Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

Technical Report

MIT-CSAIL-TR-2005-054
AIM-2005-024

August 16, 2005

Collective Choice with Uncertain Domain Moldels

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AI Memo 2005-024 16 Aug 05

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Abstract

When groups of individuals make choices among several alternatives, the most compelling social outcome is the Condorcet winner, namely the alternative beating all others in a pair-wise contest. Obviously the Condorcet winner cannot be overturned if one sub-group proposes another alternative it happens to favor. However, in some cases, and especially with haphazard voting, there will be no clear unique winner, with the outcome consisting of a triple of pair-wise winners that each beat different subsets of the alternatives (i.e. a "top-cycle".) We explore the sensitivity of Condorcet winners to various perturbations in the voting process that lead to top-cycles. Surprisingly, variations in the number of votes for each alternative is much less important than consistency in a voter's view of how alternatives are related. As more and more voter's preference orderings on alternatives depart from a shared model of the domain, then unique Condorcet outcomes become increasingly unlikely.

1. Introduction

There are abundant theoretical results showing that for large numbers of voters each having random preferences over a large set of alternatives, there will almost surely be no stable agreement or unique outcome (e.g. Arrow 1963, Campbell & Tullock1965, Kelly 1986, Saari 1994, Jones et al 1995.) To insure consensus, it has been clear for decades that some form of constraint must be introduced that prohibits voters from choosing alternatives haphazardly. One plausible constraint is that individual preference orders are consistent with a shared global model for relating alternatives (Runkel, 1956). In this case, the probability of the group reaching a stable agreement is over 90% (Richards et al., 1998, 2002.) For certain types of shared models, agreement is guaranteed regardless of the numbers of voters and their voting power. Simple examples of shared models relating alternatives include how presidential candidates are positioned along a liberal to conservative dimension, the organization of taste choices for soft (or alcoholic!) drinks, the perceived relation between landmarks

in a city, the democratic versus communist versus industrial wealth of nations, etc.

To insure consensus, important conditions include (i) that each individual votes faithfully, or not at all when "in doubt", (ii) that there is no uncertainty or external source of noise that perturbs a voter's ranking of alternatives, and (iii) that a voter's ranking is consistent with the shared global model. Any violations of these conditions will reduce the odds for consensus. Here, we explore the reduced likelihood of unique winners when a shared global model for relating alternatives is violated. The principal result will be that imperfect knowledge of a domain has small consequence if individuals vote faithfully, but haphazard preference orderings that are inconsistent with a shared domain model can create havoc.

2. The Shared Model Constraint

The main assumption is that alternatives are related by a labeled connected graph *M*(A,e) with a set of vertices A representing the alternative choice set $\{a_1,..... a_n\}$ and a set of edges e that indicate a non-metric "similarity" relationship between the alternatives (Shepard 1980, Borg & Lingoes 1987.)

Figure 1 shows a simple example of a graph *M*(A,e) representing parameter changes between four alternatives, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4. Each edge in *M*(A,e) connecting two alternatives indicates that those alternatives differ in a single attribute. To illustrate, if the alternatives are choices among alcoholic drinks, a_1 and a_4 may be two brands of a scotch whiskey such as Glenlivet (a_1) versus a scotch liquor like Southern Comfort (a_4). Likewise, a_2 and a_3 may differ from a_1 by two different blends of bourbon, such as Jack Daniels or Jim Bean.

In the ideal case, we assume that each voter's preferences are consistent with the relationships specified by the shared model *M*(A,e), with each voter having a unique most-preferred alternative, called the ideal point. Lower-ranked preferences follow from the set of transitive paths of the graph, with the second-most preferred alternatives being vertices adjacent to the ideal point, third-most the next set, etc. An ordering that jumps around, violating the relationships among alternatives in *M*(A,e) is not allowed (except later when noise or uncertainty is explicitly introduced.) Let D/i be the partial order induced from *M*(A,e) beginning at the ideal point a_i. Then D/i = (A,P) is an asymmetric and transitive directed graph where $(a_j, a_k) \varepsilon P$ iff the number of edges on the shortest path from a_i to a_j is less than the number of edges



