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

DOUBLE CONTAINMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

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U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

by

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ABSTRACT

Within international relations theory, the dominant conception of alliance formation views alliances as resulting from the need of two or more states to balance the power of a common external threat. Nation-states, in this view, combine their resources in order to prevent another state or group of states from dominating the international system. This so called Realist perspective on alliance formation has greatly influenced the way in which the American-led post-war system of alliances has been understood. Alliances like the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are said to have arisen out of the need to contain or balance a common external threat, namely the Soviet Union. Other possible motives, such as a desire on the part of the United States to control post-war Germany and Japan, have never been seriously discussed or studied. The purpose of this essay is to determine whether or not the United States pursued a strategy of *double containment* (containing both an adversary and an ally) in creating the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

The central argument of this essay is that in entering into a security alliance with Japan in September of 1951, the United States sought both to *defend* Japan against Soviet/Communist aggression and to *control* the future course of Japanese rearmament, foreign policy, and domestic politics. The need to control or contain Japan arose out of a belief or image of Japan shared by most of the U.S. policymaking elite and American allies in East Asia and Western Europe. Despite the successes of the American Occupation, Japan was perceived as being a *fragile blossom* capable of very unpredictable and unstable behavior. While the Occupation succeeded in temporarily demilitarizing Japan, grave doubts persisted as to the degree to which the seeds of democracy had been firmly planted in Japanese soil. The Japanese people were seen as being an obedient herd that would put up little or no resistance either to a revival of right-wing militarism or a Soviet-inspired

communist take-over. Because of the authoritarian tendencies within Japanese society, the strength and resiliency of Japan's pro-Western orientation were uncertain. Japan, in other words, could not be trusted. For that reason, some kind of post-Occupation mechanism was needed to insure stability and predictability in Japanese foreign, military, and domestic policy. As this essay will demonstrate, the central component of that mechanism or instrument of control was the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War and the improvement in East-West relations has come public debate about the future of the anti-communist system of alliances constructed after the Second World War. For the last forty years, these alliances (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance) have served to deter communist aggression. The Soviet/Communist military threat stimulated the United States and its allies in Western Europe and East Asia to create military alliances to dissuade the Soviet Union and its allies from launching an attack. While it remains unclear whether or not the Soviets ever intended to invade, the fact that such an attack never occurred represents a triumph for the United States and its allies.

Now that the Cold War is over, some critics and commentators are questioning the necessity of maintaining the system of alliances. With the Soviet Union clearly in decline, the threat that inspired the formation of these alliances is rapidly diminishing. In addition, increased pressures to reduce defense expenditures in the United States have strengthened those who call for major changes in American foreign policy, including the withdrawal of American military forces from Europe and Asia.[1] The U.S. security commitment to Western Europe and Japan may have deterred a Soviet attack, but it is now clear that such an attack will not happen in the future. For that reason, the United States should, say these critics, bring its troops home, cut the defense budget, and re-focus its energies on solving the many pressing domestic problems at home.

Numerous arguments have been made against neo-isolationism and in favor of preserving the status-quo. Some have warned that the Soviet Union remains a military superpower and that the West should adopt a policy of "wait and see" before dismantling its alliances.[2] Others have called for the adoption of new military missions, such as destroying the attempts of Third World countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction.[3]

Perhaps the most interesting argument in favor of maintaining NATO and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance comes from those commentators who have resurrected the ghosts of the Second World War. The alliances, it is argued, serve not only to deter a Soviet attack, but also to *contain* Germany and Japan. There remains a great deal of fear and mistrust in Western Europe and East Asia about the aggressors of World War II. The alliances ease that fear because they entangle Germany and Japan, providing the United States with influence over their foreign and defense policies. In order to avoid a new round of arms races and regional instability, it is argued, the United States should maintain these alliances so as to contain its powerful allies.[4]

Although some commentators are beginning to acknowledge that NATO and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance serve the purpose of *double containment* (containing both adversaries and allies), such open recognition is a very recent phenomena. Throughout the Cold War, the alliances were portrayed as being an outgrowth of the Soviet military threat. The United States entered into these alliances, it was argued, to deter the U.S.S.R. from attacking Japan and Western Europe. Other motives, like containing West Germany and Japan, were never discussed openly. Such collective silence stemmed from the desire to preserve harmony within the alliances. After all, a policy of containing one's allies suggests mistrust and suspicion about their future intentions. Bringing that suspicion out into the open would have created turmoil within the alliances and weakened American foreign policy. For that reason, the alliances have generally been discussed in terms of the Cold War and the Soviet military threat. But with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of Germany and Japan as great powers, the time has come for a more open and frank discussion about the origins and purposes of NATO and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Ignoring the lingering fears and suspicions is likely to produce growing tension and mistrust among the allies. This essay seeks to contribute to a more open discussion of the origins and purposes of the alliances by demonstrating that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was indeed an exercise in double containment.

The central argument of this essay is that in entering into a security alliance with Japan in September of 1951, the United States sought both to *defend* Japan against Soviet/Communist aggression and to *control* the future course of Japanese rearmament, foreign policy, and domestic politics. The need to control or contain Japan arose out of a belief or image of Japan shared by most of the U.S. policymaking elite and American allies in East Asia and Western Europe. Despite the successes of the American Occupation, Japan was perceived as being a *fragile blossom* capable of very unpredictable and unstable behavior. While the Occupation succeeded in temporarily demilitarizing Japan, grave doubts persisted as to the degree to which the seeds of democracy had been firmly planted in Japanese soil. The Japanese people were seen as being an obedient herd that would put up little or no resistance either to a revival of right-wing militarism or a Soviet-inspired communist take-over. Because of the authoritarian tendencies within Japanese society, the strength and resiliency of Japan's pro-Western orientation were uncertain. Japan, in other words, could not be trusted. For that reason, some kind of post-Occupation mechanism was needed to insure stability and predictability in Japanese foreign, military, and domestic policy. As this essay will demonstrate, the central component of that mechanism or instrument of control was the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

CHAPTER ONE: ALLIANCES AS INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL: THEORY AND HISTORY

In his classic work on international relations and international law, Hugo Grotius wrote, "There is no state so powerful that it may not at some time need the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of many nations against it."[1] States do not, argues Grotius, possess the power to remain secure by themselves. There are simply too many potential threats within the international system to permit a policy of complete isolation and self-sufficiency. Consequently, nation-states frequently find it necessary to join together in alliances for the purpose of meeting common dangers. It is by seeking the help of others that states are able to make themselves secure.

The view of alliances embodied in Grotius' statement has been, and remains, the dominant conception of alliance formation. This so called Realist perspective sees alliances as being responses to a common external threat. States do not form alliances out of friendship or shared moral and political values. Rather, the purpose of an alliance is "to enhance the security of the allies or to advance their interests, against the outer world."[2] Alliances are acts of expedience in which states combine their capabilities to counter or balance the potentially hostile power of other states. So for Realists, alliances arise out of the need of nation-states to combine their resources in order to insure their very survival.

While most students of international relations accept the Realist perspective on alliance formation, recent historical research suggests the important role played by motives other than power balancing or capability aggregation in the creation of past alliances. More specifically, alliances arise out of a desire to control or to restrain the behavior of one's allies. Alliances, in this view, are tools of management or pacts of restraint that provide states with influence over the future actions of their allies. What this perspective on alliance formation suggests is that although the desire to balance common external threats is an

important cause of alliances, the need to control and to restrain allies also plays an important part in alliance formation. The remaining chapters of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was an exercise in both power balancing and alliance restraint and control.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the literature on alliance formation and to offer an alternative perspective on the origins of alliances from that found in the works of political realists. The first section will review the Realist perspective on alliances, focusing on the relationship between international anarchy, the balance of power and threats, and alliance formation. The next section will explore the alternative explanation of alliance formation mentioned earlier. Finally, the historical record will be reviewed, emphasizing the important role played by the desire to control and to restrain allies in the formation of alliances over the last two hundred years.

Realism and Alliance Formation

It is a central contention of this thesis that while the Realist perspective on alliance formation possesses great explanatory power, there exist other important causal factors that are left out of most of the Realist literature. There can be little doubt that the existence of common external threats does inspire states to form alliances. But the desire to balance against common threats is not the only reason states enter into alliances. The historical record and the findings of this thesis confirm the notion that states also form alliances in order to control or to restrain their allies. That is not to suggest that Realism is wrong or in need of major revision. Rather, as this thesis will try to demonstrate, Realism can account for much, but not all, of the dynamics of alliance formation. It is essential, therefore, that additional explanations (like the one offered in this thesis) be explored and tested empirically so as to provide a more complete understanding of the origins of alliances.

Before turning to the key elements in the alternative explanation of alliances, it is essential to review the central features of the dominant explanation of alliance formation, namely that of Political Realism. Most Realists (including both classical[3] and neorealists[4]) begin their analyses of international politics with the concept of anarchy. Anarchy is defined as the absence of government, meaning the lack of a world government or an international sovereign to settle disputes among nation-states. So when Realists argue that the international political system is anarchic, they simply mean that there is no supra-national authority regulating international affairs. The lack of an international sovereign, in turn, means that the international political system is one of self-help, in which states must provide for their own security. There is no international police force that one can appeal to when threatened by other states. In an anarchic international environment, states must provide for their own security or face the prospect of being conquered or coerced by other states.[5]

Because states must provide for their own security, they have to remain vigilant about the actions and capabilities of their neighbors. To ignore the power of others is to risk armed conquest. The principal means of securing oneself in the international system is through the acquisition of power. Power is the ability to influence and/or control the behavior of others for the purpose of insuring national survival.[6] This definition of power suggests that one can be powerful without actually using or even possessing brute military force. Power, in other words, can be as much a psychological as it is a material asset. Nevertheless, Realists stress the central role played by the material aspects of power, especially military force.[7] In an anarchic international system, it is better to have a loaded gun than a clever argument.

Since nation-states exist in an anarchic international environment in which power is the chief instrument for insuring survival, it is not surprising that states must remain vigilant about the power or capabilities of other states. Without such vigilance, a state might suddenly find itself so weak relative to others that it will be compelled to do their

bidding or face certain conquest. For that reason, nation-states must continually take measures to protect themselves against the potentially hostile power of other states. One option open to states is to appease a threatening state by allying with it. This notion of allying with the source of danger is known as *bandwagoning.*[8] Most Realists reject the bandwagoning argument for the simple reason that bandwagoning is inconsistent with the desire for self-preservation. The bandwagoning state places its survival in the hands of a much stronger state and is, therefore, subject to its will. As one noted Realist has written, "Bandwagoning is dangerous because it increases the resources available to a threatening power and requires placing trust in its continued forbearance."[9] Assuming all states want to preserve their national independence, Realists argue that bandwagoning is both an unwise and an infrequent phenomenon.

Since bandwagoning is inconsistent with the desire of all states to control their destiny, Realists claim that states are far more likely to *balance* against potentially hostile power. Balancing is simply acquiring the means or capabilities to protect oneself from the potentially hostile power of another state or coalition of states. There are two kinds of balancing: internal and external. Internal balancing involves relying on one's own capabilities in balancing the power of others. The principal method of internal balancing is an armaments build-up. External balancing, on the other hand, involves joining together in an alliance with other states to counter a hostile state or group of states. States balance the potentially hostile power of other states by combining their resources to such a level that the hostile state will be unable to conquer or intimidate the members of the alliance.[10] Alliances, in this view, are exercises in capability aggregation by nation- states that wish to survive in an international system that puts a premium on power and brute force.

In explaining alliance formation, most Realists have stressed the desire of each alliance partner to balance the capabilities or national resources of another state or coalition of states. It is an increase in the raw capabilities of others that inspires a sense of danger and leads to the formation of an alliances. In his book *The Origins of Alliances*, Stephen

Walt takes exception to this balance of power explanation, arguing that in forming alliances, states seek to balance threats, not simply power. Aggregate capabilities are only one factor that influence states in deciding whether or not to enter into an alliance. The other three factors that enter into the calculation of what Walt calls the level of threat are: geographic proximity, offensive power, and perception of intent.[11] Walt argues that it is quite possible that a state possessing vast aggregate power may not inspire balancing behavior, for example, because it is perceived to have benign intentions or a lack of an offensive military capability. In a similar fashion, states whose aggregate power is not significantly greater than its neighbors may still inspire balancing behavior if it is seen as being aggressive. What Walt's analysis of alliance formation reveals is that there exist different sources of threat besides aggregate power and that states will take other factors, such as intentions, into account in choosing whether or not form an alliance. Nation-States, in other words, balance aggregate threats, not simply aggregate power.

Alliances as Instruments of Control

It is a central contention of this essay that the United States perceived the security alliance with Japan as being a means for both balancing against the Soviet threat and controlling an unpredictable and potentially unstable Japan. There can be little doubt that the Realist explanation of alliance formation accounts for part of the reason why the U.S. created a security alliance with Japan. There was genuine fear of the Soviet/Communist threat. In fact, all four of Walt's threat assessment factors played an important role in leading the U.S. to construct an alliance that would balance the Soviet/Communist military threat to Japan. But as this thesis will attempt to demonstrate, there existed other motives, having little to do with the external Soviet threat, that led the U.S. to enter into a formal alliance with Japan. The United States saw the alliance as a mechanism for controlling an

unpredictable Japan and restraining a latent Japanese military threat. It is the purpose of this section to provide the theoretical foundation for the alliance as an instrument of control argument.

In much of the Realist literature on alliance formation, there is general agreement that the distribution of costs, benefits, and influence among members of an alliance will frequently be unequal. That distribution, in turn, will reflect the balance of power *within* the alliance. In his discussion of bandwagoning, Walt, for example, argues that the stronger power will effectively dominate and control the behavior of the weaker state. Although Walt does not carry this observation to its logical conclusion, it follows that in a situation in which a weaker state allies itself with a stronger power against a more threatening great power, the stronger state in the alliance will have a certain degree of influence over the weaker state. Because it is weaker, the smaller state needs the alliance more than the stronger state. This asymmetry in need will, in turn, provide the stronger state with substantial influence over the policy of the smaller state.

Although Walt does not make explicit the link between asymmetry in need and degree of control within an alliance, other Realists have alluded to that connection. In fact, one can turn to the most famous work of political realism, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, to find discussion of the role formal alliances play in constraining the behavior of its weaker members. In Chapter XXI of *The Prince*, Machiavelli writes:

> . . . a prince ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure another, unless necessity forces him to it,. . . for if he (the stronger prince) wins you rest in his power, and princes must avoid as much as possible being under the will and pleasure of others.[12]

In similar fashion, Hans Morgenthau echoes Machiavelli's comments about the inequality of influence within an alliance of unequal powers.

> The distribution of benefits is thus likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance, as is the determination of policies. A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against making alliances with strong ones except by necessity.[13]

What both of these comments reveal is a clear recognition among Realists that the strongest power within an alliance possesses some degree of control over its weaker ally or allies. The amount of control depends, it would appear, on the size of the disparity in power among the allies.

While Realists clearly recognize that alliances can provide their members with control or restraint over each other, they appear to believe that the desire for inter-allied control is not a significant motivation in alliance formation. The determination to balance an external threat is the real cause of alliances; control of allies is merely an incidental benefit accruing to the most powerful ally. And yet there exist in the Realist literature clear references to the control motive being an important cause of alliance formation. In his study of the role played by alliances in American foreign policy, Robert E. Osgood writes: "Next to accretion (capability aggregation), the most prominent function of alliances has been to restrain and control allies, particularly in order to safeguard one ally against the actions of another . . ."[14] Another noted Realist and author of several books on alliances, George Liska, argues that while alliances are formed primarily to aggregate capabilities, the objectives of allies are: "Always to restrain the adversary and, if and when desirable, also each other and the scope of a conflict."[15] Clearly both Osgood and Liska believe that the desire to balance common external threats is paramount in alliance formation. But the need to control or to restrain one's allies does play an important role in leading states to enter into alliances.

As the comments of Machiavelli and Morgenthau quoted earlier indicate, Realists argue that the distribution of power *within* an alliance will determine the amount of control

one has over one's allies. For that reason, inter-allied control is a benefit belonging solely to the most powerful member(s) of an alliance. But the question now arises as to why a great power would want to enter into an alliance in order to control or restrain a small or medium power? After all, since the smaller state is relatively weak it cannot possibly pose an immediate threat to the larger state. So there must be some motive other than a sense of immediate threat that leads great powers into alliances designed to control smaller states.

