day the Council Head had called me and said. "[I want] you to be head of Project Renewal." When Haim Zipori told him, "He'll head Project Renewal or there won't be any Project Renewal," he told him [Zipori], "Go to hell!" He told me -- and I justified him: Haim Zipori is not going to tell the Moroccan Council Head how to run the town, and to this Haim Zipori didn't catch on. To the Moroccan in Y--- at such a level, you don't tell how to run the town. It's possible to suggest to him, to say, "Let's think together." But you don't tell him in black and white because he won't accept it. He got up here and screamed -- and rightly so. Justly, from his point of view. [5]

Two to Tango

Local bureaucrats and politicians are not the only ones who try to influence the implementation of ICCC policy. Local residents may neutralize the thrust of a particular program or a whole repertoire of classes by not coming to the center. As the center tries to entice residents, so residents try to lure center staff into adapting their resources to the residents' desires. It is a reiterative process. The center staff send out messages; residents interpret them and send back other messages; the staff interpret . . . , and so on.

Interpretation is a delicate process. "Sometimes what is said explicitly is exactly the opposite of what people really want," said one director. You use an "intuitive connection: to live the place, to feel even when things
aren't said exactly, and to feel what people want and their reactions to things that exist and that don't exist." She gave an example of one symbol.

For instance, we have a newsletter. In the new issue, we included a letter in manuscript. This symbol says. "You're fine just as you are; you don't need to be polished up in a print shop. As you are, both what you say and how you say it."
It's a sign to the community, in my opinion, that the door is always open. That's also the reason for its title, "The Open Door." By the way, my office door is always open, too. That's a principle of my work.

I see how they interpret our signals by how many people respond or not -- they can come, or stay away, or inquire -- and by which people respond or not, and which ones respond to which part of the supermarket. [4]

In another case, the center staff discovered that some of their workers represented values that discouraged residents from participating in center activities.

We saw the phenomenon all those years that every community organizer and social worker in the neighborhood would come to development towns knowing they'd be there for only a year or two, usually at the beginning of their careers. They gather experience and move back to the center of the country or make their bucks and quit.

The mind-set of the community worker and his approach -- and, as a result, his follow-up program -- any match between what was going on in the neighborhood and what he thought, was random. Whatever he heard, he heard in his own language. He analyzed it according to his own way of thought -- not in accord with the meaning of the same woman or fellow who told him something. Even though the words might be the same, the fellow intended something else.

This affected the residents, who felt toward those professionals: "'OK, you came to save this city, but you're
not staying here.' It led to feelings of distrust and a lack of openness toward community workers coming into the field."

So the center staff developed a program which replaced "the community organizer with all his distancing and his differences with a woman who is more or less of the same social and economic class (maybe a bit higher), who speaks and thinks similarly. ...She is believable because they know her to be a K--- resident and not a guest." [6]

This is a clear case of symbolic power outweighing status-based power. Local residents have little knowledge, authority, status or other power base as compared with the community center staff, backed as they are by professional titles, university degrees, a national corporation, large buildings and budgets. Residents derive their power not from any real ability to shut down center operations. If the centers have a social mission and state moneys to support them, they will continue to pursue that mission. Rather, it is in the center director's need to show attendance (to demonstrate his own success) and in the residents' ability to deny him that symbol that the latter's power lies.

One would expect to find symbolic power in a group of relatively powerless people organized for protest, as Lipsky (1970) has demonstrated. Protest generates bargaining resources and raises issue salience by (1) increasing others' perceptions of group solidarity and (2) activating sympathizers with greater political resources to pressure the protest target to respond. Especially as protest movements
and riots are public dramas, with today's additional media involvement in shaping public responses, the symbolic bases of power are heightened. (1)

In the ICCC case, however, residents' symbolic power is not related to their constitution as a protest group. The policy by which the ICCC was established legislated the involvement of local residents in program planning and as members of center Boards. In practice, early planners wanted residents to have input into center design, as Dr. Pozner recalled. Planners and executives alike discovered that such involvement was not easy to accomplish. Residents couldn't express what they wanted or designers and architects didn't know how to elicit responses. In many cases, directors still feel threatened by the thought of citizen Board members, or local power and status machinations are too complex to allow citizen membership. (2)

Most directors develop an attitude that they are "the

(1) See Klapp (1964). p. 233 and Lipsky (1970), Introduction, Chapters 1, 6, for discussions of public dramas and protest, respectively, and the media. Nimmo and Combs (1980) also discuss the role of the media in creating myths and heroes (Chapter 6).

(2) One example of the meaning of participation to residents comes from the U.S.: "...the ability of the neighborhood boards to shape their own program under the [Economic Opportunity] Act [of 1964; Title II-A, Section 202 (a) (3)] -- and related programs, too -- was even stronger symbolic proof to the embattled community that they could get 'in'." Earl Rabb, "Which War, Which Poverty?" The Public Interest 3 (Spring, 1966), p. 50. If center directors and others don't want to let residents 'in' on the power or status of the local animating center (in Shils' sense), it is not surprising that citizen Board members threaten them.
best interpreters of what the community tells them or of their hints or reactions or smiles or scowls." This director claims to have learned later, in the U.S., that he wasn't the smartest man sitting in the office and developing a supermarket display. But:

My initial approach had been -- OK, I know you're supposed to listen, but, really, I know what they want. So I'll listen in order to strengthen what I think. Sometimes I misread the signals because I believed strongly in my own idea and it's hard for me to believe that I'm wrong. Then I tend to interpret people's reactions in the way that I want them to look.

There are times when I know they and I are thinking differently. I bring theater here not because it meets their need for theater -- they don't need theater -- but because I want to create that need.

And sometimes I purposely do what they don't want, even when I can interpret their thoughts correctly, because I want to lead them in a certain direction. [4]

Resident involvement in the implementation of center policy is crucial because of the agency's mandate: to change people's values. Which values?

The community center and community organization are built on principles of democracy. Only England, the U.S., and maybe France have real democracies. The people from East Europe and the Arab countries don't know what it means to have power and use it, to make government work for you because it is you. And that's what we're teaching. [24]

The inculcation of values of Culture and Art: to bring that public to conventions which we accept as clear as day, to draw them near to it, to bring them toward that consciousness. [5]

There are standards, norms of behavior: to push in line, not to push; to smoke in the hall,
not to smoke; to put your feet on the chairs, not to put your feet on chairs. Of course people may have a need to smoke in the theater. But I don't let them, because I want to create a need for (a) a cultural atmosphere, (b) consideration for others, (c) preservation of health. I'm creating a new direction: "Don't throw seed shells on the floor, because I won't let you in."

I want to raise their consciousness to another standard. But I have to be careful not to advance without soldiers.

Q: How do you determine these new directions?

A: That's a problem. Some things, by social convention, are considered good; others, not. By social convention one shouldn't throw shells on the floor.

But there are other conventions to which I was educated, by which I was raised, which I like. I think it makes a society more qualitative.

There are other things we decide to do as a staff because we believe they are good.

That's the basis of my choice: social convention, group consensus, and personal principles.

Q: Are you successful in educating them to these norms?

A: In my opinion -- no. That is, yes and no, but mostly no. Today, in the community center, at shows. you don't have to say anything to anybody: they don't smoke, they don't bring in food or drinks, they don't put their feet up. A cultured, elite audience.

Those very same people, in the cinema -- food, soda, cigarettes. So what have I done, educated them?

One day I met one of these guys. who's also on our Board, in the cinema, and asked him why he smokes and eats there and not in the Bet Am [community center].

He said: "It's not that I don't understand. I know exactly what I'm doing. There, I'm part of the atmosphere, and here I'm part of the atmosphere. I don't create it, I'm part of it. [4]

We are a Western state, founded on Western principles, and must stay that way. We must train the Sphardim to be like that, and not let ourselves be pulled back to the Levant.

Development towns, where everyone is Sphardi, develop Sphardi leadership. [32]
By changing their values I mean their behavior and their taking advantage of leisure time, setting priorities for the way they spend their time, ... their exposure to things which initially they dismiss as 'not for me.' For example, it was important for me that they see "Moroccan King." "The Marriage Contract" -- which is indeed completely alien from what their lives have been about, because it's more for European ethnic groups -- but it was important that they see it ... to experience an evening of theatre in an atmosphere of theater. And not the snooker club or drunkenness or drugs or prostitution, which exist.

...First of all, I begin from the assumption that it is necessary to preserve in any way at all the cultural values of the people who are living here. I mean their folklore, their tradition, their ethnicity. ...In many cases, the melting pot worked; in many others -- we put them into a melting pot and took out empty people who didn't know where they stood. That is, for many years we maintained that Moroccan culture had to be suppressed, because it had no [base in] tradition or anything. And it's a beautiful culture, which is disappearing, and every effort must be made to preserve it. And every other ethnic group -- Kurdistan or India -- whose children have been [made to feel] embarrassed to be associated with it, as a result of that same melting pot.

To change and preserve, at the same time -- it's a very delicate balance, and one doesn't always succeed.... [6]

Summary

The ICCC policy requires change on the part of its clients, using cultural and recreational activities as the vehicle. Such change will happen, according to the logic of the policy, only through resident interaction with center programs and personnel. Residents, then, become necessary actors in the implementation of that policy. The ICCC communicates its purpose by using such symbols as their buildings, center programs, agency names, professional
titles, "beaux gestes" like the briefcase and tie, and so forth. (1) If residents understand these symbols as they were intended and accept their meanings as important in their own lives, then they will be more likely to participate in agency functions. Residents may choose not to participate, either because they reject the symbols' salience for their lives or because they interpret the symbols differently. It is in the interpretation of and acting on symbols that residents shape programs.

