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CULTIVAT(ING) MODERNITIES:
THE SOCIETY FOR NATIONAL HERITAGE, POLITICAL PROPAGANDA,
AND
PUBLIC ARCHITECTURE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY IRAN

By
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Abstract

Beginning in 1922, under the auspices of the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran, the tombs of selected historical figures were systematically destroyed to make way for modern mausoleums erected as metaphors for an “Aryan” nation in its process of modern revival. Initiated during the reign of Reza Shah who ruled the country with an iron fist between 1921 and 1941, most of the projects were implemented under his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, between 1941 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Since the monuments were ideologically inscribed commemorations of the leading modernists and reformists of the 1920s, their impact permeated the definition and function of high culture in Iran’s 20th-century sociopolitical history. The dissertation offers a critical analysis of the political underpinnings, pedagogical aims, racial schemas, and aesthetic ends of propaganda architecture as they were conceived and constructed under the aegis of the Society for National Heritage.

An in-depth study of the institutional history of the SNH, which included the construction of numerous mausoleums – particularly those belonging to Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam, and Arthur Pope, the supervision of over sixty preservation projects, and the creation of an archeological museum as well as a national library, the dissertation demonstrates that in the 20th century, the project of Iran’s “cultural heritage” was not just about a series of public monuments, well-choreographed museums, (in)accurate indexes of historical landmarks, or art exhibitions and congresses. Modern Iran’s relationship to its cultural heritage was equated to Iran’s equal and rightful place in the network of modern nations; its safest and fastest corridor to a progressive, and at times utopian, modernity; and its essential ideological justification for the political, and often despotic, reforms aimed at territorial integrity and national homogeneity. Iran’s cultural heritage, it is argued, was modern Iran’s political raison d’être.

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To the memory of my uncle, KDG,
whose vision of a just social order led him to incarceration, torture, exile, and an
agonizing death instigated by those who had hegemonic claims on justice and liberty.
After the very destruction of his humanity, he continued to believe that such humane
constructs remain possible.

I dedicate this work to my parents, Moneh and Greg Der Grigorian.
They selflessly forwent all, including passions and homelands, so that if I chose one day,
I would have the opportunity to write this and such dissertations.
Before their vast goodness, I bow with profound humility.
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PROLOGUE: THE MONUMENT

Beginning in 1922, under the auspices of the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran, the tombs of selected historical figures were systematically destroyed to make way for contemporary mausoleums erected as metaphors for a modern and "Aryan" nation in its process of revival. Initiated during the reign of Reza Shah who ruled Iran with an iron fist – first as a cabinet member from 1921, then as a king between 1926 and 1941 – most of the projects were implemented under his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, between 1941 and the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979. The monuments were ideologically inscribed commemorations of the leading modernist intellectuals and secular politicians of the 1920s. This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the political underpinnings, pedagogical aims, racial schemas, and aesthetic ends of propaganda architecture as they were conceived and constructed under the aegis of the Society for National Heritage (hereafter the SNH or the Society). During its fifty-seven-year existence, the SNH constructed some forty mausoleums, carried out over sixty preservation projects, and created a national museum and a public library. The cultural scope and diversity of the SNH's undertakings were unprecedented in the Iran's history and were bolstered by numerous publications, lectures, exhibitions, and contribution to the tourist industry. The study contends that the Pahlavi attempt to revive, or indeed to invent and diffuse, Iran's cultural heritage as such was one of the most powerful force behind Iran's modern political will; the SNH, the engine behind the holistic project of its modernity. A discursive analysis exposes these power structures and locates its architectural discourse within wider historical, cultural, and sociopolitical relations.

Five of the major monuments sponsored and erected by the SNH were selected for exhaustive investigation in this study: the mausoleum of poet Ferdawsi between 1926 and 1934 in Tus, designed by French archeologist and architect André Godard; the tomb-garden of Sufi poet Hafez between 1935 and 1938 in Shiraz, designed by French architect Maxime Siroux; the burial and museum complex in honor of philosopher-scientist Ibn Sina, known to the West as Avicenna, between 1949 and 1952 in Hamadan, proposed by Iranian architect Houshang Seyhoun; the tomb-memorial of poet Omar Khayyam first in 1934 and then again between 1959 and 1963 in Nishapur, again as per Seyhoun's proposal; and the joint-tombs of American Art
Historians Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Upham Pope between 1969 and 1972 in Isfahan, designed by Iranian architect Mohsen Forughi. In addition, general data and illustrations regarding the mausoleums of poet Sa’di, Nader Shah Afshar, Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shaykh Farid al-Din Attar, court artists Mohammad Ghaafari Kamal al-Molk, Shah Shuja’ Mozaffarid, Imam Mohammad Mahruq, and poet Baba-Taher, all of which were either erected or renovated by the SNH, have been incorporated into the narratives of the selected tombs and, therefore, have been addressed to certain extent.

Architecturally speaking, Ferdawsi’s mausoleum consisted of a main cubical burial-chamber raised on a high foundation and constructed with white marble. Its decorative program borrowed heavily from Achaemenid iconography, including bull-headed column capitals and the icon of the Zoroastrian God, Ahura Mazda. Hafez’s mausoleum consisted of two walled gardens divided by a portico; at the center of the inner-garden stood an elevated octagonal pavilion under which was housed the marble tombstone of the Sufi master. While Ferdawsi’s tomb was a deliberate attempt to revive pre-Islamic icons and prototypes, Hafez’s tomb alluded to Iran’s Islamic artistic tradition. Ibn Sina’s mausoleum was composed of two superimposing sections: the upper roof-garden was designed around a tower emulating a medieval Islamic tomb-tower that rose to more than twenty-five meters and the lower section housed the central tomb-chamber, a museum, and a library, all of which were construed with exposed concrete in the so-called “Franco-Persian” style. The conic tomb-tower of Omar Khayyam made an explicit attempt to integrate some of the architectural features that were, at the time, considered “typically Iranian,” including a rich calligraphy of white inlay on blue tiles. The joint-tomb of Ackerman and Pope was a rather successful imitation of medieval Islamic single-chamber mausoleum type, with a double-dome composition, an elevated base, and delicate brick- and stuccoworks on the four façades. While these monuments differed in their stylistic language, construction material, and urban context, the ideological program underpinning their design and production remained indomitably identical.

This study, therefore, traces the pseudoscientific and highly consistent process to which these mausoleums were subjected. The tombstones of historical figures that suited the national agenda were selected, located, and destroyed. Following the confiscation of the corpse for autopsy, a monumental structure was erected on the original site, after which the relics were interred as part of a royal inauguration. While ordinary Iranians were excluded from witnessing
these events, state-run mass media covered each ceremony in detail. The main effect of this process was that while historical figures were given a physical place to inhabit in the form of modern tombs, their physiognomies were reconstructed based on skull examinations at the newly established Medical School of Tehran University. The life-size sculpture and color portrait of each figure were first fabricated based on these autopsies and then their manipulated biographies were circulated among the masses by means of photographs, stamps, and coins, the reproducibility of which authenticated the totality of the image invented by the SNH. By the 1970s, these pervasive signs had managed to render the rhetoric on the homogenized “Aryan” and “Iranian” type credible to both Iranians and foreigners alike.

The significance of the SNH’s architectural ventures lay in the way they penetrated the key aspects of Iran’s modernizing project. Despite their structural simplicity, the monuments themselves incorporated a complex range of modern practices. Even as architecture became a vital aspect of public instruction, its public presence in urban centers served to create, define, and frame a normative and canonical sense of history, aesthetic value, progress, and modernity. Autopsies of remains stood as proof of the racial superiority of the nation, while the adjoining museums validated the display of the manifest supremacy of the race. The revival of pre-Islamic icons and prototypes was linked to centuries old Islamic practices, such as visitation to a Shi’a saint’s tomb. Pilgrimage became tourism. While the construction process of these tombs harbored technically sophisticated documentation, categorization, and ordering of the national domain, they also provided a platform for Western scholars like the German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld, André Godard, and Arthur Pope to negotiate their conflicting personal and colonial ambitions. The discourse on Iran’s historical architecture occasioned quarrels over the politics of aesthetic, techniques of preservation, the validity of particular historiography, the authenticity of heritage, and the ownership of archeological sites. In sum, these landmarks created novel ways to map modern space, time, identity, and power, in that they not only reflected but affected sociopolitical developments in modern Iran.

The overarching architectural questions that emerged from this study are as follows: How was architecture used to articulate specific conceptions of power and progress, but later became a form of popular resistance in a politically charged society? How did canonical modernism co-opt Muslim forms and narratives into an exclusively nationalist mainstream and consequently redraft the entire artistic canon and collective taste of the given society? Why was architecture-as-
representation so central to the making of narratives about both modern and historical identities, pedagogies, aesthetic, and civil order? Finally, how did these shifting uses of landmark buildings leave their imprint on architectural form(s), function(s), and meaning(s) after major social upheavals such as the Iranian Revolution? It analyzes how architecture not only endorsed political but created an aesthetic discourse, and by contrast it became a form of social resistance and artistic contestation. The study also raises broad cross-cultural and interdisciplinary questions, for the scrupulous reconstruction of the intertwined stories of each of these monuments reveals the experience of a particular kind of modernity – one that was distinguished by nationalist and secularist ambitions, rapid and radical social engineering, uneven political and technological development, and adamant yet hasty historic revivalism. That modernity intentionally sidestepped the nation that it intended to first invent and then acculturate, while its creed embraced the wholesale destruction of the historical built environment in order to yield the kings’ visions of a utopian future, embodied in their speculations of the dawning “Great Civilization.”

The case of Iranian monuments is particularly intriguing to consider along these lines, both because they had not been studied previously and because of the unique historical conditions that mark Iranian sociopolitical history in the 20th century. Consider that in a matter of eight decades, Iran continually remade its political imageries and realities: from the Shi’a Qajar dynasty to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906; from a military monarchy under Reza Shah to a nationalist prime minister in 1951; and from the 1979 popular Revolution that overthrew an autocratic monarch to the postmodern Islamic Republic that invented the only theocratic state of modern political system. Throughout these moments of political upheaval, the SNH’s monuments were the subjects of contradictory ideological trends, all the while maintaining their specific architectural qualities. In order to understand the formal and political complexities that surround my five examples, I pay particular attention to the historical contexts that reveal how in each case, a myth of lineage, national identity, and conception of aesthetic values and historiography were constructed, as well as how a political elite conceived and represented the architectural forms it fabricated. Only then does it address, how, after the Iranian Revolution, the artifacts outlived their authors to trigger alternative sociopolitical realities.
Politicized Ruins

The insertion of the history of architecture and its discourse into the mainstream history of modern Iran is one of the purposes of this study. In spite of the predominant role public buildings played in the representation and machinery of politics, its strengths and limitations in this area have been largely ignored. Nor do mainstream discourses on modern architecture consider the intriguing cultural experiments in modern Iran. In this matter, the contention of this work is that without a serious probing of the politics of architecture under the Pahlavis, its history cannot be complete, because the intimate link between Iran's modern politics and its modern, as well as modernistic perception of its ancient, historical artifacts and ruins was at the core of the Pahlavi project of modernity. In fact, I would dare to venture further by proposing that modern Iran's political history can only be fully understood in terms of its a priori modern perception and conception of Iran's cultural heritage and its renewed manifestations in the 20th century. Here, it is argued that the role of Iran's cultural heritage, in that century, was not just about a series of public monuments, well-choreographed museums, (in)accurate indexes of historical landmarks, or elaborate art exhibitions and congresses. Nor was it about the simplistic notion that icons and symbols were effectively manipulated in order to legitimatize a political regime or a royal household. It was far more than that: modern Iran's relationship to its cultural heritage was about Iran's equal and rightful place in the network of modern nations as well as its philosophical and ideological justification for the political struggles aimed at territorial integrity, radical reforms, and national homogeneity. In short, Iran's cultural heritage was modern Iran's political raison d'être.

This was due to the fact that by the end of the 19th century, the Iranian secular elite had been convinced that as a sovereign nation, Iran could and had to take its prominent place among fraternal nation-states precisely because it had done so "2,500 years ago." In the eyes of those who came to rule modern Iran, from the outset, the mission of reviving "Persia's cultural grandeur" was understood not only as a means to political deliverance and social welfare, but also as a heavy responsibility vis-à-vis the "civilized world." With the advent of Western political and military hegemony in Asia and the formation of the system of independent nations-states, the Iranian intelligentsia increasingly saw the nation as a worthy member of the so-called international community because of its irrefutable cultural superiority. Consequently, intellectuals and politicians alike relentlessly strove to cultivate the nation's artistic patrimony.
and acculturate its masses as they saw fit. In much of the 20th century, high culture often metamorphosed into their political, and often personal, resolve. That culture, to be imitated and emulated, was to be found, first and foremost, in Iran’s ruins – in its reconstructed, (re)cultivated architecture.

The political background out of which the Pahlavi era emerged and shaped itself is vital to the understanding of the subsequent attitudes toward high culture. The political skirmishes in 19th-century Qajar Iran had a direct bearing on this valorization of Iran’s cultural patrimony as such and its national sense of self-worth for the duration of the following century. The founder of the Qajar dynasty, Aqa Mohammad Khan’s main political aim, throughout the 1770s and 1790s, had been “to restore the old boundaries of the Safavid empire in the Iranian periphery to include principalities of Afghanistan and Central Asia, the Ottoman Iraq, all of the Kurdish region and frontiers of Anatolia, the Caucasian provinces, and the Iranian coasts and islands of the Persian Gulf.” While this imperial ambition remained a political priority well into Naser al-Din’s reign (ruled 1848-1896), it was repeatedly frustrated by the superior military muscle of its neighbors: tsarist Russia in the north and the British empire in the east and south. While Iran was perceived by the British as a buffer state that insured the safety of British India from Russian, and later Soviet, territorial expansionism, for the same reason, the Romanovs supported the Qajars who could insure the safety of their southern borderer against the British threat. Other Western powers, predominantly France and Germany, while showed no explicit territorial ambitions in Iran, contested and exercised political pressure on the Iranian government through other spheres of influence, the foremost of all that of culture. The Qajar rulers, in turn, tried to enhance their power by playing these colonial rivals off each other – a foreign and domestic policy which often than not resulted in war and loss of land. “The Qajar dynasty ruled nineteenth-century Iran with neither the instruments of coercion nor the science of administration, but with the practice of prudent retreats and the art of manipulating all the possible variations in the complex web of communal rivalries.”


loss of national prestige, the demeaning weight of which would resonate well into the 20th century.

Aqa Mohammad’s successor, Fath Ali Shah (ruled 1797-1834), was decisively defeated in his attempt to regain Iran’s Caucasian territories and was forced to sign the 1813 Golestan Treaty whereby northern Caucasus was ceded to Russia. 3 The shah’s second campaign, in 1826, proved even more humiliating for when his second most important city, Tabriz, fell to the enemy, the Iranian government agreed to the devastating terms of the Turkmanchai Treaty in February 1828. 4 According to it, Iran relinquished all territorial claims in the Caucasus, along with a long list of commercial capitulations and legal indemnities. More lastingly, the treaty left a deep-seated psychological dent on the country’s intelligentsia because “…few Iranians, of any political hue, were prepared to publicly accept the consequences for Iran’s international status implicit in the Treaty of Tukmenchai, which essentially had signaled the end of Iran’s great-power status.” 5 Nor were the loss of territories limited to this argument. In the 1830s, Naser al-Din Shah’s repeated and unsuccessful attempts to capture Herat met with British opposition, which viewed the fall of that city as a serious menace to the British Raj. When the shah did annex Herat in 1856, the British invaded Iran’s provinces in the Persian Gulf. The following year the Treaty of Paris persuaded Iran to recognize Afghanistan’s sovereignty and heralded the “heavy-handed exercise of British diplomacy and influence in Iran.” 6 The 1885 Russian capture of Marv, moreover, not only brought further shame on Iran’s elite, but also directly jeopardized the country’s northeastern province of Khorasan. 7 In brief, by the turn of the century, the Qajars had permanently lost all of the peripheral territories that Aqa Mohammad had set out to unify including Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq, Kurdistan, the Caucasus, and parts of the south coast of the Persian Gulf. Domestically, they had also “granted a series of commercial capitulations to

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4 See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 51.
7 “In 1885, Russia’s eventual conquest of Marv would trouble Iranians, particularly since it would bring their northern neighbor to the threshold of the country’s northeastern province, Khurasan.” Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions*, 39.
Russia and Britain," which would enable these two powers to have a direct sway on Iran’s subsequent political and non-political evolution.⁸

By the dawn of the 20th century, the military and economic humiliations had cause in Iran’s intelligentsia feelings of inferiority that was progressively “compensated for with a heightened sense of cultural and historical superiority, which constantly reminded Iranians of past imperial glories and demanded of her leaders a restoration of what were widely regarded as her ‘natural rights’.”⁹ “Failing to fulfill its manifest destiny, Iran remained enthralled by the territory it had once controlled. Qajar intellectuals cultivated a passion not only for the contemporary history of the land but also for its ancient counterpart…”¹⁰ The appearance of numerous publications, documenting and praising Iran’s cultural history, predominantly focused on its pre-Islamic material culture, was indicative of this psychological substitution of military might with a historical and cultural sense of merit. Mohammad Naser Forsat al-Dowlah’s Asar-e Ajam (1890), Etemad al-Saltaneh’s Guide to the History of the Parthian House (1892),¹¹ Mohammad Hosayn Foroughi’s History of Sassanian Monarchy (1897), Mohammad Ali Foroughi’s Brief History of Iran (1901), Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani’s Royal Mirrors: History of Iran (1906), as well as journals like Hosayn Kazemzadeh’s Iranshahr (Country of Iran, 1922-1927), Moshfeq Kazemi’s Farangestan (Europe, 1924-1926), and Mahmud Afsar’s Ayandeh (The Future, 1925) were among the sources that advocated an integrated secular nation-state, a homogeneous urban civilization, linguistic and cultural modernization, secular education for both sexes, proliferation of industrial technology, implementation of Western political philosophy, and above all, an enthusiastic and wholesale return to Iran’s pre-Islamic ethos.¹² Most argued that the “savage” Arab invasions of the 7th century had ruined the “civilized” Zoroastrian empires after which the Muslim Arab “imperialism, had retarded ‘the creative abilities of Iran’s

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⁸ “As a result of these treaties, the Qajar regained Tabriz and southern Iran, and obtained international recognition as legitimate rulers of Iran, but lost Georgia, Armenia, and their Caspian navy, gave up all claims to Afghanistan, paid an indemnity of £3,000,000 to the tsar, and, most significant of all, granted a series of commercial capitulations to Russia and Britain.” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 51.
⁹ Ansari, Iran since 1921, 176. Other intellectuals argued that the cause of Iran’s inferiority was due to the lack of law as well as the despotism and corruption of the Qajar court; see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 61-69.
¹⁰ Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 41.
¹¹ For the details of the works of Forsat al-Dowlah and Etemad al-Saltaneh, see Kashani-Sabet, “Fragile Frontiers,” 223-226.
¹² For more detailed account on these three journals, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 123-125.
talented Aryan population'. 13 These authors cautioned their modern audiences, "A nation that
does not know its history and the tools of its advancement and decline is like a child who does
not know his father and ancestors." 14

These publications would not only aspire to boost national prestige through attempts at
cultural discourses and a systemic secular pedagogy, but would also serve as prototypes for
similar arguments produced throughout the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty. The cultural discourse
invented, reinforced, and disseminated by the SNH through its diverse undertakings would
represent and sustain Iran's cultural patrimony as the explicit manifestation of the nation's most
authentic collective identity, its safest passage to a promising future, and its essential basis for
equality, if not outright superiority, vis-à-vis other nations, especially the West. Prominent
members of the SNH, such as Hasan Pirmia, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Mohammad Ali Forughi,
Arbab Keikhosraw Shahrokh, Isa Sadiq, Said Nafisi, and Ali Asghar Hekmat, in their scholarly
works, journals, speeches, and memoirs, would underscore, time and again, the basic idea that
"the country would be saved from backwardness and imperialism by cleansing the language of
foreign words, by reviving the ancient religion of Zoroaster, and by rebuilding the centralized
state of the Sassanids;" that "the modern nation had only to imitate and emulate" its ancient
cultural heritage "in order to reclaim its greatness." 15 Forughi would characterize the founder of
the Achaemenid dynasty, Cyrus the Great, as the one who "expanded his country to China and
India." 16 He would insist that "until then, there has never been a government as large as that in
the world," and would describe the Sassanian rule as "the best times in the history of our
country" with a territory "twice the size of present-day Iran" extending from India to the Caspian
Sea. He would underscore that these borders were, in fact, "the natural boundaries of Iran." 17 As
the literary editor of Le Journal de Téhéran, Nafisi would insist that while Iranians have
"forgotten all our past historical brilliancy, our struggle against Babylon, Athens, Sparta, Rome,

13 "Religion and Nationalism," Iranshahr 2 (December 1924): 41-42; quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two
Revolutions, 124.
14 Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Ayineh-haye Sekandari [Royal mirrors] (Tehran, 1906), 12; quoted in
Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 45.
15 "Dr. Taqi Arani," Mahnameh-e Mardom 5 (June 1960): 1; quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two
Revolutions, 156; and Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 45.
16 Zoka' al-Molk Forughi, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Iran (Tehran, 1343/1924), 2-3; quoted in Kashani-Sabet, Frontier
Fictions, 201.
17 Zoka' al-Molk Forughi, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Iran (Tehran, 1343/1924), 2-3; quoted in Kashani-Sabet, Frontier
Fictions, 201.
and Byzantium,” they nevertheless have an equal right among “civilized people” because they are the “architects of that [one] civilization that the human kind glorifies today.”

Despite their contempt for the Qajars, however, these men were themselves byproducts of that era, in that not only they lived during the ruling period of that dynasty, but were shaped by the personal decrees of Qajar kings in their attempts at maintaining hegemony during a volatile stage of the country’s political history. For instance, most of the early Pahlavi reformists had benefited from either a state-founded secular schooling in Iran or a state-sponsored education in Europe, which had first exposed them to new ideas and then convinced them of the infinite benefits of westernization. Most had come in long-term contact with Western scholars and diplomats by the various capitulation rights that the Qajars had conceded to European states and their citizens; they had often benefited from social mobility enabled by sporadic, but highly consequential, Qajar effort to modernized Iran’s society and economy; and, no less critical was their familiarization with Western literature, etiquette, fashion, technology, and architecture by way of their monarch’s European trips and their subsequent decrees and patronages that mimicked these cultural mores and compelled the local aristocracy to do the same. The impacts of these Western cultural mores would resonate well into the 21st century in the working of Iran’s very struggle over its own identity and path of progress. The West, imagined or otherwise, would remain a overbearing force on the imagination of Iran’s political and cultural elite.

Furthermore, a good number of Qajar royal decrees that had had a direct impact on Iran’s urban environment, extensively shaped the individual and collective experiences of these reformists. While, the most visible tower of Tehran’s Golestan Palace, Shams al-Emareh, was embellished with a large mechanical clock and the new palatial wing was ornamented with engaged Doric columns and entablature, the building façades on Tehran’s most fashionable street, Naser Khosraw, were redecorated by their aristocrat owners by sculptures of dancing angles and hanging drapes characteristic of the 17th and 18th century French and Italian palace architecture. By 1900, central Tehran had acquired paved avenues, gas lamps, and horse-drawn

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19 Iran’s first secular high school, Dar al-Fonun, founded by Amir Kabir in the, was expanded by Naser al-Din and forty of its first graduates were sent to Paris for higher education; see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 54-58.
20 Naser al Din Shah understood the “notion of ‘progress’ as a device to be purchased and brought to Iran the way he purchased and shipped home crystal wares, ornate furniture, run-of-the-mill paintings of the English countryside binoculars, Verundel hunting rifles, Sheffield pen-knives, and women’s petticoats and negligees.” Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 428.
carriages. Naser al-Din Shah's curb on the punitive practices of torture, live burial, and dismemberment of criminals gave way to permanent and long-term penitentiary complexes in major cities. The shah's lenience towards Catholic and Protestant missionary work in Iran, similarly, helped the mushrooming of Western-style schools, medical clinics, and printing houses in both the capital and the provinces. The boom in road construction at the end of the century, also made possible by Qajar capitulations to European companies, was later described as the "paved road period" of Iran. Hence, through various cultural mediums, from literature to architecture, not only did "Iranians began to see their own past through the eyes of contemporary Europeans," but also began to notice the sharp contrast "between their shahs and the most famous kings of Europe, between the poverty of Iran and the prosperity of Europe;' this, in turn, "tended to weaken the Qajar monarchy."^24

What distinguished the reformists from their Qajar sovereigns, however, was the secularist elite's demand for rapid, radical, heavy-handed, and across-the-board reforms; that is, a utopian burning desire to erase "everything" and "start over again," as would put Reza Shah's court minister in 1927. The reforms that they demanded underpinned secular, constitutional, and nationalist ideologies that would inexorably marginalize the ulama (hereafter signifying the clergy or the collective establishment of the clerics), the tribes, the traditionalist merchants, and the conservative segment of the landed aristocracy upon whose consensus hinged much of Qajar royal power. After the Constitutional struggle that resulted in the 1906 Revolution and in order to both legitimize Reza Shah's kingship and justify their own radical modernization policies, in addition to their attempts to reclaim Iran's pre-1828 national prestige, the reformists would begin to portray the entire Qajar era as "nothing but a corrupt state (dawlat) oppressing the people (mellat)," "a shameful age of dogmatism, fanaticism, and rampant clericalism," "an age of decadence and corruption," and above all, "a time when the chance for reform and equality with the West was missed."^26 Individual Qajar kings, for instance, the most eminent among them, Naser al-Din, would be "consistently scorned and ridiculed" in official Pahlavi historical

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21 See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 57; and Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 430.
22 The cities included Tabriz, Urumieh, Tehran, Isfahan, and Hamadan. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 57.
24 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 58.
26 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 10; and Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 445-446.
literature “as an ignoble tyrant (if not a traitor) who neither resisted infiltration by foreign powers nor sought to modernize the country.”\(^{27}\) Fath Ali Shah would be publicly accused for having been “an unqualified calamity to Persian art” and a man with “no taste.” Mozaffar al-Din Shah’s capitulation of the archeological excavation rights to the French would be portrayed as “the ignorance of a Sovereign who in reality had no right to traffic...the nation’s heritage.”\(^{28}\) Well into the 1980s, both inside and outside Iran, the Qajar epoch would be known as “the dark ages,” “a bad omen,” and a time of “ignorance” and “backwardness.” The political legitimacy of such a radical break with the resent past and an even more radical linkage with the ancient past would rely on the successful project of Iran’s “historical and national patrimony.”

The concept of “historical monuments” has been employed in this study as a highly selective set of architectural and archeological artifacts amassed to serve the political ideologies of those who had the power to both select and propagate such a construct. Through highly sophisticated and discursive practices – creating indexes, financing publications, delivering lectures, and sponsoring archeological excavations, national landmarks, and modern museums – these structures were transformed into a distinct grouping known as the nation’s heritage or patrimony. While there is an overwhelming literature on monuments, patrimony, and heritage, this study refrains from reiterating all the debates and definition and, therefore, only borrows the concepts of “historical monuments” and “national heritage” based on the definitions provided by French architectural historian Françoise Choay and those of “vandalism,” “destruction,” and “preservation” on those provided by French art historian Dario Gamboni.\(^{29}\) In their respective works, both Choay and Gamboni offer a rich history and historiography of “historical and national monuments.”\(^{30}\) Choay argues that the invention of the very concept can be traced to Alberti’s *De Re Aedificatoria* (1452) in which for the first time he prefigures John Ruskin’s proposal that “every human edifice is, at least potentially, a means of bearing witness and a mode

\(^{27}\) Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 445-446.

\(^{28}\) Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 45, Court Minister to French Minister, December 24, 1926, Teheran.


of memorializing the dignity of human *poesis*, a new kind of monument." Alberti both predicts Alois Reigl’s age-value of monuments where “a building’s very oldness confers upon it a certain quality,” and creates the French revolutionaries’ very term of “historical monuments” with an active function on the interpretations of national history and its pedagogical value.

With an origin in the Latin *monumentum*, a derivative of *monere* designating to warn, to recall, or to let know, monument’s primary function, in Alberti’s view, is to “preserve the memory of great events.” This functional definition ascribed to monuments would be instrumental in the Iranian context, for the ideological agenda that gave birth to Iran’s “historical monuments” was imbued with an intense desire to remember the great events of the past.

According to Choay, the term was first mentioned by L. A. Millin in 1790 within the context of the French Revolution and then in 1830 by French Interior Minister Guizot, who invented the position of the “inspector of historic monuments,” thereafter, linking political apparatus with the workings of the concept of “historical monuments.” However, Choay argues that it is not sufficient to investigate the etymological origins of this expression, but rather we have to probe “the mentalité that gave birth to the notion of historical monuments in the Renaissance” where the study and conservation of artifacts were undertaken for the sole purpose of their historical and artistic value; as tributes to history and art. In relation to antiquity, the Renaissance elite institutionalized the notion of “historical monuments” by creating a system of judging objects as art or non-art, and as worthy of preserving or destruction. Choay concludes, “by binding the notion of antiquities to that of preservation and thus excluding the concept of destruction [popes of the Renaissance and their counselors] established an ideal protection that purely verbal nature of which allows masking and authorizes the real destruction...of the same antiquities.”

Building on Choay’s proposal of the Renaissance origin of the concept of “historical monuments,” Gamboni supports Choay in “exposing ‘the false discourse on the preservation of heritage, which was born during the Renaissance and aims at concealing the real destruction and disfigurements’.” In addressing the politics of historical monuments and their preservation, Gamboni goes further and suggests the simultaneous recognition of its “dark side” by art

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31 Choay, “Alberti,” 100.
historians, for the invention of historical monuments and their sequent protection was fundamentally interdependent on the elimination of non-monuments.

[Qualifying something – as art, as ‘cultural property,’ as worth being taken care of – necessarily implies disqualifying something else, something that might have been qualified and is being ignored or something against which the qualities of the elected object are being set off. The ‘defaming comparisons’ that we have identified as a technique of disqualification often really serves this double purpose. The polemical dimension of this phenomenon further implies that what is qualified by someone may be – and often is – disqualified by someone else, and vice-versa. ‘Wars of images’ and of interpretations come to mind… Seen in this perspective, appraisal and rejection, conservation and destruction represent two sides of the same coin…]

In Pahlavi Iran, the invention of “historical monuments” by the SNH was intrinsically conditioned by these two sides of the same coin: preservation/destruction. What made this process explicitly obvious in the Iranian context was the rapidity and severity with which such a transformation occurred. Reza Shah’s heavy-handed urban renewal in Tehran is a case in point. The SNH’s modern mausoleums is another perfect example of a rapid modernization that selectively eliminated tomb-stones and tomb-chambers belonging to specific historical eras and associated with certain rulers, in order to restore those sites into the modern image that it wanted. Destruction was integral to the SNH’s modernizing schemes.

There is, furthermore, an even greater amount of literature addressing the intimate relationship between collective memory and public architecture. While some of these debates directly feed into those on historical or national monuments, their elaborate discussion is out of this study’s scope, because while these ideas deeply impacted the treatment of monuments in the West, they had a marginal and often superficial bearing on the formation of Iran’s national patrimony, modern and ancient alike. I have not found any evidence that suggests that any of the members of the SNH were familiar with, for instance, Ruskin’s *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849), Riegl’s essay on “The Modern Cult of Monuments: its Essence and its Development” (1900), or Aby Warburg’s studies in the 1920s, let alone subsequent researches such as Maurice Halbwachs’ *La Mémoire Collective* (1923), Gaston Bachelard’s *The Poetics of Space* (1958), Aldo Rossi’s *The Architecture of the City* (1966), and Frances Yates’ *The Art of Memory* (1968). Therefore, this dissertation, instead of imposing equally constructed Western definitions of monuments and heritage on the Iranian context, has tried to investigate and bring to the fore how

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36 Gamboni, *Destruction of Art*, 219-220.
the Iranian elite understood these terms and defined the evolution of Iran’s historical and national monuments.

The only possible art historical link between these authors, in particular Reigl, and the Iranian intelligentsia could have been the work of Art History Professor at Graz University Josef Strzygowski. In his then well-known Orient oder Rom (1901), he not only maintained, “The true source of Western artistic genius is located in the Indogermanic Geist,” but implored enthusiasts and skeptics alike to trace Western artistic connections, via medieval Christian Armenia, “not to Persia, but to Iran.” In the now subdued 1901 debate, Strzygowski’s firm opponents, including Reigl and Giovanni Teresio Rivoira (Le origini dell’architettura Lombarda, 1901), argued that the origin of the Western architectural canon in general and Gothic architecture in particular, is to be found not in Armenia or anywhere else in the Orient, but in “pure Roman ingenuity.” While Strzygowski’s later Nazi support effectively “edited” his scholarly contribution out of Orientalist historiography, his role “in the understanding of the Oriental sources of late antique and medieval art cannot be refuted,” as recent studies have revealed. Nor could have the implications of his (re)mapped Orient into “Indo-German” and “Semite” domains be lost on the early 20th-century Iranian intelligentsia. In his art historical arguments, local politicians and scholars might have found a prominent place for modern Iran among other “civilized” nation-states.

Based on Strzygowski’s theories on “Aryan Art” which, as he believed, had an origin in “northeastern Iran,” and kindled by the subsequent efforts of his followers, including Pope and Herzfeld, Iran’s elite could begin to read the past artistic production of their country not as “Islamic Art,” but rather as a long “Aryan” artistic tradition that had been first “contaminated” by what Strzygowski had called the “Semitic wedge” dividing the “eastern and western branches of the Aryans” after the Arab conquests, and then tragically forgotten. With the post-WWII complete disregard of Strzygowski’s scholarship by Western and non-Western historians, there remains little concrete evidence connecting the members of the SNH to Strzygowski’s Orient oder Rom. The only minor connection, readily available today, is the references made to

37 Strzygowski and Reigl were archenemies, for Reigl could not accept Strzygowski’s proposition that the Orient in general and Iran in particular, might have been the source of Western and Roman architecture.
38 A. J. Wharton, Refiguring the Post Classical City (Cambridge, 1995), 5.
Strzygowski’s works in Ackerman-Pope’s *Survey of Persian Art* (SoPA 1938).\(^{40}\) Regardless, it seems highly probable that not only Strzygowski’s compellingly argued art historical philosophy but also those of his contenders must have been examined by Iran’s pro-Aryan scholars, such as Pirnia and Forughi, between the 1900s and 1920s.

Several of the members of the Iranian intellectual elite, furthermore, having been familiar with the mainstream modern literature of the West might had come across the writings of the “official inventors of the concept of the historical monument,” who had maintained, “Monuments are the irreproachable witnesses of history. Without their august ruins, all that history has bequeathed us of the Greeks and the Romans would have seemed no more than a fable.”\(^{41}\) The upsurge of translations in the Naserid era had made Western literature available to the small cycle of Iran’s aristocracy including biographies of monarchs and dictators, military textbooks, language manuals, medical handbooks, travelogues, and works by Defoe, Moliere, Dumas, Verne, Morier, and Malcolm.\(^{42}\) By the mid-1920s, the three well-circulated Persian language journals, *Iranshahr*, *Farangestan*, and *Ayandeh*, had introduced to Iran’s growing intelligentsia Voltaire’s view on anticlericalism, Marx’s antagonism towards both religion and imperialism, Joseph Arthur Gobineau’s *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* (1855) and its theories on racial superiority, as well as Anatole France’s political satire.\(^{43}\) Far more relevant to the treatment of monuments was Gustave le Bon’s *Psychologie des foules* (1895) through which not only notions about national traits and racial superiority were strengthened, but also the “irrational mobs” were perceived as “ignorant vandals” and “vandalistic barbarians” with no appreciation for “beauty and culture.”\(^{44}\)

By relocating such nationalistic sentiments upon Iran’s existing ruins, by the late 19th century the local elite had began to not only see itself as direct heir to these artifacts, but also as an active agent in their physical protection and political promotion. This new perception of the


\(^{41}\) Comité d’Instruction publique by Kersaint; quoted in Choay, “Alberti,” 101.

\(^{42}\) See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 57-58; and Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 430-433. While Abrahamian notes that these translations had a major impact on Iran’s intelligentsia, Amanat maintains that they were mostly for the private use of Naser al-Din Shah and, therefore, reached the public only after the king’s assassination in 1896.

\(^{43}\) Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 123-124.

\(^{44}\) Gamboni, *Destruction of Art*, 15.
very meaning and function of Iran’s ruins would have far-reaching effect on Iran’s subsequent cultural and political development. Solid evidence prior to the Pahlavi dynasty shows that Iran’s pre-Islamic architecture while not completely neglected, was rarely perceived as the nation’s patrimony, national or historical alike. In 1823, for instance, Fath Ali Shah’s exquisite rock cuts at Ray’s Cheshmey-e Ali while distinctly Sassanian in style and composition was an expression of the king’s status as Persia’s monarch rather than a glorification of the nation’s pre-Islamic history. Nor were there, under the Qajars, systemic, official, and consistent efforts to demarcate, catalogue, and study the various architectural artifacts under the rubric of historical and national monuments; much less to finance and coordinate such preservation projects. That enormous task, not only of preservation *per se*, but also of definition of monuments, would be undertaken by the SNH after 1922.

Among the three major dynasties that ruled Iran before the Arab conquest of the mid-7th century – Achaemenid (559-331 BC), Parthian (247 BC-224 AD), and Sassanian (224-651 AD) – the cultural, linguistic, sociopolitical, and even genetic material of the former and the latter were regarded by modernists as the most genuine of Iran’s history. As part of their appropriation into mainstream national history and culture, the late 19th- and early 20th-century Iranian intellectuals uncritically borrowed the concept of “historical monuments” with overwhelming emphasis on their “national” and “age” values as first conceived by Alberti, politicized by the French Revolution, and finally institutionalized by Riegl; with the help of French archeologists and other scholars, the local elite with equal lack of scrutiny put into practice the European principles and standards of “preservation” for the material culture inherited from these dynasties. The Achaemenid and Sassanian palatial and funerary complexes – the most prominent among them Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Naqsh-e Rostam – were duly excavated, documented, and indexed. While most of these structures were predominantly selected for their merit as evidence of Iran’s ancient grandeur, the selections were conditioned by their superior architectural and aesthetic qualities, their large scale and fine craftsmanship, their longevity and persistence over the centuries, and, above all, their location and accessibility within the modern boarders of Pahlavi Iran. In short, these inherently architectural qualities came

45 Iran’s pre-Islamic sites, notably Persepolis, had long been admired by various Muslim rulers before the Pahlavis. Therefore neither was the late 19th-century intellectuals nor the members of the SNH inventing a connection to these pre-Islamic dynasties and their cultural production. For instance, see E. Koch, “Diwan-i ‘Amm and Chihil Sutun: the
to play a major role, along with the purely political demands, in the local elite's inclusion of individual edifices in the index of Iran's national patrimony. This set of highly selective artifacts came to be known as Iran's asar-e melli; while "melli" simply meant national, "asar" was understood as the complex sum of the definitions of trance, relics, monuments, traditions, edifices, and works. Conversely, those structures that were not selected, either because of architecture or politics, were neglected or simply raised to the ground to make way for new constructions. As in Europe, therefore, the very conception of historical monuments and their official preservation were conditioned, *a priori*, by exclusion and destruction of other, non-monumentalized, not selected, but equally historical edifices.

Under the Pahlavis, the formulation and articulation of Iran's cultural heritage would be integrated into the mainstream political agenda as one of the foremost national priorities. For awareness and protection of the nation's heritage, it was believed, would lead to modernity and progress, an idea often inflamed by Western scholars of Iran. A German archeologist would insist, "If you refer to World History, you will see that no nation has this much heritage. Greece while had a progressive period five hundred years before Christ to three hundred AD, subsequently had nothing. Italy has two progressive periods, Rome and Renaissance, whereas Europeans are so young that comparison is simply irrelevant." An American art historian would be "amazed by the fact that such brilliancy" as Achaemenid architecture "is not known to the world." He would claim that while "Romans, experts in construction, did not know how to build a cupola on a square base," Iranians had for centuries built monuments with "this technique." At the end of the Pahlavi era, Iran's minister of culture and art would be able to assert, "The conservation of monuments [in Iran] is not just a duty on a national level, since these artistic productions have to be considered, truthfully, as part of humanity's cultural patrimony." All this would finally sanction the second Pahlavi king, Mohammad Reza Shah, to write in 1961:

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46 Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu'a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old publications of the SNH] (Tehran, 1972), 41-43.
Today my country is a blend of ancient and modern. When, about 330 B.C., our splendid capital at Persepolis was burned while Alexander the Great and his troops were there, the first Persian Empire had already existed for centuries. When, in A.D. 476, the Roman Empire fell, we could already point to the antiquity of our civilization, and those who knew both frequently speak of the greater grandeur of the ruins of Persepolis when compared with those of Rome. But, side by side with these ruins, and with other fascinating reminders of our antiquity, are seen countless instances of modern progress…

An accurate reading of Iran’s modern history under the Pahlavis, therefore, is conditioned by a close look at how high culture was conceived as and operated in politics by the early Pahlavi elite. For, as this study tries to demonstrate, those who were deeply involved in the various radical and liberal sociopolitical reforms in the 1920s and 1930s were also stanch advocates, collectors, historians, or patrons of high art; at times, they were even architects, artists, and archeologists. The deep commitment of these individuals to the revival of Iran’s artistic grandeur “for the good of the country” is lost in the exclusively political historiography of modern Iran.

Political historians and scientists seldom, if at all, note that the same ideologues who unveiled the Iranian woman also forced the French Republic to give up its archeological monopoly over Iran’s historical sites. These same reformists delivered lectures about the superiority of “Persian Art” in order to forcibly acculturate the masses into a modern society. Those who changed the name of the country from ‘Persia’ to ‘Iran,’ were also the ones who displayed photographs of “Aryan skulls” in newly erected monuments and museums to justify their rationale of the country’s new name. Those who urged for a return to the “glorious past,” could only support their claims by excavating, exhibiting, and museumizing the architectural fragments found at Persepolis, Susa, Pasargadae, and other pre-Islamic archeological sites. The specificities of Iran’s modernizing efforts and schemes were seldom separate from the perception and conception of its architectural and archeological past, which, in turn, had to be willed into existence as a systematic and clearly defined index of national patrimony through cultural discourses. The SNH would remain the engine behind the working of that so-called heritage throughout the Pahlavi era, endlessly aiming to (re)present utopian concepts such as progress and civilization in tangible architectural models and productions.

Obviously, the disclosure on the connections between Iran’s cultural heritage and political culture is not the job of political historians and scientists. It is ours; those of us who

50 British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/E3909 Clive, August 26, 1927, Tehran.
remain in the margins of both the histories of modern (Western) architecture and the (medieval) architecture of the “Orient,” as well as on the margins of Iranian political historiography. This dissertation has tried to reveal the perils of Iran’s rapid modernization and the ensuing social tensions of its modernity, through the intricate details of the design and construction processes of the mausoleums of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam, and Ackerman-Pope. Their investigation hints at the often unbridgeable gulf between how things worked and how they looked in Pahlavi Iran; that is, genuine modernization and their modernistic architectural expressions are made explicit with a close look at the history of these monuments. For instance, despite the ideological message of modernity inscribed in and triggered by such monumental structures as Ferdawsiyeh, Hafeziyeh, Sa’diyeh, or Naderiyeh in various Iranian urban centers, Iranian women would continue to not only be barred from voting rights, but would also be dictated as to when to wear and not to wear the veil – the veil itself read as a metaphor for modern cultural and binary constructs of modernity and tradition, progress and backwardness. Monumental edifices and modernistic facades often hid the inability of their architects, the incapability of their contractors, and the foundation-lessness of their structures. Ceremonial and sophisticated inaugurations, as well as their subsequent official historiographies, habitually disguised the fierce rivalry between individual architects and the use of these monuments as diplomatic apparatus by royalties, politicians, scholars, and the army alike. In Pahlavi Iran, public architecture, like women’s veil, would not only remain a mere allegory of modernity, but also the supreme (re)presentation of the image of an unevenly developed modern nation.

Some of the important and relevant issues that this dissertation does not tackle, or only in passing, is, first, to offer data and analyze on how public monuments were received by ordinary Iranians or non-Iranians during the 20th century. This work is about architectural conception, not reception. Very early on in the project, I was discouraged from “entering into people’s head.” Second, while the narrative incorporates the life and work of the major players in the architectural history of Pahlavi Iran, it was never intended as a comprehensive and systematic history of Iran’s modern architecture nor its architects and patrons. Nor, by any stretch of the imagination, is it a methodical sociopolitical history of Iran, although it does propose an alternative approach to and reading of Iran’s modern social history. Third, while the study provides the separate histories and historiographies of the tombs of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyam, and addresses the role of these mausoleums in the nation-building project
and Iranian identity formation, it does not deal, in any detail, with their lives, works, and subsequent influence on Iran’s literary, social, or political traditions. The question of what Hafez’s *Divan* or Ferdawsi’s *Shahnameh* meant to either Iranians or foreigners, I have left to social scientists and historians of literature. In a similar vein, while for the reconstruction of the architectural histories of the above-mentioned tombs at a given date, I have relied on the descriptions and illustrations of medieval Muslim and modern Western visitors to these sites, and while I have approached these sources with full knowledge of their political underpinnings, the narrative seldom focuses on how the West perceived Iran’s architecture and how these monuments came to play in that Western construct. It rather centers on how the Iranian elite perceived Western as well as local attitudes toward the tombs and, in turn, constructed an Iranian aesthetic and social reality through the erection of modern and modernistic monuments to replace the historical ones.
• **Methodolog(ies) Considered**

The dissertation does not pretend to offer sophisticated theories of modernity, nationalism, high culture, or taste. Nor does it take someone else’s theory and put it into practice. *A priori,* I was simply determined to tell a story, to assemble and reveal the complexities of historical events and forms and, above all, to investigate and examine the architectural expressions of political power. The story that this dissertation narrates is the modernity of the nation that it examines. Therefore, theories of modernities were defined through the very act of looking, examining, and narrating the minuscule details of a cultural space that was endlessly and unevenly changing. Iran’s modernity, therefore, is dealt with here as a historical subject, where modernity is the complexities, tensions, and anxieties that culminated in conceiving, erecting, perceiving, discoursing, vandalizing, and eventually coopting the above-mentioned public monuments as part of a social reality. Modernity was the social reality that the reformists of the 1920s conceived and instigated and their successors perpetuated and disseminated. *A posteriori* rather than *a priori,* this dissertation contends that Iran’s modernity under the Pahlavis was not only the invention of an image of modernity, but also the unbridgeable and uneven gulfs that such undertakings created between sociopolitical structures and ideologies, perceptions and ruminations, realities and myths.

In the larger context of the Middle East, Turkey has often been characterized as the ultimate example of a society that initiated and navigated the complex processes of rapid and radical modernization, while Reza Shah’s Iran has often been presented as a deficient and more despotic mimic of that which was taking place in Turkey. Most historians, for example, place heavy emphasis on the shah’s 1934 visit to Turkey to support their argument. As a result, the literature, both in the field of architecture and social history, tends to privilege this particular reading of Middle Eastern modernities and, thus, explains that of Iran’s as contingent upon the Turkish model. This dissertation challenges and rethinks such a reading of the history of Iran’s modern political, cultural, and architectural histories, and tries to demonstrate that, first, all modernities have to be reread from within their historical, social, and artistic traditions, and second that there are no exemplary models for modernity to be mimicked; that there exists no “authentic” or “original” modernity to being with. It contends that the various modernities in the Middle East were the amalgam of a very complex, ambivalent, and unique process that occurred in each place and that the holistic depiction of each can only be recognized by reciting the
intricate details of its equally complex experiences. The mere fact that Reza Shah and his elite had to contend with a Shi’ a ulama – a very important detail that some historians, especially in the discipline of non-Western architecture, overlook – is a reason for misreading the entire history of Iran’s modernity and its architectural production. The unfamiliarity of some architectural historians with the enormous impact of the Constitutional Revolutions of 1905-1906 upon Iran’s subsequent history is yet another cause for misinterpretation during such comparisons. To do justice to all modernities and their remarkable complexities, each society has to be read, reconstructed, and (re)presented on its own terms. This dissertation has tried to do exactly that for modern Iran.

In the context of Iran, on the one hand, for those who are, even remotely, familiar with Qajar misgovernment, Reza Shah’s military might did, indeed, save Iran’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty; it certainly gave Iran a new architectural vocabulary and set the architectural profession on a par with Western standards and modus operandi. On the other hand, for those who read Iranian history through an exclusively Pahlavi lens, the shah’s place in that rather long and rich history is not nearly as formidable. While the modern structures and institutions, particularly the concept of the sovereign heroic architect and the architectural profession as a distinct way of conceiving and practicing high culture, were placed by the elite of the 1920s, some of these ideas were already present before the Pahlavis. Nor did Reza Shah have a say in what exactly went on in the cultural domain. In Iran’s artistic transactions, he was a mere footnote, an afterthought of royal speeches and inspections. There were others, Iranians and non-Iranians of far superior intellectual caliber and sophisticated cultural sensibilities, who invented and forecasted a direction for Iran’s modern artistic and architectural tradition, the effects of which are present to this day. This dissertation is also about their architectural efforts, political rivalries, personal feelings, and eventual demise.

Though Rajabi’s *Iranian Architecture during the Pahlavi Era* (1977) is an attempt on a history of modern edifices, it is in Persian and partial to the monarchy, and Ackerman-Pope’s 14-volume *SoPA* (1938 and 1964) is confined to the 18th century. In contrast, the post-revolutionary scholarship while exhaustive remains apathetic to Pahlavi culture (Kaykhosrawai 1984, Gharui 1997, Eqabi 1999).


Research was carried out during fieldwork in Iran on five occasions between 1999 and 2002, twice in Paris in 2001 and 2002, in addition to research in London, New York, Los Angeles, Washington DC, Cambridge, MA, Yerevan, and Tbilisi. The first phase of research consisted of visiting and documenting each of the SNH’s monuments, with particular attention to those under close examination. During the second phase, I consulted the archives and collections listed in the bibliography for materials either rarely published or never considered under an architectural light. In order to reconstruct the cultural history of modern Iran, the study relies on both late Qajar and Pahlavi diplomatic records pertaining to cultural affairs, obtained from the
above-mentioned collections. Letters, speeches, memoirs, and scholarly writings published by public figures (Pirnia 1927-1952, Forughi 1930s, Shahrokh 1930s, Sadiq 1945-1974, Mohammad Reza Shah 1940-1980, Herzfeld 1920s-1930s, Pope-Ackerman 1925-1977, Godard 1930s-1960s, Byron 1930s, Sami 1960s, Ullens 1951-1970), memos between the French and British embassies in Tehran and their respective headquarters between 1895 and 1951, and reports on Iranian archeological activities are of primary importance to this study. The official newspapers of the Pahlavi era, including *Ettela’at* (1926-2002), *Kayhan* (1941-2002), *Ayandegan* (1970s), and *Le Journal de Téhéran* (1935-1980) are used as windows to the state’s propaganda machine. A number of interviews were conducted and recorded as listed in the bibliography and transcribed in the appendices (Adle, H. Amanat, Firuz Mirza, Grigorian, Sagianian, Seyhoun, Voskanian, etc.). To support the archival documents, interviews, and slides, the work depends on two additional sources for physical descriptions of the tombs: the SNH’s official reports although censored are carefully detailed (the SNH’s publications 1-159); and medieval Muslim as well as modern European travel journals while approached with caution are quite descriptive (Aruzì Samarghandi c. 1150, Ibn Battuta 1325-1354, Tavernier 1678, Chardin 1686, Morier 1818, Fraser 1825, Flandin 1851, Loftus 1857, Ferrier 1857, Khanykov 1866, O’Donovan 1882, Vambery 1883, Curzon 1892, Browne 1893, Coste 1894, Sauvage 1904, de Morgan 1904, Wishard 1908, Bradley-Birt 1909, Fryer 1909-1915, Sykes 1910s, Jackson 1909 and 1911, Herbert 1928, Richards 1932, Filmer 1936, Rodkin c. 1942, Byron 1950, Ullens 1950-1970, Tallberg 1970, Sahab 1977-1978, Stevens 1979).

More specifically, this study challenges positivist approach to Iranian architectural and cultural history in that it treats history of architecture as history of ideas versus buildings, of manifest conceptions above and beyond the built environment. Monographs or manifestos by/on Iranian architects including Houshang Seyhoun, Gabriel Gauvrekian, Nikolai Markov, Heydar Ghiai, Kamran Diba, Laleh Bakhtiar/Nader Ardalan, as well as scholarly works by eminent Western Orientalists, including Phyllis Ackerman, André Godard, Maxime Siroux, Arthur Upham Pope, Ernest Herzfeld, Richard Frye, and Donald Wilber have been considered as primary material and have been thoroughly referred to in this dissertation. While secondary sources on the specific modern architecture of Iran are not many, there are a few exceptions.

The study of architecture under Reza Shah was first undertaken in the United States by Mina Marefat whose 1988 unpublished dissertation focused on the modern architecture and
urbanism of Tehran during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi eras. Since then, there has been a great interest in the growth and urban dynamics of Tehran not only as a model of a modern and postmodern metropolis, but also as an exemplary site of urban revolt (Sh. Adle, B. Hourcade, K. Abdi, M. Alemi, E. Ehlers, W. Floor, M. Falamaki, E. Gran-Aymerich, M. Khansari, S. Mazumdar, Sh. Balaghi, L. Gumpert, S. Mazumdar, Sepanlu, etc.). The examination of the urban and architectural policies in the regions and their social impact under both Pahlavi shahs have largely been ignored. Most of these scholars are concerned with the architecture of the capital city, especially as a result of its urban changes during and after the 1979 Revolution. They, therefore, tend to overlook the investigation of the modern architecture in the provinces. Tehran remains central to our understand of Iran’s modern history.

In contrast, this dissertation focuses on the provinces and attempts to bring to the fore the much overlooked dynamics and tensions between the center and the peripheries, architectural and political alike. This is particularly significant considering the fact that Reza Shah’s foremost priority consisted of centralizing power into his own hand in Tehran, while his son reinforced the cultural imperialism of the center onto the peripheries. The kings’ military and political agendas were often mirrored in the styles, techniques, and processes of the architecture and urbanism manufactured under their rule. By investigating the various urban and architectural policies implemented outside Tehran, this dissertation reveals not only the tensions between the center – Tehran – and the peripheries – Mashhad, Shiraz, Hamadan, Nishapur, Isfahan – but also the relationship between peripheral centers and their geographic or conceptual fringes – Mashhad/Tus, Shiraz/Persepolis, Hamadan/Gorgan, Nishapur/Niv-Shapur, Isfahan/Julfa. The work contends that these tensions constitute yet another dimension of Iran’s uneven modernity.

It goes without saying that despite my critical approach to Western scholars and architects like the Godards, Siroux, Herzfeld, Ackerman, and Upham Pope, I am fully aware and appreciative of their contribution to the study of Iranian art and architecture. While disapproving of the political and personal agendas underlying their academic work, I admire the amount and quality of the scholarship that they left behind within the conditions that they did. For instance, despite handsomely profiting from his archeological digs, Herzfeld excavated in sites where Qashqa’i tribes were fighting Reza Shah’s army. Despite the royal attentions that she lavishly received, Ackerman almost single-handedly produced the SoPA while fighting the feminist battle on a daily basis. Despite the professional prestige of being Iran’s Antiquities Directors, Yedda
and André toughed it out for thirty years, dealing with both Iranian bureaucrats and French imperialists. The same approach applies to later cultural historians on whose valuable work I draw on but whose inaccuracies, at times and if any, I try to amend. While this is only meant to enrich Iran’s cultural historiography, I also believe that my generation has greatly benefited from hitherto suppressed information, especially about the Pahlavi era, made available by the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1990s.

Considering the scope of this project, the diversity and disparity of its archival and documentary sources, the nature of the SNH’s extensive activities and long history, as well as the fact that this is the first inquiry in Iran’s modern public architecture covering the entire 20th century, I have made a self-conscious effort to be as comprehensive as possible precisely for these same reasons. While it was impossible to trace a complete historiography of all the Society’s monuments, the work considers the five selected projects as a totality – as a whole, where each monument is a mere fragment of the larger project that was inclusive to all the SNH’s undertakings and the Pahlavi ethos. That all-inclusive project was the architectural articulation of modernity. The selection of the monuments, analyzed in as much detail as uncovered in each respective chapter, tries to incorporate as much as possible those projects that were not selected.

The five tombs, namely those of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam and Ackerman-Pope were selected on the basis of the following considerations: 1) Architectural qualities of the monument including scale and proportion, craftsmanship, use of inscription, facilities, popularity of site, and landmark vis-à-vis the urban fabric; 2) Equal chronological distribution of monuments’ design, construction, and inauguration dates, where the first mausoleum, Ferdawsiyeh, began in 1926 and the last, Popeiyeh, ended with Ackerman’s burial in 1977; 3) Avoidance of chronological overlaps so that each monument could serve as a byproduct and a representation of a specific sociopolitical and cultural era; 4) Geographic distribution of the monuments, where the even dispersal of these monuments was meant to create a holistic vision of the modern national map, hence, the selected edifices are located in Tus, Shiraz, Hamadan, Nishapur, and Isfahan respectively; 5) No hegemony of a single architect’s work in order to display the diversity of architectural ideas and trends in modern Iran, as well as tensions and collaborations between architects over the decades; 6) The tombs of relatively
better-known historical figures, which had had a wider influence on the elite’s project of modernity; 7) The potential availability of more information in archives and other sources; 8) Historical and modern importance of the cities wherein these projects were implemented, while Hamadan, Nishapur, and Tus were important pre-Islamic and medieval cities, after the capital Tehran, Shiraz and Isfahan, along with Tabriz and Mashhad, are constituted the two largest and most significant cities in modern Iran; 9) The possibility of thematic discussions enabled by the history of a given monument, for instance, issue of racial display, invented tradition, museum culture, or architectural destruction.

This dissertation is divided chronologically into a prologue, seven body chapters, and an epilogue. Chapter 1 traces the origin and underpinning politics of the SNH; chapter 2 elaborates on the SNH’s intended cultural, pedagogical, and sociopolitical agendas; chapters 3 to 7 reconstruct the stories of the mausoleums of each of the above-mentioned historical figures, wherein each building, its history and historiography is traced and analyzed. Specifically, chapter 3 addresses the discovery and invention of Ferdawsi’s tomb in Tus as an example of an invented tradition, syndromatic of new nation-states. Chapter 4 recounts the transformation of the Musalla cemetery into Hafez’s tomb-garden in Shiraz as a case in the modern culture of tourism and its architecturally destructive patterns. Chapter 5 charts the elimination and erection of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum-museum complex in Hamadan as a model for the museum cult and its normative claim to racial superiority. Chapter 6 traces the destruction and relocation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb in Nishapur as the symbol of Iran’s essentialist architectural doctrine on the claim to return to national roots and traditions. Chapter 7 deals with the tomb of Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Pope as an attempt to expose the intrinsically masculine myth of modernity and the politics of feminism in Iran. The prologue and the epilogue frame these chapters; while the former sheds light on the Qajar political origins of the Pahlavi project of cultural heritage and explains my methodological concerns, the latter provides an impressionistic documentary script as to the fate of these Pahlavi monuments during and after Iran’s “Islamic” Revolution in 1977-1979.

Unless otherwise stated, all French and Persian translations and transliterations are mine, based on the system provided above.
I. AN ANXIOUS SOCIETY: SNH’s Origins

“Everything had to be started over again...[we] longed for Persia to progress along modern lines, without discipline there was no hope.”

Iran’s Court Minister, Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash
August 28, 1927

The February 21, 1921 military coup in Iran was planned and carried out mainly by four men: Herman Norman, the British representative in Tehran between 1920 and 1921; Edmund Ironside, British general on a mission to pull out the troops that were defending the Bolshevik incursions in 1921; Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabataba’i, the over-ambitious political writer; and Reza Khan, the chief commander of the Iranian Cossacks who partnered with Seyyed Zia only to oust him within the next hundred days in office. After declaring himself prime minister and before calling on the last Qajar king, Ahmad Shah, Seyyed Zia issued a public declaration announcing the main points of his reform. One of his concerns was a new plan for the beautification of Tehran, along with other urban centers around the country. He seemed to have been aware of urbanism as an indispensable part of the larger modernization project that he had assigned himself to accomplish in Iran. However, after his fall in May of that same year, his plan for urban revitalization ended merely with his appointment of a mayor for Tehran.

With the abolition of the Qajar dynasty by the Iranian parliament on October 31, 1925 and the coronation of Reza Khan as king on April 25, 1926, Iran entered a period of rapid and radical reshuffling at all levels of the society. In this climate of reform, a cultural group was willed into existence by a handful politicians and intellectuals who would call themselves the Society for National Heritage (hereafter SNH or the Society), or in Persian, anjoman-e asar-e

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1 Herman Norman was the British ambassador to Iran in the cabinet of Lord Curzon. Norman and Curzon had very different visions for the future of Iran therefore they never got along with each other. Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabataba’i requested the title of “Dictator” from Ahmad Shah but was refused based on the designation’s Roman origin. Seyyed Zia’s first cabinet, with one exception, had completely new members. Mahmud Khan Movaqar al-Dowleh became the minister of public instructions and commerce who did little to improve either the Ministry or its reformist undertakings. C. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule (London, 1998), 202. Also, see E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (New Jersey, 1982), chapter 3.

2 See Ghani, Iran and Reza Shah, 200 and 207.
While central to the development of the state-imposed transformations, the documentary sources on its early days are ambiguous and confusing. The significance of the program launched by the often remarkable, “founding fathers” of the SNH, while later downplayed by both Pahlavi shahs, not only had a lasting impact on Iranian society, but was neither spontaneous nor sporadic. In fact, this chapter will contend that there was a direct link between the reformist political parities and the SNH in much of the 1920s and 1930s. While the official records of the Pahlavi era assert, with stanch authority, that under the order of Reza Shah, “the creator of a civilization,” a few “intensely patriotic” men gathered sometime in 1922 and “spontaneously” formed a “cultural” group, the purpose of which was “to preserve, protect, and promote Iran’s patrimony;” a closer look at the politics of the 1920s and 1930s reveals that the Society not only was in formation since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, but was also a highly organized body integral to the massive project of Iran’s modernization. In fact, as Reza Shah’s dictatorship intensified, the most prominent politicians and intellectuals of the time instigated radical reforms through the Society whereby they could veil their most effective

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3 Various sources translate the name of the Society in different ways: Society for National Heritage, Institute of National Heritage, Institute for the Protection of National Heritage, Society for the Protection of National Monuments, Institute for National Masterpieces, and Committee for the Preservation of National Heritage. The French diplomatic records use “l’Institut des Œuvres Nationales” and “La Commission des Œuvres Nationales;” see Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 42, July 15, 1926, Tehran. The Iranian archives refer to the SNH as “the National Relics Society;” see Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 106, Document 41, page 41; Aban 2, 1305/ October 25, 1926, Tehran. Isa Sadiq, the education minister and later president of the SNH, translated it as the “Society for the Protection of National Monuments;” see I. Sadiq, “American Pioneers in Persian Art,” Surveyors of Persian Art; A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman, eds. J. Gluck and N. Siver (Ashiya, 1996), 4. One of its founders, Shahrokh refers to it as “a Committee for the Preservation of National Heritage;” see Sh. Shahrokh and R. Writer, The Memoirs of Keikhosrow Shahrokh (Lewiston, 1994), 72. Lenczowski calls the SNH, the “National Monuments Society;” see G. Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, 1978), 37. Art historian and CIA undercover agent, Donald Wilber, calls it “the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments” as well as “the National Monuments Council;” see D. N. Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran (Hicksville, 1975), 161 and D. N. Wilber, “Architecture VII. Pahlavi, Before World War II,” in Encyclopedia Iranica 1, ed. E. Yarshater (London and New York), 350-351. A similar historic preservationist movement for Arab art was launched in Egypt. In 1881, Europeans persuaded Khedive Tawfiq to decree the founding of a similar organization as the SNH called Committee for the Conservation of Monuments of Arab Art. As in Iran, it opened the Museum of Arab Art in 1884. The Egyptian Committee was modeled after France’s Commission des Monuments Historique, which was founded in 1837 by romantics like Victor Hugo, Prosper Merimée, and Viollet-le-Duc. However, whereas the Egyptian Committee was dominated by European and local Christian scholars and politicians, the Iranian SNH was exclusively in the hands of predominantly Iranian Muslim, and one Zoroastrian, nationalist elite. For more details on the Egyptian case, see D. Reid, “Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism: the Struggle to Define and Control the Heritage of Arab Art in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24/1 (February 1992): 57-76.

political muscle behind a benign cultural veneer. In so doing, they effectively and shrewdly co-opted the visual and spatial domains into the mainstream of Pahlavi ideology and program. Their techniques of cultivating and naturalizing the new parameters of modernity persistently intersected with their anxiety over collective history, public space, and the cultivation of cultural taste. At the end, the new architectural forms that emerged under the custodianship of the SNH were overt ideological commemorations of the reformist politicians. For these men, therefore, the control over the physical and conceptual “heritage” enabled them to erase the immediate past to construct the “progressive” future. The selective destruction of the built environment, both as objects of representation and as actual places, was integral to the construction of that better future. In the process of modernization, newly built landmarks on the sites of eliminated structures were both the symbols and the products of the dynamics of political power and resistance in modern Iran.

While the theme of taste persistently reoccurred in the Society’s writings, lectures, and projects as a noble end in itself, it never becomes clear what was exactly meant by the general and vague term of “good taste.” The enormous efforts vested in recreating good taste never occasioned the attempt to define the very concept. As politicians, ideologues, and even political historians, the various members of the SNH were, no doubt, neither concerned about nor interested in aesthetic theorization; they were rather focused on making a compelling and enduring aesthetic discourse on the nation’s cultural heritage. Therefore, the concept of zawq – translated as the amalgam of “taste,” “elegance,” or “verve” – was often used with an a priori meaning that, in the architectural context, seemed to have implied a harmonious synthesis of contemporary Western morphologies and proportions with Achaemenid and Sassanian decorative programs. Such hybrid products, in turn, were to be “rediscovered” and “reclaimed” through an “awakening” of the equally undefined and vague notion of “national spirit” that was always regarded by the elite as intrinsically “pure,” “authentic,” and above all, forgotten. In this “spirit” of revivalism and modernization, public landmarks, often either mimicking pre-Islamic or Western forms, were the most potent signifiers of “good taste,” at the same time the symbols and products of the dynamics of political power in modern Iran.
Debating Modernists

In the summer of 1922, a few men did come together, all leading politicians and some serious scholars; however, this was not done by the order of Reza Shah. Much of what was "kingly" about the shah was the result of these men's work. Among the SNH's prominent founders was Court Minister Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, described by the American attaché as a man of "brilliancy [with] elements of madness [sic.]," the mastermind of the SNH (Fig. 1.1). The scholar among the group was former Prime Minister Hasan Pirnia who authored *History of Ancient Iran* in four volumes, and is often credited for single handedly preventing Iran from becoming a British protectorate in 1919 (Fig. 1.2). Another scholar-politician, Mohammad Ali Forughi was Reza Shah's first and last prime minister who throughout his life remained the most publicly recognized figure of the Society (Fig. 1.3). Firuz Mirza Firuz, the sharp Qajar nobility and minister of finance, would be instrumental in the SNH's dealings with the French in the sphere of archeology (Fig. 1.4). The Zoroastrian representative to the parliament, Arbab

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5 Iran's political system in the 20th century, despite massive efforts to build modern institutions, remained essentially centered around the agency of powerful men. Therefore, single individuals in their personalities and interactions were of primary importance to the political process. "In a political system where institutions are not paramount but where individuals in their interactions constitute the essence of the political process...their personalities are of primary importance." M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, 1971), 10. "The single biggest obstacle to reform was the arbitrary structure of political power in Qajar Iran. Reform measures were vulnerable to arbitrary intervention that could either delay them or eliminate them altogether. Since most reform initiatives were dependent on, and identified with, the person of the reformer, when that person was no longer in power, his plans were summarily abandoned. That is why the history of reform in Iran over the last 150 years or so has been marked by repeated ruptures. The result was to stigmatize reformism as an abject failure." A. Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century* (Austin, 1998), 25. In the 1920s, the agency of several men, who formed the SNH, redefined the cultural as well as political parameters of Iran.

6 US State Department Records, Charles Calmer Hart, "Teymourtache Dismissed and Great Was the Fall Thereof," dispatch 1310, 891.44 Teymourtache, Abdul K.K./1, December 29, 1932, Tehran. Hart was the American foreign minister to Iran between 1930 and 1933.

7 Titled *Moshir al-Dowleh*, Hasan Pirnia is considered one of the, if not the most, prominent politicians of the late Qajar period. Pirnia was a highly principled man with a Russian educational background. He became the first prime minister after the Constitutional Revolution and resumed the position four more times, the most difficult of which during the negotiations of the Anglo-Persian Agreement in 1920. After four months as prime minister, he disagreed with War Minister Reza Khan's heavy handedness, and resigned in May 1922. In the following years, he remained in the executive committee of the SNH and published a number of influential books: *Ancient Iran* in 1927; *Myths of Ancient Iran* in 1928; *History of Ancient Iran* in 1933; and the last volume of *History* was published by his close colleague Said Nafisi after Pirnia's death.

8 Although Firuz Mirza was instrumental in the archeological dealings in the crucial years of the 1920s, his political career has overshadowed most of these activities. Titled *Nosrat al-Dowleh*, he was the eldest son of Abd al-Farmanfarmaian, the cousin of the Qajar royal family. In the late Qajar era, he was deeply involved in the first attempt of the British to make the Iranian parliament accept the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement. In cultural affairs and as the governor-general of Fars between 1923 and 1924, Firuz's strength lay in his ability to persuade Ernest Herzfeld to conduct archeological studies at Persepolis after 1923; both men visited the site numerous times and photographed the ruins. However, Firuz's aptitude either in politics or in scholarship cannot be measured up against
Keikhosraw Shahrokh would be central to the revivalistic architectural style of the 1930s. Justice and Finance Minister Ali Akbar Davar would be influential in financing the SNH’s projects by his manipulation of the bureaucratic machine (Fig. 1.5). Other high-ranking politicians and founders of the SNH included former Prime Minister Hasan Mostawfi, once minister of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts (hereafter Minister of Public Instructions) Hasan Esfandiari, Ebrahim Hakimi, and Hajj Seyyed Nasrollah Taqavi, and prominent scholar Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh (Figs. 1.6-1.9). In due course, the Society would recruit other men of power such as future Education and Culture Minister Isa Sadiq, professor and editor Said Nafisi, and future Minister of Public Instructions Ali Asghar Hekmat.

These men, all highly educated in the Western tradition and native to Iranian culture, wholeheartedly believed in the secularist and modernist models for Iran’s progress into the 20th century with all of its productive and destructive patterns in the specific domain of architecture and urbanism. While they embraced the latest intellectual trends in Europe and the United States, they could at the same time draw on the large repertoire of Iranian cultural and literary tradition. They understood and could manipulate the system on both sides. They genuinely believed in the Aryan superiority of the Iranian people and endeavored to revive its cultural expressions, deciding and defining the parameters of that nation’s heritage. They forcibly westernized aspects of the Iranian life by crushing deep-rooted social networks and beliefs such as the ulama and the tribes, nevertheless exploiting these same networks and practices to permanently alter the society that they governed. These men engineered various models of modernity’s representations through architecture to challenge labeled symbols of the traditional. The visual was pivotal to the success of their grand, often utopian, project.

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9 The equivalent of the Ministry of Public Instructions in the Iranian system in the first half of 20th century was called the Ministry of Education or Learning, Endowments or vaqf, and Fine Arts; in Persian, vezarat-e ma‘aref, owqaf, va sanaye‘-e mostazrafah. While most political historians use ‘Ministry of Education’ to describe this office, throughout this work I use ‘Ministry of Public Instructions’ first because I want to emphasize the two other responsibilities of the Ministry, those of endowment and fine art, focal to this study. Second, because all French official documents and treaties use ‘Ministry’ or ‘Minister of Public Instructions’ when dealing with the Iranian
The Society as a modern institution, along with the landmarks and the individuals involved, revealed and examined over a long period – i.e. the entire 20th century – are manifestations of the attempts on behalf of an elite to modernize Iran as it saw fit for that society and the future of its people. The construction of the modern mausoleums of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Sa’di, Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam, Nader Shah, and Ackerman-Pope as listed in the prologue, not only provided a platform for redefining the very concepts of heritage, culture, and taste within the context of Iranian society, but also had much to do with the potential re-valuation and ownership of Iran’s archeological artifacts by French and German powers. So much of the new discourse on Iran’s national heritage underpinned the control over archeological excavations. Reversibly, so much of the politics of its archeological finds determined the limits and shape of Iran’s national heritage. The SNH’s new mausoleums were the most visible and viable cultural symbols of that discourse that was being woven under the name of national heritage. Both the Iranian secular elite and different Western scholars and politicians had an active and self-conscious agency in that project. Around these signs, the nation was being remade, rearranged, and projected as modern and progressive. The construction of realities and myths through these monuments and, hence, produced in the form of architecture, both defined and mirrored the aspirations, doubts, and ultimate vision of these early Pahlavi elite. In the ensuing decades, the public (re)use of their architectural projects would exceed their initial intentions in that the people of Iran would use these spaces as sites of political resistance in order to defy the centralized state.

The cooperation of the political elite and founders of the SNH existed before Reza Khan’s 1921 military coup. It was already significant that these men had come together to invent Iran’s national heritage for until then, neither was “Persia” a “nation,” nor did the nation have a “heritage.” They had teamed up years earlier as a political party. Reformers of the 1920s, their formative years had been shaped by the steady decline of the Qajar dynasty and, under its rule, the loss of national and international prestige as perceived by the secularist elite. They had been, furthermore, advocates of rapid and radial sociopolitical change and had long been waiting for the fruits of the Constitutional Revolution. By the mid-1920s, frustrated with the ineffective

parliamentary system along with their elitist attitude toward the masses, they refrained from associating either with the Democrats or the Socialists. Instead, in the Fourth Majlis, they formed their own party called Revival (*Hezb-e Tajaddod*). The rise of Reza Khan to absolute power in the early 1920s, in addition to sheer military force, was due to his clever alliance with the Revival Party that championed heavy-handed leadership.

The party was organized by Teymurtash, Davar, and Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon. The son of a Khorasan landowner, Teymurtash was trained in a Russian military academy in Saint Petersburg. After his return to Iran, he was appointed governor of Gilan in 1919, followed by the post of justice minister and governor of Kerman. During the premiership of Reza Khan, Teymurtash twice occupied the position of the minister of public instructions until his 1926 resignation from the Majlis when he was appointed to the highest post: the minister of imperial court. With this, Teymurtash had become the second most powerful man in Iran. Davar, a lawyer educated in Geneva, returned to Iran in 1921 to “wage a campaign for legal reforms…” through his newspaper *Mard-e Azad* (The Free Man). As Reza Shah’s renowned minister of justice, Davar designed and implemented the secular judicial system that permanently altered the state-people relationship in Iran; it took the law out of the *ulama* control and relegating it under the hegemony of the central government. Tadayyon, a schoolteacher from Khorasan and a participant in the 1906 Revolution, though subsequently played a small role in the workings of the SNH, as the minister of public instructions contributed greatly to the Franco-Persian negotiations for the ownership and management of the archeological sites in 1927.

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10 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 120-123.
11 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 120.
12 Titled *Sardar Moazam*, Teymurtash was born in Khorasan in 1879. He was sent first to Eshkabad to a preparatory school, then to Russia. He was fluent in Russian and French and after his return to Iran, he compensated for his lack of Iranian education with self-discipline in reading Persian literature and history. His first post with the Iranian government was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a Russian translator. In 1919, during the Jangali Movement, he became the Governor of Gilan, which cut the attention of Reza Khan. After a short period as the Minister of Justice, he became the Governor of Kerman between September 1923 and April 1924. Teymurtash was elected to the Parliament for the Second to the Sixth National Assembly. In bureaucratic capacities, he was Reza Shah’s official translator who often corrected and refined the king’s language during their diplomatic summits. The shah is alleged to have said, “Teymurtash’s word is my word.” He is reported to have known the details of each Ministry better than the ministers themselves. According to Hart, “Teymourtache was the active head of the Persian Government. He took business out of the hands of all the cabinet ministers and discussed every problem in minutes detail, as if he might have had it solely in charge.” As Minister of Court, he dictated most of the policies and supervised their progress. His familiarity with the bureaucracy, which he had devised, the ease with which he manipulated the system, and through which he maintained an unrivaled command over its parts made him the most powerful man in Iranian society after Reza Shah. For Teymurtash’s activities, among other sources, see Majd, *Britain and Reza Shah*, 172-175, and Ghani, *Iran and Reza Shah*, various sections.
13 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 122.
Other prominent members of the Revival Party, who were at once founders of the SNH, included Hasan Mostawfi, a veteran of the constitutional movement and prime minister several times before and during Reza Shah's reign was described by British observers as "a decent and much loved politician who nevertheless failed to provide a strong leadership;" 14 Arbab Keikhsosraw Shahrokh, a graduate of Tehran's American school, was the Zoroastrian representative to the parliament, the director of Iran's telephone company, a co-founder of Tehran's first official Freemason Lodge in 1909, an influential figure in the Indo-Persian grassroots relationships, and pivotal to the erection of Ferdawsi's modern mausoleum; 15 Ebrahim Hakimi, one of the first graduates of Tehran's first secular high school, Dar al-Fonun, was sent by Naser al-Din Shah to Europe for studies only to return and join the anti-Naserid revolutionary movement, become a member of the Democrat Party, and a secret Freemason; and Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, "who had first broken with his conservative clerical background to pursue his burning interest in Shaykhism, and later, on discovering the West, had turned to European languages and to modern sciences of physics, medicine, and practical chemistry," was known as the radical editor of the Berlin-based journal, Kaveh, and later "a radical deputy from Tabriz." 16 He returned to Iran in 1924, was elected to the first Majlis as the leaders of the Liberals, and held the posts of governor of Khorasan, ambassador to Great Britain, as well as minister of roads and finance. While an active advocate of Iran's westernization in the 1910s and 1920s, Taqizadeh subsequently became an ideological mentor to the other members of the SNH during much of the 1930s and 1940s. 17

14 Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, image 147.
15 Arbab Keikhsosraw Shahrokh's life and work will be discussed in detail in chapter 3, along with his involvement in the construction of Ferdawsi's modern mausoleum; see his memoirs, Sh. Shahrokh and R. Writer, The Memoirs of Keikhsosraw Shahrokh (Lewiston, 1994).
16 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 75 and 106-107; and A. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: the Pahlavis and After (London, 2003), 43.
The most prominent the SNH and Revival member was Mohammad Ali Forughi, who became Reza Shah’s first prime minister in December 1925. By then, he had had a long and prolific political career. Elected to the second parliament in 1909, Forughi subsequently led numerous important ministries: Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and Economy; he was the prime minister between 1925 and 1927, then again in 1932 until 1935. After the 1941 British and Soviet invasion of Iran, Reza Shah desperately turned to Forughi, who took the responsibility for running the country, negotiating with the Allies, and transferring the crown to the shah’s tenuous heir. During Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, he briefly served as the second minister of court, before his death in 1942. On the side, Forughi was the editor of Education, a widely circling journal among the educated elite of the late Qajar period; member of the 1905 Revolutionary Committee; a tutor to Ahmad Shah Qajar; the ranking member of the Iranian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference; ambassador to the United States and Turkey; the founder of the Academy of Iranian Culture as well as the Freemason Lodge; a law lecturer at Dar al-Fonun; and a professor at Tehran University’s political science department for which he wrote a textbook in 1901 titled History of Iran, reprinted in 1917. While his scholarly works include studies of Ferdawsi, Sa’di, and Omar Khayyam, his two-volume, The Course of Philosophy In Europe published in 1922 and 1941 is considered Forughi’s most important scholarly work.  

Despite the collective experience and aptitude of these men, their party would not survive long, mostly because Reza Shah looked suspiciously on independent groups and individuals even though these were backing his heavy-handed rule. After coming to power, the Revival Party was soon replaced by New Iran (Iran-e Naw), according to Times Magazine, with a policy “modeled upon that of the Fascists.” The objectives and members of New Iran all the while remained essentially those of Revival. Robert Clive, the British foreign minister in Tehran, reported that “the promoters of this [new] party are a few of the younger and more advanced Persian politicians, like Taimourtache, Minister of Court; Prince Firuz, Minister of Finance; Daver, Minister of Justice; together with a sprinkling of the younger Deputies and higher officers of the


18 Mohammad Ali Forughi, titled Zoka’ al-Molk, abandoning medical studies while in his thirties, he became the editor of Tarbiyat (Education) and was involved with groups that promoted the constitutional movement under Naser ad-Din Shah. In the executive committee of the SNH, throughout, he remained the most publicly recognized figure of the Society. Speeches at various inaugurations, ceremonies, and conferences related to or organized by the SNH were delivered by him.

19 Times Magazine (September 1, 1927).
army. His Imperial Majesty the Shah is said to be the honorary president. The group’s objectives were summed up in a public speech delivered by its official head, Teymurtash, on August 28, 1927: “The independence of Persia under the banner of Pahlavi; the progress of Persia through the power of Reza Shah to civilization and modernity; resistance to foreign influence; opposition to all reactionary and subversive ideas; and honesty and devotion in public administration.” These policies were based on rigorous secularism, industrialization, administrative and military discipline, native capitalism against colonial capitulations, and linguistic and cultural homogenization of Iran. However, despite its support for Reza Shah, the party was accused of championing “republican sentiments” and was outlawed by a monarch described as “a brutal, avaricious, and inscrutable despot,” whose reign was increasingly characterized by paranoia and arbitrary rule. Still, for a while, the Revival Party guaranteed the passing of “bills presented to the Majles by the Government...without much trouble [sic.]” The party’s demise in 1932 was accompanied by Teymurtash’s own fall from grace. His death, therefore, marked the beginning of an uneven political and socio-economic development in modern Iran.

In order to play down Reza Shah’s militant image during the reign of his son, he was represented in Pahlavi historiography as a king with a sophisticated cultural taste and as the foremost patron of the arts. To this end, the founding of the SNH was credited entirely to Reza Khan, whereas the agency of those who did establish the Society was subdued in most official records. In a book, entitled The Report Book of Reza Shah the Great: Founder of Modern Iran, Cultural Minister Mehrdad Pahlbod insisted that “The Shahanshah paid particular attention to the protection and care of ancient Iranian heritage because it reminds us of the glorious periods of

21 British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12286/E4109, Clive, September 10, 1927, Tehran; reprinted in Ettela‘at (Shahrivar 9, 1306/August 31, 1927).
22 American Minister to the State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1945): III, 385; quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 165. British Minister of the Foreign Office, “Annual Report for 1932” OF 371/Persia 1933/34-16967. The details of the revival of the party under the name Progress (Taraqqi) is outside the scope of this paper. For such accounts, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 120-123, and 138; M. Eliot, “New Iran and the Dissolution of Party Politics under Riza Shah,” Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey and Iran 1918-1942, eds. T. Atabaki and E. Zurcher (London, 2003); and Ghani, Iran and Reza Shah, 289-325.
Therefore, as early as during his appointment as Iran's war minister, according to Pahlbod, Reza Khan "established an entity in the name of the *anjoman-e asar-e melli.*" Contemporaries concurred. While in his memoirs Keikhosraw Shahrokh incorrectly maintained that "in 1926, under the auspices of His Majesty Shahanshah Reza Shah Pahlavi, a Committee for the Preservation of National Heritage was formed," later Pahlavi sources went further in arguing, "His Majesty...allowed a group of Orient's historians to search and renovate historic sites in all of Iran."

The *Karnameh,* the official 980-page record of the SNH, is the 131st and the most elaborate publication of the Society by far. It depicts their entire operations in painstaking detail from its inception to the year of the *Karnameh*’s publication in 1976. Although, claiming scholarly precision and utilizing scientific methods to support its statements, the text is imbued with state propaganda and censorship, historical inaccuracies, and clumsy errors and omissions. The very opening paragraph is telling.

Early morning on the 3rd of Esfand 2479...a passionate and strong-minded Iranian son [Reza Khan] rose and rescued the nation from the grip of foreigners, tribe chiefs, and poverty. Two years had not passed from the arrival of Reza Shah the Great on the political scene when peace and security were attained. With his order, in the fall of 2481, a group of prominent intellectuals and admirers of nation's heritage proud of Iran's progress, gathered around a society in the name of *anjoman-e asar-e melli.* [Their] purpose [was] to preserve and restore historic landmarks and honor the memory, culture, and artistic prestige of ancient Iran.

The imperial dates in the newly enforced calendar are significant because they indicate the hegemony of the imperial concept of "time" and "history" in the 1970s, which originated in the foundation of the Achaemenid Empire and was intended to rival the Muslim calendar. Therefore, in this paragraph, the vagueness of "2479" and "2481" merely postponed indicating the actual dates in lieu of rhetoric. Furthermore, the sentence went on to state that with the request of the

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28 The historical inaccuracies are self-evident in that however "passionate and strong-minded" Reza Khan might have been, he could not have single-handedly "secured" Iran from all such mishaps in a single "morning;" nor was absolute "peace and security attained" by presumably 1923. SNH 131, *Karnameh,* 3. My translation.
SNH in 1925, Prime Minister Reza Khan accepted the chair of the Society. Pahlbod’s account was displaced by a couple of years and from war to prime minister, rendering both statements erroneous. The preface explicitly stated that Isa Sadiq, the minister of public instructions and the then chair of the SNH, had reviewed and corrected the manuscript. However, a comparison with Sadiq’s own writing, from which the Karnameh quoted extensively, reveals a number of deliberate revisions to the original text.

Most of these sources, therefore, remain suspect in terms of historic possibility, bureaucratic mores, and personalities of those involved. First, why would and how could a minister of war decree the formation of a society predominantly engrossed in cultural agendas and artifacts? Second, as the minister of war in the early 1920s, Reza Khan would have been ordering a group of men who, at the time, were ranked higher than himself in the state bureaucracy. 29 Third, it is by now well-known that Reza Khan became familiar with and interested in the various forms of high culture, for instance, Ferdawsi’s Shahnnameh, only after becoming a shah in 1925. For instance, Makki notes that as of his coronation, a group of seven men were ordered to see Reza Shah, assigned to read to him. 30 On one occasion, when Orang Shaykh al-Molk, a Majlis representative, had chosen the Shahnnameh, the shah had particularly liked the “more patriotic” parts of the book. Deeply moved by the nationalistic deeds animated in the stories, he is reported to have cried. Finally, while the SNH was established in 1922, the Pahlavi dynasty came into being in 1926. Therefore, Reza Khan’s direct or remote involvement with the SNH, especially its establishment, is suspect based on his position, education, and cultural background in the late 1910s and early 1920s.

Furthermore, according to the Karnameh, during this early period because of a lack of an office, the executive committee of the SNH met at the residence of one of the members. The report stops there. Sadiq, in his memoirs wrote, “The first time that I became aware of the existence of such a group was when Teymurtash, whose children were attending the school where I was an educator, invited me to his garden in the northern side of Jaleh Avenue.” 31 Disregarding the censorship and royal exultation, we can conclude that the Society was formed

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29 It is known that Hasan Pirnia was one of the founding members of the Society, involved from its initiation, especially because Pirnia was the prime minister during the early days of the SNH.
31 At this first meeting, Sadiq recalled seeing the members of the Society, among them Teymurtash who asked him to help raise funds from the state schools for the construction of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum; see Sadiq, *Memoirs*, 2: 201.
in all probability by the personal efforts of the court minister. He offered his residence for the first few meetings and solicited members of the political and educational arena to promote the Society. These seemingly small omissions and substitutions are highly significant if one considers the SNH as a site of political contest throughout the Pahlavi ruling period. The agency of Teymurtash, Forughī, and Firuz Mirza become increasingly apparent as the SNH’s story unfolds and spreads to archeology, autopsies, and the invention of patrimony.

Just as later Pahlavi historiography deflated the pivotal role played by the early Pahlavi elite in Iran’s modernization project, it also suppressed details of the connections between the New Iran Party and the Society for National Heritage — a relation that this chapter contends had been a direct one. For while short-lived and eventually banned, the ideologies of New Iran resurfaced in the activities of the SNH, the most symbolic of all, the honorary presidency of the shah. Throughout the Pahlavi era, the SNH would execute the secularist, modernistic, and at times racist theoretical programs of the Revival Party. Although each member of the SNH’s Board of Trustees was also a representative of the government cabinet, the Society was officially independent of the Pahlavi state. Legally, neither the king nor the parliament had authority over its operations. Similarly, none of its members acted on behalf of or were pressured by their respective social backgrounds, such as the clerics (ulama), the merchants (bazaaris), the tribes, or the landed aristocracy; this was because they all belonged to the pre-Reza Shah intelligentsia made up of “a small stratum that had drawn its members from diverse occupations, family positions, income brackets, educational backgrounds, and ways of life.” The formative years of the Society were, therefore, shaped by the independence of the group and its constituents from both the modern state apparatus and the historical social divides.

32 The Karnameh went on to say that the SNH conjured up a style for Ferdawsi’s mausoleum similar to that of the tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae. However, Sadiq unequivocally states that this idea came directly from Teymurtash. This point will be elaborated in chapter 3. Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 203. While Sadiq is directly quoted in the Karnameh, the words “Teymurtash” are replaced by “Asar-e Melli.” SNH 131, Karnameh, 30. Similarly, Abdi only mentions Pirnia, Forughī, and Firuz Mirza as the three founders of the Society for National Heritage; see K. Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran,” American Journal of Archaeology 105 (2001): 51-76.

33 In chapter 3, this point will be elaborated during the financing of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum in 1933. Since the SNH was not affiliated to any government ministry, the parliament did not know how to loan a very large sum of money to the Society for the completion of the mausoleum project. Loans had to be taken out from the National Bank (bank-e melli) of Iran by individuals like Forughī who took full responsibility for their interests and payments as the head of the SNH. A direct money allocation from the state to the SNH was not possible. Iran National Archives 240, Micro-reel 291, Document 54, page 17; Esfand 8, 1312, Tehran. Iran National Archives 240, Micro-reel 291, Document 54, page 5; Khordad 3-26, 1313, Tehran. Iran National Archives 240, Micro-reel 291, Document 53, page 3; Mehr 11, 1313, Tehran.
Nonetheless, an analysis of the structure, policies, and aims of the SNH immediately reveals its rootedness in mainstream politics of the time. In fact, the group’s effectiveness lay in a faked political apathy, which gave it an independence rarely found in Reza Shah’s autocratic regime. This subterfuge was a precondition for its own perpetuation. That which these politicians and ideologues were prohibited to achieve through the political apparatus, they continued to implement under the guise of a cultural organization that professed to maintain its distance from politics. In other word, Reza Shah – a purely military leader with no knowledge about how artistic and cultural expressions could operate to enhance political power – refrained from censuring, controlling, and outlawing the SNH because, as late as 1935, he did not perceive it as a political threat. The Society, in turn, managed to maintain its benign cultural image by outwardly staying out of all overt political activities. Article twenty of SNH’s first by-laws clearly states: “a member will be dismissed from the organization in case of involvement in political activities in the name of the Society.”

The intrinsically political history of anjomans in Qajar Iran points to the political foundation of the SNH: the anjoman-e asar-e melli. The anjomans played an important political role in the 19th century, especially in the reform movements as groupings that met clandestinely and formulated radical ideas. While their origin has been traced to the 18th-century Sufi gatherings, by 1852, they had developed into secret societies wherein “[t]he future was discussed, the past either lamented or in certain aspects praised,” and “comparisons” made “with the present…” This mid-19th-century political evolution of the anjomans, “as the pre-revolution kind of semi- or entirely secret association…was a new phenomenon.” Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar’s turn of the century attempt on liberalism while intended to “satisfy the political opposition” and reduce social agitation, they “merely encouraged” the formation of “semiclandestine organizations;” the further growth, in number and in scope, of the anjomans. The most important among them included “the Secret Center (Markaz-i Ghaybi); the Society of Social Democratic party (Hizb-i Ijtima’yun-i ‘Amiyun); the Society of Humanity (Jama’-i Adamiyat); the Revolutionary Committee (Komiteh-i Inqilabi); and the Secret Society

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34 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 145.
35 See Appendix 1.
36 P. Avery, Modern Iran (New York, 1965), 113.
37 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 76.
(Anjuman-i Makhfi)." Each with a political vision and program eventually played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution. In the late Qajar period, their activities were also instrumental "in canalizing growing discontent in Iranian society and in giving direction to the popular protest movement that later broke out in reaction to chronic misgovernment." The SNH emerged after World War I out of the shadows of these societies and modeled itself in the manner of their institutional name and organization. Despite its a-political name and legal disclaimer, however, it too fostered deeply political agendas.

The SNH's covert political role sharply amplified in October 1927, when Reza Shah issued a decree that prohibited all members of the court, the cabinet, and government officials to join any political party. Teymurtash, along with the most influential members of the Revival Party, was obliged to withdraw his partisan membership. However, even the British knew that "the party still meets secretly." From that time onward, it is argued here, these reformists initiated and implemented their most radical ideas through the SNH, both in opposition to an increasingly despotic and paranoid monarch and in tandem with the ever-present influence of the imperial powers. As noted in the prologue, the series of landmarks erected by the SNH would serve as a platform to implement radical reforms. The reformists' urging of further secularization was to be emboldened by the construction of national pilgrimage sites. Their ardent belief in the superiority of the Iranian "race" was to be supported by the autopsy of corpses, inherent to the reconstruction process of these monuments. Their wish for the cultural revival of ancient Iran was to be fulfilled by the use of pre-Islamic prototypes and icons in the new landmarks. Their advocacy for rapid modernization and progress was to be materialized through modern institutions housed in these complexes; western-style libraries, museums, bookshops, and restaurants were to instruct the masses on "life along modern lines." The new monuments were also to guarantee the successful erasure of old structures and habits for the prosperity of "discipline, homogeneity, reason and sense," all for the "good of the country." During his August 1927 conversation with the British embassy's Oriental secretary, Teymurtash acknowledged:

38 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 76.
41 British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/E3909 Clive reporting on Court Minister Teymurtash, August 26, 1927, Tehran.
Persia, after twenty years of so-called Constitutional Government, had made little progress, and it has, so far, failed to grasp even the principles of Constitutional Government. Everything had to be started over again...[we] longed for Persia to progress along modern lines...without discipline there was no hope. Elected on no programme and on no principle, [deputies’] acts were devoid of reasoning and sense. A homogeneous and disciplined party, grouped around a personality and worked through the personality for the good of the country, was the only hope for the future.\(^4\)

The “foremost, if not the only, intellectual giant Persia has known in a century” must have recognized that there is no such thing as mere culture. For instance, Teymurtash had already demonstrated the importance that he attributed to cultural representations of power during Reza Shah’s coronation ceremony on April 25, 1926.\(^3\) Suffocated by Reza Shah’s repressive reigning methods, Teymurtash and his co-ideologues perhaps felt that they could realize their vision for a “New Iran” by the means of these highly nuanced political activities represented as heritage.

The foundational principles and regulations of the Society resembled those of a political organization as well. In 1922, its four primary aims were listed in its first by-laws, composed of 14 articles and 21 regulations. The first article stated: “The purpose of the Society is to cultivate public fascination with Iranian scientific (elmi) and industrial (san’ati) historic heritage (asar-e tarikhi) and to attempt to protect the Fine Arts (sanaye’-e mostazrafeh) and handicraft (sanaye’-e decoratives)”.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/£3909 Clive reporting on Court Minister Teymurtash, August 26, 1927, Tehran.

\(^3\) US State Department Records, Hart, “Teymurtache Dismissed and great was the Fall Thereof,” dispatch 1310, 891.44 Teymurtache, Abdol K.K./1, December 29, 1932, Tehran; quoted in Majd, Britain and Reza Shah, 172-175.

\(^4\) In the Qajar palace of Golestan, moderately, yet meticulously planned, both the Pahlavi crown and the proceedings were Teymurtash’s initiatives. He had worked like a scholar, requesting records of European coronation ceremonies and studying Safavid and Qajar enthronement traditions. Teymurtash “was especially sensitive to protocol and wanted Reza Shah to be surrounded with dignity. He appointed Hassanali Ghaffari, a career diplomat who had been the chief of protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Ministry of Court.” Ghani, Iran and Reza Shah, 384. During the coronation, the opening speech was delivered by a senior clergyman of Tehran, who along with his colleagues sanctioned the new dynasty. While the crown was carried to the shah on a silver plate by the court minister, a long patriotic speech, with extensive recitations from the Shahnameh, was read by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Foroughi. Next, Reza Khan placed the crown on his own head, making him the Shahanshah of Iran. The enthronement on Takht-e Naderi or Nader’s throne was symbolic. The Qajars most probably never used it because of its historic associations with Nader Shah Afshar who ordered its production and adorned it with the valuable stones that he had brought back from India. The Peacock Throne or Takht-e Tavus, on the other hand, was too “oriental” in its style: a reclining bed with cushions and ornamentations; inappropriate for the image of a modern king who had pleaded for presidency only two years prior. Moreover, Reza Shah had projected himself onto the person of Nader Shah, as part of his image. Akin to Nader, he was also a self-made king; heroic, patriotic, and militant in character; the soldier who had “saved the nation” from annihilation. Historically speaking, Reza Shah had rose from the military ranks of the Qajars, just as Nader Shah had rose from those of the Safavids; both had been pivotal to the territorial integrity and expansion of Iran and both had eventually usurped the royal throne. The Pahlavi projection onto history later took shape in the elaborate monument of Nader’s mausoleum in Mashhad, in addition to various literary comparisons throughout the 20th century. The old palace, the still older throne, the new crown, the ritualistic minimalism, and the nationalistic flair deferred to historic and social genuineness of the Pahlavi dynasty.
and to preserve their old style and method." The eighth article itemized the initial objectives: “1) The establishment of a museum in Tehran; 2) The establishment of a library in Tehran; 3) The recording and classification of those works necessary to the preservation of a national heritage, and; 4) The tabulation of priceless collections related to libraries or museums that are in the possession of the state or national organizations.” Additional aims were stipulated in the ninth article: “the attempt of using the above mentioned collections to benefit the masses through instruction in schools, exhibitions, and lectures. Moreover, attempts will be made to preserve and revive the Iranian industries (sanaye'-e) and arts (honar-ha).” Consisting of fifteen members on its Board of Trustees, it enlisted “unlimited public and honorary members.” Since that board held complete control over the organization, all the corrections or modifications to the by-laws, the conditions of membership, financial as well as administrative decisions, the summoning of meetings, and the election of the members to the Board of Directors depended on its vote. More interestingly, the political agendas of the Society embraced more than the points stipulated in its by-laws. Between its conception in 1922 and 1927, the most crucial, yet unexplored, political task of the SNH was to put an end to the French monopoly over the archeological excavation rights in Iran, capitulated by the Qajar kings to the French Republic in the 19th century.

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44 See Appendix 1; my translation from Karnameh, 13-21.
45 See Appendix 1.
46 See Appendix 1.
47 See Appendix 1.
Archeology Entangled

In Pahlavi Iran, archeology was an important arena to which Reza Shah was a latecomer. The remarkable stories behind Iran's archeology positioned high culture at the heart of politics, not unlike in the neighboring regions such as Mesopotamia, Anatolia, the Levant, and the Indian Subcontinent. Both a physical and ideological site of convergence, debates concerning archeology assembled various groups and individuals that would first get to know each other, then contend and hate each other, and finally come to terms with each other. An exhaustive description of this story is both outside the scope of this study and too broad to sum up in a few paragraphs. The accounts in this study will, therefore, concern itself with archeological events to the extent that they involved the various members of the SNH, the appearance of Orientalists such as Ernest Herzfeld from Germany, André Godard from France, and Arthur Upham Pope from the United States on the Iranian cultural scene, and the influence of archeological discourse by these men on the invention of Iranian national heritage. Here, follows the diplomatic stories behind the actual archeological activities that accrued in the years following Reza Shah's 1921 coup. The fact that Herzfeld was a German archeologist, Godard a French architect, and Pope an American art historian and dealer, and the fact that all three men were genuinely interested in Iranian archeology, architecture, as well as politics, was no accident. Each was associated with a major art museum in the West – Herzfeld with the Berlin State Museum, Godard with the...
Louvre, and Pope with the Chicago and Philadelphia Museums – making the potential, and highly lucrative, finds from Iranian archeological excavations compelling both to these individuals and the institutions that supported them. Western powers expanded their spheres of influence over Iran by promoting their scholars in the area of archeology, and by extension architecture. Therefore, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, modern Iranian architecture in the 1930s, and in particular the undertakings of the SNH during that time, cannot be alienated from the predominantly French, but also German and American archeological ambitions in Iran. From the beginning, the politics of the excavations and that of the national monuments – as historic monument – were entangled.

The discourse on Iran’s “national heritage” began in October 1895. The 19th-century European commercial and political activities finally yield to an official arrangement between the French Republic and the Qajar monarchy. Under the May 12, 1895 decree of Naser al-Din Shah who was assassinated a year later, an agreement was signed on August 11, 1900 by Mozaffar al-Din Shah “conceding to the French Republic the exclusive and perpetual right to excavate in the entire expanse of the empire.” The French monopoly over all archeological sites secured by the Qajar kings resulted in the French authorities having absolute control over all archeological activities in Iran in the 1910s and 1920s. Containing eleven articles, the treaty gave French scholars and scientists a free hand to excavate wherever they deemed necessary except “the holy places, mosques, and Muslim cemeteries.” However, the French focused their excavation efforts on a single site: Susa, the Achaemenid capital in southwestern Iran, also known as Shush. Between the 1890s and 1920s, explorers, geologists, and archeologists like Captain Truilhier, Sir Henry Rawlinson, William Kenneth Loftus, Jane and Marcel Dieulafoy as

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50 For the underpinning politics of such transformations in the Orient, see E. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1979); and E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993).
51 Naser al-Din Shah was assassinated on May 1, 1896. The signature on the agreement is that of his son and successor Mozaffar al-Din Shah who has been described as “timid” and “lazy” by various accounts. The agreement states in the opening paragraph: “Le traité passé entre les deux pays, le 16 zolkadi 1312 (12 mai 1895) et du firman signé par Sa Majeste Mozaffar el Din Shah en Djammade el awal 1315 (octobre 1897) le Gouvernement persan ayant concede au Gouvernement de la Republique francaise le droit exclusif et perpetuel de practiquer des fouilles dans toute l'etendue de l'empire...” Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique, E387-3, 17, August 11, 1900, Paris; see Appendix 3.
52 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique, E387-3, 17, August 11, 1900, Paris; see Appendix 3.
well as Jacques de Morgan excavated Susa.\textsuperscript{53} Delegation Francaise en Perse, directed by de Morgan has been described by resent historians as “probably the most important archeological expedition that has left Europe.”\textsuperscript{54} The choice of Susa had since the 1850s been politically significant both for the French and the Iranian state.\textsuperscript{55} The reign of the Achaemenid dynasty, founded by Cyrus the Great (r. 559-530 BC) and expanded by Darius I (r. 521-486 BC), stretched from Egypt to India from 559 BC to its defeat by Alexander the Great in 331 BC.\textsuperscript{56} Susa was the first capital city of that which was considered as the first “Persian Empire;” this was, presumably, where Iran’s history had begun. This period of Iranian history, furthermore, became particularly significant for modern Iranian reformists and Westerners alike for whom the Achaemenid past embodied the long-lost and forgotten glory of a pure Persian monarchy. Symbolizing the spirit of the nation for the Pahlavi reformists, this selected history became the

\textsuperscript{53} W. Loftus, 	extit{Travels and Researches of Chaldea and Susiana} (London, 1857); M. Dieulafoy, 	extit{L'Acropole de Suse} (Paris, 1890); M. Dieulafoy, 	extit{L'Art Antique de la Perse} (Paris, 2 vols., 1884); and J. Dieulafoy, 	extit{Le Tour du Monde: la Perse, la Chaldée, et la Susiane} (Paris, 1883). For a Persian translation of the latter, see J. Dieulafoy, 	extit{Safarnamah-ye Madam Dieulafoy} (Tehran, 1361/1982); and 	extit{At Susa: the Ancient Capital of the King of Persia} (Philadelphia, 1890). The Dieulafoys traveled to and in Iran between 1881 and 1882. Jane Paule Henriette Rachel Magre Dieulafoy (1851-1916) dressed as a man in order to be able to travel and work at Susa. They eventually shipped most of their findings to the Louvre. Also, see P. E. Van Der Meer, 	extit{Mission en Susiane} (Paris, 1935).

\textsuperscript{54} Niknami, 	extit{Methodological Iranian Archeology}, 8. Also see his own impressive four volumes: J. de Morgan, 	extit{Mission Scientifique en Perse} (Paris, 1895-1896). Supervised by the French minister of public instructions, fine arts, and culture, it includes details of various archeological undertakings in Iran including ancient Hamadan or 'Ecbatana,' maps and sketches of the Caspian Sea region, Kurdistan, and Elam, among other topics. Bibliothèque Nationale de France; site Francois-Mitterrand, NF O2H-481 (4,1) microfilm m17131; BNF O2H-481 (5, 2) microfilm m17132; BNF O2H-481 (CARTES) microfilm m17133.

\textsuperscript{55} “The first conventional excavations, like those of Mesopotamia, did not start in Iran until 1850s when Loftus, a geologist in the Turko-Persian Frontier Commission for determining the border of Iran and the Ottoman Empire, and a politician interested in acquiring major finds for museum display, visited Susa, which was identified as the Biblical Shushan. He had already excavated at Warka, the Biblical Erech, as early as 1850 on his belief that ‘...from our childhood we have been led to regard this as the cradle of the human-race.’ The huge ruins of the Susa acropolis encouraged him to make an excavation on the central part of the mound. His campaign for the first time brought to light a columned hall of the Achaemenid period.” Niknami, 	extit{Methodological Iranian Archeology}, 7.

\textsuperscript{56} “The Medes, allied with Scythians and Babylonians, destroyed Assyria, but did not extend their power outside Iran. Eighty years later the Persians took over the empire which Babylonia had meanwhile administered. A tribe of nomadic or semi-nomadic horsemen took charge of the civilized world and did not destroy civilization but enhanced it. This was mainly the work of one man: Cyrus of the family of the Achaemenids led the Persians, but had begun his chieftainship as a vassal of the Medes (559 B.C.). Ten years later he defeated the Median ruler, Astyages. In 546 he defeated Croesus of Lydia, in 539 Nabonidus of Babylon. He died in 529, and his successor Cambyses conquered Egypt in 525. This king was violent and unbalanced, an exceptional figure among the descendents of Achaemenes. With Darius I (522-486 B.C.) the empire resumed the course set by Cyrus the Great. For centuries it was ruled with efficiency, justice, and tolerance.” H. Frankfort, 	extit{The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Orient} (London, 1989), 348. Susa was the first Achaemenid capital city and is located approximately in the southwestern region of Iran, directly north of the tip of Persian Gulf. The two other important Achaemenid cities were Persepolis, excavated by the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, and Pasargadae, excavated by the British Institute of Persian Studies; both are located northeast of modern-day Shiraz, in the south of Iran.
source for the invention of national heritage supported by those who excavated the site and those who propagated its past grandeur and potential revival.

With the military coup of 1921 and the abolition of the Qajar dynasty in 1925, the French had little actual power to execute the eleventh article of the agreement: “the Persian government agrees to give the necessary orders so that the terms of this treaty be known and observed by all the regional governments.”57 While the French complained about “several clandestine digs in the region of Ray,” they conceded amongst themselves that its reason was the “absence of our archeologists in…Persia.”58 Tension mounted when the Iranian government openly refused to implement the eleventh point of the convention. On the one hand, the reformist elite perceived the treaty as “unfair” – one signed by a monarch for whom they reserved little respect and whose dynasty they had overthrown. On the other hand, the French Republic did not want to abandon the monopoly precisely because therein lay its colonial prerogative in Iran. The British controlled the south as much as they could for its oil and access through the Persian Gulf, and the Soviets, the north via its long border with Iran. The French Republic wanted full hegemony over all aspects under the rubric of high culture.

Although the contemporary French historian Nicole Chevalier ascribes the ensuing negotiations on the excavation rights to an “archeological void” and inactivity in the 19th century, the occurrences around this “void” were more complex.59 It was certainly more than mere neglect or ignorance on the part of “Persia,” as one of Chevalier’s predecessors felt in the 1920s: “for many Persians, even those who get something of culture, Susa is very far” from their minds.60 The French motive behind the archeological negotiations underpinned political campaigns waged against the British, German, and Soviet political influence in Iran. The specificities of this French hegemony over Iran’s cultural domain is vital to the understanding of

57 “Article XI – Le Gouvernement persan s’engage à donner les ordres nécessaires pour que les termes du présent traité soient connus et observés par tous les Gouvernement des provinces.” Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique, E387-3, 19, August 11, 1900, Paris; see Appendix 3.
58 The city of Ray (or Rey) is located a few kilometers to the south of Tehran; it is the ancient site of Raga, mentioned in the Zoroastrian book of Avesta. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 33, July 23, 1924, Tehran.
59 “C’est dans ce contexte de ‘vide archeologique’ qu’il faut inscrire la negociation de la convention archeologique et la creation de la Delegation scientifique dont Morgan vient d’etre nomme delegue general.” Chevalier, Mission en Perse, 76.
their subsequent choices in dealing with the Iranian government; a point that comes across throughout French diplomatic records related not only to the 1900 Convention but also to those in the spheres of education, mass media, sport, as well as youth organizations.61

By the mid-1920s with the reformist elite at the helm of the Iranian government, the French were out of luck and had to resort to heavy diplomacy both amongst various French state institutions and with the Iranian political leaders. On July 22, 1923, Maurice Dayet, the French chargé d’affaires in Tehran, cautioned his foreign minister in Paris that “the possession of a monopoly that we only exercise in Susa, renders our right illusive to the eyes of those who are particularly interested in smashing it into pieces; just the fact that a Persian pretends [to have] the authority to dig must attract our serious attention.”62 The Iranian diplomatic attempts on reclaiming the right to excavate within the boundaries of modern Iran was perceived by the French as violently physical in nature. Like archeological artifacts, French rights seemed fragile art objects that could be vandalized, “smashed into pieces.” Moreover, the “pretending Persian” in question was Hasan Esfandiari, the Iranian minister of public instructions and a member of the SNH. In fact, between 1923 and 1927, Esfandiari along with Firuz Mirza, Teymurtash, Forughí, and a number of other members of the SNH, manipulated the situation to balance the various powers on the excavation rights, precisely because so much of the new discourse on Iran’s national heritage underpinned the management and ownership of these same archeological sites and artifacts.

In February 1924, the French attaché, Raymond Poincaré, received a letter from his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Ali Forughí, requesting an official revision to the Convention of 1900 because “it has been drafted contrary to the rules and principles of the country and completely against its interests.”63 Threatening to present the case to the League of Nations, Forughí’s letter referred to a document sent eight years earlier, highlighting the prolonged struggle between the two parties involved. Raymond Lecomte, the French minister of public

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61 The French also had exclusive rights over the Egyptian Antiquities Services and Museum beginning in the mid-19th century. Their domination lasted ninety-four years; see D. Reid, “Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism: the Struggle to Define and Control the Heritage of Arab Art in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24/1 (February 1992): 57.
63 During the 1895 negotiations, Raymond Poincaré was the French minister of public instructions. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 24-25, February 4, 1924/Dalve 8, 1302, Tehran. The letter is signed by Zoka’ al-Molk, the title of Mohammad Ali Forughí.
instructions, had protested in 1916 that “it is not appropriate to treat hypothetically the universal right reserved to France by this international” treaty.\(^{64}\) The British observed that the French were simply ignoring the claims of the Iranian government as a pure diplomatic tactic.\(^{65}\) Disregarding these claims to “universal rights,” in April 1925, members of the SNH took concrete measures to counteract the outward apathy of the French authorities in initiating a new settlement. Two seemingly unrelated events occurred in that spring, which would leave their permanent mark on Iranian cultural history: Majlis deputy, eminent scholar, and a member of the SNH Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh proposed a “harmless” bill to the parliament for the creation of a librarian position for the Antiquities Museum of Tehran; and the head of the Institute of Eastern Ancient Heritage of Berlin, Ernest Emil Herzfeld, arrived in Tehran (Fig. 1.10).\(^{66}\) While neither a trained archeologist nor a specialist of Islamic art, Herzfeld had completed a Ph.D. focused on the Achaemenid site of Pasargadæ in 1907 and had made a name as the “founding father of Islamic archeology” with his excavation of Abbasid Samarra in Ottoman Mesopotamia between 1911 and 1913. As of his days in Iraq, he was perceived both as a German menace to French cultural hegemony and considered by locals as the representative of Western presence. Both suspicions were proven justified on April 21, 1917, when Herzfeld escorted the Turkish Ottoman army during the Battle of Samarra against the British in and out of the area, which he knew so well. In Iran, he would be perceived not much differently either by Iranians or the French.\(^{67}\)

The parliamentary bill immediately drew French attention, which was eclipsed by the problematic, at least for the French, presence of Herzfeld in the capital city. The headquarters in Paris was informed that “until now the bill has not been voted on but this maneuver has no other purpose than to enable the archeologist coming from Kabul [Herzfeld] to benefit from an employment that would facilitate his investigations in a domain that has always been reserved for

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\(^{67}\) The effort was in vain for the Ottoman army was defeated and retreated north; see Thomas Leisten, “Achievement and Disaster: Ernst Herzfeld’s Excavation at Samarra 1911-1913,” lecture delivered at The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at MIT, “An Evening With...” Lecture Series May 5, 2003. On the introduction of the bill, see US State Department Archives, Murray, dispatch 1064, 891.927/10, May 6, 1925, Tehran.
us." Helzfeld’s mere presence in Tehran was registered as a direct challenge to French cultural dominance in Iranian affairs. At the end of June, the French authorities implored their superiors in Paris to dispatch a French candidate’s name so that they could, in turn, convince the “Persian Government” to forego the appointment of “a German archeologist” to the post of “Director of Antiquities Museum.” The delayed French reaction to the agreement, the bill for a new post at the museum library, and the sudden appearance of Herzfeld were intertwined. At the seam of these seemingly isolated events was the SNH. This connection is made manifest a year later by the French diplomatic records, where for the first time the Society is mentioned by the French authorities. Gaston Maugras, the French attaché to Iran, wrote on June 15, 1926:

As of his arrival, [Herzfeld] announced his intentions to travel and study inside the country but now he has decided to remain in Tehran all summer and visit the Golestan Museum and the libraries under the management of the “Institute of National Works” of which he is the animator [which] seems to me ominous for us. If we are resolute to insist on the maintenance of the digging monopoly that is due to us by the Convention of 1900 – a monopoly that the Persians rarely respect and one that we rarely exploit – the activities of Mr. Herzfeld exercised outside our domain can leave us indifferent.

If, alternatively, as I believe, we willingly renounce the benefits of an illusionary contract with lionized appearance that puts obstacle on the progress of science and research will benefit both of our nations in the Direction of Antiquities in Persia, then we can not imagine without apprehension the role, while modest and official, played by Mr. Herzfeld. The Golestan Museum where [he] is helping the Persians arrange the catalogue is a thing of no significance but it is the young leaf that will become a tree and the attached ivy that will grow with it.

Maugras immediately corrected himself on the lower margin of this same letter adding in informal handwriting, “I just learned that it was at the expense of the ‘Institute of National Works’ that Mr. Herzfeld has come to Persia and is staying. The budget of the Institute seems to be nourished by miscellaneous sources.” While the French records are misleading at times, at other instances, as in the case of this marginal note, they are extremely accurate; perhaps because informal handwritings render the assumed authority of the official printed text doubtful.

72 The marginal brings its own center into crisis, depicting a more accurate image of doubtful certainties. The informal because the authority.
One key Iranian diplomatic letter attests to the veracity of the marginal note; it confirms both the SNH’s agency in Herzfeld’s appearance in Iran and the French concerns about his activities. On June 2, 1925, the recently promoted Prime Minister Forughi wrote to the newly appointed Minister of Pahlavi Court Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash:

As Your Excellency may recall, Professor Herzfeld, who is a German Orientalist scholar has come to Tehran by the invitation of the Society for National Heritage. The aim of the Society in inviting him was to benefit from his skills in the establishment and organization of the national library and museum of Iran; [he is to] help the Ministry of Public Instructions [in this task].

The author went on to ask permission from the ministry of court for Herzfeld to visit the Royal Museum of Golestan Palace and to consult its book collection. Forughi also requested the transference of a large number of “scientific” books from the Royal Museum to the Ministry of Public Instructions. As the president of the SNH, he suggested to Teymurtash that those calligraphic and picture books that have “no artistic value” but could “serve scientific studies” would be appropriate for such transfer. “Accumulating a large number of manuscripts and publications for the Ministry’s collection would be a prelude to an expandable library...with the presence of Professor Herzfeld and under the shadow of [Reza Shah] this task will be accomplished.” To this tediously formal and exhaustive letter, Teymurtash replied with a few words at the margins: “the assignment of a committee by the government is hereby confirmed.”

It is clear from the correspondence between the two most prominent figures of the SNH, who also happened to be the prime minister and the court minister of Iran, that the Society had by then initiated its first project: the creation of a public library adjoining a national museum. Moreover, according to the Society’s session minutes on June 22, 1926, both Herzfeld’s travel expenses and land acquisition for the museum appeared as the first two topics on the agenda.

This is backed by the Society’s first publication that clearly stated: “after [his] arrival at Tehran, the Board of Directors of theanjoman-e asar-e melli, which was formed to preserve the historic heritage of Iran...in order to take advantage of the information and expertise, requested dear

73 “In this connection, the professor is in the process of investigations and believes that – by the agreement of the Court Ministry – his visit to the Royal Museum...will be helpful to his assessments.” Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 347-349; document 110, letters 0-1: Forughi and court minister in regards to permit Herzfeld access to Royal Museum; Khordad 11, 1305/June 2, 1926, Tehran.
74 Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 347-348; document 110: Forughi and court minister in regards to permit Herzfeld access to Royal Museum; Khordad 11, 1305/June 2, 1926, Tehran.
75 Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 349-350; document 111: session instructions and invitation letters of the Society for National Heritage; Khordad 31, 1305/June 22, 1926, Tehran.
Deducing from these documents, it is indisputably clear that the SNH had handpicked a German scholar for the completion of the job. Therefore, contrary to Pahlavi and Western historiography, Herzfeld had a role in “animating” neither the National Museum nor the SNH. Rather, the Society had employed the German archeologist in order to contest the French “exclusive, perpetual, and universal” cultural privileges. The Iranian reformists were playing the oldest trick in the Persian diplomatic history, a tactic well-developed and practiced by Qajar kings: setting foreign rivals to fight each other on Iranian territory while themselves politely keeping out of the clash. The “national qualities” that the Western diplomats perceived and recorded in their reports as “indifference,” “laziness,” and “dishonesty” on their Iranian counterparts were, in fact, calculated Iranian tactics to outmaneuver and frustrate the more powerful Western influences. “The lack of cultural empathy and communication was of course bilateral and in so far as the Iranians were concerned, was often deliberate.” The unfolding story of the SNH and its way of doing things is a case in point for it tends to prove this very important historic point: the native was never passive. Therefore, it came as of no surprise to many that Maugras got irritated by the cabinet members’ “friendly smiles” without getting anywhere with the negotiations.

During the fall of 1926, Maugras nevertheless fought hard on two fronts: while appealing to Paris headquarters for a candidate to the post of the Antiquities Services, he pleaded high-ranking Iranians to abstain from offering it to Herzfeld. After a fruitless meeting with Minister of Public Instructions Naser al-Dawleh, he called on Hasan Mostawfi, the president of the Council to the Majlis, to explain “the inconveniences caused to the future of the Franco-Persian relation by the nomination of a foreigner as the director of the museum and as an archeological consultant.” He stressed the fact that the political rapport between the two countries could be at a serious risk on the account of this cultural dispute. Maugras further cautioned Mostawfi that if he wanted the 1900 Convention modified, “the least he could do” was to trust the French to

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76 Society for National Heritage 1, Fehrest Mokhtasar az Asar va Ebni-e Tarikhi-e Iran [Brief inventory of Iran’s historical heritage and edifices] (Tehran, 1925), 3.
77 For the details of the domestic and international politics under the Qajars, see A. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 (London, 1997); A. K. Lambton, Qajar Persia (Austin, 1987); and Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, chapter one.
78 Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921, 9-10.
organize the Antiquities Services in Tehran. By mid-December, however, the French efforts bore little result; Maugras acknowledged, "The Persians are counting on plucking our privileges bit by bit." As the bill for the director of Antiquities Museum and Library was proposed to the parliament, the French minister, in panic, secured a personal meeting with Teymurtash. This was the last resort, "a supreme request" according to Maugras.

I explained to him that by trusting the direction of Antiquities of Persia to a German, the Persian Government would render the revision of the Convention on Digs impossible. After having complained so much about our monopoly, this is a strange way of confronting it. The fact that I had vainly consulted the other members of the Cabinet without obtaining anything of interest except friendly smiles shocked Mister Teymourtache.

Maugras’ memo hinted at the French inability to decode Persian diplomacy, as well as to the weak administrative capabilities of the Iranian minister of public instructions and the other cabinet members. Even the American diplomats, who had had comparatively little direct dealings with the Iranian government in the cultural domain, knew that “…the only factor that counts is Teymourtache’s approval and support.” They had underscored, “Direct negotiations with him is by far the best, if not the only, means by which permission can be obtained.” Maugras, therefore, was forced to appeal to Teymurtash to get more than “friendly smiles.” The court minister requested a few days “to investigate the facts of the matter,” after which he informed Maugras that the French simply had to give up their hegemony over the archeological activities in exchange for the position at the museum. As was his habit to be “astoundingly frank and straightforward in what he says,” Teymurtash put it bluntly:

Herzfeld has powerful supporters who back him first because they are his friends and hold him in high esteem; then because they are not ready to confront the French privileges directly. The decree that has conceded these privileges seems to them worthless because it has been extracted by surprise due to the ignorance of a Sovereign who in reality had no right to traffic in such manner the heritage of national memories. It would be to the advantage of both states to settle the archeological question. See if the French Government [is willing to] renounce its monopoly in exchange for the direction of the Archeological Services to be trusted to one of your compatriots. I will bring the affair to the Shah’s attention. As soon as possible, send me

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84 US State Department Archives, Williamson, dispatch 992, 891.927/47, December 14, 1929, Tehran; quoted in Majd, American Plunder of Persia’s Antiquities, 76.
85 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 2316/18/34, Clive, May 4, 1931, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 9: 1931-1934, 66.
your reply, I promise that until I have received it, Herzfeld's contract will not be approved by the parliament. 86

Characteristic of his personality, Teymurtash encapsulates the entire archeological disputes of the 1920s and 1930s in a single conversation. His words are remarkable because they reveal several crucial facts lost to Iranian historiography. First, it openly shows the unrivaled power held by Teymurtash not only in the Iranian government and parliament but also in the cultural sphere of influence; or rather, their profound interdependence in the political culture of modern Iran. Second, it confirms, beyond doubt, that Herzfeld's presence in Tehran was instigated by the agency of the SNH. 87 Perhaps more importantly, Teymurtash's frank statement discloses the reluctance on the SNH's part to directly challenge the French monopoly, preferring a cloaked confrontation through a German interference. Finally, it openly demonstrates that there was no two opposing and monolithic Iranian versus French regimes of interests; various Iranian officials disliked, even hated, each other as equally as they (dis)favored the French. These personal sentiments and feelings came to play an important role in these very modernistic, and inherently masculine, negations.

On the one hand, while Herzfeld's "powerful supporter" was the pro-German finance minister and the governor-general of Fars, Firuz Mirza Firuz, Teymurtash continued to convince the French mediators that he would back the French interests in this matter. 88 For the French, on the other hand, whereas Teymurtash's "cooperation" seemed "precious," his overriding influence on Maugras in favor of Iran went unnoticed, nevertheless recorded in the diplomatic reports. 89 Based on his meeting with the court minister, Maugras "strongly" recommended the French

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87 This points to the not-so-helpless 'nature of the Oriental native;' confirming that all subordinate groups create their own forms of resistance to power. Abrahamian explains that Iranian agency has been distorted by the "paranoid style" political culture of modern Iran and its historiography, where "politicians and political parties" have often been portrayed as "mere marionettes controlled by the Great Powers." Abrahamian notes that "the paranoid style distorted the overall picture, not just the details," at the expense of Iranian agency. E. Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, 1993), 130. In this early Pahlavi period, the SNH was far from being a 'marionette' to any power. For a theory of resistance by subordinate groups, see J. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, 1990).
88 According to his son, Shahrokh Firuz Mirza, it was Firuz Mirza who contacted Chicago University for the excavation of Persepolis. Shahrokh Firuz Mirza, in an interview by Talinn Grigor, May 22, 2003, Brookline, Massachusetts. It is a relatively well-known fact, however, that Firuz Mirza was the governor of Fars and hence deeply involved in the archeological activities in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, he was a very stanch supporter and a good friend of Ernest Herzfeld. They both extensively photographed the ruins before and during its excavation.
government to take advantage of this moment because "we can be sure that our right will not be respected. That which Mr. Teymourtache told me about our privileges seeming null to his compatriots is not an imaginary argument." Maugras at the end added that a "public discussion about our rights would have an international opinion entirely against us."90 The French diplomats in Tehran, if not those in Paris, had been convinced that the best solution to their predicament was to exchange their "unexploited monopoly" with the directorship of the archeological services in Iran. Teymurtash, with his faculty to persuade, would, hence, single-handedly, or almost, bring to an end the French monopoly over Iran’s archeological sites. Months before his murder, British Foreign Minister Clive would report, "He is entitled to the full credit for the policy attending the denunciation of the foreign treaties in 1927...agreements on the basis of equality and reciprocity."91

The negotiations on the archeological treaty had proceeded as the following: on February 4, 1927 Paul Ballereau, the newly appointed French chargé d’affaires, received the much-expected telegram from Paris. Foreign Minister Berthelot instructed him to "tell Teymourtache that the French government accepts the opening of negotiations related to the digs, be it in Paris or in Tehran. It is ready to renounce the benefits of the 1900 Convention in exchange for the attribution to a French the directorship of antiquities and museum and the right to continue, in conditions to be determined, the work at Susa."92 This brief memo was a prelude to four more years of correspondence between Paris and Tehran and from the French embassy to various ministries in the capital. On his part, Teymurtash was to inform the French "to the time and conditions to meet with the Ministry" and reassured Ballereau that "His Majesty the Shah will soon give the necessary instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to open negotiations..."93 Between the date of this telegram and the actual signing of the treaty, each side kept their initial allegiance. Herzfeld "actively continuing his personal propaganda" was backed by Firuz Mirza; and the French interests were secured by Teymurtash "giving hope to the success of the

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Much to Ballereau’s relief, by May, Herzfeld’s “friends” stopped insisting on the library position for him; instead, now “they are demanding to create a chair of ancient Persian languages and art history.” The Iranian political elite – convinced of the French willingness to give up the monopoly – now looked for ways to accommodate the German archeologist by creating a teaching position. To negotiate the details of the treaty, in particular the length of the contract, Forughi traveled to Paris in the summer of 1927.

The conditions were finalized in a letter sent on October 18. The last version of the new Convention was approved by the “personal” intervention of Teymurtash not only because the “Persian government had not kept copies of previous agreements,” but also because the former minister of public instructions, Firuz Mirza, had failed to communicate the terms of the agreement to the current one, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon – according to the French letters, “personal enemy of Prince Firouz.” Ballereau profited from these “Persian” bureaucratic and personal glitches and changed the wording to the French advantage. However, like his predecessor, Ballereau kept Teymurtash’s wishes in high esteem; “on the contrary, I exercised great liberalism on Article III to which Teymourtache held a great deal.” Furthermore, the “fortunate” absence of “Prince Firouz during the last week” caused by “a pacifying mission in Lorestan,” had rendered Ballereau’s task easier [sic.]. The private feelings of men in power were deeply imprinting the development of Iran’s artistic and archeological history. To bolster their case and to create “immediate sympathetic atmosphere,” the Paris headquarters permitted copies of the archeological finds from Susa, now in the Louvre, to be “donated” to the Tehran
Museum. According to the new Convention, the French renounced their monopoly in exchange for the directorship of the Antiquities Museum and Library in Tehran. The French control over the Archeological Services was exchanged for the concession to excavate Persepolis by Herzfeld. In both cases, the Iranian government maintained legal control over all archeological activities within its national borders. As soon as that November, the French Republic presented its candidate for the new position, in exchange for a 10,000 tomans yearly salary paid by the Iranian government. The French architect and archeologist, André Godard was to journey to Iran from his current archeological mission in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Republic made it clear that the French “savant” will be “in charge of maintaining and developing in Persia the French prestige.” It also cautioned the candidate that he would have to “smilingly tolerate thousands of obstacles, refusal of funds, and imposed and incompetent collaborators.” Godard and his colleague, Yedda Godard, arrived in Tehran on January 1929. The American chargé d’affaires described him as “most pleasing...[who] possessed on unusual talent and tact;” further adding, “both he and Madame Godard have made a very favorable impression on Tehran society, Persian as well as foreign.” On the part of the SNH, like his German rival, Godard was before long made an honorary member of the Society and was implicated in its undertakings even before his arrival in Tehran. In fact, the two men remained the only “appointed honorary

101 Negotiating with the Iranian government throughout 1929, Herzfeld was granted the rights to excavate at Persepolis in 1930. See Herzfeld’s request to Teymurtash for funding the Persepolis excavations. Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 25; document 6: Herzfeld’s proposal to the Court Ministry in regards to Persepolis preservation; October 28, 1929, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 25-28; document 6, letter 1: September 4, 1929, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 28-30; document 6, letter 2-3: Herzfeld’s proposal to the Court Ministry in regards to Persepolis preservation; October 10, 1929, Tehran.
105 R. A. Wallace Treat, dispatch 751, 891.01A/117, January 23, 1929, Tehran; quoted in Majd, American Plunder of Persia’s Antiquities, 72.
foreign members” of the SNH during the inter-war years. In a few years, both would be also asked to present their design for a new mausoleum for Ferdawsi.

While the 1927 Convention ended quarrels over excavation rights, it inflamed new animosities among the archeological and diplomatic community of Tehran. On leave of absence from the Faculty of Berlin University, Herzfeld rented a “large house” in Tehran for “at that time there was hopes that the establishment might become a German Archaeological Institute; but...the political situation was soon to destroy such possibilities.” Both the arbitrary and increasingly violent personal rule of Reza Shah in the late 1930s and the systemic murders of his political elite and friends of Herzfeld eliminated any change that he had to gain social power and prestige in Tehran. Thereafter, Herzfeld would fasten his archeological and scholarly career in Iran to the remote site of Persepolis. In the meantime, Herzfeld continued to keep a cordial friendship with Firuz Mirza and a courteous relation with the Teymurtash, who received him at the Sa’adatabad Palace in July 1931 to “look over some Persepolis drawings.” Persepolis would not only preoccupy Herzfeld during the rest of his stay in Iran but also proved a project that he safeguarded with “archaeological jealousy and suspicious glances.”

British traveler Robert Byron who spent eleven months in 1933 and 1934 photographing various historical monuments in Iran complained, on several occasions, to Shiraz’s governor and later recorded in his travelogue that the German archeologist “has no right to refuse people permission to photograph the old remains at Persepolis;” adding “that right has been expressly confirmed by the Ministry of Public Instructions.”

Even if the convention “ruined Herzfeld’s official ambitions,” the French continued to see in him a threat to their cultural hegemony in the region. “Unfortunately,” noted the French minister, “Herzfeld represents for a long time [in Iran] the German science; a task that he does with success and whose propaganda is as ferocious beneath as the personality can be [however],

106 Shahrokhi, Memoirs, 73.
107 See Appendix 4 for the French version of 1927 Convention.
109 Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 45, 480-481; document 14, letter 0-1: request for meeting by Herzfeld to the Court Ministry; July 19, 1931, Tehran.
111 There is a long discussion about the politics of photographing Persepolis by Byron and the attempts made by Herzfeld to prevent it. After a fight over individual copyright of one’s discovery and the universalism of ancient heritage, Byron “by force” managed to document Persepolis; see Byron, Road to Oxiana, 52, 157-169.
on the surface [he and his propaganda appear] tender and benign.” Bringing to the fore the
political significance of the archeological dispute, the French underscored, “our military attaché,
Captain Bertrand, sees in him our most dangerous adversary…” The French diplomats, therefore,
prepared Godard for his new struggle against the German, “it is useful that Mr. Godard be
warned in advance and that while keeping a courteous and even cordial relation [with Herzfeld],
he should maintain his guard.” The French representative to Iran, A. Wilden, however,
reassured Godard that he would find the support that he needed among the “affluent” locals; that,
as of his arrival, he would ascertain that,

the good majority of affluent Persians find Mr. Herzfeld a bit too stuffy. He makes too much dust,
so to speak - the expression is singularly appropriate here! Wherever he goes - and he travels a
lot - he unearths something. He has brought to light, near Persepolis, half a statue that he
declares to be that of Cyrus. Since the head is missing, many have doubts...they also reproach
him of devoting a big part of his activities at the dealers. It is certain that he sends to the Berlin
market numerous valuable art objects."

As of his arrival in Tehran, Godard would be fully informed about his role as the representative
of French political and cultural presence in the country; the man, it was hoped, who would “find
very soon a real Cyrus.” He would remain in Iran until the 1960s as the head of the Antiquities
Services, leaving an important mark on modern Iranian architecture, archeology, and politics
alike; issues that will be addressed in detail in the following sections.

To make things more interesting, in 1929, American competition was added to the French
assaults on Herzfeld. The American art historian and art dealer, Arthur Upham Pope was added
to this frenzied rivalry. Pope, who had come to Iran five years earlier, on the one hand openly
expressed “serious concerns” about Herzfeld’s archeological activities in Persepolis to his good
friend, Hosayn Ala who had been the ambassador to France and a member of the SNH (Fig.

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112 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-
113 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-
Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 92, March 20, 1928, Tehran. We know that Herzfeld
knew or at least was familiar with Godard’s work as early as 1926. Herzfeld’s review of Godard, “Ghazni” (Syria,
1925): 58-60, in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 47 (1926): 668-671. In fact, Godard and Herzfeld had met each other
during Herzfeld’s excavation in Samarra between 1911-1913. Thomas Leisten, “Achievement and Disaster: Ernst
Herzfeld’s Excavation at Samarra 1911-1913,” lecture delivered at The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture
114 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-
115 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-
In his rather long report, therefore, Ala cautioned the Pahlavi court that a certain "Mr. Breasted" from the Oriental Institute of Philadelphia Museum was interested in Herzfeld's excavations, underscoring that this was "not void of importance" for, according to Pope, "if Iran agreed to sign a contract with the Institute...it should be very careful of the terms and conditions..." On the other hand, Pope dismissed Godard's abilities as the Director of the Archeological Services with very harsh words; in contrast to Herzfeld who considered Godard "as a man of distinguished record and ability with whom he expected to get on well," Pope relayed to David Williamson, the American chargé d'affaires, "Godard is a third-rate man, not at all fitted to be the Director of Antiquities in Persia...if [he] should attempt such work, Persian art is doomed, because Godard does not know Persian art and is a small man."

In spite of this, the French complaints did not stop. They now worried about the "Germano-American" cooperation in the effort to export antique objects to New York and Berlin markets. In Wilden's view, "America provides the money; Germany, the men." As late as 1930, the French authorities remained convinced that they were the only ones looking after the true interests of "Persia's ancient civilization," with Godard as the head of that mission. They cynically blamed "the Black Gang (la bande noire), which under the enlightened leadership of the German Herzfeld and the intermediary of the antique dealer Pope pillage, for years now, the artistic masterpieces of Persia and habitually elevate the price [of antiques] in the American market." Further, the confidential report goes on to implicate some locals, "despite Mr. Godard's vigilance, the Herzfeld-s and Pope-s...seem to be certain that with high-positioned

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116 A year after his return from Paris, Ala would rise to great prominence in the SNH. As prime minister in the mid-1950s, Ala became one of the most influential members of the SNH. Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 32; document 7, letters 2: Ala's report about Pope's worry over Herzfeld's contract for Persepolis excavation; Aban 11, 1308/November 2, 1929, Paris. For the copies of the original letters, see Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 476-478.

117 Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 32; document 7, letters 2: Ala's report about Pope's worry over Herzfeld's contract for Persepolis excavation; Aban 11, 1308/November 2, 1929, Paris. Once again, with Teymurtash's personal intervention the Pope-Herzfeld rivalry was settled: "Considering the competition between Professor Herzfeld and Professor Pope, I have personally addressed the required limitations (jelogiri-e lazem) during my talks" with the former over "Persepolis reparations (tamirat)." Ministry of Culture, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, 33; document 7, letters 2: communication between the Court Ministry and Ministry of Public Instructions in regard to France's ambassador about Pope's concerns over Herzfeld's contract for Persepolis excavation; Azar 18, 1308/December 9, 1929, Tehran.

118 US State Department Archives, Williamson, dispatch 852, 891.927/43, June 10, 1929, Tehran; quoted in Majd, Britain and Reza Shah, 72.


[Iranian] accomplices, no effective control can be exercised upon their assignments.” The same communiqué, last of its kind addressing the archeological ordeal of the 1920s and 1930s, concludes with cultural lamentation and political loathing:

This poor country risks losing the last vestige of its artistic civilization after these [German and American] governments have destroyed all that remains of its religion, its civility, its customs, and its writing. The old Persia is dead and replaced by a young Persia, banal, hostile, and unbalanced to the point that only defects can be recognize.

As evident from contradictory letters and reports, the workings of contentions and collaborations of these men were far more complex. Despite cordialities and smiles, Pope, Godard, and Herzfeld each sought ways to consolidate their respective positions while attempting to deny the others’ advances. The simple matter of archeology, of piles of ruins, had turned into a global game of real politik; perhaps a thing that always was.

As for the relationship between the king and archeology, inspired by Pope and escorted by Herzfeld, Reza Shah made four trips to the Achaemenid capital of Persepolis, the last one with his son and successor Mohammad Reza at the end of March 1937 (Figs. 1.12). During his visit to Susa and Persepolis, “the Sovereign did not miss the ruins” representing “the vestige of the civilization of antique Persia,” wrote Wilden after the first royal stopover in 1928, added, “I could but regret the absence of Mr. Godard.” In Susa, the shah asked for an Iranian guide, refusing the help of a French specialist because “relations with France were poor at the time.”

When the empty spot of an Achaemenid audience hall was shown to the king, he inquired about the specifics of its excavation. The guide explained that “a piece of cement from the floor” had been reserved for Tehran’s Archeological Museum, while other “columns and statuettes” had been sent to Paris. The “outraged and furious” monarch replied, “Those [French] thieves took all those objects to Louvre and left the cement for Iran.” Thereafter, the ruins became not only

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125 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 179.
126 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 179.
contested scientific projects and valuable museum pieces, but also the primary destination for
foreign dignitaries and diplomats during their official visits to Iran.127 By far the grandest of all
royal visits took place in mid-October 1971, when the much older and well-established
Mohammad Reza Shah celebrated, with great fanfare and extravagance, the 2500-year
anniversary of the Persian Empire at the foot of Persepolis. While past kings had been impressed
by the site, none had hitherto claimed to be the heir to the throne of Cyrus the Achaemenid. On
that October, archeology had fully served its political function: after fifty years of negotiations,
excavations, documentations, and classifications, it enabled the shah to stand in front of a pile of
ruins and announce to the nation and the world: “Greetings to thee, O’ Cyrus, the great King, the
King of kings, the Achaemenian King, King of the Land of Iran, on behalf of myself – the
Shahanshah of Iran – and my nation. Cyrus! We have today gathered at thy eternal resting place
to say to thee: rest in peace, for We are awake, and will forever stay awake to guard thy proud
heritage.”128

127 The first such visits by a foreign royalty, to be followed by thousands of others throughout the Pahlavi ruling
period, was published in the Ettela’at. Herzfeld is depicted prominently in one of the photo suggesting that he
traveled with the foreign party; see “His Majesty Heir Apparent of Sweden in Persepolis,” Ettela’at 2352 (Azar 8,
1313/November 29, 1934): 1; and “In Company of Heir Apparent of Sweden from Tehran to Persepolis,” Ettela’at
128 Mohammad Reza Shah’s speech during the 2500-year celebrations of the Persian Empire in Pasargadae delivered
on October 12, 1971 standing in front of Cyrus’ empty tomb chamber. Parts of the celebrations took place next to
Persepolis also. A. Aryanpure, A Translation of the Historic Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah
Aryamehr (Tehran, 1973), 50. Also, see J. Hureau, Iran Today (Tehran, 1975), 60.
Discursive Heritage

Long before that October, dead poets and scientists like Ferdowsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Sa’di, and Omar Khayyam were being made to speak to modern Iranians, telling them what they really wished both for themselves and the modern nation. The tombs and their inaugurations made the revival of historic impossibilities seem possible. The cultural discourse made on Iran’s history during the early 1920s set a trend for the destruction and reconstruction of these graves for these, as well as subsequent, historical figures; all of whom were made to have a say about the form of their resting-place. These were, it was maintained, centuries-old unfulfilled wishes, and integral to the purportedly forgotten greatness of Iran on whose behalf the 20th-century politicians and scientists could speak. Mausoleums as a particular kind of architectural typology, served the political aims well. Owing to its primary function and tectonic quality, a mausoleum preconditions an a priori existence of a great hero. If there was a tomb, therein must rest a hero. Following this logic, the narration of this hero-ness was merely consequential. This habit of talking to dead people and being spoken back by the dead was institutionalized as a component of the production and meaning of the SNH’s mausoleums. It was, also, a practice conditioned by the construction of these projects. In well-orchestrated ceremonies, such as the 2500-year anniversary, the old and the new were lumped together, claiming a scientific and historical truth. This national tradition, while invented, acquired an international expression; for the shah, in the presence of the international audience and the political elite of the time, stood in front of Cyrus’s empty tomb at Pasargadae and “bow[ed his] head low before [Cyrus’] resting place and honor[ed his] unforgettable memory.” The king reassured “the eternal hero of Iranian history” and “the great liberator of history” that the royal “We” was “vigilant to protect” Cyrus’s “glorious heritage.” The political and historical validity of these and such late Pahlavi grand ceremonies, royal speeches, and “unforgettable memory” had been conditioned by the existence of a solid cultural discourse; over the previous half a century, the SNH had cultivated the holistic and normative untruth of that discourse.

129 “Michelet not only claimed to speak on behalf of a large number of anonymous dead people, but insisted, with poignant authority, that he could say what they ‘really’ meant and ‘really’ wanted, since they themselves ‘did’ not understand. In this vein, more and more ‘second-generation’ nationalists learned to speak ‘for’ dead people with whom it was impossible or undesirable to establish a linguistic connection.” B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1991), 198.

130 Aryanpure, Translation of the Speeches, 50.
By 1925, all the actors directly involved in the subsequent projects were on the scene either motivated by archeology, politics, or riches. Its first two projects mirror the Society’s role in the workings of Iranian cultural and political life: to plan the construction of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum and to register the index of Iran’s national heritage. The index consisted of a list of archeological and architectural sites around the country, the importance of which lay in its simultaneous claims to exclusivity and comprehensiveness in terms of delineating Iran’s cultural heritage. The construction of the mausoleum of the late 10th- and early 11th-century poet Ferdawsi was significant because his most famous work, the *Shahnameh* (the Book of Kings), was interpreted by the state as the supreme manifestation of the uncontaminated national spirit.\footnote{The modern importance of the historical figure of Ferdawsi will be explained in chapter 3 that deals with the poet’s mausoleum. Ferdawsi died in Tus around 1020 AD.} In implication more than actual scope, the construction of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum and the index were enormous undertakings that operated hand in hand, each feeding the other for its validity and authenticity. Both were also products of an arbitrary and selective process sustaining the political propaganda machine. Both were an outcome of modern systems of thought and action; scientific, hence ostensibly “natural;” highly sophisticated for their time. Both were invented, awaiting a tradition; both were imagined, awaiting a nation; both were politics, awaiting legitimacy through practice. During the preparation for Ferdawsi’s tomb between 1922 and 1934, the Society felt that its public obligations lay, first and foremost, in the effort to “introduce this fantastic historic heritage to the citizens [of Iran] and captivate them in this 1000-year old heritage.”\footnote{SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 4.} In order to create these intrinsic collective feelings among the masses, the SNH invited a number of well-known local and Western Orientalists to deliver public lectures and publish articles on the arts and culture of, mostly ancient, Iran. On August 13, 1925, German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld delivered a lecture at the Ministry of Culture and Art about the importance of Iran’s national heritage.\footnote{At the time, the Ministry was called *mas’udiyyeh*; what came to be the later Ministry of Culture and Art.} Herzfeld stated,

> Historic buildings and heritage is plenty and everywhere in Iran, and I cannot mention all of them. Since the Aryan tribes, or more precisely because of them, this country is called ‘Iranshahr,’ that is about nine centuries before Christ appeared, and the true ancient heritage of Iran dates from that period… This nation has reached the zenith of its culture at least on four occasions: first, the Achaemenid period when Iran was the center of the known world and lived in security for two hundred and fifty years; second, the Sassanian period which, in fact, is considered the period of Iran’s progress; third, the Seljuk period when Iran became the...
progressive force in Islamic nations during a time when Europe had just come out of its savagery; and fourth, the Safavid period during which the Iranian craft was specially brilliant which coincided with Europe’s penetration into Asia. If you refer to World History, you will see that no nation has this amount of heritage. Greece while had a progressive period five hundred years before Christ to three hundred AD, subsequently had nothing. Italy has two progressive periods, Rome and Renaissance, whereas Europeans are so young that comparison is simply irrelevant. 134

Periodization and comparison as effective techniques of making a discourse, as well as neat periodic compartments and binaries of east-west, underpinned Herzfeld’s argument. Much of later art historical treatises would reinforce the four, allegedly uncontained, historic periods.

