Community Participation in
Boston's Southwest Corridor Project:
A Case Study

by
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COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
BOSTON'S SOUTHWEST CORRIDOR PROJECT: 
A Case Study 
by 
Mauricio Miguel Gaston

Submitted to the Department of Planning and Urban Studies on May 18, 1981, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of City Planning.

ABSTRACT 

The literature about participation was reviewed. An analysis of participation under State Monopoly Capitalism was followed by analysis of reformist and administrative theories, and of the relationship between participation and alienation and decentralization. The Southwest Expressway was analyzed in historical context and the gradual institutionalization of participation was traced through a 10-year period. Participation during the design and engineering phase of the project was then studied, followed by detailed analysis of participation in the programming and design of a particular section of the project.

The study demonstrates the complex relationship between a popular movement, the state, and various planning professionals around a major urbanistic transformation in the Boston Metropolitan Region, and draws a series of lessons for both activists and progressive planners.

Thesis Supervisor: Tunney Lee
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Aerial view of Southwest Corridor Project.
(Section I Planning Profile, WFEM Archives).
INTRODUCTION

In the late 1960's, bulldozers began to tear down housing along a swath of Boston's working class and minority communities. Jamaica Plain, an Irish working class community, and Roxbury, a working class Black community were suffering this demolition as part of a project to build an 8-lane expressway -- called Interstate 95 -- from the peripheral roads to near the center of Boston; I-95 was to be one of several major radial spurs emanating from an inner belt. At that time it was known as the Southwest Expressway.

The bulldozers did not work unopposed, however, the late '60's being a period of intense political struggle in major American cities. Across the country, neighborhood groups campaigned to halt urban renewal and highway construction, to demand civil rights legislation, to integrate public education, for equal access to institutions and social services. There were picket lines, squatters in vacant buildings, confrontations with the police, rent strikes, mass marches and rallies. Starting in 1964, Black and Latino ghettos rebelled in dozens of U.S. cities and the "Urban Crisis", previously a word used in government circles and academia to refer to the fiscal crisis of
municipal governments, became one of the "buzz words" of the media and the popular vocabulary; its meaning had deepened beyond an economic crisis to a social and political crisis as well. Boston was no exception, and the transportation plans of the State -- of which the Southwest Expressway was a part -- were the object of intense struggle in the political arena as well as the technical and professional fields of urban planning. In that process, the expressway became the Southwest Corridor.

The Corridor was born out of a drastic -- in the context of the U.S. -- form of "community participation"; working class and nationally oppressed communities were the prime force in a movement which forced the state to abandon plans for a major transformation of the city -- Interstate 95 -- and replace it with another. This movement generated a coalition which included academics, environmentalists, professionals, which succeeded to a great extent in achieving the reform sought. Instead of the highway, a rapid transit line is being built. The 100-odd acres of densely populated urban land cleared for the highway are being redeveloped with a variety of projects aimed at "re-weaving the urban fabric", in the words of a planner prominent in the battle against the highway. The Corridor is currently the largest project of its kind in the country, with the most wide-ranging, officially instituted community participation component.
Perhaps the most compelling reasons for a case study of participation in the Corridor is its very "success" in attaining its goals. The relationship of popular movements to projects undertaken by the State apparatus is a question of vital importance to both activists and concerned professionals, and a situation where working class communities were able to decisively influence a major project during many significant stages is a lesson to be learned and treasured. The same can be said of the Project's shortcomings.

A second set of reasons why the Southwest Corridor Project is an important case to study may be grouped together by recognizing the magnitude and complexity of the Project. It is, of course, beyond the scope of a thesis to alight all of these issues; it is, however, possible to focus on those aspects of the Project which pertain to participation and shed clarity on them. Without pretending to resolve theoretical dilemmas which would require concentration on one or two specific issues, participation in the Project may be treated as a case study, as empirical evidence which can illustrate a number of theoretical postulates.

Among the problems on which a case study of the Southwest Corridor can shed some light are the following:

* Are urban struggles a good vehicle for advancing the interests of the classes and oppressed nationalities engaged in them?
Is the technical process an arena where popular movements are inherently at a disadvantage, or can an alliance of progressive professionals and working and oppressed people be capable of engaging in it and gain benefits without getting derailed?

How have contradictions always found in participatory situations -- empowering vs. cooptation, legitimization of the State vs. rate of social change, the neighborhood as a unit vs. the city as a unit -- been played out in the Corridor and what forces have been determinant in resolving them?

This paper will begin with a review of the issues involved in participation and an overview of the most significant literature written about them. This will allow us to lay a theoretical basis for an analysis of the Southwest Corridor as well as presenting a position vis-à-vis participation which will guide the rest of the paper.

Next the paper will give a theoretical overview of participation in the Corridor and place the Corridor in the context of urbanistic history of the city of Boston. This section will be organized as an historical narrative, building on the chronology of events as a basic structure, but departing from it in order to reflect on the implications, present relevant information, and put the facts in
perspective. It will cover the origins of the 1948 Massachusetts State Highway Plan, through the 1960's when the entire road plan became the object of intense struggle, until the 1970 moratorium on highways began to institutionalize participation. There will be short sections on the 1970-72 Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) and the 1975-76 Environmental Impact Assessment process. The major sources for this section will be a series of books written on the history of the Corridor, as well as books and articles on the development of U.S. cities. Interviews with participants and planning documents produced in the process will also be used, as well as my recollections as a minor actor in the fight against I-95.

The third chapter of this paper will begin in 1977, when community struggles forced the State to implement community participation as an integral "component" of the project. Known in the project as the "Design and Engineering Phase", it has to be approached from a different angle. Because of the technical complexity, chronology will not suffice. A description of the participation component as it was designed and as it has evolved over the last three years will replace chronology as the structure of the paper, with theoretical discussion diverting from it whenever pertinent or necessary, as in the first half. My sources will be the documents produced by the Southwest Corridor Project
Office and consultants, interviews with different actors, and my experience as part of the central planning staff.

The final part will consist of a study of the design of the Project in Boston's South End, particularly the effects of participation in the programming and design of a deck covering the rapid-transit and railroad tracks in that neighborhood. Sources for this part will be the records of meetings of the community and consultants where the program and design of the deck were discussed, as well as interviews with the participants.
I.

PARTICIPATION: THE ISSUES AND THE LITERATURE

"How promiscuous is the term participation, it is mistress to many masters"

- Kavanagh, 1972, p. 121
Discussing "participation" is very much like discussing "democracy"; it means different things to different people. For some it's sacred; for other it is the useful currency of demagoguery. Different classes and social groups advocate it for different reasons, depending on circumstances. Since our purpose here is to shed some light on the process of participation in the Southwest Corridor Project, we first need to define the parameters of our literature search.

Several important issues come to mind. First of all participation has to be discussed in a context -- historical, political and economic -- since only then will the term have some meaning. The context of the Southwest Corridor Project is a major city in the U.S. in the last 30 years. Politically, the U.S. is a bourgeois democracy. As a social formation it is the most developed example of State Monopoly Capitalism, a concept which will be explained later in this chapter. Our search for pertinent literature would therefore lead us first into a study of participation under State Monopoly Capitalism. In that context, what is the function of participation for the system? Under what conditions can the working classes and oppressed peoples benefit from participation? Why does the state promote participation, an apparent contradiction on the surface? What have bureaucrats pursued by participation?
Since participation is such an ambiguous term, and since it can serve different social groups for different purposes, ideas about participation are loaded with ideological implications which need to be explored briefly. We will look at the ideological role of some of these ideas. Then, we will briefly analyze some of the literature written by bureaucrats on participation, and see how they promote it for their own ends.

Since participation is often peddled as a remedy to alienation we will explore the conditions under which this may be in fact true and under which it may be misleading. Decentralization is also often proposed as a more democratic and participatory scheme. Since planning for the corridor was, in 1973-1977, relatively centralized, and since 1977 relatively decentralized, we will pause for a look at this issue.

Finally, we will consider some of the historical antecedents in Boston to participation in the Corridor before drawing some lessons from the literature and a discussion of the issues to orient the rest of our society.

PARTICIPATION UNDER STATE MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

Participation in the context of State Monopoly Capitalism is a complex subject which requires the clarification
of a theoretical foundation prior to an inquiry. In the context of Marxist theory, participation is essentially a political phenomenon. Conceptually, it therefore has to be understood as part of the superstructure of the social formation of which it is part.

Schematically, what ultimately determines the nature of a society is the level of the productive forces -- the means of production, and the productive capacity of the labor force -- and the relations of production. Taken together these can be conceived as the base or infrastructure of society. The superstructure consists of all the ideas, institutions, cultural, religious and philosophical patterns which in any given society tend to reproduce the social foundation. Neither the base nor the superstructure is ever static but in a constant process of transformation, driven by antagonisms inherent in the social relations of production. One class controls the means of production and exploits the others, accumulating the surplus wealth. This class is also dominant in the superstructure: it organizes, controls and influences institutions, ideas, political events in order to maintain control and continue to extract the surplus. Classes and social groups which are exploited or oppressed, however, also create their own institutions, ideas and political channels which further their interests and therefore necessarily come into conflict.
with the oppressors. This conflict is the motor of change. The major institutions of the dominant groups in maintaining the social order convenient to them is the state. While the ultimately determinant factor is the infrastructure, at any one time the realm of ideas, of laws, of politics may become dominant in deciding the outcome of a particular historical moment. (Cornforth, 1977; Harneker, 1975)

Any society can be analyzed as a social formation, where the ultimately determinant factor is the dominant mode of production and the corresponding social formation. Capitalism, where the bourgeoisie is the ruling class, is based on wage labor and on the extraction of surplus value from workers at the point of production. It is the dominant mode of production in the U.S. State Monopoly Capitalism, however, is a term which refers to the particular form which the U.S. economy and state have taken in the last 40 years or so. It is therefore important to briefly touch on its historical development.

During the economic crisis of the 1890's in the U.S., capitalism went through a significant change. The monopolies absorbed a significant part of the productive economy, and finance capital was able to use the crisis to establish its dominance over other sectors of capital. Growing beyond the geographic and economic limits at its disposal, U.S.
capitalism pushed beyond its national borders imperialist expansion, and into the so-called "Spanish-American War". Western European nations followed a similar process culminating in the First World War. (Lenin, 1968)

Internally, these nations went through a parallel process. In the first thirty years or so of the century, with the exception of the devastation caused by the World War I years, capitalist economies grew at a fast clip until the Great Depression of the thirties made capitalists wary of the future prospects of the system. In the U.S., under the New Deal, the state began to play a greater role in the economy, and consequently in the political life of the country, leading to the particular form of capitalism called State Monopoly Capitalism.

The Great Depression led to the Second World War, from which the U.S. emerged as the dominant power in the world. Its productive capacity was reinforced and domestically the U.S. embarked on a massive reorganization of its physical infrastructure. Part of this process was the construction of a huge new limited-access highway system, of which Boston's Southwest Expressway was a small segment. This expressway led to the Southwest Corridor Project. Therefore, the conditions from which the Corridor arose can definitely be traced to changes in socio-economic formation of the United States.
What concerns us first, however, is the superstructure, since it is in the realm of institutions, politics and ideas that participation occurs and where it can be understood. The major institution in the superstructure of any society is of course the state, the major instrument by which the dominant classes maintain control. A suitable place to begin a discussion of the state's role in participation is Lenin's *The State and Revolution*. (Lenin, 1969) Written just before the 1917 revolution, it is a polemic against Social Democratic parties of Europe who had taken an excessively parliamentarian approach to political activity and who had taken a right-nationalist track in supporting their own national governments in W.W.I. rather than militate against the war. The book begins by quoting Engels in arguing that the state is an organ for domination by the ruling class, rather than of reconciliation among classes and groups. (Lenin, 1969, p. 9) The book's emphasis is on the ultimate recourse of the state -- the power of an apparatus of armed men and prisons who guarantee the supremacy of the interests of those in power, although we can note that it usually enforces the existing order through the judicial structures and promotes its dominance through institutions for the propagation of ideas akin to its interests. The thrust of *State and Revolution* is a warning against expecting that participation in the institutions sponsored by the ruling class, particularly the bourgeois
parliament, will advance the interests of the working class and the oppressed to the point of hastening the day when they come to power. But even the Lenin of this book saves some of his lash for those who make non-participation in these institutions a matter principle, such as the anarchists. Dialectically, the circumstances of participation in the machinery of the state are held to be critical. "Marx knew how to break with anarchism ruthlessly for its inability to make use even of the 'pigsty' of bourgeois parliamentarianism, especially when the situation was obviously not revolutionary..." (Lenin, 1969, p. 43)

There are several points about the position mentioned above which need comment. Lenin was writing based mainly on the Russian experience, where the state was autocratic and highly repressive, leaving little room for participation. He was writing in a period when the capitalism state was relatively young, striving to form a permanent bureaucracy as part of the state apparatus. Participation in the affairs of the state was limited to the parliament or to electoral politics at best; it has been impossible to find evidence of attempts by the state to sponsor wide participation in "projects" such as urban renewal, which did take place in the 19th century, notably in Paris. We have to assume that if such a practice existed it took place at the level of informal class connections outside the institutional frame of state.
The capitalism of the United States in the century is substantially different from that of Eastern Europe in the 1910's. Monopoly of capital accumulation in which the state takes a significantly greater role than it did in competitive capitalism. (O'Connor, 1973) Moreover, the United States is a bourgeois democracy which puts it in the category of western industrial bourgeois democracies, but also with its own particular democratic traditions. These simple facts raise a host of issues which are important to touch upon.

Under Monopoly Capitalism, the reproduction of the system takes place on many levels. Economically, simple reproduction of the labor force is carried on privately and is financed through wages. At a more complex level, as capital becomes more concentrated there is a tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Rumiatzen, 1980); the state invests at a loss to keep the average rate of profit from falling. A larger share of social reproduction is financed through state expenditures and takes place at the level of social consumption (Castells, 1978, p. 30). Among these we can count added expenditures to subsidize housing, education, socio-cultural facilities and transportation. This in turn has several consequences. The state maximizes its regulatory function, increasing the role of planning. Because the state is a political entity, urban issues which tended
in the past to be treated as technical problems become highly politicized. (Castells, 1976) Furthermore, the realm of consumption takes on added importance in determining the social status and class of urban dwellers. At the private level this translates into the "keeping up with the Joneses" syndrome (Ashton, 1978) an attitude which strengthened the organization of a consumer society. But the increased level of social consumption means that issues of public consumption, such as the housing policies of the state, become the object of political struggle. No wonder the demolition of working class housing to make way for highways became such a hot potato. The state itself politicizes areas of life previously upoliticized, giving birth to what have been called urban social movements. (Castells, 1976).

This politicization is promoted by the state in different ways. The government of the U.S. is, of course, dominated by a ruling class, despite fitful arguments to the contrary. But it does not rule merely by repression. A bourgeois democracy depends to a large extent on acceptance of the status quo by those without state power, on the hegemony of the rulers over the society through a variety of institutions in the state and civil society. (Gramsci, 1971). This is done ideologically, disguising the rule of the powerful through the propagation of ideas which
hide the rule. All of the myths of "American democracy" are the most clear evidence of this. But it is also done politically, through the granting of reforms by the state. The state plays, therefore, the role of mediator not only among divergent interests among the rulers, but to some degree also between the rulers and the ruled. The working classes and oppressed groups are encouraged to keep their political activity within the bounds of legality by the granting of reforms which convince the oppressed that it is worthwhile to "work within the system" (the carrot) -- while repressing those who outstep the bounds of permissible activity (the stick).

This means that the state is less a monolithic block and more a complex and at times contradictory organism; it appears to have a "relative autonomy" from direct class rule. (Poulantzas, 1974) An often quoted example of this is legal aid offices funded by the federal government which engage in class-action suits against "the feds" on behalf of poor clients. It is the same kind of complexity that allows federal funds to finance advocate planners who provide technical assistance to "grassroots" groups engaged in opposing government policies. The important factor in this theory is that this contradictory behavior by the state does not imply that the state is an impartial arbitrator; it still is an instrument of domination, but through
negotiations, building consensus, "buying out" insurgent leadership, funneling political activity into convenient bounds, etc. rather than by naked coercion. (Castells, p. 84) The capitalist state, then, promotes participation as a political means to reproducing itself, using a flexible policy of granting the reforms which are affordable, provided that the working class and oppressed groups can be convinced to carry out their political activities within the structures which it provides for this purpose. By accepting these conditions, participation legitimizes the state.

PARTICIPATION AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

The state under Monopoly Capitalism is a complex animal, but certain features of it can be identified. We have already mentioned its role in promoting accumulation and social reproduction of the system, and its doing this through a process of negotiation in which planning takes a significant role. A further function of the state is in the realm of ideas -- the legitimation of particular policies (O'Connor, 1973), the obscurity of class rule. In this task urban planning also takes on a prominent place. Manuel Castells, in the first chapter of The Urban Question (Castells, 1977), detailed a critique of current ideas about ideas about "urban" problems. These ideas present "the
urban" as a phenomenon which can be studied apart from the social foundation, as spatial, technological phenomenon. In this light, the ideas promoted by the state in a planning situation are part of the ideological task of the state and other bourgeois institutions. Interpreting policies such as highway construction as "neutral" technical needs of society without taking into account socio-economic basis of such policies, is an example of the ideological tasks of planners functioning for the state.

Participation is the object of considerable political and ideological attention by the state. On the one hand, participation may be seen as a forum for the struggle of opposites. The working classes and the oppressed participate under certain conditions in order to further their interests. In order for this participation to be worthwhile, according to Marx, these main ingredients are important: numbers, a clear consciousness, or ideological clarity, and "that bond of brotherhood which out to exist between workmen or different countries." (Kasperson, 1980) For the oppressed to benefit from participation, ideology, among other factors must play a crucial role. Participation is seen by reformists, on the other hand, as a vehicle for reconciliation of opposites. The monopoly state, complex and contradictory, promotes participation for the sake of funneling activity into the channels which benefit dominant groups. Piven has
written, for example, of the wave of participation promoted by the federal government in the 60's as an effort by the Democratic Party -- an instrument of the rulers -- to funnel the activity of minorities away from politics, where it was relatively successful, to the arena of technical planning, where the edge would go to those with technical resources. The civil rights movement would then be confined within the limits of planning debates and electoral politics where the Democrats could harvest the major benefits. (Piven, 1970)

The cost was the Great Society Reform program, which the state could afford given a period of economic expansion. Such a strategy for participation needed ideological ammunition; the "reconciliatory" function of participation had to become prominent, and therefore a series of ideas about "participatory democracy" had to be developed and cultivated.

This task was not filled so much by the state, but by what Gramsci called "civil society". The ruling class exercises hegemony not only through the state, but through the institutions outside the state which forge ideas, cultural habits and patterns which are essential to the reproduction of the system. Through this, the rulers govern with the consent of the governed, but this consent is inculcated in the population through the active involvement of institutions under the influence of the rulers. In the case of participation a vast volume of literature was
developed which placed participation within the bounds of bourgeois democratic ideas in general and within the "American" tradition in particular. Most of this work was done by intellectuals within universities and a significant portion of it pertains to the planning profession. Because they are based on a variety of theoretical frameworks--functionalism, empiricism, ethnomethology, etc., it is difficult to categorize them. Despite this, some of the literature is genuinely helpful in studying participation, either because they document the process in the last few decades in the U.S. or because they clearly illustrate an important point of view.

REFORMIST THEORIES OF PARTICIPATION

Before the 1960's, planning theory in the U.S. was generally dominated by people like Rexford Tugwell, a brilliant intellectual, part of Roosevelt's Brain Trust and appointed governor of Puerto Rico at the launching of massive government planning efforts in the 40's. He sought to justify the massive growth of the state sector by appealing to planning as the instrument to guarantee "the common good" (Goodman, 1976; Kasperon, 1979), as an instrument of rationalization above the forces of the market. It worked for awhile as the ideological principle of state planning. Several historically determined factors made these ideas gradually
obsolete. The reorganization of State Monopoly Capitalism just after the war, as we have mentioned, increased the conciliatory functions of the state, its apparent autonomy, the granting of reforms, etc. Urbanistically, the stratification and geographic segregation of working people by income, race and ethnicity became more acute. (Gordon, 1978) The politics of interest groups gained prominence (Mollenkopf, 1978) and the urban question was politicized. As the 60's advanced, the struggle of black people for equality made the myth of "common good" patently a myth. A theoretical perspective was needed to account for the new condition. Political scientists worked on new definitions of democracy and planners began to talk about Pluralism and Advocacy.

It was precisely the urban movements against projects like highways and urban renewal that sparked the search for new ideas. Using the example of the battle against I-95, Lisa Peattie (Peattie, 1970) wrote "Reflections on Advocacy Planning". The original state-sponsored highway plans claimed to be a technical promotion of the common good. The technical studies by Urban Planning Aid in this struggle exposed the emptiness of this claim, demonstrating the political nature of planning. There were hundreds of situations like this one in every city of the United States, so it became necessary for the system to develop a planning
ideology which could take into account the reality of social conflict in the planning arena and still recognize the legitimacy of the system and the viability of struggling for more just and democratic planning. Society began to be explained as a multiplicity of social and ethnic groups competing freely for the benefits of society, except for the fact that some groups were denied equal access to sources of power, like the electoral process and technical resources. (Davidoff, 1965) What was necessary for the correction of "failures of democracy" and "market failures" was political and technical intervention aimed at making the system work as it should. Planners began to take sides, allying themselves with groups struggling against state plans. Peattie describes this process as that of planners looking for a new client, which was partially true, and raises the question of the degree to which advocates manipulated the groups they worked for in order to further their own interests. In the case of the fight against the Corridor, there were numerous groups working against the road for different purposes; it was professional advocates led by Jim Morey who eventually forged the coalition which defeated the highway.

This contradictory role of advocates -- at once helping and manipulating the poor and minority communities -- has been the subject of some controversy. We have already mentioned Piven's critique of advocacy as funneling minorities into the Democratic Party. Myrna Breitbart's (1979) article
on advocacy traces the roots of the professional practice to efforts to educate citizens to policies already formulated. Participation in this context meant using people to further decisions of powerful interests. Later it became common practice to organize "blue ribbon" committees to legitimate these decisions, usually drafted from the upper strata of the affected neighborhood. As movements against plans gained strength, those who had been excluded demanded access to institutions of power. Through conflict, negotiation and agreements, degrees of participation were achieved in different situations. Given the fact that under these conditions participation could vary enormously from one situation to another, some literature explores the degrees to which participation may be meaningful to the participants. Sherry Arnstein (1969) defines participation as:

The redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes to be included in the future. It is strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operating, and benefits like patronage and contracts are parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

It is important to note that this definition is though far-reaching, essentially reformist and liberal, since it does not posit participation as a route to a structural transformation of society but to a larger piece of the pie. She
then produces a useful and famous "ladder of participation" which requires very little comment:

- Citizen Control
- Delegated Power
- Partnership
- Placation
- Consultation
- Informing
- Therapy
- Manipulation

Degrees of Citizen Power

Degrees of Tokenism

Non-participation

While Arnstein leaves out any discussion of popular organization, the only source of power capable of allowing an oppressed group the possibility of "climbing" on her ladder, her scheme provides a useful checklist for analyzing any particular participatory situation, since often reforms granted by the state or the bureaucracy strive to keep participation at the lower rungs.

The specific situations of participation are more complex than Arnstein's ladder would allow us to think: the purpose of participation, the characteristics of the participants are left out. There are other writers, however, who have pursued what can be called a multivariate problem and proposed useful schemes. Jon Vantil and Sally Bould Vantil (1970) propose one such scheme which also requires relatively little explanation.
Participation focuses on:

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<tr>
<td>Non-elites only</td>
<td>Citizen participation</td>
<td>Grassroots participation</td>
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While slightly more powerful as tool of analysis than Arnestein's ladder, there are serious problems with this scheme. It does not allow for the process by which participation occurs to enter into the analysis, and since any political process is essentially historical, the scheme falls apart as soon as we seek to apply it.

Jose Olives (1973), using a Marxist analysis, gives us another scheme, a more complex and useful one. He deals with slightly different variables, since he is not so concerned with race and classes differences within the urban movement, merely with the political results of such struggles. He derives four categories: Urban Effect, Mobilization, Organization and Type of Action, and Political Effects. Urban effect is limited to the achievement or non-achievement of a reform. Mobilization includes successful
Social Process of the production of a political effect by urban struggle according to observations of the struggles against urban renewal in Paris.

Urban Effect  |  Mobilization |  Organization/Type of Action |  Political Effects
--- | --- | --- | ---
Satisfied Reivindication | + | reivindicative | Continuation of reivindicative action without politicizing the struggle
 | | reivindicative and political | Maintenance of reivindicative/political level. Higher stage of political struggle
 | | reivindicative | Social Integration. (Paternalism)
 | | reivindicative and political | Political decomposition (political integration to institutions)

Unsatisfied reivindication | + | reivindicative | Demobilization Discouragement
 | | political | Radicalization
 | | | Political Repression
 | | reivindicative | Individual Withdrawal
 | | political |

GRAPHIC No. 2. Oliva's Analysis of struggles against urban renewal in the Paris region, combining the struggles for reform, their political content and effect. (Castells, 197
or unsuccessful mobilization. Organization and type of action are divided into merely reformist and reformist-and-political-at-once. He then charts the different combinations possible and predicts the political results of each one. It's actually based on a survey of urban struggles in Paris. (See Graphic No. 2)

What is most striking about this scheme compared to the previous two is the emphasis it places on the relationship between the purely reformist and what is political as well as reformist. We have already discussed the importance of the consciousness of participants in making participation a valuable vehicle for advancing their interests. The goal of an immediate reform may be won or lost, but the longer range benefits to the oppressed groups may be more political: is there a deeper understanding of the functioning of institutionalized oppression? Is there a higher level of popular organization among participants in an urban movement, or does the movement achieve a reform and dissolve without a lasting political benefit? In the case of the Southwest Corridor, the victory over the highway resulted in a highly modified project which is having the effect of raising property values in the surrounding housing stock. This in turn means that the dreaded displacement may be taking place anyway, only through a different mechanism -- the market instead of the road. Given this possibility, an evaluation
of participation of the SWCP must take into account the political and ideological effects of the process on the surrounding communities which would increase their ability to fight against displacement.

