PUERTO RICANS IN CAMBRIDGE:
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
REGIONALISM
by
TULIO ESPADA

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF
URBAN STUDIES
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
August, 1976

Signature of Author...
Department of Urban Studies
(Date)

Certified by...
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by...
Chairman, Departmental Committee

© 1976
Tulio I. Espada
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY

Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable flaws in this reproduction. We have made every effort possible to provide you with the best copy available. If you are dissatisfied with this product and find it unusable, please contact Document Services as soon as possible.

Thank you.

The images contained in this document are of the best quality available.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE**

**SECTION I: THE INTRODUCTION**

- **PART ONE. THE HYPOTHESIS**
- **PART TWO. METHODOLOGY**
- **PART THREE. USE OF TERMS**
- **PART FOUR. THE HISPANO CONTEXT**

**SECTION II: THE ISLAND**

- **PART ONE. THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM**
  - A. Borinquen, Africans, Spaniards, and the World Economy
  - B. Isolation under Spain
  - C. The Modern World Breaks In
- **PART TWO. COAMO AND JAYUYA**

**SECTION III: THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE**

- **PART ONE. EARLY CAMBRIDGE, 1964–1969**
  - A. The Migrant and Cambridge
  - B. Anglo Institutions: The Bar, The Church
  - C. The First Puerto Rican Institution: The Club
  - D. The Origin of Concilio
  - E. Some Preliminary Observations
- **PART TWO: CONCILIO AND THE BATTLE OF CENTRAL SQUARE**
- **PART THREE: THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS**
  - A. The 1970 Census
  - B. The Brown Study
- **PART FOUR: EMPLOYMENT**
  - A. The Hispano Community
  - B. Differences between Jayuyanos and Coamenos
- **PART FIVE: HOUSING**
  - A. Living Conditions
  - B. Geographical Distribution
  - C. CAST—A Success Story
  - D. Jayuyano-Coameno Tensions Produced by Housing
- **PART SIX: THE CHURCH: FATHER SHEEHAN ATTEMPTS TO WORK MIRACLES**

**SECTION IV: THE CONCLUSION**

**APPENDICES:**

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I would like to take this opportunity to inform both the people who required me to write this thesis and who persuaded me to choose this topic, that is, those people who have advised and taught me at MIT, and its future readers, whomever they may be, that writing this paper has been among the hardest things I have ever done in my life, and my life has not exactly moved along a highway paved even with asphalt, much less gold. I will spare you the more maudlin details, and only give a few examples to point out the vehemence behind that remark. I grew up in one of the more rural barrios of Coamo, a place called Pasto. As a country kid, I, like all country people, rolled up my pants-legs to prevent them from being soiled in the puddles of unpaved lanes which had to be negotiated on the way to school, and then upon arrival forgot to unroll them, a mark of moral and mental depravity in the minds of the more citified students. I was therefore not unaccustomed to patronizing remarks nor discrimination nor the epithet of jíbaro. Having committed a not illegal, but nevertheless socially unacceptable indiscretion at the ripe age of seventeen, I was shipped off to the new world of Cambridge, to be supervised by a half-brother six years my elder. Thus I had had much practice in learning to adapt to a system foreign to most of what I had grown up knowing. My fortunes in Cambridge had gone up and down; I thus was acquainted both with hob-nobbing with the rich and powerful and with living and sleeping on the City Hall lawn. All of this was, of course, very useful preparation for being a graduate student at MIT.
But nothing had ever assaulted my emotional supports as well as my intellect in the same way that being the only Puerto Rican immigrant in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning did. One could have anticipated the usual attacks on the graduate student's psyche and the sense of hurdle-jumping instilled by judges sitting in a high tower watching the struggle below, clucking their tongues at the figures so small in the distance. One could even anticipate living with the omnipresent conviction that MIT was doing you a favor, that as some poor Puerto Rican without the usual degrees acquired in normal hurdle order, you would be, in the eyes of some, a tolerated if paternally patted interloper. It came almost as a revelation when I finally realized that I was doing MIT a few favors too. Not only was I a statistic for their affirmative action report, and a city document retrieval service for my fellow students, but I was also a source of rare information about the city of Cambridge, and indeed, the well was being pumped. One did get used to the necessity of proving to one's professors, fellow students, and eventually, so much doubt having been created, to oneself, that one had earned every credit on that transcript as much as any other student had. What one could not anticipate was the growing separation, imposed not merely by your own process of change, but much more painfully, imposed by your own community, those people closest to you, who insist that you are different, and though you try, you cannot explain that you are not that different, and that you still know whence you came. It is a cruel process, but having gone that road, I know it to be irreversible.
In addition to representing the embodiment of that whole process, this thesis has presented additional dilemmas. When most authors say that they were a participant-observer, they mean that they simultaneously participated and observed. I did not. I was a participant, not merely a participant, but an instigator, and the observing has been a retrospective observing. Thus the writing of this thesis has required a kind of self-analysis, and group analysis by a member of that group, that has not been pleasant or easy. But the real problem in writing this thesis has been the necessity of exposing both the strengths and particularly the weaknesses of a community that does not deserve to have its dirty linen aired before a puriently interested public. That that public will be much more interested in our weaknesses than in our strengths, in our infighting than in our needs and our goals is a suspicion that I cannot dispel from my mind. I have, nevertheless, exposed them, and my only consolation is the hope that within the Anglo community, knowledge will bring concern, and within the Hispano community, that the truth shall set us free of this plague. No doubt, some of my friends at MIT will be offended by this preface, just as my Hispano friends will be offended by the content. My only reply is that, to the best of my ability, I have told the truth, and that this truth must be faced before our problems can be solved.

It is also my pleasure to have this opportunity to thank the various members of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning who have helped me in numerous ways during the last four years, and particularly my advisor and friend, Langley C. Keyes. That
this thesis is now complete is due in large part to his patience,
his encouragement, and most importantly, his persistence in pursuing
me from one retreat to another. Each time that I had decided to
forget the whole thing, there was Langley, on the phone. It is
with a fine sense of relief that I am now able to repay, at least
in some small way, the faith that he has shown in me and in this
thesis.
ABSTRACT

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the difficulties encountered in organizing and servicing Puerto Rican migrant communities on the mainland are due to the fact that these communities are made up of people from various municipalities in Puerto Rico, and that these various municipalities do not share a common cultural heritage. Inherent in this hypothesis is the argument that regionalism is still a strong force on the island, and that the only reason that it has not been more visible there is that, so long as these people remain on the island in their home towns, relatively little contact occurs between them. Once that contact is made within the mainland communities, however, these regional differences divide the community and prevent the internal unity required for successful organization and planning.

The case of the Puerto Rican community in Cambridge, Massachusetts (about 5,000 souls in a city of about 107,000) is used to demonstrate the above hypothesis. This community's history is traced from the late 1950's through 1975. The present thesis argues that the conflicts between those people from the Municipality of Jayuya and the Municipality of Coamo are due to the fundamentally different cultural heritages that the two groups bring with them to Cambridge. Secondly it is argued that these differences, not to mention the city officials' ignorance of the community, were the fundamental cause of various hostilities, particularly the October 1969 battle between several hundred Puerto Ricans at Central Square, and that these hostilities have thus far stood in the way of the organization
of a unified Puerto Rican, and therefore a unified Hispano, community.

Specifically this thesis argues that the jibaro cultural heritage, a culture unique to Puerto Rico, has created the special problems in Cambridge. The Coameno comes from an area that has experienced significant industrialization, and thus he has acquired urban skills before his arrival in Cambridge. The Jayuyano's isolation from this coastal change, on the other hand, has left him without urban skills and with a political tradition of non-participation. As a result, the Jayuyano has been unable to participate in what has become a Coameno-dominated community.

The thesis further argues that this problem of regionalism can only be overcome if special efforts are made both by the Hispano leaders and by the city officials to develop local leadership among the Jayuyanos and to create an atmosphere of trust.
SECTION I. THE INTRODUCTION

PART ONE. THE HYPOTHESIS.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the difficulties encountered in organizing and servicing Puerto Rican migrant communities on the mainland are due to the fact that these communities are made up of people from various municipalities in Puerto Rico, and that these various municipalities do not share a common cultural heritage. Inherent in this hypothesis is the argument that regionalism is still a strong force on the island and that the only reason that it has not been more visible there is that so long as these people remain on the Island in their home towns relatively little contact occurs between them. Once that contact is made within the mainland communities, however, these regional differences divide the community and prevent the internal unity required for successful organization and planning.

The case of the Puerto Rican community (which numbers approximately 5,000) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (a city of about 107,000) is used to demonstrate the above hypothesis. Specifically, this thesis will argue that the conflicts between those people from the Municipality of Jayuya and the Municipality of Coamo are due to the fundamentally different cultural heritages that these two groups bring with them to Cambridge. Secondly, it is argued that these differences, not to mention the city officials' ignorance of the community, were the fundamental cause of various hostilities, particularly the October 1969 battle between several hundred Puerto Ricans at Central Square, and that these hostilities have thus far...
stood in the way of the organization of a unified Puerto Rican, and therefore a unified Hispano, community.

PART TWO. METHODOLOGY.

It should be made clear from the outset that the author of this thesis was a participant in many of the events described in this thesis. As a member of the 1964 police delegation, he participated in the event that marked the beginning of Puerto Rican activism in Cambridge. And in June of 1975, the cut-off date for material appearing in this thesis, he was President of the Board of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge. This personal involvement in the events described has in some ways been an advantage. The author has had access to information that would otherwise not have been available, and he has been in a position to evaluate how accurately the documents reflected the past they purport to describe.

That the author has been so intimately involved also has had its disadvantages. One problem in writing a thesis about something that one has been so thoroughly a part of is that one knows too much, and is constantly having to make decisions about the propriety of including or excluding various pieces of information. A second problem of the participant is one of objectivity. The author came to this country in 1961 from the Municipality of Coamo, and as a Coameno he is a member of one of the two groups portrayed here, two groups that have been in conflict with each other. The author has tried to portray both groups as fairly and as critically as possible. He has tried to present accurately the feelings of both, and
to be sympathetic to the reasons that they feel the way they do. Only the reader is in a position to judge whether or not he has succeeded in this endeavor.

In addition to the two conflicting Puerto Rican groups, there is another sometimes antagonistic pair in this thesis: the Hispano leaders on one hand, and the various officials of this city on the other. The author obviously was a member of one of these groups too, and he does not claim to be an impartial observer in this respect. He only claims that the facts presented here are accurate, and that the interpretations are the result of careful analysis, based not only upon his own opinions, but upon taped interviews with those people directly involved and with others who were in a position to shed some light on these events.

The information in this thesis is based in part on a selection of the literature that has been published on Puerto Rican history and migration, and on the files of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge, Inc., and of the Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants, Inc. What remains of the CEOC files for the years 1968 and 1969 and assorted internal documents that he acquired as an employee of Model Cities have also been used. He has also made extensive use of the 1970 Census of Puerto Rico and the publications of the City of Cambridge Department of Planning and Development, including their presentations of the 1970 Census data, and a 1973 study entitled The Hispano Population of Cambridge. The latter was carried out by Dr. Susan E. Brown with the cooperation of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge.
Extensive use of interviews has also been made. The author interviewed 50 Jayuyanos and 50 Coamenos who lived in Cambridge during this period. He began interviewing with a questionnaire in hand, but he soon had to abandon that method. Because many of the people interviewed were personally acquainted with the author and knew that he already knew the answers to the questions that he was asking, they could not really believe that the author intended them to answer the questions. They would look at the author as if to speculate on his sanity and then remark, "But you know about that." Thus the author was forced to try some other methods.

After consultation with experts, the author changed his tactics. With regard to the Coamenos, he asked a Spanish-speaking Anglo to assist him, and with a concealed tape recorder they entered the Hispanos' clubs. Sitting down next to a game of dominoes or cards they would start a conversation which they would occasionally direct onto the desired topic. And the Anglo could with some degree of credibility ask questions in order to pursue some of their more relevant comments. These conversations would always attract a crowd, and thus the Coamenos interviews were group interviews, which was useful since the Coamenos were more talkative in a group.

The Jayuyanos were more difficult. They do not cluster in groups in the bars. At most one finds one or two of them together, and, on a given night, these pairs might be scattered throughout the bars of Central Square. Furthermore the author found the Jayuyanos to be much more talkative in their homes around the dinner table than in any other situation. He thus started visiting the
various Jayuyano families which he had met over the years. (It was absolutely fruitless to try to talk to those that did not know him.) He would explain that as the President of the Concilio Board he was trying to collect information that would help Concilio improve its services. (The information was used for this purpose as well.) He would add that the information would also be used for a project that he was doing as a student at MIT. Those Jayuyanos who knew him would talk under these conditions, and some of them were willing to talk quite frankly. In the case of both Jayuyanos and Coamenos, they were much more expansive when asked to describe their home towns than when asked questions related to the problem of regionalism.

The author also interviewed 22 persons who were leaders, either official or non-official, in Cambridge during the time that these events occurred. The purposes of these interviews were to measure the degree of their awareness of the Hispano community, their knowledge of the community, and to discover what their perceptions were of their own agency's response, and the responses of other agencies.

Like the Puerto Ricans, many of these respondents did not use the interviews for the purpose that the author had intended them. Actually, the interview process itself became a kind of political pressure, since the officials had been given the questionnaire several days prior to the actual interview. Many had taken this opportunity to find out the answers to the questions. One actually had a copy of the 1973 Brown Study (which contained answers to many of the questions) open during the interview, in spite of the fact that the author
had asked him to put it away. He nonchalantly would turn to the appropriate page and read off the correct answer. In addition, some took advantage of this opportunity to express themselves on various issues in a manner that was more appropriate for a public relations campaign than a scientific survey. Nevertheless, the author did manage to obtain some very useful information from these interviews.

If the Anglo population is not sensitive to differences among Hispanic nationalities, it is not surprising that they are almost oblivious to Puerto Rican regionalism. Puerto Ricans, however, are very much aware of regional stereotypes, even if they remain unaware of their cost, the damage they have done to Puerto Rican political unity. To offer just a few examples of these stereotypes, Ponce is commonly regarded as being more socially conservative than San Juan, whereas the people of Ponce consider themselves to be masters of social finesse. In contrast to San Juan, Ponce's Spanish elite turned up its nose at American businessmen in the early period of U.S. occupation. The people of Coamo call themselves "maratonistas" (marathon runners), and those from Utuado boast that their town produces the island's most beautiful women.

And when the people of these towns come to the mainland they tend to form into "home town" settlements. For example, a study done by the Cambridge CAP agency, CEOC, in 1969, comments that "In New York, many people are from San Juan; in Boston, most Puerto Ricans are from the...towns of Santurce and Ponce; in Cambridge, the majority of people are from...Coamo and Jayuya." It is this regionalism
that has produced the raw material for the conflicts that plague these communities.

PART THREE. USE OF TERMS.

Before we launch into this topic, there are a few items that should be defined for the sake of precision. Words such as Hispano and Spanish are often used carelessly, and the result is confusion. A study done in 1973, for example, by the Alianza Hispana, Inc. of Dorchester (a neighborhood of Boston) is called "Two-Hundred-Ten Puerto Rican Families in Dorchester." But when one turns to its introduction, one finds that it is not only about Puerto Ricans, but about all Hispano mothers in that area.

Therefore, so as not to add to this already confused situation, it should be made clear from the beginning that in this thesis the term Hispano shall be used (as it is in Spanish) to refer to all those people who have either themselves immigrated from the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America or from Spain itself, or who are descendants of these people. Hispano is not actually a part of the English language and normally should appear in print italicized to indicate its foreign origin. However, since it is permissible not to italicize those foreign words frequently used by English-speaking persons, the author has taken the liberty of declaring Hispano a frequently-used word, since in this thesis it certainly qualifies as such.

In choosing to use the Spanish term Hispano, I have rejected the English word Hispanic. If one looks Hispanic up in the dictionary,
he will find that when used properly it refers not only to those whom the author has defined as Hispano, but also to those persons from Portugal or Portuguese-speaking areas.

This study deals exclusively with the Spanish-speaking. In Cambridge the Portuguese community has its own organization and therefore is not related to the Concilio Hispano. Consequently, the author has chosen to avoid this word.

The term Spanish-speaking also has been rejected on the grounds of clarity. Some Anglos speak Spanish, and are thus Spanish-speaking, but that does not make them Hispanos. In order to maintain this distinction between the Hispano and those who speak Spanish but are not from Spain or Latin America, I have confined the use of the term Spanish-speaking (except in direct quotations or in the names of organizations) to mean a person who is not necessarily a Hispano, but who does speak Spanish. To further insure that this distinction is maintained, the term Spanish-speaking, when used in this sense, will usually be followed by a designation such as Anglo, as in a Spanish-speaking Anglo. This distinction is important not only on the grounds of orderliness, but important also because the term Spanish-speaking is easily abused. It has happened that when a given city agency was asked to provide a list of their Hispano employees they produced a list that included many surnames that would not normally be associated with Hispanos. But since it is not that unusual for Hispanos to have German, French, Italian or English names, a further inquiry was made. It turned out that the agency had listed the
names of all those persons that had indicated on their job application that they had at some point in their life studied Spanish. The institution did not even confine itself to those who had studied Spanish successfully.

A third term that the author has rejected is one used by the U.S. Government and many institutions, including MIT's financial aid office. This is the easily-abused term, Spanish-surnamed. As pointed out earlier, many Hispanos do not have Spanish surnames, and the Anglo wife of an Hispano is not a Hispano.

Perhaps the use of the Anglo, too, should be clarified. Although its etymology might suggest that it applies only to those persons from the British Isles or possibly northern Europe, it is used in this paper to refer to Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and other assorted European-Americans. It is a word used by the Hispano population to refer to the above-mentioned individuals, and it is more polite than other words that Hispanos sometimes use, such as gringo.

Yet another clarification that needs to be made is one concerning the two names that are applied to the planning department of the Cambridge City Government. It should be pointed out that in 1975 the Community Development Program was superimposed upon the Department of Planning and Development, and that after that date the former title should be used to refer to the department as a whole, and the latter used to refer to one section of the Community Development Program. However, to avoid switching terms and confusing the reader, I have used the title Department of Planning and Development throughout this thesis.
PART FOUR. THE HISPANO CONTEXT.

Although this study focuses primarily on the regional differences within the Puerto Rican population, one should be aware that these are not the only cultural differences among Hispano communities. Every nationality carries with it the unique ethnic, social, geographical, historical and political traditions of its own nation, and all of these traditions have been different in each particular country of Latin America. The various Native Americans spread throughout the area were not identical, nor were the various immigrant populations evenly distributed throughout the region. These countries have fought different battles, and they have fought wars among themselves, and they do not think they are any more alike than Europeans think that Germans and Frenchmen are alike.

That the U.S. Government labels them all Spanish-surnamed obscures these differences. This may be evidenced by the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-speaking Peoples in 1971. According to the chairman, Mr. Henry Ramiriz, this "...is the only federal mechanism serving the nation's 12 million Spanish-surnamed Americans." No consideration is given to the very real differences among them, and thus government programs are often ill-suited for the specific population of any given community. The Government's failure to make these distinctions also leads to any number of abuses, and most of these abuses are committed at the expense of the Puerto Rican.

The Puerto Rican is the only Hispano whose entire homeland is U.S. Territory, and thus he is the only Hispano assumed to be a U.S.
certain obvious differences are apparent between the Puerto Ricans and those not U.S. citizens, even without close in-depth study. Because the Puerto Rican is an American citizen, he is entitled to all rights and privileges accorded a U.S. citizen under the U.S. Constitution. The majority of Cubans who presently live in Puerto Rico and the United States are there under Refugee Status as accorded them under the 1965 International Agreement on Cuban Refugees between the U.S. and Cuba. Predominantly, the Cubans are not U.S. citizens, although they enjoy full benefit in all federal programs. However, the following statement is indicative of the Cuban situation before the 1965 Agreement, and in many ways reflective of the situation present today with other Hispanic nationalities:

There is some conflict between other Spanish-speaking people and Puerto Ricans, but it is mostly of a rather impersonal sort. Generally, it is linked with the "discredit" which Puerto Ricans sometimes feel other Spanish-speaking throw upon them, especially when in trouble, by claiming to be Puerto Ricans, in order to enjoy the right of United States citizenship. Apparently, this has come up in the past particularly with Cubans, who attempt(ed) to enter and remain working in the country by passing as Puerto Ricans. Some Puerto Ricans tend to blame other groups for the reputation they feel is imputed wrongly to the Puerto Rican.

It is also interesting to review a situation existing in the Public Welfare system. It was undoubtedly a surprise to the author, upon asking the Director of the Department of Welfare how many Puerto Ricans are receiving Public Welfare, to learn that it was difficult for the worker to answer this question realistically as there exists a phenomenon which she termed the "Instant Puerto Rican."
She explained that "Instant Puerto Ricans are families that are not Puerto Ricans, but declare themselves as such in order to collect public welfare. On occasion, this situation has been encouraged by sympathetic social workers upon seeing a family in distress, or more commonly by not knowing the differences among Hispanics."

Looking at what has happened in welfare, one can readily understand the benefits that a non-Puerto Rican Hispano can secure by beating the system and taking advantage of the Anglo's ignorance, or prejudice, or both. Yet how frequently is the Puerto Rican misrepresented as a result?

The effects of this situation are obviously far-reaching and merit further in-depth evaluation and research. This is not the topic of the present study, however, but only background information useful in understanding the tensions inherent in the mainland Hispano community as a whole, and the more specific problem of regionalism in the Puerto Rican community.

PART FOUR. A PREVIEW OF THE CONTENTS.

But it is not enough to tell this community that it has a problem, or even what that problem is. The Government of Puerto Rico spends a great deal of money every year to have experts explain that Puerto Rico has a problem. What is needed is not a diagnosis, but a cure. And to discover the cure, one must trace the cause.

The body of this thesis begins in Section II with a short history of the island of Puerto Rico, and it does this for a purpose.
To understand the origins of the town-centered regionalism of the Puerto Rican migrant on the mainland, one must understand the history that created this regionalism. The Puerto Rican has been shaped by forces that even no other Hispano nationality has encountered, at least not in the same way or to the same extent. The result was a culture unique to Puerto Rico, the culture of the jibaro, which until this century characterized all of the island outside the city limits of its coastal towns. These forces created an island made up of isolated units, each different, with different customs, different vocabulary, and different ethnic mix. But the layer of cultural difference that is most relevant to this thesis is that brought about in the last 75 years by the impact of U.S. corporate investment. This economic development has brought about a major change in the peoples of the coast. They are no longer a part of that jibaro culture, but a part of a culture that has evolved out of it and away from it. It is this cultural legacy, this latest layer of difference, that has provided the raw material for the problem in Cambridge, and this diagnosis applies equally to the Jayuyanos who arrive with that culture intact and to the Coameno who has only recently abandoned it. The epithets that they throw at each other in Cambridge refer not to sexual activities (although they do use these in other contexts), but to the degree of urbanization and modernization that their respective towns can claim. The Coameno calls the Jayuyano "Jibaro" or "Tomatero" (tomato head), while the Jayuyano calls the Coameno "Orgulloso" or "Cara duro" (Hard-face). To understand the seeds of truth behind such epithets one must go to the island.
One must know this history to understand why two groups from the same small island could be so different. Their history also explains, in very general terms, why these people have come to Cambridge. More importantly, it explains why they make the assumptions that they do, and why they are exceedingly sensitive about some things.

One must understand that the poor of Cambridge are not alike, not even the Puerto Rican poor, and that the most important differences are not related to the pigmentation of the skin, but the ideas in their heads. One can count the distribution of pigmentation (or at least the census tries to) but the census cannot tell a planner what is going on in the minds of a community. And even when one talks to members of that community and finds out what they think, one must know why they think that way to know how to change their behavior, if that is necessary. And to know why they think the way they do, one must know their history.

The second reason that one must know this history is a corollary of the first. There has been a tendency in Cambridge to blame either the Coamenos or the Jayuyanos, or both, for the hostilities that have broken out between them. In one sense—that if they had known better they could have done better in dealing with their differences—one might be able to blame them. But placing all the blame on them, the victims, is not only wrong, it precludes any possibility of success in overcoming this problem. In reality, that there is such an explosive mix can only be blamed on the forces
that have shaped the history of the island, the hurricane-like forces that have blown across it.

Section II is a general outline of the history of the Hispano community in Cambridge as a whole, from the late 1950's to 1975. The emphasis here is on two things: the development of the hostilities in Cambridge between the Coameno and the Jayuyano, and how these hostilities have affected various institutions and programs of the community. The second thing concerns the city's officials and their lack of response. This section demonstrates that every significant advance came only after the community had picketed, demonstrated, sat-in, or threatened legal action. Thus the officials of Cambridge are not completely blameless, either. Their own ignorance, which many do not admit or do not think relevant, has tied the hands of the leaders of that community in specific instances and in general.

In Section III there is much discussion of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge, Inc., and the members of its Board. For better or worse, this institution and its leaders have been involved in every major issue that has affected the community, and it is impossible to discuss any specific problem, be it the undercount of the Hispano population in the 1970 Census, unemployment, or housing, without making reference to the activities of this institution and its members. Nor is it possible to discuss regionalism as it manifested itself in the Church, without making reference to the continuing cooperation between Concilio and Father Sheehan, the priest at St.
Mary's, and the similar problems that the two institutions faced as a result of the regionalism manifested in the community.

In the last section, Section IV, the author has tried to assess a number of things. First, which agencies in Cambridge responded to the community, and why. Secondly, he offers an explanation of why the agencies of the City of Cambridge have not offered the community decent services, and, third, he offers some possible solutions to the problem. Specifically he offers one suggestion about how the Hispano community and its leaders might try to overcome the various problems that regionalism presents, and he offers a few suggestions to the planners of the city with regard to what they might do differently.

Mr. Fernando de Baca, special assistant to President Ford for Hispanic and other minority language groups has recently declared that Hispanics are well on their way to becoming this country's number one minority. Various attempts to count this population have placed the total number in the United States at between 16 and 20 million. Since they are using their immigration quotas to the limit, moreover, and their birthrate is twice as high as that of American Blacks, he predicts the further rapid expansion of this population. [New York Times,

At the same time, Mr. de Baca went on to lament the lack of attention that this group has received from various public agencies. "We've gone unnoticed, ignored, and neglected, but we're destined to become a very important political force in the next two decades."
But how can he be so optimistic when "the voter registration rate for Spanish-speaking Americans is only about 35 percent of those eligible--some twenty percent of the national average" [Ibid.]? As this thesis demonstrates, the community has many problems to solve within itself before it is going to be able to mobilize those numbers.
SECTION II. THE ISLAND

PART ONE. THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM.

A. Borinquen, Spaniards, Africans, and the World Economy.

The origins of the hostilities in Cambridge, Massachusetts lie in almost 400 years of Island history. Thus it is not an easy matter to explain without a review of that history. The planner must know the community for which he plans, and to know the Puerto Rican one must understand his origins. To understand where the Jayuyano and the Coameno are coming from, one must understand first what they have in common, and secondly, why they are different. It is for this reason that the following synopsis of the major story lines of that history is absolutely essential to the main arguments of this thesis.

The island of Puerto Rico is one peak of a partially submerged mountain chain that runs from Key West, Florida, almost to Venezuela. Of the four large mountain-top islands--Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and Puerto Rico, which collectively are the Greater Antilles--Puerto Rico lies the farthest to the east, 1,050 miles from Florida. About 100 miles beyond Puerto Rico the chain makes an abrupt turn toward the south, and the tips above water become much smaller. The latter group is known as the Lesser Antilles. During the age of European sea power that began in the 15th century and lasted until the development of the airplane in our own century, Puerto Rico stood as the outer gate to the entire Caribbean region. The Atlantic Ocean washes its northern shore;
the Caribbean Sea laps against the beaches of its southern coast.

About 100 miles long and 35 miles wide (that is, about half the size of Massachusetts), Puerto Rico is 3,435 square miles of tropical paradise. With a remarkable stable temperature that hovers around seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit in the winter and eighty degrees Fahrenheit in the summer, its sumptuous coastal plains and white sand beaches would attract any passerby. The northeastern trade winds that regulate her temperature also bring much rain, especially to the northern two-thirds of the island, creating more than a thousand streams, over 50 of which merit the designation "rio." [Williams, p. 2]. Strewn horizontally across the island, especially through its most middle strip, are mountains, whose jagged peaks and steep valleys, along with the uneven plains that they define, trace the body of a reclining woman, if one stares at the contours long enough. The head and the torso (which make up about the western three-quarters of the area) are called the Cordillera Central; the northeastern leg is the Sierra de Luquillo; the southeastern leg, the Sierra de Cayey. Somewhat west of the island's most central point, these mountains climb precipitously to their highest and most forbidding. The highest peak of all, Cerro de Punta, towers 4,398 feet above the valley of Jayuya [Robert V. Masters, pp. 17-19. This peak is often referred to as La Puntita en Jayuya].

In the 15th century, A.D., on this island of flowers, fruits, and gurgling streams, lived a gentle people, the Borinquén. Although they were closely related to the Carib, their warlike neighbors on the nearby islands, and although they spoke approximately the same
language, Arawak, culturally they were a very different people. On
Borinquén the women ruled, and women warriors defended this island
against their expansive, aggressive patriarchal neighbors. No one
knows how many there were before the invasions of the patriarchal
and even more war-like white man; many authors estimate around 30,000
[Stan Steiner, The Islands: The Worlds of the Puerto Ricans (New

The Borinquén were a settled agricultural people. Each of the
island's seventeen sub-groups had a territorial base, within which
it cultivated fields of corn, tobacco, sweet potatoes, peanuts, pep-
pers, yam (a white vegetable similar to a potato), yuca (from
which they made a bread called casabe), and a host of other rare
and exotic products [Hauberg, p. 6 and Williams, Chapter One]. They
also gathered the island's fruits, herbs, and natural fibres, both
cotton and maguey, neither of which were cultivated, but were avail-
able for the picking.

Although the Borinquén did not possess sophisticated agricultu-
ral tools (they merely planted with a sharp stick), they were highly
skilled at carving stone; making multi-colored pottery; and spinning,
weaving, and dyeing wild fibres. From stone they made hatchets,
knives, and religious objects; from clay, various kitchen utensils,
storage vats, and, again, religious objects; and from fibre they made
fishing nets and lines, hammocks, and cloth. (Only married women,
however, wore any of the latter item, and that only below the waist.
[Williams, Chapter One.])
Blessed by an abundance of mountain streams, the islanders located their villages near water, so that they could bathe every morning. After the bath, they would then paint themselves with a red dye made from the juice of tree seeds. The dye, which was an effective insecticide, was also used to color their food. It was this dye that intensified the red of the bronze-colored Borinquén, and inspired the European discoverers to dub them "la gente colorada," the red people [Steiner, p. 8].

The people lived in circular bamboo houses, called bohíos, which were rather loosely and randomly clumped into villages. Inside the ordinary home, which was usually just one room, would be a stove made from three large stones. Its fire was kept constantly burning. Hanging from the rafters of the roof were hammocks, in which the people slept. High-backed, but short-legged chairs, made either of stone or wood, lined the walls, and above them hung the masks of the ancestors, from which perch they could oversee all affairs of the household. These masks might be made either of clay or of stone, and their presence in the home made it the only center of religious activity, apart from the village plaza, or batey.

The layout of the villages makes it very clear that their society was not completely classless. Every village had one main, swept-bare dirt road that led directly into a large, swept-bare batey. Facing the village batey was the house of the cacique, or chief. Unlike the other houses of the village, the chief's house was rectangular, possessed windows, and a plank floor made of palm trunks. The rest of the village made do with just a door for
ventilation, and a pounded earth floor. Although the local cacique might be either male or female, the island's supreme cacique, the elected leader of all others, was male.

Borinquen society of the 15th century was not a pure matriarchy, but it was matrilineal—the male positions of leadership were inherited through mothers or sisters. This fascinated the Europeans.

It was the woman who chose the man she wished to love. It was the woman who ended a love, at will. And the men seemed to have few rights [to] love, or even to their own children.... Village and family life was ruled by the women; the family name, the ownership of the land, and the tribal leadership were inherited through the women [Early travelogues, cited by Steiner, pp. 26, 33].

Second in power only to the political cacique was the religious bohique, a position that combined the functions of interpreter of the gods and spirits, healer, and historian, and a position which could be filled in the late fifteenth-century village either by male or female. The overwhelmingly primary deity was the Earth Mother, creator of life. She brought the warm rain and the crops. Next in the pantheon was a male, Huracán (from which English got its word hurricane), whose winds brought death and destruction. The female-male duality of the earthly power structure and human procreation thus projected itself into the non-human realm. There were also lesser spirits (cemies), historical personages and ancestors, and the bohique attended their stone effigies which surrounded the village batey.

That the bohique was also a curer was related to the belief that disease was caused by possession. Spirits (the ephemeral forms of the dead) took over an individual, and to get rid of the offending
spirit, it was necessary to call in an expert—the one who knew spirits and who could use this knowledge to control them, sometimes. After inhaling snuff, the healer invoked rituals and trances, which often involved medicinal herbs and nutritious foods. And since a people must understand their origins and their past, in order to learn from it, the bohiques memorized and passed on one to the other the lessons of history, the stories of its heroes and heroines, as well as its herbs [Williams, p. 7].

Also amazing to the Spaniards who arrived in the late 15th century were the scenes that they witnessed at the open-air arenas, especially large bateys, where religious ceremonies were held. As on Mount Olympus, singing, dancing, and games made up the service, as well as human phallic blood offering. (Phallic worship is as common among matriarchal societies as breast fetish is in the modern world. The dominant sex seems always to become fixated upon its opposite's most protruding part. Columbus, incidentally, when pressed for a description of Borinquen, resorted to the simile, "like a woman's nipple on a round ball.") [Steiner, p. 20.] The largest of the bateys were lined with large stones, carved and painted with female deities. And before the eyes of their gods, women and men divided into teams, not always by sex, and sought to keep a latex ball in the air with their hands, heads and elbows. It was, essentially, a netless game of volleyball, by which it was determined just whose side God was on [Ibid., p. 10.]

Columbus first found this island, on November 19, 1493, only because of female Borinquén guides, whom he had acquired quite by
accident. On his second voyage to the "new world" (the inhabitants of which he insisted on calling "Indians," since he had set out for the East Indies), the Admiral and his crew happened upon one of the Lesser Antilles. Having gone ashore to find food, they instead found women, Borinquén prisoners of war, held by the local Carib. Seizing upon this gift from the oceans (and a sudden disappearance of the Carib as a result), the women persuaded Columbus that there was a much better place to forage for food—their home, the island of Borinquén. (The conversation took place through Carib interpreters, men whom Columbus had taken on his previous voyage.) After Columbus and his crew had "enjoyed" them for eight days, he did agree to give the women a ride home, but as soon as their own beaches were sighted one night, he lost them. They jumped overboard and swam ashore. The next morning, when the men of the old world embarked, the Borinquén, following the Carib precedent, had disappeared.

The Spanish conquistadors were of the opinion that they had found a new Garden of Eden. Nightingales sang in November and the maidens were shamelessly naked. Only the married women wore a cloth wrapped around them like a skirt. The "gentle and friendly" Indians were "almost Biblical in their innocence, giving 'all they have' to strangers, offering 'great love towards all in preference to themselves" [Christopher Columbus in a letter to the King and Queen of Spain, cited by Steiner, p. 21. For the story of the female POW's, see p. 26]. The English poet John Donne (1573-1631), always associated in U.S. published history books with staid religious preoccupations, nevertheless thought that Columbus had found a good thing:
Licence my roving hands, and let them go,
Before, behind, between, above, below.
O my America! my new-found land...
My mine of precious stones, My Empery,
How blest am I in discovering thee! [Cited by
Steiner, p. 27]

If the Borinquén women loved well, they also fought well, with
"a strange fury." The Garden of Eden, it seemed, harbored Amazons.
During the Easter season of 1496 Columbus and crew, while in search
of food, happened upon another group of Borinquén women. But this
time they were not prisoners of war, but women in war-paint. With
feathers in their hair, necklaces of animal teeth and bone around
their necks, and bows and arrows in their hands, they set upon the
Spanish foragers. They were, of course, no match for guns from Lom-
bardy, and they lost. And yet when one man of the Canary Islands
attempted to rape a Borinquen cacique, instead of escaping while
she could, she attempted to kill the man. And she would have, if
his fellow men had not intervened.[Steiner, p. 23].

In 1499 the captain and crew of another Spanish ship, while
foraging for food on Borinquén, found gold [Williams, p. 15], the
lure of the New World, and its curse. Then, in 1504, the first
slaves arrived. There were five of them, and they arrived in chains,
by order of the King. They were women; they were white, Christian,
European women, "aging widows," who had been rescued from Moslem
captors in the general Islamic retreat out of Europe. Too sullied
for Spanish society at home, the King shipped them off to the New
World to be "sexual servants" of the poor, struggling, but ever
hopeful conquistadors left behind on Borinquén. And in the absence of old world amenities, they took up the life-style of the Borinquén women, as they had lived the life of Moslem women before. Now to be blessed with Spanish men, they constituted the main part of the slave trade for ten years, and their children were the first criollos, second-class Spaniards, born of this New World [Federico Ribes Tovar, The Puerto Rican Woman (New York: Plus Ultra Publishers, 1972), pp. 33-34. Also see Steiner, p. 58].

In 1508 came Juan Ponce de Leon, a plebian soldier. As a reward for his services as Indian subduer on Hispaniola, its Spanish governor had permitted him to take charge of an expedition to colonize Borinquén. Ponce arrived with fifty men on August 12, 1508. With him was the first African to ever set foot on the island, a free man, an ex-slave, Juan Garrido. Born in what is now Angola, he had been taken as slave to Spain and baptized Christian. After purchasing his freedom, of his own accord, he sailed to Hispaniola where he had fought the Carib alongside Ponce. He then accompanied Ponce to Borinquén, as he was later to accompany him to the "island" of Florida, where he was also the first African to set foot in what is now the U.S.A., more than a century before the Puritans debarked onto the rocks. Still later, he accompanied Cortez on his expedition against the peoples of Mexico, where he became the first man, of any color, to plant wheat on the American mainland [Williams, p. 16].

Ponce told the Boriquen that the white men were gods, and immortal. And the supreme cacique, Agueybana the Elder, received them, and helped them find the golden nuggets, which they craved. He led them
to a beautiful natural harbor on the northern side of the island, which Ponce called Puerto Rico, and to a nearby river called Toa, which Ponce renamed Rio Grande de Loíza.

Loíza was the female cacique who reigned over the territory surrounding the fertile lower reaches of this river. She told him that the most powerful gods of the island lived in this place, and that she had the powers to invoke them. She also told him that Borinquén was ruled by women. And Columbus wrote home, "the women do seem to work more hard than men."[Steiner, p. 24] Nearby was the Cave of Maria, the site where the oldest skeletons of the ancient peoples of the island have been found. But more important to Columbus, there was gold in the bed of the river.

Agueybana the Elder, supreme cacique, also brought people to help Ponce find the nuggets, and they stayed to show the Spaniards how to cultivate the local crops, and how to live on this island. In 1509 another Spanish ship arrived, bringing more settlers, and it is probable that the first African slaves on Borinquén came with them [Williams, pp. 16-17].