For its part, the ICCC, through its staff, must discover whether its symbols are being misinterpreted or rejected and make appropriate changes to alter resident interpretation and response. The ICCC's mission is to effect change, and organizational actors -- policy implementors -- must create and convey the image that they have the power to impose change. That power may derive from a status based on proximity to societal centers: government, university, wealth, as embodied in their legislative sanction, names, professional status, building and budget sizes. It is in their attempts to exercise this power that negotiation with local bureaucrats and politicians over power and status symbols -- power "play" -- takes place.

(1) Klapp (1964, p. 238) develops this idea of beaux gestes as "dramatically perfect gestures that invite interpretation and fit neatly into a certain plot."
Chapter 12. Identity Management Crises

Introduction

The ICCC mission embodies two orientations: service to local elites and service to the poor. The origins of these two aims may be found in the ideas and activities leading up to the government policy which create the ICCC: in Zipori's survey of recreational facilities in development towns and in the Americans' suggestions to Aranne that community centers might solve Israel's social problems. Perhaps it was intended that the agency swallow both orientations. From a perspective internal to the agency, however, they are about as compatible as was Jonah in the whale's belly. Directors and community workers struggle regularly with the question of their mission: what sort of agency are we? whom should we be serving, local and neighboring elites or the resident poor?

The next section describes some organizational manifestations of these struggles to implement the social programs included in the ICCC policy.

General Social Background

The ICCC's first explicit mandate was to provide facilities and programs of a recreational/cultural nature to slum and development town residents. One objective of this mandate was to retard migration from the towns to already crowded city centers, by providing locally the "bright lights" that -- according to this theory -- were drawing
people away from their homes. As outlined in the case, these programs were to improve the quality of local services, raising the level of the population; encourage social change, making a thriving community out of a random grouping of immigrants; or educate the individual. In sum, this meant integration, socialization, and acculturation.

Since early pre-State years, most of the thinking in Israel about social integration and acculturation was marked by the metaphor, "the desert generation." In Biblical times, the Children of Israel had wandered in the desert for 40 years, unable to enter the Promised Land until the generation that remembered Egypt had died. Like them, modern Israelis would have to wait until the "desert generation" had passed on before they could "come into" a unique Israeli culture. Social unrest following the 1967 War helped to dispel that notion. Easterners became vocal about their feelings of receiving government treatment not equal to other Israelis (as well as popular discrimination allegedly government-sanctioned). Although there had been riots before, their impact had not been as strong as it was this time.

According to Baruch Levy, former Advisor on Welfare Matters to Prime Minister Meir, the Black Panther strikes of 1971 increased public awareness of social problems, putting pressure on the government to respond. Golda Meir appointed the Commission on the Plight of Underprivileged Youth in May of that year. It was the first time there had been any
formal, official attention to social needs. The strikes, public opinion, and the newspapers, in Levy's estimation, put social issues on party platforms for the 1973 elections -- for the first time in the State's history. And the Commission's Report, delivered in November, 1972, constituted the first such social document, and a comprehensive one at that. It included 289 recommendations for government action, boosted public awareness, and led to very high expectations, the impact of which is still being felt. Said Levy: "Even though the Yom Kippur War [October, 1973] and its subsequent disillusionment [with the government] and economic problems changed the atmosphere, you can't go back to pre-1967 War illusions that all's fine. You can't ignore the [social] situation; even the politicians know that." [32]

Two new concepts succeeded the "desert generation" metaphor: the "gap" and deprivation. The gap was social, economic, and cultural; it existed between Easterners (at the low end) and Westerners; and the government was going to "make it smaller," "make it tiny," and then "eradicate it" by increasingly more aggressive social programs. [25] The gap metaphor implies that two points can be measured and their difference filled in by remedial additions. Deprivation, however, has both objective and subjective meanings, to Dr. Levy. "Objective deprivation" can be measured in terms of how much land, cement, steel, money, etc. is needed to alleviate a housing shortage. But "subjective deprivation" concerns "feelings, perceptions, preconceived notions,
consciousness: it has no logic or reason." It is apparent in ethnic relations, and it can't be solved with more housing or increased social security payments: "a second generation Cochin from a moshav [cooperative village] is still different from a second generation kibbutznik from Europe or America and from a Musrara [slum] dweller." [32]

The deprived, objectively or subjectively, were concentrated in the development towns and in a handful of city slums. Locating its field units precisely in these places, the ICCC absorbed the social mandate to narrow the gap and remediate deprivation. Since they had no resources to build housing or increase transfer payments, the centers could not ameliorate the objective conditions of deprivation. They were to address cultural and social deprivation. Since community organizers practiced the processes of inducing and managing social change, they became the agency's watchdogs of this mission. (1)

Training for the community organization (CO) profession included a particular view of the target populations and social processes. The population was "sick" or "weak". [2, 3, 4, 6, 22] This metaphor casts the CO professional in the role of a doctor and justifies intervening in the neighborhood to make the community "healthier" or "stronger". Hence, the "stronger" elements in the community leave it; the

(1) Said Haim Zipori (1980b): The matnas is based on the concept and principles of CO, and the community organizer is the embodiment of CO in the matnas.
"weaker" ones stay behind. This perception has even been adopted by many development town residents themselves. Anyone who is successful, leaves. The center and its staff are, thus, in the very delicate position of encouraging residents to stay in the place they condemn.

In point of fact, it is conventional wisdom that community centers, settlement houses, and the like attract as clients those neighborhood residents who are already on the path of upward mobility. (1) Matnas experiences bear out this contention. As one director described:

We found we were reaching only a specific section of the population,... those who are close geographically to the Center and the middle and upper classes, more or less. Since K... is built like a long hotdog, there are neighborhoods at 5-6 km. distances [from the Center], and that's a lot. ...The Center is located at the center of the city. The population of the city center is more established than that of the neighborhoods. ...That's true of the development towns in general.

...Also, the high cost of activities, and the priorities among middle class families for their children to pursue activities and interests in addition to formal schooling -- create the picture I painted [regarding the Center drawing middle class attendance]. [6]

The inclination of the elites to attend center activities, almost to the exclusion of the lower classes, disturbs many community workers and some directors, who understand the center's role as serving all residents, especially the poor. A community worker explained his feelings about this situation.

(1) I have written about this in my 1976 paper.
You come into someplace like B-- or R--. My impression of R-- is you go in there and see clubs -- music, dance, etc.-- and it's impressive. It can't help but be impressive, you see the place is filled!

But then you take a list of the clubs and the people in them, and you take a list of the people in the neighborhood, and you check them -- and you see maybe they [the center] are only reaching the top 20%, the wealthiest classes.... But there are people down there who don't want clubs, who need other things, basic organizing -- maybe they're not being reached.

...The community center should serve as many people as possible; and if you only give a certain aspect of their needs -- clubs, culture, sports -- then you're not reaching the other things.

He summarized his position by saying that in his center, "we don't deal with the top 10% of the population. We try to deal with the people whom we feel need our service." [21]

Organizational Quandries: Community Organization

According to one JDC official, the matnas-community center "sells" leisure culture. Leisure time is a middle class phenomenon; the poor, who are worried about making ends meet, have no leisure time. Clubs are a leisure time activity. (1) Community centers, 90% of whose programs consist of clubs, are thus serving the middle class. But the majority of the community center's population is not middle class. Moreover, the purposes of community organization (CO) are social change or social processes among the unorganized, in this case, the poor. This leads, therefore, to a conflict

(1) Note: "Club" is a poor translation of the Hebrew "חוג". The closest English concept is "circle", as in sewing circle.
between the community center and the CO profession. [9]

The conflict is supported by organizational tensions at the basic level of work description and performance. CO is concerned with change and process, two difficult things to see, measure, and describe. Since most social changes occur over a long period of time -- sometimes longer than the tenure of a single staff person -- their description and comprehension is even more difficult and abstract. (1) This abstraction is problematic for many in the agency: directors, center staffs, Zipori, and even some community workers.

Zipori "bought" CO in 1971, reportedly because Amidar (Immigrants' Housing Authority) approached him with the idea and with the money to support it. Why he kept it and assumed its costs when Amidar pulled out after a year is unknown. One may speculate about the efforts of Zipori's Senior Advisor on and Coordinator of CO to convince his boss of the merits of CO; perhaps Zipori liked what he saw in the effect of CO practice on one of his favorite centers; perhaps some directors prevailed upon him. But the difficulty of explaining to a manager what a CO was doing -- especially since he did whatever it was in the field. outside the center's walls and out of sight and earshot of his boss -- seemed at times insurmountable. The community workers for

(1) There are other reasons for CO's abstract nature, including perhaps the relative newness of the profession. I discuss several of these issues in my 1981 paper.
whom the abstraction got wearisome often chose to teach an English class or lead a club. Other options included scheduling regular meetings with different local committees or service agencies, committing oneself to a specific time and place. Some began organizing specific services, such as day-care centers or laundry clubs. [1, 3, 21] But such activities, "short-term" as they were, sometimes involved weeks or months before progress was visible, especially to the director and to co-workers. It got to a point, most notably in 1977, when Zipori exploded: there was too much "process", too much running around in the neighborhood; "we need to see projects, clubs, people inside the matnus," said Zipori's Assistant. [12]

Given that CO as a profession was new in Israel when it was introduced into the ICCC -- few had even heard the term before -- and that the majority of those hired as organizers had been trained in other professions, how could the agency make sense of CO? We find a clue in one of the organization's metaphors.

