THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL POLICY IN JAPAN

by

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A.B., COLGATE UNIVERSITY (1973)

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF

PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY

June, 1980

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science on
May 2, 1980 in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This study explores regional policy in Japan by treating localities as the constituents of the policy process. It focuses upon the ways in which localities initiate, react to, and try to shape policy through interactions with each other. It thereby offers a broad set of refinements of the conventional wisdom of Japan as a vertical society. By balancing the traditional view from above with a view from below it explores the extraordinary subtlety with which centralization is prosecuted in Japan. It demonstrates that:

1) There is no inherent cultural barrier to translocal interdependence and coalition building. Localities rely at least as much upon each other for policy relevant ideas as they rely upon higher levels of government. There is an active and important horizontal dynamic which has never been fully understood.

2) The Japanese polity, while centralized, is vertically fractured. There are many centers, and therefore localities often enjoy a "menu" of policy choice. Likewise, competition among ministries often encourages central actors to create coalitions of localities to "cheerlead" their proposals vis-a-vis other ministries and/or the LDP.

3) Localism, not partisanship, is the key determinant of policy. While localism is a "free-floating resource," available to those who would make best use of it, partisanship is largely a red herring. Partisan affiliation does not predict coalition behavior or policy choice.

4) Characterizations of a tightly corporate "Japan, Inc." are far too pat. It does as little good to argue that the Japanese policy process is dominated by either bureaucratic or industrial interests as it does to argue that both are the same. The bureaucracy is far from omnipotent, and the variety of competing interests ensures only that political bedfellowships are extremely fickle.

Thesis supervisor: Lucian W. Pye Ford Professor of Political Science
This is lovingly dedicated
to my wife Debbie,
a woman of endless beauties,
and to Harold Isaacs,
a different source of inspiration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I once got a big laugh out of reading the acknowledgments to a book in which the author thanked what seemed to me to be just about everyone he had ever known, including his ninth grade industrial arts teacher. (It was a book on politics.) The book was forgettable, but the author's intentions ring true. We are all, in the end, dependent upon the quality of our relationships with each other. I have been especially fortunate in this regard. My mentors, my colleagues, my respondents, and my family have all provided me unselfish and sustained support.

I am grateful most of all for the nurturance of myself and my work by Lucian Pye, a man possessing a rare combination of compassion and perspective. Asian in his benevolence, he has guided me for six stimulating years. From Terry MacDougall I have learned more about things Japanese than from any other single person. I am deeply indebted to him for his energetic guidance, for his faith in my abilities, and for his overwhelming generosity. Professors Myron Weiner of MIT, Wayne Cornelius of the University of California at San Diego (formerly of MIT), Kurt Steiner of Stanford University, and Gary Allinson of the University of Pittsburgh have all been measured and reliable critics and readers. Myron Weiner, in particular, deserves thanks for his masterful destruction of the very first draft of my thesis proposal five years ago. He sat as well in review of the finished product, and has always been a pleasure to work with. Others who have made this work substantially better than it could otherwise have been include: Mike Mochizuki, Shel
Garon, Paul Lewis, Ron Aqua, Ellis Krauss, Jim Short, and Henry Brady--my invisible college.

It was my pleasure to study for two and a half years in Japan with equally dedicated mentors and colleagues. I worked most closely with Professors Satō Seizaburō and Ōmori Wataru of Tokyo University. Other scholars who were selfless in their assistance included Professors Noguchi Yukio of Hitotsubashi University, Watanabe Yasuo of International Christian University, Watanuki Joji of Sophia University, Yakushiji Tai-zō of Saitama University, and Yorimoto Katsumi of Waseda University.

I am especially indebted to Kato Tomiko of the Local Data and Resource Center of the Ministry of Home Affairs' Local Autonomy College and to her assistant Kitaoji Nobusato, without whose dedicated assistance and institutional support the survey research reported in Chapter Five could never have been conducted. I am grateful also to the nearly five hundred local officials who answered this questionnaire, and to the more than one hundred researchers, public officials, journalists, politicians, and party officials who submitted themselves to my often too lengthy interviews. Among this group, Furukawa Shunichi, Kanbara Masaru, Mimasu Sozaburō, Okubo Teruo, Naito Kuniō, and Yamamoto Takao deserve special thanks.

Institutional support was of enormous importance on both sides of the Pacific. I am grateful to the Japan Institute of Harvard University for funding a year of language work for an auslander from MIT. Professor Donald Shively offered trenchant, even if temporarily unheeded advice about language training. I also received a grant from the International Studies Association which helped defray the costs of a summer spent trying to conceptualize this research. In Japan my family and I received
the generous assistance of Fulbright Fellowships from the U.S. Departments of State and Health, Education, and Welfare. A grant from the Japan Foundation allowed us to extend our stay. I am particularly grateful to Caroline Atsuko Yang, Director of the Fulbright Commission in Tokyo, who was compassionate far beyond any administrative requirements. This compassion was also extended to me by Professors Brown and Takagi and the remarkable staff of the Inter-University Center for Japanese Studies. They made special arrangements allowing me to enter the Center at a most critical stage of this research. None of this could have been done without that extra training. The Tokyo University Graduate School of Law provided me both with an institutional affiliation as well as library and computer resources which were of great value. Also helpful were the staffs of the Tokyo Metropolitan Research Institute, the Japan Center for Area Research, the Japan Institute of Local Government, and the localities of the Tokyo Bay area, all of which opened their doors and their data to me. My thanks also go to Susan Trautman for typing this manuscript.

I have already thanked my wife Debbie in the dedication of this thesis. What we and our son Bradley have shared these past several years is an experience of unsurpassed richness and excitement. I could never have enjoyed it as much without them.

* * * * *

The reader should note that Japanese names are presented in their conventional order, with surname first. On occasion, in response to a request for anonymity, a respondent will be identified only by affiliation and not by name.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The representation of space is as important as the representation of people."

Georges Pompidou
Lyons, France 1970

The shelves of Japanese booksellers are filled with scholarly and popular descriptions of the recent "revolution" in Japanese local politics. Pundits on both sides of the Pacific were apparently caught unaware by the partisan convulsions and political realignments of the late 1960's and early 1970's. In tandem with a marked expansion of the public sector and particularly of the affairs related to local public administration, local politics was transformed from a generally unexciting, non-partisan status quo to one of intense politicization and public arousal in little more than a decade and a half. Whether because the locality had traditionally mattered so little in the grander scheme of Japanese politics,* whether because one party control at the center encouraged frustrated opposition parties to seek alternative levers of power, or whether because control of local government had come for the first time to offer substantial political rewards, partisan competition in Japan was finally becoming diffused throughout the system; local

*The orthodoxy in prewar attitudes toward the locality held that there was no local politics, only local administration. In spite of the existence of national elections, local elections seemed the strangest of ideas. See Ide (1974, p.210) and Garon (1975).
politics and local political leaders had clearly moved onto center stage by the early 1970's.

For some fifteen years after the war local politics was a "conservative's paradise." The interesting political battles were not between the right and the left, but among the conservatives themselves. At first the national goal was reconstruction; later it became growth, rapid growth. The political means was conservative dominance at the center and in the localities. There were actually precious few local chief executives with open party endorsements at all. Most ran as conservative independents with ties to particular factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which governed the nation from Tokyo. There were only ten prefectural governors with leftist* party support in all the years before 1959. There were fewer than forty progressive party backed mayors nationwide in that year, indicative of the shallow penetration by the left in local politics.

But the conservatives succeeded too well. Accompanying the economic miracle and the widespread new affluence which they fashioned were also urban problems and massive environmental pollution. It came to be widely recognized that growth had been pursued at the expense of development. Improvements in the social infrastructure continued to lag far behind expansion of productive capacity. Demands upon govern-

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*This term is used to refer to either the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) or the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The broader term "progressive" usually refers to any of the opposition parties, including the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and Komeito. The New Liberal Club (NLC) is considered a conservative opposition party. These terms are handy, but not perfectly accurate.
ment quickly escalated. It was the opposition parties which must be credited with first recognizing the potential in these growing demands. By the mid-1960's they attempted, with some success, to channel these dissatisfactions into support for themselves and into power at the local level.

With the economic miracle all was possible— or so it seemed. Progressive local governments were the first to institute free medical care programs for the elderly and the handicapped. They moved first to clean the industrial world's foulest air. They came to power in all of Japan's biggest cities on the slogans of opposition, and on the promise that they would deliver social programs on a scale to match the grandeur of the conservatives' economic growth programs. They were highly ideological and very attractive. At the height of their local power in the early 1970's there were progressive mayors in 131 cities whose total population was nearly thirty-five million people; when that population is combined with the number of people living in the progressive-controlled prefectures which also proliferated in that period, we find that almost forty-five percent of the Japanese population lived in a locality governed by a progressive chief executive at the start of the 1970's.

By the end of that decade, however, it was clear that the progressive challenge was in recession. The 1979 nationwide local elections saw the final touches placed upon the changing of the guard; the first generation of progressive local leadership was by that time replaced in all its showcase localities: Osaka, Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kyoto. The LDP was rapidly moving to coopt progressive policy and to join in coali-
tions which had once opposed them. At present, nearly twenty percent of the members of the National Association of Progressive Mayors, the most visible and the most vocal organ of progressive local opposition, is supported by a coalition which includes the LDP. When the organization was founded just fifteen years earlier, only JSP-backed mayors belonged. Through the 1960's and well into the 1970's, the JSP, the JCP, and the JSP-JCP-backed mayors accounted for about two-thirds of all progressive mayors; by 1979 this was less than half. These changes represent the underside of the "revolution" referred to above. The progressives could not long control the partisan politicization which they had first ushered in. Those books in the stores in Tokyo are right for probably the wrong reasons. The great change has not been that the LDP is no longer on top, but that it is no longer alone at the top. And of course, that is no small "revolution."

These political changes all proceeded within an administrative structure designed to enhance the dominance of the central government. Governance in Japan is characterized by a three-tiered system in which the two bottom tiers, the forty-seven prefectures and the more than three thousand cities, towns, and villages, are both formally designated "local public bodies." Although nominally autonomous, the prefectures are conventionally understood to be subordinate to the center (most of their functions are centrally-delegated ones) and the cities, towns, and villages are likewise usually portrayed as largely subordinate to the prefectures. The nature and the extent of the autonomy of these localities, guaranteed by a separate Local Autonomy Law, has been the focus of an often acrimonious "Thirty Years War" since the end of the
American occupation.

This Local Autonomy Law was promulgated with the new Constitution on May 3, 1947. The message of the American reformers (SCAP) was clear: a democratic society requires an independent and free-thinking grass roots administrative network; local self-government is the school of democracy. Thus, the "spirit" of the Local Autonomy Law was just what the title suggests, that the autonomy of localities (chihō jichi) shall guide their administration. In that sense, prefectures and municipalities, although having different jobs to do, were essentially equal as autonomous public bodies. For the first time they were to each enjoy popularly elected chief executives as well as assemblies; for the first time local administration was to be a manifestation of popular will rather than an object of central fiat.

Steiner offers the best account of why most of this sounds hollow today. He attributes the continued weakness of localities in large measure to the absence of an independent local financial base. He also traces the secular emasculation of the Occupation reforms via revisions of the Local Autonomy Law throughout the 1950's resulting, in his view, in a reversion to prewar norms of tutelage and dependency for the localities. This idea of a "reverse course" did dominate the local autonomy debate of the fifties, and the Local Autonomy Law itself came to be viewed as a sort of paradise lost to conservative reforms. Steiner and other observers of the legal-formal aspects of public administration in Japan came to see local autonomy in the same way Barbara Tuchman describes Christianity in sixth century France; it was "officially established and fatally compromised."
But events, occurring contrary to expectations as is their wont, have forced a reassessment of this conventional wisdom. A cohort of more behaviorally inclined researchers has responded to the expansion of local political activity. Their research has tried to capture and explain the obvious vitality of local initiative in a centralized polity. The emerging consensus is that local autonomy and centralization need not exist in zero-sum relation to each other and that localism is essentially a "free-floating resource—potentially exploitable by politicians of every political stripe." The present study reinforces these notions at the same time that it also does much more. We will finally put to rest the old, monolithic idea of Japan as a centralized state. Previous studies have correctly identified the often broad divergence in local and central policy priorities, but none have satisfactorily demonstrated the relationship of this to the reality of a multi-centered government in Japan. Japanese government is centralized, but as we shall see on the pages to follow, it is also vertically fractured. It is precisely because the center speaks with so many voices that local initiative is relatively unconstrained. The coexistence of multiple, often competing centers helps ensure local autonomy at the same time that it encourages a great deal of horizontal activity across the local level. These are the counter-intuitive dynamics which most concern us here.

This study examines regional policy by using translocal coalitions instead of politics at the center as the primary focus. In the process we learn much more about the national and local policy arenas than we could have otherwise. We proceed on the central assumption that any
vertical, centralized system of governance is at base best characterized by the variety of ways in which the periphery is used by the center. It is our view that one cannot fully understand this use of the periphery without understanding the political and administrative organization of that periphery. That organization, particularly in industrial and postindustrial societies in which the vehicles of mass communication and transport are highly developed, is predominantly horizontal. The functional complexity of modern governance dictates that no locality is able, in any comprehensive sense, to have a direct relationship with the central government. Moreover, localities in modern societies are often ill-suited, ill-equipped to independently perform services and provide facilities at a uniformly high level. Given the anachronisms that are many local administrative boundaries, localities as a matter of routine turn to (and are frequently directed toward) each other, whether merely to improve their level of services, or to augment their capacity to make demands upon the center. By focusing upon the ways in which localities get together to do things or to otherwise have influence (what we will repeatedly refer to on these pages as "horizontal linkages") we will be able for the first time to identify the most important political and administrative dynamics of the policy process, mainly at the regional, but also at the local and national levels. Without in any way weakening the general applicability of the notion of Japan as a vertically structured polity, we are able to offer a broad set of refinements of the conventional understanding of the ways local actors pursue both local and regional interests. Moreover, by balancing the more traditional view from above with a
view from below we are able to explore the extraordinary subtlety of the mechanisms by which centralization is prosecuted in Japan.

We are left, however, with an assortment of definitional problems, not the least basic of which is determining just what is meant by the term region. Regions mean quite different things in different disciplines. Geographers use the concept of the natural region, an area of physical and human interaction forming an identifiable geographic space. They speak of physical characteristics such as river basins and deposits of natural resources. Economists are more concerned with economic and demographic features, such as the character of the labor force, the concentration and mix of industrial activity, the persistence of spatial pockets of unemployment, illiteracy, and/or income disparities, and the presence of one or more "central places" upon which a surrounding countryside is dependent. Economists bound regions by those points where the influence of one such center is succeeded by that of another. Specialists in the field of public administration are more concerned with identifying those areas most appropriate for the efficient delivery of public services. They are looking for administrative rationality and economies of scale. The three disciplines most often associated with regional policy are thus each looking for different things: geographers for physical homogeneity, economists for demographic homogeneity and nodality, and public administrators for administrative coherence.

Slicing into the problem from a different direction, we find that regions also mean quite different things in different countries. Cultural and historical characteristics often provide a regional identity
beyond statistical uniformity, for regions have inspired separatist and irredentist movements alike. They are as frequently linguistic, racial, and religious groupings as they are geographically defined. In Europe, the idea of the region has a strongly emotional and frequently anti-center component. In France, Jacobins and Girondists have both championed the regionalist cause, the latter using it as a reference to halcyon days past, and the former, more dominant tradition citing control of the regions as the ultimate test of the nation-state. A great deal of attention has been paid to the ethno-nationalism of such groups as the Basques, Bretons, Corsicans, Scots, Walloons, Welsh, Flemings, Croats, Magyars, and other European national minorities.

In Japan, however, there is rather less substance to the idea of region. While there are, to some degree, geographic groupings which share certain historical and cultural identities, there is far less cultural variation among the regions of any other nation in the world, except perhaps Korea. Since in Japan, unlike Europe, regional consciousness is so undeveloped the regions take on rather more instrumental functions. When seen from the center they are tools for administrative efficiency. When viewed from below, they take on the character of rallying points for local demands. That is, they are constructs of variable size and shape which are best understood as "flags of convenience" for local interests and central planners alike. The notion of the region is typically invoked by localities when they are making demands upon the center, and by the center when it is dividing up administrative tasks among the localities. It is seldom invoked consis-
tently enough to include the same localities each time.

Given the absence of the organic base for regionalism which exists elsewhere, and given the fact that regional planners themselves cannot agree upon what comprises a region, we are required to define the region with great flexibility. Recognizing that the idea of a region is highly variable, dependent as it is upon the research and policy objectives of the investigator, we are in agreement with Alesch that:

The size and shape of the (regional) area...varies with the issue. It may encompass only a dozen small local governments within a drainage basin where provision must be made for collecting and treating sewage. It may encompass several school districts where only joint action will provide special services to handicapped children. Or, it may involve three governments trying to agree on a site for an incinerator. On the other hand, the choice of locating a...jetport...power plant siting, water supply networks, and...highways...may involve every government's interests and may require developing coalitions of many of them to decide, finally, whether and where such a facility will be located.

We conceive of the region in purely instrumental terms. In our view, the coherence of the region depends entirely upon the quality of intergovernmental communication, communication between the center and the periphery, but more fundamentally, within the periphery itself. Our notion of regions then, is dependent upon the character of horizontal linkages as described above ("how localities get together to do things or to otherwise have influence"). The region is the areal subset of those translocal relations; regional policy is that large and growing subset of public policy which is directed at (if not by) these areally defined groupings of localities.
As the title suggests, this study is about the politics of that regional policy process in Japan. Chapter Two provides the conceptual framework within which the rest of the study procedes. It reviews the cross-national literature on intergovernmental relations and public policy, and presents the first model of extralocal linkages and public policy suitable for comparative study. It also provides a review of the cross-national literature on regional policy, a literature which this study is both part of and an improvement upon. The major difference between the existing literature on regional policy and the present study is the emphasis here upon the regional policy process rather than upon regional policy instruments outside their political context. Most regional policy research is state centered and prescriptive. This study is explanatory, and while closely examining the role of the central state in regional policy, opts instead to focus most closely upon the localities themselves as the constituents of this process.

Chapter Three presents a legal-formal overview of intergovernmental relations in Japan. Using the structural framework developed in Chapter Two, it first examines the vertical, tutelary relations which intervene across levels of government, before turning to an exploration of the many legally prescribed forms of translocal interdependence. The fourth chapter traces the postwar history of regional policy in Japan. It details the political battles which raged at the center over the introduction of new legal provisions for regional public policy. Taken together, Chapters Three and Four demonstrate that the regionalization of public policy has never been far from the
top of the agenda of central planners, and that however comprehensive existing programs might seem, they are at best only highly diluted in comparison to their original form. This dilution was a highly political process, the study of which demonstrates how many common notions, such as "Japan, Inc." and that of the omnipotent Japanese bureaucracy, are overextended.

We turn in Chapter Five to the presentation of behavioral and attitudinal data to generate modification of several other long held notions of Japanese public administration and society. Our survey of nearly five hundred local public officials allows us for the first time to map the ways in which local officials reach out beyond their own immediate divisions in the routine performance of their jobs. We find, contrary to what might be expected from characterizations of Japan as a purely vertical society, that there is no inherent cultural barrier to horizontal intergovernmental communication. We find, moreover, that localities rely upon each other for the broadest range of policy-relevant information at least to the same degree, and often to a greater degree, than they rely upon higher levels of government.

Chapter Six focuses out from these concerns with public administration and provides the first detailed historical study of the regional policy process in Japan. The subject of the case study is a major bridge construction project in the Tokyo Bay Area, the most populous and the most important region in the country. The coalition behavior of the localities of the Bay Area becomes the focal point for an exploration of both vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations in the regional policy process. The study spans virtually the entire post-
war period, and identifies the ways in which the issues, the actors, and the region itself were all part of much broader social, political, and economic changes. The periodization of these changes, suggested at the beginning of this introductory chapter, is used as the referrent for the dynamics of the Tokyo Bay regional policy process.

Chapter Seven provides a functional classification of the ways in which and the reasons why localities "get together to do things and to otherwise have influence." In the process, it also reviews the most important findings and the significance of this study. To the extent that it might provide a roadmap and a clearer sense of the direction in which this analysis is headed, the reader is directed to the concluding chapter as well as to the four Summary and Conclusions sections preceding Chapters Four through Six. They are designed to highlight the relevance of each chapter for the thesis as a whole, and the reader may prefer to read each of these and the concluding chapter before embarking upon the detailed explorations in between.

This study is an experiment in two very fundamental ways. First, no comprehensive work has ever been done on the regional policy process in Japan. Secondly, any approach toward regional policy which balances the traditional view from above with a view from below is new. Thus, we are here exploring both empirically and theoretically virgin territory. The measure of the success of this experiment is the extent to which we are able to learn something new about the Japanese regional policy process and at the same time contribute to further comparative research on regional policy.
NOTES

1 MacDougall (1975).

2 Steiner (1965).


4 See the studies of MacDougall (1975) and (1980a), 'Aqua' (1979), Allinson (1979), Steiner, et al. (1980), Krauss (1980), Reed (1979), Lewis (1975), McKeen (1974), and Simcock (1972).

5 Aqua (1979), Chapter Seven.

6 MacDougall (1980b).

7 Holland (1976), p. 4.


10 Boyd (1978).

11 See Connor (1977) for the complete list. When the idea of region becomes too closely tied to ethnonationalism, it becomes itself an -ism, regionalism. This regionalism is something more than an analytical category; it is akin to a political force. See Berger (1977) for the politics of regionalism in the case of France. The ethnic dimension of regional identification is also explored by Enloe (1973).

12 See the collection of essays in Hufschmitt, ed. (1969) and Brewis (1973).

13 Alesch (1972), p. 6
CHAPTER II

EXTRALOCAL LINKAGES AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCAL POLITICS*

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is designed to make explicit and provide an analytical scheme for ordering the wide variety of linkages which integrate localities with their larger social, political, and economic environments. Although the permeability of sub-system boundaries is by now a sine qua non of local and regional policy studies, no satisfactory empirically based theoretical model has yet been developed to guide research into local–nonlocal interdependence and the policy process. Walsh (1969, chapter 7) made the first tentative explorations in this area, but except where noted, most other research has proceeded without theoretical guidance.

This is perhaps due to an historical preoccupation with "Community Power." Local political systems were long viewed as closed systems; a high degree of autonomy was assumed, and the resulting studies were excessively parochial in their treatment of local politics.** Yet there were exceptions,低 murmurs muffled by the roar of the Great Debate. Warren (1963) was one of the first scholars studying local politics in the United States to speak to the vertical linkages extant between the locality and higher levels of government. Indeed, he identified this

*This chapter was first published under the same title in Comparative Urban Research, Volume 5, Number 2-3, 1978.

**See Kesselman, 1974, for a critical view of the community power debate.
as symptomatic of the "great change" in local community power in which the interdependence of local system components was being converted into a dependence of the local system upon extralocal agencies.

In the literature on the locality in the Third World this dependence was assumed from the beginning. The political development literature tended largely to ignore the locality, choosing instead to focus upon nation-building and state-building. The centralization of authority that these processes implied suggested also the penetration of traditional sectors by the expanding modern sector. Localism was understood to be a major impediment to modernization, resulting in a "penetration crisis" (Binder et al., 1971) which all less developed countries would necessarily confront, as had the European states before them. When urban areas were addressed, as in the social mobilization literature (Deutsch, 1961), they were seen as the breeding grounds for national integration (see also Friedmann, 1973). Urbanization would lead to the development of national identities and participatory attitudes (Lerner, 1958). It was only when participation increased at a rate faster than institution building that urbanization would be dysfunctional to stable development (Huntington, 1968).

Empirical studies of national-local interaction have often pointed towards the "nationalization of local politics" (Ashford, 1975a). James Rosenau (1966) has been credited with the introduction of the notion of the "penetrated system." While he was concerned with the sensitivity of the national system to perturbations generated by international events, his notion of the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and international political systems found currency in the study of local politics. Rodney Jones (1974), one of those who found the notion of central pene-
tration compelling, has gone the farthest in developing the concept in his study of local politics in India. It should also be noted that recent studies of central assimilation and penetration of local political units have not been restricted to the Third World (Anton, 1974 re Sweden; Ashford, 1975a re U.K.).

Yet, as Rabinovitz and Trueblood point out, "bets on the strength of national power must... be hedged" even in Third World countries (1973, p. 14). Indeed, a wave of revisionist literature has emerged stressing that central controls upon local politics and local policies are not always as effective as was previously assumed. Studies of local politics in Europe (Milch, 1973 and 1974 re France; Ashford, 1974 re U.K.; Kesselman, 1974a re France; Dearlove, 1973 re U.K.; Brown et al., 1973 re U.K.; Tarrow, 1974 re France), in Latin America (Whitehead, 1973 re Bolivia; Purcell and Purcell, 1973 re Mexico; Roberts, 1975 re Peru), in Africa (Cohen, 1973 re Ivory Coast), and in Japan (MacDougall, 1975; Aqua, 1979; Reed, 1979) have suggested the persistence or the reemergence of local power and local initiative in the face of centralizing political systems. They have begun to stress the capacity of the locality to resist the penetration of the center. Cohen (1973) challenges the "myth of the expanding center" and argues that the national elites in the Ivory Coast are largely unconcerned with local politics. Others have observed the overall expansion of the public sector at all levels, in an attempt to balance these perspectives (MacDougall, 1980a).

Even given their revisionist zeal, none of these scholars ignore the significance of extralocal impacts upon local and regional policy processes. Their contribution has therefore been significant for two
reasons. First, they have corrected the mistreatment of local systems as closed units so common in the first generation of community power studies. Secondly, they have correctly suggested the vitality of localism in even the most highly centralized polities of both the developed and the developing worlds. They have accomplished both in the face of contrary theoretical drifts in the discipline. The result has been a rapidly expanding literature on local politics which isolates one or another of the many linkages that unite local and extralocal political activity. This chapter will attempt to bring these together into a single conceptualization of the ways in which local policy agendas are set in part by interaction with extralocal agencies (Cobb, et. al., 1976). We first identify the central assumptions of this varied research tradition.

II. THE AXIOMS

There have been several consistent assumptions guiding research on the issue of local-extralocal linkages. Interestingly, one cannot differentiate among these studies by means of the system-level characteristics most commonly employed in comparative politics. We cannot say, for example, that studies of local politics in highly centralized polities share a single common assumption about the nature of extralocal linkages. Nor can we identify studies in one-party systems, in multi-party systems, in market economies, or in post-industrial societies as employing separate assumptions. Even studies of local politics in the same nation by different scholars have made different assumptions about the direction, the nodes, the channels, the development and the impact of the network of local-extralocal relationships. What then are these
"axioms" that have guided research?

A. **Linkages flow from above to below.** An extensive literature concerning local politics has emphasized a largely normative concern with the constraints operating upon local autonomy. These constraints, however described, have one important characteristic in common. They are constraints based upon hierarchical asymmetries that favor superordinate layers of government. Linkages in this view are essentially "Interlevel interventions" (Kesselman, 1974b, p. 363) that are (a) vertical and unidirectional (downward), (b) emanate from one of several nodes (state, prefecture, county, central government), and (c) are by and large communicated via governmental channels. Local autonomy is seen as endangered by centralization, implying that local activity is increasingly determined by national structures. This concern is of particular relevance to regional policy studies (see Kalk, 1971). Studies by Steiner (1965 re Japan), Legge (1961 re Indonesia), Fagen and Tuohy (1972 re Mexico), Tarkowski (1974 re Poland), and Frolic (1972 re USSR and China) all point towards the impotence of local initiative in the face of the expansion of national power. Sherwood (1967) places the study of urban government in Brazil in the context of a "national municipal system." Jones (1974) describes a situation in which the controls are no less superordinate in origin, but are directed from the intermediary level, the Indian state governments.

The "internal colonialism" literature has also contributed to the identification of the mechanisms which lead to the subordination of the locality in the national polity. It departs from the more orthodox literature by stressing nongovernmental and economic instruments of central dominance (Walton, 1975; Portes and Walton, 1975; Hechter, 1975). Also
departing from traditional interpretations of local political activity is the interorganizational framework suggested by Stephen Elkin (1974). Elkin addresses the openness of the local political system, but limits his analysis of the interdependence of the "focal organization" and the extralocal environment to "dependence", a vertical and downward linkage. This unnecessarily constrains a potentially important and otherwise useful conceptual tool, that of organization theory. Not all linkages with policy relevance flow from above to below.

B. Linkages flow from below to above. Another set of literature argues that the supralocal not only intervenes to affect the local, but that local and regional processes, decisions, and actors may have an independent impact upon the larger system. Indeed, the phrases "extralocal impact" or "extralocal intervention" imply a single direction in the flow of influence between the locality and its environment. Ashford (1975b) has called for empirical studies that appreciate linkages which are initiated from below. Kesselman (1974b) makes this point strongly when he notes how urban political machines in the United States have long served as agents of political socialization for newly arrived immigrants, with important consequences for national political change and stability. Thus, in this view, linkages remain vertical, although the direction of the flow is reversed. In this case the unit being affected is variable (state, nation, economic system), and the channels of the interaction may likewise be inconstant. This approach is not entirely new, of course. Vidich and Benson (1958) focused upon a small town elite's linkages with the larger society a decade before students of comparative local politics came to accept this approach.

Although it developed quite apart from the field of comparative ur-
ban politics, the patron-client model also suggests the utility of this focus. It specifies a structural model of political participation in vertically organized politics, and implies a reciprocity of benefit between local and supralocal actors. It posits a situation characterized by scarcity for the client and by a moderate level of resources controlled by the patron. It is the exchange of particularistic goods and services in a highly personalized context that shapes the relationship between actors of unequal status (Powell, 1970). The patron-client network has been viewed by scholars from the base as well as from the apex of the exchange pyramid. Viewing it in the former way, studies have detailed the penetration of the central government bureaucracy by locally based clientage relationships (Lemarchand, 1972; Lande, 1973; Grindle, 1977).

The literature on urbanization in the Third World offers important insights into local-level influences on supralocal systems. Central to those concerned with this is the phenomenon of urbanization without commensurate industrial development. Development appears to be a highly skewed process involving the industrialization of a small number of large urban centers within underdeveloped nations characterized in the aggregate by high degrees of inequality. In most Third World nations, "primate" cities, typically national capitals, are sometimes more than ten times larger than the next largest cities (e.g., Manila, Lima-Callao); they contain the highest concentration of influential political actors who are concerned with public policies that will directly affect the quality of the urban environment. A reasonable hypothesis would hold that the impact of urban politics upon the larger system, the type of below-to-above linkage addressed in this section, will be greater in countries with "primate" cities than in countries having a less top-
heavy pattern of urban-industrial development.

C. Extralocal linkages are national-local linkages. Although the research concerned with extralocal linkages is split to some degree between those studies which emphasize an upward flow and those which stress a downward flow of impacts, one axiom has guided virtually all of these empirical investigations. While the channels conducting these interactions may be variable, and while these vertical networks may exhibit a two-way flow of influence in some studies, the nodes of these linkages are clearly assumed to be the central state on the one hand and the locality or region on the other. Walton (1968), in attempting to systematize propositions concerning community power studies, suggested the linkages between national and local institutions as the appropriate units of analysis. In alluding to the centralization of decision-making outside the city he halted his analysis at the national level, and thus joined a larger community of scholars whose concern was and continues to be with the interaction only of the national and local systems (Legge, 1969 re Indonesia; Humes and Martin, 1969; Sadek, 1972 re Egypt, France, U.K., Yugoslavia; Anton, 1974 re Sweden). While this view is useful in accommodating a two-way flow of influence, it still remains too narrow.

The specification of national-local linkages does not exhaust the full range of local-extralocal interactions. Just as the comparative urban politics literature has accepted the utility of the concept of the penetrated system, it could benefit as well from other theoretical formulations developed by students of international politics. Work on the instruments of international penetration and transnationalism (Keohane and Nye, 1970) has stressed the importance of such non-governmental agencies as money markets, multinational corporations, funding organizations,
churches, and regional common markets in the shaping of domestic politics. A related body of work, the interdependence literature, has also emphasized penetration in the form of foreign governmental decisions that may shape and constrain domestic policy. From the Third World a somewhat different view of transnational penetration has emerged. The dependency literature has suggested that penetration most often takes the form of intraindustry cooperation across national borders, and that the penetration of foreign priorities is transmitted through the indigenous elite of the Third World (Bonilla and Girling, 1973; Bodenheimer, 1971). These are the "clienteles" of an international capitalist order that serve to perpetuate international inequality and further the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank, 1972) in the Third World. A similar argument is advanced by Harvey (1973), who suggests that the contemporary urban area is no more than an intermediary in a hierarchical chain that links the expropriation of surplus from the hinterland to the domination of North American and West European metropoles.

All of these formulations provide important tools for the student of local-extralocal linkages. If we accept the idea that localities are often linked to international as well as to national decisions, actors, and structures, then we must be prepared to assess the impact of all that is extralocal. Decisions by multinational corporations to invest in a particular locality (or not to), resources secured by the locality from a foreign-based lending agency, governmental decisions to revalue currency, and the relationship between local leaders and foreign political parties are all examples of the ways in which local communities may be influenced by actors outside the purview of the national system. Walton (1975) offers further examples.
This perspective is not alien to students of comparative urban studies, yet few works have been explicit in incorporating international variables. Those which do are frequently by economists or geographers (see Regional Management of the Rhine, 1975). While Rabinovitz and Trueblood (1973) have noted that national-local linkages are only a part of extralocal impacts upon local politics, their effort was to specify through a series of case studies the national-local interactions affecting localities. Theirs is the most comprehensive cross-national work thus far to appear that addresses the linkage problem, yet it remains tied to the axiom that extralocal linkages are national-local linkages.

Even Clark's excellent volume (1973), while it touches upon external impacts, subsumes them under the rubric of "Inputs and National Societal Characteristics." Mangone (1964) has offered an interesting monograph that attempts to detail the linkages between U.S. foreign policy and the economic development of a county in central New York state. The most advanced conceptual work on these transnational linkages to the locality can be found in Alger (1977, 1978, 1979).

One additional caveat can be offered here. Just as we have questioned whether the national level is the most or only appropriate supralocal node, we might wonder just how local is local. Should the region, the metropolitan area, the municipality, or the urban neighborhood be treated as the local node? Recent work on cityward migration in Latin America (Cornelius, 1975) suggests that the diversity within single cities among urban neighborhoods and among the mechanisms by which urban residents voice their demands points towards the sub-local level as the appropriate focus of linkage studies. In addition, in some systems there is the need to consider the intermediary levels of govern-
ment that have an impact upon and that are influenced by local politics. While they may often merely be the field agencies of the central government, as in many prefectural systems (Fried, 1963), they may also be considered for their independent effects (Krauss, 1980; Tarrow, 1974). We might ask, for example, how communications that originate in the central government are shaped and perhaps transformed by the intermediary level as they are passed on to the locality. The literature on the two-step flow of communication is suggestive in this regard (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). Additionally, we need to be aware of the unique role played by public and quasi-public corporations in the delivery of public services. Neither wholly central nor wholly local organs, their proliferation, particularly in the industrial democracies, deserves more scholarly attention (See Walsh, 1978 re the U.S. and Johnson, 1978 re Japan).

D. Extralocal linkages are supralocal linkages. There is one final assumption which has been almost uniformly accepted in studies of local politics. As we have seen, it has been widely agreed that extralocal linkages are vertical, extending upwards or downwards across layers of government, sometimes crossing national borders. Influence may flow from above to below, from below to above, or it may flow in either direction with the nation and the locality conceived of as the terminal points of the interaction. Even many studies which have not been satisfied with the national-local assumption have continued to emphasize the vertical nature of extralocal linkages.

But just as all international relationships are not dependency relationships, neither are all extralocal linkages asymmetrical and vertical. Although no framework has until now been developed by political scientists to cope with the horizontal interrelationships of localities across
the same level of government,* there is a rich tradition of such research in two other, related fields. Both are regional policy literatures. The first is the work done by economists in the field of regional planning. Drawing upon research in economic development and development planning, this literature is primarily concerned with the amelioration of spatial imbalance, of the possibilities for and the consequences of redressing inequality.** The research techniques and the policy prescriptions of this scholarship have been widely applied (See for example: Hansen, 1968 re France; Cullingworth and Orr, 1969 re the U.K.; Brewis, 1969 re Canada; Watson, 1970 re Italy; and Glickman, 1979 re Japan. Crossnational comparative studies can be found in Allen and MacLennan, 1970; Hansen, 1974; Burghardt, 1976; and Holland, 1976). The assumption common to these studies is that regional policy is a national instrument. Regional policy is aimed at the integration of spatially-defined, multi-jurisdictional units through national policy programs. It is the tool of the State, by the State, and is as much a tool for the State as it is one for the targeted regions. Policy prescriptions are uniformly directed at the central ministries, and the idea of involving regional constituencies is seldom addressed. Nevertheless, by identifying regional targets that are multijurisdictional, this research tradition at least suggests the potential for a broader model which would incorporate the local

*Leeds (1973) notes a similar inadequacy in the anthropological literature. While frameworks with comparative utility have been scarce, political scientists have, of course, produced work on translocal coalitions, particularly those which articulate demands upward to the national level. See Farkas (1971), Beer (1973), and Haider (1974). A recent conference in Turin, Italy has also produced several working papers concerned in part with this horizontal dimension. See Tarrow (1980), p. 3.

**These bear close analytic resemblance to the work of geographers who attribute patterns of economic and demographic distribution to spatial variations of natural resources and physical geography. See Dickinson (1967) and Clout (ed.,) (1975) for example.
actors themselves. Tarrow, et. al. (1978) make this connection by suggesting a fascinating paradox of the modern state: While policy making has become increasingly centralized, representation has at the same time become increasingly territorial and localized. They in fact argue causality, suggesting therefore that it is all the more essential that locally-based actors be included in studies of the policy process.

The second regional policy literature comes from work in the field of public administration. Here the primary concern is the rationalization of the public service delivery system, as a response to the increase in demands for and the scale of local programs. The pioneering work in this area was done earlier in this century by Maxey (1922) and by Reed (1926), but the dominant themes have scarcely changed. Most research has concerned the governance of metropolitan areas, and has focused upon legal-formal and institutional change, frequently in the form of experimentation with new units of local government. It has commonly advocated the federation of localities, or stopping short of that, has argued for what we can call the "horizontalization" of local public policy, bringing regionally adjacent public bodies together for the joint provision of public services. Kalk (1971, Chapter One) describes the dispatch with which European nations moved toward the creation of translocal federations of localities below the intermediary level of government in the postwar period in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Rumania. Walsh (1969) finds that among the thirteen metropolitan areas in her cross-national study, translocal cooperative arrangements are most highly advanced in Stockholm. She also cites widespread utilization of these formulae in France (syndicats). Aron (1969, Chapter Nine) details the same kinds of activities in American metropolitan areas. Usually stimulated by Federal programs, Regional Councils sprang up nationwide in the
1960's (see also Graves, 1964 and Rothblatt, 1971). The lack of translocal integration has also attracted the attention of researchers. Robert Wood (1961, p. 1), reflecting upon the maze of administrative jurisdictions in the New York metropolitan area, called it "one of the great unnatural wonders of the world."

Both the work on regional administration and the work on regional planning are prescriptive. Although one is state-centered and the other more locally focused, neither possesses satisfactory explanatory power for the political scientist. Being more interested in policy outcomes, policy instruments, and policy instrumentalities, both forsake examination of the policy process. Both traditions are politically neutral. Nevertheless, they are important for pointing researchers away from a too narrow focus on extralocal linkages as vertical conduits of authority and control. Additionally, for the very reason that the introduction of regional planning frequently results in the introduction of regional administration, the two traditions taken together suggest the ways in which horizontal linkages may be an important instrumentality in some centralized systems. We are thus cautioned that lateral and vertical relations do not exist in zero-sum relation to each other.

Research on the diffusion of innovation represents a third research tradition with relevance to the axiom that extralocal linkages are supralocal linkages. The most striking thing about this literature is its lopsidedness. Rogers (1962) reviews over five hundred separate studies of innovation diffusion and makes no mention of the diffusion of public policy innovation. Although still scanty, policy research in this area has begun to generate lively debates of its own. Undoubtedly because the earliest work in this field was conducted in the United States, researchers have shared the assumption that the lateral movement of policy
ideas and cues "determine in large part the pace and direction of social
and political change in the American states" (Walker, 1969, p. 890). In
the American case it is widely agreed that policy diffuses horizontally,
and more importantly, that policy originates at the local level (see also
Sharkansky, 1970; Gray, 1972; and Eyestone, 1977). The debate concerns
the economic, demographic, and political correlates of innovation, but
it fails to explain the mechanisms of policy diffusion. Policy is treat-
ed as an available property in these studies, and no direct link is ever
developed among the states. As a result, the entire discussion proceeds
at an aggregate level, employing "legislative acts" as the easily count-
able policy unit. Nowhere does this literature search beneath the cor-
relates of nominal data to explore the process of policy diffusion itself,
but it nevertheless suggests that this translocal, horizontal dynamic
has direct relevance to the policy process and it thereby suggests that
not all extralocal linkages are supralocal linkages.

It might, at this point, be useful to summarize the main arguments
presented thus far. First, to borrow Norton Long's (1972) metaphor,
cities have become "unwalled". The locality must be studied not in iso-
lation, but as a component in a larger system that can be variously de-
 fined. As Daland (1969) points out, the lack of congruence between the
boundaries of the urban political community and of the municipality it-
self suggests that we ought to speak less to geographical borders and more
directly to delineations among system components. Secondly, we have es-
established that the relationships among these system components, their
linkages, can flow in a number of directions. They may be directed up-
ward or downward across layers of government and/or across localities at
the same level. We have also suggested that local-extralocal linkages
are not confined by national borders. What remains to be specified are the types of linkages themselves.

III. THE LINKAGE CHANNELS

Hanna and Hanna (1969) provide the most elegant classification of these linkage channels. They suggest three forms of local-extralocal "integration": a formal, an informal, and a mixed type. The formal administrative linkage has been studied most intensively, and is defined by the flow of "authoritative interlevel communications" (p. 176). It includes the established structures of governance, and research in this area has tended towards the specification of the juridical bases of centralization and local autonomy. The second type of linkage relies upon interlevel elite interaction. It is described as "an informal network of influence" (p. 177). The Hannas' final category is described as a "mobilization network" (p. 178) that involves integration among elites both within and outside the formal-legal channels. This linkage is offered primarily to explain interlevel linkages of political parties and their auxiliary structures. Yet, they do not ignore what we have referred to here as horizontal, non-hierarchical linkages among sub-systems. In exploring these relationships they have pointed towards the roles played by influential individuals, "key townsmen who...communicate the perspectives of actors in one sub-system to those in other sub-systems (and who make) the socio-political practices and perspectives of the various sub-systems less divergent and contradictory" (p. 187).

While the authors were empirically concerned only with Black Africa, their analysis of local-extralocal relationships should be of considerable utility to the student of any local political system. It begins to
orient us towards a framework for making sense of the diversity of local–extralocal linkages. The inventory offered below is in part an elaboration and reworking of the Hannas' threefold classificatory scheme.

There are three broad types of local–extralocal linkages. The first are intergovernmental linkages which imply the integration of activities among authoritative actors responsible to different spatial units, within or across any level of governmental structure. While this is consistent with the Hannas' notion of formal linkages, it is broader in that it allows for the horizontal linkages among municipalities so critical to the regional policy process. These intergovernmental linkages, when vertical, typically take the form of central statutory or administrative supervision of local activity. They may refer to the prescribed functions performed by the locality for the central government. Steiner (1956, p. 191) reports that as much as eighty percent of local functions in Japan are centrally authorized and delegated functions. In pre-war Japan the central government enjoyed the capacity to appoint or remove local chief executives. (Muramatsu, 1975, discusses the persistence of central bureaucratic power vis-a-vis the locality.) In some Latin American nations, such as Mexico and Argentina, the central government assumes the administration of the capital city (Rabinovitz and Trueblood, 1973), and it is not uncommon for central personnel to play localized roles in many polities. As noted earlier, there is a vast literature on these sorts of intergovernmental linkages which presents detailed cases from virtually every continent (Legge, 1961 re Indonesia; Nsarkoh, 1964 re Ghana; Steiner, 1965 re Japan; Mackintosh, 1968 re U.K.; Rabinovitz and Trueblood, 1973 re Latin America). Particular note should be taken of the special issue of Studies in Comparative Local Government (Volume 4, Number 1, 1970) that treated cross-nationally the hierarchical inter-
governmental linkages extant in the United Kingdom, France, India, the Netherlands, the Sudan, Sweden, the United States, and Yugoslavia. These studies highlighted the downward flow of linkages, and in labeling them "tutelary" the editors identified the modal pattern of intergovernmental relationships. Tutelage implies the guidance, the direction, and the oversight of local policies (often through the appropriate ministries at the national level) that have an impact upon both the formulation and the implementation of local public policy. Undoubtedly the most significant mechanism for central tutelage is control of the local bodies' capacity to generate revenue. Local dependence upon central grants and subsidies has been detailed in all of the studies cited above. Articles by Ashford (1974 re U.K.) and Donald (1959 re Brazil) are typical of the numerous more specialized studies that are focused on local fiscal dependence. In addition to the circumscription of the local capacity to tax, many central governments possess the authority to control local expenditures and to audit local governments. (It should once again be stressed that while central-local tutelage is the modal pattern of intergovernmental interaction, such a relationship does not exhaust the full range of intergovernmental linkage possibilities.)

The second broad type of local-extralocal linkage can be labeled extra-governmental. This refers to the integration (again, either vertical or horizontal) of non-governmental actors or institutions that either influence the locality from the outside or that influence the larger system from the locality. The form of this type of linkage that has attracted the most scholarly attention is the linkage between local party organizations and their national party apparatuses. Ashford (1975a) discusses penetration of local political activity by British national party...
organizations. He finds that as the alliance of local elites with the national party increases, so does partisanship at the local level. As partisanship increases, so does local competition. Kesselman (1974a) suggests that the low intensity of national-local party linkages in France serves to enable the locality to resist central domination. With varying foci others have also studied this kind of intraorganizational linkage (Bulpitt, 1963 re U.K.; Freeman, 1958 re U.S.; Tarkowski, 1974 re Poland). Local parties may be chapters of national parties, and as such their programs may be more consistent with the goals of the national organization than with local conditions. Or, as Parkinson (1971) has demonstrated, empirical investigation of these intraparty linkages may lead us to reconsider any zero-sum assumptions that we might have concerning the relationship of party structure and the local elites' responsiveness to local circumstances. Further, we can repeat our earlier suggestion that these sorts of linkages from the locality may extend well beyond national borders. Often, major opposition and ruling parties find themselves dependent upon foreign sources of financial and ideological support. Finally, we should note once again that these vertical intraorganizational party linkages may also flow from below to above. Local political elites may become influential nationally via the apparatus of their political party or interest group.

Other forms of extragovernmental linkages exist as well, although they have not often been the objects of empirical research. Economic institutions such as large corporations and banking systems are as much a part of the political and social life of the locality as they are a part of the larger system. Indeed they may play a dominant role in shaping local public policy. Absentee decision-making is thus not restricted
to the governmental process (Long, 1959; Mott, 1970). So too, labor unions may be active in urban locales, even as their central committees are situated outside the community. Totten (1975) offers a short review of two studies that detail "the international linkages in Japanese labor politics." Harari's (1973) study is also relevant here. Just as we can speak of alliances among municipalities, we can speak of interactions among non-governmental organizations across geo-legal boundaries at the local level. Cooperation or competition among diverse interest groups and political parties on such issues as environmental protection and public services are an often important manifestation of this type of horizontal, extragovernmental linkage. So too in many polities ethnic linkages serve to shape translocal interactions. Transnational elite linkages that impact upon the locality might also be regarded as potentially important extragovernmental linkages that take an interpersonal form. Leeds (1976) has offered a valuable critique of the dualism in social science literature which posits dichotomies between rural and urban, city and town, center and periphery. He argues that this forces us to conceive of localities as enclosed ideal types, and that this precludes processual thought. He is led instead to speak of "population nucleations" for which extralocal linkages may be either "tightly" or "loosely coupled." In Leeds' view, the peasant who offers his produce for sale in the central market is a type of urban man. The locality is tied to the larger system through a wide variety of extragovernmental linkages of marketing, transportation, and communication. In this regard, Aiken's (1980) adaptation of Pred's (1973) work on the urban system deserves mention for its innovative approach to these sorts of extragovernmental linkages.

The third type of local-extralocal linkage can be called integrative.
These linkages are comprised of the interactions between governmental and nongovernmental actors and organizations which unite society and polity. As early as 1964 Leeds, in exploring the bases of national-local integration in Brazil, isolated career patterns and recruitment networks which were fundamental in linking the locality to the larger society. He found that a public official in pursuit of career mobility may come to rely upon any number of particularized, often extralocal, contacts. These may include church, education, friendship, or commercial ties, as well as contacts with extended family members (Leeds, 1964, p. 1329-1331). Many other scholars have also addressed these sorts of linkages. Valenzuela (forthcoming) is concerned with political recruitment patterns in Chile as center-local linkage mechanisms. Kesselman (1974b) speaks of the interdependence of local and extralocal actors. Daland (1968) discusses patronage linkages between governmental and non-governmental actors that are similarly based upon personal and ascriptive criteria. The Hannas (1971) speak of the relevance of both central and intermediate level actors in local politics in Africa by pointing to elite linkages that may be based upon ethnicity, language, or religion. Clientage patterns may be viewed as above-to-below linkages, or they may be viewed as essentially upward linkages that impact upon the larger system with localized actors, interests and demands.

Another form this integrative linkage might take appears when local interest groups bypass their local government in order to articulate their demands at a higher level. Hanna and Hanna (1969) report that in Mbale, Uganda, "the direct channel to the center to which the locally 'subordinate' Africans have access tends to equalize [their power vis-a-vis Asians] at the local level" (p. 193). So too, national in-
terest groups may find a local cause worthy of their organizational efforts, as in the case of the urban lobbying done in New York City by the Congress of Racial Equality to gather local support for a rent strike in the early 1960's (Lipsky, 1970). Other examples of such extralocal organizational intervention are documented in the cases of nuclear power plant construction (Nelkin, 1971), the fluoridation controversy (Crain, et al., 1969; McNeil, 1957), and the community relations problems of Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York, in which a nation-wide proxy fight was launched in order to convince Kodak of its responsibility towards urban residents (Alinsky, 1971). If these interest groups lack a national constituency, then community organizations that are active in other localities can be seen as horizontally linked to that locality. An example is the efforts of ROAR, Boston's anti-busing group, to aid similarly disposed groups in other American cities in 1975.

Yet another form of this integrative linkage is the relationship between local governments and major industrial firms which are being sought after for relocation or for the construction of new plants. Muramatsu (1975) claims that it was the wooing of new industry by localities which served as a significant local level contribution to Japan's economic development. He reports that almost three-quarters of all Japanese cities have ordinances prescribing incentives for the situation of new industries (p. 805). Allinson (1975) offers a striking historical case in which substantial cooperation was extended by local officials in the situation of the Toyota enterprise in Kariya City, Japan. The reverse form of this linkage obtains when the central bureaucracy implements public policy that has an impact upon the economic development of localities and locally-based enterprises. In the United States, the Department of Commerce (1970) has prepared an extensive examination
of this.

IV. SYNTHESIS

The three broad types of linkages outlined above can be analyzed in a number of ways. We have noted that each can flow either horizontally or vertically. This is represented in tabular form in Table 2-1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage Type</th>
<th>Direction of Flow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intergovernmental</td>
<td>if above to below:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tutelary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>if below to above:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extragovernmental</td>
<td>intraorganizational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrative</td>
<td>if above to below:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governmental-non-governmental</td>
<td>regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>if below to above:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>private demand-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A variety of structural questions immediately arise from this display. We must first consider whether the nodes of these interactions are local, intermediary, national, or international in origin. Once having determined their origin we must further ask: to where are these linkages directed? Upon what level(s) do they have an impact? Through what level(s) do they flow? The terminals of the interaction, i.e. the origin and the target, are variable and thus require identification in the analysis of local-extralocal linkages. We can further ask about the
content of the linkage channel. A wide variety of "messages" are transmitted through these channels, including financial resources, tutelage, control, conflict, demands, supports, and demonstration effects. We can ask also about the volume of the message, its degree of routinization, and thereby about the nature of its impact.

The context, the particular set of conditions which operate on local-extralocal interdependence at particular points in time, is also of analytic importance. Linkages are variable phenomena in dynamic environments. We must ask: How do linkages change over time? What difference does this make? How are these changes influenced by changes in the larger political and economic arena? We are left with a formidable, but not unmanageable array of questions which, if systematically addressed, should aid us in understanding the politics of the local and regional policy processes. This is the guide, and these are the questions which have informed the research on these pages. The extent to which this formulation acts as a searchlight illuminating the road ahead instead of as a distraction blinding the researcher (Moore, 1950) is the extent to which we will have been able to make a significant contribution to a comparative conception of local politics as well as to our understanding of the regional policy process in Japan.
CHAPTER III
INTERGOVERNMENTAL LINKAGES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Summary

This chapter provides a "nuts and bolts," legal-formal overview of intergovernmental relations in Japan. Using the structural framework developed in Chapter Two, it first explores vertical, tutelary relations, and then turns toward an examination of the eight Local Autonomy Law-based formulae for the joint implementation of policy. Of the five basic mechanisms for central tutelage, the personnel linkage is the least well understood in the West, and is therefore the best detailed in this chapter. The use of appointments of career central bureaucrats to the strategic prefectural posts of General Affairs and Local Affairs Chiefs merits particular attention. Also explored are the non-juridical, but highly institutionalized practices, such as the maintenance of Tokyo offices by municipalities and prefectures, which are designed by localities to facilitate vertical relations. The ambiguous role of the Ministry of Home Affairs as both champion of local interests and as defender of central prerogatives is outlined in relation to the notion of tatewari gyosei. Literally "vertical administration," this concept implies the mutual insularity among central ministries as much as it implies tutelage of localities by the center. It is the most important structural description of public administration in Japan, and is first introduced in this chapter.
Conclusions

We find that translocal coalitions for joint public policy are only in a literal sense horizontal forums. Like public corporations, the other fundamental tool of regional policy, they are very much bound by the tightly vertical structure of public administration in Japan. Localities in policy coalition, like localities alone, are in a large measure essentially contractors for centrally-directed regional policy as it is directed through the five tutelary mechanisms described in the first part of the chapter. We find that these coalitions have been expanding in the postwar even more rapidly than has local policy itself, but we find also that this expansion is little related to local autonomy. The exploration of the horizontal dimension of intergovernmental relations provides both reinforcement for as well as a more subtle understanding of previous notions of the mechanisms of centralization in Japanese public administration.

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a necessary "nuts and bolts" overview of intergovernmental relations in Japan by relying upon the structural model presented in Chapter Two. It first presents the legal-formal outline of the vertical structure of public administration. It then explores the eight Local Autonomy Law-based provisions for horizontal intergovernmental relations. The vertical dimension will be only summarily presented because comprehensive descriptions of vertical intergovernmental relations already exist in English.¹ The discussion of vertical linkages will therefore also concentrate primarily upon those which are least well documented in English language sources. Thus, financial relationships
will be only briefly described, while personnel linkages will be docu-
mented for the first time. The section following that focuses upon how
local governments legally and formally do things together, but more im-
portantly, it explores the ways in which these horizontal relationships
are themselves unexplored manifestations of a vertical system of local
public administration.

II. VERTICAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL LINKAGES

Broadly speaking, there are three ways in which the central gov-
ernment directs the implementation of public policy in Japan. The cen-
ter may elect to 1) do it itself through the use of its field offices
(desaki kikan) outside Tokyo, it may 2) do it through public corpora-
tions, which have a quasi-authoritative character, and/or it may 3)
have the local governments do it in the center's stead.

The first route, that of central field agencies, is a postwar phe-
nomenon. It is a strategy developed by the central ministries as a
direct response to the impending loss of the prefecture as a formal cen-
tral organ.\textsuperscript{2} The various ministries sought to maintain a foothold in
the provinces by establishing field offices they could directly command.
The result has too often been an overlapping of prefectural and field
agency activities. This duplication is not resented by the prefectures
for its inherent lack of administrative rationality, but for its contri-
bution to what the National Association of Governors calls the "double
supervision of its affairs."\textsuperscript{3} In Steiner's words, "there is no obvious
need for their existence unless one shares the distrust of local autonomy
that prompted their establishment."\textsuperscript{4} As Chapter Four will demonstrate,
the reform of these field agencies have been an unattainable object of re-
form for thirty years.
The second route, the use of public corporations, is a mire of contending laws, regulations, and directives. The so-called きだん-きょしゃ (public corporations) are fully understood by few others than the practitioners who skillfully use these organs as external agencies to the ministries. They are organs which exist outside of the government, and thus they exist outside of the restrictions of administrative procedure. There are more than one hundred such Special Corporations (特別会社) at the national level, the majority of which, such as the Japan Highway Public Corporation, the Japanese National Railway Corporation, and the Japan Housing Corporation, are deeply related to local public administration. In addition, there exist some 3,000 local public corporations which are funded by localities through grants and direct investment, and which conduct affairs as private corporations for local governments. These are de facto external organs of the local governments, as most employees work jointly for the localities as well. These should not be confused with the national level public corporations in their power and scope, but they too, through personnel linkages of the kind to be described below, also enjoy close ties with the center. Their nominal private sector status frees them from the encumbrances of direct central control, however. There were only forty-five of these in 1953, and the expansion toward the present level of three thousand was greatly accelerated during the high growth of the 1960's, as most are related to land development, housing, and the promotion of primary industry. Both the field agency route and the public corporation route for the implementation of public policy have attracted the vocal opposition of the parties of the left.

The third route, the implementation of central policy by local governments, is naturally the most important from the point of view of
this study, as it is also the most important from the point of view of
domestic public policy in Japan. A quick look at some figures strongly
suggests the scale of local government spending: In 1976, expenditures
by local governments in Japan amounted to nearly two-thirds of all net
governmental expenditures in Japan. Governmental expenditure represents
twenty-six percent of Japan's Gross National Product (GNP), but fully
seventeen percent of Japan's GNP is composed of local governmental expen-
ditures. 7

If we add to these three general routes for policy implementation,
the specific tutelary linkage mechanisms by which the center is able to
guide policy through the localities, the following results:

FIGURE 3-1

ROUTES OF CENTRAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

[Diagram of routes of central policy implementation]
Let us examine each of these in turn.

A. Finance

There is a variety of forms of financial tutelage of localities by the central government, a variety which, while expanded to over four hundred kinds of financial transfers, has not greatly changed since Stein-
er first treated the subject. He argued, quite convincingly to most, that the structure was one of local financial dependence. As evidence, he recited the litany of central prerogatives. The central government has consistently collected about seventy percent of all tax revenue in Japan. Moreover, all tax sources are prescribed by national law, and the locality may not levy a new tax or issue a bond without first secur-
ing permission. This seventy-thirty split in untransferred income spawned the catchphrase "thirty percent autonomy," (san wari jichi), which has often been cited as at the root of local dependence.

There is, however, a new orthodoxy concerning the actual degree to which Japanese localities are dependent upon the center. Aqua notes that there has been a general tendency for non-categorical grants (untied funds) to increase. His calculations show that forty-four percent of all transfer payments are of this type. Reed also argues that central financial tutelage is less than it seems to be, noting not only the large amount of non-categorical transfers, but also the inability or unwilling-
ess of the central government to discriminate against uncooperative lo-
calities.

On balance, however, while they are not the deprived suppliants of the conventional characterization, Japanese localities are also not the fiscally autonomous entities found in Federal systems. There clearly is a structure of tutelage, even if the localities operating within it are
able to do well for themselves.

B. Approval and Permission

The power to grant approval and permission (the real power lies obviously in the ability to veto local projects by withholding, or threatening to withhold, permission) stands along finances as another mechanism by which the center can supervise local governance. Each year a wide variety of new laws and mandates are promulgated by the central government, the implementation of which is left to the localities. In every case the right of permission and approval is reserved for the relevant central ministry. Thus, all such projects and programs are subject to review before implementation and are likely to be supervised during their execution. In 1969, with the promulgation of the New City Planning Law, the formal decision-making authority for urban planning and urban facilities was devolved from the Construction Minister to the prefectoral governors and to the city mayors; but what evolved instead was a system of de facto approval by the Ministry via prior consultations and conferences. Some examples of the de jure provisions: The Construction Minister's prior approval is required for a) all prefectoral roads wider than sixteen meters, b) all city roads, c) parks larger than four hectares, and d) eight different sorts of land use designations in urban plans, ranging from housing sites to manufacturing zones. The Transport Minister's prior approval is required for a) the creation of new or changes in existing bus routes and bus stops, and b) the granting of taxi licenses, among a variety of other things such as port and harbor planning. Similarly, the prefectoral governors enjoy parallel powers vis-a-vis the cities, towns, and villages within their jurisdiction.

In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which will be discussed
In some further detail below, can lay first claim to such veto power in virtually all matters related to local finance and local administration itself. Here it works in tandem with the Ministry of Finance to regulate all bond flotation by the local governments and to control, again by the sanction of approval and permission, the introduction of new taxes by the localities. The case of bond issues is a particularly interesting one, for the Local Autonomy Law (Article 230) in principle guarantees localities the right to set their own bond issuances, yet Article 250 stipulates that localities must first obtain the approval of the Minister of Home Affairs before floating a loan. This latter article, written in 1947, provides the Minister this power only "for the time being;" an intense debate has raged around how long the Ministry of Home Affairs is going to continue to insist that it is still, more than thirty years after the law was issued, "the time being."

C. Delegated Functions

Local governments in Japan perform three types of affairs. These are stipulated in Article Two, Paragraph Two of the Local Autonomy Law as: 1) Community Affairs, 2) Delegated Affairs, and 3) Administrative Affairs. Paragraph Three of that same Article contains a list of some twenty-two clauses which define community affairs. They differ from administrative affairs, in that the latter require local ordinances for their implementation and are usually associated with civil and criminal codes. They differ also from delegated functions which are stipulated by national laws and cabinet orders. Article 232 holds that local bodies

*The latest challenge to the legality of this clause was launched by former Tokyo Governor Minobe in September 1977, but his effort was aborted when an uncooperative Tokyo Prefectural Assembly declined to test the constitutionality of the law in court.
themselves shall be responsible for expenditures incurred in the conduct of all three sorts of affairs, although it also stipulates that it shall be up to the center to work out a formula to meet the expenses incurred by localities in the management of centrally delegated functions. Nevertheless, in practice these formulae have been ad hoc, and have typically been insufficient. The result has been a movement by localities to seek redress of this "excess financial burden." 14

It is of course these latter, delegated functions, which are important as intergovernmental tutelary mechanisms. Unlike the American Constitution which leaves to the states all affairs not expressly reserved for the Federal Government, the Local Autonomy Law specifies a wide range of delegated functions which the localities must perform for the center. There are two kinds of such functions. First, there are "entity" delegated functions which are assigned to the locality as a corporate unit. In turn, the locality is required to implement the national directives and guidelines by passing its own ordinance in the ordinary fashion. The affair then becomes the locality's, and does not differ from the "Community Affairs" listed above. Secondly, there are the "Agency" delegated functions in which the center assigns a function directly to one of the administrative organs within the locality. Usually it is the chief executive to whom the affair is delegated, but functions may also be assigned to the school boards, public safety commissions, etc. 15 These differ from "entity" delegated functions in that even after the assignment the affairs retain the legal character of central functions. The local organ is thus acting in the capacity of a state agency, and executes the affair under the supervision and direction of the relevant state minister (in the case of a prefecture), or under the direction of the prefectural governor (in the case of a municipality). 16 The chief
executive, when acting in this capacity, is responsible not to his legislative assembly, but to the relevant cabinet minister. Moreover, this assembly has no authority to pass ordinances or make laws concerning this affair. In cases where there is illegality, negligence, or procrastination in the execution of these affairs the center or prefecture has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus taking the recalcitrant chief executive to court to force compliance. Ultimately, the Minister also possesses the authority to remove that chief executive from office.*

In 1952 the Local Autonomy Law was revised and "Annexes Three and Four" entitled "The Affairs to be Managed and Executed by the Prefectural Governor" and "The Affairs to be Managed and Executed by the City Mayor" were added. The former alone contains 128 paragraphs, each detailing a specific function, many containing multiple subclauses which likewise assign separate affairs. These range from the adjudication of pension claims to payment for school lunch services. Preceding Annexes Three and Four are Annexes One and Two, which spell out many of the "entity" delegated functions, and which number more than one hundred each. Efforts to contain the proliferation of delegated functions notwithstanding, since 1952 functions delegated to prefectures have increased by 2.4 times and those to municipalities have doubled.17 The following table displays the growth of "Agency" delegated functions, a growth which is only slightly less than this combined growth:

*MacDougall (1975), Chapter Eight, details the famous case in which progressive localities challenged the center's "Agency" delegation of Korean Alien Registration procedures. The challenge resulted in the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
TABLE 3-1
THE GROWTH OF "AGENCY" DELEGATED FUNCTIONS
(Unit: Number of functions delegated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFECTURES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Administration Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Committee</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Labor Committee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Administration Committee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Committee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWNS/VILLAGES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/Village Mayor</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Administration Committee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Committee</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


D. Administrative Guidance

Each ministry and agency of the central government issues administrative notifications and guidelines for localities in the name of its chief executive officer. The term administrative guidance covers a very broad range of such notifications. Usually referred to collectively as tsūtatsu (literally memorandum or notification), there are actually four sorts of such communications between center and locality of which tsūtatsu is but one. In descending order of formal consequence they are:
TABLE 3-2
TUTELARY COMMUNICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ISSUING AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Ministerial Orders (kunrei)</td>
<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ministerial Notifications (tsūtatsu)</td>
<td>Deputy Director/Bureau Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Internal Memorandums (naikan)</td>
<td>Division Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Business Correspondence (jimu renraku)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief/Section Chief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unlike legal measures which derive from the Constitution, the Diet, from Cabinet orders (seirei), or from Cabinet Ministers (shōrei and kisoku), the four vehicles of intergovernmental communication listed above are directed only at civil servants. They never apply to the private sector. Of these four, only the first two are defined by law (gyōsei kisoku); nevertheless, all four may de facto carry the force of law, even if there is no legal basis for it. Indeed, although Ministerial orders and notifications are each defined by law, they are not themselves legally binding upon local administrators. They are merely treated as if they were by most of those involved.