The next thing that Ponce did, in order to teach the Borinquén the true religion and a better way of life, he said, was to give a group of them to each Spanish settler, a group that would be under each conquistador's personal care. The Spanish word for this new institution was repartimentos, or the distribution. It went hand in hand with Catholic conversion and forced labor in the mines and in the fields.

But the Borinquén ran away, to hide in the mountains. The
Spaniards hunted them down, for how could they live as noble lords, as *patrones* without serfs? The Borinquén first tested the Spanish claim to immortality, by drowning a Spaniard in a high mountain stream, and having proved to themselves that these men were not gods, but liars, they revolted.

Agueybana had died, and his brother Guaybana was now supreme cacique. As leader of the revolt he was joined by a Carib refugee from Ponce's conquest of Hispaniola, Guarionex. Guaybana was killed, but Guarionex established a guerrilla base in the territory of Otoao, the cacique of the highest mountains. Otoao (for the territory is named for its cacique) stretches from what is today Lares on the west to Jayuya on the east.

Although the rebellion in 1511 killed half the Spaniards on the island, it failed. And the Indians died; some people say they died out. They died in the gold mines, or due to harsh treatment by their new masters, or due to new diseases from the Old World, or by suicide. But many of them did flee to the mountains, to the "entrails and subterrain paths of the earth," the caves of the highlands.

The bohiques of Otoao have kept their history alive for four hundred and fifty years. When an American writer visited the old land of Otoao, as recently as the early 1970's, the local holder of the history and the herbs showed him the ceremonial grounds and the painted stone carvings of the Earth Goddess. And he repeated the story of the refugee leader of the 1511 revolt. "That is why the fields are here. That is why they built the batey so big. That is
why there are so many Ceremonial Grounds here." [Steiner, pp. 17, 11].

The Borinquen who fled to the mountains were the first Puerto Rican jíbaros. In Arawak the word meant wild; by 1511, it had come to mean free, escaped into the mountains, into Otoao.

B. Isolation under Spain.

Although Puerto Rican history is in some ways a part of general Caribbean history, the history of gold-seekers and sugar slavery, Borinqueño remained unique. There were two overwhelming facts of nature that made this particular island different: its strategic military position as the outer gate to the whole Caribbean area, and the rapid and early depletion of what turned out to be meager deposits of gold. When the gold ran out, no Spaniard wanted to go there; the ones who had already arrived wanted to leave, to go to Peru or Mexico.

But the Council of the Indies, set up in Madrid in 1511, with complete authority over Spain's New World conquests, insisted that Spaniards stay, for strategic, military reasons. Puerto Rico was "unique because the Council of the Indies treated the island not so much as territory to be colonized as a strategic outpost of empire --the cockpit...of the Hispanic Caribbean defense system" [Lewis, p. 47]. The result was that all things civilian on the island, including its economic development, were subordinate to military fiat and the defense of Spain's already old-fashioned and therefore threatened Catholic and mercantile world. It was only a Spanish-imposed isolation that would preserve this world into the 19th century.
For our purposes, its overwhelming importance as a strategic holdout of the obsolete had two consequences. Compared to the other big three of the Greater Antilles--Cuba, Hispaniola, and Jamaica--Puerto Rico received fewer African slaves. Slaves were related to profit-making enterprises, and since there were fewer prospects for profit, fewer slaves were brought. And since the slaves were brought by money-lending mercantile houses of the coast, those who owned the sugar mills, they and their descendents tended to live on the coast. There is little evidence of their presence on the island in the Cordillera Central; those that live in the mountains live in the ranges of the east, Luquillo and Cayey. The earliest African slaves, by some quirk of fate, were Wolofs (sometimes, Jelofe) from what is today Senegal. They were members of the Nation of Islam, arch-enemy of Catholic Spain. They, like the Borinquén, did not make very good slaves. They, too, fled to the mountains where they joined the Borinquén in the caves. And since the Wolof men outnumbered their own women four to one, they often lived together with Borinquén women. These unions, and the children that they produced, created very strong bonds between the African and the Borinquén.

Just fifteen miles from what is today San Juan, and about that far from the gold mines, there is a village, Loíza Aldea. Aldea is an Arabic word for village; thus, at least one word of the Islamic tradition dots the map of Puerto Rico. That they named their aldea Loíza, after the female cacique of the area to which they had originally been brought, was a tribute to the Borinquén women who had received them. The spiritualism of western Africa thus joined itself
with that of the Borinquén, and the village of Aldea Loiza, to this day, maintains a reputation for the supernatural. The Wolof, too, became jíbaro, and blended in with and identified with the Borinquén.

After 1532, the sugar mill owners had persuaded Madrid to prohibit the sale of heretical Wolof to anyone on the island. The slaveships now delivered up Yorubas and Ibo from the Slave Coast (now Nigeria), Ashantis from the interior and Fantes from the coastal areas of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), and Bakongos (from what is now Congo, Brazziville, Zaire, and northern Angolá). They also brought more members of the Nation of Islam, whether they realized it or not, the Mandinke (from the coastal areas of Gambia and Sierra Leone) [Steiner, pp. 53-66. Steiner's misspellings of African names have been corrected].

While slavery under the Spaniards was never benign, it was different from that in the southern United States. Most importantly, slaves were allowed to marry whomever they wanted, and it was possible to purchase one's own freedom or that of one's family at the lowest market price. And, since the Puerto Rican sugar business rarely boomed, the prices were not impossibly high. These two aspects of Puerto Rican slavery meant that there were many mixed marriages, and that many of the slaves in Puerto Rico went free.

That Garrido, the first African, arrived on the island a free man is symbolic of the African experience generally. Not only did Puerto Rico have fewer slaves, but also it became a haven for those escaped from other islands, particularly those of the Protestant Dutch and English. The only requirement exacted of these new
immigrants, fugitives who were declared "free" upon arrival, was a declaration of loyalty to Spain and to the Catholic Church. So many African slaves had taken advantage of this opportunity by 1714 that they had established their own town, San Mateo de Cangrejos, which is today the Santurce section of San Juan [Williams, p. 65].

In 1787 it was estimated that of a total population of approximately 100,000 people, 79 percent were free (either Spanish, or mostly Spanish), 11 percent were slaves (African or mulatto), 8 percent were free Africans, and the census takers managed to count 2 percent who were Borinquén. (This, no doubt, is an undercount of Borinquén, and probably represents the urban, visible Borinquén only, many of whom were servants in Spanish households.) Due to the continued arrival of these new jíbaros, by 1827 the free Africans and mulattos outnumbered the slaves four to one (127,287 to 34,240) [Steiner, pp. 60-61].

The second consequence of the overriding importance of military and strategic concerns was a large Spanish "drop-out" population, men who had deserted the amenities of the Spanish urban enclaves to take up life in the countryside. There Old Spain blended with the Borinquén and African jíbaro civilization to create the second jíbaro: the romanticized, impoverished man of the soil. These jíbaros were not confined to the mountains; they reached to the very limits of the Spanish city. They and their lives were unique to the island of Puerto Rico, and thus when the urban criollos began their psychological search for Puerto Rican identity, they settled on this man, the man who wore the para, the jíbaro's big straw hat.
It was this jíbaro population the Dr. Ricardo Alegria, Director of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, referred to when he called Puerto Rico "the country of the small former." "Our island has always been the country of the small farmer, the individual landowner. It is a mistake to say that Puerto Rico was part of the slave 'plantation system'" [Steiner, p. 60]. But they were not the small farmers portrayed in U.S. history and mythology. The myth and the reality of the Puerto Rican jíbaro was altogether different, and more resembled Appalachia than any other segment of U.S. life. "Scattered throughout the mountains, living usually in isolated and remote places, people who were so poor that they had to accept self-sufficiency or so independent that they would accept poverty developed a simple subsistence way of life that resembled that of the Taíno [Borinquén] more than the Spanish. Their houses were thatched like the Taíno Bohíos; they cultivated Taíno crops, slept in hammocks, learned the medicinal and magical uses of herbs....Isolated almost completely from the culture, ideas, and technologies developing in Spain, the jíbaros developed ways of their own--and at the same time preserved some things, such as certain pronunciations of the Spanish language, that time and progress eliminated from the mainstream of Spanish culture" [Williams, p. 56].

The rather pathetic plebian Spanish soldiers left on Borinquén, the raw material for this second jíbaro, were men of many pretensions, but few means. To finance their search for gold the colonists had borrowed extensively from the local branches of Spanish mercantile houses, who monopolized all flour, oil, wine, clothing, and manufactured goods, and who controlled a committee of the Council of the
Indies, the Casa de Contratación. Its main purpose was to insure that all profits went into the King's coffer; toward this end they had complete control over who traded what, with whom, and for how much. [Williams, pp. 32-33, 28] The soldiers frequently defaulted, even when they tried to diversify into the new gold, sugar cane. Due to raids from Carib Indians, French and English pirates, smallpox epidemics, and the fierce winds of Huracán, not to mention the stranglehold of the moneylenders, they more often than not ended up losing all they had, and sought to escape this unhappy, spirit-jinxed island. But they could not; Madrid had declared the death penalty for those caught in the act of deserting Borinquén. Many of these Spaniards joined the first jíbaros in the foothills and the mountains, and learned to live, as they did, off the fruits of the Earth Goddess.

Spanish rule in Puerto Rico not only tolerated mixed marriages between slaves and Borinquén, it tolerated much more open cohabitation between Spaniards and African or mulatto women. In addition, because they could not afford a real Spanish wife, many of those poor conquistadors took meztizo or Borinquén concubines, whom they lived with but did not support. By 1569, the majority of the whites lived with African, Borinquén or meztizo women [Ribes Tovar, p. 44]. Although the Council of the Indies in Madrid tried every tactic that its collective mind could think of, they could not stop such practices. Thus, it was reasonable for an old man of San Juan to explain, "My second grandfather told me the Spaniard like very much
35

the black race....And they mix the race. That's the reason there is no pure black. Nobody here is pure black. There is many mixes, Spanish race, Indian race, and black race. Nobody can say, 'I am pure....' Everywhere there is mixture" [Steiner, p. 65]. One common Puerto Rican saying is "El que no tiene Tinga, tiene Mandinga." Or, in English, "If you don't have the blood of the Tinga, you have the blood of the Mandinga."

The society that grew up under Spanish rule was mixed, both in terms of color and culture, but not mixed evenly. The criollo elite, in the 17th century, lived in the four "big cities:" the coastal (or foothills) towns of San Juan, San German, Arecibo, and Coamo [Williams, p. 56]. In these towns the rule of Spain, the King and the Church and the mercantile monopolies, was dominant. Along the coasts, where in the beginning the sugar was produced largely by slaves, and where free Africans established their fishing villages, the African gene-pool prevailed. And in the countryside, in the hills and in the mountains, there was the jíbaro, the escaped subsistence farmer, who could be criollo, meztizo, or pure Borinquén. A large part of this jíbaro mix was Spanish, especially with regard to the men.

...The Puerto Rican proletarian, and especially the campesino of the mountain and country districts, developed into a unique pre-industrial character type..., the beginnings of the peasant class so typical of Puerto Rican society even today....He inherited, to begin with, the anti-social individualism of the early Spanish settlers....The habits of indolence were encouraged by a sweet climate that required very little clothing by way of protection, so that one could be content with an ordinary striped shirt and a pair of loose trousers, and since everybody lived thus, there were no reasons for competing one against the
other; and the sentiment was reinforced by the fertility of the land and the luxuriance of its wild fruits....This individual mounted on his emaciated horse, dressed in a broad-brimmed straw hat, cotton jacket, clean shirt and checkered pantaloons, sallies forth from his cabin to mass, to a cockfight or to a dance, thinking himself the most independent and happy being in existence. [Lewis, p. 57.]

That was the idealization, the romantic image believed not only by the outside observer, but also by this jíbaro. The reality was a "poverty of terrible dimensions" [Lewis, p. 57]. The second jíbaro was either a propertyless farm laborer or a subsistence farmer engulfed by the world of the socially distant Spanish hacendado, who, in both cases, assumed the role of protector and provider with regard to the community that provided him his living.

But the image was as important as the reality. "The portrait helps to explain the massive psychological power of insularismo in the island tradition and the comparative absence of any sense of unity and identity between the various groups of a community so much physically separated from each other. [Lewis, pp. 57-58.]

The women, the descendants of the Borinquén caciques who had ruled, took over, and, essentially, took care of these conquistadores and their children. The sphere of the woman has most vigorously continued the Borinquén traditions: in their food and the way it is prepared, the construction of the home, in the crops and fruits, in the furniture, and in their belief in spirits and the Earth Mother. The instruments of jíbaro music are a blend of Borinquén, African, and Spanish; while the tunes, especially the parrandas (Christmas carolings) are clearly inspired by traditions of southern Spain, as are their dances [Seda, p. 44].
They also took care of their men's quixotic psyches by bending, accommodating to the requirements of the male's sense of dignity and, at least in public, by giving him the respect that he thought was his due. But one should not be misled. The descendents of former Muslim captives and Borinquén caciques are not like the women of Spain; they have never developed any inhibitions against physical combat, and they still, sometimes behind the scene and sometimes openly, run their villages, control the local spirits, and nurse the sick in the Borinquén way. That Felisa Rincón Marrero was mayor of San Juan (and in Puerto Rico the mayor of San Juan is as powerful as the governor) from 1946 to 1968 was no aberration, but a common pattern, writ large. [Ribes-Tovar, p. 237].

Spain managed to keep Puerto Rico more or less sealed off from the rest of the world until the 19th century. But throughout its last century of rule it was fighting a losing battle against the forces of criollo nationalism in the new world as well as the growing economic power of the United States. Between 1811 and 1830, Spain's territories in the New World had been reduced to what was essentially Cuba and Puerto Rico. Seriously weakened by a series of wars, declared and undeclared, civil and international, Spain was an easy target for the exploding independence movements throughout Latin America. And to what refuge would the Spanish, reactionary, anti-republican, anti-protestant refugees go? They went to Puerto Rico, where the Spanish were determined to make a last-ditch stand. So many of them came that the population balance shifted again, and Puerto Rico had a white, Spanish majority by 1830. [Lewis, p. 58.]
What was already one of the most mixed cultures of this world was now the recipient of new ingredients, as new hurricane-like forces blew over Puerto Rican beaches, adding new ingredients to the "genetic bouillabaise."

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Frenchmen came from Louisiana when it was bought by the United States, and from Haiti when the slaves revolted. The Latin American wars for independence brought loyalist Spaniards and Venezuelans. As the slave-sugar economy flourished, Scotch and Irish farmers came from the province of Galicia and the Canary Islands. In the 1840's, a labor shortage brought Chinese coolies to Cuba and Puerto Rico where, in the latter, they helped [re-]build the Central Highway. Italians, Corsicans, and Lebanese also spiced the melting pot. [Wagenheim, pp. 92-93].

"...And from Philadelphia, strangely enough, came a large group of Irish Catholics," who have added a red-haired, blue-eyed gene-pool into the mix around Castaner and Utuado. [Masters, p. 27.]

By the end of Spanish rule in 1898 Puerto Rico had become an island of cultural islands.

It is revealing that in 1898 the capital city had a population of less than thirty-five thousand and there were only eighteen towns with populations in excess of twenty-five hundred. The separation between town and countryside was exacerbated by an almost medieval communication system....Even journeying from hamlet to hamlet was a hazardous enterprise, and this, combined with the difficult mountainous terrain of the interior highlands, added its own contribution to the endemic parochialism and cultural philistinism of rural life. [Lewis, p. 56.]

Each hamlet was left to mix its own ingredients in its own manner, creating not one culture, but many. Anthropologists who have tackled the problem of defining a Puerto Rican culture have had an exceedingly difficult time.

Apart from consensual unions, which are not registered, another distinction among marriages in Puerto Rico which is quite significant is difference in type of ceremony, whether civil,
Protestant, or Catholic... When one realizes that Aguada is the municipio contiguous to Aguadilla, the difference in type of marriage ceremony is striking. It is difficult to explain the absence of any Protestant marriages in Barranquitas and the high rate of civil marriage in Santa Isabel. What is clear is that type of marriage ceremony differs sharply from one area of the Island to another. There is no consistent pattern which can be called "Puerto Rican." [Fitzpatrick, pp. 88-89, emphasis added.]

C. The Modern World Breaks In.

It was during the 19th century that the isolation of Puerto Rico began to break down. The refugees from nationalism and Protestantism, the urban loyalist elites from all of Spain's former colonies concentrated in Puerto Rico, and among them were many with entrepreneurial talents and experience, men who were not molded by the Spanish mercantile monopoly that had characterized Puerto Rico. They produced a more modern economic boom in the coastal areas. American capital, too, began to find its way to Puerto Rico, as the U.S. role in Latin America grew. And ideas penetrated. The urban criollo began to catch the new world fever, to dream of autonomy, if not independence. They lobbied in Spain, they wrote books and poems, and they also inspired the jíbaro.

In January of 1868 Dr. Ramon Emeterio Betances issued the "Ten Commandments of Liberty," the first of which was the abolition of slavery. In February, when he learned of a U.S. offer to buy Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spain, he issued the "Provisional Constitution of the Puerto Rican Revolution," a document that called for the independence of Puerto Rico.

It was the jíbaros of Otoao who responded, rising up in the first major mass act of violent protest against Spain since the
Borinquén had risen from Otoao in 1511. The tobacco farmers of the mountains, caught between the Spanish mercantilists on the coasts, the hacendados of the large estates, and the increased pressures and competition coming from the new coastal entrepreneurs, arose in the classic peasant fashion. It was a short, swift uprising, aimed more at expressing grievances, shaming the conscience of the rulers, and communicating over their heads to the ultimate powers at the center, powers assumed to be benevolent. The jíbaro made no pronouncements; he had no program for ruling. El Grito de Lares of September, 1868, was an outburst of fury and frustration, a cry from the inarticulate of Otoao. [Silen, pp. 28-31].

The Outcry from Lares, from Otoao, in turn inspired the independence forces of the criollo coast.

The Grito de Lares marked the birth of our Puerto Rican nationality. It was the voice of a Puerto Rico that had its own interests and its own consciousness. Those interests had collided with the interests of Spain, with the Spanish government....The jíbaro, as the man who produced the coffee on the hacienda, was cast in the leading revolutionary role of the anonymous hero fighting for the demands of his class. In joining the revolution he put his protest on the line against the privileges and luxury of a tiny minority. From that day on, the jíbaro was the people. [Silen, p. 31.]

After 1868, in the coastal cities of the criollo, "civic associations, clubs, casinos, and circles of a recreational type mushroomed," and politics became the preoccupation of the day. Independence or autonomy, negotiation or revolution were the issues of the day, and generally negotiations for autonomy won out. In 1897 Spain granted autonomy to Puerto Rico, under extreme pressures from outside forces, but before the Puerto Ricans could discover whether
that autonomy would be real or not, the army of the United States invaded in the autumn of 1898, and Puerto Rico was declared a territory of the United States. The only serious resistance to the U.S. takeover came from the machete bearers of Otoao, the horseback riding guerrillas who resisted Spain's replacement. Again, the struggle was quick and violent, and they lost.

The Puerto Rico that the North Americans seized in 1898 (along with Guam and the Philippines) was already a segmented society. The North American presence, and its impact on transportation, communication, and education, however, did not serve to unify those disparate parts. Rather, it reinforced them. Private investment as well as government spending has a strong tendency to clump in those areas where the return on profit will be reasonably rapid or the results rapidly apparent, and thus urban areas tended to become more urban, and the rural areas fall, relatively, further and further behind.

Not only did the North American presence not overcome the cultural segmentation, it has added new layers to the veneer. This former bastion of Catholicism has been somewhat penetrated by various Protestant denominations. In order to prevent undue competition for souls, the new missionaries divided up the island. The Baptists occupy a broad diagonal strip that runs along the old Carretera Militar, between Ponce and San Juan. The western end of the island was reserved for Presbyterians, the north for Methodists, and the east for Congregationalists. The United Brethren are found mainly on the southern coast, and most Episcopalians are in the larger
cities and their suburbs. [Masters, p. 28.]

There have been new immigrants. Mainlanders have come, and more importantly, the North American mass consumer culture has struck the new wage-earners of the coast. And since the Puerto Rican government still has no control over its own immigration laws, it has been unable to stop the massive, highly disruptive, and very conservative Cuban immigration. The nineteenth-century refugees from republicanism and Protestantism have now been joined by the refugees from Castro's socialism.

But the most significant change that the American presence has wrought has been to exacerbate the cultural differences between the coast and the mountains. When the U.S. took over the Island in 1898, the jíbaro zone reached all the way to the city limits of the coast. But during the course of the 20th century, the coastal jíbaro underwent fundamental changes, while the jíbaro of Otoao did not. "What took place...after 1898 was the replacement of a rudimentary rural capitalism by an industrial high finance capitalism" [Lewis, p. 93]. That Spanish culture which had been created by a system of landed estates, and subsequently adopted by the jíbaro, suffered from the slow erosion of its supports. The hacendados of the sugar lands could not compete with the corporations, and they lost their land and sank into the newly forming middle class of the city. As the lord of the manor disappeared, so did his "serf," the jíbaro, who now became a wage-laborer in the impersonal corporation.

By 1935, the end result of the new North American world of the coast was apparent, even to Washington. The following assessment
came from Secretary Harold Iches.

Puerto Rico has been the victim of the laissez faire economy which has developed the rapid growth of great absentee owned sugar corporations, which have absorbed much land formerly belonging to small independent growers who in consequence have been reduced to virtual economic servitude. While the inclusion of Puerto Rico within our tariff walls has been highly beneficial to the stockholders of those corporations, the benefits have not been passed down to the mass of Puerto Ricans. Those on the contrary have seen the lands on which they formerly raised subsistence crops given over to sugar production while they have been gradually driven to import all their food staples, paying for them the high prices brought about by the tariff. There is today more widespread misery and destitution and far more unemployment in Puerto Rico than at any previous time in its history. [Cited by Lewis, p. 92.]

The impact that such developments had on the jíbaros of the mountains was less direct, but just as real. The price of food and other necessities rose, since the rice and beans that had formerly come from the small farmers of the coast now came from corporations. And unlike most other items, coffee (the only hold-out against American capital, the crop of the mountains) was not protected by tariffs, and that fact, plus several disastrous hurricanes, severely damaged the jíbaros' only cash crop. With the continuing decline of coffee production, the jíbaro often had no choice but to leave his home in the mountains, where at least his culture was more or less intact, and migrate to the coast, in search of a job.

This process of differentiation between the coast and the mountains was accelerated after World War II by a new surge of coastal industrial development.

Operation Bootstrap was launched when Luis Munoz Marin became Puerto Rico's first elected governor (1949-1964). Munoz launched the Operation in an effort to transform the island from a depressed
agricultural area into a diversified industrial economy. "U.S. industry was lured by low wages, freedom from federal taxes and long-term forgiveness of local taxes. While the commonwealth's development agency, Fomento, catered to capitalists, successive administrations adopted a host of New Deal-style programs that made Puerto Rico the closest thing to a government-managed society in the U.S. system." [Time Magazine, Feb. 16, 1976, p. 15, "Trying to Make it without Miracles."]

The side effects of this development upon those isolated in the mountains also intensified. Prices for necessities continued to rise as more and more items became the products of agro-business. The last remnants of the small farmer of the mountains were fast disappearing; although some still lived on the land, they did not farm. It was too expensive. Instead they lived on the roots that would grow without investments and on the food stamps with which they purchased the packaged imports of corporations and agro-business.

As in 1935, the mainlanders have reported the consequences. "While processing products for export, Puerto Rico became highly dependent on imports of all kinds (the trade deficit was $1.8 billion in fiscal 1975," noted Time Magazine [Feb. 16, 1976, p. 15]. And, as a result, "The island has lost its predominantly agricultural character" [Fitzpatrick, p. 48]. Such plain statements do not begin to describe the human costs of such development. Not only for the ex-ffíbaro of the coast who has been forced to change, to adopt to these impersonal forces, but also to the ffíbaro of the mountain, who has not yet lost the cultural expectations of an almost completely destroyed system, only because he lives in the isolated valleys of Otoao.
In the coastal areas Operation Bootstrap has intensified this new layer of cultural pluralism. It has minimized the influence of the old Spanish ways, has made many of them old-fashioned, and emphasized \textit{la lucha}, the rat race. In these areas is emerging a new social group with a new mass-American culture, created and maintained by television, radio, the newspapers, and the 20th-century development of the public school system that comes complete with suburbs and buying on credit.

This sudden shift has important cultural and personal consequences. It introduces a series of uncertainties and anxieties which are the common experiences of new middle-class people in areas of rapid social transition. The advance to middle-class status involves serious economic pressures.... they are in an economically precarious position. Furthermore, they have come from a cultural background in which social status was fixed. In such a traditional two-class system, a person in the lower class has no anxieties about social position; he knows exactly what is expected of him... But the person newly arrived in the middle class has none of these certainties. [Fitzpatrick, p. 49].

The ex-\textit{jíbaro} of the coastal areas has not lost his concern for respect and dignity. He has transformed that concern into an anxiety about his own identity and image, and the identity and image of Puerto Ricans. His measuring stick is no longer that of the \textit{jíbaro}, but that of the mainland middle class, at least in some respects. He is embarrassed by his compatriot, the man of Otoao, who is not \underline{a la moda}, in style.

The condescending tone in the following description of today's \textit{jíbaro} is indicative. The man who symbolized what Puerto Rico was has now become a liability, a reminder of Puerto Rico's "backwardness," poverty, and politically subordinate status.
The jíbaro, mountain bred, avoids the town whenever possible, avoids the genteel life of a civilization higher than his own. He instinctively tucks his little hut away in the most inaccessible spots; he shrinks from the stranger and lapes into stolid silence when brought face to face with things that are foreign to his life. He does all this because he has been made to feel that he must do all that he is told by established authority, and he knows that this authority never takes the trouble to look for him unless it expects to get something out of him; because he is suspicious of outsiders, having been too often led astray by false prophets and disappointed by false promises; because he realises that he is not a free agent anywhere save in the mountain fastnesses....This lack of mental contact, of a common ground of interest between the jíbaro and the better class of Puerto Ricans drives the former to charlatans for his medical advice, to the wild fruits and vegetables of the interior for his food, and to weird creeds for his religious comfort. [Cited in Lewis, p. 96.]

The jíbaro’s response to this attack on his dignity—the townsman’s looks of disapproval when he does come to town with his para on his head, his shirt-tails tied at the waist, his trousers tight at the ankles, and a machete hanging from his belt—has been his traditional response. Most of the time he merely seeks to be left along in his mountain isolation, but, occasionally, when frustrated to the point of violence, the jíbaros, men and women, take up their weapons and strike out at the source of this frustration.

Once again, inspired in part by the independence forces of the urban coastal region, the people of Otoao erupted on October 30, 1950, burning everything in their path. The nationalists of the cities were whispering about an island-wide revolution on November 3, the eve of registration day for a vote on a new constitution for Puerto Rico. But Jayuya did not wait. On October 30 the men and women of the jíbaros rose up with rifles and machetes. The next morning at dawn the National Guard,
Armed with machine guns, bazookas and tanks recaptured Jayuya ... Fighter planes strafed the rebels. They had seized control ... last night after bombing police stations, killing some policement and setting many fires. By afternoon... with the last pockets of resistance apparently wiped out, Jayuya looked as if an earthquake had struck it, with several blocks destroyed and most of the other buildings in the town of 1,500 charred by fire. [New York Times, November 1, 1950, p. 1.]

On November 2,

rebels came out of the hills in droves today and surrendered meekly in the aftermath of the Puerto Rican uprising.... The number taken into custody passed 400. [New York Times, November 2, 1950, p. 1.]

They came out "meekly," having uttered their cry, and, once more, fell silent.
Amidst this patchwork of layered cultural patterns, the two towns that concern us are Coamo and Jayuya, the towns that by 1972 had produced approximately 62 percent of the Cambridge Puerto Rican population. And since it is the differences between the peoples of these two towns that have produced the major internal problem of the Cambridge Hispano community, a closer look at these particular towns is warranted.

As the crow flies, Coamo and Jayuya lie no more than some 20 miles apart, and both have become a part of a new center of development, a development that has been consciously designed to reach out from the port of Ponce. Ponce has always been the island's second largest city, and the southern terminus of the one Spanish road that ran from San Juan on the northern coast to Ponce on the southern. In 1950, when Operation Bootstrap began its work, Ponce had a population of 126,810; by 1970 the municipality included 158,981 persons, 82.2 percent of whom lived in the urban area. It is around Ponce that "the large oil refineries, and other commercial and industrial development, with resulting higher economic levels" have developed. [Bourne and Bourne, p. 15.]

In spite of the fact that Coamo and Jayuya lie so close together, one does not go from one to the other. The roads do not run from Coamo to Jayuya, or vice versa. Jayuya lies on the northern side of the island's watershed, high in the mountains. Coamo lies south of the watershed, in a valley of the foothills as they begin to
flatten out onto the southern coast. If one insists on following the mountain roads from one to the other, taking what on the map might appear to be the shortest route, one could easily spend two hours negotiating hair-raising trails clinging (it seems rather precariously) to the sides of the mountains in order to traverse those 20 air miles. The sensible person who wishes to go from Coamo to Jayuya would first go southwest to Ponce, and then northeast to Jayuya. Thus the cultural differences, produced by the island's history of isolation, that have caused the explosion in Cambridge, have created no problems on the island, for there is almost no contact between the two towns.

Indeed, Jayuya has very little contact with the outside world at all under normal conditions. The town sits on the northern bank of a mountain stream at an altitude of 1,430 feet above sea level. On the northern side of this stream the mountains soar to 3,116 feet; on the southern side, only one and one-half mile from the town, the island's highest mountain peaks at 4,398 feet. [Masters, p. 17.]

The roads all go around the valley of Jayuya, even the projected scenic route that promises a panorama of views from one end of the Cordillera Central to the other will not go through Jayuya. So remote an area was not even declared a municipality until 1911, and its population center, the barrio of Jayuya, was not declared urban until 1960. By 1970 the municipality's 39 square miles contained 13,588 people.

Coamo, on the other hand, is an old town founded by Spanish clerics in 1597. Its 77 square miles contain 26,468 people, and
unlike Jayuya, they were not spread all over the mountainsides before 1950, but clumped into small settlements, or concentrated in and around the urban barrio. [Geological Survey Map, 1943.] Also, very much unlike Jayuya, Coamo lies along the military road, the one road the Spanish built to connect San Juan and Ponce. Indeed, Coamo was one of the first four towns on the island, and had always been an important center of Spanish settlement. [Williams, p. 56.]

Nor has Coamo's importance as an urban center diminished over the years. Not too far from the central urban barrio are the Baños de Coamo, which have attracted the rich for centuries, and in the 20th century a gambling casino has added to their attraction. [Silén, pp. 34-35.] Also in the 20th century, one of its many civic clubs started a marathon, the Maraton San Blas, and runners now come from all over the world to this town. And, most recently, Coamo's own runner have won the Boston Marathon team prize two years in a row, in 1975 and 1976. [Boston Globe, April 20, pt. 6, p. 28.] One should also point out that their shirts very clearly declare their origin to be Coamo, not Puerto Rico.

Due to the public works program and improved highway system in the vicinity of Coamo, one can now go from Coamo to Ponce's industrial area in 15 minutes. Thus Coamo has become a commuter's town, with 27 percent of its work force traveling the 15 minutes to Ponce, or the 45 minutes to Guayama, or even the two and one-half hours to San Juan to find good jobs. Coamo, although not the center of this Bootstrap phenomenon, was drawn into it, and did develop some industry of its own, mainly the garment industry, particularly gloves and other sewing piecework.
These changes are most clearly reflected in the occupations of Coamo's residents. Those with clearly urban employment (professionals, technicians, non-farm managers, non-farm administrators, sales workers, clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives (including transportation operatives), and service workers) made up 78 percent of the municipality's work force (3,484 people out of 4,459). The largest single group were the operatives, 1,189 persons or 27 percent of the work force. Craftsmen were the second largest group, with 583 persons (13 percent) service workers third (11 percent), and professionals and technicians were fourth with 446 people or 10 percent of the population. [1970 Census.]

Because Jayuya's main street, its one road, does not really go anywhere, except to other roads, Operation Bootstrap did not do unto Jayuya as it did unto Coamo. It did not create a new struggling-to-be middle class. It brought a grand total of two U.S. (medicine) factories, which added to the two canneries operated by Goya constitute its entire industrial sector. It, too, is part of Ponce's hinterland, but it is "the other sector of the Ponce region [which] reaches into the most remote mountains with scattered agricultural population...Here agricultural workers represent 46 percent of the population and the standard of living is among the lowest on the island" [Bourne and Bourne, p. 15].

Because the road to and through Jayuya has not been much improved, and no new highways have been built in its vicinity, it did not produce the blue-collar commuting force that Coamo did. Only 7 percent of the municipality's work force is employed outside its
own boundaries, compared to 27 percent in Coamo.

The contrast is most clear when one looks at the occupations of Jayuya's work force. If one adds up the "urban" jobs (professionals, technicians, non-farm managers, non-farm administrators, sales workers, clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives and service workers) one finds that 65 percent work at non-farm occupations (1260 out of 1951), compared to Coamo's 78 percent.

Almost exactly the same percentage of persons held jobs classified as "professional, technical and kindred," (10 percent) and "service workers, except household," which was 11 percent in both towns. The contrasts showed up in operatives (transport and non-transport), craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers," among the urban force, and among household service workers, non-farm laborers (which could be either "urban" or not) and among farm labor, both managers and workers.

The largest single group of non-farm workers in Jayuya were still the operatives, but these 297 individuals constituted only 15 percent of the work force, compared to 27 percent in Coamo. And, in Jayuya these people were mostly young women. If one separates the transport workers from operatives in general, they constituted 12 percent of Jayuya's work force, but 22 percent of Coamo's. And in Jayuya these transport workers are 24 percent of all operatives, but in Coamo they are only 16 percent, which suggests that due to Jayuya's isolation, one had to do more hauling to service a non-transport operative population that was only 54 percent as large as Coamo's. In Coamo the craftsmen were the second largest group.(13 percent), but in Jayuya they came fourth with 10 percent.
Big differences also show up in terms of farming population, household servants (private household workers), and in on-farm (but also non-industrial) laborers. Farm workers and managers in Jayuya constitute 23 percent of the work force, whereas they are only 13 percent of Coamo's work force. Non-farm laborers in Jayuya were 12 percent of the work force, whereas in Coamo they were only 7 percent. And Jayuya had well over twice as many household servants per person in the work force than did Coamo (2.3 percent in the former, and only .8 percent in the latter).

The urban-rural contrasts between Coamo and Jayuya also show up in average family size. The agriculturally oriented Jayuyanos had an average family size of 5.19 persons, compared to Coamo's somewhat more modest 4.69, a difference of one-half person per family. Probably due to the larger number of children, at least in part, the median age in Jayuya is some 20 months less than that in Coamo (17.6 compared to 19.2).

In education, too, Coamo excels. The average Coameno over the age of 25 has completed 5.6 years of school, whereas the same figure for Jayuya is only 3.9 years. Some 16.9 percent of Coamo's population possess a high school diploma, whereas only 13.9 percent have one in Jayuya. Even in Coamo only 2.5 percent of the population are college graduates, and in Jayuya that number falls to an even 2 percent. However, probably due to the lack of agricultural work and the high degree of urbanization that is now occurring in Jayuya, 55 percent of the age group 3 to 34 years old was attending school in
1970, a figure that was 6 percent higher than the same figure for Coamo. That in 1970 there was still some farmwork to be done might make parents less than enthusiastic about sending a son to school is indicated by the fact that a slightly higher percentage of females were attending school in Jayuya than males (14.6 compared to 13.2 percent). That this is a relatively new phenomenon in Jayuya is indicated by the fact that in the age group over 25, females had completed fewer grades than males (3.7 compared to 4.1).

Unemployment is worse in Jayuya than in Coamo, especially for males. For the total population the figure in 1970 (before a minimum wage law for agricultural workers was implemented) unemployment in Jayuya was calculated at 8 percent, whereas Coamo's rate was 5.9 percent, some 26 percent less. That the factories which Jayuya does have employ mostly women is clear if one breaks down the male and female unemployment rates. One then finds that 9.3 percent of the males in Jayuya were unemployed and 6.7 percent of the women. And these employment figures do not count those persons, unemployed, who have given up looking for a job, and essentially retired to live off nature's offerings and food stamps in so far as possible.

As a result of all these factors it is not surprising to learn that the mean family income (for a family one-half person smaller) in Coamo was $4,503, almost twice that figure for Jayuya, $2,339. One should not, however, get the impression that the residents of Coamo are generally affluent. Indeed, 77.2 percent have incomes that place them below the poverty level (and prices in the stores of
Puerto Rico are not lower than in the United States); in Jayuya in 1970, 83.8 percent were below the poverty level. Still, compared to the "poverty" figures, the percentages for those receiving public assistance are low. In Coamo only 17.6 percent receive such assistance, but in Jayuya, 24.1 percent receive such assistance.

Desertion from the more rural barrios and movement toward the urban center in search of employment is characteristic of both Coamo and Jayuya. Twenty-five years ago, the rural barrios of Coamo were truly rural, and people used the land to feed themselves and sometimes to produce for the market. This is no longer true. Many do still live on the land, but they have jobs in town, and that is how they feed and clothe their families. Many people, particularly from the barrios most distant from the center have left the land altogether and moved into the urban area. Since Coamo has been more urban longer, this trend does not show itself for the overall aggregate municipality population figures. In 1950 43.8 percent lived in areas defined as urban; in 1960, 46.6 percent did, and in 1970 the overall figure dropped to 45.6 percent. However, this apparent drop can be explain. The urban barrio, Coamo, had expanded to the bursting point, and was spilling over into the adjacent "rural" barrios, which are really quite urban along the outskirts of the town of Coamo, even if those parts of the barrio further away are still "rural." The following map, indicating change in population, makes this very clear.
Many of Coamo's farms have been bought by real estate brokers, and the island's planners have moved to regulate this development.

A special program for planning suburban development has been started. In these plans it is recognized that closer cooperation is needed between agricultural and urban planning; in this CRU (Urban Renewal and Housing) must be more concerned as suburban communities grow and the separation between urban and rural becomes less distinct. The Planning Board envisages a "green belt" as part of this new suburban development and sees also the changing distinctions among urban, semirural, and suburban. It has the hope that communities may develop, or be developed, in which there will be a mixture of classes in which public housing may be included and where there will be increased opportunity for upward mobility. From an economic standpoint, municipal services—electricity, water, sewage, etc.—can be better provided where population density is greater and adjustments to this need can be made. Those communities or areas which remain truly rural do not at present come within this category. [Bourne and Bourne, pp. 20-21.]

