

## Substitutions

A *substitution* is a function  $s$  associating SC sentences with SC sentences that meets the following conditions:

$$\begin{aligned}s((\varphi \vee \psi)) &= (s(\varphi) \vee s(\psi)) \\s((\varphi \wedge \psi)) &= (s(\varphi) \wedge s(\psi)) \\s((\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) &= (s(\varphi) \rightarrow s(\psi)) \\s((\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)) &= (s(\varphi) \leftrightarrow s(\psi)) \\s(\neg\varphi) &= \neg s(\varphi)\end{aligned}$$

For example, if  $s(\text{"A"}) = \text{"(C} \rightarrow \text{D)"}$  and  $s(\text{"B"}) = \text{"(D} \leftrightarrow \neg\text{E)"}$ , then  $s(\text{"(A} \wedge \neg\text{B)"}) = \text{"((C} \rightarrow \text{D)} \wedge \neg(\text{D} \leftrightarrow \neg\text{E)})\text{"}$ .

If  $\varphi$  is a sentence and  $s$  is a substitution, then  $s(\varphi)$  is said to be a *substitution instance* of  $\varphi$ .

If  $s$  is a substitution and  $\mathfrak{S}$  is a N.T.A., let  $\mathfrak{S}^\circ s$  be the N.T.A. given by

$$\mathfrak{S}^\circ s(\varphi) = \mathfrak{S}(s(\varphi)),$$

for every atomic sentence  $\varphi$ . It's easy to convince ourselves that the equation

$$\mathfrak{S}^\circ s(\varphi) = \mathfrak{S}(s(\varphi))$$

holds for all sentences, complex as well as simple.

**Substitution Theorem 1.** Any substitution instance of a tautology is a tautology. Any substitution instance of a contradiction is a contradiction.

**Proof:** Suppose that  $\varphi$  is a tautology and  $s$  is a substitution. Take any N.T.A.  $\mathfrak{S}$ . Because  $\varphi$  is a tautology and  $\mathfrak{S}^\circ s$  is a N.T.A.,  $\mathfrak{S}^\circ s(\varphi) = 1$ . So  $s(\varphi)$  is true under  $\mathfrak{S}$ . Since  $\mathfrak{S}$  was arbitrary, we conclude that  $s(\varphi)$  is true under every N.T.A., and hence that  $\varphi$  is a tautology. The argument for contradictions is similar. X

**Substitution Theorem 2.** Let  $s$  be a substitution. If  $\varphi$  implies  $\psi$ , then  $s(\varphi)$  implies  $s(\psi)$ . If  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are logically equivalent,  $s(\varphi)$  and  $s(\psi)$  are logically equivalent. If  $\varphi$  is a logical consequence of  $\Gamma$ , then  $s(\varphi)$  is a logical consequence of  $\{s(\gamma) : \gamma \in \Gamma\}$ .

**Proof:** Similar. X

In analogy with the theorem before last, you might expect that every substitution instance of a consistent sentence is consistent. But that's not true. A counterexample is the inconsistent

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sentence “ $((Q \wedge \neg Q) \wedge P)$ ,” which is a substitution instance of the consistent sentence “ $(A \wedge B)$ .” What we have instead is this:

**Substitution Theorem 3.** A sentence  $\phi$  is consistent if and only if some substitution instance of  $\phi$  is tautological.

**Proof:** ( $\Rightarrow$ ) Let  $\mathfrak{I}$  be a N.T.A. under which  $\phi$  is true. Define a substitution  $s$  by:

$$\begin{aligned} s(\psi) &= “(P \vee \neg P)” \text{ if } \psi \text{ is an atomic sentence that is true under } \mathfrak{I} \\ &= “(P \wedge \neg P)” \text{ if } \psi \text{ is an atomic sentence that is false under } \mathfrak{I} \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to convince ourselves that, for any sentence  $\theta$ , if  $\theta$  is true under  $\mathfrak{I}$ , then  $s(\theta)$  is a tautology, whereas if  $\theta$  is false under  $\mathfrak{I}$ ,  $s(\theta)$  is a contradiction. To show this in detail, we’d give a proof by reductio ad absurdum: Assume that the thing you’re trying to prove is false, then show that this assumption leads to a contradiction. So assume that there a sentence  $\theta$  such that either  $\mathfrak{I}(\theta) = 1$  but  $s(\theta)$  isn’t tautological or  $\mathfrak{I}(\theta) = 0$  even though  $s(\theta)$  isn’t contradictory. Let  $\theta$  be a simplest such sentence. The proof breaks down into six cases, depending on whether  $\theta$  is atomic, a disjunction, a conjunction, a conditional, a biconditional, or a negation. I won’t go through the details.

