A C/C++ Front End for the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detection System

by

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Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering and Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Abstract
This thesis details the implementation and performance of a Daikon front end for the
C and C++ languages. The Daikon dynamic invariant detection suite is a system
designed to extract formal specifications from programs, in the form of information
about their variables and their relationships to each other. The system consists of
a front end and the analysis engine. The front end instruments the source code of
a target program, inserting code that outputs the values of the program’s variables
when run. The user compiles and runs the instrumented program, generating a trace
file that contains variable values. This data is then sent to Daikon proper, which
performs analysis on it and reports invariants about the program variables. Daikon
is a useful tool that can discover invariants that current static methods cannot find.

While the invariant analysis tool is language independent, the front ends — tools
that instrument the user code — must be written for every language to be instru-
mented. There is a huge base of pre-existing code written in C/C++ for which
invariants can be discovered. C and C++ are also widely deployed, comprise a large
segment of software currently in development, and are therefore valuable candidates
for analysis. The key difficulty in instrumenting a type-unsafe language like C is that
the instrumented program has to determine what variables are valid, and to what
extent, so that it does not output garbage values or cause a segmentation fault by
dereferencing an invalid pointer.

Thesis Supervisor: Michael D. Ernst
Title: Assistant Professor
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Invariants describe relationships among states of a program. For instance, they can describe the changes in a variable between an entry and an exit of a procedure, or state a mathematical relationship between two variables that always holds true, over the entire run of a program. Tools that can detect invariants are useful to programmers, who can use them to verify that their code runs properly by comparing the discovered invariants to a written or implicit specification. Suspicious invariants, or the absence of expected invariants, can be useful in tracking down bugs in malfunctioning code. Invariant detection is also useful to maintainers of pre-existing, poorly documented code. It can report properties of the code that will help a maintainer understand the way the code is written.

Static analysis techniques can be used to discover some invariants. However, they have major limitations. A sound static analysis is inherently conservative, as it can only output invariants that are rigorously provable. In addition, static analysis techniques generally compute very large data structures, and are limited by what analysis they can complete in a reasonable time bound. Lastly, static proofs about interesting properties of the program must be built up from small proofs, some of which cannot be statically verified because of unavailable code (for instance, calls to a compiled external library). As a consequence, static analysis techniques must often be supplied with a programmer-written specification guaranteeing certain external conditions to be fulfilled.

In contrast, dynamic analysis is independent of the source code or context of the
target program, as it relies only on the data it receives from runs of the program. The source code or executable is typically modified to generate this data for analysis, but the analysis step itself does not need to have the program available. Given a sufficiently complete test suite, dynamic analysis can suggest potential invariants about a program that a static analysis package would be unable to discover, due to the above-mentioned limitations. The Daikon dynamic invariant detector [Ern00] is a language-independent system that performs this dynamic analysis, when combined with a language-specific front end.

C/C++ is the language of choice for many developers due to a large installed base, extensive portability, and the availability of myriad development tools. In addition, the reference implementation of many algorithms is written in C/C++. This yields a large body of work in which potential invariants could be discovered, and suggests that a tool for dynamic analysis of C/C++ would be useful. As C++ has been around about 20 years [Str00], and C has been around about 25 [KR88], there exists a large body of code that could benefit from the existence of a C/C++ Daikon front end.

However, developing a C/C++ front end is a serious technical challenge. The data collection required for our dynamic analysis involves accessing variables at times when the programmer is not specifically referencing them. In a type-unsafe language like C, it is hard to determine what data is accessible, and to what extent the data can be accessed without performing an invalid access. Accesses to uninitialized memory that is available to the programmer, but known to the programmer to not be useful, could cause garbage to be output and diminish the accuracy of dynamic analysis. It is even possible that a spurious access could cause the running program to crash, by dereferencing a pointer that contains an uninitialized value, or by accessing beyond the bounds of a valid array.

This thesis describes a system that performs C/C++ code transformation to yield a new, "instrumented" version of the code that can be run to generate data for dynamic invariant analysis. The system also contains a runtime library that uses various methods of accounting to determine what data is accessible, useful, and valid, in order to prevent output of uninitialized values or causing segmentation faults.
Chapter 2 discusses the overall design of the system and the motivations for its components. Chapter 3 describes the implementation, as well as implementation challenges, the solutions that were developed to solve them, and features that were added to make the system more flexible and useful to users. Chapter 4 contains the testing methodology used to analyze the correctness and effectiveness of the system, as well as descriptions of tools developed for these tests and their use. Chapter 5 describes possible future extensions to the system. Chapter 6 compares the system to other related tools, and Chapter 7 reviews the system design, and draws conclusions about what was learned over the scope of this project.
Chapter 2

Technical Approach

The Daikon invariant detector reports properties that can be observed over a run of a target program. There are three main steps in this process:

1. Instrumentation of the target program

2. Trace file generation

3. Trace file analysis

First the target program is processed by `dfecc`, the executable component of the Daikon front end for C/C++. `dfecc` does two things. It creates a file referred to as the `decls` (declarations) file, which contains type and scope information about the variables in the program for later use by the invariant detector. In parallel, it transforms the input source, adding code to the target program. This whole process is called instrumentation.

The second step, trace file generation, consists of running the instrumented program. The execution of the instrumented program is identical to the execution of the original program, except that the code added by `dfecc` is called at specific points in the program. These specific program points (typically, the entry and exit points of each function) are referred to as "PPTs." The function of the added code is to output, at each PPT in the scope of the transform, the values of all variables visible from that scope. The added code must not affect the input-output behavior of the target program in any other way. The instrumented program is compiled and linked...
Figure 2-1: The full process of running Daikon over a C/C++ program.

with a runtime library. The instrumented program is run through a test suite, similarly to the way a program would be tested for coverage, profiling, or bug detection, exercising the code thoroughly to get as much and as varied data as possible. During the run of the program, the code added by the transformation outputs data regarding variable state to a trace file, also called the dtrace (data trace) file. This additional code imposes about a 50-fold overhead on the executable’s running time, versus an uninstrumented executable (it has not been optimized for speed).

Finally, after the run is complete and the dtrace file has been created, Daikon is given the decls and dtrace files produced by dfec and the instrumented program respectively. It examines the values, looking for relationships it can express as potential invariants. Figure 2-1 shows the process of instrumentation, compilation, dtrace generation, and invariant detection.

Daikon takes two files as input: a decls file and a dtrace file. A toy program and its corresponding decls file and dtrace file are shown in Figure 2-2. dfec produces the decls file at the time of instrumentation. It contains declarations of all the PPTs in the source, and lists what variables will be output at each execution of that program point. For each variable, it lists the declared type (the language-specific type of the variable as it was declared in the target program), the representation type (a language-independent type that determines how values of the variable will be represented in the dtrace file), and the comparability type (an identifying string used to separate variables into comparability classes, described in Section 3.10.2). Daikon uses this data to determine what type of invariants should be looked for, and among which variables to calculate relationships.
trivial.c

```c
int foo(int arg) {
    return arg+1;
}

int main() {
    int x = 3;
    x = foo(x);
    x = foo(x);
    return x;
}
```

trivial.decls

```
DECLARE
std.foo(int;)
arg
int
int
1

DECLARE
std.foo(int;)
arg
int
int
2
return
int
int
2

DECLARE
std.main()
arg
int
int

DECLARE
std.main()
return
int
int
3
```

trivial.dtrace

```
std.main()
std.foo(int;)
std.foo(int;)
std.main()
std.foo(int;)
std.main()
```

Figure 2-2: A trivial program and its associated decls and dtrace files.
The `dtrace` file contains, for each PPT that the program executes, values for all the variables that were declared in the `decls` file.

For each variable in the `dtrace` file, the name is listed, then the value, then a "modbit" (modification bit) to indicate the status of the variable at the time of output. A modbit of 0 means it was valid, but unchanged since last output (this is not implemented in `dfec`, however). A modbit of 1 means it was valid. A modbit of 2 means it was invalid, and should be ignored during invariant detection.

The C/C++ front end consists of two parts: the `dfec` executable and the Daikon runtime library. The `dfec` executable (see Section 2.1) is a source-to-source transformation program that takes in a target program, and outputs an instrumented version of the program. The Daikon runtime library, or "DRT" (see Section 2.2) implements the functions and classes used by the code added in the instrumentation step, such as the functions and classes necessary to track and output the instrumented program's variables.

### 2.1 dfec Executable

The `dfec` executable takes in source code and outputs both instrumented source and a `decls` file. Daikon uses the `decls` file to parse what appears in the `dtrace` file, so the set of variables output by the DRT at a given program point must match the set of variables declared at the same program point in the `decls` file. The `dfec` executable is based on the EDG C/C++ front end [EDG00]. This tool performs preprocessing on C/C++, builds an IL (intermediate language) tree of the statements in the target
program, then unparses them again, yielding an output semantically identical to the input (after macro preprocessing). Dfèc consists of the EDG code plus a modified back end, which performs code transformations during the unparsing step.

Dfèc’s primary code transformation is adding output calls to the source at specific program points. The program points chosen for instrumentation are the entry and exit points of each function. When generating the text for an entry to or exit from a function or class method, Dfèc examines the IL tree for variables in scope. For each one, it adds an entry to the decls file, and inserts a call to a handler function (defined within the DRT) in the source. These handler functions simply output variable names, values, and modbits to the dtrace file. An example of the code inserted during instrumentation appears in Figure 2-3.

A second transformation changes variable types from primitive pointer types to DaikonSmartPointer, a templatized type described in Section 2.2.1. Textually, this just involves changing all type expressions of the form T * to an expression of the form DaikonSmartPointer<T>.

2.2 Runtime Library

The much more interesting technical challenge involves management of program data at runtime. At instrumentation time, all that the Dfèc executable knows about variable validity is what variables are in scope, but not whether these variables are valid. For the purposes of this paper, a valid scalar variable is one that has been assigned or otherwise initialized. The Dfèc executable cannot statically determine a variable’s validity, or the extent (size of the contents) of a valid pointer, as this can change from execution to execution. Therefore, its responsibility is limited to keeping track of the list of variables in scope, and generating calls to output handlers for them at instrumentation time.