Basically, they all tend to convey the center's legal interpretation of new statutes and the center's policy intentions to the localities. These sorts of guidance might also take the form of model legislation, prepared by the center as a ready to wear legislative program for the localities. Often, due to the fact that there are so many ministries, each issuing such guidelines and notifications, localities may often ignore many with impunity. Alternatively, localities may find themselves able to choose to follow the directive which most closely conforms to its own interests. In any event, while an important mechanism of central tutelage, it is hardly a postwar phenomenon. Allinson points out that:

The vast body of civil law during the Tokugawa Era was created by the Tokugawa house and apparently adopted with little modi-
fication by most daimyō for implementation in their domains.\textsuperscript{18}

The Ministry of Home Affairs is the hinge of this vertical system. While every ministry and agency has its own sorts of functional relationships with local governments, none besides this one has the local governments themselves as its client group. It is an important difference, for that role often pits the Home Affairs Ministry as the spokesman for local interests against other ministries. Yet, the Ministry of Home Affairs is after all a central ministry itself, and as such stands atop the entire system of local public administration in Japan.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichi Shō) is the most direct descendant of the prewar Home Ministry (Naimushō) which, established in November 1873, was responsible for virtually everything related to domestic public policy before the war. Before its dissolution in December 1947 by SCAP authorities it had directly administered labor, police, construction and welfare policy, among others. The purge of many Home Ministry bureaucrats, the reduction of the organ responsible for local public administration to mere agency status, and the transfer of many of its functions to new ministries and agencies, served to greatly limit the influence of the new "Autonomy Board." But less than ten years after the end of the occupation in 1960, the then Autonomy Agency was elevated to ministry status, and the Local Autonomy Ministry (as it was then known) sat as nominal equal to the most powerful of the spending ministries. It is divided into three bureaus: Tax, Administration, and Finance, and through these units it enjoys a particularly close relationship with relevant divisions (usually those most closely related to generalized tasks of administration and public finance) within the local bodies. While each of the central ministries has its own particular client bureaus and sec-
tions within the local governments,* none has as generalized a responsibility toward local public administration. Thus, none finds itself as often as does the Home Affairs Ministry, caught between its role as advocate of local interests and its role as central ministry.

The single most important Ministry of Home Affairs local client bureau is the General Affairs Bureau of each prefecture (Somubu). These General Affairs Bureaus house the divisions responsible for taxation, finance, personnel, and local affairs, and as such are by far the most powerful bureaus within the prefecture.

The division within the prefectures' General Affairs Bureaus with the responsibility for the supervision of the affairs of the cities, towns, and villages within the prefecture is the Local Affairs Division (Chihōka).** From Meiji until the end of the Second World War, the Local Affairs Division was the Home Ministry's thumb on the pulse of local activity. Along with the Educational Affairs Section, no other prewar branch of the prefecture was more important for the continual review of local policy and for assurance of local compliance with central directives. According to some accounts they were the most powerful section in the old prefectures,¹⁹ and they are today, while less powerful than they once were, still powerfully situated as the organ of local oversight in the prefecture.***

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*For example, the Ministry of Education normally directs its grants and subsidies toward the localities' Boards of Education, the Welfare Ministry directs its toward the local Bureaus of Sanitation and Health, and the Construction Ministry has a particularly important relationship with the Engineering and Construction Bureaus of the local governments.

**The role of the Local Affairs Division, typically among the largest of the prefecture's divisions, has never before been explored in English language studies of local public administration in Japan, yet they deserve treatment, as their role is pivotal in the routine of a tutelary system.
E. Personnel

The packing of these strategic positions in the localities by central officials is the final mechanism by which the central government can supervise the implementation of its national policy.* The shuttling of personnel is an institution in Japanese local public administration which has changed little since the war, and which deserves detailed examination

***It is fascinating when one gets a glimpse of the ways in which the chiefs of these Local Affairs Divisions see their own roles and responsibilities. The journal Chiho Jichi published in 1965-1966 a ten part series of essays by these division heads, and once one realizes that most of these Local Affairs Division Chiefs are also Home Affairs Ministry career officials, one can understand the origin of both the sense of competence as well as noblesse oblige which emanates from their essays.

We've the duty as directors of the cities, towns, and villages to lead them one or two steps at a time. We've the responsibility to take them in the direction (of progress and citizens' welfare)... (Then Aomori Prefecture Local Affairs Division Chief Chiba Takeshi, 1966, pp. 53-57).

Others are less missionary, although all emphasize their leadership roles. Adachi (1965) of Gifu Prefecture emphasized his role as mediator of political disputes among municipalities, but he also emphasized their role in the explanation of statutes and laws, the calculation of subsidies, assessment for bond applications. Okada (1965) emphasized the role of the Local Affairs Division in the training of municipal personnel, the promotion of joint policy among local governments (horizontal intergovernmental relations as initiated from above is the topic of part two of this chapter), and in coordinating intraprefectural planning efforts. Okada was in particular quite frank in portraying himself as an arm of central policy. During the mid-1950's, when the amalgamation of small localities was proceeding with great urgency, it was the Local Affairs Division's responsibility to supervise the difficult and complicated process. In another role the Local Affairs Division is an important facilitator for the localities in its charge; it consolidates, coordinates, and directs their requests for funds and approvals through the prefectural and central bureaucracies.

*These personnel linkages are based more upon precedent than law, and this may be one reason why the topic is not ordinarily included in discussions of legal-formal intergovernmental relations in Japan. Secondly, the mere counting of central government heads does not by itself demonstrate tutelage. That is, it is quite conceivable that the dispatched central official who assumes a management position in the locality is concerned with his future after his early retirement, and thus will be zealous in his efforts to work for the locality, even if that means confrontation with the center,
as the in situ component of central tutelage. There are four types of personnel linkages.*

1. Chihō Jimu Kansei (Control of Local Affairs)

This form of personnel linkage originated in the occupation period when it was unclear how completely localities would be able to manage their own affairs. Amended as Supplementary Article Eight to the Local Autonomy Law in 1947, the legal provision was stipulated as an "interim measure" to override "for the time being" the guarantees of Articles 172, 173, and 175 which grant the prefectural governor sovereignty in personnel matters. When this supplement was set forth the framers of the law were most concerned about maintaining expertise in the areas of transport and insurance; a secondary concern was that of employee stability. It goes without saying that under the prewar system in which the prefecture was no more than a central field office, these concerns were unknown. With the introduction of the new system there was much that was uncertain, and thus while every prefectural official nominally became a "local civil servant" in 1947, exceptions were made for those responsible for the above areas. Although their functions are identical to those of regular prefectural employees, and although they are under the governor's supervision, their individual standing is that of national civil servants. Their jobs are created by, their appointments are approved by, their dismissals are effected by, and their salaries are paid by the center. These officials, all of whom are below the level of section chief, remain "for the time being" in this anomalous state. In 1977

*A fifth, haizoku, (assignment), is a term usually reserved for the attachment of senior officials to central field offices. Because they are not assigned to the locality itself, this form of personnel movement will not be discussed on these pages.
there were more than 20,000 such public employees, seventy-five percent of whom worked for the Welfare Ministry. Of the remaining 5,000 persons about half were from the Transport and Labor Ministries. This figure takes on even more significance when it is contrasted to the total of only 8,000 such employees in 1953, a time when this concern over the capabilities of the prefecture could be better justified.20 There are problems basic to this arrangement quite apart from questions concerning constitutional guarantees of local autonomy and the responsibility of the prefectural governor to his constituents. One is the difference in pay scale between prefectural and central civil servants, the former being higher in all but four cases. Accompanying that are issues of pensions, union membership, and other individual concerns. It has become obligatory for the center to pay "hush salaries" (yami kyūryō) to these employees in order to make up the difference between what the prefecture would pay them if they were fully prefectural employees and what the center can officially pay.

There is a long history of efforts to abolish this form of central control. The first call for its abolition was made by the famous Kambe Report in 1950.21 Joining the chorus over the next several decades were the influential Local Affairs Investigation Council (Chihō Gyōsei Chōsakai), (a body which will be discussed in Chapter Four), the blue ribbon Special Administration Investigation Council (Rinji Gyōsei Chōsakai), the Diet Committee Concerned with Local Administration (Chihō Gyōsei Iinkai), and the National Governors Association (Zenkoku Chijikai). They each supported the transfer of these employees to the status of local civil servants.

At times there was support for this change among the ministries as
well. In 1968 the Ministers of Local Autonomy (as the Home Affairs Ministry was then known), and Transport, and the chief of the Administrative Management Agency agreed upon a course of reform in an interagency memo. This was never transformed into policy, and the issue was put on ice for several years. In 1973 the Ministry of Home Affairs prepared a Diet Bill for the partial revision of the Local Autonomy Law, which would have abolished the system by the end of fiscal 1974. There was a slight delay, but in May 1974 the Local Administration Committees of both houses of Diet moved with suprapartisan support to designate the end of fiscal 1975 as the target date. It was at this point that the three relevant ministries set to work to destroy the reform plan; their counterattack again set back the reform measures. Interestingly, then Prime Minister Miki and the Socialists were both strongly in favor of the reform. Miki repeatedly issued public declarations that it would all be settled in the 1976 Diet. During this period a high level interagency conference committee was established to seek compromise of the issue, and LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Head Hashimoto Ryūtarō offered his own plan for open debate. But in the end the vested interests within the bureaucracy (Welfare, Labor, and Transport) prevailed. The LDP did not feel that it was an issue worthy of the possible alienation of some of the interests within the party; the reform was shelved. The Welfare Ministry argued that what they were engaged in in the prefectures were essentially national affairs which could not be competently conducted by local officials. They suggested that this reform would throw the pension and insurance systems into chaos and mismanagement. The Transport Ministry felt less strongly about the issue, perhaps in direct proportion to their fewer number of employees. They did, however, press strongly to retain control of vehicle registration, an affair which occupied 80 percent of
their prefectural employees.

The position which was adopted by the Ministry of Home Affairs is particularly instructive. The Ministry of Home Affairs argued that a new "general principle" in regard to personnel matters be adopted. They took the view that all prefectural employees up to the level of Deputy Section Chief be local civil servants. The Ministry of Home Affairs was sanctimonious in its defense of the principles of local autonomy, and it appeared clearly to be playing the role of the defender of the prefecture against the unprovoked and basically illegal encroachment of central power. As noted above, it is not unusual for this ministry to find itself battling other ministries as representative of the interests of the localities. But in this case, it was defending its own turf more than that of the prefectures. That is, by limiting these personnel linkages to the subdivision chief level it was actually defining the contours of its own personnel linkages with local governments. From the point of view of local public administration as a whole, the most important form of personnel linkage is that between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the local governments, and it begins to be important only at the section chief level. It is the subject of the following section.

2. Katsuai (Transfer)

The term katsuai literally implies the removal of the cumbersome-ness of a matter. It also involves the parting with something, sharing, and making things simpler by sacrificing something which is valued. It is the most highly developed, least well understood, and most commonly attacked of all personnel linkages between the center and locality.*

*The term katsuai is at times used also to designate the transfer of officials from one prefecture to another, something which is more common than is generally known. This use of the term is unrelated, however, to the sorts of institutionalized vertical transfers discussed in this section.
It is also the most important, for the personnel who are transferred are among the most professionally competent in Japanese public administration. This system of katsuai differs from the system of chihō jimu kansei discussed above in the sense that the latter is not a personnel movement. In the case of katsuai there actually takes place a transfer of highly educated and trained central officials from Tokyo to the local governments. Given the formalism which characterizes the rest of Japanese bureaucratic norms katsuai is a surprisingly informal, although no less institutionalized practice. The transferred officials are all in mid-career, and thus should be distinguished from the amakudari appointees discussed below. They are sent to the localities, mostly to the prefectures, both for further career training, as well as to serve as supervisors of assured competence in loco parentis for the center.* The Ministry of Home Affairs is more directly involved in these sorts of transfers than any of the other ministries, but it provides less than one half of the total of all such personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION MINISTRY</th>
<th>Bureau Chief</th>
<th>Deputy Bureau Chief</th>
<th>Section Chief</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Affairs</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade and Industry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/Forestry</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministers' Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>295</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>513</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Ministry of Home Affairs is more directly involved in these sorts of transfers than any of the other ministries, but it provides less than one half of the total of all such personnel.
Source: Mainichi Shimbun (March 17, 1975).

The system is interesting as much for the glimpse it affords us of career patterns in Japan's upper level civil service as it is for the implications it has for local public administration. One of the very first requirements of the new entrant in the Home Affairs Ministry is the submission of his resignation. Thereupon he begins a career-long shuttling back and forth between center and locality through which the official eventually develops an enormous web of personal ties and professional affiliations. After a short three month stint at the "home" office during which he is required to translate foreign materials on public administration, the young recruit is sent off to his first field assignment, usually in a prefectural Local Affairs Section.** But these resignations are not without some danger for the transferee himself. Each year there are one or two in each entering class who are not "invited" to return to Tokyo after their second tour of duty in the provinces is completed. In those cases there is nothing anyone can do to help him. Because they've officially resigned, they no longer have any claim on a position in Tokyo. (The weeding out of officials does not stop with the rigorous entrance examinations.) Because there are no formally prescribed procedures, and because there is no formal assignment made (they are transferred "at the request" of the prefec-

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*These men are often younger than the permanent local officials who are already in place. They may in fact not yet have as much expertise as those local officers, and they almost certainly would not yet have the same level of experience.

**It should be pointed out also that the prefectures are very desirous of these appointments, for they feel that it both raises the level of resident expertise, at least at the more advanced positions, as well as paves the way for smoother relations with the center.
tures), they must burn their bridges with each move. Each official may make as many as six or more such career moves before it becomes certain whether his career will take him "permanently" to the higher echelons of the Home Affairs Ministry, or to the less prestigious higher echelons of a prefectural administration. A look at cross-sectional data provides us with a hint of the relationship of these movements to the individual's career.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Entered H.A. Ministry</th>
<th>General Affairs Bureau Chiefs</th>
<th>Deputy General Affairs Bureau Chiefs</th>
<th>Local Affairs Section Chiefs</th>
<th>Local Affairs Section Trainee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most striking thing about these data is the almost perfect correlation between years of service and position. There is clearly a graded pattern of promotion.

A second point, again in terms of career patterns, is the way in which entire "incoming classes" of officials move between Tokyo and the prefectures together throughout most of their careers. Indeed, most of an elite Home Affairs Ministry official's career is spent away from the Ministry. Those in their fourth and fifth years are all back in Tokyo, and by the sixth year, most are back out in the provinces. This continues until the number of positions remaining at the Ministry itself for higher level aspirants becomes so few that a career decision is foisted upon the official as a fait accompli. After some fifteen years or less he understands where his future lies. There simply cannot be enough Bureau Chief and Vice Director steps to enable each member of a 14-18 man entering cohort to stay in Tokyo after his first fifteen years.

These data also tell us important things about the system itself. At any given time well over one half, and closer to two-thirds of the elite of the Home Affairs Ministry, are not in the Home Affairs Ministry per se. Under this katsuai arrangement, they are officially prefectural and municipal officials. More important than the numbers alone is the nature of the placement of these elite bureaucrats. On the average, more than sixty-five percent of the prefectures have a Ministry of Home Affairs katsuai placement in one of their top administrative posts. Moreover, if we examine these same data longitudinally, we discover that this

*Only those positions most directly related to oversight of the prefectural administration and to the supervision of the cities, towns, and villages have been included. Data are current for October 1976.
pattern has remained largely unchanged in the postwar. Indeed, if there is a change to be discerned, it is one in the direction of an even greater number of placements in recent years. Never before have as many different prefectures (thirty-seven) hosted such an official in one of these posts. (See Table 3–5).

The significance of these figures should be clearly restated. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in spite of Local Autonomy Law guarantees of the independent authority of local chief executives, enjoys what amounts to a carte blanche in the appointment of those prefectural officials who are most directly responsible for the oversight of local public policy. These personnel transfers, executed with the full cooperation of the localities, are thus one of the principal means by which the central government is able to supervise local activity. The three posts which have been singled out here are those which are most responsible for the activities of the cities, towns, and villages within the prefectures' borders. That is to say that they direct a significant portion of these municipalities' planning, spending, and policy implementation. Included in these activities are also the activities which localities engage in together (a major part of this chapter) and thus one cannot understand these horizontal intergovernmental relations unless one first understands the nature of the vertically structured system which directs them.

3. Hakkenn (Dispatch)

This sort of personnel movement is rather more irregular and more functionally specific than that discussed above. The central official who is dispatched is usually directed to solve a particular technical problem for which he is particularly well trained. He need not resign
### Table 3-5

**Distribution of Top Katsuai Posts in Postwar Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(a) General Affairs Bureau Chiefs</th>
<th>(b) Deputy General Affairs Bureau Chiefs</th>
<th>(c) Local Affairs Section Chiefs</th>
<th>Local Affairs Section Trainees</th>
<th>a+b+c</th>
<th>Number of Different Prefectures Represented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These data are not published in any form for the years 1948-1968. They are based upon a look at closely guarded Home Affairs Ministry personnel records. 1973 and 1978 data are based upon the published Chihō zaimu Kyōkai (ed.) Naisei Kankeisha Meibo.*
his post, as he is more openly a central official serving the locality. Many more of these experts come to the localities from those ministries such as Construction, Transportation, and Agriculture-Forestry which are more likely to contain the few specialists in the state of their respective arts.

4. Amakudari (Descent from Heaven)

This term has often been misapplied to the whole range of center-local personnel linkages. It is literally translated "descent from heaven," and although it was originally applied only to the assumption of important positions in private industry by retired top government officials, it has come to represent to many all that is authoritarian and incestuous about business-government and central-local relations. Central bureaucrats in fact have two careers. Forced to retire in their mid-fifties at a time when they are at the peak of their influence, they are eagerly sought after by the major corporations which must cultivate their government connections. Top government officials easily move into high ranking industry posts, as they also move easily into the world of politics. They also move on to other areas of public administration.

Each central ministry has a group of "external organs" (gaikaku dantai) and public corporations to which it ships off its retiring officials.* In the case of the Ministry of Home Affairs, these sorts of amakudari posts are usually limited to the directorships of the Ministry's external organs and to the top posts of the six national associations

* Naturally, some of these ministries enjoy a great many more informal attachments than others. Retiring top officials of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Finance Ministry for example, are the objects of the most intense competition among major corporations, public as well as private.
of local bodies.* If Ministry of Home Affairs amakudari appointments were limited entirely to organizations other than local governments, amakudari would not deserve treatment as one of the four vertical personnel linkage mechanisms in this section. The fact, however, is that the Ministry of Home Affairs enjoys one of the most extensive amakudari networks of all, a network composed of Japan's 3,000 local governments. Often referred to as the "Jichi Shō OB", (OB is Japanese for "old boy network"), there are usually upwards of twenty prefectural vice governors, who are ex-Home Affairs bigshots.** This OB system is also often filtered through the electorate, as career Home Affairs Ministry people, due to their long tenure in the field, are able to create a political base for their post-retirement. With the election of Governors Suzuki in Tokyo and Kishi in Osaka in April 1979, over forty percent of Japan's prefectural governors are at present ex-Home Affairs Ministry or ex-Home Ministry officials. Here is a "personnel" linkage which is by any measure of major significance.

Prefectures and larger municipalities began in 1953 to administer their own civil service examinations in an attempt to rely less exclusively upon the center for management personnel. At about the same time the local government workers' unions decided to launch a campaign to rid local governments of central employees. But the vertically directed personnel practices detailed above continue to be as dominant as ever. It is widely believed (rightly or wrongly) both within the central min-

*A detailed discussion of the relationship between these associations and the Ministry will be found in Chapter Seven.

**There periodically appear in the Japanese press detailed examinations of the extent of this old boy network. The most complete and the most recent appeared as a forty page section in a special edition of the magazine Zaikai Tenbō (February 1979).
istries as well as within the local governments that central officials are 1) better trained, 2) broader of intellect, 3) better able to remain aloof from local political entanglements, and that they are 4) better able to benefit their host locality through their direct access to the center, than are their colleagues who are not of ministerial origin. In the absence of behavioral data concerning these personnel linkages, it is impossible to say with any certainty whether these officials are merely the tools of central directives or whether they shuck off those ties when they leave Tokyo. The survey results reported in Chapter Five will shed some light on this question. All that can be said with certainty in view of the legal-formal and institutional ties described above is that the personnel linkage between center and locality is complex and at least potentially as sure a mechanism of tutelary control as exists in the central arsenal. As detailed on these pages, this central arsenal contains five major weapons, finance, approval/permission, delegated functions, administrative guidance, and personnel. This capacity for central tutelage and control can be nothing less than intimidating when seen from the point of view of the locality.*

*As a counterweight to this, every prefecture and every designated city has an office in Tokyo. They are important for conducting negotiations, gathering intelligence, cultivating and entertaining central officials, hosting local dignitaries, eliminating budgetary conflicts, and nurturing relationships of potential reward. Almost all are clustered in just three buildings, no more than a stone’s throw from the central ministries. The designated cities’ offices average a seven person permanent staff, while the prefectures have an even more elaborate arrangement. While the city offices are staffed by generalists who play sort of "traffic cop" (Interview October 31, 1977 with Kitakōchi Manabu, Deputy Director Kitakyushu City Tokyo Office) role, directing the flow of Central-Municipal traffic, the prefectural offices are divided into functional divisions and may house anywhere from thirty to sixty permanent staff members. In addition, the prefectural Tokyo offices act as liaisons between the center and those municipalities which do not have their own Tokyo offices. Stein er and others have referred to this, with tongue only partially in cheek, as reminiscent of the Tokugawa Era sankin kōtaï system under which the Shogun required that each daimyō maintain a residence in Tokyo, with families held hostage there when the daimyō returned to their fiefs.
F. Tatewari Gyōsei (Vertical Administration)

When seen in a systemic context however, these mechanisms seem less formidable. While highly vertical, the system is far from unitary. The center speaks with many voices. There are, in a sense, numerous bureaucratic centers, rather than one single omnicient Center. The powerful agencies of the Japanese state which many praise as among the most efficient in the world, are also engaged in intense mutual competition. They should be equally famous for their lack of coordination and mutual distrust. Projects which do not neatly and completely fit into one of these ministry's jurisdiction, or else which for one reason or another are difficult to assign, are the objects of great intra-bureaucratic political struggle. The result is a sort of "reprieve" for the localities, which are the happy object of this competition in many instances. That is, they often find themselves faced with a choice among a variety of uncoordinated central programs for the provision of facilities, grants or subsidies. This is sometimes popularly referred to as an administrative "menu"; the localities are in a sense free to follow the administrative guidelines which they choose, and are free to ignore the others which may contradict or overlap them.

This is the single most important structural feature of Japanese public administration. It is called *tatewari gyōsei* by the Japanese and is little understood in the West. Literally the term means "vertical administration," but while the flow from center to locality is an important component of this "vertical administration," of even greater importance are the barriers among the central agencies which the term also implies. It is not merely a question of strict hierarchy, that the center calls the shots; it is equally important to understand the vertically structured, mutually insular divisions within the center. Japanese
observers, both practitioners and scholars, unanimously deplore this. They speak of *tatewari gyōsei no heigai*, or the "evils, vice of vertical administration." But the evils and vices which are attacked are not the ones which the Western observer might expect. Criticism is directed not at the system of vertical control which exists apart from the "spirit" of local autonomy, but is directed instead at the lack of communication across bureaus, ministries, and agencies. 23 One gets the impression that it is the insularity and not the verticality of vertical administration which is the vice. It is the exclusivity, the narrow field of the agencies' vision which presents the problem. The problem is not one of central control, it is one of duplicated and inefficient control.

III. HORIZONTAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL LINKAGES

A. General Conditions

In the area of legal-formal intergovernmental relationships with which this chapter is concerned, there is little left to chance by the law. One might expect that even while central-local relationships were carefully circumscribed by law that relations among the localities themselves would be rather more ad hoc in nature. That is, one might anticipate that in those areas where localities are performing tasks with each other, where they are cooperating both in the support and management of public facilities which meet their mutual needs, that one would be more likely than not to discover, if not a spontaneity in the policy process, then certainly a variety in policy procedures and forms. One might expect this variety to reflect particular local conditions and thus to reflect the vitality of local autonomy.* Nevertheless, the Local

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*This is not only the Westerner's expectation. The National Association of Mayors (Zenkoku Shichōkai, 1964, p. 16) similarly argued that
Autonomy Law devotes the better part of a lengthy chapter to the careful
delineation of nine separate formulae for joint policy implementation by
two or more localities (kyōdo shori hōshiki). Instead of serving to pro-
mote local autonomy these central prescriptions for translocal policy are
typically promoted and guided by the Ministry of Home Affairs and by the
powerful Local Affairs Sections of each prefecture. Nevertheless, these
sorts of jointly managed affairs are an important and largely ignored
subset of local public policy. It is the purpose of this section to
detail them in their legal-formal context. Subsequent chapters will pro-
vide the political context for horizontal intergovernmental relations in
Japan.

Almost everything local governments do separately is also done
jointly by some. Welfare, planning, sanitation, housing, fire fighting,
education, recreation, and transportation programs are just some of the
areas in which there has been a rapidly expanding translocal component
in postwar Japan. While expenditures for what localities do together
under the rubric of one of the many Local Autonomy Law prescribed formu-
lae remains less than ten percent of all local expenditures, these expendi-
tures have been growing 50-70 percent faster than have local expenditures
themselves. *

The standard recitation of the merits of joint local public admin-


*See the data below. This growth has come at the promotion of the
Home Affairs Ministry, which throughout the postwar has been encouraging
and expanding joint policy among local governments. This historical over-
view is the subject of Chapter Four.
istration in Japan is no different from that in Western Europe or the United States, as reviewed in Chapter Two. Japanese officials and scholars stress the same advantages of economies of scale, efficiency, and improved levels of service. They point to the same gap between administrative boundaries and the actual "spheres of daily activity" (seikatsu ken) which troubles Western planners, and try to stress the "organic unity of regional society." The response from the left, which sees its role as defender of local autonomy, is one of opposition to such centrally-directed "bureaucratism, efficiency-ism, and cost-cutting-ism."

Perhaps the earliest forms of joint policy implementation in Japan were the pre-Meiji "Assistance Agreements" (ōen kyōtei) among localities. Under the terms of these agreements, localities promised to come to the aid of their neighbors in the event of such natural disasters as earthquakes, fires, and floods. Such mutual assistance was typically repaid by one shō of sake consumed by the village chief for his village. The bronze bells which today still remain atop fire towers, even in many big cities, are said to have their origin in these agreements.

Uniform, centrally prescribed formula for joint local policy did not emerge until the second decade of the Meiji period. The County-Ward-Town-Village Organization Law of 1878 allowed for the joint use of public employees by two or more localities. Two years later, the Ward-Town- and Village Association Law (1880) provided for associations and federations of several wards-towns and villages. Both of these laws, however, were voided by the promulgation of the Town and Village Code (Chōson Sei) in 1888; Chapter Six established the Partial Affairs Associations which remain today the most important of all joint policy formulations.*

*Cities were not recognized as participants in these Partial Affairs Associations until 1911.
second prewar joint policy formula provided for the mutual entrusting of children's educational affairs, and was first recognized in 1890 in the General Rules of Local Education (Chiho Gakujitsuusoku, Number 89). The third and final purely local pre-occupation device for joint local policy was established well after these other two. When the law governing cities, towns, and villages was amended in 1943, it allowed for the joint use of public facilities by residents of more than one community if the permission of the host community is first secured.

It is usually stated that these three pre-occupation formulae were carried to the Local Autonomy Law intact, and that no new formulae were introduced until the government began to revise the Law after the Occupation ended. Strictly speaking, this is true. If we conceive of horizontal policy sharing formulae as partial and voluntary, as they are today and as they were before the war, it is true that all pre-occupation formulae were maintained intact in the SCAP program. On the other hand, if we understand that these formulae are typically instigated by the center, are increasingly less partial, and are often only nominally voluntary, then we will have to additionally consider one very important, compulsory, and all-embracing though short-lived device for joint policy management - the wartime Local Administration Councils (Chiho Gyosei Kyogikai).

By 1943 local governments were entirely under the financial control of the central government, Japan was on the verge of the most direct and unitary centralization in its history. Some three years earlier the Home Ministry had, by decree, created the Local Communication Councils (Chiho Renraku Kyogikai) in order to facilitate the shipment and transfer of resources and materials for the war effort. In November 1942 these eight regional blocs were expanded by cabinet order to include the parti-
icipation of every sort of local organ, and were called the Local-All Office Communication Councils (Chiho Kakuchō Renraku Kyōgikai). After several other adjustments, the final product, the Local Administrative Councils (Chiho Gyōsei Kyōgikai) were established. There were nine blocs nationwide, and the members of these councils included each of the region's prefectural governors, the tax bureau chiefs, finance bureau chiefs, the local representatives of the Finance Ministry, and other central and local officials. The chairmen were chosen directly by the Prime Minister who met with them at least once each month. These chairmen were entirely the agents of the Prime Minister, serving at the latter's discretion. The chairman had the power to force compliance of all local bodies within his region. The purpose of this new centrally controlled "horizontal" coalition of localities was "to ensure the people's livelihood and increase the nation's war power."

They were designed to promote administrative streamlining and to battle bureaucratic sectionalism in three general areas, 1) the production and distribution of food, 2) industrial production, and 3) the improvement of overseas shipments to the armed forces. The new Council's responsibilities also included such major tasks as increasing arable land area, creating food distribution networks, improving the productivity of urban food distribution, increasing irrigation systems, and increasing energy production. The decisions relevant to these policies were in the province of the central ministries; the Councils were responsible merely for the communication, mutual adjustment, and implementation of these matters. These Councils nominally existed above the prefectures (which were themselves central organs) as a fourth level of government; but in effect, their presence made all local policy joint policy - the ultimate
in horizontal intergovernmental linkages effected through the strictest of vertical controls. These Councils were the foundation of the 1945 Superintendencies General, the final authoritarian manifestation of Imperial Japan.*

The Occupation reforms essentially rearranged the purposes for which localities exist, and to a lesser degree, also rearranged the contours of what localities were able to do. Due to the shift toward a new concern for "local autonomy," localities found themselves with a variety of new administrative burdens, and the sheer weight of these policy demands led to a sharp increase in the reliance upon joint policy formulae. During the early postwar period, joint policy formulae were often employed also as temporary measures to facilitate amalgamation of nonviable localities. The use of joint policy formulae and the more drastic measure of amalgamation were both responses to the broadened scope of local governance, introduced by the American reforms and stimulated by reconstruction. Let us explore the expanded variety of these joint local policy formulae as presently prescribed by law.**

*Steiner (1965) discusses their relationship, pp. 61-63. Interestingly, these Councils survived the SCAP reforms for a time. For an eight month period, between May 1947 and December of the same year, that is, between the time of the promulgation of the Local Autonomy Law and its first revision, Chapter Three, Section Three provided for "Councils of Local Bodies." These were supposed to improve the coordination of planning among localities in general, and among prefectures in particular. But, fearing the potential for the revival of the sort of role played by Councils during the war, and fearful of the reemergence of centralism, SCAP struck the provision from the new law. Instead, SCAP sought to promote the formation of the six National Associations of Local Governments, the National Association of Mayors, the National Association of Governors, the National Association of Towns and Villages, the National Association of City Assembly Chiefs, the National Association of Prefectural Assembly Chiefs, and the National Association of Town And Village Assembly Chiefs. (See Chapter Seven.) Councils of local governments were not to reappear in the Local Autonomy Law until the 1952 revision of the Law, and even then, only in a new and much limited context.

**Chapter Four will provide an historical overview of the relationship between amalgamation and these other schemes.
There are eight formulae which are prescribed in the Local Autonomy Law:

**TABLE 3-6**

**LEGALLY PRESCRIBED JOINT PUBLIC POLICY FORMULAE**

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<tr>
<th>ARTICLE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY LAW</th>
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<td>244.3</td>
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<td>252.2-252.6</td>
<td>Councils of Local Public Bodies</td>
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<td>Associations of Local Public Bodies</td>
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<td>298-319</td>
<td>Local Development Corporations</td>
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In addition to those in the Local Autonomy Law there are also some stipulated in other laws. Article Four of the Bay and Harbor Law (1950), for example, provides localities with the authority to jointly establish and manage Harbor and Port Authorities. The School and Education Law (1947) stipulates that localities may jointly create and participate in Educational Affairs Associations. There are similar, minor provisions in the Law for the Promotion of the Construction of New Industrial Cities, the Law for the Promotion of the Enlargement of Public Land, and the Fire Prevention Organization Law. But whereas these sorts of provisions are highly specific to particular policy programs, those stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law are actively applied in a wide variety of policy
areas, a variety which has defied accurate classification.*

The following tables provide time series data by type of function for the most important of the joint management formulae in the Local Autonomy Law. They are based upon the complete set of surveys administered every two to three years since 1964 by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The data, both the earliest as well as the most recent available, suggest the variety of the formulae and the policy areas for which they have been employed. It is obvious that while some formulae are more generally applied than are others, each seems to be preferred for one or more particular affairs. This is of course related to their legal character. The discussion below will attempt to briefly discuss each of the formulae for joint policy which are specified in the Local Autonomy Law.**
(See Tables 3-7 and 3-8.)

B. The Mechanisms

1. Establishment of Public Facilities in a Neighboring Locality

Article 244, Paragraph Three of the Local Autonomy Law stipulates that if it is agreed upon by localities in a formal conference, adjoining localities may create public facilities for common use. It is further

*One should note the high recurrence of the category "Other" in the data below. In spite of what might appear to be a comprehensive breakdown of the types of affairs localities are engaged in, consistently highest is the category "Other." Moreover, the category "Other" in the Ministry of Home Affairs Promotion Section data is itself broken down into some fifteen additional categories, including construction, accounting, tax collection, retirement allowance administration and "other." Amazingly, in spite of all this detailed classification, the sub-category "other," within "Other" is the consistently highest over time. We can only conclude that localities do anything and everything with each other, and that as stated above, there is nothing that they do by themselves which they don't also do together.

**More thorough treatments of the subject can be found in Akita (1977); Sakata (1977); and Kuze (1973), works upon which the following is based.
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Source: Chihō Kōkyō Dantaikan no Jimu no Kyōdō Shori no Jōkyō Chōsa - Promotion Section, Administrative Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.
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<td>65</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>4297</td>
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<td>2555</td>
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<td></td>
<td>403</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>845</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td></td>
<td>433</td>
<td>2431</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>3113</td>
<td>10277</td>
<td>12856</td>
<td></td>
<td>13207</td>
<td>17717</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>866</td>
<td>3239</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>2238</td>
<td>4027</td>
<td>18142</td>
<td>25090</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22281</td>
<td>34167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid,
specified that other localities may also gain the right to use such facilities after first securing permission. This provision is usually employed in the case of cities and their surrounding villages and towns. There are two general types of such arrangements. A very common type is the case of the densely populated city which, having no space for such public facilities as cemeteries, waste disposal plants, or parks, etc., seeks to secure permission from nearby localities to use their land for these sorts of purposes. In the case that the city is not interested in allowing the host locality to participate in the use of these facilities, it is not required to invoke this legal provision. It may acquire the land through private purchase, and build the facility without permission. But because of the nature of many of these projects, especially those like sewage disposal and treatment plants, in practice, negotiation is always conducted. The second type is the reverse case in which surrounding towns and villages "plug into" the regional city's superior services and facilities. In these cases, the smaller localities use the regional city as a sort of "services center," acquiring public service capabilities which they could not manage on their own.

2. Councils of Local Public Bodies

Article 252, Paragraph Two of the Local Autonomy Law allows for the establishment of Councils of Local Public Bodies for the purposes of "cooperative regional planning and for regulating contacts concerning the execution and management of the duties belonging to the limited authority of the local body, its chief executive officer, or its administrative organs." The law specifies that these Councils be designed to enable localities to jointly manage "one portion" of their responsibilities. Although the title "Councils" is used, and is identical in Japanese
to that used to designate the wartime councils created in 1943 (Kyōgikai), there is no direct participation in these organs by central agencies, and indeed the authority of these Councils is extremely limited.

As Chapter Four will describe in greater detail, the central government in the early 1950's was concerned that the high number of localities (many almost completely nonviable in the face of their newly devolved administrative responsibilities) would hamper efficient local public administration. Thus, in 1953 the Town and Village Amalgamation Promotion Law was established to consolidate the system. The introduction of these Councils, as well as two other joint policy formulae in a previous revision of the Local Autonomy Law, was based upon the recommendation of the Kambe Commission. Joint policy management was seen then, as it was also seen in the prewar era, as little more than a tool in the process of the amalgamation of localities. There already existed such devices as Partial Affairs Associations, but it was felt that these were legally too cumbersome for the purpose of steering a course toward the elimination of some of these localities. The Councils were designed for the temporary preservation of each locality's integrity while maximizing its ability to respond to regional needs.

The need to create a less ponderous and less formal first step toward amalgamation left these Councils nearly powerless, without even juridical status. Councils of Local Public Bodies are not incorporated; that is, their actions are no more than the actions of the individual localities alone. They can act only in the name of each of the participating members. The authority of the Council is no more than the authority of the member localities. Thus too, when a Council is found liable in a civil suit, responsibility rests with each of the partner bodies. Unlike
the Partial Affairs Associations, the Councils, because they lack corporeal status, may have great difficulty in independently establishing and managing public facilities, in training employees, and in owning their own property. These Councils do many of the same things that the Partial Affairs Associations do, but they do so less authoritatively and with more clumsiness. Created to facilitate amalgamation, they actually inhibit rationalization of joint policy programs which are not intended for that purpose.

There are three kinds of legal Councils, the character of each of which is stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law. The first type is the Council established for the purpose of cooperative management of specified local affairs. These are called Management Councils. The second type, called Communication Regulatory Councils, are designed for the coordination of the lateral transfer of plans and data. This type is too complicated a formal procedure for the mere process of translocal communication. Few exist. These first two varieties were introduced in the original 1952 revision of the law. The third, designed to facilitate cooperation among localities in general regional planning, was introduced later, in 1961. It is this third type, the Comprehensive Regional Planning Council that has come to be one of the two dominant administrative organs of the recently introduced and increasingly important Greater Municipal Zones. *

Virtually all of the center's intentions for these Councils are embodied in the Local Autonomy Law. The Minister of Home Affairs even

*See Chapter Four. It would be a mistake, however, to take the distinction among these three sorts of Councils too seriously, for when they are established by the member localities, there is no declaration made as to type; nor were they intended by the center to be mutually exclusive.
reserves the right to "recommend" the formation of a Council "if necessary and in the public interest" (Article 252.2.4). Every step in the formation of the Council is carefully prescribed, as are the Council's formal structure, provisions for changes in its membership, and provisions for its dissolution. Voluntary withdrawal by member localities is not recognized. Moreover, as with other joint policy formulae, the Council's affairs are not limited only to those of the participating localities. The Councils may also become the objects of national affairs.

Tables 3-7 and 3-8 display the distribution of the Councils by policy area, and show also their remarkable proliferation. The bulk of this expansion can be directly attributed to the center's concerted efforts during the 1960's to promote regional planning. There were only thirty-six Councils in 1960, and on the average, twenty new Councils have been added annually since then. This is the fastest and steadiest growth of any of these joint policy formulae.*

It should also be noted that the Ministry of Home Affairs recognizes two other sorts of formal Councils of Local Bodies as well, one legal in character, the other not. The legal one, which falls under the specification of a different article of the Local Autonomy Law (282.2) relates only to the twenty-three special wards of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. This article establishes the Prefecture-Ward Council (To-ku Kyogikai) as a reflection of the special status of Tokyo's twenty-three wards. This Council, unlike those described above, is compulsory, and is designed to facilitate the maintenance of close contact and commun-

*Just as these Councils perform a variety of functions, so too they come in a variety of sizes. The smallest usually have a staff of between five to ten persons, while the larger ones may have as many as 150-200 employees.
cation between the ward and prefectural administrations.

The second type of formal Council which is recognized by the Ministry of Home Affairs is not a legally specified entity. These Councils are referred to by the center as "de facto Councils" (jidō Kyōgikai), but their formation is equally promoted and data concerning their activities are actively collected. These de facto Councils are different in several ways from the legal variety. Most obviously, lacking legal character, they are far less cumbersome for the localities to create and use. Secondly, in some cases it is not enough to include only the cooperation of local governments in these Councils. Hence, these de facto Councils may also include private industry, public corporations, and/or central field agencies of the central government.* There are well over 1,000 of these, and the number has been steadily increasing, doubling between the mid-1960's and mid-1970's. One reason for this is the fact that the legal formalization of the Council is no guarantee of its effectiveness, given the fact that they lack juridical status. Thus, more and more, localities are opting for the less formal, more easily established de facto Councils. The majority of these de facto Councils are devoted to the promotion of primary industry and to regional development planning.

3. Establishment of Joint Organs

The third type of cooperative policy formula specified in the Local Autonomy Law is the Establishment of Joint Organs (Article 252, Paragraphs 7-13). It is ordinarily applied only to cities, towns, and villages and seems less suited to region-wide public policy than most other joint formulae. It is used mostly by smaller localities for the

*It should be noted, however, that there is no agreement as to whether or not these sorts of Councils should be considered in the same context as legal councils.
establishment of school boards, auditing units, and Equity Commissions.* Although the number of these arrangements has steadily increased from 90 in 1960 to twice that at present, there is not a single case of the use of this formula in over half of the prefectures.

4. Entrusting of Affairs

As noted above, the Entrusting of Affairs formula was one of the several prewar mechanisms for policy cooperation which survived intact in the Local Autonomy Law (Article 252, Paragraphs 14-16). The prewar use of this device was in practice limited to educational affairs. It was only after the war that it expanded into other areas. According to the law a locality may, after first entering into a formal agreement with a second locality, entrust, delegate, or commission to that second locality a portion of its public functions. Generally speaking, there are three types of this sort of arrangement. First, there are those cases in which cities, towns, and villages entrust matters to their common prefectural government. This is the most common sort of arrangement, and usually involves such matters as the creation of an Equity Commission, the establishment of clinics, the provision of training facilities for public officials, and the preparation of planning documents. The second sort of arrangement is entirely among the cities, towns, and villages themselves. When these localities entrust affairs to each other, primary school facilities are most often involved. When the entrusting is done by smaller localities to some larger regional city, a pattern which is the most common form of this second type, the policy areas are usually those of urban services such as sanitation, welfare, fire protection, and emergency services. The third major form of this practice is that of

*Sixty percent are cases of joint Equity Commissions.
the entrusting of affairs by prefectures to cities, towns, and villages. This usually takes the form of the devolution of supervisory and management authority for prefectural facilities, such as parks, housing developments, and public halls. The incidence of the use of the law has rapidly expanded:

TABLE 3-9
THE NUMBER AND SORTS OF CASES OF ENTRUSTED AFFAIRS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Among Prefectures</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Prefectures to Municipalities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Municipalities to Prefectures</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among Municipalities</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1201 1742

Source: Promotion Section, Administration Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.

It is interesting to note that the two patterns which have most sharply increased both involve an increase in municipal policy responsibility. This formula was frequently used as a transitional tool prior to the creation of more authoritative joint regional policy organs in the early 1970's. But there has also been the sense among practitioners that its procedural formalities are too cumbersome. As a result, we have seen many cases of the entrusting of affairs which were not expressly designated as such. The result is a clear confluence of trends toward both regionalization and devolution. A new round of devolution seems to have been initiated by Hiroshima and Ehime prefectures when in 1978 the governors announced that some sixty prefectural functions, mostly concerning the granting of permits and the registration of commercial establishments, would be delivered to the municipalities. Some eleven
other prefectures soon announced that they were ready to consider following suit and the types of such entrusted affairs were expanded to include responsibility for urban planning and other more substantive matters. There is thus a growing incidence of both de jure and de facto policy redistribution among Japanese localities. In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs has also been eager to press more such administrative responsibilities upon the cities, towns, and villages. It made public a concrete reform plan to that effect in May, 1979. The regionalization of public policy and the devolution of power need not be mutually exclusive.

5. Dispatching Local Public Officials

Article 252, Paragraph 17 of the Local Autonomy Law allows that if the chief executive or commission of a locality deems it necessary, they may request the dispatch and detail of employees of other localities to help in the performance of their affairs. The tenure of such an arrangement is not established by law. It may last for as short a period as a few days or for several years. Unlike the Entrusting of Affairs formula described above, the majority of these sorts of dispatch arrangements are undertaken among prefectures. The second most common form of the arrangement is the dispatch of a prefectural employee to one of the municipalities within the prefecture. By far the most common reason for resort to this device is the need for specific sorts of technical assistance which is unavailable within a given locality.

6. Mutual Relief Work

According to Article 263, Paragraph Two of the Local Autonomy Law, two localities may, by means of a resolution of each of their respective assemblies, entrust to a public service corporation the financial re-
sources to aid them in the event of fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural disaster. This seems more a form of group insurance than the formula for joint policy management for which it is formally recognized.

7. Associations of Local Public Bodies

The Association of Local Public Bodies is by far the most important legal formal mechanism for joint local public policy in Japan. Articles 284–293 of the Local Autonomy Law specify four varieties of these Associations.* While the Association formula has been employed since 1888, it has undergone much revision, and is today the basic unit of regional policy in an increasingly regional Japanese public administration system.

a and b. Town and Village Affairs Associations and All Affairs Associations.

Of the four varieties, two are vestigial, and can be quickly disposed of. The Town and Village Hall Affairs Associations and the All-Affairs Associations were virtually identical tools early in the process of the amalgamation of nonviable local bodies. Whereas under the former provision the participating localities would each retain their own local assemblies, the latter provided for the de facto amalgamation of the participating local bodies. Both formulae were restricted to towns and villages, were resorted to only in times of natural disaster, and were always few in number until their complete disappearance in the late 1950's. As the great amalgamation of local governments in the 1950's wound down, so did the incidence of these formulae.

*While Articles 284–293 of the Local Autonomy Law are the general laws governing Partial Affairs Associations, in five specific cases (education, port management, fire protection in Tokyo's ward area, flood control, and public enterprise formation) separate, special laws may regulate the activities of Partial Affairs Associations. See Genshin (1965), pp. 52–54; Akita (1977) pp. 244–245.
c. Partial Affairs Associations

The third variety of this formula for joint local policy, the Partial Affairs Association, accounts for more than half of all the joint local policy conducted by Japanese local governments. It is not only the most common joint policy formula, but it also is utilized for the widest variety of policy areas of all such devices. The expenditures of these Partial Affairs Associations, 500 trillion yen in 1976, amount to over four percent of all local expenditures, and the level of the services provided by these unions of local bodies has increased at a rate 50-60 percent faster than that of localities as a whole. The average annual growth of these Partial Affairs Associations between 1960-1975 was more than 30 percent. The average annual growth of all local governmental expenditures during this same period was less than 20 percent. The portion of local expenditures which are related to these associations has trebled since 1960. Association expenditures themselves have multiplied by nearly seventy fold in that period. In some policy areas, such as fire fighting and waste disposal, Partial Affairs Associations are responsible for one quarter to one third of all services nationwide. The degree to which regional public policy has been effective in postwar Japan is the degree to which these Partial Affairs Associations have been effective policy organs. They have been the favorite regional policy promotional tool of both the central government and the prefectures, the higher levels of government which are largely responsible for the supervision of these "horizontal" policy organs.*

*In 1952, ninety-nine percent of all Partial Affairs Associations were among cities, towns, and villages (Chihō Jichi Kenkyūkai, 1954, p. 7). As late as 1978 this still accounted for ninety-three percent of all such arrangements. (Ministry of Home Affairs Survey.) There have always been few Partial Affairs Associations with prefectural participation.
The Japanese system of Partial Affairs Associations was directly modeled after the Prussian system current at the time of the introduction of the first town and village administration system in the twenty-first year of Meiji (1888). The Partial Affairs Associations were seen then, as they were also seen in the early 1950's, as tools in the process of the elimination of duplicated services and nonviable localities. They were employed as surrogates for the amalgamation of weak towns and villages where for one reason or another amalgamation itself was impossible to achieve. This formula was extended to encompass cities in 1911, as the cities emerged as the major suppliers and consumers of public services in the early part of the Twentieth Century. The language employed today remains essentially the same as adopted in the law of that day. The prefectures were not permitted to enter into Partial Affairs Associations until 1914. But, because they were not local bodies in the same sense as the cities, towns, and villages, they were allowed to enter these arrangements only with each other. In spite of this change however, there were no prewar cases of such trans-prefectural Partial Affairs Associations. Even today, when prefectures are considered local bodies, there are only thirty-eight such joint prefectural organs nationwide, less than two percent of the total.

This total has been expanding steadily in the postwar period. Indeed, it has been expanding in spite of a sharp decline in the number of localities themselves:
TABLE 3-10

CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF
PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATIONS AND LOCALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Number of localities</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>3,426</td>
<td>3,284</td>
<td>3,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Number of Partial Affairs Associations</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>3,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/A</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1950's these Partial Affairs Associations were understood to be merely a tool in the amalgamation process. There were many tiny towns and villages whose population and financial condition could not support the many new policy programs required of them under the new local government system. For example, under the new system, a nine year compulsory education system was introduced, but many of these smaller localities could not support the new schools they were legally obligated to maintain. Thus, a great many education related Partial Affairs Associations were introduced. It was suggested at the time that these would be discarded as amalgamation progressed, for the new, larger localities would be better able to independently manage these facilities. But, while there was a small decline in the number of Partial Affairs Associations in the 1950's, as the data above suggest, the ratio of Partial Affairs Associations to local governments actually doubled. This is of some importance. The ratio of Partial Affairs Associations to the total number of localities in Japan has been steadily drawing closer to unity. Whereas there were five times more localities than Associations in 1949, there is now virtually one Association for each locality. Since each Association is the joint policy organ of several local governments, the average locality
was participating in eight of them. Rather than merely disposable tools in the amalgamation process, Partial Affairs Associations have continued to expand in spite of the improved capacity of the localities. There are two possible interpretations of this. Either the enlargement of administrative scale of the localities remains insufficient (in which case we would expect amalgamation to be continuing) or else new policy areas have been introduced to these larger, amalgamated localities for the first time, and now, only as larger localities, are they able to effectively accommodate these joint policy organs as important tools in regional policy.

The Local Autonomy Law (Article 284) provides that these Partial Affairs Associations may be established by local governments for the joint management of a single affair. That is, localities may agree to form a joint policy organ which would then be responsible for conducting policy in any specified, limited area which legitimately belongs to the local governments. These localities thus cooperate in particular policy areas without surrendering to each other their autonomy in other spheres. Participating localities cede part of their affairs to this new body, (hence the term Partial Affairs Association), and once established, all previous work in the relevant area by the individual localities ceases. Not every matter related to a given policy area need be included in the joint policy agreement. For example, in the case of the disposal of waste material, the Partial Affairs Association may be formed to build and jointly manage an incinerator, while the task of collecting the trash may remain the responsibility of the individual localities. In other cases, all matters related to a particular policy area may be transferred to this new joint organ. The Local Autonomy Law requires only that the exact sphere of
the Association's activities be clearly stipulated at the time of its formation.*

These affairs are as varied as local public policy itself. Before the major amalgamation in the 1950's, nearly one half of all Partial Affairs Associations were education related. That dropped to less than one-fifth by 1960, and is less than one-tenth today. This of course represents the rationalization of scale that was achieved by means of the amalgamation. Most striking has been the recent rise in the past decade in the number of Partial Affairs Associations in the areas of Environmental Sanitation** and fire and disaster prevention. The change in the distribution of these Partial Affairs Associations by policy area is most clearly illustrated by the following table which presents the data in four representative snapshots: before the completion of reconstruction, before the high growth decade, in the midst of the high growth decade, and present:***

*Although the participating localities may have transferred one of their affairs to an Association, this does not mean that their previously existing ordinances and regulations concerning this affair become void. While they cease to be effective as law, they formally continue to exist. Thus, when and if the Partial Affairs Association is disbanded the member localities will automatically resume their affairs under the preexisting laws.

**Under the heading of Environmental Sanitation are included joint policy organs created for the purposes of water supply, sewage systems, garbage disposal plants, liquid waste plants, crematoria, slaughter houses, and pollution prevention and monitoring facilities.

***The categories have changed slightly since 1949, but the figures remain comparable.
TABLE 3-11
PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATIONS BY POLICY AREA
OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Tertiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Facilities</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Preservation and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Sanitation</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>3192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Partial Affairs Associations are most frequently associated with the effort to "level-up" services through the pooling of resources among the smaller, less well endowed localities. One might expect, therefore, to see some relationship between locality size and the utilization of the horizontal policy-sharing option. There exist no systematic data on this, but the data available do seem to suggest such a relationship. First, in general terms, municipalities of up to 20,000 persons all participate in about the same number of such Associations. Cities of 20,000 to 150,000 persons participate with declining frequency. Those at the 150,000 population level tend to participate more frequently than even the smallest localities. One explanation for this may be that while the smallest localities are most in need of such joint policy organs, and
while the largest localities act as regional centers providing many of these scarce services to their satellite localities, those middle-sized cities are neither lacking in self-sufficiency nor are they surrounded by "poor relations." They are therefore more likely to be independent. Indeed, in the Japanese case, many of these sorts of municipalities are already the product of the amalgamation of several less viable towns and villages. Secondly, there also seems to be some relationship between city size and membership in Partial Affairs Associations in policy-specific terms. For example, only 3% of the Partial Affairs Associations concerned with the welfare of the aged had the participation of localities of less than 30,000 persons in 1967 (that figure would undoubtedly be higher today, however). At the same time, over one third of the Associations concerned with trash disposal involved the participation of these smaller localities. In the cases of trash, sewers, and hospitals the smallest localities are the most numerous, whereas in the cases of welfare programs, these small localities are the least well represented of all city size categories. This may indicate two things. First, it may indicate that physical services, being both essential as well as the most expensive, are best conducted jointly in the case of smaller localities. Secondly, it may also indicate that the smaller localities prefer to provide welfare facilities for which they can take full credit, and for which they are not willing to spend large amounts.

Article 287 of the Local Autonomy Law requires that virtually everything about the new joint organ be stipulated at the time of its formation. The law requires that the Association's by-laws include 1) the Association's name, 2) a list of the participating localities, 3) a clear delineation of the Association's affairs, 4) the location of the Associ-
ation's offices, 5) the composition of the Association's assembly and the assemblymen's method of selection, 6) the nature of the executive organ and the means of selecting the chief executive of the Association, and 7) the method of defraying expenses. The law further defines the limitations upon the member localities by requiring two further steps for the ratification of the agreement. After the local chief executives negotiate an agreement to form a Partial Affairs Association, that agreement must be approved by the member localities' assemblies. A final step, however, best demonstrates how horizontal policy cooperation is very much a part of a tightly vertical administrative system. According to Article 284, the receipt of permission from the Minister of Home Affairs in the case of a trans-prefectural Association, and from the prefectural governor, in the case of a trans-municipal Association, is the final step before the Association becomes legally constituted. This represents an official sanctioning of the contents of the Association agreement. It is a form of authorization by higher officials that a proper Association exists, and that it may be entitled to all legal and administrative authority due it under law. The central or prefectural officials judge the propriety of the Association, and endorse the new organ as in the public interest. In law the Association's formation rests at the discretion of the Administration Bureau of the next higher level of government. In practice as well, it is here too where initiative is most often taken.

But the center's formal prerogatives do not stop at the level of mere endorsement through the granting of permission. The Minister of Home Affairs and the prefectural governor (again depending upon which kinds of local governments are participating) have the authority after first consulting the localities' assemblies, to compel the localities to
enter into a Partial Affairs Association agreement. Article 284, Paragraph 4 of the Local Autonomy Law empowers these officials to require the formation of a Partial Affairs Association "if it is in the public interest." All concerned agree that the compulsory formation of these policy organs ought to be a power exercised with great caution.* Appearing before the House of Councillors Local Administration Committee during the 65th Diet Session, then Home Affairs Ministry Administration Bureau Chief (and currently Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture), Miyazawa Hiroshi stated:

"I never consider the actual application of this provision... We invoke (instead) the supervisory and leadership authority of the Minister in the guidance of (local governments)."36

Inherent in this formula for the joint management of local affairs is both a legal guarantee as well as a history of administrative practice of supervision and guidance from above. The coexistence of these vertical imperatives with the demands of horizontal policy implementation, while in many ways quite natural to the Japanese system of local public administration, has not been entirely tension-free in the postwar period. In order to understand why, one must first understand the ambiguities inher-

*Historically, this power to compel the creation of Partial Affairs Associations was instituted at the very beginning of the Meiji local government system. Interestingly, at that time these Associations were even more closely linked to the idea of amalgamation than they were after the war. The Home Affairs Ministry keeps no record of the number of Associations which have been created by the order of the Home Affairs Minister or by the prefectural governors, but according to Ministry officials, this power has never been exercised in the postwar period. (Interview with Promotion Section officials Kawano Sadamu and Arikawa Kazumi, August 23, 1978.) There is, however, a limited prewar history of compulsory formation initiated directly by the center. In 1943 the Home Ministry required that each prefecture establish an Association for pension affairs among its localities (onkyū kumiai). In the postwar period an April 1952 Special Diet Law was enacted providing a new legal base for these organizations. In December 1962 they were eliminated by law, and in their place were created Mutual Aid Associations in each prefecture. Although there are no complete records of compulsory formations of Associations of local governments, it seems that they are limited to this case.
ent in the legal status of these Associations.

Partial Affairs Associations are legally designated "special public bodies," and as such they enjoy advantages in financial and administrative powers; they are therefore considered superior to the other joint policy mechanisms discussed thus far. In this regard they are the administrative equals of the twenty-three special wards of downtown Tokyo. Like the much larger Tokyo Wards, a Partial Affairs Association, in possessing a corporate character, may employ its own staff, own its own property, establish its own ordinances, and conduct business in its own name. This status as "special public body," a designation which occupies all of the third and final volume of the Local Autonomy Law (Articles 264-319), has also often resulted in legal ambiguities and heated debate. Article 292 states that "except as otherwise provided by laws or cabinet orders authorized by law" all laws and regulations which apply to ordinary local public bodies shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Partial Affairs Associations as well. That is, Associations comprised of prefectures only shall be governed by laws relevant to prefectures, and those comprised of municipalities shall be governed by laws pertaining to municipalities. Lawmakers and legal scholars have often disagreed about the meaning of the limitations imposed by the terms "cabinet orders and laws." 37

But the most important legal-political confrontations concerning the nature of these joint policy organs have centered on the relationship of the Association to its residents. As have so many in postwar Japan, this debate has revolved around the relationship among local autonomy, representative democracy, and local public administration. The essential problem has been that no Partial Affairs Associations have popularly
elected chief executives nor do many provide for the direct election of assemblymen. In the absence of a universal system of direct popular elections, and in the context of their ambiguous status as Special Local Public Bodies, the Partial Affairs Associations have been the object of much criticism. But methods of selecting Association officials are decided, as noted above, in the initial agreement to form an association. The resulting mechanisms which have been stipulated in these agreements are varied, but few involve popular elections. Most Association chief executives are concurrently chief executives of member localities, and likewise, most association assemblymen are concurrently assemblymen of member localities. This same pattern, moreover, has continued without much change in the years for which data are available:

TABLE 3-12

METHODS OF SELECTING
PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATIONS CHIEF EXECUTIVES
BASED UPON ASSOCIATION BY-LAWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Popular Election</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Specified Locality's Chief Executive</td>
<td>1094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serves Ex-Officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected from Among Member Localities'</td>
<td>1313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Specified Assemblyman of a Specified</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locality Serves Ex-Officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected From Among Member Localities'</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblymen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>2604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ichibu Jimu Kumiai ni Kansuru Cho, Promotion Section, Administration Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.
### TABLE 3-13

METHODS OF SELECTING
PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION ASSEMBLYMEN
BASED UPON ASSOCIATION BY-LAWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Popular Election</td>
<td>1970 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some or All Member Localities' Chief Executives Serve Ex-Officio</td>
<td>222 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some or All Member Localities' Assembly Chiefs Serve Ex-Officio</td>
<td>70 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected from Among Member Localities' Assemblies by Member Localities' Assemblies</td>
<td>1072 1369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected by Member Localities' Assemblies</td>
<td>291 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1053 1069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2604 2980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.

Many observers feel that certain constitutional rights are denied residents due to their indirect relationship to the Partial Affairs Association. Among such rights as the right to the direct election of public officials, the right to demand enactment, revision, or abolition of by-laws, the right to demand an inspection of a locality's affairs, the right to demand the dissolution of a local assembly, the right to demand the dismissal of a chief executive, the right to initiate a taxpayer's suit, and the right to demand an audit are all nullified in the case of the Partial Affairs Associations. They are nullified because, in the standard interpretation by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is the member locality and not the residents of that locality which is the constituent of a Partial Affairs Association. The Local Administration
Committee of the House of Councillors, during the 65th Diet Session in 1971, issued a report outlining those areas in which the laws that apply to ordinary local bodies also apply to Partial Affairs Associations. The report suggests that all citizen rights such as direct demand and recall apply only to those Partial Affairs Associations possessed of directly elected chief executives and assemblymen. Direct demand and recall, it was argued, are the recourse only of citizens who possess the right to vote. In this interpretation, the power of direct demand resides with the electors, and the electors in the case of most Partial Affairs Associations are the member localities. In this view, Partial Affairs Associations do not have residents. Residents "belong" only to ordinary local bodies.*

Quite expectedly the most vociferous and, it should be added, often the most carefully researched, criticisms of the Partial Affairs formula have come from the Japan Communist Party (JCP) although it should be said that usually accompanying these more thoughtful critiques are some of the most dogmatic denunciations as well. JCP criticism centers upon the distance of these Associations from the public. They argue that because Partial Affairs Associations' management and organization result merely from contracts among participating localities, that it is necessary to

*A 1972 bill submitted to the 71st Diet sought to put to rest this interpretation by amending the Local Autonomy Law to allow constituent localities to issue direct demands upon the Association executive. This provision would have broadened the definition of the direct demand provision itself, but was eliminated from the body of the bill during its revision. Sakata (1977, pp. 426-427) explains the reasons why. For representative opinions of those who believe that there should be a more direct relationship between the Association Executive and Assembly on the one hand, and the citizens on the other see: Genshin (1965), p.74; Furuki (1977), pp. 308-309; and Wada (1971). Wada, a Socialist Dietman, presents an especially interesting argument. He notes that vice-governors and deputy mayors are all subject to direct demands for removal, even though they are not elected officials.
provide additional guarantees of democratic management. The JCP urges its local assemblymen to become involved in Partial Affairs Association assemblies.\(^{40}\) The JCP adopted a series of resolutions concerning Partial Affairs Associations at its Eleventh Party Congress in 1971. The party resolutions included the following: that a) the functions of the executive and the deliberative organs should be clearly separated, b) no local chief executive should be permitted to become an Association assemblyman, c) guarantees must be created to prevent domination by a single locality, d) there should be public dissemination of the contents of Association debates and the free inspection of Association records, and that e) the executive should be publicly elected.\(^{41}\) Interestingly, the JCP finds a great deal of democratic potential in the Partial Affairs Associations. Although it is more inclined to favor the Council formula for joint local policy,\(^ {42}\) it sees both the Councils and the Associations as democratic bulwarks which would defend local independence against the broader scale regional schemes promoted by the central government.\(^ {43}\) Thus, the JCP prefers to distinguish between compulsory regional schemes (to be discussed in Chapter Four) and those which may be voluntarily entered into. Partial Affairs Associations were referred to by one Party public administration expert as "the path that responds to the (unquestionable) necessity for regional policy even as it protects local autonomy,"\(^ {44}\) In the JCP view, there is nothing inherently undemocratic about Partial Affairs Associations, although there is need for substantial reform in their practical application. This kind of reasoned opposition comes as a breath of fresh air amidst other JCP claims that "Partial Affairs Associations . . . serve to fatten the pockets of monopoly capital and reactionary forces."\(^ {45}\)
The Partial Affairs Associations are criticized not only as insufficiently democratic, but also as disadvantaged when compared to ordinary local public bodies. Although it is a corporate body with special status not afforded to most other joint policy organs, it is not permitted to levy or collect taxes. Partial Affairs Associations must rely upon grants, bonds, fees, and funds allocated from member localities for their finances. Moreover, the Partial Affairs Association does not qualify under law as eligible for a portion of the centrally disbursed Local Allocation Tax; it is therefore denied access to two of the three most lucrative funding channels for ordinary localities.*

Direct contributions from member localities are most heavily relied upon. As noted above, these contributions must be stipulated in the terms of the agreement to form the Association. The localities' financial assessment is usually calculated according to one of two criteria; it is either determined on the basis of each locality's population, or else it is based upon the projected use of the facility or service by each locality. It may be distributed equally among the members, but this is seldom the formula agreed upon. In 1977 the participating localities provided seventy percent of the financial revenue of the Partial Affairs Associations nationwide. Bonds accounted for eleven percent, balance forwarded was six percent, and prefectural financial support was responsible only for three percent of the total. The dependence of the Partial Affairs Association upon these allocations from the participating localities is increasing:

*They are excluded by the terms of the Local Allocation Tax Law Article Two, Paragraph Two. Interestingly, a Partial Affairs Association may be established for the purpose of taxation, but its own revenues may not be derived from direct taxation.
TABLE 3-14  
SOURCES OF PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION REVENUE OVER TIME  
(percent)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOURCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocated from Participating Localities</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Prefectural Funds</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from Property, Fees, Charges</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Bonds</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that central and prefectural funds in support of these Partial Affairs Associations have dropped in half (in relative terms) between 1960 and 1976, while the burden upon the member localities has increased from under half of the total to more than two-thirds. In order to understand why, we have to understand the ways in which the character of the Partial Affairs Associations have changed. Fire Protection and Sanitation services have together become responsible for over one half of all Partial Affairs Association expenditures.* It is suggested by Ministry of Home Affairs officials that the most expensive portion of these sorts of services are the personnel expenses for which no subsidies or grants are available. The center does not provide funds for salaries of local officials via the subsidy and grant system. Thus, one cannot

*Indeed the former represents over one third of all fire protection expenditures nationwide, and the expenditures by Partial Affairs Associations in the area of waste disposal amounts to almost one quarter of all such expenditures by localities in Japan.
look at the data above and assume that the decline in central support as a portion of the Partial Affairs Associations revenues is attributable to a central decision to discontinue promotion of the system. Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the localities are clearly shouldering most of the burden for these services, and they are doing so in spite of the disadvantages of having neither an independent tax base nor access to Local Allocation Tax revenues.

