ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE STOCK MARKET RATIONALITY HYPOTHESIS*

Robert C. Merton


*Presented at the Italian-American Conference in Honor of Franco Modigliani, at Martha's Vineyard, September 19-20, 1985.
ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE STOCK MARKET RATIONALITY HYPOTHESIS

Robert C. Merton
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

September 1985

Introduction

The foundation for valuation in modern financial economics is the rational market hypothesis. It implies that the market price of a security is equal to the expectation of the present value of the future cash flows available for distribution to that security where the quality of the information embedded in that expectation is high relative to the information available to the individual participants in the market. As has been discussed at length elsewhere, the question whether this hypothesis is a good approximation to the behavior of real-world financial markets has major substantive implications for both financial and general economic theory and practice.

---

1 See Fischer and Merton (1984); Marsh and Merton (1983; forthcoming); Merton (1983).
The rational-market hypothesis provides a flexible framework for valuation. It can, for example, accommodate models where discount rates are stochastic over time and statistically dependent on future cash flows. It can also accommodate nonhomogeneity in information and transactions costs among individual market participants. The theory is not, however, a tautology. It is not consistent with models or empirical facts which imply that either stock prices depend in an important way on factors other than the fundamentals underlying future cash flows and discount rates, or that the quality of information reflected in stock prices is sufficiently poor that investors can systematically identify significant differences between stock price and fundamental value.

Although the subject of much controversy at its inception more than two decades ago, the rational market hypothesis now permeates virtually every part of finance theory. It has even become widely accepted as the "rule" (to which one must prove the exception) for finance practice on Wall Street, LaSalle Street, and in courtrooms and corporate headquarters. However, recent developments in economic theory and empirical work have again cast doubts on the validity of the hypothesis. Representing one view, Summers [1985] sees much of the renewed controversy as little more than a case of financial economists and general economists engaging in a partisan diversion of intellectual effort over methodological questions instead of focusing on sound research on major substantive questions. He sees this development as only hastening an apparent secular trend toward inefficient disjunction between the fields of finance and economics on subjects of conjoint research interest. Perhaps that is so. But I must confess to having quite the opposite view on these same research efforts with regard to both their substance and their
presumed dysfunctional effects on the fields of finance and economics. However, to pursue this issue further would only be an exercise in self-refutation. Thus, it suffices to say that whether market rationality is viewed as a "hot topic" or as merely a "topic with too much heat," an analysis of the current state of research on this issue would appear timely—especially so, on this occasion honoring Franco Modigliani, past-President of both the American Economic Association and the American Finance Association and prime counterexample to the Summers doctrine.

This paper focuses on the central economic question underlying the issue of stock market rationality: Do real-world capital markets and financial intermediaries, as a practical matter, provide a good approximation to those ideal-world counterparts which are necessary for efficient investor riskbearing and efficient allocation of physical investment? Although satisfaction of the rational market hypothesis is surely not sufficient to

2 As may come as a great surprise to those financial economists who regularly publish papers on capital budgeting problems, earnings estimation, financing decisions and dividend policy, Summers [1985, p. 634] finds it rather "...unfortunate that financial economists remain so reluctant to accept any research relating asset prices and fundamental values." In making this remark, perhaps Summers has in mind those financial economists who might select the closing price on the New York Stock Exchange of a ketchup company's common stock as a better estimate of that firm's fundamental value than an estimate provided by a general economist who computes a present value based on a linear regression model of the supply and demand for ketchup; autoregressive forecasts of future costs of tomatoes, wages, prices of ketchup substitutes, and consumer incomes; and a "reasonable" discount rate.
ensure efficient allocations, its broad-based rejection is almost certainly sufficient to rule out efficient allocations. 3

From this perspective on the issue, it matters little whether or not real-world dealers and deal-makers can "scalp" investors and issuers as long as their profits are a small fraction of aggregate transactions in important and well-established markets. Similarly, it matters little for this issue if, as suggested by Van Horne (1985), promoters often make large-percentage profits during the transient period of time between the inception of a new financial product (or market) and the widespread acceptance (or rejection) of the product by investors and issuers.

In evaluating market rationality as it bears on economic efficiency, it matters very much if stock prices generally can be shown to depend in an important way on factors other than fundamentals. It also matters very much if it can be shown that either academic economists or practitioners systematically provide better forecasts of fundamental values than stock prices do. Thus, this analysis focuses on empirical work on aggregate stock price behavior, and especially the new volatility test methodologies, which appear to provide evidence of this very sort.

3 As is well known, even with well-functioning (although not complete) markets and rational, well-informed consumer-investors, the competitive market solution may not be a pareto optimum, and thus, market rationality is not a sufficient condition for efficiency. Using the neoclassical model with overlapping generations, Tirole (1985) has shown that financial security prices that deviate from fundamentals can lead to better allocations than "rational" prices. However, I would argue that those cases in which stock prices both deviate substantially from fundamental values and lead to a pareto optimum allocation of investment are, at best, rare.
Although these empirical findings have had the most immediate effect in reviving the controversy over stock market rationality, some of the emerging developments in theory may prove, in the longer run, to be more important in resolving the controversy. Before proceeding with the analysis of empirical work, therefore, I pause briefly to comment on two of the more promising candidates to supersede the rational market theory.

Grounded in the sociological behavioral theory of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the theory of rational expectations speculative bubbles\(^4\) in effect provides a theoretical foundation for answering the "If you are so smart, why aren't you rich?" question underlying the rational market argument that fully-recognized, sizable, and persistent deviations between market price and fundamental value must necessarily provide "excess profit" opportunities for either investors or issuers. As we know, however, from the work of Tirole (1982), the interesting conditions under which such rational bubble equilibria can exist are still to be determined. In particular, if the theory is to be applied to the aggregate stock market in realistic fashion, then it must accommodate both "positive" and "negative" bubbles in a rational expectations framework. Such application would seem to require a satisfactory process to explain both the limits on share repurchase by firms when prices are persistently below marginal production cost and the limits on the creation of new firms with "instant profits" for the promoters in periods when general stock market prices significantly exceed that marginal cost.

Although few economists would posit irrational behavior as the foundation of their models, many, of course, do not subscribe to the sort of "super rational" behavior implied by the rational expectations theory (with or without bubbles). Based on the pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky [1979,1982], the theory of cognitive misperceptions (by which I mean the observed set of systematic "errors" in individual decision making under uncertainty) may become a base from which economic theory formally incorporates nonrational (or as some economists have described it, "quasi-rational") behavior.

As discussed in Arrow (1982), the empirical findings of such systematic misperceptions in repeated laboratory experiments appear sound and there would also appear to be many test cases within economics. In terms of both the current state of empirical evidence in cognitive psychology and financial economics, it would seem somewhat premature, however, to conclude that cognitive misperceptions are an important determinant of aggregate stock market behavior. Specifically, the same sharp empirical findings of cognitive misperceptions have not (at least to my knowledge) been shown to apply to individual decision making when the individual is permitted to interact with others (as a group) in analyzing an important decision and when the group is repeatedly called upon to make similar types of important decisions. But, this is, of course, exactly the environment in which professional investors make their stock market decisions.

If professional investors are not materially affected by these cognitive misperceptions, then it would seem that either competition among professional investors would lead to stock prices which do not reflect the cognitive errors of other types of investors, or professional investors should earn substantial
excess returns by exploiting the deviations in price from fundamental value. Unlike the theory of rational expectations bubbles with its self-fulfilling prophecy, there is no a priori reason in this theory to believe that investment strategies designed to exploit significant deviations of price from fundamental value will not be successful. However, as shown in the following section, rather robust evidence indicates that professional investors do not earn substantial excess returns.