While dividing the stages of Iranian cultural development between the Achaemenids, Sassanians, Seljuks, and Safavids, his historic narrative, nonetheless, rotated around one man. “National buildings and monuments are not limited to old buildings, inscriptions, and sculptures. For example, the true Iranian heritage is the Shahnameh, which is the masterpiece of Ferdawsi, the only great poet of this country.” 135 To this, Herzfeld added Ferdawsi’s own thoughts about his Shahnameh, by reciting: “I am constructing a high castle out of poetry, so that it will be immune from wind and rain; a building that will never be destroyed...” 136

This first public lecture organized by the SNH was designed to introduce and promote the idea of a new mausoleum for the author, making the dead poet an accomplice in the undertaking. Just as he spoke for the Iranian nation, the national elite spoke for him. At the sixth national assembly of the Majlis, Zoroastrian representative Shahrokh, while requesting permission to speak in lieu of Ferdawsi as a rhetorical gesture, immediately stressed, “such a great man...does not need me to speak on his behalf.” 137 Confident that he would “not be confronted with [any] objections,” Shahrokh began by reassuring his co-parliamentarians that in speaking on Ferdawsi’s behalf he himself was “of no significance.” Moreover, he felt that what he had to say about the poet would “not add to [Ferdawsi’s] greatness, but would only make” Shahrokh “feel small.” 138 During that session, the representative spoke on behalf of the historical figure in order to convince the parliament to approve the proposed budget for the construction of Ferdawsi’s

134 Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old publications of the SNH] (Tehran, 1972), 41-43. Herzfeld’s argument about the superiority of “Aryan” Iran’s culture is an echo of Viennese art historian and professor at Graz University, Josef Strzygowski’s much richer and complex argument about the origin of Gothic architecture in northeastern Iran. See, J. Strzygowski, Orient oder Rom: Beiträge zur Geschichte der spatantiken und frühchristlichen Kunst (Leipzig, 1901). For more, see bellow.
135 SNH 131, Kurnamah, 5.
136 SNH 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat, 35.
137 The Majlis session took place on June 20, 1927.
mausoleum. The historic figure had “toiled to revive these nationalistic aspirations” and deserved a resting place “worthy of his greatness.” This was the beginning of the Society’s undertakings.

By the request of the SNH in 1925, Herzfeld worked on a list of archeological and architectural works that crystallized a limited number of sites as Iran’s national heritage. French Chargé d’Affairs Gaston Maugras confirmed its details to his superior in Paris, “Mr. Herzfeld after having come here at the expense of the Institute for National Works has sojourned since then in the same conditions. He is in charge – in Tehran and in various provinces – of missions in an official [capacity, creating an]...archeological inventory…” That “archeological inventory” was, in fact, a simple project with enormous consequence, which Maugras knew only too well, because it would constitute the first of its kind in modern Iran. The German Orientalist had spent months traveling around the country and visiting the sites at the expense of the SNH. Now, he was asked to classify things into appropriate categories; give them a hierarchy based on the hegemonic concept of modern Iranian identity as defined by the political elite who had financed his travels and efforts.

At the end of August 1925, the index was ready. Titled *Brief Inventory of Iran’s Historical Heritage and Edifices*, it was the SNH’s first, and methodologically the most decisive, publication (Figs. 1.13). It began with a nationalistic approach to history and monuments: “In our motherland (vatan), the inheritor of an ancient civilization, there exists memories from various historic period and each [monument] points to the historical magnificence (azemat-e tarikhi) of each of our [historical] stages,” the author further underscored, “Familiarity with Iran’s antique heritage and the effort (kushesh) to preserve (hefazat) it is the responsibility of

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140 Similarly, the Egyptian Committee for the Conservation of Monuments of Arab Art, in the 1860s, “set up a ‘First Commission’ to list monuments worth preserving and a ‘Second Commission’ to oversee repairs and select relics for a museum.” D. Reid, “Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism: the Struggle to Define and Control the Heritage of Arab Art in Egypt,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24/1 (February 1992): 61.
141 Gaston Maugras was the Minister of France in Iran. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66, Fouilles archeologique E387-3, 44, November 5, 1926, Tehran.
142 Society for National Heritage 1, *Fehrest Mokhtasar az Asar va Ebni-e Tarikhi-e Iran* (Tehran, 1925); and Society for National Heritage 2, *Asar-e Melli-e Iran* [National Heritage of Iran] (Tehran, 1925/1304). As explained in the prologue and chapter 1, *asar* includes the sum of the definitions of trance, relics, monuments, traditions, and works. Herzfeld lectured on the topic of the Index on Mordad 22, 1304.
each Iranian.” While the booklet’s first paragraph denoted a modernistic optimism, the second hinted at the “Dark Ages” of Iran’s recent history. “Unfortunately...while fewer Iranians are familiar with their motherland’s historic heritage, outside [Iran], there has been particular attention drawn to Iran’s ancient heritage... One of the notable scholars of history and heritage of Iran’s past is Mister Professor Herzfeld, the German.” With this text, much of the framing and development of Iran’s national heritage would be decided; it would, it was hoped, take a single linear path to a bright future distinguished by progress, civilization, and modernity. Although concise – incorporated within thirty-eight small pages – it was intended as a comprehensive catalog based on scientific observations and examinations. A preface explained the scope and nature of the project, after which the sites were numerically listed under each major city or region: greater Tehran, Azerbaijan, Zanjan, Mazandaran, Khorasan, Semnan and Damghan, Astarabad, Isfahan, Fars, Khuzistan, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Na’in, Kerman, and Kalat. The classification of sites was arbitrary to the extent that small cities such as Damghan and Na’in and vast chunks of the country such as the regions of Azerbaijan and Khuzistan were lumped together as equals. It was a systematic way of cataloging, thus setting the limits of the nation’s heritage. The logic of their order was governed by Herzfeld’s own preconceived ideas about Iranian imagined identity, supported and financed by the preconceived ideas of his patrons.

The seemingly simplistic act of making a list, more importantly, gave Herzfeld an advantage over his French rivals. The index, coupled with its publication, was a big blow to French cultural hegemony in Iran; Maugras suspected that based on this list, Iranian cultural artifacts were to be revalorized, fenced off, and displayed to the world. It was also based on this that archeological fragments and artworks alike were going to be price-tagged and sold off to Western museums. Herzfeld’s inventory ultimately became the very foundation for the “invention” of Iran’s “historical monuments,” where “of the 247 buildings which had been scheduled by the end of 1932 as historic monuments, 82 were pre-Islamic.” The mere presence of the Index legitimized the sanctity of such ostensibly scientific endeavors. From a vague set of

143 SNH 1, Fehrest Mokhtasar, 1.
artifacts, distributed on the territory of Persia, it became a discernible entity with an active role in shaping Iranian national identity, collective memory, and official history.

In the interim, Herzfeld was also commissioned to design a “vignette for the Anjoman [sic.],” which was adopted as the SNH’s official insignia well into the 1980s (Fig. 1.14).145 His basic design was elaborated and ornamented into its final form with three “blossoming” branches of the SNH. Arguably, each represented the Society’s three main undertakings, including the archeological discoveries, the mausoleums’ constructions, and the foundation of the national museum and library (Fig. 1.15). It portrayed each institution by a corresponding architectural element. The archeological undertakings were represented by the reconstructed façade of Darius’ palace in Persepolis; the national museum by the façade of the last Sassanian palace in Ctesiphon; and the architectural projects by the medieval tower of Qabus in Gorgan that would be replicated in the 1952 mausoleum of Ibn Sina, built by the SNH in Hamadan.146 In 1934, another emblem was designed, depicting the silhouette of Ferdawsi’s modern monument, which would alternatively be used on the SNH’s letters, books, and other publications (Fig. 1.16).

The existence of the modern mausoleums of Ferdawsi and Ibn Sina were popularized by the circulation of their silhouettes as the official emblem of the Society. Each sign authenticated the other undertakings by the SNH. The two emblems, moreover, invent their own historiography and that of the Society. The second logo described the SNH’s second major project in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the design, construction, and inauguration of Ferdawsi’s monument.147 The style of the logo corresponds directly with the minimalist-

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146 The royal palace in Ctesiphon by its size and structure impressed and inspired architects and kings of the region throughout history. Many have tried to copy its extraordinary large vault. The vault of the iwan spans 75 feet; it is 90 feet high and 150 feet deep. It is attributed to Shapur I (241-272 AD) on the testimony of Ibn al-Muqaffa’, while others contend that it was built by Khosraw I Anushirvan (531-579 AD); ee, O. Reuther, “Sasanian Architecture,” in A Survey of Persian Art, ed. Ph. Ackerman and A. Pope (London, 1964), 2: 493-494. The theory that Taq-i-Kisra was under the order of Shapur I was first proposed by Herzfeld; see E. Herzfeld, Archaologische Reise im Euphrat und Tigrisgebiet II (Berlin, 1920), 76. Today, Taq-e Kisra or Iwan-e Kisra is located in modern Iraq. The façade of the palace was re-appropriated by André Godard for the design of the National Museum of Antiquities or Iran Bastan in Tehran in 1936-1939; hence the image of the original structure on the logo. More will be explained about Iran Bastan Museum in chapter 3.

147 Some booklets, letters, and documents published by or belonging to the SNH carry the second logo with Ferdawsi’s mausoleum image well after WWII. I am uncertain as to whether there was a consistent system to utilize the logos through the administrative, political, and technical changes of the Society. It might have been random, dictated by surplus letterheads, lack of technology to make new molds, etc. Nevertheless, the first logo was widely used from 1950s to 1970s. After the 1979 Revolution, the SNH’s logo along with its name was altered altogether; see epilogue for more details.
modernist expressions of the 1930s Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It reproduces the monument in image and its underpinning architectural trends. The second logo represented a more complex and sophisticated reflection of the Society. It can be interpreted as the three stages of Iranian history as perceived and classified by the SNH: the Achaemenid and Sassanian architectural productions, perceived far superior than any other in Iran’s history, were linked and revived by the modern era; that connection was made by the new architectural language of Ibn Sina’s modern mausoleum.

During that same year, 1925, two other Orientalists were introduced to the Iranian cultural landscape. They were to remain an integral part of that landscape even after their death for, in the 1970s, they would both be buried in the heart of Isfahan, under a mausoleum erected by the SNH. Throughout much of the Pahlavi era, American art historians Phyllis Ackerman and her husband Pope would shape the discourse on Iranian architecture and art, to later become naturalized into the Iranian land along with historical figures such as Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyam. Their impact on Iran’s modern art and its resonance in politics would be more profound than any other Westerner in the 20th century, not only because of Pope’s genuine belief in Iran’s superior artistic and racial status vis-à-vis the “civilized world,” but also because of the extent and nature of his involvement in the country’s cultural and political arenas. His Iranian career, moreover, would begin and end with an intimate relationship with both Reza and Mohammad Reza Shahs, characteristic of a royal patron and his art historian and dealer.

Invited by the SNH in 1925, Pope traveled to and within Iran under special protection of the Pahlavi state; this kind of royal attention became a standard practice thereafter. On April 29, 1929, the office of the Ministry of Public Instructions sent a signed and sealed letter to the governor of Isfahan: “the American Professor Pope who is a renowned expert on Iran (Iran-shenas) is traveling to the area...assist him in his wish to see the historic heritage.” The next day a prompt and affirmative reply was returned from the Ministry of Interior of Isfahan. By

148 The details of Pope (1881-1969) and Ackerman’s (1893-1977) professional and social activities are explained in chapter 7. Their two lasting contributions include the 1938 and 1964 publications of the Survey of Persian Art: From Prehistoric Time to the Present (SoPA) as well as the organization of several major international conferences in various European, American, and Iranian cities on Persian art and archeology. Pope also founded the American Institute of Persian Art and Archeology in 1921.
149 The Ministry of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts; in Persian, vezarat-e ma’aref, owqaf, va sanaye’-e mostazrafeh, as explained in footnote 9 of this chapter.
150 Iran National Archives 290, Micro-reel 8, Document 75, pages 1-2; Ordibeheesht 9, 1308/April 29, 1929, Tehran.
May 1931, the governors of Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad, Yazd, and Saveh received similar letters directly from the minister of Pahlavi court, Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash.\textsuperscript{151} In Tehran, in late April of the same year, Pope made his official debut during “the most powerful and profound of all these orations.”\textsuperscript{152} He presented on two occasions. The first appearance in the “grand hall” of General Asad Bakhtiari’s house, the later Club of the National Bank, was organized by Hosayn Ala who had met Pope during his ambassadorship in Washington D.C. and was translated by Mohammad Ali Forughi, according to Pope “one of the makers of modern Persia,” who would thereafter become Pope’s chief advocate in Iran.\textsuperscript{153} Moved by “such cataract of exciting and new ideas,” Forughi asked Pope for a second presentation in a few days, this time translated by the soon-to-be minister of education, Isa Sadiq, another future supporter of Pope. At the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Pope stood in front of high-ranking officials including Reza Khan who would become king within the following months, representatives of the parliament, the government cabinet, and the American community of Tehran. Entitled \textit{The Past and Future of Persian Art}, the speech, although addressing Iranian craft, its history, and historiography, was thoroughly political in its premise.\textsuperscript{154} In fact, Pope would vehemently argue that Iran’s modern political program, domestic and international alike, could but focus on Iran’s cultural reinvigoration; this was a well-articulated thesis summarized as:

\begin{quote}
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151 Ministry of Culture, \textit{Documents on Archaeology in Iran}, 400; document 122: Court Ministry’s correspondence in regards to Pope’s photography of Iran’s historic heritage; Ordibehesht 18, 1310/May 9, 1931, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, \textit{Documents on Archaeology in Iran}, 401; document 123: Court Ministry’s correspondence with Saveh authorities in regards to Pope’s photography of Iran’s historic heritage; Ordibehesht 18, 1310/May 9, 1931, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, \textit{Documents on Archaeology in Iran}, 402; document 123, letter 1: Court Ministry’s correspondence with Saveh authorities in regards to Pope’s photography of Iran’s historic heritage; Ordibehesht 21, 1310/May 12, 1931, Tehran. Similar to Pope, Herzfeld received a special letter on December 11, 1928 to travel to Sistan in order to “study antiquities” and explore “excavation possibilities.” The letter is signed by Hedayat, Bakhtiari, Ali Akbar Davar, Pakravan, and Firuz Mirza Firuz along with others; see Iran National Archives 113008/7885, Azar 20, 1307/December 11, 1928, Tehran; see Iran National Archives Organization, \textit{Records on The Archeological Missions in Iran 1875-1966} (Tehran, 2001), 190.

152 As will be explained in chapter 7 of this study, the impact and importance of Pope’s first lecture in Tehran will resonate well into the 1960s and would overshadow Ackerman’s far important contribution to the study of Persian art and architecture. In the 1960s, as will be seen later, the SNH will decide to erect a mausoleum for Pope, where Ackerman will also be buried. SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 10. Also, see H. Mazaheri, \textit{Aramgah-e Kharejian dar Isfahan} [The tombs of foreigners in Isfahan] (Isfahan, 1379/2000), 291.

153 A. U. Pope, “Nine Lives,” the draft autobiography in process 1956-1969; in J. Gluck and N. Siver, eds. \textit{Surveyors of Persian Art: A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman} (Ashiya, 1996), 79. Ala was the ambassador to the U.S. and the U.N. and hence met Pope during his stay in Washington D.C. While Gluck’s \textit{Surveyors} states that the first lecture took place at Tehran’s “YMCA,” Iranian sources maintain that it, in fact, occurred in the grand hall of the House of General Asad Bakhtiari, which later became the Club of the National Bank; see Mazaheri, \textit{Aramgah-e Kharejian}, 291; and Sadiq, \textit{Memoirs}, 1: 296.
\end{quote}
For more than 2,000 years the whole civilized world, ancient and modern, has paid tribute...to the Persian genius for beauty.... This art of Persia has been the country's greatest asset, it has not only brought wealth and prestige to the nation, but it has in all ages and places made friends for the country, and there is no civilized country in the world today but what has collections of Persian art that shown to all who can see that Persia is worthy of admiration and affection. 

While, according to Pope, “…the achievement in art has become one of the principal measures of the rank of the nation in history,” the revival of ancient history was to become the political purpose of the Iranian nation-state. Therefore, within the first paragraph, the Achaemenid and Sassanian “great names” like Cyrus and Ardashir were cited. Cyrus, founder of the Achaemenid dynasty in 550 BC, and Ardashir I, founder of the Sassanian dynasty in 224 AD, were evoked as Persian heroes and the founders of the Iranian nation. In 1920s Iran, where revival of the nation’s heritage was the state’s main concern, the names of these pre-Islamic kings were uttered as political slogans. The mention of their names at the start of Pope’s speech was not accidental.

In a similar tone, Pope reminded his audience that “the voices of her [Iran’s] poets still stir hearts everywhere;” that Ferdawsí, Sa’dí, Hafez, and Omar Khayyam have in fact “survived.” Pope argued that while ancient “Greek civilization” was “preserved” and “transmitted” to Europe by the “extraordinary intellectual power of...Avicenna,” “ravages of bandits, poverty, misrule, famine and ignorance” had “blight[ed] Persian art of all kinds.” As the speech progressed, Pope made comparisons between Iranian artisanship and those of Rome, China, Japan, Pharaonic Egypt, “Asia Minor,” “Northern India,” Seljuk, and even “the shores of Europe” during various periods of history and maintained, “All the artworks of the world contain Iranian elements.” He praised the Achaemenid architecture, art, and artistry, and was “amazed by the fact that such brilliancy is not known to the world. Romans, experts in construction, did not know how to build a cupola on a square base, whereas Iranians knew this technique.” Pope’s discussion on the Achaemenid architecture, relatively little studied at the time, could have also had much to do with the potential commission of excavations and sales of antique objects, hinting, no doubt, at his own candidacy for such projects. Elaborating on “the Persian genius for

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154 A. U. Pope, “The Past and Future of Persian Art” delivered on April 22, 1925 in Tehran. For the complete English text of the speech, see Gluck, Surveyors of Persian Art, 93-110. Also, see SNH 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat, 99-146.
156 Pope, “The Past and Future of Persian Art,” 93-95. Also, see SNH 131, Karnameh, 11.
157 SNH 131, Karnameh, 11-12. Pope’s point on the technique of cupola construction in addition to his claim that Western architectural form originated “Aryan Iran” was similarly taken from Strzygowski’s argument on the origin of Gothic architecture in northeastern Iran; see Strzygowski, Orient oder Rom.
beauty,” Pope claimed, “the architecture, painting, and poetry of Northern India were created directly under the instructions of Persian artists,” to underscore the idea that “nations and persons without art are barbarian.” Egyptian and Greek columns were compared with those in Persepolis to make this point:

The columns of Persepolis which have... in common with the columns of great Egyptian temples, are far more graceful, far more rational. Many of the Egyptian columns are fat and bulbous. They are copies after like great flowers... That beautiful logical fitness which distinguished Greek architecture, in which the column is beautifully proportioned to the apparent load that it is to carry, was in a large measure realized at Persepolis, and its slender sharply fluted columns look strong and energetic and graceful.158

During this lengthy talk, Pope conveyed several politically current themes. He began, first, by glorifying Persian history, historical figures, and the “spirit of the nation.” Then under the heading of “The Periods of Persian Art,” he listed the “great art periods” that shaped Iranian history with its various inventions and influences on other “civilizations.” Under his second heading, “Some Fundamental Characters,” Pope elaborated on the “fundamental principles of Persian art” although he confessed that such “full understanding” is “no small matter” for “such a gifted nation as Persia.” According to him, that art was successful primarily in its decoration, “beyond all these, Persia is famous for her brilliant decorative arts.” Advocating handcrafted works, he affirmed that industrial and mechanical inventions “often increase power at the expense of happiness, a cause of jealousy and strife...” This emphasis on craft and ornamentation was deep-seated into Orientalist discourse that, while the “sensuous” and the “decorative” were perceived as fitting to the Oriental environment and the Oriental subject, the “technical” and “scientific” were suitable to modern and progressive nations.

Pope soon moved to his next headings, termed “Standards for Judging Persian Art” and “Present Condition of Persian Art.” Making links between art and race, he noted, “the Persians despite the admixture of other blood...are still a gifted people” where “one finds the same lively imagination, the same delicate touch that created marvels for Cyrus.” Influenced by John Ruskin’s *The Stones of Venice* (1851-1853) and by Austrian art historian Josef Strzygowski’s *Orient oder Rom* (1901), Pope believed in the national and racial virtues of architectural production for architecture, unlike sculpture and painting, was “the work of the whole race,”

“expressive of [man’s] nature.” Continuity, despite historical calamities, remained possible, which, Pope insured would result in the “return of justice and security and order.” Art was not only linked to racial valor, but also had something to do with public discipline and instruction, with the establishment of political secularity and social justice. For this, he continued, the vital importance of an art museum was indisputable; without “the establishment of a real museum for her art...no revival of Persian culture is possible.” The museum was a place of “historic instruction.” In order to service the public, it must “be assembled in a common and public place” to “revive the spirit of the nation” and “awaken artists to new achievements” through which Persians “would themselves be astonished...” As most of his colleagues in Iran, Pope hoped to revive an innate national spirit in the people of Iran, a spirit that was believed to have been forgotten. Through the museum, the revival of this spirit would guarantee a harmonious continuity of its cultural history, “so that there shall be no further disastrous break in the artistic traditions of the country.” More importantly perhaps, a much-needed museum would need a director, a post, as explained above, at the core of Iranian, American, German, and French contentions.

Pope’s third and final headings, “Practical Measures for Revival of Persian Art” and “Wrong Views of Art that Delay Revival in Persia,” brought his narrative into the 20th century, addressing the concerns of the politicians in the audience. He chose his words well:

If by instruction and by example these wrong theories that retard the revival and development of a real artistic sense can be corrected, then with the government’s energetic support of practical measures, the future of Persian art is secure. The claims of art on the attention of busy ministers and administrators may at first seem slight. Yet, art is a vital necessity of life for the nation... The government and people together must do everything possible to bring art again to life in Persia.

The wrongs that needed correction stem from an equally “wrong” understanding of art and its value in the context of Qajar Iran. Pope insisted that the “mere passage of time” does not make an artwork more valuable, “if so the common stones by the roadside ought to be the loveliest of all creation’s things.” Rather art acquires its “beauty” from “understanding, skill and inspiration of some serious hardworking person.”

161 Pope’s point on the value of art was exactly the opposite of what the seminal member of the First Vienna School of art history, Alois Riegl (1858-1905), had advocated in his article, "Le Culte Moderne des Monuments: sa Nature, son Origine," (1901) about the age-value of monuments, which would become the foundational text for architectural preservation in the 20th century. Pope was familiar with Riegl’s work, no doubt, through the avid rivalry and
Pope's emphasis on the “nation's artistic spirit” returned in his concluding paragraph in the form of cultural “understanding and inspiration,” the revival of which hinged on men with good taste. “The Peacock Throne” in his view, “is only a copy made by Fath Ali Shah, who was an unqualified calamity to Persian art as different as possible from Shah Abbas and other great monarchs.” Pope stressed that the former “had no taste…” A historical ruler, Qajar king Fath Ali, held responsible by the Pahlavi reformists for the political decline of Iran, was played against another, the much-admired Safavid king Shah Abbas I. This was rhetorical tactic that Pope could exploit within the political milieu of 1920s Iran for his reconstruction of Iran’s history had found matching resonance with the nationalistic sentiments of his audience. While under Fath Ali and his successors, the 19th-century offensives on tsarist Russia and the British Empire had resulted in Iran’s loss of territory in the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, and Persian Gulf, under Shah Abbas’ rule between 1587 and 1629, the Safavid Empire had constantly expanded. In 1598, the shah had recovered Herat and unified Khorasan with Iran by defeating the Uzbeks; in 1624, he had crushed his main rival, the Ottomans, and gained control of not only Kurdistan and Baghdad, but also the venerated Shi’a cities of Najaf and Karbala. Abbas had centralized the government, devised a working bureaucracy, institutionalized the ulama, subdued the tribes, invited non-Muslims to his court, and created a formidable army. In the domain of culture, he had moved the capital city from Tabriz and Qazvin to Isfahan and had made an artistic masterpiece of it by his ingenious urbanism and royal patronage; he had rebuilt and embellished the Imam Reza Shrine and had opened safe pilgrimage routes to Mashhad. In short, Abbas had managed to accomplish what the reformists envisioned for modern Iran with the heavy-handed methods that they believed could bring about a change: a centralized, strong, and unified nation. For the Pahlavi scholars and Western Orientalists alike, none of the Qajar kings were a match for Shah Abbas the Great. In contrast to the latter, the formers would be blamed and belittled in Pahlavi official historiography, as well as the collective psyche, for their “backwardness,” “despotism,” lack of “taste,” and for Iran’s post-1828 humiliations.

polemics between Riegl and Austrian art historian Josef Strzygowski (1862-1941) whose then famous work, Orient oder Rom, had a big impact on Pope. "Both Strzygowski and [Jurgis] Baltrusaitis exerted an influence on the work of Arthur Upham Pope...whose article, "Iranian and Armenian Contribution to the Beginning of Gothic Architecture," (Armenian Quarterly, 1, no. 2, 1946) perpetuates the ideas of these two scholars. He dissects the Gothic style - as Strzygowski did - in to separate features, which he traces back to Iran and Armenian. Pope also makes some of the same problematic assumptions about the transmission of artistic styles from East and West." Ch. Maranci, Medieval Armenian Architecture: Constructions of Race and Nation (Sterling, 2000), 194, footnote 46.
Therefore, when Pope maintained that Fath Ali’s “grotesque and stupid carving of himself” in Sassanian style on the hills of Ray “will remain as one of the greatest artistic scandals in the history of the world,” he was reinforcing his audience’s long held belief that the Qajars were a bad and tasteless mimics of the more authentic Safavid rulers. It came as of little surprise when Reza Shah decided not to be crowned as Iran’s king on “Fath Ali Shah’s Peacock Throne” a few months after Pope’s lecture. Still, the stylistic imitation of the pre-Islamic architecture and art of Iran was precisely that which Pope promoted in his theories of “good taste” and “national spirit.” As a finale, he noted: “May the new renaissance of Persia that is now dawning usher in again a day of great artistic achievement in which Persia will once more delight mankind and bring honor to herself.” As he finished his speech, “Persian Art” had made a full circle: from its glorious past, to the dark ages, from its present-day demise, and finally to the solution of a still glorious revival. The speech also gave the art historian the biggest opportunity of his career. Pope, single-handedly and successfully, made a place for himself at the vanguard of Persian Art.

Colonel Reza Khan, sitting in the audience, along with his ministers and officials, Teymurtash, Forughi, Pirnia, Firuz Mirza, Davar, Mostawfi, Esfandiari, Taqizadeh, Shahrrok, Sadiq, as well as the future nationalist prime minister who would nationalize Iran’s oil industry in 1951, Mohammad Mosaddeq, must have been particularly moved by the enormous responsibility that Pope placed on the state in undertaking the task of reviving cultural valor and, through it, cultivating taste among “every Persian.” “The government must see to it,” he said, “that as in the ancient days of Persia’s greatest glory artists shall receive encouragement from the highest sources and be shown to the public for what he is: a benefactor to the nation [sic],” a point which may well have impressed Reza Khan. Convincingly arguing, Pope implored the reformists to endeavor to restore Iran and its art to its ancient standards. The colonel was, indeed, deeply moved. It was there that his most fundamental ideas about Iran’s artistic heritage were formulated. According to the American architectural historian and an undercover CIA agent

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165 Pope’s lecture “...had a very deep influence on the audience;” see Sadiq, Memoirs, 1: 298.
from 1940 to 1970, Donald N. Wilbert, the speech resonated with what Reza Khan believed about Iran's past glories.166 "He became restless before the end, but there can be no doubt of the lasting impact of what he heard on the occasion...he was convinced that the heights reached by Iranians in the past must be scaled again..."167 It was not only there that he recognized the political potential of artistic expressions, but also was convinced that the revival of such artistic expressions was Iran's modern political mission.

Influenced by Pope's minor remark on the missing tiles on the Safavid mosque of Shaykh Lutf-Allah in Isfahan, Reza Khan ordered their immediate replacement, as well as the duplication of the mosque's dome and drum in the newly built Marble Palace in Tehran.168 "The effect of the lecture was immediate," later attested those who had been present on that day, "Reza Khan's journey shortly thereafter to Isfahan to donate personally a considerable sum of money for the repair of the dome of Sheikh Lutfullah Mosque, the deterioration of which had been mentioned by Professor Pope."169 On that day, Pope had also manage to encourage the future king to facilitate access to various religious structures tightly controlled by the ulama and strictly forbidden to non-Muslims; this was an idea that already resonated well among the local secular elite that were convinced that mosques, shrines, and madrasas were bastions of regressive ideas and religious fanaticism. As will be explained in chapter 2, the conceptual transformation of such functional structures into "historical monuments" would prove the solution to both Pope's and the elite's predicament.

166 "In the 1952, [Wilber] was the political attache of the United states embassy in Tehran and a consultant to the State Department and the Institute for Defense Analysis." After the fall of Prime Minister Mosaddeq in 1953, Wilber wrote, "The fact of the matter is that I was the principal planner for Operation AJAX [i.e. the CIA coup against Mosaddeq to bring back the Shah] and was given authority to prepare an operational plan." Quoted in Abdi, "Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran," 66. In Iran there were number of art historians who were also political agents for their respective government. In the field of architectural history, Wilber's publications include Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions (Princeton, 1986) and The Islamic Architecture of Iran and Turan: the Timurid Period edited with L. Golombek (Princeton, 1987).

167 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 98. This point is confirmed by later historians such as Lenczowski, "...Reza Shah's awareness of [Iran's] great past was stimulated by the work of ...Arthur Pope...it was certainly increased by his visits to Persepolis, Susa, and other archaeological sites, and the founding of the Archaeological Museum in Tehran and of the National Monuments Society owned much to his interest." Lenczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis, 37.

168 SNH 131, Karnameh, 12. Covering a territory of 2,830 square meters, Marble palace or Kakh-e Marmar was completed in 1934, upon the order of Reza Shah, and put to use three years later; it was subsequently turned into a museum in 1976. Many collaborated in building and decorating the palace, including architect Hosayn Lorzadeh, tile specialist Ostad Izadi, inlay specialist Mohammad Hosayn, as well as, Ostad Heridar Amu-Oqli and Ostad Hosayn Tehrarezadeh Behzad. The latter, probably was related to the author of the first Ferdawsi's mausoleum design, German trained Iranian architect Karim Taherrezadeh Behzad. For details, see chapter 3 of this study.

Pope’s theories on Persian art, delineated in his lecture, had an immense bearing on its subsequently formation and teaching. Immediately translated into Persian, twenty-six pages of his speech were published and distributed by the joint efforts of the SNH and the Ministry of Public Instructions. According to Isa Sadiq, the minister of public instructions, this translation was “for the use of teachers all over the country,” written by a man who “first reawakened our own love of beauty by pointing out the significance of our accomplishment; it was [he] who thus promoted the understanding and appreciation of Iranian art and craftsmanship in all its forms.”

The American art historian not only shaped Persian Art, but also Persian pedagogy in the 20th century. It seems that which he had to say about local artistic production was taught in Iranian schools in the following decades. For instance, in Sadiq’s own textbook, Pope was extensively quoted, “Iran’s service (khedmat) [to the world] consists of its largest depository, its most ancient, and most distinguished has been in the discipline (reshteh) of craft (san’at).” In later Pahlavi historiography, the event was a pivotal moment in national artistic rebirth where “Reza Shah’s awareness” of Iran’s pre-Islamic “great past was stimulated by the work of...Pope,” along with “the National Monument Society” that “owned much to his interest.” Sadiq later concurred,

The lecture, the text of which I had translated into Farsi...published by the Ministry of Education [Public Instructions] and widely circulated was a crucial moment in the history of Iran’ self-awareness... His enthusiasm and eloquence made a profound impression on the audience...[it] went deep into our hearts... His statements about the significance of our culture and its influence upon other cultures kindled fires within us like magic. We became proud of ourselves... The fruit of Pope’s lecture in 1925 and his subsequent books and articles was a vast revival of our arts, historical and contemporary, a revival which continued throughout the reign of His Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi, then under the auspices and encouragement of H. I. M. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Even post-1979 sources, that tend to demean the Pahlavis and their deeds, correspond with the impact of the text: Pope’s “oration created excitement,” noted a book published in 2000, “and

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170 It was again republished in SNH 92, Majmu’-a-yeh Entesharat, 101-147.
172 See I. Sadiq, “Chapter 14: Iran’s services to the World,” Tarikh-e Farhang-e Iran [History of Iran’s education] (Tehran, 1957), 426-471, 469.
173 Lenczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis, 37.
174 Sadiq, “American Pioneers in Persian Art,” 3207-3209. Sadiq also underscored the same idea in his memoirs: “Until that day, the people of this country did not give importance to their own art and craft; they did not know in what ways has Iran served the science of craft (sanaye’-e elmi) and what imprint it has left on the art of other nations.” Sadiq, Memoirs, 1: 298.
from then on particular attention was paid to the national arts.”175 In the West, the revised version was published in English under the title “Persian Art and Culture” in the *Asiatic Review* of April 1928.176 This metaphoric cornerstone of “Persian Art” became a source of inspiration for local nationalists and Westerners alike. Printed, (re)printed, and cited numerously over the decades, it surfaced again as a chapter in the Society’s 92nd volume in 1972 and, as late as 1977 in Sadiq’s *Past and Future of Persian Art*.177 Each of Pope’s points – from revival to museums, from pedagogy to “no taste,” from historical figures to “nation’s spirit” – all marked the subsequent undertakings of the SNH; each of these ideas were materialized in the monuments of the national heroes.

Between 1926 and 1929, the Society focused its efforts to further substantiate the discourse on Iranian cultural heritage. Experts continued to be invited to present on various aspects of Iranian art, craft, and architecture. On September 15, 1926, German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld offered his views on Ferdawsi’s *Shahnameh* and its role in the making of Iranian history, which had already been translated and published by the SNH as the third volume in the series – the lecture would see the light again in 1972.178 The Society’s next publication was a result of his February 1927 research paper, which addressed the newly discovered seals in Hamadan.179 The two cylinder seals, one gold the other silver, were inscribed in cuneiform. The text in the three languages of Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian was translated as, “Darius, the Great King, King of kings, King of the Lands, the Son of Vishtaspar, the Achaemenid; Darius, the King saith: ‘This is the Kingdom over which I reign: from the Saken, who dwell in the neighborhood of Sogd, as far as Kush; From the Hindus as far as Sparda that has granted unto me by Auramazda, who is the greatest among the Gods. May Auramazda support me and my house!”180 Three months after their discovery, the government cabinet decided to buy the

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180 Majd, *American Plunder of Persia’s Antiquities*, 156. An alternative transition is: “Darius Great King, King of Kings, King of Countries, the Son of Gostasp Achaemenid. Darius King says: this is the Country that I rule, from
two seals from “its owner by the means of Professor Herzfeld” so that they remain “in the
country and do not go abroad.”\textsuperscript{181} The anonymous owner had initially made a deal with the
government: if he “presented” the silver seal to the “Iran Museum” collection, he would get a
“written” permission enabling him to sell the gold one. Herzfeld was instead asked by the SNH
to buy the two seals for the museum for the price of 1,200 Lire.\textsuperscript{182}

Mohammad Ali Forughi and Herzfeld again joined forces on May 9, 1927. A conference
was organized in the hall of the Ministry of Culture where each read a paper. Forughi, who had
made a trip to the south of the country to visit the much talked-about sites of Persepolis and
Pasargadae, spoke about his observations in regards to national heritage. He said,

\begin{quote}
I cannot adequately describe [my] feelings during my visit to our proud heritage. I am simply
stunned by the idea that there are callous individuals who destroy such edifices...therefore I
will refrain from mentioning the deplorable state of Persepolis. All the calamities that could
have happened to it, have already happened. Both the inscriptions and the decorations are
gone. Only the wonders of the time remain, and they must be preserved. The protection of our
national heritage depends on the peoples’ appreciation and feeling of [the SNH’s] work. The
awakening of this feeling, furthermore, is one of the responsibilities that the SNH has taken
[upon itself]. And it hopes to reach its objectives via these means.\textsuperscript{183}
\end{quote}

In Forughi’s mind, the task that these men had assigned themselves to accomplish, although
seemed to embrace scientific and rational methods, was often navigated by “feelings” and
“awakenings.” It was also about destiny; of being somewhere in the past, regressive, traditional,
and getting somewhere in the future, progressive and modern. The lecture is also indicative of
the missionary nature of the Society, where “callous individuals” would be “awaken” to culture
and brought to “appreciate” nation’s “heritage” through the hard work of the SNH. Conversely,
those “callous individuals” who destroyed the nation’s heritage, according to Forughi, were
“blind not only to the value of what they destroy, but to the very meaning of the acts they
perform.”\textsuperscript{184} Therefore, in the SNH’s view, conceptions of civilization and preservation, national
status and architecture, were synonymous.

\textsuperscript{181} Iran National Archives 71008/4346; Ordibehesht 27, 1306/May 18, 1927 and Khordad 1, 1306/May 23, 1927,
Tehran.

\textsuperscript{182} Iran National Archives 71008/4346; Ordibehesht 27, 1306/May 18, 1927 and Khordad 1, 1306/May 23, 1927,
Tehran.

\textsuperscript{183} SNH 131, Karnameh, 6-7. My translation.

Along the same line, the Hungarian ethnologist and a member of the SNH, Ali Hannibal, spoke about “the revival of the taste/spirit (zawq) of Iranian craft (san’at).”"185 "Having escaped the Bolsheviks,” according to a friend in 1933, Hannibal had become “a Persian subject” who was a “descendent of Peter the Great’s negro, and thereby cousin to certain English royalties….”186 Established in Tehran, he subsequently worked as a scholar of Persian literature and language. During his lecture on June 9, 1927, he underscored the SNH’s vital mission because, in his view, the ongoing “destruction of Iranian beauty and craft” was not “only awful for Iran but also for the entire civilized world.”187 Hannibal considered the formation of the Society to “coincide with another important event, namely the beginning of one of the historical moments for Iran,” and while “one of the darkest Iranian histories has ended,” another period filled with “full of hope” has begun. In this pivotal instant of renewal, in Hannibal’s view, the SNH “should do two” specific “things:”

First, it should demolish the results of previously doomed periods and get rid of it. Secondly, it should provide grounds for the revival of previously forbidden taste and establish the foundations for this revival. At the time that the SNH initiated these two goals, the conditions were difficult. Ignorant and indifferent people, antique dealers, and tourists were trying to demolish this entire great heritage.188

The dying Qajar era, presented here as the “dark ages,” had presumably ended and given birth to a new beginning under the heavy handed leadership of Reza Shah and the SNH’s efforts to protect the nation’s heritage from both local “ignorant and indifferent people,” as well as Western “dealers and tourists.” The role of “Iranian beauty and craft” in general, and the agency of the SNH in particular, were viewed pivotal to this historical change because the Society had the ability and the responsibly to eliminate the past to erect the future. The old, it was argued, had to be “demolished” in order to give rise to “revival” of “taste” for “Iran and the rest of the world.” The protection and preservation of Iran’s artistic legacy was perceived not only as the force that would usher in Iran’s modern era, but would finally put a stop to cultural harm inflicted on the “civilized world.”

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185 SNH 131, Karnameh, 7; my translation. Also, see Correspondence between Ministry of Culture and Education with Ministry of the Royal Court regarding Hannibal’s fee for the SNH conference, Documents on Archaeology in Iran, document 114, letter 1, Ministry of Culture and Education, 375-375; Tir 3, 1306/June 25, 1927 and Mordad 22, 1306/August 14, 1927, Tehran; and Lenczowski, Iran under Pahlavis, 326.
186 Byron, Road to Oxiana, 55.
187 Quoted in SNH 131, Karnameh, 7.
188 Quoted in SNH 131, Karnameh, 8.
The Hungarian ethnologist who had become an Iranian citizen and had committed himself to Iran’s modernization by founding Tehran’s Ethnography Museum, reiterated his American colleague Arthur Pope’s apprehension about the lack of museums in Iran while accusing Western powers for the unfair and illegal export of its antiquities. According to Hannibal, the fact that such museums did not exist was, in reality, a justification for export of artifacts: “There are no museums in Iran; and the locals are not taking care of this heritage, hence we are taking it out of the country to protect it for the appreciation of the world. These were excuses by foreigners.”189 Therefore, the lecture underscored, time and again, the vital importance of establishing a national museum. The methods and arguments listed by Hannibal were to constitute the operations of the SNH in the decades to come. Less than a decade from that lecture, an archeological museum would be inaugurated in Tehran and each of the existing tombs of the historic figures would be first destroyed and then reconstructed as means to preserve, or invent, a national patrimony.

By the mid-1930s, all those who were compelled or convinced by the discourse on Iran’s heritage started to champion its preservation and museumization by the SNH, even those who had hitherto little to say about it. For instance, French art historian Yedda Godard, who had accompanied her husband, André Godard, to Iran in 1927 and would remain until his departure three decades later, gave “an authoritative evocation of Isfahan” before a large public at Tehran’s Alliance Française. The lecture, entitled Esfahan et son Monuments a Travers les Siecles, was published in four parts, by the French language, state-controlled Le Journal de Téhéran.190 Similarly, in his preface to Godard’s 1936 Athar-é Iran: Annales Du Service Archéologique de l’Iran, an SNH-member and Minister of Public Instructions Ali Askhar Hekmat wrote that the Annals were designed so that “each” Iranian “will be able to admire the masterpieces created on

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189 Hannibal added, “The situation was as such when the SNH was established [the above were] the causes of decline in Iranian artisanship... This heritage is being destroyed anyway because there are no institutions in the country that take care of it.” SNH 131, Karnameh, 9. My translation.
190 Y. A. Godard, “Esfahan et ses monuments a travers les siecles,” Le Journal de Téhéran 206 (March 10, 1936): 1. The article continued in the same journal on March 11, 12, and 15, 1926. The four-part piece in March 1936 was meant as a reproduction of the lecture, marketed for the French community of Tehran, as well as those Parisians interested in Iranian art: “It will be, we are convinced, a great pleasure for those among them who did not have the privilege of attending, and, for the others, a fine souvenir of the hour during which, last Sunday, they were under the spell of [Yedda Godard’s] words.” It was translated into English by Mary Crane in Isfahan the same year and remained unpublished. I found the English translated text among the papers of Baroness Marie-Therese Ullens’ collection at Harvard University’s Aga Khan Visual Collection. Baroness Ullens spent most summers between 1951 and 1970 in Iran; she traveled with the Godards and documented most aspects of Iranian material culture. Her
the land of Iran."\textsuperscript{191} The minister hoped that "the inner taste of this country for the arts [would] develop again by the appreciation of these marvels and thus the Iranian heart will be more and more attached to the greatness of the fatherland (Patrie)." Hekmat further underscored that the leadership of the shah had brought to life the "strong roots of our past, long elapsed under layers of forgetfulness." And that his power has enabled the Iranian people "to taste the benefits of modern civilization."\textsuperscript{192} These consisted the basic ideology and methodology cultivated by the efforts of the SNH: to revive the dead but still innate arts of the land, to guide the masses in their rediscovery of taste, and to cultivate fondness for the homeland by the means of high culture.

These series of indexes, public lectures, and publications made up the core of a viable and univocal discourse on Iran's cultural heritage in the 1920s and 1930s. They would successfully outline a specific course and set the conditions for the overwhelming number and diversity of the Society's future undertakings. From 1922 until the dawn of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the SNH would destroy and construct thirty-eight major tomb complexes, most incorporating museums, libraries, and restaurants. It would carry out over sixty preservation projects and would create a national museum, as well as a public library, in Tehran. The Society would also publish 153 voluminous books, along with thousands of brochures, and would continue to organize hundreds of public lectures and art exhibitions. Its first decade between 1922 and 1933, would also prove to be decisive for Iran's modern sociopolitical history, because the Society, with the intellectual aptitude of its first members, would not only effectively tie cultural production to sentiments of (inter)national political superiority, but would also demarcate Iran's aesthetic parameters to a uniquely political ideology, aimed at reviving its ancient grandeur and, hence, arriving at a modernity.

collection was donated to Harvard University and is presently being catalogued at the Fine Arts Library. See Chapter 3 for details of Ullens' life and work.
\textsuperscript{191} A. Godard, \textit{Athar-e Iran: Annales Du Service Archéologique de l'Iran} (Haarlem, 1936), 1: 5.
\textsuperscript{192} Godard, \textit{Athar-e Iran}, 1: 5.
Figure 1.1
Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash.
Iranian Court Minister 1926-1933.

Figure 1.2 Hasan Pirnia, Prime Minister several times between 1906 and 1922.

Figure 1.3 Mohammad Ali Foroughi,
Prime Minister, 1295-1927 and 1932-1935.
Figure 1.4 Firuz Mirza Firuz, Finance Minister. 

Figure 1.5 Ali Akbar Davar, Justice Minister. 

Figure 1.6 Hasan Mostawfi, Prime Minister. 

Figure 1.7 Ebrahim Hakimi, Minister of Public Instructions. 

Figure 1.8 Hasan Esfandiari, Minister of Public Instructions. 
Figure 1.9 Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh at the central left as Iran’s representative to the Art Congress, with Arthur Pope on his right, New York, 1926. Source: Gluck & Siver, eds. Surveyors of Persian Art: A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope & Phyllis Ackerman, 116.

Figure 1.10 Ernest Herzfeld, German architect and archeologist. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 17.

Figure 1.11 Hosayn Ala, Court Minister. Source: Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 167.
فهرست مختصری از آثار و انبثاقه تاریخی ایران

خسی (زبان):

یکی از آخرین قدیمی‌های مسجد واقع در شهر سالارانه زقان واقع است و عبارت از بنای ترکی است که دارای کاشی‌های خوب و کوچک برخی از گرفته می‌باشد.

این مسجد در اوایل قرن هشتم هجری توسط الجابی الموتی با شاهداست.

مکان:

در شهر طوس، ۲ مجموعه در درنیکی، دارالریزان.

جامه توجه است که هزاره‌های قبلاً شاه عباس اول است که در اینجا واقع است. بنای قرینه در حال هم‌بودن بود.
Figure 1.14 Ernest Herzfeld’s proposal of a vignette for the SNH.
Source: Ernest Herzfeld Papers, Freer Gallery of Art & Sackler Gallery Archives.

Figure 1.15 SNH’s first emblem, Achaemenian and Sassanian palaces at Perseopolis and Ctesiphon, flanking the Qabus tower at the center.
Source: SNH 4, Kashf-e, front-page.

Figure 1.16 SNH’s second emblem, silhouette of Ferdowsi’s new mausoleum.
Source: I. Sadiq, Ferdowsi (Tehran, 1945), front-page.
II. A MODERN AESTHETICS: 
SNH’s Politics

“We don’t remember that we have always been firm defenders of the Aryan race against the avalanche of Tartars, Arabs, Mongols, and other hordes hostile to our collective race... Under the energetic efforts of a genius man, Iran has been revived. We have aborted all the problems of modern life.”

Said Nafisi
Le Journal de Téhéran, March 15, 1935

By the late 1920s, the Pahlavi state had reinforced its “New Order” by three central systems: the modern army, the government bureaucracy, and the court patronage.¹ Through the unified army, Reza Shah had undermined the power of the tribes and had weakened British and Russian sway over the territorial peripheries.² The often-harsh policies towards various tribes and non-Persian speaking provinces formulated in Tehran and imposed through the state bureaucracy and other modern institutions were aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity of Iran and the eventual transformation of a weak empire into a strong nation with a homogenous culture and language. Through the court patronage, the shah had made sure that those who were willing to take part in his reforms, would be benefit from “lucrative posts, favors, and futures...”³ By the late 1920s, the state had also invested its efforts in creating a network of unification by the means of the modern infrastructure. Asphalted roads, the trans-Iranian railway, modern governmental buildings, secular schools and universities, cinemas and parks, national public landmarks and statues, did not only enable the rapid mobilization of the army, but also began to slowly furnish Iran’s social and physical landscape with a modern veneer. The program

¹ E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (New Jersey, 1982), 136. “The entire undertaking to promote both Western modernization and national consciousness was assumed by Reza Khan’s strongly established state apparatus, which organized its forces to construct different aspects of national cohesion. Reza Shah’s main and immediate policies focused on modernizing the administration, the army, economic development, the judiciary system, education, and communication.” M. Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity (New York, 1993), 193.
² These groups controlled the different borders of Iran and historically the central state often counted on their armed forces for the internal security of the country. Reza Shah “broke the power of the tribal chieftains who in the past had made government authority a fiction in many provinces.” R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York, 1978), 56.
³ Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 137.
of modernity cultivated under Reza Shah, therefore, was not just about sheer military force, but also more importantly and far more enduringly, about cultural imperialism.

The politicization of post-1921 cultural expressions was primarily the meticulous work of the Society for National Heritage. Various cultural forms were given precedent over other reform projects; or rather, the cultural overtone of each political reform, either infrastructural, technological, or educational was privileged and was circulated through various medias both as a pivotal impetus for and a consequence of those reforms. For instance, throughout the mid- to late 1930s, the official daily, *Le Journal de Téhéran*, published photographs of modern banks, train stations, hotels, sanatoriums, and bridges. These images were often appeared under such titles as “A Few Aspects of Modern Iran,” “Iran: the Country of Vast Tourism,” “Tourism and Progress,” “Inauguration of Iran’s National Bank in the Capital,” “Inauguration of Shahabad’s Sanitarium,” and “Iran has Transformed itself into a Modern Country.” 4 While in the 1970s, newly erected buildings, their styles, and royal inaugurations would serve as mere backdrops to exalt the monarch, in the 1930s modern structures were reproduced in official newspapers without the presence of either Reza Shah or his officials. Unlike later decades, in early Pahlavi era architecture was perceived as an unequivocal and autonomous symbol of national progress and modernity independent of the person of the king. Often the reproduction of architectural images in the mass media was seen as the political reform itself.

The architectural manifestation of these modern changes, furthermore, was projected as expressions of national status, both modern and historical. For example, referring to Iran’s pavilion at the 1935 International Exposition in Brussels, various journals, including the royalist *Ettela’at* and its French edition *Le Journal de Téhéran*, announced “The Success of Iran” in articles accompanied with images of the neo-Achaemenid façade of Iran’s pavilion.5 Such illustrations did not only stand as confirmation of the country’s rapid modernization, but also hinted at the essential advance of Iran’s international status as an aspiring regional superpower and a powerful modern nation-state. The conspicuously Achaemenid style of the pavilion was indicative of the new regime’s effort to revitalize Iran’s pre-Islamic cultural heritage and, thus,

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recover Iran’s ancient eminence. While internationally such architectural ventures were designed to demonstrate Iran’s cultural and political merit as a “civilized nation,” domestically most of these cultural reordering were intended to hinder the cultural narratives headed by the ulama for the benefit of nationalized representations imposed by the shah’s secular state. This chapter deals with the ideological and political under-grid of the Society that would help the Pahlavi dynasty to invent and disseminate a new image of modern, secular, and homogeneous Iran.

As designed in the early 1920s and brought to maturity in the 1930s, the main goals of the SNH were based on three separate, but closely interrelated, ideological lines of argument: first, the scientific affirmation of the Aryan roots of the Iranian race; second, the secularization of the Iranian collective mental map by shifting the historical sites of Shi’a pilgrimages to other, entirely secular sites; and third, the reshaping of collective historical memory through a systematic and selective destruction and reconstruction of the built environment. These agendas would be reflected in the SNH’s making of a discourse on Iran’s cultural heritage and its construction of the tombs of selected national figures such as Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyyam. In this chapter, the section titled “Missing Bodies” reconstructs the foundation of Tehran University’s Medical School, which sustained the Aryan claims of the state on pseudoscientific basis. When the SNH was ready to provide the historical and physical material – i.e. corpses, skulls, or bones – dug out during its mausoleum projects, the nation’s “typically Aryan” types would be researched in that department. However, in reality, each of these mausoleum projects while professed to a purely scientific rationale, often lacked the very bones with which to conduct such scientific examinations. In some cases, the remains of these historic figures, for example those of Ferdawsi, were simply not there. When they were, in the case of Nader Shah, they were subjugated to a meticulous process of exhumation, documentation, publicization, and (re)entombment. In either case, the scientific certainty of these projects not only would attest to the implicit Aryan origin of Ferdawsi, Sa’di, Ibn Sina, Khayyam, but would also enable the SNH to orchestrate public display of their remains and, for a long while pseudo-scientifically perpetuate the Aryan doctrine of the state. Missing bodies and bones, with the backing of the Medical School and the SNH’s mausoleum-museum complexes would, therefore, serve as the bastions of Iran’s Aryan nation and its rightful place among the “superior race.”

The SNH’s second ideological interest was to simultaneously secularize and nationalize the historically Shi’a practices which had defined and shaped much of Iranian spiritual and daily
life since the Safavids, especially that of religious pilgrimage to venerated shrines like Mashhad’s Imam Reza and the most holy Shi’a cities of Najaf and Karbala. The Society’s attempts on secularizing *ziyarat* (religious pilgrimage/visitation), hence in this chapter “Civil(ized) Pilgrimage” was civil in the sense that each site of the monuments erected by the SNH utilized the centuries-old network and apparatus of Shi’a pilgrimage to promote a negative image of historic Shi’a destinations and to discourage their visits and their overtly religious rituals. Instead, they were to endorse a new kind of national sites, transforming pilgrimage into a “civilized” collective practice cast in the image of Western tourism. In lieu of visiting Imam Reza, the modern citizen was encouraged to pay homage to Ferdawsī located a few kilometers north of Mashhad; in Shiraz, instead of making a pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reza’s brother, Shah Cheraq, Iranians were pressed on to visit the tombs of Hafez and Sa’dī. ⁶ More importantly perhaps, the central state compelled, and at times simply forced, its citizens to pay visits to historical sites within the modern borders of Iran by denying exist visits for travels to Najaf and Karbala in British mandated Iraq. For the Iranian state, these sites were highly problematic not only because they hindered the successful formation of a secular and national conception of Iranian nationhood and its modern map, but also were powerful *ulama* establishments outside the government’s jurisdiction. They were also perceived by the Iranian intelligentsia as bastions of both regressive Shi’a theocracy and Western imperialism, hampering the nation’s progress and threatening its sovereignty. In these new sites, the modern Iranian would not only come to believe in the scientific contentions of the monuments, but would also be forced to behave differently within those spaces. For instance, public benches would replace the carpet of the mosques or Muslim prayer with poetry reading; while these seemed at first negligible anthropological differences, they would in time succeed in inducing profound cultural changes.

The SNH’s third ideological ambition was to leave the deepest mark on Iran’s urbanism and architecture. Since the mid-19th century, the Iranian intelligentsia had maintained that the immediate past needed to be erased in order to give way to a modern nation, unhindered by “tradition,” “superstition,” and “dogmatism.” ⁷ Both Reza Shah and the SNH were determined to transform these arguments into practice. “Destructive Pedagogy” explores the dialectical

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⁶ Shah Cheraq Shrine, the most venerated Shi’a mausoleum complex in Shiraz was constructed by Atabek Sa’ad Ibn Zangi in the 8th century and was expanded by Fath Ali Shah Qajar in the early 19th century.
relationship between architectural destruction and construction aimed at not only to instruct the public about “life along modern lines,” but also build a “bright future” seen as both a concept and a real place. The historical grounds for the destructive facet of the project lay in the elite’s persuasion that the people of Iran had forgotten their ancient culture and its splendor. Mislead by the weak Qajar kings, they had consequently destroyed that which was once great. For its revival, more destruction was of essence. Public instruction through architecture was not only to acculturate the people into what was hoped to become a “civilized nation,” but also would revive forgotten collective memories among ordinary Iranians. It would inexorably erase both the architectural production of the Qajar dynasty and would effectively leave out such edifices from Iran’s official history and popular memory. In short, a successful elimination of Qajar architecture would guarantee the emergence of Iran’s modernity, it was believed.

These three agendas, underpinning each of the mausoleums erected by the SNH between 1934 and 1977, would effectively uphold and reinforce the ideological mainstream of Reza Shah’s ruling period in the following manners: all three advocated modernization and nationalization of the collective identity formation and shared conception of history and memory in that they provided material for the superior status of Iran’s Aryan race and the necessary scientific support for such claims; all three promoted anti-clerical secularization and centralization including the confiscation and handling of religious endowments and institutions and their eventual replacement by other, more secular and national sites; and all three promoted a specific historical and modern construct of the Iranian nation by compulsively erasing the existing built environment in the promise to rebuilt the lost ancient social prosperity and political might of Iran. In erecting and nurturing the new mausoleums as national site of secular pilgrimage, as homes for the display of the nation’s racial genesis and type, and as symbols of both thorough modernity and ancient grandeur, the SNH hoped to contribute in no small way to the larger Pahlavi project of modernity. The following three sections will bring to the fore the rapid and uneven development that characterize the modernity that was being both invented by, negotiated through, and manifested in the mausoleums of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam, and Ackerman-Pope.

7 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 10.
• **Missing Bodies**

Immediately after placing the Persian crown on his head on April 25, 1926, Reza Shah ordered major reconstruction for the palace of Golestan, historically the Qajar seat of power.⁹ While on the king’s command large sections of the palatial complex were razed to the ground – for they were perceived aesthetically worthless and emblematic of Qajar power – the demolitions providing the perfect opportunity to exhume the cadaver of the 18th-century Iranian ruler, Karim Khan Zand, out of the palace’s grounds to be reburied in the holy city of Qom. Both the demolition and the entombment were aimed at discrediting the Qajars and enhancing the legitimacy of the new king. For Karim Khan (r. 1750-1779) had been the archrival of the founder of the Qajar dynasty, Aqa Mohammad Khan, for the Persian throne. After his death in 1779, the former’s body was brought to Tehran by the order of the latter to be buried in the ground of Golestan because Aqa Mohammad wanted to avenge himself by walking over Karim Khan’s remains on a daily basis. The moment of unearthing the bones in spring or summer of 1926 was a well-publicized national event (Figs. 2.1).¹⁰ Photographs depicted the shah in his military uniform inspecting the exhumation, his court minister, Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash holding Karim Khan’s sword, and his military architect-engineer, Sharif Zadeh displaying Karim Khan’s bones on a silver plate. Reza Shah’s decision to relocate these remains to the venerated shrine was not only symbolic, but also highly controversial. It was symbolic because the new shah was discrediting the Qajars by honoring their enemy with a proper reburial. It was controversial because in the process, Reza Shah was digging out a Muslim corpse, a practice deeply insulting to the ulama and the religious establishments and beliefs.

While, by and large, the importance of Iran’s Islamic past was played down by the Pahlavi propaganda machine, Karim Khan’s ruling period was significant for the modernists of the 1920s for several historical and nationalistic reasons, notwithstanding his infamous hostility towards Aqa Mohammad Khan. First, his reign was associated with the greater region of Fars in

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⁸ British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/E3909 Clive reporting on Court Minister Teymurtash, August 26, 1927, Tehran.
⁹ For a brief account of Reza Shah’s coronation ceremony, see footnotes in chapter 1.
¹⁰ Despite its significance, the exact date of the event is unclear. However, the images of the events are quite telling. The three men posing in the photo include the shah and his court minister, who look young and healthy, still unmarked by the burden of power that would be conspicuous in the 1930s. It most probably took place sometime following Reza Shah’s coronation in April 1926. A comparison of this photograph with that of Teymurtash carrying the Pahlavi crown on the coronation day shows that he is wearing the same attire and maintains the same posture in both images.
central Iran considered the cultural heartland of “an uncontained” Persian culture and history. An early supporter of Reza Shah, an emanate scholar of ancient Iran, and a member of the SNH, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh wrote, “The Zoroastrian religion which had appeared among the eastern Iranians, whom we many conveniently call the Avestan people, probably in the early part of the sixth century B.C., gradually spread among other Iranian people also, and may have had a considerable number of followers in Parsa as well as in the other province of Iran.”

Modern Fars was the ancient province of “Parsa,” which maintained, since the 10th century, “an exulted position as ‘the seat of empire of the Kings of Iran’ in [medieval] texts as well as on maps.”

The inhabitants of Fars were known in early Muslim writings as “the Best of the Persians,” and through Herodotus as the only people of Iran in modern European imagination. Architecturally, Fars housed most of the surviving Achaemenid and Sassanian archeological sites and, in difference to Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan where different dialect of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic were spoken, Fars’ population mostly spoke Persian. This was not only the official language of Pahlavi Iran, but was also regard as a pure Indo-European language used by Ferdawsi in his Book of Kings as well as a offshoot of Old Persian (Pahlavi) spoken by pre-Islamic dynasties.

Secondly, while Karim Khan’s seat of government had been in Fars, he had had ambitions to unite and control the entire empire with a capital at its geographic center. In effect, Karim Khan had aspired to restore the boundaries of Safavid Iran with a capital not in Isfahan, but in Tehran. To this end, in 1759, he had commissioned architect Ostad Gholam Reza Tabrizi to fortify the city-walls, to erect an audience chamber, administrative buildings, and private quarters well before the Qajars proclaimed Tehran as Persia’s capital. More importantly, Karim Khan had represented himself and his aspiration to the Persian throne in ways that were far more appealing to modern sentiments after the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Instead of taking the title of “shah” or “king of kings,” he had assumed the less domineering designation of “representative of the State (vakil al-dauleh)” or “Representative of the Subjects (vakil al-ra’aya)” and had been “reported to have specified ‘service to the Iranian State’ as the sole

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criterion for the receipt of salaries and pensions..." For the reformist of the 1920s who had struggled to limit the arbitrary rule of their Qajar kings and create some kind of representative government, Karim Khan’s ruling methods were esteemed as highly modern and progressive. The SNH’s appropriation of Karim Khan as a national hero would be consequential to the handling of the architecture that he had generously patronized in Shiraz; case in point the tombstone of Hafez.

In 1926, however, by unearthing and re-interring Karim Khan’s remains, Reza Shah and his court minister meant to rectify historic events, to mend things that they felt should not have happened in Iran’s history. “Reza Shah found this slanderous act unworthy” of Karim Khan, it was reported, “an abuse that was unwarranted.” He ordered a “respectful reburial in a worthy place” within the compound of the Fatemeh Ma’sumeh Shrine in Qom. The act not only aimed at remedying past wrongdoings, but was also designed to reflect the merits of the new shah’s nationalist intentions and ruling methods: “Of course, this act by Reza Shah is worthy of appreciation,” who “went in person to see the remains disinterred.” It, moreover, symbolized a moral duty vis-à-vis history, a gesture of public good. “These kinds of acts are powerful reminders,” maintained a pro-Pahlavi publication, “as well as instructions, that in each period of history delight your heart and in specific moments manifest themselves. [They also] enable the judgment of good and bad deeds in the society and teach the universal good and bad to [some], exposing the sins of others.”

According to one of Reza Shah’s staunch supporters, Said Nafisi, “the basis of Iranian national solidarity and the conditions of social reform” was for the monarch “to venerate the historic masters of this country and make people understand” the importance of such an undertaking. In his subsequent works, Nafisi frequently commented on Reza Shah’s interest in and patronage of the resting-places of national heroes. First educated in Iran and then in France, he had returned to Qajar Iran in 1911 to join the ministries of Interior and Public Instructions

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17 H. D. Mokhtari, Tarikh-e Bidari-e Iran [History of Iran’s awakening] (Tehran, 1947), 564. Wilber maintains that the place of the reburial was in Shrine of Fatemeh Ma’sumeh; see Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 241.
18 Mokhtari, Tarikh-e Bidari, 564; and Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 241.
19 Mokhtari, Tarikh-e Bidari, 565.
Finding the country in a political turmoil, he had supported the heavy-handed leadership of Reza Khan, as had done his co-ideologues. By the mid-1930s, he had become an influential advocate of the shah’s central role in Iran’s destiny as a renowned professor of Persian language and literature at Tehran University. The fact that he was specialized on the 7th-century Arab conquest of Iran rendered him a valuable member of the Pahlavi propaganda apparatus. Accordingly, he was a regular contributor to state-controlled journals like *Ettela’at* and *Le Journal de Téhéran*; the author of *Social and Political History of Iran* (1956), *Royal History of King of Kings Reza Shah Pahlavi* (1965), as well as the a French-Persian dictionary; the collaborator of former Prime Minister Hasan Pirnia in publishing the last volume of *History of Ancient Iran*; and, sure enough, an active and enduring member of the SNH. In his numerous articles, Nafisi consistently underscored that after centuries of “ignorance, weakness, and contempt” and because of “forgetfulness” Iran’s “national glory” was “disappearing,” adding, “Even those suffering from this neglect were unable to do much apart from wailing and lamenting.”

From the beginning of Reza Shah’s rule, in Nafisi’s view, “big steps” had been taken toward the “path of reform,” for the new shah did not miss the smallest opportunity to evoke the Iranian heritage” by restoring important historical structures and, thus, by paying “homage (ta’zim)” and “respect (takrim)” to “Iran’s great masters.”

The practice of instructing the public by referring back to architectural projects was inherent to the complex processes of modernization and homogenization of the Pahlavi state in general and the SNH in particular. Subsequently each monument erected by the SNH—the mausoleums of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyam—each skeleton dug out from these sites—those of Ibn Sina, Nader Shah, Omar Khayyam, and Baba Taher—and each skull put back into each of these tombs was meant not only to legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty and justify the rapid and radical modernization policies, but was also meant to validate the state’s Aryan claims, instruct the public, invent a national heritage and, thus, enhance the lost prestige

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21 Born in Tehran in 1893, Said Nafisi occupied other governmental posts until 1927. He wrote a biography on the work of Rudaki and his most important work, the two-volume *Tarikh-e Ejtemai va Siyasi-ye Iran* [Social and political history of Iran], was published in 1956 and reprinted in 1965. It provides “an interesting account of Qajar dynastic policies in a national context from the beginning to the mid-nineteenth century, by and large conversing the Irano-Russian wars and treaties.” Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation*, 160. In the post-Reza Shah period, Nafisi like a good majority of the local intellectuals was attracted to the communist Tudeh Party; see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 334. For a resent publication, see S. Nafisi, *Said Nafisi’s Version: Literary, Political and Youth Memories*, ed. A. Ee’tesam (Tehran, 2003).


of the nation. However, for the viability of such claims, alluding to racial superiority and historical merit, much more was needed; a new university in Tehran would fulfill this faction.

February 4, 1934 was a historic day for modern Iran because, for the first time in the nation’s long history, biology, archeology, and heritage converged on the grounds of knowledge. On that day, Reza Shah placed the cornerstone of Tehran University, which would become the most intense site of political thought and sentiments throughout the ruling period of Mohammad Reza Shah. In the 1930s, however, the opening of the university for both sexes was itself a socially and intellectually revolutionary event. Designed by French architect and Director of Iran’s Archeological Services André Godard and contracted to another French architect and future author of Hafez’s tomb, Maxime Siroux, the significance of Tehran University’s initiation ceremony was twofold. On the one hand, it marked a major step in the reorganization of public instruction techniques “according to Occidental methods,” both for Iran’s central government and those Western powers operating in Iran. The potential to control and foster intellectual development through the university rendered it a fiercely contested space. Therefore, the French in particular, but also German and American authorities, saw the inaugural ceremony of its campus a perfect occasion to win the hearts of their Iranian counterpart. On the other hand, the university enabled the state to simultaneously seize ulama’s historic monopoly over education and scientifically uphold its Aryan beliefs. Through its urban location and modern architecture, the campus was to stand for ideas of progress, modernity, and civilization.

Reza Shah’s symbolic choice to inaugurate the building of the Anatomy and Dissection Department on January 15, 1935, was further bolstered by his decree to disregard the Muslim ban on human dissection for both dissection and the civic interpretation of the Quran, undertaken

24 André Godard designed the master plan of the campus and Maxime Siroux was responsible for the Medical School building. Siroux was a young French architect who came to Iran to collaborate with archeologist Roman Ghristman on the excavations in Kashan. He became an important architect with numerous projects in Tehran and elsewhere, including the new tomb of Hafez, to be discussed in chapter 4. While different department of Tehran University were designed by different, mostly Western, architects over time, Roland Dubrulle, Mohsen Foroughi, Siroux and Godard continued to take part in shaping the campus. It nevertheless, maintained a uniform architectural vocabulary: rationalistic modern and minimalist monumentality. For more details on the campus, see Marefat, “Building to Power,” 106-109.

by the university’s Theological Department. This was condemned by the ulama.\(^{26}\) The shah’s decree and his inauguration of the department also meant that corpses were to be opened up, examined, and classified as a state-sponsored and state-supported procedure that explicitly violated Islamic law. For the secularists, however, proximity to bones and bodies was to legitimize Iran’s claim to racial superiority, historical merit, and a step closer to the revival of its ancient heritage.\(^{27}\) Therefore, on that January afternoon, dressed in the Pahlavi hats, one of the most visual and symbolic aspects of the secularization reform, the shah’s cabinet ministers walked around the white halls of the Medical School and inspected the skeletons placed on dissection tables (Fig. 2.3).\(^{28}\) To ease the discomfort of those present, the king said, “After all this is not a morgue. Someone should smile, for this is the beginning of a great university and it should be a happy occasion.”\(^{29}\) A year earlier, the shah had inserted a gold foundation plate in a marble box set in the cornerstone. The plate was a copy of gold-inscribed plaques within stone boxes discovered during the Persepolis excavations in September 1933 and published in *Ettela’at* on March 5, 1934.\(^{30}\) Excavated by German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld, it was described by Nafisi as “the most important event in the history of the Antiquities.”\(^{31}\) The British diplomats in Tehran noted, “The Imperial prerogative was exercised” to make sure that from the four discovered plaques, “two...were taken for the Shah’s private collection and the remaining two left for the new National Museum (Fig. 2.4).”\(^{32}\) Merely a few years later, the university’s cornerstone itself became a “Historic piece,” according to *Le Journal de Téhéran*, “a reminder of the style and form of...the historic Palace of Persepolis.”\(^{33}\)


\(^{27}\) “[T]he greater proximity and better adjustment simply made it possible for the object to reveal its own secrets with greater clarity or detail and for the subject to dispense with illusions that were an obstacle to truth.” M. Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (New York, 1971), 137.

\(^{28}\) There are major confusions about the dates of the two inaugural ceremonies. The cornerstone was placed on February 4, 1934 and the first building was inaugurated on January 15, 1935. Most authors confuse the two events and dates. According to French diplomatic records, the opening ceremony took place a year later on February 4, 1935 not 1934. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie-Oceanie January 1918-December 1929, Perse 129, E387-1, 141-142; February 8, 1935, Tehran. According to Amin Banani and Peter Avery, the event took place on February 5, 1935. See A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941* (Stanford, 1961), 99; and Peter Avery, *Modern Iran* (New York, 1965), 279.

\(^{29}\) Wilber also combines the two different events; see Wilber, *Reza Shah Pahlavi*, 163.

\(^{30}\) *Ettela’at* 2137 (Esfand 14, 1312/March 5, 1934): 1.


The Pahlavi state, therefore, perceived the university as an effective pedagogical tool to generate public opinion and command the country’s intellectual, political, and cultural evolution. It came as no surprise when the minister of public instructions, Ali Asghar Hekmat, was immediately appointed as the university’s president. A staunch nationalist and a member of the SNH, Hekmat’s name in Iran’s cultural context would be associated with the modern tombs of Sa’di and Hafez, as will be examined in chapter 4. In 1933, however, the post of president was well deserved for Hekmat had been responsible for the “rapid” construction of the campus wherein “as early as the fall of 1934, the erection of a hall for dissection was undertaken.” Since the immediate erection and operation of the Medical School was a priority of the political elite, it began to accept students as early as fall of 1936, while the university’s other schools and departments had to wait for the availability of financial sponsors for their construction.

Moreover, the university was to validate the scientific, hence conclusive, racial link between modern Iranians and their Aryan ancestors. A state that insisted to “have always been firm defenders of the Aryan race against the avalanche of Tartars, Arabs, Mongols, and other hordes hostile to our collective race,” could not do without modern medical science and the institution that house it. Its Anatomic Department was to provide the state a completely legitimate right to exhume and examine bones and to autopsy and dissect bodies under the rubric of objective scientific processes despite religious oppositions. Examiner and examined were to be brought to immediacy by architecture (Figs. 2.5). In sharp contrast to 1926, where the state had been incapable to scientifically prove the Aryan origin of Karim Khan Zand mainly because of the lack of such a department, in 1948, the SNH would be able to scientifically test, prove, and proudly display the “Aryan skull of Ibn Sina” in his modern mausoleum-museum in Hamadan.

At the opening ceremony in 1935, the site and its inauguration were viewed by colonial powers as a cultural sphere of political influence, during which the French authorities made a special effort to congratulate the Iranian government “in a very touching manner with a telegraph

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37 The early Pahlavi photo of a group of military men who have posed as if operating on a lying body is remarkably similar to – if not copied from – Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lesson of Doctor Nicolaes Tulp of 1632, now in Mauritshuis, The Hague. The visual similarities are self-evident, and their detail explanation, although very tantalizing, is outside the scope of this paper.
38 Instruction and photograph of Ibn Sina’s skull displayed in the mausoleum.
by the president of Paris University."\(^3\) The text, sent by Paris University’s President Charlety, was received by Claude Clarc, the French chargé d’affaires in Tehran and delivered to Hekmat on the same day. According to Clarc’s detailed report of the inauguration day, Hekmat relayed the message to “His Majesty who showed great satisfaction and approved a telegram of appreciation” to be sent back to Paris.\(^4\) The French were particularly pleased with the Iranian reaction to their message for they perceived it as an advantage over their German, British, Soviet, and American rivals. “I believe,” wrote Clarc, “the gesture was as advantageous as unique, since no other [colonial] power or foreign university was present on the occasion,” adding further, “I hope that the already cordial relation between the [French] Legation and the Ministry of Public Instructions will improve, to benefit our professors” hired for various posts at the new Tehran University.\(^5\) A certain “Monsieur Siassi,” a doctor of the Letters Faculty in Paris, was elected to the university council. Clarc felt that this was a positive move for France; “due to the contacts and authority that he holds, Siassi can use his influence to counterbalance the Americophile tendencies of the Minister of Education, Monsieur Sadig. His presence at the university Council could provide us with great services [sic.].”\(^6\)

For the French, the establishment of Tehran University was a new and highly effective sphere to exercise cultural, intellectual, and, above all, political influence. Their close relationship with Hekmat, both as minister of public instructions and president of the university, eventually secured the French control over the schools of Literature, Law, and Sciences. Hekmat’s “intention is,” wrote Clarc, “to call upon the Germans for the Faculty of Medicine and the Technical Schools...but we cannot abandon – without a fight – the Technical Schools and especially the Faculty of Medicine to the candidacy of the Germans.” He reassured his superiors in Paris that he would discuss the issue with Hekmat and other cabinet members, because this “duality of culture” will certainly bring “inconveniences to young Iranians.” For, according to Clarc, “it is in France that Persians will look for an intermediary between their old civilization

\(^3\) Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie-Oceanie January 1918-December 1929, Perse 129, E387-1, 141-142; February 8, 1935, Tehran.

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and the recent conquest of modern techniques." As in archeology, the French wanted to maintain hegemony over the Iranian educational system. The university, along with the national museums and the public library, was a cultural tool the control of which would guarantee the French Republic a success in its colonial goals. These institutions enabled both national and international exercise of political power.

In the following decades, Tehran University was perceived by the central government, the Western representatives, and the local population as a site of intense political struggle. Its design mirrored this political significance. The vast campus represented an outstanding architectural expression of both modernity and progress for not only were the individual departments designed in the explicitly modernistic vocabulary and on a rigorously regular master plan, but also the 200,000 square meters plot, cheaply bought or simply confiscated by the state, was conspicuously located at the heart of the capital city. Articles entitled "Historic Day of 15 Bahman 1313" and "The 15 Bahaman Celebrations at Tehran University" along with the photos of the campus appeared each year on the front-page of the daily newspaper as a major event in the nation's modern history. The university's historic, secular, and scientific emphasis enabled the staging of activities that would have made little sense until that time, while its modernistic and monumental architecture served as the backdrop and the object of national pride. The design reflected the aspirations of the reformist elite with its minimalist style, exact master plan, rapid construction, and sheer size; it further symbolized an institution of higher education which was controlled by the central government, secular and scientific in its pedagogic foundation, a priori conceived for both sexes, and allied with Western educational standards and methods. For these same reasons, including its central location and open spaces, the campus would later become the most important site of intellectual and political resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy: in February 1949 there would be an assassination attempt on Mohammad Reza Shah during a visit to the campus, the communist Tudeh party and other opposition groups would draw their members from its student body, and both the 1963 social riots and the 1977-1979 revolutionary struggles would begin at its gates.

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44 Ettela'at 3041-3045 (Bahman 14-18, 1315/February 3-7, 1937): 1; Ettela'at 3049 (Bahman 22, 1315/February 11, 1937): 1; Ettela'at 3053 (Bahman 26, 1315/February 15, 1937): 1.
45 See Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 249-250 and 331-334.
While the unearthing of Karim Khan’s corpse at the early stage of the Pahlavi reign marked an important moment in the history of modern Iran and the subsequent development of the Aryan ideology both in practice and later official historiography, the inauguration of Tehran University’s Anatomic Department transformed the subsequent mimicking of the event – i.e. digging up bones – into a scientific process that could be repeated over and over again. Thereafter, renovation and relocating bones and skulls came to be understood synonymously. All the renovation projects that followed the royal palace also implied diggings of bones and their scientific possessing at Tehran University. Each successive project taken up by the SNH included the almost ceremonial process of unearthing remains of those men regarded as both historic and great in official narratives. By 1934, the bones of Ferdawsi were allegedly dug out, examined, and documented; they were buried and reburied twice, the last time in 1968. Similarly, the bones and skulls of Ibn Sina, Nader Shah Afshar, and Omar Khayyam were exhumed, stored, reburied, and their images displayed in the 1950s and 1960s; chapters 5 and 6 will elucidate these events. While these and other such bones were the proof of Iran’s Aryan genesis, their underpinning processes of exhumation, documentation, examination, and display were indicative of the modernity of the nation. The establishment and growth of the university’s Anatomic Department was, therefore, a vital instrument of the modernist’s project to which Reza Shah supported through royal inspections and court patronage. The practice of revitalizing bygone cultures, icons, and histories required pseudo-scientific affirmations that gave legitimacy to the reconstruction of the SNH’s monuments. Men and edifices were revived through science. These establishments institutionalized and confirmed the claims of the state; they gave a firm beginning to the project of modernity.
• **Civil(ized) Pilgrimage**

The SNH’s success in first erecting and then impressively popularizing the modern mausoleums of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, Nader Shah, Sa’di, and Omar Khayyam between 1934 and 1979, hinged primarily on the Pahlavi state’s effective cultural secularization and economic industrialization policies of the 1920s and 1930s. Conversely, the state’s ability to create a modern middle class owned much of its success to the methodical cultural activities of the SNH. While, the intelligentsia of the early 20th century had been “a small stratum” of diverse backgrounds and convictions, “[d]uring Reza Shah’s reign...the same intelligentsia grew to total nearly 7 percent of the country’s labor force, and developed into significant modern middle class whose members not only held common attitudes toward social, economic, and political modernization, but also shared similar educational, occupational, and economic background.”

What would later become this middle class was deeply effected by the secular reforms that were, in turn, paralleled by the SNH’s long-term, and equally secular, cultural program aimed at replacing existing socio-cultural spaces and narratives, historically dominated by the Shi’a ulama. In effect, the SNH was to provide a comprehensive and coherent set of cultural, and inherently national, codes of behavior that would have the potency to outdo the rituals of Islam. Arguably, without such a substitute of social narrative, the Pahlavi dynasty could not have maintained power for long; much less legitimize itself as the country’s rightful monarchy.

Therefore, one of the political agendas of the Society in mounting a discourse on Iran’s cultural heritage included the containment and eventual replacement of Shi’a religious spaces, signs, and rituals with more secular and national public sites, symbols, and conduct.

The most radical reforms carried out by the Pahlavi state consisted of the 1925 Law of Rectification of the Official Calendar, which replaced the Islamic lunar with the Islamic solar calendar; during the same year, the establishment of the first Iranian bank and the replacement of titles by family names freed the state from foreign financial dependency and simplified its domestic bureaucratization; the shah’s justice minister, Ali Akbar Davar’s Civil Code of 1928 abrogated all foreign capitulation rights and, more radically, terminated the shar (shari’a) or the religious courts replacing them with the civic courts, which ended clergies’ legal function in the society; in 1931, the state-wide secular educational system further undermined the power of the

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46 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 145-146.
ulama and contributed to the unification of different ethno-linguistic provinces, the 1928 Uniformity of Dress Code was revised in 1936 to make the Western clothing and the Pahlavi cap compulsory for men and outlawed the wearing of the veil for women, it also was intended to eliminate the diversity of tribal and regional wears and, hence, initiate cultural homogenization. Far more important to this study, "[i]n a bold move in 1934, the Shah issued a decree secularizing the vagf property, thereby depriving the clergy of its wealth and power." This decree was translated into the Endowment Law of November 25, 1934, which gave legal right to the state to confiscate ulama property and transfer all public endowments under the direct administration of the Ministry of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts (Public Instructions) “irrespective of the status of their administration.” By 1939, most religious lands and foundations, including income generated by these establishments, had been appropriated by the Pahlavi state, leaving the clerics deprived of their most lucrative source of revenue. This also meant the beginning of “a period of intervention, subsidization and direct control over an increasing number of religious schools that persisted to the end of the reign of Muhammad Riza Pahlavi.” Largely civil code and secular laws had replaced Islamic sharia.

The implementation of these reforms saw the opposition and marginalization of the ulama composed of the learned men of the religious laws of Islam who had historically been central to the organization of the Iranian society and state, especially after 1501 when Shah Ismail Safavid proclaimed the Twelver Imami Shi’ism as Persia’s official religion. In the 1920s, the clerics were seen as a major obstacle to the state’s modernizing program not only because they represented a powerful interest group to overcome — alongside the conservative landed aristocracy, the tribes, and the traditionalist merchants — but also more importantly, the ulama had historically been the unmatched arbitrator between political and religious ideologies,

47 The educational reforms increased state school attendance by twelve fold. “The educational reforms were the most impressive of the civilian reforms. Between 1925 and 1941, the annual allocations for education increased in real terms by as much as twelve fold. In 1925, there had been no more than 55,960 children enrolled in 648 modern primary schools administered by state officials, private boards, religious communities, or foreign missionaries. By 1941, there were more than 287,245 children in 2,336 modern primary schools, almost all administered by the Ministry of Education.” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 144.
48 R. Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran (Leiden, 1970), 104.
49 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 56.
50 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 56.
51 Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran, 104.
52 See Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 11-12. “The word, ulama (sing. alim) means the learned men of the religious law of Islam. It is a term that refers to those who ‘know,’ since the root word from which it is derived
the effective upholders of mainstream narratives. In fact, under various Qajar kings, the ulama had held such a prominent position in the power structure that Reza Khan, during his premiership, could but “pursued a policy of alliance with the ulama which bore fruit for his own career.”

53 While, with overwhelming clerical support a constitutional monarchy had been granted by Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1906, the ulama had opposed Reza Khan’s proposal, as Iran’s prime minister, in April 1924 to go further and make Iran a republic. 54 The clerics had mobilized the masses against the prime minister and had brought upon him his first political defeat. Six months later, Reza Khan had made a tactical turnaround and had gone as far as Iraq to demonstrate his devotion to Imami Shi’ism and the ulama, exactly as had done Naser al-Din Shah Qajar in 1871. 55 After defeating the British backed Arab Bani Ka’ab tribal chief, Shaykh Khazal, in Khuzeistan and in a highly symbolic act of colonial defiance and Shi’a conformity, Reza Khan had made a publicized pilgrimage to the British mandated cities of Najaf and Karbala. Here, as a gesture of mutual respect, he had been presented with a portrait of Imam Ali by the local Shi’a leaders. 56 As had been the case for Naser al-Din, “the symbolism of such…gestures could hardly escape those who witnessed or read about them…” 57 While Reza Khan had abandoned his “republican goals” and had shown himself a committed Shi’a, his political defeat brought upon him by the ulama was to have a “profound effect on his later decisions to curb the power of the clergy.” 58 Much influenced by the reformists surrounding him, he would similarly blame Iran’s “backwardness” on the ulama.

means knowledge.” Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 6. Also, see S. A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago, 1984).

53 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 28.

54 “Whereas the ulema constituted forty percent of the deputies in the Sixth Majlis (1926-1928), and around thirty percent in the Seventh (1930-1932), the Eleventh Majlis which met in 1937 did not include even a single well-known and important figure from the ulama.” Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 263.

55 Reza Shah “had attempted to win and consolidate political power in the early twenties by developing links with the ulama; and further, that after his coronation, he virtually abandoned his relations with them and embarked on a series of measures intending to secularize the society. Critically, the ulama were systematically harassed or removed from their previous positions in the social structures; and the access they once had to the imperial court was cut off, so that they were denied their earlier ability to include the Shah’s practice of juggling the various social forces against one another in the quest to maintain his authority and rule.” Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, xv.

56 “He made a pilgrimage to Najaf and Karbala and showed every sign of being personally devout. But he continued his struggle against clerical influence though less openly.” Cottam, R. Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1979), 147. Also see, Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 107-108, 111, and 120.


58 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 147; and Ghani, Iran and Reza Shah, 315 who goes on to specify that “[t]his was Reza Khan’s first defeat in the political arena and he had learned a bitter lesson. If the clergy united against an issue
By the time of Reza Khan ascendency to absolute power as Iran's Shahanshah, "[t]he regime sustained a day to day practice of harassment concerning efforts to conduct moralistic passion plays, public homilies, pilgrimage to shrines..."59 While clerics were prohibited from delivering public sermons, ordinary Muslims were refused travel permits to Karbala and Najaf; others were denied visas to Mecca and Median. The state, furthermore, prohibited the public "mourning for the death of contemporary maraji-yi taglid:” those religious leaders who were selected as the “source of emulation” and “the focus of allegiance of the general population as to matters of social conduct and interaction.”60 Processions and flagellations during the month of Moharam and the performance of passion plays, both commemorating the death of Imam Hosayn, son of Islam’s fourth caliph Ali, were also outlawed.61 The prohibitions were so severe that they cut the attention of foreign diplomats; in April 1935, J. Rives Childs, the American chargé d’affaires, reported:

This year the police order is understood to have gone forth that no mourning processions were to be allowed to parade in the streets as in pervious years. A few days before the advent of Ashura certain mullahs are known to have addressed telegrams directly to the shah appealing of the removal of the restrictions imposed on observance of the day. The mullahs who took action in Kermanshah and in Teheran are known to have been placed promptly under detention until after the day had passed. Likewise in Babol, where the most serious disturbances are understood to have occurred, it appears that an application was made by the mullahs to the authorities for the holding of public processions.62

But far more significant than the ban on these yearly Shi’a rituals was the control of the actual spaces where the ulama lived and assembled, amassed its fiscal income, congregated the masses, developed theological learning, delivered sermons, educated both the civilian and religious ranks, enacted and reinforced its century-long rituals on a daily basis, alternately invented seemingly centuries-old traditions, and represented itself as a long-standing and dignified institution. In short, the spaces from which the ulama exercised actual power: the mosques,

which they felt was inimical to their interest they could carry the masses with them and their power could be overwhelming.”

59 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 38.
60 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 10 and 59. Also, see “Other acts curtailed public religious expression, particularly such traditional observations as pilgrimages to the shrines at Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, the religious drama (ta’aziyeh) and processions associated with the month of Muharram.” Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran, 104.
61 The passion play depicts the story of Imam Hosayn, who was chased and murdered by the Umayyads who, in turn, claimed the succession of the caliphate. The public processions on the day of Ashura consist of men marching in the streets and flagellating themselves, mourning the death of the Imam. Reza Shah disregarded "outward public demonstrations on the ancient Day of Sacrifice and flagellation processions in the holy month of Muharram; and restricted the performance of passion plays mourning the martyrdom of Imam Hossein.” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 141.
shrine, and madrasas. The 1934 Endowment Law did not only guarantee the wholesale state takeover of these properties, but also their transformation into historical, secular, and national monuments.

The practical conversion of these ulama spaces into state-controlled and state-managed tourist destinations increasingly became a priority for the government as the ulama began to resist its secular reforms. The validity and permanence of such a task would be determined by the SNH’s ability to conceptually mutate these functioning buildings into historicized and aestheticized art objects, safely relegated under the rubric of “historical monuments.” It would both contribute to the income from the potentially lucrative and rapidly developing tourist industry and enable the state to destroy that which the SNH chose to leave out from such a category and would. As early as April 1925, the idea of opening mosques to non-Muslims was brought to Reza Khan’s attention by American art historian Arthur Upham Pope during his famous public lecture in that year, as examined in chapter 1. Earlier, Pope had confessed to a friend, standing on the roof of Louvre, that he planned to photograph “Persian” architecture, “including especially the occupied mosques, rigidly closed to all unbelievers...”63 While encouraged by Western scholars, for the local elite the project entailed the effective protection of those edifices enlisted as “heritage” from local vandals and Western solicitors, such as Pope himself, as much as a state encroachment on ulama space. In reinforcing the idea that the clerics had become a decadent and the ulama an outdated institution, the shah “had often insisted that the intellectuals of the age could no longer be, as had been the case in Iranian history, the ulama,” because “their art and their craft was incapable of answering the difficult social and economic issues of the times.”64 The state, therefore, argued that the clerics would no longer be in need of the structures that historically housed their activities.

Since the Safavids, most rulers of Iran had conformed to the institution of bast according to which large mosques and shrines as well as the houses of mujtaheds were considered divinely safeguarded and, hence, outside royal jurisdiction. Known as haram or sanctuary, these spaces

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64 Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Iran*, 58.
had harbored fallen statesmen, religious leaders, and dangerous criminals alike.\(^{65}\) This was particularly true with the increase of Western political powers in Iran and, at the same time, the secularization of the urban space. Progressively mosques had become safeguards against both the local and foreign authorities. However, under the Pahlavis, with the Endowment Law and integral to the heritage project, the mosques and shrine including their *harams* were declared as “historical heritage” or “historical monuments” and brought under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Instructions. The most majestic of Iranian mosques, Isfahan’s Safavid Masjed-e Shah or Royal Mosque, sponsored by Shah Abbas the Great, was the first to be opened to non-Muslims, predominately American and European Christians, and Pope was one of the first Western scholars to photograph its interior quarters.\(^{66}\) With this, the *ulama* lost its last stronghold of against the king and his secularist elite; their loss of control over mosques and shrines were interpreted as a direct threat – physical, political, and, above all, moral – to the sanctity of Islam and the *ulama*’s very capability to lead the faithful.

While on the academic front, the SNH proceeded in documenting, indexing, and labeling working mosques and shrines as “historical monuments,” on the ground, Reza Shah personally demonstrate his determination to turn these *ulama*-controlled spaces into national, therefore state-run, properties. At least on two occasions, the shah’s army clashed with the clerics and their followers in two most important Shi’a *harams*. Both incidents were manifestations of the *ulama*’s resistance to the secularization policies of the regime and the state’s resolve to secularize Iranian society. When in 1925, a certain Ayatollah Bafqi accused the mother of the crown prince for letting her veil fall in the courtyard of Fatemeh Ma’sumeh Shrine, the shah entered Qom with two armored cars and walked into the mosque sanctuary without taking off his boots.\(^{67}\) Bafqi was carried away – along with two other criminals who had declared *bast* – and later died of “mysterious causes.” The facts that the king never took off his shoes and did not respect the historic sanctity of both the mosque and its *haram* was indicative of his commitment to the nationalization of most *ulama* property.

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\(^{65}\) For further discussion on the reform policies of *bast* under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar and his reformist minister Amir Kabir, see Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 150 and 237.

\(^{66}\) See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 141.

\(^{67}\) Fatemeh Ma’sumeh was the sister of the eight Shi’a Imam. There are several accounts of the incident. The dates vary from 1925 to 1928; the “man with the boots” alters from Court Minister Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash to Reza Shah himself. See Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Iran*, 42, and Avery, *Modern Iran*, 288.
The shah’s second confrontation with the *ulama* within a major shrine took place on July 12, 1935. Objection to the new dress code that forced men to wear the Western style hat, clerics organized a demonstration in the courtyard of Mashhad’s Imam Reza Shrine. 68 For two days, the one thousand or so protestors held their positions, while the shah dispatched a troop of two thousand men to Mashhad. On the eve of July 14, they opened fire on the crowd; “[m]achine guns mounted on the roofs overlooking the courts opened fire, and between four hundred and five hundred people were killed.” 69 Many were arrested, including the shrine’s caretaker, Vali Mohammad Asadi, and others, mostly leading religious figures, were expelled from Khorasan. Ten days later, during an audience with his deputies, Reza Shah pointed out, “A shrine should be reserved for a place of worship, and not for the purpose of sedition.” 70 On the incident, American Attaché Hornibrook reported, “it was intimated very clearly by His Majesty that in view of the seditious conduct of many of those who took refuge in the Shrine, any action, including that of demolishing the edifice, would have been quite justified under the circumstance.” 71

Nonetheless, as late as 1937, despite reassurances from the shah’s government, the Western representatives in Iran were very cautious in permitting their citizens to enter holy complexes like Mashhad’s Imam Reza, Qom’s Fatemeh Ma’sumeh, or Shiraz’s Shah Cheraq. The British considered that “thought the Iranian authorities continue to encourage visits, always under escort, by Christians to the Shrine, it remains British policy that non-Moslem British subjects should not seek nor avail themselves of facilities for visiting it.” 72 In the same year, when a group of Australian, American, and British students were touring Iran, Tehran’s British Legation dissuaded the party to enter Imam Reza Shrine event if Mashhad’s governor had assured that “a visit was perfectly simple.” 73 Well into Mohammad Reza Shah’s ruling period, the *ulama* continued to perceive and resist the state’s policies towards mosques and shrines as a direct denigration of Islam and a unequivocal undermining of clerical political power in Iran.

70 The meeting of Reza Shah with his deputies took place on July 24, 1935; quoted in Majd, *Britain and Reza Shah*, 218.
71 Quoted in Majd, *Britain and Reza Shah*, 218.
The SNH contributed to the larger Pahlavi project in other ways. Its responsibly to nurture and disseminate the concept of “historical monuments” went hand in hand with the regime’s effort on infrastructural modernization and cultural homogenization. A network of asphalted roads and railway along with related facilities such as hotels, restaurants, train stations, bridges, and dams; the containment of the tribal supremacy over big chunks of the country, the Persianization of non-Persian speaking provinces, were to both feed into the heritage project and reinforce and guarantee its long-term effects. While the SNH would capitalize on the long standing tradition of Shi’a pilgrimage for the success of its mausoleums – Ferdawsiyeh, Hafeziyeh, Sa’diyeh, etc. – it would need modern forms of transportation and tourist facilities to attract its increasingly growing modern middle class as well as Western travelers to these sites. The state’s ability to provide easy, safe, and rapid access to these destinations, would not only lend a hand to the SNH’s heritage project, but would also encourage modern mode of public conducts by a substitution of Shi’a pilgrimage sites by secular ones. By simultaneously banning journeys to Iraq and Saudi Arabia and erecting modern mausoleums of Iran’s historic figures, the Pahlavi state intended to encourage its citizens to make their pilgrimages to secularized and nationalized sites within Iran’s modern boarders, hence, to raise a collective feeling of national belonging. Shi’a religious pilgrimage was intended to mutate into national pilgrimage, eventually taking the form of modern tourism. Those historical figures who were either actually buried, as in the case of Hafez and Ibn Sina, or only allegedly buried, as in the case of Ferdawsi, in these modern mausoleums were represented to the people by the SNH not as Shi’a or Sunni Muslims, but as Iranian and Aryan personages. Nor were they characterized as belonging to any given tribe or locality; but instead to the Iranian nation as a whole and its authentically Persian linguistic and cultural milieu. Ultimately, the new tombs and via them the Pahlavi personification of these Muslim men, were designed to project a supra-tribal and supra-regional collective history and identity. As integral fragments of Iran’s national heritage and as popular destinations, these

74 The importance of Shi’a pilgrimage was furthermore subdued by the centralized secular educational system. The Laws of 1931 gave the Ministry of Education the opportunity to modify the curricula to de-emphasize the function of saints, Imams, and ‘sources of emulation.’ Historic figures such as Ali, Hosayn, Hasan, and the twelve Imams were to yield their religious and political significant to figures like Cyrus, Darius, Ferdawsi, Ibn Sina, and Nader Shah, often capturing the imagination of the younger generation. The modern Iranian map, both physically and psychologically, was overlapped by and shifted away from the Islamic map of the umma. An entire generation of Iranians waited for the ban on pilgrimage to be revoked in 1948, years after Reza Shah’s abdication, exile and elimination of most of his secularizing elite. “The regime was also pressured to lift Riza Shah’s proscription of the pilgrimage to Mecca, although strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia delayed this until 1948.” Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 61.
landmarks were to compel and promote the larger mission of Iran’s territorial integrity, cultural
unity, and political coherence.

The 1394-kilometer trans-Iranian railroad, also called *sar ta sar* – from one end to the
other end – contributed vitally to the SNH’s realization of its goals. Whereas in the mid-19th
century Naser al Din Shah Qajar had “viewed the railroad as a gateway to progress and a
powerful means of control over provincial governments and economy,” its realization had to wait
for the arrival of Reza Shah’s iron fist.75 Finished in 1938, the railroad was designed to stretch
from Gorgan and Bandar Shah in the west Caspian Sea, through Tehran, to Ahavaz and
Khoramshahr at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. It extended diagonally from the northeast to
the southwest of the country, fulfilling the Pahlavi state’s needs to control its provinces and,
simultaneously, circumventing the British desire to link British India with British mandated Iraq
as well as the Russian wish to have access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf.76 In addition
to the politics underpinning the railway project, its psychological function was to give a more
concrete, almost a spatial quality, to the modern concept of Iran in the form of a modern map.
For these “were not just maps,” as noted by Scott.77 “Rather, they were maps that, when
combined with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be
remade...society and the environment has been refashioned by state maps of legibility.” The
trans-Iranian railway would eventually make the cities of Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad – home
to Hafez, Sa’di, Pope-Ackerman, and Nader Shah – as well as the small town of Nishapur –
home to Omar Khayyam, Kamal al-Molk, and Shaykh Attar – easily accessible from major cities
of Iran. It would also bring modern architecture into the heart of some of the most remote towns
and villages of Iran.78 This, furthermore, would make civil pilgrimage either by Iranian or

75 Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 428.
76 In Persian *sar ta sar* literally means ‘from head to head.’ In this context, it means from one end to the other end.
Colonial ambitions of Britain, Russia, and Germany underpinned the construction and mapping of the railroad in
that part of Asia. The general plan of the railroad would have, no doubt, been much different if either the British or
the Soviets had a say. The British wanted an east-west route stretching from their mandated Iraq to their Indian
colony; the Soviets wanted a north-south conduit to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Neither really got what
they wanted. “Any north-south and east-west routes were to be avoided, the railway would also avoid the frontiers
of India, Iraq and Turkey. It was also decided to bypass every large city except the capital but traverse the areas
inhabited by the principal nomadic tribes, the control of which was most important to the Central Government.”
Ghani, *Iran and Reza Shah*, 398. By the end of the Pahlavi rule, the project was expanded eastward via Mashhad to
Singapore; northward via former Julfa to the Soviet Union, and westward into Turkey and Europe.
78 For the railway project and its architectural outcome, see D. N. Wilber, “Architecture VII. Pahlavi, Before World
War II,” in *Encyclopedia Iranica* 1, ed. E. Yarshater (London and New York), 350-351.
foreigners highly attractive; it would also provide a new conceptual map of modern Iran to its citizens.

Furthermore, Reza Shah's modern army and transportation networks had facilitated the permanent pacification of the tribes in their contestation for the control over the various regions of Iran. This had a direct bearing on the SNH's heritage project for the very documentation and, more importantly, preservation of different historic structures depended on the territorial integrity and security of the country. For instance, in attempts to document the Sassanian palaces of Kālēh-e Dokhtar and Kālēh-e Pīsā of Firuzabad military intervention was needed. As late as 1934, British traveler Robert Byron noted that permission to visit Firuzabad "is not generally granted owing to the lawlessness of the Kashgais;" further adding, "indeed [Ernest] Herzfeld and Aurel Stein seem to be the only people who had looked at the monuments there since [Jane and Marcel] Dieulafoy" in the 1880s.79 The cataloging and preservation of the nation's patrimony, the forced sedentarization of Qashqa'i, Bakhtiari, and Turkoman tribes, along with the extension of the railroad and motor-roads into the corners of Iran's territories were a part of the Pahlavi project of territorial, linguistic, and cultural homogenization. They were also essential to the successful evolution of the tourist industry in Iran. The SNH's modern mausoleums for Ferdawsi, Hafez, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyam along with many others were to directly contribute to this grand scheme. Each either enabled or validated the others. Moreover, these projects imposed a visible order on the Iranian environmental, social, historical, and ethical systems (Figs. 2.6). The secular pilgrimage sites were the architectural expression of the displacement not only of the ulama as a dominant institution, but more importantly of the Shi'a collective psyche. The modernization policies eventually started to produce a new and growing element in the Iranian society: "the social stratum of urban intelligentsia, professionals and bureaucrats – products of the modernizing policies and the needs of Riza Shah."80 In erecting the modern secular space, the state put to use two distinct, but interrelated apparatuses: an intense program of public instruction and the destruction of unwanted built environment.

79 R. Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London, 1937 and 1950), 140.
80 Akhavi, Religion and Politics Iran, xvii.
The ultimate goal of the SNH was a *mission civilisatrice*, "the purpose of which [was] to cultivate public fascination in Iranian scientific and industrial historical heritage and to attempt to protect the fine arts and handicraft, as well as to preserve their old style and method," as clearly articulated in the first article of the Society's 1922 by-laws.\(^8\) This seemingly simple undertaking would, in fact, have two profound and complex consequence for modern Iran's still unborn architectural profession: first, in the mid-1920s, the rapid and carefully selective destruction of various structures and urban fabrics, predominantly those sponsored by and erected under the Qajar dynasty; and second, beginning in the 1930s, the equally rapid and simulated revival of pre-Islamic forms, predominantly that of Achaemenid palatial architecture that were believed to have been long forgotten. These two urban and architectural trends that aimed at modernizing the country and legitimizing Reza Shah's rule, would define and shape much of the architectural culture of Pahlavi Iran. Both were the manifest expressions of contemporary social constructs such as progress and modernity, both were regarded as concrete outcomes of a reclaimed and recalled ancient memory, and both were meant to instruct the public about "progress along modern lines."\(^8\)\(^2\) Therefore, both are fundamental to the understanding of the Iranian physical and sociopolitical environment and its subsequent development.

The conscious and systematic revival of Achaemenid architecture was inherently linked to the revival of an allegedly forgotten collective memory.\(^8\)\(^3\) While editorials would insist, "We forget...all our past historical brilliancy... We forget the services that we have rendered to humanity," they would at the same time maintain that, today, "under the energetic actions of genius man, Iran has been revived." They would declare, "We have aborted all the problems of modern life."\(^8\)\(^4\) The various members of the SNH, too, believed that the spatial reconstruction of a "glorious past" would not only testify to the veracity of Iran's ancient splendor, but would also immediately produce an equally grand modern present. It was hoped that with such a revival, modern Iran would regain its ancient power status as a unified, a just, and a strong nation-state as were believed to have been the Achaemenid and Sassanian empires. While a detailed analysis of

\(^8\)\(^1\) See Appendix 1: First by-laws and regulations of the Society for National Heritage, 1922.
\(^8\)\(^2\) British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/E3909, Clive reporting on Court Minister Teymurtash, August 26, 1927, Tehran.
\(^8\)\(^3\) For architectural examples of the neo-Achaemenid buildings of the 1930s, also described as "Aryan Monumental," see Wilber, "Architecture VII. Pahlavi, Before World War II," 350-351.
the so-called neo-Achaemenid and neo-Sassanian styles of the 1930s is outside the scope of this study, the demolition techniques that proceeded that period were to persistently reoccur in each of the SNH’s mausoleums, therefore, germane to this work. In fact, the third article on the SNH’s by-laws addressed the Society’s anxiety with collective memory vis-à-vis the debates around historical monuments, their construction, preservation, and destruction. It underscored “the recording and classification of those works the preservation of which as national heritage is necessary.” The inherently selective and arbitrary process of preservation and restoration of some edifices would inexorably lead to destruction and elimination of others. In effect, the SNH’s self-imposed mission to handpick historical monuments as such, also gave it the license to do away with that which it chose not to select, as explained in the prologue.

Despite the finality of its by-laws and uncontested public discourse, however, there were fundamental opinion differences regarding the best path of progress among the secularist elite and within the Society itself. Some of its members, including former prime ministers and distinguished scholars, Hasan Pirnia and Mohammad Ali Forughi, as well as Zoroastrian Parliamentarian Keikhosraw Shahrokh had made a solid case for the revival of the nation’s pre-Islamic ethos in unifying and strengthening modern Iran. On the one hand, Forughi had described, in his writings, the Achaemenid Empire as the largest government in the world, and the Sassanian rule as “the best times in the history of our country,” and had tirelessly endeavored to reveal the modern import of their centralized governments, cultural achievements, and political power. Inspired by Pirnia and Forughi, younger SNH members like Said Nafisi would later evoke “the memory of our military deeds and our humanitarian and civilizing principles,” and would maintain, “Today we want to remind the civilized world that which we have been… Iran, once more, following its ancestral affinity is revived and remains always this nation who has proven the great faculty of assimilation with the certainty of catching-up with the lost years. Nothing can prevent a nation to arrive at its goals, and those goals will be waiting for us.” Subsequently, generations of upper and upper-middle class Iranians would intimately relate to their pre-Islamic cultural heritage.

85 See Appendix 1.
86 See the prologue in this study and D. Gamboni, The Destruction of Art (New Haven, 1997), 329-330.
87 Zoka al-Molk Forughi, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Iran (Tehran, 1343/1924), 2-3; quoted in Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 201.
On the other hand, a veteran in the struggle for a constitutional monarchy, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, who described himself as “the oldest among compatriots having something to do with the pen,” had long maintained that Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage was in no way a match to Western civilization, therefore Iranian culture had to be abandoned and the Western adopted in toto. He had insisted, “Iran must become Europeanized, in appearance and in essence, physically and spiritually.” As early as January 1920, in his newspaper, *Kaveh*, he had written, “the essential purpose [of this journal’s] program aims at, above all, to defuse and propagate the European civilization in Persia, to struggle against fanaticism… and to defend our language and literature…” further adding, “all Persian patriots must consecrate their efforts to realize… the adoption and propagation of the European civilization without any reservation or condition.” A year later, he had contended that “the only way Iran could leave behind the ‘Dark Middle Ages’ was to follow the Western experience of separating religion from politics and introducing scientific rational knowledge into public education.” This line of argument would increasingly fade away and eventually end with the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the 1953 coup d’état orchestrated by the CIA. Taqizadeh himself would later reconsider his earlier views about the merits of adopting “the European civilization” in toto and would “confess” that his statements in the *Kaveh* were “excessive.”

The younger members of the government cabinet and the SNH, however, believed that Iran’s economic modernization and infrastructural industrialization would rather constitute the necessary program for progress; only then would the masses be able to appreciate Iran’s ancient legacy together with its modern international status. During 1923, in his founded newspaper, *Mard-e Azad* (Free Man) – modeled after French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau’s

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90 Quoted in A. Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century* (Austin, 1998), 41. “[I]n Germany, Taqizadeh and a group of Iranian students published an influential periodical entitled *Kaveh*. [It] printed articles on al-Afghani, on the history of the constitutional movement in Iran, and on the development of socialism in Europe, including the growth of Marxism and the Second International. But its principle focus was on the need for national independence and internal reforms, especially secular and educational reforms.” Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 111-112.

91 Djamalzadeh, “Taqizadeh, tel que je l’ai connu,” 5.


93 “I must confess that my categorical and revolutionary opinions of some forty years ago in the *Kaveh* were excessive; since experience has shown that changes introduced in the national traditions, by repressive means, sometimes provoke furious consequences.” *Ettela’at havai* (December 10, 1960).
L’Homme Libre – Justice Minister Ali Akbar Davar had argued for a semi-welfare state through economic and infrastructural growth. In an editorial, he had written, “We have 6,000 years of history but that will not translate into factories, railroads, hospitals or schools.” In his view, progress would come only “when we have at least 5,000 kilometers of railway, 50 factories, 50 roads linking east and west, dams on the Karun River...” Since Davar’s passionately argued ideas had a direct impact on both Court Minister Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash and Finance Minister Firuz Mirza Firuz, in a letter to the Taqizadeh, Teymurtash had likewise pushed for “a capitalist economic policy for the time being” that would later evolve into Davar’s semi-welfare state. However, one thing everyone seemed to unanimously agree on: the Qajar kings, with the support of the ulama, had driven Iran into “the Dark Middle Ages” by “exploiting public ignorance, fear, backwardness, and superstitions.” They were particularly responsible, according to the SNH, for the “plunder” of Iran’s cultural heritage with their “ignorance,” “indifference,” and lack of “taste.” With the promise of a “New Iran,” a great deal of urban and architectural destruction was in the making.

In the capital city of Tehran, the state intended to modernize the urban fabric as rapidly and forcefully as it envisioned the advent of “process” and “civilization.” The first symbol of modernism was the destruction of Tehran’s 18th-century fortifications. Under its mayor, Karim Aqa Khan Buzarjomehri, the ramparts and eleven gates of Qajar Tehran were gradually dismantled between 1932 and 1937. In an arbitrary process of elimination/preservation, they were excluded from the “historical monuments” list and all but one gate were destroyed without trace (Figs. 2.7). Seen neither as historical nor monumental, but rather as standing tributes to Qajar political power, the twelve gateways symbolized the locations where the old regime had

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96 H. Kazemzadeh, “Republicanism and the Social Revolution,” Iranshahr 2 (February 1924): 257-258; quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 133.
97 Pope, “The Past and Future of Persian Art,” 110; and Hungarian ethnographer Ali Hannibal in a lecture on June 9, 1927, see Chapter 1 in this study and SNH 131, Karnameh, 7-8.
98 The urban reforms under Reza Shah have often been compared to and associated with Haussmanian reforms in Paris. Since I have not found any primary sources during my research for this dissertation that prove that the shah’s reformists were in fact copying the French plans, I refrain from insisting that there was a direct link between Baron Haussman’s Paris and Reza Shah’s Tehran. However, there is no doubt about the fact that most of the political and intellectual elite of the period had visited Paris. For a concise and comprehensive description of the official urban policies and practices under Reza Shah, see Wilber, “Architecture VII. Pahlavi, Before World War II,” 350-351.
controlled the traffic of people and objects in and out of the city. These explicitly visible elements of Tehran’s public architecture, furthermore, often caused embarrassment in Iran’s secular elite, especially during visits by European diplomats and tourists, because they were seen by both parties as signs of “shameful symbols of backwardness.” Their demolition both enabled the physical expansion of the urban fabric and the eradication of the last vestige of the ancien régime from the capital. While these acts epitomized the shah’s determination to modernize Iran, even by force, the expansion of the city enabled the state to disperse the traditional bureaucratic network of the traditionalist merchants in their bazaar, the ulama in their mosques, and the old nobility in their residential quarters. All these three groups had clung to sections of Tehran’s urban fabric as important component of their political power; now they were forced to either relocate their power base or suffer significant lost of political influence brought about by the shah’s urban renewal. While the aristocracy began to move northward for better water, air, view, and urbanism, the clerics and merchants chose to remain in their place and over the years figure less and less in the country’s political apparatus; that is, until 1979.

At the heart of the city, predominantly consisting of the residential quarters and service areas of the Qajar royal complex, approximately two-thirds of royal Tehran was leveled to the ground. Some of the demolitions were replaced by new structures; others were left vacant most probably because of the lack of construction time and the need for wider streets and open spaces. As part of a controlling urbanism to decentralize dense urban centers and to bring Tehran to look like European major cities, “1.8 square kilometers – 9% of the whole city...” was transformed into open squares, including wide avenues, urban squares, and municipal parks. In new constructions, while, the new Ministry of Finance was erected on the site of the royal harem with great symbolism, the Nayeb al-Saltaneh palace gave way to the Justice Ministry; in a similar vein, the main barracks and royal stables were transformed into the Ministry of Trade. That which was preserved, namely the major structures of the Golestan Palace such as the Shams al-Emareh, were cleaned up by the destruction of the surrounding “secondary structure.” Perhaps the most impressive single demolition, both in terms of scale and symbolism, was that of

100 H. Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran (New York, 1981), 5 and 110-111; and Banani, Modernization of Iran, 144.
101 See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 75-80.
102 See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 76.
103 Marefat, “Building to Power,” 34.
104 See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 76.
the “magnificent” Takkieh Dowlat. Erected in 1868, it is described by historians as “the brainchild of Nasir al-Din himself” and as “one of the greatest edifices built under Qajar rule.”

The complete destruction of this state theater was, on the one hand, notable because the structure was a massive work of architecture. Seating some one thousand spectators around a circular stage and three-story balconies under a semi-permanent dome, it was a hybrid of local decorative program and European building typologies, for Naser al-Din had decreed its design after Charles Garnier’s Paris opera house began in 1857. On the other hand, it was highly symbolic because it was the most imposing structure raised in the capital city by the most influential Qajar monarch for the specific purpose of Shi’a passion plays (ta’zieh) – the very performance of which the Pahlavi state had perceived as regressive and, hence, had outlawed.

Ironically, Naser al-Din had erected Takkieh Dowlat as his marked contribution to Iran’s 19th-century modernization.

Whereas much of these demolitions took place from the mid- to late 1920s, the legal basis of this harsh urban renewal policy was the “Street Widening Act,” unanimously passed by the parliament on November 13, 1933. While Reza Shah’s opening speech of the ninth Majlis had demanded a “rapid industrialization,” which even the British knew that “the country could hardly stand,” the local deputies were pressed to approve “the Law concerning the creation and widening of avenues and streets.” The case presented to them under the rubric of preservation and modernization, instead would sanction an array of destructions with relative ease; the deputies too knew this well. When the Pahlavi state applied the same “protection” tactics to Tehran’s residential quarters, where ordinary people lived and where no major Qajar landmarks existed, the binary contingencies of construction/destruction for a rapid modernization became explicitly apparent. Charles Calmer Hart, the American attaché to Iran, reported in 1931:

“...the municipality, urged on by the Shah, is trying to modernize the capital of Persia so rapidly that property owners find it almost impossible to keep up with the progress which is wiping out...”

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105 See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 76.
107 On Shi’a passion plays, see Arjomand, *Shadow of God*, various sections.
liberal areas of their real estate, for most of which they receive limited or no compensation. Property owners, besides having to give up much real estate, have been compelled to see the demolition of their houses and to replace them at their own expense by better structures construed on designs prescribed by municipal planning commission.\footnote{US State Department Archives, Hart, dispatch 387, 891.5123/5, February 20, 1931, Tehran; quoted in Majd, \textit{Britain and Reza Shah}, 162.}

Nine years later, the American embassy estimated that the number of residential structures demolished by the state ranged from 15,000 to 30,000. In a memo, it remarked, “Tehran looks as if it has been destroyed by an earthquake,” further underscoring that “[t]he ruthlessness of its methods is bewildering to anyone not used to the ways of modern Iran.”\footnote{US State Department Archives, Engert, dispatch 1830, “Change in the City of Tehran,” 891.101/3, May 10, 1940, Tehran; quoted in Majd, \textit{Britain and Reza Shah}, 163-164.} Rosita Forbes, an American traveler to Iran in the early 1930s, similarly described Tehran as “slightly Hollywoodesque, for the new streets looked as if they had not quite settled where they were going, and the rows of new houses, one room deep, were all frontage.”\footnote{R. Forbes, \textit{Conflict: Angora to Afghanistan} (London, 1931), 105.}

Nor were Iranians uncritical of what was happening to their capital city. The most vocal anti-Pahlavi clergy in the parliament and a charismatic preacher from Isfahan, Seyyed Hasan Modarres, objecting to the shah’s urban renewal, stressed during his 1925 Majlis speech, “modernization had to be distinguished from such lawless acts against the people and their possessions.”\footnote{Katouzian, \textit{Political Economy of Modern Iran}, 120. For more details on Seyyed Hasan Modarres, see Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 111 and 120.} In 1932, even German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld, who had supported the reformists in their drive for modernization and had personally collaborated with the SNH in all its undertakings, confessed to Hart; “It is a system of ruining established authorities of old, without replacing them with anything at all. Everything we see [is] a methodic destruction... The result is a vacuum. One day the consequences will appear.”\footnote{US State Department Archives, Hart, dispatch 1393, 891.00/1562, March 25, 1932, Tehran; quoted in Majd, \textit{Britain and Reza Shah}, 155-156.}

Political historians would later describe these urban changes as “a good example of bureaucratic reformism and mindless vandalism,” where “[t]he vandals played havoc with community life and historic architecture at will.”\footnote{Katouzian, \textit{Political Economy of Modern Iran}, 110-111} Others would characterize the 1930s Tehran as “a massive unfinished tableau worked on by several artists,” and a mere “external Westernization” aimed at “impress[ing] foreign observers, who usually visited only Tehran.”\footnote{Banani, \textit{Modernization of Iran}, 144.} The state “ripped down sections of cities,” a
historian of Iranian nationalism would note, “ruthlessly destroyed mosques and other edifices mellow with the charm of age, and replaced them with broad, tree-lines but incongruous boulevards.”

However, it was certainly true that, as historians Banani and Lockhart put it, “the Tehran of 1941 bore no resemblance to the Tehran of 1921.” The northward urban growth accelerated by the elite’s urge for rapid development resulted in an entire new city: “well-panned” with “wide streets intersecting each other at right angles, some paved with cut granite, others with asphalt and concrete.” “In the construction of new streets, or the extension and widening of the old, the policy was to demolish any and all buildings – residential, monumental, historical or whatever – merely in order to keep them straight.” By design, the master plan, if there was any, was intended to project “a glaring contrast to the labyrinthal lanes of the old quarters” in southern Tehran where the merchants and the ulama continue to occupy their historical spaces.

In the north, the straight streets in addition to the new squares and parks “added to the European aspect of the capital,” as later observed. While in the early 1930s the American diplomats could hardly see the benefits of a hurried urban renewal, a decade later they praised the city’s “remarkable changes since His Majesty came to the throne.”

Streets have been widened and paved; trees have been planted to take the place of the old ones destroyed by the alterations; modern government buildings have been erected in various parts of the city, and a number of small parks in local squares are being landscaped. Previous efforts, however, are not to be compared with the present activity under the direction of the Acting Chief of the Tehran Municipality, Mr. Gholam Hossein Ebtehaj... Buildings on all main streets must be at least two stories high to add more dignity to the city.

Despite being accused of vandalism, Reza Shah persisted with his drive to transform Tehran into a modern capital until the end. As late as 1940, that is one year before his exile, while taking a stroll in Tehran, he took issue with the height of the buildings on designated streets. “Why do these ugly, one-story shops still remain?” he asked. “I have told the military to force the owners to add another story or have their shops destroyed. I wonder if you, a civilian, could succeed

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119 Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, 144.
120 Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 110-111
121 Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, 144.
where the army has failed?” He then gave the owners the two options of either adding a story to their original structure or face destruction. Reportedly, after the incident, Tehran’s mayor who was held responsible for such disappointment “plunged into the task” of mending the problem, “and within a few weeks sections of the avenues looked as if they had been bombed from the air.” Notwithstanding his harsh methods, on the eve of the king’s abdication, those Iranians who could remember the pre-Reza Shah Tehran, the changes, including the speed by which they had happened, “were nothing short of miraculous,” while for those who had had the opportunity to either study or work in cities like Paris, London, and Berlin, “the chasm between the material progress of the West and their own country was a source of frustration and defeatism.” This gulf between Iran and the West, often explicitly manifested in architecture and urbanisms, would continue to be a cause of shame and disappointment for the following generations of Iranian architects and politicians alike. Throughout the Pahlavi era, Iran’s measures of progress and modernity would often be observed and scrutinized in its architectural production.

In the following decades, each of the SNH’s architectural projects that would “preserve” and “modernize” the tombs of selected historical figures such as Hafez, Ibn Sina, Sa’di, Omar Khayyam, and Baba Taher, in the similar fashion as Tehran, would involve the traceless demolition of these men’s original graves. In this study, the destruction of these medieval artifacts prior to the erection of monumental tombs to replace them, must not only be analyzed under the light of the processes of rapid modernism with its binaries of construction/destruction, but also has to be considered vis-à-vis the outwardly constructive project of preserving “national heritage” and “historical monuments” that contains an equally destructive component. At least, in the case of a rapidly modernizing Pahlavi Iran, construction was conditioned by destruction, and vise versa. Erected under the conditions of rapid and superficial modernization, for instance, Ferdawsi’s 1934 mausoleum would go through thirty years of repair until it could stand on its own feet. Emerged from these two-faceted policies of architectural preservation, Hafez’s 1939 tomb-garden would take the place of the medieval Muslim cemetery of Musalla; through an aggressive architectural intervention, the new site would become one the most popular tourist spot in modern Iran. Despite the intentions of their designers to genuinely modernize the country

124 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 149.
125 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 195.
126 Banani, Modernization of Iran, 145.
and the society, the main function that these projects ended up fulfilling was to make a semblance to a lasting progress, modernity, and civilization (Figs. 2.8).

In the spirit of inclusion and exclusion, the Pahlavi project to purge non-Persian words from the official Persian language – that is, to eliminate certain words while introducing certain others as authentically Persian – had an architectural component. Through the SNH and its public landmarks, two Persian words were popularized into the everyday tongue: anjoman (society) and aramgah (resting-place). The word anjoman in the anjoman-e asar-e melli might have been borrowed from the Zoroastrian congregations organized in various urban or rural centers, possibly a Bombay influence on Tehran and Kerman, therefore had an Indo-European etymological origin. According to the Zoroastrian representative to the parliament and a prominent SNH affiliate, Keikhosraw Shahrokh, who had “recommended” to Reza Shah the use of “Zoroastrian names” for the months of the new solar calendar, anjoman was also used in reference to elected members of a Zoroastrian assembly. More relevant to the SNH’s architectural project was the word aramgah, which, if we are to believe his diary, it was also Shahrokh’s suggestion to the king. During the 1931 royal inspection of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, he had encouraged the switch from the Arabic word for tombs, maqbara, to the Persian word, aramgah; “It was at my suggestion,” later wrote Shahrokh, “that the construction was referred to as aramgah.” The word literally means a resting-place or tomb; aram defined as quiet, tranquility, or rest, and gah as place or location. Prior to its appropriation by the SNH for its monuments, aramgah was only used in the Zoroastrian context to refer to burial grounds. Furthermore, the semantics of the individual aramghahs erected by the SNH was borrowed from the Shi’a spaces of hosaynieh, rezaiyeh, zeynabiyeh wherein passion plays were performed and religious meeting took place. Soon Ferdawsi’s aramgah was known as Ferdawsiyeh, Hafez’s Hafeziyeh, Nader Shah’s Naderiyeh, and Sa’di’s Sa’diyeh. This semantic relationship only goes to reinforce my proposition that these modern mausoleums were, in effect, designed to function as secular sites of pilgrimage and were intended to replace the Shi’a shrines as religious destinations.

By 1979, the historical figures, whose modern tombs had been erected, stood as personification of Iran's racial, national, and cultural superiority; their modern mausoleums, the aesthetic expression of that superior ethos that had ensued systematic modernization (Fig. 2.9). The SNH's careful and long-term plan to instruct the public had in part been implemented in these new civic and public spaces. In March 1935, when Le Journal de Téhéran indorsed its first leader, entitled “The Progress of Public Instruction in Iran,” the historic figures came to link public instruction, taste, and culture:

Iranians aim at instructing themselves and it is for this reason that our country has produced gardens for poets like Ferdawsi, Sa'adi, Hafez, Khayyam; scientists like Razi and Avicenna; and great men of politics like Nezam al-Molk and Amir Kabir. Even our kings have been excellent poets. However, until these last years, [public] instruction was the leisure of the privileged few because there were no cultural organizations vast enough or numerous enough to enable the majority of Empire's inhabitants to learn how to read and write ... in the cultural domain, as in all other domains, it was destined that it would be the Shahanshah Pahlavi who will think of doing something and that something would be grandiose. In effect, it's after the coup of 1921 that public instruction has started to develop in our country.¹²⁹

The article went on to list, with statistical details, the names and locations of schools, universities, sport and public facilities initiated under Reza Shah's command. At the end, "the progress of [public] instruction in Iran is constant and is an evidence of a brilliant future for our nation, precisely as stated by the Annual [journal] of 1866: 'the original Aryans, like us Europeans, [Iran] owns all the aptitudes of civilization'."¹³⁰ Iran's modern public architecture was to successfully link race, culture and history to political power and national status. It was also to be a key instrument of public instruction. Accordingly, while the budget on public works under the Qajar dynasty amounted to nothing, the budget of Pahlavi Ministry of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts (public instructions) increased six fold between 1925 and 1935.¹³¹ Unlike the former that depended on the Islamic charitable endowments, the latter brought these institutions under its control. Progress was to be achieved through relentless practices of public instruction in "gardens for poets," universities, libraries, and museums - projects that the SNH embraced wholeheartedly.¹³²

¹³¹ Archives of Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Asie-Oceanie January 1918-December 1929, Perse 129, E387-1, 163; August 20, 1935, Tehran. Also, see Arjomand, Turban for Crown, 26-27. For the use of the name 'Public Instructions Ministry,' see footnote 9 in chapter 1 of this study.
¹³² The material order of the body-in-space reflected a moral order of the mind-in-memory. Spaces that acculturated the nation were projections of its "brilliant future." In the museums and monuments, the order that was represented
The SNH's course of cultural revivalism and public instruction inevitably incorporated the modernizing institutions at the center: the establishment of a museum and a library in Tehran; the first two aims of the Society, as stipulated in article eight of its by-laws. Museums and libraries cataloged and categorized the nation, framed it, mapped it, and in the end made it legible. The fourth point of that same article stated it bluntly: "the tabulation of priceless collections, related to the library or the museum..." One year before the revolution that ended the Pahlavi dynasty, the symbolism of these monuments vis-à-vis the nation was so strong that Pahlavi historiography could maintain with relative ease:

Under Reza Shah the once paltry tomb of Sa’di (Sa’diyasse) near Shiraz was replaced by a somewhat modernistic mausoleum situated in a superb garden. Also modernistic and inspired by European architecture was the peculiar tomb- or tower-like edifice in memory of the philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sina) at Hamadan. Last but not least, Ferdowsi, master of the Iranian national epic, was honored with a grandiose monument at Tus near Mashhad, with a huge stone pedestal covered with verses from the Shahnameh. This monument was inaugurated by the old Shah on the occasion of the millenary of Ferdowsi internally celebrated in 1934.

The SNH's project in its totality as conceived by the intellectual elite of the 1930s was a cultural regime of modernity. Artistic domination, exclusivity, and violence were a priori written into its modernizing schemes; acts of architectural destruction integral to its models of construction. It was the seemingly passive, but highly and enduringly consequential, politically engine behind the selected aesthetic imagery of the Pahlavi state. It dictated taste, built modern institutions, made a solid cultural discourse, and sought to acculturate the masses. In architecture, it revived forms by destruction, reinvented rituals by construction, and fixed a lasting social meaning to this novel public domain. In order to achieve all this with relative success, the Society depended on older practices, selectively eliminating that which was of no use in order to create a new set of social reality and public conduct. The first architectural effort of the Society was to embrace a long modernistic process; it was to discover, document, destroy, (re)invent, erect, celebrate, and ritualize that which finally became the most prominent historic figure in modern Iran: Ferdowsi.

Court Minister Teymurtash's simple remark that "Everything had to be started over again," was a remarkable indication of the elite's need to compulsively erase the present to shape

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133 See Appendix 1.
134 See Appendix 1.
135 G. Lenczowski, ed. Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, 1978), 328.
Iran’s future. It was also suggestive of a specific perception of time, of its finality, and of a new and entirely rebuilt beginning. The project of cultural revival, therefore, was not just a small fragment of the larger and totalizing project of nation building; it was the project itself. What is more, the very act of belonging to the SNH was in itself a confirmation of perceiving time and aesthetics in that specifically modern way; of grasping and representing ideas of progress and modernity; or of wanting to revive the national spirit (zawq) through its architecture. To belong to the Society was already a sign of cultural distinctiveness and excellence – a difference in taste. Then it is no wonder that almost all of Reza Shah’s government cabinet, all of these “men of taste” as coined by Arthur Pope, were part of the SNH. In effect, men who made up the SNH were those who made modern Iran. They had not only taken upon themselves the impressive, and perhaps impossible, mission to homogenize and acculturate the vast and diverse population of Iran, but had also conceived an enduring institution that stood for high culture and good taste. The SNH’s sociopolitical impact and the ideological influence of its first members would resonate well into the 1980s where the project of taste and culture would be co-opted and its parameters redefined by the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even they would manage to merely react to the paradigm of taste and culture established by the early SNH.

Figures 2.1
Karim Khan Zand’s bones being dug out in the Golestan Palace, Tehran c. 1926. Reza Shah in the forefront, Teymurtash holding Zand’s sword, and military architect-engineer Sharif Zadeh holding Karin Khan’s bones on a silver plate.

Figure 2.2 Said Nafisi, professor of Persian Language and Literature at Tehran University, 1950s-1970s. Source: Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 245.

Figure 2.3 Reza Shah’s inspection of Tehran University’s Medical School, c. 1935. Source: M. R. Pahlavi, Reza Shah-e Kabir (Tehran, 1940), 27.
Figure 2.4 Persepolis plaques marking its foundation, Iran Bastan Museum, Tehran. Source: Ullens Archives.

Figures 2.5 Iranian military group posing for a photo copied from Rembrandt’s *The Anatomy Lesson of Doctor Nicolaes Tulp*, 1632, Mauritshuis, The Hague.

Figures 2.6 Urban cleansing of historic fabric, Tehran, 1930s and 1950s.

Figures 2.7 Tehran’s Qajar gates before and in the process of demolition, Tehran 1930s.
Figures 2.8 Collage of destruction of Tehran and Reza Shah’s drive for modernization.
Source: *Reza Shah-e Kabir*, chapter 8 images.
Figure 2.9 Collection of the SNH’s monuments represented as symbols of progress and modernity.  
III. Modernity Invented: 
Ferdawsiyeh

"Given the limitation of Oriental taste when confronted with Western idea, the design [of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum] is admirable.”

Robert Byron
The Road to Oxiana, 1937

“He has sung the glories of the past, has made us aware of ourselves, extended our consciousness, and in reviving the past has created confidence in the future. Ferdawsi is the best prototype of a good Iranian. He has all the admirable qualities of a great man.”

Iranian Minister of Public Instructions, Isa Sadiq
December 2, 1945

By the early 1930s, Reza Shah’s modernization project was at its zenith. Politically speaking, the secular state had gained complete and uncontested power over modern Iran’s territories and population; thereafter, much of Iran’s political culture would be shaped by the cultivation of an equally powerful image of political hegemony. In the cultural context, in 1925 selected historic edifices had been indexed as “national heritage” (asar-e melli), while 1927 had been marked by the unprecedented capitulation of the French rights over all Iranian archeological sites to the Iranian government. As explained in chapter 1, the importance of this archeological and architectural index was found in the Society of National Heritage’s simultaneous claim to exclusivity and comprehensiveness on cultural sites in Iran. The success of the 1927 convention, moreover, furnished the SNH with national reputation and international standing with which the imperial powers, as well as local authorities, had to reckon. Both tasks undertaken in their entirety by the various members of the Society, nevertheless, remained in the margins of mainstream Iranian historiography probably because these men were known to that history, first and foremost, as political figures.
However, 1934, the year of heavy secular reform, would prove to be otherwise, for in that year art and politics would be displayed to the entire world as one. While the archeological negotiations were long and convoluted on all sides, as elucidated in chapter 1, the convention proved to be the Society's first triumph. By then, too, the two official objectives of the SNH, stipulated in its 1922 bylaws, were honed into completion. By 1927 French diplomats noted, "The 'Commission for National Masterpieces'...has inaugurated the National Library and the Museum." In the interim, the Society was deeply engaged in what would soon be its next triumph, one far more spectacular. For this noteworthy event in 1934 would place marginalized culture at the heart of the political map of modern Iran. It would decisively alter and radically refigure its conceptual framework, leaving a permanent mark on the land of Iran. If the Archeological Convention were a triumph over the Colonial Other, this was a victory over History.

The most intriguing of all the monuments conceived by the SNH during its fifty-seven-year existence was, undoubtedly, the mausoleum erected to commemorate Ferdawsi, the author of the epic story of pre-Islamic kings of Iran, the *Shahnameh* or the Book of Kings. "The poet who did most to give the heroic tradition literary status among Muslims was Abulqasim Firdawsi (c. 920-1020), who lived...under the Samanids and, at the end, under Mahmud of Ghaznah, to whom he dedicated the final form of his epic [sic.]." According to Hodgson, the *Shahnameh* "is his one great work; it is an inordinately long epic poem covering several thousand years of myth, legend, and history, for the dawn of civilization in Iran to the Muslim conquest. It embodies - with close fidelity to the Pahlavi chronicles which Firdawsi used as sources - all the famous events (actual or legendary) the memory of which could give Iranians a sense of ethnic identity." Furthermore, "the Persians of the highlands identified with the ancient figures presented in Firdawsi's work," in Hodgson's view, "it became the almost canonical presentation of the old Iranian heritage among Persian-speakers and was subsequently respected as a model of the truly heroic wherever Persian became the language of culture." The erection of a modern mausoleum

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1 As explained in chapter 2, the 1934 implementation of modernization policies constitutes Reza Shah's most forceful reform period, mostly encouraged by his visit to Turkey and observation of Mustafa Kemal's aggressive westernization techniques. When he returned, the shah was particularly brutal in enforcing these socio-cultural changes; see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (New Jersey, 1982), 140-145.
to house Ferdawsi’s remains in 1934 was the first national project in a series to be built under the
custodianship of the SNH (Fig. 3.1). The efforts that went into designing and constructing the
structure entail an elaborate story. Contemporary figures such as Court Minister Abd al-Hosayn
Teymurtash, Zoroastrian Parliamentarian Keikhosrow Shahrokh, German archeologist Ernest
Herzfeld, Education Minister Isa Sadiq, French architect André Godard, and German-trained
Iranian architect Karim Taherzadeh Behzad were all caught up in a twelve-year construction
process, which would prove to be the mere beginning of forty years of restoration. When the
Pahlavi state decided to celebrate, with great fanfare, the poet’s millenary anniversary in 1934,
the discovery of the alleged original tomb of Ferdawsi gave rise to a new mausoleum in Tus,
which was inaugurated by Reza Shah in that October. First proposed by Herzfeld, the design was
instead commissioned to Taherzadeh who was, in turn, fired for malpractice. Re-proposed by
Godard, the final touches were made by Teymurtash. The design of the structure consisted of a
synthesis between the Parthian mausoleum types and Cyrus’s empty tomb, as reference to Iran’s
pre-Islamic architecture. Despite extensive cost and labor, however, the structure did not sustain
its integrity for long. The subsequent decades of fruitless restorations gave way to an imperial
decree in 1964, which set off a complete dismantlement of the monument to be re-inaugurated by
Mohammad Reza Shah and Farah Shahbanu in 1968.

The story of the Ferdawsi’s mausoleum occupies a rather large space in this study
because despite its modest look, this landmark was exceptional in both its architectural and
political substance. Structurally, it was simple, yet perpetually unstable; financially, far more
expensive than the state-budget would allow; iconographically, the subject of intense
controversy; bureaucratically, entwined by un-professionalism, indifference, and despotism;
politically, the object of blatant politics; and historically, while predictable, still the most
troublesome. Over its half century building process, not only did it consume the skills and
resources of an entire nation-state, it also turned out to be the longest, most problematic venture
undertaken by the SNH. As the sole public landmark personally unveiled by “the father of
modern Iran,” Reza Shah, it received the most lavish royal attention, while later managing to
induce political discomfort and social rage among some Iranian intellectuals and ideologues.
Furthermore, unlike the subsequent SNH projects, this monument’s inauguration was tied to a
major conference that extended to Soviet Moscow, Nazi Berlin, as well as Paris, London, and
New York. The paramount icon of revivalistic and modernistic ideologies, Ferdawsi’s monument
encapsulated the aspirations and visions of the early Pahlavi elite and, eventually, served as a blueprint for public landmarks and royal ceremonies in post-Rezaian period.

The discourse that the Pahlavi elite conjured up and nurtured to maturity through this structure was one of “bright future[s]” and “national spirit (zoq-e melli).” Its final form, construction process, invented rituals, and shifting meanings represent the complexities of a rapid modernization and an uneven development. It was the first significant public project to signaled the arrival of a modernity that would again and again fail its utopian promises. As Abrahamian argues, while the shah and subsequently his son pushed to modernize Iran on socioeconomic level – thus creating and expanding the modern middle class and its mores – they prevented, often deliberately, political development – thus incessantly widening the chasm between rulers and ruled; “in 1977,” Abrahamian concludes, “the gulf between the developing socioeconomic system and the underdeveloped political system was so wide that an economic crisis was able to bring done the whole regime.” This uneven development, I believe, can be best exposed in the stories behind Pahlavi propaganda architecture, for each attempt to convey the history of Iran’s modern architecture reveals profound doubts and inherent contradictions veiled under monumental façades that speak volumes about the complex processes of Iran’s modernity. Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, from its very conception in the early 1920s to its vandalism during and after the 1979 Revolution, endures in modern Iranian history as the ultimate pictogram of its uneven development and rapid modernization. This story began with a long history of Muslim and European travelers to the Ferdawsi’s burial-site mostly stirred by their own imagination of a place.

The Pahlavi elite, building upon their 19th-century ideologues, made a heavy use of Ferdawsi’s *Shahnameh* for a range of reasons. Unlike the late Qajar intelligentsia, however, the Pahlavi state gave a concrete place and figure to the pervious conceptual use of Ferdawsi and his opus. It built his mausoleum out of dust; it supplied him an allegorical body to inhabit; and, by the means of modern mass media and state education, it disseminated a reinvented image of his purportedly true persona. Although important in its own right, an adequate description of the nationalist exploitation of Ferdawsi and his work by either the late 19th century intelligentsia or

5 On “uneven development” in Iran and its revolutionary consequences, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 426-427.
6 “In short, the [1979] revolution took place neither because of overdevelopment nor because of underdevelopment but because of uneven development.” Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 427.
the Pahlavi state is outside the scope of this study. While several authors have argued that Ferdawsi became the national hero because of his reinvention by the Pahlavis, others have contended that the nationalistic message of the *Shahnameh* and the agendas of the Pahlavi regime were mere, nevertheless convenient, coincidences. As noted in the prologue, whereas this study does not deal with the specifics of how many Iranians read the *Shahnameh* either before or after Reza Shah, it addresses the vital role that the mausoleum and its imagery played in sustaining the discourse on the modern myth of Ferdawsi. This chapter will try to reveal that the design, construction, and exultation processes of the landmark had a direct bearing on the modern re-appropriation of the *Shahnameh* honed by the political elite. In the case of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, architecture-as-representation sustained all the theoretical and literary discussions pertaining to Ferdawsi. My analysis aims at describing how a seemingly ordinary edifice, underpinning an extraordinary tale, gave a solid shape to an abstract concept, which was 

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7 According to the Pahlavi official historiography, historically *Shahnameh* has been a symbol of Iranian nationalism. Some argue that Ferdawsi composed this work because of a Persian national revival in the 10th and 11th centuries as a protest to the Arabization of Iran. It is true that the work is composed makes use of very few non-Persian words. It is also true that it recounts the heroism of legendary and actual figures from Iran’s pre-Islamic history. Still, to claim that Ferdawsi had the same definitions for complex ideas such as land, nation, or identity, can be misleading. “Taking into consideration what has been said about Firdowsi’s religious commitment, his mastery of the Persian language, and his imposition of a unique epic style. It appears that his masterpiece has significance only in literary circles; but for the political implication of the Shahnama the explanation should be sought in twentieth-century consciousness. [The Shahnama] largely remained in the literary tradition and simply did not have an adequate basis for emphasizing nationality or nationalism in a modern sense. It is fair to say that, when nationalism and national identity became concerns in the twentieth century, the *Shahnama* certainly served as the traditional folk source of such modern notions.” Vaziri, M. *Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity* (New York, 1993), 125-126. It was thus not without political agenda that the Pahlavi regime financed, propagated, and encouraged the Ferdawsi revival on every level of social awareness. Only after the nationalist transformation, Ferdawsi’s work acquires the strictly national interpretation and overtone. Accordingly, his ambiguous medieval understanding of ‘Persian land’ was translated into and took meaning in the national boundaries of modern Iran. “The signaling out of particularly exciting heroic episodes from the great body of the *Shahnama* by the traditional local orators (naqal) to tell to their audiences in the early twentieth century (or previously) has probably been mainly to take advantage of the inherent excitement of these themes (as in the story of Rustam and Soharba) rather than to emphasize the work’s modern historical and political dimensions: the survival of Iran as a sociopolitical entity. Any association that the *Shahnma* was read by the general masses in premodern times, in association with the popular and mystical poems of Hafiz, Rumi, and the educational verses of Sa’di, should be questioned. In other words, were Hafiz and Sa’di more read among the ordinary masses or was Firdowsi? Again we have to be careful not to assess the value and weight of the *Shahnama* during those periods from a modern nationalistic standpoint. Obviously, the Firdowsi phenomenon has nicely corresponded to the needs of current nationalism.” Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation*, 126. “With the striking exception of Fedosi’s *Shahnameh*, however, the golden age of Iranian poetry does not directly add to or subtract from nationalism. The great poets were not much concerned with the native land, even in Ferdosi, whose poetry does extol the Iranian nation and race, there is little to bring comfort to the modern Iranian nationalist. Ferdosi’s poetry...is ‘always of the triumphant, victorious and imperialistic type, while of the more subtle and moving patriotic verse of the conquered and helpless nation...which can only strive to maintain its spiritual life under the more or less galling yoke of the foreign invader, and must sustain its sense of nationhood by memories of a glorious past and hopes of happier future, there is hardly a trace in Persian or Arabic until this present
Ferdawsi: the modern symbol of Iranian nationalism. In this case the greater myth, however, was the insistence on the “exact birthday” and the equally “exact spot” of Ferdawsi’s historic grave. That history, therefore, cannot be divorced from the mausoleum allegedly housing his corpse. By the closing of the Pahlavi era, this simple architecture would demarcate the exact place and time of the man buried there.

- Imaginary Place

While most historians dealing with Ferdawsi focus on his life and work, this study confines itself to the events after his death in ways that does not claim to know what actually happened to Ferdawsi’s corpse and burial-site. Pertinent is, however, the stories that others told and retold about the resting-place from Ferdawsi’s death to the 1920s. While stories are presented here as neither authentic nor inauthentic, germane are the tales that ultimately transmuted into a monumental structure that professed to revive the authenticity of the original story not only of Ferdawsi’s life, work, and death, but more remarkably, of his true persona. From the early 19th century to the present-day, three separate sets of narratives were assembled about the history and historiography of the resting-place: pre-Pahlavi Western travelogues between 1822 to 1936; Pahlavi official records reinforced by various state institutions from 1934 to 1978; and post-Pahlavi Islamized chronicles after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In retracing the tomb’s history, despite distinct differences in narrative methodology, each set of description selected individual historic accounts that fitted its contemporary political program. In each attempt to retell old stories, that which was excluded was of utmost importance. While the Westerners relied on their compatriots’ travelogues for their own accounts and neglected much of the medieval Muslim records, the post-revolutionary scholars emphasized the medieval Arabic or Persian sources and provided erroneous and incomplete data of Western descriptions. At the extremities of the 20th century, each suffered from the same technical obstacles: most 19th-

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1. Iran’s great poets were cosmopolitan in their orientation, and they sought the universal truth.” R. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, 1979), 28-29.
century Europeans could not read Arabic or Persian even if they could find the physical manuscripts, and most post-revolutionary Iranians lacked access to Western collections even if they could read English or French. Whereas Europeans did an outstanding job of describing what they saw during their visits, often accompanied with photographs and maps, post-1979 local scholars did an even better job of introducing previously missing Muslim depictions into the discourse.