In trying to understand the origins of alliances of control or pacts of restraint, it is essential to differentiate between two separate motives possessed by great powers. The first motive is a desire on the part of a large state to control the foreign and/or domestic policy of weaker states so as to make the international environment more stable and predictable. The smaller state does not pose any kind of immediate threat to the larger state. But it is perceived as being an unpredictable actor whose policies need to be stabilized from the outside. The roots of this perceived unpredictability may include: lessons from history, in which the smaller state has proven itself to be both unreliable and unpredictable; the domestic political structure of the smaller state, which may lead the great power to conclude that the smaller state is very unstable and, therefore, unpredictable; and finally images of the smaller state that stress its alienness, irrationality, or innate aggressiveness. Any of these three factors will lead a great power to conclude that regardless of the current behavior or statements of the smaller power, it simply cannot be trusted. The only way for the great power to insure that the smaller state will remain a useful tool in its broader foreign policy while at the same time remaining out of the hands of its adversaries is for the great power to control it from the outside by means of an alliance.[16]

The second reason a large state might ally itself with a smaller state is a desire to *restrain* that state from posing a future threat to its security or that of its allies. It will be recalled that bandwagoning involves allying oneself with the source of danger or threat. This definition, however, fails to address the temporal nature of threats. Threats, in other words, can be either immediate or latent.[17] An immediate threat inspires the classical

balancing response that Realists argue is the primary cause of alliance formation. Recalling Walt's four threat assessment factors (aggregate power,geographic proximity, offensive military power, and aggressive intentions), it is clear that any country registering high in all four factors will be viewed as an immediate threat. Furthermore, certain combinations of the four factors can also pose immediate threats to other states. A state, for example, that is seen as being aggressive and that possesses offensive capabilities poses an immediate threat because it can attack others states at any moment. For that reason, an immediate threat will inspire the balancing behavior discussed by most Realists.

As its name suggests, a latent threat is a security problem that has not fully emerged or developed. In understanding what constitutes a latent threat, it is again useful to examine Walt's four threat assessment factors. A state possessing high aggregate power, geographic proximity, and offensive military capabilities can still constitute a latent threat if it is perceived as lacking aggressive intentions because other states do not fear an immediate attack. Alternatively, a state lacking significant capabilities but that is perceived as possessing aggressive intentions also constitutes a latent threat because it wants to change the status-quo and will do so when it possesses the necessary capabilities.[18] That threat will be even more serious if the state has the potential to increase substantially its capabilities over time. If confronted with an aggressive state that seems likely to increase (over time) its ability to carry out that aggression (meaning its military power), then a large state will perceive the smaller state to be a latent military threat to its security.

States have several options in dealing with latent threats. First, they can utilize diplomacy to appease the latent threat, thereby moderating the aggressive ambitions of the threatening state. Another possible course of action would be a formal alliance with others against the latent threat. This option, however, is unattractive for the large state because it will permanently alienate the threatening state, thereby assuring its hostility and making it more of a threat once it has increased its capabilities. Consequently, the preferred option for large states confronting latent threats is to enter into an alliance with such states. In this

way, the large state restrains the actions of the small state as it (the small state) grows more powerful. In addition, such an alliance will lessen the resentment felt by the small state and keep alive the possibility of moderating the ambitions of the small state once it becomes a great power. Alliances, in this view, provide states with a mechanism for balancing against latent threats.

Alliances as Instruments of Control: The Historical Record

The preceding section sought to explain why states would ally with other states in order to control or restrain them. Seeking to make the international environment more predictable and amenable to their foreign policy objectives, great powers will ally with medium or small powers if, for some reason, the smaller power has a reputation for unpredictability or instability. Secondly, great powers will try to restrain both the power and ambitions of a smaller state that is perceived to be aggressive by entangling it in an alliance. In this way, great powers balance against latent threats to their security by allying with the potential source of threat. So alliances serve the dual purpose of balancing against common external threats and providing states with control over their unpredictable and potentially threatening allies.

Having explained why states would enter into an alliance in order to control an ally, the question now arises as to whether or not the historical record lends any support to this argument. The subsequent chapters of this essay will provide some confirmation in that the argument will be made that the United States signed a bilateral security alliance with Japan in order to balance the Soviet Communist threat and to entangle an unpredictable and potentially threatening Japan. But what of other alliances? Is there any evidence suggesting that past great powers have constructed alliances of control and restraint? The remainder of this chapter will briefly review the empirical record on alliance formation, suggesting that

although much work remains to be done, evidence exists suggesting that states do ally with other states in order to control and restrain them.

Without question, Paul Schroeder's work on the history of alliances since the Congress of Vienna provides the most convincing support for the conception of alliance formation discussed in this chapter. In an article reviewing the formation of alliances in Europe between 1815 and 1945, Schroeder argues that the desire to control and restrain allies played a greater role than the need for capability aggregation in the formation of many of these alliances. For example, the Anglo-French-Austrian alliance of December 2, 1854, which was ostensibly to balance against Russia, actually represented an effort by the dominant power, Great Britain, to control an unpredictable and potentially aggressive France. Although the British shared a common fear of Russia with France, the British remained suspicious about the goals of French foreign policy. For that reason, the British sought to control the French by entangling them in an alliance.[19]

Schroeder also points to the Dual Alliance of 1879 between Germany and Austria as being a clear case of a great power, Germany, allying with a smaller power in order to control or manage its foreign and domestic politics. Ever since Germany scored a resounding military victory over France in 1871, the goal of Bismarck's foreign policy had been to preserve the territorial and political status-quo in Europe. To that end, Bismarck sought to make the European system more stable and predictable. During the late 1870s, Austria's highly volatile domestic situation and foreign policy became a growing concern for Germany. More specifically, Bismarck wanted to prevent Austria from taking actions that might lead its arch-enemy, Russia, to attack it. In addition, he sought to insure that the vast Austro-Hungarian empire would remain under the control of Germans and Magyars, and not slavic elements that would make Austria a destabilizing factor in European politics. For these reasons, Bismarck agreed to defend Austria against Russia in return for influence (if not total control) over its foreign and domestic policies.[20] As one of Bismarck's

biographers states, the alliance with Austria gave Bismarck "the whip-hand over Austria and a large measure of control over her foreign policy."[21]

Conclusion

From the discussion of the historical research on alliance formation, it is clear that the argument about the origins of alliances made in this chapter lacks sufficient empirical support. The evidence is merely suggestive, not conclusive. And yet there exists enough evidence to suggest the need for a more systematic study of the history of alliance formation, with special attention being paid to the impact of a desire to control one's allies in the creation of alliances. Realism claims that alliances are efforts to balance common external threats to the security of the members of the alliance. But it appears that states also enter into alliances in order to control or restrain their allies. The desire to control an ally may stem from a perception that it is unpredictable and unstable. Or it may be the product of a fear that the state poses a latent threat to others. Whatever the motive, nation-states use alliances both to balance external threats and to control the behavior allies. The remainder of this essay will attempt to show that the desire of the United States to balance the Soviet/Communist military threat and to control what it perceived to be an unpredictable and potentially unstable Japan led to the creation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance on September 8, 1951.

CHAPTER TWO: THE JAPANESE IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: 1941-1951

It is the central argument of this essay that the United States entered into a security alliance with Japan in order to control its unpredictable and potentially unstable former enemy. There existed serious concern within American foreign policymaking circles that once the Occupation ended, the newly liberated Japan would take actions detrimental to U.S. interests. The more serious of those possible actions included: a right-wing inspired re-militarization of Japan that led to rapid, uncontrolled rearmament and, perhaps, the launching of a "war of revenge" against Japan's former enemies (including the U.S.); an alliance and separate peace with Communist China; and a communist revolution within Japan that placed a pro-Soviet, anti-western government in control of Japan's vast industrial potential. While policymakers differed as to which scenario was most likely to occur, there existed a broad consensus that an independent Japan might take actions that would make the world a less stable and secure place for the United States.

What these concerns indicate is a strong mistrust of post-occupation Japan. That mistrust produced, in turn, what I call the "Japan Security Problem" for the United States. Because of its strategic importance and industrial potential, Japan had to be kept out of the hands of the Soviet Union and had to remain friendly to the West. Clearly one way of insuring Japan's pro-Western orientation was to deter external communist aggression against Japan. The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, of course, provided such external security guarantees. But the threat to Japan's pro-Western orientation came as much from *within* as from without Japan. U.S. policymakers feared that a Japan no longer under the control of the Allied Occupation would embark on one or more of the courses mentioned earlier. So the threat to American interests came form both the Soviets and the Japanese themselves. It is the Japanese side of the threat that constitutes the Japan Security Problem.

Having spent nearly seven years implementing a vast reform program, it is curious that the United States feared the actions of an independent Japan. After all, the Occupation reforms had impacted nearly every aspect of Japanese life, from government and the economy to culture and society. Some Americans involved in the Occupation, including General Douglas MacArthur, were thoroughly convinced that the Occupation succeeded in permanently democratizing and demilitarizing Japan. Japan had been purged of its authoritarian and militaristic ways, enabling it to assume its place among the community of democratic nations. The views of MacArthur and other such optimists, however, were in the minority. The majority of American policymakers concerned with Japan and East Asia remained very suspicious about the intentions (both long and short term) of an independent Japan. That suspicion stemmed from the persistence of an *image* of Japan that formed both before and during the Second World War. The Japanese were perceived as being irrational, treacherous, hierarchical and prone to authoritarianism, aggressive, and militaristic. This image, in turn, led to the conclusion that the Japanese were capable of very sudden and unpredictable change. Since strong doubts remained about Japan's reliability and predictability, the Japanese had to be controlled from the outside. The last chapter of this thesis will demonstrate that American foreign policymakers saw the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the chief instrument for controlling post-Occupation Japan.

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the basic features of the American image of Japan. The first section will define the concept of national image and then discuss a framework for assessing the content of such images. Employing that framework, the remainder of the chapter will examine the content of the image of Japan held by most Americans both during and immediately after the war. A variety of sources will be utilized, ranging from scholarly books and articles about Japan written during this period to the private comments about Japan of leading American foreign policymakers. Although a broad range of opinion about Japan existed during this period, what will emerge from this

chapter is a common image of Japan that compelled the U.S. to construct an alliance that would allow it to control an unpredictable and potentially unstable Japan.

National Images

One of the most important developments in the study of international relations and foreign policy over the last twenty years has been the growing importance placed on decisionmaking in explaining the behavior of nation-states. Drawing primarily on work done in organizational theory and cognitive psychology, the decisionmaking approach focuses on the inner workings of the national government and on the individual beliefs and perceptions of statesmen. Underlying these various policymaking models and hypotheses is the view that rationality, the conscious choosing and implementation of ends and means, does not reflect the actual manner in which foreign policy decisions are made.[1] Rather, states are constrained by a variety of factors that inhibit or bound rationality: large bureaucracies interested primarily in promoting their own interests, the inability of national leaders to process and understand vast amounts of information, and the underlying beliefs and assumptions of ruling elites that condition the way in which they view the world. These barriers to rationality, in turn, frequently make foreign policy an outgrowth of misperception, over-simplified lessons from history, and bureaucratic politics. It is to these decisionmaking factors, therefore, that one must turn in trying to understand important foreign policy choices.

There can be little doubt that the decision to construct a security alliance with Japan arose, in part, out of the interaction of various bureaucratic and cognitive influences within the U.S. foreign policymaking process. The most important of these influences was a dominant national image, derived almost entirely from the experience of the Second World War, of Japan and the Japanese. In speaking of a national image, it is useful to think in

terms of a "firm substratum of attitude and opinion, based on emotionally meaningful experience and communication, . . . "[2] Images are more basic and long-lasting than mere fleeting opinions, and reflect "an underlying orientation . . . toward a subject . . . (that) serves to organize further and subsequent experience and knowledge."[3] To some extent, this definition of image compliments the concept of an operational code as discussed by Nathan Leites and Alexander George. Political leaders possess a set of assumptions about the world, usually formed early in their careers, that guide their perceptions and policy decisions.[4] It is this set of basic assumptions that George terms an "operational code." Statesmen will combine these basic assumptions about the world with an image of another country in judging the intentions of that country and in choosing an appropriate foreign policy.

Having assumed that national images exert significant influence on foreign policy, the question now arises as to how one determines the contents of a particular national image. Clearly the ideas and assumptions of leading policymakers are extremely important. After all, they are the ones making the actual decisions. Consequently, the comments of foreign policymakers concerned with Japan are of great importance in determining the American image of Japan. In addition, since policymakers rarely have the time to study in-depth other countries, it is essential to examine the views of those experts they turn to for information and advice. In our case, the writings of the so called "Japan specialists" both inside and outside of government will be of great importance. It is essential to remember, however, that national images are not derived entirely from expert opinion. Policymakers are also influenced by such things as the press and public opinion. So it is also useful to examine what leading newspapers and magazines say about the country in question, as well as any views expressed by the general public by means of public opinion polling.

The research strategy described above draws much of its inspiration from an outstanding essay written by Nathan Glazer on the Japanese image in the American mind between 1945 and 1975. Glazer argues that there is a single image of Japan, and that it has

been shaped primarily by the work of Japan specialists (like Edwin O.Reischauer) and less specialized but equally important opinion-makers who have written about Japan (like Ruth Benedict, Herman Kahn, and Zbigniew Brzezinski). While differences among these writers exist, Glazer claims that a single, underlying image of Japan resonates in each of their works. That image is very similar to the one discussed in the introduction to this chapter, and it is worthwhile to quote at length Glazer's central thesis:

> The following points seem to characterize the present attitude of the best-educated Americans toward Japan: that they are *characterized* by *radical paradoxes* ; that connected with this sense of radical paradox is a sense of *alienness* . . . that one aspect of their alienness is their *insensitivity* to others, their peculiar relations to other people; that because of this paradoxicality they are basically *unpredictable* -- they may change from one thing to another overnight; that because they are unpredictable . . . they are fundamentally *unstable*; that since they are unstable, we must in particular be distrustful of the *Japanese commitment to democracy.* [5]

The remainder of this essay will attempt to demonstrate that the image of Japan described by Glazer was the image held by important American elites between 1941 and 1951, and that this image greatly influenced the decision to enter into a security alliance with Japan.

The Wartime and Postwar Image of Japan

Without question, war is the most important factor in the development and persistence of an essentially negative national image. This is hardly surprising given that the other side is "the enemy" and is bent on destroying one's way of life. Of course, the intensity and persistence of the negative image will depend upon the way in which the enemy's actions are perceived. An enemy whose actions are seen as resulting from the evil desires of a single dictator will inspire a strongly negative image so long as that dictator

remains in power. But having removed the source of trouble (the Hitler or the Mussolini), the former enemy can once again be viewed in a positive light. But images of the enemy that are directed at an entire society will linger long after the war has ended. After all, the people or the society remain even after hostilities end. So although the end of the war may improve the image, it is doubtful that a country whose villains were perceived as being its people or its culture will ever be viewed in a wholly positive and trusting light.

The two types of wartime images discussed above (the enemy is a bad individual vs. the enemy is an entire people) reflect the images of the enemy prevalent in the United States during the Second World War. German aggression was explained as being the actions of a group of "bad Germans" (the Nazis). Since there were bad Germans there also existed some good Germans. The German people, after all, shared the same cultural heritage and many of the same values possessed by Americans. The fact that bad Germans were responsible for Germany's atrocious wartime behavior meant that once the Nazis were defeated and good Germans put in their place, the image of Germany could change dramatically (although mistrust certainly remains).

There was no equivalent to the "bad German" in the Pacific war, where the actions of the enemy were simply blamed on "the Japanese." Although some commentators focused on the role played by the Emperor and the Japanese militarists, time and again the Japanese people or Japanese society played the part of the villain.[6] In fact, Japan proved to be a far more hated enemy than Germany. In an essay written shortly after the war, the Pulitzer Prize winning historian Allan Nevins wrote, "Probably in all our history no foe has been so detested as were the Japanese."[7] The popular wartime journalist Ernie Pyle also observed the substantial difference in the way the enemy in Europe and the enemy in the Pacific were viewed. Commenting on the attitude of U.S. troops Pyle wrote, "In Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and deadly as they were, were still people. But out here I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman and repulsive, the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice."[8] The sentiments of American

troops echoed those at home. A poll taken in December of 1944 vividly demonstrates the extent to which the Japanese were hated. In response to the question "What do you think we should do with Japan as a country after the war?'" a shocking 13 percent of the Americans polled wanted to "kill all Japanese" while another 33 percent wanted to destroy Japan as a political entity.[9]

The intensity of hatred toward Japan illustrates the strength of the negative image of Japan at the time of its surrender on August 15, 1945. Unlike Germany, the Japanese were seen as being a race, if not a species, apart from the Western world.[10] There was something very different and, consequently, very frightening about the Japanese. They behaved in ways that were incomprehensible to many in the West. More importantly, that behavior arose out of the dictates of Japanese culture, society, and psychology. It was, in other words, ingrained in the Japanese. The end of the war did nothing to change those aspects of Japanese society and culture that had led to Japan's aggressive behavior during the 1930s. It was not simply a matter of imprisoning or executing a group of "bad Japanese." The problems were far deeper, touching the entire Japanese nation. The remainder of this chapter will examine the three Japanese characteristics that received the most attention in the West and that dominated the American image of Japan between 1941 and 1951. More specifically, the Japanese were seen as being: irrational and treacherous, militaristic and aggressive, and obedient and conditioned to authoritarianism.