Some of the other literature pertinent to a study of participation is basically in the same tradition of Arnstein and the Vantils. This tendency is reformist in that it accepts the parameters of the established order, pluralistic in that it recognizes diversity of interests and claims that the state is harmonizing them. Charles Lindbloom (1963), the well-known father of "incremental planning", bases his theory on a rejection of goal-oriented planning. He decries comprehensiveness as unrealistic and instead argues that the test of a good policy is the level of agreement among participants. His basic argument in The Intelligence of Democracy (1965) is that the virtue of the U.S. political system is precisely its ability to embody a "process of partisan mutual adjustment". Participation by oppressed groups in this context is merely the smooth functioning of democracy. The question of "who participates" in this context becomes very important, however, because if certain groups participate at a significantly lower rate than the rest of the population the state will not be able to carry out its function. In the 60's, with increasing dissatisfaction and rebellion by blacks and other minorities,
promoting the participation of minorities within the system became a strategic question.

Allan Altshuller, in *Community Control* (1970), argues that the value of giving power to the black community lies in the subsequent "socialization" of black Americans to the values and practices of mainstream U.S. society. Blacks would benefit from having a "stake in the system," whites from "the peace of reconciliation." It is tempting to call this approach cynical, but in fact it is perhaps a more candid expression of the kinds of views of participation we have been reviewing. Besides honesty it has the value of sharpening the awareness of the aims of the defenders of the system in promoting the participation of the oppressed within the system: "socializing" the oppressed into accepting the parameters of bourgeois democracy. The empirical counterpart of this theoretical position is an endless series of studies about rates of participation among blacks, Latinos, and working people in general based on income, background, status, psychological make-up, shade of skin and other factors (May, 1971, pp. 6-8, pp. 61-69). Other literature argues that people make crude cost-benefit studies of the efforts and benefits from participation before deciding the degree to which they will be involved. These studies can be used as empirical evidence of the kinds of barriers placed on people's attempts to determine their own destiny, the daily operations of monopoly capitalism
at a diffuse cultural and institutional level. They are also useful for organizers in that they can heighten awareness of the many ways political and participatory efforts can be derailed. Finally, the importance of technical knowledge in opening or closing doors is pertinent to the efforts of advocates and organizers alike and will prove important in the Southwest Corridor Project.

Other literature focuses on the effects of participating in protest on the participants themselves. Those involved in Alinsky-style efforts apparently derived great benefits in tightening neighborhood support networks, changing damaging and self-defeating habits even if the goals of the movement resulted in few results. (May, 1971, p. 8) While we may disagree with the negativity about proletarian and minority cultures implied in this view, it is true than any intense process transforms both participants and groups involved. It would be more useful to study changes in ability to confront the power structures, knowledge of pertinent technical issues, increased hope in the possibility of winning through struggle. In parallel arguments, others argue that the poor, in participating, change their attitudes, "adapting" them to those of more middle-class residents and planners, making urban renewal easier. (Loring, et al., 1957) Conversely, others see participation by "the poor" as threatening the goals of urban renewal by introducing "self-serving" attitudes into the process. (Wilson, 1966)
An interesting case study of participation in Newark around opposition to a Medical Center expansion led by the Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA) is discussed in an article by Junius Williams. (1970) The thrust of this article is that the main measure of participation should be goal-attainment. While refreshingly direct, this approach leaves out the long-range political and ideological effects of the process on participants, and is, therefore, not that useful.

A different set of issues is dealt by literature which seeks to study more structural factors affecting participation, such as local political variables and local political structure. As local political variables are included in the political history of the local city in question. A strong political party organization, for example, implies a fairly difficult process of influencing the machinery. Where a mayor is elected by loose reform coalitions the situation may be more maleable to popular pressure and hence more promising for participation. (Greenstone and Peterson, 1968) What this means is that the specific political history of the city being studied is important to the outcome of participation, a useful lesson. The formal political structure, or city charter, the level of corruption, the role of the mayor, etc. have effects on participation. Piven and Cloward, in "Black Control of Cities," argue that
current efforts at "metropolitization" of the administration of metropolitan regions is a first step in diluting the political power of blacks in central cities. (May, 1971, p. 34)

ADMINISTRATIVE GOALS IN PROMOTING PARTICIPATION

Literature on participation written from the point of view of administrators is substantially different and worth noting. Edmund Burke, for example, establishes a morphology for participation which is worth quoting at some length:

Education-therapy focuses upon the presumed need to improve the individual citizen and institutes participation programs as a form of citizenship training. Behavioral change aims at influencing individual behavior through group membership. Changing the behavior of the system's members or leaders becomes the vehicle for overall system change. Staff supplement, as the term suggests, simply involves supplementing the expertise of particular citizens. Usually this type of participation is restricted to task-oriented advice and does not include citizen involvement in the determination of goals and priorities. Cooptation is a means for capturing or neutralizing opposition by including the dissenters as participants without surrendering decision process. The inclusion of these participants also wins consent and legitimacy from the populace as a whole. Finally, community power, according to Burke, involves the creation of new power centers to confront established centers as a means of generating social change. Size and dedication are their resources conflict their tactic. (Burke, 1971, in Kasperson, 1971, p. 6)

Cold. A very clear picture of a cynical state bureaucrat's approach to citizen participation. Not surprisingly, Burke favors "behavior change" and "staff supplement" as the preferred strategies. It is very useful to keep this in
mind when analyzing why and how the state promotes "participation" in certain moments, or responds to pressures for participation by instituting it in bastardized ways. There is a significant amount of literature in this vein. Judith May (1971) reviews several books written from the perspective of organizational theory which recommends participation as a strategy for improving organization effectiveness. She groups them into several categories. Under Goal Attainment, Theodore Kaplow develops a byzantine matrix of variables to analyze behavior of the individual in organizations, recommending participation as a means of increasing the control of the individual by organizations with the purpose of reaching organizational goals. Under Integration she discusses Chris Argyris' thesis that the conflicts between individuals and organizations can be eliminated by participation while encouraging "individual growth". Under Adaptation participation is seen as a method for promoting group-consciousness among workers and supervisors. Under Socialization, May reviews a book by Alexander Leighton on what he learned from running a "relocation" camp for the Japanese in the U.S. During World War II. This is perhaps the greatest travesty of the term "participation" in print, but in its extreme way it is a powerful reminder of the fact that participation is a double edged sword. No wonder many activists, including planners, refused to "participate" at all in the activities organized by the state. Bob
Goodman warned that planners could become "soft cops" manipulating the oppressed for the benefit of the rulers and counseled conscious activists to fight to stay outside the system in their efforts. (Goodman, 1974)

PARTICIPATION AND ALIENATION

Still another issue often related to participation is alienation. Particularly in the 60's, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the anonymity of large cities, their promotion of isolated individuals with no social ties. Participation was thought to be a remedy to alienation, even within the existing social structure.

From the point of view of liberalism, alienation was related primarily to centralized, unresponsive bureaucracies. The concept also recognizes degrees of empowerment and marginality -- some social groups, such as Blacks and Latinos were "left out" of the political processes in which the majority participated. The remedy therefore was to decentralize bureaucracy and to establish programs for the effective participation of the disempowered in decision-making.

From Marxist point of view, alienation is the result of the existing social structure. It is rooted in commodity production where the worker sees the fruits of his
labor appropriated and put on the market. The value of his production is not only its "use value" but its "exchange value". But alienation also takes place in the superstructure, since the oppressed groups are not only kept from power by force, but constantly bombarded with ideas which are against their interest. A social nature in this view, participation is a remedy of alienation only to the degree that it heightens consciousness of the oppressed about their oppressed state, and improves their ability to fight against oppression.

Marxists recognized different levels of consciousness among groups in any given class and oppressed groups. Thus while massive participation is deemed necessary, it also stresses a dialectical relationship between more conscious sectors -- the leadership -- and less conscious, more numerous group. The degree to which leadership can strengthen its ties to a mass movement raising its consciousness in the process of struggle is also a measure of extent to which participation is a remedy to alienation. The quality of participation is critical. Alienation is combatted when the working class and oppressed become aware of their true time situation in society, but actually begins to be eradicated only when they consciously and actively struggle to change society.
In this light, participation under capitalism through making the bureaucracy more responsive can create the appearance of diminishing alienation, but by hiding the reality of oppression and class rule, citizens can be further alienated from the true state of society. Only through struggle can alienation be overcome.

PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMMING AND DESIGN

During the Design and Engineering phase of the Southwest Corridor Project, participation in the project entered what I call its most institutionalized phase. By this time the Corridor Project, through consultants, structured and regulated aspects of participation, mainly involving programming and design. Since these tasks are relatively technical, the political considerations become less prominent, although they are by no means unimportant. In order to inform our case study well, it therefore becomes important to review some of the issues and literature involved in participatory programming and design. Our main guide in this will be Gary Hack's Ph.D. thesis, *Environmental Programming: Creating Responsive Settings*, 1976, MIT.

Hack defines programming as "the process of arriving at a set of specifications about what to build or change in the way of man-occupied settings. This activity takes
various forms, including preparation of architectural programs, the development of environmental development standards, and on-going management of built settings. Design may be defined as the transformation of program into plans and specifications for built form. In the Corridor, both of these activities predominated during the institutionalized phase of participation. The task of programming has only recently been approached in a systematic way; traditionally it was an intuitive or personal focus that was used. Hack uses a couple of case studies, particularly that of Marvin Gardens, a low income housing development in Roxbury, to show the potentially disastrous results of this. He then proceeds to group programming tasks around four environmental definitions: 1) environmental packages, 2) environmental patterns, 3) performance guidelines, and 4) clientship.

By packages, he refers to the scale and mix of activities that will take place in a mixed environment. In some cases, as in a shopping center, this mix will be determined primarily by economic calculations. In other cases there are "rule-of-thumb" guidebooks, such as "x-parking spaces per apartment". In still other cases, as in designing a new community, the mix cannot be derived so readily from given criteria but flows instead from patterns or performance standards. (Hack, 1976, pp. 117-42)
Performance standards are a series of normative statement of what should be. They have been commonly applied to buildings which can be derived from a prototype, such as schools. Again, transit stations must meet a set of MBTA guidelines. Hack finds them useful in "structuring the dialogue in participatory settings." (Hack, 1976, pp. 175-98)

Clientship is also important for our purposes. In most public environments there is a potential contradiction among the client who is paying -- the state and its representatives -- and the user clients -- the people who will use the environment. He proposes the use of "scenarios" or imagined complex situations, in order to better define clients. Participation brings both patrons and users into the programming and design process.

Participation in programming and design is seen to include a number of important issues: 1) who to include, 2) how should people be organized to work together, 3) how should sessions be arranged, 4) how can analysis be grounded in accurate data and experience, 5) how can normative views be encouraged, 6) how can there be a transition from wishes to firm proposals, 7) who should be the managers and leaders of the process? These seven issues are a very useful set of guides for analyzing participation in both programming and design.
It is important to note that the approach to participation outlined, however, has certain necessary implications. First of all, its major aim is one of conflict resolution leading to a concrete program and design. Raising the consciousness, improving the organizational level and technical knowledge of the participants is not an explicit goal; rather, the program or design product is the priority. In the light of other literature, the politics of participation in this stage are not addressed, but they remain critical.

Another useful tool introduced by Hack is a typology of participants. He groups them as being impacted directly or indirectly, and as imparting financially, programmatically, experientially. When we explore the mechanics of participation in the Corridor, these distinctions will become useful.

Finally, the relationship between professional programmers and designers as reflections of class, race and ethnic groupings are critically important.

DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization is another "buzz word" with totally ambiguous meaning. Since it is closely tied to participation and is a very relevant concept in the context of the Southwest Corridor, it deserves consideration.
Rhetorically, decentralization attempts to "restore government to the people". It also aims at more efficient functioning of the bureaucratic machines, lessening alienation, more effective project design. For years it has been recommended by government blue-ribbon commissions, the most famous one being the 1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. One third of major U.S. cities have tried it in some way (Kasperson, 1979, p. 27) and it has of course affected the structure of state-sponsored projects like the Southwest Corridor.

In France a very useful distinction is made between decentralization and deconcentration (Kasperson, 1979, p. 28), the latter term seen to be a reorganization of the bureaucracy to permit a better link between the center and the citizens affected. In fact it is seen as a "penetration" of the periphery by the center. In the U.S. much of what passes for decentralization can more accurately be called deconcentration. Practices like BRA site offices and Little City Halls in Boston are best seen in this light.

Some efforts at a more genuine decentralization have been tried, notably under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. The decentralization of the public educational structure of New York City, for example, led to long and bitter struggles, particularly on the Lower East Side, but resulted in significant involvement and participation by Puerto Ricans
in that area of the city, as well as to some temporary, minor empowerment of that community which has been rolled back with the years. The experience remains, though. Michael Lipsky argues that decentralization is an antidote to "bureaucratic breakdown", based on an analysis of the relationship of "street level" bureaucrats to their clients and central offices. (Kasperson, 1974, p. 32) It can in fact allow for more efficient and frictionless communication than a more centralized structure. This is not, however, good in itself, since it depends on the question of who stands to gain by this efficiency. The specifics of the situation must be considered.

Decentralization is supposed to yield more democracy, make government more representative, reduce alienation. This is dubious, in light of experience. It also omits issues such as "what are the stakes in participation" and "what are the technical issues involved". It can under some circumstances make the delivery of services more equitable.

In theory, it is possible to use decentralization to create "enclaves" of power for oppressed groups, and has been used this way. But by the same token, it can divide groups and areas by fostering parochial concerns over general issues that unite. This dynamic is present in the design and engineering phase of the Corridor Project and should be kept in mind when studying that process.
Furthermore, decentralization can actually benefit reactionaries, as the North American rightwing's emphasis on "state's rights" clearly indicates.

Decentralization as a concept has a peculiar "fit" to Boston's ideosyncratic preoccupation with neighborhoods. In general, decentralization theorists have emphasized the neighborhood as a unit and stressed the need to reinforce their structures. In the Corridor Project, we'll see a reflection of this thinking in the structure of the design and engineering teams.

ON THE RECENT HISTORY OF PARTICIPATION IN BOSTON

It seems pertinent to review briefly a few aspects of participation from an historical perspective. Two areas particularly are worth noting: 1) forms of participation particular to the city of Boston, with participatory structures in some cases similar to that of other cities and in some cases with a peculiar "bend" characteristic of the area, and 2) the recent history of federal regulations of participation in state-sponsored projects.

Like every city in the U.S., Boston has a history of citizen activity around issues which may be considered "urban" today -- housing, building codes, development strategies today. In Beacon Hill, the Beacon Hill Association was formed in the latter half of the 19th century, after
the development of Back Bay attracted the wealthier residents of the city and "the Hill" began to decline. An elitist organization, they organized to protect the "quality" of the neighborhood, prevent the construction of apartment buildings, and put limits on height and size of buildings. (Rubin, 1971, p. 5) Back Bay, likewise, spawned citizen organizations in that period. The Back Bay Association coalescing merchants and the Back Bay Neighborhood Association attracting activist residents. Also elitist, these associations organized against transients, students, rooming houses and other symptoms of neighborhood "decline". (Rubin, 1971, p. 6) The above two examples are relevant to our case only in an indirect way, since they set a precedent for citizens organizing outside the bounds of the state, yet attempting to affect commercial and state activity within their neighborhood. It is also peculiar of Boston that such a great percentage of this activity occurred at the neighborhood level rather than on a citywide basis.

More relevant to the situation in the Southwest is the history of participation in working class neighborhoods of the city. In the Boston Urban Observatory's Organized Citizen Participation in Boston, a section on "historical background to 1960" describes citizen organization in the West End and North End of Boston. Based on Whyte's Street Corner Society and Herbert Gans' The Urban Villagers, the section describes the organic organization of these communities
through markets, churches, benevolent associations, professional organizations, "home-town" associations and more assimilated groupings, the role of the extended family, neighborhood networks, etc. While these phenomena may be in some way related to "participation", it seems more useful to take note of them as peculiar formations through which immigrant workers organized themselves in the areas of residence. The term participation is perhaps best used to describe the relationship between these organizations and the state. In the case of the West End, Gans argues that the urban renewal approach which ignored indigenous formations and conceived of its project as a bulldozer-created "Tabula Rasa" where a new creation could sprout, would promote bitterness and resistance to renewal by residents, as well as lead to the destruction of "valid" and constructive social structures. In later urban renewal -- and highway -- efforts, the state would learn from this lesson.

The history of participation in the South End is more directly relevant, because the corridor goes through that neighborhood and because the neighborhood's activity against the highway was certainly conditioned by its history. In 1888, the central council of private charities did a survey of housing conditions in the South End and organized a citizens' committee to get demolition laws changed. This was followed by a series of committees which organized around
"When the American people, through their Congress, voted a little while ago [1957] for a twenty-six-billion-dollar highway program, the most charitable thing to assume about this action is that they hadn't the faintest notion of what they were doing. Within the next fifteen years they will doubtless find out; but by that time it will be too late to correct all the damage to our cities and our countryside, not least to the efficient organization of industry and transportation, that this ill-conceived and preposterously unbalanced program will have wrought."

- Lewis Mumford, 1963
GRAPHIC No. 3

Rendering of Plans for I-95 at Forest Hills, Jamaica Plain.
(WFEM Archives)
The Southwest Corridor must be seen in the context of the road system of which I-95 was to be a part. After the Second World War, the U.S. embarked on a major public works project: the construction of the Federal Defense Highway Network, also known as the Interstate Highways. Linking every major industrial and population center, the system had the ostensible purpose of providing the country with a network of roads where troops, armaments and materials could be moved from anywhere in the U.S. to any other spot without a single traffic intersection. The rumor was that Eisenhower had been impressed with Germany's Autobahns during the war and had been maneuvering for the U.S. to build a similar highway network. The scope of the project was enormous -- it was to be the largest public works project in the history of the United States. It would physically, economically and culturally change the face of the country.

INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF THE MONOPOLY CITY

Of course, a major transformation of the man-made geography of the U.S. was not undertaken only for direct defense reasons; there were other powerful forces at work which are often summed up with the single word "Detroit". The U.S. was entering the automobile era in earnest. In the next twenty years, population patterns would change, with increasing suburbanization in every major population
center; the entire pattern of location for most economic activity would shift from dependence on a mixed transportation network to one almost totally dependent on the automobile and trucks. Parallel with the development of a major transportation network, a major reorganization of the center of metropolitan districts was also underway. Urban Renewal programs were discussed and planned from the 1940's, although they began to be implemented a few years later than the highways -- in the late 50's. In Boston, Urban Renewal and the Southwest Corridor coincided in time and space, and the popular struggles which surrounded them were closely related. This is, of course, no mere coincidence, since these two major projects stemmed from the same source and affected the same social groups and classes.

But before we can argue this convincingly, we need to backtrack a little, discuss some theoretical issues, and narrate some of the history of the Corridor. It is common practice in orthodox urbanism to attribute the major transformation of urban structures in the post-war period merely to the automobile, while in fact a more fundamental process was underway. This view of the period is symptomatic of a general approach to the entire field of urban studies and urban history which attempts to find laws of some inexorable process of urbanization inherent in industrialization and development, independent of the socio-economic historical formation of the societies whose cities are being studied.
Several intellectual currents influence this orthodox perspective. Technological determinism argues that the development of the form of the industrial cities can be derived from the inexorable developments of successive technologies of production, transportation, etc. (Noble, 1977) There are several variants of this perspective from a "right wing" version which argues that the logic of technology is the best measure for the organization for cities, to a neo-Marxist view, or "vulgar" Marxist view, which places undue emphasis on technological development in explaining the transition from one historic epoch to another. The latter is usually justified by quoting Marx out of context, where he states that, "The handmill gives you feudalism; the steam engine gives you capitalism." In studying the post-war period in the U.S., the increased presence of cars and trucks, the development of the Interstate Highway network looms so powerful that a technological explanation is tempting. But, in the words of Harry Braverman (1974), "These necessities are called 'technical needs,' 'machine characteristics,' 'the requirements of efficiency,' but by and large they are the exigencies of capital and not of technique."

This kind of explanation is often accompanied by a variant which has been called spatialism or spatial determinism, which suggests that there is also an inexorable logic to the way industrial economic life is organized in
space. Using this perspective, the construction of highways in U.S. cities becomes a material manifestation of the more efficient organization of production, and it is often accompanied by a fatalistic approach to the future of city form. (For a critique of the spatial theories of Losch, Alonso, Isaard, et al., see the first chapter of Stewart Holland's book, *Capital vs. the Regions* (1976).) Highways were identified with "progress", and the negative social and political consequences of highways are accepted as byproducts of some inevitable process. Urbanization, whether in the underdeveloped or the advanced industrial countries is seen as "a finite process, a cycle through which nations go in their transition from agrarian through industrial society." (Davis, 1975) Sometimes the explanation for this "inevitable" process is pseudo-economic, arguing in neo-classical terms that the logic of economies of scale and agglomeration economies demands particular concentrations and configurations, and super-highways are only one manifestation of this.

While these theories may partially aid in understanding the history of Boston's Southwest Corridor, they clearly fall short of the mark. Since a popular democratic movement had a major impact on this one major urban project, no theory of urban form which leaves such movements outside its range of explanation can be powerful enough to shed light on it, to clarify the forces which influenced its
course. It is clear that an approach is needed which can explain the forces which gave rise to the project for the Southwest Expressway in the first place, shed light on the complex political process which became the history of the project. The theory must be able to account for socio-economic and political factors, put important technological developments (like the "automobilization of society") in a historical perspective, and contribute to our ability not only to analyze an urbanistic phenomenon but to guide our professional practice in relation to it. With these criteria in mind, the only theory powerful enough to be useful is Marxism.

A Marxist approach to the analysis of U.S. cities begins with an exploration of State Monopoly Capitalism and attempts to explain major man-made environmental transformations as manifestations of deeper changes in that social formation. It takes into account the concrete history of U.S. cities. It seeks to analyze the particular type of capital accumulation dominant in different periods and establishes correlations between these, the dynamics of class struggle in the cities, and the resulting urbanistic changes.

In "Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities", David Gordon offers an historical framework which is useful in putting the post-war highway boom and
the Southwest Corridor in perspective. (Gordon, 1978) He begins by saying that "The Marxian analysis of the spatial division of labor suggests that no particular pattern of urban development is inevitably 'destined,' somehow deterministically cast in a general spatial mold. Spatial forms are conditioned, rather, by the particular mode of production dominating the society under study; they are shaped by endogenous political-economic forces, not by exogenous mechanisms. Marxians also argue that urban history, like the history of other social institutions, does not advance incrementally, advancing step by gradual step along some frictionless path. Urban history advanced discontinuously, periodically experiencing qualitative transformations of basic form and structure. During the capitalist epoch, in particular, the instability of the accumulation process itself is bound to lead to periodic institutional change." Gordon then argues that U.S. cities have historically gone through three qualitative stages, each having a peculiar form which responds to a particular period of capital accumulation. The Commercial City spanned from the early settlements in colonial days to the days of the Industrial Revolution. As industrial production became the dominant form of accumulation in the mid-19th century, the form of cities began to change to the industrial metropolis of the second half of the century. With the turn-of-the-century, and the domination of monopoly capitalism, U.S. cities
again changed to what he calls the Corporate City, which has been predominant to this day.

The major characteristic of the Corporate City has been the decentralization of manufacturing, which he convincingly argues was prompted by Capital's reaction to the high level of working class militancy and unionism in the large cities of the period. Accompanying this phenomenon are other spatial characteristics, such as the formation of the central business districts, suburban fragmentation, increased stratification of the labor force, increased segregation of residential areas by class and race, the concentrations of Corporate headquarters in the downtowns, as well as fiscal and social crises in the system which have become known as the "urban" crisis.

Gordon, however, does not consider the changes in the post-war period as qualitative but rather as refinements of the Corporate City, since monopoly capitalism has been the dominant form of accumulation in the U.S. since the Cuban-Spanish-American War of 1898:

Once this new urban form crystalized, of course, many additional influences affected urban growth. Patterns of defense spending, federal housing policies, the power of the auto-energy-construction block, the shifting dynamics of urban-land speculation -- these and many other factors -- contributed to the content of urban America after World War II. All of these factors had secondary effects, however, in the sense that they tended to reproduce the structure of the Corporate City rather than to change or undermine it.
The foundations of that urban form were so strong that simple political influences could not change its basic shape. (Gordon, 19, p. 55)

While his argument is strong, the physical transformation of U.S. cities in the period since the war, and the accompanying social and economic developments are too significant to be unaccounted. Moreover, the task at hand is putting the Southwest Corridor Project in an historical as well as socio-economic and political perspective. Even if we are to understand the post-war construction boom as a "fine-tuning" of the Corporate City, we have to argue that it was a major tune up. The Interstate Highway Project, for example, was the largest single public works project ever undertaken by the United States; it was passed in 1956 with a projected budget of $56 billion. (Mollenkopf, 1978, p. 127) The accompanying Urban Renewal program would prompt local city governments to borrow $22.5 billion in a 15 year period in addition to receiving an enormous amount of federal funds.