No such suburbs have developed in Jayuya. Population movement is still toward the town itself. All other barrios have suffered population loss, and thus Jayuya's case is much more straightforward. In 1950 there was no barrio in Jayuya that had a population dense enough to qualify as urban, including the central barrio of Jayuya. By 1960 16.0 percent of Jayuya's population lived in areas that qualified as urban, and in 1970 that percentage had grown to 28.2 percent. (That the central barrio's population increased by 63.2 percent indicates that part of that barrio must still be rural.) This is a dramatic increase, and since Jayuya did not offer much in the way of urban jobs, especially when compared to Coamo, one might suggest that the push factor of the deterioration of the farm economy under the pressure of the international agribusinesses was much stronger than any pull factor. The following map shows population shifts between barrios in the municipality of Jayuya, by percentages.
JAYUYA--Municipio; COABEY--Barrios

JAYUYA ABAJO -44.0
MAMEYES ARRIBA -22.7
JAYUYA COABEY +63.2
RIO GRANDE -44.0
JAYUYA ABajo +63.2
COABEY -6.0

VEGUITA -8.4
SALIENTE -29.0
ZAMAS -17.1
COLORES -3.5
JUACA -47.2

URBAN
But there are not enough jobs in either town to provide employment for all those who must leave the land. Obviously both towns are producing migrants, at least some of whom end up in Cambridge. Again, in the case of Coamo, the effect of this migration is not immediately apparent from the municipality's aggregate figures. Coamo's total population from 1960 to 1970 grew from 26,082 persons to 26,468, for an increase of 1.5 percent. Yet the overall growth rate of the Puerto Rican population during this decade was 2.6 percent, and thus Coamo's rate of increase was only 58 percent of the island average. One cannot say precisely how much of this slower growth rate was due to a growing propensity for smaller families and how much was due to migration, but one suspects that both contributed to it.

Jayuya's population actually declined during this decade from 14,622 persons to only 13,588.

Not only did Jayuya's population decline between 1960 and 1970, thus indicating some degree of distress in the area, but the year 1970 brought further disaster to this town, a disaster which has not yet been recorded by census-takers. Before 1970 Jayuya's agricultural economy (coffee and vegetables) was still functioning, more or less, mostly due to its isolation. But in that year the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico passed a minimum wage law guaranteeing farm workers $8.00 per day. The owners of Jayuya's tomato patches and coffee bushes refused to pay this amount, and closed down their farms, allowing the land to lie fallow. This little town made the October 15, 1975 edition of the New York Times--almost exactly the 25th anniversary of its previous appearance under the headline of rebellion.
This time the subject was its remarkable unemployment rate. "In the central town of Jayuya, population 14,000, the Puerto Rican Labor Department reports, the unemployment rate is a staggering 96 percent" [Article begins on p. 1]. A study carried out in Cambridge in 1972 estimated the number of Jayuyanos among its population to be about 630. [Brown, pp. 18, 21.] And Father Sheehan in 1975 observed that many were still arriving.

To put all these statistics succinctly, one must only say that the Jayuyano comes to Cambridge from Otoao, the high mountainous site of the jíbaros, the men and the women who have so far escaped the changes of the mind that economic change has forced upon the people of the coastal towns, including the people of Coamo. Separated by the island's highest mountains at home, in Cambridge they would be driven together by necessity, by prejudice, and by Anglo ignorance. They, like all the others from the old colonies of Spain, regardless of their differences, would be lumped together as the Spanish-speaking. And among all those differences, the most explosive mixture would be that between two groups of Puerto Ricans, two groups whose homes are only some 20 miles apart, as the crow flies.
SECTION III: THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE


A. The Migrant and Cambridge.

Due at least in part to the entry of the mainland's highly capitalized corporations and the transformations that their presence had wrought in Puerto Rico's economy, an imbalance between the number seeking jobs and the number of jobs being offered was an old problem on the island. This imbalance, even before the advent of Operation Bootstrap in the late 1940's, had already created a long-standing Puerto Rican community in New York and other mainland cities. This first imbalance was in part related to a second, the imbalance between the number of rural peoples whose agricultural livelihood had been wiped out by competition with agro-business, the highly capitalized food producers of the mainland, and the number of jobs created by the investments of these and other mainland corporations. The push off the land was much stronger than the pull of the urban job market. [Lewis, 1974, pp. 49-51.]

The peoples of the coast had given up farming and begun their transformation into middle-class wage-earners, only to find themselves in the late 60's losing out in the international labor market. Many of the corporations which their government had lured to Puerto Rico now were being lured away by even cheaper offers of Asian labor. Furthermore, the stream of farmers out of the mountains had not diminished. If anything, it had accelerated. Every year brought another crop of youth out of school and onto the job market. Something had to give, and migration to the mainland became the answer.
This new stream of migrants sought new cities, cities that were not already jammed with their fellow countrymen and their fellow unemployed. It was only in the late 50's that a handful of Puerto Ricans discovered Cambridge, Massachusetts, and chose it to be their new home. At the beginning there was only a small trickle of such migrants, but by 1965, this trickle had become a steady stream.¹

And what was this new world like? Cambridge, Massachusetts, today a city of some 107,000 people, is one of 76 separately incorporated cities that make up the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Of these 76 urban entities, Cambridge is the one most closely tied, both geographically and otherwise, to the central city of Boston. The hub of Boston's transportation center, the Park Street station, is approximately a ten-minute subway ride from Harvard Square, Cambridge's mass transit center, and a mere seven minutes from Central Square, the area around which this study centers. Boston and Cambridge are separated by the winding Charles river, a natural boundary that is crossed by thirteen bridges along the twenty some miles of banks that lie between the cities. One part of Boston, Charlestown, actually lies on the Cambridge side of the Charles, at the point where the river enters Boston Harbor.

Cambridge, like Boston, is an old city that dates from the 17th century, and like Boston it still has its core of Brahmins,

Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on discussions with migrants, including the very early ones, over the last fifteen years, on interviews with migrants carried out in 1974 and 1975, and on the author's own observations after his arrival in Cambridge in 1961. To his knowledge there is no other record of the early formative years of this community.
descendants of its first immigrants, the Pilgrims. Today, however, they are very much outnumbered by layer upon layer of peoples from the various parts of Europe, American Blacks, and most recently French Canadians, Portuguese, and Latin Americans.

Thus there really are two Cambridges, the comfortable and established Cambridge around Harvard University and to its west, and the newly arrived and poor Cambridge, which is generally located in the eastern half of the city, where the buildings of the other major university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, line the banks of the Charles, the city's easternmost edge. It was into this eastern half of Cambridge that the Puerto Ricans came.

Why these early arrivals chose Cambridge was probably due, at least in part, to their preference for its closely knit network of urban amenities, in a town that was not as forbidding as New York or Boston's South End. One author has noted the tendency of some migrants to choose cities very much like Cambridge.

These represent concentrations of Puerto Ricans in highly industrialized smaller cities, where Puerto Ricans are likely to be employed in heavier industrial work, such as factories, machine shops, and steel mills. They live in one or two family dwellings, and are often in the process of buying the home in which they live. Life in these smaller cities is much quieter and better organized, and the Puerto Rican community gives the impression of managing its life more effectively. [Fitzpatrick, p. 75.]

This observation parallels closely some of the reasons given by Hispanos in Cambridge explaining why they had come to this particular city. They often referred to quieter neighborhoods, jobs provided by the factories and businesses in its eastern half, and to their search for better and cheaper housing. And after this
early group had established itself, the most common reason for coming to Cambridge was that the new arrivals already knew somebody there from home. [Brown, p. 51.] No doubt it is this search for familiar people and familiar things that has created the Boston Puerto Rican scene in which each city of the area has been settled mainly by people who come from one or two towns on the Island.

Coamnos and Jayuyanos, the two groups that settled in Cambridge, were basically strangers to each other when they first arrived. Since there had been little or no contact on the Island, they had no strong feelings about each other, and there was thus no problem. And yet in Cambridge they were to form into two separate communities, almost as removed from each other as Coamo and Jayuya. One can deduce that the reason for this was that their cultural differences, differences that had been several centuries in the making, produced this separation. They did not dress the same; they called various objects by different names; they listened to different music; they danced differently; they married differently. In short, they were strangers in many ways.

These differences were especially significant due to the early boarding house arrangements that the two groups developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Some of them rented large apartments and subdivided them so that they closely resembled an ordinary rooming house. They then offered room and board to family members, distant relatives, or friends for approximately $20.00 per week. This was a most attractive arrangement for the immigrants, most of whom were single men or men who had left their spouses behind, and
Record Shop in Central Sq.
Notice map of Puerto Rico
with the names of Coamo
and Jayuya printed on sign.
it provided human contact, a common language, informational exchange, and, very importantly, home-cooked Puerto Rican food. It was, in short, a home away from home. To quote a sociologist on the subject of such non-familial social units,

...All human beings belong to social groups other than their nuclear family as a necessary condition to their survival.... Those who get together in circles of friends (or cliques) share, in addition to some common interest, a sense of belonging, or solidarity, and feelings of trust cemented by interpersonal adjustments or emotional ties....The most important small groups or cliques in which...Hispanos can participate are those people who came originally from the same home town in Puerto Rico. [Padilla, pp. 212, 215.]

Indeed, for the newly arrived immigrant, who often came straight from the barrio, the rooming house was a home town womb to which he could retreat from an oblivious if not hostile world. That they lived in such close quarters and ate from the same table meant that the differences in cultural background between the Jayuyano and Coameno directed them into two different concentrations, into what was to become two separate communities.

During the very early years of immigration, the Puerto Ricans were more or less randomly distributed throughout the eastern half of the city, but as time went on small concentrations built up. These concentrations, however, were not "Puerto Rican" concentrations; they were either Coameno or Jayuyano concentrations. There were two clumps of Coamenos, one about one-half mile south of Central Square in Cambridgeport (Neighborhood 5), and another about the same distance southwest of Central Square in Riverside (Neighborhood 7). The Jayuyanos were also in two clumps. One was directly east of the Harvard
campus in Mid-Cambridge (Neighborhood 6), and the other was straight south of the first, directly on Massachusetts Avenue, about one-half mile west of the center of Central Square. The latter clump's southern edge was just inside the northern boundary of Riverside (Neighborhood 7).

While the Jayuyano population from 1960 to 1969 was relatively stable, both in terms of numbers and in terms of its location, the Coamenos were not. Starting in about 1964 or 1965 there was a visible northward movement toward Central Square among the Coameno population in the Cambridgeport-Riverside area. This movement was in part an expression of the Coameno desire for urban amenities: the subway to Boston, the stores, and the movie theaters and the other entertainment possibilities of the Square, but it reflected a growth in the number of Coamenos as well.

With regard to employment, Coamenos and Jayuyanos did not arrive in Cambridge equally endowed with the skills required for earning a living. The former were better educated and had come from an area characterized by skilled trades and light industry, whereas the latter had been farmers of the mountainside and had few non-agricultural skills. Yet the Coamenos, in the beginning, had no better luck that the Jayuyanos when it came to finding a good job. There was one great equalizer: neither group could speak English. The two groups found it equally difficult to find any work other than poorly paid unskilled labor. Nevertheless, during the late fifties and the early sixties, such jobs were plentiful, and the immigrants, Coamenos or Jayuyanos, took whatever they could find. Several
companies (all of which hired many unskilled workers) could be identified as employers of significant numbers of Puert Ricans: Corrugated Box Company, Allston Arrow Company, Banda of Massachusetts, American Electroplating, and B.F. Goodrich, among others. Car washes and laundries also employed many.

This equality of opportunity was fleeting, however. As the years passed and the immigrants learned English, the better skilled, better educated Coamenos were able to find better paid jobs, usually based upon experience or skills acquired on the island. The Jayuyanos were left behind in the poorly paid jobs. By 1966 the shift became quite evident as the number of companies hiring skilled labor and also having significant numbers of Coameno employees grew. These included KLH (electronics piecework), Stop and Shop, Fenton Shoe, MMM Meat Company and Barker Steel.

Very late in this period, perhaps in 1968 or 1969, the first Puerto-Rican-owned businesses began to appear in the Central Square area. These included several bodegas, or grocery stores that also carried many Puerto Rican non-food specialties. Most of these stores were owned by Coamenos, and there were no Jayuyano owners.

Time also made clear a second difference between the two groups, a difference of cultural style, a difference related to their different island origins. Coamenos tended to use family and friendship ties in such a manner that several companies soon found themselves with a whole group of Coamenos (uncles, brothers, cousins, school friends, and so forth) all working in the same plant. This phenomenon was less apparent among Jayuyanos, although there were several
of them (at American Electroplating, Nabisco, Nexco, and Deran's Confectionary Company). These Jayuyano concentrations, however, were related more to the market for unskilled labor than to any initiative on the part of Jayuyano employees. His independence of spirit, and his jibaro penchant for the widely dispersed bohios of the mountains, took a strange turn when transplanted along the concrete walks and walls of Cambridge. Accustomed to working alone, restrained only by the forces of nature, in Cambridge he wanted to avoid other Puerto Ricans (particularly as bosses) even if he could not avoid other people or bosses altogether.

COAMENO: I work at the steel company in Watertown [Barker Steel]; I have twenty Puerto Ricans working with me and all of them are from Coamo. When the big boss asks me if I know someone that wants to work, I go looking for a Coameno. If I can't find one in Cambridge, I send for one in Coamo. But I would not recommend a Jayuyano! [Emphasis added.] However, don't misunderstand me, I am not saying that I dislike them personally. It is just that I cannot trust them. You recommend one, he works for one month or two, and he quits. Then the big boss starts complaining. I am the one responsible to the boss, not the worker. If he is a good worker, he makes more money, and I go up [get promoted] and make more money too. Do you understand? As I was saying, no one does anything for nothing. [Coameno interview.]

JAYUYANO: I prefer to work for an American boss, than to take orders from any Puerto Rican. [Jayuyano interview.]

It was around 1964 or 1965 that the boarding house phenomenon began to disappear among the Coamenos. As their economic conditions improved many began to send for their wives and families, and upon their arrival they sought separate "family-style" apartments. Many of the young men had married local Anglo women, and they, too, moved into apartments. These "family-style" apartments tended to be located in areas close to the original Coameno boarding-house concentrations.
The arrival of Coameno families meant increased numbers in Cambridge, and it meant increased communication between Cambridge and the island as the daughters-in-law wrote to their mothers and the grandchildren's activities were reported. The increased communication and information about Cambridge prompted the further migration of single men and women who were seeking employment. Many of the females were quite young and came as baby-sitters for Coameno wives who wanted to work. Both the Coameno men and women arriving during these years tended to live with these families rather than in boarding houses.

The Jayuyanos continued, to a much larger degree, to live in boarding houses. And, when they did marry, or send for their families, they tended to move away from the Jayuyano boarding house concentrations, away from the Puerto Rican concentrations; sometimes they moved out of the city altogether. Again, the parallel with their behavior on the island is quite clear. Just as the jibaro sought out his own isolated hollow, the Jayuyano separated himself. Although given the density of population in the Boston area, he could not separate himself from people, he could separate himself from Spanish-speaking people, which in some ways served the purpose. Just as in employment, an Anglo boss was somehow better than a Puerto Rican boss, so too was an Anglo neighbor preferable to another Hispano. At least he would not try to converse, and he would not presume to interfere.

The condition of the housing in these areas of Hispano concentration was poor, to say the least. A housing stock survey, 

Housing
Needs in Cambridge, published by the Department of Planning and Development in December 1972 and based on information gathered from the 1970 census, began its discussion of housing by area with the following generalization:

It is evident that the greatest number of dwelling units in need of improvement are located in the eastern end of the city -- in East Cambridge, Model Cities, Cambridgeport and Riverside [all of them areas of Hispano concentration]. A house in any of these neighborhoods is more likely to lack central heating and basic plumbing facilities than a house in any other part of the city....The large volume of absentee-owned property with antiquated heating and plumbing facilities strongly points up the need for more systematic code enforcement.

And Puerto Ricans were unaware of state and local housing codes, or that they could protest violations of such codes.

B. Anglo Institutions: The Bar, The Church.

In these early years the Puerto Rican immigrant faced a great wall of non-recognition, both with regard to the Anglo public and secular Anglo institutions. They were seen not as Puerto Ricans, much less Jayuyanos and Coamenos, but as "Spanish-speaking." Few Anglos even knew that they were U.S. citizens. That the public was oblivious to their individuality was bad enough, but that the agencies of the city also ignored them, and rarely, if ever, acknowledged their existence or their need for services was worse. The Puerto Ricans were expected to assimilate into the general Anglo urban society, as so many other ethnic groups in the city had done before them. They were treated as just one more ingredient of the immigrant Cambridge melting pot, a stew pot of Italians, Portuguese, French Canadians, Greeks, and Irish, and so forth, who had arrived before them.
The most directly felt need on the part of the new immigrants, most of them young and male, was recreation and social activities. In the beginning there was nothing for them to do and no place to go. Because they did not speak English and because they did not know their way around the city, life was basic. Just getting to and from work was considered an accomplishment. Eventually, however, as their English skills improved, a few brave souls ventured out into the local restaurants and bars, and some even went so far as to cross the Charles River in order to attend the various athletic and social activities (and sometimes, mass) at the Cardinal Cushing Center for the Spanish-speaking, in Boston’s South End.

Once they did begin to venture out in numbers, trouble ensued. In the bars, particularly, difficulties and misunderstandings arose, partly due to cultural and linguistic differences and partly due to the ignorance and prejudice of the Anglo community. Sometimes it was simply a question of turf. Because of such incidents the Puerto Rican population attracted the attention of the police, and soon there was friction not only between the Puerto Ricans and the rest of the barroom clientele, but also between the Puerto Ricans and the police.

It seemed to the Puerto Ricans that the police assumed that any trouble was their fault, and that the solution was to tell the Puerto Ricans to leave, to go home. When the Puerto Ricans protested what they considered to be an arbitrary order, the police sometimes arrested them for disorderly conduct or public drunkenness. The
drunk charge was most convenient for the police, since they could just lock the offender up for the night and let him out in the morning, without pressing charges. Since the Puerto Rican's English often was insufficient for him to defend himself and since he was unaware of his legal rights, misunderstandings and injustices were common occurrences. The Puerto Rican community became afraid to go out at night, lest they end up in jail, for reasons that they did not understand. This, unfortunately, was the Puerto Rican's first introduction to the public agencies of the City of Cambridge.

It was in 1964 that this problem finally became so critical that a few Puerto Ricans decided to do something about it. The incident that set off the reaction occurred when these young men heard that "The Margaret," that is, the Pearl Street Cafe (located on the corner of Green and Pearl Streets in Central Square) would no longer serve Hispanos. This was the last straw, for this particular bar was the favorite watering-hole of the Puerto Ricans. Margaret was the name of the owner and manager, an older woman who had been more friendly than most proprieters to a Puerto Rican presence in her place of business. The police, however, had finally pressured her into excluding these "trouble-makers."

Faced with such injustice and discrimination, about eight or nine of its Puerto Rican patrons decided to do something about an increasingly intolerable situation. Essentially they were being denied the right to enter a public place. They went to the Director of the Cardinal Cushing Center, Father Serrino, whom they had met while participating in the various activities there. They asked
him to go with them to talk to the police.

It is somewhat ironic that the institution in Cambridge most responsible for the creation of an indigenous leadership among the Puerto Rican population was the Police Department, for it was this group of young men, who had themselves been arrested for crimes of which they felt themselves innocent, who were to become the nucleus of what is today the Hispano community's leadership. It was the Police Department who helped to instill in them an appreciation for the value of learning English and of acquainting themselves with the operation of their adopted city's government.

These young men, patrons of "the Margaret" and the future leaders of the Hispano community, were blue-collar workers, and most of them were from the rural barrios of Coamo. Indeed, four of them were brothers or cousins. As a rule, they had been in Cambridge longer than most Puerto Ricans; they spoke functional, if not correct English; and they had retained some vestiges of their parents' rural sense of dignity and respect. Furthermore, because they were from the rural barrios, they were not unaccustomed to defending themselves in town.

Father Serrino arranged the meeting between the offended patrons and the Chief of Police of Cambridge. Other participants in the meeting included Margaret, the owner of the bar, two lawyers provided by the Cardinal Cushing Center, and a priest from the Center. As a result of this now famous meeting, Puerto Ricans were no longer hassled about their right to be served at the local bars, and problems with arrests decreased somewhat. This 1964 meeting was and
still is viewed by the Puerto Ricans as their first victory as a community, and the members of the "police delegation" came to be viewed with "respeto." Because they had succeeded in solving one problem, others began to bring them other problems, and eventually they had become that community's spokesmen, whether they liked it or not.

The police problem, however, did not wither away completely. Some five years later, these same people would still be negotiating with the police. In his summary of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge's first year, the Board President described the same phenomenon.

The police were terrible, as well as the courts. When a Spanish person was taken to police headquarters, he was treated very poorly, and the bail was set so high that even a "criminal" would not have had the money to pay it. That is, it was truly discrimination and abuse. Spanish people would go into a bar or restaurant to have a drink and someone would call the police for no other reason than they they were speaking Spanish [which for some reason annoyed many patrons of these establishments] and the police would come get them. Many times they were put in jail simply because they kept asking what their rights were. [Robert Santiago, Cambridge Spanish council.]

After the 1964 meeting with the Chief of Police, the Cardinal Cushing Center for the Spanish-speaking continued to be the community's main resource center. Only a short time after this meeting a group of Puerto Ricans (all Coamenos) went to Father Serrino and asked that a Spanish-speaking priest hold mass in their neighborhood. The Center agreed, and sent Padre Jose to the Blessed Sacrament Church in the Riverside section of the city. Two years later, in 1966, quite by accident, a second Spanish-speaking priest was assigned to St. Mary's of the Annunciation, a church located north of Central Square, in Area 4.
At the time of Father Daniel Sheehan's arrival there the great wave of Puerto Rican movement into that area had just begun. The Hispanics who attended the masses in Cambridge during this period were overwhelmingly Puerto Rican, and included both Coamenos and Jayuyanos. There were no arguments or fights at the Church, and thus few people realized that a problem was brewing. Even so, if one had looked closely, one could have noted that the membership of the committees of parishioners, committees that supervised various social, religious and charity functions, was almost exclusively Coameno. The Jayuyanos did not participate on these committees.

It was in the bars that the problem was very evident. In fact, the problem between the Coamenos and Jayuyanos soon came to dominate the Hispano barroom scene. As the Anglos had become more accustomed to their presence and the police problem had diminished somewhat, "the Margaret" had become an "Hispano" bar. And there it was that the Coameno and the Jayuyano, almost strangers on the island, became acquainted. As the two groups confronted each other across a smoke-filled and alcohol-fumed barroom, arguments and fist fights started over the most minor things. Here is where the local cleavage in the Puerto Rican community began. Here is where "the Cambridge Scene" really commences.

C. The First Puerto Rican Institution: The Club.

The first Puerto Rican institution in Cambridge was the "club," a private organization designed to provide recreation for Hispanics. In 1967 a group of Coamenos, many of whom were the same young men
INSTITUTIONS IN THE PUERTO RICAN COMMUNITY: 1965-1969

- site of the Cambridge Spanish Council
- site of Spanish Mass
- site of Puerto Rican Clubs
- site of first Bodegas
Restaurants, Club, Groceries Stores, Record Shop, Travel Agency,
Catholic Church/Spanish Mass.
Concilio de Cambridge
who had composed the 1964 police delegation, and some of whom had belonged to similar institutions at home in the barrios, decided to form the Latin American Sports Club. Its founders hoped to provide a place for the community to go, in part to keep them out of the local bars and the various troubles that had brewed therein. The Club would offer its members a place to talk, drink, and entertain themselves with dominoes, billiards, and dances.

The idea had been conceived by two young Coamenos who had then set about to enlist their friends and acquaintances. Potential members were asked to contribute $25.00 per person to finance the project. Once the money was collected, they formed a Board of Directors, elected officers, and rented the whole fifth floor of 525 Massachusetts Avenue, at the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and Essex Street, the western end of Central Square.

After the Club was under way, admission was charged to special events such as dances, and that plus the revenue from liquor sales was deposited in a Club bank account. This money could be withdrawn to pay the rent and other expenses, and to make interest-free loans to the membership. At first, the Club was run completely with volunteer labor.

In 1968 similar clubs had opened in the same general area, two important ones being the Latin Club on Green Street and the Fraternidad Hispana on Brookline Street. (The latter had taken its name from an abortive CEOC program of the same year, which will be discussed in the same section.) Both of these clubs also were founded and managed by Coamenos.
In part because their organizers had been members of the police delegation, and also simply because they were a place for the community to gather and exchange notes, these clubs became something more than recreational and social institutions. Unofficially, they were the service centers of a Hispano community that was being ignored by the City's agencies, and people with problems came there for advice and information. Aside from the Catholic Church, the Police, and one friendly City Councilor who would later become Mayor, very few of the City's officials or leaders were even aware of their presence. This particular City Councilor, of Italian extraction, felt some sense of cultural compatibility with the Hispanos, and was quite willing to listen to the complaints of the community.

When the clubs first formed, both Coamenos and Jayuyanos came, and both came for the same reasons. It was more comfortable there, away from the possibilities of barroom slurs from inhospitable Anglos and possible misunderstandings with the police. Although both on the job and in his home, the Jayuyano, if given a choice, preferred to avoid the Coameno, his fears of intoxicated Anglos and the possibility of arrest persuaded him to seek the security of the all-Spanish-speaking club. Furthermore, the clubs did buy jíbaro music for the jukebox, as well as music preferred by Coamenos, a luxury the Anglo bars did not afford.

The Jayuyanos, however, did not join the clubs, even though they were invited to do so. None of them ever paid the entrance fees or dues. That the Jayuyanos used the club’s facilities, but
would not support them financially, irritated the Coamenos. Nor
could the Coameno take the Jayuyano's "old-fashioned" sense of dig-
nity too seriously, whereas the Coamenos' verbal jousting over vari-
ous games, or just the weather, irritated the reticent Jayuyano.
And there was a problem over what records to play on the jukebox.

After 1967 clubs opened and closed, and the latter events usu-
ally had been precipitated by the damages done to the premises by
such fights. Although the majority of these fights were not between
Jayuyanos and Coamenos, but between Hispanos from Cambridge and out-
siders, it nevertheless did not take long for the not terribly verbal
jíbaros and their sense of personal dignity to wear out their wel-
come, and for the Coamenos, who were worried about the club's "good
name," to actively discourage them from coming into the clubs at
all. The following comments are representative of their respective
sentiments.

The Coamenos: The way I look at it, they didn't have any infan-
cia back in Jayuya. [The connotation here is that Jayuyas have
never really grown up and that they do not really understand
the ways in which the real world operates.] They don't know
how to act. At the beginning, we used to invite them to our
home to a party. We used to let them in the clubs. We used
to help them find jobs, but we have to stop it. In the club,
the problem was that they don't know how to play pool. Then
they get drunk and want to play for money. Well, as you know,
some of those guys [Coamenos] are good players, so the Jayuya-
os end up losing and then they start fighting. Well, the club
was organized for everybody, but not to have a group of Jayuyas
give it a bad name. The other problems at the club was the
music box [the jukebox]. We have some jíbaro music, and, well,
that was all they wanted to hear....[But] the Coamenos wanted
to hear salsa. So trouble start all over again. So we could
not afford to have them around. If they were members of the
club, then it was different; they have a voice. But they didn't
want to pay the dues, and then they want us to let them in and
do whatever they please. Impossible. [Interview with club owner.]
The Jayuyanos: "...For years we have been having problems in Cambridge with the Coamenos. But this is basically because we are two different groups. We don't believe on what the Coameno does and the Coameno does not understand why we don't like to be with them. Supposedly, they are better than us, more educated. They have better jobs; they own businesses, homes; [they] control the recreational activities, the clubs, and so on... With the clubs is the same. You know [Club X] doesn't let Jayuyas in, as well as the other clubs. [Collated interviews.]

D. The Origin of Concilio.

In 1968 the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee (CEOC), the local office of a federal anti-poverty program, decided to organize a small community relations program which they called "Fraternidad Hispana." The organizers of the Hispano community's clubs were insulted by this program. In their opinion it was poorly designed and poorly administered, and when they tried to make suggestions to CEOC with regard to the "Fraternidad Hispana," they were ignored. At the same time that they were struggling to serve a community through their own clubs purely with voluntary labor, this agency of professional organizers had set about to plan programs for the community without even consulting one Hispano about what that community might want. The Board of Directors of CEOC which ran the program did not include one Hispano, and neither had CEOC's Director hired any Hispano employees to help administer the program. The community, not surprisingly, made little or no use of the program and it died an early death in 1969, before it was even one year old. The clubs remained the service centers of the community. (According to the 1975 staff of CEOC, the agency's files from this period were lost in a move. The author has had to rely on his own and others' memories in describing those early events.)
Aside from inspiring the name of a new club, the Fraternidad Hispana on Brookline Street, and of attracting the club leadership's attention to CEOC, this program of 1968 produced no lasting results.

While "Fraternidad Hispana" had still been functioning and the club leadership had been complaining to CEOC, the Hispanics had made the acquaintance of a Black CEOC Board member, and in the spring of 1969 he informed them that CEOC had written a proposal to Washington in which they had based their requests partly on the presence of an Hispano community, even though they had made no special provision for Hispanics in any of their programs.

Once again, the club's leadership felt that they were being used, and because the unpaid club leadership was suffering from exhaustion in an effort to hold down regular jobs, service the community, and still maintain some sort of family life, the Board of Directors of the Latin American Sports Club called a meeting of the Hispano community to discuss the CEOC situation. They decided to form a delegation that would approach the Board of CEOC and request that two Hispanics be hired by that agency to deliver services to Hispanics. More or less, this delegation was made up of the same people who had formed the police delegation of 1964 and the club leadership of the late 1960's--the Coamenos.

The delegation presented itself at a meeting of the CEOC Board, and asked to speak. They were told that since they were not on the meeting's agenda that they would have to wait. They waited, and they waited, and after several hours they walked into the meeting uninvited and informed the Board that if they had to wait any longer, they.
would leave and return the next day with a picket line. The Board still could not see them, and they left to organize their picket line.

As they sat around that night at the Latin American Sports club discussing the arrangements for the picket line, they decided that they were going to too much trouble to merely ask for two Hispano employees. They would ask, instead, for their own agency, with their own Board of Directors. Then they would not be at the mercy of a CEOC Board that included no Hispanics, and they would be free to design and administer their own programs, based on their experience with the community. Thus was the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge, or the Spanish Council, conceived.

That picket line (which was mostly Coameno, but did include a few Jayuyanos) was two weeks old when the Director of CEOC agreed to the demand for a Hispano program with a separate Board of Directors. It is today the opinion of the organizers of that picket line that the reason it succeeded was due entirely to the fact that CEOC was embarrassed and worried about the possible consequences of such bad publicity. That an agency supposed to serve the poor should be so publicly assailed by the poor left it open to attack from its enemies.

[The CEOC Director] ran his operation in such a way that he could not fail to respond to pressure put on by the Spanish community. If [he] started to lose any piece of the very delicate coalition that he had put together, he would have gone right down the tube. There were too many people in Cambridge who wanted his scalp, because he had been a rebel. He had not been a member of the club, so to speak. In political circles he had not shared the CEOC program with the city power structure...In order to avoid the inevitable sword falling on his neck, he had to form a very loose but delicate coalition of
poor folks, Blacks, Spanish, public housing tenants, and Portu-
guese, and not only did he have to form it, but he had to keep
it together. If there was ever a signal from the community that
a part of that structure was starting to fall apart, that meant
that [his] head was ready to roll. So, he had to make every
effort to be responsive to that situation. That's how he kept
his position. That's how he was able to do things in Cambridge,
the only way. So when the Spanish Council started to make
some noise and showed dissatisfaction with their priorities
within the CEOC framework, [he] had to respond. And it cer-
tainly did have a positive effect in that regard. [Interview
with former Director of Model Cities.]

And since the CEOC Director insisted that he had no money for
any Hispano Board, a delegation of Puerto Ricans and CEOC staff went
to New York, to the regional office of OEO. There, much to the His-
panos' surprise, they discovered that the Director of the region
was a Puerto Rican, and they came home with instructions to CEOC
that it should provide them with $8,000 from its own budget. Fur-
thermore, another $10,000 would be given to CEOC by OEO, and $18,000
was to be spent by CEOC in the manner suggested by the soon-to-be-
elected Board of Directors of Concilio.

Having secured the Concilio's funding, the leaders set about
to establish this Board of Directors. There would be nine Board
members, just as there are nine City Councilors in Cambridge, and
these nine would then elect their officers, including the President
of the Board, just as the City Councilors of Cambridge elects its
Mayor. The meeting to elect the Board was held at the Latin Club
(for Concilio had no facilities of its own), and the entire Hispano
community was invited by leaflets distributed in all the areas of
Cambridge where they lived. Perhaps a hundred people attended that
meeting, and only a handful of Jayuyanos were among them. The
elections were supervised by the Election Commission of Cambridge, and the community confirmed that leadership, now five years old, by electing them the Board of Directors of the new Concilio Hispano de Cambridge. And since they were no Jayuyano candidates, there were no Jayuyanos on the Board.

E. Preliminary Observations.

The leadership that emerged from the Puerto Rican community during the 1960's was very much indigenous to that community and very much a part of one particular subgroup, the Coamenos, the largest single group of Hispanics in Cambridge. Under considerable prompting from the Cambridge police force, the first of the City's agencies to respond to their presence, these young men, the children of the rural barrios surrounding the old city of Coamo, emerged as the leaders of the immigrant blue-collar workers of Cambridge. Seasoned veterans of the Cambridge scene, they had by using the one resource they knew, the Catholic Church, tackled the problems with the police force, and then in 1967 they had organized the clubs to keep themselves and their compatriots out of the bars. After the clubs had been functioning as social service centers for two years they had organized the community to picket CEOC, and persuade them to fund an Hispano agency. Thus, when it came time for the community to elect its leaders, the Board of Directors of Concilio, that community elected this same group, on the premises of one of those clubs.
To perceive the history of Concilio's origins, and particularly the origin of its leaders, is essential to an understanding of its entire history. Concilio's Board, at the time of its formation in June 1969, was mostly Coameno; and there were no Jayuyanos on it. But the reason for this was not simply that Coamenos and Jayuyanos had come to blows in the bars of Cambridge. That this leadership emerged from one particular group, and only one group, was due to the cultural styles that the two had brought with them from the island, not to any power struggle between them. That several of the Board members were relatives also was a product of that process, and was not due to nepotism or any other devious desire on their part. Almost half of that original police delegation were relatives; that a family should band together in the face of the arbitrary arrest of one of its members is natural. The problems that Concilio would later face in terms of Board composition were due not to the fact that anyone had manipulated the situation, but rather to the very natural, almost unconscious, way in which this leadership had emerged.

Although Coamo had been a center of the elite, indeed the Baños de Coamo had been that elite's playground, these immigrants had never been a part of this upper crust. But the traditions of that elite, particularly its political and community traditions, had had an impact on them. The elite of Coamo was part of the coastal tradition; they had been playing politics in Madrid and in San Juan throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and ever since 1868 they had been the organizers of every variety of club and civic association of the town. The talk was always of politics; as soon as one
election had decided who was right and who was wrong about the chances of the various contending parties, speculation began about the next contest. Along with the lottery, cock-fighting, and softball, politics was a municipal sport. Time Magazine, no doubt talking about the coastal areas, was amazed. "The islanders are passionate in their politics, and voting turnouts of more than 80 percent are common" [Feb. 16, 1976, p. 16].

And the barrios had played a smaller game by roughly the same rules. None of this group had ever belonged to Coamo's elite fraternities, such as the one that organized and still operates the Maraton San Blas, but they had seen it done, and they called their first club a sports club. They identified with the traditions of Coamo even if their own families had not been the carriers of those traditions. That, plus their relatively better education and skills, and their rapid adaption to the mainland city, prompted them to respond to the slights and injustices of Cambridge in a political, not a personal, manner. That the leaders were almost all Coamos was not because the Coamenos desired to exclude the Jayuyanos from the community's leadership. It was the Jayuyo's own political and social traditions that had persuaded him to ignore the delegation and the committees, to at most stand by the side of the arena and merely watch the game. The Coamenos and the Jayuyanos, even before the first fight had occurred, had been two separate groups, and only one of these groups was really prepared, psychologically or otherwise, to play the pressure politics of Cambridge immigrants.
The Jayuyano, isolated in the mountain fastnesses of Otoao, arrived in Cambridge with his jíbaro cultural apparatus almost completely intact. His barrios had not copied the political traditions of the coastal elite; they had been engulfed and still were to a large extent by the paternalistic system of the hacendado. From the very beginning of Spanish rule when Ponce had divided up the Borinquén and assigned them to a lord, the jíbaro had learned to depend on the highly personalized favors of his patron. The jíbaro had no tradition of pressure politics. When abused he retreated into isolation and quietude, until that abuse became intolerable. His tradition of political activism is the tradition of the peasant uprising, a violent protest provoked by fury, and carried out more for the good of the soul than out of any hope of gaining control over one's own life. His is the wrath of the Borinquén Earth Goddess, of an erupting volcano whose lava flows down the hills burning all in its path, only to cool and harden until the next such explosion. From the uprising against the Spaniards in 1511, to El Grito de Lares in 1868, to the resistance against the U.S. takeover in 1898, to the most recent 1950 uprising in which the jíbaros of Jayuya burned a large part of their town to the ground and then walked out of the mountains to surrender, the people of Otoao have maintained just one tradition of protest.

The very reason their ancestors chose those mountain hollows centuries ago was precisely because they were isolated, and the society of the coast did not often penetrate in ways that could not
be ignored. Most significantly, in terms of the issues that divided the Jayuyanos and the Coamenos, the peoples from the mountains had been isolated from the cultural and psychological changes wrought by industrialization upon the minds of the peoples from the coast. Thus, unchanged, the jíbaro has been pushed from his mountainside. But unlike the invasion forces of the 16th century or the late 19th century, the force that pushed him was amorphous. In 1511 the jíbaros seized a Spaniard and drowned him, to see if he were god or man, and revolted against those men, but the changes in Puerto Rico since 1940 have not come embodied in any recognizable force, except perhaps the U.S. label on his can of beans or the cardboard box of rice. Having been taught his place, he has no anxiety about who he should become; he does not seek to adapt, but to survive, intact, in the hostile environment of Cambridge. As long as his jíbaro dignity is not assaulted, he merely wishes to be left alone.

The ex-jíbaro of the coast, on the other hand, has changed. Operation Bootstrap was the final stage in a process that has added a new layer of cultural pluralism to the island. In the coastal areas like Coamo, economic and social change have minimized the influence of the old Spanish ways, made many of them old-fashioned, and emphasized la lucha, the rat race. In these areas emerged a new social group, a blue-collar work force that aspires to be modern and respectable. With the mainland mass media's definition of the ideal life being broadcast into their homes, they have replaced the old sense of personal dignity with a new concern for their whole group's image before the public. Joseph P. Fitzpatrick has aptly
described this new group, from which many of the Coameno migrants come.

This sudden shift has important cultural and personal consequences. It introduces a series of uncertainties and anxieties which are the common experiences of new middle class people in areas of rapid social transition. The advance to middle class status involves serious economic pressures.... They are in an economically precarious position. Furthermore, they have come from a cultural background in which social status was fixed. In such a traditional two class system, a person in the lower class has no anxieties about social position; he knows exactly what is expected of him...But the person newly arrived in the middle class has none of these certainties. [Fitzpatrick, p. 49.]

Fitzpatrick goes on to say that these anxieties about who others think they are, and an old conviction that has never really been abandoned—that people do come in classes—has made them anxious to live up to their new image of respectability, a respectability defined by the mainland. They are thus very suggestible, and very adaptive. In the same way that they have arrived in Cambridge with industrial and craft skills, they have also arrived with some of the values of the mainland's anxiety-ridden lower middle class, especially when it concerns their "good name."