Irrational and Treacherous

The first component of the American image of Japan was the widely held view that the Japanese were both irrational and treacherous. I lump these two seemingly separate characteristics together because in most Western discussions of Japan, one almost always follows the other. A Japanese action that is described as being treacherous, for example, is usually considered to be highly irrational, and vice-versa. Nothing illustrates the close relationship between the two characteristics as the American reaction to and explanation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. In fact, the "lessons of Pearl Harbour" cast a significant shadow over all future analyses of Japan and played a major role in creating the negative image of Japan.[11]

There can be little doubt that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour convinced most Americans that all Japanese were treacherous. The conception of a people and a country capable of friendship and trust one day followed by a cruel and vicious attack on the next can certainly be seen in the results of a poll taken six months after Pearl Harbour. Asked to choose adjectives describing the Japanese, 73 percent of those Americans polled chose "treacherous," while 63 percent also described the Japanese as being "sly."[12] The U.S. government also promoted the image of a treacherous Japan. The famous propaganda film, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, for example, claimed that the Japanese code of morality cultivated as an art "double-dealing and treachery."[13] Ruth Benedict, whose classic study of Japanese culture *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* was published in 1946, echoed American propaganda in arguing that the peculiarities of Japanese culture made treachery a virtue.[14] The image of a treacherous Japan remained in the postwar period, especially among American foreign policymakers. Perhaps the most significant comments from our perspective come from John Foster Dulles, the chief negotiator of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. In 1951, Dulles told the Chinese ambassador, "The Oriental mind, particularly that of the Japanese, was always more devious than the

Occidental mind." Dulles went on to express concern that with regard to Communist China, Japan might be playing "a double-faced policy vis-a-vis the United States."[15] What these wartime and postwar comments suggest is that Pearl Harbour taught the United States that Japan was capable of very devious and treacherous behavior and that one never knew when to expect the next Japanese `stab in the back.'

In addition to being treacherous and devious, the Japanese were also perceived as being very irrational. The attack on Pearl Harbour confirmed the notion that the Japanese simply do not think like everyone else. After all, any reasonable person could see that the Pacific War was an exercise in futility for Japan. How could a small country like Japan actually believe it could defeat the United States? As the historian John Dower has written:

> Because the Pearl Harbour attack came so unexpectedly-- so literally out of the blue, as the saying goes--most Westerners regarded Japan's initiation of war as high folly, an incredible miscalculation of America's pride, its wrath, and its bountiful resources. The attack thus managed to reinforce existing impressions of the Japanese as unpredictable and fundamentally irrational . . .[16]

The notion of Japanese irrationality actually pre-dated Pearl Harbour. In a note written for the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1936, the future Pulitzer Prize winning historian Barbara Tuchman wrote, "So completely divorced is the Japanese mental process from the Occidental, so devoid of what Westerners call logic, that the Japanese are able to make statements, knowing they present a false picture, yet sincerely believing them."[17] Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1932 until the outbreak of the war, continually spoke of Japan's peculiar psychology and logic. Grew warned Americans that to attempt "to measure their (the Japanese) thinking processes or their sense of rationality by Western yardsticks would be misleading and inaccurate."[18] While one can cite dozens of similar statements, it is important to observe the general feeling that the Japanese did not think like

Westerners, that they were fundamentally irrational, and, consequently, that one could never predict what they might do next.

Militaristic and Aggressive

The second (and most widely held) image of Japan concerned its militarism and aggressiveness. Given the attack on Pearl Harbour, it is not surprising that Americans viewed the Japanese as being aggressors bent on world conquest. Similar opinions about Germany and Italy also existed. What distinguished Japanese aggression was its roots; it arose out of the dictates of culture and psychology, not Nazism or Fascism. There was something about Japanese culture and society that made all Japanese innately aggressive. As mentioned earlier, one could not simply get rid of a group of Japanese militarists in order to eliminate the possibility of future Japanese aggression. The roots of Japan's aggressive behavior during the Second World War were simply too deep; they lay in the very nature of Japanese culture and society.

Without question, the many atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the war provided the U.S. with its most vivid and persuasive example of what it perceived to be Japan's innate aggressiveness. The most brutal of those atrocities included: the Rape of Nanking, in which over 200,000 helpless Chinese were slaughtered over a six week period; the Bataan death march, the bayonetting of prisoners of war; and the orgies of rape and murder by retreating Japanese soldiers in the waning days of the war.[19] Such behavior led many Americans to speak of Japanese soldiers as being wild beasts or savage barbarians. *Know Your Enemy: Japan* called them "mad dogs."[20] Responding to reports of Japanese mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war, General George Marshall stated, "The future of Japan as a nation -- in fact, of the Japanese race itself -- depends entirely and irrevocably upon their capacity to progress beyond their aboriginal barbaric

instincts."[21] *Time Magazine* expressed similar sentiments in February of 1944. Commenting on the Bataan Death March, the magazine stressed that such atrocities revealed "the true nature of the enemy . . . an enemy that seems to be a beast which sometimes stands erect."[22]

The feeling that there was something innately aggressive, even barbaric, about the Japanese, extended to the highest reaches of the U.S. government. At various times during the war, President Franklin Roosevelt described the Japanese as being "barbarous," "uncivilized," "inhuman," and "depraved."[23] Further evidence of Roosevelt's belief that aggression constituted a fundamental feature of the Japanese can be found in his rather shocking correspondence with a Professor Hrdlicka of the Smithsonian Institute. The Roosevelt-Hrdlicka correspondence arose out of President's interest in the possibility of cross-breeding the Japanese with more docile Pacific islanders so as to eliminate "the primitive brains and barbarism of the enemy race."[24] Although his views were not quite as bizarre as those of his predecessor, Harry S. Truman also saw the Japanese as possessing an aggressive instinct. Truman, who was in the White House throughout the period covered in this essay, commented in a private diary that the atomic bomb had to be used because the Japanese were "savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic."[25]

What the comments of American political leaders and the media suggest is a broad consensus, generated by Japan's expansionist international behavior and its numerous atrocities, that the Japanese people were innately aggressive. But once the war and the atrocities ended, one would anticipate that concern about innate Japanese aggressiveness would also diminish. It did not, however, primarily due to the influence of the Japan specialists of the day. For these scholars offered well-reasoned explanations of Japan's aggressive behavior that emphasized its cultural, social, and psychological roots. The barbaric actions of Japanese soldiers were not a wartime aberration. Rather, because of the social and psychological pressures experienced by all Japanese, the Japanese people were repressed and, consequently, filled with pent up aggressiveness. The end of the war did

nothing to change the social and psychological roots of Japanese aggression. For that reason, postwar Japan could not be trusted because the entire society might suddenly explode in a fit of repressed rage.

Among the work of the wartime Japan specialists, the British anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer's study of Japanese culture received the greatest attention for its explanation of Japanese aggressiveness. Actually it is not correct to call Gorer a "Japan specialist" since he did not read or speak Japanese and had never been to Japan. But like many of his fellow social scientists who attempted to explain enemy behavior, Gorer offered sweeping generalizations about Japanese culture and society that were based on very slim research. Gorer's analysis stressed the critical role played by the socialization process, especially the childhood training practices experienced by all Japanese. These practices stressed the importance of ritual, tidiness, obedience, and taking one's proper place within a structured environment. Such a highly regimented and ritualistic environment forced people to repress their personal desires, and this repression led to periodic outbursts of aggressive behavior.[26] The importance of ritual and proper place also had an important impact on Japanese foreign policy. As Gorer wrote, " Owing to the methods by which, and the society in which, the Japanese are brought up, no Japanese can feel safe and secure unless the whole environment is understood and as far as possible controlled."[27] This need to control the environment, Gorer claims, extends to the international environment. "This largely unconscious fear of the environment is insatiable. The Japanese can never feel safe unless . . . the Mikado rules the whole earth."[28]

It is important to note that Gorer's work on Japanese culture never gained a wide popular audience. His ideas were summarized in a *Time* magazine article entitled "Why are Japs Japs?," but his work never received the kind of popular attention that the writings of some other Japanists did. But Gorer's central ideas remain important because they exerted tremendous influence over those other Japanists whose books and articles did receive popular attention. Gorer's influence is especially evident in the work of Ruth

Benedict. As mentioned earlier, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* was published in 1946 and went farther than any other work in shaping the early postwar American image of Japan. Echoing Gorer's argument that the demands of Japanese culture breed aggressive behavior, Benedict writes:

> For social pressures in Japan, no matter how voluntarily embraced, ask too much of the individual. They require him to conceal his emotions, to give up his desires, and to stand as the exposed representative of a family, an organization or a nation. The Japanese have shown that they can take all the self-discipline such a course requires. But the weight upon them is extremely heavy. They have to repress too much for their own good.[29]

Even more interesting than his influence on Benedict is the impact of Gorer's ideas on the work of E.O. Reischauer. After Benedict, Reischauer became the leading American expert on Japan. In his widely read study published in 1950, *The United States and Japan*, Reischauer also warns of Japan's repressed aggressiveness.

> . . . but the degree of tension created between these two forces (emotion and conformity) seems in some respects to be greater in Japan and their point of balance seems decidedly off center. . . . (The Japanese) are a people whose emotions are so pent up by other forces as to have *more explosive powers* (emphasis added) than we would consider normal.[30]

What makes Reischauer's comment especially interesting is that it came in 1950, after five years of an American Occupation that had supposedly ingrained pacifism and democracy in the Japanese people. Clearly the Occupation reforms had not, in Reischauer's judgment, removed those social and cultural practices that made the Japanese periodically aggressive. For that reason, the seeds of aggression remained in postwar Japan and were capable of bursting forth into the open at any moment. Concern about Japanese aggressiveness being

a time bomb waiting to explode helps explain (as later chapters will demonstrate) why the U.S. did not trust an independent Japan and felt the need to control it with an entangling alliance.

Obedience and Authoritarianism

The third component of the American image of Japan between 1941 and 1951 was the belief that the Japanese people were an obedient herd that could be easily manipulated by those in positions of authority. Japanese culture stresses the importance of the group over the interests of the individual. It is duty and loyalty to the group that is the supreme expression of virtue in Japan. These cultural values make Japan a very hierarchical society in which obedience to the leaders of the group (whether that leader be the father in the family group, one's superior in the company, or the leaders of the most important group of all, the Japanese nation) is paramount. The actions of Japan's leaders are never questioned by the individual; individualism and free expression are taboo. Rather, the Japanese people must follow their leaders wherever they wish to take them, even if that means national destruction.

Throughout the Second World War, explanations of Japanese behavior stressed the obedience of the people and the absence of any sense of individualism or free thought. In no place is the theme of an obedient and subservient Japanese herd more central than in the American propaganda film, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. The film, under the supervision of the famed Hollywood director Frank Capra, showed numerous scenes of regimentation and group activity, painting a portrait of a people lacking any sense of individuality. The film continually referred to the Japanese people being "prints off the same photographic negative" and being "an obedient mass with but a single mind." The Japanese lacked any sense of individual worth. From birth, they were trained to be subservient to the state.[31]

In addition to official government propaganda, numerous American commentators espoused the theme of an obedient Japanese herd devoid of individuality. Wilfrid Fleisher, a popular radio personality, used the "prints off the same negative" line in telling his audience that the Japanese government uses its control over education to provide "an official negative from which millions of prints are made."[32] Former ambassador Joseph Grew relied heavily on the insect world in describing the Japanese people. He spoke of the Japanese being a bustling hive of bees serving the queen (in this case the Emperor). Others compared Japanese society to an ant-hill. An American sociologist told a wartime radio audience that the Japanese were "a closely disciplined and conformist people--a veritable human bee-hive or ant-hill."[33]

Without question, the removal of thousands of Japanese-Americans to relocation camps provides the most telling evidence of the widespread belief that the Japanese were an obedient mass with but a single mind. Under Executive Order 9066, over 100,000 Japanese-Americans were taken from their homes on the West Coast to ten camps located in the interior of the United States. Many of those people had been born in the United States, and some had never even been to Japan. The fact that the U.S. government felt the need to imprison Japanese-Americans while not implementing a similar policy for German or Italian Americans illustrates the degree to which racial stereotypes about Japanese loyalty and obedience guided official U.S. policy. While people of German or Italian extraction were their own individuals and could be treated as such, General John L. De Witt, the commander who administered the relocation, explained that Japanese-Americans must be treated differently because "a Jap is a Jap." Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi expressed similar sentiments in saying, "You can't any more regenerate a Jap than you can reverse the laws of nature." Clearly Americans firmly believed the image of an obedient Japanese herd, and regarding the imprisonment of Japanese-Americans John Dower is correct in writing:

> . . . if every man, woman, and child of Japanese origin on the western coasts of the Americas was categorically identified by the highest quarters as a potential menace simply because of his or her ethnicity, then the real Japanese enemy abroad could only be perceived as a truly faceless, monolithic, incorrigible, and stupendously formidable foe.[34]

Among the Japan specialists, Ruth Benedict provided perhaps the clearest explanation of why the Japanese were so obedient and submissive. The theme of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is the central role played by hierarchy and obedience in all aspects of Japanese life, including politics. To obey and to do one's duty to others is to live a virtuous life. In politics, this means following orders from above no matter how one views them personally. The following quotation from the book provides an excellent summary of what America's Japanists were saying about the nature of Japanese politics both during and after the war.

> The Japanese rely on old habits of deference set up in their past experience and formalized in their ethical system and in their etiquette. The State can depend upon it that, when their Excellencies function in their `proper place,' their prerogatives will be respected, not because the policy is approved but because it is wrong in Japan to override boundaries between prerogatives.[35]

A society in which it is unethical to question the decisions of political leaders is especially vulnerable to subversion and authoritarian forms of government. Even after democratic institutions were introduced into Japan, one could never be certain of their

resiliency. After all, the people care little about what form of government they have; what is important is that they have someone to whom they can be loyal and obedient. Consequently, should political instability (including an attempted coup) originating from either the right or the left occur in postwar Japan, one could not expect the people to offer any resistance. They would simply obey whomever is in charge. For that reason, democracy in postwar Japan appeared to be (in the view of most American foreign policymakers) a *fragile blossom* that could be destroyed by extremist elements at any moment. The Japanese people were simply too meek, too obedient, and too passive to insure the stability of democratic institutions. This vulnerability to political subversion merely strengthened the image of Japan as an unpredictable and unstable place that, because of its immense strategic value and industrial potential, had to be controlled by the United States.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that a particular image of Japan existed in the United States both during and after the Second World War. That image was held by most influential elites concerned with Japan, as well as by leading opinion-makers and the American people. The Japanese were seen as been capable of very unpredictable and unstable behavior. They could be treacherous and irrational, pursuing a predictable, pro-American policy at one moment and then suddenly turning their back on the West. There also existed great concern about a resurgence of Japanese militarism and aggression. Most Japan specialists, in fact, argued that in spite of the American Occupation, the seeds of aggression remained in Japanese culture and society. Finally, the Japanese people were thought to be very obedient and prone to political subversion and authoritarian rule. These three factors formed an image that inspired great mistrust of an independent Japan.

Because Japan could not be trusted, some means were needed to insure its stability and predictability. The remainder of this essay will seek to demonstrate that the United States used the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the principle means for controlling and containing post-occupation Japan.

CHAPTER THREE: SOLVING THE JAPAN SECURITY PROBLEM I: THE RADICAL SOLUTION

When the war in Europe and Asia ended in the Spring and Summer of 1945, the United States and its allies confronted a problem that they had seemingly bungled a quarter of a century earlier. At Versailles, the victors in World War I inflicted severe economic penalties on Germany which weakened the prospects for democracy and stability by impoverishing and alienating the German people. Mistakes were also made in the political/military sphere, where the victorious powers failed to find the means of effectively controlling and enforcing restrictions on German military and foreign policy. The victors had been, in simple terms, both too lenient and too harsh in dealing with a defeated Germany. The consequences, of course, included the rise of Adolph Hitler, the remilitarization of Germany, and the German quest for hegemony in Europe that eventually led to the Second World War. The shadow cast by this "legacy of Versailles" weighed heavily on the minds of Allied policymakers as they contemplated the future of Germany and Japan during the last two years of the Second World War.[1]

Because the United States was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past, its postwar occupation plans sought to eliminate those factors that had led both Germany and Japan to pursue aggressive foreign policies during the 1930s. Steps would be taken, for example, to insure that neither country possessed the capability to begin another world war. These measures included disarmament, the destruction of armament industries, and the purging of those leaders responsible for the war. In addition, a strenuous effort would also be made to root out the underlying causes of militarism and aggressiveness. Democracy and a liberal international economy would have to replace the dictatorships and predatory economic policies that characterized the 1930s. In this way, American leaders believed

that both the capacity and the will to be aggressive would be permanently removed. The theme of the postwar peace settlement would be reform, not simply retribution.

