THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:
MAX WEBER AND THE MARXIST RESPONSE
by
DAVID JONATHAN ANDREW HELD
B. Sc. (Hons.), Manchester University (England)
1973
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
May 1975
Signature of Author . . . . rP1rc. !t .-...........
Department of Political Science
May 2, 1975
Certified by..........
a Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by..........a......................... ........
Chairman,
Departmental Committee
JUN 4 1975
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:
MAX WEBER AND THE MARXIST RESPONSE
by
David Jonathan Andrew Held
Submitted to the Department of Political Science on May 2, 1975,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Political Science.
It is my purpose in writing this thesis to explore the writings,
especially the methodological works, of Max Weber. My intention
is not only to reconstruct some of the central concerns of Weber's
sociology, epistemology, and methodology, but also to shed light
on the status and character of certain aspects of social theorizing
and of the self-understanding and self-comprehension of theorists.
I will, in particular, be concerned with the presence in Weber's work,
of certain claimed dualisms--the often-perceived cleavages between
fact and value, description and evaluation, subject and object,
science and criticism, and the claimed separation of theory and
practice that follows in their wake. It is my hope, finally, to
examine and explore some of the writings of those who have consis-
tently refused to accept that these dualisms are valid. In this
context we discuss some of the works of George Lukacs, Max Hork-
heimer, and Herbert Marcuse. These issues are claimed to be of
significance to social science, theory, and social scientific prac-
tice. It is, futhermore, contended that they are by no means only
"abstract philosophical" questions of limited academic import.
They also have immanent implications and consequences for the
practice of political and social life.
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first, I attempt
to explore the relation between Weber's sociology, epistemology,
and methodology. It is a discussion which I hope highlights a num-
ber of tensions in his thought which find inadequate attention and
little chance of resolution within the terms of reference that are
set. In the second part, some of the works of Lukacs, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse are examined and discussed. It is in their work, it
is argued, that many of the weaknesses of Weber's epistemology
and methodology are overcome. However, we also find in this over-
coming a further series of questions and issues which have yet to
receive the attention they require.
aThesis Supervisor: Miles Morgan
Title: Assistant Professor of Political Science and Philosophy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................
INTRODUCTION....................... . .......
4
5
PART I. MAX WEBER
THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF WEBER'S
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS . .
SCIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF DISENCHANTMENT:
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE; WEBER'S
DOCTRINE OF VALUE-FREEDOM, "OBJEC-
TIVITY, " AND THE ROLE OF METHOD...
WEBER'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY
AND METHOD . .. a.. .0 .0 . ..a.. .
13
27
89
PART I. THE MARXIST RESPONSE
ON THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE:
THE REFORMULATION OF THE NOTION OF
THEORETICAL TRUTH IN LUKACS,
HORKHEIMER, AND MARCUSE.............158
2
I.
II.
III.
IV.
3V. THE THEORY OF LABOR AS THE
FOUNDATION OF THE UNITY OF THEORY
AND PRACTICE............................195
CONCLUDING REMARKS................... ......... 234
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................... ........... 239
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is all too customary at the beginning of any piece of work--
book, thesis, or otherwise--for a long and lengthy acknowledgment
of all those who have helped to create and make possible the project
that proceeds it. Often such acknowledgments make endless fine dis-
tinctions between those to whom the author is "endlessly, " or "enor-
mously," or "very greatly, " or "greatly, "or "less than greatly"
indebted. In the case of this work, my degree of debt is so high to
all those that have, in one way or another, affected me and it, that
such distinctions cannot be made. My thanks to Hayward Alker,
Dovianna Barrens, Paul Breines, Margaret Cerullo, Josh Cohen,
Jeff and Lena Coulter, the Helds, Jeff Herf, Russel Jacoby, Tom
Kelley, Dave Knights, Joel Kreiger, Tom McCarthy, Lorenzo Morris,
and Joseph Prabhu.
I must make but four exceptions. Mickey Morgan, my "advisor,"
has provided advice that transcends all conceptions of his formal role.
He has not only provided aid but much of the direction for this thesis
and has shown seemingly endless patience in face of my dogged pre-
occupations. To Larry Simon and Jim Schmidt a very specal thanks
for their friendship and continous help, advice, contributions, etc.
(to Larry Simon this extends to the very wording of this page itself!).
I would also like to thank the Kennedy Memorial Trust for having
created the time (i. e. , the funds) for this project.
The content, I alone, obviously, am responsible for.
4
INTRODUCTION
It is my purpose in writing this thesis to explore the writings,
especially the methodological works, of Max Weber. 1 My inten-
tion is not only to reconstruct some of the central concerns of
Weber's sociology, epistemology, and methodology, but also to
shed light on the status and character of certain aspects of social
theorizing and of the self-understanding and self-:comprehension of
theorists. I will, in particular, be concerned with the presence in
Weber's work, of certain claimed dualisms: the often perceived
cleavages between fact and value, description and evaluation, sub-
ject and object, science and criticism, and the claimed separation
of theory and practice that follows in their wake. It is my hope,
finally, to examine and explore some of the writings of those who
have consistently refused to accept that these dualisms are valid.
In this context we discuss some of the works of Georg Lukacs, Max
Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. These issues are claimed to
be of significance to social science, theory, and social scientific
practice. It is, furthermore, contended that they are by no means
only "abstract philosophical" questions of limited academic import.
They also have immanent implications and consequences for the
practice of political and social life.
The recent concern in Anglo-American social science with
5
6the state and status of theory and with epistemological questions
has certain parallels with the beginnings of a Methodenstreit, that
engulfed many German thinkers at the turn of the century2 and
which appears equally alive and intensive on the Continent today.
The debate cannot be simply understood as a scholastic, academic
concern or as has been frequently charged by some members of
the Left (concerned with radical "intellectuals' " involvement in
theory only, etc.) to be for those who suffer the singular inability
to generate a practical imperative which, in turn, is argued to
reflect the dominant class's and institution's capacity for incorpora-
tion. 3 Nor should the debate be seen, as has been charged by some
of those who rest "comfortably" in certain philosophical camps, as
Sir Karl Popper put it, reflecting on the Frankfurt School's con-
tribution, "mumbo-jumbo . . . opium for the intellectuals.1"4
Rather, it is argued here, that the debate crucially reflects its
historical and social setting and the continual struggle not only to
define the qualitative nature and interrelation of truth and goodnes s,
theory and practice, i. e. , a sound conception of the "good life,"
but also the struggle for the actualization of that thought.
I am here less concerned with the issues as expressed and
manifest in the most contemporary of debates, but rather more con-
cerned with the classical works of Weber, Lukacs, and certain mem-
bers of the Frankfurt School. I chose these works for the center of
7this thesis partially because Weber's work has been and continues
to be of central importance to the shaping of contemporary social
science, and partially because in his work we find detailed and impor-
tant statements that explicitly place the dualisms, we mentioned
above, at the heart of sociology, epistemology, and methodology.
The Marxists I have chosen to discuss take, of course, fundamentally
opposing views to those of Weber. This opposition is frequently
expressed explicitly. It is our contention that this latter group of
writers provide more systematic and greater insight into the ques-
tions we explore, but by no means leave behind them theoretical
clarity and a body of "validity claims" and "truths, " etc. that can
be simply assumed and accepted.
The necessity to inquire into the relation between theory and
practice, within the Marxist tradition, also finds refreshed motiva-
tion in light of the "course of twentieth century history. " For these
decades have seen the degeneration of the Russian Revolution into
Stalinism, the critique of political economy into Diamat with its
ideological mystification and justification of centralized party
politics, technocratic social management and worse. Likewise,
the (to date) failure of revolution in the West; the absence of mass
revolutionary class consciousness; and a Marxist theory which was
and is frequently either a. deterministic, objectivistic science
8(consequentially legitimating the diremption of "revolutionary
5
practice" from the formation of class consciousness), or a pessi-
mistic cultural critique (which did less to integrate Marxist political
economy and socio-cultural, psychological dimensions than replac-e
the former with the latter), 6 have all added to the urgency to re-
examine the relationship between theory and practice. Above all,
capitalist society has not remained in equilibrium. State inter-
vention grows; the market is supported and replaced; attempts are
made increasingly to "organize" capitalism; and instrumental
reason and bureaucracy seemingly ever expand and depoliticize the
"public sphere."
In light of these developments it might be noted that Weber's
sociological insights seem all the more remarkable. In an extra-
ordinary passage he wrote:
Joined to the dead machine, bureaucratic organization
is at work to erect the shell of that future bondage to
which one day men will perhaps be forced to submit in
impotence, as once the fellahs in the ancient Egyptian
state--if a purely, technically good, that is, rational
bureaucratic administration and maintenance is the
last and only value which is to decide on the manner in
which their affairs are directed.7
Weber's works and interpretations of modern times are also as
great a challenge today, to the Marxist tradition, as they ever were.
%V * * * * *
9The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first, I attempt
to explore the relation between Weber's sociology, epistemology,
and methodology. It is a discussion which I hope highlights a num-
ber of tensions in his thought which find inadequate attention and
little chance of resolution within the terms of reference that are
set. In the second part, some of the works of Lukacs, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse are examined and discussed. It is in their work, it
is argued, that many of the weaknesses of Weber's epistemology
and methodology are overcome. However, we also find in this over-
coming a further series of questions and issues which have yet to
receive the attention they require.
We begin with an introduction to the nature of our concern with
Weber's work.
NOTES
1 The works of most immediate concern are: (1) Max Weber,
The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. E. A. Shils
and H. A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949) (which will be
referred to below as M. S. S.); (2) Max Weber, The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization, trans. and ed. T. Parsons (New York:
The Free Press, 1969) (which will be referred to below as T. S. E. 0.);
(3) Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and
ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1972) (to be referred to below as From Max Weber); (4)
Max Weber, Economy and Society, 3 vols., ed., revised, and
partially trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York: Bedminster
Press, 1968).
2 The Methodenstreit which engaged many German thinkers
at the turn of the century is briefly discussed in chap. 3.
3 See, for example, Gtiran Therborn, "Habermas: A New
Eclectic," New Left Review 67 (May/June 1971).
4The remarks are from a British Broadcasting Corporation
discussion on the Frankfurt School, transmission (27 January
1974), 17. 35-18. 25.
5 This may take a variety of forms from the polar opposites
of vanguard activism to quietism.
6
For a developed example of this view and criticism, see
P. Mattick, "The Limits of Integration, " in The Critical Spirit;
Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, ed. K. Wolff and B. Moore
(Boston: Beacon, 1968).
7 Max Weber, Gesanrnelte Politische Schriften, p. 151,
quoted in H. Marcuse, Negations, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon, 1969), p. 223.
10
Ni w 
-
No
CHAPTER I
THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF WEBER'S
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS
Introduction
A full study and critique of Weber's work would have to explore
the interrelation of his intellectual and political writings and the
dependence of many of his ideas on the epoch in which he lived.
Ideally such a study would embrace Satre's "progressive-regressive"
method to uncover the interconnections between Weber's work, life,
family, class, and general historical context. Such a study would
serve to highlight at length the relationship of epistemology and
methodology to social life, the relationship between theory and
practice. In this work we attempt to explore some of these inter-
connections.
We particularly hope to draw out the immanent connections
between Weber's methodological writings and his general interpre-
tation of the social tendencies of his times, and a particular set of
values, rationality, and practice that underpins his theory. We
would also like to suggest the relationships of that which his work
subsumes to the social life of an epoch and practice of a particular
13
14
class. The latter task is, unfortunately, mainly left to suggestion.
It is here a secondary task. To fulfill it, would require a massive
study that obviously cannot be carried through within the boundaries
of this thesis. In one of the best studies of Weber's life in Germany
at the turn of the century, R. Mitzman has attempted to do this. In
The Iron Cage, Mitzman persuasively argues that:
a. . . . generational conflict, aggravated both by the
special tensions of his family and the suffocating
character of bourgeois society in Imperial Germany
did, indeed, underlie Weber's scholarly and politi-
cal perceptions;
b. that his formulation of liberal-imperialist ideology
reflects a stage both in his personal evolution and
in the psycho-social development of the German
bourgeois; and
c. that the "heroic pessimism" of the late Weber was
in large measure a result of his shattering conflict
with his father . . . which . . . reveals in contour s
the underlying conflict . . . in fin de si'ecle Germany
and that a similar hopelessness as to any conceivable
alteration of the merciless course of rationalization
and bureaucratization was)the source of a great
deal of the estrangement and voluntarist irrationalism
of the age. 2
However, Mitzman's work has certain fundamental weaknesses,
the most important of which is his option for the methodology of
Psycho-History. 3
In this study we hope to take up a number of the issues suggested
by our second task. But we will only have time to note a few critical
points and establish a direction for further investigation.
15
We begin this study with an exploration of the empirical basis
of Weber's epistemological presuppositions.
It will be seen that we cannot separate an interpretation of
Weber's methodology from his general interpretation of the social
tendencies in development during his life and times. 4 As Ltwith
has emphasized, Weber's methodological standpoint can only be
comprehended adequately in close analysis and appreciation of his
other works, and more particularly, his general interpretation of
the rise of modern capitalism. 5 In fact, the perceived hopelessness
of the course of rationalization, with its resulting "disenchantment,"
ma be conceived, as J. Cohen has argued, to be "the foundation
for his epistemological presuppositions. ",6 It is worth, for a
moment, exploring the concept of rationalization.
In Economy and Society Weber attempts to recount the history
of rationalization in the formal theory of rationality and domination,
the two central themes. Through them the concept of industrial
capitalism becomes concretized. Economy and Society is in large
part a major effort to determine the connections between rationality,
domination, and capitalism. Marcuse has summarized the connec-
tion in its most general form:
. . . the specifically Western idea of reason realizes
itself in a system of material and intellectual culture
(economy, technology, "conduct of life, " science,
art) that develops to the full in industrail capitalism,
16
and this system tends toward a specific type
of domination which becomes the fate of the
contemporary period: total bureaucracy. 7
The essential concept is Western Rationality.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber
sets out to discuss and account for the emergent instrumentalism
(the Spirit) of capitalism and examine the part which religious ideas
of ascetic Protestantism played in accounting for an ethos, he
believed, to be peculiar to the West. Weber points to the existence of
capitalist economic and commercial organizations before the Reforma-
tion in order to refute any theory that attempted to hold that the
political-economic institutions of capitalism "were a result of the
Reformation." He dismisses such a view as a "foolish and doctrinaire
thesis.1"8 He argues instead that he regards "the influence of
economic development on the fate of religious ideas to be very
important'9 and declares that any further study of The Protes-
tant Ethic would demonstrate "how Protestant asceticism was in
turn influenced in its development and character by the totality of
social conditions, especially economic.1"10 The thesis has to be
seen in context of his other works. .
Weber discusses a number of areas of social and economic life
in which elements of rationalization had advanced prior to the out-
growth of modern capitalism. These early developments (e. g. , the
17
emergence and formation of "rational jurisprudence" in Roman
Law) are seen as having created an increasing capacity for, and
having a facilitating role in, the rise of capitalism. "The importance
of Calvinism and other branches of ascetic Protestantism, as Weber
makes clear in The Protestant Ethic, " is, as A. Giddens has pointed
out, "not that it was a 'cause' of the rise of modern capitalism, but
that it provided an irrational impetus to the disciplined pursuit of
monetary gain in a specified 'calling--and thereby laid the way open
to the further spread of distractive types of rationalization of activity
stimulated by the vicarious expansion of capitalism. "11,12 The
ascetic religious ethic sanctioned hard work, resignation to one's
"lot in life"; the division of labor, etc.; integral components of liberal
and organized capitalism. What were the elements of rationalization?
The term is a complex one and is used to refer to a number
of sets of related phenomena. (1) There is a growth in mathemati-
zation, as Marcuse pointed out, of "experience and knowledge"; the
shaping of all scientific practice according to the model of the natural
sciences and the extension of (scientific) rationality to "the conduct
of life itself. " This in turn must be seen as part of a specific feature
of the secularization of the modern world which Weber often terms
the intellectualization (i. e. , demystification and demagicfication)
and/or as the disenchantment of the world. (The respective
18
characterizations reflect Weber's ambivalence to the program of
the Western, modern "spirit. ") (2) There is "the growth of
rationality in the sense of 'the methodological attainment of attain-
ment of a definitely given and practical end by the use of an increas-
ingly precise calculation of adequate means'.1"13 The expansion of
capitalism presides over the final transformation of social relation-
ship to the form which approximates to the ideal-type of Zweck-
rationalittit, in which a person rationally calculates the conse-
quences that follow from the choice (from a range) of means to
accomplish a given end. 14 (3) There is "the growth of rationality
in the sense of the formation of 'ethics that are systematicly and
unambiguously oriented to fixed goals'. "115
The rationalization of mythical, religious, or metaphysical
interpretations of reality takes numerous different forms. Weber
shows in his studies of China and India that the rationalization of
ancient and medieval world views may follow one or a combination
of the three elements above and may extend to a varying degree
through modes of social relationships and the orientation of social
conduct; modes of legitimacy, domination, and authority; classes
and status groups and the respective institutionalized universes of
symbolic meaning. Weber, furthermore, sought to demonstrate
that each of these three aspects of rationalization was promoted
19
much further by capitalism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
discuss and trace the history of rationalization in all these forms. 16
It is, however, an important task of this work to show how this
complex concept provides an empirical basis and justification for
his epistemological presuppositions. But before we can discuss
this relationship and indeed explicate what these epistemological
presuppositions are, a number of additional points need to be noted.
In Parsons' highly influential discussion of Weber the suggestion
is made that the process of rationalization can best be described as
a law and, in fact, Parsons goes on to compare the process with the
second Law of Thermodynamics. 17 The process is not best under-
stood in this light. For Weber, rationalization, as the extension of
formal rationality, is not a unilinear law of all-embracing proportion.
Rather, the extension of formal rationality is seen to be dependent
on the outcome of conflicts with substantive rationality (which "can-
not be measured in terms of formal calculation alone, but also
involves a relation to the absolute values or to the content of the
particular ends to which it is oriented. . . . In principle, there is
an indefinite number of possible standards of value which are
'rational' in this sense"). 18 Often an advance of formal rationality
is itself an unintended consequence of action oriented to substantive
values. The extension of formal rationality results also, it is argued,
20
in the generation of unintended irrationalities of a formal and sub-
stantive kind. "In short, " as J. Cohen puts it, "the process of
rationalization can be seen as a dynamic between formal and sub-
stantive rationality. ,"19
Formal rationality is the organization and orientation of
action to formal laws, rules, and norms; it was the expression of
contemporary reason, both the result and impetus to an impersonal,
bureaucratic order, an order of precise calculation, of objective
scientific rationality. But with the increasingly impartial, "fair,"
and modern world we continually risk the "dialectic of the enlighten-
ment. "20 The extension of formal rationality to "the conduct of life"
becomes a concern for Weber also as a "form of domination"; means
becoming ends, social rules becoming reified objectifications
commanding directions, the market becoming a key mechanism in
the orientation of conduct and planning. Rationalization expressed
as formal rationality spins off its own dynamic and depersonalizes
both history and social structure. The very products of human
activity are seen as having a strong tendency to be apprehended
"as if they were something other than human products--such as
facts of nature, results of cosmic law . . . "21 Impersonal forces
threaten the role of subjectivity. "It is precisely here,1" I. Cohen
has suggested, "that substantive rationality or action oriented to the
20
in the generation of unintended irrationalities of a formal and sub-
stantive kind. "In short, " as J. Cohen puts it, "the process of
rationalization can be seen as a dynamic between formal and sub-
stantive rationality. "119
Formal rationality is the organization and orientation of
action to formal laws, rules, and norms; it was the expression of
contemporary reason, both the result and impetus to an impersonal,
bureaucratic order, an order of precise calculation, of objective
scientific rationality. But with the increasingly impartial, "fair,"
and modern world we continually risk the "dialectic of the enlighten-
ment. "20 The extension of formal rationality to "the conduct of life"
becomes a concern for Weber also as a "form of domination"; means
becoming ends, social rules becoming reified objectifications
commanding directions, the market becoming a key mechanism in
the orientation of conduct and planning. Rationalization expressed
as formal rationality spins off its own dynamic and depersonalizes
both history and social structure. The very products of human
activity are seen as having a strong tendency to be apprehended
"as if they were something other than human products--such as
facts of nature, results of cosmic law . . .1"21 Impersonal forces
threaten the role of subjectivity. "It is precisely here,1" J. Cohen
has suggested, "that substantive rationality or action oriented to the
21
particular, qualitative needs of man as the ultimate value, inter-
venes and presents tensions and limits to the process of rationaliza-
tion. 3,22 In Cohen's view, "as formal rationality advances, it
evokes counterforces all along the way.1"23 This, indeed, seems
to a large extent to be Weber's position. But there is an important
point that has not yet been made that should be stressed. Weber was
increasingly pessimistic and doubtful that action oriented to sub-
stantive issues could limit the process of formal rationalization in
the modern era. 24 If such substantively oriented action was absent
or of insufficient strength to provide such a limit, Weber thought
this should not be the case and a limit to formal rationality rigorously
defended (as the theme of Politics as a Vocation suggests). Z5 How
he sought to protect a realm of values we take up later.
Weber's ambivalence to this process and the historical exten-
sion of formal rationality has already been mentioned briefly. It is
crucial, nonetheless, according to him, to realize that the resultant
"disenchantment" acts as a critique of traditional world views
(e. g., Christianity). This means:
principally (that there are no mysterious
incalculable forces that come into play, but
rather that one can, in principle, master all
things by calculation. This means that the world
is disenchanted. One need no longer have
recourse to magical means in order to master
or implore the spirits, as did the savage for
whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical
22
means and calculations perform the service.
This is a ove all what intellectualization
means.
The basis for the attribution of ultimate meaning and value-univer-
salism by world views is undermined. In the modern, rational,
disenchanted world there is no simple reconcilitation for "ultimately
possible attitudes towards life . . . their 'struggle' can never be
brought to a final conclusion. "27
The rationale of action under capitalism, given the pervasive-
ness of Zweckrationalitat, can only be based on value-judgments and
preferences, on individually chosen values, based in turn on an
"ethic of responsibility. " The only account that we can give of our
ultimate values is through a description of the processes whereby
we choose them; the only justification of our values lies in the
coherence and clarity of our choice. The coherence of our substan-
tive rationality, our values and upheld goals was open, in Weber's
view, to critical tests in discourse. An ethic of responsibility was
based on the rational, scientific consideration and calculation of
possible consequences and necessary means in the pursuit of an
end, goal, or action. 28 But, the choice between values, in the last
instaknce, was the unique prerogative of the individual. "It is the respon-
sibilityof each personto judge and decide." There is no ultimate justifi-
cation, but the calculated choice of an individual to "which of the warring
23
gods we should serve. "29 The struggle to choose amongst gods is,
ultimately, an irrational one.
Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible
attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and
hence their struggle can never be brought to
a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to
make a decisive choice. 30
Our decision is, in the last analysis, based on faith: "only on the
assumption of belief in the validity of our values is the attempt to
espouse value-judgements meaningful. However, to judge the
validity of such values is a matter of faith." 31 This is, as Weber
put it, "the fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of know-
ledge. . . ." An account of ultimate meaning can no longer be
grounded. There are no longer world-views which can have any
ultimate basis to command intersubjective agreement.
Weber never "distanced" himself from this position. It is
a position commensurate with the unfolding of Western Rationality.
It is a position, as we shall see, that also subsumed and sanctioned
this rationality and an individualistic, atomistic ontology.
NOTES
1 Cf. J. P. Satre, Search for a Method (New York: Vintage
Books, 1967). We note a few details of this method in note 3 below.
a
PR. Mitzman, The Iron Cage (New York: Grosset and Dun-
lop, 1971), p. 12.
3 Mitzman's work is ill balanced. For Satre, in Search for
a Method, comprehension of any social phenomenon entails a double
movement and consists in clarifying the more profound structures
by means of the originality of the established fact in order to be
able in turn to determine this originality by the fundamental struc-
tures. In understanding Madame Bovary, for example, Satre
demands that an analysis both steps back through more and more
abstract planes of signification, through an analysis of Flaubert's
life, family, and class. The first movement seeks to locate the
topic of study, the second to reconstruct and explain Flaubert's
praxis--why in particular he chose to write Madame Bovary. Mitz-
man's work is particularly weak in its understanding of fundamental
structures. Much of the relevant material lies undeveloped in the
text but if recast within, for example, the framework above, its
explicitly psycho-historical bias might usefully be corrected. For
a theoretically balanced view of the use and insights psychotheory
can provide in historical works, see W. Reich, Sexpol (New York:
Vintage Books, 1972), pp. 59-74.
4For a useful restatement and elaboration of this theme, see
A. Giddens, Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber
(London: Macmillan, 1972).
5 K. Ldwith, "Max Weber und Karl Marx, " Archiv ftir
Sozialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik 67 (1932).
J. Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination,"
Telos (Winter 1972), p. 66.
7 H. Marcuse, "Industrialization and Capitalism in Max
Weber,1" in Negations, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,
1969), p. 203.
8 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism (London: Unwin University Books, 1971), p. 91.
24
25
9 Tbid.p, . 277.
1%bid., p. 183.
1Giddens, Politics and Sociology, p. 45.
12
For an excellent discussion of Weber's views on the rela-
tionship between Protestantism and Capitalism, see J. Eldridge,
Max Weber (London: Nelson, 1972), pp. 33-53.
t 3 Giddens, Politics and Sociology, p. 44, and quoting Weber,
in From Max Weber, pp. 293-94 (amended translation).
14We discuss the concept of Zweckrationalitut, and the conse-
quences of such rationality, in greater detail in the following chapter.
5 Giddens, Politics and Sociology, p. 44.
1 6 Eldridge, Max Weber, pp. 53-70.
7 T. Parsons, Structure of Action (New York: Free Press,
1937).
1 8 Weber, T. S. E. O., pp. 185-86.
1 9 Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination,," p. 66.
2 0 See M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adono, Dialectics of the
Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972).
21
P. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of
Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 106.
2 2 Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination, " p. 66.
2 Ibid. , p. 65.
2 4 For a summary of his views, cf. A. Giddens, Capitalism
and the Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx,
Durkheim, and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), chap. 12. Also note Weber's critique of socialism.
See, for example, Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, pp.85-88,
100-7, 110-li 224-26, and "Politics as a Vocation, in Weber,
From Max Weber, pp. 100,. 12-.
26
2 5 Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," From Max Weber,
pp. 77-129.
2 6 Weber, "Science as a Vocation," From Max Weber, p. 139.
2 7 Ibid., p. 152.
2 8 The status of Weber's reflections on ethics will be con-
sidered at length in the following chapter.
2 9 Weber, "Science as a Vocation, " From Max Weber,
pp. 152-53.
3 0 Ibid., p. 152.
3 1 Weber, "Objectivity in the Social Sciences,1" M.S.S., p. 55.
I am indebted to L. Simon for pointing out this quotation to me.
CHAPTER II
SCIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF DISENCHANTMENT:
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE; WEBER'S
DOCTRINE OF VALUE-FREEDOM, OBJECTIVITY,
AND THE ROLE OF METHOD
The process of rationalization is then, an agent in the demysti-
fication of the social world. With and because of disenchantment,
the undermining of the legitimatizing efficacy of cultural traditions,
the central questions of men's collective existence and of individual
life history no longer found or could find an all-embracing world-
view with systematic answers, providing a coherent and cohesive
social identity. "Now,"'' and as a result, Weber argued, "as soon
as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in
immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity
of successively and coexisently emerging and disappearing events,
both 'within' and 'outside' ourselves." To those who have eaten
of the tree of knowledge, reality no longer appears with the cohesion
of one constituted by myth, religion, and metaphysical world-views,
but as a totality "in bewegung''--a "heterogeneous flux."''
For Weber, the consequences of disenchantment were, as we
shall see, multifarious. Of these and of primary importance, was
27
28
that historical reality became conceived in identical terms to those
which Kant had conceptualized natural reality. For Weber, his-
tory was, then, a cultural manifold of infinite richness; for Kant,
natural reality was a sensuous manifold. 2 The "absolute infinitude"
of this reality, this multiplicity, "is to remain undiminished, "1 for
Weber, "even when our attention is focused on a single 'object, '
for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously
attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components
of this 'individual phenomenon' to say nothing of explaining it
3
causally. " Causal analysis evinces the same character; "an
exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomenon in its
full reality is not only practically impossible--it is simply non-
sense. "4 How then can social science embrace reality?
Since reality is unknowable in its infinity, the "object" of
investigation is delineated and constituted by the scientific investi-
gator. For Weber, all knowledge is a result of constitution; all
cognition and rationality are to be located on the side of the knower.
The scientific investigator proceeds according to his or her own
individual "values" and cognitive interests. The knowledge generated
by scientific practice is in consequence seen to be partial and one-
sided. But having said this, Weber, nevertheless, claims "objectivity"
for the social sciences and scientific "truths"f"proofs'" as value-
29
free. What is the nature of his argument? How can we conceptua-
lize Weber's position?
The core of Weber's discussion of the nature of "objectivity"
consists in the attempt to clarify the "logical relationships" between
scientific and value judgments. The discussion revolves around
their incompatibility and differences. For Weber, this-most
definitely does not imply an attitude of "moral indifference"; such
an attitute "has no connections with scientific 'objectivity'. "5 (The
authority of science, in Weber's view, as we shall see, rests on an
explicit commitment.) It does, however, imply a complex attitude
that pivots on what he calls "value-orientations" and rational method
(that guarantees the "objectivity" of scientific results). The under-
pinning assumptions of this view, and the view itself, need careful
explication and analysis.
According to Weber, "The type of social science in which we
are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality Wirklich-
6
keitswissenschaft]"6 and our aim is to:
a. . . . understand the characteristic uniqueness of social
reality, the relationships and the cultural significance
of individual events and phenomena; and
b. . . . to understand the causes of these events2 being
historically so and not otherwise. 7
Since social and cultural reality is infinite, the question arises:
how can we know and conceptualize a part of this reality?
30
The number and type of causes which have
influenced any given event are always infinite
and there is nothing in the things themselves to
set some of them apart as alone meriting
attention. A chaos of "existential judgements"
about countless individual events would be the
only result of a serious attempt to analyze
reality "without presuppositions. " And even
this result is only seemingly possible, since
every single perception discloses on closer
examination an infinite number of constituent
perceptions which can never be exhaustively
expressed in a judgement. Order is brought
into this chaos only on the condition that in every
case only a part of concrete reality is interesting
and significant to us, because only it is related
to the cultural values with which we approach
reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely
complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which
which we attribute a general cultural significance--
are therefore worthwhile knowing.d8* (Emphasis
added in last sentence.)
*Weber's discussion of the "cultural significance" criterion
for problem selection (cf. M. S. S., pp. 74-774) is ambiguous.
Parsons argues that Weber insisted on the very great importance
of the cultural significance of a problem for the values of the time
in determining the directions of the interest of the investigator.
M. Morgan, on the other hand, has pointed out that a careful reading
of the texts reveals several inconsistencies in Weber's usage of the
terms. It is unclear by whose estimation a problem is to be regarded
as "culturally significant": the investigator's, or the society's
being studied, or people's in different groups in a given society or
which culture's "significance" is to be used (even given that all
"cultures" take the phenomenon to be "significant" in some way or
another)? Broadly, Weber's remarks on the interest of the investi-
gator indicate the social scientists' sense of "significance" is
central, and his remarks on Verstehen, which we discuss at
length in the following chapter, indicate the subject's sense of
"significance" is the most important.
31
Given the nature of reality we cannot, Weber argues, give an
exhaustive description or causal explanation. Weber assumed that
a true picture of concrete reality was impossible and that no indi-
vidual or collective scientific enterprise could furnish an "absolutely-
'objective', "11 or authentic "copy of reality. " Saloman, reflecting
on such statements, has correctly observed that for Weber "the
utmost that can be accomplished by such sciences, either in the
historical or the social disciplines, is, through reasoned thought,
to bring order into the world of reality, which is in a state of cease-
less flux. The principles of classification by which this order is
to be achieved, . . . must be imposed by the scientist himself. "110
Weber's methodological standpoint consequentially hinges upon
the establishment of certain dichotomies; between reality as infinite
and science as finite; between subjectivity in science and objectivity
in science; and between "rationality" and "irrationality. "
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge
rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given
reality according to categories which are subjective
in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the
presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on
the presupposition of the value of those truths which
empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. . . .
But these data can never become the foundation for
the empirically impossible proof of the validity of
the evaluative ideas. The belief which we all have
in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity
of ultimate and final values, in which the meaning
of our existence is rooted, is not incompatible with
the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints,
from which empirical reality gets its significance.
Both these views are, on the contrary, in harmony
with each other. Life with its irrational reality 11
and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. "
We need to ask more about how these dichotomies were established.
Central to any attempt to explore the polarities Weber estab-
lished is an understanding of the distinction between value-judgments
and value-orientations.* It is important to emphasize that Weber's
notion of value-freedom was concerned explicitly with the relation-
ship of science to value-judgments. As distinct from a value-
orientation, a value-judgment is used to evaluate an object, to express
preference, approval, or dislike, etc. Such judgments are not in
any way part of science.
"By 'value-judgements' are to be understood, where nothing
else is implied or expressly stated, practical evaluations of the
unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to
our influence. "12 And, as Weber states: "The social sciences,
which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presume
to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice, and they
It should be noted that Weber rarely, if ever, made (detailed)
arguments for the positions we are attempting to summarize in his
name. Rather, for example, The Methodology of the Social Sciences
reads like a series of position statements.