Pahlavi scholars and bureaucrats, on the other hand, despite their geographic and linguistic position to tell a less biased and a more comprehensive story, produced the most deficient narrative. Their shortcoming was found in the political regime that both nurtured and benefited from that same historiography. While the history produced in Iran’s Islamic Republic omitted any recognition of Pahlavi vigor in erecting a new monument, the Pahlavi accounts accelerated the historical narrative in order to arrive at the pivotal moment when Reza Shah “heroically” and “single-handedly” salvaged the grave. Such sources univocally insisted that “the unparalleled (bi-nazir)” modern tomb of Ferdawsi, which had been “in oblivion for centuries,” was rebuilt by the order of “His Majesty.” The Pahlavi effort to collect pseudoscientific data in order to erect a monument was at the expense of exhaustive historic investigations; critical historical studies were often substituted by a blind nationalism that guaranteed the supremacy of the regime, because the modern mausoleum, it was hoped, would enable the rectification of all false historical claims about Ferdawsi’s life and death. The SNH, therefore, would take a pile of ruins and turn it into a pseudoscientific mausoleum-museum; it would take folklore and make it history, in both senses of eradicating the popular culture

9 For 19th-century Western travelogues related to Ferdawsi’s tomb, see E.G. Browne, A Year Among the Persians (Cambridge and London, 1893); R. Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London, 1st edn., 1937, 2nd edn., 1950); G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 2 vols., 1892); H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis, 1936); J. B. Fraser, Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan in the years 1821 and 1822 (London, 1825); W. Jackson, From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam (New York, 1911); E. O’Donovan, The Merv Oasis (London, 1882); and A. Vambery, His Life and Adventures (New York, 1883).

10 Fortunately for this study, one filled in that which the other lacked, highlighting the selectivity of ostensibly authentic stories.

11 While all official Pahlavi histories of the tomb maintain that it was Reza Shah who erected the modern mausoleum, all the post-revolutionary sources mentioned in footnote 13 categorically omit Reza Shah’s involvement in the 1934 construction of the new monument as well as Mohammad Reza Shah’s in the 1968 renovations.

12 H. Mokhtari, Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iran [History of Iran’s awakening] (Tehran, 1947), 554-555.
surrounding the *Shahnameh* in places like the coffeehouse and reinventing it as official history in state-sponsored textbooks and newspapers.\(^{13}\)

Put simplistically, the official Pahlavi historiography on Ferdawsi was uncomplicated: born in Tus “probably in 934 AD” the “greatest Iranian” poet, Hakim Abd al-Qasem Ferdawsi Tusi, was significant because, in writing his epic story, he revived “the glory of ancient Iran” and hence won “immortal fame.”\(^{14}\) In variance, while the post-1979 sources claim that the “medieval Muslim” poet was born “around 329-330 Hejri-e Qamari [AH]” – that is, between 950 and 951 AD, most 19th-century Western chroniclers, conversely, refrained from providing an exact date merely to stress the idea that Ferdawsi was – in the vacuum of World History – “the greatest of Iran’s bards; one of the great epic poets of the world.”\(^{15}\) The modern obsession with the exact birthday of Ferdawsi would have to wait future historiographical skirmishes. Ferdawsi’s death, however, was a subject of lesser contention perhaps because it had little to do with such authentic origins in the construction of his mausoleum. Sometime between 1020 and 1032 AD, he died in his birthplace twenty-six kilometers northwest of present-day Mashhad, in the province of Khorasan.

The chairman of the SNH and Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi had argued in his *History of Iran* (1924) that since the *Shahnameh* recounted in verses the stories of Avesta, the Zoroastrian sacred book, it “should of course be read and parts of its memorized,” presumably both as a sample of Persian literature and as a reference guide to Iranian history.”\(^{16}\)

According to another Ferdawsi enthusiast and an SNH member, Minister of Public Instructions Isa Sadiq, although “the records of his life are scanty,” there was an urgency to “see how this

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\(^{14}\) I. Sadiq, *Ferdawsi: His Life, His Personality, and His Work* (Tehran, 1945), 1 and 3. The text resurfaced in 1968, this time published by the SNH. The significance of this small booklet consisted of its Pahlavi version Ferdawsi’s life and work. Moreover, the fact that Sadiq was directly involved in the workings of the SNH from its first meetings organized by Teymurtash to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, and the fact that he published both his memoirs and scholarship renders him a central figure in my story. See below for more details.

\(^{15}\) According to the Muslim Lunar calendar, Ferdawsi was born around 329-330 AH and died in 411 AH; see Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 66. Vambery, *His Life and Adventures*, 281; and Filmer, *The Pageant of Persia*, 177. As stated above, one of the most accurate sources is Marshall Hodgson, according to whom Ferdawsi died in c. 1020; see Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*, 2: 298.

great poet lived.” For in the countless attempts to reconstruct the “exact account of his life” in the context of nationalist fervor, Ferdawsi was projected as “the best prototype of a good Iranian.” In December 1945, during a public lecture Sadiq justified his selected topic by not only emphasizing Ferdawsi’s inherent qualities, a “good Shi’a but extremely tolerant,” but also because of his own involvement in the construction of the “Mausoleum, the Congress and the Millennium” during the course of the “last twenty-four years.” In a similar vein, the SNH’s report-book, the *Karnameh* (1976), reiterated that in order “to build the mausoleum of Ferdawsi, it was required to determine the *exact* location of the tomb.” The modern mausoleum of Ferdawsi, now solidly standing, sustained the discourse on the medieval poet.

Dismissing most medieval accounts as “contradictory,” Sadiq instead refers to his co-reformist’s research. Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, one of the zealous nationalists of the Constitutional Revolution connected with “the Nationalist movement from the beginning,” was also a specialist on the *Shahnameh* (see Fig. 1.9). Years before Reza Shah’s coup d’état in 1921, Taqizadeh had published articles in his own Berlin-based periodical, *Kaveh*, advocating the pivotal role of Ferdawsi in Iran’s political and cultural revival. Taking its name from *Shahnameh*’s hero, Kaveh the blacksmith, the periodical was an influential tool to promote nationalism and secularism. Its name was emblematic of its contents for in Ferdawsi’s epic, Kaveh had defeated Zohak, the king of Arabia, who had been kissed on the shoulders and lured into subjugating Iran by Ahriman, the Zoroastrian evil God. In 1916, Taqizadeh had launched the first issue of *Kaveh* with a verse from the *Shahnameh* championing “liberation” from the “chains of Zohak.” Unlike its first series of 1916 to 1919, the second set of *Kaveh*’s articles between 1920 and 1921 were entirely devoted to issues addressing Iran’s history, literature, and culture, mostly focus on the pre-Islamic dynasties. In many editorials, Taqizadeh had argued that Iran’s political salvation was to be found in revalorizing its culture and history, of revealing its superior

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17 Sadiq, *Ferdawsi*, i.
qualities not only to the Iranian masses, but also to the “civilized world.” In fact, if we are to trust Sadiq’s recollections, the very idea of celebrating Ferdawsi’s millenary had come from Taqizadeh.

Aside from Taqizadeh as a distinguished scholar of Iran’s pre-Islamic historiography, Sadiq also evoked the voices of Western authors, like Professor of eastern languages at Columbia University Williams Jackson, Army Surgeon and Persian Scholar James Atkinson, and Art Historian of Iran Arthur Pope, as authorities on Ferdawsi and the Shahnameh.23 Like most Pahlavi authors, Sadiq did not refer to Arabic or Persian sources to reconstruct Ferdawsi’s life, for his goal seems to have been less concerned with tracing the history of the man and his tomb than to provide evidence for their modern significance. This and similar reports remained silent on the history in order to convey its revival as an unprecedented historic event, repeatedly eclipsed by two “good Iranians:” Ferdawsi and Reza Shah. In Pahlavi official literature, both were presented as the nation’s savors, both simultaneously millennia-old and astonishingly modern. The accounts, furthermore, systemically lamented the neglected condition of Ferdawsi’s tomb while almost immediately jumping to “1313” – the day when, according to Pahlavi historiography, the former was brought back into Iran’s history by the latter. In 1975, for instance, a booklet published by Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Art remarked:

They buried Ferdawsi in his own garden in Tus. For years, his grave was unnamed and unmarked. Nokhsat Ersalan Jazeh, during the time of the Mongols, built a small structure on top of his resting-place, which after a short while was ruined. Then, the governor (hakim) of Khorasan built a brick structure but that too was damaged. Until the time of the reign of His Majesty Reza Shah the Great when in 1313 for the occasion of the millenary of the author of the Shahnameh, a big resting-place was organized and built. On the thousandth-year anniversary of Ferdawsi’s birth, a group of scholars both Iranian and foreigners gave lectures in Tehran. These lectures took several days. After the end of the celebrations, the guests and the participants went to Tus to make a pilgrimage (ziyarat) to the resting-place (aramgah) of Ferdawsi. His Majesty Reza Shah the Great who paid great importance to the pride of Iran, on the 20th of Mehr of the same year, with his presence at the place of the aramgah, his reading of an interesting (jaleb) public homily and the inauguration of the building brought more magnificence and splendor to the celebration.24

While, by and large, this was the Iranian account on the true story behind Ferdawsi’s tomb, it had, in reality, been deeply influenced by 19th century European descriptions of the resting-place.

23 See Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 12-13 and 15-16. James Atkinson (1780-1852) was assigned to Major-General George Pollock’s expedition to Kabul in 1838. During his stay in the region, he produced a collection of lithographs on Afghanistan.
24 Vezarat-e Farhang va Honar [Ministry of Culture and Arts], Ferdawsi Tusi (Tehran, 1975), 18-19.
All three above-mentioned narratives, nevertheless, agreed that the oldest text describing the location of the tomb was the *Chahar Maqale-ye Nezami-ye Aruzi-ye Samargandi*. Accordingly, the author of *The Four Discourses*, Omar Ibn Ali Nezami Aruzi Samarghandi, was the first to “set foot” on the tomb less than a century after the poet’s death in the “6th century Hejri-ye Qamari [AH]." The turn of the last century, Aruzi’s narrative, after centuries of retelling, had reached Pahlavi authors via Orientalist Edward Browne’s 1899 translation and Jackson’s reproduction of Browne’s text in his travelogue, *From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam* (1911), as the following:  

Mahmud ordered that sixty thousand dinars worth of indigo should be given to Firdausi, and that this indigo should be carried to Tus on the king’s own camels, and that apologies should be tendered to Firdausi. For years the Minister (al-Maimandi, the friend of Firdausi) had been working for this, and at length he had achieved his work; so now he caused the camels to be loaded, and the indigo safely reached Tabaran (a part of Tus). But even as the camels entered the Rudbar Gate, the corpse of Firdausi was borne forth from (birum) the Gate of Rizan (or Razan). Now at that time there was in Tabaran a preacher, whose fanaticism was such that he declared that he would not suffer Firdausi’s body to be buried in the Musulman Cemetery because he was a Rafidi (Shiite); and nothing that men could say would serve to move him. Now, inside (darum) the gate there was a piece of property (milk) belonging to Firdausi, which they call the Garden of Firdausi, or Paradise; and in that garden, which was his property, they made his grave; and there he lies to this day. And I visited his tomb in the year 510 A.H. (1116-1117 A.D.).

With minor revisions, this was the generally agreed first and original account. According to Sadiq, who was had studied the works of Browne and Jackson, since “the fanatical Sunnite preacher of Tus” prevented Ferdawsi’s “body from being buried in the public cemetery,” he was forcibly buried somewhere on his own property in a “garden near the gate of Razan.”

Corroborating Sadiq’s account about the veracity of the Razan Gate, the SNH’s 1976 report-book, the *Karnameh*, underscored that “the reconstruction” of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum had been

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26 Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 66; Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 283. Also, see Sadiq, *Ferdawsi*, 3-4. However, only Jackson pointed out that Nezami Aruzi was followed by Ibn Isfandiar’s visit in 1216 who “tells the same story.” Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 284.
27 Edward Browne’s *Literary History of Persia* has been described as “...a monumental work on Persian literature...” Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 27.
29 Sadiq, *Ferdawsi*, 4-5. As his daughter refused to take the money, the king ordered the preacher who had not allowed the poet’s body to be buried in the public cemetery be expelled from the town.
based in 1934 on “the oldest document containing the location of the tomb.” It noted, “In Ahmad Ibn Omar Ibn Ali Nezami Aruzi Samarghandi’s second volume, story nine, he tells the story of how Sultan Mahmud,” the Qaznavid ruler and patron of the *Shahnameh*, had sent gold to compensate for his earlier failure to pay Ferdawsi for his work. However, as per Aruzi’s text, as the gold was being passed “through the gate of Rudvar, the corpse of Ferdawsi was being taken out by the Razan gate.” The post-1979 sources added a more detailed translation of Aruzi’s destruction to the discourse: “today” the tomb “is there and I in the year ten and five hundred [paid] a pilgrimage (*ziyarat*) to that earth (*khak=*).” As an eyewitness to Ferdawsi’s tomb, Aruzi remained one of the two historic figures present in all three modern narratives.

Although neither Pahlavi nor Western accounts included an obvious medieval personage, the post-1979 historiography underscored this twofold exclusion: well-known Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited Tus in 1346 AD (725 AH), did not mention the grave. While he acknowledged Tus as “one of the largest cities in Khurasan,” he focused on the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad and added little to his depiction of the former. This might be read as an indication of Ferdawsi’s importance in the larger medieval Muslim context, but what is of essence here is the post-revolutionary attention drawn to the exclusion of such a key historical figure by earlier modern narratives. More remarkably, Ibn Battuta, in turn, excluded Ferdawsi from his own account inadvertently making himself vulnerable to later Western and Pahlavi exclusions. The post-1979 historiography, further, revealed that Ibn Battuta was not the only subject to such disqualifications: in his 14th-century *Nazihat al-Gholub*, Hamid Allah Mostawfi observed, “On the qibla [direction of Mecca] side of Tus, there is a gate where 3,000 men named Abu Bakr have been buried and on the east side of this [is] the tomb of Imam Ojai al-Islam Mohammad Qazali as well as the mausoleum of Ferdawsi.” Mostawfi was describing a Seljuk domed edifice known as the Haruniyeh, that had dominated Tus’ skyline for centuries (Fig. 3.2). Although his name was omitted from later Western and Pahlavi versions, Mostawfi’s

32 The date given by Nezami Aruzi is in Arabic “san-a 'ashra wa kamsame'a.” Moreover, he specifically refers to his visit as *ziyarat* or pilgrimage; see Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 66.
34 Ibn Battuta, *Travels*, 177
35 The date of the text is given as 8th century A. H.; see Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 66.
assumption of the grave’s location under the Haruniyeh would be repeated by later travelers, to be discussed below. 36

The second historic figure mentioned by the three narratives was Dowlat Shah Samarghandi (died 1494-1495) who in the 15th century, “recalled” Ferdawsi’s “sepulcher” and wrote, “his grave (qabr) is in Tus city right next to (be jamb-e) the Abbasid tomb (mazar) and today the nobleman’s sepulcher (marqad) has been repaired and pilgrims can find a refuge in it.” 37 A 1999 encyclopedia maintained that this late medieval Muslim source indicated that by the 15th century, Ferdawsi’s tomb was renowned and was often visited by pilgrims. Whereas Sadiq, as other Pahlavi authors, only alluded to Dowlat Shah’s name without further clarifications, Jackson quoted this medieval sketch – “today a great tomb is established for [Ferdawsi], and there is a shelter for the visitor in that tomb” – in order to prove that the original burial-site was not “outside the walls of the old city,” as Browne had argued, but rather “inside.” 38 After pages of argument, Jackson strengthened his case with the testimony of the native: “the persistent local belief that the grave is within the walls, as well as the fact that there is no sign of a tomb found outside the Rizan Gate” indicated, in Jackson’s view, that the original burial-place must have been “inside” the walls.

In the historiography of the grave readily available to us, there is a gap between these Muslim descriptions – primarily inserted into the discourse by post-1979 scholars – and the 19th century European travelogues. Whereas medieval Muslim pilgrims seem to have highlighted the venerated Shi’a shrine of Imam Reza and mentioned Tus in passing, centuries later, the British and French paid particular attention to the then uncertain existence of Ferdawsi’s grave whilst disregarding the shrine in Mashhad. There is little doubt, based on the over-zealous descriptions in various travelogues, that most of these European travelers were eager to reach Tus and seek

36 “On the left of the road to Tus [from Mashhad], about a kilometer from the ruins, is a massive mausoleum known as the Harunieh and locally supposed to be the tomb of Harun al-Rashid, in fact it is probably the tomb of the mystic poet el-Ghazali who died in A.D. 1111. With its Sassanian-type dome on squinches and deep vertical exterior channels, it is similar to the early Islamic Jabel-i Sang at Kirman but Pope believed it was probably built in the early fourteenth century, while Herzfeld thought it was begun by the Saljugs before the Mongol invasions, recent studies by Robert Hillenbrand have led him to the belief that a still earlier date could be defended for the central dome chamber and that the façade is no later than the Saljuq period. Professor J. M. Rogers favors the later date.” S. A. Matheson, Persia: An Archaeological Guide (London, 1976), 203. Arthur Pope analyzed the Harunieh without mentioning Ferdawi’s grave; see A. Pope, “The Fourteenth Century: Mausolea,” Survey of Persian Art (London, 1964), text 3: 1072-1076.
37 The 9th century A. H.; see Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 66.
out Ferdawsi’s lost grave. Still, the intriguing facet of their perception was an a priori recognition that there was really nothing to see there; almost all accounts concurred that Tus “never rose again from” its medieval “dust.” No chronicler neglected to stress that the city, “once great,” had been “supplanted” by Mashhad. Still each of the authors sojourned to Tus to find a trace of its antique greatness. One traveler knew that he was going to see “ruins; with the destruction of Tus in 1389 Meshed gradually became the principle town of the region...” After a visit to Tus, another noted, while “Persian legend is very busy with the antiquity and history and vicissitudes of this once famous city,” there is in fact “very little to be seen” there. Yet another intended to experience “the atmosphere of poetry” that “clung about” Tus, “still” commented that “the Mongols crushed it” so that it “never rose again from the dust in which it lies today.” Even according to the official historiography produced under the current Islamic Republic of Iran, which tends to view Iran’s Islamic history under an idealized light, “the original tomb [of Ferdawsi] along with the entire city of Tus was destroyed by the Mongol invasions, by the hands of Tolol, the son of Changiz Khan.” Still, Ferdawsi’s original spot seems to have been extremely attractive for it managed to draw many to an isolated place like Tus.

Arriving in “Toos” as early as February 23, 1822 in search of its “former magnificence,” British traveler and Director of East India Company James Fraser identified and described the tomb, “a little way from the gate of entrance, there stands a dome ornamented with lacquered tiles, so small that I thought at first it might have formed a part of some private house.” In an 1825 travelogue, which “reads like a long Victorian indictment of oriental despotism,” Fraser held, “this dome covers the dust of the celebrated poet Ferdousee who after the unworthy treatment he received from Shah Mahmood Ghisnavee, retired there to die [sic.].” Fraser

39 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 278.
40 H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis, 1936), 175.
42 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 280.
43 Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 66.
44 James Baillie Fraser (1783-1856), Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan in the Years 1821 and 1822 (London, 1825), 519.
45 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 49; and Fraser, Narrative of a Journey, 519.
arrived in Tus, according to a post-1979 account, on the inaccurate date of 1821, where he found "a very small dome...covered by tile, outside the city-walls, near the southeastern gate."\(^{46}\) Similarly, writing more than half a century later, the Irish-born special correspondent to \textit{London Daily News} and British war-correspondent, Edmund O’Donovan, identified the Haruniyeh as the tomb of Ferdawsi, "the only remarkable object of the place...exactly in the center of the town,"\(^{47}\) Suspected of being a Russian spy in 1879, O’Donovan was taken prisoner by the "Tekkes" of Merv and, therefore, spent five months "examining" the wrong thing. While his \textit{The Merv Oasis} (1882) provided meticulous description of Haruniyeh’s architecture and decorative program, his misassumption that it was, indeed, Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, as had done Mostawfi’s \textit{Nazihat al-Gholub}, was probably caused by the eminence of the Seljuk tomb in either Tus proper or its vicinity, in addition to the fact that O’Donovan was an armature observer. Nonetheless, he believed that he had even identified Ferdawsi’s coffin: located “at the center of the brick domed structure,” it had been broken open, according to his “Turcoman” capturers, “only two years previously by some Russian travelers who visited the place and who also carried away with them two inscribed marble tablets which had been inserted in the southern wall.”\(^{48}\) The two vacant spaces, O’Donovan noted, were still visible.\(^{49}\)

Traveling in Iran during the same period, the Hungarian philologist and the professor of Oriental languages at Budapest University, Arminius Vambery, wrote in 1883, “among the ruins of Tus to the north of Meshed lies, according to the belief of modern Persians, [is to be found] the tomb of Firdusi. Before leaving the city I made an excursion to it. It was with feelings of sincere piety and admiration that I approached the modest monument which commemorates the resting-place of one of the greatest national poets of the world [sic.].”\(^{50}\) Although Vambery added nothing about the location or the shape of this “modest monument,” he underscored that in

\(^{46}\) Eqabi, \textit{Mausolea Structures}, 67.
\(^{47}\) E. O’Donovan, \textit{The Merv Oasis} (London, 1882), 14-16. The “Haruniya mausoleum (so called because of the erroneous local belief that it covers the grave of Harum al-Rashid; it is possible that it may have been erected over the tomb of al-Ghazali.)” L. Lockhart, \textit{Famous Cities of Iran} (Brantford, 1939), 29. Lockhart also argues that based on its style, the structure can be dated to the 1600s.
\(^{48}\) He titled this section “Russian Vandalism.” O’Donovan, \textit{Merv Oasis}, 16.
\(^{49}\) The numerous observations by Western travelers that monuments were vandalized and dilapidated in Iran would have a great influence on the SNH. Half a century later, Pahlavi scholars would look back to O’Donovan’s text and state, “Ignorant and indifferent people, antique dealers, and tourists were trying to demolish [our] great heritage.” The author would propose instead that the SNH first “demolish and then get rid of” these earlier mistakes and then “provide grounds for the revival” of good “taste.” Lecture delivered by Ali Hannibal in the summer of 1927; see SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 9 and chapter 1 in this study.
\(^{50}\) A. Vambery (1865-1905), \textit{His Life and Adventures} (New York, 1883), 281-282.
contrast to the “fearless and independent” poet who “rebelled against the thought of employing the language of the oppressors of his country” those who he encountered in contemporary Iran were a disappointment; concluding, “what an abyss is there between the modern Persians and their great poet!”

By the final decade of the 19th century, the idea to discover Ferdawsi’s lost sepulcher had become an obsession for many Europeans who journeyed to Iran. The future British foreign secretary and the “architect of British policy towards Iran,” Lord George Nathaniel Curzon spent 1889-1890 studying “Persia,” where in a matter of a few short years he managed to produce the most impressive of travelogues on the region. It was, according to him, a work which dealt “with every aspect of public life in Persia, with its inhabitants, provinces, cities, lines of communication, antiquities, government, institutions, resources, trade, finance, policy, and present and future development – in a word, with all that has made or continues to make it a nation.” According to his two-volume *Persia and the Persian Question* (1892), Curzon pictured the “remains of Tus” a destination that he “care[d] to ride out [to].” As of his arrival, he recognized “clear traces” of “a walled Arab city, quite four miles in circumference, and of a citadel in its north-east corner.” He further noticed, “In the centre is a large ruined structure under a dome, which was no doubt once a mosque, but is now known as the Nakkara-Khaneh or Drum Tower.” Referring to *The Merv Oasis*, Curzon made a correction regarding the location of Ferdawsi’s grave: “O’Donovan, who spent some time in examining and describing the ruins,” he wrote, “mistook this building for the tomb of the great national poet Firdusi, and even identified his coffin. The poet’s grave lay beneath a far humbler structure which was visible seventy years ago; but had disappeared long before O’Donovan visited it, and been replaced by no more distinctive memorial than a field of wheat [sic.]” Misdating Curzon’s travels to the region by thirty years, a post-1979 encyclopedia wrote, during his “visit in 1858, there seems to

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52 G. N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London, 2 vols., 1892); and Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, 28. Later, on October 14, 1919, Curzon became the British foreign sectary and had already “great plans” for “Persia” formulated in his 1919 Agreement, which lingered for a while and which if signed by the Iranian government would have made Iran a British protectorate; “once and for all” solving both the “Persian Question” and in consequence that of any threat to the British Raj. In this affair, two future SNH members along with a lot of money were involved: Hasan Firnia and Firuz Mirza Firuz. For more details on the 1919 Agreement, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 114.
be no such [domed] structure,” further adding, “Curzon remarked that although a great poet, his
tomb has turned into a pile of brick for political reasons.”

Among all those who went to Iran to contribute to the study of Ferdawsi, one stood out as
the most passionate. Traveling to the region between 1907 and 1908 “for scholarly research,”
Williams Jackson, professor at Columbia University, passed two days in the “ruins of ancient
Tus...one of the most famous cities in the history of Iran.” Jackson had come to Tus for a
mission: “we were interested, above all, in the problem of possibly locating the position of his
tomb.” The twenty-first chapter of his travelogue, From Constantinople to the Home of Omar
Khayyam (1911), was entirely devoted to those two days for he seemed to have endowed the
place with a sanctity that it did not have outside imagination. Taking the occasion, he narrated
the life-story of Ferdawsi as it was recounted by Jackson’s earlier compatriots who had come to
Tus to fulfill a “long desire of my heart; the ancient home of the poet Firdausi, for thought its
chronicled tale may not be known to every reader, the glamour of a mighty past” remained
visible.

One can hardly fail to notice that much of Pahlavi accounts on Ferdawsi’s life, work,
personality, and above all, resting-place, were reiterations of Jackson’s vivacious, still seemingly
authoritative, travelogue, wherein it was argued, like Reza Shah, the “spirit of Firdausi recalls to
the memory of the Persians their greatness in the ages that were falling into oblivion.” The use
of Jackson’s text must have been convenient, for he not only cited earlier chroniclers, Western as
well as selected medieval Muslim, but also made vital corrections on earlier descriptions such as
O’Donovan’s misidentification of the Haruniyeh as Ferdawsi’s mausoleum. He argued that while
“attractive as such an assignment might be, it is certainly an error” for Jackson felt that it was
“appropriate here to correct that misapprehension.” His other historically valuable addition
consisted of a seemingly unimportant remark: “Our aged guide added that some twenty years
previously, a Governor of Khurasan, named Asaf ad-Daulah Shirazi, had started to build on the
site a tomb worth of Firdausi’s memory; but as he was afterwards deprived of his office, the

56 Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 67.
57 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 277. For more on Williams Jackson, see chapter 6 in this study. Also, see P.
Soucek, “A. V. Williams Jackson: 1862-1937,” in the proceedings of the International Conference on the Study of
Persian Culture in the West (London, 2005) forthcoming. Also, see the catalogue of International Conference on the
Study of Persian Culture in the West (State Hermitage, Saint Petersburg, June 2004), 37.
58 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 290.
59 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 278.
60 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 287, footnote 2.
building was never finished [sic.].”

A post-1979 publication, although provided the wrong date for Jackson’s visit to Iran by two decades, rectified his story regarding “Abidollah Khan Bokharai, the governor of Khorasan [sic.],” who, in fact, ordered a dome-like structure “right outside” the city walls “near the southwestern” gate during the 16th century. The story was separately substantiated by Ibn Mohammad Shirazi’s 1591 introduction to a copy of the *Bysonghori Shahnameh*:

It was said that Arsalan the Attractive (Arsalan-e Jazeb) constructed a dome on Ferdawsi’s tomb and it existed until the time that Mankaghan appointed Kurkuz as the governor of Khorasan who resided in Tus and the people who came from surrounding to build the castle (qaleh), demolished the dome and moved its pieces inside the fortress. Shortly after, during the reign of Qazan, the Emir of Estesfa under whose management was Tus’ wealth, hinted about a construction on the Ferdawsi’s tomb and said to build a *Khaneghah* next to his tomb for starters.

Like Jackson’s “aged guide,” this source confirmed that the construction of the “Khaneghah [sic.]” – literally a house-place – was never completed because Estesfa’s death stopped all hitherto building activities. Despite the discrepancies, Jackson seems to have been on the right track.

The British consul general of Khorasan between 1905 and 1913, Sir Major Percy Sykes had escorted Jackson to Tus in 1907-1908. As pressed as Jackson to discover Ferdawsi’s grave, Sykes produced a map of the city which managed to tilt the debates about the grave’s position either inside or outside the city walls in favor of one (Fig. 3.3). On it, Sykes positively identified and clearly marked the “Tomb of Firdawsi” within the walls in northern Tus. Jackson later published the map in his travelogue making it readily available to Pahlavi researchers.

While subsequent hypothesis on the exact location of the tomb was be based on this diagram, much to the disappointment of Pahlavi authors, neither Jackson nor Sykes was able to locate “the

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61 Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 292.
62 According to Eqabi, Jackson visited Tus in 1890 instead of the correct date of 1907-1908. This encyclopedia is published by the joint efforts of the *sazman-e miras-e farhangi*, the Public Library, and the National Museum – all established by the SNH in the late 1920s; see Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 67.
63 “The manuscript was kept in Reza Abbasi Museum.” Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 67.
64 In 1894 Sir Major C. Percy Molesworth Sykes (1867-1945) established the British Consulate in Kerman; four years later that of Sistan. After his return from Transvaal, he was appointed as the Consul General of Khorasan between 1905 and 1913. During this period he managed to travel and document several monuments with Professor Williams Jackson. During World War I, Sykes was Commander of the South Persia Police Force comprising some 11,000 cavalry and infantry. He was believed by many to have been a British spy. He left Iran in 1918 and died in Britain. Sykes has a number of books on Iran including *A History of Persia* (London, 1915 and 1951); *A History of Exploration from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (1934), *The Glory of the Shia World* (1910); *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia* (1902).
precise spot” of the grave, leaving the “question open.” Nor were they convinced by the “old man,” Mollah Mohammad, who had “pointed out the place which he said marked” the grave. Nevertheless, both men separately documented the exact place where they believed the tomb might have been; in both cases, the spot was indicated in photographs by standing local peasants (Fig. 3.4 and 3.8). However, Jackson was relieved because, according to the mollah, “the spot” was, after all, “inside the walls.” While Sykes’s illustration of a native, without further description of Ferdawsi’s tomb, was later inserted in his A History of Persia (1915) in the section where he discussed “the rebirth of Persian literature” before “the Mongol invasion,” Jackson’s similar image was published in his 1911 travelogue, where he observed:

A low wall enclosed a rough square, perhaps ten or fifteen yards in each direction...the whole ground was cluttered with bricks, and among them were some blue tiles; but there was nothing to denote that Persia’s greatest epic poet had been buried there. Although wishing to believe that the spot thus indicated represents the real site of Firdausi’s final resting-place, I do not hesitate to say that our friend Sykes wrote me a letter a year afterwards, saying he had learned later that the location of the spot was said to have been due to the dream of a Said. Still such dreams, especially when they come at a moment opportune to a governor’s wish, are apt to be based upon some sort of tradition, or one not likely to be out of harmony with the general local view on the subject.

In a footnote, Jackson persisted with his fixation with “the spot” and his reference to earlier descriptions; “I am not sure whether the place we saw is the same that was pointed out to Fraser, in 1822, for it is not quite clear from the context whether his reference to the gate is to the Rizan or, more probably, to the Rudbar.” While directly quoting Fraser’s description, Jackson remained doubtful as to the exact answer of the place.

“Mingling itself with the dust of ages that covers this ancient site...seemed to live again with memories of the historic past – memories made bright by Firdausi’s name and fame.” Jackson deeply moved by his “gaze” on the “dilapidated portal upon the ruined walls of the desolate city that had been the heart of Eastern Iran,” was determined, as of his return to the United States, “to arrange for the erection of a simple monument on the spot.” His plans were delayed and later replaced by the Pahlavi elite’s vision of such a structure. Twelve years before the SNH’s decision to erect a monument “on that spot,” Jackson had pondered, “but should any

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65 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 292, footnote 2.
66 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 292.
68 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, footnote 293.
69 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 296.
70 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 290, 293.
monument be needed?" The question was answered, as in later years, by voicing Ferdawsi’s own thoughts and feelings:

From poesy I’ve raised a tower high
Which neither wind nor rain can ever harm;
Over this work the years shall come and go,
And he that wisdom hath shall learn its charm;
I shall live on; the seeds of words have I sown broadcast, and I shall not wholly die.  

Learning from their European forerunner, the first members of the SNH quickly learned to talk on behalf of dead men. As a finale to his public lecture, Sadiq recited Jackson’s transition of this same poetry. “Ferdawsi himself realized,” Sadiq insisted, “what a gigantic and colossal service he had rendered when, in a moment of dark despair” he wrote these lines.

After centuries of investigations, we cannot possibly know the actual location of Ferdawsi’s grave at any point in history. We can only trust in the presence of descriptions that suggest a mixture of spots as its possible location: in Ferdawsi’s own garden somewhere within the city walls near Razan Gate as relayed by Aruzi, Ibn Isfandiar, Sykes, and Jackson; adjacent to or within the Haruniyeh as depicted by Mostawfi, Dowlat Shah, and O’Donovan; “right outside” the city walls “near the southwestern” gate of Rudbar as held by Bokharai and Fraser; or alternatively placed in imaginations and impressions as in Vambery’s “modest monument” and Curzon’s “field of wheat.” Because of these separate, but seemingly authoritative, narratives, the historicity of the grave’s spot was more or less irrelevant to the Iranian modernists of the 1920s. In spite of all these “contradictory facts, scanty records, stories, and anecdotes,” about Ferdawsi’s life and death, to which the SNH openly admitted, it was determined to erect a mausoleum “on the spot” in order to alleviate all historical “confusions” about “Ferdawsi’s life.” The construction of the modern landmark was meant to fix, once and for all, the exactitude of the resting-place. This remarkable Pahlavi claim to historical certainty, furthermore, was aimed at acculturating the nation and simultaneously reviving cultural history. In both attempts, architecture was to act as the principal showground.

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71 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 293.
72 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 293.
73 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 15.
74 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 15.
75 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 2.
76 Despite the various claim to truth, there exists no cohesion in these accounts, but rather an endless ambiguity of meaning, which successive layers of meaning have gradually overlaid the contemporary narration of it. Still, to be narrating the monument is not to bear witness to its historic realities nor take history back to an authentic origin. It
Recent historians of the early Pahlavi period draw attention to Reza Shah’s 1934 celebration of Ferdawsi’s conference and monument, to provide evidence to a unique, as well as a brutal case of imposed modernization and national homogenization. The architectural object is depicted, always in passing, as a mere ideological echo: “Persian revivalism found its most lavish display in the Firdawsī International Conference,” and similarly, the regime “used the millenary celebration of Firdowsi...as an occasion to rebuild” his tombs in order to “glorify” the “national cultural achievements [sic.].” Paradoxically, while these historians dedicate a paragraph or two to the event, always underlining its purely political function, architectural historians simply and totally ignore it. The “grandiose monument” as art is systematically overlooked, for it was a priori imbued with and a posteriori narrated through politics. In variance, this chapter will contend that the events related to Ferdawsi’s tomb in 1934 were neither unique to Iran’s nationalism nor as implicitly brutal as portrayed, but rather deep-rooted in, and hence emblematic of, paradigms of Iran’s processes of uneven and rapid modernizations. It will demonstrate that the construction of the mausoleum was instrumental to the very negotiation of Iran’s modernity; not exclusively vice versa. Metaphorically speaking, Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was not a thing that happened after the arrival of nationalism and modernity in Iran; they happened, in part, because of it.

Conversely, side from scanty archival documents, contemporary newspapers, and a range of in-passing secondary sources, two of the active members of the SNH have left us their memoirs. Both, Education Minister Isa Sadiq and Zoroastrian Parliamentarian Arbab Keikhosrow Shahrokh were directly involved in the (un/dis)covery, financing, and construction of the mausoleum. Would merely add a layer to the existing, often confusing, stories, itself, in turn, becoming a ‘historic object’ in need of narration. In my own reconstruction, by recognizing the slippages of meaning, I try to read the monument against itself – architecture as a sociopolitical text. I suggest that there is a further level of meaning in the monument and its history. Here there is no search for a “true meaning” – a unity, but rather an attempt at revealing the multiple meanings unconsciously at war in the text – where at any given moment, one is privileged over the other.


Among the architectural historians, the only exception is a pro-Pahlavi work: P. Rajabi, *Me'mari-e Iran dar Asr-e Pahlavi* [Iranian architecture during the Pahlavi era] (Tehran, 1977), 70-71.

Lenczowski, *Iran under the Pahlavis*, 328.
of the mausoleum. Although both at times aggrandized their too often single-handed accomplishments in this matter, they managed to supply the details of the complications and the intrigues that went into erecting a simple tomb. Fortunately, each recounted a different story, probing at the multifaceted nature of the entire affair. Whereas Sadiq described the financial and ceremonial aspect of the project in his four-volume *Life Memoirs* (1959-1974), Shahrokh focused on the search for the grave and the design of the structure in his diary, published posthumously under the title *The Memoirs of Keikhosrow Shahrokh* (1994). 81 Stylistically, while Shahrokh told what reads like a bedtime story, void of any temporal context or precision, Sadiq’s narrative was saturated with redundant dates and names. Without Sadiq, we would have no idea when the events occurred; without Shahrokh, we would miss the most intriguing complexities of the undertaking. Their writing also speaks volumes about their personalities; in their own chronicles, each come across as men of action, filled with nationalistic zeal and cultural sensibilities; at times self-righteous and patronizing, but always uncritically loyal to Iran’s well-being over and above the Pahlavi monarchy. Certainly, nothing in their past had prepared them for the daunting task of building a national icon under the unforgiving gaze of Reza Shah. They could not have known that an architecturally mundane and structurally primitive landmark would call for hundreds of thousands of tomans, quite a few highly intelligent and committed men, like Sadiq and Shahrokh, as well as a range of “Western experts” in order to remain erect.

According to his introductory, Shahrokh was “a staunch Iranian patriot” in addition to being “a deeply committed Zoroastrian” from Kerman who became the most active of Iranian nationalists in the first half of the twentieth century (Fig. 3.5). 82 Like his coworkers in the SNH, he drew his inspirations from the promise of the Constitutional Revolution and carried a utopian zeal for ancient Iran. Subsequently, he was instrumental not only in advocating minority rights in the parliamentary system, but also in making solid ties between the Zoroastrian community of Iran and the Parsis of India, with which cultural forms and processes had been exchanged for centuries. In his official capacity, he was the Zoroastrian representative to the Majlis as long as from 1909 to his death in 1940, in addition to being the director of Iran’s Telephone Company. During his service, he became involved in the coronation ceremonies of both Ahmad Qajar and Reza Pahlavi and the orchestration of Ferdawsi’s millinery celebrations. As the most active

member of the early SNH, Shahrokh was instrumental in the introduction of the Persian calendar based on the solar rather than the lunar rotation, in addition to the substitution of Arabic with Persian words in official documents and language. His scholarly works included *Mirror of the Mazdayasnie Religion* (1907) and *The Light of Mazdayasnie* (1908), which were reprinted in 1920 and 1921 respectively. His Zoroastrian background mixed with his nationalist fervor was manifested not only in the ceaseless efforts invested in the (un/dis)covery and erection, but also the final form of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum. His inexperience in construction work and his upper middle class status, however, would hinder the project’s advance and would lead him into a bad health.

Much like his co-ideologue, Isa Sadiq was badly equipped to deal with masons and plumbers (Fig. 3.6). He was and remained a man of fancy ceremonies and academic symposia. He received a Licentiate of Science from Paris University and a philosophy degree from Colombia University; at some point amid these degrees, he assisted renowned Orientalist Edward Browne, who managed to shape most of Sadiq’s beliefs on the cultural and racial superiority of “Aryan Iran.” Between his return to Iran in 1931 and the end of the Pahlavi era, Sadiq was known as “one of the most distinguished men of letters” in the country. He held the important posts of professor at Tehran University, frequent minister of public instructions and minister of culture and art along with long list of other governmental positions and titles. He was, in fact, an exemplary byproduct of the Pahlavi system that he inexorably helped sustain throughout his academic and political career. His best-known academic work, entitled *History of Education in Iran*, was converted into a textbook in 1957 and was republished seven times until

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83 Isa Sadiq’s Licentiate of Science was in the field of mathematics from Paris University in 1918. “He entered the ministry of education in Iran in December 1918 and occupied many administrative and academic positions until 1931, when he was charged by his Government to prepare and submit a project for the foundation of a University in Tehran. In March 1932, as President of the National Teachers College, he proceeded with his University plans as well as reorganizing the National Teachers College into a Modern Institution of higher education. He was chancellor of the University in 1941.” Sadiq, *Ferdawsi*, 1.
84 Sh. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran* (Albany, 1980), 33. During the early years of the 1920s, Sadiq was well liked by the French and was seen as a pro-French influence in the Iranian educational system in which he had a vital role. During the 1940s, however, he became a liability for the French because he was involved in a controversy where he defended “the Anglo-Saxon educational system” against the French system; see Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1944-1955, Iran 40, Relation Culturelles, E45-1, 32-35, October 7, 1947, Paris. For a rather harsh critic of Sadiq’s “national-chauvinist ideas,” see Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation*, 160-161. For Sadiq’s influence on the educational system during Reza Shah, see Akhavi, *Religion and Politics*, 33.
1975. Sadiq’s other publications – *Ferdawsi, Modern Persia and her Educational System, The New Method of Education, The History of Education*, and *A Year in America* – were deeply influenced by the Western nationalist rhetoric on Aryan racial superiority; “His idols as foreign sources of reference were E. G. Browne, A. J. Arberry, A. U. Pope, R. Ghirshman, and a few others who represented the Aryan and national school of Western Orientalism.” Sadiq’s academic and political career that extended the entire Pahlavi era, “left a distinguishable impression in the minds and the hearts of many of his readers, who began to preach and murmur about the ‘grandeur and superiority of Iranian culture and civilization’…”

Sadiq’s rise to prominence among the early Pahlavi elite began probably with the SNH. At the Society’s 1922 meeting, Court Minister Teymurtash asked Sadiq to help raise funds from state schools for Ferdawsi’s mausoleum. “A few days later, in the courtyard of the school,” noted Sadiq, “I spoke a few minutes about Ferdawsi’s services to the nation,” asking students to financially contribute to the construction of the monument. “In less than two weeks,” 1,300 tomans was collected and presented to the Society’s treasurer, Shahrokh. From the outset, Ferdawsi’s monument was conceived based on the idea of public architecture as pedagogy. The structure and its production was an integral part of public instruction, which began in the courtyards of state schools. Realistically, however, this sum was not nearly enough.

The SNH soon realized that for a successful second triumph, it needed two credible claims: first, an indisputable “exact spot” as the location of Ferdawsi’s grave, and second, ample money to raise something over it. While the first was easy enough, at least a-historically, the second prerequisite was to prove far more problematic. In the early 1925, the Society initiated its project by “ask[ing] for” financial “assistance” from the parliament. However, since the *Majlis-e Shoray-e Melli* was “restricted by law to propose expenditure,” the government was “invited” in March to include a financial package in its budget for the monument. The Majlis had, on the side, reassured the government by saying, “give it to us and we will approve it.”

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87 Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation*, 161.
90 The exact date of the event was March 6, 1925 or Esfand 15, 1303 H. Sh.; see Sadiq, *Memoirs*, 4: 197; and SNH, *Karnameh*, 26.
Turning into a global curiosity, the news of these discussions traveled as far west as Paris and as far east as Calcutta. The Paris based journal, *Revue du Monde Musulman*, printed in 1925 the article entitled “The Pahlavi Nationalist Awakening in Persia,” which was extracts from “our brothers of Calcutta” originally published in various issues of Calcutta’s *Habl al-Matin* newspaper.  


The newspaper reported that “[u]nder the initiative of the Majlis’ Commission of Mobtakirat, the Government has been invited to introduce in the budget a paragraph authorizing the expenditure of sufficient sum for the reparation of the tomb of the great philosopher...and present it for Majlis’ approval.” The article, furthermore, disclosed that the Parsis of Bombay, Poona, and Dhaka had already celebrated Ferdawsi’s millenary a decade earlier than “the Iranian nation.” Referring to its Parsi source, the French text contemptuously concluded, “these days, one has to go outside Persia to find such celebrations [dedicated] to the national epic poet of Persia.”  

Back in Iran, the proposed Ferdawsi bill was trapped somewhere between the Majlis and the government since no progress was made until the end of 1925. Instead, between March and December, a number of major political changes had occurred. By that October, the parliament was considering the abolishment of the Qajar dynasty in order to confer the title of King of kings on Prime Minister Reza Khan. Accordingly, on December 15 of the same year, he was sworn in as *Shahanshah* of Iran. “A few months later,” Sadiq relayed, “not only” the new shah “personally helped with the expenses but also told” his new prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi “to take a bill to the Majlis” to finance the landmark’s erection. With the exception of Sadiq’s recollection, no other document can verify this incident. Although Forughi’s exact involvement...
remains unclear, the approval of a bill on January 21, 1926 enabled the printing of stamps, the net income of which was to contribute to the construction of the mausoleum. Accordingly, the SNH was assigned to cooperate with the Finance Ministry in producing stamps in “Ferdawsi’s name.”

By this time, although money was being collected from students and bills were being approved by the Majlis for the mausoleum, the burden of “finding the grave of Hakim Abolghassem Ferdowsi…the pride of Iran [sic.]” still rested on the SNH’s shoulders. In its invention, modern conceptions of historical time and national territory were of vital significance. Temporally speaking, the dilemma of the “exact spot” was inherently tied to a historic moment of origin; that is, the equally “exact” birth year of Ferdawsi, because only with the monument’s inauguration would such claims be sealed as a historic fact; not necessarily a modernistic revival, but rather a historic reversal of cause and effect. Therefore, the Society determined that Ferdawsi was born “1000 years ago…in 934 AD.” Exactly ten centuries later, the ceremonial inauguration by Reza Shah would render the “934” an irrefutable historic truth in official Pahlavi literature. Subsequently, whereas Jackson believed that Ferdawsi “saw the light of day” around 935; Sadiq conveniently alters the date to “around 934” to match the date of the unveiling of the monument.

Territorially speaking, the large region of Khorasan, where Tus was located, as the northeastern province of modern Iran was of geopolitical importance to the central government. For Reza Shah, who had more or less single-handedly unified the country with a series of successful military battle throughout the 1920s, Khorasan’s geographic position was as politically strategic as it had been in the previous century. The Russian conquest of Merv in 1885 increased Khorasan’s importance as the northeastern province of Iran and the strategic link between Russia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. In the 1920s, it again became a contended

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95 Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 198.
96 Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 198.
97 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 73.
98 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 1-2. This was also a period of confusion because on April 1, 1925, the Majlis passed the Law of Rectification of the Official Calendar. All dates were substituted by the solar in lieu of the lunar rotation. The next morning, 1343 had become 1304.
99 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 280; and Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 2.
100 “In 1885, Russia’s eventual conquest of Merv would trouble Iranians, particularly since it would bring their northern neighbor to the threshold of the country’s northeastern province, Khurasan.” Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 39.
territory between the British Raj, the Soviet expansionist tendency, and the Iranian national interest. Khorasan was also a domestic concern for the secular state, for its capital, Mashhad, had strong clerical influence, bolstered and sustained by the imposing presence of the Imam Reza Shrine, the "Ka’bah of the hopes of Iranians" and the most venerated Shi’a pilgrimage site in Iran. More specifically, the 1935 clash of the shah’s troupes with anti-secularist demonstrators in Imam Reza Shrine, would underscore the central function of such places, not only as religious destinations but also as problematic harbors of political resistance vis-à-vis Tehran’s central government. The immediate erection of a national monument in Tus, that could potentially rival and eventually undermine Mashhad’s Shi’a importance, acquired an urgent geopolitical dimension. The state’s tenacity to undercut ulama power in Mashhad as well as to guarantee territorial integrity in Khorasan meant the revival of Tus’ ancient and medieval prominence. The erection of a monument in Tus, commemorating a national hero in his hometown, would, it was hoped, put the isolated town on Iran’s modern map. In Ferdawsi’s modern mausoleum, the SNH and Tehran’s secular government saw a potential rival to the potency of Imam Reza’s shrine.

To finally determine the exact place and date of Ferdawsi’s death so as to initiate tomb construction, the German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld was employed by the SNH. His subsidized travels in Khorasan during summer 1925 resulted in four photographs, two labeled as “Tus, Firdausi’s grave.” The first image, “Neg. No. 2997,” depicted a local man standing in a

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101 Bahar, August 21, 1917. Bahar was a liberal nationalist newspaper that was published out of Mashhad by a few thinkers of the nationalist movements. The text read, “Khorasan! That piece of glittering gold in Iran, that Ka’bah of the hopes of Iranians, Khorasan! Khorasan glitters like gold in the reélection of the great leadership and distinguished services of its sons in the early days of the constitution when their blood was expended in war with Iran’s enemies both internal and external.” Also, see Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 107. Since Khorasan and its principal city Mashhad never developed a strong middle class, it also was never a leading actor in the constitutional movement. However, regardless of nationalism, Khorasan was always perceived by the central government in Tehran as a territory of potential foreign annexation. “Although the social base for nationalism was weak in Khorasan, the geographical basis for autonomy was strong. Khorasan is a large, economically self-contained area which is a long distance from Tehran. The maintenance of central control was traditionally difficult because of the problem of communications. Either Khorasan was to be reached by crossing the harsh desert that licked the southern foothills of the Elburz or by crossing the Elburz and approaching Mashhad via the east Caspian. Either way presented difficult access.” Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 107. Between 1919 and 1922, there was a separationist movement in Khorasan involving Ahmad Qavam, Sayyed Zia Tabataba’i, Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pesyan, and Colonel Reza Khan. For details, see Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 107-110.

102 “On February 14, 1923 Herzfeld left Berlin on what was to become a most productive expedition of discovery and research. He returned to Berlin from the second part of the trip at the end of October 1925. The journals of these trips are numbers N-83/65 in the Archive. The final Journal, covering his stay in Mashhad and the trip from there to Tehran is, unfortunately, not in the Archive. He published a summary of the trip as ‘Reiseberich’ in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Neue Folge V (Leipzig, 1926).” Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives, Catalogue of the Herzfeld Archive (Washington D.C., 2000), 8.
barren garden, a “field of wheat” to evoke Curzon (Figs. 3.7). It will be noted that like Sykes and Jackson before him, Herzfeld photographed the spot where he believed Ferdawsi had been buried in an identical manner: in all three images, a local peasant appeared on the alleged spot. Herzfeld’s second image, “Neg. No. 2993,” included a larger spectrum of the same garden; in the horizon a mud wall along with a mule were visible. Enigmatically, the shot identified simply as “Tus, Neg. No. 2992,” was a close shot of a tombstone, partially sunk in the ground (Fig. 3.9). The stone with medieval Muslim ornamentation, measured approximately two meters in length, and half a meter in width and depth. Herzfeld’s final image, similarly labeled “Tus. Neg. No 2991,” depicted a different grave (Fig. 3.10). Fractured in one place and darker in color, the tombstone appeared unembellished but firmly fastened to the ground. These images constituted Herzfeld’s unpublished materials on Tus; arguably photographed in an attempt to find Ferdawsi’s grave still hesitantly labeled as “Tus.” The fact that Herzfeld made two images of two different gravestones hinted at the presumption that he failed to discover Ferdawsi’s grave.

The anxiety of finding a viable original burial-place was mirrored in that which he did publish soon after his return to Tehran. As elaborated in chapter 1, the Society’s first publication, Brief Inventory of Iran’s Historical Heritage and Edifices (1925), although betrayed Herzfeld’s claim to certainty, nevertheless was vital to the myth of the “exact spot.” In it, under the heading of Khorasan, the second point listed the city of Tus. Here, the first point stated: “the place of Ferdawsi’s grave in the vicinity of Razan gate.” It was not “the grave,” but rather “the place” of the grave. The ambiguity was further revealed by the “vicinity of,” only to clarify, at last, that of “Razan gate.” Herzfeld’s index had taken the historiography of Ferdawsi’s grave a step closer to its imagined authentic origin. The publication of such a list by the SNH, finally, confirmed the approximate spot in Ferdawsi’s own garden somewhere within the city walls as passed on by Aruzi, Ibn Isfandiar, Sykes, and Jackson. Still, in August 1925, no one knew where the “exact spot” was “really” located, not even the scholar who had successfully concocted the index of Iran’s patrimony. The selectivity and arbitrariness of Herzfeld’s index becomes plainly

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103 Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives, Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape” volume 1, #111 and #112.
104 Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape” volume 1, #113.
105 Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape” volume 1, #114.
106 See chapter 1 in this study for the history and origins of this index. Society for National Heritage 1 Ferhest Mokhtasar az Asar va Ebni-e Tarikhi-e Iran [Brief inventory of Iran’s historical heritage and edifices] (Tehran, 1925), 10.
107 SNH, Inventory of Historic Monuments, 10.
transparent with a closer examination of events during that period. The text, written a year before the official (un/dis)covery of the grave by the SNH, predetermined the historicity of the artifact, if it existed at all. For the author of the index, the tomb solely had a symbolic value based on the simple fact that he never saw the art object that he indexed.\(^\text{108}\) Herzfeld was not only documenting but also reviving a national heritage the existence of which was uncertain.

The dilemma of the spot was worked out within the tight circle of the SNH. “I was given this assignment” and “here we began our search.”\(^\text{109}\) According to the man who was finally sent from Tehran to do the discovering as late as in April 1926, this was “the first step” of the Society.\(^\text{110}\) Shahrokh noted in his diary that in Mashhad, “I met the local high-ranking government officials,” including the caretaker (vali) of Imam Reza Shrine, as well as “many notables of Khorasan,” and arrived at “Gha’em Magham’s garden” in Tus, which was “said to have belonged to Ferdawsi [sic.].”\(^\text{111}\) Sadiq relayed the same story: with the state’s “protection” and “assistance,” in spring of 1926, Shahrokh “himself belonging to the Zoroastrian faith” – implying Ferdawsi’s modern appropriation as an advocate of Zoroastrianism – was sent to “clarify in an exact (daqiq) and correct (sahih) manner” the place of the grave.\(^\text{112}\) The SNH’s report-book, the *Karnameh*, using Sadiq’s memoirs as the only voice of authority, elaborated on the incident:

The treasurer of the *anjoman* [who was also] the chairman of Majlis’ office of Mohashereh, went to Tus to decide on the location of the tomb. From the locals, they found out that the garden that belongs to Hajj Mirza Mohammad Ali Qayem Magham al-Tolieh is that of Ferdawsi’s. With the cooperation of the governor of Khorasan, commander of the West Corps, General Amanollah Jahanbani, Majlis representative…and the caretaker (vali) of Imam Reza Shrine, the two members of the SNH started to look for the tomb in the garden. They found it. After [further] search, they discovered a plateau (takht-gah) and by clearing the dust, they realized it was the tomb.\(^\text{113}\)

Based on his inquiry with learned men of Khorasan, officials of Tus, and surrounding villagers, Shahrokh concluded that the garden of Qayem Magham “is exactly” the garden of Ferdawsi.\(^\text{114}\)

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\(^\text{113}\) The date given in the *Karnameh* is Ordibehesht 1305, equivalent to April 1926. SNH, *Karnameh*, 29-30.

With the help of the commander of West Corps, General Amanollah Jahanbani and those who had accompanied Shahrokh from Mashhad to Tus, they “dug until they reached a platform.” Narrative over narrative fortified the story further; the _Karnameh_ quoting Sadiq who in turn referred to Shahrokh’s report to the SNH after his discovery: “with the removal of the dirt, traces (asar) of the grave appeared; this platform which was six meters long and five meters wide was the tomb of Ferdowsi!”

Shahrokh’s own account in his dairy loosely corresponded with that of the _Karnameh_ / Sadiq’s with several complications. After a “very difficult” journey through unpaved agricultural lands, Shahrokh arrived in “Tous.” Although he forgoes naming “Mr. Afsar” as his SNH companion from Tehran, the minutes of a Majlis dispute on June 3, 1930 revealed that Afsar along with “Amanollah Mirza Amir Lashgar,” and other “dignitaries” from Khorasan rummaged around “the said to be” garden for the national “trace.” In the “very large” and “well-planned” apricot garden, adjacent to “the Eslamieh” side of the town as per Percy Sykes’ 1908 schematic map, Shahrokh noticed “a raised dry ground” five by six meters in dimensions (see Fig. 3.3). To eliminate all doubt, “[t]he old men of the nearby villages,” Shahrokh underscored, “were confident that this was the place where Ferdowsi had been buried.” That anonymous “old man,” it will be recalled, had directed Fraser, Sykes, and Jackson to the “exact spot” in 1822 and 1908 respectively; or perhaps, the nameless local had also posed for Herzfeld’s photograph in 1925. In passing, Shahrokh also mentioned that “a few” unnamed “French experts” who had groped around Tus and corroborated the equally unidentified “historic evidence” of the grave’s place. The pseudoscientific evidence, furthermore, was found next to the “ruins of two mud-brick rooms” missing a roof along with “pieces of broken bricks,” caused by an earthquake. In the 1930 Majlis dispute, Shahrokh reiterated this evidence, “we did not see traces of any building there, except the ruins of two mud-brick rooms.” The plateau was dug about one meter deep in order to expose the tombstone. Here was seen the “trace of two small graves.” After a century of anticipation, it seems, the “exact spot” was finally authenticated. It must have been a historic milestone.

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115 Sadiq, _Memoirs_, 4: 199.
116 SNH, _Karnameh_, 30.
117 Shahrokh, _Memoirs_, 74.
118 Shahrokh, _Memoirs_, 74.
119 Shahrokh, _Memoirs_, 159.
120 Shahrokh, _Memoirs_, 73.
moment, if it were true for even based on those accounts that ascertain such a euphoric instant, the authors were too few and the variables too many.

It is nevertheless remarkable: the “trace” of a grave that soon “appeared” under centuries of “dust,” in a garden “said to have” belonged to Ferdawsi in “the vicinity of” some gate, was “dusted off” and “discovered” by men who had made “a difficult” trip exactly for that purpose. It was bound to be found. To seal the indisputability of the case, it was (re)certified by “old” but “confidant men,” inspired by their memories. The “wisdom” handed down to “some very aged locals” by their “ancestors,” as Shahrokh later wrote, remained the final authority on this historic matter. By the time he returned to the capital to report his findings to the SNH, the ancestral trace had evolved into a national exactitude. “Now we felt certain,” he concluded. However, not everyone bought the SNH’s claim on the exact place or date of that which was being celebrated. The British were particularly skeptical about the entire Ferdawsi episode. In their 1934 annual report, they observed, “A costly mausoleum of marble” has been unveiled “at the poet’s supposed birth-place…” “The celebrations were designed,” according to later commentators, “to remind the Iranians that their great poet and patriot had extolled the glorious achievements of the earlier Persians and to inspire the modern descendants to participate in a renaissance of the nation.”

The big discovery gave rise to two major problems for the SNH: land and money. In order to erect a national monument on the chosen site, the Society had to either buy or convince the government to confiscate the property of Hajj Mirza Mohammad Ali Qayem Magham al-Tolieh – the actual owner of the “said to be garden of Ferdowsi [sic.].” In either case, the issue would crash into bureaucratic obstacles. In addition to an ephemeral remark during his 1930 speech in the Majlis, Shahrokh wrote that Qayem Magham “presented 20,000 square meters” of his property to the shah, who “transferred the Deed” to the SNH and then “to me.” Sadiq, on the other hand, noted that Qayem Magham simply “donated his 23,000 square meters” to the

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121 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 74.
122 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 73.
124 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 161.
125 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 73.
126 During the 128 sitting of the Seventh Session of the Majlis on June 3, 1930; see Shahrokh, Memoirs, 79 and 158-159.
An additional 7,000 square meters were added to the land by his son, Malek Eltejar; “in this manner, 30,000 square meters were ready for the initiation of the project.” The Karnameh merely reiterates Sadiq’s misleading interpretation of events; “Qayem Magham made a gift of his land to the SNH.” While none of the accounts were complete, all contained a trace of the following reconstruction.

Offstage, the issue was settled in full accord with Rezaian methods: the land was, most likely, nationalized as of Shahrokh’s return to Tehran in April 1926 and even earlier. Its owner was promised an equal sized territory to be transferred from one of Astan-e Qods-e Razavi’s vast properties in Khorasan. In a sense, a private citizen’s estate was to become a national park, while its price was reimbursed by Mashhad’s Imam Reza Shrine and its clerical authorities. However, as late as July 13, 1927, the hand over had not materialized; at which point, Qayem Magham sent a telegraph addressed to the person of the shah: “...two payments are due to me by Astan-e Qods ever since four years ago...please give the orders for the compensation...” The correspondent’s claim of “four years have passed,” situated the land confiscation around 1923 – three years before Shahrokh’s discovery and two years that of Herzfeld’s index of historical heritage. It also marked the year when the Society’s members attained a tight control over the Iranian government.

In regards to Qayem Mangham’s predicament, Reza Shah acted promptly and, no doubt, personally. For a mere eight days later, the Pahlavi court received another telegram from Mashhad with an affirmative message: “10,000 zar’ land has been offered and for its details, you will receive Astan-e Qods’ report.” In this case, this meant little in way of settlement; it merely signified the beginning of negotiations. In response, Teymurtash dispatched two concise letters on July 24, reassuring Qayem Magham that “in connection with your dues, after necessary

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128 SNH, Karnameh, 30.
129 Astan-e Qods, or the “sacred threshold,” is the religious and charitable establishment of the eight Shi’a Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, one of the biggest landowner of Khorasan. Its caretaker is called the vali historically under the monarch’s trustee. In Pahlavi Iran, it was run by Reza Shah’s court ministry.
130 Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Documents on Archaeology in Iran: Excavations, Antiquities and Historical Monuments (Tehran, 2001), 369-370. Document 113, letter 1: communication between Court Minister and the Society for National Heritage in regards to the transfer of land for the erection of Ferdawsi’s tomb; 21/4/1306 or July 13, 1927; Mashhad.
131 If we are to believe Sadiq’s “30,000 square meter,” then “10,00 zar’” is probably equal to the former. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 370. Document 113, letter 2: communication between Court Minister and the Society for National Heritage in regards to the transfer of land for the erection of Ferdawsi’s tomb; Tir 29, 1306/July 21, 1927, Mashhad.
investigations, the appropriate action will be taken." The second letter was directed to the SNH along with Astan-e Qods' report and Qayem Magham's reply to it. After two meetings in August and September, the SNH finally reacted to the Court Ministry on October 12, 1927. Hasan Esfandiari, the Society's secretary, solicited the royal court for the transfer of the land ownership to the SNH "as soon as possible." More notably, Esfandiari indicated that although "Mister Motevali Bashi" has requested the drawing (naqsheh) of the tomb in order to define the property limits, the SNH believed that such a "drawing is not necessary." The "only prerequisite" was, he stressed, to divide the land "in such a manner as to allow the place of the grave to appear at its center." The supposed place of a grave-as-trace now conditioned the entire scheme of the project. Further, "Mister Arbab Keikhosrow" was to enter into dialogue for the accessibility of water on the land and any other "details to be prescribed in the deed." The Society was getting into a process beyond its technical ability or the willingness to get its hands dirty.

The final solution to the complications entailed a military impetus. From the War Ministry, Commander of West Corps Jahanbani, who had personally rumbled "the said to be garden" two years earlier, reported to the royal court the following, rather promising, developments:

One set of deed which has been written in the name of [the shah] by... Qayem Magham in connection with the donation of 10,000 zar land for the purpose of... Ferdawsi's tomb is

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133 Only the cover letter has survived. Ministry of Culture, *Archaeology in Iran*, 369. Document 113, letter 0: communication between Court Minister and the Society for National Heritage in regards to the transfer of land for the erection of Ferdawsi's tomb; Mordad 1, 1306/July 24, 1927, Tehran.
The army’s intervention seems to have solved the problem, for less than a month later on January 17, 1928 a contract was signed between Qayem Magham and the shah’s trusted Court Minister Teymurtash. Attached to the minister’s cover letter to the SNH came the deed of land ownership, sealed by the royal stamp, and followed by the actual contract; it read, “This land is being remitted to the *anjoman-e asar-e melli* for the construction of Hakim Abd al-Qasem Ferdawsi’s tomb.” It not only described the exact limits of the property, but also managed to position the now (un)covered grave both conceptually and physically as the centerpiece of the nation. Five days after the signing of the deed and one day before their annual meeting, Shahrokh congratulated the Pahlavi court on behalf of the SNH for the imminent “days of glory and magnificence.”

Money was the second problem that the SNH never managed to fully tackle; instead it perpetuated its entanglement during most of the building process. For some parliamentarians the expenditure proposed for an unpretentious landmark was, no doubt, perplexing. To dig out a piece of tombstone, to claim it as the final resting-place of “our national hero,” and to ask for thousands of tomans for its erection must have seemed odd; but to no avail. The SNH was persistent. On June 20, 1927, Shahrokh rose on the Majlis floor and clarified that “the Anjoman founded for the purpose of protecting all that is necessary for the progress of Iran, has decided to re-build Ferdawsi’s grave, which has almost disappeared, and of which nothing is left today but a mound of rubble [sic.]” He also explained that the Society had managed to collect the sum of 3,738 tomans for a design that demanded 25,000. To compensate for the difference, the parliament would have to authorize 20,000 tomans savings from the current year to be dispensed to the SNH for its monumental expenses. The bill that had been prepared and signed by ninety-
two parliamentarians, was presented to the assembly to be “esteemed by the National Consultative Majlis” as Shahrokh hoped.142

However, nine days later, during the 125th sitting of the sixth assembly, parliamentarians like “Mr. Firouzabadi” and “the other gentlemen” made a case against the proposition. In response, “I fear talk is cheap and when action is called for, we shilly-shally,”143 Shahrokh further “reminded” them that “services must be appreciated and traitors punished” since an “expenditure on a worthy cause such as this is not a waste, and remains a national asset for all time.” The case was argued based not only on the durability of architecture, but also on its worth as a national heritage. “A lot of money is being wasted in this country,” Shahrokh said disappointedly, still the Majlis is unwilling to memorialize a man “who helped revive our national pride.”144 A certain “Mr. Adl” rose in Shahrokh’s defense. He proposed that the Zoroastrian deputy himself become the Majlis’ representative to the SNH. In other words, the sum would be approved only if Shahrokh were willing to “personally supervise the entire operation.”145 His logic was based on the idea that “since the Anjoman is not answerable to” the Majlis, “we must appoint our own supervisor;” after all, Adl pointed out, it is “the Majlis’ money!”146 Perhaps, Adl had a specific point in mind, addressing the silent concern of many parliamentarians: in a sea of corrupt bureaucrats, the Zoroastrian representative had a reputation of an honest man. “I don’t think there is anyone amongst you gentlemen,” Adl carried on, “who doubts Arbab Keikhosrow’s ability, and even though the Anjoman...would be in charge, the Arbab ought to be entrusted with the supervision of all the expenditures.”147 The proposal certainly made sense for not only was Shahrokh the treasurer of the SNH, but also had a personal stake in the success of the project. Whereas in digging at Persepolis and erecting neo-Achaemenid buildings Reza Shah sought a political legitimacy, through such architectural ventures Shahrokh dreamed of the return of Iran’s “identity, language and nationalistic principles,” which he declared had been “totally lost – about to disappear.”148 With each bill proposed to the Majlis in support of such architectural undertakings, the introduction of the “Persian solar calendar” and efforts on language purification, he saw Iran a step closer to his

conception of a progressive and modern Iran. In this particular case, his efforts paid off. Right before the weekend on a Thursday, the assembly approved The 1306 Law of July 21, 1927. Endorsed by seventy-eight to eighty-nine votes, the proposition read, “The majlis-e shora-ye melli authorizes its Audit Office (edare-ye mo’asherat) to use the saving of year 1306, amounting to 20,000 tomans for the construction of the tomb. Added to this sum will be the amount collected by the anjoman and will be spent with the supervision of the Office of Services” of the parliament. Since it was underscored that the sum was to be spent under the Office’s direct supervision, in a sense, Iran’s parliament itself became the actual client of Ferdawi’s modern mausoleum.

In the Iranian mass media, however, Reza Khan not only was the sole rejuvenator of the name of Ferdawi, but also the one who paid for the construction of his tomb. During the 1970s, pro-Pahlavi literature maintained that in 1923, Nobahar newspaper had reported that the shah “has given hand to the care and beautification of Ferdawi’s tomb, and in this manner has permitted his name to be imprinted on the minds of the living.” The article had apparently reminded its readers that it was “the Sardar Sepah [General], this great man,” who “has paid the cost of the care of this great historic man from his own pocket.” During much of the Pahlavi era, while it was commonly believed that Reza Shah decreed the allocation of funds for the project after his June 1922 trip to Tus, it is now clear that all the activities related to Ferdawi’s mausoleum, including the spot’s (un)covering and the financing, took place many years later; and almost none, by the king’s initiative. In 1976, the Karnameh would go further and advance the myth of “the leader’s pocket” by evoking the memories of the one man who had been central to the project. “Keikhosrow [Shahrokh] recalled the time when Reza Shah went to...Tus in 1310 [1931],” according to the Karnameh, “and asked who had constructed the road between Mashhad, Qutchan, and Tus.” Reportedly, the shah was told that the Transportation Ministry had done it for 3,000 tomans to which he had answered: “This tomb and its road has to

149 The Law of Tir 29, 1306. Tir 29, 2486 Royal Calendar and Moharam 21, 1346 AH.
151 Nobahar 28-29 (Jozey 3-4, 2482 royal calendar); quoted in Yaghma’i, Karnameh-e Reza Shah, 408-409.
152 Yaghma’i, Karnameh-e Reza Shah, 410.
153 SNH, Karnameh, 34.
be built by the people;” and since, “he himself is part of the people,” he would pay 3,000 tomans “out of his pocket to the government” as his contribution to the project.  

British diplomats reported that while the Tehran-Mashhad and Kerman-Tus roads had been “extensively repaired” in 1934, the Gorgan-Mashhad road had been “hastily built for the King’s journey” in 1931 so when he reached Tus, Reza Shah was “very angry.”  

Greeted by Khorasan’s Governor Mirza Mahmud Khan Jam, Caretaker of the Imam Reza Shrine Assadi, as well as other officials, the shah inquired about the cost and labor for the road. According to Shahrokh’s dairy, “the king” had said “since all the work connected with the mausoleum was being done by the nation, there was no reason why the Ministry of Highways [Transpiration] should pay the cost from the government’s fund;” hinting that he would instead. Shahrokh felt that “it is a great honour that His Majesty should consider himself one of the people.”  

While it is likely that Reza Shah did pay his promised 3,000 tomans for the road, the amount would prove to be an immaterial fragment of the sum asked by the SNH for the constitutions in Tus. It, nevertheless, remains unclear exactly when and how many times did the shah visit the construction site. Shahrokh while lacking any indication of time, added that the shah’s inspection not only included “the pool, two buildings on either side of it, and a part of the mausoleum” but also, more interestingly, “the model” of Ferdawsi’s tomb; an intriguing clue to which I have not found any other references.  

By the summer of 1930, though more than 25,000 tomans had been spent, there was no trace of a monument, much less a monumental structure. In the middle of the financial crisis, the question was again taken to the seventh session of the Majlis, where on June 3rd Ferdawsi’s very “merit” was attacked. Again, a representative to the parliament, Firouzabadi, maintained that 80,000 tomans was excessive because “to write poetry does not merit all this appreciation.” If the Majlis had that amount to spend, others contended, “It would be best spent on the holy places of pilgrimage,” for after all, Ferdawsi was “only a poet” who did not “merit such

154 SNH, *Karnameh*, 34.
memorialisation.” Shahrokh was “indeed surprised” for “however much we try and show our appreciation, it would be insufficient.” It seems the matter had become that of having earned the historic right to be glorified in modern times. From this episode it can be concluded that the Ferdawsi’s mausoleum project belonged to a small group of elite who, unlike some in the Majlis, conceived the eventual success of the job as a modern site of civic pilgrimage, as important, if not more, as Shi’a holy shrines. The opposition maintained that places like Mashhad and Qom were, in effect, “our true heritage,” national or otherwise. Regardless, the electorates remained divided. Shahrokh rose again to defend the SNH’s position: an “estimated 60,000 tomans” needed for the construction, 21,000 had been spent; it was unclear to him “where Firouzabadi got his figures.” Eventually, Shahrokh was convincing. “I proposed 10,000 tomans” to be paid from Majlis’ “special fund.” The proposition was approved by a majority vote; the “dissenters” gave the “appropriate answer.” These fierce disputes in the parliament ended with The 1308-1309 Law of June 24, 1930 contributing another 10,000 tomans to the Society from those years’ savings. By then, the total amount of 33,738 tomans had been allocated to the monument. Financially speaking, however, this was the tip of the iceberg.

- **Spot Assembled**

Money and land in hand, the SNH’s Board of Trustees went to work. As of the approval of 1306 Law and the signing of the land deed in January 1928, the SNH enthusiastically began the design of the actual monument. Gathered at former Prime Minister and emanate scholar Hasan Pirnia’s residence, the sole issue at hand, on December 11, 1927, had been the “determination” of the tomb’s “drawing (naqsheh),” while the next two assemblies were focused on adding to the members of the Society. The committee had to approve four membership applications to push with the progress of the design. The candidate included Director of *Vaqf* Office Mirza Ahmad Khan Saidi, Head of Inspectors of Education Ministry Ali Asghar Hekmat, Head of Personnel Office of Public Instructions Mirza Seyyed Khan Nafisi, and more germane, a

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certain Karim Taherzadeh Behzad. While the latter was described in the SNH’s correspondence as a “graduated architect/engineer (me’mar) and drawer/painter (naqash) who has just returned from Berlin,” in Shahrokh’s memoirs, he was promoted to “a prominent Iranian architect of his time.” The Society’s dealings with Taherzadeh would, nonetheless, prove to be an unhappy one. At Mohammad Ali Forughí’s house in the following February, these four men became members of the SNH most probably to prevent future bureaucratic obstacles. Equipped with necessary work force, by April 1928 the details of the structure were again the sole concern. It was, no doubt, during that meeting the committee reviewed the first two proposal drawings by Ernest Herzfeld and Taherzadeh, the prospective architects of the project. While according to Sadiq, “Herzfeld, Godard, and Taherzadeh proposed drawings and the Anjoman approved the drawing of the actual structure,” Shahrokh clarified that “at first, Hertsfeld was asked to prepare a drawing [sic.],” then Taherzadeh “too was approached.” Finally, “the latter’s scheme was selected, at the estimated cost of 20,000 tomans;” a bid that corresponded the bill approved by the parliament.

For reasons completely lost to history, Herzfeld’s design was rejected by the SNH. Yet, among his unpublished drawings, archived at the Freer Gallery, a single pencil sketch on a yellow velum, entitled “Project: Tomb of Ferdawsi,” demonstrates that Herzfeld did proposed a scheme (Fig. 3.11). In it, a three-dimensional perspective depicted a small-scale replica of a typical Achaemenid royal palace, while a small sketch of a plan, revealed a tripartite interior. In the foreground of the structure, the pairs of columns with bull-headed capitals were intended, no doubt, to connote Zoroastrian and monarchical readings of Ferdawsi’s Shahnameh; whereas the conic-dome tower in the background might have symbolized the medieval architecture of

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165 Tir 3, 1309 H. Sh. or 2489 Royal calendar. Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 135, Document 88, pp. 1-5; Yearly report 1309, Tehran. Also, see SNH, Karnameh, 26; and Yaghma‘i, Karnameh-e Reza Shah, 410.
166 Hosayn Taherzadeh Behzad, a relative of Karim Taherzadeh Behzad, was the court painter (naqash-e darbar) during the late Qajar era. From 1922 to 1928, he worked on Reza Shah’s Shahvand Palace - later renamed Green (Sabz) Palace-Museum - in Sa‘adatabad. He executed, with utmost skill and attention to details, the twenty 1.5 by 5 meters panels in the office of the shah and his dining room. The exquisite work consisted of gilding and illustration on the walls with natural colors.
168 Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 203; and Shahrokh, Memoirs, 75.
Ferdawsi’s lifetime. Evidence without context is ambiguous at best, but this study could perhaps speculate several reasons for the Society’s rejection of Herzfeld’s proposal: practically, his design might have seemed far more complicated and extensive, in terms of construction and scale, when compared to the single-chamber monument that was later proposed and selected; architecturally, his design might not have looked either “modern” or monumental enough to a group of men committed to rapid modernization through architecture; and socio-politically, the SNH might have hesitated to erect a landmark with such explicit Zoroastrian associations, for despite the state’s secularization efforts, few Iranians had forgotten that Ferdawsi had always been a Shi’a Muslim. Alternately, behind closed doors politics of rivalry or theories on aesthetics might have made the case against Herzfeld’s candidacy. We will, surely, never find out.

In the interim, Shahrokh was assigned to return to Khorasan “to make the necessary arrangements” and, more importantly, to lay the cornerstone of the new structure. In the presence of the architect Taherzadeh, Governor of Khorasan Jam, and “other important personalities,” the foundation stone was placed. The local committee that was to closely supervise the construction work consisted of these men in addition to the caretaker (vali) of the Imam Reza Shrine and Khorasan’s head of the army and police. Officially, work began on September 3, 1928. While during the SNH’s annual assembly in May, Shahrokh reported the project was “making headway,” Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, the recently appointed governor of Khorasan and an SNH member, informed the headquarter that it was, in fact, “not progressing satisfactorily.” This time accompanied by Reza Shah’s personal stonemason from Zanjan, Ostad Hosayn Hajjar Bashi, Shahrokh returned to Tus to find nothing more than a “mud-line foundation and some weak stones.” He was outraged for the foundation of this national monument was “so weak,” he later wrote, “that I could break it with my fingers.”

As of his return to Tehran, Shahrokh cautioned the SNH about the situation in Tus. He assured its Trustees that it was not his fault for he had repeatedly asked Taherzadeh to “appraise”

170 The exact date was Friday, May 18, 1928 or Ordibehesht 27, 1307 H. Sh. or 2487 Royal Calendar; see Yaghma’i, Karnameh-e Reza Shah, 410.
171 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 75.
172 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 76; and Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 354. Document 111, letter 9: session instructions and invitation letters of the Society for National Heritage; Ordibehesht 21, 1307/May 11, 1928, Tehran. Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh was a prominent SNH and elite member as stated above and in chapters 1 and 2 in this study. The annual public/general meeting took place in the Ministry of Ma’aref on Ordibehesht 21 at 3 pm. The agenda included the reading of the annual report and was signed by Hosayn Ala, the secretary of the SNH.
173 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 76.
the progress of the “structural work,” yet “I never got a satisfactory answer.” Nor did the “dignitaries” of the Mashhad committee exhibit much concern about the meager state of affairs. Immediately, a complete new team was hired. The new contractor, Hosayn Aqa Lorzadeh, and the new project manager and site accountant, Taqi Dorudian, were selected and sent directly from Tehran. To rectify the situation further, the new stonemason, Hajjar Bashi selected a “very strong, glossy patterned stone” from the Khalaj quarry six kilometers from Mashhad. The architect, whose “unfinished pyramidal roof” had cracked in several places and had been replaced by “another design based on Persepolis,” proved himself unfit for the job. It must have been during the March 6, 1932 meeting that the Board of Trustees fired Taherzadeh for malpractice and urgently “commissioned” a more competent architect.

The most intriguing visual documentation of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was, undoubtedly, the one recorded on November 18, 1933. Robert Byron, British traveler and Oxford University graduate, who has been credited for inventing “post-Victorian travel-writing,” stopped in Tus, on his way from Greece to Afghanistan, to photograph the new landmark in the midst of its ill-starred construction (Fig. 3.12). The illustration was unique because the familiar white stone base, crowned with a brick pyramidal roof, was being documented, as far as we know, for the first and the last time. Although not in the same place – i.e. in Byron’s photo collection donated to Harvard University, but rather separately in his travelogue – the image was accompanied by a commentary. Described as having had a “magnetic influence on later writers,” The Road to Oxiana (1937) was published four years after the date of the photograph; in it, Byron described the un-illustrated monument:

[N]ext year will see the thousandth anniversary of Firdausi’s birth. Foreigners have heard of Firdausi. They esteem him as only a poet can be esteemed whom no one has ever read. And it is expected, therefore, that their tributes will flatter not his work so much as his nationality. Such at least is the Persian hope... Tus, long silent between the mountains and the desert, will

174 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 76.
175 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 76-77; and Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 202.
176 Even though his original drawings have not survived, at least not in the obvious places, the current monument, with the exception of minor decorative changes, was finally erected based on André Godard’s blueprint(s). Both narratives agree with the new employees; see Shahrokh, Memoirs, 79; and Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 202.
177 N. Malcolm, “Bright Young Thing in Afghanistan,” Sunday Telegraph (December 12, 2003). Robert Byron was born in 1905 in the United Kingdom and spent ten months in 1933-1934 traveling in Iran and Afghanistan. He was quite familiar with both the Orientalist community of Tehran and Iran’s material culture. While his travelogue reads like a fiction and has been criticized as being “superficial,” five years after his travels, he contributed to Ackerman-Pope’s Survey of Persian Art as a specialist on Timurid architecture. Robert Byron Photo, Iran 155, Photo file #13 Me-Ya, Tus – Firdasih Memorial #A47/1666. Aga Khan Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University; and R. Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London, 1st edn., 1937, 2nd edn., 1950).
be the stage of these fragrant utterances. A cenotaph will be unveiled, situated with approximate probability on the site of the poet's grave. This object, which is almost built, proved a pleasant surprise. A square cone, to be covered with white stone, stands on a broad flight of steps. In front of it lies a long pool, framed by lines of trees and announced by a pair of classical pavilions.178

As skeptical as British diplomats about the alleged spot, Byron perceived the monument as a "stage" for political "utterances" fancied by all sides. In terms of design, the "pair of classical pavilions," highly symbolic in and by themselves, seem to have been later removed for no trace of them exists either in photographs or in the present-day garden.179 Surely unaware of the fact that the design of the construction was not a monumental manifestation of local "limited taste," but rather the work of a Beaux-Arts-trained French architect, Byron wrote, "Given the limitations of Oriental taste when confronted with a Western idea, the design is admirable."180 He went on to explain that the "Western part, the cenotaph, is as simple as can be." The "Persian part, the garden," on the other hand, was "beautiful as always; and the two are blended by good proportions." In conclusion, Byron projected the use of the space in the future, anticipating its unceremonious use: "when the ceremonies are over, and only the tinkling goat-bells are heard again, the Firdaussi-lover may find a grateful peace in this unpretentious shrine."181 Byron's physical description of the semi-constructed structure was both singular and telling. The "white stone" and the enigmatic "pyramidal roof" seem to have been the only constants of the project to which even Shahrokh alluded in passing.

Based on Byron's intriguing photograph, we can presume that by November 1933, the monument consisted of a base, the eight ceremonial steps, and a pyramidal crown — all of which were resting on an unstable — or worst, a nonexistent — foundation. The shortcomings of a rapid and uneven development such as the new bureaucratic systems coupled with the unforgiving gaze of the autocrat were, no doubt, the cause of the hasty and deficient groundwork for the heavy edifice; there is no record of any soil test that I could find. In due course, the monument would prove to be far less solid than it looked. In fact, the project was realized only during the last ten months before its inauguration. Byron's photograph, although forgotten under piles of papers in some collection, nevertheless, remains the only document attesting to the perpetually "almost built" condition of the project. Seemingly mundane, the depiction was truly

178 Byron, Road to Oxiana, 83. My emphasis.
179 Three additional sets of steps would be added to each side of the monument proper, which Byron did not depict.
180 Byron, Road to Oxiana, 83.
extraordinary because in it, the monument itself became the ultimate signifier of Iran’s hasty, uneven, and rapid modernization process in the 1920s and 1930s.\(^\text{182}\)

Unsurprisingly, money was depleted – again. Nor could the SNH ask for funding from the Majlis, for the very construction of the monument, from the Society’s own perspective, had to serve a pedagogical function. Money, it believed, had to come from “the people.” “Although funding could have been raised in bulk from the state,” the Karnameh maintained, “the intention of the \textit{anjoman} was that the tomb of the greatest national orator be collected as much as possible from the nation/people (\textit{melat}) in order to elevate their patriotic feelings and make them aware of the importance of their culture and position of their ancestors.”\(^\text{183}\) Sadiq concurred, “Of course it was easy for the state to provide 140,000 tomans… but the SNH’s intention, as well as its patriots, was for the people to participate in this national mission so that their patriotic feelings will be more awakened…”\(^\text{184}\) Following this contention, a lottery committee was formed: Head of the Committee Ebrahim Hakimi, Hosayn Ala, and Shahrokh were appointed from within the SNH; from outside, Representative of the Majlis Abd al-Hosayn Nikpur, Vice President of Iranian and British Petroleum Mostawfi Fateh, as well as representatives from the National Bank of Iran, the police department, and the Mayer of Tehran (Fig. 3.13).\(^\text{185}\) After a public speech delivered by Mohammad Ali Foroughi in the presence of 80,000 participants, the lottery was launched. Ornamented by the monument’s elevation diagram, the first raffle ticket was sold on February 1, 1934, a mere few months before the landmark’s inauguration (Fig. 3.14). While 160,000 tomans were collected, only 70,000 tomans were transferred to the monument’s budget.\(^\text{186}\)

The lottery was significant not only because it enabled the state to advertise its architectural undertaking, but simultaneously instruct the public; a goal prioritized by the SNH as of its founding.\(^\text{187}\) In September 1934 from Tehran’s British embassy to London, “The Firdausi

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\(^{181}\) Byron, \textit{Road to Oxiana}, 83.

\(^{182}\) The national monument was captured in its endless course of becoming, yet never really getting there. The snapshot was a frozen moment, a historic instant in that modernity that never came in the form that its authors had imagined.

\(^{183}\) SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 26.


\(^{185}\) Sadiq, \textit{Memoirs}, 2: 201 and 4: 201. Also, see SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 27-29.

\(^{186}\) Bahman 12, 1312. SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 27; and Sadiq, \textit{Memoirs}, 2: 201.

\(^{187}\) In 1934, the Majlis approved a “new item of interest,” according to the 1934 British Annual Report, “a credit of 40 million rials (£500,000) for public instructional undertakings.” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1606/1606/34, 1934 Annual Report on Persia, Tehran; see Burrell, \textit{Iran Political Diaries}, 9: 1931-1934, 659.
millenialy celebrations [sic.]" was reported as the ‘chief topic’ in the ‘Persian Press,’ even taking precedence over ‘Perso-Iraq relations.’\textsuperscript{188} Subsequently, the topic made the front-page of \textit{Ettela’at} newspaper on a daily basis; articles such as “Farsi and Ferdawsi,” “\textit{Shahnameh} and its Paintings,” “the New Museum in Tehran” soon gave way to the winning raffle numbers, running down the columns, page after page.\textsuperscript{189} The first article in \textit{Ettela’at} referring to the lottery, entitled “Manner of Drawing Ferdawsi’s Lottery,” was meant to educate ordinary people on the mechanism of a nationwide lottery.\textsuperscript{190} The big prize was announced on August 21: a certain “Mesrop Khan Kisian Armani” for the prize of 20,000 tomans, whose portrait, in the Pahlavi hat, along with a detailed biography appeared on the front-page (Fig. 3.1).\textsuperscript{191}

However, right behind closed doors, things had not gone the way either the state or the SNH had anticipated. According to the Armenian representative to the parliament, “Muslim in high positions,” who in all the excitement had never lost sight of the historic fact that Ferdawsi was, in fact, a devout Shi’a, made a fuss about Kisian’s religious and ethnic affiliation as an Armenian Orthodox Christian. While the committee first seems to have decided not to honor the prize, the Majlis representatives for the Armenian and Assyrian minorities intervened to settle the issue.\textsuperscript{192} The story was covered up at the time, as well as later, therefore nothing was recorded. That which could not been suppressed, and became part of Iran’s modern historiography was Reza Shah’s campaign against religious and linguistic minorities beginning that same year, 1934: while Jewish and Zoroastrian deputies of the Majlis were either dismayed

\textsuperscript{188} British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 5698/47/34, G. D. Pybus, September 10, 1934, Tehran; see Burrell, \textit{Iran Political Diaries}, 9: 1931-1934, 570.
\textsuperscript{191} “The Winner of 20,000 Toman Prize in the Ferdawsi Lottery,” \textit{Ettela’at} 2267 (Mordad 30, 1313/August 21, 1934) 1.
\textsuperscript{192} The funding of the Ferdawsi monument’s renovation came from a popular lottery (i.e. people were sold lottery by governmental institutions, Minister of Culture or Institute of National Heritage) for the cost of the renovation. The Cultural Ministry made this a lottery because the Parliament would not approve the budget for Ferdawsi’s renovation. 25,000 tomans was the winning price, which was drawn on the ticket of an Armenian from Tabriz. Muslims in high positions made a problem of this; they did not agree to give the money to the Armenian. Finally, me and others got involved, and the Tabriz man got the lottery money that he had won.” Sevak Saginian, Congressman and the Armenian Representative to the Majlis between 1956 and 1978, in an interview conducted by
or assassinated, Baha’i, Armenian, Assyrian as well as Azeri, Kurdish, and Arab community schools lost their license to teach. By 1938, referring to a series of article in *Ettela’at* what had denounced Christians as “dangerous criminals,” the British legation reported, “such attacks echoed Nazi radicalism and were designed to appeal to the bigoted chauvinists and the most reactionary mullahs.”\(^{193}\) The seemingly apolitical construction of Ferdawsi’s tomb was never situated outside the political map of modern Iran.

Aggravated by the lottery incident, the SNH realized that it could neither depend on the people nor the Majlis for the largest amount of money needed to finally complete the project. After years of collecting loose change, the most substantial sum came from the government during the last six months of construction. Ali Akbar Davar, better known as the mastermind of Iran’s secular judicial system and an unassuming member of the SNH, skillfully manipulated the bureaucratic machine to issue three loans. While the Majlis Laws and popular lottery had been well publicized, the last minute loans were kept secret; nor did the *Karnameh* mention then decades later. The money was directly advanced to the person of the Society’s president, Mohammad Ali Forughi, from the National Bank of Iran (*bank-e melli-e Iran*) – another Pahlavi creation – for which he was held liable. The first came a mere twenty-seven days after the sales of the first raffle ticket for the sum of 10,000 tomans, a contract was signed between Forughi and the bank on February 27, 1934.\(^{194}\) The second loan was transferred to the SNH on June 5 for the substantial amount of 45,000 tomans. “It is with Forughi’s guarantee,” the contract specified, “in case this amount and its interest” of five percent “are not paid by Forughi, then the Ministry of Finance” will be responsible for its repayment.\(^{195}\) The last check for 18,000 tomans was disbursed a few hours before the opening of Ferdawsi’s conference in Tehran on October 4, 1934.\(^{196}\) While Sadiq’s final sum was 140,000 tomans for the construction of the monument, if the confidential loans amounting to 73,000 tomans were to be added, the total equaled to 177,300 tomans, approximately £22,162 in 1934. Considering that the same year’s expenditure of the

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Talinn Grigor, July 29, 2001, Glendale, California. Saginian passed away in October 2003 as this dissertation was being written.


\(^{194}\) Iran National Archives 240, Micro-reel 291, Document 53, pp. 4, 6, 15-17. From Esfand 8, 1312/February 27, 1934 to Tir 15, 1313/July 6, 1934, Tehran.


Iranian government amounted to 62,130,785 tomans – that is £7,766,348 – Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was worth a small fortune.\(^{197}\)

The construction of the monument occasioned an even more interesting episode of public instruction. On September 16, 1930, the short but poignant article, “Bribe Money Spent on Ferdawsi’s Mausoleum,” appeared on *Ettela’at*’s front page. It began:

Today our special correspondent obtained a piece of noticeable news that we found necessary to enlighten the public’s mind by issuing it. Everybody knows that today the habits that were common in the country in particular between some statesmen are dead and eliminated and these acts shall not be practiced anymore and if indeed there are those who...by accepting bribe apply friendship or feud to others should be aware that these acts are ugly and shameful, and that the authorities pay vast attention to these acts. Based on these thoughts, we decided to report all the details to our respectful readers.\(^{198}\)

The issue at hand involved an unnamed Majlis candidate from Khorasan, who had remitted 2,500 tomans to the court minister as bribe money in the hope of favors for reelection. Teymurtash, “infuriated” by “this way of thinking” had sent the bribe back, only to change his mind and accept it the next day. As soon as he had obtained the bribe, Teymurtash had “immediately prepared” and dispatched an open telegram to the Khorasan electorates. Teymurtash’s message was both predictable and unusually clever:

Province of Khorasan,

Mr. ____ has sent me a sum of two thousand five hundred tomans as bribe money to help him in his election. It is extremely timely to use his money for Ferdawsi’s mausoleum which lacks funding. It is evident that this kind of individual does not deserve (*liaqat na-dareh*) to be a member of the Majlis and people should be informed [in order] to avoid electing him.\(^{199}\)

British Foreign Minister Robert Clive’s observation that Teymurtash “always deplored the laziness, the lack of initiative and fear of responsibility of his countrymen, their happy-go-lucky methods; their incapacity for organization” could have had, after all, some basis in reality.\(^{200}\) While the memo was designed to punish the corrupt parliamentarian and barred him from reelection, the article was intended to instruct the public on the “evils of bribery and deceit,” as well as to show the inherent merits of the mausoleum project.

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\(^{199}\) “Bribe Money Spent on Ferdawsi’s Tomb,” *Ettela’at* 28, 160.

Architecturally speaking, however, French architect André Godard was the man who would bring the project to its completion. To begin with, he was already familiar with the site when the SNH asked for his design. His travels to Khorasan in January 1932 had resulted in his own architectural index entitled “Inventory of Immobile Historic Monuments.” 201 The director of Iran’s archeological services did not seem to have much confidence in his German rival’s Brief Inventory, understandably so. Godard’s unpublished index was far more comprehensive and accurate in comparison to that of Herzfeld’s. From his arrival in Iran until his departure thirty years later, Godard had managed not only to personally and systematically visit all the sites, but had also maintained an updated version of the inventory. The notebooks were filled with copies, translation, and studies of various Arabic and Persian inscriptions, of schematic drawings of plans and elevations, etc. Godard’s classification of January 6, 1932 included the city of Tus. “No. 173: Tus. Le Tombeau a coupole dit Gumbad-i Haruniya.” 202 His category of Tus by the Haruniyeh with the absence of a reference to Ferdawsi’s grave demonstrates that as late as 1932, there was no “historic monument” to be found in Tus. Still, it establishes the fact that he had traveled to the city less than a year before his SNH commission.

As the “only foreign architect ever to hold” a position in the Iranian government, Godard proved to be vital to the evolution of architectural culture in modern Iran (Fig. 3.16). 203 Born in Chaumont, Haut Marne, he was accepted at the architectural section of the Beaux-Arts in 1901. 204 Six years later, his studio instructors characterized Godard as “remarkable, true character of an artist.” 205 Although his attendance was “very irregular” caused by his

201 Ullens’ Archives, Godard Notebooks Set II, Notebook 7, “Repertoire,” Harvard Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University. André Godard has left us a total of 10 notebooks, arranged in 2 boxes at the Fine Arts Library. His notebooks are a small part of the much larger archive of Baroness Marie-Thérèse Ullens de Schooten (1905-1989), donation to the Visual Collection by her son in the mid 1990s. The Baroness traveled to Iran regularly between 1951 and 1970 where she met André and Yedda Godards. Subsequently, she became their surrogate daughter as well as travel and research companion. After retirement and return to Europe, the Godards were financially and morally supported by the Baroness. Hence, André’s notebooks were donated along with the incredibly large and diverse Ullens collection to the Harvard University.


204 French national, André Godard was born on January 24, 1881 and died in 1965. The exact date of his acceptance into the Beaux-Arts was May 7, 1901. Paris National Archives, Archives De l’ École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, AJ52 423, Eleve – Architecture LXXXII, January 1, 1911 to December 21, 1920, André Godard.

"obligations to support his family," his progress-reports recorded, "It would be deplorable that an artist as talented as" Godard "would not be able to pursue a career begun with such brilliancy." Before World War II, he partook in archeological missions in Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan, before being sent to Tehran by the French Republic.

No less influential was André’s partner, Yedda Godard, who remained a colleague throughout excavations, publications, and colonial rivalries (Fig. 3.17). While André appears to have been a rather modest man, Yedda comes across as a strong woman, such taken by both the Orientalist discourses and the Western masculine paradigms of modernity. In a conversation, she maintained, with utter certitude that “The Iran of today, in terms of its general aspect, is the immobile Iran of the ancient times...its architecture is absolutely oriental... romantic, calming...magical and inevitably 1001 nights.” Both scholars, nevertheless, worked a lot and talked relatively little about it. This is conspicuous in their travel companion Marie-Thérèse Ullens’ interviews with the architect and his colleague at the end of their careers:

Ullens: During the past thirty years, you have restored all the historic monuments and created the national museum. [Right?]
André: Well, I have not restored all the monuments; there is a lot more to be done, but, yes, I did what I could during the thirty years. Right now, we are working on ten restoration sites.
Ullens: What about the museum? It is you who designed it...and it is you who assembled the collection?
André: Yes, well, someone had to do it!
Ullens: André Godard, decisively you are modest. Therefore, I am going to ask your partner...
Yedda: Satisfaction, yes, but also lots of trouble ...

Within the Iranian cultural context, the Godards, unlike their Iranian colleagues, Sadiq and Shahrokh, were fully trained and fit to live up to such architectural expectations as Ferdawsi’s mausoleum. Unlike them, they approached the discipline of Persian Art with a bit more critical history and paid less lip service to the state. In contrast to their German and American opponents, however, the Godards had far better reputation than either Ernest Herzfeld or Arthur Pope.

208 Ullens Archive Audio Collection, Harvard Semitic Museum, Photographic Archives, Visual Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University; CD #26 UlAuCD In GoA, Y/O; Interview with André Godard, Yedda Godard, and Iranian officials; Track 4.
209 Ullens Archive Audio Collection, CD #26 UlAuCD In GoA, Y/O; Interview with André Godard, Yedda Godard, and Iranian officials; track 6.
Despite financial difficulties, neither André nor Yedda were accused of hiding “several antique objects” in their “personal belongings” while leaving for Europe, as Herzfeld had been. Nor were the Godards stamped with the derogative label of an art dealer, for many agreed that “Pope was a very enthusiastic person who was selling, as it were, literally as well as figuratively, rugs and carpets, Iranian art, Iranian miniatures...to the West and to America.” While the Godards managed to stay clean from such scandals, they constantly faced financial and technical hurdles in working with Iran’s infant modern bureaucracy. In 1931, for instance, Clive reported, “After a temporary absence from Tehran,” the Godards returned to find “the financial estimates” for creating a national museum “had simply been cut out from the [national] budget.”

The Iranian state would, nonetheless, remain the Godards’ chief patron. In parallel to their duties as the directors of archeological services and the heads of the national museum, they were responsible for the master-plan, as well as several individual buildings, on the new campus of Tehran University. André developed and directed the architecture and fine arts curricula modeled after the Beaux Arts system, before becoming the Fine Arts Department’s first dean. In those prominent positions, the Godards not only exercised political power on local authorities, but also, above all, profoundly impacted three generations of Iranian architects, in addition to the very birth and evolution of modern architectural pedagogy in Iran. Their best-known commission was the construction of the archeological museum – Tehran’s Iran Bastan – designed after the last Sassanian palace in Ctesiphon, modern-day Iraq (Fig. 3.18). André’s recreation of the palace’s great iwan would inspire subsequent architects in their own monumental proposals, case in point, Hosayn Amanat’s 1971 Shahyad monument (see Fig. 3.38). The opening of the museum in 1939 was a big step in both Iran’s modern architecture and the SNH’s sense of achievement. After André’s death, Yedda recalled, “Since there was very little fund...two million tomans,” the

210 “Recently Professor Herzfeld at the point of leaving for Europe had several personal antique objects with him which were confiscated by the Custom’s Office for the reason of not having the proper permit.” Iran National Archives Organization, Records on The Archeological Missions in Iran 1875-1966 (Tehran, 2001), 193; letter from Ministry of Public Instructions, signed by Ali Asghar Hekmat, document 113008/8016, month 9, 21, 1312/December 12, 1933, Tehran.
212 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 3611/145/34, Clive, July 11, 1931, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 9: 1931-1934, 73. In the same year, the minister of public instructions, Ali Asghar Hekmat, had intentions to ‘sell’ Godards’ collection of “valuable bronzes from Luristan...for his own profit!” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 3611/145/34, Clive, July 11, 1931, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 9: 1931-1934, 73.
213 See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 119-120.
construction went “very slowly.” To Ullens’ question, whether “Reza Shah inaugurated it himself” when it was finally finished, Yedda replied, “Oh, no! He walked around it to see what it could possibly represent, but never entered it.” Adding, the king “had a strange sentiment...afraid of being ridiculed.”

More importantly perhaps, while Pope and Herzfeld were hired by Western states, universities, or museums, the Godards were the employees of the Iranian government, hence accountable to it. This minor technical difference seems to have had a major role on the actions and attitudes of each of these individuals towards Iran’s architecture, art, and archeology. At the end, what the Godards acquired for Louvre was far more legal, from the Iranian perspective, than what “the black gang” smuggled out of Iran to the Philadelphia museum among others. Alternatively, the Godards’ achievements, on the ground for over an uninterrupted thirty years, would prove to valuable to the local museum and pedagogical economies than Pope’s occasional and, for him highly lucrative, visits to Iran or Herzfeld’s short-term, equally lucrative, excavations at Persepolis. While, half a century later, André’s Iranian students would describe him as “one of the best humans that I have ever known; an extraordinary man,” Pope and Herzfeld would seldom be remembered by contemporary architects. Despite appearances, specifically the one represented by Ackerman-Pope’s The Survey of Persian Art (hereafter SoPA, 1938), the Godards’ contribution remains far more substantial, enduring, and ultimately beneficial for Iran. Therefore, the Godards’ numerous publications on Iranian art, archeology, and architecture between 1934 and 1965 while have not been as valuable to subsequent Western scholars as the SoPA, they do demonstrate, nonetheless, the Godards’ long-term commitment to the study and protection of Iran’s material culture. Their more obscure architectural project was the completion of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, the history of which remained outside mainstream historiographies of Iran’s architecture and politics alike.

214 Ullens Archive Audio Collection, CD #27 UIAuCD In GoA, Y/Of; Interview with Yedda Godard, continued; Track 2, Minutes 35:00. My translation.
215 Yedda Godard interview; Track 2, Minutes 35:00. My emphasis.
216 Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada. Tape 1, Side B. See Appendix 6. Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B; see Appendix 6.
217 Godards’ major works related to Iranian art, architecture, and archeology include Athar-e Iran: Annales du Service Archeologique de l’Iran (Haarlem, 1934-1949); Les Monuments de Maraghā (1934); Le Trésor de Ziwiè (1949); Persépolis (1950); Iran: Persian Miniatures-Imperial Library (UNESCO, 1956); L’Art de l’Iran (Paris, 1962); Art of Iran (London, trans. Heron, 1965). André collaborated with Yedda Godard on Les bronzes de Luristán.
In his dairy, Shahrokh noted in passing that after architect Taherzadeh’s dismissal, “the necessary drawings” were “prepared” by “Mr. Godar who at the time was in Paris [sic.].”

There must have been, however, a number of fine-tunings because Godard was, no doubt, instructed to work with Taherzadeh’s existing foundation and the lower section of the structure. Godard’s rectification, despite lack of documentation, fundamentally changed the image of the monument. The design must have been finalized during the SNH meeting on March 6, 1932, where the first point on the agenda consisted of “the issue of the celebration of Ferdawsi” and the second, “concerning the tomb of Ferdawsi.”

Teymurtash’s presence was of utmost importance because not only was this his last reunion with his brainchild, the Society, but also more importantly, because he “made” a few simple, yet vital, “changes” to the design, only after which the “drawings were approved.”

Structurally, the “cracked pyramidal” dome was removed and replaced by a six-meter cube as seen in the monument’s final form. Historically, the logic of the design, while quite rudimentary, was eccentric and called for architectural expertise. The SNH had felt that since Ferdawsi’s “service to the history and culture of Iran” was “like” that of Cyrus “the Great,” then the “shape” of his resting-place should resemble, “to a certain extent,” to that of Cyrus’ at Pasargadae (Fig. 3.19).

However, from one volume to the other, Sadiq rectified his own story: “About the style of the building...Teymurtash was persuaded that Ferdawsi’s services in regards to the preservation of Iranian nationalism and national authenticity had to be equated to those by Cyrus... hence his mausoleum has to resemble the resting-place of that King of kings.” The switch was explicit in the Karnameh’s adaptation of Sadiq’s earlier version, where in the 1975 publication, the word

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218 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 77.
219 We know that Teymurtash was present at the meeting because his office received and stamped the invitation to back up the accounts of Sadiq and Shahrokh; see Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 355-356. Document 111, letter 11: session instructions and invitation letters of the Society for National Heritage; Esfan 15, 1310/March 6, 1932, Tehran.
220 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 77.
221 While it is well known that both Shahrokh and Forughni were the founding fathers of the first official Freemason Lodge at Tehran in 1909, a reconstruction of the structure in its pyramidal design also points to that direction. A pyramid, elevated on a square base, at the center of which is a small hole, can be interpreted as the potential placement of an eye. If monuments carry multiple meanings, it is possible that the first pyramidal form was intended to stand as an icon to Freemasonry in modern Iran, even if that line of argument will not be developed in this work.
222 “About the style of the tomb, SNH was of the opinion that the services provided by Ferdawsi in reviving the history and culture, [were] similar to the services provided by Cyrus the Great, thus the mausoleum of Ferdawsi should be similar to that of Cyrus in Pasargadae.” Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 200. Also, see SNH, Karnameh, 30.
223 Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 203.
“Teymurtash” was replaced by “asar-e melli [national heritage].” Shahrokh’s account, on the other hand, reconfirmed both Teymurtash’s hands-on involvement in the final approval and his heavy-handed modifications. Shahrokh, along with the other members of the Board, were irritated with the changes. “It should be said,” Shahrokh admitted after Teymurtash’s death, “that the Committee was not very happy with the changes but as it was the wish of the Court Minister, [it] was compelled to agree.”

In retrospect, however, the selected prototype was an obvious choice. Not only was Cyrus perceived by the Pahlavi elite as the founding father of the nation, but also Cyrus’s tomb was the paramount curiosity of Tehran’s scholarly and archeological community in the 1920s. As noted in chapter 1, many, including French and German archeologists, had been in a rush to “find very soon a real Cyrus.” The structure identified as Cyrus’ mausoleum in Pasargadae consisted of a sepulcher 5.25 meters long, 5.30 meters wide and 6 meters high, raised by six steps on a 13.50 by 12.20 meter base. Inspired by archeological reconstructions, the local elite imagined the original form of the tomb as a single monumental structure raised on a series of platforms, arrived at through ceremonial stairs (Fig. 3.20). Herzfeld had proposed two variations on the same theme: “simply a raised platform or one with a cela on the top.”

The second alternative for Ferdawsi’s monument was the so-called “Mausoleum at Hatra” after W. Andrae’s 1912 reconstruction; it served as the other, more obscure, prototype of the design (Figs. 3.21-3.22). Godard was, most likely, inspired by its general morphology, proportion, and decorative logic. Republished in the SoPA, the structure was believed to have been a cubic edifice, raised on a base, flanked by attached columns on each façade. As Oscar

224 SNH, Karnameh, 30.
225 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 77.
228 See E. Herzfeld, Iran in the ancient East: Archaeological Studies (London, 1941), 215 and Plates XLIV; and G. Gullini, Architettura Iranica: degli Achemenidi ai Sasasndi (Torino, 1964), 262-265. Jane Dieulafoy’s reconstruction of Cyrus’ tomb is, however, especially quite different. She proposed that the elevated tomb proper is situated within, not along, a courtyard, itself surrounded with arcaded Doric columns. Whereas Herzfeld proposed that the structure was an integral part and focus of a walled open space, Dieulafoy proposed that it was instead surrounded by such an arcaded space; see J. Dieulafoy, Safar namah-e Madam Dieulafoy (Tehran, 1361/1982), 366. Hatra was brought into western archeological discourse in 1836 by J. Ross, who published the reports “Notes on Two Journeys from Baghdad to the Ruins of Al Hadhr,” Journal of Royal Geographical Society 11 (1839). Hatra became a focus of study for a number of western scholars thereafter. Reuther borrows the reconstructed image from W. Andrea, Hatra II (Leipzig, 1912), fig. 126. Alternatively in W. Andrea and H. Lenzen, “Die Partherstadt Asur”, Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung der Deutschen Orientgesellschaft (Leipzig, 1933), 57; see Ph. Ackerman and A. U. Pope, A Survey of Persian Art (Tehran, 1964), text 1: 439-440.
Reuther, a professor at Technische Hochschule of Dresden, had described in the SoPA’s “Parthian Art” section, “When in perfect condition these Parthian mausolea must have been enclosed cubes either with flat walls or with a decoration of vertical strips of pilasters, and the more pretentious ones must have had engaged columns and been crowned with a cornice.”

The unornamented and elevated base crowned with the cube, housing the tomb chamber, was identical in both designs. Furthermore, the pair of pillars and corner treatments, as well as the monumental staircase leading to the tomb proper, all hinted at a rather successful synthesis between the mausoleums uncovered at Pasargadae and Hatra.

The architectural prototypes were distinctly different from the purely decorative program and precedents. While the former seems to have been the work of an expert, the latter must have been made by amateurs – ministers, bureaucrats, etc. The most striking decorative element was, and remains, the icon of Ahura Mazda, the Zoroastrian God, fastened to the central front façade of the structure. It was a direct copy from Persepolis’ Hall of One Hundred Columns, or that of The Throne Hall (Figs. 3.23). Nor was this an unexpected selection; Shahrokh’s commitment to the Zoroastrian faith and community and Teymurtash’s pledge to the revival of Iran’s past grandeur were only eclipsed by the collective excitement induced by Herzfeld’s unearthing of archeological artifacts and architectural pieces out of the ruins of Persepolis. The Ahura Mazda as a mere, still forceful, fragment deferred a holistic reading of the entire undertaking. It, in turn, was framed in four “Hatraian” pairs of attached columns, crowned with bull-headed capitals. These bordered inscription plates with selected verses from the Shahnameh, which totaled forty-eight lines in Nastaliq script on each façade of the central vault (Figs. 3.24L). Below, the lower band of inscriptions on the due north surface was a classical example that exhibited the tight relationship between patronage and political ideology; patron and architecture. It read (Fig. 3.24R):

Since the sincere willingness of His Majesty, the Great King of kings, Reza Shah Pahlavi, so that his reign be long, has always been for the glory of the name of Iran and Iranians. [And since] Hakim Abd al-Qasem Ferdawsi Tusi, by composing the Shahnameh, has made the language, history, and race of Iranians alive and eternal, the appreciation and acknowledgement of the glorification of his name has captured the kingly attention. Therefore, a group of king-nurtured-s, following the king’s wishes, have made a Society called the anjoman asar-e melli, in order to erect a mausoleum on the tomb of Ferdaws. Based on the evidence, it was ascertained that from the birth of the orator exactly one thousand solar years have passed. At the time of the construction, which was in 1313 solar Hejri, the millenary celebration of

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230 Ackerman-Pope, SoPA, text 1: 439.
231 Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 67.
Ferdawsi took place and many international scholars participated. The presence of the valuable person of His Majesty King of kings and his presence in this site delighted the enlightened spirit of Ferdawsi, alleviating all the injustice of his life.\textsuperscript{232}

Constructed with fired-brick and finished in white marble, the central vault of the burial-chamber rose on top of a two-meter base on three layers of terraces. As in Cyrus’ tomb, the core was flanked by a set of stairs leading to the main front elevation – the façade due south. Two doors opened from east and west into the funerary room. From the interior, the crown sat directly above Ferdawsi’s grave. The bronze chandelier, a gift from Tehran’s Zoroastrian Society, hung over the tombstone, thus, accentuating the height of the vault. Here, at the precise center was found the tomb proper. Raised on a five by five meters plateau, the “large” one-pierce marble, donated by mason Hajjar Bashi, carried the following inscription:\textsuperscript{233}

In the name of the God who has given you body and mind
This auspicious place is the aramgah of the narrator of the Persian language and the poet of Iran’s national stories, Hakim Abd al-Qasem Ferdawsi Tusi whose words were the reviver (zendeh konandeh) of the country of Iran and whose tomb (mazar) is in the heart of the people of this eternal land.

Birth year 323 Hejri-e Qamari [AH] – Date of death 411 Hejri-e Qamari [AH] – Date of aramgah building 1353 Hejri-e Qamari [AH].\textsuperscript{234}

Other inscriptions praised the generosity of the shah, the national importance of the Shahnameh, and the necessity of historic revival. The inner north and south walls were inscribed:

In the name of giver and kind God
Whoever forgets the death [of a person] Cannot be an honest friend
If you praise the past, you recall it God forbids you to forget my advice
If someone does you good, compensate him Do not let the suffering of ancestors repeat

As the thousandth-year of Ferdawsi was approaching the state and people of Iran decided that a glorious mausoleum should be constructed on the mud-tomb for the sake of the great orator’s eternal masterpiece [the Shahnameh]. From that time on, a few servants of Iran took the first steps in this direction. For the protection of the national heritage, a society was assembled and nothing was spared to reach [its] goal; a group of highly able Iranians financially helped the cause. The Royal Ministry of Culture did not spare efforts to be helpful so that such glorious structure, which is nothing in comparison to the greatness of Ferdawsi, be built. Therefore, in the month of Mehr 1313 Hejri-e Shamsi [Solar Hajri], one hundred individuals of distinguished scholars, politicians, Orientalists, and poets of the world gathered in Tus and in the presence of His Majesty King of kings Reza Pahlavi this monument was inaugurated. To appreciate their heartfelt services, the name of the contemporary SNH members is recorded on this plaque:

\textsuperscript{232} Based on my documentation of the monument in December 1999. Mostawfi, Teymurtash, and Firuz Mirza were all either dead or behind bars. Also, see SNH, Karnameh, 31-32. My emphasis.
\textsuperscript{233} Shahrokh, Memoirs, 76-77; and Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 202.
\textsuperscript{234} Based on my documentation of the monument in December 1999. Also, see SNH, Karnameh, 33. 323 AH is equivalent to 934-945 AD and 313 Solar Hejri; 411 AH to 1020 AD and 399 Solar Hejri; 1353 AH to 1934 AD and 1313 Solar Hejri.
Despite their undeniable loyalty to Reza Shah and because of the king’s increasing mistrust of his ministers, half of these men would be either murdered or forced out of public life before the ink of this inscription could dry.

While only a few would be fortunate enough to witness the unveiling of their project in 1934, the writing on its walls would continue to attest to their pivotal role in that undertaking. For the idea of linking Cyrus, a ruler with an empty tomb-chamber, to Ferdawsi, a poet with a forgotten tombstone; arguing that such connections are not only viable but also necessary to the birth of the nation; and maintaining that such reawakening was possible through architecture, was remarkable. Arguably, only unyielding modernists, the most resolute of whom Teymurtash described as the “wizards of the age,” with brief but salient careers, could have imagined and enforced such an eccentric idea. The monument’s conspicuous reference to the pre-Islamic ethos epitomized the effort to substitute Iran’s cultural and racial superiority with its lost military might. In that modernization project “on which to build (dis)utopias,” described by James Scott as “High modernism,” the Pahlavi “revolutionary elite” not only had the intellectual caliber to conceive such a scheme, but also, fortunately or regrettably, the unprecedented political power to freely execute it; “the relative success of this cultural project hinged on both coercion and inducements.”

235 Based on my documentation of the monument in December 1999. Also, see SNH, Karnameh, 32-33, footnote 33, 484.
236 British Archives, Hart dispatch 1310, 891.44 Teymourtache, December 29, 1932, Tehran; quoted in Majd, Great Britain and Reza Shah, 172.
237 Scott argues that when four elements – “administrative ordering of nature and society,” “a high-modernist ideology,” the state’s willingness to use coercive power, and “a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans,” – come together they create High modernism. He defines: “At its center was a supreme self-confidence about continual linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and not least, an increasing control over nature… High modernism is thus a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied – usually through the state – in every field of human activity. If… the simplified, utilitarian descriptions of state officials had a tendency, through the exercise of state power, to bring the facts into line with their representations, then one might say that the high-modern state began with extensive prescriptions for a new society, and it intended to impose them.” J. Scott, Seeing like a State (New Haven, 1998), 4-5, 73, and 89-90. As an example, Scott’s examples of such high modern (dis)utopias include “the Shah of Iran.”
The architectural language of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was novel to the extent that it typified the Aryan rhetoric with this allegedly pure and uncontaminated white stone, with its revivalistic Achaemenid and Zoroastrian ornamentations and prototype, and its selected inscriptions from the *Shahnameh*. Aside from the stylistic preference of the 1930s, the more plausible explanation for the use of the white stone was the evocation of Ferdawsi’s “extremely pure” language because “less than five percent of Arabic words” were used in the *Shahnameh*. Its functional concepts, however, were taken from long existing religious practices. Intended as a secular pilgrimage site, it borrowed the Shi’a ritual of pilgrimage (*ziyarat*) and took the name of *Ferdawsiyeh* from the distinctively Shi’a architectural concept of *Hosaynieh* – a term used for the space specially constructed or converted for the reading of *Ruzeh* (the recital of the suffering and martyrdom of Imam Hosayn) during the month of Muharram. Even so, the monument remained essentially modern in its style, function, composition, and narrative quality. Its sophistication was characterized by its methodological simplicity: specific but distinct parts assembled to project a holistic certainty.

The structural failure of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum in the post-war era was caused neither by Reza Shah’s, often imaginary, “inside traitors” of the 1930s, nor by the occupying Allies in 1941. Far more simply, humidity would damage the very foundation of the mausoleum. Because of underground waters, the structures had started to sink from the days of its completion. Decades later, the *Karnameh* was quite honest about it: “Since the constructors were not familiar with the land and the underground water table of Tus, defects started to appear as of the first years. For 30 years it was subjugated to canal work and although the top portion of the building was taken a way,” it continued to sink. At the time, the Ministry of Public Instructions noted in its annual report that “From Mordad 1315 [July 1936] to Aban [October] of that same year, a number of repairs were realized at the Ferdawsi *aramgah,*” underlining the problem of water and waterways in the vicinity of the mausoleum, as well as other parts of the garden. This was to be expected because Pahlavi restructurings of old institutions, regardless of their profound implication for later periods, were often achieved in such a haste as to give to them a theatrical

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quality. The urban reforms in either Tehran or the provinces in the 1930s rarely resulted in major espousal of secular sociopolitical attitudes among the masses, especially when these were crammed into a twenty-year span.Introduced rapidly and on material levels, they brought with them unforeseen predicaments, because while the implementation of such reforms appeared monumental on the surface, they were, in reality, hurriedly assembled for the rigorous inspection of Reza Shah.241 The non-existing base of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was emblematic of Rezaian quick fix; the monumental structure that would not remain erect was an uneasy syndrome of an uneven development.242 For the architects who succumbed to reformers’ utopian wishes, the politicians who failed to keep builders professionally accountable, and the autocrat who pushed for too much too soon, created a system that was bound to break down. The missing foundation of the national landmark, therefore, spoke volumes about the very nature of the Pahlavi state: “despite impressive institutions, [it] had no viable class bases, no sound social props, and was thus without firm civilian foundations.”243

The first warning letter about the tomb’s disintegration arrived at the SNH headquarters in Tehran on April 27, 1948. Caretaker of Astan-e Qots Badr reminded Education Minister Isa Sadiq, now the director of the Society that “damages to Ferdawsi need repairs.”244 Part of the problem was the proximity of the poorly insulated shallow pool to the monument. The other was the heavy weight of the central vault. With the exception of the removal of Ferdawsi’s remains from its original grave in 1955, not much else was done; it was reported that, “By the hands of a special commission” the bones were placed “with a religious ceremony” in “a box and locked.”245 Apart from those directly involved in the repairs, most Iranians never suspected that

241 "Reza Chah a change les structures urbaines sans vraiment toucher aux structures sociales, alors qu’en Europe par exemple, c’est la societe industrielle qui a engendre la ville industrielle.” Ch. J. Adams, ed. Iranian Civilization and Culture: Essay in Honor of the 2500th Anniversary of the Founding of the Persian Empire (Montreal, 1973), 207.
242 Similarly, many were surprised by the rapid reappearance of the veil, ta ‘zieh, and ziyarat to Mashhad and Karbala immediately following the shah’s abdication and exile in 1941. The unforgiving gaze of 20th-century dictators has often been a cause of rapid construction either for inspection or ceremonial occasions. These constructions have often proven to be far less solid as they looked. A good example is Mussolini’s train stations. When Hitler visited Italy right before World War II in 1938, Mussolini received him with a grand ceremony at Rome’s new and modernistic train station. Except for the main structure of the station as the symbol of utopian modernism, most of the interior and exterior of the building consisted of temporary decorative elements in order to patch up what they had not have time to finish; see J. P. Ferrucci, “Italy on the Move: the Role of the Railway under Fascism,” paper presented at Society of Architectural Historians, New England branch Graduate Student Symposium, Harvard University, Spring 2002.
243 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 149.
244 The letter is dated Ordibehesht 7, 1327/April 27, 1948. Quoted in SNH, Karnameh, 468.
245 SNH, Karnameh, 475.
Ferdawsi’s bones were missing from his resting-place during the next thirteen years, for the monument, with the adamant exigency of the Cultural Ministry, uniformly maintained its original form. The SNH was instructed to preserve, “by any means...the image for which” the landmark “has always been famous.” The state recognized only too well the importance of maintaining the representational discourse on, of, and off of the monument. Between 1948 and 1964, there were a number of attempts to secure the pool, fence the property, strengthen the base, and reduce the weight of the vault with scaffoldings and retainer-walls but to no avail. Humidity had taken its toll on the landmark.

Subject to further state neglect and structural degradation, on July 6, 1963, the dangerous condition of the monument drew the attention of General Amir Azizi, the then governor of Khorasan who expressed his concerns in a communiqué to the Society: “During the ten months that I have been here, tourists and pilgrims have reminded me of the poor conditions of the monument;” further requesting, “Until such time that it has not been repaired, please forbid any visitors.” A few months later, Tehran’s archeological center, too, complained about the “unsatisfactory” hence mere “decorative” conservations at Ferdawsiyeh. “In agreement with experts,” it was pointed out, “this building has no proper foundation. Each year a different part sinks in, hence “any façade work either inside or outside” will be in vain.” The SNH, in desperation, appealed directly to the royal establishment by the next April. Two weeks later, Mohammad Reza Shah sanctioned both the expense and the reconstruction. While the young monarch decided to disassemble the entire monument and “start all over again,” the SNH instructed its Khorasan branch that “the outside will remain exactly the same.” Inside, though, in lieu of the “small and dark room with the fallen tiles, there will be a large room with decorations from Ghaznavi period and images form the Shahnameh.” The Society, determined to solve this national problem “once and for all,” took “no other commitment” between 1964 and 1966. The Beaux Arts trained Iranian architect, Houshang Seyhoun was hired not only to fix the structural problems, but also to propose a new master plan for the entire Ferdawsi Park.

246 SNH, Karnameh, 467-471.
247 Quoted in SNH, Karnameh, 468.
248 Quoted in SNH, Karnameh, 469. The letter is dated Azar 18, 1342/December 9, 1963.
249 The SNH’s letter is dated Farvardin 16, 1343. On Ordibehest 8, 1343/April 28, 1964, the shah approves the proposed solution. “Eventually, after consulting with experts, the solution was to disassemble the entire building and to rebuild on a new foundation. This work started in 1343.” Sadiq, Memoirs, 4: 205. My emphasis.
250 SNH, Karnameh, 468-471.
Taking advantage of this architectural failure, 28,000 square meters were added to the property to enable the construction of modern facilities to enhance tourism.\textsuperscript{251}

Learning from past mistakes, Seyhoun’s written contract, signed on June 15, 1964, consisted of the following responsibilities: detail drawings of the existing structure, submission of a material bill “within four months,” numbering and labeling of each individual marble piece and its dislocation under Seyhoun’s “direct supervision,” regular and in-person inspections, administration of contractors, as well as the approval of each expense with the salary of five percent of all construction cost.\textsuperscript{252} In November, the KJT contracting company won the bid with an estimate of 35,602,900 tomans. In February 1965, the project was handed over to Seyhoun and KJT, whose first task was a painstaking soil test. All the original marbles were numbered and disassembled. The modern monument had itself become an object of archeology. Seyhoun recently concurred:

\begin{quote}
Seyhoun: I removed the monument completely, completely.
Grigor: At once?
Seyhoun: No, piece by piece, stone by stone. We numbered the stones and we removed them.
First, we did an exact, detailed drawing of the elevation. And then, removed them and reconstructed…\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

On the now historic “exact spot,” thirty meters were dug to make way for the five-meter thick reinforced concrete foundation. On this opening, a hall of 900 square meters was designed, upon which the 1934 structure was to be reassembled – “keeping the same height as the original.”\textsuperscript{254} The laying of a new foundation meant that the original tomb-chamber would be relocated to an underground chamber, exactly below its original position. Twenty columns in the new underground tomb-chamber supported the 1934 floor level from sinking; an additional eight reinforced the structural integrity of the original vault from the ground level to the top of the monument. A six square meters opening was created to visually link the vault to the underground chamber, now housing the tomb proper. Ferdawsi’s remains were duly returned to its “exact spot,” under the 1934 gravestone. The Society’s Khorasan representative Bahador relayed to its Board that “in full compliance with your instructions in connection with the transfer of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{251} In 1966, 28,000 square meters additional land was donated by Musa and Isa Qayem Magham, the two sons of the first owner Qayem Magham, as well as a certain Hosayn Malek. Sadiq, \textit{Memoirs}, 4: 205.
\textsuperscript{252} SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 473-474.
\textsuperscript{253} Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada. Tape 1, Side A; see Appendix 6. My emphasis.
\textsuperscript{254} SNH, \textit{Karnameh}, 475.
\end{footnotesize}
Ferdawsi’s bones and burial in the new resting-place with a religious ceremony,” I am to report that “on Thursday December 7, 1967 at 3 pm,” the bones were buried “in the new location (that is the old location).” Bahodor was neither confused nor incorrect in his report; he was, in fact, faultlessly precise for Ferdawsi’s “exact spot” had once more been displaced; the 1967 “new location” was now exactly thirty meters below the 1934 “old location.” Both were “exactly” on the “spot.”

The most significant architectural alternation resulting from these conservation attempts consisted of the addition of two granite staircases leading down to the chamber proper, accessible from the façade west of the original monument. The preserved old door was locked and labeled “previous entrance to the tomb,” becoming a trace of the monument’s short but eventful history (Figs. 3.25). The pair of twenty-two steps leading to the tomb were adorned with six stone engravings from the *Shahnameh*, which included from south to north: The Visit of the Indian King to the King of Iran, Two generals in audience with the Sassanian King, Cyrus the Great on his throne, the Battle of Rostam, the War of heroes between Iran and Turan, and the Battle of Rostam and Sohrab (Figs. 3.26). On the new threshold of the tomb-chamber, it read:

This gate is the reflection of a throne; hence take off your hat,
Here is Sinai Mountain, hence take off your boots;
Here is the master of Tus, hence prostrate your forehead to the ground
Here is the burial place of Ferdawsi, hence kiss his earth.

Inside, the 1934 gravestone was placed at the center of the large new chamber (Fig. 3.27). The story-telling sculptures by Fereydun Sadiqi were displayed against the walls (Fig. 3.28). On the south side, they included the *Shahnameh* episodes of Zal in the protection of Simorgh, Zal’s battle with the lion, Rostam with his horse Raqshe, Rostam’s battle with the Monster, Rostam containing the Witch Woman, Rostam’s battle with the White Devil, Rostam’s visit to the King of Mazandaran, Rostam’s battle with the Bully of Mazandaran, Rostam consulting Simorgh for the defeat of Esfandiar, Rostam fetching double-headed arrow from the jungle, and Rostam’s triumph against Esfandiar. On the eastern wall, the two displays of the revolt of Blacksmith

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255 The reburial was performed in full accord with Muslim practice in the presence of a “Hadis reader” on Thursday afternoon, which is the Muslim day of remembering the dead. The letter also mentions the individuals present for the occasion; “…in the presence of Abd al-Fazleh Shahrawkhi, representative of Khorasan’s governor, Hajj Seyyed Mohammad Vayez Khorasani, teller of hadis, and representative of Astan-e Qods, Mohammad Taher Bahodori, representative of the SNH in Khorasan, Giv Jodat, representative of KJT construction company [sic.]…” SNH, *Karnameh*, 475. My emphasis.

256 The inscription is with bronze letters, composed by Ostad Homai.

257 Each display-case measures a glass box of 1.2 by 8.30 meters, inside carved of white marble.
Kaveh against the Unjust Zohak and the reception of Anushiravan the Wise were centered by the main inscription plaque from 1934, including the list of the SNH's members. The display cases were not only meant to boost the space from a burial to a tourist attraction, but also enable the enactment of *Shahnameh* stories around Ferdawsi's grave.

The final figures of general Ferdawsi complex were as the following: 56,753.60 square meters of garden; 945 square meters of mausoleum proper; 2,766 square meters of facilities. As part of his contract, Seyhoun designed a separate museum, restaurant, library, guesthouse, and administrative offices, all imitation the minimalist and poured-concrete architecture of none other than Le Corbusier (Figs. 3.29). The renovation cost was estimated to 9,858,559 tomans; equal to around 1.4 million dollars in 1968.

### Performing the Spot

The erection and conservation of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, including its numerous amenities, was only half of the story. More important was the first use of the place; so to speak, the performance of the spot. From the very beginning, the construction of the tomb was conditioned by an academic conference that addressed and celebrated the importance of Ferdawsi’s life and work. On the occasion of the monument’s investiture by Reza Shah in October 1934, a group of famous Orientalists were invited to Iran by the SNH to participate in both the conference in Tehran and the inauguration in Tus. During the ten-day celebrations, the foreign scholars attended lectures, visited Khorasan, and explored various historical sites. For the planning of the festivities, the Society took full responsibly. While Reza Shah personally asked Keikhosrow Shahrokh to organize the events, for he had helped arranged the shah’s coronation and had been involved in the monument’s erection, the latter refused “as I felt I needed some rest” particularly after “my involvement in the construction of the mausoleum which...was not

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258 On the northern wall, 13 high and narrow windows open to a small courtyard. The lower gallery is lighted by 40 metal lamps designed in the 1960s style.
259 See SNH, *Karnameh*, 505. According to Sadiq, the final cost was around the same amount: 9,858,000 tomans; see Sadiq, *Memories*, 4: 205. In the 1965, annual report the expenditure for Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was registered as 1,292,061 tomans. On subsequent upkeep of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 143, Document 115, page 2; 1344 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 17, 1345/May 7, 1965, Tehran; and Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, page 1; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Khoradad 11, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran.
an easy task.”260 When the king inquired about the reason for his resignation, “I replied that I had not accepted, so how could I resign? [sic.]”261 If the monument’s construction process was an indication of its inauguration, Shahrokh’s task was indeed “exhausting,” as he later wrote.262

Ferdawsi’s conference was launched on October 4, 1934, in the grand hall of Dar al-Fonun (the Abode of Learning), designed by Russian military architect Nikolai Markov in 1928, with Mohammad Ali Forughi’s opening speech both as the prime minister of Iran and the director of the SNH.263 The conference’s location was highly symbolic for Dar al-Fonun had not only been Iran’s first secular high school, but was also the legacy of the country’s foremost modernists and reformists of the 19th century: the much admired Amir Kabir.264 While prevented to partake in the celebrations, the public was updated on the Westerners’ activities as a sequel. Ettela’at Daily reported the events as they occurred: “First Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress” on October 4, “Ferdawsi aramgah,” and “Second Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress” on October 6, “Third Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress” on October 7, “In the Square of Saltanat Abad” on October 8, “Members of Ferdawsi Congress” on October 9, “Seventh Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress” on October 10, “Ferdawsi Celebrations in Berlin” on October 11, and finally the special issue on “Ferdawsi Celebrations” of October 13, 1934.265

260 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 80.
261 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 80.
262 Not only was he assigned corrupt aides, but also dauntingly, in a time before air-travel, he went “back and forth from one end of the country to another, on very bad roads” to welcome the foreign dignitaries to the land of Iran, literally in this case; see Shahrokh, Memoirs, 80. However, according to Sadiq, “Most arrived via the Pahlavi/Anzali port on the Caspian Sea; others came through Iraq.” Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 211.
263 See Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 212; and Yaghma’i, Kurnam-e Reza Shah, 410. For the most recent study on and the monograph of Nikolai Markov, see V. Daniel, B. Shafei, and S. Soroushiani, Nikolai Markov Architecture: Architecture of Changing Times in Iran (Tehran, 2004). For a brief description of Markov’s work, see Marefat, “Building to Power,” various pages.
264 Amir Kabir had also founded Iran’s first official newspaper, built factories, cut court spending, raised government revenues, and revived the standing army. On Amir Kabir and Dar al-Fonun, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 54.
265 “First Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress,” Ettela'at 2305 (Mehr 12, 1313/October 4, 1934): 1 and 3; “Ferdawsi Aramgah,” and “Second Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress,” Ettela'at 2306 (Mehr 14, 1313/October 6, 1934): 1-4; “Third Assembly of Ferdawsi’s Congress,” Ettela'at 2307 (Mehr 15, 1313/October 7, 1934): 2; “In the Square of Saltanat Abad,” Ettela'at 2308 (Mehr 16, 1313/October 8, 1934): 1; “Members of Ferdawsi Congress,” Ettela'at 2309 (Mehr 17, 1313/October 9, 1934): 1; “Seventh Assembly of the Ferdawsi’s Congress” and “Dispatch of Ferdawsi Congress Report to the World,” Ettela'at 2310 (Mehr 18, 1313/October 10, 1934): 1, 4; “Ferdawsi Celebrations in Berlin,” Ettela'at 2311 (Mehr 19, 1313/October 11, 1934): 1; Special Issue on Ferdawsi Celebration, Ettela'at 2312 (Mehr 21, 1313/October 13, 1934): 1-8.
The scholars, all invitees of the Society whose portrait appeared in a full-page of *Ettela’at*, totaled around forty scholars. They included Orientalists Henri Massé, Arthur Christensen, Vladimir Minorsky, eminent director of Leningrad’s Hermitage Museum and founder of its Oriental Department Josef Orbeli(an), as well as, Sir Denison Ross who gave a “short” but nameless talk “which was excellently received.” German Attaché Herr von Blucher first presented a collection of German works on Persian art on behalf of Berlin University, and then conferred the degree of doctor of philosophy on Forughi. John Drinkwater who “caused great enthusiasm...by reading from Fitzgerald” was followed by Persian poet Malik al-Shu’ara who, in turn, read from the *Shahnameh* in Persian. President of the American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology Franklin Mott Gunther’s long speech reminded Iranians that the institute “was founded not merely for interest in Persian art but in genuine respect and affection for the brilliant race that could create such notable monuments.” It was planned so that the nation would participate, at least symbolically, in its hero’s anniversary. To this end, the SNH had invited “body-builders” and “Shahnameh-readers” from as far as Khuzestan to prepare recitals, along with live-images from the epic stories to be performed for the Orientalists. The *Ettela’at* article, “In the square of Saltanat Abad,” depicted the Iranian elite and the Orientalists in polo gears juxtaposed to the local body-builders in action. Expensive gifts were exchanged and historic sites were visited included Tehran University’s school of fine arts, the unfinished archeological museum, and the neo-Achaemenid style governmental buildings in central Tehran. The conference ended on Monday October 8, with a closing note by the Minister of

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266 They came from all over, remarks Sadiq by anachronistically listing the countries: “France, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, USSR, Italy, Poland, Japan, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, India, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine.” Sadiq, *Memoirs*, 2: 221. “Some forty-five orientalists from eighteen countries had been invited to Tehran for the opening ceremonies as guests of the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments.” Wilber, *Reza Shah Pahlavi*, 161. Whereas the photographs of the Dar al-Fonun, hall and those of Hekmat during his speech appeared across from the portrait and biographies of participants, “Bolotnikov, Marr, Freiman, Romasrenitch, Bertels, and Orbl,” their group photo on the steps of the same building appeared and reappeared several times within the week. Special Issue on Ferdawsi Celebration, *Ettela’at* 2312 (Mehr 21, 1313/October 13, 1934): 3.


271 “In the Square of Saltanat Abad,” *Ettela’at* 2308 (Mehr 16, 1313/October 8, 1934): 1.


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Public Instructions, Ali Asghar Hekmat. Early next morning, the scholars were put on a bus headed towards Tus. After a stopover in Nishabur to visit Omar Khayyam's grave, the topic of my sixth chapter, the scholars arrived in Mashhad on October 12: the much anticipated and widely advertised day of the monument's inauguration.

To personally ensure that all was in order, as was his style, Reza Shah had gone ahead of the guests; he was particularly anxious to inspect the roads, the amenities, and above all, to arrive at Tus ahead of the party. Before reaching there, however, he had visited an exhibition of Mashhad's industrial products, which similar to Ferdawsi's tomb, had had been hastily assembled especially for his inspection. This "appears to be of a temporary nature," the shah had noticed, adding that "such exhibitions must be firm, basic, and permanent organizations and reputable merchants must look after their permanent maintenance." Much to the disappointment of the exhibit's organizers, he had concluded that "If you arranged it for a few days so that I might come and see it and be pleased, your efforts were all in vain, I am not content!" The king had little idea that his criticism would have been more appropriate for Ferdawsi's seemingly monumental tomb only a few hours away from its grand opening.

A towering figure, Reza Shah was "a man of few words." At exactly 4:00 pm, he walked into the garden to be greeted by his government cabinet, various members of the SNH, and the company of Orientalists. In an article entitled, "The creator of a civilization," Le Journal de Téhéran praised the shah for his "exemplary punctuality and exactitude." The author, professor of Persian language and literature and an SNH member, Said Nafisi, underscored that "this great man, the promoter of human progress...arrives exactly on the minute" for "all the ceremonies and national festivities..." Ferdawsi's military was one of them.

273 "His Majesty himself went 50 kilometers ahead of the caravan to personally check the condition of the road..." Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 220; and SNH, Karmeh, 51-52. "Riza Shah preceded the group by twenty-four hours in order to make a personal inspection of the facilities along the way, including the condition of the privies in the teahouses." Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 161.
274 Quoted in Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 161.
275 "Reza Khan’s physical attributes also served him well. He was a big-boned man, probably 6’3’ (1.90m), a commanding height at any time but even more so for Iran in the 1920s, where he towered over everyone around him. His simplicity and natural dignity is commented on by many observers of the period. At gatherings, he often appeared aloof and detached, confirming that power demanded a certain detachment. Reza Khan did not have a commanding voice and was never known as a captivating speaker. He exuded power but was by no means charismatic. He was a man of few words and seldom made long speeches. When he had to make a speech he was brief and to the point. At the ceremony for the laying of the first stone in constructing the University of Tehran his speech was confined to two sentences: 'The establishment of a university should have taken place earlier. Now that it has been started all efforts must be made for its speedy conclusion.'" Ghani, Iran and Reza Shah, 282-283.
After being personally introduced to each scholar by his Prime Minister Forughí, the monarch stepped up the monumental staircase and firmly positioned himself behind the table (Fig. 3.30).

His military uniform made discernible against the structure’s white backdrop, he declared:

We are very happy on the occasion of the millennium of Ferdawsi that we are able to fulfill one of the oldest wishes of the nation and demonstrate with the existence of this structure the nation’s appreciation [to Ferdawsi]. The people of Iran are sorry that Ferdawsi Tusi had to endure suffering (ranj) and that he was not sufficiently appreciated for his [effort] to revive the language and history of this country. Although by loving the poetry of the Shahnameh Iranians have made their hearts the resting-place of Ferdawsi, it was necessary to take some action and construct a structure and decorate it so that [the people could] also display their apparent (zaher) appreciation. For this reason, we ordered full attention [be paid] to the construction of this historic monument.

The author of the Shahnameh by constructing a lofty citadel, undamaged by the wind and the rain, has made his own name eternal; therefore, he neither needs such a ceremony nor [such a] structure... However, appreciation of [its] servants is the spiritual responsibility of the nation and shall not refrain from the expression of [such] appreciation. I have the highest level of satisfaction by seeing a group of scholars, our friends, and friends of our craft and literature, [who] have rushed from the corners of the world...to the resting-place of the Wise Orator and joined us to share our appreciation.... With expression of joy for your loving feelings, we invite the audience to the opening ceremony.278

While American architectural historian and undercover CIA agent, Donald N. Wilbert maintained that on the erroneous date of “October 28” the king “unveiled the monument and spoke in terms that revealed his personal familiarity with the Shahnamah,” the shah’s public zeal for Ferdawsi was, in reality, an ideological afterthought, not unlike his interest in Iranian archeology.279 Nor was the large-scale structure “unveiled,” as Wilbert reported.280 Instead, the king cut the tri-color ribbon around the monument, and then walked around and into the structure. Sadiq described his entrance into the tomb chamber as “ziarat kard” – he made a pilgrimage. The invented spot was being placed on a par with venerated Shi’a shrines and sanctuaries, such as Mashhad’s Imam Reza. While the shah “left the garden as he had entered” to

279 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 161. This incident repositioned Ferdawsi as the foremost champion of the modern nation. With the significant help of the Pahlavi apparatus, the Shahnameh became the most widely read text and Ferdawsi the most exulted historic figure in Iran. “Emphasis shifted from Islamic literature to those celebrating ancient Iranian traditions and teachings; Ferdawsi replaced Hafez and Sa’di as the most widely read Iranian poets.” K. Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran,” American Journal of Archaeology 105 (2001): 51-76, 63. It is obviously very difficult to substantiate whether Ferdawsi was widely known to the public during the first half of the 20th century.
280 Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 161.
continue his inspection of the region, the Western guests remained to visit the museum in one of "the corners of the garden." 281 On their return to Tehran after a four-day stay in Mashhad, participants received a "reminiscence" medal inscribed with Ferdawsi during a flight on the mythical bird of the Shahnameh called the Simorgh or the "thirty-chicken" (Figs. 3.31). 282

Ettela'at's daily broadcasts were only eclipsed by its October 13 special issue entirely devoted to the previous day's inauguration at Ferdawsiyeh (Figs. 3.32-3.34). 283 A photographic collage on the front-page, told the fragments of the events as a holistic narrative: the monument and the king were buttressed by the poet's statue and the Orientalists' group photograph. The second-page reported the minute details of the celebrations, while the third illustrated each participant's portrait. Whereas the fourth page issued a conjured "Telegraph from Ferdawsi's aramgah," the sixth reiterated Ferdawsi's week in pictures. 284 Still, few were moved by the events. While "the Firdausi celebrations were of great interest to a handful of foreign scholars" who "got free trips to Iran" and "read learned papers," the Iranian public remained mostly unimpressed as well as involved. 285 "As was to be expected," confirmed British diplomatic records, "the millenary was turned into an excuse for advertising the glorious resurrection of Persia under the rule of Reza Shah, and the press excelled itself in fulsome adulation." 286 This was not far from the truth as evidenced in the contemporary Iranian press. Illustrations and articles continued to appear in Ettela'at and Le Journal de Téhéran months and years after the events as constant reminders of the ten days in October. 287 In 1940, the latter published a 27 part

282 This animal was a mythical bird from the Shahnameh, which later became the totem of Iran Air. See Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 230-231; and SNH, Karnameh, 55-56.
283 Special Issue on Ferdawsi Celebration, Ettela'at 2312 (Mehr 21, 1313/October 13, 1934): 1-8.
284 Special Issue on Ferdawsi Celebration, Ettela'at 2312 (Mehr 21, 1313/October 13, 1934): 4.
285 Avery, Modern Iran, 287.
series entitled “Ferdowcy: some observations on the history of his life and magnum opus [sic.].” By the 1960s, the monument signified an important moment in the nation’s long history and its modern recovery under the Pahlavi rule. Depictions of the landmark re-emerged in the media alongside of Ferdawsi’s portrait in order to certify that “Persian literature is as old as Iranian history.”

In the aftermath of the conference, “for the memory of Ferdawsi as a result of the millenary” there was a series of name changes. Tus’ historical name was altered to Ferdawsi; official literature and travel-guides immediately adopted this new designation. In Tehran, the former Ala al-Dowleh Avenue was renamed Ferdawsi Avenue and was extended from the northern moat of the city – probably eliminating the Shemiran Gate in the process – southward to the main Sepah Square, the previous Gun-house Square. On the northern end of the avenue, the new Ferdawsi Square was adorned with a bronze statue of the author, which was donated by the Zoroastrian Society of India (Fig. 3.35). Here, Ferdawsi was depicted as sitting on pillows and cushions while composing the *Shahnameh*. In the late 1960s, however, “since this situation was not suitable to the square,” noted Sadiq, “nor to the public circulation, a few years later this statue was relocated to the Tehran University campus and a statue of the great poet in a standing position was placed in the square” (Figs. 3.36). Personally ordered by Mohammad Reza Shah, executed in Rome by Ostad Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi during 1969, the new statue was delivered to Iran and placed in the square by the SNH two years later. The substitution of a Ferdawsi in a standing position seemed to better fit the modernistic narrative on Ferdawsi, for some had contended that the “Oriental style” of the first statue was both culturally and historically “inappropriate.”

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While accounts were sometimes tinted with personal biases and at other times with political agendas, most agreed that the millenary celebrations were a success. In his *Bulletin of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology* (1934), Arthur Pope portrayed the celebrations as “most extensive and elaborate.” Sardonically, the British remarked, “on the whole, the millenary was a great success, the learned visitors survived, without a single casualty, the orgy of feasts, speeches and sight-seeing, in spite of a long and tiring journey on Persian roads.” Others maintained that the entire affair was “impressively staged.” After all, the “elaborate and costly” celebrations, along with the “imposing mausoleum,” occupied the “attention of the Persian government,” British diplomats complained, “to the exclusion of almost all other businesses.” Years later, Keikhosrow Shahrokh too wrote in his dairy: “all went well.”