Agreements, explicit as well as implicit, and legal-formal as well as informal, among the partners in a Partial Affairs Association are quite naturally the glue which holds these arrangements together and which make such horizontal policy cooperation possible. The Local Autonomy Law specifies the legal requirements for the implementation of these agreements in great detail. However, there are several less formal conventions which have evolved in the administration of these organs deserving of mention. Unfortunately, there are precious few behavioral studies of joint local policy arrangements, the majority of the volumes concerning the topic being legal exegesis by Home Ministry officials.* One interesting and welcome exception concerns the conflicting political interests among members of a trash disposal-related Partial Affairs Association in the urban suburbs of Tokyo.** Yorimoto describes some of the implicit mechanisms by which political accommodation is reached among participating localities.48

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*If it is not written from the center's perspective, then it is written from the point of view of the joint policy organ itself - never from the perspective of the participating localities.

**The garbage disposal problem has been no minor issue in Tokyo, as the discussion of Tokyo Bay Area politics in Chapter Six will demonstrate. Cooperative local policy organs are more common in the Tokyo region than are independent localities engaged in this policy area. Of the thirty-two cities, towns, and villages in Suburban Tokyo Prefecture, three-quarters are members of the seven Partial Affairs Associations related to garbage disposal.
First, he points out that there is an implicit principle of balance among the member local governments. There are certain affairs which are rather more "unpleasant" (meiwaku) than others. That is, there are some affairs no localities are anxious to host which are best conducted by means of a joint policy formula, such as slaughterhouses, contagious disease hospitals, or crematoria. A garbage or sewage disposal plant is the most common example. They are ideally situated on common borders, but when these are highly populated areas, or when there is no common border among the localities, some accommodation has to be reached in the situation of these facilities. Typically, these localities are involved in a variety of separate Partial Affairs arrangements with each other, and thus a balance is struck by which Locality A agrees to host the slaughterhouse, while Locality B takes on the crematorium, etc. Needless to say, the reverse is also true. They all compete to host the firehouses and general hospitals.

A second, related practice associated with the management of Partial Affairs Associations is the use of what is called the "dowry" (jisankin). While highly informal, it is a common practice for existing Partial Affairs Associations to extract a "dowry" from a locality seeking membership. This is usually in the form of a facility that this new entrant promises to host for the other participants. This facility may be for a second "undesirable" Partial Affairs Association, or else it may be entirely unrelated to the formalities of the joint policy formula.

Criticism of Partial Affairs Associations are numerous and varied, ranging from the sorts noted above concerning the ambiguity of their legal status and their alleged unrepresentativeness to the impotence of their assemblies and the ways in which they are said to be manipu-
lated by powerful regional cities. Most of this criticism seems centered upon one or another of the major battles over local autonomy in postwar Japan. These battle lines were most clearly drawn and the debate became most vociferous in the early 1970's when the Ministry of Home Affairs succeeded in introducing the fourth and final legal form of an Association of Local Public Bodies.

d. Multiple Affairs Associations

After a lengthy and skillfully prosecuted political battle, the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1974 succeeded in guiding through the Diet a bill for the partial revision of the Local Autonomy Law, and in introducing a new formula for joint local policy. Called Multiple Affairs Associations, these organs are legally considered one variety of Partial Affairs Associations, and as such, are governed by most of the same legal requirements. However, their basic nature is so different as to in reality constitute a very distinct form of regional joint policy organ. The introduction of Multiple Affairs Associations was achieved through the revision of Article 285 of the Local Autonomy Law which had until then been no more than a redundant statement of the corporate character of Associations of Local Public Bodies. The new Article 285 provides that the parties to an Association agreement may jointly manage more than a single affair under the same administrative organ. Thus, although the Multiple Affairs Association is no more than one sort of Partial Affairs Association, one which "fulfills the requirements of Article 285" as the Local Autonomy Law puts it, its very conception is at variance with the idea of a Partial Affairs Association. That article provides that cities, towns, and villages (prefectures and special wards are excluded) may jointly manage their affairs with other localities through
Partial Affairs Associations, even in the event that the types of affairs being jointly managed are in several different policy areas. Until 1974 Partial Affairs Associations could not be comprehensive regional joint policy organs. They were restricted to single policy areas. Often, the result was the following sort of pattern in which a separate Association was required for each jointly managed policy within the same region:

TABLE 3-15

REGIONAL PATTERNS OF MEMBERSHIP IN PARTIAL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY AFFAIR</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was seen as an unnecessary complication and hindrance to effective regional policy by officials at the Ministry of Home Affairs, who were at that time searching for a region-wide joint policy organ which could serve as the administrative unit for their new greater Municipal Zone plan.*

The new Multiple Affairs formula allows not only for multiple policy areas, but also permits some of the constituent localities to remain uninvolved in one or several of the Association's affairs. The Multiple Affairs Association members are afforded the further flexibility to create by-laws and special provisions pertaining to only a portion of the members of the Association. This has been interpreted by some to allow for an

*Although created as a response to this need, Multiple Affairs Associations are not limited to use by Greater Municipal Zones alone.
important variation in the Association decision-making process. If this provision is invoked in the charter of the Association, two majorities become requisite for policy in a given area. There must first be a majority of all members of the Association, but secondly, in order to avoid a situation in which uninvolved Association members make policy for other members engaged in a separate policy area, a majority only of interested parties is also required.

A second provision was made to distinguish a Multiple Affairs Association from the Partial Affairs formula. Paragraphs Two and Three of Article 287 were inserted in the Local Autonomy Law in order to provide alternative legal forms for Association Executive organs. They permit the Multiple Affairs Associations to create Executive Committees (rijikai) in place of the single person chief executive (kanrishu) which are required of Partial Affairs Associations. If the Executive Committee form of executive is opted for, the law stipulates that this committee be composed of the mayor of each participating locality, or of a person designated by the mayor from among his employees. Local assemblymen are excluded.

The creation of the Multiple Affairs Association formula is designed to provide a great streamlining in the provision of local services. Indeed, between 1975-1977 there was an immediate drop in the number of Partial Affairs Associations. While benefits in terms of greater joint policy cost-efficiency were anticipated, there were similar savings in the member localities themselves. Since each locality's assemblymen and mayors had to be involved in each of the various joint policy organs for each policy area, the creation of a single Multiple Affairs Association eased each of their administrative burdens as well. In addition, by
uniting the affairs of several Partial Affairs Associations, the size of
the total staff could be reduced.

As of 1978, there were sixty-two Multiple Affairs Associations, a
thirty percent increase since 1975. Some were performing in as few as
two policy areas, and one was responsible for as many as fifteen affairs.
Naturally, the average size of the Multiple Affairs Association (approximately six localities) is larger than that of the Partial Affairs Association (approximately four localities). Their character is intimately
related to the needs of the Greater Municipal Zones which the Ministry
of Home Affairs independently established in 1969, and in order to pro-
perly understand both in their fullest political context, an explanation
of the central government's thirty year quest for a politically accept-
able formula for regional administration is necessary. That is the sub-
ject of the following chapter. First, the last remaining joint policy
formula, the Local Development Corporation, will be presented.

8. Local Development Corporation

Local Development Corporations were created in 1963 to provide a
more comprehensive joint policy mechanism for local governments undertak ing massive construction and general planning activities.* These
Local Development Corporations (established under Article 298 of the Local Autonomy Law) are organized according to the same formal procedure as are
the Partial Affairs Associations. Like the Partial Affairs Associations,
they are also special local public bodies, and their formation requires
the same sorts of permission from the Minister of Home Affairs or the
governor.

*As were all other postwar joint policy formulae, these were the product of an initial recommendation by the Local Affairs Investigation Council. See the 1962 eighth report of the Council,
These two joint policy organs also differ in important ways. Whereas the Partial Affairs Associations are limited to specified spheres of public policy, the Local Development Corporations are much more comprehensive in scope. Whereas the Partial Affairs Associations are created for the management of joint public policy, the Local Development Corporations are limited only to the process leading to the construction of public facilities. They are not empowered with management authority, and dissolve automatically at the completion of the project when the planning has been realized. Theirs is the temporary purpose of acquiring land for industrial development and for housing, securing developmental funds and bonding. They are involved in the planning and execution of regionwide road, port, land use, water supply, sewer, recreation, and welfare facilities. Whereas the Partial Affairs Association has both an executive and an assembly, the Local Development Corporation has only an executive organ in which all power is vested. Again, in a manner different from the Partial Affairs Associations, employees of Local Development Corporations are appointed by the chairman of the board of directors from among the staffs of the mayors of the participating localities. The Local Development Corporation does not formally have its own employees. Those designated to join the staff retain their prior status as local government workers, and in a sense are on loan to this temporary project. During their tenure at the Local Development Corporation, their salaries continue to be the responsibility of their home localities.

There are two basic strategies employed for the financing of the activities of the Local Development Corporations. If the project is considered not to be a "special enterprise," it is funded by allocations from the member local governments, and the corporation is not responsible for making a profit. At the completion of the project, upon the disso-
lution of the Corporation, the management of the facility is transferred to the member localities. In the case of "special enterprises" however, double entry bookkeeping is introduced, as if it were a private business, and no support is received from the participating localities. Instead, the Local Development Corporation is required to finance its own activities, with revenues derived from the disposal of land or rents. In this context, the Local Development Corporation is very different from any other joint policy formula stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law.

This joint policy formula has not been particularly popular; there have never been more than eighteen such organs nationwide in any given year. Fewer localities make use of this device than any other on their joint policy "menu."

IV. CONCLUSION

The image of a public policy "menu" is one that the Japanese themselves employ. It is both very appropriate and very revealing of the basic structure of local public administration in Japan. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, in at least the legal-formal sense, localities must be responsive to a central administrative apparatus which defines the rules and which bounds much of local policy choice. In terms of the legal-formal aspects of joint local policy, Japanese localities are free to choose from the options presented to them, but they are limited by a set bill of fare. Nevertheless, given the nature of the "vertical administration" outlined earlier in this chapter, there is bound to be much confusion and contradiction in the welter of central directives and requirements. This is where students in search of local autonomy ought to be directing their attention. While the central state and its
and its vertically-directed controls are quite formidable, the central state can be neither omniscient nor omnipresent in guiding its agents. Omniscience is even harder to achieve when authority is vertically fractured.

While we have found evidence of a vertically-fractured center, and while we will find much more in the following chapter, we cannot yet conclude that translocal coalitions for policy implementation are entirely instruments of local will. What local governments do together in the implementation of policy is largely done by them in the role of "contractors" for the central government. Like public corporations, the other fundamental tool for regional policy, localities are bound by vertical imperatives. They create horizontal forums only in a literal sense. In these, as in other forms of translocal coalitions, we find a subtle interplay between purely vertical notions of tutelage and control on the one hand, and what we might have expected to be more autonomous horizontal interactions on the other. This suggests what will be a recurring theme in this study: centralization need not block translocal cooperation: it may in fact stimulate it. Ari demonstrates that the original Meiji formulae for joint local policy were created for the disposition of central affairs. Although much mutual benefit clearly accrues to the cooperating localities, we have seen in this chapter how this way of thinking about translocal policy remains intact today. We turn next to an exploration of the postwar political context in which this has been manifest.
NOTES

1 Steiner (1965); Aqua (1979); MacDougall (1980a).

2 Steiner, op. cit., pp. 318-321.


4 Steiner, op. cit., p. 320.

5 For the only English language exploration of these public corporations, see Johnson (1978).


9 Steiner, op. cit., pp. 263-299.


11 Reed (1978).


13 This section based upon ibid., pp. 33-35.

14 See Chapter Seven of this thesis and MacDougall (1975) for the politics of that movement. This section is largely based upon Sakata (1977), pp. 189-197.

15 Local Autonomy Law, Article 148.

16 Local Autonomy Law, Article 150.


19 Interview with Okubo Teruo (June 22, 1978), Research Staff, National Association of Governors.

20 This data and most of this section are based upon Sakata (1977), pp. 134-139.

21 See Steiner, op. cit.

See Sakata (1977); Furui (1977); Kuze (1973); and Endo and Tomabechi (1977).


*kanryōshugi, noritsushugi, keihisetsushugi; Ari (1973).*

Interview with Takagi Shosaku (July 27, 1978).

Nagano (1965); Akita (1977); and Kuze (1973) each suggest this.

The following discussion of these councils is based upon Takagi (1965); Kanemaru (1948); Dewa (1943); Yoshioka (1943); Yanase (1943).


Asahi Shimbun (February 2, 1979).

Asahi Shimbun (May 29, 1979).

See clauses 116-118 of the Meiji Town and Village Code.


Jichi Sho Shinkoka (1967).


Furuii (1977), pp. 294-300.

Yoshizawa (1968).

See the report reprinted in Furuii, pp. 303-306.


Gikai to Jichitai Shihen Shubu (1977), p. 244.

Ibid., p. 241.

Ibid., p. 240.


Gikai to Jichitai Shihen Shubu (1977), p. 244.

The Ministry of Home Affairs 1978 White Paper from which these data come does not explain the missing ten per cent, p. 93.

Interview with Local Finance Section Deputy Chief Iwaki Hiroshi (June 8, 1978).


50 Local Autonomy Law, Article 287, Paragraph Two, Section One.


CHAPTER IV

REGIONALIZATION SCHEMES IN THE POSTWAR

Summary

This chapter traces the postwar history of central efforts to introduce sweeping changes in the way regional policy is conducted in Japan. These efforts began in earnest almost immediately after the American Occupation and, in one form or another, they have never ceased to be at or near the top of the Ministry of Home Affairs' agenda. They have come in a variety of forms from a variety of sources (governmental, semigovernmental, and private) and have erupted into major national debates in roughly ten-year intervals. All the plans, from the straightforward amalgamation of nonviable localities which required Diet action, to the recent establishment of "Habitation Areas" which were implemented by agency directive, involve what is here referred to as the "horizontalization" of the periphery. Each successive scheme has sought to rationalize local public administration by winnowing out duplicated policy and by effecting policies of scale through the pooling of local administrative resources. When viewed in its political context it is clear that each successive scheme has also been a watered-down version of its immediate predecessor, as opposition by vested interests has repeatedly blocked the more ambitious proposals. This chapter first explores attempts at the regionalization of the prefectures only because it was the Ministry's failure to achieve its aims at this level that led it to attempt more modest reforms at the level of cities, towns, and villages. The Ministry has proven itself to be very resourceful in this extended effort, for the
postwar history of local administrative reform has essentially been a successful groping by Home Affairs bureaucrats to find a politically acceptable formula which would require localities to do more of what they do together.

Conclusions

We find that the popular characterization of "Japan, Inc." is far too simple. In the case of the postwar politics of regional policy, the LDP has often found itself battling business interests; it has also frequently moved to block ministerial schemes. The ministries have had to oppose business proposals, and they have all too frequently found themselves engaged in bitter intramural struggles. These latter political battles reinforce the notion of "sectional centralism" first developed in Chapter Three. We find that what we often glibly refer to as the "central government" is itself hardly unitary; we find further that this may frequently work to the advantage of localities which, as a result of the mutual insularity and competition among central agencies and ministries, find themselves able to choose from among a variety of regional policy schemes. Most obvious of all is our finding that the bureaucracy is far from omnipotent - a finding which should not, but which all too frequently does, shock observers of Japan.

I. INTRODUCTION

Regional policy has consistently been at or near the top of the Ministry of Home Affairs' agenda throughout the postwar period. Much of the postwar history of local public administration in Japan is the history of Ministerial efforts to promote economy of scale through the
regionalization of local public policy. The salience of this regional policy is due in no small measure to postwar reconstruction and the "planning boom" which has captivated central officials cross-nationally, in Japan no less than in Western Europe or North America. Particularly when seen from the viewpoint of the localities required to act as contractors for these schemes, most regional policy programs can be understood as part of a tireless promotion of "horizontal" policy; that is, much of what is prosecuted under central direction involves the joint implementation of public policy by coalitions of local agents. The postwar period in Japanese local public administration is best characterized as the Ministry of Home Affairs' groping for a politically acceptable formula for such horizontal policy. Always skillful, even if not always successful, the Ministry has been ever ready with new regional schemes to replace defeated ones, and these national level battles have been the most clamorous in the noisy Thirty Years War over local autonomy.

There is, at the outset, a confusion requiring clarification. As outlined in Chapter Two, most scholarly work on regional policy is of one of two traditions; regional planning or regional administration. The two are closely related. Regional planning was born of economics and geography; its central concern is spatial imbalance and the amelioration of inequality. In short it is directed at the development of backward regions. Regional planners couch their efforts wholly in terms of national-level policy instruments. Their main task is the identification of target regions, and the bringing to bear of the power of the central state. Regional development policies usually approach the modernization problem with massive inflows of central funds to the targeted area. They are usually temporary in duration, sudden in impact, and are fre-
quently implemented through local agencies. Here is the most obvious connection to the regional administration literature. Like the regional planning/development literature, this work is also directed at the modernization problem, but its focus, and thus its prescription, is different. This scholarly tradition is focused more directly upon these local agencies themselves, and particularly upon their most efficient and rational utilization. The "leveling up" of services and facilities in Japan, as elsewhere, is in this approach basically a matter of efficient public administration. Efficient administration is achieved through the elimination of nonviable local bodies. In turn, the elimination of nonviable localities is essentially a matter of the promotion of either amalgamation or the creation of new region-wide administrative apparatuses. Both amalgamation as well as these sorts of regionalization schemes are variants of a centrally directed "horizontal strategy" for regional policy, the subject of Chapters Three and Four and of this thesis more generally. The regional planning/regional development literature, with its biases toward central policy instruments, is therefore somewhat less relevant to our concerns. Since, however, both traditions of regional policy studies are very important in the Japanese context, and because most regional policy packages evoke both sets of concerns, it is best to first review the many regional development programs promulgated by the central government in the postwar.*

It is generally agreed that regional planning in postwar Japan has moved through three distinct stages. In the first period, roughly designated as 1945–1955, the primary aim of national development planning

*The little that is written on the subject in English is sketchy at best, and adopts a center-focused, from above to below view of the process. See, for example, Okita (1965).
was the reconstruction of ports, roads, and rails, and the redevelopment of power and other resources. With the successful reconstruction of Japan, the nation entered a second phase of regional development planning, 1955–1970, one aimed at promoting industrial development. Whereas the unambiguous aim here was high economic growth, it is generally argued that the third phase, 1970–present, is a reaction to the externalities produced by the success of the growth policies, and is said to be directed at balancing economic growth with environmental protection through rational land use planning.

To implement the aims of reconstruction in the immediate postwar, the government divided the nation into twenty-two regions under the Comprehensive National Land Development Act of 1950. Under this legislation, priority for public investment was given to energy and irrigation (dam) projects, some of which were modeled after the American Tennessee Valley Authority. At the same time the first in a series of major region-specific development acts were promulgated. These region-specific development acts continued until 1971, by which time all of Japan had been covered region by region:

TABLE 4-1

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Hokkaido District Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Capital Region Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Tohoku Region Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Kyushu District Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Shikoku District Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hokuriku District Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chugoku District Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Kinki Region Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Chubu Region Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Okinawa District Development Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to these sorts of region specific Acts, there were also functionally-specific pieces of legislation which benefited particular kinds of areas, such as The Special Soil Areas Act of 1952, and The Heavy Snow Areas Act of 1962. There was also Power legislation in 1952 and Industrial Promotion legislation throughout the high growth decade of the 1960's. The Land Use plans of that period were also regional in their impact, for they were largely, and generally unsuccessfully, aimed at the dispersion of Japan's Pacific coastal concentration of industry.*

In sum, whether promulgated under the reconstruction paradigm of the 1950's the growth paradigm of the 1960's, or the environmental paradigm of the 1970's, regional planning in postwar Japan has been synonomous with regional development. They have had little directly to do with regional administration, the topic at hand.

II. REGIONALIZATION SCHEMES

Quite apart from the technical administrative issues discussed in Chapter Three are the central political problems in the regionalization of public policy. The securing of rational and efficient local administration has a fundamentally political component. To the extent that it exists, economy of scale in local public administration has been achieved through the employment of a variety of devices, most of which had been highly controversial. In fact those which most promised efficiency and administrative rationality were also the most sweeping in character. Consequently, these were also the plans which most aroused the ire of

*Note for example the 1962 First Comprehensive National Development Plan's program for the creation of New Industrial Cities as well as former Prime Minister Tanaka's famous Plan for the Remodeling of the Japanese archipelago. (See Shima, 1976, pp. 124-143 for a discussion of the failures of these plans.)
affected vested interests, and thus were those around which was kicked up the most political dust. As the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, of all the more sweeping reforms, only amalgamation has ever been implemented. The rest, phoenix-like, have each died multiple deaths.

The amalgamation of nonviable local governments was not new to the postwar. As recently as 1889, there were over 70,000 cities, towns, and villages in Japan. Six years later there were "only" 16,000, as the Meiji local government reforms began to wipe out the local bases of the Tokugawa system. The process of amalgamation continued quite regularly, though slowly, through the prewar. In September 1953, with the passage of the Town and Village Amalgamation Promotion Law in the Diet, the process was accelerated in earnest. The number of localities dropped from just under 10,000 to just over 3,000 in fifteen years.

The sorts of joint policy formulae discussed in Chapter Three have been intimately related to the use of the amalgamation tool in the promotion of regional public policy. As we have already seen, the majority of these mechanisms are postwar innovations. Amalgamation and joint public policy have always, until the end of the rapid amalgamation in the early 1960's, been employed together. At the core of their interdependence has been the search for the right fit between locality size and administrative capacity. The Japanese call it tekiseika, which may be translated as rationalization, but which is better (and much more awkwardly) translated as "appropriate-ization."² It was in the atmosphere of a concerted center-led effort to determine the proper distribution of function, authority, and capability that amalgamation and joint policy
were together employed. In August 1952, just prior to the promulgation of the Amalgamation Law, the Local Autonomy Law was revised to provide for the Councils, the Establishment of Joint Organs, and the Entrusting of Functions which were introduced to reinforce the coming amalgamation effort. While hardly free of political opposition (indeed, the political history of the amalgamation from the point of view of the localities involved waits to be written), both measures were easy for most to live with. Indeed, of all the center's many efforts to congeal an atomized local public administrative system, these were perhaps their most easily achieved successes. From that point on, the horizontalization of the periphery, whether through the forced disappearance of some localities, or through the active promotion of cooperative policy management, was never to fail to produce a major political fuss. It was also, from that point on, never to disappear from the center of public debate. The following is a list of the most important central schemes for the regionalization of local public administration in postwar Japan;
### TABLE 4–2

**CENTRAL POLICY AND THE HORIZONTAL STRATEGY IN THE POSTWAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Sponsor/Forum</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Doshusei Plan</td>
<td>Kambe Commission</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Local Councils Establishment of Joint Facilities Entrusting of Affairs</td>
<td>Autonomy Agency</td>
<td>Local Autonomy Law Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Amalgamation of Cities, Towns, and Villages</td>
<td>Autonomy Agency</td>
<td>Diet Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Doshusei Plan</td>
<td>National Association of Mayors</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Chihosei Plan Fuken Togo Plan</td>
<td>Fourth Report of Local System Investigation Council</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Local Administration Communication Councils Plan</td>
<td>Seventh Report of Local Implemented System Investigation Council</td>
<td>April 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Local Development Corporations</td>
<td>Local Autonomy Ministry</td>
<td>Local Autonomy Law Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Prefectural Coalition Plan</td>
<td>Ninth Report of the Local System Investigation Council</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Prefectural Amalgamation Plan</td>
<td>Tenth Report of the Local System Investigation Council</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968–70</td>
<td>Doshusei Plan</td>
<td>Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>shelved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Greater Municipal Zones</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Regional Livelihood Zones</td>
<td>Construction Ministry</td>
<td>implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Multiple Affairs Associations</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Local Autonomy Law Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Habitation Areas</td>
<td>National Land Agency</td>
<td>implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Garden City Plan</td>
<td>Prime Minister Ohira</td>
<td>under review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. The Regionalization of Prefectures

As the above list indicates, the Doshūsei Plan has been the most oft-debated in the postwar period. Although there have been many variations of the plan, the Doshūsei idea is basically one in which prefectures would be eliminated as primary intermediary organs. In their place would be created some eight or nine (depending upon the version) new intermediary policy organs. One would be a district (Dō), and would correspond to the present Hokkaidō, the remainder would be called states or provinces (Shū), hence the name Doshū system or Doshūsei. Advocates of this plan felt that the prefectures were too imperfectly suited and too narrow for the expanding demands of regional administration. As with many another postwar political issue, the Doshū system idea had a series of prewar antecedents. It was first proposed by the Tanaka cabinet in 1927. At that time, however, it was never brought up for debate beyond the level of the Executive Council within the Cabinet's Administrative System Deliberative Council. Interestingly, this original plan sought to make prefectures autonomous localities with popularly elected chief executives instead of seeking their abolition. Added upon this layer would be the Doshū, solely responsible for the nationally delegated affairs such as police functions which could not be entrusted to these new style prefectures. Each shūchō (the administrative office of the Doshū) would have several prefectures within its jurisdiction. Their chiefs would be appointed by the Home Minister. The prefectures would be left with responsibility for the administration of such innocuous affairs as hospitals, libraries, waste disposal, and the regulation of some commercial establishments. Although the Tanaka Cabinet plan never got very far, the idea resurfaced in a more partial form in 1936. There was supporting sentiment at that
time within the Hirota Cabinet to utilize this sort of a mechanism to promote the comprehensive development of the Tohoku Region, a poor and relatively homogeneous area comprised of some six separate prefectures. But, the cabinet was soon dissolved, and the plans for a supraprefectural Tohoku State died.

During the war a variety of regional consolidation measures were taken. In July 1940 the Konoe Cabinet began moves toward the introduction of the Dōshūsei as a key part of its corporatist "New Political Order."* In June 1943 the Local Communication Councils were reformulated as the nine regional Local Administration Councils for similar purposes of coordinated, uniform local administration in the prosecution of the war. Eventually it was judged that these Local Administrative Councils lacked the authority to enforce compliance with their policy dicta, and they were replaced in turn by the ultimate in regionalization schemes. The Superintendencies General, introduced in 1945, were direct arms of the center extending to every sphere of local public administration. It was this prewar experience, one of progressive centralization by means of Dōshūsei-like reforms, that has been at the base of trepidation and opposition to regionalization by many local authorities in the postwar period.

The Dōshūsei idea was first proposed in the postwar era during the Kambe Commission hearings in March 1950. There were really two plans debated. The first, called the Dōsei plan, called for the elimination of prefectures and their replacement by eight dō, districts which would be local public bodies subject to the Local Autonomy Law and which would hold direct elections for their chief

*The Local Communication Councils, discussed in Chapter Three, were created just prior to the creation of Konoe's Cabinet.
executives and their assemblymen. They would be responsible for the administration of centrally delegated functions to the extent that they could capably administer them. They would thus be supervised according to the task involved variously by each of the central Cabinet Ministers. Thus, in terms of their administrative responsibilities and in terms of their status as local public bodies, they would resemble the existing prefectures. They would differ only in their size, and therefore in the scope of their services. The plan called also for greater reliance upon the Partial Affairs Association formula. In addition it called for the elimination of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and the creation of special cities to replace the twenty-three Tokyo Wards. The second plan, the Shūsei plan, would entail rather more significant changes in the existing system. It called for the creation of eight shū states which would have centrally appointed chief executives. Only the cities, towns, and villages would then be considered local public bodies, and only they would have popularly elected chief executives. These states would be directly supervised by the relevant cabinet Ministers. Because Kambe, the Chairman of this very influential Commission, and Honda, the head of the Autonomy Agency, each championed a different version of this plan, they could agree only to drop the whole idea. They jointly announced on March 13, 1950 that they would not push the matter for the time being. It was temporarily shelved.5

In 1952 the Local System Investigation Council (Chihō Seido Chōsakai) was legally established, and this body was to prove to be the most influential and innovative advocate of local administrative reform in the postwar period. This body is officially an advisory council (shimon Kikan) to the Prime Minister's Secretariat, with a membership of from
fifty to sixty persons composed of Diet members, local chief executives, central bureaucrats, local assemblymen, and academics. All are appointed by the Prime Minister to serve one year terms which are usually renewed. In spite of its legal status as an attachment to the Prime Minister's Secretariat, it is de facto dominated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, where its offices are physically located. It is used by that Ministry for the testing of its trial balloons. Virtually all of the most important Home Ministry supported major proposals for reform have first been debated and recommended by this body. In addition to this function, the Council also fights interministerial battles as a proxy for the Ministry of Home Affairs (dairi senso). Each year at budget time there regularly arise issues on which the Local System Investigation Council grapples with similar advisory groups representing other ministries, the most common being the Ministry of Finance-related advisory organs (Zaiseli Seido Shingikai and Zeisei Chōsakai). The tenure of the Council has been extended every other year since its establishment, and before the end of each term it has issued a major report of its deliberations. These have typically been the basis for major reform efforts. As Table 4-2 above implies, many of these reports have involved regionalization schemes. Indeed, the subject of regionalization was debated at the very first Local System Investigation Council hearings in 1952. The following year, when it issued its first report, it shelved the došhu idea, and called for its further study, due to irreconcilable differences between the National Association of Mayors (NAM) and the National Association of Governors (NAG). These two bodies were to subsequently become the two chief antagonists in the twenty year long battle over the introduction of this brand of regional administrative reform.
On August 5, 1954, the National Association of Mayors put forth its own proposal for a došū system. It called for the creation of special regional localities, but ones which would not have the sort of authority prefectures enjoyed in the supervision of city, town, and village administration. These new organs would be broader than the existing prefectures and would be mostly responsible for the coordination of general development programs. There would be a publicly elected assembly, and the chief executive would be indirectly elected by the assembly from among its own membership. In a sense, then, the NAM was proposing a sort of local mirror of the national Diet's parliamentary system. It could not tax directly, but would rely upon a combination of central funds and the support of the cities, towns, and villages whose powers would be concomitantly increased. Its functions would be strictly limited to six policy areas: 1) general development projects, 2) flood control measures, 3) road building, 4) land reclamation and reforestation, 5) disaster relief and reconstruction, and 6) research and examination centers. Not surprisingly, the NAM plan proposed to elevate the status of the cities, towns, and villages at the expense of the prefectures which would be entirely abolished. These cities, towns, and villages would then become the basic unit of local government, and the source of all direct citizen services. The new regional bodies, the došū, would be responsible only for the limited sorts of affairs listed above, and would be reduced in status to that of special local public bodies, the equal of Partial Affairs Associations or the special wards of Tokyo.

On August 9, 1954, the National Association of City Assembly Chiefs (NACAC) followed suit and announced its version of the Doshūsei plan. In the NACAC plan there were to be ten regional blocs which would in
effect be no more than central government field agencies. The affairs of the prefectures would be transferred to the cities, towns, and villages. The staff of the new intermediate level administrative units would all be central bureaucrats, and their functions would be only those delegated to them by the center. Central to this plan was the idea of expanding joint local policy by means of the use of such formulae as Local Councils and Partial Affairs Associations. The National Association of Towns and Villages (NTV), yet another deeply interested party to the debate, issued its more gradualist plan three months later.

All of the advocates of these versions of the Doshūsei idea argued that once implemented it would a) promote regional policy which would effectively supercede the narrow confines of prefectural borders, b) best provide for comprehensive industrial development, c) better coordinate the existing muddle of local and national functions, d) allow for the more natural development of regional cities which may sprawl across artificial political boundaries, and e) rationalize local policy by minimizing duplication. By this time, however, the National Association of Governors had hardened its opposition to these ideas. The NAG and its interests were powerfully represented within the conservative parties. The plans were shelved again.

Interestingly, these sorts of Doshū plans almost always received the warm support of the major opposition parties. The Japan Socialist Party had no vested interest in preserving the prefecture as it was. It supported any regional plan which involved a devolution of power to the smaller localities. The JSP preferred to see the prefecture stripped of its supervisory functions, relegated to the role of liaison. The fact that the JSP and other opposition parties were willing to support such
regionalization schemes during the 1950's is very important, for it serves to highlight the basic differences that exist in such plans even when they carry the same name. The key difference among the bewildering variety of such schemes revolves around whether or not there is provision in them for a real devolution of power to the localities (as there was in those which were proposed by the National Associations of localities as noted above) or whether there was provision only for the strengthening of the supervisory power of the prefecture (as was the case in later versions of the Doshusei proposal) usually proposed by the center or by business interests. This basic difference is often lost in historical discussions of the Doshu idea, which tend to treat all regionalization schemes as reactionary, or at least as contrary to the spirit of local autonomy. In any event, it is important to remember that the readjustment of the prefecture system has been on the center's agenda ever since the Lower House of Diet attached a resolution to that effect at the very same time that it passed the Local Autonomy Law itself. Considering this then, one can appreciate that much of the hand wringing concerning the so-called "reverse course," the undoing of the SCAP local government reforms, should have been more clearly anticipated.

In mid-1957 the details of the Fourth Report of the Local System Investigation Council were made public, and the recommendations contained therein set off the next round of regionalization debates. The protagonists were largely the same. So were many of the proposals. Only the name was changed. This time the plan was called the Chihosei Plan (Local System Plan), and once again the big political guns were drawn. Virtually every interested party submitted its own regional scheme in response to the Council's report, and quite expectedly, the only supporters of the
status quo were the National Associations of Governors and Prefectural Assembly Chiefs. That they prevailed in the face of such a widely demonstrated sentiment for change from both above and below is an indication of both their own power within the conservative ruling party as well as of the disunity of the reformers.

This disunity was evident from the beginning. The Council itself issued not one, but two regional plans, reflecting majority (seventeen members) and minority (twelve members) opinions. As Steiner points out in his discussion of the two proposals, they were "different both in substance and in spirit." They agreed only upon the need for a fundamental readjustment in the administrative scope of the existing prefectures. The majority opinion, sometimes referred to as the "Regional Plan," called for the abolition of the prefectures. It sought to replace them with a new, consolidated intermediary body called the "District Board" (chihōfu) which would have the combined characteristics of both a national and local body. There would be seven to nine such blocs nationwide, and their chief executive was to be appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of a directly elected assembly. These chief executives would be subject to recall by both the assembly or by the Prime Minister, and were nominally required to be non-partisan. This majority proposal was much less clear about the devolution of authority to the cities, towns, and villages than the earlier Dōshūsei plan of 1954, which was prepared by the National Association of Mayors. Although it was stipulated that the District Boards could not delegate affairs to the cities, towns and villages, it was not clear exactly which affairs the latter would be afforded under the new arrangement. The retention of some of the characteristics of a local public body by these new District Boards might preclude
the full transfer of powers preferred by the cities, towns and villages.

The minority opinion, sometimes referred to as the "Prefectural Plan," sought rather less sweeping changes. Instead of advocating the elimination of the prefecture altogether, it argued for the restructuring of the prefecture, and the retention of its character as a local public body. There would be fewer of them than currently existed, and the minority plan envisioned the amalgamation of three or four prefectures into one larger, more regionally comprehensive body. Retained also were provisions for the direct election of both assembly and chief executive, although the chief executive would be limited to one four year term. This minority plan was rather less ambiguous and more liberal in regard to the devolution of authority to the cities, towns, and villages. Like the 1954 NAM plan, it called for the transfer of all affairs related to sanitation, welfare, and health to the smaller localities. The prefecture would retain authority only for general development policy, education, and police functions. 10

The strongest supporter of the majority proposal was the business community. They considered the existing prefectures unnecessary hindrances to efficient and rational public administration. The business press labeled prefectures "nothing but luxuries," 11 and demanded their rationalization. At the center of the business community's concerns were the problems associated with securing industrial water and energy for the rapidly developing Kinki and Tōkai regions. Water sources were located in more rural prefectures, prefectures which were not always anxious to cooperate with the industrialists' demands for hydroelectric and water supply projects from which the hosts anticipated little gain. Moreover, industrial development was quite naturally failing to respect administra-
tive borders, and from industry's point of view, each bit of transprefectural expansion engendered mountains of additional permit and approval requirements, tax burdens, and other administrative nuisances. More significantly, it was felt that if there were only one governor in a region, he would be more likely to support the industrial development of that region. The recalcitrant, but powerful voice of the rural governor would be lost.*

The majority plan drew the immediate opposition of the left which, while having no vested interest in the preservation of the status quo as suggested above, had serious doubts about the proposal’s commitment to the devolution of power to the cities, towns, and villages. The Japan Socialist Party issued its own proposal in July, 1957, in which it advocated something quite similar to the minority program. The JSP sought the restructuring of the prefecture, and the stripping away of its supervisory authority. The JSP proposal would allow the prefecture to act merely as liaison and coordinator for the activities of the smaller localities. The preferrable size of these smaller "basic" localities was set at one hundred thousand persons. 

More influential in the subsequent shelving of both plans, however, were the six National Associations of Local Bodies (Chiho Roku Dantai). Their role as important translocal organs of interest articulation at the center will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Here however, their reaction to the new regionalization offensive of the center, a split according to the level of local government they were representing, deserves mention.

*The best case in point is that of Shiga Prefecture's governor who was inclined to protect his Lake Biwa in the face of demands from Osaka industrialists.
The two groups from the prefectural level, the National Association of Governors (NAG) and the National Association of Prefectural Assembly Chiefs (NAPAC) were quite naturally opposed to any alteration of the status quo. The NAG position, issued in August 1957 predictably held that "the prefecture is a necessary intermediary level of government." Taking the offensive, the NAG called for a reduction of central field agencies, and an increase of locally generated independent resources. They labeled the Local System Investigation Council idea reactionary, a prelude to a new and dangerous recentralization. They argued that administrative simplification and efficiency should not be the only criteria for public administration.

The same month the NAPAC concurred in its own document. The NAPAC argued that:

There is absolutely no need to change the system of public election of governors or of the character of prefectures as local bodies. This character is rooted in the Constitution and in the principle of local autonomy. The prefecture is the social, political, and economic basis of a regional citizenry.13

But the national associations representing the cities, towns, and villages had quite different ideas. They were less than enthusiastic about the majority plan of the Council, and when proposing regionalization schemes, they steered clear of support of the Chihōsei idea. Instead, they pushed for the provisions of the minority proposal which guaranteed the increase in their own power. The National Association of Mayors (NAM) issued its report in June 1957, using the older term Dōshūsei which it had championed three years earlier. Its priorities remained unchanged. It argued that the cities, towns, and villages should be made the only "basic" local bodies, and that the existing prefectural system be abolished. Subsequently, the NAM suggested, the functions then belonging to
the prefectures ought to be transferred to the municipalities "to the
degree possible." The NAM supported the idea of creating a new inter-
mediary organ for the coordination of region wide administration. But
this new organ would merely have the status of special local public body,
and thus would more closely resemble the Partial Affairs Associations or
the Special Wards of Tokyo which have highly circumscribed authority.
As the NAM envisioned it, the new regional organs would have no taxing
powers, their revenue deriving only from central funds and allocations
made by the municipalities. The NAM plan even went as far as to suggest
that the chief executive of this new regional body be appointed by the
central government from among candidates recommended by a joint conference
of the cities, towns, and villages within that region! The National
Association of Towns and Villages in July, the National Association of
City Assembly Chiefs in August, and the National Association of Town and
Village Assembly chiefs in September, each submitted rather more rhetor-
ical proposals in support of greater devolution of power to the cities,
towns and villages and in support of the elimination of the prefecture.
The City Assembly Chiefs attacked the prefecture as being "feudal;" \(^{14}\)
they saw it as an ineffective encumbrance which would best be discarded.
An interesting twist injected by this organization of Assembly Chiefs was
the requirement that the new regional bodies' chief executives be chosen
from among the region's city assembly chiefs! To make complete the con-
frontation between prefectural and subprefectural interests, the five big
cities of Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Yokohama announced their support
for the plan while the five big prefectures in which they are located
issued a joint statement in opposition in September. This division among
local groups was mirrored by deep division within the LDP where prefec-
tural interests have always been very powerful. Amidst the lack of consensus and unwillingness of the LDP to take the lead, the regionalization scheme was again tabled.

And once again, it was not tabled for long. It soon reappeared, this time in the form of less ambitious plans for the consolidation of the prefectures, an old regional tool. Prefectural consolidation as a means of securing efficient local public administration dates back to the early years of the Meiji local government system itself. In order to establish a strong and effective central administration, the Meiji government confiscated Bakufu lands and dissolved the han system when it created prefectures. In June 1871, just before the abolition of the han, there were three fu, five ken, and 261 han, 309 administrative districts in all. On July 14, 1871, the han were abolished and over time, through both dissolution and amalgamation, the number of prefectures slowly decreased. By December 1872 there were seventy-three. There were ten less in October 1875, and there were fifty-three by April of the following year. In 1879, when Okinawa prefecture was established, the final han disappeared; the prefectural system assumed its final prewar form in 1888 with the recreation of Kagawa Prefecture.15

Whereas consolidation of the prefectures historically involved only their amalgamation, in the early 1960's, given the inability of the central government to generate a politically acceptable elimination of the prefectural system, consolidation became the substitute target. The central effort to promote consolidation took two forms. These two forms, the amalgamation of existing prefectures, which was not unlike the nineteenth century amalgamation process, and the coalition of prefectures, a more partial consolidation, are very difficult to separate from each
other. Both were proposed formally by the Local System Investigation Council,* and both were strongly promoted by the Local Autonomy Ministry (as it was then known) and by the business community. At various stages of their unsuccessful but not very short-lived promotion, each borrowed significant provisions from the other. In the end, the defeat of each was the defeat of both, and the Ministry of Home Affairs came to recognize the need to look elsewhere than the prefectural level if it was to successfully promote regional policy in Japan.

The first significant proposal for prefectural amalgamation was not systemic but specific. In 1959 the Governor of Shiga Prefecture proposed that Kyoto and Shiga be amalgamated. Likewise, the Wakayama governor proposed the amalgamation of Wakayama, Osaka, and Nara Prefectures. This latter plan was dearest to the hearts of the Osaka business community which, for reasons already noted, strongly advocated such a move.16 Although the idea was placed on the back burner during the turbulent early 1960's, in April 1963 Prime Minister Ikeda announced his support for the idea, and in a speech in Osaka announced that central funds would not be reduced, as some opponents had feared, after the merger of Wakayama, Nara, and Osaka. Public debate concerning the amalgamation of Gifu, Aichi, and Mie (in the Chubu or Tokai region), of Toyama, Ishikawa, and Fukui prefectures (in the Kitariku region), and of Hiroshima and Shimane (in the West), followed in succession.** In each case, however, there was one governor,

*The Prefectural Coalition Plan was proposed in the ninth council report in 1964, and the Prefectural Amalgamation Plan was proposed in the tenth council report in 1965.

**Sakamoto, the progressive candidate for Tokyo governor in 1963, went as far as to suggest that Tokyo and Yamanashi, a neighboring rural prefecture, be merged. No one seems to have taken that particularly seriously. See Mainichi Shimbun (August 10, 1963).
such as Okuda in Nara and Matsuno in Gifu, who balked at the idea of sharing power with a more prosperous neighbor.

Recognizing the political difficulties inherent in such an amalgamation of prefectures, the Local Autonomy Ministry and the Local System Investigation Council floated an alternative form of consolidation, the Prefectural Coalition Plan (Tofuken Rengoan). This was advertised as a Japanese domestic analog to the European Community. Under this plan, the prefectures would join together for projects related to economic development while at the same time they would retain their political sovereignty. For broader regional development projects they would create joint secretariats. Their undertakings would be financed both by central funds and by assessments made upon participating prefectures. The Common Market model was unselfconsciously invoked. The coalition would be administered by a board of directors composed of the member governors. Ratification by each of the member prefectural assemblies was also provided for. The Local Autonomy Ministry promised that these coalitions would receive budgetary preferences. There was, in addition, one singularly important (and probably fatal) provision which was inserted by the Local Autonomy Ministry. The Ministry reserved the right to make binding decisions for the coalition in the event that there was a majority without full consensus on a particular issue. Thus, this was not an entirely toothless substitute for amalgamation. Despite Ministry protestations to the contrary, this bill was intimately related to the failed dochūsei idea and to the still debated amalgamation plans; when it came before Diet Committee in 1964 it faced the same problems the others had faced earlier. It was returned to the LDP for further study.

After the failure of the bill to come up for a Diet vote, the issue
was again turned over to the Local System Investigation Council. The debate continued until the autumn of 1965 at which point the council issued its tenth report. Interestingly, as with the 1957 report concerning the Dōshūsei idea, this tenth report was also composed of a majority and a minority opinion. The majority opinion was in support of a "voluntary" prefectural amalgamation plan. Instead of the elimination of the prefectural system by central fiat, as in the Dōshūsei, instead of the centrally directed and mandated consolidation implied in the Chihibei, and instead of the nationwide mandatory amalgamation of earlier plans, this proposal allowed for the amalgamation of existing prefectures only after the passage of a resolution to that effect by member prefectural assemblies. The proposal included a variety of financial incentives for such voluntary amalgamation. This amalgamation was to be political as well as economic, and by March 1966 the Local Autonomy Ministry had taken the Council plan and transformed it into a Diet Bill. The Ministry created a special unit to oversee the amalgamation process. The target date was to be the 1971 nationwide local elections. Under pressure from the opposition parties, the public employees unions, the National Association of Governors, as well as from within the LDP, and other groups, the Local Autonomy Ministry rewrote the original draft on several occasions. It was rejected in April 1966 in committee. With the ruling LDP not receiving any direct, unified support for the plan from within, and with strong opposition both from within and from without, the idea silently died... for a time. It was resurrected by the Local Autonomy Ministry only to be rejected again in June 1968, and again in August 1969. The Ministry would have to turn to the subprefectural level for application of its regionalization schemes. As we shall see below, its support for
plans to tinker with the prefecture system, some of which were still to come, was never again to be unqualified.

The Ministry of Home Affairs was not entirely without successes in the midst of these failures, but most were hollow victories at best. In 1965 the Diet approved a Ministry-supported bill designed to create what were known as Local Administration Communication Councils (Chihō Gyōsei Renraku Kaigi). Confronted by the prior defeat of the Dōshūsei plan and by stiff opposition to the pending plans for consolidation of the prefectures, the Ministry moved in yet another direction on the road to regional public policy. It adopted the idea, first proposed in the seventh report of the Local Systems Investigation Council in 1962, for the creation of nine regional blocs in which the prefectures, central field agencies, and municipalities would be gathered for the purpose of communicating, and hopefully coordinating, region-wide public policy. No new authoritative public bodies were to be formed. These Communication Councils were merely forums for discussion of issues of mutual concern. Due to the fact that central field agencies also participate in these Councils, they are not, strictly speaking, horizontal associations of localities in the way that the other proposals are. Kuze⁲¹ and Nagano²² describe them as direct links between the localities and the center, but they suggest that while the outward appearance is that of a regulatory, coordinating body directed from above, the reality is one of a locally controlled instrument. The chairmen are always local chief executives, and while moderately active in coordinating such regional projects as railway planning and disaster relief, these organs are largely consultative.

When first proposed by the Local System Investigation Council, these councils were heralded as the cure for the problems of regional adminis-
In this instance, strong opposition came from the other central ministries, however. Both the Construction Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry feared that the plan held the potential for too great a redistribution of power to the localities. They took the position that existing Local Autonomy Law provisions for Local Councils (Article 252, Paragraph Two) were sufficient and that central ministries, even through their field agencies, need not enter into local Councils whose decisions might be binding upon them. In fact, the original Local Autonomy Ministry plan had provided these Local Administration Communication Councils with binding authority in regional development policy. The plan allowed only that a failure of such a Council to reach a final decision would be referred to the relevant Ministry for a final adjustment. Ironically, while the socialists were opposing the plan as an attempt to consolidate central power, central ministries were bickering about the degree to which central power had to be compromised.

The bill itself was submitted to the same Diet session as the Prefectural Coalition Bill in 1964. Whereas the latter was being coordinated with the Prefectural Amalgamation Bill, as described above, and whereas these moves were facing an unreceptive Diet, the former less sweeping reform proposal was carried over to the next Diet session. The Local Autonomy Ministry was, in a sense, using a sort of shotgun strategy by this time, spraying the Diet with bills for regional policy schemes. The center had moved in fits and starts (and sometimes concurrently) in the ten years between 1955-1965 from the promotion of the compulsory elimination of the prefectures (道庁), to a more voluntary, though centrally directed amalgamation of existing prefectures (Prefectural Amalgamation Plan), to an even less authoritative "prefectural coalition" plan modeled after
the European Common Market. Each had met insurmountable opposition. All that could be squeezed through an uncooperative Diet was this Local Administration Communication Council Law. It was finally approved by the Diet in March 1965. But by the time it became law, it was at best a watered-down version of its original self. It had been competing the entire time with the other more sweeping reform proposals on the one hand, and it had been stiffly opposed by many of the other ministries on the other. When it finally passed it was seen as "shopworn," and few believed these new councils would contribute to regional policy. Now, fifteen years later, few believe that they have.

While it is impossible to note all of the regional schemes of that period which were never implemented, it is important to note that there were many more than those which have already been described.* One regional scheme, proposed in 1963 by the blue ribbon Special Administrative Investigation Council (Rinji Gyosei Chōsakai) which was created as a temporary external organ of the Local Autonomy Ministry, called for the creation of regional "District Offices" (Chihocho). These "District Offices" were to be regional consolidations of all of the various central ministry's field offices. Neither the affected ministries nor the prefectures wanted any part of this idea, and it quickly and quietly died. The following year this same panel of experts proposed the creation of a sort of Tokyo D.C., in which much of the administration of the capital region would be taken over by the government. This plan acknowledged that the existing organ designed to coordinate policy in the Tokyo Bay area, the Capital

*It is also important to point out that the left has not always reacted negatively toward such reforms. See Toku Kenkyukai (1976) and Chiho Jichi Sogo Kenkyuyo (1977) for a sample of progressive opinion on the regionalization of local public policy.
Region Coordination Committee (Shutoken Seibi Iinkai) which was attached to the Prime Minister's Secretariat, was largely ineffectual. It proposed instead that there be created a new Capital District Agency (Shuto-kenchō), the head of which would be a Cabinet Minister, which while not entirely replacing Bay Area local governments, would assume a variety of supervisory powers.

If the Local Autonomy Ministry had still, by the late 1960's, not succeeded in introducing an administrative apparatus for regional public policy in Japan, it was not for want of effort or creativity. During this period it had to confront its own political weakness vis-a-vis other central ministries, as it also had to confront the intransigent opposition of prefectural interests to any effort to encroach upon prefectural power. These two factors combined to result in the overhaul and redesign of the Ministry's strategy concerning regional public policy. In its next effort it was to succeed by skillfully circumventing the Diet in the early stages of introducing its new plan, and by directing that new plan at the subprefectoral level; in essence, the Ministry reversed itself by seeking in its new regionalization schemes to invest much new power in the prefectures themselves. At the time that this new strategy was taking shape within the Ministry, the business community was making its final bid to promote the Dōshūsei idea. This time, however, business leaders had lost their most important ally. With their prefectural reform packages three times defeated in Diet, the Local Autonomy Ministry no longer had a stomach for that particular battle.

The new business offensive was launched in 1968 by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry;* this time it was updated, clothed in the pro-

*Its chairman, Nagano Shigeo, has long been among the most prominent industrialists in Japan. He is the former Chairman of the Board of Nippon
gressive rhetoric of the time. Now the Dōshūsei plan was one which would deliver an end to industrial pollution and was one which would best promote and administer welfare policy to the citizens of Japan. Reintroduced at a time when big business was facing a popular and often successful challenge from the left at the local level, the plan was in large measure a cooptation of the more successful of the left's slogans. The program itself, however, was basically unchanged. In fact, it reverted to the Dōshūsei proposals that preceded the less radical amalgamation and coalition plans. It was once again an effort to abolish the prefectures and to create eight blocs for regional administration. Although in the face of broad opposition it was to prove to be a more flexible plan than earlier ones, it was to prove to be no less doomed.

Opposition, both passive and active, came from all quarters. The opposition parties feared that the introduction of these regions as central organs would lead to a strengthening of central control at the expense of local autonomy. These opposition parties, while still effectively blocked from substantive influence at the national level, were enjoying their heyday at the local level. They were jealous in defense of that base. The local government public employees unions, led by the powerful Jichirō, feared that the merger and abolition of prefectures would entail a rationalization of public administration at their expense. Thus they publicly opposed the idea as one which would result in the reduction of public services. Prefectural Assembly members, possessors of as finely tuned instincts for self-preservation as anyone, saw the introduction of this system as resulting in the destruction of their political bases. Only the most powerful among them would be able to survive the trebling of the Steel, and his role in this and other regional issues will be recounted in more detail in the discussion of Tokyo Bay Area politics in Chapter Six.
size of the electoral districts. They were quietly, although energetically, opposed to the plan. Diet members, particularly LDP representatives, feared that the loss of so many local assembly seats would handicap their own electoral strategies. The Diet candidates rely heavily upon the "machines" provided by friendly prefectural assembly members. They also anticipated a redistricting, which for some would be fatal. The National Association of Governors quite naturally opposed its own elimination.*

In the face of such combined and powerful opposition by vested interests, the business community had to fall back upon its much publicized political skills. They proved quite flexible. In order to "reduce the shock" of the initial changeover to the Dōshūsei, that is, in order to placate the worried prefectural assembly members, a revised plan was announced by Chairman Nagano in which the new regional assemblies would have the same number of seats as the total of the old prefectural assemblies.27 This wasn't enough for the local legislators who expected that assemblies of more than 700 persons (in some cases) would prove to be too unwieldy and would eventually have to be reduced. Dōshū proponents attempted to assuage the fears of the opposition parties on the left by assuring them that they supported the idea of popularly elected chief executives. They claimed also that the Dōshū would be designed to perform only those functions which could not be efficiently administered by the cities, towns, and villages. No further specification of the division of functions was offered, and the opposition parties were not placated.28 Dōshūsei advocates even went as far as promising that "for the sake of better reflecting

*Interestingly, in spite of the breadth of this opposition sentiment and the lack of evidence to support such a claim, prominent leftist local chief executives were given most of the credit by a sympathetic press for the eventual shelving of the Dōshūsei plan.
public opinion, we will maintain the title 'prefecture' (ken) under the new system." In the face of no movement at all toward the garnering of additional support, their final revised position, one that makes them seem a bit desperate, offered that the Doshūsei be implemented only in the Kansai District on a trial basis before being adopted nationwide. The Kansai District was, of course, the original target of the Doshū plans back in the early 1950's. In spite of all these efforts, there were still no takers.

Prime Minister Sato publicly allied himself with the opponents of the Doshūsei plan in January 1970 by announcing (somewhat brashly as it turned out) that this proposal would involve:

a piling of layer upon layer of administration, (and that) there would have to be more study so as to have it simplify rather than complicate local public administration.

Under considerable pressure from the business community which formed his most important base of support, the Prime Minister's staff quickly revised that statement to mean that if prefectures were not first abolished there would be an unnecessary third layer. Sato was waffling a bit. But, he soon hardened, and at the House of Representatives Budget Committee hearings held the next month, he stated that he was opposed to the introduction of the Doshūsei "given present circumstances."

The Ministry of Home Affairs was vociferous in its silence. Burnt several times too often, it lent no support to the new offensive. Ministry officials, led by a new deputy director, Saigo Michikazu, (currently Mayor of Yokohama), understood better than the business community the strength of the opposition, and the Ministry, seeing it as politically premature, quietly withdrew its support for the whole idea. The Ministry claimed it to be administratively premature, and it turned instead to less
controversial (and more directly controllable) aspects of regionalization. Then Home Affairs Ministry Administration Bureau Chief Miyazawa suggested the shift in these terms:

We've no objections to the Doshūsei as such, but first consideration should be given to the promotion and strengthening of the cities, towns, and villages which are at the roots of local autonomy. Only if we can make progress on regional policy from below will we then confront problems concerning the prefecture system. Therefore, it is fine to begin now to make preparations and to draw up blueprints for the Doshūsei. But, it is a problem for the future, not the present.32

Several months earlier, in November 1969, Miyazawa (himself now the governor of Hiroshima Prefecture) stated in an interview that before there could be effective regional administration, there would first have to be a physical base for effective region-wide transport and communications. He suggested that there would first have to be a physical integration of work, leisure, and cultural activities upon which the Doshū could eventually be constructed.33 He was here signaling the new course that the Ministry had decided upon, the scheme for Greater Municipal Zones, which was to become the keystone of their somewhat less ambitious regionalization program of the 1970's. The Ministry of Home Affairs had finally bailed out, abandoning its long alliance with business interests and finally recognizing the futility of confrontation with deeply entrenched prefectural interests - interests which hold great sway within the LDP. It chose instead the path of least resistance, manipulation of regional policy at the city, town, and village level.

B. The Regionalization of the Cities, Towns, and Villages

1. A New Strategy

If the Ministry of Home Affairs is not the most powerful of the central ministries, it is at least the equal of the most resourceful. The
Ministry was never, throughout the entire postwar period, without one or more supplementary regionalization schemes. We have already seen how one after another they were pulled from the Ministry's sleeves for public debate. The late 1960's - early 1970's was no exception. At the very height of this most recent furor over the introduction of the Doshusei, the Local System Investigation Council, the fount of so many Ministry-sponsored regionalization schemes in the past, issued its fourteenth report without an opinion on the Doshusei. The Ministry took that occasion instead to redirect the debate toward previous underpublicized LSIC reports proposing regionalization at the city, town, and village level.

These reports had been issued and ignored in the activity surrounding the promotion of the prefectural restructuring plans in the early 1960's. Even as the primary skirmish was being fought over the Doshusei, the prefectural coalition, and the prefectural amalgamation proposals at that time, the Ministry, through the Council acting as its proxy, was preparing its fall back position. It fell back in 1969 upon the thirteenth report of the Local System Investigation Council (issued in August 1968), and upon the ninth report (issued in December 1963). This regionalization scheme came to be called the Greater Municipal Zone Plan.* Both reports argued that the existing provisions for joint policy management in the Local Autonomy Law were insufficient. They suggested the need for more comprehensive "coalitions" of cities, towns, and villages (shichōson rengō). This change in strategy represented a return to efforts to strengthen the joint policy formulae described in Chapter Three. The prototype for this new "joint local body" (kyōdōtai) was not to be merely an association of local-

*This is an official but imperfect English translation of the Japanese kōiki shichōsonken.
ities, but was to be a comprehensive coalition of localities in which more power would be vested and under the auspices of which the general management of regional affairs would be centralized. These Council proposals were plucked off the shelf by an utterly resourceful Ministry of Home Affairs, an organ temporarily retreating to the limits of its own administrative authority. For the time being it was seeking neither Diet action nor the support of the business community.

The resulting regionalization scheme was a planner's paradise. The Greater Municipal Zones were selected, connected, and dissected with exquisite attention to uniformity of detail. The regional "network" was designed as a rational, planned arrangement of population centers and shopping districts within an integrated transport and communication system. What was called a "daily living sphere" (seikatsuken) was identified as the area within which a person travels to work, school, or shopping. The planners specified an ideal population size (100,000 persons) which would contain also a specified ideal number of physicians, cultural facilities, schools, libraries, and post offices.* These reams of central plans could not have been more detailed. Neither could they have been less related to specific local conditions.

The Ministry of Home Affairs was still promoting regionalization for the same reasons as before. The idea behind all of this largely obfuscatory planning was the center's aim to integrate into a regional network

*Nihon Toshi Sentaa (1970), p. 125, presents the detailed breakdown of the "regional network" into "basic neighborhoods," "primary livelihood districts," "secondary livelihood districts," "tertiary livelihood districts," and "daily living spheres." Plans for the "basic neighborhoods" specified the number of local trash boxes, while the plans for the "daily living spheres" specified the distribution of such things as fire control equipment.
each of these identified "rings" of activity at a suitable and efficient level of administrative function. It was no less than before simply a matter of rationalizing public administration. The Greater Municipal Zones were promoted as the logical response to the de facto regionalization resulting from the societal changes wrought by the high growth of the 1960's. The depopulation of the countryside, population sparsity, was often as serious a problem in the provision of public services as the overconcentration of population in Japan's dense cities. The physical de facto regionalization of human activity in rural Japan, a new phenomenon, offered Ministry planners yet another rationale. The geographic scope of people's lives had widened in the postwar, often beyond administrative borders of existing local governments. Here the Ministry of Home Affairs was able to present a reasoned and thoughtful approach to regional public policy which would not conflict with powerful vested interests.

The Greater Municipal Zones are essentially the result of what might be called the centrally-directed horizontalization of the periphery. They are designed as the forums for the coordination and conformity of local public administration and public services. The idea of conformity has variously implied conformity to levels of services in neighboring localities, the conformity of prefecture-wide service levels, and/or conformity with central expectations for efficient local public policy. National standardization of local policy was a public promise:

If the nation's regional public policy were to continue to be uncoordinated, effective regional development would be diffi-

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*The most striking of these changes was the growth of regional cities in Japan. Whereas 82% of the cities, towns, and villages of less than 50,000 persons lost population between 1960-1965, fully 80% of those with populations of more than 50,000 gained in population during that same period. (Shichōson Jichi Kenkyū, 1975, p. 3.)
cult, and the administration of local government would lack any sort of comprehensive character. The concept of the Greater Municipal Zone is that each of the nation's policies would be regulated. . . The Greater Municipal Zone is aimed at planning the promotion of a regional consolidation which is nationally uniform. 36

It was with no apparent irony intended that the directive which outlined the purpose and shape of the Greater Municipal Zones and which established them in July 1969 stated that their creation was "based upon the general will of the related cities, towns, and villages. . . ." 37

The Ministry program was quite clear; the planning activities of the individual cities, towns, and villages within a Greater Municipal Zone shall be subordinate to the planning activities of the Greater Municipal Zone itself, and that Greater Municipal Zone planning shall be conducted via regional deliberations which include the participation of the prefectural governor. The role of the governor as assistant to the center in this scheme is thus very different from the governor's role in the previous regionalization schemes. Whereas he was previously being stripped of power, in this newer reform package, the governor is presented with greater authority than before. The prefecture is instructed to take the lead in Greater Municipal Zone planning, as well as in aiding the regional organ financially and technically. The prefecture is expected to act as facilitator of the new zone, and is even encouraged to carry out basic construction projects for the body. Indeed, prior to any Greater Municipal Zone planning, consultation with the governor is required by the Ministry. He, in turn, is required to make certain that the proposed plan does not conflict with any other within his jurisdiction, and he is entrusted with the responsibility of more generally supervising the implementation of these Greater Municipal Zone plans. Central–Greater Municipal Zone grant
and subsidy distribution regulations require that funds be distributed through the prefectures. Moreover, the prefecture will not receive any of these funds until it submits a report to the Ministry certifying that it has fully studied and has approved the plan in all its technical detail. In the case of virtually every prefecture, the working level oversight for these Greater Municipal Zone activities belongs to the General Affairs Bureau and Local Administration Section Chiefs. We saw in Chapter Three that many of these officials are themselves career Home Affairs Ministry bureaucrats. Thus, in this new scheme, the Ministry is both reinforcing its control locally as well as placating the prefectural interests it had previously failed to win over.