During the first half of the century monopoly capitalism expanded both domestically and internationally at a very fast pace. The dispersal of manufacturing from the central cities to the suburbs meant that the major economic life of the country was gradually being relocated, while the fiscal structure of the local organs of the state, which depended on real estate taxes through municipal
finances was not adjusting to the new reality, creating the embryo of a deficit in municipal financing. Like the industrial expansion which preceded it, this deficit was financed on credit, but the bubble of private deficit financing burst during the Great Depression. Following the Second World War, with its political and economic advantage temporarily secure in the world, the U.S. turned its attention to consolidating the structure of monopoly capitalism at home. The Central City during the competitive capitalist period had been a machine for production (Mumford, 1961); in the first period of monopoly dominance it was becoming a machine for management and consumption. The dispersion of industry away from central cities and regions of high union militancy was accompanied by a relocation of the residences of industrial workers. The state played an important role in promoting this relocation, through FHA insured loans which fueled the suburban boom. The new organization itself spurred new growth industries, the major one being the automobile industry, which was in turn reinforced by the state through the construction of the Interstate Highway Network.

This reorganization had other implications. Already mentioned was the fiscal crisis of city governments. Corporate headquarters were still located in the downtowns as were the headquarters of the growing financial institutions. Yet the population in the central cities had changed with the exodus of white workers and the migration of black and
Latino workers, as well as with the gradual transformation of the city's labor market from industrial to service jobs. The new larger and more complex economic institutions generated a more complex class structure which was reinforced with increased segregation by race and class. Slums and ghettos were growing restless and demanding services, threatening the control of the city by the corporate giants. Shifts in class composition generated shifts in political alliances, adding to instability. Increasing demands for funds were met with diminishing resources by local governments, which forced them to boost tax assessment rates to the point where "beyond this level will spell disaster". (Wood, 1958, p. 72) City centers had to be kept accessible to the major economic activity occurring outside it. John Mollenkopf explains the situation this way:

According to contemporary analyses, the causes of this crisis in finances and central-city property values were twofold: On the one hand, the metropolitan dispersion of economic activity meant that central-city revenues were declining relative to suburban fiscal capacity. On the other, growing poor black and other minority neighborhoods required expenditure above their revenue contributions and 'threatened' neighboring property values. Contributing to the problem were increases in tax-exempt land (e.g., for new highways), limited tax mechanisms and difficulties in raising public-sector productivity. The appropriate policy seemed clear: eliminate 'blighting' slums, stimulate investment in the central business district, and provide the transportation infrastructure necessary to keep the CBD 'viable'. And the only funding source for this policy, it seemed equally clear, was the federal government. (Mollenkopf, p. 125)

In this context, we can consider the Southwest Expressway as one project in the reorganization of the city to
suit the necessities of monopoly capital. It also provided a mechanism to bail out white residents in changing urban neighborhoods, who could be reimbursed for their property taken by eminent domain and encouraged to relocate in the suburbs where they would add to the economic boom. Even more important, there was a considerable amount of industrial capital located in the inner city which could also be reimbursed by the state, thus subsidizing their relocation to a more profitable site. This is important for several reasons. It pinpoints the driving force behind the Project and explains to a large degree the political forces which would eventually coalesce to stop it and promote the Southwest Corridor. It is an important framework for understanding the technical positions of proponents and opponents of the highway. Community participation became the vehicle through which the controversy would eventually be "resolved" within the boundaries defined by the state.

In 1948, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works issued a Master Highway plan which included an Inner Belt Expressway, eight lanes wide, and a connecting link to Interstate 95 South called the Southwest Expressway.* In

* The chronology of the Southwest Corridor Project used here was derived from "Community Participation in Boston's Southwest Corridor Project," unpublished, prepared by Elizabeth de Mille, Mauricio Gaston, Jacquelyn Hall, Wendy Landman, Cheryl Myers, Thomas Nally, of Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore. 1980
September 1954, President Eisenhower appointed a five person Advisory Committee on a National highway Plan, consisting of three representatives of the monopolies, one of them a retired general, a major transit engineer and the president of the teamsters union. They produced "A ten year National Highway program", Congress passed the Interstate and National Defense Highway Act of 1956, and highway mania was off to a nationally sanctioned start. (Mollenkopf, 1978, p. 127)

It is important to note that the federal law was not a mere act of Congress but part of a national strategy which included important representatives at the local level. Robert Moses, for example, had become a powerful figure in New York through the promotion of highway construction into the central city. He became a national figure promoting this scheme as a road to metropolitan development in all major cities. In Massachusetts, John Volpe, a construction company executive, who had been former State Public Works Commissioner, campaigned for governor, making the construction of highways a major part of his platform, specifically, promoting the Inner Belt and the Southwest Expressway. (Lupo, et al., 1975) He won the election. Eventually he would become Nixon's National Secretary of Transportation in 1969. Volpe was part of a coalition that had been pulled together in Massachusetts to promote the construction of highways which reflected the composition of both Eisenhower's national commission and pro-highway forces in other states:
Monopolies with specific interests in downtowns (financiers, retailers, etc.), construction company executives, building trades bureaucrats, teamster bureaucrats, engineering executives.

In the light of the ideological form which the struggle against roads would later take, it is also important to note that in the 1950's highways were seen primarily as a transportation issue, secondly as a vehicle for urban economic development. At the time there was little consciousness of the role of highways in manipulating the location of the populations of inner cities. Chuck Turner, a black activist later prominent in the anti-highway struggles, considers that the intent to manipulate population was secondary. He puts it this way:

This highway system was planned before groups that are settled now hit these populations so that as you look at you can't relate to the initial planning in terms of a racial thing per se because there has been some turning over of the geographic distribution since '48 when the initial plan was conceived although race and class and economics certainly played a part in the planning as it went along. But in '48 it was basically a scheme to get people north and south -- that is from below Massachusetts to above Massachusetts and from the ocean to around Cambridge through Boston and around Cambridge in a more efficient manner than had been done in the past. (Turner, Note 1)

As was the case with the twin program of Urban Renewal, issues of racist manipulation of minority populations and manipulation of white working class communities lay just below the surface and were, in fact, implicit in the overall
strategy for both programs. In the jargon of urban renewal the deteriorating residential quarters of the working class and minorities were referred to as "blight", and:

Urban renewal was to throw a wall around creeping "blight", that is, a growing social problem of the minority urban poor, in order to preserve and enhance central city values and contain poor neighborhood's influence. It was no wonder that the program was executed with frequent racist overtones. (Mollenkopf, 1978)

Highways are in fact very useful as walls. As engineers, planners and architects began to consider the design and location of highways entering the central cities, they began to think of roads as instruments to be used against working class communities. (See Graphic No. 4)

The state, at the federal, state and municipal levels, began the 60's with a program to rebuild the cities and build the brave new road network. In every major city, a technocrat directed these efforts under reform candidates -- Moses in New York, Philadelphia with the Baems and the Rafskys, Logue in New Haven and later in Boston. It is not surprising that the American people were sold this "renewal and roads" package. There was a love affair with the car still raging. The reclamation of the city could find resonance among a people who had undergone massive suburbanization, acquired cars, and needed roads to get around.

The plan for Boston consisted of radial expressways leading to the metropolitan core, with three circumferential
SHIELDING "US" FROM BLIGHT
Suggestions for treating "gray areas," from Urban Design: The Architecture of Town and Cities, by Paul D. Spreiregen, sponsored by the American Institute of Architects

Grey areas are vital functional and physical adjuncts to the center of the city.

We can diminish their visual effects by shielding our approach views. At the same time we can relieve the gray areas with open spaces.

Better still, we can link them to the center with their own system of paths (a), our expressways can bypass the gray areas (b), and both systems can enter the central city together (c).

GRAPHIC No. 4
(Goodman, 1971)
rings: one 2 or 3 miles from the center -- the inner belt; one 12 to 15 miles from the center -- Route 128; and a third 25 to 30 miles -- Interstate 495. In the central parts, both the circumferential and radial roads would cut through heavily urbanized territory. Since the selection of territory depended on cheap land acquisition, and since an aesthetic goal was to shield the quarters of the working class and minorities from commuters (a phenomenon, by the way, identified by Engels in Manchester in 1844), the roads naturally were planned through slum areas. Some of the pieces were already in place: Route 128 had been built in the mid-50's, with federal and state aid; the Central Artery (1959), the Southeast Expressway (1959), and the Northeast Expressway (1954) had been built. In 1965 the Mass Turnpike was built, destroying acres of land in Chinatown, the first road in the area financed with tolls. (Sloan, 1974, pp. 12-14) Missing were the inner belt, the Southwest Expressway, a connector to Route 2 in the Northwest and a relocated I-95 on the North Shore. (See Graphics Nos. 5 and 6)

THE FIGHT IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE SOUTHWEST CORRIDOR

Before the demolition began, as concrete plans were made public for the highway system, opposition to the roads emerged. Not surprisingly, it began in Cambridge in the early '60's. The city's working class communities had been
GRAPHIC No. 5

Existing Highway System. (Sloan, 1974).
GRAPHIC No. 6

Planned Expressway System. (Sloan, 1974).
AERIAL PHOTO OF CORRIDOR AT FOWL MEADOW

GRAPHIC No. 7

Aerial Photo of I-95 at Fowl Meadow. A double barrel shotgun aimed at Boston's working class and minority neighborhoods. (SWCLDC, 1971).
fighting institutional expansion by Harvard and MIT, as well as the beginnings of urban renewal in the communities of Cambridgeport and East Cambridge. In East Cambridge, the old industrial economic base had been fleeing the city to New Hampshire, the U.S. South and overseas. MIT was promoting the development of the new aerospace and electronics industry in the Kendall Square area. Cambridgeport was being eroded by MIT in the east and Harvard in the west. There was already a consciousness (among its residents) of a struggle to save these communities. Cambridge politicians, who traditionally harnessed votes through some opposition to these institutions joined the fight which had been led in part by a Catholic priest. Chuck Turner explains it this way:

In the '60's the heavy push around the system began, that is that the Department of Public Works began to push to collect the land out in Cambridge that could be used for the building of the inner belt. The first focus was to be in Cambridge, to start the East-West Highway. What happened was that Cambridge was already besieged by MIT and Harvard; that is the Cambridge politicians, the Cambridge people were already besieged by these two universities and the politicians took the position that we can't afford at any cost to lose approximately fifteen hundred homes and a vast amount of land and an amount of businesses out of Cambridge, that to lose that population and that economic base will say to us and the...then this will only be a university town. So that the Cambridge politicians, fighting for their own political survival, took the position that this was almost a do or die issue. So that you have the city of Cambridge using its political muscle, using whatever political tactics it could devise along with the residents in the area to move against the highway. As it began to do that, it was not faced with support of other cities surrounding it. (Turner, Note 2)
Within Harvard and MIT, particularly in the architecture and planning schools, there were professionals who had built ties with the organic leaders of these communities. Harvard's Urban Field Service, for example, had worked with black community leaders in Cambridgeport in promoting daycare centers, low income housing and opposing Harvard expansion into the Riverside district adjacent to that university. These were the days of the civil rights movement and the student movement, and the professions of architecture and planning were beginning to turn their attention to the social needs of the urban population. When plans for the Inner Belt were announced, Cambridgeport residents quickly made contact with sympathetic university professionals who began to give technical ammunition to the community groups. The Cambridgeport residents organized as "the Save our Cities Committee" and began to organize against the road, principally by influencing local politicians to take a strong stand, but also beginning to look for technical back-up, and for alliances from other community groups fighting the highway. Cambridge residents were able to delay the demolition of housing for the Inner Belt, but the threat hung over them like the sword of Democles. By 1966, they could look across the Charles River and watch the destruction taking place in Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. (See Graphics Nos. 8 and 9)
GRAPHIC No. 9

GRAPHIC No. 9  
Aerial View of the Corridor. (SWCLDC, 1971).

GRAPHIC No. 10  
Location and Context. (WFEM, 1980).
In that year, demolition of homes in the path of the Southwest Expressway began, and so did the efforts to organize against it. In Jamaica Plain, several groups who had been discussing alternative strategies to stop the demolition began meeting together for Sunday brunch. (Lupo, et al., 1975, p. 26) The group included young people who had been active in the civil rights and anti-war movements who had moved into the neighborhood, some with technical planning expertise, as well as old-time residents of J.P., community activists and Irish liberals who had found the "proper channels" ineffective in fighting the highway. A remnant of the old Curley political machine led by State Representative James Craven had made its usual deals with the highway promoters and were pushing for construction of I-95 despite the implied removal of a large number of homes, so that the accepted method of lobbying local politicians had not allowed the same results that Cambridge citizens had obtained in their city. (Bassett, Note 3)

Jamaica Plain in the late '60s was perceived as a working-class Irish neighborhood, although it had always had enclaves of German and Eastern European migrants, and a district along Jamaica Pond which was the residence of wealthy "lace curtain" Irish and powerful politicians. By that time, moreover, a large public housing project at Bromley and Heath Streets had become predominantly Black and there was a large Latino population on the small streets of
the vicinity of Centre Street and Hyde Square. Moreover, as urban renewal displaced blacks and Latinos from the South End, many moved to J.P., so this sector was increasing rapidly in numbers.

The Corridor ran along the tracks of the Penn Central Railroad, located along the bottom of a small valley which bisected the neighborhood. Along the tracks were located the remnants of what once had been an important linear industrial zone; most of the factories there had left the city or would do so in the next decade.

Originally, J.P. had been a wealthy rural area of summer estates, so that some of the stately mansions remained in the area. Around the turn of the century streetcar lines contributed to transforming the neighborhood into a middle class suburb of one- and two-family homes, and workers who labored in the factories along the tracks settled into triple decker homes and brick row houses. Physically, J.P. had changed little in thirty years; demolition for I-95 was confined to a strip of homes along the tracks along Lamartine Street. Beautiful parks from Olmsted's Emerald Necklace ring the community and provide it with clearly defined physical boundaries on three sides; the boundary with Roxbury was the subject of considerable dispute, since minorities moving into the northern edge of J.P. caused the more racist forces to try to redefine the
northern edge of the community further south so as to keep alive the idea of Jamaica Plain remaining white turf.

In Roxbury, particularly in the Madison Park area, the greatest displacement was taking place. Hundreds of families were being evicted for I-95, for urban removal around Madison Park, and their homes razed. A considerable amount of industrial floor space was also being demolished, and the area soon became a wasteland. But the level of political organization and resistance in the black community was also at a high point, based on the civil rights and black power movements, and energy soon focused on the highway. I-95 was denounced as another version of "Negro Removal". The theory of the black community as an internal colony, where territorial struggles played an important part in defining the terms of oppression, began to gain currency. The main thrust of the struggle in Boston's black community at the time was desegregation of the educational system. In Madison Park, in particular, the fight around education was tied to the fight against urban renewal, since there was an urban renewal project which was to replace housing with a new high school; when the highway began to demolish more homes in the area, another issue was added to what then seemed a multifaceted effort to destroy that part of the community, whether by design or insensitivity. The Black United Front which grouped many of Roxbury's black organizations, began to look at the highway plans as
something that needed to be fought, though initially it was not considered a priority. (Turner, Note 4)

Roxbury had several distinct sub-neighborhoods adjacent to the Corridor: Lower Roxbury at the northern edge, Mission Hill to the West and Highland Park to the East. All were primarily residential areas; the last two had a history similar to Jamaica Plain, originating as county estates, becoming streetcar suburbs at the end of the 19th century and later becoming residential districts for Black and Latino communities. There was also the industry adjacent to the tracks. Lower Roxbury extended from the north and Massachusetts Avenue, where it was essentially a continuation of the South End, to the south where Mission Hill and Highland Park rose from the plain. Mission Hill was bounded on the west by a complex of medical institutions and in the north by Northeastern University, which lay adjacent to the Corridor. Highland Park extended from the Corridor towards the east, where it became part of the Greater Roxbury neighborhood.

The primary concern in Roxbury was that housing destroyed for I-95 and Madison Park High School be replaced with decent, affordable homes, and that development take place on the vacant land. There was the additional concern that once the Corridor was built the Washington Street Orange Line elevated transit line would be demolished,
leaving the community without viable transportation and causing severe economic damage in the area of Dudley Street station, which was the "downtown" of the neighborhood and Boston's black community.

In the South End, the other major neighborhood affected by I-95, the situation was somewhat different, and it was intricately linked to urban renewal. I-95 was to terminate at the inner belt before reaching the South End, but a South End bypass would take traffic from I-95 over the Penn Central tracks, as far as Dartmouth Street. The plans, detailed in the BRA's Southway Study, would demolish four buildings on every block along the tracks. The BRA, however, wanted Interstate funds to finance this road, which required a wider right-of-way and the demolition of up to 150 homes in the area. (Kruckemeyer, Note 5) In opposition to this, neighborhood activists organized a Tubman Area Planning Council, which became the nucleus of the South End Committee on Transportation, eventually the most important group in the neighborhood involved in the anti-highway struggle. The plans also implied a widening of Tremont Street to three lanes in each direction, converting it to a major arterial street. Douglass Pharmacy, a center of political activity of the Black Liberation Movement in the neighborhood, was bought by the BRA for the purpose of widening the street. As can be seen, transportation and
urban renewal were intricately related and seen as such by the communities.

The South End/St. Botolph area was more or less bounded on the west by the Prudential Center, on the east by the Southeast Expressway, on the north by the Massachusetts Turnpike and on the south by Northampton Street. It was at that time a working-class neighborhood with one of the most integrated and diverse racial and ethnic populations in the city. Its architecturally valuable bow fronts structures occupied by working class homeowners, renters and rooming houses were scheduled by the BRA to be converted to fashionable upper-middle income homes for the new professionals residents the BRA wanted to relocate into the city. Parts of the neighborhood were to be razed for new residential units; parts, including the Puerto Rican community in Parcel 19, for commercial space. Wholesale convictions were met with resistance, rent strikes, site occupations, and pickets. Some recent arrivals in the South End considered themselves "Urban Pioneers", living with the savages as they bought cheap homes, renovated them, and waited for the population to change. Others were more sympathetic to their working class neighbors and joined them in the struggle for low income housing, better schools, etc. Among this latter group were some progressive middle class professionals who were interested in the highway sue from a slightly different angle -- saving the "diversity" of the
NEEDS EXPRESSED BY COMMUNITIES

EXISTING: LOCAL NEEDS (generalized)

(areas requiring improvement)

EXISTING: LOCAL NEEDS (generalized)

(Graphics Nos. 11 and 12 (SWCLD, 1971))
Fig. 2: Project Sections

Graphic No. 13 (SWCLDC Report, 1971)

Fig. 2: Neighborhoods of the Corridor showing the division into 3 sections in the D&E Phase. (WFEM).
city's neighborhoods, improving the city's neighborhoods, improving the city's transportation system, etc.

THE COALITION AGAINST THE HIGHWAYS

There were common denominators among these neighborhoods as they faced the bulldozers of the Southeast Expressway. All were predominantly working class, and had been struggling around the issue of displacement, urban renewal and institutional expansion for some years. In all of them the influence of the civil rights and anti-imperialist movements were having an influence. In all of them there was at least a working relationship between working class activists and architects and planners and lawyers who were involved in technical support for community-based, land-and-housing related struggles. But the groups were isolated one from the other. While there was some communication, particularly among progressive professionals in different neighborhoods, there was little collective strategizing and collective action.

The initiative for coordinated work apparently was initiated by white professionals working with the Cambridge group. (Peattie, 1970) They approached the South End housing activists who in turn approached the Black United Front in Roxbury. (Turner, 1974) They also approached Jamaica Plain anti-highway activists and Milton environmentalists.
opposed to I-95 because it would destroy Foul Meadow in that suburb. (WFEM, 1980) Very soon in the coordinated fight against the highways several important decisions were made. The community groups would build coalitions as broad as possible against the highways. They would seek allies not only among similar groups but among dissimilar groups with an objective interest against the highway, such as environmentalists and among liberals within the political establishment. And they needed expertise on their side, which meant seeking friends among skilled professionals who would be willing to work for their cause.

These strategies were, of course, interconnected, but there were some underlying assumptions about the political process and about the city which are important to note. There was by no means consensus in the establishment that the destruction of inner city working class and nationally oppressed neighborhoods was undesirable. There were those, including then Harvard professor, Patrick Moynihan, who argued that the relocation of thousands of people would clear the way for more "enlightened citizens" -- from a higher class background -- to move the city and change the balance of forces. (Salvucci, Note 6) It was important, therefore, for those against the roads to build consciousness to the fact that the highways put the political forces in the inner city on the line. But the community groups also felt that if that issue became the only one in the struggle,
they would not be strong enough to win. They, therefore, decided to build strength among people who were opposed to the highways for different reasons; among those contacted who later joined the fight against the highway were suburban environmentalists who were opposed to the destruction of marsh in Canton and Milton -- Foul Meadow. This group was also gaining strength as the environmental movement got into full swing with issues like air pollution, endangered species, etc.

Another important opinion accepted early by the coalition was that the debate taking place around the highways was not merely political but also technical. The pro-highway forces had as ammunition a series of state-sponsored studies which concluded that the highways were necessary. It was important to be able to counter this technical weapon with equally valid technical material opposed to the highways. Thus, it was important to build allies among planners, architects, engineers, statisticians and other professionals who could provide the arguments for another alternative. The world of urbanism would necessarily be a central part of the fight against the highways.

It was also felt that liberals in position of power could play an important part in influencing those with higher power to take positions favorable to the anti-highway forces. Thus Barney Frank in Mayor White's office and
Justin Grey in the Cambridge City Council offices were courted and won over by the movement against highways.

In 1966, a group of progressive planning professionals led at the time by Jim Morey -- a former "defense" analyst turned anti-war activist -- formed Urban Planning Aid, an organization of advocate planners who aimed at helping community groups with professional services which would defend their interests. One of UPA's first actions was to prepare a critique of the Master Highway Plan for the State, which counted 15 deficiencies and declared the highway plan to be "technically and socially unsound". (Lupo, et al., 1975, p. 17) There were at this time no alternatives posed.

In 1967 the Harvard and MIT faculties came out against the highways, as did the Cambridge City Council. This reflected the increasingly middle class, reformist, base of the movement, but also was a demonstration of strength. The Boston Globe, on the other hand, "boosted" the highways plan with a headline reading "Expanded Highways Bring Prosperity". (Lupo, et al., 1975, p. 23) UPA countered with another study showing that 5,000 units of housing would be destroyed for the roads. The Governor again countered by asking for another study, this one by the Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project, and the battle of the technical studies was on. For a period of about a year, the major arena where the battle of the highways was fought was
the planning arena, primarily on the issue of selecting the alignment for the inner belt in Cambridge.

Frances Fox Piven has written of community participation in the planning process as a forum where the interests of the oppressed could be diverted from politics, where they are effective, into an arena where technical knowledge would not favor their interest, but the interest of those in power, who would have better access to such resources. (Piven, 1970) She argues that the major thrust of community participation as an officially instituted project came from the Democratic machine in an effort to funnel grassroots dissatisfaction with the system into convenient bounds, without denying that in the process the interests of the oppressed were also advanced. In the case of the anti-highway movement, this warning was critical, since the political battles being fought were loaded with technical information and knowledge.

Not only that, but the professionals were also taking a leading political role in the fight against the highways. In 1967 UPA organized the Greater Boston Committee on the Transportation Crisis, which united professionals, community groups and even municipalities in both technical and political efforts. Its main thrust was to provide a series of reports countering studies by city and state authorities which defended the highway. While these studies did not
seek to provide alternatives to the highways, they were based on different theoretical positions about the nature of the city which would have implications for the alternatives to the highways which would emerge later. First of all, they were more comprehensive in that the socio-political and economic impacts of the roads were more prominent than those in the pro-highway studies. They postulated that a transportation network could not be derived merely from a number of vehicles that could be projected to move through the city, but only by assessing the overall impact of a project on the urban fabric. Some of the studies were mathematical projections of traffic volumes, which undermined the current assumptions of traffic engineers who designed highways. For example, empirical evidence existed which showed that a new road not only accommodates traffic, but in fact generates new traffic patterns as well as land-use and population patterns. Thus, a decision to justify a road could not be based on mere traffic projections but implied value judgments as to whether the patterns to be generated were in fact desirable. This would give more weight to socio-political arguments, which would favor the side of the anti-highway forces. Eventually, the profession of Transportation Planning would be greatly affected.

Both community activists and professionals felt the need to move the struggle against the highways from the
technical arena back into politics. While they felt that the studies produced by the anti-highway movement were not only politically but technically superior to the pro-highway studies, they also realized that the process was being used by the highway builders to stall the opposition, to divert it, until the road had progressed so much that the arguments against it would be invalidated; once the residents are evicted and the housing demolished, they could argue that the highway can't be opposed on grounds of displacement since the displacements had already occurred. The political sphere was more promising. They, therefore, decided to "hit the streets". A series of demonstrations was held, including "People Before Highways" Day, backed up by numerous community meetings, lobbying and propaganda.