These two theories, along with Shiller's (1984) theory of fads, explicitly incorporate in an important way positive theories of behavior derived from other social sciences. In doing so, they depart significantly from the "traditional" approach of mainstream modern economic theory: namely, to derive the positive theories of "how we do behave" almost exclusively from normative economic theories of "how we should behave." Whether these theories throw light on the specific issue of aggregate stock market rationality, it will surely be interesting to follow the impact on economic theory generally from these attempts to bring economics "back into line" with the rest of the social sciences.
Empirical Studies of Stock Market Rationality

In his seminal 1965 paper proving the martingale property of rationally-determined speculative price changes, Paul Samuelson was careful to warn readers against interpreting conclusions drawn from his model about markets as empirical statements:

You never get something for nothing. From a nonempirical base of axioms, you never get empirical results. Deductive analysis cannot determine whether the empirical properties of the stochastic model I posit come close to resembling the empirical determinants of today's real-world markets. (p. 42)

One can hardly disagree that the question whether stock market rationality remains a part of economic theory should be decided empirically. There is, however, a complication: we have no statute of limitations for rejecting a theory. To the extent that one assumes the advancement of knowledge, it is the fate of all theory to be encompassed, superseded, or outright rejected in the long run. Nevertheless, at any moment, one must choose: either to continue to use the theory or to discard it. It is with this choice in mind that I examine the empirical evidence to date on stock market rationality.

As economists have cause to know well, the "long run" in economic behavior can indeed be long. Having already sustained itself for at least twenty years, the rational market theory exemplifies this same fact—here in the history of economic science instead of in the history of economic behavior.

5 This assumes as a "base date" the publication of Samuelson's 1965 paper which first set forth the theory in rigorous form. There was, of course, the oral publication of his ideas for at least fifteen years before 1965, as well as many studies of speculative prices and their random properties, extending back as far as the early 1900s.
The longevity of the theory can surely not be attributed to neglect on the part of economists bent on putting it to empirical test. I have not made any formal comparisons, but I suspect that over these twenty years, few, if any, maintained hypotheses in economic theory have received as much empirical attention as the rational market hypothesis. Indeed, there have probably been too many such tests. Although it is likely that this claim could be supported on the grounds of optimal resource allocation alone, the case is made here solely on statistical grounds. In preparation for this and other matters which bear on the testing of market rationality, I briefly review the history of these tests.

About the time that Samuelson's fundamental paper appeared in print, what has since become the Chicago Center for Research in Security Pricing completed the construction of a file of prices and related data on all New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks from 1926-1965. This file has been periodically updated and expanded to include other exchanges so that there are now available almost sixty years of monthly data and more than twenty years of daily data on thousands of stocks. In addition, Robert Shiller of Yale has created a return file for the aggregate stock market with data going back to 1872.

There had been some earlier empirical studies of the randomness of speculative price changes, but the availability of a large-scale, easily accessible data base caused a flurry of such studies beginning in the mid-1960s. From simple runs and serial correlation tests to sophisticated filtering and spectral analysis, the results were virtually uniform in finding no significant serial dependencies in stock returns. The few cases of significant serial correlation were small in magnitude and short-lived.
(disappearing over a matter of a few days), and they could largely be explained by specialist activities for individual stocks or "non-contemporaneous trading effects" for portfolios of stocks. These findings were, of course, consistent with the Samuelson martingale property as a necessary condition for rationally-determined prices.

Financial researchers at this time were aware of the possibility that a significant part of this randomness could be from random "animal spirits" which would cause prices to deviate from fundamental values. There was, however, a widespread belief that the empirical evidence did not support this alternative to market rationality. The foundation for this belief was the assumption that even with animal spirits, in the long run, stock prices will converge in the statistical equilibrium sense to their fundamental values. From this assumption, it follows that deviations from fundamental values will, by necessity, induce serial dependencies in stock returns. If such deviations were significant, then these dependencies should be detectable as, for example, systematic patterns in the long-wave frequencies of the spectral analysis of stock returns. Moreover, there had been empirical studies of "relative strength" portfolio strategies which should do well if the market "underreacts" to information and of "relative weakness" (contrary opinion) portfolio strategies which should do well if the market tends to "overreact" to information. Neither of these produced significant results. Working

---

6 See, for example, the model analyzed in Merton (1971, pp. 403-406) which examines price behavior and optimal portfolio selection when instantaneous stock price changes are random, but the level of stock price regresses toward a "normal price level" with a trend.

7 As will be discussed, the recent study by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) presents evidence that seemingly contradicts these earlier findings.
along similar lines were the studies of stocks which appear on the most active trading list or which had moved up or down by usually large amounts, designed to look for evidence of under- or overreaction. Once again, no significant findings. Thus, it appeared at the time that the empirical evidence not only gave support to Samuelson's necessary condition for rationally-determined prices, but also failed to lend support to the alternative hypothesis of random animal spirits.

As we know today from the work of Summers (1982) and others, many of these studies provided rather weak tests for detecting the types of generalized serial correlations which random animal spirits might generate, especially when the speed of reversion to fundamental values is slow. However, the concern in the 1960s was over another issue surrounding the power of these tests: the selective bias inherent in "secret models."

As the cynical version of the story goes, one could not lose by testing market rationality. If, indeed, significant empirical violations were found, one could earn gold, if not glory, by keeping this discovery private and developing portfolio strategies to be sold to professional money managers who would take advantage of these violations. If, instead, one found no significant violations, then this (financial) "failure" could be turned into academic success by publishing the results in the scientific journals. Thus, while each study performed might represent an unbiased test, the collection of such studies published were likely to be biased in favor of not rejecting market rationality. Unlike the more-generally applicable claim for "quality" bias that studies which are consistent with the accepted theory are subject to less scrutiny by reviewers than ones which purport to reject it, the potential for material effects from "profit-induced" biases is probably specialized
within economic analyses to studies of speculative prices.

One need not, however, accept this cynical characterization of academic financial researchers to arrive at much the same conclusion. The portfolio strategies tested by academics were usually simple and always mechanical; therefore, the fact that they yielded no evidence of significant profit opportunities is perhaps no great surprise. However, real-world professional investors with significant resources might well have important information sources and sophisticated models (be they of fundamentals or market psychology) that are used to systematically beat the market. As this version of the story goes, if only the academics could gain access to these proprietary models, they would quickly be able to reject the rational market hypothesis. Unfortunately, one assumes that few successful professional investors are likely to reveal their hypothetically profitable models, and thereby risk losing their source of income, simply to publicly refute the rationally-determined price hypothesis of economists (which by hypothesis they have, of course, already determined privately to be false.) Thus, it would seem that the possibility of proprietary models would, at least, significantly weaken, and in all likelihood, bias, the academic tests of market rationality.

Concern over the "secret model" problem led to the next wave of empirical tests for which the pioneering study of the mutual fund industry by Jensen (1968) serves as a prototype. The basic assumptions underlying these tests hold that if such models exist, then professional investors have them, and if they have them, then the results should show themselves in superior performance (at least, before expenses charged to investors) of the funds they managed. Tracking the performance of 115 investment companies over the period 1945-1964, Jensen found no significant evidence of superior performance for
the fund industry as a whole. Later work by Jensen and others also found no evidence that individual investment companies within the industry had superior performance. That is, it was found that for any fund which had outperformed the naive market strategy of investing in the past, the odds of the same fund doing so in the future were essentially fifty-fifty. Similar studies subsequently made of the performance of other professional investor groups (e.g., insurance company equity funds; bank trust departments) came to much the same results. Moreover, as I have indicated in my preliminary remarks, these findings have remained robust to date.  

