Dropouts to Top Scouts?:

An analysis of the use of the military as a tool for social reform

by

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Abstract

A growing contingent of U.S. policymakers and politicians are embracing the idea of youth boot camps service to address failings of our criminal, educational, and social systems. This idea is predicated on the belief that a residential program of physical labor, remedial education, and inspirational guidance, will enable "at risk" youth to overcome their troubled histories and successfully reintegrate into society.

A phalanx within this youth service advocacy is convinced that the military ought to play an active part in this scheme. Proponents argue that the military has both the material infrastructure and the available manpower resources to successfully mount such an effort. They cite historical examples, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps and Project 100,000, as proof that the military is, indeed, capable of "rescuing" and "salvaging" "at-risk" youth.

This thesis seeks to debunk this widely-accepted myth, and to demonstrate that past attempts to force the military to adopt youth-oriented social missions have been anything but the emulation-worthy successes their champions claim. This thesis examines past and current military-youth programs, and analyzes the effects these programs have had on both the military and program participants. This thesis then explores the question of why these programs remain so timelessly attractive, even in the face of failure. Finally, this thesis makes a number of recommendations about the feasibility and, ultimately, the desirability of modern military-youth programs.

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I. Introduction

Relying on the military to solve domestic problems has great political appeal. To many legislators and policymakers, the military looks the ideal instrument for correcting many of the structural failures—socioeducational and socioeconomic—that now confront American society. With its unique infrastructure, the U.S. military is capable of deploying and managing resources, human and material, on a scale scarcely imaginable by most civilian organizations. For instance, the U.S. military’s unrivaled airlift, sealift, and prepositioning capabilities allow them to provide disaster assistance and humanitarian relief across the country and around the globe, faster and more efficiently than any civilian organization.¹ At a time when domestic social crises are growing in size and scope, the unparalleled logistical and organizational skills of the U.S. military make it look ever more attractive as a tool for redressing social problems.

One crisis area in which the proposed use of the military has gained currency of late, is that of "at-risk" youth—the often impoverished, alienated, and undereducated juveniles that make up an ever-growing segment of American society. The rationale behind such proposals is that the military, an organization with an acknowledged track record of "turning boys into men," offers discipline, direction, and the opportunity to develop vocational skills in an environment designed to build confidence and self-esteem. Moreover, since the military has long been an attractive career avenue for the underprivileged, it is seen as uniquely suited to act as a catalyst for turning around the lives of these wayward juveniles.

Now, in the wake of the Cold War, the availability of surplus resources and underutilized military facilities have enhanced the pressure placed on the military to

¹ For example, the relief effort in South Florida, after Hurricane Andrew, was in complete disarray before the U.S. military took over. Similarly, following Desert Storm, U.S. troops were instrumental in saving the Kurds in Northern Iraq.
assume this non-traditional mission. However, though the circumstances engendered by the end of the superpower struggle may be unique, programs aimed at using the military in youth development schemes are neither new nor novel. Rather, the genesis of such proposals can be traced back to social activists of the Progressive Era, such as William James, who, in 1906, proposed a mandatory period of national service, a period of arduous manual labor that would instill the "military ideals of hardihood and discipline," while knocking the childishness out of America’s "gilded youth," "sending them back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas."  

Such ideas still have great resonance with policy makers today, though the basis of their appeal varies. For some policymakers, many of whom served in the military themselves, enthusiasm for military involvement grows out of a nostalgia for a memorable and meaningful experience in their youth. For others, it stems from a principled belief that military basic training can cause lasting behavioral change. If the military values of discipline, hard work, and esprit de corps "made men" out of them; they intuitively surmise that similar exposure will have the same effect on today's youth.  

It is this "intuitive understanding" of the benefits of military service that makes these proposals so timelessly attractive. For the enthusiasm for such programs we are witnessing in the wake of the Cold War is merely part of a recurring 30-year cycle of such advocacy, not something unique to our "peace

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2 Such pressure has been further enhanced by the rise of violence in America's inner-cities. For instance, responding to the Los Angeles riots, Senator Sam Nunn has proposed the "Domestic Action Program," which envisions using the military to help staunch the deterioration of our urban infrastructure, address the dearth of appropriate role models for inner-city youths, and provide training and educational opportunities for the disadvantaged. [See FY93 SASC Appropriation Bill for details.]


4 The number of politicians and policy makers who have military experience, while still high, is diminishing rapidly as a new generation of public figures takes the political stage. A great number of "baby boomers," including our President, escaped military service, either because of Vietnam-era draft evasion, or because of the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force in the early 1970s, which allowed many to eschew the military experience that was de rigeur a generation earlier.
dividend" hungry post-Cold War populace. Three decades after William James' call for the formation of a youth military service, Roosevelt's New Deal Civilian Conservation Corps plan was enthusiastically adopted. In the midst of the Great Depression, the U.S. Army was called upon to use its troops to feed, clothe, and shelter the nation's idle [and for the most part, underprivileged] youth. Then, in the 1960s, as part of Johnson's "Great Society," Project 100,000 was inaugurated. This program represented yet another attempt to exploit the unique resources of the military to "uplift" the disadvantaged from the perils of poverty and ignorance; in this case, by allowing poverty-stricken low-aptitude recruits to enter the ranks. Thirty years later, we now have, among other proposals, the National Guard-run, Project ChalleNGe, which relies on the military to "rescue" high school dropouts through a residential program of education and societal reintegration.

At first glance, we might expect the military to be enthusiastic proponents of contemporary proposals. As bureaucracy theorists Morton Halperin and J.Q. Wilson tell us, organizations seek to avoid decreases in their size, wealth, and autonomy, while, simultaneously, seeking to reduce organizational uncertainty.\(^5\) In an era when budget cutbacks inexorably threaten each of these organizational imperatives, the obvious choice might seem to be organizational transmutation and the adoption of these new missions. By embracing non-traditional missions, the services would presumably stave off threats to their organizational livelihood. Yet, with the exception of the National Guard,\(^6\) the military has rigorously resisted embracing these youth development schemes.

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\(^6\) One caveat, however. Though these new missions are officially embraced by the National Guard, it is not clear that they are universally espoused by all members of the Guard. On the other hand, it should also be noted that, among active-duty personnel, youth development proposals do have some, albeit few, champions.
For the truth is, while adopting this new role would temporarily reduce pressure on the military as an institution, it would ultimately, and more insidiously, lead to organizational degradation from within. Distracting the military from its principal role as "an organization that exists to apply violence,"\(^7\) threatens to impair future operational readiness by diverting resources and energies away from primary missions, thus leaving our troops ill-prepared to fight. As Colonel C.J. Dunlap portends, "Each moment spent performing a non-traditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military exercises. We should. . .recognize this grave risk."\(^8\)

Moreover, forcing the military to assume missions outside of its defined mandate may lead to the erosion of the military’s unique “organizational culture.”\(^9\) The U.S. military has been especially successful as an organization because its “culture” is particularly trenchant and deep-rooted. Compelling the military to adopt missions that lie outside of this culture may erode morale and “sense of mission,” which, Wilson asserts, is critical to organizational effectiveness. This “sense of mission” confers a feeling of special worth on the organization’s members, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and enables those in leadership positions to economize on the use of incentives.\(^10\)

Thus, though organizations do strive to preserve their size and wealth, they do so only to the extent that such actions do not threaten their organizational identity. Faced with trade-offs between size and identity, organizations will likely choose to shrink, rather than adopt unwanted missions because, by sacrificing autonomy and

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\(^9\) See Wilson, Chapter 6; “Organizational culture” is roughly defined as a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.

\(^10\) See Wilson, Chapter 6.
identity to preserve size and wealth, organizations may precipitate their own destruction. In short, accepting the youth development mission demands a trade-off our military will not freely make.

This thesis will argue that, whatever the seemingly obvious merits of such youth development proposals, they are, at best, costly diversions better left to civilian agencies and organizations. At worst, they threaten to diminish combat effectiveness and thrust the military into the realm of domestic politics, which could impair civil-military relations, and result in the unwelcome intrusion of the military into the U.S. domestic political debate.\(^\text{11}\)

Moreover, as examination of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Project 100,000 and contemporary programs will show, when the military has been enlisted as social reformer, it has been ineffective in achieving its goals. The very strength of its organizational culture prevents the military from being an effective social tool; tasks that are not viewed as part of the military's culture are not attended to with the same energy and resources as tasks that are seen as integral to it.\(^\text{12}\)

While the military has indisputably been more than proficient at managing the logistical demands placed upon it, this thesis will illustrate that it has failed in its mission to rehabilitate "at-risk" youth. Despite the glow that surrounds past programs, this thesis will demonstrate that these seemingly stunning successes are far more tarnished than their mythologizing champions would have us believe. We must resist the intoxicating option of deploying our military to solve problems better left to civilian organizations. Neither America's military nor America's youth can afford the alternative.

\(^{12}\) See Wilson, Chapter 6.
II. Unlearned Lessons from the Past

The Civilian Conservation Corps

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) began as the brainchild of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and combined Roosevelt’s desire to relieve unemployment with his long-stated interest in conservation. At the same time, the CCC also curtailed urban unrest by "remov[ing] large numbers of able-bodied military-age men from the ranks of potential mobs in an hour of national desperation." The CCC lasted from the early months of Roosevelt's presidency in Spring 1933 to June 1942. Over this nine-year period, nearly three million single, unemployed men, between the ages of 17 and 28, were enrolled for an average stay of approximately ten months. Those who volunteered for the program were ranked according to their level of neediness and were chosen based upon the number of slots at each camp and their level of need. Volunteers received free food, shelter, clothing, and a monthly stipend of $30, over 80% of which was sent directly to the enrollee’s family.

Though Roosevelt's original plan called for only limited military involvement, the War Department was ultimately given responsibility for managing the residential work camps. As first envisioned, the Army was only supposed to enroll and process recruits, put them through a two-week physical conditioning

12 Even before becoming president, Roosevelt had displayed a strong interest in both youth service and conservation. For instance, as governor of New York, Roosevelt initiated a state reforestation program for jobless young men, a kind of mini-CCC. [For details, see Sherradan, M., "Military Participation in a Youth Employment Program," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1981, p. 227 and The Civilian Conservation Corps, Final Report.]

13 Griffith, Jr., R. K., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars, Contributions in Military History, Number 27, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 132.; It is, perhaps, the parallels that can be drawn with our own age that invite continual comparison between the CCC and contemporary proposals. While we are not currently in the throes of a depression, it is the violence [and fear of violence] in the inner city that drives many current proposals.

14 Of those chosen for the CCC, only ten percent had completed high school, eight percent were African-American, and most came from rural backgrounds. [See Forging a Military Youth Corps: A Military-Youth Service Partnership for High School Dropouts, (The Final Report of the CSIS National Community Service for Out-of-School Youth Project), Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1992, p. 25.]

program, and transport them to camps that were to be managed by the Forest Service. Roosevelt had hoped to have 250,000 enrollees in the camps by July 1, 1933. When it became obvious that this task would prove too formidable for the civilian organizations in charge, the War Department was asked to assume a greater share of the project.

Despite its alacrity in conducting such operations, the Army was clearly not anxious to assume responsibility for the CCC camps. The General Staff believed the CCC represented an "inappropriate diversion of limited military manpower to civilian purposes." Then Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of War, George Dem--both deeply concerned about the future allocation of resources to the Army--finally agreed to accept the expanded role when they realized the utility of making their organization indispensable to the Roosevelt plan. In addition to the resource potential of such an arrangement, neither man could have overlooked the potential use of CCC enrollees as a reserve force, or at least a recruiting pool, for the regular Army.

