Essays on Economic Design and Coalition Formation
by
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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first
chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students and
colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in many
such matching situations. The chapter provides the first sufficient condition for stability that
may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The condition offered
is shown to be also necessary for stability in some matching problems.

The second chapter provides a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in coalition
formation such as the formation of clubs, partnerships, firms, business alliances, and jurisdic-
tions voting on public goods. The condition is formulated for settings in which agents first
form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alter-
natives via a mechanism. In particular, there exists a core coalition structure if the payoffs are
determined in the Tullock rent-seeking game or Nash bargaining. The core might be empty
if the payoffs are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining solutions. The
chapter also determines the class of linear sharing rules and regular Pareto-optimal mechanisms
for which there are core coalition structures.

The third chapter studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit-maximizing mo-
nopolistic seller of goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyer’s utility is buyer’s
private information and is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The chapter
solves the seller’s problem for an arbitrary number of attributes when there are two types of
buyers, adding a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional
screening problems. When there is a continuum of buyer types, the chapter shows that gener-
ically the seller wants to sell goods with some of the attributes partly damaged, stochastic,
or leased on restrictive terms. The often-studied simple bundling strategies are shown to be
generically suboptimal.

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Chapter 1. Many-to-One Matching without Substitutability

1. Introduction

This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and hospitals, and workers and firms. An agent on one side, say a firm, can hire as many workers as it needs, and an agent on the other side, a worker, can be employed by one firm only or remain unemployed. In this way, the agents form coalitions. The class of feasible coalitions is exogenously given. An unemployed worker is considered a coalition. All other coalitions consist of a firm and its workforce.

Gale and Shapley (1962) raised the question of stability of such matchings. Each agent has preferences over the coalitions that contain this agent. A matching is stable if (i) no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, (ii) no firm wants to keep some positions vacant rather than filling them with a group of matched workers, and (iii) no worker-firm pair that is presently unmatched prefers to match.

The most general known sufficient conditions for stability are substitutability conditions, which are derived from the Kelso and Crawford (1982) gross-substitutes condition. In a formulation of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the substitutability condition is as follows: if a firm wants to employ a worker $w$ from a large pool of workers, then the firm wants to employ $w$ from any smaller pool containing $w$. Kelso and Crawford (1982) show that if firms’ preferences satisfy the substitutability condition and there are

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1The college admission problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). A recent example from the realm of education is the design of a new high school admissions system in New York City, which allows both schools and students to influence the matching (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth 2005). Medical labor markets are studied for example in Roth (1984), Roth (1991), Roth and Peranson (1999), Niederle and Roth (2004), and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (forthcoming). Roth (2002) provides a survey. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is a classic survey of theory, empirical evidence, and design applications of the many-to-one matching models satisfying the above assumption.

2Starting with the work of Roth (1984) on US matching between interns and hospitals, substantial empirical evidence links the lack of stability in matching with market failures. The evidence is surveyed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and Roth (2002).

3Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Echenique and Oviedo (2004b), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and Ostrovsky (2005). Roth (1985)'s responsiveness condition is also a variant of substitutability.
no peer effects – that is, workers' preferences depend only on the firm they apply to and not on who their peers will be – then there exists a stable many-to-one matching.

There are matching settings that do not satisfy the standard assumptions of substitutability and lack of peer effects. The substitutability condition fails if there are non-trivial complementarities between workers. It also fails when there are fixed costs. The complementarities are non-trivial if, for example, a firm's production process is profitable only when adequately staffed. For instance, a biotech firm may not open a new R&D lab if it is unable to hire experts in all complementary areas required for the lab's work. Substitutability fails for firms with fixed costs if their operations must be of some minimal size to ensure profitability. Peer effects are present if workers care about interactions in the workplace or if the identity of other workers non-trivially influences workloads or other day-to-day bargaining between workers.

This paper provides a novel sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition for stability that may be used to analyze settings with complementarities and peer effects such as those mentioned above. The paper also shows that the condition is satisfied in several settings of economic importance that have not previously been recognized as admitting stable matchings.

The main component of the proposed condition is the pairwise alignment of preferences. Agents' preferences are pairwise aligned if any two agents in the intersection of any two coalitions prefer the same one of the two coalitions. For instance, a firm and a worker either both prefer to form a firm-and-one-employee coalition or both prefer a larger coalition that includes the firm, the worker, and some other workers.

The sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition is developed in three stages, from specific to more general environments. Stage 1 (Section 2) presents an example of matching with payoffs determined by Nash bargaining. Stage 2 (Section 4) generalizes this example by replacing Nash bargaining with a broad class of mechanisms. This intermediate stage is of independent interest as directly applicable to a range of matching situations in which agents are unable to enter binding agreements. Stage 3 (Section 5) addresses the general problem with agents' preferences as primitives.

The setting of Stage 1 (Section 2) is as follows. There are two dates. On date 1, firms and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this date, firms and workers cannot enter binding employment contracts. In effect, on date 1, the agents' preferences over coalitions result from the agents' expectations of the payoffs that will be determined on date 2. On date 2, each coalition creates a value and its members divide the value according to the Nash bargaining solution. This bargaining determines the agents'
payoffs. Since each preference profile induced by Nash bargaining is pairwise aligned, the pairwise alignment condition is embedded in this setting.

Stage 1 (Section 2) shows that there is a stable matching in this setting.\(^3\) This stage also proves a stronger property of this matching setting, namely the existence of a metaranking. A metaranking is a transitive relation on all coalitions; its defining property is that, restricted to coalitions containing an agent, the transitive relation agrees with preferences of this agent.\(^4\)

Stage 2 (Section 4) discusses matching when payoffs are determined by mechanisms. This setting preserves the timing and other elements of the setting from Stage 1, except that Nash bargaining is replaced by a mechanism from a broad class of games, bargaining protocols, and sharing rules. As in the setting of Stage 1, each coalition has a value. The mechanism takes the values of coalitions, that is the value function, and generates agents' payoffs and preferences over coalitions.

Stage 2 (Section 4) establishes a sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition for stability. It is sufficient for the existence of a stable matching that agents' preferences are pairwise aligned for all value functions. It is necessary for the existence of a stable matching for all value functions that agents' preferences are pairwise aligned.

Stage 3 (Section 5) addresses the general problem with agents' preferences as primitives. At this stage, in contrast to Stage 2, there are no mechanisms. The sufficient condition imposes pairwise alignment on agents' preferences from a rich domain of preference profiles as it is not sufficient for stability to impose pairwise alignment on a single preference profile.\(^5\) An example of a matching situation with pairwise-aligned preferences and no stable matching is included in Section 4 to explain why we need mechanisms.\(^6\)

In the general preference framework of Stage 3 (Section 5), the pairwise alignment

\(^3\)In this and other settings discussed, there exists a matching that is group stable and not only stable. A matching is group stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, and no firm may replace some (or no) workers, with some (or no) additional workers so that the firm and all the additional workers strictly increase their payoffs.

\(^4\)The idea of metarankings was introduced by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). See the following discussion of literature.

\(^5\)Section 5 also discusses the sufficient condition in a form in which the condition does not refer to a rich domain of preference profiles.

\(^6\)As a heuristic argument consider the roommate problem, in which agents match in pairs, and any two agents may form a pair. Preferences are always pairwise aligned, but the existence of a stable matching is not assured.
remains a necessary condition for the existence of stable matchings for all preference profiles from large domains of profiles.

The sufficiency and necessity results proved in this paper allow one to determine which sharing rules and games induce the existence of stable matchings. For instance, Section 6 determines the class of linear sharing rules and the class of welfare maximization mechanisms that induce the existence of stable matchings. Section 6 also shows that there is always a stable matching if agents’ preferences are induced by Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game.

The idea of using pairwise alignment to study stability seems to be new. As discussed above, the paper proves that the pairwise alignment is related to the idea of a metaranking introduced by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). Farrell and Scotchmer primarily study the formation of partnerships. They show that the one-sided core is non-empty in a coalition formation game followed by an equal division of value. Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) relax the Farrell and Scotchmer metaranking property and notice that the equal division may be replaced by some other linear sharing rules in Farrell and Scotchmer’s analysis. Echenique and Yenmez (2005) use metarankings to analyze the one-sided core of many-to-one matching. They construct an algorithm that finds matchings in the one-sided core if they exist. This algorithm does not rely on either substitutability or the lack of peer effects. They also verify that their algorithm efficiently finds matchings in the one-sided core if the Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) metaranking-type property is satisfied.

As a companion paper, Pycia (2005) studies the relation among pairwise alignment, metarankings, and coalition formation. The results on stability presented here are independent of the results of the companion paper because this paper studies many-to-one matching, while the companion paper studies one-sided coalition formation. The two papers employ independent solution concepts. This paper studies stability, while the companion paper studies the one-sided core. The papers provide pairwise-alignment-

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7 If a metaranking exists, then preferences are pairwise aligned. The converse implication is true in the special case studied in Section 4 but not in the general setting of Section 5.

8 The relaxed metaranking property, called the top coalition property, says that each subgroup of agents contains a coalition that is weakly preferred by all its members to any other coalition of agents in the subgroup.

9 Echenique and Oviedo (2004a) construct an algorithm that finds group stable matchings in many-to-one settings if they exist and if there are no peer effects.

10 The main difference between these two concepts is that stability presumes that a firm can sever or establish a match with a worker without taking into account the preferences of other workers the
based sufficient and necessary conditions for stability, and non-emptiness of the one-sided core, respectively. The conditions, however, are different.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the Nash bargaining example. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the theory of stability in matching with mechanisms. Section 5 presents the preference formulation of the results. Section 6 presents new settings in which stable matchings exist. The last section concludes.

2. Matching and Nash Bargaining – an Example

Let us consider the following many-to-one matching situation. On date 1, firms and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this date, firms and workers cannot enter binding employment contracts. In effect, on date 1, the agents’ preferences over coalitions reflect the agents’ expectations of the payoffs that will be determined on date 2. On date 2, each resultant coalition, $C$, creates value $v(C) \geq 0$, and its members divide $v(C)$ according to the Nash bargaining solution. That is, each agent $i$ is endowed with an increasing and concave utility function $U_i$, and agents’ payoffs $s_i$ maximize

$$\max_{s_i \geq 0, i \in C} \prod_{i \in C} (U_i(s_i) - U_i(0))$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i \in C} s_i \leq v(C).$$

Thus, agents’ preferences over coalitions are induced by Nash bargaining.

Recall that a matching is stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, no firm wants to lay off any group of its workers, and no worker-firm pair that is presently unmatched would prefer to match.\(^{11}\)

**Theorem 2.1.** If preferences during matching are induced by Nash bargaining, then there exists a stable matching.

\(^{11}\)The formal definition is presented in Section 3.

firm matches with. The one-sided core presumes that the workers have veto power over the actions of the firm. Consequently, a many-to-one matching in the one-sided core need not be stable, and a stable matching need not belong to the one-sided core. For details, see the discussion in Section 3.
Proof. To construct a stable matching, let us first observe that \( \frac{U_i(s_i) - U_i(0)}{U_i(s_i)} \), called the fear of ruin coefficient,\(^{12}\) is the same for every agent in a coalition that divides value in Nash bargaining. Indeed, the Lagrange multiplier in the Nash bargaining maximization equals the inverse of the fear of ruin, \( \frac{U_i(s_i)}{U_i(s_i) - U_i(0)} \). Additionally, the larger the fear of ruin of an agent is, the more the agent gains in a given coalition. Thus, no agents would ever want to change a coalition that maximizes their fear of ruin. Therefore, the coalition with maximal fear of ruin may be treated as if its members did not participate in the matching between the remaining agents. In this way, one can recursively construct a stable matching. This completes the proof.\(^{13}\)

The above proof may be separated into two steps. The first step constructs an index on coalitions — the fear of ruin — such that all relevant agents compare two coalitions by looking at this index only. The second step uses the index to recursively construct a stable matching.

The idea for the second step comes from Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). They study partnerships that share the surplus equally among their members. That is, if a partnership of size \( \#C \) creates value \( v(C) \), then each member obtains \( \frac{v(C)}{\#C} \). They use the index \( \frac{v(C)}{\#C} \) to recursively construct a partnership structure that belongs to the one-sided core. Except for the difference in solution concepts, their use of the index \( \frac{v(C)}{\#C} \) is the same as our use of the fear of ruin in the second step of the above proof.

The above two indices, the fear of ruin and \( \frac{v(C)}{\#C} \), determine metarankings. A metaranking is a transitive relation on all coalitions that, restricted to coalitions con-

\(^{12}\)See Aumann and Kurz (1977a, 1977b) and Roth (1979).

\(^{13}\)Three remarks about the Nash bargaining example might be of interest. The above argument, with a small modification, may be used to show that a stable matching exists when preferences come from an asymmetric Nash bargaining where agent \( i \) has bargaining power \( \lambda_i \) and the division of value \( v(C) \) in coalition \( C \) maximizes \( \prod_{i \in C} (U_i(s_i) - U_i(0))^{\lambda_i} \) over \( s_i \geq 0, i \in C \), subject to \( \sum_{i \in C} s_i \leq v(C) \). In this extension, the bargaining powers \( \lambda_i \) are agent-specific but are not coalition-specific.

Furthermore, the above argument shows that the matching is group stable and not only stable. A formal definition definition of group stability is given in Section 3. Informally, a matching is group stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, and no firm may fire some (or no) workers, and employ some (or no) additional workers so that the firm and all the additional workers strictly increase their payoffs.

Finally, the values \( v(C) \) may either accrue to the entire coalition or be composed of parts that accrue to individual members. In the latter case, the existence of a stable matching relies on the assumptions that agents’ utilities are quasi-linear in a numeraire, and that, after the coalitions are determined, the agents can contract. Then, \( v(C) \) is the sum of values that accrue to members in an optimal contract.
taining any particular agent, agrees with preferences of this agent. As in the above proof, if there is a metaranking, then there is a matching that is stable.

The existence of a metaranking is a strong and desirable property of a matching setting. For instance, Proposition 4.11 in the appendix shows that if there is a metaranking, then group stable matchings are obtained as Strong Nash Equilibria\textsuperscript{14} of a broad class of non-cooperative matching games.

Despite the attractiveness of the existence of metarankings as a property of matching situations, it is difficult to use metarankings as a sufficient condition for stability. To use metarankings to verify stability requires one to construct an index — such as the fear of ruin index above — for each matching setting.

Sections 4 and 5 solve this problem by connecting the existence of metarankings with the pairwise alignment, which is readily verifiable in a variety of settings.\textsuperscript{15} For instance, in Nash bargaining, the pairwise alignment is an immediate consequence of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom.\textsuperscript{16}

3. Model

A finite set of agents $I$ is divided into two non-empty disjoint sets, $I = F \cup W$. We will refer to agents from $F$ as firms, and to agents from $W$ as workers. Each worker seeks a firm, and each firm $f \in F$ seeks up to $M_f$ workers, where $M_f \geq 1$. A matching is a function $\mu$ from $F \cup W$ into subsets of $F \cup W$, such that

- $\mu(w) = \{f\}$ if the worker $w$ is employed by the firm $f$, and $\mu(w) = \{w\}$ if $w$ is unemployed,
- $\mu(f) \subset W$ and the size $\#\mu(f) \leq M_f$ for every firm $f$, and
- $\mu(w) = \{f\}$ iff $w \in \mu(f)$, for every worker $w$ and firm $f$.


\textsuperscript{15}Section 5 also defines relaxed metarankings and study their connection to stability and pairwise alignment. Relaxed metarankings, unlike metarankings, always exist in one-to-one matching.

Let us use the term coalition to refer to a firm $f$ and all workers matched to $f$ in some matching, or to refer to an unemployed worker. Thus, a coalition may consist of a firm $f$ and any subset of workers $S \subseteq W$ of size $\#S \leq M_f$ (including $S = \emptyset$) or of an unemployed worker. Let us denote the set of all coalitions by $C$. Thus,

$$C = \{\{f\} : f \in F, S \subseteq W, \#S \leq M_f\} \cup \{\{w\} : w \in W\}.$$  

Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between matchings and partitions of $I$ into coalitions. In particular, in any matching each agent is associated with exactly one coalition.

Each agent $i \in I$ has a preference relation $\succ_i$ over all coalitions that contain $i$. The profile of preferences $(\succ_i)_{i \in I}$ is denoted by $\succ_I$. This formulation embodies the standard assumption that each agent's preferences between two matchings are fully determined by members of the coalitions containing this agent in the two matchings.

We are interested in the existence of stable matchings in the above environment. The role of stability – most notably in preventing the unravelling of markets – has been elucidated in the empirical work started by Roth (1984). In the following definitions of stability and group stability, $C^\mu(i)$ denotes the coalition containing an agent $i$ in matching $\mu$. Specifically, the coalition containing a firm $f$ is $C^\mu(f) = \{f\} \cup \mu(f)$, and the coalition containing a worker $w$ is $C^\mu(w) = \mu(w) \cup \mu(w))$.

**Definition 3.1 (Stability).** A matching $\mu$ is blocked by a firm $f$ if there exists a subset of workers $S \subseteq \mu(f)$ such that $\{f\} \cup S \succ_f C^\mu(f)$.

A matching $\mu$ is blocked by a worker $w$ if $\{w\} \succ_w C^\mu(w)$.

A matching $\mu$ is blocked by firm $f$ and worker $w \notin \mu(f)$ if there exists $S \subseteq \mu(f)$ such that

- $\#(\{w\} \cup S) \leq M_f$,
- $\{f\} \cup \{w\} \cup S \succ_f C^\mu(f)$, and
- $\{f\} \cup \{w\} \cup S \succ_w C^\mu(w)$.

A matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or any worker-firm pair.

\footnote{Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) Definition 5.3.}
Definition 3.2 (Group Stability).

A matching \( \mu \) is blocked by a group of workers and firms if there exists another matching \( \mu' \) and a group \( A \) consisting of multiple workers and/or firms, such that for all workers \( w \) in \( A \) and for all firms \( f \) in \( A \),

- \( \mu'(w) \in A \) (i.e., every student in \( A \) is matched to a college in \( A \));
- \( C^{\mu'}(w) \succ_w C^{\mu}(w) \) (i.e., every student in \( A \) prefers the new matching to the old one);
- \( \omega \in \mu'(f) \) implies \( \omega \in A \cup \mu(f) \) (i.e., every firm in \( A \) is matched to new workers only from \( A \), although it may continue to be matched to some of its “old” workers from \( \mu(f) \)); and
- \( C^{\mu'}(f) \succ_f C^{\mu}(f) \) (i.e., every firm in \( A \) prefers its new set of workers to its old one).

A matching is group stable if it is not blocked by any group of agents.

The stability concepts presuppose that a match is between a worker and a firm. Both the firm and the worker can unilaterally sever the match, and together they can establish the match irrespective of other agents’ preferences. In particular, even though the worker and the firm are members of a coalition composed of the firm and all its employees, other coalition members – i.e., other workers – have no veto power over the creation or severance of the firm-worker match. This lack of workers’ veto power is a major difference between the stability in two-sided matching and the one-sided core in coalition formation. A matching \( \mu \) is in the one-sided core if there is no coalition \( A \) such that \( A \succ_a C^{\mu}(a) \) for each \( a \in A \). A stable matching need not belong to the one-sided core, and a matching in the one-sided core need not be stable. Group stability is a stronger property than both stability and the non-emptiness of the one-sided core.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\)Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) Definition 5.4.

\(^{19}\)The following example illustrates the difference. There is one firm \( f \) and two workers \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \). The firm would most like to hire both workers. A second best option for the firm would be to hire \( w_1 \), the more productive worker, only. The third best would be to hire \( w_2 \) only. The productive worker, \( w_1 \), does not like to work with \( w_2 \), and so \( w_1 \)'s preferences are \( \{f, w_1\} \succ_{w_1} \{w_1\} \succ_{w_1} \{f, w_1, w_2\} \). Worker \( w_2 \) wants to work for firm \( f \) irrespective of whether \( w_1 \) is working there, too. The matching in which worker \( w_1 \) works for firm \( f \), and worker \( w_2 \) is unemployed, is in the one-sided core. This matching, however, is not stable. In fact, in this example, there is no stable matching.
4. Mechanisms and Stability of Matching

The basic structure of the matching problems studied in this section is similar to the Nash bargaining example discussed in Section 2. The structure is as follows. There are two dates. On date 1, firms and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this date, firms and workers cannot enter binding employment contracts. Consequently, the agents form their preferences by foreseeing what will happen on date 2. On date 2, each resultant coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible payoffs

\[
\left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R^{|C|}_+: \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\},
\]

where \( v(C) \) is the value of coalition \( C \) and \( v: C \rightarrow R_+ \) is the value function. We allow the payoffs \( u_i \) to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of outcomes. Coalition \( C \) realizes a feasible payoff profile by playing some game, following some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. For instance, in the example of Section 2, the payoff profile was chosen via Nash bargaining. Other examples – such as Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game or linear sharing rules – are discussed in Section 6.

A post-matching mechanism (or, mechanism) is a game or a choice rule that players use to decide which profile of payoffs will be realized. The following definition of a post-matching mechanism identifies each such game or rule with resulting agents' payoffs because ultimately the stability properties of any matching problem are determined by these payoffs alone.

**Definition 4.1 (Mechanism).** A post-matching mechanism is a function \( G \) that for every coalition \( C \) and value \( v(C) \) determines nonnegative payoffs \( G(i, C, v(C)) \) for all members \( i \in C \) so that

\[
\sum_{i \in C} G(i, C, v(C)) \leq v(C).
\]

For example, an equal division rule operating on a coalition \( C \) with value \( v(C) \) produces payoffs \( G(i, C, v(C)) = \frac{v(C)}{|C|} \).

This section discusses mechanisms that do not discriminate against any worker \( w \) in any coalition \( C \) in the sense defined below. For the sake of the definition, let us denote the set of payoffs that agent \( i \) may receive in coalition \( C \) for various values \( v(C) \) by

\[
U(i, C) = \{ G(i, C, v(C)) : v(C) \geq 0 \}.
\]
Using this notation, we may state the following

**Definition 4.2 (Non-discrimination).** A post-matching mechanism is *non-discriminatory* if for any worker $w$, and coalitions $C, C' \ni w$ the sets of payoffs are equal $U(i, C) = U(i, C')$.

All above-mentioned mechanisms — Nash bargaining, equal division, the Tullock rent-seeking — are non-discriminatory.\textsuperscript{20}

We are further assuming that the mechanism is monotonic and continuous, i.e., an increase in the value of a coalition continuously improves the payoffs of all agents in the coalition.

**Definition 4.3 (Monotonicity and Continuity).** A mechanism is *monotonic* if for any agent $i$ and coalition $C \ni i$ the payoff $G(i, C, \tilde{v})$ is increasing in $\tilde{v} \geq 0$. A mechanism is *continuous* if $G(i, C, \tilde{v})$ is continuous in $\tilde{v} \geq 0$.

All above-mentioned mechanisms are monotonic and continuous. Any monotonic mechanism that produces Pareto optimal payoffs\textsuperscript{21} is continuous.

This section provides a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of stable matchings for all preference profiles induced by a non-discriminating and monotonic mechanism. These conditions build on the notion of pairwise aligned preferences. Recall that preferences are pairwise aligned if all agents in an intersection of two coalitions prefer the same coalition of the two.

**Definition 4.4 (Pairwise Alignment).** Preferences are pairwise aligned if for all $i, j \in I$ and coalitions $C, C' \ni i, j$, we have

$$C \preceq_i C' \iff C \preceq_j C'.$$

In particular, then $C \sim_i C'$ iff $C \sim_j C'$, and $C \succ_i C'$ iff $C \succ_j C'$. Preferences generated by Nash bargaining in the setting of Section 2 are pairwise aligned.

\textsuperscript{20}A mechanism that chooses payoffs $(u_i)_{i \in C}$ that maximize a welfare functional $\sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i)$ is non-discriminatory if the welfare components $W_i$ satisfy an Inada type condition $W_i'(u) \to 0$ as $u \to \infty$. If this condition fails, the welfare maximization mechanism may be discriminatory, for instance, if $W_i'(u)$ and $W_j'(u)$ tend to 0 as $u \to \infty$ but $W_i'(u) > 1$ for all $u$.

\textsuperscript{21}Given the set of feasible payoffs, the payoffs are Pareto optimal if $\sum_{i \in C} G(i, C, \tilde{v}) = \tilde{v}$.
The sufficient and necessary condition for stability is given by the following.

**Theorem 4.5 (Sufficiency and Necessity).** Suppose that there are at least two firms and that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. A non-discriminatory, monotonic, and continuous post-matching mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference profiles if, and only if, there is a stable matching for each induced preference profile. Moreover, if the mechanism generates pairwise-aligned preferences, then there is a group stable matching for each induced preference profile.

We first prove the sufficiency part, then comment on the proof of the necessity part, and end this section with a discussion of which assumptions may be dropped and which assumptions may be relaxed.

The proof of the sufficiency part is in two steps. The first step shows that under the assumptions of the theorem there is a metaranking. The second step is identical to the second step in the proof of Theorem 2.1, and hence is skipped. Recall that a metaranking is defined as follows.

**Definition 4.6 (Metaranking).** A metaranking is a transitive relation $\preceq$ on all coalitions such that for any $i \in I$ and $C, C' \ni i$,

$$C \preceq_i C' \iff C \preceq C'.$$

Two examples of metarankings determined by indices were discussed in Section 2: the fear of ruin coefficient in a matching followed by Nash bargaining and the per-head value of a coalition in a matching followed by equal division of value. The appendix discusses non-cooperative implementation of matching when there is a metaranking.

We reduced the proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5 to the following.

**Proposition 4.7 (Existence of a Metaranking).** Suppose that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. If a non-discriminatory and monotonic post-matching mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference profiles, then for each induced preference profile there is a metaranking.

Proof. Because of monotonicity, $G(a, C, v'(C)) = G(a, C, v(C))$ implies $G(b, C, v'(C)) = G(b, C, v(C))$ for any values $v(C), v'(C)$. Thus, we can define the payoff translation functions $t_{b,a}^C : U(a, C) \to U(a, C)$ for each coalition $C$ and agents $a, b \in C$ by the condition

$$t_{b,a}^C(G(a, C, \bar{v})) = G(b, C, \bar{v})$$

for $\bar{v} \geq 0$. 


The non-discrimination implies that \( U(a, C) = U(a, C') \) for \( C, C' \ni a \), and the pairwise alignment guarantees that \( t_{b,a}^C = t_{b,a}^{C'} \). Since there is a firm able to employ two workers, so \( t_{b,a} \) is defined whenever at least one of the agents \( a \) and \( b \) is a worker.