To be sure, the variances of the returns on these managed portfolios are sufficiently large that although the point estimates of the excess returns in these studies support the null hypothesis of no superior performance, they cannot reject the alternative null hypothesis that the managers do provide sufficient performance to earn the 25-100 basis points they charge. This fact may be important to the economics of the money management industry, but is inconsequential for the broader question of market rationality as a good approximation to the real-world stock market. That is, the undiscovered existence of proprietary models is not likely to provide an important

---

8 Jensen (1968) found that the average "excess return" per year (including management expenses) across all funds in his sample and all the years from 1945-1964, was -1.1 percent, and 66 percent of the funds had negative average excess returns. When expenses were excluded, the corresponding statistics were -0.4 percent per year and 48 percent. As reported in a recent Business Week article (February 4, 1985; pp. 58-59), based on the industry standard data from SEI Funds Evaluation Services, 74 percent of managed equity portfolios underperformed the Standard & Poor's 500 Index in 1984; 68 percent underperformed for the period 1982-1984; 55 percent underperformed from 1980-1984; and 56 percent underperformed from 1975-1984.
explanation for the rational market hypothesis having remained unrejected for so long a time.

During the period of the 1960s and early 1970s, the overwhelming majority of empirical findings continued to support the market rationality theory [cf. Fama (1970)]. Indeed, editors of both finance and broader economic journals, quite understandably, became increasingly reluctant to allot scarce journal space to yet another test which did not reject market rationality. Despite the mountain of accumulated evidence in support of the hypothesis, there were a relatively few of the empirical studies conducted during this period which did not seem to fit the rational market model. For example, low price-to-earnings ratio stocks seem to systematically earn higher average returns (even after correcting for risk differences) than high price-to-earnings ratio stocks. This "PE effect," later renamed the "small stock effect" after it was shown to be more closely associated with firm size than PE ratios, still remains a puzzle. Some other anomalies were the finding of various seasonal regularities such as the "January effect" and "the-day-of-the-week effect," and still another is the behavior of stock returns after a stock split. As the number of such puzzles gradually accumulated, the apparently closed gate on the empirical issue of market rationality began to reopen. Indeed, by 1978, even the Journal of Financial Economics (with its well-known editorial view in support of market rationality) devoted the entire June-September issue to a symposium on anomalous evidence bearing on market efficiency.

During this period, there were a number of empirical findings in the general economics literature which also cast doubt on the hypothesis of market rationality. Time series calculations of Tobin's Q appeared to suggest that
stock market prices were too high at times while much too low at others, to be explained by economic fundamentals alone. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) presented a theory and empirical evidence that stock prices were irrationally low during the 1970s because investors failed to take correct account of the radically-increased levels of the inflation rate in assessing expected future corporate profits and the rate at which they should be discounted.

Collectively these findings raised questions about the validity of stock market rationality, but they were hardly definitive. Some were found to be significant in one time period, but not in another. Others, such as Long's (1978) study on the market valuation of cash dividends, focused on a small sample of obscure securities. Virtually all shared the common element of testing a joint hypothesis with other important and unproven assumptions in addition to stock market rationality. There is, for example, the common joint hypothesis of stock market rationality and prices that are formed according to (one or another tax version) of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Thus, at most, these tests rejected a hypothesis including stock market rationality but also other assumptions which, on a priori grounds, could reasonably be argued as less likely to obtain than market rationality.

During the past five years, a series of tests based upon the volatility of stock prices have produced seemingly new evidence of market nonrationality that some consider relatively immune to these criticisms of the earlier apparent rejections. One group of these tests pioneered by LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) has focused on the volatility of aggregate stock market price relative to either aggregate earnings or dividends over long time periods (in the case of the former, for the post-war period and in the latter, since before the turn of the century). Their findings have been interpreted
as confirming the long-felt-but-unproved belief among some economists that stock prices are far more volatile than could ever be justified on fundamental evaluations alone.

A second group of tests examines the short-run volatility of stock price changes from one trading day to the next. It was known in the 1960s that the measured variance rate on stock returns is significantly lower over short time periods including weekends and holidays when the market is closed than over the same-length time periods when the market is open every day. The "rational" explanation given for this "seasonal" observation on volatility held that with businesses and many government activities closed, less new information is produced on these nontrading days than on trading days when they are open. However, using a period in the 1960s when the stock market was closed on every Wednesday, French and Roll (1984) show that the previously-identified lower stock return volatility over short time periods that include a nontrading day applied to the Wednesday closings as well. Because nonspeculative market activities were generally open on these Wednesdays, the earlier presumed explanation was thus plainly inadequate. It would appear that market trading itself seems to cause increased volatility in market prices, and some interpret this finding as evidence against market prices being based on fundamentals alone.9

Explaining why rationally-determined speculative price changes would

9 To the extent that stock market prices themselves are an important source of information for investors in calibrating and evaluating other data used to make their assessments of the fundamentals, the original argument that systematically less information is produced on days when the market is closed can be extended to include the Wednesday closings.
exhibit the martingale property even though the underlying economic variables upon which these prices are formed may have considerable serial dependencies, Samuelson (1965, p. 44) writes: "We would expect people in the marketplace, in pursuit of avid and intelligent self-interest, to take account of those elements of future events that in a probability sense may be discerned to be casting their shadows before them." The empirical evidence to date has been remarkably robust in finding no important cases of either lagged variables explaining stock price returns or of real-world investors (who make their decisions without benefit of even a peek into the future) being able to beat the market. This impressive success in confirming the ex ante component of the theory's prophecy has not, however, been matched in confirming its ex post component: namely, one should be able to find current or future economic events related to the fundamentals that, on average, explain current and past changes in stock prices.

As has been discussed elsewhere [cf. Fama (1981); Fischer and Merton (1984); Marsh and Merton (1983;1985)], the change in aggregate stock prices is an important leading indicator of macro economic activity. Indeed, it is the best single predictor of future changes in business fixed investment, earnings, and dividends. Moreover, the forecast errors in the realization of future earnings changes are significantly correlated with the then-contemporaneous changes in stock prices. Nevertheless, although the writers for the popular financial press try hard, they often cannot identify the specific economic events which are important enough to cause the aggregate value of the stock market to change by as much as two percent in a single day.

At the micro level, the accounting and finance literatures are populated with studies of the behavior of individual stock prices, on, before, and
after, the date of some potentially important event such as an earnings or
tender offer announcement. These "event" studies lend some support to the ex post component of market rationality by showing that stock price changes predict many such events; respond quickly and in an unbiased fashion to surprises, and do not respond to seemingly important events which, in fact, should not affect the fundamentals (e.g., "cosmetic" changes in accounting earnings which have no impact on current or future cash flows). However, some of these studies [cf. Ohlson and Penman (1985)], who find that stock price return volatility appears to increase significantly after a stock split] provide conflicting evidence which indicates that stock prices may be affected by factors other than fundamentals.

Just as the strong empirical support for the ex ante component of market rationality has moved the focus of theoretical research from models of differential information to models of rational expectations bubbles, animal spirits, and fads, so the relative lack of closure on the ex post component seems to be the driving element behind the methodological focus of current empirical tests of the hypothesis. Finance specialists seem to favor short-term volatility or event studies while general economists favor long-term studies, but both appear to agree that the statistical properties of volatility tests make them the most promising approach for rejecting the hypothesis of aggregate stock market rationality. The bulk of the formal analysis in this paper is focused on the long-term volatility tests, leaving for another occasion, the examination of the event-study approach. Before undertaking that task, I digress to comment on a few, perhaps prosaic, but nevertheless important issues that frame the testing of this hypothesis.