Outside Iran, however, Ferdawsi’s “Millenary Celebrations” proved to be the ideal diplomatic opportunity for the colonial rivals, particularly because it was well disguised under layers of cultural veneer. According to Wilber, “Delegates from the Soviet Union and Germany attempted to capitalize on the opportunity by offering gifts and making speeches that stressed the alleged cultural ties between their own countries and Iran.” Robert Byron, who was in Tehran in 1933, concurred:

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296 Pope, “Celebrations Firdawsi,” *Bulletin of the American*, 39. Many saw plenty of opportunity to promote oneself and one’s friends. Farajollah Bazl, in a posthumous recollection of Pope, wrote, “During October 4–14, 1934, Professor Pope accomplished another remarkable feat with his careful development and methodical encouragement of ‘The Celebrations of the Thousandth Anniversary of the Birth of Ferdawsi, Epic Poet of Persia’.” The gala, according to Bazl, was carried out with “great dignity” with the erection of a “proper” monument “over his grave.” These events, Bazl further maintained, “would have never succeeded without the efforts of Professor Pope.” J. Gluck and N. Siver, eds. *Surveyors of Persian Art: A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman* (Ashiya, 1996), 11. As a major participant of the conference, Pope had presented, “The Influence of Firdausi in Persia,” later published in *Firdausi 934-1934*. A. Pope, “The Influence of Firdausi in Persia,” *Firdausi 934-1934*; Supplement to *Near East and India* 43 (18 October 1934): 8-9. During his turn behind the podium, Pope had asserted that “no poet has ever dominated the consciousness of a whole race more thoroughly and none for so long a period...King and scholar, grandee and saint, have all been these many centuries nurtured and refreshed at this inexhaustible foundation of wisdom and beauty.” Sadiq, *Ferdawsi*, 13. Translated in Persian, it reappeared in *Bakhtar*; see Pope, A. “Nufuz-i Firdawsi dar jami‘ah-i irani,” *Bakhtar* 2 (Isfahan, Day 1313): 99-104. Bazl must have been mistaking for Pope was neither present during the conference nor at Tus; not only the *Karnameh* does not list him in the conference program, but also he is absent from the group photograph.


A programme of celebrations is already announced. Governments whose frontiers or other interests march with Persian's, are sending delegations to remind [Reza Shah] that while his compatriots were making epics, theirs were wearing woad. Nor, they will observe, is the comparison inappropriate today. His Majesty's new railway, his impartial and open justice, his passion for lounge suits, offer hope to the distracted world. In fact, Shah Riza Pahlevi has left Firdaussi standing [sic.]. 302

While on the Iranian side, "no expense was spared by the Government in ministering to the needs of the Orientalists," the event became truly international when a number of foreign states initiated their own festivities.303 It seems, in such marginal architectural projects, many recognized a political opportunity. Soon every major city in the West began to celebrate Ferdawsi's alleged birthday.304 In May 1934, the USSR organized Soviet style festivities. "The Russian Orientalists," historians noted, "took full advantage of the occasion and soon began celebrating the anniversaries of Persian poets who had been born in countries which now form part of the U.S.S.R."305 As the Iranian representative, Mohammad Ali Forughi had been sent to Moscow. His telegrams appeared in Ettela'at, with "heartfelt thanks from the Shahanshah's government and the anjomân-e asar-e melli for all the friendly feelings on the occasion of the birth year of Ferdawsi, which has occasioned interest and educational relations between the Soviet Union and Iran and will further generate friendly rapport..."306 Forughi reported that to celebrate Ferdawsi, people "have come from all over the Union: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Tashkent, and Stalin-abad [Stalingrad]," underscoring, "Ferdawsi is being celebrated in every city..."307 The next days, Ettela'at wrote, "the Organization of an Assembly in the Name of Ferdawsi...relations with outside."308 Articles continued to turn up in various state-sponsored newspapers only to be eclipsed by the actual reporting of the events in October 1934.309

The British, despite their contempt of what they perceived as "Soviet opportunism," themselves began to celebrate Ferdawsi's birth as fervently as their historic rival in Iran; in

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302 Byron, Road to Oxiana, 83.
304 See British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 6481/47/34, A. C. Trott, October 22, 1934, Tehran; British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 6749/47/34, A. C. Trott, November 5, 1934, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 9: 1931-1934, 575-578.
305 Avery, Modern Iran, 287.
307 "Organization of Assembly in Ferdawsi's Name," Ettela'at 2296 (Mehr 2, 1313/ September 24, 1934): 1 and 3.
308 "Organization of Assembly in Ferdawsi's Name," Ettela'at 2297 (Mehr 3, 1313/September 25, 1934): 3.

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Pope’s words, the British organized “extensive celebrations.” While before their journey to Iran, the Royal Asiatic Society held a “Ferdawsi meeting” at Cambridge University, immediate after their return, the Persian Club arranged an exhibition of “Firdawsiana,” in the presence of Hosayn Ala as Iran’s representative. A reception followed where “eminent men” read lectures addressing “Firdawsi, his poetry and his influence.” The next day, on October 31, a luncheon was given at the House of Lords and a reception at the Royal Geographical Society. All these events were made appealing to the general public by manuscript and miniature displays of various Shahnameh reproductions at the British Museum. London Times’ editorial was outdone by The Near East and India’s special issue on Ferdawsi. Back in Iran, Ettela’at reported the British celebrations in its comprehensive article and pictures, entitled “Ferdawsi Week in London.”

Much to the public credit of Pope but by the unaccredited efforts of Ethel C. Elkins, the secretary of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology, the celebrations were extended to the United States where “the vents were carefully followed in Iran with a great sense of national pride...” The executive committee of the US “Firdausi Celebration” included Executive Officer of Columbia’s Philosophy Department John J. Coss, representative of “Persian Embassy and the Persian colony of New York City, Phiroz Saklatvala and A. A. Kiachif,” as

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313 For the invitation of the Luncheon at House of Lords, stamped October 10, 1934, London; see Arthur Upham Pope Papers, box 7, file “Ferdawsi Celebration,” New York Public Library, Rare Book and Manuscripts.
315 Gluck, Surveyors of Persian Art, 11. Elkins was never recognized as the actual organizer of the events in the US, but the files related to Firdawsi’s celebration in Arthur Pope’s own papers reveal that this in fact is true. In all the communiqués only once does Pope’s name appear. See Arthur Upham Pope Papers, box 7, file “Ferdawsi Celebration,” New York Public Library, Rare Book and Manuscripts. All around the US hundreds of letters were exchanged between various individuals and institutions and the American Institute of Asian Studies. All of them read, “your request has been revived. An account of the Firdawsi celebrations abroad and in New York City as well as other necessary information is given in the current issue of the Institute Bulletin. A copy of this may be ordered for twenty-five cents. For further information I would suggest that you look up the following publications: The Near East and India, containing the Firdausi Supplement, October 18, 1934 (published in London); Illustrierte Zeitung, Leipzig, August 30, 1934; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Asia Magazine, October 1934, page 634, an article by myself on Firdawsi’s life and work.” It seems that the agenda of instructing the public had spread to Americans for she adds, “I suggest also that you go to a good museum and study copies of the Shah-Nama or "Book of Kings." For the best translation into English of the Shah-Nama see that by Arthur G. And Edmund Warner...” all send and singed by Ethel C. Elkins, the secretary and the head of publicity for the events.
well as Elkins. All expenses were paid by the Iranian embassy in Washington DC. According to Pope, "Columbia University, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the New York Public Library, and the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology, with the citizens of Persia in the United States joined to honour Firdawsi, and through him, Persia, which century after century has been one of the greatest of all the countries of the world in the creation of art forms." The November 8, 1934, reception was held with "great beauty and dignity" in the Rotunda of the Low Memorial Library at Colombia. In the absence of an Iranian official, Forughi had sent a message, "Now that...the Honorable President and its learned scholars [are] celebrating the millennium of our national poet...it is with pleasure I communicate to you the sincere thanks of the imperial Government and the Persian people to the organizers and the participants." Forughi had added, "Our gratitude is due to the inhabitants of the great metropolis of America for their generosity... I am confident that manifestations of this nature shall strengthen the bond between our two nations." To this communiqué, US State Department Cordell Hull answered, "It is my hope that in thus doing honour to a great Persian, the cultural bonds between this country and Persia may be strengthened." During his lecture at Colombia University, Williams Jackson recalled his excursions to Tus in search of Ferdawsi's grave: "In one of my seven journeys to the Orient, I made a pilgrimage to the spot where Firdausi was buried. An aged man who acted as guide pointed out the supposed situation of the grave, but no monument marked the spot at that time. Since then the Persian Government has erected a noble mausoleum to perpetuate for all time the memory of Firdausi as one of the world's great epic poets." At the end, many agreed that the occasion was a "delightful success" and "the first of its kind in the United States.

French celebrations began on December 18, 1934, in the "big amphitheater" of Sorbonne University, presided by none other than the "President de la Republique Francaise Monsieur Albert Lebrun" and the Minister of "National Education, Monsieur Andres Mallarme." For the occasion, a sculpture of Ferdawsi sitting on Shahnameh's mythical bird was unveiled at the
École des Beaux Arts; later, the bust of the poet appeared in the courtyard of the École Normale Superieure amongst other “great men of world history.” During the unveiling, Iranian Education Minister Hekmat noted that these statues were placed in these “European Universities” to “emulate the pure sentiments of young Iranians” who had come to foreign lands to pursue an education.322 A few days later, a “Ferdawsi week” was announced, organized in the Persian Legation as well as the Musée Guimet. In the press, not only Iranian kings and ministers but also French poets began to mirror themselves off Ferdawsi.323 “Homage of French Poets to Ferdawsi” by Abel Bonnard of the Académie Française stated “the country the genius of which is superiorly expressed in all the arts, has placed poetry on top of all others...the greatest is Firdousi whom we are celebrating today...this emulation of Homer”324 A year later, the French language Le Journal de Téhéran further prolonged the celebrations with several timely articles; “Ferdawsi’s Millenary in Paris” and Nafisi’s “The Principal Heroes of Ferdawsi and Armenian poets,” followed by “A Foreigner’s Appropriation of Iran: From Poet Ferdawsi to His Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi.”325 In the latter, the “eminent rector” of the Paris University, Sebastien Charléty, “spoke to us” as follows:

‘He is one of us,’ used to say Renan, ‘with Hafez and Khayyam, [Ferdawsi] personifies this amazing phenomenon that represents Iranian literature; the purest of the Indo-European genius through the saddest adventures in Asiatic history.’ [Through] this genius, the eternity of which is confirmed for ten centuries, we discover the secret affinities with that of our time and race and hence we remember the ancient relation between France and Iran.326

This reinvention of Ferdawsi, both by the local elite and Western scholars and politicians, fed into the political curriculum of race, art, and civilization. Another article in the same journal, “Ferdawsi, in Life and in Art,” fostered the notion that “the Ferdawsi spirit and imagination...faithfully reflect the genius, the spirit, and the heart of the Persian people of the

past – hardworking, energetic, and humanitarian people..." Now, firmly established as a historical event, the image of Ferdawsi’s modern mausoleum accompanied the journal’s claim.

Germany, the latest and in 1934 the fondest Western ally of the Pahlavi state, expressed its amity with the publication of a special issue in the *Illustrierte Zeitung* of August. After the return of the Orientalists from Iran, moreover, “Persia Street” in northern Berlin was invested as “a permanent memorial to the German-Persian friendship and to the one thousandth anniversary of the Persian heroic poet Firdowsi.” *Ettela’at* did not delay a full report on its front page; “From Berlin: Ferdawsi Celebrations in Germany, Ceremony of Designation” Ironically, however, a month later, swayed by Ernest Herzfeld, Reza Shah decreed the substitution of the county’s official name of “Persia” by “Iran.” British diplomats remarked that the “proposal emanated from the Persian Legation in Berlin.” In fact, based on his archeological investigations, Herzfeld had compellingly argued that “the term *Iranian* is derived from the political and geographical name of *Aryanam Khshathram* – The Empire of the Aryans – used in Achaemenian inscriptions,” hence, induced by Ferdawsi revival, “Iran” would “again” signify the “Land of the Aryans.” Concurrently, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced, “Because Iran was the birthplace and origin of Aryans, it is natural that we should want to take advantage of this name, particularly since these days in the great nations of the world noise has gotten out

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332 “Several Orientalists (primarily philologists, including A. Pictet, A. H. Sayce, and E. Herzfeld) proposed that the name *Iran* is derived from the establishment of Aryans in the region.” Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation*, 75 and 78. The name-change of “Persia” to “Iran,” seen by some historians and political scientists as yet another whimsical decree by the shah, had been in fact contended a quarter of a century earlier by European art historians. In 1901, there was the so-called *Orient oder Rom* debate, inflamed by the simultaneous publication of two books. On the one hand, Italian archeologist Giovanni Teresio Rivoira in his *Le origini dell’architettura Lombarda* argued that the origin of Gothic architecture is to be found in Roman ingenuity. In *Orient oder Rom*, on the other hand, Art History Professor at Graz University Josef Strzygowski maintained that Western architecture evolved from Eastern origins. Both men insisted that each was “utterly objective, utterly scientific and utterly correct.” Strzygowski argued that “the true source of Western artistic genius was located in the Indogermanic Geist. He urged scholars to trace artistic connections not to ‘the ancient Near East...not to Persia but to Iran...” A. J. Wharton, *Refiguring the Post Classical City* (Cambridge, 1995), 5; for the details of the argument and its impact in Western historiography, see 3-14. For
regarding the Aryan race which indicates the greatness of the race and civilization of ancient Iran.”333 Two years after both the renaming and the inauguration, Nazi Foreign Minister Doctor Schacht visited Iran to inform that the “Fuehrer had exempted” Iranians from the provisions of “the Nuremberg race-laws” for “Persians” had been considered “pure Aryans.”334 As to the renaming of Berlin’s “Persia Street” to “Iran Street,” one can only speculate.

Back in Tus, the second inauguration of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum on April 30, 1968 was redundant in that it copied the 1934 ceremony; it was unique in that it signaled the feminization of Iran’s modernity; for Mohammad Reza Shah dedicated the new structure accompanied by Farah Shahbanu and princess Shahnaz (Fig. 3.37).335 Like the architecture (re)standing in front of the royal couple, old convictions were voiced with renewed certainty. The SNH’s chair, General Farajollah Aqeveli declared that while “The people of Iran have to be aware more and more of the services provided by this wise man, more attention must be paid to his work in reviving the Persian language.”336 He underscored, “His thoughts should be studied more by the masses…” The following day, Ayandegan reported, “Shahanshah Aryamehr and Her Majesty Shahbanu yesterday sojourned to Mashhad where after a pilgrimage to the Saint Reza, they went to the Park of Aryamehr and inaugurated Ferdawsi’s resting-place, the great poet of Iran in Tus…”

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333 Iran National Archives 102012/3201, no. 41749. Prime Ministry Files, Tehran; quoted in Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 217-219; and Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 143.
334 Nafisi wrote, “In a few capital cities avenues and squares were named after Ferdawsi and in this manner the growth of Iran and the Iranian honor was proven to the living nations of today.” Nafisi, Tarikeh Shahriari, 53.
336 Quoted in SNH, Karnameh, 502-505.
337 “Shahanshah and Shahbanu in holy Mashhadr,” Ayandegan 111 (Ordibehesht 11, 1347/May 1, 1968): 1 and 12. Few of the individuals present, according to this article, are missing from Sadiq’s memories, “Shahanshah and Shahbanu who will also stay in Mashhad, yesterday at 11:30 with airplane arrived at Mashhad airport; her majesty Shahdokht Shahnaz Pahlavi, her majesty Mahnaz, her daughter… mother of her majesty Shahbanu Farideh Diba, architect Sharif Emami, the chair of senate, Court Minister Alam, President of the National Oil Company Dr. Eghbal, Minister of Culture and Arts Mehrdad Pahlbod, and Interior Ministry Abd al-Reza Ansari, were accompanying the Shahanshah Aryamehr and Her Majesty Shahbanu.” Ayandegan was a well-read newspaper established by Kamkar Shahrudi in December 1967 and was published until May 1980.
Both inaugural ceremonies solidified the discourse on Ferdawsi in form of literature. As a first step, efforts were being invested into establishing a library entirely devoted to Ferdawsi’s work. During his dinner with Finance Minister Firuz Mirza, described as a man “more English than the English,” and Hungarian ethnologist Ali Hannibal, one “more Persian than the Persian,” Robert Byron had found out that the latter was “busy instituting a Firdaussi library in honor of the poet’s millennium...” As an active member since the 1920s, Hannibal was, no doubt, working under the auspices of the Society. To contribute to the library, the SNH subsequently produced a set of publications related to the author, his work, and his birthplace: *Shahnameh and History* (1925), *Mohammad Ali Forughi’s Lecture on Ferdawsi* (1934), *Ferdawsi: His Life, Work, and Personality* (1968), *Memory-book of Ferdawsi for the Occasion of the Inauguration of his Tomb* (1970), *Historic Heritage of Khorasan* (1972), *Collection of Old Publications of the Society* (1972), and *Ferdawsi Tusi* (1975). "Simultaneously to the repairs of Ferdawsi’s aramgah,” its 71st volume stated, “the anjoman decided to invite the foremost scholars” of Iran to take up a “national duty” and “prepare a collection about their new research on Ferdawsi and his *Shahnameh.*” In cooperation with the humanities department of Tehran University, the “most deserving” piece were selected “to be mounted” in the mausoleum. Finally, in a hefty album, titled *Ettela‘at Reviewed: 28 Hundred Days in the History of Iran and the World* (c. 1980), Ferdawsi’s millenary was revisited by way of two articles: the first solicited

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338 The most critical editions of the shahname are those of Turner Macan in 1829, in four volumes, published in Calcutta; of Jules Mohl, in several volumes, published in Paris from 1838 to 1878; of Vullers, published in Leyden, in three volumes, from 1877 to 1884. There is also a synopsis of the Shahname by Mohammad Ali Foruqi with some 25,000 verses, published in 1934 in Tehran. There is also the critical text published by Minovi, Egbal and Nafisi in ten volumes in 1934 in Tehran [sic.].” Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 7.

339 Ali Hannibal was a scholar of Persian literature and language as well as the founder of Ethnology Museum in Tehran; see chapter 1 in this study.


the best design of the poet’s statue and the second nostalgically recalled the ten days of his
millenary. 343

In the post-war era, there was a surge of publications to honor not only Ferdawsi, but also
through him “Reza Shah,” posthumously made “the Great” by the parliament: Mokhtari’s
History of Iran’s Awakening (1947), Nafisi’s Royal History of the King of Kings Reza Shah
Pahlavi (1965), Sadeq-Pur’s Memories of the Past (1967), and Yaghma’s Karmeh of Reza
Shah the Great and Reza Shah the Great: A Royal Travelogue (1971), were among the
publications that reinforced the 1934 events as an historic occasion, and more importantly,
historicized the experience into the mainstream national historiography. 344 Mokhtari devoted an
entire chapter to Ferdawsiyeh’s inauguration with pages of its photographs. 345 Nafisi maintained
that the king had “rectified” a historic error by proving an “honorable” resting-place for the
bozorgan – “The Great Masters,” after centuries of “ignorance, weakness, and contempt”
towards Iran’s national heritage, according to Nafisi, the shah had taken steps to “honor” these
historic figures. 346 The “Millenary Festivities of Ferdawsi in the Fall of 1313,” Nafisi further
insisted, were “an international event because not only was it celebrated in Iran with great
glamour… but was also convened in major Western cities… demonstrating that Iranian Masters
are living assets of today’s world.” 347 In his collected publication of Reza Shah’s speeches,
Sadeq-Pur emphasized that during the reign of “His Majesty… Iranian culture regained its
international prestige,” for by his order, on the erroneous date of 1312, as to “glorify, appreciate,
and venerate” the historic figure, “the value of whom Sultan Mahmud Qaznavi did not grasp,” a
monument “worthy of Ferdawsi’s greatness” was erected. 348 Forgotten during “the dark ages” of
Iranian history, Sadiq wrote, Ferdawsi was revived and given “a worthy resting-place” by Reza

343 “25 Lire Prize for the Best Design of Ferdawsi’s Statue” and “World Thinkers Praise the Great Poet of Iran,”
344 H. Mokhtari, Tarih-e Bidari-e Iran [History of Iran’s awakening] (Tehran, 1947); S. Nafisi, Tarih-e
Shahriyari-e Shahanshah Reza Shah Pahlavi (Tehran, 1965); A. R. Sadeq-Pur, Yadegar-e Gozashteh [Memories of
the past] (Tehran, 1967); Yaghma’i, A. Karmeh Reza Shah Kabir: Bonyangozar-e Iran-e Novin [Report book of
Reza Shah the Great: founder of modern Iran] (Tehran, 1971); and Center for the Study and Publication of Political
Culture of the Pahlavi Era, Reza Shah-e Kabir: Safarnameh Homayuni [Reza Shah the Great: royal travelogue]
(Tehran, 1971).
345 Mokhtari, Iran’s awakening, 552-555.
346 Nafisi, Tarih-e Shahriyari, 53. “Bozorgan-e Iran” is translated as “Masters of Iran.”
347 Nafisi, Tarih-e Shahriyari, 53.
348 Sadeq-Pur, Yadegar-e Gozashteh, 119.
Shah, who had been inspired by “the approach of the thousandth birthday of Ferdawsi.” Conversely, those texts that did not praise the king alongside Ferdawsi were prevented from publication. For instance, when notable scholar Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh was asked to submit his article about Ferdawsi, originally published in *Kaveh*, to be included in the *Ferdawsi’s Millennium* collection (1943), its editor and the shah’s minister, Ali Asghar Hekmat, was summoned to the royal palace. While the monarch “angrily” accused Taqizadeh of not applauding “His Majesty’s merit” in his article, on behalf of his friend Taqizadeh, Hekmat pleaded with the king on its “scientific” basis by pointing out that “it does not extol (t’arif) anybody,” that “It has nothing to do with contemporary individuals.” Falling on deaf ears, the collection was barred from publication until after the shah’s abdication in 1941.

Subsequently, the project had a bigger impact on Iran’s modern history. Ferdawsi’s millenary events would prove to be the prototype for future royal festivities. Many Iranians who could recall Reza Shah’s 1934 celebration, like Sadiq, could but juxtapose it to the extravagant celebrations of his son in 1971: “the 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire.” Whereas “we had no hotels to accommodate the forty Orientalists in 1313 and had to house them in friends’ residences,” compared Sadiq, “in 1350” thousands of foreign guests were comfortably accommodated in the Cyrus Hotel or the Persepolis Inn “with all the facilities of the 20th century.” According to him, while the trip from Tehran to Tus had taken three days of automobile ride in 1934, in 1971, the guest were flown into Shiraz within two hours for the Persepolis festivities. Ferdawsi’s millenary remained an exemplary moment in Pahlavi history; one to be mimicked and, perhaps one day, transcended. In 1971, Mohammad Reza Shah was doing exactly that by erecting the Shahyad Aryamehr monument in Tehran (Fig. 3.38).

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349 This specific edition was reprinted between 1976 and 1978 by the Ministry of Culture and Arts; it was dated by the Royal Calendar. Sadiq, *Memories*, 4: 196.
glance, and successfully signaled such historic changes of progress. The only discernable
difference was that the son surpassed his father by scale and glamour.

The unique morphology and iconography of Ferdawsiyeh would also stand as an
architectural prototype to be copied in subsequent decades. Reza Shah’s own mausoleum,
erected in 1951, would be a white, austere, and modernistic structure, centrally designed around
the tomb of a man (Fig. 3.39). While inspecting the grounds, had not he “touchingly” said, “it
seems Ferdawsi was a great man; [I wonder whether] one day I would be remembered in a
similar way.” His court minister, Teymurtash, had reassured the king that “a nation which
shows its gratitude after thousand years,” would certainly “continue to show its appreciation to
those who served it” for centuries to come. Too bad, this was a fiction for the mastermind of
the monument had been beaten to death by the shah a year earlier. Unlike Ferdawsi’s
mausoleum, however, Teymurtash visited his other design, Tehran’s modern prison called Qasr-e
Qajar with “ancient Iranian motives.” Between December 1932 and October 1933, he became
the victim of his own design. “According to legend, the master builder of the Tower of London
had been one of its first inmates. With Qasr this was no legend.”

In the efforts to boost Iran’s national prestige, Ferdawsi was properly fitted in the
positivist conception of historical progress through architecture. By erecting a monument, the
Pahlavi elite was doing for Ferdawsi exactly what they felt he had done for the nation. “By
writing the Shahname,” Sadiq argued, “Ferdawsi resuscitated the ancient history of Iran and

353 Reza Shah’s mausoleum was designed and constructed in 1951 by the cooperation of Mohsen Forugh,
Keyghobad Zafar, and Ali Sadeq located in Rey, south of Tehran. For the details of this monument’s design, history,
and underpinning politics, see Der-Grigorian, “Construction of History,” chapter I.
354 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 78.
355 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 78-79. From Shahrokh’s writing, it is unclear when this event occurred. It was either in the
midst of the 1934 inauguration, during which Teymurtash could not have been present because he was already dead;
or alternatively, during the obscurely documented royal inspection of the tomb in 1931 when Teymurtash’s presence
was possible.
357 “The most famous of [prison facilities] built in the 1920s was Qasr. Its full name was Qasr-e Qajar (the Qajar
Palace) because of its location near the ruins of a royal summer retreat on the cool northern hill of Tehran. A large,
tall building perched prominently on the hilltops next to an army barracks, Qasr became a symbol of both the new
Pahlavi state and the modern judicial system...Although inspired by Bentham’s Panopticon and the Philadelphia
Penitentiary, Qasr discarded their most inhumane features...The modern prison had come to Iran via the modified
and more humanitarian systems of early-twentieth-century Western Europe. Like much else in Pahlavi architecture,
ancient Iranian motives were grafted onto the buildings to give it an ‘authentic’ look. The Western penitentiary had
been Iranianized.” E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran
(Berkeley, 1999), 27.
358 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 45.
caused it to be preserved for future generations.” The mausoleum was for the future; “he made available to future generations the spirit of ancient Iran, when it might have been obliterated by the vicissitudes that have so often swept over her.” Like the landmark, “if Ferdawsi had not written the Shahname, all the history and all the chronicles and stories about the national life of Iran might well have been lost.” Similarly, Ferdawsi’s statue would strengthen all such historic claims on accuracy. The work of Ostad Abd al-Hosayn Sadiqi, in a seated position with an open book on the left knee, it was displayed in the garden of Ferdawsiyeh (Fig. 3.40). This image of Ferdawsi, purportedly obtained from bone autopsies hence a direct result of the tomb project, would be disseminated nationwide. Sadiq’s History of Education in Iran incorporated illustration of both the sculpture and the mausoleum in his sixth chapter: the history of the Qaznavid period. In it, Ferdawsi was characterized as the historic “prototype” of “our race” who, like his protagonist Kaveh, had been unjustly treated by Mahmud of Qaznavid for he was “extremely patriotic,” neither “egoistic, selfish,” nor “xenophobic.” Printed seven times between 1957 and 1975, this principal textbook was a considerable part of Pahlavi historiography in which Ferdawsi was (re)presented by his modern tomb. In the same way, the only comprehensive, still sketchy and state-sponsored study on Pahlavi architectural history was Rajabi’s Iran’s Architecture in the Pahlavi Era (1977), which maintained, “Ferdawsi’s monumental aramgah” was erected “with attention to his personality (shakhsiyat).” Rajabi’s assertion that “more than any other period from the antique principles” the modern design of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum “has taken help from the aramgah of Cyrus,” was reinforced by the juxtaposition of the image of the former with the latter (Figs. 3.41). These architectural relationships helped mount the Pahlavi historiography legible as deeply ancient and visible as thoroughly modern. The modern preoccupations with Ferdawsi’s grave, therefore, was not one of history, but that of modernity, wherein the question was a priori framed by historic immediacy.

359 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 13.
360 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 13.
361 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 13.
362 The sculpture was of one-piece white stone. See Sadiq, Ferdawsi, i.
363 Sadiq, Tarikh-e Farhang, 121-122.
364 Sadiq, Ferdawsi, 1.
365 For other such publications, see, for example, B. Pazargan, Tarikh-e daw hazar panzah sal-e shahanshahi-e Iran: qabl az eslaim ta asar-e Pahlavi [2500-year history of monarchical Iran: from Islam to the Pahlavi era] (Tehran, c. 1971), image of tombs of Ferdawsi 105-106, Omar Khayyam 109, Ibn Sina 110, Sa’di 114, Hafez 126, and Nader Shah 153-154; and A. Bausani, E. Nobis, F. De Agostini, Iran: the Future on the Plateau (Rome: Giovanni De Agostini Editor, 1976), image of Ferdawsiyeh 196 and Reza Shah’s tomb 75.
and scientific accuracy. By “creating the most beautiful monument of Persian art and of civilization,” Iranian newspapers wrote, “Ferdawsi is the poet of the fatherland” whose “verses are the expression of the highest Persian national sentiment. He is the emissary” who transmitted “the flame of antique civilization” and “the ancient glory to the NEW IRAN” in an “intact” form.367 The state argued that Ferdawsi, presented to the world by his mausoleum, “is the symbol and spirit of his people.”368 Ferdawsiyeh had become iconic of Pahlavi Iran.

However, much to the SNH’s disappointment, the new mausoleum had an unexpected result. Once the place was marked, mapped, and performed the Western thirst in search of Ferdawsi’s mystical grave lost its potency. Two years after its inauguration, British traveler Henry Filmer, while gave a lengthy description of Tus’ ruins in his Pageant of Persia (1936), forwent an allusion to Ferdawsiyeh; “adjacent to one of these gates near the northeast is the monument constructed in 1934 to mark the sepulcher of one more eminent than the Imam Reza, Firdausi, one of the great epic poets of the world.”369 Similarly, Roger Stevens’ Land of the Great Sophy (1979) stated, in passing, that “nearby” to the “so-called Harounieh” is the tomb of Ferdawsi; and he stops there.370 The Belgian Baroness and the Godards’ travel companion for over two decades, Marie-Thérèse Ullens de Schooten’s systematic visits to Iran between 1951 and 1970 produced an architectural index far more impressive than either those of the Godards or Herzfeld. However, one cannot fail to notice that she never visited the new mausoleum of Ferdawsi; under Tus, only the Haruniyeh was documented.371 This is highly revealing for Ullens

366 P. Rajabi, Me’mari-e Iran dar Asar-e Pahlavi [Iranian architecture during the Pahlavi era] (Tehran, 1977), 70-72.
369 “Tus, now only a small group of ruins scattered about a wide extent of fields, situated fifteen miles north of Meshed, was a principal city of Khorasan when Meshed was itself but an empty plain. The remains of its ancient wall, which includes one hundred and six towers and nine gates, are still visible. Adjacent to one of these gates near the northeast is the monument constructed in 1934 to mark the sepulcher of one more eminent than the Imam Reza, Firdausi, one of the great epic poets of the world. The original tomb has perished long ago although traces of it exited in 1822 when Fraser saw in the neighborhood a small edifice, surmounted by a cupola ornamented with faience, which was pointed out to him as the grave of Firdausi. Even this fragmentary and fragile structure collapsed in 1833...Firdausi, one of the immortals of his country...” H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis, 1936), 177-178. From the text, it is apparent that Godard and Filmer were friends since Godard is quoted extensively throughout the travelogue.
371 Ullens' Archives, Color Slide Core Collection, Architecture, Tus, Haruniyeh. Aga Khan Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University. Aside from Herzfeld’s very important, still predominately architectural photographs of Iran, other major photo collections include those of Ernst Hoeltzer who documented Isfahan in 1870s-1880s; Scarce, J. Isfahan in Camera: 19th-century Persian Thought, the Photo of Ernst Hoeltzer (London, 1976). From within Iran, the most important late 19th-century photographer was Antoin Sevruguin (1830s-1933), an
almost obsessively collected data on the material cultural of Iran ranging from unknown wild flora to crumbled Sassanian palaces, from Qashqa’i nomadic migrations to Tehran’s International Style apartments. Although her 35 millimeters color-slide collection alone amounts to 5,133 images, in addition to black and white prints, video and audiotapes, Ferdawsiyeh was nowhere to be found. Unlike their 19th- and early 20th-century compatriots, the European tourists of the 1970s dismissed the (re)covered mausoleum as not worth their while.

Despite Western perceptions, however, Ferdawsiyeh was and remains iconic of not only modern Iran but, more importantly, of the “totality of the Pahlavi project” as articulated in Teymurtash’s Iran-e Naw Party manifesto, itself described by a historian as “the most audacious aspect” of Rezaian reform. The landmark was, I believe, the cultural expression and material embodiment of that manifesto in that it simultaneously signaled contemporary conceptions of Iran’s ancient history, its modern progress, as well as definitions of good taste and high culture. The edifice was also an equally daring architectural undertaking not so much for its scope and success, but rather for its undue complications and infinite failures over and above the new vocabulary that it introduced to the nation. No other single structure would match the rich iconographic and morphological collage that underpinned its conception; no subsequent SNH monument would draw its inspiration from pre-Islamic, often imagined, prototypes in such an intentionally blunt manner. Moreover, no other structure would be subject to so much political curiosity, domestic and international alike. Nor would white marble be used so exclusively because no other landmark would seek to signal the alleged Aryanism of its nation. Epitomizing that rhetoric with its ‘pure and uncontaminated’ white marble; with its revivalistic Zoroastrian ornamentations; and its narrative inscriptions of the Shahnameh, its sophistication lay in its

Armenian from Russia, who came to prominence by became Naser al-Din Shah’s court photographer. In due course, he was commissioned by Sarre to document Persepolis. While Sarre and Herzfeld exclusively used Sevruguin’s images for their Iromische Felsreleifs (Berlin, 1910), they simply refused to credit the photographer. Sevruguin’s career came to a tragic end when Reza Shah ordered all his photos to be confiscated since the new regime intended to eradicate any trace of an ‘old-fashion’ Iran; see Bohrer, F. N. ed., Sevruguin and the Persian Image: Photograph of Iran, 1879-1930 (Washington, D.C. and Seattle, 1999). For a more survey on the topic, see I. Afshar, “Some Remarks on the Early History of Photography in Iran,” Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Changes 1800-1925, eds. E. Bosworth and C. Hillenbrand (Edinburgh, 1983), 261-290. Another collection on Iran’s material culture includes Myron Bement Smith collection at Freer and Sackler Gallery donated by Katharine Dennis Smith in 1973-1985. Ullens’ collection outdoes all these previous ones in its sheer size, subject matter, and variety of documentation means. Despite her financial wealth, the only reason for her marginality was and remains her gender.


“...But it was the totality of the Pahlavi project as expressed in the Iran-i No manifesto which was the most audacious aspect of the reform programme.” Ansari, Iran since 1921, 45.
simplicity; in its historic predictability. This monument was, surely, a mirror to the early Pahlavi policies, aspirations, and ultimate vision for it was not just a new architectural vocabulary, but also a novel definition and function given to public symbols, spaces, and practices in modern Iran.

Analogous to its authors and despite its pivotal role in (re)navigating national politics, the structure would become a mere footnote in subsequent Iranian historiography, always a statement in passing. It would certainly be ignored by architectural historians. Few would realize how extraordinary was the story underlying this architecture. It was so because in each step of its making, the monument spoke of the uneven political and cultural development that would characterize much of Iran’s modernity. Like the early SNH, it was also a byproduct of its age, a brief utopian moment, as much as an inevitable consequence of late Qajar discourses on modernity and tradition, the old and the new. Crucially, it would induce the very problematic of a historic site of national origin; a rather simple question that would hunt most Iranians in the course of a turbulent 20th century: “Hosayn at Karbala or Cyrus at Pasargadae?” By projecting Ferdawsi as a point of origin or rather a vital link to the origin at Pasargadae, the Society provided the nation with a site on which collective history could be experienced at an exact place and time. This site would always evoke the SNH’s selected and privileged origin, itself a thoroughly modern act. In the unfolding of its intertwined story, therefore, the monument was the experience of a particular kind of modernity – one that was distinct not only by zealous nationalism, secularist ambitions, rapid and radical reforms, social engineering, and adamant yet hasty historic revivalism, but also one that was endlessly entangled in verbal, hence fruitless, contracts, corrupt bureaucrats, and incompetent architects, as well as an intentional sidestepping of the nation that it intended to first invent and then acculturate. Such a venture, involving each man that left a deep mark on modern Iranian history between 1921 and 1934, would become the symbol of the Pahlavi ethos over and above a problematic public object in the revolution of 1979. This mausoleum would disturb various Iranian ideologues by constantly, and often inadvertently, fixing the uneasy question of historic origin at Pasargadae. Ferdawsiyeh was, indeed, the very history of Reza Shah’s Iran; as it were, a real place on the “exact spot” that never was. And then, became.
Figure 3.1 General views of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, statue, and park, Tus, 1934-1968. Source: Talinn Grigor, 1999.

Figure 3.2 Photograph of Haruniyeh by Robert Byron in 1933, Tus, Seljuk period. Source: Robert Byron photo collection, Harvard Fine Arts Collection.
Figure 3.3 Map of the city and ruins of Tus by Major P. M. Sykes, 1907-1908.

Figure 3.4 Photograph by Williams Jackson, Tus, 1907. Labeled, “Mullah Muhammad showing the supposed spot of Ferdawsi’s grave.” Source: Jackson, From Constantinople to Omar Khayyam, 293 image.

Figure 3.5 Keikhosraw Shahrokh, Parliamentarian 1909-1940. Source: Shahrokh, Memories of Keikhosrow, title page.

Figure 3.6 Isa Sadiq, Minister of Public Instructions. Source: Sadiq, Memoirs, 1: 301.
Figure 3.8 A local standing “on the spot,” photograph by Percy Sykes, Tus, c. 1910. Source: P. Sykes, 
Figure 3.9 Photograph by Ernest Herzfeld, Tus, 1925. Labeled “Tus, Neg. No. 2992.”
Source: Herzfeld Papers, Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives.

Figure 3.10 Photograph by Ernest Herzfeld, Tus, 1925. Labeled “Tus, Neg. No 2991.”
Source: Herzfeld Papers, Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives.
Figure 3.11 Ernest Herzfeld’s design proposal for the “Tomb of Ferdawsi.” A three-dimensional and a floor-plan sketch; rejected by the SNH, 1927-1928.

Source: Herzfeld Papers, Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives.
Figure 3.12 Photograph by Robert Byron of Ferdawsi’s modern mausoleum in mid-construction, Tus, November 1933. Source: Robert Byron photo collection, Iran 155, Photo file #13 Me-Ya, Tus – Firdasih Memorial #A47/1666. Aga Khan Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University.
Figure 3.13 Some of the members of the Ferda wsi’s lottery committee and the SNH’s Board of Directors. From right to left: Ernest Herzfeld, Ebrahim Hakimi, Hasan Esfandiari, Firuz Mirza Firuz, Hosayn Ala, and Ali Asghar Hekmat at Farmaniyeh, September 6, 1926. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 19.

Figure 3.14 Ferdawsi Raffle Ticket, Tehran, 1933-1934. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 28.

Figure 3.15 Mesrop Khan Kisian Armani, the winner of the Ferdaws Lottery announced in the Ettela’at, under the portrait of Hitler.

Figure 3.16 André Godard, Director of Iran’s Archeological Services, c. 1950.
Figure 3.17 Yedda Godard, coworker and wife of André Godard, c. 1950.
Sources: Ullens Collection, Harvard Fine Arts Library.

Figures 3.18 On the left, Tehran’s Archeological Museum (Iran Bastan) designed after the Sassanian palace at Ctesiphon; and above, Tehran University’s Fine Arts school, Tehran, Yedda and André Godards, 1936-1939 and 1934.
Source: Rotch Visual Collection, MIT.
Figure 3.19 Tomb of Cyrus, Pasargadae. Visible are André Godard on top of the steps and Yedda Godard on the bottom right. Sources: Ullens Collection, Harvard Fine Arts Library.

Figure 3.20 Reconstruction of Cyrus' tomb.
Figure 3.21 Reconstruction of the “Mausoleum at Hatra.” Source: Andrea, Hatra II (Leipzig, 1912), fig. 126.

Figure 3.22 General views of Ferdawi’s mausoleum due south, Tus, 1968. Source: Talinn Grigor, 1999.
Figures 3.23 Ahura Mazda icon on Ferdawsi’s monument façade (L), a copy of Ahura Mazda icon at Persepolis’ Hall of One Hundred Columns (R). Source: Talinn Grigor, 1999.


Figures 3.25 Sign indicating old entrance to tomb (L) replaced by stairs leading to underground tomb chamber (R). Source: Talinn Grigor, 1999.

Figure 3.27 Ferdawi's tomb chamber and grave. Sources: Talinn Grigor, 1999.

Figure 3.28 Tomb chamber's display of Shahnameh stories.
Sources: Talinn Grigor, 1999.
Figures 3.29 Architect Houshang Seyhoun’s sketches of general plan of Ferdawsiyeh, indicating plan of monument proper and general plan of enlarged garden. Source: Houshang Seyhoun during an interview with Talinn Grigor, Vancouver, June 2000.

Figures 3.30 Reza Shah’s inauguration speech at Ferdawi’s mausoleum, Tus, October 12, 1934. Source: Center for the Study and Publication of Political Culture of the Pahlavi Era, Reza Shah the Great: Royal Travelogue (Tehran, 1971), chapter 8 images.

Figure 3.32 Front-page of *Ettela’at Daily*, a special issue on Ferdawsi Congress and Celebrations. Source: *Ettela’at* 2312 (Mehr 21, 1313/October 13, 1934): 1.
نفران در دانشگاه همدان

قیمتی از آقاقی تیمور - پایان آقای کر
ناله حرام - تلقی شده در جامعه
اگر - نقل اخلاقیه آقای دینی ارژمن

در سه روزی که قبل از طرف بابت
که مولو و مدل ( مدرس مسالمه)\nآمده بود به شکش به اطراف دو زندگی
اسی در سه روز محسوس می‌کرد یک هدف
ن از آقایان مدل و دوستان و دوستان و
و همیاران دوستان از انتخاب
اسی از آقایان دوستان دوستان ودیده

اگر می‌توان به دوستان را در یک
بحث شنیدیم تا آقایان حکیم
که پیشی گرفتن مدل را جدید
ن شرکت که لازم به مطلع سهنا که لازم
می‌باشد. مدل در بهتر شدن این اطلاع تا شکست

اگر از ایران سیستم که به الیوم نشر
و کنار در می‌آید به هر دوستان و
و دوستان دوستانی را در مورد سهنا و
و دوستان دوستانی را در مورد سهنا و

در این دوره آقایان فردی بی‌شماری می‌شود
که دارای شناسایی و اندازه‌گیری هستند.

بر این دوره آقایان از سوی دوستان و اندازه‌گیری
و اطلاعات ماهیوی ترکیب‌های مختلف

شکل‌گیری که مدل سوم و یک اطلاعات ماهیوی

figure 3.33 Front-page of Ettela’at Daily, a special issue on Ferdowsi Congress and Celebrations.
Source: “Five in the Afternoon Friday Twentieth of Mehr,” Ettela’at 2319 (Mehr 28, 1313/October 20, 1934): 1.
یک ساعت بعد از ظهر روز جمعه بیستم مهر
اعلیحضرت همايونی آرامگاه فردوسی را افتتاح فرمودند

Figure 3.34 Front-page of *Ettela’at Daily*, a special issue on Ferdawsi Congress and Celebrations.
Source: “Five in the Afternoon Friday Twentieth of Mehr,” *Ettela’at* 2317 (Mehr 26, 1313/October 18, 1934): 1.

Figure 3.37 Second inauguration of Ferdawsiyeh by Farah Shahbanu and Mohammad Reza Shah, Tus, 1968. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 504.

Figure 3.38 Shahyad Aryamehr Monument, Hosayn Amanat, Tehran, 1971; renamed in 1980 as Azadi/Freedom Tower. Source: J. Lowe, Celebration at Persepolis (Tehran, 1971), 35.

Figure 3.40 Ferdawsi’s statue in Ferdawsiyeh, Tus, c. 1965. Source: Talinn Grigor, 1999.

Figures 3.41 Illustration of Ferdawsi mausoleum next to Cyrus’s tomb in official architectural historiography. Source: P. Rajabi, Me’mari-ye Iran dar Asr-e Pahlavi (Tehran, 1977), 70-72.
IV. MODERNITY FASHIONED: HAFEZIEH

“I admire Hafez a lot and remind him that, one day, I will remove his tomb...from its present corrupt condition and order...[a] resting-place worthy of his social merit and dignity.”

Reza Shah Pahlavi
Royal Travelogue, 1971

As of the end of the Ferdawsi Celebrations in October 1934, the Society for National Heritage embarked on its next architectural project: the refashioning of the tomb-garden of Hafez in the capital of southern province of Fars, Shiraz. While this second project seemed quite similar to the SNH’s first undertaking, it incorporated a very different ideological purpose and construction process. To start with, at this point in Iranian history, the second phase of the Rezaian period had begun; unlike the first between 1921 and 1933 when the king’s rule was absolute, this was both absolute and arbitrary. The period from 1933 to 1941 was distinguished by the systematic downfall of the political reformists who formed the SNH. For reasons lost to history, sometimes in the mid-1930s, the Society itself was shut down and its activities suspended by the personal order of Reza Shah. The alterations to Hafez’s tomb, therefore, were a result of a fragmented and defeated SNH by individuals who carried out a pre-planned but aborted project. Their architectural reforms were not only intended to “modernize” that which was perceived as “traditional,” but also (re)appropriate the historically Sufi meaning of the place in Iran’s secular historiography. The contention of this chapter is that through careful artistic intervention at Hafezieh, a real place with a long Muslim history would become just another tourist site integral to the network of tourist destinations on the map of Iran-e Novin (New Iran).

The Sufi poet Shams al-Din Mohammad Moteqales Hafez, who lived and died in the 14th century, is famed for having never left Shiraz. His best-known work, the collection of odes entitled Divan-e Hafez, was inspired by Muslihuddin Sa’di and was mainly patronized by Shah
Shuja’ Mozaffarid (ruled 1358-1385). By the custodianship of the Society, the tombs of these three men were transformed into modern monuments in 1938, 1952, and 1965 respectively (Figs. 4.1-4.3). The restoration techniques developed for Hafez’s tomb, known as Hafezieh, proved an effective prototype for subsequent SNH projects in Shiraz: while the surrounding medieval structures were removed to make way for a modern structure, the original tombstone placed by Mohammad Karim Khan Zand in 1773 was preserved for its inherent historic and political meanings; any addition to these spaces either before or after Zand period was perceived as devoid of value and was duly removed. It would be recalled that the Zands, especially the founder of the dynasty Karim Khan, were favored by the Pahlavis for their might and opposition.

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1 Hafez was born around 726 AH or 1326 AD and died around 791 AH or 1389 AD. Hodgson describes him as “the greatest Persian poet” who “set himself to rival Sa’di...” Hafez’s masterpiece, the Divan, has been described as honest and sophisticated. “Hafez’ creativity, his very simplicity, must be found in something that transcends the similes he utilizes...all done with simple directness...” where “the human mood is immediately clear.” For a discussion of Hafez’s life, work, and larger historic context, see Hodgson, M. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago, 1978), 2: 486-489, and various other pages. Hafez’s patron, Shah Shuja’ from the Mozaffarid dynasty ruled Fars from 1358 to 1385 AD.

2 Shaykh Muslihuddin Sa’di was born in Shiraz around 1184 AD and died in 1292. His most famous works include The Orchard of 1257 and Golestan of 1266. Under the auspices of the SNH, Sa’di’s new mausoleum, which replaced a medieval tomb-garden, was dedicated by Mohammad Reza Shah and Shahnab Namor in 1952. The new mausoleum was designed and constructed by the cooperation of Iranian architects, Mohsen Forughi, Keyqobad Zafar, and Ali Sadeq. (A year before, these architects erected Reza Shah’s mausoleum in Rey, as noted in chapter 3 of this study.) The remains of Sa’di were dug out of the original and somewhat opulent tomb structure. The new complex was designed as a large garden and tomb-chamber. The entrance-gate led to the impressive façade of the burial building. The structure itself was a monumental L-shape plan, organized around the domed space of the tomb. Whereas the large frontal portico with the monumental piers gave way to an open room for the main burial chamber, the western wing led to a small museum. A contemporary travelogue maintained, “The mausoleum built during the past few years in honor of the prince of Persian poetry is an elegant building with simple lines which harmonize with its decor of trees and flowers. A discreet public-address system enables foreign visitors to enjoy the musicality of the Persian language without seizing its subtlety.” For a discussion on the reconstruction of the tomb of Sa’di, see Society for National Heritage 131, Karnam-e-e Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli [Report-book of SNH], ed. H. B. al-Ulumi (Tehran, 1976), 161-205; A. N. Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi va Asar-e Honary: Jolagah-e Shiraz [Historic structures and cultural heritage: plain of Shiraz] (Shiraz: Ministry of Culture of Fars, 1349/1970), 20-36; M. M. Eqabi, An Encyclopedia of the Iranian Historical Monuments in the Islamic Era: Mausolea Structures (Tehran, 1999), 42-43; H. Emdad, Asar-e Tarikhi-ye Fars [Guide to Fars’ historic heritage] (Shiraz, 1960), 118-125; B. Karimi, Rahnameh-e Asar-e Tarikhi-ye Shiraz [Guide to Shiraz’s historic heritage] (Tehran, 1344/1965), 43-52; A. Sami, Shiraz: The City of the Poets Sa’di and Hafez (Shiraz, 1958), 46-60; Society for National Heritage 48, Iqlim-e Pars: Asar-e Bastani va Ebni-e Tarikhi-ye Pars [Climes of Pars: Fars’ historic and archeological heritage], ed. M. T. Mostafavi (Tehran, 1343/1964, republished 1375/1996), 55-57; Society for National Heritage 64, Bozorgan-e Shiraz [Masters of Shiraz], ed. R. A. Mehrad (Tehran, 1348/1969), 228-230; Society for National Heritage 105, Tarikh-e Baft-e Qadim-e Shiraz [History of Shiraz’s old fabric], ed. K. A. Afsar (Tehran, 1353/1974, republished 1374/1995), 139, 144, 170, 178, and 190; Society for National Heritage, Goshayesh-e Aramgah-e Sa’di [Inauguration of Sa’di’s tomb] (Shiraz, 1952-1953).

to the Qajars. These conservation policies underpinned careful and deliberate historic selectivity; that which was preserved spoke to a modern, and often European, sense of aesthetics, while the removal of all trace of Qajar intervention was a politics of representation rather than a technique of preservation. The addition of a bookshop, park benches, and the official name of Hafezieh reinforced the modern identity of the place both as an edifice of the nation’s patrimony and a destination for tourism. These Pahlavi interventions at Hafezieh, furthermore, represented a shift in the official attitude towards the historic figure and his symbolic function in the larger project of Iranian nationalism and modernization. The popular and historic stories about Hafez that had been handed down had a direct bearing on the aesthetic choices made during the repairs, as well as its subsequent use in the mass media. When Hafez died in 1393, his body was buried with some religious controversy. While the ulama refused to allow his corpse to be buried in a Muslim cemetery because he had written about wine and women, his grass-root support created an atmosphere of conflict. The issue was settled by randomly drawing his seventh verse of ghazal 79; it read: “Neither Hafez’s corpse, nor his life negate; with all his misdeeds, heavens for him wait.” Since then, Hafez’s simple, everyday language to describe a wide range of human emotions impelled ordinary Muslims to use his odes, like the Quran, to foretell the future.\(^3\)

The most interesting aspect of Pahlavi discourse on Hafez’s resting-place is the conspicuous lack of it.\(^4\) In sharp contrast to the SNH’s first undertaking from 1922 to 1934, the Pahlavi effort invested in this second project between 1935 and 1938 was characterized by silence. It seems Hafez’s tomb did not lend itself to nationalistic rhetoric. While Ferdawsi was reinvented through the discourse on and about his modern mausoleum, Hafez was suppressed despite his popularity and the certainty of his tomb’s location. While the constructing of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum was intended to celebrate the nation on an exact spot, the architectural

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3 One of the most important popular rituals while visiting his tomb, therefore, has been the drawing of auguries by randomly opening his Divan and putting ones finger on a verse, an indication of the visitor’s fate. For centuries, people of various backgrounds and convictions had made a pilgrimage to Hafez’s tomb, had randomly opened the book and said, “O Hafiz of Shiraz, cast one look upon me; of thee I wish to learn my future fate, for thou art the discoverer of all secrets.” In Persian, “Ay Hafez-e Shirazi, Bar man nazar andazi, Man taleb-e yek falam, To kashf-e har razi.” See Hafez, Fifty Poems, trans. A. J. Arberry (Cambridge, 1953); and Hafez of Shiraz, trans. P. Avery and J. Heath-Stubbs (London, 1952).

4 For the purposes of my argument, I will focus on the Pahlavi appropriation of Hafez into the official discourse to the extent that it involved his tomb-garden. While I will trace the history and historiography of the grave, its political use, or rather under-use, by both the state and the SNH, I will not enter into the details of Hafez’s life, work, and political use as stated in the prologue of this study.
schemes related to Hafez’s resting-place were meant to do exactly the opposite — to undercut the popular, almost mystical nature of Hafez and to turn the tomb-garden into a modern tourist site; it was meant to (re)define the parameters of the nation’s celebration on that spot. Accordingly, while the ‘Ferdawsi episode’ was the topmost topic of propaganda by the Iranian state and media, the ‘Hafez incident’ would remain quiet, devoid of ceremonies and conferences. Furthermore, if Ferdawsi’s grave had to be discovered to reinforce the exactitude of its place and time, Hafez’s tomb had a long history and architecture of an exact place and time. As far as the early Pahlavis were concerned, Hafez’s exactitude had to be curved, reshaped, and (re)appropriated to fit the new secularist agenda; as it were, its historic exactitude, made inexact. Unlike Ferdawsiyeh, the renovations at Hafezieh were far less complicated, elongated, and expensive; while the former lasted forty-three years, the latter took only three years to come to completion. Nor did Hafezieh involve as many state agencies, government officials, foreign curiosity, and media coverage. In fact, it never received either royal or journalistic attention. My proposition that in contrast to Ferdawsiyeh, the renovations to Hafez’s tomb were meant to de-emphasize the spiritual role of Hafez within the larger context of Muslim history and relegate him into an exclusively Iranian national history played a major role in both the lack of historiography about the tomb and the rapid and minimal architectural activities at Hafezieh. The Pahlavi effort to subvert the existing discourse on Hafez, hinted at the simple fact that in pre-Pahlavi Iran, there existed a substantial popular base around the cult of Hafez; this notion, translated in architecture, Hafezieh was and had always been a real place of worship and devotion. It generated and perpetuated certain popular practices and behaviors that were perceived by the Pahlavi elite as outside their definition and constructs of idea about taste and modernity. The architectural refashioning of Hafezieh, I maintain, not only served as a platform to instruct the public on “life along modern lines,” but also had much to do with the refashioning of these undesired public practices. The new design, fundamentally different from the existing, it was hoped would change the practices performed around the tomb of Hafez. Its (re)appropriation by the state was an indispensable aspect of appropriating popular habits into the mainstream of modern culture. A missing discourse would prove to be highly effective.
**Structure (re)Fashioned**

On July 28, 1935, the royalist daily newspaper, *Ettela’at*, printed a photograph of Musalla cemetery; at its center, a tomb was conspicuously marked by a cubic structure. The short caption below the image read, “Hafez’s Aramgah in Shiraz” (Fig. 4.4). On that same day, Reza Shah’s minister of public instructions, Ali Asghar Hekmat, who had seen the illustration on the back-page of his morning paper, decided to visit the cemetery two miles north of downtown Shiraz. A few hours later, entering through two pairs of columns into the cemetery, he could easily discern the grave of the great Sufi as depicted in his newspaper. Over the shallow pool at the foreground of his view, he could see the Ka’ba-like structure that covered the tombstone. As a boy, Hekmat had often accompanied his father here; back then, he recalled, the “ugly dark color metal cage” did not restrict access to the tomb proper; “nowadays, only those who are privileged could touch the marble stone placed by Karim Khan.” From Hekmat’s elevated position, the panorama depicted tightly knitted Muslim graves surrounding the metal structure, some perhaps as old as the 650 AD Arab invasion of Fars; the cemetery punctuated, here and there, by tall cypress trees, some perhaps as old as Darius I. Uncharacteristically, Hekmat returned from the cemetery on that day without paying his respects to his beloved Sufi master, Hafez. He was determined to convince his SNH colleagues that the place was in need of their reconstructive intervention. He later would write, “After centuries of neglect, it was high time to do something for this great Iranian.”

This story is my invention. Hekmat’s frequent visits to Musalla cemetery and a number of contemporary photographs depicting the place in 1935 as portrayed above, however, are not inventions. Still very little literature has been produced on this particular project. While there exist a few scanty, scattered, and often misleading secondary sources, my narrative is mainly reconstructed based on six letters exchanged during 1936 and 1937, in addition to the Ministry of Public Instructions’ 1315 (1936-1937) annual report. These key documents indicate that the fate of *Hafezieh* was tied to a handful of men, acting on behalf of the SNH therefore semi-indenpendently of the government, yet in official capacity as high-placed individuals within the Pahlavis bureaucracy. They included SNH veterans Hekmat and Director of Archeological

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Services André Godard, second-generation SNH member Ali Sami, Chief of the South Corps

Furthermore, while these memos hint at a process that corresponds with the often misleading factual data in secondary sources, go much further to elucidate how the project actually came about: as the architect of Ferdawsiyeh, Godard was asked, most likely by Hekmat to “take care” of the Society’s next undertaking. The main task entailed the production of drawings that would transform Musalla cemetery into the tomb-garden of Hafez. Either overwhelmed by a range of responsibilities, particularly the final construction phase of Iran Bastan Museum, or fed up by the demanding construction process of the Ferdawsiyeh, Godard must have selected a friend and a colleague to propose a new design for Hafezieh. Although accepting the commission, Siroux requested an assistant for the various arrangements with local workers; Sami was appointed to this post. It is possible that the on-site provisions were also managed by Riazi, even if his involvement remained undocumented. With practically no complications, this spatial and function transformation was completed sometime in 1938. It would be composed of two gardens separated by an arcade. Each end of this freestanding structure would house an administrative office and a bookshop for tourists. At the center of the northern garden would stand the domed-tower of the resting-place (Fig. 4.5). Few years later, a Western travel-guide would be able to maintain with relative ease that unlike the “dilapidated tomb of Saadi...the tomb of Hafez, a beautiful new temple-like building...justifies an all-day picnic.”

Although according to some European travelers to Iran, Shiraz “arose from the ruins of Persepolis” and “as old as Cyrus,” the city finds its origins with the 7th-century invading Arab troops who established a military town there. In modern times, many believed that “Shiraz is a city of leisure and the home of poets,” while the Shirazis are “pleasure-loving and party-making” people. Under the Pahlavis, the city was increasingly represented in sharp contrast to both Tehran and Mashhad, as the land of exotic gardens, good wine, relaxed and secular atmosphere, and above all, the place where ‘true’ Persian culture took its most ‘authentic’ expression. By the 1970s, this image was perfected: while Tehran grew to be the seat of government, industry and

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transnational corporations, Shiraz provided the site of foreign institutions such as Arthur Pope's Asia Institute, Queen Farah's Art Festivals, and sound and light shows at Persepolis and Naqsh-e Rostam. During the 2500-year celebrations in October 1971, moreover, Shiraz facilitated Mohammad Reza Shah and his guests to make their “rendezvous” with “world history.” After half a century of construction, architecture seemed a sound confirmation of the king's assertions: “Greetings to all builders of our great Iranian civilization and culture, to all our men of learning, all our writers, literary men, and poets who in the course of thousands of years transformed this land into an everlasting center of thought, spiritual values, and universal culture and civilization.”

All this began in the 1930s when Rezaian urban reform was implemented in Shiraz. The northern historic entrance to the city, marked by the Quran gate, was circumvented by the construction of an avenue, stretching next to, instead of, through the gate, thus relegating the gate under the rubric of a historic monument. This seemingly minor urban shift underpinned military priorities that would enable the shah's army easy and swift access to the heart of the city. The new boulevard, named “Hafez,” originated at the gate and linked northern Shiraz to Zand Boulevard in downtown (Fig. 4.6). The carving out of the road that radically refigured the urban fabric of northern Shiraz was further affected by the erection of a wall separating Hafez Boulevard from the city's historic cemetery. In December 1934, the British diplomats noted, “the entrance of Shiraz has been improved by the construction of a wall to hide the cemetery, which stretches from the garden of Hafez to the Shahzadeh Abdul Hossein.” These ‘improvements’ called for a physical demarcation of the cemetery as a specific place, walled and labeled, in order to transform the Musalla area into the exclusive resting-place of Hafez. In other words, in order for Musalla cemetery to mutate into Hafezieh, as it was hoped by the SNH, it was imperative to clearly define and mark the public cemetery as such. The logic functioned on opposite binaries: if the cemetery was walled and labeled, then the Musalla would be free from such historic burdens and could be converted into a modern tourist site exclusively dedicated to the Sufi

9 Rodkin, Unveiled Iran, 113.
10 A. Aryanpure, A Translation of the Historic Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr (Tehran, 1973), 58. The address delivered on October 15, 1971 as the opening address of the Persepolis Parade representing an “Iranian Civilization.”
11 Aryanpure, Translation of Speeches, 58.
12 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 7588/47/34, A. C. Trott, December 1, 1934, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 9: 1931-1934, 585. My emphasis.
The state’s meticulous effort to single out these two public spaces as fundamentally different was a central conceptual aspect of the Hafezieh renovations, as well as its later use. The eradication of Musalla cemetery was hardly a unique tactic in Reza Shah’s urban reform; nor was transforming these confiscated urban pockets into public recreations points. The “Law 5 February 1929,” which “assigned all fallow and dead lands, squares, and ditches to the municipality,” had guaranteed Hekmat an effortless confiscation of the cemetery land. In Tehran, out of approximately 144,800 square meters confiscated, 64,424 were converted into recreational parks, including the 12,434 square meters cemetery of Chaharrah-e Hasanabad. By the end of 1929, the much larger Sar-e Qabr-e Aqa cemetery, with a property as large as 107,173 square meters, became known as Ferdawi Park. By early 1930, properties of Tehran municipality would amount to “71,000 square meters in promenades and parks.” Since the capital served as the blueprint for urban renewal in Shiraz, Musalla cemetery was subjugated to the same processes as the cemeteries in Tehran. However, due to the destructive nature of this task that necessitated the displacement and elimination of a vast number of graves, the SNH was limited in the propagation of its activities during the renovations. Moreover, to be able to successfully convince the public that Hafezieh was ‘just another’ “national memorial (yadgah-e melli),” secrecy was paramount.

The historiography produced by the SNH is in keeping with this intention to subdue the popularity of, or (un)perform, Hafez’s tomb. While its 131st volume, the Karnameh (1976), devoted entire chapters to most of its other projects, Hafezieh occupied the following statement at the very end of the book:

As a result of financial difficulties and disagreement between the Ministry of Culture and the Office of National Heritage of Fars, the beautiful garden of Hafez was in unsatisfactory condition. In 1337 (1958), it was improved by the SNH in a worthy manner. The walls and the tile-work were cared for [and] the existing library in the north of the garden was repaired and in the name of Hafez Library was put into reuse.

Not only the Karnameh did not provide the missing data, but also denied the agency of its members during the first and actual phase of the restorations in the 1930s. Likewise, the SNH’s

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15 G. C. Lenczowski, ed. Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, 1978), 327.
16 SNH 131, Karnameh, 747.

The urban reforms in Shiraz enabled the confiscation of the land in and around Musalla cemetery for the purposes of the new *Hafezieh*. Specifically, it applied to the area between the medieval graves and that which would become the main intersection street, perpendicular to Hafez Boulevard. Given the authorities’ claim that the space was “originally...a forested park” and one that Karim Khan had surrounded with “a garden, for its protection,” it became possible to annex the area into *Hafezieh*’s property. In this matter, the involvement of the commander of the South Corps, General Ali Riazi proved valuable. As in the case of *Ferdawsiyeh*, the land was “offered” to the state with the mediation of the army – “the central pillar of” Reza Shah’s “New Order.” What is more, “due to the lack of construction materials and the limited number of workers,” Riazi was “requested” by Hekmat to “donate” all that was stripped off other buildings during the construction of Shiraz’s main avenue. Situated on the destructive path of modern urbanism, the leftovers from Vakil bazaar and the residence of Fars’ Corps would provide the building material for *Hafezieh*. The Ministry of Public Instructions reported in March 1937:

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17 See Appendix 2.
19 This last source, while provides rich detail of both modern and historic alterations, attributes the authorship of the 1935-restorations to “the Ministry of Culture.” With minor exceptions, it disregards a large number of Western travelers who visited and described Hafez’s grave starting in the Safavid era. Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 40.
Since both material and labor were scarce, it was requested from the commander of South Corps that Karim Khan’s large pool [located] in Khaleh Garden (the residence of the Fars Corps on the corridor of Zand Boulevard) be donated to [Hafez’s] tomb. The material of Vakil bazaar, which was demolished by the municipality during the expansion (toseh-e) of Zand Boulevard, [should also] be bought [for this purpose].22

The SNH’s 1964 description confirms this account; “The stones of the pools in Zand style, on Zand Boulevard of Shiraz were demolished (kharab gardid) and were transported to the aramgah.”23

Equipped with the necessary material and land, the SNH began its work. The demarcation and enclosure of an area of “6,258 square meters,” immediately to the south of the existing pair of columns, began to clearly define the boundaries of modern Hafezieh, now distinctly different from the former Musalla cemetery.24 The construction of two thirty-meter long shallow pools, stretching on the north-south axis, carved a “noble appearance” for the forecourt. This, furthermore, became the crucial spatial link between that which was intended as a sanctuary and the public space of the street (Figs. 4.7-4.8). Landscaping came to play a vital role in making this transition from street to sanctuary; “A garden was laid out at the entrance of the tomb” where “two orangeries were planted on either side.”25 With the strategic isolation of the cemetery and its subtle link to the street, the authorities had set the stage for a series of thorough and uninterrupted repairs; these were later described as not only “worthy of praise and commendation,” but also one “suitable to” Hafez’s “social merit and dignity.”26 While these were mere words planted in Reza Shah’s mouth decades later, the claim that he “ordered...the garden around [Hafez’s] tomb to be closed to public burials” was, undoubtedly, a fact.27 The new wall, along with the king’s decree, sealed the future of Musalla cemetery.

As the details of property and material, the authorship of Hafezieh’s design remains a moot topic. While Mehraz and Mostafavi agreed that the “authentic building of Hafez’s aramgah” was from the Zand era, and that “the present construction was erected in 1314 during the reign of Reza Shah the Great and with the hard work of Mister Hekmat,” Afsar presented an

23 SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53. Eqabi copies, without quoting, this information in his encyclopedia; see Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.
24 Sami, Shiraz, 64.
25 Sami, Shiraz, 64.
26 Safarnameh Homayuni, 64, chapter 8 images.
uncritical history of Western accounts which ended its account at the turn of the century. In all three narratives, it seems, the SNH was unwilling or unable to document its own undertakings between 1935 and 1941. Rather more accurately, since the Society was officially dissolved by Reza Shah during that time, later historiographers hesitated to directly credit the Society for the work. Paradoxically, subsequent tourist guidebooks did a far better, still inadequate, job of tracing the Society’s efforts in the 1930s. On the one hand, Karimi’s *Guide to Shiraz’s Historic Heritage* (1965) was the only source that documented the first site “inspections” in August 1935. “The moment when the Cultural Ministry decided to give a hand to the renovation (*ta’mir*) of Hafez Aramgah,” it specified, “Mister Godard…prepared a design (*tarhi*) in accordance with the [*construction*] methods (*oslub*) from Karim Khan’s era.” On the other, Emdad’s *Guide to Fars’ Historic Heritage* (1960) gave credit to “HIM Reza Shah Pahlavi” and Hekmat when in “1314 the Hafez aramgah was renewed (*tajdid*) from its foundations…it was built anew in a modern and agreeable model by the hard-work of General Riazi, the Director of Fars’ Culture.” Emdad further noted that “the modern design is by Mister Godard,” while Behruzi’s *Historic Structures and Cultural Heritage: Plain of Shiraz* (1970) concurred: “the design of the plan of the present aramgah was drawn by the General Director of the Archeological Services.” Furthermore, in his *Shiraz: The City of the Poets Sa’adi and Hafez*, Sami voiced his own agency; “It was largely due to the persistent and valuable efforts of Dr. Hekmat…and the late General Riazi…that the present Mausoleum…so worthy of praise and commendation, was conducted. The writer of this book,” Sami modestly added in a footnote, “was also in charge of the task, and will ever be proud to have achieved it.” “But,” Sami attributed the architectural credit for “the essential repairs and the present structure” to the “Ministry of Education and the Archaeological Services.”

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33 Sami, *Shiraz*, 63-64, footnote 1.
While Reza Shah had absolutely nothing to do with this project, the secondary sources were correct in giving credit to Ali Asghar Hekmat (1892-1980) for most of its administration and financing (Fig. 4.9).34 Despite the lack of archival support, he most likely became the de-facto director of the SNH after Mohammad Ali Forughi’s forced resignation in December 1935, thus, in charge of its projects. Hekmat’s promotion would prove critical to the survival of the Society, at least underground, during the second half of Reza Shah’s arbitrary and absolute reign. From the state’s viewpoint, nevertheless, Hekmat’s directorship was well deserved, because not only had he been vital to the restructuring and homogenization of the new secular educational system, including the construction of Tehran University campus, but also had shown himself a reliable member of the Pahlavi ranks in general, and the SNH in particular. He was, indeed, a reactionary nationalist, described by those who later worked with him, “a very staunch Rezaian dictator, very staunch.”35 For instance, as a demonstration of his loyalty to the Pahlavi brand of nationalism and as the shah’s minister of public instructions (vezarat-e ma‘aref, owqaf, va sanaye’-e mostazrafeh.), Hekmat returned from Kemalist Turkey in 1938 and paid visits to a number of minority schools, including the Davitian Armenian school in Tehran. Eyewitnesses recall that Hekmat had made a point of taking the sign off the door, under his feet, and had ordered the immediate closing of the school.36

34 For more on Hekmat, see his biography in Ruknzada-Adamiyat (1959-1960: II, 295-304); Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 71, footnote 1.
35 Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada, Tape 1, Side B; see Appendix 6. When the SNH published Pope’s 1925 lecture, Hekmat wrote in the introduction, “When speaking about each great historic age of the Iranian civilization, a teacher must pay special attention to Iran’s craft and completely transmit the vital information that has been elaborated here by Professor Pope.” Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old publications of the SNH] (Tehran, 1972), 104.
36 The Davitian School was renamed Kooshesh in post-Rezaian era. Armenian institutions were not unique in their treatment; Zoroastrians and Jews along with non-Persian speaking ethnic/linguistic groups were also targeted by the state. “M. Egu. Mourey, Consul de France a Tauris [Tabriz], a S. E. ministre des affaires estranger. La semaine derniere, la direction provinciale de l'instrucion publique de Tauris a, par circulaire, a signifie a chacun des directeurs des trois ecoles armeniennes de cette ville que, a dater du commenceement de la nouvelle annee scolaire (6 spetembre 1938) et en vertu d’un decret ministeriel ratifie par le Parlement, les dits etablissements scolaires, avec toutes leurs dependances, seront ‘nationalisee’.” Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie 1930-1940, Iran 130, Instructions Publique E387-2, 29, September 7, 1938, Tabriz. The Armenian Woman’s Society was created in 1939 in order to secretly teach Armenian language and history to younger students. The eight founding members, with the leadership of Emma Moskovian, were 9th graders in the American Missionary School, called the “Iran Bethel” Protestant School. Seda Hovnanian is the eyewitness, herself a student at the school and one of the founding members of the AWS. Seda Hovnanian, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, July 15, 2002, Sherman Oaks, California. For the details of treatment of minority schools under Reza Shah, see E. Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge, 2000); and Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 163.
These despotic methods, however, proved fruitful when it came to national monuments. While Hekmat had little experience in architectural ventures, the administrative success of the Hafezieh project was mostly due to his administrative skills and ability to work Iran's underdeveloped bureaucracy. A devoted native of Shiraz, he was first educated in the Church Missionary Society School. While he continued his education in Tehran's American College, he managed to maintain a reputation for having been well read in Arabic. Leaving for Paris to study law at Sorbonne, he returned to Iran in 1933 to become the minister of education, endowment, and fine arts (vezarat-e ma'aref, owqaf, va sanaye'-e mostazrafeh). At the time, the British officials described him as “a go-ahead, pleasant young man...very helpful and approachable.”

Hekmat’s long political career in Pahlavi Iran would subsequently place him in various governmental posts, including those of minister of Interior, Health, Justice, as well as foreign minister and ambassador to India. As a leading member of the SNH, furthermore, he would be personally involved in the construction of a range of modern mausoleums. Between 1948 and 1952, he would be engrossed in the building of Sa’di’s new resting-place. Having been “responsible for erecting the fine modern mausoleum of Hafez,” he would be approached by French scholar Henry Corbin in November 1956, “to attend to the restoration of the shrine of his predecessor and fellow-townsmen Ruzbihan.” With Hekmat’s help, by 1972, the modern tomb of Ruzbehan would be built and inaugurated by the SNH. The successful completion of Hafezieh in the late 1930s would not only give way to further projects as these, but would permanently...

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38 Arberry, Shiraz, 89. For Corbin’s original letter, see SNH 131, Karnameh, 519-522. After paying “a pilgrimage to the grave,” Corbin had added, “it will become possible once again to evoke worthily the glorious past attested by Ibn Battuta and Sharaf al-Din Ibrahim: Shiraz, in rediscovering one of its sanctuaries, will bear witness to the veneration merited by one of the greatest mystics of Iran, a master whose work is of primary importance for understanding the spiritualism of Farid al-Din Attar, Jalal al-Din Rumi...and, finally, Hafez.” See Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, page 5; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Khoradad 11, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran. Such architectural discoveries spoke of historic merits in addition to a more profound understanding of literature and mysticism. They also furnished as a spatial counterpart to the newly constructed history of these men. While Attar’s mausoleum would be renovated by the SNH in 1960, Rumi’s would not, simply because his resting-place was outside the boundaries of Iran, in Konya, Turkey. As the main figure behind the Hafez and Sa’di projects, Hekmat left an architectural mark inside Sa’di’s new mausoleum. An inscription praising the “eternal fame of the poet and the glorious epoch” of Mohammad Reza Shah was the focus of the tomb-chamber before its removal after the 1979 revolution. See S. Manoukian, “The City of Knowledge: History and Culture in Contemporary Shiraz,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2001), 45.
fasten Hekmat’s name, often literally, to the high culture of Shiraz, over and above that of Pahlavi Iran. 39

The August 1935 inspections of the site must have instigated the six surviving letters regarding the restoration of Hafezieh. Exchanged between Hekmat, from the Ministry’s headquarter in Tehran and its Fars branch in Shiraz, they indicate that with Reza Shah’s disbanding of the Society, its responsibilities were transferred to the selected few at the Ministry of Public Instructions. The orders to initiate the project came from Hekmat’s office on April 6, 1936; the first letter addressing the “supervision (nezarat) of Hafezieh.” 40 It, in turn, referred to the orders given on February 24, March 14, and April 12 to this effect. Among the six, the unsigned and undated letter written in French was crucial for not only it attested to Maxime Siroux’s authorship of Hafezieh, but also encapsulated the development of the project. 41 “Your Excellency Minister of Public Instructions,” the author informed, “it is not possible to begin the construction of the building of Hafez, because the columns of Hafezieh are not finished.” 42 From this memo, two details become clear: first, despite erroneous credits in secondary sources given to Godard, his French colleague was, in fact, the architect of Hafezieh; second, the fact that the construction steps, following the “inspections,” consisted of the expansion of the columned hall or the talar, which not only divided the inner and outer gardens, but also incorporated specific tourist facilities. Accordingly, twenty-four “one-piece (yek parcheh)” columns and capitals were commissioned for off-site production; they were to be “the exact copies” of the existing Zand columns of the talar. 43 “I have [signed] a contract with the sculptors,” the letter went on to explain, “to finish the columns and the stairs within eight months.” Due to the fact that the letter was not dated, we have no idea exactly which “eight months” it actually referred to. However, as

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39 “Seyhoun: During the construction of the new [Nader’s tomb], Hekmat, with whom I had a very bad relationship, [...] always wanted to have a direct saying in the things that needed to be done; so that his name would be associated with the project. For Bu Ali’s [Ibn Sina] project, he went and found an aye [verse] from the Quran that had ‘Hekmat’ in it and was inscribed on the monument.” Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A; see Appendix 6. Also, see SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars.

40 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 16; from the central Ministry of Public Instructions to Fars branch of Ministry of Public Instructions, Farvardin 17, 1315/April 6, 1936, Tehran. These few letters also reveal the extent to which the shah’s paranoia had become both absolute and arbitrary; institutions that once upheld his rule now were diffused into individuals and, as such, brought under his personal control.

41 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 5; to the Minister of Public Instructions, no date and no signature, Tehran.

42 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 5; to the Minister of Public Instructions, no date and no signature, Tehran.

43 In secondary sources, these columns vary from sixteen to twenty-two; see Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40; SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53; and Sami, Shiraz, 65.
indicated by the Ministry’s 1315 (1936-1937) annual report, the incorrect number of “22 columns, just like the existing ones” were commissioned “with the supervision of Ostad Ayedi and Ostad Abbas,” hence explaining the contents of the first three letters.44

Aside from the French letter, the only other source endorsing Siroux’s authorship of the design is Marefat’s unpublished dissertation. Based on her interview with Siroux’s equally unnamed spouse, Marefat noted, “Another achievement was the Memorial to Hafez...constructed” on the erroneous date of 1939. “Built in a traditional style,” she maintained, “it replaced a modest structure without detracting from the serene garden that surrounded the tomb.”45 Despite Marefat’s (mis)reading of the pre-Siroux Hafezieh – for the existing Qajar structure was neither “modest” nor “distracting,” at least not from a local sense of aesthetics, nor was the original place a “serene garden” – Siroux’s authorship would be a marked one. In the architecture of this project, the SNH intended to overshadow the practice of Muslim pilgrimage, with its ultimate drive in devotion, “to replace it” with a destination for tourism, with the purpose of leisure. While “distraction” was exactly what these restorations intended, Siroux would make a great effort to preserve some of the historic fragments of the place.

Unlike his Western counterparts in Iran, Siroux does not seem to have been an architect with ambitions in politics or antiquities; nor was he cut up in the vicious game of colonial rivalry. Arguably, this gave him an ample time to be productive during his long stay in Iran. A graduate of the École des Arts Décoratives and the École Spéciale d’Architecture, Siroux (1907-1975) first was drawn to Iran via archeology.46 According to Marefat, he was “the most prolific practicing foreign architect in Iran for more than three decades.”47 Very rapidly embraced by the system of the central government, Siroux became involved in a large number of design projects, including ministries of Agriculture, Education, Industry and Mines, Interior and Finance; hotels, schools, hospitals, stadiums and regional schools, as well as villas for affluent officials. More specifically, he designed and built the National Library located north of Iran Bastan Museum in

44 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 113, Document 56, page 29; 1315 Annual Report of Ministry of Public Instructions, 1936-1937, Tehran. Another secondary source misleads by maintaining that “The southern iwan that separates the aramgah proper and the southern garden consists of 56 meters” and the incorrect number of “30 columns, 4 of which are from Karim Khan’s period...” Emdad, Asar-e Fars, 130. My emphasis.
46 Maxime Siroux became a licensed architect in 1934.
47 Marefat, “Building to Power,” 120.
1936, remaining loyal to Godard’s style and material. As for pedagogy, Siroux was hired by the Tehran University’s school of architecture as a lecturer in construction techniques during its first five years of establishment between 1940 and 1945.

Although a talented modern architect, Siroux paid special importance to local, and often marginalized, architecture and scholarship. His intimacy with indigenous cultural history enabled him to both publish several notable works on previously neglected topics and successfully collaborate with Iranian architects. For instance, his 1949 Caravanserais of Iran and Small Road Constructions heralded Iranian architectural history to include ignored and undervalued body of material as history worth writing. Focusing on the region of Isfahan, his second major work, Anciennes Voies et Monuments Routiers de la Region d’Ispahan, was published in 1971 and was posthumously translated in Persian. Both works remain the most comprehensive and serious study of minor roadside teahouses and guesthouses, both accompanied by hundreds of photographs, as well as impressive drawings of plans, sections, and maps. The kind of local historiography Siroux managed to develop would be appreciated and built upon only after the 1979 Revolution; only then would such structures be considered historically valuable as authentically Iranian and integral to Iran’s architectural history, in reaction to or despite the westernized historiography of the Pahlavi era. In that sense, Siroux was ahead of his time by a few decades and a major revolution.

Furthermore, Siroux not only lent a hand to Mohammad Ali Forughi’s son, architect Mohsen Forughi, on the construction of Tehran University’s individual buildings, but also designed a large number of modern primary and secondary schools in Tabriz, Gorgan, Sanandaj, Amol, Borujerd, Qom, Kazerun, etc., and prepared blueprints for provincial schools. While some Western and local architects would have hesitated to take up such regional, hence seemingly insignificant, projects and while few Orientalists were willing to publish on such road-

48 On the National Museum, see Marefat, “Building to Power,” 102-106.
side subjects as caravanserais, Siroux plunged into these architectural and scholarly margins. Years later, the Belgian baroness and Godards’ companion, Marie-Thérèse Ullens, would document these same popular caravanserais and teahouses before their demolition during the 2500-year unpopular celebrations (Fig. 4.10). Like Siroux, she documented objects that would soon be destroyed by modernizing forces; both Ullens and Siroux were an exception in that they condemned Reza Shah’s rapid, and often indiscriminate, modernization guidelines that continued during his son’s reign. While the details of Siroux’s contribution to Hafezieh design would remain little known, there is not much doubt that the preservation policies that underpinned this project came from him. In other words, if today the architectural traces of the Zand period remain in place, it is entirely due to Siroux. He was the one person who obstructed the destructive momentum of Rezaian reform. More than 60 years later, in referring to the design of Hafezieh, Siroux’s Iranian disciples, Houshang Seyhoun, would describe it as an “extraordinary job.” Still, even he would not be able to prevent the transformation of a medieval cemetery into a tourist hotspot in the late 1930s.

In order to better work with the local masons and contractors, Siroux asked Godard for the appointment of an Iranian assistant; from his letter we find out, “Mister Godard has promised to send an architect.” Ali Sami, while not an architect, proved to be highly qualified for the job, mainly because he was familiar with the SNH’s *modus operandi*, his native town, Shiraz, and above all the modern techniques of archeological transformations. Through German archeologist Eric Schmidt, Sami had been deeply involved with the excavations at Persepolis and Pasargadae in 1936. He would later become the director of the Archeological Services in Fars and the Oriental Institute of Persepolis, as well as a lecturer in the department of literature at Shiraz University. He would produce a number of scholarly works, including *The Achaemenid Civilization* (1962-1969), *The Sassanian Civilization* (1963-1965), in addition to a series of tourist guidebooks on Persepolis (1955), Pasargadae (1971), and Shiraz (1984).
Both Siroux’s comment and Hekmat’s letter of April 16, 1936 instructing the Fars Ministry to “hire Mister Sami to realize the Hafez’s aramgah,” indicate that in realizing the *Hafezieh*, Sami became the intermediary between the French-speaking architect and the local artisans.\(^{55}\) Learning from past mistakes, it was ordered that Sami serve also as a site administrator; “Due to the lack of an architect on the site and because the construction cost had to be regularly supervised,” recorded the 1315 annual report, “the Cultural Ministry personally assigned Mister Sami to this post.”\(^{56}\) A month after Hekmat’s letter, Fars’ Public Instructions Ministry notified its headquarter in Tehran, “we received your telegrams about the resting-place of Hafez” and will initiate the necessary steps.\(^{57}\) Sami was accordingly hired.

Most of the construction work on *Hafezieh* was completed between the spring of 1936 and winter of 1937 as per Siroux’s design and Sami’s collaboration. Sixteen of the replica columns extended the four-columned “*iwan*” on either side. The *pishtaq* (portico, also know was *peshtaq*), set in a three semi-circular frame and ornamenting the *iwan*, was removed. A total of 70 meters in length, the new *talar* incorporated 56 meters of open portico and two small halls at each end, to house a museum and a bookshop.\(^{58}\) This structure that governed circulation at time have destroyed a great deal of their remains, those bits and pieces left, nonetheless, testify to that glorious culture, it would be unfair that we neglect the struggles of our ancestors and fail to respect their efforts by not preserving their remains... Thus the author [Sami], like other pioneers of the discipline, have dedicated several years of his life to accomplish this task... This effort was not a result of anything but a love of motherland and praise of the valuable remains of the ancestors.” A. Sami, *The Achaemenid Civilization* (Shiraz: Pahlavi University, 1962), 3-4, quoted in K. Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 105 (2001): 51-76, 67. Also, see A. Mousavi, “Obituary: Professor Ali Sami (1910-1989),” *Iranica Antiqua* 25 (1990): 189-193.

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\(^{55}\) Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 14; from the central Ministry of Public Instructions to Fars branch of Ministry of Public Instructions, Farvardin 27, 1315/April 16, 1936, Tehran.


\(^{57}\) Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 7; from the central Ministry of Public Instructions to Fars branch of Ministry of Public Instructions, Farvardin 23, 1315/April 12, 1936, Tehran. And, Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 4; from Fars branch of Ministry of Public Instructions to Office of Endowment, Ordibehesht 19, 1315/May 9, 1936, Shiraz.

\(^{58}\) Whereas at the early stage of construction the columns were not ready, Siroux indicated that “the museum is almost finished, only the decorations remain.” A modern museum in a former cemetery was the most effective technique to turn the place into a tourist attraction. Moreover, the east-west extension of the *talar* was an important alteration not only in the configuration of the complex, but also in the very imagery of the place. The systematic replacement of pointed arches with columns gave the place a “magnificence” and openness hitherto lacking. The elevated portico was also intended to function as a frame, simultaneously dividing and connecting the two gardens. While the outer garden was enhanced with landscaping, park benches, and a ticket booth, the inner garden was to house the pavilion of Hafez’s tomb proper.
Hafezieh was approached by two sets of steps, on the southern façade of which, the patronage inscription read (Figs. 4.11): 59

The building of the aramgah of Khaju Shams al-Din Mohammad Hafez Shirazi
By the instructions of His Imperial Majesty King of kings of Iran Reza Shah Pahlavi
And by the order of Mister Hekmat Minister of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts
Was realized in the year one thousand three hundred sixteen Lunar Hejri 60

The arbitrary and absolute nature of the king’s rule was embodied in the gold inlay of the words “Reza Shah Pahlavi” in this inscription. Next to this, Hafez’s odes from the Divan were added, “No longer flowers-faced maidens entice me; Nor can their slender grace still suffice me,” while on the opposite façade: “Deem it no fault to hearken to the wise; You misinterpret: that is where the fault lies.” 61 On the walls of the museum and bookshop from inside the portico, two marble tablets were fixed with the inscriptions: “God’s Heavenly Gardens where the mystic dwells; Honour to those who frequent the mystic’s cells.” 62

Beyond the arcade (talar) lay an area of 2,620 square meters, where had stood Musalla cemetery. Here the metal grill of Hafez’s tombstone was dismantled and removed; so was the ablution pool. This was followed by the most destructive aspect of the entire undertaking: the complete elimination of medieval graves surrounding Hafez’s tomb. By 1938, the historic cemetery was effectively transformed into a “serine garden.” Despite the lack of archival evidence – with the exception of Siroux’s comment that specified that “we expect to finish the museum and fix the terrain to begin” the construction of the pavilion – this decision was in most likelihood imposed by Hekmat and Riazi against the architect’s intent. 63 In this context, “fix the terrain” had no other meaning than to first remove the graves, including Hafez’s, prepare the ground, then elevate Hafez’s new resting-place on five circular steps at the exact center of the garden (Fig. 4.12). There is some evidence that a few of the graves, especially those belonging to famous figures and powerful families, were relocated behind the walls of modern Hafezieh. 64

59 Sami, Shiraz, 64. Also, see Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40; and SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53.
60 Karimi, Rahnameh, 28; and Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 71.
61 Sami, Shiraz, 65.
62 Sami, Shiraz, 65.
63 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 37, Document 67, page 5; to the Minister of Public Instructions, no date and no signature, Tehran.
64 See Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40; SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53; Karimi, Rahnameh, 28; and Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 71-72, 278. One of these families included that of Qavam Saltaneh.
The state maintained a monopoly over historic selectivity, over who could be commemorated and who condemned to oblivion.

This new proposal for Hafez's tomb diverged from pre-modern Muslim burial practices in two ways. While the direction of the tomb towards Mecca was kept intact, the isolation and the elevation of Hafez's grave was uncommon architectural feature of Muslim cemeteries where inclusion in or around a holy grave was favored by the orthodoxy. In contrast, exclusion and singling-out governed the design of Siroux's Hafezieh. Before 1936, the centrality of Hafez's grave within the large context of the cemetery and the purely horizontal hierarchy among the graves in proxy implied reverence and holiness. Those who were buried next to Hafez's grave not only benefited from his baraka or holiness, but also multiplied the collective sanctity of the graves.\(^65\) Or rather, these personal relationships were made manifest in the Muslim practice of being buried close to Hafez's bones. Similarly, in Muslim cemeteries, individual graves were historically placed on the ground level. "This leveling of tombs (taswiya al-qubur) symbolized the equality of all believers in death as in life."\(^66\) As in the Musalla before the 1930s, the graves were leveled without vertical hierarchy, whereas in the new design, this logic was reversed. The operation of cleaning out graves had much to do with modern ideas about individuality and glorification. Hafez's tomb "was elevated on from the ground floor," spatially indicating the poet's superiority to, potentially, all in life and, especially, in death.\(^67\) The architectural vocabulary of the new design denoted the absence of other graves but one, marked by the elevated tomb and a pavilion. Hafez, who both drew and gave sanctity to those buried around him for centuries, now would emanate historic merit all on his own. From an exclusively nationalistic viewpoint, the surrounding graves no more had a function. In other words, the visitor would a priori know of Hafez's significance before entering the tomb-garden, therefore, there was no need for architecture to map this national merit. Alternatively, the importance was charted by isolation and elevation: only Hafez's tombstone was considered a national patrimony and a historical monument.

“Opposite to the talar,” the octagonal pavilion over the tomb proper “rose to 10 meters from the ground so that it would be visible from the railing of the entrance garden.” A walled cemetery now opened up, was made visible and accessible from the street. The double cylindrical dome of the pavilion was supported on eight columns of muqarnas capitals. Its inner dome was decorated with khatam kari – the delicate inlay of multicolor pieces to form an intricate surface – for which Shiraz was famous (Fig. 4.13). Along the inner-dome, one of Hafez’s “best couplets” in Sols calligraphy was “set in the stone lintel;” it read: “To the soul’s face my body is a screen. Blest be the day that face unscreened is seen!” Directly beneath this, Karim Khan’s marble slab was relocated to its new burial. Hafez’s bones were presumably exhumed and reburied “in its original place.” The 1773 inscription, “Who serve the King of all are themselves kings. O Heart! His grace ever protection brings,” remained intact.

Despite a significant amount of destruction, Hafezieh was the only project among all the SNH’s undertakings, which was a priori rooted in the idea of modern preservation; of selecting historic fragments and exposing them as inherently valuable. Unsurprisingly, it was also the only project to which the name of Siroux is attached. The politics of modern restorations underpinned a highly specific and consistent historic agenda, feeding and reinforcing the modern. On one hand, while Emdad revealed that “this design has been drawn from the method existing from Karim Khan Zand’s era and even the present tombstone is that of Karim Khan’s, on top of which a delicate (zarif) and beautiful (ziba) dome, on eight columns, has been erected,” he did not mention that the Qajar pishtaq decorating the top of the talar was removed. Nor did he remark on the elimination of several hundred historic tombstones. The 1315 annual report, on the other hand, specified that great efforts were made to duplicate not only the “historic” forms, but also the “traditional” crafts of Shiraz at Hafezieh. “All the designs (naqshe-ha) and carvings of surfaces and columns,” it noted, “are copied form the stone of the congressional mosque of Vakil.

69 Muqarnas is defined as honeycomb or stalactite vaulting made up of individual cells or small niches, often used as a bridging element or on capitals as decorative elements.
70 Sami, Shiraz, 65.
71 SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53.
72 Sami, Shiraz, 65. Similarly, selected ghazals from the Divan decorated the brick walls of the northern garden in white letter on blue tiles; these were the work of “Mister Malek al-Klami.” Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 113, Document 56, page 29; 1315 Annual Report of Ministry of Public Instructions, 1936-1937, Tehran.
and the seven-color tiles of the period were recreated by expert craftsmen...” A careful historic selectivity was at work. Or rather, the methodical preservation or elimination of selected architectural fragments governed the logic of the renovations. It was no accident that the tombstone ordered by Karim Khan remained intact, while all trace of Qajar additions were stripped off. The reburial of Karim Khan’s bones by Reza Shah in 1925, as noted in chapter 2, automatically guaranteed a place for his legacy in Pahlavi official historiography, architectural or otherwise. Aesthetically, while the Ka’ba-like structure of the Qajar era was perceived as projecting the image of a Shi’a tomb, the formal vocabulary of the marble tombstone enabled modern (re)appropriation in the new garden of Hafez. Politically, however, whereas the former was associated with the much-scorned Naser al-Din Qajar’s ruling period, the latter was perceived as a valuable cultural legacy from the Zand era.

The final expenditure of Hafezieh was far less complicated in sharp contrast to that of Ferdawsiyeh, both in terms of amount, procurement, and procedure. “As per the advice of each craftsman of each trade (herfeh),” implying the stonemason, the sculptors, and the khatam kari expert, “we made an exception and permitted not to go through the competitive bidding process (monaqeseh) for the decorative component” of the project. In the 1315 annual report, Riazi further specified that whereas “this enables a high construction quality” for the decorative program, “bidding was exercised for the provision of equipments and furnishings.”74 “Because the estimated cost” of the project, “including the library,” required a 60,000 tomans budget, it was decided that the Fars’ Cultural Office immediately borrow 20,000 tomans from the vaqf property of Shaykh Safi Shrine in Ardabil,” in northwestern Iran.75 A 1938 loan spent on Hafezieh was scheduled to be gradually paid back to the former from the latter’s revenues in subsequent years. The remaining expenses came from the Ministry’s budget allocated to the

75 Karimi, Rahnameh, 24. The mausoleum complex of the founder of the Safavid dynasty had itself been subjected to indexing and repairs by the SNH. In October 1926, Herzfeld was asked “to proceed at once to Ardabil to investigate and report,” on the condition of the complex. He was accompanied by prominent clerical figures, Khalkhali and Haeri. Eventually, 3000 tomans were approved to safeguard Shaykh Safi’s complex by none other than Arthur Millsaugh, the controversial American financial advisor. Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 41, Document 41, page 106; Verbal Process, Aban 2, 1305/October 25, 1926, Tehran. For a history of Shaykh Safi Shrine, see K. Rizvi, “Transformations in Early Safavid Architecture: The Shrine of Shaykh Safi al-din Ishaq Ardabili in Iran,” (1501-1629)” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000).
preservation of national heritage and under the supervision of the Archeological Services. When construction was completed in 1938, 80,000 tomans had been spent; in subsequent decades, 20,000 more tomans were allocated to its landscaping and general upkeep. The manner in which money was transformed and spent was efficient and well supervised; no public scandal came out of Hafezieh's restoration, as had been the case of Ferdawsiyeh.

At the end, the religious dimension of a tomb in the Islamic tradition was to be obscured by an artistic intervention on the physical domain of the tomb; its spirituality turned into a national attribute. While Ferdawsiyeh, an imagined place, was invented from scratch, Hafezieh, a real place, was refashioned to fit the image of a projected modernity. Not only did the architectural additions and removals place the Sufi master into a modern discourse on Iranian literature as a national hero, but also concretized the triumphs of national high culture. Even for the majority of Iranians who could not read, a visit to these new sites automatically generated feelings of collective pride. The historic potency carried by Muslim graves was to guarantee the success of the national project. By the end of the Pahlavi rule, Hafezieh, along other religious edifices in Iran, would have successfully mutated into sites of national culture and international tourism.

76 The final touch of the project consisted of signage – the very essence of the entire undertaking; “the road to the tombs” of Hafez and Sa’di, “like most places of interest in Shiraz” would be “well signposted.” S. A. Matheson, Persia: An Archaeological Guide (London, 1972), 209. This new image fed into and significantly contributed to the tourist trade in Shiraz. Religious pilgrimage became international tourism. Once again, the SNH, even in absentia, became the engine behind the selected aesthetics of the nation. These seemingly minor changes were major conceptual ingredients in defining and dictating taste. As in the past, acts of destruction were integral to its processes of construction; artistic exclusion and violence integral to its paradigm of construction. As in Ferdawsiyeh, the tension between outright destruction akin to zealous construction signaled the anxious modernity of the project. This did not simply manifest in the selection of fragments as inherently precious, but more importantly, in the very perception that artifacts needed to be historicized to gain value. For that, meticulous selection was an indispensable aspect of the project of modernity.

77 Karimi, Rahnameh, 27. By March 21, 1937, 25,000 tomans had been spent on construction material; 17,000 had come out of the budget to the Ministry of Public Instructions. Considering that Ferdawsiyeh had cost the SNH 177,300 tomans, as noted in chapter 3, Hafezieh’s restoration of 80,000 tomans was relatively cheap.

78 For a definition and appropriation of ‘culture’ in Shiraz, see Manoukian, “City of Knowledge,” various sections.
Place unPerformed

When the project was completed sometime in 1938, there is no indication that Hafezieh received any royal attention, as was the case of Ferdawsiyeh. While Reza Shah traveled to Shiraz in March 1937, he was in no mood for ceremonies and social appearances, because “he was in an evil humour and markedly ignored both persons and things that he might reasonably have been expected to attend.” He was also known to have “hated the southern provinces of Fars, Kirman and Khuzistan because in his mind they were associated with the British.” Only after taking the throne did Mohammad Reza, together with his second wife Soraya Esfandiari, return to Shiraz to inspect Hafezieh. This royal visit, nevertheless, was in no way exclusive to that purpose; rather it was a token item of the far more elaborate and publicized inaugural ceremony of Sa’diye on May 1, 1952 (Figs. 4.14). During their tour, the royal couple first attended to speeches and military marches, followed by a cutting of the tri-color ribbon at the “gate of Sa’di’s aramgah.” Only at 6 p.m. did they proceed to Hafezieh, not necessarily to inaugurate but rather to sightsee the place. Here, the young shah randomly opened Hafez’s Divan as had been the practice on the verse “O my heart, a well-wisher on your journey is all you need; A breeze of prayer from Shiraz as a guide is all you need.” While the gesture was highly symbolic, it was far from random. Nor was random the new monarch’s appearance in civilian outfit and with his wife, because in these early days, he “carefully portrayed himself in public as an apolitical youth who, having been educated in democratic Switzerland, had always been uncomfortable in his father’s autocratic court.” This public image of the shah during the inauguration of the SNH’s monuments as a progressive monarch sympathetic to the civilian popular would mutate into the image of a military leader with the passing years; so would his attire change from a suit and tie to an army uniform.

80 Avery, P. Modern Iran (New York, 1965), 387.
81 For a full and official report on Sa’diye’s inauguration as well as the visit of the shah and the shahbanu in 1952, see SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di. The event took place on Ordibehesht 11, 1331.
82 SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di, title page.
83 These are the variations of translations by Greg Grigorian of the verse: “Oh my heart, a well wisher as a trip companion is all you need; A whisper of prayer of Shiraz (in the wind) as a road guide is all you need.” “O my heart, well-wished thoughts on your journey are all you need; A guiding breeze of prayer from Shiraz is all you need.” And, “O my heart, a well-wisher on your journey is all you need; A breeze of prayer from Shiraz as a guide is all you need.” For the Persian original, see SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di, 14.
84 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 177.
The renovation of Hafez’s tomb precluded yet another exception; the Hafezieh project did not result in allegedly accurate statues or paintings of the man buried there. Consequently, while Hafez’s figure was neither sculpted nor prominently placed in Shiraz, Sa’di’s statue was unveiled during the royal visit near the former Isfahan Gate (Fig. 4.15).85 The work of Ostad Abd al-Hasan Sadiqhi, it was hoped the statue’s position at the northern-most point of the city would welcome tourists to “the city of knowledge and culture.”86 The square was fittingly renamed Sa’di Square and extended to join Hafez Boulevard to Sa’di Street in a manner that “the two boulevards of Hafez and Sa’di would be the first names that tourists (jahan-gardan) would familiarize themselves with as of their arrival at Shiraz...”87 In the light of this frenzied (re)representation, one has to wonder why was never Hafez’s sculpture erected in Shiraz, or, indeed, in any other famous public space in Iran. Why were Ferdawsi, Sa’di, Ibn Sina, Nader Shah, Kamal al-Molk, Omar Khayyam honored with visual representations that professed to an exact and scientific duplicate of these men as integral to their mausoleum projects, while Hafez was excluded from this politics of representation?

This was certainly not confined to historic figures. By 1976, when the Karnameh revisited the events of May 1, 1952, the shah’s wife, Soraya, to whom he had married in February 1951 and had divorced seven years later, was subtracted from the SNH’s narrative, as well as its photographs.88 The Society – the Pahlavi engine of image making – had rectified the visual story of Sa’diyeh’s inauguration so as to erased the former queen from the historiography of the monument by a simple process of cut-and-paste.89 The one illustration depicting her at its center never again resurfaced in the SNH’s publications; it internally had erased its own history to fit political currents and royal demands. Cut out from the politics of representation, it was as if the queen had never visited Hafezieh nor had she ever existed in the redrafted history of the SNH.

Furthermore, while Ferdawsi’s monument and millenary received unprecedented attention in the mass media, the renovation of Hafezieh was mostly ignored. Between 1927 and

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85 See SNH 131, Karnameh, 181-184; and SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di, 1-7.
86 SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di, 7.
87 SNH, Aramgah-e Sa’di, 7. During the opening speech, it was also falsely maintained, “this statue is the first of Masters of knowledge and literature (bozorgan-e elm va adab) which has been erected in Iranian cities.” Ferdawsi had been a towering feature of Tehran’s modern urbanism.
88 The divorce took place on March 14, 1958. In 1959, Mohammad Reza Shah married Farah Diba and the following year, the much-anticipated heir apparent, Reza Pahlavi, was born on October 31; see Avery, Modern Iran, 474.
89 See SNH 131, Karnameh, 191, 204.
1939, only once did the image of Hafez’s Ka’ba-like structure appear in the *Ettela’at* (see Fig. 4.4). Ornamented with the Qajar pishtaq, the medieval graves, and the metal frame, it stood in sharp contrast to the image of modern factories and train-stations regularly illustrated in daily newspapers. This politics of aesthetics helped the state provide a useful binary. The representation of distinctively modern architecture was not only to signal the development of Iran’s modernity, by also influence the use of such public places. However, one does not fail to notice that while the progress of the project was largely discounted in Persian newspapers, the French language *Le Journal de Téhéran* published several articles addressing the topic. The new pavilion was depicted on its front-page in April 1937; its caption explained, “Our photo shows the renovations done on the mausoleum of our immortal Iranian poet, Hafez, in Shiraz. In the background is located the ancient and modest monument where the ashes of Hafez are found.”

A year later, its editorial, “We Restore,” informed, “the mausoleum of Hafez and the garden surrounding it [is] in a restored state.” Therefore, “the gardens where the rest of our pure and elegant poets repose will soon be a place of pilgrimage and pleasure.” The author provided its reader with further data by personalizing the events:

I just learned from the *Ettela’at* journal that the minister of public instructions [Hekmat] has taken initiative to restore the mausoleum of the genius poet Hafez… I think, along many other [people], that one of the most glorious patrimony that has been passed on to us by previous generations is, certainly, our literature, one of the richest, most ostentatious that exists in the world. Not only we should not forget the great authors produced by the land of Iran, but also we should continue to venerate them.

The “decent and suitable (shayesteh)” tomb-garden of Hafez provided a specific place for such national venerations. “The earth (terre) where reposes” Hafez, announced newspapers, has been “restored and delivered to thousands of admirers not only in the country where Persian is spoken” but in all those places where “thinking and poetry are honored.” Land, language, and heroes converged on the grounds of architecture to invoke patriotic feelings. Hafezieh, too, enabled the voicing of historic desires: “Isn’t it true that [Hafez] himself wanted that his

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mausoleum be not a place of tears and desolation, but rather a sanctuary of song and joy,” asked the editor of the journal. Then he went on first to quote a ghazal to prove his point, followed by an account of Hafez’s “loyalty, generosity, and immensity of spirit;” he finally concluded with his “gratitude to all those who serve the immortal memory and the unequal genius” of such men. A year later, another article in the same journal insisted that “the public garden” of Hafezieh, with “thousands of orange trees, excite[s] the curiosity of tourists.” By the end of WWII, there was no doubt as to the purpose of the SNH’s design; both Hafezieh and Shiraz were being (re)navigated to appeal to both Western and local westernized visitors.

It was certainly true that “the poetical capital of the country” was also known in the Islamic world as the Dar al-Elm or the “House of Knowledge.” However, the Pahlavi reinvention of modern Shiraz had both a different overtone and purpose. By the late 1960s, when there was a rumor to relocate the capital from Tehran to Shiraz, the idea that Shiraz had always been “the capital of Achaemenian kings and the cradle of the great poet Sa’di and Hafez” was well accepted [sic.]. It certainly carried the prestige of the Zandian capital. Hafezieh’s new design was pivotal to the image of Shiraz not only as the center of high culture and art, but more importantly, as both a historic and secular town predominantly devoid of religious strictures. “Chiraz is” an article claimed, “a place of pilgrimage for those who admire and taste the delicatessen of Iranian poetry,” planned for the “comfort and well being of tourists.” Hafezieh also represented the city as simultaneously modern and ancient. Le Journal de Téhéran maintained in May 1940, “Not only is Shiraz an ancient city the wonder of which has been sung by poets, but is also one of the most modern [cities] and a center of tourism in Iran.” The militant urbanism that created the Zand Boulevard had successfully linked Hafezieh to the historic center of Karim Khan’s capital. “The big boulevard of Zand that cuts across the city

94 For other examples of historical figures being made to speak about themselves, see Nafisi, S. “Sa’di’s statements about himself,” Mehr 1 (Khordad 1316/May 1936): 42-48.
97 L. Lockhart, Famous Cities of Iran (Middlesex, 1939), 31; and L. Lockhart, Persian Cities (London, 1960), 47.
from the north to the south and whose sidewalks are ornamented with flowers,” according to an article, “rivals with the widest boulevards in the Occident.”

During its 1930s refashioning, news of Hafezieh was eclipsed by more pressing matters. The return in spring 1936 of Heir Apparent Mohammad Reza from La Rosey in Switzerland, his marriage to Princess Fawzieh, eldest sister of Egypt’s King Farouk, and in August 1938, the completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway, were all subjects that consumed the national press. While Ettela’at seemed to have remained indifferent to Hafezieh’s progress, Le Journal de Téhéran continued to elaborate on the theme with articles such as “Hafez and Music: Muquanni-Nameh or musical ode?” “Hafez,” “Ancient poets of Iran,” “Realism in Sa’di’s [work],” “Vulgarization of Iranian Literature in the Occident,” “Sa’di in English Literature,” “Sa’di in French Literature,” “Sa’di in Turkish Literature.” Hafez’s depiction as a national hero in official literature had a direct bearing on the image of the new mausoleum as both national and modern. Furthermore, both the image and the caption were effective techniques to instruct the public as to the place and worth of Hafez, etc. These occasional, but systematic, articles often illustrated with images of mausoleums and graves, mirrored official historiography in keeping with the state’s nationalist rhetoric. The new architectural vocabulary of Hafezieh not only reinforced the discourse on Iran’s modernity, but also gave it an equally modern representation. Not until the construction of the mausoleum did each of these figures become presentable in such public arenas; after the erection of their modern mausoleums, they themselves became popular icons of the new nation, susceptible to reinterpretations, re-appropriation, and most importantly, reproduction.

102 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 584/584/34, Political Review of 1939, R. W. Rullard, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 11: 1939-1942, 128. For the wedding alone, 123 triumphal arches were erected along the Rezaian avenues in Tehran, costing the State £100,000. See British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 3373/216/34, H. J. Underwood, April 29, 1939, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 11: 1939-1942, 44.
104 During this time, British diplomats noted that Le Journal de Téhéran “continued to disseminate Government propaganda; it is well printed, publishes selected photographs...and serves up to foreigners exactly the pabulum which the Government wishes them to digest.” Other local newspapers, like Ettela’at, also were accused of publishing “exactly what the police allow or direct.” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1435/1435/34, Annual Report 1936, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 305.
In depicting Reza Shah’s Iran, British diplomats correctly observed, “Western dress, western factories, even justice clothed in a trapping of the west, all these were the visible signs of the same policy.” Much of the “visible signs” were triggered by the shah’s public monuments and their subsequently historiographic description. In his history of Pahlavi architecture, for instance, Rajabi’s maintained that, “the most beautiful of all the mausoleums is the recently renovated (baz sazi) tomb of Hafez,” where the text was supported by flanking photos of Musalla and Hafezieh to show the pre- and post-Pahlavi stages (Fig. 4.16). Similarly, when in 1971, Reza Shah was made to have said, “I admire Hafez a lot and remind him [Hafez] that one day I will remove his tomb, as well as those of Sa’di and Ferdawsi, from its present corrupt condition and order for these three great narrators of the world, aramgahs suitable to their social merit and dignity,” the caption was complemented by Hafezieh’s high quality color photograph alongside a black and white poor image of Musalla cemetery (Fig. 4.17).

The new image of Hafezieh, as propagated by the regime, also found its way into the newest technological sensation that had reached Tehran in the 1930s: the cinema. In Ovanes Ohanian’s Hajji Aqa (1933-1934), the design of Hafez’s pavilion served as a backdrop for this first Iranian production during the most dramatic scene (Figs. 4.18). The main character in the story, Hajji Aqa, who had climbed a three-story building, jumped from an octagonal pavilion strikingly similar to the original at Hafezieh. While the materialization of such images on movie screens was highly consequential in that it validated the modernity of the image, cinema itself suggested both an apparatus for and a confirmation of Iran’s modernity. Rather, the appearance of the pavilion in a movie — itself a modern cultural text — legitimized its reuse atop Hafez’s grave as an icon inherently modern and new. In Shiraz, theater buildings loyal to Le Corbusier’s architectural doctrine, such as Vartan Avanessian’s Cinema Diana in Tehran, were erected as the ultimate paradigm of a modern society; one where technology and leisure were housed in

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explicitly modernistic public architecture (Fig. 4.19). By the dawn of the anti-Pahlavi revolution in 1977, 110 million Iranians were regular moviegoers.

For this reason, during much of the 20th century, while for Iran’s secular elite cinemas would denote national progress, for the ulama, they would “be filled with Western mores of sex and violence and part of the imperialist strategy to ‘spray poison’ and corrupt people’s thought and ethics.” The conservative high-ranking cleric (mojtahed) of the turn of the century, Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, for instance, had equated cinemas with “sleeping potion” or “fatal, killer disease,” which, in either case, subjugated its audience. In the 1940s, Mojtaba Navab-Safavi, the head of the radical Islamist movement Fedaiyan-e Islam, similarly condemned cinemas as “a ‘smelting furnace,’ which melts away all the wholesome values and virtues of a Muslim society.” The most vocal of all Iranian clerics, Ayatollah Khomeini condemned cinemas, among other Western cultural imports, for “[rap[ing] the youth of our country and stif[ing] in them the spirit of virtue and bravery.”

The architecture vocabulary of movie-theaters, that mushroomed all over Teheran and other major Iranian cities under Reza Shah, contributed significantly to these extremist notions about the movie industry by the opponents of westernization in general and Pahlavi high culture in particular.

With the proliferation of the cinema and modern architecture, many came to believe that in sharp contrast to “once veiled women” and “secluded gardens,” modern Shiraz displayed distinct sign of modernity. “But to women who can drive unveiled in the streets or sit

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109 Vartan Avanessian or Hovanessian (1896-1982) was a pioneer architect of Reza Shah’s Iran, mostly for his use of rational and minimal forms. Born into an Armenian family from Tabriz, he studied in the École Speciale d’Architecture in Paris and worked with Henri Sauvage. He returned to Iran in 1935 to pursue a highly productive and dynamic architectural career. The first architectural journal of Iran, Architecte, printed a monograph of Avanessian in 1946, listing his Corbusian-like design principles. His works include the Justice Ministry, the Sadabad Palace, and a large number of Corbu-style villas in northern Tehran. See Architecte 1 (August 1946): 32-37. For more details on Avanessian’s life and work, see Marefat, “Building to Power,” 132-136.

110 “Between 1963 and 1977...the number of cinema tickets sold rose from 20 million to 110 million.” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 428.


112 Fazlollah Nuri, Lavayeh-e Aqa Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri (Tehran, 1362/1983), 49; quoted in Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 179. Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri was one of the three senior clerics who led the Constitutional Revolution in 1905-1906, only to defect to the royalist camp and trigger the 1908-1909 civil war. After the war, he was hanged for “sowing corruption on earth;” quoted in E. Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, 1993), 93.

113 Mojtaba Navab-Safavi, Jam-e va Hokumat-e Eslami (Qom, 1357/1978), 4; quoted in Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 179.

114 Ruhollah Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar [Secrets unveiled], 194; quoted in Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 179-180.

115 Rodkin, Unveiled Iran, 109.
enjoyably in the open-air cinemas,” wrote a Western visitor, “the walled seclusion of a garden has lost its meaning;” concluding that “Shiraz has been modernized and been drawn into the world of unveiled Iran.” Similarly, when in 1975, French film director Albert Lamorisse shot his *The Wind of Lovers* in Fars, under the image of Hafez’s pavilion, *Le Journal de Téhéran* asked its readers, “though this photo is not an extract from the magnificent film of Lamorisse, it nevertheless closely represents the respectful and sincere poetry of the French cine-star: does not the *Hafezieh* of Shiraz speak of all the charm of Iran?” By then, many had come to believe that it did. The viable image of the nation preconditioned the idea of having a nation – one that was both progressive and ancient; one, too, which was made to appear cultured and civilized through places like *Hafezieh* and its (re)presentation in different venues.

From the state’s standpoint, if the architectural and ceremonial efforts invested in *Ferdawsiyeh* were designed to draw international attention to Iran’s Aryan roots, the *Hafezieh* project was meant to draw Western tourists to an exoticized “Persia.” A remarkable publication by the “Imperial Ministry of Interior,” simply titled *Guide Book on Iran*, stated in 1935:

It was early in 1934 that the tourist industry came to be recognized in Iran, as an important factor in the national economy. And as a result the Government was induced to resort to the promotion of the tourist business as a *restorative* measure. The work was vigorously pushed forward by creating a special department in the Ministry of Interior, known as ‘Le Department de Tourisme et de Propagande’ whose work is to afford every kind of facility to the tourists visiting this country. Since the organization of this Department every effort has been made to render the travel of foreign tourists more agreeable...it is expected that after the completion of the system of tourist organizations, Iran will soon be prepared to welcome and accommodate any stream of the world’s traffic, which may flow into this tourists’ paradise...

Iran, surely, was a “tourist paradise;” the diversity, quality, and richness of its historical architecture alone could attest to that. Nonetheless, the focus of this chapter lies in the intricate details of how Iran’s tourist industry affected notions about architectural production, including

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reconstruction, preservation, and transformation. Ultimately, on how architectural meaning came
to be (re)navigated and (re)appropriated to tally with specific political and economic agendas.

In Shiraz, Hafezieh was being marketed not only as an “agreeable” space by “restorative
measures,” but also, as an authentic corner of the “Orient.” In the section labeled “Route 9”
which traced a trail from “Bushehr-Shiraz-Esfahan-Qom-Tehran,” Hafez and Sa’di prevailed in
“the pleasure loving city” of Shiraz. Their “graves,” the Guide maintained, “are two shrines
which one must visit while in this town,” for their memory has never faded from the minds of the
inhabitants, or even from those of any Iranian.”120 Its author G. H. Ebtehaj, the director of the
tourist, propaganda, and political department of the Interior Ministry, further explained, “the
facts given regarding finance, trade, industry, agriculture, transportation and travel, in general,
will disprove the unfounded statements which find their way from time to time in the foreign
press.” This Guide was noteworthy because it exemplifies the systemacity by which the Pahlavi
state was both rearranging and packaging Iran’s architectural history for the purposes of its
tourist industry. It was so, moreover, because not only it provided the reader with maps,
illustrations, charts, and statistics based on ostensibly scientific procedures, but also, contained
“the latest changes...with detailed information” about the country, nicely fitted in 500 small, but
dense, pages for the “comfort of foreigners.”121 Subsequently, the Bureau of Tourisms,
conceived during the reign of Reza Shah, evolved into the Superior Council of Tourism by 1941,
which was managed under the Ministry of Interior and “took diverse measures to promote
tourism in Iran.”122 This, in turn, was incorporated into the National Organization for Iranian
Tourism and was ratified into law by the parliament in March 1963. “Since then,” wrote Le
Journal de Téhéran, “the development of tourism in Iran has been part of the essential projects
of the government.”123 When in 1961, the department joined the World Organization for
Tourism, Mohammad Reza Shah assumed the role of its principal patron. According to official

120 Published before Hekmat’s orders, the guide specifies in a rather brief note that Hafez “lies not alone but
surrounded by many graves.” Ebtehaj, Guide Book, 312-313. The very tone of later travel guides would change
significantly. Other such publications with the aim of “introducing Iran” to foreigners, includ W. W. Cash, Persia
Old and New (London: Church Missionary Society, 1930); and M. Nakosteen and A. Kragh, In the Land of the Lion
and Sun (Denver: World Press, 1937). An interesting one, published in modern Turkish in Istanbul had a military
overtone with images of military parades and navy bases, etc. at the end, it also included photographs of modern
buildings, bridges, hotels, Tehran’s modern post-office, and notably, Byron’s Ferdawi’s mausoleum in mid-
construction and Hafez’s metal fence as published in Etela’at. It also incorporated caricatures making fun of the
ulama; see A. Ekrem, Bugunku Iran (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1934), 33 and 35.
121 Ebtehaj, Guide Book, preface.
reports, Iran saw 74,218 tourists in 1962; a mere three years later, that number had reached 135,984.124

By the mid-1960s, therefore, the unremitting efforts of Hekmat and his team proved to be a full success. A historic Muslim cemetery had been completely transformed into one of the most pleasant tourist sites in Shiraz, often called “Home of the Greatest Poet of the World,” “the City of the Arts,” “the City of Love,” “the Land of Hafez,” and, above all, “the homeland of the most famous poets of Iran.”125 By then, Siroux’s pavilion had become the signifier of Hafez, the “Great Poet.”126 While in Tus “there was nothing to see,” Shiraz had everything to offer to the tourist: gardens, shrines, culture, wine, festivities, and even love. A visitor confessed, “life was always entertaining in Shiraz...”127 When the Belgian royal couple visited the city in November 1964, King Baudouin declared Sa’di and Hafez to belong “to the entire world” and Shiraz to be “the center of poetry, culture and humane civilization.”128 By then, few recalled Musalla cemetery and many came to sightsee Hafez’s resting-place. Coffee-table books as well as textbooks began to (re)present historic Shiraz with handsome photographs of Hafezieh.129

“Shiraz has a lot in terms of sightseeing,” published Kayhan Yearbook (1963-1964), “but the aramgahs of the loving brilliance of Iran’s literature, Hafez and Sa’di, are something else.”130 It was described in travel guides as “lofty trees, deep parks, private gardens beautifully flower-decorated.”131 Another depicted the “setting” of Hafezieh as “delicious,” where the garden in spring and summer “is a riot of flowers.”132 The author assured its readers that “Of the modern additions to the sights of the city,” erected in “the 1950s...the reconstructed tomb of Hafez [is]

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126 Examples of such travel guides among others noted below, include A. Hatami, Iran (Tehran: General Department of Publications and Broadcasting and Ettela’at Press, 1963), 97; K. Schroeder, Iran (Bonn, 1960), 128-129; I. Morath, From Persia to Iran (New York, 1960); Regional Cooperation for Development, The Land of Kings (Tehran, 1971).
129 For such examples, see A. Costa and R. Beny, Persia: Bridge of Turquoise (Toronto, 1975), 266; Lockhart, L. Persia (London, 1957), 35 and plate 48; B. Pazargan, Tarikh-e daw hazar panzdah sa-e shahanshahi-e Iran: qabl az eslam ta asar-e Pahlavi [2500-year history of monarchical Iran: from Islam to the Pahlavi era] (Tehran, c. 1971), image of tombs of Sa’di and Hafez respectively, 114 and 126; and Ullens, Iran!, 72.
130 Kayhan Year Book 1342 (Tehran, 1963-1964), 280.
131 Hureau, Iran Today, 151.
132 Stevens, Land of Sophy, 240.
noteworthy..." As Shiraz gained further prestige with the royal celebrations in October 1971, the inner court of Hafezieh served as a backdrop to all kinds of cultural events: open air symphonies, evenings of "traditional" music and poetry, plays and performances (Fig. 4.20). The fact that Hafezieh was advertised to have been constructed "completely in eastern style," helped sustain notions about its historicity and authentically vis-à-vis Iranian high culture.\textsuperscript{134}

The SNH achieved yet another triumph with Hafezieh. It might not have captured public imagination in the 1930s, but it did change their behavior in the 1960s. The promotion of Hafezieh and Sa’diyeh as tourist destinations had much to do with the location of Shiraz as the only modern and sizeable urban center adjacent to Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Naqsh-e Rostam. The full development of the tourist trade in Shiraz, with all the modern infrastructures and accommodations, had a direct bearing on access to these three sought-after pre-Islamic ruins. A journey from Paris to Persepolis or one from Rome to Pasargadae necessitated a stopover in Shiraz. For those who came to see these much advertised pre-Islamic monuments, all tourist facilities, including accommodations, restaurants, communications, and transportation, were to be provided by Shiraz. In other words, the international acclaim of these sites as an essential part of "the glory of Iran and its antique civilization" was conditioned by Shiraz’s proper modernization.\textsuperscript{135} Seen in this light, Hafezieh and Sa’diyeh were marketed as a part of a travel package to the "heart of ancient Persia." \textit{Le Journal de Téhéran}’s March 7, 1965 issue brought its readers up to date with the article, "Votre guide de voyage pour les conges de Nowrouz: Ce que vous offer Chiraz," \textit{Le Journal de Téhéran} 9203 (June 10, 1966): 4. Illustrated by the two mausoleums, it first held, "city of Shiraz...still maintains its memory and vestige from the Achaemenian époque and other dynasties which have honored the History of our country [sic.]", then indexed the facilities available for the comfort of the traveler: "Means of Access, Hotels and ‘Mehmankhanehs,’ Cinemas and Theaters, and Places of Promenade." The article went on to stress, "the monuments of Shiraz are absolutely to be visited and first of all, Persepolis, situated only some 50 km...Naghché Rostam, Pasargad, Bandé Amir,

\textsuperscript{133} R. Stevens, \textit{The Land of the Great Sophy} (New York, 1979), 240.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Kayhan Year Book 1342} (Tehran, 1963-64), 280.
Saadieh and Hafezieh, Pars Museum...” were all listed as major attractions. In parentheses, it was explained that Sa’diyeh and Hafezieh were “(the mausoleums of Saadi and Hafez).”

Hafezieh, furthermore, promised tourists and locals alike not just a visit to a historic site, but also an experience; “Iranians feel that his best poetry is...engraved on his tomb;” or alternatively, “some of the poet’s best-known lines [are] carved in relief.” The judicious restoration had also appropriated the image of Hafez, the man, into the secular history of Iran. An official publication, entitled The History of Iran’s Awakening (1947), held that “Other buildings, tomb repairs (ta’mir), and historic heritage” that were constructed under Reza Shah included “two unparalleled (bi nazir) and honorable individuals of Iran – masters of wisdom, theory, literature, and poetry – namely, Hafez and Sa’adi in Shiraz.” The “princes of Persian poetry,” according to a publication by the Ministry of Tourism, were buried in “elegant buildings with simple lines which harmonize with their décor of trees and flowers.” Here, one could acquire “a discreet public-address system that enables foreign visitors to enjoy the musicality of the Persian language without of course seizing its subtlety;” added the author, “however, individual cassettes give good translations reflecting the sensuous delicacy of Saadi and the lyrical depth of Hafez.” The Sufi master had been thoroughly historicized and commercialized through the careful refashioning of his resting-place.

Through architecture, too, the historic figures were made to speak to the nation: “Sit near my tomb, and bring wine and music,” Hafez had evidently said, “Feeling thy presence, I shall come out of my sepulcher – Rise, softly moving creature, and let me contemplate thy beauty.” A Persian text stated, “the enchanting (sahr amiz) and splendid (ba shokuh) tombs of Sa’adi and Hafez are located at the heart of Shiraz. Each year a large number of people from different cities who travel to Shiraz, also pay a visit to these tombs; even in Hafez’s aramgah they open up a fortune and lay a hand on the grave.” A practice that was ordinary a mere three decades earlier, now constituted a tourist sensation, an exotic curiosity. While in 1978, Hafezieh had been completely embraced into the topography of civil pilgrimage as just another locality among many – Ferdawsiyeh and Sa’diyeh, the mausoleums of Ibn Sina, Nader Shah, Omar Khayyam,

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138 Hureau, Iran Today, 151; and Stevens, Land of Sophy, 240.
139 H. Mokhtari, Tarikh-e Bidari-e Iran [History of Iran’s awakening] (Tehran, 1947), 553.
141 Hureau, Iran Today, 150-151.
and Baba Taher—few remembered that each of these sites had a long, and often rich, pre-modern architectural and social histories. More accurately, by then, most Iranians had forgotten that Hafezieh had always been a real place.

**Real Place**

Western and Iranian travelogues gave considerable attention to the city of Shiraz and its people. For the purposes of this study, I limit their descriptions to Musalla cemetery, and refrain from elaborating on Hafez’s life and work, personality and, with a minor exception, his modern political use both before and after 1935 and 1979 respectively. In these secondary accounts, my interest is focused on the physical condition of the cemetery at various junctions in its evolution. This section probes these often misleading and fantastic stories not only to reveal the architectural details of the modern Hafezieh, but more germane, to get a sense of its historical significance and impact within the context of the city of Shiraz.¹⁴³ It is argued that despite the Pahlavi architectural interventions at Hafezieh and its subsequent historiography, Musalla cemetery had always been an eminent historic spot for pilgrimage. As such, many kings and governors had refurbished the area at different periods and thousands of others had venerated Hafez at the foot of his tomb, but until the sweeping alterations in 1935, no one seems to have refigured its architectural features. One thing is certain: no Muslim ruler ever exhumed and relocated the corpse of Hafez. The transformation of the cemetery under Reza Shah, as a guiding principle eliminated all that was pre- and post-Zand period, in order to facilitate the (re)appropriation of the site, its history, and meaning into the official historiography of Pahlavi Iran.

Pahlavi literature on Hafez’s tomb often commence with Karim Khan’s effort on the site, merely to arrive at the pivotal moment when Reza Shah “removed” the resting-place from “its present corrupt condition and order” to a “suitable” design.¹⁴⁴ For instance, Sami wrote, “Hafez’s Tomb was built in 1773 by Karim Khan Zand in the sense that the king had a railing placed

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¹⁴³ As stated in the prologue, due to the scope and nature of this work, my narrative omits Western perception of Hafeziyeh and Hafez and focuses on their architectural accounts. Nor is this a comprehensive inventory of all descriptions of the tomb. Fortunately, most visitors either photographed or sketched the cemetery. These images, therefore, carry a heavier weight in my argument vis-à-vis later publications.
around the spot where the poet’s body” was placed. While this information is incorrect for the “railing” was not placed until a century later, he continued to explain that Karim Khan was also responsible for dividing the garden into two separate parts – “which still exist” – connected by “an open porch resting on four monolithic columns.” “But,” Sami immediately added, “the essential repairs and the present structure” was realized by the order of Reza Shah. Similarly, the SNH began its narrative with “Karim Khan’s 1773 iwan,” where Hafez’s grave was, reported to have been “located in the middle of the cemetery behind this building and around it was a metal grid placed not in a suitable manner (surat-e monaseb).” Without exception, both Karimi’s and Behruzi’s list of repairs started with “Karim Khan in 1187 Hejri,” but after minor remarks, rapidly arrived at “the year 1314 [1935-1936].” These secondary sources also systematically omitted numerous descriptions of Medieval Muslim and Western descriptions of Hafez’s tomb.

During the late Pahlavi era, Western historians merely reinforced the official rhetoric of the state by maintaining, for example, “In recent years a graceful, octagonal kiosk has taken” the place of the “iron grille,” adding, “Karim Khan Zand had the area put in order and contributed an alabaster tombstone, inscribed with some of the poet’s own words...” Another historian noted, “In the time of Reza Shah some famous sepulchers had been designated as national memorial (yadgah-e melli). This was notably the case with the tomb of the great poet Hafez at Shiraz, which was stripped of its pretentious iron fence from the era of Naser al-Din, attractively landscaped, and provided with sticking colonnades.” The fact that reports about Hafezieh, during or after its reconstruction, were absent in the SNH’s official literature is attuned with the political aims of the project.

These modern historiographies of the tomb reflected the state’s intention to appropriate the historic figure, Hafez, into the national and secular history. While the Pahlavi texts emphasized Hafez’s conflict with the ruling “sultans” and their “hypocritical clerics...who offered precept without practice,” post-1979 sources highlighted the corrupt nature of the same ruling “shahs” in discord with Hafez’s Sufi conviction. With similar disparity, whereas in

144 Safarnameh Homayuni, 64.
145 Sami, Shiraz, 63-64.
146 SNH 48, Iqlim-e Pars, 53-54.
147 Karimi, Rahnameh, 19-23; Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 63-68.
149 Lenczowski, Iran under Pahlavis, 327.
Orientalists' historiographies, Hafez came across as a “the greatest of the lyrical poets, a materialist and a mystic” perpetually surrounded by “wine and women,” modern Iranian sources represented him as someone who “sought the jewel of knowledge.” A man whose “manner of life and external condition” was validated by an inner “loftiness of aim, a magnanimity, and a moderation;” one who favored “a stone pillow to a royal crown.” In these Pahlavi narratives, Hafez was also the embodied enlightenment among the ignorant religious masses. *Le Journal de Téhéran*, for instance, maintained in a June 1965 issue that “Hafez appeared at a dark époque... during time of hypocrisy, lies, crime, and ruse. Absolutely no sign of justice [existed] and no one was interested in his work.” In a secularist revision of his personality, Hafez stood, first and foremost, as a good Iranian although in his time four Kings in Fars were displaced, in spite of this he avoided inappropriate eulogy of them, and improper panegyric, but if they rendered a service to the country and its people, so that for a short while ease and tranquility were enjoyed, then he praised them briefly in a couplet or two, but without exaggeration or flattery, and the praise he gave accorded with the facts.

In the 20th century, such discourses about Hafez’s personality were often coupled with the articulation of his resting-place.

Obviously, the history of the grave is far richer than that recorded in Pahlavi official literature. Unlike stories about Tus and Ferdawsi, many chroniclers told, by and large, the story of an existing place without attaching nostalgic projections or far-fetched tales about the site and its history. Western travelogues normally paired Sa’di and Hafez based on the logic of their proximate graves, as well as their profession and historic periods. While Sa’di, seems to have been privileged by the virtue of his widely known personal history, Hafez seems to have been referred to with greater veneration. In each case, the focus of the accounts remained on the man and his work, the elaboration of which is outside the scope of this study. Despite overwhelming similarities, there seems to have been little agreement on the pre-Safavid history of Hafez’s grave. When the Moorish traveler, Ibn Battuta, passed through Shiraz between 1340 and 1350 AD and equated its beauty to that of Damascus, Hafez was still alive, therefore as expected, he wrote nothing about the tomb. According to a recent encyclopedia, since Hafez was

152 Sami, *Shiraz*, 63.
“venerated by Muslims” at his death, his simple (sadeh) and unceremonious (be takalof)” tomb became a place of “ziyarat [religious pilgrimage] from the beginning.”\(^\text{154}\) While Arberry insisted that the “first shrine” was erected in “1452” by “the great Moghul conqueror Babur...at the suggestion of his teacher Muhammad Mu’amma’i,” the misleading statement was rectified by the SNH’s report that it was, in effect, the grandson of Timor Lange, “Abd al-Qasem Babur,” reported by Mehraz to have ruled Fars between 1450 and 1456, who assigned a certain “Molana Mohammad Mema’i” to supervise the already existing grave.\(^\text{155}\) Others elaborated on these early events:

[Hafez] lies in the garden of Mosalla outside Shiraz, a garden the praises of which he was never tried of singing, and on the banks of the Ruknabad, where he had so often rested under the shade of cypress-trees. When, some sixty years after the poet’s death, Sultan Baber conquered Shiraz, he erected a monument over the tomb of Hafez. An oblong block of stone on which are carved two songs from the Divan, marks the grave. At the head of it is inscribed a sentence in Arabic: ‘God is the enduring, and all else passes away.’ The garden contains the tomb of many devout Persians who have desired to rest in the sacred earth which holds the bones of the poet, and his prophecy, that his grave should become a place of pilgrimage for all the drunkards of the world, has been to a great extent fulfilled. A very ancient cypress, said to be of Hafez’s own planting, stood for many hundreds of years at the head of his grave, and ‘cast its shadow o’er the dust of his desire.’\(^\text{156}\)

Half a century after Babur, during Shah Ismail Safavid’s (ruled 1501-1524) military campaign “to wipe out Jama’i-Sunnism,” he ordered the destruction of this edifice, still when the “zealous Shi’a king” was told that Hafez had been a co-believer, the order was withdrawn.\(^\text{157}\)

Historical accounts leap to 1665, when French merchant adventurer Jean Baptiste Tavernier, also described as “the peripatetic French jeweler,” was erroneously presumed by his compatriots to have been the first Western witness to the tomb.\(^\text{158}\) While he considered Shiraz a “half-ruined town” and Sa’di’s tomb-garden a “very fair” place, Tavernier found Musalla cemetery a lively spot: “A cemetery can be seen, which is fenced, and in the middle of it, facing qebleh, a grave has appeared as a pilgrimage site for dervishes and holy-men who come and pray


\(^{157}\) Shah Ismail died in 1524, therefore his order must have been given between 1510s and his death. Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*, 23; Arberry, *Shiraz*, 160.

there [sic.] .” Before Tavernier, English traveler and author Sir Thomas Herbert while did neither describe his 1628 visit to the tombs of Hafez and Sa’di nor provide their architectural details, he did single out and couple the sites as cultural highlights of Shiraz. “A little out of the town,” he simply wrote, “is interred that learned poet and philosopher...Saddi...and near him his brother-poet Hodgee Haier, whose poems are of great esteem in Persia [sic.] .”

French traveler Sir John Chardin arrived at the panoramic view from Shiraz’s Allah-Akbar Pass in May 1674 and described it as “a city of learning, birth-place of two famous poets...place of their tombs, and containing many mosques, shrines, and colleges.” Wheel he felt that the days when “When Shiraz was Shiraz, Cairo was only a suburb” had come and gone, Chardin, nevertheless, “praised the many public gardens,” especially the tomb-gardens of Hafez and Sa’di. Like those before him, Chardin forewent detailed architectural description of what he saw. In a similar vein, English traveler and employee of the East India Company John Fryer, who spent the

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159 Reworded in G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 2 vols., 1892), 106. Tavernier also added at the end, “This is the resting-place of Hafez for whom Persians hold great respect.” Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.

160 S. T. Herbert, Travels in Persia 1627-1629 (London, 1928), 69-70 and 72. English traveler and author Sir Thomas Herbert (1606-1682) was the first Western visitor to the cemetery. Leading a delegation from Charles I to Shah Abbas in Isfahan, when four British sailing ships anchored at Bandar Abbas in January 1628, their journey presented the perfect opportunity to see Shiraz. Herbert was accompanied by Sir Dodmore Cotton; their journey in Iran began in January 1628 from Bandar Abbas and ended in February 1929. “In 1627 the earl of Pembroke procured his appointment in the suite of Sir Dodmore Cotton, then starting as ambassador for Persia with Sir Robert Shirley. Sailing in March they visited the Cape, Madagascar, Goa and Surat; landing at Gambrun (loth of January 1627-1628), they travelled inland to Ashraf and thence to Kazvin, where both Cotton and Shirley died, and whence Herbert made extensive travels in the Persian Hinterland, visiting Kashan, Bagdad...”


161 R. W. Ferrier, ed. A Journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s Portrait of a Seventeenth-century Empire (London, 1996), 36-37. Also, see Chardin, J. Travels in Persia 1643-1713. Sir John Chardin was (born in Paris in 1643 and died in London in 1711) “set out in company with a Lyons merchant named Raisin in 1665 for Persia and India, partly on business and partly to gratify his own inclination. After a highly successful journey, during which he had received the patronage of Shah Abbas II. of Persia, he returned to France in 1670, and there published in the following year Rcit du Couronneinent du roi de Perse Soliman III. Finding, however, that his Protestant profession cut him off from all hope of honors or advancement in his native country, he set out again for Persia in August 1671. This second journey was much more adventurous than the first, as instead of going directly to his destination, he passed by Smyrna, Constantinople, the Crimea, Caucasia, Mingrelia and Georgia, and did not reach Isfahan till June 1673. After four years spent in researches throughout Persia, he again visited India, and returned to Europe by the Cape of Good Hope in 1677. The persecution of Protestants in France led him, in 1681, to settle in London, where he was appointed jeweler to the court, and received from Charles II the honor of knighthood. In 1683, he was sent to Holland as representative of the English East India Company; and in 1686, he published the first part of his great narrative The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East Indies (London). It was not till 1711 that the complete account of Chardin’s travels appeared, under the title of Journal du voyage du chevalier Chardin, at Amsterdam. The Persian portion is to be found in vol. ii. of Harriss Collection, and extracts are reprinted by Pinkerton in vol. ix. The best complete reprint is by Langl (Paris, 1811).”

summer of 1677 in “Siras” and later produced three volumes of exhaustive data about the
country, did not found Shiraz’s architecture of great interest.163 Amid “the pleasant Walks and
Gardens, Colleges and Temples, the Tombs and Water-Course,” he ignored the tombs of either
poet.164

By 1729, minor changes were reported in Musalla cemetery. On that year, a copy of
Hafez’s Divan, once chained to the tomb, was “carried off by Ashraf the Afgan,” followed by
Nader Shah’s (ruled 17-17) order to “embellish and repair the tomb.”165 While chroniclers noted
that a roof (taq) was added to the top of Hafez’s tomb, no archival or actual evidence remains of
Nader Shah’s improvements. However, when in 1772, Karin Khan Zand initiated large urban
ameliorations to Shiraz, he dedicated “a large sum of money” for various restoration projects
which included the placing of a marble tombstone with “very nice script,” the “revamp[ing]” of
Hafez’s resting-place, the building of “a fence (hesar)” around it, and on its southern side, the
setting up of “a garden.” Karim Khan also built a “talar which on the four sides has one-piece”
columns.166 Later, British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon corroborated these reports: “Karim
Khan, in 1772, provided a large sum of money for the enlargement of the shrine; a marble table
was placed upon the tomb, which apart from certain renovations remained in the same state until
E. G. Browne saw it and described it....”167 Karim Khan’s improvements of Hafez’s tomb were
instrumental enough to make the cemetery not only a destination for pre-modern European
travelers, but also a distinct marker at which Pahlavi preservationists would go back to as their
point of origin for the conservation of an edifice looked upon as a national heritage.

Between the 1770s and 1850s, the cemetery saw few visitors who later documented their
experiences. While in 1802 and 1810 respectively, English traveler Scott Waring and Anglo-
Indian administrator Sir John Malcolm “offered to repair” Sa’di’s tomb “at their own expense,”

162 In Chardin’s words, Tavernier believed that the December 1668 “disastrous flood” must have to do with the
“dilapidated” state of Shiraz’s historic heritage. J. Chardin, Sir John Chardin’s Travels in Persia, introduction by P.
Sykes (London, 1927), 8: 419-422 and 435, 424-426, quoted in Ferrier, Journey to Persia, 36-37.
163 English traveler John Fryer (1650-1733) visited Shiraz in 1676; his “Persia” journey ended on October 8, 1678,
from Shiraz to “Gombroom,” modern-day Bandar Abbas. Others that followed him included Cornelis de Bruyn in
1705. See Fryer, J. A New Account of East-India and Persia 1672-1681 (London, 3 vols., 1909-1915); and it latest
reprint and the one used in this study, J. Fryer, A New Account of East-India and Persia 1672-1681 (New Delhi, 3
164 Fryer, New Account, 2: 211-212.
165 Emdad, Asar-e Fars, 129-130; and Curzon, Persian Question, 108.
166 Emdad, Asar-e Fars, 129-130.
they felt that Hafez’s grave did not need such attention. A year later, English diplomat and writer James Justinian Morier and British Oriental scholar Sir Gore Ouseley, too, found it “in excellent order.” French painter Eugène Flandin and architect Pascal Coste each produced a lithograph of the cemetery during their famed expedition of 1840 (Figs. 4.21-4.22). In their impressive *Monuments Modernes de la Perse* of 1897, the chapter on “Chiraz” commenced with a brief, but rhetorically rich, description and sketches of the tombs of Sa’di and Hafez. The “Athens de la Perse... the city of Shiraz” by the authors’ admission, “is solely represented in this work by the tombs of the two poets. These two names will suffice to glorify its name.” Here, the city was represented as “the true Oriental civilization” which best managed to draw “Persians and Europeans” together. Right above Coste’s sketch, “we give you a perspective view of the tomb and the surrounding garden.” The authors depicted that which they saw with relative accuracy:

The remains of Hafez rest in an isolated terrain... once enclosed in walls. A garden that touches the monument is filled with trees that protect the numerous pilgrims, admirers of the poet. The


168 Curzon, *Persian Question*, 106. Sir John Malcolm (born in Scotland in 1769 and died in 1833) was an Anglo-Indian soldier, diplomatist, administrator and author. “In 1792, having for some time devoted himself to the study of Persian, he was appointed to the staff of Lord Cornwallis as Persian interpreter, but two years afterwards was compelled by ill health to leave for England. On his return to India in 1796, he became military secretary to Sir Alured Clarke, commander-in-chief at Madras, and afterwards to his successor General Harris; and in 1798 he was appointed by Lord Wellesley assistant to the resident at Hyderabad. Arriving at Tehran in December 1800, he was successful in negotiating favorable treaties, both political and commercial, and returned to Bombay by way of Baghdad in May 1801. In 1808, he was again sent on a mission to Persia, but circumstances prevented him from getting beyond Bushire. He sailed for England in 1811, and shortly after his arrival in the following year was knighted. His intervals of leisure he devoted to literary work, and especially to the composition of a History of Persia, which was published in two quarto volumes in 1815. On his return to India in 1817, he was appointed by Lord Moira his political agent in the Deccan, with eligibility for military command... Leaving India for the last time in 1830, he shortly after his arrival in England entered parliament as member for Launceston, and was an active opponent of the Reform Bill. His works include, *Sketch of the Political History of India since 1784* (1811 and 1826); *Sketch of the Sikhs* (1812); *Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809* (1812); *Persia, a Poem* (1814); *A Memoir of Central India* (2 vols., 1823); and *Sketches of Persia* (1827).”


grave is formed of a hard limestone plinth, and of a second, more elevated, marble plinth
[brought from] Tabriz...ornamented with [Hafez's] own verses. One can still see in the garden
other tombs, those of [his] admirers who wanted to rest next to his ashes. A large pool and a jet
of water complete this place, which is kept by a mullah who shows visitors an example of the
Divan, elegantly written but [still] modern.171

While the marble gravestone was truthfully elucidated, the illustration resulted from the authors’
imagination. Or rather, that which Cost and Flandin saw was somewhat distorted by what they
had, a priori, hoped to see, because the graves “cluttering” Hafez’s tombstone were intentionally
omitted, prophesizing the removal of the graves a century later. There is little doubt as to
whether Siroux was intimately familiar with these drawings by the two giants of the Orientalist
art historical tradition. However, if we read these two images against each other, the exercise not
only reveals the constructed fragments of each visual data, but also negates the seeming accuracy
of each.

For while similar, the two depictions inform of two different architectural realities. In his
lithograph, entitled “Sépulture du Poète Hafiz (Chiraz),” Flandin seems to have given himself
great permission to depart from what he actually saw.172 For instance, while the edges of the
ablution pool were depicted much higher as to render its Muslim use impossible, the rendering of
Hafez’s tombstone was omitted altogether. The talar’s column capitals were transformed into
Doric capitals and the few visible graves were drawn both too large and too tall in comparison
with the existing graves. With his Orientalist poetic license, Flandin seems to have (re)presented
Musalla as a garden, rather than a cemetery. In contrast, Coste’s lithograph is far more accurate
in terms of architectural proportions, inclusive data, and attention to design details. The column
capitals of the talar were depicted similar to those ordered by Karim Khan and later multiplied
by Siroux; the ablution pool was drawn at the ground level and so too the few graves around
Hafez’s tombstone. Still, while the space was depicted far more monumentally than its actuality,
Coste’s lithograph would prove an ideal blueprint for the reshaping of Hafezieh in 1935.