The movement against the roads had several important characteristics. It was remarkably widespread and heterogeneous. The composition of the participants, the ideologies represented, the geographic distribution of groups involved as amazingly diverse.

Although the resistance to the road had begun in inner-city minority and white working class neighborhoods, UPA had managed to unite intellectuals, professionals, bourgeois politicians, ward hacks in the Democratic machinery, suburban environmentalists, separatist black nationalists, students and unions in the effort. This was perhaps the source
Mural on the Penn Central Embankment in Roxbury. The entire mural read: "STOP I-95 PEOPLE BEFORE HIGHWAYS".
source of strength that made it possible to achieve the specific goal of stopping the road, but it was also the source of weakness. There was general consensus on the specific issue, and on the responsibility of the state for promoting a destructive policy, but it is difficult to trade a unified ideology among the different groups. The closest thing to a unified idea was what Castells (1977) calls the "concept of the urban". The road proposal was seen as a mistake on the part of the state which would make the metropolitan region a worse place to live, and one which would trample on the interests of residents. There was recognition of "interest groups" unfairly promoting this policy, and using their power to push it through -- the highway lobby -- but little effort was made to analyze the problem as a manifestation of monopoly capitalism. Although there was a mass movement, and increased solidarity among sectors of the working class who have been generally divided, collective consciousness raising was not effectively carried out. In fact efforts to raise the political level were seen, perhaps accurately, as endangering a fragile coalition.

Furthermore, the leadership of the movement was generally provided by intellectuals and professionals; as we shall see, this had both negative and positive consequences. The movement was very effective in influencing politicians,
not only at the municipal and state levels, but at the federal level. Some of the local-based activities in the Corridor Neighborhood had a genuinely popular character to it, and did in fact generate consciousness in those communities. A remnant of these activities is the "People before Highways" mural painted along the corridor in Roxbury. The political consequences of continuing the road were made manifest to bourgeois political leadership of the area, and the technical arguments became compelling.

It is also important to remember that the struggle against the road taking place in Boston was not really unique. Throughout the country similar battles were being fought. In Newark, the Black community announced "unprecedented resistance" to any attempt to build a planned road. In 1969, these were powerful words, and the state government, even Washington, trembled slightly. In Baltimore, Seattle and other cities there was considerable resistance. (Geiser, 1970) The national mood, the infatuation with the automobile which had become part of the U.S. psyche for decades, had begun to change. The state took notice the monopoly city would have to be rationalized some other way.
Eventually the then Governor Francis Sargent, who had been a proponent of the highways, during the mid '60's reconsidered his position and in 1970 ordered a moratorium on all highway construction inside Route 128, except for I-93 from the Central Artery to its terminus in Somerville. This was followed by two years of a specially constituted Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR), a massive technical study of transportation issues, which, in November 1972, led to the Governor's decision against the Southwest Expressway and cleared the way for planning for the Southwest Corridor Project, roughly as it is being designed and built today.

It was during this period that the anti-highway forces began to develop alternatives to the Southwest Expressway. Throughout the struggle over the expressway, the pro-road forces used a strategy of forcing the state to commit itself irrevocably to the expressway. Thus, once the moratorium was decreed, they argued that the destruction to the neighborhood had already been carried out, and that, therefore, there was no longer an anti-road argument.

The anti-road forces countered with a complex strategy. On the one hand they began to argue for mass transit to replace the road. Participants in the struggle clearly state
that they did not believe in mass transit as a major issue (Salvucci, Note 7) but were merely looking for something to fill the void left by the demolition. But they also reasoned that part of the major forces behind the road were not primarily committed to roads but were builders lobbying for the state to finance some construction. If there was money in it, these people would have no major objection to building rapid transit instead of a road.

By building a movement against the roads which included working class and middle class constituencies, many of the politicians, like Mayor White and Governor Sargent, would be pressured to turn against the expressway, given that an alternative was feasible which would pacify the big-money builders. But there was no money yet for rapid transit. By lobbying with politicians, particularly Kennedy and O'Neil, people from Boston were able to transfer federal funds derived from gasoline taxes, previously available only for roads, to public transit, specifically to the new Orange Line, now known as the Southwest Corridor Project. (WFEM, 1980) This left an alternative that was acceptable to many forces in Boston but also set a precedent for other cities in the country engaged in anti-highway struggles.

A significant aspect of this strategy is that neither the community groups nor the majority of the planners fought against the highway as a transportation issue primarily.
Transportation arguments were used as tactical measures against the road. Rather they fought against the highway for social reasons and because it "destroyed the fabric of the city". Once the moratorium had been called, the planners and community groups turned their attention to the "tear in the urban fabric and a strategy to reweave it." (Lee, Note 8)

In the period when the Boston Transportation Planning Review was operating, 1970-72, the planners and architects turned their attention to alternatives to the highway. Rapid transit was one alternative but it would not be spatially large enough nor would it generate enough activity to fill the space of the demolition. The planning for the "tear in the urban fabric" would have to be more encompassing and would reflect a view of the city far more complex than that of a mere transportation issue. The proposals for filling the void are the best indications of the views of the city held by these urbanists.

The organization which generated the proposals was the Southwest Corridor Land Development Coalition which was formed from the separate groups which had fought against the Southwest Expressway, including the professionals who had been involved in the Greater Boston Committee on Transportation Crisis. Planners and architects from MIT and Harvard organized design studios which supported
the coalition's alternative seeking. Minority professional firms volunteered their time and efforts.

The community groups were at this time in a fairly firm alliance with these professionals. Piven's warning that once the struggle moved from politics to planning the interests of the oppressed communities would not be safeguarded would remain in the air, however, despite the fact that the professionals had long been involved in fighting the highway and that their alternative proposals were much more in accordance with the interests of the communities than had previous state proposals. In a longer range, the professionals' approach may find some contradiction with the interests of the majority of residents, but for the time being that was not perceived by residents to be a major issue.

Economically, one of the arguments of the highway builders was that since jobs had left the city and since there was unemployment in the inner city, a highway would improve transportation and make jobs in the suburbs accessible to inner city workers. The coalition debunked this argument by showing that inner city workers depend to a large extent on public transportation and that the fact that a minority worker could physically get to a suburban plant did not imply in any way that he could get employment there. Moreover, it argued against the likelihood that
minority workers could physically relocate in the suburbs to gain access to jobs. It therefore argued that the only solution was to locate industry in the Corridor where both land and labor force were available. (SWCLDC, 1972, pp. 15, 16) Implied in this view was that the Corridor was not merely a way "to get from here to there" but in fact a place in urban fabric where economic activity could occur. Also implied is a measure of economic activity by the liberal yardstick of alleviating unemployment instead of traditional measures such as tax-revenue generating capacity. It also sought to retain the proletarian population base of the city.

In fact, the proposal for industry in the Corridor did not originate directly from the planners, but from a survey carried out by the Coalition of the perceived needs of neighborhood residents in different neighborhoods of the Corridor. This is a reflection of the strength of the residents within the Coalition but also of the planners' ideological values. (See Graphic No. 11)

Once the perceived needs were assessed, each of the alternatives was evaluated on more complex criteria to see if the activity was justified, then evaluated for feasibility. Among the activities evaluated were transit, shopping facilities, community facilities, social services, light industry, manpower development corporations, education and
health facilities, housing for families and for the elderly, recreation and street improvements. It also proposed improved bus service and other transportation issues.

The feasibility of any particular activity, however, depended less on need than on economic constraints and on the availability and applicability of state, federal and private funding for such facilities. The approach of the planners was twofold. On the one hand they proposed to build everything needed. The proposal could then serve as an organizing tool to search for funds. On the other hand, some of the facilities which were feasible were developed further. This led to a certain "ad hoc" character to the proposed programming where serious proposals were those which were likely to get built. There was, therefore, a heavy prevalence of public institutions among the proposals since these were likely to be obtainable through political activity and lobbying. There was a significant amount of housing proposed, but as funding for housing became more scarce in the '70's the amount of proposed housing development decreased. Also, public investment was seen as an opportunity to leverage private funds for such activities as commercial development.

Among the institutions proposed for the Corridor were a new Campus High School for Madison Park in Roxbury, a new Roxbury Community College, on a long site paralleling
Columbus Avenue, an Occupational Resource Center near Roxbury Crossing. Industry was proposed for the land cleared for the Inner Belt in Roxbury, as well as for the areas near Jackson Square in Roxbury and Lamartine Street in Jamaica Plain. Housing was proposed for the area near which Ruggles Street intercepted the proposed Rapid Transit line, where the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation had been trying to get housing built for many years, as well as for different small sites where housing had been demolished for the road in Jamaica Plain. Commercial and other community-oriented facilities were proposed for the areas near the stations where the investment made by the state would attract small venture capital for secondary development.

Where there is private development there is money to be made and accumulated, and as could have been expected, there were considerable maneuvers by different forces for how the development was going to be carried out.

There were several proposals before the Massachusetts legislature for the development to occur in certain ways. (SWCLDC, 1971) On the one hand there was a proposal for a state funded Urban Development Corporation patterned after New York State's UDC which was backed by large liberal capitalists who saw "private" investment in cities as the answer to the urban crisis. There were proposals for a new local development corporation, for a new Communities Corporation
patterned after Western European models for new towns, for parcel by parcel, market-force, relatively unplanned development, and a bill authorizing the Massachusetts Housing and Finance Corporation, MHFA, to engage in community development. The Coalition developed evaluations of these alternatives, pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of each from the point of view of the communities' interests, and used these reports as political weapons to lobby for better position.

The alternative advocated was one which favored nonprofit community corporations and small "black-capitalism" entrepreneurs, but in this issue as well as on the choice of activities there was a certain amount of ad hoc, case-by-case maneuvering for each parcel, or for each site. Thus, the largest developable parcel, Parcel 18, near the new Ruggles Street Station, was staked out by a task force which included nonprofit groups such as the Roxbury Action Program (RAP) and the Lower Roxbury Development Corporation (LRDC), as well as an institution like Northeastern University. Development of industry was more or less cornered by Boston's CDC. Housing development depended on the site in question. Municipal and state institutions were attracted to the land through channels in the political process. It is important to point out that rather than a coherent ideological position towards development, the Coalition reflected the wide spectrum of views which constituted it
GRAPHIC No. 16

Plans for Parcel 18, developed with the participation of the Parcel 18 Task Force.
Drawing: Stull Assoc, Inc.  (WFEM, 1980).
LRDC Townhouses was one of the reforms won from the State.
Drawing: John Sharrat Assoc. (WFEM Archives).
and development alternatives were fought out in the planning and political arenas. Yet, given the history of popular involvement in the process, it was difficult for large-scale money to grab the opportunities. These instead went to those forces which had closer ties to the activists who stopped the road. The Coalition's report included a series of interviews with personalities with experience in development and capabilities for carrying it out, such as Ralph Smith of LRDC, and Dennis Blacket of Housing Innovations, for example.

Given the reality of the society we live in, development is development, and improvements in the urban fabric have the paradoxical effect of bettering the lives of those near it and at the same time boosting the market forces which make the development inaccessible to low-income people living in the area. The converse of development is disinvestment, however, which was also displacing working class and minority families. The issue of how to fight for improvements and still assure that the reforms will not turn out to be counterproductive, particularly through market forces, would become more important in the years to come.

Before the BTPR, much of the organized effort of transportation planners working for the state was to try to channel energy into discussions about the shape of the highway: Would it be at grade, elevated, depressed,
partially depressed? The anti-highway movement was able to step outside the bounds of these proposals and begin discussions of whether the roads should be built at all. In BTPR, the no-build alternative finally became part of the institutionalized planning process.

Once Governor Sargent announced the moratorium on highway construction inside Route 128 and set out to organize the Boston Transportation Planning Review, the Corridor struggle entered into a qualitatively different stage. By stopping the highway construction temporarily the state on the one hand pulled the rug from under the anti-highway movement by accepting its central demand, and on the other hand created the structure where all activity around the issue of the highway had to be integrated. The Governor invited all "responsible" forces in the controversy to "participate". SWCLDC skillfully joined the process while continuing to organize outside, and to prepare independent technical reports which it then presented to the BTPR.

The BTPR marks the beginning of the institutionalization of participation in the Corridor Project. Prior to its formation, the anti-highway movement had the freedom of the outsider, choosing tactics and timing its actions, forcing the state to respond to its initiatives. Once the bounds of participation were established in the BTPR, any initiative on the part of the anti-highway forces had to
be circumscribed within the calendar, agenda, and process of the official study. The forces grouped around the Greater Boston Coalition on the Transporation Crises, evaluated the situation and decided that they had enough technical ammunition to accept the new rules of the game.

The BTPR illustrates other important changes. The profession of transportation planning came face to face with a blunt reality; there was a popular movement of considerable strength opposing its very practice. In the 50's a series of sophisticated techniques for forecasting travel demand combined with changes in land use had been developed. By the late '60's the "failings" of these methods had become apparent. Even their traffic predictions were shown to be way off mark. They were made manifest by the organization of oppressed and working class communities who were the main victims of these techniques, and by the advocacy of progressive professionals in planning who chose to ally with these social groups. The "rationalization" of the monopoly city, made manifest in the practice of transportation planning was facing the consequences of its actions. The state had to recognize the political dimension of previously "technical" approaches and change its approach. Ralph Gakenheimer describes it this way:

The creation of the Open Study is an experience in the modification of formally systematic -- 'Cold War' -- methodology by the demand of a humanistic era. Examination of the transition to the Open Study is a
structured case in the adjustment of American social conscience to the institutionalized heritage of the activist 1960's. (Gakenheimer, 1976, p. 1)

In the language of this bourgeois liberal, the "humanism" refers to a more political than the prior technical approach. Rather than simply execute, the state gradually sought to involve in the policymaking process social forces previously marginal to it. The technical field of transportation planning had to mold its practice to new conditions by instituting a participatory planning process, later given the name of "Open Study".

In order to institute such a process, Governor Sargent formed a decision-making task force composed of Alan Altshuller, Secretary of Transportation and Construction, Lt. Governor Donald Dwight, and Albert Kramer, the Governor's advisor on transportation. This group advised the Governor, who had the ultimate decision-making power.

Led by Altshuller, the structure of the study was organized as as shown in Graphic No. 18. Several features of this structure are significant. First, the secretary of transportation, along with the Governor's Task Force, had the formal decision-making power. Pro- and anti-highway forces were grouped in the working committee and strictly advisory powers. Then, the community liaison and technical staff, led by Alan Sloan, was chosen directly by
Organization of the Boston Transportation Planning Review (Sloan, 1974).
Altshuller as a separate consultant structure and put in charge of managing the contradictions in the working committee. Participation in the BTPR was, as we mentioned, a strategically important step in the Corridor process, and deserves a deep study by itself. However, we can concentrate on three significant aspects of the study: the composition of the Task Force, the composition of the working committee, and the ideas guiding the actions of the community liaison staff, as summarized by Alan Sloan. (1974)

The Task Force was composed of high-level functionaries of the state. Given who they are and the power in their hands, this would put the level of participation somewhere near the bottom of "Arnheim's Ladder". (Arnheim, 1969) Since the anti-highway forces were politically sophisticated, they would accept the arrangement only if they were convinced they are at least could have an impact on the Task Force, a possibility which was held open by the opinions of Albert Kramer.

According to Gackenheimer, there were two basic positions on the task force: the "Kramer Position" and the "Altshuller Position". Kramer "disregarded obstructive detail in an effort to induce a strong commitment, to a qualitatively different future", while Altshuller perceived the situation as "very complex" and understood feasibility as "constrained by technical findings and administrative
capacity and a belief that the role of the government is to create compromise between worthy competitive interests." (Gakenheimer, 1976, p. 144) Both these men were in fact defending the interest of the state -- using a technocratic or a visionary approach -- but Kramer was more willing to dare a solution which would end the controversy, while Altshuller saw it more as a process of painstaking negotiation. Kramer could be convinced of a solution favorable to the movement in some degree.

The working committee had little formal power. Some viewed it as a mere useful adjunct of the real planning process: it "expressed to the design process the limits of tolerance for particular consequences of solution". (Gakenheimer, 1976, p. 181) Involved in it were municipalities in the Greater Boston area affected by the study, pro- and anti-highway groups, and important agencies which themselves were organs of the state (DPW, MBTA, MAPC, MDC, DCA). The anti-highway forces, which began as a popular movement, had evolved into a very respectable coalition called the Greater Boston Coalition on the Transportation Crisis, GBC, including environmentalists, Citizens for Rail Transportation, CRT, municipalities, as well as the original grassroots groups. Even within GBC, the genuinely progressive forces were beginning to be a minority. (Sloan, pp. 83-4) Within the working committee, they were powerless, except for
the fact that Sloan's staff though officially neutral, had become the "in-house champion" of the no-road option. The pro-highway forces were grouped around the MATCO, the Mass. Association of Transportation Contractors.

Sloan's staff, also called SE-2 for Study Element 2, skillfully maneuvered the process. They considered it important to show "good faith" to all parts, to convince forces that it was in their interest to abide by the rules. For this, he says, he held no secrets, gave access to information, established a timetable and stuck by it, and convinced participants that the final decisions would wait until the outcome of the study. Having achieved this, he began with large-scale meetings, identified the most "responsible" participants, and narrowed the scope of participation to smaller and more technical meetings as time went on. By the time Phase II of the BTPR began to operate, the study had more selective participation, the areas to be studied had been boiled down to those around important corridors, highways were being reconsidered (the concept of smaller urban "new style" highways was being studied), public transportation was on the agenda, and a regional transportation policy review was under way. (Sloan, 1974, p. 96)

Sloan cites several reasons why he considers participation a "success". A major reason he considers to be the
skill of the politicians, "whose job is to assess views of the public and to determine how their assessment applied to current public issues." (Sloan, 1974, p. 162) A second reason he attributes to the "responsibility" and skill of the anti-road forces, whom he perceives as initiated only by professionals. And a third reason is that "there was never any question of where the power lay." Eventually the BTPR accepted the proposals for the Corridor Project almost entirely as presented by GBC and by the SWC Land Development Coalition. It was a dramatic maneuver by the state which appropriated the program of the movement for itself, incorporated it into a structure devised by the state to execute the project, legitimated the movement (previously projected publicly as "professional protesters") and generally transformed the political and technical grounds of the controversy.

Given that the movement won their demands, it would appear totally successful. The future, however, would add ingredients that would force us to reevaluate the situation.

The Boston Transportation Planning Review played a crucial role in funneling the technical and political activity of the opponents of the highway into a state-sanctioned-and-controlled process. Prior to the BTPR, the pro-highway forces and counter-highway forces maneuvered politically
and technically for their positions. There were contradictions among different participants in the movement against the highway -- black vs. white, "professionals" vs. "community people", hardliners vs. negotiators, but the initiative was clearly in the hands of the movement. There was a cost, of course. A planning report may take an enormous amount of energy for coalition and with low resources, and could become a mere salvo in the struggle, having little hope of being implemented. Demonstrations and lobbying may have no practical results an leave participants demoralized. As Turner (see Note 9) describes their mood, "Back in 1969 not very many people were talking about the ability of communities to defeat highways. That is, there was an active struggle going on around the nation, but the whole idea of communities defeating highways wasn't one that was very popular or seen as very possible." By declaring the moratorium and instituting the BTPR, Governor Sargent moved the movement from one of an opposition movement to one where divergent forces could have "input" into a decision as to whether or not the roads would be built. The Coalition believed it had enough technical and political strength to participate somewhat successfully.

In 1972, the Boston Transportation Planning Review issued its report which included a no-build highway option that included Rapid Transit in the Southwest Corridor. In
GRAPHIC No. 19

Expressways in the Moratorium and Restudy Corridors. (Sloan, 1974).
GRAPHIC No. 20

Expressway Proposals Carried into Phase II of Restudy. (Sloan, 1974).
GRAPHIC No. 21

Transit Improvements Included in the Restudy. (Sloan, 1974.)
GRAPHIC No. 22

Highway Proposals Resulting from the Restudy. (Sloan, 1974).
addition, this option adopted most of the recommendations proposed by the Coalition for the Corridor. When Sargent decided to implement the project, he knew he had to contend with the political force represented by the Coalition and the movement which gave birth to it. It, therefore, moved carefully, in formalized ways to include both professionals and community activists who opposed the road in the structures to implement the project. At all levels in the structure anti-highway activists found a place in the implementation. It cannot be denied that there was an element of cooptation in this effort or that many activists who began to work on the project did not have reservations about doing so. By 1973, an officially constituted Project Working Committee had signed a memorandum of agreement with the state to build the project, having bargained serious concessions from the state in the process, including a very strong Community Participation Commitment.

We have described at some length how the participatory process up to and through the EIS had been the driving force behind the decision of the state to modify its plans. Evidence indicates that the roads were stopped by political action, that the plans of the monopoly state had failed for political reasons. In light of subsequent developments in transportation policy, such as the energy crisis, and in light of some of the technical findings of the BTAP, it
also seems valid to think that the state modified its plans for technical and economic reasons. The Interstate Network had been planned at a time of almost unrivaled expansion domestically and internationally; oil supplies were considered endless. A more modest transportation network for the U.S., depending on a mixed system, including transit and rails, appears in retrospect as the more "rational alternative for the Monopoly City. Thus, the BTPR did not reach its conclusion only on political grounds, but also technical.

This argument leads to the troubling possibility that maybe the Southwest Corridor was not only a political victory for a popular movement, but that the monopoly state wanted it for its own economic reasons. It is a fact that the "New Boston" which has been planned -- gentrified, with a transformed economic base, etc. -- also benefits from a good transit network. In order to answer this question, we would need to analyze the recommendations of the BTPR in great detail from the point of view of transportation planning, which is certainly outside the scope of this study. It's fair to say, though, that Sargent took all things into consideration, did a crude cost/benefit analysis, and decided against the urban roads. And there can be no doubt that an important part of that analysis was the high political cost of building them.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT PROCESS

The Lord said to Moses "All right, all right, you'll get what you want, but I have some good news and some bad news. You can take your people across the Red Sea -- I'll open up the waters for you -- and if the Pharo tries to follow, I'll let the waters close in on them." "What's the bad news?" asked Moses. "You've got to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement."

- Lester Thurow

The Environmental Impact Process was a step further in the direction of project implementation. It was also a step further in the institutionalization of participation. According to federal regulations, any major development which could affect the environment had to go through a process of environmental impact assessment aimed at pinpointing and minimizing potentially negative impacts. Though the original purpose of this regulation was aimed at protecting the ecology and the natural environment, it soon became applicable to the urban impacts of projects like the Southwest Corridor. Moreover, regulations mandated a participatory process. Since the Southwest Corridor communities were well organized, they demanded and achieved a significant impact in the EIA process.

In the first place, each of the Corridors involved in BTPR was to have its own Environmental Impact process, thereby dissolving the regional coalition which had successfully acted up to this point. Within the Southwest Corridor, the SWC Land Development Coalition remained effective, but
it was no longer part of the powerful force it had once been. The state had set one more parameter of participation, and it was accepted.

The scale of decisions was considerably narrower, more detailed, and more technical. The no-road option was won, as well as rapid transit. Decisions had to be made on the alignment and profile of the rails, the treatment of noise abatement, location of stations, parkland, industry, housing, and of an "arterial street" in Jamaica Plain which was seen as a remnant of the highway and continued to stir controversy. The priorities on the issues to be considered were set, given the physical bias of the Environmental Impact process itself. Noise abatement, for example, became a priority, while organizing around development issues, with greater potential political impact, was moved to other arenas, such as the State House, to press for its demands.

Again, the liberal forces were able to win considerable victories. An agreement that the rail/transit would be depressed rather than on the embankment was the first of these victories. An agreement was negotiated for an unprecedented high percentage of minority jobs in construction and for a share of contracts going to minority contractors. Industrial development in a Crosstown Industrial Park was negotiated, with considerable state-sponsored subsidies and incentives to large corporations for locating in the area.
Station locations favorable to local neighborhood groups were established. There was an understanding between the state, community groups, and the SWCLD Coalition, that housing would be built to replace some of the units demolished for I-95. Negotiating separately, a Roxbury group won considerable substitution of the housing through the Lower Roxbury Community Development Corporation. However, groups began scrambling to get a "piece of the action" both in this project and other federal funds and the strength of the low-income housing forces was diluted. In Jamaica Plain, racist forces grouped around State Representative James Craven continued to argue for the arterial street on the grounds that they didn't want the land used for low-income housing which would "depress property values", by and large, they succeeded in preventing housing construction, although they lost the road. Considerable funds were allocated to build decks in areas adjacent to residential districts. We will return to this issue when concentrating on the South End Deck.

Participation was again funnelled into small meetings as well as to large scale hearings where proposals could be made. Again, participation was given an "advisory" capacity, with community groups limited to "input". In all fairness, however, the "input" was often accepted in the recommendations of the study.
Another critical aspect of participation occurred during the EIA phase which bears noting: the selection of consultants in 1976. (WFEM, 1980) The relationship between professionals and the movement which had led the struggle was, as mentioned earlier, a critical and complex subject. Planners and architects had been on the forefront not only of the technical aspects of the struggle but in the political leadership as well. As the controversy became more institutionalized, the language of discourse became more and more technical. The professionals in the anti-highway movement -- including transportation planners, architects, environmental planners, urban designers, lawyers -- in fact generated through the BTPR working committees the proposals which the EIA process was reviewing, and in many cases recommending. The community groups exercised a de facto veto in the selection of consultants, and they insisted that professionals acceptable to their cause be hired. The Governor's office was occupied then by Michael Dukakis, who was very sympathetic to the liberal forces in the anti-highway movement and this gave the groups considerable clout in the selection.