In the case of Japan, removing both the capacity and the will to be aggressive translated into a program of radical demilitarization and democratization. At its most basic level, demilitarization meant the destruction of all remnants of the Japanese military machine and the purging of the militarists. But as the previous chapter illustrated, the causes of Japanese aggression lay far deeper than simply the actions of a small group of military leaders. Those causes, in the American view, were cultural and societal. If the United States and its allies wanted to insure that Japan did not repeat its actions of the 1930s, then they would have to change fundamentally those aspects of Japanese culture and society that had contributed to imperial expansion and war. More specifically, Japan would have to be made less authoritarian and more democratic. Those institutions seen as contributing to aggressiveness and militarism included: the military, the large, family-owned business groups known as the *zaibatsu*, the system of land ownership that impoverished and angered the peasantry, the educational system, and Shintoism and the Emperor, to name just a few. If these instruments of repression could be eliminated and replaced by institutions promoting democracy, a concern for individual rights, economic justice, and pacifism, then Japan could be entrusted to join the family of democratic nations.

The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a history of the American Occupation, but rather to illustrate the relationship between the very negative image of Japan outlined in the previous chapter and the reform program undertaken by the Allied Occupation between 1945 and 1947. As one might expect, an image that stressed the innate aggressiveness, treachery, and blind obedience of a people is not likely to generate much trust for that country, even after the cessation of war. How can you trust someone who is likely to stab you in the back in a fit of aggression stemming from a lifetime of pent up rage? More importantly, how can one rely on the stability of a country whose people will obediently

follow anyone seizing political power, regardless of their ideology or future intentions? Clearly such a country cannot be trusted and will remain a source of unpredictability and potential instability. This unpredictability and instability created what I call the Japan Security Problem. The argument of this chapter is that the first two years of the American Occupation sought to make Japan trustworthy and reliable by *transforming* the basic institutions and norms of Japanese society. In this way, the United States attempted to solve the Japan Security Problem from *within* Japanese society.

The Shadow of Versailles

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 set off a wave of panic and doubt throughout the United States. Rumors of amphibious invasions, submarine attacks, and air raids spread up and down the West Coast. Enemy planes were said to be an hour from New York and only 150 miles from Washington D.C..[2] Given this mass of confusion and hysteria, it is surprising to find that even in these early days of war, the United States began thinking about the postwar world. In one of his "fireside chats" only two days after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt provided a clear sense of America's war aims. He told the American people that "The sources of international brutality, wherever they exist, must be absolutely and finally broken down. We are going to win the war, and we are going to win the peace that follows."[3] The United States could not simply be satisfied with defeating the enemy. It was also essential to eliminate the underlying causes of German and Japanese aggression. Only in this way could a third world war be prevented.

Although he probably did not know it at the time, Roosevelt's fireside chat became the guiding theme of American plans for postwar Germany and Japan. The United States was determined not to "lose the peace" as had been done at Versailles twenty years earlier.

In fact, the "lessons of Versailles" exerted tremendous influence over the planning of postwar occupation policies. Actually, there existed two sets of lessons about the failures of the post World War I peace settlement. One set of lessons stressed the excessive harshness of Versailles. The treaty, in this view, had placed too many penalties (in the form of reparations) on the German economy. These penalties, in turn, created severe economic hardship for the German people and led many of them to turn to extreme political solutions (the Nazis) to remedy their problems. The lesson of Versailles, therefore, was to avoid the kind of repressive peace terms that would once again alienate the defeated countries and lead to future instability and yet another war of revenge. The United States should impose a moderate peace that stressed the importance of reconstructing the economies of its former enemies so as to promote political stability within both Germany and Japan.

Standing in direct opposition to those calling for a moderate peace settlement were those who advocated a harsh, repressive occupation policy. Advocates of this approach (especially Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau) believed that Versailles failed because it had been too lenient on Germany. Defeat had never been impressed upon the German people and the victorious powers did not impose sufficient restraints against future German militarism. In dealing with the aggressors of World War Two, the United States had to pursue a vigorous occupation policy designed to insure that Germany and Japan would never again be capable of aggression.[4] One element of such a policy was the complete destruction of the German and Japanese war machines. But the advocates of a hard peace went beyond disarmament. The Morgenthau Plan, for example, called for the complete destruction of German industry. The goal of this plan was to turn Germany into an agricultural society. In this way, Morgenthau reasoned, the German people would be impressed with the error of their ways while at the same time lacking the ability to launch any kind of war of revenge.[5]

As is often the case in the making of foreign policy, the actual occupation policies chosen by the United States represented a compromise between the extremes of repression and rehabilitation. The United States did not impose a draconian peace on its defeated enemies. Proposals like the Morgenthau Plan were discarded in favor of a policy that preserved Germany and Japan's industrial bases while at the same time demilitarizing their economies. But the occupation policies did not merely stop with economic rehabilitation. On the contrary, sweeping reforms designed to democratize and demilitarize the wartime enemies were instituted in order to cure the societal ills that had produced German and Japanese aggression. Reform, not repression or rehabilitation, was the theme of the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan.

Curing Aggression: The Origins of the Radical Reform of Japan

As was true in the case of Germany, the advocates of a moderate occupation policy for Japan were centered in the State Department and consisted mainly of foreign service officers who had previously served in Japan. The former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, was the leading spokesman for this group, and it was because of his prestige and influence that initial planning for the occupation of Japan called for a moderate peace with minimal reform.[6] In fact, until the Morgenthau Plan attracted the attention of the President and the rest of the country, the views of the State Department dominated postwar policy planning. From that point forward, however, the influence of the moderates in the State Department waned as advocates of a bolder program of reform gained the upper hand in the occupation policy process.

To Grew and the other Japan FSOs, the blame for Japan's aggressive behavior rested with the young, insolent military officers who had used terror and assassination to subvert Japanese politics during the 1930s. Japan had been on the right course in the

1920s, when liberal-minded civilians held positions of authority. Grew and the Japan FSOs claimed that the Taisho era (as the period 1912-1925 was called) saw much progress toward democracy and freedom in Japan. But the tactics of the extreme right ended that progress and led Japan down a course of militarism, war, and eventually destruction.[7]

Since Japan's behavior resulted from the actions of a fanatic minority, removing the militarists and destroying their war machine ought to be the primary objective of the occupation of Japan. The United States should remove those influences that had subverted civilian authority and with it, political stability. Joseph Ballantine, a foreign service officer with many years of service in Japan, summarized this vision of Japan's future:

> Our idea was . . . to encourage those Japanese who in the past had shown progressive pro-Western tendencies. . . . We wanted to encourage them to come forth and assume leadership. We felt that the strong forces of example, tutelage, and suggestion would be far more effectual in making the Japanese see the inconsistencies and inadequacies of their traditional order of life, and they would themselves then be willing to make choices in favor of democracy and liberalism.[8]

Having removed the militarists and re-asserted the supremacy of civilian over military leadership, the Allies could then begin the process of rehabilitating Japan economically. Once the Japanese economy regained its strength and prosperity, Japan could be re-integrated into the world economy. A prosperous Japan under a political leadership controlled by civilians, Grew argued, would be worthy of American trust.[9]

Missing from the proposals of Grew and the Japan FSOs was a program of major reform. Their proposals stressed demilitarization and economic rehabilitation, not democratization. Grew, in fact, told President Truman in May of 1945 that "from the long-range point of view, the best we can hope for is a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work." [10] In Grew's assessment of democracy in Japan, one can again see the American image of Japan at work. It will be

recalled from the previous chapter that Grew likened Japanese society to a collection of bees servicing the Emperor. Democracy could not possibly flourish, Grew reasoned, in such a hierarchical society. In fact, the Japan FSOs warned their superiors that an effort to introduce democracy into Japan would be deeply resented by the proud Japanese. For these reasons, the U.S. ought to give up any dream of remaking Japan in its own image. Although much more will be said later, it is important to note that Grew's assessment of the incompatibility of Japanese society and culture to democracy was revived in 1947 by the very American policymakers who succeeded in halting the radical reform and argued for an external solution to the Japan Security Problem. That solution, of course, was the strategy of double containment and its chief instrument was the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

Despite Grew's prestige and influence within American foreign policymaking circles, the Japan FSO's arguments were eventually rejected in favor of a sweeping program of demilitarization and democratization. Grew and his colleagues lost because their arguments were not in tune with those of the American people or the remainder of the U.S. government. The United States and its allies would not settle for the mere destruction of the militarists and then the restoration of the political and economic status-quo. It was believed that such a mild approach would enable Japan "to win by losing."[11] The wily Japanese, with American help, would rebuild themselves economically and then, at the most opportune moment, embark once again on their quest for world domination. If the United States wanted a peaceful and stable Japan, it would have to eliminate not only militarism, but also "the conditions that brought about militarism."[12]

Concerning the causes of militarism, most Americans agreed that they were political. More specifically, totalitarian forms of government, in which leaders are free to pursue their foreign policy ambitions without fear of popular discontent were held to be responsible for aggressiveness and militarism. Secretary of War Henry Stimson expressed such sentiments in July of 1945. " . . . a nation whose system rests upon free speech and all the elements of freedom, as does ours, cannot be sure of getting on permanently with a

nation where speech is strictly controlled and where the Government uses the iron hand of the secret police." Two years later, President Truman echoed Stimson's comment about the relationship between peace and democracy. "The stronger the voice of a people in the formulation of national policies, the less the danger of aggression. When all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, there will be enduring peace."[13] It was not enough simply to revive the world economy or to disarm the aggressors of World War II. Unless Japan could be democratized as well as demilitarized, the United States could expect the reemergence of a totalitarian regime and with it, an aggressive, militaristic foreign policy.

Possessing a clear set of goals, the American Occupation under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur set about the business of demilitarizing and democratizing Japan. Concerning the former, Japan's armed forces were disarmed and purges of the so called "militarists" took place. Another perceived source of militarism and aggression, the unjust and unfair laws governing the control of land, were abolished so as to avoid the future manipulation of an impoverished and angry peasantry. Efforts were also made to break the hold of the *zaibatsu*, who were thought to have encouraged and cooperated with the military leaders during the 1930s, over the Japanese economy. And finally, the new Japanese constitution contained a provision renouncing war and outlawing the possession of land, sea, and air forces. All of these measures were part of an effort to demilitarize Japan and, thereby, to reduce the likelihood of future Japanese aggression and the launching of a national war of revenge against the West.[14] By the time the Occupation changed course in 1947, most American foreign policymakers believed that the demilitarization program had been immensely successful and that Japan did not pose, in the immediate future, any kind of military threat.

In addition to demilitarizing Japan, the American Occupation sought to democratize it as well. To that end, those institutions thought to have promoted totalitarianism were either reformed or abolished. For example, the role of the Emperor in Japanese society

changed. Hirohito renounced his status as a deity and assumed a purely symbolic position in Japanese political and social life. Thousands of political prisoners were freed and opposition parties flourished. Women acquired the vote and the Japanese educational system taught the value of democracy and freedom, not national glory. Efforts were also made to democratize the Japanese economy, as labor unions were encouraged. The military's influence in Japanese politics ended and the principle of civilian authority was written into Japan's constitution. All in all, the Occupation sought to eliminate those *political, social, and economic* factors that were thought to have caused totalitarianism.

Unlike the program of demilitarization, most American foreign policymakers possessed great skepticism about the success of the effort to democratize Japan. After all, as the Japan specialists had written, obedience and duty to one's superiors were the keys to living a virtuous life among the Japanese. Was it realistic to believe that the United States could remake in its own image a society whose values were antithetical to democracy and freedom? This question runs throughout American foreign policy debates during the early postwar period. The cultural and societal roots of Japanese behavior were simply too deep. For that reason, the Occupation reforms aimed at democratization did little to change the American image of Japan as being an authoritarian, anti-democratic society. The obedience of the Japanese people made Japan very vulnerable to political subversion and, therefore, potentially unstable. It was concern about the fragility of democracy in Japan that led the United States to abandon the radical reform and to decide that once the Occupation ended, some means would be needed to control and stabilize Japanese politics. The next two chapters will examine the impact of these concerns on American policy toward Japan, including the decision to entangle an independent Japan in a security alliance.

Conclusion

Without question, the shadow of Versailles played a significant part in the decision to undertake a sweeping program of democratization. After World War I, the victorious countries did not attempt to reform German politics and society, thereby paving the way for the rise of Hitler. Having paid a high price for this error, the United States did not intend to repeat it. This determination to correct the errors of Versailles brought the negative image of Japan discussed earlier, in which Japan's authoritarian culture was perceived as fostering aggressive behavior, militarism, and totalitarian forms of government, to the forefront of American planning for postwar Japan. In fact, it is the combination of the lessons of Versailles, the firm conviction that totalitarian forms of government cause war, and the wartime image of Japan that ultimately led to the rejection of a moderate peace in favor of an ambitious program of sweeping reform. By the time Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, a general consensus existed within the United States that the best way to insure Japan's future good behavior would be to eradicate the totalitarian institutions and authoritarian attitudes that bred militarism and aggression. When the American Occupation officially began in September of 1945, the United States set about the business of controlling or containing postwar Japan from within by sponsoring a revolution in Japanese politics and society.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE JAPAN SECURITY PROBLEM II: THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR AND THE REVERSE COURSE 1947-1949

During the first two years of the American Occupation, the United States implemented a host of reforms designed to democratize and demilitarize Japan. Thousands of military, political, and business leaders were purged. The Emperor renounced his status as a deity and assumed a merely symbolic role in Japanese political and social life. A broad program of land reform, which liberated the peasantry from the domination of powerful landlords, was instituted. Political prisoners were freed and opposition parties and labor unions encouraged. Women were given the vote and the education system became more democratic and less nationalistic. And in what was the most visible attempt to solve the Japan Security Problem from within, a provision was written into Japan's new constitution renouncing war and forbidding the possession of land, sea, and air forces. Although there exists great disagreement among historians of the Occupation as to the degree to which these reforms truly revolutionized Japan, there can be little doubt that up until the Spring of 1947, the United States sought to transform Japanese political, economic, and social life in order to make Japan a more trustworthy and less unpredictable member of the international community.

In the writings and memoirs of foreign policymakers, one frequently reads of policies and strategies being overtaken by events and circumstances over which statesmen have little control. Years of policy debate and planning are forgotten as leaders cope with unexpected developments. The radical reform of Japan implemented by the American Occupation was just such a victim of circumstance. For the onset of the Cold War shifted the focus of U.S. foreign policymakers from reforming their former enemies to containing their new adversary, the Soviet Union. Where the threat to future peace and stability had

been seen as coming from a revanchist Germany or Japan, it now came from the Soviet Union and the so called international communist movement.

As one might expect, the Cold War changed the way in which American foreign policymakers viewed Japan. Having initially been seen as a potential enemy, Japan was now viewed as a geopolitical prize whose industrial power had to be kept out of the Soviet orbit. Because industrial strength was now the key to military power, George Kennan and others argued that the United States must contain the spread of Soviet expansion to those regions (Western Europe and Japan) possessing most of the world's industrial power and potential. Should the Soviet Union gain control of Japan's vast industrial resources (and those of Western Europe), the balance of international power would shift decisively against the United States. For that reason, Japan could not be allowed to fall under Soviet influence. A Japan friendly toward or under the control of the Soviet Union would be a detriment to the national security of the United States.

Once keeping Japan out of the Soviet orbit became an important foreign policy objective, the strategy of the American Occupation changed. Critics like Kennan and Secretary of the Army William Draper raised questions about the Occupation, stressing the incompatibility of the radical reform with the necessity of containing Communism. They argued that the Occupation, in its emphasis on economic and political democratization, had placed severe strains on the Japanese economy. More specifically, the program of economic deconcentration and the promotion of organized labor hindered Japanese economic recovery. The continued stagnation of the Japanese economy threatened to create the conditions of poverty and despair that strengthened indigenous communist forces. The Occupation, they argued, actually encouraged communism in its assault on militarism and authoritarianism. For that reason, the Occupation should shift its attention from democratization to economic revitalization.