Two decades after Coste and Flandin, Musalla saw further changes. In 1857 and 1878
respectively, the different governors (hokm-ran and farman farma) of Fars “repaired and
improved” Hafez’s aramgah; it was reported that a “wooden fence” was added “around” the

171 Coste, Monuments Modernes, 56.
172 See Flandin, Perse Moderne, 87, plate LXXXVII.
tomb by Marhum Farhad Mirza Motamed al-Dowleh. However, since during her 1881-1882 visit, French archeologist Jane Dieulafoy favored Sa’diyeh over Hafezieh by sketching only the former, we have no visual record of this wooden fence. Nor did the Hungarian professor of Oriental languages, Arminius Vambery, give a description that suggests such a structure; he wrote in 1883 that Hafez’s grave “stands in a large cemetery” where Karim Khan’s “white marble monument” marked the place. During his three-month stay in Shiraz and frequent visits to the cemetery, to his “astonishment,” Vambery often found “a merry carousing company seated about it, drinking their wine; at other times it was surrounded by penitent pilgrims.” The diversity of the activities at the cemetery surprised Vambery. “The former look upon Hafiz as their great master in a life of carelessness and jollity; the latter consider him a saint and come here to beseech him to intercede for them.” He also witnessed some singing songs, while others preferred the Divan to the Quran.

English scholar and renowned Orientalist Edward Browne’s account of Shiraz, like his three weeks stay in 1887, began with the tombs of Hafez and Sa’di. “Unable to rest till” he visited them first, he later noted his experience with “unmixed pleasure.” From the high position of the Quran gate, Browne could discern “Hafiziyeh, far more popular and better cared for,” than Sa’di’s tomb. From this point, “the whole plain” was “dotted with gardens,” he noted. Hafez’s grave, “a simple oblong block of stone,” as described by Browne, “occupie[d] the centre of an enclosed garden beautifully planted with cypresses and orange-trees.” The Arabic inscription on Hafez’s tomb, read: “He [God] is the enduring, and all else passeth away.” In Persian, Hafez’s ode: “Where is the good tidings of union with Thee? For I will rise up with my whole heart; I am a bird of Paradise, and I will soar upwards from the snare of the world.” Around the edge of the gravestone, Browne translated another ode: “O heart, be the slave of the King of the World, and be a king! Abide continually under the protection of God’s favour!” The two upper corners of the surface, diagonally: “When thou passest by the head of our tomb,

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173 The dates are given as “1273 and 1295” AH. The first hokm-ran of Fars was Tahmasb Mirza Moyid al-Dowleh. Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 65. See also Karimi, Rahnameh, 21; and Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.
174 J. Dieulafoy, Safarnameh-ye Madam Dieulafoy (Tehran, 1361/1982), 422 and fig. 423.
175 A. Vambery, His Life and Adventures (New York, 1883), 129.
176 Vambery, Life and Adventures, 130.
177 E. G. Browne, A Year Among the Persians (Cambridge, 1893), 263 and 277. Browne’s travelogue was result of his stay in Iran between 1887-1888. His scholarly work includes A Literary history of the Persians (Cambridge, 4 vols., 1928).
178 Browne, Among Persians, 280.
invoke a blessing, for it will be the place of pilgrimage of (all) the libertines of the world.” And the two lower corners marked Hafez’s words about his own death: “That Lamp of the mystics, Master Hafiz, Seek his date from ‘the Earth of Musalla’.” This last text indicated the Arabic numerical equivalent of “781” AH – that is 1389 AD. The “unequalled popularity still enjoyed” by Hafez, according to Browne, was “attested” by “the multitude of graves which surrounded his tomb.” Browne wondered, “What Persian, indeed, would not desire that his ashes should mingle with those of the illustrious bard from whom contemporary fanaticism would fain to withhold the very rites of sepulture?”

“The chief suburban glory of Shiraz is neither its cypresses nor its tanks, nor its gardens,” according to Lord Curzon, “but its two poets’ graves.” A year after Browne, Curzon observed, “the tomb of Hafez stand[ing] in a cemetery crowded with Moslem graves,” in addition to the two “upper and lower parts,” which were separated by a “summer-house.” As he approached the “present sarcophagus…made of yellow Yezd marble [sic.]” Curzon also noticed a “frail iron railing,” recorded in his photograph (Fig. 4.23). This 1888 description informed of two architectural details: first, the visual documentation of the railing, the only one readily available; and second, the comment indicating that the structure replaced by the 56-meter talar was used as a “summer-house.” Arguably, Curzon’s remark about the “crowded” graves must have, if not instructed, at least, inspired their later elimination. Despite the “bands of admiring pilgrims” gathered around the tomb either with “devotional or festive aim,” Curzon confessed, “in any other country in the world a greater distinction would encompass the last resting-place of a

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179 While Browne’s admiration for Hafez and his lifelong interest in the Babi movement were extensive, he wrote relatively little about Hafez’s tomb; see Browne, Among Persians, 280-281.

180 Curzon added, “The literature of a country never produced two more differently constituted exponents than Sadi and Hafiz, nor two with opposite temperaments and philosophy.” Before describing Hafeziyeh, Curzon also gave a detailed description and history of Sa’diye: “The Sadieh, or enclosure that holds the tomb of Sadi, is at the distance of about one mile from the town in a north-easterly direction, and lies just under the mountains. A garden precedes a building, containing some small rooms in the center, and an arched diwan on either side, in one of which, with plain, whitewashed, unpretentious walls, behind a tall brass lattice or screen, reposes the sarcophagus of the poet. This is an oblong chest of stone, open at the top, and covered with Arabic inscriptions. A friendly green-turbaned seyid did the honours of the place. A hundred years ago, when Franklin saw it, this tomb, which in the original fabric, was covered with a very ancient wooden case, painted black and inscribed with an ode of Sadi. In 1811, also, Ouseley saw a lid lying near; but I did not observe any such addition. In Tavernier’s time (1665) the tomb ‘has been very fair; but it runs to ruin.’ Kerim Khan restored the building, without altering the sarcophagus; but at the beginning of the present century it has again fallen into such decay that Scott Waring in 1802 and Sir John Malcolm in 1810 offered to repair it at their own expense. It has since been subjected to some sort of restoration, but even now has a forlorn and friendless look. Near by is…a long flight of steps to a subterranean well, containing fish that are or were regarded as sacred to Sadi, the water proceeding from a kanat that subsequently irrigates the garden of Dilgusha. Above the Sadieh is a place in the mountains…” Curzon, Persian Question, 105-109. Also, see S. J. Malcolm, The History of Persia (London, 2 vols., 1829).
national hero and the object of adoration to millions.” He seems to have failed to recognize the respect paid to Hafez by the “crowded” graves around his.

During the last decade of the 19th century, Musalla went through further minor alterations. “As they say,” Karimi noted, “after that [1878], one of the Parsis, an inhabitant of Yazd, opened a fortune in the Divan and the verse was in full accord with his mood.” While he was reported to have “repaired (maremat) the tomb and placed a railing on top of it,” the exact nature of these repairs is uncertain. The post-1979 amendment to this Pahlavi text, though trivial, is telling – “in 1317 H. Gh. [AH], a Parsi (Zoroastrian) individual named Ardeshir repaired (maremat) the tomb and built a railing on top of it” – because if Ardeshir was “a Parsi of Yazd,” then he could not have been a Parsi at all, for by definition only an inhabitant of the Indian Subcontinent qualifies as a “Parsi.” Ardeshir, therefore, was a Zoroastrian of Iran. The other clarification was the date of the new railing in 1899. “But,” Karimi added, “after” an equally unspecified time period, “Hajj Seyyed Ali Akbar Fall Asiri,” who took issue with the fact that a “Parsi had taken care of” the grave, “destroyed and burned the railing.” Behruzi collaborated the account: “Asiri, one of the ulama of Shiraz,” destroyed the grave “on the pretext (bahaneh) that a fire-worshipper has rebuilt” it. The post-1979 encyclopedia merely noted that Asiri “destroyed and burned the railing,” tactfully omitting both Asiri’s religious affiliation and motive for the act. Therefore, at the turn of the century, Musalla cemetery looked not much different from Coste and Flandin’s lithographs, as attested by two panoramic images of it, produced by a local photographer (Figs. 4.24-4.25). In it, the ablution pool was depicted in use and the cemetery in its late medieval appearance.

1901 marked the beginning of modern, and rather aggressive, architectural interventions into the cemetery. At first, despite misleading information, an iron Ka’ba-like cage was raised over Hafez’s tombstone as confirmed by contemporary photographs (Fig. 4.26). A year after his

1 Curzon, Persian Question, 109-110. Concerning Shiraz, Curzon disappointingly ends, “But it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, in the eyes of the Shirazi, every local goose is a swan, and that there neither is nor has been in the site and surroundings of the city anything to excite such extravagance of laudation.” After Reza Shah’s urbanisms, this too will be ‘fixed’ along ‘Western lines.’

2 Karimi, Rahnameh, 22; and Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 65.

3 Parsis are referred to those Zoroastrians who migrated to the Indian Subcontinent after the fall of the Sassanian Empire in the 7th century. Those Zoroastrians who remained in Iran are known as Zoroastrians and not Parsis. Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.

4 Karimi, Rahnameh, 22.

5 Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 65.

6 Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.
arrival at Shiraz in 1897, a certain "Mirza Hassan Akkasbashi" took a picture of Mohammad Naser Forsat al-Dowleh Shirazi, the author of the nationalistic work entitled Asar-e Ajam (1890/1934) that had vehemently argued for a revival of Iran’s pre-Islamic past, posing next to Hafez’s new enclosure (Fig. 4.27). Although the photograph hints at the renewed interest in Hafez and his tomb at that time, there is a lack of information about the site during that period including the incorrect date of its caption. According to Emdad, “During the reign of Naser al-Din Shah and Mozaffar al-Din Shah, this aramgah was renovated (tamir) and a metal grille was placed around the grave.” Later, in Eqabi’s view, “they put a metal hand-rail (nardeh),” which was not “suitable (monaseb).” With more precision, Karimi and Behruzi concurred, “In 1319 H. Gh. [AH], Vali (caretaker) of Fars Shoa al-Saltaneh built a metal railing by the hands of engineer/architect (mohandes) Mozin al-Dowleh.” Here, the dedication was inlaid on circular metal plates and fixed around the upper edge; it gave the names of the patron and the architect in addition to the date of 1319 AH (1901 AD, 1280 Solar Hejri).

In his 1937 report, General Riazi alluded to the fact that “in lieu of the metal railing which was erected of British telegraph rods of old Shiraz, an octagonal iwan was built.” Correspondingly, numerous Pahlavi observers commented on the metal structure with disapproval, because it was perceived to have been erected with bad taste and subjugated cultural neglect and degeneration by Qajar rulers. It, in the view of the Pahlavi elite, not only it did not fit into the their modern and westernized sense of aesthetics, but also projected the image of the cemetery onto that of Ka’ba in Mecca. A historian insisted that the grille was nothing more than a “pretentious iron fence from the era of Naser al-Din...” Another maintained when the marble tombstone was destroyed “during another outbreak of fanaticism led by a Sufi!... Honorable amends for that deplorable act of vandalism were made by Riza Shah,” after which

188 Mohammad Naser Forsat al-Dowleh Shirazi, Asar-e Ajam (Bombay, 1353/1934). For the details of Naser Forsat’s arguments and attitude towards the pre-Islamic ruins of Iran, see F. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 (Princeton, 1999), 41-46. According to the caption of this image, Akkasbashi had worked in Bombay for eight years before coming to Shiraz; see P. Ziaian, Shiraz: the Colorful Dream of Pars (Tehran, 2001), 19.
189 Emdad, Asar-e Fars, 129-130.
190 Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.
191 Shoa al-Saltaneh also inscribed on wooden panels selected ghazals at each end of the talar. Karimi, Rohnameh, 22-23; and Behruzi, Bana-ha-ye Tarikki, 66-67. Also, see M. Sane, Be Yadeh Shiraz: Akshaye Shiraz-e Qadim [In memory of Shiraz: photos of old Shiraz] (Tehran, 1380/2002), 103.

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"the new shrine was erected far more spectacular than the old." These authors had first assumed that there were only two "shrines" — the first constructed by the Safavid and renovated by the Zands, then vandalized and destroyed under the Qajars, only to yield the construction of a second "shrine" by the Pahlavis. These historic reconstructions faithfully accorded with Pahlavi historiography.

Nor did Western travelers, between 1901 and 1936, speak favorably about either the enclosure or its surrounding graves, still admiring Karim Khan’s tombstone. Member of the British parliament, poet and novelist Eliot Crawshay Williams and Columbia University professor Williams Jackson toured Shiraz in the same year, 1903. While Williams had just "resigned my commission in the Royal Field Artillery in India," and was traveling in Iran, Jackson was "combining the two themes" of "travel and research...into a union" which he hoped "will be found true." In his travelogue Williams described the metal enclosure around Hafez’s grave:

The marble stone beautifully carved, enclosed with a kind of cage of iron bars, at the corners of which fly horrible iron pennons. The whole of this affair is inside a square cemetery packed with the graves of those who wished to be buried "under the shadow" of the great man.

Entering the cage, we gazed on the stone... It is not the original tombstone...but it is, a finely carved slab.

On one hand, Williams concluded with feelings of disappointment: "somehow it did not strike me as quite impressive enough; the surroundings were not worthy of the hero of Persian poetry."

"Personally," he persisted with his displeasure, "I prefer to think of Omar [Khayyam]’s grave overshadowed by the wild rose-tree, though, alas! Even that delightfully romantic tradition has, I believe, now been ruthlessly made havoc of." These sentiments might have been the cause for Williams’ decision not to sketch Musalla cemetery as he did with Sa’di’s tomb. At the end, he

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193 Lenczowski, Iran under Pahlavis, 327.
195 Eliot Crawshay-Williams (1879-1962) was an assistant private secretary to Winston Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1906-1908, and MP for Leicester, 1910-1913, when he served as parliamentary private secretary to David Lloyd George who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. For more details on Williams Jackson, see chapter 6 in this study as well as P. Soucek, “A. V. Williams Jackson: 1862-1937,” in the proceedings of the International Conference on the Study of Persian Culture in the West (London, 2005) forthcoming. Also, see the catalogue of International Conference on the Study of Persian Culture in the West (State Hermitage, Saint Petersburg, June 2004), 37.
196 E. Crawshay Williams, Across Persia (London, 1907), 1, the work is dedicated to Lord Curzon. A. V. W. Jackson (1862-1937), Persia Past and Present: A Book of Travel and Research (New York, 1906), vii.
197 Williams, Across Persia, 139.
198 See Williams, Across Persia, 140. Like Jane Dieulafoy and a number of other Western travelers, Sa’diyeh is privileged over Hafeziyeh in their respective representations.
notes, “very leper-like and unpleasant” women had gathered, “close under the cemetery wall,” around a “mullah.”

Williams Jackson, on the other hand, was kinder in his appraisal of “the large iron grating” with which “the present governor of Shiraz has taken pains to have the sepulcher protected.” According to his A Book of Travel and Research (1906), the structure was “more imposing than the old metal cage that formerly enclosed it, and the scrollwork and design show some artistic taste.” Still, he remarked, “The stanchions and corner-posts are iron telegraph poles, received from the Indo-European Telegraph Company, and the Shirazis seemed to be almost as proud of these and of the little metal flags that decorate the top, as of the inscribed slab over the poet’s dust.” As the first professor of Indo-Iranian languages at Columbia University, Jackson was informed about the “number of graves,” surrounding the “handsome oblong block of marble;” he correctly argued, “burial near the poet’s dust is...a special privilege.” In Williams’s photograph of the cemetery, these “little flags” painted with “the Persian national colours” as well as the “telegraph poles” were visible, in addition to Shoa al-Saltaneh’s patronage of ghazal inscriptions on wooden panels inside the talar. Through it became clear that the later destroyed rooms on each side of the talar much have served as “shelter for priests, dervishes, and pilgrims.” The photo, interestingly, also captured the contemporary use of the space by the diverse pilgrims: women, dervishes, and mollahs, sitting on and around the graves (Fig. 4.28).

British author F. B. Bradley-Birt titled chapter 8 of his travelogue, “By the graves of Sadi and Hafiz.” After detailing the popular stories about each man, Bradley-Birt arrives at his last page, “So Hafiz was buried with full Mussalman rites at Musalla.” Like those before him, he

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199 Williams, Across Persia, 139.
200 Jackson’s main authorities and references are Curzon and Browne; see Jackson, Persia Past and Present, 332.
201 Unlike 1817, when the English painter Sir Robert Ker Porter “described it...the place is well kept up, being no longer neglected.” Sir Robert Ker Porter, described as one of the four “most renowned English travelers to Iran in the first quarter of the nineteenth century,” was invited to Tabriz by the personal invitation of Prince Abbas Mirza Qajar, and later to Tehran by Fath Ali Shah Qajar. Commissioned by President of the Russian Academy of Fine Arts Olenin, he traveled in Iran between 1817 and 1819. For details, see P. Luft, “Sir Robert Ker Porter: Wanderer between Three Worlds,” in the proceedings of the International Conference on the Study of Persian Culture in the West (London, 2005) forthcoming. See also the catalogue of International Conference on the Study of Persian Culture in the West (State Hermitage, Saint Petersburg, June 2004), 28-29.
202 F. Richards, A Persian Journey: Being an Etcher’s Impressions of the Middle East with 48 Drawings (New York, 1932), 133.
203 Jackson, Persia Past and Present, 332-333.
204 F. B. Bradley-Birt, Persia: Through Persia from the Gulf to the Caspian (London, 1909), 148-164. His other work includes Twelve Men of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century (Calcutta, 1927).
was surprised to see that “the poet rests not alone in a garden, but in the midst of many other
graves that seem to have gathered around him as if for the good-fellowship and company that he
had made his own in life.” Despite his misinterpretation of the meaning of grave exclusion and
inclusion in Muslim cemeteries, Bradley-Birt revealed an important point about the larger built
environment of Musalla which seems to have gone unnoticed by most other travelers. “Even
outside the smaller enclosure,” with which he meant the walled cemetery, “the ground is
scattered with long mounds and stones that mark the resting-place of the dead.”

This was the first account that positioned Hafez’s tomb both in the so-called “garden of Hafez,” recognized
and described by many, and in the much larger context of Musalla cemetery outside Shiraz. Bradley-Birt,
furthermore, found the graves so tightly lay that “there is scarce room to pass” to
that of Hafez, “enclosed by a large iron grating, elaborately coloured and designed” (Fig.
4.29).

Among the “thousands of pilgrims, who still come after five centuries to lay their
homage at the poet’s feet,” he was especially “shock[ed]” to see the “modernity” of the cage,
because “the supports are iron telegraph posts supplied by the Indo-European Telegraph
Department.” “There is happily nothing to offend the eye,” he concluded.

German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld’s photo, titled “Shiraz Hafiziyya, Film 5155,” was
shot during his first visit there on December 30, 1923. His diary relays a rather pleasant
experience at the cemetery:

> A walk to Hafezieh. Everything is very beautiful. They opened the gate to the grave of Hafiz and
read the verses to me. Shua al-Saltaneh has repaired it, surely a Parsi. The clerics are against
Hafiz and Sa’di because the verses are too beautiful. Tea in the open hall: entire Shiraz in front
of my eyes. Very, very beautiful.

Aside from historic inaccuracies, such as the confusion of Shoa’s religious affiliation with that of
Ardeshir’s, Herzfeld incorrectly dismissed ulama’s treatment of Hafez on aesthetical grounds.
He thus found the cemetery unworthy of Hafez’s greatness, wherein only “the memory of the
great poet remains.” Under Fars and Shiraz respectively, Herzfeld’s index similarly paid a

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206 Bradley-Birt, Through Persia, 152.
207 Bradley-Birt, Through Persia, 163.
208 Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives, Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 30, “Shiraz Hafiziyya,
Film 5155,” #167.
209 The entry went on: “Even more beautiful are Tchihil and Haft Tan, in Chehel Tan a few tombs of the 7th century
H., in Haft Tan hall of Karim Khan, with paintings: Sa’di, Shems and Hafiz. An old man gave me roses, lemons and
minimal attention to “Hafez’s grave (qabr)” without further elaboration. Decades later, Herzfeld’s rival would concur: Director of Iran’s Archeological Services André Godard’s catalog registered “the tomb of poet Hafez…on the site of ancient Musalla,” dated “époque Zand, modifications modernes” Both Orientalists, therefore, regarded the architectural object as insignificant. Still, the artistic value of the tombs reconstructed by the SNH during the 20th century was at best trivial to the Pahlavi elite in general and the SNH in particular, because these men approached these historic places in order to refigure them into their vision of New Iran.

When in July 1931, the “business-like and hard-working” Mirza Farajollah Khan Bahrami was appointed governor-general of Fars orders were given to modernize Musalla cemetery. This was prompted, no doubt, by his “great aspiration to literary eminence” particularly to that of Hafez as his “great admirer.” In the past, Bahrami had been the personal secretary of Reza Shah before and after his coronation; between 1930 and 1934, he was promoted as the governor of Isfahan, Fars, and Khorasan respectively. His efforts at Hafezieh were best captured in American artist Fred Richards’ 1932 pencil drawing of the talar (Fig. 4.30). According to Karimi, Bahrami “gave a hand to the building of Hafezieh in 1931-32 and with enthusiasm (shawq) and taste (zawqi)” rendered the place “splendid (mojalal) and beautiful (ziba).” More specifically, Bahrami had ordered the addition of a Qajar-style pishtaq on top of Karim Khan’s talar, centered above the columns facing the inner courtyard. While the motives behind the choice of its style remains unknown, his constructions of a brick wall along the southern property line was hardly surprising. It was to demarcate not only the limits of the to-be garden of Hafezieh, but also to give momentum to the rapid urbanism of Reza Shah’s era (Fig. 4.31).

210 Society for National Heritage 1, Fehrest Mokhtasar az Asar va Ebni-e Tarikhi-ye Iran [Brief inventory of the Iran’s historical heritage and edifices] (Tehran, 1925), 23.
212 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1972/1732/34, Report on Leading Personalities in Persia 1937, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 383. Titled Dabir-e A’zam, Bahrami was born in 1890 in a well-known Tehran family. He lost shah’s confidence in 1927 and was sent to Europe to oversee the affairs of Iranian students in Paris and Berlin. He returned around 1929-1930 to occupy the post of governor-general of Isfahan, Fars, and Khorasan, as well as that of minister of post and telegraphs until his final demise in October 1934. In Fars, he was replaced by Mirza Majid Khan Ahi in 1933.
213 F. Richards, A Persian Journey: Being an Etcher’s Impressions of the Middle East with 48 Drawings (New York, 1932), 132.
214 Karimi, Rahnameh, 23.
Following Bahrami, the next governor (ostrandar) of Fars, "Dabir Azam Bahrami' built a large stone gate (sardar) in the southern side of the garden," and, thus, "gave a head and face (sar va surat) to its orange-garden." However, before the completion of the project and right before plans "to improve the building proper," the second Bahrami was fired from his post as governor. In fact, his political career ended during the Ferdawsi Millenary Celebrations when he had mistakenly reported that Mashhad lacked adequate facilities to accommodate the visiting Orientalists. After that, according to the British, Bahrami went "under the cloud." Before departing though, "Because he wanted to complete the project as soon as possible, he organized a celebration, inviting numerous scholars and respected [members] of Shiraz, during which he read an oration authored by himself." Apparently, Bahrami was imitating, on a smaller scale, the Ferdawsi Celebrations of October 1934.

Bahrami's additions at Musalla were merely decorative; they had little effect on the ongoing historic use of the cemetery. When in spring 1931, Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore arrived there in company of his Shirazi hosts, they were invited inside "the massive, imposing iron railings, designed rather like the iron doors of a modern lift" for a reading of the Divan (Fig. 4.32). The photograph of the gathering on that day captured a fundamentally different way of interacting with the cemetery and, specifically, with Hafez's tomb proper. Here, Tagore and his official escorts sat on a carpet spread around the tombstone; in front of them were placed several "common-looking candlesticks" and "two modern lamps," along with "some kind of incongruous enlarged portrait of the immortal poet." The metal structure, enclosed and exclusive, enabled a practice that Siroux's modern pavilion would not. It brought privileged men, like Tagore, into, not around, the tomb of Hafez and conditioned a private reading of the Divan and a personal veneration of the Sufi master. The future pavilion of Hafez not only would not occasion such practices, but would rather intentionally prevent them.

More revealing than his well-proportioned and well-detailed sketch of the talar is Richards' experience at Hafezieh, the account of which faultlessly complements Tagore's

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215 After repairing the dilapidated walls surrounding the building, Karimi reports that Bahrami "gave a head and face to the orange gardens;" by which he means, the gardens were taken care of. Eqabi, Mausolea Structures, 40.
216 "Bahrami was called back to Tehran and with his departure it remains in standstill." Karimi, Rahnameh, 23.
217 Behruzii, Bana-ha-ye Tarikhi, 68. However, much of this would prove to be inadequate, for, arguably, the very imagery of the space did not fit into the official rhetoric of the modern state. It comes as little surprise that literature on this subject is disproportionately sparse, almost nonexistent.
218 Richards, Persian Journey, 132. Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore was born in Calcutta and died in 1941.
219 Williams, Across Persia, 139; and Richards, Persian Journey, 133.
picture. Not only he perceived Shiraz through the lens of the tomb, but also meticulously detailed its use before the 1935 changes. Richards began his chapter, “Shiraz, Hafiz and Sa’di,” with “Once the traveler is in Shiraz, it is to the tombs of Sa’di and Hafiz that he generally makes his first pilgrimage, for it is the memory of the greatness of these two poets that now provides the last two lustrous spots on the faded glory of the ancient city of Shiraz.” The tombs were represented by Richards both as “the last” trace of “a once glorious,” still fictitious, “ancient city” and the only true reason to travel to Shiraz. Clearly, despite his exceptionally accurate drawing of Hafezieh, there was a dimension of fantasy in his narrative. “Classical Shiraz had not merely an honoured past,” he insisted, but also “a glorious present” since “the place breathes of beauty and the birds sing lyrics of Hafiz.”

Moreover, in Richards’ proposed itinerary, where the first item was a evening “pilgrimage to the tomb of Hafez,” he disclosed two important points. First, he specified that the “water tank” next to Hafez’s tomb was not only “where cups and glasses are washed after tea,” but more importantly, “where ablution before prayer takes place.” This detail was lost on earlier chroniclers. Supporting my proposition, the large water-tank functioned as an ablution pool before its relocation in 1935. Subsequently, it would neither be used for hygiene nor ritual, but rather function as a decorative element of Hafezieh. Second, Richards lists the various practices that occurred in and around the talar, “a native tea-house,” “where...old men...gather to smoke their kalian,” looks out on Shiraz on the one side, and the grave...on the other.” He finally concluded, “there is no reason to imagine that” Musalla cemetery “is a graveyard at all” for “this one, is much tidier and better kept than the usual public graveyards found on the edge of the towns.”

Furthermore, if we are to believe Richards, interring and mourning were not the chief function of the place. “A good deal of smoking goes on,” he wrote, and “it is not always tobacco” either. “It is,” nevertheless, “the pleasantest of places in which to drink tea,” in Richards’ mind there seems to have been a Western ethical tag attached to how things are done around the cemetery. “To show the supreme enjoyment that ensures with tea-drinking,” to his astonishment, “all those noises made in drinking tea which are forbidden in Western nurseries,”

220 Richards, Persian Journey, 130.
221 Richards, Persian Journey, 131.
are permitted ten-fold” in Hafez’s talar. The practice of drinking tea in a “pleasantest” but “noisy” environment would cease to occur in Musalla a few years after this account. Neither tea drinking nor Marijuana smoking, neither prayer nor ablution, would be acceptable public practices around the tomb of a national hero. They, along with the pool and the enclosure, would simply disappear to make way for landscaping, benches, and a gift-shop. These, in turn, would be tailored to the needs of not the “old men of Shiraz,” but tourists.

British traveler and photographer Robert Byron, whose February 1934 picture would prove to be the last visual record of the metal cage, showed little textual interest in it; “beyond” the hill “lies the gardens…each containing the poet’s tomb,” he merely wrote (Fig. 4.33). The last man who documented Karim Khan’s talar, however, was another British traveler, Henry Filmer, who in 1935, much like his predecessors, found “the iron grating” simply “ugly.” He nonetheless felt that the master’s grave “most conspicuous” in “the midst of a Moslem cemetery” was “fitting.” While his account of Musalla was as unanimated as his photograph, it remains the only record of what would later be known as Hafezieh’s southern garden (Fig. 4.34). In it, Karim Khan’s columns were depicted flanking an arcade on each side, revealing the ambiguous spatial relationship between the to-be-southern garden and the urban fabric of Shiraz. The last woman to mention the cemetery, British author Onera Amelia Merritt-Hawkes, described the tombs of “famous poets” as “neither of them really beautiful, but interesting because so many Persians have wished to be buried near these great men.” Though “people still open a volume of Hafez and trust to a stray line to guide them in conduct and deeds,” she observed, “at the moment, [he] is not as popular as formerly, as there is a growing feeling that the country needs the practical, and many of his Sufist ideas are dangerously contemplative.” The missing graves and reconfigured ablution pool, as well as the extroverted pavilion not only contributed to, but also, imposed specific sets of secular conduct; one that excluded prayer and ghazal-reading. One, too, that was not about veneration, but rather about pleasure. By the end of Reza

222 Richards, Persian Journey, 131.
224 Filmer, H. The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis, 1936), 95. Filmer, like other travelers gives a rather long account of Sa‘di and Sa‘diyeh in the previous pages.
225 Filmer, Pageant of Persia, 97.
227 Merritt-Hawkes, Persia, 45. My emphasis.
Shah's rule, Siroux's new design had affected all the hitherto practices in Musalla. Like Hafezieh, Iranians too had changed by what had happened to their public spaces.

Several Western travelers were surprised to see Shiraz's various gardens "open for all to walk in."228 One commented, "It is one of the most charming of Shiraz customs that anyone may come along and ask to visit a garden or even picnic in it without even having met the owner."229 To her amazement, British travel writer Ella C. Sykes found in the 1910s that Musalla "is constantly visited by all classes, the pleasure-seekers coming to pay homage to a master who understood the joie de vivre, who loved art for art's sake."230 Sykes' evidence for this "remarkable fate of being adorned by both saints and sinners" was Hafez's own tomb "surrounded by graves of countless admirers." Most Western travelers, further, were mesmerized by the enclosed and "high walls" of Shiraz's gardens in that they created the very atmosphere of pleasure. The Pahlavi intervention would eliminate this architecturally introverted formula to replace it with the concept of the modern park - not only open to the public, but simply open, architecturally and visually, rendering the pavilion of Hafez visible from the street. This kind of openness, or rather opening up can be read as an act of invasion by the central state into popular practices, of seeing and controlling the public domain. By so doing, the "odour of sanctity" and the "merry carousing" among wine and songs would be lost.231 It would be tightly regimented with entrance tickets and tourist guides; with gift-shops and benches (Fig. 4.35). The preplanned form and function of the garden would now determine people's circulation and operation. It would also predetermine its very meaning as a secular public space. With an architectural shift, Hafezieh would mutate into a place of tourism - official and somber; unprovoked and unpracticed by the people. When Belgian Baroness Ullens photographed Hafez's pavilion in the 1960s, there was no question of it having any captivating Sufi history; the monument, like the only man buried there, had been appropriated into the mainstream of Iran's secular history (Fig. 4.36).

Despite this long and rich history of the Musalla cemetery, Hekmat and his team did not hesitate to implement their new and modernistic scheme. Disregarding the importance of the surrounding graves, their historic meaning, in addition to the very function of the cemetery for

228 Arberry, Shiraz, 11.
229 Rodkin, Unveiled Iran.
231 F. Bradley-Birt, Persia: Through Persia from the Gulf to the Caspian (London, 1909), 164.
pilgrims and Shirazis alike, Siroux returned the imagery of Musalla to its allegedly Zand origins. Pahlavi architectural plans supplanted and erased the equally rich historiography of the grave, recorded by contemporary Western and Iranian observers. At the end, they also managed to transform the historic practices of the place. On the modern map of New Iran, the place of Hafez’s tomb had other, far more consequential significance. Not only it helped the state to canonize the historic figure into Iranian national historiography through the refashioning of his tomb, but also it earned an income by its appeal to the international tourist trade. Hafezieh, furthermore, became a hot item on Iran’s heritage inventory.

Considered through the eyes of a rapidly developing nation-state, the project was a complete success. Through those of contemporary historians and architects, however, too much had been erased in the name of progress. When it came to evaluate the aesthetic and historic merit of Sa’di’s modern mausoleum, for instance, André Godard wrote in his notebook, “The Zand edifice was destroyed in 1949 and reconstructed on a design entirely different…” adding disapprovingly, “Nothing remains of the old monument.” The processes of purification at Hafezieh had eliminated not only the medieval graves, the ablution pool, and the Qajar additions, but also the historic value system endowed on both Hafez and the cemetery by the surrounding tombstones. The removal of the “ugly cage,” furthermore, signified the absent history of 19th-century Iran characterized by experiments and hybridity, one that perceived modernity in using the colonizer’s telegraph poles to universalize a local Sufi. That which was lost, too, was the layering of form and meaning onto the edifice itself. Architectural purification meant nothing more than eliminating the artistic intervention by historic characters like Nader Shah, Karim Khan, Shoa al-Saltaneh, Ardeshir the Parsi, and the Bahramis. Their practice on the place was swiftly displaced and effectively erased by Siroux’s new design. Pahlavi nationalism and blind adherence to Western paradigms, in reality, had diminished the complexities of Musalla’s long history. It had rendered it exactly what it had intended: a pleasant tourist site.

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- Fallen Modernists

Historians of modern Iran divide Reza Shah’s ruling period into two parts: from 1925 to 1933, when his rule was absolute, and from 1933 to his abdication in 1941, when it was absolute and arbitrary. The murder of his court minister demarcates this divide.\(^{233}\)

It is significant that by 1933-4, of the men of special ability and independence in Reza Shah’s immediate entourage, only Davar had survived in office. Others had been dismissed, arrested, assassinated, or killed in prison. The fall of Timurtash was symbolic of Reza Shah’s assumption of total and arbitrary power. For, from that moment until his own day of reckoning, the Shah became the undisputed arbiter over the lives, freedom, rights and properties of the Iranian people.\(^{234}\)

On the institutional level, this arbitrary politics caused the shutting down of the SNH. Naturally, both the reasons for its closing and reopening were suppressed in Pahlavi records; nor do we have any other source to elucidate the details.\(^{235}\) In his memoirs, Education Minister Isa Sadiq merely stated, “After 1314, the Society did not get together;” adding in parenthesis, “(because Forughi, the boss, was under house arrest from Azar 1314 [November 1935]).”\(^{236}\) The SNH remarked in its later publications, “after Ferdawsi’s aramgah,” the Society was “closed down (t’atil gardid); it was reorganized in Azar 1323 [November 1944] and continued its national services.”\(^{237}\) Banned from 1935, the SNH would only be allowed to reassemble after World War II under the jurisdiction of the Cultural Ministry. In my narrative, the first two monuments – Hafezieh and Ferdawsiyeh – not only represented the nature of the two political phases under Reza Shah, but also hinted at the development of the Society and its subsequent projects under Mohammad Reza Shah. This embodiment of politics in architecture, however, was not a result of

\(^{233}\) ‘The fifteen years which separate Reza Shah’s accession and abdication can be divided into two parts: the period 1926-33, when his power was absolute; and the period 1933-41, when it was both absolute and arbitrary. The year 1933 marks a watershed because it witnessed two important, and related, events: the fiasco of the new oil agreement, and the fall of ‘Abdullhussain Timurtash, the powerful Minister of the Imperial Court.” H. Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-modernism, 1926-1979 (New York, 1981), 101.

\(^{234}\) Katouzian, Political Economy of Iran, 109 and 119. “Firouz had been convicted on similar spurious charges [co-conspirator in overthrowing the shah] in May 1930 and was murdered in prison in January 1938. With the suicide of Davar in February 1937, the last of the small group which had been greatly responsible for the success of the early years of Reza Shah’s reign, Iran was deprived of her most dynamic figures. With the loss of Teimurtash and Davar, and Foroughi’s forced retirement, the burden of government fell heavily on Reza Shah himself.” Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 403.

\(^{235}\) Nor was the SNH the only anjoman that was rather mysteriously disbanded during this period. The various feminist and liberal movements, for instance, “The Patriotic Women’s League was dismantled for some unknown reason in 1932.” E. Sanasarian, The Women’s Rights Movement in Iran (New York, 1982), 67.


\(^{237}\) Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old publications of the SNH] (Tehran, 1972), 235.
a static political culture, but rather on the few individuals who were in power. While 
*Ferdawsiyeh* was a mirror to the ideological claims of a handful of nationalists and modernists 
during the first phase, *Hafezieh* was a corollary of the individual efforts of a few powerful men 
during the second phase.

After 1933, the ruling methods of Reza Shah changed considerably; with this, too, 
changed the relationship between the king and those who had worked with zeal for the cause of a 
New Iran. 238 While in the 1920s and early 1930s, on the one hand, “the older generation of the 
intelligentsia,” including founders of the SNH – Hasan Pirmia, Mohammad Ali Forughi, Hosayn 
Mostawfi, Arbab Keikhosraw Shahrrokh, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, and Seyyed Mohammad 
Tadayyon – had championed Reza Shah’s heavy-handed centralization and secularization of 
Iran, “their enthusiasm cooled...during the early 1930s as [the shah] signed an unfavorable oil 
agreement, intensified his quest for dynastic wealth, caused widespread inflation with his 
military expenditures, and concentrated power in his own hands by banning all political parties, 
including the reformists parties.” 239 On the other hand, the younger generation of the shah’s 
cabinet and members of the SNH – Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, Firuz Mirza Firuz, Ali Akbar 
Davar, Ali Asghar Hekmat, and Isa Sadiq – while sustained his forbidding sociopolitical and 
cultural regime and actively partook in its workings, none was farsighted enough to see his own 
demise. At the end, neither of them were protected from a system that they had helped create. 
After his exile, one of the reformists publicly accused Reza Shah for “trampling over the 
constitution, favoring the military over the civilian administration, accumulating a private 
fortune, stealing other people’s property, murdering progressive intellectuals, and widening the 
gap between the haves and the have-nots.” 240 By late 1930, the intellectual vacuum created by 
Reza Shah’s abuse of power not only corroborated the deep seeded political nature of the

238 “Reza Shah’s policy was to divide the upper-class families... While coopting some of the aristocratic families, 
[he] also supplanted them both from their positions as local magnates – positions that they had occupied throughout 
the nineteenth century – and from their function as the county’s ruling class, a function they had performed since the 
end of the Constitutional Revolution. He dispossessed many, forcing some to sell land at nominal prices, and 
depriving others not only of their power and property, but also of their liberty, dignity, and even lives... The 
mortality rate was even higher among the members of the upper class who first won but then lost the shah’s 
confidence.” “The state increasingly resorted to violence to control class and ethnic opposition, so much so that by 
1941 many Europeans, as well as Iranians, were speculating whether repression would work indefinitely, whether 
junior officers would overthrow the regime, or whether social tensions would sooner or later bring about a bloody 
revolution.”Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 150 and 164.

239 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 153.

Two Revolutions*, 154.
Society, but also its total dependence on these individual men in power, most of whom were either murdered by royal order or forced out of office into mandatory retirements. Abrahamian notes, “Not since the early days of Naser al-Din Shah had fallen statesmen been treated in such arbitrary fashion.”

Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, the central figure in the first half of my narrative, had been portrayed by various contemporary observers as “a phenomenal genius,” “the Persian wizard of the age,” “the almighty Minister of the Court,” “the demigod of the new regime,” “the shah’s alter ego,” “striking, sharp and cultured,” “forceful, quick-witted [with] presence of mind,” and “a man of exceptional ability, intelligence, European-style finesse [with] Napoleonic self-confidence, ruthlessness, and despotic cruelty.”

The American foreign minister to Iran between 1930 and 1933, Charles Calmer Hart, held his Iranian counterpart in high esteem: “Few men in history, I would say, have stamped their personalities so indelibly on the politics of any country. After my first few meetings with him I began to suspect that his brilliancy had the elements of madness [sic.]”

Teymurtash was an exceptionally handsome man, too, who possessed a refined sense of taste. In the context of the 1920s, his good looks, like his “European-style finesse,” provided him with an advantage with his European and Iranian colleagues. The cultural regime conceived and institutionalized by the SNH was exteriorized not only in the aesthetic choices in monuments, but also in the personal demeanor of its prominent members. For instance, Teymurtash remains the only Iranian political figure who attended the 1931 International Exposition of Paris. During his two-day stay in France on November 10 and 11, he made a special request to the French Republic to “organize a visit” to the “l’Exposition Coloniale.”

After escorting the court minister through the fair, the general commissariat of the Exposition arranged a fancy lunch on the grounds of the fair, overlooking the Eiffel Tower. On his way back via Moscow, Teymurtash also made sure not to miss the Lenin Museum.

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242 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 151.
243 See various diplomatic reports and personal descriptions.
244 US State Department Records, Hart, “Teymourtache Dismissed and great was the Fall Thereof,” dispatch 1310, 891.44 Teymourtache, Abdol K.K./1, December 29, 1932.
245 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1930-1940, Iran 87, Microfilm E373-2, 58, M. Gallois, November 6, 1931, Paris.
246 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1930-1940, Iran 87, Microfilm E373-2, 58, M. Gallois, November 6, 1931, Paris. And Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1930-1940, Iran 87, Microfilm E363-2, 67, January 19, 1932, Moscow newspaper clippings. Teymurtash had only a few selected friends.
Despite his unrivaled power in the Iranian society, however, Teymurtash was dismissed and arrested on December 22, 1932. He was accused of fraud, accepting bribes, and embezzling public funds during his phony trial in March. After a violent beating by the shah, the court minister died in prison exactly one year before the opening day of Ferdawsi’s conference and was buried on October 5, 1933, ironically, at Shah Abd al-Azim Shrine in Ray. 247 The next day, Byron wrote in his diary, “He might well have been kicked to death in public. [Reza Shah] rules this country by fear, and the ultimate fear is that of the royal boot.” 248 Hart noted, “Persia has lost, at least for the time being, its one true statesman.” 249 Years after his death, various diplomatic letters still referred to Teymurtash’s role in Iran’s modernization: “If we consider the abstraction ‘Iran’ in 1937 we must admit the claim that ‘she’ has, in comparison with ‘her’ situation ten years ago, made remarkable progress – the more remarkable in that it is, since the death of Teymourtache, the work of one man.” 250 He was alone neither in his services to the state nor his dreadful end. Others met the same fate.

The fall of Teymurtash was suggestive of the group’s deterioration, after which, the rest began to lose their posts one after the other. The “well-bred” Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh who had initiated the idea of celebrating Ferdawsi’s millenary anniversary, “suffered from the same

and guarded his personal life with great secrecy; Reza Shah was not one of them. “There is no record of Teimurtash having been invited to Reza Khan’s home in the evenings or having a fixed day for meetings. Teimurtash had his own circle of intimates with whom he spent most evenings.” Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 383. He married Tatiana, an Armenian, and named their daughter, Iran: the land of the Aryans. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction D’Afrique Levant 882, Iran 23, IN-2-3. Letter 1313/SP of November 16, 1964, Paris. His favorite daughter, Iran Teymurtash was nominated as the attache to the French embassy of Iran in particular to take care of the “petroleum affair.” According to the 1313 letter, Iran Teymurtash had entered France in 1949 and had obtained a residency card on October 13, 1963. After the murder of Teymurtash, the family was pressured to leave the country in the 1930s and 1940s. For a discussion on Teymurtash’s fall, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions, 153; A. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: the Pahlavis and After (London, 2003), 57-89; “The Rise and Fall of Teymourtache,” Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society 21/1 (1934): 93. 247 It was ironic that a modern reformist like Teymurtash was buried at Shah Abd al-Azim because, for the Qajar kings, it had served as the place to ‘cleanse’ from Western ‘contamination’ after return from European trips before returning to the royal palace in Tehran. One of the individuals who pleaded for Teymurtash’s life was the crown prince, Mohammad Reza, who was studying in Switzerland at the time. Davar had gone to see the prince after which he had sent a telegram to Reza Shah to spare the minister’s life. The message fell on deaf ears.

248 Byron, Road to Oxiana, 54. My emphasis.
249 US State Department Records, Hart, “Teymourtache Dismissed and great was the Fall Thereof,” dispatch 1310, 891.44 Teymourtache, Abdol K.K./1, December 29, 1932.
250 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1905/1095/34, Annual Report 1937, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 425. Teymurtash’s post remained empty for most of the 1930s; it was finally occupied by Khorasan’s former-Governor Mirza Mahmud Khan Jam in January 1939, who had been involved in the Ferdawsi project. Iran would not see such a unique mind in the 20th century and the position of the court minister would remain a symbolic post rather than the one with unlimited powers when held by Teymurtash.
persecution due to bold statements he made." Fired in September 1933 from his post of Majlis speaker, he was re-employed and sent to France as Iran’s foreign minister. Appointed representative at the Congress of Orientalists at Rome, he published an article in the official journal of the Ministry of Public Instructions, wherein he indicated that the revision of the Persian language “must proceed gradually and without the use of force.” This not only had “annoyed the Shah and caused the suppression of the paper,” but also Taqizadeh’s recall from Paris in August 1934. Well aware of the consequences of his return to Tehran, Taqizadeh “obtained prolonged leave of absence and did not return to Persia.” The British correctly concluded, “his return to Iran under the Pahlavi regime seems unlikely.”

During the following year, the SNH’s first director and the shah’s prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi, “resigned without warning on the 3rd December, ostensibly for reasons of health,” according to British reports. In the same report, appeared the name of the former prime minister and the Society’s foremost scholar, Hasan Pirnia in the obituary section. Forughi’s public resignation, however, proved insufficient for by the following January, he was arrested for having disagreed “with the Shah’s policy of inducing women to leave off wearing the veil.” In the same year, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, who had signed the historic 1927 Archeological Treaty with the French, was also arrested. While at the time the British reported that “no details as to the causes of [the] arrest [is] known,” Abrahamian explains that Tadayyon “was thrown out of the cabinet into jail when he complained that the budget allocated too little to

251 US State Department Records, Hart, dispatch 867, 891.00/1532, September 23, 1931; quoted in Majd, M. Gh. Great Britain and Reza Shah (Florida, 2001), 205.
254 “Mahmud Jam (Mudir-ul-Mulk) was appointed by the Shah to succeed him on the following day.” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1147/1147/34, Annual Report 1935, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 169.
255 Pirnia’s political alienation was one of the first because not only was he the most intelligent and serious among all these men, but also he had been instrumental in 1919 to Iran’s political independence from Britain. By the time of Reza Shah’s coronation, Pirnia was coerced into mandatory retirement. Subsequently, he withdrew from the public scene to focus on his scholarship. British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1147/1147/34, Annual Report 1935, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 170.
256 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1972/1732/34, Report on Leading Personalities in Persia 1937, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 391. In the 1937 Personalities Report it was clarified that “the real reason was probably traceable to the fact that his daughter had married the son of Muhammad Vali Asadi, keeper of the shrine at Meshed, who was later made the scapegoat for the massacres in the Meshed shrine and executed.” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 477/182/34, G. D. Pybus, January 27, 1936, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 197.
his Education Ministry and too much to the War Ministry.\textsuperscript{257} He, like Taqizadeh and Forugh before him, had come to realize that the methods to implement their secular reforms were often too cruel on the short term and too ineffective on the long one. Once firm advocates of political and cultural reforms, they were blamed for not having achieved enough reform. Therefore, when the king's push for further modernization came to be perceived by these men as sheer despotism, they began to look back on Naser al-Din Qajar's rule "with fascination...in stark contrast to the image of a blunt and uncompromising" Reza Shah.\textsuperscript{258}

In 1937, the SNH lost three more of its members to the persecutions. On February 9, the shah's gifted justice minister and the SNH's finance wizard, Ali Akbar Davar, committed suicide. His final letter to his monarch not only accused Reza Shah of despotism, but also explained the cause of his suicide as "exhaustion." British diplomats noted, "officially he died of heart failure, but he is known to have had a sharp interview with the Shah the night before." They never mended their rift. "He was found dead next morning, having taken heavy doses of opium... One way or another, he was driven to death by a task-master who insisted on an ever-increasing supply of funds to finance a programme that the resources of the country are, by all sober estimates, insufficient to meet the pace demanded."\textsuperscript{259} A few months later, charged with the conspiracy to overthrow the king, Davar's close colleague, Firuz Mirza Firuz, was arrested; "his offence being, apparently, that he had lunched with the French Charge d'Affaires while relations with France were very strained as the result of articles in the French press regarded by the Shah as insulting."\textsuperscript{260} He died in suspicious circumstances; there were rumors that Firuz had been executed, "but," the British maintained, "no confirmation of this has been obtained." When his name appeared for the last time in British papers in February 1938, it was entered under the obituary, "the actual date and cause of his death are not known." In August of the same year, Ali

\textsuperscript{259} British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 1905/1095/34, Annual Report 1937, Tehran; see Burrell, \textit{Iran Political Diaries}, 10: 1935-1938, 476. He in fact, had "worked until late the night before on official dossiers," then taken a "massive dose of opium." Cottam, R. \textit{Nationalism in Iran} (Pittsburgh, 1979), 177.
\textsuperscript{260} British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 672/167/34, G. D. Pybus, February 4, 1938, Tehran; see Burrell, \textit{Iran Political Diaries}, 10: 1935-1938, 489. Firuz's Qajar lineage and ownership of vast lands in Fars, as well as his known Anglophilia, were all very good excuses for his elimination; see Ansari, \textit{Iran since 1921}, 51.
Asghar Hekmat was fired from his post of minister because of an appreciative telegram to the French Ministry of Public Instructions in regards to an exhibition of Persian Art at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Reza Shah, however, had found the exhibit “savoring too much of the old Persia and too little of the new Iran.” According to contemporary observers, Hekmat had made the mistake of privileging “competence” over “obedience.”

By the closing of Reza Shah’s ruling era, only a few of the original members of the SNH were either alive or in office. Zoroastrian parliamentarian Keikhosraw Shahrokh, whose corpse was found in the street on July 3, 1940, was not one of them. While the press dismissed it as a stroke, British diplomats commented that the “local police” had a hand in it. “Just a few days earlier, his son Bahram, in a Persian language broadcast for Berlin, had warned that rulers of those countries which did not cooperate with Germany would soon be wandering about homeless.” Two years later, when Tehran’s Zoroastrian anjoman (Society) paid a tribute to Shahrokh with the inauguration of “his aramgah and the jashan (thanksgiving ceremony),” the anjoman’s president maintained, “one of the best and worthiest sons of Iran, to remember someone who dedicated his entire life to the upliftment and glory of the Zoroastrian community and served our Iran.” Then he asked his audience whether “anyone would not mention Shahrokh’s name while visiting Ferdowsieh.” Had Shahrokh lived longer, the neo-Achaemenid style of the 1930s might have been more than a cursory phase in Iran’s modern architectural history. It could have become a serious discourse on and off architecture, which then could have hinted at the richly hybrid socio-cultural realities of the late 19th and early 20th-century Iran.

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261 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 2586/2586/34, Annual Report 1938, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 671. The temporary fall of Hekmat was particularly harsh for British “cultural propaganda” because he had been an advocate of English educational and cultural influence. His dismissal was noted as “a misfortune” for “Mr. Hikmat had always shown himself helpful and anxious to promote English studies and willing, within the narrow limits possible in Iran, to take decisions on his own responsibility.” British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 2586/2586/34, Annual Report 1938, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 10: 1935-1938, 660. By the closing of the decade, however, he was promoted as Minister of Interior. He continued his varied posts after World War II, for a while, becoming the president of the Iranian delegation to UNESCO. See Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1944-1955, Iran 40, Relations Culturelles E45-1, 021, October 4, 1946, Tehran. From French Ambassador to Iran, Pierre Lafond, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hekmat’s brother, Nezam-al din Hekmat, was also a prominent Pahlavi figure, when he died in January 1937 Etela’ at published his obituary on the front-page; see Etela’ at 3029 (Tehran, Bahman 2, 1315/January 22, 1937): 1.

262 Most historians agree that he was assassinated by the police who acted under the order of the shah because Shahrokh’s son had made pro-Nazi speeches against his father’s wishes. See Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions, 163; and Sanasarian, Religious Minorities, 49. “[I]t was believed in Tehran that the local police had murdered the father as a measure of reprisal against the son.” Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 198.

263 The event took place on September 18, 1942 by the Society’s president Arbab Rostam Guiv; see Sh. Shahrokh and R. Writer, The Memoirs of Keikhosrow Shahrokh (Lewiston, 1994), 188.

264 Shahrokh, Memoirs, 191.
century Iran. With Shahrokh’s death, too, was lost the vital cultural link between the Parsis of British India and the Zoroastrians of Pahlavi Iran.

Nor were the purges confined to the political reformists. With the demise of his Iranian supporters, especially Firuz Mirza, Ernest Herzfeld lost his prominence among the cultural community of Tehran. In order to supervise the excavations at Persepolis as Chicago University’s director of the archaeological expedition of the Oriental Institute, Herzfeld had moved from Tehran to Fars in spring 1931. Soon, “friction with Iranian officials developed” forcing him to resign and permanently leave Iran in 1934.265 Unlike Herzfeld, however, Maxime Siroux left Iran exactly as he had entered it: without “making too much dust.”266 When Iran celebrated “the anniversary of her liberation by Reza Shah the Great, Founder of modern Iran, the means to evolution and progress,” Le Journal de Téhéran published an issue with the king’s famous photo on the trans-Iranian railway, looking at his watch.267 Next to the main article, entitled “The Man Who Made Iran,” appeared Siroux’s obituary. Crowned by a Greek cross, it read, “Madame Maxime Siroux, his spouse, and the entire family are saddened to share the passing of Monsieur Maxime Siroux, architect d.p.l.g., Iranologue, Honorary Professor of Tehran University, Chevalier de la Legion d’Honneur, Officer of the Order of Public Health, on 26 January 1975 at the age of 67. Ville d’Avray, France.”268 The juxtaposition of the article and the obituary was quite symbolic for so much of “modern Iran” was physically “made” by men like Siroux whose work would be mostly forgotten by the general public and historians alike – except perhaps in places like Hafezieh.

Reza Shah’s “fanatic neutrality” did not dissuade British and Soviet troops to invade Iran on August 25, 1941.269 Exactly twenty-two days later, he was forced to abdicate the throne in favor of his son. In his final speech to the Iranian parliament, one thing was true; “I am leaving the country soon, and must say something that you should know. No one has ever had any appreciation from me for his services and no one was ever thanked or rewarded by me, although

265 He first moved to London and then to Princeton University as professor in the School of Humanistic Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study. He died in January 1948; see Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur Sackler Gallery Archives, Catalogue of the Herzfeld Archive (Washington D.C., 2000), 11.
269 British Minister of the Foreign Office, E 3373/216/34, H. J. Underwood, April 29, 1939, Tehran; see Burrell, Iran Political Diaries, 11: 1939-1942, 44.
some excellent services were rendered."270 A man who had fervently unearthed and interred so many in Iran – Karim Khan, Omar Khayyam, Ferdawsí, and Hafez – now was forced out of that land, destined to die in exile. Ironically, soon after his departure, people began to murmur, "If the Shah should die, his subjects would be so happy that they would forget to bury him."271

These men, who termed the theoretical plans of their late Qajar predecessors into practical operations, had a vision that combined with power made them invincible, at least for a while. These and such men have been described by historians as "high modernists," who as the leaders of "an authoritarian state that [was] willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernists designs into being."272 What made their project possible was "a prostrate civil society that lacked the capacity to resist these plans."273 It would not be an exaggeration to say that within he Iranian context, the inter-war period was the making of these modernists, who sought not only to secularize, but also historicize Islam in what was hoped to become New Iran. Like most modern reformists of the 1920s and 1930s, they made a good use of architecture. Ferdawsí’s mausoleum remains the most fantastic of the structures that were erected by the SNH; Hafezieh is its most successful metamorphosis. These modern tombs epitomized all that was clever and idealistic about these early Iranian modernists who (wholeheartedly) believed in not only its (utopian) promise, but also in their own (precarious) invincibility. The elite, who buttressed Reza Shah’s royal power and image, were the real players in the politics of nationalism and modernity through representation. Like the edifices that they erected, always seemingly monumental but desperately fragile, there existed a play between what was publicly known and what was hidden about the expulsion of these men. Just like the supposed discovery of Ferdawsí’s grave and the covert destruction of graves around Hafez’s, politics of representation was one of, if not the central, concern. Men who had worked to glorify various national heroes, who had wanted to mend historic mistakes and to give burial “worthy” of them, now found themselves in oblivion. They had, in effect, perfected a system from which even they were not immune (Fig. 4.37).

270 Quoted in Ansari, Iran since 1921, 73; and Wilbur, Reza Shah, 207-208.
271 Quoted in Ansari, Iran since 1921, 73.
272 For more detail and definition of Scott’s “High modernism,” see chapter 3 in this study. J. Scott, Seeing like a State (New Haven, 1998), 5.
273 Scott, Seeing like a State, 5.
In architectural culture, the fall of these early modernists ended the revivalistic style, along with the unquestioned faith in modernity. From then onward, the amalgam of cultural revivalism and modernization, not only as an ideological but also as an aesthetic movement, began to decline. The absence of such men, and doubtless a potential number of women, from the cultural stage was conspicuously discernible in the mediocrity of subsequent artifacts and ceremonies, as will be noted in coming chapters. With their passing, Iranian official architecture took a fundamentally different form. It, in addition, began to serve a different function. The first two SNH’s architectural projects were signs of their time – objects that embodied their epoch and signaled the arrival of a new era, perhaps that of the permanent existence of the tension between the construct of modernity and tradition in Pahlavi Iran. As a perfect example of selected history, one single grave was privileged over hundreds of others; historically layered tombs were cleaned out, eliminated to make way for the enhancement of a single hero. In Ferdawsiyeh, a perfect example of invented tradition, a lost grave became the nation’s semiotic, etymological, and historical exactitude. These etymological and historical inexactitudes were made exact in architecture. Both lend themselves to aesthetic and morphological systemacit; the first was meant to embody the rebirth of an ancient Aryan nation, the second that which would sustain it on the long run, i.e. Oriental exoticism feeding Iran’s vast tourist industry.

Without Teymurtash, Firuz, and Davar “to coordinate and check developments,” most historians agree, “policies were administered with even more haste and the cult of personality was emphasized with increased vigor.” Without them, too, went the SNH. Not only the fall of these intellectual and political reformists would alter the way (high) culture was perceived, but also the very discourse on notions about (good) taste would begin to manifest differently. These men, more lastingly, managed to set up the institutional structures of modern Iran, which despite cosmetic modifications would remain unchanged to the present. The SNH was the prevailing model of such institutions. While the success of the 1927 Archeological Treaty, the projects of Ferdawsiyeh and Hafezieh depended on often spontaneous and zealous, but unsystematic, effort of individuals, later projects undertaken by the SNH were implemented based on institutional development. For instance, the construction and administration processes of Ibn Sina’s

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274 Ansari, Iran since 1921, 59.
275 The seemingly “different” Islamic Republic of is, structurally, the same centralized nation-state ordered by these few, but highly skillful, men. “The state created and developed by Reza Shah and his supporter remains, with minor modifications, the modern Iranian state.” Ansari, Iran since 1921, 2.
mausoleum in 1948 signaled the institutionalization of the Society within the larger structure of the Iranian modern state. No more the success or failures of individual projects so desperately would depend on individual men, often temporarily in power. Nor would commissions go to those who curry favors from men in power. Rather, such favors would become an integral aspect of the proper processes of the institution. Ibn Sina’s modern mausoleum, to be discussed in the next chapter, would be a mirror to this rather significant sociopolitical change.

The architecture of ‘inventing spots’ and preserving ‘authentic origins’ was perceived in exact opposites by the ulama. A mollah insisted in 1942, “We were afraid that Farangis [Europeans] would come and desecrate our graves, but our own government turned out to be worse than the heathen Farangis. What is left of our faith now?”

276 The destructive phase of these projects was perceived as a deliberate eradication of Iran’s religious culture. We return to the potent dilemma of an uneven modernity: “It is in the ingrained, universalistic precepts of modernity to do violence to local cultures. We should interpret ‘local’ politics based on local ‘identities’ in the ‘Third World’ as the invention of resistance against Western power, but not for this reason an anti-modern.”

277 These early reformists along with the institution that they installed (i.e. the SNH) and all the tools that they put to use (i.e. the monuments) were thoroughly modern. It was precisely by a deep knowledge and manipulation of these systems that they often resisted Western hegemony in Iran, cultural and political alike. The SNH, thus, (re)invented and (re)navigated the modern bureaucratic mores as it saw it fit for a New Iran; in that project, violence and exclusion were a priori written into its modernizing blueprint. This anxiety vibrating between what came to be labeled as ‘the traditional,’ very much in opposition to that which was, as a result, born as ‘the modern,’ was modernity itself. “The history of modernity embodies this tension.”

278 The Hosaynieh of Imam Reza Shrine came to be perceived by many westernized Iranians and Westerners alike as traditional only after Ferdawsiyeh and Hafezieh were erected as signifiers of a thoroughly modernized Iran. These spaces were meant to force a very specific public behavior. They were, first and foremost, to instruct the masses “on life along Western lines,” as Teymurtash had hoped in the early days of Pahlavi rule.

“One thing, however, does seem certain,” observed British diplomats in 1937, “the country cannot return to the conditions obtaining before the time of Reza Shah: some aspects of

276 Quoted in Ahmad Kasravi, Emruz Che Bayad Kard [Today what should be done] (Tabriz, 1942), 45.
modernisation, such as the unveiling of women, the cinema, the development of outdoor games, the improved communications, the introduction of schools on more or less modern lines, must affect the character of the nation.²⁷⁹ True, modernity along with its processes and mores, though perpetually open to negotiation, were irreversible. Still, it was an uneven modernity for when translated into architecture it was characterized by the tension between destruction and construction; not just by its hasty and rapid operations, but also by blinding utopian zeal, unprofessional indifference, and despotic inspections. It was modern, because it not only believed in, but also was conditioned by change; it was uneven, not only because it never arrived, but it also brought with it social frustrations and technical failures. In architectural expressions, it was the kind of modernity that while failed its utopian ambition, it endlessly continued to aspire to a vision of tomorrow; one that honed an image of undeniable certainty, but still at its core was imbued with doubt and ambiguity. It was modern, moreover, because it eventually gave birth to a new society; it was uneven because that society always looked back for a better future. Finally, it was an uneven modernity because its uncertain restlessness and certain eagerness were omnipresent in its monumental architecture.

This holistic vision of modernity precluded a sense of hurry: not as a mere encounter but an embrace with all its tensions, worries, and excitements. In the details of the architecture, we witness the material manifestation of these tensions – monumental structures that lack foundations, architects who would not build, and managers who would only report. It is also a story of architects designing for a future that endlessly looked back for its most authentic identity, of national monuments serving as centerpieces for international celebrations, of locals reclaiming universal rights. It was so, furthermore, because as argued in chapter 3, Iran’s rapid modernization was characterized by an “uneven development” under the Pahlavis, where the gap between socioeconomic developments – embodied in monumental projects such as Ferdawsiyeh, Hafezieh, Sa’diyeh – and political underdevelopment was often enormous.²⁸⁰ One depiction of Sa’diyeh, promptly erected in the suburb of Shiraz, for example, invokes this predicament perfectly (Fig. 4.38). The latest technology and urbanism signaled by the monumental structure served as a mere backdrop to veiled women doing laundry in the outskirts of the town. These

²⁸⁰ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 426-427.
same women would be given the right to vote and hold public office by a royal decree — that is, real venues brought about by modernization — or, worst still, would be given the simplistic option to wear or not wear the veil only in January 1963. For thirty more years, they would have to do laundry in a muddy ditch against the domineering modern background of such Pahlavi monuments. This rapid and increasingly uneven development was the depiction of Iran's modernity under Reza Shah; his propaganda architecture, its most potent parody.

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281 See P. Avery, Modern Iran (New York, 1965), 492.
282 Only on February 27, 1963 were women given, by a royal decree, the right to vote and run for office. This not necessarily because Mohammad Reza Shah believed that women were equal to men, since there are records that explicitly show that he did not. Rather because such a royal order would signal the completion of Iran's modernization processes as defined by Western standards. It was, therefore, just another signpost of modernity, mimicry of the West, rather than a genuine step towards gender equality and social welfare. See Sanasarian, Women's Rights, 79-105; and chapter 7 in this study.
Figure 4.1 Tomb of Hafez, Shiraz, 1938. 

Figure 4.2 Tomb of Shah Shuja’, Shiraz, 1965. 
Source: Ziaian, Shiraz: Colorful Dream of Pars, 96.

Figure 4.4 Ettela‘at’s publication of the image of Musalla Cemetery with Hafez’s tombstone in Shiraz and a modern resort in Nawshahr in the Caspian Sea region.
Figure 4.5 Arial view of Hafeziyeh, Shiraz, 1990s.
Source: Ziaian, Shiraz: Colorful Dream of Pars, 67.
Figure 4.6 Map of Shiraz with the location of the Quran gate, Hafeziyeh, Sa'dieh, and downtown Shiraz, 1960. Source: Emdad, Asar-e Tarikhi-ye Fars, map.
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Source: Center for the Study and Publication of Political Culture of the Pahlavi Era, Reza Shah the Great: Royal Travelogue (Tehran, 1971), 64 and chapter 8 images.
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Source: Ziaian, Shiraz: the Colorful Dream of Pars, 19.

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Source: Firuz Mirza Firuz private album, provided by his son, Shahrokh Firuz.

Figure 4.38 Women doing laundry in the oasis outside Shiraz, in the background new mausoleum of Sa’di, late 1960s. Source: Sane, Be Yadeh Shiraz, 131.
V. MODERNITY DISPLAYED:
Ibn Sina’s Mausoleum

“The Architecte is purely a technological and aesthetic publication, which cannot and
does not wish to have the slightest involvement with the world of politics.”¹

Editor Iraj Moshiri
Architecte, 1946

Between the completion of Hafeziyeh in 1938 and December 13, 1944 when the Society
for National Heritage re-launched its activities, the political realities of Iran had altered radically.
Reza Shah’s abdication and exile to Johannesburg initiated the reign of his son in September
1941.² In contrast to his father, the young Mohammad Reza Shah was a man acculturated “along
Western lines,” according to the parameters that the early Pahlavi elite had envisioned for the
modern monarch of the new nation-state.³ It came as little surprise, for instance, when in 1949,
he telegraphed his prime minister the following royal command: “Considering the historic
importance of the objects excavated at ‘zavieh,’ it is necessary to purchase all of them as
instructed by the court ministry.” Signed, “Shah.”⁴ With this, too, began a new era for the SNH.

The first major change in the workings of the SNH consisted of its re-establishment as a
legitimate organization. By this time, while the SNH’s former director, Mohammad Ali Forughi,
had been pivotal to the smooth transference of power from Reza to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, his
involvement with the Society seems to have been at its end (Fig. 5.1). Years later, the second

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¹ I. Moshiri, ed., Architecte 1 (August/September 1946): 1. The Architecte was the first professional journal for
architects that appeared in Iran. Its first editorial made it clear that the publication has no intention to get involved in
politics in any form or shape, hence denied the implicit relation between architecture and political power in modern
Iran.
² In 1972, the collection of the SNH’s old publications noted that “after Ferdawsi’s aramgah” the Society was
“closed down (t’atil gardid) and on 22 Azar 1323 [13 December 1944] was reorganized and continued its national
services.” Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu’a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old
publications of the SNH] (Tehran, 1972), 235. Secondary sources provided a slightly different date for the
reopening of the SNH: “In 1934, following the celebrations of the millennial anniversary of Ferdawsi and the
unveiling of his mausoleum at Tus, SNH was suspended by Reza Shah, only to resume work in 1943.” K. Abdi,
51-76, 57.
³ Mohammad Reza was sent to Le Rosey School in Rolle, Switzerland to get a comprehensive upbringing of an heir
apparent.
Pahlavi monarch would describe him as “My able and scholarly…Prime Minister.” It was instead the initiative of younger men, like Isa Sadiq, that re-launched the SNH’s activities who wrote, “For the glorification of the nation’s [Great] Masters, in 1323 [1944] by the leadership of the author, [the anjoman] was established anew under the custodianship of which a number of aramgahs were built…” Accordingly, the first meeting took place on December 3 by Sadiq’s invitation of the new members of the SNH to his residence as he himself had been invited by Reza Shah’s court minister, Teymurtash in 1922. As then, the group consisted of Iran’s contemporary political, and to some extent intellectual, elite. They included, the “former court doctor” who would become prime minister for a brief period in 1945, Ebrahim Hakimi; Allayar Saleh, “a young judge from the Iran party” who would be offered the post of justice minister in Ahmad Qavam’s 1946 government and who would prove himself “one of the last stands on behalf of the Assembly during the period after Musaddiq’s fall when, from 1953 to May 1961” democratic institutions were being stepped on; the young shah’s court and, in 1951 would-be prime minister, Hosayn Ala; the “highly religious elder statesmen trusted by the ‘ulama,” Baqer Kazemi who would become the foreign minister in Mosaddeq’s 1953 cabinet; Mohammad Reza Shah’s army general, Amanollah Jahanbani; the “veteran royalist,” Hasan Esfandiari who would be elected to the Senate in 1950; the then minister of culture, Ali Reza Qaragozlu; Hosayn Samai’i, Qasem Ghani, Mohammad Qazvini; as well as old veterans of the SNH and the Pahlavi ranks such as Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Isa Sadiq, Ali Asghar Hekmat, and André Godard.

The Society’s next meetings, held on December 10 and 17, 1944, resulted in the election of the Board of Trustees and the rewriting of the first by-laws with little modifications. There
was, however, one major amendment. The new law handed the Society over to the Pahlavi state. The *Karnameh* noted that the SNH's 11th article from the 1922 by-laws had compelled such a move.

**Article 11** – After the establishment of the [archeological] museum and the [national] library, the employment of experts for the management of these institutions, the recording of the patrimony and historic buildings, and the tabulation of the collection of books and the fine arts of the country, the SNH will hand over these institutions to the antiquity branch of the Ministry of Public Instruction (*vezarat-e ma'aref, owqaf, va sanaye'-e mostazrafeh*). The Society will continue with its activities in connection with the preservation and completion of these institutions as a special consultant.

According to the *Karnameh*'s inaccurate and contradictory account, the causes of this change were purely legislative and financial. When the Ministry of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts was branched into the two separate ministries of Education and Culture, the Society’s responsibilities were delegated to the latter. While this hinted at the bureaucratization of state structures and the SNH’s loss of independence, the second generation SNH would initiate its “national service” with the construction of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum.

Abu al-Hosayn Ibn Abdollah Ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna, was born in 980 AD in Bukhara, present-day Uzbekistan and died in 1037 in Hamadan, Iran. He was a physician, one of the most influential of the philosopher-scientists of Islam. He is particularly noted for his contribution to the fields of Aristotelian philosophy and medicine. He composed both the *Kitab Ash-Shifa* – The Book of Healing, a vast philosophical and scientific encyclopedia – and the Canon of Medicine, eminent in the history of the field. Hodgson describes Ibn Sina as “Faylasuf (philosopher) synthesizing Hellenistic and Prophetic sources for knowledge, casting Falsafah


13 See Appendix 1 and SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 63-64. The SNH was to hand over these institutions to the antiquity branch of the Ministry of Education, Endowment and Fine Arts (*vezarat-e ma'aref, owqaf, va sanaye'-e mostazrafeh*). This was later to branch into Ministry of Education and Cultivation (*vezarat-e amuzesh va parvaresh*) and the Ministry of Culture and Art (*vezarat-e farhang va honar*).

14 The *Karnameh* also adds the following rather contradictory and inaccurate details: “After the 1000th [anniversary] of Ferdawi's, the *anjoman* had no activity because in reality it had no income until 1323. After the construction of [Ferdawi's] tomb and [the organization of] the conference and inauguration, the SNH had no activity because [its] president [Mohammad Ali] Forughi had retried in Azar 1314. It was [also] discovered that after the inauguration [of Ferdawisheh], three of the founding members of the SNH – Forughi, Pirnia, [and] Shahrokh – had passed away. [Seyyed Hasan] Taqizadeh and [Hosayn] Ala were, [furthermore], not in Iran, they were serving as ambassadors to England and the US.” SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 65.
positions into Islamic terms, vizier." For Western observers, "Avicenna was among the very greatest of the many illustrious sons of Iran, and by carrying on and developing the science of Hippocrates and Galen and the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato he exercised an influence on the best brains of both the East and the West..." For the Pahlavi state, Ibn Sina’s important rested on his scientific background, while his resting-place would prove to be the best occasion to politicize Ibn Sina’s (re)presentation into modern systems of thought and knowledge.

Once restored in 1877 by the patronage of Fath Ali Shah’s granddaughter, Negar Khanum, Ibn Sina’s mausoleum went through a complete rebuilding on the occasion of his fabricated millenary anniversary in 1949. The Beaux-Arts trained Iranian architect, Houshang Seyhoun, was selected during a nationwide competition to erect a modern structure in the place of an existing tomb-chamber. He would secure most of the SNH’s projects in the years to come, himself becoming the semi-official architect of the Society. Completed in 1952, Seyhoun’s proposal for Ibn Sina’s mausoleum – a “Franco-Persian” emulation of the 11th-century tower of Qabus – would represent not only the rapidly institutionalized nature of the SNH, but also, in terms of style, the uneasy tension between imported ideas from the Beaux-Arts and those borrowed from the architectural history of medieval Iran (Fig. 5.2). In politics, however, it would hint at the determination of the young king to usher in a renewed vision of modern Iran.

The sociopolitical period traced in this chapter was first characterized by political pluralism and then a royal monopoly over the workings of culture as well as politics in Iranian society. This shift was reflected in both the SNH’s operations and Ibn Sina’s project. Since the Allied invasion of Iran had “washed away two of the three pillars that had supported Reza Shah’s regime: the bureaucracy and the court patronage,” in his attempt to regain power and prestige, the new king first made “as many friends as possible” and then induced them into his sphere of

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power. He appealed to the different social forces, including especially the masses, with the public image of a benevolent sovereign, whose reign would be different from his precursor, for while “Reza Shah’s style was coercion; his son’s was co-operation.” Therefore, whilst during 1941-1951 power was “diffuse and plural, emanating from diverse localities” and was later described as “the only extensive period in recent history in which Iran...enjoyed an open political system,” in the critical years 1951-1953, the young shah’s unconsolidated power was directly challenged by his populist and nationalist prime minister, Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq, who advocated the symbolic role of a constitutional monarch, nationalized Iran’s oil industry, and pushed for “antimilitarism, constitutionalism, and political liberalism.” The anti-Mosaddeq coup d’état, orchestrated by the shah’s royalist officers and financed by the CIA on August 19, 1953, would prove to be the beginning of Mohammad Reza Shah’s hold on Iranian structures of power, including especially the domain of culture and representation. The erection of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum would allude to the monarch’s enduring commitment to the nationalistic agendas of his father, which not only invested on the glories of Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, but also emphasized its Aryan genesis through a meticulous culture of display; the inauguration of the complex in April 1954, a chance for the young sovereign to publicly reaffirm his political power on these same merits.

It is also here that one has to look for the bureaucratization of state institutions such as the SNH, in addition to the usurpation of high art by royal hands, prophesying the workings of art in politics in much of the 1960s and 1970s. The very fact that Seyhoun’s monopoly over the SNH’s commissions would not end with Ibn Sina’s tomb was indicative of the institutionalization of the Society’s decision-making procedures. This shift also reflected the larger bureaucratic reality of Iran. Unlike his father’s political and cultural elite, that of Mohammad Reza Shah’s was neither inventing a modern nation-state nor polishing Iran’s

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18 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 178 and 176.
21 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 531.
22 Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 189.
23 See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 278-279.
24 In those days and after, architecture and politics met on far intimate grounds. The well-known architectural historian, Donald N. Wilber, was also one of the “covert designers” of the 1953 coup; he was a CIA agent who operated in Iran between 1948 and 1970; see Abdi, “Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran,” 66.
"uneven development." They were, rather, standardizing an existing modern state. By the late 1950s, for instance, just as the so-called "Theological Corps" and "Women’s right to vote" of the shah’s White Revolution, which aimed at appropriating both the ulama and the women’s rights movement into the political mainstream and hence controlling the little power they had left, the administration of the SNH under the authority of the Cultural Ministry was also a way to maintain hegemony over the Society’s activities, policies, and evolution thereafter. This was no more an anjoman – a collective of zealous nationalists, visionary intellectuals, and ambitious politicians as had been Teymurtash, Pirnia, Foroughi senior, Firuz Mirza, or Shahrokh in the 1920s and 1930s. The SNH of the 1950s and 1960s consisted of mostly bureaucrats and technocrats, men trained to follow instructions; ones who would get the job done, by and large, on time and adequately. But it was the early reformists and their despot who had brought this change where “[i]n place of an education which had produced a few sagacious men nicely adjusted to their society, men of the caliber of Mushir’d-Daulah [Hasan Pirnia] and Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh [sic.],” whose activities in and out of the SNH have been explained in the previous chapters, “came a system which produced many superficially educated people, maladjusted and filled with undigested facts which they were incapable of applying in everyday life.” Certainly, the utopian moment had come and gone. Men like older Sadiq, Foroughi junior, and Seyhoun, although still nationalists, neither held the optimistic promise of the Constitutional Revolution nor the power to do much about it. By then, one thing was indisputable: the second generation of the SNH was not remaking a nation; nor was it refiguring its parameters and image. These men were merely maintaining the status quo. That second age would be symbolized by the mausoleum complex of Ibn Sina.

25 “...It is the 1956-1958 period to which one must look for the seeds of the development that can be characterized as the bureaucratization of power in the 1960's-1970's.” Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany, 1980), 90.
26 On “uneven development” in Iran and its revolutionary consequences, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 426-427. Also, see its use in this study in chapter 3.
27 Avery, Modern Iran, 480.
28 Different organizations advocating women’s rights in Iran would follow a similar development under Mohammad Reza Shah. “While Reza Shah had coerced activist women into the government, his son encouraged organizational co-option whereby all women would come under a central institution for women. Although women’s organizations were not declared illegal, they had to accept and join the High Council to acquire legitimacy.” The social pattern and inner dynamics of both the SNH and women’s organizations seem to be very alike. While in the 1920s, the leaders of the latter were genuine feminists, blind to class differences, in the 1950s “upper-class women [...] involved in the High Council [...] saw this as an opportunity to keep themselves busy and to gain social status.” Identical to the members of the SNH in the 1950s, “such upper-class women lacked the imagination, courage, and egalitarian idealism of the nonestablishment counterparts of the 1920s.” Sanasarian, Women’s Rights, 81.
In his Index of historic monuments, German archeologist Ernest Herzfeld tabulated the following edifices in Hamadan as having historical and architectural merits: “1) Ganj-Nameh, 2) Hamadan’s Lion, 3) Gombad-e Alavian, and 4) Tomb of Esther, each with a paragraph of explanation. At the end of this list, he added, “5) Tomb (qabr) of Bu Ali Sina” without further clarifications. In his photographic collection, Herzfeld also documented the structure under the title “Hamadan, Tomb of Avicenna, near Tomb of Esther,” which depicted the former “brick structure” outshined by the latter in the outskirts of the town (Fig 5.3). However, when two years after Ferdawsiyeh’s inauguration, in December 1936, the royalist Ettela’at daily announced the “the Royal Government” had initiated “the Ibn Sina Celebrations,” Herzfeld’s index was deemed null and void, and a decision was made by the SNH to demolish the historic structure, and in its place, “start everything over again.”

The architecture of the project would certainly be in keeping with the state’s political claim that “this undertaking makes Iran and Iranians proud...” Le Jounzal de Teheran published a follow-up article in which it commented, “the most celebrated historic monument” in Hamadan “is the mausoleum of Avicenna...sober architecture void of any ornamentation.”

While the SNH was planning a new mausoleum and renewed celebrations, the French authorities were keeping a close eye on the upcoming sequel to the “Ferdawsi Celebrations,” because they, as their colonial rivals, knew that such cultural undertakings could again be used as diplomatic tools to win the hearts of their Iranian counterparts. “Given the importance that...the Iranian government attach[es] to such expressions,” reported French Minister Albert Bodard, “the organization of a seminar by French savants of oriental civilization on the occasion of

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29 See Society for National Heritage 1, Fehrest Mokhtasar az Asar va Ebnī-yē Tarikhī-yē Iran [Brief inventory of the historical heritage and edifices of Iran] (Tehran, 1925), 33.
30 Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape,” 1: 47.
31 British Minister of the Foreign Office, OF 371, 12293/E3909 Clive reporting on Court Minister Teymourtash, August 26, 1927, Tehran.
Avicenna’s celebration in Tehran would have a favorable effect.” Such an act, Bodard further insisted, would constitute an “important manifestation aimed at straightening the cultural ties between France and Iran.” The memo attested not only to the rivalry of the Great Powers in the Orient, but also to the national assertions of various non-western nations. It seems that modern perceptions about Ibn Sina – like those of the 13th-century Sufi Jalal al-Din Rumi – were the subject of contestation between Kemalists and Iranian nationalists:

Mr. Hekmat, following the momentum generated by the Ferdawsi celebrations in 1934, misses no opportunity to exhibit the importance that the government attaches to the glory of national literature. Next year, the minister is proposing to commemorate the 900th anniversary of the death of Ibn Sina...these celebrations involve a national self-love (amour-propre national). In fact, the Turks, based on the [ethnic] origin of Avicenna, annex a literary patrimony for their own country. This pretension is unsubstantiated. The famous philosopher has in effect written in Arabic and Persian. It is probable that Turkish was a foreign language [to him].

In the case of Ibn Sina, the Iranians outdid the Turks mainly because the grave of the historic figure happened to be located within the borders of Pahlavi Iran. A historic dispute would be mended on the basis of the geopolitics of architecture. A decade later, the construction of Nader Shah’s mausoleum in Mashhad occasioned yet another political controversy, this time, with the government of India. Hekmat who had been sent to New Delhi as Iran’s ambassador, on hearing about the project dispatched a letter to the SNH requesting its immediate abandonment. “When the letter was read, Ebrahim Hakimi, who could not hear well, asked Hosayn Ala seated next to him, ‘what is going on?’” Ala explained, “Hekmat is requesting the SNH not to build” Nader’s tomb because “we have good relations with India and they will be offended.” Hakimi’s reaction, Seyhoun vividly remembers, was loud and brief: “Will it offend them? To hell with them! (jahanam).” That was the end of that. Nationalists of the new nations and old colonial rivals

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34 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie 1918-1929, Perse 129, Instruction publique, E387-1, 214-215, August 6, 1937, Teheran. The memo was from French Minister in Iran Albert Bodard to French Foreign Affairs Minister in Paris.
36 “Seyhoun: Let me tell you a story. During the construction of the new [Nader’s tomb], Hekmat, with whom I had a very bad relationship, had become the ambassador of Iran to India. And Hekmat always wanted to have a direct saying in the things that needed to be done so that his name would be associated with the project. For Bu Ali project, he went and found an aye from the Koran that had ‘Hekmat’ in it and was inscribed on the monument. At that time, he did not agree that an aramgah should be built by the SNH for Nader. He wrote a letter to me from India arguing that since Indians do not have a good relation with Nader [Shah, who looted the Subcontinent in his 1738-1739 campaign], he wishes that this work [i.e. the construction of the monument] would not occur because it would offend the Indians. I prepared the drawing and took them to the anjoman for approval. On the same day, Hekmat’s letter arrived [at the anjoman]. Mr. Hakim al-Molk [Ebrahim Hakimi], [Hosayn] Ala, and the rest were sitting [around the table]. When they read the letter, Hakim who was deaf (kar bud), asked Ala ‘what’s going on?’ Ala
alike, perceived these architectural ventures in light of politics. All kinds of historic grievances were being challenged and settled on the walls of these monuments. With the insistence of the high-ranking generals of the Iranian army, including General Farajollah Aqeveli, General Amanollah Jahanbani, and General Mohammad Hosayn Firuz, Nader Shah’s mausoleum-museum was erected in 1959 as per Seyhoun’s “Franco-Persian” design. It had fully conformed to the SNH’s processes of identification, destruction, documentation, construction, reburial, and inauguration (Figs. 5.4).37

The significance of Ibn Sina, the man, as well as the city of Hamadan for the Pahlavi elite rested in the potential revival of its pre-Islamic glory and scientific background as tactics of modernization. Like Shiraz, Hamadan was believed to have evolved on the site of an eminent pre-Islamic royal palace. A number of Europeans had come here in the 19th century to discover Median Golden City attested by Herodotus.38 It certainly became a contested excavation site by American museums in the following century. The founding myth of “Hamadan or Hagmatana,” signifying “the Place of Assembly” and the Ecbatana of the ancient Greeks, began with Jamshid, the Iranian king who ruled for 700 years celebrated in Ferdawsi’s Shahnameh.39 Historically, however, the city became the capital under the Medes, followed by a subsequently long Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian urban and trade history where the city owned much of its fame to its position, the highway connecting the lowlands of Mesopotamia with the high Iranian plateau. After the battle of Nihavand, it fell to Arab invaders in 644 AD and lost much of its former prominence. With the erection of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, the SNH would try to revive

explained that Hekmat is requesting the SNH not to build [Nader’s tomb] because we have good relations with India and they will be offended. The moment that he heard this, in a loud voice, he said, ‘Will it offend them? To hell with them! (jahanam).’” Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.

37 “Grigor: As the only political figure, why was Nader Shah [‘s mausoleum] chosen as one of these projects? Seyhoun: If you pay attention to Iran’s history, you will realize that Nader was the savior of Iran; on top of that, he was a genius in war tactic... The second reason is that when they wanted to build Nader [‘s tomb], there existed three top military men in Mashhad: Sepahbod Aqeveli, Sepahbod Jahanbani, and Sarlashgar Firuz. These men had a military gang and they kept writing to the SNH saying, ‘the existing Nader tomb is not worthy of Nader and we want a new structure.’” Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B. For the Iranian army in the late 1940s, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 246.

38 “In the early 1900s scholars such as Buckingham (1829) attempted to find the Golden City of the Medes in ancient Ekbatan on the basis of Herodotus’ narrative.” K. A. Niknami, Methodological Aspects of Iranian Archeology (Oxford, 2000), 21.

“Ecbatana” not only as a place rich in ancient history, but more importantly, as a city that would go through intense infrastructural and urban modernization under the Pahlavis. Ibn Sina’s mausoleum would be central to these rapid changes.

By and large, Western accounts of Hamadan and Nishabur, the topic of the next chapter, are scarce. Unlike Shiraz, in recent history, they neither were large towns en-route to the Safavid capital of Isfahan nor were they adventurers’ obsession as Tus had been. Furthermore, the resting-place of Ibn Sina, while relatively known to local travelers, was far less sought after by Western explorers. Most accounts, furthermore, were non-descriptive and to the point; others disregard the edifice altogether. Traveling from Baghdad to Central Asia, French officer Joseph Pierre Ferrier arrived in Hamadan on April 17, 1845 and merely noted, “there are not any monuments or ruins in it that could be looked upon as having belonged to Ecbatana,” adding, “In the center of Hamadan is the tomb of Ali Ben Sina, and not far from it are those of Esther and Mordecai...” In Pascal Coste’s *Monuments Modernes de la Perse* (1866), the section dedicated to Hamadan while providing historical details of the city and mentioning the burial place of Esther and Mordecai, omitted any allusion to that of Ibn Sina. British traveler and photographer Robert Byron simply declined a visit to the tomb during his 1933 travels. He later wrote, “At Hamadan we eschewed the tomb of...Avicenna, but visited” instead the Gombad-e Alavian, with which he was most impressed. He admired the simple lines, which, he maintained were “as formal and rich as Versailles” for instead of “the wealth of the work, it is splendour of design alone.” Byron concluded, “this at last” would “wipe the taste of the Alhambra and the Taj Mahal out of one’s mouth, where Mohammedan art is concerned. I came to Persia to get rid of that taste.” British traveler Henry Filmer’s 1936 description was most likely a mere textual reproduction of Columbia University Williams Jackson’s, casting doubt on whether Filmer personally saw the structure.

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40 Joseph Pierre Ferrier was a French officer assigned at Pondicherry and was sent by the French government “to go to Persia to drill and organize the Persian army...” He was mainly tracing the Silk Road from Hamadan to Tehran, Nishabur, Mashhad into Central Asia. J. P. Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan* (London: Murray, 1856), iii and 37. Also, see chapter 3 in this study.


42 R. Byron, *The Road to Oxiana* (London, 1950), 51. Evidently, Byron did not photograph Ibn Sina’s mausoleum; see Robert Byron Photo, Iran 155, Photo file #12 Ar-Ma, Gumbad-i-Qabus #B47/312; Aga Khan Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University.

43 “His tomb, consisting of a simple brick building, which was restored by a Kajar princess in 1877, is one of the principal places of pilgrimage in Hamadan.” H. Filmer, *The Pageant of Persia* (Indianapolis, 1936), 281.
Among those who wrote about Ibn Sina’s resting-place, Jackson was the only chronicler who maintained that the “less known, but in reality more interesting” structure in Hamadan “is” Ibn Sina’s “simple brickwork building, rectangular in shape, and surrounded by an unpretentious walled courtyard which is haunted by dervishes, pilgrims, and loiterers.” He further added an architectural detail, “A carved and inscribed slab covers the dust of the great thinker, and by his side rest the remains of his contemporary, Sheikh Abu Said.” Jackson’s valuable historiographical contribution consisted of a map of Hamadan, a photograph of Ibn Sina’s tomb, and more importantly, his transcription of the patronage inscription placed by Negar Khanum during the 1877 repairs:

A modern inscription written inside the tomb records the fact that this final resting-place of ‘His Holiness Sheikh Abu Said and the Prince of Sages, Bu Ali Sina (Avicenna),’ had fallen into ruins and had been restored by the Princess Nigar Khanum of the royal line of the Kajar family in the year 1877 (A.H. 1294).

As one of the few, if not the only, textual evidence of its kind, later chronicles merely reiterate Jackson’s statement. Hence, in the 1950s, André Godard aloofly recorded in his inventory of “immobile monuments:” “Pauvre construction moderne,” adding, “Jackson has a photo showing a more interesting monument in comparison to the present one and which had the following inscription…” We find, however, Jackson’s illustration of a structure, not as impressive as perceived by Godard who, no doubt, disapproved not so much the aesthetics of the modern mausoleum per se, but rather the destruction of a historical edifice and its replacement with a new construction (Figs. 5.5-5.6).

The scarcity of historic accounts renders the reconstruction of the monument’s history an incomplete one. Until 1877, according to the Karnameh, a chahar-taq sheltered the two tombs, when Fath Ali Shah’s (ruled 1797-1834) granddaughter and daughter of the ardent modernists Abbas Mirza, Princess Negar Khanum took upon herself to replace it with a “domed brick-structure” (Fig. 5.7). It is unclear whether the dome and doorway constructed by Negar were

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44 Williams Jackson was a professor of language in Columbia University who traveled to the region between 1907 and 1908. A. V. W. Jackson, Persia Past and Present (New York, 1909), 165 and 167. Also, see chapter 3 and 4 in this study.
45 Jackson, Persia, 165 and 167.
46 “Poor modern construction.” “The tomb of his sainthood the sheikh Abu Sa’id, the prince of wisdom, Bu Ali Sina had fallen into ruins and was restored by the princess Nigar Khanum, of the Iranian Qajar Royal family 1294’ (1877).” Ullens’ Archives. Godard Notebooks Set I, Notebook “A-L,” Hamadan, Ibn Sina and Baba Tahir; Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University.
47 Qajar Princess Negar Khanum was the daughter of Abbas Mirza, who was the governor of Azerbaijan and the successor of Fath Ali Shah. “By the order of Negar, in lieu of a chahar-taq a domed brick-structure was placed over
destroyed by the time of Jackson's visit in 1907-1908, or they were renovated by either the SNH or a local governor between the 1880s and 1930s. While Herzfeld's 1925 photograph hints at the latter alternative, one thing seems certain: by August 1939, the SNH's initiative in the Ibn Sina project had bore no architectural results; while Hekmat had been busy with the restoration of Hafeziyeh in Shiraz as noted in chapter 4, the Iranian state was preoccupied with the approaching invasion of Iran and abdication of its king. The project was aborted and postponed to a more opportune time.

After WWII, the first Pahlavi propaganda booklet introducing Hamadan to the nation was prepared by the joint efforts of the SNH and the Geographical Division of the General Staff of the Army. While simply titled *A Guide to Hamadan*, it was a remarkable publication not only because it was a direct manifestation of the shared ventures of culture and politics under the Pahlavis, but also revealed the sophisticated ability of the state to (re)present cultural fragments as exacting national science and history. As the head of the General Staff of the Army, the would-be-assassinated prime minister, General Ali Razmara, who has been described as “an ambitious no-nonsense general” and “a high-handed but independent-minded officer,” wrote that the guidebook was published “on the occasion of Abu-'Ali Sina’s millennium.” In it, Hamadan, “existing since 3000 B.C.” was represented as having been reborn under the Pahlavis where hygiene and urbanism were indicative of that modern revival. “The avenues and streets of Hamadan,” noted Razmara, “like those of many other old cities in Iran have not been planned according to sound hygienic principles.” While Reza Shah's urban policies in Tehran were implemented “to impress foreign observers, who usually visited only Tehran,” the dissemination of electricity, modern urban planning, and the erection of governmental buildings soon spread to the provinces as steps to modernize the peripheries.

48 Geographical Division of the General Staff of the Army and the Society for National Heritage, *A Guide to Hamadan* (Tehran: c. 1950), forward. General Razmara was appointed by Mohammad Reza Shah as prime minister; he was assassinated in March 1951. “Somewhat ahead of his time, Razmara argued for political decentralisation, with the formation of provincial assemblies and land reform.” Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1921*, 111. *A Guide to Hamadan* reflects this decentralization policy and the importance given to 'provincial' towns where architecture served as a means and celebrations as a motive. On Razmara, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 229 and 263.

in provincial urban improvement; a total of 48 million rials were spent” to that purpose. The “standard feature” of Reza Shah’s urban planning in small cities and big towns was “two wide streets intersecting at right angles.” In fact, the shah has been reported to have picked the map of a small city and drawn a straight line in the middle of it. His generals and governors had then been responsible to see to it that the shah’s pencil drawing would, in months, turn into a wide, well-designed, and functioning boulevard to be duplicated in the remaining urban packets. “With remarkable lack of originality,” historians later noted, “the two streets were invariably called Pahlavi and Shah Avenues.”

With a similar technique, when six radiating 30-meter wide avenues were hacked though Hamadan in the 1930s, they were named in full accord with the revivalistic and nationalistic spirit of the time: Bu-Ali, Ecbatana, Baba-Taher, Cyrus, Darius, and Shahpur (Fig. 5.8). Le Journal de Téhéran held that if “big avenues” were to make up “the arteries of the town,” then “this millenary city will...become one of the most picturesque and modern [cities] of Iran.” Each of the six avenues was crowned with a historic tomb, including those of Ibn Sina and Baba-Taher, who as Muslims were co-opted into an exclusivist national history alongside with Achaemenid and Sassanian monarchs. In Ibn Sina’s case, this was particularly true because the new structure demarcated the southern tip of the new “plane radieu,” extending from the central Pahlavi square through Bu Ali avenue to Bu Ali square.

After providing general, but concise, information about the city and its historical, archeological, political, and economic conditions, the Guide ended its narrative with “Part III: List of the famous men of Hamadan;” here, Ibn Sina was listed as the first of such men. Whereas part I and II stood for the modern nation-state with its exact charts and dates, for instance, it informed that Hamadan “is situated at 3°13’ west of Tehran and the difference in local time of the two cities is 12 minutes and 50 seconds,” part III exulted “the greatest thinker of the world.” The text was illustrated with Ibn Sina’s ostensibly scientific portrait, his old and new mausoleums, and most interestingly, a beautifully crafted white architectural model of the modern structure (Figs. 5.9-5.10). Architecture as science, represented by an exact model of to-

50 A. Banani, Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford, 1961), 145.
51 “These Pahlavi Avenues,” that began to mushroom in most towns and cities, “set the style for subsequent urban development.” Avery, Modern Iran, 499.
52 Banani, Modernization of Iran, 145.
be-reality, no doubt, reinforced the state's claim that "As the year 1370 L. H. [AH] coincided with Abu-'Ali's millennium, The Society for the Preservation of National Monuments [i.e. SNH] decided to hold appropriate celebrations in Iran;" adding, "it is performing its duty on behalf of the compatriots of that great man." According to the Guide, the Society had already accomplished the following "services:"

1. Construction of a splendid mausoleum at the site of the old one, this new mausoleum has been built on the model of that of Qabus ibn Wushmguir...which was constructed in Abu-'Ali's time. The original plan has been modernized and the present mausoleum is indeed most attractive [sic.].
2. Issuance of special stamps in commemoration of the occasion. These stamps consist of six series, each of which represents one of the periods of the Iranian civilization, the stamps have been prepared in London and are superb.
3. Preparation of Abu-'Ali's statue by Mr. Abul-Hassan Sadigi, well-known painter and sculptor [sic].
4. Printing Abu-'Ali's Persian pamphlets at the expense of the Society and with the collaboration of a number of University professors. These will be published during the celebrations.
5. Preparation of a comprehensive list of Abu-'Ali's works.
6. Preparation of a book dealing with the millennium celebrations. This will consist of two parts, of which the first will discuss Abu-'Ali's life and works and the steps taken by the Society, and the second will contain all the articles and speeches written or made during the celebrations.
7. Preparation of a guidebook to, and a plan of, Hamadan, with the cooperation of the Geographical Section of the General Staff.
8. The convening of a Congress of famous orientalists and scholars of the world, the representative of the Arab states and Iranian savants, to be formed on the occasion of the celebrations [sic.].

The Guide's meticulous itemization related to Ibn Sina's millenary program tallied with both Sadiq's memoirs and the Karnameh's report. The former wrote, "The millenary of Ibn Sina's birth was coming up, and in my opinion, we had to do in 1330 for Ibn Sina -- the hero of humanity (nabeghe-ye bashar) and one of the heritages of Iran (mafakher-e melli) -- that which we had done for Ferdawsi in 1313." According to the latter, "Mr. Sadiq writes, 'I attempted...to reestablish the SNH because the thousandth anniversary of Ibn Sina was approaching'." Ferdawsiyeh and the practices occurring around it had become history to be...

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55 Geographical Division & SNH, Guide to Hamadan, part I, 1 and part III, 2.
56 Geographical Division & SNH, Guide to Hamadan, part III, 5-6. The Karnameh's list is as follows: "The committee felt that the following steps are needed: 1) The construction of a new structure for Ibn Sina's tomb, which is worthy of his greatness; 2) The preparation of Ibn Sina's statue and its placement in Hamadan; 3) The organization of a conference in Tehran with participation of international Orientalists; 4) The establishment of a library in the name of Ibn Sina; 5) The republication of Ibn Sina's Persian works; 6) The preparation of memorial medals in the name of Ibn Sina; 7) The publication of books and articles about Ibn Sina's life and work; 8) The attraction of the cooperation [of various groups] for the Ibn Sina celebration." SNH 131, Karnameh, 82-83.
57 Sadiq, Memoirs, 3: 108.
58 SNH 131, Karnameh, 82.
emulated and (re)practiced. Therefore, the erection of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum along with its accompanying celebrations has to be seen as perpetuating the Ferdawsiyeh tradition.

Apparently, the SNH first commissioned André Godard for a modern burial complex around 1945. The choice of a Frenchman immediately became a topic of passionate debates within the architectural circles. Architecte published an article objecting to the Society’s decision to automatically select Godard. Locals felt that a fair competition was in order, especially because a national figure was being honored by the structure. A number of architects protested on the basis that an Iranian would “instinctively” know better what “the national hero really wanted.” In March 1945, Godard decided to resign his commission as the Director of Iran’s Archeological Services and requested Tehran’s French embassy “for a travel permit, for himself and his wife…”59 In a memo with “absolute priority,” the French authorities, in turn, requested a replacement for Godard; the names of “Mr. Decalcquenem,” “Mr. Girshmann” and “Mr. Schlumberger” were proposed. By the following summer, Yedda and André were packing their bags.60 While the embassy kept “encouraging” its compatriots “not to play [Iranian Cultural Minister] Keshavarz’s game, and therefore not resign,” Godard’s hesitation stemmed from his certitude that the position “would not be filled by a Frenchman.”61 French Ambassador Pierre Lafond concocted a possible solution that only extended the Godards’ residency, and frustration, in Tehran:

Next to a nominal and incompetent Iranian director, we can, perhaps, propose the hiring of a French technical consultant, since the 1927 Convention would not sanction a French to the post. This consideration would permit us to propose a French archaeologist, with some chance of success, against the candidacy of an American or even an Iranian. It is therefore time to raise the question. The best solution would be for Mr. Godard to demand a renewal of his contract: in case of this proposal’s failure, we have to push for an Iranian candidate with a French formation/background.62


61 “Mr. Shayegan will soon replace Mr. Keshavarz as the Minister of Culture. We can hope that the new minister will be more favorable to Mr. Godard.” Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales, Asie 1944-1955, Iran 42, Mission Archeologique E45-3, 047, October 20, 1946, Teheran. “Mr. Keshavarz” mentioned in this French document might be the same “Fereydoun Keshavarz” who has been described by Abrahamian as “the main Tudeh spokesman in the Majles” and “a militant young doctor and university teacher who had entered politics in 1941;” see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 406 and 306.

As per orders from Paris, Yedda and André remained at their post. In the meantime, Persian newspapers, including *Ettela’at* and *Iran*, announced the competition for the design of Ibn Sina’s *aramgah*. Only Iranian nationals were allowed to participate.

- **The Birth of l’Architecte**

To complete their efforts of cultural and urban modernization in Iran, the reformists of the 1920s and 1930s had invited European architects to design most of Tehran’s official architecture. At the peak of the Western modern movement of the same two decades, mostly French and Soviet architects had been engaged in all sorts of state commissions to refigure Iran’s architectural profession, as well as its built environment. Reza Shah’s elite had felt that these Western experts were needed to give modern forms to new functions that had been historically absent in Iran such as administrative offices, ministries, banks, prisons, dams, bridges, barracks, schools, universities, museums, cinemas, cabarets, bars, villas, and parks modeled after their Western prototypes. While these architectural manifestations of modernity often served as tools to enhance and exercise state power, each successful building represented an important moment in Iran’s architectural profession – each an emblem of new beginnings for the reformists. Furthermore, these Western experts had been vital to the establishment and institutionalization of normative ideas about national patrimony, historic preservation, and museum culture. Their efforts, with the backing of court patronage and state bureaucracy, had in turn given birth to the autonomous discipline of architecture. By WWII, Iran had effectively, at least on official levels, abandoned the institution of the builder/craftsman known as *usta-me’mar* (master-builder) for the new independent and individualistic engineer/architect/artist. While the *me’mar* had acquired his expertise by experience and prestige by guild membership, the modern architect had enrolled his expertise by experience and prestige by guild membership, the modern architect had enrolled

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63 The profession of architecture was institutionalized entirely by European architects who worked in collaboration with the state and the government. The leading figures of the first generation were Nikolai Markov, André Godard and Maxime Siroux as seen in previous chapters. These three were responsible for most of the first set of governmental buildings and the initial shaping of the city of Tehran. Similarly, they set the skeleton of architectural profession in Iran for the coming generations. "As partners in Reza Shah’s modernization program, they established an educational system, developed a professional mode of operation, and left to their Iranian heirs a body of written and built work. Each had a lasting impact on the profession of architecture in modern Iran." M. Marefat, "Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921-1941," (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 116. For a
in Europe’s prestigious architectural schools. The post-Reza Shah era, therefore, would see the birth of the Iranian architect; most often trained in the School of Beaux-Arts, secular nationalist in stance, and westernized in aesthetic taste and personal outlook. The SNH, it seemed, had accomplished one of its missions. These architects, who would grow substantially in numbers and multiply in architectural convictions, would be perceived by the state and high society as the exemplary models of an acculturated nation.

As a sovereign discipline, accordingly, the evolution of the architectural profession in Iran reached its maturity after WWII. The most obvious evidence of this was the publication, in 1946, of *Architecte*’s first issue, announcing the formation of the *anjoman-e architect-hay-e Iran* or the Society of Iran’s Architects (hereafter SIA). The SNH and the SIA would join efforts in organizing several competitions. During this period, Iranian architects would be able not only to create a viable vocation and scrutinize the significance of its eminence in the cultural formation of national identity, but also raise serious debates concerning the “most authentic” national style. While the 1940s and 1950s saw the erection of better and bigger structures, either imitating, for example, Le Corbusier’s works or replicating the design principles of the École des Beaux-Arts, some of the architects of the 1960s and 1970s would dismiss these stylistic trends as “foreign (farangi)” and propose ways that, in their minds, would “return” Iran’s architectural practices and forms to their “national roots.” Soon architectural journals would remind Iranian architects that “The Shahnshah Aryamehr himself has often said that there should be Iranian solutions to Iranian problems.”

The projects of Ibn Sina and Omar Khayyam epitomized these two ostensible clashes in architectural movements in Iran. The professional confidence gained by local architects, furthermore, resulted in a symbiotic relation between their profession and state influence. Architectural forms and political strategies were interwoven to give an added significance to the profession and to the urban built environment. For the early SNH, selected buildings were a

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64 I. Moshiri, ed., *Architecte* 4 (1947): 36. The journal published only six issues between August 1946 and July 1948 remains, nevertheless, one of the few sources tracing the details of the architectural profession in Iran during this time. See Marefat, “Building to Power,” 110-142. Marefat identifies the following individuals as first generation Iranian architects who created “both a modern Iranian architecture and a professional dialogue:” Gabriel Guevrekian (1900-1970), Mohsen Foroughi (1907-1982) whose career and authorship of Ackerman-Pope’s mausoleum in Isfahan will be discussed in chapter 7, Vartan Avanesian (1896-1982) mentioned in chapter 4, Keyqobad Zafar (1910-c. 1990), Ali Sadeq, and Iradj Moshiri; see Marefat, “Building to Power.”

means to crystallize their efforts of state building into a tangible reality. Modern monuments, most often, served an administrative function, at times glorified the ancient past, occasionally exalted the monarch, but predominantly symbolized the New Iran under Pahlavi rule. The architectural production after Reza Shah would increasingly prove to be a battleground for stylistic disputes by individual professionals. With the arrival of the mostly French-trained Iranian "l'architecte," too, began the critical judgment of and debates concerning ideas about the most appropriate national taste and style. Architecture, thereafter, was to be handled as a question of pure knowledge, as well as that of a professional practice.

The author of Ibn Sina Mausoleum is, surely, the paramount personification of the Pahlavi architect. Born in 1920 into a Baha'i family of Tehran, Houshang Seyhoun would become one of the major players in the "war of styles" during the mid- to late Pahlavi era (Fig. 5.11). "Seyhoun belongs to the third generation Iranian architects who have a European formation;" although a seemingly simple statement, if projected back in the context of the 1950s architectural profession, it carries a heavy weight. While it was true that "that which Seyhoun and a few of his colleagues taught and built in Iran has remained a model to be followed by architects, builders, and promoters for a quarter of a century," things were far more nuanced and complicated in the 1950s Iran. To begin with, in the years following WWII, politicians from both the Iranian state and its colonial rivals fastened great hopes on such men – young local professionals in such apolitical disciplines as architecture, engineering, medicine, etc. "There is no doubt," maintained the French foreign minister in 1945, "the education of young Iranians in France is the most powerful means to develop our cultural influence in this country," adding further, "It is important to respond to American, British and Soviet propaganda in this domain." The Iranian authorities, in their turn, while limiting the number and age of students who would benefit from a European education, nevertheless admitted that these students "carry a heavy

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responsibly and their posts are reserved in the Iranian administration. They, too, had placed great hopes on these young, mostly, men. Seyhoun was one of the privileged.

Out of high school, he became one of the first students of Tehran University’s School of Fine Arts where he studied under Hafeziyeh’s author, French architect Maxime Siroux. During the Allied occupation of Iran, Seyhoun landed his first job consisting of five frescoes for Tehran’s “luxurious and extravagant Palace cabaret,” designed especially for foreign troops. However, when his proposal was selected by the SNH for Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, he was only twenty-three years old and had no idea that all strings of his life converged here. This was his career-making commission; “After that,” he recently said, “all these projects came to me just like that.” The prize of the competition consisted of the actual construction of the structure with the supervision of the winner. However, since “on nomination by” Godard, Seyhoun “was invited to” the École des Beaux-Arts, the architectural student went to see the director at the Archeological Museum. “I asked him to release me from going to Paris because I want to construct this monument here.” Godard replied, “I don’t have the budget for that building, you can go to farhang [abroad] and regularly send me your address... I will let you know when the budget is ready.” Seyhoun left and entered Otello Zavaroni’s studio in May 1946. His début in Paris was facilitated not only by two prize-winning design competitions and excellent relationship with Godard, but also by the Cultural Relations department of the Foreign Ministry. Two years later, with the exception of his diploma project, he had passed all his exams with flying colors. His studio projects, among others, included “a shelter on an African

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69 “In the cultured home of the Seyhouns their son Houshang flourished. He lived in this atmosphere of music and art...” Seyhoun, Houshang, 11.

70 “Soon after” his commission to design a monument at Tehran’s Central Train Station, “the National Heritage Society organized a commemoration of the millennium of the great Iranian philosopher and physician, Avicenna. The design for the commemorative monument and mausoleum in Hamadan became the subject of another competition, and again Seyhoun was the winner. The construction was to take place under his direct supervision and management.” Seyhoun, Houshang, 12.

71 Nevertheless, it was not without complications and controversies. The SIA, rejecting the jury’s decision on the basis of Seyhoun’s absence from Iran, called Seyhoun to their office. “It was very bad, a big fight. I said take your grievances to the jury, not to me.” Finally, the issue was settled with the distribution of the prizes. Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada, Tape 1, Side B; see Appendix 4.

road,” “a rural station,” “the Palace of State Council,” “a financial establishment,” and “a church.” His education, financed by the Iranian state, had prepared him well for what was to come; or so it seemed.

In March 1947, the SNH decided to reinitiate the Ibn Sina project and, hence, contacted Seyhoun with an ultimatum: “either come back” or the job will be handed over to a different architect. Seyhoun recounts:

I thought that if I were to return to Iran, I would have to do the drawings and the preparatory work first, so I decided to make this my diploma project. I told Godard about my plans and asked him to communicate it to the anjoman [i.e. SNH]. He did and they agreed. However, I also thought of signing a contract. A contract came to me. According to it, the architects responsible [for the project] were Forughi, Zafar, Sadeq, and I. Immediately, I wrote a letter saying, 'I am not even coming back to Iran. I don't want the project.' I said politely to Godard, 'you have advertised one thing in the papers and [doing something different]. Why should these men be involved in this project? I am doing all the work here; this is my right; you want to destroy my rights.' A second contract [soon] arrived.74

The intrigue linked with “the contract” not only is an excellent indicative of a French-trained student’s way of thinking about a commission – i.e. a written contract privileged over a verbal agreement – it also, more interestingly, reveals the underlying rivalries and jealousies on the part of older architects who saw in their successors a menace and clung desperately to their positions at home. “These men,” commented Seyhoun, “had so much power and did not take us seriously that we would go” to the SIA’s headquarters “with our heads lowered down.”75 Contrary to the general opinion, a sound European training in the 1950s-Iran often proved to be a liability rather than a privilege for young architects and engineers.

Seyhoun’s protest paid off, however. The revised contract had put him in full charge of Ibn Sina’s project. He simultaneously submitted the same set of drawings to two different establishments: as his Beaux-Arts diploma project and his first major commission with the Iranian government. By the end of May 1949, he was endowed with a “Docteur D’Art” by the former, and the latter had endorsed his scheme for Ibn Sina’s mausoleum (Figs. 5.12-5.14). Another contract signed between the SNH and the construction company of Ebtehaj & Partners,

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74 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.

75 "Seyhoun: Forugh, Sadeq, Zafar, [and] Anjavi had created an anjoman called anjoman-e architect-ha-ye Iran [Society of Iran’s Architects, SIA]. Those of us who finished the school would automatically become part of the anjoman." Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
initiated the cultivation of the site on June 6.\textsuperscript{76} Just prior to Mohammad Reza Shah's laying of the cornerstone on that day, "some of the bones" of the two men, Ibn Sina and Shaykh Abu Sa'id, had been "placed and sealed in special boxes for later burial."\textsuperscript{77} During the following decades, an identical unearthing-interring technique would be used for Nader Shah, Omar Khayyam, and the rest of the historic figures whose modern tombs the SNH chose to erect. In Nader's case, not only was the entire process ritualized, documented, and publicized at the time, but also the details of the operation appeared in and out of the Society's publications during the following decades (Figs. 5.15):\textsuperscript{78}

Due to the destruction of the foundation and generated dust around [Nader's] tomb, it was necessary to remove the bones. There were two tombs, Nader's and Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pessian's. On 6 Farvardin 1336... when digging the two bodies, a clay jar was discovered with a broken top and, inside it, a skull became visible. It was covered and put away. There also was the sight of a shoulder. The bones were placed in a metal box, sealed and labeled as "#1." Then Pessian ['s remains] were dug out and placed in a cotton cloth and a metal box, sealed, and labeled as "#2." Both were placed in a wooden box and stamped "SNH." [The box] was stored at the SNH's headquarters.\textsuperscript{79}

The articulation of the morose details of the event was integral to its authenticity, to the very truth of the procedure. The ostensibly scientific nature of both the unearthing and its documentation buttressed the racial and historic contention of both the state and the SNH. Such an analysis and its reproduction, as the above, were themselves part of the authentication process, where functional complexities were turned into anatomical simplicities via abstraction.\textsuperscript{80}

By the 1960s, image, text, and ritual of unearthing bones were considered normative national practices.

\textsuperscript{76} The three partners with Ebtehaj were Vahram Davitkhanian, Thomas Thomasian, and Babken Bejishkian. The Davitkhanian family owned the Tehran Cement and Clay Factories. According to the \textit{Karnameh}, on Khordad 16, 1328, "the first \textit{kolang}" was organized in the presence of the shah and other cultural representatives.

\textsuperscript{77} SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 93-96.


\textsuperscript{79} SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 226-230.

\textsuperscript{80} See M. Foucault, \textit{The Birth of the Clinic: an Archaeology of Medical Perception} (Paris, 1963), 131.
Unlike his father, the second Pahlavi monarch was not just the spontaneous and often merciless inspector of these projects in mid-construction, rather a genuine patron of the arts; during his early ruling period, he would always review and appraise, never inspect. Accordingly, the drawings and model of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, like that of Nader, were delivered to the shah who "studied and approved." Seyhoun, as his royal benefactor, had felt that the Qajar structure dating from 1877 was "ridiculous (mozakhraf); a nothing (hichi)." It was, therefore, duly and entirely removed. In its place, the new scheme consisted of two distinct functional and spatial parts: the open air upper level served as the domain of contemplation, whereas the enclosed lower floor housed the tomb-chamber, the museum, and the study-library. Although the plan seemed to follow a random arrangement of small spaces, it was, in fact, assembled vis-à-vis a central axis, leading to the tomb chamber. One entered the complex through the portico supported by a row of simple columns. Then an anti-room led into a secondary hall before entering the main burial chamber. This central room sat exactly beneath the tower that rose to more than 27 meters and marked the complex in the urban fabric. The tomb proper was rotated on the southwest/northeast axis, as required of Muslim burial, towards the direction of Mecca from Hamadan. Therefore, the grid of the complex on the north-south axis did not follow that of the tomb. Separate from the monument proper were included several service areas, a tourist gift-shop, and a ticket-booth surrounded by an elaborate "Persian garden."

The first idea for the design originated in the common belief that Ibn Sina had once said, "the tower of Qabus is the most impressive structure of all time;" hence, making the historic figure an accomplice in the design of his modern mausoleum. "It is a monument in the style of Bu Ali’s lifetime," maintains the architect, "but which has been created in a modern style; in reality, the same thing that these postmodernists do" today. Seyhoun perceived "commemorative monuments" as "the proper place of a pure architectural expression," because their function enabled, in his mind, a "grandeur and solemnity of the architectural language." The most visible part of the monument, therefore, consisted of a modernized replica of the impressive Gombad-e Qabus, located in Gorgan, northwestern Iran (Fig. 5.16). The choice of the medieval tower was based on Seyhoun's conviction that "one [has to] design mausoleums based

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81 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.
82 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
83 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
84 Seyhoun, L’architecture de Seihoun, 1-3.
on the character of the person" who would be resting under its roof.\textsuperscript{85} He painstakingly explained to me that this was a novel function assigned to architecture in Iran's architectural history: "We have a lot of mausoleums in Iran, a lot. From Cyrus to today, but none of [them] have been created with a unique quality that has a special connection (ertebat-e khasi) to the character of the person" buried there. He aimed to assemble a range of architectural fragments, "impart[ing] special meaning and order to the structure" that would, in turn, symbolize Ibn Sina's "life, work," and above all, "character."\textsuperscript{86}

Yes, a thing that you take from the past. Second, the [lower] columns... signify a century for the occasion of his millenary...[The upper columns] are twelve in total. Bu Ali was famed as the 'Scholar of twelve Sciences.' Finally, a very interesting thing: Bu Ali was a perfect man. The dimensions [of the monument] fit into a perfect square within which a [perfect] man fits...

In Seyhoun's monograph, this same concept was reiterated: "the geometric and symbolic elements" that make up the structure "is composed of a 28.5 meter imaginary square...suggest[ing] the shape of a human being standing with outstretched arms, symbolic of Avicenna and the perfection of his knowledge of the humanities and sciences. This basic square ultimately gives rise to the building’s final proportions."\textsuperscript{88} Accordingly, the main façade elevation of Ibn Sina's mausoleum, due west, seems to have been configured by the rules of the Golden Square and Leonardo Da Vinci’s \textit{Diagram of human proportion based on Vitruvian man} (Fig. 5.13).\textsuperscript{89} Seyhoun's notion about "the perfect man" that he believed had been Ibn Sina, was inscribed on Da Vinci's conception of the perfect human proportions and designed according to the relationship of "a perfect man" into "a perfect square." Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, therefore, originated in its architect’s simplistic, still steadfast, conviction that "Bu Ali was a perfect man."\textsuperscript{90}

It is also possible that Seyhoun was influenced by his most revered mentor, whom he described as "one of the best humans that I have ever known."\textsuperscript{91} An article devoted in its entirety to the Gombad-e Qabus, authored by André Godard and translated from French by American art

\textsuperscript{85} Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
\textsuperscript{86} Seyhoun, \textit{Houshang}, 36.
\textsuperscript{87} Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
\textsuperscript{88} Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
\textsuperscript{89} Seyhoun, \textit{Houshang}, 36. My emphasis.
\textsuperscript{90} See Seyhoun, \textit{Houshang}, 37.
\textsuperscript{91} Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side B.
historian Phyllis Ackerman, had appeared in the 1938 *Survey of Persian Art (SoPA)*. In it, Godard had portrayed the medieval tower as “one of the most beautiful buildings of Islamic Persia” and “one of the earliest dated monuments,” further insisting that it “would have been utterly ruined had not the Persian Government fortunately decided to restore it.” The 51-meter brick tower, erected by the Ziyarid prince Qabus in 1006 was theorized by contemporary scholars, including Godard, to have housed practices originating in Iran’s pre-Islamic religion of Zoroastrianism: “...Qabus’ body enclosed in a glass coffin was to be hung by chains in the dome of his tomb. It would seem that the whole thing was planned deliberately to protect Qabus from being disturbed in his last sleep, and this is probably why the tower is so unusually high.”

Richard Ettinghausen and Oleg Grabar concur with Godard on this point:

As no trace [of a tomb] was found, the coffin could have been suspended inside, as a medieval chronicler related. The excellent brickwork is distinguished from that of the Samandi mausoleum by the intense purity of its lines and shapes... A totally different aesthetic is present here. The origin of the Gumbad-i Qabus is not clear... Since it was built by a member of a family recently converted to Islam from Zoroastrianism and still connected with pre-Islamic tradition..., we may very tentatively suggest that its background may be sought in some Mazdaean commemorative monument or in the transformation into permanent architecture of a transitory building such as a tent.

In its modern architectural recreation in Hamadan, the Gombad only rose to a height of 23 meters, totaling 27.5 meters from the street surface (Fig. 5.17). As the centerpiece of the 1480 square meter upper level, the tower constituted the most visible component of the entire complex. “There are two differences between the towers of Qabus and Ibn Sina,” according to

93 Godard, “Gunbad-i-Qabus,” 972.
94 The inscription banner reads: “In the name of God, the clement, the merciful, this castle was built by the Amir Shams al-Ma’ali the Amir, son of the Amir, Qabus, son of Vashmgir who ordered it built during his lifetime in the lunar year 397 and the solar year 375.” Godard, “Gunbad-i-Qabus,” 970, 973.
95 “The most spectacular is the Gunbad-i Qabus built by the Ziyarid prince Qabus b. Vashmgir in 1006-7 near Gurgan, south-east of the Caspian Sea. Circular inside and shaped like a ten-pointed star outside, on an artificial platform and 51 meters high, it dominates the landscape.” Ettinghausen, R. and O. Grabar, *The Art and Architecture of Islam 650-1250* (New Haven, 1987), 221-222. “Pre-eminent among these northern Iranian towers is the Gunbad-i Qabus of 397/1006, a building of uncompromising severity which owes its commanding power to the clear lines that seem to magnify still further its already gigantic size, no subsequent tomb tower approaches that scale of this, the earliest survival of the series. Its circular plan is broken by ten huge, evenly spaced, triangular flanges which break free from the plinth and streak upwards to vanish into the corbelled cornice supporting the conical roof. The single slender arched doorway seems lost in the immensity of unbroken brickwork. Even the site is carefully chosen to accentuate the dwarfing height of the building: the tower rests on a substantial tepe which forms the sole eminence for miles around. Two identical inscription bands girdle the tower, one near the base, the other near the peak of the flanges — illegally high and thus a symbolic presence only.” R. Hillenbrand, *Islamic Architecture: Form, Function, and Meaning* (Edinburgh, 1994), 283.
Mostafavi’s *Ecbatana: historic heritage of Hamadan and a chapter about Ibn Sina* (1953).

Evidently, while Seyhoun had originally envisioned a direct replica of the former, the SNH had instead requested to reduce the height to “half” that of Gombad-e Qabus’.96 “The second difference,” Mostafavi noted, “is the slots of Ibn Sina’s tower, where Qabus has no opening, hence it is dark inside.” The author first explained that these vertical openings were intended to allow the circulation of “Hamadan’s strong winds” through the tower, and then concluded that the design was “very interesting (*jaleb*) and pleasant (*matbu*”).97

On top of the openings, the conic dome of the concrete tower sheltered a symbolic tombstone, mirroring Ibn Sina’s actual burial spot directly below. Shaped like a low pyramid, this symbolic tomb was inscribed on four sides in *Sols* calligraphy (Figs. 5.18).98 While the space around the tower was protected by a wall, overlooking the entire city and the nearby Alvand mountains, the prefabricated benches placed along the wall were intended to complete the “memorial” function of the upper level. The remaining areas were landscaped and linked to the “traditional Persian garden” on the street level by three sets of granite staircases on the northern, eastern, and western façades (Fig. 5.19).99 The formal precedence of the lower section, “housing all the functional aspects,” was similarly claimed by the architect to have been a “harmonious synthesis” of parts: Babylonian hanging gardens, Greek temples, and Pharaonic burial-chambers, symbolizing Ibn Sina’s “genius in fusing various sciences and arts.”100 Each architectural form and material seems to have denoted a specific feature of Ibn Sina’s life, work, or personality. The *Karnameh* explained the intentions of the architect:

> The technique is totally modern [so that] it could portray Ibn Sina as a genius philosopher. The rusticated stones depict his power and stability. The garden and pools are examples of

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98 The casting was poured by Czechoslovakian Zdenko Vessely. Its dimensions are 97.50 cm by 109 cm; see SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 103-104.

99 Seyhoun, *Houshang*, 36-37. Here, in the lower garden, right opposite the main entrance was buried Aref Qazvini in 1933-1934. The *Karnameh* is confused about the direction of the monument during the entire narrative. The main façade of the monument is due west as shown in Seyhoun’s original floor plan, Figs. 5.12 to 5.14 in this study. Considering this major mistake, the *Karnameh* writes, “The first staircase is towards south... On the southern side, there are other staircases with two landings and thirty-two steps. [Their] granite of ‘Khara’ stone is brought from the Alvand Mountains in the valley of Abbasabad near the Ganjnameh” Achaemenid inscriptions, located in the outskirts of Hamadan. SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 104.

Babylon's hanging gardens and symbols of the East. A selective process has been operated here with deep thought; it is not a mere mimicking. Each selection is made to demonstrate the thought and spirit of a style and a period. However, to harmonize and synthesize these different elements is the job of a talent. The building exhibits to the onlooker that there is a great man laying here; that he had an elevated spirit and an enduring legacy. With his knowledge he has managed to synthesize various sciences into a harmonious whole... The structure demonstrates all these qualities. If time does not destroy this monument, this man will remain safe.\(^{101}\)

An amalgam of Greek and Pharaonic temples, specifically those of Mentuhotep (2050 BC) and Queen Hatshepsut (1500 BC) in Deir el Bahari, Upper Egypt, served as architectural prototypes for the main façade. These carefully selected parts, void of context, were to make lofty historical and philosophical links: “Classical Greek architecture,” noted Seyhoun's monograph, “is evoked by the 10 lower level columns, while the shape of the tower refers to the contemporary architecture of Avicenna’s era,” further adding, “Together, these elements signify the fact that Persian philosophy was based on Greek philosophy.”\(^{102}\)

The 4-meter concrete columns of the main façade, which were intended to symbolize each passing century from Ibn Sina’s birth, totaled 10.\(^{103}\) The plan of this level was organized around the square tomb-chamber constructed of exposed cement and punctuated by 12 pillars rising to join the tower directly above. Inside the circular-plan pillars, the new gravestone of Yazd travertine was placed (Fig. 5.20).\(^{104}\) Under the chamber’s ceiling at 4.19 meters, 24 windows permitted the sun to cast a dim light on the tomb, while a row of Solse calligraphy ran around the room at 3.5 meters elevation. Each verse was inscribed on a single piece of white stone from Ibn Sina’s selected works.\(^{105}\)

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\(^{101}\) SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 96.

\(^{102}\) Seyhoun, *Houshang*, 37. The historic anachronism of this argument seems to be self-evident. The question remains as to how exactly were people to recognize each function attributed to each link. In other words, how was the ordinary tourist to associate ten columns with ten centuries and Greek façades with Greek philosophy? As will be seen in the concluding chapter, this amalgam of parts will inexorably open itself up to various, and often uninvited, readings by post-revolutionary tour-guides and specialists. Seyhoun would remain silent about the problematics of people’s (re)reading(s) of his cautiously crafted design. He would, in the end, dismiss my question based on “people’s un-acculturation (inculte)” and see absolutely no correlation between form and (re)meaning; between architect’s intention and execution and the reinterpretation of the landmark’s social meaning. Half a century after the monument’s erection, he would be utterly unwilling to admit that ‘reading’ has something to do with the slippery quality of his architectural choices. Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.

\(^{103}\) The main façade columns had the diameters of 95 centimeters and height of 4 meters.

\(^{104}\) See Seyhoun, *Houshang*, 36.

\(^{105}\) “Amir al-Ketab added the inscriptions of “besmelah-e rahman-e rahim” on the door leading to the tomb. The main tomb-chamber is a rectangular of 11.50 meters and a volume of 132.25 square meters. 12 pillars of the tower come down to the lower level and [Ibn Sina’s] tomb is in-between these pillars. His friend is buried next to him; each has a marble cover. In Solse Shiva calligraphy, an inscription is carved by Ahmad Masumi Zanjani. Measurements of the tomb are 43 cm by 1 meter.” For the inscription text, see SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 96-97.
The construction of the mausoleum was completed in the early 1952, costing the SNH a total of 1,707,550 tomans, equal to approximately $570,000; certainly not a small amount. Among others, the following establishments had paid for that structure: the royal court, 311,250 tomans; Hamadan’s municipality, 225,200 tomans; the Sun and Lion Foundation (the shah’s Red Cross), 100,000 tomans; sales from Ibn Sina’s lottery 129,873 tomans; sales from Ibn Sina’s stamps, 50,669 tomans; the construction company of Ebtehaj & Partners, 5,000; and most interestingly, Tehran University’s Medical school, 5,362 tomans. At the end, a 4 square meter burial-chamber had been transformed into an astonishing 7,000 square meter mausoleum and museum complex, not only towering over the largest square in the city – fittingly named Bu Ali – but also defining its urban circulation and future development (Fig. 5.21). On the first of May of the same year, in the presence of Hamadan’s governor, the cultural minister, the chief of police, the state’s technical inspector, the various members of the SNH, and “many religious leaders,” the box containing the remains of Ibn Sina and Shaykh Abu Said Dahkhud were inspected and opened for reburial. “With complete attention and respect to the religious traditions and rites (shar),” according to the Karnameh, the two men were reburied side by side in the modern tomb.

Critics and admirers alike were content with the monument. One described it as “among the most magnificent (ba shokuh-tarin) and splendid (mojalal-tarin) buildings in history,” adding, “the architectural significance (ahamiyat) and value (arzesh) of which will increase with the passing of time.” A traveler stated, “The best [mausoleum] covers the Tomb of the famous Ibn Sina,” denoting that, “A library has been set up for students in an outbuilding of the

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106 In the mid-1950s, one dollar equaled around three tomans.
107 For a detailed list of the costs and incomes related to Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, see Mostafavi, Hagmatanah, 45-46.
108 SNH 131, Karnameh, 96, 105.
109 In its 1970 annual report, the SNH informed the Cultural Ministry, “In accordance to the new master plan of Hamadan, supplementary land has been added to the property of the Ibn Sina Aramgah and for that reason a new fence has been placed.” Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, page 5; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Khoradad 11, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran. Later additions included two offices, a greenhouse, a guesthouse, the ticket kiosk, storage area, and public restrooms. “After 1349, the Hamadan Municipality gave land to the complex with gardens around it with metal fences separating Bu Ali Avenue [from the Ibn Sina Mausoleum]. Part of the western garden, is over the river. In addition to this, the municipality is [in the process of] building a large square in the name of Bu Ali on the western [this should be eastern] side of the complex. They intend to transport Ibn Sina’s statue to face this square. On the eastern side of the garden, facing the main entrance and opposite Bu Ali Avenue, is placed the [tomb of] Iranian poet Abd al-Qasem Aref Qazvini. The inscription in Nastaliq indicates the date of Bahman 1312 Shamsi.” This change took place in 1976. SNH 131, Karnameh, 105-106.
110 N. Najmi, Iran-e Qadim va Tehran-e Qadim (Tehran, c. 1970), 45.
mausoleum next to a small museum devoted" to his work. One praised it as “solidly built of stone and surmounted by a lofty tower with a conical top.”\textsuperscript{112} Another simply commented, “In the same street as the Bou Ali Hotel is the modern mausoleum...a small museum of manuscripts and objects associated with him is attached to the mausoleum [sic.]”\textsuperscript{113} By the 1960s, the mausoleum had become a recognizable public object inside and outside Hamadan, on the background of which other, more poignant, issues were raised and debated. For instance, Ayandegan published a caricature drawing in April 1968 criticizing the state’s neglect of the “poor (geda),” who, in the cartoonist’s view, had “occupied (eshqal)” the famed tourist sites (Fig. 5.22).\textsuperscript{114} A (con)fusion of the towers of Ibn Sina and Qabus appeared as the setting of a poor man and a tourist handing out money; the caption read, “the needy have occupied the tomb of Qabus.” As to my question whether “you think the Iranian people have accepted, liked your monument?” Seyhoun simply said, “As far as I can remember, there have never been difficulties...”\textsuperscript{115}

In (re)considering the design and execution of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, however, there is something to be said about the lack of attention to construction details, to the uneasy amalgam of various historic forms and elements, to the unsuccessful merger of towers and temples, and, above all, to the awkward relationship between the structure and its urban context. While the monument represented the contemporary aesthetic and political movements as well as the aspirations of those who conceived, financed, and built it, it also spoke about the architect’s way

\textsuperscript{111} “While lacking antique vestiges, Hamadan...has several monuments worthy of interest. They are usually mausoleums. Their exterior was recently renewed by constructions inspired by the spindle-shaped structure of Mongol towers, to the exclusion of all other features of these towers. The best one covers the Tomb of the famous Ibn Sina... Today he would have been called a ‘pluridisciplinary’ scientist... A library has been set up for students in an outbuilding of the mausoleum next to a small museum devoted to the work of Ibn Sina.” J. Hureau, Iran Today (Tehran, 1975), 117.

\textsuperscript{112} “At the end of April, 1954, a large number of Orientalists and others who were attending the Ibn Sina millenary celebrations in Persia as the guests of the Persian Government arrived in Hamadan from Tehran in order to be presented at the opening ceremony of the new mausoleum of the great scholar. This ceremony was performed by H.I.M. the Shah. The new building, which stands on the site of its predecessor, is on the west side of the new Abu ‘Ali avenue some 700 yards from the central Pahlavi Maidan. It is solidly built of stone and is surmounted by a lofty tower with a conical top. Several hundreds yards further to the south-south-east, facing down the avenue, is the new statue of Ibn Sina, the unveiling of which was also part of the millenary celebrations.” Lockhart, Persian Cities, 100.

\textsuperscript{113} The text continues, “The tomb of the mystic poet Sheikh Abu Said Dokduh, Avicenna’s host while he lived in Hamadan, is also housed in the same mausoleum.” S. A. Matheson, Persia: An Archaeological Guide (London, 1972), 110. And, “In 1037 the great philosopher Abu ‘Ali Sina left Isfahan for Hamadan; already in feeble health when he left the former city, he died very soon after his arrival in Hamadan.” Isfahani dispute this claim arguing that he died in Isfahan and hence belong to Isfahan instead of Hamadan. “His tomb, which was restored in 1877, was completely rebuilt in 1956, in celebration of the thousandth anniversary of his birth.” Lockhart, Persian Cities, 98.

\textsuperscript{114} [Cartoon drawing], Ayandegan 96 (Farvardin 25, 1347/April 14, 1968): 9.
of thinking vis-à-vis his own role in the society and history. The arbitrary amalgamation of historic forms, for instance in this case the fusion of Egyptian temples, Babylonian gardens, and medieval Muslim towers, had been a Beaux-Arts influence on Seyhoun who, in turn, as of his return to Iran had given himself the freedom to create new formal typologies and design formulas. "The importance of History as the generator of forms at Beaux-Arts," Seyhoun’s monograph maintained, "has permitted architects to turn towards recuperating purely formal elements from diverse sources," adding "As such, the architect had the possibility to give freewill to its geometric fantasies." 116 Ibn Sina's modern mausoleum, therefore, could be considered an architectural fantasy, aside from the very real ideological underpinning and inferences that it had on official conceptions about the nation’s superior race and taste.

- Displaying Taste & Race

The interjection of such a large-scale and novel design – part familiar, part strange – in the built environment of such a small place as Hamadan was indicative of the central government’s wish to extend central institutions into the provinces and those of the pluralist advocates dispersing the state’s central power. During the politically tense years of the mid-1950s, the realization of such a monument could but inflame passionate political disputes. Aside from its size and style, the public functions housed under its roof, buttressed the various ideological claims of the authorities. Selected architectural parts that had been assembled as a legible whole were also meant to reinforce the official rhetoric on the Aryan and exclusively Iranian roots of Ibn Sina. The public program of the monument, therefore, incorporated a very specific, arguably well-designed, orchestration of inscriptions, displays, panels, and exhibits. Furthermore, the various reproductions of the mausoleum itself in form of posters, stamps, and medallions not only reconfirmed the veracity of the role of the edifice in national identity formation, but also evenly disseminated its image throughout the vast country.

As the visitor entered the main doorway, she was exposed to a series of displays. On the immediate right, the architectural inscription read: "The architect of the tomb, architect Houshang Seyhoun; constructor of the building, Ebtehaj & Partners, 1370 Hejri-e Qamari [AH],

115 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.
116 Seyhoun, L’architecture de Seyhoun, 1-3.
1330 Shamsi [Solar Hejri].” On the immediate left, another inscription read: “Great Iranian Hakim and doctor Ibn Sina, spent a part of his valuable life in this city and here he was buried. In Mehr 1331-October 1952, The Committee of Ibn Sina’s Millenary Anniversary.”\textsuperscript{117} At the end of the hallway, Ibn Sina’s original tombstone was displayed as a “historic edifice” in juxtaposition to his modern tomb; it was advertised as “a rectangular shape 1.25, 1.05, 0.25 meter stone in the style of [the] Mongol period.”\textsuperscript{118} As the only remaining evidence of not only “what had been there before the Pahlavis,” but also as the only “object worth keeping,” the medieval stone was first excavated as an archeological object and then placed under glass and label (Figs. 5.23). Its two sides were ornamented by an Arabic inscription from the 25th and 26th verses (ay-e) of the third sureh of Majid’s Koran in Nastaliq calligraphy. The gold label that read “Old tombstone of Ibn Sina which initially covered his grave,” inexorably gave it a sense of aesthetic autonomy and historic authenticity. Each stage of this process of museumization had been carefully photographed and documented by the SNH: first, in lieu; then, in case.\textsuperscript{119} As an historic artifact, furthermore, the tombstone represented a much larger and longer historic reality, tailoring an exclusive interpretation of its own history void of a much larger context: \textit{it} represented the entire history of Ibn Sina’s tombstone before the Pahlavis. Hence, it validated not only the presence of the modern mausoleum but also, more crucially, the destructive patter to which it had been subjugated. Through it, in short, the past was being appropriated into a modern history.

Across from the tombstone, two rather large display-panels were fixed at the entrance of the new tomb-chamber (Figs. 5.24-5.25).\textsuperscript{120} Donated by Said Nafisi, the Persian language and literature professor at Tehran University and a member of the SNH, the most striking items on these boards were a photograph of the profile of a skull, flanked beneath by a pencil drawing of Ibn Sina. The former was described as “The skull of the photograph: ave-Sina [sic.],” while the

\textsuperscript{117} The former panel was fixed to the northern wall while the latter to the southern wall of the main doorway. My observation; see, Mostafavi, \textit{Hagmatanah}, 37-39 and SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 98-100.
\textsuperscript{118} Mostafavi, \textit{Hagmatanah}, 29-30. See also, SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 83.
\textsuperscript{119} “It is thus through the Museum that questions of origin, causality, representation, and symbolization are most clearly stated. The Museum, as well as the question it tries to answer, depends upon the archeological epistemology. Its representational and historical pretensions are based upon a number of metaphysical assumptions about origins – archeology intends, after all, to be a science of the arches. Archeological origins are important in two ways: each archeological artifact has to be an original artifact, and these original artifacts must in turn explain the meaning of subsequent larger history.” Quoted in E. Donato, “The Museum’s Furnace: Notes Toward a Contextual Reading of Bouvard and Pécuchet,” \textit{Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism}, ed. J. V. Harari (Ithaca, 1979), 220.
\textsuperscript{120} Each display-panel measured 60 by 40 centimeters, one with Persian and the other with English textual descriptions and illustrations.
latter, "the face of the Ave-Sina that is Designed to Skull [sic.]."\textsuperscript{121} The adjoining text reinforced the narrative of the illustrations with the description of Ibn Sina's life, work, and above all, personality. Taken as a whole, the two panels not only demonstrated the perseverance of the Aryan rhetoric under Reza Shah's successor, but also to the SNH's commitment to its original political program as first delineated in its 1922 by-laws. They also revealed the processes through which the entire project purported to represent, in exactitude, the essence of the man buried there and hinted at how sophisticated such official expressions had become by the 1950s. Through practice, the SNH had become a master of image making. The enhanced techniques of reproduction were, and remain today, a powerful metaphor for believers and skeptics alike. Overall, this corridor – an in-between, liminal space metamorphosed into an ideological museum – served the tourist to conceptually and historiographically map the mausoleum and re-navigate its contemporary meaning.

The two sides of the central hallway, which opened into two facing rooms, were reserved for a library-museum on the north and a study-lecture on the south.\textsuperscript{122} In large glass casings along the walls, the museum exhibited various manuscripts and publications of Ibn Sina's works, a range of personal objects, and a large number of paraphernalia. Among the displays here, the images of Ibn Sina's portrait and skull reappeared as if to visually (re)confirm its veracity (Fig. 5.26). On the northern wall of this hall was affixed the main inscription; it read (Figs. 5.27):

In the name of kind and merciful God
Thus, says Ali Asghar Hekmat-e Shirazi, a millennium has passed from the birth of
Hojjat Haq Sharaf al-Molk Shaykh Rayis Abu Ali Hosayn Ibn Abdol Ibn Sina. As per orders from the Shahanshah, His Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, [it] was decided to erect a building on [Ibn Sina’s] grave for the memory of that great man, whose valuable work remains standing. [The grave intended to] represent [Ibn Sina’s] intellectual greatness and height, the power of his science, and the immensity of his person. A group of patriots, [determined] to preserve [our] national heritage and pursue this noble purpose, stood up in order to realized the shah’s decree. In the year 1370 Qamari [AH], 1330 Shamsi [Solar Hejri], the structure was completed in the hope that this favor in memory of the great scientist will meet the appreciation of Iran’s children and world’s wise men.\textsuperscript{123}

This dedication was followed by eight verses from Ibn Sina's work. While the rather long name and title of the king was inscribed in gold letters, as had been the case at Hafeziyeh, the composition and wording of the text was a copy from that of Ferdawsiyeh. In all three

\textsuperscript{121} This information is based on my observation and documentation of the display board. Its author evidently was not well versed in English.
\textsuperscript{122} Each of these halls was designed to equal dimensions, each measuring 9.45 by 5.75 meters.
\textsuperscript{123} My translation. For the original text, see Mostafavi, Hagmatanah, 40-42; and SNH 131, Karnameh, 100-102.
mausoleums, the prime agency of the monarch, the good intentions of a handful of anonymous still intensely “patriotic” men, the omnipresence of the given historic figure, and the triumphal nature of the project, hinted at the systemic and consistent manner in which the SNH approached its architectural undertakings. In each case, the inscriptions were indicative of the monuments’ own history, each projecting ideas about modern national efficacy, royal generosity, and the goodwill of the nation’s “patriots;” each also simultaneously omitting the problems during construction, political intrigues, individual rivalries, and ideological push and pulls. The (un)truth signaled by their elaborate and impressive inscriptions was, in fact, a metaphor for the entire project of Iran’s modernity: utopian promises entangled in uneven development.

The portraits and statues of each of these historic figures, as explained in chapters 3 and 4, were an integral part of the mausoleum projects and their culture of display; that of Ibn Sina’s was certainly no exception. “Just as the responsibility to produce the image[s] (tasfir) of [Omar] Khayyam, Sa’di, Ferdowsi, and Ibn Sina,” noted the Karnameh, “was [placed] on the shoulders of anjoman-e asar-e melli” in October 1941, a group of artists, architects, and politicians, including Sadiq and Seyhoun, gathered to tackle this duty. More specifically, “during this meeting it was decided that since the tomb had been built by the SNH, it is, therefore, necessary to order an image (tasfir),” had thus reasoned the Society’s members, “especially because such an image will be needed for the creation of a statue.”124 The final depictions of each historic personage were manufactured based on “careful stud[ies]” of their “personalit[ies],” further added the Karnameh.125 In the special case of Ibn Sina, his “image (tasfir)” was reported to have been prepared from the photograph of his skull (Figs. 5.28). “For the preparation of the statue,” wrote Mostafavi, “numerous commissions were composed of those scholars familiar with Ibn Sina’s heritage (asar) and biography (shehr-e hall),” adding, “With attention to that which had been written in books about Ibn Sina, an image (tasfir) of him was drawn (tasrim yaft),” which was approved during the Society’s meeting on April 21, 1946 and “sent to publication, the preparation of the statue, and official recognition.”126 Based on that image, two sculptures were soon produced, one for Hamadan and the other for the capital city. As photographed in his

124 SNH 131, Karnameh, 325.
125 SNH 131, Karnameh, 326-327.
126 Mostafavi, Hagmatanah, 47, footnote 1. For more details about Ibn Sina’s statue and portrait, see Mostafavi, Hagmatanah, 47-55.
workshop, Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi, who had authored the statues of Ferdawsi, Sa’di, Omar Khayyam, and Nader Shah in the previous decades, was hired to sculpt Ibn Sina’s “one-piece out of Qom’s marble” (Figs. 5.29). Towering its author and rising to more than 3 meters, it was unveiled on the Bu Ali Square in Hamadan during an elaborate ceremony.

The narrative of the portraits and statues, as integral to the mausoleum’s very meaning, contributed in no small way to the articulation of the visual role of architecture in the politics of seeing and believing. As systems of national narrative, they disguised certain operations while enabling others, for instance, the rivalries of its architects in lieu of the coherent image of national unity, historic eminence, and architectural innovation. The dissemination of these images, furthermore, proved essential to the larger Pahlavi efforts in concocting an equally coherent narrative about Iran’s history vis-à-vis the merits of the institution of the monarchy and its attempts to modernize the country. The mausoleums and their assembly of symbols, signs, and relics were constant reminders of the omnipresence of Iran’s national heroes, in and out of daily life; their systematic and standardized nature, a condition of their veracity. The question was not so much the link between the representation and the historic figure, but rather the correlation between various (re)productions. The (un)truth of these signs was read as a prior (in)authentic. In this logic of repeated simulacra and simulations, each fabricated artifact validated the presence of the other.