33
should not create the impression that they can do so. 1,13 In fact,
the position that he seeks to sustain in "The Meaning of 'Ethical
Neutrality'1"14 and elsewhere, is that if scientific methodologies,
theories, and validity claims neither embrace nor imply value-
4udgments, they are then value -free.
Weber's position on value-freedom, it can be argued, 15 arose
as a response to two factors. Firstly, he sought to protect science
from "the present political situation. " "Everyone knows . . .
that . . . vital questions which are of decisive politidal significance
are permanently banned from university discussion, " and in view
of that fact " . . . it seems to me to be only in accord with the
dignity of a representative of science to be silent as well about such
value-problems as he is allowed to treat." 16 Secondly, he sought
to protect "the realm of values" from the increasing encroach-
ment of rationalization. Hence his views on the state, 17his
18
critique of those that viewed the state as a value in itself and his
famous stress on charismatic leadership and "politics as a vocation."' 9
With such distinctions Weber attempted to establish an enclave for
science and an enclave for value-judgments. Such an attempt
reflects Weber's anxiety to provide a limit to the rationalization of
everyday life and yet to preserve the benefits of "the fruit of the
tree of knowledge. "
34
The discussion of value-freedom, Weber makes clear, pre-
supposes the crucial questions about the nature of "objectivity"
itself.
When we distinguished in principle between "value-
judgments: and "empirical knowledge, " we pre-
supposed the existence of an unconditionally valid
type of knowledge in the social sciences, . i. e., the
analytical ordering of empirical social reality.
This presuppostion now becomes our problem in
the sense that we must discuss the meaning of
objectively "valid" truth in the social sciences.
The genuineness of the problem is apparaent to
anyone who is aware of the conflict about methods,
"fundamental concepts" and presuppositions, the
incessant shift of "viewpoints, " and the continuous
redefinition of "concepts" and who sees that the
theoretical and historical modes of analysis are
still se arated by an apparently unbridgeable
gap. 1"2
Weber's famous claim that social scientific knowledge is constituted
with reference to value has already been noted. 21 At a preliminary
level the influence of values or presuppositions ("value-orientations")
is not only not denied but seen as the very principle that makes
"objectivity" possible in the first place (and prevents "a chaos .
of judgements"). As with the Heidelberg school of Neo-Kantians,
the "theoretical relation to values," as Rickert puts it, "rather
than interfering with the acquisition of objective knowledge, becomes
the active subjective precondition which allows us to acquire objec-
tive historical knowledge. It allows us to detach from historical
reality . . . (an infinite richness) . . . , a definite object.1"22
35
This is a key part of Weber's position. If historical and social
reality is best characterized as "nothing more" than an infinitely
detailed manifold there can be (a) not only no objective analysis
of it but also (b) no most profitable starting point from which we
might best begin an examination and investigation of social
phenomena.
There is no absolutely "objective analysis of
culture . . . of social phenomena independent
of special and "one-sided" viewpoints accord-
ing to which- -expressly or tacitly, consciously
or unconsciously- -they are selected, analyzed
and organized for expository purposes. 23
As J. Cohen observed, "Rationalization and disenchantment
result in the fragmentation of the knower into a one-sided
specialist and in the fragmentation of knowledge into separate
partial systems constituted according to one-sided viewpoints."2 4
Thus the study of social phenomena presupposes value-
orientations and the work of the social and/or historical investi-
gator cannot be conceived independent of them. Indeed, the very
naming of a phenomenal object as a cultural or socio-economic
object or event, reveals the interplay of values which cannot be
taken as a given. "The quality of an event as a 'socio-economic'
event is not something which it possesses 'objectively'." It is rather
conditioned by the orientation of our cognitive interest, as it arises from the
36
specific cultural significance which we attribute to the particular
event in a given case. 1"25 The concept of culture is then, for
example, a "value -concept." 26 Therefore, the facts we select
for study depend also on "a small portion of existing concrete
reality . . . coloured by our value-conditioned interest and it alone
is significant to us."27 Likewise, ". . . the extent or depth to
which . . . the . . . investigation attempts to penetrate into the
infinite causal web . . . is . . . determined by the evaluative ideas
which dominate the investigator and his age.1" For Weber, the
explication of value-orientations serves to locate- -individually,
socially, and historically--the human sciences. It is a thesis that
attempts to take seriously the relativity of the investigator's "pre-
supposition"; the recognition that detachment of an "object" for
investigation (from the "cultural manifold") speaks of the investi-
gator, not of the object in-itself; the recognition that "the stream
of immeasurable events" that "flows unendingly toward eternity"2 9
freezes science in its youth;30 the recognition that "every science,
every single descriptive history, operates with the conceptual stock
in trade of its time. ",31 For Weber, there was a potentially inex-
haustible number of alternative ways to describe, analyze, and
account for social reality. The result is an expectation and tolerance
of a relativism in regard to theory (which is grounded in his
37
relativism in regard to value--the "result" of a rationalized and
disenchanted world).
,A- r 11% r r
Weber's view of value-relativism, it should be noted, does
not imply that "social phenomena" or "cultural objects" are
appraised according to some schema of values. The history of art,
he states, must be distinguished from an aesthetically evaluative
approach. 32 Rather, it can be argued, the thesis of value-relativism
attempts to distinguish the appraisal of objects by value schema
from their characterization33 according to their "significance"
or "meaning" within the structure of cultural values of the investi-
gator himself.
This view is not without its tensions. For, firstly, "while
reference to value makes possible objective knowledge of a cultural
or historical object, " as Goddard put it, Weber also wants to hold,
as we have seen, that "knowledge is condemned to remain incomplete.
The criterion of the real ultimately renders the real unknowable as
to its intrinsic or true nature or structure, or its objective mean-
ing. "34 Secondly, the implicit distinction between appraising and
characterizing establishes a false dichotomy. Weber's attempt to
38
simply characterize an object implies or takes for granted a
further schema of values that restricts social scientific practice,
"by a meta-theoretical assertion," to the "production" of knowledge
which "must have an exclusively descriptive [i. e., a nonevaluative,
nonjudgmental- -D. H.J content." 35 However, this -assertion. hides
an evaluation, a commitment to a particular form of rationality
and, as we shall see, a certain type of practice. These points need
further careful explication.
Weber's position is clarified and better understood in light of
the previous discussion of the empirical basis of Weber's epistemo-
logical presuppositions. With rationalization came "disenchantment"
and the "intellectualization" of the world, the perception of the
world as infinitely complex. This process Weber saw as undermin-
ing the possibility of attaining value-consensus in the constitution
of the world and, consequently, destroying the foundation for a
collectively attained sbujectivity. The end result of this process,
for the context of our discussion, was a multitude of competing
value-claims, value- relativism, no value of which could have a
privileged status. There was, in Weber's view, no ultimate
justification for any value. As a result, which we previously noted,
Weber sought to keep value-judgments outside the realm of science.
Weber's view of the human sciences rests "on an interpretation
39
of developments in the whole of society, on interpretations which,"
if it is to have validity, as Habermas has pointed out, "presupposes
a more pretentious concept of sociology, 36 i. e. , a sociology that
is able to grasp the totality of the social world, of the dominant
trends in it and make fundamental claims about them. 37 Indeed,
as we shall see, Weber's conception of social science is contituted
by his conception of the essence of the modern era, his pessimism
and resignation to what he considered the "fate of our time"--
rationalization, etc. ("the inescapable condition of our historical
situation").
Weber claims scientific practice to be free of the value-
judgments of the social or historical scientist. But this claim hinges
on a belief in the value of scientific truth and it having synonymity
with "objectivity. " A value-judgment is concealed: "The capitulation
to, and acceptance of, the rationalized world as it appears. The
method of formal rationality (use of nonevaluative concepts) is an
expression of Weber's evaluation of the meaning of the rationalized,
meaningless world, of his acceptance and resignation to this rationa-
lization.1"38 In arguing for scientific truth as objectivity, he pre-
supposes the rationality of this society. The fate of the modern
world is the unalterable foundation of "science." Several more
points need to be made.
40
The rigid demarcation Weber draws between value-judgments
and scientific practice has parallels to one of the central tenets of
positivism: that facts and values are separable and that value-
judgments have no cognitive basis. In the positivistically oriented
social sciences, this presupposition has consequences not only on
the epistemological level of self-misunderstanding of science, but
more importantly on the level of social theory and social practice,
e. g., social policy planning. To believe in the dichotomy of "objec-
tive" knowledge (facts) and values is in effect to attempt to divorce
theory from practice. Despite Weber's concern with the interplay
of value-orientations and, as we shall see, his views about the role
of scientific practice, he, nevertheless, ultimately reestablishes
this dichotomy as a fundamental tenet of his view of the sciences.
Weber's position amounts, in effect, to separating theoretical reason
from practical reason and restricting claims to objective, true
knowledge to the sphere of the former. This dichotomy, as we
emphasize later, supports a technocratic consciousness and leads
into a decisionistic ethics;39 ideological factors central to the
organization of contemporary capitalism. (These factors are held
to be ideological because their very claimed status is an inadequate
conceptualization of the nature of their own status. )
Under the guise of a value-free science, Habermas has
41
attempted to demonstrate that positivist social science masks its
true nature as a proponent of a quite specific form of rationality and
practice. 40 This much, we contend, Weber has in common with
positivism. 41 There are strong parallels between our claims about
Weber's own self-misunderstanding and miscomprehension of the
status of his own claims, and those of the positivists. The details
of Habermas' argument against positivism cannot be made here but
the points of immediate relevance to our discussion of Weber should
be drawn out. 42
In the name of his own view of science and rationality, Weber
felt that he was able to launch a critique of ideology aimed at rooting
out competing theories which are supposedly value-laden and, there-
fore, illegitimately claiming scientific status. 43 But, as we have
just pointed out, this critique is laden with a schema of values, an
evaluation which Weber overlooks. Although not recognized as such,
an interest in technically useful knowledge (i. e. , knowledge which
can aid decisions on substantive questions by providing, for example,
knowledge of the choice and effectiveness of means, regularities,
etc.)44 and the rationality which embodies it, are values assumed
by this (and the positivist) conception of science. They are not
recognized as values because of a pesuasive definition of (scientific)
rationality which makes such rationality coincide with purposive,
42
rational, scientific procedures. Thus the rationality concept under-
lying Weberian science is that of a formal rationality, a means-ends
rationality:
simply, efficiency of means to given ends.
These values are accorded a privileged status since
they are implied in "rational" procedure itself . . .
in the name of value-freedom--:this criticism of
ideologies dictates the value system for all realm
Esic] of human life, viz. , its own. 45
Theoretical objective knowledge is made coextensive with a particu-
lar form of method, rationality, and scientific practice. Questions
of practical reason are ruled out of the range of science and beyond
rational investigation (although, as we shall see, Weber's views of
the role of science do specify that science can be critical of the
coherence and "practicality" of ends). Not being open to rational
solution, practical questions become the province of the private
individual and, in the final instance, can be justified only by refer-
ence to a decision; ethics becomes decisionism and not open to cog-
nitive mediation.
Thus the belief in the fact-value, theory-practice dichotomies
leads to contradictory results. In the name of value-freedom (i. e. ,
freedom from "value-judgments"), a certain schema of values is
championed to the exclusion of all others. (On this conception,
Weber's understanding of the role of values [value-orientations,
is singularly inadequate. For his conception of the interplay of
43
science and value-orientations implies orientations with more
extensive commitments.) Furthermore, in the name of a private,
decisionistic ethics, a particular form of practice is sanctioned.
Weber's seemingly passive contemplative scientific reason masks
an underlying level of committed reason.
In the name of value-freedom, Weber smuggles in a value-
laden concept of rationality and implicitly sanctions that which he
most feared: the spread of formal rationality. Substantive rationa-
lity is suppressed in the "innocent partisanship for formal rationa-
lity. 1,46 The effect on social theory of this hidden value-orientation
is a conceptualization of "science," "scientific problems," "social
problems," and "alternative solutions" which encourage the spread
of formal rationality. Substantive rationality, i. e., the rationality
of ultimate ends, was held to be independent of science. But because
of the fact-value dichotomy, substantive rationality could not itself
be rationally justified and could not be used to ultimately ground
value choices. Thus there was no way to rationally combat the
spread of formal, means-end rationality as a value, i. e., the
process of rationalization which enthroned science and the technical
values of economy and efficiency as ultimate values. Weber saw no
historical alternative to the "fate of our time" although he sought
to protect an enclave for values and justify a limit to the process
44
of rationalization. But while not endorsing Zweckrationalitlit and
its threat to monopolize reason, Weber, nevertheless, succumbed
in the end to its logic--by grounding science in it. As Habermas
wrote,
It is ironical, however, that, as we have seen,
this recommendation of a restrictive concept of
science rests on an interpretation of develop-
ments in the whole of society: . . . In his own
work Mas Weber did not keep within the limits
set by positivism: he was, however, in agree-
ment with the Neo-Kantians, positivistic enough
not to allow himself to reflect upon the connec-
tion between his methodological perspective and
rules, and the results of his social analysis.'147
These connections need further explication. Much more can and
must be said. These themes will be further illustrated in our dis-
cus sion of how Weber approached Causality and Method and what he
himself thought science could tell us. These topics must be tempo-
rarily put aside, but will be taken up later. It is necessary, firstly,
to explore in greater detail Weber's relationship to Kant and the
neo-Kantians.
* ~ -i %U * *
45
The theoretical positions Weber adopts overlap in many
important respects with that of Kant and the neo-Kantians of his
day. The elaboration of this theme provides further insight into
his discussion of "objectivity" and the claim that there exists "an
unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i. e.,
the analytical ordering of empirical social reality, " the full nature
of which we have yet to elaborate. The discussion serves further
to highlight the tension between value-relativism and "objectivity"
and the tension between Weber's methodological position and what
we have hitherto referred to as his subsumed and more "preten-
tious concept of sociology. "
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that "nature" is
scientifically known to the human consciousness through the opera-
tions of the Understanding. We cannot know "things-in-themselves"
(the nourinal character of phenomena are inaccessible to the under-
standing). We can claim to know only what is mediated by the trans-
cendental principles, rules, and representations of human conscious-
ness (the phenomenal world). 48 n. b. It is precisely with this con-
text in mind that D. Goddard has noted that:
Weber follows Kant fully here, since he argues
that the "meahing" of history Q1. e., Objective
meaning, in the sense, for example, of history
embodying an objective teleology- -D. H.) is in-
accessible and that the actual, empirical objec-
tivity of phenomena is only possible through the
synthetic operations of consciousness. "49
46
Goddard further argues that a formal analogy with Kant's
critique of reason may be advanced. Firstly, it may be noted that
Kant . . . took as given that the perceptual world
was atomistic in character. Perceptions are
dstinct and separate from each other. . . . The
sensuous mauifold presents itself as . . . a
mosaic of impressions which . . . could only be
unified through the spontaneous operation of the
understanding. Sense data are given as subject
to unification. Here is the first parallel with
Weber.
For Weber reality is
. . . "an infinitude of details, " "an infinite rich-
ness, " "a finite segment of the meaningless
infinity of the world process. " It has no meaning
or significance, nor any internal bond or connec-
tion, except that which is conferred on it by the
operations of a meaning-endowing consciousness.
In other words, the historical process also pre-
sents itself as a mosaic of confused events and
actions, the total investigation of the detail of
which must always lead to an infinite regress 50
resulting in a "chaos of existential judgements.
Secondly, noting the influence of the neo-Kantians (and particularly
Rickert), we saw that
. . . segments of that manifold only become cultural
constellations or objects, having a certain unity of
meaning, by reference to value or meaning, or, as
it might be put, under the form of meaning. In the
same way we find in Kant that temporality and
spatiality are the conditions under which sense-data
are received. Sense-data present themselves as
stable objectivities (phenomena) under these forms
alone. Nothing in the external world can be con-
sidered phenomenal, that is, be anything more than
a vague and confused impression, unless it satisfies
these conditions.
47
However, thirdly,
. . . phenomena remain distinct and separate unless
connection is imposed on them by the pure under-
standing. They are subject to ratification. Thus a
temporal sequence A-B-C-D may have no connection
unless the temporal relationship is ratified under the
law of causality, the principal category of the under-
standing in which Kant was interested. 51
There is, of course, an extraordinary conjunction and comple-
mentarity between Weber's Kantianism and his sociological investi-
gations. Whereas the theme of rationalization can be seen as the
empirical basis (or concretization) of his epistemological pre-
suppositions, it is clear that his epistemological presuppositions
themselves were in part Kantian. But in discussing the category of
causality (which was crucial for Weber), we will see that he develops
the Kantian epistemological viewpoint as he both extends the cate-
gory's significance for the human sciences and locates its role within
a complex methodology.
For Weber, the particular concepts we develop cannot repre-
sent reality. The elaboration of concepts serves to "clarify a singum-
lar event or phenomenon, and facilitates the construction of a syste-
matic or rational picture of a segment of culture in order to establish
its internal meaning and to discover its adequate causation. "52 Yet
the concepts themselves accentuate already selected aspects of
reality; for instance, an ideal-type "is formed by the one-sided
48
accentuation of one or more points of view . . . which are arranged
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified
analytical construct (Gedankenbild). "'53 An ideal-type is constructed
by the abstraction and combination of a number of elements which,
although given in reality, are stressed and constituted from the point
of view we are interested in.* As Goddard has correctly observed,
"the ideal-type endows features of cultural experience, which other-
wise would remain indistinct, with a clear and precise meaning. ''54
The result is that the concepts generated permit us to make a pre-
cise analysis of it from the value-orientation we took toward it.
The question remains, however, what is the status of this
analysis, given Weber's claim that it can be "objective, " if our
topic of investigation is constituted by value and if our concepts are
both value and empirically relative?
The answer lies with Weber's emphasis on rational method.
On this claim rests Weber' s attempt to have separated "science
from faith. "
*Ideal-types are not formed purely through the gropings of
conceptual thought. Rather, they are modified and sharpened through
empirical analysis and in turn further aid the exactness of that
analysis. (Cf. M. Weber, M..S., pp. 32-47 and 90-98.) The
role of ideal-types will be discussed further in the next chapter.
49
In "Science as a Vocation" and "Objectivity in the Social
Sciences, " Weber states that all scientific work presupposes two
things: (1) " . . . that the rules of logic and method are valid, "
i. e., a "rational method," 55 and (2) that "what is yielded by scien-
tific work is important in the sense that it is "worth being known." 5 6
The former presupposition is crucial for the claims to objectivity,
for it is argued that "rational method" in the social sciences ".
if it is to achieve its purpose . . . " must generate "systematically
correct scientific proofs" that must be "acknowledged as correct
even by a Chinese- -or- -more precisely stated--it must constantly
strive to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely
attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the successful logical
analysis of the content of an ideal and ultimate axiom and the dis-
covery of the consequences which arise from pursuing it, logically
and practically, must also be valid for the Chinese." 57 That is to
say, despite the interplay of values, rational method is claimed to
be the basis on which truths/proofs are produced having cross-
cultural inter -subjective validity.
This does not imply that validity claims generated by "rational
methods" (or the "ideal" mentioned above) will be accepted or
rejected across cultures. In the second presupposition, as Weber
put it, "are contained all our problems"; 5 8
50
. . . for this presupposition cannot be proved by
scientific means. It can only be interpreted with
reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must
respect or accept according to our ultimate posi-
towards life. "59
In fact, Weber states that our evaluation of the importance and status
of science and/or scientific proofs is itself historical (a product of
the "rationalization" of everyday life). What, then, does Weber
mean by "valid proofs, " etc. ? It appears that Weber might have
two views on this issue.
It seems, firstly, that Weber wants to argue that "the Chinese"
would accept the validity (despite supposedly distanced cultural
norms) of rational methods (e. g., rules for logical inference,
rational thought, i.e., an appropriate methodology), but might well
reject the interpretive framework, the explanation, the explanas
of a Western advanced, industrial, and scientific culture. "The
Chinese" might prefer and argue instead for accounts and explana-
tions of the (social) world underpinned by, for example, moral or
religious standpoints. In other words, "the Chinese" might accept
the validity claims generated by an established and intersubjectively
recognized procedure but not necessarily the explanation. (We will
call this "position one. ")
But a question arises: why would the Chinese accept
the methods of. inquiry? Why are such methods exempted, in
Weber's view, in their acceptance or rejection from the process of
51
rationalization. They clearly are not trans-historical and inter-
subjectively recognized across cultures. 60 Weber offers no elabo-
ration of this point and, as with so many of his positions, they are
simply stated and assumed. Elsewhere he states that:
The means available to our science offer nothing
to those persons to whom this truth is of no value.
It should be remembered that the belief in the value
of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures
and is not a product of man's original nature. 61
If by "means" he implies rational methods of inquiry, the position
we have just established, viz. , the Chinese, is contradicted, making
the acceptance of scientific procedures itself also historically and
culturally relative . (We call this "position two. ")
Both views, it should be noted, also suggest that given at
least some cultural heterogeneity within a supposedly, predominantly,
scientific culture, there is no ultimate justification for (a) in posi-
tion one, scientific explanationsqua explanations, and (b) in position
two, for scientific methods and explanations.
Each position has its difficulties and its tensions. In the first
(position) scientific procedures are assumed to be inter-subjectively
recognized as valid and in use, productive of truths and proofs that
are said to be valid cross-culturally. Yet, it is also suggested that
the explanations of these "proofs, " etc. , need not entail inter-
subjective agreement. What then is the status of the proofs ? What
52
can they be said to be proofs of? Furthermore, in what sense can
Weber now maintain that science is a rational and systematic means
to acquire truths about empirical reality? On this conception of
science we risk a relativism, a science that is capable of producing
a multitude of competing explanations, all generated by rational
methods and all at some level claiming the status of truths. The
tensions and issues that are raised here need further explication.
But before doing so, let us look briefly at position two.
In the second position Weber argues more generally that one
cannot justify the "strange intoxication" with science and scientific
practice within its own terms of reference. There is a form of
"irrationality, " the motivation base, behind those that utilize the
"rational method." In this context we can see why Weber quotes
Tolstoi with appreciation and approval:
Science is meaningless because it gives no answer
to our question, the only question important to us:
"What shall we do and how shall we live? ,62
Thus here, acceptance of the authority of science to establish truth
claims is dependent on prescientific value choices and dependent
for acceptance or rejection on, ultimately, individually chosen values.
Science, then, rests its authority on individual decision and, like
all value choices, such a decision is, in the last analysis, based on
faith. This position, it might be noted, is very close to that of the
53
thoroughly anarchistic views of the philosopher of science, Paul
Feyerabend. 63
Yet Weber also wants to say (if we take him to be holding
position two) and given we accept the role of science, that science
is uniquely constituted by a rational method productive of valid,
objective claims! Such a view would not be accepted by Feyerabend,
who would note that the logic of position two cannot generate a single
justification for science. Science, on this account can have no more
claims to be offering an "objective" analysis of the social (or natural)
world than other methods and accounting schema that subsume alter-
native rati.onalities.
So the authority of science is (in position one), on the one hand,
legitimated by rational method, its products are independent of
value-judgments, but on the other hand, explanations are culturally
and historically relative and might well differ. In position two,
science's authority rests on a decision and is dependent (wholly) on
values. But given a decisionistic commitment to science, valid and
objective claims are (said to be) generated. Scientific claims are
partial and one-sided because in position one, different explanations
are legitimate for a given and established social phenomenon, and
in position two, because both scientific practice and explanatory
claims have no privileged status unless accepted individually and
thereby ligitimated.
54
Of the positions, position one finds stronger support through-
out the texts and appears to be Weber's essential argument for
demarcating science from faith. This view is (very importantly)
consistent with Weber's arguments, viz., the dichotomy between
value-judgments and objective knowledge (facts). It is also consis-
tent with our arguments that Weber subsumes a particular form of
rationality and practice in his view of science. In fact, his very
emphasis on and taking-for-granted of the centrality of method
might well be explained by his implicit evaluation and subsumption
of formal rationality in science. If he held to position two, he would
be risking a view of complete and utter relativism and would not be
able to defend science, as he clearly did, as a special area of
human endeavor productive of "objective" knowledge (i. e., knowledge
free of value-judgments). (It should be noted that position two does
not necessarily imply a general critique of the notion of objectivity.
Rather, that several methods, e. g., of a scientific, moral, critical,
or religious kind, might be defended as equally productive of objec-
tive knowledge e. g. , each subsuming a different form of rationalityl)
The issues raised by position two (which can be used as a basis for
a critique of position one) will be taken up again later in the text.
As we previously suggested, textual readings provide
evidence that Weber most wanted to hold to position one. It is this
55
position that we will assume and further explore for the remainder
of this cha.pter. As Weber put it in "Objectivity in the Social
Sciences,"
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge
rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given
reality according to categories which are subjec-
tive in a specific sense, namely, in that they
present the presuppositions of our knowledge and
are based on the presupposition of the value of
those truths which empirical knowledge alone is
able to give us. 64
"The criterion of scientific knowledge, " Weber declares, "is to be
found in the 'objective' validity of its results. ",65 A delicate balance
is struck? Weber deliberately opposes the minimizing of the role
of "subjectivity, " and deliberately attempts to take into account
and emphasize that which is scientifically undemonstrable. Here
Weber is "fundamentally attacking . . . the belief of science in
objective norms in general and their scientific demonstrability in
particular.1"66 The argument (developed above as position one and
suggested in the quote above), however, seeks to balance "subjec-
tivity" with a value which no longer refers to "value-orientation"
but to the universal value of scientific method. The argument for
"objectivity" rests, in the last analysis, on the capacity of certain
procedures to generate "valid" proofs, i. e. , on Method.
The position is a logically necessary one for Weber. For
once it is admitted that subjective value-orientations constitute the
56
"object of investigation" and the social facts explored; and that
there exists no alternative grounding for our knowledge, then, if
the conclusion that social science can only produce competitive
explanations of the social world to those of the laymen and holders
of other procedures and rationalities, is to be avoided--the argument
necessarily tends to a strong emphasis in epistemology on
methodology. 67
Weber's position in respect to method can also be clarified
with reference to the Heidelberg neo-Kantians of his time. 68, 69
In his highly influential rectoral address, Gesichte und Naturwissen-
schaft, 70 W. Windelband rejected the distinction between Natur/
Geisteswissenschaften as a distinction that can be made on the basis
of two different objects of inquiry.71 Rather, he argued, that any
such division must be based on a purely formal or logical state-
ment. 72 The address, in part, centers on a discussion of the status
of psychology and in the ensuing analysis and comparison of psycho-
logy and the natural sciences, he concludes that a "reconstruction
of their logical similarity . . . must rest on a formal or methodo-
logical distinction with the historical sciences.''
The principle of division is the formal character
of their ends of knowledge (Erkenntnisziele). The
one seeks general laws, the other particular his-
torical facts: expressing this in language of formal
57
logic, the end of one is general, apodictic judge-
ments (the end) of the other is singular assertoric
sentences.73
The disctinction is between nomothetic and ideographic sciences,
a distinction that classifies only the "methodological treatment
not the content of the knowledge itself.1"74
In the closing sections of the speech Windelband calls for
logicians to recognize that there are other logics than that of the
natural sciences and asks them to begin an inquiry into ideographic
analyses, specifically the work of historians, to uncover all that is
involved. "Of no less importance, " Windelband says (bearing the
natural sciences in mind) "is an understanding of historical evolu-
tion. " His argument about logics and methods rests finally on the
granting of equal status to the different ends, interests, and goals
that guide the two (potential) major scientific enterprises. He saw
both of these as necessary for the bildung (cultivation, education) of
man and German society.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to show how Heinrich
Rickert's position (in his important Kulturwissenschaften und
Naturwissenschaften)75 developed from and differed with Windelband,
but one or two points--which offer insight into Weber's own work--
may be noted. Rather than speaking of nomothetic and ideographic
sciences, Rickert stressed the fact that there are generalizing and
58
individualizing tendencies within all sciences, and saw these
tendencies as determined by the goals toward which the sciences
aim. 76IMaintaining Windelband's stress on the nature of the dis-
tinction, he argued that it was purely logical and "in no way con-
cerned . . . the content peculiar to the various branches of the
natural or cultural sciences.1" The theme can be illustrated
well by his discussion of the concerns of the Kulturwissenschaften; 7 8
which he argued were and should be concerned with "the interpreta-
tion and transmission of an historical acquisition,".i.e., Kultur, and
thus are compelled to employ the historical or individualizing method
because of the ends they seek. The distinction between the natural
and social sciences is not, however, for Rickert, an absolute one.
It is in this light that we can further understand Weber's stress
on method--a stress typical in certain philosophical circles of his
time. It was unnecessary for him to locate his early methodological
essays: the discussion of method per se. The location was, of
course, taken for granted. His methodological writings can be seen
as an excursion into histiography and the social sciences; a response
to the call for an investigation made by the neo-Kantians.
Weber's methodological preoccupations follow, then, from
Kantian and neo-Kantian and epistemological presuppositions.
They provide the framework in which his work is to be
59
understood. Our discussion of Weber's epistemology and metho-
dology can now also be seen to be a discussion that extends into
this framework.
However, in many respects, Weber's claims about the role of
the human sciences went beyond that envisaged by Windelband and
Rickert. Weber's claims about what social science could tell us
extended the logic of a discipline offering an account of Kultur, an
interpretation of past traditions, an historical hermeneutics. In
order to explicate these claims we must firstly make one further
set of distinctions: namely those that, in Weber's view, separate
the natural from the human sciences. It is only by reference to
Windelband and Rickert's positions that we can gain insight into
Weber's own.
As it was unnecessary for him to "locate" his stress on
method, he likewise essentially presupposed the neo-Kantian posi-
tion here as well. But there were certain differences and one major
change. The neo-Kantian account of the natural sciences was sub-
sumed, but he both extended and altered the neo-Kantian view of
the human sciences.
At the turn of the century in German universities there were
extensive debates about the status and differences between the natural
and cultural sciences--the famousiiMethodenstreit. Many joined
60
the debate, including economists (Schmtller, Menger), psychologists
(e.g.Wundt), historians (E. Meyer, Lamprecht), philosophers (Dilthey,
Windelband, Rickert), and many others. 80 The center of contro-
versy was the- cultural sciences. Should they, as the positivists
agreed, be assimilated into the natural sciences, employing the
same methodologies? This position was rejected completely by the
neo-Kantians. Dilthey held that there was an ontological disjunction
between the natural and social sciences. There was a fundamental
difference in the respective objects of each science, "a classifica-
tion . . . being drawn between the kingdom of nature and that of
the human mind.1"81 Windelband and Rickert, as we have seen,
rejected this ontological claim. For Rickert, the infinite flux of
reality could be broken down according to the different goals of the
respective sciences, which forced on those sciences particular
methodologies.
Rickert (also) argued that the distinction between the natural
and social sciences was not an absolute one. For Weber, following
Rickert, the distinction was also not a "distinction in principle."
But Weber's remarks on the differences between the natural and
cultural sciences were, as we shall see, all too brief.
In his critique of Roscher and IKneis, the first of his
methodological essays, he suggests that "the supposed distinction
61
between natural and social sciences may be used to support a
"spurious intuitionism. ",82, 83 The writings of Roscher, Weber
argues, hold the view that the universe of human action is not one
in which natural scientific methods apply. According to Weber,
the Roscher distinction of natural and social sciences "introduce
an overriding component of semi-mystic idealism into the . . .
analysis . . . and consequently . . . inexact intuitive procedures.
The human world is thus an 'irrational' one, which is epitomised
by the Volksgeist or Volksselle. . . . It is impossible, Weber
points out, to reconcile the use of such notions as this with the
claim, which is advanced by this same author, that vigorous histori-
cal research is an end which should be striven for." 84 Weber
argues that the social sciences are necessarily concerned with
"spiritual" or "ideal" phenomena and that there is a qualitative
difference between the subject matter of the natural and social
sciences, but argues--in this paper--that this does not imply or
involve the sacrifice of objectivity nor the substitution of replicable
causal analysis by intuitionism. 85
In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences, " Weber maintains that
"whereas in astonomy, the heavenly bodies are of interest to us only
in their quantative and exact aspects, the qualitative aspect of
phenomena concerns us in the social sciences.
62
To this should be added that in the social sciences
we are concerned with psychological and intellec-
tual (geistig) phenomena the empathic under-
standing of which is naturally a problem of a
specifically different. type from those which the
schemes of the exact natural sciences in general
can or seek to solve. Despite that, this distinc-
tion in itself is not a distinction in principle, as
it seems at first glance. Aside from pure mechanics,
even the exact natural sciences do not proceed with-
out qualitative categories. 8 6 (Emphasis added.)
If it is not a distinction in principle, one may well ask what kind of
qualitative distinction is being made? A precise answer is not
easily found in Weber' s writings.
Weber recognizes, of course, as the remarks and quotations
above suggest, that there is a qualitative difference between the
subject matter of the natural and social sciences. There are two
points that can be noted here. Firstly, there is a sense in which
Weber differentiates the natural from the social sciences which
refer back to our previous comments on Weber's conception of value-
orientations. The object domain of all sciences was seen to be the
result, for Weber, of a process of constitution. In the case of the
social sciences he felt that there was a multiplicity of possible
value-orientations that could determine the objects of investigation
(This was because of, amongst other reasons, (a) the different
interests of historians, economists, and psychologists, etc. , in
the social world; and (b) because the objects these people would
62
To this should be added that in the social sciences
we are concerned with psychological and intellec-
tual (geistig) phenomena the empathic under-
standing of which is naturally a problem of a
specifically different type from those which the
schemes of the exact natural sciences in general
can or seek to solve. Despite that, this distinc-
tion in itself is not a distinction in principle, as
it seems at first glance. Aside from pure mechanics,
even the exact natural sciences do not proceed with-
out qualitative categories. 8 6 (Emphasis added.)