Needless to say, Kennan and the other advocates of change won out and the objectives of the Occupation shifted. This so called "reverse course" led to the

subordination of programs designed to promote democracy in favor of measures to revitalize the Japanese economy. But in spite of this new emphasis on the Soviet threat, both the negative image of Japan and the Japan Security Problem remained. Japan continued to be seen as an unpredictable and untrustworthy country. In fact, the advent of the communist threat altered the way in which the American image of Japan influenced U.S. foreign policy. During this period, attention shifted from Japan's innate militarism and aggressiveness to its vulnerability to political subversion. The image of the Japanese people being an obedient herd willing to follow whomever leads them created enormous concern among American foreign policymakers. The Japanese people, it was feared, would put up little or no resistance to a Soviet-inspired communist seizure of power. So the focus of the Japan Security Problem shifted from how to prevent Japan from launching a war of revenge to how the United States could insure Japan's pro-Western orientation given its vulnerability to political subversion.

The Onset of the Cold War

It is certainly not the purpose of this chapter to provide a history of the Cold War or to engage in the debate over its origins. But because America's postwar policy toward Japan did not exist in a vacuum, it is necessary to review the series of events that resulted in increased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the Cold War transformed the way in which American foreign policymakers viewed Japan. That transformation, in turn, led to a major change in the American Occupation and, with it, the way in which the United States sought to deal with Japan's unpredictability and potential instability.

As mentioned earlier, between September of 1945 and March of 1947, the American Occupation implemented a program of sweeping political, economic and social reform in Japan. The goals of this program reflected the wartime priorities of eradicating the causes of militarism and aggression. But while General MacArthur and his staff were attempting to revolutionize Japan, a new challenge to American national security arose and moved to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. It is impossible to say exactly when the Cold War began. Soviet-American antagonism arose during the war over such issues as the opening of a second front, lend-lease assistance, and reparations. Most historians of the Cold War, however, trace the origins of the Cold War to the growing conflict over the postwar political settlement in Eastern and Central Europe that heated up in the months following Germany's surrender.[1]

Throughout 1946, a series of events and crises produced a growing consensus within American foreign policymaking circles that the Soviet Union posed a serious military, political, and ideological threat to the United States. Soviet refusal to remove Red Army troops from northern Iran produced a crisis atmosphere in Washington until Stalin finally withdrew the troops in March of 1946. Both sides also began to sharpen their public rhetoric about the threatening behavior of the other. On February 9, 1946, for example, Stalin spoke of the inevitability of war between capitalism and communism. One month later, Churchill made his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. A renewal of Soviet pressure on Turkey in August of 1946 to grant territorial concessions over the Dardenelles further energized the Truman administration, prompting the President to talk of "having it out with the Russians."[2] The Soviets eventually withdrew their demands on Turkey but their recent behavior produced within American foreign policymaking circles a genuine sense of threat by the end of 1946.

Although a clear sense of threat existed within the Truman administration, it took what was perceived to be a crisis of major proportions to galvanize the country into action. That crisis emerged on February 21, 1947 when the administration learned that Great

Britain could no longer continue providing economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, where civil wars involving indigenous communist movements were taking place. The administration quickly came to the conclusion that if southern Europe (and with it the Middle East and southwest Asia) was to remain free from communism, the United States would have to take the lead in providing the assistance needed to those countries resisting communist aggression. That assistance, of course, became the substance of the famous Truman Doctrine, in which the United States pledged to assist free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities. This new struggle, the President told Americans, pitted the forces of good against evil, freedom against tyranny.[3]

While the Truman Doctrine speech received most of the public attention, it was during this same period that the United States began making preparations for the economic revitalization of Western Europe. The Second World War destroyed much of the economic infrastructure of Europe. In the immediate postwar period, Europeans lived in abject poverty, unable, at times, to feed themselves. This profound economic deprivation generated much concern within the Truman administration because it made Europeans susceptible to the subversive tactics of Soviet-backed communist movements. In order to dampen the appeal of such movements, Europe had to be revived economically. For that reason, the United States decided to provide Western Europe with an enormous economic assistance package which came to be known as the Marshall Plan. So by the Summer of 1947, American foreign policy focused on the Soviet/Communist threat and had begun to take specific actions designed to meet or contain that threat.[4]

Containment, Japan, and the Origins of the Reverse Course

Having identified the Soviet Union as a serious threat, the United States focused much of its attention in 1946 and 1947 on halting the spread of Soviet influence in Europe. This Euro-centric approach seems quite natural since the battle-hardened Red Army sat poised in East-Central Europe. In addition, many of the crises and conflicts that led to the Cold War, such as the division of Germany and the Greek civil war, took place in Europe. But important policy decisions like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were not simply reactions to disturbing overseas developments. Rather, they were part of a new strategic framework that became the guide for American foreign policy over the next forty-five years. That framework, of course, was the strategy of containment. It was through the lenses of containment that the United States now viewed the world, including Japan. In fact it was containment, and especially the ideas and influence of its author, George Kennan, that changed the way in which the United States conducted the Occupation and approached the Japan Security Problem.

For Kennan, American foreign policy had to be based on a conception of the national interest. In the past, the U.S. lacked such a strategic vision, embracing instead either isolation or excessive idealism. In assessing the American national interest, Kennan employed a geopolitical framework of analysis. Since industrial power had now become the central element in the ability to wage war, Kennan argued that the key to the future security of United States rested on insuring that no single, hostile country possessed more industrial, war-making power than the U.S.. Finding itself on the short end of the international balance of power, the United States would be powerless to defeat this industrial resource-rich country, a condition which would imperil the very survival of the United States. So the United States had to make maintaining a favorable international balance of power (measured in terms of industrial strength) its top foreign policy priority.[5]

Having identified the preservation of a favorable balance of power as the chief American interest, Kennan went on to argue that those regions of the world containing the most industrial power were of the utmost importance to the United States. These so called "five power centers" were: the United States, the Soviet Union, Central Europe, Great Britain, and Japan. Since one of the power centers was also the chief threat, namely the Soviet Union, it was incumbent on American foreign policymakers to make certain that the U.S.S.R. did not gain access to the industrial potential of the other three regions. So containment as conceived by Kennan did not necessitate the defense of the entire non-communist world. In fact, Kennan placed little strategic importance on what is now known as the Third World. American foreign policy should, therefore, concentrate on containing the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and Japan.[6]

In evaluating the nature of the threat, many policymakers in the Truman administration emphasized the Soviet military threat. The Red Army sat poised in Eastern Europe with dozens of divisions that appeared ready to roll West. But Kennan placed far greater emphasis on the Soviet/Communist political/psychological threat to Western Europe and Japan. More specifically, Kennan worried that the economically deprived and dispirited peoples of these regions would fall prey to the appeals of domestic communist parties that were mere pawns of the Kremlin. The Soviet Union might, in other words, gain influence over the majority of the world's industrial power because the desperate people of those countries would turn to communists in hopes of alleviating their problems. Clearly the U.S. had to prevent such a turn of events by taking measures that would promote economic revival and, with it, what Kennan called the "natural forces of resistance" to communist subversion. It is this desire to build-up these forces of resistance that led to the Marshall Plan and to the reverse course in the American Occupation of Japan.[7] For the remainder of the Occupation, the United States stressed the revitalization of the Japanese economy in hopes of strengthening the resistance of the Japanese people to the communist message. But as the remainder of this essay will demonstrate, the image of

a Japan that was especially prone to authoritarian forms of government led American foreign policymakers to doubt Japan's stability and predictability even after economic recovery. Japan simply could not be trusted and,therefore, had to be controlled from the outside.

The Reverse Course and the Japan Security Problem: 1947-1949

The preceding section argued that a desire to keep Japan's vast industrial potential from the Soviet Union led to a change in the direction of the American Occupation. Rather than trying to democratize and demilitarize Japan, the Occupation now emphasized economic revitalization. The reason for this reverse course was the fear that the Soviet Union might gain influence in Japan by means of internal political subversion. A similar concern produced the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. In that sense, proneness to communist subversion was not uniquely Japanese. But what the remainder of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate is that the image of a hierarchical and obedient Japanese people made Japan appear far more vulnerable and unpredictable than the countries of Western Europe. Concern over Japan's potential instability (what I have called the Japan Security Problem) convinced American foreign policymakers that American control of Japan (in the form of the Occupation) could not end and that a peace settlement had to be delayed. More importantly, the persistence of the Japan Security Problem and the abandonment of its initial solution (the radical reform of the early Occupation) led American foreign policymakers to begin contemplating another solution, namely a bilateral security alliance that would enable the United States to control or contain Japan from the outside.

As mentioned earlier, the Cold War began heating up in the Spring and Summer of 1947. It is not surprising, therefore, that discussions about Japan's future also grew more intense during this period. In fact, these discussions were triggered by the completion of a draft of a Japanese peace treaty by a group of Japanists in the State Department under the

direction of Hugh Borton. The so called "Borton Treaty" called for a long period of international oversight of Japan. In fact, the treaty called on the Allies to cooperate in monitoring Japan's military potential for twenty-five years after the signing of the treaty. A specific commission of control would be established to watch Japan and to report any misbehavior to the Allied governments.[8] Clearly the drafters of this treaty placed little trust in post-occupation Japan and took the threat of a remilitarized Japan quite seriously. What is especially interesting about the Borton treaty is that it displayed little confidence in the success of the democratization and demilitarization program of the American Occupation. The Occupation had not revolutionized Japanese society and, therefore, had not solved the Japan Security Problem. It is interesting to note that although most American policymakers concerned with Japan rejected the Borton treaty, almost all (with the exception of MacArthur) accepted the premise that the Occupation had not made Japan trustworthy and that Japan would have to be controlled from the outside.

Two very different objections to the Borton treaty were offered in March of 1947. One objection came from MacArthur, who thought the treaty far too restrictive on Japanese sovereignty. MacArthur believed (as one might anticipate) that the early Occupation had solved the Japan Security Problem, making it unnecessary to control post-Occupation Japan. He urged the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty that lacked the restrictive controls contained in the Borton treaty.[9] MacArthur's thoughts on the Japan Security Problem are summarized in a memorandum to the State Department written in March of 1947. ". ..the Japanese nation and people are now ready for the initiation of negotiations leading to a Treaty of Peace--ready in the sense that Japan's war-making power and potential is destroyed, the framework to democratic government has been erected, reforms essential to the reshaping of Japanese lives and institutions to conform to democratic ideals have been instituted, and the people have been accorded the fundamentals of human liberty." MacArthur went on to argue that it would be wrong to place restrictive controls on post-

Occupation Japan because, "the shadow of the foreign bayonet is not conducive to rapid democratic growth."[10]

MacArthur's call for an immediate peace treaty, however, fell on deaf ears because of the intervention of George Kennan and John Paton Davies of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Given the Policy Planning Staff's subsequent decline in influence, it is difficult to imagine the high degree of power possessed by Kennan and his staff. But it must be remembered that in the Spring of 1947, Kennan played the dual role of Soviet expert and Cold War strategist. It was during this period, for example, that his famous "Mr. X" article appeared in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Suffice it to say that in the early years of the Cold War, the Policy Planning Staff played a major role in several important aspects of American foreign policy, including policy toward Japan.

Kennan and Davies agreed with MacArthur that the Borton treaty would alienate the Japanese. But their chief objection to the treaty concerned its timing. Japan was simply too unstable, both politically and economically, to end the Occupation. Should the United States leave Japan in its present condition, the Japanese might quickly fall prey to communist subversion.[11] This concern is evident in a top secret Policy Planning Staff memorandum (PPS/10) written in October of 1947. The Staff claimed that it had "no satisfactory evidence that Japanese society would be politically or economically stable if turned loose and left to its own devices at this stage." A peace treaty should be delayed, therefore, because "If Japan is not politically and economically stable when the peace treaty is signed, it will be difficult to prevent communist penetration."[12] Due primarily to the efforts of Kennan, Davies, and Under Secretary of the Army William Draper, both the Borton treaty and the radical reform of Japan had been scrapped by the end of 1947. American policy toward Japan now stressed delaying a peace treaty until Japan had been stabilized both politically and economically.[13]

During the first half of 1948, the debate about Japan's future grew more intense within American foreign policymaking circles. Kennan went to Japan in March of 1948 to

consult with MacArthur. The discussions between Kennan and MacArthur illustrate the growing rift between the attitudes of the Occupation officials (led by MacArthur) and those of the State Department. MacArthur again stressed the success of the Occupation's program of democratization. The Japanese had developed a love of liberty and a true sense of individual identity. They would not simply sit back and passively allow extremists to seize control of their country. And yet even MacArthur remained under the influence of the American image of Japan. After telling Kennan that the Japanese people would never willingly accept Communist domination, he claimed that should the Soviet Union take Japan by military force, the Japanese would cooperate with them. He argued that "The Japanese were by nature an obedient people and used to authority and would, of course, immediately shift back to the old ways in such a situation."[14] So even MacArthur, who claimed to have transformed Japan into a thoroughly democratic country, thought the Japanese capable of suddenly reverting to their old habits of obedience and deference to authority.

For his part, Kennan shared little of MacArthur's confidence about the success of the Occupation in democratizing Japan. Japan remained an hierarchical society in which the people would obey whomever held a position of authority. In a summary of his meetings with MacArthur, Kennan expressed his reservations about the stability of a post-Occupation Japan.

> I do not think that Japan's powers of resistance to Communism can be taken for granted. To the Communists, the problem of capturing Japan is not a problem of winning over the favor of the majority of the Japanese people. It is a problem of penetrating Japanese society and seizing its key positions. At present, it looks to me as though Japanese society were decidedly vulnerable to such attacks.[15]

Kennan's evaluation of Japanese society and politics provides clear evidence of the continued strength of the wartime image of Japan during the postwar period. His analysis

bears great resemblance to the picture of Japanese society and culture drawn by Frank Capra and Ruth Benedict. The threat to Japan does not arise out of the ability of the Communists to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people. Rather, it is their gaining control of the key positions within Japan's political and social hierarchy. Whether the Japanese people support Communism or are persuaded by the Communist message is irrelevant because they will obey their superiors no matter what those superiors say or do. What Kennan is describing, in essence, is the Japanese herd depicted in *Know Your enemy: Japan.* Unlike the countries of Western Europe, Japan's vulnerability to political subversion arose out of the nature of its society and culture. While revitalizing the Japanese economy would promote stability, it would not be a sufficient to remedy Japan's vulnerability and unpredictability. Given this assessment of Japan's future prospects (which had become widespread in American foreign policymaking circles by 1948), it is not surprising that the necessity of controlling post-Occupation Japan from the outside became a topic of policy debate during the Summer of 1948.

Having identified the societal roots of Japan's vulnerability to political subversion, it is hardly surprising that Kennan offered the first recommendation (since the Borton treaty proposal) that some kind of post-Occupation mechanism of control over Japan be developed. In a meeting at Ottawa in June of 1948, Kennan briefed top Canadian foreign policymakers on the latest changes in American policy toward Japan. When told of Canada's doubts about the success of the Occupation and its continued mistrust of Japan, Kennan gave the Canadians a very revealing assurance about the future of Japan. Kennan's comments quoted below are taken from a summary of the meeting prepared by the Canadian Department for External Affairs.

> Mr. Kennan concluded by saying that as we could not really count on very extensive reforms in the outlook of the Japanese, it would be necessary to maintain *certain minimum security controls for quite a time* (emphasis added). . . . He pointed to the fact that the financial assistance which they (the U.S.) propose to give the Japanese now and which would be continued for five years would have a considerable influence on making it seem profitable to the Japanese to behave themselves.[16]

What is revealing about this comment is the recognition that the Occupation had not made Japan trustworthy and that some means would be needed for controlling Japan once the Occupation ended. Of course, Kennan stressed the promise of future economic and technical assistance as being the instrument with which the U.S. could control an independent Japan. But it was only a matter of months before another instrument of control, a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance, became an important topic of discussion within American foreign policymaking circles.

During the first half of 1949, American thinking about the future of Japan changed in a number of important ways. First, the victory of the Communists in China lent a sense of urgency to American policy in East Asia. *Time* magazine, for example, reported that the "Red Tide has risen mightily in Asia and now threatens to engulf half the world's people." Communism was spreading in the region and a growing number of American foreign policymakers feared that its next target would be Japan. Additional concern arose after a Japanese general election took place in which the Conservatives won but the Communists made significant gains. Finally, a series of State Department and Occupation officials began warning of the growing restlessness and resentment of the Japanese people toward the Occupation. The Japanese, it was argued, hungered for their sovereignty. After visiting Japan, the chief of the State Department's Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Max Bishop, spoke of a tiredness about the Occupation among the Japanese and expressed

concern that "the Japanese psychologically were like a steel spring being wound tighter and tighter to recoil the more violently when released."[17] Needless to say, assessments of Japanese resentment combined with the belief that Communism was "on the march" in East Asia produced a consensus that the Occupation must be ended soon. The prospect of an independent Japan, in turn, pushed the Japan Security Problem to the forefront of discussions about Japan's future and spawned debate over the possibility of using a post-Occupation security alliance as an instrument for controlling Japan.