The result was the hiring of firms who had done work for the SWCLD coalition (Stull Associates Inc., for example) or people with a history of involvement and commitment to the communities in question. This had the result of integrating many professionals who had fought the road into the
state-contracted consultant structure for designing the project, these people would become indirect employees of the government, with the added dimension of being direct employees of private firms. At the same time, it put people with genuine progressive background in the position to influence the results of state policy towards the Corridor. Again, the trade-off between the benefits of independence and influence were at stake.

Because the EIA procedures had begun nationally as an ecologically oriented process, and only gradually -- through lawsuits and regulations -- was becoming sensitive to more urban issues, several critical potential impacts of the Corridor were not examined. In particular, the effects on the real estate market on the housing supply for working class and minority communities was not part of the agenda. The EIA mandated minimum demolition, but did not analyze the impact of the project through market forces. Since it has become evident that this is potentially the most pernicious result of the Corridor, it is important to pause and evaluate this problem.

Perhaps, by accepting the parameters of planning and participation, the communities had lost strength which they could have used to demand protection from the market. At that time, the city of Boston had rent control but would lose it within a year. Perhaps the issue of displacement
had not become critical enough. We have to remember that in 1973-75, the housing market in Roxbury and Jamaica Plain was a depressed market; a good number of units were being lost to disinvestment, arson and vandalism. In J.P. there was organizing against banking practices of redlining, where banks stop giving home improvement loans and mortgages in the area. At that time, there was considerable pressure for more investment, although some leftist community groups were already warning the potential negative effects it could have. This problem deserves considerable further scrutiny which is outside the scope of this paper.

During the EIA, the Southwest Corridor Land Development Coalition continued to be a fairly impressive force. As the technical cadre of the movement were hired to work on the project, the coalition began to lose strength. This would influence the organization and structure of the Design and Engineering Phase which would follow. The Environmental Impact Analysis hearings were held in 1976, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement was released in 1977, and the final statement was published in 1978, a year after the Design and Engineering phase was already in progress.
III. THE DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PHASE
After the draft Environmental Impact Analysis was completed and public hearings held in 1976, the SWC project office, arranged to formalize further the process of participation. Local, state and federal officials signed a "Memorandum of Agreement" which mandated that "10% of the planning and 5% of the basic design contracts let for the Southwest Corridor be designated for community participation and technical assistance as consistent with guidelines approved by the Joint Regional Transportation Committees."

(Final Environmental Impact Statement, Appendix, in WFEM, 1980) By May 1977, the agreement was put into practice with the beginning of the design and engineering phase.

Several important pieces were in place. The consultants had been selected; particularly in the participation component, a number of former corridor activists from the anti-highway movement had been selected to important positions. The project manager was Anthony Pangaro, an architect. Assistant Project Manager was Ken Kruckemeyer, another architect and South End resident who became active in 1969 when the BRA was planning the South End Bypass -- a part of the Inner Belt system -- which was to run by the end of his street. He had been part of the citizen review process of the BTPR and the EIA, had been a founder of the South End Committee on Transportation which had had proposed "a transit and traffic proposal for the South End" in the fall of
1972. (WFEM, 1980, p. 18) Within the structure of community participation, the involvement of activists as certified technicians was even greater.

As the contracts for design and engineering were activated, some construction which had been planned before the moratorium and some necessary preliminary construction began simultaneously. The South Cove Tunnel, which would link the Corridor to the existing Orange Line Tunnel burrowing under the Mass Turnpike, was begun; the station at South Cove, which had stood unfinished and unused for almost 10 years, was linked to the tunnel. A few months later, construction began on the upgrading of the Midlands branch railroad. Since the Corridor would run along the existing embankment for suburban and intercity trains, a temporary route for these trains would be necessary during construction so that an early "rehab" of the rails, unused for several years, had to be done early. There was some community discussion about this project in the Dorchester neighborhood, but this controversy was managed by the Orange Line Replacement Study. Technically not a part of the Corridor Project, it was intricately related to it.

Before May 1977, participation had been directed by the MBTA Southwest Corridor Project office, through the process. Tony Pangaro had been personally very visible in this period, attending almost every meeting and devising
strategies which would later impact, or serve as a prece-
dent for the structure of participation. For example, the
EIA process legally required public hearings, which were
project-wide. In addition to these, however, neighborhood-
based meetings were held and the groups formed at these
hearings were called Neighborhood Committees. (WFEM, 1980,
p. 3) In May, Wallace Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore, Inc.,
hired to organize and direct participation in this phase,
swinging into action. Jaci Hall, who combined technical
expertise with a history of activism in Boston's Black com-
munity and a knowledge of the neighborhoods of the Corri-
dor, was named project manager and was put in charge of
structuring the process.

PROJECT STRUCTURE

The structure designed for participation was parallel
to the structure chosen for the more technical tasks of
engineering and design. The MBTA Southwest Corridor office,
with authority derived from both the state government and
the MBTA, directed the project and had ultimate responsi-
bility for decisions. As in the EIA and BTPR processes,
"there was never any question" of where the authority lay,
since Pangaro was very skilled at making it clear in the
same steps he granted "reasonable" requests. Under the
Project Manager working for the MBTA as consultant was the
joint venture of Kaiser Engineers and Fay Spofford and Thorndike. Kaiser was a subsidiary of the well-known multinational conglomerate of that name which had considerable clout in the state government and a history of lobbying for large construction projects. They would coordinate all aspects of project design including participation. (See Graphic No. 23)

Under them was a set of consultants in charge of coordinating corridor-wide engineering and design. Called Coordinating Consultants, they had corridor-wide responsibilities. Together they formed the Urban Design Group. WFEM coordinated planning and community participation (partner David Wallace had worked in the BTPR). Stull Associates coordinated Urban Design, Roy Mann Associates coordinated landscape design, and Charles Hilgenhurst Associates coordinated land development.

The Corridor itself was divided into three sections, each headed by a large engineering firm as section engineer. The Sections corresponded fairly well to three distinct neighborhoods in the area: Section I for the South End, Section II for Roxbury and Section III for Jamaica Plain. Under each of these section engineers was still another group of consultants, some responsible for section-wide work, and others responsible for station-specific design.
Relationship Between the Consultant Structure and Structure of Participatory Committees.
(WFEM, 1980)
For example, there is a landscape architect for each section, and perhaps two or three other landscape architects, one for each station in the section, working under the direction of the station architect but following the coordinative plans of the section landscape architect.

Several features of this structure need to be noted before concentrating on the structure of participation. It is a pyramidal structure formalized by contracts and subcontracts, so that ultimately, the authority rests with the project manager. At the same time, it granted relative autonomy to the design and engineering effort at the neighborhood level. Since the problems, both technical and political, in each neighborhood were different, the theory was that the section engineers could be responsive to the needs of "its" area. It represents a relatively decentralized model of organization. There is a question, however, of who benefitted the most from this decentralized model. Decentralization is supposed to "restore government of the people", and although the project is certainly not a governmental structure, the implication is that this structure is more responsive to the concerns of the neighborhood. It is also true that the structure can just as easily be described by the term "deconcentration", which makes the bureaucracy more efficient by allowing the penetration of the periphery by the center. We can safely say that this structure
allowed the MBTA project office a good way to be in close touch with developments at a very small scale in the project reacting to them. Since the staff of the central office was liberal, they generally used this control in granting concessions, although at times it was used to keep the situation from "getting out of hand". The structure also prevented the consultant firms, which were generally skilled but very uneven in their commitment to the neighborhoods, from getting enough power to challenge the central office.

This structure also allowed for "dishing out a piece of the pie" to as many as 40 consultant firms, which was politically desirable with a sector traditionally allied to highway construction. A side effect of this was that small firms could get significant subcontracts and thus make it easier to enforce affirmative action regarding minority firms. Every station, for example, was designed by a minority firm or by a joint venture, one firm of which was minority controlled. These were part of the reforms wrested by the anti-highway movement from the state and were, to an unprecedented degree, fulfilled. Of course, given the technical level of the leadership of the movement, it also integrated those most capable in the struggle into the structure of the project itself.

Urbanistically, the structure reflects a healthy concern with analyzing the city from both a "macro" and "micro"
perspective. Regional economic, engineering, political, and physical issues were generally managed by the coordinating consultants or by the central staff, more local issues at a corresponding level in the consultant structure.

Structure of Participation

Participation was organized and structured in a similar way. On the one hand were the consultants and planners responsible for participation and on the other was the committee structure for participants; each of these two substructures paralleled the larger organization of the project. (See Graphic No. 23)

WFEM was, as we said, the coordinating consultant for participation and it organized a central planning staff including planners, architects, an editor/graphic designer. While the organization of this staff varied depending on the demands of the project, in the early period there was one planner responsible for overseeing the work in each section. The central planning staff coordinated the work, first structuring the entire process, then organizing schedules for presentations, preparing feedback to the designers and engineers on the wishes of the community, preparing and analyzing technical alternatives for community discussions, producing information relevant rather to corridor-wide issues, or to issues which became the subject of
controversy at the neighborhood level. As Tom Nally of the Central Planning Staff has written, "the responsibilities of WFEM's Central Planning Staff include preparing corridor-wide information, providing back-up support of graphic and written material for the Section Planners, conducting special studies on issues such as zoning and attending the numerous consultant and community meetings to coordinate liaison activities.... The WFEM Central Planners provide guidance on participation practices and promote consistency of process among the Sections." (WFEM, 1980, p. 6) The composition of the Central Planning Staff was also significant. Besides Jaci Hall, the staff was unusual in that it was mostly black and Latino and its white members had a liberal orientation and tended to side with the progressive forces in the community meetings when controversies cropped up. Its official position was one of neutrality, which was occasionally challenged by conservative forces in the communities, but generally its "professionalism" was unremarkable, since it was highly credentialed and did not openly take sides. Rather, its opinions affected some of the programming and design issues in an indirect way, as we shall see further on.

Each of the three section engineers employed a "Section Planner" selected jointly by the Central Planning Staff and the section engineer, with the veto power of the project
manager. The Section Planners were often called the "front-line" of the participation effort and it is therefore worth taking a closer look at them. In general, their official role was to "co-moderate community meetings; keep the community informed with mailings of project updates, meeting announcements and of minutes; and meet informally with residents and business people and community groups to discuss the Project." (WFEM, 1980, p. 6)

The planner for Section I was Janet Hunkel a resident of the South End/St. Botolph neighborhood. St. Botolph is the major street in a residential area of about 12 square blocks divided from the South End by the Penn Central tracks, where the Corridor will run. Twenty-five years ago it was considered by all to be part of the South End, although some institutions in the area like Symphony Hall have always been part of the Back Bay. Property values have traditionally been three times higher than in the South End. However, it became one of the sections of the South End to first undergo "gentrification", or displacement of working class and minority people by young professional newcomers to the community, until today it is a mostly white, middle class section literally on the other side of the tracks from the South End. Recently, the active grassroots leadership of that new community has insisted on distinguishing itself from the "other neighborhood", calling itself the "St. Botolph" neighborhood.
Ms. Hunkel was part of that wave of newcomers. She became involved in the Corridor controversy in 1975 when the pre-EIS hearings raised the issue of noise in the residential areas adjacent to the tracks. A group of St. Botolph homeowners began to meet in order to get the process to recommend a proper acoustic cover for the tracks in Section I. They joined with residents of the other side of the tracks in founding the South End/St. Botolph Task Force on Noise in order to concentrate on this issue. Her experience in this effort convinced her to become a graduate student in Urban Planning, and in the summer of 1977 she was hired as the Section Planner. (Hunkel, Note 10, and WFEM, 1980, p. 19)

The Section Planner for Section II, Dee Primm, was also a homeowner in a neighborhood adjacent to the Corridor -- Highland Park in Roxbury. A life-long resident of the community, she had been an activist in civil rights struggles, participating in the reforms won by this movement as a worker in the Roxbury Multi-Service Center. She became active in the fight against the highway and became a community organizer for the Southwest Corridor Coalition. In that capacity she had been instrumental in negotiations between the community and the state which arrived at mutually satisfactory design solutions. In 1977 she became a Section Planner for Section II.
In Section III, the selection of the section planners became more controversial and produced still another profile for the planners. There was dispute between rightwing forces led by Representative Craven and progressive forces led by SWCC over the selection of the Section Planner. The compromise resulted in the hiring of Don Grinberg, a graduate of Harvard's School of Design with high credentials but no prior involvement in either the Corridor or community issues; because of the political conflict, the Project Manager probably decided he wanted an arbitrator rather than an advocate, someone with technical credentials and no attachment or roots in the community. As a "complement", a second section planner was hired: Regla Coleman, a Cuban with a history of activism in the right-wing Abdala Cuban Movement and of work in social service agencies in the community.

The selection process produced significantly different results in each of the three sections, reflecting on the political process of the Corridor. In Section I, the planner chosen was a community activist, but one with roots in the middle class newcomers rather than the more working class oldtimers. While she had fought to get reforms from the project, the "acoustic deck" issue which propelled her into action was one attracting the attention of an additional group, different in attitude from those who had fought
against urban renewal and the roads. By the time the design and engineering phase of the project had gone into operation, the institutionalization of the project had effectively replaced an independent movement "outside" the state-sponsored project. The nature of the agenda was dictated by the needs for implementation, an issue which we shall discuss further on.

In Roxbury, where the movement was strongest, although reformist and middle class, the Corridor Project in fact absorbed into its fold a significant organizer. SWCC, based in this neighborhood, continued to exist, but Dee Primm was considered by some as a defector (unfortunately, and self-critically, a similar thing can be said for activists working in the central planning staff), as "working for the man". She did continue to work as an advocate, but in the process weakened the movement which made advocates effective. "Ms. Primm thinks that the New Orange Line will provide the major infrastructure that is required to stimulate the redevelopment of Roxbury. In the Crosstown Street portion of the Corridor, the major development that is desired has occurred. Along the Corridor itself, the eight stations and local service orientation which the community wanted has been accomplished. The one area in which the success of the project can not yet be gauged is job development." (WFEM, 1980, p. 18) She worked for specific reforms,
gave little thought to the shape of the movement as such and also was part of the process of institutionalization. From within, she continued to be an effective advocate.

In Jamaica Plain, the progressive wing of the anti-highway movement was very strong, but did not have hegemony as liberals did in Roxbury. The right, concerned with property values and patronage in construction contracts, not wanting any low-income housing in the community, was able to influence in the selection of Grimberg and Coleman, effectively neutralizing any advocacy for the remnants of the progressive movement since support at the level of the section planners was not forthcoming. Within the Central Planning Staff these groups had friends, but in the day-to-day bargaining and negotiation with the consultants the section planners had a lot of influence and in Section III they were generally not willing to be advocates for it. The institutionalization process here had left the movement, represented by SWCC and independent community organizations such as the JPCDC and City Life, pretty much out in the cold. In all three sections, the professionalization of organizers, which in fact the Section Planners represented, served to coopt the movement further into the structure of the Project. This despite the varied background of the planners, and their relatively strong links to the community.
WFEM has grouped the skills needed by the planners into two categories: "product skills" and "process skills". Product skills include the ability to produce reports, maps, diagrams, handouts, memos which describe complex interrelated concepts verbally and graphically. These materials are prepared not only for the community but also for the consultants. They can be acquired principally through formal education. "Process" skills are less tangible, they are technical in the sense that they require planners to "analyze and interpret and understand the planning and design process" and to function as a link between technical consultants and participants. But "process" skills also refer to the more political skills of maneuvering in a complex organizational structure usually with the primary goal of conflict resolution and consensus building. Nonetheless, the very real task of translating some of the popular desire into technical results was a significant accomplishment, despite any political shortcomings. (WFEM, 1980)

Some section planners, like Grinberg, had great technical expertise (product skills) but no political experience. Coleman, on the other hand, had a lot of street political skills, which she put to work against the popular movement, and almost no product skills. Hunkel had both. Dee Primm, with low "certification" among the Section Planners, was
most integrated into her community and had significant "process" skills, few "product" skills. The Central Planning Staff would complement this unevenness by providing technical assistance and sometimes by playing a more active role as mediators; but there were weaknesses. Primm's lack of technical skill and credentials weakened somewhat her standing inside consultant structure, thus, her advocacy role, but she made up for it with political skill.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

The structure of committees where the community gathered to participate in the project was similar. Formally, there was a Corridor-wide project working committee, a Neighborhood Committee for each section and a Station Area Task Force (SATF) for each station. This structure arose both from the history of prior participation, from the structure of consultants in the design and engineering phase and from the realities of the areas. (See Graphic No. 24)

The project working committee was really a remnant of BTPR and EIA days. In those processes, the state had negotiated with a coalition movement and had reached an agreement both regarding specific demands and a participatory process for design. By the time the design process began the bonds trying together a regional coalition had vanished, and even a Corridor-wide coalition had lost its reason for existing.
The varieties of participatory committees are shown as they evolved throughout the Design and Engineering Phase. (WFEM, 1980).

GRAPHIC No. 24
In fact, the Corridor-wide working committee existed in name only and, as far as I have been able to determine, never met during this period.

The Neighborhood Committees were very active, on the other hand. They received Corridor-wide and neighborhood-wide issues such as budgeting, the design of elements consistent throughout the project, such as station platforms, standards for station components, engineering issues such as alignments and profile of the tracks, etc. They met both in Open Houses, where numerous issues could be discussed informally with the consultants, and in Neighborhood Committees where specific issues were debated and largely resolved. Their meetings were moderated by the Section Planner, and attended by members of the Central Planning Staff and the project manager's office. The Neighborhood Committees had in fact functioned during the EIA review process and were incorporated into the design phase. They reflect Boston's bias for neighborhood-level political action -- parochialism -- and perhaps a conscious effort on the part of the project manager to further downplay Corridor-wide unity. Issues which could have created the basis for such a unity, such as jobs for minorities and for Boston workers, were really outside the reach of the Corridor Project Manager. (Machiavelo was probably higher in the state government.) With the Corridor-wide working committee a mere formality, there
there was no longer a place within the state-sponsored structure for the issues that had bound the coalition to come together.

Each of the Neighborhood Committees was subdivided into subcommittees called Station Area Task Forces (SATF's). These were formed to discuss station-specific concerns. The station areas were defined as the area within a 1/4 mile limit to each side of the track and halfway between stations. (See Graphic No. 23) The SATF's were co-moderated by the Section Planners and an elected representative of the group. They included residents, business people and institutions which were either in the area or which had a particular interest in the area due to its function. Their powers, as those of the Neighborhood Committee, were strictly advisory, since they had no authority to demand that the project management follow a particular recommendation. They generally reviewed issues such as station architecture, landscape design, and land development which would take place within the boundaries of the SATF. It is significant that in almost every case the recommendations of the SATF were accepted by the project office and consultants were instructed to implement them. This is a reflection of the history of the project, where the project manager and others in his staff had in fact emerged from the participatory process. It also reflects the desire of the project manager to maintain legitimacy by incorporating the recommendations.
of the project. Formally, a SATF unable to reach a decision by consensus takes a vote, and the different sides are presented to the MBTA usually which makes the final decision, although in some cases decisions are made by other agencies or by elected officials. Furthermore, the balance of forces was such that most recommendations were well within the bounds of the project's parameters by the time they reached consensus stage. The major exception to this issue was the Forest Hills garage where State Representative James Craven had managed to mobilize support for a demand to eliminate the garage in that station. The project invoked the EIS where this major decision had already been settled and their recommendations were resisted. The group represented the only segment of the pro-highway forces who remained active during the decision phase at the level of community.

After an initial period in the spring and summer of 1977, when the neighborhood committees were the primary vehicles for discussion, the SATF's became very active in the fall of 1977. They met every few weeks in all sections during the winter and spring of 1978; there were fewer meetings in the summer of 1978, partly because residents wanted fewer meetings, but primarily because the architects and other consultants needed time to develop the issues discussed at meetings into concrete plans for the project. In the fall of 1978 the SATF, Neighborhood Committee and other
task force meetings resumed. (WFEM, 1980, p. 7) The SATF's were the arenas where a number of significant issues were debated. Station design, for example, was the subject of considerable controversy in a few areas, as were land development concerns. At this point, rather than going in-depth into them or discussing specific examples, it is important to note that these discussions took place in isolated small task forces. For example, those residents of Jamaica Plain who continued to raise the issue of the need for low income housing parcels could no longer realistically ally themselves with people from other neighborhoods, since their SATF's were debating other issues at the time.

The structure was not limited to the Neighborhood Committees and SATF's. A number of issues arose in the course of design which were handled by the creation of special task forces set up to deal with specific issues. In Jamaica Plain, for example, SWCC organizers had fought for a large area of the Corridor to be covered by acoustic decks. The EIS had recommended a deck at Minton Street, but residents and clergy a few blocks north also wanted the tracks covered in the area of Boylston Street; still another group wanted decking at Green Street. A Joint Committee of the Boylston Street and Green Street SATF's was named to design what came to be called the Minton Street deck. SWCC had expected that by fighting for a deck at Minton Street they could
push the manager's office to deck the entire area between Boylston and Minton Streets, effectively doubling the area decked. In effect, however, there were limited funds for decking established in the EIA, and the area covered at Minton Street was deducted from the area covered at Boylston Street and two smaller decks resulted. The days when South End residents had fought for -- and obtained -- a promise to deck the tracks in the entire neighborhood, were in the past (the EIA process).

In Section II, Roxbury, a special task force was set up to coordinate efforts to plan for development of the largest and potentially richest development parcel in the Corridor -- Parcel 18. Roxbury had suffered the greatest devastation during the highway demolition and residents of that neighborhood had concentrated many of their organizing efforts in fighting for state-sponsored community development in the area. During the BTPR and EIS process community groups had joined in proposing a Land Bank controlled by the community to coordinate land resources in redeveloping the area. Eventually, the unity was bruised by manipulations of the state, which negotiated separate deals with different community groups. (Honoroff, Note 11)

Some of the development was "assigned" to specific groups who had been active in the Corridor process all along. LRDC became the developer for housing in the Madison
Park area. Boston CDC, led by Marvin Gilmore, became developers of the Crosstown Industrial Area. According to Kruckmeyer, these development packages were "spun off" consciously once the Corridor Project felt that their criteria for community control was established and the goals of participation were guaranteed.

Some groups won considerable reforms, but a joint effort to direct all development basically dissolved. Parcel 18, however, was critical to much of the surrounding community and nearby institutions, partly because it would be located adjacent to Ruggles Street station, which would replace Dudley Street as the major transportation road in Roxbury. WFEM and the Section II planners organized the task force, which included Northeastern University, the Roxbury Action Program, Greater Roxbury Development Corporation, the Community Development Corporation of Boston, the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation, the Mission Hill Extension Task Force, and the Mission Hill Planning Council (WFEM, 1980, p. 16) as well as individual developers who had been active in the area, such as Dennis Blacket of Housing Innovation. This is a more heterogeneous group than that which had struggled earlier for a joint development policy and included a white bourgeois institution like Northeastern University. Activists in the black community and in the Corridor Project felt that including Northeastern
in the process was a way to "keep an eye on them, preventing them from continuing to buy property unchecked." The process of design for the parcel, besides many technical issues affecting design included mediation among these different groups to arrive at some sort of consensus. It is significant, for example, that the potential effects of this development on displacement of tenants of two adjacent public housing projects was not a priority, even though that may be the most powerful factor affecting the racial and class characteristics of the surrounding residential communities. The task force, working with the consultants, has produced an important development proposal.

The potential effect of Parcel 18 development is enormous. For the last 40 years the geographic center of the black community, Boston's black turf, has been the Dudley Street transit stop and bus terminal, which has generated a commercial area around it. The traffic functions of this stop will be transferred to the Ruggles Street station of the Corridor, and the development around it on Parcel 18 has the potential of either replacing the Dudley area, or displacing it. The black community, including black professionals, have been conscious of this and have been participating in decisions. Whether the results will actually benefit black workers, or only a few developers, time will tell. Adjacent to Parcel 18 is the Mission Hill Extension public housing development, in advanced stages of decay.
The forces militating for the abandonment of public housing are of course way beyond the Corridor Project, although the project may contribute to it. In broader terms, if we see the Corridor as part of the rationalization of the monopoly city, which includes roads and urban renewal, public housing is certainly part of the same problematic. This raises the need to make more such connections in the future.

Another special Task Force was a subcommittee of the Back Bay SATF organized to review the design of acoustical canopies adjacent to that station and the design of small parks at the ends of the streets abutting the Corridor. Still another special Task Force was in fact an incarnation of the Section I Neighborhood Committee when it met to debate the design of track cover in that neighborhood, which will be discussed in detail further on. There was a Corridor-wide committee set up as the Parkland Management Advisory Committee, and there were advisory committees formed to oversee the expenditure of funds for art mandated by federal guidelines. There was some controversy around the appointment of Sidney Rockefeller to lead the art search, with some community-based artists feeling they were left out of the process.