By all accounts, the Army did a remarkable job in establishing the first major New Deal unemployment relief effort. Initially, the Army diverted virtually every available resource to the CCC: service schools, ROTC, and civilian military training summer camps, Reserve and National Guard training camps, and regular units within the United States were all stripped of both regular and non-commissioned officers. Likewise, military supplies, vehicles, and equipment were sent to the training and work camps. By the July 1 target date, nearly 220,000 men were enrolled in nearly 1,300 camps. It is highly unlikely that this mobilization

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16 ibid., p. 228, During the Hoover administration the War Department had expressed similar reluctance to assume a much smaller burden in the form of a military training camp program for civilians. [See also Rosenau, p. 40]
17 Griffith, p. 133.
18 War Department Annual Reports 1933 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 6. These figures are fuzzy as sources vary in their estimations of both number of enrollees and number of
could have been accomplished so swiftly and efficiently in the absence of an organization specifically designed for assembling, transporting, housing, clothing, and feeding thousands of men on short notice. "The CCC mobilization was the most rapid large-scale manpower mobilization in the nation's history--more rapid than even the selection and deployment of men at the beginning of World War I."\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{The Impact of the CCC on the Army}

In spite of their initial reticence, military involvement in the CCC did provide the Army with a few tangible rewards. Command of a CCC camp gave junior officers experience in managing men and resources in a manner similar to that they would acquire commanding a small military unit. Since there were too few units in the peacetime army for every officer to obtain command experience, the CCC offered an appealing alternative. It has even been argued that command of a CCC camp provided training superior to that offered in the military arena; the prohibition on military discipline in the camps meant that officers learned "to govern men by leadership, explanation, and diplomacy rather than discipline."\textsuperscript{20} Thus CCC discipline was "based on respect for authority, not fear of it."\textsuperscript{21} Ultimately, more than sixty thousand officers were trained through their association with the CCC.\textsuperscript{22}

As they settled into their role as program administrators, the Army General Staff began to view the CCC as a possible source of an enlisted reserve. This idea was to prove problematic, however, since the General Staff was very concerned that it not expose itself to the charges of militarism that would surely follow

\textsuperscript{19} Sherradan, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{20} Rosenau, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{The Civilian Conservation Corps, Final Report}, p. 63
\textsuperscript{22} Sherradan, p. 240.
advocacy of such a scheme. So sensitive was the Army to this issue that when the National Rifle Association proposed recreational shooting at CCC camps, and even offered to provide the arms and ammunition, the War Department felt obliged to reject the offer.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1935, MacArthur proposed that CCC enrollees be given the option of volunteering for two months of military training upon expiration of their service in the Corps. Upon completion of "basic" training, the enrollee would then be entitled to join an auxiliary enlisted reserve. Introduced as a bill in the House Military Affairs Committee, MacArthur's plan drew severe criticism, and perished swiftly. Admonished, thereafter the Army shunned all plans that might invite accusations that they were militarizing the CCC, even those suggested by civilians.\textsuperscript{24}

On the face of it, the CCC appears to be "one of the most amazing social action successes ever registered by the federal government,"\textsuperscript{25} as its supporters gleefully recount. Nearly three million men were rescued from the unemployment lines--fed, clothed, and housed. At the same time, the Army was able to train tens of thousands of its officers, while simultaneously (though passively) creating the basic foundations of the U.S. forces that would eventually serve in World War II. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals flaws in this seemingly clear success.

First, in many respects, the existence of the CCC actively harmed, rather than aided, the military in the mid-1930s and during the buildup before World War II. As mentioned above, the Army's role in the CCC sidetracked regular officers from troop duty and professional schooling, as well as Reserve and National Guard training and inspection assignments. In addition, military supplies that should have

\textsuperscript{23} Griffith, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid.; Criticism erupted from, among other places, the Committee on Militarism in Education (an antimilitary organization), which vigorously opposed the idea and demanded the complete withdrawal of the Army from all CCC activities.
been stockpiled for use in wartime were instead used to support CCC camp prerogatives. Likewise, fresh recruits who should have been training for combat missions (the Army's "real" job) were instead relegated to maintenance and other chores that would prove of little relevance on the battlefield.

Second, and more importantly, "the success of the CCC and the modest benefits of the New Deal relief and recovery efforts undermined the Army's ability to attract and retain good enlisted men for the rest of the depression." FDR's Administration had simultaneously cut the pay of enlisted men by 15 percent (in order to reduce government spending), while providing 250,000 CCC employees with a rate of pay higher than that of Army privates. As the *Army and Navy Journal* was fond of disdainfully noting, "Army privates received $17.85 per month while CCC enrollees were paid $30 a month." Thus, for an approximately fifty percent smaller salary, Army privates were expected to die for their country, while CCC enrollees had only to be willing and able to toil in the woods.

In January 1934, during Congressional budget hearings, Major General James F. McKinley, the adjutant general, conveyed to the committee that intimate contact between regular enlisted soldiers and CCC enrollees had produced considerable discontent among the former due to the pay differential. The General presented a CCC inspection report that stated in part:

> The enlisted men have generally displayed a commendatory loyalty and a willingness to work long hours at difficult task, and great credit is due to them. There is, however, an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, due to the unfavorable comparison of their pay with that of the enrollees and the greater solicitude shown for the Civilian Conservation Corps members. There is some indication that desertions have increased and reenlistments have fallen off.

In addition, not only did the pay differential discourage enlistments, it also adversely affected the morale of the peacetime army. By offering CCC civilian

26 Griffith, p. 158.
27 ibid.
28 ibid., p. 160.
volunteers a higher rate of pay and less demanding employment, the government effectively contributed to the erosion of the military’s organizational culture, and left members of the army feeling undervalued and exploited.

Third, the absorption of hundreds of thousands of military age men into the CCC proved to be a drain on potential manpower prospects. With the Fiscal Year 1936 budget came Congressional approval to expand the Army’s enlisted strength to 165,000 men. But when the recruitment drive commenced on July 1, 1935, the New York Times noted that the White House had put the CCC enrollees off limits to recruiters. "Roosevelt made it clear that he did not want the CCC used as a 'feeder' for the military services." Obviously, the manpower bonus previously anticipated by the General Staff were not to be realized.

Clearly, the military did not derive the expected benefits from their foray into the arena of social welfare. Though they were able to train a greater number of their officers than would have otherwise been possible, CCC duty also sidetracked many officers from duties that would prove much more relevant at the start of World War II. Proponents like to argue that though CCC recruits were not given military training per se, their exposure to the military in the camps made those who went on to fight in WWII better soldiers. However, I have seen no data that conclusively supports such a claim. Thus, it seems that the diversion of military officers into the CCC did more harm than good in terms of operational readiness.

Moreover, the CCC further eroded U.S. military capabilities by diminishing the Army's ability to retain its troops, since the benefits offered by the CCC were superior to the remuneration offered to soldiers. This pay differential also created some discordance between those in the Army and their CCC counterparts, thus adversely affecting morale within the ranks. Finally, the CCC proved to be a drain on manpower resources since CCC graduates were not allowed to be considered as

29 ibid., p. 163.
part of a recruitment pool for the military. Thus it seems, the Army had ample reason to resist this non-traditional mission; they had little to gain and much to lose from its implementation.

*The CCC and Civilian Society*

The nonmilitary impact of the CCC is also less stunning than its champions would have us believe. Fifty years after its demise, the CCC continues to garner praise. Many view it as an archetype for government programs with similar goals. Those who sing the praises of the current favorite, *Project ChalleNGe*, liken it to the CCC. They claim it, too, will provide a glimmer of hope for disadvantaged youth, through employment of a residential program of manual labor, coupled with the benefits of discipline offered by military supervision.

However, despite the halo of praise that surrounds the CCC, some detractors do exist. One critic cites emergency conditions, an oppressive authoritarian command structure, and [high] desertion and discharge rates as proof that the program is not worthy of emulation. He further suggests that "the CCC did not improve to any appreciable degree the living conditions and morale of the young men who participated."  

Which perspective one chooses depends in large part, of course, upon the criteria by which the program is judged. To its credit, the CCC did manage to feed, clothe, and house nearly three million men in the midst of a national crisis. However, as the program is being evoked today, the use of CCC-like boot camps would seem to be an unequivocally successful method by which to uplift America's underclasses. As we shall see below, the program was far from triumphant in this respect.

30 Sherradan, p. 244.
31 By one count. Different authors use different numbers, but generally the reported total number of participants lies between 2,500,000 and three million men.
Seemingly the best way to judge the worth of CCC-like programs would be to measure the long-term effects of the CCC experience on enrollees' socio-economic and academic achievements. Unfortunately, such an analysis is something most CCC enthusiasts have failed to do. For instance, one of the program's most ardent proponents, Michael Sherradan, has written a number of books and articles on the CCC, and has even created a complex model with which he claims to have proven the "success" of the CCC. Yet Sherradan's data offers absolutely no information about the educational or socio-economic status of CCC enrollees after program completion. Since contemporary analyses of similar programs have persuasively shown that the post-residential period is the most crucial interval in evaluating program success, the lack of any such analysis casts doubt on the validity of Sherradan's effusive claims about the CCC.

Another study of the CCC, conducted by J. A. Salmond, does address, though only informally, the issue of enrollee background, program experiences, and subsequent histories. Though Salmond's data is, as noted, incomplete, it is nonetheless revealing. The study indicates that while some Caucasian enrollees may have benefited socio-economically from their time in the CCC, the program was far from equally propitious for other racial groups. The 1933 act creating the CCC contained this clause: "That in employing citizens for the purpose of this Act, no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, and creed." Though the intent behind the inclusion such a clause was obviously the protection of the

33 This information was obtained in a telephone interview with youth advocate, Wade Gatling, Senior Program Officer of Public/Private Ventures, May 1993. Much of Gatling's research is devoted to formulation and analysis of feasibility models of youth programs.
34 However, a thorough, formal evaluation which measures true participant "success" rates has yet to be undertaken. [Program proponents may fear the results would prove counter-productive to their advocacy.]
rights of minorities, mere words did little to insure that equal benefits were, in fact, bestowed on all participants by the newly created agency.

In the midst of the Depression, unemployment rates for African-Americans were double the national average, and the percentage of African-Americans on welfare was twice their proportion of the population. Therefore, Federal relief schemes like the CCC were even more imperative for unemployed minorities than they were for whites. Yet, enrollee selection had scarcely commenced when reports began to trickle in that local selection agents were deliberately excluding African-Americans from all CCC activities.36

A plethora of excuses emerged to account for this phenomena. The majority of CCC camps were segregated (by necessity, officials argued), and so in areas where there were not enough non-whites to fill a camp, no minorities were accepted. Though the NAACP and other organizations lobbied for greater representation, for the most part, their complaints were ignored.

Much of the responsibility for enrollment restrictions must lie with local communities that refused to host minority camps, although some blame remains with the Administration. Roosevelt made no attempt to insure fairer treatment for African-Americans, and had, himself, agreed to the restriction of their enrollment.37 In addition, towards the end of the CCC's tenure, when camps began to close, one minority camp was shut down each time a Caucasian camp closed. Although on the face of it this closure policy seems equitable, in absolute terms, this rapid drawdown proved much more devastating to minorities than to whites. In other words, though minorities required the benefits offered by the CCC more than whites did [in the aggregate], they lost these benefits as quickly as [or faster than] did whites.

36 ibid, p. 88.
37 ibid, p. 100.
Nonetheless, as CCC proponents like to point out, over its nine year life span, the CCC enrolled between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 men, of which nearly 200,000 were African-American. Although this may very roughly reflect their absolute numbers in American society at that time, such an assessment fails to take account of the fact that a greater percentage of these men needed the opportunities offered by the CCC more than other, more generally affluent groups.

In addition, conditions at the segregated camps were often not on par with those at "white" camps. For example, though educational training was spotty (at best) for all enrollees, minority camps often focused training on areas deemed "Negro jobs." Many left the CCC to become gardeners, poultry farmers, or cooks; more were placed by CCC officials as janitors, table waiters, or chauffeurs.\(^3\)\(^8\) In an era when employment was scarce these may have seemed like acceptable alternatives. However, in retrospect, it is disturbing that even when providing training and educational opportunities to minorities, administrators were careful not to provide them with training that might make them skilled enough to compete for jobs traditionally held by whites.

In short, heralding the CCC as the premier example of how residential work camps have been used to improve the plight of the underprivileged is absurd. Granting that racial attitudes and public policies have changed since the 1930s, it is nonetheless ironic that contemporary proponents should feel compelled to model their proposals for programs designed to ameliorate racial and income inequalities on a project so obviously perverted with these same inequities.

Another method by which to gauge the success of the CCC is through measurement of enrollee satisfaction, and one way to assess "satisfaction" is through the behavioral measure of dropout and expulsion rates. According to Sherradan's data, 11 percent of CCC enrollees "deserted," and an additional six

\(^{38}\) ibid, p. 101.
percent received "non-honorable discharges." 39 Salmond's study, on the other hand, presents a much bleaker picture. Although the dropout/dismissal rate did hover around 11 percent for the first several years of camp operation, by April 1937, 18.8 percent of all enrollees who left the CCC camps were dishonorably discharged for desertion. By December 1938, the desertion rate was higher than 20 percent. "In other words, by 1939, one out of every five discharged enrollees severed his connection with the camps illegally." 40 Desertion cost the CCC dearly, in money as well as prestige, because it meant that food, clothing, and training had all been squandered. Although the program was immensely popular at its inception, by 1942 there was widespread repudiation of the CCC; a Gallup Poll indicates that by April of that year, 54 percent of those queried thought the program should be abolished. 41

Furthermore, in the area of greatest significance with respect to contemporary programs, education, the CCC also fared poorly. Even proponent Sherradan notes, "No observer, with the possible exception of the CCC director of education, has concluded that programmed education in CCC camps was especially successful." 42 Education and vocational training were at best subsidiary goals to be achieved by the Army and, despite outside pressure from some Congressmen and academicians, classroom teaching and formal job training never received much emphasis. Neither President Roosevelt nor CCC Director Fechner ever viewed the CCC as an educational program. Fechner said at one point, "The prime purpose of the CCC [i]s to furnish work and to conserve natural resources... These cannot be work camps and educational camps at the same time." 43

39 Sherridan, p. 232.
40 Salmond, p. 181.
41 Gallup Polls, 1942.
42 Sherradan, p. 235
43 ibid.
In spite of this tepid bureaucratic support, an educational program was eventually created, most likely to provide jobs for unemployed teachers and other white collar workers. Anecdotal evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that these educational advisors were less than fully dedicated to their work. "Several boys remarked that the advisor was more ready to talk sports than vocational guidance, while several others said with some resentment that the only time he [the advisor] showed much interest was 'when the corps area education director came for inspection.' "\(^4^4\) In short, most of the education obtained by CCC enrollees was simple vocational training and probably took place on the job.