If it is not a distinction in principle, one may well ask what kind of
qualitative distinction is being made? A precise answer is not
easily found in Weber's writings.
Weber recognizes, of course, as the remarks and quotations
above suggest, that there is a qualitative difference between the
subject matter of the natural and social sciences. There are two
points that can be noted here. Firstly, there is a sense in which
Weber differentiates the natural from the social sciences which
refer back to our previous comments on Weber' s conception of value-
orientations. The object domain of all sciences was seen to be the
result, for Weber, of a process of constitution. In the case of the
social sciences he felt that there was a multiplicity of possible
value-orientations that could determine the objects of investigation
(This was because of, amongst other reasons, (a) the different
interests of historians, economists, and psychologists, etc. , in
the social world; and (b) because the objects these people would
63
regard as culturally significant and consequently worthy of study,
changes over time with historical developments and as a result of
enhanced knowledge.) The complex and changing nature of the
social scientist's value-orientations is held to be in marked contrast
to much less varied value-orientations found amongst investigators
of the natural world. In a very strong statement of this point,
Weber wrote:
This way of being conditioned by "subjective
values" is, however, entirely alien in any case
to those natural sciences which take mechanics
as a model, and it constitutes, indeed, the
contrast between the historical and natural
sciences. 87
It appears to be Weber's view that there is (complete?) consensus
in the natural sciences informing the natural scientist's value-
orientations. (This point, as Weber has developed it is not very
substantial. For it can be argued that the differences between, e. g.,
the physist and the chemist create fundamentally different interests
in the natural world, with the same status as in point (a) above. It
can also be argued that the history of these sciences changes and
complicates the scientist's value-orientations in the same way as
88, 89in point (b) above.)
The second point Weber makes, which is much stronger and
more fundamental, is that whereas the natural and cultural scientist
is concerned with objects as constituted purely from the standpoint
64
of his value-orientations, the cultural scientist has in addition to
be concerned with "objects" that have a self-understanding. In
other words, the cultural scientist has to be able to understand his
object domain, which are social and historical subjects who them-
selves constitute the world in varying contexts. He cannot offer
a sceintifically adequate account of this world without taking into
consideration these acts of constitution. (This point and its conse-
quences will be further developed in the next chapter.) This is a
dimension of scientific investigation which rarely, if ever, exists
for the natural scientist. 90
However, Weber offers no argument that dwells on the differ-
ence between the natural and social sciences being essentially one of
subject matter. It seems that he saw in this distinction primarily
methodological considerations.
With Rickert he rejects the attempt to rigidly classify the
sciences. He accepts and recognizes the distinction between
generalizing and individualizing methods, the "'abstract' -theoretical
method" and "empirical historical" techniques of research. The
natural sciences are seen to be characterized by the former, but
not restricted to this methodological stance (e. g., some natural
sciences might use different methods to explain unique occurences).
With the social sciences it was significantly different. For Weber
65
establishes a major "generalizing and individualizing" tendency
within the human sciences. Sociology and even history are seen to
to employ and utilize causal explanations and generalizing laws.
There is a complex interplay, between the respective methods, that
develops in Weber's writings. How he establishes this position we
explicate at length in the following chapter. All that need be noted
here is that in making these fundamental changes in the neo-Kantian
position he takes the cultural (or human) sciences beyond the logic
or goals of those envisaged for these sciences by Windelband and
Rickert. For Rickert, for example, the study of history through
culture was thoroughly hermeneutic in intent: it was to be an
analysis and interpretation of tradition that would yield and enhance
our understanding of the socio-cultural life-world. Weber's position
was and is not simply hermeneutic in implication. As the human
sciences embodied a generalizing and individualizing tendency, so
they also embodied more complex goals. As we have previously
noted and as we shall see in more detail, Weber's extended concep-
tion of the human sciences and their roles implies an alternative
conception of their logic that both extends and changes the neo-
Kantian position we have discussed here.
Weber was much more explicit in his views about what the
sciences could tell us, then about the nature of the distinction
66
between them. However, as we point out below, there is more to
his view than he, in fact, even here makes explicit.
"In the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude,"
Weber thought, "toward what was immediately and technically use-
ful was closely associated from the very first with the hope . . .
of attaining a purely 'objective' . . . monisitc knowledge of the
totality of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity
and mathematical form. ",92 Those natural sciences which became
closely bound to evaluative attitudes (Weber names clinical medicine
and "what is conventionally called 'technology' "), lose, for him,
their scientific status -- becoming "purely practical 'arts'.1"9 3
Natural science cannot tell us whether we ought to master life
technically or whether such a pursuit is "meaningful." Natural
science can only gather knowledge of reality and tell us how to master
life technically. It cannot tell us whether to "master life technically"
nor what ends to pursue to achieve technical mastery.
The social sciences, Weber points out, "first arose in con-
nection with practical considerations. "94 Tracing its origins to
state economic policy, he goes on to say that as such:
. . .It was a "technique" in the same sense as,
for instance, the clinical disciplines in the medi-
cal sciences are. It has now become known how
this situation was gradually modified. This modifi-
cation was not, however, accompanied by a formula-
tion of the logical (prinzipielle) distinction between
67
"existential knowledge, " i. e., knowledge of what
"is," and "normative knowledge," i. e., knowledge
of what "should be. "95
Such a distinction is "absolutely" necessary for, as we have already
seen, despite the partiality, one-sidedness of knowledge, know-
ledge is "objective" and, Weber states countlessly, it is logically
impossible for an empirical discipline to establish, scientifically,
ideals which define what "ought to be, " i. e., which (and to what
purpose) an end should be pursued. What then can social sciences
tell us?
Weber argues that while value-judgments concerning what
"ought to be" cannot be validated by science, "the question of the
appropriateness of means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly
accessible to scientific analysis.1"96 Scientific analysis can allow
us to determine the applicability and suitability of a given range of
means, by examining the chances attached to each "means" for the
realization of an end. Furthermore, the social scientist can
examine the full range of consequences, advantages, "costs,"
entailed by the selection of a particular means to a given end. The
costs analyzed can be of two sorts: (1) the partial rather than the
complete realization of a chosen end, or (2) the bringing about of
additional consequences which might have negative effects on other
ends held by the individual. In this way it is also possible, Weber
68
claims, that we can "indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself
as practically meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical
situation) or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions." 9 8 , 99
"The contribution of science does not reach its limits with
this . . . 100 if we are competent in our pursuit (which must be
presupposed here), we can force the individual or at least we can
help him, to give an account of the ultimate meaning of his own con-
duct. "1101 Science is also, therefore, able to assess the internal
and external consistency of conduct, to make frequently presupposed
ideals explicit and, in other words, to be "in the service of self-
clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. "110Z Weber sees
scientific activity as an important agent in the demystification of
the world, not an end itself. Yet again, it can be said, his views
are not without difficulties and tensions.
Science, on Weber's account, can be critical of the suitability,
coherence, completeness, etc.,, of an end or ideal. Science can
evaluate means, suggest which are most appropriate to a given end,
and also ("indirectly") assess the "practicality" of ends with refer-
ence to existing historical conditions. In fact, on Weber's view,
science is able to establish "means" in a heirachy of "costs, "
practicality, etc. , and, therefore, specify accomplishable ends.
Science on this account, despite Weber's claims, is evaluative and
69
judgmental. The practical consequences of Weber's view of science
become more explicit here and bring many of our previous themes
to a head. These points are worthy of further consideration.
The assessment of means etc., according to the criteria of
practicality is to appraise these empirical possibilities with a value
that is, in Weber's works, ambiguous and much in need of absent
elaboration. For the question arises: From whose standpoint do we
judge practicality? The businessman's, the revolutionary's, the
social scientist's? Weber's view also establishes a dichotomy that
is, at best, weak. The relationship between means and ends is not
a rigid and distinct relation. After all, what are means? They can
easily be regarded as short-run ends. And ends? Are they not
long-run means? The relationship, as Hegel would argue, is an
identity of identity and difference, i. e. , a dialectical unity, a
differentiated interacting unity. 103 To evaluate ends even "indirectly"
according to the "practicality" etc. of means (albeit in an historical
context), is to beg the question as to whether or not means are ends
and vice-versa and for whom our criteria of assessment are valid.
Given Weber's views on value -orientations, he might well have
responded to these questions by saying that since the disenchanted
world can find no ultimate justifications for deciding between competing
irreducible ideals, then, what we mean by practicality or, for
70
example, an end, will of course differ. And this is how it should be.
So long as the adherents to different conceptions of practicality etc.
utilize the rational method, then we have no means available, in the
last analysis, to choose between them other than personal decision.
Just as science has the capacity to produce "objective" competing
explanations of the social world, so the role of science can produce
a plethora of different accounts of the practicality of ends, each
having equal claim to validity.
The tensions entailed in this view were pointed to in our earlier
discussion of Weber's position (cf. pp. 50-53 above, the discussion
of position one). They can be further elaborated. Weber's account
of science and "objectivity" admits, we have suggested, of the
possibility of a multitude of competing explanations of the social
world all claiming validity. Given different value -orientations and
adherence to the norms of rational method, it would seem possible
for there to be mutually incompatible, perhaps contradictory, know-
ledge claims. If this is the case, then science is open, incomplete,
and necessarily relative to the point of being potentially constitutive
of incompatible validity claims that find no possible resolution within
scientific practice. Weber's conception of science embodies incom-
pleteness and openess in the sense that:
a. true statements and claims about reality are inexhaustible,
71
b. all knowledge is held to be potentially falsifiable, and
c. scientific progress is seen to be cumulative. 104
But although it admits of incompatible knowledge claims, it does not
lead to contradiction. L. Simon has pointed out that it does not lead
to contradiction because there
is a form of incommensurability inherent in
Weber's position. All scientific truths are partial
and relative to their value -orientations. Truths
have to be understood in terms of this relativity.
Seemingly incompatible claims cannot be juxtaposed
to produce a contradiction because, in the final
analysis, they are not talking about the same
identical objects or events. Each is true of a
particular portion of the flux of reality as illumi-
nated or abstracted according to a particular
criterion of significance. Since they are not
strictly talking about the same identical thing,
they are not technically contradictory. 105
Instead, they are best conceived as truths of reality which are illumi-
nating of it, but inherently partial and never, by definition, in strict
correspondence to it. The Chinese or Western social scientist can
claim objectivity and validity for an analysis of Q, even though the
former might explain it by A and the latter by B. If Q is constituted
from different value -orientations, there is no contradiction between
the respective accounts. In Weber's conception one can only have
contradictory claims if a given analysis of Q is constituted from the
same value -orientations, uses the same intersubjectively recognized
methods of inquiry and then produces incompatible statements.
72
Scientific practice, therefore, can result in a multitude of competing
explanations of the socialworld, all illuminating reality, all adding to
our stock of knowledge. There may not be contradiction but there is
an inherent relativism. For, in the last analysis, there are no criteria
to judge between competing explanations other than those based on
individual value -orientations. This same argument obviously applies
to Weber's conception of science's capacity to address "means,"
"ends, " and "ideals. "
Having said this, however, it is crucially important to realize
that in Weber's account of the role of science, the tolerance of rela-
tivism as regards to value and consequently theory and validity, is - -
to use Macuse's famous phrase--a "repressive tolerance. ,,106 For
although we might have competing explanations all justly claiming
validity, they are in competition within a fixed framework, a specific
form of rationality, a specific schema of values that consequently
sanction a particular form of practice. They are differentiated views,
but differentiated within the same fundamental framework. As our
previous discussion of these issues pointed out, it is a framework
delineated by formal, means -ends rationality, a decisionistic ethics
and practice. It is in this framework that Weber grounded his science.
Although not recognized as such, an interest in technically useful
knowledge and the rationality which embodies it are values assumed
73
by this conception of science, for science, on this account, has an
inherent potential and subsumed interest in providing technically
useful information. Science lends itself to technical recommenda-
tions and has an in-built potential for becoming little more than a
technical critique. As we noted earlier, in the name of value -
freedom (i. e., freedom from value -judgments), Weber smuggles in
a value -laden, evaluative, concept of rationality and as such sanctions
what he hoped to challenge: the spread of formal rationality. Weber
takes for granted that which he most sought to limit.
The "logic" and "goals" of the human sciences are no longer,
as they were for Windelband and Rickert, "simply" hermeneutic in
intent. Weber's concept of science is deeply embedded in a technical,
instrumental interest. This does not mean to say that Weber's expo-
sition of the human sciences does not embody a hermeneutic dimen-
sion. As we shall see in the following chapter, his conception of
history approximates the intentions of Rickert, but his conception of
the human sciences extends the "goals" of both historical hermeneutics
and, as we have just seen, a partiality for the goals of technically
useful knowledge.
Interestingly enough, it might be noted, that what we called
Weber's second position 1 0 7 (i. e. , the view that the authority of
science's explanations and rational procedures rests on individual
74
decision) is the basis of a strong argument to undermine the first
position, which we have taken in this thesis to be the position Weber
attempted to uphold. As we know, Weber takes for granted formal
rationality as the foundation of science. His claims are essentially
unmotivated, they are with (elaborate) justification: they are, for
the best part, as sumed. But given his own view that value -judgments,
evaluations, practical recommendations, etc., are all, ultimately,
based on faith, there can, within his own terms of reference, be no
justification for the formal rationality of science as a privileged,
unevaluative, absolute ground for "objective" knowledge. The com-
mitment to formal rationality, involves a substantive choice, i. e. , a
value -judgment. The option for formal rationality requires a justified
practical reason. Since Weber has closed off value-judgments from
cognitive resolution, and rules out of consideration the possibility
that practical questions admit of truth, he cannot rationally justify his
own position. It too, within Weber's own terms of reference, rests
on a decision which is, "in the end, " based on faith. For there is,
in Weber's view, no ultimate justification on which science can be
grounded. We are, firmly, in the established relativism of position
two. But the question now is: can we avoid this position? Is it the
only option and direction we have? In asking these questions we
discover another position that Weber implicitly shuts off.
75
Although Weber, of course, allows (in position one) for the
possibility of describing the genesis of our values (e. g. , The
Protestant Ethic), he does not comprehend the possibility of a
critically reflexive understanding of this genesis. Such an under-
standing of the innerconnectedness of values to their social situated-
ness, e. g., class structuration, 108 might reveal that certain value -
orientations and judgments blind those that hold them to an adequate
conceptualization of the social world, i. e., might be ideological. It
would be ideological in the sense that and insofar as the values pro-
ject onto the social world a view which is limited, one -sided, dis -
torted, and false, and prevents an adequate confrontation with the
nature of its own limited, one-sided, distorted, and false status.
Weber can justify his view with reference to the empirical
basis of his epistemological presuppositions. There can be no
ultimate arbitration between value -judgments and value -claims;
they only admit of individual choice in a "disenchanted" world. The
position reflects, as we noted earlier, an individualistic, atomistic
ontology. 109 In holding this position, Weber also, therefore, must
uncritically accept a multitude of possible competing explanations
and accounts about the world as long as they adhere to the canons of
rational scientific method. As such he closes off the possibility of
a critical theory that might explicate the ideological basis of certain
76
accounts of the social world.
Weber's views, as we shall see, are in sharp contradistinction
to certain members of the Marxist tradition, whose writings we
explore in the next part of this thesis. It is with the possibility of
a critical reflexive understanding that we can avoid the inevitable
relativism of Weber's second position. In order to establish such a
critical understanding, the task, which Weber cannot conceive, is to
explicate the possibility of a Critical Science which is grounded and
which recognizes that practical questions admist of truth. This we
will begin to do at the close of the following chapter and through the
Marxist tradition in Part IL
. 4.4A .A4. 4 . 4
The issues and critique we have developed so far can be
further illustrated in Weber's account of the human sciences, in his
approaches to sociology and histiography in particular and in his
treatment of their respective methods and approahces to causality.
This we attempt to do in the following chapter. But before turning
to these further questions, an additional note might be added.
The neo-Kantians did not forsee that in the mid-twentieth
century the interest in certainty, prediction and control, the logic
77
they associated with the natural sciences, would become the general
logic and program for most of the social sciences. Weber might be
thought of as having anticipated this development in his preoccupation
with the process of rationalization and the spreading of instrumental
reason. It is paradoxical, however, that given his enormous insights
into economy and societythat when compared to Rickert's conception
of the human sciences, Weber's own contribution can be seen to have
added to and confirmed the very social processes he wanted to limit.
The "fate of the modern world" did indeed show a cunning that he
himself was blind to. Weber's conception of science, given all his
insights, is also ideological. 110 The question must be asked why
Weber remained satisfied with the view of science he expounded.
Any attempt to provide an adequate answer to this question
would require an analysis of the stature of L. Goldman's study of
Kant. 111 It would require a study in the sociology of knowledge that
was not just concerned with Weber 's life and work, but the epoch
from whence he emerged. It is obviously an unthinkable task in the
bounds of this thesis. We can only note a few brief points.
It is clear that Weber took for granted the philosophical con-
text of his methodological writings and, consequently, epistemology
did not directly preoccupy him as it did others of his time. Other
clues can be found in Mitzman's work that we earlier referred to.1 1 2
78
Still others, in his acquiescence and capitulation to the rationalized
world as it appeared. For ultimately this was a world in which.
formal rationality also made possible a development of social insti-
tutions strongly tending toward law and justice that would free the
arbitration of civil society from collective and individual substantive
interests. A world of universal, technically trained officials and
organizations that becomes the "absolutely inescapable condition of
our existence. " It is in this context that we may note the force of
Marcuse's comment that:
Weber's concept of fate . . . generalizes the blind-
ness of a society which reproduces itself behind the
back of individuals, of a s ociety in which the law of
domination appears as objective technological law. 113
The very concept of rationalization is also ideological. For it glosses
social processes, reifies social life, and consequently depersonalizes
and depoliticizes history. But for Weber, we must remember, this
process also brings in its wake an intellectualization of the social
world, a new freedom for thought and inquiry. Its institutions offered
a new impartiality and individuals enhanced choice. It was a world
in which each person was, in the end, best able to be the master or
the mistress of his or her life. The emphasis, as we have seen, in
Weber's discussion of values is on individual freedom and choice and
on the capacity of individuals to choose. In a disenchanted world man
finds a new freedom from dependence on unreflected Weltanschaung,
III w m~
79
and a new freedom to will his life his own.
For Weber, the modern democracy is a means to an end. 114
His political writings are deeply intertwined with the values of
European liberalism1 1 5 and its ultimate value: the individual's
autonomy. The classical tenets of bourgeois, liberal individualism
and its vision of freedom are constantly upheld. These values, Weber
argued, could only be defended and furthered by the development of
the German nation-state. But the State is always a means for Weber,
for he saw modern bourgeois democracies as the "only modes, " as
A. Giddens put it, "of partially releasing modern man from the
'iron cage' of the bureaucratized division of labour. ,116
Weber also saw the need and the possibility to supplement the
new democratic order with the value creative properties of charis-
matic political leadership. Weber sought decisionistic self -assertion
in the midst of a rationalized world. In politics he favored, as J.
Habermas wrote, "scope for a leader, strong-willed and with an
instinct for power, " ll7 who could accommodate and use the expert
civil servant. Weber's political vision was thoroughly intertwined
with the bourgeois vision of the freedoms of possessive individualism. 1 1 8
There are further consequences which should not and cannot be
overlooked. If we may quote Habermas once again:
At the time of the First World War he fWeber, D. H.]
outlined a sketch of Caesar-like leader -democracy
80
on the contemporary basis of a national-state
imperialism. This militant latter-day liberalism
had consequences in the Weimar period which we,
and not Weber, must answer for. If we are to
judge Weber here and now, we cannot overlook
the fact that Carl Schmitt was a "legitimate
pupil" of Weber's. Viewed in the light of the
history of influences, the decisionist element
in Weber's sociology did not break the spell of
ideology, but strengthened it. 119
The same can be said of Weber's conception of science. It subsumes
and capitulates to the bourgeois vision of Rationality, Freedom, and
Democracy. There is little self-consciousness of this in Weber's
methodological writings.
NOTES
Weber, M. S.S., p. 72
D. Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity of the Social
Sciences, " in History and Theory (1973), pp. 2-4.
3 Weber, M. S. S., p. 72. (First emphasis mine.)
4 Weber, M.S.S., p. 78.
5 Weber, M S.S., p. 60.
6 Weber, M.S.S., p. 72.
7M
Ibid.
8 Weber, M.S.S., p. 78.
9a
9 Weber, M. S. S., p. 72.
1 0 A. Saloman, "Max Weber's Methodology," Social Research 1
(1934): 157; quoted in Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 12.
1 1 Weber, M..S., pp. 110-11.
1 2 Weber, M.S.S., p. 1. (My emphasis.)
13 Weber, M.S.S., p. 19.
14 Weber, M S. S., pp. 1-50.
15 See especially Weber, M.S. S., pp. 1-47.
16 Weber, M.S.S., p. 8.
17
Cf. Mitzman, The Iron Cage, chaps. 3-9. Also, Giddens,
Politics and Sociology.
81
82
1 8 Weber, M. S. 5., pp. 46-47. More will be said about
Weber's conception of the State and politics at the end of this chapter.
1 9 Weber, "Politics as a Vocation, " in From Max Weber,
pp. 77-128.
2 0 Weber, M.S.S., p. 63.
2 1 See p. 28.
2 2 Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity of the Social
Sciences,1" p. 2.
2 3 Weber, M.S.S., p. 72.
2 4 Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination,"
p. 67.
2 5 Weber, M. S.S., p. 64.
2 6 Weber, M.S.S., p. 76.
2 7 Ibid.
2 8 Weber, M. S. S., p. 84.
2 9 Ibid.
3 0 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 105-6.
3 Ibid.
32 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 32-33.
3 3 For an elaboration of the proposed distinction, see E. Nagel,
The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1961), pp. 485-502.
3 4 Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity of the Social
Sciences,1" p. 14. The nature of this tension is discussed at greater
length in the following chapter.
3 5 J. Habermas commenting on a paper by T. Parsons on
Weber in Max Weber and Sociology Today, ed. 0. Stammer (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 65.
83
3 Ibid.
3 7 The concept of totality in Weber is discussed on pp. 121-23.
3 8 Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination,"
p. 69.
3The doctrine of decisionism in ethics is here taken to imply
that choice between ethical standpoints belongs solely to the indivi-
dual. It is the responsibility of each person to decide, and the
decision rests, ultimately, on faith. For an elaboration of this
viewpoint cf. my exegesis of Weber's position in the closing two
pages of the previous chpater.
Cf. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1972), pt. 2. Also J. Habermas, Theory and Practice,
trans. J. Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
4 1 It is recognized that positivism, as a label for a particular
form of knowing and self-understanding, has been much abused.
For a useful introduction to the concept cf. A. Giddens, ed. ,
Positivism and Sociology (London: Heineman, 1975), Introduction.
4Z2 The following remarks follow a part of a jointly written
paper by L. Simon and myself, in which we discuss the work of
J. Habermas.
4Cf.,for example, his critique of Roscher and Knies:"Sug-
jectivity and Determinism, " in Positivism and Sociology, ed. Giddens.
41discuss Weber's explicit views on the role of science
towards the end of this chapter.
G. Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience
(Chicago: Henry Pegnery, 1970), p. 325.
4 6 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 272.
7 Habermas, in Max Weber andSociology Today, ed. Stammer.
4 8 It should be noted that my knowledge of Kant rests too heavily
on secondary sources. Important for the views that are expressed
above were Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests; Goddard,
"Max Weber and the Objectivity of the Social Sciences, "; R. P. Wolff, ed.,
84
Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1968); L. Goldman, Immanuel Kant (London:
New Left Books, 1971).
4 9 Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity in the Social
Sciences," p. 12.
50bid., p. 14. (My emphasis.)
5 1 Ibid., pp. 14-15. (My emphasis.)
5 2Ibid. , p. 15.
5 3 Weber, M.S.S., p. 90.
5 4 Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity in the Social
Sciences," p. 15.
5 5 Weber, "Science as a Vocation,"1 From Max Weber, p. 143.
5 7 Weber, M.S. S., p. 58. (My emphasis.)
5 8 Weber, "Science as a Vocation, " From Max Weber, p. 143.
5Ibid.
6 0 Cf. C. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London: Wieden-
feld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 15-17.
6 1 Weber, M.S.S., p. 110.
6 2 Weber, "Science as a Vocation," From Max Weber, p. 163.
6 3 P. Fayerabend,Aai ntethod (London: New LeftBooks,
1975).
6 4 Weber, M.S.S., p. 110. (Second, fifth, and sixthemphases
are mine.)
6 5 Weber, M.S.S., p. 51.
85
6 6 K. LtSwith, "Rationaliztion and Freedom," in. Max Weber,
ed. D. Wrong (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 106.
6 7 For an elaboration of this theme, cf. Habermas, Know
and Human Interests, pp. 67-186. We explore this theme further in
the following pages.
6 8 The Heidelberg school was only of seven general tendencies
within neo-Kantianism. See T. K. Oesterreich, Die Deutsche Philoso-
phie des XIX Iahrhunderts und der Gegenwort, vol. 4 of Friedrich
tberwegs Grundiss der Gesichte der Philosophie (Berlin: E. S. Miller,
1923), pp. 416-70.
6 9 The two Heidelberg philosophers, W. Windelband and (especi-
ally) H. Rickert, were central figures in the shaping of Weber's
work. See A. Arato, "The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity,"
Telos (Fall 1974); and H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society
(St. Albans: Paladin Frogmore, 1974), pp. 287-96.
(The following nine references were brought to my attention by
J. Schmidt, in an unpublished paper, "The Tragic Vision in Neo-
Kantian Philosophy and Sociology." The translations are his unless
otherwise stated.)
7 0 W. Windelband, Gesichte und Naturwissenschaft (1894),
3rd unaltered ed. (Strassburg: J. H. Ed. Heitz, 1904).
7 1 Windelband was speaking essentially to the early work of
Dilthey.
7 2 Windelband, Gesichte und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 9-10.
7 3 Ibid. , p. 11.
Ibid. , p. 12.
7 5 H. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften
(Science and History) ed. A. Goddard, trans. George Reisman
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrandn, 1962).
7 6 Ibid. , p. xii.
Ibid. , pp. 1-2.
86
7 8 Ibid., p. 15.
7 9 Cf. J. Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, trans. M.
Ilford (New York:Pantheon Books, 1968), pp. 37-41.
8 0 For a brief overview of the debate cf. Freund, The Sociology
of Max Weber.
8 1 Ibid., p. 38.
8 2 Giddens, Capitalism and Social Theory, p. 134, and quoting
from Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufslttz zur Wissenschaftslehre
(Turbingen, 1968), p. 9ff. (My emphasis.)
8 3 At the time of writing the immediately above passages, I
had not read this essay and relied entirely an Giddens, Capitalism
and Social Theory, p. 134, for a summary. Since then this impor-
tant essay has been translated. Cf. Weber, "Subjectivity and
Determinism, " in Positivism and Sociology, ed. Giddens.
Ibid. , p. 134.
8 5 Weber's methodological writings attempt, of course, to
show how this is possible. The following chapter is concerned
to show how Weber proposed we proceed and what kind of detailed
methodological apparatus he recommended.
8 6 Weber, M.S. S., p. 74. (My emphasis.)
87
Weber, M.S. S. , p. 160.
88 Cf. the work and debates between Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn,
and Fayerabend. For an interesting and important attempt to
elaborate the nature of the respective sciences' value-orientations
cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.
89
I owe the above point about Weber's differentiation between
the natural and social sciences on the line of value-orientations,
and its critique to L. Simon (from an unpublished paper entitled
"A Discussion of Some Issues in Max Weber's Methodological
Writings').
9It might exist in zoology and biology, in attempts to compre-
hend, for example, advanced primates. But, obviously, to sustain
87
this point we need a very broad conception of Language and Com-
munication that transcends ordinary language.
9 1 Weber, M.S.S., p. 87.
9 2 Weber, M. S. S., p. 85.
9 Ibid. , p. 85.
9 4 Weber, M.S.S., p. 51.
95Ibid., p. 51. (First emphasis mine.)
9 6 Weber, M.S. S., p. 52.
9 7 Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 135.
9 8 Weber, M.S.S., p. 53.
99 For an illustration of these points see Weber's discussion of
Socialism, Economy and Society, vol. 1, pp. 65-68, 100-7, or Weber,
M. SS. S., p. 8, for a discussion of Anarchism.
1 0 0 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 151.
10 1 Ibid. , p. 152.
1 0 2 Ibid.
10 3
Cf. J. N. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York:
CollierBooks, 1966), pp. 70, 251-54; and S. Rosen, G. W. F.
Hegel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), chap. 3, for
a discussion of the concept of "an indentity of identity and difference."
0 4 Weber, "Science as a Vocation, " From Max Weber, p. 138 ff.
L. Simon, "A Discussion of Some Issues in Max Weber's
Methodological Writings, " pp. 17-18.
H. Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance, " in R. P. Wolff,
B. Moore, Jr., H. Marcuse, A Critique of Pare Tolerance
(Boston: Beacon, 1970).
88
1 0 7 See pp. 52-53.
1 0 8 For a discussion of the concept of class structuration cf.
A. Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London:
Hutchinson, 1973).
10 9 The relationship between Weber's empirical assessment of
the disenchanted world and his atomistic ontology is explored at
considerably greater length in the closing half of the following
chapter.
110
I am using the same defintion of ideology as on p. 75.
illGoldman, Immanuel Kant
112 Cf. p. 14.
3Cf.H. Marcuse, "Industrialization and Capitalism in Max
Weber," Negations (London: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 215.
1 1 4 For an elaboration of this theme, Giddens, Politics and
Sociolo8 y.
1 1 Ibid.
16Ibid. p. 56.
1 1 7 Habermas, in Max Weber and Sociology Today, ed. Stammer,
p. 64.
118
Cf. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. 6, for
an excellent discussion of the tenets of possessive individualism.
119
Habermas, in Max Weber and Sociolpgy Todayr, ed. Stammer,
p. 66. Habermas later modified his statement by saying that Carl
Schmitt was the "natural son" of Weber rather than "legitimate
pupil."
CHAPTER III
WEBER'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY AND METHOD
Having located the roles of value and method in Weber's work,
we are brought to Weber's analysis of causation and method. In
attempting to unravel these often misunderstood areas, we can pur-
sue the themes of the last pages to the inner mechanisms of Weber's
conception of the human sciences.
We have seen that it was Weber's view that the analysis of
"infinite reality" which the "finite mind" can conduct rests on the
as sumption that only a finite portion of this reality can be constituted
as the object of scientific investigation, and only it, once delineated
by the s ocial scientist's value -orientations and cons ide rations of
cultural significance, can be "objectively" known. Weber did not
believe, however, that this segment of "reality" should be selected
without aid and consideration of existing empirical studies and a
variety of empirical sources. In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences"
and Economy and Society, he points to criteria for selection. These
include the results of functional analysis, the usage of laws, psycho-
logical insights, and statistical facts.
89
90
The specific reference to organicist sociology--a "classical ex-
ample "- Weber cites as "Sch~ffle's brilliant work Bau und Leben des
Socialen Krpers'" 1 -- reveals that he considered it as a means of
"practical illustration and for provisional orientation, . . . not only
useful but indispensable. "? "But, " and in contradistinction to one
of his most well-known interpreters, 3 Weber immediately adds:
. . . at the same time if its cognitive value is
overestimated and its concept illegitimately
"reified" it can be highly dangerous. . . . In
the case of social collectivities precisely as
distinguished from organisms we are in a
position to go beyond merely demonstrating
functional relationships and uniformities. We
can accomplish something which is never attain-
able in the natural sciences, namely the subjective
understanding of the action of component indivi-
duals. . . We do not "understand" the behaviour
of cells, but can only observe the relevant
functional relationships and generalize on the
basis of these observations. This additional
achievement of explanation by interpretive under -
standing, as distinguished from external observation,
is of course obtained only at a price--the more
hypothetical andfragmentary character of its results.
Nevertheless, subjective understanding is the specific
characterization of sociological knowledge. 4
Weber differs strongly with SchMffle in his estimation of the logical
status of functional/holistic concepts. These, he argued, could
easily engulf sociologists into the hypostatization of concepts. It was
a "spectre of collective conceptions" which he sought "to exorcise." 5
None of this, of course, implies that Weber thought it unnecessary
and undesirable to use collective concepts, e. g. , the "State, " but he
91
always reminds one, in his methodological treatise, that it must not
be forgotten that these collectives are "solely the resultants and modes
of organization of the specific acts of individual men, since these
alone are for us the agents who carry out subjectively understandable
action. "6*
For Parsons it is given in the possibility of analytic science
(natural or social), the capacity to generate laws (statements that
formulate constant and empirically regular relationships between the
values of at least two variables). Parsons also believes, therefore,
that "Weber should have gone all the way to the view that in a purely
logical aspect there is no difference whatsoever ji. e. , between -
natural and social sciences], " and adds critically that "Weber does
not even consider the possibility of formulating laws of the latter
type, essentially because he does not develop social theory explicitly
in the direction of setting up a system of independent variables, but
confines it to the ideal type level.1"8
Weber did not, indeed, consider the possibility of formulating
laws for the social world which were logically akin to those of the
natural world; but this was by no means an oversight. He was deeply
*The point is made by Weber with considerable force. It
might also be noted in this context with some irony given the "implicit"
status of such concepts as "formal rationality, " the "fate" of the
modern world, etc.