Choose an arbitrary reference worker \( w^* \) and fix the value function \( v : C \to \mathbb{R}_+ \). Because of the non-discrimination assumption, \( t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, v(C))) \) is well defined for any agent \( a \) and coalition \( C \ni a \) even when \( w^* \notin C \). By pairwise consistency,

\[
t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, v(C))) = t_{w^*,a'}(G(a', C, v(C)))
\]

for any different \( a, a' \in C \). Indeed, if \( w^* \in C \) then the claim follows straightforwardly from the pairwise consistency. If \( w^* \notin C \), then first consider the case when \( a \) is a firm and \( a' \) is a worker. Then \( a \) is able to employ two workers and \( \{a, a', w^*\} \) is a coalition. By the non-discrimination, there is a value function \( v' : C \to \mathbb{R}_+ \) such that

\[
G(a', C, v'(C)) = G(a', \{a, a', w^*\}, v'(\{a, a', w^*\})), \text{ and } v'(C) = v(C).
\]

Then, the pairwise alignment implies that also

\[
G(a, C, v'(C)) = G(a, \{a, a', w^*\}, v'(\{a, a', w^*\})).
\]

Since \( w^* \in \{a, a', w^*\} \), we have

\[
t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, v(C))) = t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, v'(C)))
= t_{w^*,a}(G(a, \{a, a', w^*\}, v'(\{a, a', w^*\})))
= t_{w^*,a'}(G(a', \{a, a', w^*\}, v'(\{a', a', w^*\})))
= t_{w^*,a'}(G(a', C, v'(C)))
= t_{w^*,a'}(G(a', C, v(C))).
\]

In the remaining case, both \( a \) and \( a' \) are workers. Then \( C \) contains also a firm \( f \), and by the preceding argument

\[
t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, v(C))) = t_{w^*,f}(G(f, C, v(C))) = t_{w^*,a'}(G(a', C, v(C))).
\]

Consequently,

\[
\chi(C) = t_{w^*,a}(G(a, C, V(C)))
\]

does not depend on \( a \) if \( C \) is fixed. Monotonicity of the mechanism implies that \( \chi(C) \) determines a metaranking. This completes the proof.
The necessity part of Theorem 4.5 will be proved when we prove a stronger Theorem 5.12. The proof is in the appendix to Section 5, and makes two steps. A first step considers certain configurations of coalitions $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1}$ such that there is an agent $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, 3$ (we adopt the convention that subscripts are modulo 3 that is $C_{i,i+1} = C_{3,1}$ if $i = 3$ and $C_{i-1,i} = C_{3,1}$ if $i = 1$). In these configurations, if $C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}$ and $C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C_{3,1}$ then $C_{1,2} \sim_{a_1} C_{3,1}$. The second steps shows then this property implies pairwise alignment.\footnote{The necessity part of Theorem 4.5 provides some guidance for a social planner that wants to ensure the existence of a stable matching, intervenes to influence the game or rule that dictates the division of value, and does not know the set of payoffs that coalitions are able to create. Cf. Roth (1984) and other papers on the matching in medical labor markets cited in the introduction. These authors provide empirical evidence that lack of stability is related to the unravelling of markets. They also discuss efforts of medical associations to design the matching environment in such a way as to ensure stability.}

Let us finish this section with the discussion of assumptions. First notice, that for monotonic non-discriminatory mechanisms the pairwise alignment assumption may be relaxed.

**Lemma 4.9.** If a non-discriminatory monotonic mechanism induces preferences such that

$$C \sim_i C' \iff C \sim_j C'$$

for all $i, j \in C, C' \in C$, then preferences generated by the mechanism are pairwise aligned.

Proof. Fix $i, j \in I$ and $C, C' \ni i, j$. It is enough to consider the case $i \neq j$ and $C \neq C'$. Assume that the value function $v$ is such that $C \preceq_i C'$ in the induced preference profile $\mathcal{v}_i$. Use the non-discrimination to find a value $v' (C)$ such that $C \sim_i' C'$ in the induced preference profile $\mathcal{v}'_i$. Then, $v' (C) \geq v (C)$ and $C \sim_j C'$. The monotonicity of the mechanism implies that $C \preceq_j C'$. This completes the proof.

The pairwise alignment assumption may also be relaxed in other ways. Consider for example the asymmetric Nash bargaining model presented in Section 2. When the bargaining power of a worker becomes 0, this worker becomes a wage taker indifferent to all employment options, and a stable matching still exists.\footnote{In fact, if there is a metaranking in a matching problem, and the preferences are modified so that some agents become indifferent between some of the coalitions and their outside option, then the modified problem still admits a stable matching.}

\footnotetext{22}{The necessity part of Theorem 4.5 provides some guidance for a social planner that wants to ensure the existence of a stable matching, intervenes to influence the game or rule that dictates the division of value, and does not know the set of payoffs that coalitions are able to create. Cf. Roth (1984) and other papers on the matching in medical labor markets cited in the introduction. These authors provide empirical evidence that lack of stability is related to the unravelling of markets. They also discuss efforts of medical associations to design the matching environment in such a way as to ensure stability.}

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The assumptions about the mechanism may be considerably relaxed. Before discussing how they are relaxed in Section 5, let us notice that even for the sufficiency part, it is not enough to assume that a single preference profile is pairwise aligned. The following situation illustrates the problem.

**Example 4.10.** There are three workers $w_1, w_2, w_3$ and three firms $f_{1,2}, f_{2,3}, f_{3,1}$. Let us adopt the convention that the subscripts are modulo 3, that is, $w_{i+1} = w_i$ if $i = 3$. Assume that only three firm-worker coalitions $\{f_{i,i+1}, w_i, w_{i+1}\}$, $i = 1, 2, 3$, create positive payoffs for their members. Let the payoffs in coalition $\{f_{i,i+1}, w_i, w_{i+1}\}$ be such that $w_i$ obtains 2 and $w_{i+1}$ obtains 1.

In this example, the resultant preferences of agents are pairwise aligned. At the same time, there is no group stable matching. There are stable matchings given by the partitions $\{\{f_{i,i+1}, w_i, w_{i+1}\}, \{f_{i+1,i+2}\}, \{f_{i+2,i}\}, \{w_{i+2}\}\}$, $i = 1, 2, 3$. It is easy to modify the example so that there is no stable matching. It is enough to assume that agents' payoffs in coalitions $\{f_{i+1,i+2}, w_{i+2}\}$ are negligible, but positive.

The next section relaxes Theorems 4.5 and Proposition 4.7 in several ways.

First, the monotonicity and continuity assumptions, as well as the assumption that there are at least two firms, are not needed in the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5 and Proposition 4.7 (cf. Theorems 5.2 and 5.10).

Second, the result may be presented in terms of preference profiles without reference to a post-matching mechanism. Section 5 replaces the presence of a non-discriminatory mechanism with another, substantially weaker but more technical, condition that the preference profile belongs to a rich domain of pairwise-aligned profiles. Each domain of preference profiles generated by a non-discriminatory mechanism is rich; there are, however, rich domains that cannot be rationalized as coming from a non-discriminatory mechanism. Notice that, stated directly in terms of preference profiles, the results of Section 5 may be more readily applied to settings where agents' preferences are determined before the matching by institutional constraints.

Third, the sufficient conditions for stability in Section 5 are applicable also to settings that do not admit a metaranking.

Fourth, Section 5 removes the restriction that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. Theorem 5.8 replaces this restriction with a weak assumption on one-worker firms, that is, firms that can employ at most one worker. As a consequence, the sufficient condition of Theorem 5.8 is satisfied, for instance, in the Gale and Shapley (1962) marriage markets.
5. Preference Formulation of Stability Conditions

This section presents sufficient and necessary conditions for stability in a preference formulation. Unlike the results of Section 4, the stronger results of this section do not rely on the preferences being induced by a post-matching mechanism. As such, they are more directly applicable to the college admission problem.

Recall that Example 4.10 shows that the pairwise alignment of preference alone does not guarantee that a stable matching exists. As is shown in the present section, it is enough to assume pairwise consistency on the preference profile in question, and on some related profiles. In Section 4, the domain of profiles generated by a mechanism played this role. In the present section we will assume the existence of these other profiles directly — by imposing a pairwise alignment restriction on a domain of preference profiles.

To introduce our results, let us consider a simple matching problem with payoffs determined in Nash bargaining. Suppose that two firms $f_1, f_2$ and two workers $w_1, w_2$ match on date 1. On this date, they are not able to commit to terms of employment. On date 2, each coalition creates a value and divides it according to the Nash bargaining solution. As we know from Theorem 2.1, a stable matching exists in this setting.

Let us consider a heuristic for an alternative proof of Theorem 2.1. This proof, while more complex than the proof offered in Section 2, introduces the ideas used in the proofs of the stronger counterparts of Theorem 4.5 discussed in the present section.

If a stable matching does not exist, then there would be a cycle of coalitions such that each coalition contains an agent who strictly prefers the next coalition in the cycle. For example, worker $w_1$ would prefer $\{f_2, w_1, w_2\}$ to $\{f_1, w_1\}$, firm $f_1$ would prefer $\{f_1, w_1\}$ to $\{f_1, w_2\}$, and worker $w_2$ would prefer $\{f_1, w_2\}$ to $\{f_2, w_1, w_2\}$.

To show that this cannot happen, let us consider an auxiliary matching situation between firms $f_1, f_2$ and workers $w_1, w_2$ in which (i) the agents still divide the values according to the Nash bargaining solution, (ii) the values created by all coalitions except for $C = \{f_1, w_1, w_2\}$ are the same as in the original matching situation, and (iii) the value created by coalition $C$ is such that worker $w_2$ is indifferent between $C$ and $\{f_2, w_1, w_2\}$. In this auxiliary situation, the preferences of agents between coalitions from the above cycle are unchanged. The preferences are pairwise aligned because they are induced by Nash bargaining. Because of the pairwise alignment of preferences between $w_2$ and $w_1$, worker $w_1$ would be indifferent between $C$ and $\{f_2, w_1, w_2\}$, and hence $w_1$ would prefer $C$ to $\{f_1, w_1\}$. Again, because of the pairwise alignment of preferences between $w_1$ and
firm $f_1$ would prefer $C$ to $\{f_1, w_1\}$, and hence to $\{f_1, w_2\}$. Firm $f_1$'s strict preference for $C$ over $\{f_1, w_2\}$ would contradict the pairwise alignment of preferences of $f_1$ and $w_2$ over coalitions $C$ and $\{f_1, w_2\}$.

This contradiction proves that the cycle we started with cannot occur in the auxiliary situation, and hence it cannot occur in our example. So far, we have analyzed an illustrative cycle. To complete the proof and conclude that a stable matching exists, we need to show that there are no other cycles. The argument that there are no other cycles builds on the above analysis and is further developed following the statement of Theorem 5.2, and is completed in the appendix.

The role of Nash bargaining in the above heuristic argument is to ensure that there is an auxiliary situation in which the preferences are pairwise aligned, worker $w_2$ is indifferent between $C$ and $\{f_2, w_1, w_2\}$, and preferences between coalitions other than $C$ are inherited from the original preference profile. Nash bargaining may be replaced in the above example by any other non-discriminatory post-matching mechanism. Thus, the argument whose main thrust is presented above may be used to prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5 even if we drop the monotonicity and continuity assumptions.

In fact, the above heuristic argument requires only that the preference profile whose stability we analyze is embedded in a domain of pairwise-aligned profiles that is rich in the following sense. For any preference profile in the domain, any worker, and any two coalitions (of size 3 or more) containing the worker, there exists a profile in the domain in which the worker is indifferent between the two coalitions and, save for one coalition, agents' preferences over coalitions are intact. More informally, the rich domain of preference profiles allows us to make any worker indifferent between two coalitions (of size 3 or more), while keeping preferences between all but one coalition intact.

**Definition 5.1 (Rich Domain).** A domain of preference profiles $\mathcal{R}$ is rich if for any worker $w \in W$, coalitions $C, C' \ni w$ such that $\#C, \#C' \geq 3$, and any $\succsim_l \in \mathcal{R}$, there exists a profile $\succsim_l' \in \mathcal{R}$ such that $C \sim_w C'$ and all agents' $\succsim_l'$ preferences between coalitions other than $C$ are the same as in $\succsim_l$.

A domain of all preference profiles that might be generated in the Nash bargaining of Section 2 for different value functions $v : \mathcal{C} \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is rich. Any non-discriminatory mechanism induces a rich domain of preference profiles when applied to different configurations of coalitions' payoff profile sets. The domain of all profiles in any matching problem is also rich.

\[\text{Definition 5.1 (Rich Domain).}\] A domain of preference profiles $\mathcal{R}$ is rich if for any worker $w \in W$, coalitions $C, C' \ni w$ such that $\#C, \#C' \geq 3$, and any $\succsim_l \in \mathcal{R}$, there exists a profile $\succsim_l' \in \mathcal{R}$ such that $C \sim_w C'$ and all agents' $\succsim_l'$ preferences between coalitions other than $C$ are the same as in $\succsim_l$.

A domain of all preference profiles that might be generated in the Nash bargaining of Section 2 for different value functions $v : \mathcal{C} \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is rich. Any non-discriminatory mechanism induces a rich domain of preference profiles when applied to different configurations of coalitions' payoff profile sets. The domain of all profiles in any matching problem is also rich.

\[^{24}\text{Denoting by } u_i(C) \text{ agent } i \text{ utility from joining coalition } C, \text{ and by } u_I \text{ the profile of utilities of} \]
The main result of the paper is that if a preference profile belongs to a rich domain of pairwise-aligned profiles, then there exists a stable matching. This result contains Theorem 4.5.

**Theorem 5.2 (Sufficiency).** Suppose that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. If a preference profile \( \preceq \) belongs to a rich domain of pairwise aligned preference profiles, then \( \preceq \) admits a matching that is stable and group stable.

A heuristic argument for why we may expect Theorem 5.2 to be true was presented at the beginning of this section. Let us develop it here. The proof of the theorem has two main steps. The first step shows that there are no cycles of coalitions \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, \ldots, C_{m,1} \) for some \( m \geq 2 \) such that

(a) There exists \( a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \) and \( C_{i-1,i} \preceq a_i \subsetneq C_{i,i+1} \).

(b) For at least one \( i \) the preference is strict \( C_{i-1,i} \prec_a a_i \subsetneq C_{i,i+1} \) and at least one of \( C_{i-1,i}, C_{i,i+1} \) has three or more members.

Let us refer to such cycles as blocking cycles. The second step shows that if there are no blocking cycles then there exists a group stable matching. Let us first discuss, the more difficult first step, and then the easier second step.

A blocking cycle cannot have length 2. Indeed, \( C_{2,1} \preceq a_1 C_{1,2} \preceq a_2 C_{2,1} \) and the pairwise alignment imply that \( C_{2,1} \sim_a a_1 C_{1,2} \sim_a a_2 C_{2,1} \). A blocking cycle cannot have length 3 when one of the agents \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) is a firm. Indeed, assume that there is a cycle

\[
C_{3,1} \preceq a_1 C_{1,2} \preceq a_2 C_{2,3} \preceq a_3 C_{3,1}
\]

and \( C_{3,1} \) has three or more members. If two or three of the agents \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) are firms, then this is the same firm, and one can use the transitivity of this firm’s preferences and pairwise alignment of preference to show that all agents are indifferent on the cycle. If exactly one of the agents \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) is a firm, then there is a coalition \( C = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\} \) and we may use a slightly modified argument from the opening of this section.

agents \( i \in I \), we may express a utility counterpart of the rich domain condition as follows. For any worker \( w \in W \), coalitions \( C, C' \ni i \), and any utility profile \( u_I \) there exists utility profile \( u_I' \) such that \( u'_w(C) = u'_w(C') \) and \( u'_j(\hat{C}) = u_j(\check{C}) \) for all \( j \in I \) and coalitions \( \hat{C} \neq C \). A natural question one may ask is whether on any rich domain of preference profiles one may impute utilities so that the above utility counterpart of richness is satisfied. In general, the answer is no. A counterexample is presented in the appendix.
If $C$ is different from the coalitions $C_{3,1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}$, then there exists a pairwise-aligned preference profile $\succeq'_f \in \mathcal{R}$ such that

$$C \sim'_a C_{3,1}$$

and

$$C_{3,1} \succeq'_{a_1} C_{1,2} \succeq'_{a_2} C_{2,3} \succeq'_{a_3} C_{3,1}$$

with indifference if there was an $\succeq_f$ indifference in the cycle. A repeated application of the pairwise-alignment property of $\succeq'_f$, shows that

- $a_1$ is $\succeq'_f$ indifferent between $C$ and $C_{3,1}$, and thus prefers $C$ to $C_{1,2}$;
- $a_2$ prefers $C$ to $C_{1,2}$, and thus to $C_{2,3}$; and
- $a_3$ prefers $C$ to $C_{2,3}$, and thus to $C_{3,1}$.

None of the preferences on the cycle may be strict, as otherwise $a_3$ would strictly prefer $C$ to $C_{3,1}$, contrary to $a_3$'s indifference between these two coalitions.

If $C$ equals one of the coalitions $C_{3,1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}$, then we can repeat the above argument without the need to refer to the rich domain.

To show that there are no other blocking cycles requires overcoming some obstacles. The main obstacle is the lack of a single coalition containing all agents $a_1, \ldots, a_m$. In fact, such a coalition does not exist if two of the agents are firms. Even when the cycle has length 3 and all agents $a_1, a_2, a_3$ are workers, there may not exist a coalition containing all three agents if all firms are able to employ at most two workers. How to overcome this obstacle is shown in the proof presented in the appendix.\(^{25}\)

The second step in the proof of Theorem 5.2 is easier. It requires us to show that the lack of blocking cycles is a sufficient condition for stability. One could show it directly. Let us take, however, a longer route, in order to re-express this sufficient condition in a more informative way, and highlight the connection with the existence of metarankings. First let us define.

**Definition 5.3 (Relaxed Metaranking).** A relaxed metaranking is a transitive relation $\preceq$ on all coalitions such that

\(^{25}\)Theorem 5.2 is proved as a corollary of more general Theorem 5.8, which relaxes the assumption that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. The proof of Theorem 5.8 is in the appendix.
(1) For each agent \(i \in I\), and coalitions \(C, C' \ni i\),
\[
C \preceq_i C' \text{ implies } C \preceq C'.
\]

(2) For each agent \(i \in I\), and coalitions \(C, C' \ni i\) such that at least one of \(C, C'\) has
three or more members,
\[
C \preceq C' \text{ implies } C \preceq_i C'.
\]

Each metaranking is also a relaxed metaranking. An identity relation on coalitions
in the marriage problem is a relaxed metaranking for any profile of agents’ preferences.
Roughly speaking, a relaxed metaranking has two properties: (i) the coalitions higher
in the ranking are preferred to the coalitions lower in the ranking by all relevant agents,
and (ii) if two coalitions share the same level in the ranking, then either all relevant
agents are indifferent between them, or both coalitions have at most two members.

Lemma 5.4. There exists a relaxed metaranking if and only if there are no blocking
cycles.

Proof. \((\implies)\) For an indirect proof, consider coalitions \(C_{12}, C_{23}, ..., C_{m1}\) such that
\(a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}, i \in \{1, ..., m\}\), satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of the definition of a
blocking cycle. By symmetry, we can assume that \(#(C_{m,1}) \geq 3\) and \(C_{m,1} \prec_a C_{1,2}\).
Then \(C_{1,2} \preceq C_{2,3}, C_{2,3} \preceq C_{3,4}, \text{ etc.}\), and by transitivity \(C_{1,2} \preceq C_{m,1}\). Thus \(C_{1,2} \preceq_a C_{m,1}\),
contradicting \(C_{m,1} \prec_a C_{1,2}\).

\((\implies)\) Define relation \(\preceq\) so that \(C \preceq C'\) whenever there exists a sequence of coalitions
\(C_{i,i+1} \in C\) such that
\[\begin{align*}
\text{• } C &= C_{1,2}, \\
\text{• } C' &= C_{m,m+1}, \text{ and} \\
\text{• there is an agent } a_i &\in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \text{ such that } C_{i-1,i} \prec_a C_{i,i+1}.
\end{align*}\]
Then \(\preceq\) is transitive. It remains to verify conditions (1) and (2). To prove (1) take
\(C_{1,2} = C, C_{2,3} = C'\) and \(a_1 = i\). To prove (2), assume that \(C\) or \(C'\) has three or more
members, that \(i \in C \cap C'\), and that \(C \preceq C'\). Now, if \(C \succ_i C'\), then there would exist a
blocking cycle; hence \(C \prec_i C'\). This completes the proof.
Given the equivalence between the lack of blocking cycles and the existence of relaxed metarankings, to complete the second step in the proof of Theorem 5.2 it is enough to show the following.

**Proposition 5.5 (Sufficiency).** If there exists a relaxed metaranking, then there is a group stable matching.

**Proof.** The theorem is true if $I$ contains only one agent. Let us assume that the theorem is true on any subset of $I$ to prove the general case by induction.

Let $\preceq$ be the relaxed metaranking. Consider the family of coalitions

$$C_{\text{max}} = \{ C : \text{there does not exist coalition } C' \text{ such that } C \prec C' \},$$

which is non-empty since there is only a finite number of coalitions and $\preceq$ is transitive.

If there is $C_0 \in C_{\text{max}}$ such that $\#(C_0) \geq 3$, then notice that $C_0 \succeq_i C$ for any $i \in C_0$ and $C \ni i$. By the inductive assumption, there exists a partition $\{C_1, \ldots, C_k\}$ that corresponds to a group stable matching on $I - C_0$. Then $\{C_0, C_1, \ldots, C_k\}$ is a partition of $I$ that determines a group stable matching.

In the remaining case, all $C \in C_{\text{max}}$ have two or fewer members. Consider a one-to-one matching between firms from $F$ and workers from $W$ with preferences inherited from $\prec_f$. By Gale and Shapley’s (1962) result, there exists a group stable matching in this new problem; let

$$Q = \{C'_1, \ldots, C'_k\}$$

be a partition of $I$ that corresponds to such group stable matching. We can assume that $C'_1, \ldots, C'_k \in C_{\text{max}}$ and $C'_{k+1}, \ldots, C'_K \not\in C_{\text{max}}$ for some $k \geq 0$. Notice that for any $C' \in C_{\text{max}}$, any agent $i \in C'$ strictly prefers $C'$ to any $C \not\in C_{\text{max}}$ containing $i$. Indeed, if $C' \prec'_i C$ then $C' \not\prec C$ and hence $C \in C_{\text{max}}$. Thus, $k \geq 1$.

By the inductive assumption, there is a group stable many-to-one matching on $I - C'_1 - \ldots - C'_k$. Let

$$\{C''_1, \ldots, C''_m\}$$

be the corresponding partition of $I - C'_1 - \ldots - C'_k$.

Now, it is enough to notice that $C'_1, \ldots, C'_k, C''_1, \ldots, C''_m$ is a group stable many-to-one matching on $I$. Indeed, if it is not group stable then there would exist a blocking group $A$ that includes an agent $a \in C'_i$ for some $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$. Agent $i$ would prefer a coalition $C$ to $C'_i$. There would be two options. If $C \in C_{\text{max}}$, then matching $Q$ would not be group stable, contrary to its construction. If $C \not\in C_{\text{max}}$, then $C'_i \succ_a C$ (by the same argument.
that we used above to show that $k \geq 1$). This strict preference would contradict the assumption that $C'_i \preceq_a C$. This completes the proof.\footnote{In fact, this proof demonstrates that a slightly weaker condition is sufficient for group stability. This condition says that in any subset of agents either there is a coalition that is weakly preferred by all its members to all other coalitions in the subset, or there is a group of one- and two-member coalitions that are weakly preferred by all its members to any coalition not in the group. This condition is weaker than both the existence of a relaxed metaranking and the Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) top coalition property mentioned in the introduction.}

Theorem 5.2 presumed that each firm is able to employ at least two agents. If there are firms that cannot employ more than one worker, then the pairwise alignment condition is no longer sufficient for stability,\footnote{One-to-one matching is an exception. If the matching is one-to-one then all profiles are pairwise aligned and admit stable matchings.} as the following example demonstrates.

**Example 5.6.** Let $F = \{f_1, f_2\}$ and $W = \{w_1, w_2\}$. Let the firms' employment capacities equal $M_{f_1} = 1$ and $M_{f_2} = 2$. Let the preference profile $\preceq_f$ be such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\{f_1, w_1\} &\succ_{w_1} \{f_2, w_1, w_2\} \succ_{w_1} \{f_2, w_2\} \succ_{w_1} \{w_1\}, \\
\{f_2, w_1, w_2\} &\succ_{w_2} \{f_1, w_2\} \succ_{w_2} \{f_2, w_2\} \succ_{w_2} \{w_2\}, \\
\{f_1, w_2\} &\succ_{f_1} \{f_1, w_1\} \succ_{f_1} \{f_1\}, \text{ and} \\
\{f_2, w_1, w_2\} &\succ_{f_2} \{f_2, w_2\} \succ_{w_2} \{f_2, w_1\} \succ_{w_2} \{f_2\}.
\end{align*}
\]

There does not exist a stable matching, the main reason being that

\[
\{f_1, w_1\} \succ_{w_1} \{f_2, w_1, w_2\} \succ_{w_2} \{f_1, w_2\} \succ_{f_1} \{f_1, w_1\}.
\]

On the other hand, $\preceq_f$ is pairwise aligned. Moreover, the domain of all pairwise-aligned preference profiles is rich.

Thus, in order to extend Theorem 5.2 to cases of many-to-one matching with one-worker firms, i.e., firms with employment capacity $M_f = 1$, we need an additional assumption. The assumption is based on the idea of a blocking one-worker firm, i.e., a one-worker firm that belongs to a blocking-like cycle of three coalitions.

**Definition 5.7 (Blocking One-Worker Firm).** A firm $f$ unable to employ more than one worker is a blocking one-worker firm if there exist workers $w, w' \in W$ and a coalition $C \ni w, w'$ such that

\[
\{f, w\} \preceq_w C \preceq_w \{f, w'\} \preceq_f \{f, w\}.
\]
with one preference strict.

Using this notion we may state the following.

**Theorem 5.8 (Sufficiency).** If a preference profile belongs to a rich domain of pairwise-aligned preference profiles and there are no blocking one-worker firms, then there is a matching that is stable and group stable. Moreover, there exists a relaxed metaranking.