At runtime, however, more information about variables can (and must) be determined. The contents of an array or pointer variable are not necessarily valid, even if it is in scope. The DRT, or Daikon runtime library, contains mechanisms for monitoring the status of user variables in-memory (as described later, in Section 3.6) as well as
2.2.1 Smart Pointers

In C/C++, a pointer variable can point to a single valid byte, a block of a thousand bytes, a deallocated block, or even (when uninitialized) to an illegal memory region which access to would cause a segmentation fault. As noted in Section 2.2, it is infeasible to statically determine the size of the contents of a pointer variable, or even whether the pointer is valid. Instead, the DRT computes this information at runtime via a template class, DaikonSmartPointer, that monitors the validity and size of a pointer's contents at runtime. dfec replaces all pointer variables in the target program source with instances of this class.

A smart pointer is a use of the proxy design pattern [GHJV95] that replaces a regular C/C++ pointer variable [PW00]. It provides the indirection operators (* and ->), and thus acts transparently as a normal pointer variable would, without affecting the behavior of the target program. Smart pointers also add functionality; one example is reference counting. The smart pointers in the DRT keep track of the validity of the memory they point at. The structure of the smart pointer contains a base field, an index field, and a birthcount field. The index field is used for the indirection operation, and has the same value as the primitive pointer it replaces would have had. The birthcount field is a nonce used to keep track of the number of times the block pointed to has been allocated, and is described in more detail in Section 3.6.2.

The base field points to the beginning of (the lowest accessible byte) in a memory region like a block returned from malloc() or a fixed-length array). It is used to relate smart pointers that point to different offsets in the same memory region. For a pointer to a newly constructed region, the base field is the same value as the index. The, the base field is propagated unchanged to pointers derived from the first one. For example, when one smart pointer is derived from another by pointer arithmetic, the base pointer is passed to the resulting smart pointer unmodified. Thus, two smart pointers that both point into the same contiguous area of memory (like differing offsets
in an array, or pointers into the same string) share a common base field. This base field is used as a key to look up memory region information in the DaikonBasemap structure, described in Section 2.2.2.

The array subscript, addition, and subtraction operators are overloaded, like the indirection operators. They keep track how much of the memory region starting at the base pointer has been addressed by the instrumented program. This information is stored in the DaikonBasemap structure (Section 2.2.2), and is used for later reference by the output handlers, so that only memory that has been “touched” will be output.

2.2.2 Basemap

The DaikonBasemap structure (also referred to as “the basemap”) tracks validity for data. This information must not be associated with pointers because any number of pointers can point to the same block of data, and any information we gain about the block through one pointer, we wish to share with all other relevant pointers.

The basemap maps the base field of every smart pointer (non-uniquely) to a DaikonPtrInfo (see Figures 2-5 and 2-4). A DaikonPtrInfo contains a refcount (reference count) field, which is the number of smart pointers that have a base equal to the key, and a max_seen field, which is a pointer to just past the highest referenced element. (They contain other fields as well, discussed in Section 3.6.1, but these are implementation details.) When a smart pointer is initialized to point to a new region, the smart pointer creates a new DaikonPtrInfo struct, setting the refcount to 1. It then makes an entry in the basemap associating the smart pointer’s base field with this new DaikonPtrInfo. Creation of a new smart pointer via assignment, subscript, or pointer addition increments the refcount. When a smart pointer is destroyed, the refcount is decremented. When all references are dropped (i.e., when the refcount reaches zero), the memory is no longer addressable by the programmer. The DRT knows that if a new smart pointer is constructed to point to that block, it must have come from a new malloc() call and that the extent should be reset. Sharing DaikonPtrInfos between smart pointers that have the same base, although differing indexes, allows an offset smart pointer to take advantage of information gained when
char *X = "HELLO";  // DaikonSmartPointer<char> X = "HELLO";
char *Y = X + 2;    // DaikonSmartPointer<char> Y = X + 2;
char *Z = "WORLD";  // DaikonSmartPointer<char> Z = "WORLD";

Figure 2-4: A code snippet that produces the heap layout shown in Figure 2-5.

Figure 2-5: Heap layout of the instrumented program of Figure 2-4.

another pointer, pointing to the same block, updates entries further on in the block, making them valid.
Chapter 3

Implementation

This section discusses, in greater detail, the design decisions that were made during the implementation of dfec. Lower level details of smart pointers and the “basemap” mechanism are covered, along with features that were added to enhance usability.

3.1 EDG C++ front end

The static analysis required by instrumentation needs a C/C++ front end including a preprocessor, parser, and semantic checker. Building one from scratch is infeasible for the scope of this project. This being the case, I decided to build dfec off of an existing front end.

dfec is an extension of the Edison Design Group’s C++ front end [EDG00]. The EDG front end performs preprocessing on C++ source, builds an intermediate language tree (referred to in the EDG source as the “IL tree,” but also known in compiler terminology as the Abstract Syntax Tree), and then unparses the IL tree back to source. dfec consists mostly of additions to the unparsing step, such that when certain expressions are expanded to text (e.g., a procedure body), instrumentation code is added (continuing the same example, calls to output functions are added before and after the procedure body is output).

The EDG C++ front end conforms to the ANSI C++ standard, accepting ANSI C++ input and producing ANSI C++ output. As many ANSI C programs are also ANSI C++ programs, dfec handles a large subset of the ANSI C language (with the notable exception of C programs that have local definitions of tokens that are
keywords in the ANSI C++ definition, e.g., `bool`). Many older C programs are written in a dialect of C called K&R (for Kernighan and Ritchie [KR88]), which `dfec` does not handle. However, a program called `protoize` [Gui] is free and widely available which performs conversions from the K&R dialect to ANSI.

### 3.2 gcc integration

Once code is instrumented, it must be compiled and then executed. This requires that a C++ compiler, as well as system library header files, be installed on the user’s machine. Because of architecture differences and the widespread practice of proprietary extensions to the C/C++ languages, there are very few (if any) compilers and accompanying system libraries that are written in entirely ANSI C. Given this limitation, I chose to target a specific compiler (`gcc` version 2.95.3) and set of system library headers, to avoid the massive amount of work involved implementing workarounds for multiple compilers and multiple sets of system library header files.

`EDG` requires a set of system library headers to define the preprocessor macros, types, constants, and function prototypes that a program uses. It does full pre-processing (expansion of macros and `#include` directives) of input source, which is necessary for it to construct its IL tree. System library headers contain function signatures and non-primitive type definitions that are necessary for EDG to correctly parse the source. When run, `dfec` determines the location of the system library headers by executing `gcc -v -E` (for verbosity and preprocessing-only) on an empty source file, and capturing the output. `gcc` outputs the location of the system library headers according to its own configuration files, and `dfec` incorporates this into its own data structures. Then, when an `#include` directive is encountered, `dfec` can find the appropriate system library header to include.

### 3.3 libc instrumentation

Many C/C++ programs are linked to external libraries such as `libc`, which may exist only in binary form. Since `dfec` needs to modify source code to change prim-
itive pointers to smart pointers, binary-only libraries cannot be instrumented. Any operation on memory that occurs inside these libraries cannot be tracked by smart pointers, so without a mechanism that takes into account the semantics of these library functions, information about these memory blocks can become inaccurate.

Instrumented programs still operate correctly when interfacing with non-instrumented libraries. `dfec` transforms all smart pointers into ordinary pointers before passing them as arguments to uninstrumented functions. However, if a pointer is passed to an uninstrumented function, and the function modifies the pointed-to data, the DRT has no way of automatically knowing to what extent the data is now valid. I implemented a workaround for this for certain `libc` functions. `dfec` does source rewriting, replacing calls to `libc` functions with calls to wrapper functions that call the original, then update the basemap according to knowledge about the effects of the function.

### 3.3.1 `string.h` wrapper functions

For each function from the `libc` header file `string.h`, I wrote a wrapper function that calls the proper function, then updates the basemap with the valid extent of each string argument (and occasionally, the return value). The string functions in particular require this, because almost all of them modify pointed-to data in a way that can change the valid extent (`strcat()`, for example, concatenates strings together, and thus extends the reach of the destination string). Luckily, string functions are also simple to write instrumented wrappers for, because of the knowledge that the string arguments will be zero-terminated. See Figure 3-1 for an example of a wrapped string function.

### 3.3.2 `malloc()` and `free()` handling

The wrapper functions for `malloc()` and `free()` (`DAIKON_malloc()` and `DAIKON_free()`, respectively) are more involved. In addition to keeping track of the valid extent of heap memory, they must also set up the other fields in the DaikonPtrInfo structure (see Figure 3-3) that keep track of type information and
3.4 Smart pointer implementation

DaikonSmartPointer overloads pointer operators, in order to transparently behave like a primitive pointer variable would. Each overloaded operator performs the normal function, as well as recording information in the basemap. An example is given in Figure 3-2.

The example demonstrates the effects of a constructor, operator [], operator ++, and operator *().

3.5 Smart pointers require construction

The replacement of primitive pointers with smart pointers requires additional bookkeeping — primitive pointers do not require construction, but smart pointers do, because they are structures, and C++ structures must be constructed in order to initialize their values.
Dai{

DaikonSmartPointer<

char c;

const char *str = "string";

p1 = str; /* p1.base = p1.index = str;
new basemap entry created:
daikonBasemap[p1.base] = {
   modbit = 1,
   max_seen = str,
   refcount = 1
} */

p2 = p1 + 1; /* p1.operator++(1) updates basemap:
daikonBasemap[p1.base].max_seen =
max(daikonBasemap[p1.base].max_seen,
(p1.index+2)+1); */

p2 = NULL; /* p2.operator=(NULL) updates basemap:
daikonBasemap[p2.base].refcount--; 
p2.base = p2.index = NULL; */
Normal pointer variables that are declared in global scope, an argument list, or in the body of a function are stack-based variables. The C++ compiler automatically constructs all stack-based variables, so once transformed to smart pointers, are automatically constructed by the compiler. However, the heap is not compiler-managed. A smart pointer variable that is allocated on the heap will not be automatically constructed by the compiler.

`malloc()` and `free()` are the C functions that allocate and deallocate blocks of memory on the heap. These blocks of memory can store values of any type, unlike in higher level languages like Java, where instances of a type are explicitly constructed as such. In C, there is no such thing as a constructor, so C code generally uses `malloc()` to allocate memory for a struct, and then starts using it.

This leads to a problem in instrumented source when a struct has a field of a pointer type. Under instrumentation, the field is transformed to a smart pointer, which requires construction. instrumented code that allocates a block of memory and then starts treating it as a struct could damage the coherence of the basemap. When a smart pointer is assigned another value, it decrements the refcount of the old address in the basemap, and if it points to a garbage value, it will improperly decrement the refcount for that address. Most likely, this will decrement the refcount of an unaddressed block below zero, although it could possibly decrement the refcount of a valid memory block to zero. This could cause a valid block to be marked as invalid and not be output.