92
critical of all such enterprises:
It has often been thought that the decisive criterion
in the cultural sciences, too, was in the last analysis,
the "regular" recurrence of-certain casual relation-
ships. The "laws" which we are able to perceive in
the infinitely manifold stream of events must- -
according to this conception--contain the scientific-
ally "essential" aspect of reality. . . . Accordingly,
even among the followers of the Historical School
we continually find the attitude which declares that
the ideal which all the sciences, including the
cultural sciences, serve and towards which they
should strive even in the remote future is a system
of propositions from which reality can be "deduced." 9
The goal of these cultural scientists was, Weber argued, ". . . how-
ever far it might be from realization . . . to construct a closed system
of concepts, in which reality is synthesized in some sort of permanently
and universally valid classification and from which it can again be
deduced. "10 Weber rejected such a goal and frequently attacked
this view. J. Eldridge has assessed succintly Weber's view on this
issue: "This position identified by Weber as the naturalistic viewpoint
(or prejudice!) is rejected by him fundamentally because he does not
accept that the cultural scientists can have a direct awareness of the
structure of human actions in all their reality. Il1 The point is well
illustrated by Weber 's consistent critique of those that made the
"fantastic claim" for "economic theories -- e. g. abstract theories
of price, interest, rent, etc. -- that they can, by ostensibly following
the analogy of the physical science propositions, be validly applied
93
to the derivation of quantatively stated conclusions from given real
premises, since given the ends, economic behaviour with respect to
means is unambiguously 'determined'.
This does not mean, Weber asserts, that nomothetic proposi-
tions are inapplicable or impossible in the human sciences: "a valid
imputation of any individual effect without the application of 'nomo-
logical knowledge,' -- i.e., the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences--
would in general be impossible. ,,13 In fact, Weber maintains:
Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural pheno-
menon--an "historical individual" is under consideration,
the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investi-
gation but only a means. It facilitates and renders
possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes
of those components of a phenomenon the individuality
of which is culturally significant. So far and only
so far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our know-
ledge of conrete relationships. And the more "general,"
i. e., the more abstract the laws, the less they can
contribute to the causal imputation of individual pheno-
mena and, more indirectly, to the understanding of the
significance of cultural events. 14
The extent to which a cultural scientist can reach a valid causal impu-
tation with either the aid of "concretely established generalisations"
and/or "with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and
trained in analytic methods" always depends for Weber, as A. Giddens
has written, "upon the particular case in question. But it is always
true that the more precise and certain our knowledge of relevant
general principles, the more certain the causal imputation we can
make. "15
94
At an opposite pole, Weber also maintains, that the practioners
of psychology may offer the social scientist insights. 16 He deals
swiftly, however, with those that propagate a simple psychological
reductionism. As an analytic tool, the analysis of psychological
factors would, he suggests, "be as useful as a textbook of organic
chemical combinations would be for our knowledge of the biogenetic
aspect of the animal and plant world. . . . Concrete reality cannot
be deduced from 'such' factors. ,,17 Weber's view of the role of
psychology is worth quoting at length, especially in light of the grow-
ing status and popularity of psychology and the stress some schools
of social science have placed on micro-sociology, etc.
. . . the partly brilliant attempts which have been
made hitherto to interpret economic phenomena
psychologically, show in any case that the procedure
does not begin with the analysis of psychological
qualities, moving then to the analysis of social insti-
tutions, but that, on the contray, insight into the
psychological preconditions and consequences of
institutions presupposes a precise knowledge of
the latter and the scientific analysis of their struc-
ture. In concrete cases, psychological analysis can
contribute then an extremely valuable deepening of
the knowledge of the historical cultural conditioning
and cultural significance of institutions. The interesting
aspect of the psychic attitude of a person in a social
situation is specifically particularized in each case,
according to the special cultural significance of the
situation in question. It is a question of an extremely
heterogeneous and highly concrete structure of psychic
motives and influences. Social-psychological research
involves the study of various very disparate individual
types of cultural elements with reference to their
interpretability by our empathic understanding. Through
95
social-psychological research, with the knowledge
of individual institutions as a point of departure,
we will learn increasingly how to understand insti-
tutions in a psychological way. We will not however
deduce the institutions from psychological laws or
explain them by elementary psychological
pehnomena. 18
The social scientist can also glean a great deal from "statistics,"
"statistical uniformities, " "facts, " e. g., death rates, suicide rates,
immigration patterns, life chances, etc. 19 These are data to be
"taken into account. " But however important, Weber clearly dis-
tinguishes the techniques of data collection from the construction of
analytic, sociological types (which we have hiterto referred to as
ideal-types). The collection of statistics are "treated by a different
method from the other; they become conditions, stimuli, furthering
or hindering circumstances of action. 120 J. Rex has made a similar
point when he observed, "research into what Weber called the 'life
chances' of human beings strictly speaking forms no part of sociology.
True it poses a problem for the sociologist who asks whether the
differential distribution of life chances is indicative of a particular
power system or whether it means the emergence of segregated ways
of life. But by itself it is simply a part of the study of human biology
in which exact descriptive and mathematical techniques have been
developed to a high level. "2-1
Having pointed to guidelines for investigation, to signposts for
96
the social scientific enterprise, we have, of course, as yet said
nothing of how, concretely, Weber suggests we establish the existence
of a causal relationship and how one might employ his guidelines,
concepts, and methods. It is to these issues that we must now turn.
In his critique of Edward Meyer's methodological writings, 22
Weber makes both a crucial and central distinction. Meyer, he points
out, is in "danger of confusing two fundamentally different but often
identified categories: the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi. "
The distinction is between two forms of analysis and it is explicated,
albeit in embryonic form, three pages later. Weber talks of
. . . this division of the logical use of data given by
cultural reality into (1) conceptualization with the
illustrative use of "particular facts" as "typical"
instances of an abstract "concept,"i. e. as an heuristic
instrument on the one hand--and (2) integration of the
"particular fact" as a link, i. e. as a real causal factor
into a real, hence c oncrete context with the use among
other things of the products of conceptualization on the
one hand as exemplificatory and on the other as heuristic
devices - -entails the distinction between what Rickert
called the "natural scientific" and Windelband the
"nomothetic" (ad 1) and the logical goal of the "historical
cultural" sciences (ad 2). It also implies the only
justified sense in which history can be called a science
of reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). For the meaning
of history as a science of reality can only be that it
treats particular elements of reality not merely as
heuristic instruments but as the objects of knowledge,
and particular causal connections not as premises of
knowledge but as real causal factors. 24
The methods of analysis of the form of ratio cognoscendi are said to
have a different logical structure from that of ratio: essendi. The
97
former represents the scientist's attempt to construct type concepts
(of man, of organizations, of authority, of culture, of socio-economic
structures) which are developed and elaborated as heuristic devices.
The latter form represents the attempt to establish causal linkages
in explaining historical events. Both moments of the neo-Kantian
distinction of "generalizing and individualizing tendencies''2 5 are
present but in a form that would have surprised Rickert. For as
we have seen, he associated the Kulturwissenshaften with the pre-
dominant use of the historical or individualizing method, whereas
Weber has located within the human sciences the applicability of
both forms of analysis. Furthermore, it is our contention that by
the time of Economy and Society, Weber's fully developed work
embodies these two modes of analysis as two distinct types of causal
analysis. That is to say that ratio congnoscendi no longer can be
understood (as in the Methodology essays) as being only concerned
with the construction of (ideal) type concepts for heuristic purposes.
The distinction between the two modes of analysis, their development,
and their consequences need careful attention.
The treatment of these two forms of analysis differs in the
methodological works over time. In "Objectivity in the Social
Sciences'' 2 6 both are present; the major discussion evolves around
concept formation but, when Weber talks of causality, he is talking
98
about the method of ratio essendi.
To the extent that our science imputes particular
causes--be they economic or non-economic--to
economic cultural phenomena, it seeks "historical"
knowledge. 27
In "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, "7-8 the
distinctions between modes of analysis are again present, but here the
primary concern revolves around causal analysis and the extension
and elaboration of the techniques of ratio essendi. In Economy and
Society there is a significant shift in emphases. He moves the focus of
attention towards the establishment of uniformities of social and
economic organization, to the problems underpinning the formulation
of general principles, generic types, ideal-types; toward sociology.
Let us proceed more slowly and examine each position in turn.
The determination of (hypothetical) "laws" and (psychological)
factors is only the first of many operations which lead us to the
desired type of knowledge, it is a preliminary task. The essential
stages of analysis include:
The analysis of the historically given individual con-
figuration of those "factors" and their significant
concrete interaction, c onditioned by their historical
context and especially the rendering intelligible of
the basis and type of this significance would be the
next task to be achieved. This task must be
achieved, it is true, by the utilization of the pre-
liminary analysis but it is nonetheless an entirely
new and distinct task. The tracing as far into the
past as possible of the individual features of these
historically evolved configurations which are
99
contemporaneously significant, and their historical
explanation by antecedent and equally individual con-
figurations would be the third task. Finally the
prediction of possible future constellations would be
a conceivable fourth task.2Z9
In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences" this "entirely new and dis-
tinct task" andthe "third task" are early expressions of the two
modes of analysis. Weber offers an example in a discussion of
exchange and the market. Here he clearly distinguishes between the
analysis of general aspects of exchanges (a "highly important task")
and the application of the concepts which we are provided by the investi-
gation. The application entails their use as heuristic devices for
historical, causal analysis. 30 The constituent elements of causal
analysis are given in the techniques of ratio essendi.
Although both moments of the investigatory procedure are
inadequately developed and little discusssed in this essay (ratio
essendi receiving fuller theoretical treatment in the critique of
Edward Meyer), one topic does attract Weber's attenticn: the speci-
fication and usage of ideal-types. Weber does not consider his dis -
cussion of ideal-type concepts original, a new form of conceptual
method. Rather he feels he is making explicit what was always im-
plicit in past procedure and practice. 31 Since the status of these
concepts has already been discussed, it is sufficient here to sharpen
the context of their usage. 32
100
The interpretation and explanation of an historical configura-
tion requires the construction and elaboration of concepts which are
specifically delinated for that purpose and which, as we have seen,
cannot and do not reflect "universally 'essential' properties of
reality.1"33 As "mental constructs," these concepts are not "des -
criptions" nor are they "hypotheses." But they can assist and further
both description and explanation.
Ideal-types are not created in and for themselves. Their utility
can be judged only in relation to a specific concrete problem. For
example, in formulating an ideal-type of a phenomenon such as rational
capitalism the "social scientist attempts to delineate, through the
empirical examination of specific forms of capitalism, the most
important respects (in relation to the concerns which he has set him-.
self) in which rational capitalism is distinctive. ,24 The ideal is
created and developed with empirical analysis and it, in turn, sharpens
that analysis. As A. Giddens has noted, "Weber concentrates his
discussion upon the formulation of ideal types which relate to the
elucidation of specific historical configurations, since this presents
the clearest differentiationof descriptive and ideal-types. But
ideal--type concepts are not solely limited to this objective, and there
are various kinds of ideal-types which, without being simple descrip-
tive concepts, nevertheless are generic in character. "35 The
question arises, then: when does a descriptive classification of
phenomena become an ideal-type?
Ideal-types (the "one-sided accentuation of one or more points
of view") are to be distinguished from the descriptive -type which
involves "the abstract synethesis of those traits which are common to
numerous concrete phenomena. "35 "The transition from descriptive
to ideal-types takes place when we move from descriptive classifica-
tion of phenomena towards the explanatory or theoretical analysis of
these phenomena. "37 Once again this can be illustrated in reference
to the discussion of "exchange. " Weber holds that the notion of
"exchange" is descriptive to the extent that we observe that a large
number of human actions may be labelled and classifed as exchange
transactions. "But if we attempt to make the notion an element
in marginal utility theory in economics, we construct an ideal-type
of "exchange" which is based upon a purely rational construct. "38
The role of ideal-types and concept formation is central to
Weber's early methodological essay. Its exposition highlights his
stress on the importance of the process of their formation as an
independent (yet obviously interlinked) stage of analysis. The
emergent concepts (a type of man, authority, economy, etc.) as
heuristic and/or expository instruments are argued to provide
increasing clarity and precision for historical causal analysis.
101
102
This procedure gives rise to no methodological
doubts s o long as we clearly keep in mind that
ideal-typical developmental constructs and history
are to be sharply distinguished from each other,
and that the construct here is no more than the
means for explicitly and validly imputing an
historical event to its real causes while elimina-
ting those which on the basis of our present know-
ledge seem possible. 39
As yet our discussion of "ratio cognoscendi" has not shown it to be a
separate stage of causal analysis (although types such as "handicraft
economyi" "early Christianity, " "rational capitalism, " the "modern
state"have potential explanatory power and usage). Weber was to
develop this initial discussion of types and concept formation several
stages further: before doing so, his whole conception of ratio essendi
was to be explicated.
Since "the meaning of history as a science of reality can only be
that it treats particular elements of reality not merely as heuristic
instruments, but as the subject of knowledge and particular causal
connections not as premises of knowledge but as real causal factors,"4 0
the question arises as to how one can establish the validity of "real
causal" factors, causal linkages.
Obviously not by the simple "observation" of
the course of events in any case, certainly not
if one understands by that a "presupposition-
less!' mental "photograph" of all the physical and
psychic events occurring in the space-time region in
question--even if such were possible. Rather does the
attribution of effects to causes take place through a-proces s of
103
thought which includes a series of abstractions. The
first and decisive one occurs when we conceive of
one or a few of the actual causal components as
modified in a certain direction and then ask our-
selves whether under the conditions which have been
thus changed, the same effect (the same, i. e. , in
"essential" points) or some other effect "would be
expected. "41
Here, in "Critical Studies in the Logic of Cultural Sciences, " Weber
is introducing a key notion, the notion of "objective possibility. "
The category was derived by Weber from a study of certain theories
of criminal law. The reasons for and significance of this position
are well brought out by Andrew Arate:
Objective necessity has no place in criminal law,
because it does not leave room for a dimension of
subjective knowledge; foreknowledge and intention.
But a criminal case must be ultimately decided
according to evaluations of this subjective dimen-
sion. Thus criminal cases must be reinterpreted
according to an objective dynamic that allows for
more than one possibility, even if we know that only
one of these was realized. In other words, a man can
be punished for his subjective role in an event only
if the event was influenced by this role. But that
means that without that role other possible events
could have taken place instead of the event that did. 42
Weber adopts this principle for historical research.
The adoption means, among other things, that the
interest of law to locate a subjective dimension in
the past is replaced by the (contemporary) interest
of the historian. The stress on a prior interest is
important because Weber rejects the possibility of
(1) the synthesis of a historical totality in-itself
and (2) the presuppositionless photographic ob-
servation of facts. The a priori intetest of the
104
historian isolates and generalizes individual com-
ponents of events to locate the possibilities within
the dynamic of the past. 43, 44
The analytic technique is a means whereby one can discriminate between
factors which are relevant and those which are not, in accounting for
certain observed events and effects. 45 In his classic example,
Weber recasts Edward Meyer's treatment of the significance of the
outcome of the battle of Marathon for the consequential development
of Hellenic and Western European culture.
The historian's interest in the battle, itself a "relatively"
small and contained event, is.precisely in its consequences for later
developments and with the thought of what might have been had the
Persians won. 46 In order to demonstrate that the battle was "causally
significant" in a particular way, we are asked to consider alternative
possible outcomes. Two possible course of events are presented
(i. e., the effects of Greek versus Persian influence over the develop-
ment of the Western World). The procedure in this kind of causal
analysis is necessarily one of abstraction, involving "imaginative
reconstruction"; the projection of what would have occurred if events
had been qualitatively and quantatively different. 47
The assessment of causal significance of an historical
fact will begin with the posing of the following que stion:
in the event of the exclusion of that fact from the
complex of factors which are taken into account as
105
co-determinants, or in the event of its modification
in a certain direction, could the course of events, in
accordance with general empirical rules (Erfahr-
ungsregelen), have taken a direction in any way
different in any features which would be decisive
for our interest? 4 8
In the case of the battle of Marathon, the consequences of Persian
victory would have been decisive for the subsequent formation and
advancement of Hellenic and, therefore, Western European culture.
One can conclude that had the battle taken a turn to the Persian
advantage, the outcome would have been "adequate" to produce a
qualitatively different pattern in the development of the Western
World. 49
This method of "imaginative reconstruction" is the process
whereby the historian can attribute significance to causal factors and
establish "adequate causation" through "judgments of possibilities."
Furthermore, Weber argues, "we can . . . well enough estimate
the relative 'degree' to which the outcome is 'favoured' by the general
rule by a comparison involving the consideration of how other condi-
tions operating differently 'would' have favoured it. When we carry
through this comparison in our imagination by sufficiently numerous
conceivable modifications of the constellection of conditions, then a
considerable degree of certainty for a judgement of the 'degree' of
objective possibility is conceivable, at least in principle. "50
106
Despite the familiar and fully justified notice which
warns against the transference of the calculus of
probabilities into other domains, it is clear that
the . . . case of favourable chance or "objective
probability" determined from general empirical
propositions or from empirical frequencies, has
its analogues in the sphere of all concrete causality,
including the historical. 51
But we cannot, Weber immediately adds, assign a numerical measure
of chance, because what is "wholly lacking" in historical analysis is
what would have to be presupposed in order to assign quantitative
measures--"the existence of 'absolute chance' or certain measurable
or countable aspects of phenomena. " if we ask about the possibility
of predicting an event, it is given in the historical enterprise to attempt
answers which may vary depending upon "the degree of knowledge of
empirical regularities" -- ranging from the unpredictable to various
degrees of objective possibility and objective probability. 52 These
anwers, however, cannot be quantified.
(It should be noted that Weber does not mean to imply that this
"thought experiment" should take place without consideration of past
relevant studies and existing empirical knowledge. "The simplest
historical judgement represents not only a categorically formed
intellectual construct but it also does acquire a valid content until
we bring to the "given" reality the whole body of our "nomoligical"
empirical knowledge. "-53)
* * * * * *
107
From the early methodological essays to Economy and Society,
Weber shifts the (methodological) emphasis from ratio essendi to
ratio cognoscendi; from history to sociology. The philosophical
backdrop and underpinnings of this method remain unrelinquished.
The same basic positions are taken for granted. The concern for
sociology is also not "new. " For in its fundamental conception, it
is an extension of the earlier focus on ration cognoscendi, etc. 54
Thus Weber states bluntly:
It has continually been as sumed as obvious that the
science of sociology seeks to formulate type concepts
and generalized uniformities of empirical process.
This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented
to the causal analysis and explanation of individual
actions, structures, and personalities possessing
cultural significance. 53
The full text reveals that the envisaged sociological project is both
involved and complicated. In what is by now a clas sic passage,
entitled "The Definitions of Sociology and Social Action, " Weber says:
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous
word is used here) is a science which attempts the
interpretive understanding of social action in order
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course
and effects. 56
Sociology is, on this conception, as Weber says, "highly ambiguous."
For it is conceived to involve (1) interpretive understanding of social
action in order, Weber suggests, to arrive at (2) a causal explanation.
However, a question arises: Does Weber mean (a) that sociology is
108
just concerned with (1) interpretive understanding which would pro-
vide empirical information about general principles etc., to (2) i. e. ,
causal analysis, which is the sole province of the methods of ratio
essendi (as it has been so far in our exegisis)? Or does he mean
(b) that sociology itself involves a form of analysis capable of causal
explanations (of social action)? Weber's stated position is not
transparent between these two alternative positions, although it will
be argued here that despite the fact that discussion and analysis at
the level of ratio essendi always take their point of departure from
analysis and formulations at the level of ratio cognoscendi, textual
analysis suggests strongly that ratio cognoscendi itself embodies
position (b) above. In other words, whereas history is seen as pri-
marily involving analysis to establish causal linkages between
"historical individuals,1" sociology is conceived as also embodying
the capacity to offer a causal account of social action. Weber's posi-
tion needs careful explication. We can begin by asking what Weber
means by social action.
"In 'action' is included, " he suggests, "all human behaviour
when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective
meaning to it. . . . Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the
subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals),
takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in
109
its course. "57
"Meaning, " Weber envisages, may be of two kinds:
The term may refer first to the actual existing
meaning in the given concrete case of a particular
actor, or to the average or approximate meaning
attributable to a given plurality of actors; or secondly
to the theoretically-conceived pure type of subjective
meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors
in a given type of action. 58
The line between meaningful action and behavior (which is reactive
and nonreflexive) "cannot be sharply drawn. " Many areas of human
activity- -important for sociological investigation- -lie between the
two, e. g., traditional behavior, mystical experiences ("which can-
not be adequately communicated in words") and many psycho-physical
processes ("discernible" at best "by the expert psychologist"). How-
ever, empathy and/or a "complete" recapitulation of an experience, "
is not a prerequisite to understanding": "one need not have been
Caesar in order to understand Caesar. "59
Interpretative sociology, Weber argued, must be based on inter -
subjectively recognized methods of procedure, for verifiable, repro-
ducible accuracy, if it is to be counted amongst the sciences. There
was no doubt, Weber believed, that the canons of scientific wisdom
would be met. "The basis for certainty in understanding can be either
rational, which can be further subdivided into logical or mathematical
or it can be of an emotionally empathic or artistically appreciative
110
quality. 1160 The latter is attained when, through sympathetic partici-
pation, we can adequately grasp the emotional context in which the
action took place. Rational understanding is most complete when we
attain an intellectual grasp of the "action elements in their intended
context of meaning. " It is best illustrated in the use, by a subject.
of mathematical reasoning or formal logic. "We have a perfectly
clear understanding of what it means when somebody employs the
proposition 2 x 2 = 4, or the Pythagorean theorem in reasoning or
argument, or when somebody correctly carries out a logical train of
reasoning according to our accepted modes of thinking. "61likewise,
we also understand what a person is doing "when he tries to achieve
certain ends by choosing appropriate means on the basis of the facts
of the situation as experience has accustomed us to interpret them."62
An interpretation of this type of rationally purposeful action (reminis -
cent of the Aristotelean idea of "practical syllogisms")6 3 possesses
the highest degree of verifiable certainty.
On the other hand, much human activity is not oriented to such
explicitly given ends or values. Furthermore, the more these ends
and values differ from our own, the more cultural distance between
investigator and the subject of study, "the more difficult it is for us
to make them understandable by imaginatively participating in them."
Empathy, Weber tells us, is an important means of obtaining
111
understanding of social action but is only one technique to help us
achieve such understanding. Understanding requires of the sociolo-
gist both emotional sympathy (if possible empathy) and an "intellec-
tual interpretation, " i. e. , an intellectual "grasping" and "catching,"
of the "subjective intelligibility" of action. *
Given our "basis for certainty in understanding, " Weber sub-
divides further the two essential types of Verstehen he distinguished.
The first, "direct understanding" (the grasping of the meaning of an
action through direct observation), may be subdivided according to
whether it involves rational or emotive actions. Both are simply
illustrated. "We understand perfectly" what it means when some -
body "employs the proposition 2 x 2 = 4. " Likewise, we "understand
an outbreak of anger as manifested by facial expressions, exclama-
tions, or irrational emotional reactions. " The second type of Ver-
stehen, "explanatory understanding" (erklJrendes Verstehen) is more
complex and difficult and it is this form that occupies Weber's atten-
tion the most. Here a particular act is placed:
*However, Weber briefly notes, "understanding" might fail
due to major cultural differences, etc. Then, he states, "we must
simply accept them (the overt and resultant action, etc. D. H.] as
given data. "
. . . in an understandable sequence of motivation, *
the understanding of which can be treated as an expla-
nation of the actual course of behaviour. Thus for
a science which is concerned with the subjective
meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of
the complex of meaning in which an actual course of
understandable action thus interpreted belongs. 64
If the action is rational we are able to grasp the content without
difficulty. "Thus we understand the chopping of wood or aiming of
a gun in terms of motive in addition to direct observation if we know-
that the woodchopper is working for a wage or is chopping a supply
of firewood for his own use or possibly is doing it for recreation.,,66
If the action is emotive we may attain a similar "motivational under -
standing. " For example, we may understand an outburst of anger if
we know that it has been provoked by "jealousy, - injured pride, or
and insult. "**
*"A motive, " on Weber's view, "is a complex of subjective
meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an
adequate ground for the conduct in question-." 6 5 Weber's concept of
"motive" (or "subjective meaning") appears as a "catch-all" category
for a subject's intended meanings, reasons, motives, common-
sense knowledge, and procedures. We briefly discuss some of these
concepts, conflated by Weber, at the end of this chapter.
**Weber recognizes that "in a large number of cases" it is
extremely difficult to arrive at a "satisfactory interpretation of
motives. " He argues that "verification of subjective interpretation
by comparison with the concrete course of events is, as in the case
of all hypothesis, indispensable. " A few cases are "susceptible to
psychological experimentation. " "For the rest there remains only
the possibility of comparing the -largest possible number of historical
or contemporary processes which, while otherwise similar, differ
113
We can apply the term "adequacy on the level of meaning" to
"the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when
and insofar as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling,
its component parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to
constitute a 'typical' complex of meaning. r 6 7 However, such
adequacy is not to be taken as having synonymity with causal adequacy.
There is, of course, in Weber's opinion no simple and direct relation-
ship between motives, "complexes of meaning" and action. But there
is scope to explore whether or not there are systematic interconnec-
tions between motives, etc. , and action. In order to demonstrate
such interconnections and, therefore, "explanatory significance,"
we must, Weber contends, establish "empirical generalizations"
which relate an understandable sequence of motivation to a specified
class of assessible consequences. 68 An alternative form of causal
analysis to that subsumed by ratio essendi seems to be suggested.
A correct causal analysis, Weber states, pivots on our capacity
"to determine that there is a probability, which in the rare ideal case
can be numberically stated, but is always in some sense calculable,
that a given observable event (overt or subjective) will be followed or
in the one decisive point of their relation to the particular motive or
factor the role of which is being investigated. This is a fundamental
task of comparative sociology. Often unfortunately . . . we are left
to the 'imaginary experiment'. . . to arrive at a causal judgement"
(T. S.E. 0. , p. 97. )
114
accompanied by another event. "69 Therefore, a correct causal
interpretation of a concrete course of action is arrived at when the
relationship between overt action and motives has become meaning-
fully comprehensible and at the same time shown to be typical.
A correct causal interpretation of typical action means
that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown
to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning
and at the same time the interpretation is to some degree
causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to meaning
is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of
uniformity and how precisely its probability can be
numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible
statistical probability, whether dealing with overt or
subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most
perfect adequacy on the level of meaning has causal
significance from a sociological point of view only in
so far as there is some kind of proof for the existence
of a probability that action in fact normally takes the
course which has been held to be meaningful. For this
there must be some degree of determinable frequency
of approximation to an average or pure type.
Statistical uniformities constitute understandable
types of action . . . and thus constitute "sociological
generalisations" only when they can be regarded as
manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning
of a course of social action. 70
In sociology, if we are applying the methods of explanatory
understanding, a correct causal analysis of social action is stipulated
to require adequacy at the level of meaning and causation. It is
crucially important here to note Weber's remarks on causality. For
what Weber seems to be suggesting is that, given one adequately
grasps "the levelof meaning, " a correct analysis also depends on our
capacity to show causal significance, i. e., that the relationship
115
between "motives, " a complex of subjective meaning, and a given
action, is empirically significant (i. e., typical). This will be the
case if there is proof "for the existence of a probability that action
in fact normally takes the course which has been held to be meaning-
ful. " If an "empirically significant" relationship can be established
between "motives," etc. , and overt action, we have established ade -
quate grounds to ascribe typical causation, i. e., "motives " can be
causes. On the basis of such an analysis of experiences in particu-
lar situations with particular outcomes, we can make "sociological
generalizations" about understandable, regular types of actions. An
example of such an analysis is P. Walton's and L. Taylor's study of
industrial sabotage. The study attempts an analysis of "the meanings
or motives which lie behind such action, "171 (i. e. , industrial sabo-
tage) within the context of "an imaginative reconstruction of the
contextual situation in which the actor performs. "7 They find
three pure types showing that individuals attempt "to destroy or
multilate objects in the work environment in order (i) to reduce
tension, or (ii) to facilitate the work process, or (iii) to assert some
form of direct control. "73 The types that are presented are pure
in that they do not reflect the actual behavior of any person, but
they can be used as a benchmark against which to analyze an actual
course of behavior.
115
between "motives, " a complex of subjective meaning, and a given
action, is empirically significant (i. e., typical). This will be the
case if there is proof "for the existence of a probability that action
in fact normally takes the course which has been held to be meaning-
ful. " If an "empirically significant" relationship can be established
between "motives," etc., and overt action, we have established ade -
quate grounds to ascribe typical causation, i. e. , "motives" can be
causes. On the basis of such an analysis of experiences in particu-
lar situations with particular outcomes, we can make "sociological
generalizations" about understandable, regular types of actions. An
example of such an analysis is P. Walton's and L. Taylor's study of
industrial sabotage. The study attempts an analysis of "the meanings
or motives which lie behind such action," 71 (i. e., industrial sabo -
tage) within the context of "an imaginative reconstruction of the
contextual situation in which the actor performs. " 7 2 They find
three pure types showing that individuals attempt "to destroy or
multilate objects in the work environment in order (i) to reduce
tension, or (ii) to facilitate the work process, or (iii) to assert some
form of direct control. "73 The types that are presented are pure
in that they do not reflect the actual behavior of any person, but
they can be used as a benchmark against which to analyze an actual
course of behavior.
116
It is important, J. Eldridge has pointed out, "to distinguish
between two kinds of probablistic statement, both of which can
properly be thought of as conditional generalizations. The one we
might term an empirical tendency statement based upon statistical
knowledge- -for example, the tendency of certain groups of people to
be located in the commanding positions in a society. The other we
might term ideal typical constructions with built -in statements about
probability, which may be utilized as a benchmark against which to
analyze the actual course of behaviour." 7 4 And these ideal-typical
constructions of action, as we have seen, if they are the result of
explanatory understanding, rest on a form of causal analysis.
If there is to be a scientific analysis of social action--an analysis
that proceeds beyond description--it has, Weber argues, to construct
ideal types. Through the use of such types (constructed on ideas of
rational action (Z ckraional or value -oriented action Wertrational.
or emotive or traditionallyorient-ed action), "it is possible to compare
with this the actual course of action and to arrive at a causal explana-
tion of the observed deviations, " which can be "attributed to the
influence of " logical fallacies, personal factors, and a host of other
possible elements. Although "as in the case of every generalizing
science the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is reponsi-
ble for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are
117
relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content. To compensate
for this disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater pre-
cision of concepts . . . by striving for the highest possible degree of
adequacy on the level of meaning. . . . 175 And if our pure action
concepts are only constructed on the basis of "direct understanding"
(or if we cannot demonstrate causal adequacy in an attempted explana-
tory understanding), adequacy on the level of meaning is the only way
we can compensate for the lack of fullness of our generalizations.
These generalizations, nevertheless, add very important precision
to any historical analysis (which might employ a whole range of
types) that we might make.
In all cases, rational or irrational,sociological
analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same
time helps us to understand it, in that it shows with
what degree of approximation a concrete historical
phenomenon may be in one aspect "feudal" in
another "patrimonial" in another "bureaucratic, " and
in still another "charismatic. " In order to give a
precise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for
the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the
corresponding forms of action which in each case
involve the highest possible degree of logical inte-
gration, by virtue of their complete adequacy at the
level of meaning. But precisely because this is true,
it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can
be found which corresponds exactly to any one of these
ideally constructed pure types. 76
To briefly summarize we should note that Weber's emergent
methodological position is one that combines and locates the two
movements of the neo -Kantian view of the methods of the s ciences
118
within a single framework. Both ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi
provide us with a form of causal analysis. Ratio cognoscendi also
generates heuristic instruments, formulations that ratio essendi
embraces as a point of departure. But it is sociology and history
that provide the developed methodological position for investigation.
Weber thus distinguishes sciences oriented toward generalization
and individuation, .toward -sociology and. history, but distinguishes
only one methodological framework for the human sciences as a whole.
* * * * * *
The tensions we have discerned and discussed so far revolved
around Weber's account of the relationship between fact and value,
theory and practice, and that which he took for granted and subsumed.
Our present account of his methodological procedures highlight a
further central issue: that the very logical structure of Weber's
approach to the human sciences and theory formation, predetermines
the possible applications of the knowledge generated by such sciences.
In other words, that the very structure of knowledge generated by
Weber's conception of rational method is restricted in its potential
usage and that the investigatory procedures structure this bias.
The suggestion needs careful explication.
For Weber the methods of ratio cognoscendi has as an essential
119
task the establishment of types, with the aim of finding out reliable
general rules of social behavior. They can be applied at two levels.