The results of this vocational training were mixed. The CCC proved to be a notable success with illiterates; in FY 1938 alone, 8,445 enrollees were taught to read and write, and 763 were awarded college scholarships. Likewise, despite the fact that vocational facilities were inadequate, the CCC still managed to produce 4,500 truck drivers, 7,500 bridge builders, 2,000 bakers, and 1,500 welders a year.\(^4^5\) On the other hand, a great deal of training undertaken by enrollees proved useless. For instance, academic courses were often taken by enrollees who found little use for their new found knowledge after they left the CCC. Similarly, urban youths were often trained to dig ditches and clear forests--skills that would prove superfluous upon return to an urban environment.

This points to yet another inadequacy of the CCC program--little or no provision was made to find jobs for new graduates. Many returned to the welfare rolls after leaving the camps; only the wartime build-up and mobilization helped to reemploy the majority of these young people.\(^4^6\) As Sherradan notes "the army

\(^4^5\) Salmond, p. 168.
\(^4^6\) This does not bode well for current youth development proposals. Although most contemporary programs include mentorship provisions and placement assistance, few long term jobs exist to satisfy the needs of enrollees, few of whom, newly armed with their G.E.D.s, have any practical experience, and many of whom have criminal records.
cannot realistically be faulted for its unhelpful stance—education was not a genuine goal of the CCC, and the army, if anything, had a mandate from the president to keep it that way." 47

Keeping all of these factors in mind, we must ask if the CCC should still be heralded as a grand success story, a paragon to be held up as evidence that military-style boot camps are a worthwhile mission for the military and a proven method of salvaging "at-risk" youth. With respect to the military, the answer is clearly no. The Army stood to lose far more than it stood to gain from its involvement in this social experiment. Only the advent of World War II and the accompanying build-up allowed the Army to overcome the manpower barriers put in its way by the CCC. Furthermore, the military clearly did not want this mission, and surely we should certainly question the rationale of employing a reluctant caretaker for [and rehabilitator of] the nation's troubled youth. Perhaps enrollees themselves put it best: "'The CCC was a job handed off on the army' and the real army men 'showed that they did not like it in the way they acted.'" Another complained, "The second lieutenant was a general nuisance, he had too many inspections, his whole emphasis was on the Army set-up; with him the Army came first." 48

Next, we must ask, whatever its effect on the military, did the CCC successfully accomplish its social mission? If feeding, housing, and clothing three million men over a nine year period qualifies as success, then the answer is yes. If some more informative objective criteria are applied, the prognosis is far less optimistic. While some enrollees clearly profited from their CCC service, whites clearly benefited more than blacks. Likewise, though enrollees, white and black, found skills acquired through the CCC helpful, in most cases they were of

47 Sherradan, p. 235.
48 Walker, p. 52. [See also Wilson, Bureaucracy, Chapter 6.] Recall that, as Wilson suggests, tasks that are not part of the organizational culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as those that clearly are.
ephemeral value. The advent of World War II and the employment opportunities that came with it proved to be of much greater import to these men than their CCC training. In the realm of education, though the CCC was not a total failure, it was hardly the stunning success current proponents would have us believe. It is interesting to note that, in his book *The Moral Equivalent of War?*, Sherradan notes that one of the key reasons for CCC success was that "various youth development objectives were not allowed to intrude on the major goals of conservation work and economic support"-- ironic when one considers that it is precisely youth development programs which supposedly so closely link the CCC with modern camp proposals.49

Through the CCC, "Roosevelt brought together two wasted resources, the young men and the land, in an attempt to save both."50 Whether or not he ultimately succeeded is still a matter of debate.

"McNamara's Millions" or "McNamara's Morons"?

Three decades later, the military was once again called upon to act as a rehabilitator and remedial educator of America's disadvantaged youth. In the early 1960s, each year about a third of the 1.8 million 18 year-olds who took the Armed Forces Qualification Test [AFQT]51 were judged unfit for service because,52 according to then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "they [were] victims of faulty education or inadequate health services."53 Of these 600,000,

50 Salmond, J., p. 4.
51 Since 1950, this test has been given to enlistees and (until 1973) was also given to draftees to aid in the recruit and draftee selection process.
approximately half failed due to aptitude deficits. In September 1963, President John F. Kennedy established the Task Force on Manpower Conservation to tackle the problem of these myriad young men, enlistees and draftees alike, deemed unfit to serve.

The task force published their report, aptly titled *One-Third of a Nation*, after examining Selective Service records regarding draftee rejection rates and conducting a nationwide survey of rejected enlistees. This rather bleak study told a dismal tale about the state of a significant share of American youth. "Two out of five rejectees had dropped out of school to support their families or themselves; three out of ten were not working, and of those working, three out of four had unskilled, semiskilled, or service jobs." As a normative measure, the report also made recommendations and proposed solutions. Among the committee’s recommendations was a proposal that young men receive their pre-induction examinations as soon as they turned eighteen. Those with correctable medical problems could then be quickly identified and "cured," while youths rejected due to aptitude deficits would receive counseling and assistance in meeting their educational and vocational needs. The task force believed that these efforts, in conjunction with already existing Federal programs, would do much to ameliorate this "skills" problem. The task force’s report, however, made no suggestion that the Department of Defense (DOD), or any of the services, should assume any role in this effort.

However, Secretary of Defense McNamara (himself, a task force member) had other ideas, and soon after Johnson took office, McNamara began to fashion means by which his Department could play a role in fighting the newly declared War on Poverty. His first attempt, the Special Training Enlistment Program

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54 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 15.
STEP\textsuperscript{55}, was opposed by Congress, which in the 1960s, still believed
"remediation was not a military function and that such a program, if carried out,
should be done under the aegis of a civilian agency such as the Office of Economic
Opportunity."\textsuperscript{56} Legislators also felt that an attempt by the military to take on such
a role while managing a buildup in manpower for the VietNam conflict would place
too great a burden on training facilities. To ensure that the Administration could not
tack on a rider or an amendment to the bill in order to get the program passed,
Congress attached a proviso to the DOD appropriation for FY 1966, forbidding the
use of any moneys to pay for STEP or similar programs. The program was never
implemented.\textsuperscript{57}

Undaunted by Congressional disapproval, McNamara tried again in August
1966. As pro- and anti-war demonstrators marched outside, McNamara told a
meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars\textsuperscript{58} that he planned to

"...uplift the "subterranean poor" by taking into the military each year 100,000
young men who would normally be rejected." He said, "Poverty is a social and
political paralysis that atrophies ambition and drains away hope. It saps the
strength of nations... because it withers and weakens the human potential
necessary to development." \textsuperscript{59}

McNamara announced that approximately 100,000 of those who failed the AFQT
could be accepted and, through "the application of advanced educational and
medical techniques," be "salvaged," first for "productive military careers and later

\textsuperscript{55} The STEP program proposed a period of "pre-basic" training for "those with skill or physical deficits;
the assistance provided during this phase would then supposedly allow them to function successfully in the
military." Only voluntary enlistees scoring between the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 30\textsuperscript{th} percentiles on the AFQT (i.e. those
in the Category IV range), and those with medical defects that could be corrected within six weeks, would be
eligible STEP candidates. For intellectually "marginal" recruits, "pre-basic" remedial training would
emphasize verbal, arithmetic, and mechanical skills. STEP was to be conducted at an estimated cost of
$31.5 million per year, approximately $1 million of which was for trainee compensation. At an annual
rate of 15,000 candidates over a four year period, the estimated price tag per trainee would have been $2,100.
[Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 16.]

\textsuperscript{56} ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} Shapley, p. 384. Shapley argues that the Veterans of Foreign Wars was "the most hostile possible
audience" for such a proposal.

\textsuperscript{59} ibid. See also McNamara, R. S., \textit{The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office}, New York: Harper
for productive roles in society." These recruits could ultimately then return to
civilian life "with skills and aptitudes, which for them and their families would
reverse the downward spiral of human decay." 60

The plan for "Project 100,000" was structured so as to circumvent the need
for Congressional approval. McNamara's Project 100,000 recruits, also known as
"New Standards Men" [NSM], began entering the service in October 1966, and by
1968, 148,000 men had been brought in.61 The enlistment was completed despite
strong resistance within the military and the reticence of some of McNamara's top
manpower experts.62

Project 100,000 was adversarial in nature, designed, in short, to
demonstrate the military's resistance ill-founded. McNamara decided that the best
way to illustrate that low-aptitude men could be "fully satisfactory soldiers" was by
keeping their commanders ignorant of who they were. Project 100,000 was
supposed to be a blind experiment run on a mammoth military organization. Draft
boards and recruiting centers were instructed to guarantee that 22.3 percent of all
recruits inducted were Category IVs (i.e., those who would be otherwise have been
rejected due to aptitude deficits).63 The boards and centers were then instructed to
identify, within the Category IVs, a subset of men with specific characteristics that
marked them as victims of poverty. These men were to be identified as part of the
experiment only by a secret code in their file.64 Of those accepted under the new

60 Shapley, p. 385. See also Moynihan, D. P., "One Third of a Nation," The New Republic,
9 June 1982.
61 Equal numbers of draftees and volunteers were taken. Over 40 percent of the those taken were non-
whites and more than 50 percent had not finished high school. [From Moskos, C., The American Enlisted
Man, pp. 171-2.]
62 For example, Alfred Fitt, one of McNamara's closest advisors, suggested that McNamara start with a
small 3,000 man pilot program; on a small scale, he argued, the program would have had a greater
likelihood of success, and subsequent conversion of a skeptical Congress.; Shapley, p. 385.
63 During this period, Category IV's were those men who scored between the 10th and 30th percentiles on
the AFQT. The average Project 100,000 recruit was 20.3 years old, and scored at the 13.5 percentile--quite
low compared with the average regular recruit, who scored at the 56.8 percentile. [From Forging a Military
Youth Corps, p. 28.]
64 The supposed secret character of the experiment did not remain so for long. From the beginning, many
trainers and commanders were convinced they could identify NSM, even without knowledge of their AFQT
guidelines, 41.2% were African-American and only 45.2 percent had high school diplomas.\textsuperscript{65}

Unfortunately or fortunately (depending upon one's perspective), though standards were lowered for acceptance based on the AFQT qualifying examination, these same hurdles were not lowered for entry into the military's technical schools. After basic training, only the most technically qualified were recommended for advanced training. The rest were "shunted off into occupations the Pentagon euphemistically calls 'soft-skill' areas: supply and food service, clerical, and, most importantly, the infantry."\textsuperscript{66}

From the military's point of view, of course, this was the best possible outcome. But for many of those the program was designed to help, the education and technical training, envisioned by McNamara, would not be forthcoming. Instead, the bulk of NSM became instead combat arms specialists, which led inevitably to charges that the burden of fighting the VietNam War was disproportionately carried by these men. In Project 100,000's first three years, nearly half of the Army's share of NSM, and well over 50 percent of the Marine Corps' share, were given combat-related assignments. By 1968, fully 70 percent of the Marine Corps' NSM were assigned to combat specialties. The results were what one might expect from such a distribution; for instance, a Category IVB recruit who entered the Marine Corps in 1968 was two-and-a-half times more likely to die in combat than his Category I and II counterparts.\textsuperscript{67}

Critics point to this fact as both an indication of discrimination within the military towards NSM and a failure of the program, in general. However, it is important to keep in mind that there was a war underway, and the need for trained

\textsuperscript{65} Forging a Military Youth Corps, p. 28
\textsuperscript{67} ibid., pp. 12-3.
personnel—particularly in the infantry—was quite real. The fact that a greater proportion of the "intellectually marginal" soldiers were assigned to infantry occupations may simply reflect the lower training requirements for these jobs, as well as the relative lack of skills and abilities the NSM brought upon entering the service.

Even so, such a rationalization may be just as damning evidence against the program. For instance, as retired Marine lieutenant colonel Bill Corson asserts, "It might not have been a disaster if there had not been a war . . . They should have been treated as sole surviving sons," he says, thereby excusing them from combat. They weren't. Because they were not, critics of Project 100,000 maintain the program was never intended to provide a "socially uplifting experience" through vocational training. According to Corson, "They were cannon fodder, pure and simple." Whether one subscribes to Corson's conspiracy theory or not, it is clear that "Project 100,000 resulted in an infusion of manpower that helped forestall the mobilization of the National Guard and reserve, which provided a haven for draft-age men, the majority of them whites." 68

Despite initial claims of verifiable success, 69 whether Project 100,000 ultimately provided an escape from ignorance and unemployment for the 300,000-plus men known alternately as "McNamara's Millions" and "McNamara's Morons" remains unclear, but appears dubious. Critics charge that while some New Standards Men succeeded in the services; untold others suffered emotionally and physically. "Many [NSM] weren't even on a fifth-grade level," says Herb de Bose, a former first lieutenant who works with veterans. "The Army was

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68 Evans, p. 13.
69 [See Little, R. and Janowitz, M., "Basic Education and Youh Socialization in the Armed Forces," and Moskos, C., The American Enlisted Man, Chapter 8.] To this day, McNamara still claims the program was a success, and says he would do it over again, given the chance. [See Shapley, Promise and Power.]
supposed to teach them a trade, but they had "no skills before, no skills after," says de Bose. "I think McNamara should be shot." 