This result contains Theorem 5.2 because in the latter there are no one-worker firms. This strengthened result covers the Gale and Shapley marriage market in which all preference profiles are pairwise aligned and no one-worker firm can be blocking because there are no cycles of three coalitions. There are no cycles of three coalitions because there are no firms able to employ two workers.

The heuristic for Theorem 5.8 is identical to the one for Theorem 5.2. The proof is presented in the appendix.

Let us finish this section with two results connecting pairwise alignment, relaxed metarankings, and metarankings. The first result is an observation that every preference profile that admits a relaxed metaranking may be embedded in a rich domain of pairwise aligned preference profiles.

**Proposition 5.9.** (a) If a preference profile admits a relaxed metaranking then it is pairwise aligned and there are no blocking one-worker firms.

(b) The domain of profiles admitting a relaxed metaranking is rich.

The proof of (a) is straightforward. The proof of (b) is in the appendix.

The second result says when pairwise alignment on a domain of preferences implies that there exists a metaranking.

**Theorem 5.10 (Existence of a Metaranking).** Suppose that there is a firm able to employ two or more workers and that a domain of preference profiles $\mathcal{R}$ satisfies the following condition. For any agent $i \in I$, coalitions $C, C' \ni i$, and any $\preceq_i \in \mathcal{R}$, there exists a profile $\preceq'_i \in \mathcal{R}$ such that $C \sim_w C'$ and all agents' $\preceq'_j$-preferences between coalitions other than $C$ are the same as in $\preceq_i$. If preference profiles in domain $\mathcal{R}$ are pairwise aligned and are such that there are no blocking one-worker firms, then each preference profile in $\mathcal{R}$ admits a metaranking.
The proof relies on the same ideas as the proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.8, and is presented in the appendix. It is easy to modify the proof of Proposition 5.9 to show that the domain of preference profiles admitting a metaranking satisfies the domain condition of Theorem 5.10.

Let us finish with a necessity counterpart of our results. The assumptions are formulated using the following notion of a perturbation of preference profile that (i) keeps all preferences between coalitions except for a reference coalition \( C \), and (ii) perturbs agents' preferences over \( C \) in a co-monotonic way.

**Definition 5.11 (Monotonic C-Perturbation).** Given a coalition \( C \), we say that a preference profile \( \succ'_j \) is a monotonic \( C \)-perturbation of a profile \( \succ_j \) if:

- For any agent \( j \in I \) and coalitions \( C_1, C_2 \neq C \) containing \( j \) we have
  \[
  C_1 \succ'_j C_2 \iff C_1 \succ_j C_2.
  \]

- If there is \( i \in C \) and \( C'' \ni i \) such that \( C \succ_i C'' \) and \( C \prec'_i C'' \), then for any \( j \in I \) and \( C' \ni j \), if \( C \prec_j C' \), then \( C \prec'_j C' \).

- If there is \( i \in C \) and \( C' \ni i \) such that \( C \succ_i C' \) and \( C \prec'_i C' \), then for any \( j \in I \) and \( C'' \ni j \), if \( C \succ_j C'' \) then \( C \succ'_j C'' \).

For instance, if a preference profile belongs to the domain of preferences generated by a monotonic non-discriminatory mechanism, then the domain also contains its monotonic \( C \)-perturbations.

**Theorem 5.12 (Necessity).** Suppose that either there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each, or that there are no such firms. Suppose also that a domain of preferences \( R \) satisfies the following conditions:

1. For any agent \( i \in I \), coalitions \( C, C' \ni i \) such that \( \#C' \geq 3 \), and any \( \succ_i \in R \), there exists a monotonic \( C \)-perturbation \( \succ'_i \in R \) such that \( C \sim_i C' \).
2. For any agent \( i \in I \), coalitions \( C, C' \ni i \), and any \( \succ_i \in R \), there exists a monotonic \( C \)-perturbation \( \succ'_i \in R \) such that \( C \succ'_i C' \).
3. For any agent \( i \in I \), coalitions \( C, C' \ni i \), and any \( \succ_i \in R \) such that \( C \sim_i C' \), there exists a monotonic \( C \)-perturbation \( \succ'_i \in R \) such that...
\( C \succ_i' C' \).

- for any \( j \in C \) if \( C'' \succ_j C \) then \( C'' \succ_j' C \).

- for any \( j \in C \) if \( C'' \prec_j C \) then \( C'' \prec_j' C \).

Then, if all profiles from \( R \) admit a stable matching, then all profiles from \( R \) are pairwise aligned and are such that there are no blocking one-worker firms.\(^{28}\)

This theorem generalizes the necessity part of Theorem 4.5 and is proved in the appendix. The two main steps of the proof are discussed in Section 4. The final step makes use of the following.

**Remark 5.13.** As in Lemma 4.9, if a domain of preference profiles \( R \) satisfies (1), and for all \( i, j \in C, C' \in C \),

\[ C \sim_i C' \iff C \sim_j C', \]

then preferences in \( R \) are pairwise aligned.

The next section applies the theoretical results of the paper to some examples.

### 6. Applications and Examples

This section adds to the Nash bargaining example of Section 2 three further examples of settings in which our results on mechanisms of Section 4 are applicable. The mechanisms considered are linear sharing rules, maximization of a welfare objective, and Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game. The section also determines the class of non-discriminatory, monotonic, and Pareto optimal mechanisms that induce pairwise aligned profiles, and hence stable matchings.

We consider the setting of Section 4. Recall that there are two dates. On date 1, firms and workers match but do not contract. Agents’ preferences are determined by their payoffs on date 2. On date 2, each coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible payoffs

\[
\left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R^\#_+: \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\},
\]

\(^{28}\)The domain of all preference profiles that admit a relaxed metaranking satisfies the assumptions (1)-(3).
where \( v(C) \) is the value of coalition \( C \) and \( v : C \rightarrow R_+ \) is the value function. We allow the payoffs \( u_i \) to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of outcomes. Coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile by playing some game, following some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule.

**Linear sharing rules.** On date 2, agents divide the value using a coalition-specific linear sharing rule. The share of agent \( i \) in the value created by coalition \( C \) is \( k_{i,C} \). This agent obtains

\[
u_i = k_{i,C} v(C).
\]

The shares \( k_{i,C} > 0 \) are coalition-specific, \( \sum_{i \in C} k_{i,C} = 1 \), and \( k_{i,C} \) do not depend on the realization of \( v(C) \).

In this case, the pairwise-alignment requirement takes the following simple form.

**Corollary 6.1 (Sufficiency).** If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule with shares \( k_{i,C} \), then there exists a stable matching if

\[
\frac{k_{i,C}}{k_{j,C}} = \frac{k_{i,C'}}{k_{j,C'}}
\]

for all \( C, C' \) and \( i, j \in C \cap C' \).\(^{29}\)

This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 because linear sharing rules with \( k_{i,C} > 0 \) are nondiscriminatory, monotonic, and continuous. This corollary follows from Theorem 4.5 even if there are firms that can employ only one worker. We need, then, to reinterpret each such firm as being able to employ two workers, but generating the value 0 if employing two workers.\(^{30}\)

The condition on shares is also necessary, in the following sense.

**Corollary 6.2 (Necessity).** Suppose that there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each. If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule with shares \( k_{i,C} \), and there exists a stable matching for all value functions \( v : C \rightarrow R_+ \), then

\[
\frac{k_{i,C}}{k_{j,C}} = \frac{k_{i,C'}}{k_{j,C'}}
\]

\(^{29}\)Banarjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) showed that this class of linear sharing rules leads to non-empty one-sided core in coalition formation. Pycia (2005) constructs a slightly larger class of linear sharing rules that guarantees non-emptiness of the one-sided core in coalition formation. Only the linear sharing rules from this larger class guarantee that the one-sided core is non-empty for all value functions \( v \).

\(^{30}\)By the remark following Lemma 4.9, we can also extend the result to allow for \( k_{i,C} = 0 \).
for all $C, C'$ and $i, j \in C \cap C'$.

This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.12.

Notice, that if agents' utilities are $U_i(s) = s^\lambda i$, then the Nash bargaining will lead to linear division of value, and the resultant sharing rule will satisfy the above condition. Corollary 6.2 implies a partial converse of this statement. If there are firms able to employ two workers, and a profile of shares $k_{i,C}$ guarantees an existence of stable matching for all $v : C \to R^+$ then the shares $k_{i,C}$ may be rationalized as coming from a Nash bargaining.

Welfare maximization and Pareto optimal mechanisms. The agents are risk-neutral. On date 2, the members of each formed coalition $C$ choose a utility profile $(u_i^C)_{i \in C} \in R^\#C$ that maximizes the Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional

$$
\max_{(u_i^C)_{i \in C} \in C} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).
$$

subject to $\sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C)$. The welfare components $W_i, i \in I$, are increasing and concave. They are agent-specific, but not coalition-specific.

Lensberg’s (1987) results imply that payoffs $(u_i^C)_{i \in C}$ are pairwise aligned. Indeed, $\chi(C) = W_i'(u_i)$, for some $i \in C$, determine a metaranking. Hence, we obtain the following.

Corollary 6.3 (Sufficiency). If payoffs are determined by the maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional, then there is a stable matching.

Lensberg’s (1987) results also suggest that all Pareto optimal and continuous choice rules that produce pairwise-aligned profiles may be interpreted as maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional. His results cannot be directly applied in the present context, both because he considers a one-sided problem and because he

---


32For instance, Lensberg assumes that any collection of agents can form a coalition, while in many-to-one matching two firms cannot form a coalition.
assumes pairwise alignment of preferences for a much larger space of applications of the choice rule than is available in our context. The appendix provides a simple proof of the following many-to-one result inspired by Lensberg (1987).

**Proposition 6.4.** Suppose that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. Suppose also that a post-matching mechanism $G$ is non-discriminatory and monotonic, and the payoffs $(G(i,C,v(C)))_{i \in C}$ are Pareto optimal in

$$V(C) = \left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R_+^{#C} : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\}$$

for all value functions $v : C \to R_+$. If the mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference profiles, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions $W_i : U_i \to R$ for $i \in I$ such that $W_i(0) = +\infty$, and

$$(G(i,C,v(C)))_{i \in C} = \arg \max_{\sum_{i \in C} u_i \in V(C)} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).$$

This proposition implies the following.

**Corollary 6.5 (Necessity).** Suppose that there are at least two firms and that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. Suppose also that a post-matching mechanism $G$ is non-discriminatory and monotonic, and the payoffs $(G(i,C,v(C)))_{i \in C}$ are Pareto optimal in

$$V(C) = \left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R_+^{#C} : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\}$$

for all value functions $v : C \to R_+$. If the mechanism induces preference profiles that admit stable matchings, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions $W_i : U_i \to R$ for $i \in I$ such that $W_i(0) = +\infty$, and

$$(G(i,C,v(C)))_{i \in C} = \max_{\sum_{i \in C} u_i \in V(C')} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).$$

\[\text{33Both in Proposition 6.4 and Corollary 6.5, it is enough to assume that agents' payoff are Pareto optimal in a subset } V'(C) \text{ of the quasi-linear set } V(C) \text{ as long as the Pareto frontier of each } V'(C) \text{ is continuous in the value } v(C).]
**Rent-seeking.** On date 2, agents in each formed coalition \( C = \{a_1, \ldots, a_k\} \) engage in Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game over a prize \( v(C) \). Each \( a_i \in C \) will be able to lobby at cost \( c_i \) to capture the prize \( v(C) \) with probability \( \frac{c_i}{c_1 + \ldots + c_k} \). Thus, if agents expand resources \( c_1, \ldots, c_k \) then agent \( a_i \) obtains in expectation

\[
\frac{c_i}{c_1 + \ldots + c_k} v(C) - c_i.
\]

The agents play the Nash equilibrium of this rent-seeking game; every agent lobbies at cost \( \frac{k-1}{k^2} v(C) \) and has expected payoff \( \frac{v(C)}{k^2} \). Theorem 4.5 applies and there is a stable matching in any matching problem with payoffs determined by the Tullock rent-seeking.

7. Conclusion

This paper proposes a novel sufficient condition for stability of matchings that may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The main component of this condition is the pairwise alignment of preferences. The condition is particularly useful in the study of stability of matchings when preferences are induced by post-matching mechanisms. There exist stable and group stable matchings if a non-discriminatory mechanism generates pairwise aligned preferences. For monotonic, continuous, and non-discriminatory mechanisms, pairwise alignment is also a necessary condition for stability.

The sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules or games induce the existence of stable matchings. There is always a stable matching if agents’ preferences are induced by Nash bargaining or Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game. The paper also applies the sufficiency and necessity results to (i) determine the class of linear sharing rules that always induce agents’ preferences such that a stable matching exists, and (ii) determine the class of monotonic, non-discriminatory, Pareto optimal mechanisms – such as welfare maximization – that induce the existence of stable matchings.

A natural direction to extend the results of the present paper would be to generalize them to the Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) model of matching with contracts. This model incorporates as special cases the college admission setting, in which agents have preferences over coalitions, the setting in which wages are determined during matching,
and the ascending package auctions. Under certain conditions,34 such an extension of the results of the present paper is possible if there are two categories of workers. The first category encompasses the workers, such as crucial researchers in a biotech R&D lab, with whom it is not possible to write contracts because of the inherent complexity of the relationship with these workers and incompleteness of the contractual environment. These workers might provide complementary inputs to the firm production process. The second category includes workers, such as lab assistants, with whom the firm may contract but whose inputs are substitutable.

References


34 This extension requires an assumption similar to the lack of blocking one-worker firms assumed in Theorem 5.8.


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Appendices to Sections 4, 5, and 6

Appendix to Section 4. A Result on Non-Cooperative Implementation

The following results show that if there is a metaranking then the non-cooperative implementations of matching will result in a group stable matching. Recall that in a game a profile of players' strategies σ is in a Strong Nash Equilibrium if there does not exist a subset of players that can improve the payoffs of all its members by a coordinated deviation, while players not in the subset continue to play strategies from σ.

Proposition 4.11. Consider a non-cooperative game between workers and firms that has the following properties

(a) the game ends with a matching μ,
(b) the payoff of each agent i is determined by the coalition Cμ(i) that the agent belongs to in the matching, and
(c) for each coalition C, there is a profile of strategies of agents in C such that Cμ(i) = C for all i ∈ C, irrespective of strategies of agents not in C.

If agents' payoffs are such that there exists a metaranking of coalitions, then there is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of this game, all strong perfect equilibria correspond to

35There is substantial empirical evidence that stability of matching is related to well functioning matching markets. The group stability by itself, however, is not a strategic concept. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) survey the theoretical results about manipulation of the matching process via misrepresentation of preferences. Sommez (1997,1999) illustrates the theoretical problems with agents' trying to manipulate the matching process via capacity restrictions or pre-arranged matches.

group stable matchings, and any group stable matching corresponds to a strong perfect equilibrium.

An example of a game satisfying conditions (a)-(c) is the Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm. Another example is a game in which each worker applies for one or no jobs, and then each firm selects its workforce from among its applicants.

Proof. The proof or Theorem 2.1\footnote{The claim is also proved in a stronger form of Proposition 5.5.} shows that there is a group stable matching. Let us first show that any group stable matching is implementable as a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the game, and then show that each Strong Nash Equilibrium results in a group stable matching.

Consider a group stable matching. Let \( \{C_1, \ldots, C_k\} \) be the corresponding coalition structure. One of the coalitions, \( C_{i_1} \), is a maximal coalition in the metaranking, another coalition, \( C_{i_2} \), is a maximal coalition among coalitions of agents from \( W \cup F - C_{i_1} \), and we can recursively find coalitions \( C_{i_1}, \ldots, C_{i_k} \) in this way. By (c), there is a profile of strategies of agents from \( C_i \) that enforces the formation of \( C_i \). These profiles are in a Strong Nash Equilibrium.

For the remaining implication, consider a Strong Nash Equilibrium and the resulting matching with corresponding coalition structure \( \{C_1, \ldots, C_k\} \). Notice that there is a coalition \( C_{i_1} \) that is maximal in the metaranking. Indeed, otherwise the assumption (c) would imply that the members of \( C_{i_1} \) would have a coordinated profitable deviation in the game. Recursively, we can find a coalition \( C_{i_2} \) that is maximal among coalitions of agents from \( W \cup F - C_{i_1} \), and so on. An inspection of these coalitions show that the matching is group stable. This completes the proof.

Appendix to Section 5.

A counterexample showing that the class of rich domains is larger than its utility counterpart (cf. the footnote to the definition of the rich domain).

Let \( u_i (C) \) denotes agent \( i \)'s utility from joining coalition \( C \), and \( u_I \) the profile of utilities of agents \( i \in I \). We may express a utility counterpart of the rich domain condition as follows.

For any \( w \in W, C, C' \in \mathcal{C}_i, \#C, \#C' \geq 3 \), and any \( u_I \in P \) there exists \( u'_I \in P \) such that

\[ u'_I (C) \geq u_I (C) \quad \text{and} \quad u'_I (C') \leq u_I (C') \]
• \( u'_j(C) = u'_j(C') \).

• \( u'_j(\tilde{C}) = u_j(\tilde{C}) \) for all \( j \in I \) and \( \tilde{C} \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{C\} \).

The following counterexample will show that there are rich domains of preference profiles that are not representable by ordinary utilities that satisfy the above utility counterpart of richness.

Consider a firm \( f \) and three workers \( w_1, w_2, w_3 \). Let \( P \) be a domain of preference profiles consisting of the following three subdomains.

• The first subdomain of profiles contains all profiles \( \preceq_1 \) with the following properties

\[
\begin{align*}
\{f, w_1, w_3\} &\sim_{w_1}^1 \{f, w_1, w_2\}, \\
\{f, w_1, w_2\} &\succ_{w_2}^1 \{f, w_2, w_3\}, \\
\{f, w_2, w_3\} &\succ_{w_3}^1 \{f, w_1, w_3\}.
\end{align*}
\]

• The second subdomain of profiles contains all profiles \( \preceq_2 \) with the following properties

\[
\begin{align*}
\{f, w_1, w_3\} &\succ_{w_1}^2 \{f, w_1, w_2\}, \\
\{f, w_1, w_2\} &\sim_{w_2}^2 \{f, w_2, w_3\}, \\
\{f, w_2, w_3\} &\succ_{w_3}^2 \{f, w_1, w_3\}.
\end{align*}
\]

• The third subdomain of profiles contains all profiles \( \preceq_3 \) with the following properties

\[
\begin{align*}
\{f, w_1, w_3\} &\succ_{w_1}^3 \{f, w_1, w_2\}, \\
\{f, w_1, w_2\} &\succ_{w_2}^3 \{f, w_2, w_3\}, \\
\{f, w_2, w_3\} &\sim_{w_3}^3 \{f, w_1, w_3\}.
\end{align*}
\]

This domain of preference profiles is rich and it is not possible to represent the preferences by ordinary utilities that satisfy the utility counterpart of richness. Indeed, assume that each profile in \( P \) is represented by a utility profile \( u_f \) and that the resultant domain of utility profiles satisfies the above utility counterpart of richness. Take a utility profile \( u^1_{w_1} \) representing a preference profile from the first subdomain with minimal \( u^1_{w_1} (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) \). Find a utility profile \( u^2_f \) identical with \( u^1_f \) except on \( \{f, w_1, w_2\} \) and
such that \( u_{w_2}^2 (\{f, w_1, w_2\}) = u_{w_2}^2 (\{f, w_2, w_3\}) \). Then, find a profile \( u_2 \) identical with \( u_1 \) except on \( \{f, w_2, w_3\} \) and such that \( u_{w_3}^3 (\{f, w_2, w_3\}) = u_{w_3}^3 (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) \). Finally, notice that there cannot exist a profile \( u_1 \) identical with \( u_2 \) except on \( \{f, w_1, w_3\} \) and such that \( u_{w_1}^4 (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) = u_{w_1}^4 (\{f, w_1, w_2\}) \). Indeed, such a profile would have to represent a preference profile from the first subdomain. However,

\[
    u_{w_1}^4 (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) = u_{w_1}^4 (\{f, w_1, w_2\}) = u_{w_1}^3 (\{f, w_1, w_2\}) < u_{w_1}^3 (\{f, w_1, w_3\})
\]

\[
    = u_{w_1}^2 (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) = u_{w_1}^1 (\{f, w_1, w_3\})
\]

contradicting the selection of \( u_1 \) so that \( u_{w_1} (\{f, w_1, w_3\}) \) is minimal. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 5.2.** This theorem follows from Theorem 5.8 proved next.

**A lemma for the proof of Theorem 5.8.** Let us precede the proof of Theorem 5.8 with a preparatory lemma.

**Lemma 5.8.1.** Let the profile \( \preceq_I \) belong to a rich domain \( R \) of pairwise-aligned preference profiles. Assume that there are no blocking one-worker firms. Then there are no cycles of three coalitions \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \in \mathcal{C} \) such that

(a) there is an agent \( a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \),

(b) \( C_{3,1} \succeq a_3 \), \( C_{2,3} \succeq a_2 \), \( C_{1,2} \succeq a_1 \), \( C_{3,1} \) with at least one strict preference.

Proof. For an indirect proof, assume that there are coalitions \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \in \mathcal{C} \) such that

(a) there is an agent \( a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \),

(b) \( C_{3,1} \succeq a_3 \), \( C_{2,3} \succeq a_2 \), \( C_{1,2} \succeq a_1 \), \( C_{3,1} \) with at least one strict preference.

Consider the following four cases

Case 1: \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \in F \). Then \( a_1 = a_2 = a_3 \) is a firm whose preferences are circular.

Case 2: \( a_1, a_2 \in F, a_3 \in W \). Then \( a_1 = a_2 \) and we can shorten the cycle to \( m = 2 \), and use the argument from the discussion in Section 5.

Case 3: \( a_3 \in F, a_1, a_2 \in W \). The case of firm \( a_3 \) able to employ two workers was discussed in Section 5. If \( a_3 \) is able to employ at most one worker, then \( C_{3,1} = \{a_1, a_3\} \) and \( C_{2,3} = \{a_2, a_3\} \) and the result follows from the lack of blocking one-worker firms. (Notabene, this is the only place in the proof that uses the lack of blocking one-worker firms).
Case 4: \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \in W \). Then, either \( a_i = a_{i+1} \) for some \( i = 1, 2, 3 \) and the pairwise alignment directly proves the claim, or all \( a_i \) are different and each \( C_{k,k+1} \) has three members and contains a firm able to employ two workers. Take a firm \( f_0 \in F \) able to employ two workers; then \( \{a_1, f_0, a_2\}, \{a_2, f_0, a_3\}, \{a_3, f_0, a_1\} \in C \).

If \( C_{1,2} = \{a_1, f_0, a_2\} \) then
\[
C_{1,2} \sim_{a_1} \{a_1, f_0, a_2\};
\]
if \( C_{1,2} \neq \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) then use the rich domain assumption to find \( \simeq_{lf} \) such that the above indifference is true and all preferences not involving \( \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) are preserved. Abusing notation, we will continue to denote the new preference profile by \( \simeq_{lf} \). Similarly, if \( C_{1,2} = \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) then
\[
C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} \{a_2, f_0, a_3\};
\]
if \( C_{1,2} \neq \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) then use the rich domain assumption to find \( \simeq_{lf} \) such that the above indifference is true and all preferences not involving \( \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) are preserved. If \( \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \sim_{f_0} \{a_1, f_0, a_2\} \), then
\[
C_{1,2} \sim_{a_1} \{a_1, f_0, a_2\} \sim_{f_0} \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \sim_{a_2} C_{1,2}
\]
contrary to what we proved in Case 3. Thus
\[
\{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \sim_{f_0} \{a_1, f_0, a_2\}.
\]

Now, if \( C_{2,3} = \{a_3, f_0, a_1\} \) then
\[
C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} \{a_3, f_0, a_1\};
\]
if \( C_{2,3} \neq \{a_3, f_0, a_1\} \) then use the rich domain assumption to find \( \simeq_{lf} \) such that the above indifference is true and all preferences not involving \( \{a_3, f_0, a_1\} \) are preserved. Then \( C_{2,3} \succ_{a_2} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \) and
\[
\{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \prec_{f_0} \{a_3, f_0, a_1\}.
\]
Finally, on \( C_{3,1}, \{a_3, f_0\}, \{a_1, f_0\} \) we have
\[
C_{3,1} \succ_{a_3} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} \{a_3, f_0, a_1\} \succ_{f_0} \{a_2, f_0, a_3\} \sim_{f_0} \{a_1, f_0, a_2\}
\]
\[
\sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \succ_{a_1} C_{3,1},
\]
contrary to what we proved in Case 3. This completes the proof.
**Proof of Theorems 5.8.** For an indirect proof, assume that \( \succ_I \) does not admit a stable matching. In particular, a relaxed metaranking does not exist. By Lemma 5.4, the lack of a relaxed metaranking means that there exists a blocking cycle of coalitions \( C_{12}, C_{23}, \ldots, C_{m1} \in \mathcal{C} \) for some \( m \geq 2 \) such that

(a) There exists \( a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \) and \( C_{i-1,i}, C_{i,i+1} \).

(b) For at least one \( i \) the preference is strict \( C_{i-1,i} \prec a_i C_{i,i+1} \) and at least one of \( C_{i-1,i}, C_{i,i+1} \) has three or more members.

We will proceed by induction. Notice that the case \( m = 2 \) follows directly from the pairwise alignment, and the case \( m = 3 \) follows from Lemma 5.8.1. For an inductive step, fix \( m \geq 4 \), and assume that there are no blocking cycles of strictly fewer than \( m \) coalitions.

**Step 1.** First let us demonstrate that there exists \( k \) such that

- \( C_{k,k+1} \) has three or more members, and
- \( a_{k+1}, a_{k+3} \) or \( a_{k}, a_{k-2} \) are workers.

To prove this claim take \( C_{i,i+1} \) with three or more members and consider two cases.