$D_1 : a_1 \succ a_2 \sim a_3 \sim a_4$



$D_2 : a_2 \succ a_3 \sim a_1 \succ a_4$



$D_3 : a_3 \succ a_2 \sim a_1 \succ a_4$



$D_4 : a_4 \succ a_1 \succ a_2 \sim a_3$



Figure 1: Set of Partial Orders Induced from ***M***.
(No arc means alternatives are indifferent; dashed lines are implied by transitivity over preferred or indifferent alternatives.)

on the shortest path from a_i to a_k. If $(a_j, a_k) \in P$ then we say that a_j is preferred to a_k, denoted $a_j > a_k$. If the number of edges on the shortest path from a_i to a_j is equal to the number of edges on the shortest path from a_i to a_k then we say that a_j and a_k are non-comparable (or indifferent) for those voters with ideal point a_i, denoted as $a_j \sim a_k$. Figure 1 gives an example of the set of four directed graphs induced from a model *M* and the corresponding sets of feasible preferences over the set of these alternatives.

3. Definitions and Notation

Let $w = (w_1 \ldots w_n)$ be the normalized weights over the n preference types -- i.e., w_i is the proportion of voters with ideal point a_i and thus the proportion of voters with the partial order D_i over the set of alternatives A. Let $| a_j > a_k |$ denote the number of voters for whom a_j is preferred to a_k. Then an alternative a_j

ε A is the alternative most preferred by the group if for all $a_k \varepsilon A$, $a_k =/= a_j$, $| a_j > a_k | > | a_k > a_j |$. Hence, a_j is the top-ranked alternative or, more simply, "the winner". The Condorcet tally method, which evaluates all pairs of alternatives, is used to find this winner (Condorcet 1785.)

Very often in noisy contests, there will not be a Condorcet winner. Rather, one alternative a_j may beat a_k in a pair-wise comparison, but a_k is beaten by a_i, which in turn beats a_j. If either a_i, a_j, or a_k also beat all remaining n-3 alternatives, then there is a top-cycle and no winner. We call such outcomes unstable.

Stability (or conversely, the instability of an outcome): For a fixed set of alternatives and model M_n, the stability of an outcome is the probability that there will not be a top-cycle, or, equivalently, that there will be a unique Condorcet winner (excluding ties.)

Not to be confused with the stability is the robustness of an outcome. For example, an outcome may not include top-cycles, but still be very sensitive to the choice of weights, or to the particular form of the model M_n.

Robustness: The robustness of an outcome is the likelihood that perturbations in the edge set for model M_n, or fluctuations in the weights on alternatives will lead to a different winner.

Note that stability measures the ease with which an outcome can be overturned by another alternative, whereas robustness tests whether or not the same outcome will be reached following some perturbation. Following a brief aside on relevant aspects of robustness, we focus on stability.

4. Robustness

Robustness impacts stability analysis in two ways: (i) the choice of tally procedure and (ii) the relative roles of model M_n compared with weight variations on alternatives.

The simplest and most common method for choosing winners among a set of alternatives is simple Plurality, i.e. a winner-take-all. This procedure ignores any model relating alternatives, because the outcome is that alternative with the maximum number of votes (or here, equivalently, the maximum weight node in the graphical version of M_n.) The plurality winner need not be a majority winner, and in extreme cases will garner only as few percent of the total votes. Not surprisingly, this winner will be very easy to overturn, and hence is not robust. In

contrast, the Condorcet and Borda procedures favored here are quite robust to variations in voting strengths if there is some modicum of relationships among alternatives (Condorcet 1785, Borda 1786, Young 1986.)These two procedures are highly correlated (>90%) with the most likely winner being that alternative receiving the most support from many similar alternatives (Richards & Seung 2004.) Hence variations in voting strengths for one alternative become diluted with much less impact. Appendix 1 defines and compares data for these three tally procedures, and shows the striking advantage of the Condorcet and Borda winners.



Figure 2: Robustness of winners to perturbations in either weights on nodes (open diamonds) or to the structure of model (gray triangles.) Models are random graphs; weights are taken from a uniform distribution.