### 3.6 In-place smart pointer construction

All heap-based smart pointers, and structs that contain smart pointers, need to be explicitly constructed, and destroyed when their section of the heap is deallocated. This process is performed in three steps — pre-initialization by `DAIKON_malloc()`, construction and type setup by the DaikonSmartPointer class, and destruction and deallocation by `DAIKON_free()`. Sections 3.6.2 through 3.6.4 describe the three steps. However, first we will take a detailed look at the DaikonPtrInfo structure, which is used to keep track of memory state.
3.6.1 A detailed look at DaikonPtrInfo

Until now, I have only discussed the \texttt{refcount} and \texttt{max.seen} fields of DaikonPtrInfo. Figure 3-3 details all the fields in the DaikonPtrInfo structure.

\texttt{max.seen} is a pointer to the first byte just beyond the “valid” extent of the block (see Section 2.2.2). \texttt{refcount} is the number of smart pointers that point into the block (i.e., the number that share the same base field). The \texttt{modbit} is similar to the \texttt{modbit} described at the beginning of Chapter 2, but is used slightly differently in this context: a \texttt{modbit} of 1 means that a memory block is either on the stack, was allocated by uninstrumented code, or is on the heap and has not been invalidated by \texttt{DAIKON.free()} yet; and a \texttt{modbit} of 2 means that the block was allocated by \texttt{DAIKON.malloc()}, but has subsequently been \texttt{DAIKON.free()}.d.

\texttt{bounds} is a pointer that is similar to \texttt{max.seen}. It points to the first byte just beyond a memory region, but the semantics are slightly different: where \texttt{max.seen} marks off how much of a memory region has been accessed, \texttt{bounds} marks off how much of a memory region the DRT should ever allow to be accessed. If this is not known, as in the case of pointers obtained from system library calls, it is set to \texttt{NULL}. However, in the case of a fixed-length array or a block returned from \texttt{DAIKON.malloc()}, it is known, and is set appropriately. \texttt{bounds} is used both to inform the user of illegal accesses by the input program (covered in Section 3.9.1) and to calculate the number of structs that need to be constructed in-place (covered in Section 3.6.3). \texttt{leeway} is only relevant when \texttt{bounds} is non-\texttt{NULL}, and contains the number of bytes on either end of the block that \texttt{dfec} put there for array padding. Array padding is described in Section 3.9.2.

\texttt{from.malloc} simply denotes whether a block came from a \texttt{DAIKON.malloc()} call. When it is false, the remaining fields (\texttt{from.malloc}, \texttt{unformatted}, \texttt{birthcount}, \texttt{dest} and \texttt{copy}) are unset. These fields are only used on blocks that came from \texttt{DAIKON.malloc()}. If \texttt{from.malloc} is set, then \texttt{unformatted} denotes whether it has not been constructed in-place (a process described in Section 3.6.3). The \texttt{birthcount} field counts how many times a particular address has been returned.
by DAIKON_malloc(). This birthcount can be compared with the birthcount field of a smart pointer to see if the block has been free()ed and re-malloc()ed since the last use of the pointer. This comparison (and the need for it) is discussed in Section 3.6.2.

The remaining two fields are function pointers that are necessary to perform operations that depend on the specific type that the block contains. Once the block has been constructed in-place, dest is set to point to a function that DAIKON_free() calls to destroy the structs that were constructed. This is described in Section 3.6.4. Similarly, copy is set to point to a function that overloaded versions of memcpy(), memmove(), and bcopy() can call to copy a memory region from one location to another, while ensuring constructors are called when copying memory regions that contain structures that may have smart pointer fields.

3.6.2 Role of DAIKON_malloc()

Psuedocode for the malloc() wrapper function is in Figure 3-4.

When DAIKON_malloc() is called, it has no way of knowing what type is going to be stored in the memory region. However, it does know the block's size in bytes. DAIKON_malloc first calls malloc() itself, and sets up the normal fields in the basemap. In addition, it marks the block as having come from DAIKON_malloc()
and as "unformatted", as shown in Figure 3-3. Normally, the refcount field holds exactly the number of smart pointers that point to the associated block, but in the case of a DAIKON_malloc()’ed block, it’s incremented by one to represent the malloc()/free() pair. This is because when the block has been freshly malloc()’ed, it does not yet have anything pointing to it until the pointer assignment, which is where the smart pointer takes over. Adding one to the refcount to represent the malloc()/free() pair keeps the DaikonPtrInfo structure from being considered "stale", as DaikonPtrInfos with refcounts of zero are overwritten by the smart pointer constructors.

birthcount management

DAIKON_malloc() also sets the birthcount field. The birthcount field is zero for addresses on the stack, but for every address returned by DAIKON_malloc(), it is greater than zero. If DAIKON_malloc() returns an address that does not have a DaikonPtrInfo already in the basemap, it initializes the birthcount to 1. However, if DAIKON_malloc() returns an address that already has an associated DaikonPtrInfo, it increments the birthcount in the new DaikonPtrInfo. This is necessary to keep dangling pointers (pointers that point to a block that has been free()d) from accidentally becoming valid, simply because the block they point to has been renewed by DAIKON_malloc(). This newly-allocated block is semantically a different block than the old one, and dangling DaikonSmartPointers that point to it should not be considered valid. When a DaikonSmartPointer is assigned or created, it looks up its associated DaikonPtrInfo in the basemap, and the birthcount field from the DaikonPtrInfo is copied to the DaikonSmartPointer object’s birthcount field. Then, when a DRT output procedure tries to output a DaikonSmartPointer’s contents, it checks to see if the birthcount in the DaikonSmartPointer matches the birthcount in the DaikonPtrInfo. If they match, it goes forward with output, but if they don’t match, the pointer contents are output as uninit. This keeps stale pointers (which could even be a different type than the new block!) from incorrectly outputting DAIKON_malloc()ed blocks.
void *DAIKON_malloc(size_t size) {
    void * ret = malloc(size);
    if (ret) {
        if (daikonBasemap[ret] == NULL) {
            /* this pointer isn't in the basemap yet. */
            daikonBasemap[ret] = DaikonPtrInfo
                (/*max_seen=*//ret, /* We haven't seen anything yet */
                /*refcount=*/1, /* note! fake refcount must get --'ed by free() */
                /*modbit=*/1, /* The memory is valid - */
                /*bounds=*/(void*)(((char*)ret)+size), /* - up to this point */
                /*leeway=*/0,
                /*from_malloc=*/true,
                /*unformatted=*/true,
                /*birthcount=*/1); /* first time we've seen this block */
        } else {
            /* this pointer was, at one point, in the basemap. */
            int oldrefcount = daikonBasemap[ret].refcount;
            int oldbirthcount = daikonBasemap[ret].birthcount;
            /* If oldrefcount>0, then there are stale pointers still pointing
             to this block. We need to add the old refcount into the new one,
             so when they get reassigned or go out of scope, their refcount
             decrementing won't break the new DaikonPtrInfo. */
            daikonBasemap[ret] = DaikonPtrInfo
                (/*max_seen=*//ret, /* 'new' block - none of it is valid yet */
                /*refcount=*/1 + oldrefcount, /* refcount folding */
                /*modbit=*/1,
                /*bounds=*/(void*)(((char*)ret)+size),
                /*leeway=*/0,
                /*from_malloc=*/true,
                /*unformatted=*/true,
                /*birthcount=*/1 + oldbirthcount);
        }
    }
    return ret;
}

Figure 3-4: Psuedocode for the malloc() wrapper function.

3.6.3 Role of DaikonSmartPointer

One smart pointer constructor takes an argument of type void *, the return type of malloc(). Psuedocode for this constructor is shown in Figure 3-5. When this constructor is called, it first looks up the block in the basemap to see if it's already there, and if so, whether the from_malloc flag is set. If it is, it knows that it has to "format" the memory region.

Since smart pointers are templatized, the constructor for the smart pointer knows the type of struct (or scalar) that's being pointed to. The type of the block is not
known at the time `DAIKON_malloc()` is executed, so all type-aware operations must be handled by DaikonSmartPointer. The DaikonSmartPointer constructor performs these type-aware operations: constructing elements of its pointed-to type in the memory block, and setting the type-templatized destructor and copy function pointer fields (`dest` and `copy`, respectively) in the basemap entry. The first thing the constructor does is iterate over the memory block, using placement `new` to construct each struct in-place. Placement `new` calls the default constructor for the struct, which constructs each smart pointer field as well, maintaining coherence. By dividing the size of the memory region by the size of the type, it knows how many elements fit in the memory region, and constructs exactly that many.

After the block of memory has been formatted, the `unformatted` field in the basemap entry is set to false, so `DAIKON_free()` knows that a destructor must be called. The `dest` field of the DaikonPtrInfo is a function pointer, which is set to point to a template function that will iterate over the same block, destroying the constructed fields. The `copy` field is also a function pointer, which is set to point to another template function that copies elements of the template type to another memory region, explicitly constructing the objects as they arrive in the destination region. See Figure 3-7 for the templates of these functions.

### 3.6.4 Role of `DAIKON_free()`

Calls to `free()` are replaced with calls to `DAIKON_free()` in the instrumented code. When `DAIKON_free()` is called on a smart pointer, it calls `DaikonSmartPointer::free_self()`. This ensures that that the correct block is passed to the `free()` system call, even if the `index` field of the smart pointer points further into the block. This is a necessary consequence of array padding, which will be explained in Section 3.9.2.