Firstly, they can be used for the empirical study of social action
where the sociologist attempts to explore and elaborate relationships
between motives and actions, which may then help to explain actual
courses of behavior. Secondly, they can be used- -as the emphasis
in the Methodology essays and on "Direct Understanding" suggests--for
the construction of types by an investigator (without the empirical
study entailed by the previous level of application) and then employed
purely for heuristic purposes in the application of the methods of
ratio essendi. In the first named procedure, Weber can be seen as
attempting to provide a methodological framework for a hermeneutic
account of social action. We will say more about this later. To the
second named procedures, which are also hermeneutic in intent and
predominate in Weber's own studies and empirical work, a number of
points can be made that "connect" a great deal of what we have said
to date. (In the following discussion we will refer to these two levels
of application as position A and B, respectively. )
To begin with it can be noted that these investigatory procedures
are representative of more than is made explicit; they are a "consis -
tent expression of a quite definite attitude of man to reality. 1177 In
a comment that summarizes many of our themes to date, Loewith has
said:
120
The ideal-typical construct has as its foundation a
specific "illusionless" man who has been thrown
back upon himself alone, by a world become objec-
tively meaningless and sober, and therefore, to that
extent, emphatically "realistic. " He is therefore
forced to forge by himself any objective meaning
and a meaningful relationship to things, and in parti-
cular the relationship to reality, as one specifically
his own: in short "to create" a meaning, practically
and theoretically. People, state, and individual
therefore can no longer be regarded and integrated
as uniform substances with deeper backgrounds --
not merely because it would be unscientific but
because such an attitude would be marked by trans -
cendental prejudices and ideals, and the world view
into which "we have been placed" no longer justifies
such prejudices. "78
In a world that has eaten of the tree of knowledge, that "suffers the
fate of the modern era, " it is the individual who alone is sanctified.
A pivotal presupposition, which Weber tries to justify through
empirical reference is that
since all kinds of objectivities, as a result of
their disenchantment (through rationalization) can no
longer be imputed an independent meaning, it is only
the "individual, " the single man dependent solely upon
himself who is truly real and justified in his existence.
Weber asserts the purely methodological meaning of "individualistic"
and "rational" definitions, types, and constructs and denies their
substantive character and value -relatedness. 80 However, his
method embraces, as we have shown, an atomistic and individualistic
ontology, an evaluation of a mode of rationality and practice, and a
commitment to the production of certain forms of knowledge, which
alone are considered objective.
121
As such, his work is also ambivalent between an explicit
atomistic and rationalistic conception of the totality and and implicit
organicist or formalist conception. 81 In the former case, the whole
can never be known. We can only know elements of the whole and in
Weber's view even these from only a partial and one -sided view.
This conception of the totality is clearly the view that Weber explicitly
holds. As a consequence a methodological individualism can be seen
to permeate his approach in that firstly, what we can know of the
world is fragmentary and depends on our constituting standpoint
(value -orientations) and secondly, if one wants to understand what
passes, for example, under "collective" conceptions, then according
to Weber "the clear -cut sharply defined analysis of the various pos -
sible standpoints is the only path which will lead us out of verbal
confusion.1"82 "Collective" conceptions are important and useful for
an initial orientation to an issue, but should always be superseded by
analytical concepts which can put the research topic into perspective.
However, Weber's approach also embodies an implicit reference
and commitment to a formalist conception of the totality (although he
explicitly rejected such an approach in his methodological writings).
His work embraces interpretations of the whole of society and the
totality of tendencies and, therefore, subsumes "a more pretentious
concept of sociology. " Here the conception of the whole is formalized
122
and is raised to a position of domination over the parts. Social
reality is conceived as being held within an "iron cage, " an inescap-
able condition. 83
It is, in fact, Weber's implicit conception of the nature of
totality as a formal whole which become s the empirical basis and
hence partial justification of an individualistic ontology and his
methodological commitment to an atomistic conception of the totality.
Since we have already considercd these issues at some length, let us
here firstly, direct attention to his explicit methodological commit-
ments (and then come back to his implicit methodological "interests").
The establishment, application, and use of ideal types is central
to Weber's study of history and the working out of historical explana-
tions and "real" causal factors. The nature and quality of the histori-
cal relationships these procedures uncover have been well summarized
by A. Arato:
In the first instance, the concept of ideal type seems
to methodologically negate the historicity of the
spectacle it constructs. 84 However, Weber considered
ideal typic analysis only a means toward (and not the
whole of) historical analysis. He believed that the same
problem complex can be, and must be, cut into from
the points of view of several (at times opposing) ideal
types. But the aim of this procedure is the imputation
of the "adequate causation" of a unique cultural event,
or rather the reconstruction of the "objective possibilities"
of the unique cultural problem complex. 85 The adequate
cause is comprised of all the elements (each formulated
as ideal types: e. g. , "Puritan ethic, " "rational law, "
"modern science, " "free labor, " "bureaucratic state")
123
which made the emergence of a unique cultural com-
plex (also formulated as an ideal-type, e. g. , "capita-
isim, " "the spirit of capitalism, " and ultimately
Western rationality) objectively possible. But the
adequate cause is not yet a historical dynamic: the
possibility of history is not yet its reality. Weber
seeks this dynamic through his concept of "elective
affinity" (Wahlverwandschaft). He rejects the pos-
sibility, e. g., that "Western rationality" is a whole
that develops through its special cases, e. g., Pro-
testant ethic, rational law, etc. , because these elements
move in distinctly separate spheres: in their original
form they are not even comparable. Nevertheless,
these elements are the givens whose interaction
"establishes the rationality which each possesses in
outline form, " each "acquires its historical meaning
only through its encounter with the others. "86, 87
The results of Weberian analysis are an account/explanation
of an aspect of the historical social world, which is always partial
and one-sided, and takes place through concepts which capture an
aspect of this world but cannot grasp it in itself. Weber explicitly
rejects the possibility of knowing the historical totality or any of its
parts in themselves. The analysis is always external to the object
of investigation because this object, ultimately, cannot be known.
The social scientist imposes order on the "infinite cultural mani-
fold, " in his/her attempts to account for a segment of this "flux."
In other words, the social scientist gives and imposes form and
categories on the social world and creates valid representations.
But a plethora of forms, types, and explanations are, of course,
legitimate and valid (so long as the procedures and canons of rational
124
method are adhered to).
Central to Weber's methodological position are the dichotomies
between the world that can and cannot be known, between the know-
ing subject and the ultimately unknowable object. Weber attempts to
locate all cognition and rationality on the side of the knower. There
is an empirical basis and justification for this view and these
dichotomies; they reflect the diremption of man and the world in
the age of disenchantment and, consequentially, new found autonomy.
There is.also a crucial epistemological foundation. It is clearly
Kantian. For Weber ultimately reproduces the Kantian dualism
between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds; the worlds we can
know and that which exists in itself and is unknowable. We say
ultimately because Weber has his own version of this position.
Firstly, its genesis is to be accounted for historically. It is an his -
torical derivation and product (the result ofrationalization and disen-
chantment). Secondly, the outcome of these historical processes
was held to be the realization that- reality is an objectively meaning -
less, valueless, infinite flux, the overcoming of which Weber saw as
possible only through individual commitment and decision which
could create and impose form and potentially "objective" and valid
knowledge. A number of points about these issues can usefully be
made to elucidate Weber's view.
125
The Kantian doctrine of transcendental categories serves to
bring and tie together two realms or levels of phenomena:
(1) the cognitions, perceptions, intuitions,
feelings, etc. , of the particular individual, which
are commonly referred to through the use of terms
such as Erlebnis (lived experience) or simply Leben
(life in the sense in which German Lebensphilosophie
developed the term; as human life and experience
and (2) categories, forms, means of expression,
and symbols which are universal in some fashion,
and shared by a community of individuals, thus
making possible transpersonal, inter -subjective
discourse about the contents of Erlebnis and Leben. 88
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brought these two levels together and
attempted to bind them into an indisputable unity.
If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving
representations in so far as it is in any wise affected,
is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of
producing representations from itself, the spontaneity
of knowledge, should be called the understanding.
Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can
never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only
the mode in which we are affected by objects. The
faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think
the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.
To neither of these powers may a preference be given
over the other. Without sensibility no object would be
given to us, without understanding no object would be
thought. Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind. 89
As James Schmidt has point out:
With the requirements that empirical knowledge must
be viewed as consisting of both a general, inter-
subjectively shared power of producing representa-
tions ("the spontaneity of knowledge") and a-specific,
intuited, personal experience ("the receptivity of our
mind") Kant has given a solution to the problem of
126
knowledge which neither sacrifices the individual's
experience to the dictates of a higher or more
enlightend intuition (such as a wisdom which can
only be achieved by a limited group within the society)
nor dissolves the general images and representations
of discourse into a babel of competing claims and
descriptions. Disagreements may arise between
individual experience, but there exist reasonable ways
of settling them, since both the spontaneity of know-
ledge and the receptivity of mind are general species
traits of all human beings. Kant is able to win this
battle, however, only at the cost of the problematic
Ding an sich. 9 0
Weber follows this Kantian position very closely. For, as we
have seen, he provides a solution to the problem of knowledge which
also grants central importance to the individual's experience, values,
faith, and yet also does not dissolve general forms and representa-
tions into solipsism. In the human sciences Weber both preserves
the autonomous constituting role of the individual and the possibility
of rational, inter -subjective discourse. We are prevented from
collapsing into a babel of competing claims (skepticism) by adherence
to the canons of rational scientific method. Weber wins this battle
also only at the cost of reproducing Kant's dualism between the
phenomenal and noumenal realms and establising the problematic
Ding an sich. Even if the object of investigation is another subject
or oneself, there is a noumenal realm, which we cannot know.
It is very important to realize the consequences of this view
for the human science. This further dualism insures that a critically
127
reflexive understanding of the genesis of different values, value -
orientations, etc. , which we referred to at the end of the previous
chapter, cannot become part of the human sciences program. Weber's
approach and methods, with its "individualistic" and "rational"
definitions, structure the world as to make such a project anathema.
Why this is so needs careful explication.
It has already been shown that Weber 's attempt to maintain
the dualisms of fact and value and theory and practice masks a com-
mitment to a particular schema of values and practice. It has also
been argued that Weber's methodological - position embraces an evalua-
tion of the meaning of the rationalized world, as it subsumes formal
rationality as a position supposedly free of evaluations and value -
judgments (from which it criticizes all other views as ideological,
i. e., embodying commitments to practical and value judgments).
It can also be noted, as previously pointed out, that on this view reality
is both the object of analysis and the guiding thread for the interpre -
tation of this reality. This is because Weber claims the disenchanted,
rationalized world, or totality, to be of a particular quality and kind,
i.e., meaningless,-etc., and therefore can only be given meaning and
known if one pursues a particular form of method, etc. But now we
should note that we are in a circle. For what is (claimed to be)
known has become the standard of what can be known. It is like
128
Kant's demand that we should know the cognitive faculty before we
know.
Even if we leave aside this last point, the consequences of the
dualism between the world of appearances that we can know and the
essence that we cannot, can be seen to have further implications.
For since the world (or an aspect of it) cannot be known in itself,
there is no justification available, no privileged standpoint, etc. ,
which can claim access to it. Quite literally, in the end, one man' s
value-orientations, concepts, etc. , are able to shed as much light on
this world as another's (so long, of course, as they employ the rational
method). For historical reasons, there now exists a philosophical
position that can justify the inapplicability of a critical reflexive
understanding of the "social world. "
In Weber's view we can give a partial description of the processes
whereby people acquire their values, world-views, etc., but we can-
not give a critical account of these. Weber can help give an indivi-
dual an account of the ultimate meaning of his or her own conduct
and even point out the one -sided, limited nature of this person's
views and orientations. But Weber can only do so by pointing out
the legitimacy of competing claims, explanations, and by arguing
that the totality in objectively meaningless,etc., outside of indivi-
dually grounded characterizations. He cannot, in the end, arbitrate
129
between claims and claim the ideological nature of certain values,
standpoints, etc., i. e. , that they are not only limited and one -sided
but also false and distorted. He cannot do this because he has no
conception of a false and distorted view of the world (given we follow
the correct methodological procedures). He only claims ideology
when value -judgments enter into science. The philosophical justifi-
cation of this position is, of course, that since we cannot know the
object of investigation in-itself, we cannot ground any priviledged
access to this world. As we have seen and see again here, Weber's
position condones a situation of theoretical relativism, a pluralism
in the human sciences and allows no objective ground for discrimi-
nating amongst competing accounts and explanations and voicing a
preference. Weber's methods and concepts remain external to the
world in.-itself and in so doing find a philosophical ground and justi-
fication for relativism.
Hence inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge can
only be meaningfully pursued in the form of methodological inquiry
into the rules for the construction and corroboration of scientific
theories. Weber's methodological "discussions" with his contem-
poraries should be seen in this light. 91 The subjects that proceed
according to these rules lose their significance. But this view,
firstly, as we have already repeatedly noted, makes a dogma of
130
method and masks a commitment to the values and consequences of
formal rationality, which cannot be justified within its own terms of
reference, i.e., requires a practically reasoned justification which
is not made. Secondly, it rests on a philosophical argument that
dirempts the world into phenomenal and noumenal realms. The
question remains: is this view and argument justified?
To answer this question fully and adequately is beyond the
bounds of this work. It would require "nothing less" than a recapitu-
lation of Hegel's critique of Kant. Here we can only suggest a num-
ber of points and arguments that point to the inadequacy of the Kantian
dualism and Weber's failure to grasp the dialectic of experience.
The arguments and directions we suggest here are taken further in
the second part of the thesis. For they highlight an alternative
program for the social sciences, a critical program that becomes
justified and plausible when it is seen that this final dualism breaks
down.
In the Phenomenology 9 2 Hegel sought to demonstrate that any
methodological procedure that concentrates exclusively on either the
subject or object of investigation breaks down through immanent
contradiction. Likewise any epistemology that hopes to establish
131
and delineate the knowing process in, abstract philosophical reflec-
tion. Writing of Kant's circular reasoning, Hegel points out that:
What is demanded (by Kant, D. H. is thus the follow-
ing: we should know the cognitive faculty before we
know . . . The investigation of the faculty of know-
ledge is itself knowledge, and cannot arrive at its
goal because it is this goal already. 93
Weber's reasoning, we have already seen, embodies an analogous
circle.
We cannot, Hegel contends, restrict our attention to concepts,
forms, and categoris, but rather must concentrate on the explication
of the knowing process that gives rise to new conceptual forms. Such
a process Hegel finds is a continuous dialectic of subject and object
in which both terms are constantly changing, developing, and being
redefined. It makes no sense to talk of an unknowable object, a dis -
tinct noumenal realm, because to posit such a realm is to make a
cognitive claim. Summarizing an important part of Hegel's argu-
ment, Marcuse writes:
When experience begins, the object seems a stable
entity, independent of consciousness; subject and
object appear to be alien to one another. The pro-
gress of knowledge, however, reveals that the two
do not subsist in isolation. It becomes clear that the
object gets its objectivity from the subject. "The
real" which consciousness actually holds in the end-
less flux of sensations and perceptions, is a universal
that cannot be reduced to objective elements free of the
subject (for example, quality, thing, force, laws). In
other words, the real object is constituted by the
(intellectual) activity of the subject. The latter discovers
that it itself stands "behind" the objects. . . . 94
132
We cannot obviously follow Hegel's account of a subject's (or as
Hegel puts it, a "consciousness' ") journey of discovery. For this
would mean nothing less than a recapitulation of the Phenomenology.
We can, however, and this is crucial for our argument, say a little
about Hegel's analysis of the dialectical nature of experience.
In the Introduction of the Phenomenology Hegel wrote:
The dialectical movement, which consciousness exer-
cises on itself--on its knowledge as well as its object--
is, in so far as the new, true object emerges to
consciousness as a result of it, precisely that which
is called experience. . . . Consciousness knows
something, and this object is the essence or the in-
itself. But this object is also the in-itself for con-
sciousness; and hence the ambiguity of truth comes
into play. We see that consciousness now has two
objects; one is the first in-itself and the second is
the being for consciousness of this in-itself.
(These two objects, in the above and following passages, can be
thought of as Hegel's equivalent conception of what Kant had called
the noumena (the being in-itself) and phenomena (the being for con-
sciousness of this in-itself. ) Hegel continues the passage by saying
that:
The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection
of consciousness into its self, a representation, not
of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object.
But as already indicated, the first object comes to be
altered for consciousness in this very process; it
ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to conscious -
ness an object which is the in-itself only for it. And
therefore it follows that this, the being-of-consious -
ness of this in-itself, is the true, which is to say that
this true is the essence or consciousness' new object.
133
This new object contains the annihilation of the first;
it is the experience constituted through that first
object. 95
The necessity to discuss the nature of the true in-itself becomes
redundant and left to the medium of philosophical abstraction. The
result of Hegel's decision to attempt to explicate the process of
knowing reveals that consciousness can come and can only come to
know the world as it appears. The knowledge we have of the world
is our knowledge, in its being for us. As K. Dove wrote, "Since
the object of our inquiry is knowing, any distinction on our part
between subject and object would be playing with mere abstractions.
Our object is at once and inseparably both the object-knowing subject
and the object known-by-the-subject. Thus our object, consciousness
or Spirit, contains this subject-object distinction within itself and
requires no further distinction by us. 9
The "supra-phenomenal" constructs of Kantian philosophy are
unnecessary since the experiences of consciousness itself lead to
the discovery and uncovering of a more concrete distinction.
Natural consciousness will show itself to be merely
the concept (Begriff) of knowledge, or unreal know-
ledge. But since it immediately takes itself to be
real knowledge, this pathway has a negative signifi-
cance for it, and what is actually the realization of
the Concept is for it [for consciousness, D. r athe r
the loss and destruction of its self. The road may
thus be viewed as the way of doubt or, more properly
as the way of despair. For what happens here is not
what is usually understood by "doubt, " i. e., entertain-
ing a disbelief in this or that presumed truth only to
134
return to that same "truth" once the "doubt" has been
appropriately dissipated . . . On the contrary, this
road is the conscious insight into the truth of phenome-
nal knowledge, a knowledge for which that is most
real which is in truth only the unrealized Concept. 97
Phenomenal knowledge shows its incompleteness, one-sidedness,
limitedness, and falseness at the phenomenal level. The development
of the knowing subject is not epistemological activity per se, for
that process cannot be severed from the historical struggle between
man and his world, "a struggle that is itself a constitutive part of the
way to truth and of truth itself. "98 It is struggle along a road of
doubt and despair where the subject is continually confronted with
the inadequacy of its concepts. But the question arises: doswe not
risk skepticism or solipsism in this process? For what standards
or criteria reveal incompleteness or the inadequacy of our concepts?
For Hegel it is, of course, of central importance to realize
that standards are always our standards -- "consciousness provides
itself with its own standard, and the investigation will accordingly
be a comparison of consciousness with its own self. "119 K. Dove
has elucidated this process well:
To understand how this comparison takes place we
must observe that, just as consciousness or Spirit
was seen to be at one both "subjective" and "objec-
tive, " this same duality holds true for the Concept:
consciousness itself distinguishes between (a) the
Concept qua knowledge and (b) the Concept qua
object. Hence there is with consciousness not
only something which is taken to be .for it; con-
sciousness also assumes that that which is for it,
135
is in-itself or has an independent status as well.
Accordingly, we see that the Concept has two
moments. If we take the Concept to be knowledge,
then the standard for this Concept qua knowledge will
be its object or what is said to exist in-itself. In
this case the comparison will consist in seeing
whether the Concept corresponds to the object, i. e.,
what consciousness now regards as the standard of
truth. But, on the other hand, if we take the Con-
cept to be the object as it is essentially or in-itself,
then the Concept itself will be the standard for the
Concept qua known, i. e. , the Concept qua object of
knowledge. Here the comparison consists in seeing
whether the Concept ua known or qua object corresponds
to the Concept itself.fl
Furthermore, as Dove points out, it must be noted that (a) both these
aspects of the Concept must be taken into account in any attempt to
describe the knowing process and (b) it must be realized that both
these aspects embody, in fact, the same process. "The standard is
selected by consciousness itself and, since both moments of the
process fall within our object, i. e. , knowledge as it appears, any
selection of standards on our part would be superfluous. "10l The
movement and development of consciousness depends then on the pro-
cess whereby "consciousness not only selects its own standard but
is also the comparison of its knowledge with its own standard. "10Z
And if, as happens continually in the subject's struggle in the world,
consciousness finds that its criteria or standard and its knowledge
do not match, it will, "on the basis of its own assumptions, have to
change its knowledge in order to make -it correspond to its
136
standards. ,,103 But as consciousness' knowledge changes, it follows
from what we have said above, that consciousness' standard changes,
"for the standard was based upon the object and, indeed, upon the
object qua known.1"104
Consciousness thus discovers that the process in
which it placed its knowledge in doubt, all the while
certain that it held a firm criterion for what the
object of its knowledge was in-itself, turns out to
be a movement in which it loses its own truth; the
"path of doubt" (Zweifel) is transformed into "the
way of despair" (Verzweiflung). . . . Moreover,
this despair is not something arbitrarily imposed
on consciousness from without; it is immanent in
the very movement of consciousness itself. Thus,
in Baillie's poignant translation, consciousness
"suffers this violence at its own hands. "105
Experience is, therefore, a dialectical process to the extent to
which "new objects" are generated and established for itself. It is
a process in which consciousness negates the appearance of the first
object of consciousness' experience and in this process uncovers a
new object and a new standard. The negation has a content, it is a
a determinate negation. 106
Hegel speaks of the Concept (Begriff), where Kant spoke of
Categories, forms, intuitions, etc. And where Kant speaks of a
phenomenal and-noumenal world, a given diremption between subject
and object, Hegel argues we can only speak of an interaction and
tension between subject and object in the process of knowing, out of
which the concept arises. This concept cannot be identified with the
137
subject or object. It is neither simply a subjective creation and
representation nor an objective structure. Rather, it is temporal
and variable and is given subjectively, but dependent for its realiza-
tion and validity on concrete human, inter -subjective, history, in
which man interacts with the world that he is conscious of. To speak
of two worlds, as Weber did, is to gloss the complexity of man's
self-formative process and his constitution of the world. How we
might further conceive these processes will be taken up in the
next part of the thesis. It is important here, however, to note the
consequences of Hegel's critique of the Kantian dualism for Weber's
own approach to the human sciences.
Firstly, we must note that where Weber claims discontinuity,
we can only find continuity. The dualism that Weber subsumes can-
not be maintained. Secondly, we must notice that the formal -
rationality of Weber's method structures the object of investigation
in such a way as to perpetuate this dualism. The true in-itself can-
not be known. We can only make valid claims about an object from
our own individual standpoints and if we utilize the rational method.
Our concepts will then capture parts of this object and render valid
knowledge. But since the true in-itself cannot be grasped, any num-
ber of points of view can formulate starting points of investigation.
We, therefore, have a conception of the human sciences, previously
138
noted, that sees relativism as an essential feature.
But, thirdly, and in light of our above discussion of Hegel, we
must note that Weber's position is a curious one for the social scien-
tist to accept. For the objects of the social world are our objects.
Following Hegel we can note that objects of investigation are always
objects for us, the being for consciousness of an in-itself. As such
the interesting question becomes how a given body of ideas, beliefs,
and knowledge comes to be established as and in social reality. In-
deed, it is only through an account of the knowing subject (and the
constitutive presuppositions of knowledge) that the human sciences
(in fact, all sciences) can render themselves comprehensible. What
is required is an account of the human subject, of the subject's
knowledge, values, and interests. If we trace the social origins of
conflicting standpoints, the questions that surround Weberian rela-
tivism can be transformed from a preoccupation of the correspondence
of knowledge to reality, to a systematic examination of the genesis of
knowledge and its correspondence to social situations, causes, and
structures. What is required initially at least, is an analysis and
account of the constitutive elements that are at the base and roots of
the production of different (world-) views of social phenomena.
The process of knowing cannot be severed from the historical
struggle between man and his world. The process of knowing becomes
139
the process of history in which consciousness discovers the world
as its own new and real world. "The subject conceives the world as
its own 'presence' and truth; it is certain of finding only itself
there. ,107 To uncover this process of knowing and, therefore, to
uncover man's constitution of the world, is to necessitate an his -
torical reconstruction of the self-formative process of man and of
the social situatedness of all human thought.
On this account the formal rationality of Weber's methodology
is seen to be inadequate to the task of conceptualizing the historicity
of knowing process and the development of man. The method of
ratio essendi, despite its important stress on the necessity of his -
torical, interpretative analysis, ultimately emancipates itself from
history. As Marleau-Ponty observed, "Historical epochs become
ordered around a questioning of human possibility, of which each has
its formula, rather than around an immanent solution, of which
history would be the manifestation. "108 Weber's types and concepts
grasp at the world and offer us a series of representations, the rela-
tionship between can only be established through the imputation of
adequate causes, etc. But these methods cannot grasp the self -
formative process of man as process, for Weber's representations
freeze this process in a presentation of types and categories which
impose form and, therefore, order on the "cultural manifold" in a
140
series of interrelated one-sided categories, which seek to analyze
historical configurations. This analysis, restricted to a
causal analysis of historical individuals, cannot provide us with a
sufficient method to uncover the self-formative struggles of man.
This process can only be understood in the attempt to explicate
man's reality as a self -structrued, self -unfolding, and forming
whole. The method must be historical, but as historical also dialec-
tical. It must proceed:
a. through the explication of the actual constitution of ideas
in consciousness and interaction, of the dialectics of experience;
b. through the analysis of the creation, maintenance and
change of man's inter -subjective, historical Concepts;
c. it must not (nor can it) smooth over contradictions and
contradictory claims at the phenomenal level, by appealing to an
unknowable noumenal world as the justification for differences, etc.
For this view, as we have seen, embodies a false dualism and in
Weber's justification of it a dogmatic conception of the totality.
Instead our task here is--along with Hegel in the Phenomenology--
to observe and explicate "determinate and historical acts of negation"
and capture the dynamic aspects of the subject; and finally
d. it must leave open the possibility of a critically reflexive
understanding of history and tradition. It must not only accept the
141
importance of a hermeneutical understanding of the communicative
structure of tradition, but also recognize that this tradition must not
be idealized. For it might also embody interaction based on decep-
tion, distortion, i. e., ideology. As Habermas has put it, it is neces-
sary to go beyond a limited hermeneutical perspective to uncover
"what lies behind the consensus, presented as a fact, that supports
the dominant tradition of the time, and does so with a view to the
relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic
structures of the systems of speech and action. ''109
The formal method Weber posits glosses these processes and
as such reifies the social world. Despite the fact that the method
of ratio essendi is hermeneutic in intent, its tools of analysis are
insufficient for hermeneutic understanding. In fact, this whole
application of Weber's methodology is ambivalent to a hermeneutic
and, as previously noted, technical intent. For the methods of ratio
cognoscendi when applied at the level of position B are productive of
knowledge suitable to the role Weber allots to science. Sociology
on this account is concerned with the establishment of generalities,
empirical regularities, and with the expansion of knowledge of
behavioral uniformities that can provide a basis for conditional prog-
nosis and/or causal explanation. On this level Weber's conceptual
apparatus objectifies the social world and renders it open to instru-
mental action and manipulation. 110 The idea that knowledge could be
142
produced to emancipate people from hypostatizedi forces and processes
is ruled out as Weber closes off the dimension of critically reflexive
understanding. How we might reconceptualize those processes and
a method suitable to their analysis and comprehension is a topic we
will take further in the second part of this thesis.
Before closing our discussion of Weber with a few concluding
remarks, a number of further points can briefly be made. Many of
the remarks above about Weber's conception of diachronic analysis
also apply to the methodology of synchromic analysis and its applica-
tion to the empirical study of social action (position A, cf. p. 119.
In this context A. Schutz's critique of Weber's treatment of sub-
jectivity is apposite. III
Schutz argues that Weber's exposition of interpretive sociology
was a contribution of enormous importance to the human sciences,
but doesn't go far enough.
Never before had the project of reducing the "world of
objective mind" to the behaviour of individuals been so
radically carried out as it was in Max Weber's initial
statement of the goal of interpretative sociology. This
science is to study social behaviour by interpreting its
subjective meaning as found in the intentions of indivi-
duals. The aim, then, is to interpret the actions of
individuals-in the social world and the ways in which
individuals give meaning to social pehnomena. 112
However, Schutz adds that
He [Weber, D. a.) breaks off his analysis of the social
world when he arrives at what he assumes to be the basic
143
and irreducible elements of social phenomena. But
he is wrong in this assumption. His concept of the
meaningful act of the individual--the key idea of inter-
pretative sociology--by no means defines a primitive,
as he thinks it does. It is, on the contrary, a mere
label for a highly complex and ramified area that calls
for much further study. 113
Weber's project of understanding social action falls short of its inter-
pretative intentions. For example, when Weber speaks of "Direct
Understanding, " Schutz argues, he conflates important constitutive
elements of social action, rather than clarifying them. The proce-
dure of "Direct Understanding" is equivalent to "methods of under-
standing employed in everyday life" and while these methods are
satisfactory for the purposes of everyday accomplishments they gloss,
Schutz suggests, a series of factors and influences which themselves
have to be explored. 114 The two crucial sources of difficulty in
Weber's work are, according to Schutz,
1. his reference to meaning as simply constituted subjec-
tively, rather than inter -subjectively, and
2. his consequential conflation of action as a "completed"
or "objectified" act, and action as. a series and flow of events.
Weber fails to grasp the temporality of action, the process of con-
stituting. (These remarks, it should be noted, have close affinity
to our previous criticisms of the application of Weber's methods to
position B. )
144
Considerations of space make a lengthy analysis of Schutz's
critique of Weber impossible. I would, however, like to extrapolate
a few points from the issues Schutz raises (leaving aside Schutz's
own solution to the problems of studying the social world which are
not without their own difficulties). 115
It is necessary, we can argue from Schutz's critique, to go
beyond Weber's conception of social action and to inquire into the
common-sense world of everyday life. This can only be done by
exploring the processes that are taken for granted and presupposed
by a subject who attempts the execution of a projected actl 1 6 and by
showing how social realities are created, constructed, sustained,
and changed by interacting subjects.
"Efficiency, efficacy, effectivenes s, intelligibility, consis -
tency, planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of activi-
ties " - -i. e. , the rational properties of practical activities - -cannot be
"assessed, recognized, categorized, described . . . outside actual
settings within which such properties are recognized, used, pro-
duced . . . Structurally differing organized practical activities of
everyday life, " can and must be "sought out and examined for the
production, origins, recognition, and representations of rational
practices. All 'logical' and 'methodological' properties of action,
every feature of an activity's sense, facility, objectivity, accountability,
145
communality, " must be treated--as Garfinkcel put it--"as a con-
tingent accomplishment of socially organized common practices."
1 1 7
Social reality can only be known from within social situations consti-
tuted through the interactional use of language. Social structures
are generated by means of interaction, they are the product of
"organic selfl-mobilization, 118 in inter -subjectively constructed
organizations of interaction. Weber's conception of "subjective
meaning" considered to be the irreducible element of social phenomena,
glosses the complexity of this social interaction and as a consequence
cuts short the (conceptualization of the) inquiry into social action. 119
What is required in an empirical analysis of social action is
(1) an explication of the procedures and methods used by members of
a society, i. e. , their conventional practices, in constituting their
communicative relationships; (2) an explication of the processes
whereby social realities are maintained and sustained; (3) an expli-
cation and understanding of members reflexive accounts of their
experience, i. e. , their "intentional description" (which would entail
a study of their expressed intentions, goals, reasons, or motives);
and (4) very importantly, to place these intentional descriptions
within the context of a critically reflexive understanding of their
social situatedness. Such an understanding would attempt to avoid
idealizing such descriptions and would test (a) the consistency of
146
meaning between verbal and nonverbal expression and actions; (b)
check the possibility of systematically excluded meanings which
might inhibit self-expression and communicative interaction and,
therefore; (c) to assess the possibility of a deceptive self-understand-
ing, 120 i. e. , as we have dis cus se d it hitherto, the pos s ibility of
ideological distortion.
This account which is suggestive of the enormous complexity
of issues embraced by Weber's concept of "subjective meaning"
makes, of course, no claims to completeness. Rather, the account
is intended to show the limitedness of Weber's conception of the
analysis of social action and the multitude of questions which he does
not address.
It goes without saying that Weber 's analysis of social action was
an outstanding contribution. That it did not go far enough in its
intent to provide a groundwork and methodological basis for an
hermeneutic account of social action is less significant perhaps than
the long distance it did take us toward such a goal. But that this
hermeneutic intention was not also able to see the necessity for a
critical reflexive understanding was not, as we have seen, because
Weber did not go far enough. His epistemology and approach to the
human sciences closes this dimension off.
In the second part of this thesis we will not add a great deal to
147
our discussion of methods applicable to the empirical analysis of
social action (position A), although we intend to draw from the
following discussion a few additional remarks. Instead, we concen-
trate on an explication of the views of those who have consistently
recognized that the dualisms, so consistently upheld by many and
here, of course, by -Weber, mask a commitment to a particular
form of monism.
Where a dichotomy and discontinuity was claimed by Weber
between fact and value, theory and practice, essence and appearance
(the two-world theory), we have found certain definite relationships.
Where Weber claimed a diremption between fact and value, we found
an unexplicated attachment to a mode of rationality that subsumed a
schema of values that could not be justified within its own terms of
reference. Where Weber claimed a diremption. between theory and
practice, we found an immanent commitment to dicisionism, the
freedoms of possessive individualism and the practice of science
envisaged as a "technical critique" of the choice of means (as well
as the commitment to a hermeneutic practice). Where Weber claimed
a diremption between essence and appearance, we found a commit-
ment to-a particular conception of essence, i. e., a conception of
the unknowable.
Our discussion of Weber has served purposes other than an
148
assessment of the difficulties, ambiguities, and tensions in Weber's
work. For it has helped to make explicit the questions, issues, and
problems which a more adequate epistemological and methodological
framework would have to (attempt to) contend with. It is the Marxist
tradition that has continually sought to grapple with the interrelation
of the supposed dualisms and dichotomies we have discussed here.