**Case 1:** either \( a_{i} \) or \( a_{i+1} \) is a worker or both are. By symmetry we can assume that \( a_{i+1} \) is a worker. If \( a_{i+3} \) is also a worker then the claim is proved, so assume that \( a_{i+3} \) is a firm. If \( a_{i+2} \) or \( a_{i+4} \) is a firm, then it is the same firm as \( a_{i+3} \). Then however, there would exist a blocking cycle of \( m - 1 \) coalitions, either \( C_{1,2}, \ldots, C_{i+1,i+2}, C_{i+3,i+4}, \ldots, C_{m,1} \) or \( C_{1,2}, \ldots, C_{i+3,i+3}, C_{i+4,i+5}, \ldots, C_{m,1} \), contrary to the inductive assumption. So, assume that both \( a_{i+2} \) and \( a_{i+4} \) are workers. If \( a_{i+1} = a_{i+2} \) then again there would be a blocking cycle of \( m - 1 \) coalitions contrary to the inductive assumption. Finally, if \( a_{i+1} \neq a_{i+2} \) then \( C_{i+1,i+2} \) contains two workers and hence \( \#C_{i+1,i+2} \geq 3 \), \( a_{i+2} \) and \( a_{i+4} \) are workers, and hence the claim is true.

**Case 2:** both \( a_{i} \) and \( a_{i+1} \) are firms. Then in fact \( a_{i} = a_{i+1} \). Look at \( a_{i-1} \) and \( a_{i+2} \). If one of them is a firm, then it is the same firm as \( a_{i} = a_{i+1} \), and we could shorten the cycle, contrary to the inductive assumption. So, assume that \( a_{i-1} \) and \( a_{i+2} \) are workers. Notice that \( a_{i} \) is able to employ two workers because \( \#C_{i,i+1} \geq 3 \) and consider two subcases depending on whether \( \{a_{i-1}, a_{i}, a_{i+2}\} \) is identical to one of \( C_{j,j+1} \).
• If \( \{a_{i-1}, a_i, a_{i+2}\} = C_{j,j+1} \), then either at least one agent \( a_j, a_{j+1} \) is a worker, and we can reduce the problem to Case 1, or both \( a_j \) and \( a_{j+1} \) are firms. If \( a_j \) and \( a_{j+1} \) are firms then \( a_j = a_{j+1} = a_i \), and hence we can without loss of generality assume that \( C_{i,i+1} = \{a_i, a_i, a_{i+2}\} \). The pairwise alignment then implies that \( C_{i-1,i} \preceq_{a_i} C_{i,i+1} \text{ or } C_{i-1,i} \succ_{a_i} C_{i,i+1} \) depending on whether \( C_{i-1,i} \not\succ_{a_i} C_{i,i+1} \). Thus, we can substitute \( a_{i-1} \) for \( a_i \) to form the blocking cycle

\[
C_{m,1} \preceq_{a_1} C_{1,2} \preceq_{a_2} \ldots \preceq_{a_{i-1}} C_{i-1,i} \preceq_{a_{i-1}} C_{i,i+1} \preceq_{a_{i+1}} \ldots \preceq_{a_m} C_{m,1}
\]

with at least one strict preference, and reduce the problem to Case 1.

• If \( \{a_{i-1}, a_i, a_{i+2}\} \neq C_{j,j+1} \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, m \), then we can use the rich domain assumption to find a preference profile such that \( \{a_{i-1}, a_i, a_{i+2}\} \sim_{a_i} C_{i,i+1} \) and all preferences on the blocking cycle are preserved. Since \( a_i = a_{i+1} \), we can replace \( C_{i,i+1} \) with \( \{a_{i-1}, a_i, a_{i+2}\} \), and argue as above. This completes the proof of the claim.

In view of the above claim, and the symmetry of the problem, we can assume that \( a_1 \) and \( a_3 \) are workers and \( C_{m,1} \) has three or more members. Set \( C = \{a_1, a_3, f\} \) where \( f \) is a firm that can employ two workers (such a firm exists if there exists a blocking cycle).

**Step 2.** First consider the case when \( C = C_{i,i+1} \), for some \( i = 1, \ldots, m \). Look at \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C \) and conclude from Lemma 5.8.1 that either \( C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C \), or \( C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C \), or \( C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C \).

• If \( C = C_{i,i+1} \) and \( C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C \) then \( i \neq 1 \) and the shorter cycle

\[
C_{i,i+1} \prec_{a_1} C_{i+1,i+2} \prec_{a_{i+2}} \ldots \prec_{a_m} C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{i,i+1}
\]

satisfies (a) and (b) because \( C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C = C_{i,i+1} \) and \( \#(C) \geq 3 \). This is impossible, however, by the inductive assumption.

• If \( C = C_{i,i+1} \) and \( C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C \) then \( i \neq 2 \) and the shorter cycle

\[
C_{i,i+1} \succ_{a_3} C_{3,4} \succ_{a_4} \ldots \succ_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}
\]

satisfies (a) and (b) because \( C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4} \) and \( \#(C) \geq 3 \). Again, this is impossible by the inductive assumption.
- If $C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C$ then the cycle $C, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$ is blocking contrary to the inductive assumption.

**Step 3.** Finally consider the case $C \neq C_{i,i+1}$ for all $i$. Because $\#(C_{m,1}) \geq 3$, we can use the rich domain assumption to find a pairwise-aligned preference profile $\preceq_I$ such that there are no blocking one-worker firms, and all preferences along the blocking cycle are preserved and $C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}$. Abusing notation let us refer to the new profile as $\preceq_I$. Consider two subcases depending on preference of $a_3$ between $C$ and $C_{2,3}$.

- If $C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3}$, then consider the collection of $m - 1$ coalitions $C, C_{3,4}, C_{4,5}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$. This is a blocking cycle of length $m - 1$ because $C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4}$ and $\#(C) \geq 3$.

- If $C \succeq_{a_3} C_{2,3}$, then consider the collection of three coalitions $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C$. Since $C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}$, we have $C \preceq_{a_1} C_{1,2}$. Thus the collection $C, C_{1,2}, C$ satisfies

$$C \preceq_{a_1} C_{1,2} \preceq_{a_2} C_{2,3} \preceq_{a_3} C.$$

By Lemma 5.8.1 all agents are then indifferent. But then $C_{1,2}, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$ is a blocking cycle of $m - 1$ coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Proposition 5.9(b).** It is enough to show that for any $w \in W$ and any $C, C' \ni w$ such that $\#C, \#C' \geq 3$; if a profile $\preceq_I$ admits a relaxed metaranking then there exists a profile $\preceq'_I$ that admits a relaxed metaranking, agrees with $\preceq_I$ except for coalition $C$, and satisfies $C \sim_w C'$. Denote by $\preceq$ the relaxed metaranking of $\preceq_I$ and fix $C, C'$ and $w$. Consider $\preceq'_I$ that agrees with $\preceq_I$ except for coalition $C$. Furthermore, for any $j \in C$ and any coalition $C'' \ni j$, set $C \preceq'_j C''$ iff $C'' \preceq C''$ and $C'' \preceq_j C$ iff $C'' \preceq C'$. Now, consider the candidate relaxed metaranking $\preceq'$ identical to $\preceq'$ except on $C$, and such that $C \preceq' C''$ iff $C'' \preceq' C''$ and $C'' \preceq' C$ iff $C'' \preceq C'$.

Notice that $\preceq'$ is transitive. To verify that $\preceq'$ is indeed a relaxed metaranking, it is enough to verify conditions (1) and (2) defining the relaxed metaranking in case of comparisons of $C$ and some other coalition $C''$.

Condition (1) is satisfied because $C \preceq'_1 C''$ means that $C'' \preceq C''$, and hence $C'' \preceq C''$. A similar argument works for $C'' \preceq'_1 C$.

Condition (2) is satisfied for $C$, irrespective of whether $C$ or $C''$ has three or more members. Indeed, if $C \preceq' C''$ and the claim of the implication is false, that is, $C \succ'_j C''$,
then $C' \succ C''$; and thus $C \succ C''$, which would be a contradiction. A similar argument works for $C'' \preceq C$. This completes the proof.

A lemma for the proof of Theorem 5.10. Let us precede the proof of Theorem 5.10 with a preparatory lemma.

Lemma 5.10.1. Fix preference profile $\succsim_I$. If there are no cycles of coalitions $C_{12}, C_{23}, \ldots, C_{m1} \in C$ for any $m \geq 2$ such that

(a) there exists $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ and $C_{i-1,i} \not\succeq a_i C_{i,i+1}$,

(b) at least one preference is strict $C_{i-1,i} \prec a_i C_{i,i+1}$,

then $\succsim_I$ admits a metaranking.

Proof. Define relation $\ll$ so that $C \ll C'$ whenever there exists a sequence of coalitions $C_{i,i+1} \in C'$ such that

* $C = C_{1,2}$,
* $C' = C_{m,m+1}$,
* there is an agent $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ such that $C_{i-1,i} \prec a_i C_{i,i+1}$.

This is a transitive relation on coalitions, and it is straightforward to verify that this relation is a metaranking. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 5.10. For an indirect proof, assume that $\succsim_I$ does not admit a metaranking. By Lemma 5.10.1 this means that there exists a cycle of coalitions $C_{12}, C_{23}, \ldots, C_{m1} \in C$ for some $m \geq 2$ such that

(a) There exists $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ and $C_{i-1,i} \not\succeq a_i C_{i,i+1}$.

(b) At least one preference is strict $C_{i-1,i} \prec a_i C_{i,i+1}$.

We will proceed by induction. The case $m = 2$ follows directly from the pairwise alignment. The case $m = 3$ was proved in Lemma 5.8.1. For an inductive step fix $m \geq 4$ and assume that the claim is true for all collections of strictly fewer than $m$ coalitions.

As a preparatory step, let us demonstrate that there exists $a_k$ and $a_{k+2}$ that are both workers. Indeed, first notice that if both $a_i$ and $a_{i+1}$ are firms, then $a_i = a_{i+1}$ and we can shorten the cycle and invoke the inductive assumption to find a contradiction. Hence, there exists $a_i$ who is a worker. If now $a_{i+2}$ is a firm, then both $a_{i+1}$ and $a_{i+3}$
are workers, or we can shorten the cycle and invoke the inductive assumption. Without loss of generality assume that \(a_1\) and \(a_3\) are workers. Take a firm \(f\) able to employ two or more workers, and set \(C = \{a_1, a_3, f\}\).

First, consider the case when \(C = C_{i,i+1}\), for some \(i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}\). Look at \(C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C\) and conclude from Lemma 5.8.1 that either \(C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C\), or \(C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C\), or \(C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C\).

If \(C = C_{i,i+1}\) and \(C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C\) then \(i \neq 1\) and then the shorter cycle

\[
C_{i,i+1} \prec_{a_1} C_{i+1,i+2} \prec_{a_2} \cdots \prec_{a_m} C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{i,i+1}
\]

satisfies conditions (a) and (b) contrary to the inductive assumption. If \(C = C_{i,i+1}\) and \(C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C\) then \(i \neq 2\) and the shorter cycle

\[
C_{i,i+1} \prec_{a_2} C_{3,4} \prec_{a_4} \cdots \prec_{a_1} C_{i,i+1}
\]

satisfies conditions (a) and (b) contrary to the inductive assumption. Finally, if \(C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C\) then the shorter cycle \(C, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}\) satisfies conditions (a)-(b), contrary to the inductive assumption.

Finally, consider the remaining case \(C \neq C_{i,i+1}\) for all \(i\). Use the assumption on the domain from the theorem to find a pairwise aligned profile \(\prec_f\) such that there are no blocking one-worker firms, and \(C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}\) and all preferences along the cycle are preserved. Let us refer to the new profile as \(\prec_f\). Consider two cases depending on the preference of \(a_3\) between \(C\) and \(C_{2,3}\).

If \(C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3}\), then the collection of \(m-1\) coalitions \(C, C_{3,4}, C_{4,5}, \ldots, C_{m,1}\) satisfies (a)-(b) since \(C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4}\), and we can invoke the inductive assumption.

If \(C \succ_{a_3} C_{2,3}\), then consider the collection of three coalitions \(C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C\). Since \(C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}\), we have \(C \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2}\). Thus the collection \(C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C\) satisfies

\[
C \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2} \prec_{a_2} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C.
\]

By Lemma 5.8.1 all agents are then indifferent. But then \(C, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}\) satisfies (a) and (b) and consists of \(m-1\) coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This completes the proof.

**Lemmas for the proof of Theorem 5.12.** Let us precede the proof of Theorem 5.12 with two lemmas.

**Lemma 5.12.1.** Assume that a domain \(R\) of preference profiles satisfies the conditions (2)-(3) of Theorem 5.12 and that all profiles in \(R\) admit stable matchings. Assume
that \( C_{1,2}, \ldots, C_{3,1}, a_1, \ldots, a_3 \) are such that \( \{a_i\} \subseteq C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \) (all subscripts modulo 3), and that

(a) if \( a_i \in W \) then \( \{a_i\} = C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \), and

(b) if \( a_i \in F \) then \( C_{i,i+1} = \{a_i\} \cup S \cup \{a_{i+1}\} \) for some \( S \subseteq C_{i-1,i} \).

Then, if \( C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \), and \( C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \), then \( C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C_{3,1} \).

Proof. For an indirect proof assume that there exists a cycle \( C_{1,2}, \ldots, C_{3,1} \) that satisfies (a), (b), and \( C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}, C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}, \) and \( C_{2,3} \sim_{a_2} C_{3,1} \).

Use (3) with \( C = C_{2,3} \) and \( i = a_2 \) to find a preference profile \( \succ_i \in R \) such that \( C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}, C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}, \) and \( C_{2,3} \sim_{a_2} C_{3,1} \) (we continue to denote the new profile by the same symbol). Then, use (3) with \( C = C_{1,2} \) and \( i = a_1 \) to find \( \succ_i \) such that \( C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}, C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}, \) and \( C_{2,3} \sim_{a_2} C_{3,1} \).

Then, for all \( i \in C_{1,2} \cup \ldots \cup C_{3,1} \), and \( C \ni i \) different from \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \), use (2) to find \( \succ_i \in R \) such that \( C \succ_i C_{k,k+1} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 3 \). Use (3) to find \( \succ_i \in R \) such that \( C \sim_i C_{k,k+1} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 3 \) and all \( i \in I \), and \( C \ni i \) different from \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \).

Recursively for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \), use (2) to modify the preference profile – while preserving all the above mentioned strict preferences – so that there exists a sequence of subsets

\[
C_{i,i+1}^1 \subset C_{i,i+1}^2 \subset \ldots \subset C_{i,i+1}^{m_i} = C_{i,i+1}
\]

for some \( m_i \in \{1, 2, \ldots\} \) such that

- \( C_{i,i+1}^1 = \{f_i\} \) for some \( f_i \in F \),
- \( C_{i,i+1}^{k+1} = C_{i,i+1}^k \cup \{a_i^k\} \) for some \( a_i^k \in W \),
- \( a_i^{m_i} = a_i, a_i^{m_i-1} = a_{i+1} \),
- \( C_{i,i+1}^k \preceq f_i, C_{i,i+1}^{k+1} \), and
- \( C \succ_i C_{i,i+1}^k \) for any \( a \in C_{i,i+1}^k \) and \( C \ni a \) different from \( C_{i,i+1}^{k+1}, \ldots, C_{i,i+1}^{m_i-1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1}, C_{i-1,i} \).

Use (3) to modify the preferences and strengthen the last two of the above properties:

- \( C_{i,i+1}^k \preceq f_i, C_{i,i+1}^{k+1} \), and
C \prec_a C_{i,i+1} \text{ for any } a \in C^k_{i,i+1} \text{ and } C \ni a \text{ different from } C^k_{i,i+1}, \cdots, C^m_{i,i+1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1}, C_{i,i+1} \cdots, C_{i-1,i},

while maintaining the preferences $C_{3,1} \prec_a C_{1,2} \prec_a C_{2,3} \prec_a C_{3,1}$, and $C \prec_a C_{i,i+1}$ for all $a \in C \cap C_{i,i+1}$.

The resultant profile of preferences does not admit a stable matching. This completes the proof.

**Lemma 5.12.2.** Suppose that there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each. Let $R$ be a rich domain of preference profiles. Assume that each profile $\preceq f \in R$ satisfies the claim of Lemma 5.12.1: for every cycle $C_{1,2}, \ldots, C_{3,1}, a_1, \ldots, a_3$ such that $\{a_i\} \subseteq C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ and the conditions (a) and (b) are true we have

$$C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}, \text{ and } C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \text{ imply } C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C_{3,1}.$$  

Then, if $A, B \in \mathcal{C}$, $B \subset A$, $\#(A - B) = 1$, and $a, b \in B$, then $A \sim_a B$ implies $A \sim_b B$.

**Proof.** Take $A, B \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $B \subset A$, $\#(A - B) = 1$, and take $a, b \in B$. If $a = b$ then the claim is true. If $a \neq b$, then $\#B \geq 2$ and $\#A \geq 3$. Moreover, then $A \cap B$ contains a firm that can hire two or more workers. Consider three cases.

Case 1: $a, b \in W$.

There are at least two firms, so there exists $c \in F - A - B$. Consider the cycle $A, \{b, c\}, \{a, c\}$. Change $\preceq f$ so that $\{a, c\} \sim_a A$ and $\{b, c\} \sim_b A$ while preferences between coalitions different than $\{b, c\}, \{a, c\}$ are preserved. Let us denote the new profile by $\preceq f$. Then, Lemma 5.12.1 implies that $\{a, c\} \sim_c \{b, c\}$. If $B \sim_a A$ then $B \sim_a \{a, c\}$, and Lemma 5.12.1 applied to the cycle $B, \{a, c\}, \{b, c\}$ implies that $B \sim_b \{b, c\}$. Hence, $B \sim_b A$.

Case 2: $a \in F, b \in W$.

Take $c \in A - B \subset W$ and $f \in F_2 - \{a\}$; $f$ exists since there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each. Let

$$C = A - \{b\} = B - \{b\} \cup \{c\}$$

and

$$C' = \{b, c, f\}.$$  

We will repeat the Case 1 argument with some modifications. Note that $C \cap C' = \{c\}$ and $A \cap C' = \{b\}$, so condition (a) is satisfied for the cycle $C, C', A$ and all its permutations.
Moreover, firm \( a \in A \cap C \), and both \( A - C \) and \( C - A \) are singletons or empty. Hence also condition (b) is satisfied. Similar relations are true for the cycle \( C, C', B \) and all its permutations. Thus, the claim of Lemma 5.12.1 is satisfied for cycles \( C, C', A \) and \( C, C', B \).

Using the rich domain assumption, we can find a preference profile that preserves preferences between coalitions other than \( C' \) and such that

\[
C' \sim_b A.
\]

Using the rich domain assumption again, we can find a profile that preserves preferences between coalitions other than \( C \) and such that

\[
C \sim_c C'.
\]

Now, Lemma 5.12.1 implies that \( C \sim_a A \).

Since \( A \sim_a B \) was preserved in the above changes of the preference profile, we have

\[
B \sim_a C.
\]

Furthermore, \( c \) is indifferent between \( C \) and \( C' \). Thus, Lemma 5.12.1 applied to \( B, C, C' \) gives

\[
C' \sim_b B.
\]

Since \( b \) was also shown to be indifferent between \( C' \) and \( A \), we have \( B \sim_b A \) as required.

Case 3: \( a \in W, b \in F \).

After renaming the agents, we can assume that \( a \in F, b \in W \) and \( A \sim_b B \), and use virtually the same argument as in Case 2. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 5.12.** If there are no firms able to employ two or more workers each, then all preference profiles are consistent and there are no blocking one-worker firms.

If there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each, then apply Lemmas 5.12.1 and 5.12.2 to show that for all \( i, j \in C, C' \in C \), all profiles satisfy the condition

\[
C \sim_i C' \implies C \sim_j C'.
\]

Remark 5.13 then shows that all profiles are pairwise aligned. The lack of blocking one-worker firms follows directly from Lemma 5.12.1. This completes the proof.
Appendix to Section 6

**Proof Proposition 6.4.** The proof of Proposition 4.7 for monotonic mechanisms, presented in Section 4, constructs the payoff translation functions $t_{b,a} : U_a \to U_b$ for any agents $a, b$ such that one of them is a worker. Recall that for each coalition $C \ni a, b$, we have

$$t_{b,a} (G (a, C, V)) = G (b, C, V).$$

By the monotonicity of mechanism $G$, functions $t_{b,a}$ are strictly increasing. Since $G$ generates Pareto optimal profiles, functions $t_{b,a}$ are continuous.

Choose an arbitrary reference worker $w^*$, notice that $0 \in U_{w^*}$, and define

$$\psi_a (u) = f (t_{w^*,a} (u)), \ a \in I$$

where $f : U_{w^*} \to R$ is decreasing, $f (s) \to +\infty$ as $s \to 0+$, and such that all $\psi_a$ are right hand side integrable at 0. Notice that there exists a function $f$ that satisfies these conditions. Indeed, there is a finite number $k$ of functions $t_{w^*,a}$ which are all continuous, increasing, and have value 0 at 0. Take

$$t_{\text{min}} = \min_a \{t_{w^*,a}\}$$

and notice that it is also continuous and increasing, and has value 0 at 0. The functions $\psi_a$ are integrable if $f \circ s_{\text{min}}$ is. This will be so if, for example,

$$f (t) = \left[ \frac{1}{(s_{\text{min}}^{-1} (t))} \right]^2.$$  

Moreover, $f$ is decreasing (since $s_{\text{min}}$ is increasing), and $f (s) \to +\infty$ as $s \to 0+$ (because $s_{\text{min}} (t) \to 0$ as $t \to 0$). Notice that $\psi_a$ are positive and strictly decreasing and define,

$$W_a (s) = \int_0^u \psi_a (\tau) \, d\tau.$$  

Now, $W_a$ are concave and increasing.

It remains to be shown that the solution to

$$\sum_{a \in C} \sum_{\bar{u}_a \in V} W_a (\bar{u}_a) = \sum_{a \in C} \int_{\bar{u}_a}^{\bar{u}_a} \psi_a (\tau) \, d\tau$$

coincides with $G (a, C, V)$. Concavity of the problem implies that there is a solution. Since the slope at 0 for each $\int_0^{\bar{u}_a} \psi_a (\tau) \, d\tau$ is infinite, so the solution is internal. The
differentiability of the objective function implies that the internal solution is given by the first order Lagrange conditions

$$\psi_a (\tilde{u}_a) = \lambda$$

and the possibility constraint $$(\tilde{u}_a) |_{a \in C} \in V$$. The first order condition can be rewritten as

$$t_{w^*,a} (\tilde{u}_a) = f^{-1} (\lambda)$$

or

$$\tilde{u}_a = t_{a,w^*} (f^{-1} (\lambda)).$$

If there is no worker in $C$, then $C = \{f\}$ for some $f \in F$ and the claim we are proving is true. Otherwise, fix a worker $w \in C$ and notice that for agents $a \in C$

$$G (a, C, V) = t_{a,w} (G (a, C, V))$$

Lemma 5.8.1 from the appendix to section 5 shows that

$$t_{a,w^*} \circ t_{w^*,w} = t_{a,w}.$$

Hence,

$$G (a, C, V) = t_{a,w^*} (t_{w^*,w} (G (a, C, V))) = t_{a,w^*} (x)$$

for some $x \in R$.

This equation, the analogous equation for $\tilde{u}_a$ above, the monotonicity of $t_{a,w^*}$, the Pareto optimality of the mechanism, and the possibility constraint $$(\tilde{u}_a) |_{a \in C} \in V$$ imply that

$$\tilde{u}_a = G (a, C, V).$$

This completes the proof.
Chapter 2. Bargaining and Coalition Formation

1. Introduction

This paper studies games of coalition formation whose outcome is a coalition structure defined as a partition of the set of agents into coalitions. All the agents have preferences over the coalitions they can join. The paper focuses on situations in which agents first form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alternatives. Examples of such situations include the formation of clubs (cf. Buchanan 1965), partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988), firms and business alliances (Hart and Moore 1990), and jurisdictions voting on public goods (Jehiel and Scotchmer 2001).

A major challenge in modelling coalition formation is that the core—the standard solution concept employed to study games of coalition formation—may be empty. In effect, the models of coalition formation rely on structural restrictions to ensure that there are core coalition structures. For example, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) assume that the value created by a partnership is divided equally among partners. Hart and Moore (1990) assume that the coalition value depends on investments made by coalition members before they formed the coalition, that the investments are complementary at the margin, that the marginal return on investment is positively correlated with the total return, and that the total return is divided in Shapley bargaining within the coalition.

This paper addresses this challenge. It provides a sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition for the existence of core coalition structures, and it provides a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the core coalition structure. The conditions are satisfied in several bargaining settings that have not previously been recognized as admitting core coalition structures.

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1 Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001) use the term hedonic games of coalition formation to refer to such games. Drèze and Greenberg (1980) use the term hedonic to refer to the dependence of an agent’s utility on who else belongs to his or her coalition.

2 Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) assume that there is a continuum of agents, while this paper focuses on the case of a finite number of agents. There are also coalition formation games with special structure such as the one-to-one and many-to-one matching studied by Gale and Shapley (1962) and surveyed by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).

3 A coalition structure is in the core if there does not exist a counterfactual coalition whose members strictly prefer it to their coalitions in the coalition structure.

4 Hart and Moore (1990) also assume that the coalitional value is superadditive in coalition members and their assets.
The main component of the proposed condition is the pairwise alignment of preferences on proper coalitions. Agents' preferences are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if any two agents in the intersection of any two proper coalitions prefer the same one of the two coalitions. This condition is satisfied if agents' payoffs are determined in Nash bargaining. It is also satisfied if the payoffs are determined according to some other consistent solution concepts such as the egalitarian and Rawlsian division rules, and Tullock (1980) rent-seeking game.

However, the pairwise alignment of a single preference profile does not guarantee that the core is non-empty. For instance, in a roommate problem agents match in pairs and any two agents may form a pair. Preferences are always pairwise aligned, but the existence of a stable coalition structure is not assured.

Because of the problem illustrated by the above example, the main results of the paper rely on the pairwise alignment properties of the mechanism used to determine the payoffs and not only on the pairwise alignment of a single profile of payoffs. Recall that agents first form coalitions (on date 1) and then (on date 2) each coalition chooses a profile of payoffs from the set of available alternatives. On date 1, the agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. Thus, their preferences over coalitions result from their expectations of the payoffs that will be determined on date 2. On date 2, each coalition creates and divides a coalitional value, playing a game, using a bargaining solution, a division rule, or another mechanism. This mechanism determines the agents' payoffs. The mechanism is pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if the mechanism generates agents' preferences that are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions for all coalitional values. The paper imposes some mild regularity assumptions on the mechanisms studied.

The paper's main results are as follows. It is sufficient for the existence of a core coalition structure that the mechanism is pairwise aligned on proper coalitions. For any mechanism that does not satisfy this property there exists a superadditive value function for which the mechanism generates a coalition formation problem with empty core. Thus, the pairwise alignment of the mechanism is necessary for the existence of a core coalition structure for all value functions. Moreover, the core coalition structure is generically unique if the mechanism generates agents' preferences that are pairwise aligned on all coalitions for all coalitional values.