In July 1969 the Ministry of Home Affairs divided Japan into 329 of these zones (ken). The three great metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya were omitted for several reasons,* and thus while 94 percent of Japan's land area belongs to one or another of these zones, only 60 percent of the population of Japan lives within the jurisdiction of one of them. 89 percent of Japan's localities are included in this scheme. There had been some debate at the outset about what would be the best administrative mechanism for such a regionalization of local policy. In the end, given past failures in the Diet, it was decided that existing joint policy formulae would have to temporarily suffice until conditions favored a change in national law. Thus, each Greater Municipal Zone is

*These large urban centers were instead labelled "Big City Zones" (daitoshiken). This distinction was made because these metropolitan areas are vastly different in character in the scale of their services, and in the nature of their economic activity. In spite of this designation, however, there is no central program for the big cities which is comparable to the Greater Municipal Zones. There has been careful central study of the condition of these areas. See Endo (1977), pp. 117-121; Kokudo Keikaku Kyogikai (1971); and Nihon Toshi Sentaa (1970).
legally constituted as either an Association of Local Bodies or as a Local Council. (See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of each.)*

There was a very intricate system of incentives developed for the promotion of these Greater Municipal Zones. Each zone, once formed, received 1.5 million yen annually from 1969-1972 in subsidies and grants in support of their planning activities.** From 1970-1974 the average Greater Municipal Zone received an annual 20 million yen in grants designed as support for actual projects. Additional categories of funds included grants and subsidies for research expenses, an average of 18 million yen per year per Zone. In addition the Ministry of Home Affairs has designated the Zones as priority recipients of permission for local bond issuance and has designated them also for special treatment in the distribution of the Local Allocation Tax. In 1977 alone this totaled three hundred million yen. The existence of this variety of incentives and supports entails also that the Greater Municipal Zones rely very little upon their own resources. Their activities are probably even more fully dependent than are their activities as individual localities. Virtually all expenditures are covered by central and prefectural grants and outlays and by local bonds. No provision was made for the creation of new revenue sources or taxing powers.

Accompanying this financial dependence is a marked reliance upon the center and prefecture for administrative guidance as well. This is, of course, not accidental. The center will not make its financial assistance available until it is assured of the soundness of the program in question.

* Roughly speaking, 60 percent of the Greater Municipal Zones have opted for the more authoritative Association formula.

** It should be noted that at first only fifty "model" zones were created.
As stated above, certification of this sort is usually provided by the prefectural governor. But there are other controls as well. The chief executive of a Greater Municipal Zone is required to secure the consent of the Minister of Home Affairs when a) the zone seeks to reduce by more than 20 percent the total budget related to activities for which aid is received, and when b) the zone seeks to alter the distribution and use of these funds by more than 20 percent, among other things.*

The regional city also enjoys an increase in power under this arrangement. Generally speaking, of the two types of Greater Municipal Zones, those whose activities clearly center around one particular central regional city, and those composed by and large of equal sized localities, the former is far more common. In every one of the 329 Greater Municipal Zones nationwide the chief executive is also the mayor of the largest member locality. In over seventy percent of these cases, the offices of the zone are physically attached to that mayor's city hall. Due to the fact that the size of these dominant regional cities often exceeds 100,000 persons, the majority of the Greater Municipal Zones are larger than the original target of 100,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION SIZE OF GREATER MUNICIPAL ZONES AND THEIR LARGEST CITY (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Greater Municipal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Single Largest City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000-300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, in a manner quite consistent with central aims, there is an increasing tendency for smaller cities, towns, and villages to become dependent upon larger ones, and then in turn for the group of cities, towns, and villages to grow dependent upon the prefecture. The Ministry has sought to make horizontal policy cooperation so attractive as to actually a) discourage independent public policy by individual localities, and to b) discourage even horizontal public policy at any level smaller than that of the Greater Municipal Zone. Prior to the introduction of the Greater Municipal Zones and Multiple Affairs Associations, there was the variety of joint policy formulae stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law as described in Chapter Three. With the designation of the Zones, however, localities have been less willing to enter Partial Affairs Associations when they could join with even more localities in Multiple Affairs Associations which would ensure a greater flow of central funds. In one sense, broader, more rational regional planning is encouraged at the expense of independent local policy.

From the point of view of public services and facilities, however, these sorts of tendencies are not without benefit for the smaller localities. True to the intent of the program, many towns and villages are able for the first time to "tap into" programs and facilities for their residents which they were previously unable to provide. In 1970 the average expenditure per zone was 380 million yen, by 1973 it was 1.5 billion

*The Ministry of Home Affairs regulations for financial assistance to the Greater Municipal Zone are officially stated in the following documents, all of which are reprinted in Shichōson Jichi Kenkyū (ed.), pp. 236-245:
yen. The Greater Municipal Zones have been utilized to provide every sort of public service and facility, although in the early years of the program, most emphasis has been placed upon the construction of a physical infrastructure for regional policy; this is clearly reflected in the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1973 GREATER MUNICIPAL ZONES EXPENDITURES  
(in percent)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roads</th>
<th>62%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Sanitation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and Cultural Facilities</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Industry, Tourism</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Facilities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Facilities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation Facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services and Facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 100

Source: Jichishō (1978b).

The Multiple Affairs Associations, discussed in Chapter Three, were created as the administrative organs for these Greater Municipal Zones. Prior to the introduction of either the Greater Municipal Zones in 1969 or the Multiple Affairs Association in 1975, integrated and comprehensive regional policy was handcuffed by the requirement that Partial Affairs Associations be constituted for no more than a single affair. Thus, many separated Partial Affairs Associations were often entered into by the same localities, each for the management of a different affair. Regional cities were generally participating in each of that region's Partial Affairs Associations, while satellite localities were participating in correspondingly fewer of them. Each Partial Affairs Association was a separate corporate entity, replete with an assembly, executive, and professional staff. The proliferation of these organs was burdensome for all. This
is best illustrated by the actual case of a Greater Municipal Zone in Niigata Prefecture. Table 4-5 shows the eleven localities involved in various mutual combinations in the management of services in thirteen different policy areas. Before the introduction of Greater Municipal Zones and (later) Multiple Affairs Associations, each of these affairs was managed separately, under the provision of the Partial Affairs Association formula.* With the more flexible Multiple Affairs Associations, there is but a single organ managing these affairs.

Whether or not there should, from the point of view of local autonomy, be a single organ managing this variety of affairs is a separate question. Critics of the left have frequently criticized the distance of these administrative units from direct public scrutiny, but their successful introduction was nevertheless a significant political accomplishment for the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its strategy was carefully constructed. Without having to resort to legislation, it first introduced the idea of the Greater Municipal Zone, and met little opposition. It then urged that each Zone utilize an existing joint policy formula to administer its affairs. It was then able to make the case that existing joint policy formulae were insufficiently comprehensive, and called for the introduction of a new formula which would ensure the regionalization of local public policy, the Multiple Affairs Association. Its success in this effort is a measure of its great political skill. It had abandoned its prefectural strategy without abandoning its goal of regionalization; it moved to where it could be most effective, in the direction of least

*When the Greater Municipal Zones were first established, before the creation of the Multiple Affairs Associations, the average zone contained six (and in one case thirty-nine) separate Partial Affairs Associations.
### Table 4-5

**Sanjō Tsubame Greater Municipal Zone**

| POLICY AREA          | Elementary School | Flood Control | Mental Health Clinic | Transport | Food | Racing | Water | Old Age Home | Recreation Facilities | Contagious Disease Hospital | Liquid Waste Disposal | Cremation | Solid Waste Disposal |
|----------------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------|------|--------|-------|--------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| **Locality**         |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Sanjō City           |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Tsubame City         |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Kamo City            |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Iwamuro City         |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Yahiko Village       |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Yoshida Town         |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Tagami Village       |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Kamida Village       |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Sake Village         |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Tera Damarı Village  |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Bunsui Town          |                   |               |                      |           |      |        |       |              |                        |                        |          |             |
| Localities Outside the Greater Municipal Zone | 1 | 1 | 37 | 10 | 12 | 2 | 487 | | | | | |

Source: Gekkan Jichikén (1973), pp. 52-53.
resistance.

2. Diet Politics and Multiple Affairs Associations

Given the fact that the Partial Affairs Association formula was stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law, any change of the formula would necessarily involve a revision of the law itself. Revisions of national law are of course the responsibility of the Diet. The Ministry of Home Affairs, judging the mood of Diet and of the LDP in the late 1960's as rather less than positive toward their regionalization schemes, decided to "take the low road." The Ministry first introduced the Greater Municipal Zones, and only then showing the need for a comprehensive organ to administer GMZ affairs, began its move to revise the law. This touched off a new battle in Diet. But this time, they had created a regionalization scheme which benefitted virtually all of the opponents of the Doshūsei idea. Under these Greater Municipal Zones, the prefectures actually had more power than before. There was no opposition from that quarter. The main source of opposition came this time from the left, defenders of local autonomy. It was with great skill and some deft horse trading that the Ministry was able to prevail.

The left did not make a lot of noise in opposition to the Greater Municipal Zone scheme when it was first introduced. It was only afterwards, when the Home Affairs Ministry began the move to create an administrative organ for these zones that the opposition parties became aroused. The initial Ministry effort came in the form of a 1971 Diet Bill for the creation of "coalitions of cities, towns, and villages" (rengō hōan). This was the original concept as presented in the Local System Investigation Council reports upon which this whole effort was ostensibly based. The strongest, best organized voice of opposition to the bill was the Local
Government Workers Union, Jichirō.* They rejected the idea that the Greater Municipal Zones and their Multiple Affairs Associations would serve to enlarge local administration to its most appropriate scale. They felt that that had already been accomplished through the amalgamation of localities which had been proceeding since 1888. They argued that in this particular case, the principle of administrative equity conflicted with the principle of local autonomy. That is, Jichirō took the position that Multiple Affairs Associations, while intended to provide more equal facilities and services, also removes local administration for the direct control of the citizens. They recognized the necessity for regional coordination of policy and for the region-wide provision of services, but they felt that a clear distinction should be made between joint policy formulae and regional public administration. They felt that the former were at best technical devices, but that they were no substitute for regionwide consultations and democratic decision-making. They felt that the creation of a yet more comprehensive joint policy formula was a step toward the mechanistic elimination of individual localities. They saw it as a tool of national recentralization.

The Jichirō attack was comprehensive and carefully reasoned. They most feared the imposition of a new level of local government atop the municipalities and below the prefectures. Next, they argued that this "coalition" was not really, as advertised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, a Partial Affairs Association at all. They suggested that the labeling of it as such was really a matter of convenience on the part of the Ministry.

*Their arguments are most clearly presented in the June-July 1973 issue of their organ Gekkan Jichiken. These views were later to be echoed in their entirety, although not in their full complexity, by the opposition parties in Diet.
How could a "Multiple" Affairs Association be a "Partial" Affairs Association at the same time, Jichiro asked. They recognized that these "coalitions" were at least potentially much broader than mere mechanisms for joint policy management. But, Jichirō went much beyond merely opposing this particular revision of the Local Autonomy Law to allow for Multiple Affairs Associations. They called for the complete revamping of all of Volume Three of the Law, the portion concerned with joint policy formulae. It was their belief that if the purposes for which local bodies are organized jointly are not each stated separately and clearly to those localities and their residents, it then becomes a relationship not of voluntary and cooperative local governments, but a new level of government itself, one distant from popular control.*

The Japan Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party took the same positions. They argued that this "Coalition Bill" represented the partial fulfillment of an old central government aim to piece by piece repossess all administrative authority nationwide. The Socialists in particular turned their attention to the Greater Municipal Zones, arguing there were two reasons why these organs would not solve regional problems. First, the JSP argued, the Ministry had "illegally" used grants and subsidies as "bait" for road and other projects, and that it had poured these funds only into the central cities of each of the zones, cutting off the surround-

*Ironically, observers on the left at one time found themselves among the strongest defenders of the Partial Affairs Associations. They felt them to be a more acceptable alternative to the wholesale amalgamation of localities during the 1950's. Perhaps the most distinguished critic to have taken this position from the left was Hoshino Mitsuo (1955). By citing numerous foreign examples he sought to demonstrate that amalgamation was not an inevitable step, and that there existed suitable alternatives. Moreover he went even further and suggested that multiple affairs associations would be among the best of such alternatives (p. 92).
ing localities. Secondly, and more rhetorically, they suggested that "none of this was done out of consideration for the improvement of the resident's livelihood, but instead merely for financial rationality." The JSP saw the new plan as "an effort to open the way for a seven bloc nationwide regional system (doshūsei)." They moved to limit the use of financial incentives for such regionalization schemes.

The battle lines were quite clearly drawn. The Ministry of Home Affairs was pitted directly against the leftist parties, but this time there was no disquiet within the conservative camp. This case is instructive as an example of the limits of opposition strength. These limits were all the more sharply brought into relief when the Ministry dangled before the opposition parties the opportunity for the reintroduction of the direct election of Tokyo's ward chiefs, a long held leftist goal which had been the object of their own revision bills in 1961, 1965, and 1967.*

The Ministry first submitted its plan for "coalitions of localities" as noted above, to the 65th Diet in 1971. The administrative organ for the already created Greater Municipal Zones was not yet called a Multiple Affairs Association. The plan was technically a revision of the Local Autonomy Law which would create a new form of the Partial Affairs Associ-

*Although the wards as created by the SCAP reformers had elected chief executives, a 1952 revision of the law required that these ward chiefs be instead selected indirectly by the ward assemblies. In February 1962 the Tokyo District Court declared that the abolition of such direct elections was unconstitutional, but that ruling was overturned in March of the following year by the Supreme Court. Although there was no test case for the Partial Affairs Associations the Supreme Court's rulings served to define more clearly the ways in which Special Local Public Bodies were inherently different from ordinary Local Public Bodies. (Akita, 1977, p. 405). The Special Wards of Tokyo and the Partial Affairs Associations were to fully share this designation until 1975, when ironically, demands from the left for reform of one and from the right for reform of the other were to be fused in this single compromise revision of the Local Autonomy Law.
ation, at that time labeled the "local coalition." It allowed for the coalition's assemblymen to simultaneously be executive directors of the body, and it entrusted the bulk of the organ's power to the chief executive of the organ's secretariat. The bill received the immediate approval of the lower house, and the Local Administration Committee of the Upper House, not having had time to act on the bill, voted to carry the bill over to the next Diet session. No action was taken on the bill during the next three sessions, although it was carried over by majority vote of that same committee each time. In the 68th session the bill died still-born in committee due to the persistent opposition of the JCP and JSP. In the following year, 1973, the government (viz. the Ministry of Home Affairs) resubmitted the bill in a partially revised form in accordance with prior Diet debates. The government this time decided to drop the use of the term "coalition," and adopted instead the less rankling idea of "Multiple Affairs Associations. Also again included in the Local Autonomy Law revision was the long sought after creation of elected ward chiefs for Tokyo, a pairing which the opposition parties had unsuccessfully been trying to prevent. The JSP and JCP had sought to disjoin the issues by creating two different bills. The reappearance of the two linked together was a clear indication that the Ministry of Home Affairs, while willing to make other minor adjustments, was prepared to hold the public election of ward chiefs as hostage for their latest regionalization scheme.

The opposition remained opposed. Although the Ministry had excised the term "coalition" from the bill, and was now referring to these as merely one form of Partial Affairs Association, the left remained wary. Jichirō attacked the move as obfuscatory, as "camouflage and deception." Jichirō in fact prepared a comparison of the texts of the 1972 and the
1973 bills, and found no change in substance in those areas such as direct demands, dissolution procedure, disposal of property, and changing of by-laws, etc. which most concerned them. They continued to argue that the plan was a step toward the creation of a new intermediary layer of government, toward a new centralization of administrative power, and toward the implementation of then Prime Minister Tanaka's national "remodeling" plan to which they were also opposed. In the 1973 Diet session the JCP and the JSP, led by the Jichirō effort, remained unwilling to go along with the bill, in spite of the inclusion of the Tokyo Ward Chief provision. It died stillborn once again.

But 1974 presented a different set of imperatives to the opposition parties. The next round of nationwide local elections was to be held the following year, and pressure was building from within Tokyo local branches of Jichirō and the JSP for positive movement on the Ward Chief Election Bill. In one instance, on May Day 1973, 300,000 leaflets were distributed in Tokyo by representatives of the Sohyo Tokyo Branch, the Tokyo Metropolitan Workers' Union, and by the JSP Tokyo Branch in support of the bill. By 1974 it had become quite clear that the Tokyo-based interests on the left wanted the Ward Chief election measure far more than they opposed the Multiple Affairs Association plan. The opposition parties, feeling their internal erosion, moved to make their compromise with the LDP and the Ministry.

To that end, at the same time that committee deliberations resumed in Diet, the JSP invited the other three opposition parties to join in creating a unified position. They agreed on a strategy. The opposition parties decided to first once again demand the elimination of the Multiple Affairs Association idea. In the event that that were to fail, they spe-
cified a list of demands for reform of the idea. They agreed above all else that if the Ward Chief election measure were to be enacted in time for the Spring 1975 Elections that there was no choice but to support the combined package. 44

Acting as representative for the united opposition parties, Socialist Dietman Yamamoto Yanosuke presented the demands to the LDP. The idea of eliminating the Multiple Affairs Association plan was rejected on the spot, but the LDP indicated that it would be willing to consider some of the opposition reform proposals. After a series of "joint conferences," a consensus was reached which all sides could live with. It was agreed that a provision of the Multiple Affairs Association formula which had required localities to move in the direction of regional public policy be dropped. A second item which provided these Associations with authority for regional planning was also dropped, as were several other minor points. The most important revision, however, from the point of view of the opposition camp, was a subtle change in the wording of the new Article 285 of the Local Autonomy Law. The sphere of the new organ's authority was changed from "regional administration" (kōki gyōsei) to "mutually related affairs" (sōgō ni kanren suru jimu). The opposition parties claim that this change better guarantees that the Multiple Affairs Associations will be limited in their scope. They claim that this language eliminates the legal basis for central regionalization schemes via the Greater Municipal Zones. The Multiple Affairs Association was no longer to necessarily have the character of governmental organ for the Greater Municipal Zone. This provision ensured, they argued, that other forms of joint policy management could also be opted for by the participating localities. Thus, in their view, the autonomy of the localities is preserved. 45
The bill was resubmitted in March 1974 to the 72nd Ordinary Diet as a straightforward revision of the Local Autonomy Law. By May the above compromise was reached between the LDP and the opposition parties. Several collateral resolutions were sponsored by the LDP and various combinations of the opposition parties, and the bill sailed unanimously through committee as well as through a plenary session of Diet. After passage by the Upper House on May 31, it became law. The left claimed a great victory in blocking another recentralization scheme. There was, however, little real change in the bill between 1971 and its eventual passage. Ironically, the LDP was able to take credit for the reintroduction of the direct election of the Ward Chiefs of Tokyo, an issue which used to belong solely to the left. More significantly for local public administration in Japan, however, was the fact that finally, after more than twenty years of frustration, the Ministry of Home Affairs had guided through Diet a measure sufficiently comprehensive to make the regionalization of public administration possible. The Ministry had learned the hard way the political limits to regional reform.

3. Bureaucratic Politics and Garden Cities

These limits are determined as often by the sorts of competing, overtly political interests described above (National Association of Governors, Local Employees Unions, LDP Diet members), as they are by the vigorous competition among the central ministries themselves. No sooner had the Ministry of Home Affairs created its Greater Municipal Zones in 1969, than the Construction Ministry and, later, the National Land Agency (NLA) unveiled their own, uncoordinated, regional schemes, based upon similar considerations of administrative rationality and efficiency. The Ministry of Home Affairs' Greater Municipal Zones, the Construction Ministry's
Regional Livelihood Zones (Chiho Seikatsuken), and the National Land Agency's Habitation Areas (Teijüken) are the three basic central ministerial regional programs currently in operation. But there have also been numerous "spin-off" schemes introduced by other bureaus, schemes which borrow ecstatically from each of these three. For example, the Transport Ministry has introduced the idea of "Commuting Zones" in the planning of regional transport networks, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has used a different basis for the designation of "Market Regions," the Welfare Ministry has been using yet a different scheme for the administration of health policy, and even minor agencies and consultative organs have announced their own variation on the theme. These regional schemes each involve the effort by a central ministry to promote translocal cooperation in the siting and management of facilities. Each ministry uses its own regional criterion in formulating its budget and in creating programs of grants and aid to localities.

This non-coordination exists quite apart from that related to the placement of the field offices of each ministry. Here too, each central bureaucracy uses its own logic in establishing its field agencies, and the result again is a total lack of coordination when viewed from the perspective of the localities. The various placements of the center's field offices in Kyushu affords us an excellent example. Based upon historical patterns, the Transport Ministry's land transport offices is in Fukuoka, its sea transport office is in Kitakyushu, and its port and harbor field office for Kyushu is in Shimonoseki, which is actually on Honshu. The Postal Bureau's offices are located in Kumamoto, Fukuoka, and Kitakyushu.

This competitive disorder is the manifestation of the "vertical
administration," the sectional centralism first discussed in Chapter Three. The mutual insularity of the individual ministries, their uncoordinated pursuit of individual goals, is a commonly employed characterization of the system. Universally decried, yet practiced by all, this system of "vertical administration" has, as we have already suggested, hidden benefits for the localities at the bottom. The result of the proliferation of duplicate central schemes which are not strictly related to the policy functions of any one particular bureau is the expansion of choice for local officials. When presented with a variety of regional schemes, and with a variety of facilities that accompany them the local official is less worried about trying to coordinate the programs than he is concerned with finding the best fit between his needs and one of the programs. Yet, there is much criticism of this lack of coordination as well. Governor Miyazawa of Hiroshima Prefecture, a former Vice Minister of the Home Affairs Ministry argued:

A varied menu is no good. Even though the localities have something of a power to select among a variety of policies, there is at best only a very ambiguous relationship among each of the regional schemes. It is unclear to us which kinds of assistance for which kinds of schemes the center will make available...

But whether a benefit or liability for localities it seems clear that a sort of policy "menu" results from bureaucratic competition at the center. It seems likely, moreover, that fractionalization in central policy is not entirely dysfunctional at the local level, even if it creates bitter rivalries at the center. Whatever is to be said about such sectionalism, one point should be stressed beyond all others: all talk about Japan as centralized must be tempered by a healthy respect for the extent to which its central bureaucracy is also fractionalized. No less than any other
parliamentary system in which the professional bureaucracy enjoys admin-
istrative powers beyond that of their more political ministers, the Japan-
ese system is best characterized as one of sectional centralism. As the
discussion below will suggest, this has never been more clearly repre-
sented than by the regional policy issue as it was played out in the late

As we have already seen, throughout the 1950's and the 1960's, the
area of regional public policy has been monopolized by the Ministry of
Home Affairs. This monopoly culminated in their success in 1974 with the
introduction of the Multiple Affairs Association formula as the administrat-
ive organ for their Greater Municipal Zones. While, as noted above, sim-
ilar sorts of regional schemes quickly proliferated, no challenge to the
Home Affairs Ministry's leadership in this area was issued until 1978-79,
when the National Land Agency made a bid with some very powerful political
support.

Quite paradoxically, the National Land Agency, one of the weakest and
least influential central bureaus, has always had powerful political sup-
port within the LDP. The NLA was established in June 1974 as part of a
major Diet compromise, and as the result of substantial opposition party
influence in the killing of Prime Minister Tanaka's famous "Plan for the
Remodeling of the Japanese Archipelago." Tanaka's plan, prepared for him
by Shimokobe Atsushi, the first director of the NLA, had proposed that
Japan's industry be relocated throughout the nation. A minor scandal
resulted when it was disclosed that Tanaka's friends had been informed
beforehand of the details of the plan, and had had the chance to buy land
for speculative purposes. In the furor that resulted, it was finally
agreed that this National Land Agency be established and invested with
authority to coordinate national land-use related programs. Shimokobe was made the top administrator. The NLA was authorized to prepare all long-range national planning instruments, and was charged with responsibility for negotiating the budget requests of the various public corporations with the Finance Ministry. Their official entry into the regional policy arena came with the promulgation of the Third Comprehensive National Plan in 1977. Their entry became a challenge when Ohira was selected as Prime Minister in 1978. He won with the acknowledged vigorous assistance of former Prime Minister Tanaka. The NLA again had a friend in the highest of places.

The Habitat Area idea of the National Land Agency closely resembles the Greater Municipal Zone scheme, although, strictly speaking, they are not directly comparable. While the Greater Municipal Zones are directed at the joint management of facilities and at the joint provision of local services by local governments, the NLA program is more closely related to providing a system for the more rational and coordinated placement of centrally funded facilities. It is thus more directed at the spending ministries than at the localities. This difference in theory has neither precluded substantial confusion among interested parties, nor has it precluded intense competition between the two central bureaucracies for control of the "regional policy pie."

The entire regional policy question was given a shot in the arm by Ohira during the vigorous campaign in autumn 1978 for the LDP party presidency. He announced, as part of his program, that if elected (the LDP party president becomes Prime Minister as long as there is an LDP majority in Diet), he would create regional "Garden Cities" (denen toshi).* Once
he became Prime Minister, the bureaucratic struggle heated. It was apparent to all concerned that there was a variety of available regional schemes for Ohira to choose from, and that he would not have to resort to creating a new one. Most of the media seemed to expect that the new Garden City plan would be plugged into the Greater Municipal Zone network. It was anticipated that these zones would receive a new infusion of central funds and that that would be that.\textsuperscript{51}

But that was not that. The NLA jumped at the opportunity to take responsibility for the implementation of the Garden City idea, and they seemed to clearly have been given the inside track by Ohira himself. While the LDP was using the Garden City slogan as a central theme in its highly successful Spring 1979 national local election campaign,\textsuperscript{**} the NLA was succeeding in taking the regional policy initiative away from the Ministry of Home Affairs. In an interministerial, interagency bureau chief's conference in late December 1978, it was announced that the Garden City idea would follow the contours of the NLA's Habitat Areas, and not that of the Home Affairs Ministry's Greater Municipal Zones. A series of subsequent conferences was held among the fourteen central bureaus to further coordinate the effort. The NLA offered a compromise to the Ministry of Home Affairs, suggesting that the Greater Municipal Zones would be put "at the heart of the Garden City Plan" if it were agreed to by the other

\textsuperscript{*}In truth, Ohira was calling for such Garden Cities long before that campaign. As early as September 1971 he had included the idea as part of the "Ohira Vision," another campaign device. Yet, there was as little policy substance to these "Garden Cities" then as there was in 1978.

\textsuperscript{**}The idea for the creation of Garden Cities did not originate with Prime Minister Ohira, of course. He was first introduced to it by his political mentor, a former Kagawa Prefectural governor. The idea was first introduced to Japan from England, in the work of Ebeneezer Howard, in 1902. In 1909 the old Home Ministry adopted the plan, and Garden Cities have been the object of sporadic experimentation ever since.
ministries. It was, of course, not agreed. Another NLA official, putting the best light on the affair, also hinted at the split between the NLA and Home Affairs:

The Construction Ministry as well as all the other ministries and agencies are eager to cooperate with the National Land Agency in creating a single regional scheme. The Ministry of Home Affairs, though, would like to continue supporting its Greater Municipal Zone plan. We are trying to convince them to join us because so many different kinds of policies are possible within the Residence Zone program.

The NLA "Habitat Area" program was originally targeted at regions of about 100,000 to 200,000 persons, although in an effort to delay as long as possible the pressures for inclusion from politicians representing localities slightly larger or smaller than these limits, these figures were for a long time not made public. Like the Greater Municipal Zones idea, these Habitat Areas cum Garden Cities number in the hundreds, and rely heavily upon the prefectural governors for the coordination of policy among smaller localities. While less overtly a matter of "horizontal" policy sharing by local governments, the NLA-sponsored program involves the same sorts of "leveling-up" of services in regional cities and their surrounding towns and villages. The NLA would act as liaison between the locality which "signs up" for the regional program and the ministry/agency with which the program is functionally related. In August 1979 the NLA finally publicly designated twenty-eight Habitation Areas. There was, however, much variation in size. Some areas had as few as 70,000 persons, while some had as many as 600,000 people. The expected political pressures apparently did not go undenied.

The immediate result of the injection of yet another regional scheme into a system glutted with such schemes was a predictable confusion. The central ministries brought together the Planning Bureau Chiefs of each of
the forty-seven prefectures to Tokyo to explain each of the central regional schemes and their relations to each other. It was an impossible task, for it was quite clear that no one was at all sure how they were related. The first meeting was held at the Ministry of Home Affairs where the Ministry unveiled what it called its "New Greater Municipal Zone Plan" (Shin Kōiki Shichōsonken). Quite naturally, this served only to further confuse a bewildered assembly of local planners. The next day the group reconvened at the offices of the National Land Agency where once again all that could be said with surety was that there was a wide variety of regional programs available for selection by the localities. The NLA, having been created for the sole purpose of coordinating such things, could, in the end, only serve to add to the confusion inherent in Japan's sectional centralism. Although NLA chief Shimokobe argued that the Garden City Plan, once implemented, will "overcome the evils of vertical administration," the "evils" of the system were getting the better of everyone. The LDP created a special committee to sort out the competing bureaucratic claims to regional policy sovereignty. The result was a split within the party between pro-Home Affairs and pro-National Land Agency factions. All that could be achieved was a sort of status quo ante bellum, a most uneasy of truces between the two bureaus. Neither has ceded an inch; regionalization schemes remain uncoordinated, ambiguous, and more numerous by one.

III. CONCLUSION

Whatever the result, whichever ministry emerges as the leader, regional policy schemes, as they have since the early 1950's, continue to be at or near the top of the central government's concern with local public
administration. As the discussion in this chapter has attempted to detail, there has never been an extended period of time in the postwar period when one or another such scheme has not been a major source of political or bureaucratic struggle. From the point of view of the localities, there has never been any prolonged period of time when they have not been pressured from above to increase the amount of their shared, jointly implemented policy. Whether through amalgamation, the surest and most final sort of horizontalization scheme, through the reform of the prefecture system, through the expansion of joint policy formulae, or through the proliferation of ministerial directives from all quarters, local governments in the postwar have been under constant pressure to do more of what they do together. Chapter Three demonstrated that this has largely been a successful effort. Localities are doing more together than ever before. As this chapter has demonstrated, this success owes itself to the persistence, creativity, and political resourcefulness of central planners, even while it masks their repeated failure to implement yet more sweeping programs of "horizontal" administrative reform.

A second lesson was equally clear. Japan is far from the neat corporate package that some would prefer to depict. This chapter offers much in support of new revisionist work on Japan. Research by Pempel (1977) and by Vogel (1975) both suggest that there needs to be a reexamination of existing generalizations concerning policy process in Japan and that there is a variety of concepts current in Western explanations of Japan requiring substantial modification. At the top of their lists, and ours, is the notion of "Japan, Inc." There has long been an elitist conception of Japan positing the close affinity of business and bureaucratic interests. Elitists argue that this underlying consensus has been the key to
Japanese stability and to the focused vigor of Japanese postwar development. (See Fukui, 1977.) Other work, like this chapter, points to the many cases where there were substantive splits in interests, both between as well as among business and governmental actors, and thus where no clear, determined voice is heard. It is no longer uncommon for studies to find, as this one does, that there is a variety of competing interests in Japan, and that political bedfellows are as fickle here as elsewhere. There are not a few such cases where vested interests display great variety in identifying what they will defend, as well as equal variety in the depth of their commitments. In the end, Japan does not seem terribly different from other polities in which the most powerful political actors are those with the most political resources, be they money, votes, or authority. The wielders of each are bound to influence the direction of public policy. It does us as little good to argue that the Japanese policy process is dominated by either bureaucratic or industrial interests as it does for us to argue that both are essentially the same. Much more important than this sort of simple labeling is the identification of particular constellations of interests in particular circumstances, followed by the generation of testable propositions concerning those patterns. It is impossible to imagine any student of Japan failing to identify the business community as an enormously powerful articulator of interests, as one which is intimately (and indeed incestuously) related to government at all levels. It is likewise impossible to imagine, however, any student failing to identify the enormous range of interests and goals, sometimes complementary and sometimes in conflict, which are represented by these business and government elites. To place a single guiding ideology atop all that is to argue for analytical simplicity at the expense of intellectual
honesty.

We have also seen in this chapter that for all the energy expended in search of horizontal administrative reform at the local level, the center itself remains highly fractured. While bureaucratic competition is common to all modern states, "vertical administration" is said to be especially virulent in Japan. It is said to impede not only the coordination of central policy, but also to extend below, to a system of local public administration in which the engineering departments have more to do with the central Construction Ministry, and in which the human services departments have more to do with the Welfare Ministry than they have to do with each other in the same locality. Sectional centralism is said to be the logical extreme of so tightly vertical a system of public administration. The following chapter presents the results of a survey of 450 local officials who were asked to explore for us their routine patterns of intergovernmental communication. The results suggest substantial variance from any strict interpretation of the vertical model. It is those results to which we now turn.
NOTES

1 Much of the following is based upon Unno and Ōnishi (1977), pp. 2-38.

2 Nagano (1965).

3 Kawanishi (1972), p. 23.

4 See Steiner's (1965) description of the Kambe Commission.

5 Mainichi Shimbun (March 14, 1950).

6 For a comprehensive review of the activities of the LSIC, see Ogita, (1979).

7 It should here be noted that there are two sources of information about these proposals and the political battles which resulted which are particularly useful. For the outline of the proposals themselves, the best comprehensive source is Kawanishi (1972), although there are some mistakes and ambiguities. For the best sense of the politics of the issue, there is Zenkoku Chihikai Kenkyushitsu (ed.) (1970). This is a handy compilation of more than 150 news articles and editorials concerning regionalization schemes between 1955-1970.

8 Steiner, op. cit., p. 152.

9 Ibid., pp. 153-158.

10 See Kawanishi, op. cit., pp. 146-149, for more details.

11 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (June 29, 1957).

12 Asahi Shimbun (July 4, 1957).

13 See Toshi Mondai (1957) for a collection of all the positions.

14 Toshi Mondai (1957), p. 93.

15 Kawanishi, op. cit., pp. 56-60, provides the full list of prefectures at the time of each change.


18 Asahi Shimbun (September 18, 1963).

19 The Fuken Gappëi Tokubetsu Hoan.

20 Akahata (April 9, 10, 1966).
21 Kuze (1973).

22 Nagano (1965).


24 Asahi Shim bun (March 20, 1965).


29 Mainichi Shim bun (February 24, 1970).


31 Nihon Keizai Shim bun (February 28, 1970).


33 Nihon Keizai Shim bun (November 14, 1969).


37 Notification Number 156, Jichishō Gyōseikyoku Shinkōka.


40 Nihon Shakaitō (1975), pp. 18-19.

41 Ibid.

42 See Furui (1977), pp. 319-320 for the text of the original legislative proposal.


See the so-called Cultural Activity Zones proposed by an education-related deliberative council. *Asahi Shimbun* (April 10, 1979).

Kawanishi (1972), pp. 127-134, has a partial list of each ministry's field office placements nationwide. It stands in testimony to the confusion which must face local officials.

Interview with Yoshida Yuwao, Chiba Prefecture Planning Bureau Chief, (November 2, 1978).

*Asahi Shimbun* (February 2, 1979).


*Asahi Shimbun* (December 26, 1978).

Interview with NLA Planning Bureau Chief Yoshimura Akira (January 16, 1979).

Interview with NLA Planning Bureau Planning Section Chief Toshima Hideshige (February 9, 1979).

*Asahi Shimbun* (August 17, 1979).

*Asahi Shimbun* (February 7, 1979).

*Asahi Shimbun* (May 14, 1979).

*Asahi Shimbun* (June 12, 1979).
CHAPTER V

PATTERNS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATION

Summary

This chapter presents behavioral and attitudinal data to modify several long-held notions of Japanese society and public administration. A review of these dominant conceptions, all consistent with the "Japan as a vertical society" argument, is followed by a review of the limited work on intergovernmental communication and the diffusion of policy innovation in Japan. Then, based upon a nationwide survey of nearly five hundred local public officials we argue that the conventional explanations misdirect research away from many important dynamics in the policy process. Comprehensive questions of the type raised in the present study have never before been asked in the Japanese context, and they represent a significant step toward complementing the sort of analysis which more readily available budgetary data can provide. Guided by the structural model presented in Chapter Two, the survey first explores the attitudes of these officials. It then examines their administrative behavior, first in general, then in task-specific terms. By means of the use of both direct and surrogate measures as independent variables, the conditions under which our findings are most likely to obtain are also specified. A final section of the chapter provides a closer look at the diffusion of policy innovation as distinct from intergovernmental communication. This survey offers documentation of translocal interdependence, and allows us for the first time to map, through behavioral data, the ways in which local offi-
cially reach out beyond their own divisions in performing their jobs.

**Conclusions**

We find that there is no inherent cultural barrier to horizontal intergovernmental communication or translocal interdependence. The diffusion of administrative innovation in Japan has a horizontal component that could never have been clearly understood given the emphasis upon Japan as a vertical society. The vertical structure of Japanese public administration, outlined in Chapter Three, does not preclude the significant degree to which localities are mutually dependent. We find some important differences among prefectural, city, and town and village respondents, especially for generalized sorts of intergovernmental contacting. In these cases the conventional wisdom of the prefecture as a conduit between the center and the smaller localities is supported. But it is rejected for prefectures in terms of task-specific administrative routines. Of all the localities, it is the towns and villages which are closest to expectations based upon the vertical model. Our results suggest, but do not directly test the hypothesis, that there is a powerful element of "regional leadership" of these smaller, poorer towns and villages by their larger neighboring regional cities. Nevertheless, on every measure, for every administrative routine, and at every level of analysis, cities, towns, and villages are at least as likely to depend upon each other as upon their prefectures. Horizontal contacts among cities, towns, and villages are more regularized than any other pattern of intergovernmental communication, including communication between the center and the prefectures. Efforts to isolate and specify those conditions which most significantly affect patterns of intergovernmental communication indicate that economic and demographic factors
account for important differences. Importantly, there is no indication that the presence of career central bureaucrats in strategic local positions makes any discernable difference in the relationships between the center and that locality. In fact, it is their presence in prefectures and their absence in cities, towns, and villages which are both associated with greater translocal intimacy and interdependence. Few independent variables significantly affect the basic patterns of intergovernmental communication and policy diffusion which we document here for the first time. Quite simply, localities rely upon each other for the broadest range of policy ideas and policy relevant information at least to the same degree, and often to a greater degree, than they rely upon higher levels of government. Models which fail to test these relations or which posit otherwise are misleading.

I. INTRODUCTION — THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

We have seen in Chapter Four how the rationalization of local public administration, via the promotion of some dozen or more different regional policy schemes, has been a central element in postwar Japanese policy toward local governance. We have seen how the central government, although itself seldom a unified whole, has directed legal reform within a vertically structured system by attempting to reduce the atomization of administration at the periphery. Led mostly by the Ministry of Home Affairs and by the business community, sometimes in coalition and sometimes not, the history of postwar local administrative reform is best seen as the groping for politically acceptable formulae for the regionalization of public policy.

It is the task of this chapter to examine the foundation for these sorts of cooperative arrangements among localities. This chapter explores the attitudes and routine practices of the administrators most directly
responsible for the implementation of local public policy. Given the apparent imperatives of this administrative apparatus, in particular the central sources of initiative even for the "horizontalization" of policy, one would expect local public officials to have a vertical, rather than a horizontal orientation toward policy initiation and implementation. One expects in a highly centralized polity, as the Japanese one is typically characterized, that local officials are more apt to be found looking "upward" for guidance than "across" for new ideas. And that is, of course, what the conventional wisdom teaches.

Two of the three best English language works on local politics and administration in Japan embrace this view.* Steiner focuses exclusively upon central tutelage (the vertical and downward flow of intergovernmental communication) and repeatedly rejects the possibilities for translocal interdependence:

Voluntary cooperation between prefectures... is not well developed.¹

... Cooperation was made difficult by traditional jealousy or animosity between neighboring communities. Some communities feared that cooperation with another entity might be an admission of a lack of viability... Japanese local entities are not accustomed to coping with problems of local government—especially where they concern mainly national functions—on their own initiative. They are used to waiting for guidance from above.²

Steiner explains this local dependence in terms of the cultural imperatives of Japanese hierarchy:

The notions of superior and subordinate ranks inherent in a centralized government structure were reinforced in Japan by the value system of a traditionally hierarchical society.³

MacDougall strongly emphasizes the reverse flow of policy innovation,

*The recent work by Aqua (1979) shares our caution about cultural determinism and its misdirection of inquiry.
stressing initiative from below, but he remains an adherent to the vertical view of public administration, if not of political activity:

Prefectural and local bureaucrats must of necessity be oriented to those sections of higher tier bureaucracies in charge of functionally similar tasks. Since so much of the work of prefectural and local governments is delegated to them by law and subject to the guidance and direction of the national ministries, communications between different tiers of government are frequent. . . Even today local bureaucrats view themselves as part of the same administrative apparatus as that of the national bureaucracy; they see themselves as the base of an administrative hierarchy. 4

But this view is far from limited to Western observers of Japan. Indeed, it is encouraged by the Japanese themselves. Nakane's seminal work, Japanese Society, is the clearest statement of this paradigm. 5 She explains Japanese corporate structure, enterprise unions, factionalism, the centralization of administrative authority, interpersonal relations, and group activity all in terms of their nearly organic relationship to traditional, pre-industrial forms of Japanese social organization. She argues that:

. . . the basic social structure continues in spite of great changes in social organization. 6

Corporate paternalism, in her view, is the modern analogue to the benevolence of the clan leader. In spite of considerable evidence that suggests many of these forms are actually the result of particular historical configurations of conscious decisions and accidental developments,* this and other such vertical characterizations remain the dominant explanations for things Japanese.** Taken together, these sorts of explanations permit only

*See the work done by Yoshino (1968), and by Gusfield (1973) which convincingly demonstrates the ways in which tradition has been actively shaped, molded, and sometimes created by modernizing Japanese elites. Johnson (1978) also speaks of the confusion between historical accumulation and political culture.

**See also Doi (1971) on Japan as a society of dependence and Maruyama (1962) on Japan as a foxhole society.
the most trivial kinds of lateral associations among persons or organizations of the same functional type. Moreover, according to Nalcane, functionally identical units must even actively reject their commonalities:

Because of the overwhelming ascendancy of this vertical orientation even a set of individuals sharing identical qualifications tend to create a difference among themselves.

The vertical society argument has two analytic components. The first, and most familiar, is that authority, benevolence, and leadership flow hierarchically from above to below, while allegiance and loyalty flow in the reverse direction. The second component posits that these exchanges all flow within insular vertical structures. In the context of public administration in Japan, this paradigm stresses not only the dependent, tutelary character of the local bureaucracy, but it also equally stresses a corresponding mutual insularity among the localities. The Japanese literature on local administration and regional politics is filled with references to the egochizumu (egotism) and to the sekushonarizumu (sectionalism) of local public officials.* They are commonly understood as unwilling or unable to share ideas with counterparts in other localities, seeking instead to further their own interests by fully cooperating only with higher levels of government.8

These conceptions are all directly related to the notion of the Japanese bureaucracy as vertically fractured. Referring to the sectional cen-

*Not all such terms, however, are borrowed from English. The Japanese reserve the term kakkyo to describe the inability of local officials to broadly define their interests. Literally, when used as a verb, kakkyo means to "hold one's ground, to defend one's own sphere." Its usage dates from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, an era of incessant struggle among rival barons. Thus, this term is usually associated with militant protection from encroachment by neighbors. The Civil War Era itself is often referred to as the gunyū kakkyo no jidai, "the age of rival chiefs." All of these terms posit the same sort of narrowness of public administration in Japan.
tralism discussed in Chapters Three and Four, hardly a text on Japanese public administration fails to deplore the "evils of vertical administration" (たてわらぎょうせいのけいがい). Lines of intergovernmental communication are said to be exclusively functional; the Construction Ministry speaks directly to the prefectural and municipal engineering bureaus, the Finance Ministry speaks to the local Tax Bureaus, and the Home Affairs Ministry is said to be functionally linked to the General Affairs Bureaus within the localities. Few channels of communication and coordination cut laterally across the administrative organism. The result is this dominant view that there is great mutual distrust among the ministries and agencies and that this same sort of insularity, if not hostility, extends downward to the localities. Neighboring local officials are seen as reciprocally inimical since they must compete in a zero-sum battle for an identifiable, centrally-defined pool of public goods. Moreover, since public officials are culturally programmed only to look upward for policy cues and leadership, conflict is understood to be the modal property left for transmission across localities. Significantly, the universally maligned "evils" of this sort of vertical structure are not these problems associated with hierarchy and centralization, but are related instead to the second component of the vertical society argument, namely the failure to coordinate public policy due to the mutual insularity of the system components.

The vertical society model is elegant and wide-ranging. Its derivative, the vertical administration paradigm, is equally penetrating. Like most grand explanations, these are not without substantial validity. Neither is wholly wrong, but both can be profoundly misleading. We have been taught not only that Japanese localities do not rely upon each other, but also
that they cannot do so. Yet, there clearly are important dynamics in the policy process, particularly demonstration effects and the lateral diffusion of policy innovation, which these conceptions simply cannot explain. In this chapter these dynamics will be demonstrated for the first time. By treating the dominant views of Japan as empirical questions rather than as received laws, we hope to offer an important reassessment - not a rejection - of conventional wisdom.

II. RELEVANT WORK BY JAPANESE SCHOLARS - THE CONVERGING EVIDENCE

Comprehensive questions concerning relationships among localities of the type raised in the present study have never before been asked in the Japanese context. Yet there is converging evidence in support of our view that translocal interdependence in the policy process is an important, even if under-researched dynamic.

One study that contributes to this convergence of evidence explores in detail the adoption of thirty-three projects over ten years in five cities. It found that if those ten years were divided into two five year periods, the role of other localities in the local policy process increased at the expense of the role of higher levels of government:
TABLE 5-1
METHODS OF INVESTIGATING A NEW PROJECT
AT THE TIME OF ITS ADOPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ask Specialists</td>
<td>6 projects</td>
<td>7 projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convene a Conference</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey-Questionnaire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive Reports from Other Localities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confer with Higher Levels of Government</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize a Project Team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask Affected Parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask Assemblymen, Political Parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Multiple answers were permitted.)


Whereas conferences with higher level bureaucrats was the modal form of studying policy innovations in the 1965-1970 period, reports from other localities became modal in the latter period. These reports typically took the form of consultation with localities that had already adopted the policy, and that could share their experiential data. These sorts of contacts are best interpreted as the use of other localities for the purpose of confirmation of policy plans, not as sources of new ideas. Nevertheless, these data demonstrate not only a salient role for other localities, but also a growing one.

Other research has suggested the salience of other localities in the diffusion of the ideas themselves. Nearly two thousand local officials in seven cities were asked if they individually had an idea which they proposed in their division within the past year. Those who responded in the affirmative were asked to state the source of that idea, "Other cities"
were consistently at or near the top of the list of such sources, regardless of the respondent's official position:

**FIGURE 5-1**

**SOURCE OF INNOVATIVE IDEAS**

- --- division head
- ---- section head
- ------ ordinary clerk


Moreover, the study found that such translocal interdependence was high even when controlling for city size. It was the single most important source of innovation among smaller cities, it was second to the mass media
for the larger ones, and it was third behind the mass media and the internal bureaucracy in Kobe City, the only designated city in the sample. The emerging impression is one in which translocal interdependence coexists with local initiative as the most important sources of policy innovation among Japanese localities. Both sources challenge the conventional wisdom of policy diffused from above. The significance of this combination of localism and horizontal diffusion also emerges from a larger, very impressive study by the Economic Planning Agency. They found significant degrees of horizontal diffusion of innovation in the area of welfare policy reflecting, in their analysis, the proclivity of localities to respond from their general budget to demands from residents for programs provided in neighboring localities. They found that thirty-seven percent of all welfare policies conducted independently by localities were the result of this sort of "cuetaking." Consistent with the findings related above, this tendency toward lateral policy transfer increases as the size of the locality (and thus its capacity for independent policy design) decreases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY TYPE</th>
<th>PERCENT OF TOTAL POLICIES WHICH ARE HORIZONTALLY DIFFUSED*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prefectural Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Care for Elderly</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Allowances for Elderly</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly Services</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicapped Allowances</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Care for Handicapped</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>29%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*yoko' narabi seisaku*

They find that the localities most likely to adopt the policies pioneered by other localities are the poorer, smaller ones. In these cases the source of the idea for implementation is most often the mayor or his policy staff, rather than the bureaucracy. In contrast, they find that it is the bureaucracy in the larger localities which more commonly initiates welfare policy, and it does so without reference to other localities' programs.

This converging evidence, when taken together, suggests three things. First, it suggests what several American scholars have also forcefully argued, namely that local initiative, particularly mayoral leadership, is of fundamental importance in the local policy process. Secondly, it suggests that localities also rely upon each other in a variety of non-trivial ways throughout the policy process in the initiation and evaluation of new ideas. Finally, it also suggests that both of these elements—localism and translocalism—coexist as integral to local policy making in spite of conventional wisdom that posits a contrary view. It remains for the rest of this chapter to specify the interrelationship of these factors through the analysis of survey data. These data, especially when combined with existing budgetary analyses, provide us a heretofore inaccessible and broadly based portrait of the local policy process.

III. THE SURVEY

A. The Sample

This survey was administered in six waves to selected groups of students of the Ministry of Home Affairs' Local Autonomy College in Tokyo in 1978-1979. Particularly promising prefectural and city, town, and village (hereafter CTV) officials are sent to the College sometime in their mid-
career by their respective local governments for further administrative training. They come to Tokyo from every region of the country and from every sort of functional bureau, and thus, while this was not a random sample, the 456 respondents were extremely varied in their backgrounds. There were at least two respondents from each of Japan's forty-seven prefectures; most prefectures were represented by 10-20 local officials. One third of the sample came from what can be labeled the "General Affairs" bureau of their locality, the division responsible for such different things as planning, taxation, finances, budgeting, personnel, and public administration. Of the remaining two thirds, nearly seventy percent came fairly equally from each of the spending bureaus within local government: welfare (9% of the total sample), sanitation (7%), construction (11%), and so forth. The second largest category of respondents, however, even after these distinctions are made, was the more than one fifth of the sample which was too varied to be labeled anything but "other."

The sample was selected from two main groups of officials, division chiefs (kachō) and section chiefs (kakarichō). It was felt that these two positions best represent that area of professional public administration where policy is implemented and where problems are solved. The sample was therefore stratified, although non-random; it was heavily and unequally representative of division chiefs (26%) and section chiefs (63%), with few officials of other status (11%). In order to reflect the basic, two-tiered legal-formal distinction in Japanese local public administration, an equal division was made between prefectural officials (47%) and CTY officials (53%). The response rate was eighty six percent for the former and ninety percent for the latter.

There were both important differences as well as important similarities
in the two groups. The average age of both the prefectural group and the CTV group was forty two years old. In both groups the respondents had been in their present position for an average of about three years, and both the prefectural respondents and the CTV respondents had spent four years in each of their two previous posts before moving up. Thus in both sub-samples we have a good representation of broad administrative experience. In both there is also a number of localities with a "progressive" chief executive. The differences are also significant. The prefectural administrations are, quite naturally, far larger in size, and this is accurately represented in the sample. The prefectural respondents report that the division in which they work has one fourth again as many employees as do the CTV officials. There is an average of three sections in the division of the CTV respondents, but there is an average of more than four in the prefectural sample. This difference in organizational scale is also reflected in the number of officials above the level of division chief in the respondent's home locality. The CTV respondents report that there is an average of more than fifty such officials in their localities, but the prefectural respondents report almost twice that number. Another important difference between the two levels of local government is also reflected in the sample. There are, on the average, twice as many central dispatchees in the divisions represented by the prefectural group as there are in those of the CTV group.* Whereas almost eighty percent of the prefectural respondents report the presence of central officials in their division, only twenty two percent of the CTV officials make such a claim. One final difference between the two groups is also of interest. In the prefectural group, sixty percent had graduated from a four year college.

*See the discussion of Katsuai transfers in Chapter Three.
Exactly the reverse was the case for the officials of the smaller cities, villages, and towns: only forty percent were college graduates, fifty five percent being only high school graduates.

B. General Expectations

No behavioral inquiries of this sort have ever been undertaken in Japan. Given the paucity of empirical knowledge about the ways in which local bureaucrats actually do their jobs, a major purpose of this research is quite modest. We hope to map that behavior for the first time. We are less interested in describing the flow of policy innovation itself (although that is part of what concerns us) than we are interested in providing a profile of administrative routine. In the end, the findings of this beginning effort can be measured only against what we might expect armed with our general knowledge about the nature of a tutelary system of local public administration. In the context of the framework presented in Chapter Two, and informed by two important considerations: a) the structural component detailed in Chapter Three, and b) the most common general assumptions about the mutual insularity of localities as discussed in this chapter, the following is a reasonable representation of general expectations for the intensity of contacts between and across levels of government in Japan (in rank order):
It is reasonable to expect that intercourse between the prefecture and its cities, towns, and villages is by any measure the most intense and important of all intergovernmental communication. After all, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, it is the prefecture which is charged by the center with a great deal of supervisory authority in the affairs of CTV's. We have also been taught that these CTV officials see themselves at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, and thus are greatly dependent upon the tutelage of the prefecture and the center. Similarly, the
relationship between the center and the prefectures should also be very intense. It is the center which appoints many of the top prefectural officials and which directly controls many prefectural program decisions through tutelary powers relating to finance and supervisory approval. Given what we know of central policies toward the promotion of the "horizontalization" of local public policy, and in particular given the fact that virtually all Partial Affairs Associations and all of the Greater Municipal Zones are made up of only CTV's, it would be fair to expect that these horizontal relationships, while far from approaching the intensity of vertical relations between levels of government, would be of some importance. It is only due to the fact that so much of the center's supervision of the CTV's is delegated to the prefecture, however, that we would expect this relationship across the CTV level to be rather more intense than that between the center and the CTV's. Relations among the prefectures, if we are to use conventional wisdom as a guide, should be only tenuous at best. Nowhere in the actual structure of the system nor in the general characterizations of it as vertically fractured and governed by egotism, etc., do we have any base to expect substantive horizontal relationships at the prefectural level.

C. The Results

1. Attitudes

The questionnaire was divided into two main sections. One contained questions concerned only with the behavior of the respondent, the other concerned his attitudes toward intergovernmental relations.* Examination of these attitudinal questions reveals that officials in both the prefectures and the CTV's are quite positive in their assessment of the importance

*See Appendix A for a copy of the questionnaire.
of relationships with other localities at the same level. More than half in both samples indicate that these relationships have grown in importance in the past ten years (Q. 10.1) and more than ninety percent in both samples say that this is likely to result in greater local autonomy (Q. 11.1). Interestingly, both sub-samples agree with equal conviction (nearly 50%) that "the role of upper levels of government" in the policy process in their locality has also increased in the past ten years (Q. 10.2). In one sense, this suggests that local officials see themselves as increasingly less isolated, more affected by external factors than ever before. In another sense, this also suggests that they do not see the growth of horizontal relations as at all in conflict with the concomitant growth of vertical relations.

Contrary to what conventional wisdom teaches us, almost two-thirds of the respondents in each sample suggest that such horizontal relationships are "cooperative rather than competitive" (Q. 11.3), and it is suggested by an even greater number in both samples that these relationships grow not out of the need to regulate some sort of conflict, but out of a joint effort to provide public services (Q. 11.4). It is curious, given what we have seen in Chapters Three and Four concerning the central promotion of horizontal ties, that more than eighty five percent of the respondents in both samples felt instead that such ties were "mostly the result of independent initiative by the localities themselves" rather than the result of "guidance from higher levels of government (Q. 11.5). The CTV sub-sample was asked to evaluate three of the more important central regionalization schemes: the Greater Municipal Zones, Partial Affairs Associations, and Local Councils. In no case did more than six percent suggest that these should not be utilized, and in each case, over one third argued for an
expansion of the scope and functions of these mechanisms of regional policy (Q. 11.6-8).

There were also some differences in attitudes between the two groups, however. The prefectural officials were a bit more restrained in their evaluation of the role of horizontal ties than were the CTV officials when it came to comparing the importance of those ties to the importance of vertical ties. For example, the CTV group was evenly split on the question of how important relationships with other CTV's are in comparison with relationships with upper levels of government in the policy process. Over half of this group said that horizontal ties were either about the same or greater in importance than vertical ties. The prefectural officials, however, displayed a degree of the insularity posited in the vertical administration model, as seventy percent suggested that horizontal ties with other prefectures was less or much less important in the policy process than was the relationship with the center (Q. 10.3). One other difference between the two groups concerned the relationship between the partisan affiliation of a local chief executive and translocal relations. The city, town, and village officials were more inclined to feel that these horizontal ties were greatly influenced by the political coloration of the mayor (39%) than were the prefectural officials re the governor (30%). In any case, however, over sixty percent in both samples thought that partisanship did not matter at all.

In the end, these opinions, while moderately interesting, are not alone the sorts of things upon which detailed analyses should be based. At best they indicate a basic predisposition on the part of local officials toward cooperation with and reliance upon cohorts in other localities. They neither contain anything surprising nor anything which would indicate that
these attitudes are in fact reflected in their official activity. We know more than we did before, for example that local officials evaluate highly the significance of horizontal ties, both in the abstract as well as in comparison to vertical ties. It remains to be demonstrated whether this positive attitude toward translocal relations is also reflected in the routine behavior of local officials.

2. Behavior

a. Generalized Contacting

The behavioral portion of the questionnaire was directed at eliciting two very different sorts of information. We were interested in understanding both the behavior of the individual as well as the behavior of his group (in this case his division). At both levels the questions (Q. 2-7) were designed to identify patterns in the general conduct of the respondents' personal routines. Several quite striking patterns did emerge.

1. Individual Level

At the individual level the respondents were asked to report two things: first, they were asked about the frequency with which they had face-to-face contact with officials from other governmental units during the course of a month. Secondly, they were asked to report respectively the number of friends and the number of acquaintances they had among officials from other governmental organizations.* In absolute terms, the figures are quite high on all three measures:

*Friends were defined as those persons "with whom (you) associate on matters other than official business at least several times in the course of a year." Acquaintances were those with whom the respondent felt he could call for an informal business-related consultation.
TABLE 5-3

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTACTING (ABSOLUTE)

The figures indicate the percentage of respondents reporting:

(1) Regular monthly meetings with officials from other governments:
    (more than one time per month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTV Sample</th>
<th>Prefectural Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74% with other CTV officials</td>
<td>63% with CTV officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68% with Prefectural officials</td>
<td>30% with other Prefectural officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% with Central officials</td>
<td>37% with Central officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Friends in other governments:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59% in other CTV's</td>
<td>51% in CTV's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54% in Prefectures</td>
<td>27% in other Prefectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% in Central government</td>
<td>31% in Central government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Acquaintances in other governments:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77% in other CTV's</td>
<td>43% in CTV's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71% in Prefectures</td>
<td>35% in other Prefectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16% in Central government</td>
<td>45% in Central government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a consistency in these patterns which serves to sharply contrast prefectural officials on the one hand, and CTV officials on the other. In the CTV sample the horizontal response is consistently highest. That is, CTV officials have more routine contacts with other CTV officials than with prefectural or with central officials, and they report having more acquaintances and friends among other CTV officials than among upper level officials. The prefectural sample is consistent in a different way. The prefectural respondents have more contact of every kind with central and CTV officials than they have with each other. That is, fewer prefectural officials report having regular monthly meetings with officials from other prefectures than among officials of higher or lower levels of government. Whereas three out of four CTV officials meet regularly with other CTV officials, less than one out of three prefectural officials meet regularly
with other prefectural officials. It is striking that in every case, the highest response was the horizontal one in the CTV sample, while in the prefectural sample, the horizontal response was in every case the lowest of the three. On these measures at least, the prefectural officials seem to conform quite well with the conventional view of their role as "conduits," sandwiched between the supervision they receive from the center and the supervision which they conduct over cities, towns and villages. They seem at least as insular and vertically oriented as the CTV officers seem open and horizontally oriented.

Also of interest is the apparent distance between the central government and the cities, towns, and villages on these three measures. Less than one sixth of the CTV respondents reported having acquaintances or friends among or regular monthly contacts with central officials. This, taken in combination with the largely vertical orientation of the prefectural respondents, would seem to reinforce the view that CTV officials as individuals are effectively shielded from the center by the intervention of prefectural officials.

In order to eliminate the potential for skewedness in the absolute percentages reported in Table 5-3, the mean frequency for each of the responses was also computed.* These means were then rank-ordered for comparative purposes. The patterns reported above are only slightly altered when displayed in this form:

*Medians are often used as measures of central tendency with ordinal data. Here we use the arithmetic mean as a first cut at developing a relative measure of these relationships.
FIGURE 5-3

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTACTING (RELATIVE)

(The figures represent the rank order of mean frequencies.)

---Prefectural Sample  top - meetings
---CTV Sample          middle - friends
                  bottom - acquaintances

When viewed in this way, the relationships among CTV's is not in every case the most intense; in the case of formal meetings, the highest mean value is that for the prefectural officials meeting CTV officials. It is interesting and important that this deviation from the previous pattern is at the formal level. Otherwise, the highest mean for each of the other
two categories, friends and acquaintances, is the horizontal relationship among the CTV officials, reinforcing the previously reported pattern. At the individual level at least, it seems quite clear that the most important relationships are those among CTV officials and between CTV and prefectural officials. Next are the relationships between the central and the prefectural officers, followed by those among prefectural officials. The relationship between CTV officials and central officials at the individual level is comparatively weak. But it is the consistently distant relationship among prefectural officials that stands in most striking contrast to the consistently close relationship among CTV officials. That this latter relationship obtains at all is a challenge to conventional wisdom.

ii. Group Level

These same sorts of relationships were also measured at the group level (Q. 6). Respondents were asked to report for their divisions as a whole the frequency of three very different sorts of communication with other governmental organizations. These questions remained purposefully unfocused and without task specification. Again, as previously, the purpose in this section was to determine if there are patterns of generalized contacting which might confirm or contradict our original expectations. The patterns which obtained at the individual level are not entirely reconfirmed here, although there is a general consistency between individual patterns and organizational patterns of intergovernmental communication. Once again, we can report both the absolute as well as the relative levels of the frequency of these communications.
### TABLE 5-4

**DIVISION LEVEL CONTACTING (ABSOLUTE)**

The figures indicate the percentage of respondents who report (for their division as a whole):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CTV Sample</th>
<th>Prefectural Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular Monthly Visits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Central Government</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Prefecture</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to CTV's</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Central Government</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Prefecture</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from CTV's</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71 **</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Regular Monthly Letters** |            |                    |
| to Central Government     | 18         | 52                 |
| to Prefecture             | 56         | 46                 |
| to CTV's                  | 59         | 59                 |
| from Central Government   | 18         | 53                 |
| from Prefecture           | 62         | 53                 |
| from CTV's                | 65         | 61                 |

| **Regular Monthly Phone Calls** |            |                    |
| to Central Government      | 22         | 70                 |
| to Prefecture              | 81         | 66                 |
| to CTV's                   | 82         | 72 **              |
| from Central Government    | 13         | 55                 |
| from Prefecture            | 73         | 63                 |
| from CTV's                 | 84         | 77 **              |

("regular monthly" means at least once each month)

(** indicates a skewing toward twenty or more times each month, a skewing which is masked by this sort of reporting of the data, but which strongly reinforces the vertical sense of the prefecture. This masking disappears below when we rank order the means of the above relationships.)

As at the individual level, these data show that the horizontal contacts among cities, towns, and villages are consistently the most regular of all diads in intergovernmental communication. The single highest figure among the three dozen diads reported in Table 5-4 concerned telephone contacts among the CTV's themselves. Eighty four percent of the respondents claimed that their division regularly receives inquiries from other
CTV's. In contrast, the highest response rate for horizontal communications in the prefectural sample was the sixty-six percent of the prefectural respondents who reported that their division regularly phoned other prefectures. The pattern here is identical to that at the individual level, as intraprefectural telephone communication is less frequent than either communication upward to the Center (70%) or downward to the CTV's (72%). Once again we see more vertical than horizontal communication by prefectures.

The divergences from the patterns we saw earlier at the individual level themselves appear to be consistent. The responses in all categories of "received" communication in the CTV sample, that is, for all communications from the other CTV's to the respondents' divisions, follow the same patterns as before: the center is the most distant, the prefecture is much closer, but the closest of all are other cities, towns, and villages. The pattern breaks down only for regular monthly visits to the prefecture which are rather more frequently reported than visits to other CTV's in the CTV sample. Similarly, the previous pattern of the prefecture as an insular conduit between the center and the CTV's is consistently confirmed at the organizational level only for communications to other governments. In all three cases of such outward regular communication, the horizontal contact among prefectures is consistently less frequent than vertical communication downward to the CTV's or upward to the center. Although, given geographical considerations, it is not surprising that monthly visits by central officials to prefectural offices should be lower than visits from other, neighboring, prefectures, it is rather surprising that more prefectural respondents report that they receive regular telephone communications from other prefectures (63%) than
report similar telephone contacts made by the center (55%). On balance, however, the initial patterns are reconfirmed, and absolute levels of both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental communication remain quite substantial.