The `free_self()` method (see Figure 3-6) performs a few consistency checks with the associated basemap entry. First, it checks `from_malloc` to make sure that the block was originally allocated with `DAIKON_malloc()`. If `from_malloc` isn't set, the program aborts. It then checks to make sure that the `modbit` isn't 2, because a pointer
DaikonSmartPointer<T>::DaikonSmartPointer(const void* toCopy) {
    /* Find the first entry greater than the key. */
    DaikonBasemap::iterator dbi =
        daikonBasemap->upper_bound(toCopy);
    --dbi; /* scan backwards to find the last entry <= the key */
    if (((dbi==daikonBasemap->end()) ||
         (dbi->second.bounds < (void*)toCopy)) { /* New entry. Base should equal index, and we should 
        set it up in the basemap. */
        base = toCopy; index = toCopy;
        dbi->second = DaikonPtrInfo
            (/*base=*/toCopy, /*refcount=*/1, /*modbit=*/1);
    } else { /* toCopy falls within the bounds of an existing block. 
        Let's construct off that block. Take the basemap key 
        as our new base, and set the index to be what's being 
        assigned to us. */
        base = (const T*)dbi->first;
        index = toCopy;
    }
    DaikonPtrInfo & myinfo = dbi->second; /* copy birthcount from the basemap */
    if (myinfo.birthcount) {
        /* Check basemap, construct T's in-place if necessary. */
        for (T *iter = (T*)toCopy; iter<myinfo.bounds; iter++) { /* new(iter) T();
            */
            myinfo.dest = &(daikon_destruct_array<T>);
            myinfo.copy = &(daikon_copy_array<T>);
            /* We've formatted it now. */
            myinfo.unformatted_block=false;
        }
        myinfo.modbit=1;
    }
}

Figure 3-5: Psuedocode for the smart pointer constructor that performs in-place construction on a block returned from DAIKUN_malloc().

cannot be free()d multiple times. If both the consistency checks pass, it checks the unformatted variable. It's possible that unformatted is still true (for instance, if the memory block was passed to and used only by functions outside of instrumentation scope, and therefore never constructed by any smart pointer assignment), in which case no destructor is called. If unformatted is false, and the dest field is non-null, the destructor is called. The destructor (see Figure 3-7) is a wrapper function that iterates over the block, individually calling the destructors of each constructed element. If the elements are smart pointers, or structs that contain smart pointers, then their
template <class T>
void DAIKON_free(DaikonSmartPointer<T> ptr) {
    /* All this is farmed out to smartpointer.free_self(), since 
     * we need to know the base to do this. */
    ptr.free_self();
}

template <class T>
void DaikonSmartPointer<T>::free_self() {
    DaikonPtrInfo &myinfo = basemapLookup();
    if (myinfo.unformatted_block) {
        /* it's still unformatted - either it's full of scalars, or structs 
        * never got constructed in it. either way, you can just free(). */
    } else if (myinfo.dest) {
        /* it's been formatted somehow, and there's a destructor for it. 
        * call the destructor. */
        *((void*)myinfo.dest)((void*)base, myinfo.bounds);
    }
    free((void*)base);
    /* Just decrement the refcount, don't set it to zero - there may be 
    * stale smart pointers pointing to this block. */
    (myinfo.refcount)--;
    myinfo.modbit = 2;
}

Figure 3-6: Psuedocode for the free() wrapper function.

destructors are called, and the refcounts of their pointed-to memory blocks will be decremented, maintaining consistency.

Finally, the memory is deallocated. The refcount of the block is then decremented to account for the increment by the DAIKON malloc() call earlier. The refcount is not set to zero, because even though the block is invalid, there is at least one smart pointer (the argument to DAIKON_free()) that is still pointing to the block, and the destructors for those smart pointers will eventually be called and the refcount decremented to zero on its own. The birthcount is left alone, and is not incremented until the next time this particular block is returned by DAIKON malloc(). The modbit field, however, is set to 2, which is means that the data is invalid. Any output handler that reaches this block during output to the dtrace file will see the modbit, and record to the dtrace file that the data is uninitialized.
/* Basically, array destructor for in-place constructed objects, 
templatized on class. */

template <class T>
void daikon_destruct_array(const void *victim, const void *top) {
    for (T *iter = (T*)victim; iter<top; iter++) {
        iter->~T();
    }
}

/* This is called by DAikon_memcp(), DAikon_bcopy(), DAikon_memmove(), 
etc. It copies an array of objects from srcarg to destarg, ensuring 
that constructors get called. */

template <class T>
void *daikon_copy_array(DaikonSmartPointer<T> destarg, 
            DaikonSmartPointer<T> srcarg, 
            size_t n) {
    /* Safe for overlapping areas of memory - copies in the right 
direction, and through an intermediary. */
    T intermediary;
    DaikonSmartPointer<T> dest=destarg, src=srcarg;
    int numelements = n / sizeof(T);
    if (dest<src) {
        /* copy ascending. */
        for (int iter=0 ; iter<numelements; iter++)
            dest[iter] = intermediary = src[iter];
    } else {
        /* copy descending. */
        for (int iter=numelements-1 ; iter>=0; iter--)
            dest[iter] = intermediary = src[iter];
    }
    return dest;
}

Figure 3-7: Destructor and copier functions for DAikon_malloc()’ed memory regions.

### 3.7 DRT Initialization

The instrumented code relies heavily on the DRT, so it is essential that the DRT is 
initialized before the user code begins execution. The DRT has two global variables 
that are linked into the instrumented program. The first is the basemap itself, which 
is needed by every smart pointer. The second is the FILE * representing the dtrace 
file, which is necessary for output.

The dtrace file needs to be opened before the first output call is encountered. 
The basemap needs to be constructed even earlier, in case there’s a pointer variable 
in the global scope, which would be instrumented as a smart pointer. For safety, both
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Source</th>
<th>psuedo-decls file</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>struct list {</td>
<td>std.foo(list *); int::ENTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int data;</td>
<td>pointer (hashcode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct list *next;</td>
<td>pointer-&gt;data (int)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>};</td>
<td>pointer-&gt;next (hashcode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct list arr[10];</td>
<td>pointer-&gt;next-&gt;data (int)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int foo(struct list *ptr) {</td>
<td>pointer-&gt;next-&gt;next (hashcode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>::arr (hashcode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>::arr-&gt;data[] (int array)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>::arr-&gt;next[] (hashcode array)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-8: The source and decls file for an instrumented struct.

of these undergo construction before execution of the main() function even begins. To ensure that these objects are initialized properly, I used the “global initializer” design pattern from Meyers [Mey92] for ensuring early construction of global objects.

At the end of daikon.runtime.h, which is automatically preincluded in every instrumented file, there is a definition of an object of type DaikonInitializer. This object gets constructed before any smart pointer is (because it appears before any global in program source order), and before the entry to the main() function. This object opens the dtrace file and constructs the basemap, and when the program terminates and it goes out of scope, it calls the destructors as well.

3.8 Struct instrumentation

All user-defined structs and classes are also output to the dtrace file, but they have special output handlers that are generated by the dfec executable at instrumentation time (see Figures 3-9 and 3-10). A “maximum instrumentation depth” is specified by the user, and dfec does a breadth-first traversal of the IL tree branch corresponding to that type, up to the user-specified depth. Entries for all fields touched by this traversal are output to the decls file, as demonstrated in Figure 3-8.

dfec also generates, for each struct type, two functions that write output to the dtrace file for an instance of that type. The first is a static, global-
namespace function called \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} (see Figure 3-9, which \texttt{dfec} generates calls to. It checks to make sure that the struct instance provided is initialized (i.e., has modbit 1). If the argument is uninitialized, it outputs dummy values to the dtrace file for each field in the struct. If the argument is initialized, \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} then calls the second function, \texttt{daikon\_output\_thysel()} (see Figure 3-10). \texttt{daikon\_output\_thysel()} is a member function of the struct type, and when called, outputs the actual contents of its instance's fields. Struct type output is divided into two functions for two reasons. The first is that a global namespace function like \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} may not have access to all of a struct's fields, if some are private, so a member function is necessary. The second is that, if the instance is uninitialized, calling a member function of it could have adverse effects. This is why both functions are necessary.

Each instance of \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} takes five arguments: a name; a pointer to a structure \texttt{var}, an integer \texttt{depth\_left}, and two booleans, \texttt{from\_pointer} and \texttt{is\_array}. \texttt{var} is the struct that is to be output to the dtrace file. The \texttt{name} argument is simply the name of the structure, and is prepended to each field being output (for instance, for a struct pointer named head and a field named data, the \texttt{name} argument would be "head" and the function would output "head->data" to the dtrace file).

The \texttt{from\_pointer} boolean variable tells the function whether the struct being output was originally a pointer, or if its address had to be taken when calling the function (in the example above, had \texttt{from\_pointer} been false, it would have output "head\_data" instead of "head->data" to the dtrace file). \texttt{is\_array} is only true when \texttt{from\_pointer} is true, and indicates that the \texttt{var} argument is an array of structs, and that the function should output arrays of the type's fields instead of treating each as a single occurrence.

The \texttt{depth\_left} and \texttt{modbit} arguments come into play when structs have fields that are also structs. Since \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} outputs each field of the \texttt{var} argument, it must generate a call to \texttt{daikon\_output\_user\_type()} if one of the fields is another struct. This could be a call to another instance of
static void daikon_output_user_type(string name,
    DaikonSmartPointer<list> var,
    int depth_left, int from_pointer,
    int is_array) {

    string separator =
        (from_pointer ? "->" : ":");
    if ((depth_left)>0) {
        if (var.invalid(/*test_contents=*/true)) {
            if (is_array) {
                daikon_output_dummy(name + separator + "data[]");
                daikon_output_dummy(name + separator + "next[]");
            } else { /* !is_array */
                daikon_output_dummy(name + separator + "data");
                daikon_output_dummy(name + separator + "next");
                daikon_output_user_type(name + separator + "next",
                    (DaikonSmartPointer<list>)0,
                    depth_left-1, /*from_pointer=*/1,
                    /*is_array=*/0);
            } /* is_array */
        } else { /* !var.invalid */
            list::daikon_output_thyself(name, var, depth_left, separator,
                is_array);
        } /*if(!!invalid)*/
    } /*if(depth_left)*/
}; //daikon_output_user_type*

Figure 3-9: An example of a dvec-generated daikon_output_user_type() function.

daikon_output_user_type() if the field is of a different struct type than var, or it could be a recursive call, as in Figure 3-9, if the field is of the same struct type. Recursive calls will show up in circular data structures like linked lists. depth_left is decremented with each call to daikon_output_user_type(), so that struct field traversal eventually bottoms out at the same user-defined depth as the IL tree traversal did when the decls file was generated. An example of a generated daikon_output_user_type() function is shown in Figure 3-9.