**Supermarkets, sales clerks, and packaged goods**

The idea that the community center would be "a functional supermarket", in Dr. Pozner's words, came into being during the formative years of the policy, even before it was legislated. The center would offer a full array of programs, activities, and clubs running the gamut from sports to crafts, from remedial education to music and dance. The
local resident would develop a shopping list of what he would like to buy in the center and present this list to the director, who in turn would outfit his shop with supplies from his regional Youth, Sports, Culture, Adult Education, etc. Divisions of the Ministry, advertise his wares in the neighborhood, and wait for customers to sign up.

Residents, however, did not come in the numbers that were anticipated. The director in Bet She'an in 1972 saw that he had 1000 people registered in five clubs; but that left 12,000 who were not coming. He decided that he needed a staff person to draft people to come to the center. Someone told him about a profession called "community work" whose activities would fit his bill, so he hired a community worker. The latter's research revealed that people needed "bread and jam, not ceramics"; and thus was born in Bet She'an the idea of discovering and addressing people's needs.

[12] A similar process went on in Kiryat Shmona at approximately the same time. Both are credited with being the first centers to introduce community work, coincidental with the Amidar negotiations which officially introduced CO into the ICCC.

A center director who was involved with CO in its early years recalls that the ICCC originally viewed the community worker as an agent of clubs and programs. [3] The notion of the community worker as a salesman, said another observer, "fits very well with the organizational culture of the ICCC." [9] Indeed, given the supermarket metaphor, a salesman is
just what would be needed if sales weren't going well because not enough customers were coming to the store. As one community worker said: "The directors take on community workers because they think, 'Oh good, they're going to fill up the community center....'" [21] An early JDC memo proposed to fund "outreach workers" -- COs, in fact -- to bring young people -- school dropouts, pre-military, unemployed, returning soldiers, gangs -- in short, those "unaccustomed to insitutional activities," into the centers. (1 September 1971) In the daily context of their professional practice, community workers circulate among neighborhood residents, outside the center -- just as a salesman would. Said one director, describing her view of CO practice: "There's no subject that we can push only as supermarket owners or clerks. ...We must also be outside [the building]." [4]

In keeping with the supermarket metaphor, one might expect a salesman to be "pushing" many similarly wrapped, self-contained items, ready to be distributed and sold on demand. Indeed, there is a high degree of similarity in programs from one center to the next. As one CO supervisor/field worker said: "...there were certain packaged programs that everybody was supposed to be doing, or that's what you were led to believe...." [1]

One finds ballet, ceramics, folk dancing, English lessons, and so on in almost every center. The repertoire of possible clubs is extensive. One might not find
weight-lifting or photography in a particular center because the donor did not include money for such a facility, no sponsor has been found for the purchase of necessary equipment, or the center could not locate a qualified instructor or afford his/her transportation from the city 10 or 20 miles distant. But clubs without such restrictions are ubiquitous. Since concerts, shows, and exhibits are sponsored by the Popular Arts unit, one will find the same quartet or mandolin orchestra or play appearing in a region's centers within one or two weeks' time. (1) So-called community projects also appear in many centers within a short period of time. Laundry clubs, toy libraries, day-care centers, and camping weekends have all passed through the center system at one time or another. One is as likely to find a babysitting service, a macrame class, and Lorca's "Blood Wedding" in Upper Afula, Jerusalem's Romema or Netivot.

The incentives for packaging and for imitation are several: (1) the appeal of "others do it"; (2) the appeal of something that was a "proven success" elsewhere, yielding the center and its director a good name; (3) Zipori suggested there was money available to do a particular program, usually because some other agency had approached him with the idea and the funds; (4) it allowed headquarters some quality control over local programming; (5) it allowed headquarters

(1) Israel is divided into 6 administrative regions.
to solve a manpower training problem by supplementing the
inexperience, inability or lack of inventiveness of local
program staff; (6) it fostered the crystallization of an
organizational style, instead of each center doing its own
thing; (7) the magnetism of newness.

The net result has been described as a certain
fashionability, modishness, or faddism of programming,
declared as a relatively rapid alteration among various means
applied to relatively fixed ends. (1)

The ICCC's Associate Executive Director said that
faddism was once widespread, but he believed it had been
curtailed through better supervision. He cautioned, however:
"I must believe that they [a local matnas staff] arrive at
their [proposed program] idea by researching local needs.
although I know that usually the idea comes directly from the
director or his staff without their having ascertained local
needs." And he added that such a program was usually
unsuccessful because no one had checked whether the community
wanted it or not. [12]

The idea that center staff should investigate local
needs before planning programs is a principle of professional
CO practice. It was adopted by the ICCC and appears as the
first of its nine operating principles: "matnas programs
will be derived from community needs, within the overall

(1) My paraphrase of Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and
the Structure of Societies (Princeton, 1966), pp. 72, 357-8;
Since the communities where centers are located are of different sizes, different ages, different proximities to city and national centers, assorted population mixes, one would expect "community needs" to vary from place to place. If center programs derived from local needs, then, one would expect a certain amount of variety among different centers' programs. There is little reason to expect that one local resident from Iraq, a second from Yemen, and a third from Romania would all need a ceramics class. Nor is there reason to expect that 25 or 80 or 110 communities would need toy libraries -- which they had done without for 10-22 years -- within the space of 3 to 4 months. Moreover, these are not the activities for which the desert development towns for the city. Given the organizational principle of deriving programs from local needs, the extent of program similarity from one center to the next -- even as explained by the supermarket metaphor and the incentives for faddism -- is surprising.

The coexistence of prepackaged fads with the principle of community generation of programs creates organizational tensions at the operations level and complicates policy implementation. A veteran CO professional, who named faddist programming the "National Project Approach", told the following story, which illustrates some of these tensions.

(1) These principles are presented at the end of this chapter.
Just a few years ago, it was decided that CO is good for young couples, and all of a sudden every center is helped ... to plan projects for young couples. I think it's not good enough to say, it's important to organize young couples. If in my community the CO says to the Board, "I need so much budget for this project of young couples," I have to -- as a Board member -- say to this community worker, "Why? Why are you so concerned about the young couples?" And I don't want the answer, "Because I was told by XYZ in the Corporation [headquarters] that there is this budget for work with young couples...."

...After he has done a study, if he has found that there are 200 young couples, and...there is no place where they can go, and they want to go -- they're really annoyed and bored, ... they're getting impatient with each other at home..., and they thought the community center was just for kids,... -- and the community worker comes up with a program,... then I am ready to listen to him.

[2] (1)

(1) She also said that "community work" had become a "schlagger" -- a hit: "I think that there has been too much of a getting hold of a phrase: 'community organization is good.' Now this has no basis [in logic or fact]: who says it is good? What's good about it? And then if you say CO is good, then of course you have got to have lots of community organization; and so it's reflected all along the way. ...You latch on to something...."
Implications for HQ/Field Relations and Program Implementation

At ---- [Community Center], someone asked the director how many times Haim Ziperi had been there.

A fine question! Why should Haim Ziperi even be here at all? Does he dictate community center policy? [13]

The belief motivated by the principle of local needs is that the community is the point of departure for decisionmaking and the center director has complete freedom to act, given his understanding of "his" community. "When the Executive Committee reaches a decision," said the Assistant Director of the ICCC, "we first ask whether it dwarfs the local director or limits his freedom to act." [12]

The reality, however, is that headquarters does pull strings, at least some, if not all. At the very least, by setting the level of its budgetary participation in each matnas, HQ determines the extent of local activities. [13] But there are other, more subtle ways in which this happens.

A member of the Board told the following story.

Haim Ziperi issued a circular on the subject of young couples, and many of the directors took the CEO's circular as if it were Scripture. So whether or not they had young couples, whether or not they were interested in a young couples program, they did young couples.

[We, a Board of Directors subcommittee, told Haim Ziperi:] "It's OK to issue a catalog of possibilities, but then it has to take on the appearance of a catalog. But if you produce it as a memo, over your signature, it's almost like a
command. [Moreover,] ... the directors understand it as indicating your willingness to support the project financially. And then it turns out that some of them do not what they should but only those projects for which they have no budgets [understanding that you will send them money]."

And I can't say that this disease has disappeared. [33]

Some directors perceive that Zipori might press them to do one activity or another due to political pressures on him. At other times, there may be "moral" pressure: "When Haim Zipori says, 'If you'll do this...'. it's not nice not to.

We live within the ICCC. Unless you're a rebel and say -- 'Leave me [alone] about all that, I'll do here what seems necessary to us,' you work within their guidelines." [5]

A senior Ministry official involved in ICCC activities "fears" that directors believe what they are told -- that they are free. [13] One director and his staff, who wanted to try a new direction in setting priorities and planning programs, turned to one of the CO supervisors and asked: "'What will the Corporation [headquarters] think of this -- if I don't have clubs and such like?'" [8] Another director who did set his own course of action endured a poor reputation for many years. He began programming adult activities, because he found that youth were well-provided for by other agencies. When Zipori and the regional supervisor showed up, they wanted to know where all his youth activities were. He tried to convince them that his was the proper way to do things -- to no avail. [23] His poor
reputation as a director, while not costing him his job, effectively neutralized him from being an example to other directors.