The above sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules and games induce the existence of core coalition structures. For instance, Section 5 shows

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5 A coalition is called proper if there is an agent that does not belong to the coalition.

6 Cf. Example 3.2.
that there is always a generically unique core coalition structure if agents’ preferences
are induced by Nash bargaining, egalitarian or Rawlsian solutions, or Tullock’s (1980)
rent-seeking game. In addition, this section shows that using the Kalai-Smorodinsky or
Shapley bargaining solutions to divide the payoffs may result in an empty core. Section
6 relates the pairwise alignment condition to the literature on consistency of solution
concepts. Section 7 determines the class of linear sharing rules and the class of welfare
maximization mechanisms that induce the existence of core coalition structures.

The idea of using pairwise alignment to study the core seems to be new. As noted
above, Farrell and Scotchmer’s (1988) study of the formation of partnerships shows
that the core is non-empty in a coalition formation game followed by an equal division
of value. Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) note that the equal division may be
replaced by some other linear sharing rules in Farrell and Scotchmer's analysis. In a
companion paper, Pycia (2005) studies stability of many-to-one matching and shows
that the pairwise alignment of preferences generated by a post-matching mechanism is
crucial for the existence of stable matchings.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents
examples. Section 4 presents the main results. Sections 5, 6, and 7 apply the results to
determine which mechanisms generate a non-empty core. The last section concludes.

2. Model

There is a finite set of agents $I$. A coalition structure $S$ is a partition of $I$. That
is in a coalition structure $S$, each agent $a \in I$ belongs to exactly one coalition $S(a) \in
C = 2^I - \{\emptyset\}$. Each agent $a \in I$ has a preference relation $\succsim_a$ over all coalitions $C$ that
contain $a$.

Each agent $i \in I$ has a preference relation $\succsim_i$ over all coalitions that contain $i$.
The profile of preferences $(\succsim_i)_{i \in I}$ is denoted by $\succsim_I$. This formulation embodies the
assumption that each agent $a$ is indifferent between any two coalition structures with
same $S(a)$.

Agents’ preferences among coalitions reflect agents’ payoffs obtained in a game played
after the coalitions are formed. More precisely, the payoffs are determined in the fol-
lowing way. There are two dates. On date 1, agents form coalitions. On this date, the

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7That is each agent $a$ is indifferent between any two coalition structures with same $S(a)$.
agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. Consequently, the agents form their preferences by foreseeing what will happen on date 2. On date 2, agents in each resultant coalition play a game that determines individual payoffs.

We are interested in the non-emptiness of the core in the above environment.

**Definition 2.1 (Core).** A coalition structure $S$ is blocked by a coalition $C$ if $C \succ_a S(a)$ for all $a \in C$. A coalition structure is in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition.

Each coalition $C \neq I$ is called proper and each coalition structure $S \neq \{I\}$ is called proper or non-trivial.

### 3. Examples

Let us start with an example first studied in Farrell and Scotchmer's (1988) analysis of partnerships that divide surplus equally.

**Example 3.1.** During coalition formation, the agents from set $I$ of agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. The agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by date 2 payoffs. At date 2, each coalition $C$ that formed creates value $v(C) \geq 0$ and shares it equally among its members.

In this example, the core is non-empty. Indeed, to construct a core coalition structure, take a coalition $C_1 \subseteq I$ that maximizes per member value

$$\max_{C_1 \subseteq I} \frac{v(C_1)}{\#C_1},$$

add a coalition $C_2 \subseteq I - C_1$ that maximizes

$$\max_{C_2 \subseteq I - C_1} \frac{v(C_2)}{\#C_2},$$

and recursively repeat this process until all agents are assigned to a coalition. The resulting coalition structure is in the core.

A question arises what characteristics of the equal division rule lead to the non-emptiness of the core? The answer to this question provided in this paper relies on the
notion of pairwise alignment of preferences. Preferences are \textit{pairwise aligned} if for all agents \( i, j \) and coalitions \( C, C' \ni i, j \), we have

\[ C \succ_i C' \iff C \succ_j C' \]

Preferences generated by the equal division rule are pairwise aligned. Section 6 studies other value sharing mechanisms that generate pairwise aligned preferences such as the Nash bargaining.

The pairwise alignment of a preference profile is not sufficient to guarantee non-emptiness of the core as illustrated by the following.

\textbf{Example 3.2.} Consider the coalition formation problem with three agents \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \). Assume that each agent prefers to be in a coalition with one other agent to being alone, and prefers being alone to the grand coalition. Then, the preferences are pairwise aligned. However, if

\[
\begin{align*}
\{a_3, a_1\} &\succ_{a_1} \{a_1, a_2\} \\
\{a_1, a_2\} &\succ_{a_2} \{a_2, a_3\} \\
\{a_2, a_3\} &\succ_{a_3} \{a_3, a_1\}
\end{align*}
\]

then the core is empty.

The next two sections will show how pairwise alignment as a property of ex post game is sufficient, and in a certain sense necessary, condition for non-emptiness of the core.

\section{Mechanisms and Coalition Formation}

The basic structure of the matching problems studied in this section is similar to Example 1 of Section 3. The structure is as follows. There are two dates. On date 1, agents form coalitions. On this date, the agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. Consequently, the agents form their preferences by foreseeing what will happen on date 2. On date 2, each resultant coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible payoffs

\[
\left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R^C_+ : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\},
\]
where \( v(C) \) is the value of coalition \( C \) and \( v : C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) is the value function. We allow the payoffs \( u_i \) to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of outcomes. Coalition \( C \) realizes a feasible payoff profile by playing some game, following some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. For instance, in the example of Section 3, the payoff profile was chosen via equal division. Other examples – such as Nash bargaining, Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game, and linear sharing rules – are discussed in Section 6.

A post-matching mechanism (or, mechanism) is a game or a choice rule that players use to decide which profile of payoffs will be realized. The following definition of a post-matching mechanism identifies each such game or rule with resulting agents’ payoffs because ultimately the stability properties of any matching problem are determined by these payoffs alone.

**Definition 4.1 (Mechanism).** A post-matching mechanism is a function \( G \) that for every coalition \( C \) and value \( v(C) \) determines nonnegative payoffs \( G(i, C, v(C)) \) for all members \( i \in C \) so that

\[
\sum_{i \in C} G(i, C, v(C)) \leq v(C) .
\]

For example, an equal division rule operating on a coalition \( C \) with value \( v(C) \) produces payoffs 

\[
G(i, C, v(C)) = \frac{v(C)}{\#C} .
\]

This section discusses mechanisms that are regular in the following sense

**Definition 4.2 (Regularity).** A mechanism \( G \) is regular if for any agent \( i \) and proper coalition \( C \ni i \)

- \( G \) has full range: \{\( G(i, C, v(C)) : v(C) \geq 0 \} = [0, \infty) \)
- \( G \) is monotonic: \( G(i, C, \bar{v}) \) is increasing in \( \bar{v} \geq 0 \)
- \( G \) is continuous: \( G(i, C, \bar{v}) \) is continuous in \( \bar{v} \geq 0 \)

For example, the equal division rule is regular. Also, Nash bargaining, Tullock’s rent-seeking, and linear sharing rules discussed in Section 6 are regular.\(^8\)

\(^8\)A mechanism that chooses payoffs \((u_i)_{i \in C}\) that maximize a welfare functional \( \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i) \) has full range if the welfare components \( W_i \) satisfy an Inada type condition \( W'_i(u) \to 0 \) as \( u \to \infty \). If this condition fails, the welfare maximization mechanism may fail the full range condition, for instance, if \( W'_i(u) \) and \( W''_i(u) \) tend to 0 as \( u \to \infty \) but \( W''_i(u) > 1 \) for all \( u \).
This section provides a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of stable matchings for all preference profiles induced by a regular mechanism. These conditions build on the notion of pairwise aligned preferences. Recall that preferences are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if all agents in an intersection of any two proper coalitions prefer the same coalition of the two.

**Definition 4.3 (Pairwise Alignment).** Preferences are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if for all agents $i, j$ and proper coalitions $C, C' \ni i, j$, we have

$$C \succ_i C' \iff C \succ_j C'$$

In particular, then $C \sim_i C'$ iff $C \sim_j C'$, and $C \succ_i C'$ iff $C \succ_j C'$. Preferences generated by the equal division rule of Example 3.1 are pairwise aligned.

The sufficient and necessary condition for stability is given by the following.

**Theorem 4.4 (Sufficiency and Necessity).** Assume that there are at least four agents. A regular post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles that are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if, and only if, the core is non-empty for each induced preference profile.

We first prove the sufficiency part, then comment on the proof of the necessity part, and end this section with a discussion of which assumptions may be dropped and which assumptions may be relaxed.

The key part of the proof of the sufficiency part relies on the following result about metarankings. A metaranking is a transitive relation on a class of coalitions that, restricted to coalitions containing any particular agent, agrees with preferences of this agent. Formally,

**Definition 4.5 (Metaranking).** A metaranking on coalitions from family $B \subseteq 2^I - \{\emptyset\}$ is a transitive relation $\preceq$ on coalitions from $B$ such that for any $i \in I$ and coalitions $C, C' \in B$ that contain $i$,

$$C \preceq_i C' \iff C \preceq C'.$$

An example of a metaranking is determined by the per-head value of a coalition in a coalition formation followed by the equal division of value. The existence of a
metaranking is a strong and desirable property of a coalition formation game. For instance, Pycia (2006; Chapter 1 of the thesis) shows that if there is a metaranking, then coalition structures in the core are obtained as Strong Nash Equilibria\(^9\) of a broad class of non-cooperative coalition formation games.\(^{10}\)

**Proposition 4.6 (Existence of a Metaranking on Proper Coalitions).** Assume there are at least four agents. If a regular post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles pairwise-aligned on proper coalitions, then for each induced preference profile there is a metaranking on proper coalitions.

Proof. Consider proper coalition \(C\) and agent \(a \in C\). Because of monotonicity, 
\[ G(a, C, v'(C)) = G(a, C, v(C)) \] implies 
\[ G(b, C, v'(C)) = G(b, C, v(C)) \] for any values \(v(C), v'(C)\). Thus, we can define the payoff translation functions 
\[ t_{b,a}^{C} : (0, \infty) \rightarrow (0, \infty) \] for each proper coalition \(C\) and agents \(a, b \in C\) by the condition
\[ t_{b,a}^{C} (G(a, C, \tilde{v})) = G(b, C, \tilde{v}), \quad \tilde{v} \geq 0. \]

The pairwise alignment guarantees that 
\[ t_{b,a}^{C} = t_{b,a}^{C'} \] Thus, we can refer to translation function between \(a\) and \(b\) as 
\[ t_{b,a} \]

Choose an arbitrary reference agent \(w^*\) and fix the value function \(v : C \rightarrow R^+\). Because of the full range assumption, 
\[ t_{w^*,a} (G(a, C, v(C))) \] is well defined for any agent \(a\) and proper coalition \(C \ni a\) even when \(w^* \notin C\). By pairwise consistency,
\[ t_{w^*,a} (G(a, C, v(C))) = t_{w^*,a'} (G(a', C, v(C))) \]
for any different \(a, a' \in C\). Indeed, if \(w^* \in C\) then the claim follows straightforwardly from the pairwise consistency. If \(w^* \notin C\), then by full range there is a value function 
\(v' : C \rightarrow R^+\) such that
\[ G(a', C, v'(C)) = G(a', \{a, a', w^*\}, v' (\{a, a', w^*\})), \] and
\[ v'(C) = v(C). \]


\(^{10}\)Despite the attractiveness of the existence of metarankings as a property of coalition formation games, it is difficult to use metarankings as a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. The difficulty lies in constructing an index – such as the per-head value of a coalition – for each coalition formation game. Our results solve this problem by connecting the existence of metarankings with the pairwise alignment, which is readily verifiable in a variety of settings.
Then, the pairwise alignment implies that also
\[ G(a, C, v'(C)) = G(a, \{a, a', w^*\}, v'({a, a', w^*})). \]

Since \( w^* \in \{a, a', w^*\} \), we have
\[
\begin{align*}
t_{w^*, a} (G(a, C, v(C))) &= t_{w^*, a} (G(a, C, v'(C))) \\
&= t_{w^*, a} (G(a, \{a, a', w^*\}, v'({a, a', w^*}))) \\
&= t_{w^*, a'} (G(a, \{a, a', w^*\}, v'({a', a', w^*}))) \\
&= t_{w^*, a'} (G(a', C, v'(C))) \\
&= t_{w^*, a'} (G(a', C, v(C))).
\end{align*}
\]

Consequently,
\[ \chi(C) = t_{w^*, a} (G(a, C, V(C))) \]
does not depend on \( a \) if \( C \) is fixed. Monotonicity of the mechanism implies that \( \chi(C) \) determines a metaranking on proper coalitions. This completes the proof.

Proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.4. Let us consider an auxiliary preference profile \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\) such that
\[ I \preceq'_i C \]
for all \( i \in I \) and proper \( C \ni i \), and
\[ C \preceq'_i C' \iff C \preceq_i C' \]
for all \( i \in I \) and proper \( C, C' \ni i \). Pycia (2006)\(^{11}\) shows that to prove the non-emptiness of the core for the profile \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\) it is enough to prove it for \((\preceq_i')_{i \in I}\). By the above

---

\(^{11}\)For completeness, the relevant result is formulated and proved in this footnote.

**Proposition.** If the core of \((\preceq_i)_{i \in I}\) contains a two or more elements coalition structure and \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\) is equivalent to \((\preceq_i')_{i \in I}\) on proper coalitions, then the core of \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\) is non-empty.

**Proof.** If \( \{I\} \) is in the core of \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\), then the claim is true. Also, if there is a coalition structure \( S \neq \{I\} \) in the core of \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\) such that at least one agent \((\preceq_i')_{i \in I}\) weakly prefers \( S \) to \( \{I\} \), then \( S \) is in the core with regard to preferences \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\), and the claim is true.

Otherwise, all agents strictly prefer \( \{I\} \) to any \( S \neq \{I\} \) in the core of \((\preceq_i)_{i \in I}\) and \( \{I\} \) is not in the core of \((\preceq_i')_{i \in I}\). Then, there exists a coalition \( C \) such that all its members strictly prefer \( C \) to \( I \) in preferences \((\preceq'_i)_{i \in I}\). Take a proper coalition structure \( S \) in the core of \((\preceq_i)_{i \in I}\). Then \( C \notin S \). Hence there is an agent \( a \in C \) such that \( C \preceq_a S(a) \). But then \( a \) strictly prefers \( I \) to \( S(a) \), weakly prefers \( S(a) \) to \( C \), and strictly prefers \( C \) to \( I \), which is a contradiction. QED
construction and Proposition 4.6, there is a metaranking on all coalitions that reflects
the preference profile \((\succeq'_{i})_{i \in I}\). Hence, the Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) type of argument
used to prove the claim of Example 3.1 shows that the core is non-empty for \((\succeq'_{i})_{i \in I}\).
This completes the proof.

As an inspection of the proof shows, we can drop the assumption of there being at
least four agents if preferences are pairwise aligned on all coalitions that is if for all
agents \(i,j\) and coalitions \(C,C' \ni i,j\), we have

\[ C \succ_{i} C' \iff C \succ_{j} C'. \]

The necessity part of Theorem 4.4 is proved in the appendix. The proof relies on
the following two lemmas.

**Lemma 4.7.** If a regular mechanism induces preferences such that

\[ C \sim_{i} C' \iff C \sim_{j} C' \]

for all \(i,j \in I\) and proper coalitions \(C,C' \ni i,j\), then preferences generated by the
mechanism are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions.

**Lemma 4.8.** If a regular mechanism generates preference profiles with non-empty
core and coalitions \(C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1}\), and agents \(a_{1}, a_{2}, a_{3}\) are such that\(^{12}\) \(\{a_{i}\} = C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}\), then,

\[ C_{3,1} \sim_{a1} C_{1,2}, C_{1,2} \sim_{a2} C_{2,3} \Rightarrow C_{2,3} \succ_{a3} C_{3,1}. \]

Let us finish this section with the discussion of assumptions. First, let us recall that
Example 3.2 showed that even for the sufficiency part, it is not enough to assume that
a single preference profile is pairwise aligned. Second, notice that Lemma 4.7 shows
that for regular mechanisms the pairwise alignment assumption may be relaxed. Third,
the monotonicity and continuity assumptions are not needed in the sufficiency part of
Theorem 4.4 and Proposition 4.6 and the following result is true:

**Theorem 4.9 (Sufficiency for Full-Range Mechanisms).**\(^{13}\) Assume there are
at least four agents. If a full-range post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles

\(^{12}\)We adopt the convention that subscripts are modulo 3 that is \(C_{i,i+1} = C_{3,1}\) if \(i = 3\) and \(C_{i-1,i} = C_{3,1}\)
if \(i = 1\).

\(^{13}\)Proofs of Theorems 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 are presented in the appendix.
pairwise-aligned on proper coalitions, then the core is non-empty. Moreover, there is a metaranking on proper coalitions.

Fourth, for the necessity part of the equivalence, it is enough to assume that the core is non empty for superadditive value functions. A value function \( v : \mathcal{C} \to R \) is superadditive if

\[
v(C_1 \cup C_2) \geq v(C_1) + v(C_2)
\]

for any disjoint \( C_1, C_2 \in \mathcal{C} \).

**Theorem 4.10 (Necessity for Superadditive Values).** Assume there are at least four agents. If a regular post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles with non-empty core for all superadditive value functions, then the mechanism is pairwise-aligned on proper coalitions.

Finally, if we assume pairwise alignment on all coalitions, then the core coalition structure is generically unique.

**Theorem 4.11 (Uniqueness).** Assume there are at least four agents. If a full-range post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles pairwise-aligned on all coalitions, then the core is non-empty and for generic value function contains a unique coalition structure. Moreover, there is a metaranking on all coalitions.

5. Applications and Examples

This section analyzes several examples of coalition formation environments and uses the results of Section 4 to determine whether the core is non-empty. The mechanisms considered are Nash bargaining, Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game, the egalitarian and Rawlsian division rules, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution, and the Shapley value.

We consider the setting of Section 4. Recall that there are two dates. On date 1, firms and workers match but do not contract. Agents' preferences are determined by their payoffs on date 2. On date 2, each coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible payoffs

\[
V(C) = \left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R_+^{\#C} : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\},
\]
where \( v(C) \) is the value of coalition \( C \) and \( v : \mathcal{C} \to R_+ \) is the value function. We allow the payoffs \( u_i \) to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of outcomes. Coalition \( C \) realizes a payoff profile by playing some game, following some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule.

**Nash Bargaining.** On date 2, each resultant coalition, \( C \), creates value \( v(C) \geq 0 \), and its members divide \( v(C) \) according to the Nash bargaining solution. That is, each agent \( i \) is endowed with an increasing and concave utility function \( U_i \), and agents’ payoffs \( s_i \) maximize

\[
\max_{s_i \geq 0, i \in C} \prod_{i \in C} (U_i(s_i) - U_i(0))
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{i \in C} s_i \leq v(C).
\]

Thus, agents’ preferences over coalitions are induced by Nash bargaining.

**Corollary 5.1.** If preferences during matching are induced by Nash bargaining, then there exists a stable coalition structure. The coalition structure is generically unique.

This result is a corollary of Theorem 4.11 because Nash bargaining generates pairwise aligned preferences.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\)Three remarks about the Nash bargaining example might be of interest. First, the Nash structure allows for the following direct proof of theorem 5.... Let us first observe that \( \frac{U_i(s_i) - U_i(0)}{U_i(s_i)} \), called the fear of ruin coefficient (see Aumann and Kurz (1977a, 1977b) and Roth (1979)), is the same for every agent in a coalition that divides value in Nash bargaining. Indeed, the Lagrange multiplier in the Nash bargaining maximization equals the inverse of the fear of ruin, \( \frac{U_i(s_i)}{U_i(s_i) - U_i(0)} \). Additionally, the larger the fear of ruin of an agent is, the more the agent gains in a given coalition. Thus, no agents would ever want to change a coalition that maximizes their fear of ruin. Therefore, the coalition with maximal fear of ruin may be treated as if its members did not participate in the matching between the remaining agents. In this way, one can recursively construct a core coalition structure. This completes the proof.

Second, the core is non-empty when preferences come from an asymmetric Nash bargaining where agent \( i \) has bargaining power \( \lambda_i \) and the division of value \( v(C) \) in coalition \( C \) maximizes \( \prod_{i \in C} (U_i(s_i) - U_i(0))^{\lambda_i} \) over \( s_i \geq 0, i \in C \), subject to \( \sum_{i \in C} s_i \leq v(C) \). In this extension, the bargaining powers \( \lambda_i \) are agent-specific but are not coalition-specific.

Third, the values \( v(C) \) may either accrue to the entire coalition or be composed of parts that accrue to individual members. In the latter case, the existence of a stable matching relies on the assumptions that agents’ utilities are quasi-linear in a numeraire, and that, after the coalitions are determined, the agents can contract. Then, \( v(C) \) is the sum of values that accrue to members in an optimal contract.
Notice that the grand coalition does not necessarily form even if the value function is superadditive. Moreover, a strong bargaining power may hurt agents by making them less desirable coalition partners.

**Rent-seeking.** On date 2, agents in each formed coalition \( C = \{a_1, \ldots, a_k\} \) engage in Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game over a prize \( v(C) \). Each \( a_i \in C \) will be able to lobby at cost \( c_i \) to capture the prize \( v(C) \) with probability \( \frac{c_i}{c_1 + \ldots + c_k} \). Thus, if agents expand resources \( c_1, \ldots, c_k \) then agent \( a_i \) obtains in expectation

\[
\frac{c_i}{c_1 + \ldots + c_k} v(C) - c_i.
\]

The agents play the Nash equilibrium of this rent-seeking game; every agent lobbies at cost \( \frac{k-1}{k} v(C) \) and has expected payoff \( \frac{v(C)}{k} \). Theorem 4.4 applies and there is a stable matching in any matching problem with payoffs determined by the Tullock rent-seeking.

**Egalitarian bargaining solution and the Rawlsian social choice function.** Let \( U_i \) be the utility of agent \( i \) from payoff \( s_i \). The egalitarian solution is the maximal point in the set of feasible payoffs \( V(C) \) where all agents have equal utility. The Rawlsian social choice function chooses a point in \( V(C) \) that maximizes the utility of the worst-off agent.\(^{15}\) In our setting if the agents' utilities are continuous in (monetary) payoffs then the egalitarian solution and the Rawlsian social choice function coincide. Both solutions generate pairwise aligned payoffs, and the core is non-empty.\(^{16}\)

**Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.** Let \( U_i \) be the utility of agent \( i \) from payoff \( s_i \). The Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution selects the Pareto optimal profile of payoffs \( (s_i)_{i \in C} \in V(C) \) such that

\[
\frac{U_i(s_i)}{U_j(s_j)} = \frac{U_i(v(C))}{U_j(v(C))}.
\]

This solution is regular if \( \lim_{t \to \infty} U_i(t) = \infty \). As the example below shows, in general this solution does not satisfy pairwise alignment, and hence there exists a value function \( v : C \to R_+ \) for which the core is empty.

**Example 5.2.** Consider \( I = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \) and \( U_1(s) = \log(1 + s) \) and \( U_2(s) = U_3(s) = U_4(s) = s \). Then preferences of agents 1 and 2 are not aligned.

\(^{15}\)Cf. for instance Thomson and Lensberg (1989).

\(^{16}\)The solutions are regular if \( U_i(t) \to \infty \) when \( t \to \infty \). The index \( \chi(C) = U_i(G(i, C, v(C))) \) determines a metaranking.
**Shapley value.** On date 2, a subcoalition $C'$ of coalition $C$ can unilaterally achieve the value $v^C(C')$. Assume that the values $v^C$ are superadditive and set $v^C(\emptyset) = 0$. The Shapley value of agent $i \in C$ is given by

$$s_i = \sum_{C' \subset C} \frac{(#C'!)(#C - #C' - 1)!}{(#C)!} [v^C(C' \cup \{i\}) - v^C(C')]$$

and is regular.

If, on date 2 each proper subcoalition of $C$ achieves the sum of its members reservation values, then the Shapley division is equivalent to Nash bargaining, and the core is non-empty.

If, however, on date 2 each proper subcoalition $C'$ of $C$ can achieve value $v^C(C') = v(C')$ (i.e., same value that $C'$ would achieve if formed on date 1), then as shown by the example below – agents’ preferences are not necessarily pairwise aligned, and hence there exists a superadditive value function for which the core is empty.

**Example 5.3.** Consider $I = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ and the value functions $v$ such that

$$v(\{1, 2\}) = v(\{1, 3\}) = x$$

$$v(\{1, 2, 3\}) = v(\{1, 2, 3, 4\}) = y > x$$

where $x$ and $y$ are positive parameters, and $v(C) = 0$ for remaining coalitions $C$. If $x$ and $y$ are such that agent 1 is indifferent between $\{1, 2\}$ and $\{1, 2, 3\}$ then agent 2 prefers $\{1, 2\}$ over $\{1, 2, 3\}$, and the preferences of agents 1 and 2 are not aligned.

6. Consistency and Pairwise Alignment

Pairwise alignment of preference profiles is related to the idea of consistency of solution concepts. Consistency is a meta-requirement and the definition of consistent solution concept vary between economic environments (cf. Thomson (2004)). In case
of Pareto optimal division of a value \( \tilde{v} \), the definition of consistency introduced by Harsanyi (1959) to study Nash bargaining might be stated as follows.

**Definition 6.1.** A Pareto optimal mechanism is consistent if

\[
G \left( i, C', v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)) \right) = G(i, C, v(C))
\]

for any \( C' \subset C \) and \( i \in C' \).

In many environments, a consistent solution concept generates pairwise aligned preferences.

**Theorem 6.2.** A Pareto-optimal monotonic mechanism is consistent if, and only if, it generates pairwise aligned profiles.

Proof. Assume that the mechanism is consistent. Let \( a, b \in C \cap C' \) and \( a \) is indifferent between \( C \) and \( C' \). Notice that it is enough to show that \( b \) is indifferent between \( C \) and \( C' \) for \( C' = \{a, b\} \). Then \( C' \subset C \), and by the consistency equation

\[
G \left( i, C', v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)) \right) = G(i, C, v(C))
\]

for \( i \in C' \). Since, \( a \) is indifferent between \( C \) and \( C' \), monotonicity implies that

\[
v(C') = v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)).
\]

Hence, \( b \) is indifferent between \( C \) and \( C' \).