If a null or invalid pointer is encountered during the traversal, the DRT must still continue outputting entries to the dtrace file, as Daikon requires that there be a matching dtrace entry for every entry appearing in the decls file. The daikon_output_user_type() function calls a member function of DaikonSmartPointer called invalid() to determine if it's null, or points to an uninitialized block. If it is, daikon_output_user_type() outputs dummies for its fields, and effectively outputs dummies for its children's fields by calling daikon_output_user_type()
void list::daikon_output_thyself(string name,
    DaikonSmartPointer<list> var,
    int depth_left, const char *separator,
    int is_array) {

if (is_array) {
    daikon_outputSmartPointer_ints
        (name + separator + "data[]",
        DaikonSmartPointer<int>(&(var->data)),
        /*spacing=*/sizeof(list));
    daikon_outputSmartPointer_pointers
        (name + separator + "next[]",
        DaikonSmartPointer<DaikonSmartPointer<int> >(&(var->next)),
        /*spacing=*/sizeof(list));
} else { /* !is_array */
    daikon_output_int(name + separator + "data", int(var->data));
    daikon_output_pointer(name + separator + "next", var->next);
    daikon_output_user_type
        (name + separator + "next", (DaikonSmartPointer<list>)var->next,
        depth_left-1, /*from_pointer=*/1, /*is_array=*/0);
} /* is_array */
}

Figure 3-10: An example of a dfec-generated daikon_output_thyself() method.

with the var argument set to null. If the pointer is valid, however, it calls
daikon_output_thyself(), which does the actual work of outputting the fields in
much the same manner. An example of a generated daikon_output_thyself() method is shown in Figure 3-10.

3.9 Safeguards

During the testing of dfec, it became apparent that many C programs relied on the
benevolence of the compiler and their runtime environment to work correctly. dfec
was designed to be robust when faced with certain common programmer errors, and
to alert the programmer of the bug so it can be fixed.

3.9.1 Fixed-length array overrun protection

A few programs in the Siemens suite [RH98], which we used for testing, contain fixed-
length array overrun errors [HME02, Har02]. This is one of the most common errors
in C/C++ programming, and can be hard to track down. The effect of an access
beyond the declared bounds of an array is undefined, but in practice, it doesn’t always
have an adverse effect. The `schedule` program, for example, contains an array that the `gcc` linker places at the end of the program's memory space. A write beyond the bounds of the array, as long as it isn't too far, just writes into unused slots of the memory page allocated for the program. This doesn't affect any other program data, in this case.

However, when instrumented, the array is not the last thing on the page. The `gcc` linker places the data structures for the DRT immediately following the `schedule` data structures, so when the array is overrun, DRT data is overwritten, corrupting it and frequently causing the program to crash. Two safeguards were implemented to deal with this situation.

Firstly, fixed-length arrays in user code are changed to a parameterized type called `DaikonSmartArray` when instrumented. `DaikonSmartArray` is a derived class of `DaikonSmartPointer`, and does all the normal smart pointer operations such as refcounting and keeping track of extent for invariant detection purposes. In addition, it allocates the array at construction, keeps track of its declared length, and stores the length in the `bounds` field of the `DaikonPtrInfo` structure (see Figure 3-3) associated with the address of the beginning of the array. That way, no matter what pointer is derived from the array, the fixed length information is maintained. For smart pointers (and smart arrays, by extension), the pointer dereference and array subscript overloaded operators check the basemap for this `bounds` field, and if the subscript (or offset) being accessed is beyond the acceptable bounds, the instrumented program will `abort()`. This doesn't save the program, but it alerts the programmer to a bug in the code that needs to be fixed before invariant detection can proceed. This detects the bug at the point of error instead of manifesting later, such as an inexplicable crash due to DRT data corruption, which would be hard (if even possible) to debug.

The second method of protection against fixed-length array overrun is a guard structure that surrounds the DRT variables in memory. Specifically, the `FILE *` representing the `dtrace` file (the variable that the linker puts at the low end of memory) has an integer variable declared before and after it. At program initialization, the integers are initialized to two "magic numbers," and before every access to the `FILE`
*, these two numbers are checked to make sure that they haven’t changed. If the user program accesses data sequentially, it will corrupt these numbers before breaking the object. In this event, the instrumented program will also abort() with a message that informs the user that DRT data has been corrupted. This safeguard is useful for when a completely random pointer access destroys DRT data, or for when a fixed-length buffer is passed to a function outside of instrumentation scope (such as gets()).

3.9.2 Array padding

Array padding is an extension of the fixed-length array overrun protection described in Section 3.9.1. The user can opt to add a small, user-selectable number of elements to the beginning and end of every fixed-length array, by defining a preprocessor macro named DAikon_FIXED_LENGTH_ARRAY_PADDING to be the number of extra array elements desired. Then, if the instrumented code writes beyond the bounds of the array in either direction, the runtime library can simply warn the user instead of aborting, if the access falls within these padding zones. Since most array accesses are sequential, the user often can get away with a few overruns, and by defining the size of the padding zone (or “leeway”) appropriately, the user can make even an incorrect program exhibit well-defined behavior.

Array padding is implemented in two parts of the runtime library. The first part is the allocation, which is taken care of in the constructor for DaikonSmartArray. When the array is allocated, an extra

\[ 2 \times \text{element size} \times \text{DAikon FIXED LENGTH ARRAY_PADDING} \quad (3.1) \]

bytes are added to the allocation. Since DaikonSmartArray is derived from DaikonSmartPointer, it has both a base and an index field. The base is set to point to the bottom of the allocated block, and the index field is set to point element size \( \times \text{DAikon FIXED LENGTH ARRAY_PADDING} \) bytes into the newly-allocated block. Since the index field is is used to represent the “actual” pointer, there are DAikon_FIXED_LENGTH_ARRAY_PADDING valid elements before the user-visible begin-
ning of the array, as well as DAIKON_FIXED_LENGTH_ARRAY_PADDING valid elements beyond the user-visible end of the array.

The second part of array padding is the warnings that are issued when the instrumented code accesses an element in the padding area of the array. Since all dereferences are handled by DaikonSmartPointer, the checking is done in a DaikonSmartPointer member function called note_and_dereference(). note_and_dereference() looks up the relevant block in the basemap, and checks its DaikonPtrInfo for the bounds field. If bounds is set, it first checks to see if the access falls outside the bounds, and if so, throws a fatal error. If the access is within the bounds, it then checks the leeway field, to see if the access falls within the padding zone. If it does, the runtime library issues a warning, but proceeds with the access. max_seen is updated, and a reference to the appropriate memory address is returned. Code for note_and_dereference() is shown in Figure 3-11.

3.9.3 Automatic scalar initialization

The space program from the Siemens suite [RH98] makes the assumption that scalar values are initialized to zero when declared. This behavior is not part of the ANSI C standard, though some compilers (notably gcc) do this anyway. However, the version of g++ that dfec is compatible with does not. When instrumenting a C program that assumes gcc is going to initialize its variables to zero, the compilation of the instrumented source produces a version of the program where undefined behavior manifests itself as a bug.

Though this is an error on the user's part, the user will rationally attribute any change in behavior in the instrumented program to a fault in dfec. Currently, dfec outputs a zero initializer for every scalar variable that the user has left uninitialized. This allows the space program, as well as other programs that make the same assumption, to work correctly.
T & DaikonSmartPointer<T>::note_and_dereference(int ofs) {
    /* Check to make sure index+ofs is valid for dereference, update
       max_seen, and return *(index+ofs). */
    DaikonPtrInfo &myinfo = basemapLookup();
    if (invalid(*test_contents=*/false)) {
        fprintf(stderr,
                "daikon_runtime: program attempted to access an invalidated block!\n");  
        exit(DAIKON_ERR_CODE);
    }
    if (myinfo.bounds) {
        /* The leeway calculations are as follows:
            The range [base, bounds) is the only possible addressable range.
            (leeway) bytes inwards from that is allowed, but reported. */
        if (((index+ofs) >= myinfo.bounds) ||
            ((index+ofs) < base)) {
            report_array_overflow(ofs, /*fatal=*/false);
            exit(DAIKON_ERR_CODE);
        } 
        #if DAIKON_FIXED_LENGTH_ARRAY_PADDING != 0
        } else if (((int)(index+ofs)) >= ((int)(myinfo.bounds))-myinfo.leeway)||
            ((int)(index+ofs)) <= ((int)base)+myinfo.leeway) {
            /* it's not beyond the bounds as tested above, but it's
               in the leeway zone. */
            report_array_overflow(ofs, /*fatal=*/false);
        #endif /* DAIKON_FIXED_LENGTH_ARRAY_PADDING != 0 */
    }
    if (index+ofs >= myinfo.max_seen)
        myinfo.max_seen = index+ofs+1;
    return (T&)(index[ofs]);
};

Figure 3-11: The bounds-checking routine for DaikonSmartPointer.

3.10 Other Features

3.10.1 Disambiguation

This section describes a mechanism to allow the user to select whether to instrument
a pointer variable as a pointer to a single instance of its type, or as an array of its
type.

The C language allows a programmer to use a pointer variable as either a simple
reference to one variable, or as a base pointer to a sequential array of variables of
the same type, as demonstrated in Figure 3-12. By default, dfe outputs all pointers
as arrays. A pointer to a scalar is output as a one-element array. However, this is
not always good enough. If the user has a pointer to a single int variable, and uses
... char single_character;
char many_characters[100];

char *pointer;
pointer = &single_character;
pointer = many_characters;
...

Figure 3-12: The versatility of pointer variable types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>struct-array.c</th>
<th>desired .decls</th>
<th>faulty .decls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>struct data {</td>
<td>array_of_data</td>
<td>array_of_data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int x;</td>
<td>hashcode</td>
<td>hashcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int y;</td>
<td>struct node *</td>
<td>struct node *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>}</td>
<td>array_of_data-&gt;x[]</td>
<td>array_of_data-&gt;x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct data *array_of_data;</td>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>array_of_data-&gt;y[]</td>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>array_of_data-&gt;y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>int[]</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-13: An example of a struct array incorrectly output as a single struct.

the pointer to address an int field inside a larger struct with other fields (which may not necessarily be ints), the runtime will incorrectly output the subsequent bytes in the struct as if they were members of an int array. This is because the memory addresses in the struct are considered valid by the DRT, since they’ve been written to, although they’re not part of a contiguous int array. Also, there must be a decision made at instrumentation time whether a struct pointer refers to an array or a single struct. If it is instrumented as a pointer to a single struct, then fields of other structs in the array will not be output (see Figure 3-13). However, if it is a single struct but instrumented as an array, recursive instrumentation will be shallower than in the single case — array fields of the struct cannot be output, since the struct is already an array, and Daikon proper cannot handle two-dimensional arrays (see Figure 3-14).

dfec provides a mechanism by which the user can specify, for a specific variable at a specific program point, how that variable should be output. This feature is called “disambiguation.” Disambiguation is controlled by a file that is loaded at instrumentation time, containing a list that specifies the representation types of dereferenced pointer variables. This must be done at instrumentation time as opposed to runtime
so the \texttt{dfec} executable can decide which output routines to insert into the code, and what types to list in the \texttt{decls} file. (A future extension to the system could be a static analysis utility written to use this mechanism and make a guess as to the correct representation type for each pointer variable, saving the user some thought.) In Figure 3-12, \texttt{many\_characters} refers to an array while \texttt{single\_character} refers to a single value. Information about whether each pointer refers to an array or a single element can be specified in a "disambig file" that resides in the same directory as the \texttt{decls} file. \texttt{dfec} has a command-line option that causes it to read this file instead of assuming all pointer variables should be instrumented as their default types. (\texttt{dfec} can also produce the file automatically, permitting users to edit it for use on subsequent runs, rather than having to create it from scratch.)