The Effect of Project 100,000 on the U.S. Military

Like the CCC before it, a major obstacle to answering the question of whether the military benefited from this "infusion of manpower" is determining what criteria should be used. A good place to start, however, is by analyzing how well the NSM actually did while in service. A central contention of Project 100,000's architects was that those chosen would be able to function effectively (and anonymously) in a military environment and make valuable contributions toward successful missions. As has been noted above, the validity of this claim is dubious. Project 100,000 recruits suffered higher casualty rates than their Category I and II compatriots. But whether this was due to the fact that they performed more poorly as soldiers on the battlefield, or simply because they were so much more likely to be assigned to combat specialties than their more technically adept counterparts, is ambiguous. However, it seems likely that the disparity in casualty ratios stems more from the fact that NMS were so much more likely to be on the battlefield than because of any battlefield skill differences.

Examination of attrition rates and training data for the NSM provides a more revealing illustration of the performance of NSM. During the first three-plus years of Project 100,000, attrition rates for NSM were one and one-half to three times higher than they were for regular personnel. Achievement disparities between NSM and regular recruits appeared elsewhere as well. For instance, one of the

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70 Shapley, p. 387.
71 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 43.
72 As Professor Harvey Sapolsky points out, if the NSM were performing in a markedly inferior manner compared with their counterparts, someone would have noticed, and they would have been removed from front-line duty. For by letting an obviously incompetent soldier on the battlefield, the life of every other soldier present would be endangered. Hence, those posing a risk would likely have been dismissed.
73 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 44.
principal tenets of Project 100,000 was that participants would be held to the same performance standards as their "regular" peers. Hence, the only recourse available to [the anonymous] NSM experiencing difficulties was to be recycled [i.e., put back into the manpower pool and assigned to another job], or to receive remedial training. A recent study on the performance of NSM showed their recycling rates to be anywhere from 1.35 (Army) to 11.12 (Navy) times higher than corresponding rates for regular recruits. The percentage of NSM who required remedial training was, likewise, much higher: 8.75 percent of Army NSM, 15.8 percent of Air Force NSM, and 22.4 percent of Navy NSM needed remedial help, while only about one percent of Army and Navy, and slightly more than three percent of Air Force, control group personnel required such training.74

Another useful tool for evaluating the Project's success are performance records in skill training. Recruits normally receive instruction in a specific job, usually immediately after completing basic training. When skill course dropout rates for NSM are compared with those of regular personnel, attrition rates mirror those observed in the basic training data. The percentage of Project 100,000 men who dropped out due to academic, medical, and/or administrative reasons was two to three times higher that of others who attended the same courses.75

Perhaps the harshest criticism that can be aimed at Project 100,000, with respect to its effect on the military, is that "it disrupted military order by introducing a large number of people with backgrounds that were disabling in terms of their ability to adapt."76 As noted in one study of Project 100,000,

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76 ibid., p. 47
environment, large numbers of individuals who resist or are unable to conform in such an environment threaten the order that must exist if everyone is going to work effectively towards a single mission.\textsuperscript{77}

One method by which to measure the salience of this claim is to look at the number of NSM men who committed punishable offenses during their time in the armed forces. Review of this data indicates that, in fact, NSM were guilty of between 2.7 and 7.8 percent more infractions than regular military personnel.\textsuperscript{78}

Review of the factors above supports the assertion that the military was fully justified in its reluctance to assimilate low-aptitude recruits. While many of "those men [ ] excluded from the military on the basis of their AFQT scores include[d] a number of men who perform[ed] well," overall, the military would have been better served by relying solely on higher quality recruits. As demonstrated above, NSM attrited with greater frequency, required more remedial training, and were guilty of more punishable infractions than regular personnel. In addition, according to a separate study conducted by researchers at the Human Resources Research Organization [HumRRO], "depending on the particular task, low-aptitude subjects required from two to four times as much training time, from two to five times as many trials to reach criterion, and from two to six times as much prompting as did high aptitude subjects."\textsuperscript{79} This is scarcely surprising when one considers that fully 63 percent of NSM only scored in the 10-15 percentile on the AFQT test.\textsuperscript{80} In short, McNamara's New Standards Men were not a worthwhile addition to the U.S. military, from either a skills or a manpower perspective.

\textsuperscript{77} ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} ibid., p. 49. (see also Appendix I)
\textsuperscript{79} ibid., p. 53. [See also Wayne L. Fox, John E. Taylor, and John S. Caylor, \textit{Aptitude Level and the Acquisition of Skills and Knowledges in a Variety of Military Training Tasks}, HumRRO Technical Report 69-5 (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, May 1969).]
\textsuperscript{80} Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 36.
Project 100,000 and its Participants

Even in the face of the contrary evidence illustrated above, die-hard advocates continue to proclaim Project 100,000 a success, maintaining that the program's effect on the military is more or less irrelevant. Project 100,000 was not conceived to aid the military; it was created to help the underprivileged. The real issue that bears addressing, they argue, is whether Project 100,000 accomplished its social mission. The impetus behind McNamara's program was not a desire to turn the disadvantaged into the affluent, but rather to ameliorate and conquer their skills deficits. Thus if he were successful, it should be reflected in higher rates of employment, earnings, and education for the NSM veterans over their low-aptitude non-veteran peers. Examination of data comparing NSM and low-aptitude non-veterans reveals, however, that veterans have not fared significantly better than their civilian counterparts, and in many aspects, are actually worse off.\(^8^1\)

A comparative survey conducted in 1981 found that approximately 88 percent of former NSM were employed full or part-time, while 91 percent of low-aptitude non-veterans were employed. When adjusted for age [i.e., only respondents between the ages of 35-40], this employment differential increases--89.7 percent of NSM veterans were gainfully employed as opposed to 97.2 percent of non-veterans. Moreover, when those surveyed were asked to indicate the type of establishment for which they worked, a higher proportion of low-aptitude non-veteran respondents were employed privately (76 percent versus 68 percent), or owned their own business (15 percent versus 10 percent) than Project 100,000 respondents. Also, a significantly greater proportion of Project 100,000 veterans were employed by the government (23 percent versus 9 percent) than their civilian peers.\(^8^2\)

\(^{81}\) ibid., p. 111.

\(^{82}\) ibid., p. 112. The fact that 14 percent more veterans than nonveterans are employed by the government may reflect hiring preferences of the 1960s and 1970s.
With respect to income and other economic indicators, low-aptitude non-veterans reported a mean hourly wage approximately four dollars higher than their Project 100,000 counterparts. If adjusted for age, this differential actually increases to five dollars per hour. "Thus, low-aptitude civilians were making more in 1981 than low-aptitude veterans were making in 1985-6." 83 These results clearly illustrate that any advantage derived from military service did not translate into higher future incomes. These results show that NSM either did not receive the "boost" that McNamara hoped military service would provide, or were unable to translate this advantage into a competitive edge in the civilian world. 84

Another benefit hypothesized to accrue to low-aptitude individuals from military participation was a sense of discipline, maturity, and goal orientation that would prove advantageous upon their return to civilian life. [This criteria is of crucial significance with regard to current proposals, which tout the ability of the military to instill these qualities as a major selling point.] One indirect measure of this claim's validity is the level of education and training obtained by Project 100,000 participants upon their return to civilian life. Contrary to expectations, low-aptitude non-veterans achieved a higher average level of formal schooling--12.3 years as opposed to 11.7 years for the veterans. Since the average reported grade completed at time of enrollment for a Project 100,000 participant was 10.7 grade levels, evidently many of them did supplement their education. On the other hand, 27.3 percent of NSM never finished high school, and at the time of the survey, only three percent had graduated from college. 85 Thus, in every category examined, Project 100,000 veterans were either no better off, or were actually worse off than their non-veteran peers.

83 ibid., p. 115.
84 ibid., pp. 115-8; p. 118.
85 ibid., p. 119.
Nonetheless, program advocates steadfastly maintain, "the military offered not just a chance for employment, above poverty income, health and housing care, and training and education, but also [for some] a career....[So] whether [the program has been] helpful or not to an individual is probably best determined. . . by asking them." Researchers did precisely that. Surveys were administered in which NSM were asked to reflect on the effects of military service on their careers and their lives. Nearly half of the Project 100,000 veterans felt that their military experience had had a positive effect on their subsequent careers, while only 14 percent said the impact had been harmful. More than a third believed that the experience had no effect at all. Of those who responded positively, "maturity" (37.9 percent) was the reason most often given. The next most oft cited reasons were "other" and "training," (25.5 and 16.5 percent, respectively). [see Appendix III for details.]

Thus, despite objective evidence to the contrary, a majority of low-aptitude veterans felt they actually benefited from their time in the service. One must question, however, the rationale of viewing a reluctant military as our most effective method of building self-esteem and transforming low-aptitude "boys into men." While much can be said in defense of building character and self-esteem, the finding that as a group Project 100,000 men trailed indexes of life achievement runs counter to the expressed logic and expectations of such programs. If Project 100,000 was the success its advocates purport it to be, why weren't most, if not all of these men better off economically, educationally, and socially after their service?

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86 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 142. [See also Thomas Sticht, Cast-off Youth: Policy and Training Methods from the Military Experience.]

87 Surveys were given to samples of Project 100,000 participants from October 1986 through December 1987. Those surveyed were asked, first, whether they felt that being in the military had "helped," "hurt," or "had no effect" on their careers, and second, if the respondent stated that the experience had either helped or hurt, he was then asked to specify the way in which it had done so. [See the Laurence and Ramsberger study for more details.]
A number of explanations for this phenomena have gained currency in recent years. Perhaps "low-aptitude" men are inherently difficult to help, especially by the time they have reached age 18. "By that time, adverse environmental conditions and lack of opportunities may leave an indelible imprint of helplessness of such individuals." 88 (If this assertion is true, current programs like Project ChalleNGe are doomed to fail.) Also, it is often asserted (though as often contested) that military job training and experience does not easily transfer to the civilian world. 89 Even those trained for jobs with civilian equivalents may experience problems locating the right civilian position, understanding the commonalities, and communicating them to a prospective employer. Furthermore, readjustment to the world outside of the military is often problematic, and probably more so for so-called "marginal" individuals. In addition to the barriers of military-specific training and "soft-skill" assignments that may not have been particularly career enhancing, some individuals find it extremely difficult to function outside of the rigid, hierarchical, and paternal structure to which they have become accustomed. Outside of the protective military milieu, low-aptitude veterans have been compelled to fend for themselves in a less predictable and egalitarian environment. In short, the security offered by the military vanished with the uniform. 90

88 ibid.
89 See Magnum, S. L., and Ball, D. E., "Military Skill Training: Some Evidence of Transferability," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 425-441. Magnum and Ball contend that a fair degree of transferability does exist. For instance, 47.2% of all military occupational specialties were transferable, using their criteria. "With other factors controlled, males were most readily able to transfer training in the service, craft, and equipment repair occupations (e.g. for males, craftsmen ranked highest-61.1%, while combat arms ranked lowest-28.6%). [Also], analysis of skill transfer between nonmilitary training providers and employment showed that the occupational areas offering the greatest probability of skill transfer were similar to those that emerged in the analysis of military training." (p. 438) However, even if Magnum and Ball's results hold true, lack of transferability may still be considered an important factor since, as was noted above, the majority of Project 100,000 recruits ended up in combat arms specialties.
90 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 145.
The assertion that acclimation to civilian society may be a serious barrier is often rejoined with the contention that, perhaps, Project 100,000 participants would have been better off remaining in the military. However, such an assertion carries with it a perverse logic. Though low-aptitude personnel may have been aptly suited to low-complexity entry-level jobs, the military with its emphasis on youth and malleability in the lower echelons could hardly afford to leave them there. The military has a primary mission that cannot accommodate a jobs program for the semi-skilled. Countenancing such a strategy could prove dangerous to our national security both on a macro- and a microcosmic level.

Thus, it is hardly surprisingly that the military's unwillingness to accept these men (let alone retain them) remained steadfast throughout the life of the program. In short, despite the individual successes of Project 100,000, one can hardly deem it the grand success McNamara hoped it would be. This rather expensive social experiment prove to be a cumbersome [and morale draining] distraction for the military, and of little ultimate worth to the underprivileged men it was created to help. As one former Army draftee noted, "We tried to fight a war on two fronts in the sixties—a war in VietNam and a war on poverty—and we lost both."

91 ibid., p. 139.
III. History Repeats Itself: The Case for Contemporary Programs

Project ChalleNGe: A Modern Youth Corps

In spite of the dubious record of past programs, youth development proposals infused with a substantial military component are continue to be reintroduced. Three decades after the advent of Project 100,000, yet another program has been launched that relies on the U.S. military to aid the underprivileged. Project ChalleNGe, as the program is known, is centered around a plan to rescue "at risk" youth by sending them to military-youth camps, similar in structure to the CCC camps, but with a the target group more closely resembling that of Project 100,000.