Before turning to the debate about the structure of post-Occupation security in East Asia, it is important to note the degree to which the sentiments expressed earlier by Kennan had taken root in discussions about the future of Japan. William J.Sebald, the highest ranking civilian in the Occupation and a very influential voice in the making of America's Japan policy, wrote a long memorandum in August of 1949 calling for immediate negotiations toward a Japanese peace settlement. Sebald argued that the majority of the Japanese people were strongly anti-Communist. Reflecting MacArthur's thinking, Sebald went on to claim that if left to their own devices, the Japanese would choose democracy over communism. But even an optimist like Sebald had reservations about the long-term resiliency of democracy and stability in an independent Japan. After stating his belief in Japan's anti-communism, Sebald wrote, "It would nevertheless be foolhardy to assume that the Communists do not have dangerous capabilities for creating difficulties for any Japanese government and even, in favorable circumstances, of making a serious attempt to seize power."[18]

Four months later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed similar concern about Japan's vulnerability to Communist subversion. In a note to the British ambassador, Acheson spoke of the psychological advantages of the Communists in their efforts to seize control of Japan. One of the advantages stressed by Acheson was the structure of Japanese society. Sounding very much like Ruth Benedict, Acheson wrote that Japanese society was not "antithetical to totalitarian doctrines, since the Japanese are communal people long

accustomed to passive acceptance of leadership and subordination of individual interests to the state's." Acheson's assessment of Japanese society led him to speak of a potential Japanese *threat* to East Asia. The security clauses in the peace treaty must provide "security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against Soviet-Communist aggression." Acheson went on to argue that because Japan had been demilitarized, the Japanese threat would arise only if the Communists seized power. "Japan can be realistically regarded as a future threat only if allied with or in cooperation with Soviet military might."[19] So by the end of 1949, the United States had acknowledged the existence of a Japanese threat (albeit in alliance with the Soviet Union or China) in East Asia.

Serious discussions concerning possible security structures in East Asia did not take place until 1950 and 1951. But even as early as the Spring of 1949, there is evidence suggesting that the eventual solution to the Japan Security Problem, an entangling alliance providing the U.S. with control over Japan,, was on the minds of leading American and Allied policymakers. It was in March of 1949, for example, that discussions about a Pacific Pact commenced. President Elpedio Quirino of the Philippines, for example, proposed such an alliance to an American diplomat in Manila, stating that "Japan's membership in a Pacific Pact would tend to reduce the suspicions, fear and hatred which exist toward that nation on the part of other Far Eastern peoples."[20] Australia expressed similar sentiments about Japan and the need for some kind of guarantee against renewed Japanese aggression. Publicly, the United States expressed skepticism about a Pacific Pact.[21] But in a top secret paper on the future of American policy in East and South Asia, the Policy Planning Staff called for the creation of just such a Pact that included the United States, Australia, the Philippines, Japan, New Zealand, and Canada.[22] Although no concrete steps were taken to create a Pacific Pact in 1949, the proposal received a great deal of attention during 1950 and 1951.

A Pacific Pact was not the only instrument for controlling an independent Japan discussed in last half of 1949. The British Undersecretary for the Far East, Sir Esler Dening, proposed the creation of a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance as the best mechanism for insuring the stability of post-Occupation Japan. He said that the danger of Communist subversion in Japan could be mitigated by "the strong dependence of Japan on the U.S. for defense, economic aid, and trade." Japan's post-Occupation weakness, in other words, would provide the U.S. with the leverage needed to control Japan. The U.S. could use that leverage, in turn, to insure stability and Japan's pro-Western orientation.[23] A more explicit call for a bilateral alliance with Japan came, surprisingly enough, from MacArthur. In a conversation with Sebald in September of 1949, he expressed doubts about the ability of a newly created Japanese police force to put down a Communist uprising in Japan. Lacking such an internal guarantee of Japan's domestic stability, the United States ought to make an arrangement allowing to leave "a protective military force in Japan for the indefinite future, . . ."[24] What the comments of MacArthur and Dening reveal is a growing consensus among U.S. and Allied policymakers that Japan would have to be controlled after the Occupation and that a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance would be the most effective instrument of control. The following chapter will trace the developments in 1950 and 1951 that eventually led to the creation of the alliance.

CHAPTER FIVE: SOLVING THE JAPAN SECURITY PROBLEM III: THE PATH TO THE SECURITY ALLIANCE

On September 8, 1951, the United States and Japan signed a bilateral security treaty in which the U.S. agreed to defend Japan against external aggression. The signing of the security and peace treaties came after nearly two years of intensive policy debate and negotiation between the United States, Japan, and U.S. allies in East Asia and Western Europe. Throughout this period, a host of pressures and seemingly intractable problems confronted American foreign policymakers: the loss of a monopoly on the atomic bomb and, with it, the specter of Soviet superiority in conventional military power; the aggressive spread of communism in East Asia, beginning with the "fall of China" and culminating with the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950; the mounting fear and suspicion of communist subversion at home that translated into strong criticism of the Truman administration's policy toward East Asia; and the conflicting pressures to end the Occupation of Japan while at the same time controlling the future behavior of an unpredictable and potentially unstable Japan.

The various problems confronting the Truman administration created a sense of weakness and apprehension in the United States. The U.S. appeared to be "losing" the Cold War as Communism gained momentum, especially in East Asia. Domestic critics spoke of the administration's treasonous policy of appeasement. This environment produced a strong desire within the administration to "regain the initiative" both at home and abroad. Since the United States had suffered most of its setbacks in East Asia, it is hardly surprising that in an attempt to halt the spread of Communism and to silence their critics at home, Truman and Acheson focused much of their attention on East Asia.

Concerning East Asia, regaining the initiative meant stopping the spread of Soviet/Communist influence. The first step in that process, it was believed, was the

economic and political stabilization of Japan. As the previous chapter indicated, a consensus emerged in 1949 that a prolongation of the American Occupation would alienate the Japanese people and, thereby, weaken Japan's pro-Western orientation. So a peace treaty had to be signed as soon as possible. But lingering doubts about Japan's trustworthiness and dependability (the Japan Security Problem) delayed the signing of a treaty until a satisfactory means for controlling an independent Japan could be found. More specifically, the United States and its European and Asian allies wanted control over post-Occupation Japan's rearmament, foreign policy, and domestic politics. As this chapter will seek to demonstrate, the only mechanism of control that satisfied the concerns of the U.S. and its allies was a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origins and development of the decision to solve the Japan Security Problem by means of a bilateral security alliance. Special attention will be paid to the relationship between the postwar image of Japan and the concerns of the U.S. and its allies about the prospect of an independent, rearmed Japan. For example, the perception of the Japanese as being innately aggressive led many statesmen (especially in East Asia) to fear that once Japan began rearming, it would embark on rapid remilitarization that would culminate in the launching of a war revenge in East Asia. While expressing less concern about rapid Japanese rearmament, American foreign policymakers did fear the possibility of an alliance between Japan and resource-rich Communist China. For that reason, the U.S. wanted to insure that an independent Japan did not abandon its pro-Western orientation by secretly launching a "diplomatic Pearl Harbour" against American policy in East Asia. Finally, as the previous chapter indicated, the United States and its allies possessed grave doubts about political stability in post-Occupation Japan. Some mechanism was needed to influence and control the future course of Japanese rearmament, foreign policy and domestic politics. That mechanism, of course, was the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

The International and Domestic context of America's Japan Policy

Although the Truman administration suffered some serious foreign policy setbacks in 1949, it did achieve some important victories, especially in Europe. The military, political, and economic situation in Western Europe improved markedly. The Berlin Blockade, for example, was finally lifted as the Soviet Union backed away from its attempt to force the West out of Berlin. With the economic assistance provided in the Marshall Plan, the economies of Western Europe began to improve. Economic improvement brought increased political stability and a drop in the appeal of indigenous communist parties. Finally, the threat posed by the Red Army to Western Europe was met with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). All in all, the implementation of a policy of economic, political, and military containment in Western Europe appeared to halt the spread of Soviet influence and promote stability in a region deemed vital to American national security.

The successes in Western Europe, however, were not matched in other aspects of the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets may have been thwarted in their efforts to capture Western Europe by subversion and intimidation. But many American foreign policymakers viewed this success as a mere lull in the storm of communist expansion. The Soviet Union and its communist allies were still expanding, which was clearly evident in their growing influence in East Asia. The fall of China and the growing strength of communist movements in Southeast Asia inspired critics of the Truman administration to claim that the United States was losing the Cold War and that appeasement, not containment, now guided American foreign policy.

Although Truman and Acheson recognized that the assessments of their critics were exaggerated, they nonetheless shared much of the apprehension and fear about the future of American security. These pessimistic judgments were a reaction (some might say an overreaction) to the Soviet Union's successful test of an atomic bomb on September 3,

1949. The prospect of a nuclear armed Soviet Union convinced American foreign policymakers that the military balance was shifting against them. The American nuclear monopoly, it was believed, had been the only thing that had balanced Soviet superiority in conventional forces. With a growing Soviet nuclear capability, the United States' nuclear edge was being neutralized far more rapidly than it could be replaced by increased conventional forces.[1] For that reason, a tremendous sense of foreboding characterized U.S. military assessments from late 1949 through 1952. In fact, a general consensus existed that the shift in the military balance had opened up a window of vulnerability through which the Soviets would project their new military advantage to change the territorial and political status-quo in both Asia and Europe.

The fact that the Soviet Union now possessed military superiority over the United States led many American foreign policymakers to speak of the early 1950s as being a "danger zone" through which the U.S. would have to pass while it built up its military capabilities.[2] This sense of a danger zone explains why the Truman administration feared the outbreak of general war in 1950 and 1951. In fact, some thought the Korean War represented the first battle of World War Three. NSC 73/4 of August 25, 1950, for example, argued that the North Korean invasion might be "the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global war."[3] Even if the Korean War was not the first phase of a global war, it certainly demonstrated that fears about the shifting military balance had been justified. Most American foreign policymakers familiar with military matters had predicted that the window of vulnerability would embolden Soviet foreign policy. The launching of the Korean War (which was universally seen as being a Soviet-inspired action) confirmed this prediction and made the situation appear even more serious than had been assumed.

As one might expect, the conclusion that the military balance had shifted against the United States led to a major review of American national security strategy. That review, under the direction of Kennan's successor as chief of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, produced one of the most important documents in the history of American foreign policy,

NSC-68.[4] The document called for a rapid military build-up that would erase whatever advantage the Soviet Union currently possessed. Whereas Kennan had stressed the important role played by economic power in containing the Soviet Union, NSC-68 focused exclusively on the military aspects of containment. Historians of American security policy disagree as to whether or not NSC-68 was offensive or defensive in character. The document did call for a continuation of containment, although it listed the goals of American foreign policy to be the creation of "situations of strength," and to bring about a "retraction" of Soviet power. From the perspective of this essay, NSC-68's importance lies in its call for a more assertive foreign policy that would recapture the geopolitical initiative from the Soviet Union. This emphasis on the need to pursue a more positive policy designed to regain the initiative impacted all aspects of American foreign policy, including policy toward Japan.

Before turning to the impact of this sense of weakness and danger on American policy in East Asia, it is essential to review briefly the domestic political scene confronting the Truman administration. Although it had faced tough political times before, the period from the beginning of 1950 until the end of the administration proved to be, by far, its most difficult. A taste of things to come came on January 4, 1950, when Republicans interrupted and heckled the President during his State of the Union address. One month later, at a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin claimed that the State Department harbored a "nest of communists and communist sympathizers who are helping to shape our foreign policy." He also claimed to have a list of 57 communists who were presently working at the State Department.[5] Led by McCarthy, numerous Republicans in Congress picked up the theme that communists were running American foreign policy. As one might expect, these critics pointed to the loss of China and the seeming disarray in America's Far Eastern policy as evidence supporting their charges. The popularity of McCarthy and other critics of Truman's foreign policy

provided even greater incentive for the administration to change its policy in East Asia so as to regain the initiative from the communists overseas and the Republicans at home.

In hopes of silencing their critics, Truman and Acheson swallowed their pride and appointed John Foster Dulles, a leading Republican spokesman on foreign affairs, as a special consultant to the State Department on April 6, 1950. Not surprisingly, Dulles was assigned to the area for which the administration had received the most criticism, namely East Asia. After spending two months examining the Korean situation, Acheson assigned Dulles the task of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan. Dulles' appointment marks a turning point in America's Japan policy, for it brought an energetic and powerful force into the policy process. Although unforeseen events (especially the outbreak of the Korean War) diverted Dulles' attention, the primary reason it took the future Secretary of State nearly 18 months to arrange a peace settlement was the persistence of the Japan Security Problem. In fact, the many difficulties Dulles encountered while negotiating the end of the Occupation stemmed from the problem of trying to find the most reliable and effective mechanism for controlling an independent Japan.

The Dulles Mission and the Japan Security Problem

When he began working on the Japanese peace treaty problem, John Foster Dulles inherited a host of past policy decisions and assumptions, among them the American image of Japan and the Japan Security Problem. As the previous chapter noted, a consensus emerged in 1949 that an independent Japan could not be trusted by the West and would have to be controlled from the outside. The precise mechanism of control remained uncertain; both a regional security pact and a bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance had been discussed. Dulles spent much of the next 18 months exploring these two alternative security structures. Although the reasons why a bilateral security alliance was chosen over

a Pacific Pact are important and will be discussed later, what is of central importance is the broad agreement among the United States and its allies in Western Europe and East Asia that an independent Japan could not be trusted and had to be controlled. The relationship between the Japan Security Problem and the formation of a bilateral security alliance contradicts most Realist interpretations of American foreign policy and lends support to the notion that states form alliances both to balance their adversaries and control their allies.

As mentioned earlier, the principle reason the United States believed an independent Japan would be unstable and unpredictable was the image of Japan as being a very authoritarian society with an obedient population. Because Japan had a very undemocratic culture and society, it was especially susceptible to communist subversion. So an independent Japan might be pro-Western and democratic one day and then, after a communist-inspired coup in which the Japanese people offered no resistance, would suddenly become a pro-Soviet client state. While this concern continued to weigh heavily on the minds of American foreign policymakers, other factors, such as the necessity of Japanese rearmament and Japan's need for raw materials, emerged in 1950 and became part of the Japan Security Problem. So as Dulles began the process of negotiating a Japanese peace treaty, he had to find a common solution to three problems: the need to control the pace of Japanese rearmament, preventing Japan from "cutting a deal" with Communist China, and maintaining political stability and Japan's pro-Western orientation.

There is no place in which the nature of the Japan Security Problem is more succinctly explained than in a memorandum written by Dulles shortly after he assumed the task of negotiating a Japanese peace treaty.[6] After consulting with the State Department's experts on Japan and East Asia, Dulles summarized what he thought to be the broad aspects of the Japanese problem. Dulles identified seven key elements of this problem: Geography, Economics, Politics, Ethics, Social, Racial, and Military. Because of their importance as a summary of the guiding assumptions of American policy over the next 18 months, Dulles' comments on each aspect of the Japanese problem will be quoted below.

1. *Geography* - There is a physical propinquity to the China mainland, Manchuria and North Korea, now under communist domination.

2. *Economics* - There is a natural and historical economic interdependence between Japan and the now communized parts of Asia. These are the natural sources of raw materials for Japan.

3. *Politics* - The people have a tendency to totalitarian forms and to authoritarian rule.

4. *Ethics* - There is no strong religious faith which, like Christianity, tends to develop a sense of individual worth as against enforced conformity.

5. *Social* - Extreme density of population, paucity of natural resources, and religious influences have resulted in social institutions which minimize frictions by discouraging individualism in favor of family, group, and national interests.

6. *Racial* - There is a certain barrier with the West in the face of the assumed Western sense of white superiority. But there is a sense of superiority (among the Japanese) too and, in some respects, to the Chinese and a desire to be treated as social equals by the West.

7. *Military* - There is a present emotional tendency to pacifism which, however, *could easily shift to a revival of militarism* (emphasis added).

Contained in Dulles' summary of what he called "the Japanese problem" are the three elements of post-Occupation Japan which the United States sought to control with a bilateral security alliance. For example, in his discussion of Japanese politics, ethics, and society, Dulles speaks of the authoritarianism, conformity, and absence of individualism which made the resiliency of democracy in an independent Japan highly uncertain. But in addition to the inherent instability of Japanese politics, Dulles also identifies problems

associated with Japan's traditional dependence on raw materials from the Chinese mainland and its emotional tendency toward militarism. These problems, in turn, led the United States and its allies to wonder if an independent Japan could be trusted not to ally itself with Communist China or to embark on rapid rearmament and remilitarization. The next two sections of this essay will focus on these aspects of the Japan Security Problem.