In all these meetings, SATF's neighborhood committees and special task forces, the process was one where conflict
resolution was usually successful. "The operation of hundreds of community meetings held in the SWCP has followed a fairly simple pattern, the most important items brought before the community are the reports of designers on their current work. Frequently several options are considered at the meetings with the advantages and disadvantages for each course of action presented and discussed. The consultants and the MBTA formulate options before the meetings (at work sessions and meeting dry runs), and often there is a preferred option which might be more compatible with the rest of the design. The consensus seeking process often leads to protracted discussions as meeting moderators attempt to let every point of view receive a fair hearing. A representative of the MBTA attends all community meetings and is often able to indicate which suggestions are acceptable and which are not, thus eliminating needless speculation. [Emphasis mine.] Generally, after a lengthy debate, the participants are able to decide which options to recommend to the MBTA." (WFEM, 1980, p. 9) As we said before, the MBTA usually invoked the EIS to rule out some "ill-conceived proposals", but often this was done for other reasons, such as costs constraints, engineering necessities, etc.

It is significant that the option of multiple arenas of struggle in order to pursue a goal was now virtually ruled out. The project was underway, and the calendar by
which issues could be raised as well as the agenda of the meetings was determined by the logic of design and engineering, not by political concerns. Even those groups and individuals who were inclined to keep pressing for further gains from the state were busy confronting design issues as they came up. The "proper channels" had been widened, made effective and relatively responsive, leaving other channels as largely irrelevant for the purposes of the project.

WHO PARTICIPATED, WHEN AND HOW?

The composition of participants was largely determined by the history and development of the process and by the issues which were the subject of discussion at specific periods and in particular places.

Throughout the struggle against I-95, and even throughout the BTPR and EIS stages, the state had confronted a complex popular movement making a relatively coherent and unified set of demands. As the design and engineering phase began, the people who participated most avidly in the committees and task forces were basically the same people who had been most active in this movement, as well as those few who had opposed it.

The professionals who were in a leadership position in the anti-highway struggle had either moved on to other
issues since they considered the fight "won", or they had been integrated into the consultant structure of the SWCP, in many cases to ensure there would not be a relapse to the highway. This was especially important when Ed King, a long-time highway proponent, was elected governor on a "build I-95" platform. Other professionals who had been active, though not in a leadership role, basically continued to participate at their neighborhood and SATF meetings, becoming most vocal when issues of particular concern to them were raised. Thus, for example, those who had participated in the South End Committee on Transportation continued to attend those meetings where transportation policy was at stake; those who had become active fighting for an acoustic deck in Section I continued to participate when this issue was brought up.

Minority group and working class activists had generally become involved in the coalition by tying together a variety of smaller issues which affected them very directly. What participation in this stage did was to make the procedure for addressing these issues again distinct from one another by both location and topic. Thus, the people whose homes had been razed in Roxbury attended neighborhood committee and SATF meetings which had some bearing in housing development in the area. By and large, negotiations leading to housing in the area of Ruggles Street, for example, were
carried out outside the Corridor structure of participation, although the Corridor structure set them up to achieve their goal and gave support. Rather they were done directly with state agencies concerned with housing, such as the BRA and MHFA, so that while people from these groups continued to attend, they did not see the corridor meetings as a forum to which they urgently needed to mobilize. Those in Jamaica Plain who were concerned with housing, such as the community organization City Life, also attended but realized that the corridor structure did not lend itself well as a forum to wage this fight. Those opposed to low income housing in Jamaica Plain such as Ruth Parker, also continued to attend in order to make sure that the Corridor did not become the vehicle for such a fight.

The majority of people attending the meetings were local residents, with a high representation of homeowners and longtime residents. It is a commonly-held belief that this group feels a "higher stake" in what happens in a neighborhood and therefore tend to be more active. I suggest the alternative explanation that this group tends to be more integrated into the local political structure, tends to be white and therefore have felt less rejection from participation in "civic" activities and generally tend to be petty bourgeois and have a history of such participation anyway.
A number of local residents who don't fit the description above also participated more sporadically. Usually an issue would be discussed at a meeting which prompted someone to mobilize. For example, the discussion of the Minton Street deck affected a nearby Catholic church, and the priest mobilized parishioners to the meetings.

Newcomers to the neighborhoods of the Corridor -- usually young professionals -- also attended the meetings, although in smaller numbers. Generally, this group was looking for a way to find out what's going on in a neighborhood and to become involved in some local activities.

Representatives of business generally did not attend meetings except for specific purposes. Executives from the insurance companies near Back Bay station attended the SATF's there in order to insure architectural solutions favorable to their property and employees. Owners of commercial property near Forest Hills station allied with State Representative Craven attended the meetings there, in order to ensure they could control competition from new commercial development within the station.

Land developers and speculators with property near the Corridor also attended SATF meetings in order to promote their interests. Personnel from city agencies were occasionally asked by the MBTA project office to make
presentations of relevant topics (utilities, for example). (WFEM, 1980, p. 12)

As the subject of the meetings changed with time, the composition of those attending meetings also changed. When development was an issue, for example, developers, home-owners, and community development corporations became very active. When the issues were parkland and station design, the crowd tended to be more heavily made up of civic association-type people. When there was an important controversy both sides of the issue tended to mobilize people to the meetings. Again, such mobilizations tended to be for very specific purposes and for the time the controversy was alive. Afterwards, attendance tended to drop off.

PARTICIPATION AND TECHNICAL ISSUES

The technical nature of the project may be expected to limit participation from less educated or less technically oriented people. The Central Planning Staff foresaw this possibility and spent considerable effort devising means for translating technical information into lay language so that it would be within the reach of such people in the neighborhoods.

Perhaps most original were a set of documents called the SATF notebooks. Meant to demystify technical jargon
and give participants an edge in communicating with consultants, the notebooks "begin with an explanation of the station design process and the kinds of drawings prepared at each step. Materials on landscape and urban design follow to provide background for site specific information on the stations. Reference material about who's who on the project and a list of abbreviations follow. An extensive, illustrated glossary concludes the notebook." (WFEM, 1980, p. 14) The feeling, however, is that the notebooks were "overwhelming" in their scope, were used sparingly and generally did not raise that much the technical capacity of those attending the meetings. It has been my experience, however, with a few activists who participated in the process, that at least a number of individuals benefitted from the notebooks. They feel that "next time they won't confuse me so much with all that mumbo jumbo."

Another major effort by the Central Planning Staff in breaking through the technical barrier was the Corridor News, an eight to twelve page newsletter published every two months. Editions of up to 16,000 copies are printed and distributed throughout the Corridor. A mailing list consisting of everyone who has ever attended a meeting and a large number of community activists was used with every issue -- up to 4,500 people. The content of the newsletter varied considerably with the subject being discussed at the meetings. For example, when the design of the stations was
approaching a milestone community review, the newsletter would include an article on each station with accompanying graphics. When more technical issues were under consideration -- from subsoil conditions, to ventilation of the covered tracks, to noise and vibration studies, the newsletter included articles trying to describe the technical issues as directly and clearly as possible. It is felt that the newsletter was successful in this task and raised the technical capacity of thousands of participants, allowing them to engage in discourse usually outside the reach of a lot of people.

The newsletter, however, tended to shy away from controversial issues. When it was begun, the project manager rejected a community editorial board and instead allowed only a small review committee. Eventually, even this review committee was dissolved and the Project Manager personally censored each issue at three stages -- selection of articles to be included, the text of each article written and a final proofreading of the mechanicals just before going to press. This process was used to prevent "inflammatory" subjects such as the potential of the project to accelerate displacement as well as preventing the explicit treatment of controversial subjects -- the racist implications of some design alternatives, such as attempts to reinforce the separation of St. Botolph from the rest of the South End. That is not to say the project had racist goals,
but that they did not want the issue to explode. The limits of progressive professionals working within the parameters of the project become explicit in this example. The project manager had a very clear interest in conflict resolution, and in maintaining all debate within acceptable bounds, and he saw issues such as explicit anti-racist organizing as inflammatory. That became more important to him than his liberal views. The newsletter editor asked that his title be changed to that of newsletter coordinator.

Other techniques used to try to demystify technical jargon were a series of hand-outs -- ranging in size from a single leaflet to a multipage discussion of the construction process. They were helpful in disseminating information and making complex subjects accessible. Finally, the usual architect's tools of models, slides and wall graphics were not only encouraged but actually mandated for community meetings. The overall effect of these techniques was complex. They did, by and large, facilitate participation by less-skilled people, but they were also used to "boost" the project, to provide it with a positive image, and to "sell" specific solutions to some problems. As time went by and the movement outside of the institutional structure weakened, the techniques became more and more the voice of the Project Manager. Those working within struggled to get issues resolved in a way favorable to the communities involved, and were successful in many instances, but the conditions which
made this possible tended to fade. Piven's (1971) warning about shifting the struggle to a technical arena seems to be partially validated by the experience of the design and engineering phase.

The problem is complex, however, since at this stage the task was one of implementation. Those who were part of the project structure saw themselves as making sure that a hardwon reform was carried out. In the words of Assistant Project Manager Ken Kruckemeyer, "When it gets this far, the struggle is likely to be already won or lost. The responsibility is to make sure it stays that way. From this point of view, dissention becomes a tool of those who would like to see the project fail (the highway interests). It seemed to the project manager and staff that assuring the delivery of the early transit construction was essential towards assuring that the other community-oriented development would have the possibility of taking place. (Kruckemeyer, Note 12)

THE NATURE OF THE AGENDA

Another important factor affecting the composition of participants and the nature of discussion was -- not surprisingly -- the agenda of the meetings. Here we consider not the specific issue which would mobilize a natural constituency, but more the generic issues which were discussed.
WFEM has identified several of these: programming issues, station and parkland design, development and construction. (WFEM, 1980, p. 12) Not surprisingly, programming issues generated the most successful participation. Once the programming issues had been settled, participation focused on the design of the stations and landscape. Generally, station design was not very controversial. The issues varied from SATF to SATF. In Back Bay, for example, the image of the station in the neighborhood and the formal historical allusions designed by the architect were of interest to the mostly middle-class crowd that attended the meetings. In Mass. Ave. station the issue of safety -- translating the program requirements for it to a forum -- was an issue, as was the issue of "fitting into the neighborhood". In Roxbury, access by public housing tenants was important as were the relationship of the station to the planned development around it. In Jamaica Plain, the "residential character of the area" was important, and Green Street station in particular went through numerous revisions of form to meet the recommendations of participants with concerns with scale, character, materials, the amount of glazing, and the possibility of the booth collector surveilling the area adjacent to the station for added security. Generally, people attending most heavily the station design meetings tended to be the "civic activists" mentioned earlier, to be more
concerned for artistic expression and be less concerned with, or sympathetic to, social issues. (This is not meant to imply that there were not people concerned about both art and society.)

In retrospect, it seems obvious that the landscape design meetings would be controversial and well-attended, but that is not what many people expected at the beginning, since landscape architecture is popularly conceived to be purely aesthetic, and less social and political. This history of this subject in the Southwest Corridor casts a new light on urban landscape architecture.

In all three sections of the Corridor landscape design became the subject of concern and in some cases considerable controversy. In Section I, the entire length of the Corridor was to be decked over as decided in the EIS. The issue became one of what to put on top of the deck. Among the issues raised were the degree to which the corridor should join or separate the South End from the St. Botolph area, the active vs. passive recreation (active recreation perceived to attract "black teenagers" and "noise"), the orientation of activities towards the very local condition of street ends as opposed to the concept of a Corridor-wide park tying into Olmsted's Emerald Necklace, the technical issue of ventilation stacks for diesel trains running under the deck and the treatment these would receive, the issue
of crime, which was perceived by some people as crossing the tracks from the South End to St. Botolph, and the detailed treatment of details. There was concern that government agencies were incapable of providing maintenance for a large-scale park. Coupled with a preoccupation for local control, this translated into requests for a very localized design. Through a process to be described in more detail later, the landscape design issues in this area became a prime concern.

In Section II the landscape design issues centered more on the desire of tenants of public housing to have the decks be an asset to their neighborhood. Since the percentage of children is high in this area, it is not surprising that there was great desire for active recreation and tot lots. In Section III the issues, besides the earlier resolved attempt to increase the amount of decking, became one of improving the character of the area with lawns as well as more active recreation. Generally, landscape design was perceived as affecting the neighborhoods more than station design (WFEM, 1980, p. 12) and therefore received more attention from residents. In many implicit and explicit ways, urban landscape design organizes social space in a significant scale and therefore is more subject to political struggle than the more symbolic social content of a single building like a transit station.
As in other programming and design issues, the MBTA and planning consultants "developed an approach to move towards a consensus" in landscape design, emphasizing negotiation and manipulating the situation to resolve the contradiction. As in other issues, the consultants and the MBTA both favored the more "democratic" solutions — e.g., open access to decks — but were officially neutral. They in fact used their position to bring about a solution where, in the words of Jaci Hall, "You get as much as you can for the people and move on to the next issue." Those who participated in the debates about landscape design learned something about fighting on technical issues, but learned little about political activity that they did not already know. Development was potentially the most economic-oriented and political issue to be alighted in the participatory process and therefore the most potentially explosive. In the days of the anti-highway fight, the BTPR and the EIS it had initiated the most organized activity. Yet, during the design and engineering phase, development issues were almost boring to the participants. This remarkable fact bears some consideration.

Early on, the Project Manager's office selected the consultant firm of Charles Hilgenhurst Associates as coordinating consultants in charge of development and place them as one of the team of Coordinating Consultants with
Corridor-wide responsibilities. Some of the major development packages in the immediate vicinity of the Corridor Project was not their jurisdiction, such as Copley Place and Tent City. The Southwest Corridor Industrial Park, the LRDC townhouses were all negotiated and "spun off" outside the structure of participation in the SWCP. Whether this was the decision of the Project Manager, or whether powerful economic interests managed to exclude these issues from the Corridor, I do not know. The effect, however, was to locate the discourse about the hottest development issues outside the Corridor structure.

Once Hilgenhurst went to work on a development strategy for the Corridor, overall development policy was not debated at the meetings, as it had been during BTPR and the EIS phases. During 1977 and most of 1978 development was simply not on the agenda and efforts to put it there were met with MBTA replies that the study was not ready for discussion. During that time Hilgenhurst redefined the development parcels identified in the EIS, did a parcel by parcel analysis of each site, pointing out the kind of development which could take place, the necessary investment, the modifications to streets which would make it feasible, etc. These were combined to form a series of "developer's packages" for each parcel, and compiled into an overall development plan which was published and distributed. Included in the plan
were a series of "joint development" possibilities for commercial space in the new stations.

The development packages were then presented at the SATF and Neighborhood Committee meetings, when they aroused considerable attention. In Roxbury, development was seen as desirable, since the community had been undergoing gradual disinvestment for a long period, which became more serious after the demolition for I-95 left a large area looking like wasteland. It was further believed that development would generate a considerable number of construction jobs and a significant number of permanent service jobs. It was during negotiations during BTPR that the state had agreed to the precedent-setting Altshuller plan, calling for 30% minority participation in all state-sponsored projects in this part of metropolitan Boston. More development, therefore, was seen as a positive step by the participants. At that time little attention was being paid to the potentially devastating effect of displacement and therefore there was no attempt made to negotiate any protection from the state for forces that operate through the market.

In Roxbury as in other places, leadership on development-related issues was taken by a particular segment of the population -- those who had either access to becoming themselves developers or who worked through community development corporations which had some hope of influencing
the outcome in some way. The average working class tenant or homeowner was less active around these issues, as were private market developers.

In Jamaica Plain the response to development was more heterogeneous. On the one hand, the conservative and liberal forces formed rival CDC's in order to bid for participation, neither one very successfully. On the other hand, the voices to control development, to limit it, came from several quarters. Conservatives feared subsidized housing more than they feared the plague and they opposed development for this reason. Others wanted to maintain the residential character of the community. Still others wanted to maintain the residential character of the community. Still others feared the potential impact of development on accelerating displacement. Merchants feared competition, particularly in the Forest Hills Station area. There was a rare consensus on the wish to limit development. There was some controversy in J.P. around the use to be assigned to certain parcels. Some favored and some opposed, for example, the construction of a new police station on a parcel near Green Street station, but generally there was not much controversy around development. As the actual possibilities of developments approach in time, the issue will probably arise again as very important.
Concern for participation in construction was latent during 1977 and 1978. During the BTPR and the EIS, minority communities had struggled for a commitment to jobs and to a percentage of contracts going to minority-controlled contracting companies. As the contracts began to be signed, this promise appears to be largely respected by the state. But during the early stages of design, construction issues did not come to the surface. In 1979, when the first contracts became a reality, concern surfaced. "When information on construction 'went public' at Neighborhood Committee meetings in 1979, the planner's insights were confirmed. Many residents expressed concern about construction noise, work hours, rodent control, materials-hauling by truck, detour routes and parking by construction workers on local streets." (WFEM, 1980, p. 12) The MBTA has made some concessions to the participants regarding these concerns, including some which will raise the cost of the project: contracts will specify maximum noise standards, requirements for onsite parking, regulation of work hours, etc.

During construction, participation will take place less through meetings and more through divulging information in a new version of the Corridor News and handouts, through construction task forces, as well as a quick-response telephone "hotline" where people can call to get information and register complaints. This represents a couple of steps down in Arnstein's "ladder of participation."
It seems also important to review briefly some items which were not on the agenda of participation, although very much related to the project; one of these is related to transportation, the others to development.

The Southwest Corridor will replace the existing Orange Line elevated transit service which runs along Washington Street through all three sections of the Corridor. Its impact will be greatest in Roxbury where the community depends heavily on public transit and the only existing alternative is bus service. At some point in the project's history, the decisions about the Orange Line replacement were separated from those of the Corridor and the MBTA commissioned a separate study of this problem, with a separate and not-so-thorough participatory component. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at any length the nature of the replacement service study but we can point out that by separating this topic from the rest of the Corridor, the complexity of decisions was narrowed, the agenda of participation was defused of a potentially politicizing issue, and the possibility of implementing the Southwest Corridor Project improved. (See Graphic No. 25)

Among the development issues not on the Corridor agenda were the Copley Square Development and the Tent City Site, in the northern part of Section I. Both of these sites have been the object of intense struggle between developers
The area covered by the Orange Line Replacement/Improvement Study is shown. (SWCC Planning Report, Section III. WFEM Archives).
and the BRA on one side, and progressive forces in the South End on the other. Neither site was included as part of the Corridor in the EIA process and was therefore left out of the participatory process. Had they been, there is little doubt that working class and minority residents would have been able to bargain for a significant number of low income housing units, jobs and other reforms. It is tempting to say that these pieces were too valuable for the bourgeoisie to allow them to be "participated".

Similarly, the displacement of public housing tenants from housing adjacent to the Corridor was an issue outside the legal bounds of the mandate for participation, as was the already mentioned displacement of private sector tenants through market forces.

The lesson we can draw from these examples is that before a popular urban movement agrees to the parameters of a participatory process, it should carefully evaluate issues which can be essential in the future although they do not appear so at the time. For this, both technical and political sagacity is necessary. Even more to the point, however, is the fact that, had the movement outside the participatory process remained viable, capable of giving direction to the movement inside, the state may be forced to put these items on the agenda.
The Project Staff deliberately played down development decisions during the King administration in order to protect the possibility of more relative community control of this process. They felt that the King administration would try to reverse prior to victories of the movement. The elimination of low income housing from Copley Place was seen as a good example of what could happen to development. Instead, they maneuvered to postpone these decisions until a new election could bring in the possibility of better political conditions. (Kruckemeyer, Note 13)

It is important to note that the Corridor was a transportation project and would therefore appear to not lend itself readily to the broad scope of issues which were involved in a participatory process. It is certainly unique in the U.S. in this respect. This has to be attributed to its birth in a process of popular struggle.

By contrast, some agencies -- like the BRA -- organically encompass a host of issues on their agenda. For example, the issue of displacement is directly their responsibility. They do set up participatory processes which are more manipulative and dishonest. The difference, perhaps, is rooted in their history as agencies set up by the state to exercise its rule and on the balance of forces among actors organizing around specific issues.
THE DECLINE OF ACTIVISM

Over time several factors tended to reinforce a trend for activism to decline. The more consciously political organizers in the Corridor communities started out participating very actively in the committees and task forces. They continued to see the process as a vehicle for organizing and raising consciousness as well as place to struggle for specific issues. As the subject of the meetings became more technical and more station-specific, working class and minority residents attended in fewer numbers. This being so, the more progressive political people had a smaller audience. Sometimes they remained, fighting for specific reforms, but gradually they sought other issues which were drawing more attention from their social base. This in turn, tended to weaken the movement in the project.

The Southwest Corridor Coalition (SWCC) had been the primary focus for the remnants of the Corridor-wide movement as the project entered the Design and Engineering Phase. As we stated some of the leadership of SWCC became integrated into the consultant structure. Others, like Chuck Turner, felt that whatever reforms were going to be won were already on the agreements and that he would concentrate on other issues such as fighting for jobs for minority workers. Still others, such as Ralph Smith of LRDC, concentrated on specific reforms which had led them to the coalition.
The last significant effort of SWCC to organize around an issue was their campaign against an arterial street in Jamaica Plain. The EIS had left open the option of a major arterial street paralleling the Corridor along Section III, and SWCC felt that this was a scaled down version of the highway as well as taking land which could be used for development, particularly housing. They were successful in organizing against it. After that victory, they were never able to successfully combine working both within and outside the structure of participation. Project Manager Pangaro skillfully denied them access to any significant issue around which they could organize and insisted on treating them "just like any other community group in the Corridor", when their reason for being was precisely to be a coalition of other groups. When they raised an issue, the results were negotiated with others, and groups began to see SWCC as superfluous. Eventually, SWCC was unable to obtain funding and dissolved, unable to survive without them.
IV.

THE CASE OF THE SECTION I COVER
In the twenty-two years between the 1948 Massachusetts Master Highway Plan and the 1970 moratorium on highway construction inside Route 128, the struggle around the Southwest Corridor centered on the issue of highways. Interstate 95, the Southeast Expressway, was to stop just short of the South End; it was to join the Inner Belt at a mammoth intersection in lower Roxbury. The highway then funneled traffic onto local South End streets, and the BRA proposed an alternative highway ramp system called the South End by-pass, which would have affected the South End, but the implications of the road for displacement of housing or industry was not as severe in the South End as it was in Roxbury. Furthermore, the South End was, beginning in the early '60's subject to one of the most intensive urban renewal projects in the United States, and South End residents correctly perceived that the threat to their community could come more from urban renewal than from roads, and organized accordingly.

On the other hand, as early as 1960 the state proposed a variety of road and transit plans related to Interstate 95 which did threaten a substantial amount of housing in the South End. At one point, the plans called for stopping all intercity trains at Route 128, with rapid transit linking that stop to downtown Boston. Other plans called for both trains and transit lines to continue through the South End along the existing Penn Central alignment. Still other
plans combined trains and transit with the South End bypass in a combined megastructure which would have destroyed about 150 bow-front buildings; the project, called Southway by the BRA, included housing construction on air rights over the combined road/transit/rail right of way.

These different proposals were centered on the same route over the South End. The tracks would enter the South End from Roxbury on the existing Penn Central Cut, move towards the northeast under Massachusetts Avenue and West Newton Streets, pass under Back Bay Station on Dartmouth Street and follow the alignment of the Massachusetts Turnpike towards the East, with intercity rails continuing on to South Station and transit rails burrowing under the turnpike, through the South Cove Tunnel, to meet the existing Orange Line transit tunnel at Washington Street. (See Graphic No. 26)

THE ISSUE OF TURF IN THE SOUTH END/ST. BOTOLPH

The tracks either bisected the neighborhood or separated St. Botolph Street from the South End, depending on your point of view. In order to understand this distinction, which would play an important part in the politics of programming and design, it is important to briefly review the territorial history of the area. Originally, the entire area was a salt marsh; as Boston grew in the 19th century from the Shawmut
GRAPHIC NO. 26. THE CORRIDOR PROJECT IN THE SOUTH END. (WFEM ARCHIVES)
peninsula, the marsh was filled in from Washington Street towards the west and a wealthy residential neighborhood of bow-front brick residences, the homes of the emerging industrial borgeoisie, was established in the area, called the South End.

The residential district was not even finished when, during the Civil War, a major social transformation began to take place. Further to the north and west, the Back Bay was being filled and more exclusive housing was being built. At the same time, European migration was accelerating. In a few years, the rich moved out of the South End and the immigrants filled the stately homes. Nineteenth century North American works like The Late George Apley and Silas Lapham documented a new found fright of the bourgeoisie about sharing a residential area with workers, a phenomenon that had not existed in the 18th century commercial city. The architecture of Back Bay and the South End was strikingly similar, the Back Bay being slightly more ornate and varied. The street grid layout of the streets was formal, in the French style, while the South End's was slightly more historically determined, more British and informal, and included more squares. Socially however, they were two worlds apart, and they were perceived as being two worlds apart by people of all classes and races. Physically they were separated by the Boston and Albany train yards. For the last twenty years of the 19th century and the first fifty
years of this century, the entire area east of the train yards was the South End. The Penn Central tracks were considered to be a physical object that bisected an essentially homogeneous neighborhood. In the first part of the twentieth century, an insurance business district grew north of the tracks, and it too became a territorial division between the two neighborhoods. (For a more detailed description of this process, see Whitehill, 1973). In the period where class and race segregation in space was being built into the North American city, the South End was considered to include the area between the Penn Central tracks and the B&A railroad yards.