How they did this and the form their theory takes is the topic of the
following chapters.
NOTES
1Weber, T..E.O., pp. 102-3.
2 Ibid., p. 103.
3Cf.,for example, T. Parson's introduction to T.S. E.O.,
pp. 18 ff.
42Weber, T.S. E. O., pp. 103-4. (My emphasis.)
5From a letter to R. Llefmann quoted by W. Mommsen in
Max Weber, "Political Sociology and His Philosophy of World His-
tory,1 ' International Social Science Journal 17 (1965): 25. Quoted
in Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 25.
6 Weber, T. S. E.O., p. 99.
7a
7 ParsonsThe Structure of Social Action, p. 595, quoted in
Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 15.
Ibid. (My discussion of the status of laws in Weber's thought
follows the useful exergesis of Weber's views on this issue by
Eldridge, Max Weber, pp. 15-17.)
9 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 72-73.
0 Weber, M.S.S., p. 84.
1 1 Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 16.
1 2 Weber, M.S.S., p. 84.
1 3 Weber, M.S.S. p. 79.
14 Weber, M. S. S. , p. 79.
15 Giddens, Capitalism and Social Theory, p. 140, from
Weber, M. S.S., pp. 82 ff.
149
150
1 6 Weber, M.S. S. , pp. 74-75, and Weber, T. S. E.0O. , p. 94.
1 7 Weber, M.S. S. , p. 75. (Given the current state of Biology,
the analogy is unhelpful and very weak.)
18 Weber, M. S.S., pp. 88-89.
19 Weber, T.S.E.O., pp. 94, 100.
2 0 Weber, T. S. E. O., p. 100.
21 j. Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory, p. 189,
quoted in Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 19.
2 2 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 113-88.
2 3 Weber, M.S.S., p. 132.
24Weber, M.S.S., p. 135.
2 5 See p. 57.
2 6 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 50-113.
27Weber, M.S.S., p. 66.
2 8 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 113-88.
2 9 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 75-76.
30 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 76-77.
3 1 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 92-93.
3 2 The "specification" of ideal-types was- made.on p. 47.
3 Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 140.
Giddens' discussion of ideal-types is extremely helpful. Cf.
pp. 141-44 . My analysis of ideal-types follows, in large part,
this analysis.
3 4 Ibid., p. 142.
Ibid.
151
3 6 Weber, M.S.S. , pp. 90-92, 100.
3 7Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 143.
3 Ibid.
3 9Weber,M.S.S., p. 102.
4 0 Weber, M.S. S.j, p. 135.
4 1Weber, M.S.S., p. 171.
4Weber, M.S.S., pp. 168-69.
4 3 Ibid. , p. 177.
44A. Arato, "Lukaca' Theory of Reification, " Telos, no. 6
(Spring 1972), p. 62.
4 5 For a contemporary restatement and elaboration of Weber's
account of causality, cf. A. MacIntyre, "Causation and History,"unpublished.
4 6 Weber, M. S. S. , pp. 174-75.
4 7 Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 140.
4 8 Weber, M. S. S., p. 180, quoted in ibid.
4 9 Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 140.
5 0 Weber, M. S. S. , p. 183.
511bid.
52
As pointed out in Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 21.
5 3 Weber, M. S. S. , p. 17.
5 In fact, Economy and Society was written as part of an
ambitious, large work on aspects of political economy. The pro-
ject was one in which several authors collaborated, or were to
have collaborated (including A. Weber, Schumpeter, and Sombart),
parts of which were published between 1914 and 1930. Weber
conceived his contribution to be comparable in intention to the
152
writing of a Preface (!), a preparation and establishment of types,
concepts, etc. , essential to the study of historical individuals.
5 5 Weber, T.S.E.O., p. 109.
56 Weber, T.S.E.O., p. 88.
57 Ibid.
5 8 Weber, T.S.E.O., p. 89.
5 9 Weber, T. S. E. O., p. 90, quoted in Giddens, Capitalism
and Modern Social Theory, p. 147.
6 OWeber, T.S.E.O., p. 91.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
6 3 For an elaboration of this point, cf. F. H. Von Wright,
Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1971), chaps. 1, 2.
6 4Weber, T. S. E. O., pp. 95-96.
6 5 Weber, T.S.E.O., pp. 98-99. (My emphasis.)
6 6Weber, T.S.E.., p. 95.
6 7 Weber, T. S. E. O., p. 99.
6 8 Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 149.
This position is developed below.
6 9Weber, T. S. E. 0., p. 99.
7 0 Weber, T.S.E.O., pp. 99-100.
L. Taylor and P. Walton, "Industrial Sabotage: Motives
and Meanings, " in Images of Deviance, ed. S. Cohen (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 220
7Ibid.,p. 226
153
7 Ibid.
7 4 Eldridge, Max Weber, pp. 22-23.
7 5 Weber, T.S.E.O., pp. 109-10.
7 6 Weber, T.S.E.O., p. 110.
7 7 K. Ltiwith, "Weber's Interpretation of the Bourgeois-
Capitalistic World in Terms of the Guiding Principle of 'Rationali-
zation',f" in Max Weber, ed. Wrong.
78 Ibid.
7 9 Ibid., p. 108.
8 Ibid.
8 1 The distinctions being used here between types of totality
are based on those made by the Czech philosopher, K. Kosik, in
Die Dialektick des Konkreten, trans. from Czech, by Hoffman
(Frankfurt, 1967), p. 45, who distinguished three notions of
totality in the history of philosophical thought:
1. the atomistic -rationalistic conception, from
Descartes to Wittgenstein, which understands the whole or totality
as simple elements or facts;
2. the organicist or organicist-dynamist conception,
which formalizes the whole and raises the priority of the whole to
a position of domination over the parts (Schelling, Spann);
3. the dialectical conception (Heraklitus, Hegel, Marx),
which grasps the reality as a structured, self-unfolding and forming
whole.
We will discuss the third conception of totality in Part II of the
thesis.
For additional and very helpful analysis of the concepts of
totality cf. B. Ollman, "Marxism and Political Science, " Politics
and Society (1973), pp. 491 ff; P. Diessing, Patterns of Discovery
in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), chaps. 9, 20.
(The above passage from K. Kosfk was translated by J.
Schmidt.-)
8 2 Weber, M.S.S., p. 110. Cf. Weber's discussion and
consideration of "the interests of agriculture," M. S. S. , p. 109 ff.
83I. e. , the process of rationalization, etc.
154
84 M. Merleau-Ponty, "The Crises of the Understanding,,"
in Adventures of the Dialectic (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern
University Press, 1973), p. 11.
8 5 Weber, M.S.S., pp. 92-93.
8 6 Merleau-Ponty, "The Crises of the Understanding, " p. 47.
8 7 Andrew Arato, "The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity,"
Telos (Fall 1974), p. 135.
88J. Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics: Lukacs' Path
From Simmel to Marx" (Ph. D. dissertation, M. I. T., 1974), p. 1 1 .
8 9 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 93. Quoted in Schmidt,
"From Tragedy to Dialectics, " pp. 11-12.
9 0 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics, " p. 12. For an
elaboration of these issues, see Goldman, Immanuel Kant, pp. 152-66.
9 1 For example, his critique of E. Meyer.
92G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans J. B.
Baille (New York: Harper, 1967).
93G. W. F. Hegel, from lectures in the history of philosophy,
quoted by Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 7.
9 4 H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon,
1970), p. 94.
9 5 Hegel, "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, trans. K.
Dove, in M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience (New York:
Harper, 1970), pp. 23-24. Dove's translation is more accurate to
the "spirit" of Hegel's work.
9 6 K. Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method, " Review of
Metaphysics 23_(Juriit4970), p. 618. .:.
9 7 Hegel, "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, in Heidegger,
Hegel's Concept of Experience, pp. 13-14.
155
9 8 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 95.
9 9 Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," p. 619.
1 0 0bid.
10 1 Ibid. , p. 620.
0 2 Ibid.
103
- Ibid., p. 621.
14Ibid.
Ibid. , p. 622.
0 6 For an elaboration of the concept of determinate negation,
cf. A. Koj'eve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. J. H.
Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969), chaps. 1 and 7
especially.
0 7 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 120.
0 8 Marleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic.
109 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 12.
11 0 Cf. our earlier discussion of these issues on pp. 39-44.
A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans
G. Walsh and F. Lehnert (London: Heinemann, 1972), especially
chap. 1.
%Ibid. , p. 6.
I3 Ibid. pp. 7 -8.
1 1 4 For a useful summary of Schutz's views cf. Giddens, ed.,
Positivism and Sociology, pp. 7-11.
1 1 5 Schutz falls back into a form of objectivism.
16In Schutz's view, a "project is the intended act imagined
as already accomplished, the in-order-to motive in the future
156
state of affairs to be realized by the projected action" (quoted-in
Eldridge, Max Weber, p. 30.) If we seek to know why an actor
carries out one project rather than another, Schutz argues that we
must refer to the actor's past experiences to furnish a "reason"
or "cause, " a "because-motive. " Schutz ultimately follows Weber
in holding that actions can be causally explained by reference to
"motives" (albeit "because-motives") but warns against any attempt
to ascribe "invariant motives. " There are many, however, who
would not agree that we can treat reasons (or Weber's conception
of "motives") as themselves a species of cause. This issue is too
extensive a topic to be dealt with here, but see P. Winch, The
Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 45-50, 111-20; J. Coulter,
"The Ethnomethodological Programme," Human Context 6 (Spring
1974); A. Maclntyre, "A Mistake About Causality, "in P. Laslett
and W. Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1967, 2nd series), pp. 48-70, for arguments against
and references. For arguments for and references, A. MacIntyre,
"The Idea of a Social Science, " in Proceedings of the Aristotlean
Sociey supplementary vol. 41 (1967); 1. Berstein, Praxis and
Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pt. 2.
H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 33.
1 1 8 Coulter, "The Ethnomethodological Programme," p. 103.
1 1 9 For an elaboration of one aspect of this theme (that takes
the critique in the direction of Ethnomethodology), cf. E. Bittner,
"The Concept of Organization, " in Ethnomethodology, ed. R.
Turner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).
1 2 0 Points (a) to (c) are drawn from Habermas' and Wellmer's
critique of H. G. Gadamer. Cf. A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of
Society, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1971),
pp. 31-41.
'U 1:1
Ca H a
CHAPTER IV
ON THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE
REFORMULATION OF THE NOTION OF THEORETICAL
TRUTH IN LUKACS, HORKHEIMER, AND MARCUSE
In order to overcome the cleavages between fact and value, des-
cription and evaluation, subject and object, and science and criticism
that pervaded Weber's work, it becomes necessary to supersede
these dualisms and the separation of theory from practice that follows
in their wake. Such a reformulation requires a reconceptualization
of the notion of theoretical truth. For if it is admitted that there is
continuity where Weber claimed discontinuity and if, in consequence,
we are to avoid the fall of theory and science into relativism (i. e.,
position two) and/or skepticism, and/or solipsism, the question and
problematic becomes one of grounding, rationally justifying, ones'
choice of ultimate and theoretical principles and of methodological
procedure.
Against the background of the Second International and "official"
Marxism such a reconceptualization was undertaken amongst others
by the Frankfurt School and Lukacs. It is to their work, and elevation
of these issues, that we must now turn. Of the "Frankfurt" theorists
we intend to address essentially the works of Max Horkheimer and
158
159
1
Herbert Marcuse. We shall further briefly suggest how some
other contemporary Marxist figures have reflected on, and attempted
to come to terms with, the questions raised.
Two objections, however, might be made to pursuing the
problem of grounding in the work of the Frankfurt School and
Lukacs. First, it might be argued that the Frankfurt theorists,
even if they raised these issues, were not primarily concerned
with the questions of grounding in the form the problematic has
been raised here. It has been suggested by James Schmidt, for
example, that a "key discussion in Horkheimer's 'Traditional
and Critical Theory' defines critical theory as 'in its totality,
the unfolding of a single existential judgement' based on Marx's
notion of the general course of the commodity economy.'"2 Com-
menting on these passages he says: "What is significant here is
that the truths to be extracted from this expansion are primarily
negations: unfolding of the judgement does not establish the truth of
the existential judgement as a predictive theory, but rather serves
as a means of indicating the one-sidedness of the other social theories
which claim to have accounted for reality. "3 Even if this is so, it
can be contended that the issues we raise are implicitly spoken to.
For the early theoretical formulations of Horkheimer and Marcuse
assume Marx's critique of political economy as the center of their
theory. The "general course" of the commodity economy is taken as
160
nonproblematic and as an adequate account of the concrete totality
from which all other views can be regarded as "one-sided. " An
historical account of this subsumption might well be offered and it
is, of course, true that Horkheimer and Marcuse were essentially
concerned with extending Marx's critique to other areas of human
endeavor. But these works and remarks nevertheless indicate a
peculiar ambivalence between a dogmatic certitude and a hypothetical
openness of an unconcluded, incomplete, negative dialectic. 4 The
ambiguity does not dissolve the problems; answers to the questions of
the adequacy of Marx's conceptualization of the concrete totality and
the basis on which we justify our conclusions cannot be simply
assumed. 5 We shall return to Horkheimer's and Marcuse's approach
to these themes in a moment.
Secondly, it might be objected and argued that even if the Frank-
furt School raised various questions around the themes of "reason, "
"truth, " "freedom" the fact that they did not pursue them is of interest
in itself and speaks to the incapacity to reformulate the relationship
between theory and practice, truth and goodness, etc., in theory.
Such an argument could take a variety of forms, but (surely) reach
their highest development in Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness. 6
It might be held that bourgeois science was and is unworthy of
lengthy consideration because the antinomic expressions of its thinking
161
can only be overcome practically; theoretical disputes with bourgeois
science could be maintained only as a form of the class struggle.
The "sturcture of the historical process, " it might be argued, is
decisive against the "methodological self-restriction" of bourgeois
thought in all its manifestations. On this view, which reaches its
high water mark in Lukacs, modern science is criticized for three
reasons. Andrew Arato has summarized these as "(l) loss of totality;
(2) loss of ontological (historical) substratum; (3) freezing of the
given. "7
All of modern science is dominated by specialization
and organizationally, by forms of increasingly bureau-
cratic administration. On the level of scientific con-
tent, the sciences are first characterized by their
fragmentation of reality, and consequently by their
loss of totality, and their "ontological substratum":
the more intricate a modern science becomes and the
better it understands itself methodologically, the more
resolutely it will turn its back on the ontological prob-
lems of its own sphere of influence . . . the more it
will become a formally closed system of partial laws.
It will find that its own concrete underlying reality lies,
methodologically and in principle beyond its grasp.
Second, the sciences are characterized by their freez-
ing of immediate factuality of the given becaus e the
dynamic of reality is visible only from the point of view
of totality. 8
Likewise, the cultural and historical sciences disregard what is
central for Lukacs; the historical dialectic of their contents and
forms. In the famous "Reification" chapter Lukacs argues and con-
cludes that the efforts of the bourgeoisie to confront the problem of
162
reification reach class limits. 9 The methodological project of
German Classical philosophy cannot be fulfilled within philosophy,
itself indulged in endless contemplation. The overcoming of the
problem of reification is a social project, which can only be con-
tinued outside philosophy. "The continuation and concretization of
'the dialectical method as the true historical method was reserved
for a class which was able to discover within itself on the basis of
its life experience (Lebensgrund) the identical subject-object, the sub-
ject of action, the "we" of genesis, namely, the proletariat."' 1 0  The
concrete becoming of men in history, expressed in the contemporary
age as the standpoint of the proletariat, is the only possible basis
for the synthesis of the concrete totality andits sublationt- (Aufhebung).
Lukacs' position is one that attempts to overcome both volun-
tarism and fatalism, the poles of the Second International and neo-
Kantian social science. Historical Materialism, in his view, cannot
gain an adequate understanding of the social totality and has no mean-
ing outside the struggle of the proletariat, the negating subject. Its
claims to truth and objectivity are not those of a simple correspon-
dence or coherence theory. For the truth and objectivity of any
method cannot be dirempted from the social praxis of classes and
groups. All forms of thought are rooted in a particular historical
context and relative to the social situatedness of social structure. But
163
Lukacs argues the standpoint of the proletariat and consequently
Marxism transcends the "one-sidedness" and distortions of other
social theories and class ideologies. The proletariat is the class on
whose genesis capitalist society rests. The process of Bildung within
the society can only be successfully grasped from the pivot in its
constitution. "Since the proletariat will find that it itself has been
a key party in this constitution, it stands in a relationship to reality
which gives it the possibility of viewing the reality not as mere fact
[i. e. , the freezing of the given- -D. H.1, but as a set of relations which
are historically determined and capable of alteration. In other words,
the proletariat has the capability of seeing all of the relations of
capitalist society as a stage in the process of its own Bildung which
must be overcome. Ill Objectivity and truth depend on knowledge
of the totality, the coherence of which is dependent on the process of
history from which the standpoint of the proletariat as a potential
identical subject-object finds its foundations.
Lukacs refuses to ground the "theory of proletarian Bildung"
outside of the historical process and portray the role of the theorist
as neutral and detached. Theory and theoretical labor are inextri-
cably intertwined in the social process on which it cannot passively
contemplate, reflect, and describe. Rather, the theorist is seen as
a participant in an on-going class conflict, explicting an objective
164
possibility immanent in the dynamic of reified class -relations and
animized things. There are numerous issues which could be raised
here but for our purposes only a number of points need be noted. 12
Lukacs' argument is predicated on the existence of a class
whose social position is said to be unique in that, firstly, from its
position the historical process is claimed to be transparent and
within reach of theory. Secondly, from its standpoint the universal
interests of the species are assumed to be uncoverable. Thirdly,
that it is necessary for the proletariat to have a correct understand-
ing of its position and, fourthly, that it is capable of transcending its
social conditions as a result of the de-mythologizing of its interests.
Finally, it is argued by Lukacs that even if (mass) revolutionary
working class praxis does not exist the dynamic of the historical
process contains within it an immanent objective possibility of this
praxis. As such, Marxist social theory is continuous with the
imputable consciousness of the identical subject-object. Marxism
remains objective and possible. For Lukacs there is a proletarian
praxis present for class existence before it is actually known, but
such an existence is not sufficient unto itself and demands a further
critical elaboration. "The Party is the instrument in history that
does this by degrees through a dual mediation: there is a first
mediation- -the Party, mediating between the proletariat and history- -
165
and a second--the Party, consulting the proletariat or in other words,
the proletariat mediating between the Party and history. el3
Lukacs does not argue or say that the proletariat will neces-
sarily complete its Bildung process and surmount the irresolvable
tensions and contradictions in the capitalist social order. The con-
cept of imputed class consciousness specifies what is logically
required (not what empirically exists), if the proletariat is to com-
plete its transformation into the identical subject-object. "Logically
analyzed, the situation of the proletariat is seen as being both within
society (as an element of the synchronic arrangement of commodities
exchanged) and outside of society (as a subject which cannot come to
self-realization within the present arrangement of forms). Lukacs
sees no way of reconciling this duality theoretically. . . . Rather he
seeks to make the task of theorizing contingent on this very dis -
sonance, and argues.that the purpose of theory, which now becomes
equated with the activities of the party . . . " is to explicate these
contradictions to a subject "which at this point in history possesses
the possibility of practically overcoming the separations as a part of
the very process which brings it to consciousness of them. "f14
Whatever its other merits, the epistemological and political
difficulties of this position are far reaching. We have to ask whether
or not in the absence of revolutionary working class praxis, Marxism,
166
as it is here developed, can be anything more than an abstract nega-
tion. Does the revolutionary dialectic become anything more than a
"conceptual mythology?" Is the proletariat then, nothing but the
carrier of a myth, which as J. Revai argues, presents this identifi-
15.
cation as desirable; -i. e., is it a logical abstraction which Lukacs
imposes on the historical process? If this is the case, the Party
ceases to be a mediation and becomes an expression of an ethical
ideal forcing itself on history.
Lukacs attempted to show that the empirical proletariat "sur-
passed by the richness of a history which it cannot represent to
itself either as it was or it will be, retains, nevertheless, an implicit
totality and is itself the universal subject which, because it is self-
critical and sublates itself, can become for itself only through the
indefinite development of the classless society. "16 An important
feature of Lukacs' thought was not to posit an identical subject-
object, to grant the meaning of history to a "world spirit. " The
analysis of reification attempts to derive the objective possibility of
overcoming reification in the dynamic of reification itself. 17 As
such, the analysis is contingent on a verifiable process and, as
Arato suggests, "one particular analysis of economic development
(namely, Rosa Luxemburg's).1"18 But Lukacs' analysis and his solu-
tion, the identical subject-object, are far from satisfactory.
167
Given Stalinism and (current) technocratic social management
in Russia, the (as yet?) unfulfilled proletarian Bildung process in
the Western World, etc., we may well wonder (with Merleau-Ponty)
where these developments leave our original theory. Yet, in won-
dering within Lukacs' theoretical framework we are caught in a
circle. For the only standard of truth we have is deeply embedded
in the proletariat's standpoint. Yet it is precisely this standpoint
that is here problematic and questioned. To what standards and
criteria does one appeal in determining whether certain historical
developments are falsifications of the original theory, signs that its
premises are dubious, that it is inadequate to comprehend the dyna-
mics of capitalism; or rather, developments which leave the original
theory intact but with minor modifications? "In short, " as T.
McCarthy put it, "if the notion of practical confirmation or falsifi-
cation is to be used selectively, one must inquire after the theoreti-
cal basis of this selection. And if the principles of selection them-
selves contain theoretical moments, one must ask about the adequacy
of this background theory and its relation to the one under investi-
gation.1"19 As the standard of truth the proletariat's standpoint does
not allow us recourse to challenge it without undermining the entire
theoretical structure. If this is done questions of grounding cannot
be subsumed as nonproblematic.
168
Yet all of this itself assumes that it is and ever was obvious
what the standpoint of the proletariat is and that it is imputable in
its practical absence; that universal interests are uncoverable from
its actual or imputable standpoint, and, therefore, what an adequate
representation of these interests by the particular, the Party, is.
Unless these questions are addressed, we risk--as Lukacs did--
subordinating class, theory, and action to the Party. 20 In all these
respects, Lukacs' resolution of the problem of grounding raises the
same questions as the first objection attempted to ignore: the ans-
wers and the method of developing answers are assumed as self-
evident.
The connections of objectivity and truth, theory and practice
in Lukacs are closely tied to the actuality of proletariat revolutionary
praxis or its imputable possibility. In nonrevolutionary periods
and historical change the problem of the theory/practice relation-
ship, etc. , becomes, to say the least, problematic. In Lukacs'
theoretical framework these relationships are dogmatically assumed.
To tie the truth claims of Marxism as a critique of society to the
standpoint of the proletariat is to leave Marxism open to Merlea-
Ponty's view that the proletariat is a withering historical force in
both socialist and capitalist countries. Consequentially, he argues,
Marxism as a critique loses its claim to truth and becomes nothing
169
more or less than a competing ideology or moral standpoint. 21 The
Party then cannot claim, with surety, the priveleged status of his-
torical mediator. There are further empirical objections that can
be made to the theory. For example, Lukacs fails to address many
determinants of the empirical consciousness of the working class
and its historically changing needs. Obviously, the historical con-
ditions of Lukacs' and our time are considerably different from that
of Marx and Engels. Yet, in Lukacs, the potentiality of the identi-
cal subject-object was and is assumed to be revolutionary, its
standpoint transparent and immanently realizable. For Lukacs it
cannot be otherwise. The standpoint is dependent on these assump-
tions. The theory can only answer its critics by restating its premises.
Whether or not we can go beyond Lukacs' position in History
and Class Consciousness is, as yet, an open question. But for
Lukacs, of course, there is a way. Writing in the 1967 Preface to
the new edition, he suggests that the ideal of an identical subject-
object must be rejected. It was an attempt to "out Hegel Hegel. . . .
Thus the proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real
history of mankind is no materialist consumation that overcomes the
constructions of idealism.''22 With the rejection of the identical
subject-object we may well ask what of other moments of Lukacs'
theoretical edifice remain intact? "Since the identical subject-
170
object is the telos towards which all other moments of the Bildung
process are directed, there is, as J. Schmidt argues, "good reason
to believe that they too will have to be altered if they are to be trans-
formed into a materialist dialectic. ",23 In Lukacs' other three
criticisms he confirms the need for major developments in the
groundwork and categories of historical materialism. These include
alterations in his concept of nature, 24 the development of a theory
of labor and, consequentially, the recognition of the need to ela-
borate an adequate notion of praxis (that goes beyond an idealized
25imputed class consciousness). The criticisms are of crucial impor-
tance. In Lukacs opinion, the basic category of Marxist political
economy, "labour, as the mediator of the metabolic interaction
between society and nature, is missing.1"26
It means that the most important real pillars of the
Marxist view of the world disappear and the attempt
to deduce the ultimately revolutionary implications of
Marxism in as radical a fashion as possible is deprived
of a genuinely economic foundation. It is self-evident
that this means the disappearance of the ontological
objectivity of nature upon which the process of change
is based. But it also means the disappearance of the
interaction between labour as seen from a genuinely
materialist standpoint and the evolution of the men
who labour. 27
The foundation of History and Class Consciousness has to be revised
in Lukacs' view on the basis of Marx's "great insight" into the labor
process. What Lukacs points to is a theory of labor and a theory of
171
needs. A discussion of what this might entail must be postponed to
our discussion of Marcuse who, it can be argued--amongst others --
also attempted to develop a theory of labor and needs as a critical
foundation for Marxism. The search for such a ground independent
of (immediate) proletariat praxis became (and becomes) particularly
acute in times characterized by the loss of revolutionary praxis.
Few struggled with this issue and its consequences more than the
Frankfurt School. A few general remarks should, firstly, be made
about this school.
In the early work of the Frankfurt theorists, an essential tenet
was that "even the situation of the proletariat is, in this society, no
guarantee of correct knowledge.1"28 As Horkheimer wrote, "On the
identity of theory and praxis is not to be forgotten their difference." 2 9
Marcuse develops this theme, "Theory accompanies the practice
at every moment, analyzing the changing situation and formulating
its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for realizing the
truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and theory remains
its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth even if revo-
lutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows
the truth, not vice versa.'',29 How did the Frankfurt School inter-
pret the notions of truth and objectivity?
It has already been argued (against an anticipated first
172
objection) that questions of foundation and grounding are implicit
in all social theory (and science). In fact, any close reading of the
Frankfurt School suggests that these problematics and questions
are not only implicit but explicitly addressed. Obviously, a
complete discussion of Horkheimer's and Marcuse's approaches to
these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis.. However, from a
reading of Marcuse's work up to and including Reason and Revolution 3 1
and Horkheimer's Zeitschrift essays a number of important points
are developed which should not be overlooked. 32
The early formulations of the Frankfurt theorists presented
critical theory as part of a "dynamic unity with the oppressed class."
Critical theory was considered part of the present class struggle, as
a "promotive factor in the development of the masses. "33 The prac-
tical impact of the theorist was conceived in a way which was not
dissimilar to that of Lukacs; to articulate and help develop a latent
class consciousness. 34 There were, as J. Schmidt has pointed out,
strong echoes of "the Mannehim-Lukacs group during the days of
the Free School: the task of the theoretician is to attempt to provide
a milieu in which a negation of the present social order can take
place. This task is carried out through an indication of alternatives
which are not analyzed by contemplative theorists who merely confirm
'what is' at any given moment.1"34 But in fascist Germany and with
173
exile the theoretical and practical could do nothing but diverge;
"the political meaning of the Frankfurt School lost its immediacy." 3 6
As Marcuse put it, "the divorce of thought from action, of theory
from practice, is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and
no theory can undo it; but theory may help to prepare the ground
for their possible reunion.1"37 Against the objectivism of bourgeois
ideology and orthodox Marxism the task of the critical theorist
became more that of "remembering, " "recollecting, " capturing a
past which was in danger of being forgotten. Indeed, Marcuse wrote
Reason and Revolution to "make a contribution . . . to the revival
of a mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterated: the
power of negative thinking.1"38 Theirs was an attempt to preserve
a residue of Marx's original project against a theory and practice
frozen into second nature; a theory uniting, in both West and East,
with production, "a night in which all cows are black.1"39
In examining Horkheimer's and Marcuse's theoretical position
we begin with Horkheimer's Zeitschrift essays. The argument here
follows closely that of T. McCarthy. 40 Our intention, however, is
to develop the discussion into Marcuse's work. Although both Hork-
heimer and Marcuse share many fundamental positions,' they diverge
on the question of the centrality of labor, with the consequences
that Marcuse hesitated to implicate Marx in his critique of
174
instrumental rationality. 41 A discussion of this theme will take us
to a conjuncture in critical theoretic development.
Horkheimer argues that critical theory, as a dialectical
critique of ideology, must locate all thought in its historical con-
text, uncover its rootedness in human interests and yet avoid rela-
tivism and be distinguished from skepticism. He accepts the
Hegelian idea of a critique of forms of thought, but rejects Hegel's
systematic intention, in particular the telos of consciousness's
journey: the identity of subject and object in absolute knowledge.
In making these distinctions Horkheimer (and Marcuse) stress
the centrality of the "governing principle of dialectical thought, "
Hegel's concept of determinate (bestimmte) negation. "In recog-
nizing the dependence and limitedness of any finite truth or isolated
perspective, that is in rejecting the claim on its part to unlimited
truth, Hegel does not simply dismiss it out of hand, but rather finds
for this limited knowledge, as limited, one-sided, isolated, etc. ,
its place in the total system of truth. Thus critique in the Hegelian
sense does not result in mere negation, in the simple assurance that
all determinate knowledge is transitory, and worthless, in a word in
skepticism or relativism.1"42 As Horkheimer argues: "If the true
is the whole according to Hegel, the whole is not something other
than the parts in their determinate structure, but the whole process
175
of thought which contains in itself all limited representations in the
consciousness of their limitedness. ''43 What distinguishes the dia-
lectical method is its recognition of what is limited as limited, as
well as its recognition of its own limitations. Dialectical logic is
critical logic for, as Marcuse put it, "it reveals modes and contents
of thought which transcend the codified pattern of use and validation.''4
But Horkheimer cannot ground a materialist critique on Hegel's
comprehensive system. Hegel's philosophy, consonant with the
"innermost effort" of his own thought, is superseded, "not by sub-
stituting for Reason some extrarational standards, but by driving
Reason itself to recognize the extent to which it is still unreasonable,
blind, the victim of unmastered forces. "45 Insofar as the dialectic
is embedded in Hegel as an idealist system, it must be recast and
itself determinately negated. Horkheimer: "In the reflection on his
own system Hegel forgets a very definite part of experience. The
view that this system is the completion of truth conceals from him
the meaning of the time-bound interest which influences the indivi-
dual dialectical presentations as regards the direction of thought,
the choice of material and the use of names and words, and which
turns his attention from the fact that his conscious and unconscious
partiality vis-'a-vis the questions of life must necessarily become
operative as constitutive elements of his philosophy. ",46 In
176
contradistinction, Horkheimer formulates the materialist dialectic
as the "unconcluded" dialectic (the Unabgeschlossene Dialektik).
The recognition that the prevailing socio-economic conditions are
transitory and limited is not synonymous with the conception of
their Aufhebung. Horkheimer's materialism asserts that "objective"
reality can never be identical with, or absorbed into, men's concepts;
"an isolated and completable theory of reality is simply inconceivable."
Thus, as T. McCarthy has summarized it, "Horkheimer undertakes
to radicalize Hegel's already radically historical approach by (1)
giving up the theologically motivated belief that progress, whatever
it might consist in, is in any way guaranteed. The progress of his-
tory depends on the decisions and actions of historically acting sub-
jects; by (2) distancing himself from the conception of a universal
history in the strict, i. e. , Hegelian, sense. Thought, rooted as it
is in actual history, can never overview the whole of history as a
pre-given totality. Rather it owes its most general categories to
actual history itself; and by (3) accepting the consequences of this
context-boundedne s s for critical theory itself.1"47
Marcuse develops a parallel position. Dialectical thought
invalidates the claimed opposition between fact and value. Facts can
only be understood as stages of a single process; truth can be
uncovered only within the subject-object totality. The totality is the
177
result of the constitutive activity of both theoretical and practical
labor. "All facts embodythe knower as well as the doer; they con-
tinually translate past into present. "1 Objects "contain" subjectivity
in their very structure. Dialectical analysis becomes historical
analysis. It embraces the prevailing negativity (that-which-is in
terms of that-which-is-not; that which is real which opposes and
denies the potentialities inherent in itself, the being other than
itself): As well as its negation (the transformation of factuality
into realization; of subjectivity coming to itself in history, where
the development has a rational content).
The given state of affairs is negative and can be
rendered positive only by liberating the possibilities
immanent in it. This last, the negation of the nega-
tion, is accomplished by establishing a new order
of things. The negativity and its negation are two
different phases of the same historical process,
straddled by man's historical action. The "new"
state is the truth of the old, but that truth does not
steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier
state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act
on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the
negative state. 48 '
Against Hegel's transposition of the tension between what could be
and what exists, between being-in-itself (essence) and appearance,
into the very structure of Geist, Marcuse interprets this tension
materialistically. Theory attempts to grasp the contradictory
character of social processes and presents their immanent but
"unconcluded, " incomplete possibilities (the materialistic dialectic
178
is "Unabgeschlossen"). This framework becomes the basis of his
reading of Marx, 49 which we will say more about in a moment.