---

17 A mechanism is Pareto optimal if for all values \( \tilde{v} \) it generates payoffs that are Pareto optimal that is \( \sum_{i \in C} G(i, C, \tilde{v}) = \tilde{v} \).

18 The idea of consistency of solution concepts was introduced by Harsanyi (1959) in his analysis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in Nash bargaining. In terms of our definition, he restricted the choice of \( C' \) to two-element sets; in our setting both variants of the definition give same concept as may be seen from the proof of Theorem 6.2. Lensberg (1987,1988), Thomson (1988), Lensberg and Thomson (1989), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), and Young (1994) analyzed related notions of consistency in the context of Nash bargaining, welfare functions, Walrasian trade, the Shapley value, and sharing rules. Thomson (2004) gives an up-to-date survey of these results.
Finally, assume that the mechanism generates pairwise aligned profiles. Pareto optimality implies that the consistency equation holds true for singleton $C'$. Assume that consistency equation is satisfied for $C'$ of size $n$ and consider $C'$ of size $n + 1$. Set

$$v(C') = v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)).$$

Take $a \in C'$ such that $G(a, C', v(C')) - G(a, C, v(C))$ is maximal. By Pareto optimality,

$$G(a, C', v(C')) - G(a, C, v(C)) \geq 0$$

Then, by monotonicity of $G$ and the inductive assumption for $i \in C' - \{a\}$,

$$G(i, C', v(C')) = G(i, C' - \{a\}, v(C') - G(a, C', v(C')))$$

$$= G(i, C' - \{a\}, v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)) - G(a, C', v(C')))$$

$$\leq G(i, C' - \{a\}, v(C) - \sum_{j \in C - C'} G(j, C, v(C)) - G(a, C, v(C)))$$

$$= G(i, C, v(C)).$$

Pairwise alignment implies that $G(i, C', v(C')) = G(i, C, v(C))$ for all $i \in C'$. This ends the proof.

As an immediate consequence of Theorems 4.4 and 6.2, we obtain the following.

**Corollary 6.3.** Suppose there are at least four agents. Assume that a mechanism that determines the payoffs in proper coalitions is regular and Pareto optimal. The mechanism is consistent if, and only if, the core is non-empty for all value functions.

Interestingly, a historical name used to refer to consistency was “stability,” cf. Lenesberg and Thomson (1989). Thus, in the old terminology, the result says that a mechanism is stable (i.e., consistent) if it generates stable (i.e., core) coalition formation problems.
This section characterizes the class of linear sharing rules and the class of Pareto-optimal regular mechanisms that induce pairwise aligned preference profiles, and hence non-empty core.

**Linear sharing rules.** On date 2, agents divide the value using a coalition-specific linear sharing rule. The share of agent $i$ in the value created by coalition $C$ is $k_{i,C}$. This agent obtains

$$u_i = k_{i,C}v(C).$$

The shares $k_{i,C} > 0$ are coalition-specific, $\sum_{i \in C} k_{i,C} = 1$, and $k_{i,C}$ do not depend on the realization of $v(C)$.

In this case, the pairwise-alignment requirement takes the following simple form.

**Corollary 7.1 (Sufficiency).** If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule with shares $k_{i,C}$, then there exists a stable matching if

$$\frac{k_{i,C}}{k_{j,C}} = \frac{k_{i,C'}}{k_{j,C'}}$$

for all proper $C, C'$ and $i, j \in C \cap C'$.

This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.4 because linear sharing rules with $k_{i,C} > 0$ are regular.\(^{19}\) Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) showed that a slightly smaller class of linear sharing rules leads to non-empty one-sided core in coalition formation.

The condition on shares is also necessary, in the following sense.

**Corollary 7.2 (Necessity).** Suppose that there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each. If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule with shares $k_{i,C}$, and there exists a stable matching for all value functions $v : C \rightarrow R_+$, then

$$\frac{k_{i,C}}{k_{j,C}} = \frac{k_{i,C'}}{k_{j,C'}}$$

for all $C, C'$ and $i, j \in C \cap C'$.

\(^{19}\)We can also extend the result to allow for $k_{i,C} = 0$. 

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This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.12.

Notice, that if agents' utilities are $U_i(s) = s^4$, then the Nash bargaining will lead to linear division of value, and the resultant sharing rule will satisfy the above condition. Corollary 6.2 implies a partial converse of this statement. If there are firms able to employ two workers, and a profile of shares $k_{i,C}$ guarantees an existence of stable matching for all $v : C \to R^+$ then the shares $k_{i,C}$ may be rationalized as coming from a Nash bargaining.

Pareto-optimal regular mechanisms. Consider risk-neutral agents. On date 2, the members of each formed coalition $C$ choose a utility profile $(u_i^C)_{i \in C} \in R^+_{i,C}$ that maximizes the Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional

$$\max_{(u_i^C)_{i \in C}} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).$$

subject to $\sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C)$. The welfare components $W_i$, $i \in I$, are increasing and concave. They are agent-specific, but not coalition-specific.

Lensberg’s (1987) results on consistency of welfare maximization and our Theorem 6.1 imply that payoffs $(u_i^C)_{i \in C}$ are pairwise aligned.20 Hence, we obtain the following.

Corollary 7.3 ( Sufficiency ). If payoffs are determined by the maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional, then the core is non-empty.

Lensberg’s (1987) also showed that all Pareto optimal and continuous choice rules that produce pairwise-aligned profiles may be interpreted as maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional. In view of the results of Section 6, Lensberg’s result implies the following21

Proposition 7.4 (based on Lensberg (1987)). Suppose that a post-matching mechanism $G$ has full range, is monotonic, and the payoffs $(G(i, C, v(C)))_{i \in C}$ are Pareto optimal in

$$V(C) = \left\{(u_i)_{i \in C} \in R^+_{i,C} : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\}.$$

20 In fact, $\chi(C) = W_i'(u_i)$, for some $i \in C$, determines a metaranking.
21 The appendix provides a simple proof of this result.
for all value functions $v : C \rightarrow R_+$. If the mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference profiles, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions $W_i : U_i \rightarrow R$ for $i \in I$ such that $W_i'(0) = +\infty$, and

$$(G(i, C, v(C)))_{i \in C} = \arg \max_{\sum_{i \in C} u_i \in V(C)} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).$$

This proposition\textsuperscript{22} and Theorem 4.10 imply the following.

**Corollary 7.5 (Necessity).** Suppose that a post-matching mechanism $G$ has full range, is monotonic, and the payoffs $(G(i, C, v(C)))_{i \in C}$ are Pareto optimal in

$$V(C) = \left\{ (u_i)_{i \in C} \in R_+^{\#C} : \sum_{i \in C} u_i \leq v(C) \right\}$$

for any $v(C)$. If the mechanism induces preference profiles with non-empty core for superadditive value functions, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions $W_i : U_i \rightarrow R$ for $i \in I$ such that $W_i'(0) = +\infty$, and

$$(G(i, C, v(C)))_{i \in C} = \arg \max_{\sum_{i \in C} u_i \in V(C)} \sum_{i \in C} W_i(u_i).$$

\textbf{8. Conclusion}

This paper proposes a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. The main component of this condition is the pairwise alignment of preferences. The sufficient condition is necessary for the existence of core coalition structures for all value functions. For Pareto optimal mechanisms the condition is equivalent to the consistency of the solution concept employed by agents to divide the payoffs within each proper coalition.

The sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules or games induce the existence of core coalition structures. There is always a core coalition structure if agents' preferences are induced by Nash bargaining, egalitarian or Rawlsian

\textsuperscript{22}Both in Proposition 6.4 and Corollary 6.5, it is enough to assume that agents' payoff are Pareto optimal in a subset $V'(C)$ of the quasi-linear set $V(C)$ as long as the Pareto frontier of each $V'(C)$ is continuous in the value $v(C)$. 

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sharing rules, or Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game. The core may be empty if agents' preferences are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining. The paper also applies the sufficiency and necessity results to (i) determine the class of linear sharing rules that always induce agents' preferences such that a stable matching exists, and (ii) characterize the class of Pareto-optimal regular mechanisms that induce the existence of core coalition structures.

All results of this paper remain true for individual stability. Theorem 4.11 and the positive results of sections 5 and 7 remain true for the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set but other results do not. An analogous theory is true for the core in the man-woman-child problem and other multi-sided matching problems. In many-to-one matching problems weaker conditions are sufficient and necessary for the non-emptiness of the core, and even weaker conditions are sufficient and necessary for the existence of individually stable matchings. Finally, the results might also be adapted to the roommate problem if one replaces the pairwise alignment with the property proved in Lemma 4.8.

References


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23 The results remain true for both strong and weak stability. A coalition structure $S$ is strongly individually stable if there does not exist an agent $a \in I$ and coalition $C \in S \cup \{\emptyset\}$ such that $C \cup \{a\} \succ_a S(a)$ and $C \cup \{a\} \succeq_i S(i)$ for all $i \in C$. A coalition structure $S$ is weakly individually stable if there does not exist an agent $a \in I$ and coalition $C \in S \cup \{\emptyset\}$ such that $C \cup \{a\} \succ_j S(j)$ for all $j \in C \cup \{a\}$.

24 A set of coalition structures $\Sigma$ is vNM stable if (internal stability) each coalition structure $S \in \Sigma$ is in weak core, and (external stability) each coalition structure $S' \notin \Sigma$ is blocked by a coalition structure $S \in \Sigma$, that means there exists a coalition $C \in S$ such that $C \succ_a S'(a)$ for every $a \in C$. 

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Roth, Alvin E., and Oliveira Sotomayor (1990), Two Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press.


Appendices to Sections 4 and 7

Appendix to Section 4.

Proof of Lemma 4.7. Fix $i, j \in I$ and proper $C, C' \ni i, j$. It is enough to consider the case $i \neq j$ and $C \neq C'$. Assume that the value function $v$ is such that $C \succ_i C'$ in the induced preference profile $\succ_i$. Use the full range assumption to find a value $v' (C)$ such that $C \succ_i C'$ in the induced preference profile $\succ_i$. Then, $v' (C) \geq v (C)$ and $C \sim_j C'$. The monotonicity of the mechanism implies that $C \succ_j C'$. This completes the proof.
**Proof of Lemma 4.8.** For an indirect proof assume that there exists a cycle $C_{1,2}, ..., C_{3,1}$ that satisfies assumptions of the lemma but $C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}$, $C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}$, and $C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C_{3,1}$.

Use monotonicity and continuity of the mechanism to find a profile of coalition values such that $C_{3,1} \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2}$, $C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3}$, and $C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C_{3,1}$ (we continue to denote the new preference profile by the same symbol). Repeating this argument, find a profile of values such that $C_{3,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2}$, $C_{1,2} \prec_{a_2} C_{2,3}$, and $C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,1}$.

Lower the values on all coalitions $C$ different from $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1}$ so that for all $i \in C_{1,2} \cup C_{2,3} \cup C_{3,1}$ we have

$$
C \prec C_{i,i+1}.
$$

The resultant profile of preferences does not admit a stable matching. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 4.4 (necessity part).** By Lemma 4.7, it is enough to take proper coalitions $A, B$ and $a, b \in A \cap B$, and show that

$$
A \sim_a B \Rightarrow A \sim_b B
$$

Furthermore, to prove this implication it is enough to show it for $B = \{a, b\}$. Thus assume that $A \sim_a B = \{a, b\}$. Let $c \in I - A \subset I - B$. Change the values on $\{a, c\}$ and $\{b, c\}$ so that

$$
\{a, c\} \sim_a A
$$

$$
\{b, c\} \sim_c \{a, c\}.
$$

Then, by Lemma 4.8,

$$
\{b, c\} \sim_b A.
$$

Moreover, we have

$$
\{a, c\} \sim_a B
$$

$$
\{b, c\} \sim_c \{a, c\}
$$

Thus, by Lemma 4.8,

$$
\{b, c\} \sim_b B
$$

and the proof is completed.
Definition 4.9.1 (Rich Domain). A domain of preference profiles \( R \) is rich if for any agent \( i \in I \), proper coalitions \( C, C' \ni i \), and any \( \succsim'_I \in R \), there exists a profile \( \succsim'_I \in R \) such that \( C \sim'_I C' \) and all agents' \( \succsim'_I \) preferences between coalitions other than \( C \) are the same as in \( \succsim'_I \).

A domain of all preference profiles that might be generated in the equal division rule of Section 3 for different value functions \( v : C \rightarrow R_+ \) is rich. Any full-range mechanism induces a rich domain of preference profiles when applied to different configurations of coalitions' payoff profile sets. The domain of all profiles in any coalition formation problem is also rich.

Lemma 4.9.2. Assume that there are at least four agents. Let the profile \( \succsim'_I \) belong to a rich domain \( R \) of pairwise-aligned preference profiles. Then there are no cycles of three proper coalitions \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \in C \) such that

(a) there is an agent \( a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1} \),

(b) \( C_{3,1} \succsim_{a_3} C_{2,3} \succsim_{a_2} C_{1,2} \succsim_{a_1} C_{3,1} \) with at least one strict preference.

Proof. For an indirect proof, assume that there are proper coalitions \( C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C_{3,1} \in C \) satisfying (a) and (b). Consider \( C = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\} \). If \( C \) is different from the coalitions \( C_{3,1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3} \), then there exists a pairwise-aligned preference profile \( \succsim'_I \in R \) such that

\[
C \sim'_{a_3} C_{3,1}
\]

and

\[
C_{3,1} \succsim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \succsim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \succsim_{a_3} C_{3,1}
\]

with indifference if there was an \( \succsim'_I \) indifference in the cycle. A repeated application of the pairwise-alignment property of \( \succsim'_I \), shows that

- \( a_1 \) is \( \succsim'_I \) indifferent between \( C \) and \( C_{3,1} \), and thus prefers \( C \) to \( C_{1,2} \);
- \( a_2 \) prefers \( C \) to \( C_{1,2} \), and thus to \( C_{2,3} \); and
- \( a_3 \) prefers \( C \) to \( C_{2,3} \), and thus to \( C_{3,1} \).

None of the preferences on the cycle may be strict, as otherwise \( a_3 \) would strictly prefer \( C \) to \( C_{3,1} \), contrary to \( a_3 \)'s indifference between these two coalitions.

If \( C \) equals one of the coalitions \( C_{3,1}, C_{1,2}, C_{2,3} \), then we can repeat the above argument without the need to refer to the rich domain. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.9.3. There exists a metaranking on proper coalitions if and only if there is no cycle of proper coalitions $C_{12}, C_{23}, ..., C_{m1} \in C$ for some $m \geq 2$ such that

(a) There exists $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ for $i = 1, ..., m$ and $C_{i-1,i} \preceq_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}$.

(b) For at least one $i$ the preference is strict $C_{i-1,i} \prec_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}$.

Proof. ($\Rightarrow$) For an indirect proof, consider coalitions $C_{12}, C_{23}, ..., C_{m1}$ such that $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$, $i \in \{1, ..., m\}$, satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of the definition of a blocking cycle. Let $C_{m1} \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2}$. Then $C_{1,2} \preceq C_{2,3}, C_{2,3} \preceq C_{3,4},$ etc., and by transitivity $C_{1,2} \preceq C_{m,1}$. Thus $C_{1,2} \preceq_{a_1} C_{m,1}$, contradicting $C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2}$.

($\Leftarrow$) Define relation $\preceq$ so that $C \preceq C'$ whenever there exists a sequence of proper coalitions $C_{i,i+1} \in C$ such that

- $C = C_{1,2}$,
- $C' = C_{m,m+1}$, and
- there is an agent $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ such that $C_{i-1,i} \preceq_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}$ for certain $i$.

Then $\preceq$ is transitive. It remains to verify that for proper $C, C'$ with $i \in C \cap C'$

$$C \preceq C' \iff C \preceq_{i} C'$$

To prove the first implication take $C_{1,2} = C, C_{2,3} = C'$ and $i = a_1$. To prove the reverse implication assume that $C$ or $C'$ are proper, $i \in C \cap C'$, and $C \preceq C'$. Now, if $C \succ_{i} C'$, then there would exist a blocking cycle; hence $C \preceq_{i} C'$. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorems 4.9. For an indirect proof, assume that the core for $\prec_{i}$ is empty. In particular, a metaranking on proper coalitions does not exist. By Lemma 4.9.3, the lack of a metaranking on proper coalitions means that there exists a blocking cycle of proper coalitions $C_{12}, C_{23}, ..., C_{m1} \in C$ for some $m \geq 2$ such that

(a) There exists $a_i \in C_{i-1,i} \cap C_{i,i+1}$ for $i = 1, ..., m$ and $C_{i-1,i} \preceq_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}$.

(b) For at least one $i$ the preference is strict $C_{i-1,i} \prec_{a_i} C_{i,i+1}$.
We will proceed by induction. Notice that the case $m = 2$ follows directly from the pairwise alignment, and the case $m = 3$ follows from Lemma 4.9.2. For an inductive step, fix $m \geq 4$, and assume that there are no blocking cycles of strictly fewer than $m$ coalitions. Let $C = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\}$.

First consider the case when $C = C_{i,i+1}$, for some $i = 1, \ldots, m$. Look at $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C$ and conclude from Lemma 4.9.2 that either $C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C$, or $C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C$, or $C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C$.

- If $C = C_{i,i+1}$ and $C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C$ then $i \neq 1$ and the shorter cycle
  $$C_{i,i+1} \prec_{a_i} C_{i+1,i+2} \prec_{a_{i+2}} \ldots \prec_{a_m} C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{i,i+1}$$
  satisfies (a) and (b) because $C_{m,1} \prec_{a_1} C_{1,2} \prec_{a_1} C = C_{i,i+1}$. This is impossible, however, by the inductive assumption.

- If $C = C_{i,i+1}$ and $C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C$ then $i \neq 2$ and the shorter cycle
  $$C_{i,i+1} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4} \prec_{a_4} \ldots \prec_{a_1} C_{i,i+1}$$
  satisfies (a) and (b) because $C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4}$. Again, this is impossible by the inductive assumption.

- If $C \sim_{a_1} C_{1,2} \sim_{a_2} C_{2,3} \sim_{a_3} C$ then the cycle $C, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$ is blocking contrary to the inductive assumption.

Finally consider the case $C \neq C_{i,i+1}$ for all $i$. We can use the rich domain assumption to find a pairwise-aligned preference profile $\prec_I$ such that all preferences along the blocking cycle are preserved and $C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}$. Abusing notation let us refer to the new profile as $\prec_I$. Consider two subcases depending on preference of $a_3$ between $C$ and $C_{2,3}$.

- If $C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3}$, then consider the collection of $m - 1$ coalitions $C, C_{3,4}, C_{4,5}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$. This is a blocking cycle of length $m - 1$ because $C \prec_{a_3} C_{2,3} \prec_{a_3} C_{3,4}$.

- If $C \succ_{a_3} C_{2,3}$, then consider the collection of three coalitions $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C$. Since $C \sim_{a_1} C_{m,1}$, we have $C \succ_{a_1} C_{1,2}$. Thus the collection $C_{1,2}, C_{2,3}, C$ satisfies
  $$C \succ_{a_1} C_{1,2} \succ_{a_2} C_{2,3} \succ_{a_3} C.$$
  
  By Lemma 4.9.2 all agents are then indifferent. But then $C, C_{3,4}, \ldots, C_{m,1}$ is a blocking cycle of $m - 1$ coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.10. Notice that if the initial profile of values was superadditive, then the proof of Lemma 4.8 and the proof of the necessity in Theorem 4.4 may be carried out while maintaining the superadditivity of the profile of values.

Proof of Theorem 4.11. By Proposition 4.5 there is a metaranking $\preceq$ on all proper coalitions. Extend this metaranking onto a relation on all coalitions by defining

$$ I \preceq C \Leftrightarrow \exists (i \in C) \ I \not\succ_i C $$

and verify that the extended relation $\preceq$ is still a metaranking. Now, the construction from Example 3.1 shows that whenever no agent is indifferent between two coalitions, there is a unique core coalition structure. This lack of indifferences is generic, and thus the proof is completed.

Appendix to Section 7

Proof of Proposition 7.2. The proof of Proposition 4.6, presented in Section 4, constructs the payoff translation functions $t_{b,a} : (0, \infty) \to (0, \infty)$ for any agents $a, b$. Recall that for each coalition $C \ni a, b$, we have

$$ t_{b,a} (G(a, C, V)) = G(b, C, V). $$

By the monotonicity of mechanism $G$, functions $t_{b,a}$ are strictly increasing. Since $G$ generates Pareto optimal profiles, functions $t_{b,a}$ are continuous.

Choose an arbitrary reference agent $w^*$ and define

$$ \psi_a (u) = f (t_{w^*,a} (u)) \ , \ a \in I $$

where $f : (0, \infty) \to R$ is continuous, decreasing, $ f (s) \to +\infty$ as $s \to 0+$, and such that

$$ \int_s^1 \psi_a (\tau) d\tau \to +\infty \text{ as } s \to 0+. $$

Notice that there exists a function $f$ that satisfies these conditions. Indeed, there is a finite number $k$ of functions $t_{w^*,a}$ which are all continuous, increasing, and have value 0 at 0. Take

$$ t^\max = \max_a \{t_{w^*,a}\} $$

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and notice that it is also continuous and increasing, and has value 0 at 0. The functions \( \psi_a \) are integrable to infinity at 0 if \( f \circ t^{\text{max}} \) is. This will be so if, for example,

\[
f(t) = \frac{1}{(t^{\text{max}} - t)^{-1}}.
\]

Moreover, \( f \) is continuous and decreasing (since \( s^{\text{max}} \) is continuous and increasing), and \( f(s) \to +\infty \) as \( s \to 0^+ \) (because \( s^{\text{max}}(t) \to 0 \) as \( t \to 0 \)). Notice that \( \psi_a \) are positive and strictly decreasing and define,

\[
W_a(s) = \int_1^s \psi_a(\tau) \, d\tau.
\]

Now, \( W_a \) are concave and increasing, and \( \lim_{s \to 0^+} W_a(s) = -\infty \).

It remains to show that the solution to

\[
\max_{a \in C} \sum_{a \in C} W_a(\tilde{u}_a) = \sum_{a \in C} \int_0^{\tilde{u}_a} \psi_a(\tau) \, d\tau
\]

coincides with \( G(a, C, V) \). Concavity of the problem implies that there is a solution. Since the slope at 0 for each \( \int_0^{\tilde{u}_a} \psi_a(\tau) \, d\tau \) is infinite, so the solution is internal. The differentiability of the objective function implies that the internal solution is given by the first order Lagrange conditions

\[
\psi_a(\tilde{u}_a) = \lambda
\]

and the possibility constraint \( (\tilde{u}_a) |_{a \in C} \in V \). The first order condition can be rewritten as

\[
t_{w^*, a}(\tilde{u}_a) = f^{-1}(\lambda)
\]

or

\[
\tilde{u}_a = t_{a, w^*}(f^{-1}(\lambda)).
\]

If there is no worker in \( C \), then \( C = \{f\} \) for some \( f \in F \) and the claim we are proving is true. Otherwise, fix an agent \( w \in C \) and notice that for agents \( a \in C \)

\[
G(a, C, V) = t_{a, w}(G(a, C, V))
\]

Lemma 4.9.2 from the appendix to section 4 shows that

\[
t_{a, w^*} \circ t_{w^*, a} = t_{a, w^*}.
\]
Hence,

\[ G(a, C, V) = t_{a,w^*}(t_{w^*,w}(G(a, C, V))) = t_{a,w^*}(x) \]

for some \( x \in R \).

This equation, the analogous equation for \( \tilde{u}_a \) above, the monotonicity of \( t_{a,w^*} \), the Pareto optimality of the mechanism, and the possibility constraint \( (\tilde{u}_a)|_{a \in C} \in V \) imply that

\[ \tilde{u}_a = G(a, C, V). \]

This completes the proof.
Design of Goods with Multiple Attributes

1. Introduction

Determining the optimal design of a product line of goods with multiple attributes when a monopolistic firm sells to buyers with unknown valuations is a long-standing unsolved problem. So far only some special examples have been solved, cf. Wilson (1993), Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Choné (1998), Armstrong (1999), Armstrong and Rochet (1999), and Thanassoulis (2004). Among the strategies to approach the problem, McAfee and McMillan’s (1988) proposal has proved particularly influential.

McAfee and McMillan (1988) consider a monopolist who designs and sells a product line of goods with several indivisible attributes. Buyers’ utility is linear in price and in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The values of the attributes are buyers’ private information. The monopolist has zero marginal cost and aims to maximize the expected revenue subject to buyers’ incentive and participation constraints. McAfee and McMillan argued that—at least in some cases—the problem may be reduced to finding the optimal menu of deterministic bundles. In effect, the subsequent literature focused on finding the optimal deterministic bundles; the corresponding class of seller’s strategies has been referred to as simple bundling.

McAfee and McMillan’s claim is known to be true in the case of one attribute solved by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). One way to understand the intuition behind the one-dimensional case is to think of the problem as a single unit auction with one buyer, in which setting a reservation price is an optimal strategy (Myerson (1983), Bulow and Roberts (1989)). Recently, however, several authors including Pycia (2000), Manelli...
and Vincent (2003), Thanassoulis (2004), and Kendall (2004) independently constructed counterexamples to show that there are distributions of agents’ valuations for which the simple bundling strategies are suboptimal.\(^9\)

This paper makes one positive and one negative contribution to the understanding of multidimensional screening in the setting proposed by McAfee and McMillan. On the positive side, the paper fully solves the case of an arbitrary number of attributes when there are only two buyer types, which adds a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional screening problems. On the negative side, the paper proves that generically simple bundling strategies are suboptimal, contrary to McAfee and McMillan’s hypothesis.

The positive contribution is developed in Sections 3 and 4 that study situations with two types of buyers. As in the analysis of one-dimensional situations with two types, it is natural to refer to the buyer with the larger sum of values of all attributes as a high type, and to the other type of buyer as a low type. In an equilibrium, the high type buys the good with all attributes, and the low type buys the good with the attributes for which the ratio of low-type to high-type value is high enough. When the low type values at least one attribute more than the high type does, then the seller cannot post per-attribute prices, i.e., genuinely needs to bundle the attributes. When the high type values each attribute more than the low type does, the problem may be viewed as a collection of one-dimensional subproblems. Profit maximization generically requires randomization – that is simple bundling is suboptimal – except when the high type obtains an informational rent and when the low type is excluded from the market. As in one-dimensional problems, the high type obtains an informational rent when the high type is relatively scarce. The low type never has a rent and is excluded from the market when the low type is relatively scarce.