In the early '60's, the yards were taken over by the Prudential Center, as the corporate core of Boston pushed out like an octopus along several lines. It was development encouraged by the City Planning Department, whose plans for the city included nurturing the growth of this tentacle (officially dubbed "The Spine" by the BRA later), and the transformation of the residential areas closer to it into the residences for the professionals the BRA hoped to attract to the "new Boston". (See Graphic No. 27) The area of the South End closest to the Prudential Center became the first part of the neighborhood to be "gentrified" by the early '60's white petty bourgeois professionals began moving into the area, buying up homes, evicting the tenants of the existing rooming houses. Along St. Botolph
GRAPHICS Nos. 27 and 28.

Site of Prudential Center and rendering of proposed development as built. (Whitehill, 1973).
Street rooming houses and even whore house yielded to newcomers, as one of the most vibrant, multiracial, working class neighborhoods of the city was under attack. It is not tangential that this attack was not a "spontaneous result of market pressures" but a well orchestrated project directed by an able ideologue, the BRA's Ed Logue, and financed by substantial federal funds; for years the South End was the largest urban renewal project in the U.S. and received the largest share of monies.

This reality conditioned the nature of participation in the South End to a great extent. The main focus of activity was the urban renewal plan and related issues. The initial BRA proposals were coarse -- (master plans were proposed which laid out in detail large areas to be razed and replaced with new housing, large areas to be rehabbed, others to be dedicated to commercial centers. The implementation began with wholesale evictions, which resulted in wholesale resistance. The BRA then turned to a more incremental and transactive approach, setting up a field office in the South End, identifying "responsible" neighborhood representatives who would be on the one hand legitimate their proposals and on the other hand allow them to detect which proposals were meeting greatest resistance. The first important struggle occurred in 1968, on an urban renewal site and parking lot near Back Bay Station. Residents occupied the site, organized a Tent City and fought for low income
Tent City sparked a period of intense struggle against Urban Renewal in the South End. (Goodman, 1971).
housing instead of corporate use. (See Graphic No. 29) Progressive forces later organized a South End People's Urban Renewal Committee (SEPURC) with elected representatives throughout the neighborhood. The Mayor countered by organizing the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC). At the same time there was considerable struggle around the control and implementation of programs for low and moderate income housing. The mostly latino Emergency Tenants Council (ETC) and the mostly black South End Tenants Council (SETC) fought to control the housing development. These were only a few of literally dozens of such struggles. Parallel to the urban renewal and housing issues were issues of education, health, social services, access to jobs and civil rights which were very much in the agenda of the South End during this period. In all these struggles, the demand for reforms was oriented by fairly sophisticated political activity and consciousness raising.

PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH END AROUND THE ISSUE OF THE CORRIDOR

The struggle against highways began to coalesce into a metropolitan movement through the coordination of local efforts into the Greater Boston Coalition against the Transportation Crisis (GBC) in 1966 in Cambridge. The South End joined the effort in '68. Urban Planning Aid, which was
instrumental in organizing GBC was also lending technical assistance to groups like, ETC, SETC, and SEPRUC, and they encouraged housing organizers to become involved. Those who first joined the anti-road movement in the South End were progressive, middle class, activists, people like Phil Bradley, Bob Fortes and Abe Fortas, but they had a substantial mass base. For example, on the People Before Highways Day demonstration in the Boston Common in January 1969, there was a contingent from the South End led by Mel King. One sector however, was active in the movement form the beginning, and that is a small group of liberal professionals -- architects, computer programmers, transportation experts -- who were involved in GBC because of concern for "what the city should be", as well as out of concern for the neighborhood. Included in this group were Ken Kruckmeyer, an architect who later became Assistant Project Manager for the Corridor; Ann Hershfang, later a board member of Massport; Clark Frazier, a transportation enthusiast; Ellen Gordon; John and Suzie Goodrich, he an environmentalist, she a municipal bureaucrat. This group grew out of the Tubman Area Planning Council which fought against the South End By-pass under the leadership of the old Harriet Tubman House on Holyoke Street, and black activist Bob Fortes.

Several other factors affected participation in the Corridor in pre-moratorium days in the South End. One of these
was the fact that only those people in the area adjacent to the tracks took a really active interest. This ruled out almost all Chinese residents, who had been displaced out of the St. Botolph area by this time. There were some latino residents in West Canton Street, on buildings later bought by developer Goldweitz, but they were not generally active. An important group consisted of mostly Black residents of the Cosmopolitan Neighborhood, from Claremont, Wellington and Greenwich Street. (Hunkel, Interview, 1980). Ken Kruckemeyer points out that black residents Barry Adams and David Scott, as well as organizers Abe Fortas and Isaac Graves were very much part of the effort.

After 1970 and during the BTPR process, the only Corridor issue particular to the South End was the proposed construction of the South End by-pass, an issue which essentially hinged on the decision to build or not to build the Southwest Expressway. When the then-governor Sargent announced his no-road decision, the BTPR had little else to say about the Corridor in the neighborhood. The track bed would remain where it is, basically an open cut, while with the issue of widening and possible demolition was still potentially important. Participation was essentially dormant between 1972, when the BTPR decisions were announced and 1974.
In 1974 the nucleus that would remain active for the rest of the Corridor process began to organize. The Environmental Impact phase was approaching and the issue which prompted the group to form was noise. As plans for the Corridor evolved, it became public knowledge that as many as 842 trains a day would travel through the neighborhood. (WFEM 1980, P.19) Janet Hunkel, who would eventually become the Section I planner, was at that time a tenant in the St. Botolph district. She recalls the formation of the group: some friends, mostly white middle-class newcomers, had been talking about the Corridor and the issue of noise. When someone suggested they could wrest concessions from the MBTA for the benefit of the neighborhood, they called a meeting in the Fall of 1974. They soon became The South End/St. Botolph Task Force on Noise.

Several things are significant in this formation. They actually recognized the division of the two neighborhoods in the name. Secondly, the choice to concentrate on the issue of noise, a decision which betrays a lot of technical and political sophistication. The Environmental Impact Process consisted of an evolving set of regulations which demanded that a project minimize environmental disruption of the surrounding areas, and noise had been an explicitly recognized category of impact. By concentrating on noise, they could force the project to spend considerable money on
noise-abatement. Social impacts had much less precedent as a part of the EIS process, and the group's concern was not primarily with social issues anyway. This was not surprising given its composition and history of activity.

Besides the more liberal professionals which we have already mentioned as being involved in the pre-EIS process, the Task Force on Noise included a number of other professionals. Keith Brown was interested in urban design, Bill Karg was an architect and planner, Eben Kunz was an expert on acoustics and noise, Bill Satterthwaite was a teacher and Jeff Stonberg was a developer who owned property in the Ellis' neighborhood and had bought and renovated six buildings on West Newton Street.

This group, identified by Hunkel as the most active during the EIS process, was different from the oppressed and working class activists who, along with progressive professionals, had stopped the roads. Though somewhat heterogeneous, Hunkel herself describes them as "the second wave of gentrification". (The first wave represented by those involved pre-EIS). Some, like Stonberg, was a developer promoting the real estate market "out front". Others, like Hunkel, had been involved in successful efforts to have the state renovate abandoned buildings adjacent to the tracks for subsidized housing. "We were looking at the possibility of getting UMTA to help finance rehabilitation..."
of abandoned buildings for low income housing. There were a lot of abandoned buildings at the ends of the streets next to the tracks, causing blight...Some of the people may have in fact been anti-gentricication, if you had asked them. They were more interested in a plain stable community. They wanted people to be able to stay. In the back of your mind you knew that improving the neighborhood would increase pressure in a maturing real estate market, but you really wanted to improve the neighborhood -- you were really caught in a bind. At the time, the area was racially and economically mixed. Some wanted to keep it that way, other were oblivious to it, and others were plotting to change that". (Hunkel, Note 14) Despite differences of opinion, this group had an objective economic interest in the kind of neighborhood improvement which would have the effect of displacing workers and minorities although some of these people had an ideological position more in favor of low income and minority residents of the community.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The beginnings of institutionalization of participation which, during the BTPR had a somewhat different effect in the South End than it did in the Corridor's other two neighborhoods. There, the mass working class movement against the roads was weaker, since that social group was involved in
fights against urban renewal and for reforms. The progres-
sive professionals which led the fight elsewhere were also
present in this neighborhood, but unlike Roxbury, and to
a much greater extent than in Jamaica Plain, there was
also a coherent group which we may call "conscious gentri-
fiers", professionals who were active politically, who
brought their technical expertise into community affairs,
but who specifically defended causes which were in contra-
diction with working class and minority residents of the
area. Thus, everyone favored noise abatement, and could
work together for a cover on the tracks, but some of these
people were also opposed to low income housing and worked
for a cover in order to promote a rise in property values.
In Jamaica Plain, those who participated for the purpose
of preventing low-income housing -- Craven, Parker, etc.
-- were tied to an old political machine but were not
technicians. In the South End, architects, computer pro-
grammers, engineers, developers, were involved and they
could function effectively in a technical arena. As we
said, the group we have just described began to organize
during the Fall of '74, and they met periodically to discuss
strategy for about a year. Since the more progressive
people in the group had informal connections to technicians
working for the MBTA, or some of the consultant firms in-
volved at the time (such as Stull Associates). They were
able to keep abreast of developments as well as influence
decisions in a minor way. In the Fall of '75 the MBTA organized the first community meeting of the EIS process in the South End/St. Botolph neighborhoods. (We will use this name since this separation had been a de facto well established about the identity of the area). In this meeting, the Task Force on noise made its first public appearance. The Task Force came forward with the demand that the tracks be placed in tunnels; the MBTA insisted on looking for other alternatives (Hunkel, 1980, interview). The technicians in the Task Force knew they had a right to demand technical studies of the effects of different configurations on noise in a residential area and they demand it. Larry Whittig, of the acoustics firm of Bolt, Beranek and Newman (BBN), and David Lee, of Stull Associates, looked at different configurations, and estimated the potential noise level for both the loudest events and the equivalent noise over time on the South End's housing. BBN measured events of up to 120 decibels on the window sills of houses adjacent to the tracks, the equivalent of a very loud rock band. The criteria eventually established in the EIS were that the noise level should not exceed 67 decibels, or the equivalent of city street noise. (WFEM, 1970, p. 10) Similar studies were also carried out for other sections of the Corridor where housing lay near the tracks. Among the alternatives studied were noise abatement canopies, covered tracks and an open cut. As expected,
the predicted noise level for both the open cut and the noise abatement canopies were so high as to constitute a serious environmental nuisance. The community then had legal grounds to press for a track cover. From then on, the Task Force insisted on a cover; professional expertise among the Task Force members and the sympathy of technicians working for the MBTA aided this victory. It should be pointed out however, that one member of the Task Force was against covering the tracks; Clark Frazier, a computer programmer and transportation enthusiast, thought that the additional money needed to cover the tracks should be used to electrify commuter rails. Hunkel characterizes him as being more concerned for transportation than for neighborhood-centered issues.

The final EIA hearing was scheduled for February 1976, it was delayed and finally occurred in July of that year. For that hearing, the major effort of the Task Force was preparing for the issue of noise criteria. Technically, they were armed with the BBN noise studies. They had friends among the MBTA and consultants. They were politically well-connected; Ann Hersgfang, a Task Force member, used her political clout and considerable connections to pressure at the state and federal levels for a covered track. They basically succeeded and the agreement to cover the tracks was incorporated into the EIS, with the results of the noise study published as an appendix. It was a major victory for
the activists, though it should be pointed out once more that it was a victory on a different issue than victories in Roxbury, for example, where participants won demands for low income housing, productive industry, development potential as well as decks. In Jamaica Plain (Section III) and Roxbury (Section II) the decks covered a relatively small percentage of the area. In Section I, nearly the entire area was to be covered by tracks. The rationale that the cover should be used only where adjacent housing, or a proposed school could be seriously affected explained in technical terms the decision to cover the entire South End, (See the EIA) since there the housing was denser and closer to the tracks. The political and technical clout of the Task Force, as well as its concentration on the issue of noise must also be considered important factors; in fact it appears from what we have reviewed, that the issue was essentially political and that the technical manifestation was secondary. (See Graphic No. 30)

CONTROVERSY IN THE DESIGN OF THE SECTION I COVER

After the Fall of '75, the participatory process in the South End again entered a period of dormancy until the beginnings of the design and engineering phase in the Spring of 1977. Almost immediately, the South End deck became the subject of considerable controversy. The more conservative
The Section I Cover. (WFEM Archives).
and racist forces in the St. Botolph neighborhood were concerned that the cover would contribute to the elimination of the turf distinction between the two neighborhoods, a distinction which some of them had long labored to establish.

They began to organize in the Summer of '77. They proposed at the Section I Neighborhood Committee that the "Cover" consist of a barrel vault, or some other physical barrier which would "reinforce the distinction" between the neighborhoods. Since they had architects, noise experts, and engineers on their side, they prepared a substantial case. The EIS criteria stated that the project should strive to minimize the impact on the adjacent areas, and that therefore, any design for the deck which would join the two neighborhoods was essentially "disrupting the status quo." They further claimed that crime in their neighborhood was a result of "criminals" coming across the tracks from the South End and stealing their stereos and TV's.

This proposal, with its racist undertones, brought to the surface existing class and racial divisions in the area. Progressive and liberal forces, particularly blacks in the area, pressed for a counter-proposal which would tie the two neighborhoods to give them as much as possible and utilize the cover as a resource for recreation in the area. They also had assistance from some professionals sympathetic
to their cause, as well as indirectly by professionals within the Corridor Project Structure. The latter remained officially neutral but consciously presented information and designed the process in such a way as to "come to a solution as favorable as possible," in the words of Jaci Hall.

The situation was potentially serious, and the MBTA project office was concerned that an open struggle would flare. They therefore asked the Central Planning Staff to design a process which would begin to resolve the controversy through programming and design.

The first step was the re-constitution of the Section I Neighborhood Committee as the Cover Task Force which first met in August of 1977, and immediately began what was called "preliminary programming." A team of urban designers, landscape architects, and planners prepared models for different alternatives. They incorporated what we can call the "conservative position" into a "no use" alternative; what we can call the "left position" into a "high intensity use" alternative and developed a middle ground called "moderate use" alternative, with the intention of moving the extremes towards the middle. (See Graphic No. 31 for a more detailed description.) The Task Force was divided into three sub-committees, each working on a model for each alternative, which could then be evaluated by the entire group and the consultants. They further tried to de-polarize the situation.
MARY OF THREE ALTERNATIVE MODELS

The "no use" alternative prepared by the Cover Committee in September has a dome shaped barrel vault or a sloped deck over the right-of-way to discourage use on the Cover. Circulation is confined to a pedestrian way and emergency access along Carleton/Claremont Streets. Plantings on the wall and small gardens are located at the ends of streets facing the Cover, but green space was kept to a minimum to reduce the need for maintenance. Access between sides of the Cover is by bridges over the deck so that the deck itself is free of people.

The "moderate intensity use" alternative is occupied primarily by quiet, passive recreation activities in the area between Yarmouth Street and Massachusetts Avenue. One point of view saw the Cover as a set of separate developed areas with local connections, while another view looked at the Cover as a single long development. The group that worked on the model suggested that small areas along the deck could be leased to adjacent owners to insulate the residential blocks from deck activities. Access to and across the deck is provided at several streets.

The suggested "high intensity use" alternative emphasizes local orientation and a variety of activities. Active recreation areas for sports like tennis and basketball are located toward the northern end of the Cover, and quiet areas for sitting or picnicking are placed toward the south. Trees and water for background noise and a varied topography help to divide the deck into several smaller areas. A pedestrian path meanders along the deck connecting activity centers, and access from adjacent streets is provided at several points. Leased open space areas along part of the deck could help to provide privacy for nearby buildings.

GRAPHIC No. 51

Alternative Models used in preprogramming the Section I cover.
(WFEM Archives).
by asking the cover task to focus on more specific problems. Different possible uses were presented at meetings with analogies of similar activities in other landscaped areas. (WFEM 1970, p. 10) That way, concrete alternatives were proposed which could attract support from diverse interests. For example, the most reactionary position was that a high intensity use would result -- in the words of a St. Botolph resident -- in "dozens of Puerto Rican teenagers playing basketball and making noise." The consultants offered the possibility of passive recreation such as flower gardens, and someone suggested the the Zinea Society be invited to open a garden. (WFEM, Neighborhood Cover Task Force handout, 1980) This alternative was clearly less threatening to the right, while the left did not object and considered it a great improvement on a barrell vault. Uses like animal farms, urban gardens, the corridor-wide jogging and bicycle paths, and others were also introduced. At this stage, the Fall of '77, the project did not press for resolution, but rather discussion of possible programs for the use of the cover. (See Graphic No. 32)

In the Winter of 1977-78, the project engineers re-studied the alignment and profile of the Corridor, including Section I. The preliminary engineering studies done during the Environmental Impact phase showed the alignment of the tracks adjacent to the St. Botolph side, allowing room at ground level for fire safety lanes on Claremont and Carleton
HIGH INTENSITY: This orientates the area to local use. There is a variety and extensive numbers of activities.

- Activities:
  - Tennis courts
  - Plants around to buffer noise
  - Walkway along the cover
  - To be brick?
  - Varied in design
  - Undulating
  - Passive areas for sitting, chess, amphitheatre, picnic areas, vendors

- Landscaping:
  - Lots of trees
  - Varying topography
  - Water, also to be used for winter sports
  - Gardens
  - Evergreen for seasonal variety
  - Looked at 50% soft, 50% hard surface
  - Variety in the terrain

- Art:
  - Use of graphics

Graph No. 32

Record of the pre-programming process in the Section I cover. Drawing: KE/FST (WFEM Archives).
Streets on the South End side. The profile of the deck was eight feet higher than ground level, facilitating the separation of neighborhoods desired by the right, which was stronger on the St. Botolph side. New studies by engineers and sub-soil specialists suggested a change in the planned profile and alignment. It had been feared that depressing the tracks deeper than the EIS criteria had established would affect the water table, which in turn could undermine the foundation of the bow-front row houses on either side of the tracks. A study of subsoil conditions showed that this was not the case. A look a construction techniques also suggested that it would be safer, and cause less noise, to locate the tracks in the center of the space between St. Botolph and the South End, rather than adjacent to the St Botolph side. A new alignment and profile was proposed which essentially allowed the deck to be a continuous surface uniting the two neighborhoods at ground level. (See graphics Nos. 33 and 34) This, of course, somewhat alarmed the right, since it made the "no-use" alternative harder to justify.

After the alignment and profile had been redesigned, the project again reconvened the Task Force. This time, a different approach was taken. Rather than working on the three alternatives which had been the focus of prior debate, the meetings focused on a discussion of "issues." In a series of five meetings held between March 1978 to July
WHAT IS THE COVER AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD/COVER TASK FORCE?

The Southwest Corridor Project involves relocating the M.R.T.A. Orange Line to the existing central right-of-way. After completion, the Transit/Train system will comprise Rapid Transit, Commuter Rail and Amtrak Trains in the same right-of-way. In Section One, the project runs between the Metrowest and South End Neighborhoods. In this area, the Transit/Train Envelope - the structure that the trains will run through - will be lowered so that its cover will be at the same elevation (height) as existing side streets. On the South End side, Carlisle/Clarendon St. will be reconstructed at an elevation slightly higher than the existing street.

The cover is the deck that will enclose the Transit/Train Envelope (the structure that will house the trains); the Neighborhood/Cover Task Force is the community group that will advise the M.R.T.A. on how the cover should be designed.

The cover will extend from Mass Ave to Yarmouth St. with a temporary cover to Dartmouth St.

- Who is on the Neighborhood/Cover Task Force?
  - All interested residents, business owners and agency personnel in Section I
- What have people been talking about and what will be discussed at future meetings?
  - How will the cover will be designed?
  - Where should the cover be used?
  - Where might there be access?
  - What types of landscaping are appropriate?
  - Where are the best locations for ventilation equipment?

NEIGHBORHOOD/COVER TASK FORCE MEETING

MONDAY MARCH 6TH

TIME: 7:30-9:30 P.M.
PLACE: HARRIET TUBMAN HOUSE
566 COLUMBUS AVE.

GRAPHIC No. 33

Leaflet for Cover Task Force Meeting. (WFEM Archives).
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PROFILE & ALIGNMENT IN SECTION I

- Railroad and transit will be covered to attenuate noise.
- The top of the cover will not be more than 50-ft. above pre-existing streets.
- Protect adjacent housing during construction.
- Minimize vibration to adjacent properties during train operation.
- Keep tracks above water level.
- Provide light and ability to flush floor windows on 9th Borough Side.

E.I.S. CRITERIA

ENGINEERING STUDIES

Moving the transit/train envelope away from the St. Botolph side makes Carleton/Clairemont streets too narrow; it must be lowered to maintain access.

FUTURE PROFILE & ALIGNMENT

- The cover is level with the ends of perpendicular streets.
- The transit/train envelope is 50-ft. away from pre-existing buildings.
- Carleton/Clairemont ST. will be at least 7 ft. thick and built over the transit/train envelope.
- Existing changes in elevation along Carleton/Clairemont ST. will be leveled; the adjoining land, streets and alleys will be adjusted to meet these changes.

GRAPHIC No.34

Handout discussing profile and alignment changes in Section I. (WFEM Archives).
1978, the issues were grouped in three categories, "social issues" which included the separation or unity of the two neighborhoods, cross corridor pedestrian access, the class and racial composition of users, etc.; "technical issues" such as the necessary forced ventilation of the tunnel and the appearance of ventilation stacks, vibration and noise, etc.; and "programming issues" such as the different uses possible in the deck, where they should be located, how they should be oriented, and the form of the corridor-wide paths. (WFEM, 1980, p.11) This strategy lent itself better than the previous one to the desired goal of conflict-resolution. "The MBTA and the consultants developed an approach to move towards a consensus about cover uses. Common elements from the three models that had been developed were identified in an attempt to deemphasize the potentially polarizing concepts of the no-moderate, and high-intensity use which the models reflected. Guidelines on privacy, security, and maintenance were also prepared by the MBTA and the consultants." (WFEM, 1980, p. 11)

The more conservative forces resisted at first, insisting on the no-use model, until they were reminded that the participatory process was advisory and that the MBTA set the agenda and made final decisions. They agreed to continue participating, making each issue a point of contention. The existing tracks had separated the neighborhoods except for a cross street at West Newton Street, so they
insisted that this situation not be altered, they asked for brick walls closing the streets at the St. Botolph side. The project agreed in principle to maintaining the status quo in terms of cross-corridor access, but the argument shifted to the treatment of this separation, shifting the debate from concept to physical form. For this, the coordinating landscape architect, Roy Mann, was asked to prepare a series of models and drawings for "treatment options" which were then discussed at the meetings. The right pushed for as much separation as possible, the left for as much integration as possible, and in the end the MBTA chose a moderate solution with existing dead-ends of streets fenced off and present bridges replaced by circulation paths including a new connector at at West Canton/ Harcourt to replace the former Yarmouth/Irvington pedestrian bridge that was removed by the Turnpike Authority. "To avoid conflicts that could impede the consensus process, the MBTA and the consultants developed a policy on cross-corridor pedestrian access which essentially was to maintain the status quo, but allow for future access possibilities in design detailing." (WFEM, 1980, p. 11) It was a hard fight which resulted in a compromise; but as Jaci Hall said, "at least in the future those fences can be opened. It's not like knocking down a brick wall."
Another issue, which was hard-fought was significant not only to the politics of the process, but to the relationship between participation and design. The more conservative forces insisted that each street program and design the activities at the end of its block. In a way this was parochialism ad nauseam. From a metropolitan-wide movement which presented unified demands, the units of participation had gone to the level of the municipality, then to the corridor-wide level, then to the neighborhood level, then to the station area level and now to the street-end level. The original landscape plan was itself conceived as an addition to Olmsted's "Emerald Necklace," and therefore was conceptually regional, with regional linear trails. The conservative groups at first insisted on eliminating the trails, but the project over-ruled this suggestion. They then insisted on making the trail meander and therefore discourage regional use while encouraging uses, a suggestion which was accepted. Then they insisted on having each street group of residents influence, but not define, the uses taking place at the end of each street, a principle which was accepted. "The basic strategy supported by these technicians was to let the street alignments on top of the deck and the overall program of uses emerge from aggregation of street end use." (WFEM, 1980, p. 11) Though these issues were considered part of the "program issues" category, rather than "social issues", they aroused almost as much controversy as the
latter. Maintenance, also became an issue, because active uses were perceived to be harder to maintain. Surveillance and security likewise, were strongly debated and a series of guidelines were established.