As we all know, what the stock market actually did from 1872-1985 is an
enumerable fact.—As such, those numbers do not change even as the number of
tests of the rational market hypothesis on these same data continues to grow.
As we also know, the standard test statistics used in these studies do not
reflect that fact. While, of course, the same comment could be made about
virtually every area of economic model testing [cf. Leamer (1983)], it perhaps
warrants more than usual attention in this case because of the unusually large
number of studies, the large number of observations in the data set, and the
magnitudes of unexplained volatility in stock prices.

As a case study of the problem, let us consider the regression study of
the hypothesis that the expected real rate of return on the market is a
constant, which is discussed in the Summers (1985) article. He writes:

Simple regression of real ex post stock returns on
lagged dividend yields find that the null
hypothesis that the real ex ante rate is constant
can be rejected at almost any confidence level.
(p. 635)

Although hardly a proponent of this null hypothesis in either theory or
practice [cf. Merton (1973;1980)], I would nevertheless argue that in making
his statement for apparently clear rejection, Summers does not take account of
the number of regressions, collectively, researchers have run of stock returns
on various contemporaneous and lagged variables. That some adjustment for
this fact could have material implications for the strength of his conclusion
is readily apparent from the negligible $R^2$ or explanatory power of these
lagged yields. While one could perhaps argue on a priori grounds that
dividend yield is a reasonable surrogate variable for expected return, I can
report that much the same statistical significance results obtain (on the same
data set, of course) if one regresses returns on the reciprocal of current
stock price alone, omitting the dividend series altogether. 10

If knowledge is to advance, we must seek out the exceptions, the puzzles, the unexplained residuals and attempt to explain them. But, before problem solution must come problem identification. Thus, economists place a premium on the discovery of puzzles which in the context at hand amounts to finding apparent rejections of a widely accepted theory of stock market behavior. All of this fits well with what the cognitive psychologists tell us is our natural individual predilection to focus, often disproportionately so, on the unusual. As I have hinted earlier, this emphasis on the unusual has been institutionalized by responsible and knowledgeable journal editors who understandably look more favorably upon empirical studies which find anomalous evidence with respect to a widely-accepted theory than upon studies which merely serve to confirm that theory yet again. This focus, both individually and institutionally, together with little control over the number of tests performed, creates a fertile environment for both unintended selection bias and for attaching greater significance to otherwise unbiased estimates than is justified.

To clarify the point, consider this parable on the testing of coin-flipping abilities. Some three thousand students have taken my finance courses over the years and suppose that each had been asked to keep flipping a coin until tails comes up. At the end of the experiment, the winner, call her "A," is the person with the longest string of heads. Assuming no talent, the

10 See Marsh and Merton [1985]. Miller and Scholes [1982] find the same result for individual stock returns.
probability is greater than a half that "A" will have flipped 12 or more straight heads. As the story goes, there is a widely believed theory that no one has coin-flipping ability and hence, a researcher is collecting data to investigate this hypothesis. Because one would not expect everyone to have coin-flipping ability, he is not surprised to find that a number of tests failed to reject the null hypothesis. Upon hearing of "A's" feat (but not of the entire environment in which she achieved it), the researcher comes to MIT where I certify that she did, indeed, flip 12 straight heads. Upon computing that the probability of such an event occurring by chance alone is $2^{-12}$ or .00025, the researcher concludes that the widely believed theory of no coin-flipping ability can be rejected at almost any confidence level.

Transformed to the context of tests of stock market rationality, what empirical conclusion about the theory can be reached if we are told of a certified discovery of a particular money manager who outperformed the market in each and every year for twelve years? Even if the individual researcher can further certify that the discovery of this apparently gifted manager was by a random drawing, the significance of the finding cannot be easily assessed. We know the population size of (past and present) money managers is quite large. We also know that the number of researchers (past and present) studying professional money management performance is not small. However, as indicated, for quite legitimate individual and institutional reasons, results that simply confirm the "norm" (of no significant performance capability) tend not to be reported. Thus, the number of such random drawings undertaken collectively by researchers is unknown and this makes the assessment of significance rather difficult.

As we surely could do in the case of "A's" purported coin-flipping talent,
we might try to resolve this problem by testing the money-manager's talent "out of sample." Because of survivorship bias, this cannot be done easily with data from years prior to the money manager's run. If the run is still current, then we must wait many years to accumulate the new data needed to test the hypothesis properly.

The problem of assessing significance becomes, therefore, especially acute for testing theories of stock market behavior where very long observation periods (e.g., fifty to one hundred years) are required. One such class of examples are theories where price and fundamental value deviate substantially and where it is further posited that the speed of convergence of price to value is slow.

If, as is not unusual [cf. Shiller (1984)], a theory is formulated as a possible solution for an empirical puzzle previously found in the data, then the construction of a proper significance test of the theory on these same data becomes quite subtle.

Consider, for example, the following sequence of empirical studies and theories which followed the finding in the early 1970s, that low price-to-earnings ratio stocks seem to significantly outperform high price-to-earnings ratio stocks when performance is adjusted for risk according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Because there was already theory and evidence to suggest that the CAPM was inadequate to explain all the cross-sectional differentials in average security returns and because price-to-earnings ratios are not statistically independent of other firm characteristics (e.g., industry, dividend yield, financial and business risks), early explanations of the puzzle centered on additional dimensions of risk as in the arbitrage pricing and intertemporal capital asset pricing theories and on the tax
effects from the-mix of the pretax returns between dividends and capital gains. Further empirical analysis of the same data suggested that the aberration was more closely related to the size of the firm than to price-to-earnings ratios, although this claim is still subject to some dispute. Although firm size is also not statistically independent of other firm characteristics, this finding added the prospect of market segmentation or "tiering" to the original list of possible explanations for the puzzle.

Still further empirical analysis of the same data found a "seasonal" effect in stock returns which appeared to produce systematically larger returns on the market in the month of January. Closer inspection of these data pinpointed the source in place and time to be smaller firms in the early part of January. Moreover, by combining these two studies, it seems that the original PE/small firm puzzle is almost entirely the result of stock-price behavior in January. This result shifted the emphasis of theoretical explanation from risk factors and segmentation to "temporary" depressions in prices caused by year-end tax-loss sales of stocks that have already declined in price.

In the growing list of theoretical explanations of this puzzle (followed by tests on the same data set), perhaps the most recent entry is the "overreaction behavioral theory" of De Bondt and Thaler [1985] which implies that a "contrary opinion" portfolio strategy will outperform the market. It is particularly noteworthy because it also represents an early attempt at a formal test of cognitive misperceptions theories as applied to the general
stock market. To test their theory, they construct two portfolios (each containing 35 stocks): one contains extreme winners based on past returns and the other extreme losers. They find that in a series of nonoverlapping three-year holding periods, the "winners", on average, underperformed the market by 1.7 percent per year and the "losers" overperformed the market by 6.5 percent per year. The difference between the two, 8.2% per year, was judged to be significant with a t-statistic of 2.20.