In the relative sense, however, these division level patterns vary to an even greater degree from the previous individual level patterns. When the mean values of these responses are rank ordered and displayed as before, we no longer find the strongest component to be communication among the CTV's. It is replaced by vertical communication between the prefecture and the CTV's, and thus is closer to original expectations based upon conventional notions of local public administration:
But that is not to suggest that this completely confirms those original expectations, for while communications between governments at the organizational level are reported most frequently between prefectures and CTV’s, those between the center and the prefectures are of less intensity than are those among the CTV’s themselves. The mean frequencies of letter writing, telephone contacting, and visitation among CTV’s is
in every case but one greater than those between the center and the prefectures. Once again, as at the individual level, the least intense of these dyadic relationships are those between the center and the CTV's on the one hand, and among prefectures on the other. In sum then, while we see mixed patterns for the CTV sample (at the individual level horizontal relations were more intense than vertical ones whereas the reverse obtained at the division level) in both cases we see mutually insular prefectures and a rather great distance between the center and the CTV's. As expected, it is clear that there is substantial intergovernmental communication between prefecture and CTV; there is also a greater than anticipated intensity in the relationships among CTV officials. We find that this horizontal pattern of communication is consistently more intense than either that which obtains among prefectural officials or than that which obtains between central and prefectural officials. The latter, of course, is a finding contrary to our initial expectations.

b. Task Specific Patterns

As those initial expectations were based upon the most diffuse sorts of impressions about how the system operates, the best test of their validity must be correspondingly varied in its measures and comprehensive in its scope. Thus, this questionnaire was designed to measure intergovernmental communication in task specific terms as well as in the more generalized, unfocused sense already reported above. Here the respondents were again requested to answer for their division as a whole, rather than as individuals, and they were asked to report the frequency with which they contact each of eleven different sources of information and ideas for each of thirteen different routine administrative tasks (Q. 7). The result was the 143 cell matrix which is reproduced below. The respondents
were required to mark each cell to indicate the frequency with which they utilize each source of information and ideas in the conduct of their daily affairs. This is the first time that such data have been gathered. It permits us to determine the relative importance of the widest variety of sources of information and ideas (both local and extralocal) in the local administrative process.* The following matrix represents an attempt to discern patterns apart from what aggregate budgetary data alone can provide. Once again we find a marked horizontal interdependence, one which could not possibly be deduced from a more general characterization of the vertical system of local public administration in Japan. The results, the mean scores for each cell, are as follows:

*The administrative tasks which were chosen were based upon pretest queries of practitioners concerning their most routine sorts of activity. They were designed to embrace as varied and as comprehensive a selection of administrative activity as possible.
## TABLE 5-5

**LOCAL AND EXTRALOCAL RELIANCE FOR SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS**

Prefectures and CTV's Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>(j)</th>
<th>(k)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top line: CTV sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) To prepare a new ordinance</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) For interpretation and/or explanation of by-law, ordinance</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) For study of central government grants</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) For study of prefectural government grants</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) To frame a plan for the adoption of new projects</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) To prepare a draft for a mid-range plan</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) To prepare a budget proposal</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) To regulate a regional problem</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) To reform division management structure</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) To prepare assembly interpellations</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) To solve conflict with residents or local groups</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) To introduce technical innovation</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) To conduct independent research on routine matters</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLUMN</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>(j)</th>
<th>(k)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The figures represent mean scores on a four point scale: 1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=often, 4=always.
There are two results that deserve initial mention. First, it seems clear that columns e - k are largely irrelevant. That is, it appears that such sources of information, counsel, and assistance as joint policy organs, local politicians, academics, and interest groups have little routinized impact upon the activities of both prefectural and CTV officials. The average of the mean scores for those ninety-one cells in the matrix is no more than 1.3, indicating that they are little relied upon in absolute terms. Relatively speaking, the remaining four sources of counsel, i.e., the center, the prefecture, the CTV's and other divisions within the respondents' localities have an average mean score of more than 2.0. In view of these results, then, it seems that the questionnaire was probably unnecessarily comprehensive in its variety of extralocal sources of information. Nevertheless, the consistency of these responses (high for columns a - d and low for columns e - k) suggests the validity of the results reported here.

The second finding which deserves mention is more important. It is significant that the consistently highest scores were those recorded for reliance upon other divisions within the respondents' own localities (column d). This indicates that there is a great deal more local self-reliance than the "dependent locality" paradigm would allow. This is consistent with the findings of others who suggest that the local chief executive and/or the bureaucracy are more active in the local policy process than previously assumed. The "vertical administration" paradigm which posits functional barriers among localities, and indeed even among divisions within the same locality, is not supported by the data here. We find, to the contrary, that in almost every case the locality relies most upon itself. Importantly however, neither does this preclude a high degree of translocal interde-
pendence, for the locality tends next to rely upon other localities at the same level, more than upon higher levels of government.

The documentation of that translocal interdependence, as evidenced in this matrix, is the most important result of this survey. It is striking both in absolute as well as in relative terms. Patterns of extralocal administrative interdependence vary considerably from our initial expectations. In the original pattern we found at the individual level a strong horizontal component among the CTV's, but a marked mutual insularity among the prefectures. At the organizational level we found results which varied only slightly from that original pattern. In the matrix as well, the results vary from the original pattern, but they do so in an unexpected direction. This can best be illustrated by displaying the average of the mean values and their rank order according to our original model:
The figure in parentheses is the rank order.

Cities

Villages and Towns, and Villages

Prefectures

Center

Villages, Cities

2.22 (1)

1.33 (3)

2.21 (1)

1.71 (3)

2.04 (2)

The average mean values for specific tasks figure 5-6

Prefectures Only

The average of the mean values for specific tasks figure 5-5
What is most unexpected, given both our initial expectations as well as our previous findings, is the dominance of the horizontal link in the prefectural sample. There is no single task for which this prefectural interdependence is so high as to distort the average. There is an unmistakable consistency in the mutual reliance among prefectures. In contrast to our previous findings, the prefecture's contact with other prefectures is not consistently lower than its vertical contacts upward to the center or downward to the CTV's. In fact, it is often higher than both, as in the cases of preparation of a new ordinance, in reforming management structure, in introducing technical innovations, and in framing new projects, among others. In no case is the transprefectural component the lowest of the three. We are left, then, with two very different prefectoral patterns of extralocal linkage. At the individual level the prefecture seems to correspond to conventional wisdom and thus to our initial expectations, but when we look at a variety of task specific routines at the division level, the horizontal component becomes remarkably prominent.

The prominence of horizontal, mutual dependencies among the cities, towns, and villages has already been demonstrated. It is reconfirmed in this matrix as well; in only four of the thirteen areas of administrative activity were there more frequent contacts upward to the prefecture than across to other CTV's. Due to the fact that in those four areas the difference between the two was rather large, and likewise, due to the fact that in the nine cases in which contacts with other CTV's was greater the differences were rather small, the average for the two are the same, 2.22. The finding, therefore, should be clearly stated; we do not find that the CTV's rely upon each other significantly more than they rely upon the prefectures, although they clearly do in many areas. Rather, the point
to be made is that cities, towns, and villages rely upon each other for help, information, ideas, and advice in a variety of concrete situations to at least the same extent to which they rely upon the prefecture.

Indeed, the CTV's clearly do not rely upon both higher levels of government. They rely very little upon the center. Reliance upon the center in the CTV sample is consistently lower (average 1.3) than is reliance upon what one would expect to be far more irrelevant sources, such as the local governments' joint communication organs.* The reliance upon the center in the CTV sample is only slightly higher than reliance upon the most untapped sources of information. There is no case in the CTV sample in which there is more contact with the center than with the prefecture, and likewise, the CTV's are more closely in touch with each other on every dimension than they are with the central government. The central government is consistently important as a source of ideas, information, and counsel only for the prefectural sample (average 2.0). These findings confirm the earlier ones which were based upon more generalized forms of contacting and communication.

The following three sets of comparisons in Table 5-6 more clearly demonstrate the significance of these findings. Column a compares the horizontal and vertical components in the CTV sample. An H (for horizontal) indicates that the mean value for the reliance upon other CTV's was higher than the mean value for reliance upon the prefecture. When the reverse obtains, it is indicated by the symbol V (for vertical). Likewise, column b compares the horizontal and the vertical components for the prefectural sample. When the mean value on a given administrative task is higher for reliance upon the center than for reliance upon other

*The average was 1.4.
prefectures it is so indicated by a V. When the mean value for reliance upon other prefectures is higher than that for reliance upon the central government, the symbol H is used.

**TABLE 5-6**

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EXTRALOCAL RELIANCE COMPARED:
PREFECTURES AND CTV'S

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE TASK</th>
<th>(a) CTV SAMPLE</th>
<th>(b) PREFECTURAL SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) To prepare a new ordinance</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) For interpretation and/or explanation of by-law, ordinance related to division's area of responsibility</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) For study of Central grants</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) For study of Prefectural grants</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) To frame a plan for adoption of new project</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) To prepare a draft for a mid-range plan</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) To prepare a budget proposal</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) To regulate a regional problem</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) To reform division management structure</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) To prepare assembly interpellations</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) To solve conflict with residents or local groups</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) To introduce technical innovation</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) To conduct independent research on routine administrative affairs</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tendencies are quite clear. In eighteen of twenty-six cases there is a higher frequency of translocal, horizontal reliance than of reliance upon higher levels of government. Moreover, in only one case, that of
securing prefectural grants, do the two subsamples report different directions. With the exception of that case, every time the vertical component is stronger, it is stronger in both subsamples. Although the horizontal component is consistently higher than the vertical component in both subsamples, it is surprisingly the prefectural sample in which it is dominant more frequently (ten of thirteen cases).

It should by now be quite evident that there is an important horizontal dynamic in the routine of local public administration in Japan. As these patterns, each based upon different sorts of indicators, multiply, we discover that both prefectures and cities, towns and villages are mutually dependent to a substantial degree. We find that these sorts of mutual dependencies are not restricted to particular sorts of communications or tasks, but that they cut across administrative routine and across levels of analysis. Moreover, these horizontal relationships are not significant only in terms of their absolute levels. Even in a relative sense, when they are compared to the strength of vertical reliance and tutelage, these horizontal relationships are dominant more often than not. We discover that when localities are engaged in preparing new programs, creating new planning instruments, writing new ordinances, introducing technical innovations, and other tasks, they value the experiences and suggestions of other localities as much or more than they rely upon the instruction of higher levels of government. The fact that the center enjoys a variety of substantial controls over local administration, as described in Chapter Three, in no way precludes this horizontal dynamic. It is unfortunate that those sorts of structural features have effectively obscured our recognition of this until now.
3. Contributing Factors

Having established contrary to conventional wisdom that there are important and dynamic relationships among localities for general as well as specific tasks, for CTV's as well as for prefectures, and for individuals as well as for their organizations, we turn now to attempt to specify some of the conditions under which these relationships are most likely to obtain. For that purpose five independent variables are directly introduced for their hypothesized importance in intergovernmental communication. Others are more indirect, introduced through the use of surrogate measures. We turn first to the latter.

a. Indirect Measures

It is this latter group, composed of economic and demographic variables, which suggests important directions for future research. It seems reasonable to suspect that poorer, more rural, less populous, and more agricultural localities would be more dependent than richer, more urban localities upon higher levels of government for financial as well as administrative guidance and support. With their fewer resources, lesser breadth of administrative talent, and with their purportedly more deferent attitude toward higher authority, these rural localities would seem most likely to conform to our initial expectations for tutelary relationships across levels of governance. There are two reasons why separating the cities from the towns and villages in the CTV subsample provides a valid surrogate for these economic and demographic variables. The first is related to the uniformity which the Ministry of Home Affairs has been able to achieve in the postwar period; cities, on the one hand, and towns and villages on the other, have clearly distinguishable economic and demographic
characteristics. Indeed, it is those characteristics which are used by
the Ministry to define a city, a town, or a village at the time of its
formation. There are four necessary conditions for becoming a city in
Japan: 1) the total population must exceed 50,000 persons, 2) the num-
ber of houses in the central city area must be at least sixty percent of
the total number of homes in the locality as a whole, 3) at least sixty
percent of the population must be engaged in either commercial, industrial,
or professional occupations, and 4) there must be a minimum level of urban-
type services and facilities there. Thus, cities are by definition more
populous, dense, and urban; they are by definition less agricultural and
rural than towns and villages. \footnote{15} It should be noted, however, that these
are merely the necessary conditions for becoming a city. Once that des-
ignation has been received, these conditions no longer need obtain.* This
notwithstanding, and in spite of the fact that due to amalgamation there
are some cities with rural characteristics, there is a very close fit
between these eco-demographic indicators and the legal-formal status of
cities, towns, and villages. (See Table 5-7, page 220.) While there is
no substitute for continuous, integer level data for the fullest possible
test of the effects of demographic and economic differences upon patterns
of intergovernmental communication, the use of the city versus town/vil-
lage distinction as a surrogate should at least provide a convincing basis
for preliminary judgements.

But, this surrogate indicator is legitimate only if a second condition
is also met. If there are significant differences in administrative tasks
and in legal-formal status between the cities and the towns and villages,

\footnotetext{This is established by administrative precedent, October 30, 1948.}
### TABLE 5-7

**ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND CITY, TOWN, AND VILLAGE SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>ECONOMIC STRUCTURE</th>
<th>PERCENT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SECTORS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than 70%</td>
<td>50% - 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 30,000</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
<td>24 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 - 55,000</td>
<td>208 (33%)</td>
<td>53 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,000 - 80,000</td>
<td>116 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000 - 130,000</td>
<td>82 (13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130,000 - 230,000</td>
<td>60 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230,000 - 430,000</td>
<td>54 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 430,000</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>544 (86%)</td>
<td>78 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWN/VILLAGE</th>
<th>ECONOMIC STRUCTURE</th>
<th>PERCENT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SECTORS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 3,000</td>
<td>54 (2%)</td>
<td>97 (4%)</td>
<td>58 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 - 5,500</td>
<td>74 (3%)</td>
<td>185 (7%)</td>
<td>131 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,500 - 8,000</td>
<td>142 (5%)</td>
<td>275 (11%)</td>
<td>147 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 - 13,000</td>
<td>275 (11%)</td>
<td>324 (12%)</td>
<td>135 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000 - 18,000</td>
<td>169 (6%)</td>
<td>145 (6%)</td>
<td>36 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000 - 23,000</td>
<td>104 (4%)</td>
<td>77 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23,000 - 28,000</td>
<td>69 (3%)</td>
<td>20 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,000 - 33,000</td>
<td>26 (1%)</td>
<td>4 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 33,000</td>
<td>18 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>931 (36%)</td>
<td>1,128 (43%)</td>
<td>527 (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

it would be impossible to determine, in the event that significantly
different patterns of intergovernmental communication obtain, whether
they are determined by eco-demographic factors or by differences in ad-
ministrative function. Thus, it is not sufficient to demonstrate only
that there are economic and demographic differences in administrative
responsibility among these legal-formal designations which would operate
independently of the former distinctions to effect differences in pat-
terns of intergovernmental communication.

There are none of any major importance. There exist some minor legal
distinctions drawn between cities and towns/villages in the body of the
Local Autonomy Law. Article 91, for example, stipulates that cities shall
have a greater number of assembly seats than towns and villages, but this
distinction is based upon a sliding scale dependent entirely upon popula-
tion size, not upon the formal designation of the locality. Similarly,
Article 168, Paragraph 2 permits the towns and villages to dispense with
the post of treasurer, a post required for cities. Elsewhere it is pro-
vided that towns and villages may replace local assemblies with general
town meetings. The only legal provisions which even approach any sort of
systematic legal-formal distinction between the affairs of towns and vil-
lages and the affairs of cities are to be found in the annexes of the Local
Autonomy Law. These annexes stipulate the variety of entity and agency
delegated functions which comprise so much of what localities do.* There
are two sections to these annexes, Annex II.1 and IV.1, which separate
the affairs of cities from those of towns and villages. But this separa-
tion is extremely limited. First, while the delegated functions in the
other sections are very important ones, those in these two sections, re-

*These are described in Chapter Three.
served only for the city or for the city mayor, are extremely minor.

Secondly, virtually none of these affairs apply to all cities. Most are
functions reserved only for the ten large "Designated Cities," or else
for other specified groups of municipalities. Cities, towns, and villages
can therefore be uniformly treated as a single group in Japanese public:
administration. They are all, according to the official definition:

the basic ordinary local public bodies which are part of a
prefecture and which provide services directly related to
citizens' livelihood. . . There is no difference in the char-
acter of the cities, towns, and villages as the basic unit
of public administration. . . 16

While there are minor institutional differences between cities, towns, and
villages, most are based upon size alone, and do not serve to necessarily
imply different sorts of formal linkages to higher levels of government.

We have searched and found no important legal, institutional differ-
ences among cities and towns and villages which might explain different
patterns of intergovernmental communication. If we find that the prefec-
tures are more aggressive in their leadership of towns and villages than
in their leadership of cities, and if we find that towns and villages are
more vertically oriented than are cities, then we can reasonably suspect
that it is due to the economic and demographic conditions that character-
ize these towns and villages more than it is due to any sort of prefectural
responsibility for supervision and leadership of the smaller localities.

This is an important part of what we find. Among the prefectures,
the cities, and the towns/villages, the latter are the closest in their
patterns of intergovernmental communication to our original expectations.
In terms of the task-specific matrix, unlike the cities, and unlike the
prefectures, the towns and villages have a higher average frequency for
the vertical component upwards (2.50) than for the horizontal component
across (2.38). It is the town and village sample in which the only means higher than 3.0 appear, and they appear five times. There seems no question but that the towns and villages are more dependent upon higher levels of government than are either the cities or the prefectures. (See Table 5-8.)

It should also be noted, however, that this higher average of the vertical component in the town and village sample is due to a very marked difference between relations upward to the prefecture and relations across to the CTV's in the first four tasks. All but one of these are vertical in the city sample as well, and these four are the only purely vertical tasks of the thirteen in the town and village sample. Otherwise, the pattern is much like that for the cities, the horizontal and vertical components are either the same or else the horizontal component is stronger. That is, in planning, in created new projects, in budgeting, in management reform, in introducing new technologies, and so forth, the towns and villages are as likely as not to rely upon CTV's as upon the prefecture for counsel and information.

Although the towns and villages are more intensely vertical than the prefectures or than the cities, they are also more intensely horizontal in orientation as well. When we compare the mean values for each task on the horizontal axis, we find that in every single case, the town and village value is higher than the city value; See Table 5-9 below.
(The figure in parentheses is the rank order.)

(Towns and Villages Only)

The Average of the Mean Values for Specific Tasks

Figure 5-6

(Cities Only)

The Average of the Mean Values for Specific Tasks

Figure 5-7

(Towns and Villages Only)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
<th>(a) Central agencies, officials</th>
<th>(b) Prefectural offices (pref &amp; others)</th>
<th>(c) Other cities (for precedents)</th>
<th>(d) Other divisions within your local government</th>
<th>(e) Joint policy formation</th>
<th>(f) Inter-local government communication</th>
<th>(g) Local party branches</th>
<th>(h) Local politicians (mayors, etc.)</th>
<th>(i) Local groups, industry, residents</th>
<th>(j) Special, regional, national</th>
<th>(k) Local staff, retirees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top line: Cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) To prepare a new ordinance</td>
<td>1.5 2.3 2.5 2.7 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) For interpretation and/or explanation of by-law, ordinance</td>
<td>1.7 2.7 2.1 2.5 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) For study of central government grants</td>
<td>1.8 2.6 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) For study of prefectoral government grants</td>
<td>1.5 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5) To frame a plan for the adoption of new projects</td>
<td>1.4 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) To prepare a draft for a mid-range plan</td>
<td>1.3 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7) To prepare a budget proposal</td>
<td>1.3 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8) To regulate a regional problem</td>
<td>1.3 2.2 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9) To reform division management structure</td>
<td>1.1 1.4 2.3 2.6 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10) To prepare assembly interpolations</td>
<td>1.3 1.9 2.0 2.6 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11) To solve conflict with residents or local groups</td>
<td>1.3 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.4 2.1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) To introduce technical innovation</td>
<td>1.4 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.9 1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) To conduct independent research on routine matters</td>
<td>1.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMN City</td>
<td>1.37 2.12 2.13 2.31 1.14 1.41 1.23 1.12 1.15 1.31 1.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE Town/Village</td>
<td>1.23 2.50 2.38 2.51 1.28 1.45 1.32 1.20 1.13 1.22 1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The figures represent mean scores on a four point scale: 1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=fairly often, 4=always.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TV SAMPLE</th>
<th>CITY SAMPLE</th>
<th>HIGHER HORIZONTAL MEAN SCORE (C or TV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<td>5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<td>6)</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>7)</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>9)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>10)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The higher vertical and higher horizontal mean values for the towns and villages indicates that these smaller, poorer, more rural localities are less apt to be self-reliant than are the larger, richer, more urban cities. *

*It is important to note that this finding contradicts those of Noguchi, et al., (1978), as reported above.
Confirmation of this should come from scores in Column d, the reliance upon other divisions within the same local government. In fact, however, the city respondents' divisions are even less likely to depend upon input from other divisions within the same locality than are the town and village respondents' divisions. It is thus not the locality which is more self-reliant in the city case, but it is the division per se which is able to get along with less input from the outside, whether it be from outside the locality or from elsewhere in the same bureaucracy.*

There remains one final interesting possibility, a possibility not explored in this current research. Because we were concerned with the notions of tutelage and administrative dependence which have so long dominated our thinking about local public administration in Japan, the survey was structured to group the cities, towns, and villages together for comparison with prefectural patterns of intergovernmental communication. Cities, towns, and villages, as explained above, exist at the same, lowest level of local public administration; cities are never to towns and villages what prefectures are to cities, towns, and villages taken together. Thus they remain analytically distinct for the purposes of this research. Unfortunately, that precludes a detailed exploration of some of the more subtle relationships across this CTV level. We cannot distinguish in this sample, for example, to what extent the horizontal component among the towns and villages was actually something more subtle, the reliance upon particular regional cities for policy leadership. While we cannot speak in the strictest sense of tutelary relationships among CTV's, we undoubt-

*It should be noted also that this same pattern obtains for generalized contacting as well. The town and village sample was significantly more active than the city sample in terms of letter-writing, visits, and phone calls both upward to the prefecture as well as across to other CTV's.
edly can speak of regional leadership, a very different dynamic. Moreover, it is a dynamic encouraged by the center, as we have seen in Chapter Four. This idea of regional leadership does imply inequality among localities, but it does not suggest the supervision, tutelage, and dependence inherent in conventional notions of Japanese local public administration. This current effort, then, is best viewed as a first step in the direction of demonstrating the existence of an important translocal interdependence. It suggests, but is unable to test the hypothesis that the leadership by regional cities of surrounding towns and villages may be as important to the administrative process as tutelage by the prefecture. What remains for future research is the specification of the variety of relationships which obtain. We now know that it is not only (and sometimes not even predominantly) the prefecture which is heavily relied upon by local officials in their administrative routines. We need to know much more about the other sorts of leadership patterns and power relationships extant at the local level. The results of these indirect tests are clear. They indicate that economic and demographic indicators are important in affecting patterns of extralocal relations. But we are as yet unable to specify these patterns in their fullest complexity.

b. Direct Measures

Five variables were selected to control for conditions which might significantly affect patterns of intergovernmental communication. Each was chosen in response to the sorts of conventional wisdom about intergovernmental communication related earlier in this and other chapters.

1. Function

The idea of "vertical administration" is based upon the assumption that function determines intergovernmental communication. It posits that
such communication is vertical, directed between functionally identical bureaus in different levels of government. We have found no differences in patterns of extralocal contacting when the nature of the affairs of the respondents' divisions is controlled for. The patterns which were reported earlier obtained without significant modification for both the CTV and the prefectural sample. Vertical communication upward and downward, and horizontal communication across the local level are all diffused throughout the range of administrative affairs represented by the respondents of this survey. Extralocal contacting by localities is extremely diffuse in terms of both generalized contacting as well as specific tasks; it is found in spending as well as in non-spending bureaus, and in general affairs as well as in service bureaus. Functional distinctions do not seem to matter.

ii. Size

Conventional wisdom holds that smaller divisions are less capable of independent policy innovation and/or implementation. It is expected, therefore, that smaller divisions more frequently reach out to their functional counterparts in other localities or, more likely, to those in higher levels of government. This was supported by our previous separation of towns and villages from the CTV sample. Yet, when measured more directly, by controlling for the actual size of the respondents' divisions, there was no evidence to support this notion. Division size seems unrelated to patterns of extralocal communication for both prefectures and CTV's.

iii. Presence of Central Officials

Much of Chapter Three was devoted to the exploration of personnel linkages, a little understood mechanism of central tutelage in Japan.
Although little or no empirical research concerning the role of dispatched officials has been undertaken, a variety of assumptions has grown up around this practice. We are supposition rich and information poor.* The most widely held view of these central officials in the localities (hereafter COL's) suggests quite logically that they make communication easier between the prefecture and the central government. They are said to provide the necessary contacts for the locality to procure desired grants and approval. It seems reasonable to expect then that those divisions which host COL's would exhibit different patterns of vertical contacting than those which do not.

No evidence emerges either to support or to refute the notion that COL's make an important contribution to the vertical relationships between the center and localities. Instead, we find that the COL's affect patterns of task-specific horizontal intergovernmental communication. In the prefectural sample, there was significantly more intergovernmental communication across the prefectures when the presence of a COL was reported; this was true for such tasks as preparation of new ordinances, interpretation of by-laws, preparation of mid-range plans, preparation of budget proposals, and regulation of regional problems. In these cases, those divisions with COL's had significantly greater contact with other prefectural governments than did those without COL's. In no cases, however, did the presence or absence of COL's alter the already reported patterns of communications upward to the center or downward to the CTV's.

---

*The survey results do, in one important sense, conform to conventional wisdom concerning the distribution of these officials. They are heavily concentrated in the prefectures. Eighty-one percent of the respondents in the prefectural sample claimed that their division had at least one such central official (katsuai). Only twenty percent of the CTV sample made the same claim.
Similarly, COL's seemed to affect patterns of intergovernmental communication only for the horizontal dimension in the CTV sample as well. But in the case of the CTV's, horizontal communication with other CTV's was significantly enhanced only in the absence of COL's. There is more horizontal reliance at the CTV level when there are no central dispatchees. As with the prefectural sample, there are otherwise no relationships between the COL's and patterns of extralocal communication.

iv. Partisanship

The fourth independent variable tested directly for its influence upon patterns of intergovernmental communication concerned the influence of the partisan affiliation of the local chief executive. Two old saws were being examined here. The first, propagated by some scholars as well as by the progressives themselves, holds that conservatives narrowly define local interests and are exclusively oriented toward higher levels of government. Progressives, on the other hand, are more broad-minded, and are therefore more likely to seek cooperation across the local level as a bulwark against the expansion of central power. The second, competing piece of wisdom is based upon the notion that "there is no conservative or progressive way to clean the streets." In this view, partisanship matters little at the local level. Quite predictably, the partisanship of the local chief executives conforms with the latter of the two axioms; it matters not in the least. Localities, progressive and conservative, contact (and are contacted by) other governmental bodies in equal measure across the entire range of generalized and task-specific forms of communication.
v. Position

A fifth and final independent variable was of equal importance in affecting patterns of intergovernmental communication. Following the lead of the Alesch study, we tested whether younger public officials, in this case those who were section heads or below, were less experienced, knew fewer colleagues in other localities as well as at the center, and thus were likely to be less active in extralocal communication.* There were no significant differences in the interpersonal peer networks of the younger and the older (the more junior and the more experienced) officials in either sample. This is no doubt due to the ways in which administrators are rotated more frequently among functional bureaus in Japan than in the United States.

To review, indirect measures of demographic and economic factors suggest that there is important variance when we control for such factors as industrial activity, population size, and population density. The particular surrogate measure employed here, that of separating towns and villages from cities, also suggests some potentially important directions for further research, particularly in the area of regional leadership. In spite of legal-formal similarities, the cities on the one hand, and the towns and villages on the other, have very different relationships to each other and to higher levels of government. Yet, having specified some of the conditions under which patterns of extralocal communication vary, the main finding of this exercise can be simply stated: On the whole, few of these independent variables make significant differences in the patterns already reported. Localities tend to have varied general and task-specific con-

*As this is an individual level variable, it was cross-tabulated only with other individual level variables.
tacts with each other to at least the same degree that they have contacts with higher levels of government, regardless of economic, demographic, financial, functional, partisan, personnel, or other conditions.

4. The Diffusion of Policy Innovation

Although we have already demonstrated the high degree of translocal activity in Japanese local public administration, we have yet to relate that activity to the introduction of new policy ideas themselves. Obviously, not all that is transmitted across localities is related specifically to policy borrowing and cue-taking. Indeed, most of it surely is not. Much of the extralocal contacting identified here has less to do with demonstration effects than with the efforts of localities to confirm decisions already taken. Indeed, there is no reason to expect that local officials even spend most of their time innovating. The results of a separate section of this survey confirm this. The respondents were asked if their division had "adopted any sort of new policy idea, new project, or new organizational technique in the past five years." In spite of its broad definition, only one in four officials was able to identify such an innovation. Yet, innovations are, of course, adopted by localities. We are concerned with determining the sources of these innovations when they are adopted.

More than one hundred local officials identified a variety of recent innovations adopted by their division; it is a variety which defies classification. None was repeated twice. Each was highly specific to the respondents' division and locality. The new policy ideas identified by prefectural officials showed a greater concentration in spending-related areas, such as the maintenance of facilities and the provision of citizen services. The CTV officials were rather more evenly divided between man-
agement related innovations and service-related ones.

The sources of these ideas were also highly varied, but a very active and important lateral transfer of policy ideas for the sample as a whole is clearly indicated:

**TABLE 5-10**

**SOURCE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW POLICY IDEA IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS — ALL RESPONDENTS**

*(in per cent of total responses)*

- (1) Own Division 27%
- (2) Other Division in Same Locality 18%
- (3) Mayor/Governor 13%
- (4) Other Locality* 22%
- (5) Related Administrative Organ 1%
- (6) Interest Group 2%
- (7) Residents 1%
- (8) Academics 5%
- (9) Professional Journals 3%
- (10) Joint Organs of Localities 4%
- (11) Higher Levels of Government 5%

*In the case of prefectures, other prefectures; in the case of CTV's, other CTV's.

There are a number of things which are striking about this, not the least of which is the finding that the diffusion of policy innovations from other localities is more common than mayoral or gubernatorial initiative.

The first three categories should be combined with numbers six and seven in order to determine the relative importance of purely local sources. Likewise, when categories four, nine, and ten are combined, we have an approximation of the role of lateral sources of policy ideas. The result, for the sample as a whole, is a nearly two thirds reliance upon purely internal sources of ideas:
TABLE 5-11
INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL SOURCES
OF INNOVATION-
ALL RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Sources</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral Sources</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is, of course, no reason not to expect that most of these sorts of innovative ideas are internally generated. What is surprising is the high rate of lateral transfer across localities, and the low rate of dispersion from above.

More revealing, however, is the disaggregation of these findings into the two sample groups, the CTV's and the prefectures;

TABLE 5-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>PREFECTURAL SAMPLE</th>
<th>CTV SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Own Division</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Other Division in Same Locality</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Mayor/Governor</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Other Locality</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Related Administrative Organ</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Interest Group</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Residents</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Academics</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Professional Journals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Joint Organs of Localities</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Higher Levels of Government</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If these categories are once again compressed, the following contrast between the CTV's and the prefectures results:
TABLE 5-13
INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INNOVATION—
THE TWO SAMPLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREFECTURAL SAMPLE</th>
<th>CTV SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Sources</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral Sources</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A pattern which had emerged earlier reappears. Once again the prefectures seem more mutually insular than do the cities, towns, and villages. They also seem more independent. Even so, fully one fifth of the recent policy innovations at the prefectural level are innovations borrowed from other prefectures. In the case of the CTV's, if innovations are one-half of the time the result of local creativity, they are more than one-third of the time the result of cue-taking from the experiences of other localities. This is far closer to balance than we could possibly have anticipated based upon popular vertical characterizations of the system. More than counsel and support is transferred laterally in Japanese public administration. Policy ideas and innovations also diffuse horizontally.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our survey has provided inferential material suggesting that there is a very active and often very important horizontal dynamic within the clearly vertical structure of local public administration in Japan. It permits us to demonstrate a heavy translocal interdependence across the board on tasks ranging from the routine to the exceptional. We are able to demonstrate for the first time that there are at all levels of local government in Japan substantive administrative contacts which encourage cooperation and which facilitate demonstration effects. Our results fur-
ther suggest that stereotypes, however useful in providing general characterizations, are poor guides to understanding the more subtle dynamics of local public administration. Briefly restated, we have learned that for every level of locality, under virtually every sort of condition, for both general as well as task specific purposes, for actual innovations as well as for the mere confirmation of independent ideas, and through a variety of channels, the mutual reliance among localities is at least as important as is their dependence upon higher levels of government.
NOTES

1 Steiner (1965), p. 152.
2 Ibid., p. 201.
3 Ibid., p. 328.
6 Ibid., p. 8.
12 See ibid., p. 41, Table 4-9.
13 See Aqua (1979) and MacDougall (1980a).
14 See especially Aqua (1979) and Noguchi et al., (1978).
17 Alesch (1972).
CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL POLICY IN TOKYO BAY

Summary

This chapter provides the first detailed, historical study of the regional policy process in Japan. The subject of the case study is a major bridge construction project in the Tokyo Bay area, the most populous and most important region in the nation. The localities of the Bay Area are treated as the constituents of the regional policy process, for such policy, even when nationally promulgated, requires the coordination and participation of local interests. Using the structural model first presented in Chapter Two, the coalition behavior of these localities becomes the focal point for an explanation of both vertical and horizontal extralocal relations in the regional policy process. The political manifestation of these translocal coalitions, what we call the "horizontal strategy" of both central and local actors, receives particular attention. The study spans virtually the entire postwar era and identifies the ways in which the issues, the actors, and the region itself were all part of much broader social, political, and economic changes over a twenty-five year period. A periodization of these changes is used as the referrent for the dynamics of the Tokyo Bay regional policy process.

Conclusions

We find that coalitions of localities are used as devices for the
demonstration of support by central actors vis-a-vis other central actors at least as often as they are used as tools of local actors in pursuit of local interests. That is, the horizontal strategy is frequently directed by as well as at the center. We find that in either case this horizontal strategy is a necessary, although clearly not a sufficient regional policy tool. It is indispensable within, yet is incomprehensible outside the vertical structure of the Japanese polity; the variety of structural constraints described in Chapter Three require that the horizontal strategy in all its forms be directed upwards. We find further that the idea of a "unity" among progressive local governments in Japan is more than a myth; we find it to be a red herring which can distract us from the much more fundamental ways in which localities define their interests. We find that ideology is used only at the convenience of the ideologue and that it has little policy relevance. Localities are perfectly capable and willing to effectively cooperate with each other as their objective interests permit; moreover, while these interests may change, they vary quite independently of partisanship. Additionally, while we've found that conflict resolution, and often conflict itself, is at least as ritualized (and as brilliantly executed) as consensus building, we've found that both are clearly related to the leadership skills of individuals. In contrast to many political studies, and in particular contrast to most done on modern Japan, we've found great leaders who are able to seize initiative and shape opportunity. In short, we've found leaders who matter.
I. INTRODUCTION: DECADES OF CHANGE

Public administration is at base neither a scientific nor a philosophic endeavor. It is a political enterprise. This is certainly no less true for its subset, regional policy making. Indeed, it is probably more true, given the multiplication of interests when a policy moves from a purely local to a region-wide context. Having explored the administrative superstructure for local public policy in Chapters Three and Four, we have found that the legal-formal mechanisms for regional policy serve well defined central goals as much as they serve usually nascent local ones. We've found that they are frequently employed, that they are as varied as public policy itself, and that they are clearly the product of a vertical tutelary structure of public administration. In Chapter Five we discovered that at the same time such a structure far from precludes substantial exchanges of ideas, advice, and initiative among local officials. We found that our expectations derived from conventional wisdom were too simple, and that policy sharing and demonstration effects across localities are of major importance in the operation of local government. But we have as yet failed to address more basic political questions about policy choice. We have not yet explored in any systematic way the politics of regional policy. That is the purpose of this chapter.

Our strategy should be made clear at the outset. A policy package inherently regional in character will be utilized as a focal point for the examination of extralocal linkages in the policy process. While regional policy itself is frequently a national undertaking, it requires also the coordination of local interests. Thus, it should, to the extent that it is truly a regional policy, be an ideal laboratory for
exploring the interaction of the vertical and the horizontal components of public policy first posited in Chapter Two.

The policy selected concerns the construction of a bridge, the Tokyo Cross Bay Bridge Project, which would link two of Japan's most important heavy industrial belts and which would serve to physically integrate the lives of the one quarter of Japan's population which lives in the Tokyo Bay Area's four prefectures and 132 cities and special wards. The Bridge issue has been played out in political battles in national as well as regional forums for more than twenty years, and these battles have been nearly perfect mirrors of the broader social, economic and political changes in goals and priorities which have swept across the nation during this same period.

These changes represent shifts in the moods and dominant approaches of the times, and are reflections of the concerns and priorities which dominated Japan, each in turn, between the mid-1950's to the present. Each of these orientations toward policy: a) the "growth first" idea which was prosecuted in the context of a "conservative's paradise" at the local level until the mid-1960's, b) the "progressivism" which came to dominate until the money ran out with the oil shock in 1973, and c) the "recession" period which followed are all clearly as much a part of the history of Tokyo Bay public policy choice as they have also been a part of national policy. They will serve as the backdrop for the analysis to follow.

The structure of each of these three major historically-based sections of this chapter will be identical. The first part of each section will describe the general changes in economic and political objectives during that period. It will provide a nation-wide background for
the political cooperation and conflict which will subsequently be examined in the context of regional policy in Tokyo Bay. The second part will explore the Bridge Project itself; it will examine its status and prospects during that particular period. As the bridge-related section headings reveal, the project was variously being promoted, blocked, and revived. The third part of each section will focus more narrowly upon the relationships among the localities as the principal actors in the regional policy process. It will be most directly concerned with analysis of what can be called the "horizontal strategy." This is the strategy of utilizing coalitions of localities in support of or in opposition to regional policy. As we shall see, this "horizontal strategy" has been used as often by national interests as by local ones; it has been utilized both by as well as toward localities, and the nature of this strategy has significantly varied with the broader economic and political changes described above. In the case of Tokyo Bay and the Cross Bay Bridge Project, the principal forum for the prosecution of regional policy and for the utilization of the "horizontal strategy" was the Tokyo Bay General Development Council, a collection of virtually all of the Bay Area local governments. The Council's consensus, debates, and ultimate dissolution become measures of the times, and contribute to our broader understanding of the possibilities for regional public policy in Japan. In short, this is the analysis of how regional policy has evolved through the conflict and confusion of decades of change in postwar Japan. While regionally based it is far from regionally limited.
II. THE BAY AREA

A) Economic and Demographic Features

The Tokyo Bay Area is comprised of four prefectures lying in the southern portion of the Kanto Plain in Eastern Honshu. Three of these prefectures, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Chiba, have extensive bay frontage, and the fourth, Saitama, is intimately linked to the region by both physical (river systems) and economic (suburban bed towns) factors. Taken together they constitute the nation's Capital District (shutoken) and they have, since the Edo Period, been the center of Japan's administrative, commercial, and cultural activity.

FIGURE 6-1
THE FOUR MAIN ISLANDS OF JAPAN

FIGURE 6-2
THE TOKYO BAY AREA
Tokyo Bay is not, in purely physical terms, a particularly imposing area. Its 1,200 square kilometers is smaller than several other Japanese bays, and it is only somewhat less than twice the size of Japan's largest lake, Lake Biwa. Yet, Tokyo Bay has for centuries played a central role in Japan's economic development. The port facilities of Tokyo Bay, when taken together, not only process more cargo than the ports of any other single bay in the world, but they also service the world's largest metropolitan region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Cargo (million tons handled in 1976)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kobe</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kitakyushu</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kawasaki</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tokyo Bay Ports combined = 422 million tons in 1976)

Sources: Kobe shi Kōwanyoku Gijitsubu Keikakuka Tōkei Kobekō (July-September) p. 4 (1977).


As the data above clearly demonstrate, Japan is an overseas trading country (six of the world's ten busiest ports are Japanese), and Tokyo is at the hub of that activity (three of them are in Tokyo Bay). The six ports of Tokyo Bay are half again as busy as the world's single largest port, Rotterdam.
This complex of port and harbor facilities directly services 27 million people, nearly one quarter of Japan's population; this is a share that has consistently been expanding since the postwar reconstruction began:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Population Census, Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister.

In sectoral terms, these four prefectures which surround the Bay house thirty percent of Japan's urban population, twenty-six percent of the white collar labor force and twenty-five percent of the industrial workforce. The value of the manufactured goods produced in the region amounts to twenty-seven percent of the nation's total output. Similarly, the personal income of the region's residents was more than thirty-five trillion yen in 1975, thirty percent of the nation's total. No other region in Japan, and few elsewhere in the world, can match this concentration of economic and human resources.

The region is not unvariegated, however. Tokyo, for example, has the highest per capita income in Japan, sixty percent greater than the per capita income of Chiba, the poorest prefecture in the region. In aggregate terms Chiba is even less well off in comparison to its richer neighbor. The total personal income of Chiba's residents in 1975, four
trillion yen, was less than one quarter of Tokyo's 19 trillion yen.

More revealing about the distribution of economic activity in the region are the following figures:

**TABLE 6-3**

TOKYO BAY REGION RESIDENTS' PERSONAL INCOME BY PREFECTURE AND ECONOMIC SECTOR (1975)

(figures are in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.

It is clear that of the four prefectures, Chiba remains the most dependent upon agricultural production and that Tokyo is at the same time by far the least "blue collared" and the most "white collared" in the region. Moreover, a substantial portion of the Saitama, Kanagawa, and Chiba residents who derive their income from the tertiary sector, work in Tokyo, commuting as much as two hours in each direction to and from their "bedroom suburbs."

There are six major administrative units in the region, each with its own particular interests. In addition to the four prefectures already

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*Interestingly, Tokyo was the only prefecture in Japan to have declined in population (-.11%) between 1975-1976. Between 1955-1960 it had been the fastest growing prefecture. Between 1960-1965 that honor was shared by Saitama and Kanagawa. In the decade 1965-1975 the three fastest growing prefectures in Japan were Saitama, Kanagawa and Chiba.
mentioned there are two "Designated Cities," Yokohama and Kawasaki, which enjoy special administrative status under the law. They and the other eight such cities nationwide are permitted a greater freedom from prefectural supervision of their affairs than are other cities. Both are located in Kanagawa Prefecture, together accounting for more than half the prefecture's total population. Both are port cities of major importance; they are physically adjacent and form the nucleus of the Keihin District, Japan's oldest, largest, densest, and busiest industrial zone. Yokohama has steadily grown in importance since the opening of its port to foreign trade in 1869 as the result of the Harris Treaty. For generations it has been among the most cosmopolitan of Japan's cities, a major international port and window on the world.²

Kawasaki is in some ways the more interesting of the two. It is rather more an industrial than a commercial port city, and as we shall see in the case of the Cross Bay Bridge, unusual geographic factors present it with peculiar policy choices. In 1976 Kawasaki was third in the nation in industrial output, seventy percent of the total consisting of steel and petrochemical related heavy industries. Only fifty-five percent of its residents work in Kawasaki, mostly the blue collar labor in these heavy industries. The rest commute to Tokyo, its immediate neighbor to the North. The city itself runs length-wise, East to West along the southern bank of the Tamagawa River. There is a very limited municipal frontage on Tokyo Bay:
Kawasaki is thirty kilometers from East to West but is only one kilometer from North to South at its narrowest. Although it has a total land area of 133 square kilometers, the unusual distribution of that area, and the resulting land use patterns are of great political importance.

Opposite the Keihin Industrial Belt is the more modern Keiyo combinato on the Chiba shores.* We have already seen how, in aggregate terms, Chiba is rather less developed than its neighbors across the bay. This situation is the historical result of the geographical isolation of Chiba from the rest of the Capital District. The southern section of Chiba Prefecture, the Bosō Peninsula** is far more rural and far less integrated into the industrial activity of the region than is any other

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*The term Keihin is the result of a combination of Chinese characters from Tokyo and Yokohama, and the term Keiyo is a similar construction based upon characters from Tokyo and Chiba. The term combinato is the Japanese version of the Russian Kombinat. It refers to the planned concentration of integrated heavy industry.

**Interestingly, both Chinese characters in the name Bosō mean 'fringe' or 'tassle', an excellent description of the area's seclusion.
part of the Bay Area. Whereas the Keihin Belt is extraordinarily dense and developed, the Keiyō Belt has only in the last fifteen years been aggressively developed by government and industry. Although the Tokyo Bay coastal portion of the Prefecture has become an increasingly important source of petrochemical, steel, and other heavy industrial production due to the aggressive development of the combinatoro, the greater part of the peninsula remains rural and underexploited. In the same way that the density, overdevelopment, and narrow coastal land area of Kawasaki has served as a rationalization for opposition to the bridge project, the isolation and enormous development potential of southern Chiba has attracted much investment and has served as an important rationale for the promotion of the Bridge.

B) Public Administration

We have already noted that there are six major administrative units in the Tokyo Bay Area, Tokyo, Saitama, Kanagawa, Chiba, Yokohama, and Kawasaki. There are also, in addition, more than 130 cities and a nearly equal number of towns and villages. While these 250-plus administrative units seem far more rationally organized than are the thousands of Balkan-like administrative jurisdictions in the New York Metropolitan Area, regional interests are often competitive, highly localized, and are not easily managed. Indeed, in spite of numerous efforts to the contrary, there is very little that is comprehensive about Bay Area public policy. This is undoubtedly less due to the failure of localities to coordinate their activities than it is due to the nature of bureaucratic politics at the center. Tokyo Bay is often cited as the prime example of the evils of tatewari gyōsei, the sectional centralism which was described in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Virtually every central
ministry and agency has its own bureau with responsibility for harbor management, bay transport, or port construction. In addition, each has a geographically based section devoted to planning for the capital district.

Oddly enough, this confusion is in large measure the result of the introduction of "local autonomy" at the end of the war. The Meiji government had regionalized by fiat, and in 1886 the Home Ministry divided the nation into six districts for the supervision of all engineering and construction projects. The Ministry's Engineering Bureau was handed direct responsibility for all port and harbor management.* In 1949, when the Home Ministry was abolished, and the following year, when the Diet passed the Port and Harbor Law modeled in part after the New York Port Authority system, responsibility for port and harbor planning, construction, and management was devolved to the localities. The spirit of the law notwithstanding, the Transport Ministry's Port and Harbor Bureau quickly became the most important central organ in the supervision of these local Port and Harbor Bureaus. The result in the Tokyo Bay case was the dismantling of a single authority and the establishment of one for each of the Bay's six port cities.**

*In 1878 the responsibility for ports and harbors was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Home Ministry, but it was not until eight years later when these six regions, or "superintendencies," were created for administrative streamlining.

**Although in the thirty years since then there has been frequent talk about "Regional Harbors" among the various commissions and study groups concerned with the question, there have been few cases of the implementation of such a program. One case, that of Kitakyushu, involved the utilization of the Partial Affairs Association formula for joint harbor policy, but this was merely the prelude to the amalgamation of five cities into one in 1963. At present there are five such regional port authorities, all Partial Affairs Associations. (See Chapter Three.) Only one Nagoya Port, is of any major consequence. Each of these five cases are joint undertakings by the city in which the port is located and the prefecture in which the city is located.
While important, port and harbor management is of course only a small portion of the administrative burdens of the region's localities. The profusion of administrative authority and the corresponding lack of comprehensive regional administration in the Tokyo Bay region is not limited to the affairs of the Bay itself. In 1956 the Capital Region Development Law was passed by the Diet; this law was aimed in part at policy coordination in the region. It established the Capital Region Development Commission as an external organ to the Prime Minister's office in which the governors and the assembly chairmen of the region's prefectures would sit together to coordinate their policy programs. This law's definition of the region was broader than just the Bay Area, and included the eight prefectures within a 100 kilometer radius from downtown Tokyo. The body was invested with the power to approve or to veto region-wide development schemes. In reality, however, the new body could do no more than act as a clearing house for the enormous variety of regional plans produced by the central ministries and by the area's localities. After 1973 it was absorbed as a bureau into the new National Land Agency (itself a weak attempt at coordination of regional plans nationwide). The 1956 Law and related legislation did have a major impact upon the region's subsequent development, if not upon its administrative structure. It effectively placed a lid upon the further industrial development in Tokyo proper. Plants in Tokyo were permitted to remodel and modernize, but their expansion was prohibited. New plants were also prohibited, as were new universities. The result was a boom for the Keihin and the Keiyo Industrial Belts. But coordinated regional public policy remains to this day elusive and highly susceptible to the competition among the national, local, bureaucratic,
and industrial interests which continue to freely coalesce and collide in the regional policy process.

III. THE CONSERVATIVES' PARADISE

A) Background – Rapid Growth

The period between the end of the war and the middle 1960's was marked by an unassailable consensus on economic reconstruction and rapid growth. The Japanese economy during that period expanded like no other in history. A razed, spent nation became within twenty years an economic giant, the manufacturer to the world. The demands of the time were too manifest to brook dissent. In that context candidates from the left had little success in Tokyo Bay or nationwide. As we will see, conservatives at the center and conservatives in the localities often disagreed about specific projects, but their tacit covenant on growth paid handsome dividends; they, and industry, and the nation as well, prospered. Tokyo Bay was mistress to this prosperity.

The growth of Tokyo Bay's various ports' cargo handling between 1955-1970 is an excellent testimony to Japan's postwar economic miracle. In those fifteen years the total cargo handled by the ports of Tokyo Bay increased from 40 million tons to nearly 400 million tons. The individual port facilities' cargo tonnage increased to the following, extraordinary extents:
TABLE 6-4

TOKYO BAY PORT TRAFFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>1970 total tonnage</th>
<th>1955 total tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>61 = an increase of 61 times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisarazu</td>
<td>471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But the growth was not in transport and merchandise alone. The physical infrastructure was rebuilt virtually from scratch, the emphasis being placed upon plant capacity and production. Given the density of the existing Capital region, new land had to be added by filling in Tokyo Bay itself. Land fill has an old history in the region, the earliest project dating back 320 years to when the Eidai Island Project (in what is now Kōtō-ku) was begun under the Tokugawa Shogunate. The policy began in earnest in 1901, but the prewar land fill schemes pale in comparison to the ambitious postwar efforts. In 1970 it was estimated that by 1975 the area of Tokyo Bay itself would be reduced by twenty percent due to assiduous land fill efforts. Moreover, the population of the Tokyo Bay region grew from thirteen million persons in 1950 to more than twenty-one million persons in 1965, an increase of over sixty percent.

All this prosperity and growth, however, was hardly the result of coordinated, comprehensive planning. Yet this was not for want of vision. Throughout this high growth era, from central ministries, from the acad-
emy, from the LDP, from local governments, and from private industry - from every interested sector - there appeared volumes of plans, literally hundreds of schemes for the development of the region. There was one, however, which more than any other, was by far the most important statement of the conservatives' wisdom and vision for the future of the Bay Area. There was one plan, which more than any other was in every respect the product of this era, a conservatives' paradise in which the private sector could guide government in pursuit of uncontested, common goals. It is this "Neo-Tokyo Plan" which even today continues to frame debates about regional policy in the Bay Area.

Early in the course of Japan's postwar reconstruction, priority was placed upon the redevelopment of energy resources, in particular upon that which is most abundant in the archipelago - hydroelectric power. By 1955, Japanese industries had come to the verge of returning to pre-war production levels, and it was clear that additional energy sources would have to be found to power the burgeoning industrial might of Japan. Although initially established in 1951, it was not until 1955 that the immensely influential Electric Power Central Research Institute (Denryoku Chūō Kenkyūjo) began its operation with this as its goal. The central government had mandated in 1951 that three one thousandths of all electric power profits be allocated for research of this nature. Of that amount, two-thirds were allocated for the creation of this research institute, the remaining third to be used by the local electric power companies for research purposes. It was this Electric Power Central Research Institute and it was its head, Matsunaga Yasuzaemon, which by means of the Neo-Tokyo Plan, were to have the greatest influence on the pace and direction of regional policy in Tokyo Bay in the postwar.
Matsunaga, born in December 1875, is considered the "godfather" of Japan's electric power industry; a man of both vision and will. (He is said to have been a fan of Toynbee.) He had, by the time of his death at the age of 95 in 1971, lived to see an ascendant Japan. After graduating from Keio Gijuku (later Keio University) in 1896, Matsunaga entered the prestigious Mitsui Bank, which he soon left in order to return to his native Kyushu and a position with the Kyushu Electric Railway Corporation. He subsequently moved from there to the electric power industry, first in Kyushu, later in Nagoya, and finally in Tokyo, where he arrived in 1928 as the new president of Tōhō Electric. At that time there were five major power companies competing in the Tokyo market, and nine nationwide. As the decade proceeded, and as the exigencies of war abroad fed authoritarianism at home, the government introduced a plan to bring together all the major power companies into a single supply network in 1938. The government sought, through the creation of Nihon Hassōden K.K., to eliminate inefficient competition. Matsunaga was among those younger top level power officials who balked at this forced consolidation order and who resigned their positions. Whether anti-military, anti-bureaucratic, a free marketeer, a liberal, or a man of conscience, (we are left with little more than these descriptions by his associates), Matsunaga was one of those rare members of the economic elite to have "sat out" the war. In the end, this was to be the key to his enormous postwar political power. After many of those who had stayed on to manage the Nihon Hassōden K.K. had been purged by the Occupation authorities, Matsunaga was called out of retirement and was chosen by SCAP to rebuild Japan's decimated power industry. In 1950, he was appointed vice-chairman of the newly formed and powerful Public Utilities Com-
mission (Kōeki Jigyō Iinkai), the body mandated with responsibility for rebuilding all public utilities nationwide.  

Throughout this early postwar period Matsunaga of course was very close to a variety of political figures in the conservative camp. It was his initiative, as vice-chairman of the Public Utilities Commission, which led to the formation of the Electric Power Central Research Institute. Its two one-thousandths share of the proceeds of the nation's electric power industry profit became a source of his own influence in government. Indeed, the Institute was built less as a think tank and planning bureau than as a political tool for the electric power interests in general and for Matsunaga's schemes in particular. With the money collected from each of the major electric power companies, the Central Institute was almost immediately one of the most powerful lobbies in Tokyo. Matsunaga was its "don." He was particularly close to the old Liberal Party and such former Prime Ministers as Yoshida and Hatoyama. Matsunaga came neither from the ministries nor from an established route within the business community. He was always something of a maverick, an independent influence of great means.

His was also an influence of great vision. Under his direction it was decided that a separate research body be created for problems apart from electricity related questions. This was the Industrial Planning Conference (Sangyō Keikaku Kaigi). Its activities were as unlimited as his energy and creativity, tackling such questions as Hokkaido Development, Water Resource Development, Oil Resource surveys, etc. In all, the Industrial Planning Conference produced almost two dozen plans directed at postwar economic recovery and development (and needless to say, not so indirectly aimed at increasing the demand for
electricity). Matsunaga's strategy was an aggressive one. His organizations took the initiative from various competing ministries, forcing the government to respond on his terms. At the same time, as we shall see in the Tokyo Bay case, he used his influence to "create" demand in the localities. This sort of private sector leadership was made easy, if not possible, by the climate of the times, by the consensus which was the base of the conservatives' paradise.

In July 1959, the Industrial Planning Conference set forth its "Neo-Tokyo Plan." This was by far the most important and was easily the most comprehensive regional development plan to appear during the high growth era in postwar Japan. In an era of ambitious plans this was the most ambitious; in an era of private sector leadership, this was a prototype. The plan called for 400 million square meters of landfill along the Tokyo Bay coasts, and in addition called for the creation of an enormous 200 million square meter landfill island directly in the middle of the Bay. In all it proposed that fully two-thirds of Tokyo Bay be filled in. The landfill island in the midst of the Bay was the proposed site of a new central rail and motor transport facility which would connect Tokyo to both the Tōhoku and the Chūbu regions. Exclusive freight and industrial transport lines were also allocated, as were special transport links among the six bay harbor facilities. Also included were plans for a heliport, a new international jet port, and the development of a new heavy industrial belt along the Chiba coast. Total landfill costs alone were estimated at four trillion yen in 1959 ($11 billion). Two bridges were envisioned which would directly link the Keiyō and Keihin coasts and which would serve also as the route for a massive population transfer, a migration bringing the populations of the two
FIGURE 6-4
THE NEO-TOKYO PLAN

industrial zones into an even balance within twenty years. Included also was the first proposal for the Numata Dam and Hydroelectric project, one of the most massive (800 million tons) ever conceived.

An aggressive private sector was clearly leading a compliant public sector. The nature of the conservative consensus, the context within which the plan was produced and promoted, cannot be overly stressed. Matsunaga appointed a former Home Ministry bureaucrat, Kanō Kyūrō, to head the Neo-Tokyo Plan team at its inception in 1956. Kanō was a former president of the Public Housing Corporation, a well connected expert in land acquisition and finance turned LDP politician who subsequently became governor of Chiba prefecture in 1962. It was he who put together the twenty member staff of young engineers which was, according to one of them who is now a high ranking official of the Tokyo Metropolitan government, "set loose, unconstrained by any financial or political limitations." (Interview with Ebata Masaki, 9/25/78). It was a heady time for planners. The Neo-Tokyo Plan spawned similar industry-led regional development schemes elsewhere throughout Japan, and it stimulated within the government a second generation of more detailed plans for the Chiba combinato, for the Cross Bay Bridge, for the construction of a new international airport, for the construction of a Bay Coast Road, and for a variety of land fill schemes. It also marked only the beginning of Matsunaga's ambitions for the development of Tokyo Bay, ambitions realized only for as long as the conservatives' paradise and high growth prevailed.

The second generation plans were issued from all quarters. Some of the most important ones included:

a) The Southern Kanto Industrial Land Plan (The Ogawa Plan), The National Land General Development Corporation (December 1960).

This private sector plan urged the government to remove all re-
straints to private industrial development of the region. It sought the creation of a heavy industrial belt along both shores of the Bay, totaling over 116 thousand square kilometers in the area. The plan included a housing belt along the Chiba coast, road construction projects, and water resource planning programs.

b) The Tokyo Bay Development Plan
Construction Ministry (February 1961)

This plan called for the creation of the Chiba Combinato, including new cities, incentives for population movement away from Tokyo, 40-60 thousand square kilometers of industrial landfill, and the placement of steel and petrochemical facilities along the Chiba coast. In addition it was the first official government proposal for the Cross Bay Bridge.

c) The Port and Harbor Deliberative Council Plan
Transport Ministry (March 1961)

This plan sought the expansion of port facilities in each of the Bay's six harbors by means of a 66 thousand square kilometer landfill program. It called also for a new network of rail and road links in the region. Conspicuously missing was a Cross Bay Bridge proposal.

d) The Tange Plan
Tange Research Center (March 1961)

This plan moved the bridge site from Kawasaki to Tokyo, across to Kisarazu. It proposed a major rail terminus, "New Tokyo Station" for the middle of the Bay. It envisioned modern offices and a new airport built upon landfill in the middle of the Bay, connected by monorail with the major ports and downtown areas.

e) Shimizu Plan
Professor Shimizu of Chiba University (July 1961)

This plan called for the creation of a new public corporation, the Keiyo Chūō Kensetsu Kōdan, which would undertake a 70 billion yen landfill and construction program. It called for a landfill bridge connecting downtown Tokyo to the Keiyo Coast and which would contain a five lane expressway and rail link.

f) The Chiba Plan
Chiba Prefectural Government (October 1961)

This plan represented the prefecture's efforts to throw its total support behind the Combinato project for the Keiyo Coast. It called for more than 3,000 square kilometers of new land, 90% for industrial use, 10% for housing. Private industry was given a free hand in the creation of the land and in the introduction of physical infrastructure:
TABLE 6-5
DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS IN CHIBA COMBINATO PLAN
(figures represent percentage of project cost)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Central Govt.</th>
<th>WHO PAYS Prefecture</th>
<th>Relevant Locality</th>
<th>Other (bonds, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Creation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port &amp; Harbor</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In all, fully two thirds of the total costs, and one hundred percent of the landfill costs were to be assumed by private industry.*

g) The Tokyo Bay General Development Plan
   Capital Region Development Commission (November 1961)

   This was an attempted coordination of agency and ministry plans. The emphasis here was upon a balance between industrial land fill and preservation of green belts. It called for nearly 150 thousand square kilometers of landfill.

h) The Watanabe Plan
   The LDP Tokyo Bay Development Committee** (April 1962)

   Targeted for 1980, this plan sought a 1.4 trillion yen program of landfill. In addition it called for the construction of two bridges, a new international airport, and extensive road, rail, industrial and housing infrastructure.

*It should be pointed out that their gains were potentially very great as well. The major corporate land developing companies were already in the process of purchasing most of the Chiba coast and the Nansō region. They had, in direct response to the original Industrial Planning Council plan, already organized to press Chiba and the center to move on the plan after first having acquired the targeted pieces of real estate.

**The LDP remains to this day the only political party which had ever prepared a comprehensive plan for the development of the Tokyo Bay region.
That eight such similar plans should be produced and published from so many quarters within sixteen months of each other, less than two years after the Neo-Tokyo Plan was first announced, is as much a statement of the tacit consensus which dominated this period as it is a tribute to the significance and breadth of Matsunaga's leadership and vision.

It is beyond dispute that this era was a conservative's paradise, but the degree to which this paradise was a consensual one can also be overstated. It is too easy to overlook the dissent and conflict that often prevailed within the conservative camp itself. In spite of the partisan homogeniety which marked the period between the end of the war and the rise of progressive local opposition there was often intense competition for the programs and facilities which growth made possible. The consensus which prevailed was a consensus upon growth as an end. The battles centered upon the distribution of that growth, both locally as well as nationwide. The Tokyo Bay case provides us with an excellent glimpse into the cracks in the consensus at both levels in regional policy making.

At Matsunaga's urging, the LDP created the Tokyo Bay Development Committee within its Policy Affairs Research Council* in September 1958. Within the party itself, initiative was assumed by then Prime Minister Kishi, by Policy Affairs Research Council Chief Fukuda Takeo, and by LDP Secretary General Kawashima from Chiba. Fukuda was made the first chairman of the new committee, in spite of the fact that his district is

*The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is the highest policy making organ in the LDP, and is the umbrella organization for more than one hundred separate issue and region specific committees. These committees compete among each other for priorities in the final LDP budget draft proposals each year. For more detail on PARC, see Fukui, 1970.
not in the Bay Area. This was important as an effort to broaden the base of support for Tokyo-specific projects within a largely non-Tokyo based ruling party. It was not sufficient. Initial plans to create a special Tokyo Bay Development Corporation composed of central, local, and private capital, proposed by the committee (again, at Matsunaga's initiative) were killed within the party by those non-Tokyo and anti-mainstream party leaders (in this case led by Nikaido Susumu) who wanted to see a spatial decentralization of growth, that is, by those who wanted their own piece of the action.* Fukuda recognized that there was no clear consensus on making the Tokyo Bay area a developmental priority, and he scrapped the planned corporation.

In January 1959, when Fukuda was appointed the Chairman of PARC, he introduced a second plan, the "Coastal Region Development Law" which would give developmental priority to all coastal areas, in an attempt to assuage opposition sentiment within the party. (Nikaido was from an area in Kyushu which would have been included in this new measure.) It passed smoothly through the party, but it was stalled three times in the Diet due to an unfortunate combination of Cabinet reshuffles, Diet dissolutions, and session deadlines.** In the midst of these delays, Ikeda formed his first cabinet in July 1960; Ikeda's support, and thus his priorities, were quite different than Kishi's. Ikeda quickly abandoned the

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*Nikaido was later to join the Tanaka faction and lead a similar fight against the Bridge Project in particular.

**Mike Mochizuki of Harvard is currently engaged in a study of the Diet which is designed in part to deal with the great variety of such structural constraints upon Diet action. In particular, Japan has the shortest sessions among the world's major parliaments, necessitating the frequent carrying over of bills and the death of many which are lost amid shifting priorities.
the coastal regional development scheme and opted instead for his famous "Income Doubling" plan and for a program for the development of regional "Industrial Cities." It was still very much the high growth game, but the targeted sectors had suddenly been changed. Rather than advocating a plan for spending a great deal in a few coastal areas, a new program of developing twelve separate regional cities, nationwide, was given priority. The Tokyo Bay Development Committee's bill was quietly discarded.* The era was one of rapid growth and a conservatives' paradise, but it was not always easy for the ruling LDP coalition to agree upon the targets of that growth.

B) The Bridge - Conceived and Promoted

The perils of travel in Tokyo Bay is the stuff of numerous legends. The earliest is as old as recorded history itself; there appears in the Kojiki (712) the story of Yamato Takeuno Mikoto who sacrificed his beautiful mistress, Oto Tachiba no Hime, in order that he might be ensured a safe crossing of the Bay. But, in spite of the fact that we can easily find references to Edo and Meiji period land fill and canal building schemes for the coasts of the Bay, there had never been a plan for the construction of a cross bay bridge until the Neo-Tokyo Plan was made public.**

*It should be noted that although the bill originated in the LDP it was submitted to the Diet as a government bill (seifu teian). The literature on the Diet suggests that most bills emerge from the bureaucracy, and that there is a clear distinction between those and Dietman's bills (giin rippo). In fact, however, the distinction is fuzzy at best, the choice of form being largely dependent upon political expediency.