The Problem of Japanese Rearmament

It will be recalled that a central feature of the American Occupation's program of demilitarization was the complete disarmament of both Japan's military and its heavy industries. Military and industrial disarmament removed Japan's capacity to be aggressive and, therefore, insured its future peacefulness. As a further hedge against remilitarization, the new Japanese constitution contained a provision (Article Nine) outlawing the possession of land, sea, and air forces. But as the Cold War heated up, the United States began to reconsider its decision to disarm Japan permanently. In fact, the nucleus of a new Japanese military emerged soon after the Cold War commenced. Due primarily to the efforts of General Charles Willoughby, a high-ranking member of the American Occupation, elements of what became the Japanese Ground and Naval Self Defense Forces were organized and located in places like the demobilization boards, General Willoughby's Counter Intelligence Section, and small naval units retained for the purpose of repatriation and mine sweeping.[7]

It is important to note that initially, Willoughby's actions did not reflect official American policy; much of what was done occurred because of Willoughby's own beliefs in the necessity of Japanese rearmament. But by late 1949 and early 1950, the rest of the American government had accepted Willoughby's judgment and commenced planning the rearmament of Japan. Initially, the need for some kind of internal security force led

American foreign policymakers to call for rearmament. Because of Japan's vulnerability to political subversion, the United States anticipated political turmoil and an attempted communist coup once the Occupation ended. For that reason, Japan would require some means of dealing with the rioting and other acts of subversion that would follow.[8] To that end, MacArthur authorized the creation of a 75,000-man National Police Reserve in July of 1950.

While the existence of an internal security force eased some American concern about Japan's ability to cope with communist subversion, it did not eliminate it. John Allison, a high-ranking State Department expert on East Asia and a future American ambassador to Japan, expressed doubts about the loyalty of the newly created Japanese police force because it consisted of former members of the Japanese Army. He argued that the mentality of many Army members had been so warped that "demonstrations, martial songs, flag-waving and other Communist techniques may find emotional response among many ex-soldiers."[9] The U.S. could not rely on the National Police Reserve to resist communist subversion. In time of crisis, they and the rest of the Japanese people would blindly follow the dictates of whatever subversive element had seized control. For that reason, the United States insisted that the security treaty contain a provision allowing American forces stationed in Japan to intervene in Japanese politics in order to put down riots and other internal disturbances. Without question, the image of Japan as being an obedient, authoritarian society led American foreign policymakers to write an "intervention provision" into the security treaty. So the United States entered into a security alliance with Japan, in part, so that it could intervene militarily in Japanese domestic politics.

The negative shift in the balance of military power and the outbreak of the Korean War convinced American military planners that the United States would lack the resources to defend Japan against a conventional military attack. That is not to suggest that such an attack was thought to be likely or imminent. In fact, assessments of Soviet military capabilities in the Far East continually expressed doubt about the Soviet Union's ability to

invade Japan. The Soviets, it was argued, lacked the necessary amphibious capability to transport a large invasion force to the Japanese home islands.[10] In the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lost confidence in this judgment, speculating that the Soviets or Chinese might possess a secret capability unknown to the United States.[11] So the possibility of an invasion of Japan was never ruled out by American foreign policymakers. Consequently, provisions were made for the conventional defense of Japan. Because of the perceived weakness of American conventional military power, Japan would have to contribute to its own defense. The Joint Chiefs advocated the creation of a 325,000-man Japanese ground force.[12] So by the time the security treaty was signed in September of 1951, the United States had decided that Japan must rearm in order to defend itself against both internal and external aggression.

At first glance, it appears that fear of a Soviet attack erased the memory of World War II and the image of Japan as an aggressive, militaristic state. The United States abandoned its Occupation goal of a demilitarized and disarmed Japan, encouraging post-Occupation Japan to rearm. But the necessity of Japanese rearmament did not mean that fears of a remilitarized, revanchist Japan disappeared. In fact, the United States and its allies in Western Europe and especially East Asia harbored great concern about the future course of Japanese rearmament. More specifically, they feared that once the Occupation ended, Japan would embark on a program of rapid rearmament and remilitarization.[13] As Dulles wrote in the memorandum quoted earlier, although Japan seemed to be pacifist now, the U.S. feared that it might easily revert to militarism. Clearly to allow a state that is perceived as being very prone to militarism and aggression to rearm without some means of control is an invitation for international instability, arms races, and perhaps even war. So the decision to rearm Japan created a latent Japanese military threat in the eyes of the United States and its allies. In responding to that threat, the United States used a bilateral alliance to control the pace and character of Japanese rearmament.

Even before the decision to create a bilateral security alliance with Japan had been made, American foreign policymakers decided to solve the problem of Japanese rearmament with some of kind of security structure that would enable the U.S. to restrain an independent Japan. For example, a State Department memorandum dated February 1, 1950 argues for a regional security alliance rather than a neutralized Japan on the grounds that such an alliance "would strengthen the controls normally exercised through diplomatic channels over any activities of Japan which might have adverse consequences in the security field."[14] Eight months later, a State Department draft of points to be included in a U.S.-Japan security agreement stressed the control such an alliance would provide the U.S. over Japanese rearmament. "Concerning the future establishment of land, sea, or air forces by the Japanese government, the schedule for their creation, as well as their strength, type, composition, armament and other organizational features of such forces, will in all respects be determined by the United States government in consultation with the Japanese government."[15]

With the escalation of the Korean War, the United States grew even more convinced of the need for a rapid conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty and the necessity of Japanese rearmament. Consequently, discussions about controlling Japanese rearmament grew more numerous and intense in late 1950 and the first half of 1951. In fact, it was during this period that a decision to create a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance was reached. While one cannot conclusively say that the need to control the pace and character of Japan's rearmament led to the choice of a bilateral treaty over a Pacific Pact, there can be little doubt that the specter of an independent, remilitarized Japan went a long way in producing a consensus among the United States and its allies that a bilateral security alliance provided the best solution to the Japan Security Problem.

Because the U.S. and its allies perceived Japan as being capable of suddenly returning to its aggressive behavior of the past, the key to preventing a resurgence of Japanese aggression was to control both the pace and character of Japanese rearmament.

Concerning the latter point, the United States and its allies sought to prevent Japan from acquiring an offensive military capability. In this way, even if Japan possessed the *will* to be aggressive, it would lack the *capacity* to carry out that aggression. In order to insure the defensive character of Japan's military, the United States entangled Japan in a security alliance in which Japan would not provide *all* of its own defense. Japan, in other words, would remain dependent on the U.S. for its military security, which would, in turn, allow the U.S. to structure Japanese rearmament such that Japan's military power would only be defensive in character. In illustrating the relationship between the security alliance and the possession of solely defensive military forces by Japan, it is important to quote at length a memorandum written by John Foster Dulles in July of 1951.[16]

> . . . neither the United States nor Japanese Governments believe that Japan should, for its security, be dependent merely upon the exercise of the right of *individual* self-defense. Any nation which, alone, develops enough military power to defend itself . . . would automatically have a force which would make it a potential aggressive threat. Therefore, the post-war arrangements contemplate that Japan will base its security not merely upon a national Japanese defense force but upon collective defense which would involve such a combination with that of others of Japanese military strength, as it develops, that a national war of revenge would be materially impossible. The ability of Japan to gain security without such armament as could constitute an offensive threat would result from deriving that security not from Japanese military strength alone but from a combination of Japanese strength with that of the United States and perhaps eventually other nations, so that while the total would provide security, the Japanese contribution to that total would not itself constitute an offensive threat.

What this document reveals is the relationship between the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the postwar strategy of "double containment." In order to preserve a favorable balance of international power, the United States had to keep Japan's vast industrial potential free from Soviet domination. This objective necessitated defending Japan against

a Soviet military attack. Because the United States thought itself to be weak and over-stretched militarily in the early 1950s, it lacked the resources to provide for the conventional defense of Japan. For that reason, the decision was reached that Japan would have to rearm and contribute to its own defense. But the decision to rearm Japan created serious dangers stemming from the Japan Security Problem. The United States and its allies simply did not trust Japan, and feared the prospect of a remilitarized and aggressive Japan. In order to restrain this latent Japanese military threat, the U.S. decided to contain Japan with a bilateral alliance in which the U.S. could structure the pace and character of Japanese rearmament. Such an alliance, in which Japan provided for part, but not all, of its own defense, would insure that Japan's military power remained defensive. So the United States entered into a security alliance with Japan in order to contain Soviet military expansion into Japan and to control the pace and character of Japanese rearmament.

China and the Problem of Japanese Foreign Policy

To this point, the Japan Security Problem has been defined in terms of the possibility of a sudden swing by an independent Japan either to the right or the left. Japan was unpredictable because of its inherent fragility; its authoritarian, militaristic culture made it vulnerable to rapid change instigated from either side of the political spectrum. But the United States also feared the actions of the Japanese conservatives under the leadership of the pro-Western Yoshida Shigeru. For although one could count on Yoshida's opposition to communism in Japan, his intentions in the realm of foreign policy were far from clear. More specifically, the United States harbored great concern about the future policy of the Yoshida government toward Communist China. The lure of China's raw materials might, it was feared, convince post-Occupation Japan to turn away from the West in favor of an alliance with the Communists. So the Soviet/Communist bloc could gain access to Japan's

industrial potential without firing a shot or instigating a revolution. To American foreign policymakers, therefore, the United States had to maintain Japan's pro-Western orientation by preventing it from allying with Communist China. Although the security alliance was not explicitly conceived as an instrument of control over Japanese foreign policy, this section will demonstrate that shortly after the alliance was signed in September of 1951, the United States used the alliance to force Japan to enter into an alliance with Nationalist China.

Fear of a Japanese alliance with Communist China arose after Yoshida and other leading conservatives began contemplating the future prospects of the post-Occupation Japanese economy. It was well known to both the United States and Japan that because of its chronic lack of natural resources, Japan would have to find reliable foreign sources for those materials if its economy was to revive. To Japanese conservatives, the logical source for those raw materials was the Chinese mainland. As John Dower writes, "Prior to Japan's defeat, it was simply unthinkable that Japan could prosper without an intimate relationship with China, and Yoshida continued to believe this until the end of his premiership." In fact, until the very end of the Occupation, the Japanese government assumed that a close economic relationship with China would be resumed.[17]

After signing the security treaty with Japan, the United States began exerting tremendous pressure on the Japanese to enter into an alliance with Taiwan. The Senate, for example, informally expressed its expectation to the Truman administration that Japan would pledge itself to oppose Communist China. The administration, in turn, used this veiled threat from the Senate (stemming from the faet that the Senate still had to ratify both the peace and security treaties) to pressure Japan into abandoning its hopes for an economic relationship with China. Actually, the first clash over the future of Sino-Japanese relations came between Great Britain and the United States. The British wanted Japan to resume its relationship with China so as to prevent closer Japanese economic ties to South and Southeast Asia, which were seen as threatening Britain's own commercial interests. Dulles

and Acheson initially sought to placate British concerns but, having failed to do so, simply ignored them.[18]

The turning point in the worsening U.S.-Japan conflict over China came in December of 1951. Dulles went to Japan and was accompanied by two powerful members of the Senate, John Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith. In talks with Yoshida, Dulles and the two Senators made it clear that unless Japan pledged not to trade with Communist China, the Senate would have difficulty ratifying the security treaty. Dulles made a third-person summary of the meeting.[19]

> They (Dulles and the Senators) pointed out that if the Security Treaty were ratified the United States would assume a certain responsibility for Japan's security; that the threat to that security came largely from Communist China,. . . and that the Senate, before ratifying, would doubtless want to know whether or not Japan contemplated giving moral, political, or economic, support to the aggressor regime against which the United States would be expected to defend Japan.

It is hard to conceive of a more blunt use of an alliance to control the foreign policy of a weaker ally. The United States used Japanese military weakness to intimidate Yoshida into following the dictates of American foreign policy. Needless to say, the Prime Minister had no choice but to accede to American threats. He penned the famous "Yoshida Letter" in which Japan officially pledged not to normalize relations with Communist China. That policy did not change until 1978, when Japan and China established diplomatic and economic ties. Interestingly enough, Japan's relations with China resumed only after the United States established formal ties with Communist China. American control over Japanese foreign policy, it seems, remained quite effective long after the signing of the security treaty.

Conclusion

The central argument of this essay has been that the United States viewed the security treaty it signed with Japan on September 8, 1951 as being an instrument for containing both Soviet expansion and an unpredictable and potentially unstable Japan. The United States implemented a strategy of "double containment" because it did not trust an independent Japan. More specifically, the United States feared three possible developments that would threaten American national security. First, American foreign policymakers possessed grave doubts about the political stability of post-Occupation Japan. Because of its hierarchical, authoritarian society, Japan appeared vulnerable to political subversion from the extreme left or right. Consequently, the U.S. stationed troops in Japan as part of the bilateral security alliance so that it could intervene militarily in Japanese domestic politics. Secondly, the necessity of Japanese rearmament might result, it was believed, in a rapid remilitarization of Japan leading to a renewal of Japanese aggression. A security alliance gave the United States control over both the pace and character of Japan's rearmament. Finally, Japan's need for raw materials created strong incentives for a Japanese alliance with Communist China. In order to insure that Japan would not surprise the West with such an alliance, the United States used the security alliance as leverage in forcing Japan to follow the dictates of American foreign policy. All in all, the United States used the mechanism of a bilateral security alliance to control and restrain a former enemy that it could not reform and, therefore, never entirely trusted.

CONCLUSION: THE SECURITY ALLIANCE THEN AND NOW

After months of intensive negotiations, the United States and Japan signed the treaty creating the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance on September 8, 1951. The treaty called on the United States to defend Japan against external aggression. To that end, the U.S. gained access to military bases in Japan and retained sovereignty over Okinawa. For their part, the Japanese agreed to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, despite the provision in their constitution (Article Nine) prohibiting the possession of land, sea, and air forces. The original security treaty also allowed U.S. forces based in Japan to intervene militarily in Japanese domestic politics for the purpose of putting down riots and other internal disturbances. After a rather brief debate, the U.S. Senate approved the peace and security treaties on March 20, 1952, putting into place the policy of double containment in East Asia that has enabled the U.S. to contain both the Soviet Union *and* Japan.

With the signing and ratification of the security treaty, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the strategy of double containment faded into the background of American foreign policy. Since containing Japan implied a fundamental mistrust of the Japanese, U.S. foreign policymakers preserved harmony within the alliance by suppressing their doubts concerning Japan's future reliability. In addition, more pressing concerns, such as the Korean War, growing instability in Southeast Asia, and the security of Taiwan, came to the forefront of U.S. policy in East Asia. That is not to suggest, however, that Japan's importance to the United States diminished. In fact, American policy toward Japan throughout the 1950s simply shifted from an emphasis on the Soviet military threat to that of reviving the Japanese economy and, with it, the economies of the decolonized countries of Southeast Asia.

The shift in the emphasis of America's Japan policy stemmed, in part, from the fears about a Japanese alliance with Communist China discussed in the previous chapter. It

will be recalled that Dulles used the security alliance as leverage to force Yoshida to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's regime as the legitimate government of China. But concern remained that Japan would strike some kind of a deal with Communist China, leading the U.S. to provide Japan with an alternative plan for economic reconstruction that excluded its traditional economic ties to the Chinese mainland. That alternative plan had two components: the massive influx of American technical assistance to Japan and the integration of Japan's economy with that of resource-rich Southeast Asia. In this way, the Japanese economy could acquire both markets for its manufactured goods and vital raw materials while at the same time aiding in the economic development of Southeast Asia.[1]

Inequality characterized the bilateral economic relationship. The United States gave Japan unrestricted access to the U.S. market while simultaneously encouraging the Japanese to erect barriers protecting the Japanese economy from American products. As for technical assistance, the U.S. and Japan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954 to provide Japan with access to American military and commercial technology. The Japanese skillfully used this technology to promote export-led growth. In addition, Japanese restrictions on direct investment forced American companies to license their technology to Japanese corporations, thereby providing "the technological base for nearly all of Japan's modern industries." [2]

The relative harmony and stability of U.S-Japan relations during the 1950s came to a sudden end with the security treaty crisis of 1960. The original treaty signed in September of 1951 came up for revision in 1960. Japanese anger and resentment generated by the intervention provision and other objectionable elements in the original treaty resulted in the most serious political crisis in postwar Japanese history. Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Tokyo voicing opposition to the security treaty. Violent riots erupted, fuelled by a wave of anti-American sentiment. A car carrying the American ambassador was attacked and an image of President Eisenhower was hung in effigy. Eisenhower canceled a scheduled visit to Japan. In spite of this vigorous (and at times violent)

opposition, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party managed to force the treaty through the Japanese Diet. The new Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation removed the intervention provision and disputes over military bases were resolved.[3] The treaty crisis shocked the United States and renewed suspicions about Japan's reliability and vulnerability to left-wing subversion. A Gallup poll taken in 1960 revealed that 55 percent of the American people did not view Japan as being a dependable U.S. ally.[4] So although Japan had played the role of faithful junior partner throughout the 1950s, the treaty crisis seemed to confirm the negative image of Japan; in the popular view, the Japanese still could not be trusted and had, therefore, to be contained by the United States.