Steadfastly refusing to view past attempts as questionable successes (or downright failures), advocates of this approach believe that participation in a youth-military corps will provide underprivileged youth with the vocational training, formal educational opportunities, financial benefits, and personal skills normally associated with military service. These anticipated benefits will supposedly equip participants with the aptitude needed to adopt and maintain more rewarding lifestyles. According to the program's promoters, "these qualities of military life--job skills training, financial and educational opportunities, self-discipline, goal-setting, and esprit de corps--are those believed to be of potential benefit to today's youth population who are at risk of dropping out not just from school but from all of society." 92

The genesis of Project ChalleNGe began in 1989 when Hugh Price, vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation, began to explore the possibility of reintroducing the role of the military as welfare provider. When Price approached the military, neither the Army, the Navy, the Air Force nor the Marines were

interested. However, for reasons of altruism and/or self-preservation in this period of drastic military budget cuts, the National Guard expressed interest in accepting this mission. The Guard argued that their close community associations made them well-suited to such a program. Objectively speaking, however, there was little similarity between Price's proposal and past Guard missions (e.g., rapid response to riots and natural disasters), so exactly why the Guard felt uniquely qualified to run a military-youth corps is unclear. Dan Donahue of the National Guard Bureau asserts, "this program is the military's way of adding value to America." This view was echoed by Project Director, Captain Bill Morris, "As a tax-paying citizen, it makes me feel good to be doing something for ourselves." 

This proposed marriage of the National Guard and a youth-military corps then became the subject of a study initiated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. "The CSIS project was initiated to place the idea in people's minds that it [a military-youth corps] should even exist." The result of the study was a design for a military-sponsored residential training camp. Project ChalleNGe has a target group of recent high school dropouts, between the ages of 16 and 18. "This group was chosen because," according to project director Morris, "statistics show that within six to nine months after leaving school, 90 percent of all young people are in trouble with the law, drugs, and/or alcohol. If we can reach some of them before this happens, we will have been a success." 

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93 Quote conveyed on three separate occasions in May 1993 telephone interviews with Wade Gatling (PPV), Liz Ondaatje (RAND), and Jennifer Eaves (CSIS).
94 Telephone interview with Captain Morris, May 1993.
95 Telephone interview with Jennifer Eaves, "Project Challenge" Project Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1993.
96 The capital N and G stand for National Guard.
97 Author's note: Though it is universally agreed that dropouts are definitely an "at-risk" group, this number [i.e., 90 percent] seems extraordinarily high. After consulting other sources, this researcher believes the real number probably lies between 50 and 65 percent.
98 Telephone interview with Captain Bill Morris, Public Affairs Office, National Guard Bureau in May 1993.
The CSIS study was conducted and led by a steering panel composed of Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, Senator John McCain of Arizona, and a number of working groups made up of representatives from the military, youth service fields, and academia. The committee concluded that the youth corps idea was feasible in the short term, with long-term feasibility contingent upon the findings of an appropriate pilot program evaluation team. "Although the proposed program was not what "many [members] view as the right idea for national service," according to Representative McCurdy's legislative assistant Alden Schacher, in the end the entire steering committee stood behind the report's recommendations. Project Director Jennifer Eaves concurs, "Project ChalleNGe was very much a Guard driven idea, one not shared by many [if not a majority] of steering committee members. But nobody says no to the National Guard."

Unfortunately, Eaves may be correct. Even before the CSIS study was completed, the National Guard submitted a request for $1.6 million to start a pilot program. In response, for FY 1992 Congress appropriated $2 million for the establishment of two six-month residential programs to be designed and operated by the National Guard. These programs were originally slated to commence in early 1992, but due to Bush Administration resistance, no further action was taken, and none of the appropriated funds were released.

In the meantime, CSIS published their report (in September 1992) entitled *Forging a Military-Youth Corps: A Military-Youth Service Partnership for High School Dropouts*. Publication of the document, and the subsequent Clinton victory, gave new life to the National Guard proposal. Advocates, such as Senator

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99 *Forging a Military-Youth Corps*, p. viii.; McCurdy and McCain have been active in trying to create a national service since the late 1980s.
100 Ibid., p. xii.
101 Telephone interview conducted with Alden Schacher, of Representative McCurdy's office, in May 1993. The use of "everybody" in the quote is meant to encompass all youth, not just at-risk youth.
Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, spoke out in favor of the Guard plan,

While performing regular missions, their (role models from the military) innovative and flexible involvement in outreach and mentoring programs can send a powerful message to our youth that discipline, commitment and hard work matter. In the long run, the most important line of defense for our national and economic security will not be a line in the middle of Europe or in the sand of the Middle East, but the line of students going to college and graduate school to earn degrees in math and science.

The National Guard is developing a program that will target high-risk youth who do not have strong role models or solid educational backgrounds and whose lives have been affected by drug abuse. There are many opportunities for military units to provide assistance to local communities while training for their military missions.103

Of course, not everyone is equally enamored of this idea. As one detractor explains,

Unfortunately, advocates of Government activism have discovered the military. If the services were able to reduce parts of Baghdad to rubble, the argument runs, they should be able to rebuild Los Angeles, feed the hungry and meet various social needs. If a major earthquake hit California, declares Representative Pete Stark, "We need someone like Stormin' Norman on the job."

Moreover, once members of Congress perceive that they can look good by getting the military involved in social tasks in their districts, we will see troop deployments as well as procurement contracts determined by pork barrel politics.104

Fears of the intrusion of pork barrel politics may be well-founded as political ambitions may have already obtained a tight grasp on the program. By the time the proposal made it through Congress, the funds appropriated to Project ChalleNGe were no longer a paltry $2 million, but a rather exceptional sum of $44 million, to be divided among ten pilot programs.105 The states eligible for funding are as follows: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. When queried about the criteria employed in determining recipient states, Captain Morris, director of the program,

105 Information received during a May 1993 telephone interview with Captain Bill Morris, U.S. Army National Guard, Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau.
replied, "They [were] chosen in a number of ways. I don't want to say, strictly... well, first, we look[ed] at dropout rates state-wide compared to the national average. But, that does not always hold. For example, Connecticut does not have a high dropout level state-wide, but they have some troublesome urban areas." 106

In reality, of the ten states chosen, only two have dropout rates that rank among the top ten problem states nationwide, and only five states have dropout rates that are even within the top 20 highest, nationwide. 107 [See Appendix IV for details.] Instead, the ten pilot programs are sited in the home states of both Congressional members of the C.S.I.S. steering committee, the President, and several very powerful members of Congress. Certainly the placement of pilot programs is merely circumstantial evidence of political patronage. On the other hand, pilot programs are generally meant to be tests of an as yet unproved idea. As these pilot sites now encompass nearly a third of the fifty states, 108 the term "pilot program" has clearly become a misnomer. Such widespread implementation was surely not needed to test the program concept (cf., the more limited Guard proposal for FY 92).

Furthermore, each of the original pilot programs was to receive just over $1 million. Now, though the money will not be divided equally, the average has reached $4.4 million per camp. 109 The most interesting, and perhaps most troubling aspect of this Congressional largess, is that this increased appropriation was granted without request on the part of the National Guard. "They [the Guard] have had a phenomenal success rate. They put in for $1.6 million, and out comes..."

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106 Telephone interview with Captain Morris, May 1993. In fact, Connecticut's rate is among the lowest dropout rates nationwide. [see Appendix IV].
108 This includes the ten sites funded for the first cycle plus four additional sites now under consideration.
109 These prodigious appropriations have led researchers at the CSIS to query, "Are they planning to supply these kids with night-vision goggles?"
$44 million. Who else can say that these days?"110 "To put it undelicately(sic), [Project ChalleNGe] is a way for the National Guard to create a role for itself in the 21st century," said Beth Solomon, an aide to Senator Nunn. "It is a post-cold-war response"--a response that, at least in appearances, seems to be driven more by pork barrel politics than by a desire to help the most "at-risk" underprivileged youth [i.e, since only 20% of the pilot programs are sited in states with the highest dropout rates.]111

Such an outcome, while surely disturbing, should come as no surprise. Historically, the National Guard has received extensive support from Congress for a very simple reason: a Congressman's Guardsmen are also his constituents. In the present case, both Guardmen and their communities stand to directly benefit from the acquisition of a Project ChalleNGe camp. Hosting a camp brings new jobs, increases commerce to existing businesses, and in some cases, may even forestall the post-Cold War closure of bases or armories.112 While there is much to be said for the utilization of surplus military facilities, if Project ChalleNGe exists principally as an excuse to provide Guardmen and their communities with moneys to ameliorate the effects of the drawdown, better ways can be found to distribute such funds and similarly, better methods can surely be found to tackle the problems of "at-risk" youth.

Ignoring for the moment, the political patronage, real or perceived, that is associated with the youth corps, advocates can still make a case for backing the National Guard's bid for this new mission. After all, $44 million is a relatively

112 For instance, at Williams Air Force Base in Arizona, which was slated to close in 1993, hosting a Project ChalleNGe camp has brought new life to the base. "Plans include a commercial airport, university classes and various companies eager to open their doors to new markets." Getting the base ready for ChalleNGe cadets has also provided business for the local construction industry, and "workers were rushing to renovate several buildings for the program." [see Padgett, "Air Base Heads into Last Month in the Military," The Arizona Republic/Phoenix Gazette, 3 September 1993, p. 1.]
small sum of money, and a large portion of camp expenses will actually be borne by host states and communities. Besides, although arguably not the most efficient means to help at risk youth,\textsuperscript{113} it is still supposedly an expeditious means to that end. So the real question then becomes, is Project ChalleNGe somehow innately different from its predecessors? Will it succeed where others have failed?

\textit{Implementation and Evaluation of the Program}

On August 6, 1993, the first pilot program officially opened in Niantic, Connecticut. The program "relie[d] heavily on current and former military personnel to tutor, counsel, and discipline the dropouts in preparation for their taking the General Equivalency Diploma, or G.E.D. After completing the five month session, [enrollees were to] be assigned a Guard member from their community who [will] serve as mentor for a year."\textsuperscript{114} Fifty-five percent of the original group were black or Hispanic, 20 percent were female, and 44 percent came from the state's largest cities, Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport. In terms of raw numbers, the Connecticut group composed a representative cross-section of the target group the program was designed to help.\textsuperscript{115}

Lessons gleaned from the military's past forays into the realm of social work [e.g., the CCC and Project 100,000] offer scant hope that real and tangible benefits will accrue to either the military or the program's participants. Estimations of the Guard's ability to fulfill its official project goals run the gamut from "attainable," to "rather lofty," and are tempered with a "wait and see" attitude.\textsuperscript{116} Youth experts do agree, however, that residential interventions like Project

\textsuperscript{113} This lack of efficiency argument has dominated the list of criticisms levelled at the Guard by other services, according to Gatling.
\textsuperscript{114} Winerap, p. 1A cont'd.
\textsuperscript{115} Although the racial make-up of cadets has varied across states, gender and background characteristics have been similar in all states.
\textsuperscript{116} These opinions have been expressed by Lt. Greg Isbill (OKLA National Guard), Jennifer Eaves (CSIS), and Wade Gatling (PPV), respectively, in telephone interviews, May 1993.
*ChalleNGe* are the most effective way of reaching troubled youth. "You have their attention 24 hours a day. One cannot help but make some sort of impact. What is harder to do is sustain the impact after these kids are back on the street. In our experience, you really need a series of interventions with these youth. There needs to be some continuity in their lives."117

The original *Project ChalleNGe* model recommended a residential phase of one year, with another year of community mentorship (overseen by the Guard) to follow. Due to budget constraints, the residential portion of the program was shortened to six months, only to be later cut down to a 22 week period. Youth specialists wonder, with good reason, how much can be accomplished in such a short time. Because the residential period has been cut in half, the year of post-residential mentorship becomes crucially important. Unfortunately for participants, however, there is little reason to think that because Guardsmen have been successful at dealing with natural disasters, they will necessarily be gifted mentors and counselors.

Moreover, it is doubtful that one year of counseling will have a profound effect on these teens, many of whom have already spent as least that long in penal institutions.118 In its statement of project goals, the Guard stated that it expected 100% of its participants to enroll in either a high school diploma or G.E.D. program, and a 100% placement rate of its graduates. [see Appendix V for statement of project goals and missions.] These official goals seemed especially optimistic given the make-up of the Connecticut group. "The average reading level [was] sixth grade, 74 percent [had not] complete[d] their junior year of high school and nearly one-third [had] been expelled from school."119 Though lofty goals may

118 For example, several of the Connecticut programs enrollees were former drug dealers, while others had previously been imprisoned for offenses such as auto theft, weapons possession, and assault. [See Winerap, p. 1A.]
119 ibid.
be inspiring and make for good press copy, they may be fatal to the program if they prove impossible to reach.

Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the National Guard program will prove more effective at rehabilitating "at-risk" youth than, for example, the Department of Health and Human Services, an organization designed for and devoted to achieving these and similar goals. Besides, it is absurd that the military should be responsible for overseeing what is, in essence, a glorified high school G.E.D. program, at an average cost of $18,000 per student, when local school districts can do the same for approximately $5,000 per student. Program expenses seem especially prodigious when one considers that spending on regular public school pupils is less than $6,000 per year, and does not provide its students with the incentives and perquisites afforded these dropouts. The dropouts are outfitted from head (red baseball caps) to toe (ADIDAS sneakers), get a $15 weekly allowance, books, and briefcases--plus, of course, room and board for five months. In addition, upon successful completion of the program and the G.E.D. test, each enrollee receives a $2,200 stipend. Those who are too young to take the test need simply to return to school in order to receive the money.