**Although there had been early, limited borrowing from China and Korea, until the Meiji Restoration, and indeed until the first Japanese students returned from Europe and America with new technologies in 1885-1890, the only foreign technologies borrowed on any large scale were Dutch. Quite naturally, then in the area of transport, great reliance
Although the Cross Bay Bridge Project was part of that 1959 plan, its structure and dimensions were not fully specified until the Twelfth Report of the Industrial Planning Conference two years later, in July, 1961. The Cross Bay Bridge, labeled the "Bridge of Dreams" by its propagandists, was to be a combination bridge and tunnel containing two levels and six lanes of rail and highway facilities connecting Kawasaki City on the Keihin Coast with Kisasazu on the Keiyō Coast. The Bridge was to be fifteen kilometers in length, requiring the creation of large man-made islands at both nodes as termini. Large landfill islands were also envisioned as housing the tunnel section of the project. When the bridge was first proposed it was, as now, among the most ambitious and largest scale bridge construction projects in the world, one that would require eleven years and 520 billion yen to build.*

The original design of the bridge differs significantly from the present one. The 1961 design, in reaction to the destructive Autumn 1959 Typhoon which entered the mouth of Ise Bay claiming 5,000 lives, called for a ten kilometer embankment in the middle of the structure. This embankment was to provide protection for the people and structures in the dense northern portion of the Bay Area. In this plan, there were to be two wide shipping lanes on either side of the embankment permitting the free movement of cargo in and out of the Bay. This plan was tested by the Transport Ministry, and in a simulation, the results of which were never made public, it was discovered that the embankment would suc-

was placed upon canal construction. Numerous Tokyo Bay Area development schemes in Edo and Meiji combined massive landfill with canal construction projects.

*Its projected cost in 1980 has ballooned to over one trillion yen.
cessfully protect the upper bay area only at the expense of the destruction of Yokohama and other Keihin cities south of the structure. It was found that the waves which rebounded off the embankment would crash against this coastline, multiplying the Typhoon's destructive force. When the Transport Ministry published its Tokyo Bay Plan in 1961, this bridge was therefore conspicuously omitted (see page 261.) On the basis of this and other simulation results, bridge proponents quietly switched to the option of a suspension bridge/tunnel:

FIGURE 6-5
THE TOKYO CROSS BAY BRIDGE

Kawasaki --- Kawasaki

It is this latter formula which is still being promoted today.

In 1962 the Construction Ministry began its official study of the Project, integrating it into the existing plans for the Bay Area as the key section of the "Tokyo Bay Loop Road Network." This network was comprised of three major sections: a) a Bay Coast Road of 160 kilometers in circumference circling the Bay, b) the Cross Bay Bridge connecting the two main industrial coasts in the middle, and c) the Bay Mouth Bridge, a two thousand meter wide and six kilometer long roadway connecting Chiba and Kanagawa at the opening of the Bay. It is important to note that the Construction Ministry plans conformed in almost every respect to Matsunaga's Industrial Planning Council Plan. More accurately, the Construction Ministry plans were drawn up in response to the Matsunaga
initiative. After an initial five years of surveys and study, the Cross Bay Bridge Project became an official Construction Ministry project in 1966.

Active support for the Project has been from the beginning limited almost entirely to industrial, real estate, and Chiba prefectural interests. With the promulgation of the Neo-Tokyo and Chiba Combinato Plans, land developers, most notably the Japan Development Corporation, a subsidiary of Nippon Steel and the Mitsui Real Estate Corporation, began buying huge tracts in southern Chiba. The Chiba development projects, including Nippon Steel's modern steel mill in Kimitsu, proceeded in anticipation of the realization of the Bridge Plan. It has thus always been obvious why industry (Nippon Steel in particular) would so strongly advocate the Project. A direct link between these two coasts would dramatically reduce transport costs, would open the market of Western Japan to the goods of the Chiba Coast and further expand the market of Northern Japan to Keihin industry. In short, the Bridge, in accommodating over 100 thousand vehicles a day, would effectively "de-tassle-ize" Boso. The peninsula would no longer be cut off from the rest of the nation. These proponents claim that the roadway would "fulfill an age-old dream," encouraging the dispersal of urban functions among several areas, developing new markets, and ameliorating the congestion in the center of Tokyo. They argue that the Bridge would save 800 million yen, 680 million kilometers, 17 million hours and 4,500 yen per vehicle per trip each year. They are also compelled to argue the benefits of opening recreation facilities in Chiba for Kanagawa and Tokyo residents which, without the Bridge, are inaccessible.

The benefit to Chiba prefecture is consequently very easy to under-
stand. With the creation of a direct link to the Keihin Coast, and with the development of secondary road and rail lines, the development of Chiba prefecture and its tax base would rapidly expand. The Plan was adopted without delay in the prefectural government's planning documents.* In addition, the realization of these plans would represent a significant political victory for Chiba's conservative governor. We have already noted how Chiba prefecture is composed of a densely settled, industrial north and a sparsely settled rural south. Chiba has never had a leftist governor, and part of the reason has been the strength of conservative support in the South. The actualization of the Bridge and these related projects would benefit, through increased tax revenues, the provision of services throughout the prefecture, and would further strengthen the conservative prefectural administration.

From the beginning, the benefits of the Bridge Project seemed less obvious to the rest of the region. In the case of Tokyo, for example, some 80 percent of the cargo handled at the Tokyo port facilities are destined for points in Tokyo Prefecture itself. The Cross Bay Bridge would have little economic impact upon the Port of Tokyo. It is quite possible that the Bridge would relieve traffic congestion in the Capital District, but Tokyo planners have sensed no great urgency in this regard. From the inception of the Plan Tokyo seemed to have no vested interest in its completion. Neither did it have vested interests in opposition to the Program, and thus no dissent was issued from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government as long as the conservative consensus prevailed. Saitama was even more removed from the Bridge issue, and therefore little opposi-

*This should come as no surprise since, as noted earlier, the man who drew up the original Neo-Tokyo Plan for Matsunaga soon thereafter became the governor of Chiba.
tion or support came from Saitama officials.

The two important Keihin port cities also assumed a low posture during this period with regard to their position on the Bridge. In neither the Yokohama nor the Kawasaki case was there active opposition to the Bridge, but neither was there active support. Although both cities would be more directly affected by the construction of the Bridge than would Tokyo or Saitama, their interests were quite different. In the case of Yokohama, the importance of the Bridge rested in its relationship to the much desired Bay Coast Road, the highway which would divert traffic from the main downtown artery in Yokohama and which would greatly relieve much of the congestion there. The Port of Yokohama, unlike Tokyo Harbor, had traditionally been a major national entry port, an important international commercial center. Little of the foreign merchandise entering Yokohama Harbor was destined for the Yokohama market, and Yokohama had long been in need of a modern bypass road which would allow truckers to completely avoid entering the downtown area. Thus there was a natural predisposition for support of the Bridge project in Yokohama, if at first, only indirectly for its linkage to the Bay Coast Road. Yet, neither could Yokohama officials throw their unqualified support behind the Project. There was serious question as to whether the Bridge wouldn't contribute as much to increasing traffic congestion as the Bay Coast Road would contribute to relieving it. Yokohama was cautious in its support during this period.

The situation in Kawasaki was yet again different. Although here too, as in Yokohama and Tokyo as well, there was an LDP-backed chief executive with strong business support, it was more difficult in Kawasaki than anywhere else for the Bridge proponents to generate official
support. Kawasaki was to be the Keihin terminus for the Bridge, and as such it was bound to be more directly affected than any other locality by Bridge traffic. Whereas the promise of a bypass in Yokohama made the Project at least palatable to some, Kawasaki geography made the introduction of a new bypass a liability rather than an attraction. We have already noted how the City of Kawasaki is a sliver of land cutting deep into the Tama Region from the Tokyo Bay Coast. Kawasaki's major priorities have involved the construction of a lateral road network which might service its inland areas. It had been long recognized by the early 1960's that a major transport problem in Kawasaki was the existence of too many thoroughfares through the city, connecting Tokyo to Yokohama, and not enough within it. Consequently, at the same time that Chiba was aggressively adopting the prescriptions of the Neo-Tokyo Plan in 1961, the Bridge was not once mentioned in the first Kawasaki City Plan, issued that same year.\(^{14}\)

This purposeful disregard of the Bridge Project was repeated in the 1963 Kawasaki City Master Plan,\(^ {15}\) and again in the 1966 Kawasaki Port Five Year Plan.\(^ {16}\) The Cross Bay Bridge was not even mentioned in official Kawasaki City plans of 1968. This latter plan was filled instead with other projects, such as the Nippon Kōkan Steel Corporation's massive Ogishima Steel Mill, on reclaimed land in the Bay, and the promotion of a traverse rail network for the city. In spite of the fact that by 1968 the Bridge was near the height of its promotion, no note was taken of it in the city planning documents. A secondary source describing the new Plan noted only that: "Kawasaki will take into consideration the opening of the Cross Bay Bridge."\(^ {17}\)

One must search in vain for any mention of the Cross Bay Bridge in
Kawasaki City's plans during the 1960's. Although the Bay Coast Road Project is often mentioned, and although many of the other Neo-Tokyo Plan projects, such as a new international airport also receive attention from time to time, the Bridge in no way plays the important role in Kawasaki that it plays in Chiba. Indeed, even the guarded ambivalence that characterized the Yokohama attitude is missing in Kawasaki during the 1960's. Fearing a generally negative effect upon an already congested and dense downtown area, Kawasaki remained wholly uncommitted to the Project. In spite of the congruence between its LDP-backed administration and that of both Chiba and the central government, Kawasaki opted to give no active support to the project. Yet, no public battle ever developed either. No resolutions against the plan were issued by the City Assembly and no positive action was taken to oppose the measure. Nevertheless, the LDP was unable to ameliorate the substantial dissent among its Kawasaki-based politicians, a dissent which continues to the present time.

In sum then, in the absence of active opposition, the Bridge Project progressed steadily through this period on the basis of some very active support (industry, the Construction Ministry, and Chiba), some rather cautious support (Yokohama), some indifference (Tokyo, Saitama), and some mere acquiescence (Kawasaki).

C) The Horizontal Strategy

Just as it was no accident that the LDP created its Tokyo Bay Development Committee at the same time that Matsunaga was assembling his Neo-Tokyo Plan team, it was no mere coincidence that the Construction Ministry began its surveys for the Cross Bay Bridge, the Bay Coast Road, and for the Bay Mouth Bridge immediately after the Neo-Tokyo Plan was
issued. This was the national level half of Matsunaga's strategy. The other half was just as important, perhaps even more so, given that no regional policy can succeed in a hostile region. Matsunaga turned at the same time toward the localities in an effort to create local demand, in an effort to articulate local interests for the localities. He turned toward a "horizontal strategy," bringing together the Bay Area localities into a common organization, an organization designed to coordinate local interests, and more importantly, to support the ministries which would articulate those interests at budget time. Matsunaga, acting for and in concert with leading industrial interests and with the help of the LDP, engineered a facade of Bay Area solidarity behind which divergent regional interests could be shielded from view. A coalition of Bay Area localities was created to "cheerlead" the Bridge Project and other Neo-Tokyo Plan ideas by backing the Construction Ministry's efforts to fund the programs. The tone was low key and patient. The tools were three: public relations, petitions, and political contributions. This sort of centrally directed coalition building was the most characteristic use of the horizontal strategy during this long period of conservative dominance.* The organization which was created was called the Tokyo Bay General Development Council (Tōkyōwan Sōgō Kaihatsu Kyōgikai, hereafter the Council). It was officially founded in December 1962 after a characteristically important series of preparatory meetings and agreements among

*There is virtually nothing written in either Japanese or English on the widespread use of the cheerleader group (Gendan) in Japanese politics. What does exist is typically vituperative if from the left (Ohara, 1975) or blandly propagandist if from the right. Takayose (1975) offers a relatively more balanced view.
the most important industrial, political, and local leaders.* In June 1962, Ito Mitsuo, an official of the Yokohama Economic Association and the Kanagawa Chamber of Commerce, was asked by Matsunaga to begin this process of bringing together the Bay Area localities and industrial interests into a common organization.21 His first move was to contact the LDP Tokyo Bay Development Committee for assistance. The Committee's top official, a professional party worker with strong connections in both Chiba and Kanagawa, visited Ito in late June in Yokohama. It was decided at that meeting that the LDP would help Ito and Matsunaga enlist the support of the Bay Area localities; the task of organizing the region's industrial interests for their financial support was left to Matsunaga.22

Personal connections with then Kanagawa governor Uchiyama and the assurance that there would be no problems on the Chiba side lead this LDP official to seek Keihin support first. It was Uchiyama who subsequently approached then Tokyo governor Azuma with the plan and who suggested that the chairmanship of the new organization be rotated among the Bay Area's governors instead of being assigned to Matsunaga or another industry spokesman. It was further agreed, however, that the secretariat for the new body be established at Matsunaga's Electric Power Central Research Institute headquarters in downtown Tokyo.**

*The term in Japanese is nemawashi, literally "binding the roots." Few public actions of any significance are undertaken without this careful (and secret) consultative laying of the groundwork. The public conferences and debates which seem so formalistic to the Western observer are actually the result of careful, exhaustive consensus building.

**Interestingly, although the Council was dissolved in 1973, a phone call in 1979 to its old phone number reaches the Central Research Institute. In spite of the apparent leadership of the prefectural governors, the organization was very much a part of Matsunaga's personal empire.
Tokyo needed assurance that this Council was worth creating. This assurance was to come in the form of LDP intervention with the Finance Ministry in favor of a long pending Tokyo request for permission for a 3.6 trillion yen bond issue for improvement of its port facilities. Although the final amount approved was somewhat less than Tokyo had been aiming for, the Tokyo Metropolitan government soon became convinced of the power of the Tokyo Bay Development Committee and of the efficacy of membership in the proposed Council.

With the commitment of Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures secured, and with Chiba anxious for the Council to get under way, the nemawashi moved to a rather more formal plane. On September 12, 1962, a "roundtable research conference" at the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama was hosted by the Kanagawa Economic Research Council.* The governors of Tokyo, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefectures, the mayors of dozens of the area's cities, officials of the relevant central ministries, 200 industry leaders, and the press were all in attendance. It was agreed that a Bay Area council aimed at coordinated regional development planning was essential. On October 18 a more intimate meeting was held at the headquarters of the Industrial Planning Conference. Attending for Tokyo was then vice-governor Suzuki Shunichi,** The final details concerning the organization and management of the new Council were ironed out, Yokohama and Kawasaki were persuaded to join, and the stage was set for a December inauguration of the body, an inauguration which by no accident was to coincide with the peak of

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*This was one of Matsunaga's local organs. The idea to use Keihin people to organize the Council in its early stages was purposefully directed at minimizing the Kawasaki-based opposition to the Bridge Project.

**Suzuki was elected governor of Tokyo seventeen years later (1979) and almost immediately moved to resurrect the Bridge Plan.
the budget season for the Ministry of Finance.

The Tokyo Bay General Development Council was innaugurated amidst great hoopla on Christmas day. Honorary advisors included former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, an old friend of Matsunaga's. The chairmanship was to be rotated annually among the governors of the three member prefectures.* There were three vice-chairmanships, occupied by the remaining two governors and the mayor of Yokohama.** There were an additional 150 directorships, similarly honorary positions, which were distributed among the remaining twenty-eight local chief executives, the twenty-six chairmen of private organizations and the 203 presidents of private industrial and business firms which comprised the membership of the Council.*** At its inception the Council was divided into three committees: a) Water Resource, b) Port and Bay Development, and c) Road Construction. In addition to regular quarterly meetings of these committees which were made up of the local and central bureaucrats (at the division chief level) in each of the three functional areas, a general meeting was scheduled for the mid-autumn each year for the purpose of selecting Council themes, to determine budget allotments, and to make final preparations for the Council's lavish General Meeting held at budget time each year in December.

The themes never varied throughout this period. No project was given

*Saitama did not join the Council until 1971.

**Kawasaki became entitled to a vice-chairmanship in 1972 when it became a designated city.

***Among the private organizations involved were the most powerful of the economic federations and business promotion groups. The private firms included the biggest banks, shipbuilders, steel makers, real estate developers, petroleum companies, and trading firms.
greater priority than the Cross Bay Bridge, and therefore the Port and Bay Committee was by far the most active in the Council. The Council's "action program" perennially contained the same five projects: It always first called for a) the construction of the Cross Bay Bridge, and then in varying order it sought b) the construction of the Bay Coast Road, c) the creation of a joint Bay planning organ, d) comprehensive water resource policy for the Bay region, and e) the construction of a new international airport. All of these construction projects as well as the water resource issue of course first appeared in Matsunaga's Neo-Tokyo Plan.

The first two planks were considered the most important, and have already been discussed in some detail. Among the other three, the water resource issue was the most carefully studied. The nature of the water supply problem to Tokyo Bay localities is two-pronged, residential and industrial, and the relative importance of each of these varies with the locality. For example, while Tokyo demands about three times the volume of residential water that Chiba does, Chiba requires three times Tokyo's demands for industrial water. Taken as a whole, the demand for residential water is twice that of industrial water in the Tokyo Bay region. Whatever the differences in patterns of use, the Bay Area demand for water is enormous, and has consistently been a pressing regional policy issue. As early as the mid-1960's, when there were serious water shortages in the region, it was recognized that within a decade the Chiba, Tokyo and Kanagawa demand for water would exceed the capacity of the rivers which flow within their own administrative boundaries. Thus they early on joined in backing Matsunaga's ambitious dam construction projects. While the Council never mentioned the controversial Numata Dam
Project by name in their published reports and petitions, Council members made that a specific target of their demands in their personal consultations with central officials. It was this water resource issue which, more than any of the other Council planks, most engaged the research capabilities of the various localities' planners. The Water Resource Committee was the only committee in the history of the Council to issue its own research report. At the same time, however, this committee's recommendations never varied from the aims of both the hydroelectric power industry (Matsunaga) and the Construction Ministry which was battling for approval of its dam construction plans.

The airport plank proved to be a mild embarrassment to all concerned. Just as the Council had studiously avoided targeting the Numata Dam Project by name, it also avoided the promotion of a particular site for the new airport (although there was tacit agreement that a landfill site would be preferred). The Council worked closely with the Japan Landfill Association (JLA), a group which, for obvious reasons, was also anxious to see a mid-Bay site chosen. In June 1963 the JLA issued a draft plan for the creation of a twenty-three thousand square kilometer airport facility. The plan provided four separate sites for the new jetport, all off the Chiba coast. The Chairman of the JLA sat also on the Council's board of directors, as did numerous other notables from the financial world who were registered as JLA members. It seems more than a little ironic in light of the Sato government's sudden decision in 1968 to opt for the controversial Narita site that the JLA, in justifying the four alternative sites for the airport, claimed that a mid-Bay site "would be in the heart of Tokyo because the conversion of farmland is impossible." The Council was prepared to move toward the cre-
ation of a new organization to coordinate private and public interests in support of a new international airport, in short, to create a model of itself for the airport issue. Nevertheless, once the decision was taken by the central government (to the complete surprise of the Chiba governor among others) to locate the airport in Northern Chiba, the Council threw its support behind the plan. With the airport issue suddenly deflated, the Council changed tacks and began to move toward promotion of rail and road links between the airport and the central Bay Area. The Council turned its airport related energies toward demands for airport support facilities. They were shocked and a bit embarrassed, but hardly fazed.

Of the five planks, the one calling for the creation of a joint Bay Area planning body was by far the least avidly promoted. While the idea of a single regional authority responsible for the management of the Bay appeared with regularity in the Council's lists of programs, there is little evidence that concrete plans were ever devised for implementing such a proposal. The only evidence suggesting that careful thought was given to creating a legal body to manage the affairs of Tokyo Bay is buried in a September 1970 report of the Council's General Planning Subcommittee of the Port and Bay Development Committee. But here the suggestions for the creation of a legal Council of Local Public Bodies (see Chapter Three for details on this formula for joint local public policy) were blacked out, apparently vetoed at the committee level. There was never an official call for the creation of a New York-type Port Authority. The Council sought only to promote the smooth, coordinated management of Bay transport via "horizontal communication among each of the port and harbor bureaus." To the extent that details were ever formulated, the
Council called for the introduction of a jointly managed information system and for a new comprehensive Tokyo Bay development plan. For all the talk about joint policy management and cooperation in the Bay Area however, port and harbor management remained a jealously guarded local function which would not easily be surrendered.

It was noted above that the Council employed three techniques in pursuit of these five goals: public relations, petitioning, and political contributions. The bulk of the Council's annual 20-30 million yen budget* was spent on its public face. A sympathetic press was judged to be an important source of support, and toward that end the Council hosted an annual luncheon for the Bay Area's press corps at which they asked for their assistance in the development of the Bay, and at which they introduced them to governors and other influential Bay Area politicians. In 1968 the Council spent 6.5 million yen for a promotional movie. In order to make the movie the Council worked very closely with its main ministerial patron, the Construction Ministry, and the film was printed and distributed by the Finance Ministry. But by far the most lavish of its public relations efforts was the yearly "Central Grand Conference" (Chūō Taikai) at which the remaining two tools were brandished, one publicly, the other privately.

Publicly, these conferences, held at fancy Tokyo hotels, were lavish affairs attended by a who's who list of notables, including former prime ministers, Diet members, Cabinet Ministers, industrialists and governors. Invariably it was Matsunaga who delivered the formal welcoming address. It was at these parties, held each year to coincide with the

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*Approximately half came from the allotted shares of the local governments and about half came from dues paid by corporate members.
Finance Ministry's budget hearings, that the Council made public its list of demands and distributed copies of its petitions to the relevant agencies, ministries and politicians. The politicians who regularly attended these affairs were not only from the LDP. Many opposition politicians made it a point to attend, notably Socialists, Democratic Socialists and Komeito Diet members from Chiba. As soon as the conference was over, representatives of the Council personally visited the central ministries in groups to present these petitions, in a political ritual that is duplicated by every pressure group of means in Japan at that time of the year. If supplication was not the goal of the Tokyo Bay General Development Council it was certainly one of its most often employed tools during this period of the conservatives' paradise. In the first six years of its existence the Council issued more than one hundred petitions in support of one or more of the policy planks outlined above. It was a horizontal organization of localities only in its outward form. It was in reality a pressure group and cheerleader for Construction Ministry programs.

This cheerleading and pressure, as noted above, also had its less public face. Given the nature of LDP rule and given the degree to which these regional policies required the approval of the central government, it was clearly essential that the Council be on good terms with the LDP. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the nature of local public finance makes it impossible for localities to maintain roads, buildings, and other facilities and services entirely on their own. Close ties to the central agencies are especially important in the case of regional policies for which local allocation tax revenues have no single target. Thus, these sorts of "horizontal" organizations become almost obligatory
for the "courting" of party and government officials. Although the Council's relationship to the LDP was a complex and ambiguous one, the nature of the partisan homogeniety of this period, the fact that all of the Bay Area's governors were LDP supported, made good relations easier to achieve and less suspect than they were to later become. At the highest level there was full entry for the Council in the person of Matsunaga, given his position in the leading economic circles and given his past associations with Yoshida and Hatoyama. But, as we've already seen, the party is largely rural based, and any special actions on behalf of Tokyo Bay would be taken only with the compliance of the party as a whole. The Council strategy, however, was an indirect one; it entailed using the LDP's Tokyo Bay Development Committee as its representative within the party. To ensure that the Committee would fight for the desired programs, the Council made sure that the Committee members were impressed with the benefits of supporting these developmental projects. Committee members, virtually all of whom were Bay Area District representatives, were treated to site inspections and tours of the Bay. Council records show that just under one-third of all scheduled Council functions involved meetings with party officials. This figure does not include the numerous conferences, seminars, presentations and consultations with the various representatives of the central ministries with responsibility for an area of interest to the Council. The committee repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to these Council goals by fighting the good fight within PARC and by troubleshooting on behalf of local interests (as it had in the case of Tokyo's bond request earlier.)

The LDP's Tokyo Bay Development Committee was a conduit of funds and favors between the Council and the rest of the party. Council Secretariat
Chief Itō Mitsuo was given the responsibility by Matsunaga to make sure that the LDP's needs were taken care of.* As the Council was a private organization, there was nothing illegal about contributions made to the LDP. In the Council's budgets, however, these funds were buried under the heading of "promotional expenses," and thus no clear accounting can be offered. The total budget for those promotional expenses was 5 million yen in 1967, fully one quarter of the Council's total budget. But this was by no means the only source of Council contributions to the LDP. An important part of Itō's job involved his raising separate industry funds for the Council which were to be earmarked for political contributions. According to one high ranking Tokyo official who had been an original member of Matsunaga's Neo-Tokyo Plan team,

Itō Mitsuo was very effective in collecting money from industry for the Council. If it were anyone else they wouldn't have been able to get half the amount he got. He collected about 30 million yen a year. The idea was to spend whatever they had, and it was spent lavishly on things like luncheon conferences with party officials, providing limousines to Dietmen, signing their chits, etc. 31

And he went on to put all this in the perspective of the regional policy process and the necessity for this sort of lobbying:

In the Diet when politicians are considering legislation, if they are unable to demonstrate support for their proposals, funds will not be budgeted. The idea of the Tokyo Bay General Development Council was to create a backup for these friendly Dietmen in their efforts to get the bridge built. The Council would mobilize local strength for the effort. All of the Council's money and the additional money which could be secured from industry went to promote this solidarity. The Council was a very Japanese-style support mechanism involving the gathering of horizontal support and the directing of that support upwards. 32

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*Information concerning the financial support by the Council for the LDP is based upon interviews with Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama, and Kanagawa officials. It was suggested as a "strong likelihood" in an interview with former Tokyo governor Minobe (September 20, 1979), and it was confirmed by the LDP official who received the Council's favors. It was denied by Mr. Itō and by Chiba officials.
Not everyone was as eager to praise Itō and his methods,* but whatever the evaluation, the horizontal strategy worked. The Council had a very strong ally within the ruling party, an ally that battled to the limits of its influence within the party for the Council's programs. The Cross Bay Bridge Project was progressing smoothly, with the Construction Ministry funding feasibility studies and surveys of the sites. The Bay Coast Road Plan was likewise being warmly received; actual construction began in 1966. Matsunaga had created and utilized this horizontal strategy to its fullest potential during this period. There was every indication that as long as economic growth continued all would be possible for Tokyo Bay. The growth did continue, but the horizontal strategy crumbled and the Bridge came to be blocked. The times had changed.

IV. THE PROGRESSIVE ASCENDANCY

A) Background - Growth and Its Externalities

The nation which had dived headlong into reconstruction and economic growth in the 1950's and 1960's was, by the latter part of that decade reeling from its after effects. The growth had succeeded beyond success; in its wake it had engendered rapid urbanization, a depopulation of the countryside, environmental deterioration, and a social and political backlash, all of which served to undermine the conservative consensus on growth. The highly politicized citizens' movements which sprouted in city and countryside, were a direct popular response to the industrial

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*This may have been in part because he had put his own son on the Council payroll and because he was suspected by some of mishandling funds,
pollution which had accompanied industrial development.

A new militancy was developing in Japan, and it was not restricted to the proliferation of social movements. Leftist politicians rode this wave of discontent with centrally sanctioned growth policies, on the basis of promises to divert some of the benefits of this growth toward programs of welfare and environmental protection. Political opposition in Japan had, for the first time, a highly visible base, a base at the local level. These progressive localities moved to challenge the center on any number of issues, ranging from lawsuits concerning demands for additional funding to protests against the American military presence in their localities. The left came to power by convincing enough of the electorate that the conservative central government and their allies in the localities were responsible for the pollution, the lack of social programs, and the support of business interests at the expense of residents. They stayed in power for second and third terms on the basis of their ability to convince that electorate that they could successfully confront those issues in their public policy. Within a short ten year period the political groundwork had dramatically changed.

Nowhere was this change more dramatic, and nowhere was this change more significant for national politics than in the highly visible politics of the Tokyo Bay Area. When the Council was formed there were LDP related chief executives in every one of the region's six major localities, Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, Saitama, Yokohama, and Kawasaki. By the time the leftist ascendancy had reached its peak in the Bay Area (and nationwide) in 1975, only Chiba retained a conservative administration. The Council had already been dead for three years:
| TOKYO        | Azuma Ryūtarō                      | (C) April 1959 – April 1967 |
|             | Minobe Ryōkichi                    | (P) April 1967 – April 1979  |
|             | Suzuki Shunichi                    | (C) April 1979 –             |
| CHIBA       | Shibata Hitoshi*                   | (C) December 1950 – October 1962 |
|             | Kanō Kyūro**                      | (C) October 1962 – April 1963 |
|             | Tomono Taketo                     | (C) April 1963 – April 1975  |
|             | Kawakami Kiichi                   | (C) April 1975 –             |
| KANAGAWA   | Uchiyama Iwatarō                   | (C) April 1947 – April 1967  |
|             | Tsuda Bungō                        | (C) April 1967 – April 1975  |
|             | Nagasu Kazuji                      | (P) April 1975 –             |
| SAITAMA     | Kurihara Hiroshi                  | (C) July 1956 – July 1972    |
|             | Hata Yawara                        | (P) July 1972 –              |
| KAWASAKI    | Kanasashi Fujitarō                 | (C) April 1947 – April 1971  |
|             | Itō Saburō                         | (P) April 1971 –             |
| YOKOHAMA    | Nakarai Kiyoshi                    | (C) April 1959 – April 1963  |
|             | Asukata Ichio                      | (P) April 1963 – April 1978  |
|             | Saigo Michikazu                   | (C) April 1978 –             |

*Ran for Diet before end of term.

**Died in office.

Asukata's in 1963 and Minobe's four years later were the two most significant leftist electoral victories during this period.36 While there had long been a progressive governor in Kyoto, and while other important victories were achieved in Osaka and elsewhere, it was the leadership, both symbolic and real, of these two chief executives which set the pace and direction of progressive local opposition. Even had they not each been men of vigorous and aggressive bent, the national prominence of the Tokyo Bay Region would have forced this leadership upon them. The ten year assault of progressive local opposition upon the national consciousness could not have been sustained without the kind of disproportionate media coverage afforded to the Bay Area.
If Tokyo Bay was, as described earlier, the mistress to Japan's postwar economic miracle, it was a battered mistress by the late 1960's. It had grown ugly with abuse. Tokyo Bay became the field upon which environmental battles were first waged and won by progressive localities. Yokohama's Asukata and Kawasaki's Itō pioneered new policies in pollution control by forcing the compliance of industry within their administrative jurisdictions. It was the two of them working together in the case of negotiations with Nippon Kōkan, which resulted in the creation of the most pollution free and modern steel mill in the world, the Ogishima Works, straddling the border between the two cities off the coast on a massive landfill island. Landfill itself, the highly touted key to economic reconstruction at the time of the Neo-Tokyo Plan, had become a dirty word, the Ogishima success notwithstanding. Although there was no sudden change in policy with Minobe's assumption of office, and although Yokohama planners continued to push the idea, landfillers became more cautious, and the emphasis came to be directed away from preventing pollution to reversing its effects altogether. This was embodied in Minobe's famous pledge to return "Blue Skies to Tokyo" in 1971. There was simply no place left on the Keihin side to put any more artificial islands. Even the Construction Ministry was becoming cautious, albeit reluctantly. In 1971 the Ministry killed the more ambitious revision of the Massive Futtsū landfill scheme, a plan central to Chiba's still growth oriented economic development plans. The times had changed.

They had indeed. A major research study conducted in 1971 by the Science Faculty of Chiba University boldly predicted that Tokyo Bay would be "dead" in twenty years. The report, even though it emanated
from the Chiba side, was uncompromising in its assessment that industrial growth and industrial pollution simply could not continue at existing levels. At the same time the Transport Ministry had been attempting to prepare long range comprehensive planning documents with the cooperation of the Bay Area localities. The Transport Ministry had been providing a forum for the various Bay port and harbor authorities to present and coordinate their long range plans. The result was a comprehensive central planning document for the Bay Area (Kōwan Kihon Kōsō). But by the early 1970's, while the Transport Ministry was seeking to maintain the existing pace of development, it had lost the support of the Bay localities. The planning ceased after the Keihin localities demanded a slowdown in construction and landfill. The Ministry's efforts to produce a new plan with a 1985 target died stillborn. The consensus which had characterized the period of the conservative's paradise was long gone.

Also gone was the leading symbol of that era. Matsunaga Yasuzaemon died in June 1971 at the age of 95. Three months later the senior director of his Industrial Planning Conference also passed away, as did its secretariat chief two years later. The Conference, having lived beyond its era, and having been the personal tool of a single man, was effectively dismembered with his death. The industrial elite was, of course, not about to disappear, but never again was it to speak as forcefully, as convincingly, and as successfully for Tokyo Bay development as it had under Matsunaga's direction. Development had come to mean far more than growth. The times had indeed changed.

B) The Bridge - Blocked

By the late 1960's and into the early 1970's the surveys for the Cross Bay Bridge Project had been completed by the Construction Ministry.
Technically, all was ready. The economy was still booming, and industry and the LDP's Tokyo Bay Development Committee went into high gear to secure the only remaining requisite for the construction of the Bridge, a political green light. But this was to prove an insurmountable obstacle, for not only had the high growth of the 1960's fathered a popular discontent with unrestrained development projects, but it had also amplified the centrifugal tendencies of an already divided ruling LDP. The rise of the left at the local level and the traditionally rural base of the LDP worked in tandem to create a strange political bedfellowship and to freeze the Bridge Plan.

The shift into high gear at the national level came on April 21, 1971, when the Construction Ministry made public the mid-term report of its Tokyo Cross Bay Bridge Research Committee which had been formed only three months earlier. The Committee called for the rapid implementation of the Bridge plans in the form of Diet legislation creating a special semi-public bridge corporation. This so-called "Tertiary Sector" formula had been debated and refined from the French model by central bureaucrats and industry officials for several years.* The concept, which would utilize private sector management and technological expertise in conjunction with joint public and private capital investment, was an important part of many central plans of this period.**

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*It is so named for its purported advantages in efficiency and manageability in comparison to either purely public or purely private enterprises. See Johnson, 1978 for the relationship of these tertiary sector corporations to other forms of public corporations and private enterprises.

**See the following plans, for example:

a) LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council "Toshi Seisaku Taikō" (Outline of Urban Policy)
This Construction Ministry move was coordinated with both industry and LDP offensives.* The Tokyo Bay Development Committee within PARC had been important as a source of support for the Bridge Project within the party since the early days of the Neo-Tokyo Plan. Each year it prepared its policy recommendations in cooperation with the region's localities and with industrial interests for presentation to the party's Executive Council. The Committee, as it represented the Tokyo Bay interests, was composed of virtually all of the Bay Area's Dietmen. It was essentially one of several dozen regional and functional pressure groups within the party vying to make its demands heard by higher levels of the party's policy making organs.** In December 1971 the LDP's Tokyo Bay Development

b) 1969 LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council "Shinzenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku" (New National Comprehensive Plan)

c) 1970 LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council "Shinkeizai Shakai Hatten Keikaku" (New Economic and Social Development Plan)

d) 1970 Construction Ministry "Kokudo Kensetsu no Genkyō (Current State of National Land Construction)

*In fact, the Minister of Construction in April 1971, when the plan for the tertiary sector corporation was first announced was Nemoto Ryutarō, the man who later became chairman of the LDP Tokyo Bay Development Committee.

**There are five basic intraparty steps by which a Committee-backed program becomes an implemented government policy. 1) Every summer the Committee meets with invited representatives of the related ministries and with invited officials from the relevant localities. (According to one LDP official, none of the progressive localities sent their representatives to these conferences during this period.) At this meeting the Committee puts together its "shopping list," its package of desired programs. It is here where the close relations between those in the party who are most interested in a particular policy and those bureaucrats most involved in implementing it are most in evidence. 2) This "shopping list" (as well as those from all of the other PARC committees) are then subjected to a party-wide political competition at the PARC Deliberative Council (Seicho Keni Shingikai) sessions where initial party priorities are determined. 3) These priorities, with rankings attached, are then sent along to the LDP Executive Council (Sōmukai) for a final round of competition. The several most desirable are wrung out from literally thousands of programs. 4) After receiving the final approval of the three top party officials (sanyaku), the Chairman of the Executive Council, the Prime Minister, and the Secretary General, these proposals
Committee with Nakamura Umekichi as its chairman, announced its support of the tertiary sector plan. Under the terms of the LDP plan for the corporation, the return on the entire investment (two-thirds private and one-third public) would be amortized in full within twenty-six years after the project's completion, at which time it would become a public highway. Within a month, in January 1972, the LDP's powerful Executive Council approved this course of action. The party selected the Cross Bay Bridge as one of its top three construction priorities for 1972. By the end of 1972, however, there was to be a new Prime Minister and new priorities.

Industry, for its part, responded to the Construction Ministry proposal by creating what was called the Cross Bay Bridge Project Committee (Tōkyōwan Ōdan Ōro Kenyūkai) in July 1972. More than fifty corporations, led by Nippon Steel, participate as dues paying members of this body. It was designed to be the prototype for the new corporation, and its fourteen professional staffers, all economists, lawyers, and engineers on loan from their parent companies, were busy making preparations to become the management nucleus of the new tertiary sector corporation.

are 5) doled out to the various ministries. The term used, moshiireru, literally means proposed or "offered," but the understanding that these are party priorities is quite clear to all. All of these programs have typically been already studied by the ministries before having been sent along through the party organs, and thus little time is lost after the party signals the green light to the ministry. It is only after this and after the results of the separate budgetary process are completed that a largely irrelevant sixth step is taken, the formal ratification of the programs by the cabinet. The various PARC committees act as support agents in both the intraparty as well as the budgetary deliberations.
as soon as Diet approval was received.* It was this Committee which took over most of the private sector lobbying efforts for the project, and which, with the assistance of members of the Cabinet's legal division, university professors, and Construction Ministry officials, drafted the legislation which would have created the tertiary sector corporation.

In spite of this mobilization by the LDP and by industry, the bill for the creation of the tertiary sector corporation never went before the cabinet for approval. The bill never left the Construction Ministry, its budget requests having been shelved with each annual effort. What appeared to be a consensus within the LDP was nothing of the sort. It was at best only a partial consensus that failed to reflect the true diversity of the party, a party of strong rural interests. It also appears that the consensus within the Construction Ministry was beginning to crack. The crumbling solidarity in both the LDP as well as in the Construction Ministry was encouraged by a shifting national consensus upon the value of continued investment in and development of the major urban centers, a shift which neatly coincided with the rise of Tanaka Kakuei as LDP strongman.

Tanaka became Prime Minister in July 1972, but he had already controlled the Construction Ministry for several years in the person of Minister Nishimura Eichi, a member of his faction. Tanaka had long been opposed to the Bridge Plan, although it had never been necessary for him

*Because this Committee was the parent organization for the proposed corporation, there was intense infighting among the corporations and ministries to select a president of the body. Interestingly, the man chosen, Tokunaga Kizatsugu, a director of Nippon Steel, was an ex-official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), not of the Construction Ministry which had a proprietary interest in the project. Note also the discussion of amakudari in Chapter Three.
to take a public position on it. He was from Niigata, a rural and largely underdeveloped prefecture to which he was able to bring a great deal of development capital. In 1972 Tanaka published his widely influential (and widely criticized) Plan for the Remodeling of the Japanese Archipelago, a book which condemned further development of the capital district, and which proposed instead to distribute industrial growth more evenly throughout the nation. He was speaking with a clearly rural voice. At the conferences which were held by the government to debate the remodeling plan after Tanaka became Prime Minister, Chairman Tokunaga of the Cross Bay Bridge Project Committee and Nemoto Ryūtarō, former Construction Minister and chairman of the LDP Tokyo Bay Development Committee, testified that the Bridge would in fact serve Tanaka's aims. They argued that the development of the southern Chiba peninsula was entirely consistent with the deconcentration of industry proposed by the Prime Minister.

Tanaka wasn't interested. Within a month after becoming Prime Minister, correctly sensing that the Bridge Project was on the verge of receiving final approval, he instructed his Construction Minister, Kimura Takeo (also one of his faction members) to begin a "reexamination" of the project.* He stated that the plan "ran counter to (his) plan for remodeling the archipelago." While the Construction Ministry was "reexam-

*Prime Minister Tanaka used the Construction Ministry very skillfully before, during and after his tenure as Prime Minister. Not one of the five Ministers he appointed during those one and a half years was not a member of his own faction. Moreover, Prime Minister Sato's final Construction Minister and Prime Minister Miki's first one were also members of Tanaka's powerful faction. No Prime Minister had ever done that before and none has done it since. As a result, Tanaka had great success in blocking and/or redirecting projects in his desired direction during a time of enormous construction activity. For the English translation of his remodeling scheme see Tanaka, 1973.
ining" the plan, the momentum that the Project had accumulated in its fifteen years of existence dimished, but could not be destroyed all at once. Construction Minister Kimura, and his successor Kanemaru Shin could not entirely keep a lid on the project. Under great pressure from industry and parts of the LDP, the Construction Ministry approved the Cross Bay Bridge Corporation Plan (tertiary sector plan) as a piece of government sponsored legislation and submitted it to the party PARC policy organ. It was here where Kanemaru, under Tanaka's orders, moved decisively and finally to kill the project. In the first PARC meeting after Tanaka's Diet dissolution and reelection, in mid-January 1973, the Construction Ministry suddenly told the Party to hold off on the Bridge legislation. Kanemaru claimed that there were not sufficient surveys and that the Project needed more study, this in spite of the fact that the ministry had been doing detailed studies for more than a decade. Kanemaru claimed that until further research was done on the effect of the Bridge upon the movement of the Bay floor and upon shifts in rock formations along the coast, that the Project could not proceed. He claimed to be concerned with preparation for the kinds of questions which the opposition parties were sure to raise. The Construction Ministry claimed to be unprepared for an opposition party challenge in spite of the fact that none of the opposition parties had shown the slightest interest in the Project.43 Tanaka felt that he had received his mandate at the polls. He was wasting no time in reshaping central policy.

Local interests during this period had also undergone some change, although not nearly as much as might be inferred from the great shift in partisan affiliation among the Bay Area chief executives. It was still geographic, economic, and demographic considerations far more than ideology that shaped local positions on the Bridge Project. Kawasaki's
position remained unchanged, although their tacit opposition was probably easier to sustain after leftist Itō was elected in 1971. Chiba, of course, remained a strong advocate of the Project. But, in the same way that local LDP politicians in Kawasaki had resisted overtures by the LDP Tokyo Bay Development Committee's representatives for their support of the project, opposition party local politicians in Chiba were lining up behind the Plan. In December 1971, a resolution was passed in the Chiba Prefectural Assembly with suprapartisan sponsorship (LDP, JSP, Komeito) urging a start on Cross Bay Bridge construction by 1974. Another example of the broad support for the Project in Chiba is the "Kisarazu City Assemblymen's Association for the Promotion and Construction of the Cross Bay Bridge" which, founded in 1971, has the support of every party in the Kisarazu City Assembly except the JCP. This placing of local constituency interests above partisan loyalty in both Chiba and Kawasaki is underlined even more boldly by the role of Hamada Kōichi, LDP Diet representative from Chiba. He was very active throughout this period in support of the Bridge in spite of his membership in the Tanaka faction. Partisanship and ideology don't seem to have been particularly important factors except when, as we shall see below, it was particularly convenient.

Undoubtedly the best support for this observation comes from the case of Yokohama under Asukata. While there is no question that Asukata was a leading spokesman for progressive local government, there is no evidence to suggest that he ever allowed ideological considerations to undermine his pursuit of local interests, even if that brought him into alliance with the conservative central government or business interests. In one interesting case, that of the Ogishima Steel Mill, which was
mentioned earlier, Auskata found himself allied with a steel company against a hesitant Capital Region Development Commission which was first now becoming cautious about approving further growth in landfill on the Keihin Coast. This was of course a caution engendered by Auskata's and others' earlier efforts to popularize the pollution issue. The result was not a compromise of Auskata's principles, but rather a model, non-polluting steel mill.

The Yokohama position on the Bridge Project was similarly a model of leftist pragmatism and localism. The congestion of downtown Yokohama and the need for the bypass mentioned earlier had both naturally increased with the expansion of the Yokohama Port and commercial activities. On New Year's Day 1965 Auskata announced that his administration was going to be devoted to the implementation of "Six Major Projects."

Three of these projects: the building of a subway, a five hundred acre Kanagawa landfill project, and urban development, were municipal projects, and three: the construction of a new expressway, the creation of a twenty-five square kilometer new town, and the construction of a Bay Bridge which would bypass the busy downtown districts, were slated for action by public corporations. Auskata's Bay Bridge proposal (not to be confused with the Cross Bay Bridge to which it is related and which is the subject of this chapter) was not entirely new, for such a proposal had been made by others before he assumed office in 1963. It was, however, the first time that the Yokohama mayor had placed his administration firmly behind this project to divert through traffic away from the main downtown artery to one built offshore. At the time that the Bay Bridge was first proposed there was no intention to link it to the already existing Bay Coast Road Project described above. Instead, it was supposed to be a
two-level, 860 meter long, twelve lane bypass which would complete the form of an arc around Yokohama's downtown.* As construction of the far more extensive, 160 kilometer Bay Coast Road began in the latter part of the 1960's, Yokohama's planners recognized that there was the possibility of joining their Bay Bridge to the larger scheme. In 1968 Mayor Asukata and his chief urban designer, Tamura Akira decided upon the docking of the two plans and made an agreement to that effect with the Construction Ministry. They found themselves with vested interests which coincided far more with those of the industrial and financial world than with leftist rhetoric.45 Much to their credit they opted for support of a program clearly consistent with their local interests. Localism, far more than socialism, characterized this progressive (and highly pragmatic) leftist locality. Indeed, in an important sense, partisanship itself is very much like the policy positions of the localities; both are products of economic and demographic considerations. The overdeveloped Keihin area became progressive in response to its overdevelopment, while an underdeveloped Chiba, alone in a highly developed region, remains conservative, pressing ceaselessly for more industrial development. In the case of the Cross Bay Bridge, and in the politics of regional policy in Tokyo Bay more generally, it does not seem that partisanship explains much of anything that is important. No clearer statement of this can be offered than a closer look at the evolution of the horizontal strategy in the regional policy process during this period.

C) The Horizontal Strategy

It is at the local level where we should best be able to see evi-

*It is by no means an unimpressive engineering project; it is to have the longest central span of any bridge of its kind in the world.
dence that these changing times were having an important impact upon the regional policy process. To a limited extent we do. From within the stridency of the progressive opposition we see indications that an attempt was being made to steer a course toward regional self-help away from regional dependence. There are signs that Minobe and Asukata were seeking to forge a new sort of "horizontal strategy," one in which localities would press their own demands rather than those fabricated for them. In particular there was a great deal of such coalition building on the environmental issue during this period. Since the early 1970's the Bay Area localities have been very active in the sharing of pollution data, in the coordination of anti-pollution policy, and in the construction of pollution observation centers. But these seem limited in both number and importance. If, on the one hand it is important to point out the ways in which the progressive ascendance brought with it a new concern and new strategies for joint local action, it seems equally important to explain that these strategies in no way displaced existing forms of horizontal coalition building for demand making. Of significance, however, is the way in which horizontal forums were occasionally transformed during this period from mere cheerleading groups to more discerning, critical forums in which local leaders were willing to voice objections to and refinements of central programs. Most important is the fact that this new use of these forums was suprapartisan and highly pragmatic, except when, as we shall see, it was convenient for the ideologues to be ideological. This sort of selective stridency is itself, of course, its own brand of political pragmatism. It may very well be a manifestation of the localism identified above. We will return here to the Tokyo Bay General Development Council for a good look at how these changes in the horizontal strategy were manifest in relations among the constituents of
the Tokyo Bay area regional policy process.

In spite of the election in 1963 of Socialist Asukata in Yokohama and in 1967 of Minobe in Tokyo, the Council continued to endorse the same five policy programs year after year. It continued to channel funds to the LDP, and it continued to be a tool for private interests. Indeed, until the early 1970's there was never any indication that the Council would ever be anything but that. As the Cross Bay Bridge project moved closer and closer to construction in the years before Tanaka became Prime Minister, there was no indication that either Minobe or Asukata, the two most prominent leftist local chief executives in both the region as well as the nation, had any qualms about their participation in the body. Asukata delivered his first speech to the Council at its annual convention in 1964. He called for the development of water resources and for the creation of a joint Bay Area port management facility, arguing that

"to realize this we must receive central funds...we must seek financial assistance from the center."

Asukata was very supportive of the goals of the Council, and closed by firmly stating that:

"In order to achieve these goals, the full power of all the concerned parties, industry, the local governments, and the central government must be mobilized."

His next major address to the Council was in July 1967, three months after Minobe had been elected governor of Tokyo. Again Asukata offered the Council a vote of confidence, arguing the need for a new international airport, and for "rational and orderly Bay development by means of

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*This and all annual convention proceedings were reprinted in a glossy magazine Kaihô (Proceedings of the Council), published each year between 1962 and 1972.

**Ibid.
horizontal communications and mutual adjustment."* Once again he stressed the need for the Council construction projects. Not a negative word was heard.

Minobe gave his first speech to the Council on that same occasion. He was hardly the firebrand that many had feared. His speech was laden with conservative jargon, calling for the rational, efficient use of the Bay and for "central aid" to the capital district. Standing before LDP Diet representatives and central Ministry officials he declared that the conception of a Tokyo-centered Bay was both obsolete and inefficient. He urged, instead, the dispersion of Bay Area facilities in a multi-centered pattern of regional development. He concluded his speech by reassuring those assembled that his administration would be "intimately cooperative."

The Council continued to function exactly as it had in the past. Although, as we have already seen, there was much latent opposition to the Bridge Project in both conservative Kawasaki and conservative Kanagawa, there was never at any point in the Council's deliberations any such opposition to the Plan. A smooth transfer to a Minobe chairmanship was made in 1969 when it once again came to be the Tokyo governor's turn.** There is no evidence that the Council under the first Minobe chairmanship (he was chairman again in 1972), was any different than it had been under his predecessors. The Council remained a cheerleader for


**It is possible that Minobe assumed the chairmanship without making any waves because the Council afforded him a highly visible platform. For the first time ever, in 1967 the chairmanship of the National Association of Governors was denied to the Tokyo governor, ostensibly because of Minobe's leftist support.
Matsunaga's policy programs, programs which were creeping toward implementation.

But the pollution issue was beginning to get the better of active Keihin support for the Council, progressive or otherwise. On the night of November 25, 1969, both Minobe and Asukata again delivered speeches before the Council. They made clear their full support for the body, but argued forcefully for a regional anti-pollution policy and for Council consideration of the pollution issue in the projects it advocated. Asukata also expressed his dissatisfaction with the Council's failure to strongly endorse a locally-empowered Tokyo Bay Port Authority. This was the first time that a discordant note was publicly struck within the Council. It was not the last time. In spite of the fact that Minobe was again chairman in 1972, neither he nor Asukata ever again attended a Council function. Instead, having reached a "tacit"47 agreement that the Council was too cozy with business and the LDP at a time when they could ill afford public recognition of their complicity they dispatched proxies to the Council conventions each year to read increasingly accusatory statements in their stead.

This eventual change in the Tokyo and the Yokohama attitudes toward the Council might suggest the salience of partisanship in redirecting the priorities of regional policy. But it probably should not be overstated. It is evidence of something more. It is evidence that a new sensibility toward unrestrained growth was becoming widespread. There is no question that this recognition was first transformed into policy by the progressives at the local level, but there is also no question that it was quickly embraced by affected conservatives as well. That was nowhere more clearly the case than within the Council, where it was actually a
conservative Kanagawa which led to a two year battle to include an environmental plank in the Council's program of policy demands. It was not merely a progressive Tokyo-Yokohama axis which was expressing its opposition to continued industrial growth, but it was a Keihin Coastal coalition of localities, some conservative (Kanagawa and Kawasaki were still governed by LDP-backed chief executives at that time) and some progressive, which was confronting both industry and Chiba, its pro-growth neighbor across the Bay. Local interests, not merely partisan ones, were defended.

The division was quite clear cut. The Keihin Coast localities were ready for a break in the past century of relentless growth. The Chiba side wanted what it deemed to be its fair share of that growth. In April 1971 the Council created a sectional conference of cities and prefectures (Tokenshi Bukai), comprised of the five major local governments, to debate the environmental issue.* The Keihin localities sought a freeze on further large scale Tokyo Bay landfill, and since they had no more plans for such a landfill project, the target of their concern was all too clear to the Chiba planners. Their aim was to check the proposed forty-five square kilometer industrial landfill project in Futtsū on the South Chiba Coast, the last project in Chiba's famous "Keiyo Bay Coast Industrial Belt Construction Plan." Chiba Prefecture had been receiving payments from the major industrial firms for the development of this site. Under the so-called "Chiba Formula" (see Table 6-5), industr-

*The fact that the nationwide local elections were also held in April 1971 was no accident. The formation of this sectional conference drew much favorable press for those involved.
try was given free reign to develop the entire area. These industrial concerns, all active members of the Council, were excluded from the debates in the sectional conference; this is the first evidence that the Council was used for something more than as a Matsunaga cheerleader. Led by Kanagawa, which no more wanted to see Chiba go ahead with this program than did the progressives in Tokyo and Yokohama, the debate was vigorous. The results, while a compromise for both sides, clearly represented the discovery of a new role for the localities within the Council, a discovery made by localities nationwide during this period.

Those results were announced in an October 1971 Council report entitled "The Direction in Which We Must Proceed for the Preservation and the Development of Tokyo Bay." As the title suggests, it was hardly a one-sided victory for the environmentalists. The Keihin side's efforts to restrain further landfill in order to allow the Bay to purify itself was eventually shelved for "further study." As regards the sticky landfill issue, the report cites only the need for rethinking landfill programs for their environmental impact.* In addition, a clause prohibiting further industrial starts on the Keiyō Coast was also struck from the final report. That report combined the two positions by proposing "the beautification of the bay environment and better comprehensive planning for industrial siting and transport policy." The Cross Bay Bridge

*The Keihin localities were not alone in their pressure upon Chiba to ease the throttle back a bit. The central ministries and even some interests within Chiba itself were by this time concerned about the effects of the Futtsu Program, and it was due to a combined effort that the Program was cut back until it was finally undertaken in 1978 at less than half its originally proposed scale. Moreover, given Yokohama's desire to build the Bay Coast Road, this Central Ministry opposition undoubtedly made it easier for Yokohama to press hard on the pollution issue.
Project remained very much intact in that report. There is no evidence that it was even an object of debate within the conference.

While the report itself posed no threat to the continued existence of the Council as a promotional device for industrial interests, it did give warning that localities were no longer going to automatically acquiesce to demands by industry to support their programs. It is not insignificant that this warning was issued at a time when localities were flexing their muscles more generally nationwide. It is also not insignificant that this warning was engineered as much by the efforts of Kanagawa as by those of Tokyo and Yokohama. This was not a purely partisan issue. But most significant of all was the flexibility displayed by the Council itself. In 1972 it listed the "promotion of a plan to counter pollution and to preserve the natural environment" as the first in its annual list of five policy planks. This was repeated again in 1973.* This conservative-dominated, industrial support group had been heavily influenced by and had coopted a jargon of environmentalism which was more suited to the times than was the jargon of growth which properly belonged to an earlier period. This Council cooptation of the popular causes of the day (causes first popularized by the left) was extended to the Narita airport issue, in which the Council urged the government to adopt noise pollution standards for "the welfare of the area's citizens." (Naturally, the Council also urged the early completion of all transport access to the new facility, an enormous program of road and rail construc-

*Although some in the press have attributed this to Minobe's chairmanship in that year, and although Minobe, upon his accession to that post announced a new initiative in the area of environmental policy, it is clear that his chairmanship was no more than fortuitous, coinciding with the willingness of the Council to move toward a change in its approach toward Bay Area development.
tion.) These changes are as excellent examples of the flexibility of the conservatives in government and industry as any that can be found. They were the result of a new assertiveness by localities during this period, an assertiveness which amounted to a new sort of horizontal strategy.

But these changes and this strategy were soon to be sold to political expediency. The calculus for this expediency belonged to the second most important individual in the postwar history of the development of Tokyo Bay regional policy, a man undoubtedly the most powerful figure in Tokyo politics during the 1960's and 1970's. It is both curious and instructive that this man, like Matsunaga, was neither well-known nor an elected official. Komori Takeshi, like Matsunaga, did not have to answer to the electorate. Again, like Matsunaga, Komori had easy access to Prime Ministers and governors, to bankers and to cabinet ministers. The difference was political. While Matsunaga was godfather to the postwar conservative power structure, Komori was godfather to the ascendent progressives. Matsunaga and Komori were each men of their own, different times, the former leading through aggressive proposition, the latter through equally aggressive opposition.

Komori was a Marxist of uncharacteristic power, and thus it is peculiar that he is so little known and written about. He is in every respect an unusual man. Born in Mashiko in 1912, his career remains very much shrouded in mystery. After graduating from public school in that Tochigi village, Komori came to Tokyo for entrance into the Toshima Normal School, one of the elite public high schools of the prewar period. He was expelled with twenty others in a famous incident in his fourth year, just before graduating, for leading a student strike in protest of conditions in the dormitories and alleged kickbacks by school author-
ities. He worked first as a private secretary, and later as a journalist with the Teito Hibi Shimbun where he made connections which would take him in 1937 to the Shanghai office of the Tairiku Shinpo, a Japanese vernacular daily produced in occupied China with secret army funds. The president of that newspaper, Fuke Shunichi, who asked young Komori to become editor not long thereafter, was to become a key figure in Komori's life. Fuke, after the war, became a Kishi-faction Dietman (LDP), who later switched to the Fukuda faction after Kishi's retirement. It was Fuke who also first introduced Komori to Fukuda Takeo, at that time (1941) a Finance Ministry official on loan as advisor to the Nanking government. This early connection with the future LDP Prime Minister was to enable Komori to play an extraordinarily flexible role behind the scenes during the progressive ascendancy. No other Japanese leftist could claim such entry into the halls of conservative power. Interestingly, it was also Fuke who introduced Komori to the leftist study group which later became the nucleus of his own political power. Fuke first introduced Komori to Takahashi Masao, a leading Marxist economist, who in turn invited Komori to participate in a leftist study group led by professors Takahashi and Ōuchi Hyōe of Tokyo Imperial University.* Although this China-based study group was different from the one which had earlier been rounded up in the 1938 incident, its leadership was largely the same, and it occasionally included also the young Fukuda who had been a student of both Ōuchi and Minobe's father at Tokyo University. This

*These men were considered dangerously radical by the military government. In an incident closely related to the famous "Popular Front" (Jinminsensen Jiken) roundup of 400 leftists in 1937, the members of the so-called "Professors' Group," included Eda Saburo (postwar right wing socialist leader), Minobe Ryōkichi (Tokyo governor 1967-1979), and Ōuchi, jailed on contrived charges, on February 1, 1938. All were bailed out individually by the summer of 1939.
network of associations within which Komori was becoming increasingly intimate, far from being one divided into left and right factions, was essentially one seamless web of elite contacts. Whatever utility there is in partisan labeling must be tempered by a knowledge of the fluidity of these historical associations.

Komori returned to Tokyo in 1944 an established journalist with leftist credentials and conservative contacts. Soon after Japan's defeat, when the lid on Marxist publications was removed, Komori formed his own publishing company, Kodosha. This was from the beginning a political operation, a platform for the Takahashi/Ouchi group's Marxist economics. Komori sponsored a variety of conferences which he later published as collections of their work, most of which were academic best sellers at the time. It was this point at which he came to know Minobe Ryōkichi, the man whose Tokyo governorship he was to not so secretly share.* But, the publication of academic best sellers could not prevent the bankruptcy of Kodosha in 1954, a business failure largely due to Komori's penchant for underwriting the publication of books that pleased him more than his public.

Turning his eyes to more directly political instruments, Komori established the Metropolitan Policy Research Institute (Tosei Chōsakai) with Professors Takahashi and Ōuchi in 1955. The financial backing for this leftwing think tank is as unclear as that of the failed publishing house. Although their ties were unquestionably close to organized labor, there is much speculation that a sprinkling of corporate interests, notably Fuji Bank and Toshiba were also involved. This institute was

*See Minobe's personal account of Komori in the Asahi Shimbun July 8, 1979.
ostensibly created as a supporting research organ for the Prefectural Workers' Union and other public labor organizations in Tokyo. Like Matsunaga's Electric Power Central Research Institute, it was also more than that. It was also established for the purpose of creating a leftist prefectural government in Tokyo. Almost simultaneously Komori et al. supported the Tokyo gubernatorial campaign of former foreign minister Arita Hachirō who ran in 1955 as a leftist independent against incumbent Yasui Seiichirō. Arita had been an old friend from the Kōdosha days, and his candidacy, while not of Komori's making, was the first to involve Komori's efforts.

The second was four years later when Arita, this time supported by the Socialist Party, again failed, this time against popular LDP-backed newcomer Azuma Ryutarō. Komori's role in the 1959 Arita candidacy earned him the attention of novelist Mishima Yukio. Komori became the model for the character of Yamazaki Sōichi, the fixer, in Mishima's 1960 novel, *After the Banquet* (*Utage No Ato*). In 1963 Komori was to choose his own candidate for the first time. His research institute was prospering, publishing a well respected urban policy journal (*Tosei*), and his "graduates," all bright young men, many of whom came to him from Ōuchi's and Takahashi's economics seminars, were entering the Tokyo Metropolitan administration. He chose Sakamoto Katsuo, a former governor of Hyōgo prefecture, to run in Tokyo. This was Komori's third loss. It was still as much the conservative's paradise in Tokyo as it was nationwide.

But the chance that Komori had been waiting for presented itself to him in 1965, when a major bribery scandal involving more than a dozen LDP assemblymen, including the assembly speaker, erupted within the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly. Komori quickly moved to back a "committee of
concerned citizens," all professors and prominent civic leaders, most of whom had been frequent contributors to Tosei, to act as a public voice in support of good government. This committee, together with the Socialists, the Communists, the Komeito, the Democratic Socialists, and most major labor organizations, helped organize a recall campaign which forced the Tokyo Assembly to be the first ever to dissolve in mid-term. In the subsequent election the LDP tumbled from majority party to less than one-third of the seats. The Socialists now held a plurality, and Tokyo elected the first progressive assembly chief in Japanese political history.

The stage was set in 1967 for Komori's fourth try at backing a leftist gubernatorial candidate. At the eleventh hour, due to the sudden withdrawal of Ōta Kanoru, the acknowledged frontrunner, Komori chose economics professor Minobe at the urging of Professor Ōuchi. Minobe had been a very popular and visible television personality, famous for his comprehensible explanations of economic problems and for his attacks upon the conservative central government. He was a good choice. In spite of the fact that Minobe had absolutely no administrative experience, he defeated two opponents to become only the third leftist supported governor in Japan.*

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*It should be noted that Komori's influence was by this time no longer restricted to Tokyo. He had spent much of the first decade of the Institute's existence traveling throughout Japan in support of progressive local government. He was still, at that time, a highly visible public figure. He was recognized as having an inexhaustible store of knowledge about urban policy problems (Dokusho Shimbun, March 30, 1964), and his "students" at the institute were considered the best and brightest among Japan's many urban affairs specialists. His first victory was in fact not Minobe's but was the election of Shimano Takeshi in Sendai. Shimano, who was later to become with Asukata a leading figure in the National Association of Progressive Mayors, had been an attorney in the building next to Komori's Institute near Hibiya Park. It was Komori who reportedly first convinced Shimano to run, and it was Komori who reportedly bankrolled the effort.
From Komori's point of view, this lack of administrative expertise was Minobe's greatest asset. By 1967 Komori's disciples were in positions throughout the metropolitan government. Many of the "concerned citizens" committee, hand picked by Komori, soon became key figures in the new Minobe administration. They headed his school board, civil service commission, pollution research center, and policy and planning office. Perhaps even more significant was the personal empire which Komori was creating among former Institute staffs who were now rising to division and department head posts within the metropolitan government's "non-political" administrative hierarchy. By Minobe's second term Komori had created an environment within the administration in which few moves could be taken either without his knowledge or his consent. He virtually controlled personnel movements within the administration. Many of the bureau chiefs were his hand picked deputies, often former institute staffs. Those who were not were seldom in important posts. The Tokyo bureaucracy was said to be divided into Komori and anti-Komori factions, many of the latter resenting their role as "chabōzu," "tea servers to the Shōgun." The "Shōgun" was most definitely not Governor Minobe.

Komori had no authority but all the power. He has variously been referred to as Minobe's "Rasputin", as his "Shadow Governor," as the "Hibiya Governor," and as the "Master on the Tenth Floor" (jūkai no sensei). (This last reference is interesting only when you realize that there are only nine floors in the main offices of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.) He was known alternately as "the Fixer," "the Don," and the "Kuromaku" as well. (This last term refers to the men veiled in black who are not supposed to be seen, but who are responsible for setting the Kabuki stage in the midst of the performance.) That Minobe did
little without Komori was publicly acknowledged by Minobe after his re-
tirement in 1979, when, in a series of articles written for the Asahi
Shimbun he noted that he had several daily phone conversations with Ko-
mori and that he met Komori at least once each week to map strategy.

Minobe acknowledges that:

"... On the whole I followed Komori's opinions on political
problems. There are not a few fine details and particulars
about his behind the scenes maneuverings of which I know no-
thing." 53

In the following day's column, Minobe wrote:

"The man who was what you might call my daily consultant, my
most direct policy advisor, the man who played the most im-
portant role in the administration was Komori Takeshi." 54

And he freely admits in personal conversation that:

"Komori was my man in the shadows for twelve years." 55

Komori can be credited with everything from creating the famous slogan
"Stop the Sato" in 1971, a slogan which punctuated the anti-center char-
acter of progressive local opposition, to such famous "Minobe" initia-
tives as the garbage war, the famous Tokyo anti-pollution policy, the
Right to Sunshine policy, the abolition of public gambling, and other
progressive programs. He is said to have prepared or at least to have
initiated all of Minobe's major public addresses. If Minobe was the
star, Komori was the producer and director.