Do the empirical findings of De Bondt and Thaler, using over a half century of data, really provide significant evidence for their theory? Is it reasonable to use the standard t-statistic as a valid measure of significance when the test is conducted on the same data used by many earlier studies whose results influenced the choice of theory to be tested? As it happens in this particular case, the former substantive question can be answered without addressing the latter methodological one. That is, Franco Modigliani is fond of the saying, "If, for a large number of observations, you have to consult the tables to determine whether or not your t-statistic is significant, then it is not significant." This expressed concern over the delicate issue of balancing type-I and type-II errors would seem to apply here. Moreover,

11 As perhaps some indication of the tentative nature of the evidence drawn to support behavioral theories of the stock market, we have, on the one hand, De Bondt and Thaler concluding that investors make cognitive mistakes which result in the underpricing of stocks that have declined (losers) and overpricing of stocks that have risen (winners) and, on the other, Shefrin and Statman (1985) concluding that the evidence supports (different) cognitive mistakes which cause investors to sell their winners "too early" and hold on to their losers "too long". It would seem, therefore, that even a "rational" investor, fully cognizant of his natural tendency to make these mistakes, would, nevertheless, find himself "convicted" by his actions of one or the other cognitive failures.
consider the additional findings of the study as described by the authors (p. 799): "First, the overreaction effect is asymmetric; it is much larger for losers than for winners. Secondly, consistent with previous work on the turn-of-the-year effect and seasonality, most of the excess returns are realized in January." As the authors later put it [p. 804], "Several aspects of the results remain without adequate explanation;". It is at this moment difficult to see a clear theoretical explanation for overreaction being asymmetric and even more so, for the excesses tending to be corrected at the same time each year.

Suppose, however, that the authors had found no such unexplained anomalies with respect to their theory and a larger t-statistic. Would their test, considered in methodological terms, have fulfilled their expressed goal? Namely, "... our goal is to test whether the overreaction hypothesis is predictive [their emphasis]. In other words, whether it does more for us than merely to explain, ex post, the P/E effect or Shiller's results on asset price dispersion." [P. 795]. When a theory is formulated as an explanation of a known empirical puzzle and then tested on the same data from which the puzzle arose, it would appear that the distinction between "prediction" and "ex post explanation" can be quite subtle.

These same concerns, of course, apply equally to the many empirical studies which do not reject market rationality. The early tests of serial dependencies in stock returns that used the newly-created data bases in the 1960s may have been sufficiently independent to satisfy the assumptions underlying the standard test statistics. It is, however, difficult to believe in the same level of independence for the practically countless subsequent runs used to test closely related hypotheses on the same data.
Although there is no obvious solution to these methodological problems in testing the rational market hypothesis, it does not follow that the controversies associated with the hypothesis cannot be empirically resolved. It does follow, however, that the reported statistical significance of the evidence, both for and against the hypothesis, is likely to overstate—perhaps, considerably so—the proper degree of precision to be attached to these findings. As noted at the outset, although common to all areas of economic hypothesis testing, these methodological problems appear to be especially acute in the testing of market rationality. Thus, it would seem that in evaluating the evidence on this matter, "more-than-usual" care should be exercised in examining the substantive economic assumptions and statistical methodologies used to present the evidence. In this spirit, I try my hand at examining the recent volatility tests of aggregate stock market rationality.

Having already expressed my views on the LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) variance bound studies as tests of stock market rationality, I provide only a brief summary of those views as background for the discussion of more recent volatility tests that have evolved from their work.

In formulating his variance bound tests, Shiller (1981) makes three basic economic assumptions: (S.1) stock prices reflect investor beliefs which are rational expectations of future dividends; (S.2) the real expected rate of return on the stock market is constant over time; (S.3) aggregate real dividends on the stock market can be described by a finite-variance stationary stochastic process with a deterministic exponential growth rate. From these

---

12 As junior author of Marsh and Merton (1983; forthcoming).
assumptions, Shiller derives two variance bound relations: the first is that the variance of real and detrended stock prices is bounded above by the variance of real and detrended "perfect-foresight" stock prices constructed by discounting ex post the realized stream of dividends at the estimated average expected rate of return on the stock market. The second is that the variance of the innovations (or unanticipated changes) in stock prices is bounded from above by the product of the variance of dividends and a constant which parametrically depends on the long-run or statistical equilibrium expected dividend-to-price ratio. Using 109 years of data, Shiller found that the sample statistics violated by a very large margin both of his variance bounds on stock price behavior. Although he did not derive the sampling properties of his estimates, Shiller argued that the magnitude of the violations together with the long observation period make sampling error an unlikely candidate to explain these violations. Nevertheless, subsequent simulations by Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1983a,b) have shown that sampling error, and in addition, sample bias, could be important factors.

Some economists interpret the Shiller findings as strong evidence against the theory that stock prices are based upon fundamentals alone. Others, most recently Summers (1985), are more careful in noting that even if the results are "true" rejections, then they reject the joint hypothesis (S.1), (S.2), and (S.3) which need not, of course, imply rejection of (S.1). As noted earlier in this section, there are a priori economic reasons as well as

13 More precisely, Summers (1985; p. 635) refers to the joint hypothesis involving what has been called here "(S.1) and (S.2)". I do not know whether his failure to note the stationarity condition (S.3) as well was intended or not.
empirical evidence leading us to reject the hypothesis (S.2) that the expected real rate is constant. While these are perhaps sufficient to reconcile the test findings with market rationality, some economists [including Shiller (1981,1982)] have presented analyses which suggest that fluctuations in the expected real rate might have to be "unreasonably large" to make this accommodation.

If (S.2) were modified to permit the expected real rate to follow a stochastic but stationary process, then, together with (S.3), detrended rational stock prices must follow a stationary process. The prototype processes for stock prices and dividends used by both finance academics and practitioners, are not stationary and this raises a priori questions about the assumption (S.3). Kleidon (1983a,b) reports time series evidence against stationarity for both stock prices and dividends, and, using simulations, shows that Shiller's findings can occur for nonstationary dividend processes and rationally determined stock prices.

Marsh and Merton (forthcoming) show that if the stationarity assumption is replaced by a Lintner-like dividend model where the dividend is a positive distributed lag of past stock prices, then the inequality in Shiller's first variance bounds test is exactly reversed. Thus, for any given time series of stock prices, this variance bound will always be violated by one or the other assumption about the dividend process. Hence, they conclude that the bound is wholly unreliable as a test of stock market rationality. They further show that for this class of dividend processes, there is no easily identified bound between the variance of dividends and the variance of stock price innovations.

Judging from these studies, the amount of light that these variance bounds tests can shed on the issue of market rationality seems to depend critically
on the way in which we model the uncertainty surrounding future economic fundamentals. That is, if the underlying economic fundamentals are such that the levels of rationally determined, real (and detrended) stock prices can be described by a stationary process, then they have power. If, instead it is the percentage change in stock prices which is better described by a stationary process, then they have no power. This observation was surely one of the important driving forces in the development of the "second-generation" volatility tests beginning with West (1983;1984) and represented most recently by Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1985). Although closely related to the original Shiller-LeRoy-Porter formulations, these tests appear to be far more robust because they do not require the stationarity assumption. Since the Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (MRS) study is the most recent version of these tests, the analysis here focuses on it.

As with the original Shiller variance bound test which derived an inequality between the variance of rational stock prices, \( \{P(t)\} \) and the variance of ex-post, perfect-foresight stock prices \( \{P^*(t)\} \), MRS also use these series together with a time series of "naive forecast" stock prices \( \{P^0(t)\} \), to test the following derived bounds [p. 679; (11') and (12')]:

\[
E_o[(P^*(t) - P(t))^2] \geq E_o[(P^0(t) - P(t))^2] \\
\text{and} \\\nE_o[(P^*(t) - P^0(t))^2] \geq E_o[(P(t) - P^0(t))^2]
\]
where $E_0$ denotes the expectation operator, conditional on initial conditions at $t = 0$. Although MRS do retain what has been called here Shiller's assumptions (S.1) and (S.2), they do not make the stationarity assumption (S.3). Hence, this conditioning of the expectations is necessary to make sense of (1) and (2) when the series are not stationary processes.