Such displays were certainly not confined to newspapers and urban squares. Already in 1935, nine new stamps had been issued by the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs that “illustrated the various phases of progress achieved under the luminous reign of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.” Along with “Progress in science and art” and the neo-Achaemenid “Municipal building

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127 This photograph of the statue with the sculptor in mid-formation recalls the Lenin-Stalin cult in the 1940s and 1950s USSR. “The organized cult of Lenin celebrates the leader as an immortal, accessible to the people through his writings, his ubiquitous portraits, and his embalmed flesh, on permanent display in the mausoleum. The cult served the need of the Soviet state and, as a standardized complex of activities and symbols, was a government and party enterprise concocted for the delectation of the untutored masses.” N. Tumarkin, Lenin lives!: the Lenin cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, 1997), xi and 3.

128 SNH 131, Karmeh, 788; and Mostafavi, Hagmatanah, 47-48. Subject to further urban modernization in 1971, this statue was relocated to become part of the larger territory of the mausoleum complex. “The statue was not there [originally].” Seyhoun reproachfully recalls, “It was in the north where there was a square. They took and displaced it.” The architect felt that the structure had been designed not for a round square but a wide avenue. “This building was not created for a square. I wanted the building to remain in its original context.” Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.

129 See J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Michigan, 1994).

of Tehran Post Office,” the ten-dinar stamp had depicted “National relics discovered at Persepolis.” Progress had not only been inherently linked with specific mausoleums associated with ideas about “heritage” and “culture,” but more importantly, could only be “illustrated,” brought into the public domain by the means of representation and reproduction. Therefore, on the occasion of Ibn Sina’s millenary celebration in 1952, new sets of stamps were issued, this time, depicting the portrait of the scientist, his pre-modern burial-chamber, and the modern mausoleum. Similar to Ferdawsi’s medallion, Ibn Sina’s carried his profile on one side and the silhouette of his new tomb on the other (Figs. 5.30-5.31).

Since museums – as distinct and separate disciplinary areas and as “discursive formations” – were institutionalized and thus flourished in Iran under the Pahlavis, they invariably helped reproduce a national history directed at legitimizing the existence of the ruling dynasty and its formation of the nation-state. The displays of the nation’s cultural and historical fragments both canonized new ways of looking at artifacts, and prompted new insights into the purely national and racial history of Iran. More importantly, the almost sacred place reserved for these museums inevitably enabled them to assemble various historic and non-historic objects, authentic and reproduced artifacts, as well as unrelated inscriptions, boards, and models into a single coherent whole. For instance, in Ibn Sina’s museum, while the tombstone and the manuscripts articulated the SNH’s skills of production technique, the paraphernalia presented the technique of reproduction. Within its doors, the distinctions between historical objects, archeological samples, and cheap paraphernalia were reduced to none; all things became sacred under its glass casings. For the museum was an a priori privileged place that harmonized and unified all that was heterogeneously gathered under its roof. This condition inherent to museums also sanctioned the unproblematic erasure of the unwanted. “At the same time museums erase old meanings, they have the potential to allow new significances to be discerned. It becomes a question of how and in what way museums encourage (or discourage) the viewer to

132 “The set of objects the Museum displays is sustained only by the fiction that they somehow constitute a coherent representational universe. The fiction is that a repeated metonymic displacement of fragment for totality, object of label, series of objects to series of labels, can still produce a representation which is somehow adequate to a nonlinguistic universe. Such a fiction is the result of an uncritical belief in the notion that ordering and classifying, that is to say, the spatial juxtaposition of fragments, can produce a representational understanding of the world.” Quoted in Donato, “Museum’s Furnace,” 223.
see new or different possibilities in art." The erasure of the past, in this case as in the case of all these mausoleum projects, was literal, aggressive, and final. The paramount example of this was the complete destruction of the 1877 structure from the Qajar era. Architectural destruction conditioned the rewriting of history, intensely national and racist in disposition. While a sociological survey of visitors' response to the building is outside the scope of this dissertation, for it is predominantly concerned with conception, not reception, still it is probably safe to assume that Iranians and non-Iranians alike, when visiting the complex, believed in what they were presented with.

The erection of Ibn Sina's tomb and its collection, furthermore, occasioned the reinvesting of the historic figure as a purely Iranian-Aryan scientist, often de-emphasizing his Muslim intellectual background and historic context. Under Ibn Sina's new portrait, for instance, Ayandegan vehemently maintained, "You are an Iranian. You were born and you have lived under this sun and on this land (khak). You have lived with these colors, these smells, and these same sounds... You, just like us, always remember Persepolis." Shifting his address to the audience, the author affirmed, "I am a compatriot (ham vatan) of Ibn Sina, and I carry the same blood (ham khun) as Ibn Sina, I am Ibn Sina's brother," then addressing Ibn Sina once more, he concluded, "You are ours, you are one of us, you rose from our land...." Along similar lines, while Mehr published a long article entitled "Ibn Sina: One of the Famed Scientists of Iran," the Karnameh described him as "This genius... the heritage of this nation."

The architecture of the tomb, the viable correlation between portraits and statues, and the seeming scientificity of the skull display the veracity of these official declarations. On these panels, and elsewhere in the mausoleum, the scientific endeavors of race and architecture had merged to testify to bigger ideas: the act of digging skulls, portrayed as a byproduct of the architectural undertaking, fittingly nourished the notion that all Iranians were, indeed, Aryan. The ostensibly scientific evidence for this, the state claimed, resided under the tombstones of "Iranian geniuses," men like Ibn Sina. This presence, moreover, served the revivalistic agenda of the state. When Le Journal de Téhéran published "Hamadan, Capital of Darius" in February 1965, it heralded, "I [Hamadan] had in fact become a ruin, I, who had been the capital of great

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133 A. McClellan, Inventing the Louvre (Berkeley, 1994), 202.
134 "Ibn Sina: You are the Ocean, You are the Snow, You are the Tall Mountain," Ayandegan 207 (Mordad 31, 1347/August 22, 1968): 7 and 9.
kings like Darius, Cyrus, Xerxes... however, I am beginning to become an important city again; once again a center of vestige and historic monuments.” The article went on, “I only had two avenues, a few old monuments in ruins, and insignificant until 1938... A mausoleum has been erected in honor of the great international savant Avicenna, whose mother I am.” The architectural venture both occasioned and conditioned the fabrication and development of the myth of origin. Once documented and museumized, there was no doubt as to the truth of the skull, its presence in that structure in terms of belonging to Ibn Sina, and its normative use in his mausoleum. The very existence of the structure not only facilitated, but very much conditioned the realization and viability of such a deeply racist and an exclusively political agenda.

When, during the inaugural of Nader Shah’s tomb, Mohammad Reza Shah proclaimed, “People should look upon the great men of their race and past great men of their country with respect,” adding, “I hope that [the] SNH will have more success, on a daily basis, in preserving this county’s heritage and in building similar monuments to posterity in every corner of this country,” few wondered which “race” or which “great men” he actually referred to. The monumental structures, “in every corner of” modern Iran stood as firm confirmation of his discourse. Similarly, when these invented portraits found their way into textbooks and magazines, for instance, in Isa Sadiq’s History of Education in Iran (1957), teachers and students alike were convinced about the exacting truth that these images represented: this was Ibn Sina as he had always been. Most remarkably, A Guide to Hamadan’s fantastic claim that “Abu-‘Ali was,” indeed, “a strong, well-built, handsome, generous and extremely active man,” could only be sustained by the presence of the aestheticized modern mausoleum, the historicized original tombstone, the photographic reproduction of the skull, and the compulsive production of portraits, statues, medallions, stamps, and other paraphernalia, each of which counted on the next...

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137 The occasion was also used to cast away all doubt about any racial disputes: “Let’s not forget,” the editor wrote, “the heroic resistance of my citizens. Neither the Afghans nor the Turks spared my inhabitants...until the arrival” of Nader Shah who “chased the Ottoman Turks off my land...” A photograph of Ibn Sina’s tower stood as proof of all that was being asserted. E. I., “Hamadan, Capital of Darius,” Le Journal de Téhéran 8831 (February 27, 1965): 1.
138 SNH 131, Karnameh, 272.
139 Sadiq, Tarikh-e Farhang, 137. For other such publications, see, for example, B. Pazargan, Tarikh-e dav hezar panzah sal-e Shahanshahi-ye Iran: Qabl az Eslam ta Asar-e Pahlavi (2500-year history of monarchical Iran: from Islam to the Pahlavi era) (Tehran, c. 1971), image of tombs of Ibn Sina 110 and Nader Shah 153-154.
to validate itself.\textsuperscript{140} They collectively, in turn, validated a new discourse on Iran’s national history, high culture, and scientific authority, which met on the stage set by architecture.

It is under the light of politicized artistic endeavors that we have to see the inauguration of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum. In a meeting on August 24, 1952, the SNH’s Board of Trustees gathered to discuss the official inauguration of their latest undertaking and the details of the conference and ceremonies that would accompany it. Veterans and newcomers had gathered at Ebrahim Hakimi’s Niavaran garden, in northern Tehran. The former included Ali Asghar Hekmat, Allayar Saleh, Isa Sadiq, Mostashar al-Dowleh Sadeq, Hosayn Sami’i, Ebrahim Hakimi, and Qolam Hosayn Sadiqi. The latter included Taqi Ali Abadi, Mohammad Taqi Mostafavi, Kambiz, Hosayn Jodat, and Seyhoun (Fig. 5.32). Their decisions were dispatched in an official memo on October 4 to all government agencies, announcing “Ibn Sina Millenary Celebration,” scheduled for the following June.\textsuperscript{141} While the memo specified that the ministries of “Culture, Education, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Interior will cooperate with the SNH to achieve this” goal, the Society requested the Cultural Ministry to send “a representative with full rights” to its first celebration meeting on October 16.\textsuperscript{142} Here, the members who took the opportunity to be photographed in front of the nearly completed monument on October 31 of the same year, included Ali Hoyat, Taqizadeh, Hakimi, Sadiq, General Aqeveli, Hekmat, and Godard (Fig. 5.33).

Repeating the celebrations and the conference organized for Ferdawsi’s millenary in October 1934, “a large number of Orientalists” arrived in Iran during the last week of April 1954 to celebrate Ibn Sina’s life and work. As in 1934, 2-toman raffle tickets were issued with “three winners of 2,500 tomans and 3,336 winners of other prizes.”\textsuperscript{143} The income derived from these sales was used to pay for the conference as well as the completion of the monument, for as in 1934, the Western scholars were honorary guests of the SNH and the Iranian government. During the few days that followed, lectures were delivered, gifts were exchanged, and sites were

\textsuperscript{140} Geographical Division & SNH, \textit{Guide to Hamadan}, part III, 3.
\textsuperscript{141} Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 34, Document 111, page 3; memo dated Mehr 12, 1331/October 4, 1952, Tehran.
\textsuperscript{142} Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 34, Document 111, page 2; SNH’s Board of Directors to Minister of Culture, Mehr 20, 1331/October 12, 1952, Tehran. A certain Mohsen Hadad was sent; see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 34, Document 111, page 1; Minister of Culture to SNH’s Board of Directors, Mehr 23, 1331/October 15, 1952, Tehran.
\textsuperscript{143} Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 34, Document 111, page 4-5; In Sina raffle announcement, undated, Tehran.
visited, after which the participants were headed towards Hamadan to visit Ibn Sina’s modern mausoleum.\textsuperscript{144} In his father’s footsteps, Mohammad Reza Shah, dressed in a military uniform, appeared in front of the monument. Unlike his father, however, the young monarch had very little to say. With the exception of the inaugural of Nader Shah’s mausoleum, “usually, he would not talk.”\textsuperscript{145} Later it was reported, “This new resting-place was inaugurated by the gracious hands of His Majesty the Shahanshah on the date of 29 April 1954” (Figs. 5.34).\textsuperscript{146} It was hoped that the rather elaborate ritual of both unveiling the statue and inaugurating the mausoleum would help set the condition for a laudable discourse not only on Iran’s ancient past, medieval renaissance, and modernistic future, but also on the very legitimacy of the Pahlavi monarchy. In this case, it was particularly true, because unlike the inauguration of Sa’di’s mausoleum in Shiraz two years earlier, during Ibn Sina’s ribbon-cutting ceremony the shah emerged in his military uniform and was not accompanied by his queen, Soraya. It was clear that after the 1953 coup, the ritual was less about the patronage of art \textit{per se}, and more about the public display of the monarch’s political might and cultural sensibility.

Furthermore, while Sa’diyeh’s inaugural had provided contemporary chroniclers with the ideal circumstance to publicly criticize the state and the king, two years later, in the inaugural of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum the monarch and the state seized the perfect opportunity to reclaim their power.\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Yagham}, for instance, published a sharply mocking description of the first event, while two years later, no journal risked similar criticism:

A great crowd of soldiers, captains, majors and generals of every type, ministers, deputies, journalists and agents of the secret police, for the love of Sa’di, they all bore the trouble of a visit to Shiraz... And all of this because His Majesty wanted to honor the inauguration of the new mausoleum with his presence... It became clear afterwards that with the excuse of Sa’di and with the money of the state all these people in black ties and starched collars (women with dresses open to the belly button) met in parties with drivers, servants and secret agents. The Shirazis, in order to be able to attend these receptions, had to borrow money to buy the required dresses... Then, because a crowd has to be present to whom the state people can show


\textsuperscript{145} Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.

\textsuperscript{146} SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 100.

\textsuperscript{147} For an account of Sa’di’s inaugural ceremony on May 1, 1952, see chapter 4 in this study.
off and that secret agents can offend, well, here they are, the literary critics as a decoration around the jet set of society, but for heaven's sake, not too close! In the article, Sa'di, his mausoleum, and the rituals in and around it were read as excessive show of power by the ruling class and were, thus, criticized for its overindulgence, arrogance, and hypocrisy vis-à-vis the ordinary Iranian. "From the chronicle's point of view the inauguration was a mission to reaffirm monarchical authority in a distant province through 'culture'." In it, the idea of "culture" was differentiated by "black neckties" and "short dresses" on the backdrop of the modern mausoleum, which was perceived as a mere "excuse" to display political force. Or rather more accurately, these were the signs of the kind of modernity defined and displayed by the Pahlavi elite which had set itself on a collusion course with another kind of modernity defined by conflicting constructs such as "tradition," "the veil," and "the turban." This rare moment of political freedom enjoyed by Iran's mass and media ended abruptly in August 1953. Subsequently, similar exhibition of high culture on the backdrop of modern architecture would carry far less political significance.

"In the middle of the construction of Bu Ali," Seyhoun recently confessed, "I had major problems with Hekmat. He kept telling me that I should do 'this' and 'that.' Our water did not run in the same stream (jub) [i.e. We did not see eye-to-eye]. And, I would not obey him!" Similarly when Khorasan's army general (sar-lashgar) spontaneously arrived at Mashhad to "inspect" Nader Shah's mausoleum in mid-construction, "I said, 'what inspection? The building does not have an inspection' [sic.]." A mere decade ago, Seyhoun would not have uttered

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149 Manoukian, "City of Knowledge," 46.
150 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.
151 Seyhoun preferred not to mention the name of the general in question. "One of these days, when we had arrived [on the site], someone came and said that the sar-lashgar is here for an inspection. I said, 'what inspection, the building does not have an inspection!' I realized we are falling behind so I told someone else to escort the sar-lashgar. He was offended by this. From that day on, during the three years that we were construction, he orchestrated bad opinion about me and the structure - in newspapers and elsewhere; until the day when it was finished and we wanted to inaugurate it. The SNH provided a special train for everyone to participate. The photo of that day is in the Karnameh. [...] When in the morning we went to the Nader Garden (bagh-e naderi), all around there were soldiers standing with automatic weapons. They did not do that even when the Shah would come. That day, they did. After they read the announcements and the rest, the timsar got up and started to complain; that "we did not want the aramgah in this style." Why, 'we had a minaret, so that a sword can be placed on top of it so that they could write on it, 'Nader, Son of Sword.' If they had built something like that, it would have been very ridiculous (maskhareh). Then, Sepahbod Aqeveli asked me, 'what is your answer?' [...] I said, 'as much as I know about issue involving the army, the gentleman, knows about architecture' [unidentifiable]. We forced ourselves to
these words. In Reza Shah’s Iran everyone and everything was subject to impulsive inspections. This was a new kind of Pahlavi professional, one who would “not obey,” but who would live to tell about it. Despite such assertions decades later, however, things were far more nuanced on the ground at the time. Young professionals, like Seyhoun, came back to Iran from Europe with great hopes and even greater expectations of an immediate success. “These students returned to perceive that the New Order was only skin-deep and that considerable areas of society had not been penetrated by it at all. They found that they neither belonged to this society nor were readily accepted by it.”\textsuperscript{152} They, instead faced numerous obstacles: the jealously of others, especially the generation before them; their own inability to read the social codes of the existing society, above all a complete lack of professional network and contacts; and the technical disparity between what they had learned at the École des Beaux-Arts and the reality of implementing these skills at home. The gulf between their adamant certainties of how things ought to be done – buttressed by the scientific claim of their Western education – and the certainties of those who had done things as had been done for a long time – sustained by a solid socioeconomic context – was often too wide. This was particularly hard on architects and engineers who had to supervise a large number of local workers and deal with existing sites, materials, techniques, and oft-invisible red tape. Some recognized and others did not that their architectural knowledge operated in a sociopolitical vacuum. “To many Iranians who had studied or traveled in the West, the chasm between the material progress of the West and their own country was a source of frustration and defeatism.”\textsuperscript{153} Other historians concur that among Western educated architects and engineers often “disillusionment and frustration resulted.”\textsuperscript{154}

Complicating the picture further was the fact that these “disobediences” did not stem from a sovereign sense of personal rights or collective political evolution, but rather, from the fact that these men were themselves products of the New Order and, often inadvertently, paid lip service to the regime. Ultimately, that which they taught and built remained safely within the permissible limits of Pahlavi sociopolitical conduct. Their disobedience, too, had little or no depth, for, like Iran, they too had been born into a system of infrastructural development and political underdevelopment. Therefore, these men seldom proved themselves real critics of the

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\textsuperscript{152} Avery, Modern Iran, 481.

\textsuperscript{153} Banani, Modernization of Iran, 145.
established order, never a sincere opposition. Even so, to miss these highly nuanced details, for instance, the uneasy tension between various local architects, politicians, and ways of operation and to forgo a critical approach to the simultaneously awkward and eminent position of these architects in Pahlavi society in lieu of a rosy picture of what happened, would be a serious omission in terms of understanding Iranian modernity as well as the history of Iran’s modern architecture. It would simply be a historiographical neglect for the amalgam of these tensions made up the very essence of modernity’s experience in Iran, and arguably, in most non-Western societies during the height of their modernization. The overzealous and shattered expectations of the Beaux-Arts-trained architectural student, the monumental and crumbled structure of a public landmark, or the over-ambitious and overbearing demands of the Pahlavi reformist are all decisive moments in the rapid modernity of Iran-e Novin.

Seyhoun was, nevertheless, punished for having contradicted “a dictator” like Hekmat: “I would not obey him, to the point that the day of the monument’s inaugural, when the shah was going to be present, I was not invited.” In spite of this, he would go on to bigger jobs and better positions in Iran’s elitist cultural society. As an active contributor to the Pahlavi discourse on Iranian modernism through architecture, Seyhoun was, and still remains, an ardent believer in the ideological agenda established by the early modernists and co-opted by the Pahlavi royal house, candidly reflected in his nationalist reading of Iran’s architectural theories; “There is no such thing as an ‘Islamic architecture’, ” he assured me, for “all the architectural forms and elements that we see employed by Muslims over the centuries are mere variations on Sassanian prototypes.” Seyhoun’s teachings would be dominant in Iran’s main architectural establishments, such as his Alma Matter, wherein he first became a professor and then a dean in 1962. Before resigning “in protest against changes in the government of the University” in 1969, he would introduce eminent Western architects, like Alvar Aalto and Richard Neutra, to the architectural community of Tehran. (Figs. 5.35) Subsequently, as a member of the Municipal Council of Tehran, the president of SIA, and a UNESCO affiliate, he would be vital to the ties

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154 Avery, Modern Iran, 480.
155 For instance, Marefat’s dissertation, while valuable for its interviews with architects, forgoes any critical approach to the relationship between these architects and the authoritarian state, or between the architectural profession and the monarchy. This tension, I believe, is central to the history of Iran’s modern architecture which historians have thus far completely overlooked.
156 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.
157 Seyhoun interview, Tape 1.
158 Seyhoun, Houshang, 15.
between various state establishments and the architectural education and profession in Pahlavi Iran.  

In an interview with her travel companion, Marie-Thérèse Ullens, French Orientalist Yedda Godard insisted, “Between us, none of the Pahlavis were interested in art objects,” adding with no small degree of sarcasm, “Persians have no interest” in such things, “I remember Qashgah’s...using Persepolis for practical purposes... Unlike Babylon, in Persia, God alone is eternal, and the monuments can crumble!” Admittedly, if anything, the idea of god(s) alone seems to be eternal. All the same, neither did the monuments crumble in Iran nor were the Pahlavis such philistines. In fact, after the 1953 coup d’état, both king and state co-opted all the processes and forms of high culture in ways that would fully serve their need to maintain political power. While artistic and architectural discourses autonomously increased in scope and intensified in theoretical depth, they simultaneously gained in their political undertone. “So concerned was the government with the politicisation of society that it was decided as early as 1954 to establish a National Guidance Council, whose function was to control broadcasting and be ‘an instrument of propaganda,’” the SNH notwithstanding. By the beginning of the 1960s, even SAVAK, the shah’s secret police, had a close eye on the Society’s activities. In an undated letter, it alerted, “All books published [by the SNH] must be supervised by us” for “such is today’s reality...” Consequently, the evolution of national museums and monuments, as public spaces reserved for the display and consumption of high culture, was buttressed by the institution of monarchy, as the leading patron of that culture. This was much helped by the fact that since the late 1930s, the state-controlled mass media had been busy coupling the royal household with various institutions of high culture. From 1937 onward, for instance *Ettela’at* had

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160 Ullens Archive Audio Collection, CD #27 U1AuCD In GoA, Y/Of; Interview with Yedda Godard, continued; Track 2, Minutes 35:00. Qashgahis were a very important and large nomadic tribe in the southwest of Iran. They were forced to permanently settle both by Reza and Mohammad Reza Shah. Ullens fully documented one of their migrations in the 1950s and 1960s.

161 Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 127.

162 SAVAK or *sazman-e amniyat va keshvar*, Organization for Security of the state was established in 1957 and was directed by the former military governor of Tehran, General Teymur Bakhtiar; see Avery, *Modern Iran*, 465-466; and Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 436-437. In a similar fashion, SAVAK controlled the activities of the Women’s Organization of Iran “often warn[ing] them to tone down their pro-feminist stance and not arouse conservative elements against the regime.” Sanasarian, *Women’s Rights*, 87.
published a number of articles accompanied by photographs of royal members visiting museums and exhibitions; “From Qom: H.I.M. and Prince in the Astan-e Museum,” “Prince and Princess at the Ethnographic Museum (muze-ye mardom shenasi),” and “In the Archeological Museum (muze-ye asar-e bastani): Prince and Princess Fawzieh.” The last article depicted the newlywed royal couple during a show around by Godard. More and more, the king and his entourage publicly represented themselves as the foremost benefactors of the arts and the monarchy as the sole institution that would set the standard of Iran’s high culture.

Accordingly, while “modernity” was wholeheartedly presented and practiced in such ways, “tradition” and “folklore” were museumized. In sharp contrast to Reza Shah, who had been adamant to eliminate all traces of “irrational” and “old-fashioned Persia,” as seen in the previous chapters, or for instance, by taking such radical measures as destroying Antoin Sevrugui’s photo collection or Tehran’s Qajar gates, his son was dedicated to put all such traces in museums, safely on public display. This operation was itself a sign of modernity. Well-orchestrated exhibitions signaled the arrival of a New Iran. The collection in Ibn Sina’s mausoleum-museum was one of the first in the provincial towns, wherein the authority’s discouragement of public interest in things ‘traditional’ now shifted to promoting national self-consciousness through regular visits to such institutions. By the dawn of the Iranian Revolution in 1977, the list of state museums was impressive: Archeological Museum, Ethnographic Museum, Shahyad Aryamehr Museum, Qajar Golestan Palace Museum, Museum of Decorative Arts, Tehran Carpet Museum, Museum of Contemporary Art, Safavid Chehel Sotun Palace Museum in Isfahan, Pars Museum in Shiraz, Nader Shah Mausoleum-Museum in Mashhad, Ibn Sina Museum in Hamadan, Ferdawsi Museum in Tus, and Haft Tappeh Museum

163 Iran National Archives 290, Micro-reel 1, Document 427, page 5; no date, Tehran.
165 The most important late 19th-century photographer was Antoin Sevrugui (1830s-1933), an Armenian from Russia, who came to prominence by becoming Naser al-Din Shah’s court photographer. Sevrugui’s career came to a tragic end when Reza Shah ordered all his photos to be confiscated since the new regime intended to eradicate any trace of an “old-fashioned” Iran; see F. N. Bohrer, ed., *Sevruguin and the Persian Image: Photograph of Iran, 1879-1930* (Washington, D.C. and Seattle, 1999).
166 The Archeological and Ethnographic Museums, for instance, played a major role in Tehran.
in Susa. Among the Shi’ā holy shrines that were turned into museums were the Holy Tomb of Fatemeh Ma’sumeh in Qom and the Museum and Library of the Holy Threshold in Mashhad. When in October 1976, the Museum of Pahlavi Dynasty was endowed in Tehran, Mohammad Reza Shah “made declarations” about both the importance of that institution and its links to his new Rastakhiz Party. “The assembly,” the king underscored, “represents the history of our country” during the 20th century. It “explicitly shows the situation before the arrival of our Dynasty and renders possible the much needed comparison to edify the constructive époque.”

As late as February 1977 that is on the very eve of the anti-shah revolution, the two museums of Six Bahman and Massudi were also inaugurated. Under the Pahlavis, museums were “explicit” openings into Pahlavi models of history and progress; instruments of clear demarcations of “before-s” and “after-s” vis-à-vis the dynasty. Museums, too, were those public spaces that thus legitimized not only the ruling monarchy, but also, more essentially, the modernity of the nation. Through them, the homogenous Iranian was shown the promise of the shah’s ever dawning “Great Civilization.”

“The 1950s,” as Ansari notes, “continued to be a period of social change. Social boundaries and political loyalties remained dynamic and fluid... A mullah might be well versed in radical theory, converse regularly with students and espouse liberal political views, while at the same time holding fast to a dogmatic social conservatism.” He adds, “Similarly, a Marxist student, eager to overthrow the established order, saw no contradiction in relating with the traditional merchants of the bazaar, from where indeed the student may have emerged. Radical students immersed in the traditions of southern Tehran might, nevertheless, consider themselves ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’, while mocking the radical chic of the wealthy north Tehranis, whose apparent enthusiasm for ‘progress’ was derided as little more than a crass materialism.”

The architectural moment captured on Ullens’ photograph is emblematic of Ansari’s contention that specific ideological trends had not yet become exclusively associated with specific representations, with specific imagery (Fig. 5.36). A conservative Shi’a mollah, as in this case, could own and appreciate Corinthian column capitals in his garden in Qom, and those who considered themselves “progressive” could enjoy a Qajar-style palace as residence. While the

state increasingly monopolized specific public texts in order to evoke ideas about “progress” and “modernity,” the opponents began to adopt that which came to be perceived as “traditional.” In other words, only later did the mollah cling to the image of the turban and the veil as signifiers of tradition and Muslim virtue, just as the royalist to the crown and the tie as signifiers of modernity and progress. Obviously, both were being fully modern.

The coup d'etat on August 19, backed by the ulama, the army, and the monarchists alike, put an end to political plurality and social dynamics in Iran. According to Abrahamian, it simply “brought down an iron curtain on Iranian politics,” which opened the way for Mohammad Reza Shah to “consolidate his control over much of the country, especially over the intelligentsia and the urban working class” by the end of the 1950s. The coup also terminated what might have become a highly politicized and avant-garde period in Iranian artistic production. Along with political institutions and utterances, the Pahlavi state successfully usurped and planned to co-opt any such cultural discourse as part of its domain of political power. In this new kind of vision of modern Iran, architectural schemes and ideas were the prime metaphors for progress as plainly demonstrated by a “Mordad 28” poster (Fig. 5.37). The proud shah, hovering over the white and austere modernistic city with Le Corbusian buildings, stadiums, factories, dams, and telegraph posts, increasingly portrayed himself as a progressive monarch by the means of cultural discourses as this one. Similarly, his “model-village,” fittingly named “Shahabad,” translated as “made prosperous by the shah,” was the architectural embodiment of his new “social revolution (engelab-e ejtemai)” as advertised in the poster. Various unrealized architectural projects continued to define and foretell not only the monarch’s fantastic economic programs and social engineering, but also provided an idealistic image of the future of modern Iran under his rule. “I am not content with seeing Iran as a progressive country;” the king insisted, “I want my country to be a model country...a model of progress.” Each architectural model, which was presented to and approved by the shah, was accordingly decoded as synonymous with a progressive future as per his forecasts and visions of a thoroughly modern Iran.

The optimistic visions of the early modernists of the 1920s had transformed into the utopian dream of one man, reinforced by the ridiculous certainty that Iran was on the verge of “catching up” with the West by means of “shortcuts to the future” and was endlessly “about to

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169 Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 127.
accomplish its historic destiny:’’172 that is, the shah’s Great Civilization. By the 1960s, the phrase *darvaze-ha-ye tamaddon-e bozorg* came to be used regularly in state-controlled mass media. These “Gates of the Great Civilization” or the “Threshold of Great Civilization” were the shah’s imagined space upon which he held that the nation stood. “The Shah began to propagate in earnest that idea of Iran being at the threshold of the Great Civilization – a national state of national well-being with industrialization achieved and a full regeneration of Iran’s ancient heritage.”173 An architectural journal wrote, “Even ‘far out’ ideas like designing for a mobile future or moving the national capital must be taken seriously before the country is locked into its development plans. If Iran is to reach the threshold of the ‘Great Civilization’ its avowed goal, then it will have to invent unique programs to find shortcuts to the future [sic.].”174 Architectural allegories were moments of clarity in unrealistic sociopolitical schemas. Such models and their depiction of “a bright” future would, inexorably, never meet. After the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979, Mohammad Reza Shah concluded in his last book with heartache, “My country stood on the verge of becoming a Great Civilization.”175

Therefore, the fact that following the coup the shah’s two steps to gain ulama and popular support were architectural in nature should come as no surprise. The mob’s destruction of Tehran’s Baha’i temple in spring 1955 encouraged by the military general of Tehran and Ayatollah Behbahani’s public praise of it in the press ensued in the shah’s government closing down of all movie theaters and the placing of the cornerstone of a modern mosque at the heart of Tehran University’s campus.176 The latter was as intensely and deliberately symbolic as Reza Shah’s inauguration of the university’s Medical School three decades earlier.177 The style of the mosque was to be unmistakably “Islamic” (Fig. 5.38). This was the beginning of a new kind of modern imagery, negotiated through and embodied in a rhetoric that advocated a “return to Iranian roots.” Alongside the shah’s White Revolution, it would begin in the 1960s with the animated debate amid Iranian architects over the “native style of local production,” symbolized, in this study, by the modern tomb of Omar Khayyam.

171 Quoted in Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 141.
174 “Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,” 140.
176 For Mohammad Reza Shah’s consolidation of power in the late 1950s, see Abrahaimian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 420-422.
177 Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Iran*, 87.
Figure 5.1 Mohammad Ali Foroughi and Mohammad Reza Shah in Tehran, 1941.
Source: M. Behnud, *In Se Zan* [These Three Women] (Tehran, 1995), 327.

Figure 5.2 General view of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum in Hamadan, 1952.
Figures 5.3 Ernest Herzfeld’s photograph of Ibn Sina’s former mausoleum in the foreground and Esther’s tomb in the background. Hamadan, c. 1925. “1957” in the right hand corner is the printing date not that of the photograph. Source: Herzfeld Papers, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape,” 1: 47.

Figures 5.4 Nader Shah’s original and modern mausoleum; plan and inauguration by the shah, Mashhad, 1959. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 214; Talinn Grigor, 1999; Seyhoun, Seyhoun, 64; SNH 131, Karnaneh, 272.
Figure 5.5 Map of Hamadan by Williams Jackson, 1907-1908; Ibn Sina’s tomb in the lower-center. 
Source: Jackson, *From Constantinople to Omar Khayyam*, 146.

Figure 5.6 William Jackson’s photograph of Ibn Sina’s historic mausoleum, Hamadan, 1907-1908. 
Source: Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 166.
Figure 5.7 Historic mausoleum of Ibn Sina and Shaykh Abu Said, Hamadan, 1877-1949. Source: SNH 131, Karmeh, 84.

Figure 5.8 Map of Hamadan showing major historic monuments and mausoleums, 1978. Source: SNH, Babataher Orian Hamadani [Babataher of Hamadan] (Tehran, 1978), map.
Ibn Sina was a strong, well-built, handsome, generous and extremely active man. He was very polite with those whose knowledge he appreciated and he treated his disciples with the utmost kindness. He showed an unequaled zeal and diligence both in learning and in teaching and most of his nights were spent in acquiring more knowledge or writing books of his own. His official duties, whether in travel or at home, did not interrupt his studies and he even wrote some of his books in prison.

His works deal with philosophy in general and with natural sciences, medicine, psychology, logic, theology, philosophical comments on some chapters from Qur’an, mathematics, mysticism, prosody, alchemy etc. His writings comprise some 250 volumes, including books, pamphlets and so on. Among his Persian books we may mention Dānish Narmeh Alī (The Book of Knowledge), which deals with logic, natural sciences and Theology, Rāsāl Nembrā (Thesis on Fuhu); Rāsāl Mīn'īyyeh (Thesis on The
Figure 5.11 Iranian architect Houshang Seyhoun. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure 5.12 Upper floor plan of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum. Source: Seyhoun, Houshang, 37.

Figure 5.13 Main facade elevation of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum showing the design formulat based on the Golden Square.
Source: Seyhoun, Houshang, 37.
Figures 5.14 Main façade elevation due west and the lower floor plan of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum.
Source: Seyhoun, Houshang, 36.
Figures 5.15 Nader Shah’s reburial ceremony in the modern mausoleum, Mashhad, 1959.
Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 228-233.
Figure 5.16 Gombad-e Qabus, Gorgan, 1006.

Figure 5.17 Ibn Sina’s tower, Hamadan, 1952.

Figure 5.19 Lower level garden.  

Figure 5.20 Tomb-chamber.  

Figure 5.21 Ibn Sina Square, 
Hamadan.  

Figure 5.22 Caricature criticizing the problem of poverty; backdrop Ibn Sina’s Qabus tower, 1968.  
Figures 5.23 Ibn Sina’s original tombstone during excavation and in casing of the museum with the label. Source: SNH 131, Karmeh, 86 & Talinn Grigor, 2000.
Figure 5.24 Display of Ibn Sina's portrait and skull with textual description. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure 5.25 Photograph of the skulls of Ibn Sina and Nader Shah.
Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 93 and 237.

Figure 5.26 Museum's skull display.

Figures 5.28 Widely published portrait and statue of Ibn Sina. Source: Mostafávi, Hagmatánah, 48-49.
Figures 5.29 Ibn Sina’s statue in place and in workshop by Sadiqi, Hamadan, 1952. Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 112.


Figure 5.32 Meeting of the SNH’s Board of Trustees and coworkers, Niavaran, northern Tehran, August 24, 1952. Source: SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 141.

Figure 5.33 The SNH’s Board of Trustees in front of Ibn Sina’s new mausoleum, Hamadan, October 31, 1952. Source: Sadiq, *Memoirs*, 3:111.

Figure 5.34 Unveiling of Ibn Sina’s statue, Hamadan, April 29, 1952. Source: SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 138-39.

Figure 5.36 Marie-Thérèse Ullens’ photograph of Corinthian column capitals in the garden of a cleric in Qom, 1960s. Source: Ullens Collection, Harvard Visual Collection.
Figure 5.37 “28 Mordad” poster.

Figure 5.38 Tehran University’s new mosque, Tehran, 1955 c.
Source: Talinn Grigor, 2002
VI. MODERNITY NATIVIZED:
Omar Khayyam’s Tomb

“In the art and architecture of a traditional society the principles of the tradition inspire man’s creative energies and integrate the whole of society into a totality.”

Laleh Bakhtiar and Nader Ardalan
The Sense of Unity, 1973

After the 1954 inauguration of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum in Hamadan, the Society for National Heritage embarked on its next architectural undertaking without such delay: the erection of a modern tomb for Omar Khayyam in Nishapur. While the project would follow the SNH’s systematized (de/con)struction procedures and official rituals, it would aesthetically be a very different manifestation of contemporary political development. While the monarch’s power had been volatile in the 1940s and the early 1950s, by the early 1960s, Mohammad Reza Shah managed to reestablish and control the “three Pahlavi pillars” that had supported the unrivaled power of his father: “the armed forces, the court patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy.” 1 He who had committed himself to land and economic reforms despite all kinds of objections, announced “with much fanfare” on January 9, 1963, the first six points of his White Revolution. 2 Seventeen days later, they were endorsed by a national referendum, at least according to the government. When in June, thousands poured into the streets protesting against the king, his government did not hesitate to crush the opposition. 3 Described by historians as “a revolutionary strategy aimed at sustaining a traditional system of authority,” the White Revolution would subsequently enable Mohammad Reza Shah to appropriate all the various political, socioeconomic, and cultural forces, including especially the ulama, into his own domain of personal and absolute power and, thus, gain unprecedented executive sway away from

1 E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (New Jersey, 1982), 434.
3 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 424-426.
major agencies such as the Plan Organization, the National Iranian Oil Company, the Women's Organization of Iran, and the SNH into his own hands. From 1963 to the dawn of the Iranian Revolution in 1977, therefore, "[c]ulture either became the handmaiden of nationalist and rightist propaganda," as Avery notes, "in which case it ceased to be genuine; or sank into a sullen and shadowy retirement, in which case it was either inarticulate or articulated only in various forms of rather arid pedantry."5

When in March 1963, the royalist Ettelat daily published an article arguing for the "proper role of the clergy in society," it maintained, "Only some...reactionary ulama object to Iran's modernization... These individuals oppose radio, television, the cinema and similar technological signs of progress...let them not mix their personal tastes...with the contents of the shari'ah."6 Indeed, the majority of the clerics had little concern with the idea of modernity per se; their unease was in the "particular manner in which this regime's program was to be implemented" – that is, the implementations of the manifest forms of modernity. Architecture in general and the treatment of religious edifices in particular were the prime "signs of progress" that the ulama felt were vulnerable to the shah's modernization forces. Furthermore, the clerics took issue with the impact of the White Revolution's land reform laws on vaqf (religious endowment) revenues and its influence on concepts of historic monuments, national heritage, and their very (re)valorization as such. While in 1965, 20,000 mosques were registered as "working," a mere three years later, data made available to Isa Sadiq and published in his 1975 edition of History of Iran's Education, only 9,015 mosques, including 138 madrasas, were operational. The rest had been registered and were put to use as historic landmarks and tourist destinations.7 It came as little surprise when the "radical" segment of the ulama represented by Seyyed Mahmud Taleqani "condemned the nation's political leaders for having 'plundered' the lands of the Imam."8

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4 A. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: the Pahlavis and After (London, 2003), 148; Avery, Modern Iran, 464-466; and E. Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran (New York, 1982), 79-105.
5 P. Avery, Modern Iran (New York, 1965), 467.
7 By 1971, "[t]he power of the government's repression against the opposition in the early 1960's forced the ulama into quietism... The penetration of their ranks by SAVAK and those in the employ of the Endowments Organization reduced the chances for open protest in any case." Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 129 and 159.
8 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 93. At the time, Ayatollah Khomeini too had "beseech the shah" to "respect the religious authorities, don't help Israel, and learn from your father's mistake." Fayzieh Seminary, Zendiginameh-i Imam Khomeini, 1, 40-41; quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 426.
The post-1963 period was also characterized by the rapidly widening gap between political underdevelopment and socioeconomic development, supported, advocated, and often financed by the shah. While the king “helped modernize the socioeconomic structure, he did little to develop the political system,” as argued by Abrahamian, for instance, “to permit the formation of pressure groups, open the political arena for various social forces, forge links between the regime and the new classes, preserve the existing links between the regime and the old classes, and broaden the social base of the monarchy…” In the escalating assertion of their political might, both the shah’s regime and the “substantial ‘middle class’ or professional class,” which had “come of age,” embarked on a project that would outwardly negate the blind espousal of Western models in favor of a “return to national roots and traditions.” Despite his political, military, and technological dependency on the West, especially the United States, for instance, the shah declared that there should be “Iranian solutions to Iranian problems.” Pahlavi “politicians, economists, planners, bankers, architects, journalists and writers…highly educated abroad,” – according to British observers “the most notable feature of the last 35 years of Iranian social history” – would, therefore, in the 1960s search for and advance new models for the cultural formations of “the Iranian Islamic” and “the Iranian traditional” as alternatives to Reza Shah’s uncritical implementation of Western paradigms of modernity. In this new post-war construct of Iran-e Novin (New or Modern Iran), the political and professional elite’s ostensible rejection of the West, manifested in its architectural production, was not only far from limited to Iran alone, but was also aimed at usurping the little power the anti-royal institutions and networks retained.

During much of the 1960s, therefore, the SNH would be involved in several relatively small-scale, yet highly symbolic, projects concentrated in the northwestern city of Nishapur, in the province of Khorasan. These included the demolition, relocation, and construction of Omar Khayyam’s tomb-memorial by the design of Houshang Seyhoun and Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi from 1959-1963 (Fig. 6.1); the construction of Naser al-Din Qajar Shah’s court painter, Mohammad

9 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 435.
11 British Minister of the Foreign Office, 248/1582 EP 1015/36, March 1, 1961. Also, see British Minister of the Foreign Office, 371/157599 EP 1015/7, October 31, 1961; quoted in Ansari, Iran since 1921, 151.
Ghaffari, Kamal al-Molk’s tomb-memorial again by Seyhoun from 1960-1962 (Figs. 6.2); 13 the restoration of Shaykh Farid al-Din Attar Shrine in 1960 (Figs. 6.3); 14 and the restoration of the emamzadeh of Mohammad Mahruq, a relative of Imam Reza, from 1962-1967 (Figs. 6.4). 15 All four of these monuments were visited and inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963. The very fact that effort and money were being spent on the two latter was a sign of changing times, a shift in the very sign of collective identity and approach to the preservation of historic monuments in Iran for whereas Reza Shah and his reformists would not have


13 Mohammad Ghaffari, Kamal al-Molk was a prolific painter beginning with Naser al-Din Shah’s ruling period to that of Reza Shah’s. See Layla S. Diba’s work on his life and career as well as his pivotal role in the evolution of Iran’s modern painting culture: L. S. Diba and M. Ekhtiar, eds., Royal Persian Paintings: the Qajar epoch, 1785-1925 (London, 1998); and L. S. Diba, Lacquerwork of Safavid Persia and its Relationship to Persian Painting (1994). One of the episodes connected with the SNH’s efforts at Nishapur occurred on the Majlis floor. During the Sitting 74 of the Ninth Session, on March 18, 1934 Arbab Keikhosraw Shahrokh insisted, “I do not consider myself worthy of trying to say anything about Mr. Kamal-ol-Molk and his services to the country and to art. His work speaks for itself. Now that this great man has retired, his valuable work should be preserved. The measures taken in this connection were not merely to decorate the Majlis, but served also to preserve the priceless work of this great artist. Whenever I had to visit Khorasan to inspect work on Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, I would visit Kamal-ol-Molk and suggest that his paintings ought to be preserved. What better place than the Majles?” Sh. Shahrokh and R. W. Writer, The Memoirs of Keikhosrow Shahrokh (Lewiston, 1994) 167-168. For discussions related to Kamal al-Molk’s tomb-project in Nishapur, see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 133, Document 55, pages 35-36; 1340 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 5, 1341/April 25, 1962, Tehran; Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, pages 5 and 9; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 5, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran; SNH 121, Asar-e Khorasan, 253-264; SNH 131, Karnameh, 266-351; Zedehdel, Khorasan Province, 96-97.


15 Mohammad Mahruq is considered a Shi’a martyr who is believed to have been burnt alive by the Sunni governor of Khorasan in 817 AD. The restored emamzadeh dates most probably from the seventeenth century, erected on an older edifice. For discussions of the details of Emamzadeh Mahruq, see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 133, Document 55, pages 35-36; 1340 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 5, 1341/April 25, 1962, Tehran; Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 143, Document 115, page 4; 1344 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 17, 1345/May 7, 1965, Tehran; SNH 121, Asar-e Khorasan, 308-327; SNH 131,
allocated a single toman to the protection of a rather minor emamzadeh, the post-1963 SNH would recognize such undertakings not only as an effective political gesture that could co-opt Islam into the mainstream of Pahlavi culture and history, but also as a cultivation of a new, and more inclusive, attitude towards Iran’s historic heritage.

Once working mosques and madrasas were considered under the rubric of national heritage, they could become both non-operational sites of ulama power and destinations of a lucrative tourist industry. In both cases, the state had much to gain. This shift indicated an ideological change in the politics of identity and representation as well as that of political power. For the re-appropriation, versus outright rejection, of Iran’s Islamic history along with its cultural production would enable the monarchy and the state to tightly control and eventually fully bring into its domain of power the different spheres of political influence, such as the ulama. This would also enable the secular authorities to project Iran’s Muslim history as part of Iran’s modern identity as a nation not only rich in its antique but also Islamic heritage, simultaneously privileging the pre-Islamic history over the Islamic. It, therefore, came as little surprise when the restorations of Attar’s shrine and Mahrud’s emamzadeh were accompanied with the construction of two modern mausoleums within the same gardens. In these projects, the modern structures were always privileged over the Islamic historic artifacts. If for centuries many had visited the tomb of Omar Khayyam as a mere incident during a pilgrimage to Emamzadeh Mahrud, now this order would be reversed. Modern Iranians and non-Iranians alike would make their pilgrimages to the tomb of Khayyam as their final destination, while the emamzadeh would become a sideshow.

Omar Khayyam’s modern mausoleum can be considered a rare moment that not only encapsulated a period, but also hinted at what was to come. It was an architectural manifesto of the 1960s Iran, of the Iranian new middle class claiming its secularized Islamic aesthetics as integral to its modern national identity, buttressed by the assertive declarations of the White Revolution and the final departure of Director of Antiquities Services André Godard from Iran. As such, it was one of the first Iranian architectural expressions of its time that paralleled the works of Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy at New Gourna, “the Anatolian House” by Turkish architect Sedad Eldem, as well as Indian architects Charles Correa and Balkrishna Doshi with

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Karnameh, 367-383. Also, see Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 242-244; Fraser, Journey into Khorasan, 400; Sykes, “Pilgrimage to the Tomb of Omar Khayyam,” 137.
their move from the International Style to solutions to social issues and "Indian spirituality."\(^{16}\)

Overeager to "bring national tradition back" to the nation, other architects and architectural

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theoreticians like Ismail Serageldin, Heinz Gaube, Laleh Bakhtiar and Nader Ardalan were reinforcing the essentialist thinking vis-à-vis an “Islamic” or “Sufi” architecture and urbanism. After half a century of active and aggressive modernization, some Iranian architects began to see the architecture of Iran in terms of a “distinctly and uniquely Islamic visual language.” "In the art and architecture of a traditional society,” some vehemently urged, “the principles of the tradition inspire man’s creative energies and integrate the whole of society into a totality.” Despite these declarations and writings, however, these architects and authors were in fact reinforcing the West’s treatises about “the Orient” and its historic construct as Europe’s other as questioned by many thinkers within the last two decades. In the effort to reclaim Islam into Iran’s national history and aesthetics, Khayyam and his modern tomb proved to be a fitting historic figure and edifice to re-appropriate.

Described by Hodgson as mathematician, astronomer, Faylasuf (philosopher), and author of the collection of some 150 quatrains, called the Robaiyyat, Hakim Omar Khayyam was born

19 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, 3.
in 1048 AD and died in 1122 in the city of Nishapur. He “produced a comprehensive and systematic algebraic study, including many new solutions.”

The difficulty of translating Persian poetry into Western languages while keeping the thrust of the original text was exemplified by Edward Fitzgerald’s 1859 *Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*. In translating Khayyam’s work, Fitzgerald reinvented the text anew in ways that would be palpable to the average Western reader, paralleled by the works of other Orientalists such as E. Delacroix, J A. D. Ingres, J. F. Lewis, J. L. Gerome, etc. That which is important to this chapter about Fitzgerald’s reproduction was its sway over the imagination of the Pahlavi elite and its influence on the design of Khayyam’s modern tomb. According to Hodgson, “Omar” was “the man whose poetry” was not translated but rather “metamorphosed into English…”

By the 1960s, Iranian architects, too, began to chart Iranian architectural style based on English translations and readings of their national heritage. Therefore, Khayyam’s tomb, like his work, would be metamorphosed rather than preserved or renovated.

The medieval and early modern stories about Khayyam’s resting-place were relatively homogeneous and uncomplicated. Historically speaking, while its exact location was at no point in doubt, it did not become a prime site of pilgrimage or an object of patronage. Nor did it go through alterations, renovations, or additions from its conception in 1122 AD to its destruction in 1934, when a memorial stele came to replace the unornamented medieval sepulcher. Whereas in 1926, the SNH had fixated about the purportedly exact spot of Ferdawsi’s grave, four decades later it would intentionally remove and displace the historically known and exact spot of Khayyam’s tomb. At that point, the centuries-old stories told and retold about the grave had little or no consequence for the SNH of the 1960s. The later medieval Muslim and the early modern Western descriptions of the tomb were, by and large, consistent with the first historic account provided by Muslim chronicler Omar Ibn Ali Nezami Aruzi Samarghandi soon after Khayyam’s death. Their homogeneity and oft-repeated data have compelled me to focus on a single, most comprehensive, version — that of Williams Jackson — while providing extra data revealed by other chroniclers. The selection of Jackson’s description was also based on the fact that most subsequent travelers used his work as their chief reference for the history of Khayyam’s tomb as plainly demonstrated by, among others, André Godard’s classification of Mahrq Emamzadeh

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on December 20, 1937. Yet, while at this early stage neither Godard nor Herzfeld classified the pre-1963 edifice under the category of historical monuments in their respective indexes, both documented the emamzadeh, forgoing allusions to the resting-place (Figs. 6.5).

- **Jackson’s Pilgrimage**

Abraham Valentine Williams Jackson (1862-1937) was the first professor of Indo-Iranian languages at New York City’s Columbia University and has been described as “the first important American scholar” to study Iran’s history, culture, and language. His name was associated with the university wherein he was accepted as a student in 1879, graduated with four degrees in 1883, and retired from in 1935. His doctoral dissertation in Classics led him to Avestan studies about which he published three articles as early as 1885. Subsequently, he produced books on Iran’s pre-Islamic faith, including *Avestan Grammar in Comparison with Sanskrit* (1892) and *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran* (1899). Furthermore, his four trips to Iran in 1903, 1907, 1910, and 1918-1919 resulted in two travelogues: *Persia Past and Present* (1906) and *From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam* (1911). Jackson’s expertise in the religion of Zoroaster and Mani proved to be attractive to the Parsee community of India, which invited him to deliver lectures on Iran’s Zoroastrian history as well as the secularists and nationalist political elite of Iran. Aside from these academic activities, he was a member of the Omar Khayyam Society and the honorary president of the American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology organized by Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Pope.

His two-year travels “through Northern Iran, Transcaspia, and Turkistan” had led Jackson to Nishapur in May 1907 (Fig. 6.6). To his guide, Alexander the Great, “upon whose track I

24 See Society for National Heritage 1, *Fehrest-e Mokhtasar-e Asar va Abnieh-ye Tarikhi-e Iran* [Brief inventory of the historical heritage and edifices of Iran] (Tehran, 1925); and *Herzfeld Papers*, Photo File 10, “Persian Architecture and Landscape” volume 1, #100-101.
have traveled so extensively,” was added “another connecting link between the interests of East and West, while Omar’s home, as a goal to visit, gave to the journey the semblance...of a pilgrimage.” Jackson opened his seventeenth chapter, *Nishapur, the Home of Omar Khayyam*, rather romantically: “The sun had not yet risen to ‘scatter the stars from the field of night’ as we scurried along in our four-horsed vehicle on the final stage of our pilgrimage to the Home of Omar Khayyam.” On the last day of May, around noon, the caravan approached the city where a group of “pilgrims with the green banners of Islam thronged the road.” They were “certainly not,” underscored Jackson, “on their way to free-thinking Omar’s tomb,” but rather to Mashhad. The text following this was mainly concerned with three themes: the rather long history of Nishapur, including its historic eminence and present-day decay; the history and the current condition of Khayyam's tomb; and the differences in perception between how Westerners and Iranians identify the historic figure as either an Oriental poet or a “Hakim Khayyam, ‘Doctor Khayyam,’ the scientist and astronomer...” Jackson, as so many Westerner visitors, was surprised to find that “only half a dozen” locals “would know of Omar...but none would remember him as a poet.” The construction of the modern tomb by the SNH would aim at bridging this difference; it would try to (re)present Khayyam as both “an Oriental poet” and “an Iranian scientist” through the design of the monument.

As in Tus and Hamadan, the series of projects in Nishapur would buttress the state’s ambition to revive pre-Islamic historic centers of power. The echoes of such intent resonated from the 19th-century Western travelogues. Historically, it had been praised highly by divers authors: in 1216 by Yakut as “a medina” equal to Marv and Samarcand, in the 11th century by Naser Khosraw as “the sole rival to Cairo,” in 1272 by Venetian traveler Marco Polo as “Sapurgan, a place of great plenty,” in 1355 by Ibn Battuta as “Little Damascus,” and in 1404 by Spanish envoy Clavijo as “a great city.” However, by the 19th century, Nishapur, along with Ray, Damghan and Tus, was considered one of the most destroyed and rebuilt cities in Iran, largely because of its unfavorable position on the Khorasan highway and defenseless against the invading armies of Central Asia.

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27 Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 229.
28 Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 231.
The founding of the city is ascribed to the second Sassanian king, Shapur I (241-272 AD), after his defeat of “a Turanian leader named Pahlichak...” Destroyed by an earthquake, it was rebuilt by Shapur II (309-379), for which reason it was given the name of Niv-Shapur, meaning ‘the Good (Deed) of Shapur’...” Under the Sassanians, it was the site of “the Fire of Priests” said to have owed its origin to Zoroaster and the seat of bishop of the Nestorian Christian Church in 430. After the Arab invasions by the third Caliph, Othman in 651 and 652, the city served as the seat of power during the reign of the Muslim dynasties of the Tahirids (824-844), the Saffarids, and the Samanids until the 10th century. Toghrul Beg the Seljuk made Nishapur his capital in 1038, followed by his nephew and successor Alp Arslan (1063-1072). Under the latter’s son, Khayyam rejecting the governorship of Nishapur, instead asking Malik Shah’s (1073-1092) grand vizir, Nizam al-Molk, to grant him a handsome pension. After Khayyam’s death, devastating earthquakes in 1145, 1280, and 1405 were added to invasions in 1029 by “Ghuzz Turks,” in 1174 by “Takish, Shah of Khvarazm,” in 1221 by Mongols led by the son of Chengiz Khan after which “not a wall was left standing,” Turkomans and Uzbeks in the late 16th century, by Afghans in 1722 and 1749. Subsequently, Abbas Koli Khan’s efforts to revive the city were overshadowed by Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar’s annexation of Khorasan in 1796.

29 L. Lockhart, *Persian Cities* (London, 1960), 81. “Nishapour was a city which shifted its geographical position throughout the centuries... It is fairly certain that the Sasanian settlement of Nishapour was on a different site than the medieval Islamic city. We cannot identify Nishapour with any site mentioned by classical authors before the Sasanian era, but it would be reasonable to assume that there had been several towns, if not one metropolis, in the district. It is possible that main east-west trade route ran north of the Elburz mountains in pre-Sasanian times as the Parthian Stations of Isidore of Charaz would indicate. Most Arabic and Persian sources ascribe the founding of Nishapour to Shapur I (ca. 240-272 A.D.), or less probably to Shapur II (307-379 A.D.), and it would seem that the name is derived from an appellation of the king *nev sahuhr*, for the actual form [*ny]*wš*bwr* can be restored in a Parthian Manichaean fragment which may be the oldest occurrence of the name. Another name for the city was Aparshahr or Abarshahr, which is found in both Armenian and Arabic texts, and on Arab-Sasanian coins of the Umayyad period. This designation may well have been given to the Nishapur area as the center of the old ‘Upper countries’ or the ‘Upper satrapies’, of the Parthians, Seleucides, or even Achaemenids... [T]he importance which Nishapour held in Sasanian times was enhanced many-fold when it became the capital of the Tahirids in the ninth century A.D. and a great entrepot of trade in the Middle Ages[...]. After the Mongols the city lost its importance, and today the chief city of Persian Khurasan is Meshhed [sic.].” R. Frye, ed., *The Histories of Nishapur* (Cambridge, 1965), 8-9.

30 Along with Arab sources, see also a number of medieval Armenian references about Nishapour under the Sassanians: Elise Vartapat, 5th century and Lazar Parpetzi in Langlois, *Collection des Historiens de l’Armenie*, 2. 186, n. 1, 229 “Satraps and priests at Nishapur” and 242 “priests.” Also, see Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 250; and H. Filmer, *The Pageant of Persia* (Indianapolis, 1936), 169-170.

31 Lockhart, *Persian Cities*, 81. See also, Jackson, *Constantinople to Khayyam*, 254.

By the early 20th century, Nishapur’s history and its chronicles had left a great impression on various 19th-century Western travelers in search of Khayyam’s grave. Nearly every modern observer who visited Iran and wrote about it – notwithstanding the long and arduous journey from Tehran to Mashhad and back east ninety miles to Nishapur – recognized that the potential discovery of the ancient glory of the city was worthwhile even if “to-day Nishapur is a sad echo of its distinguished past.” In 1822, Director of East Indian Company James Fraser whose “friend...was delighted at finding” the tomb of “Omar Keyoomee,” and who “paid his devotions to it with true enthusiasm,” to his disappointment found:

The tombs enclosed in a garden, once laid out in tanks, fountains, and parterres, now all gone to decay; a few fruit trees, and five or six very fine old pines, give a shade to the place, and shelter to multitude of rooks. Such were the only vestiges of antiquity I could discover or hear of at Nishapoor: the place has indeed been made so often the theater of the most savage barbarity, and so frequently has been completely desolated, that it can be no matter of astonishment if every trace of former grandeur and prosperity should by this time have vanished.

“The richest and largest cities in Persia,” similarly observed French officer Joseph Pierre Ferrier after his May 22, 1845 attempted visit, “is” now “little more than one vast ruin.” These men were, in fact, compelled to make the journey because of Fitzgerald’s (re)reading of the *Robayyat*. British traveler Henry Filmer was correct to comment in 1936, “today the American and the Englishman who make their way to Nishapur are attracted not by knowledge of the fame of Nishapur as a capital of the great Seljuk power of the Middle Ages in the East but as the site of the grave of the incomparable Khayyam.” This knowledge, however, did not prevent many to return from their arduous pilgrimage with disillusionment.

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33 “To reach the town, it is first necessary to go to Meshed and then return west for about ninety miles along another road.” F. Richards, *A Persian Journey* (New York, 1932), 205 and 199.
34 Fraser, *Journey into Khorasan*, 401-402.
35 May 22, 1845, French officer Joseph Pierre Ferrier arrived at “the small but pleasant town of Nishapoor...one of the richest and largest cities in Persia, and one of the four royal cities of Khorassan.” It was believed to have been founded by “Shah-poor the second Sassanide kings...” “Shapoor restored” the city, gave it his name, and “erected an immense statue, which remained standing until the first invasion of the country by the Mussulmans who in their zeal destroyed it.” “Towards the commencement of the eighteenth century it was little more than one vast ruin, and remained in this deplorable state until after the death of Nadir Shah. In 1752 (Hejira 1166), after having stood a six months’ siege by Ahmed Shah, King of the Afghans, it was, to some extent, restored by Abbas Kooli Khan, chief of the Beiyat tribe...” After a rather long account of Nishapur, Ferrier was unable to see Khayyam’s tomb because, “one of the greatest inconveniences that arise in traveling with a caravan is the impossibility of leaving it for a few hours to visit any interesting object which may be at a little distance from the road, I suffered in this way many disappointments, and particularly at Nishapoor...” J. P. Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan* (London, 1856), 103-105.
36 This was also the case of Tus and Ferdawsi’s grave as examined in chapter 3.
Some came away shocked by the vanished magnificence of the city and the lack of inscription on the tomb. Others seem to have been appalled by the form and condition of the tombstone and, hence, concluded that “The days of the real Omar are no more.”38 In 1884, for instance, the member of Afghan Border Commission Simpson noted, “We went up the Mahruk structure, we noticed from an angle, on the right side, [Khayyam’s] grave. The ceiling was very rough and irregular, and consisted of three curves [niches], and the wall and ceiling was plastered, but it fell out in parts...without any care.”39 Lord Curzon similarly insisted that the condition of the grave would have “greatly shocked his English admirers,” which “stands in a neglected garden,” once containing “flower-beds and rivulets of water, but is now a waste of weeds.” Curzon further added, “There is no inscription to mark the poet’s name or fame; and it is to be feared that the modern Persians are as little solicitous of the dust of Omar el Khayam as a nineteenth-century citizen of London might be of that of Matthew Paris or William of Malmesbury.”40

Many seem not to understand the reason why “the tomb gets none of the homage which is received by Hafiz and Sa’di,” while others noticed the rather long inscription on Attar’s black marble tombstone in contrast to that of Omar’s which had “nothing to mark its identity.”41 Few tried to find a historic reason for the minimalism of Khayyam’s tomb. Among those who did, British travel writer Ella C. Sykes wrote in 1910, “The poet was not permitted to rest within the shrine because he was a Sunni. His uninscribed plaster tomb is in an alcove open to the air and perchance the spring winds carry falling blossoms to it.”42 Others, like Filmer, provided his readers with a vindication: “Overshadowed as his fame is in Persia by other poets so also is his tomb subordinated to the shrine of another. There is a touch of grim humor in the presence of his sarcophagus, a simple receptacle of brick and cement without inscription, beneath an arched

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38 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 238.
39 Quoted in SNH 131, Karnameh, 285-286.
40 G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 2 vols., 1892), chapter 10 “From Tehran to Mashed:” 263-264. Also, see a rewording of Curzon’s account by the SNH: Curzon, in his book entitled Persia and Persian Question writes, “I am afraid westerners who admire Omar will be disappointed by the situation of the grave that I saw in Nishapur. This place that was [once] endowed with beautiful flowers and gardens, is now disregarded with useless grass. On the grave there is no name; nothing that shows [Omar’s] greatness.” SNH 131, Karnameh, 285-286.
41 Richards, Persian Journey, 202; and N. Khanykov, Mémoires sur l’Ethnographie de la Perse (Paris, 1866), 94. Also, see Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 240, footnote 1.
wing of the imamzadeh...”⁴³ Still others ascribed the seeming mistreatment of the tomb to local incompetence as did American artist Fred Richards in 1932; “To-day the appearance of the room and tomb is as though they were neglected intentionally by his fellow countrymen. All sorts of excuses have been made for its condition, but none of them bears criticism.” Adding further, “He is buried in a garden it is true, but no roses now scatter their blossoms on his dust.”⁴⁴ Richards’ discontent was revealed by his sketch of the “bala-khanah” (rest house) of the garden, instead of the sarcophagus proper (Fig. 6.7).

The yearning to reach Khayyam’s tomb by these Western travelers has, at times, led to the compilation of (mis)information. On the one hand, the rather accurate map of Nishapur produced by the British consul general of Khorasan, Sir Major Percy Sykes, attempted to locate Khayyam’s grave within its larger urban context at the center of “the city’s ruins” (Figs. 6.8). On the other hand, the director of the American Presbyterian hospital in Tehran, John G. Wishard’s travelogue produced, in 1908, a photograph of what was believed to have been Khayyam’s original mausoleum.⁴⁵ Although the latter did not allude to the grave in his travel writings, and the map of his travels showed Wishard’s trajectory as far east as Damavand and Sari, the caption photo’s read, “tomb of the Poet Omar Khayyam.”⁴⁶ Obviously, Wishard never reached either Nishapur or Tus for he would have, no doubt, found out that what he identified as Khayyam’s tomb was in fact the rather notorious Haruniyeh of Tus, which so many before and after him had erroneously classified as Ferdawsi’s mausoleum. Of all the travelers to Nishapur, Jackson remained the most meticulous in his documentation.

By the afternoon’s sun, Jackson and company approached their final destination, Khayyam’s tomb, which lay “four miles southeast of the city, just beyond the ruined site of Shadiakh, the once delightful suburb of the old city of Nishapur...”⁴⁷ Passing through a vast graveyard and fields of poppies and directed by the “turquoise dome of the Mosque of the Imamzadeh Mahruq,” they arrived at “the gate of the white-walled enclosure around the precinct” (Figs. 6.9). As Jackson set foot into the “truly typical Persian garden, with roughly outlined walks and stone-coped water-courses, and with shade-trees and flowers on every hand,” he

⁴³ Filmer, Pageant of Persia, 172.
⁴⁴ Richards, Persian Journey, 202-203.
⁴⁵ See Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 252.
⁴⁶ J. G. Wishard, Twenty Years in Persia: A Narrative of Life under the Last Three Shahs (London: 1908), 150.
recalled the often translated and rather famous portrayal in Chahar Maqale-ye Nezami-ye Aruzi-ye Samarqandi of Khayyam’s foresight about his resting-place.\textsuperscript{48} Jackson (re)translated in his travelogue:

‘At Balkh, in the year 506 A.H. ( = 1112-1113 A.D.), when Omar Khayyam and Muzaffar-i Isfari had put up at the sarai of Amir Abu Sa’id in the street of the slave-dealers, I joined the company, and in the midst of that social gathering I heard Omar, the Proof of Truth, say: “My grave will be in a place where every spring the north wind will scatter roses” [gul, literally ‘rose,’ but used also flowers or blossoms in general]. To me this saying seemed incredible, but I knew that his like would not say anything foolish. When I came to Nishapur in the year 530 A.H. ( = 1135-1136 A.D.) – it being four[teen] years since that great soul had drawn on the veil of dust (i.e. died) and the inferior world had become orphaned of him – I went on Friday eve to visit his tomb, because he had upon me the claim of a master. I took with me someone who could point out to me his grave (lit. ‘dust’), and he took me out to the Hirah Cemetery. I turned to the left and saw his grave (lit. ‘dust’) located at the end of the garden-wall. Pear-trees and peach-trees raised their heads from outside the garden; and so great a shower of blossoms (shikufat) was poured upon his grave that the grave became hidden beneath the roses [gul, literally ‘rose,’ but used also flowers or blossoms in general]; and the saying occurred to me, which I had heard from him at Balkh. Thereupon I began to weep, because I saw nowhere any one like him in all this world or in all the regions of the universe.’ \textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Jackson, \textit{Constantinople to Khayyam}, 240.
\textsuperscript{49} Jackson, \textit{Constantinople to Khayyam}, 241-242. This story was reproduced by most early 20th-century Western chroniclers. In 1915 Sykes wrote: “The oldest account we possess of him is in the \textit{Chahar Makala} of Nizami-al-Arudi, in the section, it is to be noted, which treats of astrologers and astronomers. Here is given the original story of the poet’s saying: ‘My grave will be in a spot where the trees shed their blossoms on me twice a year.’ Nizami states that in A.H. 530 (1135) he visited the tomb of the deceased Omar, ‘seeing that he had the claim of a master on me… and his tomb lay at the foot of a garden-wall, over which pear-trees and peach-trees thrust their heads, and on his grave had fallen so many flower-leaves that his dust was hidden beneath the flowers.’ This disposes of the mistaken idea that Omar was buried beneath a rose-bush… I have twice passed through Nishapur and on each occasion visited the poet’s tomb, which… is situated in an open wing of a shrine erected by Shah Abbas in memory of Mahamed Mahruq, a forgotten relation of the Imam Riza. The shrine is set in a formal Persian garden, divided into four plots by cobbled paths which is by no means lacking in charm. Fruit-trees are grown in it, and their blossoms still fall on the tomb of the poet, which is cased with white plaster, but bears no stone or inscription… When all is said, the fact remains that Omar Khayyam, as interpreted by the genius of FitzGerald, has touched a chord in our Anglo-Saxon prosaic nature, and has thereby helped to bridge the deep gulf which separates the dreaming East from the material West [sic.].” Sykes, \textit{History of Persia}, v. 2, 137-138. In 1924, Browne wrote: “Nizami-yi Arudi, of Samarqand, who was one of ‘Omar’s pupils, gave in his \textit{Chahar Magala} (‘Four Discourses’)… ‘In the year 506 A.H. (1112/13) Khawaja Imam ‘Omar Khayyam… had alighted in the city of Balkh… in the house of Amir Abu Sa’id, and I had joined that assembly. In the midst of that friendly gathering I heard the Proof of the Truth ‘Omar say, ‘My grave will be in a spot where the trees will shed their blossoms on me twice a year.’ This seems to me impossible, thought I knew that one such as he would not speak idle words. When I arrived at Nishapur in the year 530 A.H. (1135/36), it being then some years since that great man had veiled his countenance in the dust, and this lower world had been bereaved of him, I went to visit his grave on the eve of a certain Friday (seeing that he had the claim of a master on me), taking with me a guide to point out his tomb, so he brought me to the Hira Cemetery; I turned to the left, and his tomb lay at the foot of a garden wall, over which pear trees and peach trees thrust their heads, and on his grave had fallen so many flower leaves that his dust was hidden beneath the flowers, then I remembered that saying which I had heard from him in the city of Balkh, and I fell to weeping, because on the face of the earth, and in all the regions of the habitable globe, I nowhere saw one like unto him. May God have mercy upon him…” E. G. Browne, \textit{Literary History of Persia} (Cambridge, 4 vols., 1919-1924), 2: 247. For the SNH’s reinterpretation of Aruzi’s text, see SNH 131, \textit{Karnameh}, 285.
Just as Aruzi had done centuries earlier, Jackson while facing the emamzadeh “turned to the left” fully aware that the act had been repeated and then described by many before him. Then he “approached the spot where rests the dust of him who gave expression in quatrain poetry to Persian’s freest thought.” Jackson had fulfilled a long desire of his after decades of scrupulous planning.

Finally having reached the end of his pilgrimage, Jackson stood in front of the slightly elevated grave, staring at the spot. His historic and artistic (de)valorization of Emamzadeh Mahruq was revealed by his comment that “We paid little attention to the sanctuary…for the grave of Omar was the only object of interest to us.”\(^{50}\) Subsequently, much of the SNH’s decision to spend effort and money to revamp the emamzadeh would be a mere outcome of those invested on Khayyam’s tomb. The professor seems to have been gripped with the idea of recording the smallest specificity of the place’s architecture and simultaneously reinforcing the popular, yet “shocking,” notion that the tomb had “no inscription.”\(^{51}\) The two photographs, provided by Sykes and Jackson, are both unique and complementary. The former showed the pre-1934 morphology of the emamzadeh before the destruction of its two extended wings on each side, which shelter the burial place (Fig. 6.10). The latter was one of the few clear illustrations of Khayyam’s original tombstone before its destruction in the same year (Fig. 6.11). Jackson complimented his illustration with a long explanation:

The sarcophagus stands beneath the central one of the three arched recesses, its niche measuring about thirteen feet across, while the flanking arches measure about ten feet each and are empty. A couple of terraced brick steps lead up to the flooring where it rests. The oblong tomb is a simple case made of brick and cement, the poet’s remains reposeing beneath; and, although there is no inscription to tell whose bones are interred below, every one knows that it is Omar’s grave.\(^{52}\) Vandal scribbers…have desecrated it with random scrawls, and have also scratched their names upon the brown mortar of the adjoining walls, thus disclosing the white cement underneath. A stick of wood, a stone, and some fragments of shards profaned the top of the sarcophagus when we saw it. There was nothing else.

Somberly, he ended: “But no rose-tree can now shed its petals upon the poet’s tomb, as was once the case in fulfillment of what had been, as tradition tells us, the dearest wish of his heart.”

\(^{50}\) “After [Khayyam’s] death, he was buried near the cemetery of Nishapur, next to the grave of Mohammad Mahruq, descendent of Imam Zeighn El Abedin, the fourth Shi’a imam.” SNH 131, Karmneh, 285.

\(^{51}\) This speaks of Europe’s fixation in labeling things, “enframing” objects, and ordering ideas, where the architectural order represents further meaning: order represented = order itself = world-as-exhibition; see T. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge, 1988).

\(^{52}\) Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 243.
Jackson’s story then took his readers into a detailed analysis of Aruzi’s use of “gul” and the symbolic or actual falling of leaves on the tombstone as fancied by Khayyam, concluding, “However, the site where he rests, like the tombs of Hafiz and Sa’di at Shiraz, is preserved from forgetfulness by the mosque which it adjoins,” adding further, “In this respect it is not like that of the great epic poet Firdausi, which is practically forgotten amid the ruins of Tus… Omar’s growing fame in Europe and America will bring other pilgrims to his grave.”

On his way back, “I scattered some rose-leaves by the way in order that the path to Omar’s tomb… might be strewn with the roses that he loved.” Here also, Jackson was happily surprised to find “our Armenian servant, Hovannes Agopian, had preserved in his pack a pint bottle of red wine,” with which the company first raised their cups “in Omar’s memory,” then “turned down the empty glass” with the anticipation that “only that which is best may remain… with the fame” of Khayyam.

Jackson’s text and images testified to and perpetuated the precision of the practice on the site.

Accordingly, when Sir Mortimer Durand held an audience with Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar to deliver a request from the London based Omar Khayyam Club to restore the author’s tomb, “The Shah was astonished and said, ‘Do you mean to tell me that there is a club connected with Omar Khayyam? Why, he has been dead for a thousand years. We have had a great many better poets in Persia than Omar Khayyam, and indeed I myself’.”

Between Jackson’s pilgrimage in 1907 and the foundation of the SNH in 1922, while many came to lay “gul” on the tomb, no architectural alterations occurred at the site. Reza Shah, unlike Nasser al-Din, would not remain apathetic to either Western criticism of the tomb’s condition nor to its ostensibly non-modern and “Oriental” looks. In the 1930s, therefore, the shah, “who wanted no walled towns to exist

53 Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 244.
54 It rather spoke about the west’s obsession with inscriptions, tombs, and monuments, not that of the ‘Orient’s’. The persistent western protests about the lack of such objects, in turn, constituted a minuscule manifestation of Edward Said’s definition of Orientalism: “as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it.” E. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1994), 3.
56 “Nishapur can boast only the shrine of a martyr related to [Imam Reza buried in Mashhad] Muhammad Mahruq, who reposes today beneath a much restored tile-covered dome built in the seventeenth century.” Wilkinson provides a very good history of Nishapur and its architecture. Ch. K. Wilkinson, Nishapur: Some Early Islamic Buildings and Their Decoration (New York, 1986), 37. The only comment Robert Byron had about Nishapur was “The home, curse it, of Omar Khayyam.” R. Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London, 1950), 79; and Robert Byron photo collection, Iran 155, Photo file #13 Me-Ya, Between Shiraz and Meshhed – Shrine of Gadam Gah #B38/103; Aga Khan Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University. Post-1963 commentaries on the tomb, among others, include: “Omar’s tomb is situated in a beautiful garden 2¼ miles to the south-east of the modern city of Nishapur, just beyond the now completely demolished suburb of Shadyakh. After entering the gate of this garden, one sees before one a path, with a channel of running water down the center, leading to the domed tomb of the Imamzadeh
in his country,” ordered their destruction in Nishapur and by the end of that decade would authorize the Metropolitan Museum of Art to excavate the city’s historical riches. These excavation from 1935 to 1947, however, “initially planned to recover valuable Sassanian artifacts, produced” instead a large amount of “artistic material as well as evidence of a flourishing urban settlement” dating to the Seljuk period.57 While archeological evidence contributed trivially to the Pahlavi state’s effort to revive Nishapur’s historic eminence, the SNH’s projects in that city would aim at doing exactly that.

The chain of events in October 1934 that were associated with the millenary anniversary of Ferdawsi, as seen in chapter 3, had attracted an enormous amount of diplomatic, academic, and royal attention. It had certainly kept the Society busy during the first half of the decade. It was in the effort to revive Iran’s “national spirit” that the SNH decided to take initiative in giving a more “modern” appearance to the tomb of Omar Khayyam as an integral part of the Ferdawsi Celebrations. Mostly based on Western regard for Khayyam, it was accordingly decided that the Orientalists who had been invited to Iran on the occasion, would stop in Nishapur on the way to Tus. To this end, “the SNH very quickly built a stone edifice…on the eastern side” of Emamzadeh Mahruq, later described as “a column placed three to four meters from Mahruq’s structure.”58

Muhammad Mahruq, a relative of the Imam Riza of Mashed. On approaching this shrine, one turns to the left, as Nizami-yi-'Arudi did, and one comes to the tomb, which is just beyond the eastern wall of the building. In 1934 the old tomb was demolished, to make way for a carved alabaster column eight feet in height on which are inscribed a number of ‘Omar’s quatrains, it is a most peaceful spot, far removed from the rush and turmoil of modern life. Although there are no fruit trees very close to the tomb, there are some not far away, and it is possible that, in spring time, a breeze from the south might cause their blossoms to fall on the last resting place of the great astronomer-poet.” Lockhart, Persian Cities, 84. “His tomb, an unusual modern edifice built in 1934 on the site of the original tomb, lies in a garden surrounding the seventeenth century Imamzadeh...about 4 km. south-east of Nishapur.” S. A. Matheson, Persia: An Archaeological Guide (London, 1972), 198. “Almost at the northern edge of this band of irrigated farmland delimited by qanat technology, there is a highway. Today an unnecessary bend takes it a half mile south of the route it followed fifty years ago so that traffic is brought within sight of the shrine of Muhammad Mahruq and the elegant, modern concrete and tile monument to Omar Khayyam situated in a garden beside it which is incongruously luxuriant, but the more lovely for its incongruity. A thousand years ago the highway passed a bit farther still to the south, but the modern highway cannot follow its barely discernable route because between the highway and the monuments to Muhammad Mahruq and Omar Khayyam cuts the railroad from Tehran to Mashhad following a straight northwest to southeast path across the plain.” R. W. Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History (Cambridge, 1972), 4.

57 K. A. Niknami, Methodological Aspects of Iranian Archaeology (Oxford, 2000), 22. Also, see Lockhart, Persian Cities, 81.
58 SNH 131, Karnameh, 287.
The earliest surviving Pahlavi document mentioning the tomb’s “repairs” is Reza Shah’s Court Minister Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash’s letter to Khorasan’s governor on May 16, 1931. “A group of Majlis representatives,” the minister wrote, “have collected around one thousand toman for the repair (t’amir) and amendments (tarmim) of Hakim Omar Khayyam’s resting-place (maqbara).”59 He advised, “It is, of course, understood that any repair initiative requires a priori research and the production of a map/drawing (naqsheh). Therefore, please order steps in those directions.” “However,” Teymurtash further added, “since the collected money amounts to [a mere] one thousand tomans, the expenses should be limited accordingly.” Nine days later, Khorasan’s Governor Mirza Mahmud Khan Jam reported to the Royal Court, “as per your order, a drawing...is being prepared by Mister Behzad...with whom I will go to Nishapur...to inspect the site...”60 Conversely, the governor added, “Nothing can be done with one thousand tomans.” Instead, four thousand was requested for “a tomb in a very good taste (kheyli ba-saliqeh), worthy of Khayyam’s achievements...” These seemingly unambiguous remarks between two prominent members of the Society as well as Reza Shah’s government cabinet unleashed another project undertaken by the SNH that would not simply end with a modest monument, but would instead, as in Ferdawsiyeh, extend its complications well into the 1960s.

As will be recalled from the Ferdawsiyeh project, Karim Taherzadeh Behzad was the inadequate me’mar of the first attempt on that monument. Evidently, he was hired to present a proposal for Khayyam’s memorial during the same period. The intrigue linked to the latter would be as gloomy as the former. Since, as Jam had pointed out, “in reality, the present condition of Khayyam’s grave brings shame to Iranians...to the point that European and other respectful individuals have traveled to the tomb and have spoken regretfully about it.”61 At the end of 1931, Behzad proposed two “drawings (naqsheh):” one with eight and the other with four thousand tomans estimated cost and both designed “based on European methods (oslub) but with Iranian

59 Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Documents on Archaeology in Iran: Excavations, Antiquities and Historical Monuments (Tehran, 2001), 403-404; document 124: communication between Court Ministry and Khorasan’s branch of Public Instructions Ministry in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Ordibehesht 25, 1310/May 16, 1931, Tehran; document 124, letter 1: communication between Interior Ministry and Court Ministry in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Khordad 11, 1310/June 2, 1931, Tehran.
60 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 404-405; document 124, letter 2: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Kordad 3, 1310/May 25, 1931, Mashhad.
61 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 405-406; document 124, letter 3: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Tir 14, 1310/July 6, 1931, Mashhad.
ornamentations (t'azinat).” For its “proper” realization, a few months later, Jam reiterated the same point during his request for more money from the central government. “Others,” he complained, “have such interest (‘alaqeh) in Khayyam and do not spare any efforts...while, we have had the smallest of such concerns.”

Subsequently, Teymurtash’s approval of Behzad’s “Plan no. 2” on July 13, proved the opening of years of complications and negotiations, of letters going back and forth between Tehran and Mashhad with the main concern of the Khayyam’s modern stele, its ever growing cost, and its architect’s professional ineptitude.

With the decision to “modernize” Khayyam’s tomb, the secular reformists had found themselves in an art historical dilemma: if money were being spent for the erection of a new memorial for Khayyam and its grounds, money, too, had to be allocated for the refurbishment of Emamzadeh Mahrur. Their predicament was architectural in nature not only as a result of the

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62 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 412; document 124, letter 10: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry; Esfand 4, 1310/February 24, 1932, Mashhad.
63 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 407; document 124, letter 4: communication between Court Ministry and Khorasan’s Governor in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Tir 21, 1310/July 13, 1931, Tehran. For Jam’s response to Teymurtash’s letter, see Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 407-408; document 124, letter 5: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry in regards to renovation of Omar Khayyam’s tomb; Mordad 3, 1310/July 26, 1931, Mashhad. For negotiations for the cost of Khayyam’s 1934 monument, see Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 408-409; document 124, letter 6: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry; Mordad 19, 1310/August 11, 1931, Mashhad. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 409-410; document 124, letter 7: communication between Court Ministry and Khorasan’s Governor; Shahrivar 3, 1310/August 26, 1931, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 410-411; document 124, letter 8: telegraph from Khorasan’s Governor to Court Ministry; Shahrivar 11, 1310/September 3, 1931, Mashhad. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 411; document 124, letter 9: telegraph from Court Ministry to Khorasan’s Governor; Shahrivar 11, 1310/September 3, 1931, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 412; document 124, letter 10: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Court Ministry; Esfand 4, 1310/February 24, 1932, Mashhad. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 413; document 124, letter 11: communication between Court Ministry and Khorasan’s Governor; Esfand 17, 1310/March 8, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 413-414; document 124, letter 12: communication between Public Instructions Ministry and Court Ministry; Esfand 19, 1310/March 10, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 414-415; document 124, letter 13: communication between Public Instructions Ministry and Court Ministry; Farvardin 24, 1311/April 13, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 414-415; document 124, letter 14: communication between Court Ministry and Public Instructions Ministry; Farvardin 30, 1311/April 13, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 415-416; document 124, letter 15: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Public Instructions Ministry; Farvardin 9, 1311/March 29, 1932, Mashhad. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 417-418; document 124, letter 16: communication between Khorasan’s Governor Court Ministry; Ordibehesht 11, 1311/May 1, 1932, Mashhad. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 418; document 124, letter 17: communication between Court Minister and Khorasan’s Governor; Ordibehesht 31, 1311/May 21, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 419; document 124, letter 18: memo from Court Minister; Ordibehesht 21, 1311/May 11, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 419; document 124, letter 19: memo from Ministry of Public Instructions; Khoradad 5, 1311/May 26, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 420; document 124, letter 20: memo from Court Minister; Khoradad 9, 1311/May 30, 1932, Tehran. Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 420-421; document 124, letter 21: memo from Khorasan’s Governor; Khordad 25, 1311/June 15, 1932, Mashhad.
physical proximity of the two edifices, but awkwardly, because of the subordination of the
former to the latter – a hierarchical order that the SNH intended to reverse. On the one hand,
while in his numerous memos, Teymurtash explicitly privileged Khayyam’s grave over the
emamzadeh, Public Instructions Minister Gharagozlu pressed that “As part of work on [that]
grave, it is necessary to repair the Emamzadeh Mahruq…”64 The Court Minister and the
Governor of Khorasan – both members of the SNH and each other’s “My dear friend,” on the
other hand, called attention to the urgency to finish the job on time for the ceremonies “in spite
of” the emamzadeh.65 Unsurprisingly, however, while the cost of construction for the modern
tomb had risen to nine thousand tomans in May 1932, no progress had been made on either the
renovation of the emamzadeh or the erection of Khayyam’s mausoleum.66

It must have been sometime between May 1932 and October 1934 that actual work was
carried out on the site. Instead of construction, however, the first steps were in full accord with
Reza Shah’s other modernization schemes: a destruction of the existing edifice. The two
extending wings of the emamzadeh, best documented in Sykes’ photograph, were removed
without trace along with Khayyam’s unornamented tombstone (see Fig. 6.10). On the same spot,
a 2-meter platform was built, flanked by nine marble steps (Figs. 6.12). At its center stood a stele
with inscriptions of “Hakim Omar Khayyam” on the eastern façade and selected verses from his
Robayyat on the remaining surfaces. Not only did the architects of the new monument claim to
blend “Western construction methods” and “Eastern ornamentations” as signifier of Khayyam’s
work, but also they managed to completely alter the morphology of the emamzadeh by
eliminating its two wings. Without them, the structure was reduced to a disproportioned form
with complete lack of dialogue with Khayyam’s stele. Two harmoniously interlaced historic
edifices were now awkwardly positioned as two separate and disparate architectural entities.

Worse still was the fact that the original tomb of Khayyam was neither adequately
documented nor properly photographed. As far as the Iranian modernists were concerned, the

64 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 414-415; document 124, letter 13: communication between Public
Instructions Ministry and Court Ministry; Farvardin 24, 1311/April 13, 1932, Tehran. Also, see Ministry of Culture,
Archaeology in Iran, 416-417; document 124, letter 15: communication between Khorasan’s Governor and Public
Instructions Ministry; Farvardin 9, 1311/March 29, 1932, Mashhad.

65 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 413; document 124, letter 11: communication between Court Ministry
and Khorasan’s Governor; Esfand 17, 1310/March 8, 1932, Tehran; and Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran,
418; document 124, letter 17: communication between Court Minister and Khorasan’s Governor; Ordibehesht 31,
1311/May 21, 1932, Tehran.

66 Ministry of Culture, Archaeology in Iran, 418; document 124, letter 17: communication between Court Minister
and Khorasan’s Governor; Ordibehesht 31, 1311/May 21, 1932, Tehran.
issue was of nominal importance, and its discourse, photographic or otherwise, was seen as one of the several acts that carried a nuisance potential, out of all proportion, to its real importance. Interests of national self-image were claimed to be involved. For those Iranian historians and architects who look into the issue would later regard it as a “stupidity, a mistake out of ignorance.” For them, the history of Khayyam’s original tomb justified its very preservation as was, in lieu. In addition, many maintained that the tomb’s destruction went against the very will of Khayyam himself. “If they had asked anyone that knew about Persian literature and history,” the Iranian scholar and architect, Chahryar Adle, recently noted, “they would have known that Khayyam’s tomb was exactly what he wanted; instead,” referring to the present-day monument, “they built that sugar-cone.” Today, only in Western libraries can we find traces of the historic edifice, much lamented and nitpicked by those who provided evidence for its existence and conditioned its ultimate destruction.

Complementing the stele and the ameliorations to the garden, two large pillars along with two rows of trees were placed on the 150-meter asphalt-road leading to the site. When the American team arrived to excavate nearby, there was talk by the governor to also build a roundabout, “a resthouse and circular garden (falaki) at the newly created road junction near the two columns that had been erected in honor of” Khayyam [sic.].68 The Museum’s expedition was asked to make “a shallow excavation before construction began.” “We found the remains of structures that seemed to be of the late twelfth century…” The Society’s architectural ventures kept running into archeological activities around the country, for the politics of archeology and that of national heritage were, from the outset, intertwined.

News of the Orientalists’ visit to Nishapur, on October 10, 1934, appeared in different venues. While in the Bulletin of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology, Arthur Pope reported, “The following days were taken up with a trip, which included visiting the reconstructed tomb of ‘Umar Khayyam at Nishapur, to Mashhad,” he asked the Persian charge d’affaires in London, M. K. Schayesteh, whether “…you [saw] my photograph of the tomb of Omar Khayyam in the TIMES on Monday?” adding, “I was glad to get it published as a counter

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67 Chahryar Adle, scholar, architect, and archeologist at the French Institute of Iranian Studies, in an interview conducted by Talinn Grigor, January 9, 2002, Tehran.
to the constant libel that the Persians care nothing about their old monuments…”69 Minister of Public Instructions and a staunch supporter of Pope, Isa Sadiq, later recorded the day’s details:

Without a stop in the city, the buses headed to the mausoleum of Emamzadeh Mahrug [with] a big [and] splendid garden and Khayyam’s tomb, next to the mausoleum. Just as Nezami Aruzi has narrated that ‘my tomb is in such a place that each spring it would be coved in flowers’ during our visit we saw such a beauty. [The new tomb] was located three or four meters from the wall of the mausoleum… Since the European and American Scholars and Orientalists were going to pass through Nishapur on their way to Tus, and wanted to make a pilgrimage to Khayyam, the SNH felt it was necessary to [transform] his burial place into an aramgah worthy of him, but since there was little time, the surrounding was enhanced and a stone was fixed to the tomb.70

In the garden of Khayyam, the Orientalists gathered around the stele and made a circle, according to Sadiq. Those who knew Persian recited parts of the Robayyat and translated it to their colleagues; one among them “started to cry.”71 Touched by such expressions of admiration for “Iranian culture,” the guests were invited to have wine, prepared from the grapes of the garden. The royalist Ettela’at supports Sadiq’s accounts with a small photograph depicting the scholars around the stele. It reported that the guests “spent a few hours over Khayyam’s grave…reading poetry.”72 The next day, a photo-collage of the event was printed on the journal’s front-page with the following captions: “Orientalists standing around the tomb,” “Orientalists positioned at the edge of the tomb,” “Orientalists having cocktail lunch under a tent in the tomb’s vicinity,” and “Orientalists around the emamzadeh.”73 The event was advertised as a complete success for the guests as, unlike their predecessors, they had liked the design of the modern memorial.

However, things were quite grim behind closed doors. The project’s financial difficulties were only eclipsed by those associated with the ineptness of its architect. Behzad, a man who had failed to design a satisfactory mausoleum for Ferdawsi, would also prove himself inept to construct a simple stele for Khayyam. The first half of 1935 would be exhausted by letters

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71 Sadiq, Memoirs, 2: 227.
72 [Photo with caption], Ettela’at 2323 (Aban 3, 1313/ October 25, 1934): 1.
regarding the architect and his fee. Less than six months after the completion of the stele, Khorasan’s Governor Jam received a memo from the Interior Ministry asking for “the four thousand tomans of the fifteen thousand” that had been “promised to Mr. Behzad.” Again, for over six months messages were dispatched back and forth contending the quality and worth of Behzad’s work to three, four, or fifteen thousand tomans. “Because the foundation has not been reinforced and the stones have cracked,” reported the Khorasan’s branch of Public Instructions Ministry in June 1935, “Khayyam’s new aramgah is sinking.” The news was sad because the SNH had failed in a simple undertaking. It was humiliating because it suggested that a modern nation-state, claiming to be the heir to Cyrus’s Iran – “the only surviving antique civilization and the eternal promoter of civilization” – was incapable of erecting a 2-meter post in modern times. To mend the situation, the Ministry had sent a certain “engineer Shariat” or “Sharifzadeh” to substantiate the facts of the situation. “The stones were laid on the ground and because of rain and mud were broken,” reported the engineer, adding disapprovingly, “A monument as such has a historic value and needs special attention” “In my opinion, the parts that have come apart need total dismantlement, the pouring of a concrete foundation, and the building of a new” monument. History would repeat itself at Ferdawsiyeh on a far bigger scale. Even Nishapur’s Mayor Khajenuri was sent to the site to return to attribute the situation to the “me’mar’s (architect’s) carelessness.” Shariat’s report requested more money “for the renovation of the new structure,” which were to be taken from Emamzadeh Mahruq’s endowment income (vaqf). “Do it and inform us,” were the instructions from Tehran.

By July 20, 1935, the troubles connected with Behzad reached Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi, who in a “top secret” letter ordered a thorough investigation of the architect. Tehran’s Public Instructions Ministry continued to accuse Behzad for “the distressful situation of a monument that is supposed to last very long, but which has collapsed” after the
"astronomical amount of money spent on it." The poignant letter that was forwarded to several ministries, including Khorasan’s governor, openly implicated the architect for the project’s failure as a result of his “personal carelessness.” While many reacted with alarm to this widely circulated communiqué, the Antiquities Department responded with utter apathy: “We are neither involved nor responsible for the work done on Khayyam’s tomb.” Period.

Sure enough, the climax of the saga consists of Behzad’s own voice; possibly the only archival document authored by an Iranian architect that has survived Reza Shah’s era. On his personal letterhead, labeled “moassess-e sakhteman-e Behzad [sic.]” or Behzad Construction Establishment, addressed to the Public Instructions Ministry, he began, “Instead of gratitude, I received your insulting letter.” This seemingly trivial document, exasperatingly long and self-opinionated, is indicative of several key points within the larger Iranian context during the early stage of the profession and its modern evolution. First, it demonstrated the pre-European-educated architect’s inability to deal with modern bureaucratic institutions and tropes, explicitly revealed by Behzad’s use of inarticulate language and unpersuasive arguments. His attempts on either generating patriotic sentiments or professional respect resulted in failure:

A nation that valorizes me, a great man among architects; a man who has elevated the prestige of the architectural profession...has done free work. Ask the Ministry of Public Instructions in Khorasan, [and you will see that] instead of 4,000, they have paid me only 3,000 [tomans]. Based on which rights have they decreased my salary? I told the guardian of the Emamzadeh [Mahruq] as well as the Governor [of Khorasan] that this kind of work couldn’t be done for that kind of price... The broken stones are those that I installed without taking money. Isn’t it obvious that in winter, if the monument is not cared for, it will fall to ruins; case in point is Khayyam’s...

Behzad’s unethical professional behavior was also revealed by the poverty and insolence of the text. His overemotional and exaggerated arguments were in tune with the social context of a guild, and not with those of the modern professional. While some condemned his behavior, others took his side. By the invitation of Khorasan’s Governor Jam, these quarrels ended with a

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82 Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 43, Document 4, page 9; Antiquities Department to Public Instructions Ministry, Mordad 26, 1314/August 18, 1935, Tehran. Also, see Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 43, Document 4, page 5; Public Instructions Ministry to Khorasan’s Governor, Mordad 28, 1314/August 20, 1935, Tehran.
83 Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 43, Document 4, pages 7-11; Taherzadeh Behzad’s reply to Public Instructions Ministry, Shahrivar 1, 1314/August 24, 1935, Tehran.
84 Iran National Archives 250, Micro-reel 43, Document 4, pages 7-11; Taherzadeh Behzad’s reply to Public Instructions Ministry, Shahrivar 1, 1314/August 24, 1935, Tehran.
meeting in order “to solve the issues of Behzad’s money, salary, and costs.” Present were a number of government officials including Mister Pakravan, Mohammad Ali Asadi, General (Sartip) Iraj Matbui, and Hasan Zawqi. “I walked into Khayyam’s tomb-garden and what I saw disturbed me;” insisted one during the meeting, adding, “This situation does not honor Khayyam, therefore, a new and better tomb is needed.” It was decided that while Behzad had done his initial job and had to be paid for it, the 13,000 tomans that he asked for the (re)renovation of the new tomb were excessive and the question was left indefinitely open to negotiations. As the problems related to the construction of Ferdowsieh, those linked with Khayyam’s memorial remained unsettled for a long time.

The first Pahlavi attempt to re-appropriate the tomb of Khayyam in form of a stele proved unsatisfactory to the 1960s’ aesthetic expectations of the political elite and the SNH alike. Arguably, in the haste to complete Ferdawsi’s mausoleum for the inauguration by Reza Shah, little money and interest remained for a thorough elimination and construction of a new monument for Khayyam. The 1934-stele, despite its major shortcomings, was designed in full accordance with the aesthetical sensibility and historic precedents of Iran’s Islamic architectural history:

Necessarily more public...was the erection of inscribed funerary steles over the grave. Just as the grave itself, and the position of the corpse within it, was oriented towards Mecca, so too was a typical stele, and it was intended to evoke further religious associations. Its formulaic inscription began with the bismillah, gave the name, patronymic and date of death of the deceased, and ended with a prayer...the form of the stele was that of a mehrab, a detail which facilitated their subsequent re-use as mihrabs in many a mosque. Thus minor violations of orthodoxy took on an explicitly religious protective colouring.

Furthermore, as it stood, the stele gained sanctity from the shrine of Mahruq as the original tomb had done for centuries. By their spatial proximity, the two were inexorably linked. As in all the monuments erected by the SNH, Khayyam’s modern memorial was intended to celebrate the historic figure buried there by its independent presence; to sustain its own worth independent of explicitly Muslim architectural histories and edifices. Khayyam’s tomb, as in Hafeziyeh, had to


be singled out, glorified, and celebrated free of its historical context. For this, the historic exact spot of Khayyam's resting-place would be subject to modern displacements.

**Spot Displaced**

Things were left as they were since 1934 until a letter arrived at the SNH's headquarters in 1955. The director of "Nishapur's Cultural Affairs, Mr. Fazeli" conveyed the "people's request" to Khorasan's governor and the Ministry of Culture and Art to take action in regards to the condition of Khayyam's tomb, for, according to the *Karnameh*, as early as in "1313, his admirers [had] found the tomb beneath his honor."87 Not much was done until two years later, when another letter arrived from Khorasan's Governor Rum requesting the preparation of floor-plans for the collection of tombs at Nishapur. In November 1956, the SNH informed the governor that [those] of Kamal al-Molk, Khayyam, and Attar had been initiated and will be sent when finished.” The erection of new tombs for the two former, as well as the renovation of the shrines of Attar and Mahrurq, were the Society's largest undertaking yet in terms of scope and variety. It involved two modern and two historic edifices and a complete re-navigation of Nishapur's southeastern urban pocket as a destination for both national secular pilgrimage and international tourism.

Iranian architect Houshang Seyhoun, by then a prestigious professor at Tehran University and a famed architect, was contacted in July of the same year to propose a solution for the "unsatisfactory" condition of these sites. Unlike Ibn Sina’s modern mausoleum a decade earlier, for Khayyam’s tomb, no public competition was organized nor was the design brought under any kind of scrutiny. Seyhoun had become the trusted architect of the SNH. A month later, after personally inspecting the site, he notified the SNH’s committee that since the 1934-stele “is next to the emamzadeh...any kind of action at this location cannot convey” Khayyam’s “greatness.”88 He insisted “a change of location.” Despite the SNH’s anxiety over the exact spot of Ferdawsi’s grave, and despite the fact that Khayyam’s exact spot was, and had always been, identified, it was unanimously decided to displace and eventually eliminate that exact spot. It would, it was determined, be relocated to some other spot that would become exact by erecting a new

mausoleum. The SNH and its operations, that is, random regimes that had become an institution forced by three decades of rituals, now was allowed and able to destroy, to remove, to relocate, and to reestablish historic edifices with great ease. Further it could project these practices as normative. At the time, no one would dare to publicly criticize, much less prevent, the elimination of the historic tombstone. The SNH backed by the Pahlavi state held monopoly over the nation’s heritage that it had, in effect, invented as a set of valuable artifacts. This hegemony was not only over what needed to be protected and preserved, but also more significantly, what could be permanently destroyed. The all-pervasive right to eliminate historic edifices, in turn, gave the state the prerogative to define the index of nation’s cultural patrimony. One was conditioned by the other.

The new location for Khayyam’s grave that was proposed by Seyhoun was on the northeastern side of the existing garden. According to the Karnameh, it had been a space of 43,200 square meters during the Safavid era. This spatial shift not only secured for Khayyam’s tomb a prominence of its own, independent of other structures, but more importantly completely overshadowed Emamzadeh Mahruq, the topmost ambition of the SNH since 1931 (Figs. 6.13-6.14). The new plan, furthermore, altered the entire configuration of the garden by de-emphasizing the architectural dominance of the emamzadeh in the southern corner over the northeastern corner of the new Khayyam’s tomb. The new western access to the garden was, therefore, designed to lead, along rows of trees, to the new exact spot, entirely circumventing the once prominent emamzadeh (Figs. 6.15-6.16). No one could “stop facing” the emamzadeh, then “turn to the left and [see] his grave” as had done Aruzi, Curzon, Jackson, and all those who came to visit until the 1960s. Seyhoun recently substantiated the contention of this chapter:

...right at the corner [of the emamzadeh], there was a mileh (pole). This too they had built in a hurry (ba-ajaleh) during Reza Shah’s era. The [Orientalists] really wanted to visit Khayyam. So that they would not see something ugly, they [the SNH or the government] built this [stele] in a hurry. After Reza Shah, the Society (anjoman) wanted to build Khayyam’s resting-place (aramgah), they asked me; it was impossible to build it there. I thought the best solution was to give an axis on the length [of the garden] and build the resting-place here, so that there would not be a connection between the two buildings [i.e. Khayyam’s tomb and Emamzadeh Mahruq]. In the meantime, we altered the access [to the garden] because on the existing side there was no parking. My argument was that Khayyam is unique whereas there are thousands of emamzadehs.

89 SNH 131, Karnameh, 290-291.
90 Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada; Tape 1, Side B; see Appendix 6.
Seyhoun’s derogative allusion to the 1934-stele as a “mileh” – which literally means a stick or a pole – in addition to his conviction that “Khayyam was unique whereas there are thousands of emamzadehs.” are ample indication of the ease with which it was decided both to eliminate all trace of the original resting-place and to move the location of the monument to a completely new spot. The displaced main gate, too, played a major role in marginalizing the popular and religious significance of the emamzadeh.

According to the Karnameh, Seyhoun’s proposal for the monument proper was put on examination at Tehran University’s Fine Arts Department in May 1958. This was significant because it revealed the intimate collaboration between the Society with the university as two state-controlled institutions as well as their internal links via individuals like Seyhoun and the director of the department, Mohsen Forughi. This kind of exchange also hinted at how the national monuments had become an architectural manifesto of the time, because the aim of the department was to verify that it complied with “principles of Iranian architecture.” With an official letter, Forughi had reassured the Society that “both the architectural proposal and the model” were “totally appropriate.” 91 On March 15, 1959, therefore, Seyhoun and the SNH signed a contract in thirteen points: the design and erection of the tombs of Khayyam, Kamal al-Molk, and Attar in addition to the cultivation of the two gardens and their surrounding areas with 5% of total cost as the architect’s salary. While Seyhoun was the sole supervisor of the construction process, another person was appointed and paid by him as the permanent site-manager. The agreement also underscored that the architect had “the obligation” to travel to Nishapur “once every two months” and present a detailed report on the progress of the work. Nothing was left to chance. Finally, it was intended to bring the project to its completion so that the three monuments’ inauguration would coincide with that of Nader Shah’s in Mashhad. Seyhoun managed to meet the thirteen points of his contract with few complications.

The architect’s leading idea for the design of Khayyam’s monument was derived from a (re)interpretation of Aruzi’s Chahar Maqale that bore witness to Khayyam’s own words: “place my grave so that every spring, blossoms will blow on it from the north.” Words that Seyhoun, the SNH, and many Iranians believed to have been “Khayyam’s wish.” 92 Again, as in all other projects undertaken by the SNH, the elite of the nation was speaking on behalf of its selected

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91 Seyhoun sent the proposal to the SNH on Khordad 6, 1337 or May 27, 1958; see SNH 131, Karnameh, 290-291.
historic figures who, in turn, were being made to speak through their modern mausoleums. The architect, furthermore, intended to exhibit the unique individuality of Khayyam, “to recognize his mathematical, astronomical and poetic genius.” It was, therefore, decided that “his mausoleum had to be built in such a way to be open to the elements,” hence the punctuated inner dome (Fig. 6.17). Visible from the main gate, Khayyam’s memorial was approached by a wide walkway through the garden. The originally envisioned 20-meter tower was elevated to 22 meters, composed of 8 interwoven concrete strips, joined at the center top. This was visually and physically braced by a wall surrounded by a series of fountains. White inlays of calligraphy on blue tiles, recalling the Safavid architecture of Isfahan, decorated the various facades of the memorial.

The monument, furthermore, consisted of a series of symbols related to the reconstructed personality and skills of Khayyam: “...a three-meter drop which subsequently gave shape to the building, including a lower level memorial tower and waterfalls. To echo Khayyam’s name [i.e. ‘tent-maker’], Seyhoun set the waterfalls, made of smaller triangles of solid granite, in a circle around the tower. The circular base of the tower is divided into 10 sections with 10 supporting columns. Since the number 10 is the first plural number in mathematics...to refer to Khayyam’s skill as a mathematician.” The surface was inscribed with twenty verses from the *Robayyat* in Nastaliq calligraphy, selected by Ostad Jalal al-Din Homai, handwritten by Morteza Abd al-Rosuli, and transformed into tiles by Mostafa Tabatabai (Fig. 6.18). Each diamond-shaped piece on the surface was inlaid with two such verses. A hexagonal tombstone was placed directly below the conic dome, open on eight sides and labeled with a plaque; in Persian and English, it read: “Omar Khayyam of Nyshabur 1047-1123 AD Mathematician, Astronomer, and Poet” (Fig. 6.19). Subsequently, in the northwestern corner of the garden a small library, guesthouse, and other tourist facilities were constructed.

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93 The walkway was 10 meters wide.
94 A similar technique of decoration was used on Kamal al-Molk’s modern mausoleum by Seyhoun.
95 Seyhoun, *Houshang*, 81.

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While the design’s aesthetic was endorsed by the authoritative stamp of the university, Seyhoun’s main problem was the actual realization of his scheme, one that his contractor, the K.J.T. Company, had failed to construct. On December 13, 1958, it had informed the SNH that “because of Seyhoun’s design, the tomb has to be built with fine concrete;” adding further, “We will [therefore] employ Western specialists” to finish the work. While the first structural solution of metal with aluminum had been rejected by Seyhoun, the contractors drew attention to SNH’s past experience and warned, “If we don’t give” the commission to a foreigner, “we might later regret as we did with Ferdawsi’s tomb.” A graduate of Harvard University’s Structural Engineering Department, Zareh Grigorian, while an Iranian, would take the place of the “Western specialist.” Like so many young professionals before him and despite an exceptionally superior education, Grigorian had found himself without an employment after his 1958-return to Iran (Fig. 6.20). “I was 26 or 27 years old and had only $15 in my pocket,” he recently said. For several months, briefcase in hand, Grigorian had gone “from this door to that door, this architect to that architect,” inquiring for a position. “It so happened,” he recalls, “that I met Seyhoun who usually tried to find [able] people because he was someone with a difficult character...of course, in my opinion,” at the same time, “he was a very prolific artist.” The young engineer had landed a very complicated project as he explained:

[Seyhoun’s] biggest challenge was the unusual columns [of Khayyam’s tomb]. On the plan, they had one direction, but when they rose, they would turn and twist. [In fact,] they were not columns per se, so that it could bring the load directly down [to the ground]. They would come down and, at some point, they would break [into two directions]. However, [Seyhoun] did not want any ring to take the pressure. The most important thing was [to maintain] the thinness of it all, to keep the beautiful proportions. [Furthermore], he wanted to have stone veneer. He was not ready to accept the use of any exposed steel or exposed concrete (see Fig. 6.1).

The complicated form of the monument, the complex character of its architect, and the rigid architectural doctrine had rendered its structural solution a difficult one. Grigorian proposed the idea of reducing the length of the two flanges on each I-beam to match Seyhoun’s desired thinness for each column. They would, in turn, be able to twist and turn to form the overall

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98 SNH 131, Karnameh, 292-292.
99 Zareh Grigorian, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, September 3, 2003, Belmont, MA; Tape 1, Side A; see Appendix 7. The first untapped interview was conducted by Talinn Grigor, July 30, 2001, Belmont, MA. Grigorian was born into an Armenian family of Tabriz, first studied in Tehran then in the United States before returning to Iran in 1958.
100 Grigorian interview, Tape 1, Side A.
101 “Grigorian: So one thing that I proposed was that we take a steel, an I-beam and cut it in such a way to get the thickness that he [Seyhoun] wanted. When you take a large-size I-beam, for instance, 3 feet or something, its flange
curvatures of the monument. The assembled I-beams would constitute the skeleton of the conic structure, on the surface of which desired stones were to be placed and stuffed with concrete.

The monument became a composite concrete with an I-beam, but of course, trimmed I-beam, so that the size was small. With this steel, we were able to do the job easier – they would build one and twist it [on the top]. That was the principle. Fortunately, it was very successful both in terms of money and technique; it became an almost pre-cast object. They built the skeleton and connected parts to each other, then fixed the stone and poured the concrete; although that part was a bit difficult because of the curved surfaces.102

While Grigorian confessed that “I would not take the job now,” Khayyam’s project was his first and, arguably, career-making commission in Iran. Like many young professionals, he had found the problem of being “young” when returning to “a country in which you don’t have contacts.”103 Nevertheless, like Seyhoun in the 1950s, Grigorian would go on to become the owner and director of one of the largest structural engineering firms in the country as well as a prolific faculty member at various universities including Tehran and National (Melli). Zareh Grigorian & Associates would be commissioned “six or seven university campuses,” including Pahlavi in Shiraz, Bu Ali in Hamadan, National Universities at Mashhad, Jondeshapur, and Tabriz, as well as all the buildings on Tehran’s National University and the central library of Tehran University. It would work with well-known architects such as Kamran Diba on the Museum of Contemporary Art, in addition to others like Nader Ardalan, Mohsen Forughi, and Arthur Pope. Hired by the monarch, moreover, the Golestan Palace Museum renovations and the construction of the shah’s Kish Island Winter Palace, along with numerous movie theaters, office buildings, housing complexes, and residential high-rise apartments, would be their structural work.

Once the tomb’s structural problems were solved, the project was “very quickly” ready for erection.104 With the permission of the city’s municipality, the 1934-stele was dismantled and relocated to a square in central Nishapur. The SNH’s Board of Trustees had specially instructed the city municipality “1) to transfer the same exact monument; 2) to inscribe on an appropriate place that this structure had been the old grave of Khayyam, originally located next to

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102 Grigorian interview, Tape 1, Side A.
103 Grigorian interview, Tape 1, Side A.
104 Grigorian interview, Tape 1, Side A.
Emamzadeh Mahruq; and 3) to rename the area Maydan-e Khayyam (Fig. 6.21). The new had become a heritage, while the modern, a tradition. By then, the SNH’s decision-making members were themselves getting quite old: Ebrahim Hakimi, Hosayn Ala, Ali Heyat, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Engineer Jafar Sharifemami, Ali Asghar Hekmat, Doctor Isa Sadiq, Doctor Sadeq Reza Zadeh Shafaq, General Amanollah Jahanbani, General Farajollah Aqeveli, General Mohammad Hosayn Firuz, Doctor Mahmud Mehran, Doctor Qolam Hosayn Sadiqi, Hasan Nabavi, former Justice Minister Allayar Saleh, Architect Mohsen Forughi, and Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Mostafavi. These men were not only the old veterans of the Society, but also the privileged members of the Pahlavi upper class in the late 1960s. They were a part of the "some 200 elder politicians, senior civil savants, and high-ranking military officers, who" as Abrahamian notes, "prospered by sitting on managerial boards, and facilitating lucrative government contracts.” By hanging to their post on the SNH’s Board of Trustees and Board of Directors, these individuals also benefited from Mohammad Reza Shah’s court patronage, which enabled the latter “to reward” the former, that is, “his followers with a vast array of lucrative salaries, pensions, and sinecures.” To simultaneously honor their king and their poet, therefore, some of these members made a special trip to Nishapur on May 19, 1959 to partake in the laying of the tomb’s cornerstone. “Today in the name of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah” they had announced, “we set the first stone.” Here, on the new exact spot, a plaque was placed that read, “In the 18th year of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and by his order the work on Omar Khayyam’s tomb has started. 28 Ordibehest 1338 (May 19, 1959).”

Archival evidence reveals that the SNH held regular monthly meetings during 1962, for each of which the Minister of Culture and Art was officially invited. It had been a busy year, no doubt, stimulated by the declaration of the shah’s White Revolution in the following January. In March, Khayyam’s bones were dug out, photographed, and placed in a metal box “with religious rites, and taken to the new place and buried according to religious laws.” Two months

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105 In “Esfand 1340 [February 1962], Seyhoun and Jodat informed the SNH, ‘the municipality of Nishapur wants to relocate the stele to a square in front of Nishapur’s school.’ In accordance with the SNH, Seyhoun, Jod’at, governor of Khorasan Mr. Tehrani, the Guardian of Imam Reza Shrine, and some other people, it was agreed to relocate the stele. The Ministries of Education and Culture, as well as the city municipality, approved the decision.” SNH 131, Karnameh, 300-304, 323. My emphasis.

106 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 432.

107 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 436.

later, they were reburied by Nishapur’s head-cleric, Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Nurollah Ahmadi, in the new location under the cone (Figs. 6.22-6.24). In accord with the SNH’s procedures, the events were well documented and publicized. In the resulting illustrations, the “metal box” in which the bones were preserved and transferred, as well as the curious inspection of Khayyam’s skull, were clearly visible. By that May, the remains of Khayyam had been exhumed, buried, and reburied three times.

These rituals, soon, called for the design of Khayyam’s statues. Three months after the unearthing ceremony, a meeting took place in the presence of Isa Sadiq, Houshang Seyhoun, Chair of Fine Arts Department Reza Zadeh Shafaq, Chair of Decorative Arts Department Akbar Tajvidi, representative of radio publications Shirzad, and the SNH’s Board of Directors. A committee was elected who would approve the various studies of Khayyam’s portrait based on the logic that “Just as a worthy tomb was built by the SNH to honor Khayyam, an image is needed, particularly because of the necessity to produce a statue.” Mohammad Ali Haydarian was made responsible for a likeness of both Omar Khayyam and Fitzgerald on the committee’s investigations and endorsement. Khayyam’s white marble bust, enclosed in a glass box, carved by Ostad Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi in 1970 was placed on the walkway, midway between the main gate and the modern tomb. Another life-size statue, ordered especially for the capital city, was unveiled by Shahbanu Farah Pahlavi in 1975 (Figs. 6.25).

While it is not clear how much money was spent on the Nishapur projects, in a report, the chair of the SNH’s Board of Trustees, Hosayn Ala, and the chair of the Board of Directors, General Farajollah Aqeveli, indicated that out of a budget of 2,551,954 tomans, 2,515,661 were spent. Another letter written during the same time by both men was addressed to Iran’s prime minister raising concerns over the Society’s budget. While the government intends to decrease the SNH’s budget by 1,600,000 tomans,” the author wrote, “we are confident that you would not allow such a thing,” for “our funds are collected from lotteries and other non-

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109 The exact date of the event was May 19, 1962; see SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 298.
114 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 133, Document 55, pages 14-16; SNH to Prime Minister, undated (after 1340), Tehran.
governmental sources such as promissory notes, stamps, and popular support.” Ala and Aqeveli pointed to the fact that the Society had to financially support “the maintenance of the tombs of Ferdawsi, Ibn Sina, and Khayyam” along with a long list of extra activities. They also reminded the government that “20 million-rial loans” were borrowed from the state for the construction of these tombs and they “needed to be reimbursed.” The SNH’s 1344 (1965-1966)-annual report, however, painted a more optimistic picture of the Society’s finances. An itemized list of expenses includes the cost of maintaining the mausoleums of Ibn Sina, Ferdawsi, Omar Khayyam, Nader Shah, and Kamal al-Molk to 193,125 tomans; assistance for the restoration of historic monuments to 652,651 tomans; renovation of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum to an astonishing 1,292,061 tomans; costs related to Khayyam’s mausoleum to 124,545 tomans; and among other expenses, the cost of various publications to 85,708 tomans.115

During the general meeting of March 29, 1962, while the 1340-annual report was read and the new boards of directors and trustees were elected, the main discussion concerned the completion of the tombs of Nader Shah, Khayyam, and Attar, as well as the planning of their inaugurations.116 A group of members, accordingly, made a special trip to Mashhad and Nishapur by train to see to the necessary preparations.117 A year later, the first of April was a busy day for Mohammad Reza Shah who, in his military uniform, arrived at Mashhad in the morning to first inaugurate Nader Shah’s mausoleum, next headed to Nishapur for the investiture of the tombs of Khayyam, Attar, and al-Molk, and finally left for Birjand in the late afternoon (Figs. 6.26-6.27).118 During the ceremonies, “The SNH had felt that only I should go and [stand] next to the shah and explain things;” Seyhoun obliged and remained next to the sovereign for the entire day, explaining to him the particularities of his architecture. Ordinarily, the shah never made long speeches during such events, however, for Nader Shah’s inauguration, “he asked for a microphone; he wanted to talk.” It was then that Seyhoun concluded that the shah “had loved the

117 Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 113, Document 55, page 30; Meeting invitation from SNH’s representative Aqeveli to Minister of Culture Derakhshesh, Khordad 30, 1341/June 20, 1962, Tehran.
118 I. Sadiq, Tarikh-e Farhang-e Iran [History of Iran’s education] (Tehran, 1957), 123.
The enhanced power of the state and its monarch both endorsed and gained in the architectural language at Nishapur, in that it not only represented a long tradition, but achieved this with claims of national authenticity and exclusivity. It declared the death of “the modern” and the birth of “the traditional” in the name of a reclaimed modernity.

• Modernity Gone Native

“By the order of His Royal Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Shahanshah Aryamehr an aramgah (resting-place) was built to honor the greatness of this Hakim.” This was done, according to a small booklet published by the SNH, especially for the occasion “with attention to the true/original (asil) peculiar Iranian style (shiveh).” Another book by the SNH described Khayyam’s tomb as “a splendid (ba-shokuh) memorial...design based on a hybrid (makhlut) of eastern and western architectural style.” Similar ideas soon found their way into the January 1963-issue of Japan Architects that praised its “design and art value.”

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119 “Grigor: Could you speak a bit about the inaugurations? Seyhoun: That day was 12 Farvardin [13]43 [it should be 1342, April 1, 1963 not 1964] the day of inauguration. Shah had come to it. Over all the dirt that had been said, the journals had published. The SNH felt that only I should go [stand] next to the Shah and explain things. If you remember, in the photos I am standing next to the Shah. On that same day, he had to inaugurate Nader Shah’s aramgah, then go to Nishapur over Khayyam’s inaugural and the same day, the aramgahs of Attar and Kamal al-Molk. And in the afternoon to Birjand. In the morning [the Shah] came there, and Aqeveli was there too who was reporting. It was 6-7 pages, very comprehensive. Etehar-e Tehrani was the governor of Khorasan, standing next to him [the Shah]. In the middle of Aqeveli’s report, he was saying to the Shah ‘let me cut him off because there is no time. Listen to the report in the train.’ I realized that if they do something like that, it would offend the Timsar [Aqeveli]. I began to explain the characteristic of the structure so that he would be entertained so that he does not listen to Tehrani [structural explanations about the keystone construction]. I was explaining these things to the Shah. When it was done, he came and cut the ribbon; he went in, on the tomb of Nader. Then he asked for a microphone, he wanted to talk. His photo is in the Karnameh. He had loved the building because he answered to the timsar’s dirt. After that we got into cars and went to Nishapur and there inaugurated the rest.” Seyhoun interview, Tape 1, Side A.

120 SNH, Pardeh-bardari-ye Khayyam, [not paginated].

praises of Khayyam’s memorial, paralleled by the metamorphoses of his work by Fitzgerald, was symbolic of the Pahlavi state’s appropriation of Iran’s Islamic history into its secularist cultural mainstream. The regime would increasingly intensify its “assaults on the religious establishment” by various means for the duration of the 1960s and 1970s. It would, for instance, declare “the shah to be a spiritual as well as a political leader;” “denounce the ‘ulama as ‘medieval black reactionaries’;” crack down on the clerics’ income from the endowments; prevent independent theological publications; encourage the College of Theology in Tehran University to expand the recently created religious corps and send more cadres into the country to teach peasants ‘true Islam,’’ and go as far as to replace “the Muslim calendar with a new royalist calendar allocating 2,500 years for the whole monarchy and 35 yeas for the present monarch.” Discourse on aesthetics, such as the mausoleum of Khayyam that ran the whole gamut from anti-colonialism to Sufi spirituality, were in tune with the political tides of the time.

Following the 1962-inauguration of the tomb, a symposium entitled Modern Architecture of Iran and the Role of Iranian Traditional Architectonics was kicked off in May 1964. During his opening speech, Minister of Development and Housing Nahavandi declared, “our motherland (patrie) possesses one of the most ancient civilizations, the most original and the most developed of humanity;” underscoring that “a civilization which has survived the vicissitudes of history…this force of resistance and survival applies also to architectural styles of our country.” The next day, Le Journal de Téhéran reported the details of the event in an article appropriately titled “Architecture and the Architectonic Tradition of Iran.” The architectural discipline, now thoroughly professionalized, was asserting itself as both institutionally autonomous and intrinsically nationalistic. Or so it seemed for its autonomy had become far more dependent on the bureaucratic machine of the central state and the Western architectural tenets far more (counter)influential to the dynamics of its works.

The publication of The Sense of Unity: the Sufi Tradition in Persian Architecture in 1973 was the supreme embodiment of these developments as well as a turning point in Iranian architectural ideologies and later historiography. Through the late 1960s and 1970s, its authors, Laleh Bakhtiar and Nader Ardalan, had been involved in “...the challenges of designing

123 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 444.
125 “Architecture and the Architectonic Tradition of Iran,” 2.
an architecture for modern Iran that was at home in its traditional milieu and at peace with its modern times." When in 1970 and 1974, they organized two symposiums entitled Tradition and Technology, Louis Kahn, Paul Rudolph, George Candilis, and Buckminster Fuller were among the participants. In a report from the architectural conference in Isfahan, Ayandegan newspaper reiterated some of ideas meticulously articulated in the book: “Tradition, means simultaneously dodging tradition.” Architects and historians debated a wide array of topics including the problematic of “mimicking old architecture” and “village and city architecture.” Through their restless efforts that aimed at “returning to tradition,” the authors had compellingly argued, “In the art and architecture of a traditional society the principles of the tradition inspire man’s creative energies and integrate the whole of society into a totality.” Iranian architects like Ardalan and Seyhoun had returned to Tehran from Harvard University and the École des Beaux-Arts first to recreate the architectural principles and styles of the 1940s and 1950s Europe and the United States, only to push for a return to a native roots in the 1960s. Unlike the reformists of the 1920s, they insisted that Iran’s political recovery and social well-being was not to be found in mimicking the West, but rather in rediscovering the lost “national spirit” in the economy of its architecture. These were the new men of taste, who like the nation and its king, represented themselves as astonishingly modern yet millenary old.

In these architectural discourses, the craftsman or the usta-me’mar, who had been persecuted and eventually eliminated by Reza Shah’s intellectual and political elite, was being celebrated and looked upon with nostalgia as a timeless and pure phenomenon. “The guild,” noted Bakhtiar/Ardalan, “is often directed by a master who is both a Sufi and a craftsman who possesses a conscious knowledge of the principles governing his art…” further adding, “The traditional artist creates the external art form in light of the inspiration which he has received from the spirit; in this way the art form is able to lead man to the higher states of being and ultimately to Unity.” Not only was the “traditional artist” no longer looked down upon, as the representative of “backwardness,” but rather “he” had been raised to the sacred position of the link between “man” and “the Truth.” Furthermore, for Bakhtiar/Ardalan, the function of architecture was not just to build buildings, but to reveal the very nature of the essence beyond

127 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, xxxvi.
129 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, 3.
130 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, 5 and 7.
the physical, national and spiritual alike. They maintained that architecture could and does embody quintessence: "The created works" by the master craftsman "are like art of nature, at once functional, cosmic, and imbued with a nobility of expression that seeks the Truth through the Way (Tariqah)" (Fig. 6.28).  

Such ideological contentions from the architectural mainstream were certainly neither unique to Iran nor exclusive to the architectural profession. Others, both inside and outside Iran, maintained that "Islamic architecture" derived its aesthetic laws from a purely and uniquely Islamic doctrine. In the discourse on the so-called Islamic City, for instance, they were reinforcing the notion of the existence of an Islamic type of urban fabric, unique to all Muslim societies regardless of cultural, environmental, historical, and geographical diversities. That which they were referring to was that they were using Sufi and Quranic texts to make this point. Instead of expanding, diversifying, and deconstructing the work of E. Dietz, M. S. Briggs, K. A. C. Creswell, the Marcais brothers, H. Sauvaget, and G. von Granbaum, the 1970s appropriation was in fact confirming the narrowest assertions of these historiographies. These local architects and ideologues had rendered the concepts of "the Iranian City," "the Arab Courtyard," and "the Turkish House" an essential part of understanding and explaining the various and diverse histories of their respective societies and built environments.

From within Iran, many non-architects fed this architectural trend in their writings and public lectures. When the famed author, Ali Shariati, called for curricula reform for the theological seminaries, his program's sixth point included the study of "literature and art," where research on the "Islamic City" became a special point of interest. "The intellectual was no longer satisfied with limited reform, but aspired to a change of system," as noted by Nabavi, "although western ideas continued to inspire time, it was western 'counter-culture,' rather than

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131 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, 5. By the 1970s, these thoroughly westernized architects and ideologues had forgotten the lessons of Ferdawsiyeh; they, perhaps, could not have known that modernity cannot be undone, (de) or (un)modernized and that their own conceptions of the "traditional man, space, and society" were, too, thoroughly modern.

132 Briggs (Mohammedem Architecture in Egypt and Palestine, 1924) tried to find formal connections between geographic areas within the known Muslim geography. Creswell (Early Muslim Architecture 1932-1940 and Muslim Architecture of Egypt, 1956) used a strict typological and formalist interpretation of architecture and urban fabrics. He attempted to trace formal origins only, avoiding any symbolic interpretation of Islamic architectural objects. His life-long work and drawings became an important basis of information about Islamic architecture. The Marcais brothers followed by Sauvaget were the leading French Orientalists whose effort concentrated on either North Africa or Syria. Sauvaget tried to develop the evolution of the Greco/Roman model into Islamic models. Von Granbaum (Typical Muslim City, 1955), who fathered 'Orientalist Scholarship' combined the earlier efforts of these scholars and came up with a 'universal template' of Islamic urban planning and architecture.
the former western mainstream ideas that the intellectuals helped to propagate." Other influential thinkers (rowshanfekr-an) that took part in this "western counter-culture" included Khalil M'aleki, Jalal al-Ahmad, and Ali Asghar Hajj Seyyed Javadi, whose ideas were in tune with those generated by Bakhtiar/Ardalan and Seyhoun in architecture. While many praised their courage to speak against the monarchy's over-westernization, others saw major defects in their re-reading of Islam and its modern repercussions. The leading historian of the Constitutional Revolution, Feraydun Adamiyat, for instance, "retorted that al-Ahmad's praise for traditional culture and denunciation of Western ideas would inevitably lead to the conclusion that Iran should never free itself of its traditional institutions, including that of oriental despotism."35

The most influential force behind The Sense of Unity was the professor and dean of the Department of Literature at Tehran University and the chancellor of Aryamehr University, Seyyed Hosayn Nasr, whose "Islamically purist yet comprehensive philosophical scholarship" strengthened the work's theoretical arguments and provided it with a persuasive introduction.36 A keen advocate of "a return to Persian tradition" and one that believed in the ontological and epistemological magnitude of such a mission, Nasr maintained:

Persian traditional art [has] left a heritage of unbelievable richness for the Persian people. Through their great artistic talent and refined taste the Persians have been able to create an art that is at once spiritual and sensuous, that reveals the beauty of this world as well as its fleeting nature, that reveals through the theophany of God in beautiful forms the transcendent nature of the source of this theophany. It is a heritage which is still a living reality for the vast majority of Persians and which is of universal value for the whole world, at a time when ugliness threatens to stifle the Spirit itself. The duty of the contemporary Persian is to know and understand this art and the principles that underlay it, and then to make it known to others, as for those who, because of a loss of understanding of these principles and of faith in the world-view that has created this art, can no longer follow its traditional forms and methods, it is incumbent upon them to realize at least their own shortcomings and not to hide their ignorance by pride that kills. Integrity...demands that one does not destroy for others through one's 'artistic creations something which one has lost oneself. The artist with real talent and integrity will be one who instead of identifying himself completely with the West, with its fads and even its illnesses such as nihilism, will try to understand his own personality, which means also his own tradition and culture. He will be one who realizes in humility the grandeur of the tradition which alone can

133 See Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 156-157.
136 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, Sense of Unity, xxxvi. Seyyed Hossein Nasr's works include, Three Muslim Sages (1964), An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (1964), and Ideals and Realities of Islam (1966). For information on Nasr's involvement in the religious reforms by the Iranian state, see Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 143-144.
provide for him a center and an orientation. In surrendering himself and his talents to tradition, he receives much more than he gives.  

Encouraged and escorted by Nasr, the undefined, assumed, and rigid concept of “the traditional society,” “the traditional man,” and “the traditional space” permeated the arguments made in *The Sense of Unity*. That, perhaps, was its foremost shortcoming: the essentialization of an intricate set of factors and forces that make up the alleged “traditional society, man, and space.” The erection by the SNH, in 1970, of Baba-Taher’s mausoleum in Hamadan can be considered a rather unsuccessful example of the ideas cultivated in *The Sense of Unity* (Figs. 6.29).  

The fundamental methodological shortcoming of such undertakings stemmed from their epistemological assumptions based on the principle of reciprocal cultural exclusivity. Therefore, Western systems and structures were pervasive to the entire project: the fact that the book was

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137 “For the contemporary Persian artist as for all other elements of the classes that mound and give direction to society, the paramount task is one of self-knowledge to cure this abominable inferiority complex, which is based on nothing more than the tradition and culture of Persian as well as of the real nature of the modern West, the vastly rich and fecund traditional and sacred art of Persia in one of the major means for bringing about a cure of this ignorance and for providing a center and direction for life, artistic and otherwise. Without it, individual effort will be one more noise added to the clamor and disorder that characterize our times. With it the creative power of the artistic as well as the scholar and 'thinker' can become...a light that establishes order and elucidates what would otherwise be the opaque. It can become like the song of the bird, standing above the sound and clamor that fatigues and sickens that soul of man, to remind man of the peace, tranquility and joy for which he was created and which he seeks at all times knowingly or unknowingly, but which he can only find when he gains an awareness of the sacred and accepts to surrender himself to the Will of Heaven.” S. H. Nasr, *Sacred Art in Persian Culture* (Leiden, 1971), 22-23. Commentaries on Nasr’s education and intellectual evolution, see Richard Frye, in an interview recorded by Shahla Haeri, October 3, 1984, Cambridge, MA; Tape No. 5, p. 17.

138 Baba-Taher was born around year 1000, in Lorestan or Hamadan, and died after 1055, in Hamadan. Most of his life is clouded in mystery. His nickname, Oryan or the Naked, suggests that he was a wandering dervish, or mystic. Legend tells that the poet, an illiterate woodcutter, attended lectures at a religious college, where the scholars and students ridiculed him because of his lack of education and sophistication. After experiencing a vision in which philosophic truths were revealed to him, he returned to the school and spoke of what he had seen, astounding those present by his wisdom. His poetry is written in a dialect of Persian, and he is most famous for his double distiches (daw-bayti). Baba-Taher’s original tomb once renovated in the early 20th century was found unsatisfactory and was completely redesigned and constructed in 1971. Similar to Ibn Sina Mausoleum, the smaller tomb mimics Persian medieval tomb towers, in this case Gombad-e Alavian of Hamadan. The modern mausoleum is elevated on a small hill, rising about sixty meters. The central core is buttressed by eight semi-arches, which function only as decoration. The interior is decorated with long spindle-shape ceramics and a rotunda covered with green marble flagstone upon which are inscribed the verses of the poet. André Godard’s opinion about the modern Baba-Taher Mausoleum was quite low: “Construction relativement récente et sans intérêt.” “Relatively recent construction and without interest.” Ullens’ Archives. Godard Notebooks Set I, Notebook “A-L,” Hamadan, Ibn Sina and Baba Tahir. Harvard Visual Collection, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University. For further discussions related to the details of Baba-Taher’s mausoleum project in Hamadan, see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 133, Document 55, page 35; 1340 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 5, 1341/April 25, 1962, Tehran; Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 143, Document 115, page 3; 1344 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 17, 1345/May 7, 1965, Tehran; Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, pages 5, 9; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Khordad 11, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran; SNH, *Babataher Orian Hamadani* [Baba Taher of Hamadan] (Tehran, 1978); Eqabi, *Mausolea Structures*, 23-24; “The body of Ibn Sina’s
produced in English was only eclipsed by theories used and sustained based on English translations of medieval Muslim sources, such as those magnum opus by 10th-century Ikhwan al-Safa, 11th-century Abul Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazalli, 13th-century Jalal al-Din Rumi, Muhi al-Din Ibn-Arabi, and Mahmud Shabistari, 14th-century Afdal al-Din al-Kashani and Abd al-Karim al-Jili, as well as 15th-century Abd al-Rahman Jami.\textsuperscript{139} “For the authors,” explained Nasr, “it was natural to write in English because their intellectual development had happened in that language and they had accessed many of the classical Islamic texts through their English translations. This and the fact that their book was published by a prestigious American university press made the essential credible and empowering for the reader in the Muslim world.”\textsuperscript{140} Not only Bakhtiar/Ardalan perceived and represented “the genuine essence of Persian architectural tradition” through the lens of cultural essentialism, but they helped promote the notion that “the Orient” could only valorize itself by Western norms and language. In short, Bakhtiar/Ardalan criticized the content of Westernization, while embracing its modernistic structures.

On behalf of Houshang Seyhoun as the exemplary native, still modern, architect of Iran, Arthur Erickson recently wrote: he “was generally regarded by the international architectural fraternity as one of the few architects to go beyond the...application of western modernism to his region;” adding, “He sought an adoption of modernism’s universal ethics of truth to purpose, structure and material to the native sensibilities of Iranian culture.” Further down, he underlined, “Of these none integrated traditional calligraphy and ceramic titles pattering so well with contemporary structured form as his mausoleum of Omar Khayyam [sic.]...”\textsuperscript{141} Unlike Bakhtiar/Ardalan, Seyhoun’s vigorous exploration for a genuine Iranian architecture de-emphasized the Sufi/Islamic architectonic history and instead focused on what he categorized as “the folklore” or “the vernacular” that could be found in provincial Iran. “He traveled with his students to the villages and remote areas of Iran in pursuit of Persian culture, its history and contemporaneity,” notes his monograph, adding that “He rediscovered nearly extinct arts and

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contemporary Baba Tahir, a well-known writer of mystical quatrains, lies buried near the northern limits of the town.” Lockhart, \textit{Persian Cities}, 98.
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139 See Bakhtiar and Ardalan, \textit{Sense of Unity}, 2-8.
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140 Bakhtiar and Ardalan, \textit{Sense of Unity}, xxxvi
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crafts of indigenous peoples and reintroduced the art of felting to his nation and the world [sic.]."142

While this difference between the architectural doctrines of Bakhtiar/Ardalan and Seyhoun might be ascribed to their respective religious affiliations, no sharp lines can be drawn between their architectural philosophies. For Seyhoun's project of "discovering" the "lost" folklore or vernacular was methodologically identical to that of Bakhtiar/Ardalan in that both wholeheartedly adhered to the idea that a "true Iranian architecture" not only exists somewhere out there, but had to be (re)discovered and (re)introduced into modern social and spatial fabrics. The historic selectivity of such projects was indicative of the modern underpinning of those methods put to use. Its exclusivist categories of "Sufi," "Islamic," "Traditional," "Folklore," and "Vernacular" were essentially modern. Not only did they not expose the artificiality of these binary opposites, but instead managed to further validate the (un)truth of these dichotomies. While they rejected Western architectural prototypes, their very act of denial was honed on Western epistemological assumptions, historiographical dogmas, and methodologies of a forged resistance.143

This outward paradigm-shift neither de-legitimized nor destabilized the normative canon, because it was an exclusivist interpretation of its own tradition. Decades later, for instance, Nader Ardalan, reiterates the same ideas about returning to "traditions" and "roots" in his entry in the *Encyclopedia Iranica* when tracing the development of Iran's modern architecture after World War II.144 Resonating in Khayyam's tomb, the structure itself became its function, which

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142 "Accompanied by his students, he traveled extensively throughout Iran to study historical and folk architecture.... Geometrical and pure forms...are used logically...always bearing in mind beauty and proportion." And "Seyhoun's felting designs have added a unique dimension to a traditional Iranian folk art that was nearly lost." His paintings, according to the introduction, "reflect security and strength – logic and reason are reflected in many of his geometrical patterns," nonetheless remain "spontaneous, without preconception. Precision and obsession with his work, perseverance and commitment are the basic and inherent attributes of this artist. No detail is missing. 'I want my works to be seen as simple yet complex'." Seyhoun, *Houshang*, 13-17.


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privileged doctrines over architectural experience. Operating from a position of denial, Seyhoun, Bakhtiar/Ardalan, and their colleagues were feeding the European and American appetite for Orientalism. Despite shortcomings, however, Bakhtiar/Ardalan’s philosophies vis-à-vis Iranian Sufi architecture as well as Seyhoun’s Iranian vernacular architecture came to define the architectural mainstream of the 1960s, fully endorsed and financed by Shahbanu Farah Pahlavi, herself a student at the École Spéciale d’Architecture and a key player on Iran’s cultural stage, to be reviewed in the next chapter. While her contribution began with rather symbolic royal inaugurations of exhibitions and monuments, by the early 1970s, she would help shape the discourse on local styles.

In 1961, for instance, the School of Decorative Arts was funded that resulted, three years later, in a major exhibition inaugurated by her. “She was,” it was reported, “warmly encouraging” and “deeply impressed.” A few years later, Le Journal de Téhéran asked its readers whether “we are going to assist the birth of a Pahlavi style?” “Art is man’s liberator,” began the article and insisted that “the pattern of Iran’s ancient and modern history is manifested in its most spectacular Art.” A rather long article traced the art historical development of “Persian Art,” after which it maintained, “When the Arabs…swamp Persia, she was in fact going to die with its old religion of sun and fire. In her defeat, her consciousness took a more luminous form of its genius.” The author concluded, “She seduced her conquerors and gave to Islam an art that it did not have.” The appearance of the article in this specific issue was quite symbolic. For on that same day, the shahbanu had been crowned as the first (modern) queen of (modern) Iran. The ostensibly authentic Pahlavi style, which was never thoroughly defined by its advocates nor criticized by its contenders, was adopted as the official aesthetics of the Pahlavi dynasty.

These “western counter-cultural” movements in architecture were strengthened, and arguably made possible, by another important event completely neglected by historians. The passing of André Godard in 1965, a towering figure in Iran’s modern architectural history,
symbolized the Iranian command of not only local theories and productions, but also the kind of modernity that such texts signaled. The controversy over the authorship of Ibn Sina's mausoleum and the ideological message of Khayyam's tomb were indicative of this takeover. In contrast to Reza Shah's era, Western architects would take a backseat to Western-trained and Westernized Iranian architects from the 1960s onward. Yedda and André Godard proved to be the last standing vestiges belonging to that epoch. Their careers had been long and turbulent, especially during the last few years of their residency in Iran. In a 1958-letter to Court Minister Hosayn Ala, André wrote, while "I am far from realizing all the projects that I wished to realize in Iran...several projects which were particularly close to my heart, to my great regret, have been abandoned, and I know that only with the direct influence of His Imperial Majesty would I be able to realize them." He went on to detail the remaining work at the Iran Bastan Museum; i.e. lighting and reorganization of the display, heating of the exhibition rooms, and catalog publication, "a considerable complement to Iranian propaganda abroad." "Recognizing the valuable services," replied Ala, "that you have rendered for over a quarter of a century," the shah has ordered the government's assistance to enrich the museum. "However," the sovereign had added, "the archeological education of our youth" had been "long neglected." As André was either too old or too frustrated at that point, not much change took place in either pedagogy or the museum. Nor did royal involvement ameliorate the situation for the director.

By 1960, André seems to have been fed up by lack of funding from the government and corruption among his colleagues. He brought his grievances to Tehran's French embassy and bluntly asked for a resignation. While fearing that his important post as the director of the Archeological Services of Iran might be filled by his American rival, Arthur Pope, he agreed to prolong his stay for one more year in order to "complete responsibilities related to the 2,500-anniversary celebrations of Persian monarchy scheduled for 1961." "His contract will end on
March 21 [1961],” noted the French archives, adding that “Our compatriot is absolutely and firmly decided to leave Iran on that date.” André had said to the ambassador, “Given all that is going on here, I cannot stay even an extra week,” underscoring, “I cannot stand it any more.” Nor was this the first time that he used such language, confessed Roux. After all, both Yedda and André were entering their 80s. Their controversial retirement and un-ceremonial departure from Iran were emblematic of the larger anti-colonial sentiments and aesthetic movements in the country, and in the (rest of the) world. The two French specialists had defined Iranian architectural modernity in the first half of the 20th century. They were leaving behind a fully developed professional and educational system that had decided to revolt and reject them. This rejection was both a mix of professional confidence, reactionary ideologies, and a decisive act of modernity.

Perhaps worse still was the fact that André’s death, in 1965, was eclipsed by the passing of an architectural Great Master in the same year: Le Corbusier. Whereas Iranian architects attempted to honor the latter, ‘their own Godard’ was circumvented. On the last day of August, the Society of Iran’s Architects (SIA) requested from Tehran’s French embassy the “exact” dates of Le Corbusier’s funeral to which they “intend to send a delegation of their members.”

Apparently, these architects never managed to pay such “solemn homage,” for the Foreign Minister J. Basdevant informed the next day that the ceremony was to take place that same night at the Cour Carrée of Louvre. The telegraph readily pointed out that the “incineration of Le Corbusier’s corpse” would take place in Marseille “with strict intimacy,” hence implying the impossibility of any Iranian presence. By October, the Iranian Minister of Culture and Art got involved in paying such “homage” to the “memory” of Le Corbusier’s achievements, while

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152 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asie 1918-1940, Iran 131, IN-11-17, January 7, 1960, Teheran, Iran. Confidential letter from French Ambassador Henri Roux to French Minister of Foreign Affairs.


sidelining Godards’ considerable accomplishments in Iran. It was only too obvious that something new had begun.

The last few years of the 1960s, therefore, saw major changes both in and out of the SNH. In a 1967-report, the Ministry of Culture and Art listed its rather socialist sounding “cultural politics:” 1. Culture for all (farhang barae-ye ham-e); 2. Attention to Cultural Heritage (tavajo-be miras-e farhangi); 3. Establishment of best means to advance new ideas and arts; 4. Making Iran’s culture known to the world and informing [Iranians] about world’s cultures. This fundamental shift in self-valorization was reinforced when in 1967 the SNH purchased its headquarters building in Tehran (Figs. 6.31). What was surprising was that the edifice constituted a southern wing of the residence of Hosayn Pashakhan who had been Mozaffar al-Din Shah’s court minister. Dated 1900, its style, a hybrid of two-story courtyard house with neo-classic balconies, spoke plenty about the SNH’s reclaim of what it now perceived as Iran’s heritage. A structure that the early modernists would not have hesitated to demolish was restored to its utmost aesthetic and functional heights. It now signaled the maturity and ‘enhanced’ taste of a modern nation that appreciated the entire gamete of its historic heritage.

1963, according to British officials, “was the Shah’s year.” While architects were disputing the possibilities of an Iranian style, the shah was declaring a national program that called for accelerated progress, “short cuts to the future” through which Iran would not only “catch up” with the West, but also surpass it. In an interview, the king went so far as to caution the West. “The men with blue eyes have to wake up!” he warned. In the interim, his prime minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda “underlined the importance of an Iranian thinking (la pensée iranienne),” and Le Journal de Téhéran urged its readers to “think of Iran, for Iran, in Iranian.” It was hoped that the newly established National Organization for Public Orientation would eventually evolve into “a school for Iranization.” In state-controlled newspapers people

158 SNH 131, Karmeh, 791-798.
read: "His Imperial Majesty: ‘Recover our Delay in Twenty Years’."\textsuperscript{162} In view of the fact that new public monuments symbolized national progress, the end of the decade proved the most vigorous for the SNH: the construction of Nader Shah’s mausoleum and museum complex in Mashhad, the erection and relocation of the tombs of Omar Khayyam, the restoration of Shaykh Farid al-Din Attar’s shrine, the erection of Kamal al-Molk’s tomb in Nishapur, the erection of Shah Shuja’s tomb in Shiraz, the restoration of Mahruq Emamzadeh in Nishapur, the reconstruction of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum in Tus, the erection of Tayeb’s tomb in Isfahan, and the construction of Baba-Taher’s mausoleum in Hamadan.\textsuperscript{163}

In spite of the number of these projects and despite the fact that architectural realizations were looked upon as moments of clarity in lofty and unrealistic social programs, they were devoid of careful attention to details. Official Pahlavi architecture was a mirror of its politics where “the Shah’s growing dominance of the political arena was matched by a curious lack of attention to social detail.”\textsuperscript{164} The same policies of exalted aims and visions without much attention to details were applied to these projects. The carelessness with which the upper section of Ibn Sina’s tower or Baba-Taher’s ornamentations was executed stood as telling examples. While grand proposals look very good on paper, their realization was permeated by professional indifference, technical difficulties, and a privileging of doctrine over final form, theory over experience.