His work backstage as Minobe's personal representative was probably
his most important function during the twelve year administration. This
is a role of fundamental significance for the Japanese political pro-
cess. It has long been recognized that the secret to political (or any
organizational) success in Japan lies in large measure with the ability
of that organization to avoid dramatic, sudden confrontation. That ab-
ility is best served by the talents of an individual or individuals with
wide contacts and certain authority who can operate away from the glare of the press and the public in order to secure agreement or at least understanding from all concerned parties. For that reason, Japanese political life is peopled both by those bathed in the spotlights as well as by those who exert often greater power from the shadows.* The most important job of these actors in the shadows is the securing of the understanding of all parties to an action before that action is taken. This is accomplished by nemawashi, the highly time consuming, but equally conflict reducing process of prior consultation referred to earlier in this chapter. Komori, with his extensive contacts in both the conservative as well as the progressive camps, was ideally suited for this most sensitive of responsibilities. While a socialist, Komori was by all accounts far from doctrinaire, and thus could be quite flexible in pursuit of Tokyo's interests. His long personal relationship with Fukuda allowed Komori to play a unique sort of role as bridge between the left and the right, even while helping to guide the largest leftist

*We need to additionally consider the two very different varieties of this deeply institutionalized role in Japanese politics. Using the public figure as the locus, we can look above him to the fixer, the boss who controls him. Sometimes called the kuromaku, other times the kuro-noko (both referring to the darkness in which he is said to operate), this individual, like Komori, sits above the public figure, pulling the strings, making the necessary arrangements to facilitate public policy, arrangements which either may or may not require the authorization of the public figure himself. The kuromaku holds real power. The other man in the shadows is less the generalissimo and more the lieutenant. Often referred to as the uragata (also an image borrowed from the theater, meaning stagehand), the individual is responsible for guiding his superior's ideas through their winding course toward policy. He is often required to intuit the intentions of the public figure above him, and thus frequently operates without direct orders. This is a practice called santaku, which often conveniently relieves the superior from any responsibility for the lieutenant's actions in the event that something goes wrong. In the event that something goes drastically wrong, the rules change and the public figure may have no choice but to accept responsibility, whether or not he issued the orders.
government in the non-communist developed world. This role and the man who played it were as central to the politics of the Tokyo Bay regional policy process as they were to the Tokyo Metropolitan government itself during the turbulent years of the progressive ascendency. It was Komori's calculus of political expediency which was to destroy the Tokyo Bay General Development Council, and it was his role in Tokyo's "sudden" decision to withdraw form the Council in 1973 which is emblematic of him as Matsunaga's latter day foil in Tokyo Bay Area regional politics.

As indicated above, the Council had undergone some important internal changes in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Due to the efforts of the Keihin localities within the Council, the environmental issue had become a part of industry's consciousness as well. There was every indication that the Bay Area localities were moving to initiate a new horizontal strategy to transform the Council from a coalition in support of business to a coalition of self help and joint policy. There was no publicly stated opposition among the localities to the Cross Bay Bridge and there was not even a hint that a lethal split was in the offing. Minobe had been chairman for the second time in 1972, and the Council, now including the membership of Saitama Prefecture as well, continued to press for its major construction projects, to support the LDP with undeclared funds, and to provide a forum for contacts between industry, government, and political leaders. The 1973 General Convention at which the chairmanship was passed from Minobe to Chiba Governor Tomono Taketo, was held in April without incident, and on July 4, Tokyo paid its annual dues to the Council secretariat. On July 6 Minobe dramatically announced at a press conference that Tokyo intended to withdraw from the Tokyo Bay General Development Council.
The public about-face seemed a sudden and dramatic one, but much had transpired between April and July 1973. Most of it deeply involved Komori Takeshi.* By early June Komori had become concerned about the impending Prefectural Assembly election scheduled for July 8. While the progressives hoped to gain some seats (they already held a majority of seventy of the 125 seats), the LDP had hit upon a new and threatening strategy, a slogan calling for "the defense of a free society" which attacked the Minobe regime for its purported "left wing socialism." In addition, now that the LDP was stepping on formerly progressive turf, by co-opting much progressive rhetoric and policy (as we saw the conservative Council do earlier), Komori feared at least the possibility of a reversal in the favor of the LDP. He felt that without a dramatic display of progressive opposition the Minobe administration might lose the support of crucial independent voters. They could not afford to allow the right to coopt their most successful strategems, the anti-pollution and social service platforms. He needed to capture the imagination of the same voters who had been attracted to Minobe in the first place, voters who were voting as much for Minobe as against the central government. The withdrawal from the Council, announced two days before the election, and

*The role of Komori in the Tokyo withdrawal is known only to a handful of those who were involved at the highest levels. Chiba and industry people can only speculate about it. The account which follows is based upon an interview with Mainichi Shim bun editor Naito Kunio, a close associate of Komori, who received a "leak" of the withdrawal intention in mid-June 1973. Throughout our interview (January 10, 1979), he referred to his notes from his conversation with Komori. The Komori role was later confirmed by two top Yokohama policy staffs under Asukata who had participated in the negotiations (April 3, 1979 and April 6, 1979), and by a former director of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Port and Harbor Authority on January 31, 1979, who had received the withdrawal instructions. It was later reconfirmed to me on September 20, 1979 by former governor Minobe: "While both Komori and I had agreed upon the eventual necessity of withdrawing, it was he who picked the time and the circumstances. I went along with his decision at that time."
thus plastered across the front pages of the morning papers the day before the polling took place, was orchestrated as a direct attack upon the center's growth policies, a maneuver which had paid off so handsomely in previous elections.*

Minobe went before the press and announced that the construction of the Cross Bay Bridge would be destructive of the natural environment and that protection of the natural environment was Tokyo's first priority. He argued that there should be no further development of Tokyo Bay, that there would be no benefit in such additional growth for the residents of Tokyo. He justified his withdrawal by suggesting that unless he were somehow able to cripple the Council, its "detrimental" policies would be implemented, adversely affecting his citizens' welfare. Minobe's Vice-Governor, Isomura Mitsuo, summed up the withdrawal in this way:

"High pitched planning is being conducted with business interests at the helm.** Even if we were to reform the Council from within, it wouldn't be fast enough... to prevent destruction of the Bay. Thus, in our judgement, from the point of view of the best interests of Tokyo's residents, withdrawal is the best course."57

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*This linkage of the withdrawal to electoral strategy is based not upon circumstantial evidence alone, but upon the account of one of the participants in the decision (Interview, September 19, 1978). The emphasis upon the withdrawal as an anti-center statement was repeated in an interview by former Governor Minobe, although he denied any relationship between the withdrawal and the election. (September 20, 1979).

**Isomura had a point. A look at the budgets of the Council between the years 1962-1972 shows an interesting change in sources of Council income. Whereas the local governments were the major source of funds to the fledgling Council in 1962, supplying over 70% of the operating budget, they supplied only 33% in 1964, 24% in 1968, and only 21% in 1971. By 1973 the localities were supplying the Council with less than half of the funds supplied by corporate members, whose assessment had grown thirty six times between 1962-1973. At the same time, however, his point is selectively taken. While Minobe was vocal in his public disdain for private industry, he had, since July 1972, been engaged in a tertiary sector project of his own in Tokyo Bay. He had agreed at that time to put up one third of the capital, the remainder coming from industry and the central government, for the modernization of Tokyo's enormous wholesale market facilities. Ideology conveniently has its limits.
The specific objections which were raised by Tokyo were essentially two-fold. First, they argued that the Bridge Project, in requiring the construction of several landfill islands in the Bay, would irreparably pollute the waters. The second was its objection to the leadership by private industry of the Council.

This was politics as theater, staged and timed with exquisite attention to effect. It did not matter that Tokyo funds had been channeled through the Council to LDP coffers for the first six years of Minobe's administration. It did not matter that the Cross Bay Bridge project had already been effectively frozen earlier in the year by the Tanaka government. It did not matter that Tokyo had, through its Council membership, been holding hands with industry throughout Minobe's tenure. It did not matter that Tokyo had never failed to endorse any of the Council's programs in the past and that Minobe had twice been Council Chairman. Tokyo announced that it had a responsibility to oppose, and it chose election eve to demonstrate that responsibility. Whether for this reason or for any other, the LDP lost four seats in a hotly contested election. The progressive majority coalition was returned to the assembly.

The political process behind the histrionics merits further attention for what it can teach us about the role of the fixer, about the tenuousness of the much ballyhooed "coalition of progressive localities," and about regional policy making more generally. What was publicly a sudden and dramatic act, was, not surprisingly, nothing of the sort. It was, however, a decision taken at the top, without consultation within the bureaucracy of the Tokyo Metropolitan government. In particular, the working level officials of the Port and Harbor Bureau,
from whose budget the Council's dues were paid, had been very enthusiastic and active in the Council's activities. Minobe explains:

"The top officials within my Port and Harbor Bureau, all products of previous administrations and not of my choosing, were not opposed to the Council or the Bridge. That is why I had to rely so heavily upon Komori."58

The Port and Harbor people didn't get any official word about the withdrawal until just before the action was taken, when they received on July 1 an internal memorandum (ringisho), with Governor Minobe's stamp affixed, entitled "Concerning the Withdrawal from the Tokyo Bay General Development Council." This memo involved no consultation, but merely contained a terse list of what were to become the publicly stated reasons for the withdrawal. This late notification came in spite of the fact that Komori had already leaked the story to Naitō, his former associate and trusted editor of the Mainichi Shim bun. Naitō had published his report of the impending withdrawal as the lead article on Page One of the June 20, 1973 evening edition. Feathers were understandably ruffled, and the Port and Harbor people cooperated only reluctantly with the policy.*

If there was little or no consultation within the Tokyo bureaucracy, there was a great deal of it across to the other member localities. Komori personally had telephone conversations in mid-June with each of the other progressive chief executives of member localities. Although he was not necessarily seeking it, he received the assurances of each that they would support the Tokyo withdrawal.** There is some question as to

*The fuss raised at the time by the Bay related bureaucracy was directed by then Bureau Chief Okumura, an act for which he personally sought absolution from Komori five years later. (Interview with Okumura Takemasa, January 31, 1979.)

**According to Naitō (Interview January 10, 1979), much of the nemawashi was conducted by Komori before he even brought the idea to Minobe. The original discussions were conducted by Komori and several of his highly placed disciples within the administration.
Komori's intentions vis-a-vis the role of these other progressive localities. There is no evidence to suggest that he sought a joint withdrawal of the leftist localities, although such a possibility received extensive press treatment. According to one Yokohama official who received the Komori initiative, "It was not really an invitation to join them, it was more a notification of their intentions."  

The press treatment, indicating a united progressive withdrawal in opposition to conservative growth policies, was enough for Komori, as the form, and not the substance of a true progressive coalition, was the objective in this case. Komori also reportedly contacted several of the banks which were members of the Council, as well as the conservative Chiba governor. The roots had been bound.

With the exception of the Mainichi article of June 20, the rest of the press remained silent until the day after the July 6 press conference.  

With the official announcement, the press responded by declaring the move one of a united progressive coalition. They reported that the Tokyo withdrawal was with the "support and sympathy" of the other progressive localities. The Tokyo Shimbun reported on July 7 that Yokohama, Kawasaki, and Saitama (the other progressive localities) were also going to withdraw from the Council. These reports were overstated, but were not entirely without foundation. The other progressive chief executives were playing it very coolly. Since there could be no meaningful Council without the participation of Tokyo, they realized that their own withdrawal would be superfluous, and that it could only further antagonize business and LDP officials. Thus, while Asukata in Yokohama and Hata in Saitama claimed that they were "considering" withdrawal, they were in fact considering only how best to appear supportive
of both the Tokyo move as well as of the Council. Neither these two, nor Ito in Kawasaki publicly joined in the condemnation of the Cross-Bay Bridge and none of these three ever withdrew from the Council. Ito, for example, stated that:

Kawasaki is not going to directly withdraw. We will continue our practical, business-related involvement, but I agree at base with the Tokyo governor. . .63

There is serious question whether Yokohama or Kawasaki, both designated cities more dependent upon the central government than Tokyo, could have followed suit in any event. The feeling in Kawasaki, according to one official, was that the withdrawal was an "irresponsible act" which Kawasaki could ill afford.64 As we have already seen, Kawasaki had no reason to support the Bridge, but it had even less reason to further antagonize business interests and the LDP. There was nothing to be gained by Kawasaki's participation in Tokyo's withdrawal. Mayor Ito was able to safely steer Kawasaki around this issue through the minimum necessary exercise of his political options. In Yokohama there was even more incentive to be circumspect. The decision in 1968 to link Asukata's Bay Bridge bypass plan to the Construction Ministry Bay Coast Road Plan created a vested interest for Yokohama not only in the Cross Bay Bridge Project, but also in the continued existence of the Council which was the single most important source of support for all of these projects. In spite of Asukata's public statements to the contrary, his chief lieutenant disclosed that:

It's true that we had a concrete interest in seeing the smooth and successful completion of the Bay Coast Road Project. That is why we gave no thought to withdrawing from the Council. . . Tokyo had no interest in any of the other Council projects, and thus could afford to make the big splash which we could not.65

Just three days before the withdrawal announcement, Minobe and Asukata
had met in Tokyo and had agreed to join with five other progressive local chief executives nationwide in the formation of what was called the Seven Big Cities Mayors' Conference (Nana Daitoshi Shuchō Kondankai). It was a horizontal alliance designed to provide progressive localities with independent resources of data and expertise for their joint struggle against the conservative central government and industry (see Chapter Seven for details of the limited success which this group enjoyed). It was with arresting irony that Minobe destroyed an existing, conservative horizontal forum just days after participating in the creation of a new, progressive one. Yet the lack of unified progressive interests in the case of the Tokyo withdrawal from the Council should be instructive in suggesting how chimeric was the highly touted unified coalition of progressive local governments during the period of their most widespread influence.*

But, even given the impossibility of achieving a progressive solidarity in the regional politics of Tokyo Bay, the conflict between Tokyo and Chiba was none the less bitter. Chiba governor Tomono's initial response was calm. Believing that Minobe's environmental objections could be technologically surmounted, he argued that:

If the problems of water pollution and the Cross Bay Bridge construction were scientifically studied, Minobe would undoubtedly understand that there is no relationship.67

*It should also be noted that several of the nine Tokyo wards which were participating in the Council were also opposed to the Minobe/Komori move. Ota and Edogawa Wards in particular, made their displeasure public. Both were anxious to see the completion of the Bay Coast Road, a project which would relieve much of their traffic congestion. In addition, none of these nine wards had been notified of the withdrawal until the public announcement was made. Vice-Governor Isomura was dispatched by Minobe to personally visit each of the wards to stroke the agitated ward chiefs. (Tokyo Metropolitan Government internal memorandum, August 4, 1973).
He added a barbed reference to Minobe's chairmanship of the Council the previous year:

I am perplexed by this sudden announcement, because I believe that we will be able to continue the policies of Chairman Minobe. On July 10 Tokyo vice governor Kimura visited the Chiba Prefectural Offices in order to deliver Tokyo's formal notice of withdrawal. (It was the turn of the Chiba governor to act as Council chairman.) Vice-Governor Kawakami Kiichi, acting for Governor Tomono, flatly refused to accept the notice. Kawakami, who was to himself become embroiled in all of this as Chiba governor after 1975, rejected the Tokyo claim that business was controlling the Council's affairs, and argued that if there are problems of pollution threatened by any of the Council's proposed construction activities, that they are best taken up within the Council, not from the outside. Kawakami agreed only to "hold this notice in custody, because Tokyo's will is so strong." By this time, convinced that Tokyo was interested only in scoring political points, Chiba governor Tomono was saber-rattling. Although, for both political and commercial reasons, he was never able to carry out his threats, he warned that he was prepared to cut off all sand and gravel shipments from Chiba to Tokyo.* For several years afterward, Chiba, refusing to recognize the Tokyo withdrawal, continued to bill Tokyo for its share of the Council's expenses.

If Chiba's reaction to the destruction of this Council which had

*The sand and gravel which Tokyo had been purchasing at the time was being mined at Sengen Yama in Southern Chiba. Solidly conservative, this southern portion of the prefecture has long been of crucial importance as a "casting vote" in Chiba politics, as it often may determine the outcome of an election which splits the evenly divided urban North. The Southern residents and corporations, although conservative, were naturally strongly opposed to any suspension of their economic activities.
been fighting its battles so effectively at the center was one of bitter
disappointment and resentment, the central government's attitude was one
of undiluted hypocrisy. Prime Minister Tanaka, the man who had wasted
no time in killing the Cross Bay Bridge Project in January, entered the
controversy by announcing on July 13 that he found Tokyo's withdrawal
"regrettable." Testifying before the Local Administration Committee of
the Lower House, he declared that the Cross Bay Bridge Project was "es-
sential" for the continued development of the capital region. The
statements and actions of his faction member and Construction Minister,
Kanemaru Shin, are even more memorable. Kanemaru, the man who had ear-
lier in the year reversed LDP policy during the PARC deliberations, in-
vited the entire LDP Chiba contingent of Diet representatives to Party
headquarters for breakfast on July 12. He proclaimed that "current con-
ditions notwithstanding, the plans for construction will proceed." In
a clear reference to the "Bridge Philosophy" which Minobe had made fam-
ous years earlier,* he declared that:

We cannot neglect a matter that disturbs one thousand persons
because one person is opposed. We cannot sacrifice one thou-
sand persons to the opposition of one. The contrast in appeals is as stark as any to emerge from this period of
perpetual confrontation and contrast.

The Tokyo Bay General Development Council, as it had been organized
by Matsunaga Yasuzaemon, was quite dead, much more a victim of Tokyo's
political expediency, however, than a victim of a new age to which it had

*Minobe's "Bridge Philosophy" was his famous dictum that he would
never build a bridge if a single resident were opposed to its construc-
tion. It was first used in the context of Tokyo's "Garbage War" in the
late 1960's. It was Minobe's best known statement of his philosophy
that democracy was a time-consuming, but necessary process.
seemed perfectly able to adapt. The horizontal strategy had undergone much fundamental change in the process. Although noise making is not the same as policy making, both are equally removed from the original role of localities in the Council's activities, that of cheerleading industry and government programs. Through the environmental debate, and later through the Tokyo withdrawal, localities were learning that these sorts of translocal forums could be used as much for opposition and proposition as for support. They were learning that the horizontal strategy, at least potentially, belonged as much to themselves as to the center. If the stridency of the times prevented the full utilization of this as a local tool for policy making and proposition itself, notice had been clearly served that this was possible. The realization of this possibility was left for later, different times.

V. RECESSION

A) Background - Reconciliation and the Changing of the Guard

The progressive ascendancy at the local level was unquestionably a period of strident opposition and consciousness raising, affecting the national body politic no less than local and regional policy. The timing of the Tokyo withdrawal from the Council, coming as it did just days after the decision to form a different sort of horizontal coalition among progressive chief executives, stands as symbolic of the times. Soon thereafter, however, two factors, one sudden, the other gradual, merged to dramatically affect the local political scene and to contribute to a reduction in the stridency of both political opposition as well as of policy proposition which the localities had assumed for the first time during this period of progressive ascendance.
The sudden element was of course the Oil Shock of late 1973. It meant, at least temporarily, the end of high growth. In 1974, in fact, Japan experienced a decline in GNP for the first time since the war. If the economic miracle of the 1960's had resulted in negative environmental externalities and a misdirection of social capital, it had also made progressive opposition possible. Its end made progressive opposition less potent. The big spending programs initiated first by progressive localities, such as Tokyo's free medical care for the aged, and programs for the handicapped and for children, no longer seemed feasible. Cutbacks soon began. The progressive leaders found themselves suddenly on the defensive in the mid-1970's, fending off criticisms of their "lavish welfare spending" and "fiscal irresponsibility." Minobe, for one, soon became noticeably conciliatory toward both the center and his conservative neighbors. In almost perfect parallel to the deterioration of Tokyo's fiscal health, the confrontationism of his early years gave way to much more moderation. The crowning blow came in the autumn of 1977 when first Minobe in Tokyo, and then Kuroda in Osaka, two of the most prominent progressive governors, went with hats in hand to the Ministry of Home Affairs to seek permission for the additional issuance of bonds in order to avoid being declared "financial emergency localities" by the central government. This was, of course, as heartening for the right as it was humiliating for the left.

The second factor contributing to this recession in progressive fortunes was both much less sudden and much more complicated. It is the structural changes at the center, changes which have been evolving ever since the 1955 coalescence of the parties on the right and the corresponding coalescence of the parties on the left.
The most significant aspect in this slow postwar process has been the secular decline in both LDP and JSP seats in the Diet. In 1958, the first House of Representatives election after the merging of the two camps, the LDP held 62% of the seats and the JSP held 36%, a total of 98% between them. Of the 467 seats in the lower house, only fourteen belonged to non-LDP or JSP Dietmen. In the subsequent six elections this share has steadily deteriorated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Combined LDP/JSP Share of House of Representatives Seats (percentage)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>86%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>78%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expanding share which is unaccounted for by these two parties has been usurped by the increasing number of smaller parties which have proliferated during this same twenty year period. In 1960 the Democratic Socialists (DSP) split from the JSP; in 1967 the Komeito was founded as the political arm of a rising religious movement; in 1976 the New Liberal Club split off from the LDP; and in 1977 the Socialists Citizens' League was formed from among conservative dissidents within the Socialist Party. In addition, the Japan Communist Party has enjoyed variable public support at the polls. It is not, as some would argue, the end of one party dominance in Japan, but is rather the end of one party rule and two party dominance. Most prominent of all in the midst of this LDP/JSP decline has been the rise of centrist parties, particularly in the mid-1970's, when the ideas of both the conservative LDP and the progres-
sive JSP were beginning to wear thin on the increasingly independent electorate.

These changes have demanded adjustments from all parties, but two results in particular deserve special attention. First, in an effort to expand its shrinking base and to forestall further progressive encroachments, the LDP has moved decisively to coopt the rhetoric of progressive local government in the process of coopting much of their public policy as well. Cries of "citizen participation" which served to define the most successful years of the progressive ascendance were, by the 1975 local elections, indistinguishable as to partisan affiliation. If there ever were important differences between progressive and conservative localities in policy programs, most had disappeared by the mid-1970's (see Aqua, 1979). By that time it was no longer only the progressives who were addressing issues of pollution, welfare, and participation. The progressive formula had become stereotyped, packaged, and freely employed by all. Realizing, moreover, that changes in image may not be enough to offset a slipping base of voter support, the LDP has also moved to cultivate the support of the increasingly important center parties. There has been an extraordinary increase in the incidence of such coalitions at the local level, with the LDP now a coalition partner in a full one quarter of all "progressive" city administrations. (See below.)

The second result is the obverse of the first. As the LDP became weaker, the centrist parties began to recognize the possibility for coalition at the national level. They are increasingly eager to join hands with the LDP in order to demonstrate their "responsibility." Komeito and the DSP emerged as pivotal forces in the 82nd Diet in 1977 for precisely these reasons, but the changes are most clearly manifest at the
local level, for it is there where parties have the most frequent opportunities to form and reform governments. On October 12, 1977 the Komeito and the Democratic Socialists concluded a major agreement in this regard. They announced that neither party would again enter a local coalition in which the Communists were also participants. In deciding to exclude the JCP from all joint campaigns, and thus by isolating the JCP on the left, they were demonstrating their intention to appear responsible, to be prepared for cooperation with the LDP.* At the gubernatorial level, the DSP and the Komeito, true to their pledges, moved firmly away from the left after 1977. Whereas the DSP joined with the LDP six times and ran against the LDP six times in the 1975 elections, in 1979 they did not run against the LDP in a single prefecture. Likewise, the Komeito supported the same candidate as the LDP in eight prefectures in 1979 and opposed in none, a shift from 1975 when they opposed the LDP in four contests.

From the point of view of the structural changes outlined here, more interesting than the centrist move away from the left, and more interesting than the infiltration of the progressive camp by the LDP is the proven ability of the center parties to swing effectively in both directions. The DSP–Komeito anti-JCP strategy was put to its first major test in the 1979 nationwide local elections. Far from disappearing entirely, coalitions in which both the DSP and Komeito participated with the Communists actually increased from 18 to 21. At the same time, however, the number of winning coalitions in which the DSP and Komeito succeeded together without the JCP jumped from 33 to 71. The combination of these

*This joint announcement coincided with changes in the Komeito and DSP party platforms which involve participation in a national coalition with the LDP for the first time.
two facts confirms the importance to both the left and the right of hav-
ing these two parties as coalition partners.*

A quick look at the progressive "scorecard" in the 1979 nationwide
local elections does not reveal any of these structural changes. The
National Association of Progressive Mayors, the organization founded by
Asukata Ichio in 1964 with twenty-eight members, actually increased its
membership by one (to 115) from 1978 to 1979, and although this is some-
what of a decline from its peak of 136 members in 1975, there is still
a sizeable number of mayors willing to participate in the body. Sim-
ilarly, the numbers of progressive mayors, as defined by the Japan In-
stitute of Local Government** has never been higher. By their criter-
ion a progressive mayor is one who receives the electoral support of
any non-LDP party. (This includes those which receive LDP support as
well, just as long as there is a non-LDP party in coalition with it.)
These figures reveal a secular expansion of "progressive" local govern-
ment and suggest no structural changes or recession in the post-Oil Shock
period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Progressive Mayors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japan Institute of Local Government Zenkoku Shuchō Meibō 1979.

*The DSP-Komeito-LDP combination received the most publicity during
the 1979 campaign. Nationwide, the number of such municipal administra-
tions jumped from six to forty-two, a clear reflection of the consider-
ations outlined above.
But, these figures mask the enormously complex recombination of coalition types which has dominated this period. In 1973-4, at the height of the progressive offensive, for example, less than four percent of those listed as progressive mayors had LDP support for their campaign. As the twin factors described above came to merge in the mid-1970's, the LDP clearly moved to join in coalitions where it could; likewise the more moderate opposition parties came to meet them with open arms. The result, by 1979, was that 143 of the 572 mayors (exactly 25%) had the support of the Liberal Democratic Party. If the numbers of progressive local chief executives was continuing to expand, it was doing so with much new variety. This rise in LDP participation in progressive local administrations from 14 cities in 1974 to over 140 five years later is an important statement of the ruling party's success in coopting the progressive program.

We need only examine the declining significance of the prototype of the progressive coalition for further evidence of these changes. In 1974 the JSP-JCP coalition accounted for one third of all progressive local governments, and for more than half of all progressive local coalitions. This share has declined yearly, and in 1979 accounts for only 13% of all progressive local governments and less than 20% of all progressive local coalitions. During this same period, the number of such coalitions which are labeled as "other," being too diverse to be listed among the thirty basic permutations of progressive local government, has nearly trebled. There are now more of these than there are JSP-JCP coalitions.

In a great many cases this has involved the expansion of an origin-

**Chihō Jichi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, an arm of the Local Government Workers' Union, and the most reliable source of this sort of data.
ally JSP-JCP based coalition to include center party and even LDP participation, but in most cases, these structural changes have involved the replacement of those original progressive coalitions. By the 1975 nationwide local elections these coalitions were already on the defensive, but the actual "changing of the guard" came several years later. In spite of their more conciliatory response to the economic slowdown, the progressives were clearly embattled, threatened as much by defections from within as by attacks from without. They suffered a string of off-year election defeats in the months following the summer 1977 House of Councillors election, and the feeling developed among the progressive mayors that they were approaching a watershed in their movement. They issued statements in recognition of the role which high growth played in their original proliferation. They recognized that a new strategy would have to be formulated to meet these new challenges. *

But challenge sped ahead of response. Even with the meeting of ideological appeals, by the end of the decade not a single one of the leading progressive local chief executives remained in power, and most of the leaders of secondary stature were actively putting distance between themselves and the movement. Change is always more gradual than it seems upon its recounting. While the economic changes wrought in part by the Oil Shock and while the erosion of the old LDP-JSP confrontation were to merge to define a new recessionary era in local and regional policy, the effects were not necessarily as sudden and as dramatic

*See for example Asukata Ichio's widely quoted speech to the summer 1975 conference of the National Association of Progressive Mayors in which he outlined a progressive response to the new demands of the day under the catch phrase: "From progressive localities to a localism that is progressive." Kakushin Jichitai kara Jichi no Kakushin E.
as the events. The changes described here are characterized as much by the reconciliation of left and right,* as they are characterized by the retirements of Minobe, Asukata, and Ninagawa, the three godfathers of progressive local government. A changing of attitudes seemed to precede a changing of the guard. In a sense, the drop in leftist stridency merely presaged their own fall from the most strategic heights of local government in Japan. Left in the wake of diminished rancor and progressive local power is a new political context for regional policy, a context which evolved in the Tokyo Bay area no less than in the nation at large.

B) The Bridge - Eventually Revived

The Road Bureau within the Construction Ministry was not to be deterred by Tokyo's obstreperous withdrawal from the Council. It was, however, to be temporarily overtaken by new fiscal realities. The Ministry announced in August 1973, little more than a month after Minobe's withdrawal, its detailed plans for the Cross Bay Bridge. Including both "social" as well as technical analyses of the Bridge's impact, the plan called for the creation of the special public corporation which had earlier been vetoed within the LDP. Construction was proposed to begin in 1975, and the project was expected now to take nine years at a cost of 250 billion yen. The bridge at the mouth of the bay, an off-again, on-again project throughout the years of the Council, was declared to be "technologically unfeasible." These were the first detailed, concrete plans to come from the Construction Ministry for the Cross Bay Bridge Project, but they were too late, sandwiched between the opposition of the

*By Minobe, for one, in his dealings with other Bay Area localities in the months and years following the withdrawal.
Tanaka-led LDP and the unpopularity of further "big" construction on the one hand, and the fiscal crunch that was coming on the other. The Construction Ministry began to receive notice from the Tanaka-controlled National Land Agency that the project was ill-conceived, and that it required further study.* Japan was entering a year of economic slowdown and the Bridge Project was not getting any cheaper for all the delay. The Construction Ministry had spent 1.7 billion yen each year between 1966-1975 in the research and planning for the project, activity which was becoming increasingly difficult to justify. With no final approval in the offing, and with most of the research completed, the Construction Ministry and the industrial interests in support of the Bridge (primarily Nippon Steel) needed a new strategy. In July 1976 it was announced that the Public Highway Corporation, a Construction Ministry related public corporation, would create a Cross Bay Bridge Research Office. It was funded with an annual budget of 500 million yen for "further study" of the Project. Both the Construction Ministry and industry were seeking to tread water until times became more favorable to the Project. This represented another sort of loss for the industrial interests, for it seemed to close the door upon the tertiary sector mechanism which they had been promoting. They would not be able to have a direct equity share in the Bridge if it were constructed by the Public Highway Corporation. There was no choice, however, for in order to keep the Project itself alive, the responsibility and the budget had to be shifted away from the

*The National Land Agency was created in June 1974, and within one month, on July 23, they made a public announcement of this policy. The director of the Agency, Shimokobe Atsushi, the ghost writer of Tanaka's remodeling plan, sought to enjoin the Construction and Finance Ministries to adjust their Cross Bay Bridge policies. (Tokyo Shimbun evening edition, August 3, 1974)
were fully completed. Thus, the Cross Bay Bridge Project had moved in fifteen years from the Transport Ministry to the Construction Ministry, to a Public Corporation, never receiving the necessary political approval, and more than quadrupling in its estimated cost. It is in this condition that the Cross Bay Bridge Project remains to date at the national level, debated at budget time each year, not quite dead, but not nearly about to be undertaken. It lies firmly upon the back burner, suffering from an LDP indifference and a Construction Ministry lack of will.

Yet, by mid-1979 a bridge promotion official was able to confidently predict that the Finance Ministry was prepared to increase the budget for the Project by 40% in fiscal 1980 and that construction would begin by 1981. The explanation for his optimism, whether well-founded or not, had far less to do with new strategies or conditions at the center than with skillful new uses of translocal coalitions by both the center and localities in the Bay Area, coalitions made possible by the experiences of more rancorous times past. Since, as we have already seen, the Bridge had been effectively killed by the Tanaka people prior to the Oil Shock and the subsequent slowdown in economic growth, little of importance transpired at the center during this period which would directly affect the fortunes of the Project. Yet, the changes wrought at the local level by this new economic and political recession were to prove decisive in keeping the Project alive, if not in forcing it upon the center as a priority for the region. If the Oil Shock and economic downturn guaranteed delay of the Project, they also created conditions which would favor its eventual resuscitation. Local chief executives, progressive and conservative, were equally feeling the fiscal pinch by
the mid-1970's. Minobe was himself slowly coming to realize that there was more to be gained by cooperation with Chiba in a variety of areas than by battling over a bridge which was unlikely to be built. There was too much else of importance in Bay Area regional policy, such as the high speed rail link to Narita and the acquisition of additional land for refuse disposal in the Bay, to be unnecessarily sacrificed for the sake of a bridge which held little direct importance to Tokyo. 81 This same Narita construction led to the creation of the first bridge promotion organization on the Keihin Coast in 1978. The Keihin lack of access to the region's only international airport threatened to even further disrupt commerce during the slowdown. Minds were changing on the cautious Keihin Coast. None of the subsequent changes in the fortunes of the Bridge Project during this period are comprehensible without reference to the horizontal strategy.

C) The Horizontal Strategy

It was not until the withdrawal of Tokyo from the Tokyo Bay General Development Council in 1973 that each of the constituent parts of the Council came to understand clearly the potential of that organizational idea. This potential, vis-a-vis the Bridge Project, has in the succeeding years been partially realized through the factoring out of the Council into these constituent parts. This "factoring out" has been a gradual process, slowly unfolding throughout this period, but while still underutilized, it represents the fullest expression, by the widest variety of political actors, of the horizontal strategy to date. The Tokyo Bay General Development Council, composed of business, political, and administrative actors, had been the tool of industrial interests during
the years of the conservative's paradise. During the following period in which the progressives took the lead nationwide in injecting a new sense of initiative to local government, the Council witnessed a similar emergence of local leadership on the environmental issue (not strictly partisan, however), as well as its use as a tool for local opposition. But in this later period, it is impossible to say with any accuracy that the horizontal strategy is the tool of any single group, or that it is being used in any single way. The horizontal strategy has developed under new and different political and economic conditions as a more amorphous tool for political demand making. In the case of Bay Area regional policy, what has followed in the wake of the Council has been a factoring out into its constituent parts, each newly coalesced around a variant form of translocal coalition. This has hardly been a smooth process, but it seems quite clear that the single Council of the 1960's has become at least three different horizontal coalitions in the late 1970's.

The most important of these is the direct descendent of the original Council, the Six Prefecture and City Chief Executive Conference (Roku Tokenshi Kaigi) which was finally established in July 1979 by the governors of Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa, and by the mayors of Yokohama and Kawasaki. The fact that of all these chief executives only the Kawasaki mayor remains a "bona fide progressive"* is emblematic of

*This is, of course, an appellation of limited value in the 1980's but it is offered for what it is worth as a contrast to the earlier partisan composition of the Bay Area. By mid-1979 Minobe and Asukata were gone, and both Hata in Saitama and Nagasu in Kanagawa had accepted the backing of the LDP. As a further reflection of the new complexity of coalition patterns, the new Tokyo Governor Suzuki and the new Yokohama Mayor Saigo, both former vice-directors of the Ministry of Home Affairs and unquestioned conservatives, have the support of the Democratic Socialists and Komeito, in addition to their LDP base. Saigo, moreover, received belated support from the Socialists as well.
this new period. But this belies the conciliatory stance which was adopt-
ed by Minobe and others even before the end of their tenure. An examin-
ation of the post-Council process of translocal consensus building in
the Bay Area offers our best glimpse of these changes.

The Council did not die all at once. It underwent instead a twist-
ing, twenty-month long extraordinarily Japanese series of both secret
and open efforts at revival before the secretariat was finally closed
down. Even then, the parties concerned embraced the all-important fic-
tion that the Council was, although inactive, still alive.* This ser-ies of meetings, conducted at the working level by planning officials,
was initiated at the political level in December 1973 by Yokohama's Asu-
kata less than six months after Tokyo's withdrawal. Asukata, acting as
a stalking horse for Tokyo as much as acting in pursuit of his own in-
terests, proposed that the Council be reformed in such a way as to per-
mit Tokyo's reentry. He called for the creation of a six locality "sub-
committee" which would debate reform proposals. Tokyo agreed to partic-
ipate "because it was composed only of the Bay Area localities, and not
industry."82 Beneath this veneer of only slightly decreased arrogance,
Tokyo was beginning to understand by early 1974, that the alienation of
Chiba was counterproductive. It needed improved relations for a variety
of political aims, some purely local, such as acquisition of land fill
materials,** and some regional, such as collaboration on new transport

*The Japanese have a marvelous variety of ways of referring to the
present condition of the Council. The terms: "the shop is closed," "the
signboard is being held by Chiba," "it is sleeping," etc, all are designed
to avoid recognition of the fact that it is defunct.

**A landfill project cannot be undertaken with garbage-alone, it
must be sandwiched, stratified by layers of sand and gravel, Minobe
had two major landfill projects at that time, the so-called "Dream Is-
land" project, and the construction of embankments designed to protect
links to Narita airport, solution to pressing refuse disposal problems, and coordination of regional opinion on a variety of central schemes.

The meetings of this subcommittee which were to be held on the average of once every month for the better part of the next two years, were officially begun on February 13, 1974. Asukata's representative proposed that the industrial members of the Council be demoted in official rank from "members" to Council "supporters." Yokohama, acting as broker for Tokyo's reentry, argued that "conditions had changed, what is demanded is regional administration for the welfare of the citizens rather than for big development projects." All that was agreed upon at that first meeting, and at a subsequent one two days later, of the Council's Board of Directors (a meeting in which Tokyo also participated), was that there was a need to reexamine the purpose of the Council. This view, according to the records of participants at that conference,* was held by conservative Kanagawa and Chiba as well as by progressive Yokohama and Tokyo. Basic agreement was reached that a way should be sought which would allow for the participation of Tokyo in a regional policy forum. It was

Tokyo's harbor facilities from wave damage. Chiba is the region's best source of sand and gravel.

*The subcommittee deliberations recounted on these pages is based upon the unpublished, hand written record provided by officials of Chiba, Yokohama, and Kawasaki, in addition to interviews with representatives of five of the six localities (Saitama, although nominally a member of the Council, never seemed to have anything to say about its management.) The accounts were too often self-serving and were thus contradictory. For that reason, only those positions corroborated by two or more sources are recounted here. Since Tokyo blamed Kawasaki for the eventual failure of this reform effort (Interview, Tokyo Planning Office Section Chief Watabiki Masataka, November 30, 1978), and since Chiba blamed Tokyo (Interview, Chiba Planning Bureau Chief Yoshida Yuwao, November 2, 1978) and Kawasaki blamed Chiba (Interview, Kawasaki City Planning Bureau Chief Komatsu Hideki, November 10, 1978), the adoption of this "rule of evidence" seems the most prudent course,
agreed that the subcommittee of six localities* would continue its negotiations and that each would submit a reform proposal by early March.

The second meeting of the subcommittee was held on March 1, a clear indication that these were interested parties. It was at that meeting, when the various proposals were first officially unveiled, that a clear split appeared for the first time between the two conservative localities of Chiba and Kanagawa on the one hand, and the progressive localities of Saitama, Kawasaki, Tokyo, and Yokohama, on the other. This partisan cleavage, the only time in the twenty year history of efforts to build the Cross Bay Bridge that there was a coalition between Kanagawa and Chiba, is impossible to understand without knowledge of the intense pressure that was brought to bear upon Kanagawa Governor Tsuda by pro-Bridge interests, particularly the Tokyo Bay Development Committee, within the LDP. Promises of special efforts by the Committee to secure additional road and harbor funds, in addition to a promise of intercession with the National Railway Public Corporation vis-a-vis the improvement of existing facilities, was enough to lead Kanagawa to its new position of solidarity with Chiba.

This position was deceptively straightforward. Chiba and Kanagawa submitted a plan which called for an alteration of the Council's by-laws, a change which would erase the names of the six major localities listed in Article One of the document. The plan called for a subsequent

*There is some question as to Tokyo's actual status at these meetings, just as there is some question as to whether it had actually withdrawn from the Council. Chiba claimed that since it had not accepted Tokyo's notice that Tokyo was still a full member, Tokyo claimed that since it was no longer a Council member that it was merely an observer, a formal procedural distinction which, as we shall see, often served them well in this setting of highly ritualized conflict.
"joint withdrawal" of all six localities from the organization. Chiba and Kanagawa implied that they would afterwards be interested in then joining a "Big Six" Council, something which created the impression that they were calling for a "dual" Council structure, one composed only of the local governments and one which would be composed of the business interests which would remain in the evacuated original Council. In fact, however, there is no evidence that either Chiba or Kanagawa was ever committed to participating in the locality-centered council which was the core of the Yokohama plan.

Yokohama argued at that March 1 meeting, and again at subsequent meetings which were held throughout the spring and summer of 1974, that it makes little difference whether the original council were first dissolved before the new one is created, or whether the new one was to be merely the revision of the old one, elevating the status of the localities. Yokohama put it plainly: "If we cannot reorganize the Council, we should dissolve it." At the July 2 meeting of working level representatives, however, Chiba finally admitted frankly that "There are certain conditions within our prefecture which prevent us from being able to give any serious consideration to a dissolution of the Council." Interestingly, at that July 2 meeting, Tokyo announced that it was ready to go along with the Chiba plan. This change of heart was based upon a secret June 18 Chiba-Tokyo bureau chief conference at which Tokyo agreed to give up the idea of destroying the Council, a necessary condition for the adoption of the Yokohama plan. It seemed all set, Minobe was ready to give in in order to get joint movement with Chiba on other, more pressing issues. But it now seemed apparent that Chiba was planning to **rejoin** the old Council after first engineering the joint with-
drawal of the Big Six. Indeed, Chiba refused to rule out that possibility, and the talks were again stalled, this time by a Yokohama-Chiba confrontation, a confrontation difficult to understand, given the conciliatory stances each had displayed to this point.

In spite of subsequent revisions in both the Yokohama and the Chiba plans, the talks remained stalled until the end. Probably the best explanation for the new, unexpected impasse is also the most simple. By the end of the summer of 1974, the localities were preparing to convene their final assembly sessions before the next major round of nation-wide local elections, slated for the following April. The talks were frozen to allow the electoral dust to settle. When the dust had settled, there was a new conservative governor in Chiba, a progressive governor in Kanagawa for the first time, and a general agreement that all of this had gone on long enough. It was finally agreed in July 1975 that no agreement could be worked out which would both maintain the Council and provide a forum for the Big Six Bay Area local governments. On July 29, with Tokyo conveniently resurrecting its withdrawal: "We would like to abstain from offering an opinion because we have already submitted our withdrawal," with Kanagawa suggesting that; "It would be different if even one locality were avidly arguing for support of the Council, but in the absence of such support we believe a natural extinction is best," with Yokohama concurring, and with Kawasaki and Saitama wholly indifferent, Chiba (the inheritor of the Council chairmanship) moved to close the secretariat.* Throughout this long and unsuccessful search for

* The announcement of the decision to shut down the secretariat produced a characteristically petulant letter of protest from Ito Mitsuo who, as Secretariat Chief, had the most to lose from the move which took effect on August 11. Vastly overstating the successes of the Council and the consensus on Bay Area development which it was supposed to have generated, Ito damned the loss of his job with honorifics and humility.
translocal consensus* not a single voice had been heard from the business community which had originally championed the Council idea. Its time had long past, even if the Bay Area localities were having a hard time coming to grips with the shape of its successor.

This inaction proved to facilitate translocal cooperation in the Bay Area rather than to hinder it. During the subsequent lull in activity on the creation of a new organ, Tokyo and Chiba joined together in a variety of other forums, cooperating for the first time or pollution control measures, on Narita-bound transport construction, and on finding a joint solution to problems of water resource acquisition. As long as the Bridge issue did not arise, and as long as the resurrection of the Council was not raised for discussion, the Bay Area localities, led by virtually the same personalities as at the time of Tokyo's withdrawal,** were able to cooperate as never before.

The business interests and Chiba were silent for a time on the Council, but they were still very much behind the Cross Bay Bridge Plan. In 1977, with the economy recovering, with former Prime Minister Tanaka

*This process of consensus building was not at all unlike the textbook descriptions. No agreement could be reached until all the participants first could agree to agree. To that end there were innumerable subtle shifts and splitting of nuances. To the "non-consensual" mind it all seems a bit bizarre that so much energy should be wasted for an organ not empowered to make binding policy decisions, but the posturing and the obscuring of motives each provides a margin for maneuver which Western political actors do not so routinely cultivate. It is a mechanism used to both contain conflict as well as to provide each participant a sense of having secured his objectives. If definite action is taken, on the other hand, there are bound to be winners and losers, an outcome which is made unnecessary by these tactics.

**Minobe was, of course, still governor of Tokyo, and Komori was still standing behind his every action. The new Chiba governor, Kawakami Koichi, had in fact been the Chiba vice-governor who declined to accept Tokyo's formal notice of withdrawal when it was personally delivered to him in 1973. Only the rancor and stridency was gone.
seemingly at a comfortable distance from power and preoccupied with his bribery trial, with Fukuda Takeo, the first chairman of the LDP's Tokyo Bay Development Committee, now Prime Minister, and with the once querulous Minobe now eager to cooperate with Chiba,* the time seemed right for a new offensive on the Bridge. This offensive took three separate paths, all variants on the horizontal strategy designed to generate a regional consensus, this time for both demand and policy making.

The offensive was a factoring out of the horizontal strategy into its administrative, political, and business components. This time, in a major change from past uses of this tool, the administrative component was engineered at the initiative of the localities themselves. In October 1977 Chiba governor Kawakami dispatched his Planning Bureau Chief Yoshida to solicit support from the other three Bay Area governors and to "bind the roots" for creation of this "second generation council."

The first to embrace the idea was Kanagawa governor Nagasu, an enigmatic figure who apparently saw a new Council as an opportunity for the Bay Area localities to realize the joint regional policy management organ which he had been advocating for several years.** To that end Nagasu

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*In addition to Minobe's desire to get Chiba's permission for the extension of the Number 10 Tokyo Subway into the New Towns of Chiba and beyond to the new airport, there were two other mitigating concerns. One was Tokyo's desire, shared by Kanagawa, to have the older Haneda airport relocated to a site further removed from the coast. The other, also directly involving Chiba's cooperation, is the fact that Tokyo will completely run out of landfill space within its own administrative borders by 1985. With no more space to dump the enormous volume of refuse which Tokyo generates daily, Minobe had begun eyeing a 1,000 hectare landfill island scheme to be situated within Chiba's borders. Chiba has the rights to approximately ten times the amount of Bay frontage that Tokyo has. There is every reason to expect and understand a softening of Tokyo's attituded toward the Bridge scheme in the face of this possible tradeoff.

** He also apparently saw it as an opportunity to help out an old buddy. He and Kawakami entered the old Imperial Naval Academy together
joined Kawakami in efforts to gain the approval of the other localities.*

In one sense the formation of this new Council was as much an act of reconciliation by Chiba as by the progressive localities across the Bay. As related above the latter had earlier championed the idea of a locality-centered council, under the terms of the Yokohama Plan in 1973-1975.**

In any event, the public revival of the Council idea was staged on a January 1, 1978 television program on which the four Bay Area governors appeared. At that time all four governors acknowledged that no local government alone could deal effectively with the problems of waste disposal, roads, water, and housing in the Bay Area, and they publicly pledged to work toward creating a new regional council.

There was little time wasted in initiating the preparatory conferences, the first being held on February 15, 1978 exactly four years after the start of the similar, though abortive effort described earlier. By the following September a number of things had been agreed upon, not the least important of which was the (familiar) decision to refrain from the formal establishment of the new organization until after the nationwide local elections of April 1979. In the meantime these working level of-

as classmates in the prewar years. This is a part of Nagasu's éducation which, not surprisingly for a "leftist" economist, does not appear on the flyleaf of his books.

*Initially the Chiba effort was directed only at the four prefectures. Yokohama and Kawasaki joined the fledgling Council's planning sessions only at the second meeting at the urging of their own prefecture, Kanagawa.

**One Chiba official acknowledged that: "It is true that we are just now coming to advocate a Big Six Council, and that if we had come straight along the route of the first Yokohama plan that we'd be arriving at the same place." (Interview, Suzuki Hitoshi, November 16, 1978, Chiba Prefecture Planning Bureau Planning Section Chief.)
ficials had discussed a variety of issues as potential foci for the new Council's efforts.* Included among them were region-wide earthquake and disaster relief measures, the creation of a grand, regional transport plan, coordination of freight movements among the ports of Tokyo Bay, landfill regulation, waste disposal, the removal of Haneda airport, and protection for the Bay's maritime industry. Although each of these issues is already being discussed in a variety of joint local and/or central forums, this promised to provide these disparate concerns a single, coherent organizational framework. In particular, Chiba's proposal that the first task of a new Council be the creation of a "Capital Region White Paper" which would provide an analysis of the region's needs from the coordinated point of view of the major localities, was especially promising. It signaled that the localities were prepared for the first time to not only join together in demand making upon the center, but in providing the programs which would form the core of those demands, programs which had previously been supplied to them for their support.

In the end, however, that was too much to expect. The Six Prefecture and City Chief Executives' Conference which was formally established on July 26, 1979 was not designed as a working level regional policy organ. The mayors and governors opted instead for the creation of a body which would be more fluid, and which would force them to sit and discuss regional policy issues at the political level several times annually. Although working level activity was not ruled out, specific themes as foci for Conference activities were rejected in favor of a more ad hoc approach toward regional consultations on issues of common

*Chiba was the only locality which sent a Construction Bureau official as its representative, underlining the importance of the Bridge Project in its conception of this new forum.
concern.

The most important of these issues of mutual concern, to Chiba at least, found warm support from the newly elected Tokyo governor. Where- as Minobe had seemed ready to drop his objections to the Cross Bay Bridge Project in an effort to gain concessions from Chiba in other areas, Su- zuki Shunichi lost no time in actively promoting the Project. On May 9, just one month after taking office, Suzuki hosted a visit from Governors Kawakami of Chiba and Hata of Saitama as well as Mayors Saigo of Yoko- hama and Itō of Kawasaki at his Tokyo offices. He announced his support for the formation of the Conference, which was no surprise, but he ad- ded that the Cross Bay Bridge Project should be among the first priori- ties, a move which if not a complete surprise, was certainly a dramatic acceleration of the nascent change in Tokyo policy. Suzuki had met with his policy office staff exactly one week before for a briefing on the history of Tokyo's position on the Bridge, and had listened to their cautious assessment of the merits of the Project. Appointees of the Minobe administration, all either resigned or were transferred within four months.

Suzuki does not seem to have been acting with such dispatch entire- ly without prodding, however. One of his most important backers for the LDP nomination had been former Chairman of the Board of Nippon Steel, Nagano Shigeo. It was Nagano who, as Chairman of Expo 70, Ja- pan's major industrial showplace in Osaka, hired Suzuki to be his chief executive officer in the mid-1960's. The Expo had been their joint success. Even earlier, however, Suzuki had been the top official at the Local Autonomy Agency when it was advocating the Dōshūsei plan for regional consolidation. Nagano was at that time the president of the
Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, that plan's chief non-governmental advocate (See the history of that regional plan in Chapter Four.)

Less than one week after Suzuki's election, the two met at Nagano's office and Nagano received Suzuki's promise to support the Cross Bay Bridge Plan. Nippon Steel finally had gotten the ear of the Tokyo governor for this project.*

Given this new correspondence of interests, Chiba was bound to be even more satisfied that its move toward a new variant of the horizontal strategy, the formation of the new Chief Executives' Conference, would contribute to its bridge building efforts. Falling short of becoming a truly joint regional policy instrument, it was at least a translocal expression indicating the potential for locally initiated regional public policy. It represented the latter day administrative component of the old Council.

The more purely political components which were factored out of the original Council into new translocal forums were quite different in character. One, an expression of central goals and central uses of the horizontal strategy not unlike the original Council itself, was composed of LDP politicians from the various Bay Area localities. The other, organized from among the Socialist prefectural and municipal assemblymen in the region, was a more purely local use of this strategy. In the case

*It was actually not only this project, Suzuki moved quickly and forcefully on a wide range of construction related programs. In early June Suzuki met with Construction Minister Tokai and demanded action on the entire package of Bay Area road construction. (Nikkei Shimbun, June 4, 1979.) Later that month Suzuki gave the green light to the resumption of construction of the controversial Shinjuku subway line, designed to link the Tama and the Chiba suburbs. He also brought all of his construction related bureau chiefs with him for another visit to the Construction Ministry to press for more action on planned road construction projects, including the Cross Bay Bridge (Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 1979).
of the latter, there had earlier been some public support at the national level for the Bridge Project among prominent right wing socialists like Eda Saburō, but it never became anything approaching a Party program. In fact, unlike the LDP which had actively been supporting the Project since 1958, the Socialists have never formally studied the Cross Bay Bridge Project, even for the purposes of opposing it.* In the Bay Area itself, however, the Chiba Socialists have never hidden their support for the Cross Bay Bridge even if they haven't been among the leading advocates of the Project. At a national conference of JSP prefectoral assemblymen in late 1976, the conference chairman, a Funabashi City Socialist representative to the Chiba Prefectural Assembly, proposed the formation of a JSP local representatives' Cross Bay Bridge study group.** The group, formally labeled the Tokyo Bay Problems Study Group (Tōkyōwan Mondai Chōsakai) was jointly inaugurated on April 27, 1977 by the Socialist Party's prefectoral headquarters in Tokyo, Chiba, and Kanagawa. Although some of these local assemblymen are more cautious than others in admitting their support of the Project, all agree that conditions have changed and that the Bridge deserves serious study. A Construction Ministry official, the chief of the Road Project Section, was invited to that first meeting to brief the group on the project. The group itself remains ambiguous in its outright support of the Bridge, saying only

*Although there is no formal support for the Bridge outside of the LDP there is no formal opposition either, something for which the Bridge promoters are very grateful. In particular they fear the potential that the Communist Party has in its widely circulated Akahata daily to mobilize public opinion. Thus, these promoters have periodic meetings with JCP officials to make sure that the Bridge stays a non-issue, or at least to find out beforehand if it is to become an issue.

**It was revealed in an interview with a Nippon Steel official that this local politician is a "friend" of the Bridge Project and has been receiving financial support from Nippon Steel. (Interview, January 23, 1979.)
that "doing nothing and sitting back watching the status quo benefits only the LDP." Participating were the chairmen of the prefectural JSP Assemblymens' Leagues as well as the secretariat chiefs of each locality's JSP headquarters. The important point is that these local politicians, without any initiative taken by the national party, have created an opportunity for the party to support the Project by demonstrating a translocal consensus in support of this piece of regional policy.

Several months after the Socialist assemblymen organized their study group a similar group of LDP local assemblymen was formed. They are similar only in appearance. Whereas the JSP group was locally organized representing a new post-Council form of translocal coalition building for regional policy, the LDP group, like the old Tokyo Bay General Development Council, is entirely the tool of central interests. It is the creation of the national party organization as a cheerleader for the Bridge Project. Organized by LDP Dietman and Chairman of the Party's Tokyo Bay Development Committee, Hamano Seigo, the group was formed to "backup" party efforts to get the Bridge built. Officially known as the Tokyo Bay Problems Research Conference (Tokyo-wan Mondai Chōsa Renraku Kyōgikai), the group was created at a two-day conference of Kanto region LDP local assemblymen in August 1977. Although he is not a local politician, Hamano was chosen as the group's chairman at a later meeting at the LDP Party Headquarters. Thus, Hamano is the chairman of both the Tokyo Bay PARC Committee at the national level, as well as of this league of local assemblymen. The center had decided that "it was time to create demand for the Bridge among the affected localities." Hamano himself acknowledges his initiative:

I have created the group in order to generate a consensus which had been lacking in the past. My purpose is to get the more active support of the Kawasaki and Yokohama assemblymen. We must
raise the clattering and the noise of local interests for this project, and it is only through this united Bay Area voice that we can move forward on the central ministries with our demands. Only now can we effectively confront the Transport, Construction, and Finance Ministries as well as the Public Highway Corporation with our budget requests.\(^93\)

This group held five meetings in 1978, with each one of the local LDP legislators in Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, Yokohama, and Kawasaki as a nominal member. In addition, the LDP Dietmen representing these Bay Area localities were likewise required to attend the conferences. Unlike either the JSP group or the Chief Executives' Conference, this LDP group is local only in name. It is as much a central construct as any created during the period of the conservatives' paradise.*

But it was not only within the LDP that these cheerleading tactics have been resurrected. Nippon Steel, through its Tokyo Cross Bay Project Committee,** was behind the creation in 1978 of a new joint "construction promotion council" by business groups in both the Chiba and the Keihin Coasts. This third business "factor," which had previously been included, along with the administrative and political components in the old Council, was nominally the product of an agreement reached between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Chiba and Kanagawa. Business people on the Keihin side were particularly concerned about the

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*There is some question, however, as to how serious the LDP itself is toward pushing the Bridge Project. There is the feeling among some that the appointment of Hamano, an elderly and not terribly powerful party figure, is itself evidence that the Party cares little for the Bridge. Hamano claims that he was asked by the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council to take the Tokyo Bay post in December 1977, but this in itself is no evidence of the LDP's willingness to push hard on the Bridge issue. In fact, virtually every senior LDP Dietman is the head of some committee or another, either within PARC or within the Diet, or both. Hamano, for all his years in Diet, has only once been in the Cabinet (Justice Minister under Tanaka), and has never achieved great prominence. He is retiring in 1980.

**This is the group which had been created to become the nucleus of the "tertiary sector" Bridge Corporation.
impact the opening of the new international airport in Narita would have upon their economic activity. In an interesting reversal of predicaments, it was the Keihin side which for the first time came to feel isolated and distant from the region's major transport center. With the opening of the new airport, Yokohama and Kawasaki were suddenly two hours from the region's only international airport, and these Keihin leaders, realizing that the Cross Bay Bridge would reduce that distance by more than half, are making the Project a priority for the first time. To that end a translocal Bridge promotion organization was created in September 1978, with the membership of more than 250 influential business leaders on both coasts. This "Tokyo Cross Bay Bridge Construction Promotion Council" (Tōkyō Wan Ōdan Dōro Kenseisu Sokushin Kyōgikai), a P.R.-generating, demand-making private interest group, is the third and final variant of the horizontal strategy to be factored out of the original Council in the face of changing political and economic conditions.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL POLICY IN TOKYO BAY

This chapter has explored the regional policy process by focusing upon a major construction project which has not, may not, and perhaps even should not be undertaken. The 'has not' and the 'may not' are preeminently political issues. There are no simple answers why the Tokyo Cross Bay Bridge remains unbuilt. Some are inclined to point to the opposition by leftists at the local level, but that is by far the most flatulent explanation. Many progressives found themselves directly or indirectly supporting the Project, and much of the opposition was not local. Moreover, much of the local opposition was not from the left at all, but from conservative politicians on the Keihin Coast. Others are apt to
attribute it to the financial crisis which followed the Oil Shock, but this recession failed to prevent the 1977 decision to go ahead with the 840 billion yen Honshū-Shikoku Bridge Project, similar to the Tokyo Bridge in both scale and impact, but built as a reflection of the rural priorities of the LDP. In contrast, it has been in no one's interest to point to the role of former Prime Minister Tanaka and his rural based leadership. Although the reasons for this are complex, the conserva-
tives prefer to present as unified a face as possible, blaming the in-
action on fiscal conditions, while the progressives like to claim "cre-
dit" for themselves. Lost in most explanations is the lack of consen-
sus which has plagued the LDP as much as it has been reflected in di-
vided interests within the region.

Lost also has been anything approaching a disinterested appraisal of the need for the Cross Bay Bridge. (This is, of course, the "should not" question raised above.) Any appraisal of the demand for such a bridge would have to start with an examination of the patterns of in-
tercourse between the two coasts, and here we see highly mixed config-
urations. In terms of traffic, the two coasts are of little importance to each other's activity.

TABLE 6-9

TOKYO BAY REGION TRAFFIC FLOW (1971)
(In terms of percentage of total Bay Area traffic from origin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>Saitama</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>Kanagawa</th>
<th>Chiba</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Rounding may leave row totals not equal to 100%)
Source: Tokyo Cross Bay Project Committee (unpublished).
This unimportance is reflected equally in data prepared by Kawasaki City, which of all the Kanagawa localities is already the closest physically to Chiba, and which would become the most directly linked to Keiyō if the Bridge were built. Of the traffic originating in Kawasaki in 1968, over half was bound for Kawasaki itself, thirty percent for Tokyo to the immediate north, sixteen percent for Yokohama to the south, less than three percent for other Kanagawa destinations, and less than one percent for Chiba. To underline this, it should also be pointed out that regular car ferry service between Kawasaki and Kisarazu, the two termini for the proposed Cross Bay Bridge, did not begin until 1965. There was no real demand for this sort of direct link between the two coasts, at least until the Chiba combinato was established.

It is in this, industrial, direction where we must look to understand the real demand for the Bridge. Vehicular traffic between the two coasts may be very low, but shipping is very high:

TABLE 6-10

TOKYO BAY SHIPPING PATTERNS AMONG THE BAY’S SIX PORT FACILITIES
(1974)
(In terms of percentage of total tonnage of intraBay shipping from origin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>Chiba</th>
<th>Kisarazu</th>
<th>Kawasaki</th>
<th>Yokohama</th>
<th>Yokosuka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORIGIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisarazu</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Rounding may leave row totals not equal to 100%)

Source: Ibid.
In terms of absolute tonnage, the shipping which originates on the Chiba Coast bound for the Keihin coastal ports (14 million tons in 1974) is only slightly higher than the 13.7 million tons which originates in Keihin bound for the opposite shore. Both are rather important in terms of the shipping which is done within the Bay, particularly in the transport of petrochemicals and steel.

But, it is the nature of this shipping which best demonstrates the potential utility of the Cross Bay Bridge for industrial interests. This heavy level of cross bay shipping is mostly carried out by ships of less than 500 gross tons. Few, if any, of the largest sorts of ships are used for this kind of shipping, the result being that most of what is transported by ship across the bay could more economically be transported by truck if the Bridge were built (see Figures 6-6 and 6-7):
FIGURE 6-6

SHIPPING PATTERNS IN TOKYO BAY
Ships of more than 3,000 gross tons

FIGURE 6-7

SHIPPING PATTERNS IN TOKYO BAY
Ships of up to 500 gross tons

Source: Ibid.
Presented with these sorts of patterns it becomes abundantly clear why the question of the objective need for the Bridge differs substantially depending upon whether one is an industrialist or a politician.

But we learn far more from this study of the regional policy process than the predictable fact that objective needs are but a small part of the highly political regional policy calculus. We learn first of all that it is impossible to understand this regional policy process without understanding a complex pattern of extralocal linkages. In a political system of more complete decentralization a study of the regional policy process would involve the center far less than the present one does. In Japan, however, regional policy which doesn't involve the center is of peripheral significance; the Cross Bay Bridge or any major regional project could no more be undertaken without central participation than without local support. To the extent that conventional wisdom directs our attention to the role of the center it serves us well, but to the extent that it distracts us from the role of the "periphery," it serves us poorly. Our first lesson, then, is that a balance of both leadership and support must be struck across and within levels of government in the regional policy process, a balance which defies simple labels or legal-formal abstractions. Even if regional policy has less to do with the region than with the center, (and that is not necessarily the case), it has far more to do with coalitions among actors at and across both levels than it has to do with one or the other alone.

The best embodiment of these complex relationships was the Tokyo Bay General Development Council and its variety of offspring. Neither a central nor a regional organ, but a creation by the center of regional interests for both, its purpose was to tailor demand making to the sec-
tional centralization of the Japanese bureaucracy. This involved as much a creation as a direction of demands. At later times, with the matura-
tion of local interests, we found these same regional actors acting in concert at their own initiative. We are led to conclude that the hori-
zontal strategy as an important, indeed necessary tool for demand making for regional policy, belongs to those who would employ it, although those with the most experience and success in employing it are at the center. Whatever else is to be reasonably said about this horizontal strategy, it is made both indispensable within, as well as incomprehensible out-
side of, this vertical structure of Japanese public administration. This is obvious from the experience in the case of the Cross Bay Bridge Pro-
ject: even the few translocal coalitions created apart from central initiative were created to support and thus to steer the Bridge through the budgetary maze at the center. Likewise, while some regional poli-
cies (like the Bay Coast Road) seem to have a life of their own, few are approved without demonstrable support from coalitions of local inter-
est. The translocal coalition is no less important for its ostensible powerlessness and seeming inefficacy. Its role as cheerleader is a nec-
essary component of the regional policy process.

Our second lesson learned about the politics of the regional policy process relates to a less conventional wisdom which suggests that parti-
sanship may be an accurate predictor of policy positions. The old saw which holds that "there is no conservative or progressive way to clean the streets" gave way in Japan to the view that progressive localities were identifiably similar in both policy as well as style. All the hub-bub about the rise of progressive local government in Japan in the late 1960's would have little meaning unless this assumption were at its core. But the lesson we learn from an examination of regional politics
in Tokyo Bay over a twenty year period is that partisanship is more often a red herring than a useful guide to the regional policy process. We found that partisanship was often a mask of convenience for more fundamental interests, seldom relating either to policy or to patterns of extralocal relations.