1. What's in a Name?
   An organizational reputation and control

In an organization whose field units are spread over a wide geography, one way for headquarters to control operations is by making models out of certain directors and certain centers. In the ICCC's early years, when personnel were shaping the image of the organization and fighting to establish its place on the map of existing agencies, one valued personality trait of directors and others was inventiveness -- in negotiating through miles of red tape and in creating innovative programs which would put the ICCC in the public eye. Exciting, new and successful programs would commend you to Haim Zipori, who would spread your good name in the four corners of the ICCC world. The dispersal of good and bad models ties together a wide-flung empire, creates ideals of proper behavior, and controls individual behavior. The creation and management of a good reputation is eased by the adoption of prepackaged programs and fads, which also minimizes the ability of HQ to discern among centers and identify poor behavior. Only oddballs stand out, not poor managers. Hence the appeal of programs successful elsewhere that "everybody is doing." It is also quite contrary to the
principle of deriving programs from local needs. (1)

From the director's point of view, creating a good name may be fraught with difficulty. In part, it demands the ability to "toot one's own horn," but it also necessitates rebutting a false or inaccurate or undesirable low public image. For some, such effort is untenable. In these and other cases, a situation such as the following may develop.

There are many places where the director and his staff, including the CO, are really doing new things. They simply don't know it. And these directors run around with their heads in the ground because they're being criticized -- so even the little they're doing well, they don't tell anyone. ...Haim comes and says it's all terrible, and no one tells him "You're wrong." So he's [stuck] with that impression. [8]

As the center network grew, Zipori was no longer able to travel to all the centers to get a first-hand impression. After the ICCC's reorganization into an agency with regional supervisors, he became dependent on the latter's estimations of the directors in their regions. Some directors, according to one, felt that Zipori's relying on others' opinions -- not only the supervisors' -- meant they could not share problems with their colleagues but had to report "miracles." [21] Moreover, even the supervisors were not in the centers long enough to know what was happening, some directors felt.

(1) Sapolsky (1972) discusses the Polaris Missile System's use of PERT to create an impression of successful operations among agency peers and purse-holders. The image of success created a sort of smoke-screen or buffer between the agency and any potential inspectors, who were satisfied with the agency's reputation. See especially Chapters 4 and 8.
"They can look at the budget [balance sheet], but that's not enough," said one; "it's certainly not good for checking whether we're meeting local needs." [28]

2. The Numbers Game

Attendance and membership figures are another way in which headquarters may control local programming. While they are compatible with the supermarket metaphor (as an index of cost and therefore efficiency), they are incompatible with professional CO practice. Especially in an era of tight budgets, the per-person cost of activities is an important figure, as is utilization of space, in a non-profit agency which has to justify its expenses to the politicians and the public. CO activities cannot justify themselves in such an atmosphere, inasmuch as the long-term process of developing local leadership and building democratic or civic competence involves many hours of committee meetings and walking the street, activities which are neither cost-effective nor space-efficient. Moreover, CO activities are rarely measurable in terms easy to report.

"Success is the number of participants and the number of activities and the number of paying members," said one ICCC observer.

Ask a director what he wants. He'll tell you he wants a full, roaring house every evening -- that is, light in every room; if you drop in unexpectedly at 7 p.m., you won't see an empty house. ...Even a balanced budget is marginal to activities.

Haim Zipori will tell you he wants other
things from a successful matnas -- social change, etc. But he can't measure it, and so he can't tell if it's been done or not, or done well or not. [9; 14, 29, 12, 2, 21, 3 reported similar observations.]

The transmission of images and impressions is important in the numbers game. The director has been "under pressure to produce, to show results" [14] not only to create a good name with his boss in headquarters, but also because the early political forces threatening to squash a new establishment had to be mollified, both locally and nationally, and an organizational identity had to be established quickly. (1) A street-gang worker has to hang around for about a year "before he can begin to make headway with gang leaders," the Jerusalem Post social affairs reporter said. "But it's expensive to employ someone for that long, waiting for results. The politicians are after you about the money you spend." [25]

The particular format of the Annual Survey, conducted from headquarters since 1976, reinforces the impression in the field that quantifiable programs are the desirable area of center activities. The section on CO does not lend itself to reporting activities they consider necessary, professional, and meaningful. As one community worker explained:

(1) This pressure to create a good personal reputation has led to reporting exaggerated numbers and stories about performance, not a difficult effort given the geographic dispersion and individual latitude of operation. See Edelman (1977:85) on "creaming" in reporting data.
Maybe there are youth who don't come to the place [center] because it's not their kind of people or maybe they'd just rather be where they are.

...For me, it's not enough to go into a matnas, see that it's filled wall to wall with people, with clubs, and say, "Oh, this matnas is doing its job." Go out into the boondocks a little bit and ask them, "Do you know what the matnas is? ...Do you participate in anything they do?" If they say no, then you know that somewhere, the matnas doesn't fill its function.

...Amidar sees productivity as the number of House Councils you organize. The community worker in the center sees the effectiveness of that same Council. If there are 30 Councils [on paper], of which 10 are operating, or there are only 15 but all are operating well, what's better? Everybody has his idea.

To me, it's not a question of the number of people [participating], the number of House Councils. It's a matter of, is the center effective in addressing the needs of the community? ...The matnas can be full, but there are going to be slums, not just physical but social slums: kids aren't going to school, they're not working, not going to the army....

CO doesn't pay for itself. It does pay for itself, not in ... monetary terms, but in qualitative terms. [21]

So the community organizers are poor salesmen: they don't produce results, quickly, that can be seen and measured and reported. Their work, therefore, cannot support the agency in creating the sort of identity and image that will garner necessary political support. (1) Yet, they have not been fired. Their number has grown over the decade. The ICCC makes provisions for their supervision (paid for by JDC) and teaches its directors CO principles, both at in-service

(1) As a matter of fact, the nature of their work is often against the best interests of the centers, in that they organize residents to demand of the centers programs the latter may not be ready or willing to provide.
training sessions and in the Schwartz Program to Train Senior Personnel. The supermarket metaphor goes a long way to explain how the ICCC could make sense of community organizers within it. But the activities encouraged by the metaphor -- prepackaged and faddish programs and quantitative reporting -- go against the grain of CO and the first principle of deriving programs from local needs. How may we understand the reason for the continued existence of such intra-organizational tension?

Whose Needs?

The supermarket metaphor describes an organization striving for central control over its far-flung branches and operatives. Beneath the impulse toward central control is a social mission that charges the ICCC with providing programs that society -- animating centers, elites, high status groups -- has determined necessary for the policy target population. In short, the ICCC must act as if it knows what local residents need.

However, how does anyone determine what another person needs in terms of recreational or cultural activities? It is easier to see that someone needs food, housing, clothing, a job: the Israeli conventions by which those are measured are clear. But the ICCC hasn't the resources or the mandate to provide these, and cultural/recreational standards of need have not yet been set, except by some theoretical abstraction which has not been measured in hours per week. The ICCC
hired community workers to assess local needs, but professionally and methodologically this presents a problem. While the CO profession does claim to be able to determine local needs, the subject area of these needs has rarely been cultural/recreational activities. Community organizers traditionally have focused on physical neighborhood problems: street lighting, transportation, sewer systems, housing maintenance, etc. By opting for the cultural arena of the ICCC context, matnas community workers were stepping outside the boundaries or conventions accepted by their peers.

The methodological problem is different. When the Bet She'an people answered that they needed bread and jam, the center responded with homework assistance for school-children. Local residents had no answers about cultural/recreational needs in terms the center could provide. Community workers were then charged with educating people to their "felt needs", which is tantamount to the professional using his own framework to suggest what needs might exist: the professional leading the witness, as it were. This creates the survey syndrome, where answers are given to please the questioner, or the suggested option returns in the answer column in the affirmative.

On the one hand, there is the ICCC making decisions about citizens' lives -- social control by "absorption" while keeping people in their (geographic) places -- a "publicly
unmentionable goal." (1) On the other hand, there is the
democratic value of the individual's freedom. The two are
incommensurable values: they conflict, they create tension
in the same organizational context, but a choice cannot be
made between them. In such a situation, a myth is born. It
provides an answer that resolves the tension, at least
temporarily, and blocks further questioning. In this case,
it is the myth of responding to local needs. It allows
decisions to be made by the ICCC, albeit under a screen of
indirection, and it protects the individual's freedom. As
long as the myth is believed, it ensures the continued
presence of CO and of central decision-making, each
challenging the other's principles of action. As long as it
is maintained, the myth keeps the tension under control or in
balance.

Summary

The ICCC absorbed a mandate from society to integrate,
socialize, acculturate a lower class, predominantly Eastern
population into a middle class. Western way of life. Because
of the middle class nature of its building, programs, name,

(1) The phrase is Harold Garfinkel's. Edelman (1977: p. 39)
discusses accomplishing "publicly unmentionable goals" by
focusing on popular ones. As an example, he presents
vagrancy laws as the control by society of people made poor
and unemployed by a disintegrating economic system, who might
violate the law. Labelled "criminals", they are controlled
under the general rubric of "crime control", a mentionable
goal. This, Edelman says, is a view more comfortable for
people to live with than to face the complex realities of the
economic system.
and personnel, the centers "naturally" attracted local and neighboring elites. In order to fulfill its mandate of serving the poor as well, the ICCC hired community organizers and adopted the principle of deriving programs from local needs.