This anxiety and an awareness that they could easily slip back into the disoriented, urban slum culture makes them adopt and cling to the dominant group's values even more vigorously than those people to whom such values are instinctive. That they have essentially been demoted several rungs on the relative social ladder by removing themselves from their homes and joining the poor of Cambridge exacerbates this anxiety. They thus have no patience for the iñbaro who might ruin the group's reputation, or for the poor that
call themselves Puerto Rican, in order to claim U.S. citizenship, welfare, or other benefits. Nor do they appreciate the Anglo's inability to distinguish them from less image-conscious groups. Nevertheless, it has been this same anxiety that has propelled them to adapt to this society, to learn English, and to seize every opportunity that might lead down the path of upward mobility. That the Jayuyano's clothes are not cut and styled according to the latest dictates of fashion; that they still lope along the sidewalk as if traversing their own hills and hollows; that they still talk like peasants; that they hang religious pictures on their walls, like the stone and clay cemíes of the Boringué'n, or hang plastic baubles from their rear-view mirrors, that they still insist on defending their dignity with their fists or a knife, that they stick out like sore thumbs, and that they are poor, irritates the Coamenos.

The Coamenos' snide remarks about "jíbaros" assault the Jayuyano's dignity. The Coamenos cannot take his "dignity" seriously; they smile, with tongue in cheek, and talk about people who never seem to grow up. Nor can the Jayuyano take the Coameno's "good name" seriously. He would prefer to stay away—but it is too difficult. He too is subject to Anglo prejudice. He, too, wanted to take refuge in the Coameno's private clubs. And it was in these clubs that the origins of the Battle of Central Square can be found. Indeed, it was with the founding of the Latin American Sports Club that the problems became serious, and in front of its door that it exploded.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE

PART TWO. CONCilio AND THE BATTLE OF CENTRAL SQUARE.

Concilio began in June, 1969, with a separate Board of Directors, but with no office of its own. The organization used the CEOC office as an address, and carried on all business from there. Any large meetings were held in the clubs. Furthermore CEOC had complete control over the funding and the budget, and Concilio could not even see its own books; they were controlled by CEOC. Thus for its first two years Concilio was often unsure of how much money it had or would have, which made planning exceedingly difficult, and it could not raise its own funds, since its bank account was CEOC's bank account. And since CEOC wrote the checks, in practice, CEOC had to agree to all disbursements. On the other hand, CEOC did include two Hispanics on the CEOC Board of Directors. In return for that $18,000, the clubs' unofficial social service planners had given up a great deal.

On July 9 the Concilio Board hired the Executive Director, an associate of theirs who was already a Concilio Board member. This man, a Coameno, was also a Board member of the first Hispano club; he had helped to organize the CEOC picket, and had been a part of the delegation sent to the regional offices of CEOC in New York. He then hired a part-time secretary, and by August Concilio was established in its own office, at 678 Massachusetts Avenue, in the same building as the City's Housing Authority. [Minutes of Board Meetings, July 9, 1969.]
One of the first items of business taken up by the Board was a study of the city government. A chart was brought to one meeting, and the nine members sat and discussed who was who and did what. The Board then determined to write a letter to the City Manager requesting that he call a meeting of all relevant agencies and departments, as well as all the major private and public employers in Cambridge. The purpose of the meeting would be to get commitments from them all to deliver services to the community and to hire Hispanos, so that these individuals could help their own community from such posts. [Minutes of Board Meeting, August 8, 1969.]

Much to the surprise of the Board, the City Manager agreed to call such a meeting. In a 1976 interview with the man who was City Manager in 1969 (and City Manager again at the time of the interview), the author asked him why he had acted favorably on this request.

The City Manager insisted that he had not been reacting to any kind of pressure that Concilio had exerted on CEOC or upon the City. Rather, he had been persuaded solely by the merits of the arguments put forward by the Board. Even though Concilio might have been exerting some pressure just by pointing out to the City and its officials that there was a large Hispano community and that no effort was being made to serve it. "As I told you at the time, I thought you were exaggerating your numbers, and I think that you would agree with me today that you were, but yet at the same time you really had a problem." (The author does not agree today. Later in the interview, the City Manager accurately estimated the population as about 5,000.
But that was not what the City was saying in 1969. In 1969 Concilio (shaking in its boots) estimated the population at 5,000, whereas the city was claiming less than 2,000. The City Manager remembered Concilio's 1969 claim as 20,000! Thus the City Manager responded simply because the request was legitimate, and he felt compelled to respond to a legitimate request. It was definitely "reason, not pressure."

There was, however, more to it than simply "reason." Although they were completely unaware of it at the time the decision was made, the club leadership in the spring of 1969 had stumbled onto the one sure way to convince the City Manager that they "really had a problem." They could not have made a more astute decision than the one they did make, to picket CEOC. The following remarks are those of the City Manager.

I have never been a fan of CEOC. I have never felt that the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee conducted itself very well with respect to the very constituencies that it should have. I think that as far as I was concerned, they had a built-in bias. They considered their role to be one of confrontation with the City Government or with the powers that be, rather than one of asking and trying to verge [?], and cajole a response that would be favorable. For a large part my feeling about CEOC has been rather consistent. I never felt that CEOC did a very effective job for the community that it ought to have represented.

CEOC never gave the City Government, or the people, or the attitudes credit. The purpose was to confront the city. And they...felt that nobody had any honest motives about trying to do something to improve somebody's lives. And I thought that the request that was made by the Spanish community was one that was very reasonable.

And, no doubt, to demonstrate to CEOC the way an agency should respond to the Hispano community, the City Manager responded to this reasonable request and called this meeting. If Concilio had
done him the favor of picketing CEOC, it was the least he could do for them.

The agencies of Cambridge, and its private employers, did respond to the City Manager and come to the meeting. There were so many there that the City Hall Chambers were jammed, wall to wall, and all the agencies and private institutions and employers were reasonable and full of good intentions. But after they left that meeting only five agencies actually delivered. Two of them were state agencies, two of them were agencies specially created to help the poor anyway (that is, CEOC and Model Cities), and the last was the Housing Authority, which was supposed to provide housing for low-income people. The latter three receive extensive funding through state and federal programs. None of those agencies directly under the City Manager, who had called the meeting, responded.

The Cambridge office of the state's Department of Employment Security (DES) agreed to hire one Hispano employment aide, and the Cambridge office of the state's Department of Welfare hired two workers who could speak Spanish (but who were not Hispano). CEOC hired one Coamenc, who worked for them directly for two months and then was transferred to the OEO Training and Technical Assistance Unit (which CEOC administered) as a housing specialist. Model Cities said that they would give money to CEOC for a Foreign Language Referral Service (which was not what the Council had asked for, and which remained unpopular until the day it was abolished in 1973, and the Housing Authority decided that they might be able to
admit a few Hispanos into public housing. [Model Cities' programs, purposes and programs will be explained in the subsequent chapter on housing.] The rest of that roomful of people, and the agencies, companies, and institutions that they represented, delivered nothing.

Back at the Concilio office, there were only two people to service a problem-ridden community of thousands, the Executive Director and a part-time secretary. The job was impossible. No matter how hard they tried, they could not deliver services in a manner that the community had every right to expect. The unpaid Board members, themselves, often got involved in the ordinary work at the office, which was not surprising since they had been handling such problems for years at the clubs. Thus a valiant, if frantic, effort was made to act as a referral service for Hispanos with problems.

The client would come into the office, frequently unaware of which agency he or she needed, and ask to talk to the Executive Director, who was most often out on an errand with the previous client, trying to deliver that person to the appropriate place, and to plead his or her case with the appropriate person. Meanwhile the part-time secretary could either ask the second client to wait for the Executive Director to return, or she could go with that client to the appropriate agency, leaving the office locked up, or leaving it with a Board member or a friend that had just happened in. If she left with the second client, the third client would then be faced with a person who was not even an employee of Concilio, and who could do nothing but keep the office open until either the
Director or secretary returned. When forced to make long waits, that might or might not result in a successful resolution of their problem, many prospective clients became disgruntled in the extreme, and blamed the deficiencies or complete absences of service on favoritism, or on discrimination against their group (and such persons, coincidentally, could have been Jayuyanos). Such scarcity of resources lent itself to the development of conflicts between Concilio and the community and among the Concilio Board itself.

Obviously they needed more people, and that meant money, and whenever they asked CEOC for anything, they were told that they should go to Model Cities, and when they went to Model Cities, they found that they really should address themselves to CEOC or some other agency. On the other hand, whenever a Hispano wandered into any city office, including those of CEOC and Model Cities, asking for help, he was sent to Concilio, which was supposed to be able to solve all problems for the Hispano. These agencies were perfectly willing, and in fact anxious, to relay all problems to Concilio; they were just unwilling to give it funds to hire people to do anything about all the problems that were being referred to them. And since they were completely dependent on CEOC for funds and could not raise their own money, their hands were tied. At one point, therefore, the Board tried to incorporate separately from CEOC, to gain their independence, but this proved impossible due to the attitude of the Executive Director, the man they themselves had hired back in July.

The first Executive Director was a short man with a large spirit and a voracious appetite. He was in many respects an excellent
organizer—he had the energy and the flair to inspire the population and get them behind him and his causes. He had excelled on the two-week-long picket line in front of the CEOC offices, and that was why the Board had chosen him as Director. But he also possessed a fatal flaw. He could not conceive of himself as a part of a larger unit; he could not conceive of himself as an employee of the Board. He was very much a man who intended to use his personal charisma and his new-found connections to maintain a monopoly position in which only he, and he personally, could deliver to "his" people.

But the style of the first Executive Director was not the only matter that provoked problems between him and the Board. One of the first disagreements occurred at the August meeting at which the Board decided to ask the City Manager to call a meeting of all city agencies and major employers in Cambridge. The new Executive Director objected to the Council putting pressure on the City Manager, and through him upon these other agencies and employers, to hire Hispanics. Indeed, the Executive Director already had hired his own secretary, an Anglo, against the express wishes of the Board. The Executive Director had so vehemently objected to the letter being written that, in the end, it was written by a Board member, and signed by a Board member, not by the Executive Director of Concilio.

The Executive Director offered no substantive reasons for not exerting this pressure; in fact he did not offer any reasons. The other Board members were left to conclude that the only explanation for his behavior was that he wanted to monopolize the position of
representative of the Hispanics before the Anglo powers that be, and thus ensure that all communications and benefits that were transferred from one to the other went through his person. The employment of other Hispanics would complicate his plans. From the perspective of the other Board members, he was operating in such a manner that he took the pressure off the City Manager, and aligned himself against the Board and their policies.

The problems between the Board and the Executive Director multiplied so rapidly that in a matter of weeks they had lost confidence in the man, and were convinced that he had aligned himself with an unresponsive power structure against them. Thus it was particularly frustrating when the Board attempted to incorporate Concilio, so that it could control its own finances and have complete access to its own books, only to find that the Executive Director saw incorporation and the independence of Concilio from CEOC as a threat to his own power, which was based on his rapidly cultivated relationship with the Director of CEOC, the source of Concilio's money.

The Board had made the first mistake in hiring this man, but the Director of CEOC and the City Manager compounded this mistake by dealing almost exclusively with this man and ignoring the Board of Directors. The Board wanted very much to fire the man, but they did not. They were afraid to try since his paycheck came from CEOC, and the Director of CEOC paid more attention to him than to the Concilio Board. Whenever they tried to raise the issue with the CEOC Director, whenever they tried to explain to him the damage that
this man was doing, the CEOC Director defended the Concilio Director. The Concilio Board worried and fretted but they did not try to fire their Director. And the City's officials never seemed to realize that this blunder-buss was not representative of the Board or the community; and the community too, for a few short months, assumed that the Board was responsible for him.

In a very real sense this first Executive Director was the flame that lit the powder keg of Coameno-Jayuyano tensions, the flame that set off the October 1969 Battle of Central Square. In a style more becoming to a village tough than an Executive Director, he made no attempt to overcome the Jayuyano distrust of the Coameno-controlled Concilio. He made no effort to invite them to meetings or special events, and whenever the Jayuyanos complained about the service the Director took it as an attack on his own person, a challenge to his own capacities, and his own ability to deliver. And so he fought with them. The Board members were very much aware of this situation, but were paralyzed by indecision. The Jayuyanos did not come to them to complain, and so they had no opportunity to discuss the problems with them. Nor did the Jayuyanos complain to the CEOC Director. That was not their style. They talked to each other on the sidewalks and in the bars, and merely intended to be overheard. And the Board was afraid to call a meeting about the problem because they could not predict how the CEOC Director would respond. They were afraid he could use such a meeting against them.

The crisis came to a head one autumn night in 1969 when the Concilio was only a few months old. The first Executive Director
had somehow ended up at a party held in the home of Jayuyanos and had gotten into an argument about whether or not the Concilio was delivering services equally to Jayuyanos and Coamenos. When the argument got heated, the Director displayed his new powers, his connections with the city government, by calling in the police to arrest three Jayuyanos right there in their own home. They spent the night in jail, and the Executive Director, bloated with his newfound power, walked out of that apartment with his head up and his chest out, a posture he also maintained on the sidewalks of Central Square. Puerto Ricans describe it as "frog" posture.

Not quite so confident as he appeared, the Executive Director then proceeded to the Director of CEOC. The Executive Director convinced the other that his life was in danger, that the Jayuyanos were determined to kill him, and that he therefore needed a gun. The officials of the City of Cambridge used their influence to persuade the Police Department to give him a permit to carry a pistol. Why these men succumbed to such folly, why they asked that a gun permit be given to the Executive Director of Concilio without so much as consulting the Concilio's Board of Directors about their opinion on this matter, why, when even the Mayor does not go around with a gun slung on his hip and the City Council would never tolerate such a farce—why they decided to give this man a gun is a matter of no small perplexity to this author. These officials must have believed that a Puerto Rican who was just trying to deliver the ordinary services that a community should expect should somehow need a gun to defend himself from that ungrateful community. They
believed what this man told them, that the dangerous jíbaros were lurking in every dark corner of Cambridge, laying for this man, the city's man at Concilio. These officials were no doubt totally oblivious to the fact that by allowing the director to play his games and ignore Board policy, they were seriously damaging the Board's credibility within the community. For the community assumed that the Board of Directors was in charge, and that the Board approved of this man and his gun-toting.

The Jayuyanos, especially those incarcerated, were incensed by the jailing of these three men. And yet initially they took no revenge. But when that "frog" (as he was called) started walking the sidewalks of Central Square with a gun slung on his hip, like some sheriff in a cheap (Anglo) western, and when they heard that this gun was to protect him from the Jayuyanos, they became not only outraged, but scared. They were afraid that he was going to use that gun on one of them. Not only were the Jayuyanos scared, but so were the members of the Concilio Board, and so was the Anglo secretary that the Director himself had hired. The whole Concilio office would freeze in terror, backs against the wall, whenever the Director appeared. The Jayuyanos, however, did not cower against the wall, but sought a remedy, revenge. They went to two members of the Concilio Board—indeed they went to one of their homes to meet with them—and demanded that the Executive Director be fired. It was then that they discovered that the Board had been wanting to fire this man for weeks, and not just because of his problem with the Jayuyanos.
Presented with the irate Jayuyanos, the Board members decided that the time had arrived for a showdown, and they chose an upcoming meeting scheduled for October 19 as the occasion. That meeting was in many ways a demonstration of the success that the Concilio was having with regard to the amount of attention that it could command from city officials. The Board had gotten the officials of CEOC, Model Cities (which had just begun to implement its programs), and the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority (an urban renewal office), among others, to give up their Sunday afternoon to come explain to the Hispano community what their programs offered in the present, and what might be done in the future.

The Board knew that the first Director was making an effort to bring out his supporters to that meeting, in order to attack and discredit the Board members in front of the officials. So the Board members invited the Jayuyanos to come to that meeting, en masse, to express their grievances in front of the officials, in order to discredit the Director. They had been wanting to raise the issue of regionalism anyway, and they saw this as an opportunity to do it. They also wanted to prove to the officials that the Executive Director did not represent the community, and that he could not deliver that community to them.

The supporters of the first Executive Director were for the most part Coamenos, but that was beside the point. Most of them were people that he had assisted in getting onto the roles of the Welfare Department, or some other charity, and in the process he had convinced these people that it was only due to his personal intervention
that they had received such benefits. At least that was the story that was going around (indeed, it was one of the more legal versions of that story going around), and people believed it, including the people on the Board of Directors of Concilio. And when mobilizing the people for this meeting the Director had neglected to tell them that they were about to be used to discredit the Board; he had confined himself to the benefits that he was about to deliver to them, due to his connections with these officials.

That this characterization of the first Executive Director is not just the opinion of a frustrated former Board Member is apparent from an examination of an editorial that the Director wrote encouraging the Hispano population to come to this meeting. It appeared in the third issue of a Concilio-sponsored weekly, the Noticiero Hispano, which is dated October 17 to 23, 1969. (The use of the Concilio's name by this weekly had been offered by the Director, without consultation with the Board.) One might add at this point that the Spanish wording of this editorial is just as awkward as the following English translation, which has attempted to duplicate both the style and spirit of the communique.

I want to inform you that here in Cambridge there exists an agency and the purpose of this agency is to improve an area that makes up a section of Cambridge. This agency is the Concilio Hispano. We want to inform you that this is the area where the majority of the Hispano community lives in this city.

Aside from using the first person singular pronoun "I," with reference to Concilio, revealing his own opinion that he was the Concilio in the same way that Louis XIV was France, the Director
erroneously describes the Model Cities' program as a program of Concilio. One would think that the Anglo city officials, including the Director of Model Cities, would have been offended by such an error.

Furthermore, I want it that no Hispanics who live in other areas fail to respond with their support for all those people in this community that have the right to be offered this kind of program. The area that I have referred to is that of Columbia Street, Broadway, the whole area of Mass Ave, Hampshire St. and East Cambridge. This area is better known as Model Cities. [For a complete text, see the Appendix.]

Not only does the tone turn dictatorial or demagogic ("Furthermore I want it that no Hispanics who live in other areas fail to respond...") but the description of the Model Neighborhood Area is inaccurate. It did not include all of Broadway, "the whole area of Mass Ave," all of Hampshire Street, or any of East Cambridge. He does finally get around to mentioning the name of Model Cities, the real sponsor of the said program, but he uses it only to designate a geographical area, and does not correct his earlier inaccurate description of the program's sponsor as Concilio.

The city officials and the Hispano community of Cambridge did come out on that fateful Sunday in October 1969. One of the Board members who knew that the Jayuyanos were also coming, and that the session would prove stormy, had gone up to the meeting place, the Latin American Sports Club, early, but he had decided not to unlock the doors and let the people in before 1:00, in an effort to prevent any pre-meeting fights. He was watching the crowd gather down below when he saw a vanguard of Borinquen troops approaching from the west, along Massachusetts Avenue. They were obviously ready for a fight,
both the men and the women. He flew down the stairs to try to talk to the leaders of the approaching vanguard, but by the time that he got down, the fight had started on the sidewalk in front of the Club, and already the brawl included hundreds of angry Puerto Ricans. At this point he ran in good Coameno maratonista fashion for the nearest police station, where he managed to deliver the message that there was a big fight at Central Square, and that the police were needed immediately. Racing the riot squad back to the square, he got there in time to see the crowd surround the car of the Coameno Executive Director, from which the Director had never had a chance to emerge. Fortunately the Director's gun was not in his hand, but in the glove compartment, and fortunately the message delivered by the Jayuyanos did not exceed the bounds of "Get out of this town and don't ever come back." The police assisted in the exit of the Director's car and broke up the main body of the fight moments before the main army of Jayuyanos arrived, even though they were coming at a run, having heard that a fight had already started. In spite of the fact that an estimated 400 Puerto Ricans had brawled all the way across Massachusetts Avenue, completely tying up traffic along the main street of Cambridge, and that many more had been converging on the scene, not one person was arrested.

But the damage was done. The two sides, the Board and the Executive Director, had summoned their forces for a showdown in front of the city officials. Both had intended to prove to the City's officials that their side, and only their side, could deliver this
community, but instead what they had demonstrated was not the power to bring people out, but rather how well they could do battle with each other. The Concilio, and its Board of Directors, had been discredited right before the eyes of the city officials, officials who had all arrived in time to have a ring-side seat at the hostilities. It would take years to recover from the damage done that day. And the Board and the Concilio were discredited in the eyes of the community, for that community had not seen what had transpired behind the scenes, could see nothing of what was happening. They only saw that the board had not delivered much except the battle of Central Square.

Furthermore, any hope that the Concilio would be able to organize the Jayuyanos of Cambridge died on that Sunday afternoon. The Jayuyanos, having wreaked their vengeance on the Executive Director, who has never returned to Cambridge and who submitted his letter of resignation to CEOC via the U.S. mail, retreated to their mountain fasthold of non-participation. Having lost the one Executive Director who was a community organizer, who had had the charismatic appeal to bring the crowds out (regardless of his other shortcomings), Concilio never again has been able to find an Executive Director who can organize. Any mobilization that occurred after October 19, 1969, was carried out by the Board of Directors.

It was an unqualified disaster, but it could have been worse. The Jayuyanos had come armed, just in case, and they did not use those arms. Nor did they murder the Director, even though he was
penned in his car. Fortunately, the Director did not use his gun, either. Fortunately the police got there before the main body of Jayuyano troops did, and fortunately they did not arrest anyone, for arrests might have been provocation for another round of revenge.

After the dramatic exit of the first Director the Board took over, and succeeded in following their own advice to the community, to move into the Model Cities' neighborhood. They left the building that also housed the Housing Authority and moved east down Massachusetts Avenue to the middle of Central Square. In February of 1970 they hired their second Executive Director, a woman from Jayuya, by way of Boston (Dorchester). She had not been a member of the Cambridge community, and, amazingly enough, was unaware of the Coameno-Jayuyano hostilities of the previous autumn. One of the Coameno Board members who knew her had solicited her application for the job, and the Board had hired her with the hope that a Jayuyana Executive Director would be able to patch up the deep division within the community and overcome the Jayuyanos' refusal to get involved in any attempt to mobilize the community.

In spite of their good intentions, it did not work. There was at most a lowering of the volume of Jayuyano remarks about the Coameno-controlled Concilio. Enthusiastic participation, enthusiastic anything, was totally absent from that part of the community. Nor had this second Director been at her post more than a few months when she married a man who had been living with a Jayuyana woman for years. This was unacceptable behavior and the Jayuyanos used it as an excuse for not cooperating with this woman. The Board was also
disappointed because the second Director was either unable or not inclined to mobilize and organize the community, nor was she a planner of programs. She contented herself with the ferrying of clients to their proper destinations. When one of the Board members who was organizing the Cambridge Spanish-speaking Tenants' Union asked her to sponsor this union and the housing project that grew out of it as a program of Concilio, she refused. He was forced to go to CEOC, and though she did eventually sit in on the negotiations for the incorporation of the project (a process described in full in a subsequent chapter), she was essentially there for the ride.

And she did, of course, find out about the Jayuyano-Coameno war at Central Square, and this did not inspire her toward further cooperation with the Board. She became almost secretive about what she was doing as Executive Director, and even if her intentions had been completely honest, she would have aroused suspicion in the minds of the Board members. They were understandably resentful since as Board members they would be held responsible for all Concilio acts, even if they knew not what the Concilio was doing. That at least some of her intentions were unacceptable to the Board became apparent when one day she announced to the majority of them that they were fired. (One assumes that she was going to appoint replacements from among her friends in Boston or among the Jayuyano population in Cambridge, although one cannot be sure.) However, because it is impossible according to the by-laws to fire the entire Board of Directors, or even a majority of it (although four-fifths of the Board can fire one of its members), and because the Jayuyanos of
Cambridge would not support this act of vengeance, she did not succeed in removing the members of the Board. The Cambridge Jayuyanos had been satisfied with the forced exit of the first Director; they were even; they would not be used in this Director's vendetta. She never suggested that there should be new elections for membership on the Board, the only procedurally correct way to replace Board members, either because it did not occur to her or because she knew that the people who would come out to such a meeting would reelect the same Board.

Thus the Board found itself putting up with an Executive Director who had tried to fire them, in violation of the by-laws. But once again they were afraid to try to fire her, or press the issue with CEOC, for fear that CEOC would cut them off from their funds.

The Board carried on as best it could. The undated summary of Concilio's first year, written by the President of its Board, probably in September of 1970,\(^1\) betrays the frustrations that the year had brought.

In 1969, this office was established, [and] it was a hard task, in order to help resolve many of the problems and obstacles that confronted the Hispanics in this city. It was hard at the beginning to confront this. Our first goal was to attack the federal offices called CEOC (Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee). It cost us two weeks of demonstrating to get funds to operate this agency. It was not easy, but we succeeded.

\(^1\)Since this report describes the tenants' union at Columbia Terrace as CAST, and it lists as one achievement the hiring of one Hispanic by Model Cities, and since this person was hired in September 1970, one can assume that it was written after August, and since there is no mention of the negotiations to incorporate CAST, it must have been early autumn.
That was our first task. The second was to educate the City of Cambridge to demonstrate respect for Hispanics, for in those days there existed none for a part of this city. There only existed discrimination and terrible abuse against us Hispanics.

He went on to detail the accomplishments that had been brought about in negotiations with the Department of Police, with the Housing Authority, with the courts, the Department of Welfare, the City Hospital, the owners of the factories (with the assistance of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination), and to describe the proposals being prepared for future programs. What he saw was not just the accomplishments, but rather the gaping canyon that separated the still dismal realities of the present from a future in which the Hispanics would be able to solve their "problems and obstacles."

It would be a long and sad history of our past, were we to put it down for the record. And it is for this reason that we must maintain this office in order to continue serving as the VOICE of our community and to deliver services to all those who need them....It is necessary that the community support us so that we can continue to search for a better future. We do not want to return to that era of 1969, when there were no services for the Hispanic community. We want to clear the way for our children, so that they do not have to go the same path that we have in this city, in those past years of discrimination and anguish. We shall be thinking of improving every day, for the good of our community.

This is a good summary of what we have done to this date. Many people have been involved to make this reality possible, many have worked hard in search of a better future, and many have served the Hispanic community, without pay.

That the President of the Board dwelled upon the need for the continued existence of the Concilio suggests that he had had a premonition of what the second (Jayuyana) Director would eventually attempt. Realizing that she did not have the support of the Board, nor the community, she decided to abolish Concilio. She had convinced
the CEOC Board that they were wasting their money (they were apparently not hard to convince), and that they should just cut off the funds and watch it die. The Concilio Board was in an extremely difficult position. Though they did not control their own funds, and these funds were but a pittance, CEOC nevertheless subjected them to the same kind of program evaluation as they used on other more autonomous and affluent programs. The Board, however, managed to concentrate their attention long enough to prevent Concilio's demise. Then they set about to fire the second Director, not on the grounds that she had tried to abolish the agency, for CEOC had been involved in that attempt too, and it was CEOC that had to permit her dismissal. On the grounds of her administrative deficiencies, however, after a long struggle, they finally succeeded in firing her. And although one could hear Jayuyano grumblings on the sidewalks and in the bars --"You haven't changed, anyhow: you hire a Jayuya, then you get rid of her"--there was no real protest over her departure.

The third Executive Director was hired in May, 1971, and she continued to serve until June 1975. She was an Anglo, one of the Spanish-speaking social workers hired by the Department of Welfare in August 1969 at the behest of the Spanish Council. The Board that hired her was more or less the same Board that had fought the first Director for merely hiring an Anglo secretary in 1969. This later decision was a measure of their frustration in dealing with the disunity among the Puerto Ricans. The Coameno first Director had gone down in infamy; the second Jayuyana Director had tried to destroy the Council. They hoped an outsider would at least bring peace and services.
That the Board had hired an Anglo to run the Concilio provoked more negative comment from the Anglo city officials than from the Hispano community itself, although it would be an exaggeration to say that the Hispanos were unconcerned. But the Anglos continued to make remarks to the effect of how could this woman represent the community, and occasionally they just refused to deal with her at all. Although this attitude on their part did cost the Concilio some benefits, it had another side-effect that the Board came to appreciate. That is, with both the first and second Directors, the Board had extreme difficulty in persuading the Anglo officials that they, and not their employee, over whom they had somewhat less than full control, represented the Hispano community of Cambridge. They were that community's elected representatives, and even though there were serious shortcomings with regard to their ability to represent the Jayuyano constituency, they did truly represent the majority of the Hispano population. They had been hurt and angry when their policies had been ignored in the past, in favor of those of their employee, the Director. Now that the Anglo officials felt constrained in their dealings with the Director, and thus forced to deal with the Board, they were able to see the silver lining in this cloud.

Complaints that issued from the Hispano community had as much to do with the fact that the third Director was a social worker as they did with the undeniable fact that she was Anglo. They were afraid that she would operate as a welfare worker, that she would know all their business, and that she would make unannounced visits
to their homes. The Director, however, was sensitive to this problem and did her best to overcome it in discussions with the people, and she did eventually succeed in persuading them that they were in no danger.

And there was the usual crescendo of disparagement from the sidewalks and the bars, marking Jayuyano unhappiness that they had not been consulted about her hiring. This too eventually faded, and the third Anglo Director became a second-choice mediator between the dissatisfied Jayuyanos and the Coameno-controlled Board. (The Jayuyanos' first choice was Father Sheehan, the Spanish-speaking priest of Irish extraction at St. Mary's, a phenomenon that will be discussed in a subsequent chapter dealing with the role of the Church.)

It was also during the years 1971 and 1972, in the early days of the Anglo third Executive Director, that the Board attempted to broaden its base and improve its image by appointing an additional four persons to the body, thus enlarging it to 13 members. They made a concerted effort to appoint people who were not from the municipality of Coamo. They did not succeed, however, in appointing persons from the municipality of Jayuya. Instead the appointees turned out to be professional people from other Latin American countries, some of whom were serving the Governor of Massachusetts in various capacities related to the fact that they were Hispanos. This attempt did not evoke any response, positive or negative, from the Jayuyanos.

In 1973 elections were held to form a new Board of Directors, the first such elections since 1969. Applications for candidacy were
mailed to everyone on the Concilio's client list, and they were distributed at all the Hispano businesses in the area, as well as handed out at the Concilio. No Jayuyano filled out such a form and asked to run, and the Board elected in 1973 was essentially the same as that elected in 1969, Coameno-dominated. Nor did the elections of 1974 and 1975 change the composition of the Board significantly or add any Jayuyanos, since none chose to run.

In 1974, with the advent of the state-funded CETA program (in which CETA would pay an individual's salary and assign him to work at a non-profit agency), the Concilio, through the efforts of the Anglo third Director, acquired a Jayuya employee. Her presence at Concilio provoked an angry response from the Board, not because the woman was a Jayuya, but because of her reputation among Hispanos, regardless of their place of origin. This woman was not liked, and the reasons had little to do with the fact that she was from Jayuya. Thus, as an individual, she was a bad choice if the purpose of hiring her was to overcome the Jayuyano-Coameno division. The Jayuyanos were not enthusiastic about her presence, and the fact that the Board felt compelled to object to her presence meant that they were forced to add fuel to the fire of discontent that continually burned among the Jayuyanos. That the Executive Director was an Anglo, and thus not sensitive to the undercurrents of opinion in the community, meant that the Concilio became a victim of its own Director's tokenism. Once more, they suffered from the ignorance of the outsider, and although they refrained from forcing the dismissal of this employee, mainly because she was a Jayuyana, she resigned after a few
months, of her own volition.

In 1975 the President of the Board, a man who had served from its very formation, stepped down, and his half-brother was elected President. The new President attempted to broaden the Board's composition by appointing a Jayuyano to the body. The Jayuyano was a friend of his from Somerville, an early arrival in Cambridge who had married an Anglo woman. An obviously adventurous and brave soul, he insisted on playing on the Coameno-controlled softball team in Cambridge, even though he was subject to much abuse both from the team and the fans. Having thus proved his talents for putting up with the Coamenos at their worst, the second President thought that he might survive as a Board member. He did not. He resigned after two months when he found out that there was little that he could do for Somerville that the Coameno-controlled Board was not already doing, and that they did not listen to him, anyway.

Under the Anglo third Director, the Concilio did manage to rebuild its reputation of responsibility with regard to the delivery of services, and in November 1971 it finally managed to incorporate as an independent agency with full powers over its own budget and the right to raise its own monies. Finally the Board was able to work with its Director without CEOC mediation. Every year new programs were added, new funds found, new lines of communication created between the Concilio and other agencies, and other city programs persuaded to make provisions for the Hispanics. Although the Concilio still was plagued with internal disputes, and the Board was in a position to respond to them, uninhibited by outside forces. The
most serious heritage from the past was the Board's inability to build a staff that could organize the population for political action, for the application of pressure to sensitive points in the City's power structure. The style of the staff lent itself only to indirect and less effective tactics that produced incremental improvements, but did not produce major changes in the balance of power within Cambridge. This meant that the staff's time was consumed in the delivery of larger and smaller crumbs.

All in all, the Concilio from 1969 to 1975 was a Coameno-dominated institution that went through occasional ineffective spasms of concern for sharing this control with non-Coameno Hispanics, including the Jayuyanos, but that such efforts with regard to the Jayuyanos were ineffective. When the Jayuyanos complained that Concilio is controlled by Coamenos, and that they have no role in the decision making, they are right. And when they complain that they are not invited to all its functions and special events, they are usually right.

But it must also be said that the Jayuyanos have never made a concerted effort to participate on this Board, much less challenge it, and that it has always been due to Coameno initiatives that they have been included on its staff or appointed to its Board. One might even add that the war at Central Square was indirectly a Coameno initiative, since two Coameno members of the Board had requested their presence that day, and had even suggested that they come in force. Even when the Jayuyano Director was at the Concilio, or even when there was a CETA employee from Jayuya at the office, the
Jayuyano population did not respond, and they did not support these people. And they did not want to use the services of Concilio; they came as a last resort. The Coamenos have mishandled this situation, but it is not entirely their fault that the Jayuyanos have not shared equally in the power of Concilio, or in the benefits that it has delivered. Nor should one conclude from the fact that Concilio did not succeed in including many Jayuyanos in their activities and on their Board, that they did not try. In a later section on the Church, it will be shown that Father Sheehan, too, was unsuccessful in his attempts to elicit Jayuyano participation in various Church activities, and no one has ever impugned his motives just because he also failed.

After Concilio was formed, its political, recreational, and service-delivering predecessors, the Hispano clubs, changed. As Concilio took over more and more of their political and service functions, they gradually evolved into purely recreational, profit-making organizations. Their management was no longer by a Board of Directors, but by two or three partners. Sometimes during this process they were simply owned by one person. The volunteers were replaced by salaried managers. One obvious indicator of the change was that the women no longer frequented the clubs. Their attention now centered on Concilio and the Church.

Thus, starting in June 1969, the clubs began their gradual retreat out of the political arena, a process that was complete by 1971, when Concilio finally incorporated. They remained, however, a locus of Jayuyano-Coameno tension, and the clubs continued to open and
close, due to the costs of repairing their battle sites. The first club, The Latin American Sports Club, was forced to close in 1970 after an outsider came in one night and shot a man. Not one club was open throughout the entire period from 1970 to 1975. And eventually these fights led to the complete exclusion of Jayuyanos from the clubs, for all of them were owned by Coamenos.

In an effort to overcome the increasing separation of Jayuyanos and Coamenos, one of Concilio's Board members opened a new club in 1972, the Cartucho Club. He went out of his way to include the Jayuyanos, but it did not work. The club closed in 1973. The following is the history of this effort in his own words.

The last club that I open the Jayuyanos were allowed to participate. That was my mistake. Some of them started trouble and the last thing they do was to wreck the place apart. One night they came and they started to fight with some of the boys. I ask them to get out. Then they want to fight with me. So the boys put them out and one of them (a Jayuyano) had a cut over his eye. That same night, they waited until I closed and then they break the place by throwing bricks through the windows. So I closed the club. Today in Cambridge, you don't see clubs like before and to some extent it is better. We have two clubs today, one in Washington Street and the other one in Columbia Terrace. The one in Washington Street is in the basement of a house, so if the owner doesn't want to let me or you to go in, he doesn't have to open the door. The same in the Terrace. This is how we have been able to control these people. They know this now and they don't come around. Second, this way we let in whoever we please.

Concilio has thus limped along on its functioning one Coameno leg. The VOICE that the first President of the Board referred to has been heard, but it has not evoked a substantial official response, at least not the kind of response that the Board had hoped to elicit. The situation is discouraging, for everywhere the Jayuyano looks in Cambridge, he sees the Coamenos in control: in the clubs, at Concilio,
at the Church, in the athletic association, or at the Hispano housing project CAST. And what is even more distressing, the Board of Directors of Concilio has become an interlocking directorate for all these centers, since the activists in each of the above areas, not to mention the newly created experts on housing and employment, belong to Concilio's Board, or have close connections with it. The Jayuyano's cultural heritage has not encouraged him to participate and certainly does not encourage him to try to join, to break into such a network of Coameno control. The dismal details of this regional division as it has manifested itself in housing, employment, and at the Church follow.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE

PART THREE. THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS

A. The 1970 Census.

How many Spanish-speaking persons there are in Cambridge, and the relevant characteristics of this population (location, employment, income, education, and so forth) are not matters of idle curiosity. Nor is the desire to accurately count the population merely an instance of a group trying to build up its own image, either for its own ego gratification or to impress city officials or candidates for public office. These numbers matter. Federal, state, and local programs base the size of their programs in a given area upon such numbers, and if a target group is undercounted it is very likely to be underserviced. The Model Cities program, the Community Action Program (of which CEOC is the local Cambridge manifestation), and the Revenue-sharing and Community Development Bloc Grants are all federal programs that specifically base the amount of their aid to any given community upon formulas, one variable of which is the number of people to be served. Various hiring programs, especially those involving affirmative action, are also affected by population projections.

Ever since 1969 the question of just how many Hispanics live in Cambridge has been a matter of contention. When the community picketed CEOC that spring and when they went to the City Manager in August, Hispano leaders claimed that there were 5,000 Hispanics in Cambridge, a figure that few non-Hispanos believed. And then came the results of the 1970 Census that declared the Hispanic population
to be 1,954 persons. That the city officials, especially the City Manager remember this dispute is clear from the interviews of 1976. In his interview the City Manager twice mentioned that "although you were exaggerating the numbers," he nevertheless thought that the requests were legitimate. The author does not believe that 5,000 was an exaggeration in 1969; it was an estimate, an educated guess, and he would still maintain that even if it was by no means a systematically calculated figure, it was still the best estimate available.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate that the Spanish-speaking population of Cambridge was grossly undercounted in the 1970 Census, and that the Brown Report of 1973, in spite of its many shortcomings, is the best information available regarding the size and characteristics of this population.

That the leaders of the Spanish-speaking community in Cambridge insist that their community is not properly counted should come as no surprise to anyone who is familiar with the controversies surrounding official census figures. Very few would contest the fact that minority groups in general are undercounted. This was first suggested in 1955 by Ansley J. Coale, and yet, in the 1970 edition of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot*, the authors lament, "it was not until our book was [first] published [in 1963], amazingly enough, that this became general knowledge among social scientists, aside from some specialists in demography." Glazer and Moynihan also pointed out that since the Negro male population in New York City was seriously undercounted, the degree of economic distress in the ghetto was underestimated, and programs
designed to ameliorate these conditions were insufficient.