The disambig file lists all the instrumented PPTs, and under each, a list of all the variables in scope at that PPT, along with the types that the variables are instrumented as. For pointer variables, there are two options: "A" for array, and "P" for pointer to single value. For variables of type \texttt{char}, there are two options: "I" for integer (numerical value) and "C" for character. This allows the user to choose whether a \texttt{char} variable refers to a numerical value that mathematical invariants should be calculated over, or an ASCII character. An example is shown in Figure 3-15, where the desired type of \texttt{foo} is "A" (an array of values), and the desired types of \texttt{p1} and \texttt{p2} are both "P" (a pointer to a single value).

The disambig file contains a single entry for the global variables, another entry for
```c
int foo[10] = 
    {1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55};

int peq(int *p1, int *p2) {
    return (*p1 == *p2);
}

int main() {
    int i;
    for (i=0; i<9; i++)
        peq(foo+i, foo+i+1);
}
```

---

Invariants (with disambiguation)

std.peq(int *;int *;):::ENTER
*p1 <= *p2

std.peq(int *;int *;):::EXIT1
p1 == orig(p1)
*p1 == orig(*p1)
p2 == orig(p2)
*p2 == orig(*p2)
return one of { 0, 1 }
*p1 <= *p2

---

Invariants (without disambiguation)

std.peq(int *;int *;):::ENTER
size(p1[]) - 1 == size(p2[])
p1[] elements >= 1
p1[] sorted by <=
p2[] sorted by <
p1[] < p2[] (lexically)
p2[] is a subsequence of p1[]
p1[] >= ::foo[] (lexically)
p2[] > ::foo[] (lexically)