CO practice, however, is in essential conflict with the organizational culture. The agency operates as a supermarket: it rewards rapid turnover of many prepackaged or fashionable goods, using salesmen to promote them. But such an understanding of the role of the organizer, the nature of programs, the volume of activity, and the speed of work is antithetical to the professional practice of CO.

In order to implement its societally-mandated policy, the ICCC must retain this thorn in its side. It can only do so through the myth of local needs, which bridges over the tension between the ICCC's central decisionmaking and CO's protection of individual freedom. The myth enables continued organizational existence by holding in abeyance conflicts which would impede it. It is an obstacle, however, to policy implementation because it perpetuates the belief that centers respond to local needs in face of a different reality.

Metaphors also play a crucial role in this part of the ICCC story. The "desert generation" metaphor allowed no room for social policy; only the passage of time and death could help. The "gap" metaphor created a stage for action, and CO's health metaphor provided a professional to intervene to close the gap. Within the ICCC, the "supermarket" metaphor
offers a way for managers -- center directors and agency executives -- to make sense of a professional practice crucial to policy implementation whose essence was too abstract -- or too different -- for them to understand and whose way of looking at their world was by and large opposed to their own. And the myth, as I have said, facilitates this delicate balance.
Operational Principles of the Matnassim

* The matnas' programs will be derived from the needs of the community, within the general framework of its point of view.

* The matnas will serve the entire community, maintaining an equilibrium among classes and strata, ages and levels.

* Matnas' activities will encompass several areas of the quality of life, joining them together.

* The matnas will cooperate with other institutions working in the community.

* The matnas will strive to involve community residents in the planning and implementation of its services.

* The matnas will remain flexible in allocating its resources and in executing its programs.

* The matnas will operate economically, using its resources efficiently.

* The matnas will preserve maximum independence, while remaining faithful to the community and to its elected representatives.

* The matnas will not give service without recompense.

(1980; Hebrew original - my translation)
Chapter 13. Myths and the ICCC

The myth of local needs is not the only myth that enables the ICCC to (temporarily) resolve tensions that otherwise would incapacitate its ability to function. In this final section of analysis, I discuss some other myths.

Myth of Uniqueness

The ICCC has presented itself, since its creation, as a unique institution. For example, the argument for the ICCC providing its own in-house supervisory system rather than purchasing professional supervision from other organizations is based on "the matnas' unique message [conveyed] by its operational style which distinguishes it among other agencies offering a similar [supervisory] service." (5 November 1979, Evaluation Report)

The bases for this claim are several, the original and strongest being that unlike other government agencies in development towns, the matnas offers comprehensive services (with respect to content) to all age groups in the population. Other bases include: (1) the non-partisan nature of the community center; (2) the multi-functional capability of the building's rooms (i.e. their capacity to convert from a child-care center to a dance hall); (3) the multi-purpose or multi-service nature of the center's program (i.e. its flexibility in accommodating Housing Project Committee meetings, parenting education classes, and Citizens' Advisory Service consultations, crossing agency -
and hence, party - lines as well as program content
divisions); (4) the centers' foundation on principles of
participatory planning (in building design and programming);
(5) their direction by voluntary, public Boards. (1)

In point of fact, community centers were neither new to
Israel or to their clientele, nor are they unique with
respect to these arguments. Indeed, there were and are no
other "matnassim" in Israel, but there were community centers
by other names around the country in 1969: the Jerusalem
YM-YWHA, Bet Rotschild and others in Haifa, the kibbutz
prototypes, and so forth. That this was so is illustrated by
a series of meetings held by the Public Council on Community
Work in the first half of 1971. The Council, whose members
were senior community organizers representing Amidar, the
Welfare Ministry, and the Histadrut, discussed the need to
define and distinguish among different kinds of community
centers sponsored by various agencies. (protocol, 15 July
1971) This was at the time that the ICCC was preparing to
open its first center. Also, as Pozner found out, Jews from
Casablanca had had a community center there; there were
centers in Jewish communities in Iran; similar institutions
existed in Poland, Romania, and elsewhere. (2)

(1) Other, less ideological claims to uniqueness might have
been based on the high degree of professionalization and
training of the centers' staffs, the high salaries and
extensive work benefits they enjoy, and the wide range of
in-service training and professional conferences promoted by
the ICCC and obligatory for its employees and local staffs.

(2) See Patai (1980) for evidence that this was so.
Among the predecessors of the matnas-community center are those which are non-partisan; those whose facilities are multi-functional and whose programs include a variety of activity types for a wide age-range. It is true that in the development towns, such an agency was an innovation. It is also true that the ICCC pioneered the ideas of participatory planning and public Boards (although neither has been fully realized in practice). These have always been only partial bases for the claim to uniqueness, however.

Any agency would claim to be unique when faced with the necessity of establishing itself in a field of existing agencies performing activities. A new agency, in order to establish itself, must create an identity which will distinguish it from look-alikes -- not to mention sound-alikes, which may also explain why then-Minister Aranne refused to call his creations by the Hebrew version of "community center". Such a name was good for American purposes, where its ready identity would aid in attracting donors. But in Israel, a such-named entity might get lost in the crowd of similar agencies. This would be a liability not (only) because it risked losing accolades and political capital from potential confusion with Welfare's "community" projects. If the matnas looked and sounded like other entities, whether of its own Ministry or of others, it would be easier for the others to swallow it up in their own budget, personnel, and administrative categories. The matnas needed its own unique name and "unique" identity to set it
apart from others, so it would be more difficult to kill it with budget cuts and absorb it into some pre-existing agency.

The ICCC might have claimed uniqueness as the first and only publicly-funded, national institution to supply recreational facilities and programs to entire communities. Or it could have based a claim on its mission as the first government agency to implement an expressly-social mandate. It did neither. Why should the ICCC present and persist in pursuing a claim to uniqueness based on criteria inappropriate to such a claim, especially when other criteria were readily available?

Because the other criteria represent publicly unmentionable goals. To say that the ICCC's purpose was and is to take Levantine traits out of Eastern Jews by educating them to the symbols of upwardly-mobile, Western culture would raise, explicitly, more questions than most Israelis want to acknowledge, publicly. It is one thing to proclaim that a policy or program will "narrow the gap". Those on the lower end desire to close the gap; those on the upper end presumably want the same. Publicly, at least, concerted discrimination is intolerable in policy and in practice. Israel is socialist in ideology and desirous, therefore, of a classless society. Judaism, in religion and culture, requires that the poor be helped and that both individual and community be righteously giving of their resources. (1) In

(1) "Charity" in Hebrew is denoted by the word "tzedaka", which derives from the root meaning "just" or "righteous".
short, "narrowing the gap", comprehensive service provision, participatory planning, and other such goals are publicly admissible goals. As metaphors, they may reflect concerns of the hour — beliefs about and ways of seeing and understanding contemporary social problems — and be transitory, soon replaced by new metaphors. But they are grounded in the particular cultural values held by the nation as a whole.

Values which are not held universally within a culture, or which contradict other, more strongly held values, are verboten — publicly unmentionable — goals. Their explicit discussion brings to light contradictions and conflict which might be more disruptive than what a society can handle at that point in time. Claiming uniqueness on the basis of providing publicly-funded recreational activities to narrow social gaps would draw public attention to such questions as: government's responsibility to provide recreation; the amount of recreation necessary to the individual's well-being; the relationship between recreation and social or economic standing — all questions on which there is no social or cultural consensus. A claim based on the less-specific mission of implementing a unique government-mandated social policy would focus explicit attention on the nature of that policy and the causal hypothesis of its proposed program. Most Israelis have not been ready to assume the "white man's burden" implied by immigrant "absorption" and Westernizing the Levant. Such a position harks back to sub-national,
cultural superiorities developed over 2500 years of Jewish dispersion throughout the world. Where hierarchies of ethnic communities grew out of fine points of distinction between degrees of religious practice, learning, and sophistication. Moreover, a policy based on such distinctions flies in the face of general Jewish cultural values of unity and equality: "all Jews are brothers." "all Jews are responsible one for another." and so forth. To openly declare one ethnic group the sole superior group into which all others must be educated and evolve would be too explicit a challenge to the delicate intermingling of a new old nation. It may be a "kosher" goal, but it cannot be stated out loud. (1)

Therefore, the ICCC needed a myth of "uniqueness based on the not unique" to establish itself organizationally while drawing attention away from its mission. The myth was necessary to stop further questioning as to the nature of the agency and whether a new institution with such large budgets and relative independence should exist. The grounds for the claim to uniqueness were precisely those to which the agency would be most vulnerable on a charge of duplicating services. The tactic seems to be. Surprise the enemy by doing precisely what he least expects. Other agencies will claim that the ICCC duplicates their services; the ICCC, then, must beat them to the punch and claim that it is unique in the way it

(1) Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979, p. 40) present eight kinds of aims, including "taboo aims" which are like "verboten goals".
provides those services. The result is to deflect attention from the agency's social mandate.