The impact that such knowledge has had, however, seems to be limited to the insertion of disclaimers into the census reports. In 1973, for example, the Planning and Development Department of the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, published a report on the 1970 census, entitled *Social Characteristics, Cambridge, 1970*. In this report they explain that "...the exact magnitude [of the U.S. population] is not known, but it is estimated that in 1960 the census missed about 5.7 million people, or 3 percent of the country's population. The undercount was more severe for certain groups within the population...[A second instance] where census counting is probably inaccurate is among the sizeable community of recent immigrants. Because of their real or imagined fears of illegal status in this country, language problems in understanding and filling out the census mail-back forms, and the high frequency of address changes, many recent immigrants have not been counted. Moreover, city surveys show that this group is a rapidly growing one, and has undoubtedly increased significantly in size in the three years between the census and the date of this publication" [*Social Characteristics*, p. 9].

They go on to explain that caution should be used whenever planning is based upon such figures, especially estimates of the number of foreign-born or foreign stock (the children of the foreign-born). Furthermore, because the census is really an estimate based upon sample interviews, there can be technical errors of five to ten percent or more. "In general, the smaller number in the sample, the larger possible error" [*Summary Statistics*, p. 2].
Based upon such observations, one might expect that the undercount of Spanish-speaking persons is greater than the undercount of Blacks that Glazer and Moynihan pointed out. Like the Blacks, they are often found in ghettos and many of the most destitute males are difficult to locate due, in part, to the nature of our welfare laws. In addition, the Spanish-speaking, unlike the Blacks, fall into a second undercounted category, the immigrant, and into a third, the non-English-speaking population. Since the 1970 questionnaires were mailed out, rather than delivered in person during the initial stage of the process, and since none of the forms were translated into Spanish, and since none of the census workers who did the follow-up on non-returned questionnaires spoke Spanish, this single factor, that the population under investigation here did not necessarily read or speak English, would alone account for a gross undercount. In addition, the warning that the mere mechanics of a census can lead to an undercount (for example, the size of the sample) is also relevant since the number of Spanish-speaking persons interviewed in Cambridge in 1970 was only 122.

But the above explanations of why the number of Spanish-speaking persons has been minimized is not the end of the story. An additional problem has been the manner in which the data have been analyzed and presented by the Department of Planning and Development of the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, a department that resides within City Hall. The people of this department were the ones who in 1972 released the information that the Spanish-speaking population of Cambridge equaled 1,954 individuals, of whom 522 were Puerto Rican.
Why they happened to choose these numbers has become something of a mystery.

For our purposes here the most relevant publication of the Department is the August 1972 1970 Census Summary Statistics for Cambridge, Massachusetts (hereafter, Summary Statistics). On page 13 the planners address themselves to the question of population composition, and there the confusion begins. Under the heading "Population Totals" they list the breakdown of the population, derived, one supposes, from the answers elicited from a section entitled "Color or Race" on the mail-in questionnaire. The composition, as listed, was as follows: White (91,794), Black (6,636), Other Races (1,987), and Spanish-American (1,954). Leaving aside the question of why what is essentially a cultural identification is here mixed in with "racial" categories, one faces the dilemma of why in this publication "Spanish-American" has been added, when it was not one of the responses in the questionnaire. (One could choose from White, Negro or Black, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, or Other. After "Other" were instructions to write in the "race.") Perhaps 1,954 persons spontaneously and unprompted wrote in Spanish-American, and thus the planners counted up a total Spanish-speaking population of 1,954 persons, a number which constituted less than 2 percent of the total population.

Although in a 1976 interview with the author the planners were unable to explain how the number 1,954 was derived, it is quite clear that it was not computed in the manner described in Department
publications as the usual method by which such figures are calculated. If they had done as they said they had done, they would have taken the total number of Spanish-speaking within the sample, 122, and multiplied it by the set rate of persons per household, 4, and then multiplied that product by 5, since the sample was stated to be twenty percent of the total number of Spanish-speaking persons counted. If one does these calculations, one comes up with the number 2,440, which is considerably larger than 1,954.

To further confuse the issue the authors used several different terms to refer to the same population (Spanish language, Spanish-speaking, Spanish indicators, and the "5 Spanish Categories"), and, interestingly enough, they produced a figure of 2,352 people of Spanish origin or descent [Summary Statistics, p. 13]. Obviously these people are native speakers of Spanish, they are Hispanos, and so one wonders why they decided that the Spanish language population was only 1,954. When asked this question, they answered that they were unsure.

Furthermore, the Department of Planning and Development eliminated a possibly significant measure of the Spanish-speaking, the question of origin. Although the 1970 questionnaire asked what country one's mother and father were born in, and in each case it clearly instructed that the reply should be, "Name of foreign country; or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.," the information that appears in the Summary Statistic [p. 14] completely obscures the nature of the replies. With the exception of track summaries, it merely divides the population into two categories, "Native Population" and "Foreign Born,"
and Native Population includes those people born "in the United States, Puerto Rico, or a possession of the United States."

Actually, one can at least suggest where the number 1,954 came from. It would appear that it is the sum of all those people listed in the tract summaries as Spanish-speaking. That is, the total of all those listed in the various summaries also comes to 1,954. And, one also finds that if one adds up all those persons listed in the tract summaries as "Other American," one arrives at a figure of 2,352, which is identical to the number of persons listed as members of the "5 Spanish Categories."

Although "Other Americans" was not defined in the glossaries, the Department census-takers say that it means those people from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America, or to put it simply, it means Hispanos. Even this number is not complete since the number of "Other Americans" in a given tract was listed only if that group constituted one of the three largest categories of "Country of Origin of Foreign Stock." The point of leading the reader through a simplified description of the many contortions that one must go through when attempting to use such publications is only to demonstrate that the Department chose the smallest of several possible numbers (numbers which appear in their own publications) when they proclaimed 1,954 to be the number of Hispanos in Cambridge.

Not only were the numbers grossly inaccurate, but so in turn were the figures which purported to describe the characteristics of this population. What the 1970 census did manage to do well was to count the Spanish-speaking student population of Cambridge, those
persons, most often graduate students, who were attending MIT and Harvard. These students could read and write English, and they filled out their mail-back forms. As a result, the census maintains that about one-third of the total Spanish-speaking population was enrolled in school (663 out of 1,954), and that about half of those people between the ages of 3 and 34 who were attending school were attending a private university (330 out of 663) [Summary Statistics, pp. 23-24]. Furthermore, the census proclaims that 37.6 percent of all Spanish-speaking males in Cambridge have completed at least five years of university work, whereas the percentage of all male residents of Cambridge is only 29 percent [Ibid, p. 25]. Since there is no male-female breakdown on these figures for the Boston area as a whole, one must lump the males and females together in order to compare these figures with a larger and more representative urban population. This has the effect of diluting the Spanish-speaking figure, since the number of females who have completed more than five years of college work is only 14.6 percent. One also has to compare those people who have completed four years instead of five. Even so, one comes up with the patently absurd result that the number of Spanish-speaking who have completed four years of college approaches the point of being 4 times greater than that for the whole Boston area, and even twice as large as the figure for all of Cambridge, a high-density area for the educated.

These students, needless to say, are not representative of the much larger non-student Spanish-speaking population of Cambridge. The data concerning their origin, standard of living, income, or
almost any characteristic that one could choose to examine, would not accurately describe the majority of this population. For example, consider the question of just where this population lives. The census states that it was in Tract 3534 (Riverside, or Area 7) that one could have found the neighborhood with the highest percentage of Spanish-speaking, 11.7 percent, and that the area with the largest number (258) of Spanish-speaking, as opposed to the largest percentage, was Tract 3531 (or Area 2) [Social Characteristics, p. 29]. The former has a rather large student population, and it had been, prior to 1970, a center of Coamenos concentration. However, by 1970 it was quite observable to anyone who cared to walk down the streets of Cambridge that Area 7 was no longer the area with the highest concentration of Spanish-speaking, that many of the Coamenos had moved to form a larger and denser concentration in Areas 3 and 4, the Model Cities Neighborhood. The latter, Tract 3531, encompasses MIT student housing. Although this information might be useful if one wanted to commend MIT's recruiters of the Spanish-speaking throughout the world for the fine job that they seem to be doing, it is of no use to those persons concerned about the problems of the ordinary, hard-working, but poor immigrant.

This problem of grossly undercounting and otherwise misrepresenting the Hispano population is not just a problem of Cambridge. It is nationwide. Several national organizations, including La Raza (an organization of Chicanos) and the President's Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for the Spanish-speaking, not to mention local organizations, such as the Greater Boston Hispanic Advocacy Agency
and the Puerto Rican Forum, have rejected the national census as an accurate measure of this population, and have condemned the consequent erroneous projections based upon it. In spite of such warnings, however, planners do tend to use this material, since they claim that they have nothing else upon which to base their projections. In Cambridge, officials from seven agencies indicated that they use the 1970 Census, although two added that they also use Concilio-produced materials and five indicated that they do use their own records. (The latter practice, while superior to use of the 1970 Census, could, in some cases, merely serve to reinforce a pattern of under-servicing Hispanos.)

B. The Brown Study.

It was in June, 1972, shortly after an announcement by the Department of Planning and Development that there were only 1,954 Spanish-speaking persons in Cambridge, that Dr. Susan Brown, an anthropologist, came to the Boston area in search of a Spanish-speaking population to study. She was the recipient of a post-doctoral fellowship from the Center of Urban Ethnography of the University of Pennsylvania; that is, she brought the funds for such a study with her. At that moment in time, the Concilio was still smarting from the announcement that the Spanish-speaking population was so small, and indeed, their very existence was being threatened. Who was going to fund a program for 1,954 people? The need for documented proof of the size of the Spanish-speaking population, and its
conditions, was desperate. The Concilio needed something to prove that the 1970 census was inaccurate, since its data was official and assumed to be credible by all agencies and foundations that might serve the population. Dr. Brown was welcomed with open arms at the Concilio, and she agreed to do her study in Cambridge.¹

Although Dr. Brown had a fellowship to do such a study, the funds were not unlimited. Neither did the Concilio have any funds. For this reason, and because she and the Concilio felt it would lend increased credibility to the study, they decided to secure additional money and services from outside funding sources and to involve the Department of Planning and Development as much as possible. As a result, funding ($500) and consultant services were given by Harvard University, MIT donated money ($500) and computer time, and the Department of Planning and Development offered consultant time and the final printing of 3,000 copies of the report.

A second and harder decision, imposed by the limited nature of the funds, was the choice between making an all-out effort to count every Spanish-speaking person in Cambridge or to concentrate on eliciting the characteristics of that population, at the expense of counting. The latter would mean accepting a sample population, but examining it in depth. It was felt both by Dr. Brown and by the third Executive Director of the Concilio that due to the scattering of the population throughout eastern and northern Cambridge, its mobility, and the staff and funding limitations, an all-out effort

¹Much of the information in this section comes from an interview with the third Director of the Concilio, and from the Brown Report itself.
to count was not feasible. It was also felt that in-depth information about the problems and desires of the Spanish-speaking would do more to improve the services offered by Concilio than a purely numerical study, and it would also help put pressure on agencies designed to serve communities with problems. Furthermore, the in-depth study was much more feasible, given the limitations of staff and money.

Thus it was decided to develop a Master List of all Spanish-speaking households in Cambridge, in so far as that was possible, and then to select a sample from that Master List which would be interviewed in depth. By acquiring names and addresses from the Police Department, the Welfare Department, Cambridge City Hospital, and the Concilio client list, some 900 households were located, and a random sample of 137 households containing 593 persons were interviewed. The study began in the summer of 1972 and lasted eight months [Susan E. Brown, *The Hispano Population of Cambridge: A Research Report*, 1973, pp. 3 and ii].

The Brown Report is most interesting in terms of the manner in which it totally discredits the results of the 1970 census. For example, she managed to locate 900 households, almost half as many households as the census counted people. Furthermore, Dr. Brown intentionally excluded all the Spanish-speaking university student households from her Master List (it being unlikely that they would show up on the records of the Police Department, Welfare Department, Concilio client list, or Cambridge City Hospital Records, anyway), and as pointed out in the previous section, many of those counted
among the 1,954 of the 1970 census had been university students.
In the end, Dr. Brown projected a total Spanish-speaking population in Cambridge of 4,500 persons, and one should remember that the primary purpose for which the study was designed was to elicit characteristics, not numbers.

The Brown Report also makes completely clear that the population most sampled by the 1970 Census was the university student population. To give just a few examples, the 1970 Census declared that only 36 percent of Hispanos were blue-collar workers, whereas the Brown Report demonstrates that the percentage is more like 84 percent. College graduates do not constitute 37.6 percent of the population, but less than 1 percent. The unemployment rate is not 7.0 percent, but more than twice that, 14.5 percent [Brown, pp. 38, 34, 35, 25. Also see Appendix for charts comparing 1970 Census with Brown Report].

Dr. Brown also managed to successfully locate the major concentration of Spanish-speaking within the Model Cities Neighborhood (roughly Areas 3 and 4). She estimated that 30 percent of the estimated total population of 4,500 persons lived within Tracts 3523 through 3528, those located completely within this neighborhood, and she further estimated that if one included Tracts 3530 and 3531, the percentage of this population would exceed 40 [Brown, p. 7]. The exact number of households from these tracts that appeared on the Master List was 501, out of a total on the Master List of some 900 households. She also found 61 families in Tract 3533 (Cambridgeport,
or Area 6) and 54 in Tract 3534, which had produced the highest percentage of Spanish-speaking in the 1970 Census.

Of equal importance was the fact that the Brown Report, unlike the publications of the Department of Planning and Development, broke down the Spanish-speaking population both by country of origin and by municipality of origin within Puerto Rico. The results showed that Puerto Ricans constituted 64 percent of the Cambridge Spanish-speaking, that the Cubans were the second largest group (12 percent), and that the Colombians and Dominicans were the third and fourth, each of them with 4 percent. No other single country yielded more than 2 percent, although another fourteen countries were represented [see Table 8 of the Brown Report].

With regard to the municipality of birth among the Puerto Ricans, it was found that in 1972 and early 1973 the largest single group, the Coamenos, constituted 40 percent of the Puerto Rican population. Those from Jayuya were second, making up 22 percent, and those from Ponce were third, constituting 8 percent. After Orocovis (5 percent) one drops off to San Juan, from which only 3 percent of the Cambridge Spanish-speaking population had come. It is interesting to note that the first four municipalities listed above are within Senatorial District VI, the Ponce District, and thus one could say that 75 percent of this population in Cambridge comes from one Senatorial District in Puerto Rico (and the island has eight all together [Brown, p. 21]).

Other exceedingly important facts that the Brown Study elicited were that 95 percent of the Spanish-speaking in Cambridge had arrived
within the last five years (since 1968), and that 63 percent of the population had come to Cambridge straight from their homes on the island, with no intermediate destination [Ibid, p. 16]. Unfortunately, the latter statistic is not broken down between Jayuyanos and Coamenos, and therefore it is impossible to say how many Jayuyanos have arrived in Cambridge straight from the highest mountains of Jíbaro Puerto Rico. However, from personal observation, this author believes that most of them have come directly to Cambridge, and this fact has had major implications with regard to their cultural predispositions, and thus their ability, or rather inability, to adapt successfully to the Cambridge scene or to work with the Coamenos. (Since they come from an urban, more conventionally politicized environment, it is not as crucial that Coamenos might arrive here directly from the island.)

The Brown study was thus a life-saver, both for the Concilio and for the community generally. It received the support and thus the endorsement of two major universities, Model Cities, and Cambridge City Hall, and it demonstrated that there was a sizable population in need of services. These needs became more clearly defined, and defined in ways that the traditional agencies could understand. Funding possibilities for the Concilio improved, and even though it then found itself competing with the traditional agencies for monies with which to service the Spanish-speaking (since having had the group pointed out to them they used it to try to bolster up their own increasingly scarce funds), the end result was that the Spanish-speaking did receive more services, from whatever source, public or
private. The prestige of the Concilio and its visibility also increased, since it had demonstrated a commendable capacity in coordinating such an effort from the beginning stages of its development and staffing through the final publication of the results.

That the Brown Report succeeded in finding the non-student Spanish-speaking population, and of eliciting valuable information about it, should have been a lesson to the Department of Planning and Development about how to go about measuring such populations and their characteristics. One lesson that they might have learned was that the success of the study was very much related to the fact that the researcher made extensive use of the personnel and resources of the Concilio. Among other things, she consulted with the Concilio about the design of the questionnaire, the hiring of Spanish-speaking interviewers, and she consulted extensively with Concilio personnel in the latter stages of analysis. As a result, given the limitations of time and money, the Brown Report was a valid and useful document. And yet, officials from only two agencies in Cambridge said that they used the Brown Report in their program planning. The other agencies do have this report; indeed, one official read from it at his interview. Whenever he was asked a question about the Hispano community, he would look up the appropriate page and read the answer, which was not what he was supposed to do.

At the same time one should point out that the existence of the Brown Report, the only source of reasonably accurate information about the Hispano population, was an accident: Dr. Susan Brown happened to come to Cambridge looking for a population to study.
Its existence is not at all related to any effort on the part of the responsible city officials, or Model Cities, or CEOC. They contributed, insofar as they did contribute, only when asked, and their responses were very much token responses. And only a few agencies have seen fit to use this information, even after it had been produced by someone else.

Two and one-half years after the Brown Report was printed by the Department of Planning and Development, they carried out their 1975 Mid-Decade Census, the results of which have not yet been reported.

Although it is too early to evaluate the accuracy with which it will reflect the Spanish population, the author is not optimistic. The Department of Planning and Development rejected an offer of help from the Concilio, and it hired only one Spanish-speaking person to participate in the count, an Hispano who had lived in Cambridge only one year. This one Hispano employee was not a permanent employee. He was hired through the CETA program and was used only during the initial stages of the census, and was not consulted during the later stages of compilation and evaluation. (This information is based on an interview with this employee.) Thus the community is still waiting to see if it has been counted, officially.
PART FOUR: EMPLOYMENT

A. The Hispano Community.

Any discussion of employment among the Hispano population of Cambridge must begin with the generalization that the overwhelming majority is employed, and employed in blue-collar jobs, and that very few of them earn enough money that they can avoid worrying about how they are going to pay their bills. Even within those limits there are great variations in living standards and types of employment among Hispanics, and one great divide is that between the Coameno and the Jayuyano.

The publications of the City of Cambridge's Department of Planning and Development indicate that from 1960 to 1970 the blue-collar portion of the city's labor force declined from 13,496 persons to only 9,642 persons. They also report that those persons engaged in manufacturing declined from 12,058 to 8,021. From these figures one might conclude that the blue-collar work force of the city had been seriously depleted in the last ten years; that almost one-third of it had suddenly exited the city. Perhaps, or perhaps the City of Cambridge could not count those workers who had left (mostly Irish and some Black), and did not count their replacements, because their replacements were not native speakers of English. From the 1970 census, however, this idea would never occur to anyone, since it reports that 64% of the Hispano population hold white-collar jobs.  

---

1Social Characteristics, p. 92-95.
The Brown Report (1972-73), however, a report carried out not by the City's planners, but by an anthropologist who picked Cambridge as the site of her research, found that the employment pattern among the Hispanos was exactly opposite to what the census had shown. Instead of being a white-collar force, the Hispanos turn out to be a blue-collar force; indeed, 84 percent of them reported jobs classified "blue-collar." Among the white-collar force, 7 percent were secretaries (a position that, in spite of what it deserves, does not command the salary or respect that other jobs in that category do), and thus if one subtracts the secretaries from the white-collar force, one finds that not 65 percent of the Hispanos are white-collar, but a mere 9 percent. Among those 84 percent classified as blue-collar, 52 percent said that they worked in factories, 4 percent described themselves as laborers, and the rest (none constituting more than 4 percent) were carpenters, seamstresses, mechanics, cooks, painters, laundry workers, or domestics [Brown, pp. 39-40].

And, one might add, this working force is not well paid. Counting only those households that have at least one breadwinner, only 17 percent brought home an income, after taxes, of more than $200.00 per week, or $10,400 per year. Furthermore, if one considers that the average American household in 1973 reported (in a Gallup poll) that they required $149.00 per week just to make ends meet, just to pay bills, and if one considers that prices on the eastern coast of the United States, and especially in highly inflated Cambridge, would make that average figure considerably higher, then one comes to the conclusion that approximately 80 percent of Hispano households...
are worrying about how they are going to keep a roof over their heads and food on the table, even when the head of household has a job.¹

That this is not the condition of Cambridge residents in general is apparent from a few comparisons. Fully half of all Cambridge households had an income of $9,815, which is just a few dollars a week less than what this small 17 percent of Hispanos had. The median household income for the total Hispano population, on the other hand, was a mere $5,616 per year, or $108 per week, only 58 percent of what half the households of Cambridge brought home. Furthermore, the average size of household in Cambridge generally was 2.5, whereas the average Hispano household was 3.9 persons [Brown, p. 25], and thus the Hispano households were feeding and sheltering 36 percent more people on 58 percent less money.

Hispanos come here to work and they usually succeed in finding something. More than 70 percent of all male Hispanos, 16 years of age or older, in Cambridge were employed in 1972, and if one eliminates the high school and college age population, and looks only at those who are 22 to 24 years old, one finds that a remarkable 94.7 percent of them were employed. The figure for the group 25 to 34 years of age was 85.5 percent, and for those aged 35 to 44, it was 70.6 percent. And, in addition to the men, almost 40 percent of the

¹Brown, p. 46, and George Gallup, "Americans Say Family of Four Needs $177 a Week to Get by," The Boston Globe, February 29, 1976, p. 58. The figure in the headline refers to 1976, but the article also gives the figure for 1973. The question asked was, "What is the smallest amount of money a family of four needs each week to get along in this community?"
women work. Only 11 percent of the total Hispano population aged 16 or over had never held a job in Cambridge. Aside from those still in high school, most of that 11 percent were probably the wives of employed husbands, wives who chose to stay home to care for small children. And, it would appear that once they get a job, they keep it, since 47 percent of the working population had only held one job in the entire time that they had been in Cambridge. Only 10 percent of the population that had had jobs had had more than four since their arrival in the city [Brown, pp. 40-41].

In spite of the fact that they come to Cambridge to work, and that they obviously accept jobs that do not pay well, many Hispanics do have extreme difficulties in finding work. In 1974 the Division of Employment Security indicated that in Boston, for example, the Hispanics have the highest rate of unemployment of any group in the city, at least 15.9 percent. (The rate for Blacks was 12 percent, for Chinese, 7.6 percent, and for whites, 7.4 percent["Hispanic Jobless rate 61% or 15.9 %," Boston Globe, March 5, 1974, p. 3].) The Brown study found that in Cambridge 19 percent were unemployed, but actively seeking work. If one were to adjust this figure to comply with Department of Labor unemployment criteria, it would probably produce a rate of about 14.5 percent among Hispanics. (The unemployment figure for the general population of Cambridge is only 4.0 percent [Social Characteristics, pp. 83-85].) Of those not working, 36 percent said that they had to stay home to take care of small children, 30 percent said that they were ill, and 11 percent explained that they were simply too old to work. Another 7 percent said that
they were students; 5 percent explained that they were very pregnant. Only 4 percent said that they could not find work, and only an additional four percent said that they could not find work because of a language problem. Two percent said that they had been laid off. That leaves only 1 percent unaccounted for [Brown, p. 38].

Nor is this Hispano immigrant population beating a path to the doorstep of the Department of Welfare. Of the 1,663 households receiving assistance under the category Aid to Families with Dependent Children, only 129 were Hispano. Only 27 families out of 405 receiving General Relief and only 1 percent of those receiving old age assistance were Hispano [Brown, p. 44]. These percentages are more or less the same as the percentage of Hispanics in the relevant age group in the general population. Indeed, the figures gathered in the Brown study indicate that, based on the income and employment data, there were many Hispano households in Cambridge who were eligible for assistance but who were not receiving it. That these families did not want to ask for help, that they were unwilling even to acknowledge that they could use some assistance is indicated by the fact that 88 percent of the Hispanics interviewed would not admit that they had an economic problem [Brown, p. 52]. Why they would not admit it might be related to their Spanish sense of personal dignity (a quality that suffers as much from the Department of Welfare's application process as it does from the need itself); it certainly was not related to their true economic situation since over 80 percent of that population, by the standards of the average American as revealed in the Gallup poll, did not bring home "the
smallest amount of money a family of four needs each week to get along in this community" [Gallup, Boston Globe, February 29, 1976, p. 58].

Furthermore, most of those Hispanics receiving assistance from the Department of Welfare were women with children, but no spouse. Not even all of those spouseless mothers resorted to welfare, since the 129 AFDC families identified by the Welfare Department as Hispanics (or 16 percent of the households on the master list of the Brown study) does not constitute but about 36 percent of those households headed by females (or 25 percent of the total number of Hispano households). That these women tend to return to the work force once their children are school age is suggested by the breakdown on working women. Among those aged 20 to 21, 50 percent work, whereas the percentage of those working falls to 34.6 percent for those women 22 to 24. However, the percentage of women working then climbs back rapidly to 50 percent among those aged 25 to 34 [Brown, p. 36]. That those who chose to stay home with their children were probably the relatively unskilled is indicated by a simple mathematical calculation. The median weekly income of employed Hispano women is $70.00 [Brown, p. 47], and a mother with three children could receive approximately $73.00 a week from the Department of Welfare ["Committee Backs Mass Bill to Foot $8m OEO Cost," Boston Globe, March 21, 1973; p. 3]. They are not lazy; they either cannot afford child care, or they do not see the merits of working when they can save money by staying home with their children.
B. Differences between Jayuyanos and Coamenos.

As described in the earlier section, the process of differentiation between the Coameno and the Jayuyano had already begun to develop before the establishment of Concilio. The more appropriate urban industrial and craft skills and the higher level of education that the Coameno had brought with him began to matter once he also had learned the English language, and slowly but surely the Coamenos left the Jayuyanos behind in the low-paid jobs. This shift in the skill level of the jobs that Coamenos could obtain also produced a change in companies. The electronics industry emerged as the major employer of Coamenos in Cambridge, as workers moved to the plants of the Electronics Corporation of America, Honeywell, Shintron, and the Advent Company [Interview, (Hispano) CEOC employment specialist].

Furthermore, unlike the Jayuyano, the Coameno was able to establish a reputation as a capable and ambitious employee, and some of them thus began to move into positions of responsibility, as inspectors or supervisors. (This was no doubt related to the fact that Coamenos often were employed in jobs that did not begin to use their skills to capacity, and compared to the Anglos working the same jobs, they were much more educated. It was only language [and possibly Anglo prejudice] that was holding them back. To give just one example of this, a man who had worked as an accountant in Coamo became an ordinary factory worker in Cambridge. Over the years, however, he has worked his way up to plant supervisor.) And the Coamenos, because they had built up a reputation for being good workers, were
often asked by their employers to find new employees for openings as they occurred. They then found members of their family or good friends, people over whom they could exercise some sort of control, since they not only assumed responsibility for training them, but also supervised their work habits, so that the new person did not damage their own reputation. If they could not find anyone over whom they could exercise these sorts of controls, they sent home to Coamo for someone else to immigrate, with a job waiting for him.

The Jayuyanos were different, not only because they did not arrive with such marketable skills or education to list on their resumes, but also because of their predilections regarding work. The Jayuyanos are loners when it comes to employment. Even when tilling the fields of Jayuya they did not live or work in villages; rather they tended to find some isolated hollow that they could call their own, and to work alone, subject only to the vagaries of nature. Factory production did not afford them many opportunities to satisfy this desire for independence, and so the Jayuyano tended to settle for second best. If the Anglos cooperated and merely left him alone, which they did without any instructions, then the only real threat to his style was another Puerto Rican. And the Jayuyanos, whether by conscious design or merely due to his lack of contacts, tended to go to plants or factories or other employment sites where there

---

1 Personal observation of the author, who from 1961 to 1969, that is for nine years, worked at numerous jobs (atypically, according to Brown), including several different types of factory work (such as sheet metal worker), truck driving, and mechanic.
were no other Puerto Ricans. If he had a choice, that is what he did. And, for the same reason, he was not anxious to bring in his friends or relatives from Jayuya. Neither did the boss ask him to do this, nor did he volunteer his services. For this reason it is much more difficult to trace the movement of Jayuyanos through the Cambridge factories, but due to the fact that there are relatively few places that hire people without marketable skills, they do, in spite of themselves, occasionally clump in the same companies’ plants. According to the Employment Specialist for CEOC Manpower, those companies with identifiable concentrations of Jayuyanos in the period after 1970 were Deran’s Confectionary, the Cambridge Plating Company, and American Biltrite. (This description of work attitudes is based on the author’s own observations, in so far as he worked in Cambridge and knew many Jayuyanos; and his own impressions have been confirmed by Hispano employment specialists at CEOC.)

Throughout the 1970’s there was continued if not spectacular improvement for both Jayuyanos and Coamenos in terms of the kinds of work that they could get, both in terms of skill level and level of responsibility, and the pay checks that they could thus command. Some of this improvement was due to the natural course of events, that Coamenos learned English, functionally if not elegantly, and that Jayuyanos gained experience and seniority, if not skills. But much of this improvement was also due to the indefatigable efforts of the Spanish Council, and the intense, if erratic, pressure that they put on various federal, state and local agencies in Cambridge. Not only did they try gentle and not so gentle persuasion upon
these agencies, especially those dealing with employment, but they also pressed upon the latter the need for including Hispanos in their programs.

The first agency related to employment that responded, when the weeks long picket line in front of CEOC was still fresh in their minds, was the local office of the state Division of Employment Security (DES). In August 1969, as a result of the meeting in the City Hall Chambers, DES agreed to hire one Hispano Employment aide. When he left them (to work for CEOC's employment office) they replaced him with an Anglo, but Spanish-speaking employment specialist. (There has been no objection to this, because the Anglo in question has served the community well.)

In 1970, after a sit-in first by the working committee of the pre-incorporation Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants' and then by the entire population of CAST (men, women, and children) who thus were able to attract Model Cities' Board of Directors' attention to the fact that they had not been servicing the Hispano population of their designated territory. Model Cities was persuaded to hire one Hispano in their employment program. (The man actually worked out of the Cambridge Learning Center. When the Federal Government abandoned Model Cities, and City Hall took it under its own wing, this employment specialist moved to the employment office of the City of Cambridge. [Based on interviews with those involved.])

It was also due to Concilio's unsolicited help in spotting oversights on the part of Anglo administrators that the DES C-TEP (career training) program of 1971-72 accepted four Hispanos into their program
(two Puerto Ricans and two Cubans), and that the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), a federal program funded by OEO and administered by CEOC, began to accept Hispano applications in 1971. The NYC found summer jobs for high school students, aged 14-18, that would give them money (to help them stay in school during the rest of the year) and experience (to help them find work once they had finished). And since a youth had to come from a family whose income fell below a nationally set maximum in order to be eligible to participate, this program became the one and only that truly addressed itself to the Jayuyano population more than to the Coamenos. Concilio made a concerted effort to enroll Hispanic youth in the program, keeping information forms in its own office, and publishing information about it in its monthly newsletter, and after 1972 it produced a bumper crop of Hispano participants, annually.

At first, for reasons best understood by CEOC, most of these youths were assigned to work at Concilio, which used them as clerical help and recreation workers in the summer programs for younger children. However, because CEOC was not assigning participants to Anglo institutions, Concilio had more help than it could use. Nor could it properly supervise them with its own small staff, and thus it seemed on some days that they were more trouble than they were worth. The Anglo third Director thus spent much energy convincing CEOC that Hispano youth did not necessarily have to work for the Spanish Council, that there might be other places in the city where they could also gain experience, and thus some of the surplus was
negotiated away.¹

In August, 1972, DES finally, after lengthy negotiations, installed a job-bank machine at the Concilio (to read the daily list of openings which come on microfiche cards) and agreed to train one of Concilio's outreach workers as an employment aide. Once he was trained, he went to work for CEOC's employment office, and Concilio was unable to get DES to train another worker. They did manage, however, to persuade DES to supply them on one morning a week with its own Hispano employment aide, and to persuade Model Cities to loan them theirs for the same morning. After the DES Hispano moved to CEOC, and the Model Cities employee was moved to the City's employment office, the Spanish-speaking Anglo (whom DES had hired to replace the Hispano) came to Concilio two days a week. By the end of 1973, the Concilio office service had counseled 400 people, had placed 92 in jobs, and was predicting even larger numbers for 1974. Furthermore, Concilio used its various publications, throughout its history, to publicize specific job openings, various employment counseling services available in CAMbridge, and various special programs that any agency in the city might be operating.

Nevertheless, Concilio has suffered disappointments in this area of great concern. As mentioned above, DES did not follow up its first success by training a second employment specialist from among the Concilio workers, and even though Concilio from 1972 to

¹Information compiled from interviews with Concilio Director, CEOC Employment aide, and from the monthly newsletter of the Concilio.
1975 made numerous grant proposals that included provisions for a full-time employment specialist of their own, they have received their grants, minus the employment specialist. In 1975 Concilio was still operating its employment counseling service only two days a week, with the Anglo (Spanish-speaking) specialist on loan from DES.¹

Although other training programs did exist and were very popular with the general public, the program that Hispanics, especially Coamenos, were most enthusiastic about was CETA (the Comprehensive Employment Training Act), which began in 1974. In Cambridge, CETA came in two parts. The City of Cambridge administered the CETA Public Service Training Jobs, which were jobs for which the city paid the salary (with federal money) while the person worked for some non-profit service-oriented agency. Only due to the fact that it adamantly insisted, Concilio was able to hire three people through this program in 1975: one Spanish-speaking Anglo, one Coameno, and one Jayuyano. (The Jayuyano was the woman referred to in the section on Concilio, the one and only Jayuyano employed through the CETA program.) Exactly how many Hispanics were hired is not known, since the City of Cambridge Employment Office claims that it is unable to provide such statistics. However, in interviews with the various Hispano or Spanish-speaking employment specialists involved, it was

¹Information taken from interviews with the various employment specialists, Concilio documents, including newsletters, grant proposals, and a pamphlet entitled "Concilio Hispano de Cambridge," which on the basis of internal evidence was published in 1974.
possible to determine that the Coamenos were the most numerous group of Hispano participants. The second part of CETA, the CETA I Training Program, was administered by CEOC, and it too provided paid employment and training, although it did not involve non-profit institutions. The emphasis in this program was on the development of employable skills, such as welding and mechanics. It too was popular with Hispanos, especially the Coamenos, and it too was underutilized by Jayuyanos.

Thus by 1975 the Cambridge Hispano community had managed to develop three employment specialists from its own ranks (in 1975 two were employed by CEOC and one by the city). None of these individuals was a Jayuyano; two were Coamenos and one was from Colombia. Again, wherever it mattered, the Coameno had come prepared and had managed to get involved, and the Jayuyano had not. That Jayuyanos did participate in the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the one program with a maximum income limit as an eligibility, suggests that their underutilization of these programs was due not to any lack of interest on their part, but to a failure in program design. In most cases the problem lay in the eligibility requirements, which instead of ensuring the inclusion of the most disadvantaged (as in the NYC), ensured their exclusion. Most programs (like CETA) required more education, skills, and experience than the most disadvantaged can offer.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE

PART FIVE. HOUSING

A. Living Conditions

In May of 1974 at a conference of urban planners held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Professor Hortense Dixon of Texas Southern University "decried the lack of commitment to housing the nation's poor and warned that the urban crisis 'is still alive and kicking. In fact, it is very healthy. It has not died simply because buildings are no longer being burned'" [Boston Globe, May 4, 1974]. That Cambridge is no exception to these remarks is quite clear from the "Issue Papers" produced by the Department of Planning and Development. "Over the last decade, a variety of pressures has affected the condition of the city's privately-owned housing stock. Increasing absentee ownership, declining home ownership, conversions and cutting up of apartments are a few examples" ["Issue Paper No. 2]. Furthermore, "In the late 1960's soaring rents began forcing many either to seek government assistance or to leave Cambridge. While some did leave, others unable to benefit from public programs simply paid more than they could afford. This situation has been amply documented in studies which show the large number of families and elderly paying an excess of 35 percent of their gross income for housing." ["Issue Paper No. 3"].

In the Brown report, housing was listed as a major problem by 32 percent of all Hispano households, and thus it tied with language difficulties for first place among all problems mentioned. In 1970 less than 5 percent of all Hispanics in Cambridge owned their own
homes, and only 6 percent lived in owner-occupied buildings. (One would assume that the latter units are usually in buildings with a smaller number of better maintained units.) That they end up in the less desirable neighborhoods is clear. A housing survey (published in 1973, but based on the 1970 census) indicated that in those tracts with the highest concentration of Hispanics, 80 percent of the houses had been built before 1939 and that 84 percent of the buildings needed major repairs. (The above report was cited in an undated Concilio pamphlet, "Concilio Hispano de Cambridge." From internal evidence it would appear to be a 1973 report.)

That this population is unlikely to force the landlords to make repairs or to provide the usual plumbing and heating facilities or to report these landlords to the city authorities is clear, considering the present system of enforcement. Cambridge has never undertaken a systematic housing inspection program on a neighborhood to neighborhood basis, and usually inspections are made only when tenants complain to the Housing Inspection Department. That this system does not work is apparent to the Department of Planning and Development. In their own words, "it is clear, however, that a very large volume of code violations are not reported; while many occupants are not apprised of their legal rights, others fear retaliation from the landlord. Many are simply afraid that if improvements are made, their rents will be raised."[Housing Needs in Cambridge, p. 29]. And considering that in 1970, neither the Housing Authority, the Housing Inspection Department, nor the Rent Control Board had one Spanish-speaking employee, it was even more unlikely that Hispano
tenants would be aware of their rights or that they would lodge a complaint with the proper authorities.

But the condition of the housing is not the only problem. It is overcrowding that presents one of the hardest problems for the Hispano family. The Massachusetts Department of Community Development has reported that Cambridge is in dire need of an additional 8,580 units of low and middle income housing [Report cited in "Concilio Hispano de Cambridge," 1973?]. The City's Department of Planning and Development has indicated that family-size apartments are the hardest to come by [Social Characteristics of Cambridge, p. 155]. And "the vast majority of Hispano households are comprised of the nuclear family, that is, of a couple and their children" [Brown, p. 23].

Although the 1970 Census indicates that 16.9 percent of all Hispano families are living in overcrowded conditions, Concilio housing workers, when interviewed, stated that from their experience, that figure is much too low. According to their statistics, which apply only to public housing, 65 percent of all Hispanos in these projects are overcrowded. There simply are not enough large apartments, and those that do exist are occupied and the turn-over rate is low.

Nor does the private sector offer the Hispano family a viable alternative. Landlords are responding not to the blue collar family, but to the more affluent young professionals who are settling in Cambridge in increasing numbers. The 1970 census indicated that between 1960 and 1970 the number of one-room units rose 25.8 percent,
while the number of units with 6 rooms declined 12.2 percent, the number with 7 rooms declined 24.4 percent, and the number of units with 8 or more rooms declined 9.4 percent [Social Characteristics, p. 155]. The Concilio housing workers also pointed out that when a large apartment in the private sector can be found, and the landlord is willing to rent to a family with children, the rent is usually too high for most Hispanics to pay.

It would thus appear that Hispanic parents and their children are among those bearing the brunt of Cambridge housing problems. According to the 1970 Census, Hispanics pay a higher percentage of their gross income to live in more dilapidated apartments under more crowded conditions [Brown, p. 26]. Such poor conditions have no doubt created severe problems for these families and exacerbated other problems, and may actually have limited the number of Hispanics moving into Cambridge.