To test the bounds (1) and (2), they form the test statistics [p. 683, (16),(17)]:

$$S_1 = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[ (P^*(t) - P^0(t))^2 - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (P^*(t) - P(t))^2 \right]$$

and

$$S_2 = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[ (P^*(t) - P^0(t))^2 - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (P(t) - P^0(t))^2 \right]$$

and show that $E[S_1] \geq 0$ and $E[S_2] \geq 0$. With the same data set used by Shiller (1981) but now extended to run from 1872-1983, and a "naive forecast" $\{P^0(t)\}$ based on the current dividend, MRS find that these second moment inequalities are substantially violated by the point estimates of both (3) and (4).

The MRS analysis appears to address all the cited criticisms of the first-generation volatility tests with two exceptions, both of which they point out (p. 686): the assumption of a constant discount rate and the statistical significance of their estimates. Since the former has already been discussed in the literature on the first-generation tests, I examine only the latter here.

As with the original Shiller analysis, it is understandable that MRS did not examine the significance issue formally. After all, it is no easy task to derive the necessary mathematical relations for general processes. In the
Shiller case, the assumption of stationarity for the underlying processes make somewhat credible the heuristic argument that with a 109-year observation period, the sample statistic is not likely to differ from its expected value by the large magnitudes necessary to void his apparent rejection. Such creditability does not, however, extend to nonstationary processes. Because the extension to include nonstationary processes is the most important contribution of the MRS and other second-generation volatility tests, it is appropriate to examine the sampling properties of their statistics in such an environment.

As noted, deriving these properties in general is no easy task. Thus, I focus here on a simple example which fits their conditions and is easy to solve for the sampling properties.

Suppose there is a rationally-priced stock which we know as of today \( t = 0 \) will not pay a dividend until at least time \( T \) in the future. Suppose (as is often assumed in representative finance models) the dynamics for stock price in real terms, \( P(t) \), follows a geometric Brownian motion which we can describe by the Ito stochastic differential equation:

\[
\frac{dp}{p} = r \, dt + \sigma \, dZ
\]  

(5)

where \( r \) is the required expected real return on the stock; \( \sigma^2 \) is the instantaneous variance rate; and \( dZ \) is a Weiner process. \( r \) and \( \sigma^2 \) are positive constants.

Suppose further that we decide to perform a MRS type experiment using price data from today until year \( T \) in the future. Since none of us knows today what stock prices will be in the future, it is clear that the test statistic is conditional only on the current price, \( P(0) = P_0 \), and the date
at which we end the test, \( T \).

By the MRS definition, the ex post perfect-foresight stock price series, \( \{P^*(t)\} \), will be constructed according to the rule:

\[
dP^*(t) = rP^*(t)dt
\]  

(6)

with the further terminal or boundary condition that

\[
P^*(T) = P(T),
\]  

(7)

From (6) and (7), it follows immediately that

\[
P^*(t) = e^{-r(T-t)}P(T).
\]  

(8)

From the posited dynamics (5), we can represent the random variable for the stock price at time \( t \) in the future, conditional on \( P(0) = P_o \), by

\[
P(t) = P_o \exp[\mu t + \sigma Z(t)]
\]  

(9)

where \( \mu = (r - \sigma^2/2) \) and \( Z(t) = \int_0^t dZ(s) \) is a normally distributed random variable with the properties that,

\[
E_o[Z(t)] = 0
\]  

(9a)

\[
E_o[Z(t)Z(s)] = \text{Min}(s,t).
\]  

It follows from (9) and (9a) that, \( 0 \leq t \leq T \),

\[
E_o[P(t)] = P_o e^{rt}
\]  

(10a)

and

\[
E_o[P^2(t)] = P_o^2 e^{2rt}.
\]  

(10b)

It follows from (8), (10a), and (10b) that

\[
E_o[P^*(t)] = P_o e^{rt}
\]  

(11a)

and

\[
E_o[[P^*(t)]^2] = P_o^2 e^{2rt + \sigma^2 T}.
\]  

(11b)

By comparison of (10) with (11), we see that the conditional expectation of
the "forecast," $P(t)$, is equal to the conditional expectation of the
"realization," $P^*(t)$, and the conditional noncentral second moment of the
forecast is always less than the corresponding second moment of the
realization. This verifies in this model the fundamental principle underlying
both the first- and second-generation volatility tests, the principle that
rational forecasts should exhibit less volatility than the realizations.

For analytic convenience, suppose that in performing this test, we choose
our "naive forecast," $P^0(t)$, equal to zero for all $t$ (which is acceptable
within the MRS methodology). In this case, the MRS volatility bound statistic
(3) can be rewritten as:

$$E_o(X_1) \geq E_o(X_3) \quad (12)$$

and the MRS volatility bound statistic (4) can be rewritten as:

$$E_o(X_1) \geq E_o(X_2) \quad (13)$$

where,

$$X_1 = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T [P^*(t)]^2 dt$$

$$X_2 = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T [P(t)]^2 dt$$

$$X_3 = X_1 + X_2 - \frac{2}{T} \int_0^T P^*(t)P(t) dt$$

with the MRS $S_1 = X_1 - X_3$ and the MRS $S_2 = X_1 - X_2$.

Substituting from (8) and (9) and computing the conditional expectations,
we have that:

$$E_0[S_1] = E_0[X_1 - X_3]$$

$$= (P_0^2)[e^{(2r+\sigma^2)T} - 1]/[2r + \sigma^2]T$$
and

\[ E_0[S_2] = E_0[X_1 - X_2] \]

\[ = \frac{(P_0)^2 e^{\sigma^2 T}}{2r(2r + \sigma^2)T} \left[ \sigma^2(e^{2rT} - 1) - 2r(1 - e^{-\sigma^2 T}) \right] . \]  

(16)

By inspection of (15) and (16), we confirm the MRS inequalities \( E_0[S_1] \geq 0 \) and \( E_0[S_2] \geq 0 \), and moreover, we see that for \( \sigma^2 > 0 \), they are strict inequalities whose magnitudes grow without bound as the observation period \( T \) becomes large. Unfortunately, the standard deviations of both statistics also grow without bound as the observation period becomes large, and moreover, the rates of growth are at a larger exponential rate than the expected values. Hence, for large \( T \), virtually any realized sample values for \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) are consistent with the ex-ante inequalities (12) and (13).

In noting the upward trend in their series and the prospect for heteroskedasticity, MRS (pp. 685-686) attempt to correct for this possible inefficiency by weighting each observation by the inverse of the market price of the stock. However, such a scaling of the data does not rectify the sampling problem. For example, using their scheme, the new statistic \( S'_2 \), replacing \( S_2 \) in (16) can be written as:

\[ S'_2 = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \left[ \frac{P(t)}{P(t)} \right]^2 dt - \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \left[ \frac{P(t)}{P(t)} \right]^2 dt . \]  

(17)

Again computing expectations, we have that:

\[ E_0[S'_2] = \frac{[e^{\sigma^2 T} - 1]}{\sigma^2 T} - 1 . \]  

(18)
which is positive and growing in magnitude without bound. Again, the standard deviation of $S_2'$ also grows at a larger exponential rate than $E_0[S_2']$.

Because $E_0(S_1) > 0$ and $E_0(S_2) > 0$, it follows that $E_0(X_3)/E_0(X_1) < 1$ and $E_0(X_2)/E_0(X_1) < 1$. A perhaps tempting alternative method to test the inequalities (12) and (13) would be to use the ratios $X_3/X_1$ and $X_2/X_1$ instead of the differences $S_1$ and $S_2$. However, as we now show, unless the real discount rate is considerably larger than the volatility parameter $\sigma^2$, the ex ante expected values of both these ratios produce exactly the reverse of the inequalities for the ratios of their individual expectations.