The myth is a myth because people believe in it, in many forms. As a veteran director said. "We are the only ones of all the institutions who are capable of determining our own goals and programs." [6] Because people believe, they have no need to look further or elsewhere for other answers. The myth provides the answer they need.

**On verboten goals and organizational principles**

Organizational principles may also reflect the problem of publicly unmentionable goals. One of the earliest of the ICCC's principles was, "the matnas shall remain a-political." That has been understood as a requirement that the center shall remain "non-partisan", so that it should not be caught up in local party and hamula (extended family) politics. Specifically, it has been interpreted as part of Zipori's brilliance also in retaining the right to hire and fire center directors. [13] Were directors subject to appointment by local elected officials or Boards of Directors, they would be caught up in the local incentive structure. Moreover, Zipori would have lost the power to determine the professional qualifications and calibre of center directors, to oversee their training, and to create some sense of continuity within his far-flung empire.

In the 1980 "operating principles", that injunction has been reworded: "The matnas shall preserve maximum independence, while remaining faithful to the community and
to its elected representatives." The reality of the situation is that the center is intimately involved in the political life of its location. As one observer noted, "The community centers can't be a-political. They have the ear of the mayor, and the illusion of power [in] money and resources." [25; 5 and 13 discussed similar observations] Moreover, the center is also dependent: on residents, on local and regional bureaucrats and politicians for their participation and cooperation. In order for the ICC to accomplish its social change mandate, it must retain centralized control over its operations and be able to determine which programs can best accomplish desired change. However, in order to succeed locally, it must avoid seriously challenging the powers-that-be. This it does by coopting them, sharing the symbols of power while striving to retain the ability to exercise power. (1) The stated a-political and independent nature of the local agency is designed to foster the belief that the community centers are somehow outside of or above or removed from the play of power. To admit to involvement in power play would be to invite more serious competition, thereby hindering policy implementation. The principle, then, functions as a myth in creating beliefs which direct attention away from a reality which is verboten.

(1) Lasswell's definition of power is useful in this context: "Political power is the giving and receiving of support for decisions that significantly affect values in the whole community." (1979, p. x)
Goals: Ritual and Myth

When Prime Minister Begin decided, soon after he was first elected, that Israel's slums and development towns needed "renewal", based on local citizen steering committee proposals, the matnassim were asked to coordinate the Project in those sites where they were already in operation. They accepted. If the explicit mandate of the community centers is to provide cultural/recreational facilities and programs, how could they agree to coordinate Project Renewal locally or to head its steering committees?

Every year since the first centers were opened, at Annual Meetings and on various other occasions, the ICCC asks itself, in formal session: What are our goals and objectives? The regularity and frequency with which this question has been raised is surprising. After all, the agency has been operating for over a decade, expanding at a goodly pace. The ICCC's head of Research and Planning wrote at the end of 1979 that the agency's goals and operating principles were only then in the process of crystallization. (11 November 1979, Work Report) How has the ICCC been functioning without a clear understanding of what its goals and objectives are?

Asking several people about this continual questioning of goals and objectives, I was answered with variations on the theme that continual re-examination was a good thing. "It keeps us from bureaucratizing or stagnating" [4]; "it's a sort of zero-based planning where we continually re-examine
our premises" [12]; "after all, if the matnas is a tool for social change, and society is constantly changing, then we should continuously raise the question of what are our goals."[5]

There certainly has been a succession of goals during the past decade, from providing

- "someplace to go" in development towns
- nonpartisan facilities for recreational activities to achieve social integration, fill increased leisure time, retard the exodus from development towns

between 1967 and 1971, to

- narrowing the social gap
- advancing weak communities
- reducing ethnic tensions
- combatting juvenile delinquency and drug use

from 1971 to 1973, to

- providing multi-service centers
- comprehensive coordination of social services

in 1974 -1976, to

- providing quality of life

in 1977-79.

If these are the goals of the ICCC, how may one know if one is realizing them? How do you implement a policy to provide "quality of life"? Workers hired in the late 1970's know little or nothing of organizational goals from the early 1970's. Does one assume then that earlier goals were met and the agency moved on to new ones? How should we understand that an organization operating for 10 years was crystallizing
its overall policy and goals at the end of that period?

I would like to suggest that the answers lie in the consideration of goals. The goals themselves are less important than the rituals surrounding them. Attention is focused on setting goals, deriving objectives from them, and devising a plan of operations from the objectives. With all this attention to the formal, rational model of goal-setting and decision-making, very little attention is paid to the actual goals themselves and their achievement. Goals come and goals go, while the organization performs its annual ritual of discussing the goal-setting process, incorporating new ones as they are invented. The myth of organizational flexibility to match a changing society is created to deflect attention from the fact that the social goals set for the agency are difficult to attain, but the agency continues on as if the situation were otherwise. The excitement of discovering a new goal -- which often bears the same hypothetical cause-effect relationship to social problems as did prior goals, in new metaphors of the day -- also deflects attention from the specifics of center programs and their relative ineffectiveness in solving those social problems.

In this case, the myth of flexibility and the need for continued innovation, bolstered by the generality of "providing quality of life", create a situation in which a great variety of programs are acceptable as agency practice. Thus, camping and Project Renewal, the Big Brother Association and National Nature Protection may each find a
place on the list of ICCC activities. Moreover, the myth of flexibility ensures an ambiguity or a vagueness that makes measurement impossible. You can't hit a moving target. And you can't miss a cow standing broad-side, like "quality of life".

From this we may understand something about the nature of rituals. Rituals may preserve and propagate cultural metaphors and the values they embody. (1) They also may be seen as the physical embodiment of myths. In their repeated attention to the need to determine goals, the mechanics of goal-setting and its processes, these rituals support the belief that agency activities are goal-oriented and that the agency's goals are adaptable to society's changing needs.

To repeat, attention to the organizational structures of goal-setting (of which citizen participation is one) and to the rituals of determining goals and objectives deflects attention from target-practice and the nature of the target. I would like to call this the myth of rational goals. Unlike the flexibility myth, which is particular to the ICCC, the myth of rational goals is far more universal.

To justify its on-going existence, the ICCC must convince the public that it is accomplishing its mission. As the Polaris missile system created the image of success through its use of PERT, so the ICCC creates the aura of success by seeming to pursue goals rationally. Moreover,

these are societally mandated goals. Not only does the appearance of rational, goal-oriented behavior grant the agency legitimacy and public support. It also creates a buffer between the goal-setting activity and the actual technical operations of the community centers, which serves to put these activities beyond the public's inspection. In other words, as long as the public sees that the agency is setting and pursuing goals (via the rituals and the myth they perpetrate), the public believes that actual agency programs are goal-oriented. (1)

Not only is seeing believing. Belief also structures sight. As Manning (1977) wrote: "Complex, industrialized societies have committed themselves to a public posture of rationality, and the rational myth legitimates organizations and institutions within this society. It is not surprising that organizations of central symbolic importance should call upon the legitimating powers of the myth of rationality to justify both their existence and actions."

The ICCC may or may not be implementing its socially-mandated policy. As long as its rituals and myths of uniqueness, flexibility, and rational pursuit of goals

(1) John Meyer et al. (1977) noted a similar process with respect to public schools, which must appear to carry out societally-mandated "rules" in order to garner support and legitimacy. The technical aspects of schooling -- curriculum and teaching -- are less important to the public's belief. (Their "professionalization" has also removed them from the public's purview.) As a result, school structures are "de-coupled" from the "technology" of schooling. See also Westerlund and Sjostrand's discussion of the myth of rational goals (1979, pp. 36 - 42).
continue to compel belief within and without the organization. It will continue to be trusted as implementing its policy.
Part Five: Conclusions

If the preceding case story and analysis have been successful, they illustrate my argument that the study of policy implementation must bring into account symbolic, metaphoric, and mythic elements of political and organizational behavior. For a more complete understanding and evaluation of implementation successes and failures. In these final two chapters, I will summarize the argument and present some questions about the usefulness of a symbolic theory.

Chapter 14. General Conclusions

The argument

I have argued that an implementation theory which sees the executive determining policy and his subordinates executing his fiat omits some important features of the process. For it is, indeed, a process. Many actors at many different levels inside of the organization and of its environment influence the shaping of policy output and outcome. Each actor makes meaning of the policy and his role vis à vis its form, by interpreting the symbolic content of the policy (whether substance or process). Each time an actor acts on his interpretation of the policy, he is implementing it (or a part of it). Each interpretation yields a new view of the policy; it is modified in some way. When a CO supervisor requests that a local worker initiate a
particular project. and the worker refuses. each has interpreted the policy to include or exclude the project. Each interpretation was an effort to implement the policy. Each actor understood the policy differently. Each effort modified the policy. at least temporarily. If the worker had acceded to her supervisor's request, the policy would have been permanently modified. Policy implementation, then, is reiterative and cyclical: successive interpretations make it difficult. if not impossible. to re-enter the river at the same point (if it is even the same river).