Since  $\mathfrak{I}(\phi) = 1$ ,  $s(\phi)$  is a tautological substitution instance of  $\phi$ .

( $\Leftarrow$ ) If  $\phi$  is inconsistent, then every substitution instance of  $\phi$  is inconsistent. So no substitution instance of  $\phi$  is tautological. X

**Substitution Theorem 4.** A sentence  $\phi$  is tautological iff every substitution instance of  $\phi$  is tautological iff every substitution instance of  $\phi$  is consistent. A sentence  $\psi$  is contradictory iff every substitution instance of  $\psi$  is contradictory iff every substitution instance of  $\psi$  is invalid.

**Proof:** Let **(a)** be “ $\phi$  is tautological,” **(b)** be “Every substitution instance of  $\phi$  is tautological,” and **(c)** be “Every substitution instance of  $\phi$  is consistent. We show, first, that **(a)** implies **(b)**, next that **(b)** implies **(c)**, and finally that **(c)** implies **(a)**.

**(a)  $\Rightarrow$  (b):** Substitution Theorem 1.

**(b)  $\Rightarrow$  (c):** Immediate.

**(c)  $\Rightarrow$  (a):** What we’ll actually prove is that the negation of **(a)** implies the negation of **(c)**, which comes to the same thing. If  $\phi$  isn’t tautological, then  $\neg\phi$  is consistent. So, by Substitution Theorem 3, there is a substitution  $s$  such that  $s(\neg\phi)$  is tautological. Since the negation of  $s(\phi)$  is tautological,  $s(\phi)$  is contradictory. So  $\phi$  has a substitution instance that is inconsistent.

We could prove the second part of Substitution Theorem 4 the same way, but a quicker proof appeals to the first part of Substitution Theorem 4, thus:

$\Psi$  is contradictory  
 iff  $\neg\psi$  is tautological  
 iff every substitution instance of  $\neg\psi$  is tautological  
 [because **(a)** is equivalent to **(b)**]  
 iff every substitution instance of  $\psi$  is contradictory  
 iff every substitution instance of  $\neg\psi$  is consistent  
 [because **(b)** is equivalent to **(c)**]  
 iff every substitution instance of  $\psi$  is invalid. X

Let  $\phi$  be a sentence whose only connectives are “ $\wedge$ ,” “ $\vee$ ,” and “ $\neg$ .” Let  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  be the sentence obtained from  $\phi$  by exchanging “ $\wedge$ ”s and “ $\vee$ ”s everywhere. Let  $d$  be the substitution that replaces each atomic sentence by its negation. It’s easy to convince ourselves, using de Morgan’s laws, that  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  is logically equivalent to the negation of  $d(\phi)$ . Hence:

**Substitution Theorem 5.** Let  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  be sentences whose only connectives are “ $\wedge$ ,” “ $\vee$ ,” and “ $\neg$ .” Then if  $\phi$  implies  $\psi$ ,  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$  implies  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$ . If  $\phi$  is logically equivalent to  $\psi$ ,  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  is logically equivalent to  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$ .

**Proof:** If  $\phi$  implies  $\psi$  then, by Substitution Theorem 2,  $d(\phi)$  implies  $d(\psi)$ . So the negation of  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  implies the negation of  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$ . So there is no N.T.A. under which the negation of  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  is true and the negation of  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$  is false. Hence there is no N.T.A. under which  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$  is true and  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  is false; that is,  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$  implies  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$ .

The second part of Substitution Theorem 5 appeals to the first. If  $\phi$  is logically equivalent to  $\psi$ , then  $\phi$  implies  $\psi$  and  $\psi$  implies  $\phi$ . It follows by the first part of the theorem that  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$  implies  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  and  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  implies  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$ . Consequently,  $\phi^{\text{Dual}}$  is logically equivalent to  $\psi^{\text{Dual}}$ . X