Once the dust from the treaty crisis settled, the U.S.-Japan relationship stabilized. Both sides shifted their attention to other concerns: the U.S. to the spread of communism and Soviet power in Latin America and Southeast Asia; and Japan to achieving the goal of double-digit economic growth. Mutual confidence and trust gradually increased during the 1960s. Although uneasy about the Vietnam War, Japan provided substantial logistical and economic assistance to the U.S. and South Vietnam.[5] Japanese attitudes concerning the U.S. also improved, especially after the U.S. decided to return sovereignty over Okinawa. Some of the good feeling accumulated during this period dissipated with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine and the various Nixon Shocks of the early 1970s. But at the end of the 1970s, the U.S.-Japan strategic partnership remained intact, continuing as the cornerstone of the double containment strategy in East Asia.

Yet it is clear that American mistrust of Japan did not disappear. Of course, Japan's economic miracle generated great admiration among many Americans, prompting some scholars to offer Japan as a model for the United States.[6] But Japan's achievements did not change the fundamental American image of Japan discussed in the second chapter of this essay. For all of their success, the Japanese were still seen as an obedient people capable of unpredictable behavior. Even in times of great economic prosperity, Japan always seemed capable of an abrupt change in behavior that could destabilize not only

Japanese society, but also the international system. This concern about lurking Japanese instability provided the theme for Zbigniew Brzezinski's book *The Fragile Blossom*, published in 1972. The future national security adviser during the Carter Administration argued that although Japan appeared to be a very stable society, the Japanese possessed a predilection for abrupt change. "Japanese society can be said to be characterized by a kind of metastability, that is to say, a stability that appears to be extremely solid until all of a sudden a highly destabilizing chain reaction is set in motion by an unexpected input . . . once instability is set in motion, insecurity tends to intensify instability."[7] What Brzezinski's comment reveals is that among the American foreign policymaking elite, serious concern about Japan's stability and reliability remained even after decades of relatively harmonious relations between the two countries. So although leading American foreign policymakers still spoke of the security alliance in terms of the Soviet threat, the fears and doubts about Japan that played a role in the alliance's formation in 1951 persisted.

After a period of relative harmony during the early 1980s, U.S.-Japanese relations have grown more contentious. A host of specific issues, ranging from the controversy over the FSX to the Persian Gulf War, have injected more turbulence into the relationship than at any time since the security treaty crisis of 1960. But more significant than these issues is the mutual fear and heightened suspicion of the last ten years. What is most striking about the fears expressed by some Americans about Japan their resemblance to the arguments made by Ruth Benedict, George Kennan, and John Foster Dulles some forty years ago. The negative image of Japan has survived to the present and has intensified now that a growing number of Americans believe that Japan poses an immediate economic threat to the United States.

Without question, the work of the so called *Japan revisionists* provides the most compelling evidence that the American image of Japan bears great resemblance to the image held in the early postwar era. Numerous references to the Japanese herd, for example, can

be found in these works. Clyde Prestowitz, for example, speaks of Japan's "tribal pride" and of Japan's "survival instinct and herd mentality."[8] In explaining Japan's intransigence over trade, James Fallows echoes Ruth Benedict in arguing that Japan does not share the West's devotion to abstract principles (like free trade), adhering instead to a kind of "situational ethics" in which power and authority are honored more than Western concepts like fairness.[9] Finally, the work of Karel van Wolferen also shares much in common with the immediate postwar image of Japan, especially in his skepticism about Japanese democracy. Van Wolferen argues that while Japan possesses the institutions of parliamentary democracy, the substance of its politics is hardly democratic. Japan's powerful political and bureaucratic elite has successfully exploited Japanese culture to create a system that suppresses open conflict and encourages obedience. As van Wolferen writes, "Japan's political culture . . . discourages individual growth and fosters dependency. The Japanese accept a high degree of organisation and restrictions; they tolerate the ways that officials meddle in their lives, and do not question their permanent political tutelage. Very few can conceive of civil disobedience as legitimate political action."[10] Clearly the passage of forty years has done little to change the American image of Japan. The Japanese are still perceived as an obedient, amoral herd with a weak commitment to democracy. Combining this negative image with the emergence of a perceived Japanese economic threat, it is hardly surprising that talk of *containing* Japan has assumed a prominent place in discussions about the future of U.S.-Japan relations.

Since the United States and its allies in East Asia continue to view Japan as an unpredictable and potentially unstable country, there is little doubt that the impulse to contain Japan will persist. Even if one does not agree with the dominant image, the fact that most East Asians are likely to feel threatened by an uncontained Japan (which might, in turn, spawn an Asian arms race) makes a policy of containing Japan a prudent course for the foreseeable future. But given growing tension within the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship and the corresponding decline of the Soviet threat, one has to wonder whether

the security alliance in its current form will remain an effective instrument of double containment. Will Japan, for example, be content to play the role of a contained junior partner that obediently follows the dictates of American foreign policy? It seems more likely that, as recent Japanese resentment over Washington's handling of the Gulf War indicates, Japan will want a greater voice in major international decisions. On the American side, the end of the Cold War and budgetary pressures at home cast significant doubt upon the future willingness of the United States to bear the burdens of containing Japan. The widespread feeling that American competitiveness is weakened *because* the U.S. provides for Japan's defense seems likely to increase pressures to "bring the troops home." For these reasons, there appear to be forces on both sides of the Pacific working against the long-term stability of the *current* security alliance.

Given the potential instability of the status-quo over the long-term, the United States would do well to begin exploring alternative security structures and institutions for containing Japan and preserving stability in East Asia. One possibility is a regional security alliance, similar to NATO, that would entangle Japan much like NATO and the EC do for the recently unified Germany. A more realistic option would be to restructure the bilateral security alliance in such a way that Japan would bear more of the *burden* of international leadership while the United States would *share* more of its power and influence with Japan. In the short-term, the current security alliance seems likely to continue serving as an instrument for containing Japan. But if the United States wants to promote stability in East Asia and preserve its security partnership with Japan over the long-term, then it will have to develop a more imaginative solution to the Japan Security Problem than the one it formulated in the wake of the Second World War.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See, for example, the work of Ravenal (1985) and Layne (1987)

2. This is the argument of the advocates of "finite containment." For a useful account of this argument, see Stephen Walt's essay in Miller and Lynn-Jones 1989: 3-47

3. Krauthammer 1991: 23-33 makes this argument

4. Mearsheimer 1990: 5-56 generated much controversy and debate in arguing that Europe would become less stable after the Cold War since NATO would no longer be able to prevent Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER ONE: Alliances as Instruments of Control: Theory and History

1. The statement is from Grotius' classic work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres.* It is quoted in Wight 1978:123. This quotation is not offered as evidence that Grotius was a Realist. In fact, he and his followers (Grotians and Neo-Grotians) constitute a separate school of thought within international relations theory. Nonetheless, Grotius does appear to accept the Realist explanation of alliance formation. For a contemporary analysis written from the Grotian perspective that also shares much in common with Realism, see Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society.*

2. Wight 1978:122 Morgenthau makes a similar point about alliances being acts of expedience. See Morgenthau 1967: 175

3. Prominent classical realists concerned with international relations include: Thucydides, Machiavelli, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, to name just a few.

4. The most influential of the structural or neorealist students of international relations is undoubtedly Kenneth Waltz. Others belonging to the neorealist school are: Robert Gilpin, Morten Kaplan, and Stephen Walt, to name just a few.

5. Waltz 1979: 102-107

6. Morgenthau 1967: 26

7. Waltz objects to Morgenthau's definition of power. For Waltz, power is simply raw capabilities and can be measured objectively in terms of military force levels, gross national product, population, etc. So the balance of power is really the distribution of capabilities.

8. Walt 1987: 19-21 provides an excellent summary of bandwagoning

9. Walt 1987: 29

10. Waltz 1979: 168

11. Walt 1987: 21-26

12. Machiavelli 1950: 84

13. Morgenthau 1967: 178-179

14. Osgood 1968: 22

15. Liska 1962: 116

16. Knorr 1976: 230

17. For the distinction between immediate and latent threats, I am indebted to my colleague James Chung of MIT. See Chung 1991: 1-2

18. Chung 1991: 7

19. Knorr 1976: 238-239

20. Knorr 1976: 242-243

21. Crankshaw 1981: 371

CHAPTER TWO: The Japanese Image in the American Mind: 1941-1951

1. For an excellent discussion of the so called rational actor model, see Allison 1971: 10-38

2. My use of the concept of image draws heavily on the work of Nathan Glazer. For the definition of image used in this chapter, see Glazer's essay in Iriye 1975: 164

3. Iriye 1975: 165

4. George's conception of the operational code is summarized in Gaddis 1982: viii-ix. For a more detailed discussion, see George 1969: 190-222

5. Iriye 1976: 157

6. For an excellent discussion of the good German-bad German vs. the enemy is all of Japan, see Dower 1986: 34. A similar point is made in Thorne 1985: 129

7. Quoted in Dower 1986: 33

8. Dower 1986: 78

9. Dower 1986: 53-54

10. Dower 1986: 8

11. For an insightful discussion of the impact of lessons drawn from history on American foreign policy, see May 1973.

12. Dower 1986: 323-324 (FN #4)

13. Thorne 1985: 125

14. Benedict 1989: 163

15. Quoted in Dower 1986: 310

16. Dower 1986: 111

17. Tuchman 1981: 93-97

18. Quoted in Dower 1986: 97

19. Dower provides a chilling account of Japanese atrocities. See Dower 1986: 41-48.

20. Thorne 1985: 130

21. Quoted in Dower 1986: 141

22. Quoted in Dower 1986: 52

23. Dower 1986: 49

24. Thorne 1978: 158-159 and 167-168

25. Dower 1986: 142

26. Minear 1980: 41 and Dower 1986: 126

27. Gorer's essay is reprinted in Silberman 1962: 322

28. Silberman 1962: 324

29. Benedict 1989: 315

30. Quoted in Minear 1980: 53

31. Dower 1986: 18-23

32. Dower 1986: 322 (FN #9)

33. Dower 1986: 83

34. The comments of De Witt, Rankin, and Dower can be found in Dower 1986: 79-81.

35. Benedict 1989: 86

CHAPTER THREE: Solving the Japan Security Problem I: The Radical Solution

1. The impact of the "lessons of Versailles" on American postwar planning is summarized in Gaddis 1972: 96

2. Thorne 1985: 4

3. Gaddis 1972: 1

4. Gaddis 1972: 95-100

5. For a summary of the Morgenthau Plan, see Gaddis 1972: 118-120. Theodore Cohen discusses the Morgenthau Plan's impact on American occupation planning for Japan. See Cohen 1987: 27-31

6. For a useful discussion of the ideas of this so called "Japan Crowd," see Harries and Harries 1987: 14

7. Cohen 1987: 18

8. Harries and Harries 1987: 14

9. Cohen 1987: 19

10. Cohen 1987: 17

11. Cohen 1987: 48

12. Cohen 1987: 7

13. The comments of Stimson and Truman can be found in Gaddis 1987: 36

14. Histories of the demilitarization program are numerous. Harries and Harries 1987 and Dower 1988 provide excellent overviews of the program.

CHAPTER FOUR: Solving the Japan Problem II: The Onset of the Cold War and the Reverse Course 1947-1949

1. On the problem of Eastern Europe, see Gaddis 1972: 133-173.

2. These events are summarized by LaFeber 1980: 35-41

3. An excellent account of the events leading up to the Truman Doctrine can be found in Yergin 1977: 258-275. Also see Acheson 1969: 217-225.

4. Lafeber 1980: 58-64

5. Kennan's thought has been the subject of much scholarly examination. Gaddis 1982: 25-53 is the standard account. It is important to note that Kennan was not first to suggest that American foreign policy be based on maintaining a favorable balance of power. For a discussion of the work of other Realist critics of American foreign policy, see Gaddis 1987: 22-25. On the classic works of geopolitics, see Kennedy 1976: 177-204.

6. Gaddis 1982: 30-31

7. Gaddis 1982: 34-38 argues that the strategy of containment as conceived by Kennan was primarily an economic, and not a military, doctrine.

8. For a useful summary of the Borton treaty, see Schaller 1985: 98-99

9. Schaller 1985: 99-100

10. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1947, Vol VI: 454-455

11. Schaller 1985: 103-106. See also Mayers 1988: 162-163

12. FRUS 1947, Vol. VI: 537

13. On Draper's role in bringing about the Reverse Course, see Schonberger 1989: 161-197

14. FRUS 1948, Vol. VI: 697

15. FRUS 1948, Vol. VI: 712-713

16. FRUS 1948, Vol. VI: 807

17. The comment from *Time* is quoted in Donovan 1982: 78. Bishop's assessment is in FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 660

18. FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 834

19. FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 927-928

20. FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 1126

21. See, for example, Acheson's comments of May 18. He argued against a Pacific Pact because of the many "internal conflicts" that remained among the countries of East Asia. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State never listed those conflicts or explained why they would inhibit the formation of a Pacific Pact. See FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 1143

22. For the Policy Planning Staff paper, see FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII: 1148-1151

23. Dening's comments came at a meeting with State Department officials in charge of East Asian policy. For a summary of the meeting, see FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 853-855

24. FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 862

CHAPTER FIVE: Solving the Japan Security Problem Three: The Path to the Alliance

1. Trachtenberg 1988: 11

2. Trachtenberg 1988: 12

3. Trachtenberg 1988: 16

4. Trachtenberg argues that the strategy embodied in NSC-68 was essentially offensive. See Trachtenberg 1988: 12-15. For a discussion of NSC-68 as being primarily a defensive strategy, see Gaddis 1982: 91-107.

5. Donovan 1982: 162-166. For a useful account of the domestic turmoil generated by McCarthyism by one of its chief targets, see Acheson 1969: 354-371

6. This important document can be found in FRUS 1950, Vol VI: 1207-1212

7. On Willoughby and early Japanese rearmament, see Dower 1988: 378. A more detailed examination of Willoughby's activities can be found in Harries and Harries 1987: 220-227.

8. FRUS 1949, Vol. VII: 670-672

9. Memorandum by Allison on Japanese Police Establishment, July 24, 1950, Dulles Peace Treaty File, Department of State (DOS) RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 3, "Defense, 1950."

10. See the assessment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Soviet amphibious capabilities in JIC-285 "Review of Soviet Capabilities" in the Geographic File 1948-50 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense (DOD) RG 218.

11. The National Intelligence Assessment of February 10, 1951 states: "There are no positive indications that the USSR intends to attack Japan by mid-April 1951, but it has the capability of doing so and could launch such an attack without any appreciable warning." Dulles Peace Treaty File, DOS, RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 13.

12. On the JCS proposal, see Dower 1988: 386

13. Comments to this effect by the foreign ministers of Australia and New Zealand can be found in the Dulles Peace Treaty File, DOS, RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 10, dated April 4, 1951 and April 19, 1951 respectively.

14. Memorandum of February 1, 1950 located in Dulles Peace Treaty File, DOS, RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 10.

15. Draft Treaty Points are in a memorandum of October 27, 1950 located in Dulles Peace Treaty File, DOS, RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 1.

16. This memorandum, dated July 13, 1951, is in the Dulles Peace Treaty File, DOS, RG 59, Lot 54D423, Box 1. Also see a similar argument in a memorandum in the same location by John Allison and dated December 2, 1950.

17. Dower 1988: 401

18. Dower 1988: 403-404

19. Dower 1988: 406

CONCLUSION: The Security Alliance Then and Now

1. On the relationship between revival of the Japanese economy and Southeast Asia, see Gilpin 1975: 110 and Borden 1984.

2. Gilpin 1975: 145 and Samuels 1991: 9

3. On the security treaty crisis, see Packard 1966.

4. Iriye 1975: 141

5. Havens 1987: 84-106 provides an excellent account of the Japan's role as a silent strategic and economic partner of the U.S. during the Vietnam War.

6. The most influential of the many Americans praising Japan's achievements and suggesting that the U.S. has much to learn from Japan is Ezra Vogel. See his widely read book *Japan as Number One.*

7. Brzezinski's comment is quoted in Iriye 1975: 161.

8. Prestowitz 1988: 193 and 328.

9. Fallows 1989: 51-52

10. Van Wolferen 1989: 366

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