It is in this context that the general lack of interest shown by the Housing Authority in these problems becomes even more distressing. As far back as 1968 the Cambridge Housing Convention, an ad hoc group of concerned citizens called together in response to a CEOC report on Cambridge housing problems, pointed out the Authority's lack of enthusiasm.

It can build new public housing units with [federal and state] government money, but in fact has provided only eighty-eight units in the last fourteen years. CHA can also provide inexpensive living arrangements for low-income citizens by giving them a rent supplement under the Leased Housing Program, but out of a four hundred unit authorization available to CHA, less than one hundred have been used, and that figure was achieved only after continual pressure from various Cambridge groups and residents.
And after negotiations with the Housing Authority, they concluded that, "Meetings with the CHA have produced little positive response from the agency...The Housing Convention feels very strongly that CHA is not adequately meeting its responsibilities to the people of Cambridge" [Cambridge Housing Convention, December 14, 1968, pp. 9-10]. That was in 1968. The Housing Authority does not seem to have reversed this pattern in the years from 1969 to 1975.

Although public housing in Cambridge is often old and run-down (some of it has been around since the 1930's), and some of the projects have become the scene of racial violence, there were Hispanics who wanted to move in. The Concilio Board felt that there were many vacancies in some projects (due to their lack of desirability), even though there were long waiting lists for projects in general. Thus in putting pressure on the Housing Authority to admit Hispanics, they went offering the agency a way out of its own dilemma. At least that was the Board's understanding of why the Housing Authority agreed, in August 1969, to admit Hispanics. In the seven years that have passed, however, public housing has not exactly been overwhelmed by Hispanics. They occupy only 6 percent of those units which are in projects that include low income units (117 units out of 2098), and they occupy only 2 percent (50 out of 2105 units) of those projects that include middle income or market price units [see Appendix, "Hispano Families Living in Publicly Assisted Housing," Chart B].

When the author was doing the research for this thesis, the Housing Authority was the one institution from which he was unable
to get a response. There was only one individual who had been at the Housing Authority throughout most of this period from 1969 to 1975, and who had had the responsibility for assigning the limited number of apartments to the many applicants, and he was the individual from whom an interview was requested. Although he never refused to be interviewed, he was never available, even at those times when he had specifically made an appointment with the interviewer. Furthermore, if a Hispano tenant in 1975 had been inclined to go to the Housing Authority, or the Rent Control Board, or the Housing Inspection Department with a complaint, he or she would have found that there was still not one Spanish-speaking employee in any of these three offices.

B. Geographical Distribution.

The geographical distribution of the Hispano population continued to develop along the same lines of regionalistic concentration that had appeared in nascent form in the earlier period. One new development was the appearance of a Cuban concentration.

In the earlier period there had been no obvious concentration of any nationality other than Puerto Rican. The Cubans, Dominicans, Colombians, and various others were dispersed throughout the eastern and northern parts of the city. By 1970, however, the first non-Puerto Rican concentration, that of the Cubans, had formed in East Cambridge (Area 1). Although none of the other nationalities have coalesced into such an easily identifiable neighborhood (due probably to the relative smallness of their numbers, compared to the
1970-1975

- Heavily Populated/ Families/P.Rican/Others
- Public/Housing
- Students/Professionals
- Heavily Populated/ Families/Cubans/Others

Model Cities Neighborhood Area 3 and 4

[Map showing various areas and symbols like Heavily Populated/ Families/P.Rican/Others and Public/Housing, with circled areas labeled as Area 3 and Area 4.]
Puerto Ricans and Cubans), there is a concentration of several Central and South American nationalities along Harvard and Green Streets in the Mid-Cambridge area.

Among the Puerto Ricans, concentration by municipality of origin continued to characterize their geographical distribution, but there was considerable movement of these concentrations. In the earlier period, Coamenos had located in the Cambridgeport-Riverside area (Areas 5 and 7), whereas the Jayuyanos had tended to locate in the Mid-Cambridge area (Area 6). By the late 60's, however, the Coamenos had begun a gradual expansion into the Central Square area, an expansion that reflected not only a movement of the population, but also a growth in their numbers. The Jayuyanos had remained, more or less, in the Mid-Cambridge area, and rapid growth was not yet apparent among them. During the 1970's a number of different forces would combine to produce a movement of both Coamenos and Jayuyanos into the area north of Central Square, into Areas 3 and 4, and the most rapid growth was among Jayuyanos. The end result of this growth and these movements was that Central Square and the area to its north have become the center of the Cambridge Hispano community.

The movement to the north of Central Square (into Areas 3 and 4) of the Coamenos after the formation of Concilio in June 1969 was no longer just a search for urban amenities. Particularly after the publication of the first Executive Director's editorial in Noticiero Hispano in October 1969, this movement was the result of
a conscious effort on the part of Concilio clientele to make themselves eligible for programs being offered by Model Cities in its Model Neighborhood Area (MNA). Even though that letter had been full of misinformation about who was running the program (Model Cities, not Concilio) and exactly which area constituted the MNA, these matters were eventually straightened out.

Model Cities, a federal program under the Department of Housing and Urban Development, had been established by Congress in 1966 and charged with the responsibility of assisting cities of all sizes throughout the country in improving the environment of their most "blighted" areas. The program designers' philosophy not only provided for the removal of visible "blight"; it emphasized the development of the neighborhood residents' skills as the most effective method of stimulating an end to "blight."

Model Cities programs should focus on the residents of the model neighborhood. All programs and activities should be directed at facilitating their full participation in the economic, social and political mainstream of urban life. Communities should deal not only with the educational, health, employment, income, housing and other problems of disadvantaged neighborhood residents, but should also consider in what ways the initiative and mobility of neighborhood residents are impeded by attitudes and behavior of residents of the wider community and develop a workable program to deal with those impediments. The process of involving residents in planning, decision-making, and program implementation should result in a plan and program that is responsive to their needs and both recognizes and develops their competence as individuals and citizens.\(^1\)

\(^1\)This quotation comes from a 65-page document, which appears to have been procured by the national office for the purpose of informing employees of Model Cities as well as neighborhood activists recruited by them of the goals, procedures, vocabulary, and so forth of Model Cities. It has no title, or at least no title page extant, but the quotation comes from pp. 1-2.
Model Neighborhood Area

---

Somerville City Limits

Area

Area Three

Area Four

MNA

Areas 3 and 4
One certainly could not fault its designers with setting their goals too low, and their philosophy of starting with the people made good sense. In response to this declaration of help on the way, and its publication in *Noticiero Hispano*, the Coamenos accelerated their move north into the Model Neighborhood area, which then had a population of some 18,000 souls of diverse origins: middle-class white, black, Hispano, Italians, Portuguese, the elderly, and poor white, as well.

In reality, these people were in some ways moving into a neighborhood worse than the one from which they had come. Both Areas 3 and 4 are characterized by industrial and commercial enterprises that under present zoning laws would not be allowed to establish themselves in the city. The resulting traffic problems (congestion and scarce parking), trucking, noise, odors, and visual blight do not make this area a desirable place to live.

According to the 1970 Census, Area 4 had the most children under 18 in Cambridge, and the city's lowest median family income. It also had the most female-headed families (with or without children), the highest number of AFDC cases, the most juvenile delinquency cases, and the highest rates of unemployment. That it also contains the highest percentage of people with incomes that place them below the poverty line is not surprising. Area 3 is not far behind Area 4 in children under 18, female-headed families with children, and percentage of families below the poverty line. In addition, Area 3 ranked first in number of Old Age Assistance and General Relief Cases, and it had the most crowded population in
Cambridge, nearly 130 persons per residential acre, almost double the city-wide average. Area 4 was only 34% more crowded than Cambridge in general. And both had median rents of $77.00 a month, the lowest in the city [Neighborhood 4 Profile; Neighborhood 3 Profile].

Nevertheless, in hopes of obtaining help with regard to finding better employment, job training, and day care, as well as to avail themselves of up-graded schools, English language programs, and the multitude of promised services, they came. It is also possible that some of these families were being pushed out of the Cambridge-Port-Riverside areas by rising rents. The Coamenos found housing throughout the MNA, but most significantly around Columbia Street, and eight-block-long thoroughfare running roughly north-south between Main Street and Cambridge Street. As services improved, and Concilio, following its own advice, relocated into the MNA, other Hispanos followed.

Although Jayuyanos were not as active as Coamenos in the 1969-1970 Concilio-encouraged movement into the MNA of Model Cities, Concilio did have an effect on their location and housing patterns. Under pressure from the Concilio, the Housing Authority began to admit Hispanos into public housing projects, and most of those involved, particularly with regard to low income projects, were Jayuyanos. Most Coamenos (although not all), because they generally had higher incomes, could avoid these projects, even if at great sacrifice. For the most part, Coamenos lived in privately owned buildings, although a few do live in low, middle or mixed income projects [Author's observations, confirmed by Concilio's housing workers].
Even though the low income projects, particularly those that have no middle income units, are undesirable places to live, by anyone's standards, they, unfortunately, looked good to the Jayuyanos. Many had been living in the Mid-Cambridge Area, more specifically in Census Tract 3530, a tract in which almost 30 percent of the units lacked some or all basic plumbing (such as hot water), and over 22 percent did not have complete kitchen facilities. In this regard, Tract 3530 is the worst in the city [Social Characteristics, p. 154].

That they could not afford better apartments, plus the fact that they tended to have large families convinced many of them that they had little choice but to seek low income public housing. According to the housing workers who assisted them in their efforts to get such units, and according to Father Sheehan, to whom they complained, the Jayuyanos really did not want to be there. It is the observation of the housing workers that, given a choice, the Jayuyanos tend to move away from any Hispano concentration, into their isolated hollows (at least isolated from Spanish-speaking persons), or the closest approximation they can find. In the same way that their lack of marketable skills creates their concentrations in certain factories, economic necessity creates their concentrations in low income public housing.

The very first households that Concilio managed to see placed in public housing were two Jayuyano families who in 1969 went to live in Washington Elms, a run-down project located in the south-
eastern corner of the Model Neighborhood Area. The first public housing project to offer a significant number of large apartments to the Hispanos, however, was the Jefferson Park project in North Cambridge, and it soon became a second area of visible Jayuyano concentration as many families moved there from the Mid-Cambridge area. In their minds, Jefferson Park had two advantages: better living conditions and distance from the Coamenos.

Originally they were pleased about their relocation, but their pleasure soon turned to regret. They did not like being so far from the Spanish grocery stores of Central Square, the Concilio, St. Mary's Spanish-language mass and their friends, and so far from ready employment. Furthermore, the Black population of North Cambridge was growing rapidly (especially at Walden Square and Rindge Towers, both of which are public projects, as well as at Jefferson Park), and explosive tensions developed between the Blacks and the whites. The Jayuyanos became a confused third party, not identifying with either group, and unable to make themselves understood in an increasingly untenable situation. Fights broke out daily, vandalism escalated, and frequently the Jayuyanos became caught up in the violence. Many thus began to ask for transfers out of Jefferson Park, or they simply left without giving notice.

Many of those families concerned, due to efforts mounted by Concilio and the Housing Authority, were relocated to the Washington Elms project. Although Washington Elms also suffered from racial tension and vandalism, at least it was close to Central Square. By 1974 this movement out of North Cambridge, plus new arrivals from the island
Jayuyana girl in slip running away from photographer at Washington Elm playground.

Car park in front of apartment at Washinton Elms.

Jayuyana girl at Washinton Elms playground.

Name of resident printed under his apartment window.
created a Jayuyano concentration alongside the Coamenos in Area 4, within the MNA of Model Cities. Other non-Puerto Rican Hispanos followed them (although no national concentration was apparent), and many Hispanos also began to move into Newtowne Courts, which is right next door to the Washington Elms project. By 1975 there were 72 Hispano families in the two projects. Forty-six of them were at the Washington Elms, where Hispanos lived in 14 percent of the available units [see Appendix, "Hispano Families Living in Publicly-Assisted Housing," Chart A].

C. CAST, A Success Story.

This location of the Coamenos within the MNA of Model Cities did eventually produce results, at least in the area of housing. In December of 1970 the tenants of Columbia Terrace, at the southern end of Columbia Street, formed a corporation and bought a controlling interest in their own buildings. In the following year they made arrangements to add another building, bringing the total number of families served to 52. The creation of the Cambridge Spanish-speaking Tenants' Union, Inc. (CAST Associates) was a major achievement, especially if one considers that it doubled the rate of home ownership among the Hispano population of Cambridge.¹ (Five percent of

¹The story of CAST is based on interviews with members of its Board, its Superintendant, the Director of Model Cities throughout the period of CAST's organization, and a personal familiarity with all of the following events, since the author was intimately involved with the whole process, beginning in 1969, through the completion of all arrangements for CAST II in late 1972. Furthermore the author has had complete access to all of CAST's files.
900 households would equal about 51 households.) But the story of
CAST's creation is a long and winding story if one follows it from
its very beginnings to 1975.

Actually, the first group that became interested in improving
the lot of the Spanish-speaking residents of Columbia Terrace was
not Model Cities at all, but the Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS). In 1968 or early 1969, as a part of a larger effort to or-
ganize tenants, members of SDS came to Columbia Terrace in order to
mobilize the tenants of Lark Realty in order to force the landlord
to make needed repairs, without raising the rent.

Although SDS did not succeed in organizing a successful tenant's
union, they did manage to create certain expectations, in a manner
very similar to the expectations created by the abortive 1968 CEOC
Community Development Program, Fraternidad Hispana. SDS was not
successful for several reasons. First, the organizers did not
speak Spanish, and secondly, the tenants viewed them with suspicion
since they believed SDS to be a Communist organization. But probab-
ly most important was the fact that the attempt to organize a tenants'
union exposed the residents to reprisals from the landlord, reprisals
against which SDS could not defend them. When the local leader of
the SDS-sponsored effort was evicted, enthusiasm for a tenants'
union plummeted to zero.

Nor was Model Cities the second organization to concern itself
with the plight of Lark Realty tenants. That organization was CEOC,
which in the late summer of 1969 sent two "expert" organizers to
persuade the tenants that they should form a union and withhold their
monies, until the landlord made the needed repairs. CEOC had recently hired their first Hispano, a Coameno, and they sent him along too, as an interpreter, since they had decided on a strategy of organizing a core group of Hispanos. (The rest of the Columbia Terrace population had seemed even less enthusiastic about a union than the Hispanos.) These experts went from family to family extolling the virtues of a rent strike, and purposely neglecting to mention the possible consequences of such an act. But the residents did not have to be reminded; they could remember the eviction of the local leader of the SDS-sponsored union without any help from the experts. Although in the presence of the organizers they would agree to withhold their rent, as soon as collection time arrived, they would pay. The second effort was no more successful than the first.

The third attempt to unionize the tenants succeeded. The Coameno, who had been brought along mainly as an interpreter and a "native" expert, had been following the experts around, house to house, and watching them and the reaction of the residents to them. He had tried to persuade the CEOC lawyer that they were going about it the wrong way, but he could not. After they obviously had failed, he finally persuaded them to let him try his way, in the spring of 1970. He, too, went door to door talking to the tenants, but he did not come with a program. He simply let them talk, and let them define their problems, their way. Yes, they were upset about the condition of the buildings, but they were also afraid. "Well," he would ask, "would it hurt just to talk to the landlord? You don't have to threaten him with a rent strike, just talk to him." That
they were willing to do, and he succeeded in putting together the Columbia Terrace Tenant's Union and its "Working Committee," most of whom, need one add, were Coamenos. There were no Jayuyanos among them. They drew up a list of things that they wanted done, and went with their list to the landlord. This list included: repair all windows; repair all plumbing; repaper all apartments; exterminate all roaches and other insects; and hire a Spanish-speaking superintendent or assistant-superintendent. What the landlord saw this time was numbers, unanimity, and a group that was willing to give him a way out. After two meetings Lark Realty agreed to do all of these things, provided the tenants provide the labor. The landlord would provide the materials, and train one tenant to repair broken windows. The tenants happily accepted the conditions. In fact, they thought that they were excellent ideas. The new "Working Committee" was a success and thus it gained the confidence of the tenants generally. The CEOC experts had still played a role this time around, but merely as technical consultants who answered the questions that they were asked.

At approximately the same time that the working committee was beginning to function and consultations were going on between the tenants at Columbia Terrace and CEOC, certain problems arose for CEOC that would inspire it to move on this issue. Late in 1970 OEO informed CEOC of their decision to terminate its housing program. It had been an experimental program, designed for only three years, and 1971 was to be its third and last year. In danger of losing
funds, CEOC sought to renew the program, and thus they needed an easily demonstrable success that could be shown to the national office.

It was only after Lark Realty had actually begun supplying the materials and the repairs were underway, that the CEOC lawyers came up with the idea that the Columbia Tenants' Union should form a corporation and enter into a limited partnership under the provisions of the 236 Federal Housing Program, a program designed to create privately run, non-profit, low and moderate income housing developments. The 236 "limited dividends" program also provided that one must rehabilitate such premises after purchase. The lawyers called a meeting with the Working Committee, and although they left the committee somewhat confused about the technicalities of the 236 Program, the tenants did agree to discuss the purchase of the buildings with the landlord. After negotiations, the landlord agreed to sell 42 units for $250,000. Having secured this agreement, the tenants then faced the problem of where they were going to get the $10,000 required to conduct a feasibility study, a study that was required to demonstrate that the project was eligible for participation in the 236 Program. The CEOC solution, as usual, was to ask someone for the money. This time the suggested agency was Model Cities. And thus the lawyers helped CAST draw up a technically competent proposal to Model Cities.

Model Cities at the time was in the low posture of the proverbial sitting duck. In spite of its lofty purposes, it had little to show in terms of what it had done for the Hispano community, and
nothing to show for what it had done to develop low and middle income housing. There were no Hispanics on its Board, it had hired no Hispanics, indeed it had hired no one that even spoke Spanish, although it had given a few dollars to CEOC for the unpopular (with the Hispanics and Portuguese) Foreign Language Referral Service, and it was funding an English as a Second Language program. Just to drive the point home, the Columbia Terrace Tenants' Union decided at this time to change their name to the Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants (CAST), in order to emphasize two things: that they were Spanish-speaking and that the object was housing. This emphasis was needed to point out to Model Cities the opportunity that they were being offered: to help a group that they had previously ignored, and to do something about a problem that they had neglected.

The sitting-duck, Model Cities, came through with the $10,000, but only after the Working Committee carried out a sit-in at a Model Cities Board meeting. Once the money had been obtained, and the study completed, and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency had ruled positively on the feasibility study, the tenants found out that they needed more money in order to become part-owners of the corporation. In fact, they needed to borrow $65,000. As far as CEOC and the tenants were concerned, Model Cities was the only possible source for this money. No bank was ever going to lend so much to people with so little collateral. Although the Model Cities staff seemed to be in favor of granting such a request, its Board of
C.A.S.T. after rehabilitation.
Directors was not. They were opposed to giving (or even loaning) an Hispano group so much money, and, consequently, so much power.

Another sit-in was called for, and the Concilio Board and every man, woman, and child from CAST came to that Board meeting. Complete with crying babies, prying toddlers, and troops of boys and girls equipped with toy percussion instruments and guitars, the mothers, the women warriors of Borinquén, were out in full force. No Board of Directors could have withstood them, and the Model Cities Board said yes, yes to anything, just to get the women out of there. On December 15, 1970, the agreement was signed; thus was the $65,000 loan obtained (to be repaid within one year); and thus was the Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants, Incorporated, or CAST Associates, created. In May 1972 CAST II (9 units) was successfully negotiated, making a total of 52 units in the Columbia Terrace project. The tenants own a 28 percent interest in CAST I and a 49 percent interest in CAST II, and they control the management and tenant selection for the entire project through their own elected Board of Directors.

In a March 1976 interview, the man who had been Director of Model Cities in 1970 and 1971 confirmed the above impressions of the Concilio Board members. He explained that when CAST had first approached them, he and his staff had been so busy trying to salvage the Cambridge office of Model Cities generally that they had given little thought to the Hispano community. When CAST did approach them, "They [the CAST members] were upset that Model Cities had not helped them. They made it very plain that they expected some help to be forthcoming."
On the other hand, "The most that the leadership had intended to do was the minimum—to provide maybe twenty to twenty-five thousand dollars worth of services that they hoped would keep the Spanish community more or less in place." Even with regard to that money, they worked out an arrangement with CEOC, so that CEOC monies, too, would be used. "CEOC would take some responsibility....It would not be all Model Cities' money."

Resource allocation for the Hispanos was "almost insulting [since] the level of effort that we had made was so low. And it was pretty obvious that the Spanish-speaking people had not been well represented in the planning process of Model Cities and they certainly were not well represented in the disseminating process of Model Cities."

The Concilio's estimation that the Director and his staff supported them was also accurate. "We had some funds left over that we were trying to recycle and...one of the proposals was the one from CAST....I was very excited about that. I thought that was the kind of thing Model Cities should do."

But the Board was not in favor. The Director attributed their opposition to a number of factors. First, the Board would lose control over the money and the jobs produced by the money. Another major factor was prejudice. "A good portion of money was going to Spanish-speaking people....They were suspicious of that....They didn't believe that the Spanish organization had the capability to deal with this proposal."
The ex-Director who spoke so frankly in March of 1976 was no longer an employee of Model Cities or any other agency in Cambridge. He does speak Spanish; he was in the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic; and he has spent some time in Puerto Rico. His parting comment was, "I don't think the Board ever really understood the Spanish community." In one sense, CAST was very fortunate that he happened to be the Director at the time the proposals were submitted.

The ex-Director of Model Cities called CAST "a landmark." He was referring to the way in which community participation had led to a concrete, viable program. But CAST's success was not limited to its origins. Its real success has been its ability not only to sustain, but to improve the condition of the buildings and the individual units. Indeed, this success has mystified the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). Faced with a generally dismal situation in which the usual low-income housing project rapidly deteriorates into as bad a slum as it was meant to replace, Columbia Terrace has earned the somewhat dubious distinction of being an "exception." Indeed, its success is so rare that whenever this author has attempted to use it as a model to the MHFA, their response has been that the success of CAST is so rare, so completely atypical, that it, therefore, proves nothing.

CAST's secret of success, however, is not unfathomable. The tenants themselves hire a realty management agent to run the project. If that agent does not maintain the buildings properly, they can fire him, given sixty day's notice, and hire another. (The one that they do use is one of the three partners in CAST Associates.) Thus the
residents have indirect control over all maintenance decisions. Another secret is that the buildings involved are old—built before the days of modern slap-dash technique—and its brick exterior is sound and easily maintained. Culturally it matters that the Coamenos and their friends who live there share the positive attributes of the Anglo middle-class that contribute to the upkeep of local pride and appearance. But most important is the sense of community that is maintained, in part due to tenant control over new tenant selection. Every family, Hispano or Anglo, is well acquainted with every other family, and all their children. Furthermore, the superintendent is personally acquainted with all the tenants, and with their children. He cashes everyone’s checks, and when the children carry them down for their mothers, he not only hands out the cash for their mother, but lollipops for the messenger. By creating a personal relationship with the children, he has the authority and the respect necessary to stop the children from doing any sort of damage, before that damage is done. It is much cheaper that way, and that CAST does not have the large maintenance bills that most projects have is one more secret of their success.

In essence, CAST operates as a small village. The cohesiveness of the group and the power that they have over tenant selection which maintains that cohesiveness has both a positive and a negative side. On the one hand it makes possible the sense of responsibility and cooperation that all residents have for the project, and, on the other hand, it has also produced hard feeling among and charges of discrimination from those groups that are not represented in the project: the Jayuyanos and Blacks.
The successful organization of the Columbia Terrace Tenants' Union and its transformation into CAST, Inc. provide an excellent lesson in community mobilization. First of all the organizers and the planners must acquaint themselves with the communities that they intend to serve. That two attempts failed and that one succeeded in organizing these people demonstrates that it was not that the tenants could not be organized, but that the experts did not know how to do it. For an outsider to approach a community with a program already prepared is to ask them to support what the outsider wants and to deny them an opportunity to express what they want. To be insensitive to their fears, to be willing to jeopardize their tenure in a building without providing protection, is to use them, not to help them. To be dishonest by not frankly describing the possible repercussions of any given policy does not fool the people, it merely makes them suspicious of the outsider.

It is the adamantly held opinion of the Coameno organizer that this effort succeeded not so much because he was a Coameno, or that he spoke Spanish, but because he was willing to sit and talk and listen. He was willing to meet the people; to know them as individuals. He was willing to let them decide their own strategy. With regard to the process of organization, the tenants benefitted from the experts only when those experts subordinated themselves (unwillingly and as a last resort) to the community's will, but once the Tenants' Union was organized, and only then, it was possible to suggest to them a more long range solution, the 236 Federal Housing Program. In the same way that it is the CAST tenants' control over
their own housing that has insured its success, it was the tenants' control over the goals and strategies of their organization that made it a success. The organizers must determine what the community wants, and do that, not what they want, if they are to succeed.

Yet another lesson is that the community cannot just wait for the appropriate agencies to deliver. Both CEOC and Model Cities had been mandated to develop such housing projects, and neither one had done so as of late 1970. In the case of CEOC, it was only when they were faced with a possible loss of funds that they moved; in the case of Model Cities, it was only when two sit-ins had been carried out that they saw their duty. The mere fact that people needed housing and that these agencies were supposed to develop it was not enough to produce low income housing. CAST is a success, but it represents a success for the 52 families who live there, not for any public program, not for the organizers, and not for the community in general.

Although CAST may serve as an example of how to cure urban blight, it has not solved the Hispanics' housing problems. Considering the size of this population, 52 units do not constitute a solution.
C.A.S.T. II
Rehabilitation,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Client: Cambridge Alliance of Spanish Tenants.
Sponsor: Better Cities, Inc.
Management: Edwin D. Abrams.
Financing: MHFA 236 Rent Supplement.
Consultants: Environmental Design Engineers —
Mechanical and Electrical.
Contractor: Sid Kumins, Inc.
Site: Existing run-down row houses on Columbia Street.
Program: Complete rehabilitation including new
Heating, Ventilating and Electrical Systems. Parti-
tions were replanned to allow improved living, eat-
ing and sleeping relationships. Plans were devel-
oped with tenant participation and since the tenants
have a 49% ownership through Limited Dividend
Corporation they will have a strong participation in
the management.
D. Jayuyano-Coameno Tensions Produced by Housing and Geographical Location: El Batey de Polaroid.

CAST I and II, a fourth Coameno stronghold after the St. Mary's clubs and the Concilio, has created further tensions within the Puerto Rican community. The Jayuyanos feel that the Comenos have effectively excluded them from CAST, and they are right. To date, not one Jayuyano family has been admitted. The 1976 population composition within CAST, according to the superintendent, is as follows.

**POPULATION OF CAST BY ORIGIN OF FAMILIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
<th>Percentage of Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coameno</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Puerto Rican, but no Jayuyanos</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Families</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The composition of CAST is no accident. Its Board of Directors has a Coameno President, a Coameno Vice-President, a Coameno Secretary, and an Anglo Treasurer, and these people, who control tenant selection, do not want Jayuyanos (or Blacks, it would also appear) in the project. In 1976 the author interviewed the President of CAST's Board, and asked him why there were no Jayuyanos. He replied, "...The reason that there are no Jayuyanos in the complex is simply
C.A.S.T. residents removing snow.

Batey cleaning team having lunch.

Look both ways before crossing.

Lady working at a buffet in the c.a:s.t. community room.
because Jayuyanos do not apply for apartments in the complex. The same goes for Blacks." When the question was pursued, he replied, "...Not only they don't apply, but I feel that the remaining members of the Board will not allow me to recommend one of them. They have established a very bad reputation around the Terrace, plus you know that Coamenos and Jayuyanos are like water and oil, they do not mix. So before we accept one and then find ourselves with all kinds of problems, we just don't encourage them to apply." Essentially, as with the clubs, the Jayuyanos have learned that they are not wanted, and as a matter of pride, they do not apply.

The Coamenos, too, are developing a bad reputation for using strong arm tactics. On one occasion, at least, Dominican residents of CAST felt that the Coamenos were treating them unfairly, and they sought the intervention of Concilio on their behalf. Concilio recommended that they express their feelings to the CAST Board, and the results were disastrous. The Board, as soon as they heard that the Dominicans had gone to Concilio, called the Dominican residents to a CAST Board meeting and threatened them with reprisals (reporting them to the Welfare Department or to Immigration) if they ever tried to get outside intervention again. The CAST Board President, when asked about the situation, replied, "The Dominicans can say thank you for the Board letting them occupy apartments in the complex....After that incident they have been very silent."

Not only is Concilio aware of the problems, but the larger community too. In a 1976 interview with the President of the Area 4 Planning Team (who in 1970 at the time CAST was formed was Chairperson
of the Housing Committee of the Model Cities Board), she indicated that she had "many questions" about the CAST project. To date, she declared, "...CAST has given an apartment to none of the Neighborhood people." One should point out, however, that they have provided apartments for some people: Coamens, Hispanos other than Jayuyanos, and Anglos, and that these people, too, are "Neighborhood" people.

The Polaroid Parking Lot: Front-line Batey of Cambridge

Between Columbia Terrace, the site of the Coameno stronghold CAST, and Washington Elms and Newtowne Courts, the public projects where many Jayuyanos have moved since 1973, lie just three short blocks, a large part of which is taken up by the Polaroid Company's parking lot. Although the Terrace residents had originally viewed the lot as a convenient place to park their automobiles after working hours, the President of CAST now admits, "Things have not worked out as we expected. I don't know what it is with this parking lot that everyone ends up here, and I mean everyone; people from everywhere come here." The descendents of the Borinquen may have no mountains to flee to, and the surrounding walls may not be carved or painted with the face of the gods, but Polaroid's parking lot is known throughout Area 4 as "Puerto Rican Plaza."

Everyone gathers for card games, dominoes, a few bets here and there, boxing, basketball, occasional movies, and not infrequently, various illicit activities. The popularity of the lot has even attracted Hispanos from out of town, people completely unknown to the
The batey (polaroid parking lot), on the right C.A.S.T. II on left C.A.S.T. I.
Cambridge community. Although both the strangers and the Jayuyanos know that they are not welcome, they come. Excluded from the clubs, from control of Concilio, and from the apartments at the Terrace, the Jayuyanos have staked out the batey for their last stand. The fights that used to take place in the clubs now transpire at El Batey de Polaroid, and the violence and the presence of strangers has made the residents of the Terrace afraid—afraid for their children and for themselves. Many of those who have moved out of the Terrace have given the parking lot scene as their reasons for leaving.

The residents of the Terrace have, several times, sent delegations to Polaroid and to the police asking that something be done. They asked Polaroid to shut down the lot after working hours—to completely seal it off, but the most that Polaroid was willing to do was to shut off the lights at 10:00 p.m. "We don't understand why they can't close the place at night and on the weekend. Sometimes the police has to come three or four times down here. This is not good. This is giving a bad name to the Terrace." Part of the problem is a question of jurisdiction between the police and the private security guards hired by Polaroid. The police are reluctant to tread on their territory, and thus they do not always patrol the area as closely as the situation warrants.

If something is not done about the situation, a tragedy of some sort is very likely to occur. The escalating seclusionism of the Coameno, both in his clubs and at CAST, and the ever-growing number of Jayuyanos in the Washington Elms and Newtowne Courts area is continuing to feed the flames of the Jayuyano-Coameno hostility. Some day soon the batey of Polaroid may explode.
That the Concilio is not the only institution in Cambridge that has been plagued by the Coameno-Jayuyano problem, and that it is not the only institution that has failed to overcome the problem is apparent from the story of St. Mary's Church, and its priest, Father Daniel Sheehan. No matter how impartial he tried to be, his organization, too, was identified by the Hispano community as "Coameno." Neither was he able to put Jayuyanos onto the parishioners' committees. They were led by Coamens, and no Jayuyanos asked to serve. Equally frustrated as the Concilio Board, he threw up his hands and left Cambridge. No amount of pleading could persuade him to stay and deal with what he felt was an insoluble problem.

It was in 1969 at about the same time that Concilio opened its doors that Padre Jose, the Spanish-speaking priest at the Church of the Blessed Sacrament in the Cambridgeport section of Cambridge was transferred out of the city. His removal from the scene, combined with the influx of Hispanics into the Central Square area brought the Spanish-speaking Irishman at St. Mary's into the Hispano limelight. Father Daniel Sheehan, who had been in Cambridge since 1968, was approached by a group (Coamens, of course, but not exactly the same people who had formed the police delegation over the bar issue), and asked if he would conduct masses in Spanish at St. Mary's. Thus from 1969 until his departure at the
end of 1975, Father Sheehan attempted to guide St. Mary's Hispano flock, which numbered at least 1,000 by the end of the period.¹

Prior to the formation of Concilio and the concentration of the Hispano population in the Central Square area, tensions between the Jayuyano and the Coameno at the Church were not obvious to the unschooled eye. This was due in part to the small number of Hispanos attending the Church in this early period, and to the fact that most people just came and listened to the mass, met their friends, and left. For perhaps as long as one year, Father Sheehan remained happily oblivious to this undercurrent in the Hispano sea, in spite of the fact that all of the various committees that supervised charities and activities within the Hispano part of the congregation were composed of mostly Coamenos, and no Jayuyanos. Indeed, the pillar of the church committees was a Coameno woman who had been a founding member of the Concilio Board of Directors.

But Father Sheehan did not remain oblivious for very long. After he had begun giving the Spanish language mass at St. Mary's, his reputation grew, and he was asked to give masses in other parts of the Boston area, some as far away as Peabody and Salem. Thus in the early 70's he began to follow the Hispano population around, from town to town, and in the process he learned his first lesson in regionalismo. Father Sheehan had hoped to serve the

¹The information in this part (Section III, Part 6) is based on interviews with Father Sheehan and with one of the most active members of the Church, the Coamena who was a founding member of the Concilio Board, and with the third Executive Director of Concilio, unless otherwise indicated.
Hispano community generally; instead, he found himself in the service of Hispano regionalism. The various churches became identified not with where the Spanish-speaking now lived, but from where they had come. The mass in Salem was attended by Puerto Ricans, while the one in Peabody attracted the Dominicans. Dominicans who lived in Salem traveled to Peabody for the mass, and Puerto Ricans in Peabody traveled to Salem. The Spanish-language mass held in the Allston-Brighton section of Boston became identified with the Cubans, and those Cubans who lived in Cambridge duly went to Allston-Brighton to mass, rather than to St. Mary's, which was much closer. Once the Cuban concentration in East Cambridge developed, they established their own "Cuban" mass in their own neighborhood.

Thus Father Sheehan learned his first lesson in Spanish regionalism.

Hispanos tend to identify with their own community instead of their local parish, [and they] don't identify with the Hispano community as a whole. Presently there is a problem in that the Cuban and Dominican populations [in Cambridge] identify the church [St. Mary's] as Puerto Rican. They say that I favor the Puerto Ricans instead of the others. I didn't mean to exclude anyone, but it has happened. We have a lot of activities for the Hispano community [as a whole], but [their mutual participation] is really artificial, and doesn't carry over [into other areas of their lives]. There is no general unity within the Hispano population.

Once Father Sheehan became aware of the problems between Jayuyanos and Coamenos, and many of the Jayuyanos had moved to North Cambridge, he started a Spanish-language mass in North Cambridge. He wanted to avoid any charges of favoritism, and to make mass attendance more convenient for the Jayuyanos living in the Jefferson Park and Waldon Square public housing projects. One problem that
worried him was the growing influence of Jehovah's Witnesses among the Jayuyanos, a phenomenon that was not apparent among Coamenos. Furthermore, after St. Mary's had lost its nunnery in 1973, it made some sense to develop activities in North Cambridge, where there were still nuns to help him.

Once again, Father Sheehan's good intentions were thwarted by the Hispanos. No more than some 30 people ever chose to attend the Spanish-speaking mass in North Cambridge. The Jayuyanos continued to attend St. Mary's, even though its committees were run by Coamenos. They wanted to meet their friends in the Central Square area and spend the day with them. Some of those who lived in North Cambridge even began to ask Father Sheehan if he would pick them up and give them a ride to mass at St. Mary's, when he had just finished giving a mass right on their own doorstep. "They are driving me crazy," was his parting comment.

Even though Father Sheehan became well acquainted with the manifestations of Hispano regionalism, he nevertheless continued his valiant efforts to serve this community, and to maintain what he characterized as an "artificial unity." That he was not able to overcome such factionalism was not because he did not try. But it became more and more difficult for him to maintain his reputation of impartiality as his own funds dwindled. He could not help the Jayuyanos who came to him; he had to refer them to Concilio. And the more he had to rely on the Concilio and the Parents' Advisory Committee of the School Department's bilingual education programs
at St. Mary's, the more he became associated with the Coamenos-Jayuyo problem that had manifested itself in these organizations.

This artificial unity was most apparent in the various recreational and educational activities that Saint Mary's sponsored. With the growth of the community had come the concurrent need for recreational programs for all ages, but the city's already existing programs made no provisions for this new Hispano population. Hispano children were not encouraged to participate in summer programs, and the adults either had to provide their own entertainment, or content themselves with movies and programs that they did not understand or relate to culturally. Thus church-going and church sponsored activities tended to become even more important to the Hispanos in Cambridge than they had been in their countries of origin.

Father Sheehan in 1969 and 1970 began by organizing English language classes for adults, at the church. Supplemented by such services and amenities as babysitting, transportation and refreshments, these classes were taught by the nuns of St. Mary's Convent, some of whom spoke Spanish. Father Sheehan also sponsored parties for the children, dances for everyone, religious plays, and various retreats and excursions. The Hispano community was impressed by his efforts and appreciated them, since they provided much needed inspirational and recreational activities. Indeed the Board of Directors of Concilio in 1970 invited the Irish priest to become a member of the Board, thus making him the one and only Anglo ever honored in this manner, but Father Sheehan declined the invitation. He did not want to become identified with either the Coamenos or
the Jayuyanos, and he was afraid that joining the Board of Concilio would embroil him in such problems. "...I don't get involved in the politics of it, after what happened with the First Director."

Nevertheless, Father Sheehan continued to cooperate with the Concilio, and in the summer of 1971 he organized the first summer program for Spanish-speaking children, ages 3 to 14. During the early part of 1971 Father Sheehan had been invited by Cambridge Community Services, Inc. (CCS) to sit on their Board and represent both St. Mary's and the Hispano community. When he learned that CCS was a funnel for foundation monies earmarked for summer recreational programs, he agreed. He then went to the Anglo, Spanish-speaking third Executive Director of Concilio and together they drew up a proposal, which CCS approved.

Thus the program began, at St. Mary's, with the nuns from Saint Mary's Convent along with some additional staff providing arts, crafts, and religious training, as well as occasional outings. The latter, for which the children were loaded onto buses, became a pathetic measure of the lack of any such opportunities for adults. Parents, starved for recreation themselves, came with the children, and then there was not enough room on the buses. Additional buses would be hired, and still there would not be enough room. In the end, people had to be turned away.