This sociological radicalism raises questions as to the logical
structure of critical theory. How are the relationships between
theory and praxis, fact and value, etc., conceived to avoid relativism
or skepticism? To what concept of truth does critical theory appeal,
if not to the Hegelian? Horkheimer's and Marcuse's responses con-
tain moments of both identity and difference. For Horkheimer
(1937) critical theory stood against the embeddedness of traditional
theory in the reproductive process of present day society and those
very processes themselves. Critical theory was conceived to
accelerate the subversion of structures of exploitation. The dif-
ference between traditional and critical theory was the difference
between two different "modes of cognition" (Erkenntisweisen):
Traditional theory being shaped by the mode of cognition of the
natural sciences.
The axioms of traditional theory define general con-
cepts within which all the facts in the field must be
conceived. . . . In between, there is a hierarchy of
genera and species, between which there are generally
appropriate relations of subordination. The facts
are individual cases, examples or embodiments of
the genera. There are no temporal differences
between the units of the system . . . Individual genera
may be added to the system or other changes made,
but this is not normally conceived in the sense that
the determinations are necessarily too rigid and must
prove inadequate where the relation to the object or
179
the object itself changes without thereby losing
its identity. Rather, changes are treated as
omissions in our earlier knowledge or as the
replacement of individual parts of the object.
Discursive logic, or the logic of the intellect
(Verstand), even conceives living development
in this way. It is unable to conceive the fact that
man changes and yet remains identical with him-
self. 50
Critical theory, on the other hand, is, as we have seen,
radically sociological. Its content is ever changing.
There are no general criteria for critical theory as
a whole, for such criteria always depend on a
repetition of events and thus on a self-reproducing
totality . . . Despite all its insights into individual
steps and the congruence of its elements with those
of the most advanced traditional theories, critical
theory has no specific instance for itself other than
its inherent interest in the supersession of class
domination. 51
Nor is there, Horkheimer adds further, a social class by whose
adherence and acceptance of the theory we could be guided. "It is
possible for the consciousness of every social stratum today to be
limited and corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circum-
stances, it may be bent on truth. " In his important early progra-
matic statement about Critical theory, 52 Horkheimer explicates
critical theory's concerns and preoccupations. Critical theory, in
the formation of its categories, concepts, and in all phases of its
development makes its own "an interest in a rational organization
of human activity which it has set itself to elucidate and legitimize.
180
For it is not just concerned with goals as they have been prescribed
by the existing life forms, but with men and all their possibilities."53
Horkheimer asserts the objectivity of this truth for the goal of a
rational society "which today, of course, only appears to arise in
the imagination, is really invested in every man. "54 It is given in
men as potential. From this standpoint critical theory can unmask
the ideological, one-sided, and partial character of competing
theories. But our questions as to the logical structure of critical
theory are not resolved. This description of critical theory gives
rise, as T. McCarthy has argued, to a related question: "in what
way can the interest in the future (an interest in a rational society)
that guides critical theory be distinguished from the particularistic
interests concealed behind ideological theories?"55
This question must, of course, be answered if the interest in
the future which guides critical theory is to be distinguished from
the interest(s) guiding ideological theories and suspicion of one-
sidedness, etc. "What is there, then, about the conception of free-
dom which guides it [critical theory- -D. H.] that ensures that it too
is not just another time-bound (say post-Enlightenment), culture-
bound (say secularized bourgeois culture), and perhaps even class-
56
bound (say alienated intellectuals) standpoint?"
A reading of Horkheimer's "Critical and Traditional Theory"
181
and other Zeitschrift essays suggests that he more or less took up
the notion of the "coincidence of reason and freedom directly or
indirectly (i. e., through Marx) from Hegel without sufficiently
attending to the reworking of philosophical foundations that a rejec-
tion of Hegel's idealism entails.''57 It is, however, less plausible
to suggest that the above is true for all Horkheimer's colleagues.
Here we argue that Marcuse's greater emphasis and explication of
Marx's philosophy and theory of labor does not allow such concer-
tineering of position-s.58 But before attempting to discuss Marcuse,
a few more points might be added to our examination of Horkheimer.
When the issues we raised above arise in Horkheimer he
attempts to ground critical theory either, as we have seen, in an
"interest" in the future that is immanent in man, and/or in human
work. Thus, for example, Horkheimer writes: "The viewpoints
which critical theory draws from historical analysis as the goals
of human activity, especially the idea of the reasonable organiza-
tion of society that will meet the needs of the whole community, are
immanent in human work, but are not correctly grasped by indivi-
duals or by the common mind. "'59 In this paper Horkheimer
presents this view of work almost without argument, as if it were
obvious and could be taken for granted. The question is not which
interpretation of work is correct (and there are many), but how
182
does one decide which interpretation and theory is correct and
which are ideologically corrupt? 6 0
In various expressions of culture, in art, religion, and philo-
sophy, Horkheimer (and Marcuse, although for some different
reasons as we shall see) sought to uncover the desire for a rational
organization of life and realization of freedom. But most cultural
artifacts, as they argued, have a double character; they are
differentiable as both (and predominantly) affirmative and yet also
critical, progressive and regressive. 61 But who is to interpret
these criteria, and how? The critical theorist is required to dif-
ferentiate between progressive and regressive tendencies. This,
Horkheimer suggests, he can do only on the basis of his interest
in the future. "A certain concern is also required if these tendencies
are to be preserved or expressed. ''62 We have moved in a circle,
"since it was precisely the legitimacy of this interest, its univer-
sal and nonideological character, that we wished to ground."63 Else-
where, other suggestions are to be found, 64 but there is little philo-
sophical elucidation of what a rejection of Hegel's idealism entails,
and little clarification of a philosophy and social theory based on
materialist presuppositions.
What then, we must ask, is the status of Marx's critique of
political economy? What is the status of a theory that claims to be
183
radically historical and at the same time attaches truth and validity
claims to its analysis of the epoch. In "Zum Probleme der Wahr-
heit," Horkheimer argues that a dialectical theory which has given
up the
. . . metaphysical character of finality, the solemnity
of a revelation, becomes itself a transitory element
bound up with the destiny of men. The unconcluded
dialectic does not however lose the stamp of truth.
In fact, the uncovering of limitedness and one-
sidedness in one's own and in other's thought con-
stitutes an important aspect of the intellectual pro-
cesses. . . . In so far as the experiences won through
perception and deduction, methodical research and
historic events, everyday work and political struggle
stand up to the available means of knowledge, they are
the truth. The abstract reservation that one day a
justified critique of one's own epistemic situation
will be put into play, that it is open to correction,
expresses itself among materialists not in a tolerance
for contradictory opinions or even in a skeptical in-
decision, but in a watchfulness against one's own
error and in the mobility of thought. . . . The theory
which we see as right may one day disappear because
the practical and scientific interests which played a
role in its conceptual development, and more impor-
tantly the things and conditions to which it referred
have disappeared . .. . but a later correction does not
mean that an earlier truth was an earlier untruth,.
the dialectic freed from the idealist illusion over-
comes the contradiction between relativism and dog-
matism. While it does not presume that the progress
of critique and determination will end with its own
standpoint, it in no way gives up the conviction that its
knowledge- -in the total context to which its concepts and
judgements refer--is valid not only for individuals or
groups but simply valid, i. e. that opposed theories
are false. 65
Our questions remain: what are the criteria for this nonabsolute
truth? How do we judge between competing theories?
184
Horkheimer summarizes his position by reference to a type
of historico- practical confirmation:
It is not history which takes care of the correction
and further determination of the truth, so that the
knowing subject . . . would only have to look and
see; rather the truth is carried forward in so far as
the men who have it stand firm by it, apply and support
it, act according to it, bring it to power against all
resistance from regressive, limited, one-sided
standpoints. The process of knowledge involves real
historical willing and acting as well as experiencing
and conceiving. The latter cannot progress without
the former. 60
In reference to the claimed innateness of the goal of a rational society
in men, etc., Horkheimer adds that this is not a claim "that should
bring a sigh of relief. For the realization of possibilities depends
on historical conflicts . . . man's own will plays a part in that
truth, and he may not take his ease if the prognosis is to come
true. 1167 This concept of practical confirmation raises a series
of problems. Obviously, numerous questions arise here of a type
not dissimilar to those we discussed in Lukacs. For example,
what if social praxis is oriented towards fascism or technocratism,
does this confirm or leave intact our claims about the essence of
human reality? Given the quotations we started with (p. 1711), it is
clear that Horkheimer would agree with Marcuse when he writes
that the truth of critical theory is indeterminate and remains neces-
sarily so "as long as it (the truth--D. H1. is measured against the
185
idea of unconditionally certain knowledge. For it is fulfilled only
through historical action. . . "68 The truth claim remains--
unfalsified--but the theory awaits verification. The issues that
are invoked can be further illustrated by Horkheimer's conception
of the status of Marx's critique of political economy.
On the one hand he (and Marcuse) presuppose Marx's theory
of the general course of the commodity economy: Critical theory
becomes the unfolding of this unique existential judgement. Marx's
critique of political economy is the truth of capitalist society. 69
On the other hand, the need for revision is frequently recognized
in light of the "course" of capitalist society and socialism in
Russia, etc. 70 Yet, this theory is still the basis for judging the
one-sidedness and partiality of all other competing theories. It is
the basis on which all other incomplete theories can be judged. If
the truth is the whole, it is here assumed to be grasped by Marx.
Here, as with Lukacs, there are epistemological difficulties and
here, as with Lukacs, there is a similar circle. The conclusion
must also be the same: "if the notion of practical confirmation or
falsification is to be used selectively, one must inquire after the
theoretical basis of the selection": Since "the principles of
selection themselves contain theoretical moments, one must ask
about the adequacy of these theoretical moments," 71 the taken-for-
186
granted background theory and its relation to those under investi-
gation and the society that is changing. Otherwise, we risk leaving
everything as it was.
The critical spirit attempts to provide the milieu for the
determinate negation of the present social order. Those that
partake of its original tenets refuse "to speak the language of domi-
nation. "172 Horkheirer's version of critical theory is in essence
negative, but not wholly so. For Horkheimer seeks to maintain a
positive ideal of truth and virtue, while adopting a wholly negative
attitude to other theories, views, and interested standpoints. In
Hegel, such a unity of positive and negative moments is not a neces-
sary contradiction, if we pass through Stoicism and Skepticism to
the insights of the Unhappy Consciousness. There,
. . . the "hitherto negative attitude" of self-conscious-
ness towards reality "turns into a positive attitude.
So far it (consciousness--D. H.j has been concerned
merely with its own independence and freedom; it
has sought to keep itself "for itself" at the expense of
the world as its own and real world, which in its
permanence possesses an interest for it." The sub-
ject conceives the world as its own "presence" and
truth; it is certain of finding only itself there. 73
This process is the movement of history itself. The question,
nonetheless, arises: how is this process and presence of the sub-
ject and its truth to be conceived? Horkheimer clearly rejects
Hegel's own view and in doing so risks contradiction unless he
187
adequately grounds, historically and/or philosophically, his
privileged standpoint. For Horkheimer the truths to be drawn out
are primarily negations. He is unable to accept, as foundational,
the claims to rigor of the model of the natural sciences; the stand-
point of the proletariat; the position of the party or its leadership;
or, for example, the social practice of groups and classes of his
day. He says little, if anything, positive about the telos of his work.
"in regard to the essential kind of change at which critical theory
aims, there can be no . . . concrete perception of it until it
actually comes about. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating,
the eating here is still in the future.1"74 The dialectic is neces-
sarily negative for "in a historical period like the present, true
theory is more critical than affirmative. " This view finds it
full development and justification in The Dialectics of the Enlighten-
ment. However, the negative judgments of Horkheimer's critical
theory always, as we have tried to point out, subsume a social
theory to which it grants a privileged status and/or an interest in
a rational society according to which it demarcates itself from other
ideological theories. His view of the privileged status of this theory
is, as we have seen, circular and insufficiently founded. Further,
this "interest" was, we argued, neither philosophically grounded
nor identifiable with a particular class standpoint. The (possible)
188
convergence of reason and freedom was said, by Horkheimer, to
be immanent in man and work. But who is justified in interpreting
this criterion? A few intellectuals? How can we interpret it, let
alone elaborate and justify its immanence? Horkheimer had a
strong tendency to treat the answers to these questions as self-
evident. What is required and what is lacking is an elaboration
and elucidation of the notions of "reason, " "truth, " and "free-
dom" upon which his theory relied, but which are taken over from
Hegel, via Marx, without adequate reflection. The rejection of
Hegel's idealism requires the development of alternative philo-
sophical and social foundations which finds too brief an extension
here.
NOTES
IObviously a detailed discussion of the "Frankfurt" approach
to these issues would have to include a detailed reading of T. W.
Adorno's, W. Benjamin's, and other members' work.
2 Cf. J. Schmidt, "Critical Theory and the Sociology of
Knowledge: A Response to Martin Jay,1" Telos (Fall 1974), p. 176.
(Emphasis mine.) Horkheimer's paper is in Critical Theory,
trans. M. J. O'Connell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).
These papers are reprinted and translated from Horkheimer's
Kritische Theorie, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1968).
3 Schmidt, "Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge,"
p. 176. This view of Horkheimer's essay is not to be confused
with Schmidt's position.
41For an elaboration of this criticism, which is also launched
at Habermas, see R. Bubner, "Was Ist Kritische Theorie?, ".
Philosophische Rundschau 16 (1969). Bubner's article is reprinted
in K. 0. Apel, et al., Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt,
1971), pp. 160-209.
5 This is especially true in light of the issues raised on p. 8 f.
6 G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R.
Livingstone (Cambridge: M.I. T. Press, 1971).
7 These points are well elaborated in A. Arato, "Lukacs'
Theory of Reification," Telos, no. 11 (1972), p. 38.
8Ibid., pp. 37-38. Cf. Lukacs, History and Class Conscious-
ness, pp. 92-110.
9 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 121.
1 0 Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of Reification, " p. 51; and quoting
Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 149.
189
190
1 1 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics, " p. 232. Chap. 4
is an outstanding account of the notion of "The Concrete Totality
and Lukacs' Theory of Proletarian Bildung, " (forthcoming in
Telos).
2 For a fuller discussion, see Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of
Reification"; Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics"; and P.
Breines, Praxis and Its Theorists: The Impact of Lukacs and
Korsch in the 1920's, " Telos, no. 11 (1972).
Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, from the
Introduction by J. Bien, p. xix.
1 4 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics, " pp. 238-39.
15Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, pp. 53-55.
%Ibid. , p. 54.
17 Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of Reification, " p. 54.
1 Ibid.
1 9 T. McCarthy, "On the Problems of Truth and Objectivity
in the Early Writings of Max Horkheimer" (Boston: Department of
Philosophy, Boston University), p. 9. (Mimeographed.)
2 0 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 300 ff.
2 1 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, pp. 310-11.
J. Schmidt has pointed out that this argument is only a consistent
application of Lukacs' arguments. Cf. Schmidt, "From Tragedy
to Dialectics, " chap. 5.
2 2 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xxiii.
2 3 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics, " p. 249.
2 4 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. xxiii-xxiv.
Cf. Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of Reification, " pp. 42-43.
2 5 Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.
2 6 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xvii.
191
27Ibid.
2 8 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 213.
2 9 Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, vol. 1, p. 256, quoted in
R. Jacoby, "Marxism and the Critical School, " Theory and
Society, vol. 1, no. 2 (1974).
3 0 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 322. (Emphasis mine.)
3 1 Apart from Marcuse's Reason and Revolution, and a number
of scattered references to his more recent works, I intend to -
concentrate the discussion on "On the Philosophical Foundations
of the Concept of Labour in Economics" (1933), trans. Douglas
Kellner, Telos 16 (1973); "The Foundations of Historical Material-
ism'''(1932), in his Studies in Critical Philosophy, trans.Joris
de Bres (Boston: Beacon, 1973); "The Concept of Essence" (1936);
"Philosophy and Critical Theory" (1937), in his Negations. We
leave, for future discussion, the bulk of Marcuse's "Heideggerian
Marxist" work and his Marx-Freud synthesis (with its resultant
tendencies to biologism and objectivism).
3 2 Cf. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937),
"Postscript" (1937) in his Critical Theory. Of considerable impor-
tance also are Horkheimer's "Zum Probleme der Wa.hrheit" (1935)
and "Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis" (1938) in his Kritische
Theorie.
3 3 Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," pp. 214-15.
34 Ibid.
3 5 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectics, " p. 255.
36 R. Jacoby, "Critique of Automatic Marxism, " Telos 10
(1971).
3 7 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. xii.
3 Ibid. , p. vii.
3 9 Cf. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory. " Also,
H. Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon, 1972),
pp. 69-74; Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment.
192
For an important new study in the same tradition, R.
Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from
Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon, 1975).
4 0 T. McCarthy, "On the Problem of Truth and Objectivity."
Cf. also T. McCarthy, "Introduction" to J. Habermas, Legitima-
tion Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1975).
41 M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown,
1973), pp. 78-80.
4 2 McCarthy, "On the Problem, " p. 2.
4 3 Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, p. 237, trans. and quoted
in McCarthy, "On the Problem. "
4 4 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. xii.
4 5 Ibid., p. xiii.
4 6 Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, p. 240, trans. and quoted
in McCarthy, "On the Problem,1" p. 3.
4 7 McCarthy, "On the Problem," p. 3. Cf. Bubner, "Was
Ist Kritische Theorie?"; M. Theunissen, Gesellschaft und Ge-
sichichte, Zur Kritik der Kritischen Theorie (Berlin, 1969).
Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 315.
49 Ibid., p. 282 ff., especially pp. 312-22.
soHorkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory, " in
Critical Theory, pp. 223-25. This translation, quoted from G.
Therborn, "The Frankfurt School, " New Left Review 63 (1970),
pp. 68-69.
5 1 Horkheimer, Critical T , p. 242. This translation,
quoted from Therborn, "The Frankfurt School, " p. 68. Therborn's
article is useful insofar as it points out where Horkheimer later
modified and "toned down" the radicalism of his early work. The
above quotation is from the original Zeitschrift essays. In his
later republication of this essay, "social injustice" has been sub-
stituted for "class domination" (Klassenherrschaft).
193
5 2 See "Traditional and Critical Theory, " "Postscript, "in
Critical Theory or Kritische Theorie.
5 3 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 245. The translation is
once more that of Therborn, "The Frankfurt School, " p. 69.
5 4 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 251; Therborn, "The
Frankfurt School, " p. 69.
5 5 McCarthy, from the "Introduction" toHabermas, Legitima-
tion Crisis, pp. xi-xii.
5 Ibid.
5 7 Ibid. p. xii.
5 8 It could be argued that such a philosophy of labor is implicit
in Horkheimer's work. Cf. his views on work that follow. Even
if this were true, it could not be doubted that what is implicit, is
highly undeveloped.
5 9 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 213. (Emphasis mine.)
6 0 McCarthy, from the "Introduction" to Habermas, Le -
mation Crisis, p. xii. For alternative discussion of "work" see,
for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, The Dialectics of the Enlight-
enment.
6 1 Cf., for example,"The Social Function of Philosophy,"
"Art and Mass Culture, " in Horkheimer, Critical Theory. And,
"Philosophyand Critical Theory, " "The Affirmative Character of
Culture, " in Marcuse, Negations.
6 2 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 213.
6 3 McCarthy, from the "Introduction" to Habermas, Legiti-
mation Crisis, p. xii.
6Ibid.,p. xiii.
6 5 Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, p. 246, trans. and quoted
in McCarthy, "On the Problem, " pp. 6-7.
6 6 Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, p. 247, trans. and quoted
in McCarthy, "On the Problem, " p. 8. (Emphasis mine.)
194
6 7 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 251.
6 8 Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," Negations, p. 75.
6 9 For example, cf. Horkheimer's "Traditional and Critical
Theory, " in Critical Theory; or his "Zum Probleme der Wahrheit,"
in Kritische Theorie. Cf., also, Marcuse, "Philosophy and
Critical Theory," in Negations.
7 0 The "etc." was elaborated on p. 8 f.
71 As in note 19.
72P. Piccone in his review of M. Jay's The Dialectica Imagi-
nation: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social
Research, 1923-50, Telos 16 (1973), p. 146.
7 3 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 119-20, quoting
from Hegel's Phenomenologyof Mind, vol. 1, p. 223.
7 4Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 220.
CHAPTER V
THE THEORY OF LABOR AS THE FOUNDATION
OF THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
The views of Lukacs' 1967 Preface suggest that a theory of
labor and needs could provide a material consumation that over-
comes the construction of idealism and provides an elucidation of
thought on materialist presuppositions. Some of the arguments of
Lukacs' most sympathetic critics would suggest the same direc-
tion. 1 The argument is also found in Marcuse. 2 We attempt,
below, to explicate such a theoretical position, although the posi-
tion is not claimed to be that which is found in Lukacs' later work,
or throughout Marcuse. 3 However, it seems worthwhile to recon-
struct and develop a theory of labor, etc. , given the stress both
theorists have placed on it and given its contemporary vitality (e. g.,
Alfred Schmidt). 4 It should be emphasized that what is outlined
here is only the briefest development of a series of arguments that
take various complex forms. We only hope to sketch an approach
which is claimed to go beyond the positions of the early Lukacs and
Horkheimer. (A more 'complete exploration of these points would,
195.
196
of course, have to involve a detailed consideration of Lukacs' last
lobor in the Ontology, 5 an examination of Marcuse's Heidegerrian
Marxism, the various developments of his later work and a detailed
consideration of contemporary positions.) Here we merely hope to
indicate the direction of the program and say a little about its
limitations.
It was in Lukacs' later writing, as we noted earlier, that he
suggested that Marx's "great insight" into the labor process was
passed by and over in History and Class Consciousness.
Marx's great insight that "even production for the
sake of production means nothing more than the
development of the productive energies of man,
and hence the development of the wealth of human
nature as an end in itself" lies outside the terrain
which History and Class Consciousness is able to
explore. '
For Lukacs this meant that (1) Capitalist exploitation loses its
"objectively revolutionary aspect, " i. e. , its objectively progres-
sive qualities and revolutionary implications. He felt that, in his
earlier work, he had not yet comprehended the material foundation
of capitalist exploitation. In Lukacs' view this was because he had
not grasped the ontological objectivity of nature, the labor process,
upon which all social processes are based and therefore, in his
view, to be understood. Secondly, that there was a failure to grasp
and comprehend the fact that "although this evolution of the species
Man is accomplished at first at the expense of the majority of
197
individual human beings and of certain human classes, it finally
overcomes this antagonism and coincides with the evolution of the
particular individual. This the higher development of individuality
is only purhcased by a historical process in which individuals are
sacrificed.1"
What Lukacs is suggesting in these quotations is that the
understanding of the development of history, the species and the
individual has to be closely tied to an adequate conceptualization of
the process of labor, the "dialectics of labour. " Further, the telos
of social formation is, no longer, the elusive and abstract notion of
the identity of subject and object, but rather "a notion of a harmo-
nious, total appropriation of objective reality by an objective,
embodied subject."8 The fulfillment of what Marx called man's
"species nature" (a notion that will be elaborated below) becomes
the goal of a future rational social order, the "paradigm" of which
might be conceived in, for example, the terms of the following
passage:
The immediate, natural and necessary relation of
person to person is the relation of man to woman.
In this natural species relationship man's relationship
to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as
his relation to man is immediately his relation to
nature- -his own natural destination. In this relation-
ship, therefore, is sensously manifested, reduced to
an observable fact, the extent to which the human
essence has become the human essence of man. From
this relationship one can therefore judge man's whole
level of development. 9
198
Commenting on this passage from Marx's Economic and Philosophi-
cal Manuscripts, P. Walton et al. note that "the humanised relation
of two reproducing animals is precisely its nature as a reciprocal
activity, entered into freely and consciously, with the aim of satis-
fying the other as oneself.I'10 This constitutes full, undistorted
sociality which, as we shall see, is a key element constitutive of
species nature. 11 These ideas need closer examination. We begin
by addressing the concept of labor.
In a recent interview, that was published posthumously,
Lukacs suggests that his new work centers on the question of the
relationship between necessity and freedom, causality and teleology.
"Traditionally,"'' Lukacs said, "philosophers have always built sys-
tems founded on one or the other of these two poles. They have
either denied necessity or denied human freedom. My aim-is to
show the ontological interrelation of the two, and to reject the
'either-or' standpoints with which philosophy has presented man.
The concept of labour is the hinge of my analysis . . . The notion
of alternatives is basic to the meaning of human labour, which is
thus always teleological- -it sets an aim which is the result of a
choice. It thus expresses human freedom.''12 What is this concept
of labor or, as Lukacs puts it elsewhere,"the dialectics of labour,"
the 'Marxian Ontology"? How can we conceptualize this new
direction?
199
For Marx, nature becomes objective for us through the labor-
ing process, in which both nature and the laboring subjects are
themselves transformed. We may speak, in a limited sense, about
a "dialectics of nature" in that the synthesis of material labor
unites the historical subject (which is of nature) and the process
of nature. Through Man, and by virtue of men's theoretical-
practical activity, "nature attains self-consciousness" and "amal-
gamates with itself. 1l3 Human activity, labor, production, and
creation also, therefore, mediates between men and society. For
Marx the world was the "world of man. " He rejects the metaphy-
sical idea of a "final universal goal" given and unfolding in history; 14
a goal that predetermines the meaning of the world; a Spirit or Logos
that guides man's praxis from an organic, sense-certain, undif-
ferentiated unity between man and nature to a rational, reasoned
differentiated unity between man and nature (which preserves indi-
viduality in a context of self-conscious collectivity). 15 Goals and
purposes, in the strict sense, are always a category of human prac-
tice and here, as A. Schmidt has pointed out, Marx "limited himself,
as a materialist, to what Hegel called the "finite-teleological stand-
point," Hegel put it this way:
In practice man relates to nature as to something
immediate and external. He himself is in this
relation an immediately external and hence sensuous
and individual, who has however the right to conduct
himself towards natural objects as their purpose. 16
200
In Capital, Marx discussed at length the way in which the "purposive
will" 17 of man "triumphs over nature":
We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as
exclusively human. A spider conducts operations
that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to
shame many an architect in the construction of her
cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect
from the best of bees is this, that the architect
raises his structure in imagination before he erects
it in reality. At the end of the labour process, we
get a result that already existed in the imagination
of the labourer at its commencement, that was there-
fore already ideally present. He not only effects a
change of the form of the natural basis; in it he also
realizes his purpose, which he knows, which determines
the mode of his astgvity, and to which he must sub-
ordinate his will.
According to both Hegel and Marx, labor's purposes are sub-
ject to necessary limitations; they are limited objectively "by the
material at men's disposal . . . and, subjectively, by the structure
of men's needs and drives. ",19 Marx, of course, went beyond Hegel
in attempting to work out the socio-historical roots of human pur-
poses. In doing so, he includes (although in sketchy form) an
analysis of the complex further mediations that arise when labor
casts off its "first, instinctual form" in which man (simply) utilized
nature through the natural organs of his body. In a higher unity of
man and nature, conscious production directed to a purpose, is
mediated through the role of tools20 or artifacts. 21
201
Marx conceives man's "finite-telological activity, " his
"purposeful creations, " his "conscious activity" as critical for
the adequate separation of man's species characteristics from
those of animals. Man externalizes and objectifies his nature,
hitory is the creation and record of his praxis. Labor is the
defining, natural, and historical condition of man. But more than
this can be said. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,
Marx argued that ". . . an animal only produces what it immediately
needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man
produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of
immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free
from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom."2 2
Here and elsewhere in these early writings23 Marx distinguishes
human nature from the nature of animals by reference to four
characteristics of man's productive activity. It is, as we have
seen, (1) conscious, purposive (sometimes he uses the words
"self-conscious"). It is also (2) universal, there are no limits to
man's capacity to extend himself and, therefore, history. Man
produces in order to live, to satisfy his material needs. He also,
according to Marx, produces free of physical need and men "only
truly produce in freedom therefrom. " There are, we suggested
above, necessary limitations on human production. But these
are operative in qualitatively different ways in each historical epoch.
202
What man will make or is capable of making admits of no formal
answer. (3) Man's productive activity can be planned, and (4) it
is "social. " In the Manuscripts Marx suggests that man is a social
being because "he exists in reality as the representation and the
real mind of social existence, and as the sum of human manifesta-
tions of social existence."24 Each man is both unique and a com-
munal being. He is the "subjective existence of society as thought
and experienced. "125 In the German Ideology the concept of social
being receives important further alteration. 26 It can be argued2 7
that Marx saw language as intrinsic to and, therefore, further defin-
ing of human production. Although Marx's statements about lan-
guage are underdeveloped, they provide us with further insight into
the social nature of man's species being. He wrote:
Language is as old as rhuman) consciousness, language
is practical consciousness that exists also for other
men, and for that reason alone it really exists per-
sonally as well; language, like consciousness, only
arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse,
with other men. 28
As M. Gordy has pointed out, "the necessity he [Marx- -D. H.) speaks
of is empirical necessity because language is practical conscious-
ness and practice is empirical. Since practical consciousness, i. e.,
purposive consciousness, is what makes production human, then
language, or the possibility of language, is coextensive with human
production. " For Marx, "language is impossible without human
203
beings living together and talking to each other, so the possibility
of language implies human society. Since the possibility of language
is coextensive with human production, human production is
"social. "79
The form of man's labor, its quality and quantity vary, Marx
of course reasoned, with natural and historical circumstances. In
Capital, however, he says why it is essential to begin with a study of
man, man's essence, the nature of labor:
To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-
nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from
the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he
that would criticize all human acts, movements, rela-
tions, etc. by the principle of utility, must first deal
with human nature in general, and then with human
nature as modified in each historical epoch. 30
Therefore, it is claimed, in order to know what is central and useful
for mankind, we must begin from analysis of man, of labor in general
and then labor as developed, changed, and constrained in each social
formation. The unity that informs Marx's project is, P. Walton et
al. suggest, "his constant insistence on basic premises which reveal
the dialectics of labour. "
The labour process, which antedates value, and
serves as its starting point, thus again makes its
appearance within capital, as a process which occurs
inside its substance and forms its content. The
labour process, because of its abstractness, and its
material nature, is equally characteristic of all
forms of production. 31
204
From an understanding of the "natural unity" of what is "exclusively
human" Marx proceeds to explore (from the early writings on aliena-
tion to the concrete measure of exploitation of labor power in Capital)
how man's development is constrained by the history of class societies.
In tearing away from man the object of his production,
[this] tears from him his species -life, his real objec -
tivity as a member of the species, and transforms his
advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his
inorganic body, nature, is- taken away from him. 32
The analysis is directed to uncover the tensions between the "natural
unity" of labor and its historical unfreedom, in order to explore the
conditions for the possibility of overcoming structures of alienation;
conditions that might reveal developing "needs" and "purposes" that
cannot be met under, for example, capitalism's rigid preoccupation
with profit and distribution of scarce values.
Commenting on a similar reading of Marx, P. Walton et al.
declare that the problem now becomes that of deriving operational
concepts from "the dialectic" that will both account for and help
reveal the dynamics and direction of social change. "What we have
to 'show, " they add, "is how alienation is linked to the labour theory
of value in Marx's work and in so doing highlight their dependence
upon his view of man. "33
Yet, within the terms of reference of the theory, several ques -
tions remain. How given a claimed human essence of the type
205
discussed above can we explain structures of unfreedom? Does the
quality of man's species characteristics change over time? If so,
does his essence change? If so, how can we claim a concept of
essence that is trans-historical or a-historical or how can we ana-
lyze its changing social form over time? What is the relation of
essence and appearance over time? How is alienation, if conceived
as embracing the four dimensions Marx discusses in the Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts, 34 to be linked to a critique of
capitalist society that includes the concept of human essence, species
characteristics, as its foundational premise? If man is alienated
from his species being, how can we still justify our premises, i. e.,
can we still claim man has species characteristics if, as B. Olman
suggests, "alienated man. . . has lost touch with all human
specificity?"35
* * * * * * *
The argument can be taken several stages further by an analysis
of Marcuse's work. In developing this second argumentation we use
the above discussion as a backdrop and attempt to advance the argu-
ment beyond the problematics raised by the questions above.
Marcuse shares Horkheimer's position on sociological radical-
ism, the unconcluded nature of the dialectic and the stress on an
206
immanent, essential potential in man that is yet to be realized. But
in place of a relatively static epistemological relationship of essence
to appearance and fact, Marcuse develops a critical and dynamic
relationship of essence to appearance seen as parts of a historical
process. With Horkheimer he stresses the embeddedness of all
theory in social struggle; its ultimately necessary confirmation in
practice but also its ultimate (as yet) irreducibility to any given form
of social practice. "The truth of the model of essence, " he argues,
"is preserved better in human misery and suffering and the struggle
to overcome them than in the forms and concepts of pure thought."3 6
This truth is "indeterminate" and remains necessarily so. It is ful-
filled "only through historical action, and its connection can thus
result only post festum."1' The truth claim remains, as we saw
earlier, unfalsified; but the theory awaits verification. While Hork-
heimer acknowledged the necessity to supersede (aufheben) philosophy
with social theory, Marcuse explicated this theoretical intention at
greater length. In Reason and Revolution, "The Concept of Essence,"
and in other places, Marcuse explained that "if there was to be any
progress beyond this philosophy [Hegel's -- D. Ha , it had to advance
beyond philosophy itself and, at the same time, beyond the social
and political order to which philosophy had tied its fate. "37 In a
critique of Sartre's existentialism, he wrote:
207
One step more toward concretization [away from Hegel's
philosophy] would have meant a transgression beyond
philosophy itself. Such a transgression occurred in
opposition to Hegel's philosophy . . . When they LKierke-
gaard and Marx--D. H.] came to grips with the concrete
existence, they abandoned and repudiated philosophy.