Define the statistics $Q_1 = X_3/X_1$ and $Q_2 = X_2/X_1$. By substituting from (8), (9), and (14), we can write the expressions for $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ as:

$$Q_1 = 1 + Q_2 - 4r \left\{ \int_0^T \exp\left[ - (r + \mu)(T-t) - \sigma[Z(T)-Z(t)] \right] dt \right\} / [1 - e^{-2rT}] ,$$

and

$$Q_2 = 2r \left\{ \int_0^T \exp\left[ - 2(\mu(T-t) - 2\sigma[Z(T)-Z(t)] \right] dt \right\} / [1 - e^{-2rT}] .$$

Taking expectations and integrating (20), we have that:

$$E_0[Q_2] = 2r[1 - e^{-(2r-3\sigma^2)T}]/[(2r - 3\sigma^2)[1 - e^{-2rT}]] .$$

By inspection of (21), if $2r > 3\sigma^2$, then $E_0[Q_2] + 2r/[2r - 3\sigma^2] > 1$ as $T$ gets large. If $0 < r \leq 3\sigma^2$, then $E_0[Q_2] + \infty$ as $T$ gets large.

Thus, for large $T$, the expectation of the ratio $X_2/X_1$ satisfies exactly
the reverse of the inequality satisfied by the ratio of their expectations \( E_0[X_2]/E_0[X_1] \), and this is the case for all positive parameter values \( r \) and \( \sigma^2 \).

Taking expectations in (19) and substituting from (21), we have that:

\[
E_0[Q_1] = 1 + 2r \left( \frac{1-e^{-(2r-3\sigma^2)T}}{(2r-3\sigma^2)} - \frac{2(1-e^{-(2r-\sigma^2)T})}{(2r-\sigma^2)} \right) / \left(1-e^{-2rT}\right). \tag{22}
\]

From (22), if \( 0 < 2r \leq 3\sigma^2 \), then \( E_0[Q_1] \to \infty \) as \( T \) gets large. For \( 2r > 3\sigma^2 \) and large \( T \), we have that \( E_0[Q_1] \to 1 + 2r(5\sigma^2-2r)/(2r-3\sigma^2)(2r-\sigma^2) \) which only becomes less than one if \( 2r > 5\sigma^2 \). As described in Merton [1980, p. 353, Table 4.8], the average monthly variance rate on the market between 1926 and 1978 was estimated to be 0.003467 which amounts to a \( \sigma^2 = 0.0416 \) in annual units. Hence, an expected annual real rate of return on the market of the order of ten percent would be required to make \( E_0[Q_1] \) satisfy the inequality \( E_0[Q_1] < 1 \). Thus, in addition to being indicative of the sampling problems, the expectation of these ratios are largely consistent with the empirical evidence reported by MRS.

The choice of \( P_0^0(t) \equiv 0 \) as the "naive forecast" in this example, does not explain these findings. If, for example, we chose \( P_0^0(t) = P_0 e^{rt} \), the "true" conditional expected value for both \( P(t) \) and \( P^*(t) \), the large \( T \) results will remain essentially unchanged because the ratios of second central and non-central moments tend to one for both \( P(t) \) and \( P^*(t) \). Indeed, in this case, the MRS inequality just reduces to the original Shiller variance bound defined here in terms of conditional variances and using the "true" ex ante expected values for \( P^*(t) \) and \( P(t) \). For much the
same reason, the selection of almost any naive forecast whose volatility is considerably less than that of stock price is unlikely to change these results. As shown by example in the appendix, the asymptotic distributions for $S_1$ and $S_2$ need not converge even if the naive forecast is unbiased and follows a nonstationary process quite similar to the one posited for stock prices.

The example presented here assumes that the underlying stock pays no interim dividends, and therefore, one might wonder if perhaps this polar case is also pathological with respect to the MRS analysis. Although unable to fully solve the dividend-paying case analytically, I offer the following analysis to suggest that the fundamental sampling problems identified by this example will not be significantly changed.

The MRS analysis appears to be impeccable with respect to bias (i.e., the expected value conditions on their inequalities). The problem is that the standard deviation of their estimate for the noncentral second moments grows at an exponential rate greater than the growth of the expected value of the estimate. Thus, the important characteristic to examine is the relation between the second moment and the square root of the fourth moment of future stock prices. Suppose that the dividend paid is a constant proportion $\rho$ of the current stock price. The noncentral second moment of $P(T)$, given $P(0)$, can be written as $[P(0)]^2 \exp[2(r - \rho + \sigma^2/2)T]$. The square root of the noncentral fourth moment of $P(T)$ can be written as $[P(0)]^2 \exp[(2(r - \rho) + 3 \sigma^2)T]$. Thus, as long as $2r + \sigma^2 > 2\rho$, the expected second moment estimate grows exponentially. However, the ratio of the expected value of the estimate to its standard deviation will for large $T$, always decline according to $\exp[-2\sigma^2T]$, independently of the payout
ratio, \( \rho \). Because the MRS estimates involve simple averages of sums (or integrals) of squared stock prices, it thus seems unlikely that the sampling properties of the estimators for large \( T \) will be significantly affected by appending dividends to the model. To the extent that dividend changes are more sticky than proportional to stock price changes (which as an empirical matter, they seem to be),\(^{14} \) then the model presented here becomes an even better approximation.

In this light and given that Shiller (1981) had already found enormous empirical violations of the central second-moment bounds between actual stock prices and ex-post perfect-foresight prices, it is not altogether surprising to find that the measured non-central second moments of these same two series also exhibit large violations when estimated on the same data set. In that sense, the Mankiw-Romer-Shapiro study provides no important new empirical findings about the magnitudes of stock market volatility. Nevertheless, their study [together with the West (1984) analysis] is central to the controversy over the rational market hypothesis because of its claim to rule out the interpretation of Shiller's empirical findings as simply a rejection of the assumption of a stationary process for dividends and stock prices. As shown here, this claim remains to be proved.

In summary, I believe that when the heat of the controversy dissipates, there will be general agreement that the rejection or acceptance of the rational market hypothesis as a good approximation to real-world stock market

\(^{14} \text{See Marsh and Merton (1985).} \)
behavior will turn on how we model uncertainty. If, in fact, the levels of expected real corporate economic earnings, dividends and discount rates in the future are, \textit{ex-ante}, well-approximated by a long average of the past levels [plus perhaps a largely-deterministic trend], then it is difficult to believe that observed volatilities of stock prices in both the long and not-so-long runs, are based primarily on economic fundamentals. This assertion can be confirmed by simulations using economic models of the nonfinancial sector with stationary processes for the levels of outputs generating the uncertainty.

Thus, if the well-informed view among economists and investors in the 1930-1934 period was that corporate profits and dividends for existing\textsuperscript{15} stockholders would return in the reasonably near future to their historical average levels [plus say a six percent trend], then market prices in that period were not based upon fundamentals. If this were the view, then it is surely difficult to explain on a rational basis why the average standard deviation of stock returns during this period was almost three times the corresponding average for the forty-eight other years between 1926-1978 [cf. Merton (1980, pp. 353-4)]. If once again in the 1962-1966 period, the informed view was that required expected returns and the levels and growth rates of real profits in the future would be the same as in the long past,

\textsuperscript{15} Some investors in 1930-1934 may have believed that there was a significantly changed probability of broad-based nationalization of industry than in the past. Given the substantially increased levels of business and financial leverage, there were perhaps others who saw a different prospect for widespread bankruptices than was the case in the past.
then stock prices were (ex ante) too high. 16

If, as is the standard assumption in finance, the facts are that the future levels of expected real corporate economic earnings, dividends, and discount rates are better approximated by nonstationary stochastic processes, then even the seemingly extreme observations from these periods do not violate the rational market hypothesis.