One could, moreover, speculate about the effects of the rather perverse incentive structure such remuneration creates. The average student who stays in school receives no "extra" pecuniary benefits, and is the passive recipient of less than $6,000 per year in funding. Meanwhile, ChalleNGe dropouts are given clothing, food, lodging, a weekly stipend, and a $2,200 bonus. The logic behind such an incentive structure defies explanation.

On the face of it, given these extraordinary perquisites, [and the Guard's claims about the merits of its program], one would expect most, presumably

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120 Letter to the Editor, "Don't Rob Schools to Pay for Boot Camps," New York Times, 18 August 1993, p. 18A.
121 ibid.
earnest, participants to take full advantage of this unique opportunity. However, of the 172 volunteers accepted into the Connecticut program, nearly 30 percent left the ChalleNGe camp before it even officially opened. During the two week orientation, many found they could not handle the paramilitary atmosphere and withdrew [a predictable outcome, given attrition rate data for past programs.] Over a dozen more were expelled, and four volunteers were arrested on charges of assaulting a fellow enrollee. Hardly an encouraging record for a camp that had not yet even opened its doors, and as we shall see below, a telling portent of things to come.\textsuperscript{122}

The Expected Impact of ChalleNGe [and its clones] on the Military

In the face of such an inauspicious beginning, the National Guard was undaunted. Guard officials remained optimistic about the program chances for success, and with good reason, in light of the potential employment opportunities offered by Project ChalleNGe. If the pilot camps provide any indication of what lies ahead, the National Guard ought to be very optimistic, indeed. "Financing is generous--more typical of a military than a social welfare program."\textsuperscript{123} "Anybody who is anybody wanted th[ese] job[s]," according to platoon leader David Henderson, hardly surprising given that salaries for camp educators are over $30,000 per year, while the average starting salary for a teacher in the United States is just over $19,000 per year.\textsuperscript{124}

Yet, for all of the perquisites offered to the military in this period of budget cutbacks, none of the other branches of the military are clamoring to participate in

\textsuperscript{122} A similar situation occurred when the first camp in Arizona opened in October 1993. The initial enrollment of 108 students fell by 16 percent due to "reasons ranging from disputes with instructors to complaints about the rigid schedule" before the program began. By the end of the five month program, 30 percent had dropped out or been dismissed. [see the Phoenix Gazette, 7 October 1993, p. B1.]

\textsuperscript{123} Winerap, p. 1A.

\textsuperscript{124} ibid. and Letter to the Editor, "Don't Rob Schools to Pay for Boot Camps," New York Times, 18 August 1993. p. 18A.
the ChalleNGe program, nor have they proposed similar programs themselves. The fact is, the vast majority of active duty personnel do not support the idea. Reasons for this opposition varies. As the Rand report, *Policy Options for Army Involvement in Youth Development*, points out, "national level partnership" programs like *Project ChalleNGe* "raise concerns...about detracting from primary Army missions in that they may divert [or be perceived to divert] Army resources and personnel away from an exclusive focus on core requirements." In his widely-read satirical account of the [future] downfall of the U.S. military, Colonel C. J. Dunlap describes the dangers of using the military in the domestic social sphere:

...the U.S. military's duties...proliferated into a host of new missions, many of which were far afield from traditional military duties...The American decision to embrace non-traditional missions was a calamity for them. When the time came to meet a traditional military threat...too many of their soldiers had lost their military skills and their martial spirit. Indeed, they no longer were warriors, and had not been for years. What is more, the new U.S. missions squandered what was left of their military budget at the very time America needed every penny to keep its military a bona fide fighting force.

While the scenario Dunlap writes about is fictitious, his description reflects the real fears and beliefs held by most military personnel. Moreover, many of Dunlap's observations do have a basis in fact. For, "indeed, of 18 missions given the Department of Defense in 1992-1993, all but one were non-combat."

Other critics of *Project ChalleNGe* are less hostile to the acceptance of non-traditional missions in general, and many believe that some of the newly prescribed missions are worthwhile. However, none of these critics believe rehabilitating "at-risk" youth is one of these acceptable missions; such programs, they argue, ought to handled by civilian agencies set up to deal with social welfare issues. As one supporter of non-traditional missions puts it:

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125 Ondaatje, p. 60.  
126 Dunlap, p. 66.  
127 ibid.
Rather than continuing to resist these missions, the armed forces should embrace them, albeit selectively. Accordingly, national security policymakers need to map out well-defined criteria for employing the military in non-combat roles, and should resist calls by politicians and the press to employ its extremely attractive but extremely expensive skills and resources to solve domestic and international woes better addressed by civilian organizations. Using Army Special Forces personnel, for example, to teach in crime-infested inner city schools, would be a waste of a force designed and trained to carry out missions in the world's most demanding and hostile environments.

Still other critics, rightfully, voice fears that ChalleNGe-like programs will erode the military's sense of unique identity. They believe this mission is being embraced simply to avoid the inevitability of the post-Cold War drawdown. For instance, the fact that the National Guard has adopted this mission has elicited explicit criticism from some active duty personnel, who view themselves and their services as above such self-serving behaviors. As veteran Naval officer and CSIS Project Director for ChalleNGe, Jennifer Eaves notes,

> those of us who have actually served in the military do not see this as a valid part of our mission. Certain pragmatic implications certainly make it look like a good idea. For instance, the military's awesome infrastructure and great economies of scale. We are really good at doing this kind of thing. But, I really do not think we should be doing it, especially if it is only being done to keep from drawing down. And it is definitely not a good enough reason to keep National Guard armories open.

In short, most members of the military feel that Project ChalleNGe is simply not the right job for its organization. It detracts from the military's primary mission, wastes precious [and expensive] resources, degrades operational readiness, and destroys the sense of mission and organizational culture that have made the U.S. military such a potent fighting force heretofore. To a great extent, the military has accepted, albeit reluctantly, the necessities of drawing down, and most personnel believe we should now aim to keep the "remaining troops extremely

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128 Rosenau, pp. 46-7.
129 Eaves has been in the Navy for more than a decade. She served as enlisted personnel for ten years, received a commission, and now serves with the Navy Reserves. Telephone interview, May 1993. NOTE: The reader may find it ironic to hear such criticism from the Project Director behind the CSIS report. This is further evidence that many of those on the steering committee did not feel that Project ChalleNGe was the right solution to this social problem.
well trained and decidedly focused on the complex task of modern warfighting."

Such a strategy leaves little room for domestic distractions.

**Expected Impact of Project ChalleNGe on its Participants**

Seven months after the first camp was opened, the results of the first Project ChalleNGe cycle have been released. Even for die-hard advocates, the results cannot be encouraging. Though the National Guard reached 95% of their enrollment target, the nation-wide retention rate [as measured against the enrollment target] was only 55%. In other words, of the 1322 cadets that were enrolled for the first cycle [the original target was 1395 enrollees], only 774 participants "graduated" from the 22 week program. Some states' programs fared markedly better than others, but even relatively successful programs failed to meet Guard expectations. For instance, though the Illinois program boasted a respectable 96% retention rate, they attained only 64% of their enrollment target. The one anomaly in an otherwise dismal showing, was the camp in Georgia, which had a [relatively low] 19% attrition rate; and of the 81% of cadets that remained in the program, 97% received their GEDs. Unfortunately for program enthusiasts, Georgia represented the exception, not the rule. Five of the 10 states' programs retained fewer than half of their enrollees; Maryland and West Virginia fared especially poorly, retaining only 18% and 34% of their enrollees, respectively. [see Appendix VI for a state-by-state breakdown of program results.]

Although, as noted above, the National Guard's stated goal was to have 100% of program graduates obtain their degrees, by the end of March 1994 only 73% [568 cadets] had received their diplomas. At first glance, an almost 75%

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130 Dunlap, p. 65.; As mentioned previously, both Halperin and Wilson have noted that the view that all organizations want larger budgets ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on one hand, and the complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other which they want to reduce. All else being equal, bigger is better than smaller, but all else is not equal. So, sometimes organizations will opt for smaller budgets and greater control. [See Wilson, Chapter 10 and Halperin, *Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy.*]
"success rate" does not appear to be a complete failure. Although 73% falls far below the Guard's official goal, their acknowledged expectation level lay closer to an 85% GED graduation rate; thus, 73% appears to be a [relatively] respectable outcome. However, a bit of arithmetic shows just how abysmal this result truly is. With an annual operating budget of $44 million [based on the FY93 Congressional appropriation], and an expected operation rate of two cycles per year, we can fairly calculate the costs of the first cycle as being half of the annual outlay, hence $22 million. With a graduating class of 568 students, the cost per student has now risen to $38,732.40, twice the expected cost per student, and more importantly, 7.6 times more expensive than sending dropouts through GED programs offered in neighborhood schools!

Ignoring cost-benefit concerns, however, advocates argue that a one-time charge of $40,000 per cadet may be a small price to pay. If ChalleNGe is able to successfully educate and reintegrate those cadets that do make it to graduation, future expenditures on these youths may be curtailed. After all, the costs of keeping them in prisons and/or paying their welfare checks because, as dropouts, their prospects for employment would be slim, will likely add up to more than $40,000. So if 568 dropouts have been "salvaged", the argument goes, this must viewed as a triumph.

Such an argument has much to recommend it, thus, ultimately the true success of Project ChalleNGe will be defined by how well graduates assimilate into their school, work, and community life over the long term. But, if history offers any lessons, we ought not be overly optimistic about expected outcomes. Both the CCC and Project 100,000 [and, as we shall see below, other boot camp

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131 Although some camps certainly were. At the New York camp, which had a 55% retention rate, only 22% of cadets graduated with their GEDs. The Connecticut group highlighted above also did poorly, with only a 43% retention rate. Further, of those who remained, only 47% received their diplomas.
ventures] have shown us that short-term positive effects notwithstanding, long-term prospects for permanent change seem slim.

**Juvenile Boot Camps and "Challenge" Programs**

Though too little time has passed to determine the long-term effects of the *Project ChalleNGe*, a reasonable prediction of the likelihood of "success" can be made by comparing *ChalleNGe* cadets with graduates of other boot-camp programs. Like the *ChalleNGe* program, juvenile boot camp jails and "challenge programs", such as Outward Bound, have sought to capitalize on the perceived positive effects of military training to rehabilitate and educate "at-risk" youth.¹³²

To be fair, there are some notable differences between the Guard-run venture and these other programs, however. Boot camp prisons are set-up as alternative incarceration options for youthful offenders who would otherwise go to jail; thus the impetus behind enrollees' participation is quite different from that of *ChalleNGe*’s cadet volunteers. On the other hand, however, the majority of juvenile offenders accepted into boot camp prisons have backgrounds very similar to those of the average *ChalleNGe* participant-- a youthful, non-violent offender [with few, if any, prior offenses], often a high school dropout, frequently from a broken home.

Moreover, while one of the goals of utilizing juvenile boot camps is the alleviation of prison crowding, the programs' larger goals focus on education, rehabilitation, and self-awareness [i.e., self-esteem building] training, which are, of course, the primary goals of *Project ChalleNGe*. So, although one must be cautious about drawing exact parallels between them, it is reasonable to make some gross comparisons, in terms of success rates, between *Project ChalleNGe* and

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¹³² These "challenge" programs are not to be confused with *Project ChalleNGe*.  

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what are, in boot camp vernacular, commonly called "shock incarceration" programs.

Over the past ten years, boot camp jails have proliferated throughout the nation. The idea of "shock incarceration" [hereafter, "SI"] first arose in the late 1970s, in discussions between the Georgia Department of Corrections and a local judge. In December 1983, Georgia opened its first boot camp. Since that time interest in SI program development has increased sharply. By the end of 1988, 15 SI programs were operating in nine states, and by the end of 1993, 46 programs were in operation in 30 states, serving approximately 7500 participants per year, for an average stay of 18 weeks.

Were not already obvious, the growth of SI programs alone would point to the incredible popularity of military-styled rehabilitation programs. In many states, due to extensive positive media coverage, a political constituency for SI has developed. SI makes good copy by conveying themes which clearly cater to public desires for a panacea for crime through strict discipline and deterrence. At the same time, boot camps appeal to a number of disparate constituencies. "Hard-liners [can] take heart that inmates [are] not lazing around prison yards, and liberals [can] take solace in shorter prison terms and, in most states, programs [oriented] towards rehabilitation." Thus, not surprisingly, "the impetus for SI development generally has not come from correction officers, but from judges, governors, and legislators." In 1989, in states where SI-related policy discussions or planning was underway, the National Institute of Justice surveyed those involved, and asked them to identify the individuals or groups driving the creation of the boot camps.