One technical problem which prompted considerable concern was that of ventilation, although there was less debate and controversy. The train tunnel required exhaust stacks and intakes for diesel trains. Residents, particularly those concerned with the architectural character of the neighborhood, wanted to insure they were not prominent or readily distinguishable from the brick buildings. Naturally, no one really wanted the stacks at the end of their street. The Urban Design Consultants therefore prepared a series of alternatives for the location, groupings and design of the stacks, which were then discussed at Task Force meetings. (WFEM, Ventilation Handout, July 1978) A consensus was reached without much controversy. (See Graphic No. 35)

The techniques used in this process were sophisticated and participatory. At every Task Force meeting, residents were encouraged to record their comments, draw suggestions on maps, actually work on models, using clay, wood blocks, cardboard cut-outs, etc. Elaborate handouts were prepared for the Task Force meetings; simpler ones were mailed out by the thousands. Several issues of the Corridor News
GRAPHIC No. 35

One of many handouts on alternative location and design for ventilation stacks in the Section I cover.
Drawing: Stull Assoc., Inc. (WFEM Archives).
devoted space to the design of the deck, informing residents of the area of the process underway and giving them technical information valid for participating. It should be noted however, that the more controversial class and race conflicts of the process were censored out of the project sponsored literature. Eventually, agreement began to be reached on a program for the deck, and by the end of the summer of 1968, the landscape architect produced a coordinative landscape plan. The plan showed the location, size and some detailing for sitting areas, tot-lots, gardens, planted areas, ventilation stacks, lawns, and one basketball court. Passive recreation dominated the activities, the corridor trail was included as a meandering path, and cross-corridor access was kept to the existing conditions, with possible openings in the future. (See Graphics Nos. 36 and 37)

Once the coordinative landscape plan was published, each section of the Corridor had a separate landscape architecture firm in charge of detailing the plan further. The Section I landscape architects, Moriece and Gary, prepared these detailed drawings, and presented them at a Cover Task Force Meeting in the Fall of '78, beginning what WFEM called the third stage of participation on the cover. The community endorsed these plans, making suggestions about materials to be used, types of plants, etc. Budget constraints required a revision which was then presented at an Open
Partial Site Plan — Section I Cover

Diagramatic Program and Partial Site Plan for Section I Deck.
Drawing: Stull Assoc. Inc. (WFEM Archives).

GRAPHIC No. 36
This Bird's-eye View Shows the Current Plans

**Massachusetts Ave.**
- The access between the cover, Mass. Ave., and the station passes by a garden for the Mass. Horticultural Society.

**Albemarle, Blackwood & Cumberland Sts.**
- These 3 dead end streets have a paved area with some planting and iron fence at the end of each street.

**Durham Street**
- A garden provides a visual ending to the street.
- Non-intense usage buffers the street from the park.
- A straight, visually open path responds to security concerns.

**Follen Street**
- The focal point has plantings with a sitting area.
- The pedestrian access is visually open.

**Copley Place Housing**
- The basketball court is moved away from homes.
- The focal point combines sitting with a tot lot.
- The ventilation intake is at ground level.

**Additional MBTA DEM com.**
- The input will refresh but not change the type of organization of activities.

**Harbor Street and Copley Place Housing**
- There is pedestrian access to W. Canton, Copley Place housing and the cover.
- Carleton St. provides vehicle access to the townhouses facing onto the cover.
- The lawn area forms a formal green space similar to existing South End parks.

**Wellington Street**
- The focal point is a plaza with a sitting area overlooking Wellington and Albemarle.

**Carleton St.**
- These 3 houses have front yards and parking.

**Copley Place**
- Carleton St. is discontinued between W. Newton and the alley.
- The focal point has plantings with a sitting area.

**Graphic No. 57**
Handout developed by Section I Planner, KE/FST, showing results of Programming. (WFEM Archives)
House in February 1979, another cover Task Force meeting was held in March "to review the status of the overall design," and further discussion has been delayed pending review by the MBTA and Federal agencies. (WFEM, 1980, p. 11) What Reagan's austerity program will do to all this programming and design is at this time an open question.

PARTICIPATION FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

While we have explored at some length the potential cost -- to working class and minority communities -- of institutionalized participation, it is important to review both sides of the argument. After all, the Corridor, and the deck were serious reforms wrested from the state at considerable effort. The communities involved had a valid and serious interest in implementation; this had to be guaranteed, since the opposition had not given up. (In the middle of the Design and Engineering phase, Ed King, a reactionary politician, was elected governor running on a platform which included stopping the Corridor and building I-95 -- an insane proposition by then, but worthy of note.) Because of the history of the project, the project manager, the Central Planning Staff and several key consultants had emerged from the stop-the-highway movement -- they were more progressive and more committed to the communities than some important consultants, particularly in the
Coordinating Engineering firm of Kaiser. For these reasons, improved administrative control by the central office was often a positive factor -- a very unusual reality in a U.S. city.

There were many ways in which participation was beneficial to the administrators. Important conflicts became clear early on in the process allowing administration to take measures in the design of the process. In the case of the South End deck, it's fair to say that the administration did not approve of "fencing off" St. Botolph and worked to make the final design more democratic. A good confrontation may have been better, and the administrators avoided it like the plague.

The residents' knowledge of their local area was also a great help to engineers and designers. Some sophisticated homeowners in the South End had technical knowledge of subsoil conditions and foundation structures, which directed the administrators and engineers to study the problems of construction carefully.

In many cases, design was definitely improved by participation. The design of the transit station at Green Street in Jamaica Plain went through about 10 versions because of community suggestions, and the architects felt the results were definitely better because of it. (WFEM, 1980) The design of the Section I deck likewise became
very sensitive to conditions and particularities of each small area, which is positive.

Using Burke's typology of administrative uses of participation (see page ) we can identify several areas in which the project administration benefitted from participation. By using the process, the administration encouraged behavioral change in participants, discouraging an honored tradition of confrontation. While we cannot say that participation served as staff supplement, early participants certainly became a quarry for the recruitment of staff. Cooptation, "capturing or neutralizing the opposition", was practiced with vigor by the administration. Community empowerment, which Burke frowns upon, was carried out to a degree not without administrative encouragement.

As mentioned earlier, the decentralized structure, with multiple committees at every geographic and functional level, allowed Pangaro room for maneuver against some forces in the community. In the case of the Forest Hills Station area, where reactionary forces led by State Representative James Craven tried to influence design, administrative power played a liberal role. The structure also provided the administration with allies against some consultants. For example; landscape and urban design was often referred to by engineers as "frills" and "soft design"; popular
occupation with these issues was shared by administration, which benefitted from participation.

Generally, the administration gave considerable free reign on details, exercising its power over them occasionally for a purpose, or to remind someone of who was in charge. They kept control of the dynamic of the process and its general direction. They benefitted from participation.

TECHNICAL ISSUES IN PROGRAMMING AND DESIGN

The programming of the Section I deck was a complex and difficult process. Technically, it illustrated a number of issues which we have discussed previously.

In the first place, the participatory process served as a platform where coordination took place among different design and engineering disciplines. Architecture, urban design, engineering, and landscape architecture were all involved. As we saw, any significant change made by technicians in one area had repercussions in the others. A great deal of coordinating consultants and the Project Manager's office, but also much coordination took place through the community meetings. The calendar of community meetings often determined the calendar for technical presentations, and therefore served as a scaffolding for much of the coordination which took place.

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The structure of the process also sheds some light on the way design and programming issues can be structured for participatory discussion. In the first chapter, we discussed Gary Hack's proposal to group programming issues into four categories: 1) environmental packages, 2) environmental patterns, 3) performance guidelines, and 4) clientship. The first three of these can best be discussed under technical issues; clientship we shall discuss under social and political issues.

Environmental Packages is the name that Hack gives to the most common form of environmental programming, particularly of individual buildings, consisting of specific "rule-of-thumb" guides, such as "X parking spaces per housing unit", and definite predetermined needs, such as "X hospital rooms"; environmental packages are not useful when they "cannot be readily derived from existing criteria". Since the deck was such a wide-open proposition, we can agree that environmental packages did not play a significant role in programming the deck.

The concept of environmental patterns on the other hand is a very useful one. If defined as "relationships in space with geometric properties, context and human use", we could consider it the generic category under which the three alternative uses for the pre-programming phase could be classified. Such patterns are intrinsically meaningful,
since they embody human relations in space. It is not surprising that the use of space, as summarized by such proposals as the "barrel-vault, no-use alternative", can become symbols around which groups actually organize and struggle. From the experience of the deck, these are useful ways to discuss the needs and desires of people, to translate social opinions into spatial and physical form. Also, from the experience of the pre-programming of the deck, these patterns are not very promising as a method for steering the discussion of programming into a consensus. Performance standards, finally, which Hack recommends be used in "structuring the dialogue in participatory settings", were not very relevant to the deck. These refer to specific physical requirements for certain activities. In the case of station design, the MBTA has developed a comprehensive set of standards for the functioning of stations -- everything from station platforms to graphics. In programming the Corridor stations, they were very useful, although when there was debate this usually centered around problems other than performance standards. In programming the deck these standards were practically non-existent, with the possible exception of the technical requirements of ventilation we have discussed.

Finally, the method used in the final programming for the deck -- the grouping of issues under "social", "technical" and "programming" does not fit well into Hack's scheme. This strategy was conceived in discussions about
the goal of establishing a process of consensus building. By focusing on issues which participants could tackle one at a time, and around each one a certain degree of compromise and agreement could be reached through it, the consultants were able to defuse a potentially polarizing situation. The selection of this structure, to our knowledge, came from the direct experience in the pre-programming process rather than from some other pre-developed scheme. In this case, the organization of programming was determined by politics more than by technical requirements or common professional practice.

Some professionals, notably engineers, tend to view participation as a nuisance which cannot possibly make a contribution to design. In fact, I believe that even in highly technical issues participation aided the process of design. I have already mentioned some residents' knowledge of sub-soil conditions and foundations in alerting designers to problems with construction techniques. Ventilation for the deck was another area where participation may have helped.

As stated before, it is a difficult, if not impossible, task to separate the technical from the socio-political implications of participation in a project like the Corridor. If only for the sake of an exercise, however, it may be useful to attempt an evaluation of the technical aspects of
the problem. In that category, the Project office and the consultants would rate an excellent mark. The combination of fairly difficult engineering and design problems with a complex participatory situation was carried out smoothly and resulted in the design for an urban park which should get professional recognition for excellent design. An evaluation of the social and political aspects of participatory design is more complex.

SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES IN PROGRAMMING AND DESIGN OF THE SECTION I COVER

In the programming and design of the Section I Cover are reflected a number of important aspects of the implications of participation, which are best seen in the context of institutionalization of the process.

In the South End, the movement against the roads was different than in the other Corridor neighborhoods. While this community had a militant history of working class and minority activism, these groups were mostly engaged in battles against urban renewal. They joined the other neighborhoods and the regional Greater Boston Coalition on the Transportation Crisis in order to build alliances, and out of a vision of a better city. For these reasons, the leadership of the movement in the South End tended to be more professional than in other neighborhoods.
When the moratorium was declared and the state arranged the first step in the institutionalization of participation through the BTPR, the movement in the South End still had enough strength to form the independent South End Committee on Transportation. This organization was linked to the pro-housing and anti-renewal organizations of the community—the new South End Project Area Committee, a group concerned with urban renewal, endorsed SECOT proposals for example—by that time a mostly white professional progressive group. Some of the leadership then became more directly linked to the state by going to work for the project. Though they fought from within, and obtained good reforms for the area, the movement outside began to wither. By the time participation entered the Environmental Impact Phase, the participants in the project were organized in the South End/St. Botolph Task Force on noise. The composition of this group, particularly the leadership, was whiter, more professional, and for the first time, conservatives played a more important role. They were able to win a major victory—covering the tracks with a deck—but it was a victory with ambiguous results. It was costly improvement financed by the state, but it would accelerate a process of gentrification, displacement of minority and working class residents which had been promoted by BRA in the area for 20 years. During the Design and Engineering phase this process
was intensified, as was the inability of the participatory process to confront it.

This points to a dilemma common to numerous "urban" movements. If workers and minorities fight for reforms and concessions to improve their lives, these very reforms often operate through the market to their detriment. It is a crucial lesson to be learned by hundreds of activists and progressive professionals: somehow the struggles for specific goals in the environment can be counter-productive. Those professionals working within the state can aid in reproducing the system unless a mass political movement is strong enough to give direction to the struggle. (The answer to the dilemma seems to be in the politization of the participatory process outside the boundaries of the state).

Participation is therefore a double-edge sword. It can be effective in winning specific reforms, but it can also funnel a popular movement with a serious progressive, if not revolutionary, potential into the confines of a process designed by the state for the sake of resolving conflicts. Professionals within the system can and do contribute, but often at the loss of strength among workers and minorities. By joining the state in a project where the priority becomes implementation, they put themselves in a position where they promote a de-politization of the process and contribute to its weakening. The case of the South End
deck is a clear example. Had politics been a priority, the class and racial antagonisms which arose around the programming and design of the cover would have to the forefront rather than been manipulated in order to build a deck with "as much as you can get given the circumstances." Since the urban battles, of which the deck is only one, will continue and intensify, this loss of politization of the process is in fact tragic.

Janet Hunkel, the Section I planner explained the changing role of a professional participant in the institutionalization of the process this way:

"During the EIA reviews, the task of the planners involved in the Task Force was more advocacy than anything that's happened afterwards. Before the EIA, this was even more true. The Task Force would meet, hash out differences, discuss strategy, prepare for meetings with the 'T' and their main consultants, and would meet again later to evaluate the situation. The community would not only meet, but do research and prepare plans and documents before meeting with them. Now, we argue in front of the 'T' planners. Since the EIA that has not happened. The whole SATF thing is so well organized that people could get information there rather than go and try to research it themselves.

"I worked as a community person and as a planner hired by the Project. What I did before is a lot what I do here, but all of a sudden I'm getting paid for it. That took a lot of the burden off the community's doing their own work as volunteers." (Hunkel, Note 15)

The degree to which a professional within the state-sponsored project is in fact linked to the people affected is as important to their effectiveness as their ideological
orientation. In the Southwest Corridor, these links are strong, perhaps unprecedented in the U.S. in a project of its kind. But the working class and minority movements, as well as the progressive professional movement from which these professionals emerged was weak, so that even with the best intentions the dynamic of the project made their partisian activity very difficult. In the case of a liberal Janet Hunkel, whom, as we have seen, was both a liberal and a resident concerned with improving property values, her links to the community may in fact serve to legitimate the activities of the state and may be a barrier to the politicization of the process. The fact that she at times advocated for the "barrel-vault crowd" is an indication of the potentially reactionary function of a participatory process.

Other professionals in the project -- in the Central Planning Staff, in the Project Manager's office, or in some other consultant capacity, were in a similar situation, except that their location within the project structure militated to weaken their links to the working class and minority communities. The Section Planner's job was to serve precisely the function of linkage. In the other jobs, the linkage had to take place through social and other contracts outside the place of work. The fact that there were many able, committed, liberal professionals in these places did not guarantee that the project respond
to the interest of these communities. The fact that many of these people had been the leadership of the movement to stop the road, rather than technical participants, meant that their incorporation into the project hastened the demise of an independent, politically conscious movement.

Participation in a technical arena, warned Piven, can de-rail a movement from politics to technical discourse. The process of the Section I cover confirms this, but not without reservations. In fact, in a community like the South End there is a considerable reservoir of technical expertise among the working class and minority activists, the result of participatory efforts like the Corridor. It is significant that the planners involved both in management, and in the Central Planning Staff spent considerable effort disseminating technical information and skills. The SATF Notebooks, the hand-outs, the presentation, deserve credit as contributing to this.

But this effort appears to fall short of benefitting the oppressed in one significant aspect -- ideological clarity. As stated in the first chapter, the role of urban planning under state monopoly, capitalism is political -- to mediate conflict and exercise the hemogeny of the ruling class in a democratic atmosphere -- but it is also ideological. Urban planning exercises what Castells calls "the ideology of the urban," obscuring class-rule and racial
oppression with the concept that the problems of urban life are somewhat inherent in cities, the result of an "urban crisis" rather than an unjust social system. The participatory process aimed at "defusing polarization," channeling debate into technical issues, reaching consensus, etc. cannot help having this negative ideological content. Even the concept of advocacy planning considered "left" in planning circles, is based on a pluralistic model of society, where different groups compete freely for their "fair share of the pie," with technical advocacy compensating for disadvantages. Promoting this idea may in fact contribute to hiding the need for struggle. The participatory process of programming and designing the cover was ideologically very opaque. In fact, the greatest ideological clarity occurred in the pre-moratorium days; gradually, the institutionalization of participation obfuscated the political essence of the process until it was almost invisible. The diligence of the project in preventing a public discussion of the racial and class issues involved in the cover design, at least outside of the Task Force and SATF meetings is evidence of this phenomenon. Progressive professionals, committed to "the rules of the game" and to implementing a hard-won reform, contributed to it.

Another concept common to the participation process is that European social-democratic invention: "The community".
Conceived as above class and racial differences, above the actual organization of society, it funnels activity towards the attainment of "common good." In the case of the Cover, the fact that it was decked and landscaped was seen as a benefit to the community. The contribution that this and other urbanistic transformations will make towards entrenching monopoly capitalism in the city are not even part of the discussion. In this area, progressive professionals can make a great contribution, since we are trained in the exercise of ideas. We must fight to make class rule and racial oppression part of the professional and participatory discourse, even when talking about the location of ventilation stacks for a train tunnel.

This lack of explicit ideological discussion weakens the participatory process. In Arnhein's ladder of participation, on page 226, the participatory process in the Corridor reached only a degree of tokenism; information was disseminated and collected, citizens were consulted, and there was placation of anger at the state. The process contributed to the empowerment of workers and minorities as a group only to the degree that some people were able to bargain their skills for higher education and a job within the project structure. The masses of these social groups will benefit to the degree that a future strong movement can lay claim to the skills of these professionals and direct the struggle. Under these conditions, the participatory process
can perhaps contribute to the empowerment of the working class and the oppressed. Using the Van Til's matrix for participation, the participants in the cover were composed of elites and non-elites together, and they focused on what they call administrative concerns (though in a technical form), yielding a citizen's advisory formation. (See page 30) More politics and greater "non-elite" strength would have yielded what they call "grass roots" participation. The general depolitization of the institutionalized participatory process can be analyzed with the typology used by Jose Olives (1975) in classifying struggles against urban renewal in the reconstruction of Paris. (See Graphic No. 2) The Corridor, and the deck in particular, were definite reform victories. In depoliticizing the struggle, the effect was a positive reform, had politics been maintained on the participatory public agenda, a link could have been strengthened between the "reivindicative" and the political, leading to a superior level of struggle. There is no question that the implementation of the project could have been made more difficult, however the issue was therefore not only the reluctance of planners in the structure to put politics on the agenda, but the absence of a movement which could guarantee, from outside the boundaries of the state, that politics could not be ignored.

It may be argued that the decline of progressive activism in the Corridor for the last ten years cannot be blamed
on the machinations of the state and on the matriarchal politics of participatory planning. To a great degree this is true. Participation in the project, we repeat, must be viewed in a historical context. For the last ten years the popular movements of the '60's have been losing strength and often the Corridor Planners wished there was still a progressive movement in the community which could force the agenda. But the sapping of the popular strength of the Black and Puerto Rican liberation movements, as well as the weakening among both white workers and progressive professionals, cannot be explained without the massive intervention of the liberal state in granting reforms and funneling participation within reformist limits. Viewed this way, the progressive and liberals involved in the Corridor were both perpetrators and victims of a process which weakened the left. Black and minority communities lost a potentially powerful movement, learned some technical and political lessons and attained some concrete reforms, some of which will accelerate the process of gentrification which may more effectively limit their interest and their search for power than the roads and urban renewal they began fighting against thirty years before.

The participatory process in the Section I Cover also raised, although to a small degree, the danger of the reactionary uses of participation. Conservative elements among
the "second wave of gentrifiers" effectively defended their interests and obtained some legitimacy and credibility through the process. This phenomenon is not isolated. Ayn Rand freaks have been elected block representatives in neighborhood networks begun by the left in Dorchester, where they are raising the slogans of "self-help" and promoting capitalist solutions to problems caused by capitalism. In Europe participatory schemes are promoted by the right in order to penetrate working class communities. The rise of a "grass-roots" new-right racist movement in this country only underscores the need to view participation with a more critical eye and more ideological clarity. Technical expertise is invaluable in this effort, but it must not be divorced from the political issues involved in planning if we are to make a contribution to changing the city for the benefit of the working class and minorities.
EPILOGUE

This study of Boston's Southwest Corridor Project first attempts to identify important issues pertinent to participation and later reflects upon them as they are made manifest throughout the history of the project. The major observations, reflections and lessons drawn from the study are therefore incorporated into the text, and it is not the purpose of this epilogue to catalogue them, but rather to go a little beyond them and point to some of the questions this study leaves unanswered.

We began by asking whether struggles around urbanistic transformations are a vehicle through which the working classes and the oppressed can further their interests. In a sense, it is a moot question; these struggles emanate from contradictions in Monopoly Capitalism. Resistance by working people to changes in the urban environment stem from the fact that these changes are actually attempts to rearrange the urban fabric better to serve the needs of the monopolies. Whether or not conscious activists get involved in these struggles, they will emerge spontaneously from changing social conditions. This study also makes apparent the fact that bourgeois society, particularly the State, has developed a sophisticated array of measures -- technical, organizational and ideological -- aimed at confronting these movements. Sponsoring officially sanctioned participation
in the graning of reforms is one of these measures. The question then becomes not whether to engage in these struggles, but **how** to engage in them: how to raise the organizational, political, ideological level of these struggles so that the workers and the oppressed peoples suffering these transformations will engage in them and emerge stronger than they began. The case study points to a few good lessons.

One of the characteristics of participation in the Southwest Corridor, and other similar struggles, is lack of ideological clarity. The coalitions engaged in them are heterogeneous in composition and ideas, and the prevailing ideology seems to have been a sort of left wing "urban ideology" as labelled by Castells. Little explicit class analysis has been part of the polemics or negotiations. Key bourgeois concepts like "the community" as a force above class interests, "participation" as democracy incarnate, decentralization as justice, etc., have predominated. It became apparent that the bourgeois state is willing to put a building here or there, even to drop plans for a super highway, as long as it can circumscribe the public discourse within the language of bourgeois democracy. The lesson we can draw is that explicit analysis should not be negotiated away in bargaining for a reform. There is always a danger that clarity will be labeled illegitimate, and that for that reason Marxist urbanist must learn to speak in English. Nevertheless, principles should not be negotiable. Another
lesson of the Southwest Corridor -- rather, a cluster of lessons -- center around the different ways the state can circumscribe the boundaries of debate through participation. In this problem planners can play an important role, since we are trained in the analysis of urban issues. In the case of the Corridor we have pointed out several important examples of this. The development of Parcel 18 and the abandonment of adjacent public housing are two issues impossible to disentangle one from the other, as are the Section I Deck, Copley Place, and Tent City. Yet the state manages to keep them separate. The displacement effect, through the market, of Corridor development is another such connection. This points out the need to sharpen our analysis of urbanistic transformations, to make the explicit analysis of the context of any particular situation part of the strategizing done by urban movements.

Another problematic area pointed out by the Corridor experience is the nature of alliances forged in the struggle. There is considerable Marxist literature on this subject. The contribution planners can make in this area, however, is in the role of technical debate in determining the nature of these struggles. It has been the practice of progressive planners to forge counter-plans and counter-studies to destructive proposals by the state, corporations, bourgeois institutions. But the experience of the Corridor points
out the weakness of advocacy when it substitutes for political leadership. Planners and architects may draw beautiful plans, and even get a few things built, but if the working class, Blacks and Puerto Ricans, who originally were to use them, end up weaker -- or moved somewhere else -- the purpose of progressive planning has been subverted.

This signals the need to ensure that a participatory process be directed not by planners working for the state, even if they are leftists, but by an independent political movement which can use the process to develop strength for the working class and minorities affected. The construction of such a movement is outside the bounds of this study. In the context of participatory situations, however, we should examine carefully the consensus-building techniques advocated by bourgeois planners in order to make sure they do not absorb and diffuse popular demands. In the Corridor we have seen this happen in several stages -- preliminary planning for the highway, negotiations during teh BTPR and EIS, and even during engineering, programming and design decisions.

We also need to pay attention to the implementation of reforms wrested from the state and large corporations, to ensure that we don't wind up limiting political initiative for the sake of ensuring the successful completion of a particularly urban project. As planners we should not waste our time developing normative models of planning in a
bourgeois society; rather, we should concentrate on more
detailed analysis of the functioning of the bourgeois state--
its role in capital accumulation, legitimation of bour-
geois rule, and midwifing of capital's projects to transform
the city to better suit its needs. We should be doing the
work collectively, which is rarely the case today. The
recent organization of a progressive planners' national
structure is a hopeful step in this direction. We should
also be building, as progressive planners, closer ties with
minority and working class communities engaged in these
struggles.

In conclusion, let us throw in a monkey wrench: the
role of the bourgeois state is changing rapidly in the
United States. There is an organized fascist movement
gaining ground, but this does not seem to be dominant at
the moment. Castells argues that the bourgeois state will
not be dismantled but rather modified into something he
calls "authoritarian statism". Whether or not this is
ture, and what it may mean, it deserves careful study. It
cannot be denied that we are witnessing important changes
in the role of the state. On top of that, monopolies seem
to be preparing an incursion into areas formerly handled by
the state. In Reagan's Transition Team's proposal for the
neighborhoods there is a series of recommendations for the
state to facilitate corporate involvement in housing, neigh-
borhood physical, social and economic planning, social
services, even neighborhood-level social organizations. All this makes an analysis of participation in the Southwest Corridor appear prematurely outdated, but I believe the lessons drawn are general enough to be useful in the coming period, whatever it may bring.
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NOTES


2. Ibid.


5. Comments by Ken Kruckemeyer, Assistant Project manager, Southwest Corridor Project, on a preliminary draft of this paper.


7. Ibid.

8. Interview with David Lee, architect and urban designer active at all stages of SWCP.


10. Interview with Janet Hunkel, Section I planner, SWCP, April 1980.


15. Hunkel, op. cit.