Khayyam’s tomb was paradigmatic of this unbridgeable gulf between ideas and the economy of production. For instance, while Seyhoun “would say ‘I don’t want to be dishonest.’ ‘One should not build a concrete column and cover it with brick’,” as confessed by Grigorian, and that “We had many fights…Ardalan was the same…,” the concept of honesty in the use of material was never realized in Khayyam’s monument.\textsuperscript{165} The tile veneer, in reality, concealed a sophisticated steel and concrete structure. The fantastic design, like the equally fantastic social programs of the shah, was simply undoable with structural honesty as understood by architects in Europe and the United States. Worse still, Seyhoun could not have erected his “traditional Persian style” without the structural solutions provided by a Western-educated engineer, just as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[163] See Appendix 2.
\item[164] Ansari, \textit{Iran since 1921}, 163.
\item[165] Grigorian interview, Tape 1, Side A.
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Bakhtiar and Ardalan could not have sustained their arguments in defense of a “traditional Sufi architecture” without English translations of Rumi, al-Ghazalli, Ibn-Arabi, Jami, etc. Nor would the monument live up to its most symbolic promise; no rose petals would ever rest on Omar Khayyam’s modern tombstone.

Despite these rather important fine points, the SNH had managed to achieve its main goal with the relocation of the exact spot: by the 1970s, Khayyam’s tomb was favored over Emamzadeh Mahruq. Iranians and non-Iranians alike would come to Khayyam’s garden to visit Khayyam’s tomb. Few would enter the Emamzadeh, now safely tucked in one corner of the plot. In February 1965 and under the tombs’ illustrations, both Ettela’at and Le Journal de Téhéran informed their readers that “here rest geniuses such as Khayyam, Attar and al-Molk” under “splendid tombs,” without any allusions to the emamzadeh. A few months later, two articles in Le Journal de Téhéran and Roshanfekr accused the “Mongols” for “massacring two million” Nishapur’s inhabitants. After a rather long narrative of Shahpur, “who ordered its architect to build the city on a grid-plan,” the articles insisted, “whoever mentions Nishapur today, remembers the mausoleum of Khayyam.” The garden of Omar Khayyam had mutated into a secular pilgrimage site; a dislocated historic exact spot that always was.

“But,” the Iranian architect and later dean of Tehran University’s School of Architecture, Rostom Voskanian insists, “In 1967-1968, Seyhoun started to go around all the studios. When I came back [from Paris] and joined his team, I realized that every student designed the same way.” Seyhoun “said ‘do what you want,’ then left;” according to Voskanian, “The entire program changed to a more realistic one, taking actual sites as design projects…old Tehran, the bazaar, etc. Students were forced to think realistically; therefore each began to find uniqueness.

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168 Rostom Voskanian was born into a Christian Armenian family from Tabriz. He was picked as the fifth recipient of the Paris scholarship. Graduating from Beaux-Arts in 1964, he returned to Tehran University as an assistant professor, initially working with Houshang Seyhoun and later chairing the School until 1980. The complete conversation consisted of the following: “In 1967-68, Seyhoun started to roam around all studios. He would go to reviews and tell what to do in all departments. When I came back [from Paris] and joined his team, I realized every student designed the same way. That was a shortcoming – all 90 students had the same design. We hired [additional] instructors from Europe…5 instructors became 26. Seyhoun said ‘do what you want,’ then left. Eventually we had several instructors to each studio. The entire program changed to a more realistic one, taking actual sites as design projects…old Tehran, the Bazaar, etc.” Rostom Voskanian, Iranian-Armenian architect, Professor and Dean at Tehran University’s School of Architecture 1964-1980, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, July 31, 2001,
The Beaux-Arts was old-fashioned and had to be changed. These changes also changed us, the professors, and [thus] Tehran University developed enormously. Voskanian further suggested that by the early 1970s, "the university saw the birth of Regionalism, cultural sensitivity," which, in turn, gave way to compelling projects. "We gave up Formalism," he said. "This change in the curricular and the acknowledgement of Iranian architecture," moreover, occasioned "social issues related to Iranian socio-economic reality. We began to travel to places like Yazd and Kashan." Another Iranian architect and student at the School of Architecture, Hosayn Amanat, concurs with Voskanian, "The Beaux-Arts approach was Architecture as High Art and Beauty, with the arrival of the new wave [of instructors from Italy] more emphasis was placed on the social and urban context of the projects." The discourse on Iranian architecture had shifted from the International Style of the 1930s and the Beaux-Arts principles of the 1950s to the aestheticization of Iran's rural and religious architecture.

On the official level, this co-option of Iran's Islamic heritage into the mainstream of Pahlavi culture was most palpable in May 1965 when Le Journal de Téhéran published an article on "Mashhad’s Urbanization" illustrated by an architectural model of “the future plans for the central square of the mausoleums." The author maintained that the Ministry of Development and Housing “will be transforming the city of Mashhad and will revalorize its mausoleums within this year.” The new plans consisted of “fundamental reconstructions around the mausoleums...formed of several public places and encircled by new housing buildings” as well as “a 15,000 square meter public park...” In March 1966, the same journal announced that the Ka'ba had been “purified by rosewater donated by Iran.” These steps initiated by the Iranian

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Glendale, California. For further details about his work and thoughts, see Grigor, T. "Use/Misuse of Public Monuments and their Iranian Reclaim," Thresholds 24 School of Architecture Journal (Spring 2002): 46-53.
169 Voskanian interview, June 12, 2000
170 Voskanian interview, June 12, 2000.
171 The Iranian-Canadian architect, Hosayn Amanat, in a written interview by Talinn Grigor, April 2, 2000, Vancouver, Canada; see Appendix 6.
172 Despite looks, it was not necessarily going back to authentic prototypes, rather it was yet another modernistic selection of a chosen past; one that could easily fit under the rubric of the folklore, the vernacular, or the traditional. It came as of little surprise when Mashhad and Qom were not included in student travel curricula. Here the casting of Yazd and Kashan's mud constructions as vernacular was conceptually different from the Shi'a shrines in Mashhad and Qom. Architectural pedagogy, alongside its production, had been deeply affected by architectural theories and those that probe them.
173 "L’Urbanisation de Meched," Le Journal de Téhéran 8881 (May 4, 1965): 3. Also, see “A modern city of hundred thousand inhabitant at the heart of Mashhad,” Ayandegan 1426 (Shahrivar 18, 1351/September 9, 1972): 5 and “Modern city of Mashhad until 16 Mehr,” Ayandegan 1428 and 1432 (Shahrivar 20 and 25, 1349/September 11 and 16, 1972): 11 and 7, these two articles had an illustration of the model of the modern city.
government were meant to secularize and historicize the paramount images of Islam within Iran and thus guarantee the perpetuation of royal power: Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, the most venerated Shi’a site in Iran, and the Ka’ba in Mecca. The former was an official and forceful encroachment into the very heart of ulama space and aggressive penetration of its last bastion; the latter, an intensely self-evident symbolic act (Fig. 6.32). The shah increasingly represented himself in the mass media as a devout Muslim. By 1975, while he was portrayed as “one of the standard bearers of the Islamic movement in the twentieth-century world,” the May 1978 royal visits to Mashhad were characterized as “pilgrimage to Imam Reza’s Shrine.” These political tactics translated into architecture: if Omar Khayyam Memorial was to reclaim aesthetic Persian tradition back into Iranian modern culture, the military urbanism in Mashhad was both to traditionalize Islam and render the ulama ineffective.

The state increasingly demonstrated its impertinence by breaking into the bazaar and ulama spheres of influence, “a territory in which,” according to Abrahamian, “previous regimes had feared to tread.” While the control of those spaces was synonymous with the subjugation of points of power, the anesthetization of the traditionalist bazaar structure served to curb the power of the conservative merchant class. It challenged the bazaar’s economic basis by setting up state corporations to import and distribute food. The state-controlled media began to talk about the need to uproot the bazaar and plan highways through the old city center. Large supermarkets and a state-run central market were scheduled to be built. The politics of the bazaar that eventually “helped to bring down the Shah of Iran,” was an example of spatial “[i]llegibility” that “has been and remains a reliable resource for political autonomy.”

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177 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 443.

178 “Tehran shopkeepers protested that the government was using state corporations and large department stores to undermine the bazaar, ‘the pillars of Iranian society.’” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 443.

179 It was mainly modeled after London’s Covent Garden.

In the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, the Pahlavi state was determined to “overcome this spatial unintelligibility and to make urban geography transparently legible from without.”\(^{181}\) A shopkeeper told a journalist, “The big stores are taking away our livelihood. The government will flatten our bazaars to make space for state offices.”\(^{182}\) If the “worm-ridden shops” were eradicated, the state would gain significant control over the economy and segments of the urban masses.\(^{183}\) The theoretical and legal claims of the state went hand-in-hand with such architectural ventures. With the dawn of the 1970s, both Pahlavi state and the SNH would assume an amazing overconfidence in their conception and projection of Iran’s true spirit, artistic and political alike. Such overt manifestations of national “truth” and “essence” would be triggered in and defined by the Society’s last major architectural project, the double-tomb of American art historians Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Pope, the very man who had inseminated the idea of such a mission in his April 1925 speech. Had he not affirmed, “Persian art” had to “revive the spirit of the nation” and “awaken artists to new achievements” whereby Persians “would, themselves, be astonished…”\(^{184}\) It seems, four decades later, “Persians” were indeed “astonished” by what they had created: a traditional Persian architecture.

\(^{181}\) Scott, Seeing like a State, 45-55.
\(^{182}\) Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 444.
\(^{183}\) Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 443.
\(^{184}\) A. U. Pope, “The Past and Future of Persian Art” delivered on April 22, 1925 in Tehran. For the complete English text of the speech, see Gluck, Surveyors of Persian Art, 93-110. Also, see chapter 1 in this study.
Figure 6.1 The modern tomb of Omar Khayyam, Nishapur, 1963. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.


Figures 6.5 Photograph by Ernest Herzfeld, showing the exterior view of Emamzadeh Mahruq, Nishapur, 1925. Labeled “Nishapur, Shrine of Mohammad Mahruq (*Bagh-i Khayyam*), Neg. Nos. 2905-2906.”
Figure 6.6 Front cover of Williams Jackson’s travelogue, From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam, the painting is by Jay Hambidge depicting Mahruq’s Emamzadeh and Khayyam’s sarcophagus under the third niche from the left.
Source: Jackson, From Constantinople to Khayyam, cover-page.

Figure 6.7 Fred Richards’ sketch of the rest-house in the garden of Omar Khayyam, Nishapur, 1932. Source: Richards, Persian Journey, 202.

Figures 6.8 “Major Sykes’s Diagram of the Ruins of Older Nishapur” and Haruniyeh in Tus, labeled by Wishard as the “tomb of the Poet Omar Khayyam”
Sources: Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 252 & Wishard, Twenty Years in Persian, 150.

Figure 6.10 Photograph of Emamzadeh Mahruq by Major J. W. Watson labeled “The Tomb of Omar Khayyam.” The tombstone is below the second iwan from the left. Source: Sykes, History of Persia, 2: 138.

Figure 6.11 “The Tomb of Omar Khayyam.” Source: Jackson, Constantinople to Khayyam, 242.
Figure 6.13 General site plan of Omar Khayyam’s tomb-memorial by Houshang Seyhoun, Nishapur, 1963.
Source: Seyhoun, Houshang, 81.

Figure 6.14 Floor plan of Omar Khayyam’s tomb-memorial by Houshang Seyhoun, Nishapur, 1963.
Source: SNH 121, Asar-e Bastani-ye Khorasan, 278.
Figure 6.21 Several members of the SNH’s Board of Trustees and members on an inspection of Khayyam’s tomb; Seyhoun is seen on the farthest right of the image.

Figures 6.22 Hojjat Allah Eslam Seyyed Nurollah Ahmadi conducting the religious ritual for the reburial of Khayyam’s remains in the 1963-tomb, Nishapur, May 19, 1962. Visible is the metal box in which the bones were preserved and transferred.

Figure 6.23 The SNH’s committee and other officials inspecting the skull of Omar Khayyam before reburial in the modern tomb, Nishapur, May 19, 1962.
Figure 6.24 Omar Khayyam’s bones are being dug out from the 1934 grave and relocated to the new site, Nishapur, March 1962. Source: SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 299.

Figures 6.26 Mohammad Reza Shah's inauguration of Nader Shah's monument-museum in Mashhad followed by his visit to Kamal al-Molk's tomb in Nishapur, April 1, 1963. He is on the left of the photos with this military uniform. Source: SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 276 & 364.

Figure 6.27 Mohammad Reza Shah cutting the inaugural ribbon on Omar Khayyam's modern tomb, Nishapur, April 1, 1963. On his right are standing his future Court Minister Assadollah Alam and architect Houshang Seyhoun. Source: SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 361.
Figure 6.28 Celebration of “traditional architecture and craft” in official Pahlavi historiography with the juxtaposition of the inner domes of the tombs of Khayyam and Baba Taher to men in the process of construction.


Figures 6.31 The SNH’s headquarters in Tehran, courtyard and gateway, 1967.
Source: SNH 131, Karnameh, 795 and 2.

Figure 6.32 Example of the post-1970’s urbanism: implementation of green belt around the Imam Reza Shrine and complex, Mashhad.
Source: Beny, Persia: Bridge of Turquoise, 190.
VII. MODERNITY FEMINIZED

"POPEIYEH"

"Were I not what I am today, I would wish to be an architect... That is really where women should have much to say..."

Queen of Iran Shahbanu Farah Diba Pahlavi
1978

"Persia has now taken her place among the civilized nations, but she must maintain it by active participation in all...intentional cultural affaires."

American Art Historian and Art Dealer Arthur Upham Pope
Oxford, July 26, 1934

By the beginning of the 1970s, while all kinds of sociopolitical agitations lurked beneath the surface of Iranian society, the various forms and practices of high art observed by the Pahlavi dynasty continued to define the socio-cultural norm in modern Iran. On an almost daily basis, the combinations of images of the shah and/or the shahbanu, the daughters and sons of the couple, the mothers or sisters of royalties, as well as other high placed officials, appeared in the mass media.1 While until then, un-peopled architectural landmarks turned up in newspapers as

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signifiers of Iran’s nationhood and modernity, after the oil boom in 1974, the politics of illustrations was exclusive to the royal members and their acts of charity and patronage. The political theatrics of cutting the tricolor ribbon or inaugurating a building had become standard public gesticulation, performed and duplicated, presented and represented as the similes of the dawning Great Civilization – the shah’s personal “super welfare state.” The institution of monarchy was now portrayed as not only the nation’s foremost historic heritage, but also the sole cause of Iran’s bright future.

The last decade of the Pahlavi era, tackled in this chapter, was characterized by all-embracing centralization, by the exercise of power by a selected few at the upper ephemeron of Iranian society. In 1973, it was observed, “Power has not flowed from institution to institution but rather from individual to individual. Indeed, the concentration and distribution of power is effectively channeled through a complex web of personal relationships.” The period was also defined by the epitomization of high culture as the ultimate signifier of a utopian modernity wherein individuals came to play their substantial role through the fully crystallized apparatus of culture. This made the relationship between politics and its artistic expressions an immediate and resilient one. It was in this sociopolitical environment that under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and Art, the Society for National Heritage was ordered to erect a mausoleum for Arthur Upham Pope on the banks of Isfahan’s Zayandeh River (Fig. 7.1). It will be argued that the very possibility of constructing a fine monument for an American art historian in the heart of Safavid Isfahan – architecturally speaking, the most acclaimed and fascinating city in Iran – was a direct byproduct of the intimate marriage between public monuments and individual power in

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3 Between 1965 and 1979, “the state bureaucracy grew from 12 ministries with some 150,000 civil servants to 19 ministries with over 304,000 civil servants. The dramatic growth of the bureaucracy enabled the state to penetrate more deeply the everyday lives of ordinary citizens.” E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (New Jersey, 1982), 438.

the 1970s Iran. A mirror to Pope’s own philosophy on “Persian Art” and a metaphor for late Pahlavi ethos, the tomb would be the SNH’s last major architectural project, completed in 1972.

Some of the major sequels that eventually yielded to the 1979 Revolution occurred after “the 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire,” celebrated in October 1971. The event was not only an ample proof of both Pahlavi centralization and extravagance, but also was indicative of how cultural and artistic formations operated as pure politics. The decade began with Mohammad Reza Shah’s declaration at Pasargadae: “On this historic day when the New Iran has turned to the glorious birthplace of the ancient Iranian empire to renew its covenant with 25 centuries of glorious history, as the Shahanshah of Iran, I call to witness the world history, that the inheritors of Cyrus’s heritage have remained loyal during this long period to our spiritual mission…” Through such declarations it was becoming apparent that while the shah had attained an unparalleled poise in his power over the country and his semi-divine mission for his people, he had simultaneously become extremely detached from the country’s realities. In official accounts, the illusory Great Civilization blurred and often superseded the evolving economy, social conflicts, and political underdevelopments. The quadrupling of world petroleum prices in 1974 both increased Iran’s national oil revenue to $20 billion and convinced the shah that he would solve all sociopolitical problems single-handedly. The monarch’s overconfidence externalized in a number of major decisions that he conceived and imposed between the oil boom and the dawn of the revolution.

In March 1975, he decreed a one-party state, dissolving the New Iran and People’s parties to create the Resurgence Party which, in turn, announced that it would “observe the principles of ‘democratic centralism,’ synthesize the best aspects of socialism and capitalism, establish a dialectical relationship between the government and the people, and help the Great Leader complete his White Revolution and lead his Iran towards a new Great Civilization (Tamadun-i

5 Speech delivered as the address for the Persepolis Parade opening on October 15, 1971. A. Aryanpure, A Translation of the Historic Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr (Tehran, 1973) 59.
6 “Between 1974 and 1977, it topped $38 billion.” The money was channeled in many different ways. True that a good bulk went to royal excesses, but it is also true that a much greater sum was spent on the economy, either directly or through royal subsidies. The earlier plans concentrated mainly on the infrastructure; the later plans, Fourth (1968-1973) and Fifth (1973-1978) on human resources, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 427 and 431. Petrodollars made many things possible. “Avec 1 milliard de dollars de revenus petroliers annuels, Mohammad-Reza put se lancer dans la revolution blanche; avec 20 milliards, il pouvait rever de la ‘grande civilisation’.” B. Hourcade and Y. Richard, Teheran: Au Dessous de Volcan (Paris, 1987), 237.
Bozorg)." The Resurgence Party, furthermore, tightened its control over the Ministry of Culture and Art, Information and Tourism, Science and Higher Education, and the National Radio and Television. It also seized under its direct control the ministries of Housing and Town Planning, Health and Social Welfare, as well as Labor, Industry and Mines. Through state control of cultural activities, the somewhat spontaneous and autonomous artistic expressions, including the discourse on public space and its use, became systematized, institutionalized, and above all, fully censored and controlled; the public domain no more belonged to the public. The complete and successful centralization of power in the hands of a few northern Tehranis also rendered the production of architecture an articulation of hegemonic rule.

In this climate of frenzied centralization, the SNH was reduced to a state apparatus, a mere process in the service of the massive bureaucratic machine. Those who had once defined and dictated public taste and advocated political reform through the active cultivation of the arts now found themselves in a highly centralized and meticulously censored autocracy. The Society no longer consisted of intellectuals who championed the "Aryan" superiority of the ordinary Iranian nor was it the entity that vehemently maintained that Iran's political salvation lay in its artistic revival. In reconstructing the story behind the mausoleum of Pope, hence, one deals with either a group of zealous secular reformists as it had been in the 1920s and 1930s, or a state institution as it had been in the 1940s and 1950s. The SNH of the 1970s consisted of a handful of well-connected women and men who were driven by personal favors and obligations, personal sentiments and agendas. After decades of restless activity and agency, the third generation SNH had become a measly name integral to the imperious Names of the Monarchy. Its intervention as a reform force completely subverted, it turned into an agency with the sole responsibility of reproducing the image of the royal might. The Society, as such, was no more.

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7 The Resurgence party was called Hezb-e Rastakhiz in Persian. The main goal of the Resurgence party was to transform the somewhat old-fashioned military dictatorship into a totalitarian-system one-party state. Absorbing the New Iran and the People's parties, the Resurgence party. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 441.
8 Resurgence Party, The Philosophy of Iran's Revolution (Tehran, 1976); quoted in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 441.
9 The immediate impact was felt on the publishing realm where the number of titles dropped by 69%. By the end of 1975, "twenty-two prominent poets, novelists, professors, theater directors, and film makers were in jail for criticizing the regime." Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 442-443.
As noted in chapter 1, “in the mid-1920s, two American art historians were introduced to the Iranian cultural landscape; they were to remain there even after their death.”\(^\text{10}\) In the Iranian context, the names of Phyllis Ackerman (1893-1977) and Arthur Pope (1881-1969) are associated with two lasting contributions: one was their *Survey of Persian Art: From Prehistoric Time to the Present* (hereafter *SoPA*) originally published in 1938-1939 in six very heavy volumes and reprinted in 1964 in twelve volumes. Second was the organization, between 1926 and 1972, of several international congresses and exhibitions on the artistic legacy of Iran.\(^\text{11}\) These events and publications were, in turn, affiliated to the American Institute of Persian Art and Archeology of New York, founded by their shared efforts in 1928. Enlarged and renamed as the Asia Institute, it was relocated to Shiraz in 1966. Three years later, Pope died and was buried in Isfahan.\(^\text{12}\)

Despite appearances, this final chapter is not about the story of the man, Pope (and his wife); but rather about two women, Farah Diba and Phyllis Ackerman, whose lives were intertwined in Iran of the 1970s not only as a result of their mutual interest in art and architecture, but also because of the construction of the monument intended to immortalize Pope. These were two women who introduced a part of themselves in Iran’s project of modernity and, hence, forced their feminine gaze into the patriarchal construct of modern Iranian state and society. While both feminized that modernity, they were nevertheless unable to prove it with a feminist thrust. Through the lives of these two singular women, therefore, this chapter also addresses the tricky matter of Iranian feminism during the last decade of the Pahlavi era in terms

\(^\text{10}\) See chapter 1 in this study.
\(^\text{12}\) While Ackerman and Pope left behind an enormous amount of archival material, the historiography of their mausoleum, both in the contemporary mass media and in the SNH’s publications, suffers from the coverage of the 2500-year celebrations exactly during the same years of Pope’s death and the structure’s completion. My reconstruction of both their relationship and their resting-place is based on the archives kept at the New York Public Library and Harvard University Art Museum, as well as the documents published in Jay Gluck and Noel Siver’s *Surveyors of Persian Art: A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman* (Ashiya, 1996), the SNH’s annual reports, and a few articles in contemporary newspapers. Additional documents, both textual and visual, are to be found in Shiraz, which unfortunately I was unable to secure during my visit. For archival documents between Pope and the Iranian government regarding his travels, permits for travel within Iran, permits to borrow artifacts for exhibitions, the *SoPA*, dealings with Godard and Herzfeld, etc., see Arthur Upham Pope Papers, 1921-1951, The New York Public Library and Harvard University Art Museum Archives, Paul j. Sachs files and John Coolidge files. Other sources include Iran National Archives Organization, *Records on The Archeological Missions in Iran 1875-1966* (Tehran, 2001), 227-268 and 308. In addition to Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, *Documents on Archaeology in Iran: Excavations, Antiquities and Historical Monuments* (Tehran, 2001), 35-37, 57-59, 129-155, 305-306, 317-336, 484-485, 489, 494-495, 501, and 510-511. For a list of additional collections on or about Ackerman-Pope, see Gluck, *Surveyors*, 38.
of its (mis)use by and (dis)appearance in Iran’s mainstream high culture. During this epoch of “politics of personalism” and “meaningless tokenism,” both the SNH and the Women’s Organization of Iran (hereafter WOI) became nothing more than an image of modernity, nurturing and perpetuating the equally hollow image of a conservative monarchy.  

When the shah’s secret police, SAVAK, drove all real intellectual and artistic opposition underground or into exile, Shahbanu Farah emerged as the liberal ruler who would, it was hoped, bring moderate reform both in the domain of culture and women’s rights. On the one hand, as the Regent, her political power stemmed from the creation of a second royal court around her person by those who pushed for some kind of liberal reform in the hope of circumventing social upheavals. On the other hand, when Ackerman died in 1977, she was buried in Pope’s mausoleum, in death as in life becoming an appendix to her husband. The Ackerman-Pope’s monument serves here, as a gendered metaphor of a feminized modernity that merely looked feminine, for both Pope’s mausoleum and Pahlavi co-option of feminism remained mere byproducts of the masculine myth of modernity. They were, in turn, outcomes of the total subversion of culture in politics. In the late Pahlavi era, women were to be (re)presented, if at all, in absentia. However, through the agency of ‘mere art,’ the shahbanu in the political context, and Ackerman in the academic milieu, exercised power and challenged their respective mainstreams. However, their resistance to existing structures of power rendered their personal relationships with their respective partners – i.e. the king and Pope – very complex and multifaceted; this chapter brings to the fore that complexity. While Farah and Ackerman could not, and would not in any case, prevent a revolution, they did question and exasperate the masculine strictures of culture, modernity, and politics that defined modern Iran in the 1970s.

The rather fragmented historiography of Iranian modern architecture, from the outset, was delineated and canonized by men who saw themselves as instigators of change and progress. In the 20th century, not unlike the Western canon of modern art, canonical history of Iran was honed by both Western and westernized men. The following questions that have been asked and answered for the latter is valid for the former: “Is this because there were no women involved in…modern movements? No. Is it because those who were, were without significance in determining the shape and character of modern art? No. Or is it rather because what modernist...

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art history celebrates is a selective tradition which normalizes, as the only modernism, a particular and gendered set of practices?" Like Griselda Pollock, I too will "argue for this explanation" in the case of modernism in the Iranian architectural and art historical context. "As a result any attempt to deal with artists” or art historians, “in the …history of modernism who are women necessitates a deconstruction of the masculinist myths of modernism."

- **Ackerman, the (non-male) Scholar**

Phyllis Ackerman, born in Oakland, California, at the turn of the century, received her Bachelor of Art in 1914, Master of Art in 1915, and Ph.D. in 1917 at the University of California in Berkeley where she studied under Professor Arthur Pope (Fig. 7.2). Her dissertation, titled *Hegel and Pragmatism*, upset the entire educational mainstream; “a critical indictment…marvelous, brilliant!” in Pope’s words. As a student of his, she became an assistant fellow in the Department of Philosophy and Aesthetics, where he “depended on her critical judgment then and on through their long life together.” Their student-teacher affair soon resulted in Pope’s divorce from his first wife, Betha Clark Damon, and forced the couple to move to New York City University. Here, they collaborated on teaching a course on Asian ornament, focusing on Near Eastern societies. While iconography and interpretation was her area of concentration, aesthetics and history was his. From these early days of her career, Ackerman approached non-Western cultures and their artistic production with an interpretive method of study. An authority on ceramics, John Walker recalled, “I must say she convinced me that much of the early ceramic ornamentation was a form of ancient language.”

Very early on, many others were impressed by Ackerman’s unique approach to and reading of historical art objects. The following incident is also a remarkable indication of her in-depth understanding of objects within their cultural context and historical use. Contesting the process that went into experiencing a Persian rug, she entered into a dispute with the director of

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17 Gluck, *Surveyors*, 57.
the Frick Museum, Mortimer Clapp. True to the museum culture of framing and labeling artifacts on walls, he insisted that the rug was meant to hang on the wall and to be experienced “simultaneously” – as a whole. In unyielding disagreement, Ackerman held that it was, in fact, intended to lie on the floor and be viewed “sequentially” – each piece at a time as the viewer walked over or experienced the object. She assured Clapp that “you are confusing repetitive identity with continuity.”

Ackerman was pointing to the repetitive experience of the object – the rug being viewed as fragmented pieces, while the viewer is in motion – versus a holistic gaze from a single fixed viewpoint; in other words, a more marginalized and feminist approach to the viewing of the object by its moving subject. Clapp stopped arguing.

Early feminists and active advocates of modern art, Ackerman and her “great pal” Georgia O’Keefe changed American modern art, each from her own corner of the margin. Particularly sensitive to maintain an independent identity and corresponding designation, when married to “Arthur,” Ackerman kept her name. Hence, my own play of terms from “Pope” to “Arthur” in this narrative to signal a methodological reversal of names: it intends to subvert the historically accepted reference to “wives” by their first name, while “the artist/the historian/the author” has always been referred to by “his” last name. This politics of naming has conditioned the authority of the scholar’s voice. Ackerman was fully aware of this, for early on, under five different names, each using the initials P.A., she wrote critiques and reviews for almost every major art journal published in New York, London, and Paris. Eventually, she solidified her designation to “Phyllis Ackerman.” Her first principal work of the 1930s under that name, entitled *Tapestry, Mirror of Civilization*, depicted the course of civilization as reflected in the art of tapestry. It was a “quite a brilliant production,” “profound, important,” according to her reviews, “a magnificent piece of work.” A leading Russian sinologist praised it as “thrilling, important, and true.” It remained for decades the principle authority on the topic of wallpaper and its origin in China; but which also described the course of civilization as reflected in the art of tapestry. In the Iranian context, she was considered an authority on the prehistoric myths and symbols of the Persian culture. She was also the first to see the link between Persian and

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18 Gluck, *Surveyors*, 57.
20 Gluck, *Surveyors*, 57.
22 See, for example, Ackerman, Ph. “Some Problems of Early Iconography,” in “Text: Sasanian Periods,” *SoPA*, 2: 831-895. For a complete list of Ackerman’s work, see Gluck, *Surveyors*, bibliographic list. The following are some
Japanese cultural forms, when "In the famed and popular pattern of the Four Kings tapestry, she identified the king in Japanese tapestry as the Persian Chosroe II" from the 6th century. Her familiarity with Asian cultures coupled with her probing of existing approaches to the subject was to have a lasting influence on the artistic and architectural historiography of Iran.

The petty quarrels over the typeset of the SoPA or the subsequent Ackerman-Arthur projects demonstrate the centrality of cultural representation of agency. It is not so much the fact that there were no "great women" throughout Iranian cultural as well as political history; it is rather that the "great men" of that history have overshadowed their female counterparts. Hence, we return to the question of (re)presentation: the ability to not only speak then, but to also be able to make a discourse for later. The mausoleum and the SoPA complicate the examination of those gendered misrepresentations. This chapter tries to resolve the following issues in the specific case of Ackerman-Arthur history: How can we restate what Ackerman said, when we have to constantly to refer back to "what Pope said"? How do we tell Ackerman's story knowing too well that we have to endlessly fall back on the stories that were publicly told, that were written in books, that were represented as history about Pope? The mythological problematics of how to subvert the existing discourse by empowering those that were marginalized has to be tackled. Ultimately, this chapter contends that a tomb – an architectural work as an unchanging text – can help to narrate and perhaps better represent a historic resistance. The internal dynamic between Ackerman and her husband not only reveals the coercive process of making the history of Iranian art and architecture, but also points to the masculine constructs of Iran's modernity. As subversion of the masculine myth, Ackerman's feminism occasions the reconstruction of her contribution to the discourse on Iranian art and architecture. The fact that she neither adopted her husband's name nor missed a single


Gluck, Surveyors, 571.

The problematics of reconstructing a narrative is historically shaped by the Western masculine structures of power and hence is imbued with such misrepresentations.
opportunity to be (re)presented in the very discourse that Ackerman-Arthur invented, enables this (re)construction of Ackerman and Arthur, at least, as equals.\textsuperscript{25}

While Ackerman-Arthur’s undertakings between 1925 and 1977, in the form of publications, lectures, and exhibitions were instrumental to the making of modern institutions and practices within the context of both the shah’s modernizing plan, the underemphasized fact that Arthur was one of the most active dealers of art renders his place in history an uneasy one. My pro-Ackerman-the-scholar proposition is not only reinforced by “the ‘problem’ of Arthur’s being a ‘scholar’ while also selling art” that had “bothered many,” but also hints at the direct link between the presence of his mausoleum and his role as the “art dealer” of the royal house.\textsuperscript{26}

Here, my question is not whether Arthur was or was not an art dealer, much less whether and how much he profited, sometimes illegally, from his sales. Nor do my arguments stem from a feminist plot, for the study privileges the attempts of a revisionist history to simplistic matters of revenge. Moreover, I am certainly not blind to the blatancy that Ackerman too benefited from Arthur’s commercial activities. Instead, this investigation bring to the fore the often muted voices that provide evidence for Ackerman-as-scholar vis-à-vis Arthur-as-dealer in an attempt for a more accurate reconstruction of their contribution. The accurate historicization of their internal dynamics, an overlooked matter, will not only reveal the deeper complexities of Iran’s modernity in its historical context of art, but will also shed a light on the numerous later historiographies that never give enough credit to Ackerman for her contribution. The fact that contemporary figures, Arthur’s own colleagues and compatriots, did not think too highly of his scholarship is buttressed by Arthur’s own writing about Ackerman’s role in their joint undertakings; neither of these can be ignored. It is useful, furthermore, to find out why such a controversial non-Iranian, seemingly an apolitical, figure rests today under a public monument located amid Iran’s most exquisite urban fabric.\textsuperscript{27} How can we narrate the story of Ackerman so as to reformulate our understanding of Arthur’s practices? Ultimately, what can a mausoleum tell

\textsuperscript{25} Unequal partnerships have long existed in the Western artistic tradition; examples are Rodin and Camille Clodel, Denise Scott Brown and Robert Venturi, Ray and Charles Emes, as well as Eileen Gray and Charlotte Perriand as collaborators of Le Corbusier.

\textsuperscript{26} Letters between Rexford Stead and Robert Payne from 1978 and 1983; in Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 573. As a dealer in art, Arthur was involved in the fierce competition over the archeological excavation rights of Iran’s historic sites and the transfer of their objects to the West, as explained in chapter 1. In the harsh environment of the art market, Arthur managed to create many enemies, men who not only disliked him but who also left archival evidence that casts shadow on his scholarly aptitude.

\textsuperscript{27} For its architectural and urban beauty, Isfahan is known as “Isfahan \textit{nesf-e jahan}” or “Isfahan is half the world.”
us about the politics of patronage and art history, of the patron and the art historian, and of unequal partners in art historical ventures? 28

The SoPA, of course, remains to this day Ackerman-Arthur’s greatest contribution to the study of Iranian artistic heritage. A vigorous dissertation remains to be written about its substance and underpinning politics. That which is important to my investigation is the working of the masculine gaze through the SoPA in its effect on Ackerman’s image as a scholar vis-à-vis Arthur-the-man and Arthur-the-scholar. There is little doubt that Ackerman’s pervasive scholarly and intellectual presence transformed the individual essays into a massive and serious academic work: that is, seventy years after its first publication, the only major and most comprehensive study on Iran’s material culture — a collection of academic essays from pre-historic architecture to modern tapestry and music. 29 Still, the SoPA is more than that, for while Ackerman’s agency as the main editor was fundamental to its scholarly truth, in both editions she is depicted as an “assistant editor.” The normalcy of that position, however, is betrayed by archival evidence and contemporary observers. Ackerman’s nephew, John Forbes, conceded to her assistant and

28 The fact that Pope was main advisor to the Pahlavi family for acquiring art objects straightened the already direct link between culture and politics in modern Iran. Furthermore, as one reads more into Pope’s life, one gets two polar images of who he was as a person, as an art historian, and as an art dealer. With more digging, the image becomes only more confusing. There are those who practically worshipped him, and then those who were appalled by his activities and personality. Therefore, it is very hard to establish who Pope really was and what constituted his art historical agenda in Iran.

29 “Despite all [Pope’s personal and political agendas], the present work is still the most comprehensive ‘Survey of Persian Art’ [SoPA]. The present set is the second edition but unfortunately, despite the added knowledge of and expertise in Persian art, nothing was added to or revised in the new edition, the work is undoubtedly a great effort but it also has glaring weaknesses. The Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian sections are indeed good. The parts on Islamic architecture are also impressive. The section on carpets ignores western Persian carpets as well as the carpets of the northeast. The sections devoted to miniature and the art of the book are too limited. The section on calligraphy is meaningless. The present edition ignored the pottery of Naishabur at a time when the Metropolitan Museum’s excavation work in the region had already been completed.” C. Ghani, Iran and the West: a Critical Bibliography (London, 1987), 681. Initiated after Arthur’s renowned 1925 public lecture in Tehran, the SoPA-project, including most major Orientalists of the time began in 1926. Its second publication in 1964 was dedicated to Mohammad Reza Shah, as the first had been to Reza Shah. Both monarchs were the chief patrons of the monumental works. In 1938, Ali Asghar Hekmat, Hosayn Ala, “Anjomani Meli Iran” — that is the SNH — along with twenty to thirty Western scholars, businessmen, and philanthropists, predominately from New York. SoPA 1938, 1: title page. The sponsors for the first edition appeared in the following order, including the SNH and a number of its prominent members: “His Majesty Riza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran; His Excellency, Ali Ashgar Hekmat; His Excellency, Mirza Hussein Ala; The Anjamin Meli Iran [sic.];” followed by a twenty-nine other, mostly, Western names, including “Mrs. Wood Armsby, Monsieur Louis Cartier; Lord Duveen of Millbank; Mr. Edsel B. Ford; The Hon. Franklin Mott Gunther; Mrs. Otto H. Kahn; Mrs. William H. Moore; Mr. and Mrs. Howard Sachs; Mr. Edward M. M. Warburg; and Sir Arnold Wilson, M. P.,” see “Sponsors,” SoPA, 1: xi. This is only to point to the fact that high art was intimately married to patrons with grand, often political, aspirations in Iran. Subsequently, Edward Warburg donated a set of the 1938-SoPA to Harvard University’s Fine Arts Library.
biographer, Rexford Stead in 1978, “PA never did receive her due – how right you are. And the Survey [SoPA] is the No. 1 example, as you say.”\textsuperscript{30} Others who had helped complete the enormous project recalled years after her death, “she had done more editing than he had done; she had been more than his assistant, she had written or rewritten so many of the articles that it bore throughout the trace of her muscular style.”\textsuperscript{31} The manuscripts of the submissions carry her meticulous corrections.\textsuperscript{32} Another confirmed that,

\begin{quote}
During Arthur’s long career – and it was often a stormy one plagued by financial anxieties and other frustrations – he and Phyllis worked side by side in an intensity of intellectual devotion. No other woman could have or would have done so much for him. To have proofread, five times, and checked 8,000 cross-references in Arthur’s six volumes Survey of Persian Art was proof enough of a ‘marriage of true minds.’\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, a marriage of “true” but unequal “minds” for on the 1938 publication, Ackerman’s name never appeared on the cover of the SoPA’s six impressive volumes – not even as “Miss. Pope.”

Twenty-six years and a world war later, during the publication of the second edition in 1964, Ackerman fought her partner in order to get her name on the spine of all twelve volumes. In response to her scholarly work, Arthur had maintained that the appearance of her name on the spine would “only crowd it,” because “both names would not fit in the ideal type size.”\textsuperscript{34} He had added, “Isn’t it enough that you have been handsomely credited on each title page?”\textsuperscript{35} Regardless, with the help of her student, Ackerman managed to print her name without Arthur’s consent. After seeing it, he remained silent. She, on the other hand, was pleased when the so-called “ideal type size” was adjusted to give her the credit that she deserved; all the same, in the subordinate position of an assistant editor. Subsequently, the additional four volumes would use the same title-page design with her name present. For, there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that the SoPA could not have been completed, even the second time around, without Ackerman’s voice of authority.

Without her Arthur could never have completed the Survey [SoPA], for she had gifts of literary organization which he completely lacked, she organized the flow of work, proofread the 3,000

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{30}Letter from John Douglas Forbes, Ackerman’s nephew, to Rexford Stead, December 14, 1978; in Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 64.
\bibitem{31}Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 58.
\bibitem{32}See \textit{Arthur Upham Pope Papers}, 1921-1951, Box 5, Page proofs of the Survey of Persian Art (Oxford 1938); Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library.
\bibitem{34}Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 58.
\bibitem{35}Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 58.
\end{thebibliography}
pages of text not once but several times, translated the chapters written in German, French and Italian – and one from a minor language no one else read either but she knew the subject better than the author – and by her scholarship gave to it an authority it would not otherwise possess. 36

The SoPA along with its historiography neglects Ackerman’s authoritative voice, precisely because it undermines the very structures that it is supposed to reinforce. A glance at the bibliographies of these two historians immediately confirms my point. Whereas nearly all of Ackerman’s articles appeared in refereed art journals, Arthur published mostly in commercial magazines like Country Life, Travel, Kayhan International, Tehran Journal, Mainichik Daily News, Times, Near East and India, the Soviet Pravda and Izvestiia; among these, New York Times and Illustrated London News seemed to have been his favorites. 37 The few exceptions consisted of Apollo, Encyclopedia Britannica, and Bulletin of the American Institute of Persian Art and Archeology and Bulletin of the Iranian Institute. The latter two publishing institutions were under his management.

Ackerman had contributed far more and had received far less public acknowledgment in respect to Arthur. The books that she, no doubt edited, appeared under his name including Introduction to Persian Art (1930), Masterpieces of Persian Art (1945), and Persian Architecture: The Triumph of Form and Color (1965). Posthumously published in 1969 and republished four times in the following years by Jay Gluck, long friend and assistant to Ackerman-Arthur, Persian Architecture was a 120-page concise history of Iranian architecture from the Achaemenid to the Qajar periods. According to its critic, Michael Levey in Apollo, it was a “concise introduction” to Iranian architectural history “of epic scale” – a work that embraced “concentrated authority, clarity, and appeal.” 38 In like fashion, Lewis Mumford praised Arthur highly in his review:

36 Gluck, Surveyors, 61.
38 Pope, Introducing Persian Architecture, cover page.
Dr. Pope’s work has never been adequately treated in English. The most casual student of architecture should find even the first contact with this work a dazzling experience, for its illustrations demonstrate the unique character of Persian architecture: the integration of durable colored surfaces of intricate pattern with audacious constructive forms. The unique feat puts Persian architecture on a par with that of Egypt, Greece or our Middle Ages. With his characteristic grasp and philosophic acumen, Dr. Pope has summed up in a book of relatively modest dimensions a whole lifetime of ardent research.39

During the numerous exhibitions and congresses that Ackerman-Arthur organized starting in 1926, the former took a second seat to the latter. Their “First Congress and Exhibition of Persian Art and Archeology” in Philadelphia, was represented by a full-scale replica of Isfahan’s Royal Mosque.40 This was to be followed by a series of similar international exhibitions throughout the 20th century: London in 1931; Leningrad and Moscow in 1935; New York in 1940; Tehran in April 1960; as well as Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington D.C. in the same year. The 1968 exhibition was organized at home in the three major cities of Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz. In Tehran, the displayed art objects were part of the Fifth Congress on Iranian Art during which Arthur made his last public speech. Only after Arthur’s death did Ackerman attend the 1972 Oxford Congress followed by the one in Munich in 1976 as a representative. The final congress, scheduled for 1979 in Gent, never took place because of the political turmoil in Iran.41

These publications, coupled with the exhibitions and the conferences, not only rendered the study of Iranian art and architecture physically available and conceptually legible to a new generation of Western scholars, but also instigated a distinct discourse based on a pedagogical

39 Gluck, Persian Architecture, cover page.
40 See, Gluck, Surveyors, 116-119.
41 For the various art exhibitions organized by Ackerman and Pope, see Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie 1918-1929, Iran 131, Fouilles archeologique E387-3-12, July 27, 1930, Teheran. Iran National Archives 240, Micro-reel 69, Document 30, pages 9 and 34-46; letters between Public Instruction Ministry and Finance Ministry, some are undated c. 1931, Tehran; includes a request for and a packing list of the objects sent from Qom to the London Exhibit. A. U. Pope, “Iran’s Handicraft Exhibition (namayesh-gah-e san‘ati-ye Iran),” Ettela’at 1203-1204 (Azar 12-13, 1309/ December 3-4, 1930): 1. Also, see T. Rice, The Paris exhibition of Iranian art, 1938 (reprinted from vol. 5/2 of Ars Islamica: MCMXXXVIII 1938); K. Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran,” American Journal of Archaeology 105 (2001): 51-76, 61. For an in-person description of the Leningrad Exhibition, see I. Sadiq, Yadgar-e Omr [Life memoirs] (Tehran, 4 vols., 1959-1974), 2: 263-289. In April 1960, the Fourth Congress of Iranian Art and Archeology took place in Tehran by Pope’s suggestions and under Sadiq’s supervision, see Sadiq, Memoirs, v. 3, 343-364. By 1930, Pope had “acquired a small but choice” collection of Persian bronzes form Lorestan regions for the University of Pennsylvania, including six bronze pieces and eight seal cylinders, a “few” glass beads and three flint arrow heads, for the publishers in 1934, they were not only valuable for “the beauty of the objects, their wonderful preservation...and the strange and subtle forms of a decorative art both naturalistic and conventional, but also because of the age and historical meaning of these two thousand pieces, the oldest examples of the native art recovered...in Persia.” L. Legrain, Luristan Bronzes in the University Museum (Philadelphia, 1934), 3. Some of these same objects were lent for Pope’s London Exhibition of Persian Art in 1932.
model that began with the Achaemenids and Sassanians in the antiquities and early middle ages, declined because of 7th-century Arab invasions to be revived in modern times. This was a new historiography of Iranian art, which was not only rigidly linear, based on Western paradigms, but was exclusively national. Arthur saw himself as an agent in this historic mission. For instance, apologizing for his delayed article, he wrote in 1927 to the editor of Arts and Decorations magazine, Mary Fantin Roberts, “I am working on an extremely difficult and exacting task of designing and constructing a Persian Court. It is a very serious work, and we hope that it will be the best piece of genuine Persian architecture that has been done perhaps for centuries. A tall order, you see.” A few years later, he wrote to his close Iranian friend and a prominent member of the SNH, Court and Prime Minister Hosayn Ala,

I want to be in Iran to make my contribution to the architectural development of the country. I think as I have written Hekmat that the present architectural trend is for the most part very disappointing; that it threatens to break Iran’s great tradition, to impose upon her as if she were a conquered country the architecture of another time and place that is wholly contradictory to the spirit of Iranian art... I still think there have been some sadly lost opportunities and that Iran has not yet got a glimpse of how magnificently her own architecture can guide her. You had a glimpse of the sort of thing I had in mind from the sketches made for the library. Arthur underscored, “I still believe I can design a library for Iran perhaps better than anyone else.” That which was implied by “anyone else” was Arthur’s French rival André Godard who was, concurrently, in the process of erecting the Archeological Museum of Tehran, as noted in chapter 3. A few days later, Arthur persisted, “I cannot tell you how I grieve over the ineptness of most of the architecture being built in Iran today...the rebuilding of the country and the revival of Iran’s artistic spirit is being damaged and deflected...” While he must have meant the International Style, ironically, the so-called neo-Achaemenid and neo-Sassanian styles that nevertheless shaped most of the built environment of the 1930s-Tehran, came to be known as “Pope Architecture.” Arthur’s biographer would reproduce the images of the main office of the National Bank (bank-e melli), the Police Headquarters, and, more interestingly, the

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42 Letter from Pope to Mary Fantin Roberts of Arts and Decorations in New York, September 20, 1927; Pope Papers, Box 1 General Correspondence of Arthur Upham Pope 1926-27, file “A.”
43 Hosayn Ala was a veteran diplomat active since the days of Reza Shah. He became Mohammad Reza Shah’s court minister and his prime minister in 1951. He has been described by Abrahamian as “a titled aristocrat [and] trusted by the conservative landowners, a former diplomat with the reputation of being anti-British...” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 266.
44 Letter from Pope to Hosayn Ala, January 2, 1937, London; Pope Papers, Box 3 General Correspondence 1934, file “1937 A.”
45 Letter from Pope to Hosayn Ala, January 22, 1937, London; Pope Papers, Box 3 Personal correspondence 1934, file “1937 A.”
Archeological Museum (Iran bastan) as best examples of such a style. This not only reveals the extent to which Arthur-the-scholar has been overestimated in Iran’s historiography at the expense of friends and foes alike, but also that such architectural productions were far from being monolithic. While these neo-styles remained a direct product of the hegemonic discourse nurtured by Orientalists like Arthur, Godard, and Herzfeld, it was never a distinct and separate, unrivaled and uncomplicated history.

The French and American cultural and academic rivalry went beyond just architectural commissions. In fact, all along Arthur attempted to create a parallel institution to the SNH and its corresponding publications. The American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology (hereafter AIPAA) in the 1930s and the Asia Institute of the 1960s and 1970s were, in many ways, competing with the SNH and other cultural establishments in Iran. When Godard’s Athar-e Iran came out, Arthur complained to his compatriot Donald Wilber, “It is, as usual, a little pretentious, pseudo-scientific and a far too many ‘I’s’ in it,” further adding, “The Survey [SoPA] will contain, when finished, 3500 pages. The word ‘I’ is only to be found in footnote quotations from a few contemporary observers [sic.].” Instead, Arthur continued to assure the Iranian authorities that the volumes of “his” SoPA were “the greatest assets and weapons in the hand of the Foreign Office for compelling respect and admiration for Iran’s achievements,” while encouraging its dissemination and presence in all diplomatic as well as academic milieus. He pressed the court minister that “It ought to be where it can be seen constantly in every Legation, where every visitor can see the prodigious record of Iran’s contribution to the world.” The rivalry between the Athar-e Iran and the AIPAA’s publications was not just manifest antagonism between colonial powers in the field of Parisian art and studies. It was also indicative of how such arbitrary constructs as “Persian Art” and “Persian Studies” came to be conceived, framed, and brought to maturity as normative, apolitical, practices. Soon, it was only natural to discuss, examine, museumize, and historicize Iran’s material past.

46 The captions read: “Facing, Bank Melli main office and Police Headquarters – both in Achaemenid style; below, Musée Iran Bastan, national archaeology museum, after Sasanian era Ctesiphon.” Gluck, Surveyors, 90-91.
47 For further reading on the Asia Institute, see American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology, Announcement and Outline of Program (New York: American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology, 1930); American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology, What it is, What it has Done, What it is Doing, (New York, 1932).
49 Letter from Pope to Hosayn Ala, March 5, 1937, London; Pope Papers, Box 3 General Correspondence 1934, file “1937 A.”
Arthur, whose personal and professional interests coincided with the Pahlavi dynasty’s intent to remain in absolute power, in sharp contrast to his Western rivals would first be financially cared for by the shah and then immortalized through a monument. While little known, it nevertheless remains a fact that Arthur served both shahs as their cultural salesman in the West; a position not only well exploited by him, but also by the Pahlavi elite who could “appreciate the advertising value to Persia of such a magnificent work” as the SoPA. 50

It was Ackerman who assembled the material for the completion of this task [the SoPA]. Pope was more of a promoter than scholar. He was forever forming organizations and he persuaded influential Iranians to sponsor his efforts. His primary “sales pitch” was that he would make Iran a “household word,” a phrase he often used in conversation. He also promoted the idea of 2500 years of uninterrupted monarchy and the “Aryan” origins of the Iranians. With the help of some Iranians, he was always close to the Persian Court and in the last ten years of his life, he sometimes acted as an advisor on purchases by the Court circle.51

The Qajar nobility and a founding member of the SNH, Firuz Mirza Firuz, thanked Arthur for “what you are doing to popularize Persian art in America and Europe,” further adding, “We can only congratulate you for the books you intend to publish and I believe every Persian will be enthusiastic about learning from authoritative leaders in the knowledge of art, ‘What the World Owes to Persia,’ a fact that Persians themselves do not know.” 52 However, in retrospect, Arthur had done far less actual work “for Iran’s art and archeology” on the ground. He was never as nearly involved as the Godards in their efforts vested in the Archeological Museum and Tehran University’s Schools of Fine Arts and Architecture. Nor did Arthur, like Herzfeld, spend year after year excavating at Persepolis and the like. Later, the intimate rapport between the shah and the White House in the 1970s might have something to do with the privileging of Arthur over his

50 “Charge d’Affaires David Williamson also adds: ‘Professor Pope has succeed in so inspiring His Highness Teymourtache with the importance of this book that the Shah contributed $1,000 towards the printing of its, and His Majesty’s name will head the list of donors. Copies of the ‘Survey’ [SoPA] have been ordered by the Crown Prince, His Highness Teymourtache, and...the Minister of Public Works. These men appreciate the advertising value to Persia of such a magnificent work.” US Archives, Williamson, dispatch 852, 89.927/43, June 10, 1929; quoted in M. Gh. Majd, Great Britain and Reza Shah (Florida, 2001), 35. “In the field of art and architecture, the scholar who comes to mind first is the eminent Arthur Pope. His authorship and editorship produced voluminous works on Persian art and architecture linking the distant past with the modern era that guaranteed continuity of “Persian art” in a national context...it is clear that there could not have been anything uniquely Persian either in prehistoric times or in later periods... The Achaemenian art and architecture reflected a multiplicity of influences from previous civilizations and from within the existing communities of the Achaemenian empire; these elements could not have produced a narrow and single ethnic art in the Iranian plateau, then or later. The national conceptualization of multiformat art in the vast Iranian plateau convinced Pope to produce other works on the topic... Pope gained considerable attention in Iran and was quoted by numerous scholars there; thus he supplied the missing link in creating a comprehensive national heritage.” M. Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity (New York, 1993), 145.
51 Ghani, Iran and the West, 681.
French and German rivals. The fact that by 1966, when the shah was ready and willing to recall these veteran Orientalists back to Iran in order to contribute to his Great Civilization, both Godard and Herzfeld had already died, might also have had a big role in the monarch's decision. Arthur had outlived his rivals into immortality, or so it seemed.

Nevertheless, from the very beginning, Arthur's scholarly aptitude was questioned by many who knew him. During a private showing of the London exhibition in 1930, Court Minster Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash had noticed lacking artifacts and had asked Godard under whose supervision Arthur had packed the objects for England. The two men had concluded, "Pope doesn't know anything about this kind of thing." The representative of Pennsylvania University Museum, Fredrik Wulsin, had similarly conceded to Museum Director Horace Jayne that "Persian archaeology would be better off without [Arthur]." Unfortunately," the President of Tehran's American College, Doctor Samuel Jordan, remarked, "Mr. Pope did actually send certain articles out of the country without the knowledge of the Persian authorities." Director of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago James Henry Breasted had "expressed some misgivings regarding Pope's scholarship..." Similar comments continued to appear in American diplomatic letters. "Professor Pope," commented the American Attaché Hornibrook, "is cordially disliked by both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the acting Minister of Education [Hekmat]," adding, "He has the open hostility of the British Minister and all members of his staff... He is openly condemned by Monsieur Godard... He is cordially disliked by Dr. Herzfeld, Dr. Erich F. Schmidt and all other archaeologists, some of whom have made certain charges in regard to his activities in Persia which have reached the ears of many high Persian officials." The attaché concluded that "For the above reasons I am inclined to the opinion that the Government would not entrust" the excavation and conservation of Persepolis to Arthur.

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52 Letter from Firouz Mirza Firouz to Pope, March 28, 1928, Tehran; in Gluck, Surveyors, 298.
53 Mohammad Reza Shah's rapport with the United States has been described by Abrahamian as the shah's "‘special relations’ with Washington;" see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 500.
54 US Archives, Hart, dispatch 165, 841.607 Persian Art/2, September 23, 1930 quoted in Madj, Britain and Reza Shah, 45.
55 US Archives, Hart, dispatch 735, 891.927/124 July 21, 1931; quoted in Madj, Britain and Reza Shah, 49.
56 Quoted in Madj, Britain and Reza Shah, 33.
58 US archives, Hornibrook, dispatch 123, 891.927 Persepolis/90, June 25, 1934; quoted in Madj, Britain and Reza Shah, 151. About Pope's "questionable activities" with Iran's antiquities, see Madj, Britain and Reza Shah, 137-138.
On a more personal note, in 1947, Ackerman told Arthur, "...I can accept the furtiveness, mendacity, evasiveness...but there is one thing I cannot accept, and that is the hypocrisy in our personal relationship. So we shall continue as colleagues, with the minimum of personal attitudes on your part... You can save yourself the trouble of writing the letter you talk about..."\(^59\)

Because Ackerman’s voice is very faint, apart from such rare letters, this study falls back on Arthur’s letters that yield historical understanding of their rapport. While privately, he referred to her as “sweetheart, dearest, beloved, my darling, darlingest,” publicly, he strictly stuck to “Dr. Ackerman.”\(^60\) Indeed, through their letters, they come across as two individuals who deeply respected and were committed to each other; it seems, Arthur far more than Ackerman. “You have certainly covered yourself with glory in the architecture section,” he told her once, adding at the end, “I adore you.”\(^61\) His support of her-as-scholar went far beyond their internal dynamics. “[M]y wife,” he wrote, “is also working to the limit of her endurance, days and evenings as well, and could hardly take the evening off merely to hear things that she knows just as well, if not better, than I do...”\(^62\) During the last stage of the SoPA’s editing when “work [was] piling up very heavily,” Arthur confessed to Wilber, “She is staying here to see the Survey [SoPA] through [sic.]...”\(^63\) In a remarkable letter to Ala, Arthur not only praised and promoted her as “the outstanding scholar in the field of Iranian art in the world today,” but also insists that where Herzfeld had made “an utter mess” of, she had triumphantly prevailed:

I suppose you will receive a copy of the Indian Journal of Arts and letters with Phyllis’ contribution at the meeting of the Indian Society at the Dutch Legation. It is one of the most compact and brilliant statements of Iran’s role in Asiatic history that has appeared. I should think the Iranians would be interested. They do not know her and she is really – I mean it quite seriously – all in all the outstanding scholar in the field of Iranian art in the world today. Herzfeld, of course, has more intense erudition at certain points and much more practical experience in the archaeological and architectural field but Iran’s achievements in art are far greater in scope and there are whole areas in which he is only an outsider and amateur which Phyllis knows well. I would like to see the Iranians get acquainted with her, at least intellectually...she has already reconstructed the great throne of Khosrau, a problem of which – confidentially – Herzfeld made an utter mess. It is one of the most brilliant pieces of historical research I know and by piecing together all the documents and certain architectural

\(^{59}\) Letter from Ackerman to Pope, beginning of February 1947; in Gluck, Surveyors, 64.

\(^{60}\) See different letters in Pope Papers, Box 3 Personal correspondence 1934, file “1937 Ackerman, Phyllis (Mrs. Pope).”

\(^{61}\) Letter from Pope to Ackerman, undated; Pope Papers, Box 3 Personal correspondence 1934, file “1937 Ackerman, Phyllis (Mrs. Pope).”

\(^{62}\) Letter from Pope to A. F. Black, head of Women’s City Club of San Francisco, July 27, 1927; Pope Papers, Box 1 General correspondence 1926-1927, file “B.”

\(^{63}\) Letter from Pope to Donald Wilber, August 25, 1937, London; Pope Papers, Box 4 Personal correspondence 1937, file “Wilb-Wilk 1937.”
records she is able to give a picture of this really stupendous creation, which was a veritable
building in itself, with a degree of magnificence that was never approached by the imperial
setting of any other monarch. [Mojtaba] Minovi, who is quite a cautious scholar, thinks it is not
only thrilling but proven up to the hilt.  

While it could easily be argued that Ackerman-the-scholar was just another entity that Arthur
manipulated and marketed, it is very hard to miss his genuine – at least in these writings – belief
in her aptitude and talent as a scholar. This, perhaps, only goes to show that their relationship
was far more complex and ambiguous than a simple reconstruction can allow and reveal.

After Reza Shah’s exile, Arthur forged close relationship with the young king, Mohammad
Reza, who in July 1956 appointed him “General Consultant on Persian Art” for which the Iranian
government would “occasionally extend to you certain gifts…” Early on, during his rather
shaky reign, Arthur had expressed devout loyalty to the sovereign as “the servant of the Crown.”

In a letter to the shah, Arthur wrote,

Your Majesty: We profoundly appreciate the generous welcome which you have so graciously
accorded us. I speak for myself and my colleagues, as well as many in America who would
like to extend to you their greetings, and envy us the privilege of working with a young,
forward-looking monarch who now faces the crucial task of initiating once more a great
renaissance in the life of a nation that has played such a significant role in the history of
civilization.

We are all honored that you should be ready to consult us, and we feel the heavy responsibility
that we face in trying to furnish your country with the finest of which we are capable. We are
determined to do this in terms of a sympathetic appraisal of Iranian necessities and Iranian life,
not just imposing schemes because they have been successes in our own country, but thinking
in terms of your own past and future.

We are deeply conscious of the great debt that civilization owes to Iran. We should take great
satisfaction in being able, we hope, to return some interest on that debt…Thus we hope to use
your, and our tradition together, to serve you, your people and the future of your land, we shall,
in fact, be servants of the Crown, of the people of Iran, yet likewise true to our own
heritage…

Not only did Arthur represent, for Mohammad Reza Shah, an element of continuity between his
father’s rule and his own, but also provided a pseudoscientific historiography of Iran’s
civilization and heritage that fitted perfectly into the Pahlavi project of modernity. He also
offered the young king a pivotal role in the future of both Iran and the (Western) world through
not only the high appraisal of its ancient culture, but also through the intimate relationship

64 Letter from Pope to Hosayn Ala, February 9, 1937; Pope Papers, Box 3 Personal correspondence 1934, file “A.”
65 In a letter from Dr. Ali Amini, Ambassador of Iran to US on July 19, 1956; Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance, Documents on Archaeology in Iran: Excavations, Antiquities and Historical Monuments (Tehran, 2001),
489.
between Iran and the US. By the time of Arthur's death on September 3, 1969 in Shiraz and funeral three days later in Isfahan, all arrangements had been made by a royal decree for his State Funeral and resting-place.67 Thereafter, Ackerman chose to stay in Shiraz and continue to work despite her illness. Rahim Manaberi, the whirling dervish, took care of her as she became increasingly weak and senile. Despite her physical condition, she decided to travel to England for the fall of 1972 for the final Persian congress in Oxford. It was there that in her old age, she confessed to Rexford Stead that “Arthur should never have changed the Iranian Institute into the Asia Institute...ought never to have left the 89th Street building” in New York; Iranian studies “alone could have lasted Arthur the rest of his life...it was a mistake to go all over the map.” Unless Ackerman’s diaries and notebooks become publicly available, we will never know, what she really wanted.

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66 Letter from Pope to Mohammad Reza Shah, date and place unspecified [probably around the shah’s visit to the USA in November 1949]; Pope Papers, Box 11 Asia Institute (cont’d), file “Asia Institute (cont’d), Iran.”
67 For the details of Pope’s funeral, see the memoirs by Richard Frye, Carl Penton, Sumi Gluck, and James Underwood in the Surveyors. An interesting incident related to the funeral was the building of Pope’s coffin by the “most accomplished coffin maker in [New] Julfa, an Armenian named “Vigan [should be Vigen], “a gentle soul and skilled carpenter.” While he had done a great job, “near perfect copy of the finest type of medieval European coffins,” he had added the usual Christian cross on it. Frye recalls “When the coffin came it was painted black with a white cross upon it. As you may know, Phyllis Ackerman was a militant atheist and she demanded that the cross be removed as soon as she saw it. Muslims have no coffins so we were dependent on the Armenians who replied, ‘monument cross, no coffin.’ In desperation, the cross was blackened with shoe polish. The coverage of the “State Funeral,” on September 6, was thorough both in Iranian and non-Iranian media. Ayandegan newspaper informed its readers, “It has been decided that next to Kajdu Bridge...a splendid (ba-shokuh) mausoleum be built.”67 For the American audience, the New York Times wrote, “the Shah has ordered a special mausoleum built of him there.” See “Pope’s Aramgah in Isfahan,” Ayandegan 522 (Shahrivar 13, 1347/September 4, 1968): 1. Also, see “Commemoration day for Pope,” Ayandegan 523 (Shahrivar 15, 1347/September 6, 1968): 1; J. Underwood, “Iran was His Life and His Love,” Kayhan International (September 4, 1969); J. Underwood, “Final Homage to Pope,” Kayhan International (September 22, 1969); “Arthur Pope, 88, Expert on Iran; Leading Authority on Old Persian Culture Dies,” New York Times (September 4, 1969): 47; “Pope’s Photographs Tour Japan,” Tehran Journal (September 15, 1969). Other sources include Sadiq, Memoirs, 3: 367-370; and Gluck, Surveyors, various sections.
Farah, the (Constructive) Modernist

In the afternoon of September 10, 1969, Farah Shahbanu “called upon” Phyllis Ackerman to offer her “personal condolences.” It must have been during this meeting at the Narenjestan, the Qajar palace turned over to the Asia Institute, when the queen, “on a special command” offered the scholar “a retirement allowance for life.” While Ackerman had “refused [the] clause in her contract as an unnecessary expense to the Iranian government, Her Imperial Majesty, [had] gratefully acknowledged her invaluable contribution.” The last few years of her life, Ackerman would be “very well cared for” with “the very comfortable house – the two servants – her cats,” and “a driver…” Feminine modernists, a patron and a scholar, had been legally as well as ideologically bound on that day (Fig. 7.3).

The shahbanu’s ability to give the “special command” had been made possible by a highly symbolic event in the history of modern Iran: in March of 1967, newspapers had announced that the queen would become the Regent of her oldest son, the heir apparent, Reza II. On October 26 of that year, she was coroneted not only as the first official queen since Iran embraced Islam in the 7th century, but also as a woman vested with legal authority.

For this section, I made requests to be given the permission to interview Shahbanu Farah Pahlavi. Regrettably, they were rejected.

Letter from Carl J. Penton to Rexford Stead, January 1, 1982; in Gluck, Surveyors, 553.

H. Ferretti, “Phyllis Ackerman Dies in Iran at 84,” Mainichi Daily News (February 1, 1977); in Gluck, Surveyors, 572.

Letter from Rexford Stead to Joseph McMullan, October 3, 1969, Shiraz; in Gluck, Surveyors, 563.

There exists an enormous amount of pro- and anti-Pahlavi information on Farah Pahlavi; a lot can be found on the Internet. Here, I will only elaborate the details of her activities as the head of cultural affairs for the Pahlavi court in addition to her role in contemporary architecture. The major events of her life are as the following: “Farah Diba was born on October 14, 1938 in Tehran. Her father was an army officer, her father was also a law graduate of the Sorbonne and the French military Academy of St. Cyr. The Diba family came from Azerbaijan and the Ghotbi clan who lived on the Caspian coast of Gilan. Her mother, Farideh Diba, personally supervised her education, first at Tehran’s Jeanne d’Arc and Razi schools, and later at the Ecole d’Architecture in Paris, where she was studying up to the time of her marriage to Mohammad Reza Shah. Her love for architecture would continue throughout her later life.” She was married to the Shah “on December 21, 1959, which took place at the Marble Palace in Tehran. [Subsequently] most of her time was devoted to the promotion of social welfare and culture, and she was patron of 24 educational, health, cultural and charity organizations.” Since the Iranian Revolution, she has been living in exile dividing her time between Paris and New York. See http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/fdiba/farah_diba.php, accessed February 10, 2004.

See “M Hoveyda Soumet un project de loi historique: la Chahbanou deviendra Regente,” Le Journal de Téhéran 9430 (March 8, 1967): 1; “Aujourd’hui le Couronnement,” Le Journal de Téhéran 9622 (October 26, 1967/14 Aban 1346) 20 pages of special issue; “101 Coups de Canon a 11 heures hier matin: Les Souverains sont Couronner,” Le Journal de Téhéran 9623 (October 27, 1967): 1. The October 26, 1967 coronation represented Farah Diba as “the first Queen to be crowned in the 2,500 and more years of Persian monarchy.” Blanch, Farah, 121. Viewed from Qom or Najaf, it was already problematic that the queen had been crowned as the first in Iran’s history after Islam; the issue only generated agitation among the ulama. However, within the royal circles, it eventually created a different kind of problem: that of competition between the king and the queen.
event of [my death]," the shah had announced, "and until the Crown Prince attains legal age, authority is to lie with Her Majesty the Queen... My armed forces will be as obedient to HMQ...as ever they were to me." He had specified that, "Their orders may come from a woman or a man of tender years, but they are to be obeyed with no less respect.” While historians agree that the “Regency was a public relations exercise designed to show the shah’s respect for women’s equality,” few believed that the shahbanu would make something of it.

In response to allegations that the Pahlavi dynasty was drunk with its own “Westoxication” (Gharbzadegi) or “indiscriminate borrowing from the West” by well-known ideologues like Jalal al-Ahmad and Ali Shariati, the shahbanu started to champion, subsidize, and care for Iran’s cultural heritage as the truest of its qualities – as its authentic identity. In an attempt to carve a place for herself in the spiteful circle of the royal household and to take over a sphere that could contribute to the country’s welfare, she believed that “good architecture” could not only avert a popular revolution from below, but also bring about a successful elitist revolution from above. That such an achievement could, finally, acculturate the nation. “Of all the attempts to ‘liberalise’, a separate royal court surrounding the queen “was perhaps the most symbolic. Supporters of the regime who recognised the need for reform understood that the Empress, popular among the people, harboured more liberal thoughts than her husband (to whom she had unique access) and therefore was considered the best means by which reform could be achieved.” Described by those who knew her as “deeply compassionate” and “warm-hearted,” the shahbanu was also “a moderating influence, besides being able to raise topics that no one else dared refer to.” Unlike her husband, she was one who knew Iran, even if she was of it. While publicly the shahbanu maintained her royal demeanor, privately she proved herself a staunch

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74 The event was described as “a memorable turning point in our history” by Court Minister Assadollah Alam. A. A. Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977 (New York, 1991), entry November 22, 1973, 334-335.
75 Ansari and others correctly argue that the shah had “no intention of relinquishing any real power;” see Ansari, Iran since 1921, 198.
76 Jalal al-Ahmad’s pamphlet, entitled Gharbzadegi – “The plague of the West” or “Westoxication” – which advocated a return to Islamic roots, was widely circulated in the 1960s Iran. For the definition, see Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions, 425.
77 Ansari, Iran since 1921, 198. This liberal tendency of the shahbanu’s court, and its divergence from the shah’s conservative boundaries, did not bother the shah alone. When during the 1977 Arts Festival a modern play enacted a couple having sex, everyone was shocked. “Since arts and culture were the natural preserve of the Empress, her supporters were the principal architects of a festival whose chief aim was to challenge and extend the cultural horizons of ordinary Iranians. For liberally-minded technocrats educated on the Parisian Left Bank, it was the natural function of art to challenge conceptions and it was entirely acceptable to achieve this end by shocking the observer.” Ansari, Iran since 1921, 198.
critic of the extravagance of the court and often interfered with the king’s decisions. 79 “For all that she is an impulsive sentimentalist,” admitted the shah’s most trusted court minister, Amir Assadollah Alam, “one must admit that the queen is a moderating influence, complicating many issues by her intervention, but calming as many as she inflames. Long may her influence be felt; a valuable safeguard against the abuse of power,” adding, “She alone has the ability to open HIM’s eyes to the truth.” 80 To his “touchy mood,” she often responded “with considerable dignity.” 81

The creation of two royal courts, each centered on the queen and the king, while was not intended as a competition, nevertheless brought tension between them. “Since her promotion as prospective Regent, there’s been a perceptible upsurge of rivalry between her and HIM.” 82 The court minister rather plainly and in an attempt to agitate both sides, felt that, “it’s simply a question of ‘one country cannot be ruled by two kings’.” The personal frictions between the king and the queen – mostly lost to historiography – and the subsequent takeover by the queen of Iran’s cultural affairs were in part due to several historical occurrences in the 1970s: the shah became completely detached from Iranian sociopolitical realities and saw himself as the a divine figure in Iran’s future; the queen matured in confidence and experience, and hence established herself as the unrivaled wife of the king with the birth of not only of the heir apparent, but also a second son; and in the final decade of Pahlavi rule, cultural events and activities proliferated in an unprecedented manner, wherein the state and the monarchy had far more at stake.

Since Farah Shahbanu took upon herself the court’s cultural responsibilities, the disagreements often manifested in artistic and architectural concerns: “I reported that the mayor of Tehran has assembled the architectural plans for the Pahlavi museum; should he submit them to HIM or HMQ? ‘To me, of course’,” the shah had irritably replied. 83 Similarly, when preparations were being made for the rather excessive and expensive 2500-year festivities, she had “expressed doubts over our competence to organize the forthcoming celebrations...” Alam

78 Alam, Shah and I, various pages.
79 Naser al-Din Shah Qajar’s wife and head of the harem, Anis al-Dowleh, like Farah Pahlavi vis-à-vis Mohammad Reza Shah, was also “often been credited with championing ordinary people’s causes and criticizing the shah for his personal excesses...” A. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 (London, 1997), 437.
82 Alam, Shah and I, entry November 12, 1972, 255.
83 Alam, Shah and I, entry May 29, 1972, 221.
recalled that "[s]he [was] keen to find a role for herself in their planning, but I told HIM...'too many cooks spoil the broth and Her Majesty's entourage is not exactly lacking in potential troublemakers'." When a year later she was asked by the court minister to approve a "documentary film" of these same events, she responded, "'For goodness sake, leave me alone... I want our names to be utterly dissociated from those ghastly celebrations'," concluding that "HIM and I see eye to eye on nothing..." Unsurprisingly, those who refused to accept the shahbanu's political authority often attacked her on the basis of artistic styles and tastes. When the director of Asia Institute, Richard Frye, had proposed to the Art Festival organizing committee, "Why don't you get folk artists from Kurdistan...Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the like?" its members had replied, "Aghai Frye, we are avant-gardistes, not folklorists [sic.]!" Considered as one of the shahbanu's entourage, Frye was eventually "kicked off the board...by the Tehrani avant-gardistes" who, no doubt, backed the more conservative court of the shah.

The agitation of a second court around Farah Shahbanu was further aggravated by the fact that she took her role very seriously, one that her background had prepared her for. She was in heart and in training an architect, for while in September 1957, she was accepted at Paris' École Spéciale d'Architecture, her studies would last only two years. In spite of the fact that "architectural studies were abandoned for more pressing affairs...affairs of State," architecture remained central to the shahbanu's career and agency in the workings of Iranian politics and society. "I knew [that architecture] was a difficult job," she confessed in an interview, "but I was gripped by it. I always have such satisfaction, such pleasure, when I see houses being built." She believed rather romantically that, "Architecture is an act of creation - I always wanted to create...architecture is art, and it is human, and allied to nature too - or it ought to be,

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84 Alam, Shah and I, entry August 29, 1970, 166.
85 Alam, Shah and I, entry October 10, 1972, 245-246. My emphasis.
86 Richard Frye, in an interview recorded by Shahla Haeri, October 3, 1984, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Tape No. 2, 22-23, Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University. Richard N. Frye was emeritus professor of Iranian Studies at Harvard University. He became the head of Asia Institute of Pahlavi University from Pope's death in 1969 to 1974. In the 1940s, he was sent to Afghanistan by the Roosevelt administration to gather information on the political situation of the region. According to Frye, his curiosity for ancient inscription brought him to Shiraz in 1948, after which he was regularly involved in Iranian cultural and political affairs, particularly during the Mosaddeq era (1951-1953). His books include A History of Bukhara, the Golden Age of Persia, The History of Ancient Iran, and The Heritage of Persia (1962), reprinted last in 1993.
87 L. Blanch, Farah: Shahbanou of Iran (London, 1978), 50. This biography is a byproduct and manifestation of the tensions between the shah and the shahbanu: "Afshar adds that Lesley Blanch was paid $50,000 for her book on the Empress, which 'Farah didn't even want', but which Alam (the Court Minister) thought would make a suitable gift to her from the Shah." P. Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne (London, 1983), 92.
88 Blanch, Farah, 45.
as an integral part of the land around it.” Adding, “Were I not what I am today, I would wish to be an architect: I know my early choice of a career was the right one for me.” In the context of rapid modernization and an increasingly uneven development, social engineering was equated to the work of the architect, the builder. When asked by her biographer whether “you agree that your present job...is also creative,” that “together, you and the Shah have created a new country, new people, new ways of life... Surely what you are both doing is creation, or architecture, on a very large line,” the shahbanu certainly agreed. “Yes; and my part gives me a chance to have much to say about our new buildings, city-planning, hospitals, schools, housing developments and such;” further underscoring, “That is really where women should have much to say... There are so many things I want to see done – to see that our town planners understand.”

In real terms, the shahbanu used her constitutional rights to the maximum. Unlike most members of the regime’s upper echelon, she was genuinely committed to and passionate about the arts. “My soul needs the artistic aspects of life,” she said in an interview for *Point de Vue*, “[t]hey allow me to overlook daily problems, insults, quibbles, and closed-minded attitudes. Artistic events allow me to get closer to the artists whom I have always praised.” Gradually but firmly, the shahbanu took over the Ministry of Culture and Art. The national television, the

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89 Blanch, *Farah*, 45.
90 Alam, *Shah and I*, entries May 9, 1970 and August 1975, 150 and 435. Alam’s diary while of great interest is heavily edited; furthermore, the originals have not been donated to any collections for crosschecking.
91 From an interview with Farah Diba Pahlavi, published in the French magazine *Point de Vue*, a Persian translation of which appeared in the May 1997 issue of *Jahan* magazine in Los Angeles. The complete conversation is as the following. “Reporter: It seems you are taking part in cultural and international affairs more frequently. Does this mean you want to put aside conservatism to some degree?”
numerous museums as well as the tourist industry fell under her jurisdiction. Her patronage initiated the Art Festivals in “the city of Hafez and Sa’di,” featuring modern plays, films, drama, poetry, and dance; the first of which was inaugurated by her at Persepolis on September 11, 1967. Subsequently, she presided over all the national and international Film and Arts Festivals and chaired the Foundation for Iranian Culture, the Society of Iran’s Architects, and the Shahbanu Farah Cultural Foundation. She was also often the Iranian representative during international cultural events, for instance, the March 1976 Exhibition of Islamic Art that was inaugurated by Queen Elizabeth in London.

Despite her efforts, the shahbanu was often dismissed by the establishment because her efforts were perceived as “mere art.” “[The] Queen flew out to Isfahan to inspect various ancient monuments which have been badly neglected,” Alam wrote with no small degree of sarcasm, “I suppose we should be thankful that she takes an interest in such matters.” Similarly, when the Soviet ambassador asked the court minister “the motive for HMQ’s forthcoming trip to Russia,” he replied that it was “merely for cultural purposes.” However, when her work was rejected as such, she exploited the manifest power of architecture to make her point. She not only dictated her wish in and out of politics through debates over architectural styles, but also defied hasty infrastructural and urban development by insisting on the necessity for the preservation of historic landmarks and old urban pockets. When the shah found out, for example, that “the

1350/March 19, 1972); 1321 (Ordibehesht 17, 1351/May 7, 1972); 1348 (Khordad 17, 1951/June 7, 1972); 1411 (Mordad 30, 1351/August 21, 1972); 1421 (Shahrivar 11, 1351/September 2, 1972). For general and in-person description of Farah Shahbanu’s activities, see Frye interview, Tape 5, 18-20.


95 See Alam, Shah and I, entries on pages 255, 313, and 473. “[O]ver the years the Shah delegated more of his responsibilities to the Empress in these marginal areas so that they became almost exclusively her domain. The Ministry of Culture and Information, the museums, the various arts festivals and national television [were] all used as a means of royal patronage and extending the individual importance of those within her office, many of whom [were] often related to her and the Diba family.” R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York, 1978), 139.


Queen’s entourage has blocked work on a new hotel at Isfahan, complaining that it spoils a view” of the Safavid bridge, Si-o-Seh Pol, Alam was immediately sent “to investigate this nonsense…”98 In the context of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Iran, to prove oneself, as the queen did, an obstacle to the rapid modernization of the built environment was not just an architectural stance, but an intensely political one as well. “In nation-building,” wrote the shah, “fine talk is never a substitute for systematic, dogged work.”99 In order to “best show the pace and progress – to me so thrilling – of national growth…underway in my country,” he listed the factories, hospitals, schools, dams, orphanages, airports, post and telegraph offices, women’s clinics, universities, sanatoriums, and other buildings that he had inaugurated over the first six months of 1960. The very integrity of the king’s ever-dawning Great Civilization as well as his own legitimacy as the monarch rested on the perpetual expansion of such projects, which more often than not looked astonishing on paper, but ill fated when and if realized (Fig. 7.4). Their prevention, or worse still, the negation of their (un)truth-as-progress, destabilized the monarchy’s imagery and undermined its ideological claims. The shahbanu, and “her entourage,” were not just “nonsensically” blocking a work on some “hotel.” They were, inadvertently perhaps, rejecting the very foundations of Pahlavi raison d’être. They were, in effect, denying the symbolic expression of Mohammad Reza Shah’s modernity. Simultaneously, what was happening was that the shahbanu was offering Iran, and the world, an alternative model of being modern. In architectural terms, this feminized version of modernity was not destructive but constructive via all-embracing policies of preservation. It was not characterized by exclusion and destruction was had been the modernity of the 1920s and 1930s under Reza Shah, but instead made conscious attempts to include as much as its rhetoric would allow. In short, even Qajar edifices were also deemed worthy of preservation.

Foretelling the crisis of the megalopolis of the Third World, the shahbanu publicly declared as early as April 1975, “we have to contain urban development.”100 Her input came through her presence in meetings and discussions and especially through her “active Royal patronage.”101 In order to conserve “the domestic architecture of Safavid and later centuries,” she vehemently opposed “the pick-axes of demolition,” which were making way for the ultimate

101 Blanch, Farah, 114.
icons and phallic symbols of a masculine modernity: the “cement high-rise.”

Under her tutelage, Safavid and Qajar houses in Nain, Isfahan’s Hasht Behesht palace and Pir-e Bakran, Shiraz’s Narenjestan among other structures were preserved. “In 1973, 600 major building sites were on the list for preservation and 300 of these were actively under repair.” She also insisted that each structure should “serve some practical use...headquarters for seminars, libraries, lecture or concert halls” in lieu of becoming mere “monuments and museums.” Safavid as well as Qajar spaces and structures were to be protected, rather than destroyed, as acts of a (re)new(ed) expressions of modernity. The queen went further and encouraged artists-state dialogue, “The state must buy artists’ work;” she declared, “Painters must organize syndicates.” She certainly came to play an increasingly heavy role in politics through the benign veneer of both culture and femininity. To his own eventual detriment, Mohammad Reza Shah continued to dismiss her as “well intentioned, but no one could honestly credit her with much experience or patience.” Nor did the shah, in general, take women seriously.

102 Blanch, Farah, 116. “Then there is the problem of designing new houses, and housing developments which have both quality and are practical. Architectural problems, the designing of livable new houses, of finding a new style which can be considered truly Iranian but not merely repetitive, is a problem to which the Shahbanou and the younger architects she inspires give much thought. Architecture is a career pre-eminently suited to women, since they understand the practical issues of daily life. Of what use those showy masculine concepts of model housing developments and new town centers, where the housewife must go several miles to buy a loaf of bread?” Blanch, Farah, 120. The assumption here is that a woman is a priori “a housewife” or that “the wife” gets the “loaf of bread” and that a female architect would “pre-eminently” solve this and such “feminine” architectural problems. Despite the outward promotion of women in expressions like “showy masculine concepts,” this revealing statement remains in the masculine paradigm of modernity where there are too many assumptions and too many certainties. “It is significant that such practical issues were of first consideration in the rebuilding of Warsaw, where tradition and practicality and progress are combined, and the Mayor, at that time, was both a woman and an architect. Here in Iran, it might be said that the Queen is both a woman and an architect...” as if the two are mutually exclusive. 103 N. Ardalan, “Architecture, VIII. Pahlavi, After World War II,” in Encyclopedia Iranica 1, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London and New York), 352-354, 354.

104 Blanch, Farah, 114. Her biographer called it, “heritage of the Safavids which a Pahlavi Queen now protects.” Furthermore, “[t]he Shahbanou in particular showed concern to preserve older buildings of secular character, insofar as they were characteristic of Iranian artistic skills or connected with Iranian history, that were threatened with demolition to make place for new streets. The haste with which, under Reza Shah, the gates of Tehran...were sacrificed to modern traffic, and similar precipitate acts, were later regretted.” The anxiety of the debating modernists had come to hunt their progeny, the feminine modernists. “The religious sanctuaries, which could be entered by foreigners with special permission under Reza Shah, became closed to non-Moslem visitors after the war, with the exception of those mosques and shrines that had been registered as historic monuments, especially the ones in Isfahan and Shiraz... The manifold cultural activities supported by the state were placed under the jurisdiction of the High Council of Culture and Art (Showra-ye ‘Ali-ye Farhang) operating in conjunction with the Center of Research and Cultural Coordination.” G. Lenczowski, ed. Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, 1978) 327.

105 “Shahbanu during a visit to exhibition: ‘The state must buy artists’ work’,” Ayandegan 95 (Farvardin 24, 1347/April 13, 1968): 1.

106 Alam, Shah and I, entry May 13, 1970, 152. “The Shah on the other hand...did not take the Empress’s role seriously.” Ansari, Iran since 1921, 198.
Farah Shahbanu was able to force her political will through high culture not only because she had been endowed with the role of the Regent and had the backing of some royalists, but also because she embodied the ultimate model of the Pahlavi woman. That is, she functioned in full harmony with the parameters of good taste and acculturated conduct as delineated by the secular reformists of the 1920s and sustained by the Pahlavi ethos thereafter. Hence, in spite of her oppositions and obstructions, she remained, like most of the upper and upper-middle class of the 1970s Iran, a byproduct and a symbol of the de-politicized Pahlavi society who were all "born into the new apolitical state." This was very important, even for the shah because the shahbanu was offering to Iran and, more importantly for the royal family, to the (Western) world, the image of the ideal Iranian woman as "modern-yet-modest," an ideal that would transform into the image of "Islamic-thus-modest" after 1979. This paradigm shift would be in fact a shift in pure (re)presentation, in the tectonics of how women looked in modern Iran for it rarely addressed the genuine interests and concerns of women either before or after the revolution. It was more often than not about mimicry of Western women's image or a reaction to it, minus the rights, Constitutional or otherwise.

Just as the SNH was the channel through which to manufacture and disseminate high art, the WOI was the organization through which the state formulated and implemented laws for the improvement of women's lives. Although Ashraf Pahlavi, the shah's twin sister, was the honorary and actual head of the WOI, it was the shahbanu who represented the archetype of the "modern-yet-modest" Iranian women for the simple reason that the latter had supremely far better public reputation than the former. It was certainly not coincidental that the ideals of an authentic Iranian culture and the modern Iranian woman came to be simultaneously embodied in the queen. For both were integral to the same ideological economy.

In fact, throughout the Pahlavi era, these two entities had followed a remarkably similar path. Initiated by exceptionally intelligent women and/or men as avant-garde and often-radical movements for modernization -- and of modernity itself -- both the SNH and the WOI would end

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107 In his book, Mohammad Reza Shah devoted a chapter to the topic entitled "The Eternal Question of Women." See Pahlavi, Mission for my Country, 217-237. At the end of it, he states, "I have the greatest faith in our wonderful women, so many of whom are by common consent among the loveliest in the world. I think they can remain as thoroughly feminine as in the past and yet rise to the challenge of the their new role in modern Persian society." 237


110 On Ashraf Pahlavi's activities with the WOI, see Sanasarian, Women's Rights, 85-86. As for Ashraf's personal life, it might be sufficient to ask a middle-aged Iranian!
up becoming mere images of modernity in the 1960s and 1970s. "In the first period, women’s status was seen as a symbol of modernity of the new nation and the new state. In the second period, it became the symbol of the modernity of the monarch and his progressive benevolence towards women." Like the cultural reformists of the 1920s – men like Hasan Pirnia, Mohammad Ali Forughi, Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, Keikhosraw Shahrough, or Firuz Mirza Firuz – frustrated with the Constitutional Revolution had fastened their hopes on the person of Reza Shah only to later be eliminated, the early feminists – women like Zandokht Shirazi, Roshanak Nodust, Afaq Parsa, Shahnaz Azad, Mohtaram Eskandari, or Sedigeh Dovlatabady – would first willingly join the shah’s state apparatus in the hope of gender equality only to regret later. By the 1970s, both the SNH and the WOI had become mere projections of Mohammad Reza Shah’s enhanced image as a modern monarch of a modern nation, marketed for the international rather than domestic consumption. The WOI “despite its practical domination on the women’s issue,” Sanasarian notes, “never intended to launch an intensive national program for tackling the problem of women’s consciousness.” Publications never reached their intended audience and public schools never embraced any such program. Whatever reform benefited women was a result of orders from above and often served as a façade for Western media and governments; they had little or no effect on the Iranian masses. “[F]eminism – as such – was neither the desire of the authorities nor the intention of those who championed legal changes.” While pro-Pahlavi spokespersons praised the dynasty for granting educational and professional opportunities to women, pointing to Reza Shah’s prohibition of the veil in public spaces and to the 1963 referendum for women’s suffrage, their opponents argued that not only were these reforms cosmetic leaving women on an unequal legal, economic, and social basis but had also caused “the commodification of women’s sexuality…” The Pahlavi woman remained a mere representation – a public text like public monuments – and an instrument within the exclusively masculine and patriarchal structures of Iranian modernity.

112 See Sanasarian, Women’s Rights, chapter 3; and Najmabadi, “Modernity and Morality,” 667.
113 Sanasarian, Women’s Rights, 110.
114 Sanasarian, Women’s Rights, 110. “The shah’s attitude towards women’s rights was indicative of his new outlook on the nature of his own rule: women’s rights were to be royal grants. All women’s initiatives, even of a charitable nature, had to be absorbed and controlled centrally by the state…” The WOI was a “vehicle for projecting the shah’s image internationally as a champion of women’s rights in Iran.” Najmabadi, “Modernity and Morality,” 674 and 676.
The parallel histories of the WOI and the SNH through the 20th century can be explained in terms of their function in the Pahlavi matrix, for instead of genuine reform, they both could be manipulated, with relative ease, into an image of reform. They were always susceptible to the abuses of political power: both enjoyed imperial patronage without political (in)dignity; both functioned as effective tools of socio-cultural homogenization; both were willed into and out of the state bureaucracy when convenient; both produced, and persistently reproduced, an imagery and actual models of social inclusion and exclusion; both spoke about the unique merits of an authentically ancient as well as a thoroughly westernized nation; both implied a historical continuity or change within and outside the dynasty's history; both were temptingly attractive and familiar to the Western world; and both perfectly replicated the paradigm of a (Western) modernity. The bottom line was that, with enough iconographical exploitation, the harmonious marriage of the agendas underpinning the SNH and the WOI could, and did, invent the image of a monarch who insisted on being astonishingly modern and millenary old. As an appendix to the shah, Farah Shahbanu naturally embodied this perfect marriage.

By an unwritten law, [royal women] are always presented in the press as some disembodied presence, composed of face, head, hands and feet, and a bit of leg... Shoulders, if glimpsed above an unrevealing décolletage, are admitted; so far – but no further. Royal ladies do not have cleavages. This is all part of those dictums of 'good taste' which dehumanize Thrones and their occupants.116

While an activist in her own right, the shahbanu never had a cleavage. The woman on the throne, like the women in the street, was also dehumanized into an instrument – perhaps the ultimate apparatus of all, for it lends itself to pure representation – to reinforce the masculine myth in the making. Fragmented women can never be agent of the holistic vision of modernity; they are a priori deficient; a priori, a mere fragment of that all-inclusive masculine project. The various manifestations of feminism and taste in the 1970s provided a concrete form and articulated a very specific ideological agenda that was modernity itself. Simply because both were taking their assertions and assumptions from a masculine paradigm of Western modernity, whereby women, like the folklore, remained a passive, a voiceless object of domination and potential acculturation. It is in this historic context that architectural productions of that period must be reviewed. It is also under this light that this chapter will examine the mausoleum of Ackerman and Arthur in Isfahan, as the last major construction by the SNH.

116 Blanch, Farah, 149.
Gendered Space

“I believe in God and that I have been chosen by God to perform a task. My reign has saved the country and it has done so because God was on my side.” As Mohammad Reza Shah’s sense of divine mission intensified in the 1970s and as he began to perceive himself as a prophet, the SNH too began to have skewed priorities about Iran’s past and present grandeur and glorification. Arthur Pope was placed on an equal footing with historical, and by then historicized, men like Nader Shah Afshar, Omar Khayyam, Ibn Sina, Sa’di, Hafez, and Ferdawsi, the modern mausoleums of whom had become sites of national pilgrimage and objects of historic heritage. In the context of total centralization and the public spheres’ takeover by the state, architectural works, and consequently the architectural profession itself, became a state tool to praise the king and his dynasty. Architects, who had gained semi-autonomy and exercised influence between the 1940s and 1960s, now either became instruments of the system or disappeared from the stage of production. By the turn of the decade, architectural propaganda of the regime and the revivalism of historic forms were perceived as nothing more than normative and apolitical acts of aesthetics. In this domain, the regime intended to import that which it saw fit from abroad and insisted that the “inherent Iranian genius” would style this into “a new and regenerated” native culture. “Culture, in fact, [was] just another tool of the political system and survived only where it [was] allied to the system. Culture at this level [was] a plaything of the elite, in particular those surrounding Empress Farah, and existed in a complete vacuum.”

Taking advantage of this climate, Arthur made a special request to the chairperson of the SNH’s Board of Trustees, Isa Sadiq, following the Fourth Congress of Iranian Art and Archeology. “For a few minutes,” he had told Sadiq, “I wanted to see you alone.” At 3:00 pm on May 17, 1960, he arrived with a nazr: “My wish is that my corpse be given to the earth in Persia so that others begin to appreciate it…” This was going to be his last gesture for “Persia” as integral to his life-long acculturating mission that he had assigned himself since 1925. Arthur specifically added, “I beg of you to inform the Shahanshah about this issue and get a permission for me to state in my will that my corpse will be transferred to Iran and will be interred in

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118 For Mohammad Reza Shah’s notions about his prophesy and divine mission, see Ansari, Iran since 1921, 181; Graham, Illusion of Power, 42; Amuzegar, Dynamics of Revolution, 143 and 219.
Isfahan.” Despite the obvious self-glorifying motives behind the request, Sadiq was deeply moved by Arthur’s “passion for Persia.” He promised to relay the request to the king.

This conversation was followed by an official letter – which itself would be regarded as a monument and eventually would become part of the mausoleum – making the final arrangements for the location and construction of his tomb. “Isfahan, of course, is my special love,” Arthur had written, “where my most important work was done and my greatest happiness.” He who had made a career out of Iran’s cultural heritage wished to become a “lesson” to foreigners and locals alike after his death. He noted:

the whole point is to show the Persian people that their great spirits, artists, poets, creative leaders, scholars are of such quality as to evoke the profoundest admiration of kindred spirits in other lands, who affirm their gratitude and devotion in more than words, and to affirm to visitors from other countries that one is not interred in Persia by the accident of dying there, but with the conviction that it is a holy ground and a privilege for those who understand it to use it as a final resting place, as a witness of their faith in the land and the great personalities that have through the many centuries made it what it has been and, at the same time, prophecies a noble future.

The monument was going to be not only an active agent in the mission civilisatrice but also an icon to Arthur’s memory. “His mausoleum,” his admirers maintained, “will be a symbol of our eternal gratitude for his great services to Iran and ‘a witness of his faith in our land’.” Towards the same end, in a letter on October 27, 1967, he implored his once student and assistant at the Asia Institute in New York, the museum director Rexford Stead, to embark on a biography where his life “could be used as a demonstration that neither health nor money are essential to decent achievement.” His own attempt on an autobiography, titled Nine Lives, was never realized; highlighting Stead’s words in 1982 that Ackerman “was the behind-the-scenes indefatigable worker for most of Arthur’s successful endeavors.” In Arthur’s mind, the tomb, erected by the SNH, and the biography, composed by Stead, would no doubt guarantee his memory.

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121 Sadiq, Memoirs, 3: 366.
123 Iran National Archives 290, Micro-reel 44, Document 75, page 1, undated, Tehran.
124 Gluck, Surveyors, 4.
125 Gluck, Surveyors, xvi.
126 Letter from Rexford Stead to Robert Payne, May 25, 1982; in Gluck, Surveyors, 57. Pope’s early solo projects were seldom completed. After marrying Ackerman, he moved to New York to work on a book called Philosophical Maladies of the Nineteenth Century, which was never finished.
According to Sadiq, Arthur’s letter triggered the idea of the construction of a landmark in Isfahan. Reportedly, Sadiq transmitted this letter to Mohammad Reza Shah who was so “touched” that he issued commands to the authorities of Isfahan and the SNH for its realization.\textsuperscript{127} However, according to Arthur’s successor as the head of the Asia Institute, Richard Frye, the story was quite different. After its bankruptcy in the 1950s, the New York Institute was closed down and the library shipped to the University of Pennsylvania Museum; including a number of valuable art works. Until the mid-1960s, Ackerman and Arthur lived in upper Connecticut when they received a message from the Iranian Embassy in Washington D.C. “saying that the present Shah ‘wants to do something for you, because of your service to Iran and friendship for my father.’”\textsuperscript{128} Arthur’s final return to Iran was agreed on conditions. According to Frye, he wanted two things:

‘One, I want my Asia Institute to be resurrected and brought to Iran, brought back to life. Two, I want to be buried under a mausoleum on the bank of the Zayandeh [River].' So the Shah said, ‘Let it be done.’ And, of course, this is what happened. They got the library...sent it all to Iran...and Pope and his six cats...they came into that house, it was really almost a caricature!\textsuperscript{129}

While the two historians first arrived in Tehran to settle there, the shah soon changed his mind realizing the political implications of Arthur’s presence at the heart of the social and academic rivalry of Tehran University. He instead insisted that the Asia Institute be established in Shiraz – near the historic capital of Persepolis, for he had new plans for Shiraz. In the late 1960s, there were rumors about the potential relocation of Iran’s capital city from Tehran to Shiraz. The newly reopened Asia Institute there would have greatly enhanced the new capital’s political and

\textsuperscript{128} "The Institute fell on hard times during the war. It was originally, until 1941, called the American Institute of Iranian Studies... Then it was changed to the Asia Institute, and they got money form Washington to teach languages and expand greatly into all of Asia: China, Japan and everything else. After the war, it didn’t flourish because it really was a kind of one-man show...Pope personally...kept it going. It fell on bad times, and was forced to go bankrupt and close. The library was boxed up and sent to the University of Pennsylvania Museum, and a lot of the objects that were in the Asia Institute. Arthur...was 85 when he retired... For quite a number of years he [had been] living in upper Connecticut, when he got a message from the Iranian Embassy saying that the present Shah ‘wants to do something for you, because of your service to Iran and friendship for my father.' Frye interview, Tape 2, 10-11. A close associates and friend of Pope later recorded that Pope’s death was really caused by the disagreement over the Asia Institute between him and Frye, “Assad [Behroozan, a former student of Pope] believes that AUP died of a broken heart and blames Frye for it.” Letter from Sumi Gluck to Rexford Stead, August 1982, Ashiya, Japan; in Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 553. In a similar vein, Carl Penton writes, “When Dr. Frye arrived to assume the position as director, many things changed...[he] was not familiar with the procedures of the institute, nor was he prepared to accept AUP’s way of doing things.” Letter from Carl J. Penton to Rexford Stead, January 1, 1982; in Gluck, \textit{Surveyors}, 553.
\textsuperscript{129} Frye interview, Tape 2, 11.
academic prestige. Hence, Arthur's first wish was granted by the king: Narenjestan, a rather rundown 19th-century Qajar summer residence was turned over to the Institute. With it came a substantial amount of money from the shahbanu to renovate the entire complex, including its wall paintings, mirror-work (*ayne-kari*), wood-frames, and garden (Fig. 7.5). The work was completed just before the dawn of the Iranian Revolution in 1978.

The newly established Pahlavi University in Shiraz took the Institute under its bureaucratic wings after months of reluctance. Whereas Arthur and his protégés wanted it to remain independent, under the direction of Shahbanu Farah's office, Frye insisted that for the Institute's effectiveness and prosperity it needed to associate itself with Pahlavi University. Frye had argued with Arthur, "you know, for the future of the Institute, for its service to Iran, it's got to belong to the University." Frye recalls that Gluck, Arthur's later biographer, was "violently opposed to this" disregarding warnings that the Institute "cannot function by itself...without any students, without any credits, we're just doing [the work] in a vacuum. We're doing it for ourselves." For the decision to go under the jurisdiction of the university, Frye would struggle six years to get the smallest task accomplished. Later Frye implemented a vast number of projects, academic and otherwise, for instance, the organization of the 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971. Forced by the location of the celebrations in Shiraz, on the occasion Frye had to select and invite scholars, provide translators and cultural guides, etc. His efforts, however, went into making the Congress on Iranian Studies a success.

Whereas the Asia Institute was Arthur's scholarly legacy, the mausoleum in the heart of Isfahan was the physical manifesto of his ideologies. However, contrary to mainstream history, it was not a generous gesture granted to Pope by the Iranian government, but rather a condition for his return to Iran. It was accordingly granted right before his death. During the SNH's January 30, 1966 meeting, "the request on October 5, 1965 of Scholar and Orientalist Mister Professor

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130 The Narenjestan Palace Museum is located on Zand Avenue in Shiraz. In the 19th and early 20th century, a Qajar palace was revamped by Farah Shahbanu's sponsorship and became the home of the Asia Institute in 1966. The types of objects that are being kept there include archeological items, photographs, slides, Ackerman-Pope's library and personal papers. See http://www.spongobongo.com/her9933.htm, February 11, 2004.
131 While Farah Shahbanu was the honorary president of the Asia Institute, the Pahlavi University was under the shah's control. I was unable to understand how Frye figured in this politics of domination. He seems to have been more on the liberal side with his proposition of "inviting folklorists, etc.," as stated above.
132 Frye interview, Tape 2, 12.
133 Frye interview, Tape 2, 13.
134 Frye interview, Tape 2, 9.
135 Frye interview, Tape 3, 9.
Pope to Senator Mister Doctor Sadiq” was put on the table. Subsequently, according to Sadiq, the work was initiated with the joint accord of the Ministry of Culture and Art and the SNH, who informed its Isfahan branch to take action with the local governor, Ebrahim Parsa, and the mayor of Isfahan. “After discussions, a land” belonging to the municipality “adjacent to Zayandeh River was selected.” During a conversation on December 22 of the same year, Arthur and “his wife” had insisted that “work should begin as soon as possible so that during [my] visit from Shiraz to Isfahan in the next Spring, [I] could personally inspect (bazdid) the edifice.” After the 1968-Congress of Iranian Art and Archeology, organized in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, Arthur visited the site and gave his approval. However, construction began on May 8, 1970, that is, nine months after his death. After seeing the sketches of the design that “included a Kufic inscription,” Arthur had told the architect that it was “one of his favorites…” (Fig. 7.6). Rexford Stead would later describe the design as “a Hafiz-type tomb” for which the SNH allocated a budget of 30,000 tomans.

With Arthur’s request, Iranian architect Mohsen Forughi was called to work with him on the specifics of the tomb’s design. Both the execution of the drawings and the supervision of the contract were delegated to Forughi who was invited to Isfahan to inspect the site. The project must have been one of his simplest ones for by then his career had been long and prolific. The former dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at Tehran University and a Beaux-Arts trained Iranian architect, Forughi was born into a prominent secular family of Tehran in 1907. He was not only a man of the Pahlavi system, but also the very byproduct of the SNH. In fact, he was born into the SNH for his father was none other than Reza Shah’s prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi: one of the, if not the, founding-fathers and the president of the Society from its 1922-insemination to his forced resignation in 1935. Arthur considered both father and son as his “extremely good friends” and his “representatives” in Iran. Forughi junior was also a byproduct of Arthur-the-scholar and Arthur-the-dealer. “M. Professeur,” some had heard Forughi.

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136 SNH 131, Karnameh, 425-426. The meeting took place on Bahman 19, 1344.
138 SNH 131, Karnameh, 426.
141 Letter from Rexford Stead to Joseph McMullan, October 3, 1969; in Gluck, Surveyors, 563. And, see SNH 131, Karnameh, 428. 30,000 tomans in 1965 was equivalent to around $4,000.
142 Letter from Pope to Murray, letter 891.927/300, January 4, 1938; quoted in Majd, Britain and Reza Shah, 43.
tell Arthur, “I was a young ‘French architect who had been born in Persia,’ assigned by some lucky quirk to be your interpreter. From the first day in Qazvin when you opened my eyes to the beauty of my country’s art, I was reborn ‘a Persian with a French education’” (Fig. 7.7). With a “slow, emotional voice,” Forughi had also remembered a thing that Arthur had told him back then, “Foroughi, you should collect.” That same night, the young man had bought his “first piece.” In 1969, *Keyhan International* portrayed his collection as “one of the finest...in the country.”

Described by those who worked with him as “a very gentle and kind individual with his love for Iranian art” and by later authors as “the best-known architect of his generation” as well as “one of the first modern Iranian architects,” Foroughi was sent by the Iranian government to and graduated from the École Superieure des Beaux-Arts in 1934. He returned to Iran two years later to join the Literature and Technology Schools of Tehran University and awaited the establishment of the School of Architecture. Described by Marefat as the first Iranian architect “to actually participate in [Reza] Shah’s building program,” Foroughi proved pivotal to the politics of the architectural profession in the 1950s and 1960s and its relationships to the state.

When younger architects like Houshang Seyhoun returned to Iran armed with ideas deeply influenced by major figures like Le Corbusier and others avant-garde architects, it was Foroughi and his generation that defended the grand tradition of the Beaux-Arts. Engaged with the Technical Office of the Ministries of Education and Finance and the National Bank and well connected with both André Godard and Maxime Siroux, he eventually succeeded Godard to become the first Iranian dean of the Architectural School until 1962. He was also one of the founders of the Society of Iran’s Architects and a prominent member of the SNH throughout the

146 After Mohsen Foroughi, Houshang Seyhoun became the dean as explained in chapter 5. Foroughi died in 1982. See also Marefat, “Building to Power,” 128-130.
1960s and 1970s (Fig. 7.8). As a leading figure of these establishments, he became an important link between the state and the profession throughout the Pahlavi era. His main works included the Faculty of Law at Tehran University — the first major academic construction by an Iranian architect — the Ministry of Finance, and the National Bank offices opposite Tehran’s main bazaar. Described as “the public building that best embodies [Forughi’s] style,” the latter began in 1945 and was completed in the mid-1950s (Fig. 7.9). A “style” according to Marefat “although...fundamentally modern,” still “paid homage to the Islamic past.” His technique of blending modern Western morphology with Iranian decorative elements would be used again in the design of Sa’di’s modern mausoleum of Shiraz as explained in chapter 4. It is, however, simply and thoroughly modern, precisely because it refers back to an “Islamic past,” inherently and deliberately selective. When it came to the dialectic between the modern and the tradition, Marie-Thérèse Ullens’ interview with Forughi was a telling one:

Ullens: [Do] you preserve the old style [of buildings] or do you adopt the extremely modern style?

Forughi: In general, it is the modern style that we use. We have also tried to construct with the old style. However, I have to say [that] with the present-day needs, with the [availability of] new materials, and the modern life, we did not get good results [with the old style]. Conversely, [for the production of] modern decorations such as mosaics, paintings, and frescoes, we used exactly the same process as the old times and we get the same appearance for the decorations as the old times.

Ullens: Are the materials that you use the more modern ones? [Because] some of the buildings that I have seen are constructed with [reinforced] concrete.

Forughi: At the beginning we constructed with materials that were not very solid; today we use modern materials like concrete including all the other modern [building] processes.

In this conversation, while it is unclear which architectural movement was understood as “extremely modern,” it is evident that in their minds there was a distinct and binary opposition between the so-called “modern style” and the “old style,” between “modern materials” and “old materials,” ultimately between “modern life” and “old times.” In the mind of the king and the scholar, Forughi was, no doubt, the perfect architect who could live up to their expectations, both aesthetically and historically.

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147 See Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada; Tape 1, Side B; see Appendix 6.
148 For a brief description of the structural and decorative characteristics of the bazaar’s National Bank office, see Marefat, “Building to Power,” 130-132.
149 Ullens Archive Audio Collection, Harvard Semitic Museum, Photographic Archives, Visual Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University; CD #26 UIAuCD In GoA, Y/Of; Interview with Andre Godard, Yedda Godard, and Iranian officials; Track 3, minutes 3:12 on. My emphasis.
A monument dictated by Arthur’s taste could have nothing to do with modern architecture for he deplored the modern movement of the 1920s to 1950s. He often voiced his opinions about its “destructive” and “propagandistic” force.150 More specifically, Arthur simply loathed the International Style and the changes that the CIAM had forced upon the profession.151 In a letter addressed to the president of Harvard University, Nathaniel Marsh Pusey, he had called the Graduate School of Design’s alliance with the modern movement, in general, and Le Corbusier with his Carpenter Center, in particular, a mistake for it was “a movement immature and aggressive, contemptuous of history, and derisive of the constants in humane culture; a movement not unrelated to the ‘catastrophic deterioration of Western culture’.”152 In Arthur’s view, while the movement was “intellectually...dogmatic and repetitive, some clichés...demonstrably fallacious,” with “unanalyzed assumptions,” in practice “it exalted the mechanical and imposed on credulous public buildings that are vacant, monotonous and brutish.” At he end of his letter, Arthur praised Harvard University for “serving” in recent years “as a citadel protecting ancient and universal values from la nouvelle invasion barbare.”153 In closing, “it is heartening to think that [the citadel’s walls] are being repaired and that it once more will, in the crucial field of architecture, promote rational and humane standards.” According to the letters postscript, Arthur marinated that “P. S. This is not an essay on Modernism in Architecture. If some of its sounds too hot that is because it has been in a pressure cooker for forty years.”154

In the same anti-modernist vein, in the last paragraph of his Introducing Persian Architecture, he wrote with apprehension: “But if Persian Architecture in part survived the vicissitudes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is not certain that it has survived the impact of European style. All this came at a time when Iran – forgetting her own past, was particularly vulnerable to novelty and propaganda.”155 Arthur was forgetting the fact that other sets of “vulnerability and propaganda” had given him, an American art dealer, a prominent and authoritative position wherefrom he could utter such (un)truths. “Many substantial monuments have been built and suggested without any hint to the immensely rich and vital architectural tradition,” he went on, “in the so-called International style, that might quite as well have been

150 Harvard University Art Museum Archives, John Coolidge files, letter from Pope to Dr. Nathaniel Marsh Pusey, February 20, 1955.
151 This was particularly true in the areas of historic preservation policies and their valorization techniques.
152 Letter from Pope to Pusey.
153 Letter from Pope to Pusey.
154 Letter from Pope to Pusey.
built in Oregon, Uruguay, Finland, New Zealand or Japan – as if Persian architectural tradition had been played out after 3000 years of continuous evolution..." The fact that the concept and discourse about such “continuous architectural tradition” with “masterpieces” at “Persepolis, Sarvistan, Gunbad-i Qabus, the Mausoleum of Uljaitu, the Madrassa of Khargird, the Mosque of Gawhar Shah, the Blue Mosque of Tabriz, the Mašjid-i-Shah and the Shaykh Lutf Allah of Isfahan” had been invented and nurtured to maturity by himself with a significant help from his colleagues and rivals at the SNH over the last fifty years was completely lost to the author. Lost too was the proposition that the conceptions of a continuous art historical evolution, with its selected masterpieces was an outcomes of the efforts made by these men in Pahlavi Iran.

Therefore, it was very clear that Arthur’s preferred tomb design would involve some kind of historic revivalism of morphology and style. “This arrangement, twice approved” by “His Majesty,” was formally intended as a revival of the “twelfth-century style that he liked,” on the north bank of the picturesque Zayandeh River, overlooking the Safavid style Khaju bridge from the 17th century. Sadiq maintained that Forughi’s design, “with Professor Pope’s inclination” was “prepared based on the architectural methods of the fifteenth century Hejri.” Furthermore, “the outside of the aramgah,” according to the Karnameh, was to be explicitly “Iranian.” Despite conflicting opinions, in either case, conception of a grand historic past had utmost significance to Arthur’s design conception. It, in turn, was not just the de-politicized history of Iranian architecture in terms of the repertoire of buildings and artifacts, but more poignantly, the narrative of Persian Architectural History as framed and assembled by the first European travelers to Iran up to Arthur himself. Accordingly, he was, surely and intimately, familiar with Jane Dieulafoy’s rather handsome sketch of Khaju Bridge and while Eugene Flandin’s lithography erroneously labeled, “Pont Kadjiou, Chiraz,” certainly was known by Arthur. His own documentation of “Isfahan. Bridge Khaju. Rebuilt by Shah Abbas II, 1642-66 (1052-77 H.)”

156 Iran National Archives 290, Micro-reel 44, Document 75, page 1; not dated, Tehran. There exists very little literature on Ackerman-Pope’s mausoleum probably because it was of interest to a handful individuals who were either directly involved or personally cared for Pope. For further reading, see SNH 131, “Aramgah-e Professor Pope,” *Karnameh;* Sadiq, *Memoirs,* 3: various pages; and selected parts of Gluch, *Surveyors.* For a recent Iranian publication, see H. Mazaheri, *Aramgah-e Kharejian dar Isfahan* (Isfahan, 2000), 289-300.
158 SNH 131, *Karnameh,* 428.
in the SoPA was accompanied by two beautiful photographs. There is also enough evidence to support the proposition that the mausoleum of Isma'il the Samanid in Bukhara, modern-day Uzbekistan, dated between 914 and 943, was sufficiently celebrated by the mainstream history to later become a favored prototype for Arthur's own mausoleum, even if Forughí never recorded his motives behind the design.

In the SoPA, Eric Schroeder of Fogg Art Museum presented the "Mausoleum of Isma'il the Samanid" with section, plan, and elevation drawings, and described it as "a building of vivid energy, rotund and solid as a Chou bronze; its surface sparkles with caprice and genius, its bricks are 'stones of fire'. Historically, "this most notable of early Islamic buildings," was also considered, "richly stored with the past and charged with the future." There was a characteristically Orientalist exultation of the monument's decorative program and form: "But of all the characteristics of the mausoleum the most obvious is the most memorable: the rich texture of the brick surface," noted Schroeder. In his view, furthermore, while "the supports are ponderous" and "the dome is primitively ovoid," it "for the first time" had made visible the "grasp of the decorative uses of brick and that delight in revealed structure which are the spirit of Seljuq architecture." Historians of subsequent decades not only confirm the superiority of the monument, but also link it to Iran's pre-Islamic architectural history; "...the most epoch-making building in Iranian Islamic architecture. Yet it looks backward as well as forward. Its domed square form, its arched opening on each side, its lack of directional emphasis and the presence of an upper gallery with corner domes are all features with Sasanian antecedents." Historians stated that it was, "in short, a fire temple in Islamic dress."

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161 According to Grabar and Ettinghausen "...the canopy tomb, a domed cube generally open on all sides, like the first constructions in Najaf and Kerbela over the tombs of Ali and his descendants...the mausoleum of Isma'il the Samanid in Bukhara was used for more than one prince, and perhaps under the Samanid prince Nasr (914-43)...Inside the most striking feature is the transition from square to dome: the squinches are framed within an octagonal flat arcade on brick colonnades, and above a narrow sixteen-sided zone smoothes the passage to the base of the cupola...the peculiarity of the Bukhara mausoleum is the unusual use of brick. Almost every visible brick is at the same time an element of construction and part of the decorative design." Grabar and Ettinghausen remain uncertain about the pre-Islamic as the prototype; "The plan, thought akin to some, is not exactly like that of any known fire-temple - in any case an unlikely model for a mausoleum." R. Ettinghausen and O. Grabar, The Art and Architecture of Islam 650-1250 (New Haven, 1987), 218.
164 "The domed square mausoleum and its multiple derivatives had...a history of consistent popularity in Iran which extended from at least the early tenth century until modern times and was not, as in the case of tomb towers, generally confined to Northern Iran. In Transoxiana, the 10th century saw the construction of a while series of..."
Much like the Samanid tomb, Arthur’s mausoleum was conceived as a modern monument so well dressed in “Islamic” attire that even the “Islamic” Revolution would not distinguish its “modern” from its “Islamic.” Apart from a missing gallery and the addition of a second dome, the structure’s typology and the delicate façade brickwork evoked the Samanid structure (Figs. 7.10-7.11). Raised on a 60-centimeter plinth, the 6 by 3 by 5 meters chamber room was accessed by 6 sets of small steps surrounding it. Each step led to a blind arch, itself decorated in the *mashrabiya*-type brick façade (Fig. 7.12). The horseshoe arches were ornamented with an intriguing interplay of brick- and clay-works, recalling the Samanid tomb *iwan* (Figs. 7.13). The chamber was accessed from the narrow southern façade, where laid Arthur and on his north Ackerman. While the original design of the roof envisaged 2 one-piece stone domes above each tombstone, in October 1970 the SNH instructed the architect to go ahead with 4 separate pieces of construction material in order to move on to “decorative tile works and calligraphy.”\(^{165}\) Unlike *Ferdawsiyeh* and *Hafeziyeh*, this monument had absolutely no structural problems. Unlike the tombs of Omar Khayyam and Baba Taher, the tile- and brick-works here were carried out with careful attention to details. In fact, “the beloved old master mason of Isfahan,” Ostad Hosayn Ma’arefi had done “a wonderful job on the grave, both waterproofing inner and outer walls and sinking an enormous cement foundation into the soil.”\(^{166}\) Some inferred this as Ma’arefi’s “symbolic gesture...of reverence” to Arthur.

In mid-construction, Ma’arefi had surprised Arthur’s assistant Carl Panton with his very first concern about the monument. “What orientation” he had asked him, “do you prefer for the grave?”\(^{167}\) When Panton had inquired about his opinion, Ma’arefi, “like the good Muslim he was” had maintained “*kiblah*, of course.” Therefore, each of the two gravestones, engraved in Persian and English, were positioned directly under each small dome at the level of the ground in accord with Muslim burial practices (Fig. 7.14). Within the north-south oriented rectangular mausolea of domed square type, often with elaborate brick decoration (‘Tomb of the Samanids’ in Bukhara; Arab-Ata mausoleum at Tim...). But the Islamic detailing completely transforms the model.” The modular repetition, too, completely transforms the medieval model. “Sasanian *chahar taqs*, built of a rough stone which defies applied ornament, rely for their effect on their simple but massive proportions which lend monumentality even to such small buildings. The ‘Tomb of the Samanids’ retains this monumentality even though every surface but the dome is decorated. It is a triumph of balance. The key to this achievement is the use of baked brick. No earlier Iranian building exploits the decorative potential of the medium, though a Mesopotamian structure of the late 8th century displays sophisticated brick ornament: the palace of Ukhaidir.” R. Hillenbrand, *Islamic Architecture: Form, Function, and Meaning* (Edinburgh, 1994), 287-290.

\(^{165}\) SNH 131, *Karnameh*, 428.
tomb chamber, they were, in turn, placed diagonally facing southwest – the direction of Mecca from Iran. Penton and others were satisfied believing that Arthur too “would have been pleased” with the “happy coincidence” that both Mecca and the Khaju bridge were in the same direction for it would prevent many later discords: “When Westerners later criticized the kibla orientation, I simply responded that AUP was facing Khaju Bridge,” adding, “When some Persians complained that the grave was crooked, and the monument needed to be squared at an angle to the grave and was unsatisfactory, I would only respond that the grave was oriented on the kibla [sic.].”

The specificities of the grave went far beyond mere orientation; they were in keeping with political allegiances and power politics.

Out of three possible inscriptions of two verses from Persian poetry – the words “Witness and Affirmation” and an expression by Spinoza – during the construction, Sadiq had insisted that “people would not understand the meaning of these inscriptions.” Instead, he had purposed that Arthur’s own letter to Mohammad Reza Shah be inlaid in a gold plate and fixed inside the tomb chamber. Arthur had, naturally, agreed. “Following completion of the tomb,” Sadiq later wrote, “I translated Professor Pope’s letter of October 6, 1965 into Persian and asked the revered contemporary poet, Professor Jalal al-Din Homa’iy, to put it into verse.” In the hands of Irfan Panahy, the verses were transformed into calligraphic Persian inscriptions, adorning the two inner domes in white and blue tiles (Fig. 7.15). Their English translation read:

You who pass before my tomb, look deeply at my state; Although my tongue is silent, the secret of my heart should be clear; It is me, an image made from art, I am lost in love for these who are sad; It was my desire in this world to conclude my life in Iran; I searched for a tomb in Iran so that my friends would know the way; Whoever is wise in this world shall find a crown in this pure tomb; I put the body in the tomb so that my ashes would unite with the pure dust; In Iran, I chose Isfahan, a world which is half the world; In this tomb I placed my head a treasure of knowledge and art; I set my tent on the banks of the Zayandeh-Rud so my soul may become lively from the singing river; This is a national monument by edict of the Shah, a magnificent tomb; I am peaceful in this place from which I look proudly at the sky; For those of the past it is a monument I greet to people of the future; in 1350 we praised the past with a description of this state.

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170 Gluck, Surveyors, 4.
171 “This eulogy is by the noble scholar, Jalal al-Din Homa’iy, written in the month of Ordibehesht, in A.H. 1350 [C. E. 1971]. Calligraphy of Irfan Panahy. Translated by Renee Bernhard.” For the Persian original, see Gluck, Surveyors, 4-5.
This inscription was an amplified echo of Arthur’s desire to become a physical part of the Iranian landscape after his death, a fragment of Iran’s architectural heritage that he helped create. Along with historic figures like Ferdawsi, Hafez, and Sa’di, the American scholar and art dealer was naturalized into the Iranian land as part of its eternal artistic patrimony. However, the message of the inscriptions include the second corpse that would be buried there. For someone who had complained about others’ use of the “I,” in the dedication, there were “far too many ‘I’s’.”

As for the letter proper, both the English and Persian metal reproductions, along with the scholar’s signature, were fixed to the main interior wall of the burial chamber, on its narrow northern façade (Fig. 7.16). While a result of a simplistic process of reproduction, the letter’s subtle meaning went much farther in that it made the link between the man in the tomb and the man on the throne visibly and perpetually explicit. This was, of course, highly symbolic for not only the letter-turned-into-the-wall’s-writing verbalized to the uninformed passerby the bond between the two men but also spoke plenty about the monarch’s flair for ‘culture.’ As for the exact reproduction of Arthur’s signature, it authenticated the entire endeavor, the very existence of the monument in that style and on that spot (Fig. 7.17). The signature, ‘exactly’ as is, does not only invoke Arthur-the-man as singular and present but also incarnates eternality. Through the signature, the signer is always present.

By definition, a written signature implies the actual or empirical nonpresence of the signer. But, it will be said, it also marks and retains his having-been present in a past now, which will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in general, in the transcendental form of nowness (maintenance). This general maintenance is somehow inscribed, stapled to present punctuality, always evident and always singular, in the form of the signature. This is the enigmatic originality of every paraph. For the attachment to the source to occur, the absolute singularity of an event of the signature and of a form of the signature must be retained: the pure reproducibility of a pure event.

On June 1, 1971, the SNH’s reported in the 1349-Annual Report, “the structural work on Professor Pope’s Aramgah was completed; the preparation for the tile and the gravestone is in

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173 “The Homa iya poem as well as the text of the original English letter are inscribed in faience and affixed to the wall of the mausoleum.” Gluck, Surveyors, 4.
174 J. Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago, 1982), 328. Derrida further notes: “All writing, therefore, in order to be what it is, must be able to function in the radical absence of every empirically determined addressee in general. And this absence is not a continuous modification of presence; it is a break in presence, ‘death,’ or the possibility of the ‘death’ of the addressee, inscribed in the structure of the mark.” 315-316.
progress.” The work was completed in 1972. Like most of the SNH’s undertaking, the landmark was a result of royal patronage, this one far more explicitly than previous monuments erected by the Society. More than four times the original 30,000 tomans, it had cost the SNH 140,000 tomans, equivalent to $20,000. While a billboard designated the site as “Professor Pope’s Park,” the monument proper was never officially ‘named’ aside from the standard ‘Professor Pope’s tomb’ or ‘Professor Pope’s aramgah’ but as the SNH’s history would force itself on names and labels, people began to joke and call it “Popeiyeh” as in Hafeziyeh, Naderiyeh, Sa’diyeh, or Ferdawsiyeh (Fig. 7.18). In 1981, Frye wrote that the ordinary people of Isfahan mockingly claimed that “Shiraz had its Sa’adiyya (Sa’adi’s place) and its Hafiziyya (Hafez’s place), and now Isfahan had a Popiyya.” This was the first and the easiest subversion of the social meaning of the landmark by the Iranians on the street, waiting for its usurpation after the revolution. In the same vein, another ordinary Iranian wrote on Arthur’s unfinished grave, “Rise, oh scholar, who sleepeth here; this is no place to repose but a park of fun, leave this place.”

Architecturally, however, the Popeiyeh was an example of good monument both in terms of conception of design ideas, execution of structure, and attention to details. It remains, I believe, the best architectural work constructed by the SNH. Moreover, while the infant bureaucracy under Reza Shah had been unable to properly construct Ferdawsiyeh in 1934, the bureaucratic machine that erected Popeiyeh half a century later was highly effective and efficient. The former needed four decades to make a simple structure stand up; the latter managed to do it in less than three years. It was evident that the SNH, under the direct control of the Cultural Ministry, had fully grown into a well-organized, well-equipped, and well-trained unit, an integral fragment of a modern and centralized state. In sharp contrast to the early 1930s, in the 1970s orders were given and conveyed swiftly and things were carried out without delays and disruptions. Nor did the SNH have difficulties with techniques and technology, incompetent architects and incapable contractors. The construction of the Popeiyeh was, so to speak, a piece of cake. Iran had been modernized, at least on the material level and for those who were sufficiently privileged. Popeiyeh, furthermore, offered the SNH a semblance of continuity and

176 SNH 131, Karmameh, 428.
tradition. A man who had “opened Persian eyes to Persian Art,” who had from the very beginning been advocate, if not devotee, of Iran’s ‘historic heritage’ was now becoming, through architecture, an item on the inventory of that so-called heritage. The SNH was not only celebrating its own history, but was also fabricating its institutional historiography.

Ackerman’s funeral in Shiraz on January 25, 1977 was “very quiet and small.”179 As her old disciple Abd al-Hosayn Hamzavi put it, her death “marks the end of an era in Persian Art.”180 It was particularly true because it was the voice of a marginal subject about another kind of marginality within the larger context of cultural modernism in Iran. Similarly, when Ackerman died, the New York Times wrote an article devoted to her passing, titled “Phyllis Pope Dies at 83, an Expert on Asian Art.”181 The article referred to her as ‘Mrs. Pope.’ A friend later wrote: “Alas, poor Phyllis, called ‘Pope’ and ‘Mrs.’ at the very end, when she wasn’t around to read the proofs or fire off a letter to the editor.”182 Today, a solid attestation to these fluid voices, Ackerman’s tombstone, an exact duplicate of Arthur’s 160 by 50 centimeter gravestone, reads, “Dr. Phyllis Ackerman, Professor Pope’s wife and collaborator who died in Shiraz in 1977 A.D.” (Fig. 7.19).183 The double-domed mausoleum, furthermore, represents Ackerman’s presence only in an ‘architectural echo’ – in its formal duplication of the “second” dome; still only legible by the holistic composition of “Pope’s resting-place.” Ackerman joined, Sadiq wrote, “Professor Pope under the mausoleum’s second dome.”184 Similarly, this exclusivist masculine discourse is also revealed by the Karnameh’s description of events and use of terminology. Ackerman referred to as “his wife (hamsar-ash)” is only eclipsed by the passing allusions to the fact that she too would be buried there: “North of the aramgah another grave for Professor Pope’s wife was constructed.”185 Subsequently, most of the Karnameh’s energy goes into reconstructing

178 Letter from Frye to Stead.
179 Memo by Jay Gluck; in Gluck, Surveyors, 570. “Ackerman will be buried beside her husband in a National Monument tomb in Isfahan. The double-domed building is set in the middle of a student park called Professor Pope Park. No foreigners in the cultural field have been so honored in all of Asia as have Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Upham Pope.” H. Ferretti, “Phyllis Ackerman Dies in Iran at 84,” Mainichi Daily News (February 1, 1977), in Gluck, Surveyors, 572.
180 Memo by Jay Gluck; in Gluck, Surveyors, 570.
181 The New York Times (February, 1 1977), page unknown.
182 Gluck, Surveyors, 572.
184 Gluck, Surveyors, 4.
185 SNH 131, Karnameh, 430; also, see 421-430.
Arthur’s achievements, Arthur’s letter, and Arthur’s aramgah. Ackerman’s presence is raveled in a conspicuous denial of a holistic presence, in a traced absence both in the mausoleum and in its historiography; she exists only as a mere supplement of “Professor Pope.” In Derridian terminology, Ackerman is present as a parasite.

Ackerman’s forced marginality reinforces the marginal historiography of her contribution to the larger project of “Persian Art.” Nor did posthumous attempts to praise the historians situate Ackerman on an equal footing with her husband. The voluminous Surveyors of Persian Art published in 1996, while an important contribution to the study of Iranian art history remains methodologically problematic in that it mimics the original SoPA both in style and tactics.¹⁸⁶ Whereas Arthur is often characterized as “a community man, a true citizen” – one with lofty aims like turning “his beloved San Francisco” into a new “Pericleian Athens” – Ackerman comes across as a “sorority girl, campus beauty.”¹⁸⁷ It comes as of little surprise when the editors of the Surveyors add at the bottom of their introduction to the biographic documents,

The reader will no doubt observe that this volume contains far less material on Phyllis Ackerman than it does on Arthur Upham Pope. Unfortunately, Dr. Ackerman’s diaries, journals, and files, which would have been a prime source of information regarding her life and work, are in storage in Iran and, therefore, were not accessible to us.¹⁸⁸

This did not mean that Ackerman did not ‘speak’ – far from it if we consider the SoPA. The fact that she did not insist on either a mausoleum or a biography only goes to show that she ‘spoke’ in deference: the archival material that the biographers could have relied on were those produced privately by Ackerman – diaries, journals, and personal files. While these documents stayed in Shiraz, exactly where she had left them, Arthur’s legacy was already long placed in public institutions such as libraries, museums, and archival collections; often, ironically by Ackerman herself. “The spaces of femininity are those from which femininity is lived as a positionality in discourse and social practice.”¹⁸⁹ The exclusivity of the public and private domains configured the very meaning of masculine authority and feminine non-authority within its mythic boundaries. Therefore, “[w]e are here defining a mental map rather than a description of actual

¹⁸⁷ Gluck, Surveyors, xv.
¹⁸⁸ Gluck, Surveyors, 37.
¹⁸⁹ Pollock, Vision and Difference, 66.
social space.” Ackerman had a voice, but it has to be located somewhere other than in (or as) monuments (Fig. 7.20).

Ultimately, the kind of feminism promoted under the Pahlavis had little to do with a set of practices and laws that would ameliorate women’s rights or would provide women with wider range of professional opportunities and personal choices. Similarly, the kind of artistic production that was sponsored and valorized as ‘culture’ by the dynasty had little to do with genuine expressions of and concern for social and existential predicaments. Pahlavi Feminism and Culture were both contingent fragments of Iran’s institution of monarchy and its image-making engines. In fact, feminism, just like progress, was itself a cultural construct, a representation of sameness that solely contributed to the equally constructed image of the royal household as progressive and modern. The gulf between feminism and cultural production that would make things better and their sophisticated manifest-art were simply too wide. This is significant for the consuming presence of such representations that only referred back to themselves, that had meaning only in terms of mere (re)presentations, I argue, constitutes the experience of modernity in Iran. The social tension generated by this gulf is modernity itself. In that sense, both Ackerman and Farah Diba embodied this tension: they personified Iran’s modernity.

While neither could or would overturn the hidden male agenda conditioning the SNH, the WOI, or, in fact, the entire monarchy as practiced by Mohammad Reza Shah, they did manage to challenge, to resist, and at some point, to change elements in/of it. Even Arthur had changed at the end (Fig. 7.21). “When the ‘hegemonic discourse’ repositions itself so that it can ‘occupy the position of the other it too becomes subject to a major transformation to its own decolonization.” In a posthumously published article in the *Acta Iranica*, he had stated, “the ideal historian…needs more knowledge and more skills than one person can hope for.” He had instead proposed a “sympathetic and informed cooperation among the associated disciplines, a sense of fraternal dedication, mutual advantage and mutual responsibility.” “Coordinated effort” while making “rigorous ethical and psychological demands…offers promising result.” More critically, Arthur had doubted the very process that is invested in writing history, “History…what can it hope to achieve, and how?” Perhaps more surprisingly for an Orientalist who had spent his

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190 Pollock, *Vision and Difference*, 68.
life validating a staunchly linear history, he had asked, “What does history aim at?” or “Are there many kinds of history?” Arthur first rejects both “naïve realism” and “elementary empiricism” as methods of writhing history on the basis that “the contribution of the observer to the observed can never be wholly eliminated.” Pope, “Art as an Essential,” 154. He goes on, “The seductive fallacy that any idea or fact will somehow constitute a solid brick in the ultimate edifice of knowledge is philosophically illiterate, and the cause of much wasted effort. We must ask continuously what we mean by knowledge, what kind of knowledge do we want? What is the relation of description to interpretation? What shall we say to the historian of art who boasts that his work is happily free from value judgment…”

Quoting from Tales of the Genji by Lady Murasaki, he had concluded, “history books show us only a corner of life.” Pope, “Art as an Essential,” 153-162.

3 Quoting from Tales of the Genji by Lady Murasaki, he had concluded, “history books show us only a corner of life.”

In the sociopolitical and cultural context of 1970s Iran, Ackerman’s pronunciation of artistic judgments and Farah Diba’s interventions in political resolve, both from a position of authority, uncannily delineated the gendered politics of those same structures. They introduced flexible identities and subjective interpretation to the construct of modernity, monopolized by the implied masculine voice and gaze. More importantly perhaps, their activities subverted the Western modernist project of cultural exclusion. Their very presence in the cultural and political milieu of Iran – themselves inherently linked to each other through such “modern-but-modest” women – disturbed this imagery of inclusion/exclusion. They were the few who could and did force the female gaze on the coercive artistic and political mainstreams. On the one hand, Ackerman, posthumously called “the gracious old matriarch of Persian studies,” brought much-needed doubt to over-authoritative assertions, staunch declarations, and uncritical theories about “3000 years of continuous…architectural tradition.” She was the one who offered a reading of artifacts within their cultural and historical context to replace a judgment of art objects in the socio-cultural vacuum of the museum. On the other hand, Farah Diba offered a more liberal practice of monarchy – not only as an ancient tradition and a traditional institution, but above all as a modern practice. She resisted certain ways of running and controlling the country, which although was not revolutionary, was certainly exasperating. Her determination on architectural preservation that was inclusive of all histories and styles, made her a constructive modernist in contrast to the early debating modernists who favored elimination of all trace of certain histories.

“A little then to develop feminist analyses of the founding moments of modernity and

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193 Pope, “Art as an Essential,” 154. He goes on, “The seductive fallacy that any idea or fact will somehow constitute a solid brick in the ultimate edifice of knowledge is philosophically illiterate, and the cause of much wasted effort. We must ask continuously what we mean by knowledge, what kind of knowledge do we want? What is the relation of description to interpretation? What shall we say to the historian of art who boasts that his work is happily free from value judgment…”
194 Pope, “Art as an Essential,” 153-162.
modernism, to discern its sexualized structures, to discover past resistances and differences, to examine how women producers developed alternative models for negotiating modernity and the spaces of femininity. What modernist art history celebrates is a selective tradition, which normalizes as the only modernism, a particular and gendered set of practices. Any attempt to deal with the cultural historiography of 20th-century Iran that is made by women necessitates a deconstruction of the modernist myth. We are not only dealing with the inherently exclusivist agenda of modernity, but also a modernity that is being construed in the imperialist domain. The Western colonial project was the creation and articulation of cultural difference. In Iran’s case of the 1970s, we are dealing with women’s production of alternative models of modernity, of difference.

In closing, as proposed in the prologue and throughout this dissertation: it would be a mistake to think that the role of Iran’s cultural heritage was just about a series of public modern monuments, well-choreographed museums, accurate indexes of historical landmarks, or elaborate art exhibitions and congresses; or to think that it was about icons and symbols that were effectively manipulated into legitimatising Reza Shah’s political regime and Mohammad Reza Shah’s royal household. As we have seen, modern Iran’s relationship to its cultural heritage was Iran’s modern raison d’être. “The conservation of monuments [in Iran] is not just a duty on a national level,” affirmed the shah’s minister of culture and art, Mehrdad Pahlbod, “since these artistic productions have to be considered, truthfully, as part of humanity’s cultural patrimony.” In a similar breath, Mohammad Reza Shah reasserted in the SoPA, “Persia has always looked to the ideal of beauty and found therein not only the redeeming answer to brutality, chaos and frustration but also a consolation, delight and revelation. Persia has always believed [that] beauty is as real and important as the world of fact and circumstance, and

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196 Pollock, *Vision and Difference*, 89-90. “[C]onsidering not only the spaces represented, or the spaces of the representation, but the social spaces from which the representation is made and its reciprocal positionalities. The producer is herself shaped within a spatially orchestrated social structure which is lived at both psychic and social levels. The space of the look at the point of production will to some extent determine the viewing position of the spectator at the point of consumption. This point of view is neither abstract nor exclusively personal, but ideologically and historically constructed. It is the art historian’s job to re-create it – since it cannot ensure its recognition outside its historical moment… The spaces of femininity are those from which femininity is lived as a positionality in discourse and social practice. They are the product of a lived sense of social locatedness, mobility and visibility, in the social relations of seeing bad being seen.” Pollock, *Vision and Difference*, 66.

197 See, for example, the arguments made in F. Cooper and L. Stoler, eds., *Tension of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997); and E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993).

achievement in art is proof of status and quality.” Nor were projects and projections of a bright future to be found outside the construct of art: “We would,” he wrote, “certainly like suggestions from the past as to what the future is to be like...” The discourse on “Persian Art and Architecture,” on “Iran’s Cultural Heritage” not only shaped its political and economic potentials and expectations in Pahlavi Iran, but also more importantly, it came to define, frame, and articulate Iran’s modern history, culture, progress, and civilization. It served the nation as a mirror to its most authentic and epic identity; it provided the nation a historical path of progress and a bright vision of its tomorrow.

Moments before September 8, 1978, when the monarch’s soldiers opened fire on his people of the public space, Cultural Heritage had cultivated a sophisticated sense of Good Taste – or so it seemed. For when they did, they instigated the end of taste itself.

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200 Pope, “Art as an Essential,” 159.
Figure 7.1 General view of the mausoleum of Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Upham Pope, Isfahan, 1972. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure 7.2 Art Historian Phyllis Ackerman
Source: Gluck, Surveyors, 59.

Figure 7.3 Queen Farah and Ackerman meet prior to the first Arts Festival, Shiraz, August 1967. Source: Gluck, Surveyor, 481.
Figure 7.4 “Farahzad” city, an utopian projection of future cities in Iran.

Figure 7.5 Narenjestan Qajar palace and site of the Asia Institute after 1966, Shiraz.
Figure 7.6 Elevation drawing of Ackerman-Pope’s mausoleum by Mohsen Forughí, c. 1966.
Source: Gluck, Surveyor, 3.

Figure 7.7 Pope, at the center, with Mohsen Forughí standing on his left, gloves in hand, probably Shiraz or Isfahan, c. 1928.
Source: S. H. Nyman in Gluck, Surveyor, 267
Figure 7.8 The SNH’s Board of Trustees; Mohsen Forughi is seen on the farthest left, probably Tehran, c. 1970. Sources: Sadiq. Memoirs, 4: 206.

Figure 7.9 The National Bank of Iran (bank-e melli-e Iran) headquarters on the opposite side of Tehran’s main bazaar, 1945-c.1950. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2001.
Figure 7.10 The mausoleum of Isma’il the Samanid built by Samanid Prince Nasr in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, approximately dated between 914 and 943 AD. Source: Talinn Grigor, 1997.

Figure 7.11 Due south view of Ackerman-Pope’s mausoleum, Isfahan, 1972. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.
Figure 7.12 *Mashrabiay*-like blind arch and brick detailing of Ackerman-Pope’s mausoleum by Ostand Hosayn Ma’arefi, Isfahan, 1972. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.


Figure 7.18 Rexford Stead standing next to the plaque erected by the municipality of Isfahan indicating “Professor Pope’s Park,” Isfahan, 1969. Source: Gluck, Surveyors, 563.

Figure 7.19 Ackerman’s gravestone. Source: T. Grigor, 2000.

Figure 7.20 The New York Congress, April 24, 1960; Ackerman is standing at the center with the long dress; on her left stands Isa Sadiq. Source: Sadiq, Memoirs, 3: 351.

Figure 7.21 Pope at Narenjestan, c. 1966. Source: Pope, Introduction to Architecture, cover-page.
EPILOGUE: THE MONUMENT

“I go to Hafeziyeh because he was not a mollah, he was an Iranian. You see, the discourse of goodness is blind to religion.”

Pegah
Iran, 2003

The Iranian Revolution, which began in the early 1978 and ended on April 1 of the following year, is, surely, one of the most fascinating, complex, and controversial events in the 20th century. I have no intention to act as its historian here. Nor is my aim to analyze, review, or elucidate its occurrences. Acting as the end of this narrative, the epilogue is an impressionistic documentary, which positions me amid its tales. It neither pretends to be archival or scholarly; nor does it hide the fact that it is based on the amalgam of my gallivants in the streets of Iran, my chats with ordinary Iranians who were willing to talk, and my reflections in Ferdawsiyeh, Hafeziyeh, Naderiyeh, and Popeiyeh, as well as in the mausoleums of Ibn Sina and Omar Khayyam. It is, ultimately, about perceptions and opinions, rumors and ruminations.

However, what this epilogue tries to do is to bring to the fore the feelings and sentiments, anger and passions of those who engaged these monuments during and after the revolution. It examines the changing meanings of these landmarks over that same period; of how they were perceived as public signs that glorified an unwanted monarch, only later to become sites of resistance to an equally unwanted theocratic orthodoxy. While at the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter IRI) they were neglected and subdued, after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989 they were officially embraced as signifiers of cultural heritage, national history,

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and above all, a lucrative means to boost the tourist industry. This shift was in part due to ordinary Iranians who had chosen these places for their daily or weekly outings in lieu of the nearest mosque. Only after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, therefore, have these landmarks become what they were originally intended to be: secular and national pilgrimage sites. They remain public transcripts upon which power and resistance are inscribed, triggered, and re-navigated. These monuments tell the story not only of architecture as revolution, but also about architecture in evolution – architecture as a sociopolitical text open to endless reinterpretations.

- Architecture in (r)Evolution

“In the mid-1970s the shah’s regime seemed as durable as the massive dams he built and proudly named after his relatives.” However, when on June 29, 1978 Farah Shahbanu decreed the allocation of “2,150 million rials” for “Southern Tehran,” it was already too late. The Iranian Revolution had begun. A week later, she made another attempt to demonstrate the monarchy’s commitment to both Islam and Iran by first making a “pilgrimage to Imam Reza Shrine” and then inaugurating the fourth festival of Tus, where, for a last time, “efforts were made to revive the Persian language, Iranian nationalism, and...forgotten traditions...” The royal house, it seems, was turning to both Imam Reza and Ferdawsi via their resting-places to legitimize its existence for these had been pivotal sites around which so much of Pahlavi history had revolved. However, as argued in chapter 3, the question of national origins was mistakenly, and perhaps inadvertently, once more put at Cyrus’ tomb in Pasargadae through Ferdawsiyeh. The (re)presentation of an harmonious marriage between the Shi’a shrine and the poet’s mausoleum in Tus, as signifiers of Iranian identity, was belated.

The popular revolts in the streets took a life of their own by 1978. When on August 19, Abadan’s Cinema Rex was set on fire by three men linked with “the anti-Shah clerical leaders,”
official newspapers announced that 377 civilians had “carbonized.” Since 1904, the ulama had linked cinemas “directly with the onset of corruption, licentiousness, prostitution, moral cowardice and cultural dependence.” In response, Mohammad Reza Shah decreed the resignation of Prime Minister Amuzegar’s government and ordered the closing down of all gambling houses, casinos, and movie theaters. It was not only emblematic but also chronic: while under Reza Shah, cinemas and their style had stood for modernity, during his son’s reign, each time in trouble, he had shut them down to reestablish his devotion to Islam and “unadulterated traditions.” Through Cinema Rex, the revolting masses (or their adversaries) were, therefore, using the building as a weapon to resist and incriminate the authorities (or their adversaries). The blazing and vandalizing of 180 movie houses by the end of the revolution, extended to other institutions perceived as “nests” of “Westoxication.” In late October 1978, for instance, Zandjan’s art museum was set on fire. By that November, the shahbanu made another highly symbolic pilgrimage, this time to the historic centers of Shi’ism, Najaf and Karbala in modern-day Iraq, as had done Reza Shah in 1924 to gain ulama and popular support for his rise to power. The fact that the queen was again conspicuously veiled was not lost on the official reportage. As demonstrations intensified, “rumors circulated of the imminent declaration of a regency under the management of the Empress.” Some liberal royalists continued to believe that she could save the monarchy. However, by then, no amount of urban planning or cultural engineering could prevent the toppling of the Pahlavi state. Any subsequent attempt to stop a revolution through architecture, or any other means for that matter, would end in failure. Farah

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6 Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 179.
7 When the government cabinet changed, Popeïyeh’s architect Mohsen Forughi became the minister of culture and art, replacing the long held post of Mehrdad Pahlbod, the shah’s brother-in-law; see “Demission du cabinet Amouzegar,” Le Journal de Téhéran 12.894 (August 27, 1978): 1.
8 “By the time the Islamic government was established less than a year later the Rex theater event, up to 180 cinemas nationwide (32 in Tehran alone) had been burnt, demolished, or shut down, leaving only a total of 256 cinemas extant.” Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 182-183.
10 BBC SWB ME/5973/A/6, November 20, 1978. Also see “Shahbanu’s visit to Iraq,” INA, November 18, 1978; quoted in Ansari, Iran since 1921, 208.
11 Ansari, Iran since 1921, 209.
Shahbanu left Iran on January 1, 1979. Not only had the people chosen revolution over architecture; they had also co-opted architecture in their revolution (Figs. E.1).