In light of the empirical evidence on the nonstationarity issue, a pronouncement at this moment that the rational market theory should be discarded from the economic paradigm, can, at best, be described as "premature." However, no matter which way the issue is ultimately resolved, the resolution itself promises to identify fruitful new research paths for both the finance specialists and the general economist. Just as the breakthroughs of more than two decades ago by Lintner, Markowitz, Miller, Modigliani, Samuelson, Sharpe, and Tobin, dramatically changed every aspect of both finance theory and practice, so the rejection of market rationality together with the development of the new theory to supersede it, would, once again, cause a complete revision of the field. If, however, the rationality hypothesis is sustained, then instead of asking the question "Why are stock prices so much more volatile than (measured) consumption, dividends, and replacement costs?, perhaps the general economist will begin to ask questions like, "Why do (measured) consumption, dividends, and replacement costs exhibit so little volatility when compared with rational stock prices?" With this

16 There were, however, some economists and professional investors who apparently believed that the government had finally found both the will and the means to avoid major macroeconomic disruptions from high unemployment, erratic growth rates, and unstable inflation. Their best guesses for the future may have been formulated with less weight on the distant past.
reversed perspective may come the development of refined theories of consumer behavior (based upon intertemporally-dependent preferences, adjustment costs for consumption, the nontradability of human capital, and cognitive misperceptions) that will explain the sluggish changes in aggregate consumption relative to permanent income. They may also see new ways of examining the question of sticky prices that has long been an important issue in the analysis of the business cycle. Because rational speculative prices cannot be sticky, comparisons of the volatilities of such prices with non-speculative prices may provide a useful yardstick for measuring the stickiness of nonspeculative prices and their impact on aggregate economic activity.
APPENDIX

In the text, it was shown that if rational stock prices follow a geometric Brownian motion and if the naive forecast \( P^0(t) = 0 \), then the MRS sample statistics, \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \), will have asymptotic distributions whose dispersions are growing at an exponential rate greater than their expected values. As noted, the choice of a naive forecast which follows a stationary process with an exponential trend does not change this conclusion about the asymptotic distributions. Using the model of the text, we now show that selection of a naive forecast variable which is both unbiased and follows a nonstationary process very much like the rational stock price need not alter this conclusion. Thus, it would appear that conditions under which the MRS statistics will exhibit proper distributional properties for long observation periods are quite sensitive to the choice of the naive forecast variable and therefore, are not robust.

Suppose that the naive forecast is given by \( P^0(t) = \lambda(t)P(t) \) where \( \{\lambda(t)\} \) are independently and identically distributed positive random variables with:

\[
\begin{align*}
E[\lambda(t)] &= 1 \\
\text{Var}[\lambda(t)] &= \delta^2 \\
E[\lambda^3(t)] &= m_3 \\
E[\lambda^4(t)] &= m_4 .
\end{align*}
\]

(A.1)

\( \lambda(t) \) describes the "noise" component of the naive forecast relative to the optimal forecast which by assumption is the stock price, \( P(t) \). It is further assumed that the noise is independent of all stock prices (i.e., \( \lambda(t) \) and
P(s) are independent for all t and s). Therefore, \( E[P^0(t) \mid P(t)] = P(t) \), and hence, \( P^0(t) \) is an unbiased forecast. Because, moreover, the \( \{\lambda(t)\} \) follow a stationary process, the nonstationary part of the process describing the naive forecast is perfectly correlated with the optimal forecast, \( P(t) \).

Substituting for \( P^0(T) \) in (3) and rearranging terms, we can write the continuous-time form for the MRS statistic \( S_1 \) as:

\[
S_1 = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T P(t)[2[1-\lambda(t)]P^*(t) - [1-\lambda^2(t)]P(t)]dt .
\]  

(A.2)

From (A.1) and (A.2), we can write the expectation of \( S_1 \) conditional on the sample path \( \{P(t)\} \), \( \bar{S}_1 \), as

\[
\bar{S}_1 = \frac{\delta^2}{T} \int_0^T [P(t)]^2 dt ,
\]

(A.3)

because \( \lambda(t) \) is independent of both \( \{P(t)\} \) and \( \{P^*(t)\} \). Note: \( \bar{S}_1 \) does not depend on the sample path of \( P^*(t) \). From (A.3) and (10.b), we have that:

\[
E_0[S_1] = \delta^2 P_0^2 [e^{(2r+\sigma^2)T} - 1]/[(2r + \sigma^2)T] ,
\]

(A.4)

which satisfies the MRS strict inequality \( E_0[S_1] > 0 \) provided the naive forecast is not optimal (i.e., \( \delta^2 > 0 \)).

Define the random variable \( Y_1 \equiv [S_1 - \bar{S}_1]^2 \). From (A.2) and (A.3), we write \( Y_1 \) as:
\[
Y_1 = \frac{1}{T^2} \int_0^T \int_0^T P(t)P(s)[2(1-\lambda(t))P^*(t) - [1+\delta^2-\lambda^2(t)]P(t)] 
\]
\[
- \int_0^T \int_0^T [2(1-\lambda(s))P^*(s) - [1+\delta^2-\lambda^2(s)]P(s)] ds dt
\]
\[
(A.5)
\]

Because \( \lambda(t) \) is independent of \( \lambda(s) \) for \( t \neq s \), we have from (A.1) and (A.5) that the expectation of \( Y_1 \), conditional on the sample path \{P(t)\}, \( \bar{Y}_1 \), can be written as:

\[
\bar{Y}_1 = \frac{1}{T^2} \int_0^T P^2(t)[4\delta^2[P^*(t)]^2 + 4[1+\delta^2-\lambda^2]P(t)P^*(t) + [m_4-\lambda^2]P^2(t)] dt
\]
\[
(A.6)
\]

Note that the integrand of (A.6) is always positive. From (8) and (9), we have that, \( k = 2,3,4 \):

\[
E_0\{[P(t)]^k[P^*(t)]^{4-k}\} = [P_0e^{rt}]^4 \exp[6\delta^2 T + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} k(k-7)(T-t)]
\]
\[
(A.7)
\]

Taking expectations in (A.6) and substituting from (A.7), we have that

\[
E_0[Y_1] = E_0[\bar{Y}_1] \text{ grows exponentially as:}
\]

\[
E_0[Y_1] \sim \exp[(4r + 6\delta^2)T]/T^2
\]
\[
(A.8)
\]

Therefore, the standard deviation of the MRS sample statistic \( S_1 \) given by \( \sqrt{E_0[Y_1]} \) grows exponentially according to \( \exp[(2r + 3\delta^2)T]/T \).

By inspection of (A.4), we have that the ratio of \( E_0[S_1] \) to \( \sqrt{E_0[Y_1]} \) declines exponentially at the rate \( -2\delta^2T \). Thus, for large \( T \), virtually any sample result for \( S_1 \) is consistent with the population condition \( E_0[S_1] > 0 \). By a similar analysis, the reader can verify that the same
result obtains for the MRS statistic $S_2$.

In contrasting their tests with the earlier Shiller (1981) analysis, MRS [1985, p. 683] point out that their statistics do not require detrending "...because the 'naive forecast' $P^0_t$ can grow as dividends grow...". On page 684, they further their case for robustness by noting "...that the naive forecast need not be efficient in any sense." The naive forecast analyzed here does not seem to be pathological with respect to the conditions they set forth. Thus, it would appear that the naive forecasts necessary to provide proper asymptotic distributional properties for their statistics are anything but naive.