For Marx, the conception of "realit6 humaine" is the
critique of political economy and the theory of socialist
revolution. The opposition against Hegel pronounces
the essential inadequacy of philosophy in the face of
the concrete human existence. 38
Marcuse argues that one criterion for the objective validity of
dialectical theory's separation of essence and appearance is the
"suitability of its concepts for service as the organizing principle
in the explanation of a given group of appearances (e. g., constella-
tions of political power among states of a specific era, their alliances
and conflicts). If the historical structure (e. g., 'imperialism')
postulated as -'essential' for the explanation of such a grouping
makes it possible to comprehend causally the situation both in its
individual phases as well as in terms of the tendencies effective
within it, then it is really the essential in that manifold of appear-
ances. This determination of essence is true: it has held good within
the theory. "39 Yet, Marcuse goes on to argue, the theory of which
it is a part is itself at the same time a factor in the historical
struggles that it aims to grasp and catch: "only in them can the
essential theoretical truths be ultimately verified. And from this
very historicity of dialectical concepts grows a new kind of 'universal
40validity' and objectivity. " The question is: how are we to conceive
208
the dynamic and historical relationship of essence and appearance
from which a new kind of "universal validity" and "objectivity"
derive? There is a strong tendency, in Marcuse's earlier work,
to answer this question, explicitly, through a thoery ot alienation,
grounded in the concept of labor and a dialectic of needs. This is
how we shall read his work here.
For Marcuse the distinctions between appearance and essence,
form/content, immediacy/potentiality, have significance at more
than one level. Firstly, they have import for the analysis and
explanation of social formations and realities. The appearance and
form of a social reality is not to be taken to be synonymous with
illusion. To uncover the essence and content (to explain appearance
and form) requires an analysis that is itself a "process of elucidating
one reality by disclosing its foundation in and determination by
another."41(Cf. the example of imperialism above.) Marcuse argues
that all the concepts that Marx and critical theory employ make pos -
sible a knowledge of reality in opposition to the freezing of the given,
the false facticity and evidences of immediate reality. In doing this
they refer us to a second level of significance. For in examining,
for example, capitalist society they refer us to "standards entirely
foreign to commodity production, " they are also critical concepts.
Concern for man moves into the center of the theory and to a con-
209
ceptualization of man's potentiality within a particular historical
situation. "At this level the tension between essence and appearance,
between authentic potentiality and immediate existence, is reflected
anew in the concrete notions with which the theory attempts to grasp
the social process of life in its antagonistic character. 1142 These
concrete notions belong to two levels: (1) Some deal with phenomena
in their reified form, as they appear immediately, and others aim
at their real content, as it presents itself to theory once its immediate
and taken-for -granted phenomenal form has been transcended.
"Both groups of concepts are equally necessary to an understanding
of the antagonistic reality; nevertheless, they are not on the same
level. In terms of dialectical theory, the second group of concepts,
which has been derived from the totality of the social dynamic, is
intended to grasp the essence and the true content of the manifesta-
tions which the first group describes as they appear. "43 The dia-
lectical concepts transcend the given social reality in the direction
of another historical structure which is present as a tendency in the
given reality. "The positive concept of essence . . . is rooted in
this potential structure. "
In attempting to demarcate progressive and regressive moments,
the potential from the given, Marcuse often has the propensity to
make similar arguments to those that Horkheimer used. This was
210
indicated in the discussion of Horkheimer above. Marcuse often
includes references to "the interest of freedom,1" "historical goals,"
which have the potentiality to be fulfilled in a real "universality":
Materialist theory moves beyond historical relativism
in linking itself with those social forces which the
historical situation reveals to be progressive -and truly
"universal. "a
The arguments that underlie these statements and similar ones4 5
can easily be read as following Horkheimer's pattern of argumenta-
tion, viz., "the interest in a future rational society" or as treating
as self-evident what a "progressive and truly universal" view is,
etc. To the extent that this is true, the criticisms we made of
Horkheimer's position obviously apply and will not be repeated here.
However, there is an alternative reading, which is the one that
principally concerns us. Marcuse can be read as subsuming a
theory of labor and needs, from which a particular type of social
theory is said to follow. He can be seen, consequently, as recasting
and grounding theory and thought on materialist presuppositions.
The theory needs further explication. In Marcuse's work it finds
extended development in Reason and Revolution (although we shall
refer back to other earlier works).
Marcuse argues that Marx focused his theory on the labor pro-
cess and "by doing so held to and consumated the principle of the
Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content (reality) determines
the structure of the theory. ''46
211
He made the foundations of civil society the founda-
tions of the theory of civil society. This society
operates on the principle of universal labour, with
the labour process decisive for the totality of human
existence; labour determines the value of all things.
Since the society is perpetuated by the continued
universal exchange of the products of labour, the
totality of human relations is governed by the im-
manent laws of the economy. The development of
the individual and the range of his freedom depend
on the extent to which his labour satisfies a social
need. All men are free, but the mechanisms of the
labour process govern the freedom of them all. The
study of the labour process is, in the last analysis,
absolutely necessary in order to discover the condi-
tions for realizing reason and freedom in the real
sense. A critical analysis of that process thus yields
the final theme of philosophy. 47
Marx, Marcuse argues in an earlier essay, takes up the Hegelian
concept of labor with all its essential characteristics: "'Labour is
the becoming -for -itself of man within externalization (Entus serung)
or as externalized man. ',"48 In contrast to the concrete analysis of
the "labour processes" in Capital this is, of course, an "abstract"
determination of labor (that is insufficient for economic theory).
But, Marcuse also points out, "it remains the foundation for all
concrete concepts of labour in Marx and is explicitly operative in
Capital: As the creator of use-values, as useful labour, labour is
therefore a condition of human existence independent of all social
forms; it is external natural necessity that mediates the material
exchange between man and nature, and thus human life. "19 The
essential tenets of the concept of labor, which were developed on
212
pages 199ff., are here explicit and/or implicit. Labor as "media-
tion, " "objectification, " etc. , finds its place, but with one major
change in emphasis: the process of history as man's becoming,
development and potential realization, finds greater expression
and thematization.
Being and becoming are constituted through the being and
becoming of historical,human existence. Within the totality of
being, the meaning of labor is the key constitutive element for all
human praxis. In the "Foundations of the Concept of Labour, "
Marcuse stresses that the very structure of being human, embraces
the "necessity for life" ("the remedy of wants always leaves some -
thing to imagine and that some unfulfilled want always remains
behind. ")50
The necesssity for life underlines an "ontological"
condition: it is grounded in the very structure of
being human that simply can never reduce to a pas -
sive process, but must constantly be a process of
"self -creation" as "self -making. " Even praxis of
human existence which is self-mediated in the pro-
cess of coming to know itself, requires "labour"
as the mode of its becoming. 51
Being human is always more than its present existence: "a discre-
pancy that demands constant labour. "
This essential excess of being over existence con-
stitutes the primordial and ineliminable human
"necessity for life" (Gottl). Man's very structure
of need is grounded in it and its fulfilling is the final
meaning of labour: the need for an enduring and
213
lasting self-fulfillment of the existence in the
actuality of all its possibilities--a task in whose
service the economy ultimately is also engaged. 52
In the labor process man develops both his inner and outer nature
in a continuous ever-transforming process. It is a process in
which he develops, struggling to fulfill anticipated needs. It is a
process of becoming, a process with a final meaning. Any analysis
of social life has to capture this dynamic process in its categories.
Marcuse stresses that far from being a mere economic activity
(Erwerbstttikeit), labor is and was concevied by Marx, as the
"existential activity" of man, his "free conscious activity"- -"not
a means for maintaining his life (Lebensmittel) but for developing
his 'universal nature. ' "53
The new categories [of political economy--D. H.] will
evaluate the economic reality with a view to what it
has made of man, of his faculties, powers, and needs.
Marx summarizes these human qualities when he
speaks of the "universal essence" of man; his exami-
nation of the economy is specifically carried on with
the question in mind whether that economy realizes
man's Galtungwesen (universelles Wesen). 54
Marcuse does not specify at length what he considers Marx meant
by "universal essence. " Nor does he specify at length what he
considers the "universal essence" of man to be. We will, following
textual suggestions take this to be the fulfillment of man's species
nature throughlabor (hitherto discussed) which can be characterized
as self-conscious, universal, social, planned, and free. 55 (Man is
214
free if "'nature is his work and his reality, ' so that he 'recognizes
himself in a world he has himself made.I' ,56
The "final theme of philosophy" opens problems and possibilites
which are no longer philosophical. The self-realization of man now
requires the explanation, understanding, and abolition of certain
modes of labor. The critique begins in philosophical terms because
the "enslavement of labour" and its emancipation are both conditions
that affect the very foundation of human existence and go beyond the
framework of traditional political economy. 57 Marx, of course,
departs from philosophical terminology in the elaboration of his
own theory. However, Marcuse points out: "The critical, trans-
cendental character of economic categories, hitherto expressed by
philosophical concepts, later, in Capital, is demonstrated by the
economic categories themselves. ",58 A few further points need
to be made.
Marcuse elaborates Marx's notion of alienated labour in its
complex social forms. We cannot, for obvious reasons of space,
develop this specific discussion. 59 It is important to note, how-
ever, the different levels of analysis. On the one hand, Marx's
discussion of man's alienation from his product, process, fellow-
man, and species being is developed. Under the capitalist mode
of production, it is concluded, "the worker does not affirm but
215
contradicts his essence. " The concept of second nature summarizes
this state of alienation.60 History is nature's coming to be in self-
consciousness. Yet a distinction persists. Man is of nature and
makes history, but nature is not made by man.
The distinction is vital: if it is lost then the laws
of history are simply equated with the laws of nature;
they are made timeless and unchangeable. Rather
the laws in history exist, are natural, blind, and
fateful, but are ultimately grounded in human insti-
tutions. They are specifically historical; they can
be changed. 61
In an essay on K. Popper, Marcuse writes that: "The less a society
is rationally organized and directed by the collective efforts of free
men, the more it will appear as an individual governed by 'inexor-
able' laws . .0."62
The dialectical analysis of social reality. . . shows
this reality to be overpowered by objective mechanism
that operates with the necessity of "natural" (physical)
laws . . . The movement is dialectical in itself inasmuch
as it is not yet piloted by the self-conscious activity of
freely associating individuals. 63
The analysis of economic, objective facts becomes necessary in
order to grasp the complex cycle of the reproductive processes of
civil society. But in such an analysis itself, objective facts are not
simply facts: they come "alive and enter an indictment of society."
An economic theory cannot but in turn be a critical theory. "Econo-
mic realities exhibit their own inherent negativity. "
In Marx, as for Hegel, dialectical analysis moves from
216
appearance to essence, from immediacy to potentiality. Critical
theory follows and explicates the existential dialectic by taking
cognizance of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is "the
moving and creating principle,"'' the labor process.
The dialectic is the "dialectic of negativityr- -every
fact is more than a fact; it is a negation and restric-
tion of real possibilities. Wage labour is a fact, but
at the same time it is a restraint on free work that
might satisfy human needs. Private property is a
fact, but at the same time it is a negation of man's
collective appropriation of nature. . . . Man's
social practice embodies the negativity as well as
its overcoming. 64
From an understanding of labor in general, the dialectics of labor,
we can make explicit what is immanently possible, potential, and
available to determinate negation. But, Marcuse stresses, this
can only be done in historical analysis. It is a central tenet of
Marcuse's analysis that man's capacity to realize his essence
evolves and changes over time. So, on the other hand, the analysis
of alienated labor must be supplemented with an analysis of its con-
tinually changing social form, and, also, of the positive concept of
essence rooted in it.
Here again the development from Hegel is essential. Hegel's
philosophy, Marcuse argues, revolves around the universality of
reason; it was a rational system with each moment, its every part
(the subjective and objective, of for-itselfness and in-itselfness)
217
integrated into a comprehensive, structured, self-unfolding whole.
Marx shows, and this is the crucial development, in Marcuse's
view, that capitalist society first put such a universality into
practice.
Capitalism developed the productive forces for the
totality of a uniform social system. Universal corn--
merce, universal competition and the universal inter-
dependence of labour were made to prevail and trans-
formed men into "world-historical, empirically
universal individuals.'"65
This universality is, of course, a negative one for the productive
forces, man's products, impinge on him as uncontrolled alien
power, second nature. But in concrete, social theoretic analysis,
Marx uncovers in the dynamic of. this social formation and mode
of production (under the laws of capitalist accumulation and value,
etc. )66 the objective possibility of this negativity being negated.
One class in capitalist society makes this possible and points in the
direction of another historical structure which is present as a
tendency.
The proletariat is distinguished by the fact that, as
a class it signifies the negation of all classes. The
interests of all other classes are essentially one-
sided; the roletariat's interest is essentially
universal.97
How can we conceive, ground, and justify the claimed "universal
interests"? Marcuse's answer is worth quoting at length:
218
The universality of the proletariat is, again, a
negative universality, indicating that the alienation
of labour has intensified. . . . The labour of the
proletarian prevents any self-fulfillment; his work
negates his entire existence. This utmost negativity,
however, takes a positive turn. The very fact that
he is deprived of all assets of the prevailing system
sets him beyond this system. He is a member of the
class "which is really rid of the old world and at the
same time stands pitted againt it. " The "universal
character" of the proletariat is the final basis for the
universal character of the comrnunist revolution . . . .
The proletariat is the negation not only of certain
particular human potentialities, but also of man as
such. All specific distinguishing marks by which men
are differentiated lose their validity . . . (Property,
culture, religion, nationality) . . . His concern to exist
is not the concern of a given group, class or nation, but
is truly universal and "world historical. ,,68
Capitalism puts universality into practice and creates the possibility
of "universal reason. " It creates a subject that represents the
universality of man, for its structural and historical determinants
create the conditions for the realization of man's species nature.
Capitalism fulfills the condition of necessary universality; it
revolutionizes the productive forces and creates the possibility of
production free from the immediacy of physiological needs; it
socializes production; "all" that is required and left is that men
recognize and repudiate fetishism, the appearance and form of
capital, and with their (ever-present) "purposive 
-will, " will history
their own.
Few other than Marcuse have appreciated the immense
219
difficulties involved in this last step and the blocks to its realiza-
tion. 69 It is here, however, that critical theory--as we have
expounded it--finds its role. And it is the immanent possibility of
the confluence of historical developments and human essence, the
becoming of man's species characteristics, that directs this
theoretical labor. We asked earlier how we could interpret the
concept of truth in the following passage of Marcuse's:
Theory accompanies the practice at every moment,
analyzing the changing situation and formulating its
concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for
realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains
the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian.
Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary
practice deviates from its proper path. 70
We are now in a situation to offer a reading and interpretation. It
was argued that the labor process is pivotal in the constitution of
being; that the dialectics of labor disclose the unfolding of man and
his powers in history. In the Frankfurt School reading, however,
the dialectic is, as we have seen, unconcluded and open. Read in
this way the theory of labor and needs attempts to surmount the
difficulties raised by our questions to the first argumentation. The
potential for man to realize his essence is conceived as being
historical and dynamic. Marx was read as resting his theory on
the assumption that the labor process determines the totality of
human existence and thus gives to society its basic patterns. As
220
manifest in capitalism, the "productive activity" of man was said
to have created the possibility of realizing species nature. The
truth of this process and its immanent potentiality is the world
constitutive activity of labor. The key constitutive element in the
overcoming of capitalism and authoritarianism emerges as dependent
on the historical and pivotal role of the proletariat. The truth claims
of critical theory are intertwined with man's historio-practical
activity and rest, consequently, on a philosophy of materialism,
an analysis of labor, and, therefore, on the species characteristics
of man. The analysis of modes of labor and production can, as a
consequence, be empirical, analytic, and critical. The interest in
freedom and a rational social order is grounded in every act of labor.
Every moment of labor anticipates the fulfillment of the species-
characteristics of man, an enduring and lasting self-fulfillment of
existence in the actuality of all its possibilities. The "universal
validity" and "objectivity" of this "reconstructed" school of critical
theory finds its foundaion in an analysis of labor itself.
Marcuse emphasizes that Marx's conception of reality as
dialectical was "originally motivated by the same datum as Hegel' s,
namely, by the negative character of reality. "
In the social world this negativity carried forward
the contradictions of class society and thus remained
the motor of the social process. Every single fact
and condition was drawn into this process so that its
221
significance could be grasped only when seen in this
totality to which it belonged. For Marx, as for Hegel,
"the truth" lies only in the whole, the "negative
totality. "71
Social reality, however, can only be conceived as a negative totality
in the process of abstraction, a process which is imposed on critical
theory by the very structure of its subject matter. The analysis of
the labor proces continually reveals the necessity to move through
two fundamental levels of analysis. We must first grasp in its
immediacy, the fetishized world of appearances, the "pseudo-con-
crete, " and in so doing we must follow the abstractions that make
up this world. The second step is then "the abstraction from the
abstraction" (Marcuse) to the true concrete world, to essence.
Accordingly, the Marxian and critical theory of capitalism elabo-
rates firstly, the abstract relations such as commodity, exchange
value, money, wages and return from them to the concrete totality,
the structural tendencies that lead to its self-generated collapse
and to immanent and potentially successful emergence of a socialist
totality.
The negativity of reality is an historical and social condition,
the analysis of it always historical. The study of any moment of the
"world of men" is, Marcuse argues, inescapably embedded in the
structure of the socio-historical process. But what the relation-
ship of part to whole is, is little developed. B. Ollman, developing
222
K. Kosik's notion of the concrete totality, provides an important
elucidation of the dialectical relation of whole to parts which can be
employed here with consistency to the theoretical position. Olman
argues that the dialectical and materialist conception of totality in
Marx views the whole as "the structured interdependence of its
relational parts, the interacting events, processes, and conditions
of the 'real' world. "72 Through the constant interaction and develop-
ment of these parts, the whole also changes, realizing (some of) the
possibilities given in prior stages.
Flux and interaction, projected back into the origins
of the present and forward into its possible future,
are the chief distinguishing characteristics of the
world in this view . . . Since this interdependence
is structured--that is, rooted in relatively stable
connections--the same interaction accords the whole
a relative autonomy, enabling it to have relation as
a whole with the parts whose order and unity it repre-
sents.73
These relations are of four types:
(1) The whole shapes the parts to make them more
functional within this particular whole (so it is that
capitalism, for example, gets the laws it requires);
(2) the whole gives meaning and relative importance
to each part in terms of this function (laws in capital-
ism are only comprehensible as elements in a struc-
ture that maintains capitalist society, and are as
important as the contribution they make); (3) the whole
expresses itself through the part, so that the part can
be seen as a form of the whole . . . (a study of any
major capitalist law which includes its necessary
conditions and results will be a study of capitalism';
and (4) the relations of the parts with each other, as
suggested above, forge the contours and meaning of
223
the whole, transform it into an ongoing system with
a history, a goal, and an impact. 4
The analysis of any part of the socio-historical process
cannot and must not avoid the analytic process of totalization. Nor
can the part simply be subsumed under the whole. The develop-
ment of man in history, the changing forms of human practice, can
only be grasped if each moment is conceived as embedded in the
whole, the Unabgeschlossence Dialektick of labor. Likewise, the
totality cannot be understood without reference to its constituents,
the consciousness and self -consiousness of men.
Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past. 7 5
* * * * * * *
The theoretical position we developed above grounds Marxism
as a materialist critique in an analysis of the labor process. The
foundations of this process, it was argued, embody and anticipate the
"universal interests" of the species, the fulfillment of man's
species nature, in a rational social order that conforms to the
"good, " the "just, " and the "true. " It attempts to uncover an
immanent relationship between truth and freedom in history and,
at one and the same time, avoid relativism (being class, culture,
and time bound) and, yet, be inextricably intertwined with historical
process and social struggle. There are several directions one
224
could take in commenting on this reconstructed position. For
example, much needs to be said about the relationship between
causality and teleology or for what passes under the concept
"dialectic. " However, we must restrict ourselves to the essential
themes of this chapter.
The "philosophical anthropology" of our theory of labor
attempts to avoid the pitfalls and epistemological circles of Lukacs'
theory of the standpoint of the proletariat and that of Horkheimer's
static epistemology. The question is, whether the difficulties of
the previous positions we addressed are resolved, recast, or
determinately negated (preserved and superseded)? A number of
major points need to be made.
The theory of labor as it was developed in the first and
second argumentation says very little about man's suggested "uni-
versal essence. " The notion of unalienated labor is ill developed.
Yet its "unpacking, " concretization and expansion seems of central
importance if it is to become something more than an abstract,
metaphysical standard recognizable only by "isolated" theorists.
How can we or might we recognize this essence, know its content,
let alone deduce institutional structures compatible with its principles?
How are we to differentiate what is argued to be immanent and poten-
tial from those that claim to represent such a standpoint, e. g. , the
225
party, intellectuals, critical theorists? Are there criteria that
make such distinctions possible and are there unique principles of
social and political organization that follow from the premises of
the theory? Or are there a multitude of competing moral and
political standpoints compatible with "labor's" uncovered telos?
Herbert Marcuse has said that in a rationally organized society,
he believes, labor can win back its "originally libidinous" character. 7 6
Marx, on the other hand, attacked the (Fourier) thesis that labor
could become play in a free society. In the Grundrisse, he chastized
and ridiculed Fourier's romantic, "'naive, dreaming shop-girl's
view' that labour must become fun: "Really free labour, e. g.,
composing, is at the same time grimly serious, the most intensive
effort.'" 7 7  If the notion of species nature is to have empirical
import the issues raised by the questions above cannot be glossed
78
over.
A further objection emerges from those above. The (possible)
convergence of reason, freedom, species nature, was said to be
immanent in labor. As we asked of Horkheimer earlier, we must
ask here: who is justified in interpreting this criterion? A group
of critical theorists, intellectuals? Although certainly not conceived
as such, the theory is, in fact, potentially "elitist. " Without a con-
scious theoretical defence of the possible political need for a "party,"
226
"leadership, " etc. , the theory faces the danger of lapsing into an
unconscious, dogmatic, elitism which becomes even more serious
given the lack of explicated principles for political and social organi-
zation and action.
Furthermore, if the theory of labor is to have analytic,
empirical and critical import, it becomes important to be able to
recognize true from false needs, ideologically distorted from
reflected/true interests and to explore their relationship to social
development. The theoretical position that we developed above,
argues that despite and given alienation, labor still embodies
"human specificity" (the possibility of fulfilling species nature, etc.);
that the development of man in labor, is the unfolding of man and his
powers in history; that the dialectic is unconcluded but potentially
"concluded" (i. e., that man can break through the current structures
of unfreedom towards ever greater realization). Yet given the con-
tinuance of domination in Eastern Europe, with political suspicion
of any free thought- (rationalized by use of Marxist terminology);
the absence of a universal proletariat; the developments of twentieth-
century capitalism (and the emergence of revolutions in the Third
World, etc.)79 the theoretical position is faced with "discrepancies"
which unless it can (begin to) account for has no recourse but to
lapse, for example, into the static, epistemological position of a
227
Horkheimer and/or fall open to the charge of investing groups and
classes in the life world with a conceptual mythology. 80 What
seems required is a theory of labor that embodies a more developed
theory of human needs and their relationship to historical develop-
ments and social evolution. In this light, Habermas' suggestion that
the dynamics of human practice embody two essential moments (that
are interdependent but irreducible, etc.) speaks of an alternvative
view of the interconnection between labor, needs, and social evolu-
tion (and, therefore, the motor of history) that is deserving of
close consideration. 81
NOTES
Cf. Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of Reification"; also. P.
Piccone, "Dialectics and Materialism in Lukacs,I" T elos, no. 11
(1972).
2 See references listed under fa. 31, chap. 4.
3Ibid.
4
A. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London:
New Left Books, 1973).
The entire Ontology has not, as yet, been published. A
brief summary of his views can be found in Georg Lukacs, Die
Ontologische des Menschlichen Denkens und Handelns (Vienna:
Hundsblume Editione, 1970). Also, "The Dialectic of Labour, "
Telos 6 (Fall 1970), pp. 162-74.
6 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xvii.
7 Ibid., p. xviii.
8 Schmidt, "From Tragedy to Dialectis, " p. 251.
For an elaboration of this telos, cf. K. Marx, Early Writings,
trans, and ed. T. B. Bottomore (London: McGraw-Hill, 1964),
pp. 159-60.
Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, pp. 32-33. For
a discussion of "appropriation" in Marx, cf. B. Olman, Aliena-
tion (Cambridge: The University Press, 1973), pp. 91-106.
9 Quoted in Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, p. 6.
See Marx, Early Writings, p. 154.
1 0 Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, p. 6.
111
1 1 The notion of "species nature" in Marx is discussed on
pp. 201 ff. below.
228
229
1 2 G. Lukacs, "Interview on His Life and Work, " New Left
Review 68 (July-August 1971), p. 51.
1 3 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 79.
4 For a discussion of this rejection, see Schmidt, The
Concept of Nature in Marx, chap. 1.
1 5 The concepts of undifferentiated and differentiated unity
are usefully developed in G. A. Cohen, "Marx's Dialectic of
Labour, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (Spring 1974), pp. 253-61.
1 6 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 99 (and quoting
Hegel, Enzyclopadeie, vol. 11, Naturphilosophie, p. 36, Miller,
p. 5).
7 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 178;
1 Ibid.
9 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 100.
2 Ibid. , pp. 100-7.
2 1 Cf. M. Wartofsky, "Towards an Historical Epistemology,"
(Cambridge: January 1974, unpublished lectures at M. I. T.).
2 2 Quoted in Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, pp.
27-28.
2 3 Marx, Early Writings, pp. 120-34, 152-67, 168-78, 189-94.
Ibid. , p. 158.
2 Ibid.
2 6 Cf. K. Marx, The German Ideology (New York: International
Publishers, 1973), pp. 50-52.
27I owe this point to M. Gordy's unpublished paper, "Marx's
Ethics."
2 8 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 51.
230
2 9 Gordy, "Marx's Ethics,," p. 14.
3 0 Quoted in Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, p. 29.
3 1 bid., p. 30 (and quoting from Marx, 's Grundrisse, p. 78).
3 2 Quoted in Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, p. 31.
Cf. Marx, Early Writings, pp. 120-34.
3 3 Walton, From Alienation to Surplus Value, p. 34.
3 41Marx, Early Writings, pp. 120-34. Cf. for an elaboration
and discussion of the arguments, Olman, Alienation; I. Meszaros,
Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin, 1972).
3 5 Ollman, Alienation, p. 134.
3 6 Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence, " Negations, p. 73.
3 7 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 257.
38
Marcuse, "Sartre's Existentialism," Studies in Critical
Philosophy, pp. 188-89.
3 9 Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," Negations, p. 74.
4Ibid. (Emphasis mine.)
4 1 N. Geras, "Marx and the Critique of Political Economy,"
in Ideology and the Social Sciences, ed. R. Blackburn (London:
Fontana, 1972), p. 294. Cf. Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence,"
Negations, pp. 69-71; also, Cohen, "Karl Marx and the Withering
Away of Social Science. "
42Marcuse, The Concept of Essence," Negations, p. 85.
4Ibid.,pp. 85-86.
44
Ibid., p. 78.
4Ibid.,pp. 76-80. Cf. also references listed under fn. 69,
chap. 4.
4 6 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 272-73.
231
47 Ibid.
4 8 Marcuse, "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Con-
cept of Labour, " p. 12 (and quoting Marx and Engels, Gesamtaus-
gabe, 1. Abtg. 3, pp. 157, 168.
4 9 Ibid., p. 13 (and quoting Marx, Kapital, Volksausg. , ed
K. Kautsky (Berlin, 1928), Bd. 1, p. 10).
sIbid.,p. 22 (and quoting Gottl, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft
(Jena, 1931), p. 442).
51 Ibid. p. 22.
52 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
3 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 275 (and quoting K.
Marx, Okonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte (1844) in Marx-
Engels,Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1932), pp. 87-88.
54 Ibid.
5 Ibid. , pp. 274-76.
5 Ibid., p. 275 (and quoting Marx as in reference 49 above,
p. 89).
57 Ibid. ,- p. 276.
5 8 Ibid.
5 9 Cf. ibid., pp. 273-87.
6 0 For a discussion of "second-nature" see R. Jacoby,
"Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of
Philosophy from Lukacs to the Frankfurt School, " Telos 10
(Winter 1971), especially pp. 141-44.
6 1Ibid., pp. 141-42.
H. Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws,"
Partisan Review 26 (Winter 1959), p. 117 ff.
232
6 3 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 316.
6 Ibid. p. 282.
6 Ibid., p. 287 (and quoting Marx, The German Ideology,
p. 64).
6 6 For an explication of these laws, see Marcuse, ibid.,
pp. 295-312. Or P. Mattick, Marx and Keynes (Boston: Porter
Sargent, 1969); E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, vol. 1
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
7 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 291.
6 Ibid., pp. 291-92.
9Cf.,for example, H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New
York: Vintage, 1961); Five Lectures (Boston: Beacon, 1970);
One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 322.
71 Ibid., pp. 312-13.
7 2 B. Ollman, "Marxism and Political Science,"'' Politics
and Society 3 (1973): 496. Also see Kosik, Die Dialektic des
Koncreten.
73 Ibid.
74Ibid.
75K. Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New
York: International Publishers, 1972).
7 6 H. Marcuse, "Trieblehre und Freiheit,"'' printed in Freud
in der Gegenwart (Frankfurt, 1957), p. 418. Quoted in Schmidt,
The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 231.
7 7 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 505. Cf. also pp. 595-99. Quoted
in Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx.
7 8 The problems are not necessarily insurmountable within
the tenets of the theory, i. e. , what is missing- -e. g. , a theory of
233
socialism and political institutions- -could be developed within the
terms of reference of the theory.
7 9 See the brief discussion of these issues on p. 7f.
8 0 See our earlier discussion of Lukacs for an elaboration
of this point.
8 1 Cf. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, especially chaps. 2, 3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theory of Labor, as we have developed it here, is open
to several objections, all of which it might be able to respond to
but which remain major problems at this time. A question, how-
ever, remains: Might it be that the series of philosophical questions
that arise when the problems of "ultimate foundations" emerge in
critical theory are themselves a misplaced series of questions?
We need to ask then, what is the rational justification for grounding,
i. e., how can we ground the problem of grounding? It can clearly
not be ruled out that there is no absolute ground for critical theory.
The status of critique in Marx's Political Economy might have been
developed by the critical tradition in a direction which admits of no
final philosophical solution. Are the questions about the nature of
Critique, and the foundations of critical theory, adequately posed by,
for example, the Frankfurt theorists? There is clearly insufficient
time available to adequately deal with these issues, but a few points
can briefly be made. These points will suggest another understanding
of critique and an alternative direction.
In light of the problems that weigh on the above attempts to
reformulate the concept of truth and to find absolute standards for
234
235
the foundation of Critique, it might be argued that there are good
reasons why Marx did not pursue these issues at length in his later
work. They admit of no ultimate solution. Instead, it can and has
been argued that the notion of Critique found in Capital is akin to
the nature of critique in all science.
G. A. Cohen, in an article entitled "Karl Marx and the Withering
Away of Social Science, ''l argues that the critical base of Marx's
work rests on the claim (common to all science) that when scientific
explanation uncovers a reality unrepresented and unknown in appear-
ance and, therefore, discredits a common-sense understanding of
that appearance, science can be regarded as potentially subversive.
The results of the practice of science can only be critical when
"there is a gulf between appearance and reality when and only when
the explanation of a state of affairs renders unacceptable the descrip-
tion that it is natural to give of it if one lacks the explanation, this
description being based purely on observation and committing the
observer to know theoretical hypotheses. ''2 The withering away of
the Critique of Political Economy can only take place when there is
a withering away of the gap between appearance and essence, between
the immediacy of the givenness of everyday reality and the mechan-
isms that creates and generates these appearances and underlies
them. When the reality that is pretheoretically available is closed,
236
science becomes "neutral" to its subject. With the gulf present, we
can talk of man's alienation in the sense that "I am alienated from
myself and from what I do to the extent that I need theory to reach
myself and the reasons governing my actions . . . The need for a
theory of the social processes in which I participate reflects a simi-
lar alienation from those processes."3 Hence a reduced reliance
on the results of science that are subversive and critical is both
desirable and immanently necessary to the integrity and autonomy
of the individual. This does not, obviously, make it possible.
The possibility, of course, rests on a unity of theory and
practice, a unity in which practice is informed by theory and creates
the conditions for the transparency of social life. It was Marx's
view that under the Feudal and Capitalist modes of production, social
relationships and social processes were and are organized in such
a way as to produce blocks to the transparency of social life (e. g.,
the fetishism of commodities). 4 "When social reality inevitably
generates discord between thought and reality, the enemy of illusion
must operate on reality, not in thought alone. "5 The gap can only
be closed by practice. The Eleventh Thesis sets the program for the
day.
None of this is to say that we are forced back to a view of
science that rests on a fact/value, theory/practice dichotomy, etc.
237
It does say, however, that the problem of demarcation remains a
problem. Amongst the writers whose works we have explored, we
have not found sufficient grounds for separating science from faith.
NOTES
1 Cohen, "Karl Marx and the Withering Away of Social
Science. "
2 Ibid., p. 200.
Ibid.,pp. 202-3.
4 Cf. ibid. , pp. 190-99; Geras, "Marx and the Critique of
Political Economy. "
Ibid. , p. 198.
238
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