std.peq(int *;int *;):::EXIT1
p1 == orig(p!)
p1[] == orig(p1[])
p2 == orig(p2)
p2[] == orig(p2[])
size(p1[]) - 1 == size(p2[])
p1[] elements >= 1
p1[] sorted by <=
p2[] sorted by <
return one of { 0, 1 }
p1[] < p2[] (lexically)
p2[] is a subsequence of p1[]
p1[] >= ::foo[] (lexically)
p2[] > ::foo[] (lexically)
```

Figure 3-15: An example program, its disambig file, and invariants with and without using disambiguation.
the parameter variables at each PPT, and another entry for every user-defined class or struct in instrumentation scope. Members of structs or classes can be disambiguated just like variables at a program point. Entries can occur in the disambig file in any order, and variables can be omitted, which will lead to them being instrumented as their default type.

3.10.2 Variable Comparability

Variable comparability information can speed up the invariant detection process and reduce the number of trivial invariants by eliminating comparisons between unrelated variables. For instance, if two variables have the same type, but are never actually compared (directly or indirectly) in the target program, it can be assumed that any invariants discovered involving both variables are purely coincidental (see Figure 3-16). dfec can, after instrumentation, call an external program called Lackwit [OJ97], which performs static analysis on C code to determine what variables are comparable. A combination of Perl scripts and another preparatory front end that aids Lackwit in its analysis of array variables are used, and the comparability types are inserted into the decls file in the correct places. This process is described in Section 3.10.3. No variable comparability detection is implemented or planned for C++.

Figure 3-16 is a demonstration of the need for comparability types. Without comparability types, Daikon would attempt to calculate invariants relating index and weight, because they’re both ints. However, since one is an index and one is a numerical value, their comparability types will be different, and no invariants will be calculated relating their values. However, weight will be compared to the elements of the bar array.

3.10.3 Lackwit execution

Lackwit, as distributed, contains a few bugs and is missing a few necessary features for it to be transparently usable as a variable comparability detector. Michael Harder has written an lwpp Perl script that makes the use of Lackwit transparent for the user, and I’ve written a separate extension of the EDG front end called 1n that inserts
int bar[] = \{1,1,2,3,5,8\};

int foo(int index, int weight) {
    return bar[index] + weight;
}

Invariants detected, using Lackwit

std.foo(int;int):::EXIT1
index == orig(index)
weight == orig(weight)
:::bar == orig(:::bar)
index >= 0
weight >= 0
:::bar has only one value
:::bar[] elements one of \{ 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 \}
weight < return

Invariants detected, without using Lackwit

std.foo(int;int):::EXIT1
index == orig(index)
weight == orig(weight)
:::bar == orig(:::bar)
index >= 0
weight >= 0
:::bar has only one value
:::bar[] elements one of \{ 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 \}
:::bar[index..] >= (index)
:::bar[index..] sorted by <=
:::bar[0..index-1] elements one of \{ 1, 2, 3, 5 \}
:::bar[weight..] >= (index)
:::bar[weight..] sorted by <=
:::bar[weight+1..] > (index)
:::bar[weight+1..] sorted by <
:::bar[0..weight-1] elements one of \{ 1, 2, 3, 5 \}
index <= return
index <= size(:::bar[])-1
weight < return
weight <= size(:::bar[])-1
return >= :::bar[index]

Figure 3-16: A demonstration of the necessity of comparability types.
Figure 3-17: The changes made by 1h to a sample function.

information into a source file to allow Lackwit to better detect variable comparability.

Lackwit comes with a file called libc.c, which contains signatures for functions in libc, and fake stub implementations for each that cause Lackwit to associate their arguments in the correct manner. Every execution of dfec causes this file to be processed by Lackwit, which notes every time a variable is comparable to another (by an assignment, boolean relation, or other expression that involves the two variables directly), and adds this information to a database that can later be queried to determine equivalence classes of variable comparability.

For each source file being instrumented by dfec, a copy is set aside and processed by other utilities before being input to Lackwit. First it is processed by 1h, which takes in C source and outputs a modified version of the source. Lackwit fails to calculate the correct comparability of array indices over function-call boundaries, so 1h manually adds arguments to function calls for these indices to compensate for this bug, as demonstrated in Figure 3-17. Every array subscript operation is rewritten in a manner that the index is associated with a new local variable that 1h adds, called arrayname_index for an array variable named arrayname. A similar rewriting is done for array elements, using a new variable called arrayname_element. This adds information that allows Lackwit to connect comparability classes over function-call boundaries.
Once all the source files have been handed to Lackwit and the comparability database has been built, the decls file is rewritten by the lwpp script that iteratively queries the Lackwit database for comparability identifiers of each variable. Because of bugs in the Lackwit executable, the transitivity of variable comparability is not always maintained, and the script performs additional unification of comparability classes (i.e., if A is comparable to B and B is comparable to C, lwpp manually adds the "A is comparable to C" relation in cases where Lackwit omits it). Another bug causes the Lackwit executable to crash if a field of a structure is queried when it hasn't been explicitly referenced in the source. lwpp catches these crashes, and calculates comparability of struct fields by referencing the comparability classes of its parent.
Chapter 4

Testing

Testing \texttt{dfec} consists of verifying two separate properties of the system: that it does not affect the behavior of the instrumented program, and that it outputs as much quality data as possible to the \texttt{dtrace} file so that Daikon proper has can discover quality invariants.

\texttt{dfec} was tested using a test suite comprised of six programs from the Siemens suite [RH98], along with the reference implementations of the MD5 cryptographic hash [Plu99] and Rijndael [RD01] algorithms. The Siemens programs are each accompanied with quite large test suites that fully exercise program behavior, and the Rijndael implementation is accompanied by an fairly exhaustive test stub. The Siemens programs are valuable because other research [RH98] has independently reported invariants about the program. If \texttt{dfec} can generate trace files that allow Daikon to report these invariants, we can be reasonably assured of its success. The MD5 and Rijndael algorithms are useful because they are computationally heavy, and have extensive test stubs that can be used to verify that they work correctly (i.e., produce the same output) under instrumentation.

Correct program behavior is checked by comparing the output of the instrumented version with the uninstrumented one. This is done using a simple textual diff of the outputs. Verifying that an instrumented program is producing valid trace data is harder to check. A regression test suite has been constructed that contains versions of \texttt{dtrace} and \texttt{decls} files that are known to exhibit quality invariants in the Siemens suite. The \texttt{dtrace-diff} tool (see Section 4.1.1) compares two \texttt{dtrace} files and enu-
merates any differences between them. This makes it easy to tell if a change in dfec yields a positive change in the dtrace file (such as suppression of the output of uninitialized variables) or a negative one (such as the failure to output structs). An invariant diff tool also exists, written by Michael Harder, which can show how the changes in the dtrace or decls files add or remove from the potential invariants that Daikon proper can detect. The invariant diff tool is used mostly to detect errors or changes in Daikon proper, and is outside the scope of this thesis.

4.1 Tools

4.1.1 dtrace-diff

For regression testing purposes, it is important to compare the output dtrace file produced by one run of an instrumented program to an earlier, 'ideal' version. The dtrace-diff tool is a Perl script written for this purpose. It is useful because it can catch bugs in the output procedures, or if a revision of the DRT is buggy and causes the instrumented program's behavior to differ from that of the uninstrumented version, it will catch that by noting a difference in expected PPTs. It is analogous to the UNIX diff utility, in that it compares two files and outputs lines where they differ. Unlike diff, however, it takes the semantics of the dtrace file into consideration. It takes an extra argument of a decls file, so it knows the types of the variables being compared. This is useful because some textual differences in the dtrace file may not indicate an actual semantic difference that should be worried about.

Floating-point variables can be compared to within a tolerance, so that they'll be considered to be equivalent if they're within a configurable $\epsilon$ of each other. This is useful for comparing the operations of an instrumented program on two different platforms, such as Linux and Solaris, where the floating-point hardware or library implementation may give slightly different results.

Pointer variables are recorded to the dtrace file as type "hashcode", analogous to Java where each object instance has its own unique hashcode that can be effectively implemented by just using its address in memory. These hashcodes are output to the
dtrace file, but Daikon knows not to calculate mathematical invariants over them, since their values are non-deterministic and are tied to the memory layout of the system at the time of execution. Similarly, dtrace-diff knows that if two runs of a program have different values for a hashcode-type variable, it doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a semantic difference in the two executions of the program. The exception to this is that null pointers are always the same value (namely, 0) on all executions of the program. dtrace-diff only outputs a difference on hashcode variables if one instance is null and the other is not.

4.2 Modifications to the test suites

The programs that were used as a test suite for dfec were occasionally uninstrumentable in their given form, due to size, faults, or dialect of C used. Below is a report of the modifications that were done to get them to work with dfec.

4.2.1 Siemens

The Siemens suite [RH98] is a suite of programs used frequently in the testing and program analysis field. They are written in the K&R dialect of C, and to instrument them, they first had to be passed through protoize [Gui]. Under instrumentation, some previously undetected faults were uncovered.

Array-overrun bugs were found in three of the Siemens programs (print_tokens2, replace, and tcas). These errors had not been noticed in previous research using the programs. When the coverage test suites were originally created, the erroneous programs had read or written an element beyond the bounds of an array without inducing a fault. However, in our environment, the array bounds errors caused the programs to crash, by corrupting the DRT’s data structures and triggering an assertion failure. This was the motivation for adding the runtime checks for such memory errors to the DRT as described in Section 3.9.1. The implementation of the array padding feature (see Section 3.9.2) with the default setting of 2 padding elements allowed print_tokens2 and tcas to execute without generating a fatal error. However, the replace program would require dozens of elements to operate correctly, so
it still generates a fatal error. It is useful to have at least one program generating a fatal error in the test suite, solely to ensure that the runtime library’s error-handling mechanism is operating correctly.

In addition to requiring protoization, the type system of some of the Siemens programs was slightly convoluted, and required some changes. For example, in print_tokens2, the two types character_stream and token_stream were occasionally used interchangeably. Both are typedef aliases of FILE *, and are compatible, but print_tokens2 failed to include forward declarations for its functions. dfsc failed to match the implicit definition of unget_error(token_stream) with the later explicit definition of unget_error(character_stream). In ANSI C, this would have only generated a warning, because token_stream and character_stream are both pointer types. In the instrumented code, however, they are both smart pointers, which are template classes. The compiler has no way of knowing that they’re compatible, and therefore gives an error. The function signature was changed to be consistently unget_error(token_stream) and it compiled and executed fine.

4.2.2 Rijndael

The Rijndael reference implementation [RD01] contains the algorithm and an extensive test stub. The test stub is designed for gathering timing data, so it runs an exceptionally large amount of code. In fact, it runs so much that the instrumented program (on Linux) eventually terminates abnormally, because the generated dtrace file exceeds the two gigabyte filesize limit on the ext2 filesystem. Because of this, we had to reduce the number of iterations of some top-level loops to get a test that would run in a reasonable amount of time, and produce a reasonably-size dtrace file for invariant detection.
Chapter 5

Future Work

dfec is a working system, and can handle non-buggy programs in a subset of the ANSI dialect of C. However, for usability purposes, this still leaves something to be desired. Non-buggy programs are extremely rare, and users may want to use dfec and Daikon specifically to find bugs in their programs. There is much room for usability work to be done, as well as increasing the subset of ANSI C that dfec can handle.

5.1 Additional libc instrumentation

Currently, only the string.h functions, memcpys, memmove(), bcopy(), getopt(), malloc(), and free() have had wrappers written for them. There are other functions in libc that take pointer arguments, or return pointers, that should have wrapper functions written for them that understand the semantics of the function, and what effect it has on the heap.

5.2 gcc emulation

gcc has a few non-ANSI constructs in its header files, which occasionally require workarounds. For example, gcc header files use the _attribute_ construct, which is non-ANSI, to specify certain things like linkage of functions. Currently, dfec attempts to deal with these by carefully defining system macros that make it act like an older version of gcc (one that doesn't support constructs like _attribute_) during the preprocessing step. In the header files, there are macro tests that check the
gcc version, and define different prototypes (ones that don’t include \_attribute\_) for older gcc versions. By emulating an older version of gcc, dfec causes these older prototypes to be defined. This is not an elegant solution, and it may result in incorrect operation if function signatures in the areas of system header files intended for older gcc versions don’t match the signatures for new versions. Making dfec behave more like gcc would help streamline the instrumentation process. As EDG has just recently released a new version of their front end with better support for gcc emulation, moving dfec to be based on the newer version of EDG could help.

5.3 Thread safety

The current implementation of the runtime library is not thread-safe, and consequentially, the instrumented version of any multi-threaded program will likely fail to execute correctly. To make the runtime library thread-safe, all accesses to the basemap will need to grab a mutex. This would avoid corrupting the STL map by calling mutation operations in parallel. Also, all DaikonSmartPointer operators assume that their associated DaikonPtrInfo will not change between the beginning and end of the function. A per-block mutex might work here, or possibly just reuse of the basemap mutex, so that only one DaikonSmartPointer could be executing an operator at a time.

Additionally, accesses to the dtrace file will need to be serialized, so that the output from two PPTs does not interleave. A simple mutex that must be grabbed before outputting a PPT, and is released afterward, should do the trick.

5.4 Same-sized smart pointers

Ideally, to minimize the possibility of error, and to maximize interoperability with uninstrumented code, it is desirable to make the smart pointer as much as possible like the primitive pointer it replaces. The current implementation of a smart pointer is an object which is a different size than a primitive pointer. This changes the memory layout of instrumented data structures. The instrumented code is adjusted
accordingly, and should deal with the data structures transparently to the user, but uninstrumented code does not.

Currently, the index field of DaikonSmartPointer is placed at offset 0 in the memory layout of the object, so that uninstrumented code that thinks the object is a primitive pointer will overwrite this field. Since the index field represents the equivalent primitive pointer, this is more or less the desired behavior. However, when an array of pointers is instrumented, the size of the DaikonSmartPointer presents a problem. Uninstrumented code iterating over the block of pointers will first get the index field of the first DaikonSmartPointer, then its base field, then its birthcount cast to a pointer, then the index of the second DaikonSmartPointer, and so on (see Figure 5-1). Clearly, this is incorrect behavior and will most likely cause the program to crash (when the uninstrumented code dereferences the birthcount, which is probably a low number, and therefore an invalid pointer).