Two-thirds of those surveyed named legislators or the governor, while only one-third named the Department of Corrections.\textsuperscript{137}

Like other military-styled rehabilitation programs, boot camp SI appeals to administrators and policymakers who have, themselves, served in the military [i.e., since boot camp "made men" out of them, SI can do the same for today's teenage offenders.] And because so many of those formulating policy have themselves been through basic training, "SI programs usually command broad, quick, and unquestioning support. Legislators and corrections officials do not need theoretical rationales--many feel they have an intuitive understanding of SI based on personal experience."\textsuperscript{138}

About 20 percent of those surveyed by the National Institute of Justice said they supported boot camp prisons because they thought they would be a more effective correctional intervention than regular incarceration. The belief is that exposure to the "intensive exercise, martial drills, and hard labor" normally associated with military service would "shock" young offenders into changing their ways.\textsuperscript{139} Again responding intuitively, "they believed firmly--and in some cases fervently--that SI programs would help rehabilitate offenders and deter future crime. Some officials indicated they had heard glowing anecdotes that claimed success rates in excess of 97 percent for some programs."\textsuperscript{140}

Despite high levels of enthusiasm on the part of policymakers, examination of existing boot camp programs shows that such exuberance is hardly justified. The dropout rate for most programs is high, "about a quarter of the inmates fail to complete the program and are sent to a regular jail."\textsuperscript{141} Even at New York's Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, considered by experts to be the nation's

\textsuperscript{137} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{138} ibid., p. 2.  
\textsuperscript{139} Fisher, p. 43.  
\textsuperscript{140} ibid., p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{141} Fisher, p. 37.
premier boot camp, the failure rate is high. "Although boot camp graduates do marginally better than other inmates at first, after two years the number of offenders who return[ed] to prison is roughly the same, around 50 percent over four years."  

Similar recidivism rate data exists for other boot camp programs. In a 1993 Georgia boot camp study, researchers found that six months after release, boot camp participants actually had a recidivism slightly higher than those who had served their sentence in prison [11.3% versus 10.3%]. Over time, boot camp participants recidivated marginally less often than those who had been incarcerated, but after four years time boot camp recidivism rates were still higher than 50%. In Oklahoma, where the Department of Corrections compared return rates of boot camp graduates with similar non-violent [though incarcerated] offenders, after 29 months almost half the SI graduates, but only 28 percent of those jailed, had returned to prison. These figures become even less auspicious when one considers that many states "restrict boot camp eligibility to those persons believed most likely to be deterred--young non-violent offenders who have not yet been confined under sentence."  

Equally unfavorable results have surfaced from other military-styled rehabilitative physical and/or educational programs. These so-called "challenge programs," "try [like ChalleNGe ] to rehabilitate offenders by increasing their self-esteem, self-control, and respect for authority by exposing them to vigorous

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142 ibid.
143 Prison Boot Camps: Short Term Costs Reduced, but Long-Term Impact Uncertain, Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 1993, p. 29.; In Skock Incarceration: An Overview of Existing Programs, another Georgia study is cited. In this study, the Georgia Department of Corrections found that 38.5 percent of their boot camp graduates returned to prison within 36 months. Of the boot camp graduates who had been in their teens when admitted, 46.8 percent returned to prison within three years of release. [It should be emphasized that neither of these studies involved carefully constructed comparison groups, and so one should be cautious about placing too much faith in these results. Furthermore, neither the GAO report nor the NIJ report reveals the margin of error for its results.]
144 Parent, p. 4.
145 ibid., p. 3.
Such programs have typically been used for older juvenile offenders, and though [like the CCC and Project 100,000] they seem to be successful at increasing participants' self-esteem and confidence, as the following studies illustrate, they have been markedly less successful at keeping them permanently out of trouble.

For instance, in one study of the progress of all graduates of Florida's Short Term Elective Placement [S.T.E.P.] program for juvenile delinquents, it was found that 31.3 percent of the youths recidivated within 12 months of release from the STEP program. As expected, first-time offenders were more successful than those previously committed [59.2% versus 35.7%]. Females fared better than males, and rural youths fared better than their urban counterparts. Neither offense type nor the offender's race seemed to have an impact on recidivism.147

Another study focused on community-based DSO alternative incarceration options for juvenile status offenders. Their results provided few surprises but strongly support the conclusions reached by similar studies.148 As should be expected, recidivism rates seem most directly correlated with client characteristics. In other words, what one brought to the program--history of prior offenses, age, sex, family background--was the most significant predictor of eventual outcomes.149

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146 ibid., Appendix C, p. 57.; While no unified theory of juvenile delinquency exists, it is commonly believed that delinquents suffer from deficiencies in problem-solving skills and from dysfunctional views of self; "challenge" programs are thus designed to aid participants in overcoming these personal and psychological deficits.
147 ibid., p. 58.
148 Kobrin, S., Community Treatment of Juvenile Offenders: the DSO Experiments, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983, p. 200.; After six months, there appeared to be no significant difference in recidivism rates between their experimental and control groups. In fact, overall, "the analysis shows a moderately deleterious impact--higher recidivism rates at six months--attributable to program participation."
149 In short, the study suggests that programs catering to predominantly older male offenders with no prior offenses can expect a favorable outcome, in terms of recidivism rates. The outcome can be expected to be less positive if the population in question has a high proportion of females, younger males, and, in either of these categories, they have many prior offenses. [For more details, see the chapter entitled "Client Recidivism and Program Components," pp. 182-7.]
More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, however, is the fact that type of services provided to offenders seemed to be the least effective predictor of success. Similarly, site [i.e. service facilities] as a program component displayed "only a marginal and tenuous relationship" to recidivism. "Variation in recidivism was apparently unaffected by such facility characteristics as level of staff professionalism, the use of volunteers or paraprofessionals, the diversity of services offered, or the use of coercive authority in treating status offenders."\textsuperscript{150} Again, though these findings should be viewed with caution--the study's authors note that it was difficult to operationalize the variables--the findings are nonetheless of sufficient potential importance, and further indicate that one ought to be wary of very optimistic assessments of what these programs can accomplish, whether they are managed by the military or by civilians.

Clearly, one should be cautious about directly comparing recidivism rates of programs that are substitutes for jail with expected success rates for program such as Project ChalleNGe. However, the survey of programs described above were quite varied in their orientation and methods, while at the same time, they shared some crucial similarities with the ChalleNGe program. As mentioned above, all of the programs reviewed herein focused, for the most part, on non-violent juvenile offenders, often dropouts with dysfunctional family backgrounds--which makes the profile of a typical participant quite similar to the typical ChalleNGe cadet. Likewise, boot camps, "challenge" programs, and the community-based DSO programs all stress what are viewed as the positive aspects of the military milieu--an emphasis on discipline, structure, hard [physical and mental] labor, and self-esteem enhancement. Furthermore, a majority of these programs also stressed educational remediation and advancement, which again sounds quite similar to the advantages and goals now being touted by the National Guard.

\textsuperscript{150} Kobrin, p. 185.
Thus, though we cannot apply the recidivism results of other programs to an expected outcome of ChalleNGe without qualification, we should not fail to appreciate the insights such a comparison can provide. These results, coupled with ChalleNGe's marginal first cycle performance and the historical case studies examined, point to a very simple conclusion—we should abandon attempts to mandate military involvement in youth remediation and rehabilitation programs. Yet, despite of the plethora of evidence weighing against the institution of such programs, new military-dependent proposals continue to appear. Both politically and psychologically, Americans seem to be smitten with the idea of using the military as a welfare provider. Why is this the case, and can we ever hope to break out of this destructive and costly social cycle?
IV. The Military as Welfare Provider: an American Addiction?

While contemporary programs mirror neither the CCC nor Project 100,000 exactly, they share a number of similarities. Each program aimed to ameliorate a domestic social crisis involving disadvantaged youths, through utilization of the skills, logistical talents, and disciplinary traditions of the military. Close examination of the historical evidence has revealed that neither the CCC or Project 100,000 were as successful as their advocates have alleged, and with Project ChalleNGe it seems we destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. Why, in the face of so much evidence to the contrary, are Americans—a population, according to many scholars, who, by virtue of their liberal tradition, are naturally anti-military—consistently drawn to the idea of employing the military as a catalyst for social reform? Likewise, what makes this institution, a supposed bedrock of social conservatism, the persistent choice for the role of vanguard of social change?151

The fact is that there are two major flaws in conventional "wisdom" about the military and the way in which Americans view it. Firstly, the armed services are not nearly so resistant to change as is often assumed, and secondly, Americans display great confidence in the military's honesty, organizational prowess, and efficiency, and as a whole, are much more pro-military than many scholars would have us believe.

Far from the monolithic ideological institution resistant to change within itself, as described by Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, the military has often led American society in terms of social change. In fact, the civilian sector has often failed to keep pace with the achievements of the military in at least two areas: racial discrimination and sexual discrimination.152 While progress has not always been

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151[For details of this argument, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State and/or Janowitz, M., The Professional Soldier.]
152 While this point should be not be interpreted to mean that the military has invariably been more socially conscious than society as a whole, examination of the Civil War period provides a number of examples of how certain segments of the military have proved more progressive than the government they
as even or rapid as many would like, as sociologist Charles Moskos says, "blacks occupy more management positions in the military than in business, education, government, or any other significant sector of society." The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies concurs [as noted above], "the military has gone farther than any other public or private institution in practicing equal opportunity." 

The military has also led the charge in the area of women's rights. In the civilian sector, only three of every 100 top executive jobs are held by women, and this figure has not changed substantially in the last decade. Female executives earn only 68 percent as their male colleagues. In the military, on the other hand, females account for ten percent of the active duty personnel, and 12 percent hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. While these numbers do not adequately reflect the makeup of society as a whole, they outshine the statistics for the civilian sector. Moskos agrees, "the evidence clearly shows that when it comes to equal opportunities, the once rigidly segregated and male-dominated Armed Forces are clearly in advance of comparable civilian institutions.

This fact is not lost on the American public, who in recent polls have expressed an unprecedented degree of confidence in the military as an institution. The most recent, a Harris poll taken in March 1993, asked Americans (as they have each year since 1960) whether or not they "have a great deal of confidence" in various institutions. On a scale between one and 100 percent, the military received a score of 57 percent--a 27 year high. This score lies in stark contrast with

served. [For details, see Armstead Robinson's "Not North of Dixie's Line," in Cunliffe, M. [ed.], Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 117-35.]
154 ibid.
155 Brant, p. 14
156 ibid.
confidence ratings given to the White House and Congress in the Harris poll, 23 percent and 12 percent respectively. Other polls have given the military still higher ratings. A February 1991 Gallup Poll, for example, showed that "public confidence in the military soared to 85 percent, far surpassing every other institution in our society."\textsuperscript{158} and a heretofore unpublished 1991 Roper poll gave a 78\% favorable assessment of the military, again far exceeding the rating given to any other institution or agency.\textsuperscript{159}

In his book \textit{The Confidence Gap}, Seymour Lipset hypothesizes a general decline in the amount of faith Americans place in institutions. Lipset asserts that this decline can be traced to many factors, including the way in which the media presents the news, a series of (apparently) inadequate U.S. Presidents, and a sense of malaise, attributable to the United States' relative decline as superpower. While his hypotheses seem to be intuitively correct, polling data suggests that Lipset's hypothesis is incomplete.\textsuperscript{160} It is true that confidence in civilian government entities, departments, and agencies has declined markedly in the last ten years, but confidence in the military had changed little before 1991, remaining at least as high as the best-rated civilian bodies. The Department of Education, for example, has fallen to its lowest point in nearly a decade.\textsuperscript{161} Likewise, the private sector has suffered a decline in public confidence. Between 1968 and 1981, the number of people who felt business could be trusted to strike a fair balance between profit and the interests of the public declined by a full 51 percent.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{159} Unpublished Roper poll data, 1991. The military's score was undoubtedly given a boost by the Gulf War, but, at the same time, the role of the war should not be overestimated as the Harris poll data indicates an approval rating that was even seven points higher in 1993, two years after the war ended.
\textsuperscript{160} Lipset, S and Schneider, W., \textit{The Confidence Gap,} New York: The Free Press, See chapters 1, 2, & 5.
\textsuperscript{161} Correll, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{162} Lipset and Schneider, p. 183.
It is not surprising that many Americans, having lost faith in both civilian government agencies and the private sector, find attractive the idea of employing the military to help solve social ills, especially those directly tied to racial and social inequalities (like those to be addressed by Project ChalleNGe). Even commentator and journalist James Fallows, previously a harsh critic of the military, has adopted the view that the military may be our last best hope. He now views the military as the "one government institution that has been assigned the legitimacy to act on its notion of the common good."163 Fallows goes on to say, "I am beginning to think that the only way the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security threat and turn the job over to the military."164 As polling data shows, Fallows is not alone in his view.

A telling comparison is revealed by comparing public confidence in the military and the public's impression of the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, two organizations which presumably would control programs like Project ChalleNGe, were they not managed by the military. As noted previously, in the 1991 Roper poll, those expressing a favorable opinion of the military numbered 78%. Those who were favorably inclined towards the Department of Health and Human Services totaled only 52%, and those favorably disposed towards the Department of Education were but 48% of those polled.165 Small wonder, then, that policy makers are inclined to turn these missions over to the military.

Finally, we must consider the possibility that the reason that politicians cast such a covetous eye towards the military is that they view this very successful and highly respected organization as a panacea for social ills, for which they are

unwilling to make the hard choices required to truly solve. Perhaps policymakers hope [in vain] that the military will step in to reintegrate dropouts and reform juvenile delinquents because they find it too politically painful to attempt to come to grips with the economic and social problems that give rise to these structural failures in the first place.
V. Conclusions and Some Recommendations

Twice before in this century, and again today, policymakers have called upon the U.S. military to act as a social welfare agency for underprivileged youth. Though many outside the military herald the CCC and Project 100,000 as evidence that the military can cure domestic ills, to embrace such an opinion is to ignore the lessons, not to mention the details of these historical initiatives. Military-youth development programs adversely affect the operational readiness of our armed forces, are prodigiously expensive, and have proven to be of little sustainable value to those youth who are truly "at-risk," no matter how much money is spent.