To introduce the negative contribution of the paper let us look at an example in which

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\(^9\)Similarly, the simple unidimensional intuition is not robust when the outside options are type dependent. Deneckere and McAfee (1996), Rasul and Sonderegger (2001), and Ambjørnsen (2002), and Figueroa and Skreta (2005) find that in some cases type dependent outside options lead to stochastic screening (interpretation favoured by Rasul and Sonderegger (2001) and Figueroa and Skreta (2005)) or to damaged goods (Ambjørnsen (2002), Deneckere and McAfee(1996)).
the distribution of buyer types require the seller to employ more complex strategies than simple bundling. Consider a software company that serves a 50%-50% population of sophisticated and unsophisticated users, and sells software packages with two potential attributes: reliability and ease of use. Assume that the sophisticated users are willing to pay $300 for reliability and nothing for the ease of use, while the unsophisticated users are willing to pay $100 for reliability and also $100 for the ease of use. If restricted to simple (deterministic) bundles, the best seller's choices are:

- sell reliable software to sophisticated users for the price of $300 and easy to use software to unsophisticated users for $100, or
- sell the reliable and easy to use software to both types of users for $200.

Both choices lead to the expected revenue and profits of $200 per user. Using stochastic mechanisms, the seller can achieve higher profits. The seller can sell reliable software to sophisticated users for $300 and easy to use but only 50% reliable software to unsophisticated users for $150. This menu of contracts is incentive compatible and leads to the expected profit of $225 per buyer, and hence is 12.5% better than the best simple bundling strategy.

The negative contribution of the paper is developed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 shows that generically — that is at least on an open and dense set of Lebesgue absolutely continuous distributions — simple bundling strategies are suboptimal in the McAfee and McMillan model. Section 6 qualifies this result by showing that if there are two buyer types, then the maximum seller's loss from not being able to use lotteries is 12.5%, as in the example discussed above.

2. Model

The formal model is the same as that studied by McAfee and McMillan (1988). A monopolistic seller sells a good with \( n \) indivisible attributes to a buyer who desires at most one unit of each attribute. The utility\(^\text{11}\) of buyer of type \( t \in [0, 1]^n \) from a contract

\[(q; p) \in [0, 1]^n \times [0, \infty)\]

\(^{10}\)Cf. footnote 5.

\(^{11}\)We adapt the standard assumption that whenever the buyer is indifferent he chooses a contract that brings most profit to the seller.
composed of price $p$ and the vector of probabilities $q_i$ of receiving attributes $i = 1, ..., n$ is given by

$$U(q, p; t) = tq - p = t_1q_1 + ... + t_nq_n - p.$$ 

The buyer’s reservation value equals 0. We denote by $F$ the seller’s prior distribution over the buyer’s types. The seller’s valuation or production cost of the goods is normalized to be zero, and she seeks to maximize her expected revenue

$$\max \int p(t) \, dF(t)$$

subject to the feasibility, participation, and incentive-compatibility constraints of the buyer

$$q(t) \in [0, 1]^n,$$

$$tq(t) - p(t) \geq 0 \text{ for all } t \in \text{supp}(F), \quad (\text{IR})$$

$$tq(t) - p(t) \geq tq(t') - p(t') \text{ for all } t, t' \in \text{supp}(F). \quad (\text{IC})$$

A product $q \in [0, 1]^n$ and contract $(q; p)$ offered by the monopoly is called simple (or deterministic) if $q \in \{0, 1\}^n$. A contract is called complex (or stochastic) if $q \notin \{0, 1\}^n$. A product line is called simple if it contains only simple products. Otherwise, the product line is called complex. Similarly, a menu of contracts is called simple if it contains only simple contracts, and called complex otherwise.

3. The Case of Two Attributes and Two Buyer Types

This section completely characterize the solution to (1) when there are two buyer types and two attributes. A monopolistic seller faces

- a buyer of type $A = (a_1, a_2) \in (0, 1)^2$ with probability $\mu_A$, and
- a buyer of type $B = (b_1, b_2) \in (0, 1)^2$ with probability $\mu_B = 1 - \mu_A$.

If $A$ and $B$ derive the same value from the product with both attributes, then the optimal contract is simple and offers the good for the common valuation. Let us thus focus on the case when one of the types has a higher valuation for the good with both attributes and assume that $A$ values the good more than $B$ does, that is

$$a_1 + a_2 > b_1 + b_2.$$  (2)
When the values of attributes 1 and 2 are positively correlated, that is \( a_1 > b_1 \) and \( a_2 > b_2 \), then the monopolists may decide for each attribute separately whether to sell it to both \( A \) and \( B \) or only to \( A \).

**Proposition 3.1.** Consider the seller's problem (1) with two attributes and buyer's types \( A \) and \( B \) such that \( a_1 > b_1 \) and \( a_2 > b_2 \). The optimal contract is simple and offers attribute \( i = 1, 2 \) at price \( b_i \) if \( b_i \geq a_i\mu_A \) and at price \( a_i \) if \( b_i < a_i\mu_A \).

Consider now the remaining case when the values of attributes 1 and 2 are negatively correlated and assume that attribute 2 is valued more by type \( B \) than by type \( A \). As a consequence of (2) that means

\[
\begin{align*}
a_1 > b_1, \\
a_2 < b_2.
\end{align*}
\]

**Proposition 3.2.** Consider the seller's problem (1) with two attributes and two buyer's types. Suppose (2) and (3). There are two cases:

- If \( b_1 \geq a_1\mu_A \) then the simple contract \((1, 1; b_1 + b_2)\) is aimed at both types of buyers.
- If \( b_1 < a_1\mu_A \) then the simple menus of contracts are suboptimal. The optimal menu of contract consists of \((1, 1; a_1 + a_2)\) and \(\left(\frac{b_2-a_2}{a_1-b_1}, 1; \frac{b_2-a_2}{a_1-b_1} b_1 + b_2\right)\).

In the latter case, the optimal simple product line is either \(\{(1, 1; b_1 + b_2)\}\) or \(\{(1, 1; a_1 + a_2), (0, 1; b_2)\}\).

The intuition behind this result is simple. If there are few \( A \) types then optimally the seller offers the good with both attributes to both types of buyers. If there are many \( A \) types, then separating the buyers becomes important, and the best separating menu of contracts is the one from the proposition. The seller is indifferent between these two options if \( b_1 = a_1\mu_A \). The result is formally proved as part of Theorem 4.1 presented next.
4. The Case of an Arbitrary Number of Attributes and Two Buyer Types

This section extends the analysis of Section 3 to the case of two buyer types and an arbitrary number of attributes, and completely characterizes the solution to (1). Now, a monopolistic seller faces

- a buyer of type \( A = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in [0,1]^n \) with probability \( \mu_A \), and
- a buyer of type \( B = (b_1, \ldots, b_n) \in [0,1]^n \) with probability \( \mu_B = 1 - \mu_A \).

For simplicity of exposition, assume that each attribute is positively valued by at least one buyer, that is

\[
\max \{a_i, b_i\} > 0 \quad \text{for} \quad i = 1, \ldots, n. \tag{4}
\]

Assume also that \( A \) values the contract offering all attributes weakly more than \( B \) does, that is

\[
a_1 + \ldots + a_n \geq b_1 + \ldots + b_n. \tag{5}
\]

We may thus think of \( A \) as the high type and of \( B \) as the low type. Finally, let us also reindex the attributes so that

\[
\frac{b_i}{a_i} \quad \text{is a weakly increasing sequence}. \tag{6}
\]

All these assumptions are without loss of generality.

We will show that in an optimal product line, whenever a product contains attribute \( i \), then it contains all attributes \( j > i \). The high type will buy a product with all attributes, and the low type will buy a product with all attributes above some cut-off level. The cut-off level will be shown to be the lower of two potential cut-offs\(^{12}\)

\[
n^* = \min \{i : a_{i+1} + \ldots + a_n < b_{i+1} + \ldots + b_n\}, \tag{7}
\]

and

\[
n^{**} = \min \left\{ i : \frac{b_i}{a_i} \geq \mu_A \right\}.
\]

In the low type aimed product, the cut-off attribute \( n^* \) may be randomized and offered with probability

\[
\pi = \frac{b_{n^*+1} + \ldots + b_n - a_{n^*+1} - \ldots - a_n}{a_{n^*} - b_{n^*}}. \tag{8}
\]

\(^{12}\)By convention, \( \min \emptyset = +\infty \).
Notice that $\pi$ is well defined and belongs to $(0, 1]$ if $n^* < +\infty$.

Using the above introduced notation, the following theorem gives a full characterization of the two-type case for an arbitrary number of attributes $n = 1, 2, \ldots$.

**Theorem 4.1.** Assume (4), (5), and (6).

If $b_n \leq a_n$ or $n^{**} \leq n^*$, then the following simple menu of contracts is optimal\(^\dagger\)

- $(1, \ldots, 1; a_1 + \ldots + a_{n^{**}-1} + b_{n^{**}} + \ldots + b_n)$,
- $\left(\frac{0, \ldots, 0}{n^{**}-1}, 1, \ldots, 1; b_{n^{**}} + \ldots + b_n\right)$.

If $a_n < b_n$ and $n^* < n^{**}$, then the following menu of contracts is optimal

- $(1, \ldots, 1; a_1 + \ldots + a_n)$,
- $\left(\frac{0, \ldots, 0, \pi, 1, \ldots, 1}{n^* - 1}, \pi b_{n^*} + b_{n^*+1} + \ldots + b_n\right)$.

In the latter case, generically $\pi \in (0, 1)$ and the simple menus are suboptimal.

The basic intuition for the theorem relies on the fact that — except for the case when both buyer types buy the good $(1, \ldots, 1)$ — the IC constraint of type $B$ is slack while the IR constraint of type $B$ and the IC constraint of type $A$ are tight. The first case corresponds to tight IR constraint of type $A$ and second case corresponds to this last constraint being slack. The formal proof is in the appendix.

Let us finish with several remarks.

(1) As in Section 3, if $A$ and $B$ derive same the value from the bundle of all attributes then the optimal contract is simple and offers a single good with all attributes for the common valuation. In terms of Theorem 4.1, the equality of valuations means that $n^* = 1$ and $\pi = 1$. The optimal menu falls thus under the first case if $n^{**} = 1$ and under the second case otherwise.

(2) If the high type has weakly higher valuation for all attributes, then the seller may allow the buyers to compose the good from separately priced attributes. As in

\(^\dagger\)The result may be generalized to the case with continuum of attributes.

\(^\dagger\)If $n^{**} = \min \emptyset = +\infty$, then the menu is reduced to offering $(1, \ldots, 1; a_1 + \ldots + a_n)$ to $A$ and shutting $B$ out of the market.
Proposition 3.1, the optimal contract is simple and offers attributes \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) at price \( b_i \) if \( b_i \geq a_i \mu_A \) and at price \( a_i \) if \( b_i < a_i \mu_A \).

If there are attributes that the low type values more than the high type, then the seller needs to bundle the attributes and cannot price them separately.

(3) In equilibrium, the high type buys a good with all attributes, while the low type buys the attributes \( \min \{ n^*, n^{**} \}, \ldots, n \). The attributes bought by the low type include all those that the low type values weakly more than the high type does, and may include some of the remaining attributes.

(4) There exists an optimal menu of contracts that includes a simple contract and a contract that randomizes over at most one of the attributes.

(5) Profit maximization generically requires complex menus except if \( b_n \leq a_n \) or \( n^{**} \leq n^* \). This last condition is equivalent to \( \mu_A \leq \frac{b_{n^*}}{a_{n^*}} \). Thus, complex menus are called for if the problem is genuinely multidimensional (\( b_n > a_n \)) and there are enough high types in the population (\( \mu_A \leq \frac{b_{n^*}}{a_{n^*}} \)).

(6) Generically, the high type obtains an informational rent if

- the high type is scarce in the sense \( \mu_A \leq \frac{b_{n^*}}{a_{n^*}} \), or
- the problem is reducible to a collection of one-dimensional problems (\( b_i \leq a_i \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \)) and the seller is not shutting the low type out of the market (\( \mu_A a_n < b_n \)).

Otherwise no type obtains a rent.

Finally notice that screening a continuous distribution of buyers close to the two-type distributions requiring complex product lines also requires complex product lines. This last point is developed in the next section.

5. The Generic Suboptimality of Simple Bundling

This section shows that the generic distribution of buyer types induces the seller to offer menus of complex contracts. "Generic" in this context means that the set of
distributions that require the seller to use complex contracts in order to maximize profits contains a dense and open subset of the space of all distributions. The relevant space of distributions is the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous Borel probability measures on $[0, 1]^n$ endowed with weak topology relative to bounded continuous functions.

The seller's problem (1) always has a solution. The seller's problem also has a solution if the seller is constrained to use simple bundling strategies.\(^{15}\) The following result compares these two solutions.

**Theorem 5.1.** For a generic distribution $F$ of buyer types the monopolistic seller seeking to maximize (1) can earn strictly more by offering a menu of complex contracts than the maximum of expected earnings from menus of simple contracts, that is

$$\max_{q(t) \in [0,1]^n, IC, IR} \int p(t) dF(t) > \max_{q(t) \in [0,1]^n, IC, IR} \int p(t) dF(t).$$

The proof is divided into two parts: density and openness. The proof of the density relies on the special structure of simple menus. The structure of simple menus allows us to locally perturb a distribution that does not satisfy (9) so that the resultant distribution satisfies (9). This perturbation is a mixture of the original distribution and a Lebesgue continuous approximation to a two-type distribution with complex solution (given by Proposition 3.2).\(^{16}\) The proof of openness of the set of distributions satisfying (9) relies on Berge's maximum theorem and Rochet's (1985) reinterpretation of the IC conditions in terms of convexity of buyer's rent as a function of buyer's type. Let us start with the density proof and then discuss the framework used to prove openness.

\(^{15}\) Cf. Rochet and Choné's (1998) or Lemma 5.2.

\(^{16}\) The genericity result of Theorem 5.1 is not limited to the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous distributions with weak topology. An inspection of the proofs in this paper shows that the class of measures requiring complex contracts is dense in any space of distributions that contains the class of distributions with differentiable Lebesgue densities, and is endowed with topology satisfying the following three assumptions:

1) The class of distributions with differentiable densities is dense.

2) If $F_k \to F$ then for every continuous $u$ we have $\int udF_k \to \int udF$ (i.e. the topology is at least as strong as the weak topology).

3) $(1 - \varepsilon) F + \varepsilon G \to F$ as $\varepsilon \to 0$.

Moreover, under these assumptions the proof in the paper shows that the class of distributions requiring complex contracts is locally open around each Lebesgue absolutely continuous distribution. Consequently, this class is generic in the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous distributions.
Proof of the density part of Theorem 5.1. To show that the set of stochastic distributions is dense in the set of Lebesgue absolutely continuous probability distributions on $[0,1]^n$, take a distribution $F$ such that a simple menu of contracts

$$u^* = \{(J; p^*_J) : J \in \{0,1\}^n\}$$

is optimal. Our goal is to construct a complex menu $u^h$ and a Lebesgue absolutely continuous distribution $G_\varepsilon$ such that the seller strictly prefers the menu $u^h$ to any simple menu if buyer types are distributed according to $(1 - \alpha) F + \alpha G_\varepsilon$ and $\alpha > 0$ is small.

Notice that it is enough to consider the case when the density of $F$, denoted $f$, is continuous and its support contained in $[\delta, 1 - \delta]^n$ for a small $\delta$. For any bundle $J \in \{0,1\}^n$, we may also assume the corresponding buyer type $t^J = J$ strictly prefers that the contract $(J; p^*_J)$ to all other contracts in $u^*$.\textsuperscript{17}

To construct $u^h$, let us fix $h > 0$ and define an auxiliary menu of contracts

$$\tilde{u}^h = u^* - \{(1,0,...,0; p^*_{(1,0,0,...,0)})\} \cup \{(1,0,...,0; p^*_{(1,0,0,...,0)} + h)\}.$$

Now,

$$u^h = \tilde{u}^h \cup \{(K; p^*_K)\},$$

where $K$ is the complex bundle $(1, \frac{1}{2}, 0, ..., 0)$ and $p^*_K = \frac{1}{2}p^*_{(1,0,0,...,0)} + \frac{1}{2}p^*_{(1,1,0,...,0)}$.

We want to show that profits from $u^h$ are the same as from $u^*$ up to first order in $h$ when buyer types are distributed according to $F$. For brevity, the profit that the seller obtains from menu $u^h$ if the buyer types are distributed according to $F$ will be referred to as the expected profit from $u^h$ over $F$. The expected profits from $\tilde{u}^h$ over $F$ equals that from $u^*$ over $F$ up to first order in $h$, because $u^*$ is optimal if buyer types are distributed according to $F$. Thus, it is enough to compare profits from $u^h$ and $\tilde{u}^h$.

For a menu of contracts $u$ and a complex contract $(J; p_J) \in u$, denote by $T^*_J$ the subset of buyer types that weakly prefer $(J; p_J)$ to other contracts in $u$. Notice that for any simple bundle $J \neq \{(1,0,...,0)\}$, the types from $T^*_J$ weakly prefer $(J; p^*_J)$ to any other choice in $u^h$. Thus the difference in profits between $u^h$ and $\tilde{u}^h$ has to come from types in $T^*_u \cap T^*_K \cap T^*_J$. Furthermore, the mass of $T^*_u \cap T^*_K \cap T^*_J$ is of second order in $h$ if $J \neq (1,0,...,0), (1,1,0,...,0)$. The impact on difference in profits in the two remaining subsets $T^*_u \cap T^*_K \cap T^*_J$ and $T^*_u \cap T^*_K \cap T^*_J$ cancel out because

\textsuperscript{17}We refer to the preferences of types $t^J$ despite that they are not in the support of $F$. 

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- In the first subset $u^h$ brings $\frac{1}{2} \left( p^*_1 - p^*_0 \right)$ more per buyer than $\tilde{u}^h$ and the mass of this subset is up to first order

$$\left( E_{T^*_{(1,0,0,0,0)}} \cap T^*_{(1,0,0,0,0)} \right) \left( \text{vol}_{n-1} T^*_{(1,0,0,0,0)} \cap T^*_{(1,1,0,0,0)} \right) h.$$

- In the second subset $\tilde{u}^h$ brings $\frac{1}{2} \left( p^*_1 - p^*_0 \right)$ more per buyer than $u^h$ and the mass of this subset is up to first order

$$\left( E_{T^*_{(1,0,0,0,0)}} \cap T^*_{(1,1,0,0,0)} \right) \left( \text{vol}_{n-1} T^*_{(1,0,0,0,0)} \cap T^*_{(1,1,0,0,0)} \right) h.$$

Thus $u^h$ is first order equivalent to $\tilde{u}^h$ and hence to $u^*$. 

To construct a distribution that is close to $F$ and requires complex contracts denote $R = \max \left\{ 0, p^*_1 - p^*_0 - p^*_0 \right\}$ and consider a four-type auxiliary distribution $\tilde{G}$ with masses

$$\mu(t^1), \mu(t^2) \gg \mu(t^3) \gg \mu(t^4)$$

on points $t^i$ defined as follows:

$$t^1 = (p^*_1 + h, 0, ..., 0),$$
$$t^2 = (0, p^*_0, 0, ..., 0),$$
$$t^3 = (p^*_1 + R, p^*_1, 0, ..., 0),$$
$$t^4 = t^3 + (h, -2h, 0, ..., 0).$$

By assumptions on $u^*$, the points $t^1, t^2, t^3, t^4 \in (0, 1)^2 \times \{0\}^{n-2}$ for small $h$. In the spirit of Proposition 3.2, we can show that to extract maximum expected profit from $\tilde{G}$ seller may offer bundles $(1, 0, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1, 0, ..., 0), (1, 1, 0, ..., 0), (1, 1, 0, ..., 0)$, and $K$ at prices

$$p_{(1,0,0,0,0)} = t^1 = p^*_1 + h,$$
$$p_{(0,1,0,0,0)} = t^2 = p^*_0,$$
$$p_{(1,1,0,0,0)} = t^3 + t^2 - R = p^*_1,$$
$$p_{K} = t^4 + t^2 - R = (t^3 + h) + \frac{1}{2} \left( t^2 - 2h \right) - R$$

$$= \left( p^*_1 + R \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( p^*_1 - p^*_0 \right) - R = p^*_K.$$

This menu is $h$ first order strictly better than an optimum of simple menus. Moreover, this menu is a subset of $u^h$ and $u^h$ would extract the same expected profits from a population of buyer types distributed according to $\tilde{G}$.
Let us take $\varepsilon > 0$ and define the distribution $G_\varepsilon$ to be the convex combination of four normal distributions $N \left( t^i + \varepsilon h, (\varepsilon h)^4 \right)$ restricted to $[0, 1]^n$; the weights are $\mu(t^i)$, $i = 1, \ldots, 4$. As $\varepsilon \to 0^+$ the expected seller's profit from $u_h$ over $G_\varepsilon$ approximates the expected profit from $u_h$ over $\tilde{G}$. Moreover, $\limsup_{\varepsilon \to 0^+}$ of the maximum expected profit from a simple menu $u$ over $G_\varepsilon$ approximates the expected profit from $u$ over $\tilde{G}$, and the convergence is uniform over simple menus $u$ and over $h > 0$. Hence there is $\varepsilon > 0$ such that the expected profit from $u_h$ over $G_\varepsilon$ is $h$ first order better than the expected profit from an optimal simple menu over $G_\varepsilon$.

To end the proof, consider $(1 - \alpha) F + \alpha G$ for small positive $\alpha$. Since $u^*$ and $u_h$ are $h$ first order equivalent on $F$ so $u_h$ weakly $h$ first order dominates any simple menu on $F$. On the other hand $u_h$ is $h$ first order strictly better than any simple menu on $G$. Thus for any $\alpha > 0$ the menu $u_h$ first order in $h$ strictly dominates any simple menu on $(1 - \alpha) F + \alpha G$. This completes the proof of the density.

The proof of openness relies on Rochet's (1985) reformulation of the monopoly problem. In (1) the monopoly maximizes $\int p(t) \, dF(t)$ over pricing policies $(p, q)$. The maximization is constrained by the individual rationality and incentive compatibility of the buyers. Using incentive compatibility one can replace the individual rationality of the buyer by the assumption of zero price for a zero amount of both goods. Denote by $M_n$ the set of Lebesgue absolutely continuous probability distributions on $[0, 1]^n$. As shown by Rochet for $F \in M_n$ the incentive constraints are equivalent to the convexity of the utility function $u(t) = tq(t) - p(t)$. Whenever $u$ is convex it is differentiable almost everywhere, and has one-sided partial derivatives everywhere on the interior of its domain. Denote by $\frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_1} u$ the right-hand side derivative operator and by $\nabla$ the gradient operator

\[
\nabla u(t) = \left( \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_1} u, \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_2} u \right)(t)
\]

Given the indifference-breaking assumption that indifferent buyers behave in a way preferred by the seller, the utility-maximizing quantity bought by a buyer is

\[
q(t) = \nabla u(t).
\]

and the price that the buyer pays is

\[
p(t) = t\nabla u(t) - u(t).
\]

\footnote{Alternatively we could work with the standard gradient that exists almost everywhere.}
Hence for \( F \in M_n \), the monopoly problem translates into maximizing

\[
\int t \nabla u(t) - u(t) \, dF
\]

subject to \( u(0,0) = 0 \), \( u \) is convex, and \( \nabla u \in [0,1]^n \).

Denote by \( U \subset C[0,1]^n \) the set of functions satisfying the constraints of (10). Since \( U \) is a closed subset of the compact space \( C[0,1]^n \) so \( U \) is compact in metrics inherited from \( C[0,1]^n \). The proof of openness relies on the following result (proved in the appendix).

**Lemma 5.2.** The mapping

\[
U \times M_n \ni (u,F) \to u \circ F = \int t \nabla u(t) - u(t) \, dF \in R
\]

is continuous.

**Proof of the openness part of Theorem 5.1.** Use Rochet (1985) and consider the equivalent program (10). The compactness of \( U \) and Lemma 5.2 allow us to invoke the Berge’s Maximum Theorem (Berge (1963, p. 116)) to conclude that

\[
M_n \ni F \to P(F) = \arg \max_{u \in U} \int t \nabla u(t) - u(t) \, dF
\]

is upper hemicontinuous. Consequently, since \( U^d \) is closed in \( U \), so \( P^{-1}(U^d) \) is closed in \( M_n \), and thus the set of complex distributions is open in \( M_n \).

6. **How Much Is Lost By the Restriction to Simple Bundling?**

This section starts with an estimate of the worst-case scenario for a seller restricted to screening through simple product lines when there are two buyer types. It then constructs examples to show that the result of Section 4 — that in an optimal screening the seller may randomize over one attribute only — does not generalize to cases with three or more buyer types.
**Theorem 6.1.** If there are only two buyer types then the maximum percentage loss from the restriction to simple contracts is 12.5% of the best simple menu revenue. If $n$ is the number of attributes, then this bound is achieved for two types $A, B \in [0, 1]^n$ such that

$$\mu_A = \mu_B = \frac{1}{2},$$

$$b_n + ... + b_2 = b_1 = \frac{1}{3},$$

$$a_1 = 1, \ a_2 = ... = a_n = 0.$$

It is easy to verify that for the parameters provided the loss is 12.5%. Let us prove that this is the maximal loss resulting from the restriction to simple contracts.

**Proof of Theorem 6.1.** Denote by $\pi^C$ the optimal profit and by $\pi^S$ the optimal profit from simple contracts. Our problem is to maximize $\frac{\pi^C - \pi^S}{\pi^C}$, or equivalently $\frac{\pi^C - \pi^S}{\pi^C}$, over two-type distributions $(a, b) = ((a_1, ..., a_n), (b_1, ..., b_n))$. By compactness and continuity of the problem the maximum exists. Notice that we can assume (4), and choose notation so that (5) and (6) are satisfied. Furthermore, by Theorem 4.2, we can restrict attention to situations when $b_n > a_n$ and $n^* < n^{**}$. Thus, the constraints on our problem are $a_4, b_i, \mu_A \in [0, 1], (4), (5), (6), b_n > a_n$, and $n^* < n^{**}$.