Due to the expanded number of participants projected for 1972, Father Sheehan sought new sources of funds and personnel to run that summer's program. This need for funds was met by the happy coincidence that the legislature had just made Massachusetts the first
state to mandate bilingual education, in 1971, by passing the Transitional Bilingual Education (TBE) Act. (This law was passed only after a 1970 study, *The Way We Go to School: the Exclusion of Children in Boston*, demonstrated that the schools were not addressing themselves to the problems of non-English-speaking immigrants, and that as a result, in Boston alone, over 5,000 Hispano children were not even attending school.) The new law stipulated that "in every school district which had twenty or more students of limited English-speaking ability in a particular language group, a full bilingual program must be provided for these children (*Bilingual Education*, p. 5)."

The new law also stipulated that the parents of these children should play an active role in the entire process through the organization of a Parents' Advisory Committee (PAC) for each language group concerned. Actually, the Cambridge Public School Department already had such a committee, a Bilingual Advisory Committee, that had grown out of a community initiative, rather than a legal requirement. Concilio personnel (Coamenos), parents, and teachers had participated, although Concilio tended to shoulder most of the burden of running the committee. The committee helped to identify potential teachers and aides for these classes, an important function since the criteria used in selecting regular teachers did not necessarily qualify a person to deal effectively with Hispano children. The TBE Act, in addition to providing funds for the regular school year, also offered funds for summer cultural and recreational programs, and due to the obvious success of St. Mary's 1971 program, Father
Sheehan and the Concilio personnel were able to add TBE money to the funds that they had acquired from CCS.

Concilio further assisted St. Mary's 1972 program by hiring teenagers, (both Coameno and Jayuyano) through the Neighborhood Youth Corps, whom it then reassigned to St. Mary's summer activities program. Thus jobs supervising the recreational aspects of the program were made available, and St. Mary's acquired the requisite additional staff. Although there was money available for a summer program for the teenagers themselves, unfortunately no proposals were made. In all fairness, however, one might add that the teenagers were more interested in jobs than in recreation or educational programs.

In 1973, however, a series of misfortunes were to seriously affect the ability of St. Mary's to maintain the activities which it had been sponsoring for the Hispano community, and more and more of these functions were to evolve into Concilio programs. This process contributed to Father Sheehan's increasing difficulties with regard to keeping his flock peacefully together.

One of the first programs affected by the cutbacks was the children's summer program. Since St. Mary's was unable to run a full-time program in 1973, the Department of Public Schools established a morning class at Roberts School, using TBE funds. Concilio provided lunch, and supervised the children's walk over to St. Mary's, where afternoon recreational activities were provided by the Church, with CCS funds.
In 1974 and 1975, after St. Mary's Convent had closed, the nuns had departed, there had been a bad fire at the church, and the church had closed one of its parochial schools. St. Mary's had to give up the idea of a summer program altogether, and Concilio inherited the recreational aspects of the program, while the TBE program continued to fund morning classes at Roberts School. Father Sheehan had assisted the Concilio in writing and presenting its proposal to CCS, asking that they continue to fund the recreational programs, under Concilio sponsorship.

Under Concilio sponsorship there were considerable differences in the kinds of summer programs offered. In 1974 and 1975, Concilio did not provide regular play periods for the children, but ran a series of programs that would include the whole family. Furthermore, Concilio actively recruited personnel and participants for the summer programs of other institutions and agencies in Cambridge, and encouraged these programs to make special provision for the Hispano community. Although at first CCS was somewhat dubious about the design of Concilio's program, especially since they were addressing themselves to adults as well as children, the new program's mix of trips to the mountains, crafts, and films, and other assorted activities has been a success, and CCS is quite satisfied with the results.

The increasing involvement in and ultimate adoption of one of Father Sheehan's programs by Concilio and the TBE Parents' Advisory Committee (PAC) meant that Father Sheehan's artificial unity suffered. Concilio's problems in this arena have already been related, and so
this section will confine itself to the regionalism that appeared to split PAC. In reality, PAC had always been run by the Concilio, not by parents, regardless of its name or any theories to the contrary, but in 1974 Concilio made a noble effort to turn the reins of power over to the parents, unsuccessfully. Instead of the parents taking over, the employees of the bilingual program, the teachers and aides, became the dominant group, and PAC became a battleground between the parents and the administration on the one hand, and the teachers on the other. These battles exacerbated a factional struggle that had originated within the Concilio Board of Directors, among Coamenos, but had taken on a regional appearance, since the faction that had been ousted used a Jayuyana woman as their ostensible leader. Actually this woman was the wife of a Coameno. (Although such marriages are extremely rare, they do happen.) The Coameno husband had been involved in a dispute with various members of the Concilio Board, and when his side lost, he retaliated by attacking the Coamenos in PAC, through his Jayuyano wife. Thus to the unschooled eye, it appeared that the Jayuyanos were attempting to unseat the Coameno leadership in at least one of their strongholds. In reality, this was not the case. This woman did not represent the Jayuyanos, and they did not come out to support her when she claimed that she did. They, too, knew to whom she was married, and, perhaps, what the battle was about. They were not interested. The Coameno husband lost again, and by the summer of 1975 PAC was firmly in Concilio hands again. That this battle, which at least appeared to be between Coamenos and Jayuyanos occurred at a time
when Father Sheehan's own resources were being cut back, and thus his own responses were being further limited, meant that he became a more and more frustrated man.

Many people, mostly Jayuyanos, come to me looking for help, but what can I do, except tell them to go to the Concilio? But they don't go. [They do go, but only as a last resort.] A lot of Jayuyanos come here or see me on the street and complain about their housing situation, jobs, and so forth. What can I do, especially when the Concilio is responsible for these services? However, I know that they don't want to go to Concilio because they think that the Concilio is for Coamenos. The same thing happens at the Church. St. Mary's is looked upon by other Hispanos as a Coameno church, especially since the leadership of the church's Spanish Parent Committee is Coameno. I just don't see how we can bring these groups together.

Of particular concern to Father Sheehan was the placement of Jayuyano families in the various public housing projects, particularly into the Washington Elms project. They Jayuyanos complained to him that they were being discriminated against because Coamenos were not placed in such rundown projects. He relayed this message to the Coameno most involved in their relocation out of Jefferson Park (North Cambridge) into the Washington Elms project (Model Neighborhood Area), relocations that had been made at the request of the families involved. The housing worker, who really was not trying to discriminate against the Jayuyanos, tried to explain to Father Sheehan, so that he could explain to the Jayuyanos, that it was not a plot, and that the problem was related to the general housing shortage in Cambridge, the fact that these families could not afford to pay the rent in other places, and that there were not enough large apartments in the public housing projects, and these families could not afford large apartments at market prices. If he were
going to put a roof over their head, he had to put them into Washington Elms.

At least Father Sheehan, as a member of the clergy, was not expected to be an all-powerful and benevolent hacendado. It was only expected that the clergy should communicate with the powers that be, on behalf of the offended parishoner. Concilio, on the other hand, was expected to deliver, but it could not deliver what the Jayuyanos wanted, and so the parishoners continued to complain to Father Sheehan. Father Sheehan, in the end, only wanted out, and in late 1975 he found himself a replacement and left.

Father Sheehan never understood that he was caught up in a web of expectations and assumptions that were rooted deep in the soil of Otoao, even though he was, no doubt, the only Anglo in Cambridge that had been to both Jayuya and Coamo, not once, but twice. In an effort to better serve the community he went to the island, and even after observing the tremendous differences between the two places, he still did not understand the cultural origins of this problem and attributed it, instead, to the fact that Coamenos predominated among the early arrivals, and thus they "[had] everything," whereas the Jayuyanos, having predominated among the later arrivals, had been left out. "I went to Coamo and Jayuya during my two visits to the Island—not to study the communities, but to visit the families of people from here. Every place is very different, and characteristics vary from community to community." But when asked why the two groups cannot get along, he replied, "The Jayuyanos are more
recently arrived here than the Coamenos, and they may think that the Coamenos have everything. I know also that Jayuyanos are arriving in bunches lately."

That Father Sheehan, one of those persons most knowledgeable about the Hispanos of Cambridge and a man who was genuinely concerned about their welfare, was oblivious to the fact that the completely divergent cultural baggage with which the two groups arrived was the primary cause of the problem, and that all the other problems have grown out of this fundamental, unavoidable fact, is most discouraging. Ascribing the Jayuyano's adaption to the Cambridge environment as inadequate due to a factor of timing suggests that time alone will remedy the problem. But time will not, for although many Jayuyanos have arrived recently, there are those among them who have been here as long as any of the Coamenos, and they are still handicapped by their lack of marketable skills and the great cultural gap that looms between the batey of Otoao and the batey of Polaroid.

That Father Sheehan also continued to avoid any direct association with the Concilio, in his vain attempt to overcome St. Mary's reputation as a Coameno controlled institution, frustrated the Concilio leadership. They knew that they were not serving the Jayuyanos effectively, and in an attempt to overcome this nagging problem, they had asked Father Sheehan, in 1975, if he would establish an office for himself at the Concilio. Perhaps if he were sitting in the same room with the various people from the Welfare Department, DES, and
so forth, and he personally delivered these people to the appropriate
desk, they would have more confidence in the sincerity of Concilio's
efforts. And, perhaps, since the Jayuyanos prefer to talk to him,
they would come to the Concilio more often, thus facilitating the
identification of their needs and their desires. Perhaps they would
even overcome their feelings that Concilio did not want to serve
them, just because in many cases it could not deliver what they
wanted.

Father Sheehan declined the request. He insisted that working
independently but cooperatively remained his philosophy, and he
believed that this arrangement "operated very, very well and without
duplication." Even though he knew, and Concilio knew, that his own
committees at the church were Coameno committees, that they had no
more Jayuyano representation on them than did the Concilio Board of
Directors, and that the community identified his church as Coameno,
he would not join the agencies that operated at least part-time out
of the Concilio office.

This attitude on his part caused a number of disappointed Board
members to believe that in part Father Sheehan's decision was based
upon a never openly expressed, but nevertheless real rivalry between
St. Mary's and the Concilio. As a separate "Hispano" institution
in the community, he wanted to maintain his own base, and not lend
his own influence to his rival. This undercurrent of real or per-
haps only imagined rivalry, however, has never interfered with
cooperation between the two institutions. Rather, if it has had
any effect, it has been to increase the number of joint programs and cooperation in order to at least create an image of goodwill and united action. Nevertheless, some Board members continue to feel that this separatism on the part of St. Mary's is unproductive, needless, and a bother. Father Sheehan's replacement, a Spaniard, arrived in late 1975, but it is still too soon to determine what his response will be to this problem, the problem that Father Sheehan believed to be insoluble.
SECTION IV. THE CONCLUSION

PART ONE. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE CAMBRIDGE HISPANO COMMUNITY

This concluding section shall approach two overall questions. The first is, what can this discussion of the Puerto Ricans on the island and in Cambridge tell us about the official response to the special problems of this community; which agencies and institutions in Cambridge have responded and why? The second question has three parts: how can the community make these agencies more responsive; what must the community itself do to overcome the problem; and third, what can these agencies and the community leaders, together, do to solve the problems that this cultural legacy has caused in Cambridge?

Although the preceding saga is not the complete story of the Hispano community from 1969 to 1975, it nevertheless outlines the general nature of the demands emanating from that community and the response that those demands elicited. To sum up, private institutions (such as the Catholic Church) were more responsive than any public agency. Indeed, the Church was the only institution that responded upon request, without sermonizing, and without the need for pressure. Father Sheehan did not attempt to serve this community from behind a desk, or to acquaint himself with it merely by reading books. He spoke Spanish and so he could talk to the people: he went to Coamo and Jayuya. He was the only Anglo leader, official or unofficial, who knew that the problem that divided the Hispano community was a problem between two groups of Puerto Ricans, and not between
The Mayor and the ladies at the airport.

Compliments of MAYOR ALFRED E. VELLUCCI
Coameños residents and the Mayor of Cambridge at the airport waiting for the maratonistas.

Compliments of MAYOR ALFRED E. VELLUCCI
the Puerto Ricans and other Hispano nationalities. But even Father Sheehan did not understand the origins of the problem. He did not know the history of these people, and so he could not understand why the community acted in this manner. And therefore he could not tackle the problem. He declared it insoluble, and he left.

The Mayor of Cambridge is second only to Father Sheehan in his knowledge of this community. Since 1965, when he was a City Councilor, he has been aware of this community and what he affectionately calls its "big mouths." After the City Council had elected him Mayor in 1970, he went to Puerto Rico, and to Coamo, to visit the families of Cambridge residents, and he stayed in the home of the Concilio Board President. Over the years he has accepted all invitations to various Hispano functions and festivities. Indeed, in 1976 he met the Maraton San Blas (Coamo) team at the airport when they arrived to compete in the Boston Marathon; and he escorted them royally, with siren blaring and lights flashing, all the way to Columbia Terrace. As a result of this socializing, the Mayor is familiar with the Coamenos, and with their problems. He is not, however, familiar with the Jayuyanos and their problems.

Both Father Sheehan and the Mayor understood that a city is made up of people, not numbers, and they responded to the Hispano community as people. And the Hispano community has responded by giving them their respect and their support. But unfortunately neither one of these people was in a position to tackle some of the most basic problems facing the Hispanics. As the Mayor quite readily
admitted, "I have responded the best I could with what power I have and through cooperation with the Spanish Council." But the Mayor of Cambridge is not the decision-making official; the City Manager is.

Among the public agencies of Cambridge, those that have been most responsive have been agencies that were either state agencies (such as the Department of Employment Security, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, and the Department of Welfare), or they have been local agencies that receive considerable amounts of state and federal funds, and must therefore be sensitive to the various affirmative action laws and guidelines that dictate a certain degree of responsiveness. These agencies include the Department of Public Schools, the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee, and the pre-1973 Model Cities program. (The one exception to this rule has been the Housing Authority, which in spite of its outside funding has responded very minimally.) One must add, however, that these agencies responded only after pressure had been applied. The Mayor, who is also the Chairman of the School Committee, summed it up very nicely: "[Which has been most responsive?] The School Department, because of state and federal laws and Puerto Rican pressure."

The least responsive agencies have been those most directly under the City Manager, those over which this chief executive of the City has the most control. To give just one example, the Hispano community has been asking Cambridge City Hospital to hire Hispanics and Spanish-speaking personnel ever since the August 1969 meeting which
the City Manager arranged. And yet, in January of 1976 the Hospital
still did not have even a Spanish-speaking interpreter in its emer-
gency room, the most critical spot. (The problem is not with the
Hospital's Director; it seems to lie in the Department of Planning
and Development.) As a result, in January of 1976, the Concilio
Board President resorted to holding up the approval of a city clinic
in order to force the City Manager to sign a memorandum declaring
his intention to hire Hispanics at the Hospital. Thus the City Mana-
ger was made aware of a problem that was seven years old. [See Appen.]

Cambridge City Hospital is just one recent example of the City's
lack of response, but the problem dates back to the days when the
first Hispanics arrived. As the history of the Hispanic community in
Cambridge demonstrates, the only responses that the Hispanic communi-
ty had provoked from city agencies prior to its picket of CEOC in
1969 had been undesirable responses. The police were the first to
notice the Hispanics, and they responded by arresting them for public
drunkenness. Then CEOC dreamed up its "Fraternidad Hispano" program
in 1968, a program that did not respond to any community. It was
only the community's picket line in front of the CEOC offices that
drew the attention of the city's officials.

Many officials came down to see that picket line and to talk
to the people on it. The City Manager, the Mayor, the City Counci-
lors, and the officials of Model Cities came, among others. They
came down to see what was happening, some because they wanted to
help, and some because they were just curious. Others came for their
own benefit. They came in order to establish communication with
the Hispano community, for fear that their offices were next on the Concilio's list of targets. They had nothing to fear, however, for as soon as CEOC agreed to the formation of the Concilio, the picket ended. It was not until the next year, 1970, that Concilio walked into the offices of Model Cities and stayed there for three days, until its Board finally decided that they would meet with the Hispano community. The then Executive Director of Model Cities remembers that scene well.

What I think the Spanish-speaking people were saying was that the Model Cities Board had some very clear deficiencies and this didn't happen after I arrived here, this has been happening for some time. The problem had started in 1968-1969, when the planning [for the agency] took place. These people weren't coming to me saying something is wrong with you and the program, they were saying something has been wrong and we hope you can correct it. This is the way I took it. I think that the Model Cities Board discriminated against everybody except themselves.

The Hispano sit-in at Model Cities, as the ex-Director perceived, clearly was the result of unfulfilled expectations and promises. Model Cities had not spontaneously sought out the Hispano community, nor had it, of its own accord, sought to serve them.

There is no doubt that the city officials responded only when pressure was applied, but this does not tell us very much. In every society, in every community, political pressure exists, and it exists because it is necessary. So all that we have learned is that Cambridge is no exception to the rule. One city official made this point explicitly.

Some of the approaches of the Spanish Council, Spanish-speaking, were successful. I don't say that the Agency [Model Cities] went along willingly in all cases.—It's like a number
of things in a democratic process: people bring pressure to bear to get what they think is best for them and that is good. Sometimes professional people feel that they know what is best and therefore want that followed and unless there is pressure introduced to do something else—as the Spanish-speaking wanted to do—only then will it happen in a special way. [Emphasis added.]

Even though every city government is the object of pressure groups, and must respond to those groups, some cities, however, do manage to plan relatively effectively. One wonders about Cambridge. The Executive Director of the Cambridge Welfare Department, an employee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, responded with the following comment when asked how she thought the City could be made more responsive to the Hispanic community.

...I think its awareness...and I think activities of the Spanish population itself bringing it to the attention of the officials. This city responds, unfortunately, very much to pressure. And they don't do as much planning and assessment as they should. Sometimes they respond to pressure that doesn't really exist. ...I don't think they always evaluate where the pressure is coming from. I think they just respond, and I think that in most cases, they responded to the Spanish community itself saying that we need this assistance. [Emphasis added.]

The Mayor has this to say:

School yes—city no. Because politicians in City Hall are wrapped up with bureaucracies and are not compassionate, concerned with racial, ethnic, Hispanic or Puerto Rican problems. They only understand the pressure of organized groups.

---

1 The Mayor is not the only official who referred to bureaucratic rivalries over who has control over what and who is responsible for what. One small example of the problems that this can create, even in the writing of a thesis, concerns the interview with the Executive Director of Planning and Development. He would not discuss the 1975 reorganization of the City's Planning Department, and only wanted to discuss those areas that he controlled prior to 1975. These bureaucratic problems are not the subject of this thesis, and therefore they shall, for the most part, be ignored.
Unfortunately Model Cities' definition of creativity was, as this description hints, nothing more than responses, under pressure, to "everyone with different ideas." And when its second Executive Director tried in 1971 to impose a coherent planning system for the agency, the Board and other officials objected. Furthermore, the lack of assessment of the results of "different ideas" meant that the Model Cities Board and staff never asked themselves why "some of the approaches of the Spanish Council, the Spanish-speaking, were successful." And it therefore never learned the lessons that the example of CAST offered, and it did not follow up these successes by continuing to fund the kinds of projects that had been successful.

Not only do these statements confirm the author's conclusion that pressure is absolutely necessary, but they also suggest something more: that in Cambridge, pressure upon the city may be the only way to provoke a response from its officials. The author's own experience with these people, and his observations of them over the years, would force him to agree that the City's officials "don't do as much planning and assessment as they should." One ex-Director of Model Cities described their methods.

Model Cities was a model of a lot of a lot of things. Some of the things that we demonstrated with federal money failed, but unless you are prepared to endorse the status quo, which never has been a good thought, you experiment and try some creative way to solve some of these problems. That's what we try to do at Model Cities--everyone with different ideas. We tried a lot of them. Some of the approaches of Spanish Council, Spanish-speaking, were successful.

If the Spanish programs were so successful, then why didn't they follow them up? The above, then, shows the lack of assessment and
evaluation of what was a success and the reasons why.

As a result of these planning deficiencies in the agencies of Cambridge, the community has always had to go over the heads of the planners, to the City Manager, to get a response; or they have had to picket, sit-in or threaten legal action to attract the attention of the planners and their Boards. Not once was there a positive response elicited simply on the basis of reason.

But why are the Cambridge City officials so thoroughly unable to take the initiative? And worse, why are they so slow to respond? Many Cambridge residents tend to look at the City Manager and the City Council as the key persons in Cambridge decision-making. But one must not only look at the pinnacle of the structure, the tip of the iceberg. One must look at the City Manager's staff, the city's planners. The City Manager, the chief executive of the city, does have the final say on almost all matters that concern the city, and he must approve any matter before it may be taken before the City Council. In some sense, then, he is indeed the "Big Boss" of all the departments of the City of Cambridge. If a given community can communicate with the City Manager it has a much better chance of getting what it wants. And some people would ask, therefore, "Why bother with the planners, the administrators of the various programs, and those officials who are essentially the City Manager's staff?"

But there is a good reason for bothering with those who hold professional planning positions in Cambridge. The City Manager does not really run everything—he merely coordinates everything, and makes the final decisions. He is extremely dependent, therefore, on
this staff for the production of plans and for information that is fed into his decision-making process. The officials who write these plans and who gather the information have a very important impact on the alternatives from which the City Manager can choose.

The spotlight, therefore, should be turned upon the planners, those officials who during these years have been most responsible for shaping the direction that Cambridge and its 13 Neighborhoods should go.

In the body of this paper I have purposely refrained from referring to them as individuals since many of them have held several different posts in several agencies. To name them first as employees of one office and then another would only have confused the reader. Similarly, I have referred throughout this paper to the Department of Planning and Development, but the reader should be reminded at this point that there are two names that apply to the city's planning department. Not only is it referred to by the designation used in this thesis, but by yet another name: the Community Development Program. The latter was superimposed upon the Department of Planning and Development in 1975. The responsibilities of the Director of Planning and Development were reduced, and the Director of the Community Development Department was, in theory, installed over him.

The following is, therefore, a list of officials who have had much to do with planning for the City of Cambridge; some of them also are members of the Boards of various other agencies. Again they are listed not by name, but by letter. Also listed are some
relevant facts about each one, so that a general assessment of their characteristics can be made.

Official A. Official A. has been working for the City for approximately 6 years. A. first came here as an attorney for Model Cities, and then was promoted to become its third Director. Subsequently A. became Assistant City Manager for Community Development. A. does not live in Cambridge, nor does A. speak Spanish.

Official B. Official B. has been working for the City approximately 9 years. B. was the first Chairman of the Board of Model Cities, and then became its Director of Program Operations. B. is now an administrator of planning and program development for the City. B. is a resident of Cambridge (in fact, a resident of the Model Cities MNA), but does not speak Spanish.

Official C. Official C. has worked in Cambridge only six months, and is by training a social worker. As State Coordinator of HUD, Region I, IPA. Official C. is on loan to the City for two years as Human Resources advisor. Official C. neither lives in Cambridge nor speaks Spanish.

Official D. Official D. has been working in Cambridge for three and one-half years. A lawyer by training, D. was Planning Director for Model Cities, and then became Deputy Administrator for Community Development for the City. D. does not live in Cambridge, nor does D. speak Spanish.

Official E. Official E. is a planner by training, and has worked in the City for 8 years. E. has been Executive Director of Planning for the City. E. does not live in Cambridge, nor does E. speak Spanish.

Official F. Official F. has worked in Cambridge for four years as an administrator. F. was the second Director of Model Cities. F. does speak Spanish, but does not live in Cambridge. At the time of the interview F. was no longer an employee of the City.

Official G. Official G. is a social worker, and Director of the Welfare Department since 1970. F. does not live in Cambridge, nor does G. speak Spanish.

The first thing that one notes about these people who have shaped the general direction of Cambridge is that only two live in Cambridge. Only one speaks Spanish (and none speaks any of the other
foreign languages heard on the streets of Cambridge). Only one is
a planner by training. Those that are attorneys had not specialized
in relevant branches of the law before coming here. These facts
raise several questions. Since they do not live in this city, have
they acquainted themselves with it and how have they done this? How
much have they learned about the various ethnic neighborhoods of
this city? And have they acquainted themselves with the Hispano
community? Do they realize that Cambridge is in part a city of im-
migrants, and that the poor are not all alike, just because they are
poor?

The following are responses that the author received from some
of these planners when he posed a few of these questions to them.

Question: Are you familiar with the community?

No....I know that there is a course given at Harvard on
Puerto Rico, but I didn't take it. But that course did dis-
cuss...the towns. I know that when new workers come aboard I
mention it to them....I have workers here who are familiar with
the population, but I myself can't communicate, and therefore
I don't have much knowledge of it....Prior to coming here I did
a manpower training program, and in that I made sure that in
Boston that the workers read this study about Puerto Rico. [Who
did the study?] Five Families...Vida [The title of the latter
book is La Vida]...So, I had a feeling of the culture and so
forth....[Five Families is about Mexicans; La Vida is about a
very atypical family of prostitutes.]

Question: What kind of planning has Model Cities done for the
Hispano community? What services has Model Cities delivered
to the Hispano community?

[Model Cities] disputed with the Concilio [how best to
provide services for the Spanish-speaking]. I think Model
Cities' view of what should happen in Cambridge was that the
existing institutions, like the hospital, the School Department
and so forth ought to change themselves in order to have more
bilingual people in them, and I don't want to paraphrase Concil-
io's viewpoint, but it was almost a development of a mini-
Model-Cities with all kinds of subdivisions, such as recreation
and education. It was just a different viewpoint of how to serve the community. [What this official was trying to say was that Concilio thought Model Cities should provide services directly to the community, and that Model Cities thought that "existing agencies" should do that, not Model Cities itself.]

**Question:** What services does the Department of Planning and Development offer to the general community? To the Hispano community?

*We are not an agency that delivers services to people.* [Emphasis added.] We tend to operate on the policy level. We deal with fiscal and physical policy level matters, dealing with the City administration, the City Council, or city-wide things, rather than people.

The above responses indicate that these people who have been formulating and administering the programs offered by the City of Cambridge since 1970, and some of them even before that date, are not really familiar with the Hispano community. At best, they have communicated with the Concilio and have had some sort of personal involvement with one or more individuals in that community. But they do not know that community; they do not know who they are or from where they have come. They are completely dependent on people telling them about that community, or, worse, they are dependent on what they have learned from books or various other materials such as the 1970 Census. But a census is no more than numbers, and in the 1970 Census, those numbers are wrong. Nor are many of the books which people tend to read very helpful. As one Department Director indicated, she recommends the works of Oscar Lewis to all new workers; and if there are worse books than these with regard to communicating the culture of Puerto Rico and Spanish America generally, the author has not read them.
But most of these planners are not even reading bad books about Hispanics. An Executive Director of the Department of Planning and Development, the only professionally trained planner in the City, not only admits that he does not know this community, but he maintains that his Department has nothing to do with this community. He insists that other agencies are responsible for these neighborhoods, and that his own Department is only concerned with "fiscal, physical, and policy-level matters." Does he really fail to see that fiscal, physical, and policy matters are basic matters that have an impact on everything else? Does he really believe that the problems of the Hispano community are unaffected by policy decisions regarding the census or the City's overall budget? Or is this failure to see the fundamental relationships between overall policies and special neighborhood problems an excuse for ignorance of these immigrant neighborhoods that make up much of Cambridge?

If the Director of the Department really believes that there is no fundamental relationship between the parts and the whole, then there is a perfectly obvious explanation of why the planners of the City of Cambridge do not respond to the needs of the residents who support the "fiscal, physical and policy level" planning of this Department. Such beliefs might explain why the Department has not hired one Hispano or Black as a planner for one of these 13 Neighborhoods.

Such attitudes also go far to explain why the City does not plan effectively for its various communities. They might also explain
why the City of Cambridge does not seem to plan, and why when it does come up with a plan, that plan evokes so much negative response from the residents of Cambridge. This applies not only to the Hispano community, but to all those communities in Cambridge. It was not the Hispanos who raised a protest against the Kennedy Library on the Kendall Square site.

The City Manager might not have found himself backed against the wall so often (as in the case of the Hospital) if his planners had been more sensitive to the desires of the people for whom they plan. If the planners had known this community, then they would have known that they were not planning for some undifferentiated mass of poor, or only for whites, or Blacks. There were Hispanos, too. And these groups do not think alike. Even a Black Puerto Rican does not respond like a mainland Black. If the planners had known the experience of CAST and the way the Hispano community feels about public housing, they would not have been surprised when the Concilio objected to a proposed housing development plan that made no provision for anything but public housing. Evidently, however, they thought that because the spokesmen for the whites and Blacks had liked it, Hispanos would too. And they were wrong.

Considering the attitude of these planners it should come as no surprise that the City Manager, who is dependent on them for his own information, is no expert on the Hispano community of Cambridge, either. Yet it is somewhat surprising that he did not realize that the major problem among those Hispanics was not between Puerto Ricans and other nationalities (which was what he thought) but between two
groups of Puerto Ricans. Since he was City Manager in October 1969, at the time of the Battle of Central Square, one would have thought that he might have heard something to that effect, or that he would have asked who was fighting with whom on the main thoroughfare of the city. Or perhaps he did ask, and these officials told him that it was "the Spanish." And perhaps this City Manager who "wants to do that thing right" and "approach these problems" would be aware that the agencies over which he has the most control are those that were the most sluggish in their response. Then he would not cite the Department of Employment Security (a state agency) as the City's most unresponsive public agency, when those agencies most directly under his own control have been much less responsive than DES.

Faced with this unresponsive iceberg, what can the 13 Neighborhoods of Cambridge do? And, in particular, what can the Hispano community do? Obviously if the planners feel no need to go to the community, then that community must go to them, in the only manner that they understand, with political pressure. As the history of these last six or seven years demonstrates, these officials will continue these acts of arrogance, this "fiscal, physical, and policy level" planning that does not service people, unless the various communities take it upon themselves to stop them.

And with regard to the Hispano community, the leaders and the community must realize that this political pressure cannot be applied by the leaders alone. They can complain, cajole, and threaten, but only numbers, the numbers of the Hispano community, can force an end to such not-so-benign neglect. These leaders have been caught in
a vicious circle. In order to build credibility with the community, they must deliver the services. In order to deliver the services these agencies must respond. To make the agencies respond, they must prove that the community is behind them. If, however, they cannot make the agencies respond, then they lose credibility, and the community does not come out in numbers large enough to enable these leaders to deliver. So they cannot build the credibility that they need to turn these numbers out. As a result, the leaders blame the agencies for not delivering, but they also sometimes get disgusted with the people they are trying to serve, which is an understandable but not very productive response.

Since it is the tip of that iceberg, the City Council and the City Manager, that is most vulnerable, the Hispano community must organize, register, and vote in order to be able to reward and punish city councilors, who in turn will see that the City Manager does not damage their own chances for reelection by offending this community. The City Manager, in turn, will seek to direct his staff so that he is not caught between the City Council and the community. It is only when these councilors know that the Hispanics can give or withhold between 1,000 and 2,000 votes that the census-makers, the hospital, the Rent Control Board, the Housing Inspection Office, the Traffic Department, and so forth will do their duty to this body of constituents.

If the Hispanics could get organized, then the planners of the city could be taken to task. Then they would listen to what is
merely common sense, the realization that you cannot plan effectively for a community unless you know that community and what it wants. The planners would pay more attention to those programs that have succeeded, those that, either by accident or design, coincided with what the people wanted and served the needs that the people perceived. The summer recreation programs started by Father Sheehan and carried out by Concilio were oversubscribed; the Neighborhood Youth Corps attracted not only the highly motivated Coameno, but the more reticent Jayuyano. And CAST works, too, because both in the early stages of planning and in its present state its structure has made it responsive to both the desires and the fears of its residents. Both of the two former Directors of Model Cities have said that CAST is a success; so why has this model, this idea, not been followed up?

Our numbers have to be organized and concentrated upon targets, and the target should be the City Council. And that brings us to the tragedy of the Battle of Central Square, the war between the Coamenos and the Jayuyanos, and, in a larger sense, the regionalismo and the suspicions and divisions that it fosters in every Puerto Rican community on the mainland. Although most communities have not been faced with mixtures quite so explosive as that in Cambridge, regionalism has prevented all of us from learning the value of subordinating these differences, and gaining the rewards of a united community.

The leaders of our communities must recognize that they are dependent upon these numbers, and that they must do more than is
normally expected of multi-service and advocacy agencies to deal with their extraordinary problems. They have exhausted themselves trying to do it alone, trying to do what only the community as a whole can do. Like Father Sheehan, they are frustrated and discouraged, and they feel that that community does not appreciate their indefatigable efforts, that it betrays them by not coming out in the requisite numbers to support them. Thus as individuals, or as a Board, they are left extremely vulnerable to retaliation from city officials whose pride has been wounded, or whose hands have been slapped.

It is difficult when one is constantly fighting for survival to redirect one's attention from the source of the external threat to the source of internal dilemmas that weaken them from within. Always the external threat appears more pressing. The leaders must realize that they are involved in a two-front struggle, and that their only security lies in addressing themselves to the origin of their weakness. If they cannot do this thing first, they must do both things simultaneously. And they, like the planners, must listen to their community, to a community a part of which has not yet found its voice.

But there is room for hope. Neither the community's leaders nor the City's officials can shirk this responsibility. As the City Manager has said, "But the one thing we ought to do is try." Amazingly enough, although the whole community is wrapped up in this regionalism, in its pride and its prejudice, very few people realize why they have these attitudes or even that they do have them and that
they are acting upon them. It is only when it is pointed out to them that it suddenly dawns upon them that their own little peeves toward others, as well as their sense of who they are and what they represent, are all part of an island-wide web that has ensnared us all.

This community, therefore, in whatever city it finds itself, must isolate this disease-carrying agent, stick it under a microscope and stare at it in all of its ugliness, and stare at the damage that it has done to us all. The organism of this disease must be analyzed. Its origins in the history of the island, the history of hurricane-like forces that first destroyed the lives of the Borinquen, and then deposited new peoples, layer upon layer, valley after valley, in their separate worlds. We must also realize that over the centuries there has been little to weave them together for their own purposes; they have shared only the sufferings of Borinquen. They have never had the opportunity to share in a successful united struggle for their own benefit. Their unity has never been rewarded. We must stop blaming each other, pin-point the source of our problems, and wipe out this disease. But to do this we must be willing to stare it in the face, to acknowledge that it exists, and we must be willing to swallow the bitter cure.

Perhaps in Cambridge in 1965 the problems could have been avoided if we had been aware of the problem. But we were not; the body politic has already been damaged. The community's institutions will now have to adopt measures that have been recommended for the Island,
even if they have not been implemented, measures designed to deal
with this problem of cultural difference. With regard to the moun-
tain hinterlands, planners have noted the following:

The other sector of the Ponce region reaches into the most re-
 mote mountains...[including] the town of Jayuya....The develop-
ment of two such disparate sections requires entirely different
types of planning. Similarly in the San Juan area, there are
isolated municipalities—Orocovis and Barranquitas. [Bourne
and Bourne, 1973, p. 15.]

Such separate communities require separate planning, and that means
that Jayuyanos must be involved in that planning. And since Concili-
lio is the Hispanos' voice, that means that there must be Jayuyanos
on Concilio's Board. This has not happened when events were allowed
to follow their own course, so we must take measures to ensure that
Jayuyanos are represented. In short, Concilio will probably have
to add some sort of quota system to its by-laws concerning the elec-
tion of Board members. There seems to be no other way to ensure
proportional representation for this group.

This will not be easy. And it will not work unless the commu-
nity leaders, the members of that Board, realize that such a system
is absolutely essential to the community's future development. Fur-
thermore, and even more difficult, they must convince the already
organized portion of that community, the mass of Coamenos, that such
measures are necessary. Otherwise, putting Coamenos and Jayuyanos
on that Board, seating them around the same table, will only facili-
tate further misunderstandings, further disaster.

Nor will it be easy to find Jayuyanos to run for election, to
sit on that Board. They have not produced leaders in the almost
unconscious way that the Coamenos have. All those Jayuyanos who have been at Concilio, as Executive Director, as Board member, or as CETA employee, have been there because the Coamenos put them there, in the absence of any Jayuyanos who wanted to be there. As a result, they were not leaders produced by the Jayuyano people. They had no constituency, no credibility within their own group, no support from that group, and they did not serve that group. The only Jayuyanos in this saga who are even likely candidates for the title of leader are those three men, jailed by the first Executive Director, who led the people to what became the Battle of Central Square. And since two of those three have left Cambridge, even they are not a realistic possibility. But as Gordon Lewis suggests in his lament about island politics generally, "the capacity of any people for 'self-government' rests in the last resort upon the practical opportunities that are given to it to undertake the experiment." [Lewis, 1963, p. 111.] It is up to the leadership of Concilio to persuade the Jayuyano that participation is worth it, to him and his community.

There is nothing in the Jayuyano's past experience, either in Otoao or in Cambridge, to convince him that his participation matters. As a hired hand of the hacendado, or as the independent, but marginal subsistence farmer completely engulfed by the hacendado's world, or as the object of the omnipresent citified Coameno's slurs, nothing in his experience has given him any reason not to retreat to his mountain stronghold of isolation and non-participation. It is
therefore incumbent upon this community's present leadership to
demonstrate otherwise.

The leadership must therefore go beyond the normal call of duty
with regard to this group and give it special consideration. The
Concilio must conceive some plan by which the services are brought
to their very doorsteps. Perhaps by setting up branch offices in
the neighborhoods where they live, by bringing these services to
them, they can be convinced that the Hispano leadership intends to
include them, too. The staff who work in these branches must be
trained; they must be educated so that they understand the origins
of this community, the assumptions that it makes, the conclusions
that it necessarily draws. This staff must be patient, for it must
overcome a lifetime of experience and a tradition hundreds of years
old that have taught these people to survive in one particular way,
perhaps the only way in which they could have survived against the
series of disasters that have struck Jayuya. They must realize that,
especially, what they are proposing to do is to deprive these people
of the habit of withdrawal, their one successful port in the storms
that have buffeted them for centuries.

Quota systems and other programs that give special privileges
are not without their own problems. They are by no means an ultimate
solution. They are not anyone's goal. They are, however, useful
tools. When some groups are better endowed than others by their
historical experience with the means of survival, such systems of
special treatment are necessary. Until the means of survival, the
means of success, however one defines it, are equally dispersed, the more fortunate and the less fortunate cannot meet as equals, because they are not equally powerful. And if the Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics are willing to apply such reasoning to themselves in terms of their relationship to the Anglo community, they should be able to learn to apply it within their own community. Until the Jayuyanos begin to acquire some of these survival skills, they will not be the Coamenos' equals, politically. And if they cannot meet the Coamenos as equals, and unify with them on the basis of political equality, they will not meet them, they will not unify with them. There is no point to their participating as tokens. Nor would their pride let them participate except as equals.

Not only are the leaders dependent upon the whole community, they could also use a little help from the City's officials. Not only should the community leaders not give up, but the city's officials also must assume their responsibilities. They, too, must acquaint themselves with the community's origins and its problems, and what is required to solve those problems. Father Sheehan was the one man who knew this problem, but he did not understand its origins, and thus he could not understand how to begin working on a solution. But those who know its origins, who know why the various groups act the way they do, can do something about it.

So what can they do? First, they should stop trying to place the blame on anyone's shoulders. The problem should not be blamed on the Coamenos, or the Jayuyanos. Perhaps the two groups should have handled their problems better, but they did not cause their
problems. If one wants to blame people, then the City officials should share the blame. They can be blamed for their ignorance and its various manifestations: the way in which they have made things difficult for the community's leaders, the way they have not listened to what they were told, and the way in which they have not assisted as much as they could have in the delivery of services.