Secondly, policy implementation cannot be understood as always or necessarily "rational", in the sense that it is goal-oriented. Specifically, political and organizational behavior in implementing policy is not necessarily concerned with the conscious and deliberate adjustment of agency means to the realization of explicitly-stated policy ends. (1) That is. the study of policy implementation cannot assume implementors' "intent to implement as written." without masking some other real features of the situation. For one, somebody is certain to point out that policy language is often vague and ambiguous. This is especially the case with so-called "broad-aim programs", which are a favorite subject of implementation case studies. The rationale given is that such social legislation often becomes the arena for interest-group politicking, and vague language is a way to

(1) This is phrased after Herbert Simon's definition of rationality (1976, p. 76).
accommodate differences by alienating no one. While getting the bill passed. Assuming "intent to implement as written" becomes problematic when what's written provides no clear indication of intent. Blaming the problem on ambiguous language or rationalizing it away as political peace-piping, however true, may be a partial truth. It posits the norm that policy ends should be stated explicitly.

Publicly-unmentionable goals are no less real because they cannot be stated explicitly. Government must, at times, accommodate conflicting values, as Arnold (1935) so neatly pointed out in his study of the criminal trial. (1) Where conflicting ideals are incommensurable, we could expect ambivalent attitudes toward legislation which embodies them, as well as ambiguous language to mask the ambivalence.

Conflicting interest groups which must be accommodated in the policy if it is to be drafted may be, then, consequence of value conflict as much as cause. If value conflict in policy relates to matters of status and status-based power (like Prohibition Repeal or the ICC), then we might expect some of the policy's goals to be publicly verboten -- and, hence,

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(1) Arnold wrote: The criminal trial must "bring into sharp relief various deep-seated popular moral ideals" of justice while appearing "as an efficient means of enforcement and working order." (1935, p. 131) Elsewhere he wrote: "An official admission by a judicial institution that it was moving in all directions at once in order to satisfy the conflicting emotional values of the people which it served would be unthinkable. ...The success of the law as a unifying force depends on making emotionally significant the idea of a government of law which is rational and scientific. (1935, p. 49)"
policy language to be ambiguous or vague.

Furthermore, the rationality of implementors' intent and the multiplicity of actors are interdependent concepts. If we no longer assume that subordinates execute superiors' orders, we must be limited in our expectations of implementors' execution of policymakers' intent. Even under the assumption that intent has been clearly conveyed and understood, street-level bureaucrats have been shown not to comply with their superiors' interpretation of agency intent. If we understand that the congregation of implementors is potentially very large, that each implementor interprets the policy in the act of implementing it, and that different implementors may make different interpretations, then we no longer have the conditions for a conscious and deliberate adjustment of agency means to the realization of policy or agency ends.

This is the arena where analysts usually propose the exercise of incentives, suasion, professional education, and other elements of control. These are usually regarded as "in-house" practices, however. If we enlarge the world of implementors to include actors in the agency's environment -- national, regional, and local officials of other Ministries and agencies, local elected officials, and so forth -- then the exercise of control measures becomes questionable. Bardach's "fixer" would seem to be an answer: the politician/legislator who can cross agency lines to promote his policy's intent. The ICCC had a "fixer" in Haim Zipori:
because of his party connections and his designation (for a while) as Aran's assistant, he could maneuver across geographic and Ministerial divisions (within his party -- and his personal charm sometimes helped him cross party lines as well). But still the agency was faced with control problems -- different interpretations -- both within and without the agency.

If we include residents as policy implementors -- since by attending or not attending center programs, they influenced policy implementation -- the question of goal-oriented behavior becomes even more problematic.

The symbolic lens

If we use the lens of symbols, myths, and metaphors to look at policy implementation, these parts of its reality make sense in a different way than they do through a linear, rational lens. The concern of symbolics is the making of meaning, not goal-oriented activity. Meaning is made through the interpretation of symbols. Metaphors and myths are part of the creation of meaning because they focus our sight toward some aspects of experience and away from others. Myths have another function in that they perpetuate belief. The relationship is interdependent: myths foster belief, but beliefs foster myths as well. Metaphor and symbol interpretation and understanding are also products of specific belief--or value-systems. All three interpretive media are rooted in a particular culture and time. Their
meanings are social and may be shared; we talk of a symbol-sharing community. They are also artifacts and transitory. Belief focuses sight: believing is seeing. Seeing is also believing, and the art or craft of creating and conveying impressions and images and sustaining beliefs is part of the meaning and interpretation focus of the symbolic lens.

The power of symbols and metaphors is in their ability to suggest multiple meanings and to convey different meanings to different observers. Hence, we can never be sure that the policymaker's intent will be interpreted similarly by implementors. By definition, this will not be the case for implementors and legislators who belong to different communities, for a community is a group of people who respond similarly to the same symbols. We would expect this to be true especially of a center-periphery type of organization like the ICCC, where executives in Jerusalem and community workers in the field belong to different value communities. It is also true in such a case where the ICCC, in order to change resident values, must draw them into center activities; but being from different value communities, residents may interpret building or program symbols in such a fashion as to keep their distance from the centers. What looks like a community from headquarters in Jerusalem looks like several, sometimes antagonistic ethnic groups from the field. Where a rationalist paradigm would see explicit, even single-meaning policy expressions as the norm and ambiguity
an undesirable exception, the symbolic paradigm sees ambiguity -- the conveyance of multiple meanings -- as the rule. (1)

I have argued that policies may be symbolic by virtue of their substance and/or their legislative process. In the ICCC case, substantive symbols include the community center building and its accoutrements, center programs, and agency names. We may see its processual symbolism most clearly at one point in time. The coincidence of Black Panther rioting, the Prime Minister's Commission and its massive social recommendations, and their assumption by the ICCC as part of its mandate -- at that particular point in the ICCC's development -- created the impression that the matnassim were a legislative response to protest. Whatever this meant in the Israeli cultural context -- affirmation to the poor of government's concern, to the wealthier classes of their "just righteousness" to the poor, while confirming established values and behavioral norms -- it laid the groundwork for another demonstration nearly ten years later calling for a matnas in another poverty neighborhood.

Timing is crucial in the creation and management of impressions. A different concatenation of events might have

(1) The problem is not so much explicit, ambiguous language as it is policy wording which allows for single or multiple interpretations. That is, what is criticized as being more or less explicit is not policy wording but the operable intent which one understands or derives from policy wording. Thus, explicitly worded policy may still mask publicly unmentionable goals, whose explicit public discussion is verboten.
changed the public perception of the ICCC as the government taking care of its people. If the Yom Kippur War had happened a year earlier, when the first five centers were getting off the ground, the ICCC might not have had the numerical strength to project the image it did one year later, and it might have been cancelled altogether by subsequent economic troubles. Had the War been delayed by a year or two, the agency might have been that much slower to coalesce. As it was, the War was portrayed afterwards as a catalyst of the ICCC's take-off as a needed national agency. Zipori and others determined, ex post facto, that the centers had fulfilled necessary functions on the home front: organizing volunteers, comforting wives, mothers, and children, providing necessary communication lines, etc.

Like all such hindsight, this assessment involved selective vision. The self-congratulatory proclamations may be seen as attempts to justify agency existence and to further its establishment. This illustrates the use of symbols in impression management. It is difficult, after the fact, to distinguish between impression and reality, not only because of Rashomon effects (each actor experiences the same reality differently) or blind-man's-elephant effects (each actor "sees" a different piece of the same reality), but because the impression is and becomes the reality. The belief in the narration of interwoven symbols -- the myth -- presents reality and forestalls interrogation into any other reality. Confronting believers with a picture of community
center failure to do anything locally meaningful during the War would earn one the label of heretic, fool, agitator, etc. It would not disconfirm the myth unless there were already doubters in the congregation.

According to this view, implementation success or failure may ride on the creation of meaningful, believable myths and images -- as the Polaris PERT case shows -- rather than on the direct pursuit and achievement of explicit policy goals. The related point is that desired outcomes may attract policies as much as policies are seen to determine outcomes. This is where timing and image come together. For example, Ronald Reagan claimed as Governor of California that his welfare reform policy cut the number of recipients by 300,000. This could, however, have been equally well explained by a different calculation of population data. The right timing allowed him to attribute the reduction to his policy. The coincidence of Black Panther riots and the Prime Minister's Commission created the impression that the latter came in response to the former, although Mrs. Meir claimed (with some external confirmation) that she had begun appointing Commission members and drafting government legislation many months in advance. The ICCC was also drawn in as an apparent government response to riots, even though Aran had initiated research and planning 5-6 years earlier. The desire to stem development town emigration -- a desired outcome -- became an ICCC goal. as did the family of programs related to Early Childhood Education. A rationalist
implementation theory finds such a succession of unrelated, *ex post facto* goal-setting problematic. A symbolic lens does not, in that it focuses on meaning, images, and interpretation, rather than goal-oriented behavior. Some of the confusion of outputs with outcomes becomes understandable when viewed through this lens. "Community centers are a tool for accomplishing something," said one center director, "but sometimes they turn into a goal in and of themselves." [24]

If the focus is on conveying an image, and goal-orientation is secondary, this should not be surprising. In short, unintended consequences, which rationalist theory fights, are expected in the symbolic view, because of the power of symbols, metaphors, and myths to suggest multiple meanings and various interpretations.

What, then, is the usefulness of symbolics for implementation, especially if the analysis of implementation is the fight to control the unintended consequences which I believe are part and parcel of the symbolic frame? Because of the subjects on which symbolics focuses, this lens brings to our view aspects of policy implementation which other lenses obscure, yet which are no less real than the attributes illuminated by other lenses. Because symbols, metaphors, and myths reinforce community boundaries and channel thought, perception, and behavior, they

- strengthen feelings of belonging and separateness
- perpetuate a political system
- perpetuate a social status quo
- perpetuate a culture, a way of life.