A solution to this is to have the smart pointer object be the same size as the primitive pointer it replaces. The base and birthcount would be removed from the smart pointer, and put into another STL map, separate from the basemap. Where the basemap maps from base pointers to attributes of a memory region, this new map would map uniquely from the address of a smart pointer variable in memory to a small structure holding its birthcount and its associated base pointer. On construction or assignment of a smart pointer, instead of copying the base and birthcount directly from the source smart pointer, the constructor function would make a new entry in the new map for the target smart pointer, and copy the base and birthcount fields from the source’s entry in the new map. A diagram of this is shown in Figure 5-2.

This design would slow the instrumented executable down, but it would be much more safe. Additional safety features could be implemented, such as caching the last known value of the smart pointer in the new map, so if the pointer was changed by uninstrumented code, the runtime library could tell that it had been changed, and look to see if pointed to a different known block or was pointing to an unknown block now.
5.5 Safety and debugging features

While dfec is not intended to be primarily used as a debugging tool, some features found in the tools discussed in Chapter 6 would be welcome additions to the runtime library. Saving a snapshot of the call stack and associating it with a malloc()ed block, like Valgrind [Sew02], could help users track down a bug involving the block if it was found to impair program execution. Another Valgrind feature checks to make sure the program under analysis is using the deallocator (free(), delete, or delete[])) that correctly matches the allocator (malloc(), new, or new[])) used to obtain the given block. Finally, disclosing memory leaks at the end of the program, while it would neither aid invariant detection or help a faulty program execute, could possibly be of interest to users who are using the Daikon system primarily to fix bugs in their programs.
Figure 5-2: Proposed implementation of a slimmer smart pointer.
Chapter 6

Related work

dfec is obviously similar to other Daikon front ends like dfej (the Java front end), but additionally, dfec's runtime library has much in common with testing and profiling tools such as Purify [HJ92], debug_mall [Cah90], and Valgrind [Sew02]. However, the aim of dfec is often different than the aim of these testing tools: while they monitor memory state in order to catch errors, dfec monitors memory state to determine what pointers are valid. dfec's error-detection mechanisms are primarily defensive, designed to allow the running program to execute as long as safely possible, even if it behaves illegally. In contrast, most testing tools want to aggressively find and report errors, even if the error would not normally be fatal (e.g., making the assumption that variables are initialized to zero, or referencing a block immediately after it is free().

dfec also has similarities to profilers and other instrumentation tools such as gprof [gpr98] and the run-time type-checking tool bh [LYHR01]. The primary challenge that dfec faces that other instrumentation tools don't face is that a dfec-instrumented program must access data at times when the original program did not. Output calls inserted at PPTs traverse the program's data structures, and use information obtained from the basemap to do this safely. Other instrumentation tools only refer to data exactly when the original, uninstrumented program would have.
6.1 dfej

The Daikon front end for Java (dfej) has functionality similar to dfec — it takes Java input, instruments it, and produces a decls file and a Java output file to be compiled and run [Ern00]. dfej has a runtime library component that consists mostly of routines for doing output, but it does not track pointers, nor does it need to. The faculties of the Java language forgo any need for smart pointers, as Java reference types can be only be used to point to single objects, and the size of Java Vectors and arrays can be easily determined at runtime. Since smart pointers are not necessary, neither is construction, and all the pointer-tracking complexities of the runtime library for dfec are irrelevant. Some of the static components of dfec have no dfej analogue, such as disambiguation, because the underlying language differences. Where dfec has to guess the size of an array, dfej can consult the JVM at runtime to determine an array’s length with no possibility of error.

6.2 Purify

Purify is a software testing and quality assurance tool that detects memory leaks and access errors [HJ92]. Its primary focus is to help the programmer discover and fix run-time detectable errors such as memory leaks (malloc()s without matching free()s), reads from uninitialized memory, and writes to free()d memory.

Purify is run on object files before linking them, modifying them instead of modifying the source code like dfec does. Purify inserts a function call before and after every data memory access instruction. At runtime, it keeps a state table that holds two status bits for every byte of memory in the heap, stack, and statically allocated data sections. One bit encodes whether a byte is writable or not (i.e., whether it’s been allocated on the stack or malloc()ed and not yet free()d), and the other bit encodes whether the byte is readable or not (i.e., whether it has been initialized by a write). It also pads the beginning and end of malloc()ed blocks with a few bytes, but in contrast to dfec, it marks them as unreadable and unwritable, so if the program under analysis attempts to access them, it will report a warning or error.
dfec’s padding reports the warning as well, but the intent is to allow the program to continue execution predictably and stably.

Also, Purify “holds” memory blocks for a period of time after they’ve been free()d, in an attempt to minimize the chance that a block will be free()d, realloc()ed, and then accessed with a stale pointer. If this were to happen, this would be a memory error that Purify is unable to detect. dfec can detect this error, however, as the birthcount for the smart pointer and the birthcount for the memory block would not match.

Another error that Purify does not catch is when two array variables are adjacent in memory, and one overflows into the other. Purify attempts to minimize occurrence of this error by inserting unallocated bytes after variables as described above. Since most array accesses are sequential, this technique will most likely report an overflow before the program begins writing into the next array. However, if the program jumps far beyond the end of the array and writes into the next one without touching the unallocated region, Purify will not catch the error. dfec will catch it, because the base pointer for the array is associated with a DaikonPtrInfo that specifies the bounds. Any access beyond the bounds is caught.

In summary, dfec is able to catch certain errors that Purify is unable to due to their fundamentally different approaches in tracking memory state. Purify uses a byte-based approach, where each byte is associated with status bits that simply indicate the memory location’s validity. The positive aspect of this is that the bookkeeping overhead of a memory access is a small constant (an array lookup, a test, and a write), whereas for dfec, the correct DaikonPtrInfo must be looked up, which is \(O(\log n)\) in the current implementation (\(n\) being the number of disjoint memory regions being tracked in the basemap). Additionally, Purify has finer granularity than dfec in determining validity. If a block is newly allocated, and then has a write performed on it several bytes in, Purify only reports the written byte as valid, whereas dfec will assume that all bytes from the beginning of the block up to the written byte are valid. Indeed, dfec performs construction and default initialization of array elements and elements of malloc()ed blocks as soon as possible, to avoid
accidentally outputting garbage data. However, the memory overhead of Purify is a constant 25% of the user-addressable memory, whereas dfec's memory usage can be much smaller, depending on the size of the allocated blocks. For a program that only has one pointer variable, that points to a malloc()ed block of four megabytes size, Purify uses an entire extra megabyte to store status bits, whereas dfec only uses a single DaikonPtrInfo structure, about 34 bytes (depending on architecture and compiler-generated padding for alignment purposes). Purify also catches errors that dfec does not, in specific, memory leaks. Memory leaks are of no interest to dfec. They could be easily caught by the runtime library by checking, during the destruction of the basemap, if there exist any DaikonPtrInfo structures for blocks marked as from malloc that still have a modbit of 1, and complain. However, since a program will still run correctly and generate valid data even with a memory leak, dfec does nothing about it.

6.3 Valgrind

Valgrind [Sew02] is a system that, like Purify, attempts to discover memory access errors. It operates in a similar fashion to Purify, and (like Purify) catches uses of uninitialized memory, accesses to memory that has been free()d, boundary violations on malloc()ed blocks, and memory leaks. Additionally, Valgrind catches reads and writes to inappropriate areas on the stack, and mismatched uses of malloc()/new/new[] versus free()/delete/delete[].

Valgrind, like Purify, has two bits per memory location — an A bit to indicate a valid address (i.e., the address has been allocated), and a V bit to indicate valid data (i.e., the address has been initialized). In contrast to Purify, Valgrind's validity-tracking operates at bit granularity, keeping status bits for every bit of user memory, and for every register in the processor. The A-bits (tracking address validity) are, as in Purify, per-byte. This leads to a program with a four-megabyte memory footprint (like the one described in Section 6.2) requiring an additional four-and-a-half-megabyte memory state table.

Unlike dfec, Valgrind can detect incorrect accesses of the stack frame. Mis-
matched uses of `malloc() / new/new[]` versus `free() / delete/delete[]` could be detected by `dfec`, by adding status bits to DaikonPtrInfo that indicate how the block was allocated. However, since `dfec`'s goal is to continue even in the face of programmer error, it does not perform these checks. Confusing `malloc()` for `new` and `free()` for `delete` is fatal, however. Array constructors and destructors are manually called by the runtime library on `malloc()`ed blocks, and these array constructors cannot be guaranteed to be compatible with `new[]` and `delete[]`, which have compiler-specific implementations.

### 6.4 debug_malloc

deprecated [Cah90] is a library consisting of replacements for the standard system `malloc()`, `free()`, and related calls. No code change is required to use it, but the executable must be linked with the debug_malloc library. It works by providing hostile conditions for programs that will cause the program to segfault on certain memory errors when it might have continued unaware under normal conditions. The `malloc()` replacement fills the returned memory area with the value 0x01, which will break programs that expect memory areas to be initialized to zero, as well as programs which `free()` an area and expect it to be returned unchanged on the next `malloc()`. The `malloc()` replacement also allocates a certain amount of padding that it fills with “magic numbers”, which it then uses when it performs consistency checks during `free()`, ensuring that these numbers have not been changed (which would indicate that the program wrote beyond the bounds of the block). The `free()` replacement also fills the block with the value 0x02, which will break programs that `free()` memory regions and then continue to reference them.

debug_malloc is extremely lightweight compared to `dfec`, Valgrind, and Purify. It requires very little additional state information, and therefore has a small footprint. Also, it doesn’t check every access, instead only performing sanity checks during `malloc()` and `free()`. In exchange for the low overhead, some errors are missed. For example, it only catches out-of-bounds errors when the program actually writes out-of-bounds, whereas `dfec` can catch a read. The goal of debug_malloc is opposite
to the goal of dfec, in that debug_malloc tries to make it hard for a buggy program to execute, and dfec tries to make it easier for even buggy programs to execute in the most “correct” fashion they can.

6.5 Run-Time Type Checking

The run-time type checking system devised by Loginov, Yong, Horwitz, and Reps [LYHR01] is more similar to dfec than the other testing tools described in that it performs instrumentation on the source code. Like the other testing tools, however, it maintains status bits for each byte of memory, instead of on a per-block basis, like with dfec. The status bits are used to represent what type the byte contains (one of “unallocated,” “uninitialized,” “integral,” “real,” and “pointer”). The “unallocated” and “uninitialized” tags work exactly the same way as they do in Purify, allowing the system to detect the set of memory-access errors that Purify does. The system’s primary focus, however, is to detect and report run-time type conflicts. An example of a type conflict is when a union variable is written as an integral type, then is read as a pointer type. Statically, there is no feasible way to check that code is free from this type of error, but at runtime, the system notes that the union has been initialized to an integral type, and then issues a warning when it is read as a conflicting type.

dfec performs a nominal amount of runtime type-tracking, using the dest and copy function pointers in DaikonPtrInfo. Of course, this type-tracking is on a per-block basis, whereas the run-time type checking system is per-byte. Per-byte tracking allows for more complicated memory layouts (like non-homogeneous arrays for user-implemented allocators, or arrays of structs with differently typed fields) to be correctly tracked. However, dfec’s interest in types is only so it can call constructors, destructors, and copy functions, and per-block tracking is sufficient for this. Some run-time type errors could be detected — for instance, using memcpy() to copy a region of type A into a region of type B. However, since dfec wants to be as transparent as possible to the user, in this case it simply updates the destination region’s dest and copy function pointers with those of the source region, instead of issuing
an error about the difference.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis has shown the design, implementation, and effectiveness of a C/C++ front end for the Daikon system, consisting of a source-to-source transformation utility and a runtime library to be linked into the instrumented source. \texttt{df}ec instruments C/C++ code, producing a list of variable declarations and an instrumented source file that, when compiled and linked with the Daikon runtime library, tracks variable values and outputs them to a data trace file for later analysis with the Daikon invariant detection engine.

The instrumented program, during \texttt{dtrace} output, accesses memory at times when the original program would not have. This forces \texttt{df}ec to determine on its own what variables are valid and the size of arrays. This is necessary to avoid output of garbage values, to ensure the output of as much valid data as possible, and to avoid causing segmentation faults by dereferencing invalid pointers. This requirement differentiates \texttt{df}ec from other instrumentation programs which only access memory exactly when the original source would have accessed memory.

Testing, use, and the gradual evolution of the system has shown that performing the necessary instrumentation of C code while maintaining coherency (i.e., without disrupting the original semantics of the program) is extremely hard to do. C is a very low-level language, and allows the programmer to perform operations (like reinterpret casts) that can break any additional code linked into the system. Additionally, the C language does not provide protection against array overruns or other out of bounds accesses like Java does.
In spite of this, safeguards can be implemented that dynamically enforce safety. Adding bounds-checking to a program not only alerts the user to a potential problem, but (through fixed-length array padding) could actually increase the safety of the program — corner cases that used to have undefined behavior will now be well-defined, and won’t have a possibility of crashing the program, where the original uninstrumented source may have crashed.

User feedback suggests, however, that any behavior that diverges from the behavior of the uninstrumented source is unacceptable, whether it informs the user about properties of the code in question or not. dfec is part of a system used to detect invariants, and is not a buffer overrun detector. Unfortunately, this puts dfec in the position of attempting to emulate undefined behavior, but progress can be made by carefully choosing the behavior that is the most tolerant of the running program.

Uninstrumented functions from libc pose a unique challenge in that they cannot be rewritten by the front end. However, they are well-defined semantically, and can be assumed to be well-behaved, to a greater degree than user code can be. Additional information can be gleaned from the semantics of these functions, which can aid dfec in the discovery of more valid user data.

In summary, implementing a front end for Daikon consists of an inherent tradeoff between collecting as much data as possible from the running program, while ensuring (most importantly) that the program behavior is never changed. By playing it safe, keeping track of boundaries, and enhancing the picture by taking advantage of knowledge we have about the behavior of external functions, we can collect as much data as possible to export to Daikon proper for detection of quality invariants.
Bibliography