Let us review the evidence provided by the Tokyo Bay case. We find that localities have basic interests, explainable in terms of the demographic and economic imperatives which confront them; these interests do not greatly change. Chiba socialists are apt to be pro-Bridge, while Kanagawa conservatives are apt to be very cool toward the Project or very avid about it, depending upon the degree to which their locality is directly affected by the construction. Yokohama's progressive leadership is extremely flexible, willing to shelve any ideological predispositions to cooperate with the central ministries and the LDP in order to secure its own pet project. Kawasaki, whether conservative or progressive (and it was both during this twenty year period) saw no overwhelming merit in the Bridge, and has continued to keep its distance. Holding out for a greater central commitment to its infrastructural development, particularly in terms of a lateral transport network, Kawasaki has been consistently coy but not intractable.* Kanagawa, during the turbulent debate on environmental responsibility which threatened at least a partial change in the character of the Council in the early 1970's, was a leader of the environmental side, in spite of the then conservative political affiliations of its governor. It was simply taking the position which its industrial saturation demanded of it. Of all the Bay Area

*According to one promoter of the Bridge, Kawasaki has been anxious to receive an "omiyage" in exchange for support of the Bridge; this is the Japanese term for gift. (Interview, Cross Bay Project Committee official, June 6, 1979.)
localities, only Tokyo, the least directly affected by the Project, could afford a public display of opposition, and even then it was a display designed to serve other ends.

In retrospect it seems obvious that partisanship should not be a useful guide to understanding the regional policy process. The conflicts within the region were not conflicts between progressive and conservative localities, but among localities at different stages of industrial development. It was this difference which was itself responsible for the emergence of the progressive challenge in the Bay Area. It was in the older, earlier industrialized Keihin localities where the pollution and housing issues were most acute, and thus where the progressives had their most natural base of support. Seen in this way it becomes more apparent that both partisanship as well as policy positions derive from a common source, not one from the other.

Had the partisan model been accurate we would have expected a full speed ahead consensus on the Bridge to dominate the regional policy process during the conservatives' paradise, and a united progressive opposition to characterize the horizontal strategy during the progressive ascendency. Neither obtained. There is a metaphor which is widely applied to the progressive mayors who were elected in rapid succession in the mid-late 1960's for their first terms. They are said to have "parachuted down" into hostile territory; they landed in the midst of a conservative assembly and an entrenched bureaucracy. In a sense, then (the argument continues), it was necessary for these isolated chief executives to seek each other out, to rely upon each other for resources and support to a greater degree than do conservative local chief executives who can count on a wider variety of organized and industrial
support. This "parachute thesis" has been used to explain why it was likely that a translocal progressive solidarity would supplant the mutual distrust and competition which had until then characterized relations among localities (See Chapter Five for a review of these dominant views of translocal relations). It became more than just a slogan, it became an article of faith to many that progressive localities would join in coalition to confront the center with a united, popular opposition to conservative policy. The case of Tokyo Bay demonstrates rather convincingly that these sorts of ideas were made more of fluff than of substance. We learn that for all the many important changes which progressives brought to Japanese politics, one thing which did not change was the ways in which political interests are defined.

Minobe argued in 1975 that a progressive coalition of Tokyo Bay Area localities would first of all provide a like-minded administrative base for regional policy problems and that it would secondly serve as the foundation for assaults upon the center.* He was far less sanguine in the months immediately after leaving office when he reached the same conclusion we have reached here:

Why couldn't we succeed in putting together the continuing assembly of progressive local chief executives which we had so many times tried to create? The answer is that although the problems confronting every prefecture and every city seem to be the same, they are in reality reflections of different local conditions. The term 'urban problems' is as complicated and as varied as the number of urban areas.97

Put simply, partisanship is just not a good indicator of local interests and positions in the regional policy process.

*See, for example, the record of the round table discussion in which all of the JSP-supported local chief executives in the Bay Area participated in 1975. (Gekkan Shakaitō, June 1975, pp. 10-24.) See also the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Alan Campbell (Rutgers University 1977) for an example of how scholars also accepted this idea (p. 365).
The third lesson to be gleaned from this twenty year regional policy process in Tokyo Bay concerns political leadership and the leader's role in the management and routinization of conflict. Although it has seldom been synthesized into a single coherent piece of research, there is an uncharacteristic consensus among Japan scholars on the subject of political leadership. Whether the emphasis is placed upon the prominent absence of charismatic leadership throughout Japanese history, or whether the emphasis is placed upon the salience of personality, as versus organizationally based sources of authority, or even if the emphasis is placed upon the abilities of the leader in understanding and guiding complex patterns of interpersonal relations there is unanimous agreement among Western observers that leadership in the world of Japanese politics is directed away from open conflict and towards cooperation whenever possible. This is almost universally tied in most analyses to consensual patterns of decision-making and indirectly to the need for the preservation of at least the fiction of harmony. These sorts of considerations produce leaders in the Japanese context who are superbly competent at masking their true intentions and goals in order that they might never "really" be defeated. The truly accomplished leader, in this view, is the one who can successfully guide those below him in the conflict without ever fully revealing himself to them. The case study recounted on these pages supports most of these notions about political leadership and its relationship to consensus in Japan. If anything it underscores yet another widely accepted notion of leadership in Japan, a notion most clearly set forth by Robert Ward:

Throughout Japanese history political power has seldom, if ever, really been wielded by those whose official position apparently entitled them to do so.
We learn from the very different, yet at the same time remarkably similar cases of Matsunaga Yasuzaemon and Komori Takeshi that the great leader in Japan does not inspire, he conspires, usually behind the scenes and with extraordinary skill. If any exception at all is to be taken with the views of Japanese leadership current in the secondary literature it is that Japanese men of power remain fairly anonymous not because of the unstated dictates of consensual patterns of decision-making, but because they are simply more effective in every way when they stand back from the spotlight, free to nurture the connections and relationships which are at the base of their power. Even considering the restraints imposed by the time consuming process of consensus building, we've found Komori and Matsunaga both succeeding by seizing the opportunity to make their times in their own image. This is a sort of leadership which only partially respects the sorts of constraints which other observers have tended to reify. While we've found that conflict resolution and often conflict itself is at least as ritualized (and as brilliantly executed) as consensus building, we've found that both are clearly related to the leadership skills of individuals. In contrast to many political studies, and in particular contrast to most done in modern Japan, we've found great leaders who clearly have mattered.

There remains to be made a final judgement which must stand quite apart from the three concluding observations offered thus far. That judgement concerns a question which has been begged throughout this analysis, namely, to what extent do we really see fundamental change in the regional policy process in these twenty years and to what extent do we see continuity? Given the obvious changes in the language of local politics during these past twenty years, as reflected in the introduction
of social welfare issues, as well as in the introduction of local opposition and its accompanying assertiveness it seems clear that there have been important new ingredients thrown into the local politics stew. But new ingredients and fundamental change in political style and structure are two different things. This study of the politics of regional policy in Tokyo Bay has spanned a twenty year period, a period of rapid partisan reconfigurations, it has found that these politics of regional policy have almost too perfectly followed the contours of the nationwide local political climate during this period. During the conservative's paradise the localities were pliant, even if not uniformly anxious to see the implementation of some regional policies. The years of the progressive ascendance found them more assertive, although, as we have shown, the shedding of their docility was largely unrelated to partisanship. The recession in stridency which followed found the politics of regional policy in Tokyo Bay equally affected. Conciliation replaced opposition, cooperation replaced conflict here as elsewhere in Japan.

These are certainly changes, but they do not add up to structural reorientation. It has been the not very implicit assumption throughout this analysis that an understanding of the relations among localities, as the constituents of the regional policy process, is essential to an understanding of the process itself. The "horizontal strategy" has been identified as the organized political manifestation of those relations. It is here where these changes seem less convincing. It is here where the continuity seems more striking. While we have seen variations in this strategy (at various times these translocal coalitions were more assertive than at other times, on various occasions we saw initiative for these coalitions coming from below as well as from above), we have never
seen any indication that the structural constraints on the regional policy process have ever changed in the least (see Chapter Three for a detailed examination of these constraints). In the absence of a slackening of these constraints it should not be surprising that the horizontal strategy continues in all its forms to be directed upwards. It should not be surprising that translocal coalitions are created more for supplication than for the generation of local options. It should not be surprising that it continues to be used effectively by the center. One cannot escape the conclusion that for all the important changes which the progressive ascendancy fostered, most conspicuously the changes in local policy priorities, localities remain unable (and undoubtedly also unwilling) to put teeth into their regional policy organs. They've learned how to oppose, but they've as yet shown no sustained inclination to propose and to independently conduct important regional policy programs. In the end, then, the continuity with past patterns of regional policy making must be stressed at least as strongly as the many important changes which have swept across the local political landscape in the postwar period. It is the task of the following, final chapter to make sense of the broadest context of political and administrative translocal relations in Japan.
NOTES


2 See MacDougall and Lewis (forthcoming) for details on land use planning and industrial development in Yokohama.

3 Kaplan (1971).

4 For details on the Law, see Steiner (1965) and Kawanishi (1972).

5 Speech delivered by Okumura Takemasa, Chief, Tokyo Metropolitan Government Port and Bay Bureau, delivered to the Tokyo Bay General Development Council (November 27, 1970).

6 For details on the role of this body, see Otani Ken (1978) and Johnson (1979); for a broader history of the electric power industry, see Shin Denki Jigyō Koza Henshū Iinkai (ed.) (1977) and Osawa Utsuji (1978). Details concerning Matsunaga are based upon interviews with Yoda Susumu of Tokyo Electric (March 24, 1979), Tomono Taketo, former governor of Chiba (February 25, 1979), and Itō Mitsuo, former secretariat chief of the Tokyo Bay General Development Council (September 14, 1978).

7 Other similar schemes appeared in Kansai as well. See Steiner (1965), p. 164.

8 All measurements have been converted into the metric system. For reconversion note that 1 square kilometer = 250 acres = .38 square miles.

9 Muramatsu Michio (1975) suggests there was rather more bureaucratic leadership during this period than this research has been able to uncover. See the following pages for the deluge of government plans which were modeled directly on the private Neo-Tokyo Plan.

10 Interview with LDP official (December 8, 1978).

11 Interview with Nippon Steel Corporation planning official (September 15, 1978).

12 See Ōdan Dōro Kenkyūkai (ed.) (1972).


14 In that plan, existing road patterns were given extensive treatment, and it was noted how Kawasaki's road and rail system was designed for "girding" traffic; virtually all major roads ran North to South. There were no major arteries Eastward to the interior in 1961. (Kawasaki Kensetsu Kyoku, 1961, pp. 27, 29). Even by 1968 only one of
Kawasaki's nine major roads was designed to traverse the length of the city (Kawasaki Shi Keikaku Kyoku, 1968).


16 Kawasaki Shi Kowan Kyoku (1966).


18 In addition to those already listed, the Bridge Project is also conspicuously missing from the Kawasaki Port and Harbor Plans (Kawasaki Kō Kowan Kanrisha, ed., 1967) and the Kawasaki section of the Kanagawa prefectural collection of urban plans of its cities (Kanagawaken Dobokubu Keikakuka, 1968).

19 Interviews with Hamano Seigo, LDP Diet Representative (March 14, 1979); Tamura Akira, Yokohama City Chief Engineer (April 3, 1979); Arai Yoichi, Transport Ministry Harbor Bureau Section Chief (February 22, 1979).

20 Interview with LDP official (January 11, 1979).

21 Interview with Itō Mitsuo (September 12, 1978).

22 This entire account of the nemawashi process is based upon interviews in 1978 and 1979 with the participating LDP official who requested not to be named.

23 Interview with Watanabe Mamoru, vice-director of Kanagawa Prefecture Engineering Bureau (December 1, 1978).


25 Interview with Itō Mitsuo, former chief of Tokyo Bay General Development Council Secretariat (September 12, 1978).

26 Interview with Tomono Taketo, former Chiba governor (February 5, 1979).

27 Kawasaki City Planning Bureau mimeographed records.

28 Interview with Naitō Kunio, Editor, Mainichi Shimbun, (January 10, 1979).

29 See Campbell (1977) for details on the Japanese budgetary process.

30 A log of the Council's daily activities was published in its annual report, Kaihō.

31 Interview with Ebata Masagi, Tokyo Metropolitan Government Port and Harbor Bureau Chief Engineer (December 26, 1978).

32 Ibid.
33 See Simcock (1972) and McKean (1975).

34 For details on the Settsu and other cases, see Steiner (1980).

35 By far the best and most detailed treatment of the rise of progressive local government during this period is MacDougall (1980). See also Steiner, et. al. (1980).

36 See Steiner, et. al. (1980), Chapter Nine, for a detailed look at the national significance of these two victories.

37 Tokyo (1971).

38 Interview with Arai Yoichi, Transport Ministry Port and Harbor Bureau, Environment Section Chief (February 22, 1979).


41 Interview with LDP official (May 2, 1979).


43 Interview with LDP official and participant at that PARC meeting (December 8, 1978).

44 Interview with Humana Seigo, LDP Dietman (March 14, 1979).

45 Interview with Tamura Akira, Yokohama City Chief Engineer (April 3, 1979).

46 See Alan Campbell (1977), pp. 365-367, for a list of the half-dozen or more translocal organizations which were established in the Bay Area during this period to battle pollution.

47 Interview with former governor Minobe (September 20, 1979).

48 Interview with Watanabe Mamoru, Deputy Chief, Kanagawa Prefecture Engineering Bureau and former Kanagawa representative to the Council's sectional conference (December 1, 1978).

49 Tōkyōwan no Hozen to Kaihatsu no Susumubeki Hōkō.

50 Much of the account of Komori's life and activities which follows is based upon "The Staff Officer in the Shadow," appropriately appearing as Chapter One of Naito's (1975) account of the Minobe governorship. The only other published sources are the rather more sensational accounts found in the Japanese weeklies. See Gendai (April 1975); Matsuyama (1978); Honda (1975); Dokuho Shimbun (March 30, 1964); Shukan Shincho (June 5, 1971); Shukan Sankei (March 27, 1975); and Shukan Sankei (March 10, 1977). The repetition in these articles is great, as Komori has granted few
press interviews in the past decade. For his own statement of his goals for Tokyo, written before Minobe became governor, see Komori (1966).

51 See, for example: Ōuchi, Hyoe (ed.) Nihon Infureshon no Kenkyū, Nihon Shihonshugi no Kenkyū, and Nihon Keizai wa Jo Naru Ka.

52 Interview with former Tosei Chōsakai official (October 17, 1978) and Nippon Steel executive (November 24, 1978). See also Naitō Kunio (1975), Chapter One.

53 Asahi Shimbun (July 7, 1979).

54 Asahi Shimbun (July 8, 1979).

55 Interview with former governor Minobe (September 20, 1979).

56 His personal connections enabled Minobe to meet Fukuda regularly during their respective tenures as the leading public figures in the two opposing camps (Asahi Shimbun, July 14, 1979).

57 Chiba Nippo (July 11, 1973).

58 Interview (September 20, 1979).


60 For a more complete discussion of the sympathetic role of the press during the progressive ascendency, see MacDougall (1980).

61 Mainichi Shimbun, editorial (July 11, 1973) and Sankei Shimbun (July 7, 1973).


63 Tokyo Shimbun (July 7, 1973).

64 Interview with Komatsu Hideki, Kawasaki City Planning Bureau Chief (November 10, 1978).

65 Interview with Tamura Akira, Yokohama City Chief Engineer (April 3, 1979).

66 See the July 18, 1973 issue of Shūkan Tocho for the juxtaposition of these two stories.

67 Asahi Shimbun (July 7, 1973).

68 Tokyo Shimbun (July 7, 1973).

69 Chiba Nippo (July 12, 1973).

70 Asahi Shimbun (July 14, 1973).

For a short statement of the evolution of this, see the Asahi Shim bun (May 28, 1979).

It also did not help him when in 1977 he lost his prefectural assembly majority.


See the Asahi Shim bun (June 30, 1978) for a discussion of this.

See the Asahi Shim bun (May 28, 1978) for the full list.

See the Asahi Shim bun (April 4, 1978) and the Asahi Ja anaru (June 30, 1978) for detailed accounts of these changes.


See Johnson (1978).

Interview with Yamamoto Takao, Deputy Director, Cross Bay Bridge Project Committee (August 3, 1979).

For details on the complicated administrative and political interests involved in the Narita transport issue, see Ek onomisto (September 19, 1978).

Interview with Watabiki Masataka, Tokyo Metropolitan Government representative to this subcommittee (August 22, 1978).

Asahi Shim bun (February 16, 1974).

Interview with committee official (February 2, 1979).

Ibid.

Unpublished Chiba Prefecture Planning Bureau data.

Ibid.

Interview with Tokyo representative to that meeting, Shibata Tokue (November 18, 1978).

Chiba Shim bun (October 12, 1977) and interview with Yoshida Yuwao (November 2, 1978).

Interview with a participant at the meeting (April 12, 1979).


Interview with Suda Katsuo, Chiba Prefectural Assemblyman (December 11, 1978).

Interview with Hamano Seigo (March 14, 1979).
Kawasaki-Shi Keikakukyoku (ed.) (1968), p. 81.

Samuels (1976) reviews the literature on partisanship and local public policy.

See MacDougall (1980); Steiner, et. al. (1979); and Aqua (1979) for a variety of positions on this.

Asahi Shimbun (July 13, 1979).

Silberman and Harootunian (eds.) (1966) compiled a loose collection of essays on the topic, however.

Reischauer (1977), pp. 240, 329. The Western literature is not entirely without reference to great and charismatic figures in Japanese history (note Iwata's 1964 study of Okubo Toshimichi, the "Bismarck of Japan"), but these sorts of great figures are usually seen as such only by their biographers.


Scalapino and Masumi (1967), pp. 18-19.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

We have done a great many different things on these pages. We have discussed the politics of three separate policy arenas: local, regional, and national, over most of the postwar; we have elaborated the legal-formal as well as many of the institutionalized administrative practices that lack juridical bases, we have identified patterns of intergovernmental communication which challenge previous conceptions; and we have taken our understanding of all of these and have focused more narrowly upon one particular regional policy process, the case of Tokyo Bay. The unifying thread in all of this, of course, was identified in the Introductory Chapter many pages ago. Our premise has always been that essential to an understanding of regional policy is a prior understanding of the ways in which localities get together to do things or to otherwise have influence. We have learned a great deal, not the least of which is that they do so in an extraordinary variety of ways, with an extraordinary variety of goals, and as much for their own purposes as for the purposes of central actors. We have not found that horizontal linkages are consistently of transcendent importance in the policy process, but that was not our expectation. We have found instead that these translocal coalitions are essential tools of both central and local actors within (and in the Japanese case perhaps because of) the more generally vertical structure of public administration. The translocal coalition appears to be a necessary, although not in itself sufficient, artifice for regional public policy. Of course, we have also learned much more in the process, and it is the pur-
pose of this chapter to offer a synthetic presentation of these findings.

In order to do so it would be best to again focus out, away from both the context of particular regions and away from horizontal linkages in only the regional policy arena. We want to return to these relations in a systemic context in order to present a functional classification of translocal coalitions.* Each of the following functional types is as fully relevant to regional policy as it is relevant to the Japanese policy process more generally. When appropriate, each will be accompanied by short descriptions of its more salient examples. As we discovered with the case of the Tokyo Bay General Development Council, any single coalition of localities can perform any variety of functions over time or at the same time. That is why the following addresses the functions of such coalitions, not merely the coalitions themselves.

TABLE 7-1
THE FUNCTIONS OF TRANSLOCAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COALITIONS

I. ADMINISTRATIVE

A) Implementation
B) Diffusion

II. POLITICAL

A) Acquisition
B) Support
C) Opposition
D) Proposition

IMPLEMENTATION

In purely functional terms, the clearest distinction to be made is between the articulation of policy, an administrative function, and the

*The indomitable reader will recognize that this sort of analysis is suggested by the model presented in Chapter Two.
articulation of interests, a more political one. This research has demonstrated that there is substantial translocal activity in both. Chapter Three was directed at exploring the first of these translocal administrative functions, the joint implementation of local public policy. We found that the incidence of such joint policy, based upon the legal-formal requirements of the Local Autonomy Law, increased by more than thirty percent per year between 1960-1975, a rate nearly twice that of the increase in local expenditures during the same period. We also found in Chapter Four that these sorts of joint policy formulae have long been promoted by the central ministries. The implementation of joint local policy has been intimately related to central efforts to regionalize (and hopefully to rationalize) local public policy. Central officials have assumed the leadership in this form of translocal coalition building because they seem to fundamentally believe most local public administration to be inefficient. The use of the localities' administrative capabilities as agents, as contractors for central schemes, is nowhere more clearly in focus. We learn a great deal about the vertical nature of Japan's public administration by exploring this particular form of horizontal relationship.* This implementation function is seldom an autonomous, locally initiated form of translocal coalition. It is seldom taken without the guidance and financial support of prefectural and/or central authorities. That this function

*See Yorimoto (1974) for an interesting analysis of this in the case of trash disposal and garbage treatment plants; and see Takayose (1975) for a more general treatment as well as an examination of the case of Hanshin (the Osaka-Kobe region). One very interesting contemporary example not related to the Ministry of Home Affairs is the so-called Phoenix Plan for solid waste disposal in Tokyo Bay. It is a plan that has engendered a fierce competition between the Transport and Welfare Ministries. Both have encouraged the utilization of joint policy formulae in an effort to gain allies from among the localities to be affected by the massive project.
has been expanding markedly in the postwar tells us much about the re-
gionalization of public policy but much less about the autonomy of either
interest or policy articulation in the Japanese policy process.

DIFFUSION

The second identifiable administrative function of translocal coal-
itons was the subject of Chapter Five. It concerns the diffusion of
public policy. Our survey of nearly five hundred local officials nation-
wide indicated quite clearly that localities rely at least as much upon
each other for ideas and innovations as they rely upon higher levels of
government. It also indicated the many ways in which they rely upon each
other more than upon the center. The survey suggested that the most com-
mon channel of such policy communication is informal, one dependent upon
the quality of interpersonal links among public officials.

In spite of conventional wisdom to the contrary, the extent of such
translocal diffusion should not have been surprising. There has been
systematic nationwide notification among localities of changes, in by-
laws and ordinances, independent of central direction, at least since
1910 when the National Association of Mayors first resolved to introduce
such a practice. It was resolved at that same 1910 conference that cities
would share budgetary and migration data as well.1 Over time these sorts
of formal, information-centered practices began to evolve into the more
narrow, functionally specific sorts of associations which are so numerous
today. The important thing to note is that Japan, which is frequently
cited for the underdevelopment of its horizontal associations, has not
been any later in developing these professional associations than the Unit-
ed States, for example. There were only five functionally organized na-
tional forums for local public officials in existence in the United States
prior to the turn of the Twentieth Century. By 1930 there were just over thirty. While the professional associations in the United States provide somewhat different services for their members (they are a prime source of job placement information, an unnecessary function in Japan with its lifetime employment practices), these associations had to wait for the maturation of mass communications systems before they could begin to proliferate in earnest in both the United States and Japan.

Although few respondents in our sample suggested that such horizontal associations were themselves the sources of their policy ideas, the sheer number and variety of these organizations suggest that these forums provide the interpersonal contacts which were cited as prime sources of policy relevant communications. In one of the few studies designed to count and classify these sorts of horizontal forums, the Local Government Workers' Union-related Japan Institute of Local Government concluded in 1978 that "there are as many regional associations as stars in the sky." This investigation explored only those associations officially supported by public funds, and examined every sort of translocal organization in two wards, eleven cities, and five towns. Although their purpose of highlighting the uses of public funds and public employees was different than ours, their catalogue of these organs is extremely instructive. We find, for example, that these eighteen localities combined to financially support almost 1,000 translocal organizations, some strictly regional, others nation-wide. Setagaya Ward in Tokyo alone accounted for more than half of these, spending in excess of 1.4 billion yen for their support in fiscal 1975. Included in this list are such organizations as the Tokyo Ward, Bay Area, and Kanto Region Planning Section Chief, Pollution Section Chief, Transportation Bureau Chief, and General Affairs Bureau Chief Associations. According to
different data, Tokyo belonged in 1978 to twenty-seven separate transprefectural regional associations of Bureau and Division Chiefs alone. All were designed to facilitate the transfer and exchange of policy ideas for the region in each of ten different functional areas.  

Forums of this sort are frequently criticised for their lack of administrative authority. A 1971 blue ribbon panel study prepared for Governor Minobe lambasted the incomplete state of Bay Area regional cooperation. It argued that for all the forums designed to promote discussion, there are none which attempt to regionally manage public policy.  

Such criticisms, heard as much from the left as from the right, are in one sense on the mark; but in another sense, they may be aimed at the wrong target. We learned earlier that localities are extremely jealous guardians of the limited authority they do have. We have further discovered that when localities move toward the joint implementation of public policy, by surrendering their sole authority in a policy area they also make central and/or prefectural tutelage more complete.* What these criticisms fail to recognize is what we have learned from our survey, namely that even if these translocal associations are without authority, they provide the contacts, and thus the basis, for the lateral diffusion of policy ideas and innovations. As we earlier demonstrated, this diffusion may in turn be responsible for helping to sustain the vitality and dynamism which characterize local public administration in a structurally centralized Japan.

ACQUISITION

Initiative of a more purely political sort is preserved in the activ-

*See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of these mechanisms.
ity of budgetary acquisition groups. These are the most ubiquitous of all translocal coalitions. They may be ad hoc collections of like-minded chief executives or they may be fully institutionalized organs for collective demand-making. They are in either event directed upwards, usually at the Finance Ministry and at one functionally related ministry, as well as toward the major political parties. The chief tool of the acquisition group is the petition. These petitions are most numerous and these groups are most active each December at budget time when the ministries and the Diet offices are flooded with both. Unlike the "Cheerleader" groups which will be discussed below under the rubric of the support function, these budgetary acquisition groups are directed at, not by the center.

It is not unusual for localities with common interests to join together to focus their combined influence upon central agencies and politicians. Moreover, these issues need not be regional in nature. For example, the five prefectures in which were located six of Japan's designated cities in 1967 organized themselves to secure additional funds from the center. They argued that the designated cities, by virtue of their special taxing powers, were effectively siphoning off prefectural revenues. The diversion of these revenues, the prefectures argued, prevented them from providing effective regional programs. In other examples, the mandarin orange producing prefectures organized in 1971 to resist the importation of grapefruit from the United States and to secure additional subsidies for orange production; in addition, both the most sparsely populated as well as the most densely populated prefectures each have established organizations to make known their special needs. There are also ad hoc organizations of cities with highly mobile populations, of cities with an excessive reliance upon single industries like coal, fishing, and
rice production, and even of localities which are hosts to civilian air-
port facilities. These sorts of ad hoc coalitions, while not as innumer-
able as the special interests which they represent, are extremely varied.
They share in common only their target - the central government - and
their tool - the petition. All also, of course, rely heavily upon the
good offices of their Diet representatives.

The other sorts of budgetary acquisition groups that are formed from
translocal coalitions are rather more institutionalized. They are also,
of necessity, more generalized in their appeals to the center. The most
prominent of these are the Six National Associations of Local Bodies (Chihe
Roku Dantai, hereafter CRD). Their names and the dates of their founding
are listed in Table 7-2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Founding Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Mayors (NAM)</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Prefectural Assembly Chairmen (NAPAC)</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Towns and Villages (NATV)</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of City Assembly Chiefs (NACAC)</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Governors (NAG)</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Town and Village Assembly Chiefs (NATVAC)</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They exist at the regional levels, but are far more active in the national

*Due to the sharp break between the pre and postwar periods for these
organizations, their founding dates are sometimes reported differently,
according to the source and the particular manifestation of the organi-
bation. The dates reported here are those of the founding of the earliest
nation-wide ancestor of the existing body. All dates are confirmed by the
institutional history of that organization when one exists. See the fol-
lowing: Zenkoku Shichōkai (ed.) (1968); Zenkoku Chijikai (ed.) (1977);
policy arena. These organizations have undergone a great deal of reform-
ination in both their structure and their functions since their inception,
due to a variety of mergers, amalgamations, and changing political condi-
tions, but it was the American Occupation (SCAP) which really gave these
organizations a boost in the immediate postwar. Distrustful of Home
Ministry bureaucrats, SCAP turned to these associations and relied direct-
ly upon them for much of the implementation of occupation policy. SCAP
used them quite aggressively, giving them standing representation on im-
portant national administrative committees such as the Local Systems
Investigation Council* and the Town and Village Amalgamation Promotion
Committee. In addition, each of the six CRD chairmen sat as members of
the Local Administration Committee (Chiho Gyosei Linkai) which was created
in the wake of the dismantling of the Home Ministry. The CRD emerged in
the immediate postwar from its semi-governmental torpor at SCAP's direc-
tion, and its leaders became some of the most influential executives of
MacArthur's local policy. All six were formally reinaugurated after the
war as part of the SCAP effort to nurture interest groups and to introduce
autonomy to Japan.

The CRD are nevertheless frequently criticized for their close ties
to the central government. The ties are close. The Secretary General and
the Deputy Secretary General of each of the six organizations is an amakudari
appointment from either the Home Affairs Ministry or the Prime Minister's
office.** In addition to the heads of the secretariats there are numerous

*See Chapter Four.

**See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of this form of personnel linkage.
posts for retired central officials:

**TABLE 7-3**

**THE SIX NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF LOCALITIES AND AMAKUDARI POSITIONS**
(excluding Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General)
(Data is current as of August 1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th># Bureaus</th>
<th># Home Affairs Ministry Amakudari Bureau Chiefs</th>
<th>Total # Amakudari Bureau Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACAC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPAC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATVAC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office register of the Six National Associations of Localities and Interview with Mr. Katō Yukio, Division Chief, National Association of City Assembly Chiefs (August 9, 1978).

The connection is so close in many cases that some have run for the Diet from their positions in the secretariats of these bodies with the support of the LDP. Such connections have led many observers to write off the CRD as some sort of "kept organ" (goyo kikan), as a "governmentalized interest group," or as a Ministry of Home Affairs "client body." While critics acknowledge the role played by the CRD during the occupation in defense of local autonomy,* they claim that over time, given the continuous conservative power at the center, ties have deepened with the LDP, and the CRD have, as a result, become coopted by the center. To support this view the critics point to the CRD's endorsement of the elevation of the Autonomy Agency to Ministry status in 1960, to their support of the reversion of police functions to prefectural and central control in the mid-

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*See the account in the JSP-edited *Kokumin Jichi Neukan* (1964), p. 98.
1950's, and to their support for central efforts to abolish local boards of education at about the same time. This view of the CRD holds that taken together, they are merely one of among many devices at the disposal of the center for the dissemination of tutelary directives and for the mobilization of support for central programs. Ari sees it as a "percolation" downward of directives. Steiner also treats the CRD as a conduit of central will, calling the National Association of Governors "an informal channel for guidance...used by the Cabinet to ensure the cooperation of the governors in the implementation of national policies."

These sorts of characterizations are only partially accurate. The CRD, with all their contacts with the central government, frequently champion local causes in opposition to the ministries, are often deeply divided among themselves, and have in the last five years become widely acknowledged as among the most effective and influential budgetary acquisition groups in Japan.* The Six National Associations of Localities are simply much more than their critics would allow. While their major function is that of acquisition, they also function to diffuse, support, oppose, and propose policy - they do everything that the more ad hoc translocal coalitions do, and more.

The CRD are firmly institutionalized, although of ambiguous legal status.**

*For a glimpse at the change over time in some critics' view of the role of the CRD see the JSP's Kokumin Jichi Nenkan, an annual which has, since its inception in 1964, set aside a section for a discussion of CRD activity. By the 1978 issue the opening fusillade of criticism of the CRD had disappeared entirely for the first time. In its place was praise for the CRD's "aggressive pressing of the center for redress of the local fiscal crisis." (Kokumin Jichi Nenkan Henshu Iinkai ed.) (1978).

**Article 263,3 of the Local Autonomy Law recognizes their existence by requiring reports of their formation, but was written for other, more mundane purposes and amended to the Law in 1963, well after their founding. See the explanation by Nagano (1970), pp. 1127-1128.
Each of the organizations is principally supported by an assessment upon the member localities, based upon population size. Although we speak of the Six National Associations as a group, there is no formal secretariat joining the individual organizations. The closest that these six groups have come to establishing a joint organ among themselves was the creation in August 1963 of the Local Autonomy Policy Establishment Council (Chiho Jichi Kakuritsu Taisaku Kyōgikai). This continues to be the only joint policy study organ among the CRD. It replaced an earlier council which was limited only to formulation of financial policy. It is composed of the chiefs as well as two additional officers of each of the six associations. Due to the rapid turnover in the membership of these associations (especially in the associations of assembly chiefs, a freely rotated and largely honorary position in most localities), power is concentrated in the secretariats of the organizations. If there are differences between the CRD and other interest groups in Japan, they may be only in the extent to which the CRD are well connected, both institutionally and personally, to the powers that be. Their techniques and tools of influence are no different.

As we have already seen in the case of plans for the regionalization of local public policy in Chapter Four, there is an enormous diversity of interests among the six associations. They are hardly as monolithic as some have suggested. Cleavages within the CRD have emerged on numerous occasions. Some of the more prominent include the City, Town, and Village groups versus the Prefectural ones with respect to the distribution of tax revenue, and the Chief Executive groups versus the Assembly Chief groups with respect to the proper balance between executive and legislative
power in local government.* They are also seldom as mutely supportive of central policy as some have depicted. The six associations have frequently united to oppose the center, as in 1966 when they fought against a Home Affairs Ministry move to limit gubernatorial terms to three.

The stereotype holds that the CRD are agents of central interests, particularly of the Ministry of Home Affairs, but it is much more accurate (and much less fashionable) to see both the CRD and Home Affairs as agents of local interests. Home Affairs is at least as much a defender of local interests within the central bureaucracy as it is the director of local public administration from above. That it does the latter is not sufficient cause to ignore the former. Uncompromising adherence to the latter point of view prevents an understanding of how the Six National Associations of Localities are capable, as translocal coalitions, of forcefully representing local interests at the center. They frequently work with, and sometimes as proxy for, the Ministry of Home Affairs on behalf of localities, in battles over budgetary acquisition. Of all the functions which the CRD perform, it is this which more than any other circumscribes their existence. The Six National Associations of Localities provide an institutional aegis for more ad hoc coalitions of localities. They provide the research staff, the funds, and the contacts for effective

*These sorts of disputes are not uncommon. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Home Affairs authorized the trebling of the value of contracts which the local chief executive can authorize without legislative consent. The National Associations of Prefectural Assembly, City Assembly, and Town and Village Assembly Chiefs were strongly opposed, and accused the Ministry of collusion with the other three CRD associations. (Interview with Yamada Shiro, Bureau Chief, National Association of City Assembly Chiefs, August 9, 1978.) Ari (1960) provides more details about these cleavages in specific cases. Also see Asahi Shimbun (June 12, 1957) for more on this.
lobbying in Tokyo. They are frequently ahead of their patron ministry in proposing change.* At times when local finances are healthy, as in 1969, the CRD was out front in the effort to block the Finance Ministry attempt to cut back the Local Allocation Tax rate. When local financial conditions are less stable, the CRD associations fight for increases. For all their faults and "coziness" with the central government, and for all else that they do, the Six National Associations of Localities have no peer in performing what they do best, acting as translocal coalitions on behalf of local governments for the acquisition of more from the center. They are the localities' strongest lobby in Tokyo. Since CRD interests and Ministry of Home Affairs interests (and local interests more generally) are not infrequently contiguous, the CRD often do act in support of the Ministry, but it is worth repeating that these associations, like all others which perform this acquisitive function in its pure form, seem far more to be directed at than by the center.

SUPPORT

Clientage of this kind, in response to direction from above, is a critically important subset of the acquisition function; its identifica-
tion in the regional policy process constitutes one of the most important findings of this research. But the support function ought not, and indeed

*The best example is the ongoing debate over "excess financial bur-
den," an issue first popularized by the progressive localities. The CRD have picked up the issue and have continued to press relentlessly for fis-
cal reform. In November 1975 the CRD jointly created a special committee to study the issue. Their report was made public at budget time in 1978 (Chihō Jichi Kakuritsu Taisaku Kyōgikai, ed., 1978). See MacDougall (1975) for the best detailed discussion of this issue and of the way it came to be prominent on the national agenda as a result of the initial efforts of a coalition of five Tokyo municipalities.
probably cannot, be entirely separated from acquisition. The use of coalitions of local supporters as "cheerleaders" for central schemes is fundamental to the formulation of regional policy. The Tokyo Bay General Development Council was, in its first decade at least, a particularly clear example of this highly rational response to the vertically structured administrative and political system. The Council had been created by non-local actors in order to demonstrate to the LDP and to the Finance Ministry that the Cross-Bay Bridge Project was strongly desired by the region's residents. The Construction Ministry adopted the program and became the central patron for this horizontal coalition of localities. The Council supported the Ministry's programs and for more than a decade petitioned and cajoled LDP and Finance officials in an effort to get the bridge built.

Richardson speaks of "two kinds of political processes in Japan," one being rather polyarchic in which "actors speak for themselves" and compete directly with one another. The other he sees as taking place in more hierarchical arenas of politics in which "political actors in subordinate positions typically seek ratification and support of their decisions from persons at 'higher' levels." He calls this "external legitimation" and sees it as at least a partial raison d'être for the participation of some in the policy process. Our study of the regional policy process isolates a third, vastly different flow of competition and support. We have found that the support of coalitions of localities for higher level actors is one of the most common forms of translocal coalition building and of demand-making for regional policy. We have found that this sort of "external legitimation" originates not from below as in Richardson's hierarchical model, nor, since regional policy is most clearly
a subset of national policy in Japan, does it represent a free competition among equals. The "cheerleader" function is essentially one of support by local supplicants at the behest of interested non-local ones, and it blurs the western notion that demands and supports are somehow necessarily distinct. In the Japanese context the latter may merely be but one manifestation of the former. This sort of support is in any event central to the regional policy process. The petitioning and the assembling of large back-up groups* are as much a part of Japanese political life as the far more well publicized factions and cliques. In spite of its "horizontal" exterior, the Cheerleading support group is as institutionalized a manifestation of and is as clearly a response to Japan's vertical system of public administration as is any of the other more widely popularized ones. It is an apparently necessary but obviously not sufficient ingredient in the "winning" of a regional policy package.

This support function also has a more purely horizontal, and not incidentally far less fully developed, manifestation. There are also those coalitions of localities which are designed for mutual political aid. Although not unknown among conservative localities as well, this sort of political support has more commonly flowed among progressive localities. For example, when Kushiro City in Hokkaido, a progressive stronghold, suddenly faced the imposition of the 200-mile fishing limit and a subsequent threat to its major industry in the mid-1970's, other progressive cities sent funds for loans to unemployed fishermen there. In a second case in Hokkaido, that of Yubari City, which saw its coal miners lose their jobs as Japan increased its dependence on petroleum, progressive mayors were able to raise 300-400 million yen for deposit in a local Labor Bank as

*This is now a Japanese verb, bākkuappu suru.
relief funds. Other instances involved the dispatching of water tank trucks from Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kawasaki to help drought-stricken Kochi City in 1972, and the case of the three month loan of civil engineers from several Tokyo area progressive localities to help out flooded Niihama City in Ehime in 1975. Of course, none of this amounts to very much, but it does suggest that this support function of translocal coalitions need not be necessarily restricted to clientelism in the regional policy process.

**OPPOSITION**

This aspect of the support function, stimulated as it was by partisan considerations, highlights a fifth functional type of translocal coalition. Localities, particularly progressive ones, have also found it useful to come together in opposition to the central government. Just as was the case with translocal coalitions of acquisition, these coalitions of opposition exist at the regional level but are more prominent in the national arena. The most prominent such coalition is the National Association of Progressive Mayors (NAPM) which, founded in 1964 under the leadership of Yokohama Mayor Asukata, has been the leading voice of organized opposition from the periphery. The twenty-two mayors who participated in the founding conference that year were all JSP-backed, but all felt isolated both from the party as well as from national power.  

The NAPM was designed as a political expression of their fundamental unity, if not in terms of their prescriptions for public policy, then certainly in terms of their opposition to the conservative central government.*

*At the inauguration of the NAPM it was suggested by many that it was really a "National Association of Socialist Mayors." But by 1980, nearly twenty percent of the members of the NAPM enjoy the backing of the LDP as a member of their electoral coalition. For a discussion of this rather significant change in historical perspective, see Chapter Six.*
The founding came just ahead of the 1967 nationwide local elections, the elections in which progressive victories at the local level first brought them to national prominence. Their ranks continued to swell throughout this period of progressive ascendency: eighty-one members in 1966, one hundred six in 1971, one hundred thirty-two in 1973, and the peak of one hundred thirty-six in 1975. With this growth in numbers came an expansion of NAPM activities. A secretariat was established to handle the organization's public relations and research work. The NAPN began publishing a journal of limited circulation* as well as research reports, the register of the Association's membership, and an annual collection of the policy statements of each of the progressive mayors. The purpose of most of these publications was as much for public relations as for the diffusion of policy ideas. The progressive mayors were growing in number and were increasingly being taken seriously by most observers.**

It would not be fair to suggest that the NAPM program was void of policy prescription, yet its most conspicuous activity and its raison d'être is political. Its is clearly a politics of opposition. Among the avowed aims of the NAPM is the "forcing (of) change in national policy," the "fighting (of) a war of resistance against the center," and so forth. The strategy is horizontal -- the strengthening of progressive solidarity through mutual campaign aid, the pooling of resources, and joint action

*Chiho Jichi Tsushin, the journal, has never had a circulation in excess of 4,300 copies.

**The LDP, in September 1968, even went as far as to establish its own association of LDP mayors, the LDP Mayors Communication Council (Jiminto Shichō Renraku Kyōgikai). As an indication of just how seriously the LDP was taking this threat by progressive localities, this new body was formed at the insistence and with the participation of all the top party leaders. See the account in Jiyū Shinpo (October 9, 1968).
salient issues - but the direction is most clearly vertical - a coalition aimed directly at the conservative center.

There are many prominent examples of this targeting of demands. The NAPM was, for example, deeply involved in the anti-Self Defense Force (SDF) movements which were spearheaded by progressive mayors of military base cities. In 1971-1972, amid the intensification of central government efforts to expand their SDF bases and to regain control of Okinawa, the NAPM resolved to work against the transfer of any U.S. bases to Japanese control. With the NAPM supporting them, the progressive mayors of Naha in Okinawa in November 1972, and of Tachikawa in Tokyo in January 1973 suspended the citizen registration of SDF employees living on base. This was designed to limit those residents' ability to use municipal facilities, to register to vote, and to send their children to city schools. Other progressive cities, Yokohama and Kyoto among them, made headlines by refusing to issue permits for SDF parades. In other examples of NAPM supported anti-center political activity, progressive cities worked to block the Tanaka remodeling plan (see Chapter Four), and they tested the limits of mayoral powers in 1970-1971 by permitting resident Korean aliens to choose unrecognized North Korea as their original homeland.16

While every major project undertaken by the National Association of Progressive Mayors has been politically motivated and while most have been directed against the conservative central government, not all have been cases of opposition for opposition's sake. Many of the important NAPM campaigns have been at least functionally no different from those of other translocal coalitions in search of more from the center. The acquisition of greater budgetary shares has long been a preoccupation of NAPM strategists, but whereas (as noted in the discussion above) the Support (cheer-
leading) function is a subset of the acquisition functions for conserva-
tive translocal coalitions, the opposition function is a newer, far
more strident response to the vertical structure of public administration
in Japan. Whereas the modal budgetary acquisition group makes its demands
in concert with a central ally in the form of a polite request (onegai
suru gata), the translocal coalition of opposition, without such allies,
is bound to make its demands on the basis of its "natural right" to a
greater share of central funds (tozen no kenri gata). This is best illus-
trated by the case of "excess financial burden" mentioned earlier. This
issue, first popularized by a group of five Tokyo mayors in January 1968,
galvanized the NAPM, which succeeded in transforming it into a nationwide
movement for more money from the center for centrally delegated tasks.*

The NAPM movement involved mass rallies, national conferences, and even
an October 1974 sit-in at the Ministry of Home Affairs in which Asukata
and fifty other progressive mayors participated. As we have already noted,
the National Association of Mayors and the National Association of Govern-
ors both subsequently took up this same issue, but their approach, as
rather more conservative budgetary acquisition groups, was quite different.
They worked with the Ministry of Home Affairs to have the issue placed on
its agenda, and the Ministry has become a leading advocate for change.

The support function and the opposition function are thus both best seen

*Article 18 of the Local Finance Law states that "The amount of the
shares, subsidies, or other disbursements of the State to local public
bodies shall be computed on the basis of the amount necessary and suffi-
cient for such local public bodies to perform the affairs for which such
disbursements are paid." The localities have demonstrated that there is
a substantial gap between the services they are required to provide by law
and the financial support which they are receiving to support those serv-
ces. They are demanding that the center honor the spirit of Article 18
by eliminating this "excess financial burden" (chōka futan).
as variant expressions of the acquisition function. Given the relatively limited scope for the purely local allocation of resources, much of the activity of translocal coalitions involves the direction of demands upward.

PROPOSITION

These demands, however, need not necessarily be devoid of locally developed policy options. That is, they need not necessarily be either blindly oppositional or blindly supportive. They have occasionally been accompanied by the proposition of coherent, alternative policy. Although infrequent in number and even more infrequent in achieving their desired goals, translocal coalitions of proposition are identifiable as a sixth and final functional type. Groups previously introduced in the context of other functional activities have also, of course, been active from time to time in proposing policy alternatives to the center. For example, the National Association of Progressive Mayors has been advocating the creation of a new Welfare Ministry.* Likewise, as discussed above, the Six National Associations of Localities have been working on effective solutions to the excess financial burden problem. Not all the activities of the acquisition, support, or opposition groups are functionally uni-dimensional, but neither were any of these groups designed expressly for the study and proposition of policy alternatives.

One which was provided Japanese localities with a rare glimpse at the largely untapped potential for joint local action on national policy issues. The Seven Big City Chief Executives' Conference (Nana Daitoshi Shuchō Kondankai - hereafter referred to as the Seven City Group) was

*The change in title occurs only in Japanese. The translation of the existing Kosei Shō and the proposed Fukushi Shō are identical in English, but worlds apart in their nuance in Japanese,
organized in July 1973, the same week that Tokyo withdrew suddenly from the Tokyo Bay General Development Council. Although the two moves were unconnected, the dissolution of a modal "cheerleader" group in favor of the creation of a more policy-eclectic and aggressive translocal coalition, coming as it did at a time of progressive ascendancy, is not without its symbolic attractiveness. This Seven City Group was composed of the chief executives of the major localities which together form the Tōkaidō megalopolis: Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. All, in 1973, had progressive chief executives, and while there was clearly a strong element of opposition in their motives for formation, unlike the NAPM and the variety of other such translocal progressive groupings, this was designed to provide member localities with a data resource and analysis capacity independent of the center. The expressed purpose was informed advocacy, not oppositional solidarity.

Although their activities involved a wide range of urban problems, the group attracted the most public attention for their creation of a special Auto Exhaust Control Task Force. The Japanese auto industry had expanded its production of automobiles by an average of nearly thirty percent per year between 1961-1973. There were then more than thirty million cars in Japan, and auto exhaust pollution had become a major social irritant. The number of days in which air standards were considered unacceptable in Nagoya in 1973 was 87.3 percent. In Osaka it was an astonishing 98.7 percent. Yet, at the time of the passage of the Muskie Bill in the United States in 1971, with the exception of a carbon monoxide regulation for new cars issued in 1968, the Japanese government was still operating under its original auto emission standards, standards set in 1951 and 1959. Following the Muskie Bill lead, the Japanese government created similar
standards in October of the following year, but when the U.S. automakers secured an extension from the U.S. government in the enforcement date of the new standards, the Japanese automakers, also claiming that such standards were technologically unfeasible, sought a similar reprieve. The Environment Agency, which had to rule on the request for an extension, announced in mid-1973 that it would need industry data to make its decision; no provision was made for a public hearing. It was in response to these developments that the Task Force was created by the Seven Big City Group. The purpose of the Task Force, chaired by Tokyo's Shibata Tokue, was simply to present data with which to confront the automakers' claims. Coming as it did from the independent research efforts of a coalition of concerned localities, it was revolutionary. The investigations conducted by the city officials and their invited scientists were highly technical inquiries into the engineering and design of auto engines and exhaust control devices. Their reports, published in roughly six month intervals, are highly detailed examinations by scientists for scientists. Their first report, issued in October 1974, argued that it was entirely feasible for Japanese automakers to produce low pollution autos by 1976 with the technology existing in 1974:

If the manufacturers claim that it is impossible, we suggest they carefully study the results of our experiments. . . ."18

Everyone agreed that their research was sound, but their timing was unfortunate. The Japanese economy in 1974, stunned by the aftereffects of the Oil Shock, was in recession, and economic planners were in no mood to further "restrain" industry. A two-year extension was granted in December. The Task Force, however, continued its research and began to monitor industry activity. While it did not succeed in preventing an industry victory in delaying the enforcement of the new stricter standards,
it did pioneer a new form of translocal coalition. Chairman Shibata, who elsewhere has written of their activity in Ralph Nader-esque terms, claims:

We learned an extremely important lesson. We learned that we cannot be passive and succeed. We must be armed with our own data, our own proof that what we are claiming is possible.

This form of translocal coalition is rare, and it remains associated with progressive opposition. That is, there is no indication that the Seven Big City Group has survived the return of conservative administrations in Tokyo and Yokohama. Yet, it is opposition with a difference—it is informed opposition, opposition armed with sophisticated policy analysis, not merely with political invective.

In summary, it seems clear that localities "get together to do things or to otherwise have influence" in a wide variety of ways. Some, such as coalitions of implementation and diffusion, are largely apolitical; others, namely the acquisition function and its three related subsets; support, opposition, and proposition are more expressly concerned with the articulation of political interests. Translocal coalitions of acquisition, support, implementation, and diffusion are widespread and play unquestionably important roles, shaping the local and regional as well as the national policy process. The significance of the translocal coalitions of opposition and of proposition seems more sporadic and less easily demonstrable. Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand anything important about the regional policy process or about translocal interdependence (the organization of the constituency of that process) without first understanding the vertical structure of the Japanese polity. Only the diffusion function, of the six outlined above, is not ultimately in most cases directed by or at the center (see Chapter Five).
In their modal forms, these functions assume several different patterns in their flow of influence and activity from their points of initiative to their ultimate targets:

**FIGURE 7-1**

PATTERNS OF TRANSLOCAL COALITION ACTIVITY

\((S = \text{source of initiative} \quad T = \text{target})\)

**Pattern 1**

```
Center

(S)  

\arrow{down}

Localities (T) \rightarrow (T)

IMPLEMENTATION
```

**Pattern 2**

```
Center

(S)  

\arrow{down}

Localities (S)(T) \rightarrow (T)(S)

DIFFUSION
```

**Pattern 3**

```
Center

(T)  

\arrow{down}

Localities (S) \rightarrow (S)

ACQUISITION

OPPOSITION

PROPOSITION
```

**Pattern 4**

```
Center

(S)  

\arrow{down}

Localities (T) \rightarrow

SUPPORT
```

We can restate our findings by reference to Figure 7-1 above:

(Pattern 1) IMPLEMENTATION - The large and growing number of cases of joint policy implementation in Japan is the result of a long history of central efforts to promote uniform and efficient regional public policy. (See Chapter Three for the mechanisms of these sorts of joint policy, and see Chapter Four for the history of those central efforts.)

(Pattern 2) DIFFUSION - The diffusion of administrative innovation in Japan has a translocal component which has never been clearly understood. There does not seem to be any sort of inherent cultural barrier to horizontal policy interdependence. While tutelage remains an important mechanism for policy diffusion, it is by no means the only one. The "Japan as a
vertical society" argument has been overextended as an explanation.
(See Chapter Five for the survey upon which these conclusions are based.)

(Pattern 3) ACQUISITION, OPPOSITION, and PROPOSITION - Horizontal coalitions designed to enlarge local shares or to otherwise affect central priorities almost always reflect the vertical structure of the system. The routings of demands are shaped by these vertical imperatives, be they demands for or demands against the allocation of valued goods. Localities are perfectly capable and willing to cooperate effectively with each other as their objective interests permit. Less trivially, these interests frequently supersede partisan affiliations. (See Chapter Six for a study of the ways in which the Tokyo Bay region was the site of a variety of these sorts of coalitions and how localism, far more than partisanship, was the "free-floating resource" that helped local actors define their priorities.

(Pattern 4) SUPPORT - Coalitions of localities are used as devices for demonstrating support by central actors vis-a-vis other central actors at least as often as they are used as tools of local actors in pursuit of purely local interests. This holds true both for political goals as well as for more purely administrative matters. Such support can be seen as "cheerleading," and it highlights the sectional centralism of the Japanese polity. It belies the myths that have developed concerning the monolithic unity of Japan Incorporated. It also suggests that notions of "supports" and "demands" need not necessarily be differentiable.
(See Chapter Six for a detailed study of the operations of several such support groups. See Chapter Four for a survey of the postwar cracks in the "unity" of elite interests vis-a-vis regional policy.)

Above all else, this research has demonstrated and reaffirmed the salience of politics. It seems ironic at this late date in the study of politics that this should represent much of a contribution, but in a discipline drifting toward the "big" explanation, toward analysis based upon "inexorables," we have opted for the modesty of structural frameworks and functional classifications. In the process we have, in independent harmony with Richardson, agreed that "policy processes involve multiple participants, and all outcomes involve often complex coalitions between mul-

tiple actors motivated by different interests." The focus upon multiple processes and coalitions of interests has enabled us to identify those factors such as partisanship, the vertical society, the lack of decisive leadership, the omnipotence of the central bureaucracy, and the monolithic unity of business and government which have taken on an exaggerated importance in Japanese studies. It has also enabled us to identify those which probably deserve added emphasis, like the importance of consensus building as a tool in the ritualization and avoidance of conflict. Most importantly, it has enabled us to understand the politics of policy, particularly regional policy, in Japan for the first time.
NOTES

1 Zenkoku Shichō Kai (ed.) (1968).
5 Tōkyō-to Kikaku Chōsei Kyoku (ed.) (1971).
6 See Campbell's (1977) discussion of sub-governments and budget politics.
7 See Shiono (1976), Chapter One, for details on the coalition of sparsely settled prefectures and their skillful use of the horizontal strategy in influencing Diet legislation.
8 Takayose (1975).
9 Ari (1960).
10 Ibid.
11 Interview with Professor Ari Bakuji, Hosei University (September 26, 1977).
15 Shiohara (1975).
16 See MacDougall (1975) and Chiō Jichi Tsūshin (October 1970).
17 Interview with former Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryōkichi (September 20, 1979).
19 Shibata (1978).
20 Interview with Shibata Tokue, Director, Tokyo Metropolitan Government Pollution Research Institute (September 25, 1978).
For more details on this coalition see Shibata (1975 and 1978) and Takayose (1975); for a description of another sort of translocal coalition of proposition see Katagiri, et al., (1975).

MacDougall (1980b).

APPENDIX A

A SURVEY OF EXTRALOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS IN JAPAN

Local Autonomy College
Richard J. Samuels
1978 - 1979

(A) First we would like to ask you about matters related to you as an individual.

Q. 1: Please tell us about your personal background.

(1) Age:______years
(2) Prefecture:_________________________
   City, Town, or Village:_______________ (hereafter CTV)
   Bureau:_____________________________
   Division:____________________________
(3) Working backwards from the present list your previous positions and their dates:
   a. Current position:_______________ As of:_______________
   b. Previous position:_______________ As of:_______________
   c. Previous position:_______________ As of:_______________
(4) Entered Local Administration:___________
(5) Highest Degree Obtained:_____________________
(6) Prefecture of Birth:_____________________

Q. 2: Please tell us about the sorts of communications which you personally have with officials in other units of government.

(1) How often do you meet with other officials to discuss official business each month?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>1-2X</th>
<th>3-5X</th>
<th>6-9X</th>
<th>More than 10X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With CTV Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Prefectural Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Central Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) How many friends and acquaintances do you have who are officials of other governmental bodies with whom you associate on matters other than official business at least several times in the course of a year?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1-2 people</th>
<th>3-5 people</th>
<th>6-9 people</th>
<th>More than 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTV Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) Are there any officials from other governments who are the kinds of acquaintances you would call for an informal consultation when problems arise concerning official business?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1–2 people</th>
<th>3–5 people</th>
<th>6–9 people</th>
<th>More than 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTV Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prefectural Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Now we would like to ask you some questions concerning the division to which you belong.

Q. 3: Please tell us about the size of your division.

(1) Number of sections:_______
(2) Number of units not called sections which are their equivalent:_______
(3) Total number of division employees:_______
Q. 4. Does your division participate in the sorts of organizations whose goal is to promote better communication among local governments? If there is such participation by your division, please list all of the organizations' names (if there is no formal name please describe its purposes), the number of localities which are members, and the number of times each year which each one convenes. Finally, in the space provided, please indicate where the initiative for the formation of the organization originated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Participating Bodies</th>
<th># Times Each Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pref.</td>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>( )</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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<td>9.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q. 5: Has your division adopted any sort of new policy idea, new project, or new organizational technique in the past five years? If so, please choose the one you consider most significant and describe it for us in concrete terms. Indicate also the year of its adoption, and where this innovation originated (for example: from within your division, from another division, from the mayor, assemblymen, other localities, central bureaus, associations of localities, industry, local groups, citizens, mass media, etc.)

(1) The innovation: ( 

(2) Date of adoption: 

(3) Main source: 

Q. 6: Excluding routine legal and administrative reporting, to what extent does your division receive communication from and initiate contact with other governmental bodies? Considering the cases of each of three sorts of communications separately, (a) personal visitation, b) letters, c) telephone, please respond by indicating roughly how often each month your division as a whole has such contacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Visitation:</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>1-2X</th>
<th>3-5X</th>
<th>6-9X</th>
<th>10-20X</th>
<th>More than 20X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM your div. to Prefecture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTV's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO your div. from Prefecture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTV's</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters:</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>1-2X</th>
<th>3-5X</th>
<th>6-9X</th>
<th>10-20X</th>
<th>More than 20X</th>
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<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM your div. to Prefecture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTV's</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO your div. from Prefecture</td>
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</table>
(3) Telephone:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center</th>
<th>FROM your div. to Prefecture</th>
<th>CTV's</th>
<th>TO your div. from Prefecture</th>
<th>CTV's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 7: Your division acquires reports and receives important information and ideas from a variety of sources in the course of conducting its official business. In the grid below, there are a variety of reasons (listed down the left side from 1-13) which might necessitate your division's contacting the information sources listed across the top (a-k). Please indicate in the space provided to what extent such contacts are made with each source for each reason.

- Θ - always
- O - fairly often
- Δ - occasionally
- X - never

Although it is time consuming, please be sure to fill in each box. Do not leave any space empty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>(j)</th>
<th>(k)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Agencies</td>
<td>Prefectural offices (for Pref. = other prefectures)</td>
<td>Other CIVs (for government)</td>
<td>Other divisions within your local government</td>
<td>Joint policy organ</td>
<td>Joint communication</td>
<td>Local assemblymen, party branches, parties</td>
<td>Control politicians</td>
<td>The Six National Associations of Local Government</td>
<td>Specialists, think tanks</td>
<td>Local groups, residents, industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) To prepare a new ordinance

2) For interpretation and/or explanation of by-laws, ordinance

3) For study of central government grants

4) For study of prefectural government grants

5) To frame a plan for the adoption of new projects

6) To prepare a draft for a mid-range plan

7) To prepare a budget proposal

8) To regulate a regional problem

9) To reform division management structure

10) To prepare assembly interpellations

11) To solve conflict with residents or local groups

12) To introduce technical innovation

13) To conduct independent research on routine matters
Next, we would like to ask you about matters related to your local government as a whole.

Q. 8: Please answer the following questions related to your chief executive and about your local administration.

1) His party support: ______

2) Has your chief executive changed in the past five years?
   a. No ______
   b. If yes, i) When? ______
      ii) What was previous chief executive’s party support? ______

3) About how many officials are there in your local government above the level of division director? ______ persons. Among these, how many come from the center or the prefecture? ______ persons.

Q. 9: In the light of your own experience until now, have cooperative relations between your locality and other localities been successful? (Circle the correct response and then proceed to the indicated question.)

1 - They have generally been successful. (Go to 1-1.)
2 - They have not been successful. (Go to 1-2.)
3 - It is impossible to say. (Go to 1-3.)

1-1) On the whole, in what respects have these relations been successful? (Feel free to circle more than one response.)

1) They have raised the quality of services provided to the residents.
2) They have resulted in improvement in administrative efficiency.
3) There has been progress in local policy.
4) Frictions between localities have been eliminated.
5) Demand-making vis-a-vis the prefecture and center has been made easier.
6) It has resulted in the actualization of central and prefectural plans.
7) Central and prefectural aid has increased.
8) Other, namely ( ).

1-2) What are the main reasons why such cooperative efforts have not been successful? (If you answered (2) above.)

1) There is an intractible base of conflicting interests among localities.
2) There is substantial intervention by center and prefecture.
3) The level of aid by center and prefecture is too low.
4) Contrary to the original goal, administrative efficiency has declined.
5) There are political disputes among the chief executives and the legislators.
6) The executive staff itself has not been enthusiastic about cooperative efforts among localities.
7) Other, namely (  ).

(1-3) If you answered (3) above, please cite the reasons why it is impossible to say.  

)

Q. 10: From the standpoint of financial and administrative affairs, both the center and the prefecture have a great deal of influence in the local policy process; but at the same time, one can consider the ways in which other cities, towns, and villages also influence the local policy process via such means as joint policy management organs, the exchange of information, and through communication about and regulation of mutual affairs. Thinking about these sorts of possibilities, select the appropriate response in the following three cases.

(1) Compared to ten years ago, the present influence resulting from relations with other localities in the policy process in your locality has:

1 - grown larger  
2 - grown smaller  
3 - impossible to say  

(2) Compared to ten years ago, the role of the center and prefecture in your locality's policy making process has:

1 - grown larger  
2 - grown smaller  
3 - impossible to say  

(3) In the policy making process in your locality, when compared with the influence of relations with higher levels of government, the influence of relations with other localities is:

1 - very much smaller  
2 - smaller  
3 - about the same  
4 - greater  

(The following questions were asked of prefectural officials only.)

(4) In the policy making process in your prefecture, compared to ten years ago, the influence of the cities, towns, and villages has:
1 - grown larger
2 - grown smaller
3 - impossible to say

(5) In the policy making process in your prefecture, the influence of cooperative relationships with other prefectures, when compared to similar relationships with cities, towns, and villages are comparatively speaking:

1 - much smaller
2 - smaller
3 - the same
4 - larger

(6) In the policy making process in your prefecture, the influence of the central government, when compared to that of the cities, villages, and towns is:

1 - smaller
2 - the same
3 - larger

(D) Finally, we would like to ask you about your own ideas concerning relationships among localities in general.

Q.11: In the following series of questions, please circle the answers that you intuitively feel are the most appropriate.

(1) Generally speaking, the strengthening of cooperative relations among local governments:

1 - will probably result in the strengthening of local autonomy
2 - will probably result in the strengthening of central control of localities
3 - It is impossible to say because ( )

(2) Generally speaking, relationships among localities are:

1 - greatly influenced by the political coloration of the chief executives
2 - not greatly influenced by the political coloration of the chief executives
3 - It is impossible to say because ( )

(3) Generally speaking, if one had to choose, relationships among localities are:

1 - competitive rather than cooperative
2 - cooperative rather than competitive
3 - It is impossible to say because ( )
(4) Generally speaking, when localities conduct a conference for the exchange of information:

1 - it is because they will then be able to cooperatively provide even more appropriate and complete services
2 - it is because it has become necessary to regulate some sort of conflict of interest
3 - It is impossible to say because ( ).

(5) Generally speaking, cooperative relationships among localities are:

1 - mostly the result of independent initiative by the localities involved
2 - mostly the result of guidance from the prefecture and/or the central government
3 - It is impossible to say because ( ).

(Questions (6) through (9) were asked only of city, town and village officials.)

(6) The "Greater Municipal Zone" plan, created as an administrative unit by the Ministry of Home Affairs:

1 - should be strengthened and given even more scope and functions
2 - should be allowed only the limited functions and scope which it presently enjoys; the role of local governments should not be greatly altered
3 - should be abolished
4 - I cannot say

(7) Partial Affairs Associations which are created among localities for the joint management of specific policies:

1 - should be allowed a broader scope and should be more often put into practical use
2 - should not be changed, as the existing level of use is fine
3 - should not be used at all
4 - I cannot say

(8) Councils of local governments

1 - should be allowed a broader scope and should be more often put into practical use
2 - should not be changed, as the existing level of use is fine
3 - should not be used at all
4 - I cannot say
(9) If cooperative relations among localities were to be strengthened what do you expect would be the influence upon each of the following:

a) The cause of citizen participation would  
   1 - be advanced  
   2 - be impeded  
   3 - can't say

b) The power of the assembly would  
   1 - be enhanced  
   2 - be impaired  
   3 - can't say

c) The power of the chief executive would  
   1 - be enhanced  
   2 - be impaired  
   3 - can't say

d) The power of interest groups would  
   1 - be enhanced  
   2 - be impaired  
   3 - can't say

e) The power of the local bureaucracy would  
   1 - be enhanced  
   2 - be impaired  
   3 - can't say

(10) At present, in terms of local autonomy, when compared to the importance of the relationships between the locality and higher levels of government (prefecture, center), the importance of the relationship among localities is:

1 - rather insignificant  
2 - low in significance, but not something which should be ignored  
3 - fairly low in significance, but there is not that great a difference  
4 - at about the same level of significance  
5 - of greater significance
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