Policy-making and implementation may be seen to do all these things when viewed through a symbolic lens. The ICCC could be seen as an example of a policy enacted by established cultural, social, and political groups to encorporate (through education and cooptation -- sharing the cultural symbols of status) a potentially threatening group. Through the use of mutually comprehended, if not shared, symbols. lines of "them" and "us" are reinforced, as is the social, political, and cultural status quo. Symbolic aspects of policies like the ICCC allow some people to believe they are helping the poor, thereby fulfilling cultural and/or religious mores. while encouraging the poor to aspire to change in the belief that they might realize change. (1)

For policy analysts and evaluators, symbolics carries a particular message regarding the assessment of implementation success or failure. By several social outcome criteria, ICCC policy implementation could be judged a failure. Yet. none have yet complained; on the contrary, a matnas is a desirable entity, in some locations. What has been successfully implemented is an image or a message -- specifically. of government concern and responsibility for its poorer citizens. affirming their desires for higher status and extending them hopes to achieve it. From a symbolic point of

(1) The American version of this is the Horatio Alger myth.
view, the ICC has been successful, not only in establishing a network of community centers but also in implementing the symbols of a publicly unmentionable goal -- preserving the social and cultural status quo by perpetuating the symbols of Western culture over those of the Levant.

Some theorists have claimed that implementation problems are specific to a federal government system. The argument is proposed that smaller states with "strongly centralized governments" would be better able to control implementors' behavior to accomplish national policy objectives. (1) I hope I have successfully demonstrated with the ICC case that such is not the case. Local and regional divisions of a centralized government Ministry are just as influential in policy implementation as are subordinates of federal departments. Although there are other differences between Israeli and American government systems, I can think of nothing that would make their organizational and public administrative bureaucracies incomparable.

As far as the specific policy is concerned, the goals of Atlanta's "Honor Farm" New-Town-In-Town listed here should lay to rest any questions of comparability:

    achievement of racial balance; retention in the community of families "which have moved upward in income and education, to serve as examples of success for others to imitate;" provision of schools "which will be recognized city-wide as superior"; and provision of a small neighborhood shopping center "for convenience and for

(1) Levine (1972), p. 3.
development of community spirit." (1)

(1) Derthick (1972), p. 52.
Chapter 15: Some Unanswered Questions

Let me reiterate at this point with all due emphasis that to say that policies are symbolic or that their implementation is to one extent or another influenced by their metaphors and cultural myths is not to belittle their reality or their meaningfulness. "Token" or "cosmetic" judgments evaluate the relative success with which policy implementors convey their meaning, regardless of whether the outputs are "material" or "symbolic". Material rewards may be symbolic at the same time. The Peace Corps, for instance, was and is a highly symbolic policy, and at the same time proposed material foreign assistance. That it has not been decried as either token or cosmetic is a sign that its meaning was communicated, successfully, to both foreign and home audiences. When African-Asian-Latin countries expelled the Peace Corps, it was not because it was seen as token or cosmetic but because its symbolism was reinterpreted in light of new political circumstances in which its continued presence could not be accommodated. That is, its symbolic elements were real, and their reality was first accepted, then rejected, and in some cases accepted once more.

There is, however, a meaningful question to be raised concerning tangible and symbolic outcomes of the policy process, from the viewpoint of an advocate for change. Lipsky (1970, p. 14) raised it in the context of the influence of relatively powerless groups on public policy.
He wrote: "...the capacity of the political system to deny material changes to masses of people while legislating or proclaiming to the contrary is an extremely salient aspect of the political process." The policy analyst who is also an advocate, like the reformer, sees implementation slippage as an obstacle to accomplishing desired change. But he also sees with the eyes of a sceptic vis a vis government policy. For the discovery of "implementation" in the U.S. was, to some extent, the result of a crisis of belief in the policy process. The War on Poverty had strengthened national belief in the Presidency and in America's strength, and a sense of unity and purposiveness. Vietnam and Watergate challenged these beliefs and self-images. and this crisis extended to the policy process. The implementation concept, suggesting as it does the possibility to correct flaws and put the system back on its tracks. generated an excitement that asking the right questions could yield solutions. This might be seen as an effort to regenerate belief. Yet, most implementation studies to date -- Bardach's in particular, and the present one is no exception -- conclude on an essentially pessimistic note: policy implementation is complex, and the slippage problem is not easily solved. As a matter of fact, in trying to put a finger on the problem, it often turns into a definitional will o' the wisp.

If policies are symbolic, then looking at them from a rationalist point of view means that we will always perceive a slippage gap. What the symbolic frame suggests is that
slippage and unintended consequences will always appear. Because the reality of the policy process is not goal-oriented. It is more a play of social control, rather than a reallocation of tangible resources subject to bureaucratic controls. The drama of social change is more the dissemination and acquisition of the symbols of the established culture than it is of the status objects themselves. The question then becomes: It is a miracle that any tangible rewards are given at all! Thurman Arnold once wrote (1935, p. 13) about the trial as ceremony: "...if results are more important than the moral lessons which are to be taught by the process -- we move the settlement of the dispute into a less symbolic atmosphere." Perhaps this suggests a direction in which to pursue questions about tangible versus symbolic rewards.

To what extent do legislators, implementors, and "just plain folk" control their use of symbols? To what extent can we determine an answer to this question? If a legislator manipulates the symbolic elements of a policy unintentionally, calling the manipulation to his attention would either elicit an honest denial because he is blind to that behavior; or elicit a contrived denial as he conspires not to see the behavior. If he is manipulating symbols intentionally, asking him might elicit contrived denial because he cannot publicly admit such behavior; or elicit confirmation of the observation.

We know that symbols are and have been used consciously
and purposely. From research on the media, on advertising, on rhetoric in politics, on Nazi propaganda, and on Korean brainwashing techniques, we know that intentionally-used symbols do accomplish desired ends. Knowing that symbols may be unintentionally manipulated confirms the power attributed to them. Zipori's invocation of power and status symbols in proposing the center director as Project Renewal head generated unintended consequences locally for the center and the ICCC. Whether this was a case of intentionally-used symbols that backfired or of symbols unintentionally used, we do not know. The effect, however, is clear. I have presented the ICCC case to illustrate a policy where intentional use of symbols is not so readily seen. In most analyses of implementation, to date, not only have researchers not consciously investigated any underlying or inherent symbolics of the policies they have studied, but we have been given no purposeful indication that these policies have involved symbolic elements, let alone that these elements might have affected implementation efforts.

One must be able to identify symbols and myths in order to study them. Because we as practitioners and researchers are usually part of that culture of which these media are part and parcel -- which is to say, we are caught up in their belief and vision -- we cannot identify them as such. It is only through some distance that we are enabled to call symbols, metaphors, and myths by their names. Such perspective is acquired through cultural or historic
distance: a different time (Gusfield looking back at Prohibition) or a different place (my looking at Israel, and subsequently at the U.S. from an "Israelized" perspective) or a different religion or other belief (a type of cultural lens). Perhaps this is why men have seen mythmaking as a characteristic of primitives: we must step outside our own time and place to see the myths operative there.

For this reason, I think that we cannot always know about the manipulation or non-manipulation of symbolics.

Can we know when a policy will be more or less symbolic? Almost every object or act contains the potential to represent some other element, and this potential is subject to little predictability or control. The context of the object or act will determine its symbolic nature more than any characteristic inherent in it. If the literal meaning of an object or act is sufficient to explain it, then I think a symbolic interpretation could be a gratuitous exercise. If policy success may be attributable in some cases to belief, the identification of policy failure may be conditional upon a loss of belief. That loss may open our eyes to the policy's symbolic elements.
Postscript

Is "implementation" symbolic? Quite possibly, in a number of ways. The continued study of implementation, like its creation as a concept, might be a myth attempting to reconcile a belief about democracy with a perception of the intractable reality of the policy process. In my role as reformer or idealist, I would prefer to believe in implementation and in the American myth of popular democracy, rather than that policy is really about conservative social control. "...All sorts of symbols are necessary for the preservation of the political fact of democracy." wrote Arnold (1937, p. 41), "many of which violate its creeds."

"Implementation" is a "problem" only from the rationalist point of view, since it examines the perfectability of goal achievement which a symbolic point of view does not expect to find. Edelman (1977, p. 142) wrote: "...prevailing symbols and ideology depict public policy as a rational conversion of popular 'wants' into ... [solutions to] public problems, with occasional defects in the process." From this point of view, implementation analysis which seeks to correct such defects is another part of the culture which maintains this ideology.

Arnold (1935, p. 37) also wrote: "A stable government is like a ballet. It requires a whole cast of characters, each with his particular role to play, dancing in opposition to each other." Ballets attract critics among their
audiences. As long as the dancers perform well, the critics write good reviews. When the dancers lose their credibility, the critics step outside and write bad press. But the bad review does not necessarily cause the dancers to regain their credibility with the critic. From here to implementation as a crisis of belief. The dance of legislation may be losing its credibility as a democratic process. Implementation studies may have offered an attempt to shore up this belief, but I am no longer convinced of their ability to do so. Implementation may be a myth that is in the process of corroding.

Lastly, perhaps symbolics merely substitutes one myth for another? Quite probably.
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