By Theorem 4.2, the optimal contract brings

$$\pi^C = \mu_A (a_1 + ... + a_n) + (1 - \mu_A) (\pi b_{n^*} + b_{n^*+1} + ... + b_n).$$

Let us estimate the profits $\pi^S$ from the optimal simple contract from below. The following two contracts are individually rational and incentive compatible:

- $$\left\{ (1, ..., 1; a_1 + ... + a_n), \left( \underbrace{0, ..., 0}_{n^*}, 1; \underbrace{b_{n^*+1} + ... + b_n}_{n-n^*} \right) \right\}, \text{ or}$$

- $$\left\{ (1, ..., 1; a_1 + ... + a_n + (b_n - a_n)), \left( \underbrace{0, ..., 0}_{n^*-1}, 1; \overbrace{b_{n^*} + ... + b_n}^{n-n^*+1} \right) \right\}. $$

The first of these two contracts brings

$$\pi^{S1} = \mu_A (a_1 + ... + a_n) + (1 - \mu_A) (b_{n^*+1} + ... + b_n)$$
and the second one brings

\[ \pi_{s2} = \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_n + (1 - \pi) [b_{n^*} - a_{n^*}]) + (1 - \mu_A) (b_{n^*} + \ldots + b_n). \]

Hence, \( \frac{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}}{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}} \) is an upper bound on \( \frac{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}}{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}} \).

Let us drop the constraint \( n^* < n^{**} \) and maximize the upper bound \( \frac{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}}{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}} \) subject to the remaining constraints. This is done via two claims proved in the appendix.

Claim 1. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with any \( n \) is not higher than the maximum of the auxiliary problem with \( n = 2 \) and \( n^* = 1 \).

Claim 2. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with \( n = 2 \) and \( n^* = 1 \) is \( \frac{1}{6} \).

It remains to verify that the upper bound \( \frac{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}}{\pi^{C \text{-} \text{max}}} = \frac{1}{6} \) is achievable for any \( n \geq 2 \) in the original problem. This upper bound is indeed achieved for the parameters stated in the theorem. This completes the proof.

In Section 4, we noted that when there are only two buyer types then it is enough for the seller to randomize over one attribute. This last corollary is false when there are more than two buyer types. A simple counterexample that violates this property has \( n = 3 \) and three buyer types

\[ A = (1, 0, 0), B = (0, 1, 0), C = \left( \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{array} \right) \]

with masses \( \mu_A, \mu_B, \mu_C \) such that \( \mu_C << \mu_A, \mu_B \). Then, in any optimal menu of contracts the probability of allocating good 1 to type \( C \) and the probability of allocating good 2 to type \( C \) belong to \( (0, 1) \).

The following example constructs a two-dimensional situation in which some buyers are allocated only lotteries.

Example 6.2. Consider \( n = 2 \) and three types \( A = (a_1, a_2) = (1, \frac{1}{2}), B = (b_1, b_2) = (0, \frac{3}{2}), C = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \) that occur with probabilities \( \mu_A, \mu_B, \mu_C \) such that \( \mu_C << \mu_B << \mu_A \). Then, type \( C \) buys a good with lotteries for both attributes.

Indeed, the optimal menu of contracts leads to types \( A \) and \( B \) being allocated the good \( (1, 1) \) at the price \( a_1 + a_2 = \frac{5}{4} \) because of the assumed condition on probabilities and \( b_1 + b_2 > a_1 + a_2 \). Conditional on this allocation, the incentive compatibility of
A and B precludes the seller from selling any full attribute to type C. The seller can, however, offer the contract \( \left( \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4} \right) \). C will take this offer while A and B's incentive constraints will not be violated.

References


**Appendix**

**Proof of Theorem 4.1.** A general form of the product line consists of two contracts \( \tilde{A} = (q_i^A, ..., q_m^A; p^A) \) chosen by type \( A \) and \( \tilde{B} = (q_i^B, ..., q_m^B; p^B) \) chosen by type \( B \). The
optimal menu of contracts exists by the Weierstrass maximum theorem because prices $p^A, p^B \in [0, n]$ and hence the menu of contracts corresponds to a point in the compact set

$$([0,1]^n \times [0,n]) \times ([0,1]^n \times [0,n])$$

and the function from menus to the profits they generate is upper hemicontinuous. Similarly, there exists an optimal simple menu of contracts.

Let us first consider the problem of Theorem 4.1 and make two assumptions. First, notice that it is enough to consider strictly positive

$$a_i, b_i > 0, i = 1, ..., n.$$ 

Indeed, if we prove the claim in this case then the continuity of the expected profits from a fixed menu of contracts with respect to $a_1, ..., a_n, b_1, ..., b_n$ establishes the claim in the general case. Second, let us focus on the case

$$b_n > a_n$$

because the case of $b_n \leq a_n$ is straightforward.

There are two incentive constraints and two individual rationality constraints in the seller's maximization. Let us refer to them as IC-A, IC-B, IR-A, IR-B, where the labels are self-explanatory. Let us call a constraint slack if it may be dropped from the maximization and tight otherwise. Let us call a constraint strictly slack if it is satisfied with strict inequality in optimal menu of contracts, and weakly tight otherwise.

Before characterizing the optimal menu of contracts $(\tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$ let us prove four claims.

Claim 1. If IC-B is weakly tight, then $q^B_i = q^A_i = 1$ for $i = 1, ..., n$, and $p^A = p^B = b_1 + ... + b_n$.

To prove Claim 1 first note that if IC-B is weakly tight then also IC-A is weakly tight. Indeed, if $A$ strictly preferred $\tilde{A}$ to $\tilde{B}$, then we would have $q^B_i = 1$ for $i = 1, ..., n$ because $q^B_i < 1$ for some $i = 1, ..., n$ would allow the seller to gainfully replace the contract $\tilde{B}$ with

$$(q^B_1, ..., q^B_i + \varepsilon, ..., q^B_n; p^B + b_i \varepsilon)$$

for some small positive $\varepsilon$. Consequently, $A$'s strict preference of $\tilde{A}$ over $\tilde{B}$ would imply that $p^A < p^B$. But this is a contradiction, as then the Seller would be better off by proposing single contract $\tilde{B} = (1, ..., 1; p^B)$ that would be accepted by both $A$ and $B$.  

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Thus, if IC-B is weakly tight then both A and B are indifferent between the contracts \( \tilde{A} \) and \( \tilde{B} \). Hence, also the seller is indifferent between selling either of the products, and this means that \( p^A = p^B \leq b_1 + \ldots + b_n \). The optimal among such contracts sets \( q^B_i = q^A_i = 1 \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) and \( p^A = p^B = b_1 + \ldots + b_n \), which proves the claim.

Claim 2. If IC-B is strictly slack then
(a) \( q^A_i = 1 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \),
(b) IR-B is weakly tight, and \( p^B = b_1 q^B_1 + \ldots + b_n q^B_n \),
(c) IC-A is weakly tight and
\[
p^A = p^B + (1 - q^B) a_1 + \ldots + (1 - q^B) a_n
= a_1 + \ldots + a_n - (a_1 - b_1) q^B_1 - \ldots - (a_n - b_n) q^B_n
\]

To prove (a) notice that if \( q^A_i < 1 \) for an \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), then the Seller could do better by replacing \( \tilde{A} \) by \( (q^A_1, \ldots, q^A_i + \varepsilon, \ldots, q^A_n, p^A + a_i \varepsilon) \) for some small positive \( \varepsilon \). To show (b) notice that with IR-B strictly slack the seller could benefit by raising \( p^B \). To show (c) notice that with IC-A strictly slack, the seller would profitably increase any \( q^B_i \) that is smaller than 1. However, \( q^B_i = 1 \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) cannot obtain as it would mean that the bundles offered to both types are identical, and by the incentive compatibility conditions their prices would have to be equal, and thus type B buyer would be indifferent between the contracts, contrary to the strict slackness of IC-B. Since IC-A is weakly tight, the formula for \( p^A \) follows from (a).

Denote
\[ d_i = a_i - b_i. \]
By Claim 2, if IC-B is strictly slack then the seller maximizes
\[
\max_{q^B \in [0,1]} \mu_A p^A + \mu_B p^B
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_n - d_1 q^B_1 - \ldots - d_n q^B_n) + \mu_B (b_1 q^B_1 + \ldots + b_n q^B_n)
= (\mu_B b_1 - \mu_A d_1) q^B_1 + \ldots + (\mu_B b_n - \mu_A d_n) q^B_n + \text{constant}
\]
subject to A’s participation constraint, IR-A,
\[
a_1 + \ldots + a_n - d_1 q^B_1 - \ldots - d_n q^B_n = p^A \leq a_1 + \ldots + a_n.
\]
Consequently, when IC-B is slack then the seller’s problem can be stated as

$$\max_{q^B \in [0,1]} (b_1 - \mu_A a_1) q_1^B + \ldots + (b_n - \mu_A a_n) q_n^B$$

subject to IR-A constraint

$$d_1 q_1^B + \ldots + d_n q_n^B \geq 0.$$

Claim 3. Assume that IC-B is strictly slack. The following conditions are equivalent:

(a) IR-A is slack in the maximization (P),
(b) $$d_{n^{**}} + \ldots + d_n \geq 0,$$

Indeed, unconstrained by IR-A the seller would set $$q_i^B = 1$$ whenever $$\frac{b_i}{a_i} > \mu_A$$, $$q_i^B = 0$$ whenever $$\frac{b_i}{a_i} < \mu_A$$, and be indifferent what values are taken by $$q_i^B$$ whenever $$\frac{b_i}{a_i} = \mu_A$$. Since $$n^{**}$$ denotes the minimum $$i$$ such that $$\frac{b_i}{a_i} \geq \mu_A$$, so in an IR-A unconstrained optimal contract $$q_1^B = \ldots = q_{n^{**} - 1}^B = 0$$ and $$q_{n^{**}}^B = \ldots = q_n^B = 1$$. Thus, the slackness of IR-A is equivalent to (b).

Claim 4. The following conditions are equivalent:

(a) $$d_{n^{**}} + \ldots + d_n \geq 0,$$
(b) $$n^{**} \leq n^*,$$
(c) $$\mu_A \leq \frac{b_{n^*}}{a_{n^*}}.$$

Recall that $$b_n > a_n$$, and thus $$n^{**} \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$$. To see the equivalence of (a) and (b) note that the monotonicity of $$\frac{b_i}{a_i}$$ and definition of $$n^*$$ implies that $$d_i + \ldots + d_n \geq 0$$ iff $$i \in \{1, \ldots, n^*\}$$. To see the equivalence of (b) and (c) note that the monotonicity of $$\frac{b_i}{a_i}$$ and definition of $$n^{**}$$ implies that $$\frac{b_i}{a_i} \geq \mu_A$$ iff $$i \in \{n^{**}, \ldots, n\} \cup \{+\infty\}$$.

Now, we are ready to solve the seller’s problem separately considering $$n^{**} \leq n^*$$ and $$n^* < n^{**}$$.

Case $$n^{**} \leq n^*$$. Either IC-B is strictly slack or weakly tight. This gives two potential solutions. By Claims 3 and 4, the solution for IC-B strictly slack may be obtained by solving unconstrained (P) and is written out in Theorem 4.1. The solution for IC-B weakly tight is given in Claim 1. It remains to check that the solution in Theorem 4.1 is weakly better than the solution in Claim 1.
The difference in expected profits between the solutions is

\[
\mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_{n**} - b_{n**} + \ldots + b_n) + \mu_B (b_{n**} + \ldots + b_n) - (b_1 + \ldots + b_n)
\]

\[
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_{n**} - b_{n**} - b_{n**} - 1) - (b_1 + \ldots + b_{n**} - 1).
\]

Since \( a_n < b_n \), we have \( n** < +\infty \). If \( n** \in \{2, \ldots, n\} \), then this difference is strictly positive because \( \mu_A > \frac{b_{n**} - 1}{a_{n**} - 1} \geq \frac{b_i}{a_i} \) for \( i \leq n** - 1 \) by definition of \( n** \) and monotonicity of \( \frac{b_i}{a_i} \). In particular then IC-B is indeed strictly slack. If \( n** = 1 \), then the two solutions are identical (and IC-B is weakly tight).

Case \( n** < n** \). Then IR-A is tight, and thus (P) reduces to

\[
\max_{q_B^B \in [0,1]} (b_1 - \mu_A a_1) q_1^B + \ldots + (b_n - \mu_A a_n) q_n^B = (1 - \mu_A) (b_1 q_1^B + \ldots + b_n q_n^B)
\]

subject to

\[d_1 q_1^B + \ldots + d_n q_n^B = 0.\]

Thus, there exists \( k \in [0,1] \) such that

\[
q_i^B = 1 \text{ whenever } \frac{b_i}{d_i} > \frac{1 - k}{k},
\]

\[
q_i^B = 0 \text{ whenever } \frac{b_i}{d_i} < \frac{1 - k}{k},
\]

and \( q_i^B \) for \( i \) such that \( \frac{b_i}{d_i} = \frac{1 - k}{k} \) are determined by the constraint, not necessarily in a unique way. Equivalently

\[
q_i^B = 1 \text{ whenever } \frac{b_i}{a_i} > k
\]

\[
q_i^B = 0 \text{ whenever } \frac{b_i}{a_i} < k
\]

and \( q_i^B \) for \( i \) such that \( \frac{b_i}{a_i} = k \) are determined by the constraint. Note that \( a_i > 0 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n^A \) and that \( k \leq \mu_A \). There is some indeterminacy for \( i \) such that \( \frac{b_i}{a_i} = k \). Without loss of generality we can assume that \( q_i^B = 0 \) or 1 for all such \( i \) except for one, let us call it \( n*** \) and choose it in such a way that

\[
q_i^B = 1 \text{ for } i > n***
\]

\[
q_i^B = 0 \text{ for } i < n***
\]
and
\[ q_{n^{***}}^B = \frac{- (d_{n^{A}+1} + \ldots + d_n) - (d_{n^{***}+1} + \ldots + d_{n^A})}{d_{n^{***}}} = \frac{-d_{n^{***}+1} - \ldots - d_n}{d_{n^{***}}}. \]

and \( q_{n^{***}}^B \in (0,1]. \) By definition of \( n^* \), this properties imply that \( n^{***} = n^* \). Hence,
\[
\pi = q_{n^*}^B = \frac{-d_{n^*+1} - \ldots - d_n}{d_{n^*}} \in (0, 1],
\]
and the solution is as postulated in Theorem 4.1. It remains to check that this solution is preferred by the seller to the optimal solution with IC-B tight (described in Claim 1); the slackness of IC-B will then automatically be satisfied. The difference in expected profits from the two solutions is
\[
\mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_n - d_1q_{n^*}^B - \ldots - d_nq_{n^*}^B) + \mu_B (b_1q_{n^*}^B + \ldots + b_nq_{n^*}^B) - (b_1 + \ldots + b_n)
\]
\[
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_n) + \mu_B (b_n\pi + b_{n^*+1} + \ldots + b_n) - (b_1 + \ldots + b_n)
\]
\[
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_{n^*} - d_{n^*}\pi) + \mu_B b_{n^*}\pi - (b_1 + \ldots + b_{n^*})
\]
\[
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_{n^*} - (a_{n^*} - b_{n^*})\pi) + (1 - \mu_A) b_{n^*}\pi - (b_1 + \ldots + b_{n^*})
\]
\[
= \mu_A (a_1 + \ldots + a_{n^*-1} + (1 - \pi) a_{n^*}) - (b_1 + \ldots + b_{n^*-1} + (1 - \pi) b_{n^*})
\]
and is strictly positive (as required) because \( \mu_A > \frac{b_{n^*}}{a_{n^*}} \geq 1 \) for \( i \leq n^* \). The genericity claim of Theorem 4.1 is straightforward. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Lemma 5.2.** First note for any \( u \in U \) the function \( \Phi (u) \) such that \( \Phi (u) (t) = t \nabla u (t) - u (t) \) is well-defined as \( \nabla u (t) \) exists everywhere. Note that \( \Phi (u) \) is measurable, and it is bounded since \( \nabla u (t) \in [0,1]^n \). Moreover, \( \nabla u (t) \in [0,1]^n \) and \( u (0) = 0 \) for \( t \in [0,1]^n \) imply that
\[
\Phi (u) (t) = t \nabla u (t) - u (t) \in [-n, n]
\]
for \( t \in [0,1]^n \) and \( u \in U \).

Take \( (u, F) \in U \times M_n \) and a sequence \((u_k, F_k) \in U \times M_n \) that tends to \((u, F)\). We are to prove that \( u_k \circ F_k \to u \circ F \). Note that
\[
|u_k \circ F_k - u \circ F| \leq |u_k \circ F_k - u \circ F_k| + |u \circ F_k - u \circ F|
\]
and thus it is enough to show the convergence to 0 of both elements of the left-hand-side sum.
Consider the first element of the sum, take a small \( \varepsilon > 0 \), and note that
\[
|u_k \circ F_k - u \circ F_k| \\
\leq \int_{[0,1]^n} |\Phi(u_k)(t) - \Phi(u)(t)| \, dF_k \\
= \int_{[0,1-\varepsilon]^n} |\Phi(u_k)(t) - \Phi(u)(t)| \, dF_k + \int_{[0,1]^n-[0,1-\varepsilon]^n} |\Phi(u_k)(t) - \Phi(u)(t)| \, dF_k.
\]

For any small \( \varepsilon > 0 \) the first integral tends to 0 as \( k \to \infty \) because \( u_k \to u \) uniformly and all those functions are convex. Moreover, by \( \Phi(u)(t), \Phi(u_k)(t) \in [-n, n] \) the second integral is smaller than
\[
2nF_k([0,1]^n-[0,1-\varepsilon]^n).
\]

Since the weak convergence \( F_k \to F \) implies the convergence
\[
F_k([0,1]^n-[0,1-\varepsilon]^n) \to F([0,1]^n-[0,1-\varepsilon]^n),
\]
\( F \) is Lebesgue absolutely continuos, and the Lebesgue measure of \([0,1]^n-[0,1-\varepsilon]^n\) tends to 0 as \( \varepsilon \to 0 \), so the second integral can be shown to tend to 0 as \( k \to \infty \) and \( \varepsilon \to 0 \). Taking this together we may conclude that
\[
|u_k \circ F_k - u \circ F_k| \to 0
\]
as \( k \to \infty \).

It remains to show that \( |u \circ F_k - u \circ F| \to 0 \) with \( k \to \infty \). This is so if \( \Phi(u) \) is continuous. In general, since \( u \) is continuous, it is enough to show that
\[
\left| \int_{[0,1]^n} t \nabla u(t) \, dF_k - \int_{[0,1]^n} t \nabla u(t) \, dF \right| \to 0 \text{ as } k \to \infty
\]
and furthermore, we can analyze the elements of the sum \( t \nabla u(t) \) separately, so it is enough to show that
\[
\left| \int_{[0,1]^n} t \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_i} u(t) \, dF_k - \int_{[0,1]^n} t \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_i} u(t) \, dF \right| \to 0 \text{ as } k \to \infty
\]
for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Denoting by \( f \) and \( f_k \) the densities of \( F \) and \( F_k \), respectively, we can write a sufficient condition for the above property as
\[
\left| \int_{[0,1]} t \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_i} f_k(t) \, dt_i - \int_{[0,1]} t \frac{\partial^+}{\partial t_i} f(t) \, dt_i \right| \to 0 \text{ as } k \to \infty
\]
for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) and any \( t_1, \ldots, t_{i-1}, t_{i+1}, \ldots, t_n \in [0, 1]^{n-1} \). Now, \( t_i \to t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) \) is increasing, so the set of discontinuities is of measure 0. Let \( I \) be a union of intervals of total length \( \varepsilon \) that covers the set of discontinuities. We can find a continuous \( \varphi \) such that \( \varphi (t_i) \in [0, 1] \) for all \( t_i \) and \( \varphi (t_i) = t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) \) if \( t_i \notin I \), and decompose:

\[
\left| \int_{[0,1]} t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) f_k (t) \, dt_i - \int_{[0,1]} t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) f (t) \, dt_i \right|
\leq \left| \int_{[0,1]} \varphi (t_i) f_k (t) \, dt_i - \int_{[0,1]} \varphi (t_i) f (t) \, dt_i \right|
+ \left| \int_{I} (t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) - \varphi (t_i)) f_k (t) \, dt_i - \int_{I} (t_i \frac{\partial^+ u}{\partial t_i} (t) - \varphi (t_i)) f (t) \, dt_i \right|
\]

Now, the first difference tends to 0 as \( F_k \to F \) and \( \varphi \) is continuous. Moreover, \( F_k \to F \) implies also that there exists an \( M \) independent of \( I \) such that for large \( k \), the second difference is smaller than \( M \varepsilon \). This concludes the proof.

**Proof of Claims 1 and 2 from the proof of Theorem 6.1.**

Claim 1. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with any \( n \) is not higher than the maximum of the auxiliary problem with \( n = 2 \) and \( n^* = 1 \).

Let us prove this claim in two steps. First notice that if \( n^* + 1 < n \) then the lower dimensional problem with \( n' = n^* + 1 \) attributes and valuations

\[
\begin{align*}
a_1' &= a_1, \ldots, a_{n^*}' = a_{n^*}, a_{n^*+1}' = a_{n^*+1} + \ldots + a_n, \\
b_1' &= b_1, \ldots, b_{n^*}' = b_{n^*}, b_{n^*+1}' = b_{n^*+1} + \ldots + b_n,
\end{align*}
\]

satisfies all constraints and attains the same objective \( \pi^C\max\{\pi^{S_1}, \pi^{S_2}\} \).

Second, notice that if \( n^* > 1 \) then the lower dimensional problem with \( n' = n - n^* + 1 \) and

\[
\begin{align*}
a_i' &= a_{n^*-1+i}, \ b_i' = b_{n^*-1+i}, \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, n'
\end{align*}
\]

satisfies the constraints. Indeed, (5) is not violated because the definition of \( n^* \) implies that

\[
a_{n^*} + \ldots + a_n \geq b_{n^*} + \ldots + b_n.
\]

Other constraints are satisfied in a straightforward manner. This lower dimensional problem attains weakly higher objective \( \pi^C\max\{\pi^{S_1}, \pi^{S_2}\} \) as the nominator does not change and the denominator weakly increases. This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with $n = 2$ and $n^* = 1$ is $\frac{1}{9}$.

Without changing the maximum, we can add variable $\pi$ to the set of variables we maximize over, and add its definition (8) to the set of constraints. Thus, the problem takes the form

$$\max_{a_1, b_1, \mu_A, \pi} \frac{\pi^C - \max \{\pi^{S_1}, \pi^{S_2}\}}{\pi^C} = 1 - \max \left\{ \pi^{S_1}, \pi^{S_2} \right\}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{\max \{\mu_A (a_1 + a_2) + (1 - \mu_A) b_2, \mu_A (a_1 + a_2 + (1 - \pi) [b_1 - a_1]) + (1 - \mu_A) (b_1 + b_2)\}}{\mu_A (a_1 + a_2 + (1 - \mu_A) (\pi b_1 + b_2))}$$

$$= \frac{(1 - \mu_A) \pi b_1 - \max \{0, \mu_A (1 - \pi) [b_1 - a_1] + (1 - \mu_A) b_1\}}{\mu_A (a_1 + a_2 + (1 - \mu_A) (\pi b_1 + b_2))}$$

subject to $a_1, b_1, \mu_A \in [0, 1], (4), (5), (6), (8), b_2 > a_2$.

First, notice that at the maximum

$$0 = \mu_A (1 - \pi) [b_1 - a_1] + (1 - \mu_A) b_1. \quad (11)$$

Indeed, if $\mu_A (1 - \pi) [b_1 - a_1] + (1 - \mu_A) b_1 < 0$ at the maximum, then the objective could be made arbitrarily close to 1 by taking $\mu_A = 0, \pi \sim 1$ (i.e., $a_1 - b_1 \sim b_2 - a_2$), and $b_2 << b_1$. If $\mu_A (1 - \pi) [b_1 - a_1] + (1 - \mu_A) b_1 > 0$ at the maximum, then the objective could be made arbitrarily close to 1 by taking $a_2, b_1, b_2 \sim 0$ and $a_1 >> 0$ (note that then also $\pi \sim 0$).

Taking (11) into account, we can reduce the auxiliary problem to

$$\max_{a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2, \mu_A, \pi} \frac{(1 - \mu_A) \pi b_1}{\mu_A (a_1 + a_2) + (1 - \mu_A) (\pi b_1 + b_2)}$$

subject to $b_1 \in [0, 1], a_1, b_2, \pi \in (0, 1), (8), (11),$ and $a_1 > b_1$.

Second, notice that the objective increases and all constraints are satisfied when we decrease $a_2$ and $b_2$ while maintaining (8). Thus, at the maximum, $a_2 = 0$, and (8) implies that

$$b_2 = \pi (a_1 - b_1).$$

At the same time, (11) implies that

$$\mu_A = \frac{b_1}{b_1 + (1 - \pi) [a_1 - b_1]}.$$

Plugging these two expressions into the maximization, we can reduce it further to

$$\max_{a_1, b_1, \pi} \frac{(1 - \pi) [a_1 - b_1] \pi b_1}{b_1 a_1 + (1 - \pi) [a_1 - b_1] (\pi b_1 + \pi (a_1 - b_1))}$$

$$= \frac{(1 - \pi) \pi [a_1 - b_1] b_1}{b_1 a_1 + (1 - \pi) \pi [a_1 - b_1] a_1}$$

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subject to $b_1 \in [0, 1], a_1, \pi \in (0, 1)$, and $a_1 > b_1$.

Third, notice that $b_1 > 0$ at the maximum and thus we can simplify the problem further to

$$\max_{a_1, b_1, \pi} \frac{1}{\frac{1}{(1-\pi)\pi} \frac{a_1}{a_1-b_1} + \frac{a_1}{b_1}}$$

subject to $b_1, a_1, \pi \in (0, 1)$, and $a_1 > b_1$. At the maximum, $\pi = \frac{1}{2}$. Substituting $x = \frac{a_1}{b_1}$ we reduce the problem to minimizing the denominator $f(x) = 4\frac{x}{x-1} + x$ over $x > 1$. The problem is convex as $f''(x) = \frac{8}{(x-1)^3} > 0$. Thus, the minimum is achieved at $f'(x) = 4\frac{-1}{(x-1)^2} + 1 = 0$, that is at $x = 3$. The minimum equals $\frac{1}{4\frac{3}{2}+3} = \frac{1}{9}$ and Claim 2 is proved.