The military operations of the Mojahedin guerilla fighters, which had begun as early as August 1971 and which intended to sabotage the “2500-year celebrations of the Persian Empire,” were most effective when they managed to dynamite the mausoleum of Reza Shah in 1978 (see Fig. 3.36). This was one of the first and most visual revolutionary acts of violence incarnated in architecture. In a similar vein, in August 1980, the radical clerics revealed their attitude toward the Iranian feminist movement by vandalizing the tomb of the leading Iranian feminist, Sediqeh Dowlatabadi. “The event was a symbolic show of revenge and hatred for the best known feminist leader, and the feminist cause, in Iran.” Throughout 1978, popular anger manifested itself by attacks on public monuments of the shahs, as well as monarchical emblems and pictures (Figs. E.2). A number of ministries and banks, movie theaters and liquor stores, and Western embassies were attractive targets for the masses as well. In rare cases, museums were attacked, for instance,

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12 Other women were not so lucky. For instance, Doctor Farokhru Parsai, the education minister who had warned the royal court that “number of art festivals overlap with the month of Moharam” and that “religious considerations have to be taken into account,” became the only female Pahlavi official to be executed by the revolutionaries. Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 33, Document 45, page 1; Memo from Education Minister Parsai, Shahrivar 6, 1351/August 28, 1972, Tehran.


14 Mojahedins were freedom fighters with strong conviction and motivation for Islamic ideologies. “Their first operations were designed to disrupt the extravagant celebration of the 2500-year anniversary of the monarchy. After bombing the Tehran electrical works and trying to hijack an Iran Air plane, nine Mojahedin were arrested. Despite these, in the next four years they carried out a succession of violent attacks. This included the bombings of Reza Shah’s mausoleum.” Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 491. Although Reza Shah’s corpse was rescued, the structure was destroyed. That which remained of the mausoleum well into the 1980s was the empty lot of the resting-place and the processional avenue leading to the non-existing monument. However, this very road leading to Qom and connecting to the ex-tomb is still called the Aramgah Boulevard. Although there is no trace of the building, the name persists under the IRI, which has done a good job of changing names of and associations with the Pahlavi regime. The road is called Aramgah Boulevard perhaps because by now not many remember whose *aramgah* it actually refers to. On the Mojahedin, see E. Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven, 1989).

rumors spread that a few had entered the Golestan Palace Museum and stolen Nader Shah’s sword. During the first weeks of the upheaval, there were also rumors that bulldozers were at the gates of Persepolis.

In an effort to eradicate all representation of the monarch systematically, Ayatollah Khomeini, who among a long list of accusations had blamed the shah for “using cultural imperialism to undermine Islam and Iran,” appointed one of his militant supporters, Hojjat al-Islam Khalkhali, to the post of a revolutionary judge. Known to the outside world as the “Hanging Ayatollah” or the “Blood Judge,” locals, as Mr. B. who had actively participated in the uprising recalls, began to “call him Ayatollah khar-e-khalli (empty donkey) or khal-khalli (dot-dot).” Mr. B. vividly remembers seeing him on television with a pickaxe in hand tearing down statues and monuments. Others recall that Ferdawsiyeh in Tus, Hafeziyeh and Sa‘diyeh in Shiraz as well as Naderiyeh in Mashhad had been on Khalkhali’s list of “un-Islamic” symbols. “A mob led by local mollahs,” Dr. N., who lived in Shiraz at the time, told me, “gathered in Hafeziyeh to destroy the edifice, forcing the first post-revolutionary governor of Shiraz to telegraph” the interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan in Tehran. Bazargan, who had been appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini to the post on February 5, 1979 and who was still on relatively good terms with the Leader of the Revolution, had in vain brought the issue to his attention. “In desperation,” Dr. N. maintained, “Bazargan managed to save Hafez’s tomb through his personal contacts with the moderate clerics of the south.” Eight months later, when Bazargan resigned in

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16 Ayatollah Khomeini’s another architectural related accusations was “creating huge shantytowns and neglecting low-income housing.” Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 30.

17 My conversation with “B” took place sometime in 2001, somewhere in the United States. His identity will have to remain abbreviated. Unlike Mussolini who also was photographed with a pickaxe in hand, however, Khalkhali never went ahead and began to build things. Or almost. Iranian architect and Dean of Tehran University’s School of Architecture, Rostom Voskanian recounts, “in place of Reza Shah’s tomb...a new project was intended. Four of us, professors [of Tehran University] went to Ray to see the [new] site and proposal. As we were judging the project, someone came and said ‘Khalkhali is already building while you’re sitting here talking.’ The mollah responsible [for the project] was stunned. We ran and saw that Khalkhali was, in fact, putting up public toilets” where the shah’s tomb had originally been. People also remember him for destroying lives. “He used to catch people,” B said, “and execute them on the spot based on the logic that if they were innocent, then they would immediately go to heaven, therefore I was doing them a favor; alternatively, if they were guilty, then they were paying their dues. What logic!” Historians concur with rumors and memories: “Khomeini also created a traveling tribunal for...Khalkhali, who was known as the ‘Hanging Ayatollah.’” E. Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran* (Berkeley, 1999), 125; and “...the Revolutionary Court under its self proclaimed leader, Sadiq Khalkhali....” Sh. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran* (Albany, 1980), 174. The Western media began to call him the “Blood Judge.” For his activities during the revolution, see his own rather boasting biography, Haj Shaykh Sadeq Khalkhali, *Khaterat-e Ayatollah Khalkhali* (Tehran, 1379/2000), 219-257.

18 I spoke to “Dr. H.” sometime in 2002, somewhere in Europe. His identity and the specificities of our meeting, unfortunately, have to remain ambiguous.
protest against the murders carried out by Khomeini’s special armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, he had not managed to prevent hundreds of executions. Similarly, the doorman at Sa’diyeh had told a then Ph.D. student from Michigan University, “a mob entered the courtyard to destroy Sa’di’s tomb.” Without much elaboration, he had told him, “They were convinced not to go ahead.” The attack on Naderiyeh was mostly due to the figural representation of the Afshar king as per Houshang Seyhoun’s design (see Figs. 5.4). Here, the “zealots,” as in the case of certain Safavid palaces in Isfahan, had tried to remove or erase the “faces” or the eyes off paintings and statues, which were considered by the mob as “un-Islamic.” The architect of the monument, however, insisted that Naderiyeh went unharmed not only because “the majority...have respect” for Nader Shah, but also because he had renovated Mashhad’s Imam Reza Shrine. “In their [clerics’] opinion,” the architect insisted, “this has an inherent value” and had contributed to the monument’s survival. Alternatively, the success of the “soldiers” in protecting Nader’s statue was much more due to the elevated position of the edifice, on top of the already large-scale mausoleum, as much as to their efforts to do so or Nader’s three-century-old renovation of a shrine.

Despite these ruminations and the international media’s depiction of events in a revolutionized Iran, however, the Iranian Revolution was a relatively non-violent collective experience, at least as much as a genuine revolution would allow. This was particularly true when it came to the treatment of Iran’s cultural heritage for the leaders of the movement, regardless of their political views, never advocated wholesale cultural destruction. “While there were undoubtedly members of the ulema who supported ‘Islamisation’ on a radical scale, enthusiastically if naively encouraging the destruction of all symbols of monarchy (including

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21 Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada. Tape 1, Side A; see Appendix 6.
22 “Statues of the Pahlavi Shahs were removed, street names changed and the tomb of Reza Shah razed to the ground, but other sites, because of their ‘cultural significance’, were retained and protected. [ft 92: Some notable sites which escaped serious damage were the tomb of Shah Ismail Safavi, the Shah who brought Shi’ism to Iran in the sixteenth century, and the tomb of Nadir Shah in Mashhad. In the latter case, the statue sat atop the tomb, and soldiers were able to prevent zealots from destroying it. Similarly, in some cases the state had to concede to social determination in the restoration of some pre-revolutionary names, e.g. Kermanshah Province.] Certainly extensive damage was done to some key sites, especially in Isfahan, [footnote 93: Zealots in some cases sought to remove the ‘faces’ from some paintings in key palaces.] but this was a consequence of the failure of central government, not an aspect of policy.” Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 223.
archaeological sites) and the wholesale adoption of Arabic, this was not reflected among the leaders of the Revolution.\(^{23}\) In the mind of the majority that had taken to the streets, there was a marked distinction between what was understood as Iran’s cultural and national heritage on the one hand, and the icons and symbols of the Pahlavi monarchy on the other. While the latter were rejected and disfigured, at times violently, the former was left relatively intact; “...there is no tangible evidence that any museums or archeological or historical sites were vandalized.”\(^{24}\) While in his early publication, *Revealing of the Secrets*, Ayatollah Khomeini “called for cancellation of legislation passed between 1925-1941 because it had violated the will of God…” which would have included the 1927 Archeological Treaty, during the revolution, he “forbade any destruction to cultural sites including Persepolis and, despite the protestation of his critics, held an altogether ambivalent attitude towards Iranian nationalism…”\(^{25}\) The rumors of bulldozers at Persepolis were never confirmed; after a radio-announcement Nader Shah’s sword was returned to the Golestan Museum; and the “mobs” gathered to demolish the tombs of Ferdawsi, Hafez, Sa’di, and Nader Shah were dissuaded to proceed with their plans.\(^{26}\) Nor did I come across any substantial evidence, that is, aside from rumors and recollections, that there were such “vandalistic mobs.”\(^{27}\)

When in August 1979, the IRI established itself as the sole successor to the revolution by eliminating all political opposition, banning all leftist newspapers, and taking hold of all state institutions, Ayatollah Khomeini “launched the Cultural Revolution in order to Islamize the whole country.”\(^{28}\) From then until 1982, the government marginalized Iran’s pre-Islamic cultural production as both an ideological reaction to and a methodological imitation of the shah’s regime. The pre-Islamic history, along with the Pahlavi era, was portrayed as the “age of

\(^{23}\) Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 223. Mohammad Reza Shah’s fall was nothing like Saddam Hussein’s demise, which only goes to show that the SNH, unlike the Ba’th Party’s cultural organs, had indeed succeeded to acculturate the Iranian masses.

\(^{24}\) Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 223.

\(^{25}\) Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Iran*, 163; and Ansari, *Iran since 1921*, 223.

\(^{26}\) “A curator of the [Golestan] palace went immediately to the revolutionary officials and asked for their help. It was announced immediately on the radio that this should not have happened and these objects belong to [the] people, all the stolen objects were returned the next day. The rumors of an attempt to bulldoze Persepolis by a mob led by one of the early revolutionary figures in the first few weeks after the revolution was never officially confirmed and denied; however, the damage had been done.” K. Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 105 (2001): 51-76, 70.

\(^{27}\) For a history and historiography of “vandalism,” “vandals,” their motives, its reception, interpretations, and underpinning politics, see Gamboni, *Destruction of Art*, chapter 1.

\(^{28}\) www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah-khomeini/php; accessed March 1, 2004. Also, see Abdi, “Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran,” 70.
ignorance," "time of despotic kings," and "era of plunder." Both historical and modern monuments were (re)read as reminders of royal excess and class oppression. For instance, the 2500-year Celebration tents near the ruins of Persepolis, which had housed the international dignitaries and guest of the shah in October 1971, while thoroughly vandalized, were left on public display as evidence of royal gluttony. Under the Republic, they became artifacts of state propaganda; billboards affixed after 1980 read, "The deeds of those bygone have left you with an instruction." From the outset, the IRI under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, knew only too well how to manipulate the diverse range of cultural icons and symbols to appeal to the masses, from treatment of monuments to poster designs and street name-changes. One could argue that Iran’s 1979 Revolution was, in fact, a cultural revolution, not a political one, because the distribution of social power remained more or less unchanged -- a few men continued to rule the vast majority, which, in due course, began to contest the way that they were being governed. One scholar has noted, "...it may be ventured that if the [Pahlavi] regime had not gone beyond...the attempt to monopolize cultural symbols, the revolution may not have occurred."

29 See, for example, publications such as R. Kaykhosrovai, The Age of Ignorance: The Pillage of Iranian Cultural Heritage (Tehran, 1984). Alternatively, see the introductions to some of the Iran National Archives Organization publications: Ganjineh Asnad 21 and 22 (Spring and Summer 1996); Culture During Reza Shah, ed. M. Delfani (Tehran, 1997); Iran and German Experts Immigrants 1931-1940 (Tehran, 1995); Records on The Archeological Missions in Iran 1875-1966 (Tehran, 2001).

30 "Pre-Islamic monuments were recalled not as sources of national pride, but as symbols of monarchical tyranny imposed on the masses." Abdi, "Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran," 70.

31 Based on my observation in 2000. Alternatively, a different wording of the translation might be: "The work of those who have passed by leave you with an advice." Similarly, when the post-revolutionary Ettela’at published its oversize "28 thousand-day history of Iran and the world," Curzon’s photograph of Hafez’s tomb appeared next to other Qajar structures namely the Shams al-Emareh of Tehran and Sa’di’s old mausoleum (see Fig. 4.23). The caption read, “in the days when the Dowleh-s and the Saltaneh-s [the aristocrats of the Iranian society] did not feel either compassion (rahm) or generosity (mor’at) for the livings, who was going to augur (tofal zadan) and read from the Quran on the soul of Hafez?” Lamenting, the caption goes on, “Those dear to the heart of Khaju Shirazi are the thorns and dry leaves that grow widely around his tomb. These two men [in the photograph] will value the snapshot more than reading a fateh upon him. Here, behind these black railings, rests the great poet of all centuries.” Ettela’at at 28 hezar ruz-e tarikh-e Iran va jahan (Tehran, c. 1980) 75. Typifying the IRI’s subsequent (re)application of Iran’s modern history, the commentary forgoes any allusion to the Pahlavi effort at Hafeziyeh. As for pedagogy, Tehran University’s Department of Archeology was shut down as a “pseudo-science in service of the court to glorify despotism and justify royal oppression of the masses...” First unsuccessfully pressured under the History Department, it survived to only become active after 1990.

32 For details of the politics of posters and stamps during and after the Iranian Revolution, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chapters 3 and 4.

33 “The process of declassing the religious stratum led inexorably to attempts to appropriate the clergy’s last resource: the cultural symbols which in the past have been so vital in inculcating among Iranians a sense of self, an explanation of the cosmos and of social reality...it may be ventured that if the regime had not gone beyond this to the attempt to monopolize cultural symbols, the revolution may not have occurred.” Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, 183.
The official policy on culture, as well as other sociopolitical concerns, sharply changed once the IRI firmly established itself as the sole legitimate successor to the revolution. “After 1982, as Iran’s Thermidor began” Ayatollah Khomeini “emphasized the importance of government as well as law and order.” While until then he had mobilized the urban masses with his appeal to the poor, externalized in the destruction of the Pahlavi monarchy and its symbols, after 1982, “he toned down his language to institutionalize the revolution and build the Islamic Republic, which increasingly took the shape of a propertied middle-class republic.”

With the Ayatollah’s death on June 3, 1989, the Thermidor intensified in ideological overtone, bureaucratic mores, and its attitude towards cultural objects and built environment. After years of neglect, in January 1985, the government organized the sazman-e miras-e farhangi-e keshvar, or the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization (hereafter ICHO) (Fig. E.3). When, three years later, the Majlis rectified it, the major cultural institutions of the Pahlavi era went under its administrative control, including the SNH, which modified its name from anjoman-e asar-e melli to anjoman-e asar va mofakher-e eslami or the Society for Islamic Heritage and Thought. With increased centralization of state institutions, the responsibilities of the SNH in the upkeep and management of its monuments now fell under the direct control of the ICHO.

While it is unclear and perhaps unrecoverable how exactly the mausoleums erected by the SNH were treated during and after the revolution, it is easier to determine their fate between the beginning of the Thermidor and the present-day. Although the landmarks, along with their collections, facilities, and gardens, were neglected by the authorities of the new Republic, the structures themselves were not vandalized or disfigured. Nevertheless, I was unable to reconstruct, even inaccurately, whether, within these compounds, burial-chambers, and museums, people smashed the portraits of the monarch or just left them intact; whether specific individuals, such as curators and doormen, foreseeing the potential danger to such icons, erased

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34 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 133.
35 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 133.
36 They included the Archeological Museum, the Center for Archaeological Research, National Center for Protection of Iranian Antiquities, Center for Traditional Crafts, Center and Museum of Ethnography, Office for Historical Heritage, Office for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of the Provinces, Office of the Museums, Office of Palaces, Office of the Golestan Palace Endowments, and the SNH. “On 30 January 1985 the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization was formed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran... On 22 April 1988, the Majlis ratified the constitution of the ICHO. The ICHO, initially working under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and later under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, was entrusted with extensive responsibilities over recovery, protection, preservation, and introduction of architecture... In September
the shah’s inscription and dismantled his portraits before the arrival of the mob; whether all of
these royal symbols went unnoticed until the new order of law was established and then they
were adjusted to fit the new political ideology. In other words, it is difficult to say whether what
we see today in/on these monuments was done in accordance with a predefined and systematic
program of rewriting from above (i.e. the IRI) or was done in the zeal of the revolt as an act of
critique below (i.e. the people).

In either case, the result was intriguing, because that which remained reveals how
political power operated on the artifacts of the bygone regime, and how public art managed to
dictate political resistance when it was publicly accessible to the people. The fact that
Ferdawsiyeh, Hafeziyeh, and the rest of these monuments, were a priori placed in the public
domain to shape and control public taste, and the fact that because of their architectural qualities
and social meaning they were not removed, eventually rendered them sites of popular resistance
during the anti-Pahlavi revolution and subsequently to the anti-clerical rebellions. Only after
neglecting these monuments for a decade and after their use by the people to show public
discontent did the IRI realize the need to bring them in the fold of the mainstream iconographical
and ideological discourse. What we (do not) see today on, in, and off these monuments, once
erected by the SNH, is quite telling, for the various attempts to erase royal signs have left their
distinct marks.

As the centerpiece of Pahlavi national pride, some insisted that the Ferdawsiyeh would
have been either blown up or smashed into pieces if it were not for its remote location in Tus.
The discernible icon of the Zoroastrian God, Ahura Mazda, on its façade would have been reason
enough for it symbolized the pre-Islamic history of Iran, favored by the Pahlavis over Iran’s
Islamic past as its authentic national identity (see Figs. 3.23-3.24). According to others, there
were pale attempts to deface the content and writings of the display-cases depicting stories from
the Shahnameh because they explicitly glorified Iran’s tradition of monarchy. The veracity of
these early occurrences is unclear however. Subsequently, the structure went through several
minor, but significant, architectural rectifications by the IRI. The main façade inscription
carrying the praise of Reza Shah as quoted in chapter 3, was carved out and (re)inscribed with
identical letters, changing the entire thrust of its meaning. “Since the sincere willingness of His

1996, the ICHO was transformed into a research institute.” One of its branches consisted of “Center for Architecture
and Cultural-Historical Monuments…” Abdi, “Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran,” 71
Majesty, the Great King of kings, Reza Shah Pahlavi, so that his reign be long, has always been for the glory of the name of Iran and Iranians” mutated into “If the willingness of culture and arts, have always been…” The awkward and elongated empty spaces between letters divulge the visually aggressive intervention of a politically charged script (Fig. E.4). Through a similar technique, the main dedication board, fixed inside the burial-chamber, was clumsily modified, reworded, and partially removed. While I could not find a depiction of the 1934- or 1964-dedication panel for comparison, the current panel contains obvious traces of tampering in form of black spots, crammed letters, and awkward wordings of the current inscription, as well as the conspicuously missing name and titles of the either Pahlavi shah (Figs. E.5). Furthermore, the adjoining gift-shop and restaurant, as well as the museum, were declared as “un-Islamic” and their upkeep an unnecessary expense for the government. Subsequently, it was easy for the state to actively discourage the performance of the stories in the Shahnameh and public visitations to Ferdawsiyeh.

In order to fit the IRI’s ideological narrative better, Ibn Sina’s mausoleum and museum complex went through several similar revisions. Ibn Sina’s statue, prominently placed at the center of Bu Ali Square, acquired a new veneer inscription, similar to the old one minus the credits to the king’s patronage (Fig. E.6 and compare to Fig. 5.29). Inside the museum and mausoleum building, the standard glossy poster-photos of Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor as Supreme Leader (vali-e faqhi) Ali Khamenei, replaced the Pahlavi inscription that had for years read, “This modern (novin) resting-place has been dedicated by the generous hands of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Ordibehesht 1333.” Yet, the panel proper directly below, which described the history of the monument and its patronage was amended to only exclude the shah’s name and long titles. On this panel, the end of the fourth and the entire fifth lines were erased and rewritten in exact letters as to not leave any distinction between the new and the original inscriptions: “…With the of King of kings, high positioned Wise King, His Imperial Majesty, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi…” was replaced by “…with the effort of the Society for National Heritage of Iran for the purpose of honoring the prominent philosopher…” 37 (Fig. E.7 and compare to Fig. 5.27). The exhibition of Ibn Sina’s “Aryan skull,” both inside the library and in the hallway, remained intact hinting at two possible lines of reasoning: either the
new policy-makers were oblivious to its profound racist implications or they were unable to see
the link between scientific museumization of things and the things as traces of racial ideologies
(see Figs. 5.24-5.26). The marks left by removed plaques, the holes left by eliminated emblems,
and the empty spaces between letters all point to what were there and are no more. The new
marks nevertheless constitute the continuously evolving history of the monument. 38

Such transmutations were not limited to the monuments alone. The lives of their
architects too were radically altered after the revolution. Like his student Hosayn Amanat,
Houshang Seyhoun’s name appeared on the revolutionary wanted-list, not only because both
men had been the shah’s distinguished architects, but also because they belonged to the Baha’i
faith, declared as an illegal sect by the IRI. 39 As proposed in chapter 5, “The author of Ibn Sina’s
mausoleum is, surely, the paramount personification of the Pahlavi architect.” Seyhoun is also
the paramount personification of the Pahlavi architect after the Islamic Revolution: neglected,
perturbed, and understudied. My interviews with different Iranian architects active before the
revolution, including Seyhoun, Amanat, and Rostom Voskanian, were both overwhelming and
unmanageable for each wanted to recount everything possible, from architectural theory to
political philosophy, from a chat with the shah to the pedantic depiction of a doorknob. These
once eminent and influential figures in Pahlavi Iran are now mostly forgotten, exiled to the very
corner of the globe that educated them half a century ago (i.e. the West). Some of them yearn to
occupy the spotlight as in the “old times” (zaman-e qadiim), for instance, during an interview.
Still each was exceedingly cautious as to who was conducting that same interview. As most
revolutions are in the habit of doing, this one has taken away from these men their livelihood and
peace of mind, as well as their guarantee of posterity: the monuments. Each, with a hint of
nostalgia and trepidation, asked me whether I could send them a photograph of their own work. I
was, obviously, only too happy to oblige. Still these architects have shown an exceptional ability
to adapt. Seyhoun and Voskanian, with their Beaux-Arts backgrounds, have dropped the ruler
and picked up the brush perhaps because to Beaux-Arts-trained architects painting and sculpting

37 In Persian, the two inscriptions are as follows: “be farman-e Shahanshah boland-jaygah sh’ahriar kheradmand
olahazrat homayun Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi” and “be kushesh-e anjoman-e asar-e melli-e Iran be mnzur-e
tajlil az magham-e valaye in filusuf-e alighadr.”
38 These mutilations would constitute what Jacque Derrida calls ‘trace.’ Marks which signal the presence of a thing
in the past, a thing clumsily hidden but nevertheless visible. Missing words, speak about the presence of their
ideologies. The point is that everyone knows what used to be, or at least what should have been, there.
39 For details on the treatment of Baha’is during and after the revolution, see E. Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in
Iran (Cambridge, 2000), 114-123.
are sub-processes of architectural conception. As for those with an American educational background, like Amanat and Nader Ardalan, they have found it easier to succeed in the architectural profession of North America.

In June 2000, I was sitting with these same architects, Seyhoun and Amanat, exchanging stories about Iran's modern architecture. We had had a long discussion about anything related, even remotely, to the SNH, its monuments, their construction processes, and their underpinning politics. As it was getting late, I directed my final question to Seyhoun:

Grigor: How do you think the Iranian people have received and accepted these monuments?
Seyhoun: These people, especially the [post-revolutionary] tour-guides who are uninformed, they say things in reverse. For example, in the video that I have [of a tour of Omar Khayyam's tomb], the guide explained to the people that the monument's architect [Seyhoun] wanted to show that this [the conic form] is an up-side-down cup of wine. This is completely idiotic.
Amanat: It's a way of vilifying him [Seyhoun]. They want to show that he was a drinker.
Seyhoun: No, no, they want to show that Khayyam was a drinker. [Alternatively,] when the guide talked about the 12 columns [of Ibn Sina's mausoleum, designed as] the 12 Sciences, he said, "it [signifies] the 12 Imams."

I was exhilarated by the unexpected turn that the discussion had taken and was anxious to lead it to the delicate question of how public landmarks generate meaning(s), the working of the intention of the (autonomous heroic) architect in those articulations, and the problematics of the (re)reading of architectural meaning(s) after the erection of the structure. As I struggled to penetrate the dialogue, Amanat turned to me and said:

Amanat: Go back and repeat what you said earlier.
Grigor: Exactly, exactly. That is, monuments can be interpreted by [various] people [where] the 12 Sciences mutate into the 12 Imams. [How do you account for that?] Seyhoun: In a different époque, there is a different explanation. There is no need to base oneself on people's lives, because people are unculturated (inculte).
Grigor: Yes, but you as the architect...
Seyhoun: I cannot be there to correct...
Grigor: No, you should not be there to correct but when you were designing a monument, you wanted to say something, to explain something. Right?
Seyhoun: I have given my explanations.
Grigor: But it is wrongly understood.

40 Seyhoun departed for Paris in February 1980, bringing to an end his architectural activities. Since 1982, he has been living in Vancouver, engaged mainly in painting. Both Seyhoun and Voskanian are very active in their respective studios, which has resulted over the last two decades in a number of successful one-person shows in various North American cities. On October 7, 2001, Seyhoun was the fourth receiver of the Roudaki Foundation's Ehsan Yarshater Award; see Center for Iranian Studies Newsletter 13/2 (Fall 2001): 5.
41 Amanat's death decree came with those of the then Prime Minister Hoveyda and the Pahlavi family. He fled the country in 1979 to establish a discreet yet successful architectural practice in Vancouver, Canada. Hosayn Amanat, in a written interview by Talinn Grigor, April 2, 2000, Vancouver, Canada; see Appendix 8.
42 Seyhoun interview. Tape 1, Side A.
43 Seyhoun interview. Tape 1, Side A.
Seyhoun laughed and changed the subject. It seemed to me that it was hard for him to welcome the idea that public architecture operates on, and is conditioned by, the absence of the architect; to see that he, indeed, “could not” have “been there” to “explain.” Notably, it seemed to me that the notion that he built so that he would not “be there” was lost on him. A far more significant proposition that he did not seem to appreciate was that the ability for his monuments to alter in social meanings (i.e. “sciences” versus “imams”) occasioned their very survival after the revolution. If the 12 columns for the “12 Sciences” had not mutated in popular narratives into the “12 Imams,” the structures might have simply been declared “un-Islamic” and razed to the ground.

Out of the five monuments examined in this dissertation, Popeiyeh typifies such a mutation in social meaning(s). “Pope’s mausoleum is more of an apotheosis than any book,” wrote Pope’s biographer in 1976, “But the Persians will be asking sooner or later what the mausoleum is all about and the book will be the only way they can find out. So that’s settled.”\footnote{Letter from Robert Payne to Rexford Stead, January 20, 1976, AOA; in J. Gluck and N. Siver, eds., Surveyors of Persian Art: A Documentary Biography of Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman (Ashiya, 1996), 573.} Pope’s wish to stand on the same footing as Ferdawsi, Hafez, and Sa’di in Iran’s history would not last long for a “Persian” engagement with Pope’s mausoleum would altogether alter its meaning for most Iranians. Nor would most “Persians” have access to Pope’s biography published in 1996.\footnote{Gluck, Surveyors of Persian Art.} While the talks to eradicate the structure during the revolution never bore fruit, soon afterwards graffiti of obscene words, poetic verses, and political jokes began to appear on its façade (Fig. E.8).\footnote{Neither should be considered as mere acts of vandalism, but rather a popular engagement with a public monument.} The placard identifying the green area around the tomb, originally named and marked Pope’s Park, was duly renamed and (re)marked as shataq’s park (Fig. E.9). Thirty-three years after his letter to the SNH, Pope is forgotten for the simple reason that the tomb-chamber is locked and access to the public denied. While both the tombstone inscriptions and the reproduction of Pope’s letter to the shah remain intact, neither can communicate the original purpose of the monument, the identity of its occupants as well as that of its patron. Alternatively, its mason Hosayn Ma’arefi’s suggestion to orient Pope’s grave towards Mecca facilitated its shifting meaning from the mausoleum of two American art historians to the venerated resting-place of an anonymous Muslim saint to which people come and wherein they
make wishes. The white ribbon that I found on its door is one of the traces of such popular reverence (Fig. E.10). The revivalistic neo-Samanid style of the monument’s design, the almost accidental orientation of its graves towards Mecca, and its removed inscriptions have all contributed to its enduring presence after two decades of the revolution.

- (co)Opted Modernity

By the beginning of the 1990s, which had seen the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the end to the Iran-Iraq War, and the intensification of “Iran’s Thermidor,” the various fragments of Iran’s national heritage were being vigorously and officially (re)appropriated in the mainstream culture and society as such. The most obvious evidence of this was on April 20, 1991, when Iran’s president, Hojjat al-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, not only made an official visit to Persepolis, but also “hailed [it] the seat of the ancient monarchy [and] as part of the ‘national heritage’.” In the guest-book, he wrote: “In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate. Visiting the incredible remains of Persepolis provokes considerable national pride in every individual. By seeing these remains, our people will discover their own capabilities and the cultural background of their country, and will believe that they will recover their historical role in the future to uphold upon this talent and foundation, the blazing torch of Islam to light the path of other nations.” As in the days of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah, Persepolis represented the nation’s pride, its glorious past, its potential for revival, and above all, the means to a better future, both for Iran and the rest of the world. This cultural gesture by IRI’s high-ranking political leader was made even more notable when Iran’s highest-ranking authority,

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47 Nor was anything particularly modern about this metamorphosis in meaning: “By a natural transition the mausoleum would acquire sanctity from its very surroundings and indeed might become in due time a supplementary place of worship. It commonly happened that the identity of the original tenant was forgotten, to be replaced by that of a personality more attuned to the requirements of local piety...Often the new identification would gain credence even though an inscription visible to all would tell a very different tale thus the tower at Lajim (1022) and commemorating a noble lady of probably Bawandid stock, is now the Imamzada ‘Abdallah.” R. Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture: Form, Function, and Meaning (Edinburgh, 1994), 276-278.

48 On Iran’s Thermidor, see F. Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran (New York, 2000). When the then minister of culture and Islamic guidance, and the future moderate president of Iran, Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami, publicly maintained that the “cinema is not the mosque,” things had changed significantly. “Nazar-e Imam Khomeini dar Barh-ye Film-ha, Serial-ha, Ahang va Paksh-e Baranmeh-ha-ye E’lam Shod,” Keyhan Havai (December 30, 1987): 3; quoted in Naficy, “Islamizing Film,” 205.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, reenacted the event three years later. During his speech overlooking the ruins, the *faqih* (religious jurist) "praised the ruins as witness to the greatness of Iranian past and the achievements of its people."\(^5\) Then, he urged his audience to ask itself, "Who built these monuments?" While he attributed the construction of the Achaemenid royal palaces to the hard work of thousands of slaves, he, nevertheless, officially sanctioned the discussion and study of Iran’s pre-Islamic past in schools and universities of the IRI.\(^5\)

Pre-Islamic monuments were not the only public texts that the IRI successfully co-opted into its version of Iranian history that selected the birth of Islam as its golden age. The historical knowledge produced under the Pahlavis was similarly reintroduced into the public domain. The appearance of the SNH’s original publications under its post-revolutionary institutional name was another manifestation of a heritage reclaimed. Since the SNH’s monuments could no longer be physically removed or reworked without instigating social protest, the ICHO instituted hegemony over literature rather than architecture. In other words, while the post-revolutionary authorities had found it difficult to eliminate the public monuments erected or valorized by the Pahlavis, they found it significantly easier to rectify its history in books, including the numerous publications by the SNH. Nor did the IRI find it financially viable to invent the wheel: i.e. to write these books anew.\(^5\) In the various architectural encyclopedias, books, and indexes produced after the revolution, the SNH’s architectural projects are played down in a remarkably tactful manner. Their histories are, by design, ambiguously written. Dates are provided by

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\(^5\) Reprinted in *Miras-e Farhangi* 2 (3-4): 5; quoted in Abdi, "Archaeology and Nationalism in Iran," 72.

\(^5\) Quoted in Manoukian, "City of Knowledge," 32.

\(^5\) As Abrahamian notes, "Historians cannot complain that the Islamic Republic does not take the past seriously. They might, however, find its methods of revising history somewhat unorthodox. Like most ideological regimes, it harbors an unhealthy interest in history." Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions*, 180. By the end of the decades, a large number of official publications, declaring and clarifying the state’s program for social, economic, and cultural reform hit the market. In one of such publication entitled *The Era of Construction*, under the “culture and art” section it was explained, “The reason for the Supreme Leader’s repeated reference and emphasis on ‘cultural onslaught’ is the increased significance of art and culture in Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sacred system.” The introduction further elucidated the intrinsic link between national culture and national morality, “The exertions made by officials in charge of cultural and artistic affairs, as manifested in the government’s development programs, indicate a deep understanding of the importance of culture and art and the extent of damage that is threatening the public morals and human dignity of the Iranian nation in the event of defeat from or retreat against the cultural onslaught.” *The Era of Construction: a Narrative of Eight Years of Construction During the Presidency of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani 1989-1997*, “Culture and Art,” (Tehran, 1997), III: 229.

\(^5\) While Iran’s monarchs built to make a discourse, its clerics print to subvert that which they have inherited and hesitate to destroy. The post-revolutionary modernity resides in the still uneasy tension between edifice and its history; it lies not in the act of destruction-construction, but the constructed and its narration. Appropriation, as in the case of the monuments, seems to be the best option for the highly pragmatic IRI. For the argument of the pragmatism of both Imam Khomeini and hence the IRI, see Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, introduction and chapter 1.
generalities such as "the last century" or "the 20th century." The structures themselves are rarely, if at all, illustrated, and are always subded by more Islamic-looking structures – onion domes, minarets, iwans, etc. As a case in point, Kiani’s *Iran’s Architecture*, while “dedicated to Ferdawsi on the occasion of the thousandth anniversary of the composition of [the] *Shahnameh*,” in his extensive list of monuments cataloged by typology (i.e. mosques, madrasas, tombs, castles, etc.), the SNH’s mausoleums are nowhere to be found. Most, like *Ferdawsiyeh*, are simply missing; some, like *Hafeziyeh*, are briefly cited, and none are illustrated.

In fact, the history of Iran’s 20th-century architecture is conspicuously absent not only through the lack of specific buildings in the indexes, but also in its semantics. For instance, as a typological category, the Persian word *aramgah*, signifying tomb, made popular by the SNH, is replaced by its Arabic surrogate, *maqbara*.

Similarly, while the *Encyclopedia of the Iranian Historical Monuments in the Islamic Era* borrows the information word-by-word from the SNH’s 48th volume, entitled *Climes of Pars: Fars’ Historic and Archeological Heritage*, it methodically eliminates any hint of its original Pahlavi text. The historiographical techniques of giving Gregorian dates in parenthesis following the Solar Hijri (Hejri-e Shamsi) dates are eliminated and any credit to the Pahlavi kings and ministers are replaced by generic terms, such as “the Ministry of Culture,” “the government,” “the people of Shiraz,” etc. However, with the exception of these alterations, these works are often republished without even a new typeset. Therefore, the histories that they narrate use Pahlavi texts for factual and scientific reliability, as well as its blind adoption of its narrative methodology.

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56 Two reasons might be suggested; the authors heavily rely on Persian sources and have little or no access to Western archives and libraries. Second, the fact remains that a vast amount of Iranian historiography in a systematic and methodical manner was produced under the Pahlavis. As to the monuments, while the explicitly monarchic signs are replaced, the knowledge, along with its fundamentally Western modernists methodology, is unchanged. Republication of these old books is an excellent and effective means for the ICOH not only to co-opt the SNH as its own but also to re-appropriate empirical and national knowledge. “A mediated second edition...a re-framing which sets a different interpretive space... The recuperation of historical knowledge produced by the Pahlavi state is carried out through the erasures that make it possible to disentangle it from the state rhetoric through which they were first produced.” Manoukian, “City of Knowledge,” 58.
As I would every night during my stay in Tehran, I turned on the local radio half an hour before midnight. On 104 FM, Tehran Radio’s Night Program (barname-ye shabangah) had begun. The narrator was relating an incident that had occurred the night before, when the current owner of a house identified as national heritage had secretly arranged the sale of the land and had, therefore, begun to demolish the house proper because a site declaimed a national heritage was barred from the real-estate market. The structure in question had been the residence in Rasht of the officially esteemed leader of the Jangali (Jungle) Resistance of 1915-1921, Mirza Kuchek Khan. According to the report, the ICHO had accidentally found out and put a stop to both the transaction and its resulting destruction. The reporter seemed angry: “This is not just a house, it is a part of our history (tarikh).” The owner’s moral fiber was questioned because, the journalist held, only a “barbarian” vandal would destroy for personal material profit. In the reportage, it was underscored, time and again, “This is our historic edifice and cultural heritage (asar-e bastani va miras-e farhangi).” After a lengthy speech about the house’s national, historical, cultural, and even ethical value for Iran and Iranians, the reporter stressed the international importance of the edifice: “All these small countries invent historic heritages, which” when listed “do not exceed the single digit.” The number of “ours,” he insisted, “passes six or seven digits.” The next day, on the same program, it was announced that the cultural minister had dedicated 300 billion tomans for the preservation of Iran’s historical monuments, including, he had specified, “Takht-e Jamshid [Persepolis], Takht-e Solayman, and Soltanieh.”

Today, the ICHO has established itself as the all-inclusive state institution that manages most of the state-level cultural events, historical edifices, as well as research centers and collections. Its elaborate web site, at http://www.iranmiras.org, contains not one but numerous

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57 Tehran Radio’s Night Program (barnameye shabangah), on 104 FM, Wednesday, October 22, 2003, 11:20 pm.
58 “Mirza Kuchek Khan, the famous Sardar-e Jangal (Jungle Commander), has attracted more attention than any other personality in the history of early twentieth-century Iran. Nationalists see him as an ‘unyielding patriot,’ an ‘incorruptible leader,’ and an ‘indefatigable fighter’ who took to the mountains of northern Iran with the burning ‘ambition of ridding the country’ of Russian and British troops. According to this interpretation, his revolution would have succeeded but for Lenin’s willingness to sacrifice Iran to reach a compromise with Britain. For local reformers, Kuchek Khan fought for regional autonomy as well as against feudal landlords and corrupt tribal chiefs. For some leftists, he was a Che Guevara, the forests of Gilan were the Sierra Maestra, his bearded followers were revolutionary peasants, and his short-lived Soviet Socialist Republic was a forerunner of revolutionary Cuba. For Khomeinists, Kuckek Khan was a turbaned martyr who raised the banner of Islam against the West and died fighting both the monarchists and the Communists... The Islamic Republic has honored him with postage stamps and posters, as well as articles, books, and full chapter in school textbooks... [However,] the Islamic Republic’s portrayal of the Jangalis is incomplete [and] also blows the Jangalis completely out of proportion.” For details of the IRI’s reinterpretation and above all misinterpretation of the Jangali Resistance and Mirza Kuchek Khan, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 97-101.
monument indexes arranged by provinces, various databases, cultural encyclopedias, and lists of
museums and cultural foundations. "Nowadays," the ICHO declares on its homepage, it "is
proud to identify, renovate, preserve, and introduce [the] Cultural heritage of ancient and Islamic
country of Iran..." In its vast "historical heritage" index, Tehran alone includes 1,502
structures, painstakingly identified and documented. Under the ICHO’s Khorasan branch,
Ferdawsi, Tus, and Ferdawsiyeh occupy a special place where the "significance of Ferdowsi" is
meticulously explained. The article under "Ferdowsi," begins with none other than "Professor
Arthur Upham Pope, the well-known American specialist in Persian art, in an article contributed
to the Supplement of The Near East and India of October 1934, writes:" The long, uncritical,
and above all, uncensored quotation from Arthur Pope as per Isa Sadiq’s translation provides to
the reader the 1934-text in its exact form: Ferdawsi is credited for "glorifying the ancient
Persians" who, in turn, is described as “An Iranian...proud” of “Cyrus, Darius, Ardeshir,
Anushirvan, Rostam, and Bozorgmehr,” all of whom are historic or mythical pre-Islamic kings
and heroes. This Republican reproduction of a Pahlavi text is not only indicative of how the IRI
has reclaimed all pre-revolutionary cultural texts, but also how the ICHO cannot do without co-
opting such narrative into its cultural mainstream. Perhaps more importantly, the ICHO has
found it very difficult to subdue the presence and use of the former SNH’s monuments both in
terms of national discourse on cultural heritage and their lucrative contribution to the tourist
trade.

When in January 2000, the First International Tourism Exhibition was inaugurated by
Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Ayatollah Mohajerani in Kish, Iran Daily published an
article entitled, “Tourism Industry Ignored for 2 Decades.” It revealed that during a press
conference, Mohajerani had urged the Majlis and the government, as well as “other relevant
organizations,” to recognize the importance of tourism and help “create a national will to realize”
its optimum development and operation. Since then Ferdawsiyeh, Hafeziyeh, Sa’diyeh,
Naderiyeh, in addition to the complexes of Ibn Sina, Baba Taher, and Omar Khayyam, have been
fully integrated into the government’s effort to promote Iran’s tourism. The monuments proper

60 The exact text is "Nowadays, [the ICHO] has pride of identification, renovation, preservation and introducing
Cultural heritage of ancient and Islamic country of Iran..." http://www.khorasanmiras.ir/eindex_subjects.aspx,
have been revamped, their public facilities including museums, gardens, gift-shops, restaurants, and restrooms have been reopened and updated; and public visitation to these sites officially encouraged. In some cases, as in Hafeziyeh and Naderiyeh, new inscription-boards, which conceal the revolutionary holes and scratches, have been mounted (Fig. E.11). Well-designed entrance-tickets and information-booklets have been prepared and freely handed out at the door (Figs. E.12 & E.14). Available too are optional tour-guides in different languages including Arabic, as well as English and French. At Ferdawsiyeh, the performance of the epic stories of the Shahnameh have been officially organized and are enacted around Ferdawsi’s tomb on a regular basis (Fig. E.13). During my visit to the site, the ticket vendor while handing me a receipt underscored, “You should not miss the Shahnameh show” to be performed in a few minutes. He also offered me four different illustrated leaflets describing the site and its facilities, Ferdawsi’s life and work, and “the rich cultural heritage” of Tus and Khorasan. Such brochures and other forms of promotional publications permeate the overwhelming number of bookshops in all major Iranian cities (Figs. E.14). The sites reconstructed by the SNH have also been advertised and made appealing to the general public through the dissemination of post-cards, invitation-cards, key-chains, pocket phonebooks, and other paraphernalia carrying the images of these mausoleums (Figs. E.15). So-called “traditional carpets,” “traditional water-pipes,” and a broad range of “traditionally handcrafted” souvenirs, marketed for the international tourist trade, carry the duplicate images of these mausoleums. For instance, in a tourist gift-shop in Shiraz, I was shown a remarkable khatam kari model of Sa’di’s mausoleum (Fig. E.16). Khatam kari, the delicate inlay of multicolor wood pieces that form an intricate surface, has not only made Shiraz historically famous, but is also considered one of the most esteemed handicrafts of the country. “This is,” pointing to the model, the salesman said, “the genuine (asil) tradition (son’at-e) of Iran.” While Sa’diyeh was intended to symbolize Iran’s modernity when erected in 1952, today in the form of its khatam kari model, it represents the most authentic of all Iranian traditions.

The IRI, in fact, could not remain in power without acknowledging the pervasive presence of these historic figures – Ferdawsi, Hafez, Sa’di, Ibn Sina, and Omar Khayyam – nor

63 Among others, official tourist publications include: Hamadan (Tehran, 1998) photo of the mausoleums of Ibn Sina and Baba Taher on pages 1 and 7; Hamadan (Tehran, 1999), 9; Khorasan (Tehran, 1999), Ferdawsiyeh image on page 6; Isfahan (Tehran, 1999), no picture of Ackerman-Pope tomb; I. Afshar Sistani, Shenakt-e Ostan-e Khorasan (Tehran, 1998); Iran: Past, Present, Future (Tehran, video, 1992); H. Zedehdel, Series of Guide Books to Iran: Fars Province (Tehran, 1998); H. Zedehdel, Series of Guide Books to Iran: Khorasan Province (Tehran, 1999).
could it continue to evade the equally pervasive presence and popular use of their mausoleums. In recent years, therefore, it has increasingly felt the need to give a religious as well as national overtone to them and as such reintroduce them into its public narratives, because they help it to legitimize itself as the rightful successor to the popular revolution. When on May 14, 2004, the authorities organized “the official commemoration of Ferdowsi” in Tus, the police clashed with demonstrators who had gathered around Ferdawsiyeh “in order to protest against their poor conditions and the official corruption,” broadcasted the SMCCDI Information Services. “The clashes erupted,” according to the article, “as the security forces intended to close the perimeters leading to Ferdowsi’s Mausoleum and to break brutally the peaceful protest demo in order to allow the officials to organize the ceremony,” further emphasizing that “clubs and chains were used against the residents who retaliated by throwing pieces of stones to the regime’s agents and their vehicles [sic.]” Similar clubs and chains had been used during the student protests in and around Tehran University after February 2004 elections as well as in June 2003. The authors, daneshjoo.org (student.org), accused “the Islamic regime” and the “Mullahcracy” of “misusing” the name of Ferdawsi, described in their manifesto as “the Father of Iranism.” They further blamed the authorities of planning to “destroy his [Ferdawsi’s] statue” and of belittling his work, the Shahnameh depicted as “the history of Iran’s glorious past.” Through the reuse of these mausoleums, the IRI has attempted, according to the article, “to reverse a little bit its increasing unpopularity and to play the national feelings of some naive Iranians especially living abroad.” Whereas under the Pahlavis these tombs were perceived as heritage, without much meaning for the general population, they have become very important national sites under the IRI, because they are perceived by the people as non-religious places in contrast to the increasingly growing numbers and types of mosques. They are also seen as potent sites to enact civil disorder and demand social justice for these are the public spaces that the Islamic Republic has not managed to fully bring under its “Islamic” fold. Therefore, that which the Pahlavi kings intended (i.e. the practice of civic pilgrimage) was realized only after the revolution and only after the institutionalization of the theocratic orthodoxy.

65 daneshjoo.org, “Ferdowsi’s official commemoration”
66 daneshjoo.org, “Ferdowsi’s official commemoration”
I had found myself in a neo-Qajar style teahouse in Tehran; currently the most fashionable public spaces where one is offered traditional kamar barik (thin waist) tea and a water-pipe, served on a takht, the elevated wooden bench covered with carpet. To the young women who were invited by my host to our takht, I asked whether they had visited Hafeziyeh. The most vocal among them, Pegah, said, “two-three times a month, on Thursday nights.”

When I asked why did she go there, she said, “I read a fateh (verse) and I make a ni’at (wish).” I was not satisfied with her answer because she was describing the public function of the place, not a private purpose facilitated by it. I persisted with my inquiry, “but why do you go there?” With a short delay and a big reluctance, Pegha finally disclosed, “For me, there is a big difference between going to Qom or Mashhad for ziyarat (religious pilgrimage) and going to Hafeziyeh, because he [Hafez] was not a mollah. He was an Iranian.” Azadeh, sitting next to Pagah, got excited and confessed, “It’s true, it’s true. I cry when I put my hands on his gravestone,” adding immediately, “A feeling of calmness (aramesh) comes over me. I feel him, he talks to me.” This reminded me of another young woman who had caught my attention during my visit to Hafeziyeh. She had placed a single red rose on the tomb of Hafez, had put her palms on the tombstone, and after a while had left the place in tears (Fig. E. 17). Based on her loose overcoat and casual veil, she too had appeared in variance with IRI’s strict dress code. Pegha who seemed to have not finished her thoughts, looked at me seriously and said, “You see, the discourse of goodness (bahs-e khubi) is blind to religion. And, Hafez is good.” One girl who had not said a word all evening and whose name I never found out, concluded with utmost confidence, “Ultimately (belakhareh), Hafeziyeh provides for a very calm (aram) and good feeling (ehsas-e khub); it is clean of politics (siyasat) and corruption (fesad).” The range of implications, political or otherwise, meant by the seemingly simple words of an ordinary Iranians could have only been deduced by the sharpness and wit of her listener.

The political grievances of those that I overheard in the streets, parks, and cafés persistently manifested in cultural expressions; each nonchalant conversation about Iran’s culture eventually mutated into a passionate political critique. This rather strange impression was explicitly substantiated one afternoon when I walked into a small neighborhood post-office in Tehran. As I was waiting to be assisted, my glance fell on the stamp-display haphazardly taped

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67 This conversation took place sometime in 2003, somewhere in Tehran. The specificities of our meeting have to remain ambiguous for the safety of those involved.
to the wall. When with a deliberate air of innocence, I asked the badly shaved postal worker whether “you carry stamps with the image of Persepolis,” with an equally innocent and apathetic air, he replied, “all we have are giyah (plants), heyvan (animals or creatures), and,” pointing to stamps of turbaned men, “khodeshun (themselves)!” With this last remark and his distinctly belittling “plants and creatures,” I was supposed to understand not only his implied “mollah-s” in lieu of “themselves,” but also his intense disapproval of the regime. I thought the technique of resistance was both remarkably clever and rather witty. After my smile, he burst: “What are you talking about, khanum (lady)? Persepolis stamps! They wanted to bulldoze Persepolis, they wanted to destroy Pasargadae.” His co-worker, a casually veiled woman around her forties, interjected, “All they print on stamps these days are their own images. They have no respect for culture!” This conversation, which began with a simple question about the replica of some ruins, stretched for an hour to end with the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. By then, I was certain that each of my inquiries into Iran’s cultural heritage, icons, and symbols invariably led to political anxieties. In these expressions, most political grievances were made manifest in specific cultural particularities.

These ruminations about culture, despite their historical (in)accuracies, were also concrete ways to negotiate the workings of politics in the IRI. Soon I realized that these same individuals to whom I spoke, decided and defined the hegemonic discourse on culture on a daily basis through personal and, often free, choices. It seemed that each ordinary Iranian (re)invented her own version of events and resisted or reinforced that which she perceived as the mainstream on an individual term, much depending on not only who she was and what she did, but also where and with whom she found herself at any given moment of criticism or adherence. At the National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, when I requested a photocopy of Nader Shah’s image adorning the cover-page of a pre-1979 publication by the SNH, the assistant adamantly refused. “I am sorry khanum, it cannot be done (ne-misheh).” When I hesitantly asked, “why?” she simply said, “it’s un-Islamic (gheyr-e eslami-ye).” While I did not persist with my inquiry for she could have refused to copy the other pages, I remained quite confused. In her mind “un-Islamic” was the (re)reproduction of a figurative image or was it the reproduction of Nader

68 It seemed that the post-revolutionary ruminations about the revolution have generated further rumors and ruminations about what happened. “The subalterns make their own memories, but they do not make them just as they please.” S. Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory (Berkeley, 1995), 118.
69 The full Persian name of the National Library is ketab-khane-ye melli-e jomhuri-ye eslami-ye Iran.
Shah’s image as a king? A few hours later, when the shift changed, the next assistant copied the image without a hint of hesitation.

In a similar vein, to my ostensibly naive question, “who is buried here?” pointing to the unmarked and bolted mausoleum of Ackerman-Pope, a student from the local university assured me that I was looking at a three-hundred-year-old structure. “The tomb of a Muslim Safavid saint...centuries old, very old (kheyli qadim),” she said. Although access to the tombstones is forbidden to those who are not willing to pay a handsome bribe to the park’s gardener who holds the mausoleum’s key, it simultaneously enables the preservation of their original inscriptions. Notably, the date of “Royal 2535” on Ackerman’s tombstone remains intact invoking the history of the monument and the political context out of which it emerged. On the one hand, Ackerman’s gravestone, rather than Pope’s, refers back to the Pahlavi era and its unrealized (dis)utopia(s). On the other, Pope’s revivalistic architectural ideology has turned him into a “Muslim saint,” where Ackerman has altogether disappeared. Neither before nor after the revolution is she (re)presented. In either case, however, it is the passerby, the park users that negotiate this (un)presence and its (re)presentation, for “...like a ‘post-modern’ society where the relations between the scholarly, political and popular fields, potentially but not necessarily relations of conflict, are managed at the individual level with an imaginary element readily added.” It seemed, in the everyday chores of the IRI, many decide for themselves what exactly is “Islamic,” “un-Islamic,” or even “Islamic-enough” and thus contribute or resist to the sociopolitical and cultural dynamics of modern Iran.

In retrospect, by the dawn of the revolution, the Society of National Heritage had accomplished much of what the secular reformists and modernists had set out to do in 1922. According to the SNH’s 1976 official figures, Ferdawsiyeh had seen 376,652 Iranian, 3,863 foreign, and 5,900 free-of-charge visitors; Naderiyeh a total of 195,446 visitors; the tomb-gardens of Omar Khayyam and Shaykh Attar, 73,032 Iranian, 3,190 foreign, and 1,150 free-of-charge visitors; Ibn Sina’s mausoleum-museum complex, 65,175 Iranian, 2,170 foreign, and 31,497 free-of-charge – the high number of free entries was, no doubt, due to school trips to the museum. And, Baba-Taher’s tomb-tower had seen a total of 61,058 visitors. Furthermore, in that year alone, 836,000 individuals had visited these landmarks erected by the SNH, excluding the

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70 Adelkhah, *Being Modern in Iran*, 132.
most popular among them, *Hafeziyeh and Sa'diyeh*. These monuments certainly did contribute to Iran’s tourist industry with substantial incomes. As per its by-laws’ first article, it had, indeed, managed to “cultivate public fascination in Iranian historic heritage (asar-e tarikhi);” it had succeeded to “protect Iranian fine arts (sanaye’-e mostazrafeh) and handicraft (sanaye’-e dasti),” and it had ensured the “preservation” of their “old style and method.” As per its eighth article, the SNH had “established” a noteworthy “museum” and an adjoining “library in Tehran;” it had invented and institutionalized a prominent index of “national heritage.” Finally, as per its ninth article, it had certainly “used” these modern institutions “through teachings in the schools, exhibitions, and lectures for the masses.” As the revolution came to demonstrate, the Society had, in effect, acculturated the masses for, despite animosities and hostilities, Iran’s national heritage was respected and protected by those same masses.

The SNH’s architectural projects not only stand as representations of particular political periods in Pahlavi history, but also speak about the Society’s own institutional history and politics. Each was a result of a specific modern way of doing things and came to construct a specific social reality. Through them national history was (re)read and (re)presented, the nation’s past was revived and exalted, and the bright future was planned and imposed. For modern Iran and the SNH alike, *Ferdawsiyeh* embodies its most remarkable story – a perfect tale of modernity; *Hafeziyeh* manifests its most successful spatial transformation – a modernistic metamorphosis and its buttressing modern cult of tourism; Ibn Sina Mausoleum invokes its most sophisticated ability to museumize national history – an excellent example of the modern fetish with museums; Omar Khayyam Tomb symbolizes its most explicit architectural doctrine – a seemingly anti-West, still thoroughly Western, ideology; and *Popeiyeh* personifies its deeply

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71 Society for National Heritage 131, *Karnamah-e Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli* [Report-book of the SNH] ed. H. B. al-Ulumi (Tehran, 1976), 785. By the dawn of the revolution, the Society was substantiating its own past activities as history. In a “Farvardin 2537” publication, entitled *By-laws of the SNH’s Prizes*, it announced “each year, on Mehr 20, the anniversary of the inauguration of Ferdawsi Aramgah, which is the first biggest action/step (eqdam) taken by the SNH, prizes will be given away.” Society for National Heritage booklet, “Asasnameh-ye Jayeze-ha-ye Asar-e Melli,” *Jayeze-ha-ye Asar-e Melli* [Gifts of national heritage] (Tehran, 1357/1978/2537), 3. The SNH was historicizing its inventions as tradition, to be remembered, celebrated and made history. There can be little doubt as to the success of these projects in line with those defined and forecasted by the early modernists.

72 During 1349/1970-1971, the total income from entrance tickets of the mausoleums were 2,323,727 rials; from books sales, 227,638 rials; stamps sales, 83,845 rials; and state aid, 13,000,000 rials. For an itemized list of SNH’s income and expenditure, see Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 126, Document 44, pages 11-17; 1349 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Khoradad 11, 1350/June 1, 1971, Tehran. And, Iran National Archives 297, Micro-reel 143, Document 115, page 8-9; 1344 Annual Report of Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, Ordibehesht 17, 1345/May 7, 1965, Tehran.

73 See Appendix 1, By-laws articles 1, 8, and 9.
masculine paradigm of modernity, high culture, and feminism. Each embraces some kind of
destruction of the historical built environment in order to give birth to a new vision of modernity;
each embodies the tensions generated by rapid modernization that intended to negate
modernity’s implicit uncertainties; and each is a direct byproduct of a modernized nation-state
that kept falling short of a Great Civilization. While none really qualifies as an architectural
masterpiece, each masterfully tells the story of Iran’s modernity under the Pahlavis and after.

For the IRI, therefore, *Ferdawsiyeh* remained a symbol of the basic ideological dilemma
for those in power to reconcile Iranian secular nationalism with Shi’a theology on the basis of
style. *Hafeziyeh* remains the perfect mediator between the regime’s strict orthodoxy and the
liberal demands of the vast majority. *Naderiyeh* embodies the uneasy relationship between kings
and clerics in the mainstream narratives of Islamic Republic’s version of Iranian history; and the
tombs of Sa’di and Omar Khayyam, that of equally uneasy relationship between strict teachings
of Shi’ism and Iran’s rich literary tradition. Only in 1991, did Rafsanjani draw near these
seemingly distinct phenomena by his symbolic visit to Persepolis, sanctioning the official
reclaim of Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage by the authorities. Half a century after the erection of the
monuments and two decades after the revolution, the portraits of Ibn Sina, along with those of
Ferdawi, Hafez, and Omar Khayyam, have become a normative social and cultural history.
They are published in thousands of journals, magazines, books, and posters every month. They
are subjects of international conferences, symbolisms, exhibitions, and displays, outstandingly
organized by the IRI. They signal the irrefutable heritage of the nation of Iran, recognized, by
locals and foreigners alike, in the manifest portraits and architecture invented by the SNH. Their
very modern mausoleums, too, have all become signifiers of an inherently national and historical
Iranian heritage, equal, if not more prominent than, for instance, the Qabus tower, Yazd’s main
mosque, Persepolis, etc. As on the mural in the lobby of Xerox Company headquarters in
Tehran, on the back of city maps, or in official newspapers, these modern mausoleums are
represented as just another Iranian heritage among many in spite of mainstream history (Figs.
E.18).75 They also represent the singular, holistic, and iconized nation of Iran for the supreme
symbol of modern nationhood and national citizenship, the final page of each Iranian passport is
adorned with the image of Hafez’s pavilion (Fig. E.19). This alone hints at the extent to which

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75 For example see, *Iran*, year 7, no. 1736 (Bahman 17, 1379/February 5, 2001): 11.
the project of modernity as imagined and framed by the political elite of the 1920s, however unrealistic and defective, remains pervasive in today’s culture and society in Iran. The passport with the image of the pavilion which was designed by a French architect and now embodies the staunchly anti-West IRI, is also emblematic of the complexities of the historic project of modernity, of its hybridity and ambivalences of agendas and agencies, of its profound interdependence on such invented binaries as the West and the Orient, the modern and the traditional, the civilized and the barbarian through such designs as Hafez’s pavilion.

The SNH might have had the grandest of its triumphs if its patron had not been thrown out of his royal chair into exile, for the most ostentatious of all mausoleums would have been that of Mohammad Reza Shah’s. “Stronger than Cyrus!” was the headline of Le Journal de Téhéran on March 5, 1979 when reportedly a “10 billion rilas” mausoleum-complex was discovered in the vicinity of Pasargadae, intended for the “ex-shah.” The article provided the details that resonated well with each of the anti-shah popular sentiments:

We have just discovered eight mausoleums for the members of the Pahlavi dynasty under construction, to be erected all around the tomb of Cyrus the Great...in the region of Pasargadae, 80 km from Shiraz. Members of the Revolutionary Committee have gone to the site to confirm the facts. The head of the group, Engineer Asghar Karimi, has declared that the Shah’s mausoleum would have ultimately consisted of the erection of other mausoleums for the members of his family. It was decided that ‘Kayhan’ Society, having under its services Architects Shovrai, Amanat, and Khavari (the last two belong to an unofficial sect [i.e. Bahai]) would have been responsible for the mausoleum’s construction under the supervision of the Culture and Art Ministry. Fifty-five thousand square meters were allocated to the Shah’s mausoleum. To the south of the construction site, there exists a large morgue. In the western section, large quarries of stone are visible. The mausoleum in general looks like that of Cyrus’: a thing that forces us to think that the Shah wanted to follow the example (les traces) of the Achaemenians even that of their tombs. Engineers have estimated 10.000.000.000 rials [or 1.000.000.000 tomans was allocated] for the erection of the principal monument. Three times as such was reserved for the other structures. It is worth mentioning that the necessary material for the construction of the different mausoleums was to be delivered from abroad. The mausoleum penetrates three floors underground with a main entrance of 20-degree angle elevated to form a cone [sic.].


77 “Plus fort que Cyrus! Un mausolea de 10 milliards de rials pour l’ex-Chah,” Le Journal de Téhéran 12.996 (March 5, 1979): 1. While the article was accompanied by a photograph of a concrete foundation in way of ‘concrete’ evidence, its veracity is as suspect as the subsequent use of images after the revolution. Nor was it unthinkable for, after all, the shah had terminal cancer and was planning to be remembered for a long time. As a revolutionary reaction to the shah’s mausoleum, the following day, with the leadership of interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, “one million” gathered to “pay” a highly symbolic “homage” to the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, over his tomb in Ahmadabad village. “Un million de personnes pour rendre un hommage posthume au Dr. Mossadegh,” Le Journal de Téhéran 12.997 (March 6, 1979): 1.
Reza Shah died of a heart attack, exiled alone in Johannesburg; his son died of cancer surrounded by his exiled family in Cairo. In neither case did the vast majority of Iranians mourn their deaths. The former was temporarily buried awaiting its final resting-place in Iran and the latter was unceremoniously interred in a Sunni mosque, again in the hope of being transferred to his last resting-place in Iran. The mausoleum of the former was razed to the ground in 1980; since 1980, the latter is waiting for relocation. There is a measure of irony that both Pahlavi kings, the fathers of New Iran, whose reigns were marked by elaborate ceremonies of burying and reburying men of Iran in the land of Iran, of royal inspections and inaugurations of the mausoleums of Iran’s historical figures, had both found themselves without a (father)land to be buried in. Their corpses, as their persons, would be exiled from an Iran the uneven modernity of which they helped first to cultivate and then (re)cultivate.
Figures E.1 Protestors on the floor of a building in mid-construction overlooking the passing masses; and tanks and protestors foregrounded by Mohsen Forughi’s National Bank headquarters, Tehran, 1978. Source: Various Iranian newspapers.


Figure E.3 Post-1979 emblem of Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization at the entrance of all its monuments. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.
Figure E.4 The post-1979 (re)inscription on the main façade of Ferdawi’s mausoleum in Tus, 1934. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure E.6 Replaced veneer inscription of Ibn Sina’s statue in Bu Ali Square, Hamadan, post-1979.
Figure E.7 The shah’s patronage inscription replaced by Imams’ images, Ibn Sina’s mausoleum, Hamadan, post-1979. Sources: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure E.10 Post-1979 wish-ribbon tied to Ackerman-Pope's mausoleum door, Isfahan. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure E.9 Pope’s Park post-1979 name-change to Shataq’s Park, Isfahan. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.

Figure E.11 New inscription-board is being installed in the inner-garden of Hafeziyeh and the garden is being revamped. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.
Figures E.12 Post-1989 entrance-tickets for \textit{Sa'diyeh} and \textit{Hafeziyeh}, both sides. Source: The Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization.

Figure E.13 Officially organized and performed the stories of the \textit{Shahnameh} around the tomb of Ferdawsi in \textit{Ferdawiyyeh}. Source: Talinn Grigor, 2000.
Figures E.14 Post-1979 color-brochures for Ferdawsiyeh, the mausoleums of Baba Taher and Ibn Sina, and Naderiyeh. Source: The Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization.

Figures E.15 Post-1989 production of invitation-cards with the images of Hafeziyeh, Sa‘diyeh, and Omar Khayyam’s tomb. Source: Goya House of Art and Culture.

Figure E.16 Khatam-kari model of Sa‘diyeh in a Shiraz gift-shop. Source: Ziaian, Shiraz: the Colorful Dream of Pars, 157.
A young woman placing a red rose on the tomb of Hafez.

Source:
Talinn
Grigor, 2000

Figure E.18 Mural in the lobby of Xerox Company headquarters in Tehran; on the central left is visible the tomb of Hafez, and on the central right that of Sa’di. Other significant landmarks include the tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae, soldiers from Persepolis, the tower of Qabus in Gorgan, the iwan of the Friday Mosque in Yazd, the bridge of Sio-Se-Pol in Isfahan, and the now destroyed gate of Bam citadel in Bam.
Figure E.19 The inner back-page of the Iranian passport with the image of *Hafeziyeh*. 
APPENDIX 1: **BY-LAWS & REGULATIONS**
The SNH’s First By-laws and Regulations, 1922

During their meetings in 1922, the founding members wrote down the first charter of the Society for National Heritage, composed of 14 by-law articles and 21 regulation articles.¹

- **The By-laws (asas-nameh):**

  Article 1: A society in the name of Society for National Heritage (anjoman-e asar-e melli) has been established, the purpose of which is to cultivate public fascination for Iranian scientific (elmi) and industrial (san’ati) historic heritage (asar-e tarikhi) and to attempt to protect the fine arts (sanaye’-e mostazrafeh) and handicraft (sanaye’-e dasti) and to preserve their old style and method.²

  Article 2: The main office of the Society is in Tehran and it is possible that with the decision of the Board of Founders [Board of Trustees] branches be established in the provinces.³

  Article 3: The Society consists of 15 Founding members (mo’asese-yelcomite-ye anjoman) [Board of Trustees], who form the committee of the Society in addition to unlimited public and honorary members.

  Article 4: The Board of Directors (hey’at modireh anjoman) is elected by the Founding members [Board of Trustees], from among the Founding members. It should consist of one chairperson (reyis), two vice chairpersons, two secretaries, and one treasurer.

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² In the by-laws articles 1 and 7, “scientific and industrial heritage” must be understood in terms of the existing production system of the early 20th-century Iran, at the time when the document was written. The word “industry” neither means the oil, steel, or any other heavy industries. It means the way in which certain artifacts, here in the sense of artisanal and craft, have been produced historically in Iran. The preoccupation with that of handicraft is in terms of skills in making objects, artworks, and artifacts either for daily use or as works of art. These included carpets, textiles, metalwork, glasswork, tile and glass works as architectural ornamentation (*kashi-kari va ayneh-kari*), etc.

³ In articles 2 to 5, there is confusion about the names of the two main committees of the SNH: the Board of Trustees and the Board of Directors. The first is labeled under two names: the committee of the Society and the Founding members of the Society. The Board of Directors is labeled the executive committee. The Board of Trustees consists of the 15 members who make the key decisions and grant permission for main activities. Out of these fifteen members, each year the Board of Directors is elected, consisting of six individuals assigned to the posts of one chairperson, two vice chairpersons, two secretaries, and one treasurer. These members implement the
Article 5: The number of the members of the Board of Trustees is permanent. In case the number drops, based on the two-thirds of votes of the Board, a new member will be elected in order to complete the fifteen members.

Article 6: The fiscal year (doray-e amal-e salianeh) [yearly operation period] of the Board of Trustees starts on the first of Khordad [May 22] and ends on the first of Ordibehesht [April 21] of the following year. At the beginning of each fiscal year a new Board of Directors is elected. The Board of Trustees will meet as necessary. At the end of each fiscal year their report of activities will be presented.

Article 7: The SNH can assign pen membership or honorary membership to foreign international scholars who are friends of the science (elm) and craft (san'at) and who reside abroad and encourage the goals of the Society.

Article 8: The initial goals of the Society are the following:
1. The establishment of a museum in Tehran.
2. The establishment of a library in Tehran.
3. The recording and classification of those works, the preservation of which as national heritage is necessary.
4. The tabulation of priceless collections related to the library or the museum which are in the possession of the state or national organizations in Iran.

Article 9: Other goals of the Society include, the attempt to use the above-mentioned collections and benefit the masses from those collections through teachings in the schools and exhibitions and lectures for the masses. Moreover, attempts will be made to preserve and revive the Iranian crafts (sanaye'-e) and arts (honar-ha).

Article 10: To achieve those goals, the Society will request donations from the state and the people of Iran. For example, it will request from the state an appropriate location for the museum and library, and the procurement of experts to manage these institutions. It will also request the establishment of laws for the preservation of the national heritage.

Article 11: After the establishment of the [archeological] museum and the [national] library, the employment of experts for the management of these institutions, the recording of the decisions of the Board of Trustees; they do not seem to have independent decision-making power except for minor issues related to implementation.
patrimony and historic buildings, and the tabulation of the collection of books and the fine arts of
the country, the SNH will hand over these institutions to the antiquity branch of the Ministry of
Public Instructions (vezarat-e mo’aref). The Society will continue with its activities in
connection with the preservation and completion of these institutions as a special consultant.

Article 12: Corrections or modifications to the by-laws are to occur by the founding
committee [Board of Trustees]. Any suggestion to change the by-laws is to be considered by the
founding committee [Board of Trustees]. It is required that at least one-third of the Board
members agree with the suggestion in question. In any case, after one month of presentation of
the suggestion in a special session, the issue will be presented and voted for.

Article 13: For those points that are not foreseen in this by-laws, for example condition of
membership, financial contribution of founding members and general members, etc., the Board
of Trustees will compile and approve regulations (nezam-nameh) that will be adhered to and
practiced.

Article 14: Corrections and modifications of the above mentioned regulations are to be
made by the founding committee [Board of Trustees].

- **The Regulations (nezam-nameh-ye anjoman):**

**Formation of the Society**

Article 1: As per the by-laws, the Society is formed of three parts:

1. Founding members.
2. General members.
3. Honorary members.

Article 2: The honorary members are individuals who have donated services to the
scientific and industrial heritage of Iran and who have demonstrated special interest in the goals
of the Society by important financial and moral support. In addition, those individuals who
support the goals of the Society from outside Iran can become corresponding members of the
Society.

Article 3: The conditions of membership of the SNH are as follows:

1. The acceptance of the by-laws and regulations of the Society.
2. Iranian citizenship for the Founding and General membership.
Article 4: The membership acceptance of a General and Honorary member should be presented by two Founding members and be approved by majority votes of the Founding Committee [Board of Trustees].

Article 5: An annual fee of eight tomans for General members and sixteen tomans for Founding members have to be paid to the treasury of the Society.

Addendum: If a General member pays an amount of hundred and fifty tomans or more, or a Founding member pays an amount of three hundred tomans or more as a lump sum to the treasury of the Society, he will be considered a permanent member and will be exempt from paying the annual membership fee.

The Meetings of the Board of Trustees

Article 6: The Founding Committee [Board of Trustees] will decide upon regular meetings by a majority of votes of its members. In addition to these meetings, extra meetings will be held upon the request of the Board of Directors or seven members of the Board of Trustees.

Article 7: The decisions of the Board of Trustees are valid when the majority of the founding members who live in Tehran are present at the meeting. In case during a voting, the issue is not decided upon and the voting is postponed to the next meeting, the decision will be taken by those who are present at the second meeting.

Article 8: In the following cases the decisions of the Board of Trustees is valid only if two-thirds of the members living in Tehran are present at the meeting:

1. Selection of the members.
2. Amendments to the Bylaws or Regulations.
3. Dismissal of a member of the Society.

The Board of Directors (hey'at modireh)

Article 9: The Board of Trustees of the SNH will elect the Board of Directors once a year in Khordad [mid-May to mid-June].

Article 10: Responsibilities of the Board of Directors is as the followings:

1. To execute the decisions of the Board of Trustees.
2. To manage the foreign affairs.
3. To invite the Board of Trustees to the meetings according to Article 6.
4. To prepare semi-annual activity reports.
5. To prepare annual reports for the general assembly.
6. To oversee the financial activities of the Society and to prepare semi-annual financial reports for the Board of Trustees and annual financial reports for the general assembly.

Article 11: The matters that are decided by the Board of Trustees must be approved by the majority of the votes and in case of equal vote, the chairperson's vote is the decisive one.

The General Assembly

Article 12: The general assembly, consisting of all Founding, General, and Honorary members, meets once a year in the month of Ordibehesht [mid-April to mid-May].

Article 13: The general assembly meets by the invitation of the Board of Directors. The date and time of the meeting is decided by the Board of Directors, approved by the Board of Trustees, and submitted to the members by invitation-cards, and/or advertising through the mass media.

Article 14: In addition to the annual assembly, in case the Board of Trustees feels the need for a meeting, the Board of Directors, in a pre-approved manner according to the previous article, will invite the members of the Society.

Article 15: The general assembly will take place for the following reasons:

1. To listen to the report of the Board of Directors in connection with their yearly activities and achievements.
2. To listen to the report in connection with matters brought up by the Board of Trustees and the required budget in connection to these issues.
3. To transmit information about the assets and liabilities.
4. To discuss those issues upon which the Board of Trustees needs the agreement of the general assembly before making a decision.

Article 16: The general assembly is valid if one-third of its members who are in Tehran are present. However, if in the first meeting the assembly does not have a quorum, the next time the general assembly will be valid regardless of the number of members present.
Financial Matters of the Society

Article 17: Every six months the Board of Directors will prepare the Society’s financial report and submit it to the Board of Trustees. Once a year another detailed report will be presented to the general assembly.

Article 18: The financial affairs of the Society are the responsibly of the treasurer. He should keep the assets, liabilities, incomes, and expenditures of the Society in proper books. Preparation of semi-annual and annual reports is also his responsibility.

Article 19: No expenditure of the incomes of the Society is permitted unless it is within the budget that has been previously approved by the Board of Trustees. All incomes of the Society shall be submitted to the treasurer, and all expenditure permits shall be issued with the signatures of both the chairperson and the treasurer.

The Dismissal of a Member of the Society

Article 20: In the following cases, the Society members are dismissed from membership:

1. Disobedience to the conditions of membership, as stipulated in article 3.
2. Involvement in activities against the Society and involvement in political issues in the name of the Society.

Article 21: In connection with the cases indicated in the pervious article, dissociation of members depends on the decision of Board of Trustees.
APPENDIX 2: ARCHITECTURAL PROJECTS
List of Major Architectural Projects by the SNH

This appendix consists of the list of major architectural projects, either directly or indirectly, undertaken by the SNH from the Society's establishment in 1922 to the dawn of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It is by no means a comprehensive list because the SNH's activities were extensive and pervasive. This, however, is intended to serve as a general guide to its major building projects including the architects and/or sculptors responsible for the design, the dates of the monuments' construction and of their inauguration or visit by Pahlavi royalties.

1. Design and construction of Ferdawsi's mausoleum, Tus, Khorasan
   Architects/authors: Ernest Herzfeld, Taherzadeh Behzad, André Godard, Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, and Keikhosraw Shahrokh
   Sculptor: Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi
   1926-1934; inauguration by Reza Shah on October 12, 1934

2. Demolition and erection of Omar Khayyam's stele, Nishapur, Khorasan
   Architect: Taherzadeh Behzad
   1934, visited by Reza Shah on October 11, 1934

3. Renovation and alteration to the tomb-garden of Hafez, Shiraz, Fars
   Architect: Maxime Siroux
   1935-1938; visited by Mohammad Reza Shah and Queen Soraya on May 1, 1952

4. Demolition and construction of Sa’di’s mausoleum, Shiraz, Fars
   Architect: Mohsen Forughi and Ali Sadeq; Sculptor: Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi
   1945-1952; laying of cornerstone by Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1948 and inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on May 1, 1952

5. Construction of Reza Shah’s mausoleum, Ray, greater Tehran
   Architects: Keyqobad Zafar, Ali Sadeq, and Mohsen Forughi
   1948-1951, burial ceremony held with Mohammad Reza Shah’s presence in 1951

6. Demolition and construction of Ibn Sina’s mausoleum and museum complex, Hamadan, Hamadan
   Architect and sculptor: Houshang Seyhoun and Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi
   1949-1952; inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 29, 1954

7. Demolition and construction of Nader Shah’s mausoleum and museum complex, Mashhad, Khorasan
   Architect and sculptor: Houshang Seyhoun and Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi
   1955-1959; inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963
8. Demolition, relocation, and construction of Omar Khayyam’s tomb-memorial, Nishapur, Khorasan
Architect and sculptor: Houshang Seyhoun and Abd al-Hasan Sadiqi
1959-1963, inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963

9. Restoration of Shaykh Farid al-Din Attar’s shine, Nishapur, Khorasan
1960, visited by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963

10. Construction of Ghaffari Kamal al-Molk’s tomb-memorial, Nishapur, Khorasan
Architect: Houshang Seyhoun
1960-1962, inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963

11. Demolition and construction of Shah Shuja’ Mozaffarid’s tomb, Shiraz, Fars
Architects: proposed by Houshang Seyhoun, reworked by Sadr Hashemi, 1958-1965 c.

12. Restoration of Mohammad Mahruq Emamzadeh, Nishapur, Khorasan
1962-1967, visited by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 1, 1963/Farvardin 12, 1342

13. Dismantlement and reconstruction of Ferdawsi’s mausoleum, Tus, Khorasan
Architect: Houshang Seyhoun
1964-1968; inaugurated by Mohammad Reza Shah and Shahbanu Farah on April 30, 1968

14. Construction of Tayeb Tabrizi’s mausoleum, Isfahan, Isfahan
inaugurated by a group of scholars and politicians on October 7, 1968

15. Demolition and construction of Baba Taher’s mausoleum, Hamadan, Hamadan
Architect: Mohsen Forouhi; 1867-1970

16. Construction of the joint mausoleum of Phyllis Ackerman and Arthur Pope, Isfahan, Isfahan
Architect: Mohsen Forouhi and Ostad Hosayn Ma’arefi

17. Demolition and construction of Rouzbahan’s tomb, Shiraz, Fars. 1972

18. Construction of Sibueh’s tomb, Shiraz, Fars. 1975

Note: The SNH’s undertakings between 1975 and 1979 included a large number of minor constructions, reconstructions, or renovations. For the details of these projects, see the Society’s main report-book, the Karnameh.
APPENDIX 3: PUBLICATIONS

List of Publications by the SNH

Society for National Heritage 1. *Fehrest-e Mokhtasar-e Asar va Abnieh-ye Tarikhi-e Iran* [Brief inventory of Iran’s historical heritage and edifices] (Tehran, 1925/1304)

Society for National Heritage 2. *Asar-e Melli-ye Iran* [National heritage of Iran] (Tehran, 1925/1304)

Society for National Heritage 3. *Shahnameh va Tarikh* [the ‘Book of Kings’ and history] (Tehran, 1925/1304)


Society for National Heritage 5. *Se Khatabe dar bar-e Asar-e Melli va Tarikhi-e Iran* [Three lines of arguments about Iran’s national and historic heritage] (Tehran, 1927/1306)


Society for National Heritage 64, Bozorgan-e Shiraz [Masters of Shiraz], ed. R. A. Mehraz (Tehran, 1969/1348)


Society for National Heritage 81. Dar bare-ye Shahanshah-e Iran [About the King of Iran], trans. K. Jahandari (Tehran, 1971-1972/1350)


Society for National Heritage 86, Danesh va Khord Ferdawsi [Education of Ferdawsi], ed. M. Shay-e (Tehran, 1971-1972/1350)


Society for National Heritage 92, Majmu’ a-yeh Entesharat-e Qadim-e Anjoman [Collection of old publications of the Society] (Tehran, 1972/1351)


Society for National Heritage 103. Farhang-e Farsi be Pahlavi [Persian culture to Pahlavi], ed. B. Foruvashi (Tehran, 1974-1975/1353)


Society for National Heritage 125. Tarikh-e Nishapur [History of Nishapur], ed. Moud Sabe-i (Tehran, 1976/1355/2535)

Society for National Heritage 126. Bahsi dar Tarikh-e Ejtemai va Asar-e Tarikh-ye Kerman [Discussion on social and historical heritage of Kerman], ed. Ebrahim Bastani Parvizi (Tehran, 1976/1355/2535)


- **Booklets and Brochures**


APPENDIX 4: 1900 ARCHEOLOGICAL CONVENTION

Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929,
Perse 66 Fouilles Archéologique
E387-3, pages 17-19
August 11, 1900, Paris, France

Note: the original French text has been reproduced here as it appears in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"Convention relative à la concession des antiquités de la perse

Le présent traité a pour objet d’homologuer en un seul instrument diplomatique les conventions et clauses du traité du 12 mai 1895 (16 zilkade 1312) et du firman Royal d’octobre 1897 (djemmadi el awal 1315) avec les modifications dont l’expérience a démontré l’utilité.

En raison des bonnes et anciennes relations qui existent entre l’Iran et la France, en raison du traité passé entre les deux pays, le 16 zolkadi 1312 (12 mai 1895) et du firman signé par Sa Majeste Mozaffer el Din Shah en Djemmade el awal 1315 (octobre 1897) le Gouvernement persan ayant concédé au Gouvernement de la Republique française le droit exclusif et pépétuel de pratiquer des fouilles dans toute l’étendue de l’empire, les conditions dans lesquelles seront effectués les travaux, les études et l’attribution des objets trouvés, sont réglées par l’accord suivant:

Article Ier. - Les délégués français sont autorisés à fouiller dans toute l’étendue de l’Empire, sauf dans les lieux saints et vénérés tels que les mosquées et cimetières musulmans. Ils devront respecter les habitudes, les coutumes et les mœurs du pays et ne rien faire qui y soit contraire.

Article II. - Le Gouvernement français s’engage à verser au Tresor persan la valeur au poids de tous les objets d’or et d’argent découverts dans les fouilles. Tous les autres produits des fouilles sauf ceux provenant de la Suzians, lesquels resteront sans indemnité la propriété du Gouvernement français seront partagés par moitié entre les deux Gouvernements.

Article III. - Les matières d’or et d’argent découvertes seront pesées par un des membre de la Délégation française en présence du Gouverneur de la Province ou les fouilles auront été faites. Après constatation du poids, la valeur en sera versée par la Legation de France au Tresor persan.
Article IV. — Les délégues français sont autorisés à photographier, dessiner ou mouler toutes sculptures, statues, œuvres d’art ou inscriptions n’appartenant pas à des monuments religieux musulmans.

Article V. — Le Gouvernement persan s’engage à faire rendre aux savants français les honneurs qui leurs convois et transports, de leurs campements, habitations et magasins, a faciliter leurs travaux et leurs voyages dans les diverses provinces de l’Empire.

Article VI. — Chaque fois que le Gouvernement français lui manifestera l’intention de pratiquer des fouilles, sur un point déterminé, le Gouvernement persan designera un délégué instruit et intelligent qui aura pour mission de faire rendre aux savants français les honneurs qui leur sont dus, assurer leur sécurité, faciliter leurs travaux et veiller à ce que les conditions du traité ne soient pas transgressées.

Article VII. — Les savants français auront le droit de construire tous magasins et maisons qui seront jugés par eux nécessaires pour leurs travaux, pour leurs habitations et pour la garde de leur matériel ou des antiquités.

Article VIII. — Les colis reçus ou expédiés par la délégation scientifique et les bagages accompagnant les délégués français sont exempts de tous droits de douane, à l’entrée comme à la sortie, et dispensés des droits de douane et de la visite douanière dans l’intérieur de l’Empire. Ils ne pourront être visités qu’aux douanes frontières.

Article IX. — Le Gouvernement français prend à sa charge toutes les dépenses quelles qu’elles soient, en dehors de celles nécessitées par la protection et les égards dus à la délégation scientifique.

Article X. — Toutes les dispositions antérieures qui ne sont pas reproduites au présent traité sont et demeurent annulées d’un commun accord.

Article XI. — Le Gouvernement persan s’engage à donner les ordres nécessaires pour que les termes du présent traité soient connus et observés par tous les Gouvernements des provinces. Fait à Paris en double exemplaire le 11 août 1900. Correspondant au 14 Rabi-Sanih 1318

Approuvé — Ce contrat est exact. Sa Majesté Mozaffar-ed-Dine Chah Kadiar. 14 Rabi Sani 1318

à Paris Certifié sincère et véritable la traduction ci-dessus du persan en français.

APPENDIX 5: 1927 ARCHEOLOGICAL CONVENTION

Direction des Affaires Politique et Commerciales Asie-Oceanie 1919-1929, Perse 66 Fouilles Archéologique
E387-3, pages 75-80
October 18, 1927, Tehran, Iran

Note: the original French text has been reproduced here as it appears in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"Fouilles archéologique

Accord de principe conclu entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Impériale de Chah de Perse et le Gouvernement de la Republique Française au sujet de l'abolition de la Convention franco-persane de 1900 relative au monopole des fouilles archéologique.

Article I.— Le Gouvernement persan confiera à un spécialiste français, présenté par le Gouvernement français, la Direction Generale, sous l'autorite du Ministre Persan compétent, des Antiquités, de la Bibliothèque et du Musée. Le Gouvernement Persan demandera au Parlement de voter l’engagement de ce spécialiste pour cinq ans, mais pour marquer au Gouvernement de la Republique son sincere desir de voir un savant francais exercer les fonctions dont il s’agit pendant une periode beaucoup plus longue, il promet dès maintenant de proposer au Parlement, au moins trois fois encore après l’expiration des cinq premières années, l’engagement pour le même service et dans les mêmes conditions d’un spécialiste français de façon à embrasser une période minimale de vingt ans.

Article II.— Aussitôt que la premiere loi d’engagement pour cinq ans du Directeur Général Français, présenté par le Gouvernement Français, des Antiquités, de la Bibliothèque et du Musée sera voté par le Parlement et que le contrat d’engagement de ce spécialiste sera signé, le Gouvernement Français renoncera automatiquement sans autre délai et sans aucune réserve au monopole qui lui avait été concédé par la convention

[In the margin:] Il est entendu entre les signataires que le mot ‘automatiquement’ est
de 1900. En conséquence ni le Gouvernement Français, ni la Legation de France n’auront plus à intervenir en quoi que ce soit dans les questions des fouilles archéologiques en Perse. Les cas d’arbitrage qui seront prevus au contrat du Directeur et qui entraîneraient l’intervention de la légation de France ne pourront s’appliquer qu’aux relations personnelles entre le Directeur et le Gouvernement Persan.

Article III.— Le Gouvernement Persan n’aura aucune raison a donner ni aucune explication à fournir dans le cas où il jugerait convenable à la fin d’une période de cinq ans de proposer au Parlement l’engagement d’un spécialiste français différent de celui dont la période d’engagement aura pris fin.

Article IV.— La Mission Française pourra continuer les fouilles de Suse dans les conditions actuelles mais en se conformant aux règlements à venir concernant les fouilles et la répartition des objets trouvés.

Le 18 octobre 1927
Ont signé de la part du gouvernement Persan:
le Ministre de l’Instruction Publique: TADAYON
le Gérant du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères: F. PAKREVAN

A signé de la part du gouvernement Français:
Le Chargé d’Affaires de France en Perse: BALLEREAU.

[Attached on page 79]

Protocole de signature

Le 18 octobre 1927 a 12:30 heures au Palais du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a eu lieu la séance de signature de l’Accord de principe conclu entre le Gouv de Sa Majeste Impériale le
Chah de Perse et le Gouv de la République Française au sujet de l’abolition de la Conception franco-persane de 1900 relative au monopole de fouilles archéologiques.

Etaient présents, de la part de la Perse:
Son Excellence Tadayon, Ministère de l’Instruction Publique;
Son Excellence Fatoullah Khan Pakrevan, Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Etaient présents:
Son Excellence Anouchirevan Khan, Chef du Protocole.

De la part de la France:
Monsieur Ballereau, Chargé d’affaires de France en Perse.

Etaient présents:
Monsieur Bellan, Consul de France, 1er drogman de la Légation de France,
Monsieur Siassi, Monchi-Bachi de la Légation.

Après avoir relu les textes et après avoir constaté les conformités, les Délégués des deux pays ont signés l’accord en question.
Il est entendu que le texte français fera foi.
Téhéran, le 18 octobre 1927.

TADAYON F. PAKREvan
ANOUCHIERVAN BALLEREAU
MOHSEN KHAN RAIS SIASSI KHAN. »
APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW WITH HOUSHANG SEYHOUN

The Architect of Ibn Sina Mausoleum and Omar Khayyam's Tomb, Houshang Seyhoun, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, June 29, 2000, Vancouver, Canada.

Note: only those parts that are related to the architecture of the monuments are transcribed. Some historic explanations are not included.

- **Tape 1, Side B**

  [Unidentifiable conversation about Ferdawsiyeh]

  Talinn Grigor: So Ferdawi is inside?

  Houshang Seyhoun: Yes [...]

  Grigor: When the anjom [the SNH] wanted a project, they came to you or was it a national competition?

  S: The Ibn Sina [project] was a competition; the rest of the projects were requested by the anjom.

  G: How did they choose an architect?

  Hosayn Amanat: When he [Seyhoun] won the Ibn Sina project, he became famous and all the projects came to him.

  S: Well, I had already won the competition in Iran, then they organized the Sina competition and I won and then the war ended. When the war ended, Godard was the Dean of [Tehran University's] School [of Fine Arts]. Godard was a staunch Gaulist, a Gaul-worshipper.

  A: He was a Gaulist, a [French] nationalist.

  S: When we went to the museum to see Godard, he had the photo of Gaul on his table.

  A: Tell us how he was.

  S: I will. He was one of the best human beings that I have ever known. An extraordinary man. Very good, very good. Until the end of the war we all spoke French at School. Our professor was a French – Maxime Siroux, he published a good book on Caravanserai – at a time when no one did such a thing, and he did an extraordinary job of it in 1937. When the war ended, the French government...had a cultural policy (siasat-e farhangi), which was to select upper [level] students from around the world in France. All subjects, so that they would return to their country. Mr. [André] Godard [head of the Archeological Services in Iran] was selected for this
job in Iran. Eight were selected from Iran. One was I, a high honor student. Eight of us went to France. Two things occurred during that time, one was this [Sina competition]. Foroughi, Sadeg, Zafar, [and] Anjavi had created an anjoman called anjoman-e architect-ha-ye Iran [Society of Iran's Architects, SIA]. Those of us who finished the school would automatically become part of the anjoman. However, these men had so much power and did not take us seriously that we would go there with low heads...[unrelated story about Veresk bridge and a monument in front of the train station]. A request was made to the anjoman for the design of the monument. The jury consisted of foreigners at that time in Iran. Both SNH and SIA were part of it. They printed an advertisement in the journal and I won the competition. The SIA rejected the jury's decision because I was not in the country. They called me to their place and there was a big fight, it was very bad. I was twenty-three years old. I said "take your grievances to the jury, not me." Finally, they paid the first and second prize – second 700 tomans to Sadeq.

S: Returning to Godard who was responsible for sending students to France, and he also was part of the SNH.

A: It was created by Reza Shah?

S: No, it was created during his reign. Since I was the winner of Bu Ali [Ibn Sina or Avicenna] competition, I thought I wanted to construct the building, but a young man who has just finished school does not have the experience. I went to Godard and asked him to release me from going to Paris, because I wanted to construct this monument here [in Iran] and if I were to go abroad, I would not be able to do this. Godard said, "I don't have the budget for that building, you can go to farang [abroad] and regularly send me your address and when the budget is ready, I will let you know." The budget was ready exactly when I had passed all my exams and the only remaining part was the diploma project. They wrote, "either come" – because in the newspaper, it was mentioned that the only prize of the competition was the construction of the monument and nothing else – therefore I had the right to build. I thought that if I were to return to Iran I would have to do the drawings and the preparatory work in Iran first, so I decided to make this my diplomat project. I told Godard about my plans and asked him to communicate it to the anjoman. He did and they agreed. However, I also thought of signing a contract. A contract came to me [in Paris]. According to it, the architects responsible were Foroughi, Zafar, Sadeq, and I. Immediately I wrote a letter saying, "I am not even coming back to Iran. I don't want the project." I politely said to Godard, "you have advertised one thing in the papers and why should
these men be involved in this project, I am doing all the work here, what is their involvement in this; this is my right; you want to destroy my rights.” A second contract arrived. The next projects did not involve any competition.

S: In the middle of the construction of Bu Ali, I had major problems with Hekmat. At the time, he was the head of the anjoman and was a very staunch Reza-Shahian dictator, very staunch. He kept telling me that I should do this and that. Our water would not run in the same jub [We did not see eye to eye]. And I would not obey him to the point that the day of the inaugural of the monument, when the shah was going to be present, I was not invited.

G: So you did not go?

S: No, I did not go. If I had gone, the degree of my success would not have been as much as when I did not go. Someone said, “If you had been there, they would not have talked about you as much.” After that, all these projects came to me like that.

G: This first project was advertised in the Etela’at?

S: In all the newspapers of the time. Ettela’at, Iran, … in the year 1323-24.

G: And only Iranians could participate?

S: Yes.

G: Who chose the sites and the historic figures?

S: All of these sites always existed. The Bu Ali aramgah was a street called Bu Ali. There was a property of 45m and 68m. There was a tomb and behind ran a river. The old building was ridiculous (mozakhraf); it was nothing. Therefore, the site existed. However, we took the entire site and moved the grave. The surrounding was a cemetery. Now they have created a square, which is not good because this building was not created for a square. I wanted the building to remain in its original context.

G: How about the statue [of Ibn Sina]?

S: The statue was not there [originally]. It was in the north where there was a square. Now they took and displaced it. It was the work of Sadighi. I have not seen it. The site of Nader Shah…that of Khayyam, this is Emamzadeh Mahruq, right at the corner there was a mileh [a pole or rod]. This too they had built in a hurry (ba-ajaleh) during Reza Shah’s era. The [Orientalist] really wanted to visit Khayyam because he was famous when visiting Ferdawsi. So that the Orientalist would not see something ugly, they built this in a hurry. After Reza Shah, the anjoman wanted to build Khayyam’s aramgah, they asked me, it was impossible to build it there.
I thought the best solution was to give an axis on the length [of the garden] and build the aramgah here, so that there would not be a connection between the two buildings [of Khayyam’s tomb and the emamzadeh]. In the mean time, we altered the access [to the garden] because on the existing side there was no parking. My argument is that Khayyam is unique whereas there are thousands of emamzadehs. Let me explain something for you. We have a lot of monuments in Iran, a lot. From Cyrus to the present, but none of these monuments have been created with a unique quality that has a special connection (ertebat-e khasi) to the character of the person [buried there]. For example, you have been to Naqsh-e Rostam, right?

G: Correct.

S: There are four monuments built for four kings, in the mountain, which is in the form of a cross. Four different kings, four difference characters, but all four monuments are the same. Later, after Cyrus – Cyrus is the only person who has a separate tomb, even that does not signify anything about Cyrus’ character, they just built a structure. After Islam, the same thing, even the Qabus tower, etc. all these are the same thing – none carry the character of the person buried inside. I thought the monument that I want to build has to respect several things: First, there have to be symbols in the monument, which speak about the character of the person. For Bu Ali’s aramgah, this tower is a tower, which is a reminder of Qabus tower. Qabus Ibn Hoshmgir who lived during Bu Ali’s lifetime and Bu Ali went to his court. Therefore, it is a monument in the style of Bu Ali’s lifetime but which has been created in a modern style. In reality, the same thing that these postmodernists do...

A: Now!

S: Yes, a thing that you take from the past eras. Second, the columns that total ten. Each column signifies one century for the occasion of his millenary... [The upper columns] are twelve in total. Bu Ali was famed as the “Scholar of twelve Sciences” – he was specialized in many many things…. And finally one thing that is very interesting. Bu Ali was a perfect man. The dimensions fit into a perfect square within which a man fits...[multitude of square proportions in the design]. There are 500-600 squares. This was my first idea. Until then, no one had designed monuments based on the character of the person. Now for the Nader Shah’s tomb... [Details of Nader Shah’s mausoleum design].

T: Why was Nader Shah, as the only political figure, chosen for these projects?
S: If you pay attention to Iran’s history, you will realize that Nader was the savior of Iran, on top of that he was a genius in war tactics...[details of Nader Shah’s campaigns in India and Afghanistan]. The second reason is that when they wanted to build Nader [‘s tomb], there existed three top military men in Mashhad: Sepahbod (General) Aqeveli, Sepahbod Jahanbani, and Sarlashgar (General) Firuz. These men had a military gang and they kept writing to the SNH saying, “the existing Nader tomb is not worthy of Nader and we want a new structure.”

[End of Side B]

- Tape 1, Side A

S: Let me tell you a story. During the construction of the new [Nader’s tomb], Hekmat, with whom I had a very bad relationship, had become the ambassador of Iran to India. And Hekmat always wanted to have a direct saying in the things that needed to be done; so that his name would be associated with the project. For Bu Ali project, he went and found an aye from the Quran that had “Hekmat” in it and was inscribed on the monument. At that time, he did not agree that an aramgah should be built by the SNH for Nader. He wrote a letter to me from India arguing that since Indians do not have a good relation with Nader, he wishes that this work [i.e. the construction of the monument] did not occur because it would offend the Indians. I prepared the drawings and took them to the anjoman for approval. The same day, Hekmat’s letter arrived [at the anjoman]. Mr. Hakim al-Molk [Ebrahim Hakimi], [Hosayn] Ala, and the rest were sitting there. When they read the letter, Hakim who could not hear well, asked Ala ‘what’s going on?’ Ala explained that Hekmat is requesting the SNH not to build [Nader’s tomb] because we have good relations with India and they will be offended. The moment that he heard this, in a loud voice, he said, “Will it offend them? To hell with them (jahanam)!" Once that he said this, we did not look at the letter anymore. [Details of Nader Shah’s mausoleum design].

G: While designing, did you know what the SNH wanted in terms of form?

S: No, they only gave me the function: library, museum, and statue. For Bu Ali, they wanted a library, a study, and the tomb-chamber within the structure but for Khayyam [‘s tomb], they wanted nothing. For Ferdawsi [‘s tomb] nothing. [Unrecognizable].

G: When you proposed a design, did they ask for changes?

S: No, no, with Nader’s tomb we took the proposal to the shah. He would study them and approve.
G to Amanat: Just like your [Shahyad design].
A: Yes, [unrecognizable].
S: Over Nader [\textquoteleft\textquoteleft s tomb design\textquoteright\textquoteright] they wanted to kill me. There was a General [\textit{farmandar-e lashgar}] in the army – this is in the \textit{Karnameh} – who would drive me crazy. The issue was this: usually when we went to Mashhad, we would take the train. We would stay awake all night, then take the car directly without resting, to the site with the representative of the SNH, so that we could finish the work by the afternoon and return to Tehran… There was no time to socialize. One of these days, when we had arrived [on the site], someone came and said that the \textit{sar-lashgar} is here for an inspection. I said, "what inspection, the building does not have an inspection!" I realized that we were falling behind so I told someone else to escort the \textit{sar-lashgar}. He was offended by this. From that day on, during the three years that we were in construction, he orchestrated bad opinion about me and the landmark, in newspapers and elsewhere – until the day when it was finished and we wanted to inaugurate it. The SNH provided a special train for everyone to participate. The photo of that day is in the \textit{Karnameh}.

[...] When in the morning we went to the Nader Garden (\textit{bagh-e naderi}), all around there were soldiers standing with automatic weapons. They did not do that even when the shah would come. That day, they did. After they read the announcements and the rest, the \textit{timsar} got up and started to complain; that "we did not the aramgah in this style." That, "we had a minaret, so that a sword can be placed on top of it so that they could write on it, 'Nader, Son of Sword'." If they had built something like that, it would have been very ridiculous (\textit{maskhareh}). Then, \textit{Sepahbod Aqevali} asked me, "What is your answer [to the \textit{timsar}'s critic]?" [...] I said, "as much as I know about the issue involving the army, the gentleman knows about architecture" [unidentifiable]. They made us kiss and make up; we even went to lunch as guests of Khorasan's Governor. [...] Because of the success of this building, I named my son Nader. Then, the day of the return with train, that same \textit{timsar} came to see us off. He told \textit{Timsar Aqevali} and \textit{Timsar Jahanbani} said that "from tomorrow on, I will place soldiers at the monument so that no one could destroy it."

\textit{Timsar Aqevali} told him, "Do what you want here, but know this, this project and this building has been ordered by His Majesty. If you destroy it, remember who you'll have to deal with."

G: The shah?
S: Yes, we left. At 8 pm in the train, dinner was ready and I happened to be at a table with Mr. Mehran, who was part of the SNH.
A: The Minister of Culture.

S: No, he was a governor then. At the dinner table – I knew nothing then – he said to me, “you got away well.” I said, “what?” He said, “Didn’t Anshan tell you that he [timzar] wanted to kill you? After having a lot of vodka at 6 am, he had told his underlings that ‘today I am going to kill someone’.” They had called Anshan and he had ordered the soldiers around the garden. [...] This was not the end of it. Two months later, Timsar Aqeveli called me and said, “Come here immediately I have something important.” I went to the SNH; the Board of Directors was there. There was a letter from the timzar for the shah. It said, “This building does not have tile-works and a minaret,” things that did not go with Nader’s violent personality. He had written very bad things about me; that “Why have you given this commission to an unknown architect, on top of it, a Jew!” They asked me to respond to that. The first thing I did was to put my hand in my pocket and pull out my driver’s license where the name of [my] father was “Seyyed.” I asked, “Can a Jew be a Seyyed?” Then, I said, “I am not answering.” They said, “You have to because this is written to the shah and we have to answer him.” I repeated the same thing as the other day. I said, “Invite all the experts of the country and ask their opinions [...]” We gathered recommendations [...] and other documents and sent then to the shah. A month later, the timzar was called from Mashhad to Tehran and that was the end of that. [Discussion about Nader Shah’s personality.]

G: Could you speak a bit about the inaugurations?

S: That day was 12 Farvardin [13]43 the day of inauguration. The shah had come to it. Over all the dirt that had been said, the journals had published. The SNH felt that only I should go next to the shah and explain things. If you remember, in the photos I am standing to the shah. On that same day, he had to inaugurate Nader Shah’s aramgah, and then go to Nishapur over Khayyam’s inaugural and the same day, the aramgahs of Attar and Kamal al-Molk. And in the afternoon to Birjand. In the morning [the shah] came there, and Aqeveli was there too, who was reporting. It was six to seven pages, very comprehensive. Etehar-e Tehrani was the Governor of Khorasan, standing next to him [the shah]. In the middle of Aqeveli’s report, he was saying to the shah “let me cut him off because there is no time. Listen to the report in the train.” I realized if they do something like that, it would offend the Timzar [Aqeveli]. I began to explain the characteristic of the structure so that he would be entertained and not listen to Tehrani [structural explanations about the keystone construction]. I was explaining these things to the shah. When it
was done, he came and cut the ribbon; he went in, on the tomb of Nader. Then he asked for a microphone, he wanted to talk. His photo is in the Karnameh. He had loved the building because he answered to the timsar’s dirt. After that we got into cars and went to Nishapoor and there inaugurated the rest.

G: He [the shah] spoke there too?
S: Yes, well usually he would not talk, but here [at Naderiyeh] he spoke intentionally to respond to the previous talks.

G: Did the king tell you specifically whether he liked these, all of these, buildings?
S: Yes, of course. [Structural explanations about Khayyam’s tomb based on mathematical and geometric rules and Khayyam’s wishes for his tomb to be open to the weather and flowers].

G: My final question, how do you think the Iranian people have received, accepted, liked these monuments?
S: As far as I can remember, when I was in Iran, there have not been difficulties for me. At the present, [...] was in Iran and took video of my monuments and there are guides [...] and everyone appreciates them.

G: Why do you think these monument...
S: Only I do not agree with one thing. These people, especially the guides who are not informed of things, they say things in reverse. For example, in the video that I have, the guide explains to the people that the architect of this monument wanted to do this to show that this is a cup of wine in reverse [Seyhoun is talking about Khayyam’s monument]. This is completely idiotic.

A: It’s a way of vilifying him. They want to show that he [Seyhoun] was a drinker.
S: No, no, they want to say that Khayyam was a drinker. Or that the guide explained about the 12 columns for the 12 sciences of Bu Ali, he said it was for the 12 Imams.

A to G: Go back and repeat what you said earlier.
G: Exactly, exactly. That is, monuments can be interpreted by people [...] and so ‘12 Sciences’ become ‘12 Imams’...

S: In a different époque, there is a different explanation. There is no need to base oneself on people’s lives, because people are un-acculturated (inculte). Outside the question...

G: Yes, but you as the architect...
S: I cannot be there to correct...
G: No, you should not be there to correct but when you were building a monument, you wanted to say something, to explain something.

S: I have given my explanations.

G: But it is wrongly understood.

S: [Seyhoun laughing...Discussion about Armenian architecture and Mount Ararat during Seyhoun’s visit to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia...]

G: In your opinion, why were not these monuments destroyed. Why do you think the clerics destroyed many other things but not these monuments?

A: Well, it’s obvious why they destroyed Reza Shah’s [tomb]. How about Nader’s tomb?

S: [Explanation about Nader Shah’s election as king...] They should have destroyed Nader on the horse. However, a majority of the people has a reverence for Nader. Second, Nader renovated Imam Reza’s Shrine. In their [clerics’] opinion this has an inherent value.

A: [Unidentifiable]

S: I removed the monument completely, completely [regarding Ferdawsiyeh’s 1968-renovations]

G: At once?

S: No, piece by piece; stone by stone. We numbered the stones and we removed them. First, we did an exact, detailed drawing of the elevation. And then, removed them and reconstructed...

[End of side A]
APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW WITH ZAREH GRIGORIAN

The Structural Engineer of Omar Khayyam’s Tomb, Zareh Grigorian, in an interview recorded by Talinn Grigor, September 3, 2003, Belmont, Massachusetts, USA.

- Tape 1, Side A

Talinn Grigor: We could go on with Armenian [langue] I will later translate. I was wondering whether you are ok with using our conversation here in my dissertation.

Zareh Grigorian: Sure.

T: I also took a photo of you last time and I would like to use that in the dissertation.

Z: I believe I was younger then, correct?

T: Yes, two years.

Z: [Laughing] Yes, of course.

T: This time, I would like us to focus on Khayyam’s monument; whatever you remember about it from the beginning. How did they choose you as the engineer, etc?

Z: That is a very interesting story, because I had just returned from US and was only 26-27 years old. I met Seyhoun who was a man who always tried to find [able] people, because he was someone with a difficult character. However, of course, in my opinion he was a very prolific artist. Even now that I have worked with hundreds of people and have had 2,000 students who are all over the world, more or less famous, [still I believe he was so]. So, I got back [to Iran] looking for a job, my briefcase in my hands, from this door to that door, this architect to that architect, and it was so arranged that we got to meet each other. For some reason that project was occasioned. His biggest challenge of the project was to be able... The columns that he had designed were of a unique form of columns. On the plan, they had one direction, but when they went up, they would turn.

T: Yes, I see.

Z: And, itself it was not a column per se, so that it could bring the load directly down. It would come down and at some point would break [into two directions] and he [Seyhoun] did not want anything there; he did not want any ring or anything else to take the pressure. The most important thing was the thinness of it; he really wanted it to be thin so that I would keep the beautiful proportions.
T: As far as I remember, the column comes down and has an opening here [at the middle], then it would come very close to each other and then would separate again.

Z: Yes, I think I have a photo somewhere here; it has been a long time, and I think it has been forgotten. Well, in my opinion, it has been forgotten but apparently, there is still interest in it. The biggest challenge of all was that he wanted it to have a stone veneer. He was not ready to accept the use of any exposed steel or exposed concrete. It had to be stone. For stone, the best thing would have been to have concrete and on top of that stone. But this [the distance from one façade to the other] could not have been too much; the minimum that would rise upwards. In addition, it had a very complicated shape. If they were to make that complicated form on the top [of the monument] out of concrete, it would have cost them an enormous amount [of money]. They had to build a model and then build the formwork on the elevation. My proposition was... On top of it all, the question of money was a serious one. The budget was not such that you could spend whatever you wanted. So one thing that I proposed was that we take a steel, an I-beam and cut it in such a way to get the thickness that he [Seyhoun] wished. When you take a large-size I-beam, for instance, 3 feet or something, its flange is very wide. If this is 24 inches, then this [the flange] is at least 12 inches. We did not want this [the flange] to be 12 but did want this [the height] to be 24.

T: But where did this I-beam go in the structure?

Z: Let me explain. We cut this [the ends of the I-beam] so that the I-beam came with a small flange. And all the stone were placed around it, and then concrete was poured in it. Therefore, this became a composite concrete with an I-beam, but of course, trimmed I-beam so that the size was small. So with this steel we were able to do the job easier – they would build one and twist it [on the top]. That was the principle. Fortunately, it was very successful both in terms of money and technically it was almost a pre-cast thing. They built the skeleton and connected to each other, then fixed the stone and poured the concrete. That part was a bit difficult because of the curved surfaces. However, they had a very good contractor. He [Seyhoun] fortunately had the advantage of choosing good contractors. I don’t recall the name of that contractor now for it was long time ago. When was it? 1957, 1958 when I got back to Iran, and six months later I got this job...my first big job that fortunately, I don’t know how it happened but I was given that kind of a job. As someone young you always take risks; whatever they say, you say, “I can do it.” if they approach me now, no, there are thousand kinds of
obligations. There is suing, and this and that...without experiments... [the monument] turned out so successful that the stone never got separated [from each other] – of course they would tie the stones together before pouring the concrete. However, as long as I was in Iran, that structure never had a problem. There is a big concrete mate right underneath, a round foundation; one piece of circular mate so that it [the structure] keeps its own balance.

T: So the first thing was to pore this mate with reinforced concrete?

Z: Of course...

T: I am still unable to visualize the I-beams. Is this a plan that you are drawing?

Z: Yes, yes it is a plan. Yes, so the I-beams would vertically go up, each with their own slop. However many unites they were, they would build individually. They erected them and then fastened them tighter. In the middle there was a formwork...a temporary formwork, one on this side, one on this side...before everything, like stone or etc., there were these steels. Then on top of that we affixed the stones. Of course, there was no dishonesty, because if you are seeing a stone, it is not important if underneath, there is steel, concrete, or whatever. [I am saying this] because he [Seyhoun] was very much against these kinds of stuff, of having any kind of dishonesty in the design. We had many fights with each other at the time. In Niavaran [Palace renovations], we built a shell and he would not accept our proposal to place waterproofing over it...when it was done, during rainy days, water would leak [laughing]. Finally, he was convinced and we placed copper on it. It's still there, a private, very beautiful house. He had that kind of a character; he would not be convinced.

T: You mean his argument was that “whatever I see on the surface has to be inside?”

Z: Ya, ya, he would say, “I don’t want to be dishonest.” That, “One should not build a concrete column and cover it with brick.” Ardalan was the same, we worked similarly with him; there were others who did not care about such things as long as something was built. Three months ago at a conference in Vancouver I found his number but did not call because it was too late. But I have heard that he is painting now and is very successful, doing exhibitions, etc. [Seyhoun’s student and their meetings, etc.] Seyhoun built a Beethoven mask and gave it as a gift to my brother Rouben Grigorian who was a composer. [Village neighbors with Seyhoun]. He built a very interesting house next to us. After all these fights, we ended up being neighbors. But that first job gave me the opportunity of having a very interesting job at a very young age. I had no experience in Iran, especially with steel. I had worked a few years in US before returning to
Iran. As for Pope, you were asking [earlier], I met him several times because he and his wife were interested in Persian architecture all their lives, and he wanted information about domes. This generated interest in me to go and find out how these domes work. This Shell-theory, as I mentioned last time, was published. Nader Khalili,…

T: You gave me your article, the Shell-theory…

Z: They threw me in this work, several times I traveled extensively with architect [Mohsen] Foroughi and F…[undistinguishable] around Shiraz looking at domes; there is one 1000 years old…

T: And if you were to compare Seyhoun with Foroughi?

Z: They are very different people.

T: How are they different?

Z: Seyhoun has a much more open vision; Foroughi much more classic and conservative.

Very...his works are around? Didn’t he do one of these monuments?

T: Yes, he authored that of Pope and Ackerman.

Z: really?

T: Well, his father, Mohammad-Ali Foroughi was a good friend of Pope since 1925…

Z: When did Pope die?

T: In 1969.

Z: So it was before the Revolution [of 1979] that Foroughi died…

T: Because Mohammad-Ali Foroughi was a very good friend of Pope’s, Mohsen Foroughi began to travel with Pope all over Iran, and since Foroughi had been educated in Europe, according to his words, “I began to appreciate Iranian [architecture] because of Pope.”

Z: It was because of Pope and Ardalan that interest was generated about [Iranian architecture.] They would take me to their meetings where there were very important people, the famous Iranian intellectuals, etc. I would go as a structural engineer; I traveled with them with great interest. We saw a mosque where villagers had taken all the stones and had built a village next to it…around Shiraz. They gave money to buy back these stones from the villagers. It is done everywhere in the world. One other incident: they took me to Isfahan to see a structure; apparently, it had been significant in the past. It had become a private house… All these renovations were on a volunteer basis… Foroughi and those other people, they would not take
money. But it was a good experience in renovations. Here [in the US], I do a lot [of such things]...

T: For this [Khayyam’s] project, do you remember how long it took from the day you walked into Seyhoun’s office to the day...

Z: It was very quick. Apparently, talks had been going on for a while, leading to nothing.

T: And within a year...

Z: Ya, ya see, the construction itself was symmetrical. Once they built one, they would erect 10 per day. The only thing that took long was the fixing of the stones. Even that, all the stones were identically cut.

T: So you would go to the site and supervise?

Z: No, I never did. I have not seen it. I have only seen it in photos but many-many of them from which I remember the top that was designed to be open so that rain would fall on his [Khayyam’s] tomb. That was how it was done...with rhombus openings, they were not even rhombus since they were on a curve. [Discussion about photos.] Who did [designed and constructed] Ferdawsi [‘s mausoleum]? The one with the sword?

T: You are thinking of Nader Shah’s tomb.

Z: Right, right.

T: Ferdawsi’s is the first that the Society [for National Heritage] built

Z: Right now I remember. Nader Shah was Seyhoun’s with big stones. He was not very happy with that one, with the engineer so he came and found me. I would not take the job now...[laughing] but it was interesting and I was looking for a job. You are young and you come back to a country in which you don’t have contacts and you look for a job.

T: So you were 25 years old?

Z: No, I was 28.

T: From Harvard [University]?

Z: Ya, I finished in 1958 and I came back after working for six months.

T: So one day you just walked into his [Seyhoun’s] office?

Z: Everywhere I would go looking for a job. And one day, I don’t remember who said I should go. He had an accountant and through him I got to meet him [Seyhoun]. He knew my brother but that did not mean that it was a plus in engineering.

T: Did your being Armenian matter in all this?
Z: Well, he was very close to Armenians, being a Baha’i himself and had many Armenian students. He had no biases. However, he was a very unique character. Very difficult.

T: Difficult meaning he was very stubborn?

Z: Yes, stubborn, his will had to be executed and he was a very angry man. He knew himself to be superior, which in my opinion he had the right to be. After him, the university graduates were not of as high quality. During his time, it was much... it was Kolsar after him, or Mikeleski. Do you know him?

T: No, but I do know that in 1968, he fought and left.

Z: Ya, the fights were always there.

T: But Mr. Rostom Voskanian says something else. That “Seyhoun had dominated all the studios and he would walk around... it had turned out that everyone designed the same thing.” When he left there was more diversity in students’ works.

Z: He would know better. Rostom was a very close friend of mine. We worked together on several projects and were friends. After him [Seyhoun], it was Kolsar, they invited me to teach. I went for two years teaching a course [called] “Advanced Structures.” There were a number of students in the class and only one course, since I was totally involved at the daneshgah-e melli [National University]. I did it with great pleasure. [Discussion about teaching]

T: Do you remember the cost of the structure?

Z: No! [Laughing] There have been so many projects since. I don’t even remember how much they paid me for that. I am trying to recall the name of the contractor because it was one of the best, the absolute best.

T: As far as I remember it was KJT.

Z: Perhaps I can look into old papers, perhaps KJT...

T: The place of Khayyam’s burial has been changed three times. First, it was in one of the niches of the emamzadeh. Then in 1934, during the Ferdawsi’s celebration by Reza Shah, all the Orientalists on their way to Tus stopped at Nishapoor. For that they destroyed the old and in its place built a monument with a stele. However, that too did not have a foundation and started to fall apart. When, finally, they built this. So each time this poor man’s bones were removed.

Z: I was never aware of these issues; I was only involved in drawing [the structure]. I would appreciate if you have any images of it.
T: Of course, I have slides that you can have for both details and general views. I will send them to you [unrelated conversation]. So you don’t recall whether there ever was a problem with the site.

Z: No, we had no difficulties. If you think carefully, the advantage of this project in terms of structure was its symmetry.

T: But the problem of exactly where should the monument be in the garden....

Z: That was a thing that took a while to decide because there were trees, etc.

T: So when you came, most of these decisions were made?

Z: Before me, there were a couple of people who had looked at it and said it won’t work. Right now we are working for a German architect and we have been fighting over one inch for over a month. The structural engineer tries to accommodate to the possible extent but some ask more than that which is possible. This project was like that: the thickness with which the column went up, if it were thicker, it would not have that kind of proportion. The thickness was limited to a certain amount you could not change. So, they gave a project and said these are the sizes and you have to build it. It was one of those projects that could not be changed in any way.

T: You did everything yourself, you did not have a team? You did all the drawings?

Z: No, of course not. I had just returned. I had only $15 in my pocket. After 4-5 months this position opened up.

T: Would this statement be correct: since the *anjoman* [SNH] was a governmental organization, this job enabled you to enter the professional circles?

Z: No, I already had a job at the *edaraye sakhteman-e bank-e melli* [the Technical Office of the National Bank] where [Mohsen] Foroughi was the director. Before leaving for the US, since I had been the best student [in my year] I ended up working at the National Bank. The Technical Office was one of the most important places for architecture and engineering. When I returned I wanted to work for myself so I did not give myself fully to the [Technical] Office and then I left. I worked with Modam for 20 years. In that same place Jamshid Amouzegar worked for feasibility studies. So it was really the Shiraz University that made me known. Five or six of the main buildings there, including the central library was our work.

T: How about Tehran University’s central library?

Z: That was my work too.

T: You also did the Modern Art Museum.
Z: [Explanations about Ardalan’s work in Tehran] The renovation of Golestan Palace was our work. [Looking at portfolio of works and talking about individual buildings].

T: Was it easy to work with [Kamran] Diba?

Z: Yes, very. [Looking at portfolio of works and talking about individual buildings].

Z: Ardalan was very innovative. When he came to Iran, he had been away for a long time and he could introduce lots of innovations.

T: How was the relationship between Ardalan and Seyhoun?

Z: I don’t think it was bad. They worked with very different systems: Ardalan completely American and Seyhoun completely European. Europeans never paid too much attention to details. On the papers it would say: “for further details, see me on the site!” [Laughing] They would decide everything on site, unlike the American system where everything had been decided beforehand. [Further description of project in the portfolio.]

- **Tape 1, Side B**

Z: I was more involved with schools and cultural activities. [Further description of project in the portfolio]. One can talk a long time about Iran. Our office was very active.

T: When did you leave Iran?

Z: My children came to study here, before the revolution [Undistinguishable]. We came in 1979. After the revolution I returned for six months to teach at the university

T: Tehran or National [Melli] University?

Z: National only. There were no problems. The work situation was unclear so I downsized my office. A month later, there was the hostage taking at the [US] embassy. Therefore, I came to America and worked here. Two or three [engineers] remained at the office, and then I don’t know what happened. The active years were from 1962 to 1979 on a very big scale. We did six to seven university campuses: Bu Ali, Mashhad, Jondeshapur, Tabriz. The entirety of National [Melli] University was the work of our office; 19 structures and the amphitheater. Dr. Jahanara was the director of the university [Discussion about Jahanara and the university system].

T: Thank you very much.

[End of conversation]
APPENDIX 8: INTERVIEW WITH HOSAYN AMANAT

The Iranian-Canadian architect, Hosayn Amanat, in a written interview by Talinn Grigor, April 2, 2000, Vancouver, Canada.

Talinn Grigor: How did your education and career develop? Who were your mentors in Iran and whose ideologies from the West, did you adhere to? Very briefly, how can you situate yourself as an architect 1970, just prior to the commission of Shahyad?

Hosayn Amanat: My architecture degree is from the School of Architecture, Faculty of Fine Arts, Tehran University. The story of how I ended up in Architecture School is itself an interesting one. My secondary school education was in Alborz High-School in Tehran. Architect "Heydar Ghiai" was my first professor at the Atelier Ghiai, one of four Ateliers of the time. After first year due to imprisonment of Mr. Ghiai and Architect Mohsen Foroughi, the Dean of the School, due to Majles-Sana [Senate] episode, our school went through some changes. Architect Houshang Seyhoun became the Dean of the School and thus he became my second mentor. I should also mention, thinking back on our school, it was a very free happy and joyful environment without much restrictions, rules, and regulations. Mr. Seyhoun brought more discipline, however the main dynamic force was the love of the teachers and students to the High Art of Architecture. The school had limited resources, e.g., the "History of Art" course thought by old Mr. Moghaddam did not have a course book. He did not even refer us to any English or French resource in the school’s library where the books were from forty years before when Mr. André Goddard established the school, and rumors was that Sadegh Hedayat [the renowned existentialist author of the 1950s Iran] was the librarian. Out of the students’ desperation a photocopied pamphlet of notes written by one of students with ambiguity and mistakes, published by the head janitor (Farrash) of school "Mash Abbas Ali" circulated in the hands of students during the examination period as a precious commodity. In the Ateliers [studios], we would learn a lot when working on the projects of other students, and some of the talented ones acted as our mentors in the time when our professors could not spend time in the Atelier due to economic boom in Iran and the fact that they had a lot to do in their offices (e.g. for my Diploma Thesis, Mr. Ahamad Hashemi who was in our Atelier and like many others senior students, had not finished the school, helped me a great deal). I had also worked in Mr. Ghiai’s and other architects’ offices before graduation. The educational ideology of our school was inspired by the
Beaux-Arts. Later on after Mr. Seyhoun himself a Beaux-Arts graduate became the Dean, graduates from Italian and other foreign schools started to teach at the School and we benefited from the input of teachers like Architect Mirfendereski. The Beaux-Arts approach was Architecture as “High Art” and Beauty, with the arrival of the new wave more emphasize, was put on the social and urban context of the projects. It seems André Godard who had a special love for Iranian Art and Architecture founded the school perhaps with a great deal of hope to be inspired from the Iranian Architecture as he did in few buildings he designed, but by the time I entered there western style of Architecture had become dominant.

G: As I understand, the project started with a nationwide competition. What year was it announced and within which general socio-political and professional circumstances did it emerged and develop?

A: As graduate (Magna Cum Laude) of the school after working about one year on my thesis with 25 rendered drawings of large size some about 4X6 meters, I had plans to continue studies in USA. When I saw the small ad in first page of Etela’at in 1966 few months after my graduation, regarding competition for a monument for 2500 years of Iranian Kingdom, I was very dubious as to how serious and sincere competition it can be, and how much as a fresh graduate with no connections, I could hope for success, however I thought this is only one drawing and I can do it in no time. It took me about a month with thousands of ideas and sketches and doubts. At last in that evening few hours before the deadline, I decided on a scheme and with the help of a group of friends and students in the basement of our house, worked all through the night and rendered the design which grew to be 2 drawings, presenting a more comprehensive idea for the monument, one was presenting the monument and other the Meydan [Square]. To me this was a monument to reminisce the culture and history of the land, it was a living museum in itself to be complemented by a whole series of museums halls, all under ground hidden under the landscaping of the Meydan, each hall had a central sunken court and each representing one period of history of the land and all connected to each other. So when a visitor starts from the monument itself going through all these Museum Exhibition Halls, all holding the antique artifacts and other audio visuals, he will have a thorough ideas about what this land has been through. With the fascination I had for the history, culture, literature, poetry, music, and architecture of Iran, this was a great opportunity to realize an environment to delve into the sources and manifestations of this culture, the kings and dynasties where an excuse or
one way to name the chapters of this book, with Shahyad the Heading of all these chapters. The idea of “Halls of History” or “Dynasties” was presented in the second “chassis” as a complementary concept to the monument; here the tree of life had its roots in the historic underground edifice. (The Halls would cover about 50% of Meydan underground). I was told by some of [the] members of the Jury, that this was one of the reasons why I won the competition. As a dreamer I could not or did not want to see or hear and did not care about the political rhetoric of the time about Jashnha Celebrations to me it was the crystallization of a love for essence of the culture which had been with me since early childhood, traveling all over Iran and seeing scenes like Persepolis. Afterwards due to many reasons like inner political struggles in the organization in charge of building the monument (Shoraye Jashnha) and many other factors like fear of cost overruns, leading to accusations of embezzlement and corruption or perhaps lack of appreciation for its purpose, they cancelled the “History Halls.” Looking back, I think the Shah himself would have supported the idea, if the organization of Jashnha had supported it.

G: Was the competition organized by a special committee who was also part of the administration of the 2500-year celebration? Or was the commission of Shahyad seen as a separate project independent of the celebrations?

A: Shoraye Jashnha was and kept being in charge until completion of the project. There was no other special commission in charge. After the signing of contract with me, Architect Mohsen Foroughi was appointed as a “Naazer” (supervisor) overlooking my work in terms of contract administration etc. Mr. [Mohsen] Foroughi was a very gentle and kind individual with his love for Iranian art. We found a great deal to talk and he was a bounty to save me through the political hurdles. He liked the design and never commented or interfered in it. In contrast with lower scale officials who were jealous and sometimes expected something from the treasure they thought you were hording!! As an architect, he was generous and most of the time when I went to see him in his house in BandarPahlavi Street, opposite to the building of “Nafte Pars” that I had designed as my first before graduation (which he liked). In our discussion about contractor’s claims etc., with Messian music at background, he showed me the new additions to his antique collection. He was a source of encouragement and never interfered in any of design concepts or details.

G: How many architects participated? Were they local or foreign? Who were the significant figures?
A: More than 20 architects had participated, all of them Iranians. A number of architects with high political connections were not happy that a young unknown graduate from Iranian school has won the competition; some of prominent ones were Mr. Monaghghah and Mr. Sardar-Afkhami.

G: What was the program of the commission - in other words, what exactly were you asked to design? What were the restrictions, limitations, and requirement of the design?

A: As far as I remember there was no program except for the small ad in the paper which said it is intended to build a monument to represent the 2500 years of Iranian Kingdom in a Meydan to be built at the Mehrabad [international airport] intersection the height should not exceed 45 m due to proximity to Airport, etc. The idea of having exhibition halls in the monument and having a meaningful interior was mine. I think the size of the Maydan was given too, you can refer to the first page of Etela't in months of Mordad or Tir of 1966 for exact text.

G: Where did the final exhibition take place? Who were the judges? Based on which criteria did they make their final choices?

A: The “Jury” happened in the building of Shoraye Jashnha in corner of Pasteur Ave. and Matin Daftri Street. What I remember from Judges: Architect Foroughi, Architect Seyhoun, Architect Ghiai (Mr. Seyhoun tells me now that Ghiai was not there, he thinks Architect Sadegh was there), Architect and Urban Planner Schewer, German advisor of Teheran municipality and plan organization of Iran, Architect Nasser Badie deputy minister of Housing and Development, Architect Koohang from plan organization. (Mr. Seyhoun says he was not there). The criterion was a befitting monument. According to the minutes of the Jury to be reported to Shah: “None of the designs were befitting for the ideal project, however this design (being Amanat’s) is closest.” I do not recall where was and if there was a public exhibition. I recall that all the designs were taken to Saad Abaad where I went to present it to Shah for his final approval.

G: How did you go about thinking about and outlining the monument? How did you envision it initially? What was the ‘parti’? Were you actively conscious that you were designing a monument, which would symbolize important political ideas and historic figures?

A: I find it difficult, sometimes impossible to explain how ideas come to my mind. I usually sketch freely sometime hundreds of versions and through a torturous pain of doubts and dissatisfactions, close to the deadline sometimes very late; I either find a new sparkle or chose one of the sketches and finalize it. In this instance, I had the main shape of Sassanid Arch with
buttresses moving up, but I found the simple buttresses problematic, until the idea of warped buttresses appeared through the dark clouds and became more lucid when we rendered it in early hours of the dawn. The "History Halls" idea was always there from the start like some of main features, e.g., the Sassanid Arch, representing pre Islamic Iran the Oji Arch, representing Islamic Iran and the ascending buttresses. Despite all false political rhetoric of the time, I was anxious to realize a dream and knew if successful, since it is connected to the essence of a deep culture, it will survive the political struggles and disputes. Many times I was blamed and warned by my friends and relatives and students I used to meet in my trips to foreign countries, that by designing it I am siding with the regime, and I will suffer consequences. For me I was looking further and perhaps deeper to bring a forgotten culture to the eyes of common people of Iran and the visitors.

Q: Were your ideas restricted to certain forms? Or were you given the artistic liberty to work freely in terms of formal, structural, contextual, and material choices? Who in particular from the royal family or government was directly involved with the design? Did any ideas come from the Shah himself or was he involved with the process in anyway?

A: Nobody told me what and how to do. I decided to throw an idea and did not hope it will succeed. I was planning to go for continuing my studies. There are many stories about the course of design and building details. Stories about its unique stone work, its tiles, its structural design and the choice of its structural engineer “Ove Arup and Partners” which needs far more pages to write. However, I should say I was not restricted in any aspect and in few cases Shah and Shahbanu supported me in disputes, which had come about. No ideas came from Shah. All I know a design was prepared before by Mr. Monaghghah’s office and when presented to him (the Shah) he did not like it and ordered the competition, which was reluctantly carried out by Shoraye Jashnha. Mr. Monaghghah’s design became one of the entries of the competition again. I should say they involved Shah in the project’s affairs but he always came back with the answer that responsibility is with the architect let him do his work. Ctesiphon was what I always liked and came to my mind immediately. The Mogahnass Kari’s and Rasmi Saazi’s and underlying geometry of domes and vaults and the spaces they define were all in my mind, when I started sketching. These were what I had measured and drawn Borje Toghrol in Ray as a part of my university courses and sketched as a hobby most of the weekends. I used to go to all sites around
Tehran, places like Varamin frequently, sketching its Reservoir (Abanbar) Domes and Yakhchal Walls, its mausoleums and mosques. All these had a share in the soul of this monument.

G: In the literature of the 1970s, Gombad-e Qabus is often compared to Shahyad; accordingly, which were the historic prototypes that you were looking at? In the same light, is it true that the arch resembles that of the Palace at Ctesiphon? Again, according to the literature, Shahyad was meant to be the Arch de Triumph of Tehran? Was this so or was only a later interpretation?

A: I did not start with the idea of Arc de Triumph of Paris and did not want to do one (because I did not like it) however as an architect your eye records anything you see and reflect it in what you design. I had traveled through Europe in 1963 and USA in 1964 before my graduation at 1966, and had seen a lot including the Titus Arch, etc.

G: Ultimately, how was the form of Shahyad going to materialize its primary function both within the context of the 2500-year celebrations and afterwards, in the larger context of monarchic Iran?

A: I think I have addressed this before to me; this was a reference to a historic culture with a great aspiration for a bright future and both of these at least in my heart were completely separate to what was happening politically or otherwise in Iran then. While I celebrate all the cultures of the world and you may know I have designed buildings in Greek Classic style, to me this building was and is a celebration of the culture of one part of the world which I was lucky of have been born in (and perhaps lucky to have survived the death decree of its Islamic revolution!).

G: From our temporal vantage-point, would you change any part of the design today?

A: I have found out that during the course of building and a while after completion of my buildings, I always want to make changes to make them better, however afterward I become indifferent and accept them as they are. This was the same when Shahyad finished, a few months before completion I added to the height I think about 20 cm, so it is 20 cm higher than 45 meters. I also wanted to have a bit more height and diameter for the Blue Dome at the top. Now I do not think so and do not want to make a change.

G: Which company contracted the project? How long did it take to complete the construction? Did you have difficulties with either the contractors or the government? Was the Shah pleased with the final structure? Did he ever comment on it directly?
A: “MAP” Construction Company was the contractor. The executive director in charge was Mr. Mohammad Pourfathi, a structural engineer older than my father and a brave, dervish-like human being. Through the building of the project, I developed special respect and affection for him. When the contract was signed and go ahead was given, the design process for tender documents took 4 months. It took 2 1/2 years to build. Mr. Pourfathi had a great respect and reverence for Mr. Foroughi, so in case of disputes between me and him about his financial claims, he listened to Mr. Foroughi, whom we went to when we had problems. Government problems existed too, it is a long story. I always had problems to get paid and some technical problems too. Shah was very proud and pleased with structure. At the opening night, he proudly introduced me to the heads of states that were his guests, under the Shahyad archway, as the “young Iranian architect of the monument.” Afterwards in a letter to the Plan Organization of Iran he said, “...in Shakks liaaghat e khod ra be esbaat resaandeh ast....”

G: There are many different, both popular and professional, speculations about the abrupt flat cut off of the top of Shahyad. Some claim that the structure could not have been very tall because of its proximity to Mehrabad Airport; some claim that it had to be finished on time thus was left unfinished; others see it as a proper design and proportional gesture. Could you shed some light on this?

A: Definitely, this is the design decision the buttresses have their base on the history, moving toward an unknown distant future, which to me was and will eventually be a bright one. I have published a book for dedication ceremony in which I have shown the golden sections and proportions directing the geometry of the building. The building finished on time for the dedication ceremony according to plans.

G: Finally, Shahyad was a very important monument for the city of Tehran both prior to and during the popular struggles of 1978-1979. It was also used as a symbol of people’s victory over the monarchy, thus renamed Maydan-e Azadi [Freedom Square]. Whereas many other monuments did not survive the Revolution, such as Reza Shah’s mausoleum and Kamran Diba’s Namaz Kaneh [prayer house in the former Farah Park], Shahyad endured. It changed its social meaning and, after the Revolution, emerged as a new ideological icon. At the end, the masses came to associate Shahyad with the notion of Azadi [Freedom]. How would you explain this phenomenon? Do you feel that ‘good’ architecture should be able to transcend its initial political meanings in the manner that Shahyad manage to do?
A: This is a deep question and needs a long answer. I think I have covered it partly before. The test of time will show if Shahyad qualifies to that category. From the day the scaffold was removed from under the Arch and when its flood lights were lit a great love was created in the hearts of people for this newborn child, even if they did not like the regime of the land in which it was born. So far, this is what I hear from the people and to me it is why they kept it.

G: My two final questions: Under the light of Shahyad, how do you explain the role of politics in architecture and the role of the architect in politics?

A: I think I have covered the essence of the questions. I can tell you as the architect I did not have, and did not think I can have, a role in politics of the time. I did not have much faith in the politicians either.

G: Are you proud of Shahyad?

A: I cannot say I am proud, I feel fulfilled to an extent. And I feel thankful to have been its designer. I think there are great talents in our world that never have the opportunity to do what they can, I am grateful I had a chance.
APPENDIX 9: ACKERMAN & POPE PAPERS
List of Contents and Locations of Philly Ackerman and Arthur Upham Pope Papers

Manuscripts and Archives Division
The New York Public Library
Humanities and Social Sciences Library
Fifth Avenue & 42nd street, Room 328
(212) 930-0801; fax (212) 302-4815; mssref@nypl.org

Arthur Upham Pope Papers, 1921-1951
List of Containers

Box 1 – Personal correspondence 1921-27
Box 2 – International Exhibition of Persian Art, Commission of Inquiry
                  Lectures 1930-31
Box 3 – General correspondence 1934
                  Ackerman, Dr. Phyllis (Mrs. Pope) 1937
Box 4 – General correspondence, “Wilb” 1937
                  Committee for National Morale 1940-42
                  General correspondence, 1950
                  General correspondence, 1951
Box 5 – Writings by Pope, etc., reprints of Writings by Dr. Phyllis Ackerman
                  Page proofs of the Survey of Persian Art (Oxford 1938)
                  Personal Miscellaneous papers
Box 6 – American Institute of Iranian Art & Archaeology
Box 7 – Firdausi Celebration (epic poet of Persia) 1934-35
                  Name change 1937
Box 8 – American Institute of Iranian Art & Archaeology (cont’d)
Box 9 – American Institute of Iranian Art & Archaeology (cont’d)
Box 10 – Asia Institute
Box 11 – Asia Institute (cont’d), Iran, Shah of, Reception, 1949
                  Asia Institute (cont’d), Iran
Box 11 – Asia Institute (cont’d)
Box 12 – Asia Institute (cont’d)
Box 13 – Asia Institute Bookshop
Box 14 – Newspaper Clippings (bound) 1930-33
Box 15 – Newspaper Clippings (bound) 1934-38
Box 16 – Newspaper Clippings (mounted but unbound) 1939-41
Box 17 – Scrapbooks of clippings related to China
Box 18 – Correspondence, 1930-1952
Box 19 – Printed Material, 1930-1952
Box 20 – Photographs
Box 21 – Scrapbooks; oversized photographs and publication

Arthur Upham Pope Papers
The New York Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division
Accession # *87M60 Title: Pope, Arthur Upham, 1881-1969
Location 20-p-2/7 Approximate inclusive dates: 1921-1951
Volume on arrival: 18.75 linear feet
Number of boxes after reboxing: 16 record cartons, 1’5” box
Date of receipt: October 1987 Box No. 1-17

For three additional files on Arthur Upham Pope’s correspondence, see
Harvard University Art Museum Archives, 32 Quincy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Paul J. Sachs Files and John Coolidge Files.

The Narenjestan Palace Museum, Zand Avenue in Shiraz.
It includes archeological items, photographs, slides, Ackerman-Pope’s library and personal papers. See http://www.spongobongo.com/her9933.htm.
GLOSSARY

alaqeh  interest
anjoman  society, association, organization
Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli  Society for National Heritage
Aqa  sir, mister
aramesh  calmness
aramgah  tomb, resting-place, mausoleum
aram  calm
asar  trace, monument, heritage
asar-e tarikhi  historic heritage, historical monuments, historical trace
asas-nameh  by-laws
asil  genuine
Astan-e Qods  ‘sacred threshold:’ the Imam Reza Shrine
Ayatollah  literally ‘sing of God;’ modern title for a high-ranking cleric
aye-kari  mirror-work
azemat  magnificence
azemat-e tarikhi  historical magnificence

bagh  garden, courtyard
ba shokuh  splendid
bastani  ancient
bazdid  to inspect, to visit
bi nazir  unparalleled

chahar-taq  the domed prototype of the Zoroastrian fire temple, literary, ‘four roofs’
cheragh  light

daqiq  exact

ehsas-e khub  a good feeling
ejeta’i  social
elm  science, knowledge
elmi  scientific
emamzadeh  descendant of an imam or the shine where one is buried

faqih  religious jurist, person of religious learning
Ferdawsiyeh  Ferdawsi’s resting-place or mausoleum
fesad  corruption

gah  place, location, spot
Gharbzadegi  indiscriminate borrowing from the West, lit. stricken by the West
also translated as “the plague of the West” or “Westoxication”
gheyre eslami  non-Islamic, un-Islamic
**ghazal** poetic verses
**giyah** plants

**Hafeziyeh** Hafez’s resting-place or mausoleum
**hefazat** to care for, to preserve
**Hejri-e Qamari** Anno Hejri, AH, Muslim lunar calendar
**Hejri-e Shamsi** Solar Hejri, Muslim solar calendar
**hesar** fence
**hey'at modireh** Board of Directors, management board
**heyvan** animals, creatures
**Hojjat al-Islam** ‘proof of Islam;’ title of middle-ranking clerics
**honar** art
**honar-ha** the arts
**hosaynieh** religious center dedicated to Imam Hossein, used for celebrating or commemorating special religious events

**Iran-e Naw** new Iran
**Iran-e Novin** new or modern Iran
**iwan** barrel-vaulted space open at one end usually into a forecourt

**karnameh** report-book
**khatam kari** handicraft special to Shiraz with delicate inlay of multicolor wood-pieces form an intricate surface
**khanum** lady
**khodeshun** themselves
**kushesh** effort, try

**Majlis** parliament, national assembly
**makhlut** hybrid, mixed
**maqbara** tomb, resting-place
**masjed** mosque
**masjed-e shah** royal mosque
**me'mar** master builder, architect, sometimes also engineer
**me'mari** architecture
**melat** the nation, the people
**melli** national
**mohandes** engineer or architect
**mojalal** splendid
**mollah** low-ranking clergyman
**muqarnas** honeycomb or stalactite vaulting
**muzeh** museum

**Naderiyeh** Nader Shah Afshar’s resting-place or mausoleum
**naqash** painter, drawer
**naqsheh** plan, map, diagram
**naw** new
nezam-name-ye anjoman  Society’s Regulations
nezarat  supervision, care
novin  modern, new
oslub  method
ostad  master, master-builder, expert in construction or craft
ostandar  governor

pishtaq or peshtaq  a type of monumental entrance to a building such as a mosque, palace, caravanserai, or madrasa. Such portals are characterized by a large rectangular frame that surrounds an iwan-like niche containing the actual doorway.

qaleh  castle
qibla  the direction of Mecca from any given point

Sa’diyeh  Sa’di’s resting-place or mausoleum
sadeh  simple
sahih  correct
sahr amiz  enchanting
saliqeh  (good) taste
san’at  industry
san’ati  industrial
sanaye’  craft
sanaye’-e dasti  handicraft
sanaye’-e elmi  industry or science of craft
sanaye’-e mostazraf  fine arts
sardar  front gate, gate
shawq  with enthusiasm
siyasat  politics
son’at  tradition
son’ati  traditional

t’azinat  ornamentations
ta’zieh  ceremony surrounding death, particularly the death of Imam Hosayn the son of the fourth Caliph, Ali
tajdid  renewed
takht  elevated wooden bench covered with carpet
takht-gah  plateau
talar  pavilion, portico	
tarmim  amendment
ta’mir  repair, renovation, fix, rebuild
tarhi  design
taq  roof

Tehranis  inhabitants of Tehran

ulama (also spelled ulema)  clergy or the collective establishment of the clerics
usta-me’mar master-builder

caretaker of the Imam Reza Shrine complex in Mashhad

vaqf religious endowment, Islamic religious property (Arabic waqf)

vatan motherland, country

velayat-e faqih Jurist’s guardianship

vezarat-e ma’aref, awqaf, va sanaye’-e mostazrarfeh literary, Ministry of Education, Endowment, and Fine Arts; Ministry of Public Instructions, or Ministry of Public Works,

yek parcheh one-piece, single-piece

zawq spirit, taste, inspiration

zawqi with taste

zeynabieh place dedicated to Zeynab, Prophet Mohammad’s granddaughter, and used for religious meetings

ziba beautiful

ziyarat pilgrimage, usual religious pilgrimage
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    (former *anjoman-e asar-e melli*)
  National Library of Iran’s Islamic Republic, *ketab-khane-ye melli-e jomhuri-ye eslami-ye Iran*
  French Institute of Iranian Studies, *anjoman-e Iranshenasieh fransavi dar Iran*
  Tehran University, School of Fine Arts Library
  Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Art, *ketab-khane-ye pejohesheh-e farhang va honar-e eslamii*
  Library of Iran’s Archeology Museum, *ketab-khane-ye muze-ye Iran Bastan*
  Office of Modern Iranian History, *daftar-e tarikhi-ye Iran-e moaser*

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  Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangères
  Bibliotheque Nationale de France; site Francois-Mitterrand
  Bibliotheque Nationale de France; site Richelieu
  Les Archives de France
  Bibliotheque d’Art et d’Archeologie, Fondation Jacques Doucet

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