To further reinforce the importance of model M_n in a choice domain, rather than weights on alternatives, consider Figure 2. In this figure, the two curves differ in whether the structure of the domain model is altered, or whether the weights on vertices (alternatives) are changed. Again, as will be inferred unless otherwise noted, weights that voters place on vertices in M_n are chosen from a uniform distribution, and the graphical model M_n with n vertices is a random graph with all edges bi-directional with edge probability of one-half. The directed graphs D_i governing a voter's preference orders are limited to the ideal point and its neighbors in M_n, with all lower ranked preferences taken as equivalent (i.e. indifferent.) The open diamonds show that when the domain model is held fixed, but a second set of weights on alternatives are chosen from a uniform distribution, there is little change in the percent of agreement in outcomes, which remains

roughly constant at 40% for n <30 and 1/2<p<2/3. In contrast, when the weights are held fixed, but applied to two different random models for M_n, there is a dramatic fall in agreement between the two winners (gray triangles.) Elsewhere we have shown that for n>10 the expected agreement in outcomes when M_n is revised is roughly (n-k)/n, where k is the number of vertices in M_n that have been altered (Richards, 2005.) The sections that follow detail the result highlighted in Fig. 2, showing that both the structure of the model M_n and the extent to which voter's preferences adher to this model are the major sources of instability in outcomes.

5. Methods

Our results are largely based on Monte Carlo simulations. The procedure is to construct a connected graph a with n vertices and edge probability p. (For most of these simulations, p = 1/2.) In the ideal case, with no "noise" and faithful voting, the random graph a determines the set of n feasible preference orders, with each preference order assigned a weight w_i, i = 1,....n, drawn uniformly from the interval [0,1000]. These weights create an n-tuple w_i representing the distribution of voters over feasible preferences. We then evaluate all a pairs of alternatives to determine whether one alternative beats all others using the Condorcet tally. The number of trials varied between 200 and 500 depending upon the probability of no-winner. Because of the high correlation between the Borda and Condorcet winners, the presence of Condorcet top-cycles gives a good indication of the likelihood that a Borda winner can be overturned. The maximum average error in the results is about 3 percent.

6. Uncertainty in Voting

We assume that each voter's ideal point (first choice) is respected, and only second or lower ranked preferences are subject to uncertainty. In the extreme case, there is no regard for any shared model M_n relating alternative choices, and all votes are cast haphazardly, excepting the voter's first choice. Backing away from this extreme, we can group voters by their ideal points, and let the haphazard voting take place only for small segments of the voting population, and only for alternatives that do not correspond to the ideal points. Figure 3 is an example. For this particular model M_4, the directed edge from a_1 to a_4 and the new directed edge from a_4 to a_3 shows that now a_3 (rather than a_1) is a second choice preference for a_4, whereas a_4 still remains one of three second-choices for a_1. The result of these changes is a new preference ordering D_4 for a_4, but NO change



Figure 3: Preference orders for a1, a2, a3 remain the same, but preference order for a4 is altered.

in D_1 for a_1. The most extreme case of such rearrangements will be when edges of M_n are chosen randomly from a list of all directed edges among the alternatives. This case will be referred to as a "random directed graph", to be contrasted with the ideal M_n whose edges are all bidirectional.

6.1 Haphazard Voting

The simplest perturbation to describe is the most extreme: excepting the ideal point, all individuals make choices haphazardly when choosing between the two alternatives being compared in each Condorcet trial. In other words, model M_n becomes irrelevant, and furthermore, each voter's preference orders

are changing widely from one Condorcet test pair to the next. Figure 4 shows the result: the probability of a top-cycle, and hence no unique winner, rises rapidly toward 100%, already reaching 90% for 10 alternatives. In contrast, as shown by the lowest curve, if voters respect the



Figure 4: Top curve: ransom preference orders. Bottom curve: preference orders of voters respect a shared domain model relating alternatives.

model M_n (here a random graph relating alternatives with p(e) =1/2), the chance of no winner is less than 5%. Hence model M_n provides enormous stability in outcomes, because the likelihood of no-winner is small.