Project ChalleNGe has been born amidst disillusionment with the excesses of the last decade, a seemingly endless array of political scandals, and a marked decline in our nation's economic resources. Yet opposing this disillusionment is a general appreciation for the efficiency, material resources, and skills of our armed forces, buoyed by recent successes in the field and substantial rebuilding in the 1980s [and reinforced with the romanticized notions of military service, held by many policymakers]. In this era of disillusionment, the lure of calling upon our country's remaining respected and well-equipped institution to address the problem of "at-risk" youth is seductive; however, we must resist this "call to arms."

Previous attempts to employ the military in such endeavors were only marginally successful in their own time, so attempting to model modern proposals on past programs of dubious reputation is ill-considered.

Granted, the military has proven a route to success for myriad disadvantaged youths. But those the military has voluntarily taken have been selectively culled from the population at large. Though our armed services have embraced "disadvantaged" recruits, the men and women chosen have been the best and the brightest of our nation's underprivileged. There have, of course, been periods when this selectivity has not been enforced. Project 100,000 is an obvious
example. The experience of the New Standards Men should have signaled the danger of lowering standards, but in the aftermath of VietNam, with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in the early 1970s, military entry requirements and behavioral standards were relaxed. Not surprisingly, the quality and morale of our armed forces declined measurably. With the re-elevation of standards and requirements in the 1980s, we again became an enviable fighting force.

But, assimilating low-quality recruits into the ranks is but one way in which the military can be adversely affected by a role as welfare provider. By distracting the military from its primary mission, we threaten operational capabilities, while simultaneously eroding the organizational culture that has made this institution so estimable. The U.S. military has been successful because it is composed of a select group that, imbued with a clear sense of mission, has, for the most part, been allowed to concentrate on its raison d’être, national security.

Expecting the military to prove equally successful at redeeming America’s "at-risk" youth is to ignore the deleterious effects of forcing the military to adopt a mission that lies outside of its defined mandate. From an operational readiness standpoint, such missions reduce the time and resources devoted to military training and preparations.\(^{166}\) From the standpoint of organizational culture, military-youth development missions lead to a deterioration of morale and sense of purpose. Besides, to expect the military to enthusiastically embrace the military-youth mission is, quite frankly, wishful thinking. Neither past programs nor current

\(^{166}\) Certainly, one can argue that in the post-Cold War world, potential threats are smaller and less dangerous than before the thaw in international relations. Moreover, the U.S. is becoming ever less likely to intervene in any crisis that does not menace our country directly. [See Sapolsky, H. and Weiner, S., "War Without Killing," Breakthroughs, . . . ] Thus, re-routing military resources onto the domestic front may seem like an acceptable idea. Yet, as General Dunlap has noted, in periods of military drawdown, it becomes more, not less, important for those forces remaining to devote their energies to preserving and enhancing operational readiness. In short, when militaries shrink, they need to get leaner and meaner, not smaller and more diverse, as they will no longer be able to simply rely on sheer size to overwhelm the enemy. [See Dunlap, Jr., C., "The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.]
proposals can boast the enthusiastic participation of either the leaders or the members of our nation’s armed forces.

Even when military-sponsored and/or military-styled programs do come into existence, they are costly and provide few, if any, long-term benefits for their participants. Training, when it has existed at all, has focused on low-skill vocations, or on jobs that have no civilian equivalents. Moreover, though instilling the martial values of hard work, discipline, and self-esteem sounds very appealing in the abstract, evidence does not bear out claims that imbuing troubled youth with such values will permanently change their behavior. Salvaging "at-risk" youth is difficult for any organization, civilian or otherwise. As history has clearly shown us, relying on the military is no panacea.

In the 1930s, the CCC only proved to be a durable "success" because the advent of World War II saved camp graduates from an imminent return to the unemployment lines. Thirty years later, McNamara’s New Standards Men did not profit similarly from their own wartime experience. Neither their participation in the VietNam war, nor their tenure in the military, in general, seems to have provided them with any long-term benefits; by most indices of "success," the NSM have fared poorly. And in the 1990s, with Project ChalleNGe and other similar programs, we seem destined to repeat past mistakes.

Perhaps, this seems an overly harsh appraisal of past and present military-youth programs. The “best and the brightest” of youth program participants will likely graduate and become reintegrated into society. For the truly "marginal," on the other hand, finite exposure [i.e., 22 weeks] to a program of military discipline and physical activity will hardly undo a lifetime of dysfunction. As has been noted, the majority of program participants are barely literate, many have extensive

167 There is even speculation that the NSM are a significant part of the "VietNam veterans problem" that still plagues our nation nearly two decades after the fall of Saigon. Perhaps many of those Army jacketed, [seemingly] hard-core homeless that one finds on street corners in every major U.S. metropolis are the legacy of McNamara’s ill-fated experiment.
criminal records, and are products of broken homes. Though it would be wonderful if the military could truly change the lives of these youths, expecting such a result is like chasing a chimera.

However, this is not to imply that the U.S. military can never be an effective force in the area of youth development. Servicemen, as individuals, should pursue these same goals, as volunteers in their own communities. On a much more private, much less public level, members of the military should take part in these efforts because, as individuals, they may truly be able to impart some of their knowledge and experience to those who seek mentorship and guidance. In addition, the non-institutionalized use of volunteers will likely alter participants’ views of these programs. If juveniles know, for instance, that a serviceman is volunteering, and not simply participating in the program as part of his or her job, the youths will likely place greater value on that person’s input. In short, juveniles who possess the requisite motivation to succeed after participating is a military-style program would also respond to a community-based program, and with greater economy.

In a similar vein, removing these projects from our defense budget would free resources for use in the private sector, both to aid economic growth and to address social problems directly—all without impairing the integrity of the military. As one policy analyst stated, "Put bluntly, if we have a lot of people in uniform with time to rebuild public housing and teach school, they should be working as civilians in the construction or education industries."\footnote{Bandow, p. 19}

Finally, despite American policymakers' predisposition to don "rose-colored glasses" when evaluating military-youth programs, there may yet be a reason to hope that political initiatives forcing military intervention may be abandoned. Though these proposals are currently popular, over time we should
expect growing resistance by organizations, such as schools, prisons, and
government agencies, that may be negatively impacted if the military adopts the
missions these civilian organizations have traditionally called their own. As the
scale of military-youth programs grows, the military will become functional [and in
the case of government agencies, allocational] rivals of existing organizations.169

Although small projects, such as ChalleNGe might not be viewed as a real
threat, the large-scale programs envisioned by many policymakers will inevitably
call into question the continued need for some of the aforementioned organizations.
Few, if any, bureaucratic organizations surrender their autonomy, and especially
their very existence, without a struggle. Faced with their own mortality, threatened
organizations will likely unite in opposition to military-youth programs. Hence,
these programs may fail in the end, not because of concern for our military, and not
because of concern for those the programs are supposed to help, but because of
bureaucratic resistance and the concerns of policymakers who fear a political
backlash from those constituencies threatened by program implementation.
Although rational evaluation may not instigate a reevaluation of military-youth
assistance proposals, perhaps political self-interest will.

169 Functional rivals are "other agencies whose social functions are competitive with those of the bureau
itself," while allocational rivals are "those other agencies who compete with it for resources, regardless of
their functional relationship with it." [See Downs, A., Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967,
p. 11.]
APPENDICES I-VI
APPENDIX I: Percentage of New Standards Men and Control Group Men Committing Offenses in Service (22-24 Months of Service)\textsuperscript{170}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Non Judicial Punishment\textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>Court Martial Convictions\textsuperscript{b}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Standards</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Light punishment and other corrective measures imposed by a commanding officer for minor offenses and rules infractions.

\textsuperscript{b} Includes special, summary, and general court-martial convictions.

\textsuperscript{c} Less than 0.05%

APPENDIX II: Effect of Military Experience on Post-Service Career as Viewed by the Project 100,000 Sample, by Race and Educational Status \textsuperscript{171}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Helped</th>
<th>Hurt</th>
<th>No Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonblack</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Status at Entry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nongraduate</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS graduate</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Data are unweighted.

\textsuperscript{170} Adapted from Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 49

\textsuperscript{171} ibid., p. 124.
APPENDIX III: Reasons for Helpful Effects of Military Service on Post-Service Career as Reported by Project 100,000 Sample, by Education and Race

| How Military Helped Career | By Education: | | By Race: | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                           | Nongraduate   | HS Graduate   | Nonblack      | Black         | Total         | Nongraduate   | HS Graduate   | Nonblack      | Black         | Total         | Nongraduate   | HS Graduate   | Nonblack      | Black         | Total         |
|                           | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       | Na Na %       |
| Leadership                | -- -- 2 2.5   | 2 2.3         | -- -- 2 1.4   |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Maturity                  | 26 40.6       | 29 35.8       | 33 38.4       | 22 37.2       | 55 37.9       |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Disciplne                 | 4 6.2         | 9 13.6        | 9 10.5        | 6 10.2        | 15 10.3       | 6 9.5         | 4 6.2         | 9 13.6        | 15 17.4       | 22 37.3       | 37 25.5       |                |               |               |
| Ed. Assistance            | 12 18.7       | 25 30.9       | 15 17.4       | 22 37.3       | 37 25.5       | 12 18.7       | 25 30.9       | 15 17.4       | 22 37.3       | 37 25.5       |                |               |               |               |
| Motivation                | 2 3.1         | -- -- 2 2.3   | -- -- 2 1.4   |               |               | 2 3.1         | -- -- 2 2.3   | -- -- 2 1.4   |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Other                     | 14 21.9       | 10 12.3       | 16 18.6       | 8 13.6        | 24 16.5       | 14 21.9       | 10 12.3       | 16 18.6       | 8 13.6        | 24 16.5       |                |               |               |               |
| TOTAL                     | 64 100%       | 81 100%       | 86 100%       | 145 100%      |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |

Note: The question asked was, "All things considered, do you think that your entire period of military service, including Reserve or Guard Duty, has helped, hurt, or had no effect on your career?" Those who responded positively were then asked, "Why do you think it has helped?"

a Data are unweighted.
b Entire sample had been separated from service at time of survey.

172 ibid., p. 125.
**APPENDIX IV: Status Dropout Rates for Persons 16 through 19 by State (1990)\(^a\):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE: Washington, D.C.</th>
<th>DROPOUT RATE (%): 19.1</th>
<th>PILOT PROG. RECIPIENT:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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\(^a\) National Average (11.2%).

APPENDIX V: National Guard's Official Goals for Project ChalleNGe

Program Objectives to Support Mission

1] Socialization Process: Participants can develop positive self image and discipline, motivation, and identity with community necessary to function as a contributing member of society.

2] To enhance participants educational skills, instill desire to continue self-improvement, and teach values and life skills required to succeed on the job and within the community.

3] To integrate program graduates into larger community through assistance with employment and educational efforts.

4] To provide mentorship services after graduation.

Program Goals

1] 80% of cadets graduate from residential phase (22 weeks long).

2] Cadet education: 100% of cadets enroll either in a GED program, or re-enroll in high school upon completion of the residential phase.

3] 85% of cadets complete either the GED, or obtain a high school diploma.

Cadet Development

1] 100% of cadets demonstrate growth in self-discipline and personal responsibility.

2] 100% of graduates will demonstrate growth in human relations and skills.

Post-Residential Phase Goals

1] 100% of graduates placed within education or employment within 30 days.

2] 100% of cadets remain free of criminal activity and substance abuse in the post-residential phase

Post Program Goal

1] 80% of cadets retain placement and remain free of criminal activity and substance abuse for 6 months.

Information herein provided by the National Guard Bureau, 1992.
# APPENDIX VI:

ChalleNGe Class #1-93 State Performance [Inaugural Cycle Participant Results]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Perform. Average %</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Perform. Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>W. Va.</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>64%</td>
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<td>55%</td>
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</table>

- *Performance Average* = Student Retention % Against Enrollment Target plus GED Grad % divided by 2.
- *Student Retention % Against Enrollment Target* = Graduation Enrollment divided by Enrollment Target.
- *Student Retention % Against Initial Enrollment* = Graduation Enrollment divided by Initial Enrollment.
- *GED Grad %* = GED Grads divided by Graduation Enrollment.

Data Provided by National Guard Bureau of the United States, current as of 24 March 1994.
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Plus telephone interviews with the following people (My sincere thanks each of them): Jennifer Eaves, Project Director (Center for Strategic and International Studies); Wade Gatling, Senior Project Officer (Public/Private Ventures); Lieutenant Greg Isbill (Plans, Operations, and Military Support Office of the Oklahoma National Guard); Tessa Kaganoff (RAND Corporation); Jeffrey Lewis (former Research Analyst for the Office of Technology Assessment); Captain Bill Morris, Director of Project ChalleNGe (Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau); Liz Ondaatje (RAND Corporation); Julie Pacquing (Senate Appropriations Office); Alden Schacher (Office of Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma); and Lieutenant Colonel David Super (Internal Information, National Guard Bureau).