They too have a responsibility. Or, as the City Manager said, "one delivers these services because it is a mandate of the people." The City Manager could begin by hiring Hispanics in those agencies that have or should have some relationship to the community. Hispanics on their boards and as their employees would ensure that they are not planning in the dark, that they are not making decisions without the necessary understanding. There were no Hispanics on the Board of CEOC when it designed the ill-fated Fraternidad Hispana, nor did Model Cities have any Hispanics on its Board when they failed to deliver on their promises.

And the officials of the City could acquaint themselves with a few basic facts about the community, so that their ignorance does not tie the hands of the community's leaders. It was the scene in the bars and the clubs that started the problem, but the event that sealed the community's fate was the Battle of Central Square, and in that the City's officials were not totally blameless. The Board of Directors had wanted to fire the man who sparked that violence, they had wanted to fire him for a long time, but the Director of CEOC had not listened to them.
The obvious solution to this problem of ignorance would be for the officials to talk to the people for whom they are planning. But if they cannot do that, and they will not hire Hispanics, then they should at least listen to that community's leaders when they are trying to tell them something.

And they must assume that these leaders know what they are doing. One can only ascribe to prejudice the Board of CEOC's refusal to let Concilio have control over its own funds from 1969 to 1971. The Board of Model Cities was quite explicit, in front of its second Director. They had no faith in the capacities of the Hispano leadership to handle so much money and so much control. One can only attribute such attitudes to ignorance or prejudice. As they proved to CCS, and to Model Cities, the programs that they have designed and implemented have been successful. The recreation programs and the housing programs, in particular, have demonstrated that this all-pervasive lack of confidence is totally unwarranted.

Furthermore, one can only ascribe to prejudice the assumption on the part of officials that Hispanics do not understand and know their own community. The author often complains about the books by Oscar Lewis; the reason he does so is that the officials of this city, when they do read books about Hispanics, read Oscar Lewis. And when an Hispano, a Puerto Rican, tries to tell them that Five Families is about Mexicans, not Puerto Ricans, and that La Vida applies to one particular family, and is not a description of all Puerto Ricans, they do not believe the Hispano. To his face, they tell him he is wrong, that Five Families is about Puerto Ricans. One
wonders if they would dispute the word of another Anglo, if that Anglo were describing to them a book about their home town.

In short, the officials could begin by admitting that to plan successfully for an ethnically diverse city like Cambridge they need to know something about the cultures of its communities. Then they could admit that they are ignorant of these communities, and then they could try to remedy that ignorance. Then they might be able to gain some credibility and build trust between themselves and these communities.

In Cambridge, with regard to the particular course that regionalism has taken between the Coameno and the Jayuyano, the community's leaders and the City's officials should work together to build trust. And to build that trust they themselves must make an effort to find out what it is that these people perceive to be their problems and then help them solve at least one small problem. Even a small beginning in the right direction is better than nothing, and better than blocking that road. They could be of great assistance to the Concilio by helping it deliver, to help it overcome the centuries-old mistrust of the urbanite that quite reasonably dwells in the Jayuyano's mind. Instead, they have kept Concilio fighting to survive, and have forced Concilio to fight so hard for every "favor" bestowed that Concilio has been seriously handicapped in its ability to deal with this problem. It would also help if they would stop tossing Concilio around like a football in their bureaucratic games.

It is an extremely difficult problem that cannot be solved overnight. But if the officials are willing, Hispanics might be able to
solve some of their problems; and they might begin to solve the bigger problems. But the arrogance of ignorance, a sense of superiority, and impatience with these people, either on the part of other Hispanos or the officials, will prevent anything from being done. It will make this an insoluble problem. For if the leaders or the officials act like hacendados, the Jayuyanos will treat them like hacendados, and they will hold them responsible for not delivering the services to them, not because they could not, but because they would not.

What planners must know if they are to produce results is what people think, and if they want to change the status quo, they must first change the people's minds. Ultimately what matters are not the services delivered, or how often these people vote. These things, like the quotas, are just means to an end. What does matter is that the people of Otoao learn that they can solve their problems. The first Executive Director delivered some services, but he convinced the people that he, personally, had brought them these things, which was a lie. That he was in a position to pretend was only because of the numbers that the city officials believed that he controlled. He did not serve these people, they served him. What matters is not what is delivered but the process of delivery, for that is what will change their minds. This process must convince the people of Otoao that they can begin to control these hurricanes that have torn them by the roots from the soil of Otoao and blown them to Cambridge. The process must convince them that "fate" can be changed, that men create these hurricanes and that men can stop them.
APPENDIX A

Regional Differences between the Towns: Comparisons and Contrasts

1. The 1970 Census:

a. Age by Sex, for Municipios: 1970 (Table 28)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipio</th>
<th>Median Age:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COAMO</td>
<td>Males: 18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAYUYA</td>
<td>Males: 17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Coamanos tend to be slightly older than the average Jayuyano.

b. Household Relationship, for Municipios, 1970 (Table 29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipio</th>
<th>Persons per household:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COAMO</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAYUYA</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Jayuyanos demonstrate a larger household composition than the Coamenos.
c. Social Characteristics for Municipios, 1970 (Table 98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Workers</td>
<td>4,389</td>
<td>1,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in Municipality of Residence:</td>
<td>2,828 (64%)</td>
<td>1,430 (73.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked outside of Municipality:</td>
<td>1,183 (27%)</td>
<td>142 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Work Not Reported:</td>
<td>378 (9%)</td>
<td>363 (19%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: A significantly greater number of Coamenos work outside of their respective municipality than Jayuyanos. Public access may be considered a major factor here.

d. Employment Characteristics for Municipios, 1970 (Table 102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males, 16+ yrs.</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, 16+ yrs.</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Unemployment is higher in Jayuya than in Coamo; male unemployment is higher than female in both towns, but to a greater extent in Jayuya.
e. Occupation and Earnings for Municipios, 1970 (Table 103)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males, 16+ yrs.</td>
<td>$2,126</td>
<td>$1,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, 16+ yrs.</td>
<td>$2,036</td>
<td>$2,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,082</td>
<td>$2,074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Earnings of both male and female are more consistent in Coamo; the earnings of the Jayuyano female are higher than all other categories, and more than 60% more than that of the Jayuyano male.

f. Occupations and Earnings for Municipios, 1970 (Table 103)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Employed, 16+ years:</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>1,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers:</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgrs. &amp; Admin., except Farm:</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers:</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Kindred Wkrs:</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives, except Transport:</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equipment Operatives:</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except Farm:</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and Farm Managers:</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Laborers and Foremen:</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Wkrs., except Household:</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Household Workers:</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Employment concentration in Coamo is more related to factory work than in Jayuya (1-operatives/factory work, 2-craftsmen, 3-farm workers), with Jayuya placing more emphasis on agricultural and manual labor (1-farm workers, 2-laborers, 3-factory workers).
g. Income and Poverty Status in 1969 for Municipios (Table 105)

Mean Family Income—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$4,503</td>
<td>$2,339</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Coamenos have nearly double the family income of Jayuyanos; also, they have fewer individuals in the family to spend it on.

h. Income and Poverty Status in 1969 for Municipios (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of families living below poverty level:</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% receiving public assistance income:</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Both towns have large numbers of people living below poverty level, with Jayuya showing the more serious condition.
i. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, 1970

School Enrollment--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total enrolled, 3-34 yrs:</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Median School Yrs. Completed--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>6.0 yrs.</td>
<td>4.1 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>5.1 yrs.</td>
<td>3.7 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>5.6 yrs.</td>
<td>3.9 yrs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Coamenos, 25 yrs. and older tend to be more educated than the average Jayuyanos of comparable age; both towns show relatively positive % of present school enrollment, with Jayuya apparently having a higher % enrolled. The dropout rate may be an unknown factor here.


j. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, cont.

% of high school graduates--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males, 25+ yrs:</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, 25+ yrs:</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 25+ yrs:</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Although Coamo has a higher percentage of males than females who are high school graduates, the reverse is true of Jayuya; This could be a factor in the employment situation in Jayuya.
k. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, cont.

% of college graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>males, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>females, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total, 25+ yrs.</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: The difference between the two towns is practically negligible; Coamo, however, is the higher, with a full 1% difference between the males.

Population increases and decreases based upon the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>26,485</td>
<td>15,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26,080</td>
<td>14,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26,468</td>
<td>13,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: During the period of 1960, both towns suffered a population decrease. Between 1960 and 1970, Coamo has apparently recuperated, but Jayuya continues to decrease. From 1950 to 1970, the Jayuya municipality has decreased by 9.3%. (It is interesting to note that according to the 1970 Census, the barrios of Jayuya which have lost the greatest population are those located near the Cordillera.)
Urban percentages based upon the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Jayuya has shown a dramatic increase in urbanization, between 1950-1960, and also between 1960-1970, a virtual 28.2% increase in 20 years; Jayuya was considered to have no urban population until 1960 Census reports. Coamo, on the other hand, has had a relatively stable urban area for at least the past 20 years. The decrease may be attributed to the increase in housing developments (urbanizaciones) outside of the main urban area.

% of Manufacturing based upon 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Coamo suffered a decrease in manufacturing in 1950-1960, but has more than doubled in the last 10 years. This decrease may have been a contributing factor to the population decrease of the same period. Jayuya went through a small increase in 1960, and, like Coamo, a major increase in 1970. Jayuya's population, however, continues to decrease while Coamo's population has apparently stabilized.
Median Family Income based upon the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coamo</td>
<td>$410</td>
<td>$720</td>
<td>$1,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayuya</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>$649</td>
<td>$1,578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Both Towns have gained tremendously in median income during the past 20 years and especially during the past 10 years. Coamo has increased 79% in median income, and Jayuya has increased 84%.

Comparisons with the Island: 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census

a. Population Attrition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coamo</th>
<th>Jayuya</th>
<th>The Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>26,485</td>
<td>15,113</td>
<td>2,210,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26,080</td>
<td>14,632</td>
<td>2,349,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26,468</td>
<td>13,588</td>
<td>2,712,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Although Coamo and Jayuya suffered population decline in the 1950-60 period, the Island increased; in fact, the Island shows continual increase over the past 20 years.

b. Urban Percentage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
<th>THE ISLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Coamo remains relatively stable in urban population; Jayuya undergoes 2 major increases; the Island shows a 15.9% increase since 1960, and a steady increase over the 2 decades.


c. Percent of manufacturing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
<th>THE ISLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: The increase in manufacturing on the Island as a whole has been more gradual than in Coamo and Jayuya. Coamo appears to be more industrialized than average in comparison with the rest of the Island.

d. Family Median Income:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>COAMO</th>
<th>JAYUYA</th>
<th>THE ISLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>$ 410</td>
<td>$ 250</td>
<td>$ 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$ 720</td>
<td>$ 649</td>
<td>$1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$1,924</td>
<td>$1,518</td>
<td>$3,063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Although all three areas underwent major increases in both decades, Coamo and Jayuya are still way behind the Island in Family Median Income. The Island appears to have undergone the major percentage growth between 1950-1960, and all three have more than doubled in the 1960-1970 period. Although all other increases for the Island have undergone relatively gradual increases, it is this category that indicates the most significant change.
HISPANO FAMILIES LIVING IN PUBLICLY-ASSISTED HOUSING
(From "Major Publicly-Assisted Housing Developments in Cambridge,"
Department of Community Development, Cambridge, August 14, 1974)

NORTH CAMBRIDGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>3-Bedroom Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>Hispano Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson Park</td>
<td>152 49%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>12 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Way</td>
<td>43 77%</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rindge Towers</td>
<td>42 5%</td>
<td>elderly, moderate</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>20 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walden Square</td>
<td>108 45%</td>
<td>elderly, low, moderate</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>12 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>345</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1383</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>3-Bedroom Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>Hispano Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harwell Homes</td>
<td>24 43%</td>
<td>elderly, moderate</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inman Court</td>
<td>18 15%</td>
<td>elderly, moderate</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>6 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newtowne Court</td>
<td>88 30%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>26 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt Towers</td>
<td>112 49%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>5 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Elms</td>
<td>126 39%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>46 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>368</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1018</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTHER AREAS COMBINED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>3-Bedroom Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>Hispano Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corcoran Park</td>
<td>78 51%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>808 Memorial Dr.</td>
<td>34 11%</td>
<td>elderly, low, middle, mrkt.</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>9 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millers River</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>elderly</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>10 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>929 Mass. Ave.</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>elderly, market</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putnam Gardens</td>
<td>42 34%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodrow Wilson Court</td>
<td>4 6%</td>
<td>elderly, low</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>158</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1043</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>871 25%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3444</strong></td>
<td><strong>156 4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
<th>number of Hispano Units</th>
<th>percentage of Hispano Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of units in public housing projects that contain Hispanics (from Chart A)</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of units in public housing projects (1974)</td>
<td>4,862</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of units in public housing projects that include low-income units</td>
<td>2,098</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of units in public housing projects that include middle-income and market price units, and include Hispanics.</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income and market price units, with or without Hispanics.</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX B

**TRACT SUMMARIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tract #</th>
<th>Spanish Language Population</th>
<th>Other Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3521</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3522</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3523</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3524</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3525</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3526</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3527</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3528</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3529</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3530</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3531</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3532</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3533</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3534</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3535</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3536</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3537</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3538</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3539</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3540</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3541</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3542</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3543</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3544</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3545</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3546</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3547</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3548</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3549</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3550</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Spanish Language Population** 1,941

**Other America Population** 1,185

**total** \(= 1,941\)**  \(=1,185\)**

**OBSERVATION:** The Other American population only registered in Tract Counts as a specific population if it was among the Top 3 Countries of Origin of Foreign Stock. Other than that, it was included in the gross Foreign Stock population.
Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge

TOTAL ENROLLED IN SCHOOL (15%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Enrolled (3-34 years)</th>
<th>SPANISH-AMERICAN</th>
<th>663</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NURSERY</strong></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Private</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KINDERGARTEN**

| Total                       | 50               | 100.0 |
| Public                      | 44               | 88.0  |
| Parochial                   | -0-              | -0-  |
| Other Private               | 6                | 12.0  |

**ELEMENTARY (1-8 yrs.)**

| Total                       | 178              | 100.0 |
| Public                      | 136              | 76.4  |
| Parochial                   | 39               | 21.9  |
| Other Private               | 3                | 1.7   |

**HIGH SCHOOL (1-4 yrs.)**

| Total                       | 65               | 100.0 |
| Public                      | 54               | 83.1  |
| Parochial                   | 11               | 16.9  |
| Other Private               | -0-              | -0-   |

**COLLEGE**

| Total                       | 330              | 100.0 |
| Private                     | 330              | 100.0 |

Total Enrolled over 35 years =16

OBSERVATION: This table affirms the high sampling of Hispanic college students.
PERCENT OF PERSONS 25 AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED (20%)

SPANISH-AMERICAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE COMPLETED</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEMENTARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 4</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Persons 25+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>452</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: This is another affirmation of the oversampling of the college student population. Also, the % figure of 78.9% in the total column for College 1-3 appears to be a mathematical error.
Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge

COUNT OF PERSONS 25 AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPANISH-AMERICAN</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All persons 25+</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None Completed</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ELEMENTARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HIGH SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COLLEGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: More evidence of the oversampling of the college Hispanic population.
Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge

MEDIAN AGE

SPANISH AMERICAN POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: Although this varies slightly from the author's opinion that the Median Age of the Puerto Rican population (principally male) was approximately 22 years of age, this discrepancy could be due to the number of college students sampled, especially fifth-year or graduate students of Hispanic origin.
Appendix B (cont.)

MEDIAN AGE OF THE HISPANO POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: The Median age for the Brown Study population is approximately 5 years less than that of the 1970 Census. The difference for the male population is approximately 8 years; possibly this may be attributable to the elimination of the college population by the Brown Study.

COUNT OF PERSONS ENROLLED IN SCHOOL BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Hispanic % of Pop. in Age Group/Brown Study</th>
<th>Hispanic % of Pop. in Age Group/1970 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-13</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of all persons age 3-34 in school: 47.6% 45.8%

OBSERVATIONS: Although the Brown Study intentionally did not sample the college student population, one can observe the oversampling of that group by the 1970 Census. Although there are percentage variances between the two, one can also observe a rather high school enrollment rate for the under-18 population.
Appendix B (cont.)

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS 25 YEARS AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None completed</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 years</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: The Brown Study found the highest percentage of the population studied (26.6%) had completed 5-6 years of schooling, whereas the 1970 Census found the highest percentage in the fifth year of college.

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OLDER (By percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers:</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar and Service Workers:</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: Here the two studies are in complete opposition. Probably the 1970 Census arrived at these percentages based upon sampling the student and higher-income Hispanic population. If one were to accept the Brown conclusions, other contrasting characteristics in terms of economic necessity and so forth would logically follow.
Appendix B (cont.)

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF HISPANIC POPULATION / Contrasted with general population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Age</th>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
<th>General pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 and over</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: The Brown study demonstrates a much higher unemployment rate than the 1970 Census. Furthermore, Dr. Brown notes in her commentary that "...this 14.5%, however, does not reflect an accurate unemployment figure for as is evident, in reality additional non-working persons desire employment but temporarily have given up looking for work." [Brown pp. 35-37.] Both studies show higher %s of Hispanic unemployed than the rate for the general population. Note: Because the 1970 Census did not give the unemployment rate for Hispanics in percentages, the 7.9% figure was arrived at by dividing the number of unemployed hispanos into the number of employed.

MEDIAN ANNUAL INCOME FOR HISPANO HOUSEHOLDS 1970/ Contrasted with General Population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
<th>General Population (Census)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5,616</td>
<td>$6,612</td>
<td>$9,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: The Brown Study demonstrated a lower family income for Hispanics than the 1970 Census; however, both studies demonstrated that the Hispanic family income was demonstrably lower than that of the general population.

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS: UNITS BY NUMBER OF PERSONS PER UNIT/ Contrasted with General Population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Brown Study</th>
<th>1970 Census</th>
<th>General Population (Census)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATION: The Brown study found a higher concentration than both the Census Hispanic count and the general count; in the case of both the Brown Study and the Census Hispanic count, the Hispanic population evidenced higher concentration. Thus, we can correlate with the previous table. Hispanics have both lower income and higher concentration per unit.
Another important facet of the Brown study was that it took into consideration both Nationalistic Hispanic and Regional Puerto Rican differences when it addressed the question of Population composition. The 1970 Census, on the other hand, broke the Spanish language population into several categories and did not address itself at all to Puerto Rican regional differences. The Puerto Rican population was handled most awkwardly by this census, and as previously discussed the Puerto Rican could appear in any one of three categories, if at all. Brown addressed the question of National Origin in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Master List Pop.</th>
<th>Household Heads</th>
<th>Sample Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latin Country</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Mainland</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Country</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Individuals      | 576              | 137             | 593          |

OBSERVATIONS: Dr. Brown did an extensive breakdown of Country of origin. On all lists, the highest percentage was Puerto Rican. Interesting to note is the 30% total giving Country of Birth as U.S. Mainland.
Dr. Brown included in her publication a specific Table of Regional Origins of the Puerto Rican population. The percentage breakdown offered the following results:

PERCENTAGE OF ALL PERSONS BORN IN PUERTO RICO BY PLACE OF BIRTH
(Table 9, Brown Study)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Coamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Jayuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Ponce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Orocovis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>San Juan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Caguas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Mayaguez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Other Towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Other Cities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: The Coameno population proved to be significantly larger than all other populations; Dr. Brown placed the combined percentage of Coamo and Jayuya at 62%.

Another interesting calculation made by Dr. Brown that was unavailable in the 1970 Census was the place of birth on the Mainland:

PERCENTAGE OF ALL HISPANOS BORN ON THE MAINLAND U.S. BY PLACE OF BIRTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>Miami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Other locations in Mass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBSERVATIONS: By far the largest percentage is that of persons born in Cambridge. If one could assume that the majority of this population was of Puerto Rican origin, then it would follow that any count of the Puerto Rican population by the 1980 Census would be even more difficult than the 1970, unless some modification were made.
Appendix C.

QUESTIONNAIRE:

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
1. Name:
2. Address:
3. Age:
4. Nationality:
5. Relationship to Hispanic/Puerto Rican Community:

II. EMPLOYMENT:
1. Occupation:
2. Employed by:
3. How long have you worked in the Cambridge Area:
4. What services do you or your agency offer to:
   a. The general population-
   b. The Hispanic population-
   c. The Puerto Rican population-
5. Based upon what data available do you offer these services:
6. During your planning process, is consideration given to:
   a. General Hispanic needs and differences-
   b. Puerto Rican regional differences-
7. Does your agency employ Hispanos? Nationality: yes no

III. FAMILIARIZATION
1. When did you first become aware that there was a Spanish-speaking population in the city of Cambridge: Year
2. Are you familiar with this population? yes no
   a. If yes, please name the 3 most predominant Spanish-Speaking populations in Cambridge:
      1.
      2.
      3.
3. Please estimate the size of:
   a. The Hispanic population of Cambridge:
   b. The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:
4. Why, in your opinion, would a non-Puerto Rican Hispano claim to be a Puerto Rican?
5. What are the principal towns on the Island from which our Puerto Rican population in Cambridge originates:
   a.
   b.
6. Do you speak Spanish? Any other language? yes no
7. What is your first reaction when you hear someone speaking Spanish?
8. What, in your opinion, is the difference between an Ethnic group and a Minority group?
Appendix C. (cont.)

Anglo Interviews

IV. PERCEPTIONS-
1. What, in your opinion, has been the official response to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population by the City Officials?

2. Do you feel this response has been successful? __________ yes no
   a. Why?______________________________________________

3. Which agencies within the City do you feel have responded most to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?
   a. __________________________________________________
   b. __________________________________________________
   c. __________________________________________________
   d. __________________________________________________
   e. __________________________________________________

4. Do you feel this response has been successful? __________ yes no
   a. Why?______________________________________________

5. Which agencies within the City do you feel have responded least to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?
   a. __________________________________________________
   b. __________________________________________________
   c. __________________________________________________
   d. __________________________________________________
   e. __________________________________________________

6. In your opinion, has your group or agency responded to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population? __________ yes no
   a. How has your group/agency responded?

7. To what do you attribute the response by the City officials and city agencies to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?

8. In your opinion, what are the major obstacles confronting:
   a. the Puerto Rican population today-________________________
   b. the general Hispanic population today-_______________________

9. Are you familiar with the Concilio Hispano? __________ yes no
   a. If yes, what do you feel have been the major successes of this agency-________________________
   b. What do you feel have been its major drawbacks-________________________

10. In your opinion, what are the major needs of:
    a. The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge-______________________
    b. The general Hispanic population of Cambridge-______________________
Appendix C. (cont.)

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. What type of additional information or data would you like to see made available to the Anglo public?

2. What recommendations would you give to the Concilio in order to improve its services?

3. What recommendations do you have for improving services to and the involvement of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican community by the Anglo public?

4. What recommendations do you have for:
   a. The Puerto Rican community-
   b. The general Hispanic community-

5. How would you envision the City and city agencies incorporating these recommendations into their Planning Process?
Appendix C. (cont.)

OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA

Section II

Question # — ( )

(4) What services do you or your agency offer to:

(a) The General Population:

1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or Community Organization 1
3. Technical Assistance and/or Funding 5
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 1

(b) The Hispano Population:

1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or Community Organization 1
3. Technical Services and/or Funding 6
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 2

(c) The Puerto Rican Population

1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or Community Organization 1
3. Technical Assistance and/or Funding 6
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 2

(5) Based upon what data available do you offer these services:

1. The 1970 Census 7
2. The Brown Study 2
3. Federal/State Requirements 5
4. Own statistics/records 5
5. "Need" 4
6. other 3
7. No answer 5
Appendix c. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section II, cont.

(6) During your planning process, is consideration given to:
   (a) General Hispanic Needs and Differences:
   1. yes__14__
   2. no__4__
   3. no answer__3__
   (b) Puerto Rican Regional Differences:
   1. yes__1__
   2. no__17__
   3. no answer__3__

(7) Does your agency employ Hispanos:
   1. yes__12__
   2. no__8__
   3. no answer__1__

   Nationality:
   1. Puerto Rican__6__
   2. Non-Puerto Rican Hispanos__4__
   3. Don't Know__4__
   4. No Answer__12__

SECTION III

(1) When did you first become aware that there was a Spanish-speaking population in the City of Cambridge:
   1. 1960-1965__2__
   2. 1966-1969__10__
   3. 1970-1975__8__
   4. No Answer__1__

(2) Are you familiar with this population:
   1. yes__18__
   2. no__3__
   If yes, please name the 3 most predominant Spanish-speaking populations:
   1. Puerto Rican__18__
   2. Cuban__12__
   3. Dominican__7__
   4. Other__8__
   5. Don't Know__0__
   6. No Answer__3__
Appendix C. (cont.)

OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section III, Cont.

(3) Please estimate the size of:

(a) The Hispano population of Cambridge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Range</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-4,599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,600-6,099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,100-8,099</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,100-10,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Range</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,999</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-4,599</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,600-6,099</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,100-8,099</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,100-10,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Why, in your opinion, would a Non-Puerto Rican Hispano claim to be a Puerto Rican:

1. To qualify for Federal and State Benefits 11
2. To avoid U.S. Immigration Laws 2
3. Other 3
4. Don't Know 6
5. No Answer 0

(5) What are the principal towns on the Island from which our Puerto Rican population in Cambridge originates:

1. Coamo 6
2. Jayuya 1
3. Other 8
4. Don't Know 6
5. No Answer 4

(8) What, in your opinion, is the difference between an Ethnic group and a Minority group:

1. Race/Color 5
2. Socio-Economic Conditions 3
3. Number 3
4. Public Opinion 2
5. Language 3
6. Other 3
7. Don't Know/No Answer 6

SECTION IV

(1) What, in your opinion, has been the official response to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population by the City Officials:

1. open and responsive 2
2. somewhat responsive/growing awareness 5
3. general lack of recognition 5
4. react to pressure only 5
5. other 3
6. don't know/ no answer 2
Appendix C, (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.

(2) Do you feel this response has been successful:

1. yes 8
2. no 9
3. Other 3
4. no answer 1

If yes, why?
- Increased resources available for Hispanics 1
- Visible results and awareness 2
- Local pressure 1
- Federal and State Requirements 0
- Relaxation of Tensions 1
- Hispanics Remain Powerless 2
- Other 1
- Don't Know/No Answer 2

If no, why?
- Lack of internal motivation on the part of the City 1
- Weakness of Hispano political power 2
- Inadequate funding 0
- Better Response Possible 1
- Other 2
- Don't know/No Answer 4

(3) Which agencies within the city do you feel have responded most to the needs of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population:

Five most frequently mentioned: 1. Concilio Hispano
2. CEOC
3. Cambridge School Department
4. Welfare Department
5. Cambridge Model Cities

(4) Do you feel that this response has been successful:

1. yes 9
2. no 1
3. somewhat 4
4. Don't know/no answer 7

If yes, why?
- Federal/State Requirements 0
- Increased resources for Spanish-speaking 2
- Increased awareness 4
- Visible results 6
- Other 2
- Don't know/no answer 1
Appendix C. (cont.)

OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.

If no, why?

a. Insufficient funds \[1\]
b. Political jealousies \[1\]
c. Lack of motivation \[-0-\]
d. Weakness of Hispano political power \[1\]
e. Other \[-0-\]
f. Don't know/no answer \[1\]

(5) Which agencies within the city do you feel have responded least to the Hispano and Puerto Rican population?

Most frequently mentioned:

1. Cambridge City Hospital
2. Cambridge Redevelopment Authority
3. Cambridge City Council
4. Cambridge Recreation Department
5. Chamber of Commerce
6. Universities (Harvard, MIT)
7. Department of Public Works
8. Police Department
9. Cambridge School Department

[Note: It was impossible to limit this to five responses, since the last five agencies mentioned were tied.]

(6) In your opinion, has your group or agency responded to the Puerto Rican and Hispanic population:

1. Yes \[14\]
2. No \[1\]
3. Somewhat \[3\]
4. No answer \[3\]

(6a) If yes, how has your group responded?

a. Funding \[5\]
b. Technical Assistance \[7\]
c. Services \[9\]
d. Other \[4\]
e. Don't know/no answer \[1\]

(7) To what do you attribute the response by the City officials and City agencies to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population:

1. Pressure \[9\]
2. Growing Awareness \[3\]
3. Political Powerlessness of Hispanos \[3\]
4. "Need" \[3\]
5. Institutionalized Racism \[2\]
6. Federal/State Requirements \[1\]
7. Fiscal Reputation of Concilio \[1\]
8. Lack of commitment \[2\]
9. "White guilt" \[1\]
10. Other \[-0-\]
11. Don't know/no answer \[2\]
Appendix C, (cont.)

OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.

(8) In your opinion, what are the major obstacles confronting:
(a) the Puerto Rican population today:

1. Limited skills_13
2. Inability to assimilate/isolation_4
3. Language barrier_8
4. Discrimination_6
5. Limited political power/involvement_3
6. Other_4
7. Don't know/no answer_3

(b) the general Hispano population today:

1. Leadership_2
2. Citizenship_4
3. Language barrier_4
4. Limited skills_8
5. Discrimination_4
6. Inability to assimilate_2
7. Other_2
8. Don't know/no answer_7

(9) Are you familiar with the Concilio Hispano?

1. Yes_20
2. No_1

(a) If yes, what do you feel have been the major successes of the agency:

1. Provision of services_3
2. Advocacy and community leadership_14
3. Community organization_5
4. Other_2
5. Don't know/no answer_3

(b) What do you feel have been its major drawbacks:

1. Inability to coordinate internally_4
2. Inability to provide services_1
3. Lack of direction in leadership_4
4. Lack of political involvement_2
5. Lack of funding_6
6. Isolation_2
7. Overexpansion_1
8. Other_2
9. Don't know/no answer_4
Appendix C. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.

(10) In your opinion, what are the major needs of:

(a) the Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment and training</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Involvement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of leadership</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational opportunities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) the general Hispano population of Cambridge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment and training</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Leadership</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Opportunities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no answer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION V

(1) What type of additional information or data would you like to see made available to the Anglo public:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information/Data</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origins of the Puerto Ricans and Hispanics</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Differences between Puerto Ricans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs of Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services and Events of Concilio</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services available to Hispanos in the community</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) What recommendations would you give to the Concilio in order to improve its services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase funding pattern</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater political involvement by members</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delineate Goals and Objectives</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More community involvement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate citywide application of Affirmative Action</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve publicity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialize services</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define distribution of power</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider Hispanic and regional differences in planning process</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. (Cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section V, cont.

(3) What recommendations do you have for improving services to and the involvement of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican community by the Anglo public:

1. Encourage Hispanics to join Community Planning meetings
2. Utilize Concilio personnel and data in Planning process
3. Conduct bilingual community meetings in areas of Hispano concentration
4. Better effort of communication
5. Greater utilization of data available on Puerto Ricans and Hispanics.
6. Other
7. Don't know/no answer

(4) What recommendations do you have for:

(a) the Puerto Rican community:

1. Assimilate
2. Become involved in City issues
3. Establish a political base
4. Strengthen Concilio
5. Greater utilization of resources available in private sector
6. Other
7. Don't know/no answer

(b) the general Hispano community:

1. Assimilate
2. Become involved in City issues
3. Establish a political base
4. Strengthen Concilio
5. Greater utilization of resources available in the private sector
6. Other
7. Don't know/no answer

(5) How would you envision the City and city agencies incorporating these recommendations into their planning process:

1. Conduct bilingual planning meetings in areas of Hispano concentration
2. Utilize more comprehensive data on Hispanics in planning process
3. Develop awareness of regional and national differences and incorporate these into the Planning process
4. Hire more Puerto Ricans and Hispanics in City Depts. and Agencies
5. Utilize relevant Concilio personnel in planning process
6. Other
7. Don't know/no answer
APPENDIX D.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND
CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE

1. The City of Cambridge hereby announces and binds itself to a formal commitment by it to recruit and hire qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel to fill positions at all levels of employment by the City of Cambridge, in accordance with both the letter and spirit of any and all state and/or federal Affirmative Action guidelines.

1A. This agreement is subject to all applicable Civil Service and other State and Federal requirements of law.

2. The City of Cambridge further agrees to appoint Puerto Rican and other Hispanic representative to any and all boards and committees whose decisions affect the Puerto Rican and other Hispanic Community of Cambridge, with special emphasis to be placed in appointing said representatives to the Cambridge Housing Authority and the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority.

3. As consideration for this agreement, Concilio Hispano de Cambridge, as a representative for the Puerto Rican and other Hispanic Community, acknowledges the good faith of the City of Cambridge in executing and complying with the terms and spirit of this and any other agreements on behalf of the said Community.

EXECUTED UNDER SEAL this sixteenth (16th) day of January, 1976.

THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
BY: [Signed]

James L. Sullivan,
City Manager

CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
BY: [Signed]

Tulio Espada,
President
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND THE CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL AND CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE

This agreement is the result of a series of discussions involving representatives of the City of Cambridge, the Cambridge Hospital and Concilio Hispano de Cambridge; and relates to staffing patterns at the Cambridge Hospital as well as at any and all other facilities which are presently or may in the future be operated by or through the City of Cambridge and/or the Cambridge Hospital, with specific regard to anticipated neighborhood health facilities located at 105 Windsor Street and at North Cambridge.

1. The City of Cambridge hereby announces and binds itself to a formal commitment by it to recruit qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel according to both the letter and spirit of any and all state and/or federal Affirmative Action guidelines towards the ultimate end of effective delivery of health and related social services to the Hispanic community of the City of Cambridge.

2. This agreement includes, but is not limited to, a formal commitment on the part of the City of Cambridge to recruit qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel to fill positions at the 105 Windsor Street and at the North Cambridge neighborhood health service facilities, for receptionists, adult nurse practitioners, adult health aides, pediatrics nurse practitioners and pediatrics health aides, within thirty (30) days from the date that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts issues the appropriate certificate of need for the said facilities.

3. The City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital further agree to recruit, in compliance with paragraph one (1) of this agreement, qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic staff personnel to fill anticipated future positions for mental health workers, social service workers and nutritionists, and as rapidly as possible to fill present and future positions for physicians, according to the same Affirmative Action guidelines.

4. The City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital further agree to recruit and hire qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel to serve as interpreters at the Cambridge Hospital and all of its said facilities, so that competent interpreting services will at all times be available to the Hispanic Community of Cambridge; such hiring to be accomplished and services to be provided immediately at the Cambridge Hospital and at any other said facility presently in operation, and within seven (7) days of the date upon which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts issues the appropriate certificate of need as to any future facility.

5. The Concilio Hispano de Cambridge agrees, as does the City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital, to actively and vigorously
participate in the recruitment of the said Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel alluded to throughout this agreement; and the City of Cambridge further agrees to hire as quickly as openings become available, any and all qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel, as determined by both the Cambridge Hospital and the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge.

6. The City of Cambridge further agrees, in the interests of facilitating identification and resolution of future issues affecting the Hispanic Community of Cambridge, to appoint to the Board of Health and Hospitals, a member of the Puerto Rican/Hispanic Community who is recognized for his or her leadership and interest in the Hispanic Community of Cambridge.

7. As part of the consideration for this agreement, the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge agrees to withdraw its opposition to the application by the City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital for the granting of a certificate of need by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for a neighborhood health services facility located at 105 Windsor Street, as the Concilio is satisfied that the interests of the Hispanic Community will be well served, and the reasons for its continued opposition to the said application will be obviated, so long as all parties hereto comply with the letter and spirit of this agreement.

EXECUTED UNDER SEAL this sixteenth (16th) day of January, 1976.

THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
BY:
[Signed]
James L. Sullivan,
City Manager

THE CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL
BY:
[Signed]
Leslie N. H. MacLeod,
Director

CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
BY:
[Signed]
Tulio Espada,
President
EDITORIAL

CARTA A TODOS LOS HISPANOS Y AMIGOS DE CAMBRIDGE

Queridos Amigos:

Quiero informarle que aquí en Cambridge existe una agencia y los propositos de esta agencia es mejorar el área que compone una sección de Cambridge. Esta agencia es el Cambridge Spanish Coun-
cil. Queremos informarle que en esta área vive la mayoría de la comunidad Hispana de esta ciudad.

Oímos decir en una reunión las otras noches que hay dinero en-
vuelto para programas en dicha área, a la que nos referimos; en mi petición, yo quiero pedirle a todos Ustedes que se unan a mí persona y a un grupo de líderes de la ciudad para las personas hispanas que viven en esta área.

Como numero uno le voy a pedir que se construya un centro para cuidar los niños de todas aquellas madres que viven en dicha área y al mismo tiempo que se ensene Inglés a nuestros hijos en este sector. También para que se le brinde alimentacion atencion medica; si es necesario. Esto brindara la oportunidad para que todas las madres puedan trabajar si es que así lo desean y le brindara tranquilidad, pues saben que en este lugar sus hijos, nuestros hijos, tendrán ayuda profesional GRATUITAMENTE.

Tambien queremos que se ofrezca un local donde ofrecer clases de Inglés a los adultos, para así mejorar en economia en nuestros hogares, trabajos y toda la comunidad Hispana de Cambridge.

Los invito a todos y cada uno de ustedes a que asistan este proxima Domingo 19 de Octubre 1969 a una gran reunión de toda la comunidad Hispana.

Tambien quiero que no se quede ninguno de los Hispanos de otras áreas en Cambridge, sin respaldar a todas las personas ed esta comun-
nidad, que tienen derecho a que se le ofrezca esta clase de programa. El area que me refiero es la de Columbia St., Broadway, toda el area de Mass Ave, Hampshire St. e East Cambridge. Esta area es mejor cono-
cido como MODEL CITIES.

Asi espero la cooperacion de todos Ustedes, el proximo Domingo. La reunion se llevara acabo en el 595 de Mass Ave mejor conocido por Latin American Sports Club a la 1:00PM Dios Mediante.

Habrá refrigerios y golosinas.

Cordialmente,

[Signed] Jorge Cordova
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


Interviews:

2. Robert A. Boyer--Director, City of Cambridge, Planning Department.
4. Daniel Driscoll--Director of Housing, Cambridge Redevelopment Authority.
5. James Farrell--Third Executive Director, Cambridge Model Cities; presently Assistant City Manager in charge of Community Development.
7. Francis X. Hayes--First Model Cities Board Chairman; presently Director of Model Cities Evaluation Department.
9. Natalie O'Connor--Executive Director, Concilio Hispano 1971-1975; Member, State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education; Board Member, Cambridge Spanish PAC and Master PAC, 1973-1975; Board President, Agencias Unidas de Massachusetts.
10. Janet Rose--Model Cities Board Member, 1969-present; Chairwoman, Model Cities Housing Committee; Chairwoman, CDA, Inc. (present); Board Member, Neighborhood Family Care Center; Board Member, CEOC.
11. Roberto Santiago--President of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge (Spanish Council), 1969-1974; Founder of the Spanish Council; Board Member, Model Cities, CEOC, Cambridge Community Services; Liaison for the Bilingual Dept. of the Cambridge School Dept.; Board Member, CAST. Coameno.
13. Joseph Tulmieri--Assistant Director of the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority; Member, CEOC Board of Directors; Member, Model Cities Board of Directors.

Interviews were conducted by the author as explained in the Preface with:

50 Coamenos

50 Jayuyanos
Publications, Pamphlets, and Articles


"Neighborhood Profiles," Cambridge Community Development Department.