6.2 Haphazard Preferences Orders

The disastrous case above is equivalent to all voters changing their preference orders for each Condorcet comparison. Let us then require that each voter's preference ordering on alternatives be fixed. Thus rather than constraining the preference orders D_i to be constrained by a shared model M_n, let the D_i's be chosen at random (but as before, limited to three levels as in Fig. 1.) This perturbation can be effected by altering the bidirectional edges in M_n, specifically by choosing edges at random from a uniform distribution of all ${}_nC_2$ edges.

Let e_{ik} be the directional edge linking v_i to v_k, and e_{ki} be the opposite directional edge from v_k to v_i. If voter (i) associated with vertex v_i drops a similarity relation to v_k, then edge e_{ik} is deleted and the remaining directional

edge from vertex v_k is e_{ki} . In this process, only vertex v_i has been altered, or, equivalently, only voter (i) has changed his preference orderings.



Figure 5: Probability of top-cycles (i.e. no winner) when the shared domain model is perturbed (top and middle) versus the ideal case where all preference orders respect the domain model (solid dots.)

The top curve in Fig. 5 (filled squares) shows the probability of top-cycles when all voters rearrange their edges in M_n, choosing new neighbors from a uniform distribution of (n-1) vertices. (Hence for p = 1/2, about one-half (0.4) of the links between vertices will be bi-directional.) For this condition, note the maximum of roughly 20% compared with only 4% of top cycle outcomes for the ideal bi-directional M_n (lowest curve.) Significantly, unlike random noise on alternative weights, as the number of alternatives becomes large, the odds for no unique winner become small.

Between these two cases of all bidirectional or mostly directed edges in M_n is shown another, much less extreme "miss-matched" condition where only one type of voter rearranges only one edge (open circles.) An intermediate miss-match is if all voters rearrange only one relationship in the global domain model M_n ; the result is similar and roughly intermediate between the solid squares and

open circles. In the complementary miss-match where only one type of voter rearranges *all* edges, again the result is also an intermediate curve with a maximum near 8 alternates. These results are surprising: even one type of voter with directed edges has a disturbing effect on the probability of consensus and the effect is roughly equivalent to all voters mismatching one relationship.

7. Partial Uncertainty

Here we explore further the condition where most of the population will agree on a model for the domain and vote accordingly, but a smaller segment will have beliefs and preference orders inconsistent with the shared model held by the majority. How detrimental to achieving consensus will be an aberrant set of voters?

7.1 Preliminaries

As before, the manipulation is for each individual to vote their first choice but otherwise choose alternatives arbitrarily during each tally, ignoring the shared model M_n. The fraction of haphazard votes cast will be the main independent variable. In a Condorcet tally with the "indifferent" option, there will be a one-third probability of choosing either one of the two alternatives being compared, or simply punting. Because punting will not disrupt a fair social outcome, the uncertainty or noise in this case will be taken as 67%, namely the two-thirds of the votes that are cast for one alternative or another. Obviously, as the number of haphazard votes increases, the probability of no-winner will also increase (see Fig.4.) We can increase the odds for such negative outcomes in two ways: (i) by adding more uncertain (or rogue) voters who always vote haphazardly, or (ii) by distributing the haphazard votes across all voters. As will be shown, one set of curves predicts the unsuccessful outcome in both cases.

7.2 Haphazard votes for all less preferred alternatives

The solid curves in Fig. 6 show the probability of no Condorcet winner when varying amounts of noise or uncertainty is distributed uniformly across all voters, for all choices other than their first choice. Each curve represents the result for different random graphs having vertices ranging from 3 to 100, with edge probability of one-half. These results are rather insensitive to whether the random graph is sparse or dense, specifically for edge probabilities ranging from 1/4 to 3/4. Note that the slope of the curves is about one over most of the range, with the percent no-winner proportional to the uncertainty for a random

graph of known size n. As the size, n, of these graphs increases, so does the effects of uncertainty or noise in the aggregation process. The translation from one curve to another is approximately $O(n^2)$ as n increases. Note that even a



Figure 6: Solid curves: Noise distributed evenly among all agents.
Numbers indicate size of random graph

small percent of haphazard votes (e.g.10%) can have severe consequences on achieving successful outcomes for choice sets larger than twelve alternatives.

The dashed lines summarize simulation results when a small group of voters are uncertain, and vote haphazardly 100% of the time. (Recall that the voting power for any type of voter is chosen from a uniform distribution of weights.) For a single type of rogue voter among a group of four types (alternatives), the effect on the outcome will be equivalent to distributing the

noise over 25% of the total votes cast. Hence the dashed curve labeled "1 voter" crosses the 4- alternative solid curve at a point directly above 25% noise on the abscissa, corresponding to about 12% no-winners in each case. Similarly, if there are eight different voter types (i.e. a random graph relating eight alternatives), then the same dashed line labeled "1 voter" will cross the 8-alternative solid curve directly above 1/8 = 12% noise, corresponding to about 22% no winners whether or not the noise is concentrated in one type of voter, or distributed across all voters. For three voters, the calculation is similar, simply finding the noise equivalent if all rogue voter's votes were distributed across all voters. The lowest dashed curve labeled 1/2-voter corresponds to one voter who votes haphazardly 50% of the time.

7.3 Haphazard votes for third or less desired alternative

One might expect in practice that uncertainty will increase for less preferred alternatives. In other words, given two alternatives being compared, if these alternatives are third or fourth ranked in an voter's preference ordering, uncertainty over which to favor should be much higher than for the first and second choices. Consider then voters who introduce noise only if both of the two alternatives being contested are third or higher choices. Thus in the shared domain model, the voter's first choice or ideal point is not adjacent to the two contested alternatives. Fig. 7 shows the results are dramatically different from the previous case.

First, although only results for 40 vertex random graphs are shown, the size of the graph ($n > 10$) makes little difference in the main effect. Rather, unlike the earlier results, here the edge probability of M_n (or G_n) drastically changes the relations between voter uncertainty and the probability of no winner. For highly connected random graphs [p(e) -> 1], noise is ineffective – as expected as the covering becomes complete– whereas for sparse graphs such as chains, an almost trivial amount of noise or uncertainty can create a high probability of no-winners.



Fig. 7: Haphazard votes for alternatives not immediately similar to ideal point (i.e. non-adjacent vertices in Gn.) Data are for 40 vtx random graphs with edge probability, p, as indicated.

We also see a rather pleasing correlation between the edge probability of M_n (i.e. G_n) and the asymptotic slope of the relation between no-winners and uncertainty or noise. As the noise approaches zero, the slopes of the curves are (1-p)/p for edge probability p. The cases for p = 1/2 and p = 1 illustrate. When p = 1, the slope is zero; whereas for p = 1/2 the asymptotic slope is one.



Fig. 8. Same data as in fig. 7, replotted to show asymptotic behavior for large n.

Figure 8 provides another plot of a portion of the same data, revealing a second asymptotic property of uncertainty or noise limited to third or lower-ranked preferences. Here, the abscissa is the mean maximum degree of M_n (G_n) normalized by the number of vertices n. For all points shown, the noise is fixed at the maximum of 100%, provided that the two contested alternatives are not adjacent to the voter's first choice. There appears to be an asymptotic bound on the percent no-winners versus the normalized mean maximum degree of M_n . The theoretical explanation is under study.

8. Summary

There are three main points: First, outcomes are very sensitive to variations of preference orderings, especially those that are inconsistent with the model M_n for the domain held by the majority. Second, when voting uncertainty is limited to deciding between choices that are third-ranked or lower (i.e. choices not adjacent to the voter's ideal point), then the type of graph (i.e. structure of M_n) is the main factor in blocking unique winners, with the deleterious effects of uncertainty increasing as the similarity relationships in the domain model M_n becomes more sparse [Fig.7]. Equivalently, for random graphs, as the mean maximum vertex degree decreases [Fig.8], the percent of no-winners increases roughly monotonically when uncertainty is limited to third or higher-ranked alternatives. The size of M_n makes little difference for n>40 alternatives. Thirdly, and in contrast to uncertainty in less desirable preferences, when uncertainty or noise pervades ***all*** choices except the voter's first choice, then the odds for outcomes with no-winners increases with the size of the domain model M_n , and the structure of M_n is much less important [Fig.6].

Acknowledgements: Supported under AFOSR contract #6894705.

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10. Appendix: Robustness of Three Tally Procedures

10.1 Definitions of the tallies

***Plurality* P** (winner-take-all): Let there be n alternative choices a_i with v_i of the voters preferring alternative a_i. The winner is

$$\text{Plurality_winner} = \text{argMax}(i)\ \{v_i\} \qquad [1]$$

Note that no information about any similarity relationships among alternatives is captured in [1]. In other words, the Plurality voting method does not consider second ranked preferences of the voters.

Borda* B*: Assume the alternative choices are related by a model $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ that is held in common by all voters. In the unperturbed case, each voter's ranking of alternatives reflects information about choice relationships. (Note that the effective role of is to place conditional priors on the choice domain.) Although the shared model $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ has typically been represented as a graph, $\mathbf{G}_n$, it is more convenient to use the matrix $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ where the entry "1" indicates the presence of the edge ij in $\mathbf{G}_n$ and 0 otherwise. For simplicity, we assume that the edges of $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ are undirected, meaning that if alternative a_1 is similar to alternative a_2,

then a_2 is equally similar to a_1. However, directed edges require only a trivial modification to the scheme.

With $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ expressed as the matrix $\boldsymbol{M}_n$ we can include second choice opinions in a tally by defining a new voting weight v^*_i as

$$v^*_i = \{ 2\, v_i + \Sigma_j \, \boldsymbol{M}_{n\,j}\, v_j \} \qquad [2]$$

where now first-choice preferences are given twice the weight of the second-ranked choices, and third or higher ranked options have zero weight. (This is a simplified, revised Borda procedure.) The winner is then

$$\text{winner_Borda} = \text{argMax}(i)\, \{v^*_i\} \qquad [3]$$

***Condorcet* C**:

Definition: let d_{ij} be the minimum number of edge steps between vertices i and j in $\boldsymbol{M}_n$, where each vertex corresponds to the alternatives a_i and a_j respectively.

Then a pairwise Condorcet score S_{ij} between alternatives a_i and a_j is given by

$$S_{ij} = \Sigma_{\mathrm{k}}\, v_k\, \mathrm{sgn}[\, d_{jk} - d_{ik}] \qquad [4]$$

with the sign positive for the alternative a_i or a_j closer to a_k. Note that if a_i or a_j are equidistant from a_k, then sgn=0 and the voting weight v_k does not contribute to S_{ij}. Furthermore, as before in the Borda method, we again impose a maximum on the value of d_{ij} of 2, which means that third or higher ranked alternatives do not enter into the tally.

A Condorcet winner is then

$$\text{winner_ Condorcet} = \boldsymbol{ForAll}_{\mathrm{i=!=j}}\ S_{ij} > 0\,. \qquad [6]$$

10.2 Results

Figure 9 provides some additional data on the robustness of the three aggregation procedures. Here, connected random graphs of edge probability 1/4 were generated, with weights on nodes chosen from a uniform distribution. Winners were then found using Condorcet (C), Borda (B) and simple Plurality (P) tallies, the latter being simply that node with maximum input weight. Then the input weights were diddled using a uniform sampling from +/- 50% of the initial node weight (hence and average of 25% variation.) Using the same

graphical model M_n, a second set of winners were calculated. Figure 9 shows the probability that the winners were the same.



Fig. 9: Percent different Winners with mean weight variation of 50%; B = Borda; C= Condorcet; P = simple Plurality (winner is vertex having maximum weight.)

For the Borda and Condorcet procedures. over 80% of the winners remained the same (curve labeled BC). In contrast, the simple Plurality method (P) was not robust to noisy input weights. Furthermore, as shown earlier in Fig. 3, the Plurality winner seldom agreed with the Borda or Condorcet winners constrained by graphical models describing similarity relations among 10 or more alternatives. This difference shows the large effect prior knowledge about the domain can have on the determining optimal (maximum likelihood) choices.